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<H1 id="firstHeading" class="firstHeading" lang="en">Sino-Indian War</H1>			<DIV id="bodyContent" class="mw-body-content">
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<TH class="summary" colspan="2" style="background-color:#B0C4DE;text-align:center;vertical-align:middle;font-size:110%;">Sino-Indian War</TH>
</TR>
<TR>
<TD colspan="2" style="text-align:center;border-bottom:1px solid #aaa;line-height:1.5em;"><A href="/wiki/File:China_India_Locator_(1959).svg" class="image"><IMG alt="China India Locator (1959).svg" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6a/China_India_Locator_%281959%29.svg/250px-China_India_Locator_%281959%29.svg.png" width="250" height="127" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6a/China_India_Locator_%281959%29.svg/375px-China_India_Locator_%281959%29.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6a/China_India_Locator_%281959%29.svg/500px-China_India_Locator_%281959%29.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="940" data-file-height="477" /></A><BR />
The Sino-Indian War was fought between India and China</TD>
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<TD colspan="2">
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<TH style="padding-right:1em">Date</TH>
<TD>20 October<SUP id="cite_ref-webster_chronological_dates_1-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-webster_chronological_dates-1">[1]</A></SUP> – 21 November 1962<BR />
(1 month and 1 day)</TD>
</TR>
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<TH style="padding-right:1em">Location</TH>
<TD><SPAN class="location"><A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A> and <A href="/wiki/North-East_Frontier_Agency" title="North-East Frontier Agency">North-East Frontier Agency</A></SPAN></TD>
</TR>
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<TH style="padding-right:1em">Result</TH>
<TD>Chinese victory<SUP id="cite_ref-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-2">[2]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-3">[3]</A></SUP></TD>
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</TD>
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<TH colspan="2" style="background-color:#B0C4DE;text-align:center;vertical-align:middle;font-size:110%;">Belligerents</TH>
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<TR>
<TD style="width:50%;border-right:1px dotted #aaa;"><SPAN class="flagicon"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg/23px-Flag_of_India.svg.png" width="23" height="15" class="thumbborder" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg/35px-Flag_of_India.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg/45px-Flag_of_India.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="1350" data-file-height="900" /> </SPAN><A href="/wiki/India" title="India">India</A></TD>
<TD style="width:50%;padding-left:0.25em"><SPAN class="flagicon"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg.png" width="23" height="15" class="thumbborder" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg/35px-Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg/45px-Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="900" data-file-height="600" /> </SPAN><A href="/wiki/China" title="China">China</A></TD>
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<TH colspan="2" style="background-color:#B0C4DE;text-align:center;vertical-align:middle;font-size:110%;">Commanders and leaders</TH>
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<TR>
<TD style="width:50%;border-right:1px dotted #aaa;"><A href="/wiki/Brij_Mohan_Kaul" title="Brij Mohan Kaul">Brij Mohan Kaul</A><BR />
(Chief of General Staff of the Indian Army)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/Sarvepalli_Radhakrishnan" title="Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan">Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan</A><BR />
(President of India)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru" title="Jawaharlal Nehru">Jawaharlal Nehru</A><BR />
(Prime Minister of India)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/V._K._Krishna_Menon" title="V. K. Krishna Menon">V. K. Krishna Menon</A><BR />
(Defence Minister of India)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/Pran_Nath_Thapar" title="Pran Nath Thapar">General Pran Nath Thapar</A><BR />
(Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army)</TD>
<TD style="width:50%;padding-left:0.25em"><A href="/wiki/Luo_Ruiqing" title="Luo Ruiqing">Luo Ruiqing</A> (chief of PLA staff)<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP><BR />
<A href="/wiki/Zhang_Guohua" title="Zhang Guohua">Zhang Guohua</A> (field commander)<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP><BR />
<A href="/wiki/Mao_Zedong" title="Mao Zedong">Mao Zedong</A><BR />
(Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/Liu_Bocheng" title="Liu Bocheng">Liu Bocheng</A><BR />
(Marshal of PLA)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/Lin_Biao" title="Lin Biao">Lin Biao</A><BR />
(Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China)<BR />
<A href="/wiki/Zhou_Enlai" title="Zhou Enlai">Zhou Enlai</A><BR />
(Premier of the People's Republic of China)</TD>
</TR>
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<TH colspan="2" style="background-color:#B0C4DE;text-align:center;vertical-align:middle;font-size:110%;">Strength</TH>
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<TD style="width:50%;border-right:1px dotted #aaa;"><SPAN class="flagicon"><A href="/wiki/India" title="India"><IMG alt="India" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg/23px-Flag_of_India.svg.png" width="23" height="15" class="thumbborder" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg/35px-Flag_of_India.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg/45px-Flag_of_India.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="1350" data-file-height="900" /></A></SPAN> 10,000–12,000</TD>
<TD style="width:50%;padding-left:0.25em"><SPAN class="flagicon"><A href="/wiki/China" title="China"><IMG alt="China" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg.png" width="23" height="15" class="thumbborder" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg/35px-Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg/45px-Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="900" data-file-height="600" /></A></SPAN> 80,000<SUP id="cite_ref-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-5">[5]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-6">[6]</A></SUP></TD>
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<TH colspan="2" style="background-color:#B0C4DE;text-align:center;vertical-align:middle;font-size:110%;">Casualties and losses</TH>
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<TR>
<TD style="width:50%;border-right:1px dotted #aaa;">1,383—3,250 killed<BR />
548—1,047 wounded<BR />
1,696 missing<BR />
3,968 captured<SUP id="cite_ref-Strategic_Studies_Institute_7-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Strategic_Studies_Institute-7">[7]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Kargil_from_Surprise_to_Victory_8-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Kargil_from_Surprise_to_Victory-8">[8]</A></SUP></TD>
<TD style="width:50%;padding-left:0.25em">722 killed<BR />
1,697 wounded<SUP id="cite_ref-Strategic_Studies_Institute_7-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Strategic_Studies_Institute-7">[7]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-9">[9]</A></SUP></TD>
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<P>The <B>Sino-Indian War</B> (<A href="/wiki/Hindi_language" class="mw-redirect" title="Hindi language">Hindi</A>: <SPAN lang="hi" xml:lang="hi">भारत-चीन युद्ध Bhārat-Chīn Yuddh</SPAN>), also known as the <B>Sino-Indian Border Conflict</B> (<A href="/wiki/Simplified_Chinese_characters" title="Simplified Chinese characters">simplified Chinese</A>: <SPAN lang="zh-Hans" xml:lang="zh-Hans"><A href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%B0" class="extiw" title="wikt:中印">中印</A><A href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E8%BE%B9%E5%A2%83" class="extiw" title="wikt:边境">边境</A><A href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E6%88%98%E4%BA%89" class="extiw" title="wikt:战争">战争</A></SPAN>; <A href="/wiki/Traditional_Chinese_characters" title="Traditional Chinese characters">traditional Chinese</A>: <SPAN lang="zh-Hant" xml:lang="zh-Hant"><A href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%B0" class="extiw" title="wikt:中印">中印</A><A href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E9%82%8A%E5%A2%83" class="extiw" title="wikt:邊境">邊境</A><A href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD" class="extiw" title="wikt:戰爭">戰爭</A></SPAN>; <A href="/wiki/Pinyin" title="Pinyin">pinyin</A>: <I><SPAN lang="zh-Latn-pinyin" xml:lang="zh-Latn-pinyin">Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng</SPAN></I>), was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the <A href="/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising" title="1959 Tibetan uprising">1959 Tibetan uprising</A>, when India had granted asylum to the <A href="/wiki/14th_Dalai_Lama" title="14th Dalai Lama">Dalai Lama</A>. India initiated a <A href="/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_Sino-Indian_War#Forward_policy" title="Events leading to the Sino-Indian War">Forward Policy</A> in which it placed outposts along the border, including several north of the <A href="/wiki/McMahon_Line" title="McMahon Line">McMahon Line</A>, the eastern portion of a <A href="/wiki/Line_of_Actual_Control" title="Line of Actual Control">Line of Actual Control</A> proclaimed by Chinese Premier <A href="/wiki/Zhou_Enlai" title="Zhou Enlai">Zhou Enlai</A> in 1959.</P>
<P>Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3,225-kilometre-long Himalayan border,<SUP id="cite_ref-Indo-China_War_of_1962_10-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Indo-China_War_of_1962-10">[10]</A></SUP> the Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in <A href="/wiki/Ladakh" title="Ladakh">Ladakh</A> and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962, coinciding with the <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A>. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theatres, capturing <A href="/wiki/Rezang_la" class="mw-redirect" title="Rezang la">Rezang la</A> in <A href="/wiki/Chushul" title="Chushul">Chushul</A> in the western theatre, as well as <A href="/wiki/Tawang" title="Tawang">Tawang</A> in the eastern theatre. The war ended when China declared a <A href="/wiki/Ceasefire" title="Ceasefire">ceasefire</A> on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously announced its withdrawal to its claimed 'line of actual control'.</P>
<P>The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh <A href="/wiki/Mountain_warfare" title="Mountain warfare">mountain conditions</A> under which much of the battle took place, entailing large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (14,000 feet).<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment of the navy or air force by either the Chinese or Indian side.</P>
<P>It is noteworthy that the buildup and offensive from China occurred concurrently with the 13-day <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A> (16–28 October 1962) that saw both the United States and the Soviet Union confronting each other, and India did not receive assistance from either of these world powers until the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved.</P>
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<DIV id="toc" class="toc">
<DIV class="toctitle" lang="en" dir="ltr" xml:lang="en">
<H2>Contents</H2>
<SPAN class="toctoggle"> [<A role="button" tabindex="0" class="togglelink">hide</A>] </SPAN></DIV>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1"><A href="#Location"><SPAN class="tocnumber">1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Location</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-2"><A href="#Background"><SPAN class="tocnumber">2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Background</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-3"><A href="#Aksai_Chin"><SPAN class="tocnumber">2.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Aksai Chin</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-4"><A href="#The_McMahon_Line"><SPAN class="tocnumber">2.2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">The McMahon Line</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-5"><A href="#Events_leading_up_to_war"><SPAN class="tocnumber">3</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Events leading up to war</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-6"><A href="#Tibet_and_the_border_dispute"><SPAN class="tocnumber">3.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Tibet and the border dispute</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-7"><A href="#1960_meetings_to_resolve_the_boundary_question"><SPAN class="tocnumber">3.2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">1960 meetings to resolve the boundary question</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-8"><A href="#The_Forward_Policy"><SPAN class="tocnumber">3.3</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">The Forward Policy</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-9"><A href="#Early_incidents"><SPAN class="tocnumber">3.4</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Early incidents</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-10"><A href="#Confrontation_at_Thag_La"><SPAN class="tocnumber">4</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Confrontation at Thag La</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-11"><A href="#Chinese_and_Indian_preparations"><SPAN class="tocnumber">5</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Chinese and Indian preparations</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-12"><A href="#Motives"><SPAN class="tocnumber">5.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Motives</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-13"><A href="#Military_planning"><SPAN class="tocnumber">5.2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Military planning</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-14"><A href="#Chinese_offensive"><SPAN class="tocnumber">6</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Chinese offensive</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-15"><A href="#Eastern_theatre"><SPAN class="tocnumber">6.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Eastern theatre</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-16"><A href="#Western_theatre"><SPAN class="tocnumber">6.2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Western theatre</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-17"><A href="#Lull_in_the_fighting"><SPAN class="tocnumber">7</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Lull in the fighting</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-18"><A href="#Continuation_of_war"><SPAN class="tocnumber">8</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Continuation of war</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-19"><A href="#Eastern_theatre_2"><SPAN class="tocnumber">8.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Eastern theatre</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-20"><A href="#Western_theatre_2"><SPAN class="tocnumber">8.2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Western theatre</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-21"><A href="#Ceasefire"><SPAN class="tocnumber">9</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Ceasefire</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-22"><A href="#World_opinion"><SPAN class="tocnumber">10</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">World opinion</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-23"><A href="#Involvement_of_other_nations"><SPAN class="tocnumber">11</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Involvement of other nations</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-24"><A href="#Aftermath"><SPAN class="tocnumber">12</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Aftermath</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-25"><A href="#China"><SPAN class="tocnumber">12.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">China</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-26"><A href="#India"><SPAN class="tocnumber">12.2</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">India</SPAN></A>
<UL>
<LI class="toclevel-3 tocsection-27"><A href="#Internment_and_deportation_of_Chinese_Indians"><SPAN class="tocnumber">12.2.1</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Internment and deportation of Chinese Indians</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-28"><A href="#Later_conflicts"><SPAN class="tocnumber">13</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Later conflicts</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-29"><A href="#Diplomatic_process"><SPAN class="tocnumber">14</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Diplomatic process</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-30"><A href="#In_popular_culture"><SPAN class="tocnumber">15</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">In popular culture</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-31"><A href="#See_also"><SPAN class="tocnumber">16</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">See also</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-32"><A href="#Notes"><SPAN class="tocnumber">17</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Notes</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-33"><A href="#References"><SPAN class="tocnumber">18</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">References</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-34"><A href="#Bibliography"><SPAN class="tocnumber">19</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Bibliography</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-35"><A href="#Further_reading"><SPAN class="tocnumber">20</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">Further reading</SPAN></A></LI>
<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-36"><A href="#External_links"><SPAN class="tocnumber">21</SPAN> <SPAN class="toctext">External links</SPAN></A></LI>
</UL>
</DIV>
<P></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Location">Location</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=1" title="Edit section: Location">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
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Pre-Simla British map published in 1909 shows the so-called "Outer Line" as India's northern boundary</DIV>
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Postal Map of China published by the Government of China in 1917</DIV>
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<P>China and India shared a long border, sectioned into three stretches by <A href="/wiki/Nepal" title="Nepal">Nepal</A>, <A href="/wiki/Sikkim" title="Sikkim">Sikkim</A> (then an Indian <A href="/wiki/Protectorate" title="Protectorate">protectorate</A>), and <A href="/wiki/Bhutan" title="Bhutan">Bhutan</A>, which follows the <A href="/wiki/Himalayas" title="Himalayas">Himalayas</A> between <A href="/wiki/Burma" class="mw-redirect" title="Burma">Burma</A> and what was then <A href="/wiki/West_Pakistan" title="West Pakistan">West Pakistan</A>. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the <A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A> region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of <A href="/wiki/Xinjiang" title="Xinjiang">Xinjiang</A> and <A href="/wiki/Tibet" title="Tibet">Tibet</A> (which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of <A href="/wiki/Arunachal_Pradesh" title="Arunachal Pradesh">Arunachal Pradesh</A> (formerly the <A href="/wiki/North_East_Frontier_Agency" class="mw-redirect" title="North East Frontier Agency">North East Frontier Agency</A>). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.</P>
<P>Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres above sea level, and <A href="/wiki/Arunachal_Pradesh" title="Arunachal Pradesh">Arunachal Pradesh</A> is mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7,000 metres. The Chinese Army had possession of one of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the <A href="/wiki/Italian_Campaign_(World_War_I)" class="mw-redirect" title="Italian Campaign (World War I)">Italian Campaign</A> of <A href="/wiki/World_War_I" title="World War I">World War I</A>) harsh conditions have caused more casualties than have enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Background">Background</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=2" title="Edit section: Background">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<DIV role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main articles: <A href="/wiki/China%E2%80%93India_relations" title="China–India relations">China–India relations</A> and <A href="/wiki/Sino-Indian_border_dispute" title="Sino-Indian border dispute">Sino-Indian border dispute</A></DIV>
<P>The cause of the war was a dispute over the <A href="/wiki/Sovereignty" title="Sovereignty">sovereignty</A> of the widely separated <A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A> and <A href="/wiki/Arunachal_Pradesh" title="Arunachal Pradesh">Arunachal Pradesh</A> border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to <A href="/wiki/Kashmir" title="Kashmir">Kashmir</A> and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict.</P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Aksai_Chin">Aksai Chin</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=3" title="Edit section: Aksai Chin">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<DIV role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A></DIV>
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Traditional borders of Jammu and Kashmir (CIA map). The northern boundary is along the Karakash valley. Aksai Chin is the shaded region in the east.</DIV>
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1873 map of trade routes between Ladakh and Chinese Turkestan. The international border between the British Indian Empire (including the Kashmir region) and Chinese Turkestan is shown in two-toned purple and pink.</DIV>
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<P>The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the conquest of <A href="/wiki/Ladakh" title="Ladakh">Ladakh</A> by the armies of Raja <A href="/wiki/Gulab_Singh" title="Gulab Singh">Gulab Singh</A> (Dogra) under the suzerainty of the <A href="/wiki/Sikh_Empire" title="Sikh Empire">Sikh Empire</A>. Following an <A href="/wiki/Sino-Sikh_War" title="Sino-Sikh War">unsuccessful campaign</A> into Tibet, Gulab Singh and the Tibetans signed a <A href="/wiki/Treaty_of_Chushul" class="mw-redirect" title="Treaty of Chushul">treaty in 1842</A> agreeing to stick to the "old, established frontiers", which were however left unspecified.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197024_13-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197024-13">[13]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Rubin_14-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Rubin-14">[14]</A></SUP> The <A href="/wiki/First_Anglo-Sikh_War" title="First Anglo-Sikh War">British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846</A> resulted in the transfer of the <A href="/wiki/Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)" title="Jammu and Kashmir (princely state)">Jammu and Kashmir</A> region including Ladakh to the British, who then installed Gulab Singh as the Maharaja under their suzerainty. British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border, who did not show any interest.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197025–26_15-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197025–26-15">[15]</A></SUP> The British boundary commissioners fixed the southern end of the boundary at <A href="/wiki/Pangong_Lake" class="mw-redirect" title="Pangong Lake">Pangong Lake</A>, but regarded the area north of it till the <A href="/wiki/Karakoram_Pass" title="Karakoram Pass">Karakoram Pass</A> as <I>terra incognita</I>.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197026_16-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197026-16">[16]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The Maharaja of Kashmir and his officials were, however, keenly aware of the trade routes from Ladakh. Starting from <A href="/wiki/Leh" title="Leh">Leh</A>, there were two main routes into Central Asia: one passed through the <A href="/wiki/Karakoram_Pass" title="Karakoram Pass">Karakoram Pass</A> to <A href="/wiki/Shahidulla" class="mw-redirect" title="Shahidulla">Shahidulla</A> at the foot of the <A href="/wiki/Kunlun_Mountains" title="Kunlun Mountains">Kunlun Mountains</A> and went on to <A href="/wiki/Yarkant_County" title="Yarkant County">Yarkand</A> through Kilian and Sanju passes; the other went east via the <A href="/w/index.php?title=Chang_Chenmo_Valley&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Chang Chenmo Valley (page does not exist)">Chang Chenmo Valley</A>, passed the <A href="/w/index.php?title=Lingzi_Tang_Plains&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Lingzi Tang Plains (page does not exist)">Lingzi Tang Plains</A> in the Aksai Chin region, and followed the course of the <A href="/wiki/Karakash_River" title="Karakash River">Karakash River</A> to join the first route at Shahidulla.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWarikoo,_India's_gateway_to_Central_Asia20091–2_17-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEWarikoo,_India's_gateway_to_Central_Asia20091–2-17">[17]</A></SUP> The Maharaja regarded Shahidulla as his northern outpost, in effect treating the Kunlun mountains as the boundary of his domains. His British suzerains were however sceptical of such an extended boundary because Shahidulla was 79 miles away from the Karakoram pass and the intervening area was uninhabited. Nevertheless, the Maharaja was allowed to treat Shahidulla as his outpost for more than 20 years.<SUP id="cite_ref-18" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-18">[18]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-19" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-19">[a]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-20" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-20">[b]</A></SUP></P>
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<A href="/wiki/W._H._Johnson" class="mw-redirect" title="W. H. Johnson">W. H. Johnson's</A> route to <A href="/wiki/Khotan" class="mw-redirect" title="Khotan">Khotan</A> and back. The bold line shows Johnson's proposed boundary.</DIV>
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<DIV class="thumbinner" style="width:222px;"><A href="/wiki/File:Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg" class="image"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9f/Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg/220px-Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg" width="220" height="269" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9f/Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg/330px-Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9f/Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg/440px-Hung_Ta-Chen%27s_Map.jpg 2x" data-file-width="545" data-file-height="666" /></A>
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The map given by Hung Ta-chen to the British consul at Kashgar in 1893. The boundary, marked with a thin dot-dashed line, matches the 1873 British map.</DIV>
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<P>Chinese Turkestan regarded the high mountains of the Kunlun range with the Kilian and Sanju passes as its southern boundary. Thus the Maharaja's claim was uncontested.<SUP id="cite_ref-21" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-21">[19]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-22" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-22">[c]</A></SUP> After the 1862 <A href="/wiki/Dungan_Revolt_(1862%E2%80%9377)" title="Dungan Revolt (1862–77)">Dungan Revolt</A>, which saw the expulsion of the Chinese from Turkestan, the Maharaja of Kashmir constructed a small fort at Shahidulla in 1864. The fort was most likely supplied from <A href="/wiki/Khotan" class="mw-redirect" title="Khotan">Khotan</A>, whose ruler was now independent and on friendly terms with Kashmir. When the Khotanese ruler was deposed by the Kashgaria strongman <A href="/wiki/Yakub_Beg" class="mw-redirect" title="Yakub Beg">Yakub Beg</A>, the Maharaja was forced to abandon his post in 1867. It was then occupied by Yakub Beg's forces until the end of the Dungan Revolt.<SUP id="cite_ref-23" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-23">[20]</A></SUP> In the intervening period, <A href="/wiki/W._H._Johnson" class="mw-redirect" title="W. H. Johnson">W. H. Johnson</A> of <A href="/wiki/Survey_of_India" title="Survey of India">Survey of India</A> was commissioned to survey the Aksai Chin region. While in the course of his work, he was "invited" by the Khotanese ruler to visit his capital. After returning, Johnson declared that Khotan's border was at Brinjga, in the Kunlun mountains, and the entire the <A href="/wiki/Karakash_River" title="Karakash River">Karakash Valley</A> was within the territory of Kashmir. The boundary of Kashmir that he drew, stretching from Shahidullah to the <A href="/wiki/Lanak_La" title="Lanak La">eastern edge of Chang Chenmo Valley</A> along the Kunlun mountains, is referred to as the "Johnson Line" (or "Ardagh-Johnson Line").<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963116_24-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963116-24">[21]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-28" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-28">[d]</A></SUP></P>
<P>After the Chinese reconquered Turkestan in 1878, renaming it <A href="/wiki/Xinjiang" title="Xinjiang">Xinjiang</A>, they again reverted to their traditional boundary. However, by now, the Russian Empire was entrenched in Central Asia, and the British were anxious to avoid a common border with the Russians. After creating the <A href="/wiki/Wakhan_corridor" class="mw-redirect" title="Wakhan corridor">Wakhan corridor</A> as the buffer in the northwest of Kashmir, they wanted the Chinese to fill out the "no man's land" between the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges. Under British (and possibly Russian) encouragement, the Chinese occupied the area up to the <A href="/wiki/Yarkand_River" title="Yarkand River">Yarkand River</A> valley (called <A href="/wiki/Raskam" class="mw-redirect" title="Raskam">Raskam</A>), including Shahidulla, by 1890.<SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201065–66_29-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201065–66-29">[25]</A></SUP> They also erected a boundary pillar at the Karakoram pass by about 1892.<SUP id="cite_ref-30" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-30">[26]</A></SUP> However, these efforts appear half-hearted. A map provided by Hung Ta-chen, a senior Chinese official at <A href="/wiki/St._Petersburgh" class="mw-redirect" title="St. Petersburgh">St. Petersburgh</A>, in 1893 showed the boundary of Xinjiang up to Raskam. In the east, it was similar to the Johnson line, placing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory.<SUP id="cite_ref-31" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-31">[27]</A></SUP></P>
<P>By 1892, the British settled on the policy that their preferred boundary for Kashmir was the "Indus watershed", i.e., the water-parting from which waters flow into the Indus river system on one side and into the Tarim basin on the other. In the north, this water-parting was along the Karakoram range. In the east, it was more complicated because the <A href="/wiki/Chip_Chap_River" title="Chip Chap River">Chip Chap River</A>, <A href="/wiki/Galwan_River" title="Galwan River">Galwan River</A> and the <A href="/w/index.php?title=Chang_Chenmo_River&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Chang Chenmo River (page does not exist)">Chang Chenmo River</A> flow into the Indus whereas the <A href="/wiki/Karakash_River" title="Karakash River">Karakash River</A> flows into the Tarim basin.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201052–53,&nbsp;60,&nbsp;69,&nbsp;72_32-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201052–53,&nbsp;60,&nbsp;69,&nbsp;72-32">[28]</A></SUP> A boundary alignment along this water-parting was defined by the Viceroy <A href="/wiki/Lord_Elgin" class="mw-redirect" title="Lord Elgin">Lord Elgin</A> and communicated to London. The British government in due course proposed it to China via its envoy Sir <A href="/wiki/Claude_MacDonald" class="mw-redirect" title="Claude MacDonald">Claude MacDonald</A> in 1899. This boundary, which came to be called the <A href="/wiki/Macartney%E2%80%93MacDonald_Line" title="Macartney–MacDonald Line">Macartney–MacDonald Line</A>, ceded to China the Aksai Chin plains in the northeast, and the <A href="/wiki/Trans-Karakoram_Tract" title="Trans-Karakoram Tract">Trans-Karakoram Tract</A> in the north. In return, the British wanted China to cede its 'shadowy suzerainty' on <A href="/wiki/Hunza_(princely_state)" title="Hunza (princely state)">Hunza</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010114-115_33-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010114-115-33">[29]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-35" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-35">[e]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In 1911 the <A href="/wiki/Xinhai_Revolution" title="Xinhai Revolution">Xinhai Revolution</A> resulted in power shifts in China, and by the end of <A href="/wiki/World_War_I" title="World War I">World War I</A>, the British officially used the Johnson Line. However they took no steps to establish outposts or assert actual control on the ground.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP> According to <A href="/wiki/Neville_Maxwell" title="Neville Maxwell">Neville Maxwell</A>, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation.<SUP id="cite_ref-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute_36-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute-36">[31]</A></SUP> From 1917 to 1933, the "Postal Atlas of China", published by the Government of China in Peking had shown the boundary in Aksai Chin as per the Johnson line, which runs along the <A href="/wiki/Kunlun_mountains" class="mw-redirect" title="Kunlun mountains">Kunlun mountains</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970_37-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970-37">[32]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-middlepath_38-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-middlepath-38">[33]</A></SUP> The "Peking University Atlas", published in 1925, also put the Aksai Chin in India.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963101_39-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963101-39">[34]</A></SUP> Upon <A href="/wiki/Indian_independence_movement" title="Indian independence movement">independence</A> in 1947, the government of India used the Johnson Line as the basis for its official boundary in the west, which included the Aksai Chin.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> On 1 July 1954, India's first Prime Minister <A href="/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru" title="Jawaharlal Nehru">Jawaharlal Nehru</A> definitively stated the Indian position,<SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani_26-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani-26">[23]</A></SUP> claiming that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> According to <A href="/wiki/George_N._Patterson" class="mw-redirect" title="George N. Patterson">George N. Patterson</A>, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".<SUP id="cite_ref-Patterson_41-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Patterson-41">[36]</A></SUP><SUP class="reference" style="white-space:nowrap;">:<SPAN>275</SPAN></SUP></P>
<P>In 1956–57, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting <A href="/wiki/Xinjiang" title="Xinjiang">Xinjiang</A> and <A href="/wiki/Tibet" title="Tibet">Tibet</A>, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the <A href="/wiki/Karakoram" title="Karakoram">Karakoram mountains</A>, was much more difficult.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> The road came on Chinese maps published in 1958.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="The_McMahon_Line">The McMahon Line</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=4" title="Edit section: The McMahon Line">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
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<DIV class="thumbinner" style="width:222px;"><A href="/wiki/File:China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg" class="image"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8b/China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg/220px-China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg" width="220" height="273" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8b/China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg/330px-China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8b/China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg/440px-China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1019" data-file-height="1265" /></A>
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The McMahon Line is the red line marking the northern boundary of the disputed area.</DIV>
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<DIV role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main articles: <A href="/wiki/McMahon_Line" title="McMahon Line">McMahon Line</A> and <A href="/wiki/Simla_Accord_(1914)" title="Simla Accord (1914)">Simla Accord (1914)</A></DIV>
<P>In 1826, British India gained a common border with China after the British wrested control of <A href="/wiki/Manipur" title="Manipur">Manipur</A> and <A href="/wiki/Assam" title="Assam">Assam</A> from the <A href="/wiki/Konbaung_dynasty" title="Konbaung dynasty">Burmese</A>, following the <A href="/wiki/First_Anglo-Burmese_War" title="First Anglo-Burmese War">First Anglo-Burmese War</A> of 1824–1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, <A href="/wiki/North-East_Frontier_Agency" title="North-East Frontier Agency">NEFA</A> official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India, stating that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border."<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> A 1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River, following the Himalayas foothill alignment.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in <A href="/wiki/Shimla" title="Shimla">Simla</A> regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, <A href="/wiki/Beijing" title="Beijing">Beijing</A> later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet, and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, <A href="/wiki/Henry_McMahon_(diplomat)" class="mw-redirect" title="Henry McMahon (diplomat)">Henry McMahon</A>, who had drawn up the proposal, decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the <A href="/wiki/Himalayas" title="Himalayas">Himalayas</A>, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian.<SUP id="cite_ref-VKSingh_42-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-VKSingh-42">[37]</A></SUP> However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the <A href="/wiki/Indian_subcontinent" title="Indian subcontinent">Indian subcontinent</A>, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India,<SUP id="cite_ref-VKSingh_42-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-VKSingh-42">[37]</A></SUP> while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.<SUP id="cite_ref-43" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-43">[38]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Months after the <A href="/wiki/Simla_Accord_(1913)" class="mw-redirect" title="Simla Accord (1913)">Simla agreement</A>, China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line. T. O'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the <A href="/wiki/North-East_Frontier_Agency" title="North-East Frontier Agency">North East Frontier</A>, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-8" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the <A href="/wiki/Anglo-Russian_Convention_of_1907" class="mw-redirect" title="Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907">Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907</A>, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government".<SUP id="cite_ref-Gupta_44-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Gupta-44">[39]</A></SUP> The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921.<SUP id="cite_ref-Free_45-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Free-45">[40]</A></SUP> It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.</P>
<P>China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of <A href="/wiki/Tawang" title="Tawang">Tawang</A>, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> However, up until <A href="/wiki/World_War_II" title="World War II">World War II</A>, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defence of India's eastern border.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In the 1950s, India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> Given India's historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-8" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Events_leading_up_to_war">Events leading up to war</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=5" title="Edit section: Events leading up to war">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<DIV role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <A href="/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_Sino-Indian_War" title="Events leading to the Sino-Indian War">Events leading to the Sino-Indian War</A></DIV>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Tibet_and_the_border_dispute">Tibet and the border dispute</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=6" title="Edit section: Tibet and the border dispute">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the <A href="/wiki/Partition_of_India" title="Partition of India">Partition of India</A> in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and <A href="/wiki/Pakistan" title="Pakistan">Pakistan</A>), and the establishment of the <A href="/wiki/People%27s_Republic_of_China" class="mw-redirect" title="People's Republic of China">People's Republic of China</A> (PRC) in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly created PRC.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP></P>
<P>At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, <A href="/wiki/Premier_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China" title="Premier of the People's Republic of China">Chinese Premier</A> <A href="/wiki/Zhou_Enlai" title="Zhou Enlai">Zhou Enlai</A> stated that he had no claims over Indian-controlled territory.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction and that the McCartney-MacDonald Line was the line China could accept.<SUP id="cite_ref-middlepath_38-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-middlepath-38">[33]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.<SUP id="cite_ref-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute_36-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute-36">[31]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In 1950, the Chinese <A href="/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army" title="People's Liberation Army">People's Liberation Army</A> <A href="/wiki/Invasion_of_Tibet_(1950%E2%80%931951)" class="mw-redirect" title="Invasion of Tibet (1950–1951)">took control of Tibet</A>, which all Chinese governments regarded as still part of China. Later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-10" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> and placing border posts in Aksai Chin.<SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP> India found out after the road was completed, protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.<SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister <A href="/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru" title="Jawaharlal Nehru">Jawaharlal Nehru</A> declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,<SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> and in 1951 and 1952, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated;<SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani_26-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani-26">[23]</A></SUP> in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.<SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani2_47-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani2-47">[42]</A></SUP> Chinese Premier <A href="/wiki/Zhou_Enlai" title="Zhou Enlai">Zhou Enlai</A>, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People's Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres (46,000 sq mi) of territory claimed by India as Chinese.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> <A href="/wiki/CIA" class="mw-redirect" title="CIA">CIA</A> documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored <A href="/wiki/Burma" class="mw-redirect" title="Burma">Burmese</A> premier <A href="/wiki/Ba_Swe" title="Ba Swe">Ba Swe</A> when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP> They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In 1954, China and India negotiated the <A href="/wiki/Five_Principles_of_Peaceful_Coexistence" title="Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence">Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</A>, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the slogan <I>Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai</I> (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was popular then. However, Nehru in 1958, had privately told <A href="/wiki/Gopalaswami_Parthasarathy_(diplomat)" title="Gopalaswami Parthasarathy (diplomat)">G. Parthasarathi</A>, the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at all and send all communications directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister <A href="/wiki/VK_Krishna_Menon" class="mw-redirect" title="VK Krishna Menon">VK Krishna Menon</A> since his communist background clouded his thinking about China.<SUP id="cite_ref-GP_49-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-GP-49">[44]</A></SUP> According to <A href="/wiki/Georgia_Institute_of_Technology" title="Georgia Institute of Technology">Georgia Tech</A> scholar <SPAN class="nowrap">John W Garver</SPAN>, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the <A href="/wiki/Tenzin_Gyatso,_14th_Dalai_Lama" class="mw-redirect" title="Tenzin Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama">14th Dalai Lama</A>, who fled <A href="/wiki/Lhasa_(prefecture-level_city)" title="Lhasa (prefecture-level city)">Lhasa</A> after a failed <A href="/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising" title="1959 Tibetan uprising">Tibetan uprising</A> against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, <A href="/wiki/Mao_Zedong" title="Mao Zedong">Mao Zedong</A>, was enraged and asked the <A href="/wiki/Xinhua_News_Agency" title="Xinhua News Agency">Xinhua News Agency</A> to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.<SUP class="noprint Inline-Template Template-Fact" style="white-space:nowrap;">[<I><A href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed"><SPAN title="This claim needs references to reliable sources. (April 2010)">citation needed</SPAN></A></I>]</SUP></P>
<P>Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the <A href="/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army" title="People's Liberation Army">People's Liberation Army</A> took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-11" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-8" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani2_47-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani2-47">[42]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani3_50-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani3-50">[45]</A></SUP> and two months later in Aksai Chin, a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.<SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 2 October, Soviet Premier <A href="/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchev" title="Nikita Khrushchev">Nikita Khrushchev</A> defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had <A href="/wiki/Expansionist" class="mw-redirect" title="Expansionist">expansionist</A> designs on China. The People's Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.<SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani_26-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani-26">[23]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-51" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-51">[46]</A></SUP></P>
<P>As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.<SUP id="cite_ref-VKSingh_42-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-VKSingh-42">[37]</A></SUP> In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-10" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate.<SUP class="noprint Inline-Template Template-Fact" style="white-space:nowrap;">[<I><A href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed" title="Wikipedia:Citation needed"><SPAN title="This claim needs references to reliable sources. (May 2011)">citation needed</SPAN></A></I>]</SUP> China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.</P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="1960_meetings_to_resolve_the_boundary_question">1960 meetings to resolve the boundary question</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=7" title="Edit section: 1960 meetings to resolve the boundary question">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>In 1960, based on an agreement between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, officials from India and China held discussions in order to settle the boundary dispute.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196391_52-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196391-52">[47]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-53" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-53">[48]</A></SUP> China and India disagreed on the major watershed that defined the boundary in the western sector.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196396_54-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196396-54">[49]</A></SUP> The Chinese statements with respect to their border claims often misrepresented the cited sources.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196399_55-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196399-55">[50]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="The_Forward_Policy">The Forward Policy</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=8" title="Edit section: The Forward Policy">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General <A href="/wiki/B.M._Kaul" class="mw-redirect" title="B.M. Kaul"><SPAN class="nowrap">B. M. Kaul</SPAN></A> as army Chief of General Staff,<SUP id="cite_ref-Maxwell_56-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Maxwell-56">[51]</A></SUP> but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war.<SUP id="cite_ref-Maxwell_56-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Maxwell-56">[51]</A></SUP><SUP class="noprint Inline-Template" style="white-space:nowrap;">[<I><A href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability" title="Wikipedia:Verifiability"><SPAN title="The material near this tag failed verification of its source citation(s). (September 2017)">not in citation given</SPAN></A></I>]</SUP> According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-12" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-13" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani3_50-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani3-50">[45]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Clark_57-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Clark-57">[52]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-58" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-58">[53]</A></SUP> There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line, to which India claimed sovereignty.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-14" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani_26-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani-26">[23]</A></SUP> China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been advancing. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-11" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> Indeed, at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with each force attempting to outmanoeuver the other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on <A href="/wiki/Taiwan" title="Taiwan">Taiwan</A>, but on 23 June the U.S. assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chang_59-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chang-59">[54]</A></SUP> China's heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet.<SUP id="cite_ref-Athale_60-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Athale-60">[55]</A></SUP> It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war, according to Anil Athale, author of the official Indian history.<SUP id="cite_ref-Athale_60-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Athale-60">[55]</A></SUP> The Chinese sent a large quantity of non-military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta.<SUP id="cite_ref-Athale_60-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Athale-60">[55]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Early_incidents">Early incidents</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=9" title="Edit section: Early incidents">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the <A href="/wiki/Indian_Air_Force" title="Indian Air Force">Indian Air Force</A> was told not to plan for <A href="/wiki/Close_air_support" title="Close air support">close air support</A>, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.<SUP id="cite_ref-Sukumaran_61-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Sukumaran-61">[56]</A></SUP> In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.<SUP id="cite_ref-Sukumaran_61-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Sukumaran-61">[56]</A></SUP></P>
<P>During June–July 1962, Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:</P>
<OL>
<LI>Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.</LI>
<LI>Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.</LI>
<LI>Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had deteriorated after <A href="/wiki/1961_Indian_annexation_of_Goa" class="mw-redirect" title="1961 Indian annexation of Goa">the Indian annexation of Goa</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-Patterson_41-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Patterson-41">[36]</A></SUP><SUP class="reference" style="white-space:nowrap;">:<SPAN>279</SPAN></SUP></LI>
</OL>
<P>On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP> On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-8" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defence, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-15" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Given his foreknowledge of the coming <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A>, <A href="/wiki/Mao_Zedong" title="Mao Zedong">Mao Zedong</A> was able to persuade <A href="/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchev" title="Nikita Khrushchev">Nikita Khrushchev</A> to reverse the Russian policy of backing India, at least temporarily.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> In mid-October, the Communist organ <I><A href="/wiki/Pravda" title="Pravda">Pravda</A></I> encouraged peace between India and China.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> When the Cuban Missile Crisis ended and Mao's rhetoric changed, however, Russia reversed course.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Confrontation_at_Thag_La">Confrontation at Thag La</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=10" title="Edit section: Confrontation at Thag La">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at <A href="/wiki/Dhola,_Tibet" title="Dhola, Tibet">Dhola</A>, on the southern slopes of the <A href="/w/index.php?title=Thag_La_Ridge&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Thag La Ridge (page does not exist)">Thag La Ridge</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-16" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges along which India interpreted the McMahon Line to run.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-12" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani2_47-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani2-47">[42]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Joshi_63-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Joshi-63">[58]</A></SUP> In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the top of Thag La.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-8" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-17" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given discretion to use force.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> On 11 September, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-10" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP></P>
<P>However, the operation to occupy Thag La was flawed in that Nehru's directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-18" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-13" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> In addition to this, each man had to carry 35 kilograms (77 lb) over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP> By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled both banks of the <A href="/wiki/Namka_Chu" title="Namka Chu">Namka Chu</A> River.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-19" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> On 20 September, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-20" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Some Indian troops, including <A href="/wiki/John_Dalvi" title="John Dalvi">Brigadier Dalvi</A> who commanded the forces at Thag La, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours".<SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani3_50-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani3-50">[45]</A></SUP> According to <A href="/wiki/Neville_Maxwell" title="Neville Maxwell">Neville Maxwell</A>, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-14" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 4 October, Kaul assigned some troops to secure regions south of the Thag La Ridge.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-21" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola post.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-11" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop an escalation into all-out war. Indian troops marching to Thag La had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions; two <A href="/wiki/Gurkha" title="Gurkha">Gurkha</A> soldiers died of <A href="/wiki/Pulmonary_edema" title="Pulmonary edema">pulmonary edema</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 10 October, an Indian <A href="/wiki/Punjab_(India)" class="mw-redirect" title="Punjab (India)">Punjabi</A> patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-22" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP> The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used <A href="/wiki/Mortar_fire" class="mw-redirect" title="Mortar fire">mortar fire</A>. However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-23" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the <A href="/wiki/Rajput" title="Rajput">Rajput</A> who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP> In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, and the Chinese 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honours, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-24" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October, it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-25" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thag La Ridge.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Chinese_and_Indian_preparations">Chinese and Indian preparations</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=11" title="Edit section: Chinese and Indian preparations">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Motives">Motives</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=12" title="Edit section: Motives">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in <A href="/wiki/Tibet" title="Tibet">Tibet</A>. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s. It was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be "substantially accurate".<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-10" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The CIA's recently<SUP class="noprint Inline-Template" style="white-space:nowrap;">[<I><A href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Dates_and_numbers#Chronological_items" title="Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers"><SPAN title="The time period mentioned near this tag is ambiguous. (July 2017)">when?</SPAN></A></I>]</SUP> declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration — their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground". In general terms, they tried to show the Indians once and for all that China would not acquiesce in a military "reoccupation" policy. Secondary reasons for the attack were to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing Indian weakness and<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP> to expose as traitorous Khrushchev's policy of supporting Nehru against a Communist country.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Another factor which might have affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-U.S.-India encirclement and isolation of China.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-11" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> India's relations with the <A href="/wiki/Soviet_Union" title="Soviet Union">Soviet Union</A> and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets (and Americans) were preoccupied by the <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A> and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-26" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> P. B. Sinha suggests that China waited until October to attack because the timing of the war was exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. Although American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola, and China's buildup between 10 and 20 October appeared to coincide exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began 20 October, the Chinese probably prepared for this before they could anticipate what would happen in Cuba.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-12" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> Another explanation is that the confrontation in the Taiwan Strait had eased by then.</P>
<P>Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived Indian aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalysing the Chinese reaction.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-12" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Neville Maxwell and <A href="/wiki/Allen_S._Whiting_(political_scientist)" class="mw-redirect" title="Allen S. Whiting (political scientist)">Allen Whiting</A> argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory that was legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-13" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in <A href="/wiki/Xiangqi" title="Xiangqi">Chinese chess</A>:</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE class="templatequote">
<P>Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the <A href="/wiki/Xiangqi#Board" title="Xiangqi">Chu Han boundary</A>. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that’s great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-14" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>India claims that the motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-27" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as it claimed that Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops. It also claimed that the Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line, though there was no evidence of such advance before the 1962 war. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so". No serious re-appraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-13" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> Nehru's confidence was probably justified given the difficulty for China to supply the area over the high altitude terrain over 5000 km from the more populated areas of China.</P>
<P>The Chinese leadership initially held a sympathetic view towards India as the latter had been ruled by British colonial masters for centuries. However, Nehru's forward policy convinced PRC leadership that the independent Indian leadership was a reincarnation of British imperialism. Mao Zedong stated: "Rather than being constantly accused of aggression, it's better to show the world what really happens when China indeed moves its muscles."</P>
<P>Chinese policy toward India, therefore, operated on two contradictory assumptions in the first half of 1961. On the one hand, the Chinese leaders continued to entertain a hope, although a shrinking one, that some opening for talks would appear. On the other hand, they read Indian statements and actions as clear signs that Nehru wanted to talk only about a Chinese withdrawal. Regarding the hope, they were willing to negotiate and tried to prod Nehru into a similar attitude. Regarding Indian intentions, they began to act politically and to build a rationale based on the assumption that Nehru already had become a lackey of imperialism; for this reason he opposed border talks.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Krishna Menon is reported to have said that when he arrived in Geneva on 6 June 1961 for an international conference in Laos, Chinese officials in Chen Yi's delegation indicated that Chen might be interested in discussing the border dispute with him. At several private meetings with Menon, Chen avoided any discussion of the dispute and Menon surmised that the Chinese wanted him to broach the matter first. He did not, as he was under instructions from Nehru to avoid taking the initiative, leaving the Chinese with the impression that Nehru was unwilling to show any flexibility.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In September, the Chinese took a step toward criticising Nehru openly in their commentary. After citing Indonesian and Burmese press criticism of Nehru by name, the Chinese critiqued his moderate remarks on colonialism (People's Daily Editorial, 9 September): "Somebody at the Non-Aligned Nations Conference advanced the argument that the era of classical colonialism is gone and dead...contrary to facts." This was a distortion of Nehru's remarks but appeared close enough to be credible. On the same day, Chen Yi referred to Nehru by implication at the Bulgarian embassy reception: "Those who attempted to deny history, ignore reality, and distort the truth and who attempted to divert the Conference from its important object have failed to gain support and were isolated." On 10 September, they dropped all circumlocutions and criticised him by name in a China Youth article and NCNA report—the first time in almost two years that they had commented extensively on the Prime Minister.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:ToI-48">[43]</A></SUP></P>
<P>By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to believe that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-15" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-28" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into <A href="/wiki/Goa" title="Goa">Goa</A>, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after <A href="/wiki/Portugal" title="Portugal">Portugal</A> refused to surrender the <A href="/wiki/Exclave" class="mw-redirect" title="Exclave">exclave</A> <A href="/wiki/Colony" title="Colony">colony</A> to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India's expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India's Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it, India will have to repeat <A href="/wiki/Invasion_of_Goa" class="mw-redirect" title="Invasion of Goa">what it did in Goa</A>. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces",<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-29" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end [Chinese] aggression on Indian soil just as it ended Portuguese aggression in Goa".<SUP id="cite_ref-Patterson_41-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Patterson-41">[36]</A></SUP> By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as <A href="/wiki/Delhi" title="Delhi">Delhi</A> increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines.<SUP id="cite_ref-Patterson_41-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Patterson-41">[36]</A></SUP> Foreign Minister <A href="/wiki/Chen_Yi_(communist)" class="mw-redirect" title="Chen Yi (communist)">Marshal Chen Yi</A> commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death."<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-16" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-17" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's <A href="/wiki/PLA_National_Defense_University" class="mw-redirect" title="PLA National Defense University">National Defense University</A>, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-18" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> On 22 September 1962, the <I><A href="/wiki/People%27s_Daily" title="People's Daily">People's Daily</A></I> published an article which claimed that "the Chinese people were burning with 'great indignation' over the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi could not 'now say that warning was not served in advance'."<SUP id="cite_ref-Peoples_Daily_65-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Peoples_Daily-65">[60]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-foia_cia_polo09_66-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-foia_cia_polo09-66">[61]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Military_planning">Military planning</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=13" title="Edit section: Military planning">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict.<SUP id="cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Swaminathan-67">[62]</A></SUP> In August 1962, Brigadier D. K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.<SUP id="cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Swaminathan-67">[62]</A></SUP> Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thag La, Maj. General J. S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away."<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-19" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-14" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-30" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Swaminathan-67">[62]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India's estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:DNA_68-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:DNA-68">[63]</A></SUP> It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat of a counter-attack from China.<SUP id="cite_ref-CIA:DNA_68-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-CIA:DNA-68">[63]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. <A href="/wiki/Lin_Biao" title="Lin Biao">Lin Biao</A> reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on 10 October (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-20" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-21" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal, followed by a return to the negotiating table.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-22" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP> India led the <A href="/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement" title="Non-Aligned Movement">Non-Aligned Movement</A>, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military, would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-23" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>China also reportedly bought significant amount of Indian Rupee currency notes from Hong Kong, supposedly to distribute amongst its soldiers in preparation for the war.<SUP id="cite_ref-Salon_69-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Salon-69">[64]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the <A href="/wiki/Chengdu_Military_Region" title="Chengdu Military Region">Chengdu</A> and <A href="/wiki/Lanzhou_Military_Region" title="Lanzhou Military Region">Lanzhou</A> military regions.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-24" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 12 October, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to "clear Indian territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders" and personally met with Kaul, issuing instructions to him.</P>
<P>On 14 October, an editorial on <I>People's Daily</I> issued China's final warning to India: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale.  ... It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory ... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict ... At this critical moment ... we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble."<SUP id="cite_ref-foia_cia_polo09_66-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-foia_cia_polo09-66">[61]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Marshal <A href="/wiki/Liu_Bocheng" title="Liu Bocheng">Liu Bocheng</A> headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on <A href="/wiki/Force_concentration" title="Force concentration">force concentration</A> to achieve decisive victory. On 16 October, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self-defensive counter-attack", scheduled for 20 October.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-25" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Chinese_offensive">Chinese offensive</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=14" title="Edit section: Chinese offensive">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>On 20 October 1962, the Chinese <A href="/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army" title="People's Liberation Army">People's Liberation Army</A> launched two attacks, 1000 <A href="/wiki/Kilometre" title="Kilometre">kilometres</A> apart. In the western theatre, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the <A href="/wiki/Chip_Chap_River" title="Chip Chap River">Chip Chap valley</A> in <A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A> while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the <A href="/wiki/Namka_Chu" title="Namka Chu">Namka Chu</A> river. Some skirmishes also took place at the <A href="/wiki/Nathula" class="mw-redirect" title="Nathula">Nathula Pass</A>, which is in the Indian <A href="/wiki/State_(administrative_division)" class="mw-redirect" title="State (administrative division)">state</A> of <A href="/wiki/Sikkim" title="Sikkim">Sikkim</A> (an Indian <A href="/wiki/Protectorate" title="Protectorate">protectorate</A> at that time). <A href="/wiki/Gurkha" title="Gurkha">Gurkha rifles</A> travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three <A href="/wiki/Regiment" title="Regiment">regiments</A> of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-31" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Eastern_theatre">Eastern theatre</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=15" title="Edit section: Eastern theatre">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP> The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP> The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-32" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> However, the PLA bypassed the defenders by crossing the shallow October river instead. They formed up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river under cover of darkness, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of <A href="/wiki/Rajput" title="Rajput">Rajputs</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-8" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP></P>
<P>At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines, preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry launched a surprise attack from the rear and forced the Indians to leave their trenches.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-9" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The Chinese overwhelmed the Indian troops in a series of flanking manoeuvres south of the McMahon Line and prompted their withdrawal from Namka Chu.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-10" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP> Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops retreated into <A href="/wiki/Bhutan" title="Bhutan">Bhutan</A>. Chinese forces respected the border and did not pursue.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-33" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> Chinese forces now held all of the territory that was under dispute at the time of the Thag La confrontation, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.<SUP id="cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-11" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-NamkaChu-64">[59]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 22 October, at 12:15 am, PLA mortars fired on <A href="/wiki/Walong" title="Walong">Walong</A>, on the McMahon line.<SUP id="cite_ref-Walong_70-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Walong-70">[65]</A></SUP> Flares launched by Indian troops the next day revealed numerous Chinese milling around the valley.<SUP id="cite_ref-Walong_70-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Walong-70">[65]</A></SUP> The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA responded by lighting a bush fire, causing confusion among the Indians. Some 400 Chinese troops attacked the Indian position. The initial Chinese assault was halted by accurate Indian mortar fire. The Chinese were then reinforced and launched a second assault. The Indians managed to hold them back for four hours, but the Chinese used weight of numbers to break through. Most Indian forces were withdrawn to established positions in Walong, while a company supported by mortars and medium machine guns remained to cover the retreat.<SUP id="cite_ref-Walong_70-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Walong-70">[65]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On the morning 23 October, the Indian Army discovered a Chinese force gathered in a cramped pass and opened fire with mortars and machine guns, leading to heavy fighting. About 200 Chinese soldiers were killed and wounded in this action. Nine Indian soldiers were also killed. The fighting continued well into the afternoon, until the company was ordered to withdraw. Meanwhile, the 4th Sikhs made contact with the Chinese and subjected them to withering mortar and machine gun fire as the Chinese set off a brush fire and attempted to sneak forward.</P>
<P>Elsewhere, Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on <A href="/wiki/Tawang" title="Tawang">Tawang</A>, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-34" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Over the following days, there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols at Walong as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements. On 25 October, the Chinese made a probe, which was met with resistance from the 4th Sikhs. The following day, a patrol from the 4th Sikhs was encircled, and after being unable to break the encirclement, an Indian unit was able to flank the Chinese, allowing the Sikhs to break free.<SUP id="cite_ref-Walong_70-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Walong-70">[65]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Western_theatre">Western theatre</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=16" title="Edit section: Western theatre">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<DIV class="thumb tright">
<DIV class="thumbinner" style="width:452px;"><A href="/wiki/File:Aksai_Chin_Sino-Indian_border_map.png" class="image"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/47/Aksai_Chin_Sino-Indian_border_map.png/450px-Aksai_Chin_Sino-Indian_border_map.png" width="450" height="629" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/Aksai_Chin_Sino-Indian_border_map.png 1.5x" data-file-width="624" data-file-height="872" /></A>
<DIV class="thumbcaption">
<DIV class="magnify"><A href="/wiki/File:Aksai_Chin_Sino-Indian_border_map.png" class="internal" title="Enlarge"></A></DIV>
The map shows the Indian and Chinese claims of the border in the Aksai Chin region, the Macartney-MacDonald line, the Foreign Office Line, as well as the progress of Chinese forces as they occupied areas during the Sino-Indian War.</DIV>
</DIV>
</DIV>
<P>On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops.<SUP id="cite_ref-71" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-71">[66]</A></SUP> Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched a number of attacks throughout the western theatre.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP> By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 20 October, the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap Valley, <A href="/wiki/Galwan_River" title="Galwan River">Galwan Valley</A>, and Pangong Lake.<SUP id="cite_ref-Burkitt_72-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Burkitt-72">[67]</A></SUP> Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner. Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming, as evidenced by the Galwan post, which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August, but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison. Following the 20 October attack, nothing was heard from Galwan.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-35" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>On 24 October, Indian forces fought hard to hold the Rezang La Ridge, in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling to the Chinese.<SUP id="cite_ref-Rezang_73-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Rezang-73">[68]</A></SUP></P>
<P>After realising the magnitude of the attack, the Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn in order to consolidate and regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-36" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Lull_in_the_fighting">Lull in the fighting</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=17" title="Edit section: Lull in the fighting">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>By 24 October, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the control line prior to the conflict. Four days of fighting were followed by a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-37" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing</P>
<OL>
<LI>A negotiated settlement of the boundary</LI>
<LI>That both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometres from present lines of actual control</LI>
<LI>A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA</LI>
<LI>That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-38" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-74" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-74">[69]</A></SUP></LI>
</OL>
<P>Nehru's 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometre withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometres of blatant military aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the <A href="/wiki/McMahon_Line" title="McMahon Line">McMahon Line</A> in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed <A href="/wiki/MacDonald_Line" class="mw-redirect" title="MacDonald Line">MacDonald Line</A> in Aksai Chin. Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response. However, the <A href="/wiki/Soviet_Union" title="Soviet Union">Soviet Union</A> was preoccupied with the <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A> and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years. With the backing of other <A href="/wiki/Great_power" title="Great power">great powers</A>, a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-39" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A> and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-40" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Cuba_75-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Cuba-75">[70]</A></SUP> According to Calvin, the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-41" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Continuation_of_war">Continuation of war</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=18" title="Edit section: Continuation of war">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>After Zhou received Nehru's letter (rejecting Zhou's proposal), the fighting resumed on the eastern theatre on 14 November (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian attack on Walong, claimed by China, launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. The Chinese resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-42" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Eastern_theatre_2">Eastern theatre</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=19" title="Edit section: Eastern theatre">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>On the eastern theatre, the PLA attacked Indian forces near <A href="/wiki/Sela_Pass" title="Sela Pass">Se La</A> and <A href="/wiki/Bomdila" title="Bomdila">Bomdi La</A> on 17 November. These positions were defended by the <A href="/wiki/Indian_4th_Infantry_Division" class="mw-redirect" title="Indian 4th Infantry Division">Indian 4th Infantry Division</A>. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops.</P>
<P>Se La occupied high ground, and rather than assault this commanding position, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-43" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Western_theatre_2">Western theatre</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=20" title="Edit section: Western theatre">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<DIV class="thumb tleft">
<DIV class="thumbinner" style="width:222px;"><A href="/wiki/File:China_India_western_border_88.jpg" class="image"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/China_India_western_border_88.jpg/220px-China_India_western_border_88.jpg" width="220" height="267" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/China_India_western_border_88.jpg/330px-China_India_western_border_88.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/China_India_western_border_88.jpg/440px-China_India_western_border_88.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1038" data-file-height="1262" /></A>
<DIV class="thumbcaption">
<DIV class="magnify"><A href="/wiki/File:China_India_western_border_88.jpg" class="internal" title="Enlarge"></A></DIV>
The disputed areas in the western sector.</DIV>
</DIV>
</DIV>
<P>On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack two <A href="/wiki/Platoon" title="Platoon">platoons</A> of Indian troops at <A href="/wiki/Gurung_Hill" title="Gurung Hill">Gurung Hill</A>.</P>
<P>The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area and also from the connecting <A href="/wiki/Spangur_Gap" class="mw-redirect" title="Spangur Gap">Spangur Gap</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 123 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP></P>
<P>At 6:55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves. Fighting continued for the next hour, until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon. Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the battle was over.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP> Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops.<SUP id="cite_ref-Yadav_76-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Yadav-76">[71]</A></SUP> The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral.<SUP id="cite_ref-Yadav_76-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Yadav-76">[71]</A></SUP> The battles also saw the death of <A href="/wiki/Shaitan_Singh" title="Shaitan Singh">Major Shaitan Singh</A> of the <A href="/wiki/Kumaon_Regiment" title="Kumaon Regiment">Kumaon Regiment</A>, who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La.<SUP id="cite_ref-Yadav_76-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Yadav-76">[71]</A></SUP> The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed.<SUP id="cite_ref-Chushul_12-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Chushul-12">[12]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Indian forces suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. The Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line – many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-44" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of <A href="/wiki/Tezpur,_Assam" class="mw-redirect" title="Tezpur, Assam">Tezpur, Assam</A>, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometres from the <A href="/wiki/Assam" title="Assam">Assam</A>-<A href="/wiki/North-East_Frontier_Agency" title="North-East Frontier Agency">North-East Frontier Agency</A> border.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-15" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the <A href="/wiki/Brahmaputra_River" title="Brahmaputra River">Brahmaputra River</A>, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-15" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Ceasefire">Ceasefire</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=21" title="Edit section: Ceasefire">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November, it declared a unilateral <A href="/wiki/Cease-fire" class="mw-redirect" title="Cease-fire">cease-fire</A>. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated,</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE class="templatequote">
<P>Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometres back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometres from the line of actual control.</P>
</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires on 19 November (before India's request for United States air support), but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire, and thus, American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles,<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-45" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> but for the most part, the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The <A href="/wiki/United_States_Air_Force" title="United States Air Force">United States Air Force</A> flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.</P>
<P>Toward the end of the war India increased its support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "<A href="/wiki/Special_Frontier_Force" title="Special Frontier Force">Tibetan Armed Force</A>" composed of Tibetan refugees.<SUP id="cite_ref-77" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-77">[72]</A></SUP> <-- The Discoverer writes: The positions to which the Chinese troops withdrew in the Western sector were different from the pre-war positions.<SUP id="cite_ref-USA,_India,_Africa_78-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-USA,_India,_Africa-78">[73]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Colombo_compromise_79-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Colombo_compromise-79">[74]</A></SUP> The area gained by China in Ladakh has been claimed by India to be 6,475 square kilometres (2,500 sq mi),<SUP id="cite_ref-80" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-80">[75]</A></SUP> and the total area occupied by China has been estimated to be 14,500 square miles (38,000 km<SUP>2</SUP>).<SUP id="cite_ref-USA,_India,_Africa_78-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-USA,_India,_Africa-78">[73]</A></SUP> For this reason, Nehru did not officially accept the ceasefire offer of the positions of 7 November 1959, but stuck to his earlier demand to return to the positions of 8 September 1962.<SUP id="cite_ref-Colombo_compromise_79-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Colombo_compromise-79">[74]</A></SUP> --></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="World_opinion">World opinion</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=22" title="Edit section: World opinion">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract both its own population and international opinion from its <A href="/wiki/Great_Leap_Forward" title="Great Leap Forward">internal issues</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-81" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-81">[76]</A></SUP> According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China–India border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world <A href="/wiki/Dictatorship_of_the_proletariat" title="Dictatorship of the proletariat">dictatorship of the proletariat</A>. This was further triggered by <A href="/wiki/Mao_Zedong" title="Mao Zedong">Mao Zedong</A>'s views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, <A href="/wiki/Accra" title="Accra">Accra</A>, and Calcutta". Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a "pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives, rather than expansionism" and blames this particular conflict on India's provocations towards China. However, Calvin also expresses that China, in the past, has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggered the dispute over NEFA and <A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A> and indeed <A href="/wiki/Tibet" title="Tibet">Tibet</A>. Calvin's assumption, based on the history of the Cold War and the Domino Effect, assumed that China might ultimately try to regain control of everything that it considers as "traditionally Chinese" which in its view includes the entirety of South East Asia.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-46" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The <A href="/wiki/John_Fitzgerald_Kennedy" class="mw-redirect" title="John Fitzgerald Kennedy">Kennedy</A> administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India". In a May 1963 <A href="/wiki/National_Security_Council_(USA)" class="mw-redirect" title="National Security Council (USA)">National Security Council</A> meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. <A href="/wiki/Secretary_of_Defense" class="mw-redirect" title="Secretary of Defense">Defense Secretary</A> <A href="/wiki/Robert_McNamara" title="Robert McNamara">Robert McNamara</A> and General <A href="/wiki/Maxwell_Taylor" class="mw-redirect" title="Maxwell Taylor">Maxwell Taylor</A> advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. McNamara stated "Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognise that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons. Any large Chinese Communist attack on any part of that area would require the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., and this is to be preferred over the introduction of large numbers of U.S. soldiers."<SUP id="cite_ref-Anand_82-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Anand-82">[77]</A></SUP> After hearing this and listening to two other advisers, Kennedy stated "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India."<SUP id="cite_ref-Anand_82-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Anand-82">[77]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-83" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-83">[78]</A></SUP> It remains unclear if his aides were trying to dissuade the President of considering any measure with regard to India by immediately raising the stakes to an unacceptable level, nor is it clear if Kennedy was thinking of conventional or nuclear means when he gave his reply.<SUP id="cite_ref-Anand_82-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Anand-82">[77]</A></SUP> By 1964 China had developed its own nuclear weapon which would have likely caused any American nuclear policy in defense of India to be reviewed.<SUP id="cite_ref-Anand_82-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Anand-82">[77]</A></SUP> The <A href="/wiki/Lyndon_Baines_Johnson" class="mw-redirect" title="Lyndon Baines Johnson">Johnson</A> Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians. However India developed its own nuclear weapon by 1974, within 10 years of the Chinese.<SUP id="cite_ref-84" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-84">[79]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The United States was unequivocal in its recognition of the Indian boundary claims in the eastern sector, while not supporting the claims of either side in the western sector.<SUP id="cite_ref-85" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-85">[80]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Kalha_86-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Kalha-86">[81]</A></SUP> Britain, on the other hand, agreed with the Indian position completely, with the foreign secretary stating, 'we have taken the view of the government of India on the present frontiers and the disputed territories belong to India.'<SUP id="cite_ref-Kalha_86-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Kalha-86">[81]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The <A href="/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement" title="Non-Aligned Movement">non-aligned nations</A> remained mostly uninvolved, and only the <A href="/wiki/United_Arab_Republic" title="United Arab Republic">United Arab Republic</A><SUP class="noprint Inline-Template" style="margin-left:0.1em; white-space:nowrap;">[<I><A href="/wiki/Wikipedia:Please_clarify" title="Wikipedia:Please clarify"><SPAN title="The UAR as a union of Egypt and Syria broke up in '61, although Egypt continued to use the name until 1971; in the next sentence, reference is made to Egypt. For the sake of clarity, a common name should be settled on. (July 2016)">clarification needed</SPAN></A></I>]</SUP> openly supported India.<SUP id="cite_ref-Retzlaff_87-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Retzlaff-87">[82]</A></SUP> Of the non-aligned nations, six, <A href="/wiki/Egypt" title="Egypt">Egypt</A>, <A href="/wiki/Burma" class="mw-redirect" title="Burma">Burma</A>, <A href="/wiki/Cambodia" title="Cambodia">Cambodia</A>, <A href="/wiki/Sri_Lanka" title="Sri Lanka">Sri Lanka</A>, <A href="/wiki/Ghana" title="Ghana">Ghana</A> and <A href="/wiki/Indonesia" title="Indonesia">Indonesia</A>, met in <A href="/wiki/Colombo" title="Colombo">Colombo</A> on 10 December 1962.<SUP id="cite_ref-timeline_88-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-timeline-88">[83]</A></SUP> The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf.<SUP id="cite_ref-timeline_88-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-timeline-88">[83]</A></SUP> The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India.<SUP id="cite_ref-Retzlaff_87-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Retzlaff-87">[82]</A></SUP></P>
<P>In 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou explained the Chinese point of view to President Nixon of the US. As for the causes of the war, Zhou asserted that China did not try to expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war. However, Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack.<SUP id="cite_ref-State_Department_89-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-State_Department-89">[84]</A></SUP> Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.<SUP id="cite_ref-State_Department_89-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-State_Department-89">[84]</A></SUP> The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies.</P>
<P>While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favourably because of fear of the Chinese and competitiveness,<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-47" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the <A href="/wiki/Partition_of_India" title="Partition of India">Indian partition</A>, improved its relations with China after the war.<SUP id="cite_ref-Dobell_90-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Dobell-90">[85]</A></SUP> Prior to the war, Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defence against "northern" enemies (i.e. China), which was rejected by India.<SUP id="cite_ref-officialhistory_46-16" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-officialhistory-46">[41]</A></SUP> However, China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries, beginning on 13 October 1962, and concluding in December of that year.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-16" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> Pakistan also expressed fear that the huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan's security in future conflicts. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.<SUP id="cite_ref-Dobell_90-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Dobell-90">[85]</A></SUP> On 2 March 1963, Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in <A href="/wiki/Kashmir" title="Kashmir">Pakistani-controlled Kashmir</A> to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-17" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-timeline_88-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-timeline-88">[83]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Dobell_90-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Dobell-90">[85]</A></SUP> The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line.<SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani_26-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani-26">[23]</A></SUP> India's military failure against China would embolden Pakistan to initiate the <A href="/wiki/Second_Kashmir_War" class="mw-redirect" title="Second Kashmir War">Second Kashmir War</A> with India. However, it effectively ended in a stalemate as Calvin states that the Sino-Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernising India's military.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-48" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support.<SUP id="cite_ref-timeline_88-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-timeline-88">[83]</A></SUP> In January 1966, China condemned the <A href="/wiki/Tashkent_Agreement" class="mw-redirect" title="Tashkent Agreement">Tashkent Agreement</A> between India and Pakistan as a Soviet-US plot in the region.<SUP id="cite_ref-timeline_88-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-timeline-88">[83]</A></SUP> In the <A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971" title="Indo-Pakistani War of 1971">Indo-Pakistani War of 1971</A>, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in <A href="/wiki/East_Pakistan" title="East Pakistan">East Pakistan</A> to found the new nation-state of <A href="/wiki/Bangladesh" title="Bangladesh">Bangladesh</A>.<SUP id="cite_ref-91" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-91">[86]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Involvement_of_other_nations">Involvement of other nations</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=23" title="Edit section: Involvement of other nations">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>During the conflict, Nehru wrote two desperate letters to U.S. President <A href="/wiki/John_F._Kennedy" title="John F. Kennedy">John F. Kennedy</A>, requesting 12 squadrons of fighter jets and a modern radar system. These jets were seen as necessary to beef up Indian air strength so that air-to-air combat could be initiated safely from the Indian perspective (bombing troops was seen as unwise for fear of Chinese retaliatory action). Nehru also asked that these aircraft be manned by American pilots until Indian airmen were trained to replace them. These requests were rejected by the Kennedy Administration (which was involved in the <A href="/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis" title="Cuban Missile Crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</A> during most of the Sino-Indian War). The U.S. nonetheless provided non-combat assistance to Indian forces and planned to send the carrier <A href="/wiki/USS_Kitty_Hawk_(CV-63)" title="USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63)">USS <I>Kitty Hawk</I></A> to the Bay of Bengal to support India in case of an air war.<SUP id="cite_ref-92" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-92">[87]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Some reports suggest a contradictory response from the U.S. According to former Indian diplomat <A href="/wiki/G._Parthasarathy" class="mw-redirect" title="G. Parthasarathy">G. Parthasarathy</A>, "only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence."<SUP id="cite_ref-93" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-93">[88]</A></SUP> In 1962, President of Pakistan <A href="/wiki/Ayub_Khan_(Field_Marshal)" class="mw-redirect" title="Ayub Khan (Field Marshal)">Ayub Khan</A> made clear to India that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas.<SUP id="cite_ref-94" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-94">[89]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Aftermath">Aftermath</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=24" title="Edit section: Aftermath">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="China">China</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=25" title="Edit section: China">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<P>According to the China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilised along the <A href="/wiki/Line_of_Actual_Control" title="Line of Actual Control">Line of Actual Control</A>.</P>
<P>According to James Calvin of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-49" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964 and its support of Pakistan in the <A href="/wiki/1965_India_Pakistan_War" class="mw-redirect" title="1965 India Pakistan War">1965 India Pakistan War</A> tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-50" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP></P>
<P>Lora Saalman opined in a study of Chinese military publications, that while the war led to much blame, debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernisation of India but the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.<SUP id="cite_ref-95" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-95">[90]</A></SUP></P>
<H3><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="India">India</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=26" title="Edit section: India">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H3>
<DIV class="thumb tright">
<DIV class="thumbinner" style="width:222px;"><A href="/wiki/File:John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg" class="image"><IMG alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e8/John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg/220px-John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg" width="220" height="176" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e8/John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg/330px-John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e8/John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg/440px-John_Kenneth_Galbraith_and_Jawaharlal_Nehru.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1000" data-file-height="800" /></A>
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U.S. Ambassador to India <A href="/wiki/John_Kenneth_Galbraith" title="John Kenneth Galbraith">John Kenneth Galbraith</A> and Prime Minister Nehru conferring at the time of the conflict. This photograph was taken by the United States Information Service (USIS) and sent to President John F. Kennedy with a letter from Galbraith dated 9 November 1962.</DIV>
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<P>The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister <A href="/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru" title="Jawaharlal Nehru">Jawaharlal Nehru</A>, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, <A href="/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_India" title="Prime Minister of India">Prime Minister</A> <A href="/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru" title="Jawaharlal Nehru">Nehru</A> faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-18" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> Indian President <A href="/wiki/Radhakrishnan" class="mw-redirect" title="Radhakrishnan">Radhakrishnan</A> said that Nehru's government was naive and negligent about preparations, and Nehru admitted his failings.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> According to Inder Malhotra, a former editor of <I>The Times of India</I> and a commentator for <I>The Indian Express</I>, Indian politicians invested more effort in removing Defence Minister <A href="/wiki/Krishna_Menon" class="mw-redirect" title="Krishna Menon">Krishna Menon</A> than in actually waging war.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-4" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> Krishna Menon's favoritism weakened the Indian Army, and national morale dimmed.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-5" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> The public saw the war as political and military debacle.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-6" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> Under American advice (by American envoy <A href="/wiki/John_Kenneth_Galbraith" title="John Kenneth Galbraith">John Kenneth Galbraith</A> who made and ran American policy on the war as all other top policy makers in USA were absorbed in coincident Cuban Missile Crisis<SUP id="cite_ref-96" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-96">[91]</A></SUP>) Indians refrained, not according to the best choices available, from using the <A href="/wiki/Indian_air_force" class="mw-redirect" title="Indian air force">Indian air force</A> to beat back the Chinese advances. The CIA later revealed that at that time the Chinese had neither the fuel nor runways long enough for using their air force effectively in Tibet.<SUP id="cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-7" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-BlackNovember-62">[57]</A></SUP> Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and its <A href="/wiki/Chinese_Army" class="mw-redirect" title="Chinese Army">military</A>. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question the once popular "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the <A href="/wiki/Cold_War" title="Cold War">Cold War</A> bloc superpowers.<SUP id="cite_ref-Garver_4-26" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Garver-4">[4]</A></SUP></P>
<P>The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on <A href="/wiki/Minister_of_Defence_(India)" title="Minister of Defence (India)">Defence Minister</A> <A href="/wiki/V._K._Krishna_Menon" title="V. K. Krishna Menon">Menon</A>, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernise India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, <A href="/wiki/Pakistan" title="Pakistan">Pakistan</A>, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by <A href="/wiki/Operation_Gibraltar" title="Operation Gibraltar">infiltrating</A> <A href="/wiki/Jammu_and_Kashmir" title="Jammu and Kashmir">Jammu and Kashmir</A> and ultimately triggering the <A href="/wiki/Second_Kashmir_War" class="mw-redirect" title="Second Kashmir War">Second Kashmir War</A> with India in 1965 and <A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1971" class="mw-redirect" title="Indo-Pakistani war of 1971">Indo-Pakistani war of 1971</A>. The Attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure.<SUP id="cite_ref-97" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-97">[92]</A></SUP> In the <A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1971" class="mw-redirect" title="Indo-Pakistani war of 1971">Indo-Pakistani war of 1971</A> India won a clear victory, resulting in liberation of Bangladesh (formerly East-Pakistan).<SUP id="cite_ref-98" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-98">[93]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-99" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-99">[94]</A></SUP></P>
<P>As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified <A href="/wiki/Henderson_Brooks%E2%80%93Bhagat_Report" title="Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report">Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report</A> on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the <A href="/wiki/Indian_Army" title="Indian Army">Indian Army</A> in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment. <A href="/wiki/Neville_Maxwell" title="Neville Maxwell">Neville Maxwell</A> claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered.<SUP id="cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-19" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40">[35]</A></SUP> The Indian government has attempted to keep the Hendersen-Brooks-Bhagat Report secret for decades, although portions of it have recently been leaked by Neville Maxwell.<SUP id="cite_ref-100" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-100">[95]</A></SUP></P>
<P>According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3 million hectares, 83,000 km<SUP>2</SUP>) of disputed territory even if it felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated its willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognised the serious weaknesses in its army. It would more than double its military manpower in the next two years and it would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems to later become <A href="/wiki/List_of_countries_by_size_of_armed_forces" class="mw-redirect" title="List of countries by size of armed forces">the second-largest army in the world</A>. India's efforts to improve its military posture significantly enhanced its army's capabilities and preparedness.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-51" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP> This played a role in subsequent <A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_wars_and_conflicts" title="Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts">wars against Pakistan</A>.</P>
<H4><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Internment_and_deportation_of_Chinese_Indians">Internment and deportation of Chinese Indians</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=27" title="Edit section: Internment and deportation of Chinese Indians">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H4>
<DIV role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <A href="/wiki/Persecution_of_Chinese_Indians" class="mw-redirect" title="Persecution of Chinese Indians">Persecution of Chinese Indians</A></DIV>
<P>Soon after the end of the war, the Indian government passed the <A href="/wiki/Defence_of_India_act_and_Defence_of_India_rules,_1962" title="Defence of India act and Defence of India rules, 1962">Defence of India Act in December 1962</A>,<SUP id="cite_ref-open_101-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-open-101">[96]</A></SUP> permitting the "apprehension and detention in custody of any person [suspected] of being of hostile origin." The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of any person simply for having a Chinese surname, Chinese ancestry or a Chinese spouse.<SUP id="cite_ref-atlantic_102-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-atlantic-102">[97]</A></SUP> The Indian government incarcerated thousands of Chinese-Indians in an <A href="/wiki/Internment" title="Internment">internment</A> camp in <A href="/wiki/Deoli,_Rajasthan" title="Deoli, Rajasthan">Deoli</A>, <A href="/wiki/Rajasthan" title="Rajasthan">Rajasthan</A>, where they were held for years without trial. The last internees were not released until 1967. Thousands more Chinese-Indians were forcibly deported or coerced to leave India. Nearly all internees had their properties sold off or looted.<SUP id="cite_ref-open_101-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-open-101">[96]</A></SUP> Even after their release, the Chinese Indians faced many restrictions in their freedom. They could not travel freely until the mid-1990s.<SUP id="cite_ref-open_101-2" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-open-101">[96]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Later_conflicts">Later conflicts</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=28" title="Edit section: Later conflicts">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<DIV role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main articles: <A href="/wiki/China%E2%80%93India_relations" title="China–India relations">China–India relations</A>, <A href="/wiki/Nathu_La_and_Cho_La_incidents" class="mw-redirect" title="Nathu La and Cho La incidents">Nathu La and Cho La incidents</A>, and <A href="/wiki/1987_Sino-Indian_skirmish" title="1987 Sino-Indian skirmish">1987 Sino-Indian skirmish</A></DIV>
<P>India also reported some military conflicts with China after the 1962 war. In late 1967, there were two incidents in which both countries exchanged fire in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other being "<A href="/wiki/Chola_incident" class="mw-redirect" title="Chola incident">Chola incident</A>" in which advancing Chinese forces were forced to withdraw from Sikkim, then a protectorate of India and later a state of India after annexation in 1975. In the <A href="/wiki/1987_Sino-Indian_skirmish" title="1987 Sino-Indian skirmish">1987 Sino-Indian skirmish</A>, both sides showed military restraint and it was a bloodless conflict.</P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Diplomatic_process">Diplomatic process</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=29" title="Edit section: Diplomatic process">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<P>In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the <A href="/wiki/Line_of_Actual_Control" title="Line of Actual Control">Line of Actual Control</A> (<A href="/wiki/Line_of_Actual_Control" title="Line of Actual Control">LoAC</A>). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred.</P>
<P>On 20 November 2006 Indian politicians from <A href="/wiki/Arunachal_Pradesh" title="Arunachal Pradesh">Arunachal Pradesh</A> expressed their concern over Chinese military modernization and appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962.<SUP id="cite_ref-India_soft_103-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-India_soft-103">[98]</A></SUP> Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public,<SUP id="cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-3" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Swaminathan-67">[62]</A></SUP> as the two sides have engaged in <A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_wars_and_conflicts" title="Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts">various wars</A>.</P>
<P>On 6 July 2006, the historic <A href="/wiki/Silk_Road" title="Silk Road">Silk Road</A> passing through this territory via the <A href="/wiki/Nathu_La" title="Nathu La">Nathu La</A> pass was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.</P>
<P>In October 2011, it was stated that India and China will formulate a border mechanism to handle different perceptions as to the LAC and resume the bilateral army exercises between Indian and Chinese army from early 2012.<SUP id="cite_ref-104" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-104">[99]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-105" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-105">[100]</A></SUP></P>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="In_popular_culture">In popular culture</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=30" title="Edit section: In popular culture">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<UL>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Vidyadhar_Shastri#Authorship" title="Vidyadhar Shastri">Vidyadhar Shastri</A> wrote a <A href="/wiki/Sanskrit" title="Sanskrit">Sanskrit</A> poem <I>Himadri Mahtyam</I> to exhort Indians to defend the <A href="/wiki/Himalaya" class="mw-redirect" title="Himalaya">Himalaya</A></LI>
<LI>Australian author <A href="/wiki/Jon_Cleary" title="Jon Cleary">Jon Cleary</A> wrote a novel set at the time of the conflict, <I><A href="/wiki/The_Pulse_of_Danger" title="The Pulse of Danger">The Pulse of Danger</A></I> (1966).</LI>
<LI>A Hindi movie, <I><A href="/wiki/Haqeeqat_(1964_film)" title="Haqeeqat (1964 film)">Haqeeqat</A></I> (1964), and a Tamil movie, <I>Ratha Thilagam</I> (1963), were based on events of the Sino-Indian war.</LI>
<LI>On 27 June 1963, against the backdrop of the Sino-Indian War, <A href="/wiki/Lata_Mangeshkar" title="Lata Mangeshkar">Lata Mangeshkar</A> sang the patriotic song "<I>Ae Mere Watan Ke Logon</I><SPAN style="padding-left:.2em;">"</SPAN> (literally, "Oh, the People of My Country") in the presence of <A href="/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru" title="Jawaharlal Nehru">Jawaharlal Nehru</A>, <A href="/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_India" title="Prime Minister of India">Prime Minister of India</A>. The song, composed by <A href="/wiki/C._Ramchandra" title="C. Ramchandra">C. Ramchandra</A> and written by <A href="/wiki/Pradeep" class="mw-redirect" title="Pradeep">Pradeep</A>, is said to have brought the Prime Minister to tears.<SUP id="cite_ref-encyclopaedia_of_hindi_cinema_106-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-encyclopaedia_of_hindi_cinema-106">[101]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-107" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-107">[102]</A></SUP></LI>
<LI>The 2017 Hindi movie <I><A href="/wiki/Tubelight_(film)" title="Tubelight (film)">Tubelight</A></I> is set during the times of the Sino-Indian war.</LI>
</UL>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="See_also">See also</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=31" title="Edit section: See also">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<UL>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Nathu_La_and_Cho_La_incidents" class="mw-redirect" title="Nathu La and Cho La incidents">Nathu La and Cho La incidents</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Aksai_Chin" title="Aksai Chin">Aksai Chin</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Sino-Indian_relations" class="mw-redirect" title="Sino-Indian relations">Sino-Indian relations</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Trans-Karakoram_Tract" title="Trans-Karakoram Tract">Trans-Karakoram Tract</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Line_of_Control" title="Line of Control">Line of Control</A></LI>
</UL>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Notes">Notes</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=32" title="Edit section: Notes">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<DIV class="reflist columns references-column-width" style="-moz-column-width: 30em; -webkit-column-width: 30em; column-width: 30em; list-style-type: lower-alpha;">
<OL class="references">
<LI id="cite_note-19"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-19"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem (2010)</A>, p. 48 quotes a report by <A href="/wiki/Ney_Elias" title="Ney Elias">Ney Elias</A> in 1885: "He [the Wazir] wants the Maharaja to re-occupy Shahidulla in the Karakash valley. Previous to the rebellions in Eastern Turkistan which broke up Chinese rule there in 1863, the Kashmiris had occupied Shahidulla for nearly 20 years. About 1865 they abandoned it, and in 1868 Shaw and Hayward found it occupied by the Andijani (Kokandi) troops of the late Amir Yakub Beg. In 1873–74 Sir D. Forsyth recognised the Amir’s ownership, and recommended the Maharaja’s boundary to be drawn to the north of the Karakash valley as shown in the map accompanying the mission report. This I believe has never been accepted by Kashmir, and the boundary has been left an open question."</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-20"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-20"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem (2010)</A>, p. 48, 83: An India Office (London) memorandum in 1893 stated: "Shahidulla has hitherto been regarded as the frontier post on the road from Leh to Yarkand. Lord Kimberley the secretary of state would suggest that the Chinese Government at Peking ... should be intimated...that the Indian authorities, acting on behalf of the Kashmir State, will gladly co-operate with the Chinese authorities in Kashgaria in determining the frontier on the road from Leh to Kashgar. Her Majesty’s Government would, however, demur to any attempt being made by the Kashgarian officials to fix the boundary of the Ladakh State on this road without their previous concurrence being obtained."</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-22"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-22"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem (2010)</A>, p. 58 quotes Captain <A href="/wiki/Francis_Younghusband" title="Francis Younghusband">Younghusband</A>'s report of 1889: "In the former Chinese occupation the Kuen-Lun Mountains (that is the branch of them over which are the Kilian and Sanju Passes) were always recognised as the frontier, and the country to the south belonged to no one in particular. When the Chinese revolt took place and they were driven from Yarkand, the Kashmir State sent a detachment of troops to Shahidullah and built a fort there. Yakub Beg when he came into power at Yarkand sent some troops, who built a fort at Ali Nazar on the Karakash River at the junction of the roads from the Kilian and Sanju Passes. Shortly afterwards the Kashmiris evacuated the Shahidullah fort after occupying it for about three years, and the Andijanis then took possession of it and occupied it till Yakub Beg's death."</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-28"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-28"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">Some commentators state that Johnson's work was "severely criticised" as inaccurate. His boundary line was described as "patently absurd", and extending further north than the Indian claim. Johnson is said to have been reprimanded by the British Government for crossing into Khotan without permission and he resigned from the Survey.<SUP id="cite_ref-Calvin_11-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Calvin-11">[11]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-1" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Guruswamy-25">[22]</A></SUP><SUP id="cite_ref-Noorani_26-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-Noorani-26">[23]</A></SUP> Others state that Johnson's bold explorations were highly commended, and he was rehired a year later at a higher salary. The "invitation" from the Khotanese ruler was likely a forcible removal, and the ruler was merely seeking British help in warding off Yakub Beg and the Russian Empire.<SUP id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMehra,_John_Lall_(Book_review)1991149_27-0" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEMehra,_John_Lall_(Book_review)1991149-27">[24]</A></SUP></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-35"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-35"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">The so-called Macartney-MacDonald proposal was precipitated by the crisis over <A href="/wiki/Hunza_(princely_state)" title="Hunza (princely state)">Hunza</A>, which was theoretically a vassal state of both China and Kashmir. In 1890, the British invaded Hunza and replaced its ruler, and the Chinese remonstrated. The British wanted the Chinese to cede their suzerainty over Hunza and yet grant rights to cultivate lands outside its boundary. In return for this largesse, they were prepared to cede the Aksai Chin plains, but not Lingzi Tang plains, to China. Scholar Parshotam Mehra has termed it a 'barter'.<SUP id="cite_ref-34" class="reference"><A href="#cite_note-34">[30]</A></SUP></SPAN></LI>
</OL>
</DIV>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="References">References</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=33" title="Edit section: References">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<DIV class="reflist columns references-column-width" style="-moz-column-width: 30em; -webkit-column-width: 30em; column-width: 30em; list-style-type: decimal;">
<OL class="references">
<LI id="cite_note-webster_chronological_dates-1"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-webster_chronological_dates_1-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English language: Chronology of Major Dates in History, page 1686. Dilithium Press Ltd., 1989</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-2"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-2"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/717710.shtml">China won, but never wanted, Sino-Indian war - Global Times</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160923100111/http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/717710.shtml">Archived</A> 23 September 2016 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-3"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-3"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-lost-war-with-China-but-won-Arunachals-heart/articleshow/17039530.cms">India lost war with China but won Arunachal's heart - Times of India</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161130161304/http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-lost-war-with-China-but-won-Arunachals-heart/articleshow/17039530.cms">Archived</A> 30 November 2016 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Garver-4"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-8"><SUP><I><B>i</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-9"><SUP><I><B>j</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-10"><SUP><I><B>k</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-11"><SUP><I><B>l</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-12"><SUP><I><B>m</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-13"><SUP><I><B>n</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-14"><SUP><I><B>o</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-15"><SUP><I><B>p</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-16"><SUP><I><B>q</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-17"><SUP><I><B>r</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-18"><SUP><I><B>s</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-19"><SUP><I><B>t</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-20"><SUP><I><B>u</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-21"><SUP><I><B>v</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-22"><SUP><I><B>w</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-23"><SUP><I><B>x</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-24"><SUP><I><B>y</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-25"><SUP><I><B>z</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Garver_4-26"><SUP><I><B>aa</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFGarver2006" class="citation">Garver, John W. (2006), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/china%20decision%20for%201962%20war%202003.pdf">"China's Decision for War with India in 1962"</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>, in Robert S. Ross, <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DCihrQEdPzAC"><I>New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy</I></A>, Stanford University Press, pp. 86–, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-8047-5363-0" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-8047-5363-0">978-0-8047-5363-0</A>, <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170828015135/https://books.google.com/books?id=DCihrQEdPzAC">archived</A> from the original on 28 August 2017</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=China%E2%80%99s+Decision+for+War+with+India+in+1962&rft.btitle=New+Directions+in+the+Study+of+China%27s+Foreign+Policy&rft.pages=86-&rft.pub=Stanford+University+Press&rft.date=2006&rft.isbn=978-0-8047-5363-0&rft.aulast=Garver&rft.aufirst=John+W.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Findianstrategicknowledgeonline.com%2Fweb%2Fchina%2520decision%2520for%25201962%2520war%25202003.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-5"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-5"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">H.A.S.C. by United States. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services — 1999, p. 62</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-6"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-6"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><I>War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet</I> by Eric S. Margolis, p. 234.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Strategic_Studies_Institute-7"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Strategic_Studies_Institute_7-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Strategic_Studies_Institute_7-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">The US Army <CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf">"Archived copy"</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120205072610/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf">Archived</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN> from the original on 5 February 2012<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">7 May</SPAN> 2012</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Archived+copy&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil%2Fpdffiles%2FPUB52.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN> says Indian wounded were 1,047 and attributes it to Indian Defence Ministry's 1965 report, but this report also included a lower estimate of killed.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Kargil_from_Surprise_to_Victory-8"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Kargil_from_Surprise_to_Victory_8-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book">Malik, V. P. (2010). <I>Kargil from Surprise to Victory</I> (paperback ed.). HarperCollins Publishers India. p. 343. <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/9789350293133" title="Special:BookSources/9789350293133">9789350293133</A>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Kargil+from+Surprise+to+Victory&rft.pages=343&rft.edition=paperback&rft.pub=HarperCollins+Publishers+India&rft.date=2010&rft.isbn=9789350293133&rft.aulast=Malik&rft.aufirst=V.+P.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-9"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-9"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book">Mark A. Ryan; David Michael Finkelstein; Michael A. McDevitt (2003). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PsoDGLNmU30C&pg=PA188"><I>Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949</I></A>. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 188–. <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-7656-1087-4" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-7656-1087-4">978-0-7656-1087-4</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130313045707/http://books.google.com/books?id=PsoDGLNmU30C&pg=PA188">Archived</A> from the original on 13 March 2013<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">14 April</SPAN> 2011</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Chinese+warfighting%3A+The+PLA+experience+since+1949&rft.pages=188-&rft.pub=M.E.+Sharpe&rft.date=2003&rft.isbn=978-0-7656-1087-4&rft.au=Mark+A.+Ryan&rft.au=David+Michael+Finkelstein&rft.au=Michael+A.+McDevitt&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DPsoDGLNmU30C%26pg%3DPA188&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Indo-China_War_of_1962-10"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Indo-China_War_of_1962_10-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-prc_1962.htm">"Indo-China War of 1962"</A>. <I>globalseurity.org</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170713235919/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-prc_1962.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 13 July 2017.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=globalseurity.org&rft.atitle=Indo-China+War+of+1962&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.globalsecurity.org%2Fmilitary%2Fworld%2Fwar%2Findo-prc_1962.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Calvin-11"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-8"><SUP><I><B>i</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-9"><SUP><I><B>j</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-10"><SUP><I><B>k</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-11"><SUP><I><B>l</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-12"><SUP><I><B>m</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-13"><SUP><I><B>n</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-14"><SUP><I><B>o</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-15"><SUP><I><B>p</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-16"><SUP><I><B>q</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-17"><SUP><I><B>r</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-18"><SUP><I><B>s</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-19"><SUP><I><B>t</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-20"><SUP><I><B>u</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-21"><SUP><I><B>v</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-22"><SUP><I><B>w</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-23"><SUP><I><B>x</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-24"><SUP><I><B>y</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-25"><SUP><I><B>z</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-26"><SUP><I><B>aa</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-27"><SUP><I><B>ab</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-28"><SUP><I><B>ac</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-29"><SUP><I><B>ad</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-30"><SUP><I><B>ae</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-31"><SUP><I><B>af</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-32"><SUP><I><B>ag</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-33"><SUP><I><B>ah</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-34"><SUP><I><B>ai</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-35"><SUP><I><B>aj</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-36"><SUP><I><B>ak</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-37"><SUP><I><B>al</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-38"><SUP><I><B>am</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-39"><SUP><I><B>an</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-40"><SUP><I><B>ao</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-41"><SUP><I><B>ap</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-42"><SUP><I><B>aq</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-43"><SUP><I><B>ar</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-44"><SUP><I><B>as</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-45"><SUP><I><B>at</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-46"><SUP><I><B>au</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-47"><SUP><I><B>av</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-48"><SUP><I><B>aw</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-49"><SUP><I><B>ax</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-50"><SUP><I><B>ay</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Calvin_11-51"><SUP><I><B>az</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm">"The China-India Border War"</A>. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20111111000325/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 11 November 2011<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">15 October</SPAN> 2011</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=The+China-India+Border+War&rft.pub=Marine+Corps+Command+and+Staff+College&rft.date=1984-04&rft.aulast=Calvin&rft.aufirst=James+Barnard&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.globalsecurity.org%2Fmilitary%2Flibrary%2Freport%2F1984%2FCJB.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Chushul-12"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Chushul_12-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFSubramanian2000" class="citation">Subramanian, L. N. (November–December 2000), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010209084245/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/lns.html">"The Battle of Chushul"</A>, <I>Bharat Rakshak Monitor</I>, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com:80/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/lns.html">the original</A> on 9 February 2001</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Bharat+Rakshak+Monitor&rft.atitle=The+Battle+of+Chushul&rft.date=2000-11%2F2000-12&rft.aulast=Subramanian&rft.aufirst=L.+N.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bharat-rakshak.com%3A80%2FMONITOR%2FISSUE3-3%2Flns.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197024-13"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197024_13-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMaxwell,_India's_China_War1970">Maxwell, India's China War 1970</A>, p. 24.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Rubin-14"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Rubin_14-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan. 1960), pp. 96–125, <A href="/wiki/JSTOR" title="JSTOR">JSTOR</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/756256">756256</A>.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197025–26-15"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197025–26_15-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMaxwell,_India's_China_War1970">Maxwell, India's China War 1970</A>, p. 25–26.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197026-16"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMaxwell,_India's_China_War197026_16-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMaxwell,_India's_China_War1970">Maxwell, India's China War 1970</A>, p. 26.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEWarikoo,_India's_gateway_to_Central_Asia20091–2-17"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWarikoo,_India's_gateway_to_Central_Asia20091–2_17-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFWarikoo,_India's_gateway_to_Central_Asia2009">Warikoo, India's gateway to Central Asia 2009</A>, pp. 1–2.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-18"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-18"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMehra,_An_"agreed"_frontier1992">Mehra, An "agreed" frontier (1992)</A>, p. 57: "Shahidulla was occupied by the Dogras almost from the time they conquered Ladakh."</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-21"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-21"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMehra,_An_"agreed"_frontier1992">Mehra, An "agreed" frontier (1992)</A>, p. 57: "The southern frontier of Chinese Turkestan was similarly undefined... the Chinese 'considered the Kuen-lun mountains (i.e. the branch of them over which are the Kilian and Sanju passes) as their frontier'..."</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-23"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-23"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMehra,_An_"agreed"_frontier1992">Mehra, An "agreed" frontier 1992</A>, p. 48; <A href="#CITEREFVan_Eekelen,_Indian_Foreign_Policy_and_the_Border_Dispute2013">Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute 2013</A>, p. 160; <A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963</A>, p. 65; <A href="#CITEREFPalit,_War_in_High_Himalaya1991">Palit, War in High Himalaya 1991</A>, p. 29</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963116-24"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963116_24-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963</A>, p. 116.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Guruswamy-25"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-8"><SUP><I><B>i</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Guruswamy_25-9"><SUP><I><B>j</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFGuruswamy2003" class="citation">Guruswamy, Mohan (23 June 2003), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160930222001/http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/20spec.htm">"The Great India-China Game"</A>, <I>Rediff News</I>, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/20spec.htm">the original</A> on 30 September 2016</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Rediff+News&rft.atitle=The+Great+India-China+Game&rft.date=2003-06-23&rft.aulast=Guruswamy&rft.aufirst=Mohan&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rediff.com%2Fnews%2F2003%2Fjun%2F20spec.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Noorani-26"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani_26-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani_26-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani_26-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani_26-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani_26-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani_26-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news">Noorani, A.G. (30 August – 12 September 2003). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20111002095213/http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2018/stories/20030912002104800.htm">"Fact of History"</A>. <I>Frontline</I>. <B>26</B> (18). Madras: The Hindu group. Archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2018/stories/20030912002104800.htm">the original</A> on 2 October 2011<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">24 August</SPAN> 2011</SPAN></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Frontline&rft.atitle=Fact+of+History&rft.volume=26&rft.issue=18&rft.date=2003-08-30%2F2003-09-12&rft.aulast=Noorani&rft.aufirst=A.G.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Ffrontlineonnet.com%2Ffl2018%2Fstories%2F20030912002104800.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEMehra,_John_Lall_(Book_review)1991149-27"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMehra,_John_Lall_(Book_review)1991149_27-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMehra,_John_Lall_(Book_review)1991">Mehra, John Lall (Book review) 1991</A>, p. 149.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201065–66-29"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201065–66_29-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem 2010</A>, pp. 65–66.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-30"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-30"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem (2010)</A>, p. 73; <A href="#CITEREFMehra,_An_"agreed"_frontier1992">Mehra, An "agreed" frontier (1992)</A>, p. 63</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-31"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-31"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970">Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers (1970)</A>, pp. 73, 78: "Clarke added that a Chinese map drawn by Hung Ta-chen, Minister in St. Petersburg, confirmed the Johnson alignment showing West Aksai Chin as within British (Kashmir) territory."</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201052–53,&nbsp;60,&nbsp;69,&nbsp;72-32"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem201052–53,&nbsp;60,&nbsp;69,&nbsp;72_32-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem 2010</A>, pp. 52–53, 60, 69, 72.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010114-115-33"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTENoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010114-115_33-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010">Noorani, India–China Boundary Problem 2010</A>, pp. 114-115.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-34"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-34"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFMehra,_An_"agreed"_frontier1992">Mehra, An "agreed" frontier (1992)</A>, p. 160; <A href="#CITEREFPalit,_War_in_High_Himalaya1991">Palit, War in High Himalaya (1991)</A>, pp. 32–33; <A href="#CITEREFVan_Eekelen,_Indian_Foreign_Policy_and_the_Border_Dispute2013">Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute (2013)</A>, p. 9; <A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963)</A>, p. 69</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute-36"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute_36-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-The_Un-Negotiated_Dispute_36-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFMaxwell1970" class="citation">Maxwell, Neville (July–September 1970), "China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute", <I>The China Quarterly</I> (43): 47–80, <A href="/wiki/JSTOR" title="JSTOR">JSTOR</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="//www.jstor.org/stable/652082">652082</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+China+Quarterly&rft.atitle=China+and+India%3A+The+Un-Negotiated+Dispute&rft.issue=43&rft.pages=47-80&rft.date=1970-07%2F1970-09&rft_id=%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F652082&rft.aulast=Maxwell&rft.aufirst=Neville&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970-37"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970_37-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970">Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers 1970</A>.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-middlepath-38"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-middlepath_38-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-middlepath_38-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation journal">Verma, Virendra Sahai (2006). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://chinaindiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/virendravermapaperborderdispute.pdf">"Sino-Indian Border Dispute At Aksai Chin - A Middle Path For Resolution"</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>. <I>Journal of development alternatives and area studies</I>. <B>25</B> (3): 6–8. <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Serial_Number" title="International Standard Serial Number">ISSN</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="//www.worldcat.org/issn/1651-9728">1651-9728</A><SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">30 August</SPAN> 2013</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+development+alternatives+and+area+studies&rft.atitle=Sino-Indian+Border+Dispute+At+Aksai+Chin+-+A+Middle+Path+For+Resolution&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=6-8&rft.date=2006&rft.issn=1651-9728&rft.aulast=Verma&rft.aufirst=Virendra+Sahai&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fchinaindiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com%2F2010%2F07%2Fvirendravermapaperborderdispute.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963101-39"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963101_39-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963</A>, p. 101.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Neville_Maxwell-40"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-8"><SUP><I><B>i</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-9"><SUP><I><B>j</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-10"><SUP><I><B>k</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-11"><SUP><I><B>l</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-12"><SUP><I><B>m</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-13"><SUP><I><B>n</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-14"><SUP><I><B>o</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-15"><SUP><I><B>p</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-16"><SUP><I><B>q</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-17"><SUP><I><B>r</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-18"><SUP><I><B>s</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Neville_Maxwell_40-19"><SUP><I><B>t</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book"><A href="/wiki/Neville_Maxwell" title="Neville Maxwell">Maxwell, Neville</A> (1970). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/12249475/Indias-China-War-Neville-Maxwell"><I>India's China War</I></A>. New York: Pantheon. <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/0224618873" title="Special:BookSources/0224618873">0224618873</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120112043045/http://www.scribd.com/doc/12249475/Indias-China-War-Neville-Maxwell">Archived</A> from the original on 12 January 2012.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=India%27s+China+War&rft.place=New+York&rft.pub=Pantheon&rft.date=1970&rft.isbn=0224618873&rft.aulast=Maxwell&rft.aufirst=Neville&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scribd.com%2Fdoc%2F12249475%2FIndias-China-War-Neville-Maxwell&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Patterson-41"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Patterson_41-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Patterson_41-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Patterson_41-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Patterson_41-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">George W. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-VKSingh-42"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-VKSingh_42-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-VKSingh_42-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-VKSingh_42-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/562/562-vk-singh.htm">"562 V.K. Singh, Resolving the boundary dispute"</A>. <I>India-seminar.com</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061018213033/http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/562/562-vk-singh.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 18 October 2006<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=India-seminar.com&rft.atitle=562+V.K.+Singh%2C+Resolving+the+boundary+dispute&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.india-seminar.com%2F2006%2F562%2F562-vk-singh.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-43"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-43"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, Foreign Language Press of the People's Republic of China, 1961</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Gupta-44"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Gupta_44-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">Gupta, Karunakar, "The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy", <I>The China Quarterly</I>, No. 47. (Jul. – Sep. 1971), pp. 521–45. <A href="/wiki/JSTOR" title="JSTOR">JSTOR</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/652324">652324</A></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Free-45"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Free_45-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">Free Tibet Campaign, "<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.freetibet.org/info/facts/fact17.html">Tibet Facts No.17: British Relations with Tibet</A>" <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080411071528/http://www.freetibet.org/info/facts/fact17.html">Archived</A> 11 April 2008 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-officialhistory-46"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-8"><SUP><I><B>i</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-9"><SUP><I><B>j</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-10"><SUP><I><B>k</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-11"><SUP><I><B>l</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-12"><SUP><I><B>m</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-13"><SUP><I><B>n</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-14"><SUP><I><B>o</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-15"><SUP><I><B>p</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-officialhistory_46-16"><SUP><I><B>q</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Noorani2-47"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani2_47-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani2_47-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani2_47-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">A.G. Noorani, "<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2017/stories/20030829001604900.htm">Perseverance in peace process</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050326174852/http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2017/stories/20030829001604900.htm">Archived</A> 26 March 2005 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>.", <I>India's National Magazine</I>, 29 August 2003.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-CIA:ToI-48"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:ToI_48-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-06-27/us/27957825_1_cia-papers-india-china-border-border-issue">Chinese deception and Nehru's naivete led to 62 War</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100411055730/http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/dec/11kavi.htm">Archived</A> 11 April 2010 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>. <I>Times of India</I></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-GP-49"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-GP_49-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news">Pubby, Manu (22 January 2010). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dont-believe-in-hindichini-bhaibhai-nehru-told-envoy/570332/2">"Don't believe in Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai, Nehru told envoy"</A>. <I>Indian Express</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130511091050/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dont-believe-in-hindichini-bhaibhai-nehru-told-envoy/570332/2">Archived</A> from the original on 11 May 2013.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Indian+Express&rft.atitle=Don%27t+believe+in+Hindi-Chini+bhai-bhai%2C+Nehru+told+envoy&rft.date=2010-01-22&rft.aulast=Pubby&rft.aufirst=Manu&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.indianexpress.com%2Fnews%2Fdont-believe-in-hindichini-bhaibhai-nehru-told-envoy%2F570332%2F2&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Noorani3-50"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani3_50-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani3_50-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Noorani3_50-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">India's Forward Policy, Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of Oriental and African Studies</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-51"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-51"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">"<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,894328-8,00.html">The Shade of the Big Banyan</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071013163851/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0%2C9171%2C894328-8%2C00.html">Archived</A> 13 October 2007 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>." <I>Time</I>, 14 December 1959.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196391-52"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196391_52-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963</A>, p. 91.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-53"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-53"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130921053454/http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/OR_Part_2.pdf">"Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples' Republic of China on the Boundary Question - Part 2"</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>. Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1961. Archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/OR_Part_2.pdf">the original</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN> on 21 September 2013<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">30 August</SPAN> 2013</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Report+of+the+Officials+of+the+Governments+of+India+and+the+Peoples%E2%80%99+Republic+of+China+on+the+Boundary+Question+-+Part+2&rft.pub=Ministry+of+External+Affairs%2C+India%2C+1961&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.claudearpi.net%2Fmaintenance%2Fuploaded_pics%2FOR_Part_2.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196396-54"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196396_54-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963</A>, p. 96.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196399-55"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground196399_55-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A href="#CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963">Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963</A>, p. 99.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Maxwell-56"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Maxwell_56-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Maxwell_56-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Maxwell, Neville (April 2001). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Dec-1/kargil.htm">"Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction"</A>. stratmag.com. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061209140900/http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Dec-1/kargil.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 9 December 2006<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">18 August</SPAN> 2006</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Henderson+Brooks+Report%3A+An+Introduction&rft.pub=stratmag.com&rft.date=2001-04&rft.aulast=Maxwell&rft.aufirst=Neville&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratmag.com%2Fissue2Dec-1%2Fkargil.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Clark-57"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Clark_57-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.gregoryclark.net/redif.html">"rediff"</A>. <I>Gregoryclark.net</I>. 24 October 2002. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160820204824/http://www.gregoryclark.net/redif.html">Archived</A> from the original on 20 August 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Gregoryclark.net&rft.atitle=rediff&rft.date=2002-10-24&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gregoryclark.net%2Fredif.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-58"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-58"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://in.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/24chin.htm">"rediff.com Special Series: 40 years after the 1962 Sino-Indian war"</A>. <I>In.rediff.com</I>. 24 October 2002. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161121034753/http://in.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/24chin.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 21 November 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=In.rediff.com&rft.atitle=rediff.com+Special+Series%3A+40+years+after+the+1962+Sino-Indian+war&rft.date=2002-10-24&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fin.rediff.com%2Fnews%2F2002%2Foct%2F24chin.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Chang-59"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Chang_59-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday, <I>Mao: The Unknown Story</I> (2006), pp. 568, 579.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Athale-60"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Athale_60-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Athale_60-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Athale_60-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/07china.htm">"Special Series: 40 years after the Sino-Indian 1962 war"</A>. <I>Rediff.com</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170102172608/http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/07china.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 2 January 2017<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Rediff.com&rft.atitle=Special+Series%3A+40+years+after+the+Sino-Indian+1962+war&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rediff.com%2Fnews%2F2002%2Fnov%2F07china.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Sukumaran-61"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Sukumaran_61-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Sukumaran_61-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFSukumaran2003" class="citation">Sukumaran, R. (July 2003), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/The1962IndiaChinaWarandKargil1999_rsukumaran_0703">"1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power"</A>, <I>Strategic analysis</I>, <B>27</B> (3), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161119075221/http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/The1962IndiaChinaWarandKargil1999_rsukumaran_0703">archived</A> from the original on 19 November 2016</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Strategic+analysis&rft.atitle=1962+India-China+War+and+Kargil+1999%3A+Restrictions+on+Air+Power&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=3&rft.date=2003-07&rft.aulast=Sukumaran&rft.aufirst=R.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.idsa.in%2Fstrategicanalysis%2FThe1962IndiaChinaWarandKargil1999_rsukumaran_0703&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-BlackNovember-62"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-BlackNovember_62-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news">Malhotra, Inder (5 December 2008). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ghosts-of-black-november/394274/0">"Ghosts of black November"</A>. <I>Indian Express</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130329084029/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ghosts-of-black-november/394274/0">Archived</A> from the original on 29 March 2013<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">9 January</SPAN> 2013</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Indian+Express&rft.atitle=Ghosts+of+black+November&rft.date=2008-12-05&rft.aulast=Malhotra&rft.aufirst=Inder&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.indianexpress.com%2Fnews%2Fghosts-of-black-november%2F394274%2F0&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Joshi-63"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Joshi_63-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">Manoj Joshi, "Line of Defence", <I>Times of India</I>, 21 October 2000</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-NamkaChu-64"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-5"><SUP><I><B>f</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-6"><SUP><I><B>g</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-7"><SUP><I><B>h</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-8"><SUP><I><B>i</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-9"><SUP><I><B>j</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-10"><SUP><I><B>k</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-NamkaChu_64-11"><SUP><I><B>l</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020810075442/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Namka.html"><I>Battle of Namka Chu, 10 Oct – 16 Nov 1962</I></A>, Bharat Rakshak, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com:80/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Namka.html">the original</A> on 10 August 2002</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Battle+of+Namka+Chu%2C+10+Oct+%E2%80%93+16+Nov+1962&rft.pub=Bharat+Rakshak&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bharat-rakshak.com%3A80%2FLAND-FORCES%2FArmy%2FHistory%2F1962War%2FNamka.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Peoples_Daily-65"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Peoples_Daily_65-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><I><A href="/wiki/People%27s_Daily" title="People's Daily">People's Daily</A></I>, 22 September 1962 issue, pp. 1</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-foia_cia_polo09-66"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-foia_cia_polo09_66-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-foia_cia_polo09_66-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070701042636/http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-09.pdf"><I>The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: 1961–62</I></A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>, Central Intelligence Agency, 5 May 1964, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-09.pdf">the original</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN> on 1 July 2007</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Sino-Indian+Border+Dispute%2C+Section+3%3A+1961%E2%80%9362&rft.pub=Central+Intelligence+Agency&rft.date=1964-05-05&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foia.cia.gov%2FCPE%2FPOLO%2Fpolo-09.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Swaminathan-67"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Swaminathan_67-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFSwaminathan" class="citation">Swaminathan, R., <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030625063031/http://www.saag.org/papers7/paper693.html"><I>Lessons of 1962: A stock taking after 40 years</I></A>, South Asia Analysis Group, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.saag.org:80/papers7/paper693.html">the original</A> on 25 June 2003</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Lessons+of+1962%3A+A+stock+taking+after+40+years&rft.pub=South+Asia+Analysis+Group&rft.aulast=Swaminathan&rft.aufirst=R.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.saag.org%3A80%2Fpapers7%2Fpaper693.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-CIA:DNA-68"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:DNA_68-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-CIA:DNA_68-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1106769">China feared military coup in India during 60s</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070930040711/http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1106769">Archived</A> 30 September 2007 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>. <I>DNA India</I></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Salon-69"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Salon_69-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Mark Ames and Alexander Zaitchik (2 December 2012). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.salon.com/2012/12/02/better_than_bourne_who_really_killed_nick_deak/">"James Bond and the killer bag lady"</A>. <I>Salon.com</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170205135109/http://www.salon.com/2012/12/02/better_than_bourne_who_really_killed_nick_deak/">Archived</A> from the original on 5 February 2017<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Salon.com&rft.atitle=James+Bond+and+the+killer+bag+lady&rft.date=2012-12-02&rft.au=Mark+Ames+and+Alexander+Zaitchik&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.salon.com%2F2012%2F12%2F02%2Fbetter_than_bourne_who_really_killed_nick_deak%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Walong-70"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Walong_70-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Walong_70-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Walong_70-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Walong_70-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020615032009/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Walong.html"><I>Battle of Walong, 18 Oct - 16 Nov 1962</I></A>, Bharat Rakshak, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com:80/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Walong.html">the original</A> on 15 June 2002</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Battle+of+Walong%2C+18+Oct+-+16+Nov+1962&rft.pub=Bharat+Rakshak&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bharat-rakshak.com%3A80%2FLAND-FORCES%2FArmy%2FHistory%2F1962War%2FWalong.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-71"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-71"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">e.g. Chip Chap Valley, Pangong</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Burkitt-72"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Burkitt_72-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book">Burkitt, Laurie; Scobell, Andrew; Wortzel, Larry M. (July 2003). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf"><I>THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AT 75</I></A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>. <A href="/wiki/Strategic_Studies_Institute" title="Strategic Studies Institute">Strategic Studies Institute</A>. pp. 340–341. <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/1-58487-126-1" title="Special:BookSources/1-58487-126-1">1-58487-126-1</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120205072610/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf">Archived</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN> from the original on 5 February 2012.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=THE+LESSONS+OF+HISTORY%3A+THE+CHINESE+PEOPLE%E2%80%99S+LIBERATION+ARMY+AT+75&rft.pages=340-341&rft.pub=Strategic+Studies+Institute&rft.date=2003-07&rft.isbn=1-58487-126-1&rft.aulast=Burkitt&rft.aufirst=Laurie&rft.au=Scobell%2C+Andrew&rft.au=Wortzel%2C+Larry+M.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil%2Fpdffiles%2FPUB52.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Rezang-73"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Rezang_73-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Mohan.html">Men of Steel on Icy Heights</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070206135922/http://bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Mohan.html">Archived</A> 6 February 2007 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>. Mohan Guruswamy <I>Deccan Chronicle</I>.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-74"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-74"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation journal"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2094-1962-12-KS-a-JHS.pdf">"The Himalayan Border Crisis. - Chinese Offensive in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency. - 100-Mile Chinese Advance in N.E.F.A. - Unilateral Cease-Fire by Chinese Forces"</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>. <I>Keesing's Record of World Events</I>. <B>8</B> (12): 19109. 8 December 1962. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150526212555/http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2094-1962-12-KS-a-JHS.pdf">Archived</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN> from the original on 26 May 2015.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Keesing%27s+Record+of+World+Events&rft.atitle=The+Himalayan+Border+Crisis.+-+Chinese+Offensive+in+Ladakh+and+North-East+Frontier+Agency.+-+100-Mile+Chinese+Advance+in+N.E.F.A.+-+Unilateral+Cease-Fire+by+Chinese+Forces.&rft.volume=8&rft.issue=12&rft.pages=19109&rft.date=1962-12-08&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fweb.stanford.edu%2Fgroup%2Ftomzgroup%2Fpmwiki%2Fuploads%2F2094-1962-12-KS-a-JHS.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Cuba-75"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-Cuba_75-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Goldman, Jerry; Stein, Giel (October 1997). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/">"The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18–29 1962"</A>. hpol.org. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060818073911/http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/">Archived</A> from the original on 18 August 2006<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">18 August</SPAN> 2006</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=The+Cuban+Missile+Crisis%2C+October+18%E2%80%9329+1962&rft.pub=hpol.org&rft.date=1997-10&rft.aulast=Goldman&rft.aufirst=Jerry&rft.au=Stein%2C+Giel&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hpol.org%2Fjfk%2Fcuban%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Yadav-76"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Yadav_76-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Yadav_76-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Yadav_76-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">YADAV, Atul, <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Yadav.html">Injustice to the Ahir Martyrs of the 1962 War</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070509224534/http://bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/Yadav.html">Archived</A> 9 May 2007 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>. <A href="/wiki/Bharat_Rakshak" title="Bharat Rakshak">Bharat Rakshak</A>, <A href="/wiki/The_Tribune_(Chandigarh)" title="The Tribune (Chandigarh)">The Tribune</A>. 18 November 1999</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-77"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-77"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE id="CITEREFGangdruk" class="citation">Gangdruk, Chushi, <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010307182110/http://www.chushigangdruk.org/history/history11.html"><I>Establishment 22</I></A>, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.chushigangdruk.org:80/history/history11.html">the original</A> on 7 March 2001</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Establishment+22&rft.aulast=Gangdruk&rft.aufirst=Chushi&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chushigangdruk.org%3A80%2Fhistory%2Fhistory11.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-USA,_India,_Africa-78"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-USA,_India,_Africa_78-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-USA,_India,_Africa_78-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book">Okoth, Pontian Godfrey (2015). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.co.in/books?id=-_wBCQAAQBAJ"><I>USA, India, Africa During and After the Cold War</I></A>. University of Nairobi Press. p. 98. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160923185408/https://books.google.co.in/books?id=-_wBCQAAQBAJ">Archived</A> from the original on 23 September 2016.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=USA%2C+India%2C+Africa+During+and+After+the+Cold+War&rft.pages=98&rft.pub=University+of+Nairobi+Press&rft.date=2015&rft.aulast=Okoth&rft.aufirst=Pontian+Godfrey&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.in%2Fbooks%3Fid%3D-_wBCQAAQBAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Colombo_compromise-79"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Colombo_compromise_79-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Colombo_compromise_79-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news">Malhotra, Inder (17 October 2011). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-colombo--compromise-/860792/0">"The Colombo 'compromise<SPAN style="padding-right:0.2em;">'</SPAN>"</A>. <A href="/wiki/Indian_Express" class="mw-redirect" title="Indian Express">Indian Express</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170828015135/http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-colombo--compromise-/860792/0">Archived</A> from the original on 28 August 2017<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">23 September</SPAN> 2016</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The+Colombo+%E2%80%98compromise%E2%80%99&rft.date=2011-10-17&rft.aulast=Malhotra&rft.aufirst=Inder&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Farchive.indianexpress.com%2Fnews%2Fthe-colombo--compromise-%2F860792%2F0&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-80"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-80"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book"><A href="/wiki/K._V._Krishna_Rao" title="K. V. Krishna Rao">K. V. Krishna Rao</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.co.in/books?id=G7xPaJomYsEC"><I>Prepare Or Perish: A Study of National Security</I></A>. p. 101. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160924012940/https://books.google.co.in/books?id=G7xPaJomYsEC">Archived</A> from the original on 24 September 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">23 September</SPAN> 2016</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Prepare+Or+Perish%3A+A+Study+of+National+Security&rft.pages=101&rft.au=K.+V.+Krishna+Rao&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.in%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DG7xPaJomYsEC&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-81"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-81"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.stormingmedia.us/92/9232/A923244.html">Abstract of "Fighting to Make a Point: Policy-Making by Aggressive War on the Chinese Borders" by Jr Pettis Roy C.</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070928030401/http://www.stormingmedia.us/92/9232/A923244.html">Archived</A> 28 September 2007 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>. — <A href="/wiki/National_War_College" title="National War College">National War College</A></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Anand-82"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Anand_82-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Anand_82-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Anand_82-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Anand_82-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news">Anand Giridharadas (26 August 2005). "<SPAN style="padding-left:0.2em;">'</SPAN>63 Tapes Reveal Kennedy and Aides Discussed Using Nuclear Arms in a China-India Clash". Mumbai, India: New York Times.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=%2763+Tapes+Reveal+Kennedy+and+Aides+Discussed+Using+Nuclear+Arms+in+a+China-India+Clash&rft.date=2005-08-26&rft.au=Anand+Giridharadas&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-83"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-83"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/08/27/2003269368">"JFK, aides considered nuclear arms in China-India clash"</A>. <I><A href="/wiki/Taipei_Times" title="Taipei Times">Taipei Times</A></I>. 3 March 2017. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160526225134/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/08/27/2003269368">Archived</A> from the original on 26 May 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Taipei+Times&rft.atitle=JFK%2C+aides+considered+nuclear+arms+in+China-India+clash&rft.date=2017-03-03&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.taipeitimes.com%2FNews%2Fworld%2Farchives%2F2005%2F08%2F27%2F2003269368&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-84"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-84"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html">"India's Nuclear Weapons Program - Smiling Buddha: 1974"</A>. <I>Nuclearweaponarchive.org</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110519083726/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html">Archived</A> from the original on 19 May 2011<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Nuclearweaponarchive.org&rft.atitle=India%27s+Nuclear+Weapons+Program+-+Smiling+Buddha%3A+1974&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fnuclearweaponarchive.org%2FIndia%2FIndiaSmiling.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-85"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-85"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Smith, Jeff M. (14 September 2012). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/forgotten-war-himalayas">"A Forgotten War in the Himalayas"</A>. YaleGlobal. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161220145005/http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/forgotten-war-himalayas">Archived</A> from the original on 20 December 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">27 September</SPAN> 2016</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=A+Forgotten+War+in+the+Himalayas&rft.pub=YaleGlobal&rft.date=2012-09-14&rft.aulast=Smith&rft.aufirst=Jeff+M.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fyaleglobal.yale.edu%2Fcontent%2Fforgotten-war-himalayas&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Kalha-86"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Kalha_86-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Kalha_86-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Kalha, R. S. (21 November 2012). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatdidChinaGain%20attheEndoftheFighting_RSKalha_211112">"What did China Gain at the End of the Fighting in November 1962?"</A>. Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161206163938/http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatdidChinaGain%20attheEndoftheFighting_RSKalha_211112">Archived</A> from the original on 6 December 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">27 September</SPAN> 2016</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=What+did+China+Gain+at+the+End+of+the+Fighting+in+November+1962%3F&rft.pub=Institute+for+Defence+Studies+and+Analysis&rft.date=2012-11-21&rft.aulast=Kalha&rft.aufirst=R.+S.&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.idsa.in%2Fidsacomments%2FWhatdidChinaGain%2520attheEndoftheFighting_RSKalha_211112&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Retzlaff-87"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Retzlaff_87-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Retzlaff_87-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text">"<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3023681">India</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170312065257/http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023681">Archived</A> 12 March 2017 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>.: A Year of Stability and Change". Ralph J. Retzlaff. Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1962: Part II. (Feb. 1963), pp. 96–106.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-timeline-88"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-timeline_88-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-timeline_88-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-timeline_88-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-timeline_88-3"><SUP><I><B>d</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-timeline_88-4"><SUP><I><B>e</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/chtime.htm">"Indo China Time Line"</A>. <I>Rediff.com</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170209030803/http://www.rediff.com/news/chtime.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 9 February 2017<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Rediff.com&rft.atitle=Indo+China+Time+Line&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rediff.com%2Fnews%2Fchtime.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-State_Department-89"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-State_Department_89-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-State_Department_89-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080111153100/https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/70143.pdf">"China, October 1971 – February 1972"</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN>, <I>Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, p. 722</I>, U.S. State Department, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/70143.pdf">the original</A> <SPAN style="font-size:85%;">(PDF)</SPAN> on 11 January 2008</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=China%2C+October+1971+%E2%80%93+February+1972&rft.btitle=Foreign+Relations%2C+1969%E2%80%931976%2C+Volume+XVII%2C+p.+722&rft.pub=U.S.+State+Department&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.state.gov%2Fdocuments%2Forganization%2F70143.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-Dobell-90"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-Dobell_90-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Dobell_90-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-Dobell_90-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation journal">Dobell, W. M. (Autumn 1964). "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty". <I>Pacific Affairs</I>. <B>37</B> (3): 283–95. <A href="/wiki/Digital_object_identifier" title="Digital object identifier">doi</A>:<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="//doi.org/10.2307%2F2754976">10.2307/2754976</A>. <A href="/wiki/JSTOR" title="JSTOR">JSTOR</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="//www.jstor.org/stable/2754976">2754976</A>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Pacific+Affairs&rft.atitle=Ramifications+of+the+China-Pakistan+Border+Treaty&rft.ssn=summer&rft.volume=37&rft.issue=3&rft.pages=283-95&rft.date=1964&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.2307%2F2754976&rft_id=%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F2754976&rft.aulast=Dobell&rft.aufirst=W.+M.&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-91"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-91"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue47/articles/a07.htm">The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090823000531/http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue47/articles/a07.htm">Archived</A> 23 August 2009 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>. by Stephen R. Shalom, professor of Political Science</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-92"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-92"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-untold-story-how-the-us-came-to-indias-aid-in-1962/20121204.htm">The Untold Story: How Kennedy came to India's aid in 1962</A> <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131217221734/http://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-untold-story-how-the-us-came-to-indias-aid-in-1962/20121204.htm">Archived</A> 17 December 2013 at the <A href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</A>., Rediff News, 4 December 2012.</SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-93"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-93"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-11-16/india/28230923_1_jawaharlal-nehru-kapil-sibal-foreign-secretary">"Jawaharlal Nehru pleaded for US help against China in 1962"</A>. <I>The Times Of India</I>. 16 November 2010. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100411055730/http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/dec/11kavi.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 11 April 2010.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Times+Of+India&rft.atitle=Jawaharlal+Nehru+pleaded+for+US+help+against+China+in+1962&rft.date=2010-11-16&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Farticles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com%2F2010-11-16%2Findia%2F28230923_1_jawaharlal-nehru-kapil-sibal-foreign-secretary&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-94"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-94"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842104-10,00.html">"Asia: Ending the Suspense"</A>. <I>Time</I>. 17 September 1965. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130521075607/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0%2C9171%2C842104-10%2C00.html">Archived</A> from the original on 21 May 2013.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Time&rft.atitle=Asia%3A+Ending+the+Suspense&rft.date=1965-09-17&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.time.com%2Ftime%2Fmagazine%2Farticle%2F0%2C9171%2C842104-10%2C00.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-95"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-95"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation journal">Saalman, Lora (Spring–Summer 2011). "Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions". <B>64</B> (2). <A href="/wiki/Journal_of_International_Affairs" title="Journal of International Affairs">Journal of International Affairs</A>: 174–175.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Divergence%2C+Similarity+and+Symmetry+in+Sino-Indian+Threat+Perceptions&rft.ssn=winter&rft.chron=winter%E2%80%93spring&rft.volume=64&rft.issue=2&rft.pages=174-175&rft.date=2011&rft.aulast=Saalman&rft.aufirst=Lora&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-96"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-96"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.indianexpress.com/news/whoever-has-seen-aksai-chin-as-i-have-would-want-someone-else-to-have-it/3634/0">"<SPAN style="padding-left:0.2em;">'</SPAN>Whoever has seen Aksai Chin, as I have, would want someone else to have it<SPAN style="padding-right:0.2em;">'</SPAN>"</A>. Indian Express. 3 March 2009. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090307023311/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/whoever-has-seen-aksai-chin-as-i-have-would-want-someone-else-to-have-it/3634/0">Archived</A> from the original on 7 March 2009<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">25 June</SPAN> 2012</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=%E2%80%98Whoever+has+seen+Aksai+Chin%2C+as+I+have%2C+would+want+someone+else+to+have+it%E2%80%99&rft.pub=Indian+Express&rft.date=2009-03-03&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.indianexpress.com%2Fnews%2Fwhoever-has-seen-aksai-chin-as-i-have-would-want-someone-else-to-have-it%2F3634%2F0&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-97"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-97"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">John Pike. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm">"Indo-Pakistan War of 1965"</A>. <I>Globalsecurity.org</I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170106183112/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 6 January 2017<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Globalsecurity.org&rft.atitle=Indo-Pakistan+War+of+1965&rft.au=John+Pike&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.globalsecurity.org%2Fmilitary%2Fworld%2Fwar%2Findo-pak_1965.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-98"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-98"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070102010708/http://www.subcontinent.com/1971war/surrender.html"><I>1971 India–Pakistan War, Part VII: The Surrender</I></A>, New Delhi: SAPRA Foundation, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.subcontinent.com:80/1971war/surrender.html">the original</A> on 2 January 2007</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=1971+India%E2%80%93Pakistan+War%2C+Part+VII%3A+The+Surrender&rft.place=New+Delhi&rft.pub=SAPRA+Foundation&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.subcontinent.com%3A80%2F1971war%2Fsurrender.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-99"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-99"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.sify.com/news/1971-war-i-will-give-you-30-minutes-news-columns-jmqlV0fcjja.html">"1971 War: 'I will give you 30 minutes<SPAN style="padding-right:0.2em;">'</SPAN>"</A>. Sify.com. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120624053518/http://www.sify.com/news/1971-war-i-will-give-you-30-minutes-news-columns-jmqlV0fcjja.html">Archived</A> from the original on 24 June 2012<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">25 June</SPAN> 2012</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=1971+War%3A+%27I+will+give+you+30+minutes%27&rft.pub=Sify.com&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sify.com%2Fnews%2F1971-war-i-will-give-you-30-minutes-news-columns-jmqlV0fcjja.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-100"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-100"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">David Brewster. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.academia.edu/7698503/_Leaked_1962_report_reveals_Indias_still-unresolved_military_weaknesses_Lowy_Interpreter_2_April_2014">"Leaked 1962 report reveals India's still-unresolved military weaknesses, Lowy Interpreter, 2 April 2014. Retrieved 1 September 2014"</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170828015136/http://www.academia.edu/7698503/_Leaked_1962_report_reveals_Indias_still-unresolved_military_weaknesses_Lowy_Interpreter_2_April_2014">Archived</A> from the original on 28 August 2017.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Leaked+1962+report+reveals+India%27s+still-unresolved+military+weaknesses%2C+Lowy+Interpreter%2C+2+April+2014.+Retrieved+1+September+2014&rft.au=David+Brewster&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F7698503%2F_Leaked_1962_report_reveals_Indias_still-unresolved_military_weaknesses_Lowy_Interpreter_2_April_2014&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-open-101"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <A href="#cite_ref-open_101-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up to: </SPAN><SUP><I><B>a</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-open_101-1"><SUP><I><B>b</B></I></SUP></A> <A href="#cite_ref-open_101-2"><SUP><I><B>c</B></I></SUP></A></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Jaideep Mazumdar (20 November 2010). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/the-1962-jailing-of-chinese-indians">"The 1962 jailing of Chinese Indians"</A>. <A href="/wiki/OPEN_(Indian_magazine)" class="mw-redirect" title="OPEN (Indian magazine)">OPEN</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131218104951/http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/the-1962-jailing-of-chinese-indians">Archived</A> from the original on 18 December 2013<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">17 November</SPAN> 2013</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=The+1962+jailing+of+Chinese+Indians&rft.pub=OPEN&rft.date=2010-11-20&rft.au=Jaideep+Mazumdar&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.openthemagazine.com%2Farticle%2Fnation%2Fthe-1962-jailing-of-chinese-indians&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-atlantic-102"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-atlantic_102-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web">Matt Schiavenza (9 August 2013). <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/08/indias-forgotten-chinese-internment-camp/278519/">"India's Forgotten Chinese Internment Camp"</A>. <A href="/wiki/The_Atlantic" title="The Atlantic">The Atlantic</A>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131109132110/http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/08/indias-forgotten-chinese-internment-camp/278519/">Archived</A> from the original on 9 November 2013<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">17 November</SPAN> 2013</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=India%27s+Forgotten+Chinese+Internment+Camp&rft.pub=The+Atlantic&rft.date=2013-08-09&rft.au=Matt+Schiavenza&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%2Fchina%2Farchive%2F2013%2F08%2Findias-forgotten-chinese-internment-camp%2F278519%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-India_soft-103"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-India_soft_103-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/20jintao1.htm">"<SPAN style="padding-left:0.2em;">'</SPAN>India soft on China's Arunachal claim<SPAN style="padding-right:0.2em;">'</SPAN>"</A>. Rediff.com. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160423190339/http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/20jintao1.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 23 April 2016<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=%27India+soft+on+China%27s+Arunachal+claim%27&rft.pub=Rediff.com&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rediff.com%2Fnews%2F2006%2Fnov%2F20jintao1.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-104"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-104"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20111011151729/http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfeed/news/indiachina-to-resume-annual-defence-dialogue-early-next-year/850932.html">"India-China to resume annual defence dialogue early next year"</A>, <I>IBN Live</I>, 8 October 2011, archived from <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://ibnlive.in.com:80/generalnewsfeed/news/indiachina-to-resume-annual-defence-dialogue-early-next-year/850932.html">the original</A> on 11 October 2011</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=IBN+Live&rft.atitle=India-China+to+resume+annual+defence+dialogue+early+next+year&rft.date=2011-10-08&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fibnlive.in.com%3A80%2Fgeneralnewsfeed%2Fnews%2Findiachina-to-resume-annual-defence-dialogue-early-next-year%2F850932.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-105"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-105"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation news"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2523730.ece">"India-China border mechanism by year-end"</A>. <I><A href="/wiki/The_Hindu" title="The Hindu">The Hindu</A></I>. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140706122750/http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2523730.ece">Archived</A> from the original on 6 July 2014<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">10 March</SPAN> 2017</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Hindu&rft.atitle=India-China+border+mechanism+by+year-end&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thehindu.com%2Fnews%2Fnational%2Farticle2523730.ece&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-encyclopaedia_of_hindi_cinema-106"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-encyclopaedia_of_hindi_cinema_106-0"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation book">Khubchandani, Lata (2003). <A href="/wiki/Gulzar_(lyricist)" class="mw-redirect" title="Gulzar (lyricist)">Gulzar</A>; <A href="/wiki/Govind_Nihalani" title="Govind Nihalani">Govind Nihalani</A>; Saibal Chatterjee, eds. <I>Encyclopaedia of Hindi Cinema</I>. Popular Prakashan. pp. 486–487. <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/81-7991-066-0" title="Special:BookSources/81-7991-066-0">81-7991-066-0</A>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Encyclopaedia+of+Hindi+Cinema&rft.pages=486-487&rft.pub=Popular+Prakashan&rft.date=2003&rft.isbn=81-7991-066-0&rft.aulast=Khubchandani&rft.aufirst=Lata&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI id="cite_note-107"><SPAN class="mw-cite-backlink"><B><A href="#cite_ref-107"><SPAN class="cite-accessibility-label">Jump up </SPAN>^</A></B></SPAN> <SPAN class="reference-text"><CITE class="citation web"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/dec/11kavi.htm">"Kavi Pradeep, master of the patriotic song, dies at 84"</A>. <A href="/wiki/Rediff.com" title="Rediff.com">Rediff.com</A>. 11 December 1998. <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100411055730/http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/dec/11kavi.htm">Archived</A> from the original on 11 April 2010<SPAN class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <SPAN class="nowrap">4 November</SPAN> 2010</SPAN>.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Kavi+Pradeep%2C+master+of+the+patriotic+song%2C+dies+at+84&rft.pub=Rediff.com&rft.date=1998-12-11&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rediff.com%2Fnews%2F1998%2Fdec%2F11kavi.htm&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
</OL>
</DIV>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Bibliography">Bibliography</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=34" title="Edit section: Bibliography">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<UL>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFDas_GuptaLüthi2016" class="citation">Das Gupta, Amit R.; Lüthi, Lorenz M., eds. (2016), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hFRuDQAAQBAJ"><I>The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New perspectives</I></A>, Taylor & Francis, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-315-38892-2" title="Special:BookSources/978-1-315-38892-2">978-1-315-38892-2</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+Sino-Indian+War+of+1962%3A+New+perspectives&rft.pub=Taylor+%26+Francis&rft.date=2016&rft.isbn=978-1-315-38892-2&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DhFRuDQAAQBAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN>
<UL>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFLüthi,_India's_Relations_with_China2016" class="citation">Lüthi, Lorenz M. (2016), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yCElDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA29">"India's Relations with China, 1945–1974"</A>, <I>Ibid</I>, pp. 29–47</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=India%27s+Relations+with+China%2C+1945%E2%80%931974&rft.btitle=Ibid&rft.pages=29-47&rft.date=2016&rft.aulast=L%C3%BCthi&rft.aufirst=Lorenz+M.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.uk%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DyCElDwAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA29&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFChaowu,_From_'Hindi-Chini_Bhai-Bhai'_to_'international_class_struggle'_against_Nehru2016" class="citation">Chaowu, Dai (2016), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yCElDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA68">"From 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' to 'international class struggle' against Nehru: China's India policy and the frontier dispute, 1950–62"</A>, <I>Ibid</I>, pp. 68–84</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=From+%27Hindi-Chini+Bhai-Bhai%27+to+%27international+class+struggle%27+against+Nehru%3A+China%27s+India+policy+and+the+frontier+dispute%2C+1950%E2%80%9362&rft.btitle=Ibid&rft.pages=68-84&rft.date=2016&rft.aulast=Chaowu&rft.aufirst=Dai&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.uk%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DyCElDwAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA68&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFFisher,_Rose_&_Huttenback,_Himalayan_Battleground1963" class="citation">Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.questia.com/read/10466588"><I>Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh</I></A>, Praeger – via <A href="/wiki/Questia" class="mw-redirect" title="Questia">Questia</A>, <SPAN style="font-size:90%; color:#555">(Subscription required (<SPAN title="The site requires a paid subscription to access this page." style="border-bottom:1px dotted;cursor:help">help</SPAN>))</SPAN></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Himalayan+Battleground%3A+Sino-Indian+Rivalry+in+Ladakh&rft.pub=Praeger&rft.date=1963&rft.aulast=Fisher&rft.aufirst=Margaret+W.&rft.au=Rose%2C+Leo+E.&rft.au=Huttenback%2C+Robert+A.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.questia.com%2Fread%2F10466588&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFMaxwell,_India's_China_War1970" class="citation"><A href="/wiki/Neville_Maxwell" title="Neville Maxwell">Maxwell, Neville</A> (1970), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=csbHAAAAIAAJ"><I>India's China War</I></A>, Pantheon Books, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-394-47051-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-394-47051-1">978-0-394-47051-1</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=India%27s+China+War&rft.pub=Pantheon+Books&rft.date=1970&rft.isbn=978-0-394-47051-1&rft.aulast=Maxwell&rft.aufirst=Neville&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DcsbHAAAAIAAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFMehra,_John_Lall_(Book_review)1991" class="citation">Mehra, Parshotham (1991), "<SPAN style="padding-left:0.2em;">"</SPAN>John Lall, Aksai Chin and Sino-Indian Conflict" (Book review)", <I>China Report</I>, <B>27</B> (2): 147–154, <A href="/wiki/Digital_object_identifier" title="Digital object identifier">doi</A>:<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="//doi.org/10.1177%2F000944559102700206">10.1177/000944559102700206</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=China+Report&rft.atitle=%22John+Lall%2C+Aksai+Chin+and+Sino-Indian+Conflict%22+%28Book+review%29&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=2&rft.pages=147-154&rft.date=1991&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1177%2F000944559102700206&rft.aulast=Mehra&rft.aufirst=Parshotham&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFMehra,_An_"agreed"_frontier1992" class="citation">Mehra, Parshotam (1992), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=mIduAAAAMAAJ"><I>An "agreed" frontier: Ladakh and India's northernmost borders, 1846-1947</I></A>, Oxford University Press</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=An+%22agreed%22+frontier%3A+Ladakh+and+India%27s+northernmost+borders%2C+1846-1947&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=1992&rft.aulast=Mehra&rft.aufirst=Parshotam&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DmIduAAAAMAAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFNoorani,_India–China_Boundary_Problem2010" class="citation"><A href="/wiki/A._G._Noorani" title="A. G. Noorani">Noorani, A.G.</A> (2010), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=GoAyDwAAQBAJ"><I>India–China Boundary Problem 1846–1947: History and Diplomacy</I></A>, Oxford University Press India, <A href="/wiki/Digital_object_identifier" title="Digital object identifier">doi</A>:<A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="//doi.org/10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780198070689.001.0001">10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198070689.001.0001</A>, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-908839-3" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-19-908839-3">978-0-19-908839-3</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=India%E2%80%93China+Boundary+Problem+1846%E2%80%931947%3A+History+and+Diplomacy&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press+India&rft.date=2010&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780198070689.001.0001&rft.isbn=978-0-19-908839-3&rft.aulast=Noorani&rft.aufirst=A.G.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DGoAyDwAAQBAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFPalit,_War_in_High_Himalaya1991" class="citation">Palit, D. K. (1991), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ukw1PuEt8IcC"><I>War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962</I></A>, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-85065-103-1" title="Special:BookSources/978-1-85065-103-1">978-1-85065-103-1</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=War+in+High+Himalaya%3A+The+Indian+Army+in+Crisis%2C+1962&rft.pub=C.+Hurst+%26+Co.+Publishers&rft.date=1991&rft.isbn=978-1-85065-103-1&rft.aulast=Palit&rft.aufirst=D.+K.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3Dukw1PuEt8IcC&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFSnedden,_Understanding_Kashmir_and_Kashmiris2015" class="citation">Snedden, Christopher (2015), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=s5KMCwAAQBAJ"><I>Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris</I></A>, Oxford University Press, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-84904-342-7" title="Special:BookSources/978-1-84904-342-7">978-1-84904-342-7</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Understanding+Kashmir+and+Kashmiris&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=2015&rft.isbn=978-1-84904-342-7&rft.aulast=Snedden&rft.aufirst=Christopher&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3Ds5KMCwAAQBAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFVan_Eekelen,_Indian_Foreign_Policy_and_the_Border_Dispute2013" class="citation">Van Eekelen, Willem Frederik (2013), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8eTzBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA163"><I>Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China</I></A>, Springer, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-94-017-6555-8" title="Special:BookSources/978-94-017-6555-8">978-94-017-6555-8</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Indian+Foreign+Policy+and+the+Border+Dispute+with+China&rft.pub=Springer&rft.date=2013&rft.isbn=978-94-017-6555-8&rft.aulast=Van+Eekelen&rft.aufirst=Willem+Frederik&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3D8eTzBwAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA163&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFWarikoo2009" class="citation">Warikoo, K., ed. (2009), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=w_Z8AgAAQBAJ"><I>Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives</I></A>, Routledge, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-134-03294-5" title="Special:BookSources/978-1-134-03294-5">978-1-134-03294-5</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Himalayan+Frontiers+of+India%3A+Historical%2C+Geo-Political+and+Strategic+Perspectives&rft.pub=Routledge&rft.date=2009&rft.isbn=978-1-134-03294-5&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3Dw_Z8AgAAQBAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN>
<UL>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFKarim,_Strategic_dimensions_of_the_trans-Himalayan_frontiers2009" class="citation">Karim, Afsir (2009), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=w_Z8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA56">"Strategic dimensions of the trans-Himalayan frontiers"</A>, <I>Ibid</I>, pp. 56–66</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Strategic+dimensions+of+the+trans-Himalayan+frontiers&rft.btitle=Ibid&rft.pages=56-66&rft.date=2009&rft.aulast=Karim&rft.aufirst=Afsir&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3Dw_Z8AgAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA56&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFWarikoo,_India's_gateway_to_Central_Asia2009" class="citation">Warikoo, K. (2009), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=w_Z8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1">"India's gateway to Central Asia: trans-Himalayan trade and cultural movements through Kashmir and Ladakh, 1846–1947"</A>, <I>Ibid</I>, pp. 1–13</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=India%E2%80%99s+gateway+to+Central+Asia%3A+trans-Himalayan+trade+and+cultural+movements+through+Kashmir+and+Ladakh%2C+1846%E2%80%931947&rft.btitle=Ibid&rft.pages=1-13&rft.date=2009&rft.aulast=Warikoo&rft.aufirst=K.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3Dw_Z8AgAAQBAJ%26pg%3DPA1&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFWoodman,_Himalayan_Frontiers1970" class="citation">Woodman, Dorothy (1970) [first published in 1969 by Barrie & Rockliff, The Cresset Press], <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=tkCAAAAAIAAJ"><I>Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries</I></A>, Praeger</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Himalayan+Frontiers%3A+A+Political+Review+of+British%2C+Chinese%2C+Indian%2C+and+Russian+Rivalries&rft.pub=Praeger&rft.date=1970&rft.aulast=Woodman&rft.aufirst=Dorothy&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DtkCAAAAAIAAJ&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
</UL>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="Further_reading">Further reading</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=35" title="Edit section: Further reading">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
<UL>
<LI><CITE id="CITEREFGarver,_Protracted_Contest2011" class="citation">Garver, John W. (2011), <A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=TOVaMckcO0MC"><I>Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century</I></A>, University of Washington Press, <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-295-80120-9" title="Special:BookSources/978-0-295-80120-9">978-0-295-80120-9</A></CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=Protracted+Contest%3A+Sino-Indian+Rivalry+in+the+Twentieth+Century&rft.pub=University+of+Washington+Press&rft.date=2011&rft.isbn=978-0-295-80120-9&rft.aulast=Garver&rft.aufirst=John+W.&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DTOVaMckcO0MC&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><I>David Malone</I>, The Border War of 1962 // Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy - Oxford University Press, 2011 - 425 p. - <A href="/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number" title="International Standard Book Number">ISBN</A> <A href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780199552023" title="Special:BookSources/9780199552023">9780199552023</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Himalayan_Blunder" title="Himalayan Blunder">Himalayan Blunder</A> by Brigadier John Dalvi. Natraj Publishers</LI>
<LI><CITE class="citation book">Lamb, Alastair (1964). <I>The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries</I>. L. Oxford University Press.</CITE><SPAN title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=The+China-India+Border%3A+The+Origins+of+the+Disputed+Boundaries&rft.series=L&rft.pub=Oxford+University+Press&rft.date=1964&rft.aulast=Lamb&rft.aufirst=Alastair&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3ASino-Indian+War" class="Z3988"><SPAN style="display:none;"> </SPAN></SPAN></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Gunnar_Myrdal" title="Gunnar Myrdal">Gunnar Myrdal</A>. <I>Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.</I> New York: Random House, 1968</LI>
<LI><I>History of the Conflict with China</I>, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. — Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War.</LI>
<LI>Allen S. Whiting. <I>The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina.</I></LI>
<LI><I>The Sino-Indian Boundary Question</I> [Enlarged Edition], Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962</LI>
</UL>
<H2><SPAN class="mw-headline" id="External_links">External links</SPAN><SPAN class="mw-editsection"><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</SPAN><A href="/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&action=edit&section=36" title="Edit section: External links">edit</A><SPAN class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</SPAN></SPAN></H2>
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<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm">Sino-Indian War (1962)</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/indochin.htm">Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict</A> — Rediff.com.</LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010419174901/http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm">Neville Maxwell: Henderson Brooks Report</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_284247,001300370003.htm">1962 Sino-Indian War, <I>Hindustan Times</I></A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/showcolumns.aspx?id=COLEN20070022560">Why India lost the 1962 border war? – Tejas Patel</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050507113230/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/">War in the Himalayas: 1962 Indo-Sino Conflict</A> (includes official war history) from History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India</LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070304003142/http://www.bcasnet.org/login/viewarticle.php?pid=100&disp=1">Critical Asian Studies Article: Sino Indian War 1962</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060619091847/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-12/16/content_3928187.htm">India, China to speed up border dispute talks: 2005 Xinhuanet</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://ia.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/15chin.htm">The Rediff Special/Claude Arpi</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.casas-pkucis.org.cn/English/Journals/nyyj/bak/0202-1.htm">1962 War and Its Implications fr Sino-India Relations</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060530193456/http://www.fyjs.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=13872&fpage=1">Historical maps of the Sino-Indian border</A> <SPAN class="languageicon">(in Chinese)</SPAN></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/SSEAL/SouthAsia/kashmir.html">Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; [[University of California, Berkeley</A> Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list]</LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070215144429/http://journal.frontierindia.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=section&id=7&Itemid=53">Frontier India India-China Section</A></LI>
<LI><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1101845">China, India, and the fruits of Nehru's folly</A> by Venkatesan Vembu, <I><A href="/wiki/Daily_News_%26_Analysis" class="mw-redirect" title="Daily News & Analysis">Daily News & Analysis</A></I>, 6 June 2007</LI>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/File:Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg" class="image" title="Indian Navy seal"><IMG alt="Indian Navy seal" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg/25px-Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg.png" width="25" height="13" class="thumbborder" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg/38px-Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg/50px-Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="900" data-file-height="450" /></A> <A href="/wiki/Indian_Navy" title="Indian Navy">Indian Navy</A></LI>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Chief_of_the_Army_Staff_(India)" title="Chief of the Army Staff (India)">Chief of the Army Staff</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Chief_of_the_Naval_Staff_(India)" title="Chief of the Naval Staff (India)">Chief of the Naval Staff</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Chief_of_the_Air_Staff_(India)" title="Chief of the Air Staff (India)">Chief of the Air Staff</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Minister_of_Defence_(India)" title="Minister of Defence (India)">Minister of Defence</A></LI>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Military_history_of_India" title="Military history of India">History</A></LI>
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<LI>Ranks and insignia
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_wars_and_conflicts" title="Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts">Indo-Pakistani wars</A>
<UL>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1947" title="Indo-Pakistani War of 1947">1947</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965" title="Indo-Pakistani War of 1965">1965</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971" title="Indo-Pakistani War of 1971">1971</A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Indian_annexation_of_Hyderabad" title="Indian annexation of Hyderabad">Operation <I>Polo</I></A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Congo_Crisis" title="Congo Crisis">Congo Crisis</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Annexation_of_Goa" title="Annexation of Goa">Operation <I>Vijay</I></A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Operation_Trident_(1971)" title="Operation Trident (1971)">Operation <I>Trident</I></A></LI>
<LI><A class="mw-selflink selflink">Sino-Indian War</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Cho_La_incident" class="mw-redirect" title="Cho La incident">Cho La incident</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Siachen_conflict" title="Siachen conflict">Siachen conflict</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Operation_Blue_Star" title="Operation Blue Star"><I>Blue Star</I></A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Operation_Woodrose" title="Operation Woodrose"><I>Woodrose</I></A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/1987_Sino-Indian_skirmish" title="1987 Sino-Indian skirmish">1987 Sino-Indian skirmish</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Indian_intervention_in_the_Sri_Lankan_Civil_War" title="Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War">Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/1988_Maldives_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat" title="1988 Maldives coup d'état">Operation <I>Cactus</I></A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Kargil_War" title="Kargil War">Kargil War</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir" title="Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir">Kashmir insurgency</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/2001_Bangladeshi-Indian_border_skirmish" class="mw-redirect" title="2001 Bangladeshi-Indian border skirmish">2001 Bangladeshi-Indian border skirmish</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/2001%E2%80%9302_India%E2%80%93Pakistan_standoff" title="2001–02 India–Pakistan standoff">Operation <I>Parakram</I></A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia" title="Piracy off the coast of Somalia">Piracy off the coast of Somalia</A></LI>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Category:Indian_Army" title="Category:Indian Army">Army</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Category:Indian_Navy" title="Category:Indian Navy">Navy</A></LI>
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<DIV id="Armed_conflicts_involving_the_People&#039;s_Republic_of_China" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><A href="/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China" title="List of wars involving the People's Republic of China">Armed conflicts</A> involving the <A href="/wiki/China" title="China">People's Republic of China</A></DIV>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Internal</TH>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War" title="Chinese Civil War">Chinese Civil War</A> (1927–50)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Kuomintang_Islamic_insurgency" title="Kuomintang Islamic insurgency">Kuomintang Islamic insurgency</A> (1950–58)</LI>
<LI><A href="/w/index.php?title=Kuomintang_insurgency&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Kuomintang insurgency (page does not exist)">Kuomintang insurgency</A> (1949-1961)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Chamdo" title="Battle of Chamdo">Battle of Chamdo</A> (1950)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/1959_Tibetan_uprising" title="1959 Tibetan uprising">Tibetan uprising</A> (1959)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Xinjiang_conflict" title="Xinjiang conflict">Xinjiang conflict</A> (1980–present)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989" title="Tiananmen Square protests of 1989">Tiananmen Square protests</A> (1989)</LI>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><A href="/wiki/Cross-Strait_relations" title="Cross-Strait relations">Cross-Taiwan Strait</A><BR />
(vs <A href="/wiki/Taiwan" title="Taiwan">Taiwan</A>)<BR />
<SMALL>(after 1 Oct 1949)</SMALL></TH>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Kuningtou" class="mw-redirect" title="Battle of Kuningtou">Kuningtou</A> (1949)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Dengbu_Island" title="Battle of Dengbu Island">Dengbu Island</A> (1949)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Landing_Operation_on_Hainan_Island" title="Landing Operation on Hainan Island">Hainan Island</A> (1950)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Nanri_Island" title="Battle of Nanri Island">Nanri Island</A> (1952)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Dongshan_Island_Campaign" title="Dongshan Island Campaign">Dongshan Island</A> (1953)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Yijiangshan_Islands" title="Battle of Yijiangshan Islands">Yijiangshan Islands</A> (1955)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Dachen_Archipelago" title="Battle of Dachen Archipelago">Dachen Archipelago</A> (1955)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Second_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis" title="Second Taiwan Strait Crisis">Second Taiwan Strait Crisis</A> (1958)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Campaign_at_the_China%E2%80%93Burma_border" class="mw-redirect" title="Campaign at the China–Burma border">Burmese border</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_Dong-Yin" title="Battle of Dong-Yin">Dong-Yin</A> (1965)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Third_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis" title="Third Taiwan Strait Crisis">Third Taiwan Strait Crisis</A> (1995–96)</LI>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Others</TH>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">vs <A href="/wiki/USSR" class="mw-redirect" title="USSR">USSR</A></TH>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Sino-Soviet_border_conflict" title="Sino-Soviet border conflict">Sino-Soviet border conflict</A> (1969)</LI>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">vs <A href="/wiki/United_States" title="United States">United States</A> and allies</TH>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Korean_War" title="Korean War">Korean War</A> (1950–53)</LI>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">vs <A href="/wiki/India" title="India">India</A></TH>
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<LI><A class="mw-selflink selflink">Sino-Indian War</A> (1962)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Chola_incident" class="mw-redirect" title="Chola incident">Chola incident</A> (1967)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/1987_Sino-Indian_skirmish" title="1987 Sino-Indian skirmish">Sino-Indian skirmish</A> (1987)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/2017_India_China_border_standoff" class="mw-redirect" title="2017 India China border standoff">Sino-Indian Standoff</A> (2017)</LI>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">vs <A href="/wiki/South_Vietnam" title="South Vietnam">South Vietnam</A>/<A href="/wiki/Vietnam" title="Vietnam">Vietnam</A></TH>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Battle_of_the_Paracel_Islands" title="Battle of the Paracel Islands">Paracel Islands</A> (1974)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War" title="Sino-Vietnamese War">Sino-Vietnamese War</A> (1979)</LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_conflicts_1979%E2%80%9390" title="Sino-Vietnamese conflicts 1979–90">Sino-Vietnamese conflicts 1979–90</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Johnson_South_Reef_Skirmish" title="Johnson South Reef Skirmish">Johnson South Reef Skirmish</A> (1988)</LI>
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<LI><A href="/wiki/Incorporation_of_Tibet_into_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China" title="Incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China">Incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/wiki/Incorporation_of_Xinjiang_into_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China" title="Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China">Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China</A></LI>
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<TH scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><A href="/wiki/Help:Authority_control" title="Help:Authority control">Authority control</A></TH>
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<LI><SPAN class="nowrap"><A href="/wiki/Integrated_Authority_File" title="Integrated Authority File">GND</A>: <SPAN class="uid"><A rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://d-nb.info/gnd/7649955-8">7649955-8</A></SPAN></SPAN></LI>
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					<LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ar"><A href="https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9" title="الحرب الصينية-الهندية – Arabic" lang="ar" hreflang="ar" class="interlanguage-link-target">العربية</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-as"><A href="https://as.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A6%AD%E0%A6%BE%E0%A7%B0%E0%A6%A4-%E0%A6%9A%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%A8_%E0%A6%AF%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A7" title="ভাৰত-চীন যুদ্ধ – Assamese" lang="as" hreflang="as" class="interlanguage-link-target">অসমীয়া</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-bn"><A href="https://bn.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A6%AD%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%A4-%E0%A6%9A%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%A8_%E0%A6%AF%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A7" title="ভারত-চীন যুদ্ধ – Bangla" lang="bn" hreflang="bn" class="interlanguage-link-target">বাংলা</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-cs"><A href="https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%8C%C3%ADnsko-indick%C3%A1_v%C3%A1lka" title="Čínsko-indická válka – Czech" lang="cs" hreflang="cs" class="interlanguage-link-target">Čeština</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-de"><A href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indisch-Chinesischer_Grenzkrieg" title="Indisch-Chinesischer Grenzkrieg – German" lang="de" hreflang="de" class="interlanguage-link-target">Deutsch</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-es"><A href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerra_sino-india" title="Guerra sino-india – Spanish" lang="es" hreflang="es" class="interlanguage-link-target">Español</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-eo"><A href="https://eo.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%88in-barata_Milito" title="Ĉin-barata Milito – Esperanto" lang="eo" hreflang="eo" class="interlanguage-link-target">Esperanto</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fr"><A href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerre_sino-indienne" title="Guerre sino-indienne – French" lang="fr" hreflang="fr" class="interlanguage-link-target">Français</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-gu"><A href="https://gu.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AB%A7%E0%AB%AF%E0%AB%AC%E0%AB%A8%E0%AA%A8%E0%AB%81%E0%AA%82_%E0%AA%AD%E0%AA%BE%E0%AA%B0%E0%AA%A4-%E0%AA%9A%E0%AB%80%E0%AA%A8_%E0%AA%AF%E0%AB%81%E0%AA%A6%E0%AB%8D%E0%AA%A7" title="૧૯૬૨નું ભારત-ચીન યુદ્ધ – Gujarati" lang="gu" hreflang="gu" class="interlanguage-link-target">ગુજરાતી</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ko"><A href="https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%9D%B8%EB%8F%84-%EC%A4%91%EA%B5%AD_%EC%A0%84%EC%9F%81" title="인도-중국 전쟁 – Korean" lang="ko" hreflang="ko" class="interlanguage-link-target">한국어</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hy"><A href="https://hy.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D5%89%D5%AB%D5%B6-%D5%B0%D5%B6%D5%A4%D5%AF%D5%A1%D5%AF%D5%A1%D5%B6_%D5%BD%D5%A1%D5%B0%D5%B4%D5%A1%D5%B6%D5%A1%D5%B5%D5%AB%D5%B6_%D5%BA%D5%A1%D5%BF%D5%A5%D6%80%D5%A1%D5%A6%D5%B4_(1962)" title="Չին-հնդկական սահմանային պատերազմ (1962) – Armenian" lang="hy" hreflang="hy" class="interlanguage-link-target">Հայերեն</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hi"><A href="https://hi.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A4%AD%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A4-%E0%A4%9A%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%A8_%E0%A4%AF%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A7" title="भारत-चीन युद्ध – Hindi" lang="hi" hreflang="hi" class="interlanguage-link-target">हिन्दी</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-id"><A href="https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perang_Tiongkok-India" title="Perang Tiongkok-India – Indonesian" lang="id" hreflang="id" class="interlanguage-link-target">Bahasa Indonesia</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-it"><A href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerra_sino-indiana" title="Guerra sino-indiana – Italian" lang="it" hreflang="it" class="interlanguage-link-target">Italiano</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-he"><A href="https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%AA_%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9F" title="מלחמת הודו-סין – Hebrew" lang="he" hreflang="he" class="interlanguage-link-target">עברית</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-kn"><A href="https://kn.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B2%AD%E0%B2%BE%E0%B2%B0%E0%B2%A4-%E0%B2%9A%E0%B3%80%E0%B2%A8_%E0%B2%AF%E0%B3%81%E0%B2%A6%E0%B3%8D%E0%B2%A7" title="ಭಾರತ-ಚೀನ ಯುದ್ಧ – Kannada" lang="kn" hreflang="kn" class="interlanguage-link-target">ಕನ್ನಡ</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ka"><A href="https://ka.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E1%83%A9%E1%83%98%E1%83%9C%E1%83%94%E1%83%97-%E1%83%98%E1%83%9C%E1%83%93%E1%83%9D%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1_%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98" title="ჩინეთ-ინდოეთის ომი – Georgian" lang="ka" hreflang="ka" class="interlanguage-link-target">ქართული</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-hu"><A href="https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%ADnai%E2%80%93indiai_h%C3%A1bor%C3%BA" title="Kínai–indiai háború – Hungarian" lang="hu" hreflang="hu" class="interlanguage-link-target">Magyar</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ml"><A href="https://ml.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B4%87%E0%B4%A8%E0%B5%8D%E0%B4%A4%E0%B5%8D%E0%B4%AF-%E0%B4%9A%E0%B5%88%E0%B4%A8_%E0%B4%AF%E0%B5%81%E0%B4%A6%E0%B5%8D%E0%B4%A7%E0%B4%82" title="ഇന്ത്യ-ചൈന യുദ്ധം – Malayalam" lang="ml" hreflang="ml" class="interlanguage-link-target">മലയാളം</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-mr"><A href="https://mr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A4%AD%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A4-%E0%A4%9A%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%A8_%E0%A4%AF%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A7" title="भारत-चीन युद्ध – Marathi" lang="mr" hreflang="mr" class="interlanguage-link-target">मराठी</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ms"><A href="https://ms.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perang_China-India" title="Perang China-India – Malay" lang="ms" hreflang="ms" class="interlanguage-link-target">Bahasa Melayu</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-nl"><A href="https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indiase_oorlog" title="Sino-Indiase oorlog – Dutch" lang="nl" hreflang="nl" class="interlanguage-link-target">Nederlands</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ja"><A href="https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%B0%E5%9B%BD%E5%A2%83%E7%B4%9B%E4%BA%89" title="中印国境紛争 – Japanese" lang="ja" hreflang="ja" class="interlanguage-link-target">日本語</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-no"><A href="https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Den_sino-indiske_krig" title="Den sino-indiske krig – Norwegian" lang="no" hreflang="no" class="interlanguage-link-target">Norsk</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-oc"><A href="https://oc.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gu%C3%A8rra_Sinoindiana" title="Guèrra Sinoindiana – Occitan" lang="oc" hreflang="oc" class="interlanguage-link-target">Occitan</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pa"><A href="https://pa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A8%AD%E0%A8%BE%E0%A8%B0%E0%A8%A4-%E0%A8%9A%E0%A9%80%E0%A8%A8_%E0%A8%9C%E0%A9%B0%E0%A8%97" title="ਭਾਰਤ-ਚੀਨ ਜੰਗ – Punjabi" lang="pa" hreflang="pa" class="interlanguage-link-target">ਪੰਜਾਬੀ</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pnb"><A href="https://pnb.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_%D8%AF%DB%8C_%D8%A8%DA%BE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA_%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86_%D9%84%DA%91%D8%A7%D8%A6%DB%8C" title="1962 دی بھارت چین لڑائی – Western Punjabi" lang="pnb" hreflang="pnb" class="interlanguage-link-target">پنجابی</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pl"><A href="https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojna_chi%C5%84sko-indyjska" title="Wojna chińsko-indyjska – Polish" lang="pl" hreflang="pl" class="interlanguage-link-target">Polski</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-pt"><A href="https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerra_sino-indiana" title="Guerra sino-indiana – Portuguese" lang="pt" hreflang="pt" class="interlanguage-link-target">Português</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ro"><A href="https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C4%83zboiul_Sino-Indian" title="Războiul Sino-Indian – Romanian" lang="ro" hreflang="ro" class="interlanguage-link-target">Română</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ru"><A href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%B0_(1962)" title="Китайско-индийская пограничная война (1962) – Russian" lang="ru" hreflang="ru" class="interlanguage-link-target">Русский</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sa"><A href="https://sa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%A4%AD%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%9A%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%A8%E0%A4%AF%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A7%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8D" title="भारतचीनयुद्धम् – Sanskrit" lang="sa" hreflang="sa" class="interlanguage-link-target">संस्कृतम्</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sr"><A href="https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B4%D0%B8%D1%98%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8_%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82" title="Кинеско-индијски рат – Serbian" lang="sr" hreflang="sr" class="interlanguage-link-target">Српски / srpski</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sh"><A href="https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinesko-indijski_rat" title="Kinesko-indijski rat – Serbo-Croatian" lang="sh" hreflang="sh" class="interlanguage-link-target">Srpskohrvatski / српскохрватски</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-fi"><A href="https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiinan%E2%80%93Intian_sota" title="Kiinan–Intian sota – Finnish" lang="fi" hreflang="fi" class="interlanguage-link-target">Suomi</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-sv"><A href="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinesisk-indiska_kriget" title="Kinesisk-indiska kriget – Swedish" lang="sv" hreflang="sv" class="interlanguage-link-target">Svenska</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ta"><A href="https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%87%E0%AE%A8%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%A4%E0%AE%BF%E0%AE%AF_%E0%AE%9A%E0%AF%80%E0%AE%A9%E0%AE%AA%E0%AF%8D_%E0%AE%AA%E0%AF%8B%E0%AE%B0%E0%AF%8D" title="இந்திய சீனப் போர் – Tamil" lang="ta" hreflang="ta" class="interlanguage-link-target">தமிழ்</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-te"><A href="https://te.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B0%AD%E0%B0%BE%E0%B0%B0%E0%B0%A4%E0%B1%8D_%E0%B0%9A%E0%B1%88%E0%B0%A8%E0%B0%BE_%E0%B0%AF%E0%B1%81%E0%B0%A6%E0%B1%8D%E0%B0%A7%E0%B0%82_1962" title="భారత్ చైనా యుద్ధం 1962 – Telugu" lang="te" hreflang="te" class="interlanguage-link-target">తెలుగు</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-th"><A href="https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%84%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A1%E0%B8%88%E0%B8%B5%E0%B8%99-%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%B4%E0%B8%99%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%94%E0%B8%B5%E0%B8%A2" title="สงครามจีน-อินเดีย – Thai" lang="th" hreflang="th" class="interlanguage-link-target">ไทย</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-tr"><A href="https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%87in-Hindistan_Sava%C5%9F%C4%B1" title="Çin-Hindistan Savaşı – Turkish" lang="tr" hreflang="tr" class="interlanguage-link-target">Türkçe</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-uk"><A href="https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0_%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%B0" title="Китайсько-індійська війна – Ukrainian" lang="uk" hreflang="uk" class="interlanguage-link-target">Українська</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-ur"><A href="https://ur.wikipedia.org/wiki/%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86_%D8%A8%DA%BE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA_%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF" title="چین بھارت جنگ – Urdu" lang="ur" hreflang="ur" class="interlanguage-link-target">اردو</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-vi"><A href="https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chi%E1%BA%BFn_tranh_Trung-%E1%BA%A4n" title="Chiến tranh Trung-Ấn – Vietnamese" lang="vi" hreflang="vi" class="interlanguage-link-target">Tiếng Việt</A></LI><LI class="interlanguage-link interwiki-zh"><A href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%B0%E8%BE%B9%E5%A2%83%E6%88%98%E4%BA%89" title="中印边境战争 – Chinese" lang="zh" hreflang="zh" class="interlanguage-link-target">中文</A></LI>				</UL>
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document_title: Sino-Indian War

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