fivethirthyeight--2020-07-14--What You Need To Know About Today’s Elections In Alabama, Maine And Texas

It ’ s runoff Tuesday !
Alabama and Texas held their congressional primaries all the way back in March , but there were two competitive U.S. Senate elections ( in addition to six House races worth watching ) in which no candidate got a majority of the vote .
The runoffs in those races finally take place today , after months of delay because of the coronavirus pandemic .
In addition , Maine also holds its rescheduled primaries Tuesday .
Making a political comeback isn ’ t easy when you ’ ve infuriated your party ’ s boss .
Just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who is now an underdog in the race for his former U.S. Senate seat .
After resigning from this seat to join President Trump ’ s cabinet in 2017 , Sessions earned Trump ’ s scorn by recusing himself from special counsel Robert Mueller ’ s investigation into alleged links between Russia and the Trump campaign in the 2016 election .
Trump derided Sessions for months and then sent him packing after the 2018 midterm election .
Sessions then decided to run for his old seat , but the president is backing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to block Sessions ’ s return to Washington .
Trump ’ s endorsees have had mixed results in recent weeks , but Tuberville looks favored to advance and face vulnerable Democratic Sen. Doug Jones in November .
Tuberville and Sessions won a similar share of the vote in the March 3 primary — Tuberville narrowly led Sessions 33 percent to 32 percent — but the polls now show Tuberville with a clear advantage .
The most recent survey , from Auburn University , found Tuberville ahead 47 percent to 31 percent , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A poll from Jones ’ s campaign and one from Republican pollster Cygnal put Tuberville ahead by more than 20 points , 54 percent to 32 percent and 55 percent to 32 percent , respectively .
Even Sessions ’ s own polling put him behind : A late May poll conducted on behalf of his campaign put Tuberville up 6 points , 49 percent to 43 percent .
But recent revelations about Tuberville ’ s past financial dealings could open the door for a late Sessions recovery .
About a decade ago , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because of fraud and Tuberville played a substantial role in bringing in potential investors .
It ’ s unclear , though , just how much voters may care about his past financial ventures .
Instead , Alabama Republicans will probably decide the race based on how close each candidate is to Trump .
And Tuberville and his allies have been only too happy to make it clear whom Trump supports and opposes : Club for Growth Action is running ads highlighting Trump ’ s endorsement , and Tuberville ’ s campaign released an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that if he could change one thing about his presidency , he wouldn ’ t have chosen Sessions to be attorney general .
For his part , Sessions has tried to fight back .
He ’ s hit Tuberville for not living in Alabama , and the former senator has even portrayed himself as an anti-establishment candidate .
He ’ s also maintained he is loyal to Trump , although the president ’ s campaign seems disinclined to accept that support .
In April , it sent a letter to Sessions demanding he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in his Senate campaign because it might mislead voters into thinking Trump backs Sessions .
No matter who wins , though , the GOP nominee will probably be favored against Jones in November .
The Auburn poll tested Jones against each Republican contender , and found Jones behind by 6 to 8 points .
And with Trump likely to win Alabama by a sizable margin at the top of the ticket , that should boost the chances of whichever Republican wins today ’ s runoff .
Like the other two states voting today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year is for U.S. Senate .
However , the Democratic primary to face vulnerable Republican Sen. Susan Collins is a mere formality : The party will almost certainly nominate state House Speaker Sara Gideon , whose campaign received the blessing of national Democrats over a year ago .
But Gideon ’ s nomination is still a milestone worth noting : The winner of the primary will automatically receive $ 4 million raised by left-leaning groups in the wake of Collins ’ s vote to confirm Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court in 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fire of an already red-hot race , as Collins and Gideon have been virtually tied in most polls this year .
The Republican primary in northern Maine ’ s 2nd Congressional District also promises to be a notable race .
After winning by only 1 percentage point ( and by the grace of Maine ’ s unique ranked-choice voting system ) in 2018 , Democratic Rep. Jared Golden will once again be fighting for his electoral life here in November .
And his opponent this time around will be either former gubernatorial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sen. Eric Brakey or former state Rep. Dale Crafts .
Brakey , who was the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in 2018 , has long looked like the front-runner : His $ 798,246 raised through June 24 was more than Crafts ( $ 329,851 ) and Bennett ( $ 174,021 ) combined .
But in late June , a mysterious super PAC began sending campaign mail attacking the libertarian-leaning Brakey for his allegedly insufficient loyalty to Trump ( he initially supported Sen. Rand Paul for president in 2016 ) .
Since then , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a recent poll by SurveyUSA found that Crafts was the first choice of 37 percent of likely Republican primary voters , followed by Bennett with 25 percent and Brakey with 19 percent .
( With ranked-choice voting , that wouldn ’ t be enough to win the nomination outright , but the poll also found that Crafts was the top second choice of Bennett and Brakey supporters . )
Crafts , a more traditional conservative , has the endorsement of former Gov .
Paul LePage plus an inspiring story to tell as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now uses a wheelchair .
Texas has enough runoffs to fill a 10-gallon hat , but the big statewide race is the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate between former Air Force helicopter pilot MJ Hegar and state Sen. Royce West .
( The winner will advance to face three-term Republican Sen. John Cornyn in November . )
Hegar , who ran for the House in 2018 , is the preferred choice of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee , but West could very well win .
In the crowded March 3 primary , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the vote — Hegar ’ s 22 percent to West ’ s 15 percent — meaning there is a lot of unaligned support up for grabs today .
Notably for West , most of the other major candidates endorsed him — including Cristina Tzintzún Ramirez , who finished third with 13 percent — whereas none backed Hegar .
We have two recent polls of the runoff , and both show the race is very much up for grabs .
A survey from The Dallas Morning News/UT-Tyler found Hegar up by 12 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but with a huge number of undecideds , while a poll from Cornyn ’ s campaign found Hegar ahead by 4 points , 39 percent to West ’ s 35 percent .
But Hegar has a big fundraising edge : As of June 24 , she had raised about $ 6.5 million to West ’ s $ 1.8 million , and she had about 10 times as much in her campaign war chest — $ 1.6 million to $ 160,000 .
Hegar ’ s campaign and her allies at the DSCC and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2 million for ads in the final week of the campaign , giving her around an 85-to-1 spending advantage over West , according to calculations by the Texas Tribune .
But West ’ s campaign may be on the upswing because of the heightened focus on race and policing after George Floyd was killed by Minneapolis police in May .
West , who is African American , recently said the “ stars have aligned ” for his campaign because of his focus on criminal justice reform in the state legislature .
He has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Cornyn and for voting in the 2016 Republican presidential primary ( Hegar says she cast a protest vote for Carly Fiorina against Trump ) .
For her part , Hegar has run an ad opposing family separation at the border and systemic racism .
She ’ s also cast West as a political insider who ’ s worked on behalf of his personal self-interest rather than for his constituents .
Regardless of who wins , though , the nominee will start out as an underdog against Cornyn .
But with Joe Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Star State , the Senate race could be close , too .
There are also runoffs in four competitive House races : • 10th District Democratic runoff : In a familiar theme for 2020 primaries , this race has revolved around electability .
Physician Pritesh Gandhi has faulted civil-rights lawyer Mike Siegel for losing to GOP Rep. Michael McCaul here by 4 points in 2018 , even as former Rep. Beto O ’ Rourke was carrying this Austin-to-Houston district in the Senate race .
Siegel , who is endorsed by Sens .
Bernie @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policies like the Green New Deal and Medicare for All , while Gandhi ’ s more cautious views align more with Joe Biden ’ s .
Siegel outpaced Gandhi 44 percent to 33 percent in the first round , but Gandhi spent more during the pre-runoff disclosure period ( April 1 through June 24 ) , $ 189,079 to $ 154,691 , and has been the beneficiary of six mailers and a TV ad from 314 Action , an outside group that supports scientists running for office .
• 22nd District Republican runoff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican-held open seat in suburban Houston , Fort Bend County Sheriff Troy Nehls finished well ahead of businesswoman Kathaleen Wall ( 40 percent to 19 percent ) .
But Wall has deployed her tremendous financial advantage ( she ’ s given or loaned almost $ 7.5 million to her own campaign ) to smear Nehls for not taking sex trafficking seriously as sheriff , with some provocative TV ads featuring a survivor and her parents .
Nehls has said he simply doesn ’ t have enough money for ads of his own , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his March supporters stay loyal .
• 23rd District Republican runoff : This Republican-held open seat along the Texas-Mexico border is seen as one of Democrats ’ best pickup opportunities in the entire nation , but GOP honchos like House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy believe they have a formidable candidate in former Navy cryptologist Tony Gonzales .
That said , not every Republican is on board .
On June 30 , Sen. Ted Cruz endorsed Gonzales ’ s runoff opponent , Air Force veteran and businessman Raul Reyes , who many Republicans fear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views .
In response , Trump weighed in on Gonzales ’ s behalf ( reportedly at McCarthy ’ s urging ) , pitting the two old rivals against each other once again .
This time , it could go either way , too : Gonzales only narrowly outpolled Reyes in the first round , 28 percent to 23 percent , and although he significantly outspent him in the pre-runoff period , $ 207,226 to $ 101,131 , that doesn ’ t account for the ( at least ) $ 109,788 Cruz is spending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s behalf .
• 24th District Democratic runoff : This suburban Dallas-Fort Worth seat is yet another GOP-held open seat Democrats are trying to flip .
With few policy differences between the Democratic candidates — retired Air Force Colonel Kim Olson and former Carrollton-Farmers Branch school board member Candace Valenzuela — the runoff has turned on their identities and experience .
Valenzuela , a 36-year-old who would be the first Black Latina to serve in Congress , represents the new generation of Democratic politicians .
She has the support of several former presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as all three components of the Congressional Tri-Caucus : the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus , the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus ( the first 2020 candidate to achieve that hat trick ) .
Meanwhile , Olson touts her extensive resume , first as one of the first female fighter pilots and then as human-resources director of the Dallas school district — though she ’ s come under fire for the district ’ s budget deficit and firing of hundreds of teachers ( problems that predated her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 41 percent to 30 percent in the first round of voting , a recent poll sponsored by one of Valenzuela ’ s endorsers found the reverse — Valenzuela 52 percent , Olson 37 percent — after a coalition of outside groups dropped “ high six figures ” on pro-Valenzuela mail , television and digital advertising .
A couple of safe Republican seats also have some intriguing runoffs , with the winner in each more or less guaranteed to head to the House .
Here ’ s what ’ s happening in those two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Lobbyist Josh Winegarner finished well ahead of former White House physician Ronny Jackson in the March 3 primary , 39 percent to 20 percent .
Winegarner might seem like a favorite , given his first-round edge and his endorsement from long-time Rep. Mac Thornberry , whose retirement opened up this North Texas seat .
However , Jackson has Trump ’ s backing , as well as the endorsement of Chris Ekstrom , who finished third in the primary with 15 percent .
Jackson has also outraised Winegarner since the runoff period began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support as Winegarner .
Plus , the only surveys of the runoff show Jackson ahead , though they both come from groups allied with Jackson — the Club for Growth and Miles for Greatness Fund — but all in all , this race could go either way .
• 17th District Republican runoff : Jeff isn ’ t the only Sessions trying to mount a political comeback today .
Former Rep. Pete Sessions , who lost his 2018 reelection bid in Texas ’ s 32nd Congressional District , shifted his political aspirations 100 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 17th District , where his childhood home of Waco is located .
However , retiring GOP Rep. Bill Flores has opposed Sessions ’ s attempt to take over his seat , instead backing businesswoman Renee Swann in the runoff .
On March 3 , Sessions garnered 32 percent to Swann ’ s 19 percent in a crowded primary , and he ’ s since gotten the endorsement of third-place finisher George Hindman , who was just behind Swann with 18 percent .
But Swann ’ s attacks on Sessions ’ s carpetbagging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign funds to pay legal bills , could be enough for her to beat him today .
As usual , don ’ t be surprised if we don ’ t get full results tonight .
All three states have seen an increase in the use of mail ballots , which take longer to count .
That said , relatively low turnout could make it easier for Alabama to report most of its votes on election night , and most Texans may still decide to vote in person since the state declined to allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote absentee .
Maine ’ s results will likely take the longest , due to the likelihood that voters ’ second or third choices on their ranked-choice ballots will decide the winner .

It’s runoff Tuesday! Alabama and Texas held their congressional primaries all the way back in March, but there were two competitive U.S. Senate elections (in addition to six House races worth watching) in which no candidate got a majority of the vote. The runoffs in those races finally take place today, after months of delay because of the coronavirus pandemic. In addition, Maine also holds its rescheduled primaries Tuesday.
Alabama
Making a political comeback isn’t easy when you’ve infuriated your party’s boss. Just ask former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who is now an underdog in the race for his former U.S. Senate seat.
After resigning from this seat to join President Trump’s cabinet in 2017, Sessions earned Trump’s scorn by recusing himself from special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into alleged links between Russia and the Trump campaign in the 2016 election. Trump derided Sessions for months and then sent him packing after the 2018 midterm election. Sessions then decided to run for his old seat, but the president is backing former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville to block Sessions’s return to Washington. Trump’s endorsees have had mixed results in recent weeks, but Tuberville looks favored to advance and face vulnerable Democratic Sen. Doug Jones in November.
Tuberville and Sessions won a similar share of the vote in the March 3 primary — Tuberville narrowly led Sessions 33 percent to 32 percent — but the polls now show Tuberville with a clear advantage. The most recent survey, from Auburn University, found Tuberville ahead 47 percent to 31 percent, and two May surveys found similar results. A poll from Jones’s campaign and one from Republican pollster Cygnal put Tuberville ahead by more than 20 points, 54 percent to 32 percent and 55 percent to 32 percent, respectively. Even Sessions’s own polling put him behind: A late May poll conducted on behalf of his campaign put Tuberville up 6 points, 49 percent to 43 percent.
[Related: Our 2020 National Polling Averages]
But recent revelations about Tuberville’s past financial dealings could open the door for a late Sessions recovery. About a decade ago, Tuberville co-founded a hedge fund that collapsed because of fraud and Tuberville played a substantial role in bringing in potential investors. It’s unclear, though, just how much voters may care about his past financial ventures.
Instead, Alabama Republicans will probably decide the race based on how close each candidate is to Trump. And Tuberville and his allies have been only too happy to make it clear whom Trump supports and opposes: Club for Growth Action is running ads highlighting Trump’s endorsement, and Tuberville’s campaign released an ad featuring an interview of Trump saying that if he could change one thing about his presidency, he wouldn’t have chosen Sessions to be attorney general. For his part, Sessions has tried to fight back. He’s hit Tuberville for not living in Alabama, and the former senator has even portrayed himself as an anti-establishment candidate. He’s also maintained he is loyal to Trump, although the president’s campaign seems disinclined to accept that support. In April, it sent a letter to Sessions demanding he cease using the president’s name in his Senate campaign because it might mislead voters into thinking Trump backs Sessions.
No matter who wins, though, the GOP nominee will probably be favored against Jones in November. The Auburn poll tested Jones against each Republican contender, and found Jones behind by 6 to 8 points. And with Trump likely to win Alabama by a sizable margin at the top of the ticket, that should boost the chances of whichever Republican wins today’s runoff.
Maine
Like the other two states voting today, the marquee race in Maine this year is for U.S. Senate. However, the Democratic primary to face vulnerable Republican Sen. Susan Collins is a mere formality: The party will almost certainly nominate state House Speaker Sara Gideon, whose campaign received the blessing of national Democrats over a year ago. But Gideon’s nomination is still a milestone worth noting: The winner of the primary will automatically receive more than $4 million raised by left-leaning groups in relation to Collins’s vote to confirm Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court in 2018. That should add more fuel to the fire of an already red-hot race, as Collins and Gideon have been virtually tied in most polls this year.
The Republican primary in northern Maine’s 2nd Congressional District also promises to be a notable race. After winning by only 1 percentage point (and by the grace of Maine’s unique ranked-choice voting system) in 2018, Democratic Rep. Jared Golden will once again be fighting for his electoral life here in November. And his opponent this time around will be either former gubernatorial press secretary Adrienne Bennett, former state Sen. Eric Brakey or former state Rep. Dale Crafts.
[Related: How Popular Is President Donald Trump?]
Brakey, who was the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in 2018, has long looked like the front-runner: His $798,246 raised through June 24 was more than Crafts ($329,851) and Bennett ($174,021) combined. But in late June, a mysterious super PAC began sending campaign mail attacking the libertarian-leaning Brakey for his allegedly insufficient loyalty to Trump (he initially supported Sen. Rand Paul for president in 2016). Since then, Brakey has acted like an underdog, and a recent poll by SurveyUSA found that Crafts was the first choice of 37 percent of likely Republican primary voters, followed by Bennett with 25 percent and Brakey with 19 percent. (With ranked-choice voting, that wouldn’t be enough to win the nomination outright, but the poll also found that Crafts was the top second choice of Bennett and Brakey supporters.) Crafts, a more traditional conservative, has the endorsement of former Gov. Paul LePage plus an inspiring story to tell as the survivor of a 1983 accident who now uses a wheelchair.
Texas
Texas has enough runoffs to fill a 10-gallon hat, but the big statewide race is the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate between former Air Force helicopter pilot MJ Hegar and state Sen. Royce West. (The winner will advance to face three-term Republican Sen. John Cornyn in November.)
Hegar, who ran for the House in 2018, is the preferred choice of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, but West could very well win. In the crowded March 3 primary, the two candidates combined to win about 37 percent of the vote — Hegar’s 22 percent to West’s 15 percent — meaning there is a lot of unaligned support up for grabs today. Notably for West, most of the other major candidates endorsed him — including Cristina Tzintzún Ramirez, who finished third with 13 percent — whereas none backed Hegar.
We have two recent polls of the runoff, and both show the race is very much up for grabs. A survey from The Dallas Morning News/UT-Tyler found Hegar up by 12 points, 32 percent to 20 percent, but with a huge number of undecideds, while a poll from Cornyn’s campaign found Hegar ahead by 4 points, 39 percent to West’s 35 percent. But Hegar has a big fundraising edge: As of June 24, she had raised about $6.5 million to West’s $1.8 million, and she had about 10 times as much in her campaign war chest — $1.6 million to $160,000. Hegar’s campaign and her allies at the DSCC and Emily’s List allocated about $2 million for ads in the final week of the campaign, giving her around an 85-to-1 spending advantage over West, according to calculations by the Texas Tribune.
[Related: An Updating Estimate Of The Congressional Generic Ballot]
But West’s campaign may be on the upswing because of the heightened focus on race and policing after George Floyd was killed by Minneapolis police in May. West, who is African American, recently said the “stars have aligned” for his campaign because of his focus on criminal justice reform in the state legislature. He has also hit Hegar for a past donation to Cornyn and for voting in the 2016 Republican presidential primary (Hegar says she cast a protest vote for Carly Fiorina against Trump). For her part, Hegar has run an ad opposing family separation at the border and systemic racism. She’s also cast West as a political insider who’s worked on behalf of his personal self-interest rather than for his constituents.
Regardless of who wins, though, the nominee will start out as an underdog against Cornyn. But with Joe Biden running neck-and-neck with Trump in the Lone Star State, the Senate race could be close, too.
There are also runoffs in four competitive House races:
A couple of safe Republican seats also have some intriguing runoffs, with the winner in each more or less guaranteed to head to the House. Here’s what’s happening in those two races:
As usual, don’t be surprised if we don’t get full results tonight. All three states have seen an increase in the use of mail ballots, which take longer to count. That said, relatively low turnout could make it easier for Alabama to report most of its votes on election night, and most Texans may still decide to vote in person since the state declined to allow the pandemic as a valid excuse to vote absentee. Maine’s results will likely take the longest, due to the likelihood that voters’ second or third choices on their ranked-choice ballots will decide the winner.
CLARIFICATION (July 14, 2020, 11:32 a.m.): This story has been updated to reflect the fact that while left-leaning groups raised money because of Sen. Collins’s vote to confirm Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, most of this money was raised before the confirmation vote took place. To date, the groups have raised more than $4.1 million.
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fivethirthyeight--2020-07-14--White Democrats Are Wary Of Big Ideas To Address Racial Inequality

Even before a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd , leading to a renewed national conversation about racial inequality , white Democrats were already pretty “ woke ” on some issues .
An overwhelming majority of white Democrats said that racial discrimination was a major barrier to Black people getting ahead in America , that the police and the broader criminal justice system in America treated Black people unfairly and that the legacy of slavery still affected Black Americans today .
And on issues of criminal justice and policing in particular , white and Black Democrats held fairly similar views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have shown even greater wokeness among white Democrats ( and Americans more broadly ) .
White Democrats now view the police even less favorably and the Black Lives Matter movement more favorably , and they are also more likely to agree that Black people face “ a great deal ” or “ a lot ” of discrimination in America today .
What we don ’ t know yet is whether white Democrats have moved significantly on racial issues beyond policing and discrimination in general — issues that deal with more material concerns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Most polling since Floyd ’ s death has focused on policing , Confederate monuments and other topics that have been in the news .
But here ’ s what we do know right now .
In polling both before and even since Floyd ’ s death , white Democrats have been fairly opposed to giving reparations to the descendants of enslaved people , an idea supported by a clear majority of Black Democrats .
And on a wide range of other policy ideas intended to address racial inequality , white Democrats are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more opposed to all these policies across the board , which is why we ’ re focusing on white Democrats here . )
To look at these differences more closely , we focused on areas of American life where there is documented racial inequality .
We then searched for polling on those issues .
Our aim was to find the most recent polling available , in part to see whether views on major issues had changed in the wake of Floyd ’ s death , but for many issues , we had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Floyd was killed .
We found results in four major areas : income inequality , education , housing and the workplace .
The wage gap between Black and white Americans has been rising for decades , and this gap persists , even accounting for educational levels , with white college graduates earning much more than Black college graduates .
Moreover , wealth in the United States is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of white Americans .
Experts argue that mere changes in individual behavior is not enough to reduce these gaps , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda to address racial income and wealth disparities .
White Democrats support increasing taxes on the incomes of very high-earning Americans as well as taxing the wealth of people with a high net worth , according to polls .
Recent surveys suggest that white Democrats may be even more supportive of these ideas than Black Democrats .
That said , white Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of providing reparations to Black Americans as restitution for slavery or to make up for past and current discrimination that African Americans have faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across a number of surveys , is telling , because reparations are clearly intended to benefit Black people specifically and in a way that , for example , expanding health care through a wealth tax is not .
Floyd ’ s death and the heightened discussion around racism that followed have not led to substantial support for reparations among white Democrats .
In late April and early May this year , a quarter of white Democrats supported reparations , according to polling from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape .
In more recent polls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of white Democrats .
That ’ s a substantial increase but still nowhere near the support this policy has among Black Democrats .
About two-thirds of Black Americans supported reparations both before and after Floyd ’ s death .
Education experts generally favor greater school integration and argue that it is an important tool in ensuring black Americans get a high-quality education .
White Democrats are fairly supportive of ideas like creating magnet schools that may draw in kids from across a community and redrawing school district lines to increase racial diversity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about as supportive of these policies as Black Democrats are .
White Democrats are also mostly in favor of having the federal government take actions to increase school integration , a step that was strongly opposed by many white Americans in the era after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling .
( There are reasons to be skeptical of this polling and think that some white Democrats may be lying about their true preferences , but we ’ ll come back to that later . )
There is division @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of forcing students to attend a school farther away from their home or in a school district outside their neighborhood to ensure schools are integrated .
Those policies have some echoes of the controversial “ busing ” policies implemented after Brown v. Board and subsequent rulings that resulted in greater racial integration of schools but that also angered many white Americans .
Notably , both Black and white Democrats are wary of race and ethnicity being factors in college admissions decisions , at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Schools normally take this step , in part , to increase the number of Black students attending , so it ’ s somewhat surprising that this policy is not more popular among Black Democrats .
In all , though , we see the same trend in education as in income : Support among white Democrats dips for more aggressive policies , particularly ones with explicit trade-offs or downsides for white people .
On these education questions , the only polling we have available was conducted before Floyd ’ s death , so it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But if views on wealth and income policies are any guide , we might still see gaps between white and Black Democrats regardless .
Many U.S. cities have distinct areas with predominantly Black populations , often because of policies created in the past to keep Black people in certain neighborhoods and out of others .
Many heavily Black areas have high numbers of people living in poverty and relatively few amenities like supermarkets .
Some of these communities face an intense and at times unwelcome police presence .
Therefore , racial inequality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to polls , white Democrats say they support efforts to build more housing in their neighborhoods , even low-income housing in suburban and upper-income areas .
( Again , we will come back to why you should be somewhat skeptical of these responses . )
But white Democrats don ’ t really prioritize residential integration , according to a 2019 Pew poll .
Only about one-third of white Democrats said they wished their community were more racially mixed , with the vast majority ( 60 percent ) saying they were fine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
Black Democrats answered fairly similarly to white Democrats on these questions — favoring more housing in their neighborhoods and low-income housing in the suburbs , but most ( 62 percent ) said they were happy with the current racial composition of their community .
But , unlike with measures aimed at reducing racial inequalities in income and education , where Black and white Democrats disagreed , white Democrats , like their Black counterparts , support aggressive interventions to reduce racial inequality in housing .
The finding that Black Democrats are happy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communities is not surprising .
Black Democrats living in heavily Black areas may want some of the positive attributes of heavily white neighborhoods ( like grocery stores and other amenities ) but may not necessarily want to move to whiter neighborhoods themselves — or have more white people move to their neighborhoods and change the character of the area .
Again , this data was collected before Floyd ’ s death , so we ’ ll need new polling to see whether views among white or Black Democrats have changed .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overwhelmingly want racially diverse workplaces and , when generally defined , support affirmative action .
Though a minority of white men believe that affirmative action has made it harder for them to find work , the vast majority of white and Black Democrats agree that Black people are treated less fairly than white people in employment situations .
But while both white and Black Democrats value workplace diversity and recognize unfairness in employment situations , neither group thinks race and ethnicity should be taken into account when making decisions about promotions or hiring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase workplace diversity .
That view in some ways contradicts Black and white Democrats ’ support of affirmative action and a racially diverse workplace , but nevertheless , Black Democrats share white Democrats ’ reluctance to embrace a more aggressive position that might increase racial equality in the workplace .
What ’ s going on here ?
Considering the long history of racial discrimination in employment , it ’ s likely that Black Democrats are worried that factoring race into the job application or promotion process would hurt them , even if that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Alternatively , Black Democrats and their white counterparts might be hoping that diversity can be achieved without the direct consideration of race at the individual level , therefore explaining their wariness about considering race in hiring and promotions , as well as in college admissions .
That may or may not change in the wake of Floyd ’ s death and the national conversation about systemic racism ; again , we ’ ll need new polls to know .
Does the data overstate — or understate — white Democrats ’ commitment to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear : White Democrats — definitely before Floyd was killed but most likely afterward too — are more circumspect about ideas promoting racial equality that might be disruptive to the status quo for white people .
But it ’ s worth considering two other readings of these numbers .
It ’ s possible that this data is overstating the support of white Democrats , even for more mild policy proposals to reduce racial inequality .
Indeed , before the protests precipitated by Floyd ’ s death , the Democratic Party was increasingly connected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if you identify as a Democrat or liberal , there may be pressure to say in a survey that you support ideas to address racial inequality — whether you really do or not .
Experts refer to this as “ social desirability bias ” and say it plagues polling around racial issues , in particular .
“ [ F ] or scholars studying White liberals in this period , you must take into account [ the ] possibility that White liberals are responding expressively .
That is , they are aware of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answer that ‘ bad ’ White people give , and don ’ t wan na be bad White ppl , ” Stanford University political science professor Hakeem Jefferson wrote in a Twitter thread last year , raising doubts about polling results that show white liberals expressing as high or higher concerns about racial inequality than some Black Americans .
“ I ’ m not saying we ought not believe White liberals when they tell us on surveys they are racially progressive .
I am , however , suggesting that we treat these data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ date , ” he added .
“ I stand by these points and have made them again recently — the key point is that we need to think about tradeoffs and consider what happens when white folks are forced to give up their privilege , ” Jefferson told us recently .
Another reason to be skeptical of white Democrats ’ commitment to addressing racial inequality is to look at their actions .
In cities such as New York and San Francisco , where white voters tend to be Democratic-leaning , schools and neighborhoods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s not clear that a lot of elected officials in these cities are trying that hard to change those dynamics , which suggests that voters may have elected people they knew would maintain the racial status quo .
Finally , a sizable gap remains between Black Democrats and white Democrats even on issues that would seem less fraught than , say , reparations or school integration .
White Democrats , for example , are significantly less likely than Black Democrats to support taking down Confederate monuments , according to a recent ABC News/Ipsos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of policies and views that don ’ t fall neatly into one of the buckets we covered above , there is still a significant gap between white and Black Democrats .
But it ’ s also worth considering whether this data is understating the potential support of white Democrats for fairly drastic proposals to address racial inequality .
After all , we have seen huge increases in the past decade in the share of white Democrats who say America must take additional steps to ensure equal rights for Black people and who say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s still less than half .
These recent shifts are likely due in part to the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement — in addition , views on race and identity are now one of the major dividing lines between the two parties , and party rhetoric on these issues is crystallizing .
( Increasingly , when people who identify as Democrats see their party leaders suggest that the police are treating Black people unfairly , they ’ ll adopt that stance as well , new research indicates . )
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more general , policies and views .
The recent protests against systemic racism and police brutality against Black people could cause a racial awakening — a second one just in this decade — for white Democrats .
People who are trying to learn more about systemic racism and what they can do to reverse it ( books about racial equality are in high demand , for example ) may end up shifting their views in ways that may not be apparent in polls right now or even three months from now .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ by signaling from elites — for instance , the push by leaders of the University of California system to allow race to once again be considered in the admissions process and a New York Times Magazine cover story calling for reparations .
Also , we may be entering a period of peak “ white collective guilt , ” which scholars define as “ remorse that a white person experiences due to her group ’ s actions toward black people , ” not necessarily due to her individual actions .
White Democrats are more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collective guilt , and these feelings predict support for affirmative action and general aid for Black Americans .
“ It is one thing to say one believes in the existence of systemic racism and another to do something about it , ” said Robert Griffin , a polling and public opinion expert who is the research director of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group .
“ However , these somewhat superficial changes are still important .
For the public , they create opportunities to recognize the gap between stated belief and lived action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feeling pressured to bring the two into closer alignment.
” Finally , many of these polls are asking fairly imprecise questions about racial policy ideas that aren ’ t totally fleshed out .
Specific plans for reparations , particularly proposals that would be funded largely by new taxes on the very wealthy or some other mechanism that does not target the incomes of most white Americans , might be fairly popular with white Democrats , or at least less unpopular than reparations defined generically and without details .
To conclude , you should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats are very “ woke ” on policy matters of substance , or even more concerned about racial inequality than Black Americans are .
That doesn ’ t seem true — at least not yet , whether you are reading polls or visiting a public school and notice that , though it ’ s in a liberal-leaning area of the country , it ’ s still not very racially mixed .
That said , however , it seems that white Democrats have dramatically shifted their views on racial issues over the past 10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they hadn ’ t picked up on ( or had even ignored ) before .
And so their views and priorities may keep shifting — which could translate to more substantive actions , like looking for integrated schools for their children or even supporting some kind of modest approach to reparations .

Even before a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd, leading to a renewed national conversation about racial inequality, white Democrats were already pretty “woke” on some issues. An overwhelming majority of white Democrats said that racial discrimination was a major barrier to Black people getting ahead in America, that the police and the broader criminal justice system in America treated Black people unfairly and that the legacy of slavery still affected Black Americans today. And on issues of criminal justice and policing in particular, white and Black Democrats held fairly similar views. Surveys since Floyd’s death have shown even greater wokeness among white Democrats (and Americans more broadly). White Democrats now view the police even less favorably and the Black Lives Matter movement more favorably, and they are also more likely to agree that Black people face “a great deal” or “a lot” of discrimination in America today.
What we don’t know yet is whether white Democrats have moved significantly on racial issues beyond policing and discrimination in general — issues that deal with more material concerns, such as school integration and wealth redistribution. Most polling since Floyd’s death has focused on policing, Confederate monuments and other topics that have been in the news.
[Related: There’s A Huge Gap In How Republicans And Democrats See Discrimination]
But here’s what we do know right now. In polling both before and even since Floyd’s death, white Democrats have been fairly opposed to giving reparations to the descendants of enslaved people, an idea supported by a clear majority of Black Democrats. And on a wide range of other policy ideas intended to address racial inequality, white Democrats are fairly tentative. (Republicans are much more opposed to all these policies across the board, which is why we’re focusing on white Democrats here.)
To look at these differences more closely, we focused on areas of American life where there is documented racial inequality. We then searched for polling on those issues. Our aim was to find the most recent polling available, in part to see whether views on major issues had changed in the wake of Floyd’s death, but for many issues, we had to rely on older polling, conducted before Floyd was killed. We found results in four major areas: income inequality, education, housing and the workplace.
Income Inequality
The wage gap between Black and white Americans has been rising for decades, and this gap persists, even accounting for educational levels, with white college graduates earning much more than Black college graduates. Moreover, wealth in the United States is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of white Americans. Experts argue that mere changes in individual behavior is not enough to reduce these gaps, and that the government must have a specific agenda to address racial income and wealth disparities.
White Democrats support increasing taxes on the incomes of very high-earning Americans as well as taxing the wealth of people with a high net worth, according to polls. Recent surveys suggest that white Democrats may be even more supportive of these ideas than Black Democrats.
That said, white Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of providing reparations to Black Americans as restitution for slavery or to make up for past and current discrimination that African Americans have faced. That divide, which is consistent across a number of surveys, is telling, because reparations are clearly intended to benefit Black people specifically and in a way that, for example, expanding health care through a wealth tax is not.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at addressing racial wealth and income inequality Percentage of respondents who support each policy or issue Policy Pollster Month/year of poll White Democrats Black Democrats Democratic race gap Wealth Tax Reuters/Ipsos 12/19 82% 69% +13 Wealth Tax Nationscape 6/20-7/20 82 71 +11 Issue Pollster Month/year of poll White Democrats Black Democrats Democratic race gap Reparations AP-NORC 9/19 28% 81% -54 Reparations Gallup 6/19-7/19 32 80 -48 Reparations ABC/Ipsos 6/20 36 78 -42 Reparations Nationscape 6/20-7/20 33 69 -36 Reparations Vice/Ipsos 1/20 34 68 -34 Each poll used slightly different question wording; respondents were counted in favor if they said they somewhat or strongly supported the idea, or if they said the policy should be enacted. The Nationscape question on taxing the wealthy specified raising taxes on households making more than $600,000 a year.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Floyd’s death and the heightened discussion around racism that followed have not led to substantial support for reparations among white Democrats. In late April and early May this year, a quarter of white Democrats supported reparations, according to polling from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape. In more recent polls, that support has grown to 33 percent of white Democrats. That’s a substantial increase but still nowhere near the support this policy has among Black Democrats. About two-thirds of Black Americans supported reparations both before and after Floyd’s death.
Education
Education experts generally favor greater school integration and argue that it is an important tool in ensuring black Americans get a high-quality education.
White Democrats are fairly supportive of ideas like creating magnet schools that may draw in kids from across a community and redrawing school district lines to increase racial diversity. In fact, they’re about as supportive of these policies as Black Democrats are. White Democrats are also mostly in favor of having the federal government take actions to increase school integration, a step that was strongly opposed by many white Americans in the era after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling. (There are reasons to be skeptical of this polling and think that some white Democrats may be lying about their true preferences, but we’ll come back to that later.)
There is division about more aggressive ideas, however. White Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of forcing students to attend a school farther away from their home or in a school district outside their neighborhood to ensure schools are integrated. Those policies have some echoes of the controversial “busing” policies implemented after Brown v. Board and subsequent rulings that resulted in greater racial integration of schools but that also angered many white Americans.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at integrating schools Percentage of respondents who favor each policy Policy Pollster Month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Busing kids to other school districts Gallup 7/19 49% 71% -22 Having students attend schools outside their local community Pew Research 1/19-2/19 52 71 -19 Involving the federal government in school integration Gallup 7/19 65 83 -18 Creating more magnet schools Gallup 7/19 80 86 -6 Considering race and ethnicity in college admissions decisions Pew Research 1/19-2/19 34 39 -5 Redrawing school district lines Gallup 7/19 75 77 -2 Respondents were counted in favor if they said the policy should be enacted, they favored the proposal, or race and ethnicity should be a major or minor factor in college admissions.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Notably, both Black and white Democrats are wary of race and ethnicity being factors in college admissions decisions, at least according to a 2019 Pew survey. Schools normally take this step, in part, to increase the number of Black students attending, so it’s somewhat surprising that this policy is not more popular among Black Democrats.
In all, though, we see the same trend in education as in income: Support among white Democrats dips for more aggressive policies, particularly ones with explicit trade-offs or downsides for white people. On these education questions, the only polling we have available was conducted before Floyd’s death, so it’s possible that opinions have shifted. But if views on wealth and income policies are any guide, we might still see gaps between white and Black Democrats regardless.
Housing
Many U.S. cities have distinct areas with predominantly Black populations, often because of policies created in the past to keep Black people in certain neighborhoods and out of others. Many heavily Black areas have high numbers of people living in poverty and relatively few amenities like supermarkets. Some of these communities face an intense and at times unwelcome police presence. Therefore, racial inequality experts generally want to increase housing integration.
According to polls, white Democrats say they support efforts to build more housing in their neighborhoods, even low-income housing in suburban and upper-income areas. (Again, we will come back to why you should be somewhat skeptical of these responses.) But white Democrats don’t really prioritize residential integration, according to a 2019 Pew poll. Only about one-third of white Democrats said they wished their community were more racially mixed, with the vast majority (60 percent) saying they were fine with the current racial mix of their community.
Black Democrats answered fairly similarly to white Democrats on these questions — favoring more housing in their neighborhoods and low-income housing in the suburbs, but most (62 percent) said they were happy with the current racial composition of their community. But, unlike with measures aimed at reducing racial inequalities in income and education, where Black and white Democrats disagreed, white Democrats, like their Black counterparts, support aggressive interventions to reduce racial inequality in housing.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at integrating neighborhoods and their own communities Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or hold each view Policy or view Pollster Month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems DEM
RACE GAP Building more houses, condos and apartments in their community Cato 3/19 66% 70% -4 Building more low-income housing in the suburbs Gallup 7/19 79 82 -3 Saying their community is not racially diverse enough Pew Research 1/19-2/19 36 31 +5 Cato respondents were counted in favor if they said they somewhat or strongly favored the policy. Pew Research respondents were asked whether they wished their community were more racially mixed, less racially mixed or about as racially mixed as it is.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
The finding that Black Democrats are happy with the current racial composition of their communities is not surprising. Black Democrats living in heavily Black areas may want some of the positive attributes of heavily white neighborhoods (like grocery stores and other amenities) but may not necessarily want to move to whiter neighborhoods themselves — or have more white people move to their neighborhoods and change the character of the area. Again, this data was collected before Floyd’s death, so we’ll need new polling to see whether views among white or Black Democrats have changed.
The workplace
According to polls, both white and Black Democrats overwhelmingly want racially diverse workplaces and, when generally defined, support affirmative action. Though a minority of white men believe that affirmative action has made it harder for them to find work, the vast majority of white and Black Democrats agree that Black people are treated less fairly than white people in employment situations.
But while both white and Black Democrats value workplace diversity and recognize unfairness in employment situations, neither group thinks race and ethnicity should be taken into account when making decisions about promotions or hiring, even though the objective is to increase workplace diversity. That view in some ways contradicts Black and white Democrats’ support of affirmative action and a racially diverse workplace, but nevertheless, Black Democrats share white Democrats’ reluctance to embrace a more aggressive position that might increase racial equality in the workplace.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at increasing workplace diversity Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or agree with each view Policy or view Pollster Month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Race should be considered in hiring and promotions Pew Research 1/19-2/19 37% 38% -1 Affirmative action Gallup 11/18-12/18 79 78 +1 Companies should promote racial diversity Pew Research 1/19-2/19 89 82 +7 Respondents were counted in favor if they said the policy was very important or somewhat important to enact, they generally favored the idea, or the policy should be enacted.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
What’s going on here? Considering the long history of racial discrimination in employment, it’s likely that Black Democrats are worried that factoring race into the job application or promotion process would hurt them, even if that racial factor is supposed to benefit them. Alternatively, Black Democrats and their white counterparts might be hoping that diversity can be achieved without the direct consideration of race at the individual level, therefore explaining their wariness about considering race in hiring and promotions, as well as in college admissions.
That may or may not change in the wake of Floyd’s death and the national conversation about systemic racism; again, we’ll need new polls to know.
Does the data overstate — or understate — white Democrats’ commitment to equality?
The broader finding here is clear: White Democrats — definitely before Floyd was killed but most likely afterward too — are more circumspect about ideas promoting racial equality that might be disruptive to the status quo for white people. But it’s worth considering two other readings of these numbers.
It’s possible that this data is overstating the support of white Democrats, even for more mild policy proposals to reduce racial inequality. Indeed, before the protests precipitated by Floyd’s death, the Democratic Party was increasingly connected with racial justice movements. So, if you identify as a Democrat or liberal, there may be pressure to say in a survey that you support ideas to address racial inequality — whether you really do or not. Experts refer to this as “social desirability bias” and say it plagues polling around racial issues, in particular.
[Related: When Proof Is Not Enough]
“[F]or scholars studying White liberals in this period, you must take into account [the] possibility that White liberals are responding expressively. That is, they are aware of the ‘right’ answer, understand the answer that ‘bad’ White people give, and don’t wanna be bad White ppl,” Stanford University political science professor Hakeem Jefferson wrote in a Twitter thread last year, raising doubts about polling results that show white liberals expressing as high or higher concerns about racial inequality than some Black Americans.
“I’m not saying we ought not believe White liberals when they tell us on surveys they are racially progressive. I am, however, suggesting that we treat these data with more skepticism than we have to date,” he added.
“I stand by these points and have made them again recently — the key point is that we need to think about tradeoffs and consider what happens when white folks are forced to give up their privilege,” Jefferson told us recently.
[Related: How Biden Is Winning An Identity Politics Election So Far]
Another reason to be skeptical of white Democrats’ commitment to addressing racial inequality is to look at their actions. In cities such as New York and San Francisco, where white voters tend to be Democratic-leaning, schools and neighborhoods are very segregated. And it’s not clear that a lot of elected officials in these cities are trying that hard to change those dynamics, which suggests that voters may have elected people they knew would maintain the racial status quo.
Finally, a sizable gap remains between Black Democrats and white Democrats even on issues that would seem less fraught than, say, reparations or school integration. White Democrats, for example, are significantly less likely than Black Democrats to support taking down Confederate monuments, according to a recent ABC News/Ipsos survey.
Indeed, on a range of policies and views that don’t fall neatly into one of the buckets we covered above, there is still a significant gap between white and Black Democrats.
Where white and Black Democrats diverge on race issues Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or agree with each view Policy or view Pollster month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Police officers can generally not be trusted Data for Progress 6/20 33% 71% -38 Police do only a fair or poor job of protecting people from crime Pew Research 6/20 50 72 -22 Our country has “not gone far enough” in giving Black people equal rights with white people Pew Research 1/19-2/19 64 82 -18 Confederate monuments should be removed from public spaces ABC News/Ipsos 6/20 68 84 -16 U.S. military bases named after Confederates should be renamed ABC News/Ipsos 6/20 63 73 -10 Respondents were counted in favor if they said they somewhat or strongly supported the idea.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
But it’s also worth considering whether this data is understating the potential support of white Democrats for fairly drastic proposals to address racial inequality. After all, we have seen huge increases in the past decade in the share of white Democrats who say America must take additional steps to ensure equal rights for Black people and who say they support reparations, even though it’s still less than half. These recent shifts are likely due in part to the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement — in addition, views on race and identity are now one of the major dividing lines between the two parties, and party rhetoric on these issues is crystallizing. (Increasingly, when people who identify as Democrats see their party leaders suggest that the police are treating Black people unfairly, they’ll adopt that stance as well, new research indicates.)
And Black and white Democrats agree on many, more general, policies and views.
Where white and Black Democrats agree on race issues Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or agree with each view Policy or view Pollster Month/year of poll White dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Legacy of slavery affects the position of Black people today Pew Research 1/19-2/19 80% 87% -6 Police do a poor job of treating racial and ethnic groups equally Data for Progress 6/20 48 46 -2 Increase government aid to poor Americans Pew Research 9/19 72 73 -1 Decrease spending on police Pew Research 6/20 43 42 +1 Redirect funding from police to education and other community services Data for Progress 6/20 56 51 +5 Police killing of Black Americans is a sign of broader problems Data for Progress 6/20 72 66 +6 Respondents were counted in favor if they said they agreed with the statement a great deal or fair amount, they somewhat or strongly supported the idea, they said the policy should be enacted or they said spending on policing in their area should be decreased a lot or a little.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
The recent protests against systemic racism and police brutality against Black people could cause a racial awakening — a second one just in this decade — for white Democrats. People who are trying to learn more about systemic racism and what they can do to reverse it (books about racial equality are in high demand, for example) may end up shifting their views in ways that may not be apparent in polls right now or even three months from now. The general public may also be influenced by signaling from elites — for instance, the push by leaders of the University of California system to allow race to once again be considered in the admissions process and a New York Times Magazine cover story calling for reparations.
Also, we may be entering a period of peak “white collective guilt,” which scholars define as “remorse that a white person experiences due to her group’s actions toward black people,” not necessarily due to her individual actions. White Democrats are more likely than white Republicans to feel white collective guilt, and these feelings predict support for affirmative action and general aid for Black Americans.
[Related: Is Police Reform A Fundamentally Flawed Idea?]
“It is one thing to say one believes in the existence of systemic racism and another to do something about it,” said Robert Griffin, a polling and public opinion expert who is the research director of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. “However, these somewhat superficial changes are still important. For the public, they create opportunities to recognize the gap between stated belief and lived action. Such recognition can result in people feeling pressured to bring the two into closer alignment.”
Finally, many of these polls are asking fairly imprecise questions about racial policy ideas that aren’t totally fleshed out. Specific plans for reparations, particularly proposals that would be funded largely by new taxes on the very wealthy or some other mechanism that does not target the incomes of most white Americans, might be fairly popular with white Democrats, or at least less unpopular than reparations defined generically and without details.
To conclude, you should be skeptical of stories that suggest white Democrats are very “woke” on policy matters of substance, or even more concerned about racial inequality than Black Americans are. That doesn’t seem true — at least not yet, whether you are reading polls or visiting a public school and notice that, though it’s in a liberal-leaning area of the country, it’s still not very racially mixed. That said, however, it seems that white Democrats have dramatically shifted their views on racial issues over the past 10 years, and are recognizing racial inequalities that they hadn’t picked up on (or had even ignored) before. And so their views and priorities may keep shifting — which could translate to more substantive actions, like looking for integrated schools for their children or even supporting some kind of modest approach to reparations.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: COVID-19 deaths are rising. What will the U.S. do?


fivethirthyeight--2020-07-14--College Football’s Big Conference Hurdle

We start with the news that at least two of the Power Five college football conferences — the Big Ten and the Pac-12 — will limit their schedules to conference-only games because of the coronavirus .
It ’ s a move that has wide-reaching implications , from the possibility that the College Football Playoff will need to choose among five or six unbeaten teams for its four spots to the very real financial implications for smaller schools that rely on nonconference matches with , say , Alabama or Oregon to keep their athletic programs afloat .
In a lot of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of college sports mirrors the federal coronavirus response in the U.S. as a whole ; certainly the football season would already have been canceled if it weren ’ t such a huge moneymaker for colleges .
We ’ re not sure about all that might happen if there are no nonconference games this year , but the possibility that Notre Dame will finally have to join a conference is at least fun to think about .
Next , we talk about what it means that Manchester City won its appeal in the international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its two-year ban on European competition now overturned .
While the ruling came more or less on a technicality , and Man City has certainly not been exonerated for cooking its own books , the team can now pretty much do what it wants , and UEFA may not have a leg to stand on for enforcing Financial Fair Play .
But is that such a bad thing ?
FFP ’ s rules about how clubs can use their revenue aren ’ t at all straightforward , and they certainly don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ salary caps do in the U.S .
Since European football seems unlikely to embrace a salary cap model any time soon , maybe what small and mid-tier teams need are more billionaire owners ready to spend unbelievable sums of their own money , not less .
Southampton is waiting for you , Bill Gates .
Finally , Neil lays out the history of teams that have changed their names for one reason or another .
While it seems rare these days , it ’ s actually been a very normal part of sports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wild old team names the Washington football team could take some inspiration from while picking out a new one .
Looking at you , Nebraska Old Gold Knights-Antelopes-Bugeaters-Rattlesnake Boys-Cornhuskers .
What we ’ re looking at this week : • What the Big Ten and Pac-12 decisions mean for the rest of college football .
• Everything you need to know about the lifting of Manchester City ’ s ban .

We start with the news that at least two of the Power Five college football conferences — the Big Ten and the Pac-12 — will limit their schedules to conference-only games because of the coronavirus. It’s a move that has wide-reaching implications, from the possibility that the College Football Playoff will need to choose among five or six unbeaten teams for its four spots to the very real financial implications for smaller schools that rely on nonconference matches with, say, Alabama or Oregon to keep their athletic programs afloat. In a lot of ways, the decentralized, semi-regional nature of college sports mirrors the federal coronavirus response in the U.S. as a whole; certainly the football season would already have been canceled if it weren’t such a huge moneymaker for colleges. We’re not sure about all that might happen if there are no nonconference games this year, but the possibility that Notre Dame will finally have to join a conference is at least fun to think about.
Next, we talk about what it means that Manchester City won its appeal in the international Court of Arbitration for Sport, with its two-year ban on European competition now overturned. While the ruling came more or less on a technicality, and Man City has certainly not been exonerated for cooking its own books, the team can now pretty much do what it wants, and UEFA may not have a leg to stand on for enforcing Financial Fair Play. But is that such a bad thing? FFP’s rules about how clubs can use their revenue aren’t at all straightforward, and they certainly don’t level the playing field the way that salary caps do in the U.S. Since European football seems unlikely to embrace a salary cap model any time soon, maybe what small and mid-tier teams need are more billionaire owners ready to spend unbelievable sums of their own money, not less. Southampton is waiting for you, Bill Gates.
Finally, Neil lays out the history of teams that have changed their names for one reason or another. While it seems rare these days, it’s actually been a very normal part of sports — and there are a ton of wild old team names the Washington football team could take some inspiration from while picking out a new one. Looking at you, Nebraska Old Gold Knights-Antelopes-Bugeaters-Rattlesnake Boys-Cornhuskers.
What we’re looking at this week:


fivethirthyeight--2020-07-14--Bernie Williams Deserves More Credit For Making The Yankees A Dynasty

Any talk of the New York Yankees ’ dynasty of the 1990s and early 2000s usually centers on the “ Core Four ” : shortstop Derek Jeter , closer Mariano Rivera , starter Andy Pettitte and catcher Jorge Posada .
History has mostly remembered that quartet as the primary force behind the pinstriped turnaround that saw New York win four World Series in the span of five seasons from 1996 to 2000 .
But that narrative leaves out one of the best and most important Yankees of that hugely successful era — center fielder Bernie Williams .
In this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pretty Damn Good Players , we aim to change that .
Full disclosure : According to the advanced metrics , Williams is probably not quite a Hall of Fame-caliber player .
He ranks just 27th among primary center fielders since 1901 in total wins above replacement , and 26th in JAWS , an average of career and peak WAR .
By JAWS , Williams ’ s career was better than only 22 percent of the center fielders already enshrined in Cooperstown .
Williams fares better according to more traditional measures — he ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to both the Hall of Fame Standards and Monitor tests , which Bill James created to judge a player ’ s conventional Hall qualifications .
If we looked only at those standard markers for enshrinement , we ’ d predict Williams to have a 60 percent shot , according to a logistic regression I ran looking at Hall-qualified players from throughout history .
In reality , though , Williams fell quite a bit short of induction .
After garnering 9.6 percent of the writers ’ vote in his first ballot appearance — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Famer needs to be on — he dipped to 3.3 percent in his second try , dropping him off the ballot entirely .
Just like that , one of the best hitters of his era — and one of the winningest players as well — was unceremoniously knocked out of consideration for the game ’ s top honor .
Williams ’ s contributions to the Yankees ’ dynasty are seriously underappreciated .
Before he debuted at midseason of 1991 , New York was in a rare down period of three consecutive losing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fourth in 1992 as Williams spent most of the season in Triple-A .
But Williams showed late that year that he had improved significantly , and he was a key contributor ( 2.3 WAR ) as the Yankees won 88 games in 1993 .
By 1994 and 1995 , Williams blossomed into a full-blown star , producing the 14th-most WAR ( 9.7 across two shortened seasons ) of any position player in MLB .
And the Yankees were very good again .
In 1994 , they had the best record in the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; when we reconstructed the 1994 World Series last fall , New York was the most likely winner .
In 1995 , the Yankees were back in the playoffs for the first time in 14 years , coming within an epic Mariners walk-off win of advancing to the AL Championship Series .
( Williams was terrific in the AL Division Series , hitting .429 with a 1.381 on-base plus slugging . )
All of this was before Jeter or Posada even played a full season in the majors , while Pettitte and Rivera @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1995 .
Out of the star-studded crop of prospects who turned the Yankees around in the ’ 90s , Williams was the first to make a huge impact in the major leagues , helping to set the tone for what happened over the next decade or so .
Eventually , he had company .
Jeter became the team ’ s regular shortstop in 1996 , recording 2.7 WAR .
Pettitte led the team in innings pitched and total value ( 5.1 WAR ) .
Rivera was a dominant setup man ( 4.6 WAR @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ full-time closer .
New York won the World Series with Williams as the team ’ s third-best player by WAR ( 4.0 — trailing Pettitte and Rivera ) , and the dynasty was off and running .
Posada moved ahead of Joe Girardi on the catching depth chart in 1998 , when New York won a record 125 games across the regular season and playoffs .
The Yankees would end up winning four out of five titles from 1996 to 2000 , a run interrupted only by a loss to the Cleveland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Related : Would The Expos Have Won The 1994 World Series ? ]
Throughout that entire run , the Core Four clearly played massive roles in New York ’ s dominance .
But Williams outshone almost all of them .
According to WAR , only Jeter ( 25.9 ) provided the Yankees with more regular-season value than Williams ( 24.5 ) during the span of those World Series-winning seasons .
Likewise , only Jeter ( 48.9 ) generated more weighted runs created ( wRC ) in the postseason for the Yankees over that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
By any measure , Williams was ( at worst ) the second-best position player on a team that ranks among the greatest dynasties in baseball history .
In his prime , Williams was a terrific all-around hitter , capable of winning batting titles and bombing home runs with equal skill .
In his best seven seasons by WAR , Williams hit a cumulative .324 with a .409 on-base percentage and a .939 OPS , stellar numbers that stand up next to the peak years of just about any batter from history .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Despite winning four Gold Glove awards , his defensive metrics were surprisingly poor — thus hurting his JAWS ranking — and his performance fell off a cliff quickly as he got older .
After helping the Yankees win another pennant with 5.0 WAR in 2001 and producing 4.7 more at age 33 in 2002 , Williams had -1.9 total WAR over the rest of his career before ( unofficially ) retiring in 2007 .
Much like fellow HoPDGP member Andruw Jones , Williams produced the vast majority of his career value before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Core Four were still producing for the Yankees into the 2010s , years after Williams had played his last game in pinstripes , which kept him from participating in the farewell narrative with the rest of the dynasty ’ s cornerstones .
[ Related : The Dodgers ’ Legacy May Depend On This Short Season ] But that doesn ’ t mean Williams ’ s contributions to the Yankees should be as forgotten as they seem to have been over the years .
Without the strength of his performances , New York could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its dynasty years — and thus , history might not have viewed it the same way .
And as great as Jeter , Rivera , Pettitte and Posada were , Williams paved the way for their success in the pressure-cooker environment of George Steinbrenner ’ s Yankees .
“ Honestly , thank God for Bernie Williams , ” Posada told The Players ’ Tribune in 2016 .
“ If Bernie Williams doesn ’ t do well , I don ’ t think any of us would have been here .
”

Any talk of the New York Yankees’ dynasty of the 1990s and early 2000s usually centers on the “Core Four”: shortstop Derek Jeter, closer Mariano Rivera, starter Andy Pettitte and catcher Jorge Posada. History has mostly remembered that quartet as the primary force behind the pinstriped turnaround that saw New York win four World Series in the span of five seasons from 1996 to 2000. But that narrative leaves out one of the best and most important Yankees of that hugely successful era — center fielder Bernie Williams. In this week’s installment of our Hall of Pretty Damn Good Players, we aim to change that.
HOF resume: Bernie Williams, CF Category Value Rank at Pos. Career WAR 49.0 27 Peak WAR 37.6 26 JAWS 43.3 26 HOF Monitor 134 10 HOF Standards 48 9 Black Ink Test 4 68 Gray Ink Test 61 53 Implied HOF%* 60% 12 Years on ballot 2 — Vote share 3.3% — HOF track** — — *Hall of Fame probability based on traditional stats. **Hall of Fame track based on most recent vote share and years on the ballot. Sources: Baseball-Reference.com, FanGraphs
Full disclosure: According to the advanced metrics, Williams is probably not quite a Hall of Fame-caliber player. He ranks just 27th among primary center fielders since 1901 in total wins above replacement, and 26th in JAWS, an average of career and peak WAR. By JAWS, Williams’s career was better than only 22 percent of the center fielders already enshrined in Cooperstown. Williams fares better according to more traditional measures — he’s a top-10 center fielder since 1901 according to both the Hall of Fame Standards and Monitor tests, which Bill James created to judge a player’s conventional Hall qualifications. If we looked only at those standard markers for enshrinement, we’d predict Williams to have a 60 percent shot, according to a logistic regression I ran looking at Hall-qualified players from throughout history.
In reality, though, Williams fell quite a bit short of induction. After garnering 9.6 percent of the writers’ vote in his first ballot appearance — well off the track a future Hall of Famer needs to be on — he dipped to 3.3 percent in his second try, dropping him off the ballot entirely. Just like that, one of the best hitters of his era — and one of the winningest players as well — was unceremoniously knocked out of consideration for the game’s top honor.
Williams’s contributions to the Yankees’ dynasty are seriously underappreciated. Before he debuted at midseason of 1991, New York was in a rare down period of three consecutive losing seasons, and they would add a fourth in 1992 as Williams spent most of the season in Triple-A. But Williams showed late that year that he had improved significantly, and he was a key contributor (2.3 WAR) as the Yankees won 88 games in 1993. By 1994 and 1995, Williams blossomed into a full-blown star, producing the 14th-most WAR (9.7 across two shortened seasons) of any position player in MLB. And the Yankees were very good again. In 1994, they had the best record in the American League when the strike ended the season; when we reconstructed the 1994 World Series last fall, New York was the most likely winner. In 1995, the Yankees were back in the playoffs for the first time in 14 years, coming within an epic Mariners walk-off win of advancing to the AL Championship Series. (Williams was terrific in the AL Division Series, hitting .429 with a 1.381 on-base plus slugging.)
[Related: Our Hall Of Pretty Damn Good Players]
All of this was before Jeter or Posada even played a full season in the majors, while Pettitte and Rivera were only in their rookie seasons in 1995. Out of the star-studded crop of prospects who turned the Yankees around in the ’90s, Williams was the first to make a huge impact in the major leagues, helping to set the tone for what happened over the next decade or so.
Eventually, he had company. Jeter became the team’s regular shortstop in 1996, recording 2.7 WAR. Pettitte led the team in innings pitched and total value (5.1 WAR). Rivera was a dominant setup man (4.6 WAR) a year before becoming the Yankees’ full-time closer. New York won the World Series with Williams as the team’s third-best player by WAR (4.0 — trailing Pettitte and Rivera), and the dynasty was off and running. Posada moved ahead of Joe Girardi on the catching depth chart in 1998, when New York won a record 125 games across the regular season and playoffs. The Yankees would end up winning four out of five titles from 1996 to 2000, a run interrupted only by a loss to the Cleveland Indians in the 1997 ALDS.
[Related: Would The Expos Have Won The 1994 World Series?]
Throughout that entire run, the Core Four clearly played massive roles in New York’s dominance. But Williams outshone almost all of them. According to WAR, only Jeter (25.9) provided the Yankees with more regular-season value than Williams (24.5) during the span of those World Series-winning seasons. Likewise, only Jeter (48.9) generated more weighted runs created (wRC) in the postseason for the Yankees over that span than Williams (38.6) did. By any measure, Williams was (at worst) the second-best position player on a team that ranks among the greatest dynasties in baseball history.
Among dynasty-era Yankees, Bernie trails only the Captain Leaders for the New York Yankees in wins above replacement (WAR) in the regular season and weighted on-base average (wOBA) and weighted runs created (wRC) in the playoffs, 1996-2000 Regular-Season WAR Playoff Runs Created Player Pos WAR Player wOBA wRC Derek Jeter SS 25.9 Derek Jeter .390 48.9 Bernie Williams CF 24.5 Bernie Williams .352 38.6 Andy Pettitte P 21.8 Paul O’Neill .338 30.7 David Cone P 17.1 Tino Martinez .326 30.0 Paul O’Neill RF 16.1 Scott Brosius .336 19.5 Mariano Rivera P 14.5 Chuck Knoblauch .313 17.7 Tino Martinez 1B 13.3 Jorge Posada .303 11.9 Jorge Posada C 10.3 Darryl Strawberry .396 10.3 Orlando Hernandez P 9.9 Cecil Fielder .357 9.9 David Wells P 8.9 David Justice .322 8.3 WAR is measured using JEFFBAGWELL (Joint Estimate Featuring FanGraphs and B-R Aggregated to Generate WAR, Equally Leveling Lists), which averages the metrics found at Baseball-Reference.com and FanGraphs. Source: Baseball-Reference.com, FanGraphs
In his prime, Williams was a terrific all-around hitter, capable of winning batting titles and bombing home runs with equal skill. In his best seven seasons by WAR, Williams hit a cumulative .324 with a .409 on-base percentage and a .939 OPS, stellar numbers that stand up next to the peak years of just about any batter from history.
Williams wasn’t a perfect player. Despite winning four Gold Glove awards, his defensive metrics were surprisingly poor — thus hurting his JAWS ranking — and his performance fell off a cliff quickly as he got older. After helping the Yankees win another pennant with 5.0 WAR in 2001 and producing 4.7 more at age 33 in 2002, Williams had -1.9 total WAR over the rest of his career before (unofficially) retiring in 2007. Much like fellow HoPDGP member Andruw Jones, Williams produced the vast majority of his career value before he turned 30. All of the Core Four were still producing for the Yankees into the 2010s, years after Williams had played his last game in pinstripes, which kept him from participating in the farewell narrative with the rest of the dynasty’s cornerstones.
[Related: The Dodgers’ Legacy May Depend On This Short Season]
But that doesn’t mean Williams’s contributions to the Yankees should be as forgotten as they seem to have been over the years. Without the strength of his performances, New York could very well have won fewer championships during its dynasty years — and thus, history might not have viewed it the same way. And as great as Jeter, Rivera, Pettitte and Posada were, Williams paved the way for their success in the pressure-cooker environment of George Steinbrenner’s Yankees.
“Honestly, thank God for Bernie Williams,” Posada told The Players’ Tribune in 2016. “If Bernie Williams doesn’t do well, I don’t think any of us would have been here.”
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fivethirthyeight--2020-07-15--How The Experts Are Measuring The Economic Recovery

In early June , the National Bureau of Economic Research made it official : The United States was in a full-blown recession .
Joblessness had risen to historic levels , total production was down , and industrial activity slowed to a crawl .
Just like that , the COVID-19 pandemic had extinguished the longest period of expansion in U.S. history .
Ever since , the signs of recovery have been confusingly mixed — unemployment has improved more quickly than expected and the stock market has shown surprising resilience , but other indicators have looked much worse .
So how can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recovering ?
As part of our ongoing survey of economists , conducted in partnership with the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business , we asked experts which metrics they have their eye on to judge the strength of the recovery now — and what they ’ re looking at to predict where the economy might be headed next .
In terms of measuring the recovery , economists are looking most closely at gross domestic product .
Given three options to describe the level of attention they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our respondents said they were watching it “ very closely , ” with another 16 percent saying they were looking at GDP “ somewhat closely ” and only 3 percent saying they weren ’ t following it closely at all .
The next-most watched statistic was the unemployment rate , which also shouldn ’ t be surprising ; both GDP and unemployment are key lagging indicators , or important metrics that show how the economy has been doing .
According to the survey , retail and food sales also belong in that category @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hospitality and retail sectors are among the industries harmed most when virus-related shutdowns force businesses to close .
Based on the three main indicators economists said they ’ re using to judge the recovery , America has a long way to go before things are back to their pre-pandemic baseline .
After mostly cruising along at between 2 and 3.5 percent annualized quarter-over-quarter growth for years , real GDP dropped by an annualized rate of 5 percent from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of 2020 , which contained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( although the National Bureau of Economic Research says the recession technically began in February 2020 ) .
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ’ s GDPNow model estimates that second-quarter real GDP will end up being down by an annualized rate of 35.5 percent — seven times worse than the first quarter — when the Bureau of Economic Analysis releases its official number later this month .
Similarly , the unemployment rate is currently 11.1 percent , an increase of 7.6 percentage points from February — and still higher than any level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 .
When the Congressional Budget Office released an update to its long-term forecast for the decade earlier this month , it projected that the unemployment rate would remain above its pre-pandemic level for the rest of the decade .
Retail and food sales fell from just over $ 200 billion ( in CPI-adjusted 1982-84 dollars ) in February to $ 161 billion in April — a massive drop .
But thanks to reopening stores , it rallied to just shy of $ 190 billion in May , and will likely be even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is any indication .
Those gains are tenuous , though , endangered by rising case counts across the country that have already forced some types of businesses to close again .
There figures to be a tight inverse relationship between the virus ’ s spread and retail/food businesses ’ ability to stay open , which is a big reason to watch this indicator going forward .
That ’ s not to say these are the only metrics that might prove to be insightful .
“ Interestingly , consumer confidence and the savings rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Allan Timmermann , a professor of finance and economics at the University of California , San Diego , after he reviewed the survey ’ s findings .
“ I found the latter a bit surprising because we have seen from earlier crises that consumers can be scarred by large macroeconomic shocks , particularly when they occur in peoples ’ formative years , and if precautionary savings go up by a lot – as we have seen in April and May already – then consumer spending will be lower and the recovery more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ones economists seem to be focusing on most , meaning they are the metrics that should tell us where we are in the process of recovering from the recession .
But as we mentioned above , they are fundamentally lagging indicators — and that is exacerbated by the fast-moving nature of the virus , a crisis for which our traditional economic indicators are almost uniquely ill-suited .
Real GDP is only released quarterly ; retail and food sales come out monthly , but give a snapshot of the month prior to when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rate only captures a glimpse of how things were in the middle of the preceding month .
These days , things might have changed significantly by the time the numbers come out .
That ’ s why we also asked our survey panel which of the faster-moving data sources might tell us where the major indicators above are headed .
Of the options we presented , the only one economists were clearly watching was consumer spending , which was considered “ very useful ” by 65 percent of respondents , and at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 35 percent of those surveyed .
A clear second tier of usefulness formed around initial unemployment claims and job postings from various recruiting sites .
The panel was split roughly 50-50 over whether each was “ very ” or “ somewhat ” useful , but no respondents thought they offered zero value .
It ’ s still early , but consumer spending seems to be on the rise .
According to the extremely useful Opportunity Insights COVID data dashboard , overall consumer spending — based on credit and debit card usage data collected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was down about 33 percent ( compared with January ) , but made consistent strides between then and mid-to-late June .
By June 22 , spending was down only around 6 percent relative to January levels .
But the wave of June coronavirus cases across the country has clearly slowed spending : as of July 1 , it was back to down 9 percent compared with January .
High-frequency employment data tells a similar story .
According to Indeed , job postings have steadily improved from their low point on May 1 ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but they remain 23 percent below their level from a year ago .
Initial claims have dropped every single week since March 28 — that ’ s 14 consecutive weeks — but only by an average of 4.3 percent per week over the past four weeks , compared with an average weekly decline of 13.6 percent over the 10 weeks before that .
Such real-time data is a welcome addition to the slower , monthly or quarterly pace of most official releases that make up the canon of important lagging indicators .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , quickly updating data has been a hallmark of this crisis , whether it be public health or economic data .
So how will we know when things are better ?
According to our survey , we ’ ll get there when real GDP returns to form and unemployment is reduced .
And the early clues might be hidden in people ’ s willingness to spend .
But no matter what you look at , most economists agree : It might be a very long time before we reach a full recovery .

In early June, the National Bureau of Economic Research made it official: The United States was in a full-blown recession. Joblessness had risen to historic levels, total production was down, and industrial activity slowed to a crawl. Just like that, the COVID-19 pandemic had extinguished the longest period of expansion in U.S. history.
Ever since, the signs of recovery have been confusingly mixed — unemployment has improved more quickly than expected and the stock market has shown surprising resilience, but other indicators have looked much worse. So how can we know when the economy is truly recovering? As part of our ongoing survey of economists, conducted in partnership with the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, we asked experts which metrics they have their eye on to judge the strength of the recovery now — and what they’re looking at to predict where the economy might be headed next.
[Related: Where The Latest COVID-19 Models Think We’re Headed — And Why They Disagree]
In terms of measuring the recovery, economists are looking most closely at gross domestic product. Given three options to describe the level of attention they paid to GDP, 81 percent of our respondents said they were watching it “very closely,” with another 16 percent saying they were looking at GDP “somewhat closely” and only 3 percent saying they weren’t following it closely at all.
How economists are evaluating the recovery Share of surveyed economists who said they were closely watching certain metrics to evaluate the speed and strength of the economic recovery Share Who Said They Watch… Metric Not at all Somewhat Very closely GDP 3% 16% 81% Unemployment rate 3 26 71 Retail and food sales 10 29 61 Consumer confidence 23 48 29 Saving rate 23 55 23 The survey of 31 economists was conducted July 2-6. Source: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT/IGM COVID-19 ECONOMIC SURVEY
The next-most watched statistic was the unemployment rate, which also shouldn’t be surprising; both GDP and unemployment are key lagging indicators, or important metrics that show how the economy has been doing. According to the survey, retail and food sales also belong in that category — particularly in this pandemic, since the hospitality and retail sectors are among the industries harmed most when virus-related shutdowns force businesses to close.
Based on the three main indicators economists said they’re using to judge the recovery, America has a long way to go before things are back to their pre-pandemic baseline.
After mostly cruising along at between 2 and 3.5 percent annualized quarter-over-quarter growth for years, real GDP dropped by an annualized rate of 5 percent from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of 2020, which contained only about one month of coronavirus-related effects (although the National Bureau of Economic Research says the recession technically began in February 2020). The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow model estimates that second-quarter real GDP will end up being down by an annualized rate of 35.5 percent — seven times worse than the first quarter — when the Bureau of Economic Analysis releases its official number later this month.
[Related: The Economy Is A Mess. So Why Isn’t The Stock Market?]
Similarly, the unemployment rate is currently 11.1 percent, an increase of 7.6 percentage points from February — and still higher than any level it had reached from 1948 through March 2020. When the Congressional Budget Office released an update to its long-term forecast for the decade earlier this month, it projected that the unemployment rate would remain above its pre-pandemic level for the rest of the decade.
Retail and food sales fell from just over $200 billion (in CPI-adjusted 1982-84 dollars) in February to $161 billion in April — a massive drop. But thanks to reopening stores, it rallied to just shy of $190 billion in May, and will likely be even higher in June if consumer spending data is any indication. Those gains are tenuous, though, endangered by rising case counts across the country that have already forced some types of businesses to close again. There figures to be a tight inverse relationship between the virus’s spread and retail/food businesses’ ability to stay open, which is a big reason to watch this indicator going forward.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: COVID-19 deaths are rising. What will the U.S. do?
That’s not to say these are the only metrics that might prove to be insightful. “Interestingly, consumer confidence and the savings rate are being followed less closely,” said Allan Timmermann, a professor of finance and economics at the University of California, San Diego, after he reviewed the survey’s findings. “I found the latter a bit surprising because we have seen from earlier crises that consumers can be scarred by large macroeconomic shocks, particularly when they occur in peoples’ formative years, and if precautionary savings go up by a lot – as we have seen in April and May already – then consumer spending will be lower and the recovery more sluggish.”
The big headline numbers are the ones economists seem to be focusing on most, meaning they are the metrics that should tell us where we are in the process of recovering from the recession. But as we mentioned above, they are fundamentally lagging indicators — and that is exacerbated by the fast-moving nature of the virus, a crisis for which our traditional economic indicators are almost uniquely ill-suited. Real GDP is only released quarterly; retail and food sales come out monthly, but give a snapshot of the month prior to when they are released. Even the unemployment rate only captures a glimpse of how things were in the middle of the preceding month. These days, things might have changed significantly by the time the numbers come out.
[Related: The Unemployment Rate Is Falling, But More People Are Losing Their Jobs Permanently]
That’s why we also asked our survey panel which of the faster-moving data sources might tell us where the major indicators above are headed. Of the options we presented, the only one economists were clearly watching was consumer spending, which was considered “very useful” by 65 percent of respondents, and at least “somewhat useful” by the remaining 35 percent of those surveyed.
What are economists using to predict recovery? Share of surveyed economists who said certain high-frequency metrics were useful for predicting the economic recovery Share Who Said Metric was… Metric Not at all Somewhat Very useful Consumer spending 0% 35% 65% Initial unemployment claims 0 52 48 Job postings 0 55 45 Traffic 6 77 16 Mobility (from cellphones) 3 84 13 The survey of 31 economists was conducted July 2-6. Source: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT/IGM COVID-19 ECONOMIC SURVEY
A clear second tier of usefulness formed around initial unemployment claims and job postings from various recruiting sites. The panel was split roughly 50-50 over whether each was “very” or “somewhat” useful, but no respondents thought they offered zero value.
(The economists were less impressed with mobility data such as traffic — i.e., miles driven — or trends in cellphone tracking data, though the majority acknowledged them as at least somewhat useful data points.)
[Related: The Industries Hit Hardest By The Unemployment Crisis]
It’s still early, but consumer spending seems to be on the rise. According to the extremely useful Opportunity Insights COVID data dashboard, overall consumer spending — based on credit and debit card usage data collected by Affinity Solutions — in early April was down about 33 percent (compared with January), but made consistent strides between then and mid-to-late June. By June 22, spending was down only around 6 percent relative to January levels. But the wave of June coronavirus cases across the country has clearly slowed spending: as of July 1, it was back to down 9 percent compared with January.
High-frequency employment data tells a similar story. According to Indeed, job postings have steadily improved from their low point on May 1 (down 39 percent relative to 2019), but they remain 23 percent below their level from a year ago. Initial claims have dropped every single week since March 28 — that’s 14 consecutive weeks — but only by an average of 4.3 percent per week over the past four weeks, compared with an average weekly decline of 13.6 percent over the 10 weeks before that.
Such real-time data is a welcome addition to the slower, monthly or quarterly pace of most official releases that make up the canon of important lagging indicators. In fact, the lack of reliable, quickly updating data has been a hallmark of this crisis, whether it be public health or economic data. So how will we know when things are better? According to our survey, we’ll get there when real GDP returns to form and unemployment is reduced. And the early clues might be hidden in people’s willingness to spend. But no matter what you look at, most economists agree: It might be a very long time before we reach a full recovery.
Subscribe to our coronavirus podcast, PODCAST-19