fivethirthyeight--2020-08-12--It’s Way Too Soon To Count Trump Out

It’s Way Too Soon To Count Trump Out

Joe Biden currently has a robust lead in polls .
If the election were held today , he might even win in a landslide , carrying not only traditional swing states such as Florida and Pennsylvania but potentially adding new states such as Georgia and Texas to the Democratic coalition .
But the election is not being held today .
While the polls have been stable so far this year , it ’ s still only August .
The debates and the conventions have yet to occur .
Biden only named his running mate yesterday .
And the campaign is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of which the United States has not seen in more than 100 years , which is also causing an unprecedented and volatile economy .
Nor has it been that uncommon , historically , for polls to shift fairly radically from mid-August until Election Day .
Furthermore , there are some reasons to think the election will tighten , and President Trump is likely to have an advantage in a close election because of the Electoral College .
That , in a nutshell , is why the FiveThirtyEight presidential election forecast , which we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 29 percent chance of winning the Electoral College , despite his current deficit in the polls .
This is considerably higher than some other forecasts , which put Trump ’ s chances at around 10 percent .
Biden ’ s chances are 71 percent in the FiveThirtyEight forecast , conversely .
If these numbers give you a sense of deja vu , it may be because they ’ re very similar to our final forecast in 2016 … when Trump also had a 29 percent chance of winning !
( And Hillary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) So if you ’ re not taking a 29 percent chance as a serious possibility , I ’ m not sure there ’ s much we can say at this point , although there ’ s a Zoom poker game that I ’ d be happy to invite you to .
One last parallel to 2016 — when some models gave Clinton as high as a 99 percent chance of winning — is that FiveThirtyEight ’ s forecast tends to be more conservative than others .
( For a more complete description @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is handling some complications related to COVID-19 , please see our methodology guide . )
With that said , one shouldn ’ t get too carried away with the comparisons to four years ago .
In 2016 , the reason Trump had a pretty decent chance in our final forecast was mostly just because the polls were fairly close ( despite the media narrative to the contrary ) , close enough that even a modest-sized polling error in the right group of states could be enough to give Trump a victory in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ current 2020 forecast , conversely , stems mostly from the fact that there ’ s still a long way to go until the election .
Take what happens if we lie to our model and tell it that the election is going to be held today .
It spits out that Biden has a 93 percent chance of winning .
In other words , a Trump victory would require a much bigger polling error than what we saw in 2016 .
Let ’ s briefly expand on the points I made above .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ corrective against what I see as overconfident assessments elsewhere — I ’ m mostly focused on the reasons why Trump ’ s chances are higher than they might appear .
But we should be clear : Trump ’ s current position in the polls is poor .
Biden is currently ahead in our polling averages in Florida , Wisconsin , Michigan , Pennsylvania , Arizona , Ohio and in the second congressional district in Nebraska — all places that Clinton lost in 2016 .
If he won those states ( and held the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be enough to give him 352 electoral votes .
He ’ s also within roughly 1 percentage point of Trump in Texas , Georgia , Iowa and Maine ’ s second congressional district .
If he won those , too , he ’ d be up to a whopping 412 electoral votes .
It ’ s important to remember that the uncertainty in our forecast runs in both directions .
There ’ s the chance that Trump could come back — but there ’ s also the chance that things could get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Our model thinks there ’ s a 19 percent chance that Biden will win Alaska , for example , and a 13 percent chance that he will win South Carolina .
The model also gives Biden a 30 percent chance of a double-digit win in the popular vote , which would be the first time that happened since 1984 .
But there are downside scenarios for Biden .
Polls often change substantially between now and November Every day , my colleague Nathaniel Rakich tweets out a list of what our national polling average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in past campaigns .
And it can be a pretty wild ride .
Here is Tuesday ’ s version , for instance .
Three of the candidates leading in national polls at this point — Michael Dukakis in 1988 , George W. Bush in 2000 , and John Kerry in 2004 — did not actually win the popular vote .
Bush blew a 10-point lead , in fact , which is larger than Biden ’ s current advantage .
( Luckily for Bush , he won the Electoral College . )
In other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ called ” the winner correctly , but the margins were way off .
Jimmy Carter eventually beat Gerald Ford by just 2.1 percentage points — not the 26.6-point lead he had at this point in the campaign .
Bill Clinton won by 5.6 points — not 20.1 points .
And Barack Obama won a considerably more commanding victory in 2008 than polls at this point projected .
Now , there are some mitigating factors here .
Some of these polls were taken at the height of a candidate ’ s convention bounce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to correct for those .
And in general , polls have become less volatile over time , probably because increased polarization means there are fewer swing voters than there once were .
The polls have been particularly stable so far this year , in fact .
But while there are some factors that reduce uncertainty , there are other factors that increase it .
COVID-19 is a big reason to avoid feeling overly confident about the outcome The COVID-19 pandemic has led to more than 150,000 fatalities and has upended pretty much every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s approval ratings for his handling of it have been awful .
But to the extent this is an election about COVID-19 , there ’ s the possibility that the situation could improve between now and November .
Cases have recently begun to come down after an early-summer spike , and recent economic data has shown improvement there , too .
There ’ s also the possibility that a vaccine could be approved — or rushed out — by November , though it ’ s highly unlikely it could be widely distributed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this ?
No , we aren ’ t building a COVID-19 projection model .
( It ’ s really hard . )
But we have built an “ uncertainty index ” that essentially governs the margin of error in our forecast .
It contains eight components , two of which are very high because of COVID-19 .
Specifically , these are the high volatility in recent economic data , and the volume of major news events , as measured by the number of full-width New York Times headlines .
There ’ s more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 , but the protests around police brutality , Trump ’ s impeachment earlier this year , etc .
— than in any recent election campaign .
We also expect turnout to be harder to predict this year based on primary elections held during the pandemic that had highly variable turnout — which , in turn , could lead to more polling error .
So even if the polls don ’ t change that much between now and November , that could create some additional uncertainty on Election Day .
See the methodology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 .
But the other components of the uncertainty index are low , pointing toward a stable campaign .
For instance , polarization is high , poll movement so far has been limited , and there aren ’ t that many undecided voters ; the index accounts for all of those things .
In fact , the uncertainty index points toward the overall uncertainty going into November being about average relative to past presidential campaigns .
So our model isn ’ t necessarily saying that things are going to get crazy , although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also saying you shouldn ’ t necessarily expect highly stable campaigns like 2012 to be the new normal in the time of COVID-19 .
( And keep in mind that 2016 was a pretty volatile campaign , too , even without COVID-19 . )
Empirically , the polls can move quite a bit from August to November , more than you might expect intuitively !
There are some sources of uncertainty that the model doesn ’ t account for , however .
We assume that there are reasonable efforts to allow eligible citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ballots , and that electors are awarded to the popular-vote winner in each state .
The model also does not account for the possibility of extraconstitutional shenanigans by Trump or by anyone else , such as trying to prevent mail ballots from being counted .
It ’ s hard to know what the “ fundamentals ” say I ’ ve long been critical of models that use economic “ fundamentals ” to try to predict election results , mostly because — although they claim to be highly precise — they haven ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcome of an election where they don ’ t already know the results .
And those models are especially likely to have problems this year because of highly variable economic data .
One model based on second quarter GDP projects Trump to win -453 ( negative 453 ! )
electoral votes , for example .
But if you built a model based on third-quarter GDP , which is expected to be highly positive , it might predict a Trump landslide .
This isn ’ t to say that we don ’ t employ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We do , but it ’ s much less confident than others , and it receives relatively little weight in the overall forecast .
It also isn ’ t currently that bad for Trump .
In fact , it essentially predicts the popular vote to be roughly tied .
Why ?
• Although three of the economic factors we use in the model ( jobs , spending , manufacturing ) have been terrible , a fourth component ( income ) has been very strong because of government subsidies in the form of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if stimulus payments lapse .
The fifth and sixth components , inflation and the stock market , have also been reasonably favorable .
• Most of the variables that declined are now improving , and are expected to continue to improve .
( Our model projects what the economy will look like by November rather than relying on current data . )
• Trump is an elected incumbent , and elected incumbents are usually favored for reelection .
• We extended our analysis back to elections since 1880 ( ! )
to expand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship between the economy and the election likely isn ’ t as strong as other models claim , anyway .
In other words , our forecast thinks it ’ s far from obvious that the economy will doom Trump , especially if he can tell a story of recovery by November .
Indeed , Trump ’ s approval ratings on the economy are still fairly good , so our model seems to be doing a reasonably good job of capturing how voters actually feel about the economy .
Another way to look at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying that , in a highly polarized environment , the race is more likely than not to tighten in the stretch run .
Empirically , large leads like the one Biden has now tend to dissipate to some degree by Election Day .
And if the race does tighten… Trump appears to have an Electoral College advantage again Our model says there ’ s an 81 percent chance that Biden wins the popular vote — compared to his 71 percent chance in the Electoral College .
That means there ’ s about a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote .
( Conversely , the model puts the chance that Biden wins the Electoral College but loses the popular vote at only around 1 in 750 . )
That reflects the fact that the tipping-point state — the state that would provide the decisive 270th electoral vote — is somewhat to the right of the national popular vote .
More specifically , our projection as of Tuesday had Biden winning the popular vote by 6.3 percentage points nationally , but winning the tipping-point state , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4.5 percentage points : That 1.8-point gap is actually smaller than what Clinton experienced in 2016 , when there was about a 3-point gap between her losing margin in Wisconsin ( which was also the tipping-point state in 2016 ) and her winning margin in the national popular vote .
This analysis is a simplification , too .
There ’ s a lot of uncertainty in the outlook , so the tipping-point state could easily turn out to be Florida or Pennsylvania or something more unexpected like North Carolina .
Still , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subtract 2 points from Biden ’ s current lead in national polls to get a sense for what his standing in the tipping point states looks like .
Add it all up , and you can start to see why the model is being fairly cautious .
Biden ’ s current roughly 8-point lead in national polls is really more like a 6-point lead in the tipping point states .
And 6-point leads in August are historically not very safe .
That margin is perhaps more likely than not to tighten and at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fair amount of uncertainty about what COVID-19 and the rest the world will look like by November .
Biden is in a reasonably strong position : Having a 70-ish percent chance of beating an incumbent in early August before any conventions or debates is far better than the position that most challengers find themselves in .
And his chances will improve in our model if he maintains his current lead .
But for the time being , the data does not justify substantially more confidence than that .

Joe Biden currently has a robust lead in polls. If the election were held today, he might even win in a landslide, carrying not only traditional swing states such as Florida and Pennsylvania but potentially adding new states such as Georgia and Texas to the Democratic coalition.
But the election is not being held today. While the polls have been stable so far this year, it’s still only August. The debates and the conventions have yet to occur. Biden only named his running mate yesterday. And the campaign is being conducted amidst a pandemic the likes of which the United States has not seen in more than 100 years, which is also causing an unprecedented and volatile economy.
Nor has it been that uncommon, historically, for polls to shift fairly radically from mid-August until Election Day. Furthermore, there are some reasons to think the election will tighten, and President Trump is likely to have an advantage in a close election because of the Electoral College.
That, in a nutshell, is why the FiveThirtyEight presidential election forecast, which we launched today, still has Trump with a 29 percent chance of winning the Electoral College, despite his current deficit in the polls. This is considerably higher than some other forecasts, which put Trump’s chances at around 10 percent. Biden’s chances are 71 percent in the FiveThirtyEight forecast, conversely.
If these numbers give you a sense of deja vu, it may be because they’re very similar to our final forecast in 2016 … when Trump also had a 29 percent chance of winning! (And Hillary Clinton had a 71 percent chance.) So if you’re not taking a 29 percent chance as a serious possibility, I’m not sure there’s much we can say at this point, although there’s a Zoom poker game that I’d be happy to invite you to.
One last parallel to 2016 — when some models gave Clinton as high as a 99 percent chance of winning — is that FiveThirtyEight’s forecast tends to be more conservative than others. (For a more complete description of our model, including how it is handling some complications related to COVID-19, please see our methodology guide.)
With that said, one shouldn’t get too carried away with the comparisons to four years ago. In 2016, the reason Trump had a pretty decent chance in our final forecast was mostly just because the polls were fairly close (despite the media narrative to the contrary), close enough that even a modest-sized polling error in the right group of states could be enough to give Trump a victory in the Electoral College.
The uncertainty in our current 2020 forecast, conversely, stems mostly from the fact that there’s still a long way to go until the election. Take what happens if we lie to our model and tell it that the election is going to be held today. It spits out that Biden has a 93 percent chance of winning. In other words, a Trump victory would require a much bigger polling error than what we saw in 2016.
Let’s briefly expand on the points I made above.
Biden’s lead is pretty impressive
In this article — partly as a corrective against what I see as overconfident assessments elsewhere — I’m mostly focused on the reasons why Trump’s chances are higher than they might appear. But we should be clear: Trump’s current position in the polls is poor.
Biden is currently ahead in our polling averages in Florida, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Ohio and in the second congressional district in Nebraska — all places that Clinton lost in 2016. If he won those states (and held the other states Clinton won), that would be enough to give him 352 electoral votes. He’s also within roughly 1 percentage point of Trump in Texas, Georgia, Iowa and Maine’s second congressional district. If he won those, too, he’d be up to a whopping 412 electoral votes.
It’s important to remember that the uncertainty in our forecast runs in both directions. There’s the chance that Trump could come back — but there’s also the chance that things could get really out of hand for him. Our model thinks there’s a 19 percent chance that Biden will win Alaska, for example, and a 13 percent chance that he will win South Carolina. The model also gives Biden a 30 percent chance of a double-digit win in the popular vote, which would be the first time that happened since 1984.
But there are downside scenarios for Biden.
Polls often change substantially between now and November
Every day, my colleague Nathaniel Rakich tweets out a list of what our national polling average would have looked like at this stage in past campaigns. And it can be a pretty wild ride. Here is Tuesday’s version, for instance.
The @FiveThirtyEight nat'l polling average with 84 days until E-Day: 2020: Biden+8.3
2016: Clinton+6.6
2012: Obama+0.5
2008: Obama+2.6
2004: Kerry+2.5
2000: Bush+10.0
1996: Clinton+11.3
1992: Clinton+20.1
1988: Dukakis+5.6
1984: Reagan+16.0
1980: Reagan+22.1
1976: Carter+26.6 — Nathaniel Rakich (@baseballot) August 11, 2020
Three of the candidates leading in national polls at this point — Michael Dukakis in 1988, George W. Bush in 2000, and John Kerry in 2004 — did not actually win the popular vote. Bush blew a 10-point lead, in fact, which is larger than Biden’s current advantage. (Luckily for Bush, he won the Electoral College.) In other cases, the polls at this point “called” the winner correctly, but the margins were way off. Jimmy Carter eventually beat Gerald Ford by just 2.1 percentage points — not the 26.6-point lead he had at this point in the campaign. Bill Clinton won by 5.6 points — not 20.1 points. And Barack Obama won a considerably more commanding victory in 2008 than polls at this point projected.
Now, there are some mitigating factors here. Some of these polls were taken at the height of a candidate’s convention bounce, although there are ways to try to correct for those. And in general, polls have become less volatile over time, probably because increased polarization means there are fewer swing voters than there once were. The polls have been particularly stable so far this year, in fact.
But while there are some factors that reduce uncertainty, there are other factors that increase it.
COVID-19 is a big reason to avoid feeling overly confident about the outcome
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to more than 150,000 fatalities and has upended pretty much every American’s life, and Trump’s approval ratings for his handling of it have been awful.
But to the extent this is an election about COVID-19, there’s the possibility that the situation could improve between now and November. Cases have recently begun to come down after an early-summer spike, and recent economic data has shown improvement there, too. There’s also the possibility that a vaccine could be approved — or rushed out — by November, though it’s highly unlikely it could be widely distributed by then.
How to account for this? No, we aren’t building a COVID-19 projection model. (It’s really hard.) But we have built an “uncertainty index” that essentially governs the margin of error in our forecast. It contains eight components, two of which are very high because of COVID-19. Specifically, these are the high volatility in recent economic data, and the volume of major news events, as measured by the number of full-width New York Times headlines. There’s more news this year — not just about COVID-19, but the protests around police brutality, Trump’s impeachment earlier this year, etc. — than in any recent election campaign.
We also expect turnout to be harder to predict this year based on primary elections held during the pandemic that had highly variable turnout — which, in turn, could lead to more polling error. So even if the polls don’t change that much between now and November, that could create some additional uncertainty on Election Day. See the methodology guide for more on how we handle COVID-19.
But the other components of the uncertainty index are low, pointing toward a stable campaign. For instance, polarization is high, poll movement so far has been limited, and there aren’t that many undecided voters; the index accounts for all of those things.
In fact, the uncertainty index points toward the overall uncertainty going into November being about average relative to past presidential campaigns. So our model isn’t necessarily saying that things are going to get crazy, although they could. But it’s also saying you shouldn’t necessarily expect highly stable campaigns like 2012 to be the new normal in the time of COVID-19. (And keep in mind that 2016 was a pretty volatile campaign, too, even without COVID-19.) Empirically, the polls can move quite a bit from August to November, more than you might expect intuitively!
There are some sources of uncertainty that the model doesn’t account for, however. We assume that there are reasonable efforts to allow eligible citizens to vote and to count all legal ballots, and that electors are awarded to the popular-vote winner in each state. The model also does not account for the possibility of extraconstitutional shenanigans by Trump or by anyone else, such as trying to prevent mail ballots from being counted.
It’s hard to know what the “fundamentals” say
I’ve long been critical of models that use economic “fundamentals” to try to predict election results, mostly because — although they claim to be highly precise — they haven’t actually been very good at predicting the outcome of an election where they don’t already know the results.
And those models are especially likely to have problems this year because of highly variable economic data. One model based on second quarter GDP projects Trump to win -453 (negative 453!) electoral votes, for example. But if you built a model based on third-quarter GDP, which is expected to be highly positive, it might predict a Trump landslide.
This isn’t to say that we don’t employ a fundamentals forecast of our own. We do, but it’s much less confident than others, and it receives relatively little weight in the overall forecast. It also isn’t currently that bad for Trump. In fact, it essentially predicts the popular vote to be roughly tied. Why?
Although three of the economic factors we use in the model (jobs, spending, manufacturing) have been terrible, a fourth component (income) has been very strong because of government subsidies in the form of the CARES Act, though that could change if stimulus payments lapse. The fifth and sixth components, inflation and the stock market, have also been reasonably favorable.
because of government subsidies in the form of the CARES Act, though that could change if stimulus payments lapse. The fifth and sixth components, inflation and the stock market, have also been reasonably favorable. Most of the variables that declined are now improving, and are expected to continue to improve. (Our model projects what the economy will look like by November rather than relying on current data.)
High polarization potentially blunts the impact of a poor economy.
Trump is an elected incumbent, and elected incumbents are usually favored for reelection.
We extended our analysis back to elections since 1880 (!) to expand the sample size, and found the relationship between the economy and the election likely isn’t as strong as other models claim, anyway.
In other words, our forecast thinks it’s far from obvious that the economy will doom Trump, especially if he can tell a story of recovery by November. Indeed, Trump’s approval ratings on the economy are still fairly good, so our model seems to be doing a reasonably good job of capturing how voters actually feel about the economy.
Another way to look at it is that our model is just saying that, in a highly polarized environment, the race is more likely than not to tighten in the stretch run. Empirically, large leads like the one Biden has now tend to dissipate to some degree by Election Day. And if the race does tighten…
Trump appears to have an Electoral College advantage again
Our model says there’s an 81 percent chance that Biden wins the popular vote — compared to his 71 percent chance in the Electoral College. That means there’s about a 10 percent chance that Trump again wins the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote. (Conversely, the model puts the chance that Biden wins the Electoral College but loses the popular vote at only around 1 in 750.)
That reflects the fact that the tipping-point state — the state that would provide the decisive 270th electoral vote — is somewhat to the right of the national popular vote. More specifically, our projection as of Tuesday had Biden winning the popular vote by 6.3 percentage points nationally, but winning the tipping-point state, Wisconsin, by a smaller margin, 4.5 percentage points:
The Electoral College could once again help Trump Forecasted vote margin in battleground states and lean relative to the nation, from FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecast as of Aug. 11 State forecasted vote margin Lean relative to nation New Mexico D+11.8 D+5.5 Virginia D+10.6 D+4.3 Colorado D+9.2 D+2.9 Maine statwide D+8.2 D+1.9 Michigan D+6.9 D+0.6 New Hampshire D+6.4 D+0.1 National D+6.3 EVEN Nevada D+6.2 R+0.1 Minnesota D+4.7 R+1.6 Pennsylvania D+4.7 R+1.6 Wisconsin* D+4.5 R+1.8 Florida D+3.2 R+3.1 Nebraska 2nd District D+0.9 R+5.4 Arizona D+0.8 R+5.5 North Carolina D+0.3 R+6.0 Ohio R+1.0 R+7.3 Georgia R+2.8 R+9.1 Maine 2nd District R+3.9 R+10.2 Iowa R+4.3 R+10.6 Texas R+4.4 R+10.7 * Wisconsin is the tipping-point state as of Aug. 11.
That 1.8-point gap is actually smaller than what Clinton experienced in 2016, when there was about a 3-point gap between her losing margin in Wisconsin (which was also the tipping-point state in 2016) and her winning margin in the national popular vote. This analysis is a simplification, too. There’s a lot of uncertainty in the outlook, so the tipping-point state could easily turn out to be Florida or Pennsylvania or something more unexpected like North Carolina.
Still, as a rough rule-of-thumb, perhaps you can subtract 2 points from Biden’s current lead in national polls to get a sense for what his standing in the tipping point states looks like. Add it all up, and you can start to see why the model is being fairly cautious. Biden’s current roughly 8-point lead in national polls is really more like a 6-point lead in the tipping point states. And 6-point leads in August are historically not very safe. That margin is perhaps more likely than not to tighten and at the very least, there’s a fair amount of uncertainty about what COVID-19 and the rest the world will look like by November.
Biden is in a reasonably strong position: Having a 70-ish percent chance of beating an incumbent in early August before any conventions or debates is far better than the position that most challengers find themselves in. And his chances will improve in our model if he maintains his current lead. But for the time being, the data does not justify substantially more confidence than that.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-12--What A Biden-Harris Ticket Says About The Democratic Party

In this FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew reacts to Joe Biden ’ s announcement that California Sen. Kamala Harris @ @ @ @ @ .

What A Biden-Harris Ticket Says About The Democratic Party
In this FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew reacts to Joe Biden’s announcement that California Sen. Kamala Harris will be his running mate.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-12--Model Talk: How The 2020 Presidential Forecast Works

FiveThirtyEight ’ s 2020 presidential election forecast is live !
In this edition of “ Model Talk , ” Nate @ @ @ @ @ down what ’ s new in this year ’ s forecast and discuss where the @ @ @

FiveThirtyEight’s 2020 presidential election forecast is live! In this edition of “Model Talk,” Nate Silver and Galen Druke break down what’s new in this year’s forecast and discuss where the uncertainty lies.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-12--Politics Podcast: The 2020 Presidential Forecast Is Live!

On Wednesday , we launched our 2020 presidential election forecast .
It currently shows Joe Biden with a 71 percent @ @ @ @ @ and President Trump with a 29 percent chance .
In this “ Model Talk ” @ @ @ @ @ podcast , Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the new additions to the forecast and @ @ @ @ @ s outcome so uncertain .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ @ @ @ @ @ audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your @ @ @ @ @ you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast @ @ @ @ @ .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on @ @ @ @ @ , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in @ @ @ @ @ Twitter or in the comments .

On Wednesday, we launched our 2020 presidential election forecast. It currently shows Joe Biden with a 71 percent chance of winning the election and President Trump with a 29 percent chance. In this “Model Talk” edition of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the new additions to the forecast and what makes this election’s outcome so uncertain.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-12--The Miami Heat’s Dynamic Duo Could Make Noise In The Playoffs

It ’ s always satisfying when two players with agreeable games end up on the same team , under a coach who understands their symbiotic energy and optimizes their creativity inside the right system .
My favorite example is Duncan Robinson and Bam Adebayo , a two-man basketball opera who might also represent the NBA ’ s most potent 1-2 punch .
They pass , cut , float , feint , screen , shoot and dunk like the personification of teamwork in its most merciless and committed form .
Miami ’ s offense averages 114.8 points per 100 possessions when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mark that would lead all teams except the Dallas Mavericks — and when you look at the various and often subtle ways they interact , it ’ s obvious that efficiency isn ’ t a coincidence .
Sometimes , a basic arrangement blossoms into something else .
Cross Robinson ’ s catch-and-shoot threat with Adebayo ’ s rare ability to dice set defenses up as a high-post delivery man , and the result is peanut butter and jelly : two delicacies that are slightly more enjoyable when smashed together .
The two complement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but nothing is more mutually beneficial than their dribble handoffs .
According to Second Spectrum , no pair other than the Denver tandem of Monte Morris and Nikola Jokić has hooked up on more direct handoffs since the restart , and on those plays , Adebayo and Robinson rank in the 71st percentile in points per chance .
( We ’ re working with a small sample size , but according to Second Spectrum , whenever Adebayo ’ s defender is in “ soft ” coverage on these handoffs , Miami averages 1.79 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 162 different combinations that have at least 200 actions this season , Robinson and Adebayo ’ s dribble handoff averages the most points per chance ( 1.22 ) .
Many times it ’ s nothing out of the ordinary : Robinson zips up from the baseline to retrieve the ball from Adebayo , who can either keep the ball and pivot toward the rim for his first step toward a potential dunk , or flip it to Robinson , set a screen and prompt an immediate three from one of basketball ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to PBP Stats , Adebayo has assisted more of Robinson ’ s threes this season than any other player in the NBA has fed one of their teammates ’ s downtown conversions . )
Regarding the first scenario , Adebayo has executed the most fake handoffs this season , while the Heat generate 1.38 points per possession on those plays — good for the 93rd percentile among the 65 players who ’ ve pulled off at least 25 of them , according to Second Spectrum .
That number rises to an unconscious 1.42 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dance partner .
The gravity is bone crushing .
And the attention drawn by their collaboration yields opportunities for everybody else .
Imagine being Wes Matthews in the play below : You anticipate everything Robinson wants to do , and Brook Lopez even lends you a helping hand higher up on the floor than he typically wants to be , but in the end it doesn ’ t matter .
The pair places immense pressure on defenders .
Here , when Kemba Walker falls trying to chase Robinson around a stagger screen , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he can switch onto Bam and let Jaylen Brown snuff out Robinson ’ s potential three .
But in that chaos , Nunn springs free near the top of the arc .
Robinson swings him the ball , and he ’ s able to blow by Walker ’ s hard closeout for a layup .
In this next example against the Denver Nuggets , Adebayo actually keeps the ball and draws a foul at the rim , but he could have easily kicked it out to either corner .
These two are simply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a coordinated reaction .
It ’ s basketball ecstasy .
The Heat utilize this dribble-handoff partnership more as a delicious side dish than an entree — it accounts for 7.6 actions per 100 possessions , which is pretty scarce when lumped in with pick-and-roll pairings , according to Second Spectrum — but that limited dosage makes sense for a variety of reasons .
To start , Heat coach Erik Spoelstra has almost too many ball-handling options , with Jimmy Butler , Goran Dragić and Nunn all touching the rock in an offense that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provided by shooters like Robinson and Tyler Herro .
Adebayo is also useful as a traditional big man who rolls to the rim , and Robinson is more than adept at spacing the offense .
Defenses that can switch all five players can frustrate the duo .
Watch what happens when OG Anunoby glides off Adebayo to smother Robinson in the corner .
But handoffs are not the only way these two attack .
In fact , their primary entry point into Miami ’ s offensive scheme usually comes away from the action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where Bam sets an off-ball screen for Robinson , which is in the 81st percentile among duos with at least 50 direct off-ball screens .
Moreover , among the 139 duos that have engaged in at least 50 direct off-ball screens this season , Robinson and Adebayo ’ s 1.40 points per direct off-ball screen ranks first .
On their own , Adebayo and Robinson are both important , skilled , highly valuable players that every NBA team wishes they had .
But together , they unlock something even more special .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but they do represent a tenacious setup combo that ’ s peppered throughout Miami ’ s 48-minute fights .
If the Heat set forth on a playoff run that includes more than one upset , Robinson and Adebayo ’ s collaborative magic will be a key factor .

It’s always satisfying when two players with agreeable games end up on the same team, under a coach who understands their symbiotic energy and optimizes their creativity inside the right system.
My favorite example is Duncan Robinson and Bam Adebayo, a two-man basketball opera who might also represent the NBA’s most potent 1-2 punch. They pass, cut, float, feint, screen, shoot and dunk like the personification of teamwork in its most merciless and committed form.
Miami’s offense averages 114.8 points per 100 possessions when the pair shares the court — a mark that would lead all teams except the Dallas Mavericks — and when you look at the various and often subtle ways they interact, it’s obvious that efficiency isn’t a coincidence.
Sometimes, a basic arrangement blossoms into something else. Cross Robinson’s catch-and-shoot threat with Adebayo’s rare ability to dice set defenses up as a high-post delivery man, and the result is peanut butter and jelly: two delicacies that are slightly more enjoyable when smashed together.
The two complement each other in several different ways, but nothing is more mutually beneficial than their dribble handoffs. According to Second Spectrum, no pair other than the Denver tandem of Monte Morris and Nikola Jokić has hooked up on more direct handoffs since the restart, and on those plays, Adebayo and Robinson rank in the 71st percentile in points per chance. (We’re working with a small sample size, but according to Second Spectrum, whenever Adebayo’s defender is in “soft” coverage on these handoffs, Miami averages 1.79 points per possession.)
And of the 162 different combinations that have at least 200 actions this season, Robinson and Adebayo’s dribble handoff averages the most points per chance (1.22). Many times it’s nothing out of the ordinary: Robinson zips up from the baseline to retrieve the ball from Adebayo, who can either keep the ball and pivot toward the rim for his first step toward a potential dunk, or flip it to Robinson, set a screen and prompt an immediate three from one of basketball’s premier outside shooters. (According to PBP Stats, Adebayo has assisted more of Robinson’s threes this season than any other player in the NBA has fed one of their teammates’s downtown conversions.)
Regarding the first scenario, Adebayo has executed the most fake handoffs this season, while the Heat generate 1.38 points per possession on those plays — good for the 93rd percentile among the 65 players who’ve pulled off at least 25 of them, according to Second Spectrum. That number rises to an unconscious 1.42 points per possession when Robinson is his dance partner. The gravity is bone crushing.
And the attention drawn by their collaboration yields opportunities for everybody else. Imagine being Wes Matthews in the play below: You anticipate everything Robinson wants to do, and Brook Lopez even lends you a helping hand higher up on the floor than he typically wants to be, but in the end it doesn’t matter.
The pair places immense pressure on defenders. Here, when Kemba Walker falls trying to chase Robinson around a stagger screen, Marcus Smart instantly abandons Kendrick Nunn so he can switch onto Bam and let Jaylen Brown snuff out Robinson’s potential three. But in that chaos, Nunn springs free near the top of the arc. Robinson swings him the ball, and he’s able to blow by Walker’s hard closeout for a layup.
In this next example against the Denver Nuggets, Adebayo actually keeps the ball and draws a foul at the rim, but he could have easily kicked it out to either corner. These two are simply reading the defense and then bursting off a coordinated reaction. It’s basketball ecstasy.
The Heat utilize this dribble-handoff partnership more as a delicious side dish than an entree — it accounts for 7.6 actions per 100 possessions, which is pretty scarce when lumped in with pick-and-roll pairings, according to Second Spectrum — but that limited dosage makes sense for a variety of reasons. To start, Heat coach Erik Spoelstra has almost too many ball-handling options, with Jimmy Butler, Goran Dragić and Nunn all touching the rock in an offense that utilizes all the space that’s provided by shooters like Robinson and Tyler Herro. Adebayo is also useful as a traditional big man who rolls to the rim, and Robinson is more than adept at spacing the offense.
Defenses that can switch all five players can frustrate the duo. Watch what happens when OG Anunoby glides off Adebayo to smother Robinson in the corner.
But handoffs are not the only way these two attack. In fact, their primary entry point into Miami’s offensive scheme usually comes away from the action: Miami averages 1.20 points on possessions where Bam sets an off-ball screen for Robinson, which is in the 81st percentile among duos with at least 50 direct off-ball screens. Moreover, among the 139 duos that have engaged in at least 50 direct off-ball screens this season, Robinson and Adebayo’s 1.40 points per direct off-ball screen ranks first.
On their own, Adebayo and Robinson are both important, skilled, highly valuable players that every NBA team wishes they had. But together, they unlock something even more special. They may not throw knockout punches by themselves, but they do represent a tenacious setup combo that’s peppered throughout Miami’s 48-minute fights.
If the Heat set forth on a playoff run that includes more than one upset, Robinson and Adebayo’s collaborative magic will be a key factor.
Check out our latest NBA predictions.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-13--How We Designed The Look Of Our 2020 Forecast

An election year in the FiveThirtyEight newsroom is unlike any other year .
We started off by launching our Democratic primary forecast in January , and once Joe Biden had effectively clinched the nomination in April , we were ready to hit the gas on our general election forecast .
But 2020 has its own agenda : a global pandemic , a crashing U.S. economy , changes to the way we conduct elections , and a reckoning with systemic racism and police brutality .
This week , however , we kicked off the main event : We launched our 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put a lot of thought into how to forecast an election amid world-altering events , and into how to design and let users interact with that forecast .
How do you present a forecast that communicates what we know but also what we don ’ t know and what might change ?
That question became especially pressing given the added uncertainty introduced by COVID-19 , but we ’ ve been thinking about it for years , especially after the 2016 election .
Our impression was that people who read a lot of our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spent a good amount of time with our forecast thought we gave a pretty accurate picture of the election — polls showed Clinton leading , but not by much , and President Trump had a clear chance of winning given his advantage in crucial battleground states .
People who were looking only at our top-line forecast numbers , on the other hand , thought we bungled it .
Given the brouhaha after the 2016 election , we knew we had to thoughtfully approach how we delivered the forecast .
When readers came looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the election , we needed to make sure that information lived in a well-designed structure that helped people understand where those numbers are coming from and what circumstances were affecting them .
We started by putting some major goals for the design on paper .
We aimed to : • Construct a clear narrative that helps readers better understand how the election actually works .
• Focus almost exclusively on the model and put related information into other projects .
• Help users find our other content , like video , podcasts and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
• Design for desktop and mobile devices so readers can have a great experience no matter how they access the forecast .
• Use art to let that weird visual quality that FiveThirtyEight is known for shine .
In the 2016 and 2018 , we built straightforward interfaces : a sidebar and a series of modules that weren ’ t really linked by a narrative flow .
One of our goals this time was to form a narrative , so we figured , why not rethink how the user explores the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a number of experimental experiences , including interfaces where readers could shuffle the House , Senate and presidential forecasts like a deck of cards , or ones where users could sort of choose their own adventure .
Ultimately , we chose a fairly simple structure for displaying the presidential forecast , leaving behind some of the more complicated user experiences .
The final version is modular and the pieces of the forecast are visualized on cards .
Each card gives the reader a different lens on the election .
Some also offer a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or hovering on elements like dots or lines .
This structure also helped us nail our goal of designing for flexibility .
Adapting for smaller screen sizes and other platforms ( like social media , TV and video ) was much easier because each piece of content was designed to stand alone .
Now that we had a sound foundation , we needed great data visualizations to build on it .
To iron out what we wanted to show in this year ’ s forecast , we sifted through all the work we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past forecasts and documented what every chart aimed to accomplish and how successful we felt it was .
This approach helped us prioritize visualizations that effectively communicate what is most valuable to readers .
We divvied up the design of the individual graphics across our team of visual journalists .
To ensure some consistency in the results , we asked each person to consider a standard set of questions about their design .
No visualization in this forecast received more design attention than the top line , which is what we call the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a candidate or party winning the election .
Whether we show the chances in percentages or odds , this is the portion of an election forecast that is most anticipated — and has the most potential to be misunderstood .
In 2016 , we aimed for simplicity , both visually and conceptually .
In 2018 , we leaned into the complexity of the forecast .
For 2020 , we wanted to land somewhere in between .
We also knew we wanted to try to lift the curtain a little on how that top-line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place .
To really oversimplify things : Each candidate ’ s odds of winning at least 270 electoral votes come from their chances of winning in each state and D.C. To get from polling averages to probabilities , we simulate the election thousands of times to account for a whole bunch of uncertainties : How accurate will the polls be overall ?
What if they ’ re off in only certain states ?
What if Trump beats his polls , but only in the Midwest ?
What if Biden overperforms in the states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the economy improves a ton between now and Election Day ?
What if it gets worse ?
What if the coronavirus or vote-by-mail laws affect turnout ?
I could go on , but let ’ s stop there .
Those simulations give us a universe of possibilities , and focusing on the scope of that universe is eventually how we chose the design for the top-line chart .
We came up with dozens of concepts , from dead-simple bar charts and conventional visualization types to universes within universes .
In each iteration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the design .
Some were relatively undemanding .
Others were … pretty bizarre !
We tried to get creative rather than boxing ourselves into things we knew would work .
Ultimately , we landed on two elements to lead off the forecast .
First — before we get to any numbers — we give the reader the headline and a sense of the range of possible electoral outcomes in the form of a grid of maps : There are a number of ways a candidate can win , depending on which states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these maps represents one simulated scenario .
We want to prime readers to focus on the states as the drivers of the overall odds , and we want to tease the idea of multiple possible outcomes .
Second , we follow the maps with a chart that we affectionately call “ the ball swarm , ” a reference to a type of chart sometimes called a bee swarm : Similar to the grid of maps , the ball swarm shows readers 100 representative electoral outcomes from our model .
The dots huddle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a candidate wins the Electoral College by in each scenario .
Hover over each of the dots to see how the map shook out in that simulation .
Those maps — some of which you ’ ve already seen at the top of the forecast — are intended to hammer home how the states power the overall probabilities and show the huge range of potential outcomes that would be consistent with the data currently being input into the model .
Forecasting an election is more like predicting the weather than predicting whether a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; it ’ s complicated , and one of the chief benefits of building a model is to measure the real-world uncertainty about the outcome .
We hope the ball swarm ’ s universe of 2020 outcomes communicates that uncertainty .
Our guess is that you won ’ t see something like the ball swarm in other publications ’ election coverage and we hope that you think it ’ s as weird and informative as we do .
As for the rest of our presidential forecast , let our forecast mascot Fivey Fox @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s more to come from the forecast and no doubt from 2020 , so buckle up and give it a scroll !

An election year in the FiveThirtyEight newsroom is unlike any other year. We started off by launching our Democratic primary forecast in January, and once Joe Biden had effectively clinched the nomination in April, we were ready to hit the gas on our general election forecast. But 2020 has its own agenda: a global pandemic, a crashing U.S. economy, changes to the way we conduct elections, and a reckoning with systemic racism and police brutality.
This week, however, we kicked off our main event: We launched our 2020 presidential election forecast on Wednesday. We put a lot of thought into how to forecast an election amid world-altering events, and into how to design and let users interact with that forecast. How do you present a forecast that communicates what we know but also what we don’t know and what might change? That question became especially pressing given the added uncertainty introduced by COVID-19, but we’ve been thinking about it for years, especially after the 2016 election.
Our impression was that people who read a lot of our coverage in the lead-up to 2016 and spent a good amount of time with our forecast thought we gave a pretty accurate picture of the election — polls showed Clinton leading, but not by much, and President Trump had a clear chance of winning given his advantage in crucial battleground states. People who were looking only at our top-line forecast numbers, on the other hand, thought we bungled it. Given the brouhaha after the 2016 election, we knew we had to thoughtfully approach how we delivered the forecast. When readers came looking to see who was favored to win the election, we needed to make sure that information lived in a well-designed structure that helped people understand where those numbers are coming from and what circumstances were affecting them.
Building the foundation
We started by putting some major goals for the design on paper. We aimed to:
Construct a clear narrative that helps readers better understand how the election actually works.
Focus almost exclusively on the model and put related information into other projects.
Help users find our other content, like video, podcasts and stories, to give the model context.
Design for desktop and mobile devices so readers can have a great experience no matter how they access the forecast.
Use art to let that weird visual quality that FiveThirtyEight is known for shine.
In the 2016 and 2018, we built straightforward interfaces: a sidebar and a series of modules that weren’t really linked by a narrative flow.
One of our goals this time was to form a narrative, so we figured, why not rethink how the user explores the election? This time around, we considered a number of experimental experiences, including interfaces where readers could shuffle the House, Senate and presidential forecasts like a deck of cards, or ones where users could sort of choose their own adventure.
Ultimately, we chose a fairly simple structure for displaying the presidential forecast, leaving behind some of the more complicated user experiences. The final version is modular and the pieces of the forecast are visualized on cards. Each card gives the reader a different lens on the election. Some also offer a chance to explore deeper by switching tabs or hovering on elements like dots or lines. This structure also helped us nail our goal of designing for flexibility. Adapting for smaller screen sizes and other platforms (like social media, TV and video) was much easier because each piece of content was designed to stand alone.
Designing the floor plan
Now that we had a sound foundation, we needed great data visualizations to build on it. To iron out what we wanted to show in this year’s forecast, we sifted through all the work we’ve done before. We surveyed past forecasts and documented what every chart aimed to accomplish and how successful we felt it was.
This approach helped us prioritize visualizations that effectively communicate what is most valuable to readers. We divvied up the design of the individual graphics across our team of visual journalists. To ensure some consistency in the results, we asked each person to consider a standard set of questions about their design.
Choosing the most expensive couch
No visualization in this forecast received more design attention than the top line, which is what we call the chart that shows the overall chances of a candidate or party winning the election.
Whether we show the chances in percentages or odds, this is the portion of an election forecast that is most anticipated — and has the most potential to be misunderstood. In 2016, we aimed for simplicity, both visually and conceptually. In 2018, we leaned into the complexity of the forecast. For 2020, we wanted to land somewhere in between. We also knew we wanted to try to lift the curtain a little on how that top-line chart comes to exist in the first place.
To really oversimplify things: Each candidate’s odds of winning at least 270 electoral votes come from their chances of winning in each state and D.C. To get from polling averages to probabilities, we simulate the election thousands of times to account for a whole bunch of uncertainties: How accurate will the polls be overall? What if they’re off in only certain states? What if Trump beats his polls, but only in the Midwest? What if Biden overperforms in the states hit hardest by the pandemic? What if the economy improves a ton between now and Election Day? What if it gets worse? What if the coronavirus or vote-by-mail laws affect turnout? I could go on, but let’s stop there.
Those simulations give us a universe of possibilities, and focusing on the scope of that universe is eventually how we chose the design for the top-line chart.
We came up with dozens of concepts, from dead-simple bar charts and conventional visualization types to universes within universes.
In each iteration we tried to add a visual twist to the design. Some were relatively undemanding. Others were … pretty bizarre! We tried to get creative rather than boxing ourselves into things we knew would work. Ultimately, we landed on two elements to lead off the forecast.
First — before we get to any numbers — we give the reader the headline and a sense of the range of possible electoral outcomes in the form of a grid of maps:
There are a number of ways a candidate can win, depending on which states they put in their column. Each of these maps represents one simulated scenario. We want to prime readers to focus on the states as the drivers of the overall odds, and we want to tease the idea of multiple possible outcomes.
Second, we follow the maps with a chart that we affectionately call “the ball swarm,” a reference to a type of chart sometimes called a bee swarm:
Similar to the grid of maps, the ball swarm shows readers 100 representative electoral outcomes from our model. The dots huddle on an x-axis showing how many votes a candidate wins the Electoral College by in each scenario. Hover over each of the dots to see how the map shook out in that simulation.
Those maps — some of which you’ve already seen at the top of the forecast — are intended to hammer home how the states power the overall probabilities and show the huge range of potential outcomes that would be consistent with the data currently being input into the model. Forecasting an election is more like predicting the weather than predicting whether a coin will land on heads or tails; it’s complicated, and one of the chief benefits of building a model is to measure the real-world uncertainty about the outcome. We hope the ball swarm’s universe of 2020 outcomes communicates that uncertainty.
Our guess is that you won’t see something like the ball swarm in other publications’ election coverage and we hope that you think it’s as weird and informative as we do. As for the rest of our presidential forecast, let our forecast mascot Fivey Fox guide you through it. There’s more to come from the forecast and no doubt from 2020, so buckle up and give it a scroll!


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-13--Could Kamala Harris Win The Presidency In 2024? Here’s What History Tells Us.

The fact that California Sen. Kamala Harris is Joe Biden ’ s vice presidential nominee is undeniably historic .
She is only the third woman to run as vice president on a major-party ticket , and of the two main parties , she is the first Asian American and the first Black woman to run in the general election as president or vice president .
As my colleague Perry Bacon Jr. noted on Tuesday , Biden ’ s choice could also have ramifications that extend far beyond the 2020 election .
If Biden wins in November , his VP pick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ woman president .
That presents a number of challenges , which we ’ ll discuss later , but first , let ’ s look at the track record of VPs making it to the Oval Office .
Since John Adams first held the VP post in 1789 , 14 of 47 vice presidents have gone on to become president , making it the most likely — albeit still far from certain — stepping stone to the White House .
The number of vice presidents who have sought the presidency has really skyrocketed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 13 VPs since the end of World War II ( excluding Vice President Mike Pence ) , eight — or more than half — have gone on to become their party ’ s presidential nominee .
However , as you can see in the table below , far fewer — just three — have won a presidential election , and just four have become president at all .
Biden , of course , is hoping to become the fifth modern VP to accomplish this feat .
That ’ s not a great batting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford first became president because their predecessors could not finish their terms — in Johnson ’ s case , because John F. Kennedy was assassinated , and , in Ford ’ s case , because Richard Nixon resigned .
At 77 , Biden is the oldest major-party nominee in history and , if elected , would be the oldest president to hold the office , so without getting too macabre , there could easily be a scenario in which his VP must finish his term .
Biden ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assign huge importance to his vice presidential pick and what it might signal for the future of the Democratic Party .
Even if Biden wins and serves out his term , it ’ s not clear that he ’ d run for a second one .
He has portrayed himself as a transitional candidate , describing his campaign as a “ bridge ” to the next generation of Democratic leaders , so it ’ s entirely possible that Harris , who is 55 , will be thought of as the future of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely eyeing a future White House run , too .
For one thing , she campaigned for it in 2020 .
And , as we mentioned at the outset , it ’ s pretty common for VPs to run .
Just three of the vice presidents since 1948 — Spiro Agnew , Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney — didn ’ t seek the presidency after serving as VP .
But that doesn ’ t mean if Harris were to run it would be easy .
It turns out that running for president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mixed bag .
Take someone like Ford .
After assuming the presidency in 1974 when Nixon resigned , Ford mounted a run for a full term in 1976 , but it was hardly a coronation .
Before he won the GOP nomination , he had to fend off a serious primary challenge from Ronald Reagan that went all the way to the national convention .
Some elected vice presidents , like Nixon , George H.W .
Bush and Al Gore , have had an easier time winning their party nominations against weak opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Dan Quayle , didn ’ t even make it to the general election .
It ’ s impossible to say which of these comparisons might prove most apt for Harris — we don ’ t even know if she ’ ll be vice president — but it ’ s not hard to imagine her facing a major intraparty challenge in the future .
For one , we ’ ve never had a woman vice president , let alone a woman president — and past elections have shown us just how challenging it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to win .
For his part , Biden has sparked criticism for botching the selection process — the only thing we knew up until Tuesday was that he would pick a woman to be his running mate — making the conversation less about his running mate ’ s credentials and more about whether she was the “ right ” kind of woman for the job .
It ’ s also possible that four years from now , the Democratic Party will have moved even further to the left , and Biden and Harris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fallen out of fashion , encouraging a primary challenge .
Nevertheless , if Harris does become vice president , it undoubtedly raises her odds that she might one day occupy the White House and lead the Democratic Party in a presidential election .
Even after her underwhelming 2020 bid , one only has to look at Biden ’ s career arc to see how Harris ’ s presidential aspirations could benefit from serving as VP .
It wasn ’ t until Barack Obama made Biden his vice president in 2008 that he established @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to become its preferred choice in 2020 .
( His two prior presidential bids were unsuccessful . )
It is , of course , too soon to say whether Biden will win in November , but he could become the 15th vice president to reach the White House .
And someday Harris could easily become the 16th .

The fact that California Sen. Kamala Harris is Joe Biden’s vice presidential nominee is undeniably historic. She is only the third woman to run as vice president on a major-party ticket, and of the two main parties, she is the first Asian American and the first Black woman to run in the general election as president or vice president.
As my colleague Perry Bacon Jr. noted on Tuesday, Biden’s choice could also have ramifications that extend far beyond the 2020 election. If Biden wins in November, his VP pick could go on to become the first woman president. That presents a number of challenges, which we’ll discuss later, but first, let’s look at the track record of VPs making it to the Oval Office.
Since John Adams first held the VP post in 1789, 14 of 47 vice presidents have gone on to become president, making it the most likely — albeit still far from certain — stepping stone to the White House. The number of vice presidents who have sought the presidency has really skyrocketed in modern times, too. Of the 13 VPs since the end of World War II (excluding Vice President Mike Pence), eight — or more than half — have gone on to become their party’s presidential nominee. However, as you can see in the table below, far fewer — just three — have won a presidential election, and just four have become president at all. Biden, of course, is hoping to become the fifth modern VP to accomplish this feat.
Most vice presidents run for president … but not all win Vice presidents since 1948 who have run for president, and whether they won their party’s nomination and the subsequent presidential election Vice President Party Won nomination Won pres. election Alben Barkley D Richard Nixon* R ✓ ✓ Lyndon Johnson† D ✓ ✓ Hubert Humphrey D ✓ Gerald Ford† R ✓ Walter Mondale D ✓ George H.W. Bush R ✓ ✓ Dan Quayle R Al Gore D ✓ Joe Biden D ✓ * Nixon lost the first time he ran for president, in 1960, after serving as vice president, but ran again in 1968 and won. † Johnson and Ford both became president upon the death or resignation of their predecessors, so they technically ran as incumbents. Spiro Agnew, Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney didn’t run for president after serving as vice president. This list does not include Vice President Mike Pence, as he could still run for president in the future.
That’s not a great batting average, especially when you consider that both Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford first became president because their predecessors could not finish their terms — in Johnson’s case, because John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and, in Ford’s case, because Richard Nixon resigned. At 77, Biden is the oldest major-party nominee in history and, if elected, would be the oldest president to hold the office, so without getting too macabre, there could easily be a scenario in which his VP must finish his term.
Biden’s advanced age has understandably prompted many to assign huge importance to his vice presidential pick and what it might signal for the future of the Democratic Party. Even if Biden wins and serves out his term, it’s not clear that he’d run for a second one. He has portrayed himself as a transitional candidate, describing his campaign as a “bridge” to the next generation of Democratic leaders, so it’s entirely possible that Harris, who is 55, will be thought of as the future of the party no matter what.
Harris is likely eyeing a future White House run, too. For one thing, she campaigned for it in 2020. And, as we mentioned at the outset, it’s pretty common for VPs to run. Just three of the vice presidents since 1948 — Spiro Agnew, Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney — didn’t seek the presidency after serving as VP. But that doesn’t mean if Harris were to run it would be easy. It turns out that running for president after being VP is kind of a mixed bag.
Take someone like Ford. After assuming the presidency in 1974 when Nixon resigned, Ford mounted a run for a full term in 1976, but it was hardly a coronation. Before he won the GOP nomination, he had to fend off a serious primary challenge from Ronald Reagan that went all the way to the national convention. Some elected vice presidents, like Nixon, George H.W. Bush and Al Gore, have had an easier time winning their party nominations against weak opposition, but others, like Alben Barkley and Dan Quayle, didn’t even make it to the general election.
It’s impossible to say which of these comparisons might prove most apt for Harris — we don’t even know if she’ll be vice president — but it’s not hard to imagine her facing a major intraparty challenge in the future. For one, we’ve never had a woman vice president, let alone a woman president — and past elections have shown us just how challenging it can be for a highly qualified woman to win. For his part, Biden has sparked criticism for botching the selection process — the only thing we knew up until Tuesday was that he would pick a woman to be his running mate — making the conversation less about his running mate’s credentials and more about whether she was the “right” kind of woman for the job. It’s also possible that four years from now, the Democratic Party will have moved even further to the left, and Biden and Harris’s more moderate politics will have fallen out of fashion, encouraging a primary challenge.
Nevertheless, if Harris does become vice president, it undoubtedly raises her odds that she might one day occupy the White House and lead the Democratic Party in a presidential election. Even after her underwhelming 2020 bid, one only has to look at Biden’s career arc to see how Harris’s presidential aspirations could benefit from serving as VP. It wasn’t until Barack Obama made Biden his vice president in 2008 that he established a strong enough profile within the party to become its preferred choice in 2020. (His two prior presidential bids were unsuccessful.) It is, of course, too soon to say whether Biden will win in November, but he could become the 15th vice president to reach the White House. And someday Harris could easily become the 16th.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-13--First The New York Rangers Made The Postseason. Then They Got The No. 1 Draft Pick.

The right to draft top hockey prospect Alexis Lafrenière came down this week to the eight teams that had made and exited the qualifying round of the Stanley Cup playoffs .
Some of those teams were undoubtedly expecting to still be playing , but they all likely would have been happy with the highly touted winger as consolation .
Knocked-out fifth seed Pittsburgh would have loved to see Lafrenière playing alongside Sidney Crosby next year .
Edmonton , another fifth seed that was upset in the qualifiers , would have jumped at the chance to put him with Connor McDavid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maple Leafs were fresh off a Game 5 elimination against Columbus , fans even tried to write into existence them getting the No .
1 pick .
Alas , the pingpong balls had different plans .
The NHL draft lottery gods decided the team on Broadway would get the first crack at the Quebecer , who could be the first of his province to be taken first overall since Pittsburgh selected goaltender Marc-Andre Fleury in 2003 .
“ I ’ m sure Ranger fans everywhere were pretty excited when the ball came up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York Rangers General Manager Jeff Gorton after Monday night ’ s lottery .
Lafrenière is one of two junior hockey players — along with Crosby — to have won the Canadian Hockey League ’ s Player of the Year Trophy twice .
The winger has put up impressive point totals in nearly every level of hockey he has played at , including 35 goals and 112 points in 52 games with the Rimouski Océanic this past season in the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League .
“ It ’ s been a really long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s really fun to know who won the lottery today , ” Lafrenière told the media Monday .
“ Really good team , obviously , with a lot of good players.
” The Rangers haven ’ t looked like a really good team recently , finishing the previous two seasons out of the playoffs and with below-average Simple Rating System marks .
They ’ ve been in the midst of an open rebuild since February 2018 , when Gorton and then-President Glen Sather sent a letter to fans signaling that the Rangers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of constructing a team for the future .
“ Our promise to you is that our plans will be guided by our singular commitment : ensuring we are building the foundation for our next Stanley Cup contender , ” the letter read .
The trade deadline later that month saw them part with the familiar faces of Rick Nash and Ryan McDonagh .
They selected Vitali Kravtsov and K ’ Andre Miller in that summer ’ s draft , and they used the No .
2 overall pick in the 2019 draft on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crop of highly touted Rangers prospects , including Filip Chytil and Igor Shesterkin .
To further bolster its roster , the team even lured free agent Artemi Panarin from Columbus and signed Jacob Trouba , whom it had acquired in a trade with Winnipeg , to a seven-year deal .
But the rebuilding process might be complete after Monday night .
The rebuild could have been nearly over already , with a successful playoff run to the Rangers ’ name , if the puck had bounced just a little differently over the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Rangers saw their odds of winning the Stanley Cup increase by 0.8 percentage points under the league ’ s Return to Play format .
That was the fifth-highest change among teams involved in the 24-team competition .
When comparing the odds of the Rangers ’ chances of making the postseason on March 11 versus the eve of the play-in series , the Blueshirts saw their chances rise 26.5 percentage points , to 44.4 percent from 17.9 percent .
It was the fourth-highest jump , trailing only Chicago , Montreal and Arizona @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rangers were seventh in the Metropolitan Division and were 2 points out of a wild-card spot for the Eastern Conference playoffs .
While they still had a chance at the playoffs in the East , the Rangers ’ 79 points through 70 games were only the fifth-most points amassed by the teams eligible for Monday ’ s draft lottery and the sixth-most points per game .
Of course , the Rangers were still 40 points better than the hapless Detroit Red Wings , who finished with the league ’ s worst record ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the draft .
The Rangers had won only two of their final seven regular-season games before the year stopped abruptly .
And their run of losing continued in the play-in round : They were swept in three games by the Carolina Hurricanes .
For those efforts , they now get first dibs at drafting a player who could bring them from the verge of success to consistent playoff appearances .

First The New York Rangers Made The Postseason. Then They Got The No. 1 Draft Pick.
The right to draft top hockey prospect Alexis Lafrenière came down this week to the eight teams that had made and exited the qualifying round of the Stanley Cup playoffs. Some of those teams were undoubtedly expecting to still be playing, but they all likely would have been happy with the highly touted winger as consolation.
Knocked-out fifth seed Pittsburgh would have loved to see Lafrenière playing alongside Sidney Crosby next year. Edmonton, another fifth seed that was upset in the qualifiers, would have jumped at the chance to put him with Connor McDavid. And in Toronto, where the Maple Leafs were fresh off a Game 5 elimination against Columbus, fans even tried to write into existence them getting the No. 1 pick.
Alas, the pingpong balls had different plans.
The NHL draft lottery gods decided the team on Broadway would get the first crack at the Quebecer, who could be the first of his province to be taken first overall since Pittsburgh selected goaltender Marc-Andre Fleury in 2003. “I’m sure Ranger fans everywhere were pretty excited when the ball came up for the Rangers,” said New York Rangers General Manager Jeff Gorton after Monday night’s lottery.
Lafrenière is one of two junior hockey players — along with Crosby — to have won the Canadian Hockey League’s Player of the Year Trophy twice. The winger has put up impressive point totals in nearly every level of hockey he has played at, including 35 goals and 112 points in 52 games with the Rimouski Océanic this past season in the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League.
“It’s been a really long last couple of months, but it’s really fun to know who won the lottery today,” Lafrenière told the media Monday. “Really good team, obviously, with a lot of good players.”
The Rangers haven’t looked like a really good team recently, finishing the previous two seasons out of the playoffs and with below-average Simple Rating System marks. They’ve been in the midst of an open rebuild since February 2018, when Gorton and then-President Glen Sather sent a letter to fans signaling that the Rangers would gut the roster in the hopes of constructing a team for the future. “Our promise to you is that our plans will be guided by our singular commitment: ensuring we are building the foundation for our next Stanley Cup contender,” the letter read.
The trade deadline later that month saw them part with the familiar faces of Rick Nash and Ryan McDonagh. They selected Vitali Kravtsov and K’Andre Miller in that summer’s draft, and they used the No. 2 overall pick in the 2019 draft on Kaapo Kakko. He joined a growing crop of highly touted Rangers prospects, including Filip Chytil and Igor Shesterkin. To further bolster its roster, the team even lured free agent Artemi Panarin from Columbus and signed Jacob Trouba, whom it had acquired in a trade with Winnipeg, to a seven-year deal.
But the rebuilding process might be complete after Monday night. The rebuild could have been nearly over already, with a successful playoff run to the Rangers’ name, if the puck had bounced just a little differently over the past few weeks.
According to our calculations, the Rangers saw their odds of winning the Stanley Cup increase by 0.8 percentage points under the league’s Return to Play format. That was the fifth-highest change among teams involved in the 24-team competition.
When comparing the odds of the Rangers’ chances of making the postseason on March 11 versus the eve of the play-in series, the Blueshirts saw their chances rise 26.5 percentage points, to 44.4 percent from 17.9 percent. It was the fourth-highest jump, trailing only Chicago, Montreal and Arizona.
Teams in Round 2 of the NHL draft lottery by points per game at the end of the regular season on March 11 Team Points Points/ game Pittsburgh Penguins 86 1.246 Edmonton Oilers 83 1.169 Toronto Maple Leafs 81 1.157 Nashville Predators 78 1.130 Florida Panthers 78 1.130 New York Rangers 79 1.129 Winnipeg Jets 80 1.127 Minnesota Wild 77 1.116 Source: Hockey-Reference.com
Prior to the restart, the Rangers were seventh in the Metropolitan Division and were 2 points out of a wild-card spot for the Eastern Conference playoffs. While they still had a chance at the playoffs in the East, the Rangers’ 79 points through 70 games were only the fifth-most points amassed by the teams eligible for Monday’s draft lottery and the sixth-most points per game.
Of course, the Rangers were still 40 points better than the hapless Detroit Red Wings, who finished with the league’s worst record (17-49-5) but will pick just fourth in the draft.
The Rangers had won only two of their final seven regular-season games before the year stopped abruptly. And their run of losing continued in the play-in round: They were swept in three games by the Carolina Hurricanes.
For those efforts, they now get first dibs at drafting a player who could bring them from the verge of success to consistent playoff appearances.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-13--The A’s Aren’t Just Scrappy. They’ve Got Stars.

The Oakland A ’ s might be something of America ’ s team in 2020 .
Their torrid start to the season has pushed them past the besmirched Houston Astros in the American League West standings and in our prediction model .
Every time the A ’ s excel on the field , we ’ re reminded of “ Moneyball , ” the best-selling book that helped accelerate baseball ’ s information age with its focus on how the early-2000 A ’ s used market inefficiencies to find wins at the margins .
What is often overlooked in the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just how talented those A ’ s were .
This year ’ s version may be even more so .
The low-payroll Athletics have continued to find new ways to win on a budget , with only two players on full-season contracts of more than $ 10 million , compared with the six such contracts on the Astros .
And they ’ re also always looking for an edge in their play .
For instance , their hitters again have one of the lowest ground-ball rates in the game , and they ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MLB since 2013 — hitting balls into the air before “ launch angle ” was part of the baseball vernacular .
They ’ ve had pitchers develop and lean on new pitches .
But these next-generation A ’ s aren ’ t successful just because of finding and creating value .
They ’ re also once again laden with legitimate star talent .
When the A ’ s won three division titles from 2000 to 2003 — with Barry Zito , Eric Chávez and Miguel Tejada roaming the East Bay — they ranked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 10th in position player production .
The current crop of A ’ s trails only the Yankees and Astros in position player WAR since 2018 , and ranks third early this season .
On the pitching side , the A ’ s trail only Cleveland in WAR in the AL .
Oakland ’ s pitching staff finished last season tied for 20th in club history in ERA- , a statistic that takes into account seasonal league and ballpark run-scoring effects .
It was a largely veteran group , but it included the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who came to Oakland as a prospect in a 2017 deal that sent closer Sean Doolittle to Washington , and A.J .
Puk , whom the club selected sixth overall in the 2016 draft .
Last season also saw the breakout of 26-year-old Frankie Montas , who began using a split-finger fastball to increase his strikeout rate .
They are arguably the A ’ s most talented young collection of starters since Zito , Mark Mulder and Tim Hudson .
Early this season , Montas and Luzardo are helping the staff to what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ club history , and the best since the 2003 group .
Among pitchers to have thrown 10 innings this season , Luzardo ranks 11th overall , and first among left-handed pitchers , in fastball velocity .
Montas ranks 16th .
Luzardo ’ s darting two-seamer has produced an overall groundball rate of 55 percent .
His changeup rates as a plus pitch that works well off the fastball along with his slider at the bottom of the zone .
Houston ’ s hitters struggled against the combination last week : Luzardo and Puk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 prospects in baseball entering last season , and Puk was garnering comparisons to Randy Johnson in the spring before being placed on the injured list with a shoulder strain just prior to opening day .
Chris Bassitt has filled in admirably in his absence , but Puk is making progress in his rehab .
Meanwhile , Montas has looked like an ace with a splitter he added that produced the fifth-best whiff-per-swing mark of its kind last season .
The A ’ s bullpen has again been excellent .
The A ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ player group .
While A ’ s first baseman Matt Olson and third baseman Matt Chapman have established themselves as stars with their bats and gloves , Marcus Semien emerged as an MVP candidate a year ago .
Five-tool threat Ramón Laureano keeps getting better and has even improved his plate discipline early this season .
Mark Canha has quietly become a source of patience and power .
Combined they give the A ’ s five players who rank in the top 23 of AL position player WAR .
It ’ s reminiscent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four players rank in the top 30 in 2001 .
The 2001 A ’ s rank 37th this century in WAR by individual AL teams and have been surpassed by the 2018 ( 20th ) and 2019 ( 33rd ) A ’ s .
In extrapolating their performance this season , the A ’ s could challenge their 2018 mark .
After failing to advance to a World Series earlier this century , longtime A ’ s general manager Billy Beane famously said , “ My shit doesn ’ t work in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look similar to that group , maybe this time , with this blend , outcomes will be different .
CORRECTION ( Aug. 13 , 2020 , 1:29 p.m. ) : An earlier version of this article misidentified Oakland player Mark Canha as Matt Canha .

The Oakland A’s might be something of America’s team in 2020. Their torrid start to the season has pushed them past the besmirched Houston Astros in the American League West standings and in our prediction model. Every time the A’s excel on the field, we’re reminded of “Moneyball,” the best-selling book that helped accelerate baseball’s information age with its focus on how the early-2000 A’s used market inefficiencies to find wins at the margins. What is often overlooked in the “Moneyball” discussions, though, is just how talented those A’s were. This year’s version may be even more so.
The low-payroll Athletics have continued to find new ways to win on a budget, with only two players on full-season contracts of more than $10 million, compared with the six such contracts on the Astros. And they’re also always looking for an edge in their play. For instance, their hitters again have one of the lowest ground-ball rates in the game, and they’ve owned the lowest ground-ball rate in MLB since 2013 — hitting balls into the air before “launch angle” was part of the baseball vernacular. They’ve had pitchers develop and lean on new pitches. But these next-generation A’s aren’t successful just because of finding and creating value. They’re also once again laden with legitimate star talent.
When the A’s won three division titles from 2000 to 2003 — with Barry Zito, Eric Chávez and Miguel Tejada roaming the East Bay — they ranked third in the majors in pitching WAR and 10th in position player production. The current crop of A’s trails only the Yankees and Astros in position player WAR since 2018, and ranks third early this season. On the pitching side, the A’s trail only Cleveland in WAR in the AL.
Oakland’s pitching staff finished last season tied for 20th in club history in ERA-, a statistic that takes into account seasonal league and ballpark run-scoring effects. It was a largely veteran group, but it included the debuts of young starters Jesús Luzardo, who came to Oakland as a prospect in a 2017 deal that sent closer Sean Doolittle to Washington, and A.J. Puk, whom the club selected sixth overall in the 2016 draft. Last season also saw the breakout of 26-year-old Frankie Montas, who began using a split-finger fastball to increase his strikeout rate. They are arguably the A’s most talented young collection of starters since Zito, Mark Mulder and Tim Hudson.
Early this season, Montas and Luzardo are helping the staff to what would be its seventh-best ERA- performance in club history, and the best since the 2003 group. Among pitchers to have thrown 10 innings this season, Luzardo ranks 11th overall, and first among left-handed pitchers, in fastball velocity. Montas ranks 16th. Luzardo’s darting two-seamer has produced an overall groundball rate of 55 percent. His changeup rates as a plus pitch that works well off the fastball along with his slider at the bottom of the zone. Houston’s hitters struggled against the combination last week:
Luzardo and Puk were each considered one of the top 20 prospects in baseball entering last season, and Puk was garnering comparisons to Randy Johnson in the spring before being placed on the injured list with a shoulder strain just prior to opening day. Chris Bassitt has filled in admirably in his absence, but Puk is making progress in his rehab. Meanwhile, Montas has looked like an ace with a splitter he added that produced the fifth-best whiff-per-swing mark of its kind last season. The A’s bullpen has again been excellent.
The A’s are also loaded in their position player group.
While A’s first baseman Matt Olson and third baseman Matt Chapman have established themselves as stars with their bats and gloves, Marcus Semien emerged as an MVP candidate a year ago. Five-tool threat Ramón Laureano keeps getting better and has even improved his plate discipline early this season. Mark Canha has quietly become a source of patience and power. Combined they give the A’s five players who rank in the top 23 of AL position player WAR. It’s reminiscent of when the A’s had four players rank in the top 30 in 2001. The 2001 A’s rank 37th this century in WAR by individual AL teams and have been surpassed by the 2018 (20th) and 2019 (33rd) A’s. In extrapolating their performance this season, the A’s could challenge their 2018 mark.
After failing to advance to a World Series earlier this century, longtime A’s general manager Billy Beane famously said, “My shit doesn’t work in the playoffs.” While these A’s look similar to that group, maybe this time, with this blend, outcomes will be different.
Check out our latest MLB predictions.
CORRECTION (Aug. 13, 2020, 1:29 p.m.): An earlier version of this article misidentified Oakland player Mark Canha as Matt Canha.