fivethirthyeight--2020-08-24--Why There Are So Few Moderate Republicans Left

Monday marks the first night of the Republican National Convention , and things could certainly be going better for President Trump .
He is trailing Joe Biden in the national polls as well as in several key swing states .
And FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential forecast currently says Biden — not Trump — is favored to win the election .
In fact , circumstances seem so dire for the GOP that election handicappers like the Cook Political Report think the Democrats — once underdogs — are slightly favored to take back the GOP-controlled Senate , too .
So if Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the House , the Senate and the presidency — that raises the question : Would the GOP change course ?
This is a question I ’ ve thought about a lot , and it ’ s one of the reasons why I argue in my book , “ Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop , ” that America ’ s two-party system is failing us .
With the two parties now fully nationalized , deeply sorted by geography and culture , and locked in a tightly contested , zero-sum battle over “ the soul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American way of life , ” it ’ s nearly impossible to break that cycle .
And so I think it ’ s unlikely that Republicans will become more moderate even if they were to take the shellacking I ’ ve outlined above .
The problem is that political parties are not singular entities capable of easily changing course .
They are , instead , a loose coalition of office-holders , interest groups , donors , activists , media personalities and many others , all jockeying and competing for power .
Think of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the tugs have been toward more extreme and more confrontational versions of the party .
In the GOP ’ s internal rope pull , this has meant that over the past few decades , and particularly since 2010 , almost all the would-be moderates have either gravitated toward Trump to stay relevant or simply broken away altogether .
And all that momentum in the Republican party is pulling toward a more confrontational , Trumpian direction — even if he is no longer at the helm .
Moderate Republicans are few and far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Perry Bacon Jr. described five wings of the Republican Party from most to least Trumpian .
The takeaway was clear .
The fortunes of those who were the most solidly aligned with Trump ( Bacon listed Rep. Matt Gaetz of Florida , Rep. Jim Jordan of Ohio and Rep. Mark Meadows of North Carolina as prominent examples ; I ’ d add Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton and Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley ) were rising within the party , while the fortunes of the so-called Trump skeptics were falling .
Some , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have left the party .
Others , like Rep. Will Hurd of Texas , are retiring .
And then there are the anti-Trumpers , like former Ohio Gov .
and 2016 presidential contender John Kasich , who are now endorsing Biden .
Anybody with any ambitions within the party has , in other words , embraced Trump and Trumpism .
These recent shifts aren ’ t entirely new , either .
They are the latest iteration of a decades-long transformation of the GOP .
In short , moderates have been bowing out .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ more evangelical , and now more Trumpian Republicans have been stepping up .
In the 2018 midterms , for example , congressional Republicans ’ biggest losses came among their most moderate members .
The same could happen again in 2020 .
Not to mention , a good chunk of this cycle ’ s retiring Republicans are leaving because they not only are tired of Trump and Trumpism but also anticipate being in the House minority again , where they would be powerless .
As political scientist Danielle Thomsen has shown , more and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress altogether , choosing not to run because they no longer see a place for themselves .
This is true in both parties , Thomsen found — but especially among Republicans .
Moderates increasingly feel as if they just don ’ t “ fit.
” And that feeling of not belonging may stem in part from party leaders and party activists who want more extreme candidates to run .
( It also helps that more partisan candidates are the ones who are naturally drawn to politics . )
In a survey of party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) branch of government in 2013 — well before Trump became president — local party leaders said they preferred more extreme candidates to more centrist candidates .
This finding was true especially among Republicans , who preferred extreme candidates by a 10-to-1 margin .
( Democrats preferred more extreme candidates just 2 to 1 . )
If anything , this ratio may be even more lopsided among Republicans .
One of the underappreciated changes in the past few years is the extent to which Trump-styled Republicans have taken over the machinery of state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll be able to shape the GOP well beyond 2020 , too .
This swing toward more radical candidates may sound surprising — after all , shouldn ’ t party leaders want to nominate moderates to win ?
But considering that the overwhelming majority of legislative elections are now safe for one party , most parties can win regardless of who they nominate .
In fact , there ’ s even evidence that the long-standing electoral price of extremism has all but vanished .
These patterns are all part of a vicious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for decades .
The more extreme the Republican Party has become , the more moderates have opted out or just been passed over .
The more moderates have opted out or been passed over , the more extreme the party has become .
And the more the Republican Party recedes to just elected officials in solidly conservative states and districts , the more they define the party .
Of course , it ’ s not just elected officials in the Republican Party who are becoming more extreme .
Conservative media is part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has long played a central role in shaping the GOP .
On some days , it ’ s hard to tell who ’ s running the country — Trump , or the Fox News hosts who give him many of his ideas ( not to mention the rotating cast of characters who have jumped between the administration and the network ) .
But , at its core , right-wing media is opposition media , built around rejecting liberalism .
It is a business driven by outrage and anger .
And in its increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has helped set the tone for the GOP ’ s existential struggle against liberals ’ so-called plans to control everything — media , culture , college campuses .
So if Republicans were to go back to being the opposition party because of massive losses in November , right-wing media in its current form would also make it difficult for any would-be moderate Republicans to break through .
As for the rest of the power players in the GOP coalition ?
They do not offer a moderating influence , either .
Key GOP activist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups , gun-rights groups , and billionaire donors are far more extreme than the rest of the party .
For instance , the Koch brothers have organized something akin to a party within a party at the state level , where they have influenced Republicans to take unpopular positions on taxes , social benefits and climate policy .
Libertarian megadonor Robert Mercer has also played an outsize role , funding a variety of conservative organizations that propelled Trump to power , including media outlets like Breitbart .
As a result of these groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with messaging and advocacy that paint the electorate as more conservative than it really is .
This , too , has had the effect of moving the party further to the right .
To be sure , the more libertarian business conservatives and more populist social conservatives maintain an uneasy partnership in forming this coalition , but the more they both occupy unpopular positions , the more they must stick together around the shared proposition that the biggest threat to their joint interests is the Democratic Party .
Voters are becoming more extreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The GOP is more and more a party of disaffected non-college-educated white people — especially men and those over age 50 .
And as the Republican Party has traded its younger , college-educated white people — especially women — for the Democrats ’ non-college-educated , older white people — especially men — the Republican party ’ s primary electorate has shifted in ways that make anti-establishment , pro-Trump candidates more prevalent than they were even four years ago , and certainly eight years ago .
Consider , for example , fervently pro-Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won a surpising primary victory over five-term Republican Rep. Scott Tipton in Colorado ; Laura Loomer , whose anti-Muslim remarks got her banned from social media , running in Florida ; or Marjorie Taylor Greene , the QAnon enthusiast running in Georgia .
These candidates are very much products of the 2020 Republican Party .
It has also meant that Republican voters are more anti-establishment and pro-Trump .
Political science shows us that voters follow cues from their parties , and are more likely to change their opinions on issues to align with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change their partisan identity to fit with preexisting opinions .
So by redefining what it means to be a Republican , Trump has moved opinions of many GOP voters over the past four years .
It is possible that another leader could emerge and reorient the Republican Party again , as Trump did .
But many of these trends predate Trump .
So it ’ s far more likely that ambitious politicians will try to work with , rather than against , the sentiments that Trump has kicked up .
Case in point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to stick with Trump , and almost all 2024 presidential hopefuls are tacking in a very Trumpian direction .
Some may point to Maryland ’ s Larry Hogan , the popular moderate Republican governor who has also been rumored to have 2024 aspirations , as a potential future for the Republican Party ( noting in the same breath , perhaps , two other popular Republican governors , Charlie Baker of Massachusetts and Phil Scott of Vermont ) .
These three governors , however , don ’ t fit with the national Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four most highly educated states , where the last vestiges of socially liberal Yankee Republicanism still thrive , and state legislatures are so Democratic that voters like having a check on runaway spending .
It ’ s hard to see Hogan , or a similar candidate , having much appeal to Republican voters outside the Northeast .
And even as popular as Baker might be in liberal Massachusetts , he is more beloved by Democrats than Republicans .
But wait , you say : Isn ’ t America moving in a much more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else , won ’ t that put pressure on the GOP to moderate ?
It ’ s certainly easy to think America is moving in a much more liberal direction if you look at trends in public opinion over the past few years .
Historically , though , public opinion is most liberal precisely when liberal policies are least likely to be enacted ( like now , and especially in 2017 and 2018 , when Republicans had unified control in Washington ) .
Once Democrats regain control , however , and then try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opinion will likely shift against them , in a more conservative direction — or at least this is how it has worked historically .
Americans favor government until they get it .
( Remember in 2009 when it was fashionable to proclaim a permanent Democratic majority ? )
This is the great irony of American public opinion : It mitigates against moderation because it tells the out-party that they don ’ t need to move to the middle — that public opinion is moving in their direction .
That is , right until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
To be sure , Democrats ’ electoral fortunes have risen considerably since 2016 , enough to take control of the U.S. House in 2018 and pick up seats across multiple state legislatures .
The political “ mood ” of the country ( based on aggregated polling ) has moved left , to levels not seen since the early 1960s .
But it ’ s a good bet that this shift , particularly on social issues , is partly anti-Trump backlash , which will dampen when Trump is no longer president .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats , after losing three consecutive presidential elections , nominated Bill Clinton in 1992 and moved in a more centrist direction .
This might feel like a tempting comparison to make with the GOP now , but the key difference is that the Democrats of the early 1990s had a more diverse coalition to draw on that made that kind of pivot possible ( even as late as the 1990s , the Democratic Party had plenty of rural and Southern supporters ) .
By contrast , the Republican coalition of today lacks any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pull it back to a more centrist position .
The bottom line : American political parties are not top-down entities , capable of turning on a dime .
They are loose networks and coalitions of many actors and groups .
And because the Republican Party has been pulling in a more extreme direction for decades now , most Republican moderates have either quit the team or reoriented themselves in a more combative , Trumpian direction to stay alive .
And these forces will most likely continue to tug at the party , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve faced for decades : Quit , or get on board .

Monday marks the first night of the Republican National Convention, and things could certainly be going better for President Trump.
He is trailing Joe Biden in the national polls as well as in several key swing states. And FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecast currently says Biden — not Trump — is favored to win the election. In fact, circumstances seem so dire for the GOP that election handicappers like the Cook Political Report think the Democrats — once underdogs — are slightly favored to take back the GOP-controlled Senate, too.
So if Republicans were to lose on that scale — the House, the Senate and the presidency — that raises the question: Would the GOP change course?
This is a question I’ve thought about a lot, and it’s one of the reasons why I argue in my book, “Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop,” that America’s two-party system is failing us. With the two parties now fully nationalized, deeply sorted by geography and culture, and locked in a tightly contested, zero-sum battle over “the soul of the nation” and the “American way of life,” it’s nearly impossible to break that cycle. And so I think it’s unlikely that Republicans will become more moderate even if they were to take the shellacking I’ve outlined above.
The problem is that political parties are not singular entities capable of easily changing course. They are, instead, a loose coalition of office-holders, interest groups, donors, activists, media personalities and many others, all jockeying and competing for power. Think of a giant tug of war in which all the tugs have been toward more extreme and more confrontational versions of the party.
In the GOP’s internal rope pull, this has meant that over the past few decades, and particularly since 2010, almost all the would-be moderates have either gravitated toward Trump to stay relevant or simply broken away altogether. And all that momentum in the Republican party is pulling toward a more confrontational, Trumpian direction — even if he is no longer at the helm.
Moderate Republicans are few and far between
Back in March 2019, FiveThirtyEight’s Perry Bacon Jr. described five wings of the Republican Party from most to least Trumpian. The takeaway was clear. The fortunes of those who were the most solidly aligned with Trump (Bacon listed Rep. Matt Gaetz of Florida, Rep. Jim Jordan of Ohio and Rep. Mark Meadows of North Carolina as prominent examples; I’d add Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton and Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley) were rising within the party, while the fortunes of the so-called Trump skeptics were falling. Some, like Rep. Justin Amash of Michigan, have left the party. Others, like Rep. Will Hurd of Texas, are retiring. And then there are the anti-Trumpers, like former Ohio Gov. and 2016 presidential contender John Kasich, who are now endorsing Biden.
Anybody with any ambitions within the party has, in other words, embraced Trump and Trumpism.
These recent shifts aren’t entirely new, either. They are the latest iteration of a decades-long transformation of the GOP. In short, moderates have been bowing out. And more conservative, more combative, more evangelical, and now more Trumpian Republicans have been stepping up.
In the 2018 midterms, for example, congressional Republicans’ biggest losses came among their most moderate members. The same could happen again in 2020. Not to mention, a good chunk of this cycle’s retiring Republicans are leaving because they not only are tired of Trump and Trumpism but also anticipate being in the House minority again, where they would be powerless.
As political scientist Danielle Thomsen has shown, more and more would-be moderates are opting out of Congress altogether, choosing not to run because they no longer see a place for themselves. This is true in both parties, Thomsen found — but especially among Republicans. Moderates increasingly feel as if they just don’t “fit.”
And that feeling of not belonging may stem in part from party leaders and party activists who want more extreme candidates to run. (It also helps that more partisan candidates are the ones who are naturally drawn to politics.) In a survey of party chairs at the county-level (or equivalent) branch of government in 2013 — well before Trump became president — local party leaders said they preferred more extreme candidates to more centrist candidates. This finding was true especially among Republicans, who preferred extreme candidates by a 10-to-1 margin. (Democrats preferred more extreme candidates just 2 to 1.) If anything, this ratio may be even more lopsided among Republicans. One of the underappreciated changes in the past few years is the extent to which Trump-styled Republicans have taken over the machinery of state and local parties, which means they’ll be able to shape the GOP well beyond 2020, too.
This swing toward more radical candidates may sound surprising — after all, shouldn’t party leaders want to nominate moderates to win? But considering that the overwhelming majority of legislative elections are now safe for one party, most parties can win regardless of who they nominate. In fact, there’s even evidence that the long-standing electoral price of extremism has all but vanished.
These patterns are all part of a vicious cycle that has been feeding on itself for decades. The more extreme the Republican Party has become, the more moderates have opted out or just been passed over. The more moderates have opted out or been passed over, the more extreme the party has become. And the more the Republican Party recedes to just elected officials in solidly conservative states and districts, the more they define the party.
Extreme right-wing media, activists and donors are increasingly influential
Of course, it’s not just elected officials in the Republican Party who are becoming more extreme. Conservative media is part of this trend as well, as it has long played a central role in shaping the GOP. On some days, it’s hard to tell who’s running the country — Trump, or the Fox News hosts who give him many of his ideas (not to mention the rotating cast of characters who have jumped between the administration and the network).
But, at its core, right-wing media is opposition media, built around rejecting liberalism. It is a business driven by outrage and anger. And in its increasingly prominent role in the GOP, it has helped set the tone for the GOP’s existential struggle against liberals’ so-called plans to control everything — media, culture, college campuses. So if Republicans were to go back to being the opposition party because of massive losses in November, right-wing media in its current form would also make it difficult for any would-be moderate Republicans to break through.
As for the rest of the power players in the GOP coalition? They do not offer a moderating influence, either. Key GOP activist groups, including evangelical groups, anti-immigration groups, gun-rights groups, and billionaire donors are far more extreme than the rest of the party. For instance, the Koch brothers have organized something akin to a party within a party at the state level, where they have influenced Republicans to take unpopular positions on taxes, social benefits and climate policy. Libertarian megadonor Robert Mercer has also played an outsize role, funding a variety of conservative organizations that propelled Trump to power, including media outlets like Breitbart.
As a result of these groups’ efforts, elected Republicans are confronted with messaging and advocacy that paint the electorate as more conservative than it really is. This, too, has had the effect of moving the party further to the right. To be sure, the more libertarian business conservatives and more populist social conservatives maintain an uneasy partnership in forming this coalition, but the more they both occupy unpopular positions, the more they must stick together around the shared proposition that the biggest threat to their joint interests is the Democratic Party.
Voters are becoming more extreme
Finally, there are the Republican voters. The GOP is more and more a party of disaffected non-college-educated white people — especially men and those over age 50. And as the Republican Party has traded its younger, college-educated white people — especially women — for the Democrats’ non-college-educated, older white people — especially men — the Republican party’s primary electorate has shifted in ways that make anti-establishment, pro-Trump candidates more prevalent than they were even four years ago, and certainly eight years ago.
Consider, for example, fervently pro-Trump House candidates like Lauren Boebert, who won a surpising primary victory over five-term Republican Rep. Scott Tipton in Colorado; Laura Loomer, whose anti-Muslim remarks got her banned from social media, running in Florida; or Marjorie Taylor Greene, the QAnon enthusiast running in Georgia. These candidates are very much products of the 2020 Republican Party.
It has also meant that Republican voters are more anti-establishment and pro-Trump. Political science shows us that voters follow cues from their parties, and are more likely to change their opinions on issues to align with their partisan identity than they are to change their partisan identity to fit with preexisting opinions. So by redefining what it means to be a Republican, Trump has moved opinions of many GOP voters over the past four years.
It is possible that another leader could emerge and reorient the Republican Party again, as Trump did. But many of these trends predate Trump. So it’s far more likely that ambitious politicians will try to work with, rather than against, the sentiments that Trump has kicked up. Case in point: Republican senators facing reelection this November continue to stick with Trump, and almost all 2024 presidential hopefuls are tacking in a very Trumpian direction.
Some may point to Maryland’s Larry Hogan, the popular moderate Republican governor who has also been rumored to have 2024 aspirations, as a potential future for the Republican Party (noting in the same breath, perhaps, two other popular Republican governors, Charlie Baker of Massachusetts and Phil Scott of Vermont). These three governors, however, don’t fit with the national Republican Party. They represent three of the four most highly educated states, where the last vestiges of socially liberal Yankee Republicanism still thrive, and state legislatures are so Democratic that voters like having a check on runaway spending. It’s hard to see Hogan, or a similar candidate, having much appeal to Republican voters outside the Northeast. And even as popular as Baker might be in liberal Massachusetts, he is more beloved by Democrats than Republicans.
Public opinion flips between two extremes
But wait, you say: Isn’t America moving in a much more liberal direction? And, if nothing else, won’t that put pressure on the GOP to moderate? It’s certainly easy to think America is moving in a much more liberal direction if you look at trends in public opinion over the past few years. Historically, though, public opinion is most liberal precisely when liberal policies are least likely to be enacted (like now, and especially in 2017 and 2018, when Republicans had unified control in Washington).
Once Democrats regain control, however, and then try to enact more liberal policies, public opinion will likely shift against them, in a more conservative direction — or at least this is how it has worked historically. Americans favor government until they get it. (Remember in 2009 when it was fashionable to proclaim a permanent Democratic majority?) This is the great irony of American public opinion: It mitigates against moderation because it tells the out-party that they don’t need to move to the middle — that public opinion is moving in their direction. That is, right until they win and start governing based on it.
To be sure, Democrats’ electoral fortunes have risen considerably since 2016, enough to take control of the U.S. House in 2018 and pick up seats across multiple state legislatures. The political “mood” of the country (based on aggregated polling) has moved left, to levels not seen since the early 1960s. But it’s a good bet that this shift, particularly on social issues, is partly anti-Trump backlash, which will dampen when Trump is no longer president.
Few forces of moderation remain
Political analysts will sometimes recount how the Democrats, after losing three consecutive presidential elections, nominated Bill Clinton in 1992 and moved in a more centrist direction. This might feel like a tempting comparison to make with the GOP now, but the key difference is that the Democrats of the early 1990s had a more diverse coalition to draw on that made that kind of pivot possible (even as late as the 1990s, the Democratic Party had plenty of rural and Southern supporters). By contrast, the Republican coalition of today lacks any significant liberal or moderate factions who might pull it back to a more centrist position.
The bottom line: American political parties are not top-down entities, capable of turning on a dime. They are loose networks and coalitions of many actors and groups. And because the Republican Party has been pulling in a more extreme direction for decades now, most Republican moderates have either quit the team or reoriented themselves in a more combative, Trumpian direction to stay alive. And these forces will most likely continue to tug at the party, leaving would-be moderates with the same choice they’ve faced for decades: Quit, or get on board.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-25--RNC, Day 1: Live Updates And Analysis

RNC, Day 1: Live Updates And Analysis

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fivethirthyeight--2020-08-24--What To Watch For On Night 1 Of The RNC

What To Watch For On Night 1 Of The RNC

It ’ s the first night of the Republican National Convention , and FiveThirtyEight ’ s political team will be @ @ @ @ @ Here , the crew discusses what to expect tonight and throughout the week .
Will @ @ @ @ @ than the DNC ?
Will Republicans appeal to the center ?
How will they address @ @ @ @ @ justice reform or the coronavirus pandemic ?

It’s the first night of the Republican National Convention, and FiveThirtyEight’s political team will be watching and live blogging! Here, the crew discusses what to expect tonight and throughout the week. Will the GOP put on a better show than the Democratic convention? Will Republicans try to appeal to the center? How will the party address major issues, like criminal justice reform or the coronavirus pandemic?


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-24--Cuban Players Are Powering The White Sox

The Chicago White Sox haven ’ t had a winning season since 2012 — and it ’ s been even longer since they were truly relevant .
The last postseason series the South Siders won came in the 2005 World Series , when they beat the Houston Astros for their first championship since 1917 .
As a general rule , the Pale Hose are practically never among the most electrifying teams in baseball .
This year , however , is different .
After a slightly rocky start to the season , the ChiSox have won nine of their last 12 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crosstown rival Cubs over the weekend — raising their playoff chances to 94 percent according to the FiveThirtyEight prediction model .
And they ’ re doing it with a very particular source of production : a record-breaking ensemble of Cuban-born stars .
On Aug. 1 , the White Sox became the first team in MLB history to have an all-Cuban top four in their lineup when they started their contest against the Kansas City Royals off with center fielder Luis Robert , third baseman Yoán Moncada , first baseman José Abreu and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( The quartet went 11-for-22 with 17 total bases in the game . )
That group also dominated for the Sox against the Cubs this weekend , with 10 total home runs and 16 runs batted in .
Chicago has plenty of American-born talent on hand , of course , led most notably by shortstop Tim Anderson , who has an 1.063 on-base plus slugging with 1.3 wins above replacement already this season .
It also has a wealth of Latin American talent from outside Cuba , headlined by Dominican left fielder Eloy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even so , it ’ s true that the White Sox would not be winning anywhere near as much — or be anywhere near as exciting to watch — without Robert , Moncada , Abreu and Grandal leading the way .
It ’ s early still , but no team has ever gotten as much from its Cuban players as those four are tracking to give Chicago in 2020 .
Together , the quartet has already generated 3.61 WAR in 29 games , which would work out to 20.2 WAR over a full @ @ @ @ @ @ @ season , the MLB record for WAR ( per 162 games ) by Cuban players on one team was 14.6 , by Zoilo Versalles , Tony Oliva , Camilo Pascual and Sandy Valdespino of the 1965 Minnesota Twins .
That club came within a game of winning the World Series with a core of Latin American players signed by scout Joe Cambria while the team was still the Washington Senators , who also show up high on the list in 1959 : The 1968 Cleveland Indians , who rank third on the list @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stellar trio of starter Luis Tiant , center fielder José Cardenal and catcher Joe Azcue .
( Tiant in particular had an incredible season that year , leading the American League with a 1.60 ERA . )
But it ’ s also no coincidence that the majority of teams on the list are concentrated in a very tight range of seasons .
Aside from the Senators , most teams had not considered Latin America as a serious source of talent — to their great detriment — until the 1950s .
( Cincinnati Reds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1920s , but he was very much the exception . )
What followed was an era of Latino stars who rose to become some of the best in baseball , led by the likes of Tiant , Pascual , Versalles , Puerto Rico ’ s Roberto Clemente , Juan Marichal of the Dominican Republic and Tony Pérez of Cuba .
Chicago even had its own Cuban superstar in Minnie Miñoso , who starred for the Sox in four different decades .
Unfortunately , MLB ’ s Cuban heyday came to an end around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the country in 1960 , forcing countless subsequent stars into a terrible choice between defecting ( which can be a dangerous act for numerous reasons ) and giving up their major-league dreams to play for far less than their worth on government-owned teams .
It ’ s no coincidence that , as the generation of players who began their careers in the 1950s — and starred through the 1970s — retired , there was a huge dropoff in Cuban production at the MLB level : That trend reversed some in the late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as José Canseco and Rafael Palmeiro emerged as perennial All-Stars — though both grew up in Miami after their parents left Fidel Castro ’ s Cuba for the U.S. An arguably greater watershed moment came with pitcher Liván Hernández ’ s midnight defection in 1995 , aided by scout Joe Cubas .
Hernández dominated the 1997 postseason , earning World Series MVP honors with the Florida Marlins , and his brother Orlando made a harrowing journey to America by boat several months later .
Along with countryman José Contreras , the Hernández brothers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1997 through 2005 , powering a Cuban revival in the 21st century .
That renaissance continued with the emergence of such talented Cuban hitters as Yunel Escobar , Kendrys Morales , Alexei Ramírez , Leonys Martín , Yoenis Céspedes and Yasiel Puig , to go with a new generation of fireballing pitchers headlined by Aroldis Chapman and José Fernández .
The same era also helped produce Robert , Moncada , Abreu and Grandal — all building blocks behind the White Sox ’ s impressive 2020 season .
Abreu landed in Chicago first , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2013 and winning Rookie of the Year honors in his debut season the following year .
He has generated 21.0 WAR in his career , or 3.0 per season — fourth most of any Cuban player ever , behind Fernández , Palmeiro and Tiant — with a career OPS 36 percent better than league average .
So far this year , he ’ s been the South Siders ’ best player with 11 home runs and 1.6 WAR .
Then came Moncada , who was acquired from the Boston Red Sox in 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — which cost Chicago an all-time pitcher but gained them one of the best young infielders in all of baseball .
Since the start of 2019 , only four third basemen — Alex Bregman , Anthony Rendon , Matt Chapman and Nolan Arenado — have more WAR than Moncada ’ s 6.0 mark , and Moncada ( who turned 25 in May ) is younger than any of them .
Robert arrived next , after defecting in the winter of 2016-17 .
Although he hasn ’ t been quite as good as Abreu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ player in Chicago — if not the entire major leagues — in 2020 so far : Though he strikes out a ton ( in 36 percent of plate appearances , to be exact ) , Robert hits the ball hard , runs very fast and has been one of the best defensive center fielders in baseball this year .
Robert may be a rookie , but the second-best prospect in all of baseball going into the season hasn ’ t really needed much of an adjustment period before excelling against MLB competition .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ added as a free agent last fall after enjoying a solid 2019 season ( 3.8 WAR ) with the Milwaukee Brewers .
After coming to America as a child under a special Cuban immigration lottery , Grandal lived and went to college in Miami before being taken with the 12th overall pick in the 2010 draft .
Including 2020 , he ’ s been the second-best catcher in baseball by WAR ( behind Buster Posey ) since first becoming a regular in 2014 .
Together , the White Sox ’ s Cuban connection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team ’ s long-awaited breakout season .
They have hit 26 combined home runs with an .863 OPS and 206 total bases .
They ’ ve also produced a little less than one-third of the team ’ s WAR , with Abreu and Robert in particular ranking as two of the team ’ s three best players ( sandwiched around Anderson ) .
No other team in baseball history has showcased Cuban talent so front and center , and there will likely be more where that came from as the season goes on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is also another milestone in the evolution of MLB ’ s Cuban players , whose contributions have grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade .
Back in 2016 , it looked like the influx of players from Cuba would increase even more dramatically after then-President Barack Obama loosened the U.S. ’ s embargo on the country .
A couple of years later , MLB had even agreed with the Cuban government to streamline the path for players to play in America .
That agreement was scuttled , however , when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But even if the relationship between countries remains fraught , Cuba ’ s baseball talent can ’ t be denied — and there ’ s no greater proof of that than the turnaround transpiring in Chicago this summer .

The Chicago White Sox haven’t had a winning season since 2012 — and it’s been even longer since they were truly relevant. The last postseason series the South Siders won came in the 2005 World Series, when they beat the Houston Astros for their first championship since 1917. As a general rule, the Pale Hose are practically never among the most electrifying teams in baseball.
This year, however, is different. After a slightly rocky start to the season, the ChiSox have won nine of their last 12 games — including two of three against the crosstown rival Cubs over the weekend — raising their playoff chances to 94 percent according to the FiveThirtyEight prediction model. And they’re doing it with a very particular source of production: a record-breaking ensemble of Cuban-born stars.
On Aug. 1, the White Sox became the first team in MLB history to have an all-Cuban top four in their lineup when they started their contest against the Kansas City Royals off with center fielder Luis Robert, third baseman Yoán Moncada, first baseman José Abreu and catcher Yasmani Grandal hitting in order. (The quartet went 11-for-22 with 17 total bases in the game.) That group also dominated for the Sox against the Cubs this weekend, with 10 total home runs and 16 runs batted in.
Chicago has plenty of American-born talent on hand, of course, led most notably by shortstop Tim Anderson, who has an 1.063 on-base plus slugging with 1.3 wins above replacement already this season. It also has a wealth of Latin American talent from outside Cuba, headlined by Dominican left fielder Eloy Jiménez (0.7 WAR). But even so, it’s true that the White Sox would not be winning anywhere near as much — or be anywhere near as exciting to watch — without Robert, Moncada, Abreu and Grandal leading the way.
It’s early still, but no team has ever gotten as much from its Cuban players as those four are tracking to give Chicago in 2020. Together, the quartet has already generated 3.61 WAR in 29 games, which would work out to 20.2 WAR over a full, 162-game season. Going into this season, the MLB record for WAR (per 162 games) by Cuban players on one team was 14.6, by Zoilo Versalles, Tony Oliva, Camilo Pascual and Sandy Valdespino of the 1965 Minnesota Twins. That club came within a game of winning the World Series with a core of Latin American players signed by scout Joe Cambria while the team was still the Washington Senators, who also show up high on the list in 1959:
The White Sox have a historic Cuban connection Most wins above replacement (WAR) per 162 games generated by Cuban-born players for MLB teams in a single season, 1901-2020 Latin-Born Players Cuban-Born Players Season Team WAR* Share of Tm WAR* Share of Tm 2020 White Sox 26.9 45.9% 20.2 30.7% 1965 Twins 14.6 31.5 14.6 31.5 1968 Indians 16.3 39.1 13.8 32.7 1964 Twins 12.5 27.7 12.6 27.7 1959 Senators 11.2 38.4 11.2 38.4 1970 Twins 16.5 33.4 10.9 22.2 1954 White Sox 16.3 32.6 10.7 21.4 1969 Twins 19.6 36.4 9.9 18.5 1923 Reds 9.4 21.3 9.4 21.3 1962 Twins 10.7 24.9 9.1 21.0 1963 Twins 9.4 18.4 9.1 17.9 1963 Phillies 9.2 21.6 8.8 20.7 2019 Astros 21.1 32.1 8.4 12.6 1970 Athletics 10.0 22.9 8.1 18.1 1967 Indians 9.0 29.8 7.9 23.7 *Per 162 team games. Sources: Baseball-Reference.com, FanGraphs
The 1968 Cleveland Indians, who rank third on the list above, also deserve mention for the stellar trio of starter Luis Tiant, center fielder José Cardenal and catcher Joe Azcue. (Tiant in particular had an incredible season that year, leading the American League with a 1.60 ERA.) But it’s also no coincidence that the majority of teams on the list are concentrated in a very tight range of seasons. Aside from the Senators, most teams had not considered Latin America as a serious source of talent — to their great detriment — until the 1950s. (Cincinnati Reds pitcher Dolf Luque stood out in the 1920s, but he was very much the exception.) What followed was an era of Latino stars who rose to become some of the best in baseball, led by the likes of Tiant, Pascual, Versalles, Puerto Rico’s Roberto Clemente, Juan Marichal of the Dominican Republic and Tony Pérez of Cuba. Chicago even had its own Cuban superstar in Minnie Miñoso, who starred for the Sox in four different decades.
Unfortunately, MLB’s Cuban heyday came to an end around when the United States began an embargo against the country in 1960, forcing countless subsequent stars into a terrible choice between defecting (which can be a dangerous act for numerous reasons) and giving up their major-league dreams to play for far less than their worth on government-owned teams. It’s no coincidence that, as the generation of players who began their careers in the 1950s — and starred through the 1970s — retired, there was a huge dropoff in Cuban production at the MLB level:
That trend reversed some in the late 1980s and into the ’90s, as José Canseco and Rafael Palmeiro emerged as perennial All-Stars — though both grew up in Miami after their parents left Fidel Castro’s Cuba for the U.S. An arguably greater watershed moment came with pitcher Liván Hernández’s midnight defection in 1995, aided by scout Joe Cubas. Hernández dominated the 1997 postseason, earning World Series MVP honors with the Florida Marlins, and his brother Orlando made a harrowing journey to America by boat several months later. Along with countryman José Contreras, the Hernández brothers starred for six World Series champions from 1997 through 2005, powering a Cuban revival in the 21st century.
That renaissance continued with the emergence of such talented Cuban hitters as Yunel Escobar, Kendrys Morales, Alexei Ramírez, Leonys Martín, Yoenis Céspedes and Yasiel Puig, to go with a new generation of fireballing pitchers headlined by Aroldis Chapman and José Fernández. The same era also helped produce Robert, Moncada, Abreu and Grandal — all building blocks behind the White Sox’s impressive 2020 season.
Abreu landed in Chicago first, signing as an international free agent in 2013 and winning Rookie of the Year honors in his debut season the following year. He has generated 21.0 WAR in his career, or 3.0 per season — fourth most of any Cuban player ever, behind Fernández, Palmeiro and Tiant — with a career OPS 36 percent better than league average. So far this year, he’s been the South Siders’ best player with 11 home runs and 1.6 WAR.
Then came Moncada, who was acquired from the Boston Red Sox in 2016 as part of the Chris Sale trade — which cost Chicago an all-time pitcher but gained them one of the best young infielders in all of baseball. Since the start of 2019, only four third basemen — Alex Bregman, Anthony Rendon, Matt Chapman and Nolan Arenado — have more WAR than Moncada’s 6.0 mark, and Moncada (who turned 25 in May) is younger than any of them.
Robert arrived next, after defecting in the winter of 2016-17. Although he hasn’t been quite as good as Abreu, he might be the most exciting player in Chicago — if not the entire major leagues — in 2020 so far:
Though he strikes out a ton (in 36 percent of plate appearances, to be exact), Robert hits the ball hard, runs very fast and has been one of the best defensive center fielders in baseball this year. Robert may be a rookie, but the second-best prospect in all of baseball going into the season hasn’t really needed much of an adjustment period before excelling against MLB competition.
The final piece, Grandal, was added as a free agent last fall after enjoying a solid 2019 season (3.8 WAR) with the Milwaukee Brewers. After coming to America as a child under a special Cuban immigration lottery, Grandal lived and went to college in Miami before being taken with the 12th overall pick in the 2010 draft. Including 2020, he’s been the second-best catcher in baseball by WAR (behind Buster Posey) since first becoming a regular in 2014.
Together, the White Sox’s Cuban connection has been the primary force behind the team’s long-awaited breakout season. They have hit 26 combined home runs with an .863 OPS and 206 total bases. They’ve also produced a little less than one-third of the team’s WAR, with Abreu and Robert in particular ranking as two of the team’s three best players (sandwiched around Anderson). No other team in baseball history has showcased Cuban talent so front and center, and there will likely be more where that came from as the season goes on.
The White Sox’s success is also another milestone in the evolution of MLB’s Cuban players, whose contributions have grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade. Back in 2016, it looked like the influx of players from Cuba would increase even more dramatically after then-President Barack Obama loosened the U.S.’s embargo on the country. A couple of years later, MLB had even agreed with the Cuban government to streamline the path for players to play in America. That agreement was scuttled, however, when the Trump administration declared it illegal last year. But even if the relationship between countries remains fraught, Cuba’s baseball talent can’t be denied — and there’s no greater proof of that than the turnaround transpiring in Chicago this summer.
Check out our latest MLB predictions.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-24--LeBron And AD Dominate Like Kobe And Shaq. But Can They Win Like The Classic Lakers?

LeBron James has spent his career burdened by comparison .
He is the poster athlete of the Age of Scrutiny : applauded at 17 for maintaining Magic Johnson ’ s collaborative basketball legacy , denigrated at 34 for lacking Michael Jordan ’ s last-second cold-bloodedness , measured annually against contemporaries from Carmelo Anthony to Giannis Antetokounmpo .
In just the past few seasons , he has surrendered and regained his reputation as the game ’ s best player too many times to count .
It is fitting , then , that the latter stages of his career have found James @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with two challenges .
The first is to win a championship with the Lakers .
The second is to do so in a manner in keeping with the demands of a famously provincial fan base — to win it , in other words , like Kobe Bryant .
The arrival of Anthony Davis in James ’ s second L.A. season has made a title more likely ; after a Game 1 loss to the red-hot Trail Blazers , the Lakers have settled in to take a 2-1 series lead .
Davis ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the comparisons all the more unavoidable .
In the broadest sense , the two superstars fit the mold of Bryant and Shaquille O ’ Neal ; one is a generational wing creator , the other a league-pacing big man .
But what makes them powerhouses in the modern game — their versatility and awareness , a shared habit for forgoing the egoistic play in favor of the right one — also earns them a dose of local suspicion .
Kobe and Shaq butted heads , did their own things , got buckets and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strain of Lakers fan ( summed up best by this guy ) who sees the current squad ’ s deep catalog of pick-and-roll variations as unnecessary to the task at hand .
The hoops intelligentsia has , for the most part , weighed the case for hero ball and ruled against it .
But behind the nostalgia of the Kobe-Shaq partisans may be a point .
A lot has changed in the past two decades of the NBA , but the ability to clear out and go to work remains a useful postseason @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are going to match their predecessors , they might need to fall back on some of their old go-it-alone tendencies .
By today ’ s scoreboard-spinning standards , the offensive ratings put up by the early-2000s Lakers ( 107.3 points per 100 possessions in 1999-2000 , 108.4 in 2000-01 , 109.4 in 2001-02 ) don ’ t amount to much ; 19 teams bettered those marks this year .
But in the slowed-down aftermath of the Jordan era , those marks stood near the top of the league .
L.A. seemed at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ full-spectrum future , marrying the midrange stylings made iconic by MJ ( the fadeaway that Kobe inherited ) with the post-centric approach that had come before ( Shaq ’ s drop step , pressure-tested by everyone from Hakeem Olajuwon to David Robinson ) .
Opposing teams had a hard enough time dealing with either O ’ Neal on the block or Bryant at the elbow , let alone wrangling both .
It was brutalist basketball , concerned less with maximizing efficiency — the word then brought to mind economy of motion , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as straightforwardly as possible .
Over their championship seasons , Bryant and O ’ Neal used 29.8 and 31.5 percent of the Lakers ’ possessions , respectively , and to devastating effect .
Bryant averaged 25.4 points and 5.1 assists on a .547 true shooting percentage ; if he was disinclined to hunt the most analytically sound shots , he made the less-recommended ones with remarkable facility .
O ’ Neal put up 28.6 points and 12.4 rebounds per game , leading the league in Box Plus/Minus in all three seasons .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one-two punch , little-big , ever created in the game , ” O ’ Neal said .
Much of their effectiveness came , counterintuitively , from how little they needed one another .
( Some of the friction between them likely came from the same source . )
To be sure , they benefited from each other ’ s presence — Bryant , stationed on the wing , dissuaded teams from hurling double-teams at O ’ Neal ; O ’ Neal kept help defenders from lining up in Bryant ’ s path — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-sufficient scorers .
Synergy ’ s system of tracking iso plays and post-ups doesn ’ t extend back to the “ Roundball Rock ” days , but the two held so fast to archetypes that the numbers would be almost redundant .
Pull up any film from their three-peat run and it will show more or less the same things : Shaq in the post pivoting into uncontestable jump hooks and mashing his way to massive slams , Kobe working his jab-steps and crossovers into 18-foot pullups or attacks on the rim .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ those Lakers never dealt with , of course : strong-side overloads , expanded skill sets , the prioritization of space and tempo .
Where Kobe and Shaq dealt in addition , LeBron and AD deal in multiplication .
This season ’ s usage rates for James and Davis ( 31.5 and 29.3 percent , respectively ) are similar to those of peak Bryant and O ’ Neal , but the two play more in tandem .
The plays James has spent a career refining — the defense-collapsing drives and precognitive passes — find @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acumen and gummy-armed lob finishes .
Per PBP Stats , no assist combination has been more fruitful this season than James to Davis , both in sum totals and baskets at the rim .
( In 2001-02 , Bryant-to-Shaq ranked 38th in the league in total assists ; Rick Fox tallied more assists to O ’ Neal . )
“ He does everything , ” James said last week of his All-Star teammate .
“ He handles the ball for us , he posts up , he ’ s on the perimeter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Year.
” The formula has worked well enough ; even after a drowsy run in the bubble seeding games , the Lakers retained the West ’ s best regular-season record , at 52-19 .
In a statement-making win over the East-leading Bucks in March — a narrative-laden potential Finals preview — James and Davis combined for 67 points , 17 rebounds and eight assists ( those all James ’ s ) .
Ahead by 6 with just under three minutes left and looking to ice the game , the Lakers turned to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ screen , which they ran nearly 600 times over the course of the regular season , per Second Spectrum .
One trip yielded a James layup that missed but drew help defense ; Davis cleaned it up with a tip-in .
The next coaxed a double-team of James , and Davis popped free for a wide-open elbow jumper .
The sequence summed up the bind the two put defenses in : Both players provoke overreaction , so one gets loose .
But gaudy stats and the overall record have masked the kind of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deep rounds of the playoffs .
The synchronicity of James and Davis has come at the cost , for now , of some measure of individual excellence .
James averaged 0.90 points per possession on 300 isolation plays this year , down from 0.97 last season and his lowest mark since 2015-16 .
Davis averaged 0.90 points per possession on 321 post-up plays , which represented a similar dip from last year and was his lowest average since 2016-17 .
To judge James and Davis solely by their one-on-one acumen is reductive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history has borne out the idea that , at certain postseason junctures , squaring off and going to work is the best option .
The Raptors won last year ’ s title due in no small part to Kawhi Leonard ’ s increasingly accurate Jordan impression ; the last four Finals MVPs have scored at least 0.94 points per possession in iso situations in the playoffs .
The numbers echo a prominent line of thought concerning postseason basketball : that seven-game series tend to break the sport down to its simplest variables — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Exceptions spring to mind .
The 2013-14 Spurs beat LeBron ’ s Miami Heat via a kind of basketball hivemind , and the pre-Durant Warriors played similarly , just 10 extra feet from the basket .
But the present Lakers , like their forebears , lack the roster depth to do that .
In each of the Lakers ’ championship seasons from 2000 to 2002 , only one player not named Bryant or O ’ Neal averaged more than 10 points ; twice it was Derek Fisher , at just over 11 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Lakers likewise have only one consistent double-figure threat outside of James and Davis — Kyle Kuzma .
If defenses face the option of either guarding the James-Davis pick-and-roll straight up or collapsing on it and allowing 3-pointers from Kentavious Caldwell-Pope and Alex Caruso , the decision is easy .
The good news for Lakers fans is that James has plenty of practice in taking the needed solo turn .
His 45-point elimination-avoiding outburst against the Boston Celtics in 2012 found him squarely in the Kobe-Jordan tradition , canning turnaround fadeaways and blowing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the 2018 postseason , his last in Cleveland , James shouldered more than his preferred share of the playmaking burden , and his 9.7 iso possessions per game in the playoffs was second only to James Harden ’ s 12.9 .
James ’ s effectiveness in these situations , in which he scored 0.99 points per possession , helped drag one of the least-qualified rosters in recent memory to the Finals .
And though Davis posted a negative plus/minus without James on the court during the regular season , a 31-and-11 outing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Lakers ’ Game 2 victory over the Blazers on Thursday offered hope that Davis might shoulder a bigger postseason load and rely less on James .
On Saturday , the pair became the first Lakers duo since Bryant and O ’ Neal in 2002 to log 25 points and 10 rebounds apiece in a playoff game .
On the whole , of course , Lakers fans will be delighted if they have the luxury of debating the merits of various championship methodologies in a couple of months .
But the most stubborn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of vindication .
If James is to win his fourth championship this season and is to win Davis his first , they just might have to do it the old-school way .

LeBron James has spent his career burdened by comparison. He is the poster athlete of the Age of Scrutiny: applauded at 17 for maintaining Magic Johnson’s collaborative basketball legacy, denigrated at 34 for lacking Michael Jordan’s last-second cold-bloodedness, measured annually against contemporaries from Carmelo Anthony to Giannis Antetokounmpo. In just the past few seasons, he has surrendered and regained his reputation as the game’s best player too many times to count. It is fitting, then, that the latter stages of his career have found James in Los Angeles, where he contends with two challenges. The first is to win a championship with the Lakers. The second is to do so in a manner in keeping with the demands of a famously provincial fan base — to win it, in other words, like Kobe Bryant.
The arrival of Anthony Davis in James’s second L.A. season has made a title more likely; after a Game 1 loss to the red-hot Trail Blazers, the Lakers have settled in to take a 2-1 series lead. Davis’s presence, though, has also made the comparisons all the more unavoidable. In the broadest sense, the two superstars fit the mold of Bryant and Shaquille O’Neal; one is a generational wing creator, the other a league-pacing big man. But what makes them powerhouses in the modern game — their versatility and awareness, a shared habit for forgoing the egoistic play in favor of the right one — also earns them a dose of local suspicion. Kobe and Shaq butted heads, did their own things, got buckets and won three rings. There is a strain of Lakers fan (summed up best by this guy) who sees the current squad’s deep catalog of pick-and-roll variations as unnecessary to the task at hand.
The hoops intelligentsia has, for the most part, weighed the case for hero ball and ruled against it. But behind the nostalgia of the Kobe-Shaq partisans may be a point. A lot has changed in the past two decades of the NBA, but the ability to clear out and go to work remains a useful postseason tool. And if the new Lakers are going to match their predecessors, they might need to fall back on some of their old go-it-alone tendencies.
By today’s scoreboard-spinning standards, the offensive ratings put up by the early-2000s Lakers (107.3 points per 100 possessions in 1999-2000, 108.4 in 2000-01, 109.4 in 2001-02) don’t amount to much; 19 teams bettered those marks this year. But in the slowed-down aftermath of the Jordan era, those marks stood near the top of the league. L.A. seemed at the time to embody the sport’s full-spectrum future, marrying the midrange stylings made iconic by MJ (the fadeaway that Kobe inherited) with the post-centric approach that had come before (Shaq’s drop step, pressure-tested by everyone from Hakeem Olajuwon to David Robinson). Opposing teams had a hard enough time dealing with either O’Neal on the block or Bryant at the elbow, let alone wrangling both.
It was brutalist basketball, concerned less with maximizing efficiency — the word then brought to mind economy of motion, not shot charts — than with deploying advantage as straightforwardly as possible. Over their championship seasons, Bryant and O’Neal used 29.8 and 31.5 percent of the Lakers’ possessions, respectively, and to devastating effect. Bryant averaged 25.4 points and 5.1 assists on a .547 true shooting percentage; if he was disinclined to hunt the most analytically sound shots, he made the less-recommended ones with remarkable facility. O’Neal put up 28.6 points and 12.4 rebounds per game, leading the league in Box Plus/Minus in all three seasons. “We’re … the most dominant one-two punch, little-big, ever created in the game,” O’Neal said.
Much of their effectiveness came, counterintuitively, from how little they needed one another. (Some of the friction between them likely came from the same source.) To be sure, they benefited from each other’s presence — Bryant, stationed on the wing, dissuaded teams from hurling double-teams at O’Neal; O’Neal kept help defenders from lining up in Bryant’s path — but they were, at heart, self-sufficient scorers. Synergy’s system of tracking iso plays and post-ups doesn’t extend back to the “Roundball Rock” days, but the two held so fast to archetypes that the numbers would be almost redundant. Pull up any film from their three-peat run and it will show more or less the same things: Shaq in the post pivoting into uncontestable jump hooks and mashing his way to massive slams, Kobe working his jab-steps and crossovers into 18-foot pullups or attacks on the rim.
The modern NBA features challenges and expectations those Lakers never dealt with, of course: strong-side overloads, expanded skill sets, the prioritization of space and tempo. Where Kobe and Shaq dealt in addition, LeBron and AD deal in multiplication. This season’s usage rates for James and Davis (31.5 and 29.3 percent, respectively) are similar to those of peak Bryant and O’Neal, but the two play more in tandem. The plays James has spent a career refining — the defense-collapsing drives and precognitive passes — find natural outlets in Davis’s catch-and-shoot acumen and gummy-armed lob finishes. Per PBP Stats, no assist combination has been more fruitful this season than James to Davis, both in sum totals and baskets at the rim. (In 2001-02, Bryant-to-Shaq ranked 38th in the league in total assists; Rick Fox tallied more assists to O’Neal.) “He does everything,” James said last week of his All-Star teammate. “He handles the ball for us, he posts up, he’s on the perimeter, he’s the Defensive Player of the Year.”
How LeBron and AD stack up against Kobe and Shaq Regular-season statistics for LeBron James and Anthony Davis in 2019-20 vs. Kobe Bryant and Shaquille O’Neal in 1999-2000 through 2001-02 Per game Player Min. Pts. Rebs. Asts. 3P% eFG% USG% LeBron James 34.6 25.3 7.8 10.2 34.8% 55.0% 31.5% Kobe Bryant 39.1 25.4 5.9 5.1 29.4 48.3 29.8 Difference -4.5 -0.1 1.9 5.1 5.4 6.7 1.7 Anthony Davis 34.4 26.1 9.3 3.2 33.0 53.6 29.3 Shaquille O’Neal 38.7 28.6 12.4 3.5 0 57.5 31.5 Difference -4.3 -2.5 -3.1 -0.3 33 -3.9 -2.2 Advanced stats include effective field-goal percentage (eFG%) and usage rate (usg%). Source: Basketball-Reference.com
The formula has worked well enough; even after a drowsy run in the bubble seeding games, the Lakers retained the West’s best regular-season record, at 52-19. In a statement-making win over the East-leading Bucks in March — a narrative-laden potential Finals preview — James and Davis combined for 67 points, 17 rebounds and eight assists (those all James’s). Ahead by 6 with just under three minutes left and looking to ice the game, the Lakers turned to their preferred play: the James-Davis ball screen, which they ran nearly 600 times over the course of the regular season, per Second Spectrum. One trip yielded a James layup that missed but drew help defense; Davis cleaned it up with a tip-in. The next coaxed a double-team of James, and Davis popped free for a wide-open elbow jumper. The sequence summed up the bind the two put defenses in: Both players provoke overreaction, so one gets loose.
But gaudy stats and the overall record have masked the kind of minor deficiencies that can become major in the deep rounds of the playoffs. The synchronicity of James and Davis has come at the cost, for now, of some measure of individual excellence. James averaged 0.90 points per possession on 300 isolation plays this year, down from 0.97 last season and his lowest mark since 2015-16. Davis averaged 0.90 points per possession on 321 post-up plays, which represented a similar dip from last year and was his lowest average since 2016-17.
To judge James and Davis solely by their one-on-one acumen is reductive in the extreme. Still, recent history has borne out the idea that, at certain postseason junctures, squaring off and going to work is the best option. The Raptors won last year’s title due in no small part to Kawhi Leonard’s increasingly accurate Jordan impression; the last four Finals MVPs have scored at least 0.94 points per possession in iso situations in the playoffs. The numbers echo a prominent line of thought concerning postseason basketball: that seven-game series tend to break the sport down to its simplest variables — namely, who can score on whom.
Exceptions spring to mind. The 2013-14 Spurs beat LeBron’s Miami Heat via a kind of basketball hivemind, and the pre-Durant Warriors played similarly, just 10 extra feet from the basket. But the present Lakers, like their forebears, lack the roster depth to do that. In each of the Lakers’ championship seasons from 2000 to 2002, only one player not named Bryant or O’Neal averaged more than 10 points; twice it was Derek Fisher, at just over 11 points per game. This year’s Lakers likewise have only one consistent double-figure threat outside of James and Davis — Kyle Kuzma. If defenses face the option of either guarding the James-Davis pick-and-roll straight up or collapsing on it and allowing 3-pointers from Kentavious Caldwell-Pope and Alex Caruso, the decision is easy.
The good news for Lakers fans is that James has plenty of practice in taking the needed solo turn. His 45-point elimination-avoiding outburst against the Boston Celtics in 2012 found him squarely in the Kobe-Jordan tradition, canning turnaround fadeaways and blowing past one-on-one defenders. More recently, during the 2018 postseason, his last in Cleveland, James shouldered more than his preferred share of the playmaking burden, and his 9.7 iso possessions per game in the playoffs was second only to James Harden’s 12.9. James’s effectiveness in these situations, in which he scored 0.99 points per possession, helped drag one of the least-qualified rosters in recent memory to the Finals. And though Davis posted a negative plus/minus without James on the court during the regular season, a 31-and-11 outing as James struggled with his shooting in the Lakers’ Game 2 victory over the Blazers on Thursday offered hope that Davis might shoulder a bigger postseason load and rely less on James. On Saturday, the pair became the first Lakers duo since Bryant and O’Neal in 2002 to log 25 points and 10 rebounds apiece in a playoff game.
On the whole, of course, Lakers fans will be delighted if they have the luxury of debating the merits of various championship methodologies in a couple of months. But the most stubborn among them may also feel a sort of vindication. If James is to win his fourth championship this season and is to win Davis his first, they just might have to do it the old-school way.
Check out our latest NBA predictions.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-25--If You Wait Until Your State’s Deadline To Mail Your Ballot, You May Be Too Late

All eyes are on the post office lately .
( Yet another sentence we never thought we ’ d write in 2020 . )
In the past few weeks , Democrats have alleged that Postmaster General Louis DeJoy , a major donor to the GOP and President Trump , is trying to slow down mail delivery and thus disrupt the election .
And the U.S .
Postal Service itself sent a letter ( naturally ) to 46 states and Washington , D.C. , warning them that there could be delays in ballot deliveries .
Depending on your political worldview , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other .
But the letter isn ’ t part of a master plan to forestall democracy .
It was instead about states assuming mail works differently than it does — regardless of who the postmaster is .
And that could have a major effect on whether your mail-in vote is counted .
The post office has long-standing guidelines ( which predate DeJoy ) that recommend how much time voters and election officials should allow to apply for , send and receive mail-in ballots .
“ We ’ ve been working on this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encourage states to update their laws to reflect the realities of how the post office actually works , ” said Amber McReynolds , CEO for the National Vote At Home Institute , a nonprofit organization that lobbies for policies that make it easier for voters to cast absentee ballots .
In almost all states , even people who meet the deadline to request or mail back their ballot run the risk of their ballot not arriving on time simply because of how long the mail takes .
The USPS recommends voters allow one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and when they would like to receive it , and another week between when they put their completed ballot in the mail and the state ’ s deadline for receiving it .
But many states allow mail ballots to be requested up until a few days before Election Day , which this year falls on Nov. 3 , even if the deadline for returning the ballot is the day of the election .
“ The reality is that voters are going to fail if election officials are being asked to mail ballots out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So if you ’ re among the 64 percent of voters who say they ’ re likely to cast a mail-in ballot this year , don ’ t wait until the last minute to request or return your ballot .
When should you request or send it , then ?
We have a table for that : We calculated these dates by applying the USPS guidelines to each state ’ s deadline for receiving ballots .
As you can see , 33 out of the 39 states that require would-be mail voters to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have statutory deadlines later than the USPS recommends .
Alaska , Iowa , Maryland , New Mexico , New York and Virginia are the only states whose deadlines comply with USPS guidelines .
Similarly , in eight states that theoretically allow you to postmark your ballot by Nov. 2 or 3 , you ’ ll want to put your ballot in the mail before that deadline to ensure it arrives in time to count .
But don ’ t worry if you don ’ t get your act together in time , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decide who to vote for .
In most states , you can both request a “ mail ” ballot in person and drop off a completed ballot at your local election office or an official ballot drop box instead of mailing it .
If you ’ re willing to do that , it ’ s fine to wait until the statutory deadlines to request and submit your ballot .
It ’ s not a perfect solution , but you can also pay extra to send your ballot by priority or overnight mail , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So while we urge people to meet the recommended deadlines in the chart , it ’ s important to know you have options if you don ’ t .

If You Wait Until Your State’s Deadline To Mail Your Ballot, You May Be Too Late Check the USPS’s recommendations before dropping your vote or paperwork in the mail.
All eyes are on the post office lately. (Yet another sentence we never thought we’d write in 2020.) In the past few weeks, Democrats have alleged that Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, a major donor to the GOP and President Trump, is trying to slow down mail delivery and thus disrupt the election. And the U.S. Postal Service itself sent a letter (naturally) to 46 states and Washington, D.C., warning them that there could be delays in ballot deliveries.
Depending on your political worldview, one event seemed to be evidence of the other. But the letter isn’t part of a master plan to forestall democracy. It was instead about states assuming mail works differently than it does — regardless of who the postmaster is. And that could have a major effect on whether your mail-in vote is counted.
The post office has long-standing guidelines (which predate DeJoy) that recommend how much time voters and election officials should allow to apply for, send and receive mail-in ballots.
“We’ve been working on this for a while across the country to encourage states to update their laws to reflect the realities of how the post office actually works,” said Amber McReynolds, CEO for the National Vote At Home Institute, a nonprofit organization that lobbies for policies that make it easier for voters to cast absentee ballots.
In almost all states, even people who meet the deadline to request or mail back their ballot run the risk of their ballot not arriving on time simply because of how long the mail takes.
The USPS recommends voters allow one week between when they request their ballot and when they would like to receive it, and another week between when they put their completed ballot in the mail and the state’s deadline for receiving it. But many states allow mail ballots to be requested up until a few days before Election Day, which this year falls on Nov. 3, even if the deadline for returning the ballot is the day of the election. “The reality is that voters are going to fail if election officials are being asked to mail ballots out that late,” said McReynolds.
So if you’re among the 64 percent of voters who say they’re likely to cast a mail-in ballot this year, don’t wait until the last minute to request or return your ballot. When should you request or send it, then? We have a table for that:
Over 30 states have risky mail-in ballot deadlines When voters should request and send back their mail ballots, according to USPS guidelines, and how different that is from each jurisdiction’s deadline Recommended deadline How many days later jurisdiction deadlines are jurisdiction ▲ ▼
Request by … ▲ ▼
Send by … ▲ ▼
Request ▲ ▼
Postmark ▲ ▼
Conn. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 days — Del. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — Mont. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — N.H. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — R.I. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — S.D. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — Wyo. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — La. 10/19/20 10/26/20 11 — Ga. 10/20/20 10/27/20 10 — Mich. 10/20/20 10/27/20 10 — S.C. 10/20/20 10/27/20 10 — Ala. 10/20/20 10/27/20 9 6 days Maine 10/20/20 10/27/20 9 — Wis. 10/20/20 10/27/20 9 — Ark. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Okla. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Pa. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Tenn. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Minn. 10/27/20 11/3/20 6 0 Mass. 10/23/20 10/30/20 5 4 Ohio 10/26/20 11/2/20 5 0 Kan. 10/23/20 10/30/20 4 4 Ky. 10/23/20 10/30/20 4 4 N.C. 10/23/20 10/30/20 4 4 Fla. 10/20/20 10/27/20 4 — Ariz. 10/20/20 10/27/20 3 — Idaho 10/20/20 10/27/20 3 — Neb. 10/20/20 10/27/20 3 — Texas 10/21/20 10/28/20 2 6 W.Va. 10/26/20 11/2/20 2 1 Ill. 10/27/20 11/3/20 2 0 Ind. 10/20/20 10/27/20 2 — Mo. 10/20/20 10/27/20 1 — Va. 10/23/20 10/30/20 0 4 Alaska 10/24/20 11/3/20 0 0 Iowa 10/24/20 11/2/20 0 0 Md. 10/20/20 11/3/20 0 0 N.Y. 10/27/20 11/3/20 0 0 N.M. 10/20/20 10/27/20 0 — Calif. — 11/3/20 — 0 D.C. — 11/3/20 — 0 Miss. 10/27/20 11/3/20 — 0 Nev. — 11/3/20 — 0 N.J. — 11/3/20 — 0 N.D. 10/26/20 11/2/20 — 0 Utah — 11/2/20 — 0 Wash. — 11/3/20 — 0 Colo. — 10/27/20 — — Hawaii — 10/27/20 — — Ore. — 10/27/20 — — Vt. — 10/27/20 — — Show more rows Mississippi and North Dakota have no statutory ballot-request deadline. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Washington, D.C., are currently planning to automatically mail ballots to every voter, so they also do not have ballot-request deadlines. Sources: State Election Officials, U.S. Postal Service
We calculated these dates by applying the USPS guidelines to each state’s deadline for receiving ballots. As you can see, 33 out of the 39 states that require would-be mail voters to request a ballot by a certain date have statutory deadlines later than the USPS recommends. Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York and Virginia are the only states whose deadlines comply with USPS guidelines. Similarly, in eight states that theoretically allow you to postmark your ballot by Nov. 2 or 3, you’ll want to put your ballot in the mail before that deadline to ensure it arrives in time to count.
But don’t worry if you don’t get your act together in time, or simply want to take more time to decide who to vote for. In most states, you can both request a “mail” ballot in person and drop off a completed ballot at your local election office or an official ballot drop box instead of mailing it. If you’re willing to do that, it’s fine to wait until the statutory deadlines to request and submit your ballot. It’s not a perfect solution, but you can also pay extra to send your ballot by priority or overnight mail, which are faster than standard mail service. So while we urge people to meet the recommended deadlines in the chart, it’s important to know you have options if you don’t.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-25--What Went Down On Night 1 Of The RNC

What Went Down On Night 1 Of The RNC

What Went Down On Night 1 Of The RNC


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-28--RNC 2020, Day 4: Live Updates And Analysis


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-27--A Historic Moment For Protest In Sports

A Historic Moment For Protest In Sports

In a breaking news episode , Sara , Neil and FiveThirtyEight senior sports writer Chris Herring reflect on the wild @ @ @ @ @ sports world in the past 24 hours and contextualize the players ’ strike that began @ @ @ @ @ to the WNBA , MLB and MLS , among other leagues .
This is a @ @ @ @ @ — and grief — in American sports ; it shows both how far athletes have @ @ @ @ @ organize protests and how little has changed .
What we ’ re looking at today @ @ @ @ @ for racial justice started with the Milwaukee Bucks and the NBA .
• Kenny Smith @ @ @ @ @ NBA ” in solidarity with players .

A Historic Moment For Protest In Sports Hot Takedown discusses the strike for racial justice that began in the NBA.
In a breaking news episode, Sara, Neil and FiveThirtyEight senior sports writer Chris Herring reflect on the wild events that have rocked the sports world in the past 24 hours and contextualize the players’ strike that began with the NBA and spread to the WNBA, MLB and MLS, among other leagues. This is a historic moment of collective action — and grief — in American sports; it shows both how far athletes have come in their ability to organize protests and how little has changed.
What we’re looking at today:


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-27--What To Watch For On The Final Night Of The RNC

The FiveThirtyEight Politics crew discusses what to expect on the fourth and final night of the 2020 Republican National Convention @ @ @ @ @ what they think President Trump will talk about in his closing speech .

What To Watch For On The Final Night Of The RNC
The FiveThirtyEight Politics crew discusses what to expect on the fourth and final night of the 2020 Republican National Convention, and in particular, what they think President Trump will talk about in his closing speech.


fivethirthyeight--2020-08-27--Could A Backlash Against Black Lives Matter Hurt Biden? The Two Don’t Appear Linked So Far.

In the wake of the police killing of George Floyd on May 25 , the popularity of the Black Lives Matter movement skyrocketed .
By early June , 53 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement , compared with just 28 percent who said they opposed it , according to polling by Civiqs .
In particular , white Democratic support of the movement increased from about 80 percent to 90 percent , and there were both more white independents expressing support for BLM and fewer expressing opposition .
At about the same time , Joe Biden led President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points in FiveThirtyEight ’ s average of national polls .
But between that time and the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha , Wisconsin , on Sunday ( we have barely any new polling since Blake ’ s shooting ) , Black Lives Matter ’ s surge in popularity ended : About 49 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement , compared with around 38 percent in opposition — similar to BLM ’ s net approval before Floyd ’ s death .
That drop in popularity has largely been driven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 80 percent of whom oppose the movement , higher than before Floyd ’ s death ) and white independents ( who now support BLM at similar levels as before Floyd ’ s death ) .
And at the moment , Biden leads Trump by just over 8 points in FiveThirtyEight ’ s polling average .
Why does all of this polling data matter ?
Because it suggests that Biden ’ s electoral prospects and the popularity of Black Lives Matter are not closely linked — at least not so far .
Some political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for Black Lives Matter and the increased focus from both Republicans and the media on riots that have accompanied some of the protests of police violence against Black people might boost Trump and hurt Biden .
Republicans certainly seem to think so — numerous speakers at the Republican National Convention have condemned the rioting and implied that state and local Democratic leaders are being too lenient toward the protesters , who are generally associated with Black Lives Matter .
“ Law and order , ” meanwhile , was a heavy theme in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the convention on Wednesday night , including the line , “ The hard truth is you won ’ t be safe in Joe Biden ’ s America.
” These dynamics could hurt Biden .
It ’ s hard to predict the future .
But be wary of any confident arguments that they will hurt him , since the popularity of Black Lives Matter dipped weeks ago but Biden ’ s did not .
In fact , there are a few fairly logical reasons that would explain why BLM ’ s support has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have anything to do with Biden and that wouldn ’ t affect his electoral prospects : • The surge in support for BLM came in the wake of constant media coverage of Floyd ’ s death , which was recorded on video and depicted hard-to-defend behavior from the police .
It ’ s not surprising that those numbers gradually came back to earth once media coverage of Floyd and the resulting protests became less pervasive .
• Second , BLM is a social-activist movement , not an electoral or political organization .
BLM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and trying to maximize public support , and they generally keep some distance from party politics .
In fact , in the weeks after Floyd ’ s death , Black Lives Matter activists started pushing controversial ideas , such as defunding the police , and controversial tactics , such as blocking traffic when they were protesting .
I doubt it shocked BLM activists that defunding the police , in particular , was not popular .
And I would assume that at least some of the dip in BLM ’ s popularity among white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embrace of cutting police funding , in addition to the rioting .
• Finally , as BLM started taking more controversial stands — particularly defunding the police — Republican politicians started attacking those positions .
Voters often follow cues from the elites in their party , so it ’ s not surprising that BLM has grown more unpopular with Republicans and some independents .
Biden , in contrast , has repeatedly condemned rioting and also repeatedly said that he opposes defunding the police .
So it would make sense that voters don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In fact , there was speculation at the start of the Floyd protests that they would boost Trump and hurt Biden — and that was not borne out .
An emphasis on “ law and order ” helped the Republicans win the 1968 presidential election , and both parties embraced tough-on-crime , tough-on-Black-people approaches to win elections in the 1980s and 1990s .
But the case that Trump won the 2016 election largely because of identity and racial issues has perhaps been overstated by the media in the years since .
And the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggests that the electorate in 2020 may not be responding to issues around race and policing in the way it did in those earlier eras .
That might be because of the growing number of non-white and college-educated voters , who tend to have more liberal views on these issues .
It might be because Americans are more uncomfortable with Trump ’ s approach to race than Biden ’ s , or because of the increased media focus on the more radical racial views of white people , such as the Trump-supporting teenager @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in Kenosha on Tuesday .
But let ’ s say we wake up in a week and Biden ’ s lead in national polls is down to 4 or 5 percentage points .
Let ’ s say Trump has even pulled ahead of Biden in our polling averages in Wisconsin and Florida .
And let ’ s say we get a bunch of new polls in the wake of Blake ’ s shooting that show public opinion firmly opposed to the rioting .
Could we conclude that there is an anti-BLM backlash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be hard to say for sure .
First , a Trump surge in the polls might simply be a traditional “ convention bounce ” from the Republican National Convention , which has taken place amid the unrest in Kenosha .
Second , it would be a bit odd ( and perhaps disingenuous ) for voters to switch from Biden to Trump , or from undecided to Trump , because of riots that Biden has condemned .
Such voters might be people who traditionally vote Republican , backed Trump in 2016 and have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are looking for a rationale to stick with their party and support Trump again .
Third , it would be hard to unpack which voters are annoyed by the riots specifically , as opposed to the months of protests against racial injustice , Black athletes striking and other actions that aren ’ t rioting but still might offend people who are more broadly wary of pushes for racial equality made by Black Americans .
We should be skeptical of claims that Americans overall will support Black people ’ s demands for equality if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manner that America ’ s white majority prefers — history suggests that even peaceful tactics like kneeling can generate a ton of backlash .
( Remember that the March on Washington and Martin Luther King Jr. were both fairly unpopular in the 1960s . )
And we should acknowledge what the past five decades of American electoral history has shown : Being the political party aligned with Black people seems very well correlated with the plurality of white people opposing that party .
It might be the case that the best thing electorally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black Lives Matter activists to keep quiet until February , but BLM activists might not want to delay their push for racial justice to focus on Trump ’ s defeat .
All that said , there could be a bloc of voters who support the protests and currently back Biden but who will shift to Trump because of the riots .
We can ’ t rule out that group emerging .
But , crucially , that group has not emerged yet , despite plenty of opportunity .
And based on what we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ August of this year , there are a lot of reasons to be skeptical that such a group will emerge .
In terms of racial issues , America is much different from how it was in 1968 or 1988 — and maybe even in 2016 .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

In the wake of the police killing of George Floyd on May 25, the popularity of the Black Lives Matter movement skyrocketed. By early June, 53 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement, compared with just 28 percent who said they opposed it, according to polling by Civiqs. In particular, white Democratic support of the movement increased from about 80 percent to 90 percent, and there were both more white independents expressing support for BLM and fewer expressing opposition.
At about the same time, Joe Biden led President Trump by about 6 to 7 percentage points in FiveThirtyEight’s average of national polls.
But between that time and the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on Sunday (we have barely any new polling since Blake’s shooting), Black Lives Matter’s surge in popularity ended: About 49 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement, compared with around 38 percent in opposition — similar to BLM’s net approval before Floyd’s death. That drop in popularity has largely been driven by increased opposition among white Republicans (80 percent of whom oppose the movement, higher than before Floyd’s death) and white independents (who now support BLM at similar levels as before Floyd’s death).
And at the moment, Biden leads Trump by just over 8 points in FiveThirtyEight’s polling average.
Why does all of this polling data matter?
Because it suggests that Biden’s electoral prospects and the popularity of Black Lives Matter are not closely linked — at least not so far. Some political analysts have suggested that the decline in support for Black Lives Matter and the increased focus from both Republicans and the media on riots that have accompanied some of the protests of police violence against Black people might boost Trump and hurt Biden. Republicans certainly seem to think so — numerous speakers at the Republican National Convention have condemned the rioting and implied that state and local Democratic leaders are being too lenient toward the protesters, who are generally associated with Black Lives Matter. “Law and order,” meanwhile, was a heavy theme in Vice President Mike Pence’s address at the convention on Wednesday night, including the line, “The hard truth is you won’t be safe in Joe Biden’s America.”
These dynamics could hurt Biden. It’s hard to predict the future. But be wary of any confident arguments that they will hurt him, since the popularity of Black Lives Matter dipped weeks ago but Biden’s did not. In fact, there are a few fairly logical reasons that would explain why BLM’s support has gone down that don’t really have anything to do with Biden and that wouldn’t affect his electoral prospects:
The surge in support for BLM came in the wake of constant media coverage of Floyd’s death, which was recorded on video and depicted hard-to-defend behavior from the police. It’s not surprising that those numbers gradually came back to earth once media coverage of Floyd and the resulting protests became less pervasive. Second, BLM is a social-activist movement, not an electoral or political organization. BLM activists aren’t conducting endless polling and trying to maximize public support, and they generally keep some distance from party politics. In fact, in the weeks after Floyd’s death, Black Lives Matter activists started pushing controversial ideas, such as defunding the police, and controversial tactics, such as blocking traffic when they were protesting. I doubt it shocked BLM activists that defunding the police, in particular, was not popular. And I would assume that at least some of the dip in BLM’s popularity among white Republicans and white independents stemmed from its embrace of cutting police funding, in addition to the rioting. Finally, as BLM started taking more controversial stands — particularly defunding the police — Republican politicians started attacking those positions. Voters often follow cues from the elites in their party, so it’s not surprising that BLM has grown more unpopular with Republicans and some independents.
Biden, in contrast, has repeatedly condemned rioting and also repeatedly said that he opposes defunding the police. So it would make sense that voters don’t link his views to BLM.
In fact, there was speculation at the start of the Floyd protests that they would boost Trump and hurt Biden — and that was not borne out. An emphasis on “law and order” helped the Republicans win the 1968 presidential election, and both parties embraced tough-on-crime, tough-on-Black-people approaches to win elections in the 1980s and 1990s. But the case that Trump won the 2016 election largely because of identity and racial issues has perhaps been overstated by the media in the years since. And the evidence — at least so far — suggests that the electorate in 2020 may not be responding to issues around race and policing in the way it did in those earlier eras. That might be because of the growing number of non-white and college-educated voters, who tend to have more liberal views on these issues. It might be because Americans are more uncomfortable with Trump’s approach to race than Biden’s, or because of the increased media focus on the more radical racial views of white people, such as the Trump-supporting teenager who shot three protesters, killing two, in Kenosha on Tuesday.
But let’s say we wake up in a week and Biden’s lead in national polls is down to 4 or 5 percentage points. Let’s say Trump has even pulled ahead of Biden in our polling averages in Wisconsin and Florida. And let’s say we get a bunch of new polls in the wake of Blake’s shooting that show public opinion firmly opposed to the rioting. Could we conclude that there is an anti-BLM backlash helping Trump?
Maybe, but it would be hard to say for sure. First, a Trump surge in the polls might simply be a traditional “convention bounce” from the Republican National Convention, which has taken place amid the unrest in Kenosha.
Second, it would be a bit odd (and perhaps disingenuous) for voters to switch from Biden to Trump, or from undecided to Trump, because of riots that Biden has condemned. Such voters might be people who traditionally vote Republican, backed Trump in 2016 and have been on the fence this year but are looking for a rationale to stick with their party and support Trump again.
Third, it would be hard to unpack which voters are annoyed by the riots specifically, as opposed to the months of protests against racial injustice, Black athletes striking and other actions that aren’t rioting but still might offend people who are more broadly wary of pushes for racial equality made by Black Americans. We should be skeptical of claims that Americans overall will support Black people’s demands for equality if only they made those demands in the manner that America’s white majority prefers — history suggests that even peaceful tactics like kneeling can generate a ton of backlash. (Remember that the March on Washington and Martin Luther King Jr. were both fairly unpopular in the 1960s.) And we should acknowledge what the past five decades of American electoral history has shown: Being the political party aligned with Black people seems very well correlated with the plurality of white people opposing that party. It might be the case that the best thing electorally for the Democratic Party would be for Black Lives Matter activists to keep quiet until February, but BLM activists might not want to delay their push for racial justice to focus on Trump’s defeat.
All that said, there could be a bloc of voters who support the protests and currently back Biden but who will shift to Trump because of the riots. We can’t rule out that group emerging. But, crucially, that group has not emerged yet, despite plenty of opportunity. And based on what we’ve seen in June, July and August of this year, there are a lot of reasons to be skeptical that such a group will emerge. In terms of racial issues, America is much different from how it was in 1968 or 1988 — and maybe even in 2016.
Geoffrey Skelley contributed analysis to this article.