fivethirthyeight--2020-06-18--Our New Polling Averages Show Biden Leads Trump By 9 Points Nationally

Today we launched our general election polling averages , nationally and for all states with a sufficient number of polls .
Recent polls show former Vice President Joe Biden with a solid lead over President Trump nationally , and in most swing states .
Biden currently leads Trump 50.5 percent to 41.3 percent in national polls , according to our average — a 9.2-point lead .
Biden also leads Trump in swing states such as Michigan , Wisconsin and Arizona — although his lead in many swing states are not as wide as his margin in national polls , suggesting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor Trump in the event of a close election .
Overall — assuming that states that haven ’ t been polled go the same way as they did in 2016 — Biden leads in states worth 368 electoral votes , while Trump leads in states totalling 170 electoral votes .
But a potential problem for Biden is that Trump could have an Electoral College advantage if the election tightens .
Biden currently leads Trump by “ only ” 6.6 points in the current tipping-point state , Minnesota , but this is narrower than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national polls .
So while a Biden landslide is possible if he wins all these swing states , so is a Trump Electoral College victory , depending on which way the race moves between now and November .
The rest of this article covers how our polling averages work in a fair amount of detail .
We know that a lot of you will probably take the off-ramp here and not read through the methodology .
However , we ’ d encourage you to at least read the next section , which distinguishes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve just released ) and our election forecast model ( which we ’ ll publish later ) .
The goal of our polling averages is to reflect the current state of the polling in each state , rather than to predict the eventual outcome .
That is to say , our averages are a snapshot , not a forecast .
Indeed , the way we calibrate various settings in the polling averages — such as how aggressive they are in responding to new data — is mostly based on how well the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how well they predict the outcome of the race .
The polling averages will , of course , be a major ingredient in our forecast model .
But there are times when they will differ from the forecast .
For instance , parties typically get a boost in the polls following their national convention .
However , this can be fleeting ; the convention bounce usually fades over time .
Our forecast will adjust for this , but the polling averages are a snapshot of the race today and will not .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the polls with other ways of projecting the outcome in each state , such as what happened in the previous election or its demographics .
Our polling averages do not do this , however .
They simply reflect the polls , albeit with a number of adjustments that I ’ ll describe later .
Which polls we include and how we weight them One pillar of FiveThirtyEight ’ s philosophy is to include as many polls as possible , although we do use an algorithm that assigns a higher weight to polls with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we don ’ t exclude polls just because they ’ re outliers , because we think the polling firm is partisan , and for any similar reasons .
Instead , we have a variety of strategies to make our polling averages more robust without having to cherry-pick data .
But as polling gets more complicated , there are an increasing number of edge cases where it may be unclear what constitutes a scientific poll .
So there are some situations where data is excluded : • We don ’ t use polls that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or suspect that the pollster faked data .
• We don ’ t use DIY polls commissioned by nonprofessional hobbyists on online platforms such as Google Surveys .
( Professional or campaign polls using these platforms are fine . )
• We don ’ t treat subsamples of multistate polls as individual “ polls ” unless certain conditions are met .
• We don ’ t use “ polls ” that blend or smooth their data using methods such as MRP .
These can be smart techniques — but if a pollster uses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a model rather than a poll .
We want to do the blending and smoothing ourselves rather than inputting other people ’ s models into our own .
• We exclude polls that ask the voter who they support only after revealing leading information about the candidates .
If , for instance , a poll says “ Joe Biden loves puppies .
Who do you plan to support : Biden or Trump ?
” we won ’ t include it .
• We exclude polls that test hypothetical candidates — for instance , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Trump , Biden and Utah Sen. Mitt Romney .
There have also been some recent cases where media organizations that sponsor polls misrepresented what those polls actually say .
We are working on policies for how to handle these .
However , we do include a campaign ’ s internal polls in our averages if they are released to the public .
( This is a change from 2016 , although something we implemented in our midterm forecast in 2018 . )
These internal polls are subject to a fairly harsh house @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as historically , internal polls exaggerate their candidate ’ s margin by a net of around 5 percentage points in presidential races .
If you don ’ t see a poll listed , it may be that we simply haven ’ t gotten around to adding it yet , or that we are working with the pollster or the media sponsor to nail down certain information about it .
We strongly encourage all press releases and stories about polls to include the following details , at a minimum : the dates the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the sample frame ( e.g .
likely voters ) and the firm responsible for conducting the poll .
Please don ’ t hesitate to drop us a line if you think you ’ ve found a poll that we ’ re missing .
[ Related : We ’ ve Updated Our Pollster Ratings Ahead Of The 2020 General Election ] Finally , a few notes on how our averages use multiple versions of the same poll and weight polls .
Sometimes , the same poll will include multiple turnout models , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with or without third-party candidates ) .
When a poll has more than one turnout model , we always use the likely voter version of a poll before the registered voter version , and the registered voter version before the version conducted among all adults .
However , if a pollster releases three turnout models and doesn ’ t designate any of them as the main one , we simply average the versions together .
As for how we weight polls , their weights are based on their sample size and pollster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turn , reflect a combination of the pollster ’ s past performance and whether it meets current industry best practices .
In addition , polls receive a penalty to their weight if they are conducted among registered voters or all adults rather than likely voters .
And if a particular polling firm conducts a large number of polls in a state within a short period of time , the weight assigned to each of its polls during this period will be discounted .
Thus , a pollster can not “ flood the zone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls of Arizona all at once .
How we calculate our polling average Once we ’ ve decided which polls to include and how to weight them , there are basically two ways you can calculate a polling average : • You can take a simple average of recent polls , which is basically what RealClearPolitics does ; • Or you can use any of a variety of methods to calculate a trend line of the polls , as HuffPost Pollster formerly did .
FiveThirtyEight ’ s polling averages are basically a blend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slightly more accurate than using either method on its own .
For most of the race , our average primarily relies on the averaging method , which is usually the more conservative of the two .
( Although , unlike in the case of RCP , there ’ s not a hard cut-off for the date ; rather , the weight assigned to each poll gradually ramps down to zero depending on the number of polls and how long ago it was conducted . )
However , our average leans more heavily into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ line in the final couple of weeks of the campaign .
Thus , our polling averages can be fairly conservative for most of the race but more aggressive later on .
We also introduced a change with our presidential primary averages this year , where our method now recognizes that certain types of major events are more likely to produce changes in the polls .
That means we now treat certain events as essentially spanning multiple days on the calendar .
Specifically : • We treat each party ’ s convention as being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trail .
• A candidate clinching his or her party ’ s nomination counts as 10 days .
• A presidential debate is equivalent to six days .
• And the announcement of the nominee ’ s VP choice is four days .
Movement in the polls following these events is likely to be real and not statistical noise , so we made these tweaks so that the polling average responds more aggressively following them .
Although , as I mentioned in the case of convention bounces , the polls can sometimes revert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so some of these event-based gains might still be short-lived .
The nitty-gritty on how we adjust polls At this point , we want to give you a deep dive on what we ’ re adjusting for in our polling averages .
Namely , we adjust polls in three ways : There ’ s a likely voter adjustment , a house effects adjustment and what we call a timeline adjustment that accounts for how recent a poll is .
First , the likely voter adjustment works by taking polls of registered voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would say if they were conducted among likely voters instead .
The reason we do this is that almost all polls conducted in the closing weeks of the campaign are among likely voters — and likely voter polls are generally more accurate .
But many polls earlier in the cycle , especially before Labor Day , are conducted among registered voters .
So we ’ re trying to distinguish actual changes in the state of the race from changes that just reflect a pollster turning on its likely voter filter .
The way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ starting with historical priors based on the effects that likely voter screens tend to have , but then adjusting these priors as polls are released that provide direct comparisons of likely voter and registered voter versions of the same poll .
For instance , if the same poll has Biden ahead by 6 points among registered voters but only up by 4 points among likely voters , that helps us to calibrate the adjustment .
( In other words , we love it when pollsters publish both registered voter and likely voter numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gain more ground from likely voter screens than Democratic ones do , since Republican voters tend to be older and whiter , which are characteristics associated with higher turnout .
However , challengers — regardless of party — tend to gain ground in likely voter polls relative to incumbents , probably because some low-propensity voters may choose the incumbent as a default , whereas likely voters have thought through their choice more carefully .
That means the effects could be somewhat offsetting this year — Trump is a Republican ( which should help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s also an incumbent ( which should hurt him ) .
Still , the effects from partisanship are slightly stronger than the effects from incumbency , and Trump has been doing slightly better in likely voter polls than in registered voter polls so far .
Thus , likely voter screens may slightly improve Trump ’ s position overall — perhaps by a percentage point or so relative to Biden .
Next , our house effects adjustment attempts to correct for polls that consistently lean toward one candidate or the other .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the polling firm Rasmussen Reports has a strong pro-Trump house effect , as Trump tends to have a higher approval rating in those polls than in those from other pollsters .
To be clear , there isn ’ t necessarily anything wrong with having a house effect ; sometimes , an “ outlier ” poll turns out to be right .
But adjusting for house effects makes polling averages more stable .
[ Related : An Updating Calculation Of The President ’ s Approval Rating ] However , the mechanics of house @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if you ’ re looking at polls across multiple states .
For instance , if a certain polling firm has a 3-point pro-Biden house effect in its poll of Colorado , should we also assume it has a 3-point pro-Biden effect when it polls in , say , Pennsylvania ?
In past years when calculating house effects , we applied a constant house effects adjustment to all of a firm ’ s polls , regardless of what state they were conducted in .
But after extensively testing that assumption , we found that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the accuracy of your average very much .
In fact , it can potentially even make your polling averages less accurate .
I ’ ll skip the gory details , but if you ’ re not careful , what can wind up happening is that your averages become anchored to prolific pollsters that poll across many states , and pollsters that focus on just one or a handful of states end up having their numbers adjusted toward these more prolific pollsters .
This is a problem because a lot of the information we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this process , and pollsters that survey just one state or one region often do a really good job of it .
For example , a lot of Missouri-specific pollsters ( correctly , it turned out ) had Republican Josh Hawley ahead of Democrat Claire McCaskill in that state ’ s U.S. Senate race in 2018 while other pollsters ( such as Marist College ) that conduct polls in many states had McCaskill leading .
Our house effects adjustment ended up shifting all the local polls toward McCaskill , putting her ahead in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have shown Hawley ahead … andHawley eventually won by 6 percentage points .
Thus , we ’ ve changed our house effects adjustment so that it mostly reflects how a poll compares to others in the same state .
A few technical notes about our house effects adjustment : • The adjustment is more aggressive for firms that have done more polling .
For instance , if a firm had an apparent 5-point pro-Biden house effect in Wisconsin , but this was only based on one poll , it would be hard to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect or if the firm had just happened to come up with an outlier .
That ’ s why our adjustment is more aggressive in cases where a firm has conducted many polls .
• Polling firms also vary in how many undecided and third-party voters they tend to include .
Some pollsters often publish results such as Biden 50 , Trump 49 , for example , with few undecideds .
Our house effects adjustment also adjusts for this .
• For a campaign ’ s internal polls , our algorithm starts with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fairly strong house effect favoring the party conducting the poll .
This differs from nonpartisan polls , where we start with a prior that the house effect is zero .
In both cases , the house effects adjustment moves away from the prior as we collect more data .
Finally , we apply a timeline adjustment based on the recency of the poll which adjusts for shifts in the overall race since a poll was conducted .
For instance , say that a poll of Arizona last month showed Biden up 3 points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a strong shift toward Trump since then in national polls and in polls of similar states such as Nevada .
This adjustment will shift that older Arizona poll toward Trump .
Of course , it would be better to have a new Arizona poll instead of having to adjust the old one .
But sometimes , a key swing state can go weeks with little or no polling .
( Especially as shrinking media budgets force pollsters to pick and choose their battles more ; there was a dearth of high-quality polls in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2016 race , for example . )
So this adjustment mostly matters when the polling in a state is “ stale ” ; it considerably improves accuracy in these cases .
But it doesn ’ t have much of an effect when there is a lot of recent polling in a state .
The way this adjustment works is that our program examines the trends in national polls and in polls of states that are similar based on our CANTOR scores .
So , for instance , the polls of similar states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more influence on the adjustment of polls in Michigan than will polls of dissimilar states such as California or Mississippi .
National polls also have a major influence on this timeline adjustment , simply because there are a lot of them , so they ’ re often the easiest way to detect a trend .
[ Related : How To Read Polls In 2020 ] Additionally , this adjustment also accounts for the elasticity of each state , or how responsive it is to the national environment .
Some states ( such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swingier ” than others because they have a lot of swing voters .
So if national polls move by , say , 4 percentage points toward Trump over a particular period of time , we might expect them to move by more than that ( perhaps 5 points ) in New Hampshire .
Other states are relatively inelastic and tend not to swing as much .
Georgia , for instance , has a lot of African American voters and young urban professionals who are heavily Democratic , and a lot of older white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even though Georgia has become increasingly competitive as the number of young , college-educated professionals grows , there aren ’ t actually that many swing voters there , so its polls tend to be fairly stable .
Elasticity scores for 2020 , are based on an examination of individual-level polling data from the exit polls in 2008 and from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study in 2012 and 2016 , are as follows : Note that swingier states tend to be white and relatively irreligious .
Black voters are generally the most reliable Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generally the most reliable Republican ones .
So states such as New Hampshire that have neither many Black voters nor many evangelical Christians tend to be elastic .
That ’ s it for now !
But please drop us a line if anything seems wrong .
We do discover bugs from time to time when we ’ ve launched a new product , and tips from readers are invaluable in catching those .

Our New Polling Averages Show Biden Leads Trump By 9 Points Nationally But the race is closer in swing states, which could allow Trump to win the Electoral College if the race tightens.
Today we launched our general election polling averages, nationally and for all states with a sufficient number of polls. Recent polls show former Vice President Joe Biden with a solid lead over President Trump nationally, and in most swing states. Biden currently leads Trump 50.5 percent to 41.3 percent in national polls, according to our average — a 9.2-point lead.
Biden also leads Trump in swing states such as Michigan, Wisconsin and Arizona — although his lead in many swing states are not as wide as his margin in national polls, suggesting that the Electoral College could once again favor Trump in the event of a close election.
Here’s a table showing the averages in swing states:
Biden leads nationally and in most swing states FiveThirtyEight polling averages as of 5:30 p.m. on June 17, 2020 State Biden Trump Biden Margin Colorado 54.1% 37.1% +17.0 Maine* 53.2 39.7 +13.5 New Mexico* 54.1 40.8 +13.3 Virginia 50.5 39.9 +10.6 Michigan 50.9 40.7 +10.2 National 50.5 41.3 +9.2 Nevada 48.2 40.1 +8.0 New Hampshire 50.0 42.3 +7.7 Florida 49.7 42.8 +6.9 Minnesota* 50.8 44.2 +6.6 Wisconsin 49.0 42.4 +6.6 Pennsylvania 49.0 43.7 +5.3 Arizona 47.7 43.6 +4.0 North Carolina 47.6 44.6 +3.0 Ohio 48.4 45.7 +2.7 Georgia 47.0 46.1 +1.0 Iowa 45.6 46.2 -0.6 Texas 46.5 47.2 -0.7 Polls are adjusted for house effects, whether or not they were conducted among likely voters, and the time the poll was conducted. * Maine, Minnesota and New Mexico do not yet have enough polls for us to display a chart on our polling averages page, but we can calculate an average based on the polls available.
Overall — assuming that states that haven’t been polled go the same way as they did in 2016 — Biden leads in states worth 368 electoral votes, while Trump leads in states totalling 170 electoral votes.
But a potential problem for Biden is that Trump could have an Electoral College advantage if the election tightens. Biden currently leads Trump by “only” 6.6 points in the current tipping-point state, Minnesota, but this is narrower than Biden’s 9.2-point lead in the national polls. So while a Biden landslide is possible if he wins all these swing states, so is a Trump Electoral College victory, depending on which way the race moves between now and November.
The rest of this article covers how our polling averages work in a fair amount of detail. We know that a lot of you will probably take the off-ramp here and not read through the methodology. However, we’d encourage you to at least read the next section, which distinguishes between our polling averages (what we’ve just released) and our election forecast model (which we’ll publish later).
[Related: An Updating Average Of 2020 Presidential General Election Polls]
Polling averages are a snapshot, not a forecast
The goal of our polling averages is to reflect the current state of the polling in each state, rather than to predict the eventual outcome. That is to say, our averages are a snapshot, not a forecast. Indeed, the way we calibrate various settings in the polling averages — such as how aggressive they are in responding to new data — is mostly based on how well the polling average predicts future polls, not how well they predict the outcome of the race.
The polling averages will, of course, be a major ingredient in our forecast model. But there are times when they will differ from the forecast. For instance, parties typically get a boost in the polls following their national convention. However, this can be fleeting; the convention bounce usually fades over time. Our forecast will adjust for this, but the polling averages are a snapshot of the race today and will not.
In addition, our forecast model will blend the polls with other ways of projecting the outcome in each state, such as what happened in the previous election or its demographics. Our polling averages do not do this, however. They simply reflect the polls, albeit with a number of adjustments that I’ll describe later.
Which polls we include and how we weight them
One pillar of FiveThirtyEight’s philosophy is to include as many polls as possible, although we do use an algorithm that assigns a higher weight to polls with a higher pollster rating. That means we don’t exclude polls just because they’re outliers, because we think the polling firm is partisan, and for any similar reasons. Instead, we have a variety of strategies to make our polling averages more robust without having to cherry-pick data.
But as polling gets more complicated, there are an increasing number of edge cases where it may be unclear what constitutes a scientific poll. So there are some situations where data is excluded:
We don’t use polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect that the pollster faked data.
We don’t use DIY polls commissioned by nonprofessional hobbyists on online platforms such as Google Surveys. (Professional or campaign polls using these platforms are fine.)
We don’t treat subsamples of multistate polls as individual “polls” unless certain conditions are met.
We don’t use “polls” that blend or smooth their data using methods such as MRP. These can be smart techniques — but if a pollster uses them, they’re really running a model rather than a poll. We want to do the blending and smoothing ourselves rather than inputting other people’s models into our own.
We exclude polls that ask the voter who they support only after revealing leading information about the candidates. If, for instance, a poll says “Joe Biden loves puppies. Who do you plan to support: Biden or Trump?” we won’t include it.
We exclude polls that test hypothetical candidates — for instance, a poll testing a hypothetical three-way race between Trump, Biden and Utah Sen. Mitt Romney.
There have also been some recent cases where media organizations that sponsor polls misrepresented what those polls actually say. We are working on policies for how to handle these.
However, we do include a campaign’s internal polls in our averages if they are released to the public. (This is a change from 2016, although something we implemented in our midterm forecast in 2018.) These internal polls are subject to a fairly harsh house effects adjustment though (see below), as historically, internal polls exaggerate their candidate’s margin by a net of around 5 percentage points in presidential races.
If you don’t see a poll listed, it may be that we simply haven’t gotten around to adding it yet, or that we are working with the pollster or the media sponsor to nail down certain information about it. We strongly encourage all press releases and stories about polls to include the following details, at a minimum: the dates the poll was conducted, the sample size, the sample frame (e.g. likely voters) and the firm responsible for conducting the poll. Please don’t hesitate to drop us a line if you think you’ve found a poll that we’re missing.
[Related: We’ve Updated Our Pollster Ratings Ahead Of The 2020 General Election]
Finally, a few notes on how our averages use multiple versions of the same poll and weight polls. Sometimes, the same poll will include multiple turnout models, or several versions of a question (i.e., with or without third-party candidates). When a poll has more than one turnout model, we always use the likely voter version of a poll before the registered voter version, and the registered voter version before the version conducted among all adults. However, if a pollster releases three turnout models and doesn’t designate any of them as the main one, we simply average the versions together.
As for how we weight polls, their weights are based on their sample size and pollster rating. The pollster ratings, in turn, reflect a combination of the pollster’s past performance and whether it meets current industry best practices. In addition, polls receive a penalty to their weight if they are conducted among registered voters or all adults rather than likely voters. And if a particular polling firm conducts a large number of polls in a state within a short period of time, the weight assigned to each of its polls during this period will be discounted. Thus, a pollster cannot “flood the zone” by releasing, say, 10 polls of Arizona all at once.
[Related: Our Pollster Ratings]
How we calculate our polling average
Once we’ve decided which polls to include and how to weight them, there are basically two ways you can calculate a polling average:
You can take a simple average of recent polls, which is basically what RealClearPolitics does; Or you can use any of a variety of methods to calculate a trend line of the polls, as HuffPost Pollster formerly did.
FiveThirtyEight’s polling averages are basically a blend of these two techniques, which is slightly more accurate than using either method on its own. For most of the race, our average primarily relies on the averaging method, which is usually the more conservative of the two. (Although, unlike in the case of RCP, there’s not a hard cut-off for the date; rather, the weight assigned to each poll gradually ramps down to zero depending on the number of polls and how long ago it was conducted.) However, our average leans more heavily into the polynomial method of calculating a trend line in the final couple of weeks of the campaign. Thus, our polling averages can be fairly conservative for most of the race but more aggressive later on.
[Related: The Latest Political Polls Collected By FiveThirtyEight]
We also introduced a change with our presidential primary averages this year, where our method now recognizes that certain types of major events are more likely to produce changes in the polls. That means we now treat certain events as essentially spanning multiple days on the calendar. Specifically:
We treat each party’s convention as being equivalent to 15 days on the campaign trail.
A candidate clinching his or her party’s nomination counts as 10 days.
A presidential debate is equivalent to six days.
And the announcement of the nominee’s VP choice is four days.
Movement in the polls following these events is likely to be real and not statistical noise, so we made these tweaks so that the polling average responds more aggressively following them. Although, as I mentioned in the case of convention bounces, the polls can sometimes revert to the mean a few weeks later, so some of these event-based gains might still be short-lived.
The nitty-gritty on how we adjust polls
At this point, we want to give you a deep dive on what we’re adjusting for in our polling averages. Namely, we adjust polls in three ways: There’s a likely voter adjustment, a house effects adjustment and what we call a timeline adjustment that accounts for how recent a poll is.
First, the likely voter adjustment works by taking polls of registered voters or all adults and inferring what they would say if they were conducted among likely voters instead. The reason we do this is that almost all polls conducted in the closing weeks of the campaign are among likely voters — and likely voter polls are generally more accurate. But many polls earlier in the cycle, especially before Labor Day, are conducted among registered voters. So we’re trying to distinguish actual changes in the state of the race from changes that just reflect a pollster turning on its likely voter filter.
The way the likely voter adjustment works is by starting with historical priors based on the effects that likely voter screens tend to have, but then adjusting these priors as polls are released that provide direct comparisons of likely voter and registered voter versions of the same poll. For instance, if the same poll has Biden ahead by 6 points among registered voters but only up by 4 points among likely voters, that helps us to calibrate the adjustment. (In other words, we love it when pollsters publish both registered voter and likely voter numbers.)
Republican candidates generally tend to gain more ground from likely voter screens than Democratic ones do, since Republican voters tend to be older and whiter, which are characteristics associated with higher turnout. However, challengers — regardless of party — tend to gain ground in likely voter polls relative to incumbents, probably because some low-propensity voters may choose the incumbent as a default, whereas likely voters have thought through their choice more carefully. That means the effects could be somewhat offsetting this year — Trump is a Republican (which should help him among likely voters) but he’s also an incumbent (which should hurt him).
Still, the effects from partisanship are slightly stronger than the effects from incumbency, and Trump has been doing slightly better in likely voter polls than in registered voter polls so far. Thus, likely voter screens may slightly improve Trump’s position overall — perhaps by a percentage point or so relative to Biden.
Next, our house effects adjustment attempts to correct for polls that consistently lean toward one candidate or the other. In our presidential approval averages, for instance, the polling firm Rasmussen Reports has a strong pro-Trump house effect, as Trump tends to have a higher approval rating in those polls than in those from other pollsters. To be clear, there isn’t necessarily anything wrong with having a house effect; sometimes, an “outlier” poll turns out to be right. But adjusting for house effects makes polling averages more stable.
[Related: An Updating Calculation Of The President’s Approval Rating]
However, the mechanics of house effects can quickly become complicated, especially if you’re looking at polls across multiple states. For instance, if a certain polling firm has a 3-point pro-Biden house effect in its poll of Colorado, should we also assume it has a 3-point pro-Biden effect when it polls in, say, Pennsylvania?
In past years when calculating house effects, we applied a constant house effects adjustment to all of a firm’s polls, regardless of what state they were conducted in. But after extensively testing that assumption, we found that this strategy doesn’t actually improve the accuracy of your average very much. In fact, it can potentially even make your polling averages less accurate.
I’ll skip the gory details, but if you’re not careful, what can wind up happening is that your averages become anchored to prolific pollsters that poll across many states, and pollsters that focus on just one or a handful of states end up having their numbers adjusted toward these more prolific pollsters. This is a problem because a lot of the information we gain from local pollsters is lost in this process, and pollsters that survey just one state or one region often do a really good job of it.
For example, a lot of Missouri-specific pollsters (correctly, it turned out) had Republican Josh Hawley ahead of Democrat Claire McCaskill in that state’s U.S. Senate race in 2018 while other pollsters (such as Marist College) that conduct polls in many states had McCaskill leading. Our house effects adjustment ended up shifting all the local polls toward McCaskill, putting her ahead in our average when a straight average would have shown Hawley ahead … andHawley eventually won by 6 percentage points.
Thus, we’ve changed our house effects adjustment so that it mostly reflects how a poll compares to others in the same state.
A few technical notes about our house effects adjustment:
The adjustment is more aggressive for firms that have done more polling. For instance, if a firm had an apparent 5-point pro-Biden house effect in Wisconsin, but this was only based on one poll, it would be hard to say whether this reflected an actual house effect or if the firm had just happened to come up with an outlier. That’s why our adjustment is more aggressive in cases where a firm has conducted many polls.
Polling firms also vary in how many undecided and third-party voters they tend to include. Some pollsters often publish results such as Biden 50, Trump 49, for example, with few undecideds. Our house effects adjustment also adjusts for this.
For a campaign’s internal polls, our algorithm starts with the prior that they do have a fairly strong house effect favoring the party conducting the poll. This differs from nonpartisan polls, where we start with a prior that the house effect is zero. In both cases, the house effects adjustment moves away from the prior as we collect more data.
Finally, we apply a timeline adjustment based on the recency of the poll which adjusts for shifts in the overall race since a poll was conducted. For instance, say that a poll of Arizona last month showed Biden up 3 points there, but there’s been a strong shift toward Trump since then in national polls and in polls of similar states such as Nevada. This adjustment will shift that older Arizona poll toward Trump.
Of course, it would be better to have a new Arizona poll instead of having to adjust the old one. But sometimes, a key swing state can go weeks with little or no polling. (Especially as shrinking media budgets force pollsters to pick and choose their battles more; there was a dearth of high-quality polls in Michigan and Wisconsin toward the end of the 2016 race, for example.) So this adjustment mostly matters when the polling in a state is “stale”; it considerably improves accuracy in these cases. But it doesn’t have much of an effect when there is a lot of recent polling in a state.
The way this adjustment works is that our program examines the trends in national polls and in polls of states that are similar based on our CANTOR scores. So, for instance, the polls of similar states such as Wisconsin and Ohio will have more influence on the adjustment of polls in Michigan than will polls of dissimilar states such as California or Mississippi. National polls also have a major influence on this timeline adjustment, simply because there are a lot of them, so they’re often the easiest way to detect a trend.
[Related: How To Read Polls In 2020]
Additionally, this adjustment also accounts for the elasticity of each state, or how responsive it is to the national environment. Some states (such as New Hampshire) tend to be “swingier” than others because they have a lot of swing voters. So if national polls move by, say, 4 percentage points toward Trump over a particular period of time, we might expect them to move by more than that (perhaps 5 points) in New Hampshire.
Other states are relatively inelastic and tend not to swing as much. Georgia, for instance, has a lot of African American voters and young urban professionals who are heavily Democratic, and a lot of older white evangelicals who are heavily Republican. So even though Georgia has become increasingly competitive as the number of young, college-educated professionals grows, there aren’t actually that many swing voters there, so its polls tend to be fairly stable.
Elasticity scores for 2020, are based on an examination of individual-level polling data from the exit polls in 2008 and from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study in 2012 and 2016, are as follows:
Every state’s elasticity score Updated for 2020 State Elasticity New Hampshire 1.28 Rhode Island 1.26 Maine 1st District 1.25 Vermont 1.23 Maine 1.17 Massachusetts 1.17 Hawaii 1.15 Iowa 1.13 North Dakota 1.11 Idaho 1.10 West Virginia 1.10 Maine 2nd District 1.09 New Mexico 1.09 Colorado 1.09 Connecticut 1.09 Nevada 1.08 Alaska 1.07 Arizona 1.07 Oregon 1.07 Wisconsin 1.06 Washington 1.06 Nebraska 2nd District 1.06 Montana 1.05 Kansas 1.04 Florida 1.04 New Jersey 1.04 Nebraska 3nd District 1.03 South Dakota 1.03 Michigan 1.03 Ohio 1.02 Nebraska 1.02 Utah 1.02 Arkansas 1.02 Texas 1.02 Missouri 1.01 Minnesota 1.01 Indiana 1.00 Kentucky 1.00 Tennessee 0.98 Illinois 0.98 Pennsylvania 0.97 Nebraska 1st District 0.97 California 0.96 New York 0.96 Wyoming 0.95 North Carolina 0.94 Louisiana 0.93 Oklahoma 0.93 Virginia 0.92 Delaware 0.90 South Carolina 0.88 Maryland 0.87 Georgia 0.84 Alabama 0.81 Mississippi 0.79 District of Columbia 0.62 Elasticity scores reflect how much a state’s polls would be expected to change based on a change in national polls. For instance, if Idaho’s elasticity score is 1.1, a 5-point swing in national polls would be expected to produce a 5.5-point swing in Idaho. Sources: Exit Polls, Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note that swingier states tend to be white and relatively irreligious. Black voters are generally the most reliable Democratic voters, while white evangelical Christians are generally the most reliable Republican ones. So states such as New Hampshire that have neither many Black voters nor many evangelical Christians tend to be elastic.
That’s it for now! But please drop us a line if anything seems wrong. We do discover bugs from time to time when we’ve launched a new product, and tips from readers are invaluable in catching those.
‘I don’t buy that locations (of party conventions) matter’: Nate Silver


fivethirthyeight--2020-06-17--Can We Tell Which States Will Be Swing States In November?

It ’ s the holy grail of presidential election campaigns : knowing which states will be decisive in the Electoral College .
We have our guesses : States like Arizona , Michigan , North Carolina and Wisconsin are widely expected to be among the top swing states for 2020 .
But how confident can we really be in those expectations five months before the election ?
To find out , we went back and checked which states election handicapper The Cook Political Report thought would be swing states as of mid-June 2004 , 2008 , 2012 and 2016 .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the actual swing states turned out to be after the election .
( To be clear , Cook does great work , and we ’ re not trying to pick on them — we ’ re simply using them as a proxy to see where conventional wisdom stood at the time .
It ’ s actually surprisingly hard to find historical sources for this , and Cook is one of the only outlets we could consistently find with early assessments of the presidential race dating back to 2004 .
In an email , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cook Political Report , told us he thinks of its ratings as rough guidelines , particularly at this point in the cycle : “ My view has always been that we are not trying to predict outcomes as much as help our readers see which states are safely in a party ’ s column , which aren ’ t but could get into play , which ones are competitive but one side seems to have an advantage , and which ones are really , really close.
” ) Importantly , much of how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how you define what is a swing state .
For instance , “ swing state ” could mean simply a state that is closely contested — a toss-up state in Cook ’ s lingo .
But it could also mean a bellwether state — aka a state whose results closely match the national popular vote .
This might sound like semantics , but it ’ s actually an important distinction : In a roughly tied election , toss-up states and bellwether states are more or less the same ; however , in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidate leads nationally by 10 points , the bellwether states may not actually be very close .
So how you define a swing state matters .
And as it turns out , early ratings are often wrong about which states will be toss-ups in November .
But , as we will explain , that doesn ’ t mean they are useless or even bad .
In fact , Cook does have a pretty good track record of identifying an election ’ s bellwether states early on , and arguably that ’ s more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s look at which states Cook expected would be toss-ups at this point in the cycle in the last four presidential elections and which states actually ended up being toss-ups .
The teal states in the chart below are those that Cook correctly rated as toss-ups ; the pink ones are states that Cook rated as toss-ups but did not turn out to be that close ; and the gray ones are states that Cook did not rate as toss-ups but ended up close enough to count as one .
As you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of calling toss-ups is mixed .
In June 2008 , Ohio was the only toss-up state it called correctly .
In late May 2016 , it correctly identified New Hampshire and North Carolina as toss-ups but missed nine other states that turned out to be tight .
On the bright side , in April 2004 , Cook correctly foresaw seven states ’ toss-up status , missing only four and incorrectly calling toss-ups in just Florida and Missouri .
And in late May 2012 , it correctly pegged all four of the eventual toss-up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appears they cast too wide a net by also rating Colorado , Iowa , Nevada , New Hampshire and Pennsylvania as toss-ups , those states all just barely missed the cutoff for being actual toss-ups ( then-President Barack Obama won them each by 5 to 7 points ) .
But what went wrong in 2008 and 2016 wasn ’ t that Cook misread the electorate in specific states ; it ’ s that it didn ’ t realize how competitive ( or uncompetitive ) the presidential race would be overall .
( To @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s fault ; there was no way for anyone to anticipate that the economy would collapse in fall 2008 , sending Obama to a landslide victory , or that then-FBI Director James Comey ’ s Oct. 28 letter to Congress seemed to bring the 2016 campaign within a normal-sized polling error of a Donald Trump victory . )
This is clear when you look at the states that Cook ’ s springtime ratings implied would be bellwethers : Most of them turned out to be actual bellwethers in November .
In late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was an overall favorite , but it did correctly anticipate that Colorado , Florida , Michigan , Nevada , Pennsylvania , Virginia and Wisconsin would closely mirror the national popular vote ( although three other states also did ) .
Similarly , in June 2008 , Cook ’ s ratings implied a presidential race that was too close to call , but even after the race shifted in Democrats ’ favor , four of the six states Cook viewed as the likeliest bellwethers indeed turned out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four other states Cook missed ) .
And in 2004 and 2012 , Cook had even more success pre-identifying bellwether states than they did pre-identifying toss-up states .
So where does that leave us in 2020 ?
Well , as of June 16 , The Cook Political Report lists six states as toss-ups : Arizona , Florida , Michigan , North Carolina , Pennsylvania and Wisconsin .
And since Democrats have the advantage in states worth only 232 electoral votes and Republicans have the advantage in states worth only 204 , Cook is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be bellwethers .
History suggests you can largely trust those bellwether ratings , too — though you should expect the election to still throw us a few curveballs .
One or two of those states will probably not be that close to the national popular vote ; two or three states not on this list probably will turn out to be good national bellwethers .
The toss-up ratings , on the other hand , should not be taken literally — at least not at this stage .
And that ’ s because , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how states will vote in relation to one another , it is more challenging to forecast the national political environment so far in advance .
But in a way , that ’ s OK ; the bellwethers are really what matter .
It doesn ’ t really matter if , say , Virginia or Texas is decided by just 1 point , because if either one of those scenarios comes to pass , the election is likely a landslide .
Knowing the bellwethers in advance is arguably far more valuable because we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is leading in them — because whoever wins the bellwethers wins the election .

It’s the holy grail of presidential election campaigns: knowing which states will be decisive in the Electoral College. We have our guesses: States like Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin are widely expected to be among the top swing states for 2020. But how confident can we really be in those expectations five months before the election?
To find out, we went back and checked which states election handicapper The Cook Political Report thought would be swing states as of mid-June 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016. We then compared those early ratings to what the actual swing states turned out to be after the election. (To be clear, Cook does great work, and we’re not trying to pick on them — we’re simply using them as a proxy to see where conventional wisdom stood at the time. It’s actually surprisingly hard to find historical sources for this, and Cook is one of the only outlets we could consistently find with early assessments of the presidential race dating back to 2004. In an email, Charlie Cook, the founder of The Cook Political Report, told us he thinks of its ratings as rough guidelines, particularly at this point in the cycle: “My view has always been that we are not trying to predict outcomes as much as help our readers see which states are safely in a party’s column, which aren’t but could get into play, which ones are competitive but one side seems to have an advantage, and which ones are really, really close.”)
[Related: Our Pollster Ratings]
Importantly, much of how accurate these early ratings are hinges on how you define what is a swing state. For instance, “swing state” could mean simply a state that is closely contested — a toss-up state in Cook’s lingo. But it could also mean a bellwether state — aka a state whose results closely match the national popular vote. This might sound like semantics, but it’s actually an important distinction: In a roughly tied election, toss-up states and bellwether states are more or less the same; however, in an election in which, say, one candidate leads nationally by 10 points, the bellwether states may not actually be very close. So how you define a swing state matters.
And as it turns out, early ratings are often wrong about which states will be toss-ups in November. But, as we will explain, that doesn’t mean they are useless or even bad. In fact, Cook does have a pretty good track record of identifying an election’s bellwether states early on, and arguably that’s more important.
First, though, let’s look at which states Cook expected would be toss-ups at this point in the cycle in the last four presidential elections and which states actually ended up being toss-ups. The teal states in the chart below are those that Cook correctly rated as toss-ups; the pink ones are states that Cook rated as toss-ups but did not turn out to be that close; and the gray ones are states that Cook did not rate as toss-ups but ended up close enough to count as one.
As you can see, Cook’s record of calling toss-ups is mixed. In June 2008, Ohio was the only toss-up state it called correctly. In late May 2016, it correctly identified New Hampshire and North Carolina as toss-ups but missed nine other states that turned out to be tight. On the bright side, in April 2004, Cook correctly foresaw seven states’ toss-up status, missing only four and incorrectly calling toss-ups in just Florida and Missouri. And in late May 2012, it correctly pegged all four of the eventual toss-up states; while at first glance it appears they cast too wide a net by also rating Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania as toss-ups, those states all just barely missed the cutoff for being actual toss-ups (then-President Barack Obama won them each by 5 to 7 points).
But what went wrong in 2008 and 2016 wasn’t that Cook misread the electorate in specific states; it’s that it didn’t realize how competitive (or uncompetitive) the presidential race would be overall. (To be clear, this is not Cook’s fault; there was no way for anyone to anticipate that the economy would collapse in fall 2008, sending Obama to a landslide victory, or that then-FBI Director James Comey’s Oct. 28 letter to Congress seemed to bring the 2016 campaign within a normal-sized polling error of a Donald Trump victory.)
This is clear when you look at the states that Cook’s springtime ratings implied would be bellwethers: Most of them turned out to be actual bellwethers in November.
In late May 2016, Cook was wrong to think former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was an overall favorite, but it did correctly anticipate that Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin would closely mirror the national popular vote (although three other states also did). Similarly, in June 2008, Cook’s ratings implied a presidential race that was too close to call, but even after the race shifted in Democrats’ favor, four of the six states Cook viewed as the likeliest bellwethers indeed turned out to be bellwethers (although so did four other states Cook missed). And in 2004 and 2012, Cook had even more success pre-identifying bellwether states than they did pre-identifying toss-up states.
So where does that leave us in 2020? Well, as of June 16, The Cook Political Report lists six states as toss-ups: Arizona, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. And since Democrats have the advantage in states worth only 232 electoral votes and Republicans have the advantage in states worth only 204, Cook is therefore also expecting these six states to be bellwethers.
[Related: The Latest Political Polls Collected By FiveThirtyEight]
History suggests you can largely trust those bellwether ratings, too — though you should expect the election to still throw us a few curveballs. One or two of those states will probably not be that close to the national popular vote; two or three states not on this list probably will turn out to be good national bellwethers.
The toss-up ratings, on the other hand, should not be taken literally — at least not at this stage. And that’s because, while handicappers are pretty good at assessing how states will vote in relation to one another, it is more challenging to forecast the national political environment so far in advance. But in a way, that’s OK; the bellwethers are really what matter.
It doesn’t really matter if, say, Virginia or Texas is decided by just 1 point, because if either one of those scenarios comes to pass, the election is likely a landslide. Knowing the bellwethers in advance is arguably far more valuable because we can then focus our energy on watching who is leading in them — because whoever wins the bellwethers wins the election.
‘I don’t buy that locations (of party conventions) matter’: Nate Silver


fivethirthyeight--2020-06-17--There’s A Huge Gap In How Republicans And Democrats See Discrimination

Democrats and Republicans have very different views about how much discrimination various demographic groups face in American society .
That disagreement underlies virtually everything happening in American politics today , from the discussions about race and policing in the wake of George ’ s Floyd ’ s killing by Minneapolis police to the 2020 presidential election .
We wrote about these differing perceptions near the start of President Trump ’ s term in 2017 .
Those perceptions have not changed that much , but we felt like these questions of discrimination are more relevant than ever , with Trump running @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rethinking its racial policies in the wake of Floyd ’ s death .
Here are some recent findings about perceptions of discrimination and perceptions of various groups in American society , based on recent polling from the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape project .
The survey we relied on was administered after Floyd ’ s death , from May 28 to June 3 , but previous sets of polls from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape had similar results — except for shifts in responses to questions about black people and policing , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Democrats thought black and Muslim Americans face “ a great deal ” or “ a lot ” of discrimination in America today , as opposed to “ a moderate amount , ” “ little ” or “ none at all.
” Perceptions of discrimination against black people have surged among all groups , including Republicans , in the wake of Floyd ’ s death .
But the vast majority of Democrats thought that black people in America faced high levels of discrimination even before Floyd ’ s death .
About half of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of discrimination .
Very few Democrats thought that Christians , men or white people face high levels of discrimination in America .
In contrast , only about half of Republicans thought that black people and Muslims face high levels of discrimination , and only about a quarter thought that women do .
The majority of Republicans thought those groups face “ a moderate amount , ” “ little ” or “ no ” discrimination at all .
Generally , Republicans were less inclined to say that any group in America faces high levels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this polling .
But significantly more Republicans than Democrats thought there is discrimination against Christians and white people .
These views of discrimination line up closely with partisanship , among both voters and elected officials .
Among voters , black Americans , Muslims and women are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates ; Christians , men and white Americans are more likely to vote for Republicans .
[ Related : Republicans And Democrats Increasingly Agree On The Protests … But Not Why People Are Protesting ] At the political elite level , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a number of steps to reverse discrimination against black Americans and women .
The Trump administration reversed some of the Obama policies aimed at blacks in particular , while adopting policies that the administration said created a more level playing field for Christians , men and native-born Americans , who are more likely than immigrants to be white .
There are similar numbers of people in both parties who thought that Jewish Americans face high levels of discrimination .
What explains that ?
Well , Jewish Americans vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ defender of Jewish people in America and particularly in Israel , which may explain why a lot of Republicans also viewed Jewish Americans as facing high levels of discrimination .
In other words , it ’ s likely that voters would see discrimination through partisan lenses anyway , but decisions by leading politicians are probably reinforcing those dynamics .
In fact , partisans shift their support on policies to align with their party ’ s leaders , and not the other way around .
There are partisan gaps in favorability To get another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how partisanship might shape those feelings , we looked at measures of favorability , where people are asked , “ Do you have a very or somewhat favorable or very or somewhat unfavorable view of group X ?
” Although questions about group favorability are fraught because of “ social desirability bias ” — basically , even if someone feels intensely negative feelings towards , say , black or white people , they might not admit it to a pollster — we can still learn something by analyzing responses .
We focused here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” unfavorable views because we are assuming you must really dislike a group to admit this on a survey .
Nearly half of Democrats expressed unfavorable views about police and evangelicals .
Unfavorable views of the police have substantially increased from polling before Floyd ’ s death , but Democrats ’ unfavorable views of evangelicals were already very high and remain so .
About a quarter of Democrats said they had unfavorable views of white Americans ; a quarter said the same of undocumented immigrants , even though the Democratic Party is increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast , large shares of Republicans expressed unfavorable views of undocumented immigrants , LGBT Americans and Muslims .
More than 20 percent of Republicans said that they had unfavorable views of black Americans and police , with the latter group having increased in unfavorability substantially since Floyd ’ s death .
On both perceptions of discrimination and favorability measures , Americans ’ views seem to be shaped more by partisanship than age , race or gender .
So , Republicans — men and women — generally see discrimination in similar ways and view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So do black and white Democrats .
A helpful illustration of the partisan dynamics is that a greater share of Democratic men ( 44 percent ) than Republican women ( 28 percent ) thought that women in the U.S. face high levels of discrimination .
But there is a big GOP split on age .
Republicans under the age of 45 were more likely to say that they saw high levels of discrimination than those over 45 .
And that cuts across the traditional divisions — younger Republicans saw more discrimination than older @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group ) and against whites ( a more Republican group ) .
In the wake of Floyd ’ s death , a clear majority of Republicans under 45 thought there was a lot of discrimination in America against black people .
The over-45 GOP cohort did not share that view .
Older Republicans were much more likely than younger Republicans to say that they had negative views of undocumented immigrants and Muslims .
There were also some notable differences among Democrats .
For example , Democrats under 45 were significantly more likely than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an unfavorable view of the police ( 54 percent compared to 38 percent ) .
Black Democrats were more likely than white Democrats to have unfavorable views of the police ( 58 percent to 41 percent ) .
Black and Hispanic Democrats were about twice as likely as white Democrats to view LGBT Americans unfavorably , and about 30 percent of both groups expressed unfavorable views of white Americans .
And white Democrats , in particular , viewed evangelicals unfavorably ( 50 percent ) .
We should be careful not to overstate these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women in the Republican Party .
There are plenty of non-religious Republicans .
There are plenty of Christian Democrats .
Also , it ’ s not that the two parties are on different planets in terms of perceptions of discrimination — Republicans and Democrats agree that Muslims face more discrimination than Christians , and that black people face more discrimination than white people .
Most Republicans and Democrats view Asian , black , Latino and white people favorably .
( Or at least feel compelled to say so in a survey . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ both sides ” situation — Democratic perceptions of discrimination line up more with the evidence than Republican perceptions .
No candidate has recently run for president with a plan for banning Christians from entering the U.S. And by most measures , whatever discrimination they might face , Christians , men and white people remain fairly powerful in American society today , certainly more so than black people , Muslims and women .
[ Related : Do You Know How Divided White And Black Americans Are On Racism ? ]
This data is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disconnect at the heart of American politics .
When social identities are threatened ( real or imagined threats , often made salient by group leaders ) , individuals retreat to the safety of their in-groups , and react defensively with more negative feelings toward outside groups .
And given the effectiveness of in-group retreating for political outcomes , there is little chance of this changing anytime soon , at least from political leaders who stand to gain the most from these identity-based fights .
The activation of social identities can have positive democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s anti-Latino rhetoric led to increased political activity from Latinos with a stronger racial identity .
And as we wrote about last week , strong racial identity among black Americans leads to collective voting to defend group interests .
Moreover , if a sense of shared identity can be triggered , partisans can come together to prioritize national interests .
But so long as the parties remain largely distinct in terms of the group identities of their members — and how those members feel about other groups — ingroup and outgroup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ June 17 , 2020 , 3:52 p.m. ) : An earlier version of a footnote in this article incorrectly said that the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey did not ask respondents whether Asians faced discrimination .
Respondents were , in fact , asked whether Asians faced discrimination .
FiveThirtyEight Podcast : Views of Black Lives Matter have shifted .
What happens next ?

Democrats and Republicans have very different views about how much discrimination various demographic groups face in American society. That disagreement underlies virtually everything happening in American politics today, from the discussions about race and policing in the wake of George’s Floyd’s killing by Minneapolis police to the 2020 presidential election.
We wrote about these differing perceptions near the start of President Trump’s term in 2017. Those perceptions have not changed that much, but we felt like these questions of discrimination are more relevant than ever, with Trump running for a second term and the country rethinking its racial policies in the wake of Floyd’s death.
Here are some recent findings about perceptions of discrimination and perceptions of various groups in American society, based on recent polling from the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape project. The survey we relied on was administered after Floyd’s death, from May 28 to June 3, but previous sets of polls from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape had similar results — except for shifts in responses to questions about black people and policing, as we explain below.
Perceptions of discrimination differ across party
An overwhelming majority of Democrats thought black and Muslim Americans face “a great deal” or “a lot” of discrimination in America today, as opposed to “a moderate amount,” “little” or “none at all.” Perceptions of discrimination against black people have surged among all groups, including Republicans, in the wake of Floyd’s death. But the vast majority of Democrats thought that black people in America faced high levels of discrimination even before Floyd’s death. About half of Democrats also thought women face a lot of discrimination.
Very few Democrats thought that Christians, men or white people face high levels of discrimination in America.
In contrast, only about half of Republicans thought that black people and Muslims face high levels of discrimination, and only about a quarter thought that women do. The majority of Republicans thought those groups face “a moderate amount,” “little” or “no” discrimination at all.
Who faces discrimination? Percentage of respondents who said each group experiences “a great deal” or “a lot” of discrimination, by party identification Group All Democrats Republicans Gap Blacks 61.2% 77.5% 45.4% D+32.1 Muslims 57.5 70.0 48.2 D+21.8 Women 37.8 47.8 27.7 D+20.1 Jews 34.4 36.1 34.7 D+1.4 Men 15.8 12.9 18.5 R+5.6 Whites 18.0 11.8 25.3 R+13.5 Christians 22.7 15.9 32.5 R+16.6 Survey conducted from May 28 to June 3. “Democrats” and “Republicans” refer to self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans. Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape
Generally, Republicans were less inclined to say that any group in America faces high levels of discrimination, at least according to this polling. But significantly more Republicans than Democrats thought there is discrimination against Christians and white people.
These views of discrimination line up closely with partisanship, among both voters and elected officials. Among voters, black Americans, Muslims and women are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates; Christians, men and white Americans are more likely to vote for Republicans.
[Related: Republicans And Democrats Increasingly Agree On The Protests … But Not Why People Are Protesting]
At the political elite level, former President Obama’s administration took a number of steps to reverse discrimination against black Americans and women. The Trump administration reversed some of the Obama policies aimed at blacks in particular, while adopting policies that the administration said created a more level playing field for Christians, men and native-born Americans, who are more likely than immigrants to be white.
There are similar numbers of people in both parties who thought that Jewish Americans face high levels of discrimination. What explains that? Well, Jewish Americans vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates. But Trump has cast himself as a defender of Jewish people in America and particularly in Israel, which may explain why a lot of Republicans also viewed Jewish Americans as facing high levels of discrimination.
In other words, it’s likely that voters would see discrimination through partisan lenses anyway, but decisions by leading politicians are probably reinforcing those dynamics. In fact, partisans shift their support on policies to align with their party’s leaders, and not the other way around.
There are partisan gaps in favorability
To get another assessment of feelings about different groups and how partisanship might shape those feelings, we looked at measures of favorability, where people are asked, “Do you have a very or somewhat favorable or very or somewhat unfavorable view of group X?” Although questions about group favorability are fraught because of “social desirability bias” — basically, even if someone feels intensely negative feelings towards, say, black or white people, they might not admit it to a pollster — we can still learn something by analyzing responses. We focused here on “very” and “somewhat” unfavorable views because we are assuming you must really dislike a group to admit this on a survey.
Nearly half of Democrats expressed unfavorable views about police and evangelicals. Unfavorable views of the police have substantially increased from polling before Floyd’s death, but Democrats’ unfavorable views of evangelicals were already very high and remain so. About a quarter of Democrats said they had unfavorable views of white Americans; a quarter said the same of undocumented immigrants, even though the Democratic Party is increasingly supportive of immigration and immigrants.
(Un)favorability is partisan Percentage of respondents who have a unfavorable impression of each group, by party identification Group All Democrats Republicans Gap Evangelicals 31.1% 43.1% 19.9% D+23.1 The police 35.7 45.8 25.2 D+20.6 Whites 18.2 22.5 13.1 D+9.5 Jews 12.2 11.6 12.4 R+0.8 Asians 13.4 12.1 16.7 R+4.6 Latinos 13.7 10.5 17.9 R+7.4 Blacks 16.8 12.6 22.2 R+9.6 LGBT 23.5 15.5 33.7 R+18.1 Muslims 26.8 17.1 41.9 R+24.8 Undocumented immigrants 42.4 27.8 64.6 R+36.8 Survey conducted from May 28 to June 3. “Democrats” and “Republicans” refer to self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans. Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape
In contrast, large shares of Republicans expressed unfavorable views of undocumented immigrants, LGBT Americans and Muslims. More than 20 percent of Republicans said that they had unfavorable views of black Americans and police, with the latter group having increased in unfavorability substantially since Floyd’s death.
Younger and older Republicans diverge
On both perceptions of discrimination and favorability measures, Americans’ views seem to be shaped more by partisanship than age, race or gender. So, Republicans — men and women — generally see discrimination in similar ways and view the same groups favorably or unfavorably. So do black and white Democrats. A helpful illustration of the partisan dynamics is that a greater share of Democratic men (44 percent) than Republican women (28 percent) thought that women in the U.S. face high levels of discrimination.
But there is a big GOP split on age. Republicans under the age of 45 were more likely to say that they saw high levels of discrimination than those over 45. And that cuts across the traditional divisions — younger Republicans saw more discrimination than older Republicans against blacks (a more Democratic group) and against whites (a more Republican group). In the wake of Floyd’s death, a clear majority of Republicans under 45 thought there was a lot of discrimination in America against black people. The over-45 GOP cohort did not share that view.
Older Republicans were much more likely than younger Republicans to say that they had negative views of undocumented immigrants and Muslims.
More of the younger Republicans see discrimination Percentage of respondents who said each group experiences “a great deal” or “a lot” of discrimination, by age category Group All Republicans Under 45 45 and older Diff Blacks 45.4% 56.2% 37.8% -18.4 Women 27.7 35.8 22.0 -13.8 Men 18.5 26.3 12.8 -13.5 Whites 25.3 32.8 19.9 -13.0 Muslims 48.2 55.8 42.8 -13.0 Christians 32.5 37.7 28.7 -9.0 Jews 34.7 36.7 33.3 -3.5 Survey conducted from May 28 to June 3. Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape
There were also some notable differences among Democrats. For example, Democrats under 45 were significantly more likely than those over 45 to say they had an unfavorable view of the police (54 percent compared to 38 percent). Black Democrats were more likely than white Democrats to have unfavorable views of the police (58 percent to 41 percent). Black and Hispanic Democrats were about twice as likely as white Democrats to view LGBT Americans unfavorably, and about 30 percent of both groups expressed unfavorable views of white Americans. And white Democrats, in particular, viewed evangelicals unfavorably (50 percent).
We should be careful not to overstate these identity-based divides. There are plenty of women in the Republican Party. There are plenty of non-religious Republicans. There are plenty of Christian Democrats. Also, it’s not that the two parties are on different planets in terms of perceptions of discrimination — Republicans and Democrats agree that Muslims face more discrimination than Christians, and that black people face more discrimination than white people. Most Republicans and Democrats view Asian, black, Latino and white people favorably. (Or at least feel compelled to say so in a survey.)
But this also isn’t a “both sides” situation — Democratic perceptions of discrimination line up more with the evidence than Republican perceptions. No candidate has recently run for president with a plan for banning Christians from entering the U.S. And by most measures, whatever discrimination they might face, Christians, men and white people remain fairly powerful in American society today, certainly more so than black people, Muslims and women.
[Related: Do You Know How Divided White And Black Americans Are On Racism?]
This data is important because it illustrates a serious identity-based disconnect at the heart of American politics. When social identities are threatened (real or imagined threats, often made salient by group leaders), individuals retreat to the safety of their in-groups, and react defensively with more negative feelings toward outside groups. And given the effectiveness of in-group retreating for political outcomes, there is little chance of this changing anytime soon, at least from political leaders who stand to gain the most from these identity-based fights.
The activation of social identities can have positive democratic outcomes, too. For instance, Trump’s anti-Latino rhetoric led to increased political activity from Latinos with a stronger racial identity. And as we wrote about last week, strong racial identity among black Americans leads to collective voting to defend group interests. Moreover, if a sense of shared identity can be triggered, partisans can come together to prioritize national interests.
But so long as the parties remain largely distinct in terms of the group identities of their members — and how those members feel about other groups — ingroup and outgroup conflict is easily activated.
CORRECTION (June 17, 2020, 3:52 p.m.): An earlier version of a footnote in this article incorrectly said that the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey did not ask respondents whether Asians faced discrimination. Respondents were, in fact, asked whether Asians faced discrimination.
FiveThirtyEight Podcast: Views of Black Lives Matter have shifted. What happens next?


fivethirthyeight--2020-06-17--Republicans And Democrats Agree On The Protests But Not Why People Are Protesting

Public opinion is now in favor of the protesters who have spent the last three weeks advocating for police reform in response to the death of George Floyd , a black man killed by a police officer in Minneapolis .
This is notable , because public opinion around the protests was initially split .
But as the protests have grown larger and spread to more parts of the country , there ’ s evidence they have become more popular .
For instance , in a Morning Consult survey conducted June 10-12 , 64 percent of Americans said they supported the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first time the pollster asked in late May and early June .
[ Related : There ’ s A Huge Gap In How Republicans And Democrats See Discrimination ] In fact , the protests are so popular that they ’ re now supported by majorities of Democrats and Republicans .
But this bipartisan support masks some of the enormous differences that still exist between the two parties on issues of race and discrimination .
For starters , there ’ s a pretty big gap in just how strongly Democrats and Republicans back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Economist/YouGov poll , for instance , 73 percent of Democrats said they strongly approve of the nonviolent protests , compared with just 27 percent of Republicans .
And according to the most recent Yahoo News/YouGov poll , Democrats and Republicans are also fairly split on how peaceful the protests have been , how long they should last and what ’ s driving them .
In that poll , Democrats were 40 points more likely than Republicans to say that the protests have been mostly peaceful and three-quarters of Republicans said they wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to less than one-quarter of Democrats .
Republicans were also 44 points more likely than Democrats to say the protests were primarily motivated by long-standing biases against the police , whereas most Democrats said the protests were motivated by a genuine desire to hold police accountable .
FiveThirtyEight Podcast : Views of Black Lives Matter have shifted .
What happens next ?
The fact that Democrats and Republicans are so polarized when it comes to the motives driving the protests is important because it conveys just how differently Republicans and Democrats view racism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ YouGov asked respondents a number of questions on whether systemic racism was a problem or whether police killings signaled a bigger issue within American life .
As you can see in the chart below , Democrats and Republicans are divided , with as much as a 60-point gap separating them on some of these issues .
Recent surveys by CBS , CNN and Monmouth University have found equally large partisan divides on race and policing as well .
The thing is , public opinion about race hasn ’ t always been this polarized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ race were entirely unrelated to partisanship before Barack Obama was elected president in 2008 .
But after he was elected , racial attitudes and party identification became increasingly intertwined to the extent that by 2012 , opposition to interracial relationships or overtly negative views of African Americans predicted whether someone identified as Republican for the first time in decades .
[ Related : Do You Know How Divided White And Black Americans Are On Racism ? ]
Of course , Donald Trump ’ s political rise took this growing partisan polarization over race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular , quickly consolidated their views in reaction to Trump ’ s offensive statements about racial and ethnic minorities .
CBS News polls from the last 10 years underscore just how much Democrats have changed their opinion of systemic racism in a relatively short period of time .
As you can see in the chart below , it wasn ’ t that long ago when Democrats and Republicans responded pretty similarly to the question of whether white Americans had an easier time of getting ahead .
Democrats , however , are now much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exist for white Americans than they were five years ago .
A similar shift has happened on questions of police brutality and institutional racism within the criminal justice system .
For instance , the percentage of Democrats who think that the police disproportionately use deadly force against black Americans increased by more than 30 points since CBS News first asked the question in August 2014 .
Meanwhile , Republicans ’ views have remained steady — just 24 percent think the police disproportionately use deadly force against African Americans .
It ’ s certainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Republicans are so divided over race and policing after Floyd ’ s death .
The upshot of this growing polarization is that Democrats and Republicans increasingly inhabit separate realities about race in America , worlds apart on everything from the causes of racial inequality to the Confederate flag ’ s meaning to the N-word ’ s offensiveness to the value of teaching black history in schools .
The current partisan divide over race may be predictable , but it ’ s still incredibly important — especially considering this is a presidential election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective wedge issue for the Republican Party , as demonstrated by the 2016 election , when Republicans split up the Democrats ’ diverse coalition of nonwhite voters , white racially liberal voters and racially conservative white voters .
But after 12 years of Obama and Trump , racially conservative Democrats have mostly defected or converted .
That means Democrats are now united about many of the racial issues that once splintered the party .
Take the Black Lives Matter movement , for example .
In a June 2016 Pew Research Center poll , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 percent of white Republicans supported the Black Lives Matter movement .
Those numbers are now up to 92 percent among white Democrats and 37 percent among white Republicans in the latest Pew survey .
[ Related : Public Opinion Of The Black Lives Matter Movement Has Shifted .
What Happens Next ? ]
The fact that Republicans experienced a nearly 20-point increase in support since 2014 doesn ’ t bode well for them either , considering polls at this point indicate that it is Democrats — and not Republicans — who are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ race .
In fact , congressional Democrats ’ efforts to pass sweeping legislation to help remedy some of the racial biases in the criminal justice system could even be an effective racial wedge issue for the Democratic Party heading into November .

Public opinion is now in favor of the protesters who have spent the last three weeks advocating for police reform in response to the death of George Floyd, a black man killed by a police officer in Minneapolis.
This is notable, because public opinion around the protests was initially split. But as the protests have grown larger and spread to more parts of the country, there’s evidence they have become more popular. For instance, in a Morning Consult survey conducted June 10-12, 64 percent of Americans said they supported the protests, up 10 percentage points from the first time the pollster asked in late May and early June.
[Related: There’s A Huge Gap In How Republicans And Democrats See Discrimination]
In fact, the protests are so popular that they’re now supported by majorities of Democrats and Republicans. But this bipartisan support masks some of the enormous differences that still exist between the two parties on issues of race and discrimination.
For starters, there’s a pretty big gap in just how strongly Democrats and Republicans back the protests. In last week’s Economist/YouGov poll, for instance, 73 percent of Democrats said they strongly approve of the nonviolent protests, compared with just 27 percent of Republicans. And according to the most recent Yahoo News/YouGov poll, Democrats and Republicans are also fairly split on how peaceful the protests have been, how long they should last and what’s driving them. In that poll, Democrats were 40 points more likely than Republicans to say that the protests have been mostly peaceful and three-quarters of Republicans said they wanted the protests to stop now, compared to less than one-quarter of Democrats. Republicans were also 44 points more likely than Democrats to say the protests were primarily motivated by long-standing biases against the police, whereas most Democrats said the protests were motivated by a genuine desire to hold police accountable.
FiveThirtyEight Podcast: Views of Black Lives Matter have shifted. What happens next?
The fact that Democrats and Republicans are so polarized when it comes to the motives driving the protests is important because it conveys just how differently Republicans and Democrats view racism in America.
In its polling, YouGov asked respondents a number of questions on whether systemic racism was a problem or whether police killings signaled a bigger issue within American life. As you can see in the chart below, Democrats and Republicans are divided, with as much as a 60-point gap separating them on some of these issues. Recent surveys by CBS, CNN and Monmouth University have found equally large partisan divides on race and policing as well.
The thing is, public opinion about race hasn’t always been this polarized.
In fact, some attitudes about race were entirely unrelated to partisanship before Barack Obama was elected president in 2008. But after he was elected, racial attitudes and party identification became increasingly intertwined to the extent that by 2012, opposition to interracial relationships or overtly negative views of African Americans predicted whether someone identified as Republican for the first time in decades.
[Related: Do You Know How Divided White And Black Americans Are On Racism?]
Of course, Donald Trump’s political rise took this growing partisan polarization over race to new heights. Democrats, in particular, quickly consolidated their views in reaction to Trump’s offensive statements about racial and ethnic minorities.
CBS News polls from the last 10 years underscore just how much Democrats have changed their opinion of systemic racism in a relatively short period of time. As you can see in the chart below, it wasn’t that long ago when Democrats and Republicans responded pretty similarly to the question of whether white Americans had an easier time of getting ahead.
Democrats, however, are now much more likely to agree that societal advantages exist for white Americans than they were five years ago. A similar shift has happened on questions of police brutality and institutional racism within the criminal justice system. For instance, the percentage of Democrats who think that the police disproportionately use deadly force against black Americans increased by more than 30 points since CBS News first asked the question in August 2014. Meanwhile, Republicans’ views have remained steady — just 24 percent think the police disproportionately use deadly force against African Americans.
It’s certainly not surprising, then, that Democrats and Republicans are so divided over race and policing after Floyd’s death. The upshot of this growing polarization is that Democrats and Republicans increasingly inhabit separate realities about race in America, worlds apart on everything from the causes of racial inequality to the Confederate flag’s meaning to the N-word’s offensiveness to the value of teaching black history in schools.
[Related: How Black Americans View Their Racial Identity]
The current partisan divide over race may be predictable, but it’s still incredibly important — especially considering this is a presidential election year. Race has long been an effective wedge issue for the Republican Party, as demonstrated by the 2016 election, when Republicans split up the Democrats’ diverse coalition of nonwhite voters, white racially liberal voters and racially conservative white voters. But after 12 years of Obama and Trump, racially conservative Democrats have mostly defected or converted. That means Democrats are now united about many of the racial issues that once splintered the party.
Take the Black Lives Matter movement, for example. In a June 2016 Pew Research Center poll, only 64 percent of white Democrats and 20 percent of white Republicans supported the Black Lives Matter movement. Those numbers are now up to 92 percent among white Democrats and 37 percent among white Republicans in the latest Pew survey.
[Related: Public Opinion Of The Black Lives Matter Movement Has Shifted. What Happens Next?]
The fact that Republicans experienced a nearly 20-point increase in support since 2014 doesn’t bode well for them either, considering polls at this point indicate that it is Democrats — and not Republicans — who are now more unified on many issues of race. In fact, congressional Democrats’ efforts to pass sweeping legislation to help remedy some of the racial biases in the criminal justice system could even be an effective racial wedge issue for the Democratic Party heading into November.


fivethirthyeight--2020-06-16--The NBA Can Come Back Now. Should It?

The NBA Can Come Back Now. Should It?

Hot Takedown talked last week about what the NBA ’ s restart would look like , but not all of its players seem ready to return .
We discuss the concerns raised by Brooklyn Nets point guard Kyrie Irving after a call with 80 other players on the Orlando bubble system and whether playing games will distract from the important cultural conversations happening right now around racial justice and inequality .
Irving , who is also a players association vice president , has a reputation in the NBA universe that may be affecting how people perceive his leadership on this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using his voice to advocate for and shield less well-known players with similar , and very legitimate , concerns .
We don ’ t necessarily think there ’ s a right answer to whether playing games and drawing attention on the court to vital issues like police brutality and racial justice is more powerful than not playing and making space for activists where sports otherwise would be .
But since it seems like the NBA will restart regardless , we think it ’ s important to have these conversations that center the players @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to make an impact on what the league does — and what the public sees .
Next , we talk soccer !
Specifically the return of the English Premier League , where there is a lot to play for — just not the title .
We discuss the race for spots in the Champions League , which may be even more open this year because Manchester City is , pending an appeal , barred from European football .
As a sign of the times , Neil is just happy to have soccer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently promoted newcomers Sheffield United , while all Sara wants is for Spurs to finish ahead of Tony Chow ’ s beloved Arsenal .
But there ’ s a lot on the line financially for both Spurs and Arsenal as two of the traditionally bigger and more monied clubs .
Making it into the Champions League or Europa League would boost the transfer market prospects of two clubs that will both need a fair bit of help rebuilding .
There ’ s drama at the bottom of the table , too , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their soccer .
Aston Villa and Bournemouth have brutal schedules compared to Watford and West Ham , but an extra game to play could make the difference for Villa staying up .
We all agree , however , that scrappy Norwich is relegation bound .
Finally , we have a no-limit Rabbit Hole all about poker with special guest Maria Konnikova .
Maria is a New York Times bestselling author and contributor to The New Yorker with a doctorate in psychology .
She decided to learn how to play poker to better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lives , and she joined us to talk about why poker is a great vehicle to learn about probability , what it teaches us about decision making and the difference between playing at the Jersey Shore and Montecarlo .
Her new book on the subject , “ The Biggest Bluff : How I Learned to Pay Attention , Master Myself , and Win , ” is available June 23 .
What we ’ re looking at this week : • Michael Lee at The Athletic writes that Kyrie Irving is doing his job @ @ @ @ @ @ @ League teams have the toughest road ahead .
• And read an excerpt from Maria Konnikova ’ s upcoming book .

Hot Takedown talked last week about what the NBA’s restart would look like, but not all of its players seem ready to return. We discuss the concerns raised by Brooklyn Nets point guard Kyrie Irving after a call with 80 other players on the Orlando bubble system and whether playing games will distract from the important cultural conversations happening right now around racial justice and inequality. Irving, who is also a players association vice president, has a reputation in the NBA universe that may be affecting how people perceive his leadership on this issue, but he may also be using his voice to advocate for and shield less well-known players with similar, and very legitimate, concerns. We don’t necessarily think there’s a right answer to whether playing games and drawing attention on the court to vital issues like police brutality and racial justice is more powerful than not playing and making space for activists where sports otherwise would be. But since it seems like the NBA will restart regardless, we think it’s important to have these conversations that center the players’ concerns. It will strengthen their ability to make an impact on what the league does — and what the public sees.
Next, we talk soccer! Specifically the return of the English Premier League, where there is a lot to play for — just not the title. We discuss the race for spots in the Champions League, which may be even more open this year because Manchester City is, pending an appeal, barred from European football. As a sign of the times, Neil is just happy to have soccer to watch; Geoff is rooting for recently promoted newcomers Sheffield United, while all Sara wants is for Spurs to finish ahead of Tony Chow’s beloved Arsenal. But there’s a lot on the line financially for both Spurs and Arsenal as two of the traditionally bigger and more monied clubs. Making it into the Champions League or Europa League would boost the transfer market prospects of two clubs that will both need a fair bit of help rebuilding. There’s drama at the bottom of the table, too, for those who are looking for more schadenfreude in their soccer. Aston Villa and Bournemouth have brutal schedules compared to Watford and West Ham, but an extra game to play could make the difference for Villa staying up. We all agree, however, that scrappy Norwich is relegation bound.
Finally, we have a no-limit Rabbit Hole all about poker with special guest Maria Konnikova. Maria is a New York Times bestselling author and contributor to The New Yorker with a doctorate in psychology. She decided to learn how to play poker to better understand the role of luck in our lives, and she joined us to talk about why poker is a great vehicle to learn about probability, what it teaches us about decision making and the difference between playing at the Jersey Shore and Montecarlo. Her new book on the subject, “The Biggest Bluff: How I Learned to Pay Attention, Master Myself, and Win,” is available June 23.
What we’re looking at this week: