theintercept--2020-02-27--Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of “Light” Footprint

a dozen al-Shabab fighters infiltrated the perimeter of a military base in Manda Bay , Kenya .
One of them took aim with a rocket-propelled grenade , firing at a U.S. surveillance plane and touching off an hourslong firefight .
When it was all over , the two American pilots of that plane and a U.S. soldier were dead , two other U.S. military personnel were wounded , six surveillance aircraft and helicopters were destroyed , and parts of the airfield were in flames .
Where there are U.S. bases , there is the potential for such attacks , because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offensive military operations , but targets for them too .
Since 9/11 , the U.S. military has built a sprawling network of outposts in more than a dozen African countries .
The Intercept has obtained U.S. military documents and a set of accompanying maps that provide the locations of these African bases in 2019 , including the one at Manda Bay .
These formerly secret documents , created by the Pentagon ’ s Africa Command and obtained via the Freedom of Information Act , offer an exclusive window into the footprint of American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five U.S. outposts in Somalia rank second only to the six in Niger when it comes to America ’ s footprint on the continent , AFRICOM is actively seeking to expand its presence in the Horn of Africa .
“ Additional posture and/or capacity is required in East Africa to more efficiently employ limited aviation resources in support of U.S. activities in southern Somalia , ” according to the formerly secret files , which also mention the “ potential establishment of one or more [ contingency locations ] in Somalia to support Somali @ @ @ @ @ @ @ planning documents also state that five “ contingency locations ” were recommended to be upgraded to “ semi-permanent ” status : Baledogle , Kismayo , and Mogadishu in Somalia , and Arlit and Diffa in Niger .
What are the forces at these bases doing there ?
In Diffa , according to a recent inspector general ’ s report , a small unit of U.S. Special Forces has been providing advice and assistance to Niger ’ s 51st Special Intervention Battalion , which conducts operations in the Lake Chad region .
Another Special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , advise , and assist activities with a local counterterrorism force in Arlit , Niger .
The presence of U.S. commandos at Diffa and Arlit first came to widespread notice in the wake of the October 2017 ambush by Islamic State militants in Tongo Tongo , Niger , that killed four U.S. soldiers .
The U.S. base at Baledogle received attention last September when it was attacked by the Somali terrorist group , al-Shabab .
Manda Bay , Kenya , where al-Shabab killed the American soldier and U.S. pilots , is still another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s 2019 list .
In the wake of the attack last month , its defenses were also hardened and its troop strength markedly increased .
“ I think it ’ s self-obvious we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay as we needed to be , ” AFRICOM ’ s Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 30 .
“ Al-Shabab managed to penetrate onto that airfield .
A lot of people don ’ t know , but the base where our troops live is not where the airfield is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to that airfield , kill three Americans and destroy six aircraft there .
… There ’ s about 120 infantrymen there on the ground now who are securing that place , and they ’ ve been working hard since 6 January to put in the appropriate level of defenses .
So I am confident that by the time they are done , Manda Bay will be much more properly defended.
” The attack in Kenya came at a time when Defense Secretary Mark Esper was already considering proposals for a major drawdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the continent , in West Africa , including the possible abandonment of a recently built $ 110 million drone base in Agadez , Niger .
According to Manley , the Pentagon ’ s so-called Blank Slate Review process is still ongoing , and there has been no change to U.S. “ force posture ” in Africa as of yet .
“ I haven ’ t made any decisions yet on West Africa or East Africa , ” Esper said recently , while at the same time calling on European nations to “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scaling back U.S. posture and presence in Africa has prompted fierce pushback in Congress .
“ These personnel and installations are critical in combatting the ever-increasing number of violent extremist groups throughout the region that pose an immediate threat to our partners and allies , ” wrote U.S. Sens .
Lindsey Graham , R-S.C. , and Chris Coons , D-Del.
, in a January 15 letter to Esper .
The senators argued that “ any withdrawal or reduction would likely result in a surge in violent extremist attacks on the continent and beyond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of competitors like Russia and China.
” James Inhofe , chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee echoed these concerns .
“ Today , more than a dozen terrorist groups with ties to Al Qaida and ISIS are operating across Africa , ” he said late last month .
“ Many of these groups have ambition to attack Americans and our partners .
Without sustained pressure , the threat posed by these groups will.
” But in the face of deteriorating security and gloomy Pentagon assessments , some experts question this rationale .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fighting terrorism in Africa is not working , ” said William Hartung , the director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy , or CIP .
“ As the U.S. military footprint and military activities have increased , terrorist violence has grown and terrorist groups have proliferated.
” His colleague , Temi Ibirogba , a program and research associate with the Africa Program at CIP , noted that the rise of violent extremism in Africa in the face of persistent U.S. military engagement since 9/11 should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is better ” strategy .
“ The U.S. military should be considering alternative approaches like better coordination with African regional and continental organizations and encouraging African governments to consider negotiations in certain cases , ” she told The Intercept .
In recent years , the U.S. military has carried out no fewer than 36 named operations and activities in Africa , including at least eight “ 127-echo ” programs , which are named for the budgetary authority that allows U.S. Special Operations forces to use host-nation military units as proxies in missions aimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Run by Joint Special Operations Command , the secretive organization that controls the Navy ’ s SEAL Team 6 and the Army ’ s Delta Force , or by theater special operations forces , these 80- to 120-person units , operating with the assistance of U.S. commandos , are primarily engaged in counterterrorism operations , especially ones aimed at high-value targets .
The 2019 AFRICOM planning document notes that U.S. forces will “ continue to conduct counter-VEO-focused activities ” from 16 separate bases .
Even discounting the two counter-VEO bases in Libya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the map was created by AFRICOM , this leaves one each in Kenya , Mali , and Tunisia , as well as five in Somalia , four in Niger , and two in Cameroon at Garoua and Maroua .
The site in Garoua is a drone base that was profiled by The Intercept in 2016 .
In 2017 , the Intercept revealed that while the U.S. military fortified its base in Maroua , known as Camp Salak , the outpost also served as a scene of illegal imprisonment , torture , and even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces , AFRICOM has been making the case that its bases and the missions run from them are integral to U.S. interests .
“ Strategic access to Africa , its airspace , and its surrounding waters is vital to U.S. national security , ” Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee late last month .
He and others have argued for what they contend is AFRICOM ’ s supposed bang for the buck .
“ What U.S. Africa Command accomplishes with relatively few people and few dollars , on a continent three-and-a-half times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is a bargain for the American taxpayer , ” Manley told The Intercept .
But a recent inspector general ’ s report , examining U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa , raises serious questions about the utility of billions of tax dollars spent on U.S. bases , operations , and assistance to local partners .
Even after a decade-plus spent fighting militants in Somalia , “ the threat posed by al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia in East Africa remains ‘ high , ’ despite continued U.S. airstrikes and training of Somali security forces , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense Department ’ s Inspector General .
The DoDIG further noted that al-Shabab not only “ remains a potent threat ” due to its “ ability to conduct high-profile attacks , recruit fighters , and finance ongoing operations , ” but that the group “ appears to be a growing threat to U.S. personnel and interests in the region.
” The DoDIG ’ s assessment of West Africa was even more dire .
“ VEO violence in West Africa grew rapidly over the past 2 years ; in Burkina Faso , Mali , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by 250 percent since 2018 , ” according to the report .
AFRICOM told the DoDIG that security in West Africa continued to deteriorate during the final quarter of 2019 as terrorist groups “ launched a growing number of offensive attacks against military facilities and troops … often resulting in large numbers of casualties ” to U.S.-allied armed forces .
“ VEOs in West Africa are not degraded nor contained to the Sahel and Lake Chad region , ” the command admitted .
Given the current state of affairs , the Center for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States needs to reevaluate its approach .
“ It ’ s time for an honest reassessment of U.S. anti-terror strategy in Africa , including greater transparency about the size and scope of U.S. military operations there , ” he told The Intercept .
“ The underlying drivers of terrorism , including poverty , corruption , and repression , do not have military solutions .
”

Last month, about a dozen al-Shabab fighters infiltrated the perimeter of a military base in Manda Bay, Kenya. One of them took aim with a rocket-propelled grenade, firing at a U.S. surveillance plane and touching off an hourslong firefight. When it was all over, the two American pilots of that plane and a U.S. soldier were dead, two other U.S. military personnel were wounded, six surveillance aircraft and helicopters were destroyed, and parts of the airfield were in flames.
Where there are U.S. bases, there is the potential for such attacks, because bases are not just launching pads for offensive military operations, but targets for them too. Since 9/11, the U.S. military has built a sprawling network of outposts in more than a dozen African countries. The Intercept has obtained U.S. military documents and a set of accompanying maps that provide the locations of these African bases in 2019, including the one at Manda Bay. These formerly secret documents, created by the Pentagon’s Africa Command and obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, offer an exclusive window into the footprint of American military operations in Africa.
Maps of U.S. “Enduring” and “Non-Enduring” bases in Africa. The Pentagon defines “enduring” bases as providing “strategic access and use to support United States security interests for the foreseeable future.” “Non-Enduring” outposts — also known as “contingency locations” — are defined as supporting and sustaining “operations during contingencies or other operations.” Contingency locations can be categorized as initial, temporary, or semipermanent. Images: U.S. Africa Command
During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee late last month, Stephen Townsend, the commander of AFRICOM, echoed a line favored by his predecessors that AFRICOM maintains a “light and relatively low-cost footprint” on the continent. This “light” footprint consists of a constellation of more than two dozen outposts that stretch from one side of Africa to the other. The 2019 planning documents provide locations for 29 bases located in 15 different countries or territories, with the highest concentrations in the Sahelian states on the west side of the continent, as well as the Horn of Africa in the east. Since the plans were created, according to AFRICOM spokesperson John Manley, two bases have been shuttered, leaving the U.S. with an archipelago of 15 “enduring locations” and 12 less-permanent “contingency locations.” The documents note, however, that AFRICOM is actively seeking to enhance its presence and is primed for expansion in the future.
ENDURING FOOTPRINT 2019 NON-ENDURING FOOTPRINT 2019 Chebelley, Djibouti Bizerte, Tunisia Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti Arlit, Niger Entebbe, Uganda Dirkou, Niger Mombassa, Kenya Diffa, Niger Manda Bay, Kenya Ouallam, Niger Liberville, Gabon Bamako, Mali St. Helena, Ascension Island Garoua, Cameroon Accra, Ghana Maroua, Cameroon Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso Misrata, Libya Dakar, Senegal Tripoli, Libya Agadez, Niger Baledogle, Somalia Niamey, Niger Bosasso, Somalia N’Djamena, Chad Galcayo, Somalia Kismayo, Somalia Mogadishu, Somalia Wajir, Kenya
Violent extremism and insecurity on the continent has increased exponentially during the very years that the U.S. has been building up its network of bases, providing billions of dollars in security assistance to local partners, conducting persistent counterterrorism operations that include commando raids, combat by U.S. Special Operations forces in at least 13 African countries between 2013 and 2017, and a record number of U.S. airstrikes in Somalia (just over one attack per week in 2019). There are now roughly 25 active militant Islamist groups operating in Africa, up from just five in 2010 — a jump of 400 percent — according to the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Militant Islamist activity also hit record levels in 2019. There were 3,471 reported violent events linked to these groups last year, a 1,105 percent increase since 2009. Reported fatalities resulting from African militant Islamist group activity also increased by 7 percent over last year, to an estimated 10,460 deaths. The situation has become so grim that U.S. military aims in West Africa have recently been scaled back from a strategy of degrading the strength and reach of terror groups to nothing more than “containment.”
The current archipelago of U.S. outposts in Africa represents a decrease of seven sites from the 34 bases detailed in a set of briefing documents by AFRICOM science adviser Peter Teil that were published by The Intercept in 2018. The new 2019 AFRICOM planning documents provide information on five bases slated for closure, including a longtime “enduring” site in Gaborone, Botswana, and four contingency locations, or CLs, in Faya Largeau, Chad; Lakipia, Kenya; Benina, Libya; and Gao, Mali. Shuttering the CLs, according to the documents, is part of an effort to “seek efficiencies by consolidating … functions at a reduced number of posture locations,” while the removal of Gabrone was chalked up to “a lack of DoD [Department of Defense] property or routine DoD presence” and the fact that “Botswana does not acknowledge or desire any formal DoD access at the international airport.”
Manley refused to say which two additional bases were dropped from the 2019 list. “The fluctuation in the number is not related to Misrata and Tripoli,” he told The Intercept in response to a question about whether the Libyan outposts were the others closed. But it is worth noting that since the 2019 base posture document was produced, the U.S. pulled its forces out of the North African nation. “Due to increased unrest in Libya, a contingent of U.S. forces supporting U.S. Africa Command temporarily relocated from the country in response to security conditions on the ground,” AFRICOM announced last April as the Libyan civil war flared up. Those troops have never returned, according to Manley, and a recent inspector general’s report states that they won’t be redeployed until there is a ceasefire in Libya’s civil war.
It’s also worth noting the documents state that U.S. Army Africa uses space at “host nation facilities” in Theis, Senegal, and Singo, Uganda, even though the bases are not listed on AFRICOM’s maps. While these “cooperative training locations” are not officially considered outposts by the command, they raise the question of whether 29 bases is actually a more accurate count. Whatever the real number of bases, the recent alteration of AFRICOM’s footprint in 2019 appears to be a strategic consolidation as the command fortifies its presence in some of the continent’s hottest hotspots. Of the 6,000 or more U.S. personnel deployed in Africa, about 1,200, according to Manley, are in West Africa, with a significant percentage in Niger, which has become the key American hub on that side of the continent. Around 500 Special Operations forces are reportedly deployed on the other side of the continent in Somalia, the site of America’s most intense and longest-running undeclared war in Africa.
While the five U.S. outposts in Somalia rank second only to the six in Niger when it comes to America’s footprint on the continent, AFRICOM is actively seeking to expand its presence in the Horn of Africa. “Additional posture and/or capacity is required in East Africa to more efficiently employ limited aviation resources in support of U.S. activities in southern Somalia,” according to the formerly secret files, which also mention the “potential establishment of one or more [contingency locations] in Somalia to support Somali National Security Force development.” The 2019 planning documents also state that five “contingency locations” were recommended to be upgraded to “semi-permanent” status: Baledogle, Kismayo, and Mogadishu in Somalia, and Arlit and Diffa in Niger.
What are the forces at these bases doing there? In Diffa, according to a recent inspector general’s report, a small unit of U.S. Special Forces has been providing advice and assistance to Niger’s 51st Special Intervention Battalion, which conducts operations in the Lake Chad region. Another Special Forces detachment has been engaged in train, advise, and assist activities with a local counterterrorism force in Arlit, Niger.
The presence of U.S. commandos at Diffa and Arlit first came to widespread notice in the wake of the October 2017 ambush by Islamic State militants in Tongo Tongo, Niger, that killed four U.S. soldiers. The U.S. base at Baledogle received attention last September when it was attacked by the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabab. Manda Bay, Kenya, where al-Shabab killed the American soldier and U.S. pilots, is still another “enduring” location from AFRICOM’s 2019 list. In the wake of the attack last month, its defenses were also hardened and its troop strength markedly increased.
“I think it’s self-obvious we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay as we needed to be,” AFRICOM’s Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 30. “Al-Shabab managed to penetrate onto that airfield. A lot of people don’t know, but the base where our troops live is not where the airfield is. But they were able to get access to that airfield, kill three Americans and destroy six aircraft there. … There’s about 120 infantrymen there on the ground now who are securing that place, and they’ve been working hard since 6 January to put in the appropriate level of defenses. So I am confident that by the time they are done, Manda Bay will be much more properly defended.”
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper speaks during a news conference at the Pentagon in Washington on Jan. 27, 2020. The Army, for the first time, will send soldiers from one of its new training brigades to Africa to expand the use of the new specialized units as the Pentagon looks at possible troop cuts on the continent. Photo: Jose Luis Magana/AP
The attack in Kenya came at a time when Defense Secretary Mark Esper was already considering proposals for a major drawdown of U.S. forces on the other side of the continent, in West Africa, including the possible abandonment of a recently built $110 million drone base in Agadez, Niger. According to Manley, the Pentagon’s so-called Blank Slate Review process is still ongoing, and there has been no change to U.S. “force posture” in Africa as of yet. “I haven’t made any decisions yet on West Africa or East Africa,” Esper said recently, while at the same time calling on European nations to “step up in Africa.”
Talk of scaling back U.S. posture and presence in Africa has prompted fierce pushback in Congress. “These personnel and installations are critical in combatting the ever-increasing number of violent extremist groups throughout the region that pose an immediate threat to our partners and allies,” wrote U.S. Sens. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., and Chris Coons, D-Del., in a January 15 letter to Esper. The senators argued that “any withdrawal or reduction would likely result in a surge in violent extremist attacks on the continent and beyond as well as increase the geopolitical influence of competitors like Russia and China.” James Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee echoed these concerns. “Today, more than a dozen terrorist groups with ties to Al Qaida and ISIS are operating across Africa,” he said late last month. “Many of these groups have ambition to attack Americans and our partners. Without sustained pressure, the threat posed by these groups will.”
But in the face of deteriorating security and gloomy Pentagon assessments, some experts question this rationale. “The current, overly militarized approach to fighting terrorism in Africa is not working,” said William Hartung, the director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy, or CIP. “As the U.S. military footprint and military activities have increased, terrorist violence has grown and terrorist groups have proliferated.”
His colleague, Temi Ibirogba, a program and research associate with the Africa Program at CIP, noted that the rise of violent extremism in Africa in the face of persistent U.S. military engagement since 9/11 should be cause for skepticism of the “more is better” strategy. “The U.S. military should be considering alternative approaches like better coordination with African regional and continental organizations and encouraging African governments to consider negotiations in certain cases,” she told The Intercept.
In recent years, the U.S. military has carried out no fewer than 36 named operations and activities in Africa, including at least eight “127-echo” programs, which are named for the budgetary authority that allows U.S. Special Operations forces to use host-nation military units as proxies in missions aimed at violent extremist organizations, or VEOs. Run by Joint Special Operations Command, the secretive organization that controls the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 and the Army’s Delta Force, or by theater special operations forces, these 80- to 120-person units, operating with the assistance of U.S. commandos, are primarily engaged in counterterrorism operations, especially ones aimed at high-value targets.
The 2019 AFRICOM planning document notes that U.S. forces will “continue to conduct counter-VEO-focused activities” from 16 separate bases. Even discounting the two counter-VEO bases in Libya that appear to have been closed since the map was created by AFRICOM, this leaves one each in Kenya, Mali, and Tunisia, as well as five in Somalia, four in Niger, and two in Cameroon at Garoua and Maroua. The site in Garoua is a drone base that was profiled by The Intercept in 2016. In 2017, the Intercept revealed that while the U.S. military fortified its base in Maroua, known as Camp Salak, the outpost also served as a scene of illegal imprisonment, torture, and even killings.
Facing a potential drawdown of forces, AFRICOM has been making the case that its bases and the missions run from them are integral to U.S. interests. “Strategic access to Africa, its airspace, and its surrounding waters is vital to U.S. national security,” Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee late last month. He and others have argued for what they contend is AFRICOM’s supposed bang for the buck. “What U.S. Africa Command accomplishes with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent three-and-a-half times the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the American taxpayer,” Manley told The Intercept.
But a recent inspector general’s report, examining U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa, raises serious questions about the utility of billions of tax dollars spent on U.S. bases, operations, and assistance to local partners. Even after a decade-plus spent fighting militants in Somalia, “the threat posed by al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia in East Africa remains ‘high,’ despite continued U.S. airstrikes and training of Somali security forces,” the Defense Intelligence Agency told the Defense Department’s Inspector General. The DoDIG further noted that al-Shabab not only “remains a potent threat” due to its “ability to conduct high-profile attacks, recruit fighters, and finance ongoing operations,” but that the group “appears to be a growing threat to U.S. personnel and interests in the region.”
The DoDIG’s assessment of West Africa was even more dire. “VEO violence in West Africa grew rapidly over the past 2 years; in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Western Niger, VEO violence increased by 250 percent since 2018,” according to the report. AFRICOM told the DoDIG that security in West Africa continued to deteriorate during the final quarter of 2019 as terrorist groups “launched a growing number of offensive attacks against military facilities and troops … often resulting in large numbers of casualties” to U.S.-allied armed forces. “VEOs in West Africa are not degraded nor contained to the Sahel and Lake Chad region,” the command admitted.
Given the current state of affairs, the Center for International Policy’s Hartung believes that the United States needs to reevaluate its approach. “It’s time for an honest reassessment of U.S. anti-terror strategy in Africa, including greater transparency about the size and scope of U.S. military operations there,” he told The Intercept. “The underlying drivers of terrorism, including poverty, corruption, and repression, do not have military solutions.”


theintercept--2020-02-26--Emails Show Rep. Henry Cuellar Provided Extensive Favors to Border Security Lobbyists

a conservative Texas Democrat , has used his perch in Congress to push for funds for private prisons , drone surveillance , and increased border security enforcement .
The lawmaker has defended his record as part of his duty as a border lawmaker focused on national security , but emails show Cuellar acting at the behest of well-connected lobbyists for a government contractor .
Perceptics , a company that sells cameras that scan license plates , has frequently tapped Cuellar for favors since at least 2011 , including a push to edge out a competing vendor , using its team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor with his office .
The close relationship with the lawmaker was revealed through emails that were published online last summer after Perceptics was targeted by an anonymous hacker .
Colin Strother , a spokesperson for Cuellar , declined to discuss the emails and accused The Intercept of “ an agenda and a bias.
” Perceptics declined to comment .
The emails show the lawmaker ’ s name mentioned dozens of times as an ally Perceptics could use to sponsor legislation or write official letters on the company ’ s behalf .
Lobbyists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Perceptics ’ s “ friendly congressman ” and “ our Cuellar firepower.
” Cuellar ’ s close ties to business interests stand out , even among other conservative House Democrats .
Cuellar is the biggest Democratic recipient of campaign donations from the private prison industry , one of the only Democrats vote to delay regulations on payday lending , and has voted in support of the Trump administration ’ s agenda in Congress a record 75 percent of the time .
The lawmaker ’ s unusually conservative record has attracted a progressive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immigration attorney .
The Texas primary is on Super Tuesday , March 3 .
The primary has attracted heavy levels of spending from progressive and business interests , with a political action committee associated with border security lobbyists raising thousands in support of Cuellar .
began in earnest in early 2011 after Cuellar , who has been in office since 2005 , was appointed to the House Homeland Security Committee ’ s panel overseeing border security .
“ And here are the D ’ s….note Cuellar !
” wrote Cristina Antelo , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ release announcing the lawmaker ’ s new committee assignments .
John Dalton , the chief executive of the company , was reminded in a follow-up email from Antelo that she had introduced him to Cuellar “ at least twice , once at a fundraiser I hosted for the CHC BOLD PAC , ” a reference to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus ’ s PAC .
Antelo , notably , serves on the board of CHC ’ s foundation and has routinely hosted CHC BOLD PAC fundraisers over the last decade .
In 2011 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation against Axiompass , a competing firm that had been awarded a contract by the State Department to install vehicle identification technology along the U.S.-Mexico border .
Executives at Perceptics believed that they had been unfairly passed over for the lucrative deal .
Cuellar stepped up to the task .
The Texas lawmaker contacted State Department Inspector General Steve Linick on March 22 , 2012 , requesting an investigation over the agency ’ s procurement process .
One year later , Patricia Inglima , an aide to Cuellar , passed along a letter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s team , confirming that her office had successfully encouraged the agency to open an inquiry .
“ I have just confirmed with OIG that the letter is in reference to the license plate reader technology bid and that the investigation is continuing , ” Inglima wrote .
In 2014 , the Podesta Group , a now-shuttered lobbying firm that once managed Perceptics ’ s lobbying efforts , boasted in a client report about overseeing a sophisticated effort to undermine the Axiompass contract .
“ Together , we successfully recruited allies in Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an investigation , ” the report noted , offering further plans for tying funding for the contract to the results of the investigation .
During the following sessions of Congress , Perceptics lobbyists assisted Cuellar in privately urging then-Rep. Kay Granger , R-Texas , a senior lawmaker on the Appropriations Committee , to increase spending on U.S.-Mexico foreign aid designed to boost border vehicle tracking technology .
The plan was detailed in a document summarizing a call with Perceptics ’ s lobbying team .
“ Cristina sent the latest draft of our proposal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a contact on Rep. Cuellar ’ s staff , ” the document noted .
The team also discussed a meeting between Mexico ’ s ambassador to the U.S. and Cuellar , to which “ Perceptics would be invited.
” After a series of meetings between Perceptics and the lawmaker , Cuellar wrote a letter to Granger urging her to adopt $ 135 million in foreign aid into the following budget for the construction of specialized cargo traffic lanes enhanced with nonintrusive automated vehicle identification technology , a system Perceptics sold to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manager at Perceptics , emailed his team to note that “ Cuellar personally and Cuellar ’ s staff have said that in conversations with Chair Granger and her office , LPRs were discussed specifically under the category of non-intrusive inspection technologies.
” In 2017 , Perceptics lobbyists drafted a letter to be sent under Cuellar ’ s name to Customs and Border Protection , requesting that officials continue and expand a pilot program at the Laredo Juarez-Lincoln Port of Entry to use state-of-the-art license plate-reading technology .
It is unclear if this draft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ request sent to the CBP has not yet been formally answered .
The following year , Perceptics lobbyists orchestrated an effort to push the Trump administration to incorporate an upgrade to license plate-reading technology into its border security plan .
As The Intercept previously reported , Rep. Chuck Fleischmann , R-Tenn. , read talking points provided to him by Perceptics lobbyists as he questioned then-Customs and Border Protection chief Kevin McAleenan .
After Fleischmann spoke , Cuellar , who serves on the same border security committee , also brought up similar issues during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lobbyist to Perceptics , forwarded the hearing video to Dalton , Perceptics ’ CEO , to tout the firm ’ s success on Capitol Hill .
“ Most relevant to us , Congressman Fleischmann asked about CBP ’ s plan to modernize its LPRs as we asked his office to do , ” wrote Alonzo .
“ Later on , ” Alonzo added , “ Congressman Henry Cuellar asked about pilots going on at Laredo that sound a lot like Perceptics ’ .
” Throughout the interactions with Cuellar over the years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Cuellar and sponsor fundraising events for him .
The relationship goes back to at least 2009 , when Antelo sponsored a breakfast fundraiser for Cuellar with Perceptics executives .
The Podesta Group , in regular updates to its client , reminded Perceptics to give to lawmakers with key oversight roles over immigration and homeland security , including Cuellar .
Federal Election Commission disclosures show multiple donations to Cuellar over the years .
a group founded and funded by billionaire Charles Koch , has poured cash into the race to boost Cuellar , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PAC has interjected itself into a race to defend a Democrat .
Corporate trade associations funded with undisclosed business money , including the American Bankers Association , the National Association of Realtors , and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce , which alone has devoted $ 200,000 to defending Cuellar , are all flooding the district with money to defeat Cisneros .
Gilberto Ocañas , a lobbyist with the international law firm Dentons , also launched a new dark-money group , called American Workers for Progress , that has spent at least $ 720,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out-raised Cuellar in direct donations , in part through national enthusiasm and endorsements from Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez , D-N.Y. , and Sen. Bernie Sanders , I-Vt .
But Cuellar has built a deep campaign reserve , in part from his prodigious fundraising from corporate PACs .
Cash from the border defense industry could play a pivotal role .
Earlier this month , CHC BOLD PAC , the Congressional Hispanic Caucus group affiliated with Perceptics lobbyists and other corporate lobbyists , transferred $ 250,000 to a Super PAC supporting Cuellar .
On Thursday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fundraiser in Washington , D.C. , in support of Cuellar and asking attendees for as much as $ 20,000 each to host the event .

Rep. Henry Cuellar, a conservative Texas Democrat, has used his perch in Congress to push for funds for private prisons, drone surveillance, and increased border security enforcement.
The lawmaker has defended his record as part of his duty as a border lawmaker focused on national security, but emails show Cuellar acting at the behest of well-connected lobbyists for a government contractor.
Perceptics, a company that sells cameras that scan license plates, has frequently tapped Cuellar for favors since at least 2011, including a push to edge out a competing vendor, using its team of lobbyists and campaign contributions to curry favor with his office.
The close relationship with the lawmaker was revealed through emails that were published online last summer after Perceptics was targeted by an anonymous hacker. Colin Strother, a spokesperson for Cuellar, declined to discuss the emails and accused The Intercept of “an agenda and a bias.” Perceptics declined to comment.
The emails show the lawmaker’s name mentioned dozens of times as an ally Perceptics could use to sponsor legislation or write official letters on the company’s behalf. Lobbyists and executives at the firm referenced him as Perceptics’s “friendly congressman” and “our Cuellar firepower.”
Cuellar’s close ties to business interests stand out, even among other conservative House Democrats. Cuellar is the biggest Democratic recipient of campaign donations from the private prison industry, one of the only Democrats vote to delay regulations on payday lending, and has voted in support of the Trump administration’s agenda in Congress a record 75 percent of the time.
The lawmaker’s unusually conservative record has attracted a progressive primary opposition from Jessica Cisneros, an immigration attorney. The Texas primary is on Super Tuesday, March 3. The primary has attracted heavy levels of spending from progressive and business interests, with a political action committee associated with border security lobbyists raising thousands in support of Cuellar.
The relationship began in earnest in early 2011 after Cuellar, who has been in office since 2005, was appointed to the House Homeland Security Committee’s panel overseeing border security. “And here are the D’s….note Cuellar!” wrote Cristina Antelo, a contract lobbyist, passing along a press release announcing the lawmaker’s new committee assignments.
John Dalton, the chief executive of the company, was reminded in a follow-up email from Antelo that she had introduced him to Cuellar “at least twice, once at a fundraiser I hosted for the CHC BOLD PAC,” a reference to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s PAC. Antelo, notably, serves on the board of CHC’s foundation and has routinely hosted CHC BOLD PAC fundraisers over the last decade.
In 2011, Perceptics pushed to initiate an inspector general investigation against Axiompass, a competing firm that had been awarded a contract by the State Department to install vehicle identification technology along the U.S.-Mexico border. Executives at Perceptics believed that they had been unfairly passed over for the lucrative deal.
Cuellar stepped up to the task. The Texas lawmaker contacted State Department Inspector General Steve Linick on March 22, 2012, requesting an investigation over the agency’s procurement process.
One year later, Patricia Inglima, an aide to Cuellar, passed along a letter from the State Department to Perceptics’s team, confirming that her office had successfully encouraged the agency to open an inquiry. “I have just confirmed with OIG that the letter is in reference to the license plate reader technology bid and that the investigation is continuing,” Inglima wrote.
In 2014, the Podesta Group, a now-shuttered lobbying firm that once managed Perceptics’s lobbying efforts, boasted in a client report about overseeing a sophisticated effort to undermine the Axiompass contract. “Together, we successfully recruited allies in Congress who demanded that the State Department launch an investigation,” the report noted, offering further plans for tying funding for the contract to the results of the investigation.
During the following sessions of Congress, Perceptics lobbyists assisted Cuellar in privately urging then-Rep. Kay Granger, R-Texas, a senior lawmaker on the Appropriations Committee, to increase spending on U.S.-Mexico foreign aid designed to boost border vehicle tracking technology.
The plan was detailed in a document summarizing a call with Perceptics’s lobbying team. “Cristina sent the latest draft of our proposal for the Economic Support Fund for Mexico to a contact on Rep. Cuellar’s staff,” the document noted. The team also discussed a meeting between Mexico’s ambassador to the U.S. and Cuellar, to which “Perceptics would be invited.”
After a series of meetings between Perceptics and the lawmaker, Cuellar wrote a letter to Granger urging her to adopt $135 million in foreign aid into the following budget for the construction of specialized cargo traffic lanes enhanced with nonintrusive automated vehicle identification technology, a system Perceptics sold to the government.
Dennis Thompson, a program manager at Perceptics, emailed his team to note that “Cuellar personally and Cuellar’s staff have said that in conversations with Chair Granger and her office, LPRs were discussed specifically under the category of non-intrusive inspection technologies.”
In 2017, Perceptics lobbyists drafted a letter to be sent under Cuellar’s name to Customs and Border Protection, requesting that officials continue and expand a pilot program at the Laredo Juarez-Lincoln Port of Entry to use state-of-the-art license plate-reading technology. It is unclear if this draft letter was ever sent. A records request sent to the CBP has not yet been formally answered.
The following year, Perceptics lobbyists orchestrated an effort to push the Trump administration to incorporate an upgrade to license plate-reading technology into its border security plan. As The Intercept previously reported, Rep. Chuck Fleischmann, R-Tenn., read talking points provided to him by Perceptics lobbyists as he questioned then-Customs and Border Protection chief Kevin McAleenan.
After Fleischmann spoke, Cuellar, who serves on the same border security committee, also brought up similar issues during the hearing. Lucio Alonzo, a lobbyist to Perceptics, forwarded the hearing video to Dalton, Perceptics’ CEO, to tout the firm’s success on Capitol Hill.
“Most relevant to us, Congressman Fleischmann asked about CBP’s plan to modernize its LPRs as we asked his office to do,” wrote Alonzo. “Later on,” Alonzo added, “Congressman Henry Cuellar asked about pilots going on at Laredo that sound a lot like Perceptics’.”
Throughout the interactions with Cuellar over the years, Perceptics executives and lobbyists continued to donate to Cuellar and sponsor fundraising events for him. The relationship goes back to at least 2009, when Antelo sponsored a breakfast fundraiser for Cuellar with Perceptics executives.
The Podesta Group, in regular updates to its client, reminded Perceptics to give to lawmakers with key oversight roles over immigration and homeland security, including Cuellar. Federal Election Commission disclosures show multiple donations to Cuellar over the years.
Americans for Prosperity Action, a group founded and funded by billionaire Charles Koch, has poured cash into the race to boost Cuellar, the very first time the Koch-backed Super PAC has interjected itself into a race to defend a Democrat.
Corporate trade associations funded with undisclosed business money, including the American Bankers Association, the National Association of Realtors, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which alone has devoted $200,000 to defending Cuellar, are all flooding the district with money to defeat Cisneros. Gilberto Ocañas, a lobbyist with the international law firm Dentons, also launched a new dark-money group, called American Workers for Progress, that has spent at least $720,000 on ads backing Cuellar.
Cisneros has out-raised Cuellar in direct donations, in part through national enthusiasm and endorsements from Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., and Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt. But Cuellar has built a deep campaign reserve, in part from his prodigious fundraising from corporate PACs. Cash from the border defense industry could play a pivotal role.
Earlier this month, CHC BOLD PAC, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus group affiliated with Perceptics lobbyists and other corporate lobbyists, transferred $250,000 to a Super PAC supporting Cuellar. On Thursday, CHC BOLD PAC is hosting a last-minute fundraiser in Washington, D.C., in support of Cuellar and asking attendees for as much as $20,000 each to host the event.


theintercept--2020-02-26--Our Revolution, Accused of Dark-Money Spending for Sanders, Took Only Six Donations Over $5,000 in 2

Our Revolution, Accused of Dark-Money Spending for Sanders, Took Only Six Donations Over $5,000 in 2019, None Larger than $25,000

The issue arose most recently during the Nevada debate , when Sen. Elizabeth Warren said that everyone onstage besides her and Sen. Amy Klobuchar had taken money from super PACs , which can take in and spend money for candidates with fewer restrictions than a campaign .
Her statement cast shade on Sanders , and seemed to raise questions whether the political spending is at odds with the Vermont senator ’ s rejection of money in politics .
Warren didn ’ t mention names , but Pete Buttigieg tweeted about the “ nine dark money groups ” that make up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and include Our Revolution , the youth-led climate group Sunrise Movement , and a super PAC affiliated with the National Nurses union .
Our Revolution in particular has received scrutiny because it is a 501 ( c ) ( 4 ) , which allows it to accept large donations without disclosing its donors , unlike super PACs .
Rival presidential candidates have been attacking Sen. Bernie Sanders over the advocacy groups boosting his campaign , accusing the Democratic frontrunner of taking untraceable dark money and contributions from super PACs and from the nonprofit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In response to an Intercept inquiry , Our Revolution provided information on its donors , which is not yet public , saying that in 2019 , it only received a total of six donations over $ 5,000 .
Last year , the average individual contribution to Our Revolution was $ 17.73 , with 99.99 percent of its donations coming in under $ 5,000 , according to the group .
The six big contributions totaled $ 78,289.53 last year , or roughly 4 percent of its revenue .
The biggest contribution was around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all sources , took in $ 1.87 million in 2019 , and the bulk of that was spent on state and local races or other organizing campaigns separate from the Sanders presidential run .
For comparison , VoteVets alone , a super PAC that supports liberal veterans for public office and is backing Buttigieg , has spent $ 2.1 million airing ads for the former mayor so far .
Our Revolution ’ s board has to approve any donation over $ 5,000 .
Our Revolution posts the names of all donors who give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amount is not tied to an identity , meaning it ’ s impossible to know which on the list are the six who gave more than $ 5,000 .
It ’ s a case of too much transparency , without the necessary detail , leading to opacity .
When asked to identify the six donors , Paco Fabian , a spokesperson for Our Revolution , told The Intercept that a few donors , not wanting to be solicited by other groups , didn ’ t want the size of their contributions to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billionaires or associated with large corporations .
On January 22 , the watchdog group Common Cause filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission alleging that Our Revolution broke campaign finance laws by soliciting donations “ explicitly to elect Sanders president.
” Fabian said the contention that the group is outside of FEC rules is simply false .
Sanders has since distanced himself from the group , and supporters note that Our Revolution ’ s efforts in the Democratic primary are miniscule compared to the millions of dollars outside groups , bankrolled by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Nina Turner , former Ohio state senator and Sanders campaign co-chair , left her position as president of Our Revolution to serve as a national surrogate for Sanders in 2020 .
“ I would think that we should end super PACs right now .
So I would tell my opponents who have a super PAC , why don ’ t you end it ?
And certainly that ’ s applicable to the groups that are supporting me , ” Sanders said at a New Hampshire forum in January .
Only some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s presidential bid , a spokesperson told The Intercept , as most of the nonprofit ’ s work is dedicated to helping elect progressives running for local , state , and federal office — from city council and county commissioner to congressional seats .
“ Bernie and beyond , ” as Fabian described their efforts up-and-down the ballot .
“ Pretending that a grassroots group with a diverse , working-class membership is in any way the same thing as a SuperPAC spending millions of dollars on ads is frankly dangerous , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be concerned .
People coming together , pooling their resources and organizing to improve their communities are a threat to their political power.
” The details provided by Our Revolution set it apart from the super PACs blanketing the airwaves for contenders like former Vice President Joe Biden and Buttigieg .
Buttigieg , who has more billionaire donors to his presidential campaign than any other Democrat , in particular has been hitting Sanders on this , claiming he ’ s backed by several dark-money groups , and even comparing the Vermont senator @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a longtime critic of super PACs , recently reversed her position on the issue , saying the fact that only the “ two women ” in the race didn ’ t have super PAC support was “ just not right.
” A super PAC backing Warren , called Persist PAC , filed with the FEC last week .
Kitchen Table Conversations , a super PAC supporting Klobuchar , also filed its paperwork last Friday .

Rival presidential candidates have been attacking Sen. Bernie Sanders over the advocacy groups boosting his campaign, accusing the Democratic frontrunner of taking untraceable dark money and contributions from super PACs and from the nonprofit he founded in 2016, Our Revolution.
The problem with the charge: It’s not dark money, and it’s not big, either.
The issue arose most recently during the Nevada debate, when Sen. Elizabeth Warren said that everyone onstage besides her and Sen. Amy Klobuchar had taken money from super PACs, which can take in and spend money for candidates with fewer restrictions than a campaign. Her statement cast shade on Sanders, and seemed to raise questions whether the political spending is at odds with the Vermont senator’s rejection of money in politics. Warren didn’t mention names, but Pete Buttigieg tweeted about the “nine dark money groups” that make up a coalition called People Power for Bernie and include Our Revolution, the youth-led climate group Sunrise Movement, and a super PAC affiliated with the National Nurses union. Our Revolution in particular has received scrutiny because it is a 501(c)(4), which allows it to accept large donations without disclosing its donors, unlike super PACs.
In response to an Intercept inquiry, Our Revolution provided information on its donors, which is not yet public, saying that in 2019, it only received a total of six donations over $5,000. Last year, the average individual contribution to Our Revolution was $17.73, with 99.99 percent of its donations coming in under $5,000, according to the group.
The six big contributions totaled $78,289.53 last year, or roughly 4 percent of its revenue. The biggest contribution was around $25,000. Our Revolution, from all sources, took in $1.87 million in 2019, and the bulk of that was spent on state and local races or other organizing campaigns separate from the Sanders presidential run.
For comparison, VoteVets alone, a super PAC that supports liberal veterans for public office and is backing Buttigieg, has spent $2.1 million airing ads for the former mayor so far. Our Revolution’s board has to approve any donation over $5,000.
Our Revolution posts the names of all donors who give more than $250, though the amount is not tied to an identity, meaning it’s impossible to know which on the list are the six who gave more than $5,000. It’s a case of too much transparency, without the necessary detail, leading to opacity. When asked to identify the six donors, Paco Fabian, a spokesperson for Our Revolution, told The Intercept that a few donors, not wanting to be solicited by other groups, didn’t want the size of their contributions to be listed. He added that none are billionaires or associated with large corporations.
On January 22, the watchdog group Common Cause filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission alleging that Our Revolution broke campaign finance laws by soliciting donations “explicitly to elect Sanders president.” Fabian said the contention that the group is outside of FEC rules is simply false. Sanders has since distanced himself from the group, and supporters note that Our Revolution’s efforts in the Democratic primary are miniscule compared to the millions of dollars outside groups, bankrolled by wealthy donors, pump into the race. Nina Turner, former Ohio state senator and Sanders campaign co-chair, left her position as president of Our Revolution to serve as a national surrogate for Sanders in 2020.
“I would think that we should end super PACs right now. So I would tell my opponents who have a super PAC, why don’t you end it? And certainly that’s applicable to the groups that are supporting me,” Sanders said at a New Hampshire forum in January.
Only some of the group’s activities benefit Sanders’s presidential bid, a spokesperson told The Intercept, as most of the nonprofit’s work is dedicated to helping elect progressives running for local, state, and federal office — from city council and county commissioner to congressional seats. “Bernie and beyond,” as Fabian described their efforts up-and-down the ballot.
“Pretending that a grassroots group with a diverse, working-class membership is in any way the same thing as a SuperPAC spending millions of dollars on ads is frankly dangerous,” Fabian said. “But our adversaries should be concerned. People coming together, pooling their resources and organizing to improve their communities are a threat to their political power.”
The details provided by Our Revolution set it apart from the super PACs blanketing the airwaves for contenders like former Vice President Joe Biden and Buttigieg. Buttigieg, who has more billionaire donors to his presidential campaign than any other Democrat, in particular has been hitting Sanders on this, claiming he’s backed by several dark-money groups, and even comparing the Vermont senator to oligarch Mike Bloomberg.
Warren, a longtime critic of super PACs, recently reversed her position on the issue, saying the fact that only the “two women” in the race didn’t have super PAC support was “just not right.” A super PAC backing Warren, called Persist PAC, filed with the FEC last week. Kitchen Table Conversations, a super PAC supporting Klobuchar, also filed its paperwork last Friday.