theintercept--2020-01-29--Trump Is Growing Concerned About Bernie Sanders, While His Advisers Think the Vermont Senator Will B

Trump Is Growing Concerned About Bernie Sanders, While His Advisers Think the Vermont Senator Will Be Easy to Beat

, Donald Trump ’ s reelection campaign sent an email to millions of subscribers that came with a dire warning in the subject line : “ Socialist Invasion : Bernie Sanders and AOC Barnstorm Iowa.
” The note began : “ Forget Joe Rogan .
An endorsement from AOC is actually problematic.
” The rest of the email was an unremarkable recitation of the horrors of a Sanders-led socialist regime in America , but it underscored Trump ’ s shifting electoral concerns as Sanders surges in the final week before the first caucus in Iowa .
Trump , according to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his reelection worries from his longtime focus on former Vice President Joe Biden to the new twin threat of Sanders and former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg , who is running for the nomination but has committed to spend at least $ 1 billion of his fortune to defeat Trump , no matter who is nominated .
Trump ’ s interest in Bloomberg and his money is described by his advisers as “ an obsession , ” but he has also long been concerned that the populism embraced by Sanders , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play out in unpredictable ways in a general election .
Last week , the New York Times reported that some of Trump ’ s advisers believe that Sanders is a beatable general election candidate and have worked to elevate him , a report that former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg ’ s campaign seized on to argue that Sanders is a risky nominee .
But the same article suggested that Trump himself disagrees and has been working to undermine Sanders with his public comments .
“ The president , his advisers say , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ target for months , and he believes he is actually hurting Mr. Sanders .
Mr. Trump ’ s advisers do not necessarily share that view , ” the Times reported .
The divergent views among Trump and his aides lead to an amusing strategic synchronicity : Trump believes that he is hurting Sanders by attacking him , while the president ’ s advisers believe that he is helping Sanders with those same attacks — and so Trump attacking Sanders serves the interests ( as they understand them ) of both Trump and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prognostications can be correct , Trump ’ s private fears , as ever , have emerged publicly as well , according to an analysis of Trump ’ s public comments on the race going back to early 2019 .
Trump has tweeted more times about Sanders in just the first few weeks of this year than he has since last summer , while he has tweeted slightly less about Biden , even as the former vice president has been central to Trump ’ s narrative around impeachment .
In stump speeches made in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ name — or , as Trump refers to him , “ Crazy Bernie ” — eight times as often as Biden .
This marks a drastic change from last fall when Biden was a frequent Trump target at campaign rallies , while Sanders was barely mentioned .
As Warren rose in the late summer and early fall , Trump ’ s mentions of her climbed as well , then declined as her own polling did in late October and November .
Buttigieg merited a handful of Trump mentions in December , as he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back quickly .
Head-to-head polling over the past year has generally shown Biden to have the widest lead over Trump , followed closely by Sanders ( who has a 3-point edge over Trump in the Real Clear Politics average ) .
Warren and Buttigieg generally fall third and fourth against Trump .
A New York Times analysis that found Warren faring poorly against Trump in key rustbelt states was deadly to her campaign in the fall .
When Bloomberg is considered in the comparison , he tends to poll ahead of Trump , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ roughly equal to Sanders .
The reference in Trump ’ s campaign email to Rogan — “ Forget Joe Rogan ” — came with no explanation or background , reflecting the campaign ’ s awareness of the controversial podcast host ’ s reach in popular culture .
( Last week , Rogan , one of the most popular media figures in the country , said he would probably vote for Sanders .
The Sanders campaign shared a video with his comments on Twitter , a move that was wildly controversial among some segments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with elevating a figure they slammed as transphobic , sexist , and racist . )
Trump has long been nervous about Sanders , as he explained in a private conversation with Lev Parnas , a central character in the impeachment saga , and others in 2018 , audio of which has been leaked .
“ I think Bernie as vice president would have been tougher , ” Trump said , referring to Hillary Clinton ’ s 2016 selection of Sen. Tim Kaine to be her running mate .
“ He was the only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pick.
” “ You know , I got 20 percent of [ the ] Bernie vote , people don ’ t realize that , because of trade , because he ’ s a big trade guy .
He basically says we ’ re getting screwed on trade , and he ’ s right .
I ’ m worse than he is , but we can do something about it .
I don ’ t know if he could have , ” he said , presumably meaning that he is worse for free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ But had she picked Bernie Sanders , it would have been tougher , ” Trump continued .
“ Now , then you say — people say no , it would have been easier because then her sort of establishment , normal Democrats would have come to me , so she may have lost a lot of votes too.
” Trump , at the April 2018 dinner , added , correctly , that he thought Sanders would run in 2020 , even as people at the table disagreed .
“ I think he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of television .
Usually when they do a lot of television , that means they ’ re running.
” After Sanders announced his candidacy last February , Trump similarly said during an Oval Office press briefing that Sanders ’ s position on trade was comparable to his .
“ Oh , Bernie Sanders is running .
Yeah , that ’ s right .
Personally , I think he missed his time .
But I like Bernie because he is one person that , you know , on trade , he sort of would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being very tough on trade .
He was tough on trade .
The problem is he doesn ’ t know what to do about it .
We ’ re doing something very spectacular on trade.
” Trump , if he wants to get serious about Sanders , may need to come up with a more effective nickname for the unorthodox independent senator from Vermont .
“ Crazy Bernie , ” like Trump ’ s “ Crazy Nancy ” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi , is the name Trump resorts to for political rivals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ handle .

On Sunday morning , Donald Trump’s reelection campaign sent an email to millions of subscribers that came with a dire warning in the subject line: “Socialist Invasion: Bernie Sanders and AOC Barnstorm Iowa.”
The note began: “Forget Joe Rogan. An endorsement from AOC is actually problematic.”
The rest of the email was an unremarkable recitation of the horrors of a Sanders-led socialist regime in America, but it underscored Trump’s shifting electoral concerns as Sanders surges in the final week before the first caucus in Iowa.
Trump, according to operatives in his circle, has expanded his reelection worries from his longtime focus on former Vice President Joe Biden to the new twin threat of Sanders and former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg, who is running for the nomination but has committed to spend at least $1 billion of his fortune to defeat Trump, no matter who is nominated. Trump’s interest in Bloomberg and his money is described by his advisers as “an obsession,” but he has also long been concerned that the populism embraced by Sanders, as well as Sen. Elizabeth Warren, would play out in unpredictable ways in a general election.
Last week, the New York Times reported that some of Trump’s advisers believe that Sanders is a beatable general election candidate and have worked to elevate him, a report that former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg’s campaign seized on to argue that Sanders is a risky nominee. But the same article suggested that Trump himself disagrees and has been working to undermine Sanders with his public comments. “The president, his advisers say, has been in need of a clear target for months, and he believes he is actually hurting Mr. Sanders. Mr. Trump’s advisers do not necessarily share that view,” the Times reported. The divergent views among Trump and his aides lead to an amusing strategic synchronicity: Trump believes that he is hurting Sanders by attacking him, while the president’s advisers believe that he is helping Sanders with those same attacks — and so Trump attacking Sanders serves the interests (as they understand them) of both Trump and his advisers.
In stump speeches made in January, Trump mentioned Sanders’s name — or, as Trump refers to him, “Crazy Bernie” — eight times as often as Biden.
While only one of those prognostications can be correct, Trump’s private fears, as ever, have emerged publicly as well, according to an analysis of Trump’s public comments on the race going back to early 2019. Trump has tweeted more times about Sanders in just the first few weeks of this year than he has since last summer, while he has tweeted slightly less about Biden, even as the former vice president has been central to Trump’s narrative around impeachment. In stump speeches made in January, Trump mentioned Sanders’s name — or, as Trump refers to him, “Crazy Bernie” — eight times as often as Biden. This marks a drastic change from last fall when Biden was a frequent Trump target at campaign rallies, while Sanders was barely mentioned.
Graphic: Soohee Cho/The Intercept
As Warren rose in the late summer and early fall, Trump’s mentions of her climbed as well, then declined as her own polling did in late October and November. Buttigieg merited a handful of Trump mentions in December, as he climbed in the polls, but fell back quickly.
Head-to-head polling over the past year has generally shown Biden to have the widest lead over Trump, followed closely by Sanders (who has a 3-point edge over Trump in the Real Clear Politics average). Warren and Buttigieg generally fall third and fourth against Trump. A New York Times analysis that found Warren faring poorly against Trump in key rustbelt states was deadly to her campaign in the fall. When Bloomberg is considered in the comparison, he tends to poll ahead of Trump, but not as well as Biden and roughly equal to Sanders.
The reference in Trump’s campaign email to Rogan — “Forget Joe Rogan” — came with no explanation or background, reflecting the campaign’s awareness of the controversial podcast host’s reach in popular culture. (Last week, Rogan, one of the most popular media figures in the country, said he would probably vote for Sanders. The Sanders campaign shared a video with his comments on Twitter, a move that was wildly controversial among some segments of the left, who charged Sanders with elevating a figure they slammed as transphobic, sexist, and racist.)
Trump has long been nervous about Sanders, as he explained in a private conversation with Lev Parnas, a central character in the impeachment saga, and others in 2018, audio of which has been leaked.
“I think Bernie as vice president would have been tougher,” Trump said, referring to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 selection of Sen. Tim Kaine to be her running mate. “He was the only one I didn’t want her to pick.”
“You know, I got 20 percent of [the] Bernie vote, people don’t realize that, because of trade, because he’s a big trade guy. He basically says we’re getting screwed on trade, and he’s right. I’m worse than he is, but we can do something about it. I don’t know if he could have,” he said, presumably meaning that he is worse for free trade supporters than Sanders would be. “But had she picked Bernie Sanders, it would have been tougher,” Trump continued. “Now, then you say — people say no, it would have been easier because then her sort of establishment, normal Democrats would have come to me, so she may have lost a lot of votes too.”
Trump, at the April 2018 dinner, added, correctly, that he thought Sanders would run in 2020, even as people at the table disagreed. “I think he might, because he does a lot of television. Usually when they do a lot of television, that means they’re running.”
After Sanders announced his candidacy last February, Trump similarly said during an Oval Office press briefing that Sanders’s position on trade was comparable to his. “Oh, Bernie Sanders is running. Yeah, that’s right. Personally, I think he missed his time. But I like Bernie because he is one person that, you know, on trade, he sort of would agree on trade. I’m being very tough on trade. He was tough on trade. The problem is he doesn’t know what to do about it. We’re doing something very spectacular on trade.”
Trump, if he wants to get serious about Sanders, may need to come up with a more effective nickname for the unorthodox independent senator from Vermont. “Crazy Bernie,” like Trump’s “Crazy Nancy” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, is the name Trump resorts to for political rivals he doesn’t know how to handle.


theintercept--2020-01-29--During Impeachment Trial, GOP Senators Schedule Blitz of High-Dollar Fundraisers

has transformed into a courtroom for the impeachment trial of President Donald Trump .
Legislative hearings are postponed .
Judicial nominations have been canceled until further notice .
But the impeachment trial hasn ’ t stopped the daily grind of Senate fundraising .
GOP lawmakers have scheduled near daily events for lobbyist fundraisers throughout this week of impeachment proceedings .
The week began with a dinner fundraiser for Sen. Todd Young , R-Ind.
, and Sen. John Thune , R-S.D.
, scheduled on Monday evening .
And on Tuesday morning , Sen. Bill Cassidy , R-La.
, was scheduled for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tax Partners , a lobby firm that represents firms including Apple , Citigroup , and Uber .
On Tuesday evening , Sen. Dan Sullivan , R-Alaska , was scheduled to host a dinner fundraiser , with a request for hosts of the event to provide $ 1,000 each .
Senate Leader Mitch McConnell , R-Ky. , planned to start the day on Wednesday with a breakfast fundraiser .
The invite for the event , sent to supporters on Friday , requests that political action committees provide $ 5,000 to host .
And on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breakfast fundraiser with Sen. Mike Braun , R-Ind .
Later that day , the National Republican Senatorial Committee will host McConnell and 11 other GOP senators for a large fundraiser benefiting the party ’ s 2020 election effort .
Several senators canceled fundraising plans last week as the trial got under way .
Last week , however , GOP officials sent out an updated fundraising schedule , with events on nearly every day this week .
Notably , the events appear to be during trial breaks for breakfast , lunch , and dinner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the week .
The trial will include eight hours of questioning on both Wednesday and Thursday .
On Friday , followed by four hours of debate , the Senate will vote on calling new witnesses to the trial .
Jahan Wilcox , a spokesperson for Braun ’ s office , confirmed the event but said , “ it ’ s no different than Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren campaigning in Iowa while the trial is in recess.
” “ I don ’ t know anything about campaign activity since this is the official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sen. Cassidy will be in the impeachment trial on Wednesday and every day the trial is scheduled , ” said Cassidy spokesperson Cole Avery .
Super PACs aligned with Senate Republicans raised $ 68.3 million in 2019 , a record for a nonelection year .
The party will be defending 23 seats this year .

The Senate has transformed into a courtroom for the impeachment trial of President Donald Trump. Legislative hearings are postponed. Judicial nominations have been canceled until further notice.
But the impeachment trial hasn’t stopped the daily grind of Senate fundraising. GOP lawmakers have scheduled near daily events for lobbyist fundraisers throughout this week of impeachment proceedings.
The week began with a dinner fundraiser for Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Sen. John Thune, R-S.D., scheduled on Monday evening. And on Tuesday morning, Sen. Bill Cassidy, R-La., was scheduled for a fundraiser at the offices of Capitol Tax Partners, a lobby firm that represents firms including Apple, Citigroup, and Uber. On Tuesday evening, Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, was scheduled to host a dinner fundraiser, with a request for hosts of the event to provide $1,000 each.
Senate Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., planned to start the day on Wednesday with a breakfast fundraiser. The invite for the event, sent to supporters on Friday, requests that political action committees provide $5,000 to host.
And on Thursday, Thune will appear for a breakfast fundraiser with Sen. Mike Braun, R-Ind. Later that day, the National Republican Senatorial Committee will host McConnell and 11 other GOP senators for a large fundraiser benefiting the party’s 2020 election effort.
Screenshot: The Intercept
Several senators canceled fundraising plans last week as the trial got under way. Last week, however, GOP officials sent out an updated fundraising schedule, with events on nearly every day this week. Notably, the events appear to be during trial breaks for breakfast, lunch, and dinner.
The impeachment trial schedule runs through the week. The trial will include eight hours of questioning on both Wednesday and Thursday. On Friday, followed by four hours of debate, the Senate will vote on calling new witnesses to the trial.
Jahan Wilcox, a spokesperson for Braun’s office, confirmed the event but said, “it’s no different than Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren campaigning in Iowa while the trial is in recess.”
“I don’t know anything about campaign activity since this is the official office, but I do know that Sen. Cassidy will be in the impeachment trial on Wednesday and every day the trial is scheduled,” said Cassidy spokesperson Cole Avery.
Super PACs aligned with Senate Republicans raised $68.3 million in 2019, a record for a nonelection year. The party will be defending 23 seats this year.


theintercept--2020-01-29--How Radovan Karadzic Led an American Scholar Into a Labyrinth of Genocide Denial

I am a genocide scholar at the University of Sarajevo and my research interests extend to various forms of radicalization , including religious extremism .
I ’ ve learned that people can be both brutal and beguiling , and I appreciate that there may be some value in conveying precisely the power of Karadzic to manipulate and sway , to charm and rationalize .
This makes sense if one seeks to understand the personality of a war criminal .
However , Stern ’ s flattering and naive depiction of Karadzic reflects the profound influence he had on her , bordering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This seems to have clouded Stern ’ s ability to see her way clearly through the labyrinth of genocide denial into which Karadzic led her .
Stern , who is a professor at Boston University , openly admits to being on a “ research team ” with Karadzic to explain what motivated him .
The result is that the portions of her book that describe the 1990s war in Bosnia , and the historic events that preceded it , closely echo the rhetoric of Serb nationalism .
Jessica Stern , an expert on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ book about Radovan Karadzic , who was convicted in 2016 for committing genocide against Bosnian Muslims .
Her book , “ My War Criminal , ” has already drawn attention for Stern ’ s choice to allow Karadzic to give her a bioenergetic healing treatment while interviewing him in prison .
Another baffling aspect relates to her odd approach to interviewing : She claims to have entered an “ altered state ” during her 12 prison meetings with the onetime leader of Bosnia ’ s Serbs .
But these aren ’ t even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ book .
She cites my book , “ Genocide on the Drina River , ” in reference to claims by Karadzic that Alija Izetbegovic , who was Bosnia ’ s wartime president , “ saw his own people as expendable ” because he was frustrated that the vast majority of Muslims in the country “ were secular or at least not fundamentalists.
” While my book explains the secularism of Bosnia ’ s Muslims , there is nothing about Izetbegovic being frustrated with it ; my work is dedicated to deconstructing the Serb @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The proper use of my book as a reference would have been in a discussion about the factors that did drive the genocide in Bosnia — largely the territorial ambitions of Serb leaders and their plan to establish a Greater Serbia .
This is why Bosnian Muslims were targeted for extermination by Serb elites .
But Stern largely fails to discuss those factors and instead dedicates much of her book to validating the idea that Serbs legitimately feared Islam .
Stern contacted me during her writing process for commentary and feedback ; I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manuscript , and she mentions this in her acknowledgments .
Alas , she appears to have ignored most of my suggestions and has even misrepresented my research .
The reader should be warned that the way Stern uses references in her book amounts to much more than just poor academic practice .
For instance , one of the arguments put forth by Karadzic , and upheld in Stern ’ s book , is that Serbs committed genocide out of a fear that Bosnian Muslims were planning to impose a sharia state .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the context of this claim is misleading .
In another instance , Stern supports the Serbian nationalist narrative by arguing that there is “ some truth to … Karadzic ’ s claims that Izetbegovic had cultivated jihadis.
” Again , my work was cited as a source for what Stern described as “ Bosnia ’ s continuing problem with the jihadis.
” The aim of the report I wrote about Salafism and other forms of extremism was to assess whether Salafi groups present a security threat .
But I approached the topic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ framework of reciprocal radicalization .
The findings of my report warn that the hyperfocus on Salafism in Bosnia has “ drawn attention away from other forms of extremism , ” especially the ethnic and religious radicalization of Serbs in the Republika Srpska , which is the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina .
The findings of my report do not support Stern ’ s agenda , and so she decides to misunderstand it .
Stern also gives validity to allegations that Bosnian Muslim military leaders shot at their own people , or manufactured @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the crosshairs of Serb snipers , in order to garner international sympathy .
Yet , her presentation of these long-contested claims contradicts the international tribunal ’ s judgment in the trial of Karadzic , which actually states that “ most of the international witnesses present on the ground never received any conclusive proof that the Bosnian Muslim side was sniping or shelling its own civilians.
” Despite this , she claims cynically that “ media coverage of besieged Sarajevo was useful to the Bosniak leadership , ” and she demonstrates a clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ moral entrepreneurs ” — a label she applies even to journalists , many of whom reported on the war in Bosnia at great personal risk .
We are in a climate of renewed denial of the Bosnian genocide .
A few months ago , the 2019 Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to the Austrian writer Peter Handke , whose books on Bosnia have been widely criticized as engaging in genocide denial .
But there is at least one aspect of Stern ’ s work for which I am relieved : She @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approach .
In this sense , she is not attempting to delude .
She is transparently fascinated by Karadzic because he is a war criminal , and reasonable readers — even if they are uninformed about the genocide in Bosnia and are venturing into the uncomfortable task of reading about it for the first time — are unlikely to mistake hers for an objective viewpoint .
So let ’ s be clear : Radovan Karadzic committed genocide against Bosnian Muslims .
He is serving a life sentence for this crime .
The judgment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former Yugoslavia is decisive that this was not a question of self-defense .
Moreover , this was not Karadzic ’ s personal war , as one might conclude from Stern ’ s narrative .
The political events that preceded the war , though seismic , did not threaten anyone ’ s existence , only the power and geostrategic ambitions of Serb elites .
Moreover , the genocide was not something that Karadzic merely “ oversaw , ” as Stern says , as if he checked in every so often with a team of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very strategic objectives that guided every step of a highly systematic plan implemented across the country , and he issued directives along the way to fine-tune and adapt that plan to changing circumstances .
Stern — concerned more with the making of the genocidaire than with the making of the genocide — repeats various untruths put forth by Karadzic and other genocide deniers .
While she properly corrects the record in some cases , in others she does not , and in some cases she implies a false moral equivalence .
In fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ framing the Bosnian war as one of “ very fine people on both sides.
” This is the approach of authors like Handke as well , who have worked tirelessly to deny or downplay the Serb genocide against Muslims in Bosnia .

Photo: SHONE/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images
Jessica Stern, an expert on terrorism, has just published an unusual book about Radovan Karadzic, who was convicted in 2016 for committing genocide against Bosnian Muslims. Her book, “My War Criminal,” has already drawn attention for Stern’s choice to allow Karadzic to give her a bioenergetic healing treatment while interviewing him in prison. Another baffling aspect relates to her odd approach to interviewing: She claims to have entered an “altered state” during her 12 prison meetings with the onetime leader of Bosnia’s Serbs. But these aren’t even the most significant problems with this troubling book.
Stern, who is a professor at Boston University, openly admits to being on a “research team” with Karadzic to explain what motivated him. The result is that the portions of her book that describe the 1990s war in Bosnia, and the historic events that preceded it, closely echo the rhetoric of Serb nationalism.
I am a genocide scholar at the University of Sarajevo and my research interests extend to various forms of radicalization, including religious extremism. I’ve learned that people can be both brutal and beguiling, and I appreciate that there may be some value in conveying precisely the power of Karadzic to manipulate and sway, to charm and rationalize. This makes sense if one seeks to understand the personality of a war criminal. However, Stern’s flattering and naive depiction of Karadzic reflects the profound influence he had on her, bordering at times on a hypnotic power. This seems to have clouded Stern’s ability to see her way clearly through the labyrinth of genocide denial into which Karadzic led her.
Stern contacted me during her writing process for commentary and feedback; I had read an early draft of her manuscript, and she mentions this in her acknowledgments. Alas, she appears to have ignored most of my suggestions and has even misrepresented my research. The reader should be warned that the way Stern uses references in her book amounts to much more than just poor academic practice. For instance, one of the arguments put forth by Karadzic, and upheld in Stern’s book, is that Serbs committed genocide out of a fear that Bosnian Muslims were planning to impose a sharia state. The way she refers to my own work in the context of this claim is misleading.
She cites my book, “Genocide on the Drina River,” in reference to claims by Karadzic that Alija Izetbegovic, who was Bosnia’s wartime president, “saw his own people as expendable” because he was frustrated that the vast majority of Muslims in the country “were secular or at least not fundamentalists.” While my book explains the secularism of Bosnia’s Muslims, there is nothing about Izetbegovic being frustrated with it; my work is dedicated to deconstructing the Serb genocide against Bosnia’s Muslims. The proper use of my book as a reference would have been in a discussion about the factors that did drive the genocide in Bosnia — largely the territorial ambitions of Serb leaders and their plan to establish a Greater Serbia. This is why Bosnian Muslims were targeted for extermination by Serb elites. But Stern largely fails to discuss those factors and instead dedicates much of her book to validating the idea that Serbs legitimately feared Islam.
Stern’s flattering and naive depiction of Karadzic reflects the profound influence he had on her, bordering at times on a hypnotic power.
In another instance, Stern supports the Serbian nationalist narrative by arguing that there is “some truth to … Karadzic’s claims that Izetbegovic had cultivated jihadis.” Again, my work was cited as a source for what Stern described as “Bosnia’s continuing problem with the jihadis.” The aim of the report I wrote about Salafism and other forms of extremism was to assess whether Salafi groups present a security threat. But I approached the topic in a nuanced way and within the framework of reciprocal radicalization. The findings of my report warn that the hyperfocus on Salafism in Bosnia has “drawn attention away from other forms of extremism,” especially the ethnic and religious radicalization of Serbs in the Republika Srpska, which is the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The findings of my report do not support Stern’s agenda, and so she decides to misunderstand it.
Stern also gives validity to allegations that Bosnian Muslim military leaders shot at their own people, or manufactured scenarios that were likely to put citizens in the crosshairs of Serb snipers, in order to garner international sympathy. Yet, her presentation of these long-contested claims contradicts the international tribunal’s judgment in the trial of Karadzic, which actually states that “most of the international witnesses present on the ground never received any conclusive proof that the Bosnian Muslim side was sniping or shelling its own civilians.” Despite this, she claims cynically that “media coverage of besieged Sarajevo was useful to the Bosniak leadership,” and she demonstrates a clear animosity toward international actors she depicts as “moral entrepreneurs” — a label she applies even to journalists, many of whom reported on the war in Bosnia at great personal risk.
We are in a climate of renewed denial of the Bosnian genocide. A few months ago, the 2019 Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to the Austrian writer Peter Handke, whose books on Bosnia have been widely criticized as engaging in genocide denial.
But there is at least one aspect of Stern’s work for which I am relieved: She is honest about the subjectivity of her approach. In this sense, she is not attempting to delude. She is transparently fascinated by Karadzic because he is a war criminal, and reasonable readers — even if they are uninformed about the genocide in Bosnia and are venturing into the uncomfortable task of reading about it for the first time — are unlikely to mistake hers for an objective viewpoint.
So let’s be clear: Radovan Karadzic committed genocide against Bosnian Muslims. He is serving a life sentence for this crime. The judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is decisive that this was not a question of self-defense. Moreover, this was not Karadzic’s personal war, as one might conclude from Stern’s narrative. The political events that preceded the war, though seismic, did not threaten anyone’s existence, only the power and geostrategic ambitions of Serb elites. Moreover, the genocide was not something that Karadzic merely “oversaw,” as Stern says, as if he checked in every so often with a team of junior genocide managers. Karadzic authored the very strategic objectives that guided every step of a highly systematic plan implemented across the country, and he issued directives along the way to fine-tune and adapt that plan to changing circumstances.
Stern — concerned more with the making of the genocidaire than with the making of the genocide — repeats various untruths put forth by Karadzic and other genocide deniers. While she properly corrects the record in some cases, in others she does not, and in some cases she implies a false moral equivalence. In fact, Stern could be fairly accused of framing the Bosnian war as one of “very fine people on both sides.” This is the approach of authors like Handke as well, who have worked tirelessly to deny or downplay the Serb genocide against Muslims in Bosnia.


theintercept--2020-01-29--One Year into “Remain in Mexico,” the U.S. Is Enlisting Central America In Its Crackdown on Asylum

It was the gunshots that did it .
Leonardo had received death threats from a criminal gang extorting money from the little store run out of his family ’ s home on the eastern outskirts of San Salvador , and he stayed .
But when the words progressed to bullets , he knew it was time to leave .
“ They shot at the house .
They fired 14 times , ” said Leonardo , who was inside with two other people at the time of the attack .
Leonardo left home early one morning last April and travelled the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in one day .
He rode a bus alone through Guatemala , rafted across the Suchiate River into Mexico , and made it up to Tapachula , in the southern state of Chiapas , by nightfall .
He would never have guessed that he would spend the next eight months there .
( Leonardo , like most of the migrants and asylum-seekers interviewed in this story , asked not to be identified by his real name , fearing for his own safety and that of family members in El Salvador . )
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but he was once detained overnight anyway .
Immigration agents tried to pressure him to sign a voluntary deportation form , telling him the alternative was weeks in custody , he said .
“ They know they are violating the law , ” he told me late last year , sitting on a shaded curb with dozens of other migrants and asylum-seekers outside of an immigration office in Tapachula .
Leonardo has since made it to the U.S.-Mexico border , where he signed up on the local waitlist to cross into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ His number is several hundred away from being called .
If he does get to speak to a U.S. official , there ’ s a good chance he ’ ll be sent back to Mexico .
Under the so-called Migrant Protection Protocols , also known as “ Remain in Mexico , ” more than 59,000 asylum-seekers have made it to the U.S. border only to be returned to Mexico while their claims are processed .
One year ago , on January 29 , 2019 , the U.S. sent a Honduran asylum-seeker back to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ date — the first person subjected to “ Remain in Mexico.
” Since then , people from dozens of countries have been affected , but Honduras and Guatemala comprised more than 60 percent of cases , and Cuba , El Salvador , Ecuador , Venezuela , and Nicaragua accounted for most of the rest .
Migrant and human rights groups have repeatedly condemned the policy .
Fewer than five percent of people subject to the MPP had access to legal representation .
Children , LGBTQ asylum-seekers , and people with disabilities have all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most dangerous cities in Mexico .
“ As of January 21 , 2019 , Human Rights First has tracked at least 816 public reports of murder , torture , rape , kidnapping , and other violent attacks against asylum seekers and migrants returned to Mexico under MPP , ” the organization noted in a fact sheet released this month .
The policy was a milestone in the Trump administration ’ s assault on asylum , but that assault has spread much further south .
In response to U.S. pressure , Mexico has clamped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and militarizing enforcement .
And under new agreements , asylum-seekers who still manage to make it to the U.S. border now risk being sent to countries in Central America , not just Mexico .
people stuck waiting at ports of entry , MPP may be the most visible way the U.S. government blocks people from setting foot on U.S. soil , but there are many other forms of border externalization .
They didn ’ t all start with Trump , but his administration has intensified efforts to get other countries , especially in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of immigration police .
The global expansion of the U.S. border really got going after the September 11 , 2001 attacks and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security the following year , said Tucson-based journalist Todd Miller , who has researched the phenomenon for years and documented U.S. border externalization in his latest book , “ Empire of Borders : The Expansion of the U.S. Border Around the World.
” The departments of Homeland Security , Defense and State are all involved in activities related to border expansion , Miller said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Protection and Homeland Security Investigations — a domestic and global arm of Immigration and Customs Enforcement — advise and train local border security forces in other countries , as do members of the U.S. military and other forces .
“ This is all over the place , ” said Miller .
“ This is a phenomenon that you ’ re seeing around the world.
” Central America became a particular priority in 2014 following a surge in arrivals of unaccompanied minors from Guatemala , Honduras , and El Salvador , said Miller .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of migrants traveling together in caravans , calling them “ invasions , ” his administration has tried to get Central American governments to do more to stop people from reaching the U.S. and to accept asylum-seekers that the U.S. turns back .
The U.S. signed “ Border Security Arrangements ” with Guatemala , El Salvador , and Honduras in 2019 .
Their purpose , according to DHS , is to deploy CBP and ICE officials “ to advise and mentor host nation police , border security , immigration and customs counterparts.
” Yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Central America , the most effective deployment these days is arguably not its own but that of its southern neighbor .
During the year “ Remain in Mexico ” has been in force , Mexico has drastically stepped up its role as proxy enforcer in the U.S. clampdown on overland migration .
Mexico ’ s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador took office on December 1 , 2018 , and his government publicly objected to the announcement of MPP plans later that month .
In January 2019 , officials processed humanitarian visas for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including many traveling in the caravans .
But the government abruptly stopped accepting applications after two weeks , right when MPP was implemented .
In May , Trump threatened to impose escalating tariffs on Mexican exports to the U.S. if Mexico did not take action to impede northbound migration .
The following month , the two governments announced a deal : MPP would be expanded along the joint border , and Mexico would deploy 6,000 members of its nascent National Guard to areas along and near the border with Guatemala .
Gabriel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an immigration office in Ciudad Juárez in June , made it north through Mexico shortly before the deal , but some policies had already shifted .
He told me he had faced political persecution in Cuba since refusing years earlier to become a government informant while working at an international airport .
He landed in Nicaragua in late April and made his way north with other Cubans , paying bribes here and there to pass , but they did not get past one of the many checkpoints in Chiapas .
Gabriel and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detention facility in Tuxtla Gutiérrez .
“ We slept piled on top of each other .
I contracted scabies , ” said Gabriel .
“ So many people had pneumonia.
” Mexico ’ s National Immigration Institute said in a statement earlier this month that its immigration stations were never at more than 50 percent capacity in the last three months of 2019 .
However , some facilities in Chiapas have periodically been severely over capacity .
A spokesperson from the institute was not available for comment on conditions in custody , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NGO monitoring visits , by time of publication .
Immigration officials in Tuxtla Gutiérrez tried pressuring people to sign voluntary deportation forms by threatening to restrict food and phone calls .
Instead , detainees began organizing to break out .
They initially agreed to riot May 13 , but postponed it by a day so that it would not happen during the shift of the one guard who treated everyone humanely , according to Gabriel .
Roughly 40 migrants and asylum-seekers , mostly Cuban and a few Central Americans , eventually managed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just one of several organized , largely Cuban-led escapes from immigration facilities in Mexico last year , most of them in Chiapas .
Gabriel made it to Ciudad Juárez , where he was among thousands of people on the waitlist to be allowed to cross the bridge into the U.S. to request asylum — and then possibly be sent right back .
Gabriel ’ s case highlights the particular situation in which Cuban migrants find themselves .
Cubans used to get a waiver to transit Mexico to the U.S. , where they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for decades .
But Cubans are not exempt from “ Remain in Mexico , ” and Mexico soon stopped issuing them waivers .
Mexico also shifted its policy toward many African migrants and asylum-seekers not long after the U.S. threats of tariffs .
Instead of releasing them with waivers that give them two or three weeks to leave Mexico , in effect permitting transit north , Mexico began restricting people to the state of Chiapas and requiring exit by the country ’ s southern border with Guatemala .
“ Mexico is playing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an Angolan asylum-seeker , told me as he and a dozen others from Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo gathered under a small canopy tent on a rainy afternoon outside the Siglo XXI immigration detention center in Tapachula last October .
Tarp-covered tents covered the Siglo XXI grounds .
Part encampment and part protest , African migrants and asylum-seekers had been living and organizing together at Mexican authorities ’ doorstep for months , seeking waivers .
Ze , his wife , and their four children flew to Brazil and gradually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to immigration authorities in each country along the way , he said .
They were sometimes detained for a period , but then issued transit permits .
Ze was held in Tapachula for two weeks , and that is where the journey stalled .
“ We have protested .
We have marched , ” he said .
“ Nothing has changed.
” Another African migrant who ended up in Tapachula , Patrice , was making the journey with his pregnant wife and three young children .
After fleeing political persecution and war in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the family traveled 2,500 miles up through the Americas .
Traversing the Darién Gap along the way still haunts them .
The Pan-American Highway connecting South , Central , and North America has only one gap : through the Darién jungle between Colombia and Panama .
“ We walked for two weeks through the Darien , ” Patrice told me .
“ There were corpses of people who died along the way.
” After four months in Tapachula , Patrice and his family joined African , Caribbean , and Central American migrants and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a caravan together , but they did not even make it 20 miles out of the city .
National Guard troops blocked the highway , and security forces and immigration agents fanned out to detain people , though most had authorization to be in the state of Chiapas and were released after spending one to several nights in Siglo XXI .
This month , the Mexican National Guard and immigration agents mounted another massive operation to halt the advance of caravan groups made up of predominantly Honduran migrants and asylum-seekers .
More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite López Obrador ’ s initial promises that there were 4,000 temporary jobs available for migrants arriving with the caravan .
has become to get through Mexico , those that do make it could now wind up back in Guatemala .
In November , the Trump administration implemented a new “ asylum cooperative agreement ” that allows the U.S. to send asylum-seekers to Guatemala to seek protection there instead or return home .
As of Monday , the U.S. had sent 166 Hondurans and 102 Salvadorans to Guatemala , according to the Guatemalan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have chosen to seek asylum in Guatemala , and for good reason .
Violent crime , including murder , is common , the U.S. State Department notes in its travel advisory for Guatemala , as it does in its advisories for Honduras and El Salvador .
Despite their major differences , the three countries also share deep-rooted political corruption , structural inequality , and cross-border criminal groups .
They are among the top countries of origin of migrants and asylum-seekers apprehended at the U.S. border — not safe havens for people fleeing for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ me to Guatemala , it is as though they are sending me back to Honduras , because the same gangs that are in Honduras are in Guatemala , ” said Edwin , a Honduran asylum-seeker fleeing extortion-related threats of violence against his family from both gang members and police .
As we spoke last October , he watched his 6-year-old son playing beside him in the central plaza of Tapachula .
The U.S. also signed asylum cooperative agreements with Honduras and El Salvador last year .
Their status is in flux , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin implementation “ in the coming weeks , ” DHS Acting Secretary Chad Wolf said January 9 at a joint press conference with the Honduran president .
Under the deal , the U.S. could potentially send asylum-seekers from Mexico , Guatemala , Nicaragua , and other countries to Honduras .
The asylum cooperative agreement is “ a humanitarian responsibility , ” said Wolf .
Rigoberto Cabezas laughed when asked outside a Tapachula immigration office last October what he thought about Honduras being considered a safe country for refugees , but he knows it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there with his wife and two young sons , aged 2 and 6 .
They fled Nicaragua in August , after two years of political persecution , including detention and threats , due to his active participation in protests against the government , said Cabezas .
“ They are all a bunch of thieves , ” he said , referring to the governments in the region .
“ If the situation were different , we would not be migrating .
”

It was the gunshots that did it. Leonardo had received death threats from a criminal gang extorting money from the little store run out of his family’s home on the eastern outskirts of San Salvador, and he stayed. But when the words progressed to bullets, he knew it was time to leave.
“They shot at the house. They fired 14 times,” said Leonardo, who was inside with two other people at the time of the attack.
Leonardo left home early one morning last April and travelled the 300 miles from El Salvador to Mexico in one day. He rode a bus alone through Guatemala, rafted across the Suchiate River into Mexico, and made it up to Tapachula, in the southern state of Chiapas, by nightfall. He would never have guessed that he would spend the next eight months there. (Leonardo, like most of the migrants and asylum-seekers interviewed in this story, asked not to be identified by his real name, fearing for his own safety and that of family members in El Salvador.)
He obtained permission to stay in southern Mexico, but he was once detained overnight anyway. Immigration agents tried to pressure him to sign a voluntary deportation form, telling him the alternative was weeks in custody, he said.
“They know they are violating the law,” he told me late last year, sitting on a shaded curb with dozens of other migrants and asylum-seekers outside of an immigration office in Tapachula.
Leonardo has since made it to the U.S.-Mexico border, where he signed up on the local waitlist to cross into the United States and ask for asylum. His number is several hundred away from being called.
More than 59,000 asylum-seekers have made it to the U.S. border only to be returned to Mexico while their claims are processed.
If he does get to speak to a U.S. official, there’s a good chance he’ll be sent back to Mexico. Under the so-called Migrant Protection Protocols, also known as “Remain in Mexico,” more than 59,000 asylum-seekers have made it to the U.S. border only to be returned to Mexico while their claims are processed.
One year ago, on January 29, 2019, the U.S. sent a Honduran asylum-seeker back to Tijuana to wait for his immigration court date — the first person subjected to “Remain in Mexico.” Since then, people from dozens of countries have been affected, but Honduras and Guatemala comprised more than 60 percent of cases, and Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua accounted for most of the rest.
Migrant and human rights groups have repeatedly condemned the policy. Fewer than five percent of people subject to the MPP had access to legal representation. Children, LGBTQ asylum-seekers, and people with disabilities have all been sent back to some of the most dangerous cities in Mexico.
“As of January 21, 2019, Human Rights First has tracked at least 816 public reports of murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, and other violent attacks against asylum seekers and migrants returned to Mexico under MPP,” the organization noted in a fact sheet released this month.
The policy was a milestone in the Trump administration’s assault on asylum, but that assault has spread much further south. In response to U.S. pressure, Mexico has clamped down on migration, changing transit policies and militarizing enforcement. And under new agreements, asylum-seekers who still manage to make it to the U.S. border now risk being sent to countries in Central America, not just Mexico.
With camps of people stuck waiting at ports of entry, MPP may be the most visible way the U.S. government blocks people from setting foot on U.S. soil, but there are many other forms of border externalization. They didn’t all start with Trump, but his administration has intensified efforts to get other countries, especially in Central America, to play the part of immigration police.
The global expansion of the U.S. border really got going after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security the following year, said Tucson-based journalist Todd Miller, who has researched the phenomenon for years and documented U.S. border externalization in his latest book, “Empire of Borders: The Expansion of the U.S. Border Around the World.” The departments of Homeland Security, Defense and State are all involved in activities related to border expansion, Miller said. DHS agents from Customs and Border Protection and Homeland Security Investigations — a domestic and global arm of Immigration and Customs Enforcement — advise and train local border security forces in other countries, as do members of the U.S. military and other forces.
“This is all over the place,” said Miller. “This is a phenomenon that you’re seeing around the world.”
Central America became a particular priority in 2014 following a surge in arrivals of unaccompanied minors from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, said Miller. And as Trump has fixated on groups of migrants traveling together in caravans, calling them “invasions,” his administration has tried to get Central American governments to do more to stop people from reaching the U.S. and to accept asylum-seekers that the U.S. turns back.
The U.S. signed “Border Security Arrangements” with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras in 2019. Their purpose, according to DHS, is to deploy CBP and ICE officials “to advise and mentor host nation police, border security, immigration and customs counterparts.” Yet while the U.S. is sending more personnel to Central America, the most effective deployment these days is arguably not its own but that of its southern neighbor. During the year “Remain in Mexico” has been in force, Mexico has drastically stepped up its role as proxy enforcer in the U.S. clampdown on overland migration.
“Mexico is playing the role of the wall.”
Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador took office on December 1, 2018, and his government publicly objected to the announcement of MPP plans later that month. In January 2019, officials processed humanitarian visas for thousands of predominantly Honduran migrants and asylum-seekers, including many traveling in the caravans. But the government abruptly stopped accepting applications after two weeks, right when MPP was implemented.
In May, Trump threatened to impose escalating tariffs on Mexican exports to the U.S. if Mexico did not take action to impede northbound migration. The following month, the two governments announced a deal: MPP would be expanded along the joint border, and Mexico would deploy 6,000 members of its nascent National Guard to areas along and near the border with Guatemala.
Gabriel, a Cuban man I met outside an immigration office in Ciudad Juárez in June, made it north through Mexico shortly before the deal, but some policies had already shifted. He told me he had faced political persecution in Cuba since refusing years earlier to become a government informant while working at an international airport. He landed in Nicaragua in late April and made his way north with other Cubans, paying bribes here and there to pass, but they did not get past one of the many checkpoints in Chiapas.
Gabriel and the others were sent to an overcrowded immigration detention facility in Tuxtla Gutiérrez.
“We slept piled on top of each other. I contracted scabies,” said Gabriel. “So many people had pneumonia.”
Read Our Complete Coverage The War on Immigrants
Mexico’s National Immigration Institute said in a statement earlier this month that its immigration stations were never at more than 50 percent capacity in the last three months of 2019. However, some facilities in Chiapas have periodically been severely over capacity. A spokesperson from the institute was not available for comment on conditions in custody, including allegations of coercion and recent restrictions on NGO monitoring visits, by time of publication.
Immigration officials in Tuxtla Gutiérrez tried pressuring people to sign voluntary deportation forms by threatening to restrict food and phone calls. Instead, detainees began organizing to break out. They initially agreed to riot May 13, but postponed it by a day so that it would not happen during the shift of the one guard who treated everyone humanely, according to Gabriel.
“We yelled, ‘Freedom! Freedom!’” said Gabriel. “The federal and municipal police showed up.”
Roughly 40 migrants and asylum-seekers, mostly Cuban and a few Central Americans, eventually managed to break out that night. It was just one of several organized, largely Cuban-led escapes from immigration facilities in Mexico last year, most of them in Chiapas. Gabriel made it to Ciudad Juárez, where he was among thousands of people on the waitlist to be allowed to cross the bridge into the U.S. to request asylum — and then possibly be sent right back.
Gabriel’s case highlights the particular situation in which Cuban migrants find themselves. Cubans used to get a waiver to transit Mexico to the U.S., where they have had their own specific path to regularization for decades. But Cubans are not exempt from “Remain in Mexico,” and Mexico soon stopped issuing them waivers.
At their tent camp outside the Siglo XXI immigration detention center in Tapachula, African migrants and asylum-seekers shelter from the rain in October of 2019. Photo: Sandra Cuffe for The Intercept
Mexico also shifted its policy toward many African migrants and asylum-seekers not long after the U.S. threats of tariffs. Instead of releasing them with waivers that give them two or three weeks to leave Mexico, in effect permitting transit north, Mexico began restricting people to the state of Chiapas and requiring exit by the country’s southern border with Guatemala.
“Mexico is playing the role of the wall,” Ze, an Angolan asylum-seeker, told me as he and a dozen others from Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo gathered under a small canopy tent on a rainy afternoon outside the Siglo XXI immigration detention center in Tapachula last October.
Tarp-covered tents covered the Siglo XXI grounds. Part encampment and part protest, African migrants and asylum-seekers had been living and organizing together at Mexican authorities’ doorstep for months, seeking waivers.
Ze, his wife, and their four children flew to Brazil and gradually made their way north, presenting themselves to immigration authorities in each country along the way, he said. They were sometimes detained for a period, but then issued transit permits. Ze was held in Tapachula for two weeks, and that is where the journey stalled.
“We have protested. We have marched,” he said. “Nothing has changed.”
Another African migrant who ended up in Tapachula, Patrice, was making the journey with his pregnant wife and three young children. After fleeing political persecution and war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the family traveled 2,500 miles up through the Americas. Traversing the Darién Gap along the way still haunts them. The Pan-American Highway connecting South, Central, and North America has only one gap: through the Darién jungle between Colombia and Panama.
“We walked for two weeks through the Darien,” Patrice told me. “There were corpses of people who died along the way.”
After four months in Tapachula, Patrice and his family joined African, Caribbean, and Central American migrants and asylum-seekers on October 12 to head north in a caravan together, but they did not even make it 20 miles out of the city. National Guard troops blocked the highway, and security forces and immigration agents fanned out to detain people, though most had authorization to be in the state of Chiapas and were released after spending one to several nights in Siglo XXI.
This month, the Mexican National Guard and immigration agents mounted another massive operation to halt the advance of caravan groups made up of predominantly Honduran migrants and asylum-seekers. More than 2,000 people were detained and deported despite López Obrador’s initial promises that there were 4,000 temporary jobs available for migrants arriving with the caravan.
Migrants board buses after their passage was blocked by the Mexican National Guard near Tapachula, Mexico, on Jan. 23, 2020. Photo: Marco Ugarte/AP
Hard as it has become to get through Mexico, those that do make it could now wind up back in Guatemala. In November, the Trump administration implemented a new “asylum cooperative agreement” that allows the U.S. to send asylum-seekers to Guatemala to seek protection there instead or return home. As of Monday, the U.S. had sent 166 Hondurans and 102 Salvadorans to Guatemala, according to the Guatemalan Immigration Institute. Fewer than five percent have chosen to seek asylum in Guatemala, and for good reason.
Violent crime, including murder, is common, the U.S. State Department notes in its travel advisory for Guatemala, as it does in its advisories for Honduras and El Salvador. Despite their major differences, the three countries also share deep-rooted political corruption, structural inequality, and cross-border criminal groups. They are among the top countries of origin of migrants and asylum-seekers apprehended at the U.S. border — not safe havens for people fleeing for their lives.
“If they send me to Guatemala, it is as though they are sending me back to Honduras.”
“If they send me to Guatemala, it is as though they are sending me back to Honduras, because the same gangs that are in Honduras are in Guatemala,” said Edwin, a Honduran asylum-seeker fleeing extortion-related threats of violence against his family from both gang members and police. As we spoke last October, he watched his 6-year-old son playing beside him in the central plaza of Tapachula.
The U.S. also signed asylum cooperative agreements with Honduras and El Salvador last year. Their status is in flux, but Honduras and the U.S. were supposed to begin implementation “in the coming weeks,” DHS Acting Secretary Chad Wolf said January 9 at a joint press conference with the Honduran president. Under the deal, the U.S. could potentially send asylum-seekers from Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other countries to Honduras. The asylum cooperative agreement is “a humanitarian responsibility,” said Wolf.
Rigoberto Cabezas laughed when asked outside a Tapachula immigration office last October what he thought about Honduras being considered a safe country for refugees, but he knows it’s possible he could be sent there with his wife and two young sons, aged 2 and 6. They fled Nicaragua in August, after two years of political persecution, including detention and threats, due to his active participation in protests against the government, said Cabezas.
“They are all a bunch of thieves,” he said, referring to the governments in the region. “If the situation were different, we would not be migrating.”


theintercept--2020-01-29--How the Environmental Lawyer Who Won a Massive Judgment Against Chevron Lost Everything

the second-hottest year on record , while the fires in the Amazon rainforest were raging , the ice sheet in Greenland was melting , and Greta Thunberg was being greeted by adoring crowds across the U.S. , something else happened that was of great relevance to the climate movement : An attorney who has been battling Chevron for more than a decade over environmental devastation in South America was put on house arrest .
Few news outlets covered the detention of Steven Donziger , who won a multibillion-dollar judgment in Ecuador against Chevron over the massive contamination in the Lago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behalf of Indigenous people and farmers there for more than 25 years .
So on August 6 , Donziger left a Lower Manhattan courthouse unnoticed and boarded the 1 train home with an electronic monitoring device newly affixed to his ankle .
Save for the occasional meeting with his lawyer or other court-sanctioned appointment , he has remained there ever since .
“ I ’ m like a corporate political prisoner , ” Donziger told me as we sat in his living room recently .
The attorney , who is 6-foot-3 , graying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for New York Mayor Bill Blasio when he was able to walk the city streets , was surprisingly stoic and resigned about his predicament during my two visits to the apartment he shares with his wife and 13-year-old son .
But on this particular Wednesday , as the winter sunlight in his living room was dimming and the charger for his spare ankle bracelet battery flashed on a nearby shelf , his optimism about his epic battle against one of the biggest oil companies in the world seemed to be flagging .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Donziger is not exaggerating .
As he was arguing the case against Chevron in Ecuador back in 2009 , the company expressly said its long-term strategy was to demonize him .
And since then , Chevron has continued its all-out assault on Donziger in what ’ s become one of the most bitter and drawn-out cases in the history of environmental law .
Chevron has hired private investigators to track Donziger , created a publication to smear him , and put together a legal team of hundreds of lawyers from 60 firms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign against him .
As a result , Donziger has been disbarred and his bank accounts have been frozen .
He now has a lien on his apartment , faces exorbitant fines , and has been prohibited from earning money .
As of August , a court has seized his passport and put him on house arrest .
Chevron , which has a market capitalization of $ 228 billion , has the funds to continue targeting Donziger for as long as it chooses .
In an emailed statement , Chevron wrote that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law should find the fraudulent Ecuadorian judgment to be illegitimate and unenforceable.
” The statement also said that “ Chevron will continue to work to hold the perpetrators of this fraud accountable for their actions , including Steven Donziger , who has committed a litany of corrupt and illegal acts related to his Ecuadorian judicial fraud against Chevron.
” The developments that led to Donziger ’ s confinement were , like much of the epic legal battle he ’ s been engaged in for decades , highly unusual .
The home confinement is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand over his cellphone and computer , something that ’ s been asked of few other attorneys .
To Donziger , who had already endured 19 days of depositions and given Chevron large portions of his case file , the request was beyond the pale , and he appealed it on the grounds that it would require him to violate his commitments to his clients .
Still , Donziger said he ’ d turn over the devices if he lost the appeal .
But even though the underlying case was civil , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the litigation between Chevron and Donziger since 2011 , Lewis A. Kaplan , drafted criminal contempt charges against him .
In another legal peculiarity , in July , Kaplan appointed a private law firm to prosecute Donziger , after the Southern District of New York declined to do so — a move that is virtually unprecedented .
And , as Donziger ’ s lawyer has pointed out , the firm Kaplan chose , Seward & Kissel , likely has ties to Chevron .
Making the case even more extraordinary , Kaplan bypassed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he knew well , U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska , to oversee the case being prosecuted by the firm he chose .
It was Preska who sentenced Donziger to home detention and ordered the seizure of his passport , even though Donziger had appeared in court on hundreds of previous occasions .
Despite Donziger ’ s current predicament , the case against Chevron in Ecuador was a spectacular victory .
The twisted legal saga began in 1993 , when Donziger and other attorneys filed a class-action suit in New York against Texaco on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indigenous people in the Amazon over massive contamination from the company ’ s oil drilling there .
Chevron , which bought Texaco in 2001 , has insisted that Texaco cleaned up the area where it operated and that its former partner , the national oil company of Ecuador , was responsible for any remaining pollution .
At Chevron ’ s request , the legal proceedings over the “ Amazon Chernobyl ” were moved to Ecuador , where the courts were “ impartial and fair , ” as the oil company ’ s attorneys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The move to Ecuador , where the legal system does not involve juries , may have also appealed because it spared Chevron a jury trial .
In any case , an Ecuadorian court ruled against Chevron in 2011 and ordered the company to pay $ 18 billion in compensation , an amount that was later reduced to $ 9.5 billion .
After years of struggling with the health and environmental consequences of oil extraction , the impoverished Amazonian plaintiffs had won a historic judgment from one of the biggest corporations in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never had a moment to savor their David-over-Goliath victory .
Even though the ruling was subsequently upheld by the Ecuadorian Supreme Court , Chevron immediately made clear that it would not be paying the judgment .
Instead , Chevron moved its assets out of the country , making it impossible for the Ecuadorians to collect .
That year , Chevron filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations , or RICO , suit against Donziger in New York City .
Although the suit originally sought roughly $ 60 billion in damages , and civil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 20 entitle a defendant to a jury , Chevron dropped the monetary claims two weeks before the trial .
In its statement , Chevron wrote that the company “ focused the RICO case on obtaining injunctive relief against the furtherance of Donziger ’ s extortionate scheme against the company.
” Instead , that case was decided solely by Kaplan , who ruled in 2014 that the Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron was invalid because it was obtained through “ egregious fraud ” and that Donziger was guilty of racketeering , extortion , wire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justice , and witness tampering .
The decision hinged on the testimony of an Ecuadorian judge named Alberto Guerra , who claimed that Donziger had bribed him during the original trial and that the decision against Chevron had been ghostwritten .
Guerra was a controversial witness .
Chevron had prepped him on more than 50 occasions before his testimony , paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars , and arranged for the judge and his family members to move to the United States with a generous monthly stipend that was 20 times the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2015 , when Guerra testified in an international arbitration proceeding , he admitted that he had lied and changed his story multiple times .
According to Chevron , Guerra ’ s inaccuracies didn ’ t change the thrust of his testimony .
For his part , Judge Kaplan wrote that his court “ would have reached precisely the same result in this case even without the testimony of Alberto Guerra.
” In its statement , Chevron said that Guerra was relocated to the U.S. for his safety and noted that the court found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Ecuadorian judge were “ proper and transparent.
” Lawyers for Donziger said the changes in Guerra ’ s testimony completely undermined his original bribery allegations , which Donziger has consistently denied .
In any case , that evidence emerged after the trial , and an appeals court declined to consider the new information and ruled against Donziger in 2016 .
Had Donziger been criminally charged with bribery , a jury would have assessed Guerra ’ s credibility .
Instead , in the RICO case , which was civil , the decision about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ person — Kaplan — who chose to believe him .
That choice has set the stage for the legal losses Donziger has suffered since , according to some close watchers of the Chevron case .
“ On the basis of Kaplan saying , ‘ I believe this witness ; I find Donziger guilty of the crime of bribery of the judge ’ — on the basis of that , he ’ s been destroyed .
That is the pinnacle element of all of the other claims against him .
And if you take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them — they ’ re just not there , ” said Charles Nesson , an attorney and Harvard Law School professor .
“ He has effectively been convicted of bribery by the finding of a single judge in a case in which bribery wasn ’ t even the charge , ” Nesson said of Donziger .
“ I teach evidence , that you have to prove what you assert .
But the proof in this case is the thinnest.
” Nesson , who represented Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Grace featured in the book and film “ A Civil Action , ” teaches Donziger ’ s case in his “ Fair Trial ” course , using it as an example of a decidedly unfair trial .
“ Donziger epitomizes a person in asymmetric civil litigation who can now be denied a fair trial , ” he explains to his students .
Nesson is one of several legal scholars who have opined that Kaplan has a soft spot for Chevron , which the judge once described as “ a company of considerable importance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the world , that supplies a group of commodities , gasoline , heating oil , other fuels , and lubricants on which every one of us depends every single day.
” In contrast , the judge has exhibited antipathy for Donziger , according to his former lawyer , John Keker , who saw the case as a “ Dickensian farce , ” in which “ Chevron is using its limitless resources to crush defendants and win this case through might rather than merit.
” Keker withdrew from the case in 2013 after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ motion , however meritless , in the hope that the court will use it to hurt Donziger.
” Donziger ’ s current prohibition from working , traveling , earning money , and leaving his home shows how successful Chevron ’ s strategy has been .
But even as his fate hangs in the balance , Donziger ’ s case matters far beyond the life of this one lawyer .
“ It should be nothing short of terrifying for any activist challenging corporate power and the oil industry in the U.S. , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Amazon Watch , an organization devoted to the protection of the rainforest and Indigenous people in the Amazon basin .
“ They ’ ve made it clear there ’ s no amount of money that ’ s too much to spend on this case , ” he said of Chevron .
“ They will stop at nothing.
” The Chevron case may be most devastating for the plaintiffs in the Amazon , who never received their judgment despite being left with hundreds of unlined waste pits and contaminated water and soil from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and billions of gallons of dumped toxic waste .
Everything that ’ s happened to Donziger “ is small potatoes compared to the fact that Kaplan has rendered the damage the company actually did as totally irrelevant , ” said Nesson .
But the latest twists and turns in the Chevron case may also be particularly bad news for climate activists .
A mere 20 companies are responsible for a third of the greenhouse gases emitted in the modern era ; Chevron ranks second only to Saudi Aramco among them .
And it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climate crisis will require confronting these mega-emitters , whose resources for litigation dwarf that of any individual .
Making Chevron and other companies clean up the messes created by their oil production will speed the transition away from fossil fuels , according to Rex Weyler , an environmental advocate who co-founded Greenpeace International and directed the original Greenpeace Foundation .
“ If hydrocarbon companies are forced to pay for the true costs of their product , which include these environmental costs , it will make the alternative energy systems more competitive , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the climate movement should focus on Chevron ’ s case — and Donziger ’ s legal battle .
“ One of the most effective things climate activists can do right now to change the system would be to not let Chevron get away with polluting in these countries , whether Ecuador , Nigeria , or anywhere ” said Weyler .
While some human rights and environmental advocates have tried to call attention to Donziger ’ s case and Chevron ’ s bullying of him , Weyler felt that the outcry should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happened to Donziger , and some of his former allies , whom Chevron has gone after as “ nonparty co-conspirators , ” people may be afraid to stand up to the company .
Donziger himself is living in fear .
There is no set punishment when a judge files for criminal contempt of court , so he spends his days worrying over what will happen to him next .
“ It ’ s scary , ” he told me .
“ I don ’ t know what they ’ re thinking.
” But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could still be forced to pay the multibillion-dollar judgment by courts in another country , is also afraid .
“ They are afraid of the precedent .
Not only is Chevron afraid , the entire extraction industry is afraid of the precedent , ” said Weyler .
“ They do not want to be held responsible for the pollution of their industry .
”

Last August, during the second-hottest year on record, while the fires in the Amazon rainforest were raging, the ice sheet in Greenland was melting, and Greta Thunberg was being greeted by adoring crowds across the U.S., something else happened that was of great relevance to the climate movement: An attorney who has been battling Chevron for more than a decade over environmental devastation in South America was put on house arrest.
Few news outlets covered the detention of Steven Donziger, who won a multibillion-dollar judgment in Ecuador against Chevron over the massive contamination in the Lago Agrio region and has been fighting on behalf of Indigenous people and farmers there for more than 25 years. So on August 6, Donziger left a Lower Manhattan courthouse unnoticed and boarded the 1 train home with an electronic monitoring device newly affixed to his ankle. Save for the occasional meeting with his lawyer or other court-sanctioned appointment, he has remained there ever since.
“I’m like a corporate political prisoner,” Donziger told me as we sat in his living room recently. The attorney, who is 6-foot-3, graying, and often used to be mistaken for New York Mayor Bill de Blasio when he was able to walk the city streets, was surprisingly stoic and resigned about his predicament during my two visits to the apartment he shares with his wife and 13-year-old son. But on this particular Wednesday, as the winter sunlight in his living room was dimming and the charger for his spare ankle bracelet battery flashed on a nearby shelf, his optimism about his epic battle against one of the biggest oil companies in the world seemed to be flagging. “They are trying to totally destroy me.”
Donziger is not exaggerating. As he was arguing the case against Chevron in Ecuador back in 2009, the company expressly said its long-term strategy was to demonize him. And since then, Chevron has continued its all-out assault on Donziger in what’s become one of the most bitter and drawn-out cases in the history of environmental law. Chevron has hired private investigators to track Donziger, created a publication to smear him, and put together a legal team of hundreds of lawyers from 60 firms, who have successfully pursued an extraordinary campaign against him. As a result, Donziger has been disbarred and his bank accounts have been frozen. He now has a lien on his apartment, faces exorbitant fines, and has been prohibited from earning money. As of August, a court has seized his passport and put him on house arrest. Chevron, which has a market capitalization of $228 billion, has the funds to continue targeting Donziger for as long as it chooses.
In an emailed statement, Chevron wrote that “any jurisdiction that observes the rule of law should find the fraudulent Ecuadorian judgment to be illegitimate and unenforceable.” The statement also said that “Chevron will continue to work to hold the perpetrators of this fraud accountable for their actions, including Steven Donziger, who has committed a litany of corrupt and illegal acts related to his Ecuadorian judicial fraud against Chevron.”
The developments that led to Donziger’s confinement were, like much of the epic legal battle he’s been engaged in for decades, highly unusual. The home confinement is his punishment for refusing a request to hand over his cellphone and computer, something that’s been asked of few other attorneys. To Donziger, who had already endured 19 days of depositions and given Chevron large portions of his case file, the request was beyond the pale, and he appealed it on the grounds that it would require him to violate his commitments to his clients. Still, Donziger said he’d turn over the devices if he lost the appeal. But even though the underlying case was civil, the federal court judge who has presided over the litigation between Chevron and Donziger since 2011, Lewis A. Kaplan, drafted criminal contempt charges against him.
In another legal peculiarity, in July, Kaplan appointed a private law firm to prosecute Donziger, after the Southern District of New York declined to do so — a move that is virtually unprecedented. And, as Donziger’s lawyer has pointed out, the firm Kaplan chose, Seward & Kissel, likely has ties to Chevron.
Making the case even more extraordinary, Kaplan bypassed the standard random assignment process and handpicked someone he knew well, U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska, to oversee the case being prosecuted by the firm he chose. It was Preska who sentenced Donziger to home detention and ordered the seizure of his passport, even though Donziger had appeared in court on hundreds of previous occasions.
Ecuadorian local Manuel Silva shows evidence of an oil spill in Lago Agrio on Dec. 14, 1998. Indigenous Ecuadoreans sued Texaco, accusing the company of turning the region’s rainforests into a “toxic waste dump” by drilling for oil. Photo: Dolores Ochoa/AP
A Tainted Witness
Despite Donziger’s current predicament, the case against Chevron in Ecuador was a spectacular victory. The twisted legal saga began in 1993, when Donziger and other attorneys filed a class-action suit in New York against Texaco on behalf of more than 30,000 farmers and Indigenous people in the Amazon over massive contamination from the company’s oil drilling there. Chevron, which bought Texaco in 2001, has insisted that Texaco cleaned up the area where it operated and that its former partner, the national oil company of Ecuador, was responsible for any remaining pollution.
At Chevron’s request, the legal proceedings over the “Amazon Chernobyl” were moved to Ecuador, where the courts were “impartial and fair,” as the oil company’s attorneys wrote in a filing at the time. The move to Ecuador, where the legal system does not involve juries, may have also appealed because it spared Chevron a jury trial. In any case, an Ecuadorian court ruled against Chevron in 2011 and ordered the company to pay $18 billion in compensation, an amount that was later reduced to $9.5 billion. After years of struggling with the health and environmental consequences of oil extraction, the impoverished Amazonian plaintiffs had won a historic judgment from one of the biggest corporations in the world.
But Donziger and his clients never had a moment to savor their David-over-Goliath victory. Even though the ruling was subsequently upheld by the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, Chevron immediately made clear that it would not be paying the judgment. Instead, Chevron moved its assets out of the country, making it impossible for the Ecuadorians to collect.
That year, Chevron filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, or RICO, suit against Donziger in New York City. Although the suit originally sought roughly $60 billion in damages, and civil trials involving monetary claims of more than $20 entitle a defendant to a jury, Chevron dropped the monetary claims two weeks before the trial.
In its statement, Chevron wrote that the company “focused the RICO case on obtaining injunctive relief against the furtherance of Donziger’s extortionate scheme against the company.”
Instead, that case was decided solely by Kaplan, who ruled in 2014 that the Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron was invalid because it was obtained through “egregious fraud” and that Donziger was guilty of racketeering, extortion, wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering. The decision hinged on the testimony of an Ecuadorian judge named Alberto Guerra, who claimed that Donziger had bribed him during the original trial and that the decision against Chevron had been ghostwritten.
Guerra was a controversial witness. Chevron had prepped him on more than 50 occasions before his testimony, paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars, and arranged for the judge and his family members to move to the United States with a generous monthly stipend that was 20 times the salary he received in Ecuador. In 2015, when Guerra testified in an international arbitration proceeding, he admitted that he had lied and changed his story multiple times. According to Chevron, Guerra’s inaccuracies didn’t change the thrust of his testimony. For his part, Judge Kaplan wrote that his court “would have reached precisely the same result in this case even without the testimony of Alberto Guerra.” In its statement, Chevron said that Guerra was relocated to the U.S. for his safety and noted that the court found that the company’s contacts with the Ecuadorian judge were “proper and transparent.”
Lawyers for Donziger said the changes in Guerra’s testimony completely undermined his original bribery allegations, which Donziger has consistently denied. In any case, that evidence emerged after the trial, and an appeals court declined to consider the new information and ruled against Donziger in 2016.
“He has effectively been convicted of bribery by the finding of a single judge in a case in which bribery wasn’t even the charge.”
Had Donziger been criminally charged with bribery, a jury would have assessed Guerra’s credibility. Instead, in the RICO case, which was civil, the decision about a key witness came down to one person — Kaplan — who chose to believe him. That choice has set the stage for the legal losses Donziger has suffered since, according to some close watchers of the Chevron case.
“On the basis of Kaplan saying, ‘I believe this witness; I find Donziger guilty of the crime of bribery of the judge’ — on the basis of that, he’s been destroyed. That is the pinnacle element of all of the other claims against him. And if you take that one out, the rest of them — they’re just not there,” said Charles Nesson, an attorney and Harvard Law School professor. “He has effectively been convicted of bribery by the finding of a single judge in a case in which bribery wasn’t even the charge,” Nesson said of Donziger. “I teach evidence, that you have to prove what you assert. But the proof in this case is the thinnest.”
Nesson, who represented Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case and the plaintiffs in the suit of W. R. Grace featured in the book and film “A Civil Action,” teaches Donziger’s case in his “Fair Trial” course, using it as an example of a decidedly unfair trial. “Donziger epitomizes a person in asymmetric civil litigation who can now be denied a fair trial,” he explains to his students.
Nesson is one of several legal scholars who have opined that Kaplan has a soft spot for Chevron, which the judge once described as “a company of considerable importance to our economy that employs thousands all over the world, that supplies a group of commodities, gasoline, heating oil, other fuels, and lubricants on which every one of us depends every single day.”
In contrast, the judge has exhibited antipathy for Donziger, according to his former lawyer, John Keker, who saw the case as a “Dickensian farce,” in which “Chevron is using its limitless resources to crush defendants and win this case through might rather than merit.” Keker withdrew from the case in 2013 after noting that “Chevron will file any motion, however meritless, in the hope that the court will use it to hurt Donziger.”
Photo: Annie Tritt for The Intercept
Donziger’s current prohibition from working, traveling, earning money, and leaving his home shows how successful Chevron’s strategy has been. But even as his fate hangs in the balance, Donziger’s case matters far beyond the life of this one lawyer.
“It should be nothing short of terrifying for any activist challenging corporate power and the oil industry in the U.S.,” said Paul Paz y Miño, associate director of Amazon Watch, an organization devoted to the protection of the rainforest and Indigenous people in the Amazon basin. “They’ve made it clear there’s no amount of money that’s too much to spend on this case,” he said of Chevron. “They will stop at nothing.”
The Chevron case may be most devastating for the plaintiffs in the Amazon, who never received their judgment despite being left with hundreds of unlined waste pits and contaminated water and soil from millions of gallons of spilled crude oil and billions of gallons of dumped toxic waste. Everything that’s happened to Donziger “is small potatoes compared to the fact that Kaplan has rendered the damage the company actually did as totally irrelevant,” said Nesson.
But the latest twists and turns in the Chevron case may also be particularly bad news for climate activists. A mere 20 companies are responsible for a third of the greenhouse gases emitted in the modern era; Chevron ranks second only to Saudi Aramco among them. And it’s increasingly clear that addressing the climate crisis will require confronting these mega-emitters, whose resources for litigation dwarf that of any individual.
Making Chevron and other companies clean up the messes created by their oil production will speed the transition away from fossil fuels, according to Rex Weyler, an environmental advocate who co-founded Greenpeace International and directed the original Greenpeace Foundation. “If hydrocarbon companies are forced to pay for the true costs of their product, which include these environmental costs, it will make the alternative energy systems more competitive,” said Weyler.
Accordingly, Weyler feels that the climate movement should focus on Chevron’s case — and Donziger’s legal battle. “One of the most effective things climate activists can do right now to change the system would be to not let Chevron get away with polluting in these countries, whether Ecuador, Nigeria, or anywhere” said Weyler. While some human rights and environmental advocates have tried to call attention to Donziger’s case and Chevron’s bullying of him, Weyler felt that the outcry should be louder.
After seeing what’s happened to Donziger, and some of his former allies, whom Chevron has gone after as “nonparty co-conspirators,” people may be afraid to stand up to the company. Donziger himself is living in fear. There is no set punishment when a judge files for criminal contempt of court, so he spends his days worrying over what will happen to him next. “It’s scary,” he told me. “I don’t know what they’re thinking.”
But Weyler pointed out that Chevron, which could still be forced to pay the multibillion-dollar judgment by courts in another country, is also afraid. “They are afraid of the precedent. Not only is Chevron afraid, the entire extraction industry is afraid of the precedent,” said Weyler. “They do not want to be held responsible for the pollution of their industry.”