scientificamerican--2020-10-28--A Vision for the Next Decade of Human Genomics Research

Since the launch of the Human Genome Project 30 years ago , genomics has become deeply woven into research , medicine and , increasingly , daily life .
In roughly 10,000 days , genomics has blossomed from a boutique discipline associated with a moonshot project into a scientific area now vital for areas as diverse as microbiology and oncology .
What ’ s next for genomics , especially in its applications to human health and disease ?
For the past several years , the broader genomics community has worked with the U.S. National Human Genome Research Institute to formulate a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lies at the forefront of human genomics for the next decade .
The vision represents the strong consensus that we heard about the key guiding principles and values that now undergird human genomics , such as those related to diversity , equity , social justice , data sharing and team science .
The broader biomedical enterprise increasingly depends on a strong foundation for genomics ( consisting of infrastructure , resources and dynamic areas of technology development ) , and so the vision articulates the need to sustain and improve this foundation .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in genomics—with a call to action for high-risk pursuits to break down such barriers .
And , because we are scientists , there are also ambitious and compelling research projects in human genomics that serve to stretch our imaginations and pique our curiosity .
The vision for the next phase of human genomics is bolder than ever , and continues to embrace many of the original promises of the Human Genome Project .
It does so even as some of the previous predictions about genomic advances are still to be fully realized .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ disingenuous and breeds overpromises , but at every encounter during our recent strategic planning process , we found the optimism and exuberance of our colleagues to be both inspiring and metaphorically intoxicating , pushing us to be even bolder and more willing to take risks in describing where genomics might lead us .
That is why the vision ’ s capstone is a set of 10 bold predictions for human genomics by 2030 .
Innovation is inspired by reaching for seemingly unreachable goals .
When early naysayers predicted that the Human Genome Project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and generated the first human genome sequence in less time and for less money than originally planned .
Had we not been overly ambitious for the past 17 years since the end of the Human Genome Project , we would not have reduced the cost of DNA sequencing by more than a millionfold , made genome sequencing routine for the diagnosis of rare genetic diseases , or , most recently , generated a truly complete , end-to-end sequence of a human chromosome .
As a physician-scientist , I was drawn to genomics because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , never dreaming that genomic medicine would begin to be implemented in my lifetime ( and I ’ m only 60 ! )
.
During the Human Genome Project , we mapped and sequenced the human genome to the best of our ability with the then-available methods , which shockingly started with handwriting DNA sequences onto notebook pages and then faxing those pages to collaborators .
Little by little , we found that our step-by-step evolution of approaches was in fact the revolution that we needed for success .
Similar patience and tenacity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vision ’ s bold predictions .
Even if two or three of them are realized , we will have accomplished the incredible .
Among the boldest of the 10 predictions are those that rely not only on the tools of genomics , but also on advances in society—a reminder that the science can only take us so far .
To fulfill the full potential of genomics , researchers need to push the boundaries of science while every one of us—scientists and nonscientists alike—need to continually examine what we know to be true and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us must raise awareness of health inequities and develop the empathetic will to address them , caring for others ’ genomes as much as we do our own .

Since the launch of the Human Genome Project 30 years ago, genomics has become deeply woven into research, medicine and, increasingly, daily life. In roughly 10,000 days, genomics has blossomed from a boutique discipline associated with a moonshot project into a scientific area now vital for areas as diverse as microbiology and oncology.
Numerous genomic applications—noninvasive prenatal genetic testing, DNA-based forensics, direct-to-consumer ancestry sleuthing, genetic disease diagnostics and SARS-CoV-2 virus surveillance, among others—are common practice.
What’s next for genomics, especially in its applications to human health and disease? For the past several years, the broader genomics community has worked with the U.S. National Human Genome Research Institute to formulate a vision—a “2020 vision”—of what lies at the forefront of human genomics for the next decade.
The vision represents the strong consensus that we heard about the key guiding principles and values that now undergird human genomics, such as those related to diversity, equity, social justice, data sharing and team science. The broader biomedical enterprise increasingly depends on a strong foundation for genomics (consisting of infrastructure, resources and dynamic areas of technology development), and so the vision articulates the need to sustain and improve this foundation.
The new vision identifies barriers that impede progress in genomics—with a call to action for high-risk pursuits to break down such barriers. And, because we are scientists, there are also ambitious and compelling research projects in human genomics that serve to stretch our imaginations and pique our curiosity.
The vision for the next phase of human genomics is bolder than ever, and continues to embrace many of the original promises of the Human Genome Project. It does so even as some of the previous predictions about genomic advances are still to be fully realized.
Critics may say such genomics boldness is disingenuous and breeds overpromises, but at every encounter during our recent strategic planning process, we found the optimism and exuberance of our colleagues to be both inspiring and metaphorically intoxicating, pushing us to be even bolder and more willing to take risks in describing where genomics might lead us. That is why the vision’s capstone is a set of 10 bold predictions for human genomics by 2030.
Bold Predictions for Human Genomics by 2030 Generating and analyzing a complete human genome sequence will be routine for any research laboratory, becoming as straightforward as carrying out a DNA purification. The biological function(s) of every human gene will be known; for non-coding elements in the human genome, such knowledge will be the rule rather than the exception. The general features of the epigenetic landscape and transcriptional output will be routinely incorporated into predictive models of the effect of genotype on phenotype. Research in human genomics will have moved beyond population descriptors based on historic social constructs such as race. Studies that involve analyses of genome sequences and associated phenotypic information for millions of human participants will be regularly featured at school science fairs. The regular use of genomic information will have transitioned from boutique to mainstream in all clinical settings, making genomic testing as routine as complete blood counts. The clinical relevance of all encountered genomic variants will be readily predictable, rendering the diagnostic designation ‘variant of uncertain significance (VUS)’ obsolete. An individual’s complete genome sequence along with informative annotations will, if desired, be securely and readily accessible on their smartphone. Individuals from ancestrally diverse backgrounds will benefit equitably from advances in human genomics. Breakthrough discoveries will lead to curative therapies involving genomic modifications for dozens of genetic diseases. From Green, E.D., et. al., “Strategic vision for improving human health at the Forefront of Genomics,” Nature 2020.
Innovation is inspired by reaching for seemingly unreachable goals. When early naysayers predicted that the Human Genome Project would fail, we ignored the pessimism and generated the first human genome sequence in less time and for less money than originally planned. Had we not been overly ambitious for the past 17 years since the end of the Human Genome Project, we would not have reduced the cost of DNA sequencing by more than a millionfold, made genome sequencing routine for the diagnosis of rare genetic diseases, or, most recently, generated a truly complete, end-to-end sequence of a human chromosome. As a physician-scientist, I was drawn to genomics because of its potential for changing medical care, never dreaming that genomic medicine would begin to be implemented in my lifetime (and I’m only 60!).
During the Human Genome Project, we mapped and sequenced the human genome to the best of our ability with the then-available methods, which shockingly started with handwriting DNA sequences onto notebook pages and then faxing those pages to collaborators. Little by little, we found that our step-by-step evolution of approaches was in fact the revolution that we needed for success.
Similar patience and tenacity will be needed in striving for the vision’s bold predictions. Even if two or three of them are realized, we will have accomplished the incredible.
Among the boldest of the 10 predictions are those that rely not only on the tools of genomics, but also on advances in society—a reminder that the science can only take us so far. To fulfill the full potential of genomics, researchers need to push the boundaries of science while every one of us—scientists and nonscientists alike—need to continually examine what we know to be true and know to be possible. Each of us must raise awareness of health inequities and develop the empathetic will to address them, caring for others’ genomes as much as we do our own.


scientificamerican--2020-10-29--How Do We Prevent War in Space?

How Do We Prevent War in Space?

On January 30 , 2020 , an amateur satellite watcher tweeted , “ Something to potentially watch.
” Cosmos 2542 , a Russian inspection satellite , was “ loitering around ” USA 245 , an American spy satellite , and , he wrote , “ as I 'm typing this , that offset distance shifts between 150 and 300 kilometers.
” USA 245 then adjusted its orbit to get away from Cosmos 2542 , which in turn tweaked its own orbit to get closer again .
“ This is all circumstantial evidence , ” the watcher wrote , but “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make it look like a known Russian inspection satellite is currently inspecting a known U.S. spy satellite.
” Laura Grego , an astrophysicist who studies space technology , saw the tweets ; she catalogues satellites , so she has been reading amateur watchers ’ communications , she says , “ since before Twitter was invented.
” One country 's satellite stalking another 's is exactly what people like Grego , who worry about space war , worry about .
Space war is not warfighters shooting one another in space .
Nor is it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high grounds : “ Satellites do n't ‘ drop ’ bombs , ” Grego says , “ and are n't faster , better or less expensive than other ways of bombing.
” Space war is war on satellites .
Cosmos 2542 could have been equipped to interfere with or damage USA 245 or to blow it to pieces .
And if it had done so , the U.S. might have retaliated , perhaps by destroying a Russian spacecraft , and we might have had a space war .
And then which satellites , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be destroyed ?
For the U.S. more than anyone else , space war could be ruinous .
The country relies heavily on its satellites to transmit signals for GPS , credit-card transactions , hospital systems , television stations , weather reports ; the list goes on and on .
But it depends more than any other country on its military satellites for communication and surveillance .
And all satellites—bright and moving in predictable , public orbits—are essentially sitting ducks , nearly impossible to defend ; space war is what the military calls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution to vulnerability is , of course , military .
Last December the Department of Defense created the Space Force , saying that Russia and China had “ weaponized space ” and that space is now a “ warfighting domain.
” Space Force 's job is to protect U.S. satellites and to respond to bad behavior by adversaries .
Cosmos 2542 , as the then head of Space Force , General John Raymond , sternly told Time magazine , “ has the potential to create a dangerous situation in space.
” But Cosmos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start a space war .
Neither Grego nor the amateur watchers know what Cosmos was doing , but their best guess is that it was something like what Russian trawlers do when they hang around U.S. Navy ships : annoy , or intimidate if possible , and see what they can see .
In any case , in mid-March the amateur watcher tweeted that USA 245 had made a small maneuver “ that will put it at a distance of thousands of kilometers for weeks to come if not months , ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Before it did , Grego added her own tweet : “ A good time to establish some shared understandings about how close is too close.
” Grego is at the Union of Concerned Scientists , a nonprofit that is part of the three worlds—nongovernmental organization ( NGO ) , military and diplomatic—focused on space war .
To her , the best way to stop a space war is to enter an international agreement to prevent or limit one .
So far negotiations are stalled in international politics .
Diplomats never work fast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are “ splashing around in the puddle of diplomacy ” without getting much done .
So here we are , with the possibility of an escalating space war that would bring certain and incalculable civilian consequences .
Yet attempts at diplomacy have been lackluster , and the military 's response sounds as aggressive as it does protective .
“ I do n't know if space war is imminent , ” says John Lauder , a 30-year veteran of the intelligence community 's arms-control monitoring efforts , “ but there are trends that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not sitting on top of us , but it 's moving in our direction at a rapid speed.
” For almost as long as there have been satellites , there have been weapons to use against them and networks to track them .
Satellite number one , of course , was Sputnik 1 , put into orbit by the former U.S.S.R. on October 4 , 1957 .
Sputnik and its successors were tracked immediately by amateurs with cameras ; by February 1959 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency had set up the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was a missile called High Virgo , launched by the U.S. on September 22 , 1959 .
In 1963 the former U.S.S.R. tested the first “ satellite fighter ” ; in a 1968 test , another satellite fighter entered the same orbit as a U.S.S.R. target satellite , maneuvered next to it and exploded .
After this energized beginning , the U.S. and the former Soviet Union turned their attention from space war to the nuclear balances of the cold war .
The U.S. spent the subsequent decades building satellites that were “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and functioning very , very well , ” says Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation .
“ But they were not built with the idea of having an adversary do something to them.
” Once the U.S.S.R. collapsed , he says , “ America thought it would be dominant in space forever.
” Space war appeared briefly on the U.S. agenda in 2001 , when a security commission report , headed by Donald Rumsfeld before he left to become secretary of defense , warned of U.S. vulnerability and included the notable phrase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Loverro , then an air force program director , began advocating for a kind of space force , but “ 9/11 happened , and everybody forgot about space , ” he says .
Meanwhile , Grego says , France , Japan , the U.K. and India had launched their own satellites , and more nations had built , bought or operated satellites launched by others .
Loverro and other officials , helped by Representatives Mike Rogers of Alabama and Jim Cooper of Tennessee , both on the House Armed Services Committee , kept @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military and got nowhere until December 2019 , when Space Force was created by presidential fiat .
“ Magically , we were revived , ” Loverro says .
This suddenness meant that for a while , Space Force was long on rhetoric but short on specifics and subject to snide remarks from people on the Internet .
Its public image was not helped when its first official act was to design uniforms ( camouflage , even for soldiers whose field of battle is in front of a computer ) and a logo ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office—and Star Trek ) .
By June , however , Space Force and its Combatant Command , U.S. Space Command , were recruiting tech-smart people ; coordinating with international allies ; deciding which technologies to buy ; and running war-game simulations in which teams attack , counterattack and outthink one another .
Space war “ does n't have to be inevitable , ” says Brigadier General Thomas James , commander at Joint Task Force–Space Defense , a component of Space Command , but “ it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take it seriously.
” Anyone attacking satellites can choose from a long , varied menu of weapons .
The splashiest option , called a direct-ascent antisatellite weapon , or DA-ASAT , is a missile shot from Earth that blows up a spacecraft .
The U.S. and Russia have had DA-ASAT missiles since the cold war .
China and India have both tested DA-ASATs on their own satellites .
Russia 's latest test was this past April .
Another option for attacking satellites is a maneuverable satellite , like Cosmos 2542 , which can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have often used small engines to move for safety reasons , such as to avoid space debris , and maneuverable satellites could be used for refueling or repair .
But maneuverable satellites can be dual use , equally capable of colliding with other satellites or of spying on or shooting them .
In the past few years the U.S. and Russia have used satellites to deploy smaller subsatellites that roam around : Cosmos 2542 emitted Cosmos 2543 , which also stalked USA 245 .
The U.S. has the X-37B , a smaller , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does generally secret things , including emitting subsatellites .
What these subsatellites can do that parent satellites can not is also secret and therefore unclear : Weeden says that all we know about them is what we see .
A space war technology that we can not see , in contrast , is electromagnetic radiation .
Satellites can carry equipment to jam others ’ communications from or to ground stations , or they can mount spoofing attacks to trick other satellites into communicating the wrong things .
The U.S. , China and Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ navigation satellites .
Lasers on satellites or on the ground can dazzle or blind spy satellites ’ imaging sensors , although exactly who has what laser technology with which capabilities is , again , classified or unknown .
In all these hostilities , the U.S. has much to lose .
Of the 3,200 or so functioning satellites , the U.S. owns 1,327 .
Of those , 935 are commercial satellites that provide broadcasting and secure , global communications .
Around 200 U.S. satellites are government and scientific satellites that collect data for predicting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creep of continents and , like the Hubble Space Telescope , understanding the universe .
The remaining handful are military and intelligence satellites , most of which are used for communications—command and control of forces , for example , or directing of drones—and for spying .
Together the satellites enable modern civilization .
They provide the Internet access and GPS navigation and timing signals on which everyone in the world depends and support industries from banking to food supply , the power grid , transportation , the news media and health care .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ fundamental to U.S. security and are the source of its vulnerability .
The early-missile-warning system uses only 10 satellites , the intelligence community 's high-resolution imagery is provided by maybe a dozen , and military command and control communications depend on just six .
“ The central military problem has been , ” Grego says , “ that we extended ourselves into space , and now we 're vulnerable.
” This vulnerability matters because no one is sure how satellites can be defended .
Perhaps imaging satellites could be fitted with a shutter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or bodyguard satellites could protect other satellites .
Whether such defenses have been put into practice is unknown .
“ You wo n't find a lot of official details on the technologies for defense , ” Weeden says , “ due to classification.
” “ Cloaking ” a satellite is technically possible , he says , but also expensive and difficult .
You can make a spacecraft dark to radar or to telescopes but not to both , and the process can hamper the satellite 's performance .
Most efforts at defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The natural place for the military to go is deterrence by punishment , ” Grego says .
“ You use ASAT on me ; I 'll use it on you.
” The first problem with punishment , though , is unpredictable escalation .
The second is the flip side of U.S. vulnerability—that Russia and China do not need their military satellites as much as the U.S. does .
“ It 's only really the U.S. that needs to conduct military operations anywhere in the world all the time against anyone , ” Weeden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and China 's need for defense communications is local or regional and “ can generally be solved with [ other ] means.
” Alternatively the U.S. could deter attacks by denying their benefits .
In other words , a redundant , resilient system that could take losses without losing effectiveness would not be as attractive a target .
This is standard deterrence theory ; whether the Pentagon is practicing it is not clear .
The official Defense Space Strategy , published this past June , avoided this level of detail in the unclassified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ denial of benefits is effectively being supplied , however , by the commercial space industry .
Traditionally the Pentagon has contracted with defense-industry giants such as Lockheed Martin , Raytheon and Northrop Grumman to build its satellites .
These spacecraft tend to be the size of large pickup trucks , and one reason for that is economic efficiency , says Colonel Eric Felt of the Air Force Research Laboratory 's Space Vehicles Directorate .
Whatever new function you need , he says , “ just glue it on to whatever you 're building.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ however—SpaceX , Blue Origin , Virgin Galactic , Planet—have reusable launchers and satellites the size of watermelons at a quarter to a tenth the cost .
The savings allow the military to launch more satellites more often , Felt says , spreading out different functions to different vehicles and making replacement easier .
New Space companies are linking hundreds or thousands of small satellites into large constellations that ensure Internet access and continuous imaging coverage of every spot on the globe and serve as textbook denial of benefits .
The Space-Based Infrared System @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a constellation of 10 large early-warning satellites and is “ a fat , juicy target , ” says Joshua Huminski of George Mason University 's National Security Institute .
“ I hit three SBIRS satellites , and you do n't have early warning.
” But if SBIRS were a megaconstellation of small satellites , he says , “ I take out three , and it 's annoying , but the constellation will heal itself.
” Felt says that Space Force is developing close relationships with New Space companies , is adopting New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not by specification but by function ( “ I need a five-inch coffee mug ” versus “ I need a caffeine-delivery system ” ) and is buying good-enough commercial imagery with a credit card .
By mid-July , months after Cosmos 2542 emitted Cosmos 2543 and drifted away from USA 245 , amateur trackers noticed that Cosmos 2543 was suddenly accompanied by a projectile , Object 45915 , which then zoomed off , apparently using its own motor , at more than 700 kilometers per hour .
Raymond called it an “ on-orbit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Defense tweeted that it hoped Russia would work with international partners toward responsible behavior in space .
Getting spacefaring countries to agree to behave themselves is not simple .
International law governing space is a work in progress : NGOs are working on space-law manuals , Weeden says , but “ law about conflict in space is so far undefined.
” International binding treaties are nonspecific or old or on indefinite hold .
The United Nations Charter prohibits threats to territorial integrity that extend to outer space .
The Outer Space Treaty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signed in 1967 , before the great advances in space technologies .
In 2014 Russia and China proposed the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space treaty , which prohibits stationing weapons in space ; the U.S. does not agree to the proposal 's terms but has made no counterproposal .
Most recently , the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space agreed on 21 nonbinding guidelines for behavior—for example , “ adopt , revise and amend , as necessary , national regulatory frameworks for outer space activities ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a considerable amount of work but do seem a little vague and underwhelming when you read them .
You would be disappointed if you hoped they would address space war , but they are not meant to.
” The issues on which countries would have to agree are complex and prickly .
How do you include everyone—not just the elephantine U.S.-China-Russia triad but all 10 or so countries that can reach space ?
What is the definition of “ weapons ” when , say , a robot arm could be used either to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another country 's satellite ?
How to set up lines of communication so that a message of “ Sorry , I did n't mean to hit your satellite ” can go out before miscalculation and escalation occur ?
What counts as aggression—hitting another country 's satellite with a DA-ASAT missile ?
Sidling up to another country 's satellite ?
How close is too close ?
How do you verify that no one cheats on an agreement ?
And which targets for attacks would cross the line into war , asks John Klein , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instructor at George Washington University 's Space Policy Institute ?
” If you blow up all the GPS satellites—that 's critical infrastructure ; that 's probably war .
Take out a small satellite , probably not war.
” Meanwhile , Grego points out , countries more or less abide by unofficial norms of behavior : registering new satellites sent into orbit , deorbiting their dying ones to avoid creating debris , not testing DA-ASATs on their own satellites and not destroying another country 's satellites .
So if a binding treaty is too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreement based on current norms ?
“ The U.S. and Russia are talking about this , ” Lauder says .
“ Not that we know in detail what they 're talking about , but that they 're talking is a good thing .
Because nobody can be confident of winning a space war.
” Grego agrees with the consensus that it is best to use current norms as a starting point in talks , but she is a little fed up with the pace of diplomacy 's progress .
The situation “ should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of agreed limits , ” she says .
Should n't the State Department get going on this ?
“ We are , ” says Eric Desautels , director of the Office of Emerging Security Challenges at the State Department .
In July 2020 U.S. and Russian officials discussed opening lines of communication to prevent miscalculation and escalation—the first such discussion since 2013—and expressed interest in continuing the discussion .
Meanwhile the U.S. supports a new U.N. agreement that would “ break the impasse ” on space and also reduce risk of escalation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is knowing where every satellite is and how it is behaving .
Space Force 's June 2020 doctrine calls this “ space domain awareness.
” Officially that awareness comes via a global network of sensors on satellites and telescopes on the ground that covers all orbits all the time and tracks everything bigger than 10 centimeters : 3,200 live satellites , as well as 24,000 nonfunctioning “ zombies ” and pieces of space debris that , in a collision with a satellite at 35,400 kilometers an hour , would cause a catastrophic breakup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Force 's 18th Space Control Squadron at the Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California .
Data on the secret satellites are set aside , and the rest go into a public , free , online catalog called Space-Track , from which “ conjunction notifications ” are issued when two satellites look like they might get too close .
The 18th Space Control Squadron works in a secretive operations center that , judging by press release photographs , values functionality over hominess—a maze of connected computer desks , banks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spelling out “ Where Space Superiority Begins ” on a beige wall .
In this barn of a room , five to seven members of the 18th Squadron sit next to one another and , to ensure complete and accurate analyses , also next to their colleagues from the U.K. , Australia , Canada , NASA and the Department of Commerce , as well as a representative from a collective of New Space companies ( all with security clearances ) .
Not on the same floor but available nearby for consultation are representatives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence community , including the National Reconnaissance Office .
Most people in the 18th Squadron are younger than 25 years , although some experienced “ graybeards ” bring the average age up to 27 .
All are tech whizzes .
“ They 've blown my socks off , ” says Lieutenant Colonel Justin Sorice , the 18th 's commander .
The 18th Squadron can say only so much about the details of its job .
To find out how to track a satellite , ask the amateurs .
They prefer to be called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are active , lots are retirees and all are tech-minded .
They use binoculars and stopwatches or radio receivers—although sometimes they get fancier—and provide global coverage by being international .
They sometimes communicate on Twitter but mostly use a public mailing list called SeeSat , which is how Grego followed them pre-Twitter .
“ I stopped calling them amateurs a long time ago , ” she says .
“ They 're quite skilled.
” Their low-tech approach means they track mainly the brightest , biggest satellites .
They pick spacecraft from Space-Track , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be over which cities on a given night , or from rocket-launch notices telling navigators to avoid particular areas .
They watch the satellite pass a star , and they hit a timer .
As they watch it pass a second star , they check the time to a fraction of a second .
By knowing the stars ’ positions and the time , they can derive an orbit .
The last time the secret X-37B , a maneuverable satellite/spy plane , flew , the hobbyists had its orbit in 24 hours .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of information , ” says Jonathan C. McDowell , a hobbyist and an astronomer at the Center for Astrophysics | Harvard & Smithsonian .
Many satellites , for instance , are in low Earth orbit ( LEO ) , which is up to 2,000 kilometers high .
These see the least area but take the crispest pictures , so satellites in LEO are often imagers either doing science , such as monitoring weather , or spying .
Others in geosynchronous orbit ( GEO ) , at 35,786 kilometers , hover over and move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ You 've effectively built a 35,000-kilometer tower , ” McDowell says , “ and taken away the tower , ” so the satellites in GEO are mostly for communications or broadcasting .
Satellites in highly elliptical orbits usually spend most of their time over the Northern Hemisphere and tend to be early-warning or spy satellites .
And in sun-synchronous orbits , satellites keep in lockstep with the sun so that the shadows on Earth are unchanging—perfect for spying .
Information also comes from a satellite 's behavior .
If it is adjusting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Earth 's drag or watching one spot on Earth : “ During the 1973 war , ” McDowell says , referring to the Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states , “ satellites moved to give more frequent passes over Egypt.
” Satellites can “ flare ” when the sun glints off their flat surfaces ; if the flaring is random , the satellite is tumbling out of orbit .
McDowell thinks maybe 10 percent of the satellites they track are classified— spacecraft for military command and control , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spy satellites—some of which are high-resolution instruments that resemble the Hubble Space Telescope but look down instead of up .
These do not show up on Space-Track .
The hobbyists are the only open source of information on all countries ’ classified satellites and , Weeden says , a “ primary source of data on American military objects.
” These space watchers are aware that they bear a responsibility to be careful of speculating about how a spy satellite is being used , McDowell says , but on the whole they are not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries can buy binoculars and stopwatches , too .
In any case , McDowell thinks the hobbyists are generally apolitical .
The enemy , as they see it , is not as another country but the failures of function to which machines are prone , such as RUD ( rapid unplanned disassembly ) , and IOBM ( in oceans by mistake ) .
They see themselves , as the 18th Squadron surely must , “ as an international community of engineers in space battling Murphy 's Law and nature , ” McDowell says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finding the gaps in Space-Track left for classified satellites and filling them in : “ It 's the Sudoku thing , ” McDowell says .
Ultimately the hobbyists matter in the way that oversight and transparency always matter .
Everything about satellites and space war is beset with secrecy—some necessary , some perhaps not .
If the hobbyists had not published the Cosmos stalking , Grego says , the U.S. would have been free not to acknowledge a vulnerability , and Russia would have been free to deny that anything had happened .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ can be powerful in their own way.
” The military and the diplomats work secretly in their own spheres , but if the rest of us want to track the probability of space war , the hobbyists are out there making sure it is as open source as possible .

On January 30, 2020, an amateur satellite watcher tweeted, “Something to potentially watch.” Cosmos 2542, a Russian inspection satellite, was “loitering around” USA 245, an American spy satellite, and, he wrote, “as I'm typing this, that offset distance shifts between 150 and 300 kilometers.” USA 245 then adjusted its orbit to get away from Cosmos 2542, which in turn tweaked its own orbit to get closer again. “This is all circumstantial evidence,” the watcher wrote, but “a hell of a lot of circumstances make it look like a known Russian inspection satellite is currently inspecting a known U.S. spy satellite.”
Laura Grego, an astrophysicist who studies space technology, saw the tweets; she catalogues satellites, so she has been reading amateur watchers’ communications, she says, “since before Twitter was invented.” One country's satellite stalking another's is exactly what people like Grego, who worry about space war, worry about. Space war is not warfighters shooting one another in space. Nor is it war from the highest of all military high grounds: “Satellites don't ‘drop’ bombs,” Grego says, “and aren't faster, better or less expensive than other ways of bombing.” Space war is war on satellites. Cosmos 2542 could have been equipped to interfere with or damage USA 245 or to blow it to pieces. And if it had done so, the U.S. might have retaliated, perhaps by destroying a Russian spacecraft, and we might have had a space war. And then which satellites, and which services civilization depends on, would be destroyed?
For the U.S. more than anyone else, space war could be ruinous. The country relies heavily on its satellites to transmit signals for GPS, credit-card transactions, hospital systems, television stations, weather reports; the list goes on and on. But it depends more than any other country on its military satellites for communication and surveillance. And all satellites—bright and moving in predictable, public orbits—are essentially sitting ducks, nearly impossible to defend; space war is what the military calls “offense-dominant.”
The U.S. military's solution to vulnerability is, of course, military. Last December the Department of Defense created the Space Force, saying that Russia and China had “weaponized space” and that space is now a “warfighting domain.” Space Force's job is to protect U.S. satellites and to respond to bad behavior by adversaries.
Cosmos 2542, as the then head of Space Force, General John Raymond, sternly told Time magazine, “has the potential to create a dangerous situation in space.” But Cosmos 2542's stalking turned out not to start a space war. Neither Grego nor the amateur watchers know what Cosmos was doing, but their best guess is that it was something like what Russian trawlers do when they hang around U.S. Navy ships: annoy, or intimidate if possible, and see what they can see. In any case, in mid-March the amateur watcher tweeted that USA 245 had made a small maneuver “that will put it at a distance of thousands of kilometers for weeks to come if not months,” and after that Cosmos 2542 took itself elsewhere. Before it did, Grego added her own tweet: “A good time to establish some shared understandings about how close is too close.”
Grego is at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit that is part of the three worlds—nongovernmental organization (NGO), military and diplomatic—focused on space war. To her, the best way to stop a space war is to enter an international agreement to prevent or limit one. So far negotiations are stalled in international politics. Diplomats never work fast, Grego says, but right now they are “splashing around in the puddle of diplomacy” without getting much done.
So here we are, with the possibility of an escalating space war that would bring certain and incalculable civilian consequences. Yet attempts at diplomacy have been lackluster, and the military's response sounds as aggressive as it does protective. “I don't know if space war is imminent,” says John Lauder, a 30-year veteran of the intelligence community's arms-control monitoring efforts, “but there are trends that make space more dangerous. It's not sitting on top of us, but it's moving in our direction at a rapid speed.”
Space Pearl Harbor
For almost as long as there have been satellites, there have been weapons to use against them and networks to track them. Satellite number one, of course, was Sputnik 1, put into orbit by the former U.S.S.R. on October 4, 1957. Sputnik and its successors were tracked immediately by amateurs with cameras; by February 1959 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency had set up the first satellite-surveillance network. The first antisatellite weapon was a missile called High Virgo, launched by the U.S. on September 22, 1959. In 1963 the former U.S.S.R. tested the first “satellite fighter”; in a 1968 test, another satellite fighter entered the same orbit as a U.S.S.R. target satellite, maneuvered next to it and exploded.
After this energized beginning, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union turned their attention from space war to the nuclear balances of the cold war. The U.S. spent the subsequent decades building satellites that were “exquisitely capable and costing billions of dollars and functioning very, very well,” says Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation. “But they were not built with the idea of having an adversary do something to them.” Once the U.S.S.R. collapsed, he says, “America thought it would be dominant in space forever.”
Space war appeared briefly on the U.S. agenda in 2001, when a security commission report, headed by Donald Rumsfeld before he left to become secretary of defense, warned of U.S. vulnerability and included the notable phrase “a Space Pearl Harbor.” Douglas Loverro, then an air force program director, began advocating for a kind of space force, but “9/11 happened, and everybody forgot about space,” he says.
Meanwhile, Grego says, France, Japan, the U.K. and India had launched their own satellites, and more nations had built, bought or operated satellites launched by others. Loverro and other officials, helped by Representatives Mike Rogers of Alabama and Jim Cooper of Tennessee, both on the House Armed Services Committee, kept pushing for a space branch of the military and got nowhere until December 2019, when Space Force was created by presidential fiat. “Magically, we were revived,” Loverro says.
This suddenness meant that for a while, Space Force was long on rhetoric but short on specifics and subject to snide remarks from people on the Internet. Its public image was not helped when its first official act was to design uniforms (camouflage, even for soldiers whose field of battle is in front of a computer) and a logo (the delta-shaped wing shared by patches of the U.S. Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office—and Star Trek). By June, however, Space Force and its Combatant Command, U.S. Space Command, were recruiting tech-smart people; coordinating with international allies; deciding which technologies to buy; and running war-game simulations in which teams attack, counterattack and outthink one another. Space war “doesn't have to be inevitable,” says Brigadier General Thomas James, commander at Joint Task Force–Space Defense, a component of Space Command, but “it's very serious business, and we take it seriously.”
Offense and Defense
Anyone attacking satellites can choose from a long, varied menu of weapons. The splashiest option, called a direct-ascent antisatellite weapon, or DA-ASAT, is a missile shot from Earth that blows up a spacecraft. The U.S. and Russia have had DA-ASAT missiles since the cold war. China and India have both tested DA-ASATs on their own satellites. Russia's latest test was this past April.
Another option for attacking satellites is a maneuverable satellite, like Cosmos 2542, which can approach another country's vehicle. Satellites have often used small engines to move for safety reasons, such as to avoid space debris, and maneuverable satellites could be used for refueling or repair. But maneuverable satellites can be dual use, equally capable of colliding with other satellites or of spying on or shooting them. In the past few years the U.S. and Russia have used satellites to deploy smaller subsatellites that roam around: Cosmos 2542 emitted Cosmos 2543, which also stalked USA 245. The U.S. has the X-37B, a smaller, robotic version of the Space Shuttle that does generally secret things, including emitting subsatellites. What these subsatellites can do that parent satellites cannot is also secret and therefore unclear: Weeden says that all we know about them is what we see.
A space war technology that we cannot see, in contrast, is electromagnetic radiation. Satellites can carry equipment to jam others’ communications from or to ground stations, or they can mount spoofing attacks to trick other satellites into communicating the wrong things. The U.S., China and Russia routinely jam other countries’ links with navigation satellites. Lasers on satellites or on the ground can dazzle or blind spy satellites’ imaging sensors, although exactly who has what laser technology with which capabilities is, again, classified or unknown.
In all these hostilities, the U.S. has much to lose. Of the 3,200 or so functioning satellites, the U.S. owns 1,327. Of those, 935 are commercial satellites that provide broadcasting and secure, global communications. Around 200 U.S. satellites are government and scientific satellites that collect data for predicting hurricanes, monitoring droughts, watching the creep of continents and, like the Hubble Space Telescope, understanding the universe. The remaining handful are military and intelligence satellites, most of which are used for communications—command and control of forces, for example, or directing of drones—and for spying. Together the satellites enable modern civilization. They provide the Internet access and GPS navigation and timing signals on which everyone in the world depends and support industries from banking to food supply, the power grid, transportation, the news media and health care.
The few military and intelligence satellites are fundamental to U.S. security and are the source of its vulnerability. The early-missile-warning system uses only 10 satellites, the intelligence community's high-resolution imagery is provided by maybe a dozen, and military command and control communications depend on just six. “The central military problem has been,” Grego says, “that we extended ourselves into space, and now we're vulnerable.”
This vulnerability matters because no one is sure how satellites can be defended. Perhaps imaging satellites could be fitted with a shutter that reacts fast to too much light, or bodyguard satellites could protect other satellites. Whether such defenses have been put into practice is unknown. “You won't find a lot of official details on the technologies for defense,” Weeden says, “due to classification.” “Cloaking” a satellite is technically possible, he says, but also expensive and difficult. You can make a spacecraft dark to radar or to telescopes but not to both, and the process can hamper the satellite's performance.
Most efforts at defense tend to focus on deterrence. “The natural place for the military to go is deterrence by punishment,” Grego says. “You use ASAT on me; I'll use it on you.” The first problem with punishment, though, is unpredictable escalation. The second is the flip side of U.S. vulnerability—that Russia and China do not need their military satellites as much as the U.S. does. “It's only really the U.S. that needs to conduct military operations anywhere in the world all the time against anyone,” Weeden says, whereas most of Russia's and China's need for defense communications is local or regional and “can generally be solved with [other] means.”
Alternatively the U.S. could deter attacks by denying their benefits. In other words, a redundant, resilient system that could take losses without losing effectiveness would not be as attractive a target. This is standard deterrence theory; whether the Pentagon is practicing it is not clear. The official Defense Space Strategy, published this past June, avoided this level of detail in the unclassified version of the report.
Deterrence by denial of benefits is effectively being supplied, however, by the commercial space industry. Traditionally the Pentagon has contracted with defense-industry giants such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman to build its satellites. These spacecraft tend to be the size of large pickup trucks, and one reason for that is economic efficiency, says Colonel Eric Felt of the Air Force Research Laboratory's Space Vehicles Directorate. Whatever new function you need, he says, “just glue it on to whatever you're building.” The so-called New Space companies, however—SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, Planet—have reusable launchers and satellites the size of watermelons at a quarter to a tenth the cost. The savings allow the military to launch more satellites more often, Felt says, spreading out different functions to different vehicles and making replacement easier.
New Space companies are linking hundreds or thousands of small satellites into large constellations that ensure Internet access and continuous imaging coverage of every spot on the globe and serve as textbook denial of benefits. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), in contrast, is a constellation of 10 large early-warning satellites and is “a fat, juicy target,” says Joshua Huminski, director of the National Security Space Program at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.* “I hit three SBIRS satellites, and you don't have early warning.” But if SBIRS were a megaconstellation of small satellites, he says, “I take out three, and it's annoying, but the constellation will heal itself.”
Felt says that Space Force is developing close relationships with New Space companies, is adopting New Space's rule for ordering new technology not by specification but by function (“I need a five-inch coffee mug” versus “I need a caffeine-delivery system”) and is buying good-enough commercial imagery with a credit card.
Space Diplomacy
By mid-July, months after Cosmos 2542 emitted Cosmos 2543 and drifted away from USA 245, amateur trackers noticed that Cosmos 2543 was suddenly accompanied by a projectile, Object 45915, which then zoomed off, apparently using its own motor, at more than 700 kilometers per hour. Raymond called it an “on-orbit weapons test.” The U.K.'s Ministry of Defense tweeted that it hoped Russia would work with international partners toward responsible behavior in space.
Getting spacefaring countries to agree to behave themselves is not simple. International law governing space is a work in progress: NGOs are working on space-law manuals, Weeden says, but “law about conflict in space is so far undefined.” International binding treaties are nonspecific or old or on indefinite hold. The United Nations Charter prohibits threats to territorial integrity that extend to outer space. The Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons in space but was signed in 1967, before the great advances in space technologies. In 2014 Russia and China proposed the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space treaty, which prohibits stationing weapons in space; the U.S. does not agree to the proposal's terms but has made no counterproposal. Most recently, the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space agreed on 21 nonbinding guidelines for behavior—for example, “adopt, revise and amend, as necessary, national regulatory frameworks for outer space activities”—which, Grego says, took “a considerable amount of work but do seem a little vague and underwhelming when you read them. You would be disappointed if you hoped they would address space war, but they are not meant to.”
The issues on which countries would have to agree are complex and prickly. How do you include everyone—not just the elephantine U.S.-China-Russia triad but all 10 or so countries that can reach space? What is the definition of “weapons” when, say, a robot arm could be used either to replace a defunct sensor or to grab another country's satellite? How to set up lines of communication so that a message of “Sorry, I didn't mean to hit your satellite” can go out before miscalculation and escalation occur? What counts as aggression—hitting another country's satellite with a DA-ASAT missile? Sidling up to another country's satellite? How close is too close? How do you verify that no one cheats on an agreement? And which targets for attacks would cross the line into war, asks John Klein, a fellow at Falcon Research and an instructor at George Washington University's Space Policy Institute? ”If you blow up all the GPS satellites—that's critical infrastructure; that's probably war. Take out a small satellite, probably not war.”
Meanwhile, Grego points out, countries more or less abide by unofficial norms of behavior: registering new satellites sent into orbit, deorbiting their dying ones to avoid creating debris, not testing DA-ASATs on their own satellites and not destroying another country's satellites. So if a binding treaty is too hard, how about a nonbinding international agreement based on current norms? “The U.S. and Russia are talking about this,” Lauder says. “Not that we know in detail what they're talking about, but that they're talking is a good thing. Because nobody can be confident of winning a space war.”
Grego agrees with the consensus that it is best to use current norms as a starting point in talks, but she is a little fed up with the pace of diplomacy's progress. The situation “should have been managed years ago by some kind of agreed limits,” she says. Shouldn't the State Department get going on this? “We are,” says Eric Desautels, director of the Office of Emerging Security Challenges at the State Department. In July 2020 U.S. and Russian officials discussed opening lines of communication to prevent miscalculation and escalation—the first such discussion since 2013—and expressed interest in continuing the discussion. Meanwhile the U.S. supports a new U.N. agreement that would “break the impasse” on space and also reduce risk of escalation.
Always Watching
The fundamental necessity of space security is knowing where every satellite is and how it is behaving. Space Force's June 2020 doctrine calls this “space domain awareness.” Officially that awareness comes via a global network of sensors on satellites and telescopes on the ground that covers all orbits all the time and tracks everything bigger than 10 centimeters: 3,200 live satellites, as well as 24,000 nonfunctioning “zombies” and pieces of space debris that, in a collision with a satellite at 35,400 kilometers an hour, would cause a catastrophic breakup.
The information is sent to Space Force's 18th Space Control Squadron at the Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Data on the secret satellites are set aside, and the rest go into a public, free, online catalog called Space-Track, from which “conjunction notifications” are issued when two satellites look like they might get too close.
The 18th Space Control Squadron works in a secretive operations center that, judging by press release photographs, values functionality over hominess—a maze of connected computer desks, banks of wall monitors and shiny metal letters spelling out “Where Space Superiority Begins” on a beige wall. In this barn of a room, five to seven members of the 18th Squadron sit next to one another and, to ensure complete and accurate analyses, also next to their colleagues from the U.K., Australia, Canada, NASA and the Department of Commerce, as well as a representative from a collective of New Space companies (all with security clearances). Not on the same floor but available nearby for consultation are representatives from France, Germany and the U.S. intelligence community, including the National Reconnaissance Office. Most people in the 18th Squadron are younger than 25 years, although some experienced “graybeards” bring the average age up to 27. All are tech whizzes. “They've blown my socks off,” says Lieutenant Colonel Justin Sorice, the 18th's commander.
The 18th Squadron can say only so much about the details of its job. To find out how to track a satellite, ask the amateurs. They prefer to be called hobbyists; 20 to 100 of them are active, lots are retirees and all are tech-minded. They use binoculars and stopwatches or radio receivers—although sometimes they get fancier—and provide global coverage by being international. They sometimes communicate on Twitter but mostly use a public mailing list called SeeSat, which is how Grego followed them pre-Twitter. “I stopped calling them amateurs a long time ago,” she says. “They're quite skilled.”
Their low-tech approach means they track mainly the brightest, biggest satellites. They pick spacecraft from Space-Track, from Web sites listing which satellites will be over which cities on a given night, or from rocket-launch notices telling navigators to avoid particular areas. They watch the satellite pass a star, and they hit a timer. As they watch it pass a second star, they check the time to a fraction of a second. By knowing the stars’ positions and the time, they can derive an orbit. The last time the secret X-37B, a maneuverable satellite/spy plane, flew, the hobbyists had its orbit in 24 hours.
“The orbit gives a surprising amount of information,” says Jonathan C. McDowell, a hobbyist and an astronomer at the Center for Astrophysics | Harvard & Smithsonian. Many satellites, for instance, are in low Earth orbit (LEO), which is up to 2,000 kilometers high. These see the least area but take the crispest pictures, so satellites in LEO are often imagers either doing science, such as monitoring weather, or spying. Others in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), at 35,786 kilometers, hover over and move exactly with one spot on Earth. “You've effectively built a 35,000-kilometer tower,” McDowell says, “and taken away the tower,” so the satellites in GEO are mostly for communications or broadcasting. Satellites in highly elliptical orbits usually spend most of their time over the Northern Hemisphere and tend to be early-warning or spy satellites. And in sun-synchronous orbits, satellites keep in lockstep with the sun so that the shadows on Earth are unchanging—perfect for spying.
Information also comes from a satellite's behavior. If it is adjusting its orbit, it could be countering Earth's drag or watching one spot on Earth: “During the 1973 war,” McDowell says, referring to the Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, “satellites moved to give more frequent passes over Egypt.” Satellites can “flare” when the sun glints off their flat surfaces; if the flaring is random, the satellite is tumbling out of orbit.
McDowell thinks maybe 10 percent of the satellites they track are classified— spacecraft for military command and control, early-warning equipment, and radio and optical spy satellites—some of which are high-resolution instruments that resemble the Hubble Space Telescope but look down instead of up. These do not show up on Space-Track. The hobbyists are the only open source of information on all countries’ classified satellites and, Weeden says, a “primary source of data on American military objects.” These space watchers are aware that they bear a responsibility to be careful of speculating about how a spy satellite is being used, McDowell says, but on the whole they are not worried about revealing national secrets: rival countries can buy binoculars and stopwatches, too.
In any case, McDowell thinks the hobbyists are generally apolitical. The enemy, as they see it, is not as another country but the failures of function to which machines are prone, such as RUD (rapid unplanned disassembly), and IOBM (in oceans by mistake). They see themselves, as the 18th Squadron surely must, “as an international community of engineers in space battling Murphy's Law and nature,” McDowell says. And they like solving puzzles, finding the gaps in Space-Track left for classified satellites and filling them in: “It's the Sudoku thing,” McDowell says.
Ultimately the hobbyists matter in the way that oversight and transparency always matter. Everything about satellites and space war is beset with secrecy—some necessary, some perhaps not. If the hobbyists had not published the Cosmos stalking, Grego says, the U.S. would have been free not to acknowledge a vulnerability, and Russia would have been free to deny that anything had happened. These hobbyists, she says, “can be powerful in their own way.” The military and the diplomats work secretly in their own spheres, but if the rest of us want to track the probability of space war, the hobbyists are out there making sure it is as open source as possible.
*Editor’s Note (11/20/20): This sentence has been revised after posting to clarify Joshua Huminski’s primary affiliation.


scientificamerican--2020-10-29--Climate Change Is Central to California's Wildfires

As the toll from California ’ s wildfires grows higher year after year , the state ’ s future appears fiery and hazy with smoke .
For conservative columnists like Ben Shapiro , Niall Ferguson and Tyler O ’ Neil , it ’ s clear who is responsible : California Democrats .
In recent opinion pieces , they acknowledge that climate change might play a role in these fires , but they blame Democratic leadership for exacerbating fuel buildups through poor land management .
As proof , they reference a study from early this year in Nature Sustainability .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrong .
Their opinion pieces represent a dangerous form of climate denialism , one that recognizes the value of climate adaptation—adapting to life under a changing climate—but purposefully misdirects by refusing to acknowledge the critical importance of limiting the amount of future climate change .
The science is clear .
Climate change plays an undeniable role in the unprecedented wildfires of recent years .
More than half of the acres burned each year in the western United States can be attributed to climate change .
The number of dry , warm , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than doubled since the 1980s .
Without aggressive reduction of greenhouse gasses , forests in Northern California , Oregon and Washington could experience an increase of more than 78 percent in area burned by 2050 .
Governor Gavin Newsom correctly characterized recent wildfires as a “ climate damn emergency.
” It ’ s almost unfathomable to imagine a situation in which the 2020 wildfire season becomes a regular occurrence or even a mild year , but that ’ s exactly what could happen in our future .
We must dramatically reduce our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a few decades , we might recall the more than four million acres of California burned so far this year—that have already shattered the prior record , set in 2018—as a relatively light wildfire season .
That prospect , rooted in science and devastating to life and property , is unacceptable .
But we must also prepare for reality with strong measures to reduce our already heightened and increasing risk .
Resilience will require a broad portfolio of actions , from the household to the federal level , from emergency preparedness to disaster-resistant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treatments like prescribed burns have become a salient example .
Fuel treatments reduce the buildup of vegetation that has resulted from nearly a century of fire suppression and from the criminalization of traditional Indigenous controlled burning .
Twenty million acres of forests across California could now benefit from fuel treatments like prescribed burns , purposely-set fires intended to safely reduce fuel overgrowth .
However , inadequate funding , limited prescribed burn crews , and dangerous weather conditions remain barriers to conducting prescribed burns .
As the owner of 57 percent of forests in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enormous role to play .
The U.S. Forest Service aspires to treat 500,000 acres per year , but is unlikely to reach that target given limited funding from Congress .
However , new legislation could help : a new bill from Ron Wyden ( D–Ore . )
could guarantee $ 600 million each year for prescribed burns across federal , state and private lands .
Meanwhile , legislators in Sacramento have passed dozens of bills to address wildfire risk in the last few years , including six new laws on prescribed burns .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ several of the barriers we found in our study , including the need for liability protection and programs for training and public education .
Last year , Governor Newsom also declared a state of emergency to fast-track 35 fuel-reduction projects that would protect 200 at-risk communities .
But fuel treatments alone are not the solution ; we can not disregard that our contributions to climate change continue to aggravate our risk .
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an essential part of protecting our communities and ecosystems in the future .
By exclusively focusing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ignore the ongoing influence of climate change and politicize critical action for fuel treatments that protect our communities and ecosystems .
In the September 29 debate , two years after recommending that Californians rake the forest , President Trump deflected on commenting on the role of climate change in recent wildfires .
Instead , he told us , “ Every year I get the call : ‘ California is burning !
California is burning !
” If that was cleaned , if you had good forest management , you wouldn ’ t be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won ’ t prevent climate disasters .
From California wildfires to Gulf Coast floods , we already experience their effects .
Arguments that purposefully misconstrue the impacts of climate change on our ecosystems and communities increase our peril .

As the toll from California’s wildfires grows higher year after year, the state’s future appears fiery and hazy with smoke. For conservative columnists like Ben Shapiro, Niall Ferguson and Tyler O’Neil, it’s clear who is responsible: California Democrats. In recent opinion pieces, they acknowledge that climate change might play a role in these fires, but they blame Democratic leadership for exacerbating fuel buildups through poor land management. As proof, they reference a study from early this year in Nature Sustainability.
We wrote that study. These columnists are wrong.
Their opinion pieces represent a dangerous form of climate denialism, one that recognizes the value of climate adaptation—adapting to life under a changing climate—but purposefully misdirects by refusing to acknowledge the critical importance of limiting the amount of future climate change.
The science is clear. Climate change plays an undeniable role in the unprecedented wildfires of recent years. More than half of the acres burned each year in the western United States can be attributed to climate change. The number of dry, warm, and windy autumn days—perfect wildfire weather—in California has more than doubled since the 1980s.
Without aggressive reduction of greenhouse gasses, forests in Northern California, Oregon and Washington could experience an increase of more than 78 percent in area burned by 2050. Governor Gavin Newsom correctly characterized recent wildfires as a “climate damn emergency.” It’s almost unfathomable to imagine a situation in which the 2020 wildfire season becomes a regular occurrence or even a mild year, but that’s exactly what could happen in our future.
We must dramatically reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. Otherwise, in a few decades, we might recall the more than four million acres of California burned so far this year—that have already shattered the prior record, set in 2018—as a relatively light wildfire season. That prospect, rooted in science and devastating to life and property, is unacceptable.
But we must also prepare for reality with strong measures to reduce our already heightened and increasing risk. Resilience will require a broad portfolio of actions, from the household to the federal level, from emergency preparedness to disaster-resistant building codes. For wildfires, fuel treatments like prescribed burns have become a salient example.
Fuel treatments reduce the buildup of vegetation that has resulted from nearly a century of fire suppression and from the criminalization of traditional Indigenous controlled burning. Twenty million acres of forests across California could now benefit from fuel treatments like prescribed burns, purposely-set fires intended to safely reduce fuel overgrowth. However, inadequate funding, limited prescribed burn crews, and dangerous weather conditions remain barriers to conducting prescribed burns.
As the owner of 57 percent of forests in California, the federal government has an enormous role to play. The U.S. Forest Service aspires to treat 500,000 acres per year, but is unlikely to reach that target given limited funding from Congress. However, new legislation could help: a new bill from Ron Wyden (D–Ore.) could guarantee $600 million each year for prescribed burns across federal, state and private lands.
Meanwhile, legislators in Sacramento have passed dozens of bills to address wildfire risk in the last few years, including six new laws on prescribed burns. These laws and recent executive actions address several of the barriers we found in our study, including the need for liability protection and programs for training and public education. Last year, Governor Newsom also declared a state of emergency to fast-track 35 fuel-reduction projects that would protect 200 at-risk communities.
But fuel treatments alone are not the solution; we cannot disregard that our contributions to climate change continue to aggravate our risk. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an essential part of protecting our communities and ecosystems in the future. By exclusively focusing on fuel treatments, these conservative columnists ignore the ongoing influence of climate change and politicize critical action for fuel treatments that protect our communities and ecosystems.
In the September 29 debate, two years after recommending that Californians rake the forest, President Trump deflected on commenting on the role of climate change in recent wildfires. Instead, he told us, “Every year I get the call: ‘California is burning! California is burning!” If that was cleaned, if you had good forest management, you wouldn’t be getting those calls.”
Ignoring climate change won’t prevent climate disasters. From California wildfires to Gulf Coast floods, we already experience their effects. Arguments that purposefully misconstrue the impacts of climate change on our ecosystems and communities increase our peril.


scientificamerican--2020-10-29--Governments Worldwide Consider Ditching Daylight Saving Time

It ’ s nearly that time of the year again : the end of daylight saving , when Americans push their clocks back and rejoice at the gained hour of sleep—or mourn the lost hour of sunlight in the afternoon .
This system ’ s twice-a-year transitions have become increasingly unpopular .
Scientists have been calling attention to the damaging effects of the time changes—which include a general reduction in mental and physical well-being , as well as a potential increased risk of serious complications , such as strokes and heart attacks , soon after the shifts .
There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and harmful medical errors shortly following when clocks are moved forward in the spring .
In many countries , this might be the one of the last instances in which people make the adjustment .
Governments around the world have been in discussions about scrapping the seasonal clock changes and sticking to one time—either permanent standard time or permanent daylight saving .
In the U.S. , many states are considering , or have already passed , legislation to adopt one of the two .
Hawaii and most of Arizona decided to adopt just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last year the European Parliament voted to abolish the time shifts , but the member states of the European Union have yet to agree on how to implement the decision .
Beth Malow , a professor of neurology and pediatrics at Vanderbilt University , spoke with Scientific American about the health effects of this timekeeping practice and what should replace it .
[ An edited transcript of the interview follows . ]
The end of daylight saving time is fast approaching .
Generally speaking , how disruptive are the transitions to and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well-being ?
There ’ s a lot of variability in what people experience .
Some people have shared with me that , for example , they might have a child with autism , and for two or three months after the transition , they feel like things are just not right with their child ’ s sleep .
People also tell me they just feel out of sync for a while .
Other people may deal with the change more easily .
It ’ s similar to when we travel [ from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are affected by jet lag more than others .
The one thing I will say is that people think , “ Well , it ’ s only an hour , so it ’ s not a big deal .
It ’ s kind of like traveling from Nashville , [ Tenn. ] , to New York [ City ] —going from Central to Eastern time.
” But [ daylight saving ] really isn ’ t that .
It ’ s a misalignment of your biological rhythms , or circadian rhythms , for eight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote a commentary in JAMA Neurology last year that discusses some medical complications—such as cardiovascular problems and stroke—associated with the transitions .
Can you talk a bit about how daylight saving changes can increase the risk for these kinds of events ?
We don ’ t know the actual mechanism because these are epidemiological studies , where there are large numbers of people , and [ researchers ] observe the stroke rate or heart attack rate increase the week after [ the time change ] .
The predominant increase has been with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
We think that what ’ s triggering that [ increase ] is either the loss of an hour of sleep or the circadian misalignment , where you ’ re off sync when you move the clocks an hour ahead .
Whenever we disrupt sleep or disrupt our circadian rhythm , it can cause increases in inflammatory markers and our stress response—and we know that can take a toll on the heart and the brain .
You mentioned that not everybody is affected equally by the time changes .
Are some people more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , what is known about why they are more at risk ?
Some people definitely seem to be more vulnerable .
I think age is one factor .
As we get older , our circadian rhythm or just our ability to deal with sleep deprivation is affected .
So younger people do better than older people .
People with underlying conditions oftentimes struggle more—people with neurodevelopmental conditions [ such as autism ] or degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer ’ s or other forms of dementia will be more sensitive .
Some of us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us are night owls .
Our ability to deal with being up later or earlier , depending on the time change , can affect us as well .
All of those can make a difference .
I don ’ t think we know enough yet about what factors influence our ability to adapt .
I think there are probably also some genetic factors that we ’ re not aware of that would make people more susceptible .
I imagine people are experiencing negative effects every year .
Is there any research looking at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these changes ?
I think , in reality , by October or November , we ’ ve gotten over the March transition .
It ’ s probably , in most people , maybe , at most , several weeks .
What ’ s more of an issue is : you almost have a chronic circadian misalignment—or things are just off-kilter for eight months of the year .
That ’ s how I would look at it .
When you ’ re in standard time , the sun at noon is , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re really aligned .
When you ’ re in your daylight saving time for eight months of the year , you ’ re an hour off , and you 're getting not enough light in the morning and too much light at night .
And that gets worse as the summer approaches—as the days get longer , and you ’ re getting light into the evening , when your body should be getting less light so that it can get ready for bed .
In the morning , as we start getting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when you ’ re in daylight saving time .
This year is a bit different , given that there is the COVID-19 pandemic , which itself has been associated with sleep disturbances , and the forthcoming U.S. presidential election .
Do you think that these things will make the transition back to standard time particularly disruptive for some people ?
Yes and no : Yes , in that we ’ re all dealing with a higher baseline level of stress .
When you add in the stress of transitioning from one time to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have more stress .
On the other hand , I think the advantage right now [ is related to ] the reason that we didn ’ t really pay attention to [ the shift ] very much in March , [ which was that ] most of us were working from home , and we had more control over our sleep-wake cycles than we normally did .
For example , I didn ’ t have to wake up at 6 A.M. , so I didn ’ t notice as much whether it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we can control our schedules , [ the easier ] it ’ s going to [ be ] .
In some ways , the pandemic has made it easier because we ’ re not as rigid in our time zones .
I will say that I ’ m excited about people getting an hour more sleep on November 1 , because I think that will bode well for being rational at the polls .
Regardless of which side you ’ re on or what ’ s going on in your individual state with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will know that their mind and their ability to vote in a rational way is optimized because they ’ ve gotten that extra hour of sleep .
There have been efforts both in the U.S. and elsewhere to abolish these yearly time changes , either by adopting permanent daylight saving or sticking to standard time alone .
Do you agree with these efforts ?
Most people agree that we need to get rid of this transition back and forth .
I personally am an advocate for permanent standard .
The reason I am @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really important for our well-being , our mood and our sleep .
Getting enough light , especially in the winter , is critical .
If we have permanent daylight saving time , I worry that come May , June , July , we ’ re getting too much light too late in the evening .
Then we have trouble falling asleep because we don ’ t make [ enough ] natural melatonin , which requires it to be dark .
To me , the beauty of the permanent standard is : you have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ winter , when you need it , and you have your dark in the summer , when you need it .
[ Studies have ] shown that if you ’ re on the eastern side of the Central time zone versus the western side of the Eastern time zone , you ’ ll actually get more sleep because you have that extra hour of light in the morning and don ’ t have that extra hour of light at night .
The American Academy of Sleep Medicine just came out with a support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are a lot of different groups that have come out in favor of permanent standard time from the health standpoint .
Some countries and U.S. states already do not observe daylight saving time .
Have researchers studied those areas to see how that arrangement has worked out for people who live in them ?
I have not seen those studies ; I ’ d like to see those studies .
I don ’ t think we know enough about Hawaii and [ most of ] Arizona , where they have opted out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ m really glad you brought that up .
It ’ s important to readers to know that a state can opt out of daylight saving time .
In order to go to permanent daylight saving time , we actually have to have an act of Congress , which could be a pretty heroic effort right now , in our politically divisive time .
I would say anyone who believes that we should get rid of the transition and just go to one [ time ] , that would be a very strong argument @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I think we can do some of those studies you ’ re talking about , because we can compare rates of illness , sleep and car accidents before and after they make that switch .

Editor’s Note (11/5/21): This story from October 29, 2020, is being republished ahead of November 7, when daylight saving time will end this year and clocks will be turned back one hour.
It’s nearly that time of the year again: the end of daylight saving, when Americans push their clocks back and rejoice at the gained hour of sleep—or mourn the lost hour of sunlight in the afternoon.
This system’s twice-a-year transitions have become increasingly unpopular. Scientists have been calling attention to the damaging effects of the time changes—which include a general reduction in mental and physical well-being, as well as a potential increased risk of serious complications, such as strokes and heart attacks, soon after the shifts. There is also evidence of increases in traffic fatalities and harmful medical errors shortly following when clocks are moved forward in the spring.
In many countries, this might be the one of the last instances in which people make the adjustment. Governments around the world have been in discussions about scrapping the seasonal clock changes and sticking to one time—either permanent standard time or permanent daylight saving. In the U.S., many states are considering, or have already passed, legislation to adopt one of the two. Hawaii and most of Arizona decided to adopt just standard time more than 50 years ago. Last year the European Parliament voted to abolish the time shifts, but the member states of the European Union have yet to agree on how to implement the decision.
Beth Malow, a professor of neurology and pediatrics at Vanderbilt University, spoke with Scientific American about the health effects of this timekeeping practice and what should replace it.
[An edited transcript of the interview follows.]
The end of daylight saving time is fast approaching. Generally speaking, how disruptive are the transitions to and from daylight saving to physical and mental well-being?
There’s a lot of variability in what people experience. Some people have shared with me that, for example, they might have a child with autism, and for two or three months after the transition, they feel like things are just not right with their child’s sleep. People also tell me they just feel out of sync for a while. Other people may deal with the change more easily. It’s similar to when we travel [from the U.S.] to Europe. Some people are affected by jet lag more than others.
The one thing I will say is that people think, “Well, it’s only an hour, so it’s not a big deal. It’s kind of like traveling from Nashville, [Tenn.], to New York [City]—going from Central to Eastern time.” But [daylight saving] really isn’t that. It’s a misalignment of your biological rhythms, or circadian rhythms, for eight months out of the year.
You wrote a commentary in JAMA Neurology last year that discusses some medical complications—such as cardiovascular problems and stroke—associated with the transitions. Can you talk a bit about how daylight saving changes can increase the risk for these kinds of events?
We don’t know the actual mechanism because these are epidemiological studies, where there are large numbers of people, and [researchers] observe the stroke rate or heart attack rate increase the week after [the time change]. The predominant increase has been with the switch from standard to daylight in March. We think that what’s triggering that [increase] is either the loss of an hour of sleep or the circadian misalignment, where you’re off sync when you move the clocks an hour ahead. Whenever we disrupt sleep or disrupt our circadian rhythm, it can cause increases in inflammatory markers and our stress response—and we know that can take a toll on the heart and the brain.
You mentioned that not everybody is affected equally by the time changes. Are some people more vulnerable than others? And if so, what is known about why they are more at risk?
Some people definitely seem to be more vulnerable. I think age is one factor. As we get older, our circadian rhythm or just our ability to deal with sleep deprivation is affected. So younger people do better than older people. People with underlying conditions oftentimes struggle more—people with neurodevelopmental conditions [such as autism] or degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s or other forms of dementia will be more sensitive.
Some of us are morning people, and some of us are night owls. Our ability to deal with being up later or earlier, depending on the time change, can affect us as well. All of those can make a difference. I don’t think we know enough yet about what factors influence our ability to adapt. I think there are probably also some genetic factors that we’re not aware of that would make people more susceptible.
I imagine people are experiencing negative effects every year. Is there any research looking at the kind of long-term versus short-term impacts of these changes?
I think, in reality, by October or November, we’ve gotten over the March transition. It’s probably, in most people, maybe, at most, several weeks. What’s more of an issue is: you almost have a chronic circadian misalignment—or things are just off-kilter for eight months of the year. That’s how I would look at it. When you’re in standard time, the sun at noon is, in most places, right above your head—you’re really aligned. When you’re in your daylight saving time for eight months of the year, you’re an hour off, and you're getting not enough light in the morning and too much light at night. And that gets worse as the summer approaches—as the days get longer, and you’re getting light into the evening, when your body should be getting less light so that it can get ready for bed. In the morning, as we start getting into the fall, it gets darker when you’re in daylight saving time.
This year is a bit different, given that there is the COVID-19 pandemic, which itself has been associated with sleep disturbances, and the forthcoming U.S. presidential election. Do you think that these things will make the transition back to standard time particularly disruptive for some people?
Yes and no: Yes, in that we’re all dealing with a higher baseline level of stress. When you add in the stress of transitioning from one time to another, you’re going to have more stress. On the other hand, I think the advantage right now [is related to] the reason that we didn’t really pay attention to [the shift] very much in March, [which was that] most of us were working from home, and we had more control over our sleep-wake cycles than we normally did. For example, I didn’t have to wake up at 6 A.M., so I didn’t notice as much whether it was dark or light. The more that we can control our schedules, [the easier] it’s going to [be]. In some ways, the pandemic has made it easier because we’re not as rigid in our time zones.
I will say that I’m excited about people getting an hour more sleep on November 1, because I think that will bode well for being rational at the polls. Regardless of which side you’re on or what’s going on in your individual state with your Senate races, at least Americans will know that their mind and their ability to vote in a rational way is optimized because they’ve gotten that extra hour of sleep.
There have been efforts both in the U.S. and elsewhere to abolish these yearly time changes, either by adopting permanent daylight saving or sticking to standard time alone. Do you agree with these efforts?
Most people agree that we need to get rid of this transition back and forth. I personally am an advocate for permanent standard. The reason I am is because I look at light as really important for our well-being, our mood and our sleep. Getting enough light, especially in the winter, is critical. If we have permanent daylight saving time, I worry that come May, June, July, we’re getting too much light too late in the evening. Then we have trouble falling asleep because we don’t make [enough] natural melatonin, which requires it to be dark. To me, the beauty of the permanent standard is: you have your light in the morning in the winter, when you need it, and you have your dark in the summer, when you need it. [Studies have] shown that if you’re on the eastern side of the Central time zone versus the western side of the Eastern time zone, you’ll actually get more sleep because you have that extra hour of light in the morning and don’t have that extra hour of light at night.
The American Academy of Sleep Medicine just came out with a support on permanent standard time, and there are a lot of different groups that have come out in favor of permanent standard time from the health standpoint.
Some countries and U.S. states already do not observe daylight saving time. Have researchers studied those areas to see how that arrangement has worked out for people who live in them?
I have not seen those studies; I’d like to see those studies. I don’t think we know enough about Hawaii and [most of] Arizona, where they have opted out of daylight saving time. But I’m really glad you brought that up. It’s important to readers to know that a state can opt out of daylight saving time. In order to go to permanent daylight saving time, we actually have to have an act of Congress, which could be a pretty heroic effort right now, in our politically divisive time.
I would say anyone who believes that we should get rid of the transition and just go to one [time], that would be a very strong argument for going to permanent standard. Then I think we can do some of those studies you’re talking about, because we can compare rates of illness, sleep and car accidents before and after they make that switch.


scientificamerican--2020-10-30--Election Science Stakes: Environment

Election Science Stakes: Environment

Steve Mirsky : In the last episode or our pre-election podcast series we spoke about climate .
For this episode I talked about other environmental issues with Scientific American senior editor Mark Fischetti , who oversees our coverage on sustainability .
SM : Mark , what are some of the big environmental issues that are at stake in this election ?
Mark Fischetti : Well , I think a lot of people focused on climate , which is certainly something to focus on .
But you know , outside of that , I think in terms of the current administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be looking at chemical pollution .
There have been a number of regulations that have either been reversed , or just struck down or overridden by the Trump administration that essentially allow more pollution to be imposed on air and water .
So for a few examples , right , so there were protections that were taken down for wetlands that basically allow for dumping of pesticides and other pollutants into the waterways .
There were regulations on emissions from power plants , not just about carbon dioxide , but also about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less restriction on mercury that power plants could emit .
I mean , mercury is a horrible toxin .
And then in the whole coal-fired arena , there 's regulations about disposal of toxic waste that have been rolled back too , which will add levels of lead and arsenic and other contaminants like that into the environment .
So these are longstanding toxins and other compounds that we know are bad for people and the environment , and those things are being rolled back as well .
SM : Well , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aspect .
Because , you know , even if you do n't care that there will ever be another tree , or another bird , human with these things as well .
MF : Right , the birds and the trees and the squirrels and the people all use the same water and the same air and the same soil , which we forget about that as well .
There were there are some protections for soils and what kinds of chemicals can be used in agriculture , for that matter , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then the question is , would this be different under Biden ?
And I think it would be because a lot of those regulations , including the ones I kind of called out specifically , most of them were put in place or made tougher during the Obama and Biden administration .
So I would think that the Biden administration would n't want to restore that .

Full Transcript
In the last episode or our preelection podcast series, we spoke about climate. For this episode, I talked about other environmental issues with Scientific American senior editor Mark Fischetti, who oversees our coverage on sustainability.
Mark, what are some of the big environmental issues that are at stake in this election?
“Well, I think a lot of people focused on climate, which is certainly something to focus on. But you know, outside of that, I think in terms of the current administration, I think a big focus really should be looking at chemical pollution. There have been a number of regulations that have either been reversed or just struck down or overridden by the Trump administration that essentially allow more pollution to be imposed on air and water. So, for a few examples, right—so there were protections that were taken down for wetlands that basically allow for dumping of pesticides and other pollutants into the waterways.
“There were regulations on emissions from power plants, not just about carbon dioxide but also about heavy metals. So there’s actually less restriction on mercury that power plants could emit. I mean, mercury is a horrible toxin. And then in the whole coal-fired arena, there’s regulations about disposal of toxic waste that have been rolled back, too, which will add levels of lead and arsenic and other contaminants like that into the environment. So these are long-standing toxins and other compounds that we know are bad for people and the environment. And those things are being rolled back as well.”
Well, that’s a key thing is the health aspect. Because, you know, even if you don’t care that there will ever be another tree or another bird, human health is at stake with these things as well.
“Right, the birds and the trees and the squirrels and the people all use the same water and the same air and the same soil, which we forget about as well. There are some protections for soils and what kinds of chemicals can be used in agriculture, for that matter, that have been changed as well. So then the question is: Would this be different under Biden? And I think it would be because a lot of those regulations, including the ones I kind of called out specifically, most of them were put in place or made tougher during the Obama and Biden administration. So I would think that the Biden administration would want to restore that.”
—Steve Mirsky
[The above text is a transcript of this podcast.]


scientificamerican--2020-10-29--Climate Change Sets a Drought Trap for U.S. Corn

U.S. corn production is booming as Midwestern farmers adopt new technologies and methods that mitigate bad weather , destructive pests and weeds .
New research published yesterday in Nature Food shows maize is becoming more vulnerable to drought , a finding with major implications for annual corn yields given scientists ' predictions that climate change will intensify poor weather conditions .
`` What is clear , '' the researchers found , `` is that despite robust corn yields , the cost of drought and global demand for corn are rising simultaneously . ''
The researchers used county-level soil maps and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the nine Midwestern states known as the Corn Belt .
After looking at different fields ' drought conditions each year between 1999 and 2019 , the authors identified a `` very clear '' increase in crops ' sensitivity to soil conditions that lead to drought , said report co-author David Lobell , a Stanford University professor of Earth system science .
In an interview , Lobell said the good news is that technologies like weed- and insect-resistant crops are boosting farmers ' overall productivity .
The bad news , he added , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be improving the crop 's resilience to worsening weather conditions , rendering yields more sensitive to drought .
Why ?
One potential cause is farmers ' increasing ability to boost their crops with technologies that are n't drought-related but do address other challenges .
`` If those things other than drought , like pests or weeds , are becoming less of a constraint , '' Lobell said , it makes sense that weather conditions would play an outsize role in determining crop success from year to year .
Another plausible explanation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technologies often spur changes in how farms are managed .
Increased access to drought-resistant seeds , for instance , has enabled farmers to begin planting their crops more densely because hardier seeds are more able to cope with potential water shortfalls .
So while it 's positive that drought technologies are improving , Lobell said , they simultaneously trigger `` management changes that translate these gains for drought conditions into gains for all conditions .
And then on top of that you have these changes in the things that have very little to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be more helpful when the conditions are good than when the conditions are bad . ''
What results , the researcher said , is a tension between farmers ' need to increase overall agricultural productivity and adapt to rising global temperatures .
`` It seems like [ climate change is ] going to do as much damage as we thought , or maybe even more , '' he said in an interview .
`` Because it 's taking away the good conditions that farmers are [ becoming ] really good at . ''
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ & E News .
E & E provides daily coverage of essential energy and environmental news at www.eenews.net .

U.S. corn production is booming as Midwestern farmers adopt new technologies and methods that mitigate bad weather, destructive pests and weeds.
But the long-term outlook isn't rosy.
New research published yesterday in Nature Food shows maize is becoming more vulnerable to drought, a finding with major implications for annual corn yields given scientists' predictions that climate change will intensify poor weather conditions.
"What is clear," the researchers found, "is that despite robust corn yields, the cost of drought and global demand for corn are rising simultaneously."
The researchers used county-level soil maps and satellite-based yield estimates to assess crop success in the nine Midwestern states known as the Corn Belt. After looking at different fields' drought conditions each year between 1999 and 2019, the authors identified a "very clear" increase in crops' sensitivity to soil conditions that lead to drought, said report co-author David Lobell, a Stanford University professor of Earth system science.
In an interview, Lobell said the good news is that technologies like weed- and insect-resistant crops are boosting farmers' overall productivity. The bad news, he added, is that those advancements do not appear to be improving the crop's resilience to worsening weather conditions, rendering yields more sensitive to drought.
Why? One potential cause is farmers' increasing ability to boost their crops with technologies that aren't drought-related but do address other challenges. "If those things other than drought, like pests or weeds, are becoming less of a constraint," Lobell said, it makes sense that weather conditions would play an outsize role in determining crop success from year to year.
Another plausible explanation, the report said, is that new technologies often spur changes in how farms are managed. Increased access to drought-resistant seeds, for instance, has enabled farmers to begin planting their crops more densely because hardier seeds are more able to cope with potential water shortfalls.
So while it's positive that drought technologies are improving, Lobell said, they simultaneously trigger "management changes that translate these gains for drought conditions into gains for all conditions. And then on top of that you have these changes in the things that have very little to do with drought that are going to be more helpful when the conditions are good than when the conditions are bad."
What results, the researcher said, is a tension between farmers' need to increase overall agricultural productivity and adapt to rising global temperatures.
"It seems like [climate change is] going to do as much damage as we thought, or maybe even more," he said in an interview. "Because it's taking away the good conditions that farmers are [becoming] really good at."
Reprinted from Climatewire with permission from E&E News. E&E provides daily coverage of essential energy and environmental news at www.eenews.net.