lewrockwell--2020-12-21--The 1918 Rockefeller-US Army Worldwide Pandemic

One new historical development that has been evolving over a few years and now brought into focus because of COVID-19 , is the so-called “ Spanish Flu ” of 1918 .
Recurring reports and documentation are emerging to tell us that this ‘ Greatest Pandemic in History ’ was not “ Spanish ” , not “ the flu ” and , not a natural occurrence but the result of human tinkering with vaccines .
There surely is much more to emerge , but the accumulating evidence to date is too compelling to dismiss .
In simple terms , the emerging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was caused by a misguided – and very experimental – Rockefeller Institute meningitis vaccination program which was initiated at Fort Riley by the US military , and spread to the world from there .
This essay will attempt to briefly document the evidence that is available so far .
There will of course be many objections to the content of this essay , not only from the ideologues and trolls , but from those in high places with vital body organs requiring protection .
Murder in the Margins ... Loudon , Margaret Best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6.12 First , there was never any justification for associating the 1918 pandemic with Spain .
The pathogen did not originate in Spain , nor was Spain the hardest hit .
The most commonly-accepted “ official story ” as related by our MSM is that all countries but Spain had initiated severe censorship ( due to the war ) and thus the facts of the pandemic freely circulated only in the Spanish media , and so it was “ natural ” to refer to this as the Spanish Flu .
From this reasoning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has at least 125 % freedom of speech and minus the same degree of censorship , we should rename COVID-19 “ The American curse ” .
( This may yet happen , for other more valid reasons ) .
In any case , the documented evidence is increasingly voluminous – and increasingly solid – that this outbreak originated at Fort Riley , Kansas , in the US .
Conspiracy theorists and historical revisionists can not change this now .
The 1918 pandemic was quite possibly the worst the world had seen , certainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million people and killed at least 50 million worldwide .
The current “ official narrative ” ( again ) is that it was caused by “ an H1N1 virus that originated in birds ” ( which is not a ‘ flu ’ in any case ) , and its only tenuous connection with the US was that it was “ first identified in the US in military personnel ” in the spring of 1918 .
These claims appear to be false .
In a 2008 report , the US NIH admitted that most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the flu ’ nor from any bird virus but from a bacterial pneumonia .
The details of the studies corroborate this extensively , in which even Dr. Anthony Fauci says , “ We agree completely that bacterial pneumonia played a major role in the mortality of the 1918 pandemic.
” .
In fact , it is now stated that the reason modern medical technology was never able to identify the “ killer influenza strain ” from this pandemic was because influenza was not the killer .
It might be obvious to us today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young , old and immunocompromised , while the “ Spanish Flu ” attacked healthy people in their prime – which is what a bacterial pneumonia does .
Again , the official narrative tells us that , due to troop movements because of the war , the pathogen was spread worldwide .
But the current emerging thesis is that troop movements might have been irrelevant because Rockefeller , in their combined haste and hubris , “ sent their experimental anti-meningococcal serum to England , France , Belgium , Italy and many other countries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certainly appears to be the prime suspect , and we can understand the reluctance of today ’ s WHO and CDC to reveal this to the popular press .
As Dr. Kevin Barry wrote : It would be much more difficult to maintain the marketing mantra of “ vaccines save lives ” if a vaccine experiment originating in the United States .
.
.
caused the deaths of 50-100 million people .
( and ) “ The American Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and its experimental bacterial meningococcal vaccine may have killed 50-100 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far less effective sales slogan .
According to the 2008 National Institute of Health paper , bacterial pneumonia was the killer in a minimum of 92.7 % of the 1918-19 autopsies reviewed .
It is likely higher than 92.7 % .
The researchers looked at more than 9000 autopsies , and “ there were no negative ( bacterial ) lung culture results.
” “ … In the 68 higher-quality autopsy series , in which the possibility of unreported negative cultures could be excluded , 92.7 % of autopsy lung cultures were positive for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of approximately 9000 subjects who were followed from clinical presentation with influenza to resolution or autopsy , researchers obtained , with sterile technique , cultures of either pneumococci or streptococci from 164 of 167 lung tissue samples .
Wine Tastings Are Murd ... Klein , Libby Best Price : $ 2.51 Buy New $ 7.56 “ There were 89 pure cultures of pneumococci ; 19 cultures from which only streptococci were recovered ; 34 that yielded mixtures of pneumococci and/or streptococci ; 22 that yielded a mixture of pneumococci , streptococci , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ streptococci ) ; and 3 that yielded non-hemolytic streptococci alone .
There were no negative lung culture results.
” Pneumococci or streptococci were found in “ 164 of ( the ) 167 lung tissue samples ” autopsied .
That is 98.2 % .
Bacteria was the killer “ The 1918 and 1919 volumes of the Journal of the American Medicine Association include many articles on the cause , prevention , and treatment of influenza .
Again and again , investigators wonder at the spotty presence of B. influenzae in the ill , note @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observe it in other infections such as measles , scarlet fever , diphtheria , and varicella ( chickenpox ) .
In one article , the authors write , “ There seems to be no justification for the belief that the epidemic was due to the influenza bacillus , which is probably a secondary invader and bears about the same relation to the influenza cases as to respiratory infections of a different sort ” ( Lord 1919 ) .
This appears to be where the story begins : Following an outbreak of epidemic meningitis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ October and November , 1917 , a series of antimeningitis vaccinations was undertaken on volunteer subjects from the camp .
At that time , vaccinations ( and perhaps much of medical science generally ) were in their infancy , with very much unknown .
In particular , Dr. Gates himself ( see Note 8 ) notes that prior to this time , “ meningococcus vaccines have not been extensively employed for prophylactic immunization , and only a few references are to be found in the literature that relate vaccination experiences.
” He further @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ very severe ” reactions to the vaccines – which were entirely experimental .
In this case , the Rockefeller Institute , which seems to be where the experiments in opening this special compartment of Pandora ’ s Box originated , contrived an experimental vaccine and were understandably anxious to “ see what happens ” .
It was apparently a rather crude anti-bacterial vaccine that was made in horses .
I haven ’ t the medical competence to comment on the equine portion but others more knowledgeable have suggested this might not have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advantage of the war to Rockefeller was that the US Army ballooned from little more than 250,000 to 6,000,000 men , with the “ Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research ” now having an enormous pool of human guinea pigs to conduct vaccine experiments .
Candy Slain Murder : A ... Day , Maddie Best Price : $ 3.92 Buy New $ 7.19 In a 26-page paper published in July of 1918 by Dr. Fredrick L. Gates , M. D. , First Lieutenant , Medical Corps , U. S. Army , writing from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and The Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research , New York , Dr. Gates outlines the procedure .
For the determination of dosage and the study of reactions and antibody formation six groups of about 50 men each were chosen from the various companies in the regiment .
Successive groups received increasing doses of vaccine in a series of three injections at 4 to 10 day intervals .
The determination of the dosage of vaccine for subsequent groups followed from the reports of the reactions produced by the given doses .
It was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in order to locate closely the zone of mild reactions and to avoid unexpectedly severe results .
The occurrence of an occasional reaction of greater severity even with the smaller doses , and increasing local tenderness after the injection of the larger doses of vaccine led to the choice of relatively lower doses for the general series throughout the camp rather than the attempt to push the dosage up to the limit of endurance .
Later experience fully justified this decision .
The preliminary series of vaccinations , therefore , served to establish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dosage for extended vaccination , the reactions which might be expected to follow the chosen doses , and the production of immune bodies in the serum of vaccinated men .
On the basis of these findings the vaccine was offered to the camp at large .
“ Heretofore meningococcus vaccines have not been extensively employed for prophylactic immunization , and only a few references are to be found in the literature that relate vaccination experiences.
” Those few references listed apparently experienced severe reactions , all of which indicates this was truly an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The results were not long in coming .
“ … Fourteen of the largest training camps had reported influenza outbreaks in March , April , or May , and some of the infected troops carried the virus with them aboard ships to France … As soldiers in the trenches became sick , the military evacuated them from the front lines and replaced them with healthy men .
This process continuously brought the virus into contact with new hosts – young , healthy soldiers in which it could adapt , reproduce , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out .
… Before any travel ban could be imposed , a contingent of replacement troops departed Camp Devens ( outside of Boston ) for Camp Upton , Long Island , the Army ’ s debarkation point for France , and took influenza with them .
Medical officers at Upton said it arrived “ abruptly ” on September 13 , 1918 , with 38 hospital admissions , followed by 86 the next day , and 193 the next .
Hospital admissions peaked on October 4 with 483 , and within 40 days , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hospital for influenza .
Some developed pneumonia so quickly that physicians diagnosed it simply by observing the patient rather than listening to the lungs… ” I would say here that all indications are that this event was accidental .
There may well have been hubris and ‘ god-like ’ imaginings at the Rockefeller Institute , but I am not in a position to make such accusations .
From everything I have seen in researching this subject and , while I can not speak for Rockefeller , the US military appears to have approached @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and high hopes of staving off meningitis infections in their troops .
I have referenced above the paper by Dr. Gates that was written in 1918 , and have studied it repeatedly .
From those readings , I recognise no hint of deception or cover-up , no recklessness , no disdain for the lives of the soldiers , and no attempt ( as we see with vaccines today ) to minimise or discard the dangers of adverse reactions .
The entire tone of his paper is one of an intelligent and educated medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dangerous pathogen and his efforts to eliminate it .
He is careful in his statements , he documents the care in administering minor and increasing doses of the vaccine and monitoring their effects at every stage .
From everything I have learned , I could find no fault with the US military in this ‘ experiment ’ , except perhaps the fact that it was an experiment .
The faults , disdain , cover-ups and deception came later .
My reading of the aftermath is that both the Rockefeller Institute and the US @ @ @ @ @ @ @ autopsies ) fully realised what had happened and , in humanly-understandable terms in the face of the calamity they had inadvertently unleashed , decided the most prudent course was to bury the truth rather than face the recriminations of an already war-weary world .
Let ’ s not forget this pandemic killed more people than did the war itself , by a very large margin .
In that situation , what would you do ?
Can you see the headlines in the NYT and London Times , reading “ Whoops !
” .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ‘ flu ’ and ‘ Spanish ’ because it disguised both the origin and the pathogen itself , steering the world ’ s public in wrong directions and blaming everything on nature .
But perhaps after more than 100 years it is time for the US to show a bit of courage and integrity and tell the truth .
There is after all a first time for everything .
There is one other aspect to this that requires mention : the attempt by some individuals to lay the blame for this event on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stupid to warrant refuting , but I will briefly deal with it because it is one element of a large category of history that demands public revelation – that of Jewish slave trading .
The connection with this topic to the 1918 pandemic is the theory first promulgated by a Canadian historian named Mark Humphries from Canada ’ s Memorial University of Newfoundland who wrote that newly unearthed records confirm that one of the side stories of the war – the mobilization of 96,000 Chinese laborers to work behind the British and French @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western Front – may have been the source of the pandemic .
While Humphries acknowledges that his hypothesis awaits confirmation , the National Geographic couldn ’ t wait and , in an article written by Dan Vergano – they published the accusation as “ about as close to a smoking gun as a historian is going to get ” .
That wouldn ’ t be so bad , but this is only 1 % of the picture of Chinese “ laborers ” working “ behind the lines ” at the oddest places in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told that the International Jews responsible for China ’ s opium century – Rothschild , Sassoon , Kadoorie , Hardoon , and many more , were also responsible for kidnapping and transporting as slaves millions of Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong for at least 150 years – the reason we have Chinese all over the world .
Few are aware that the Panama Canal was built primarily by Chinese slaves kidnapped by Jewish slave traders and shipped to Central America .
That is the reason that even today more than 10 % of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The same was true for the Great Panama Railroad , interestingly documented by tales that after completion all the Chinese committed suicide .
The story was that once the Railroad was built , the Chinese ‘ laborers ’ began smoking opium and all killed themselves , some apparently by cutting off their own heads .
As James Bond would say , “ Well , that ’ s a neat trick ” .
I should point out that the symptoms of smoking opium are pacific , not violent , and nobody is likely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those same heads on a spike , or hang themselves with their own hair .
It was the same with the railroads in both Canada and the US , where ( as with the HSBC bank ) the names were Scottish but the money was all Jewish , and countless thousands of Chinese were kidnapped and sent to North America to build the railroads for their Jewish friends – after which most were massacred .
The connection with the 1918 pandemic is the approximately 150,000 Chinese “ laborers ” who “ voluntarily ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the war effort .
This by itself is ridiculous .
The Chinese in Shandong had enough trouble with the Jews selling opium and the Japanese gobbling up their country to care about some stupid war halfway around the world .
What happened was that the International Jews had infiltrated themselves so thoroughly into China that they controlled Chiang Kai-Shek and more importantly Harvard-educated T. V. Soong and , after establishing a Rothschild-owned Central Bank , were in the process of looting every penny from China .
In the midst of this , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they prevailed upon Chiang and Soong to kidnap yet more Chinese to be used as slave labor and cannon fodder for their war in Europe .
Chiang obliged , and the Chinese citizens were forcibly conscripted as always .
They were sent first to Canada , transported across the country to the Atlantic , then shipped to Europe where nearly all of them died .
This is the issue .
“ Historians ” ( primarily Jewish ) have suddenly discovered that the Chinese who were shipped to Canada and Europe came not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Spanish flu ” , ready to infect the world .
The documented evidence is of course non-existent but then Jewish historical novels seldom rely on evidence .
One Jewish historian tells us that at the time China was suffering from something that “ just must have been ” the Spanish flu , with at least 150 miles along the Great Wall suffering from this infection .
Well , Beijing is like every other cold climate in the world in that we will find colds and the flu in winter , so nothing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had was one Chinese at mile zero , one at mile 150 and one at mile 300 , and thus we have infected Chinese for at least 300 miles .
The next part tells us that when the “ infected ” Chinese were in Canada waiting for transportation to Europe , they were housed in internment camps “ surrounded by barbed wire ” .
Even worse , while on the 8,000 Km .
train trip across Canada , their carriages were locked to protect them from “ anti-Chinese sentiment ” .
That ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the American Wild West , where gangs of marauding Canadians would be mounted on horseback and chasing down trains so they could mount them and beat up the hated Chinese passengers ?
There was no anti-Chinese sentiment extant to justify such outrageous measures .
The Chinese were indeed in locked carriages , and for the same reason they were in internment camps with barbed wire – so the ungrateful kidnapped slaves couldn ’ t escape .
The theory is further embellished that many of the kidnapped Chinese were ill , conveniently with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the Great Wall to Europe .
No indication of how it migrated to Fort Riley .
And of course , the reason the Spanish flu didn ’ t affect China was because all Chinese had already been infected and were immune .
I was always a fan of Science Fiction , but it occurs to me that Medical Fiction may be even more exciting .
There is so much effort today to attribute the ‘ Spanish flu ’ to the Chinese – by Jewish historians – as there also is to attribute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese – by the same Jewish historians .
This really needs to end , and the best method is to name and identify all those responsible .
Perhaps the time has finally arrived for the world to know the truth of a great many things .
J Infect Dis .
2008 Oct 1 ; 1987 : 962–970 .
Predominant Role of Bacterial Pneumonia as a Cause of Death in Pandemic Influenza : Implications for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness David M. Morens , Jeffery K. Taubenberger , and Anthony S. Fauci Public Health Rep. 2010 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 82–91 .
The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919 ; Carol R. Byerly , PhD Reprinted with permission from The Unz Review .

One new historical development that has been evolving over a few years and now brought into focus because of COVID-19, is the so-called “Spanish Flu” of 1918. Recurring reports and documentation are emerging to tell us that this ‘Greatest Pandemic in History’ was not “Spanish”, not “the flu” and, not a natural occurrence but the result of human tinkering with vaccines. There surely is much more to emerge, but the accumulating evidence to date is too compelling to dismiss.
In simple terms, the emerging evidence supports postulations that the 1918 pandemic was caused by a misguided – and very experimental – Rockefeller Institute meningitis vaccination program which was initiated at Fort Riley by the US military, and spread to the world from there. This essay will attempt to briefly document the evidence that is available so far. There will of course be many objections to the content of this essay, not only from the ideologues and trolls, but from those in high places with vital body organs requiring protection.
Murder in the Margins ... Loudon, Margaret Best Price: $3.99 Buy New $6.12 (as of 07:10 UTC - Details) First, there was never any justification for associating the 1918 pandemic with Spain. The pathogen did not originate in Spain, nor was Spain the hardest hit. The most commonly-accepted “official story” as related by our MSM is that all countries but Spain had initiated severe censorship (due to the war) and thus the facts of the pandemic freely circulated only in the Spanish media, and so it was “natural” to refer to this as the Spanish Flu. From this reasoning, since we all know the US has at least 125% freedom of speech and minus the same degree of censorship, we should rename COVID-19 “The American curse”. (This may yet happen, for other more valid reasons).
In any case, the documented evidence is increasingly voluminous – and increasingly solid – that this outbreak originated at Fort Riley, Kansas, in the US. Conspiracy theorists and historical revisionists cannot change this now.
The 1918 pandemic was quite possibly the worst the world had seen, certainly for centuries. It infected about 500 million people and killed at least 50 million worldwide. The current “official narrative” (again) is that it was caused by “an H1N1 virus that originated in birds” (which is not a ‘flu’ in any case), and its only tenuous connection with the US was that it was “first identified in the US in military personnel” in the spring of 1918. These claims appear to be false. In a 2008 report, the US NIH admitted that most of the deaths were not from ‘the flu’ nor from any bird virus but from a bacterial pneumonia.
The details of the studies corroborate this extensively, in which even Dr. Anthony Fauci says, “We agree completely that bacterial pneumonia played a major role in the mortality of the 1918 pandemic.” . In fact, it is now stated that the reason modern medical technology was never able to identify the “killer influenza strain” from this pandemic was because influenza was not the killer. It might be obvious to us today because we know that influenza attacks the young, old and immunocompromised, while the “Spanish Flu” attacked healthy people in their prime – which is what a bacterial pneumonia does.
Again, the official narrative tells us that, due to troop movements because of the war, the pathogen was spread worldwide. But the current emerging thesis is that troop movements might have been irrelevant because Rockefeller, in their combined haste and hubris, “sent their experimental anti-meningococcal serum to England, France, Belgium, Italy and many other countries, helping spread the epidemic worldwide.” It certainly appears to be the prime suspect, and we can understand the reluctance of today’s WHO and CDC to reveal this to the popular press. As Dr. Kevin Barry wrote:
It would be much more difficult to maintain the marketing mantra of “vaccines save lives” if a vaccine experiment originating in the United States . . . caused the deaths of 50-100 million people. (and) “The American Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and its experimental bacterial meningococcal vaccine may have killed 50-100 million people in 1918-19” is a far less effective sales slogan.
The Smoking Gun
According to the 2008 National Institute of Health paper, bacterial pneumonia was the killer in a minimum of 92.7% of the 1918-19 autopsies reviewed. It is likely higher than 92.7%. The researchers looked at more than 9000 autopsies, and “there were no negative (bacterial) lung culture results.” “… In the 68 higher-quality autopsy series, in which the possibility of unreported negative cultures could be excluded, 92.7% of autopsy lung cultures were positive for ≥1 bacterium. … in one study of approximately 9000 subjects who were followed from clinical presentation with influenza to resolution or autopsy, researchers obtained, with sterile technique, cultures of either pneumococci or streptococci from 164 of 167 lung tissue samples. Wine Tastings Are Murd... Klein, Libby Best Price: $2.51 Buy New $7.56 (as of 07:10 UTC - Details)
“There were 89 pure cultures of pneumococci; 19 cultures from which only streptococci were recovered; 34 that yielded mixtures of pneumococci and/or streptococci; 22 that yielded a mixture of pneumococci, streptococci, and other organisms (prominently pneumococci and non-hemolytic streptococci); and 3 that yielded non-hemolytic streptococci alone. There were no negative lung culture results.” Pneumococci or streptococci were found in “164 of (the) 167 lung tissue samples” autopsied. That is 98.2%. Bacteria was the killer
“The 1918 and 1919 volumes of the Journal of the American Medicine Association include many articles on the cause, prevention, and treatment of influenza. Again and again, investigators wonder at the spotty presence of B. influenzae in the ill, note its presence in healthy individuals, and observe it in other infections such as measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, and varicella (chickenpox). In one article, the authors write, “There seems to be no justification for the belief that the epidemic was due to the influenza bacillus, which is probably a secondary invader and bears about the same relation to the influenza cases as to respiratory infections of a different sort” (Lord 1919).
This appears to be where the story begins:
Following an outbreak of epidemic meningitis at Camp Funston, Kansas, in October and November, 1917, a series of antimeningitis vaccinations was undertaken on volunteer subjects from the camp.
At that time, vaccinations (and perhaps much of medical science generally) were in their infancy, with very much unknown. In particular, Dr. Gates himself (see Note 8) notes that prior to this time, “meningococcus vaccines have not been extensively employed for prophylactic immunization, and only a few references are to be found in the literature that relate vaccination experiences.” He further relates that the few referenced cases experienced “very severe” reactions to the vaccines – which were entirely experimental.
In this case, the Rockefeller Institute, which seems to be where the experiments in opening this special compartment of Pandora’s Box originated, contrived an experimental vaccine and were understandably anxious to “see what happens”. It was apparently a rather crude anti-bacterial vaccine that was made in horses. I haven’t the medical competence to comment on the equine portion but others more knowledgeable have suggested this might not have been the best method. One enormous advantage of the war to Rockefeller was that the US Army ballooned from little more than 250,000 to 6,000,000 men, with the “Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research” now having an enormous pool of human guinea pigs to conduct vaccine experiments.
Candy Slain Murder: A ... Day, Maddie Best Price: $3.92 Buy New $7.19 (as of 07:10 UTC - Details) In a 26-page paper published in July of 1918 by Dr. Fredrick L. Gates, M. D., First Lieutenant, Medical Corps, U. S. Army, writing from the Base Hospital, Fort Riley, Kansas, and The Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, New York, Dr. Gates outlines the procedure.
For the determination of dosage and the study of reactions and antibody formation six groups of about 50 men each were chosen from the various companies in the regiment. Successive groups received increasing doses of vaccine in a series of three injections at 4 to 10 day intervals. The determination of the dosage of vaccine for subsequent groups followed from the reports of the reactions produced by the given doses. It was considered important to increase the doses gradually in order to locate closely the zone of mild reactions and to avoid unexpectedly severe results.
The occurrence of an occasional reaction of greater severity even with the smaller doses, and increasing local tenderness after the injection of the larger doses of vaccine led to the choice of relatively lower doses for the general series throughout the camp rather than the attempt to push the dosage up to the limit of endurance. Later experience fully justified this decision. The preliminary series of vaccinations, therefore, served to establish the method of injection, the proper dosage for extended vaccination, the reactions which might be expected to follow the chosen doses, and the production of immune bodies in the serum of vaccinated men. On the basis of these findings the vaccine was offered to the camp at large.
“Heretofore meningococcus vaccines have not been extensively employed for prophylactic immunization, and only a few references are to be found in the literature that relate vaccination experiences.”
Those few references listed apparently experienced severe reactions, all of which indicates this was truly an experiment intruding on ground not before traveled.
The results were not long in coming. “… Fourteen of the largest training camps had reported influenza outbreaks in March, April, or May, and some of the infected troops carried the virus with them aboard ships to France … As soldiers in the trenches became sick, the military evacuated them from the front lines and replaced them with healthy men. This process continuously brought the virus into contact with new hosts – young, healthy soldiers in which it could adapt, reproduce, and become extremely virulent without danger of burning out.
… Before any travel ban could be imposed, a contingent of replacement troops departed Camp Devens (outside of Boston) for Camp Upton, Long Island, the Army’s debarkation point for France, and took influenza with them. Medical officers at Upton said it arrived “abruptly” on September 13, 1918, with 38 hospital admissions, followed by 86 the next day, and 193 the next. Hospital admissions peaked on October 4 with 483, and within 40 days, Camp Upton sent 6,131 men to the hospital for influenza. Some developed pneumonia so quickly that physicians diagnosed it simply by observing the patient rather than listening to the lungs…”
I would say here that all indications are that this event was accidental. There may well have been hubris and ‘god-like’ imaginings at the Rockefeller Institute, but I am not in a position to make such accusations. From everything I have seen in researching this subject and, while I cannot speak for Rockefeller, the US military appears to have approached this with sincerity, good intentions, and high hopes of staving off meningitis infections in their troops. I have referenced above the paper by Dr. Gates that was written in 1918, and have studied it repeatedly. From those readings, I recognise no hint of deception or cover-up, no recklessness, no disdain for the lives of the soldiers, and no attempt (as we see with vaccines today) to minimise or discard the dangers of adverse reactions. The entire tone of his paper is one of an intelligent and educated medical officer sincerely documenting the situation of a dangerous pathogen and his efforts to eliminate it. He is careful in his statements, he documents the care in administering minor and increasing doses of the vaccine and monitoring their effects at every stage. From everything I have learned, I could find no fault with the US military in this ‘experiment’, except perhaps the fact that it was an experiment. The faults, disdain, cover-ups and deception came later.
My reading of the aftermath is that both the Rockefeller Institute and the US military (after conducting their thousands of autopsies) fully realised what had happened and, in humanly-understandable terms in the face of the calamity they had inadvertently unleashed, decided the most prudent course was to bury the truth rather than face the recriminations of an already war-weary world. Let’s not forget this pandemic killed more people than did the war itself, by a very large margin. In that situation, what would you do? Can you see the headlines in the NYT and London Times, reading “Whoops!”. I believe that this pandemic became the ‘flu’ and ‘Spanish’ because it disguised both the origin and the pathogen itself, steering the world’s public in wrong directions and blaming everything on nature. But perhaps after more than 100 years it is time for the US to show a bit of courage and integrity and tell the truth. There is after all a first time for everything.
The Inevitable “Chinese Coolies”
There is one other aspect to this that requires mention: the attempt by some individuals to lay the blame for this event on China. The accusation itself is too stupid to warrant refuting, but I will briefly deal with it because it is one element of a large category of history that demands public revelation – that of Jewish slave trading.
The connection with this topic to the 1918 pandemic is the theory first promulgated by a Canadian historian named Mark Humphries from Canada’s Memorial University of Newfoundland who wrote that newly unearthed records confirm that one of the side stories of the war – the mobilization of 96,000 Chinese laborers to work behind the British and French lines on World War I’s Western Front – may have been the source of the pandemic. While Humphries acknowledges that his hypothesis awaits confirmation, the National Geographic couldn’t wait and, in an article written by Dan Vergano – they published the accusation as “about as close to a smoking gun as a historian is going to get”.
That wouldn’t be so bad, but this is only 1% of the picture of Chinese “laborers” working “behind the lines” at the oddest places in the world. It needs to be told that the International Jews responsible for China’s opium century – Rothschild, Sassoon, Kadoorie, Hardoon, and many more, were also responsible for kidnapping and transporting as slaves millions of Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong for at least 150 years – the reason we have Chinese all over the world.
Few are aware that the Panama Canal was built primarily by Chinese slaves kidnapped by Jewish slave traders and shipped to Central America. That is the reason that even today more than 10% of the population of Panama is Chinese. The same was true for the Great Panama Railroad, interestingly documented by tales that after completion all the Chinese committed suicide. The story was that once the Railroad was built, the Chinese ‘laborers’ began smoking opium and all killed themselves, some apparently by cutting off their own heads. As James Bond would say, “Well, that’s a neat trick”. I should point out that the symptoms of smoking opium are pacific, not violent, and nobody is likely to cut off their own heads, impale those same heads on a spike, or hang themselves with their own hair.
It was the same with the railroads in both Canada and the US, where (as with the HSBC bank) the names were Scottish but the money was all Jewish, and countless thousands of Chinese were kidnapped and sent to North America to build the railroads for their Jewish friends – after which most were massacred.
The connection with the 1918 pandemic is the approximately 150,000 Chinese “laborers” who “voluntarily” went from Shandong to Europe to assist in the war effort. This by itself is ridiculous. The Chinese in Shandong had enough trouble with the Jews selling opium and the Japanese gobbling up their country to care about some stupid war halfway around the world. What happened was that the International Jews had infiltrated themselves so thoroughly into China that they controlled Chiang Kai-Shek and more importantly Harvard-educated T. V. Soong and, after establishing a Rothschild-owned Central Bank, were in the process of looting every penny from China. In the midst of this, and with the war now a reality, they prevailed upon Chiang and Soong to kidnap yet more Chinese to be used as slave labor and cannon fodder for their war in Europe. Chiang obliged, and the Chinese citizens were forcibly conscripted as always.
They were sent first to Canada, transported across the country to the Atlantic, then shipped to Europe where nearly all of them died. This is the issue. “Historians” (primarily Jewish) have suddenly discovered that the Chinese who were shipped to Canada and Europe came not only with their luggage but with the “Spanish flu”, ready to infect the world. The documented evidence is of course non-existent but then Jewish historical novels seldom rely on evidence. One Jewish historian tells us that at the time China was suffering from something that “just must have been” the Spanish flu, with at least 150 miles along the Great Wall suffering from this infection. Well, Beijing is like every other cold climate in the world in that we will find colds and the flu in winter, so nothing special here. But what we actually had was one Chinese at mile zero, one at mile 150 and one at mile 300, and thus we have infected Chinese for at least 300 miles.
The next part tells us that when the “infected” Chinese were in Canada waiting for transportation to Europe, they were housed in internment camps “surrounded by barbed wire”. Even worse, while on the 8,000 Km. train trip across Canada, their carriages were locked to protect them from “anti-Chinese sentiment”. That’s cute. Would this be like the American Wild West, where gangs of marauding Canadians would be mounted on horseback and chasing down trains so they could mount them and beat up the hated Chinese passengers? There was no anti-Chinese sentiment extant to justify such outrageous measures. The Chinese were indeed in locked carriages, and for the same reason they were in internment camps with barbed wire – so the ungrateful kidnapped slaves couldn’t escape.
The theory is further embellished that many of the kidnapped Chinese were ill, conveniently with the Spanish flu, and thus carried it from the Great Wall to Europe. No indication of how it migrated to Fort Riley. And of course, the reason the Spanish flu didn’t affect China was because all Chinese had already been infected and were immune. I was always a fan of Science Fiction, but it occurs to me that Medical Fiction may be even more exciting.
There is so much effort today to attribute the ‘Spanish flu’ to the Chinese – by Jewish historians – as there also is to attribute Europe’s Bubonic Plague to the Chinese – by the same Jewish historians. This really needs to end, and the best method is to name and identify all those responsible. Perhaps the time has finally arrived for the world to know the truth of a great many things.
Additional References
1. Deaths from Bacterial Pneumonia during 1918–19 Influenza Pandemic
John F. Brundage* and G. Dennis Shanks†
Author affiliations: *Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Silver Spring, Maryland, USA; †Australian Army Malaria Institute, Enoggera, Queensland, Australia
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/14/8/07-1313_article
4. PDF of Fort Riley Study [1918]
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2126288/pdf/449.pdf
5. American Experience, “The First Wave”, PBS
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/influenza-first-wave/
Notes
Bacterial Pneumonia Caused Most Deaths in 1918 Influenza
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/bacterial-pneumonia-caused-most-deaths-1918-influenza-pandemic
J Infect Dis. 2008 Oct 1; 1987: 962–970. Predominant Role of Bacterial Pneumonia as a Cause of Death in Pandemic Influenza: Implications for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, and Anthony S. Fauci
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2599911/
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn14458-bacteria-were-the-real-killers-in-1918-flu-pandemic/
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2020/07/gary-g-kohls/the-true-story-of-the-1918-so-called-viral-influenza-pandemic/
https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/library/2008-10-01-Predominant-Role-of-Bacterial-Pneumonia-as-a-Cause-of-Death-in-Pandemic-Influenza-
Implications-for-Pandemic-Influenza-Preparedness-by-AS-Fauci-DM-Morens-J-K-Taubenberger-Jrnl-of-Infect-.pdf
https://fort-russ.com/2020/05/did-psychopath-rockefeller-create-the-spanish-flu-pandemic-of-1918/
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/blog/vaccine-development-spanish-flu
A REPORT ON ANTIMENINGITIS VACCINATION
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7827612.pdf
Public Health Rep. 2010; 125(Suppl 3): 82–91. The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919; Carol R. Byerly, PhD
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2862337/
Reprinted with permission from The Unz Review.


lewrockwell--2020-12-21--The Next Dollar Problem Has Just Arrived

It is not for no reason that cryptos are roaring , and precious metals are playing catch-up .
In the last month there have been developments that point to a new phase of accelerating monetary inflation for the dollar , and fiat money is only just beginning to be exchanged for these inflation hedges at an increasing pace .
Hyper-inflation of the dollar is now becoming obvious to a growing cohort of investors .
It is driven by factors on both sides of bank balance sheets , with evidence that large depositors are reducing their term deposits and increasing their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be behind the increase in M1 money supply fuelled out of a shift from the M2 statistic , which includes savings deposits .
It amounts to a hidden run against bank balance sheets .
Meanwhile , increasing supply chain problems against a background of covid lockdowns are leading to the withdrawal of bank credit from non-financial businesses , potentially imploding bank balance sheets as a bank credit contracts .
A Murder Most Unladyli ... Robin Stevens Buy New $ 54.99 Foreign support for both the dollar and dollar-denominated fixed interest assets are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to rising bond yields and dollar interest rates in the New Year , undermining the equity market bubble .
The Fed is now faced with not only financing ballooning federal budget deficits , but underwriting US supply chains in their entirety , which is corroborated by ongoing global logistical problems , tying up an annualised $ 34 trillion of intra-business payments in America alone .
The Fed ’ s unwavering commitment to Keynesian monetary policies will lead the Fed to attempt to offset these supply chain problems , to rescue banks that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bank credit , and to defray the bad debts that will arise .
It is a momentous task encompassing the whole US economy , requiring even faster money-printing , and is impossible without destroying the unbacked dollar .
Since May , I have been warning of a dollar collapse .
I showed that commodities , stocks , cryptocurrencies and precious metals were all rising because of the dollar ’ s loss of purchasing power .
The media is still reporting on the economic effects solely of Covid-19 .
In doing so , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ factors .
To return to a normality was always there as a beacon of hope — the spring of hope in a winter of despair .
And it has only been a small minority who have pointed out that far from being a solution , inflationary financing has negative consequences .
And even fewer of us who have tried to demonstrate that instead of stimulating economic activity , debasing the currency actually kills it .
The pace of monetary destruction is making a new leap .
Figure 1 is the money supply of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is soaring at a new pace .
In the last two weeks of November , M1 money supply jumped by over 14 % — an annualised rate of 367 % .
The hyperinflationary trend of US M1 money supply is clear .
But everyone has become so bemused by these developments that they have taken to disregarding them , while prices in stocks , commodities and cryptocurrencies console them by rising .
These developments must not be ignored by anyone who wishes to preserve their wealth , and they give important clues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deposits are being encashed According to the most recent figures , the sum of total checkable deposits and the currency component of M1 increased in November by $ 435.7bn , a rise of 11.6 % , while total savings deposits fell by $ 88.5bn ( 0.75 % ) .
The difference between the former two and the latter is instant access .
It represents a turnaround from rapidly increasing savings deposits between April and June , to increasing cash and checking accounts instead .
It is a new trend which differs from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the time of cash contributions to families from the Treasury .
To the extent that the helicopter-drop bolstered savings accounts , that effect has faded , and following the slowing of the rate of increase in savings deposits , total savings deposits in November actually fell for the first time this year .
The reasons for this turnaround reflect a new reluctance by depositors to tie up funds in the banking system .
To be clear , with smaller depositors protected by the FDIC , the shifts in deposits are sure to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insured amounts of $ 250,000 , almost certainly reflecting a financially informed class of depositor , likely to be trading in financial assets .
The apparent suddenness of the change in attitude among large depositors should pique our interest .
We can not blame zero interest rates on this development , because there were massive inflows totalling $ 1.24 trillion into total savings deposits in March April and May , when interest rates were also zero .
The most likely reason time deposits are not being renewed is because it is a first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduce their overall currency exposure relative to the assets , goods and services they normally buy , which for them will embrace all their bank balances , including comparatively illiquid savings accounts .
Proof of Murder ( A Bey ... Elliott , Lauren Best Price : $ 2.65 Buy New $ 5.50 In the context of a combination of monetary inflation and the effect on asset prices , encashment of savings deposits makes sense .
There is no point in lending money to the bank for zero interest , when prices of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And if you sell them , there is then no point in tying up the proceeds in time deposits — better to buy something else .
Even though this change of behaviour appears to signal that the depositors concerned are increasingly aware that prices are rising , and that assets and goods should be bought sooner rather than later , they are yet to appreciate that the phenomenon is of the purchasing power of the currency falling rather than prices rising .
This gives us an indication on where we are in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are being given by the rise in money M1 , including the extent that it is now fuelled out of savings deposits , is that it will eventually lead to an acceleration of the disposal of money by all bank depositors .
But we are not there yet .
In the past , hyperinflations of the money quantity have led through rising prices to an increase in demand for currency in the form of notes .
In the Germany of 1922—23 , wage earners had to encash their salaries in order to spend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rapid increase in demand for paper marks while their purchasing power collapsed .
This is why the printing presses were running at full tilt .
In the modern economy where cash notes and coin play only a small role , the raising of spending liquidity at the banks creates a reservoir of funds , which when a shock comes , is poised to flow rapidly into anything which is not fiat money .
If that condition is triggered , it will drive the dollar ’ s purchasing power over a cliff-edge .
An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a more sudden increase of consumer goods prices measured in declining fiat than occurs in an economy where cash notes are the principal means of payment .
But we are not there yet .
For commercial banks the initial effect of a reduction of savings accounts increases their exposure to the temporal mismatch between funding and their loan books .
In the past , this has ended up with bank runs , such as that of Northern Rock in the UK in 2008 , a warning of what was to come .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the collapse of the whole Cypriot banking system in 2012 .
This is getting closer to where we are .
The assumption in financial circles is that the soft ban on cash and improved communication between banks and their regulators make bank runs a thing of the past .
The trouble will lie with banking customers who have failed to get this message .
We now have a partial explanation for why , as our first chart in Figure 1 showed , M1 money is soaring , because money has been diverted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ included in the broader M2 .
That leaves another puzzle to solve , which is on the asset side of the banking system ’ s collective balance sheet .
Apart from the decrease of deposits in M2 and the increase of funds in checking accounts , the origin for most of the sudden fall in US M2 money supply in November is linked to the contraction in bank lending .
Figure 2 is of M2 minus M1 , giving an approximation from customer deposits of the course of bank credit on the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credit tends to expand over a period of years when bankers gradually become less cautious about lending , as memories of the previous financial crisis gradually fade .
Lemann was intensely financial , and with the assistance of the Fed ’ s inflationary financing and guarantees did not end up undermining bank lending to the non-financial sector , despite the sudden knock to GDP and gross output .
Following the chart in Figure 2 tells the story since the Lehman crisis .
With official price inflation remaining low and the Fed in control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expanded at a steady pace for ten years .
When the US banks ran into balance sheet constraints in September 2019 , the Fed intervened in the repo market to ensure bank credit continued to be available .
The problem was patched up until March this year , when the Fed cut its funds rate to 0 % and announced unlimited QE a few days later .
It coincided with the first world-wide covid-19 lockdowns .
At that time , it was thought that in a matter of a few months the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global economy would return to normal .
Bankers remembered from Lehman that the solution was to keep calm and carry on .
With that in mind and egged on by the Fed , commercial banks rapidly expanded credit to counter what were thought to be short-term liquidity problems in non-financials due to supply chains and the payments along them seizing up .
Commodity prices rallied , which was taken as confirmation by many that the manufacturing outlook was restored to being bullish .
Between March and early November bank credit expanded by nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ having already more than doubled since 2008 .
Bank credit , and with it bank balance sheets , became even more dangerously overextended and ripe for a significant contraction .
Only an increase in bank equity can reduce the pressure on balance sheets if credit levels are to be maintained .
But with bank equity at current levels relative to book value , dilution of shareholder equity is an unattractive option .
The only alternative is to reduce the ratio of assets to shareholders ’ funds , and so in recent weeks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And given the enormous increase since the Lehman crisis there is now likely to be a further significant withdrawal of bank lending .
The psychology of bank credit cycles is easy to understand in the context of bankers who start with a fear of risk , followed by lending caution , growing competition for business , then greed compressing margins even further , and finally fear again .
Bankers have a strong tendency to act in unison , creating a definitive lending cycle , a feature seen throughout banking history .
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bankers ’ collective monopolistic instincts led them to rally round to prevent a crisis at one or more banks infecting them — as was the case with Barings in 1890 — and then to central banks becoming wholly responsible for bank rescues in the twentieth century .
That was one of the reasons why the Fed was created in the first place .
The comfort of rescue from their own follies affects the herd instinct of bankers when it comes to lending .
They know they will always be bailed out .
Long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Overend Gurney and Company in 1866 , Bagot wrote that “ These losses were made in a manner so reckless and so foolish that one would think a child who had lent money in the City of London would have lent it better ” .
Bagot ’ s description could equally be applied to the behaviour of banks in the run up to the Lehman failure , and to the condition they find themselves in today .
It could also be extended to the behaviour of central banks and banking regulators who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lending cycles would have perceived this phenomenon time and again .
In our contemporary example , at the top of the lending cycle bankers clearly believed that the Fed was firmly in control ; and that the economy , if it wasn ’ t for covid , was healthy .
We can not know for certain which of the recent events tipped this view from extreme optimism to doubt and possibly evolving panic , because it is fundamentally a matter of the madness of the banking crowd .
But the evidence suggests that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chains and that the payments that go with them .
They have not recovered from the initial pandemic disruption .
And now nervous bankers see that savers are liquidating savings deposits in favour of instant access checking accounts in a trend which searches for greater liquidity .
Logistics businesses involved in the transportation , storage and flow of goods have been badly disrupted by the covid pandemic .
Containers full of goods have accumulated at ports with ongoing distribution capacity having been cut .
Furthermore , stockpiling of certain goods has led to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , clogging them up despite financial penalties .
An example is the UK government stockpiling PPE at Felixstowe , having over-ordered in the initial covid panic and now require storage for a reserve of vital supplies .
And with containers not being swiftly returned from importing nations to exporters , the global flow of goods has become badly impaired , which is why so many are in the wrong place .
The disruption to global logistics started early this year with shipments backlogged at China ’ s container ports and a lack of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ containers .
Shipping companies were forced to cancel sailings , and that led to a lack of components in China ’ s export markets .
When China emerged from lockdowns earlier this year road haulage returned towards normality .
The pressure on container distribution from China to America ’ s Pacific seaboard eased initially , but the pandemic ’ s course in America impacted on its road haulage capacity , leading to an accumulation of containers in North American ports .
The backlogs led to container vessels unable to get unloading slots and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ applied to containers that fail to get loaded as scheduled and rebooked for the next available sailing , which in turn might have had to be rolled over again .
By mid-October , it was reported that up to a third of transhipment cargos in Asian container shipping hubs was subject to rollovers , and more recent reports suggest the problem has not been resolved — if anything , conditions have deteriorated .
And due to poor communications , cargo owners often have no idea where their shipments are in the logistics chain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supply chains .
Supply chain problems are gumming up the global economy .
In addition , increased government spending is making things worse — for example , the accumulation of containers at Felixstowe full of government-owned PPE .
And the American government ’ s rapid increase in inflationary financed spending is putting further pressure on shipment logistics by leading to greater trade imbalances .
The financing requirements of American businesses are proportional to the supply chain disruption from the container chaos , whether the business is importing consumer goods or components for manufacture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far larger than GDP , being directly related to US gross output , last recorded at the end of the second quarter 2020 at $ 34.26 trillion .
The screenshot of the FRED chart below illustrates how this has dropped from its all-time peak at the end of 2019 .
The contraction in gross output to the mid-year point approached $ 4 trillion , and as we have seen , the initial response from the banks was to extend credit to alleviate the supply chain crisis .
But given that annual movement of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ output , the implication of the initial increase in bank lending to end-June was the banks loaned credit of an extra $ 1.6 trillion , and the non-financial sector ( i.e .
the basic economy ) absorbed supply chain costs of $ 2.3 trillion , leaving business finances very stretched .
The situation has deteriorated further since end-June .
As they breathe in and count up to ten , bankers now realise that the Fed has not done enough to protect them from the true scale of the logistics disaster .
Unlike Lehman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are now fully exposed to a rapidly deteriorating situation .
They can no longer afford to support cash-strapped businesses while the Fed dithers , which is why the sudden collapse in bank lending is now taking place and appears to have much further to go .
And seeing their depositors withdrawing term lending , commercial banks are now in a growing panic to rein in their bank lending and de-gear their balance sheets .
So far , the Fed has been acting conventionally in Keynesian terms to rescue the US economy .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ covid are contained , it has promised unlimited QE , currently running at $ 120bn a month , to fund the increase in the Federal budget deficit .
They have imposed zero interest rates to keep funding costs down .
The initial round of monetary inflation financed two-thirds of increased federal spending in the second half of fiscal 2020 to end-September , the remaining third being from revenues .
A second “ stimulus package ” is due shortly , which will be financed by yet more monetary inflation .
The Fed ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government ’ s ballooning deficit to backstopping supply chain disruptions as well , now that bank lending is failing to keep pace .
While the former problem is still ongoing , the latter is far larger , which without the Fed ’ s successful intervention will end in a deflationary slump to rival the 1930s , with banks failing under the pressure from previous lending excesses and from the consequences of rising bad debts .
To save the banks , they will have to be supported in the face of current and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credit expansion , regulations will have to be amended or suspended , because the banks now lack the equity backing to expand their balance sheets sufficiently .
Even if that could be achieved , the Fed is up against the 80/20 Pareto rule , whereby roughly 80 % of private sector economic activity is by local small and medium sized businesses .
Getting support to SMEs is a mammoth task , and merely supporting supply chain payment flows , substantial though they are , will not be sufficient to resolve mounting economic problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a Keynesian solution to everything , for the Fed there can be no turning back , and anyway they have no mandate to do so .
The stimuli for covid are becoming small beer compared with what the Fed has yet to face .
The growing realisation in the banking community that America and the wider world faces a deep economic slump will do what these conditions are bound to do — lead the banks into a race for the exit .
Reassurances from the Fed will not stop it .
Foreigners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bank deposits and $ 22 trillion of financial assets in American dollars will also race for the exit by selling dollars for other currencies , commodities and gold — anything but dollars .
This is already happening as Figure 3 of the dollar ’ s trade-weighted index shows .
Domestic depositors , faced with the choice of being creditors of any bank ( moving funds from one to another is no solution for systemic issues ) will increasingly opt to exchange their swollen bank accounts for anything but dollars in the bank , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ factor not seen in previous monetary collapses is that there is now an educated class of cryptocurrency fans , who understand that the Fed ’ s monetary policy is causing the dollar to collapse , relative to their favoured cryptocurrency .
Their education is far from complete , but that doesn ’ t matter .
They are making money , measured in fiat , and everyone sees it .
Gone is the situation where only one man in a million understands what is happening to money .
This can only quicken the pace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The choice between financial assets and other goods So far , we have detected that depositors not protected by the FDIC have been liquidating their savings deposits in favour of cash in order to invest in inflating assets .
For every asset bought , there is a seller who banks the proceeds .
And with cryptocurrencies , equities , commodities and raw material prices all in bull markets , sellers are reinvesting instead of just taking profits .
Clearly , this activity is being driven by increasing speculation in market bubbles , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the dollar losing its purchasing power for tangible goods .
For evidence that this is not yet an inflation trade , we only need to look at market sentiment for gold , whose performance has noticeably lagged that of other financial assets .
In the absence of a widespread fear of currency debasement , we must conclude that the actions in financial markets , with the exception of fixed interest where there is only one buyer — the Fed , are indeed speculative bubbles , and that these bubbles will burst .
When @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only in valuations simply disappears .
An important consequence is that bank collateral , which is increasingly in the form of listed financial assets or those that relate to them , falls in value , exposing the folly of excessive balance sheet leverage by leaving loans inadequately covered .
The bank collateral problem was expressed by Irving Fisher in his analysis of the Wall Street Crash and how that led to self-feeding losses at the banks .
Nothing needs to be added to his description .
Without the Fed ’ s intervention , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credit will lead to sharply higher borrowing rates due to increasing refinancing demands at a time of credit contraction .
Interest rates are far too low on this account alone .
Historically , the conditions that lead to speculative bubbles imploding are nearly always related to rising interest rates and bond yields , exposing malinvestments .
The consequences of a falling currency over-owned by foreign interests can also trigger these conditions .
For foreign investors the returns on dollar-denominated assets are struck after currency losses , and this is particularly noticeable in fixed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ low to offset the currency losses now arising .
According to US treasury TIC figures , in the last twelve months to October private sector foreigners have liquidated nearly $ 300bn of fixed interest Treasury bonds , corporate and agency bonds .
The true liquidation is larger once offshore dollar-based captive insurance businesses are removed from the figures .
The underlying condition is of time preference , which , in a falling currency , alerts foreign owners to future losses not offset by current interest rates .
This is why capital gains from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of interest income have become so important for foreigner investors .
But as Figure 4 shows , with rising yields there is a growing sense that profits from falling yields will now be replaced by capital losses from rising yields .
Rising bond yields for US Treasury debt have further negative implications for equity markets .
Valuations are solely based on the Fed ’ s monetary policy and completely divorced from the prospects for business in the non-financial sector , where supply chains are failing and bankruptcies mounting .
Bank depositors holding in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on protection will attempt to reverse their current bullishness on equities by liquidating their positions .
The traditional safe-haven attractions of swapping bank deposits for US Treasuries will be swapping creditor status at insolvent banks for collapsing bond prices in a collapsing currency .
The only refuge is likely to become a choice between precious metals and cryptocurrencies , in an attempt to rid themselves of dollars .
Developments on these lines are repeating the experience of the John Law episode in France exactly three hundred years ago .
Wise bankers , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collapse not by shorting the Mississippi venture , but Law ’ s paper currency , the unbacked livre , on the foreign exchanges in London and Amsterdam in return for currencies backed by gold and silver .
That was the second fortune he made from Law ’ s paleo-Keynesian policies , the first from secretly selling Mississippi shares deposited with him as collateral .
There can be little doubt that the monetary , banking and economic developments and their requirements for an additional and unlimited expansion in the money supply is set to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currencies that take their cue from it , as surely as John Law ’ s currency collapsed three hundred years ago .
In their partial understanding of what represents money , the cryptocurrency community are just the first to get this message .
The Best of Alasdair Macleod

Abstract
It is not for no reason that cryptos are roaring, and precious metals are playing catch-up. In the last month there have been developments that point to a new phase of accelerating monetary inflation for the dollar, and fiat money is only just beginning to be exchanged for these inflation hedges at an increasing pace.
Hyper-inflation of the dollar is now becoming obvious to a growing cohort of investors. It is driven by factors on both sides of bank balance sheets, with evidence that large depositors are reducing their term deposits and increasing their instant access checking accounts. This appears to be behind the increase in M1 money supply fuelled out of a shift from the M2 statistic, which includes savings deposits.
It amounts to a hidden run against bank balance sheets. Meanwhile, increasing supply chain problems against a background of covid lockdowns are leading to the withdrawal of bank credit from non-financial businesses, potentially imploding bank balance sheets as a bank credit contracts. A Murder Most Unladyli... Robin Stevens Buy New $54.99 (as of 07:10 UTC - Details)
Foreign support for both the dollar and dollar-denominated fixed interest assets are being withdrawn, which is sure to lead to rising bond yields and dollar interest rates in the New Year, undermining the equity market bubble.
The Fed is now faced with not only financing ballooning federal budget deficits, but underwriting US supply chains in their entirety, which is corroborated by ongoing global logistical problems, tying up an annualised $34 trillion of intra-business payments in America alone. The Fed’s unwavering commitment to Keynesian monetary policies will lead the Fed to attempt to offset these supply chain problems, to rescue banks that fail to survive the inevitable contraction in bank credit, and to defray the bad debts that will arise.
It is a momentous task encompassing the whole US economy, requiring even faster money-printing, and is impossible without destroying the unbacked dollar.
Introduction
Since May, I have been warning of a dollar collapse. I showed that commodities, stocks, cryptocurrencies and precious metals were all rising because of the dollar’s loss of purchasing power.
The media is still reporting on the economic effects solely of Covid-19. In doing so, they have consistently underestimated them and ignored other factors. To return to a normality was always there as a beacon of hope — the spring of hope in a winter of despair. And it has only been a small minority who have pointed out that far from being a solution, inflationary financing has negative consequences. And even fewer of us who have tried to demonstrate that instead of stimulating economic activity, debasing the currency actually kills it.
The pace of monetary destruction is making a new leap. Figure 1 is the money supply of the world’s reserve currency, which is soaring at a new pace. In the last two weeks of November, M1 money supply jumped by over 14% — an annualised rate of 367%.
The hyperinflationary trend of US M1 money supply is clear. But everyone has become so bemused by these developments that they have taken to disregarding them, while prices in stocks, commodities and cryptocurrencies console them by rising. These developments must not be ignored by anyone who wishes to preserve their wealth, and they give important clues to the road ahead.
US savings deposits are being encashed
According to the most recent figures, the sum of total checkable deposits and the currency component of M1 increased in November by $435.7bn, a rise of 11.6%, while total savings deposits fell by $88.5bn (0.75%). The difference between the former two and the latter is instant access. It represents a turnaround from rapidly increasing savings deposits between April and June, to increasing cash and checking accounts instead. It is a new trend which differs from the relationship between instant access and savings accounts at the time of cash contributions to families from the Treasury. To the extent that the helicopter-drop bolstered savings accounts, that effect has faded, and following the slowing of the rate of increase in savings deposits, total savings deposits in November actually fell for the first time this year.
The reasons for this turnaround reflect a new reluctance by depositors to tie up funds in the banking system. To be clear, with smaller depositors protected by the FDIC, the shifts in deposits are sure to be mostly in balances larger than the insured amounts of $250,000, almost certainly reflecting a financially informed class of depositor, likely to be trading in financial assets. The apparent suddenness of the change in attitude among large depositors should pique our interest.
We cannot blame zero interest rates on this development, because there were massive inflows totalling $1.24 trillion into total savings deposits in March April and May, when interest rates were also zero. The most likely reason time deposits are not being renewed is because it is a first step for bank customers who intend to reduce their overall currency exposure relative to the assets, goods and services they normally buy, which for them will embrace all their bank balances, including comparatively illiquid savings accounts. Proof of Murder (A Bey... Elliott, Lauren Best Price: $2.65 Buy New $5.50 (as of 07:10 UTC - Details)
In the context of a combination of monetary inflation and the effect on asset prices, encashment of savings deposits makes sense. There is no point in lending money to the bank for zero interest, when prices of the assets and goods you buy are rising. And if you sell them, there is then no point in tying up the proceeds in time deposits — better to buy something else. Even though this change of behaviour appears to signal that the depositors concerned are increasingly aware that prices are rising, and that assets and goods should be bought sooner rather than later, they are yet to appreciate that the phenomenon is of the purchasing power of the currency falling rather than prices rising.
This gives us an indication on where we are in the hyperinflation process. The signal we are being given by the rise in money M1, including the extent that it is now fuelled out of savings deposits, is that it will eventually lead to an acceleration of the disposal of money by all bank depositors. But we are not there yet.
In the past, hyperinflations of the money quantity have led through rising prices to an increase in demand for currency in the form of notes. In the Germany of 1922—23, wage earners had to encash their salaries in order to spend them immediately, which led to a rapid increase in demand for paper marks while their purchasing power collapsed. This is why the printing presses were running at full tilt. In the modern economy where cash notes and coin play only a small role, the raising of spending liquidity at the banks creates a reservoir of funds, which when a shock comes, is poised to flow rapidly into anything which is not fiat money.
If that condition is triggered, it will drive the dollar’s purchasing power over a cliff-edge. An adjustment on these lines will lead to a more sudden increase of consumer goods prices measured in declining fiat than occurs in an economy where cash notes are the principal means of payment. But we are not there yet.
For commercial banks the initial effect of a reduction of savings accounts increases their exposure to the temporal mismatch between funding and their loan books. In the past, this has ended up with bank runs, such as that of Northern Rock in the UK in 2008, a warning of what was to come. A more apt laboratory example, perhaps, is the collapse of the whole Cypriot banking system in 2012. This is getting closer to where we are.
The assumption in financial circles is that the soft ban on cash and improved communication between banks and their regulators make bank runs a thing of the past. The trouble will lie with banking customers who have failed to get this message.
We now have a partial explanation for why, as our first chart in Figure 1 showed, M1 money is soaring, because money has been diverted from from savings deposits which are only included in the broader M2. That leaves another puzzle to solve, which is on the asset side of the banking system’s collective balance sheet.
Bank lending is suddenly contracting.
Apart from the decrease of deposits in M2 and the increase of funds in checking accounts, the origin for most of the sudden fall in US M2 money supply in November is linked to the contraction in bank lending. Figure 2 is of M2 minus M1, giving an approximation from customer deposits of the course of bank credit on the other side of bank balance sheets.
Bank credit tends to expand over a period of years when bankers gradually become less cautious about lending, as memories of the previous financial crisis gradually fade. Lemann was intensely financial, and with the assistance of the Fed’s inflationary financing and guarantees did not end up undermining bank lending to the non-financial sector, despite the sudden knock to GDP and gross output.
Following the chart in Figure 2 tells the story since the Lehman crisis. With official price inflation remaining low and the Fed in control of interest rates, bank credit then expanded at a steady pace for ten years. When the US banks ran into balance sheet constraints in September 2019, the Fed intervened in the repo market to ensure bank credit continued to be available.
The problem was patched up until March this year, when the Fed cut its funds rate to 0% and announced unlimited QE a few days later. It coincided with the first world-wide covid-19 lockdowns. At that time, it was thought that in a matter of a few months the virus would be brought under control and the global economy would return to normal. Bankers remembered from Lehman that the solution was to keep calm and carry on. With that in mind and egged on by the Fed, commercial banks rapidly expanded credit to counter what were thought to be short-term liquidity problems in non-financials due to supply chains and the payments along them seizing up. Commodity prices rallied, which was taken as confirmation by many that the manufacturing outlook was restored to being bullish. Between March and early November bank credit expanded by nearly $2 trillion to record levels, having already more than doubled since 2008.
Bank credit, and with it bank balance sheets, became even more dangerously overextended and ripe for a significant contraction. Only an increase in bank equity can reduce the pressure on balance sheets if credit levels are to be maintained. But with bank equity at current levels relative to book value, dilution of shareholder equity is an unattractive option. The only alternative is to reduce the ratio of assets to shareholders’ funds, and so in recent weeks, bank credit has begun to contract sharply. And given the enormous increase since the Lehman crisis there is now likely to be a further significant withdrawal of bank lending.
Lending psychology
The psychology of bank credit cycles is easy to understand in the context of bankers who start with a fear of risk, followed by lending caution, growing competition for business, then greed compressing margins even further, and finally fear again.
Bankers have a strong tendency to act in unison, creating a definitive lending cycle, a feature seen throughout banking history. With repeating cyclical failures, over time the bankers’ collective monopolistic instincts led them to rally round to prevent a crisis at one or more banks infecting them — as was the case with Barings in 1890 — and then to central banks becoming wholly responsible for bank rescues in the twentieth century. That was one of the reasons why the Fed was created in the first place.
The comfort of rescue from their own follies affects the herd instinct of bankers when it comes to lending. They know they will always be bailed out. Long before these developments, in the case of Overend Gurney and Company in 1866, Bagot wrote that “These losses were made in a manner so reckless and so foolish that one would think a child who had lent money in the City of London would have lent it better”. Bagot’s description could equally be applied to the behaviour of banks in the run up to the Lehman failure, and to the condition they find themselves in today. It could also be extended to the behaviour of central banks and banking regulators who encourage credit excesses.
Any observer of lending cycles would have perceived this phenomenon time and again. In our contemporary example, at the top of the lending cycle bankers clearly believed that the Fed was firmly in control; and that the economy, if it wasn’t for covid, was healthy. We cannot know for certain which of the recent events tipped this view from extreme optimism to doubt and possibly evolving panic, because it is fundamentally a matter of the madness of the banking crowd. But the evidence suggests that it is the continuing difficulties with supply chains and that the payments that go with them. They have not recovered from the initial pandemic disruption. And now nervous bankers see that savers are liquidating savings deposits in favour of instant access checking accounts in a trend which searches for greater liquidity.
Global logistics are in chaos.
Logistics businesses involved in the transportation, storage and flow of goods have been badly disrupted by the covid pandemic. Containers full of goods have accumulated at ports with ongoing distribution capacity having been cut. Furthermore, stockpiling of certain goods has led to container ports being used as storage facilities, clogging them up despite financial penalties. An example is the UK government stockpiling PPE at Felixstowe, having over-ordered in the initial covid panic and now require storage for a reserve of vital supplies. And with containers not being swiftly returned from importing nations to exporters, the global flow of goods has become badly impaired, which is why so many are in the wrong place.
The disruption to global logistics started early this year with shipments backlogged at China’s container ports and a lack of truck drivers to pick up and deliver containers. Shipping companies were forced to cancel sailings, and that led to a lack of components in China’s export markets. When China emerged from lockdowns earlier this year road haulage returned towards normality. The pressure on container distribution from China to America’s Pacific seaboard eased initially, but the pandemic’s course in America impacted on its road haulage capacity, leading to an accumulation of containers in North American ports. The backlogs led to container vessels unable to get unloading slots and mounting chaos from rollovers — the term applied to containers that fail to get loaded as scheduled and rebooked for the next available sailing, which in turn might have had to be rolled over again.
By mid-October, it was reported that up to a third of transhipment cargos in Asian container shipping hubs was subject to rollovers, and more recent reports suggest the problem has not been resolved — if anything, conditions have deteriorated. And due to poor communications, cargo owners often have no idea where their shipments are in the logistics chain and therefore cannot manage their own supply chains.
Supply chain problems are gumming up the global economy. In addition, increased government spending is making things worse — for example, the accumulation of containers at Felixstowe full of government-owned PPE. And the American government’s rapid increase in inflationary financed spending is putting further pressure on shipment logistics by leading to greater trade imbalances.
The financing requirements of American businesses are proportional to the supply chain disruption from the container chaos, whether the business is importing consumer goods or components for manufacture. The totality of the problem is far larger than GDP, being directly related to US gross output, last recorded at the end of the second quarter 2020 at $34.26 trillion. The screenshot of the FRED chart below illustrates how this has dropped from its all-time peak at the end of 2019.
The contraction in gross output to the mid-year point approached $4 trillion, and as we have seen, the initial response from the banks was to extend credit to alleviate the supply chain crisis. But given that annual movement of all supplies is the equivalent of gross output, the implication of the initial increase in bank lending to end-June was the banks loaned credit of an extra $1.6 trillion, and the non-financial sector (i.e. the basic economy) absorbed supply chain costs of $2.3 trillion, leaving business finances very stretched.
The situation has deteriorated further since end-June. As they breathe in and count up to ten, bankers now realise that the Fed has not done enough to protect them from the true scale of the logistics disaster. Unlike Lehman, which they rode through, they are now fully exposed to a rapidly deteriorating situation. They can no longer afford to support cash-strapped businesses while the Fed dithers, which is why the sudden collapse in bank lending is now taking place and appears to have much further to go. And seeing their depositors withdrawing term lending, commercial banks are now in a growing panic to rein in their bank lending and de-gear their balance sheets.
The Fed’s mounting tasks
So far, the Fed has been acting conventionally in Keynesian terms to rescue the US economy. In order to ensure that the consequences of covid are contained, it has promised unlimited QE, currently running at $120bn a month, to fund the increase in the Federal budget deficit. They have imposed zero interest rates to keep funding costs down. The initial round of monetary inflation financed two-thirds of increased federal spending in the second half of fiscal 2020 to end-September, the remaining third being from revenues. A second “stimulus package” is due shortly, which will be financed by yet more monetary inflation.
The Fed’s task is now evolving from only financing the government’s ballooning deficit to backstopping supply chain disruptions as well, now that bank lending is failing to keep pace. While the former problem is still ongoing, the latter is far larger, which without the Fed’s successful intervention will end in a deflationary slump to rival the 1930s, with banks failing under the pressure from previous lending excesses and from the consequences of rising bad debts. To save the banks, they will have to be supported in the face of current and future loan commitments. And for future credit expansion, regulations will have to be amended or suspended, because the banks now lack the equity backing to expand their balance sheets sufficiently.
Even if that could be achieved, the Fed is up against the 80/20 Pareto rule, whereby roughly 80% of private sector economic activity is by local small and medium sized businesses. Getting support to SMEs is a mammoth task, and merely supporting supply chain payment flows, substantial though they are, will not be sufficient to resolve mounting economic problems for smaller businesses. But having embarked on a Keynesian solution to everything, for the Fed there can be no turning back, and anyway they have no mandate to do so. The stimuli for covid are becoming small beer compared with what the Fed has yet to face.
The growing realisation in the banking community that America and the wider world faces a deep economic slump will do what these conditions are bound to do — lead the banks into a race for the exit. Reassurances from the Fed will not stop it. Foreigners, with over $6 trillion of bank deposits and $22 trillion of financial assets in American dollars will also race for the exit by selling dollars for other currencies, commodities and gold — anything but dollars. This is already happening as Figure 3 of the dollar’s trade-weighted index shows.
Domestic depositors, faced with the choice of being creditors of any bank (moving funds from one to another is no solution for systemic issues) will increasingly opt to exchange their swollen bank accounts for anything but dollars in the bank, leading to a crack-up boom.
One factor not seen in previous monetary collapses is that there is now an educated class of cryptocurrency fans, who understand that the Fed’s monetary policy is causing the dollar to collapse, relative to their favoured cryptocurrency. Their education is far from complete, but that doesn’t matter. They are making money, measured in fiat, and everyone sees it. Gone is the situation where only one man in a million understands what is happening to money. This can only quicken the pace of the dollar’s collapse.
The choice between financial assets and other goods
So far, we have detected that depositors not protected by the FDIC have been liquidating their savings deposits in favour of cash in order to invest in inflating assets. For every asset bought, there is a seller who banks the proceeds. And with cryptocurrencies, equities, commodities and raw material prices all in bull markets, sellers are reinvesting instead of just taking profits. Clearly, this activity is being driven by increasing speculation in market bubbles, and to a minimal extent by fear of the dollar losing its purchasing power for tangible goods. For evidence that this is not yet an inflation trade, we only need to look at market sentiment for gold, whose performance has noticeably lagged that of other financial assets.
In the absence of a widespread fear of currency debasement, we must conclude that the actions in financial markets, with the exception of fixed interest where there is only one buyer — the Fed, are indeed speculative bubbles, and that these bubbles will burst. When bubbles go pop, money which exists only in valuations simply disappears.
An important consequence is that bank collateral, which is increasingly in the form of listed financial assets or those that relate to them, falls in value, exposing the folly of excessive balance sheet leverage by leaving loans inadequately covered. The bank collateral problem was expressed by Irving Fisher in his analysis of the Wall Street Crash and how that led to self-feeding losses at the banks. Nothing needs to be added to his description.
Without the Fed’s intervention, a reduction in the availability of bank credit will lead to sharply higher borrowing rates due to increasing refinancing demands at a time of credit contraction. Interest rates are far too low on this account alone. Historically, the conditions that lead to speculative bubbles imploding are nearly always related to rising interest rates and bond yields, exposing malinvestments.
The consequences of a falling currency over-owned by foreign interests can also trigger these conditions. For foreign investors the returns on dollar-denominated assets are struck after currency losses, and this is particularly noticeable in fixed interest, where yields are far too low to offset the currency losses now arising. According to US treasury TIC figures, in the last twelve months to October private sector foreigners have liquidated nearly $300bn of fixed interest Treasury bonds, corporate and agency bonds. The true liquidation is larger once offshore dollar-based captive insurance businesses are removed from the figures.
The underlying condition is of time preference, which, in a falling currency, alerts foreign owners to future losses not offset by current interest rates. This is why capital gains from falling interest rates to offset the lack of interest income have become so important for foreigner investors. But as Figure 4 shows, with rising yields there is a growing sense that profits from falling yields will now be replaced by capital losses from rising yields.
Rising bond yields for US Treasury debt have further negative implications for equity markets. Valuations are solely based on the Fed’s monetary policy and completely divorced from the prospects for business in the non-financial sector, where supply chains are failing and bankruptcies mounting.
Bank depositors holding in excess of the FDIC $250,000 limit on protection will attempt to reverse their current bullishness on equities by liquidating their positions. The traditional safe-haven attractions of swapping bank deposits for US Treasuries will be swapping creditor status at insolvent banks for collapsing bond prices in a collapsing currency. The only refuge is likely to become a choice between precious metals and cryptocurrencies, in an attempt to rid themselves of dollars.
Developments on these lines are repeating the experience of the John Law episode in France exactly three hundred years ago. Wise bankers, such as Richard Cantillon, played the bubble collapse not by shorting the Mississippi venture, but Law’s paper currency, the unbacked livre, on the foreign exchanges in London and Amsterdam in return for currencies backed by gold and silver. That was the second fortune he made from Law’s paleo-Keynesian policies, the first from secretly selling Mississippi shares deposited with him as collateral.
There can be little doubt that the monetary, banking and economic developments and their requirements for an additional and unlimited expansion in the money supply is set to destroy the dollar and all the fiat currencies that take their cue from it, as surely as John Law’s currency collapsed three hundred years ago. In their partial understanding of what represents money, the cryptocurrency community are just the first to get this message.
Reprinted with permission from Goldmoney.com.
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