democracynow--2020-01-07--Headlines for January  7, 2020

Headlines for January  7, 2020

The Pentagon and the Trump administration have issued confusing and at times contradictory messages on the United States ’ positions on Iraq and Iran amid an escalation of global tensions following the United States ’ assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani .
On Monday , the U.S. Command in Baghdad issued a memo to the Iraqi government that appeared to suggest the United States would withdraw U.S. forces from the country .
The memo came after the Iraqi Parliament ’ s vote to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq .
But only hours after the memo was released , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not withdrawing troops from Iraq , prompting a wave of questions and confusion that ended only after Chair of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley admitted to reporters that the memo was a “ poorly worded ” draft and that it was released by mistake .
The Pentagon also contradicted President Trump Monday , saying the United States would not attack Iranian cultural sites , and acknowledged that attacking cultural sites without military justification is a war crime .
Over the weekend , President Trump threatened to target 52 locations in Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retaliates against the U.S. Trump said the number 52 was for Iran ’ s taking of 52 hostages 40 years ago .
The United States also denied a visa to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif , who was slated to address the United Nations Security Council in New York later this week .
Denying him a visa is a violation of a 1947 United States-United Nations agreement .
European powers are continuing to call for a de-escalation of the tensions .
This is French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian .
Jean-Yves Le @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , very serious .
There is a sequence of escalations which is becoming very worrying and which , if it continues , can lead to a situation of conflict .
Yes , it ’ s true .
And that ’ s why we need to mobilize all of our efforts in order to stop this very disturbing process , which can lead us to a disaster , which can then get out of control.
” Meanwhile , there are reports that dozens of people were killed in Iran during a stampede at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his hometown in the southeastern city of Kerman .
Over a million people in Iran and Iraq have poured into the streets to mourn his death .
The New York Times is reporting that Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told officials in a meeting at Iran ’ s National Security Council that he wants the retaliation for Suleimani ’ s assassination to be a direct attack on U.S. interests , carried out by Iranian forces — not Iranian proxies .
And more details have emerged about how the Border Patrol @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian Americans at the U.S.-Canada border over the weekend .
The New York Times reports some of those detained were questioned for hours , including being interrogated about their opinions on the United States and the situation with Iran .

The Pentagon and the Trump administration have issued confusing and at times contradictory messages on the United States’ positions on Iraq and Iran amid an escalation of global tensions following the United States’ assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani.
On Monday, the U.S. Command in Baghdad issued a memo to the Iraqi government that appeared to suggest the United States would withdraw U.S. forces from the country. The memo came after the Iraqi Parliament’s vote to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq. But only hours after the memo was released, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the U.S. was not withdrawing troops from Iraq, prompting a wave of questions and confusion that ended only after Chair of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley admitted to reporters that the memo was a “poorly worded” draft and that it was released by mistake.
The Pentagon also contradicted President Trump Monday, saying the United States would not attack Iranian cultural sites, and acknowledged that attacking cultural sites without military justification is a war crime. Over the weekend, President Trump threatened to target 52 locations in Iran, including cultural sites, if Iran retaliates against the U.S. Trump said the number 52 was for Iran’s taking of 52 hostages 40 years ago.
The United States also denied a visa to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who was slated to address the United Nations Security Council in New York later this week. Denying him a visa is a violation of a 1947 United States-United Nations agreement. European powers are continuing to call for a de-escalation of the tensions. This is French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.
Jean-Yves Le Drian: “The situation is serious, very serious. There is a sequence of escalations which is becoming very worrying and which, if it continues, can lead to a situation of conflict. Yes, it’s true. And that’s why we need to mobilize all of our efforts in order to stop this very disturbing process, which can lead us to a disaster, which can then get out of control.”
Meanwhile, there are reports that dozens of people were killed in Iran during a stampede at the funeral procession for General Qassem Soleimani in his hometown in the southeastern city of Kerman. Over a million people in Iran and Iraq have poured into the streets to mourn his death.
The New York Times is reporting that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told officials in a meeting at Iran’s National Security Council that he wants the retaliation for Suleimani’s assassination to be a direct attack on U.S. interests, carried out by Iranian forces — not Iranian proxies.
And more details have emerged about how the Border Patrol detained and questioned as many as 200 Iranian Americans at the U.S.-Canada border over the weekend. The New York Times reports some of those detained were questioned for hours, including being interrogated about their opinions on the United States and the situation with Iran.


democracynow--2020-01-06--Former Top Bush Official: I Saw the March to War in 2003. I'm Seeing the Same Thing with Iran Now

This is a rush transcript .
Copy may not be in its final form .
AMY GOODMAN : This is Democracy Now !
For more on the Trump administration ’ s assassination of Iran ’ s top military commander , we ’ re joined by Lawrence Wilkerson , retired United States Army colonel , served as Secretary of State Colin Powell ’ s chief of staff from 2002 to 2005 .
Colonel Wilkerson has long warned about the U.S. going to war with Iran .
In 2018 , he wrote a piece for the Times headlined “ I Helped Sell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s Happening Again.
” Lawrence Wilkerson is a distinguished visiting professor of government and public policy at the College of William & Mary .
Welcome back to Democracy Now !
, Colonel Wilkerson .
Talk about what happened in 2003 and your response to what you ’ re seeing happen right now after the assassination of Soleimani .
LAWRENCE WILKERSON : Let me say first , Amy , that I find myself agreeing and really appreciating the history that was given by the Johns Hopkins professor with regard to Iran .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and about U.S.-Iran relations , and she pretty much laid it bear for us .
I associated the 2003 situation and the catastrophic decision to invade Iraq , which is what produced what we ’ re looking at today , essentially — all across the region , the chaos that we ’ re looking at was produced by the United States invasion in 2003 .
I watched as the intelligence was cooked , as principals in the George W. Bush government were sold by that intelligence or helped to warp that intelligence , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cheney , and I watched the inevitable march to war , even though I was working for a man who did everything he could , especially after the U.N. Security Council resolution in November , 8 November , 2002 , that sent the inspectors back into Iraq — I watched us go to war nonetheless .
I ’ m watching the same thing again .
And let me just say that this morning at 2 a.m. my time , I was on London news with News 4 .
And the speaker before me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Ministry of Defense .
And his main points — he was fairly glib .
He was much more articulate than the warmonger Mike Pompeo .
But he tried to make a rational case for the execution of Soleimani .
And he said it was a tactical incident , and that as a tactical incident , it would not disturb the current tension that much .
It was not a tactical incident ; it was a strategic incident .
As a military professional , I have real trouble with our turning over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case , if Iran is indeed our enemy — and I think they are now , for sure — we have turned the initiative over to them , the strategic , not the tactical , initiative .
Now it is up to Iran as to what they do as a riposte to what we did .
They can do any number of things across such a wide spectrum of activities that I shudder to consider .
It ranges from unleashing Hezbollah , if Nasrallah will agree , on Israel , to attacks inside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with sleeper agents and so forth .
So the initiative is now in Iran ’ s hands .
That ’ s what this killing did .
It shifted the strategic initiative for this tension to Iran .
If Iran reacts in a very escalatory way , we will have no choice but to up the ante still further , which I would say would probably be executing a bombing campaign from multicarrier battle groups in the North Oman Sea , from Al Udeid in Qatar and so forth , a very devastating bombing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggested it , with his very impolitic remark about 52 sites and so forth .
This is a strategic situation , and we caused it .
And it ’ s going to rebound to our disfavor , I think .
AMY GOODMAN : Colonel Wilkerson , on Friday , Vice President Pence falsely attempted to link Major General Soleimani to the 9/11 attacks .
He tweeted Soleimani , quote , “ Assisted in the clandestine travel to Afghanistan of 10 of the 12 terrorists who carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times and others have noted the claim lacks evidence .
If you can talk about what General Powell did , that speech he gave on February 5th , 2003 , that you helped to prepare ?
Again , this also backs up Secretary of State Pompeo , who said that Iran was just about to attack U.S. personnel again .
Where ’ s the evidence , as you have asked the question back in 2003 ?
LAWRENCE WILKERSON : Well , Amy , this is risible .
It ’ s laughable .
Pence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are laughable .
Suleimani and his entourage were actually helping us in Afghanistan in 2001 , early 2002 , to fight the Taliban .
We got indispensable help from Iran in that regard .
And then President Bush made the statement about the “ axis of evil ” and sort of countermanded all that good cooperation .
Nonetheless , they still were cooperating with us , all the way up to the Bonn conference and the selection of Karzai to be the intermediate ruler in Afghanistan .
So , this is total falsehood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practice of the Bush administration , as it was a practice of the George — of the Trump administration , as it was a practice of the Bush administration .
I ’ m not saying George — AMY GOODMAN : We ’ re going to have to leave it there , but we ’ re going to do Part 2 with you and post it online at democracynow.org .
Lawrence Wilkerson , retired United States Army colonel who served as Secretary of State Colin Powell ’ s chief of staff .
I ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for joining us .

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now! For more on the Trump administration’s assassination of Iran’s top military commander, we’re joined by Lawrence Wilkerson, retired United States Army colonel, served as Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff from 2002 to 2005. Colonel Wilkerson has long warned about the U.S. going to war with Iran. In 2018, he wrote a piece for the Times headlined “I Helped Sell the False Choice of War Once. It’s Happening Again.” Lawrence Wilkerson is a distinguished visiting professor of government and public policy at the College of William & Mary.
Welcome back to Democracy Now!, Colonel Wilkerson. Talk about what happened in 2003 and your response to what you’re seeing happen right now after the assassination of Soleimani.
LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Let me say first, Amy, that I find myself agreeing and really appreciating the history that was given by the Johns Hopkins professor with regard to Iran. We rarely hear the truth about Iran and about U.S.-Iran relations, and she pretty much laid it bare for us.
I associated the 2003 situation and the catastrophic decision to invade Iraq, which is what produced what we’re looking at today, essentially — all across the region, the chaos that we’re looking at was produced by the United States invasion in 2003. I watched as the intelligence was cooked, as principals in the George W. Bush government were sold by that intelligence or helped to warp that intelligence, as was the case was with Dick Cheney, and I watched the inevitable march to war, even though I was working for a man who did everything he could, especially after the U.N. Security Council resolution in November, 8 November, 2002, that sent the inspectors back into Iraq — I watched us go to war nonetheless. I’m watching the same thing again.
And let me just say that this morning at 2 a.m. my time, I was on London news with News 4. And the speaker before me was a representative of the U.K.’s Ministry of Defense. And his main points — he was fairly glib. He was much more articulate than the warmonger Mike Pompeo. But he tried to make a rational case for the execution of Soleimani. And he said it was a tactical incident, and that as a tactical incident, it would not disturb the current tension that much. It was not a tactical incident; it was a strategic incident.
As a military professional, I have real trouble with our turning over the initiative to our enemy. In this case, if Iran is indeed our enemy — and I think they are now, for sure — we have turned the initiative over to them, the strategic, not the tactical, initiative. Now it is up to Iran as to what they do as a riposte to what we did. They can do any number of things across such a wide spectrum of activities that I shudder to consider. It ranges from unleashing Hezbollah, if Nasrallah will agree, on Israel, to attacks inside the United States, inside Europe, with sleeper agents and so forth. So the initiative is now in Iran’s hands. That’s what this killing did. It shifted the strategic initiative for this tension to Iran.
If Iran reacts in a very escalatory way, we will have no choice but to up the ante still further, which I would say would probably be executing a bombing campaign from multicarrier battle groups in the North Oman Sea, from Al Udeid in Qatar and so forth, a very devastating bombing campaign. Indeed, President Trump has suggested it, with his very impolitic remark about 52 sites and so forth. This is a strategic situation, and we caused it. And it’s going to rebound to our disfavor, I think.
AMY GOODMAN: Colonel Wilkerson, on Friday, Vice President Pence falsely attempted to link Major General Soleimani to the 9/11 attacks. He tweeted Soleimani, quote, “Assisted in the clandestine travel to Afghanistan of 10 of the 12 terrorists who carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.” The New York Times and others have noted the claim lacks evidence. If you can talk about what General Powell did, that speech he gave on February 5th, 2003, that you helped to prepare? Again, this also backs up Secretary of State Pompeo, who said that Iran was just about to attack U.S. personnel again. Where’s the evidence, as you have asked the question back in 2003?
LAWRENCE WILKERSON: Well, Amy, this is risible. It’s laughable. Pence’s words, in particular, are laughable. Suleimani and his entourage were actually helping us in Afghanistan in 2001, early 2002, to fight the Taliban. We got indispensable help from Iran in that regard. And then President Bush made the statement about the “axis of evil” and sort of countermanded all that good cooperation. Nonetheless, they still were cooperating with us, all the way up to the Bonn conference and the selection of Karzai to be the intermediate ruler in Afghanistan. So, this is total falsehood. But this seems to be a practice of the Bush administration, as it was a practice of the George — of the Trump administration, as it was a practice of the Bush administration. I’m not saying George —
AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to have to leave it there, but we’re going to do Part 2 with you and post it online at democracynow.org. Lawrence Wilkerson, retired United States Army colonel who served as Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff. I’m Amy Goodman. Thanks so much for joining us.


democracynow--2020-01-06--AOC Condemns Killing of Soleimani: This Was an Act of Aggression Committed by the United States

This is a rush transcript .
Copy may not be in its final form .
AMY GOODMAN : This is Democracy Now !
I ’ m Amy Goodman .
Over the weekend , I caught up with New York Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez .
She had come to the showing of a film that ’ s just been shortlisted for the Oscar , Knock Down the House , which chronicled her race , her unlikely victory in Queens and the Bronx to become a congressmember from New York .
I asked her for her response to the assassination of the Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OCASIO-CORTEZ : Well , we ’ ve been really looking at how we ’ re going to respond , because it ’ s not enough to just say no war in Iran .
We need to be tactical about how we can actively resist further escalation on already an unprecedented level of escalation and aggression by the president , and therefore by the United States .
He did this on behalf of our entire country .
And that ’ s what makes the potential illegality of his action so flagrant , because he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not done with the support of the United States .
But in his seat as the president , this has now been an act of aggression committed by the United States .
And so , one is that we have to hold him accountable , which , you know , to me , I believe we need to enact the War Powers Resolution , demand that he come before Congress , and without getting permission , we must draw back support .
But also I believe that Representative Ro Khanna , he introduced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year that could have prevented all of this .
He introduced an amendment that prevented any funding for offensive action in Iran .
And it was overwhelmingly passed , bipartisan .
It passed the House with Republican and Democratic support , and then it was stripped by Democratic and Republican leadership .
And so , had his amendment passed , it would have — it could have prevented all of this .
But nevertheless , it can prevent further horrific actions from occurring and undemocratic actions from occurring .
And I think we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand-alone bill and see if we can pass it again .
But again , none of this happens , we don ’ t fix any of this , domestically or in terms of — or internationally , without the votes and without the political will .
And that ’ s why I think that inspiring people to enter this process , you know , we ’ ve got to get — we ’ ve got to get the votes , inside and outside , you know , out in the streets and in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do that is by inspiring people and demystifying this process for everyday people to be able to engage .
And I think whether it ’ s this vehicle or Instagram or , you know , engaging on social media ourselves , that ’ s one of the ways that we can truly powerfully transform our democracy .
AMY GOODMAN : That ’ s New York Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez speaking on Saturday after a screening of the Oscar-shortlisted documentary Knock Down the House .

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now! I’m Amy Goodman. Over the weekend, I caught up with New York Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. She had come to the showing of a film that’s just been shortlisted for the Oscar, Knock Down the House, which chronicled her race, her unlikely victory in Queens and the Bronx to become a congressmember from New York. I asked her for her response to the assassination of the Iranian commander, Qassem Soleimani.
REP. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ: Well, we’ve been really looking at how we’re going to respond, because it’s not enough to just say no war in Iran. We need to be tactical about how we can actively resist further escalation on already an unprecedented level of escalation and aggression by the president, and therefore by the United States. He did this on behalf of our entire country. And that’s what makes the potential illegality of his action so flagrant, because he did not consult Congress and this was not done with the support of the United States. But in his seat as the president, this has now been an act of aggression committed by the United States.
And so, one is that we have to hold him accountable, which, you know, to me, I believe we need to enact the War Powers Resolution, demand that he come before Congress, and without getting permission, we must draw back support. But also I believe that Representative Ro Khanna, he introduced an amendment to the defense authorization last year that could have prevented all of this. He introduced an amendment that prevented any funding for offensive action in Iran. And it was overwhelmingly passed, bipartisan. It passed the House with Republican and Democratic support, and then it was stripped by Democratic and Republican leadership. And so, had his amendment passed, it would have — it could have prevented all of this. But nevertheless, it can prevent further horrific actions from occurring and undemocratic actions from occurring. And I think we need to reintroduce his amendment as a stand-alone bill and see if we can pass it again.
But again, none of this happens, we don’t fix any of this, domestically or in terms of — or internationally, without the votes and without the political will. And that’s why I think that inspiring people to enter this process, you know, we’ve got to get — we’ve got to get the votes, inside and outside, you know, out in the streets and in Congress. And the way that we do that is by inspiring people and demystifying this process for everyday people to be able to engage. And I think whether it’s this vehicle or Instagram or, you know, engaging on social media ourselves, that’s one of the ways that we can truly powerfully transform our democracy.
AMY GOODMAN: That’s New York Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez speaking on Saturday after a screening of the Oscar-shortlisted documentary Knock Down the House.


democracynow--2020-01-06--Trump's Killing of Qassem Soleimani Means "Rules of the Game Have Totally Changed" in Middle East

This is a rush transcript .
Copy may not be in its final form .
AMY GOODMAN : This is Democracy Now !
, democracynow.org , The War and Peace Report .
I ’ m Amy Goodman , as we continue to look at the fallout of the U.S. assassination of Iran ’ s top military commander , Qassem Soleimani , in Baghdad last week .
On Sunday , the Iraqi Parliament voted to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq .
President Trump responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq , quote , “ like they ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been the target of some of the harshest sanctions the world has ever seen .
U.S.-backed sanctions killed more than a million Iraqis , including half a million children , between 1990 and 2003 .
We go now to Baghdad , where we ’ re joined by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad , correspondent for The Guardian newspaper .
His latest piece is headlined “ Iran ends nuclear deal commitments as fallout from Suleimani killing spreads.
” Ghaith , we spoke to you last week in Turkey .
You made it to Baghdad .
Talk about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response in the streets to the assassination of the Iranian leader at Baghdad airport last Friday .
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD : Well , Amy , good morning .
First I would like to — a slight correction : The piece was written by my colleague , Martin Chulov , and not me .
But I arrived in Baghdad .
I arrived in Baghdad just as the day when the funeral for General Qassem Soleimani and his Iraq associate , Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , was taking place .
I stood there among , I would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Many of them were militiamen .
Many of them were waving the flags of their respective militias .
It was a very , very impressive scene , I have to say .
I mean , these militias , we have to remember , the last three months , were on the back foot .
They were accused of oppressing demonstrators .
A lot of the demonstrations in Baghdad were targeting these militiamen as oppressive , corrupt , part of an Iranian — a pro-Iranian government .
But since the assassination , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the street in force .
As we ’ ve said , the narrative changed from demonstrations versus the government into Iraq is in the middle of a confrontation .
You like it or you don ’ t , but Iraq is in the middle of a confrontation between the United States and Iran .
And the question those militias and politicians are asking is : Either you are with the United States or you are with Iran .
And that was , again , the scene we ’ ve seen in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an emergency session to , quote , “ expel all foreign troops , ” and especially the Americans , from Iraq .
And we ’ ve seen the people who attended , the parliamentarians [ inaudible ] — the Sunnis and the Kurds boycotted the session .
So this is where you see the clear divide within Iraq at the moment .
And then you ’ ve seen even some elements within the Shia bloc , like Muqtada al-Sadr , who for the past few months was trying to position himself as , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Suddenly , all these different Shia factions stumbling among themselves trying to prove who is pro-Iran further .
So , Muqtada issues a statement calling for the declaration of or the formation of international resistance brigades against the Americans .
You see the parliamentarians chanting , “ Yes , yes to Soleimani !
No , no to America !
” in the Iraqi Parliament .
And then they passed a resolution , which is — it ’ s not clear as ending American presence in Iraq immediately .
It basically calls to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ providing aid to Iraq to fight ISIS in 2014 .
But it leaves in place the Strategic Framework Agreement that Iraq signed with America in 2008 .
But for the consumption , for the local consumption , the optics are clear .
These powers , these Shia militias , these different forces in Iraq are willing to go even further than the measured Iranian response we ’ ve heard up until today .
They ’ re willing to go and declare themselves as soldiers in defense of Iran and Iraq .
AMY GOODMAN @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this new information that ’ s come to light about the timing of Soleimani ’ s assassination Friday morning ?
Iraq ’ s caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi has revealed he had plans to meet with Soleimani on the day he was killed to discuss a Saudi proposal to defuse tension in the region .
Mahdi said , quote , “ He came to deliver me a message from Iran responding to the message we delivered from Saudi Arabia to Iran ” — Saudi Arabia , obviously , a well-known enemy of Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the significance of this .
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD : Well , it is very significant if it ’ s actually General Qassem Soleimani came to Iraq to deliver this message , if it was actually there was a process of negotiations in the region .
We know that Abdul-Mahdi and the Iraqi government , in general , over the last year had been trying to position Iraq as this middle power , as this power where both — you know , as a country that has a relationship with both Iran and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq found itself in , Iraq has tried to maximize on this .
So they started back in summer and fall , when there was an escalation between Iran and the United States , when Iran shot down an American drone .
We ’ ve seen Adel Abdul-Mahdi fly to Iran , try to mediate .
We ’ ve seen Adel Abdul-Mahdi open channels of communications with the Gulf , with Saudi Arabia .
So , if it actually , the killing of General Soleimani , ended that peace initiative , it will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , because , as Narges was saying earlier , it is — you know , Pompeo is speaking about Iran being this ultimate evil in the region , as this crescent of Shias , as if they just arrived in the past 10 years in the region .
The fact if we see Iran ’ s reactions , it ’ s always a reaction to an American provocation .
You ’ ve seen the occupation of Iraq in 2003 .
You ’ ve seen Iran declared as an “ axis of evil.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an Iranian perspective , it ’ s always this existential threat coming from the United States .
And I don ’ t think there is a more existential threat than in past year .
So , yes , I know — I mean , I think Adel Abdul-Mahdi and the Iraqi government were trying to find this middle ground , which I think is totally lost , because even Adel Abdul-Mahdi , the person who was trying to find this middle ground , was the person who proposed this law yesterday in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country .
And I would like to add like another thing .
The killing of Qassem Soleimani ended an era in which both Iran and the United States coexisted in Iraq .
So , from 2013 , '14 , we , as journalists , we 've seen on the frontlines how the proxies of each power have been helping each other .
So we ’ ve seen Iranian advisers helping the American-trained Iraqi Army unit or counterterrorism unit in the fight against ISIS .
In the same sense , we ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — kind of to ISIS when it was threatening these militias .
That coexistence , it didn ’ t only come from both having a — sharing an enemy , which is ISIS , or Daesh , but also these were the rules of the game .
These were the rules in which Qassem Soleimani could travel openly in Iraq .
I mean , remember , Qassem Soleimani arrived in Baghdad airport , where half of it is an American base .
Qassem Soleimani could travel openly in Iraq .
He took selfies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t happen in secret .
Qassem Soleimani was not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi hiding in a cave or moving stealthily through the country .
These movements are — he stayed in the Green Zone .
So , all this happened because there was an understanding between the Americans and the Iranians .
So , if the Americans wanted to keep their bases in Iraq , the Iranians would have the freedom to move .
And with the killing of Soleimani , I think the rules of the game have totally changed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the assassination will be the American bases in Iraq .
I don ’ t see any way where the Americans can keep their presence as they did before the assassination of Soleimani .
And even the people in the streets , even the people who opposes Iran , who opposes the presence of Iranian militias in power and politics , the corruption of these pro-Iranian parties , even those people would look at these American bases now as not as a force that came to help them in the fight against ISIS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dragging them into a war between Iran and the United States .
AMY GOODMAN : President Trump said , “ We ’ re not leaving unless they pay us back for it , ” meaning the Air Force base .
So , what do you see happening with these U.S. troops ?
I mean , the Iraqi government years ago also said they had to leave , and they didn ’ t .
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD : Well , one thing I would like to comment , when President Trump said the Iraqi — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we ’ ve seen sanctions , Mr. President .
We ’ ve seen hunger .
We ’ ve seen — I mean , I lived through so many wars in this country , but I don ’ t think there was anything more traumatizing than the sanctions , where you couldn ’ t get medicine , you couldn ’ t get pencils , you couldn ’ t get even papers to draw on in school .
So the sanctions devastated this country more than any war the country has been through .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen sanctions .
Secondly , there are two kinds of American presence here .
And again , a lot of the Parliament resolution yesterday was for local consumption and for theatrics and to show support for the Iranians .
So , you have the American bases in the country , and these are part of the strategic agreement with the United States in which they train Iraqi Army , there is a — train the Iraqi Air Force , Iraqi F-16 squadrons based on these bases .
And then there is the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2014 , when Prime Minister Abadi at that time sent a letter , and a law passed by the Parliament , asking for an aid and assistance in the fight against ISIS .
Now , President Trump himself said he wanted these troops out .
It ’ s weird that he will sanction a country for doing what he actually wanted to do .
But in any case , the awkwardness started when Americans brought troops to Iraq out of Syria and said they ’ re positioning them in Iraq just to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s when Iraq found itself in a very awkward position , pulled between Iran and the United States .
So , I can ’ t see a way — if Iraqi government says these troops that came in 2014 should leave , I don ’ t see how these troops will stay in the country .
The bases is a different issue .
No one is talking about the bases , and no one is talking about the strategic agreement with the United States .
AMY GOODMAN : Do you see a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Shia forces , the Iran-backed forces , were fighting ISIS .
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD : Well , ISIS has already a resurgence in Iraq .
There are lots of places north of Baghdad , between Kirkuk and Salah ad Din , in a triangle called Hawija , where ISIS are active .
They are , you know , doing their own attacks .
So , yes , these Shia forces were formed to fight against ISIS , as well as these American troops that came in to fight against ISIS .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so in the back spot .
No one is thinking about ISIS anymore .
Everyone is thinking about how they can maneuver and maneuver their own troops and confront each other .
So , this is the biggest anxiety .
And I keep on talking about this Iraqi anxiety in the streets of Baghdad .
No one would like to see — I mean , none of the people I talk to in the streets want to see themselves back again under sanctions , fodder for war between Iran and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that these calls for the reformation of militias , for attacks on the United States , attacks on those who collaborate with the United States .
We ’ ve been through this .
This was the story of the past decade .
It ’ s strange that we enter a new decade , and we just repeat the same story , the same narrative , only in a bigger — in a bigger way .
AMY GOODMAN : We want to thank you so much , Ghaith , for being with us .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Guardian newspaper .
When we come back from break , we ’ ll hear the response of New York Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez .
I caught up with her here in New York this weekend .
And also , we ’ ll hear from a man who ’ s trying to stop war with Iran , who feels he was instrumental in leading to the war in Iraq : the chief of staff of Secretary of State Colin Powell , Colonel Larry Wilkerson .
Stay with us .

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, as we continue to look at the fallout of the U.S. assassination of Iran’s top military commander, Qassem Soleimani, in Baghdad last week. On Sunday, the Iraqi Parliament voted to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq. President Trump responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq, quote, “like they’ve never seen before.” Iraq has already been the target of some of the harshest sanctions the world has ever seen. U.S.-backed sanctions killed more than a million Iraqis, including half a million children, between 1990 and 2003.
We go now to Baghdad, where we’re joined by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, correspondent for The Guardian newspaper. His latest piece is headlined “Iran ends nuclear deal commitments as fallout from Suleimani killing spreads.”
Ghaith, we spoke to you last week in Turkey. You made it to Baghdad. Talk about what you’re seeing, the response in the streets to the assassination of the Iranian leader at Baghdad airport last Friday.
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD: Well, Amy, good morning. First I would like to — a slight correction: The piece was written by my colleague, Martin Chulov, and not me.
But I arrived in Baghdad. I arrived in Baghdad just as the day when the funeral for General Qassem Soleimani and his Iraq associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was taking place. I stood there among, I would say, tens of thousands of people. Many of them were militiamen. Many of them were waving the flags of their respective militias. It was a very, very impressive scene, I have to say. I mean, these militias, we have to remember, the last three months, were on the back foot. They were accused of oppressing demonstrators. A lot of the demonstrations in Baghdad were targeting these militiamen as oppressive, corrupt, part of an Iranian — a pro-Iranian government. But since the assassination, we’ve seen these militias come back into the street in force. As we’ve said, the narrative changed from demonstrations versus the government into Iraq is in the middle of a confrontation. You like it or you don’t, but Iraq is in the middle of a confrontation between the United States and Iran. And the question those militias and politicians are asking is: Either you are with the United States or you are with Iran.
And that was, again, the scene we’ve seen in the Parliament. So, the Parliament held an emergency session to, quote, “expel all foreign troops,” and especially the Americans, from Iraq. And we’ve seen the people who attended, the parliamentarians [inaudible] — the Sunnis and the Kurds boycotted the session. So this is where you see the clear divide within Iraq at the moment. And then you’ve seen even some elements within the Shia bloc, like Muqtada al-Sadr, who for the past few months was trying to position himself as, if not anti-Iranian, anti-Iranian-power in Iraq. Suddenly, all these different Shia factions stumbling among themselves trying to prove who is pro-Iran further. So, Muqtada issues a statement calling for the declaration of or the formation of international resistance brigades against the Americans. You see the parliamentarians chanting, “Yes, yes to Soleimani! No, no to America!” in the Iraqi Parliament. And then they passed a resolution, which is — it’s not clear as ending American presence in Iraq immediately. It basically calls to end the agreement upon which America started providing aid to Iraq to fight ISIS in 2014. But it leaves in place the Strategic Framework Agreement that Iraq signed with America in 2008.
But for the consumption, for the local consumption, the optics are clear. These powers, these Shia militias, these different forces in Iraq are willing to go even further than the measured Iranian response we’ve heard up until today. They’re willing to go and declare themselves as soldiers in defense of Iran and Iraq.
AMY GOODMAN: Ghaith, can you comment on this new information that’s come to light about the timing of Soleimani’s assassination Friday morning? Iraq’s caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi has revealed he had plans to meet with Soleimani on the day he was killed to discuss a Saudi proposal to defuse tension in the region. Mahdi said, quote, “He came to deliver me a message from Iran responding to the message we delivered from Saudi Arabia to Iran” — Saudi Arabia, obviously, a well-known enemy of Iran. Was he set up? Talk about the significance of this.
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD: Well, it is very significant if it’s actually General Qassem Soleimani came to Iraq to deliver this message, if it was actually there was a process of negotiations in the region. We know that Abdul-Mahdi and the Iraqi government, in general, over the last year had been trying to position Iraq as this middle power, as this power where both — you know, as a country that has a relationship with both Iran and the United States. In that awkward place Iraq found itself in, Iraq has tried to maximize on this. So they started back in summer and fall, when there was an escalation between Iran and the United States, when Iran shot down an American drone. We’ve seen Adel Abdul-Mahdi fly to Iran, try to mediate. We’ve seen Adel Abdul-Mahdi open channels of communications with the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia.
So, if it actually, the killing of General Soleimani, ended that peace initiative, it will be kind of disastrous in the region, because, as Narges was saying earlier, it is — you know, Pompeo is speaking about Iran being this ultimate evil in the region, as this crescent of Shias, as if they just arrived in the past 10 years in the region. The fact if we see Iran’s reactions, it’s always a reaction to an American provocation. You’ve seen the occupation of Iraq in 2003. You’ve seen Iran declared as an “axis of evil.” So, if you see it from an Iranian perspective, it’s always this existential threat coming from the United States. And I don’t think there is a more existential threat than in past year. So, yes, I know — I mean, I think Adel Abdul-Mahdi and the Iraqi government were trying to find this middle ground, which I think is totally lost, because even Adel Abdul-Mahdi, the person who was trying to find this middle ground, was the person who proposed this law yesterday in the Parliament to expel all American troops from the country.
And I would like to add like another thing. The killing of Qassem Soleimani ended an era in which both Iran and the United States coexisted in Iraq. So, from 2013, '14, we, as journalists, we've seen on the frontlines how the proxies of each power have been helping each other. So we’ve seen Iranian advisers helping the American-trained Iraqi Army unit or counterterrorism unit in the fight against ISIS. In the same sense, we’ve seen American airstrikes on threats to these — kind of to ISIS when it was threatening these militias. That coexistence, it didn’t only come from both having a — sharing an enemy, which is ISIS, or Daesh, but also these were the rules of the game. These were the rules in which Qassem Soleimani could travel openly in Iraq. I mean, remember, Qassem Soleimani arrived in Baghdad airport, where half of it is an American base. Qassem Soleimani could travel openly in Iraq. He took selfies. People took his pictures. That didn’t happen in secret. Qassem Soleimani was not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi hiding in a cave or moving stealthily through the country. These movements are — he stayed in the Green Zone. So, all this happened because there was an understanding between the Americans and the Iranians. So, if the Americans wanted to keep their bases in Iraq, the Iranians would have the freedom to move. And with the killing of Soleimani, I think the rules of the game have totally changed.
So now I think the first victim of the assassination will be the American bases in Iraq. I don’t see any way where the Americans can keep their presence as they did before the assassination of Soleimani. And even the people in the streets, even the people who opposes Iran, who opposes the presence of Iranian militias in power and politics, the corruption of these pro-Iranian parties, even those people would look at these American bases now as not as a force that came to help them in the fight against ISIS, but a force that’s dragging them into a war between Iran and the United States.
AMY GOODMAN: President Trump said, “We’re not leaving unless they pay us back for it,” meaning the Air Force base. So, what do you see happening with these U.S. troops? I mean, the Iraqi government years ago also said they had to leave, and they didn’t.
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD: Well, one thing I would like to comment, when President Trump said the Iraqi — sanctions that the Iraqis have never seen, we’ve seen sanctions, Mr. President. We’ve seen hunger. We’ve seen — I mean, I lived through so many wars in this country, but I don’t think there was anything more traumatizing than the sanctions, where you couldn’t get medicine, you couldn’t get pencils, you couldn’t get even papers to draw on in school. So the sanctions devastated this country more than any war the country has been through. So, yes, we’ve seen sanctions.
Secondly, there are two kinds of American presence here. And again, a lot of the Parliament resolution yesterday was for local consumption and for theatrics and to show support for the Iranians. So, you have the American bases in the country, and these are part of the strategic agreement with the United States in which they train Iraqi Army, there is a — train the Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi F-16 squadrons based on these bases. And then there is the American troops that arrived in the country back in 2014, when Prime Minister Abadi at that time sent a letter, and a law passed by the Parliament, asking for an aid and assistance in the fight against ISIS. Now, President Trump himself said he wanted these troops out. It’s weird that he will sanction a country for doing what he actually wanted to do.
But in any case, the awkwardness started when Americans brought troops to Iraq out of Syria and said they’re positioning them in Iraq just to counter the presence of Iranians. That’s when Iraq found itself in a very awkward position, pulled between Iran and the United States. So, I can’t see a way — if Iraqi government says these troops that came in 2014 should leave, I don’t see how these troops will stay in the country. The bases is a different issue. No one is talking about the bases, and no one is talking about the strategic agreement with the United States.
AMY GOODMAN: Do you see a possible ISIS resurgence in Iraq? Actually, the Shia forces, the Iran-backed forces, were fighting ISIS.
GHAITH ABDUL-AHAD: Well, ISIS has already a resurgence in Iraq. There are lots of places north of Baghdad, between Kirkuk and Salah ad Din, in a triangle called Hawija, where ISIS are active. They are, you know, doing their own attacks. So, yes, these Shia forces were formed to fight against ISIS, as well as these American troops that came in to fight against ISIS. But ISIS at the moment seems to be so in the back spot. No one is thinking about ISIS anymore. Everyone is thinking about how they can maneuver and maneuver their own troops and confront each other. So, this is the biggest anxiety.
And I keep on talking about this Iraqi anxiety in the streets of Baghdad. No one would like to see — I mean, none of the people I talk to in the streets want to see themselves back again under sanctions, fodder for war between Iran and the United States. Already there’s an anxiety that these calls for the reformation of militias, for attacks on the United States, attacks on those who collaborate with the United States. We’ve been through this. This was the story of the past decade. It’s strange that we enter a new decade, and we just repeat the same story, the same narrative, only in a bigger — in a bigger way.
AMY GOODMAN: We want to thank you so much, Ghaith, for being with us. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad is the Iraqi correspondent for The Guardian newspaper.
When we come back from break, we’ll hear the response of New York Congressmember Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. I caught up with her here in New York this weekend. And also, we’ll hear from a man who’s trying to stop war with Iran, who feels he was instrumental in leading to the war in Iraq: the chief of staff of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Colonel Larry Wilkerson. Stay with us.


democracynow--2020-01-06--Soleimani's Death Could Galvanize Shia Coalitions Against One "Foreign Aggressor" — The U.S.

This is a rush transcript .
Copy may not be in its final form .
AMY GOODMAN : Fallout continues to mount following the U.S. assassination of Iran ’ s top military commander , Qassem Soleimani , at the Baghdad airport on Friday morning .
Iranian media is reporting over a million mourners took to the streets of Tehran today for the funeral of Soleimani , who headed Iran ’ s elite Quds Force .
On Sunday , Iran announced it would suspend its commitments under the landmark 2015 nuclear deal , which the U.S. pulled out of in 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq .
President Trump responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq , quote , “ like they ’ ve never seen before.
” Iraq has already been the target of some of the harshest sanctions the world has even seen .
U.S.-backed sanctions killed more than a million Iraqis , including more than half a million children , between 1990 and 2003 .
Trump has also threatened to target 52 locations in Iran , including cultural sites , if Iran retaliates against the U.S .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a war crime .
Trump said the number 52 was for Iran ’ s taking of 52 U.S. hostages 40 years ago .
Meanwhile , more information has come to light about the timing of Soleimani ’ s assassination .
Iraq ’ s caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi has revealed he had plans to meet with Soleimani on the day he was killed to discuss a Saudi proposal to defuse tension in the region .
Mahdi said , quote , “ He came to deliver me a message from Iran , responding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia to Iran.
” This comes as the U.S. continues to increase its presence in the Middle East .
The U.S. is sending nearly 3,000 more troops from Fort Bragg to the region .
Meanwhile , the U.S. has announced it ’ s temporarily halting its fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria so it can redirect it focus in the region .
We begin today ’ s show with Narges Bajoghli , professor of Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University .
Her recent opinion piece for The New York Times is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nothing for Iran.
” She is the author of Iran Reframed : Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic .
And in Baghdad , Ghaith Abdul-Ahad , correspondent for The Guardian newspaper , is back with us .
His latest piece is headlined “ Iran ends nuclear deal commitments as fallout from Suleimani killing spreads.
” Let ’ s begin with Professor Bajoghli .
Right now the reports of up to a million people are in the streets of Tehran .
The body of Soleimani has been returned , and the funeral is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significance of the assassination and what has happened since ?
NARGES BAJOGHLI : Yes .
I mean , a week ago , it would have been unthinkable to have crowds like this in Iran .
Today was Tehran ; yesterday in Ahvaz and Mashhad ; tomorrow the body will go on to Kerman .
After the violent crackdown that the state orchestrated against protesters in November of 2019 — so just a month and a half ago — there was so much anger in Iran because of the violent crackdown of the state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of legitimacy within the Islamic republic in dealing with the fallout of the maximum-pressure campaign and the severe sanctions that the Trump administration has put on them .
So , to think that these numbers of people are coming out onto the streets really signals two things .
One , Qassem Soleimani , within Iran itself , was seen as a national hero , because he was seen as keeping ISIS at bay , and , two , because of Trump ’ s tweets just two nights ago that he would target Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sense of national unity within the country .
And this is no longer about support for the regime , but it ’ s really about standing up to a foreign aggressor .
This is something that — the killing of Soleimani , the assassination of Soleimani , and then Trump ’ s repeated tweets and threats , is doing two things : one , rallying Shia , sort of a transnational Shia community , especially those that are loyal to the Islamic republic in Iran , and then , two , rallying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
AMY GOODMAN : I mean , this threatening to blow up Iranian cultural sites , I mean , it ’ s as if someone is threatening to blow up the Empire State Building or — well , on Saturday , Trump tweeted , “ Iran has been nothing but problems for many years .
Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans , or American assets , we have targeted 52 Iranian sites ( representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important to Iran & the Iranian culture , and those targets , and Iran itself , WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD .
The USA wants no more threats !
” Trump tweeted .
So talk about this and him going back 40 years to say that ’ s how he chose that number , 52 , and what this means to the Iranian people .
NARGES BAJOGHLI : Two things .
One is that — you know , for me , what this signifies is the continued misunderstanding of United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Iran and the Iranian revolution and what it ’ s produced .
I think because there ’ s been such an obsession in the U.S. after the — during and after the hostage crisis , in particular with understanding the Iranian revolution of 1979 , as — like this obsession with it solely being an Islamic republic and an Islamic revolution , has meant that much of our analysis in this country and throughout the West , in particular , really undermines and does not think about the complexities within Iran and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not thinking about what comes after it , was a revolution , a popular revolution , first and foremost .
So this was not a revolution led by a vanguard or an elite .
This is one of the most popular revolutions of the 20th century , a revolution led from below in which the main thrust of it and one of the main slogans of the revolution was “ neither east nor west , ” meaning neither the Soviet Union nor the United States .
It really was a revolution that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran and not having it be under the sway of imperial powers .
That is first and foremost .
And that is a continuation of a centuries-long movement in Iran to establish independence within the country .
So , what happens after the revolution in Iran and the Islamic republic coming about , there are a lot of Iranians , both within the country and outside , obviously , who disagree with the Islamic republic .
However , I think what ’ s important to understand — and this is where Trump , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been doing on Iran , and I do think regime change and regime collapse is the policy of this administration when it comes to Iran — but the huge mistake that he made with that tweet the other night , by claiming to want to attack Iranian cultural heritage sites , is that he is now bringing up that sentiment again within the Iranian population , that as much as some within Iran may dislike the Islamic republic , they will not stand for a foreign aggression , especially from the sole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and attack their country and attack historical sites that have nothing to even do with the regime , but it ’ s about Iranian culture , which is thousands of years old .
AMY GOODMAN : Narges Bajoghli , tell us who Qassem Soleimani was .
NARGES BAJOGHLI : Qassem Soleimani was the major general of the Quds Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard in Iran .
The Quds Force is the main force of the Revolutionary Guard which is in charge of extraterritorial operations of the Revolutionary Guard , meaning operations outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , during the 1980s , was a veteran of the 1980-'88 war with Iraq , which was the longest conventional war of the 20th century .
That is where he learned how to fight .
That is where he began to learn and to develop his understanding of international politics .
And one of the things I think it 's important to remember is that the war of the 1980s , which was an extremely bloody war — it was one of the wars in which trench warfare was fought for the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a war in which , for all of the political and elites of the Islamic republic , and especially those who fought in the war , they began to understand their viewpoint of international politics in that time , in which they saw how the United States and Western powers were supporting and supplying Iraq with weapons and intelligence during that time .
So he comes about in that battlefield and in those wars .
From that point on , he then goes on into the Quds Force .
And what is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important of a general as he was — and he was significant — he , nonetheless , within the Revolutionary Guard — one of the things that the Revolutionary Guard has become so adept at , because it sort of had to , is asymmetrical warfare .
But what that means on the ground is that decision-making within the Revolutionary Guard — and I studied them for 10 years in Iran , and I saw this no matter what area that they were functioning in — decision-making power and leadership within the Revolutionary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ad hoc way .
And that is a legacy of the 1980 wars — of the 1980s war .
And so , Qassem Soleimani was in charge of the Revolutionary Guard ’ s relationship especially in the Middle East and with Iraqi and Lebanese forces , Shia forces , but he was not the only one who was able to create these relationships , nor was he the only one who was doing these strategic maneuverings within the region .
He rose to prominence as a public figure in around 2013 , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that there was very large media — a very large media campaign created for Qassem Soleimani within Iran .
I followed around his media teams for a few years and saw how they made documentaries about him , music videos , films .
There ’ s fiction films about him now , made in Iran , and films and documentaries and music videos made in Arabic , as well , for Arab audiences .
And the reason that they were doing that at the time was to shore up support for Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , he becomes this really prominent public figure , which is something that we often don ’ t see within Iran .
You know , in order to sort of understand Soleimani , you have to understand that this hero-like status that he began to have is not very common within the culture of the Islamic republic .
They make heroes out of martyrs , but they don ’ t necessarily make heroes out of living figures .
Qassem Soleimani , though , did become a hero because of this concerted media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the fight against ISIS .
AMY GOODMAN : So talk about the significance of him being assassinated and what this means .
NARGES BAJOGHLI : So , one thing is very important to note .
As many Iranians were protesting against the government in November and have been protesting against the government for decades now , there is a very large contingency within Iran that does not support the Islamic republic or wants significant reforms to the Islamic republic .
However , Qassem Soleimani , because of the depictions of him within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because of his role in fighting against ISIS in Iraq and Syria , he was really sort of seen as being above the fray of the internal politics of the Islamic republic , for two reasons .
One is that his activities were focused outside of Iran and not inside of Iran , so that he therefore wasn ’ t sort of caught up in the fractious politics of the Islamic republic .
And , two , he was not a corrupt person .
So , within the Islamic — within the Revolutionary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lot of corruption scandals in Iran , with , you know , different folks embezzling money , especially when it comes to the sanctions and things like that .
He sort of stayed above that .
And if you see images from the supreme leader and the president and all these other dignitaries visiting his family home in Tehran over the past few days , you ’ ll be able to also see , very visually , that his home is very humble .
So he really stayed above that .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular within Iran .
Now , too , he ’ s also a very — he also had a very hero-like status outside of Iran , as well , among Shia armed groups and among certain Shia communities in Iraq and Lebanon , again , because of the way in which he helped to direct forces against the Islamic State , which one of their main goals and one of their — they said over and over again that they saw the Shia as their main enemy .
And so , because of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as this main protector .
Within Iran , for years , one of the main slogans that you would hear over and over again and that people would repeat was that if Tehran and Qassem Soleimani were not in Damascus , then Daesh , or ISIS , would be in Tehran .
So , because of that , he really was an important national and symbolic figure .
Now , the importance of his assassination is that because he was seen as this really important military hero that kept the homeland safe and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces in the region , this — and this is what I wrote in The New York Times piece — he is this — I mean , there is nobody that the Islamic — or , that the United States could have assassinated with a higher — you know , a symbol that was sort of higher than him , in a way , and that would have unified people in the way that it has .
I mean , I don ’ t think that the Trump administration fully understands what it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes to Iran and Shia communities across the region .
As a symbol , Qassem Soleimani will have and has proven in the past two days to be a symbol that will move people to action .
AMY GOODMAN : And then let ’ s talk about the nuclear deal .
Speaking to CNN ’ s Jake Tapper Sunday , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested that Obama ’ s landmark Iran nuclear deal was tantamount to starting a war .
This is Pompeo referring to the JCPOA — that ’ s the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been heralded by many as a major international diplomatic victory for peace .
AMY GOODMAN : So , if you can respond to this , Professor Bajoghli , and also that Iran has just announced they , too , will no longer abide by the Iran nuclear deal ?
I mean , the U.S. pulled out of it in 2018 , but Iran was resisting pulling out entirely , until now , until the number two man in Iran , Soleimani , was assassinated by Trump .
NARGES BAJOGHLI : Well , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say real quick here is that actually Iran hasn ’ t pulled out of the JCPOA yet .
The announcement that Iran made yesterday is actually within still the confines of the JCPOA , and they have stated clearly that if other parties come back to the JCPOA , they will also reverse the steps that they have taken .
So they actually haven ’ t pulled out of the JCPOA .
It ’ s a very strategic and , frankly , surprising move .
I did expect them to pull out , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so it shows that they ’ re actually being very strategic about the reactions that they are having to Soleimani ’ s death at this point .
Now , going to Pompeo ’ s statement , I mean , that statement just frankly doesn ’ t understand the U.S. 's role in the region , not only since 2003 with the invasion of Iraq , but longer than that .
But going specifically to what he said about the JCPOA , the JCPOA itself , whatever critiques that folks on the right may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and this was something that the Obama administration said over and over again — an initial framework for engagement with Iran .
Whether folks within the Trump administration like it or not , Iran is a country that has — or , the Iranian civilization is one that has been in the region for thousands of years .
It is not going anywhere .
It 's one that , no matter how much they try to isolate , will not disappear .
So , by pushing it further into the corner , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of the Iran nuclear deal and then imposing such harsh sanctions , and not only imposing sanctions , but also undertaking covert actions , doing cyberwarfare against Iran , what all of this has produced is a situation in which Iran feels completely cornered .
And that is part of the reason why we saw Iran lash out the way that it did over the summer and the months — and a few months over the fall .
So , the fact — I mean , the JCPOA was a framework in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , was trying to slowly normalize ties with Iran in a way so that then they could then begin to talk about other issues that the U.S. or European powers may have had with Iran .
It ’ s actually the Trump administration and the way that they pulled out of the deal and then have begun to apply this maximum-pressure policy against Iran that has , in effect , produced the conditions of war with Iran .
AMY GOODMAN : According to The Washington Post , Qassem Soleimani multiple times used memes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In July 2018 , after Trump threatened the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Twitter , Soleimani responded by telling Iran ’ s Tasnim News Agency , “ If you begin the war , we will end the war .
You know that this war will destroy all that you possess , ” he said .
A few days later , Soleimani posted an edited image of himself standing with a walkie-talkie in front of an exploding White House onto Instagram .
Text on the image read , “ We will crush the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of that same year , after Trump tweeted a Game of Thrones-inspired image of himself with the text “ Sanctions are coming , ” Soleimani posted his own Game of Thrones meme with an image of himself and text reading “ I will stand against you.
” In April of 2019 , Twitter suspended Soleimani ’ s account .
They haven ’ t suspended Trump ’ s account .
Your response , as we wrap up ?
NARGES BAJOGHLI : Yeah , I mean , look , Soleimani has had a very large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Guard , and especially when it comes to the threats that the Trump administration has been making once it pulled out of the Iran deal — and I think one thing that ’ s really important to point out here is the role of John Bolton within the administration and him being very adamant for many , many years about regime change in Iran .
So we were dealing and we have been dealing with an administration here in the United States which has had its eyes on weakening Iran to the point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So , Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard and the media teams that the Revolutionary Guard have , which are extremely big , they receive a lot of state funding .
The Revolutionary Guard itself has a lot of funding that it pours into its media production .
I mean , that ’ s what I studied for so many years , and I was looking at all of these different media teams .
They have been responding in this way .
They will continue to respond in this way .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as much as the United States sort of tries to control the narrative , the public narrative , when it comes to Iran , within the West , Iran tries to control the public narrative especially among the internal population in Iran and among Arab Shia populations , as well .
So we ’ ll continue to see these sorts of tit-for-tats , whether in narrative , in rhetoric or in memes of internet culture .
AMY GOODMAN : Narges Bajoghli , we want to thank you for being with us , professor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ University .
We ’ ll link to your piece in The New York Times , “ Suleimani ’ s Death Changes Nothing for Iran , ” author of Iran Reframed : Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic , also director of The Skin That Burns , a documentary film about survivors of chemical warfare in Iran .
This is Democracy Now !
When we come back , we go to Baghdad .
Stay with us .

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: Fallout continues to mount following the U.S. assassination of Iran’s top military commander, Qassem Soleimani, at the Baghdad airport on Friday morning. Iranian media is reporting over a million mourners took to the streets of Tehran today for the funeral of Soleimani, who headed Iran’s elite Quds Force. On Sunday, Iran announced it would suspend its commitments under the landmark 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. pulled out of in 2018.
The Iraqi Parliament voted Sunday to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq. President Trump responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq, quote, “like they’ve never seen before.” Iraq has already been the target of some of the harshest sanctions the world has even seen. U.S.-backed sanctions killed more than a million Iraqis, including more than half a million children, between 1990 and 2003.
Trump has also threatened to target 52 locations in Iran, including cultural sites, if Iran retaliates against the U.S. The targeting of cultural sites is widely viewed as a war crime. Trump said the number 52 was for Iran’s taking of 52 U.S. hostages 40 years ago.
Meanwhile, more information has come to light about the timing of Soleimani’s assassination. Iraq’s caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi has revealed he had plans to meet with Soleimani on the day he was killed to discuss a Saudi proposal to defuse tension in the region. Mahdi said, quote, “He came to deliver me a message from Iran, responding to the message we delivered from Saudi Arabia to Iran.”
This comes as the U.S. continues to increase its presence in the Middle East. The U.S. is sending nearly 3,000 more troops from Fort Bragg to the region. Meanwhile, the U.S. has announced it’s temporarily halting its fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria so it can redirect it focus in the region.
We begin today’s show with Narges Bajoghli, professor of Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University. Her recent opinion piece for The New York Times is headlined “Suleimani’s Death Changes Nothing for Iran.” She is the author of Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic. And in Baghdad, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, correspondent for The Guardian newspaper, is back with us. His latest piece is headlined “Iran ends nuclear deal commitments as fallout from Suleimani killing spreads.”
Let’s begin with Professor Bajoghli. Right now the reports of up to a million people are in the streets of Tehran. The body of Soleimani has been returned, and the funeral is underway. Can you talk about the significance of the assassination and what has happened since?
NARGES BAJOGHLI: Yes. I mean, a week ago, it would have been unthinkable to have crowds like this in Iran. Today was Tehran; yesterday in Ahvaz and Mashhad; tomorrow the body will go on to Kerman. After the violent crackdown that the state orchestrated against protesters in November of 2019 — so just a month and a half ago — there was so much anger in Iran because of the violent crackdown of the state, that there really was another crisis of legitimacy within the Islamic republic in dealing with the fallout of the maximum-pressure campaign and the severe sanctions that the Trump administration has put on them.
So, to think that these numbers of people are coming out onto the streets really signals two things. One, Qassem Soleimani, within Iran itself, was seen as a national hero, because he was seen as keeping ISIS at bay, and, two, because of Trump’s tweets just two nights ago that he would target Iranian cultural sites, it’s creating a sense of national unity within the country. And this is no longer about support for the regime, but it’s really about standing up to a foreign aggressor. This is something that — the killing of Soleimani, the assassination of Soleimani, and then Trump’s repeated tweets and threats, is doing two things: one, rallying Shia, sort of a transnational Shia community, especially those that are loyal to the Islamic republic in Iran, and then, two, rallying national sentiment within Iran against the United States.
AMY GOODMAN: I mean, this threatening to blow up Iranian cultural sites, I mean, it’s as if someone is threatening to blow up the Empire State Building or — well, on Saturday, Trump tweeted, “Iran has been nothing but problems for many years. Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!” Trump tweeted. So talk about this and him going back 40 years to say that’s how he chose that number, 52, and what this means to the Iranian people.
NARGES BAJOGHLI: Two things. One is that — you know, for me, what this signifies is the continued misunderstanding of United States and U.S. policymakers when it comes to Iran and the Iranian revolution and what it’s produced. I think because there’s been such an obsession in the U.S. after the — during and after the hostage crisis, in particular with understanding the Iranian revolution of 1979, as — like this obsession with it solely being an Islamic republic and an Islamic revolution, has meant that much of our analysis in this country and throughout the West, in particular, really undermines and does not think about the complexities within Iran and Iranian history.
The 1979 revolution itself, not thinking about what comes after it, was a revolution, a popular revolution, first and foremost. So this was not a revolution led by a vanguard or an elite. This is one of the most popular revolutions of the 20th century, a revolution led from below in which the main thrust of it and one of the main slogans of the revolution was “neither east nor west,” meaning neither the Soviet Union nor the United States. It really was a revolution that was about creating independence and sovereignty in Iran and not having it be under the sway of imperial powers. That is first and foremost. And that is a continuation of a centuries-long movement in Iran to establish independence within the country.
So, what happens after the revolution in Iran and the Islamic republic coming about, there are a lot of Iranians, both within the country and outside, obviously, who disagree with the Islamic republic. However, I think what’s important to understand — and this is where Trump, for all of the things that he has been doing on Iran, and I do think regime change and regime collapse is the policy of this administration when it comes to Iran — but the huge mistake that he made with that tweet the other night, by claiming to want to attack Iranian cultural heritage sites, is that he is now bringing up that sentiment again within the Iranian population, that as much as some within Iran may dislike the Islamic republic, they will not stand for a foreign aggression, especially from the sole superpower in the world, to come and attack their country and attack historical sites that have nothing to even do with the regime, but it’s about Iranian culture, which is thousands of years old.
AMY GOODMAN: Narges Bajoghli, tell us who Qassem Soleimani was.
NARGES BAJOGHLI: Qassem Soleimani was the major general of the Quds Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard in Iran. The Quds Force is the main force of the Revolutionary Guard which is in charge of extraterritorial operations of the Revolutionary Guard, meaning operations outside of Iran.
Now, Soleimani himself, during the 1980s, was a veteran of the 1980-'88 war with Iraq, which was the longest conventional war of the 20th century. That is where he learned how to fight. That is where he began to learn and to develop his understanding of international politics. And one of the things I think it's important to remember is that the war of the 1980s, which was an extremely bloody war — it was one of the wars in which trench warfare was fought for the first time after World War I — this is a war in which, for all of the political and elites of the Islamic republic, and especially those who fought in the war, they began to understand their viewpoint of international politics in that time, in which they saw how the United States and Western powers were supporting and supplying Iraq with weapons and intelligence during that time. So he comes about in that battlefield and in those wars.
From that point on, he then goes on into the Quds Force. And what is important to understand here is that as important of a general as he was — and he was significant — he, nonetheless, within the Revolutionary Guard — one of the things that the Revolutionary Guard has become so adept at, because it sort of had to, is asymmetrical warfare. But what that means on the ground is that decision-making within the Revolutionary Guard — and I studied them for 10 years in Iran, and I saw this no matter what area that they were functioning in — decision-making power and leadership within the Revolutionary Guard is very much done in an ad hoc way. And that is a legacy of the 1980 wars — of the 1980s war. And so, Qassem Soleimani was in charge of the Revolutionary Guard’s relationship especially in the Middle East and with Iraqi and Lebanese forces, Shia forces, but he was not the only one who was able to create these relationships, nor was he the only one who was doing these strategic maneuverings within the region.
He rose to prominence as a public figure in around 2013, and part of the reason for that is that there was very large media — a very large media campaign created for Qassem Soleimani within Iran. I followed around his media teams for a few years and saw how they made documentaries about him, music videos, films. There’s fiction films about him now, made in Iran, and films and documentaries and music videos made in Arabic, as well, for Arab audiences. And the reason that they were doing that at the time was to shore up support for Iran’s fight against ISIS. Because of that, he becomes this really prominent public figure, which is something that we often don’t see within Iran. You know, in order to sort of understand Soleimani, you have to understand that this hero-like status that he began to have is not very common within the culture of the Islamic republic. They make heroes out of martyrs, but they don’t necessarily make heroes out of living figures. Qassem Soleimani, though, did become a hero because of this concerted media effort in order to rally up support for the fight against ISIS.
AMY GOODMAN: So talk about the significance of him being assassinated and what this means.
NARGES BAJOGHLI: So, one thing is very important to note. As many Iranians were protesting against the government in November and have been protesting against the government for decades now, there is a very large contingency within Iran that does not support the Islamic republic or wants significant reforms to the Islamic republic. However, Qassem Soleimani, because of the depictions of him within Iran, especially after 2013, and because of his role in fighting against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, he was really sort of seen as being above the fray of the internal politics of the Islamic republic, for two reasons. One is that his activities were focused outside of Iran and not inside of Iran, so that he therefore wasn’t sort of caught up in the fractious politics of the Islamic republic. And, two, he was not a corrupt person. So, within the Islamic — within the Revolutionary Guard in particular, there have been a lot of corruption scandals in Iran, with, you know, different folks embezzling money, especially when it comes to the sanctions and things like that. He sort of stayed above that. And if you see images from the supreme leader and the president and all these other dignitaries visiting his family home in Tehran over the past few days, you’ll be able to also see, very visually, that his home is very humble. So he really stayed above that. And for those reasons, he remained extremely popular within Iran.
Now, too, he’s also a very — he also had a very hero-like status outside of Iran, as well, among Shia armed groups and among certain Shia communities in Iraq and Lebanon, again, because of the way in which he helped to direct forces against the Islamic State, which one of their main goals and one of their — they said over and over again that they saw the Shia as their main enemy. And so, because of that, he was sort of seen as this main protector. Within Iran, for years, one of the main slogans that you would hear over and over again and that people would repeat was that if Tehran and Qassem Soleimani were not in Damascus, then Daesh, or ISIS, would be in Tehran. So, because of that, he really was an important national and symbolic figure.
Now, the importance of his assassination is that because he was seen as this really important military hero that kept the homeland safe and that worked against ISIS and ultimately U.S. forces in the region, this — and this is what I wrote in The New York Times piece — he is this — I mean, there is nobody that the Islamic — or, that the United States could have assassinated with a higher — you know, a symbol that was sort of higher than him, in a way, and that would have unified people in the way that it has. I mean, I don’t think that the Trump administration fully understands what it has done in this regard when it comes to Iran and Shia communities across the region. As a symbol, Qassem Soleimani will have and has proven in the past two days to be a symbol that will move people to action.
AMY GOODMAN: And then let’s talk about the nuclear deal. Speaking to CNN’s Jake Tapper Sunday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested that Obama’s landmark Iran nuclear deal was tantamount to starting a war. This is Pompeo referring to the JCPOA — that’s the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — which has been heralded by many as a major international diplomatic victory for peace.
SECRETARY OF STATE MIKE POMPEO: This war kicked off — people talk about the war. This war kicked off when the JCPOA was entered into. It told the Iranians that they had free rein to develop a Shia crescent that extended from Yemen to Iraq to Syria and into Lebanon, surrounding our ally Israel and threatening American lives, as well. We’ve taken a very different approach. That approach has been successful.
AMY GOODMAN: So, if you can respond to this, Professor Bajoghli, and also that Iran has just announced they, too, will no longer abide by the Iran nuclear deal? I mean, the U.S. pulled out of it in 2018, but Iran was resisting pulling out entirely, until now, until the number two man in Iran, Soleimani, was assassinated by Trump.
NARGES BAJOGHLI: Well, one thing I’m going to say real quick here is that actually Iran hasn’t pulled out of the JCPOA yet. The announcement that Iran made yesterday is actually within still the confines of the JCPOA, and they have stated clearly that if other parties come back to the JCPOA, they will also reverse the steps that they have taken. So they actually haven’t pulled out of the JCPOA. It’s a very strategic and, frankly, surprising move. I did expect them to pull out, but they haven’t. And so it shows that they’re actually being very strategic about the reactions that they are having to Soleimani’s death at this point.
Now, going to Pompeo’s statement, I mean, that statement just frankly doesn’t understand the U.S.'s role in the region, not only since 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, but longer than that. But going specifically to what he said about the JCPOA, the JCPOA itself, whatever critiques that folks on the right may have of it, it was — and this was something that the Obama administration said over and over again — an initial framework for engagement with Iran. Whether folks within the Trump administration like it or not, Iran is a country that has — or, the Iranian civilization is one that has been in the region for thousands of years. It is not going anywhere. It's one that, no matter how much they try to isolate, will not disappear.
So, by pushing it further into the corner, as the Trump administration has done with pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal and then imposing such harsh sanctions, and not only imposing sanctions, but also undertaking covert actions, doing cyberwarfare against Iran, what all of this has produced is a situation in which Iran feels completely cornered. And that is part of the reason why we saw Iran lash out the way that it did over the summer and the months — and a few months over the fall. So, the fact — I mean, the JCPOA was a framework in which the Obama administration, it seemed, was trying to slowly normalize ties with Iran in a way so that then they could then begin to talk about other issues that the U.S. or European powers may have had with Iran. It’s actually the Trump administration and the way that they pulled out of the deal and then have begun to apply this maximum-pressure policy against Iran that has, in effect, produced the conditions of war with Iran.
AMY GOODMAN: According to The Washington Post, Qassem Soleimani multiple times used memes on social media to mock President Trump. In July 2018, after Trump threatened the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Twitter, Soleimani responded by telling Iran’s Tasnim News Agency, “If you begin the war, we will end the war. You know that this war will destroy all that you possess,” he said. A few days later, Soleimani posted an edited image of himself standing with a walkie-talkie in front of an exploding White House onto Instagram. Text on the image read, “We will crush the U.S.A. under our feet.” In November of that same year, after Trump tweeted a Game of Thrones-inspired image of himself with the text “Sanctions are coming,” Soleimani posted his own Game of Thrones meme with an image of himself and text reading “I will stand against you.” In April of 2019, Twitter suspended Soleimani’s account. They haven’t suspended Trump’s account. Your response, as we wrap up?
NARGES BAJOGHLI: Yeah, I mean, look, Soleimani has had a very large media team around him. The Revolutionary Guard, and especially when it comes to the threats that the Trump administration has been making once it pulled out of the Iran deal — and I think one thing that’s really important to point out here is the role of John Bolton within the administration and him being very adamant for many, many years about regime change in Iran. So we were dealing and we have been dealing with an administration here in the United States which has had its eyes on weakening Iran to the point of either regime collapse or regime change.
So, Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard and the media teams that the Revolutionary Guard have, which are extremely big, they receive a lot of state funding. The Revolutionary Guard itself has a lot of funding that it pours into its media production. I mean, that’s what I studied for so many years, and I was looking at all of these different media teams. They have been responding in this way. They will continue to respond in this way. This is also — again, remember, as much as the United States sort of tries to control the narrative, the public narrative, when it comes to Iran, within the West, Iran tries to control the public narrative especially among the internal population in Iran and among Arab Shia populations, as well. So we’ll continue to see these sorts of tit-for-tats, whether in narrative, in rhetoric or in memes of internet culture.
AMY GOODMAN: Narges Bajoghli, we want to thank you for being with us, professor of Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University. We’ll link to your piece in The New York Times, “Suleimani’s Death Changes Nothing for Iran,” author of Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic, also director of The Skin That Burns, a documentary film about survivors of chemical warfare in Iran.
This is Democracy Now! When we come back, we go to Baghdad. Stay with us.


democracynow--2020-01-06--Headlines for January  6, 2020

Headlines for January  6, 2020

Global tensions are mounting following the United States ’ assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in a drone strike at the Baghdad International Airport Friday morning .
Up to a million mourners poured into the streets of Iran and Iraq for the funeral procession of the longtime leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ’ Quds Force .
In response to the assassination , the Iraqi Parliament voted Sunday to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq .
President Trump responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq “ like they ’ ve never seen before.
” Iraq has already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harshest sanctions the world has even seen .
U.S.-backed sanctions killed more than a million Iraqis , including over 500,000 children , between 1990 and 2003 .
Trump has also threatened to target 52 locations in Iran , including cultural sites , if Iran retaliates against the U.S .
The targeting of cultural sites is widely viewed as a war crime .
Trump said the number 52 was for Iran ’ s taking of 52 hostages 40 years ago .
The Pentagon says it ’ s sending nearly 3,000 more troops to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Iran says it ’ s pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal .
The United States has already pulled out of the nuclear deal .
Many Iraqi residents say they are concerned the rising tensions between the U.S. and Iran will engulf Iraq .
This is Baghdad resident Naji Khathem .
Naji Khathem : “ It is a horrific atmosphere .
They want us to live in chaos , worse than what we live in now .
There will be more killings , and the fight between the U.S. and Iran will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t care that we are protesting for our rights .
What is coming will be worse.
” Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and California Congressmember Ro Khanna have introduced new legislation that would block funding for any military action “ in or against Iran ” without congressional authorization .
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi says the House will vote this week on a war powers resolution to limit Trump ’ s military actions .
Meanwhile , the Council on American-Islamic Relations says more than 60 Iranians and Iranian Americans were stopped and held for hours @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the weekend as they were trying to return to the United States , many after attending a concert in Vancouver .
Advocates say some were denied entry into the U.S .

Global tensions are mounting following the United States’ assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in a drone strike at the Baghdad International Airport Friday morning. Up to a million mourners poured into the streets of Iran and Iraq for the funeral procession of the longtime leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. In response to the assassination, the Iraqi Parliament voted Sunday to expel all U.S. military forces from Iraq. President Trump responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq “like they’ve never seen before.” Iraq has already been the target of some of the harshest sanctions the world has even seen. U.S.-backed sanctions killed more than a million Iraqis, including over 500,000 children, between 1990 and 2003. Trump has also threatened to target 52 locations in Iran, including cultural sites, if Iran retaliates against the U.S. The targeting of cultural sites is widely viewed as a war crime. Trump said the number 52 was for Iran’s taking of 52 hostages 40 years ago. The Pentagon says it’s sending nearly 3,000 more troops to the Middle East from the 82nd Airborne Division. Iran says it’s pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal. The United States has already pulled out of the nuclear deal. Many Iraqi residents say they are concerned the rising tensions between the U.S. and Iran will engulf Iraq. This is Baghdad resident Naji Khathem.
Naji Khathem: “It is a horrific atmosphere. They want us to live in chaos, worse than what we live in now. There will be more killings, and the fight between the U.S. and Iran will move to Iraq. They don’t care that we are protesting for our rights. What is coming will be worse.”
Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and California Congressmember Ro Khanna have introduced new legislation that would block funding for any military action “in or against Iran” without congressional authorization. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi says the House will vote this week on a war powers resolution to limit Trump’s military actions. Meanwhile, the Council on American-Islamic Relations says more than 60 Iranians and Iranian Americans were stopped and held for hours of questioning at the U.S.-Canada border over the weekend as they were trying to return to the United States, many after attending a concert in Vancouver. Advocates say some were denied entry into the U.S.