vox--2020-11-02--Why countries interfere in elections

Why countries interfere in elections

What Russia — or any other foreign power — might do to disrupt the 2020 US election has loomed over the entire race .
Russia and other actors are using social media to sow discord .
US intelligence officials announced in October that Russia ( and Iran ) had gained access to voter registration data .
And the New York Times reported last month that Russia has plans to interfere in the last few days of the election or just after November 3 , primarily to help Trump .
How big Russia ’ s impact will be is impossible to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have an impact on the outcome in 2016 , says Dov Levin , an expert on foreign election interference and author of Meddling in the Ballot Box : The Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions .
Russia and the US have a long history of intervening in each other ’ s politics , going back and forth dozens and dozens of times since the end of World War II .
And foreign attempts to meddle in US elections have occurred since its founding , though that time the blame went to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , foreign actors rarely just meddle for meddling ’ s sake .
Levin argues that a country ’ s leaders have to believe that one side ’ s victory in a particular foreign election would be untenable for their interests — and they need to know that the opponent might be interested in getting their assistance .
When those conditions exist , hello foreign interference .
I called up Levin to talk more about why countries decide to intervene in other countries ’ elections , how he sees Russian and other foreign interference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kinds of interference we may see more of in the future .
Our conversation , edited for length and clarity , is below .
There ’ s been such a focus in the United States on Russia ’ s meddling in the 2016 election and potential meddling in the 2020 election .
But from your book , it sounds like foreign election interference was a pretty common occurrence around the world throughout history .
Yes , this is a pretty common form of interference that has been going on since national-level elections in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in pre-modern elections for pope or for king , which existed in some countries .
And I find that this has been a pretty common phenomenon , using various secret or covert , or public and overt , messaging ever since .
Many major world powers have used that method .
Between 1946 and 2000 , the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia have intervened in one out of every nine national-level executive elections using this method .
In your book , you lay out two conditions that have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interfere in an election .
Can you explain them ?
The first one is the great power sees one of the candidates or parties in the target country as a threat to some of its key interests , and the foreign power expects it would be really hard to move the target in this regard .
So that is one condition .
The other is that there is another local candidate or party in the target country that is willing to accept such assistance — and it ’ s usually because they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ willing to bear the cost of such interference , which is , when it is secret , the possibility of exposure and delegitimization .
When interference is in public , it ’ s the possibility of a big backlash , or in the longer term , some voters not being happy that their candidate or party is getting assistance from a foreign power , and , as a result , not voting for them in the next election .
So usually the local actor , when they are willing to accept or ask @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in deep political trouble and this request or agreement to accept such foreign interference on their behalf is , in football terms , a “ Hail Mary.
” They ’ re in deep political trouble , and this is meant to save them , so to speak .
Your thesis would seem to fit with what we know about Russia ’ s interference activities in 2016 , and the Trump ’ s campaign ’ s receptiveness to getting help from Russia .
Last week , intelligence officials cited both Iran and Russia as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of course , looms large .
I ’ m wondering if , based on your thesis , you think Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s calculus is different in 2020 than it might have been in 2016 ?
We do not know yet the thinking of Russia while it ’ s intervening , and we can not be 100 percent sure in this regard .
But it seems that it ’ s a very similar calculus .
That is , you know , they are very worried that Democrats will come to power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they will have a very hardline policy towards Russia , given anger among the Democrats about Russia ’ s behavior in 2016 , Russia ’ s behavior in Ukraine , its behavior in other countries , like poisoning people , and things like that .
So they are clearly pretty worried of the possibility that [ Vice President Joe ] Biden and the Democratic Party would come to power and push back against various Russian behaviors and shenanigans around the world .
And while we naturally don ’ t have any evidence yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have , as you could see from the Mueller report , and other sources , pretty strong circumstantial evidence that someone in the Trump campaign in 2016 was coordinating with Russia either directly or through WikiLeaks .
Again , we don ’ t have conclusive evidence that Russia is intervening in 2020 .
But assuming [ the suspected Russian influence operation that involved setting up a fake progressive digital news outlet called ] Peacedata and things like that are for this purpose , the calculus seems to be pretty similar to what was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fear of the possibility of the Democratic presidential candidate coming to power and pushing back against Russia for its behavior , both towards the United States and elsewhere in the world .
We do know that Russia wanted to hurt Hillary Clinton and preferred Trump in 2016 .
According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence , Russia is denigrating Biden in 2020 .
But baked into that is this idea that Russia really just wants to foment chaos and undermine democracy , and Trump also advances that goal .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
How do you see that idea — that Russia wants to generate chaos — as fitting into this framework ?
I would separate electoral activities and non-electoral activities .
Clearly , from what we know about some of their non-electoral activities — those that are not related to any election — some of them are meant to cause chaos in various ways and disrupt and damage .
So about non-electoral activities , I would completely agree with this view of Russian behavior .
However , when it comes to their electoral activities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , all of those leaks that were given to WikiLeaks — the idea that that was only done to sow chaos , I see that as the wrong interpretation .
From the point of view of Russia — and I ’ m giving here the general logic of most interveners in this regard — sowing chaos in an election is not the productive message because it can make their situation worse .
If all they want to do , to quote the Joker , is “ see the world burn ” — you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burn , ” so to speak — then doing that in an election is the wrong way , because you antagonize the side that is suffering from it and incentivize them to harm you even more .
If they ’ re intervening in elections , it is usually because they don ’ t want one of the sides to be elected .
And only if they see that particular side as so bad from their perspective that they don ’ t care too much about antagonizing them further will they be willing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So I think that the interpretation that Russia intervened in 2016 just to sow chaos and that they didn ’ t really care who would win is mistaken .
They clearly funded activities that were in an organized campaign to lead Hillary Clinton to lose in 2016 .
They had a pretty clear agenda .
They tailored stuff pretty clearly in a way that would help Trump the most .
For example , some of these leaks literally came out a few hours after domestic scandals Trump was involved in like , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ of Clinton campaign chair John Podesta ’ s emails ] came out hours after the famous Access Hollywood tape .
Those are activities which are not just meant to sow chaos .
They clearly are meant to achieve an agenda — in that particular case , to reduce the damage Trump was suffering that day from that Access Hollywood tape .
So from the way Russia acted in 2016 , and from the overall behavior of such interveners , I think it is very unlikely that they were doing it in 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wanted to sow chaos , they didn ’ t need to act in such a purposeful way .
I agree that they were intervening on the side of Trump in 2016 .
But take 2020 : The Department of Homeland Security has warned that Russia is amplifying misinformation about voting problems , including claims about mail-in voter fraud .
This obviously echoes Trump ’ s rhetoric , so it ’ s certainly bolstering his position .
But that could also potentially create doubt about the election results .
That doesn ’ t necessarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the system as a whole .
We don ’ t know exactly what Russia ’ s strategy is when it comes to 2020 .
It will take us time to know for sure what it is exactly doing in 2020 .
But I would say that some of the negative effects on democracy are , from Russia ’ s point of view , a useful side effect .
They have one major goal , which is to help Trump get reelected .
If it harms American democracy in some way — which , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other research that such interference , on average , does in many cases — that ’ s from their point of view a great side effect .
Vladimir Putin is not going to cry , and is not going to in any way feel bad about it , so to speak .
But that is not their main goal .
And again , it takes time to see how these activities play out in retrospect .
There ’ s a lot of what you could call , in military terms , the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we know , from 2016 , a lot of the stuff was designed very purposefully to help Donald Trump .
And my guess is that when we do have a post-2020 estimate of what exactly Russia did , we will see that most of it was stuff that was meant to help Trump in various ways .
You say that one of the reasons Russia wouldn ’ t intervene unless they think one side is so bad it thinks it ’ s worth the risk , antagonizing them .
In 2016 , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Russian interference would have become such a huge part of the public discourse if Clinton had won — for example , it seems unlikely we would have had the full Mueller investigation .
It seems if Russia reprised what it did in 2016 in 2020 , the consequences would be even more profound if there is a Democratic administration .
Do you think this affects Russia ’ s calculus at all this year , that they ’ ve realized they might have pushed the envelope too far already ?
I think there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the Russian intervention in 2016 .
The Russian intervention in 2016 was meant to be secret .
In other words , Russia wanted to keep all of the activities — or more accurately , the hand behind those activities — completely a secret from the American public and the rest of the world .
If it was up to Vladimir Putin , all of those leaks by WikiLeaks , we ’ d all have been speculating in the following four years , where could they have come from ?
Was it some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Was it some Trump campaign mole in the Clinton campaign ?
And Putin would be , you know , like one of those James Bond villains with their cat , watching people speculating where it came from , and no one would notice Russia .
You know what I mean ?
I do , but I have a lot of trouble believing that .
They were kind of sloppy .
How could Russia have believed that we — or at least US intelligence agencies — would not have figured that out ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In my data , only a handful of covert electoral interventions were actually exposed before the election — you know , clear evidence was found that a foreign power was involved , and then literally caught red-handed , so to speak .
Such exposure was relatively rare .
The reason why I think Russia was exposed in this regard was simply that the [ military intelligence agency ] GRU is not — or the Russian intelligence agencies are not — as good as they used to be .
They used to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but in the last few years , it has become evident that they became very sloppy .
You know , there ’ s another report that multiple secret agents of the GRU had forged passports with consecutive numbers .
It was more like one of those , you know , parodies of James Bond rather than any effective spies .
So , I would say that the reason why it was exposed both in 2016 , and to a certain extent in 2020 , is simply that the GRU is not as good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not maintain operational secrecy in 2016 .
That ’ s why they were caught .
In 2020 , they seem to have tried to put even more effort into keeping it secret , but they have , nevertheless , seemed to have been exposed in various ways .
This is not because Vladimir Putin thought that he would be exposed and was wanting everyone to know that he was behind it , but simply because his intelligence agency is not as good as the KGB was during the Cold War .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence agencies , clearly , have been able to penetrate it in some ways and detect its activities .
That makes sense , but even some of its other activities — like outreach from people with links to the Russian government to the Trump campaign — just seemed destined to get discovered .
I would just add , as you mentioned , that , if not for the intervention itself being exposed , the chances that there would have been so much digging that we would have detected other stuff would have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that ’ s a good point .
As you mentioned in your book , the Soviet Union , and later Russia , and the US have intervened in one out of every nine national-level elections between 1946 and 2000 .
That obviously peaked during the Cold War .
But after the Cold War , I think it ’ s fair to say that the US and Russia weren ’ t exactly on equal footing .
It seems much more risky for Russia to meddle in the US , than for the US to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ m curious about that calculation — what are the risks for powers when they ’ re not on equal footing with their intervention target ?
From the point of view of Russia , I would guess that one of the reasons it chose to work covertly was to reduce , a bit , the risks involved .
If it isn ’ t exposed , it is less risky .
If you don ’ t know where it ’ s coming from , you can not do something in retaliation .
The second reason @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meddling , when it ’ s known , is relatively rare .
Russia ’ s gamble was probably that they would get away with it .
As I mentioned , in most cases , this type of covert election interference is not detected .
And if they would have been detected , they would not be likely to be very severely punished .
This probably would have been Vladimir Putin ’ s calculus .
Why is punishment so rare ?
Because of two major reasons .
One reason is basically that if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have no incentive to punish the side that aided them .
Why should they bite the hand that just gave them an election victory ?
I find in my book that in many cases , such interventions are effective and bring to power the assisted side .
And if they lost , again , in many cases , this is done covertly .
So if a foreign power leaked incriminating documents , but you don ’ t know that a foreign power was behind it , you won ’ t punish them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is known [ who meddled ] , the winning party decides to let bygones be bygones and try to open a new page .
That is why it usually doesn ’ t happen .
Given this long history of election meddling between the US and Russia , I ’ m curious if you found that Russia relied on a similar “ playbook ” in past interventions as they did in 2016 .
Does Russia revisit the same sort of strategies over and over again , or do they tailor it based on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or political interests ?
I would divide the answer into two parts .
What they did in 2016 , and what they probably did in 2020 , follows tools and techniques that they have used in many countries in the past , including beforehand in the United States and outside of the United States .
There ’ s nothing new about the strategies .
However , when it comes to what they chose , you know , why they chose this method and not that method — that was very well-tailored to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , in my opinion , that ’ s one reason why they chose in 2016 to look for emails from the DNC and the Clinton campaign and to leak them .
Clearly they believed that such supposed “ dirt ” on Hillary Clinton would be especially effective .
So they figure out what will be the most effective to damage a candidate , and then tailor their methods from there .
Foreign powers , when they intervene in elections — both Russia and the United States — they tend to tailor very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their “ client , ” or the side that they are assisting , to give them the the maximum assistance they believe is possible , given the circumstances and their capability .
In your research , did you come across a tool or method for election interference that tended to be the most effective in swaying an electoral outcome ?
I actually tried to investigate that in my book .
I found some preliminary evidence that the size of the intervention matters .
If it ’ s very large , and you ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time , basically throwing the kitchen sink , so to speak , at this particular country , it is more likely to work .
I found also that when it ’ s done overtly , or in public , it is usually much more effective than covertly , increasing the vote share of the preferred side by 3 percent on average more than a covert operation .
As for specific methods , giving money or various dirty tricks like what Russia did in 2016 , I could not find conclusive evidence that there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective than others .
Why is overt intervention more effective ?
I basically argue that overt would usually be more effective because of the way in which it is closely coordinating with the local actor , and the fact that in an overt intervention , a country is able to bring more of its power to bear .
Think about an election as a contest in competitive promise-making .
One candidate says , “ If you vote for me , you will get a chicken in every pot.
” The other candidate says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you vote for me , you ’ ll get two chickens in every pot.
” And basically a great power , because it usually has a resource advantage over any of the other two candidates , it can basically outbid the two sides .
The foreign power comes in and says , “ If you vote for this guy , all of you get two chickens in every pot , a brand new stove , and a brand new car.
” In other words , a great power can use its resource advantages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communicating with the voters directly , and bringing all of its resource advantage to bear .
With covert operations , in contrast , you ’ re trying to intervene ineffectively .
You are giving money to the preferred side .
But then , they ’ ll run more ads that hopefully people will watch , or you are hacking and leaking documents that you hope some people will read .
In those cases where there ’ s a possibility of a backlash , they do it in secret .
They only intervene overtly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a backlash , and it ’ s likely to be effective .
What do you think is the future of foreign meddling ?
Well , I see two directions .
One direction is an attempt to “ digitize ” more traditional intervention techniques and make them more usable in cyberspace .
What was done in 2016 , when it comes to those leaks and hacks , was basically taking an analog technique and making it digitalized .
I expect other methods of interference would also become digitized .
For example , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when a foreign power wants to give campaign funding on the side , they will use cryptocurrencies for this purpose .
It makes it much easier to transfer it without anyone in the target country detecting it , and it also reduces the number of meetings needed for this purpose .
Usually for [ illicit ] campaign funding you need to meet up in some hotel room in secret and give the money in a suitcase or something like that .
That ’ s literally how it was done in some cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movies .
Cryptocurrencies make it easier to transfer the money without detection and with less meetings .
All you would need to do is be a foreign agent , come into the country with a USB with some cryptocurrency on it , buy a brand-new laptop in a local store , go to your local Starbucks , connect the USB drive with the cryptocurrency on it to your new laptop , log on to the Starbucks wifi , and transfer the money .
So that could be one possible future intervention .
Another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — not just fake news and then leaks and hacks — would be the return of a very ancient interference technique that existed in the pre-modern world .
That would be directly changing the vote tallies .
Before the modern era , for example , if you are , say , the Holy Roman Empire and you wanted to determine who would be the next pope , in some cases , you literally bribed the cardinal in charge of counting the votes , and in that way determined who would be the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we started to have elections with millions of people and thousands of ballot places around the country .
But with digital election machines becoming increasingly common , it ’ s possible that one day a foreign power may try to hack into a voting machine or a central computer in charge of tallying the votes coming all across the country , and literally change the vote count directly .

What Russia — or any other foreign power — might do to disrupt the 2020 US election has loomed over the entire race.
Russia and other actors are using social media to sow discord. US intelligence officials announced in October that Russia (and Iran) had gained access to voter registration data. And the New York Times reported last month that Russia has plans to interfere in the last few days of the election or just after November 3, primarily to help Trump.
How big Russia’s impact will be is impossible to know right now, though it did have an impact on the outcome in 2016, says Dov Levin, an expert on foreign election interference and author of Meddling in the Ballot Box: The Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions.
Russia and the US have a long history of intervening in each other’s politics, going back and forth dozens and dozens of times since the end of World War II. And foreign attempts to meddle in US elections have occurred since its founding, though that time the blame went to the French.
But whatever the time period, foreign actors rarely just meddle for meddling’s sake. Levin argues that a country’s leaders have to believe that one side’s victory in a particular foreign election would be untenable for their interests — and they need to know that the opponent might be interested in getting their assistance. When those conditions exist, hello foreign interference.
I called up Levin to talk more about why countries decide to intervene in other countries’ elections, how he sees Russian and other foreign interference playing out in 2020, and what kinds of interference we may see more of in the future. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below.
Jen Kirby
There’s been such a focus in the United States on Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election and potential meddling in the 2020 election. But from your book, it sounds like foreign election interference was a pretty common occurrence around the world throughout history.
Dov Levin
Yes, this is a pretty common form of interference that has been going on since national-level elections in the 18th century, and even beforehand, in pre-modern elections for pope or for king, which existed in some countries. And I find that this has been a pretty common phenomenon, using various secret or covert, or public and overt, messaging ever since.
Many major world powers have used that method. Between 1946 and 2000, the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia have intervened in one out of every nine national-level executive elections using this method.
Jen Kirby
In your book, you lay out two conditions that have to be present for a foreign power to interfere in an election. Can you explain them?
Dov Levin
The first one is the great power sees one of the candidates or parties in the target country as a threat to some of its key interests, and the foreign power expects it would be really hard to move the target in this regard. So that is one condition.
The other is that there is another local candidate or party in the target country that is willing to accept such assistance — and it’s usually because they are in deep political trouble. They are willing to bear the cost of such interference, which is, when it is secret, the possibility of exposure and delegitimization. When interference is in public, it’s the possibility of a big backlash, or in the longer term, some voters not being happy that their candidate or party is getting assistance from a foreign power, and, as a result, not voting for them in the next election.
So usually the local actor, when they are willing to accept or ask for such interference, [is] in deep political trouble and this request or agreement to accept such foreign interference on their behalf is, in football terms, a “Hail Mary.” They’re in deep political trouble, and this is meant to save them, so to speak.
Jen Kirby
Your thesis would seem to fit with what we know about Russia’s interference activities in 2016, and the Trump’s campaign’s receptiveness to getting help from Russia. Last week, intelligence officials cited both Iran and Russia as engaging in election interference. Russia, of course, looms large. I’m wondering if, based on your thesis, you think Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculus is different in 2020 than it might have been in 2016?
Dov Levin
We do not know yet the thinking of Russia while it’s intervening, and we cannot be 100 percent sure in this regard.
But it seems that it’s a very similar calculus. That is, you know, they are very worried that Democrats will come to power in the 2020 elections, and that they will have a very hardline policy towards Russia, given anger among the Democrats about Russia’s behavior in 2016, Russia’s behavior in Ukraine, its behavior in other countries, like poisoning people, and things like that.
So they are clearly pretty worried of the possibility that [Vice President Joe] Biden and the Democratic Party would come to power and push back against various Russian behaviors and shenanigans around the world.
And while we naturally don’t have any evidence yet of any ties in 2020, we have, as you could see from the Mueller report, and other sources, pretty strong circumstantial evidence that someone in the Trump campaign in 2016 was coordinating with Russia either directly or through WikiLeaks.
Again, we don’t have conclusive evidence that Russia is intervening in 2020. But assuming [the suspected Russian influence operation that involved setting up a fake progressive digital news outlet called] Peacedata and things like that are for this purpose, the calculus seems to be pretty similar to what was in 2016: a very deep Russian fear of the possibility of the Democratic presidential candidate coming to power and pushing back against Russia for its behavior, both towards the United States and elsewhere in the world.
Jen Kirby
We do know that Russia wanted to hurt Hillary Clinton and preferred Trump in 2016. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia is denigrating Biden in 2020. But baked into that is this idea that Russia really just wants to foment chaos and undermine democracy, and Trump also advances that goal. We see this very specifically with online propaganda. How do you see that idea — that Russia wants to generate chaos — as fitting into this framework?
Dov Levin
I would separate electoral activities and non-electoral activities. Clearly, from what we know about some of their non-electoral activities — those that are not related to any election — some of them are meant to cause chaos in various ways and disrupt and damage. So about non-electoral activities, I would completely agree with this view of Russian behavior. However, when it comes to their electoral activities, the whole Russian intervention in 2016, all of those leaks that were given to WikiLeaks — the idea that that was only done to sow chaos, I see that as the wrong interpretation.
From the point of view of Russia — and I’m giving here the general logic of most interveners in this regard — sowing chaos in an election is not the productive message because it can make their situation worse.
If all they want to do, to quote the Joker, is “see the world burn” — you know, see the United States “burn,” so to speak — then doing that in an election is the wrong way, because you antagonize the side that is suffering from it and incentivize them to harm you even more.
If they’re intervening in elections, it is usually because they don’t want one of the sides to be elected. And only if they see that particular side as so bad from their perspective that they don’t care too much about antagonizing them further will they be willing to do that during the election period.
So I think that the interpretation that Russia intervened in 2016 just to sow chaos and that they didn’t really care who would win is mistaken. They clearly funded activities that were in an organized campaign to lead Hillary Clinton to lose in 2016. They had a pretty clear agenda. They tailored stuff pretty clearly in a way that would help Trump the most.
For example, some of these leaks literally came out a few hours after domestic scandals Trump was involved in like, for example, one of their big leaks [of Clinton campaign chair John Podesta’s emails] came out hours after the famous Access Hollywood tape.
Those are activities which are not just meant to sow chaos. They clearly are meant to achieve an agenda — in that particular case, to reduce the damage Trump was suffering that day from that Access Hollywood tape. So from the way Russia acted in 2016, and from the overall behavior of such interveners, I think it is very unlikely that they were doing it in 2016 just to sow chaos. If they wanted to sow chaos, they didn’t need to act in such a purposeful way.
Jen Kirby
I agree that they were intervening on the side of Trump in 2016. But take 2020: The Department of Homeland Security has warned that Russia is amplifying misinformation about voting problems, including claims about mail-in voter fraud. This obviously echoes Trump’s rhetoric, so it’s certainly bolstering his position. But that could also potentially create doubt about the election results. That doesn’t necessarily benefit one particular candidate — it undermines the system as a whole.
Dov Levin
We don’t know exactly what Russia’s strategy is when it comes to 2020. It will take us time to know for sure what it is exactly doing in 2020.
But I would say that some of the negative effects on democracy are, from Russia’s point of view, a useful side effect. They have one major goal, which is to help Trump get reelected. If it harms American democracy in some way — which, by the way, I find in other research that such interference, on average, does in many cases — that’s from their point of view a great side effect. Vladimir Putin is not going to cry, and is not going to in any way feel bad about it, so to speak. But that is not their main goal.
And again, it takes time to see how these activities play out in retrospect. There’s a lot of what you could call, in military terms, the “fog of battle.” But from what we know, from 2016, a lot of the stuff was designed very purposefully to help Donald Trump. And my guess is that when we do have a post-2020 estimate of what exactly Russia did, we will see that most of it was stuff that was meant to help Trump in various ways.
Jen Kirby
You say that one of the reasons Russia wouldn’t intervene unless they think one side is so bad it thinks it’s worth the risk, antagonizing them. In 2016, that was Hillary Clinton. But I wonder if Russian interference would have become such a huge part of the public discourse if Clinton had won — for example, it seems unlikely we would have had the full Mueller investigation.
It seems if Russia reprised what it did in 2016 in 2020, the consequences would be even more profound if there is a Democratic administration. Do you think this affects Russia’s calculus at all this year, that they’ve realized they might have pushed the envelope too far already?
Dov Levin
I think there’s a bit of a misunderstanding about the Russian intervention in 2016. The Russian intervention in 2016 was meant to be secret. In other words, Russia wanted to keep all of the activities — or more accurately, the hand behind those activities — completely a secret from the American public and the rest of the world.
If it was up to Vladimir Putin, all of those leaks by WikiLeaks, we’d all have been speculating in the following four years, where could they have come from? Was it some kind of disgruntled employee in the DNC? Was it some Trump campaign mole in the Clinton campaign? And Putin would be, you know, like one of those James Bond villains with their cat, watching people speculating where it came from, and no one would notice Russia. You know what I mean?
Jen Kirby
I do, but I have a lot of trouble believing that. They were kind of sloppy. How could Russia have believed that we — or at least US intelligence agencies — would not have figured that out?
Dov Levin
Most covert interference is usually not caught. In my data, only a handful of covert electoral interventions were actually exposed before the election — you know, clear evidence was found that a foreign power was involved, and then literally caught red-handed, so to speak. Such exposure was relatively rare.
The reason why I think Russia was exposed in this regard was simply that the [military intelligence agency] GRU is not — or the Russian intelligence agencies are not — as good as they used to be. They used to be very good at hiding their tracks, but in the last few years, it has become evident that they became very sloppy.
You know, there’s another report that multiple secret agents of the GRU had forged passports with consecutive numbers. It was more like one of those, you know, parodies of James Bond rather than any effective spies.
So, I would say that the reason why it was exposed both in 2016, and to a certain extent in 2020, is simply that the GRU is not as good as it used to be. They did not maintain operational secrecy in 2016. That’s why they were caught. In 2020, they seem to have tried to put even more effort into keeping it secret, but they have, nevertheless, seemed to have been exposed in various ways.
This is not because Vladimir Putin thought that he would be exposed and was wanting everyone to know that he was behind it, but simply because his intelligence agency is not as good as the KGB was during the Cold War. And the United States government, and its intelligence agencies, clearly, have been able to penetrate it in some ways and detect its activities.
Jen Kirby
That makes sense, but even some of its other activities — like outreach from people with links to the Russian government to the Trump campaign — just seemed destined to get discovered.
Dov Levin
I would just add, as you mentioned, that, if not for the intervention itself being exposed, the chances that there would have been so much digging that we would have detected other stuff would have been very unlikely as well.
Jen Kirby
Yes, that’s a good point. As you mentioned in your book, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, and the US have intervened in one out of every nine national-level elections between 1946 and 2000. That obviously peaked during the Cold War. But after the Cold War, I think it’s fair to say that the US and Russia weren’t exactly on equal footing. It seems much more risky for Russia to meddle in the US, than for the US to meddle in Russia. So I’m curious about that calculation — what are the risks for powers when they’re not on equal footing with their intervention target?
Dov Levin
From the point of view of Russia, I would guess that one of the reasons it chose to work covertly was to reduce, a bit, the risks involved. If it isn’t exposed, it is less risky. If you don’t know where it’s coming from, you cannot do something in retaliation.
The second reason is that retaliation in response to such meddling, when it’s known, is relatively rare. Russia’s gamble was probably that they would get away with it.
As I mentioned, in most cases, this type of covert election interference is not detected. And if they would have been detected, they would not be likely to be very severely punished. This probably would have been Vladimir Putin’s calculus.
Jen Kirby
Why is punishment so rare?
Dov Levin
Because of two major reasons. One reason is basically that if the side that was being assisted wins, they have no incentive to punish the side that aided them. Why should they bite the hand that just gave them an election victory? I find in my book that in many cases, such interventions are effective and bring to power the assisted side.
And if they lost, again, in many cases, this is done covertly. So if a foreign power leaked incriminating documents, but you don’t know that a foreign power was behind it, you won’t punish them. And in the few cases where it is known [who meddled], the winning party decides to let bygones be bygones and try to open a new page. That is why it usually doesn’t happen.
Jen Kirby
Given this long history of election meddling between the US and Russia, I’m curious if you found that Russia relied on a similar “playbook” in past interventions as they did in 2016. Does Russia revisit the same sort of strategies over and over again, or do they tailor it based on the political climate, the candidate, or political interests?
Dov Levin
I would divide the answer into two parts. What they did in 2016, and what they probably did in 2020, follows tools and techniques that they have used in many countries in the past, including beforehand in the United States and outside of the United States. There’s nothing new about the strategies.
However, when it comes to what they chose, you know, why they chose this method and not that method — that was very well-tailored to the political climate.
Particularly in the United States, in my opinion, that’s one reason why they chose in 2016 to look for emails from the DNC and the Clinton campaign and to leak them. Clearly they believed that such supposed “dirt” on Hillary Clinton would be especially effective.
Jen Kirby
So they figure out what will be the most effective to damage a candidate, and then tailor their methods from there.
Dov Levin
Foreign powers, when they intervene in elections — both Russia and the United States — they tend to tailor very carefully their interventions to the needs of their “client,” or the side that they are assisting, to give them the the maximum assistance they believe is possible, given the circumstances and their capability.
Jen Kirby
In your research, did you come across a tool or method for election interference that tended to be the most effective in swaying an electoral outcome?
Dov Levin
I actually tried to investigate that in my book. I found some preliminary evidence that the size of the intervention matters. If it’s very large, and you’re using multiple methods at the same time, basically throwing the kitchen sink, so to speak, at this particular country, it is more likely to work.
I found also that when it’s done overtly, or in public, it is usually much more effective than covertly, increasing the vote share of the preferred side by 3 percent on average more than a covert operation. As for specific methods, giving money or various dirty tricks like what Russia did in 2016, I could not find conclusive evidence that there is any particular method that is more effective than others.
Jen Kirby
Why is overt intervention more effective?
Dov Levin
I basically argue that overt would usually be more effective because of the way in which it is closely coordinating with the local actor, and the fact that in an overt intervention, a country is able to bring more of its power to bear.
Think about an election as a contest in competitive promise-making. One candidate says, “If you vote for me, you will get a chicken in every pot.” The other candidate says, “No no no, if you vote for me, you’ll get two chickens in every pot.” And basically a great power, because it usually has a resource advantage over any of the other two candidates, it can basically outbid the two sides. The foreign power comes in and says, “If you vote for this guy, all of you get two chickens in every pot, a brand new stove, and a brand new car.”
In other words, a great power can use its resource advantages in order to move the needle by communicating with the voters directly, and bringing all of its resource advantage to bear.
With covert operations, in contrast, you’re trying to intervene ineffectively. You are giving money to the preferred side. But then, they’ll run more ads that hopefully people will watch, or you are hacking and leaking documents that you hope some people will read.
In those cases where there’s a possibility of a backlash, they do it in secret. They only intervene overtly when they know that there will not be a backlash, and it’s likely to be effective.
Jen Kirby
What do you think is the future of foreign meddling?
Dov Levin
Well, I see two directions. One direction is an attempt to “digitize” more traditional intervention techniques and make them more usable in cyberspace. What was done in 2016, when it comes to those leaks and hacks, was basically taking an analog technique and making it digitalized.
I expect other methods of interference would also become digitized. For example, it is possible that, in the future, when a foreign power wants to give campaign funding on the side, they will use cryptocurrencies for this purpose. It makes it much easier to transfer it without anyone in the target country detecting it, and it also reduces the number of meetings needed for this purpose.
Usually for [illicit] campaign funding you need to meet up in some hotel room in secret and give the money in a suitcase or something like that. That’s literally how it was done in some cases, like in one of those crime movies.
Cryptocurrencies make it easier to transfer the money without detection and with less meetings. All you would need to do is be a foreign agent, come into the country with a USB with some cryptocurrency on it, buy a brand-new laptop in a local store, go to your local Starbucks, connect the USB drive with the cryptocurrency on it to your new laptop, log on to the Starbucks wifi, and transfer the money.
So that could be one possible future intervention. Another “digitization” of these interference techniques — not just fake news and then leaks and hacks — would be the return of a very ancient interference technique that existed in the pre-modern world. That would be directly changing the vote tallies.
Before the modern era, for example, if you are, say, the Holy Roman Empire and you wanted to determine who would be the next pope, in some cases, you literally bribed the cardinal in charge of counting the votes, and in that way determined who would be the next pope.
That stopped being possible when we started to have elections with millions of people and thousands of ballot places around the country. But with digital election machines becoming increasingly common, it’s possible that one day a foreign power may try to hack into a voting machine or a central computer in charge of tallying the votes coming all across the country, and literally change the vote count directly.


vox--2020-11-02--They hate Trump for a living. They might miss him, too.

She can ’ t wait for him to leave .
“ I ’ m very excited about him being gone , ” says the comedian , who went from ( mostly ) unknown to omnipresent this spring with a brilliant series of Trump lip-sync videos .
“ I want my career to do other things , and I don ’ t want to talk about him anymore.
” Cooper doesn ’ t have a love-hate relationship with Trump .
She hates him .
Which puts her in the same boat as other media personalities and companies that have turned the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their ire into opportunities .
And now that it looks as though Trump might be leaving , they need to figure out what to do next .
Even if some of them aren ’ t ready to say that out loud quite yet .
To be clear : A post-Trump world doesn ’ t mean the political and cultural divisions that brought us Trump — and that Trump has exploited — get closed up .
But if your reason for being is defeating Donald Trump , and that happens , then … what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of “ Never Trump ” Republicans who came together less than a year ago to deploy ads against Trump in the 2020 election , now wants to become a media company , according to Axios .
The Lincoln Project says that ’ s not exactly true .
But it could be , per a statement from the company : “ We have not floated the idea of becoming producers or a media company … people have approached us about it , and we ’ ve said to one and all , ‘ This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
We ’ re locked down tight on the mission of defeating Trump.
’ ” So if they were to do that , they ’ d be following in the footsteps of Crooked Media , the company run by Obama White House veterans , which formed after Trump ’ s 2016 election .
For the last four years , the company has primarily leaned on its flagship Pod Save America podcast but has branched out into other ventures like a newsletter , an HBO show , and other politically-tinged podcasts ; industry executives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of nonpolitical programming in a post-Trump world .
One indicator of Crooked Media ’ s ambition : It has hired Jason Concepcion , a high-profile podcaster from The Ringer , where he specialized in pop culture projects like Binge Mode , a series dedicated to franchises like Harry Potter and Game of Thrones ; and NBA Desktop , an inventive version of SportsCenter for the Google Doc + Insta Stories generation .
( Of note : Crooked Media ’ s core team also started their podcasting career at The Ringer . )
Crooked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comment on Concepcion ’ s role or his company ’ s post-Trump strategy , but sent a statement hinting at the company ’ s expanded ambitions : “ Crooked has always been in this for the long haul to inform , entertain , and inspire action .
We ’ ll have a lot more to say soon about what ’ s next , once we all get a chance to breathe after this election.
” Some anti-Trump media will have no choice but to pivot to something else if Trump loses the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the spring of 2016 when it started to look like Trump might be a serious presidential candidate — but not an actual president .
It ’ s still going , but if Trump loses , the show will at least change its name while keeping host Virginia Heffernan , says a Slate PR rep. “ This is a problem we wanted to have , ” says Jacob Weisberg , who started Trumpcast at Slate and now runs the podcast studio Pushkin Industries .
Pushkin , Weisberg notes , doesn ’ t have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ But I expect a lot of political shows , which are really built on the Trump phenomenon , are going to decline.
” Of course , there are plenty of media outlets that existed before Trump and haven ’ t said they are directly opposed to his administration but have still benefited from his tenure : The “ Trump bump ” that the New York Times , Washington Post , CNN , and MSNBC have all seen are well-documented .
The same goes for individual talents like Maggie Haberman , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Michael Barbaro was a well-regarded but unfamous Times reporter prior to February 2017 when he launched the paper ’ s The Daily podcast weeks after Trump ’ s inauguration .
Now he ’ s a star and a star-maker .
Jake Tapper has gone from a CNN anchor into a charismatic truth-teller and bluffer-buster : Maybe someone else could have gotten Trump ’ s chief of staff to announce the White House had given up on containing the pandemic , but Tapper did it on a big platform .
One obvious thing that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the “ can-you-believe-he-did-that ” story , which Trump has been reliably serving up since 2015 when he announced his candidacy .
Which is different from saying people won ’ t be outraged — there will be plenty of that going around .
But there ’ s unlikely to be a single focus for that outrage — or someone who seemingly enjoys being that focus .
“ There ’ s going to be a certain kind of easy story that has the potential to go away for all outlets if there ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Official Says Outrageous Thing , ’ ” says Noah Shachtman , editor-in-chief of the Daily Beast .
“ If Biden does win , his people have shown that they ’ re pretty careful.
” One big unknown is what kind of interest Trump would generate outside of the White House .
Traditionally , presidents have kept a low profile after leaving office , but no one expects that to happen with Trump .
The question is how much attention he ’ ll be able to attract if he ’ s tweeting as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to nuclear codes and pardon power .
It ’ s quite likely that Trump and his remaining hangers-on will try to create some kind of media company after he leaves — an idea they are floating now , just as they had floated in 2016 .
Then again , he may not need to build much of an operation : Fox News has already demonstrated that it thrives when a Democrat is in the White House , as it did throughout the Obama administration .
And it already has an audience that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cooper , meanwhile , has been planning on a post-Trump world for months .
She says she made her first Trump-sync , “ How to Medical , ” as a spur-of-the-moment project to occupy her for a few hours during the pandemic lockdown .
But over the next few months , as her clips kept going viral , she says they started to feel like an obligation .
And in the summer , when her newly acquired talent managers arranged an online Q & A for her , she realized that many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liked her .
So she ’ s been trying to move beyond Trump .
Last month she debuted “ Everything ’ s Fine , ” a one-off Netflix sketch comedy .
She ’ s also producing a sitcom for CBS .
She ’ s mostly stopped making Trump videos , though she ’ ll still pop one off occasionally : Last week , when Trump mused publicly about getting in a truck and driving away , she couldn ’ t help herself .
But she also knows she ’ s never going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Netflix special includes a different take on her Trump-sync , where she and Helen Mirren re-create the infamous “ grab them by the pussy ” Access Hollywood audio .
And she knows she ’ ll always be known as someone who got her big break from Donald Trump .
“ I just have to keep doing other things for the next few years so all of that gets buried , ” she says .
“ I ’ m still very proud of these videos — I don ’ t think I ’ ll @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They ’ re on the right side of history .
”

Donald Trump made Sarah Cooper famous.
She can’t wait for him to leave.
“I’m very excited about him being gone,” says the comedian, who went from (mostly) unknown to omnipresent this spring with a brilliant series of Trump lip-sync videos. “I want my career to do other things, and I don’t want to talk about him anymore.”
Cooper doesn’t have a love-hate relationship with Trump. She hates him. Which puts her in the same boat as other media personalities and companies that have turned the Trump era to their advantage by focusing their ire into opportunities.
And now that it looks as though Trump might be leaving, they need to figure out what to do next. Even if some of them aren’t ready to say that out loud quite yet.
To be clear: A post-Trump world doesn’t mean the political and cultural divisions that brought us Trump — and that Trump has exploited — get closed up. But if your reason for being is defeating Donald Trump, and that happens, then … what?
The Lincoln Project, a group of “Never Trump” Republicans who came together less than a year ago to deploy ads against Trump in the 2020 election, now wants to become a media company, according to Axios. The Lincoln Project says that’s not exactly true. But it could be, per a statement from the company:
“We have not floated the idea of becoming producers or a media company … people have approached us about it, and we’ve said to one and all, ‘This is a convo for after the election. We’re locked down tight on the mission of defeating Trump.’”
So if they were to do that, they’d be following in the footsteps of Crooked Media, the company run by Obama White House veterans, which formed after Trump’s 2016 election. For the last four years, the company has primarily leaned on its flagship Pod Save America podcast but has branched out into other ventures like a newsletter, an HBO show, and other politically-tinged podcasts; industry executives expect the company to add other kinds of nonpolitical programming in a post-Trump world.
One indicator of Crooked Media’s ambition: It has hired Jason Concepcion, a high-profile podcaster from The Ringer, where he specialized in pop culture projects like Binge Mode, a series dedicated to franchises like Harry Potter and Game of Thrones; and NBA Desktop, an inventive version of SportsCenter for the Google Doc + Insta Stories generation. (Of note: Crooked Media’s core team also started their podcasting career at The Ringer.)
Crooked Media co-founder Jon Favreau wouldn’t comment on Concepcion’s role or his company’s post-Trump strategy, but sent a statement hinting at the company’s expanded ambitions: “Crooked has always been in this for the long haul to inform, entertain, and inspire action. We’ll have a lot more to say soon about what’s next, once we all get a chance to breathe after this election.”
Some anti-Trump media will have no choice but to pivot to something else if Trump loses the election. Slate started its popular Trumpcast podcast in the spring of 2016 when it started to look like Trump might be a serious presidential candidate — but not an actual president. It’s still going, but if Trump loses, the show will at least change its name while keeping host Virginia Heffernan, says a Slate PR rep.
“This is a problem we wanted to have,” says Jacob Weisberg, who started Trumpcast at Slate and now runs the podcast studio Pushkin Industries. Pushkin, Weisberg notes, doesn’t have an explicitly anti-Trump show in its lineup. “But I expect a lot of political shows, which are really built on the Trump phenomenon, are going to decline.”
Of course, there are plenty of media outlets that existed before Trump and haven’t said they are directly opposed to his administration but have still benefited from his tenure: The “Trump bump” that the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, and MSNBC have all seen are well-documented.
The same goes for individual talents like Maggie Haberman, the Times’s star Trump reporter. Michael Barbaro was a well-regarded but unfamous Times reporter prior to February 2017 when he launched the paper’s The Daily podcast weeks after Trump’s inauguration. Now he’s a star and a star-maker. Jake Tapper has gone from a CNN anchor into a charismatic truth-teller and bluffer-buster: Maybe someone else could have gotten Trump’s chief of staff to announce the White House had given up on containing the pandemic, but Tapper did it on a big platform.
One obvious thing that would go away in a Biden administration is the “can-you-believe-he-did-that” story, which Trump has been reliably serving up since 2015 when he announced his candidacy. Which is different from saying people won’t be outraged — there will be plenty of that going around. But there’s unlikely to be a single focus for that outrage — or someone who seemingly enjoys being that focus.
“There’s going to be a certain kind of easy story that has the potential to go away for all outlets if there’s a change of administration — ‘Administration Official Says Outrageous Thing,’” says Noah Shachtman, editor-in-chief of the Daily Beast. “If Biden does win, his people have shown that they’re pretty careful.”
One big unknown is what kind of interest Trump would generate outside of the White House. Traditionally, presidents have kept a low profile after leaving office, but no one expects that to happen with Trump. The question is how much attention he’ll be able to attract if he’s tweeting as a private citizen instead of a guy with access to nuclear codes and pardon power.
It’s quite likely that Trump and his remaining hangers-on will try to create some kind of media company after he leaves — an idea they are floating now, just as they had floated in 2016. Then again, he may not need to build much of an operation: Fox News has already demonstrated that it thrives when a Democrat is in the White House, as it did throughout the Obama administration. And it already has an audience that thrills to Trump’s provocations.
Cooper, meanwhile, has been planning on a post-Trump world for months. She says she made her first Trump-sync, “How to Medical,” as a spur-of-the-moment project to occupy her for a few hours during the pandemic lockdown.
But over the next few months, as her clips kept going viral, she says they started to feel like an obligation. And in the summer, when her newly acquired talent managers arranged an online Q&A for her, she realized that many of her fans hated Trump more than they liked her.
So she’s been trying to move beyond Trump. Last month she debuted “Everything’s Fine,” a one-off Netflix sketch comedy. She’s also producing a sitcom for CBS. She’s mostly stopped making Trump videos, though she’ll still pop one off occasionally: Last week, when Trump mused publicly about getting in a truck and driving away, she couldn’t help herself.
How to regret pic.twitter.com/M40KLcw6XL — Sarah Cooper (@sarahcpr) October 26, 2020
But she also knows she’s never going to get completely away from Trump. Her Netflix special includes a different take on her Trump-sync, where she and Helen Mirren re-create the infamous “grab them by the pussy” Access Hollywood audio. And she knows she’ll always be known as someone who got her big break from Donald Trump.
“I just have to keep doing other things for the next few years so all of that gets buried,” she says. “I’m still very proud of these videos — I don’t think I’ll ever not be proud of them. They’re on the right side of history.”


vox--2020-11-02--The Vox 2020 presidential election live blog

It ’ s one day before the 2020 presidential election , and millions of Americans have already cast their ballots @ @ @ @ @ former Vice President Joe Biden , with millions more heading to the polls on Election @ @ @ @ @ the presidential election , voters in several states will also decide on Senate and House @ @ @ @ @ and several local ballot initiatives .
Today , Trump and Biden will travel the country @ @ @ @ @ voters .
Trump is scheduled to campaign in North Carolina , while Biden is set @ @ @ @ @ Most national polls show Biden ahead , but the outcome is far from predetermined .
@ @ @ @ @ of mail-in ballots this year , it ’ s also possible it could take days @ @ @ @ @ Vox journalists will be providing live news updates , analysis , and context behind the @ @ @ @ @ Follow our live blog here for updates as we enter the final day of the @ @ @ @ @ more of Vox ’ s 2020 election coverage here .

This liveblog has ended. Visit our 2020 election hub for Vox’s latest coverage of Election Day.
It’s one day before the 2020 presidential election, and millions of Americans have already cast their ballots for President Donald Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden, with millions more heading to the polls on Election Day. In addition to the presidential election, voters in several states will also decide on Senate and House races, gubernatorial races, and several local ballot initiatives.
Today, Trump and Biden will travel the country making their final pitches to voters. Trump is scheduled to campaign in North Carolina, while Biden is set to campaign in Pennsylvania. Most national polls show Biden ahead, but the outcome is far from predetermined. Due to the large number of mail-in ballots this year, it’s also possible it could take days to count the votes.
Vox journalists will be providing live news updates, analysis, and context behind the news throughout the day. Follow our live blog here for updates as we enter the final day of the campaign trail. And read more of Vox’s 2020 election coverage here.
Live blog: The final day before Election Day


vox--2020-11-02--Why a top democracy watchdog has its eyes on the US election

America ’ s deep polarization has undermined faith that the 2020 election will be free and fair .
Republicans are outright accusing Democrats of stealing an election on baseless claims of voter fraud .
Democrats , meanwhile , are anxiously gaming out scenarios where the conservative majority on the Supreme Court intercedes to hand the election to Trump .
None of this is a great look for one of the world ’ s oldest democracies .
Which is why the international election monitoring experts at the Carter Center announced this summer they would be taking steps to help strengthen American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2020 election .
Founded by former President Jimmy Carter in 1982 , the organization is best known for working abroad to help strengthen democracies and democratic processes in foreign countries .
This includes election monitoring .
The Carter Center isn ’ t sending election observers to US polling stations in 2020 , but their decision to do public outreach around the US election was an acknowledgment that the country was showing troubling signs of democratic backsliding , from its crippling polarization to renewed racial tensions .
To find out more about what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attention on the US and what specifically has its experts so concerned , I called up Avery Davis-Roberts , who manages the Carter Center ’ s Democratic Election Standards Project .
Our conversation , lightly edited for length and clarity , is below .
Most of the Carter Center ’ s work is abroad , so what prompted the center to get involved in the US election this year ?
I think it ’ s helpful to take a step back and think a little bit about why we ’ ve gotten involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the criteria we use when we are looking at those countries , because it puts things in context a little bit .
So often , when we are deciding where we will observe , we look at a number of factors or characteristics about the political environment in the country , and will often prioritize for observation countries that are experiencing extreme political polarization , or where there is an increase in racial tension between the key ethnic groups in the country , or where the country is going through a moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or transitioning toward democracy , or maybe taking steps backward and almost backsliding .
There are a lot of different criteria that we use , but those are just a few of them .
Most of the time that the Carter Center has been observing , we would not have thought of the United States as meeting those criteria .
But in the last five to 10 years , we ’ ve seen that political polarization has greatly increased in the US .
This year , we were really seeing long-simmering racial tensions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ context of police brutality , and then obviously , the protests and responses to those protests .
We ’ re seeing that there were attacks on our democratic institutions , exacerbated , in part , by the conditions of the pandemic and misinformation .
So this year , we felt that when we consider those characteristics , there would probably be something the Carter Center could bring to support the elections in the United States as we would in other countries .
The extreme political polarization , in some respects , isn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic and police brutality protests supercharging that — creating a sort of tipping point — or did you have these concerns for some time ?
I think you raise a good point .
Obviously , the polarization has been happening .
We ’ ve been seeing it happening .
I think this year , the pandemic has supercharged everything .
So one of the things that ’ s been a concern of ours is the way that the political polarization in the general environment has been seeping into people ’ s understanding about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confidence and trust in elections .
With the pandemic , and the increase in people wanting to vote safely using mail-in ballots , and then all of this misinformation about that process — that ’ s just one example of the way that we were seeing these narratives around the election potentially decreasing trust , decreasing confidence .
And so it was really trying to think about ways that we could bring our international experience to bear to promote trust and confidence that we thought would be useful in this particular election cycle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concrete steps that the Carter Center took to increase trust and faith in the integrity of elections ?
One of the things we have done is we have embarked on a modest public education campaign , largely social media-based — you know , putting out voter education materials .
We ’ ve done one pre-election video about voting options — why there are multiple options , that there should be an option for everyone , and that they are all safe options .
And post-election , we ’ ll have a video that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the days right after the election and the need to not worry if it takes a while for the votes to be counted .
So we ’ ve been doing public education through that campaign , but also through a number of online events that we have held for the last month or six weeks .
We did some journalist training through Election SOS .
We have been working with the National Vote at Home Institute on materials and tools and good practices for election officials .
One of the things that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working internationally is one way that you can really help promote confidence in the electoral processes is by increasing transparency into that process .
So helping the public understand how the process works , but also how they can — if they ’ re concerned — how they can have access to that process , how journalists can see into that process to help explain what ’ s happening .
Because if you understand more about what your election officials are doing , then you can understand why processes take a certain amount @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really mean .
So we ’ ve been working on outreach to election officials to help them think about the simple things that they could do in advance of the election that would help increase transparency .
Transparency strikes me as even more challenging in a pandemic — for example , it might be harder for election officials to do outreach with social distancing .
How are election officials encouraging transparency with all these challenges ?
We ’ ve put out , with the National Conference of State Legislators , a report on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Election Day , and post-election processes .
We did that as part of that reach-out to election officials to find out if they were changing any of their practices around observation because of the pandemic .
In some cases , it seems like there might be fewer people in physical spaces , which is completely understandable .
But for the most part , there was definitely an understanding that we need to still maintain that transparency .
Some jurisdictions are trying new things like streaming some of the processes online so that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an enclosed environment but you can still see what ’ s happening .
So there are jurisdictions that are trying to , you know , do what we ’ re all doing , which is getting used to Zooming things all the time , and streaming things all the time , to try and promote greater transparency .
And I think this year in particular , election officials are really understanding that there ’ s a lot of explaining that just needs to be done , particularly around the issue of processing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seeing such a huge increase in the number of ballots .
That ’ s just explaining all of the steps that they go through , from beginning to end of that process , to secure the ballots , and how they make sure that voters get the ballots they need , and what happens to your ballot when it ’ s returned .
All of these steps , and sometimes that ’ s streaming things , sometimes that ’ s public education campaigns , sometimes it ’ s giving more interviews to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources on their website , so you can track your ballot , you know where it is , and providing information about what to do if there ’ s an issue .
Some of the institutions in the US that are supposed to provide transparency in our elections also seem to be undermined by increased polarization .
I ’ m thinking of something like partisan poll watchers here , who normally oversee elections .
But with Trump calling for his supporters to go watch the polls , and the specter of voter fraud @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a new connotation .
It almost seems like these institutions were already really broken , and I wonder how we can fix that ?
This idea of party poll watchers is something that we see internationally in almost all countries .
There are people who are in the polling places observing the process — not interfering in the process , but observing the process to ensure the best interests of a candidate or a party .
That is something that happens internationally .
And it happens here .
What I think is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow party poll watchers , but what is much less common are nonpartisan election observers .
You would see nonpartisan election observers in many countries around the world .
I think one of the things that has struck me about this process is that we really need to think about ways we can facilitate the role of nonpartisan observers in the election process .
To make sure that there are observers who are a part of the process whose job is to help promote the integrity of the process , to help promote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ useful feedback to election officials about what ’ s going really great on Election Day — or before or after the election — but also to provide recommendations on the things that could be a little better next time .
So that there ’ s an objective , nonpartisan way of promoting continuous improvement in the election process itself , and the voters as their main constituents .
Almost like an independent election board , or something , that doesn ’ t have a stake in the outcome of the election .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open and , to use the overused term , be “ free and fair.
” They want the best interests of the voters in that process .
So I ’ ve been thinking about ways that could be more of a common practice across the United States going forward .
That makes me wonder whether you think the United States has ceased to be a model of democracy for the rest of the world .
That ’ s a good question , and I don ’ t know that I can answer it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been points in the past where I would be observing elections around the world , and people would say things like , “ You ’ re observing our elections .
What about your elections ?
” Particularly after 2000 , when the world was watching people counting votes in Florida .
It became a question at that point of , “ Oh , you seem to also have issues.
” From our perspective , it ’ s important to remember that no election is perfect .
Anywhere in the world , there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process .
It ’ s important to be humble as we ’ re embarking on our elections , and to just know that there are some things that we do really well here .
And there are things that they do really well in Zambia , and in Bolivia .
There are lessons that can be learned internationally , and we should be humble and be open to continually improving and to try to take what we can as good practices that have worked for others and see if we can incorporate them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that point , the Carter Center isn ’ t actually sending observers to polls , but there will be international observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ) and Organization of American States ( OAS ) this year .
What role do international observers play in US elections — or what role could they play ?
As international observers would do anywhere , they provide a really important objective outside assessment of how the election process — not just Election Day , but the campaign period , voter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all of that has unfolded .
They can provide an objective assessment of that , and put it into the context of international practice , international standards .
So it ’ s always helpful to have somebody who is not maybe so in the weeds on the ins and outs of the day-to-day election experience to provide that outside look at the process .
One of the challenges of observing here is obviously the size of the country and the decentralized nature of our election administration , the fact that there are close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s a little bit more of a challenge to observe here — or a lot more of a challenge to observe here — than it might be in a country where even if it ’ s geographically very large , they have a centralized election administration process .
In those countries , recommendations can be made that are quite pointed , because they ’ re obviously applicable to the whole country .
In the context of the United States , though , some of the recommendations from international observers are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be — because they can ’ t make recommendations to Fulton County in Georgia , specifically , when there are thousands of counties across the country .
Even with our decentralized system , what would be some signs about the health of American democracy we should be looking for ?
They may not even be clear on Election Day or even immediately after , but what things are you watching for to signal real or even greater democratic backsliding ?
The thing I find most concerning is being hyperbolic .
Some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the attacks on democratic institutions .
It ’ s important to have those conversations , but I think it ’ s also important to remember that we do have institutions that function .
We do have processes and rules in place to address most of the problems that might come up after Election Day .
And that , actually , some of this rhetoric also serves to undermine confidence in the process , and to make people feel like it ’ s all out of control , and what is the point ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ find that balance — having concern , but thinking about constructive ways to address that concern , while also understanding that we kind of just have to let the process unfold and see what happens .
I think that ’ s important .
I know that ’ s not directly answering your question , but that is where I ’ m at .
No , I think that makes a lot of sense .
But part of that rhetoric does seem to come from this increased polarization , and lack of trust — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not going to let your vote count .
So how do we fix that , or reverse that trend ?
There are a host of election reforms that many organizations are working on and that many individual citizens are supporting .
I think for me , and one of the things that ’ s going to be the biggest challenge post-election , no matter what the outcome is , is getting back to this issue of trust .
How do we reestablish trust in our election system ?
Because someone is going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are going to be unhappy about that .
But we have to figure out how we can come back to a place where we know that there will be another election .
That we know , intellectually and emotionally , that there will be another election and that the people who have been elected were elected , according to whatever rules are in place .
If we don ’ t like those rules , we have to think about ways to change them .
If we think that the electoral system has problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that we change those legally .
But rebuilding that trust in the system is important , and rebuilding trust — it sounds kind of kumbaya-ish , but building trust among each other .
The fact that supporters on both sides of the political spectrum feel that if the other side wins it ’ s the end of democracy is a problem .
There is this sense that we are other from one another .
And so how do we start mending this sort of societal rift I think is really going to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of that .
But there ’ s a lot of work that we ’ re going to have to do at the community level to figure out how we can talk to each other .

America’s deep polarization has undermined faith that the 2020 election will be free and fair. Republicans are outright accusing Democrats of stealing an election on baseless claims of voter fraud. Democrats, meanwhile, are anxiously gaming out scenarios where the conservative majority on the Supreme Court intercedes to hand the election to Trump.
None of this is a great look for one of the world’s oldest democracies. Which is why the international election monitoring experts at the Carter Center announced this summer they would be taking steps to help strengthen American democracy before, during, and after the 2020 election.
Founded by former President Jimmy Carter in 1982, the organization is best known for working abroad to help strengthen democracies and democratic processes in foreign countries. This includes election monitoring.
The Carter Center isn’t sending election observers to US polling stations in 2020, but their decision to do public outreach around the US election was an acknowledgment that the country was showing troubling signs of democratic backsliding, from its crippling polarization to renewed racial tensions.
To find out more about what prompted the Carter Center to focus its attention on the US and what specifically has its experts so concerned, I called up Avery Davis-Roberts, who manages the Carter Center’s Democratic Election Standards Project.
Our conversation, lightly edited for length and clarity, is below.
Jen Kirby
Most of the Carter Center’s work is abroad, so what prompted the center to get involved in the US election this year?
Avery Davis-Roberts
I think it’s helpful to take a step back and think a little bit about why we’ve gotten involved in elections in other countries, and of the criteria we use when we are looking at those countries, because it puts things in context a little bit.
So often, when we are deciding where we will observe, we look at a number of factors or characteristics about the political environment in the country, and will often prioritize for observation countries that are experiencing extreme political polarization, or where there is an increase in racial tension between the key ethnic groups in the country, or where the country is going through a moment of significant transition, either consolidating democracy or transitioning toward democracy, or maybe taking steps backward and almost backsliding.
There are a lot of different criteria that we use, but those are just a few of them. Most of the time that the Carter Center has been observing, we would not have thought of the United States as meeting those criteria.
But in the last five to 10 years, we’ve seen that political polarization has greatly increased in the US. This year, we were really seeing long-simmering racial tensions come to the surface more in the context of police brutality, and then obviously, the protests and responses to those protests. We’re seeing that there were attacks on our democratic institutions, exacerbated, in part, by the conditions of the pandemic and misinformation.
So this year, we felt that when we consider those characteristics, there would probably be something the Carter Center could bring to support the elections in the United States as we would in other countries.
Jen Kirby
The extreme political polarization, in some respects, isn’t new. Did you see the pandemic and police brutality protests supercharging that — creating a sort of tipping point — or did you have these concerns for some time?
Avery Davis-Roberts
I think you raise a good point. Obviously, the polarization has been happening. We’ve been seeing it happening. I think this year, the pandemic has supercharged everything. So one of the things that’s been a concern of ours is the way that the political polarization in the general environment has been seeping into people’s understanding about the electoral process, and impacting their confidence and trust in elections.
With the pandemic, and the increase in people wanting to vote safely using mail-in ballots, and then all of this misinformation about that process — that’s just one example of the way that we were seeing these narratives around the election potentially decreasing trust, decreasing confidence. And so it was really trying to think about ways that we could bring our international experience to bear to promote trust and confidence that we thought would be useful in this particular election cycle.
Jen Kirby
So what are some of the concrete steps that the Carter Center took to increase trust and faith in the integrity of elections?
Avery Davis-Robert
One of the things we have done is we have embarked on a modest public education campaign, largely social media-based — you know, putting out voter education materials. We’ve done one pre-election video about voting options — why there are multiple options, that there should be an option for everyone, and that they are all safe options.
And post-election, we’ll have a video that talks more about what to expect in the days right after the election and the need to not worry if it takes a while for the votes to be counted.
So we’ve been doing public education through that campaign, but also through a number of online events that we have held for the last month or six weeks. We did some journalist training through Election SOS. We have been working with the National Vote at Home Institute on materials and tools and good practices for election officials.
One of the things that we’ve discovered in our years of working internationally is one way that you can really help promote confidence in the electoral processes is by increasing transparency into that process. So helping the public understand how the process works, but also how they can — if they’re concerned — how they can have access to that process, how journalists can see into that process to help explain what’s happening.
Because if you understand more about what your election officials are doing, then you can understand why processes take a certain amount of time, or what particular issues really mean. So we’ve been working on outreach to election officials to help them think about the simple things that they could do in advance of the election that would help increase transparency.
Jen Kirby
Transparency strikes me as even more challenging in a pandemic — for example, it might be harder for election officials to do outreach with social distancing. How are election officials encouraging transparency with all these challenges?
Avery Davis-Roberts
We’ve put out, with the National Conference of State Legislators, a report on observer practices this year, for pre-election, Election Day, and post-election processes. We did that as part of that reach-out to election officials to find out if they were changing any of their practices around observation because of the pandemic.
In some cases, it seems like there might be fewer people in physical spaces, which is completely understandable. But for the most part, there was definitely an understanding that we need to still maintain that transparency.
Some jurisdictions are trying new things like streaming some of the processes online so that you don’t have to be in an enclosed environment but you can still see what’s happening. So there are jurisdictions that are trying to, you know, do what we’re all doing, which is getting used to Zooming things all the time, and streaming things all the time, to try and promote greater transparency.
And I think this year in particular, election officials are really understanding that there’s a lot of explaining that just needs to be done, particularly around the issue of processing absentee ballots, because we’re seeing such a huge increase in the number of ballots.
That’s just explaining all of the steps that they go through, from beginning to end of that process, to secure the ballots, and how they make sure that voters get the ballots they need, and what happens to your ballot when it’s returned. All of these steps, and sometimes that’s streaming things, sometimes that’s public education campaigns, sometimes it’s giving more interviews to the press. And also just having more resources on their website, so you can track your ballot, you know where it is, and providing information about what to do if there’s an issue.
Jen Kirby
Some of the institutions in the US that are supposed to provide transparency in our elections also seem to be undermined by increased polarization. I’m thinking of something like partisan poll watchers here, who normally oversee elections. But with Trump calling for his supporters to go watch the polls, and the specter of voter fraud, “poll watchers” has taken on a new connotation. It almost seems like these institutions were already really broken, and I wonder how we can fix that?
Avery Davis-Roberts
This idea of party poll watchers is something that we see internationally in almost all countries. There are people who are in the polling places observing the process — not interfering in the process, but observing the process to ensure the best interests of a candidate or a party. That is something that happens internationally. And it happens here.
What I think is unusual in our context is most states allow party poll watchers, but what is much less common are nonpartisan election observers. You would see nonpartisan election observers in many countries around the world.
I think one of the things that has struck me about this process is that we really need to think about ways we can facilitate the role of nonpartisan observers in the election process. To make sure that there are observers who are a part of the process whose job is to help promote the integrity of the process, to help promote transparency in the process, to provide useful feedback to election officials about what’s going really great on Election Day — or before or after the election — but also to provide recommendations on the things that could be a little better next time. So that there’s an objective, nonpartisan way of promoting continuous improvement in the election process itself, and the voters as their main constituents.
Jen Kirby
Almost like an independent election board, or something, that doesn’t have a stake in the outcome of the election.
Avery Davis-Roberts
They would just want the election to be open and, to use the overused term, be “free and fair.” They want the best interests of the voters in that process. So I’ve been thinking about ways that could be more of a common practice across the United States going forward.
Jen Kirby
That makes me wonder whether you think the United States has ceased to be a model of democracy for the rest of the world.
Avery Davis-Roberts
That’s a good question, and I don’t know that I can answer it directly. I think that there have been points in the past where I would be observing elections around the world, and people would say things like, “You’re observing our elections. What about your elections?” Particularly after 2000, when the world was watching people counting votes in Florida. It became a question at that point of, “Oh, you seem to also have issues.”
From our perspective, it’s important to remember that no election is perfect. Anywhere in the world, there is always room for improvement in any election process. It’s important to be humble as we’re embarking on our elections, and to just know that there are some things that we do really well here.
And there are things that they do really well in Zambia, and in Bolivia. There are lessons that can be learned internationally, and we should be humble and be open to continually improving and to try to take what we can as good practices that have worked for others and see if we can incorporate them into our own election process.
Jen Kirby
To that point, the Carter Center isn’t actually sending observers to polls, but there will be international observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Organization of American States (OAS) this year. What role do international observers play in US elections — or what role could they play?
Avery Davis-Roberts
As international observers would do anywhere, they provide a really important objective outside assessment of how the election process — not just Election Day, but the campaign period, voter registration processes, post-election processes — how all of that has unfolded.
They can provide an objective assessment of that, and put it into the context of international practice, international standards. So it’s always helpful to have somebody who is not maybe so in the weeds on the ins and outs of the day-to-day election experience to provide that outside look at the process.
One of the challenges of observing here is obviously the size of the country and the decentralized nature of our election administration, the fact that there are close to 10,000 electoral jurisdictions in the country. It’s a little bit more of a challenge to observe here — or a lot more of a challenge to observe here — than it might be in a country where even if it’s geographically very large, they have a centralized election administration process. In those countries, recommendations can be made that are quite pointed, because they’re obviously applicable to the whole country.
In the context of the United States, though, some of the recommendations from international observers are a little higher-level, because they have to be — because they can’t make recommendations to Fulton County in Georgia, specifically, when there are thousands of counties across the country.
Jen Kirby
Even with our decentralized system, what would be some signs about the health of American democracy we should be looking for? They may not even be clear on Election Day or even immediately after, but what things are you watching for to signal real or even greater democratic backsliding?
Avery Davis-Roberts
The thing I find most concerning is being hyperbolic. Some of the narratives around democratic backsliding, or the attacks on democratic institutions. It’s important to have those conversations, but I think it’s also important to remember that we do have institutions that function. We do have processes and rules in place to address most of the problems that might come up after Election Day. And that, actually, some of this rhetoric also serves to undermine confidence in the process, and to make people feel like it’s all out of control, and what is the point?
So, you know, trying to find that balance — having concern, but thinking about constructive ways to address that concern, while also understanding that we kind of just have to let the process unfold and see what happens. I think that’s important. I know that’s not directly answering your question, but that is where I’m at.
Jen Kirby
No, I think that makes a lot of sense. But part of that rhetoric does seem to come from this increased polarization, and lack of trust — this idea that the other side is not going to let your vote count. So how do we fix that, or reverse that trend?
Avery Davis-Roberts
There are a host of election reforms that many organizations are working on and that many individual citizens are supporting. I think for me, and one of the things that’s going to be the biggest challenge post-election, no matter what the outcome is, is getting back to this issue of trust. How do we reestablish trust in our election system?
Because someone is going to lose this election, and some people are going to be unhappy about that. But we have to figure out how we can come back to a place where we know that there will be another election. That we know, intellectually and emotionally, that there will be another election and that the people who have been elected were elected, according to whatever rules are in place.
If we don’t like those rules, we have to think about ways to change them. If we think that the electoral system has problems, we have to think about ways that we change those legally.
But rebuilding that trust in the system is important, and rebuilding trust — it sounds kind of kumbaya-ish, but building trust among each other. The fact that supporters on both sides of the political spectrum feel that if the other side wins it’s the end of democracy is a problem. There is this sense that we are other from one another.
And so how do we start mending this sort of societal rift I think is really going to be the challenge. Electoral reforms may be part of that. But there’s a lot of work that we’re going to have to do at the community level to figure out how we can talk to each other.