vox--2020-05-04--Canada succeeded on coronavirus where America failed. Why?

Canada and the United States are , in many respects , similar countries .
With the coronavirus outbreak , the two North American nations had comparable risk profiles , sharing ( for example ) similarly aged populations and similar distance from the earliest hot spots in Europe and East Asia .
Yet the outbreak has been dramatically worse in the United States than its northern neighbor .
Per capita , the United States has about twice as many confirmed coronavirus cases as Canada and about 30 percent more deaths .
Canadian testing rates have been consistently higher , especially during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American outbreaks : In mid-March , the Canadian testing rate was roughly five times higher than the American one .
To explain this divergence , I spent the last week speaking with Canadian public health experts who had been following the situation in the two countries closely .
These experts varied in their take on their own country ’ s performance during the pandemic , assessments ranging from middle of the pack by global standards to one of the very best in the world .
But they all shared the same view of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Canada : The Canadian policy response has been orders of magnitude better than the American equivalent .
“ We have a federal government that is supporting provinces ’ responses , ” says David Fisman , an epidemiologist at the University of Toronto .
“ You have a chief executive who is directly undermining the public health response.
” There are a number of factors that have enabled Canada to perform at a higher level than the United States , including more consistent pre-virus funding for public health agencies and a universal health care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important seems to have been a difference in political leadership .
The American response has become infected by partisan politics and shot through with federal incompetence .
Meanwhile , Canada ’ s policies have been efficiently implemented with support from leaders across the political spectrum .
The comparison is a case study in how a dysfunctional political system can quite literally cost lives .
The Canadian approach has not been perfect .
Its death rate is currently much higher than best-in-class performers like Germany and South Korea ; Canadian officials have fallen down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to long-term senior care and the indigenous population .
But given the interdependence between these two large neighboring economies , Canadians are not only vulnerable as a result of their own government ’ s choices but also because of their southern neighbors ’ failures .
“ The biggest public health threat to Canada right now is importing cases from the United States , ” says Steven Hoffman , a political scientist who studies global health at York University .
The easiest way to see the divergence between the two countries is to look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across the epidemic , courtesy of Our World in Data : You can see in the data that cases began to tick up in the two countries at roughly the same time .
But in March , the American caseload spikes significantly higher and faster than the Canadian equivalent , indicating greater Canadian success at “ flattening the curve.
” Through early May , the Canadian numbers remain consistently and significantly lower .
The most immediately visible reason for this divergence has been the choices made by each country ’ s political leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Justin Trudeau has taken a consistent stance that the virus is a serious threat that requires a strong federal response .
In mid-March , Trudeau ’ s wife Sophie Grégoire tested positive — causing the prime minister himself to enter strict self-isolation well before mandatory distancing became part of everyday life .
He took over parenting duties from his sick wife and conducted socially distanced press briefings from his front lawn .
Since his wife ’ s recovery , Trudeau has been consistently emphasizing the need for Canadians to stay the course and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the White House .
Of course , such rhetoric would seem like a performance if not backed up by actual policy .
But the Trudeau government has won high marks from experts when it comes to core federal responsibilities .
Two clear points of contrast with the US are personal protective equipment ( PPE ) and testing .
In Canada , the federal government has served as a centralized hub of PPE purchases — buying supplies in bulk and distributing them to the country ’ s provinces on the basis of need .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ’ s efforts in this area have been haphazard and marked by political favoritism .
Maryland Gov .
Larry Hogan is currently hiding thousands of coronavirus tests , purchased from South Korea , in an “ undisclosed location ” protected by the National Guard .
Hogan , a Republican Trump critic , is worried that the federal government might seize them .
After the federal government seized 500 ventilators requested by Colorado ’ s Democratic governor , Trump sent 100 back to the state — crediting them to Sen. Cory Gardner , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Canada was ahead of the North American curve on testing because its federal government once again made the right choices .
In mid-March , Canadian federal authorities launched a large-scale testing procurement program aimed at ensuring the country could test early and often .
By contrast , Trump put his unqualified son-in-law , Jared Kushner , in charge of the country ’ s testing ramp-up .
Kushner proceeded to hype a Google testing website that didn ’ t exist and spearhead a drive-through push that , as of early April , had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ centers across the entire country .
The top-level response isn ’ t all that matters here .
Canada has a similar federal system to America ’ s , where a lot of the key decision-making on this epidemic — like the power to issue stay-at-home orders — is devolved to provincial authorities .
In theory , there could have been a situation like America ’ s , where Republican governors of large states were either slow to implement distancing measures or refused altogether , largely for ideological reasons .
The premiers ( governors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at varying levels of quality during the outbreak .
But what ’ s notable is that there was no dissent from local authorities over the basic need for extreme measures to stop the virus ’ s advance .
In late March , Canadian provinces moved en masse toward distancing , with no real difference between provinces governed by Liberals , Conservatives , or any other party .
“ We put in factors like physical distancing fairly quickly , and there wasn ’ t any inconsistency like what you ’ re getting right now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a physician and expert on respiratory infections at the University of Toronto .
This speaks to the deeper political reasons for Canada ’ s superior performance , ones that go beyond the personal qualities of Justin Trudeau and Donald Trump .
While Canada ’ s political divisions are stark , with a sharp urban-rural divide very much reminiscent of America ’ s , partisan identities are not nearly as fixed or powerful as they are south of the border .
In a world where partisanship isn ’ t so extreme and there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consensus between the major parties , it ’ s much easier for political leaders to come together during a time of national crisis .
“ In Canada , polar ends of the political spectrum are completely aligned on how to manage this pandemic .
And I got ta tell you , it ’ s extraordinarily helpful , ” says Isaac Bogoch , an infectious disease expert at the University of Toronto .
“ That ’ s one of the main drivers of success here.
” A forthcoming paper in the Canadian Journal of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ McGill University , analyzed data on coronavirus attitudes among both members of parliament and the general Canadian public .
They found that , unlike in the United States , there was zero evidence of political polarization on the coronavirus — of Liberals taking it more seriously and Conservatives being skeptical .
“ Both Canadian elites and the mass public are in a moment of cross-partisan consensus on COVID-19 , ” they conclude .
“ Unlike in the United States , response to the coronavirus is not structured by partisanship , at least at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example of this is Doug Ford , the premier of Ontario ( Canada ’ s most populous province ) .
He ’ s a right-wing populist who won power by contrasting himself with unpopular center-left opponents , rallying rural and suburban voters against the alleged insularity and immorality of the urban elite — though Ford , like Trump , hails from his country ’ s largest city .
There are certainly places to criticize Ford ’ s response ; an Ontario nursing home made international headlines for being one of Canada ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ held to the national consensus rather than trying to position himself as a leader of a populist uprising .
When asked recently about a tiny anti-distancing protest in Toronto , he unequivocally condemned it .
“ It ’ s reckless to do what they ’ re doing and personally I think it ’ s selfish , ” Ford said , describing the protesters as “ a bunch of yahoos.
” In discussing the United States , Ford has taken a decidedly different tone that underscores the disparity between the two nations .
Despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populist standards , he has been quite concerned about the risks of the much more severe outbreak down south .
“ I don ’ t want them in Ontario , ” he recently said of Americans .
“ We need to keep our borders closed.
” The importance of public health and universal health care While the nature of politics in the two countries seems to be responsible for the sharpest distinctions between the two countries , it ’ s also worth noting that there are at least three other notable differences rooted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ First , Canada has more direct experience with novel coronaviruses .
In 2002 , a coronavirus we now call SARS emerged in Guangdong , China , and eventually spread to about 26 countries .
In 2003 , there was a significant outbreak in Canada centering on Toronto ; 44 Canadians died from the disease ( the US had a tiny number of cases and zero deaths ) .
This recent experience with a respiratory disease outbreak is something Canada has in common with some of the best international performers during the coronavirus crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
All of these countries , Canada included , studied these past experiences and used them to guide their policy during the current outbreak .
“ Obviously there were lessons learned from SARS , ” Bogoch says .
“ How the municipal , provincial , and federal public health agencies coordinate with each other — many of those lessons [ came from ] SARS.
” Second , the public health budget in Canada has increased in recent years .
In the US , by contrast , authorities have been relatively starved of resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent over the last decade in inflation-adjusted dollars .
“ Public health has faced chronic underinvestment in the United States for quite some time .
Over the last couple of years , there have been further cuts , ” says Hoffman , the York professor .
“ Countries get to choose how prepared they are for pandemics .
And the United States made strategic budgeting choices that do not position it well.
” Third , and finally , every expert I spoke emphasized the value of Canada ’ s single-payer health care system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compared to America ’ s extremely expensive and low-capacity system .
The reasons varied .
Some pointed out that , in a single-payer system , the universality of care meant that everyone would go to a doctor if they needed a test or treatment .
If care is affordable , poor and marginalized communities — like , say , undocumented migrants — are less likely to become hot spots than they are in the American system , where out-of-pocket costs can be prohibitive .
Others argued that a single-payer system gives Canadian authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When the government controls the system of payment for health care services , rather than leaving decisions up to hospitals and insurance companies , they have a huge amount of power to commandeer the health system for national goods .
If a Canadian hospital is having a spike in cases and needs an emergency shipment of PPE , the government can work to get it shipped over from a less-needy hospital .
If an American hospital is having the same problem , they ’ re going to have a tough time getting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of aggressive police intervention we haven ’ t seen here ) .
It ’ s a little tricky to say how much of the difference between these countries can be explained by the specific nature of Canada ’ s health care system .
If you look across the world , there are countries with single-payer systems that have had severe outbreaks ( like Italy ) and countries with more privatized systems that have done well ( like Australia ) .
What ’ s clearer , rather , is the difference between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other developed country has some kind of universal coverage system , while the United States does not .
It ’ s not the sole reason why the United States has done worse than Canada , but it appears to be a factor .
Canada ’ s not perfect .
But America is clearly worse .
One problem that a lot of Canadians have with American reporting on their country is a tendency to romanticize its northern neighbor : making a country with real and significant problems seem like a cold , polite paradise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus as it is on anything else .
The Canadian experts I spoke to had no shortage of complaints about their country ’ s response .
The most striking such failure has to do with senior care facilities .
As of mid-April , roughly half of all Canadians who had died were residents of such buildings , raising questions about the standard of professional attention and medical care at dedicated homes for the elderly .
“ It is profoundly troubling and deeply disturbing to me how broken this part of our health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a professor of medicine at McGill University , told the New York Times ’ s Dan Bilefsky .
Canada ’ s indigenous population is another important problem area .
These communities , some of which are so isolated that they can only typically be reached by aircraft , are chronically under-resourced and underprivileged .
While the death toll has yet to reach astronomical heights in those areas , they remain acutely unprepared for an outbreak .
These are serious failings , ones that shouldn ’ t be glossed over or excused .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ accountable for its mistakes .
But no country ’ s response to this outbreak has been perfect .
Even early success stories have faced problems down the line — second waves in Hong Kong and Singapore , for example .
Canada could see a turn for the worse and end up with an experience closer to America ’ s .
But at this point in the crisis , the worst you can say about the Canadian response is that it has been basically competent — what you would expect from a country with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The United States , by contrast , hasn ’ t cleared this lowest of bars .
Our lack of attention to public health , poorly designed national health care system , and deep political dysfunction have contributed to the greatest public health crisis of our lifetimes .
The United States could have been in a similar situation as Canada .
We have the world ’ s largest economy and its finest academic institutions ; the Canadians show us that , had our political leadership marshaled these resources in the right ways and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers of American lives would likely have been saved .
That ’ s not what happened .
We now have every reason to believe that our broken political system is quite literally deadly .
Every day at Vox , we aim to answer your most important questions and provide you , and our audience around the world , with information that has the power to save lives .
Our mission has never been more vital than it is in this moment : to empower you through understanding .
Vox ’ s work is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our distinctive brand of explanatory journalism takes resources — particularly during a pandemic and an economic downturn .
Your financial contribution will not constitute a donation , but it will enable our staff to continue to offer free articles , videos , and podcasts at the quality and volume that this moment requires .
Please consider making a contribution to Vox today .

Canada and the United States are, in many respects, similar countries. With the coronavirus outbreak, the two North American nations had comparable risk profiles, sharing (for example) similarly aged populations and similar distance from the earliest hot spots in Europe and East Asia.
Yet the outbreak has been dramatically worse in the United States than its northern neighbor.
Per capita, the United States is currently seeing about twice as many confirmed coronavirus cases as Canada and about 30 percent more deaths. When you look at per capita cases and deaths across the course of the entire outbreak, the comparison looks even worse: the United States has over two times as many confirmed coronavirus cases as Canada and roughly twice as many deaths.
Canadian testing rates have been consistently higher, especially during critical early stages for the two countries: In mid-March, the Canadian testing rate was roughly five times higher than the American one.
To explain this divergence, I spent the last week speaking with Canadian public health experts who had been following the situation in the two countries closely. These experts varied in their take on their own country’s performance during the pandemic, assessments ranging from middle of the pack by global standards to one of the very best in the world.
But they all shared the same view of the difference between the United States and Canada: The Canadian policy response has been orders of magnitude better than the American equivalent.
“We have a federal government that is supporting provinces’ responses,” says David Fisman, an epidemiologist at the University of Toronto. “You have a chief executive who is directly undermining the public health response.”
There are a number of factors that have enabled Canada to perform at a higher level than the United States, including more consistent pre-virus funding for public health agencies and a universal health care system. But one of the most important seems to have been a difference in political leadership.
The American response has become infected by partisan politics and shot through with federal incompetence. Meanwhile, Canada’s policies have been efficiently implemented with support from leaders across the political spectrum. The comparison is a case study in how a dysfunctional political system can quite literally cost lives.
The Canadian approach has not been perfect. Its death rate is currently much higher than best-in-class performers like Germany and South Korea; Canadian officials have fallen down, in particular, when it comes to long-term senior care and the indigenous population. But given the interdependence between these two large neighboring economies, Canadians are not only vulnerable as a result of their own government’s choices but also because of their southern neighbors’ failures.
“The biggest public health threat to Canada right now is importing cases from the United States,” says Steven Hoffman, a political scientist who studies global health at York University.
The key political differences
The easiest way to see the divergence between the two countries is to look at this chart of per capita cases across the epidemic, courtesy of Our World in Data:
You can see in the data that cases began to tick up in the two countries at roughly the same time. But in March, the American caseload spikes significantly higher and faster than the Canadian equivalent, indicating greater Canadian success at “flattening the curve.” Through early May, the Canadian numbers remain consistently and significantly lower.
The most immediately visible reason for this divergence has been the choices made by each country’s political leadership.
Throughout the crisis, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has taken a consistent stance that the virus is a serious threat that requires a strong federal response. In mid-March, Trudeau’s wife Sophie Grégoire tested positive — causing the prime minister himself to enter strict self-isolation well before mandatory distancing became part of everyday life. He took over parenting duties from his sick wife and conducted socially distanced press briefings from his front lawn. Since his wife’s recovery, Trudeau has been consistently emphasizing the need for Canadians to stay the course and remain distanced — unlike his counterpart in the White House.
Of course, such rhetoric would seem like a performance if not backed up by actual policy. But the Trudeau government has won high marks from experts when it comes to core federal responsibilities. Two clear points of contrast with the US are personal protective equipment (PPE) and testing.
In Canada, the federal government has served as a centralized hub of PPE purchases — buying supplies in bulk and distributing them to the country’s provinces on the basis of need. In the United States, the federal government’s efforts in this area have been haphazard and marked by political favoritism.
Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan is currently hiding thousands of coronavirus tests, purchased from South Korea, in an “undisclosed location” protected by the National Guard. Hogan, a Republican Trump critic, is worried that the federal government might seize them. After the federal government seized 500 ventilators requested by Colorado’s Democratic governor, Trump sent 100 back to the state — crediting them to Sen. Cory Gardner, a Republican up for reelection in 2020.
Canada was ahead of the North American curve on testing because its federal government once again made the right choices. In mid-March, Canadian federal authorities launched a large-scale testing procurement program aimed at ensuring the country could test early and often. By contrast, Trump put his unqualified son-in-law, Jared Kushner, in charge of the country’s testing ramp-up. Kushner proceeded to hype a Google testing website that didn’t exist and spearhead a drive-through push that, as of early April, had built a grand total of five testing centers across the entire country.
The top-level response isn’t all that matters here. Canada has a similar federal system to America’s, where a lot of the key decision-making on this epidemic — like the power to issue stay-at-home orders — is devolved to provincial authorities. In theory, there could have been a situation like America’s, where Republican governors of large states were either slow to implement distancing measures or refused altogether, largely for ideological reasons.
The premiers (governors) of Canada’s provinces performed at varying levels of quality during the outbreak. But what’s notable is that there was no dissent from local authorities over the basic need for extreme measures to stop the virus’s advance. In late March, Canadian provinces moved en masse toward distancing, with no real difference between provinces governed by Liberals, Conservatives, or any other party.
“We put in factors like physical distancing fairly quickly, and there wasn’t any inconsistency like what you’re getting right now with Trump,” says Anna Bannerji, a physician and expert on respiratory infections at the University of Toronto.
This speaks to the deeper political reasons for Canada’s superior performance, ones that go beyond the personal qualities of Justin Trudeau and Donald Trump.
While Canada’s political divisions are stark, with a sharp urban-rural divide very much reminiscent of America’s, partisan identities are not nearly as fixed or powerful as they are south of the border. In a world where partisanship isn’t so extreme and there’s a greater degree of political consensus between the major parties, it’s much easier for political leaders to come together during a time of national crisis.
“In Canada, polar ends of the political spectrum are completely aligned on how to manage this pandemic. And I gotta tell you, it’s extraordinarily helpful,” says Isaac Bogoch, an infectious disease expert at the University of Toronto. “That’s one of the main drivers of success here.”
A forthcoming paper in the Canadian Journal of Political Science by scholars at Toronto and McGill University, analyzed data on coronavirus attitudes among both members of parliament and the general Canadian public. They found that, unlike in the United States, there was zero evidence of political polarization on the coronavirus — of Liberals taking it more seriously and Conservatives being skeptical.
“Both Canadian elites and the mass public are in a moment of cross-partisan consensus on COVID-19,” they conclude. “Unlike in the United States, response to the coronavirus is not structured by partisanship, at least at the moment.”
Perhaps the most interesting example of this is Doug Ford, the premier of Ontario (Canada’s most populous province). He’s a right-wing populist who won power by contrasting himself with unpopular center-left opponents, rallying rural and suburban voters against the alleged insularity and immorality of the urban elite — though Ford, like Trump, hails from his country’s largest city.
There are certainly places to criticize Ford’s response; an Ontario nursing home made international headlines for being one of Canada’s hardest-hit locations. But he’s held to the national consensus rather than trying to position himself as a leader of a populist uprising. When asked recently about a tiny anti-distancing protest in Toronto, he unequivocally condemned it.
“It’s reckless to do what they’re doing and personally I think it’s selfish,” Ford said, describing the protesters as “a bunch of yahoos.”
In discussing the United States, Ford has taken a decidedly different tone that underscores the disparity between the two nations. Despite being unusually open to immigration by right-wing populist standards, he has been quite concerned about the risks of the much more severe outbreak down south.
“I don’t want them in Ontario,” he recently said of Americans. “We need to keep our borders closed.”
The importance of public health and universal health care
While the nature of politics in the two countries seems to be responsible for the sharpest distinctions between the two countries, it’s also worth noting that there are at least three other notable differences rooted in longer-term approaches to health policy.
First, Canada has more direct experience with novel coronaviruses. In 2002, a coronavirus we now call SARS emerged in Guangdong, China, and eventually spread to about 26 countries. In 2003, there was a significant outbreak in Canada centering on Toronto; 44 Canadians died from the disease (the US had a tiny number of cases and zero deaths).
This recent experience with a respiratory disease outbreak is something Canada has in common with some of the best international performers during the coronavirus crisis, most notably South Korea and Taiwan. All of these countries, Canada included, studied these past experiences and used them to guide their policy during the current outbreak.
“Obviously there were lessons learned from SARS,” Bogoch says. “How the municipal, provincial, and federal public health agencies coordinate with each other — many of those lessons [came from] SARS.”
Second, the public health budget in Canada has increased in recent years. In the US, by contrast, authorities have been relatively starved of resources: CDC funding has fallen by 10 percent over the last decade in inflation-adjusted dollars.
“Public health has faced chronic underinvestment in the United States for quite some time. Over the last couple of years, there have been further cuts,” says Hoffman, the York professor. “Countries get to choose how prepared they are for pandemics. And the United States made strategic budgeting choices that do not position it well.”
Third, and finally, every expert I spoke emphasized the value of Canada’s single-payer health care system at this crucial moment, especially when compared to America’s extremely expensive and low-capacity system.
The reasons varied. Some pointed out that, in a single-payer system, the universality of care meant that everyone would go to a doctor if they needed a test or treatment. If care is affordable, poor and marginalized communities — like, say, undocumented migrants — are less likely to become hot spots than they are in the American system, where out-of-pocket costs can be prohibitive.
Others argued that a single-payer system gives Canadian authorities coordinating powers that their American counterparts lack.
When the government controls the system of payment for health care services, rather than leaving decisions up to hospitals and insurance companies, they have a huge amount of power to commandeer the health system for national goods. If a Canadian hospital is having a spike in cases and needs an emergency shipment of PPE, the government can work to get it shipped over from a less-needy hospital. If an American hospital is having the same problem, they’re going to have a tough time getting it from a competitor (absent a level of aggressive police intervention we haven’t seen here).
It’s a little tricky to say how much of the difference between these countries can be explained by the specific nature of Canada’s health care system. If you look across the world, there are countries with single-payer systems that have had severe outbreaks (like Italy) and countries with more privatized systems that have done well (like Australia).
What’s clearer, rather, is the difference between the United States and everywhere else: Every other developed country has some kind of universal coverage system, while the United States does not. It’s not the sole reason why the United States has done worse than Canada, but it appears to be a factor.
Canada’s not perfect. But America is clearly worse.
One problem that a lot of Canadians have with American reporting on their country is a tendency to romanticize its northern neighbor: making a country with real and significant problems seem like a cold, polite paradise.
That’s as true on the coronavirus as it is on anything else. The Canadian experts I spoke to had no shortage of complaints about their country’s response.
The most striking such failure has to do with senior care facilities. As of mid-April, roughly half of all Canadians who had died were residents of such buildings, raising questions about the standard of professional attention and medical care at dedicated homes for the elderly. “It is profoundly troubling and deeply disturbing to me how broken this part of our health care system is,” Susan Bartlett, a professor of medicine at McGill University, told the New York Times’s Dan Bilefsky.
Canada’s indigenous population is another important problem area. These communities, some of which are so isolated that they can only typically be reached by aircraft, are chronically under-resourced and underprivileged. While the death toll has yet to reach astronomical heights in those areas, they remain acutely unprepared for an outbreak.
These are serious failings, ones that shouldn’t be glossed over or excused. Canadians can and should hold their government accountable for its mistakes.
But no country’s response to this outbreak has been perfect. Even early success stories have faced problems down the line — second waves in Hong Kong and Singapore, for example. Canada could see a turn for the worse and end up with an experience closer to America’s.
But at this point in the crisis, the worst you can say about the Canadian response is that it has been basically competent — what you would expect from a country with a functioning political and health care system. The United States, by contrast, hasn’t cleared this lowest of bars. Our lack of attention to public health, poorly designed national health care system, and deep political dysfunction have contributed to the greatest public health crisis of our lifetimes.
The United States could have been in a similar situation as Canada. We have the world’s largest economy and its finest academic institutions; the Canadians show us that, had our political leadership marshaled these resources in the right ways and at the right times, some significant numbers of American lives would likely have been saved.
That’s not what happened. We now have every reason to believe that our broken political system is quite literally deadly.


vox--2020-05-04--The Rise of Skywalker is now on Disney+

The Rise of Skywalker is now on Disney+

May 4 is perhaps best known as “ the day before Cinco de Mayo ” — unless you ’ re a Star Wars fan .
In that case , you might be accustomed to thinking of the date as May the Fourth ... as in , “ May the Force be with you.
” Certainly that ’ s how Disney wants us to think of this otherwise average date .
Ever since it acquired Lucasfilm in 2012 , Disney has celebrated Star Wars Day on May 4 , with the first officially organized celebration taking place on May 4 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come to expect from the annual event are tons of sales on franchise merch and live spectacles at Disney ’ s theme parks , as well as independent events at bars , bowling alleys , and movie theaters that invite fans to share in the joy of their favorite movie series .
As the coronavirus pandemic hampers the 2020 edition of the “ holiday , ” Disney is focusing on the opportunity to market its Disney+ streaming service by expanding the service ’ s catalog of Star Wars content .
Anyone anticipating this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of The Mandalorian may appreciate a new behind-the-scenes look at the Star Wars drama , debuting Monday .
The first episode of Disney Gallery : The Mandalorian , an eight-installment making-of series , is now streaming .
Hopefully the show will provide new Baby Yoda content to coo at .
But that ’ s small potatoes compared to May 4 ’ s biggest release : the Disney+ arrival of December ’ s Star Wars : Episode IX — The Rise of Skywalker , the capper to the franchise ’ s far-reaching Skywalker Saga @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the streaming platform as a special May the Fourth gift ; it was reportedly expected to arrive on Disney+ in July , but Disney bumped up its streaming release date by two months amid the pandemic , as it has done with other tentpole films ’ Disney+ debuts .
Your mileage may vary on how good a gift this is , considering The Rise of Skywalker was roundly disparaged by critics .
Vox ’ s Alissa Wilkinson awarded the film just 1.5 stars ( out of 5 ) in her review , writing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similarly wrote that the movie “ feels like a checklist that director and co-writer J.J. Abrams is systematically working through.
” She noted that The Rise of Skywalker suffers both from fan-courting moments that neglect established plot lines and character motivations and the unshakable feeling that it was “ reverse-engineered ” to be a mainstream hit .
The Rise of Skywalker ended up with a 52 percent “ rotten ” score from Rotten Tomatoes , a big drop from its more well-liked predecessors .
That makes it the most derided Star Wars film @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s no skin off Disney ’ s nose , since the movie still made beaucoup bucks : The Rise of Skywalker grossed more than $ 1 billion worldwide , and finished 2019 as the sixth-biggest film of the year .
( Also , for what it ’ s worth , the fan service did delight at least some .
I liked it ! )
On the plus side for Star Wars fans who consider the ninth movie to be a colossal waste of time , there ’ s another Star Wars finale dropping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The long-running animated TV series Star Wars : The Clone Wars , whose story is set between Episode II and Episode III , will air its series finale on May 4 .
Reviews leading into the conclusion have been strong .
“ The Clone Wars ’ final episodes have been escalating levels of excellence in all aspects : score , animation , writing , blocking , voice acting , directing and visuals , ” wrote Kevin Johnson of the A.V .
Club after the series ’ penultimate episode .
The Clone Wars began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , followed by a companion TV series later that same year .
The show aired on Cartoon Network until Disney ’ s acquisition of Lucasfilm resulted in its sudden cancellation in early 2013 , during its fifth season .
Disney was newly in control of the expansive Star Wars canon , and one of its first public efforts was to pare that canon way down .
The Clone Wars , it seemed , became a casualty of the Star Wars expanded universe reset .
When The Clone Wars was canceled , a sixth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Disney dropped the season on Netflix in 2014 — but as it was not conceived as The Clone Wars ’ last , it left the series without a proper conclusion .
After fan outcry , Disney announced in 2018 that it would bring The Clone Wars back for one final season on its then-unnamed streaming service .
This long history makes the show ’ s May 4 finale probably this year ’ s most significant , or at least unique , Star Wars Day event .
( All six previous seasons are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newcomers to check out . )
Every day at Vox , we aim to answer your most important questions and provide you , and our audience around the world , with information that has the power to save lives .
Our mission has never been more vital than it is in this moment : to empower you through understanding .
Vox ’ s work is reaching more people than ever , but our distinctive brand of explanatory journalism takes resources — particularly during a pandemic and an economic downturn .
Your financial contribution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it will enable our staff to continue to offer free articles , videos , and podcasts at the quality and volume that this moment requires .
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May 4 is perhaps best known as “the day before Cinco de Mayo” — unless you’re a Star Wars fan. In that case, you might be accustomed to thinking of the date as May the Fourth ... as in, “May the Force be with you.”
Certainly that’s how Disney wants us to think of this otherwise average date. Ever since it acquired Lucasfilm in 2012, Disney has celebrated Star Wars Day on May 4, with the first officially organized celebration taking place on May 4, 2013. What Star Wars diehards have come to expect from the annual event are tons of sales on franchise merch and live spectacles at Disney’s theme parks, as well as independent events at bars, bowling alleys, and movie theaters that invite fans to share in the joy of their favorite movie series.
As the coronavirus pandemic hampers the 2020 edition of the “holiday,” Disney is focusing on the opportunity to market its Disney+ streaming service by expanding the service’s catalog of Star Wars content. Anyone anticipating this fall’s release of season two of The Mandalorian may appreciate a new behind-the-scenes look at the Star Wars drama, debuting Monday. The first episode of Disney Gallery: The Mandalorian, an eight-installment making-of series, is now streaming. Hopefully the show will provide new Baby Yoda content to coo at.
But that’s small potatoes compared to May 4’s biggest release: the Disney+ arrival of December’s Star Wars: Episode IX — The Rise of Skywalker, the capper to the franchise’s far-reaching Skywalker Saga. The movie is now available on the streaming platform as a special May the Fourth gift; it was reportedly expected to arrive on Disney+ in July, but Disney bumped up its streaming release date by two months amid the pandemic, as it has done with other tentpole films’ Disney+ debuts.
Your mileage may vary on how good a gift this is, considering The Rise of Skywalker was roundly disparaged by critics. Vox’s Alissa Wilkinson awarded the film just 1.5 stars (out of 5) in her review, writing:
Is this what audiences demand from franchise movies? Films that cater to what’s comfortable and capitulates to the most unimaginative fans? That feel as if they’re just ticking boxes on a checklist? You could say I’m taking this too seriously, but I think a series as important to movies — and to millions of people — as Star Wars deserves to be taken seriously.
And Vox’s Emily VanDerWerff similarly wrote that the movie “feels like a checklist that director and co-writer J.J. Abrams is systematically working through.” She noted that The Rise of Skywalker suffers both from fan-courting moments that neglect established plot lines and character motivations and the unshakable feeling that it was “reverse-engineered” to be a mainstream hit.
The Rise of Skywalker ended up with a 52 percent “rotten” score from Rotten Tomatoes, a big drop from its more well-liked predecessors. That makes it the most derided Star Wars film of the decade, but that’s no skin off Disney’s nose, since the movie still made beaucoup bucks: The Rise of Skywalker grossed more than $1 billion worldwide, and finished 2019 as the sixth-biggest film of the year. (Also, for what it’s worth, the fan service did delight at least some. I liked it!)
On the plus side for Star Wars fans who consider the ninth movie to be a colossal waste of time, there’s another Star Wars finale dropping on Disney+ for Star Wars Day. The long-running animated TV series Star Wars: The Clone Wars, whose story is set between Episode II and Episode III, will air its series finale on May 4.
Reviews leading into the conclusion have been strong. “The Clone Wars’ final episodes have been escalating levels of excellence in all aspects: score, animation, writing, blocking, voice acting, directing and visuals,” wrote Kevin Johnson of the A.V. Club after the series’ penultimate episode.
The Clone Wars began with a theatrical film in summer 2008, followed by a companion TV series later that same year. The show aired on Cartoon Network until Disney’s acquisition of Lucasfilm resulted in its sudden cancellation in early 2013, during its fifth season. Disney was newly in control of the expansive Star Wars canon, and one of its first public efforts was to pare that canon way down. The Clone Wars, it seemed, became a casualty of the Star Wars expanded universe reset.
When The Clone Wars was canceled, a sixth and then-final season had already finished production. Disney dropped the season on Netflix in 2014 — but as it was not conceived as The Clone Wars’ last, it left the series without a proper conclusion. After fan outcry, Disney announced in 2018 that it would bring The Clone Wars back for one final season on its then-unnamed streaming service. This long history makes the show’s May 4 finale probably this year’s most significant, or at least unique, Star Wars Day event. (All six previous seasons are available on Disney+ as well, for newcomers to check out.)


What day is it today?

Today is Tuesday , May 5 , 2020 , at least in the continental United States .
It is already Wednesday , May 6 , in some parts of the world .
To some degree , time is an illusion .
We are bound by its forward passage , being the third-dimensional creatures we are , but the perceptions we have placed upon time have been invented .
Humans invented the year .
Humans invented the month .
Humans invented the day , the hour , the minute , the second .
These distinctions are not arbitrary — it really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Earth to orbit the sun — but their creation was not inevitable .
Our numerical system is likely base-10 because we have 10 fingers ; the way we understand time is almost entirely dependent on the fact that we evolved on this planet , circling this sun .
Time , at least as we understand it , is also a byproduct of capitalism .
In his seminal 1967 economic paper “ Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism , ” E. P. Thompson notes that in early human cultures , delineations of time were broad understandings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ went down , when the seasons changed .
But as industrialization became the norm , time became a mechanized system that no longer served those who ’ d invented it .
We increasingly served at the beck and call of time , for that is how those who possessed capital could best regulate those who performed the labor .
For we are now at a point where sociologists are discussing the “ problem ” of leisure .
And a part of the problem is : how did it come to be a problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ convenience with industrial capitalism , was the agent which converted men to new valuations of time ; which taught children even in their infancy to improve each shining hour ; and which saturated men ’ s minds with the equation , time is money .
One recurrent form of revolt within Western industrial capitalism , whether bohemian or beatnik , has often taken the form of flouting the urgency of respectable timevalues .
And the interesting question arises : if Puritanism was a necessary part of the work-ethos which enabled the industrialized world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the past , will the Puritan valuation of time begin to decompose as the pressures of poverty relax ?
Is it decomposing already ?
Will men begin to lose that restless urgency , that desire to consume time purposively , which most people carry just as they carry a watch on their wrists ?
But it remains that on some base level , we will always understand time .
The sun comes up , the sun goes down .
Though we might be inside , where that process is more difficult to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does not obscure the day and night cycle .
What is lost , as each day blends into the next , in vaguely similar ways , is the mechanistic definition of time , the capitalist definition of time , the industrial definition of time .
We do not know what day it is , but we do know when there is a new day .
To live inside is to lose distinction .
There is a numbing effect that occurs when each day is the same , when our schedules are subsumed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undifferentiated time .
And yet isn ’ t this how so many of the less privileged around the world , forced to work jobs involving menial labor , day after day after day , already live ?
Isn ’ t this why we invented the weekend ?
Has this quarantine simply shown to those of us with more economic privilege that our “ free time ” was always a mirage , which could disappear before our eyes , by giving us so much “ free ” time ?
I have a wall calendar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I need to orient myself in time , I look at it .
But even the usefulness of my calendar has started to fray around the edges .
I began writing this story because I couldn ’ t quite believe it was a Thursday , even as I knew it had to be a Thursday .
But it might as well not be .
A cycle that bears the sun across our sky until it sets in the west is a reality ; “ Thursday ” is an invention .
Is it still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I will update this article daily until we don ’ t need it anymore .
I hope there is a time when we know it is Thursday or Tuesday or June 17 without having to look at a calendar or ask each other or Google .
I hope there is a time when going outside to see the sun doesn ’ t feel like exposing yourself to toxic levels of radiation .
( I know I should be taking walks ; every time , I feel like I ’ m risking everything @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time in which all this “ free ” time no longer feels like a period we must exploit for maximum value .
I hope there is a time when I remember what it ’ s like to grab lunch with a friend , to watch dogs play in the surf , to breathe in the air and just be .
Until then , find a way to make time have meaning for you .
Read a long book .
Cook an elaborate meal .
Take up knitting .
Write an epic poem .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ always meant to get to .
Sleep .
Remember that time doesn ’ t own you , and that you own time .
This will be over someday , a part of the past .
It will someday be a memory .
Hang on to that .
I ’ ll see you outside again .
For now , it is Tuesday , May 5 , 2020 .
In some parts of the world , it is Wednesday , May 6 , 2020 .
Are you a “ What day is it today ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ theme song .
It ’ s written by composer Laura Stratford , and it is wonderful .

Today is Wednesday, July 1, 2020, at least in the continental United States. It is already Thursday, July 2, 2020, in some parts of the world. Life isn’t resuming gracefully, but the herky jerky train wreck of America’s reopening certainly speaks to some desire to exit this quarantine period. And so “What Day Is It Today” will exit the stage, too. For now, at least.
To some degree, time is an illusion. We are bound by its forward passage, being the third-dimensional creatures we are, but the perceptions we have placed upon time have been invented. Humans invented the year. Humans invented the month. Humans invented the day, the hour, the minute, the second.
These distinctions are not arbitrary — it really does take about 365 days for the Earth to orbit the sun — but their creation was not inevitable. Our numerical system is likely base-10 because we have 10 fingers; the way we understand time is almost entirely dependent on the fact that we evolved on this planet, circling this sun.
Time, at least as we understand it, is also a byproduct of capitalism. In his seminal 1967 economic paper “Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” E. P. Thompson notes that in early human cultures, delineations of time were broad understandings of when the sun came up and went down, when the seasons changed. But as industrialization became the norm, time became a mechanized system that no longer served those who’d invented it. We increasingly served at the beck and call of time, for that is how those who possessed capital could best regulate those who performed the labor.
Thompson writes:
For we are now at a point where sociologists are discussing the “problem” of leisure. And a part of the problem is: how did it come to be a problem ? Puritanism, in its marriage of convenience with industrial capitalism, was the agent which converted men to new valuations of time; which taught children even in their infancy to improve each shining hour; and which saturated men’s minds with the equation, time is money. One recurrent form of revolt within Western industrial capitalism, whether bohemian or beatnik, has often taken the form of flouting the urgency of respectable timevalues. And the interesting question arises: if Puritanism was a necessary part of the work-ethos which enabled the industrialized world to break out of the poverty-stricken economies of the past, will the Puritan valuation of time begin to decompose as the pressures of poverty relax? Is it decomposing already? Will men begin to lose that restless urgency, that desire to consume time purposively, which most people carry just as they carry a watch on their wrists?
But it remains that on some base level, we will always understand time. The sun comes up, the sun goes down. Though we might be inside, where that process is more difficult to witness, the fact of our insideness does not obscure the day and night cycle. What is lost, as each day blends into the next, in vaguely similar ways, is the mechanistic definition of time, the capitalist definition of time, the industrial definition of time. We do not know what day it is, but we do know when there is a new day.
To live inside is to lose distinction. There is a numbing effect that occurs when each day is the same, when our schedules are subsumed by what feels like an endless gulf of undifferentiated time. And yet isn’t this how so many of the less privileged around the world, forced to work jobs involving menial labor, day after day after day, already live? Isn’t this why we invented the weekend? Has this quarantine simply shown to those of us with more economic privilege that our “free time” was always a mirage, which could disappear before our eyes, by giving us so much “free” time?
I have a wall calendar hanging above my desk, and when I need to orient myself in time, I look at it. But even the usefulness of my calendar has started to fray around the edges. I began writing this story because I couldn’t quite believe it was a Thursday, even as I knew it had to be a Thursday. But it might as well not be. A cycle that bears the sun across our sky until it sets in the west is a reality; “Thursday” is an invention. Is it still necessary? I don’t know.
What’s important to remember is that time doesn’t own you. You own time. This will be over someday, a part of the past. It will someday be a memory. Hang on to that. I’ll see you outside again.
This story was originally published Friday, March 27, 2020.
Are you a “What day is it today?” superfan? Check out our official theme song. It’s written by composer Laura Stratford, and it is wonderful.


vox--2020-05-05--The Supreme Court hears the biggest presidential immunity cases since Nixon

Next week , the Supreme Court will hear three cases that could upend one of the most basic assumptions that the Court has maintained since the Nixon years — that the president of the United States is not above scrutiny or immune from investigation .
The Court will hear these cases , moreover , in an unusual remote argument — the Supreme Court ’ s building remains closed to the public due to the coronavirus .
They are maddening because , in all three cases and especially in the first two , existing law is clear that President Trump should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s attempts to immunize himself from congressional oversight seeking access to many of his financial records .
Meanwhile , Vance involves a New York prosecutor ’ s investigation into alleged criminal activity by the Trump Organization — which also seeks some of Trump ’ s financial records .
In all three cases , Trump ’ s lawyers have made extraordinarily expansive claims that the president is beyond the reach of investigators .
Indeed , in Vance , Trump lawyer William Consovoy literally told a federal appellate judge that Trump is immune @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ’ s in office , if he were to shoot someone in the middle of Manhattan ’ s Fifth Avenue : In all three cases , investigators targeted third parties with access to Trump ’ s records — banks and an accounting firm — so the president can not resist these subpoenas simply by refusing to comply with them .
In any event , the cases present a very basic question about what it means to hold power in the United States .
Should the most powerful man in the nation be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fact that the president wields such power demand oversight of the man who holds that office ?
Up until now , the Supreme Court has generally erred on the side of oversight .
But it remains to be seen whether this Supreme Court , with its Republican majority , will act consistently with the Court ’ s prior decisions .
What these investigations are about In Mazars , the House Oversight Committee subpoenaed the president ’ s accounting firm , Mazars USA .
As a lower court that upheld this subpoena explained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Office of Government Ethics announced that it had identified an error in one of the several reports that President Trump had filed since he became a presidential candidate in 2015.
” Later on , Trump ’ s former lawyer , Michael Cohen , testified that Trump “ ‘ inflated his total assets when it served his purposes ’ in some situations and had ‘ deflated his assets ’ in others , ” thus exacerbating fears that Trump did not comply with federal ethics laws requiring him to disclose his finances .
Among other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation is needed to determine whether stronger ethics laws are necessary to prevent presidents from misrepresenting their finances in the future .
Mazars , for its part , says that it will comply with the subpoena if courts determine that it should .
Similarly , the Deutsche Bank case involves two parallel House investigations targeting Deutsche Bank and Capital One .
One probe is being run by the House Financial Services Committee , which seeks many documents , most of which are actually unrelated to Trump .
Among other things , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including from Russian oligarchs , ” which “ has flowed largely unimpeded into the United States through … anonymous shell companies and into U.S. investments , including luxury high-end real estate.
” But the broader investigation into foreign money laundering and similar crimes touches on Trump and his businesses .
According to a 2017 article in USA Today , Trump “ and his companies have been linked to at least 10 wealthy former Soviet businessmen with alleged ties to criminal organizations or money laundering.
” The Financial Services Committee also says that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , among other things , would make it easier to determine if US businesses are enabling international money laundering .
Meanwhile , the second probe by the House Intelligence Committee also seeks many of the same documents from Deutsche Bank .
Its investigation touches more directly upon Trump himself , as it seeks to answer questions like whether there are “ any links and/or coordination between the Russian government , or related foreign actors , and individuals associated with Donald Trump ’ s campaign , transition , administration , or business interests , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s interests.
” This investigation may also inform legislation seeking to reduce foreign interference in US elections .
Finally , the Vance case involves Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance ’ s criminal investigation into the Trump Organization and related businesses .
Vance ’ s brief to the Supreme Court points to “ multiple public reports ” describing “ transactions and tax strategies .
.
.
spanning more than a decade , ” which suggested that Trump ’ s businesses were engaged in criminal activity within Vance ’ s jurisdiction .
Vance points specifically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made on behalf of [ Trump ] to two women with whom [ Trump ] allegedly had extra-marital affairs.
” Vance ’ s office subpoenaed Mazars , seeking financial documents that may inform this criminal investigation .
What existing law actually says about congressional subpoenas Current law governing the House ’ s power to issue subpoenas and conduct investigations is so favorable to the House ’ s legal position that it is more than a little surprising that Mazars and Deutsche Bank needed to be heard by the Supreme Court at all .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ v. United States Servicemen ’ s Fund ( 1975 ) , “ the power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process .
.
.
is inherent in the power to make laws.
” Without such a power , “ a legislative body can not legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
” For this reason , the Court recognized in an earlier case that Congress ’ s investigative power is “ co-extensive with the power to legislate.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eastland , Congress is entitled to gather information — and to use compulsory subpoenas to gather such information — whenever that subpoena is “ intended to gather information about a subject on which legislation may be had.
” The Supreme Court , moreover , has cautioned that courts must be extraordinarily cautious about interfering with congressional investigations .
“ To find that a committee ’ s investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power , ” the Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove ( 1951 ) , “ it must be obvious that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.
” Finally , courts are forbidden to dig into the legislature ’ s motives for conducting a particular investigation .
One of Trump ’ s lawyer ’ s primary arguments against the House ’ s subpoenas is that Congress ’ s real purpose is to catch Trump in a criminal act , not to actually conduct investigations that could inform pending legislation .
But even if the House does have a hidden motive , the courts are prohibited from digging into that motive under the Supreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power , ” the Court held in Barenblatt v. United States ( 1959 ) , “ the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power.
” Given these extraordinarily deferential precedents , there ’ s really no doubt how Mazars and Deutsche Bank should be resolved , at least going by existing law .
Each of the subpoenas seek to gather information about “ a subject on which legislation may be had ” — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , money laundering , or foreign interference in elections .
And the Supreme Court is forbidden from digging into whether the House had some other motive for issuing these subpoenas .
What existing law actually says about law enforcement subpoenas of Trump Trump claims even broader immunity from Vance ’ s subpoena than he seeks from House investigations .
“ The President can not effectively discharge [ their ] duties if any and every prosecutor in this country may target him with criminal process , ” Trump ’ s lawyers write .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress , through its power of impeachment , the sole right to prosecute the sitting President for wrongdoing , ” and that the president may not be subject to any criminal process whatsoever until after they leave office .
But the Supreme Court ’ s precedents do not support such a claim of sweeping immunity for the president , at least when an investigator seeks information unrelated to the president ’ s conduct while in office .
The Supreme Court did hold in Nixon v. Fitzgerald ( 1982 ) that a president “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liability predicated on his official acts.
” So civil lawsuits seeking to hold a president to account for his conduct as the nation ’ s chief executive will generally fail .
Similarly , a president may have some immunity from criminal process when prosecutors seek information related to that president ’ s official actions .
But the scope of this immunity is much more limited .
As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon ( 1974 ) , allowing the president to “ withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.
” But both Nixon cases involved a president ’ s conduct in office .
They did not involve an investigation into a private business that happened to be associated with a sitting president .
And this distinction matters a great deal .
As the Supreme Court held in Clinton v. Jones ( 1997 ) , “ we have never suggested that the President , or any other official , has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Now , there is some language in Clinton that is favorable to Trump ’ s position in the Vance case .
Clinton held that a president may be subject to a private civil lawsuit filed in federal court , but it also punted on the question of what should happen if a president is sued in state court .
“ Because the claim of immunity is asserted in a federal court and relies heavily on the doctrine of separation of powers that restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other two , ” the Court explained in Clinton , “ it is not necessary to consider or decide whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribunal.
” But Vance also doesn ’ t involve a “ comparable claim ” to the one at issue in Clinton .
As the two Nixon cases suggest , the president has much weaker immunity to criminal process than his immunity to civil lawsuits .
And Vance involves a criminal investigation .
Moreover , as a federal appeals court that upheld the Vance subpoena concluded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , do not target Trump directly .
Rather , they target an accounting firm .
And they seek documents that may inform a broad criminal investigation that stretches well beyond Trump himself .
As the lower court noted , “ the grand jury is investigating not only the President , but also other persons and entities.
” Thus , if Trump were afforded the broad immunity that he seeks , that could have ripple effects that extend far beyond the president .
Such immunity could frustrate a much broader investigation , and effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activity , and who are not the president .
This is exactly the sort of ripple effect the Supreme Court worried about when it warned that allowing a president to “ withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.
” As the Supreme Court warned in the 1974 Nixon case , if presidential immunity leaves courts “ without access to specific facts , ” then “ a criminal prosecution may be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long way of saying that , while the Vance case is not as clear cut as the Mazars and Deutsche Bank cases , existing law still weighs heavily against Trump .
Trump ’ s personal lawyers take unusually maximalist positions in their brief , often relying on highly dubious factual claims in the process .
Trump ’ s lawyers begin their argument with a rhetorical flourish — “ to call these subpoenas unprecedented would be an understatement , ” they claim , adding that “ this is the first time that Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President.
” But the House ’ s brief lists numerous examples where Congress did , in fact , obtain private records from a sitting president , including an 1860 investigation into President James Buchanan , which subpoenaed Buchanan ’ s private letters ; an 1867 investigation into President Andrew Johnson that examined Johnson ’ s “ private financial dealings and bank accounts ” ; 1973 and 1974 investigations into President Richard Nixon , which obtained Nixon ’ s tax returns ; and a 1980 investigation that subpoenaed tax and bank records from President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a larger investigation into the president ’ s business dealings with that brother .
Nevertheless , the Trump Justice Department also filed briefs arguing , in effect , that the president is special .
They argue that investigators must jump through novel hoops if they seek information concerning a president .
“ The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme , ” Trump ’ s solicitor general argues , quoting the Fitzgerald decision , and thus the president must enjoy “ immunity from any process that would risk impairing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the performance of its functions.
” As a historical matter , this argument is dubious .
After the Supreme Court allowed the Clinton lawsuit to move forward , the private plaintiff in that lawsuit subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky to testify that she had an affair with President Bill Clinton .
That set in motion a chain of events that led to Clinton ’ s impeachment .
So , if the Supreme Court were willing to tolerate a lawsuit that interfered so substantially with Clinton ’ s ability to focus on his functions as president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s hard to argue that subpoenas seeking some of Trump ’ s financial documents will be even more disruptive of Trump ’ s ability to do his job as president .
Nevertheless , the Supreme Court recently signaled that it is open to the argument that there should be special rules for subpoenas targeting the president .
In late April , the Court ordered the parties to file additional briefs “ addressing whether the political question doctrine or related justiciability principles bear on the Court ’ s adjudication of these cases.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not decide certain matters that are better decided by the elected branches .
Among other things , it applies when judges fear the “ impossibility of a court ’ s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.
” The Supreme Court ’ s order calling for supplemental briefing is brief and cryptic , but it suggests that at least some members of the Court are open to an argument that a court decision ordering enforcement of the subpoena would show “ lack of respect due ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is unclear whether Trump would benefit from a Supreme Court decision dismissing this case under the political question doctrine .
Trump , after all , is the plaintiff in these cases .
He is suing to prevent Mazars and the banks from voluntarily complying with the House ’ s subpoena .
If the Supreme Court says that federal courts may not decide Mazars and Deutsche Bank , the House might still obtain the documents that it seeks because the banks and accounting firm could still choose to turn the documents over voluntarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s brief frames these cases as fundamental disputes about what it means to wield power .
That brief argues , in essence , that the president plays such an important and singular role in our system of government that whoever occupies that office must be protected from interference .
That ’ s one way to approach such a powerful office .
But another way is to say that with great power must come great responsibility .
Under this view , the president should be a subject of investigation because he is powerful — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president tremendous ability to behave in an abusive and corrupt manner .
Especially in the congressional subpoena cases , existing law clearly indicates that Trump should lose before the Supreme Court .
The question for the justices is whether they believe that protecting the most powerful man in the nation is so important that it is worth scrapping much of that existing law .
Every day at Vox , we aim to answer your most important questions and provide you , and our audience around the world , with information that has the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has never been more vital than it is in this moment : to empower you through understanding .
Vox ’ s work is reaching more people than ever , but our distinctive brand of explanatory journalism takes resources — particularly during a pandemic and an economic downturn .
Your financial contribution will not constitute a donation , but it will enable our staff to continue to offer free articles , videos , and podcasts at the quality and volume that this moment requires .
Please consider making a contribution to Vox today .

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court will hear three cases that could upend one of the most basic assumptions that the Court has maintained since the Nixon years — that the president of the United States is not above scrutiny or immune from investigation. The Court will hear these cases, moreover, in an unusual remote argument — the Supreme Court’s building remains closed to the public due to the coronavirus.
Trump v. Mazars, Trump v. Deutsche Bank, and Trump v. Vance are maddening cases.
They are maddening because, in all three cases and especially in the first two, existing law is clear that President Trump should lose. Mazars and Deutsche Bank concern Trump’s attempts to immunize himself from congressional oversight seeking access to many of his financial records. Meanwhile, Vance involves a New York prosecutor’s investigation into alleged criminal activity by the Trump Organization — which also seeks some of Trump’s financial records.
In all three cases, Trump’s lawyers have made extraordinarily expansive claims that the president is beyond the reach of investigators. Indeed, in Vance, Trump lawyer William Consovoy literally told a federal appellate judge that Trump is immune from criminal investigation, at least while he’s in office, if he were to shoot someone in the middle of Manhattan’s Fifth Avenue:
Here is Trump's lawyer, William Consovoy, telling Judge Denny Chin that if Trump were to shoot someone on fifth avenue, he could not be criminally investigated while in office.
Very normal argument. pic.twitter.com/xlDBwmCUnR — Erick Fernandez (@ErickFernandez) October 23, 2019
In all three cases, investigators targeted third parties with access to Trump’s records — banks and an accounting firm — so the president cannot resist these subpoenas simply by refusing to comply with them.
In any event, the cases present a very basic question about what it means to hold power in the United States. Should the most powerful man in the nation be given extraordinary legal immunity? Or does the fact that the president wields such power demand oversight of the man who holds that office?
Up until now, the Supreme Court has generally erred on the side of oversight. But it remains to be seen whether this Supreme Court, with its Republican majority, will act consistently with the Court’s prior decisions.
What these investigations are about
In Mazars, the House Oversight Committee subpoenaed the president’s accounting firm, Mazars USA. As a lower court that upheld this subpoena explained, this investigation began after “the Office of Government Ethics announced that it had identified an error in one of the several reports that President Trump had filed since he became a presidential candidate in 2015.” Later on, Trump’s former lawyer, Michael Cohen, testified that Trump “‘inflated his total assets when it served his purposes’ in some situations and had ‘deflated his assets’ in others,” thus exacerbating fears that Trump did not comply with federal ethics laws requiring him to disclose his finances.
Among other things, the House says that this investigation is needed to determine whether stronger ethics laws are necessary to prevent presidents from misrepresenting their finances in the future. Mazars, for its part, says that it will comply with the subpoena if courts determine that it should.
Similarly, the Deutsche Bank case involves two parallel House investigations targeting Deutsche Bank and Capital One.
One probe is being run by the House Financial Services Committee, which seeks many documents, most of which are actually unrelated to Trump. Among other things, it is investigating “the influx of illicit money, including from Russian oligarchs,” which “has flowed largely unimpeded into the United States through … anonymous shell companies and into U.S. investments, including luxury high-end real estate.”
But the broader investigation into foreign money laundering and similar crimes touches on Trump and his businesses. According to a 2017 article in USA Today, Trump “and his companies have been linked to at least 10 wealthy former Soviet businessmen with alleged ties to criminal organizations or money laundering.”
The Financial Services Committee also says that its investigation may inform proposed legislation that, among other things, would make it easier to determine if US businesses are enabling international money laundering.
Meanwhile, the second probe by the House Intelligence Committee also seeks many of the same documents from Deutsche Bank. Its investigation touches more directly upon Trump himself, as it seeks to answer questions like whether there are “any links and/or coordination between the Russian government, or related foreign actors, and individuals associated with Donald Trump’s campaign, transition, administration, or business interests, in furtherance of the Russian government’s interests.” This investigation may also inform legislation seeking to reduce foreign interference in US elections.
Finally, the Vance case involves Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance’s criminal investigation into the Trump Organization and related businesses. Vance’s brief to the Supreme Court points to “multiple public reports” describing “transactions and tax strategies . . . spanning more than a decade,” which suggested that Trump’s businesses were engaged in criminal activity within Vance’s jurisdiction. Vance points specifically to “‘hush money’ payments made on behalf of [Trump] to two women with whom [Trump] allegedly had extra-marital affairs.”
Vance’s office subpoenaed Mazars, seeking financial documents that may inform this criminal investigation.
What existing law actually says about congressional subpoenas
Current law governing the House’s power to issue subpoenas and conduct investigations is so favorable to the House’s legal position that it is more than a little surprising that Mazars and Deutsche Bank needed to be heard by the Supreme Court at all.
As the Supreme Court explained in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund (1975), “the power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process . . . is inherent in the power to make laws.” Without such a power, “a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”
For this reason, the Court recognized in an earlier case that Congress’s investigative power is “co-extensive with the power to legislate.” Thus, the Court held in Eastland, Congress is entitled to gather information — and to use compulsory subpoenas to gather such information — whenever that subpoena is “intended to gather information about a subject on which legislation may be had.”
The Supreme Court, moreover, has cautioned that courts must be extraordinarily cautious about interfering with congressional investigations. “To find that a committee’s investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power,” the Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove (1951), “it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.”
Finally, courts are forbidden to dig into the legislature’s motives for conducting a particular investigation. One of Trump’s lawyer’s primary arguments against the House’s subpoenas is that Congress’s real purpose is to catch Trump in a criminal act, not to actually conduct investigations that could inform pending legislation. But even if the House does have a hidden motive, the courts are prohibited from digging into that motive under the Supreme Court’s precedents.
“So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power,” the Court held in Barenblatt v. United States (1959), “the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power.”
Given these extraordinarily deferential precedents, there’s really no doubt how Mazars and Deutsche Bank should be resolved, at least going by existing law. Each of the subpoenas seek to gather information about “a subject on which legislation may be had” — whether that subject be presidential financial disclosures, money laundering, or foreign interference in elections. And the Supreme Court is forbidden from digging into whether the House had some other motive for issuing these subpoenas.
What existing law actually says about law enforcement subpoenas of Trump
Trump claims even broader immunity from Vance’s subpoena than he seeks from House investigations. “The President cannot effectively discharge [their] duties if any and every prosecutor in this country may target him with criminal process,” Trump’s lawyers write. They claim that “the Constitution gives to Congress, through its power of impeachment, the sole right to prosecute the sitting President for wrongdoing,” and that the president may not be subject to any criminal process whatsoever until after they leave office.
But the Supreme Court’s precedents do not support such a claim of sweeping immunity for the president, at least when an investigator seeks information unrelated to the president’s conduct while in office.
The Supreme Court did hold in Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) that a president “is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” So civil lawsuits seeking to hold a president to account for his conduct as the nation’s chief executive will generally fail.
Similarly, a president may have some immunity from criminal process when prosecutors seek information related to that president’s official actions. But the scope of this immunity is much more limited. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon (1974), allowing the president to “withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.”
But both Nixon cases involved a president’s conduct in office. They did not involve an investigation into a private business that happened to be associated with a sitting president. And this distinction matters a great deal. As the Supreme Court held in Clinton v. Jones (1997), “we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.”
Now, there is some language in Clinton that is favorable to Trump’s position in the Vance case. Clinton held that a president may be subject to a private civil lawsuit filed in federal court, but it also punted on the question of what should happen if a president is sued in state court.
“Because the claim of immunity is asserted in a federal court and relies heavily on the doctrine of separation of powers that restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two,” the Court explained in Clinton, “it is not necessary to consider or decide whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribunal.”
But Vance also doesn’t involve a “comparable claim” to the one at issue in Clinton. As the two Nixon cases suggest, the president has much weaker immunity to criminal process than his immunity to civil lawsuits. And Vance involves a criminal investigation.
Moreover, as a federal appeals court that upheld the Vance subpoena concluded, the subpoenas, in that case, do not target Trump directly. Rather, they target an accounting firm. And they seek documents that may inform a broad criminal investigation that stretches well beyond Trump himself. As the lower court noted, “the grand jury is investigating not only the President, but also other persons and entities.”
Thus, if Trump were afforded the broad immunity that he seeks, that could have ripple effects that extend far beyond the president. Such immunity could frustrate a much broader investigation, and effectively immunize third parties who engaged in criminal activity, and who are not the president.
This is exactly the sort of ripple effect the Supreme Court worried about when it warned that allowing a president to “withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.” As the Supreme Court warned in the 1974 Nixon case, if presidential immunity leaves courts “without access to specific facts,” then “a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated.”
All of which is a long way of saying that, while the Vance case is not as clear cut as the Mazars and Deutsche Bank cases, existing law still weighs heavily against Trump.
Is the president special?
Trump’s personal lawyers take unusually maximalist positions in their brief, often relying on highly dubious factual claims in the process. Trump’s lawyers begin their argument with a rhetorical flourish — “to call these subpoenas unprecedented would be an understatement,” they claim, adding that “this is the first time that Congress has subpoenaed private records of a sitting President.”
But the House’s brief lists numerous examples where Congress did, in fact, obtain private records from a sitting president, including an 1860 investigation into President James Buchanan, which subpoenaed Buchanan’s private letters; an 1867 investigation into President Andrew Johnson that examined Johnson’s “private financial dealings and bank accounts”; 1973 and 1974 investigations into President Richard Nixon, which obtained Nixon’s tax returns; and a 1980 investigation that subpoenaed tax and bank records from President Jimmy Carter’s brother as part of a larger investigation into the president’s business dealings with that brother.
Nevertheless, the Trump Justice Department also filed briefs arguing, in effect, that the president is special. They argue that investigators must jump through novel hoops if they seek information concerning a president. “The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme,” Trump’s solicitor general argues, quoting the Fitzgerald decision, and thus the president must enjoy “immunity from any process that would risk impairing the independence of his office or interfering with the performance of its functions.”
As a historical matter, this argument is dubious. After the Supreme Court allowed the Clinton lawsuit to move forward, the private plaintiff in that lawsuit subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky to testify that she had an affair with President Bill Clinton. That set in motion a chain of events that led to Clinton’s impeachment.
So, if the Supreme Court were willing to tolerate a lawsuit that interfered so substantially with Clinton’s ability to focus on his functions as president of the United States, it’s hard to argue that subpoenas seeking some of Trump’s financial documents will be even more disruptive of Trump’s ability to do his job as president.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently signaled that it is open to the argument that there should be special rules for subpoenas targeting the president. In late April, the Court ordered the parties to file additional briefs “addressing whether the political question doctrine or related justiciability principles bear on the Court’s adjudication of these cases.”
The political question doctrine provides that courts should not decide certain matters that are better decided by the elected branches. Among other things, it applies when judges fear the “impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” The Supreme Court’s order calling for supplemental briefing is brief and cryptic, but it suggests that at least some members of the Court are open to an argument that a court decision ordering enforcement of the subpoena would show “lack of respect due” to President Trump.
That said, it is unclear whether Trump would benefit from a Supreme Court decision dismissing this case under the political question doctrine. Trump, after all, is the plaintiff in these cases. He is suing to prevent Mazars and the banks from voluntarily complying with the House’s subpoena. If the Supreme Court says that federal courts may not decide Mazars and Deutsche Bank, the House might still obtain the documents that it seeks because the banks and accounting firm could still choose to turn the documents over voluntarily.
With great power ...
Ultimately, the solicitor general’s brief frames these cases as fundamental disputes about what it means to wield power. That brief argues, in essence, that the president plays such an important and singular role in our system of government that whoever occupies that office must be protected from interference.
That’s one way to approach such a powerful office. But another way is to say that with great power must come great responsibility. Under this view, the president should be a subject of investigation because he is powerful — and because that power gives an unchecked president tremendous ability to behave in an abusive and corrupt manner.
Especially in the congressional subpoena cases, existing law clearly indicates that Trump should lose before the Supreme Court. The question for the justices is whether they believe that protecting the most powerful man in the nation is so important that it is worth scrapping much of that existing law.