vox--2020-09-28--What people get wrong about herd immunity, explained by epidemiologists

How will the Covid-19 pandemic end ?
And when ?
These have been the biggest questions since the pandemic began earlier this year .
The answer likely depends on one routinely misinterpreted concept in public health : herd immunity .
“ Herd immunity is the only way we ’ re going to move to a post-pandemic world , ” says Bill Hanage , an epidemiology researcher at Harvard .
“ The problem is , how do you get to it ?
” Typically , the term herd immunity is thought of in the context of vaccination campaigns against contagious viruses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health officials think through the math of how many people in a population need to be vaccinated to prevent outbreaks .
With Covid-19 , since we don ’ t yet have a vaccine , the discussion has centered on herd immunity through natural infection , which comes with a terrible cost .
Confusing matters , too , is the persistent and erroneous wishful thinking by some who say herd immunity has already been reached , or will be reached sooner than scientists are saying .
For instance , at a recent Senate hearing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claimed that New York City has its outbreak under control thanks to herd immunity and the fact that around 22 percent of the city ’ s residents had been infected .
But Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institutes of Health , who was a panelist at the hearing , immediately spoke up to correct the senator : “ If you believe 22 percent is herd immunity , I believe you ’ re alone in that.
” Hypothetically , yes , there are situations under which herd immunity to Covid-19 could be achieved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city of around 2 million people , experienced one of the most severe Covid-19 outbreaks in the world .
At the peak in the spring and early summer , the city ’ s hospitals were completely full , the New York Times reported .
During this period , there were four times as many deaths as normal for that point in the year .
But then , over the summer , the outbreak sharply died down .
Researchers now estimate between 44 percent and 66 percent of the city ’ s population was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s possible herd immunity has been achieved there .
( This research has yet to be peer-reviewed . )
But that ’ s much higher than 22 percent , and the cost of this herd immunity was immense : Between 1 in 500 and 1 in 800 residents died there , the researchers estimate .
Many more were hospitalized , and still more may suffer long-term consequences of the infection .
Similarly , the oft-cited example of Sweden , which has pursued a laxer social distancing strategy than its European peers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up herd immunity in younger people , while protecting older residents and trying to keep hospitals from exceeding capacity ) , has paid a price , too : a much higher death rate than fellow Scandinavian countries .
We ’ re several months into this pandemic , and herd immunity is still widely misunderstood and being continually misused for partisan goals of discrediting science and scientists .
The biggest misconception is that achieving herd immunity through natural infection is a reasonable pandemic response strategy .
It ’ s not .
Let ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a population has become immune to a virus , an outbreak will stop growing exponentially .
There may continue to be new cases , but each new case will be less likely to start a big chain of infections .
In this simple view , the herd immunity threshold — that specific proportion of the population with some immunity — is derived from a value called the R0 ( r-naught ) .
This is the figure that quantifies the average transmissibility of a disease .
If the R0 is 2 , that means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will lead to fewer than two new cases .
So the herd immunity threshold for a disease of this contagiousness is 50 percent .
When half the population becomes immune , then , the outbreak may start to decline because the virus will not be able to spread as easily .
For Covid-19 , the exact figure for the threshold depends on whom you ask .
Based on the simple math , “ the expectation for the natural herd immunity level for Covid would be 60 to 75 percent , ” Shweta Bansal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Though the figure could be a bit lower , perhaps 40 percent , in some places .
Regardless of the exact figure , as a country , the US is nowhere near reaching this threshold .
In New York City , which experienced the worst coronavirus outbreak in the US , around 20 percent of residents got infected and 23,000-plus people died .
Overall , a new Lancet study — which drew its data from a sample of dialysis patients — suggests that fewer than 10 percent of people nationwide have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we have a long , sick , and deadly way to go if the US is going to reach herd immunity through natural infection .
So far , there have been more than 200,000 deaths in the United States , with relatively few infections .
There ’ s so much more potential for death if the virus spreads to true herd immunity levels .
“ The cost of herd immunity [ through natural infection ] is extraordinarily high , ” Hanage says .
The herd immunity threshold for Covid-19 could be lower , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It depends on the makeup of a community , and its social dynamics .
So that ’ s the simple math of herd immunity — it ’ s a fraction derived from the R0 of the virus .
Easy , right ?
In reality , how herd immunity through natural infection plays out in the real world is much messier , and very hard to precisely predict .
For one , this simple mathematical view of herd immunity assumes that risk of catching the disease in a population is evenly distributed .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case with Covid-19 .
Risk of catching the virus varies greatly and in a number of dimensions .
Here , physician and virology expert Muge Cevik breaks down the dimensions of risk : As we ’ ve seen , some people are more at risk of infection and severe illness or death because of their job , the environments they live and work in , the makeup of their immune system , socioeconomic factors like poverty , or their behavior : Some people may be willfully disregarding social distancing and mask-wearing mandates .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ evenly share risk means the threshold for herd immunity can change based on who gets infected .
Let ’ s say all the people most at risk of both catching and spreading the virus all get infected first .
Then “ the immunity within that group will have a particularly outsize benefit , ” Hanage says .
“ Because they are the core group driving infection.
” So the overall threshold for herd immunity will be lower .
How much lower ?
Some hypothetical estimates put it as low as 20 percent , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stretch , ” Bansal says .
“ Is [ the herd immunity threshold ] lower than 60 percent ?
Sure , that ’ s entirely possible .
But I again , I think I don ’ t want any place on the planet to get to anything even close to that , right , in terms of infection rates.
” Hanage underscores a gross inequality here : Herd immunity achieved through natural infection would come at an undue cost to some of the most vulnerable , marginalized groups in the country .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are more at risk of becoming infected than others — and they are predominantly people from racial [ and ] ethnic minorities and predominantly poor people with less good housing — we are effectively forcing those people to have a higher risk of infection and bear the brunt of the pandemic , ” Hanage says .
The herd immunity threshold can be lower than estimated .
But hypothetically , the threshold could be higher as well .
It ’ s also the case that the herd immunity threshold can change over time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ immunity calculated : The threshold is dependent on the contagiousness of the virus .
Well , the contagiousness of the virus isn ’ t a fixed biological constant .
It ’ s the result of the biology of the virus interacting with human biology , with our environments , with our society .
As seasons change , as our behavior changes , so can the transmissibility of the virus .
The herd immunity threshold is not one fixed target .
Herd immunity doesn ’ t end the pandemic .
It just slows it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immunity threshold , it doesn ’ t mean the pandemic is over .
After the threshold is reached , “ all it means is that on average , each infection causes less than one ongoing infection , ” Hanage says .
“ That ’ s of limited use if you ’ ve already got a million people infected.
” If each infection causes , on average , 0.8 new infections , the epidemic will slow .
But 0.8 isn ’ t zero .
If a million people are infected at the time herd @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s example , those already infected people may infect 800,000 more .
There are a lot of other unknowns here , too .
One is the type of immunity conferred by natural infection .
“ Immunity ” is a catchall term that means many different things .
It could mean true protection from getting infected with the virus a second time .
Or it could mean reinfections are possible but less severe .
You could , potentially , get infected a second time , never feel sick at all ( thanks to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pass on the virus to another person .
“ If immunity just reduces disease ... then [ the ] concept loses meaning , ” Sarah Cobey , a computational biologist at the University of Chicago , writes in an email , noting , though , that this scenario is “ unlikely.
” Overall , we don ’ t know if herd immunity through natural infection would look the same as herd immunity achieved through a vaccination campaign .
“ We don ’ t know yet if those two things will be different , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Harvard , says .
Even New York City could see another big wave Right now , New York City appears to have its epidemic mostly under control , with fewer than 200 new cases a day , down from a springtime high of more than 5,000 cases per day .
But the progress is precarious , with city health officials growing concerned about increasing clusters of cases in several of the city ’ s neighborhoods .
Mayor Bill de Blasio said the city needs to take “ urgent action ” to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s possible there are pockets of herd immunity in some New York communities , and , overall , it ’ s estimated around 20 percent of the city ’ s residents contracted the virus .
Despite what Sen. Paul might think , New York has achieved some control through measures like social distancing and mask-wearing .
“ As soon as they lift their foot off the brake , they will see that outbreak come back , ” Bansal says .
The reason New York has the epidemic under control is not because it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s because it 's gotten its act together .
But even if there ’ s some degree of protection in New York from the natural infections that have occurred there , that protection will only last while mitigation measures are in place .
Another way to think about it : Through control measures , New York City has successfully , and artificially , reduced the transmissibility of the virus .
That temporarily lowers the bar for the herd immunity threshold .
But the city can ’ t resume life as it went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would increase the transmissibility of the virus , and the epidemic would grow there until reaching a higher herd immunity threshold .
Also , in New York , it ’ s important to remember that the level of immunity could vary widely from one community to the next .
“ Even if one borough has reached a herd immunity threshold , the boroughs around it may not have , ” Tedijanto says .
Why you can ’ t infect the young to protect the old Let ’ s say herd immunity is achieved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
White House adviser Scott Atlas ( who is a neuroradiologist , not an epidemiologist ) has suggested this is a good thing to do .
“ When younger , healthier people get infected , that ’ s a good thing , ” he said in a July interview with a San Diego local news station .
“ The goal is not to eliminate all cases .
That ’ s not rational , not necessary if we just protect the people who are going to have serious complications.
” Let ’ s be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ good thing ” when young people get sick .
For one , some of these young people may die , more may get severely ill , and a not-yet-understood proportion of them could suffer long-term consequences .
Remember : The more people infected , the more chances for rare , horrible things to happen .
These younger people , now immune , could , in theory , protect older populations more at risk of dying from Covid-19 .
But in building up herd immunity in this way , we ’ ve also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the older people , which can be set off in the future .
“ I think it ’ s impossible to think that you can have infections only among younger people , and not let them spread to other groups with populations that might be more vulnerable , “ Tedijanto says .
People just don ’ t separately themselves so neatly into risk groups like that .
“ We can try and insulate ” older people , Hanage says .
“ We can do a very good job of insulating them .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amount of infection outside them , the higher the chance that something ’ s going to get into them.
” Overall , here ’ s the biggest problem with thinking about herd immunity through natural infection : It ’ s impossible to predict which route it is going to go .
“ We don ’ t understand and measure our world in very deep ways yet , ” Bansal says .
We can ’ t predict the movements and behaviors , the risk factors , of millions of people , and how they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to develop through natural infection means letting the virus rip a hard-to-predict course through the population .
Herd immunity isn ’ t a dirty word .
When a vaccine comes , it will be essential for scientists to devise a strategy to most effectively inoculate the country and end the pandemic .
The price of achieving herd immunity through a vaccine campaign is the price of the vaccine , and the price of our patience waiting for it .
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How will the Covid-19 pandemic end? And when?
These have been the biggest questions since the pandemic began earlier this year. The answer likely depends on one routinely misinterpreted concept in public health: herd immunity.
“Herd immunity is the only way we’re going to move to a post-pandemic world,” says Bill Hanage, an epidemiology researcher at Harvard. “The problem is, how do you get to it?”
Typically, the term herd immunity is thought of in the context of vaccination campaigns against contagious viruses like measles. The concept helps public health officials think through the math of how many people in a population need to be vaccinated to prevent outbreaks.
With Covid-19, since we don’t yet have a vaccine, the discussion has centered on herd immunity through natural infection, which comes with a terrible cost. Confusing matters, too, is the persistent and erroneous wishful thinking by some who say herd immunity has already been reached, will be reached sooner than scientists are saying, or can be reached without incurring horrible losses.
For instance, at a recent Senate hearing, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) claimed that New York City has its outbreak under control thanks to herd immunity and the fact that around 22 percent of the city’s residents had been infected.
But Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institutes of Health, who was a panelist at the hearing, immediately spoke up to correct the senator: “If you believe 22 percent is herd immunity, I believe you’re alone in that.”
The White House’s top advisers on the coronavirus also have meetings with doctors who advocate for allowing the virus to spread among young, healthy people, while attempting to protect older people and those most at-risk. It’s wishful thinking. Throughout the pandemic, the Trump administration has constantly been trying to downplay the seriousness of the virus. This is just the latest. Even President Trump, himself diagnosed with Covid-19, has continued to shrug off the virus’s seriousness. “Don’t let it dominate you,” Trump said in a video after returning to the White House following treatment at Walter Reed medical center. “Don’t be afraid of it.”
Hypothetically, yes, there are situations under which herd immunity to Covid-19 could be achieved through natural infection. But it comes with a price. Manaus, Brazil, an Amazonian city of around 2 million people, experienced one of the most severe Covid-19 outbreaks in the world. At the peak in the spring and early summer, the city’s hospitals were completely full, the New York Times reported.
During this period, there were four times as many deaths as normal for that point in the year. But then, over the summer, the outbreak sharply died down. Researchers now estimate between 44 percent and 66 percent of the city’s population was infected with the virus, which means it’s possible herd immunity has been achieved there. (This research has yet to be peer-reviewed.)
But that’s much higher than 22 percent, and the cost of this herd immunity was immense: Between 1 in 500 and 1 in 800 residents died there, the researchers estimate.
Many more were hospitalized, and still more may suffer long-term consequences of the infection. Similarly, the oft-cited example of Sweden, which has pursued a laxer social distancing strategy than its European peers (partially with the goal of building up herd immunity in younger people, while protecting older residents and trying to keep hospitals from exceeding capacity), has paid a price, too: a much higher death rate than fellow Scandinavian countries.
We’re several months into this pandemic, and herd immunity is still widely misunderstood and being continually misused for partisan goals of discrediting science and scientists. The biggest misconception is that achieving herd immunity through natural infection is a reasonable pandemic response strategy. It’s not. Let’s explain.
Herd immunity, explained, simply
There’s a simple explanation of herd immunity.
After a certain proportion of a population has become immune to a virus, an outbreak will stop growing exponentially. There may continue to be new cases, but each new case will be less likely to start a big chain of infections.
In this simple view, the herd immunity threshold — that specific proportion of the population with some immunity — is derived from a value called the R0 (r-naught). This is the figure that quantifies the average transmissibility of a disease. If the R0 is 2, that means that, on average, each case will lead to fewer than two new cases.
So the herd immunity threshold for a disease of this contagiousness is 50 percent. When half the population becomes immune, then, the outbreak may start to decline because the virus will not be able to spread as easily. For Covid-19, the exact figure for the threshold depends on whom you ask. Based on the simple math, “the expectation for the natural herd immunity level for Covid would be 60 to 75 percent,” Shweta Bansal, a Georgetown University epidemiologist, says. Though the figure could be a bit lower, perhaps 40 percent, in some places.
Regardless of the exact figure, as a country, the US is nowhere near reaching this threshold. In New York City, which experienced the worst coronavirus outbreak in the US, around 20 percent of residents got infected and 23,000-plus people died. Overall, a new Lancet study — which drew its data from a sample of dialysis patients — suggests that fewer than 10 percent of people nationwide have been exposed to the virus. That means we have a long, sick, and deadly way to go if the US is going to reach herd immunity through natural infection.
So far, there have been more than 200,000 deaths in the United States, with relatively few infections. There’s so much more potential for death if the virus spreads to true herd immunity levels. “The cost of herd immunity [through natural infection] is extraordinarily high,” Hanage says.
The herd immunity threshold for Covid-19 could be lower, or higher, than 60 percent. It depends on the makeup of a community, and its social dynamics.
So that’s the simple math of herd immunity — it’s a fraction derived from the R0 of the virus. Easy, right? In reality, how herd immunity through natural infection plays out in the real world is much messier, and very hard to precisely predict.
For one, this simple mathematical view of herd immunity assumes that risk of catching the disease in a population is evenly distributed. But we know that isn’t the case with Covid-19.
Risk of catching the virus varies greatly and in a number of dimensions. Here, physician and virology expert Muge Cevik breaks down the dimensions of risk:
The risk of transmission is complex and multi-dimensional. It depends on many factors: contact pattern (duration, proximity, activity), individual factors, environment (i.e. outdoor, indoor) & socioeconomic factors (i.e. crowded housing, job insecurity). (2/n) pic.twitter.com/0mEiHhbnWa — Muge Cevik (@mugecevik) September 21, 2020
As we’ve seen, some people are more at risk of infection and severe illness or death because of their job, the environments they live and work in, the makeup of their immune system, socioeconomic factors like poverty, or their behavior: Some people may be willfully disregarding social distancing and mask-wearing mandates.
Knowing that the population doesn’t evenly share risk means the threshold for herd immunity can change based on who gets infected. Let’s say all the people most at risk of both catching and spreading the virus all get infected first. Then “the immunity within that group will have a particularly outsize benefit,” Hanage says. “Because they are the core group driving infection.”
So the overall threshold for herd immunity will be lower. How much lower?
Some hypothetical estimates put it as low as 20 percent, but “I think that is a stretch,” Bansal says. “Is [the herd immunity threshold] lower than 60 percent? Sure, that’s entirely possible. But I again, I think I don’t want any place on the planet to get to anything even close to that, right, in terms of infection rates.”
Hanage underscores a gross inequality here: Herd immunity achieved through natural infection would come at an undue cost to some of the most vulnerable, marginalized groups in the country.
“Because of the fact that some groups are more at risk of becoming infected than others — and they are predominantly people from racial [and] ethnic minorities and predominantly poor people with less good housing — we are effectively forcing those people to have a higher risk of infection and bear the brunt of the pandemic,” Hanage says.
The herd immunity threshold can be lower than estimated. But hypothetically, the threshold could be higher as well. It’s also the case that the herd immunity threshold can change over time. Remember the simple math of how herd immunity calculated: The threshold is dependent on the contagiousness of the virus.
Well, the contagiousness of the virus isn’t a fixed biological constant. It’s the result of the biology of the virus interacting with human biology, with our environments, with our society. As seasons change, as our behavior changes, so can the transmissibility of the virus. The herd immunity threshold is not one fixed target.
Herd immunity doesn’t end the pandemic. It just slows it down.
Once you hit the herd immunity threshold, it doesn’t mean the pandemic is over. After the threshold is reached, “all it means is that on average, each infection causes less than one ongoing infection,” Hanage says. “That’s of limited use if you’ve already got a million people infected.” If each infection causes, on average, 0.8 new infections, the epidemic will slow. But 0.8 isn’t zero. If a million people are infected at the time herd immunity is hit, per Hanage’s example, those already infected people may infect 800,000 more.
There are a lot of other unknowns here, too. One is the type of immunity conferred by natural infection. “Immunity” is a catchall term that means many different things. It could mean true protection from getting infected with the virus a second time. Or it could mean reinfections are possible but less severe. You could, potentially, get infected a second time, never feel sick at all (thanks to a quick immune response), and still pass on the virus to another person. “If immunity just reduces disease ... then [the] concept loses meaning,” Sarah Cobey, a computational biologist at the University of Chicago, writes in an email, noting, though, that this scenario is “unlikely.”
Overall, we don’t know if herd immunity through natural infection would look the same as herd immunity achieved through a vaccination campaign. “We don’t know yet if those two things will be different,” Christine Tedijanto, an epidemiology researcher at Harvard, says.
Even New York City could see another big wave
Right now, New York City appears to have its epidemic mostly under control, with fewer than 200 new cases a day, down from a springtime high of more than 5,000 cases per day. But the progress is precarious, with city health officials growing concerned about increasing clusters of cases in several of the city’s neighborhoods. Mayor Bill de Blasio said the city needs to take “urgent action” to prevent these clusters from growing.
It’s possible there are pockets of herd immunity in some New York communities, and, overall, it’s estimated around 20 percent of the city’s residents contracted the virus. Despite what Sen. Paul might think, New York has achieved some control through measures like social distancing and mask-wearing.
“As soon as they lift their foot off the brake, they will see that outbreak come back,” Bansal says. The reason New York has the epidemic under control is not because it’s achieved herd immunity; it’s because it's gotten its act together.
But even if there’s some degree of protection in New York from the natural infections that have occurred there, that protection will only last while mitigation measures are in place.
Another way to think about it: Through control measures, New York City has successfully, and artificially, reduced the transmissibility of the virus. That temporarily lowers the bar for the herd immunity threshold. But the city can’t resume life as it went on before the pandemic struck. That would increase the transmissibility of the virus, and the epidemic would grow there until reaching a higher herd immunity threshold.
Also, in New York, it’s important to remember that the level of immunity could vary widely from one community to the next. “Even if one borough has reached a herd immunity threshold, the boroughs around it may not have,” Tedijanto says.
Why you can’t infect the young to protect the old
Let’s say herd immunity is achieved through millions of younger people getting sick. White House adviser Scott Atlas (who is a neuroradiologist, not an epidemiologist) has suggested this is a good thing to do. “When younger, healthier people get infected, that’s a good thing,” he said in a July interview with a San Diego local news station. “The goal is not to eliminate all cases. That’s not rational, not necessary if we just protect the people who are going to have serious complications.”
Let’s be clear, it’s not a “good thing” when young people get sick. For one, some of these young people may die, more may get severely ill, and a not-yet-understood proportion of them could suffer long-term consequences. Remember: The more people infected, the more chances for rare, horrible things to happen.
These younger people, now immune, could, in theory, protect older populations more at risk of dying from Covid-19. But in building up herd immunity in this way, we’ve also built up powder kegs of vulnerability among the older people, which can be set off in the future.
“I think it’s impossible to think that you can have infections only among younger people, and not let them spread to other groups with populations that might be more vulnerable,“ Tedijanto says. People just don’t separately themselves so neatly into risk groups like that.
“We can try and insulate” older people, Hanage says. “We can do a very good job of insulating them. But the fact is, the larger the amount of infection outside them, the higher the chance that something’s going to get into them.”
Overall, here’s the biggest problem with thinking about herd immunity through natural infection: It’s impossible to predict which route it is going to go. “We don’t understand and measure our world in very deep ways yet,” Bansal says. We can’t predict the movements and behaviors, the risk factors, of millions of people, and how they change over time. Allowing herd immunity to develop through natural infection means letting the virus rip a hard-to-predict course through the population.
Herd immunity isn’t a dirty word. When a vaccine comes, it will be essential for scientists to devise a strategy to most effectively inoculate the country and end the pandemic. The price of achieving herd immunity through a vaccine campaign is the price of the vaccine, and the price of our patience waiting for it.


vox--2020-09-29--Why it’s so difficult to abolish sororities and fraternities

The summer of 2020 will go down in history as a period of institutional reckoning as Americans of all ages confront the inequalities inherent within their police departments , schools , and workplaces .
For some college students , the national unrest has led to scrutiny of a more insular institution , yet one that ’ s rooted in America ’ s higher education tradition : Greek life .
Taylor , a sophomore at Mississippi State , began the school year determined to drop out of Greek life — more specifically , the historically all-white , male-dominated system of social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose full name and gender are omitted for privacy reasons , felt compelled by calls to abolish the institution , which were being posed nationwide at campuses like American , Duke , Northeastern , Tufts , Vanderbilt , and Washington University , on social media and in campus opinion pieces .
Taylor was soon confronted by the reality of what would be feasible at Mississippi State , a Southern college with a hugely influential Greek presence .
“ Abolition isn ’ t possible , at least in the near future , because of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within our school culture and student organizations , ” Taylor told me , estimating that about a quarter of enrolled undergraduates participate in Greek life .
“ So if people like me , people who want reform and change , were to drop their fraternities and sororities , that would lead the space to become even less inclusive than it already is.
” For now , Taylor is still a member of their chapter , although they quietly started @ abolishmsstategreeklife on Instagram to feature student voices critical of the Greek system .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ racism have pushed the concept of abolition — of radically transforming the current criminal justice system — toward the mainstream ; more Americans have begun to question the excesses of municipal police budgets and , specifically , policing tactics .
According to abolitionists , reform is impossible because reforms have failed , time and time again .
The same abolitionist argument is currently being lobbed at the historically white Greek system , which was established in the early 19th century as a sort of secret society for US college-educated men .
Nationwide , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abolish Greek Life , ” establishing Instagram accounts that display anonymous student testimonies and informational slides on the many human and financial costs of the system .
Many involved in Greek life , in addition to unaffiliated students , are now questioning the basis of its existence while weighing the decades of baked-in harm it has imposed on students .
The history of racism , sexism , classism , and mental and physical abuse within these organizations is hard to ignore .
A handful of fraternity and sorority chapters at certain campuses , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ having conversations about disbanding .
At Northwestern , about 75 percent of Sigma Nu fraternity members have disaffiliated , including its former president , the Daily Northwestern reported .
The Panhellenic Council at Tufts , which oversees its sorority system , announced in late July that it would suspend fall recruitment — something that also occurred in spring 2017 — to reflect and educate themselves “ on the structurally and situationally problematic nature of Greek life.
” That internal push is one some experts have not witnessed before from members , who have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A student exodus also occurred during the 1960s civil rights movement , the New York Times reported . )
But the mobilization necessary to excise Greek life entirely from the American college education system is much more complex and difficult to achieve compared to these grassroots efforts .
While members could withdraw from their campus ’ s chapter or vote to dissolve it , the national organization can still deploy resources to recruit new members and rebuild the chapter in later years .
For student activists , however , the ongoing movement is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the piecemeal progress made so far , campus by campus .
“ I think this movement is on the right side of history , ” said Roy , the anonymous student behind the national Abolish Greek Life movement and Instagram account .
“ We ’ ve seen this formally done at Swarthmore , Colby , and Williams , so there ’ s no reason to believe that fraternity and sorority life can ’ t disappear eventually.
” For white men , fraternities have historically produced a long list of leaders in business @ @ @ @ @ @ @ An astonishing number of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies , congressmen , and male senators , and American presidents have belonged to fraternities , ” the Atlantic ’ s Caitlin Flanagan reported .
The revolving door of influence that surrounds fraternities , arguably the bulwark of the Greek system , is ironic in retrospect , considering their highly exclusive and secretive origins .
“ These groups , which have always been exclusive by definition , were a way for men to express their independence and rebelliousness against an institution that said they couldn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a historian who has published a book on the history of white college fraternities , told me .
“ They started in secrecy , until the first and second generation of men who entered frats became professors and college admins , who became much more sympathetic to their cause.
” This relationship gradually became more symbiotic and less hostile , and in the late 19th century , sororities were established as a sort of “ sister ” group that men socialized with .
Yet the debate over Greek life — primarily the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since its conception .
They ’ ve drawn comparisons to gangs , in light of a harsh pledging process that theoretically inspires loyalty to one ’ s house .
Frats have drawn comparisons to gangs , in light of a harsh pledging process that theoretically inspires loyalty to one ’ s house One former member of American University ’ s Delta Tau Delta chapter recently told the Washington Post , “ The pressure was on those of us in Greek life to justify our existence and we couldn ’ t do it .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the system was a moral issue , and it was one I could not live with.
” Only a small minority of undergraduate students go Greek , despite outsized media attention on the system : The National Panhellenic Conference has about 400,000 sorority members nationwide while the North American Interfraternity Conference ( NAIC ) has about 384,000 .
But beyond membership numbers , there isn ’ t comprehensive data on the Greek system in the US ; few campuses provide a clear demographic breakdown of members by ethnicity or socioeconomic standing , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t widely publicized .
It has taken decades for a body of research and reporting to emerge that quantifies the system ’ s social and physical harms : A 1993 Harvard study found that four out of five fraternity or sorority members were binge drinkers .
Women in sororities are 74 percent more likely to experience rape than other college women .
In a 2013 survey distributed to over 200,000 Greek life members at nine public universities , about 72 percent self-identified as middle- or upper-middle class , while only 18 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working-class or low-income , respectively .
Beyond these statistics , frats and sororities have a documented history of exclusion , especially toward non-white members .
Students of color say racial bias still persists in the rush process , and almost every year , a fraternity is in the news for engaging in blatantly racist behavior .
Usually , it requires a shocking national incident — usually a death or severe accident — affiliated with Greek life to spur this cycle of conversation .
( Syrett himself was interviewed in a 2014 Business Insider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fraternities will never disappear from American college life.
” ) But after the chapter suspensions are handed down and schools publicized stricter policies , the Greek system still appears to be intact .
The Greek system has extensive financial ties .
Colleges have no interest in getting rid of them .
If Greek life is so troublesome — as a hot spot for sexual assault , hazing , and civil lawsuits — why have most universities not taken a hardline stance against its existence ?
The short answer is money .
“ Many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on campuses for decades , and that ’ s led them to accumulate a strong alumni network that can be tapped as donors , ” said Noah Drezner , a Columbia associate professor of higher education who researches alumni giving .
“ I would say that Greek alumni are disproportionately represented on trustee boards and in administrative positions.
” It ’ s not in a college ’ s financial interest to anger or alienate their donors , he added .
Fraternities and sororities traditionally offer housing for students , a boon for universities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ funds for the construction of chapter houses and the land they reside on .
Frats own about $ 3 billion worth of real estate across 800 US campuses , reported Bloomberg ’ s John Hechinger in his book True Gentleman : The Broken Pledge of American Fraternities .
This funding is key in small college towns where housing is limited and most members live together .
If , for example , a university sought to disband a fraternity , it would then have to purchase the house ( or the parcel of land @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The thing is , students in Greek life are richer to begin with , but they also may be more loyal monetarily , ” said Syrett .
It ’ s a self-perpetuating cycle : As members graduate , some return as generous donors , eager to become beneficiaries for the next generation .
And with money comes power — at both the student and institutional level .
The University of Alabama is an extreme case of how Greek organizations can harness their influence : For over a century , an informal underground @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allegedly influenced how members , who comprise over 34 percent of the undergraduate population , vote in campus and local city elections .
These students are , according to AI.com , “ a powerful bloc of voters from fraternities and sororities ” who have reportedly used intimidation and voter coercion tactics .
Part of a member ’ s dues toward the national organizations could also become contributions to the Fraternity and Sorority Political Action Committee , or FratPAC , which has historically donated a majority of its funds to Republican candidates and lobbied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in these organizations , both through your membership and your financial contributions , you are allowing these organizations to influence politics and races in ways that may not align with your own opinions , ” read one post from Richmond University ’ s “ Abolish Greek Life ” account .
Even at the chapter level , “ Greek life is terrified of lawsuits , ” said Gwendolyn Strasberg , a junior at the University of Southern California who recently dropped her sorority .
“ They have lawyers on retainer , ready to work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them look bad.
” Several Greek organizations at USC filed lawsuits against the university in 2019 after administrators set forth new recruitment standards that deferred the rush process from fall to spring .
“ Greek life is more than just influence at schools , ” Strasburg added .
“ There is a political presence , and ultimately these organizations want to maximize their influence.
” How the coronavirus and the abolitionist movement could impact Greek life ’ s future Many former members like Strasburg are cutting ties to the national chapter , highlighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are typically swept under the rug : rampant misogyny in frat culture , body shaming , popular hazing practices , substance abuse , and more .
Although some students have voiced their support of eventual abolition , they are advocating for different solutions .
Some like Strasburg see disaffiliation as the answer , since the culture is “ beyond the capacity for reform.
” Others like Taylor , the student at Mississippi State , believe their internal efforts could improve a system that is an entrenched aspect of campus life .
In recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chats have been leaked online , which suggests that a few active members are exposing these behaviors , although it ’ s unclear if their goal is for their chapters to be abolished or reformed .
“ Greek life is spending all of its energy fighting people like me who are speaking out , rather than looking to fix the system , ” said Strasburg , who says she has faced online attacks for her beliefs .
“ How do you enforce anti-racist policies when half of Greek life centers around alcohol and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these standards when they ’ re in an altered mindset ?
” The response to “ Abolish Greek Life ” has similarly varied by campus ; some chapters are acknowledging the validity of certain criticisms , while others are moving ahead with fall recruitment and actively ignoring the burgeoning movement .
And as much as Vanderbilt is a poster child for Greek life abolition , students on campuses like USC or the University of Georgia with a well-known fraternity and sorority presence are reacting more negatively .
This reaction in defense of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doubtful of change .
“ I do believe that most adults who lead the Interfraternity and Panhellenic Councils work tirelessly to improve Greek life from within , ” Taylor told me .
“ But no one ’ s ever seen those results , which is why people are turning to abolition.
” Yet according to some former Vanderbilt Delta Tau Delta members , who approached the school ’ s Greek life director and the national organization , they felt their concerns were dismissed , the Times reported .
The North American Interfraternity and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups that oversee most existing fraternities and sororities , have maintained that abolition is “ not going to happen , ” according to the Washington Post , and that those disaffiliating are among a small minority .
“ Abolishing fraternities is not the answer to addressing cultural challenges across campus , ” wrote Todd Shelton , a spokesperson for the NAIC , in an email .
“ The vast majority of students involved in fraternities want to work through their organizations to improve campus culture by enhancing diversity , inclusion and respect for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Panhellenic Conference didn ’ t address the concept of abolition , CEO Dani Weatherford admitted that sororities “ must reckon with the legacy and manifestations of systemic racism and other forms of bias that impact the sorority experience.
” In August , the organization formed an “ access and equity advisory committee ” to improve the recruitment process with the aim to “ eliminate structural and systemic barriers.
” The coronavirus pandemic , however , could very well be a factor in the decline of Greek life .
Colleges across the country have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facilities and fraternity and sorority houses , some of which have not ceased in-person recruitment or social events .
The Times ’ s coronavirus tracker has identified at least 251 cases tied to Greek members .
Plus , the pandemic has exacerbated financial stressors on students , particularly those from lower-income or middle-class families , who might no longer be able to afford Greek life membership dues .
( Dues and additional fees for housing , meals , and apparel vary from chapter to chapter , but members are expected to pay about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . )
“ The coronavirus could stress the relationship between higher education institutions and Greek life , specifically because of the many risks that fraternities and sororities exacerbate on college campuses , ” said Lisa Wade , a sociologist at Tulane University who has advocated for Greek abolition .
“ We ’ ve adapted to those threats — the rise of sexual violence and physical harm to students — and have accepted them as a cost of doing business in higher ed .
But Covid introduces another risk that ’ s especially dangerous.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ system , Wade said , but in recent years , administrators have cracked down on fraternities and sororities .
Some schools began monitoring parties in 2017 , and at campuses with severe allegations of hazing and sexual assault , fraternity activity was entirely suspended .
Public university presidents even attended a conference on Greek life in 2018 as part of an effort to create a nationwide Greek chapter scorecard to track student misbehavior .
( Penn State ’ s newly established Piazza Center for Fraternity and Sorority Research and Reform is in charge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it has not yet published a public annual report since its 2019 launch . )
In the meantime , the coronavirus will likely remain the top priority of administrators nationwide , but it could be an unexpected accelerant in the favor of Greek life abolitionists .
This time feels different , students say .
“ That ’ s what everyone hopes , right ?
That this time , we ’ re a little better and society is willing to demand and make more change , ” Taylor said .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than sit passively on the wrong side.
” Help keep Vox free for all Millions turn to Vox each month to understand what ’ s happening in the news , from the coronavirus crisis to a racial reckoning to what is , quite possibly , the most consequential presidential election of our lifetimes .
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The summer of 2020 will go down in history as a period of institutional reckoning as Americans of all ages confront the inequalities inherent within their police departments, schools, and workplaces. For some college students, the national unrest has led to scrutiny of a more insular institution, yet one that’s rooted in America’s higher education tradition: Greek life.
Taylor, a sophomore at Mississippi State, began the school year determined to drop out of Greek life — more specifically, the historically all-white, male-dominated system of social fraternities and sororities. The 19-year-old, whose full name and gender are omitted for privacy reasons, felt compelled by calls to abolish the institution, which were being posed nationwide at campuses like American, Duke, Northeastern, Tufts, Vanderbilt, and Washington University, on social media and in campus opinion pieces.
Taylor was soon confronted by the reality of what would be feasible at Mississippi State, a Southern college with a hugely influential Greek presence.
“Abolition isn’t possible, at least in the near future, because of the way it’s so ingrained within our school culture and student organizations,” Taylor told me, estimating that about a quarter of enrolled undergraduates participate in Greek life. “So if people like me, people who want reform and change, were to drop their fraternities and sororities, that would lead the space to become even less inclusive than it already is.”
For now, Taylor is still a member of their chapter, although they quietly started @abolishmsstategreeklife on Instagram to feature student voices critical of the Greek system.
Months of protests against police brutality and racism have pushed the concept of abolition — of radically transforming the current criminal justice system — toward the mainstream; more Americans have begun to question the excesses of municipal police budgets and, specifically, policing tactics. According to abolitionists, reform is impossible because reforms have failed, time and time again.
The same abolitionist argument is currently being lobbed at the historically white Greek system, which was established in the early 19th century as a sort of secret society for US college-educated men. Nationwide, students are rallying around the slogan “Abolish Greek Life,” establishing Instagram accounts that display anonymous student testimonies and informational slides on the many human and financial costs of the system.
Many involved in Greek life, in addition to unaffiliated students, are now questioning the basis of its existence while weighing the decades of baked-in harm it has imposed on students. The history of racism, sexism, classism, and mental and physical abuse within these organizations is hard to ignore.
A handful of fraternity and sorority chapters at certain campuses, like American, are publicly disbanding or having conversations about disbanding. At Northwestern, about 75 percent of Sigma Nu fraternity members have disaffiliated, including its former president, the Daily Northwestern reported. The Panhellenic Council at Tufts, which oversees its sorority system, announced in late July that it would suspend fall recruitment — something that also occurred in spring 2017 — to reflect and educate themselves “on the structurally and situationally problematic nature of Greek life.”
That internal push is one some experts have not witnessed before from members, who have historically been hostile to criticism. (A student exodus also occurred during the 1960s civil rights movement, the New York Times reported.) But the mobilization necessary to excise Greek life entirely from the American college education system is much more complex and difficult to achieve compared to these grassroots efforts. While members could withdraw from their campus’s chapter or vote to dissolve it, the national organization can still deploy resources to recruit new members and rebuild the chapter in later years.
For student activists, however, the ongoing movement is not defined by the odds against them but the piecemeal progress made so far, campus by campus. “I think this movement is on the right side of history,” said Roy, the anonymous student behind the national Abolish Greek Life movement and Instagram account. “We’ve seen this formally done at Swarthmore, Colby, and Williams, so there’s no reason to believe that fraternity and sorority life can’t disappear eventually.”
A rebellious history
For white men, fraternities have historically produced a long list of leaders in business, law, and politics: “An astonishing number of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, congressmen, and male senators, and American presidents have belonged to fraternities,” the Atlantic’s Caitlin Flanagan reported. The revolving door of influence that surrounds fraternities, arguably the bulwark of the Greek system, is ironic in retrospect, considering their highly exclusive and secretive origins.
“These groups, which have always been exclusive by definition, were a way for men to express their independence and rebelliousness against an institution that said they couldn’t exist,” Nicholas Syrett, a historian who has published a book on the history of white college fraternities, told me. “They started in secrecy, until the first and second generation of men who entered frats became professors and college admins, who became much more sympathetic to their cause.”
This relationship gradually became more symbiotic and less hostile, and in the late 19th century, sororities were established as a sort of “sister” group that men socialized with.
Yet the debate over Greek life — primarily the purpose of frats — has been around since its conception. They’ve drawn comparisons to gangs, in light of a harsh pledging process that theoretically inspires loyalty to one’s house.
Frats have drawn comparisons to gangs, in light of a harsh pledging process that theoretically inspires loyalty to one’s house
One former member of American University’s Delta Tau Delta chapter recently told the Washington Post, “The pressure was on those of us in Greek life to justify our existence and we couldn’t do it. … I realized that remaining complicit in the system was a moral issue, and it was one I could not live with.”
Only a small minority of undergraduate students go Greek, despite outsized media attention on the system: The National Panhellenic Conference has about 400,000 sorority members nationwide while the North American Interfraternity Conference (NAIC) has about 384,000. But beyond membership numbers, there isn’t comprehensive data on the Greek system in the US; few campuses provide a clear demographic breakdown of members by ethnicity or socioeconomic standing, and things like membership dues and housing fees aren’t widely publicized.
It has taken decades for a body of research and reporting to emerge that quantifies the system’s social and physical harms: A 1993 Harvard study found that four out of five fraternity or sorority members were binge drinkers. Women in sororities are 74 percent more likely to experience rape than other college women. In a 2013 survey distributed to over 200,000 Greek life members at nine public universities, about 72 percent self-identified as middle- or upper-middle class, while only 18 percent and 6 percent categorized themselves as working-class or low-income, respectively.
Beyond these statistics, frats and sororities have a documented history of exclusion, especially toward non-white members. Students of color say racial bias still persists in the rush process, and almost every year, a fraternity is in the news for engaging in blatantly racist behavior.
Usually, it requires a shocking national incident — usually a death or severe accident — affiliated with Greek life to spur this cycle of conversation. (Syrett himself was interviewed in a 2014 Business Insider story with the headline, “Why fraternities will never disappear from American college life.”) But after the chapter suspensions are handed down and schools publicized stricter policies, the Greek system still appears to be intact.
The Greek system has extensive financial ties. Colleges have no interest in getting rid of them.
If Greek life is so troublesome — as a hot spot for sexual assault, hazing, and civil lawsuits — why have most universities not taken a hardline stance against its existence? The short answer is money.
“Many of these fraternities and sororities have been on campuses for decades, and that’s led them to accumulate a strong alumni network that can be tapped as donors,” said Noah Drezner, a Columbia associate professor of higher education who researches alumni giving. “I would say that Greek alumni are disproportionately represented on trustee boards and in administrative positions.” It’s not in a college’s financial interest to anger or alienate their donors, he added.
Fraternities and sororities traditionally offer housing for students, a boon for universities, and wealthy alumni often pitch in funds for the construction of chapter houses and the land they reside on. Frats own about $3 billion worth of real estate across 800 US campuses, reported Bloomberg’s John Hechinger in his book True Gentleman: The Broken Pledge of American Fraternities.
This funding is key in small college towns where housing is limited and most members live together. If, for example, a university sought to disband a fraternity, it would then have to purchase the house (or the parcel of land) to turn into student housing.
“The thing is, students in Greek life are richer to begin with, but they also may be more loyal monetarily,” said Syrett. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle: As members graduate, some return as generous donors, eager to become beneficiaries for the next generation. And with money comes power — at both the student and institutional level.
The University of Alabama is an extreme case of how Greek organizations can harness their influence: For over a century, an informal underground society called “The Machine” has allegedly influenced how members, who comprise over 34 percent of the undergraduate population, vote in campus and local city elections. These students are, according to AI.com, “a powerful bloc of voters from fraternities and sororities” who have reportedly used intimidation and voter coercion tactics.
Part of a member’s dues toward the national organizations could also become contributions to the Fraternity and Sorority Political Action Committee, or FratPAC, which has historically donated a majority of its funds to Republican candidates and lobbied for pro-Greek legislation. “By remaining in these organizations, both through your membership and your financial contributions, you are allowing these organizations to influence politics and races in ways that may not align with your own opinions,” read one post from Richmond University’s “Abolish Greek Life” account.
Even at the chapter level, “Greek life is terrified of lawsuits,” said Gwendolyn Strasberg, a junior at the University of Southern California who recently dropped her sorority. “They have lawyers on retainer, ready to work if there are any actions that make them look bad.” Several Greek organizations at USC filed lawsuits against the university in 2019 after administrators set forth new recruitment standards that deferred the rush process from fall to spring. “Greek life is more than just influence at schools,” Strasburg added. “There is a political presence, and ultimately these organizations want to maximize their influence.”
How the coronavirus and the abolitionist movement could impact Greek life’s future
Many former members like Strasburg are cutting ties to the national chapter, highlighting certain nefarious aspects of Greek life that are typically swept under the rug: rampant misogyny in frat culture, body shaming, popular hazing practices, substance abuse, and more.
Although some students have voiced their support of eventual abolition, they are advocating for different solutions. Some like Strasburg see disaffiliation as the answer, since the culture is “beyond the capacity for reform.” Others like Taylor, the student at Mississippi State, believe their internal efforts could improve a system that is an entrenched aspect of campus life. In recent weeks, several fraternity and sorority group chats have been leaked online, which suggests that a few active members are exposing these behaviors, although it’s unclear if their goal is for their chapters to be abolished or reformed.
“Greek life is spending all of its energy fighting people like me who are speaking out, rather than looking to fix the system,” said Strasburg, who says she has faced online attacks for her beliefs. “How do you enforce anti-racist policies when half of Greek life centers around alcohol and intoxication? Can you hold people to these standards when they’re in an altered mindset?”
The response to “Abolish Greek Life” has similarly varied by campus; some chapters are acknowledging the validity of certain criticisms, while others are moving ahead with fall recruitment and actively ignoring the burgeoning movement. And as much as Vanderbilt is a poster child for Greek life abolition, students on campuses like USC or the University of Georgia with a well-known fraternity and sorority presence are reacting more negatively. This reaction in defense of the system is why Strasburg and Taylor are doubtful of change.
“I do believe that most adults who lead the Interfraternity and Panhellenic Councils work tirelessly to improve Greek life from within,” Taylor told me. “But no one’s ever seen those results, which is why people are turning to abolition.” Yet according to some former Vanderbilt Delta Tau Delta members, who approached the school’s Greek life director and the national organization, they felt their concerns were dismissed, the Times reported.
The North American Interfraternity and the National Panhellenic Conferences, two national groups that oversee most existing fraternities and sororities, have maintained that abolition is “not going to happen,” according to the Washington Post, and that those disaffiliating are among a small minority.
“Abolishing fraternities is not the answer to addressing cultural challenges across campus,” wrote Todd Shelton, a spokesperson for the NAIC, in an email. “The vast majority of students involved in fraternities want to work through their organizations to improve campus culture by enhancing diversity, inclusion and respect for all students.”
And while the National Panhellenic Conference didn’t address the concept of abolition, CEO Dani Weatherford admitted that sororities “must reckon with the legacy and manifestations of systemic racism and other forms of bias that impact the sorority experience.” In August, the organization formed an “access and equity advisory committee” to improve the recruitment process with the aim to “eliminate structural and systemic barriers.”
The coronavirus pandemic, however, could very well be a factor in the decline of Greek life. Colleges across the country have seen Covid-19 clusters emerge in student housing facilities and fraternity and sorority houses, some of which have not ceased in-person recruitment or social events. The Times’s coronavirus tracker has identified at least 251 cases tied to Greek members.
Plus, the pandemic has exacerbated financial stressors on students, particularly those from lower-income or middle-class families, who might no longer be able to afford Greek life membership dues. (Dues and additional fees for housing, meals, and apparel vary from chapter to chapter, but members are expected to pay about $500 to $1,500 per semester.)
“The coronavirus could stress the relationship between higher education institutions and Greek life, specifically because of the many risks that fraternities and sororities exacerbate on college campuses,” said Lisa Wade, a sociologist at Tulane University who has advocated for Greek abolition. “We’ve adapted to those threats — the rise of sexual violence and physical harm to students — and have accepted them as a cost of doing business in higher ed. But Covid introduces another risk that’s especially dangerous.”
Universities tend to tolerate the Greek system, Wade said, but in recent years, administrators have cracked down on fraternities and sororities. Some schools began monitoring parties in 2017, and at campuses with severe allegations of hazing and sexual assault, fraternity activity was entirely suspended. Public university presidents even attended a conference on Greek life in 2018 as part of an effort to create a nationwide Greek chapter scorecard to track student misbehavior. (Penn State’s newly established Piazza Center for Fraternity and Sorority Research and Reform is in charge of collecting data for the national scorecard, but it has not yet published a public annual report since its 2019 launch.)
In the meantime, the coronavirus will likely remain the top priority of administrators nationwide, but it could be an unexpected accelerant in the favor of Greek life abolitionists. This time feels different, students say. “That’s what everyone hopes, right? That this time, we’re a little better and society is willing to demand and make more change,” Taylor said. “I’d rather fight a losing battle than sit passively on the wrong side.”


vox--2020-09-29--The case for weakening the Supreme Court

The death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg on September 18 underlined a peculiar aspect of the American political system : The state of laws governing everything from abortion to environmental regulation to health care to national security depends , in part , on when exactly elderly judges happen to die .
That not only fosters a ghoulish preoccupation with the health of Supreme Court justices , and puts justices like Ginsburg in a position where they have to dictate their wishes for their seat from their deathbed — it also raises major questions about whether a group of nine unelected jurists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much power over law and policy in the United States .
This worry , that the courts have gotten too powerful relative to other branches , has a long history , among conservatives repulsed by decisions affirming rights to abortion and birth control , as well as among liberals and leftists who argue that courts capable of overruling Congress and state legislatures undermine democracy .
Two law professors , Ryan Doerfler of the University of Chicago and Samuel Moyn of Yale , recently released a paper laying out a way to “ democratize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to strike down federal laws as unconstitutional ( an ability usually referred to as “ judicial review ” ) .
In order to pass transformative progressive legislation like Medicare-for-all or a Green New Deal and ensure the Court does not tamper with them , Doerfler and Moyn propose either stripping the Court of jurisdiction over certain legislation or imposing a supermajority requirement under which a 7-2 majority would be required for the Court to overturn acts of Congress .
Doerfler and I discussed the paper last week , what their proposals would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and leftists shouldn ’ t fear losing judicial review , and why we can ’ t count on courts to protect democracy .
A transcript , edited for length and clarity , follows .
Let ’ s start with the very basics : What is “ judicial review ” ?
When people use the term “ judicial review , ” usually what people are referring to is the judicial evaluation of either legislation or executive activity for conformity with the Constitution .
Because the Constitution has legal priority over legislation and executive actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to enforce either if the Constitution conflicts with them .
A whole lot of judicial activity is not judicial review , including , for example , review of executive actions for conformity with statutes when making regulations .
The US has a fairly strong practice of judicial review .
How unusual is that internationally , especially compared to what we think of as peer countries in Western Europe , Canada , Japan , Australia , and New Zealand ?
I should say I ’ m very much not a comparativist , but American-style @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitutionality are binding on all of their branches , has traditionally been understood as a global outlier .
Now , since the mid-20th century , that has become less and less true .
Still , even today , we see a huge range of practices .
There are systems that go entirely without judicial review , like the Netherlands or Switzerland , where federal legislation , at least , is entirely exempt from review .
We also have systems like Canada or Israel , where the legislation is subject to judicial review , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judicial determinations .
And then to the other end of the spectrum , we have systems like we have here in the US .
Interestingly , US states also employ different systems with respect to state constitutions .
North Dakota and Nebraska require supermajorities for their high courts to declare state statutes inconsistent with the state constitution .
Let ’ s dig into your actual proposals .
The first is a supermajority rule , where the Supreme Court would need seven votes , not just five , to overturn federal legislation .
How @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Court can , by a simple majority 5-4 vote , declare a federal statute invalid .
And then that ’ s it , under our system of judicial supremacy .
Our basic idea is that Congress could impose a limit on the Supreme Court that says that the Court may only declare a federal statute unconstitutional by , let ’ s say , a 7-2 majority .
Congress could pass a statute that imposes this requirement for federal legislation in general , or just for specific statutes — if Congress were to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1 [ the House Democrats ’ democracy reform bill ] , something like that .
To close out the scheme , Congress would probably want to add a couple of additional features .
Congress would likely want to establish an analogous requirement for lower courts — for example , a requirement that federal courts of appeal can declare federal legislation unconstitutional only by unanimous 3-0 vote .
Even more importantly , [ they could also pass ] legislation providing that any relief provided by lower federal courts on constitutional grounds would terminate upon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ event that the justices are ultimately unable to rule on a statute ’ s constitutionality .
For example , if the justices voted 5-4 that a statute was unconstitutional , under the supermajority rule , the court couldn ’ t declare the statute unconstitutional .
And in that event , any relief [ that is , rulings stating the statute was unconstitutional ] provided by lower courts would terminate .
That limitation on relief is to prevent disuniformity among lower courts in those sorts of 5-4 cases .
You also propose using the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from judicial review .
Is there any precedent for that ?
What kind of bills are you imagining making SCOTUS-proof ?
And would the Supreme Court really accept legislation limiting its jurisdiction , or just rule it unconstitutional ?
This is a mechanism called “ jurisdiction stripping ” — Congress just passing a statute prohibiting either the Supreme Court specifically or even lower courts from ruling on the constitutionality of , say , the Green New Deal .
Congress has — not with tremendous frequency but certainly over the course of history — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have gone to great lengths to interpret those statutes narrowly , and the constitutionality of that legislation is a hot topic of debate among professors who study federal courts , largely because there ’ s just not a ton of judicial precedent on it .
As to which topics Congress should specifically exempt there , we don ’ t really take a firm position .
These are just tools that we ’ re trying to put on the table for progressives , but I would say our inclination is the more the better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jurisdiction stripping or a supermajority requirement or some other type of reform , our goal is to channel as many policy decisions as possible away from the democratically unaccountable judiciary back to the political branches .
I should say that I ’ m also something of a judicial review skeptic , and when I make this argument to friends on the left , the usual rebuttal , which is very fair , is to go down a litany of decisions from Brown v. Board of Education ( striking down school segregation ) to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) to Roe v. Wade ( legalizing abortion ) to Obergefell v. Hodges ( legalizing same-sex marriage ) .
Those are all cases where the Court struck down some legislation or policy that was suppressing some minority group , or impinging upon what many believe to be a fundamental right .
I ’ m curious how you weigh the downsides , for progressives , of losing those decisions against the upside of losing decisions that went the other way .
I ’ m also curious if that ’ s even the right way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s exactly the question that I think we need to address from the left in particular .
First , this might seem a little convenient , but my first response is to say our proposal deals with federal legislation in particular .
Review of executive action is more complicated , as is review of state law , for reasons having to do with federal supremacy .
So with Brown or Roe , for example , [ our proposal ] may not even affect that [ because those cases didn ’ t originate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But setting those qualifications aside — for universally accepted precedents , like Brown , for example , a supermajority requirement is going to have no bearing .
If a litigant were today to argue that Brown was wrongly decided , she would lose 0-9 .
Even under a supermajority rule , Brown would remain the law of the land .
Second , with other more contentious precedents , one has to look at what judicial enforcement has actually provided , right ?
Take Roe , for example .
What Roe as applied has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protections , especially for economically disadvantaged women .
And at what cost ?
What ’ s the downside of operating under this regime ?
So in part , our position is , “ Look , for every Roe or Obergefell , we get a Citizens United [ striking down restrictions on corporate political spending ] or Shelby County [ striking down part of the Voting Rights Act ] , let alone decisions like Lochner [ striking down a state law limiting workdays to 10 hours ] or Dred Scott [ ruling Black Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And our claim is that progressives have over the long run fared terribly under a system of judicial supremacy .
It ’ s worse still if we think about the rights that progressives should be concerned about providing : positive , affirmative rights .
Take the abortion example .
Progressive are concerned with providing an affirmative right for abortion , financed by the state .
That sort of protection is only going to be provided by statute , through something like Medicare-for-all with abortion services covered .
And there , by lessening the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we make it more possible for Congress to successfully create such a right without judicial interference .
Those are some instrumental reasons why I think progressives should prefer a system with less , rather than more , judicial intervention .
There are more principled reasons as well .
If the only way that progressives can achieve their policy goals is through an anti-democratic institution , rather than through popular majorities , that should be concerning , just as a matter of principle .
Now , I don ’ t think that ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be more confident in the popularity , or at least the potential popularity , of their policies with the broader population .
But insofar as we ’ re relying on judicial elites to tell popular majorities what they should think ?
I think that should also trouble progressives .
The most persuasive defense of judicial review , to my mind , is what law professors sometimes call the “ political process theory ” approach .
To simplify dramatically , on this view you concede the point that high-stakes political decisions should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the courts .
But a prerequisite for democratically accountable legislators making these decisions is that they ’ re actually democratically accountable , and they have strong incentives to make themselves less accountable through measures like gerrymandering or voting restrictions or , in extreme cases , vast constitutional changes like the ones the Fidesz party in Hungary has enacted to entrench its autocratic regime .
So you need a Supreme Court with the ability to overturn legislation that threatens the democratic nature of our legislatures themselves .
Is the supermajority court you ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like this , given that there weren ’ t even five votes on the Supreme Court to overturn large-scale gerrymandering in North Carolina and Maryland ?
That ’ s a great place to start , right ?
There wasn ’ t a supermajority ; there wasn ’ t even a majority .
I think that that ’ s part of the response .
This is the John Hart Ely approach to justifying judicial review : The role of the Court is not to enforce substantive values , but rather to police the democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our democratic capacities well .
The first response is sort of glib , but I think it rings true , which is : nice in theory , but it fails in practice .
[ Harvard law professor ] Michael Klarman just authored a book-length foreword to the Harvard Law Review ’ s Supreme Court issue detailing the Supreme Court ’ s contribution to what he calls “ the degradation of our democracy.
” The Roberts Court in particular has been horrendous on this front with decisions like Shelby County .
The justices , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideological actors , and they ’ re disposed to help their ideological compatriots where they can , even in cases where it seems more plausible that the Court would intervene , like partisan gerrymandering .
Time and again , it ’ s just declined to do so .
So then what ’ s our recourse ?
Sadly , I think probably the recourse is to press ahead through the bad democratic system that we have , to make it a better one .
Maybe that ’ s unsatisfying , but I think that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re in right ?
There is no deus ex machina that ’ s going to come in and save our democracy .
We just have to do it ourselves .
We have to enact statutes like HR 1 , for instance , which would make our system meaningfully more democratic .
And then if we protect HR 1 from judicial invalidation — that ’ s a good thing .
Then we ’ ve made progress on the democratic front .
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The death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her replacement by Amy Coney Barrett, in many ways her ideological opposite, underlined a peculiar aspect of the American political system: The state of laws governing everything from abortion to environmental regulation to health care to national security depends, in part, on when exactly elderly judges happen to die.
That not only fosters a ghoulish preoccupation with the health of Supreme Court justices, and puts justices like Ginsburg in a position where they have to dictate their wishes for their seat from their deathbed — it also raises major questions about whether a group of nine unelected jurists, appointed for life, has too much power over law and policy in the United States.
This worry, that the courts have gotten too powerful relative to other branches, has a long history, among conservatives repulsed by decisions affirming rights to abortion and birth control, as well as among liberals and leftists who argue that courts capable of overruling Congress and state legislatures undermine democracy.
Two law professors, Ryan Doerfler of the University of Chicago and Samuel Moyn of Yale, recently released a paper laying out a way to “democratize” the Supreme Court by weakening its ability to strike down federal laws as unconstitutional (an ability usually referred to as “judicial review”). In order to pass transformative progressive legislation like Medicare-for-all or a Green New Deal and ensure the Court does not tamper with them, Doerfler and Moyn propose either stripping the Court of jurisdiction over certain legislation or imposing a supermajority requirement under which a 7-2 majority would be required for the Court to overturn acts of Congress.
Doerfler and I discussed the paper last week, what their proposals would mean for the Court, why liberals and leftists shouldn’t fear losing judicial review, and why we can’t count on courts to protect democracy. A transcript, edited for length and clarity, follows.
Dylan Matthews
Let’s start with the very basics: What is “judicial review”?
Ryan Doerfler
When people use the term “judicial review,” usually what people are referring to is the judicial evaluation of either legislation or executive activity for conformity with the Constitution. Because the Constitution has legal priority over legislation and executive actions, courts in the US will decline to enforce either if the Constitution conflicts with them.
A whole lot of judicial activity is not judicial review, including, for example, review of executive actions for conformity with statutes when making regulations.
Dylan Matthews
The US has a fairly strong practice of judicial review. How unusual is that internationally, especially compared to what we think of as peer countries in Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand?
Ryan Doerfler
I should say I’m very much not a comparativist, but American-style judicial review, where judicial assessments of constitutionality are binding on all of their branches, has traditionally been understood as a global outlier.
Now, since the mid-20th century, that has become less and less true. Still, even today, we see a huge range of practices. There are systems that go entirely without judicial review, like the Netherlands or Switzerland, where federal legislation, at least, is entirely exempt from review. We also have systems like Canada or Israel, where the legislation is subject to judicial review, but legislators reserve the right to override judicial determinations. And then to the other end of the spectrum, we have systems like we have here in the US.
Interestingly, US states also employ different systems with respect to state constitutions. North Dakota and Nebraska require supermajorities for their high courts to declare state statutes inconsistent with the state constitution.
Dylan Matthews
Let’s dig into your actual proposals. The first is a supermajority rule, where the Supreme Court would need seven votes, not just five, to overturn federal legislation. How would that work?
Ryan Doerfler
The baseline is the Court can, by a simple majority 5-4 vote, declare a federal statute invalid. And then that’s it, under our system of judicial supremacy.
Our basic idea is that Congress could impose a limit on the Supreme Court that says that the Court may only declare a federal statute unconstitutional by, let’s say, a 7-2 majority. Congress could pass a statute that imposes this requirement for federal legislation in general, or just for specific statutes — if Congress were to enact the Green New Deal or HR 1 [the House Democrats’ democracy reform bill], something like that.
To close out the scheme, Congress would probably want to add a couple of additional features. Congress would likely want to establish an analogous requirement for lower courts — for example, a requirement that federal courts of appeal can declare federal legislation unconstitutional only by unanimous 3-0 vote.
Even more importantly, [they could also pass] legislation providing that any relief provided by lower federal courts on constitutional grounds would terminate upon Supreme Court review, even in the event that the justices are ultimately unable to rule on a statute’s constitutionality. For example, if the justices voted 5-4 that a statute was unconstitutional, under the supermajority rule, the court couldn’t declare the statute unconstitutional. And in that event, any relief [that is, rulings stating the statute was unconstitutional] provided by lower courts would terminate. That limitation on relief is to prevent disuniformity among lower courts in those sorts of 5-4 cases.
Dylan Matthews
You also propose using the power of Congress to circumscribe certain topics from judicial review. Is there any precedent for that? What kind of bills are you imagining making SCOTUS-proof? And would the Supreme Court really accept legislation limiting its jurisdiction, or just rule it unconstitutional?
Ryan Doerfler
This is a mechanism called “jurisdiction stripping” — Congress just passing a statute prohibiting either the Supreme Court specifically or even lower courts from ruling on the constitutionality of, say, the Green New Deal.
Congress has — not with tremendous frequency but certainly over the course of history — enacted jurisdiction-stripping legislation. Historically, courts have gone to great lengths to interpret those statutes narrowly, and the constitutionality of that legislation is a hot topic of debate among professors who study federal courts, largely because there’s just not a ton of judicial precedent on it.
As to which topics Congress should specifically exempt there, we don’t really take a firm position. These are just tools that we’re trying to put on the table for progressives, but I would say our inclination is the more the better. Whether we’re talking about jurisdiction stripping or a supermajority requirement or some other type of reform, our goal is to channel as many policy decisions as possible away from the democratically unaccountable judiciary back to the political branches.
Dylan Matthews
I should say that I’m also something of a judicial review skeptic, and when I make this argument to friends on the left, the usual rebuttal, which is very fair, is to go down a litany of decisions from Brown v. Board of Education (striking down school segregation) to Loving v. Virginia (legalizing interracial marriage) to Roe v. Wade (legalizing abortion) to Obergefell v. Hodges (legalizing same-sex marriage). Those are all cases where the Court struck down some legislation or policy that was suppressing some minority group, or impinging upon what many believe to be a fundamental right.
I’m curious how you weigh the downsides, for progressives, of losing those decisions against the upside of losing decisions that went the other way. I’m also curious if that’s even the right way to think about judicial review.
Ryan Doerfler
That’s exactly the question that I think we need to address from the left in particular.
First, this might seem a little convenient, but my first response is to say our proposal deals with federal legislation in particular. Review of executive action is more complicated, as is review of state law, for reasons having to do with federal supremacy. So with Brown or Roe, for example, [our proposal] may not even affect that [because those cases didn’t originate with challenges to federal legislation].
But setting those qualifications aside — for universally accepted precedents, like Brown, for example, a supermajority requirement is going to have no bearing. If a litigant were today to argue that Brown was wrongly decided, she would lose 0-9. Even under a supermajority rule, Brown would remain the law of the land.
Second, with other more contentious precedents, one has to look at what judicial enforcement has actually provided, right? Take Roe, for example. What Roe as applied has actually afforded us are incredibly paltry abortion protections, especially for economically disadvantaged women. And at what cost? What’s the downside of operating under this regime?
So in part, our position is, “Look, for every Roe or Obergefell, we get a Citizens United [striking down restrictions on corporate political spending] or Shelby County [striking down part of the Voting Rights Act], let alone decisions like Lochner [striking down a state law limiting workdays to 10 hours] or Dred Scott [ruling Black Americans could not be citizens].” And our claim is that progressives have over the long run fared terribly under a system of judicial supremacy.
It’s worse still if we think about the rights that progressives should be concerned about providing: positive, affirmative rights. Take the abortion example. Progressive are concerned with providing an affirmative right for abortion, financed by the state. That sort of protection is only going to be provided by statute, through something like Medicare-for-all with abortion services covered. And there, by lessening the court’s authority to review legislation, we make it more possible for Congress to successfully create such a right without judicial interference.
Those are some instrumental reasons why I think progressives should prefer a system with less, rather than more, judicial intervention. There are more principled reasons as well. If the only way that progressives can achieve their policy goals is through an anti-democratic institution, rather than through popular majorities, that should be concerning, just as a matter of principle. Now, I don’t think that’s true. I think that progressives should be more confident in the popularity, or at least the potential popularity, of their policies with the broader population. But insofar as we’re relying on judicial elites to tell popular majorities what they should think? I think that should also trouble progressives.
Dylan Matthews
The most persuasive defense of judicial review, to my mind, is what law professors sometimes call the “political process theory” approach. To simplify dramatically, on this view you concede the point that high-stakes political decisions should be made by democratically accountable legislators, not by the courts.
But a prerequisite for democratically accountable legislators making these decisions is that they’re actually democratically accountable, and they have strong incentives to make themselves less accountable through measures like gerrymandering or voting restrictions or, in extreme cases, vast constitutional changes like the ones the Fidesz party in Hungary has enacted to entrench its autocratic regime. So you need a Supreme Court with the ability to overturn legislation that threatens the democratic nature of our legislatures themselves.
Is the supermajority court you’re imagining able to push back challenges like this, given that there weren’t even five votes on the Supreme Court to overturn large-scale gerrymandering in North Carolina and Maryland?
Ryan Doerfler
That’s a great place to start, right? There wasn’t a supermajority; there wasn’t even a majority. I think that that’s part of the response.
This is the John Hart Ely approach to justifying judicial review: The role of the Court is not to enforce substantive values, but rather to police the democratic process to make sure that we exercise our democratic capacities well.
The first response is sort of glib, but I think it rings true, which is: nice in theory, but it fails in practice. [Harvard law professor] Michael Klarman just authored a book-length foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s Supreme Court issue detailing the Supreme Court’s contribution to what he calls “the degradation of our democracy.” The Roberts Court in particular has been horrendous on this front with decisions like Shelby County. The justices, like the rest of us, are ideological actors, and they’re disposed to help their ideological compatriots where they can, even in cases where it seems more plausible that the Court would intervene, like partisan gerrymandering. Time and again, it’s just declined to do so.
So then what’s our recourse? Sadly, I think probably the recourse is to press ahead through the bad democratic system that we have, to make it a better one. Maybe that’s unsatisfying, but I think that’s just the situation we’re in right? There is no deus ex machina that’s going to come in and save our democracy. We just have to do it ourselves. We have to enact statutes like HR 1, for instance, which would make our system meaningfully more democratic. And then if we protect HR 1 from judicial invalidation — that’s a good thing. Then we’ve made progress on the democratic front.