vox--2020-07-13--Israel’s West Bank annexation plan and why it’s stalled, explained by an expert

It took three elections , but Israel finally formed an emergency government this spring , in the middle of a pandemic and a global economic crisis .
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz , of the Blue and White party , averted another election , but the deal also laid out a plan for annexation of parts of the West Bank as soon as July 1 .
The plan has the potential to completely upend the fragile , but unsustainable , status quo in the Israeli-occupied territory .
Home to nearly 3 million Palestinians , the land makes up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state of Palestine .
But the viability of that future state is complicated by the presence of some 500,000 Jewish settlers who also live in the West Bank , in settlements dotted across the approximately 2,262 square miles of territory .
Under the two-state framework historically supported by the United States and the international community , the vast bulk of the West Bank would be returned to the Palestinians .
As part of a final peace deal , Israelis and Palestinians would negotiate what to do about the settlements , with some heavily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ borders likely to be ceded to Israel .
But peace talks have stalled for years , and there is no deal anywhere on the horizon .
Instead , the Israeli right has been pushing for Netanyahu ’ s government to just go ahead and unilaterally annex significant portions of the West Bank that it wants to keep , making them officially part of Israel proper , regardless of what the Palestinians think about it .
In January , the Trump administration unveiled its “ peace plan , ” developed by US and Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who refused to participate .
The plan helped create the conditions for Netanyahu to move forward with unilateral annexation , and for months , it looked as though Netanyahu was going to do it .
In fact , it was supposed to officially happen as soon as July 1 .
The United States is hesitating — and has some other things to deal with , like a raging pandemic and economic recession .
Gantz , whose support Netanyahu needs to move forward , is also urging patience , suggesting Israel deal with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The rest of the world has also resisted the plan : British Prime Minister Boris Johnson penned an op-ed against it .
Other countries , from Germany to Jordan , have condemned the move , and United Nations officials have consistently called it illegal .
So the plan remains stalled , for now at least .
Given all the questions swirling , I reached out to Brent E. Sasley , a professor at the University of Texas at Arlington and an expert on Israeli politics , to talk about the basics : what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happening ( or not happening ) now , and what comes next .
He offered some historical context to explain the current dynamics and the still-present uncertainty about this moment .
Our conversation , edited for length and clarity , is below .
I guess an obvious place to start is : What is the West Bank ?
Geographically speaking , it ’ s literally the west bank , uncapitalized , of the Jordan River .
It ’ s become a convenient term to use when you don ’ t want to refer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” or “ Judea and Samaria ” — the latter being terms that hark back to the ancient Jewish kingdom and which the Israeli government uses formally in all of its references toward the area .
For some people , it ’ s a non-political term because it doesn ’ t refer to anyone ’ s claim to the land .
But for many , many right-wing Jews , many Israelis , and many people on the right who support Israel ’ s occupation , they see it as a political term because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Jewish homeland .
Typically , most Israelis don ’ t see it as separate territory .
They ’ re more aware now of the separateness of the West Bank , but for a long time , even after Israel conquered it in 1967 , they didn ’ t .
They ’ d talk about family members living in extensive areas of Israel , but they actually meant people living in West Bank settlements .
The line itself between Israel proper and the West Bank was just not something that they saw .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ perspective , how do Palestinians see it ?
They would call it Palestine .
So when we talk about annexation of the West Bank , what does that actually mean ?
So that is kind of the big question .
In theory , annexation can mean anything .
Netanyahu has , in the past , promised that he will connect part of the West Bank [ to Israel ] .
He ’ s also talked about annexing the Jordan Valley , which is a very specific part of the West Bank .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about annexation of all of Area C. After the Oslo Accords , the West Bank was divided into areas A , B , and C. Area C has fewer Palestinians and more Jewish settlements .
For some people supportive of annexation , they think that the entire area should be annexed .
And the Trump plan , for example — I wouldn ’ t call it a peace plan — lays out specific areas .
So there ’ s no real answer .
One could argue that ’ s a positive thing because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hash out some kind of agreement .
But I actually think it ’ s a bad thing .
First of all , the ambiguity creates space for the Israeli government under Netanyahu to get away with almost anything .
Even if it does something really small and says , ‘ We have now annexed this , ” they ’ ve moved the goalposts and created language that actually embeds annexation into the discourse .
They ’ ve now done something that makes it very difficult to reverse , and depending on where they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impossible to reverse .
That now becomes the new norm .
So that ambiguity , I think , is really problematic and dangerous .
So since we don ’ t have a precise definition of annexation , it can basically be anything that Netanyahu dreams it to be ?
Is that fair ?
Yes , although I would add one more point to that .
And that is — I don ’ t know if you ’ ve heard the term — “ creeping annexation ” ?
I have , but maybe remind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I just said is the case , but the bigger problem is that creeping annexation has been taking place since 1967 .
Creeping annexation refers to the gradual process by which Israel expands its control over the West Bank .
That includes a whole series of factors .
Israelis build settlements in the West Bank , and then Israel has to then kind of take control of that area .
But to do that , they then end up building roads and infrastructure to hook those homes up to Israel proper .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those settlements , because many of the settlers work in Israel , and many Israelis go to these settlements for various reasons , whether it ’ s to buy wine or visit family .
So you end up with this whole infrastructure there .
It also refers to the application of Israeli law in the settlements and often the surrounding areas .
Palestinians in the West Bank have been able to use , in a limited way , the Israeli Supreme Court to dispute , for example , the route of the security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one hand , that sounds good , because that means Palestinians have access to Israeli institutions , and those institutions can push the government to change its policies .
But on the other hand — this gets back to that ambiguity I was talking about — that means that Israeli law is applied not just to the Israeli citizens but to non-Israeli citizens , as well .
So that ’ s part of the overall process we ’ re seeing .
So it ’ s a sort of de facto control , even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
I mean , de facto control over much of it .
Why is talk of formal annexation happening right now ?
I think there ’ s probably a convergence of factors .
First , as I said , this is a process that ’ s been ongoing for a long period of time .
So everything that I ’ ve said about the ambiguity and moving the goalposts and new language — yes , that would be a major change .
But in some ways , it will just be making concrete @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long time .
Second , of course , is Trump .
In order to appease the evangelical base of his support , Trump has been pushing hard to change massive long-standing conditions and to really adopt the right-wing Israeli positions regarding Jerusalem and sovereignty over the West Bank .
The Trump plan comes out of that process , and so Israeli right-wingers see this as a moment in which conditions are ripe for them to do this .
If you have the backing of the world ’ s most powerful country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a third factor is that the political right in Israel has been dominant since the 2009 election , and there ’ s nothing on the horizon that suggests the Jewish left , the Zionist left , is in a position to challenge them in any serious , viable way .
After these last three elections there was no clear winner , that ’ s true , but the political right and the center-right always [ did far better in ] those elections .
The Jewish left did not do very well at all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jewish left , I ’ m excluding the Arab political parties here , because obviously they don ’ t have a majority of support from the Jewish population .
That support is what ’ s necessary in order to form the government .
I ’ m not dismissing that community , I ’ m saying in terms of the political game , their ability to set the agenda is marginal .
And then finally , I think , you have Netanyahu .
When he first came to power — not in his first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maybe third term — he was a little bit more pragmatic .
I think he was more open to negotiation .
Around 2012-2013 , there was a moment when Netanyahu had been pressured not to completely leave the West Bank but to put in place a series of concessions that really would have changed the game .
But they failed to a wide degree .
I think Netanyahu has since then become more and more bold in promoting the idea of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank .
And so I think he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he ’ s got no serious challengers on the left , so it ’ s , “ Look where I am , I might as well do this now.
” So all those factors converged for annexation to start on July 1 .
But then that date came and went , and annexation didn ’ t happen .
Why does the plan seem to be stalling ?
It got harder than Netanyahu thought it would be .
The Trump administration started to waffle a little bit .
Benny Gantz , his partner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as originally thought , and the settlers were really upset that the plan at least created some sense , however temporary , of an actual Palestinian state .
They were not happy with that .
So you heard a lot of voices starting to oppose this when it came down to actually trying to implement it .
What would you say is causing the hesitation on the part of the Trump administration ?
I ’ m not sure that the Trump administration has as much energy and time to focus on this issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot of other stuff going on that ’ s kind of occupying the Trump administration , certainly its domestic energy .
So it has kind of left foreign policy alone , except for Trump ’ s intermittent pronouncements on foreign affairs .
I also think there was a lot of pressure brought to bear on the Trump administration , and again , that ’ s within this context of the administration being slightly distracted by other things .
It just wasn ’ t going as smoothly as they seemed to have thought it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t able to push it as much as they thought they would .
What we ’ ve also seen is that when it comes to really substantive issues , Trump likes to say things , and he will sometimes lend his support to ideas or policies that fit with his general ideas , but he doesn ’ t always put the whole weight of the administration behind him because that ’ s just how he makes policy — or more aptly , that ’ s how he doesn ’ t make policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seeing something of that here , too .
And from the Israeli perspective — or maybe Netanyahu ’ s perspective — how nerve-wracking is Trump ’ s waffling ?
Because it would seem Trump is the window of opportunity .
Correct me if I ’ m wrong , but I imagine if Joe Biden were to win in November , the circumstances would change radically .
But perhaps if annexation has already happened , there ’ s probably little Biden could do to reverse it .
Do I have that right ?
How @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say there is a lot Biden could do to reverse course , but it ’ s unlikely he would do it .
But I wouldn ’ t say Trump ’ s waffling is “ nerve-racking ” for Netanyahu .
I would say “ frustrating.
” Definitely Netanyahu and his allies see this as an opportunity .
But I also think they ’ re aware of Trump ’ s mercurial nature .
They know what he ’ s like , they ’ ve watched , they ’ ve listened to him , they ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I don ’ t believe that they are expecting Trump to stand firm .
Is there a world where Israel goes ahead with annexation without US support ?
So there ’ s a difference between the US not supporting it and the US opposing it .
So the former ?
Yes , there is a world in which that happens .
And again , you pointed out all these calculations that Netanyahu has to make , and I think that part of it is that he does genuinely believe that Israel has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he believes he has a role to play in getting Israel to that point .
If the US opposes it , that ’ s a different issue .
But if the US doesn ’ t say anything , he knows he ’ s got the support of some people in the administration , at least privately .
He ’ s got the support of the US ambassador to Israel .
For him , that might well be enough .
Again , this is where the ambiguity comes in .
It might not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choose to occupy 50 percent of the West Bank.
” It might be , “ We are now formally going to annex these settlements , ” or the Jordan Valley , or even some smaller step .
Given this ambiguity , do we actually know how formal annexation could happen ?
Is it a matter of issue , like an order ?
Or do troops move in ?
Basically , how would we know that yesterday is different from today ?
Right , that ’ s a good question .
I don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depends on what Netanyahu wants to do .
For major decisions or changes in law , he would need the support of the Knesset [ Israel ’ s parliament ] .
That would mean getting the support of coalition partners like [ Benny Gantz ’ s ] Blue and White party that might not necessarily be on board with everything .
Like any government , there are a number of steps that could be taken to get around the need for legislative approval .
It all depends on what they want to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really answering the question , but I think it depends .
I want to talk a bit about the domestic politics of this .
There was a sense that Netanyahu was using annexation as an election ploy in this latest election .
But is the Israeli public generally supportive of the move , or is it much more divided than it appears ?
So as a general rule , the landscape , or the context , is that most Israeli Jews think that the West Bank is , at least in some general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it goes back to 1967 , when many felt Israel was threatened [ by Israel ’ s Arab neighbors ] .
And then that was replaced by this miracle : Israel didn ’ t just win [ the 1967 war ] , but it was a stunning victory .
And all of a sudden , after 20 years , the heartland of the Jewish people and Jewish history and Jewish religious aspects , all of that now is suddenly under Israeli sovereignty , and Israelis can actually go touch the Western Wall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Temple .
Ever since then , that underlying sense of religious nationalism — because religion is part of it — really connected them to the area .
So you can trace polling data over time that shows how Israeli Jews think about this .
And so , as a general rule — and polling data does bear this out — most Israeli Jews see the West Bank as part of Jewish history and heritage , part of its religious history .
That ’ s the context .
The Israel Democracy Institute has good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should look at is the Israeli Voice Index [ from July 2020 ] .
It found that 25 percent of Israelis oppose any application of Israeli sovereignty to parts of Judea and Samaria [ the West Bank ] , while 24 percent support applying Israeli sovereignty to all of it — so that ’ s roughly equal .
14 percent support applying sovereignty to large settlement blocks and 8 percent support applying it to the Jordan Valley .
If you add all of that together , 46 percent — almost half of Israelis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of sovereignty .
That ’ s at the general level .
But we also see specific responses often change .
If you bring in scenarios , if you mention specific settlements or specific areas , it changes depending on how you ask it .
So what about Netanyahu , then ?
Are his political fortunes now intertwined with his promise to annex the West Bank ?
He ’ s been talking in these terms for a long time now .
The extent of what he ’ s been saying is something new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself is not new .
He ’ s been saying , since he ran against Shimon Peres in 1996 , that he is better for Israel ’ s security , better for the Jews , in part , not just because he ’ ll protect them but because he does believe in a stronger , more sovereign Israel that includes the West Bank or parts of the West Bank .
That ’ s kind of been his rallying cry ever since he got involved in national politics .
So it ’ s not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is yes — but it ’ s not a new thing .
Since Netanyahu has been in power for so long , has his rhetoric helped solidify public opinion in favor of annexation ?
Maybe that ’ s an impossible question to answer , but I ’ m curious how much he ’ s helped shape public opinion .
I don ’ t think so .
To some extent , we do know that often public opinion will follow what leaders say and do .
In Israeli history specifically , we know that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the public will turn around and end up supporting policies that they didn ’ t support before if the leaders simply implement them and then just move ahead .
But again , there ’ s a very large constituency in Israel for holding on to the West Bank or applying Israeli sovereignty in some way .
And that ’ s not new .
The right and the center-right are dominant in Israel .
There is almost no other game in town .
And so people who will participate in the political arena or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They have choices , depending on their view , but again , the bulk of their choices all support what we now call annexation to one degree or another .
What ’ s the deal with Benny Gantz ?
It seems he ’ s stalling on annexation , too .
Is he sort of the kingmaker here ?
Why does his support matter ?
I wouldn ’ t call him a kingmaker , but yes , his agreement is necessary .
He ’ s a partner with Netanyahu .
We call it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s technically not a unity government , but he ’ s supposed to be the partner , the main senior partner .
Without Gantz , the government could fall or would fall .
His assent or his consent is absolutely necessary for there to be any progress on annexation .
Is it surprising that Gantz is dragging his feet ?
I don ’ t think we should be surprised .
He ’ s given observers a bit of a roller coaster ride .
He presented himself as an alternative to Netanyahu , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lot of his rhetoric and things he was saying , I don ’ t think he was as much of an alternative as many people thought he was .
But he presented himself as such , and said , “ We ’ re going to stand for all these different things , none of which could possibly include Netanyahu.
” Yet in the end , he goes with Netanyahu .
And he agrees to let Netanyahu be in a bit more of a senior position , with Netanyahu as prime minister for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That becomes very disappointing , and it looks like he ’ s just saying , “ Yep , I ’ ll just do what I need to do to stay in power.
” He was never a loud supporter of annexation or anything like that .
The fact that he seems to be slowing it down , I don ’ t think that ’ s surprising .
What will be surprising is if he flat-out said , “ No .
No annexation of any kind whatsoever of any part of the West @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Is there any risk of the government collapsing over this ?
Netanyahu can ’ t really do anything without Gantz ’ s support .
Unless Netanyahu has lined up other parties to support him that would equal 61 seats in the Knesset , he can ’ t go anywhere .
That ’ s not to say Netanyahu doesn ’ t have options to pressure Gantz .
But yes , it is a risk .
The two were brought together out of sheer expediency .
Even though the two parties share a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not exactly the same .
Blue and White sees itself as a vehicle for doing its own thing .
Benny Gantz sees himself as prime minister material .
He views Netanyahu as older , as someone who had his chance but who doesn ’ t have the same level of vitality anymore .
The two parties have different perceptions of the future and what their roles are in them .
That does create a context for decisions that might break the government apart .
What I ’ m trying to say is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it comes to annexation , but as well as on other issues .
What about the Palestinian response ?
What is their position , and is there anything Palestinians can do ?
I think that the Palestinians are in an extremely weak position , and they have been for a very long time .
Part of that is because of decisions that they have made over time .
And part of that is because Israel has been the stronger power for a very long time .
So the balance is in Israel ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — neither the Arab states nor the United Nations nor obviously the United States — have been willing to really push Israel as hard as they could on these issues .
And you have the Palestinians , who themselves are divided , so that weakens their position .
Second of all , you have Mahmoud Abbas , head of the Fatah party , the Palestine Liberation Organization [ the organization formally recognized by international bodies such as the UN as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians ] , and the Palestinian Authority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West Bank ] .
Abbas has been working with Israel for a very long time on security issues , which has been to both sides ’ benefit but especially to Israel .
They ’ ve also been working together on a host of other issues related to sharing resources or economic factors .
So there is this long-standing level of institutional interaction .
What that has done is , in part , made the Palestinians dependent on Israel .
For the Palestinians — and when I say Palestinians , I mean Fatah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the West Bank ; Hamas [ which controls the Gaza Strip ] is obviously a different issue — to now pull apart , sure they could .
They could say , “ Look , we ’ re not going to work with you on security issues.
” That would be harmful to Israel and to Israelis .
But it would also really hurt the Palestinians , because then Israel won ’ t have incentives to prop up the Palestinian Authority , which Israel depends on , but which much of the Palestinian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and political leaders , or at least the old guard among the Palestinians .
The fact that Abbas has been threatening action for many , many years but never really follows through has essentially removed any credibility that his threats might be taken seriously .
Again , it ’ s not all Abbas ’ s fault , and it ’ s not all the Palestinians ’ fault — they ’ re just in a much weaker position and there ’ s no way for them to get out of that position on their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been trying .
They ’ ve been working at the international level , in international institutions , in the diplomatic and legal arenas .
But there ’ s only so far that can go .
If Israel does move for formal annexation , what might the reaction be ?
Is there a potential for real violence ?
Neri Zilber , an Israeli journalist , had a really interesting thread on Twitter in which he argued that everybody talks about how there ’ s going to be this eruption of violence from “ the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people say , “ But there was no violence when Israel did this or that , like when the US moved the embassy.
” And Zilber argues that the Palestinians don ’ t organize reaction unless there ’ s something really substantive and concrete .
So Trump said , “ Yes , the embassy is now moved.
” That sounds horrific , but it didn ’ t really change anything on the ground .
There was no need to organize any kind of violence or other kind of response .
But annexation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sending settlers and troops to the West Bank or to the Jordan Valley , that would be a substantive change .
And so there would probably be some kind of reaction : protests , demonstrations , maybe riots .
Those are more likely under those conditions .
Where do the Arab states stand on this ?
The last war between an Arab state and Israel was in 1973 .
Any war that ’ s taken place since then has been with what we call a “ non-state actor ” and Israel .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states have lost interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue because there ’ s a whole host of other things going on .
It ’ s been so long that the old allure of what we used to call “ pan-Arabism ” — confronting Israel , destroying Israel , or at least removing it from parts of the area — that just doesn ’ t make sense anymore .
You can ’ t do that to Israel at this point .
And the Israeli economy is quite large , and it ’ s pretty clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ structural problems that they have to reform .
So there ’ s no willpower or interest in confronting Israel anymore .
That ’ s the general context .
On something like annexation , they ’ re not going to launch a war against Israel , like the old paradigm of conflict used to be .
It is possible they could pressure Israel through the United States , through Europe , or on their own , in the UN and other places .
Has the pandemic played any role in how annexation has — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out ?
I don ’ t think so .
No , I would say no — my shortest answer .
But it is possible that it could make annexation difficult to pursue if the Israeli government ends up being consumed with figuring out how to stop the spread .
It ’ s possible that would put a brake on things .
So if Israel goes ahead and annexes the West Bank , is this the official end of a two-state solution ?
I don ’ t know if you follow discussions in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw that Peter Beinart , he first had a longer piece in Jewish Currents , the left-wing Jewish magazine , and he had a piece in the New York Times .
He argued that it ’ s time to acknowledge that the two-state solution is dead — and this is before annexation has taken place .
Plenty of other observers , commentators , scholars , and activists have been arguing that for many , many years .
I think a lot of people are struggling with that particular question .
Those who believe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of the West Bank , or believe that the West Bank belongs to Israel in some way , obviously they are very constant with the idea that either there shouldn ’ t be a two-state solution or that the Palestinians will be happy with some percentage of the West Bank and that ’ s fine .
They don ’ t need all of it .
There are people who genuinely believe that the Palestinians will be satisfied with some small amount of the West Bank .
For others , like the J-Street @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal Zionists , ” it ’ s a fight that ’ s worth continuing .
The two-state solution isn ’ t really dead , and we really won ’ t know it ’ s dead until we know .
As long as things remain ambiguous and there ’ s no massive physical Israeli occupation of the entire West Bank and Israel does not annex the entire area and so on , in a sense the two-state solution is still alive .
But I certainly think it ’ s a question that we need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point do we say that the occupation has become permanent ?
Does there have to be a certain number of settlers or troops living in an area before we say , ‘ It ’ s pretty clear Israel has no intention of moving to a two-state solution ?
” The political right , which no longer really believes in a two-state solution , is not going to get there on its own , and there ’ s no one on the horizon replace them .
So maybe this is the moment .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pinpointing a particular date and time , but this particular point in history , which could be 2019-2020 .
All that .
That ’ s a really vague answer , but it ’ s a question I ’ m struggling with myself .
I don ’ t have a good answer for myself , so I can ’ t give you one .
Is there any way out of this current situation ?
Would it be possible to work out an agreement on the West Bank without actually addressing the question of Palestinian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intertwined that it would be impossible ?
There have been plenty of plans and ideas put forward over the years , dealing with some questions now and then dealing with statehood questions later .
That didn ’ t work .
There have been other plans that say , “ Let ’ s deal with these questions now , the final-status questions , the questions about statehood , and so on .
There is a way out.
” When Ehud Barak was the Israeli Prime Minister and participated in the discussions at Camp David @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1990s and in the 2000s , he proposed swapping land .
Israel would annex part of the West Bank , and the Palestinians would get some part of Israel .
Back then , it was a very small amount that the Palestinians would get , but that idea is out there .
Negotiators and others have been talking about this for a long time .
So that is an option .
But at this point , it ’ s not really an option for the political right in Israel .
Is there another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ options out there are enormous pressure on Israel to at least halt the process of creeping annexation , or you get a change in domestic politics in Israel and Palestine .
But again , we ’ re at this point for a reason .
We didn ’ t just get to this point by some exogenous force that put us here .
We got here because of all the changes and the choices people have made and the developments that have been going on in the region within each country and in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really not hopeful .
I ’ m not hopeful for a two-state solution at this point .
I ’ m not hopeful for a peaceful solution at this point .
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It took three elections, but Israel finally formed an emergency government this spring, in the middle of a pandemic and a global economic crisis.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz, of the Blue and White party, averted another election, but the deal also laid out a plan for annexation of parts of the West Bank as soon as July 1.
The plan has the potential to completely upend the fragile, but unsustainable, status quo in the Israeli-occupied territory. Home to nearly 3 million Palestinians, the land makes up a critical part of any future independent state of Palestine. But the viability of that future state is complicated by the presence of some 500,000 Jewish settlers who also live in the West Bank, in settlements dotted across the approximately 2,262 square miles of territory.
Under the two-state framework historically supported by the United States and the international community, the vast bulk of the West Bank would be returned to the Palestinians. As part of a final peace deal, Israelis and Palestinians would negotiate what to do about the settlements, with some heavily populated blocs near Israel’s recognized borders likely to be ceded to Israel. But peace talks have stalled for years, and there is no deal anywhere on the horizon.
Instead, the Israeli right has been pushing for Netanyahu’s government to just go ahead and unilaterally annex significant portions of the West Bank that it wants to keep, making them officially part of Israel proper, regardless of what the Palestinians think about it.
In January, the Trump administration unveiled its “peace plan,” developed by US and Israeli officials without the input of Palestinian leaders, who refused to participate. The plan helped create the conditions for Netanyahu to move forward with unilateral annexation, and for months, it looked as though Netanyahu was going to do it. In fact, it was supposed to officially happen as soon as July 1.
But it didn’t.
The United States is hesitating — and has some other things to deal with, like a raging pandemic and economic recession. Gantz, whose support Netanyahu needs to move forward, is also urging patience, suggesting Israel deal with its own growing coronavirus outbreak first.
The rest of the world has also resisted the plan: British Prime Minister Boris Johnson penned an op-ed against it. Other countries, from Germany to Jordan, have condemned the move, and United Nations officials have consistently called it illegal.
So the plan remains stalled, for now at least.
Given all the questions swirling, I contacted Brent E. Sasley, a professor at the University of Texas at Arlington and an expert on Israeli politics, to talk about the basics: what annexation means, why all this is happening (or not happening) now, and what comes next. He offered some historical context to explain the current dynamics and the still-present uncertainty about this moment.
Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below.
Jen Kirby
I guess an obvious place to start is: What is the West Bank?
Brent E. Sasley
Geographically speaking, it’s literally the west bank, uncapitalized, of the Jordan River. It’s become a convenient term to use when you don’t want to refer to “Palestine” or “Israel” or “Judea and Samaria” — the latter being terms that hark back to the ancient Jewish kingdom and which the Israeli government uses formally in all of its references toward the area.
For some people, it’s a nonpolitical term because it doesn’t refer to anyone’s claim to the land. But for many, many right-wing Jews, many Israelis, and many people on the right who support Israel’s occupation, they see it as a political term because it doesn’t refer to being a Jewish homeland.
Typically, most Israelis don’t see it as separate territory. They’re more aware now of the separateness of the West Bank, but for a long time, even after Israel conquered it in 1967, they didn’t. They’d talk about family members living in extensive areas of Israel, but they actually meant people living in West Bank settlements. The line itself between Israel proper and the West Bank was just not something that they saw.
Jen Kirby
And if that’s the Israeli perspective, how do Palestinians see it?
Brent E. Sasley
They would call it Palestine.
Jen Kirby
So when we talk about annexation of the West Bank, what does that actually mean?
Brent E. Sasley
So that is kind of the big question. In theory, annexation can mean anything. Netanyahu has, in the past, promised that he will connect part of the West Bank [to Israel]. He’s also talked about annexing the Jordan Valley, which is a very specific part of the West Bank.
For some people, we’re talking about annexation of all of Area C. After the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into areas A, B, and C. Area C has fewer Palestinians and more Jewish settlements.
For some people supportive of annexation, they think that the entire area should be annexed. And the Trump plan, for example — I wouldn’t call it a peace plan — lays out specific areas.
So there’s no real answer. One could argue that’s a positive thing because there’s lots of room to hash out some kind of agreement. But I actually think it’s a bad thing.
First of all, the ambiguity creates space for the Israeli government under Netanyahu to get away with almost anything. Even if it does something really small and says, “We have now annexed this,” they’ve moved the goalposts and created language that actually embeds annexation into the discourse.
They’ve now done something that makes it very difficult to reverse, and depending on where they do it, it might even be impossible to reverse. That now becomes the new norm. So that ambiguity, I think, is really problematic and dangerous.
Jen Kirby
So since we don’t have a precise definition of annexation, it can basically be anything that Netanyahu dreams it to be? Is that fair?
Brent E. Sasley
Yes, although I would add one more point to that. And that is — I don’t know if you’ve heard the term “creeping annexation”?
Jen Kirby
I have, but maybe remind me what it means.
Brent E. Sasley
Everything that I just said is the case, but the bigger problem is that creeping annexation has been taking place since 1967. Creeping annexation refers to the gradual process by which Israel expands its control over the West Bank.
That includes a whole series of factors. Israelis build settlements in the West Bank, and then Israel has to then kind of take control of that area. But to do that, they then end up building roads and infrastructure to hook those homes up to Israel proper.
And then there has to be security for those settlements, because many of the settlers work in Israel, and many Israelis go to these settlements for various reasons, whether it’s to buy wine or visit family. So you end up with this whole infrastructure there.
It also refers to the application of Israeli law in the settlements and often the surrounding areas. Palestinians in the West Bank have been able to use, in a limited way, the Israeli Supreme Court to dispute, for example, the route of the security barrier that Israel built.
On the one hand, that sounds good, because that means Palestinians have access to Israeli institutions, and those institutions can push the government to change its policies.
But on the other hand — this gets back to that ambiguity I was talking about — that means that Israeli law is applied not just to the Israeli citizens but to non-Israeli citizens, as well. So that’s part of the overall process we’re seeing.
Jen Kirby
So it’s a sort of de facto control, even if it isn’t formal annexation?
Brent E. Sasley
I mean, de facto control over much of it.
Jen Kirby
Why is talk of formal annexation happening right now?
Brent E. Sasley
I think there’s probably a convergence of factors.
First, as I said, this is a process that’s been ongoing for a long period of time. So everything that I’ve said about the ambiguity and moving the goalposts and new language — yes, that would be a major change. But in some ways, it will just be making concrete what’s already been happening for a long time.
Second, of course, is Trump. In order to appease the evangelical base of his support, Trump has been pushing hard to change massive, longstanding conditions and to really adopt the right-wing Israeli positions regarding Jerusalem and sovereignty over the West Bank.
The Trump plan comes out of that process, and so Israeli right-wingers see this as a moment in which conditions are ripe for them to do this. If you have the backing of the world’s most powerful country, then you do it.
I think a third factor is that the political right in Israel has been dominant since the 2009 election, and there’s nothing on the horizon that suggests the Jewish left, the Zionist left, is in a position to challenge them in any serious, viable way.
After these last three elections there was no clear winner, that’s true, but the political right and the center-right always [did far better in] those elections. The Jewish left did not do very well at all in comparison. And when I say Jewish left, I’m excluding the Arab political parties here, because obviously they don’t have a majority of support from the Jewish population. That support is what’s necessary in order to form the government. I’m not dismissing that community, I’m saying in terms of the political game, their ability to set the agenda is marginal.
And then finally, I think, you have Netanyahu. When he first came to power — not in his first term, but around his second and maybe third term — he was a little bit more pragmatic. I think he was more open to negotiation. Around 2012-2013, there was a moment when Netanyahu had been pressured not to completely leave the West Bank but to put in place a series of concessions that really would have changed the game. But they failed to a wide degree.
I think Netanyahu has since then become more and more bold in promoting the idea of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. And so I think he’s been around for so long, he’s got no serious challengers on the left, so it’s, “Look where I am, I might as well do this now.”
Jen Kirby
So all those factors converged for annexation to start on July 1. But then that date came and went, and annexation didn’t happen. Why does the plan seem to be stalling?
Brent E. Sasley
It got harder than Netanyahu thought it would be. The Trump administration started to waffle a little bit. Benny Gantz, his partner, was not as keen on annexation as originally thought, and the settlers were really upset that the plan at least created some sense, however temporary, of an actual Palestinian state. They were not happy with that. So you heard a lot of voices starting to oppose this when it came down to actually trying to implement it.
Jen Kirby
What would you say is causing the hesitation on the part of the Trump administration?
Brent E. Sasley
I’m not sure that the Trump administration has as much energy and time to focus on this issue. Obviously, there’s a lot of other stuff going on that’s kind of occupying the Trump administration, certainly its domestic energy.
So it has kind of left foreign policy alone, except for Trump’s intermittent pronouncements on foreign affairs. I also think there was a lot of pressure brought to bear on the Trump administration, and again, that’s within this context of the administration being slightly distracted by other things.
It just wasn’t going as smoothly as they seemed to have thought it would, or at least they weren’t able to push it as much as they thought they would.
What we’ve also seen is that when it comes to really substantive issues, Trump likes to say things, and he will sometimes lend his support to ideas or policies that fit with his general ideas, but he doesn’t always put the whole weight of the administration behind him because that’s just how he makes policy — or more aptly, that’s how he doesn’t make policy.
I think we’re probably seeing something of that here, too.
Jen Kirby
And from the Israeli perspective — or maybe Netanyahu’s perspective — how nerve-racking is Trump’s waffling? Because it would seem Trump is the window of opportunity.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but I imagine if Joe Biden were to win in November, the circumstances would change radically. But perhaps if annexation has already happened, there’s probably little Biden could do to reverse it. Do I have that right? How do you see it?
Brent E. Sasley
I would say there is a lot Biden could do to reverse course, but it’s unlikely he would do it.
But I wouldn’t say Trump’s waffling is “nerve-racking” for Netanyahu. I would say “frustrating.” Definitely Netanyahu and his allies see this as an opportunity. But I also think they’re aware of Trump’s mercurial nature. They know what he’s like, they’ve watched, they’ve listened to him, they’ve seen what he’s done. I don’t believe that they are expecting Trump to stand firm.
Jen Kirby
Is there a world where Israel goes ahead with annexation without US support?
Brent E. Sasley
So there’s a difference between the US not supporting it and the US opposing it. So the former?
Jen Kirby
Yes, sure.
Brent E. Sasley
Yes, there is a world in which that happens. And, again, you pointed out all these calculations that Netanyahu has to make, and I think that part of it is that he does genuinely believe that Israel has a right to this land, and he believes he has a role to play in getting Israel to that point.
If the US opposes it, that’s a different issue. But if the US doesn’t say anything, he knows he’s got the support of some people in the administration, at least privately. He’s got the support of the US ambassador to Israel. For him, that might well be enough.
Again, this is where the ambiguity comes in. It might not be, “We are now going to choose to occupy 50 percent of the West Bank.” It might be, “We are now formally going to annex these settlements,” or the Jordan Valley, or even some smaller step.
Jen Kirby
Given this ambiguity, do we actually know how formal annexation could happen? Is it a matter of issue, like an order? Or do troops move in? Basically, how would we know that yesterday is different from today?
Brent E. Sasley
Right, that’s a good question. I don’t know. I mean, it depends on what Netanyahu wants to do. For major decisions or changes in law, he would need the support of the Knesset [Israel’s parliament].
That would mean getting the support of coalition partners like [Benny Gantz’s] Blue and White party that might not necessarily be on board with everything. Like any government, there are a number of steps that could be taken to get around the need for legislative approval. It all depends on what they want to do. I know I’m not really answering the question, but I think it depends.
Jen Kirby
I want to talk a bit about the domestic politics of this. There was a sense that Netanyahu was using annexation as an election ploy in this latest election. But is the Israeli public generally supportive of the move, or is it much more divided than it appears?
Brent E. Sasley
So as a general rule, the landscape, or the context, is that most Israeli Jews think that the West Bank is, at least in some general sense, part of Israel.
Again, it goes back to 1967, when many felt Israel was threatened [by Israel’s Arab neighbors]. And then that was replaced by this miracle: Israel didn’t just win [the 1967 war], but it was a stunning victory.
And all of a sudden, after 20 years, the heartland of the Jewish people and Jewish history and Jewish religious aspects, all of that now is suddenly under Israeli sovereignty, and Israelis can actually go touch the Western Wall, their closest connection to the Old Temple.
Ever since then, that underlying sense of religious nationalism — because religion is part of it — really connected them to the area. So you can trace polling data over time that shows how Israeli Jews think about this.
And so, as a general rule — and polling data does bear this out — most Israeli Jews see the West Bank as part of Jewish history and heritage, part of its religious history. That’s the context.
The Israel Democracy Institute has good polling data. The one that you should look at is the Israeli Voice Index [from July 2020]. It found that 25 percent of Israelis oppose any application of Israeli sovereignty to parts of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], while 24 percent support applying Israeli sovereignty to all of it — so that’s roughly equal. 14 percent support applying sovereignty to large settlement blocks and 8 percent support applying it to the Jordan Valley.
If you add all of that together, 46 percent — almost half of Israelis — support some element, some aspect, of sovereignty.
That’s at the general level. But we also see specific responses often change. If you bring in scenarios, if you mention specific settlements or specific areas, it changes depending on how you ask it.
Jen Kirby
So what about Netanyahu, then? Are his political fortunes now intertwined with his promise to annex the West Bank?
Brent E. Sasley
He’s been talking in these terms for a long time now. The extent of what he’s been saying is something new, but the contents or the substance itself is not new. He’s been saying, since he ran against Shimon Peres in 1996, that he is better for Israel’s security, better for the Jews, in part, not just because he’ll protect them but because he does believe in a stronger, more sovereign Israel that includes the West Bank or parts of the West Bank.
That’s kind of been his rallying cry ever since he got involved in national politics. So it’s not really new. I guess the answer is yes — but it’s not a new thing.
Jen Kirby
Since Netanyahu has been in power for so long, has his rhetoric helped solidify public opinion in favor of annexation? Maybe that’s an impossible question to answer, but I’m curious how much he’s helped shape public opinion.
Brent E. Sasley
I don’t think so. To some extent, we do know that often public opinion will follow what leaders say and do. In Israeli history specifically, we know that on big security-related issues, sometimes the public will turn around and end up supporting policies that they didn’t support before if the leaders simply implement them and then just move ahead.
But again, there’s a very large constituency in Israel for holding on to the West Bank or applying Israeli sovereignty in some way. And that’s not new. The right and the center-right are dominant in Israel. There is almost no other game in town. And so people who will participate in the political arena or people who vote are aware of this.
They have choices, depending on their view, but again, the bulk of their choices all support what we now call annexation to one degree or another.
Jen Kirby
What’s the deal with Benny Gantz? It seems he’s stalling on annexation, too. Is he sort of the kingmaker here? Why does his support matter?
Brent E. Sasley
I wouldn’t call him a kingmaker, but yes, his agreement is necessary. He’s a partner with Netanyahu. We call it a “unity government” — it’s technically not a unity government, but he’s supposed to be the partner, the main senior partner.
Without Gantz, the government could fall or would fall. His assent or his consent is absolutely necessary for there to be any progress on annexation.
Jen Kirby
Is it surprising that Gantz is dragging his feet?
Brent E. Sasley
I don’t think we should be surprised. He’s given observers a bit of a roller coaster ride.
He presented himself as an alternative to Netanyahu, although, if you look closely at a lot of his rhetoric and things he was saying, I don’t think he was as much of an alternative as many people thought he was.
But he presented himself as such, and said, “We’re going to stand for all these different things, none of which could possibly include Netanyahu.” Yet in the end, he goes with Netanyahu. And he agrees to let Netanyahu be in a bit more of a senior position, with Netanyahu as prime minister for the first part of their rotation agreement. That becomes very disappointing, and it looks like he’s just saying, “Yep, I’ll just do what I need to do to stay in power.”
He was never a loud supporter of annexation or anything like that. The fact that he seems to be slowing it down, I don’t think that’s surprising. What will be surprising is if he flat-out said, “No. No annexation of any kind whatsoever of any part of the West Bank.” That would be more surprising.
Jen Kirby
Is there any risk of the government collapsing over this?
Brent E. Sasley
Netanyahu can’t really do anything without Gantz’s support. Unless Netanyahu has lined up other parties to support him that would equal 61 seats in the Knesset, he can’t go anywhere. That’s not to say Netanyahu doesn’t have options to pressure Gantz. But yes, it is a risk.
The two were brought together out of sheer expediency. Even though the two parties share a lot of right-wing ideology, they’re not exactly the same. Blue and White sees itself as a vehicle for doing its own thing. Benny Gantz sees himself as prime minister material. He views Netanyahu as older, as someone who had his chance but who doesn’t have the same level of vitality anymore.
The two parties have different perceptions of the future and what their roles are in them. That does create a context for decisions that might break the government apart.
What I’m trying to say is there is a risk of this when it comes to annexation, but as well as on other issues.
Jen Kirby
What about the Palestinian response? What is their position, and is there anything Palestinians can do?
Brent E. Sasley
I think that the Palestinians are in an extremely weak position, and they have been for a very long time. Part of that is because of decisions that they have made over time. And part of that is because Israel has been the stronger power for a very long time. So the balance is in Israel’s favor.
And no other actors — neither the Arab states nor the United Nations nor, obviously, the United States — have been willing to really push Israel as hard as they could on these issues. And you have the Palestinians, who themselves are divided, so that weakens their position. Second of all, you have Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Fatah party, the Palestine Liberation Organization [the organization formally recognized by international bodies such as the UN as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians], and the Palestinian Authority [the interim Palestinian governing body in the West Bank].
Abbas has been working with Israel for a very long time on security issues, which has been to both sides’ benefit but especially to Israel. They’ve also been working together on a host of other issues related to sharing resources or economic factors. So there is this longstanding level of institutional interaction. What that has done is, in part, made the Palestinians dependent on Israel.
For the Palestinians — and when I say Palestinians, I mean Fatah, the PLO, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank; Hamas [which controls the Gaza Strip] is obviously a different issue — to now pull apart, sure, they could. They could say, “Look, we’re not going to work with you on security issues.” That would be harmful to Israel and to Israelis.
But it would also really hurt the Palestinians, because then Israel won’t have incentives to prop up the Palestinian Authority, which Israel depends on, but which much of the Palestinian elite does as well, the economic and political leaders, or at least the old guard among the Palestinians.
The fact that Abbas has been threatening action for many, many years but never really follows through has essentially removed any credibility that his threats might be taken seriously. Again, it’s not all Abbas’s fault, and it’s not all the Palestinians’ fault — they’re just in a much weaker position and there’s no way for them to get out of that position on their own.
I mean, they have been trying. They’ve been working at the international level, in international institutions, in the diplomatic and legal arenas. But there’s only so far that can go.
Jen Kirby
If Israel does move for formal annexation, what might the reaction be? Is there a potential for real violence?
Brent E. Sasley
Neri Zilber, an Israeli journalist, had a really interesting thread on Twitter in which he argued that everybody talks about how there’s going to be this eruption of violence from “the streets” or from Palestinians. Sometimes people say, “But there was no violence when Israel did this or that, like when the US moved the embassy.” And Zilber argues that the Palestinians don’t organize reaction unless there’s something really substantive and concrete.
So Trump said, “Yes, the embassy is now moved.” That sounds horrific, but it didn’t really change anything on the ground. There was no need to organize any kind of violence or other kind of response.
But annexation, particularly if it’s accompanied by sending settlers and troops to the West Bank or to the Jordan Valley, that would be a substantive change. And so there would probably be some kind of reaction: protests, demonstrations, maybe riots. Those are more likely under those conditions.
Jen Kirby
Where do the Arab states stand on this?
Brent E. Sasley
The last war between an Arab state and Israel was in 1973. Any war that’s taken place since then has been with what we call a “non-state actor” and Israel.
In part that’s because the Arab states have lost interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue because there’s a whole host of other things going on. It’s been so long that the old allure of what we used to call “pan-Arabism” — confronting Israel, destroying Israel, or at least removing it from parts of the area — that just doesn’t make sense anymore. You can’t do that to Israel at this point.
And the Israeli economy is quite large, and it’s pretty clear that many of the Arab economies have structural problems that they have to reform.
So there’s no willpower or interest in confronting Israel anymore. That’s the general context. On something like annexation, they’re not going to launch a war against Israel, like the old paradigm of conflict used to be. It is possible they could pressure Israel through the United States, through Europe, or on their own, in the UN and other places.
Jen Kirby
Has the pandemic played any role in how annexation has — or rather hasn’t — played out?
Brent E. Sasley
I don’t think so. No, I would say no — my shortest answer. But it is possible that it could make annexation difficult to pursue if the Israeli government ends up being consumed with figuring out how to stop the spread. It’s possible that would put a brake on things.
Jen Kirby
So if Israel goes ahead and annexes the West Bank, is this the official end of a two-state solution?
Brent E. Sasley
I don’t know if you follow discussions in the American Jewish community, or if you saw that Peter Beinart, he first had a longer piece in Jewish Currents, the left-wing Jewish magazine, and he had a piece in the New York Times. He argued that it’s time to acknowledge that the two-state solution is dead — and this is before annexation has taken place.
Plenty of other observers, commentators, scholars, and activists have been arguing that for many, many years. I think a lot of people are struggling with that particular question. Those who believe that Israeli sovereignty should extend to some part of the West Bank, or believe that the West Bank belongs to Israel in some way, obviously they are very constant with the idea that either there shouldn’t be a two-state solution or that the Palestinians will be happy with some percentage of the West Bank and that’s fine. They don’t need all of it. There are people who genuinely believe that the Palestinians will be satisfied with some small amount of the West Bank.
For others, like the J-Street types, or what we call “liberal Zionists,” it’s a fight that’s worth continuing. The two-state solution isn’t really dead, and we really won’t know it’s dead until we know. As long as things remain ambiguous and there’s no massive physical Israeli occupation of the entire West Bank and Israel does not annex the entire area and so on, in a sense the two-state solution is still alive.
But I certainly think it’s a question that we need to be asking ourselves. At what point do we say that the occupation has become permanent? Does there have to be a certain number of settlers or troops living in an area before we say, “It’s pretty clear Israel has no intention of moving to a two-state solution?” The political right, which no longer really believes in a two-state solution, is not going to get there on its own, and there’s no one on the horizon to replace them.
So maybe this is the moment. And by moment, I’m not pinpointing a particular date and time, but this particular point in history, which could be 2019-2020. All that. That’s a really vague answer, but it’s a question I’m struggling with myself. I don’t have a good answer for myself, so I can’t give you one.
Jen Kirby
Is there any way out of this current situation? Would it be possible to work out an agreement on the West Bank without actually addressing the question of Palestinian statehood? Or are those two so intertwined that it would be impossible?
Brent E. Sasley
There have been plenty of plans and ideas put forward over the years, dealing with some questions now and then dealing with statehood questions later. That didn’t work. There have been other plans that say, “Let’s deal with these questions now, the final-status questions, the questions about statehood, and so on. There is a way out.”
When Ehud Barak was the Israeli prime minister and participated in the discussions at Camp David and Taba at the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s, he proposed swapping land. Israel would annex part of the West Bank, and the Palestinians would get some part of Israel. Back then, it was a very small amount that the Palestinians would get, but that idea is out there.
Negotiators and others have been talking about this for a long time. So that is an option. But at this point, it’s not really an option for the political right in Israel.
Is there another way out? The only other two options out there are enormous pressure on Israel to at least halt the process of creeping annexation, or you get a change in domestic politics in Israel and Palestine.
But again, we’re at this point for a reason. We didn’t just get to this point by some exogenous force that put us here. We got here because of all the changes and the choices people have made and the developments that have been going on in the region within each country and in the United States.
So I’m really not hopeful. I’m not hopeful for a two-state solution at this point. I’m not hopeful for a peaceful solution at this point.


vox--2020-07-13--The federal agency that’s supposed to protect workers is toothless on Covid-19

When Nevada ’ s casino workers went back to work for the first time since March , many found that their employers weren ’ t doing enough to protect them from the coronavirus .
Casinos , including the MGM Grand and the Bellagio , didn ’ t immediately inform employees if a new case was detected or shut down their work areas .
And they didn ’ t even require their guests to wear face masks for weeks after reopening and until the state made it mandatory .
“ It ’ s wrong that they didn ’ t prepare for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bellman at the MGM Grand who recently tested positive for Covid-19 , said in a statement .
Management “ had three months to prepare , and they didn ’ t .
None of our upper management had a clue what to do , and that ’ s unfortunate .
They put a lot of us and our families at risk.
” Workers across industries face a frightening situation as the United States continues to reopen .
Zermeno and his coworkers have one advantage that most workers across America lack : an army @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behalf .
The Culinary Union , the state ’ s largest , representing 60,000 workers , has filed a lawsuit in federal court .
( MGM Resorts , which owns both the MGM Grand and the Bellagio , said in a statement that the lawsuit was the first it had heard of any issues with worker safety and that the union should have first contacted management to “ share information and collaborate to keep workers and guests safe.
” ) Most American workers aren ’ t unionized .
They depend on state and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety .
And right now , they ’ re largely on their own .
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration ( OSHA ) has taken a laissez-faire approach to the pandemic — issuing non-binding guidelines on keeping workers safe that bear few consequences for employers who break them .
“ I am horrified at OSHA .
I can ’ t even call it a response , ” Nancy Lassen , a labor attorney based in Philadelphia , said .
“ They delegated their enforcement authority and their substantive authority to state and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-organized , non-union worker who has no lion protecting them at the mercy of whatever their employer decides to do.
” OSHA has already received over 6,000 complaints nationwide about workplace safety issues related to the coronavirus , more than half of which are from the health care industry .
Nevertheless , the vast majority of those workplaces haven ’ t faced inspections .
Some states , including Virginia and Oregon , are working on their own coronavirus regulatory framework to fill the gap in protections for workers and enforce them at local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the pandemic response , the lack of leadership from the federal government has put the onus on state authorities .
But in states that are less willing to regulate , restaurants aren ’ t abiding by occupancy limits , social distancing isn ’ t being enforced in distribution centers where there are already a high number of positive cases , and grocery stores are allowing customers to go maskless .
Workers , meanwhile , have nowhere to turn .
The federal government is abdicating responsibility for protecting workers OSHA ’ s formal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers from falls or warning them about hazardous chemicals in the workplace come with citations and hefty fines for organizations that don ’ t comply .
The agency ’ s coronavirus guidelines — which the agency started issuing on March 9 , before most states issued stay-at-home orders — do not .
They call for employers to develop their own infectious disease preparedness and response plans ; implement basic prevention measures , such as regularly cleaning the workplace and encouraging good hygiene ; ensure that sick people are identified and isolated quickly ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plexiglass barriers to face masks and gloves .
They also offer industry-specific guidance tailored to different kinds of workplaces , including those where social distancing is difficult .
But the guidelines are nonbinding and unenforceable , essentially toothless without repercussions for employers who don ’ t comply .
They have consequently drawn criticism from leading Democrats , including Sen. Elizabeth Warren .
There are business incentives for employers to ensure workplace safety amid the pandemic .
The coronavirus doesn ’ t discriminate based on pay grade : Everyone from the entry level to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a safe work environment .
But many of those highly paid white-collar workers have been able to work from home .
As essential workers have stayed on job sites , OSHA isn ’ t holding employers accountable .
Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia , who oversees the agency , told Congress on June 9 that it has issued only a single citation related to Covid-19 , proposing a $ 6,500 fine against a Georgia nursing home for neglecting to report within 24 hours that six of its employees were hospitalized .
There are steps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workplace safety amid the pandemic .
When OSHA finds that workers are in “ grave danger ” due to exposure to toxic or physically harmful substances or new hazards , it can issue an emergency standard .
Developing new workplace standards usually takes years , but an emergency standard would take effect immediately and last for six months .
The novel coronavirus , which has killed more than 130,000 in the US and could leave those who recover with permanent lung damage , could qualify as such a new hazard , labor lawyers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of demands , the AFL-CIO , which represents 55 member unions and almost 13 million members , has been pushing the agency to implement an emergency temporary standard to protect workers from infection since at least April .
It even sought a federal appeals court order in May mandating that the agency adopt one .
Scalia has defended OSHA ’ s decision not to issue an emergency standard , writing in an April letter to the AFL-CIO that the industry-specific guidance it has already provided is more effective than a one-size-fits-all approach in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t respond to a request for further comment .
But the pandemic is playing out against the backdrop of the White House ’ s broader push for deregulation .
One of Trump ’ s earliest executive orders , issued in January 2017 , demanded that , for every new regulation proposed , at least two prior regulations should be slated for elimination .
Trump has since killed many Obama-era regulations , including a proposal to create a safety standard for health care workers facing airborne pathogens like influenza and tuberculosis .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ care employer , including nursing homes and hospitals , to develop and implement an airborne infection control plan and ensure that its stockpile of personal protective equipment , such as N95 masks , was adequate before the outset of the coronavirus pandemic , which created shortages of such equipment , David Michaels , the former head of OSHA and a professor at the George Washington University School of Public Health , said .
OSHA already has safety standards to protect health care workers from blood-borne pathogens , such as HIV or Ebola , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them from airborne pathogens .
A growing body of research suggests that the coronavirus is airborne — transmitted via respiratory droplets and , in some circumstances , aerosols , both of which are expelled while breathing , sneezing , or coughing — so the existing blood-borne pathogens standard does little to ensure workers are protected during this pandemic .
OSHA identified the need for an airborne pathogen standard after H1N1 , a strain of influenza , spread to the US in 2009 , and it became clear that many health care providers did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety guidelines .
The standard went through an extensive six-year review process and was on the agency ’ s agenda of regulations scheduled to be implemented in October 2017 .
But the Trump administration decided not to move forward with it .
“ The Trump administration made it very clear : They don ’ t want new regulation , ” said Michaels , who oversaw the development of the standard prior to stepping down in January 2017 .
“ They want to get rid of regulation , no matter what the cost to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and safety .
The Trump administration appears to be opposed to regulation on principle.
” OSHA has also chosen to selectively enforce some of its existing standards amid the pandemic , including a record-keeping standard that would require employers to report new coronavirus cases among their employees .
Under normal circumstances , employers are required to report work-related illnesses and injuries and resulting hospitalizations and deaths in a timely manner to OSHA .
But the agency has argued that it is difficult to determine that an employee actually contracted the coronavirus in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread , and that nationwide contract tracing is still in a nascent stage .
Employers are therefore not obligated to report every employee who tests positive for the coronavirus .
Unionized workplaces have been demanding that their employers provide that information anyway .
But workers in non-unionized workplaces , who have nothing to rely on but those OSHA reports , could be left in the dark about the amount of risk they ’ re taking on when they choose to go to work and whether they might have been exposed to the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to our collective benefit as a nation , to require that you report all persons in your workplace with this illness , ” Lassen said .
“ OSHA is a driver of federal government response and could and should have been out there enforcing legal standards from the beginning of the pandemic.
” But even if OSHA were taking meaningful steps to enforce its standards during the pandemic , the problem remains that the federal government as a whole has failed to communicate that worker protection must be a top priority .
Employers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for work by offering them hazard pay and pandemic bonuses , including in meatpacking plants , which President Donald Trump has ordered to stay open despite them becoming hot spots of infection .
Instead , employers should be incentivizing workers to stay home for their own safety and that of their community , Michaels said .
Employers need to feel pressure to do so from the highest levels of government — and that ’ s not the message coming from the White House right now , he added .
“ That requires the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to allow unprotected workers to be exposed to the virus , ” he said .
“ Simply having more enforcement would be useful , but it ’ s not enough.
” Some states are stepping up to protect workers instead With OSHA refusing to issue new standards or enforce existing ones with respect to the coronavirus , some states are developing their own emergency standards .
Virginia was the first to do so in June , with the state ’ s health and safety board voting to approve a new emergency standard and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follow suit .
Commissioned by Gov .
Ralph Northam , the standard will apply to every business in the state , requiring them to develop plans for handling workers exhibiting coronavirus symptoms , bar employees with coronavirus symptoms from showing up to work , and notify workers who may have been exposed to an infected coworker within 24 hours .
It also codifies basic infection prevention measures , such as regular cleaning , social distancing , and hand-washing , and shields workers from retaliation should they call for better safety measures , privately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While employers face no penalties for failing to comply with OSHA ’ s coronavirus guidelines , Virginia ’ s standard will be enforced by state inspectors that could levy fines of up to $ 124,000 or force businesses to close if they fail to comply , according to the Washington Post .
Some employers , however , have consequently denounced the standard , saying it imposes new burdens on businesses that are already stretched thin and trying to stay afloat during the pandemic .
Oregon has also recently clamped down on businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the July 4 weekend , Gov .
Kate Brown said Oregon would be stringently enforcing the state ’ s standards mandating face coverings , physical distancing , and occupancy limits for businesses .
She sent out staff from the Oregon Liquor Control Commission and the state ’ s Occupational Safety and Health division to conduct inspections statewide and issue citations , fines , and warning notices to businesses that fail to comply .
How workers can demand better protection Workers can easily file a complaint online with OSHA if they feel unsafe in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ best of times , it isn ’ t necessarily the best way for workers to pressure their employers to adopt better safety measures .
The agency has limited resources : It can ’ t conduct a thorough investigation of every workplace where a complaint has been filed and , even if it does investigate , the process will take months , which is little consolation to workers who are facing imminent risk due to the pandemic .
“ In most cases , OSHA is , at best , sending a letter or an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when they get a complaint from a worker and requesting that the employer respond , but OSHA rarely follows up to see if that response is accurate or if workers are protected , ” Michaels said .
Filing complaints with state Occupational Safety and Health divisions and health departments is also an option .
Those agencies are more active in some states , including Massachusetts , Virginia , Pennsylvania , and New York , than others .
Lassen , who represents a number of unions in Pennsylvania , recommends workers collectivize and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has seen that strategy work in the grocery and food-processing industries and among public employees during the pandemic .
“ The first thing I always tell people is , ‘ Gather your fellow workers together and act as a group , ’ ” she said .
“ People acting as a group tend to get a lot more attention from employers than squeaking wheels .
Individual employees can get marginalized and isolated and retaliated against .
But there truly is strength in numbers .
Workers that are willing to say we rise together @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a target and acquire more credibility.
” The National Labor Relations Act protects workers from retaliation should they engage in any concerted activity with respect to their hours , wages , and terms and conditions of employment .
So workers who stage a walkout or picket over the lack of personal protective equipment available in the workplace and publicize their dispute with local media , for example , can ’ t be penalized for doing so .
Lassen says the pandemic could present an opportunity for the labor movement if workers can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likes of the United Food and Commercial Workers or the United Auto Workers Union to advocate on their behalf , and demand better working conditions through the collective-bargaining process .
Workers only need to gather five employees to form a union .
“ Go get yourself a lion , ” she said .
“ You just need someone who has a bigger voice and will bring it to bear on your behalf.
” Every day at Vox , we aim to answer your most important questions and provide you , and our audience @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has the power to save lives .
Our mission has never been more vital than it is in this moment : to empower you through understanding .
Vox ’ s work is reaching more people than ever , but our distinctive brand of explanatory journalism takes resources — particularly during a pandemic and an economic downturn .
Your financial contribution will not constitute a donation , but it will enable our staff to continue to offer free articles , videos , and podcasts at the quality and volume that this moment requires .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ today .

When Nevada’s casino workers went back to work for the first time since March, many found that their employers weren’t doing enough to protect them from the coronavirus. Casinos, including the MGM Grand and the Bellagio, didn’t immediately inform employees if a new case was detected or shut down their work areas. And they didn’t even require their guests to wear face masks for weeks after reopening, and until the state made it mandatory.
“It’s wrong that they didn’t prepare for handling this,” Sixto Zermeno, a bellman at the MGM Grand who recently tested positive for Covid-19, said in a statement. Management “had three months to prepare, and they didn’t. None of our upper management had a clue what to do, and that’s unfortunate. They put a lot of us and our families at risk.”
Workers across industries face a frightening situation as the United States continues to reopen. Zermeno and his coworkers have one advantage that most workers across America lack: an army of union lawyers to advocate on their behalf. The Culinary Union, the state’s largest, representing 60,000 workers, has filed a lawsuit in federal court. (MGM Resorts, which owns both the MGM Grand and the Bellagio, said in a statement that the lawsuit was the first it had heard of any issues with worker safety and that the union should have first contacted management to “share information and collaborate to keep workers and guests safe.”)
Most American workers aren’t unionized. They depend on state and federal authorities to enforce laws about workplace safety. And right now, they’re largely on their own.
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has taken a laissez-faire approach to the pandemic — issuing non-binding guidelines on keeping workers safe that bear few consequences for employers who break them.
“I am horrified at OSHA. I can’t even call it a response,” Nancy Lassen, a labor attorney based in Philadelphia, said. “They delegated their enforcement authority and their substantive authority to state and local entities, which leaves the typical non-organized, non-union worker who has no lion protecting them at the mercy of whatever their employer decides to do.”
OSHA has already received over 6,000 complaints nationwide about workplace safety issues related to the coronavirus, more than half of which are from the health care industry. Nevertheless, the vast majority of those workplaces haven’t faced inspections.
Some states, including Virginia and Oregon, are working on their own coronavirus regulatory framework to fill the gap in protections for workers and enforce them at local businesses. Just as with other parts of the pandemic response, the lack of leadership from the federal government has put the onus on state authorities.
But in states that are less willing to regulate, restaurants aren’t abiding by occupancy limits, social distancing isn’t being enforced in distribution centers where there are already a high number of positive cases, and grocery stores are allowing customers to go maskless. Workers, meanwhile, have nowhere to turn.
The federal government is abdicating responsibility for protecting workers
OSHA’s formal standards on things like systems to protect workers from falls or warning them about hazardous chemicals in the workplace come with citations and hefty fines for organizations that don’t comply. The agency’s coronavirus guidelines — which the agency started issuing on March 9, before most states issued stay-at-home orders — do not.
They call for employers to develop their own infectious disease preparedness and response plans; implement basic prevention measures, such as regularly cleaning the workplace and encouraging good hygiene; ensure that sick people are identified and isolated quickly; and provide protective equipment, ranging from plexiglass barriers to face masks and gloves. They also offer industry-specific guidance tailored to different kinds of workplaces, including those where social distancing is difficult.
But the guidelines are nonbinding and unenforceable, essentially toothless without repercussions for employers who don’t comply. They have consequently drawn criticism from leading Democrats, including Sen. Elizabeth Warren.
There are business incentives for employers to ensure workplace safety amid the pandemic. The coronavirus doesn’t discriminate based on pay grade: Everyone from the entry level to the C-suite has an interest in creating a safe work environment.
But many of those highly paid white-collar workers have been able to work from home. As essential workers have stayed on job sites, OSHA isn’t holding employers accountable.
Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia, who oversees the agency, told Congress on June 9 that it has issued only a single citation related to Covid-19, proposing a $6,500 fine against a Georgia nursing home for neglecting to report within 24 hours that six of its employees were hospitalized.
There are steps that OSHA could still take to improve workplace safety amid the pandemic. When OSHA finds that workers are in “grave danger” due to exposure to toxic or physically harmful substances or new hazards, it can issue an emergency standard. Developing new workplace standards usually takes years, but an emergency standard would take effect immediately and last for six months.
The novel coronavirus, which has killed more than 130,000 in the US and could leave those who recover with permanent lung damage, could qualify as such a new hazard, labor lawyers argue. As part of a litany of demands, the AFL-CIO, which represents 55 member unions and almost 13 million members, has been pushing the agency to implement an emergency temporary standard to protect workers from infection since at least April. It even sought a federal appeals court order in May mandating that the agency adopt one.
Scalia has defended OSHA’s decision not to issue an emergency standard, writing in an April letter to the AFL-CIO that the industry-specific guidance it has already provided is more effective than a one-size-fits-all approach in a single emergency regulation. The agency didn’t respond to a request for further comment.
But the pandemic is playing out against the backdrop of the White House’s broader push for deregulation. One of Trump’s earliest executive orders, issued in January 2017, demanded that, for every new regulation proposed, at least two prior regulations should be slated for elimination.
Trump has since killed many Obama-era regulations, including a proposal to create a safety standard for health care workers facing airborne pathogens like influenza and tuberculosis. The standard would have required every health care employer, including nursing homes and hospitals, to develop and implement an airborne infection control plan and ensure that its stockpile of personal protective equipment, such as N95 masks, was adequate before the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, which created shortages of such equipment, David Michaels, the former head of OSHA and a professor at the George Washington University School of Public Health, said.
OSHA already has safety standards to protect health care workers from blood-borne pathogens, such as HIV or Ebola, but no such standard exists to protect them from airborne pathogens. A growing body of research suggests that the coronavirus is airborne — transmitted via respiratory droplets and, in some circumstances, aerosols, both of which are expelled while breathing, sneezing, or coughing — so the existing blood-borne pathogens standard does little to ensure workers are protected during this pandemic.
OSHA identified the need for an airborne pathogen standard after H1N1, a strain of influenza, spread to the US in 2009, and it became clear that many health care providers did not comply with the agency’s safety guidelines. The standard went through an extensive six-year review process and was on the agency’s agenda of regulations scheduled to be implemented in October 2017. But the Trump administration decided not to move forward with it.
“The Trump administration made it very clear: They don’t want new regulation,” said Michaels, who oversaw the development of the standard prior to stepping down in January 2017. “They want to get rid of regulation, no matter what the cost to the public in terms of their health and safety. The Trump administration appears to be opposed to regulation on principle.”
OSHA has also chosen to selectively enforce some of its existing standards amid the pandemic, including a record-keeping standard that would require employers to report new coronavirus cases among their employees.
Under normal circumstances, employers are required to report work-related illnesses and injuries and resulting hospitalizations and deaths in a timely manner to OSHA. But the agency has argued that it is difficult to determine that an employee actually contracted the coronavirus in the workplace, given current levels of community spread, and that nationwide contract tracing is still in a nascent stage. Employers are therefore not obligated to report every employee who tests positive for the coronavirus.
Unionized workplaces have been demanding that their employers provide that information anyway. But workers in non-unionized workplaces, who have nothing to rely on but those OSHA reports, could be left in the dark about the amount of risk they’re taking on when they choose to go to work and whether they might have been exposed to the virus.
“OSHA had an opportunity, to our collective benefit as a nation, to require that you report all persons in your workplace with this illness,” Lassen said. “OSHA is a driver of federal government response and could and should have been out there enforcing legal standards from the beginning of the pandemic.”
But even if OSHA were taking meaningful steps to enforce its standards during the pandemic, the problem remains that the federal government as a whole has failed to communicate that worker protection must be a top priority. Employers have been incentivizing employees to show up for work by offering them hazard pay and pandemic bonuses, including in meatpacking plants, which President Donald Trump has ordered to stay open despite them becoming hot spots of infection. Instead, employers should be incentivizing workers to stay home for their own safety and that of their community, Michaels said.
Employers need to feel pressure to do so from the highest levels of government — and that’s not the message coming from the White House right now, he added.
“That requires the president to say it’s unacceptable to allow unprotected workers to be exposed to the virus,” he said. “Simply having more enforcement would be useful, but it’s not enough.”
Some states are stepping up to protect workers instead
With OSHA refusing to issue new standards or enforce existing ones with respect to the coronavirus, some states are developing their own emergency standards.
Virginia was the first to do so in June, with the state’s health and safety board voting to approve a new emergency standard and creating a template for other states to follow suit.
Commissioned by Gov. Ralph Northam, the standard will apply to every business in the state, requiring them to develop plans for handling workers exhibiting coronavirus symptoms, bar employees with coronavirus symptoms from showing up to work, and notify workers who may have been exposed to an infected coworker within 24 hours. It also codifies basic infection prevention measures, such as regular cleaning, social distancing, and hand-washing, and shields workers from retaliation should they call for better safety measures, privately or publicly, or wear protective equipment.
While employers face no penalties for failing to comply with OSHA’s coronavirus guidelines, Virginia’s standard will be enforced by state inspectors who could levy fines of up to $124,000 or force businesses to close if they fail to comply, according to the Washington Post. Some employers, however, have consequently denounced the standard, saying it imposes new burdens on businesses that are already stretched thin and trying to stay afloat during the pandemic.
Oregon has also recently clamped down on businesses with hazardous working conditions. Ahead of the July 4 weekend, Gov. Kate Brown said Oregon would be stringently enforcing the state’s standards mandating face coverings, physical distancing, and occupancy limits for businesses. She sent out staff from the Oregon Liquor Control Commission and the state’s Occupational Safety and Health division to conduct inspections statewide and issue citations, fines, and warning notices to businesses that fail to comply.
How workers can demand better protection
Workers can easily file a complaint online with OSHA if they feel unsafe in the workplace. But even in the best of times, it isn’t necessarily the best way for workers to pressure their employers to adopt better safety measures. The agency has limited resources: It can’t conduct a thorough investigation of every workplace where a complaint has been filed and, even if it does investigate, the process will take months, which is little consolation to workers who are facing imminent risk due to the pandemic.
“In most cases, OSHA is, at best, sending a letter or an email or a phone call to employers when they get a complaint from a worker and requesting that the employer respond, but OSHA rarely follows up to see if that response is accurate or if workers are protected,” Michaels said.
Filing complaints with state Occupational Safety and Health divisions and health departments is also an option. Those agencies are more active in some states, including Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, than others.
Lassen, who represents a number of unions in Pennsylvania, recommends workers collectivize and, if need be, unionize. She has seen that strategy work in the grocery and food-processing industries and among public employees during the pandemic.
“The first thing I always tell people is, ‘Gather your fellow workers together and act as a group,’” she said. “People acting as a group tend to get a lot more attention from employers than squeaking wheels. Individual employees can get marginalized and isolated and retaliated against. But there truly is strength in numbers. Workers that are willing to say we rise together and we fall together have become less of a target and acquire more credibility.”
The National Labor Relations Act protects workers from retaliation should they engage in any concerted activity with respect to their hours, wages, and terms and conditions of employment. So workers who stage a walkout or picket over the lack of personal protective equipment available in the workplace and publicize their dispute with local media, for example, can’t be penalized for doing so.
Lassen says the pandemic could present an opportunity for the labor movement if workers can collectivize around their fear, get the likes of the United Food and Commercial Workers or the United Auto Workers Union to advocate on their behalf, and demand better working conditions through the collective-bargaining process.
“Go get yourself a lion,” she said. “You just need someone who has a bigger voice and will bring it to bear on your behalf.”
Correction: This story previously stated that there was a minimum number of employees required to form a union. There is no such minimum.


vox--2020-07-13--Join the Vox Book Club to talk Rodham with author Curtis Sittenfeld, live on Zoom

For my money , Curtis Sittenfeld has for years been one of the most exciting contemporary American authors out there .
Like everyone else , I had my mind blown in 2005 by Prep , Sittenfeld ’ s achingly authentic debut novel about a young girl ’ s coming of age at an exclusive New England boarding school .
And ever since , Sittenfeld has continued putting out thoughtful , tender novels about femininity , class , and American ambition .
So I ’ m thrilled to announce that at the end of July , Sittenfeld will be joining the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discuss her latest novel , Rodham .
Rodham explores an alternate universe in which Hillary Rodham never married Bill Clinton .
It ’ s a breezy , scandalous read that uses the Clintons as a way of thinking about power , gender , race , and the force of charisma in American politics .
We ’ re spending July breaking it down here at the book club , and you can check out our latest post on how it fits into the murky , fascinating world of political fanfiction .
Sittenfeld and I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the book on Thursday , July 30 , at 5 pm ET .
We ’ ll talk until 5:45 pm , with the last 10 minutes reserved for questions from the audience , and at the end of the event , I ’ ll reveal our pick for next month ’ s book .
We would love to see you there .
RSVP now , and be sure to sign up for the Vox Book Club newsletter to make sure you don ’ t miss anything .
Every day at Vox , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and provide you , and our audience around the world , with information that has the power to save lives .
Our mission has never been more vital than it is in this moment : to empower you through understanding .
Vox ’ s work is reaching more people than ever , but our distinctive brand of explanatory journalism takes resources — particularly during a pandemic and an economic downturn .
Your financial contribution will not constitute a donation , but it will enable our staff to continue to offer free articles , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and volume that this moment requires .
Please consider making a contribution to Vox today .

For my money, Curtis Sittenfeld has for years been one of the most exciting contemporary American authors out there. Like everyone else, I had my mind blown in 2005 by Prep, Sittenfeld’s achingly authentic debut novel about a young girl’s coming of age at an exclusive New England boarding school. And ever since, Sittenfeld has continued putting out thoughtful, tender novels about femininity, class, and American ambition. So I’m thrilled to announce that at the end of July, Sittenfeld will be joining the Vox Book Club live on Zoom to discuss her latest novel, Rodham.
Rodham explores an alternate universe in which Hillary Rodham never married Bill Clinton. It’s a breezy, scandalous read that uses the Clintons as a way of thinking about power, gender, race, and the force of charisma in American politics. We’re spending July breaking it down here at the book club, and you can check out our latest post on how it fits into the murky, fascinating world of political fanfiction.
Sittenfeld and I will be meeting on Zoom to discuss the book on Thursday, July 30, at 5 pm ET. We’ll talk until 5:45 pm, with the last 10 minutes reserved for questions from the audience, and at the end of the event, I’ll reveal our pick for next month’s book. We would love to see you there. RSVP now, and be sure to sign up for the Vox Book Club newsletter to make sure you don’t miss anything.