motherjones--2020-05-14--The Non-Paranoid Person’s Guide to Viruses Escaping From Labs

Few people in the United States had heard of the Wuhan Institute of Virology ( WIV ) —the high-security biolab in Wuhan , China , that does cutting-edge research on coronaviruses—until mid-April , when the Trump administration began to imply that it might be the source of SARS-CoV-2 , the virus that causes COVID-19 .
So far the only evidence supporting this idea is the coincidence of COVID-19 breaking out in the same city as the institute , but that ’ s been enough to feed conspiracy theories for months .
Such theories were relegated to the right-wing fringe—even before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broadcast that “ you are a kook if you think that this virus happened in a lab !
” —until the administration , feeling the heat for its own inept response , began to embrace them .
The groundwork to do so was laid when two cables from officials at the US Embassy in Beijing were leaked to the Washington Post .
The cables had been sent to Washington in 2018 after the officials had visited the Wuhan Institute of Virology—the first lab in China with a Biosafety Level 4 rating , meaning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world ’ s most dangerous pathogens—and been told of safety concerns there .
“ During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory , they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory , ” one of the cables said , urging the government to send additional support to the lab and stressing how important the WIV ’ s work was for “ future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention.
” The second leak was more pointed .
Fox News @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasing confidence ” that the outbreak had come from the lab .
Asked about the report at his briefing , President Trump responded , “ More and more , we ’ re hearing the story.
” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later pressed the case on The Hugh Hewitt Show , saying , “ We know that the first sightings of this occurred within miles of the Wuhan Institute of Virology .
We know the history of the facility—the first BSL-4 lab where there ’ s high-end virus research being conducted took place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese Communist Party , when it began to evaluate what to do inside of Wuhan , considered whether the WIV was , in fact , the place where this came from .
And most importantly , we know they ’ ve not permitted the world ’ s scientists to go into that laboratory to evaluate what took place there.
” The motivation to blame China—to point the finger at foreign sloppiness as the true cause of the pandemic—seems clear .
In recent weeks , the administration ’ s argument that it had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has crumbled .
New reports keep making it clear how early and often they were warned , including a claim by ABC News that the first alarms started ringing way back in November , when US intelligence picked up on the outbreak through intercepted communications in China and flagged it as potentially “ cataclysmic.
” Hence the desperation to shift attention from its own deer-in-the-headlights ineptitude and make China the enemy .
But the Trump administration ’ s politically motivated attempts to cast blame on the WIV are misguided .
If anything , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the work being done at the lab was part of an international project launched in the United States—until now : Shortly after Trump embraced the lab-escape theory , in late April , the administration cut funding to EcoHealth Alliance , which helped fund the WIV lab .
The leaked cables show just how close the relationship is between the WIV and the United States .
There ’ s no sign that the institute reached out to Beijing for extra help back in 2018 ; instead , it reached out to Washington .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Post reported , “ No extra assistance to the labs was provided.
” In the unlikely event that the virus is proven to have a lab connection , that failure to provide more experienced staff may look like an epic blunder by the Trump administration .
“ The cables raise really serious red flags and it would stand to reason that anybody that received these cables would take steps to figure out whether there was fire underneath the smoke , ” Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy recently told the Post .
“ But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have answers about the origin of this virus.
” It ’ s doubtful we ’ ll ever pinpoint COVID-19 ’ s origins .
Despite many experts ’ skepticism , no one I talked to said they could confidently rule out the possibility that it accidentally escaped from a lab that was studying it .
But it could also have been carried to Wuhan by anyone who was infected elsewhere , or by an animal that served as an intermediate host .
As we ’ ve seen in the United States , most people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Tracing a disease like that back to Patient Zero may be impossible .
Yet it may turn out for the best that the WIV is now in the news .
Most people don ’ t realize how heroic some of its work was or how important to heading off the next pandemic .
They also haven ’ t grasped the danger posed by the work being done at high-security biolabs around the world .
Yes , the next pandemic could start from a lab in China .
But it could just as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In recent decades , more diseases have been jumping from animals to humans , a phenomenon called zoonotic spillover .
Experts blame our increasing incursions into the natural world .
As we convert forests to farms and hunt wild animals , we give viruses new opportunities for spillover .
A major effort to detect and prevent such spillovers began after SARS ( Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ) appeared in southern China in November 2002 , infecting a number of people who had connections to a “ wet market ” where wildlife was sold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world by destroying lung cells and triggering severe pneumonia .
SARS killed 10 percent of its victims , an extremely high rate , but it wasn ’ t tremendously contagious , and the world was able to corral it by July 2003 .
Virologists soon identified a new coronavirus as the cause of SARS .
It resembled other viruses found in bats , which were suspected to be the original hosts .
Bats are the natural carriers for many of the world ’ s worst infectious diseases , including MERS and Ebola @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cause problems .
Bats have hyperactive immune systems that make things difficult for viruses .
In most mammals , including us , such aggressive immune responses would trigger lethal inflammation ( such as the cytokine storms that kill some COVID-19 patients ) , but bats also have unique repair mechanisms in their cells that constantly clean up the inflammation .
The repair mechanisms are there to fix the wear and tear caused by bats ’ intense metabolisms—their hearts can beat a thousand times a minute during flight—but they also allow bats to rev @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Any battle-hardened viruses that can eke out an existence in such an unfriendly environment can be devastating if they cross over into mammals with weaker defenses , much like an invasive species dropped into a virgin environment .
In 2004 , according to Scientific American , a team from the WIV led by virologist Shi Zhengli began visiting caves in southern China , hoping to find the cause of SARS .
They captured bats and took blood , saliva , and fecal samples , and tested the samples for viruses back in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began working with PREDICT , a new program established at USAID to train and fund scientists to test “ high-risk ” areas for new viruses .
By identifying unknown viruses before they spilled over into humans—to “ find them before they find us , ” as Shi put it—researchers hoped to establish an early-warning system .
PREDICT worked in dozens of countries , but the WIV was one of its linchpins , and Shi Zhengli became famous as China ’ s “ Bat Woman.
” In 2013 , the WIV discovered SARS-CoV , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cave in Yunnan Province .
Shi ’ s team found that the bats of southern China were full of viruses , especially coronaviruses .
Over 10 years , her team collected more than 10,000 samples from bats in the region and discovered hundreds of new coronaviruses , including some with the ability to infect humans .
Many bats harbored multiple viruses , and there were alarming signs that the viruses were recombining with each other—swapping chunks of genetic code as they replicated , producing novel viruses with new abilities .
“ It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats , and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China , ” Shi and her colleagues wrote in a 2019 paper that now seems chillingly prescient .
“ Therefore , the investigation of bat coronaviruses becomes an urgent issue for the detection of early warning signs.
” SARS and SADS—a related virus that killed 25,000 piglets in 2017—both erupted in southern China , where the most concerning lineage of coronaviruses had been found and where future outbreaks were expected .
When authorities alerted Shi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Wuhan was being caused by a mysterious new coronavirus , she was surprised .
“ I had never expected this kind of thing to happen in Wuhan , in central China , ” she told Scientific American .
Wuhan is a skyscraper-filled metropolis of 11 million people hundreds of miles from the bat-friendly caves of southern China .
Shi asked herself , “ Could they have come from our lab ?
” Shi described the next few weeks as the most stressful of her life .
She frantically searched her lab ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an accident or inappropriate disposal , only relaxing once the genetic code of the new virus was sequenced and didn ’ t match the coronaviruses in her lab .
“ That really took a load off my mind , ” she said .
“ I had not slept a wink for days.
” Shi ’ s lab shouldn ’ t be completely cleared of possible blame until an independent body can review the lab ’ s records , which the Chinese government shows no signs of releasing .
There ’ s also the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been a CDC-run BSL-2 lab in Wuhan , which has reportedly worked with bat coronaviruses and is remarkably close to the city ’ s wet market .
In any case , while Shi ’ s comments were meant to be reassuring , they actually implied something unsettling .
Most of us mistakenly believe that the risk of a biolab-based pandemic is infinitesimal .
But clearly Shi didn ’ t rule out an accidental escape from her lab .
And , it turns out , she ’ s not alone .
As much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the source of the next pandemic , they also have grave concerns about labs .
The first big cluster of COVID-19 cases was found in December in people who had connections to Wuhan ’ s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market .
The market reportedly sold live wild animals .
Since the original SARS was likely carried by civets in a “ wet market ” in southern China , it seemed like a potential culprit , and the Chinese government pushed that narrative .
The market was closed on January 1 , and the area @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the new coronavirus is the wildlife sold illegally in a Wuhan seafood market , ” Gao Fu , the director of China ’ s Center for Disease Control and Prevention , announced in January .
Media outlets worldwide ran with the wet-market theory .
Yet even in January , it was clear that the chances the coronavirus first spilled over in the market were vanishingly small .
There ’ s no evidence it sold live pangolins , another animal thought to be intermediate carriers of bar-borne coronaviruses , but at least one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extensive testing of the animals and animal parts that were being sold in the market , none ever tested positive for the virus , according to China ’ s CDC .
The only positive samples were “ environmental ” and may have been from the sewage .
More importantly , the timing was wrong .
According to Chinese government data analyzed by the South China Morning Post , the earliest cases in Hubei Province can be traced to mid-November , weeks before the outbreak at the market .
“ The virus came into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that marketplace , ” Daniel Lucey , an infectious disease specialist at Georgetown University and a fierce critic of the lab-escape theory , told Science in late January .
The market was just an amplifier , Mardi Gras in miniature .
Which left no firm explanation for how a virus that had originated in bats in remote caves in southern China had suddenly appeared in downtown Wuhan .
Even the most common theories—that it had jumped from the bat to a person or another animal that served as an intermediate host as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of events .
No wonder then that to some it was like a black hole suddenly opening in the Swiss countryside outside the CERN particle-collider .
It was all perfect fodder for conspiracy-minded bigots like Rush Limbaugh , who didn ’ t understand the science and immediately spun dark bioweapon fictions about the “ ChiCom ” government , which were rightly condemned by experts in the field ( and which he ’ s since retracted ) .
SARS-CoV-2 ’ s genome showed no signs of being anything but natural , and five of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lab-escape hypothesis in the pages of Nature Medicine .
“ Our analyses clearly show that SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus , ” they wrote .
But questions remained about whether a bat-cave researcher might have unwittingly carried the natural virus back to Wuhan , or become infected in the lab .
Unfortunately , such territory had already been made toxic by the Limbaughs of the world .
One of the few scientists to speculate publicly was the well-known Rutgers microbiologist Richard Ebright .
“ The possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result of the activities of PREDICT—during field collection of bats and bat excreta , or during laboratory characterization of bats , bat excreta , or bat viruses— can not be excluded and can not be dismissed , ” he told me , comparing the idea of actively seeking new viruses in remote places and bringing them back to labs ( in densely populated areas ) to “ looking for a gas leak with a lighted match.
” Ebright ’ s focus on lab escapes has made him something of a pariah , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rile the public .
But he isn ’ t alone in legitimizing these concerns .
“ It ’ s important to be upfront that we do not have sufficient evidence to exclude entirely the possibility that it escaped from a research lab , ” the respected University of Washington biologist Carl Bergstrom wrote on Twitter .
Though he called a natural zoonotic spillover “ far more plausible , ” he cautioned : “ Whatever the origin of # SARSCoV2 may have been , going forward we need to carefully assess and manage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activities.
” Jonna Mazet , the director of PREDICT , made the case for the WIV ’ s safety practices , pointing out all the reasons why an accident involving researchers from the WIV was incredibly unlikely .
“ I ’ m a scientist , ” Mazet said .
“ I would never say a lab accident was not possible .
I ’ m just saying it ’ s a lot less likely than a lot of other explanations.
” Researchers in the field wear full Tyvek suits and masks , and freeze @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lab , they break viruses into pieces before studying it and do all their work inside biosafety cabinets designed to prevent any escapes .
For all those reasons , most mainstream scientists doubt the lab connection .
“ We have not found evidence to support any theory that the origins of SARS-CoV-2 among humans occurred in a laboratory either intentionally or by accident , ” Daniel Lucey recently wrote on the blog of the Infectious Diseases Society of America .
So far , in fact , there is no hard evidence supporting any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Wuhan .
It ’ s all speculation .
The modern era of pathogen releases can be said to have begun in 1973 in England , when a lab assistant working with smallpox infected herself and spread it to three others , two of whom died .
Four years later , smallpox was almost officially eradicated from the wild , yet the following year a medical photographer at Birmingham Medical School mysteriously died of the disease .
It turned out that researchers in another part of the building were experimenting with smallpox , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ photographer through the ventilation system .
There ’ s already been one lab-caused mini-pandemic , in 1977 , when a strain of influenza erupted in China and swept the globe .
( Luckily , it was a mild one . )
Flu strains are famous for constantly mutating , but this one was nearly identical to one last seen in the 1950s , meaning it had been held somewhere in suspended animation .
Suspicion fell on the Soviet Union ’ s robust bioweapons program , but researchers concluded the pathogen had more likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrong .
Nobody fessed up .
The Soviets got their moment in 1979 , when a cloud of anthrax spores escaped a secret bioweapons lab when an air filter wasn ’ t properly replaced after maintenance .
The spores killed at least 66 people in the adjacent town of Sverdlovsk .
The Soviets aggressively denied it , but American intelligence was suspicious .
The incident was only confirmed in 1992 , after the fall of the Soviet Union , when President Boris Yeltsin invited an independent team of scientists to investigate .
Defenders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety precautions have been drastically improved since the 1970s , which is certainly true , yet the 21st century has seen a surge of incidents , possibly because of the explosion of Biosafety Level 3 and 4 labs .
BSL-3 labs handle highly infectious and lethal pathogens like anthrax , West Nile virus , avian flu , SARS , and MERS .
BSL-4 labs handle the baddest of the baddies , for which there are no current countermeasures , such as Ebola and smallpox .
In 2001 , the United States had five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the anthrax attacks , the era of bioterror research began .
There are now at least nine in the United States , and more than 50 around the world , including seven still planned or under construction .
There are many more BSL-3 labs—200 registered in the United States alone .
The best protocols in the world can ’ t eliminate human error , which is the cause of most accidents in high containment biolabs .
Official incident reports read like something from the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant in The Simpsons .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a centrifuge and kicked over a tray of pathogens .
An animal cage containing bedding potentially contaminated with novel SARS coronavirus got knocked over by a freezer door and spilled its contents onto the floor .
Liquids aerosolize .
Lab mosquitoes can escape .
Lab rats bite .
Lab technicians attempting to inject lab animals accidentally hit their own fingers .
Often , as the Laboratory-Acquired Infection Database reveals , there ’ s no smoking gun explaining how the researcher got infected .
Nature finds a way .
This happens even in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Allergies and Infectious Diseases estimates that , at their labs , a lab-acquired infection will occur once for every 600,000 hours of work .
That ’ s really low , and if there were just a few scientists working with these pathogens , the odds of an accident would also stay low .
And with hundred , maybe even thousands of such labs proliferating around the world , even low-probability events can become relatively common .
Using 2010 data from the CDC , one expert estimated that somewhere in the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ twice weekly.
” Some have involved deadly agents including anthrax , avian flu , and Ebola .
Most incidents are minor , but not all .
Take two examples at lower-risk labs : In 2009 , a researcher at the University of Chicago died after being infected by a weakened strain of plague .
In 2012 , a postdoc at San Francisco ’ s VA Medical Center came down with meningitis from his lab .
While having dinner with friends , he began to feel dizzy .
The next day , he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the hospital , where he died .
An investigation by USA Today , published in 2015 , found that more than 100 high-security labs in the United States had suffered “ the most egregious safety or security breaches.
” The pressurized “ space suits ” worn by researchers ruptured 37 times in American BSL-4 labs from 2013 to 2014 .
Rats were found making nests out of biohazard bags and used lab supplies outside a UCLA lab .
A Texas A & M University researcher stuck himself with a needle while handling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then a week later ( while still taking a round of antibiotics to deal with the first incident ) was bitten by another mouse carrying the same bacteria .
On multiple occasions , mice carrying either SARS or H1N1 flu escaped from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill researchers .
One common cause of accidents involves working with live agents that are supposed to be dead .
BSL-4 labs often kill deadly pathogens with radiation so they can be sent to less secure labs for research , but sometimes the kill is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ live pathogens are simply used by mistake .
That looked like the case in 2014 , when the CDC sent the wrong batch of Ebola samples from a BSL-4 lab to a less secure one that was expecting dead Ebola .
( In a stroke of luck , those were inactive as well . )
And it was the case at the US Army ’ s Dugway Proving Ground , which unknowingly shipped ( via commercial carriers ) live anthrax spores to nearly 200 labs around the world over a twelve-year period .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not the case , of course , for the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases , in Fort Detrick , Maryland , which employed Bruce Ivins , the disgruntled scientist suspected of instigating the 2001 anthrax attacks that killed five people .
The institute also had its research suspended in 2009 after the discovery of pathogens in storage for which there were no records .
( A researcher at the time reassured the New York Times that while the institute ’ s record keeping wasn ’ t perfect , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with similar pathogens . )
These problems are not just in the past , either .
The National Academy of Sciences pegged the chance of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak , a catastrophe for animal agriculture , at 70 percent over the 50-year lifespan of the 580,000-square-foot National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility , currently being completed on the edge of Kansas State University in Manhattan , Kansas .
“ When some horrific Level 4 pathogen escapes a Manhattan bio lab , all the heartland will weep with remorse , ” one rancher wrote to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local resistance , the project is on track to start opening as soon as next year .
Outside the United States , data is scarce , but the anecdotes don ’ t inspire restful sleep .
In 2004 , a scientist at Russia ’ s secretive State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology , also known as VECTOR—an important part of the Soviet Union ’ s bioweapons program and one of two facilities where smallpox is currently stored—accidentally lanced herself with a needle containing Ebola and died .
( VECTOR also suffered a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2014 , 2,349 vials containing SARS samples went awol from Paris ’ Pasteur Institute .
China has also had its problems .
Late last year , almost 200 researchers at the Lanzhou Veterinary Research Institute in northwest China tested positive for antibodies of the bacteria that causes a flu-like disease called brucellosis .
That was after the nearby Lanzhou Biopharmaceutical Plant used expired sanitizer while making its brucella vaccine , which allowed the bacteria to escape through waste fumes and travel downwind to the veterinary institute .
The original SARS has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it has actually escaped from three different labs , one in Taiwan , one in Singapore , and one at China ’ s National Institute of Virology in Beijing , where two researchers were infected .
The researchers mistakenly believed they were handling a version of the virus that had been inactivated .
One researcher at the NIV passed the infection to her mother , who eventually died , as well as a nurse , who passed the disease to five other people .
As dangerous as it is to culture deadly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involves engineering pathogens to be even deadlier .
Concerns over this so-called “ gain-of-function ” research flared up in 2011 , when two different teams showed how an extremely deadly strain of avian influenza , which kills approximately 60 percent of its victims but is not easily transmissible between humans , could be mutated to make it extremely infectious through the air .
The scientists argued that such experiments allow us to learn how viruses might evolve to be more infectious or lethal , and many others agreed .
Gain-of-function studies help “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic preparedness , from selection of candidate vaccine viruses and development of high-yield seeds to manufacture of safe vaccines for the global community , ” 23 scientists wrote in a guest editorial in mBio , the journal of the American Society for Microbiology .
But others believed the risks dwarfed the benefits .
The biosecurity expert Lynn Klotz , together with science journalist Edward J. Sylvester , surveyed the CDC ’ s lab accident data and conservatively estimated the chance of a pandemic pathogen escaping a lab at just 0.3 percent per year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent chance of an escape from a single lab over 536 years of work .
Perhaps that would be acceptable , but they quickly counted 42 labs known to be working with live SARS , influenza , or smallpox , which translated to an 80 percent chance of an escape every 12.8 years .
And that was in 2012 , when such work was far less commonplace than it is now .
The two later estimated the likelihood of an escaped virus seeding “ the very pandemic the researchers claim they are trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a risk too dangerous to live with.
” They wrote , “ There is a substantial probability that a pandemic with over 100-million fatalities could be seeded from an undetected lab-acquired infection ( LAI ) , if a single infected lab worker spreads infection as he moves about in the community.
” Ron Fouchier , the scientist doing the gain-of-function research , argued that such estimates don ’ t take into account the specifics of his highly secure lab .
When those were factored in , he said , the chance of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every million years , a number that researchers including Klotz had trouble taking seriously .
Fouchier concluded , “ Since natural influenza pandemics have occurred on average every 30 years over the last century , the probability that the next pandemic will emerge in nature is orders of magnitude larger than emergence from a laboratory.
” At the time Fouchier ’ s lab was one of only two doing this work .
Now there are more .
One experiment was conducted at the University of North Carolina in 2015 .
Working with researchers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bioengineers added a new spike protein to a wild coronavirus that gave it the ability to infect human cells—eerily foreshadowing COVID-19 .
The argument for it was that doing so would help us learn how to treat a novel SARS-like coronavirus , but many watchdogs objected , including Richard Ebright .
“ The only impact of this work is the creation , in a lab , of a new , non-natural risk , ” he told Nature at the time .
Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2014 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our safety precautions have not been commensurate with the risk .
“ It is hardly reassuring that , despite stepwise technical improvements in containment facilities and increased policy demands for rigorous biosecurity procedures in the handling of dangerous pathogens , potentially high consequence breaches of biocontainment occur nearly daily : In 2010 , 244 unintended releases of bioweapon candidate ‘ select agents ’ were reported .
Looking at the problem pragmatically , the question is not if such escapes will result in a major civilian outbreak , but rather what the pathogen will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be contained , if indeed it can be contained at all.
” So how do we make our labs safer ?
In 2014 , the Obama White House took a first step , announcing a pause on gain-of-function research until the merits could be fully debated .
But in 2017 , under Trump , the NIH lifted the pause , essentially agreeing with Ron Fouchier , and the work—including that which it helped fund in Wuhan—eventually went on .
“ GOF research is important in helping us identify , understand , and develop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pathogens that pose a threat to public health , ” announced Francis Collins , the NIH director .
Some scientists strenuously objected , such as Johns Hopkins ’ Steven Salzberg , who wrote , “ I can ’ t allow this to go unchallenged .
This research is so potentially harmful , and offers such little benefit to society , that I fear that NIH is endangering the trust that Congress places in it.
” Megan Palmer , a biotechnology and security expert at Stanford University , told me she is also deeply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in high-security biolabs , but that evaluating the dangers can be difficult .
“ The problem is that in most cases , we don ’ t actually know how risky or beneficial the research will be.
” To get a better handle on the science , she says , “ We need much more sophisticated systems for understanding and managing risk .
We should be collecting incidents and analyzing them , and then sharing that information and trying to draw lessons for improvement.
” Ironically , the beginnings of such a system were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration ’ s 2018 National Biodefense Strategy .
The strategy also called for coordinating with international partners to reduce the risk of future pandemics or bioterror attacks .
But after announcing the plan , the administration let it drop .
“ The funding has not materialized , ” Palmer says of Trump ’ s biosecurity research plans .
“ We say these things are important , and then we don ’ t follow through.
” The administration ’ s move to axe this research does not make the world any safer , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ researchers .
“ We can ’ t be assigning blame prematurely , ” says Palmer , who sees a lab escape as the less likely hypothesis .
“ We need to do the research to really figure out how this may have originated and , to prevent future threats , our focus needs to go beyond just this particular incident.
” As we ’ ve seen , pathogens do not stay put .
Preventing the next pandemic will require extraordinary foresight and international collaboration—the exact opposite of the Trump administration ’ s approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ options .
We are all stuck on one big cruise ship , and no one ’ s getting off any time soon .

Few people in the United States had heard of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)—the high-security biolab in Wuhan, China, that does cutting-edge research on coronaviruses—until mid-April, when the Trump administration began to imply that it might be the source of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. So far the only evidence supporting this idea is the coincidence of COVID-19 breaking out in the same city as the institute, but that’s been enough to feed conspiracy theories for months. Such theories were relegated to the right-wing fringe—even before Rush Limbaugh complained on an April 16 broadcast that “you are a kook if you think that this virus happened in a lab!”—until the administration, feeling the heat for its own inept response, began to embrace them.
The groundwork to do so was laid when two cables from officials at the US Embassy in Beijing were leaked to the Washington Post. The cables had been sent to Washington in 2018 after the officials had visited the Wuhan Institute of Virology—the first lab in China with a Biosafety Level 4 rating, meaning it has the security for working with the world’s most dangerous pathogens—and been told of safety concerns there. “During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory,” one of the cables said, urging the government to send additional support to the lab and stressing how important the WIV’s work was for “future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention.”
Yes, the next pandemic could start from a lab in China. But it could just as easily come from our own backyard.
The second leak was more pointed. Fox News, citing unnamed insiders, reported “increasing confidence” that the outbreak had come from the lab. Asked about the report at his briefing, President Trump responded, “More and more, we’re hearing the story.”
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later pressed the case on The Hugh Hewitt Show, saying, “We know that the first sightings of this occurred within miles of the Wuhan Institute of Virology. We know the history of the facility—the first BSL-4 lab where there’s high-end virus research being conducted took place at that site. We know that the Chinese Communist Party, when it began to evaluate what to do inside of Wuhan, considered whether the WIV was, in fact, the place where this came from. And most importantly, we know they’ve not permitted the world’s scientists to go into that laboratory to evaluate what took place there.”
The motivation to blame China—to point the finger at foreign sloppiness as the true cause of the pandemic—seems clear. In recent weeks, the administration’s argument that it had little advance warning about the coming virus has crumbled. New reports keep making it clear how early and often they were warned, including a claim by ABC News that the first alarms started ringing way back in November, when US intelligence picked up on the outbreak through intercepted communications in China and flagged it as potentially “cataclysmic.” Hence the desperation to shift attention from its own deer-in-the-headlights ineptitude and make China the enemy.
But the Trump administration’s politically motivated attempts to cast blame on the WIV are misguided. If anything, a lab connection would increase American culpability because the work being done at the lab was part of an international project launched in the United States—until now: Shortly after Trump embraced the lab-escape theory, in late April, the administration cut funding to EcoHealth Alliance, which helped fund the WIV lab.
The leaked cables show just how close the relationship is between the WIV and the United States. There’s no sign that the institute reached out to Beijing for extra help back in 2018; instead, it reached out to Washington. But the institute was rebuffed. As the Post reported, “No extra assistance to the labs was provided.”
In the unlikely event that the virus is proven to have a lab connection, that failure to provide more experienced staff may look like an epic blunder by the Trump administration. “The cables raise really serious red flags and it would stand to reason that anybody that received these cables would take steps to figure out whether there was fire underneath the smoke,” Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy recently told the Post. “But we still have more questions than we have answers about the origin of this virus.”
It’s doubtful we’ll ever pinpoint COVID-19’s origins. Despite many experts’ skepticism, no one I talked to said they could confidently rule out the possibility that it accidentally escaped from a lab that was studying it. But it could also have been carried to Wuhan by anyone who was infected elsewhere, or by an animal that served as an intermediate host. As we’ve seen in the United States, most people infected with SARS-CoV-2 never even know it. Tracing a disease like that back to Patient Zero may be impossible.
Yet it may turn out for the best that the WIV is now in the news. Most people don’t realize how heroic some of its work was or how important to heading off the next pandemic. They also haven’t grasped the danger posed by the work being done at high-security biolabs around the world. Yes, the next pandemic could start from a lab in China. But it could just as easily come from our own backyard.
In recent decades, more diseases have been jumping from animals to humans, a phenomenon called zoonotic spillover. Experts blame our increasing incursions into the natural world. As we convert forests to farms and hunt wild animals, we give viruses new opportunities for spillover.
The earliest cases in Hubei Province can be traced to mid-November, weeks before the outbreak at the market. The market was just an amplifier, Mardi Gras in miniature.
A major effort to detect and prevent such spillovers began after SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) appeared in southern China in November 2002, infecting a number of people who had connections to a “wet market” where wildlife was sold. SARS eventually killed 774 people around the world by destroying lung cells and triggering severe pneumonia. SARS killed 10 percent of its victims, an extremely high rate, but it wasn’t tremendously contagious, and the world was able to corral it by July 2003.
Virologists soon identified a new coronavirus as the cause of SARS. It resembled other viruses found in bats, which were suspected to be the original hosts. Bats are the natural carriers for many of the world’s worst infectious diseases, including MERS and Ebola, though in bats these viruses rarely cause problems. Bats have hyperactive immune systems that make things difficult for viruses. In most mammals, including us, such aggressive immune responses would trigger lethal inflammation (such as the cytokine storms that kill some COVID-19 patients), but bats also have unique repair mechanisms in their cells that constantly clean up the inflammation. The repair mechanisms are there to fix the wear and tear caused by bats’ intense metabolisms—their hearts can beat a thousand times a minute during flight—but they also allow bats to rev their immune systems 24/7 without destroying themselves. Any battle-hardened viruses that can eke out an existence in such an unfriendly environment can be devastating if they cross over into mammals with weaker defenses, much like an invasive species dropped into a virgin environment.
In 2004, according to Scientific American, a team from the WIV led by virologist Shi Zhengli began visiting caves in southern China, hoping to find the cause of SARS. They captured bats and took blood, saliva, and fecal samples, and tested the samples for viruses back in Wuhan. In 2009, the lab began working with PREDICT, a new program established at USAID to train and fund scientists to test “high-risk” areas for new viruses. By identifying unknown viruses before they spilled over into humans—to “find them before they find us,” as Shi put it—researchers hoped to establish an early-warning system. PREDICT worked in dozens of countries, but the WIV was one of its linchpins, and Shi Zhengli became famous as China’s “Bat Woman.”
In 2013, the WIV discovered SARS-CoV, the cause of SARS, in a cave in Yunnan Province. Shi’s team found that the bats of southern China were full of viruses, especially coronaviruses. Over 10 years, her team collected more than 10,000 samples from bats in the region and discovered hundreds of new coronaviruses, including some with the ability to infect humans. Many bats harbored multiple viruses, and there were alarming signs that the viruses were recombining with each other—swapping chunks of genetic code as they replicated, producing novel viruses with new abilities. “It is highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China,” Shi and her colleagues wrote in a 2019 paper that now seems chillingly prescient. “Therefore, the investigation of bat coronaviruses becomes an urgent issue for the detection of early warning signs.”
SARS and SADS—a related virus that killed 25,000 piglets in 2017—both erupted in southern China, where the most concerning lineage of coronaviruses had been found and where future outbreaks were expected. When authorities alerted Shi on December 30 that a pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan was being caused by a mysterious new coronavirus, she was surprised. “I had never expected this kind of thing to happen in Wuhan, in central China,” she told Scientific American. Wuhan is a skyscraper-filled metropolis of 11 million people hundreds of miles from the bat-friendly caves of southern China. Shi asked herself, “Could they have come from our lab?”
Shi described the next few weeks as the most stressful of her life. She frantically searched her lab’s records, looking for signs of an accident or inappropriate disposal, only relaxing once the genetic code of the new virus was sequenced and didn’t match the coronaviruses in her lab. “That really took a load off my mind,” she said. “I had not slept a wink for days.”
Shi’s lab shouldn’t be completely cleared of possible blame until an independent body can review the lab’s records, which the Chinese government shows no signs of releasing. There’s also the possibility that the source of contamination could have been a CDC-run BSL-2 lab in Wuhan, which has reportedly worked with bat coronaviruses and is remarkably close to the city’s wet market.
One expert estimated that somewhere in the United States, “a breach of containment happens about twice weekly.” Some have involved deadly agents including anthrax, avian flu, and Ebola.
In any case, while Shi’s comments were meant to be reassuring, they actually implied something unsettling. Most of us mistakenly believe that the risk of a biolab-based pandemic is infinitesimal. But clearly Shi didn’t rule out an accidental escape from her lab. And, it turns out, she’s not alone. As much as biosecurity experts worry about nature as the source of the next pandemic, they also have grave concerns about labs.
The first big cluster of COVID-19 cases was found in December in people who had connections to Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. The market reportedly sold live wild animals. Since the original SARS was likely carried by civets in a “wet market” in southern China, it seemed like a potential culprit, and the Chinese government pushed that narrative. The market was closed on January 1, and the area was scrubbed clean. “The origin of the new coronavirus is the wildlife sold illegally in a Wuhan seafood market,” Gao Fu, the director of China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention, announced in January.
Media outlets worldwide ran with the wet-market theory. Yet even in January, it was clear that the chances the coronavirus first spilled over in the market were vanishingly small. There’s no evidence it sold live pangolins, another animal thought to be intermediate carriers of bar-borne coronaviruses, but at least one stall may have sold civets. Despite extensive testing of the animals and animal parts that were being sold in the market, none ever tested positive for the virus, according to China’s CDC. The only positive samples were “environmental” and may have been from the sewage.
More importantly, the timing was wrong. According to Chinese government data analyzed by the South China Morning Post, the earliest cases in Hubei Province can be traced to mid-November, weeks before the outbreak at the market. “The virus came into that marketplace before it came out of that marketplace,” Daniel Lucey, an infectious disease specialist at Georgetown University and a fierce critic of the lab-escape theory, told Science in late January. The market was just an amplifier, Mardi Gras in miniature.
Which left no firm explanation for how a virus that had originated in bats in remote caves in southern China had suddenly appeared in downtown Wuhan. Even the most common theories—that it had jumped from the bat to a person or another animal that served as an intermediate host as it traveled to Wuhan—would require a remarkable confluence of events. No wonder then that to some it was like a black hole suddenly opening in the Swiss countryside outside the CERN particle-collider.
It was all perfect fodder for conspiracy-minded bigots like Rush Limbaugh, who didn’t understand the science and immediately spun dark bioweapon fictions about the “ChiCom” government, which were rightly condemned by experts in the field (and which he’s since retracted). SARS-CoV-2’s genome showed no signs of being anything but natural, and five of the world’s top scientists criticized the lab-escape hypothesis in the pages of Nature Medicine. “Our analyses clearly show that SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus,” they wrote.
But questions remained about whether a bat-cave researcher might have unwittingly carried the natural virus back to Wuhan, or become infected in the lab. Unfortunately, such territory had already been made toxic by the Limbaughs of the world. One of the few scientists to speculate publicly was the well-known Rutgers microbiologist Richard Ebright. “The possibility that SARS-CoV-2 entered humans as a direct result of the activities of PREDICT—during field collection of bats and bat excreta, or during laboratory characterization of bats, bat excreta, or bat viruses—cannot be excluded and cannot be dismissed,” he told me, comparing the idea of actively seeking new viruses in remote places and bringing them back to labs (in densely populated areas) to “looking for a gas leak with a lighted match.”
Ebright’s focus on lab escapes has made him something of a pariah, especially among experts who don’t like to rile the public. But he isn’t alone in legitimizing these concerns. “It’s important to be upfront that we do not have sufficient evidence to exclude entirely the possibility that it escaped from a research lab,” the respected University of Washington biologist Carl Bergstrom wrote on Twitter. Though he called a natural zoonotic spillover “far more plausible,” he cautioned: “Whatever the origin of #SARSCoV2 may have been, going forward we need to carefully assess and manage the risk associated with a range of activities.”
Jonna Mazet, the director of PREDICT, made the case for the WIV’s safety practices, pointing out all the reasons why an accident involving researchers from the WIV was incredibly unlikely. “I’m a scientist,” Mazet said. “I would never say a lab accident was not possible. I’m just saying it’s a lot less likely than a lot of other explanations.” Researchers in the field wear full Tyvek suits and masks, and freeze samples in liquid nitrogen. In the lab, they break viruses into pieces before studying it and do all their work inside biosafety cabinets designed to prevent any escapes. For all those reasons, most mainstream scientists doubt the lab connection. “We have not found evidence to support any theory that the origins of SARS-CoV-2 among humans occurred in a laboratory either intentionally or by accident,” Daniel Lucey recently wrote on the blog of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.
So far, in fact, there is no hard evidence supporting any theory that explains how SARS-CoV-2 wound up in Wuhan. It’s all speculation.
The modern era of pathogen releases can be said to have begun in 1973 in England, when a lab assistant working with smallpox infected herself and spread it to three others, two of whom died. Four years later, smallpox was almost officially eradicated from the wild, yet the following year a medical photographer at Birmingham Medical School mysteriously died of the disease. It turned out that researchers in another part of the building were experimenting with smallpox, and the virus most likely reached the photographer through the ventilation system.
The National Academy of Sciences pegged the chance of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, a catastrophe for animal agriculture, at 70 percent over the 50-year lifespan of a high-security lab currently being completed in Kansas.
There’s already been one lab-caused mini-pandemic, in 1977, when a strain of influenza erupted in China and swept the globe. (Luckily, it was a mild one.) Flu strains are famous for constantly mutating, but this one was nearly identical to one last seen in the 1950s, meaning it had been held somewhere in suspended animation. Suspicion fell on the Soviet Union’s robust bioweapons program, but researchers concluded the pathogen had more likely been released during a vaccine trial gone wrong. Nobody fessed up.
The Soviets got their moment in 1979, when a cloud of anthrax spores escaped a secret bioweapons lab when an air filter wasn’t properly replaced after maintenance. The spores killed at least 66 people in the adjacent town of Sverdlovsk. The Soviets aggressively denied it, but American intelligence was suspicious. The incident was only confirmed in 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union, when President Boris Yeltsin invited an independent team of scientists to investigate.
Defenders of biolabs like to point out that safety precautions have been drastically improved since the 1970s, which is certainly true, yet the 21st century has seen a surge of incidents, possibly because of the explosion of Biosafety Level 3 and 4 labs. BSL-3 labs handle highly infectious and lethal pathogens like anthrax, West Nile virus, avian flu, SARS, and MERS. BSL-4 labs handle the baddest of the baddies, for which there are no current countermeasures, such as Ebola and smallpox. In 2001, the United States had five BSL-4 labs. Then, after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, the era of bioterror research began. There are now at least nine in the United States, and more than 50 around the world, including seven still planned or under construction. There are many more BSL-3 labs—200 registered in the United States alone.
The best protocols in the world can’t eliminate human error, which is the cause of most accidents in high containment biolabs. Official incident reports read like something from the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant in The Simpsons. A wrench got caught in the lid of a centrifuge and kicked over a tray of pathogens. An animal cage containing bedding potentially contaminated with novel SARS coronavirus got knocked over by a freezer door and spilled its contents onto the floor. Liquids aerosolize. Lab mosquitoes can escape. Lab rats bite. Lab technicians attempting to inject lab animals accidentally hit their own fingers. Often, as the Laboratory-Acquired Infection Database reveals, there’s no smoking gun explaining how the researcher got infected. Nature finds a way.
This happens even in well-run labs. The National Institute for Allergies and Infectious Diseases estimates that, at their labs, a lab-acquired infection will occur once for every 600,000 hours of work. That’s really low, and if there were just a few scientists working with these pathogens, the odds of an accident would also stay low. But with hundreds, maybe even thousands of such labs proliferating around the world, even low-probability events can become relatively common.
Using 2010 data from the CDC, one expert estimated that somewhere in the United States, “a breach of containment happens about twice weekly.” Some have involved deadly agents including anthrax, avian flu, and Ebola. Most incidents are minor, but not all. Take two examples at lower-risk labs: In 2009, a researcher at the University of Chicago died after being infected by a weakened strain of plague. In 2012, a postdoc at San Francisco’s VA Medical Center came down with meningitis from his lab. While having dinner with friends, he began to feel dizzy. The next day, he was covered in a rash and was taken to the hospital, where he died.
An investigation by USA Today, published in 2015, found that more than 100 high-security labs in the United States had suffered “the most egregious safety or security breaches.” The pressurized “space suits” worn by researchers ruptured 37 times in American BSL-4 labs from 2013 to 2014. Rats were found making nests out of biohazard bags and used lab supplies outside a UCLA lab. A Texas A&M University researcher stuck himself with a needle while handling a mouse carrying Lyme disease bacteria, then a week later (while still taking a round of antibiotics to deal with the first incident) was bitten by another mouse carrying the same bacteria. On multiple occasions, mice carrying either SARS or H1N1 flu escaped from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill researchers.
One common cause of accidents involves working with live agents that are supposed to be dead. BSL-4 labs often kill deadly pathogens with radiation so they can be sent to less secure labs for research, but sometimes the kill is incomplete, and other times containers of live pathogens are simply used by mistake.
That looked like the case in 2014, when the CDC sent the wrong batch of Ebola samples from a BSL-4 lab to a less secure one that was expecting dead Ebola. (In a stroke of luck, those were inactive as well.) And it was the case at the US Army’s Dugway Proving Ground, which unknowingly shipped (via commercial carriers) live anthrax spores to nearly 200 labs around the world over a twelve-year period. Miraculously, no one died.
That was not the case, of course, for the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, in Fort Detrick, Maryland, which employed Bruce Ivins, the disgruntled scientist suspected of instigating the 2001 anthrax attacks that killed five people. The institute also had its research suspended in 2009 after the discovery of pathogens in storage for which there were no records. (A researcher at the time reassured the New York Times that while the institute’s record keeping wasn’t perfect, it was better than that of universities working with similar pathogens.)
These problems are not just in the past, either. The National Academy of Sciences pegged the chance of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, a catastrophe for animal agriculture, at 70 percent over the 50-year lifespan of the 580,000-square-foot National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, currently being completed on the edge of Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas. “When some horrific Level 4 pathogen escapes a Manhattan bio lab, all the heartland will weep with remorse,” one rancher wrote to the Topeka Capital Journal. Despite strong local resistance, the project is on track to start opening as soon as next year.
Outside the United States, data is scarce, but the anecdotes don’t inspire restful sleep. In 2004, a scientist at Russia’s secretive State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, also known as VECTOR—an important part of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons program and one
facilities where smallpox is currently stored—accidentally lanced herself with a needle containing Ebola and died. (VECTOR also suffered a major unexplained explosion last year.) In 2014, 2,349 vials containing SARS samples went awol from Paris’ Pasteur Institute.
China has also had its problems. Late last year, almost 200 researchers at the Lanzhou Veterinary Research Institute in northwest China tested positive for antibodies of the bacteria that causes a flu-like disease called brucellosis. That was after the nearby Lanzhou Biopharmaceutical Plant used expired sanitizer while making its brucella vaccine, which allowed the bacteria to escape through waste fumes and travel downwind to the veterinary institute.
The original SARS has not reemerged from the wild since 2003, but it has actually escaped from three different labs, one in Taiwan, one in Singapore, and one at China’s National Institute of Virology in Beijing, where two researchers were infected. The researchers mistakenly believed they were handling a version of the virus that had been inactivated. One researcher at the NIV passed the infection to her mother, who eventually died, as well as a nurse, who passed the disease to five other people.
As dangerous as it is to culture deadly natural pathogens, the most troubling research involves engineering pathogens to be even deadlier. Concerns over this so-called “gain-of-function” research flared up in 2011, when two different teams showed how an extremely deadly strain of avian influenza, which kills approximately 60 percent of its victims but is not easily transmissible between humans, could be mutated to make it extremely infectious through the air.
The scientists argued that such experiments allow us to learn how viruses might evolve to be more infectious or lethal, and many others agreed. Gain-of-function studies help “to inform the influenza vaccine strategy for pandemic preparedness, from selection of candidate vaccine viruses and development of high-yield seeds to manufacture of safe vaccines for the global community,” 23 scientists wrote in a guest editorial in mBio, the journal of the American Society for Microbiology.
But others believed the risks dwarfed the benefits. The biosecurity expert Lynn Klotz, together with science journalist Edward J. Sylvester, surveyed the CDC’s lab accident data and conservatively estimated the chance of a pandemic pathogen escaping a lab at just 0.3 percent per year, meaning there would be an 80 percent chance of an escape from a single lab over 536 years of work. Perhaps that would be acceptable, but they quickly counted 42 labs known to be working with live SARS, influenza, or smallpox, which translated to an 80 percent chance of an escape every 12.8 years. And that was in 2012, when such work was far less commonplace than it is now. The two later estimated the likelihood of an escaped virus seeding “the very pandemic the researchers claim they are trying to prevent…as high as 27%, a risk too dangerous to live with.” They wrote, “There is a substantial probability that a pandemic with over 100-million fatalities could be seeded from an undetected lab-acquired infection (LAI), if a single infected lab worker spreads infection as he moves about in the community.”
Ron Fouchier, the scientist doing the gain-of-function research, argued that such estimates don’t take into account the specifics of his highly secure lab. When those were factored in, he said, the chance of a lab-acquired infection dropped to less than one every million years, a number that researchers including Klotz had trouble taking seriously. Fouchier concluded, “Since natural influenza pandemics have occurred on average every 30 years over the last century, the probability that the next pandemic will emerge in nature is orders of magnitude larger than emergence from a laboratory.”
For years, Fouchier’s lab was one of only two doing this work. Now there are more. One experiment was conducted at the University of North Carolina in 2015. Working with researchers from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, bioengineers added a new spike protein to a wild coronavirus that gave it the ability to infect human cells—eerily foreshadowing COVID-19. The argument for it was that doing so would help us learn how to treat a novel SARS-like coronavirus, but many watchdogs objected, including Richard Ebright. “The only impact of this work is the creation, in a lab, of a new, non-natural risk,” he told Nature at the time.
“This research is so potentially harmful, and offers such little benefit to society, that I fear that NIH is endangering the trust that Congress places in it.”
Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2014, the bioweapon historian Martin Furmanski argued strongly that our safety precautions have not been commensurate with the risk. “It is hardly reassuring that, despite stepwise technical improvements in containment facilities and increased policy demands for rigorous biosecurity procedures in the handling of dangerous pathogens, potentially high consequence breaches of biocontainment occur nearly daily: In 2010, 244 unintended releases of bioweapon candidate ‘select agents’ were reported. Looking at the problem pragmatically, the question is not if such escapes will result in a major civilian outbreak, but rather what the pathogen will be and how such an escape may be contained, if indeed it can be contained at all.”
So how do we make our labs safer? In 2014, the Obama White House took a first step, announcing a pause on gain-of-function research until the merits could be fully debated.
But in 2017, under Trump, the NIH lifted the pause, essentially agreeing with Ron Fouchier, and the work—including that which it helped fund in Wuhan—eventually went on. “GOF research is important in helping us identify, understand, and develop strategies and effective countermeasures against rapidly evolving pathogens that pose a threat to public health,” announced Francis Collins, the NIH director. Some scientists strenuously objected, such as Johns Hopkins’ Steven Salzberg, who wrote, “I can’t allow this to go unchallenged. This research is so potentially harmful, and offers such little benefit to society, that I fear that NIH is endangering the trust that Congress places in it.”
Megan Palmer, a biotechnology and security expert at Stanford University, told me she is also deeply concerned by some of the research done in high-security biolabs, but that evaluating the dangers can be difficult. “The problem is that in most cases, we don’t actually know how risky or beneficial the research will be.” To get a better handle on the science, she says, “We need much more sophisticated systems for understanding and managing risk. We should be collecting incidents and analyzing them, and then sharing that information and trying to draw lessons for improvement.”
Ironically, the beginnings of such a system were supposed to have been part of the Trump administration’s 2018 National Biodefense Strategy. The strategy also called for coordinating with international partners to reduce the risk of future pandemics or bioterror attacks. But after announcing the plan, the administration let it drop. “The funding has not materialized,” Palmer says of Trump’s biosecurity research plans. “We say these things are important, and then we don’t follow through.”
The administration’s move to axe this research does not make the world any safer, and neither does continuing to scapegoat Chinese researchers. “We can’t be assigning blame prematurely,” says Palmer, who sees a lab escape as the less likely hypothesis. “We need to do the research to really figure out how this may have originated and, to prevent future threats, our focus needs to go beyond just this particular incident.”
As we’ve seen, pathogens do not stay put. Preventing the next pandemic will require extraordinary foresight and international collaboration—the exact opposite of the Trump administration’s approach so far. There are no other options. We are all stuck on one big cruise ship, and no one’s getting off any time soon.


motherjones--2020-05-14--The Bailout is Working—for the Rich

The Bailout is Working—for the Rich

This story was published originally by ProPublica , a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power .
Sign up for ProPublica ’ s Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox as soon as they are published .
Ten weeks into the worst crisis in 90 years , the government ’ s effort to save the economy has been both a spectacular success and a catastrophic failure .
The clearest illustration of that came on Friday , when the government reported that 20.5 million people lost their jobs in April .
It marked a period of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the Great Depression .
Also on Friday , the stock market rallied .
The S & P 500 is now up 30 % from its lows in mid-March and back to where it was last October , when the outlook for 2020 corporate earnings looked sunshiny .
Companies have sold record amounts of debt in recent weeks for investment-grade companies .
Junk bonds , historically dodgy during an economic swoon , have roared back .
If you ’ re looking for investors ’ verdict on who has won the bailout , consider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the giant private equity firm , have soared 80 % from their lows .
The stock of Blackstone , another private equity behemoth , has risen 50 % .
The reason : Asset holders like Apollo and Blackstone—disproportionately the wealthiest and most influential—have been insured by the world ’ s most powerful central bank .
This largess is boundless and without conditions .
“ Even if a second wave of outbreaks were to occur , ” JPMorgan economists wrote in a celebratory note on Friday , “ the Fed has explicitly indicated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no danger of running out of ammunition.
” Many aspects of the coronavirus bailout that assist individuals or small businesses , meanwhile , are short-term or contingent .
Aid to small businesses comes with conditions on what they can do with the money .
The sums allocated by the CARES Act for stimulus and expanded unemployment insurance are vast by historical standards .
But the relief they provide didn ’ t prevent tens of millions from losing their jobs .
The assistance runs out in weeks , and the jobless live at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will decide whether that help gets extended and , if so , for how long .
It ’ s a bailout of capital .
“ If the theory is : Let ’ s make sure companies are solvent and the workers will be OK , that theory could work .
But it ’ s a trickle-down theory , ” said Lev Menand , a former New York Fed economist who now teaches at Columbia Law School .
We do know one thing , he said : “ It worked for asset holders.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ praised for their boldness and speed , have come in two stages .
First , in February and March , the central bank shored up capital market “ liquidity , ” which marks how willing investors are to buy and sell .
The central bank role is to be a “ lender of last resort , ” working through banks so they can get money to companies and people .
That expanded in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis .
The Federal Reserve , historically viewed as reserved Brahmins who controlled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new job : “ the dealer of last resort , ” in the words of economist Perry Mehrling .
The Fed bought assets and it bailed out the shadow banking system .
“ Shadow banking ” takes many forms and can mean many things , but generally it describes activities that look like classic banking—taking in deposits and lending out that money—that are undertaken by , for example , a private-equity fund or another institution outside the traditional system of federally insured deposits .
The beneficiaries of this Federal Reserve help in 2008 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lending markets for corporations and financial institutions such as the commercial paper and repurchase agreement markets—all of which had seized up and stopped functioning .
Then this year , the Fed came to the rescue of these markets again , doing “ such a great job with this that everyone has forgotten this has happened , ” Menand said .
Those Fed moves were necessary .
But they should not be consigned to the memory hole .
Everyone learned in 2008 that those corners of the markets were vulnerable , but the lessons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The government tried to install new rules governing different pockets of these markets in piecemeal fashion ; financial interests bitterly opposed much of that new regulation .
And now , just a short 12 years later , the Fed had to step in to protect these markets and interests once again .
The second stage of the Fed ’ s extraordinary rescue goes beyond liquidity .
It has said it will buy assets it has never bought before .
For almost 100 years , the Fed purchased only government bonds .
Now it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to buy various forms of corporate and other debt , either by direct lending , by buying bonds , or buying loans .
The mere announcement that the Fed would do this had an immediate effect , spurring the boom in corporate borrowing .
The Fed didn ’ t stop with the most solid , safest corporate stalwarts .
In early April , it also announced something unprecedented .
The central bank said it would buy junk bonds , debt issued by fragile companies , many of which already have crushing debt loads @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back and their cousins , leveraged loans , revived .
In doing so , the Fed backstopped the riskiest markets in the world .
The most dangerous investments in the world , it should go without saying , are not owned by middle- and working-class Americans , to whom every politician pledges fealty .
No , they are owned by the most risk-seeking investors in the world , the ones that need the highest returns : private equity firms and hedge funds .
But wait , there ’ s more .
The riskiest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long boom era of the last decade .
In the past several years , regulators — especially the former chair of the Federal Reserve , Janet Yellen—repeatedly worried that companies had too much debt .
They were concerned how lenders had raced to ease conditions , or covenants , on their loans to elbow out their competitors to fork over money , just as they had in the run-up to 2008 .
At a moment of record profits , the ratio of corporate debt to earnings steadily rose , while corporate stock buybacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like a parental exhortation to their kids to get off TikTok and brush their teeth .
Yet after all that worry , the Fed then stepped in to save the wealthiest speculators .
The mere word that the Fed will make some purchases in this market has swelled these investors ’ net worth .
Meanwhile , images of mile-long food lines have become common .
In some ways , it ’ s unfair to blame the Fed .
The speed of its actions and its ability to deploy groundbreaking new approaches mask the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work through the capital markets .
And only through credit , at that .
The Fed has no ability to help regular people directly .
“ It ’ s really ill-suited to get money to where it ’ s most needed and on terms that are the most appropriate , ” said Kate Judge , a Columbia law professor and expert in the Federal Reserve .
The House and Senate have much greater powers , the power of the purse and of legislation .
Congress could have passed laws that directed help in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ payrolls , a much more direct form of aid to people who have lost the ability to work .
But Congress has been reluctant to use sufficient fiscal measures going back to the 2008 rescue .
What happens if the economy doesn ’ t come back soon ?
The Fed ’ s saddle-ʼem-with-more-debt approach is premised on a sharp and rapid recovery .
The virus burns itself out , people go back to work , they buy and sell , and everything snaps back .
Companies pay back their loans , and all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health crisis does not pass quickly , or if the economy does not roar back , the Fed ’ s actions might prove inadequate .
But investors shouldn ’ t be too worried .
They have been taught they can count on the government .

This story was published originally by ProPublica, a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up for ProPublica’s Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox as soon as they are published.
Ten weeks into the worst crisis in 90 years, the government’s effort to save the economy has been both a spectacular success and a catastrophic failure.
The clearest illustration of that came on Friday, when the government reported that 20.5 million people lost their jobs in April. It marked a period of unfathomable pain across the country not seen since the Great Depression. Also on Friday, the stock market rallied.
The S&P 500 is now up 30% from its lows in mid-March and back to where it was last October, when the outlook for 2020 corporate earnings looked sunshiny. Companies have sold record amounts of debt in recent weeks for investment-grade companies. Junk bonds, historically dodgy during an economic swoon, have roared back.
If you’re looking for investors’ verdict on who has won the bailout, consider these returns: Shares of Apollo Group, the giant private equity firm, have soared 80% from their lows. The stock of Blackstone, another private equity behemoth, has risen 50%.
The reason: Asset holders like Apollo and Blackstone—disproportionately the wealthiest and most influential—have been insured by the world’s most powerful central bank. This largess is boundless and without conditions. “Even if a second wave of outbreaks were to occur,” JPMorgan economists wrote in a celebratory note on Friday, “the Fed has explicitly indicated that there is no dollar limit and no danger of running out of ammunition.”
Many aspects of the coronavirus bailout that assist individuals or small businesses, meanwhile, are short-term or contingent. Aid to small businesses comes with conditions on what they can do with the money. The sums allocated by the CARES Act for stimulus and expanded unemployment insurance are vast by historical standards. But the relief they provide didn’t prevent tens of millions from losing their jobs. The assistance runs out in weeks, and the jobless live at the mercy of a divided Congress, which will decide whether that help gets extended and, if so, for how long.
It’s a bailout of capital. “If the theory is: Let’s make sure companies are solvent and the workers will be OK, that theory could work. But it’s a trickle-down theory,” said Lev Menand, a former New York Fed economist who now teaches at Columbia Law School.
We do know one thing, he said: “It worked for asset holders.”
The Fed’s efforts, universally praised for their boldness and speed, have come in two stages. First, in February and March, the central bank shored up capital market “liquidity,” which marks how willing investors are to buy and sell. The central bank role is to be a “lender of last resort,” working through banks so they can get money to companies and people.
That expanded in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. The Federal Reserve, historically viewed as reserved Brahmins who controlled the money supply, stepped into a new job: “the dealer of last resort,” in the words of economist Perry Mehrling. The Fed bought assets and it bailed out the shadow banking system. “Shadow banking” takes many forms and can mean many things, but generally it describes activities that look like classic banking—taking in deposits and lending out that money—that are undertaken by, for example, a private-equity fund or another institution outside the traditional system of federally insured deposits.
The beneficiaries of this Federal Reserve help in 2008 were money market funds, and short-term lending markets for corporations and financial institutions such as the commercial paper and repurchase agreement markets—all of which had seized up and stopped functioning. Then this year, the Fed came to the rescue of these markets again, doing “such a great job with this that everyone has forgotten this has happened,” Menand said.
Those Fed moves were necessary. But they should not be consigned to the memory hole.
Everyone learned in 2008 that those corners of the markets were vulnerable, but the lessons didn’t stick, apparently. The government tried to install new rules governing different pockets of these markets in piecemeal fashion; financial interests bitterly opposed much of that new regulation. And now, just a short 12 years later, the Fed had to step in to protect these markets and interests once again.
The second stage of the Fed’s extraordinary rescue goes beyond liquidity. It has said it will buy assets it has never bought before. For almost 100 years, the Fed purchased only government bonds. Now it has announced a wide variety of programs to buy various forms of corporate and other debt, either by direct lending, by buying bonds, or buying loans.
The mere announcement that the Fed would do this had an immediate effect, spurring the boom in corporate borrowing.
The Fed didn’t stop with the most solid, safest corporate stalwarts. In early April, it also announced something unprecedented. The central bank said it would buy junk bonds, debt issued by fragile companies, many of which already have crushing debt loads. Sure enough, junk bonds roared back and their cousins, leveraged loans, revived.
In doing so, the Fed backstopped the riskiest markets in the world. The most dangerous investments in the world, it should go without saying, are not owned by middle- and working-class Americans, to whom every politician pledges fealty. No, they are owned by the most risk-seeking investors in the world, the ones that need the highest returns: private equity firms and hedge funds.
But wait, there’s more. The riskiest markets only got more so during the long boom era of the last decade. In the past several years, regulators — especially the former chair of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen—repeatedly worried that companies had too much debt. They were concerned how lenders had raced to ease conditions, or covenants, on their loans to elbow out their competitors to fork over money, just as they had in the run-up to 2008. At a moment of record profits, the ratio of corporate debt to earnings steadily rose, while corporate stock buybacks hit records. Those cautions were treated like a parental exhortation to their kids to get off TikTok and brush their teeth.
Yet after all that worry, the Fed then stepped in to save the wealthiest speculators. The mere word that the Fed will make some purchases in this market has swelled these investors’ net worth. Meanwhile, images of mile-long food lines have become common.
In some ways, it’s unfair to blame the Fed. The speed of its actions and its ability to deploy groundbreaking new approaches mask the paucity of its tools. It must work through the capital markets. And only through credit, at that. The Fed has no ability to help regular people directly. “It’s really ill-suited to get money to where it’s most needed and on terms that are the most appropriate,” said Kate Judge, a Columbia law professor and expert in the Federal Reserve.
The House and Senate have much greater powers, the power of the purse and of legislation. Congress could have passed laws that directed help in different ways. Europe has essentially nationalized payrolls, a much more direct form of aid to people who have lost the ability to work. But Congress has been reluctant to use sufficient fiscal measures going back to the 2008 rescue.
What happens if the economy doesn’t come back soon? The Fed’s saddle-ʼem-with-more-debt approach is premised on a sharp and rapid recovery. The virus burns itself out, people go back to work, they buy and sell, and everything snaps back. Companies pay back their loans, and all is forgiven and forgotten.
If the health crisis does not pass quickly, or if the economy does not roar back, the Fed’s actions might prove inadequate. But investors shouldn’t be too worried. They have been taught they can count on the government.


motherjones--2020-05-14--A Honduran Man Has Died of COVID-19 After Leaving an ICE Jail Plagued by the Virus

On April 23 , the staff of the Morrow County Jail in Gilead , Ohio , told immigration detainees that a feverish man they ’ d been sharing a crowded dorm with had tested positive for COVID-19 .
The next day , Immigration and Customs Enforcement abruptly released one of the men who ’ d potentially been exposed without testing him : Óscar López Acosta , a 42-year-old Honduran man with diabetes who ’ d spent 18 months in government custody .
On May 3 , López tested positive for COVID-19 after an ambulance took him from his home to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The next day , ICE confirmed that 47 people in its custody at Morrow County had tested positive .
The jail was only holding 51 immigration detainees at the time .
It was exactly what experts had warned would happen if ICE didn ’ t use its power to release people : Nearly everyone had become infected after sharing a dorm in which social distancing was impossible .
On Sunday , López died from complications from the coronavirus after being released from the hospital , the local coroner ’ s officer confirmed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ became the first person to die in ICE custody after contracting COVID-19 .
Ohio attorneys , immigrant advocates , and López ’ s widow , Lourdes Mejía Flores , believe López is the second to die after being infected in ICE custody .
“ This infection is on ICE ’ s hands , ” said Elizabeth Bonham , a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio .
Mejía , Lopez ’ s wife , told me her husband had almost no appetite when he arrived home in Dayton , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Aside from two quick trips to a store , he stayed inside , his widow said .
But his symptoms continued to get worse .
His body ached and he was vomiting the week he got back .
“ I can ’ t handle it , ” he said soon before calling an ambulance later that week .
“ I ’ m dying.
” López then spent nearly a week in the hospital before dying two days after being released , said Mejía , who noted that she started feeling feverish on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law firm represented López , said an ICE official called her on Tuesday morning to discuss López ’ s case .
She responded that López was dead .
When she told the official that López got COVID-19 at the jail , he replied “ yeah ” and didn ’ t refute her claim , according to Bradley .
( When I called him , the official declined to speak with me . )
It will likely be impossible to know for sure whether López contracted the virus in detention .
ICE spokesperson Khaalid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tested before ICE released him .
Through April 24 , Walls added , no asymptomatic detainees at Morrow County were tested .
López was originally from San Francisco de La Paz , a small municipality about 100 miles northeast of Tegucigalpa , Mejía said .
They had three children : an 18-year old boy and a 2-year-old girl who live with Mejía in Ohio , along with an 8-year-old daughter in Honduras .
“ He was a very responsible person , ” Mejía said in tears .
“ He was very caring .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ deported in 2009 and again in 2012 before returning to the United States soon after .
In October 2018 , a few days after his daughter ’ s first birthday , his teenage son got into a car accident .
López went to help him .
The police called ICE , who detained López .
He was quickly transferred to Justice Department custody to await trial for reentering the county without authorization .
Normally , someone in López ’ s position would plead guilty , Cheryll Bennett , the federal public defender who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said he chose to stand trial to delay being sent back to Honduras , where relatives had been killed and he wouldn ’ t have access to quality medical care for his diabetes .
During his January 2019 trial , she added that López went into diabetic shock after the jail where he was being held forgot to give him his insulin injection .
In May 2019 , López was transferred back to ICE custody after being sentenced to time served by a federal judge .
From there , he was held in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for protection from persecution in Honduras .
Bradley , the immigration attorney , explained that three of López ’ s nephews were killed by a gang in Honduras in 2010 .
In October , he lost his case and subsequently appealed the decision .
Anna Babel , a professor of Hispanic linguistics at Ohio State University , started visiting López late last year as a volunteer .
She documented much of what López told her in emails to immigrant advocate Danya Contractor , who helped set up a fund to raise money for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , López told Babel that a man in his unit punched him in the chest when López went to use the bathroom during the night .
He said that criminal inmates stashed marijuana in a bathroom light fixture and used electrical wires to light it .
( The sheriff ’ s office announced last month that it was investigating three suspected overdoses that occurred within the jail ; Sheriff John Hinton did not reply to an interview request . )
A doctor told López he had a cracked rib but that the injury @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Babel wrote in an email .
López believed that was absurd because he ’ d never been hit in the chest before then .
She could still see the swelling when she visited a week after the incident .
Babel and López kept in touch by phone after ICE cut off social visitation in March in response to the pandemic .
She remembered him as a sweet and mild-mannered man , as well as a devout Christian .
Even before COVID-19 , López told Babel he feared he would die in ICE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very hard for him to aguantar , to survive those conditions , ” she said .
On March 16 , ICE informed López that he would not be released while his immigration appeal was pending .
About a month later , two people were transferred into the general population at Morrow County from another Ohio jail without first being quarantined , according to a lawsuit filed on April 24 by the ACLU of Ohio .
While it ’ s unclear how the virus entered the jail , one of the transferred men was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He spent about 10 days in the shared dorm before being removed , the lawsuit states .
Sheriff Hinton has admitted that detainees and staff weren ’ t wearing masks until the first person tested positive .
The jail ’ s publicly available booking records show that ICE transferred five people to Morrow County on April 21 , after the first signs of infection .
Boubou Sow , a pseudonym chosen by a Mauritanian asylum seeker , said he and others asked guards to stop bringing new people in only to be threatened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a call from the jail last week that people got sick one by one , but that guards didn ’ t believe them at first .
“ We knew from the beginning that if one of us got it , ” Sow said , “ we all would because it ’ s just one big room with recycled air.
” One of the men booked-in on April 21 was hospitalized with COVID-19 last week before being sent back to the jail , Contractor , the immigrant advocate , confirmed after calling a local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tested , Sow said .
“ We don ’ t even know if they got it , ” he added about the people in López ’ s position .
“ They walked out of here without being tested.
” When Babel picked López up at the jail on April 24 , she said he seemed in good health .
As they drove to his home wearing masks , he told Babel he planned to bring his daughter from Honduras and get back to work .
López usually worked construction during the summer and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ I think it ’ s just really ironic that if he had been on the outside we would have been calling him an essential worker and a hero , ” Babel said .
On Saturday , one day before he died , López texted Babel to say that he had been released from the hospital .
Babel told him she was sorry for the nightmare he ’ d been through .
“ Sí , pero ya pasó , ” López replied .
Yes , but it ’ s over .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I can ’ t say what he died of.
” Babel said .
“ But his wife said to me—and I agree with her—that ultimately what killed him was those 18 months in detention .
”

On April 23, the staff of the Morrow County Jail in Gilead, Ohio, told immigration detainees that a feverish man they’d been sharing a crowded dorm with had tested positive for COVID-19. The next day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement abruptly released one of the men who’d potentially been exposed without testing him: Óscar López Acosta, a 42-year-old Honduran man with diabetes who’d spent 18 months in government custody.
On May 3, López tested positive for COVID-19 after an ambulance took him from his home to the Miami Valley Hospital in Dayton. The next day, ICE confirmed that 47 people in its custody at Morrow County had tested positive. The jail was only holding 51 immigration detainees at the time. It was exactly what experts had warned would happen if ICE didn’t use its power to release people: Nearly everyone had become infected after sharing a dorm in which social distancing was impossible.
On Sunday, López died from complications from the coronavirus after being released from the hospital, the local coroner’s officer confirmed. Last week, Carlos Ernesto Escobar Mejía became the first person to die in ICE custody after contracting COVID-19. Ohio attorneys, immigrant advocates, and López’s widow, Lourdes Mejía Flores, believe López is the second to die after being infected in ICE custody. “This infection is on ICE’s hands,” said Elizabeth Bonham, a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio.
Mejía, Lopez’s wife, told me her husband had almost no appetite when he arrived home in Dayton, which is not a major coronavirus hot spot. Aside from two quick trips to a store, he stayed inside, his widow said. But his symptoms continued to get worse. His body ached and he was vomiting the week he got back. “I can’t handle it,” he said soon before calling an ambulance later that week. “I’m dying.” López then spent nearly a week in the hospital before dying two days after being released, said Mejía, who noted that she started feeling feverish on Tuesday.
Karen Bradley, whose immigration law firm represented López, said an ICE official called her on Tuesday morning to discuss López’s case. She responded that López was dead. When she told the official that López got COVID-19 at the jail, he replied “yeah” and didn’t refute her claim, according to Bradley. (When I called him, the official declined to speak with me.)
It will likely be impossible to know for sure whether López contracted the virus in detention. ICE spokesperson Khaalid Walls told me that López was not tested before ICE released him. Through April 24, Walls added, no asymptomatic detainees at Morrow County were tested.
López was originally from San Francisco de La Paz, a small municipality about 100 miles northeast of Tegucigalpa, Mejía said. They had three children: an 18-year old boy and a 2-year-old girl who live with Mejía in Ohio, along with an 8-year-old daughter in Honduras. “He was a very responsible person,” Mejía said in tears. “He was very caring. He was always attentive.”
López was deported in 2009 and again in 2012 before returning to the United States soon after. In October 2018, a few days after his daughter’s first birthday, his teenage son got into a car accident. López went to help him. The police called ICE, who detained López. He was quickly transferred to Justice Department custody to await trial for reentering the county without authorization.
Normally, someone in López’s position would plead guilty, Cheryll Bennett, the federal public defender who represented him, said. But Bennett said he chose to stand trial to delay being sent back to Honduras, where relatives had been killed and he wouldn’t have access to quality medical care for his diabetes. During his January 2019 trial, she added that López went into diabetic shock after the jail where he was being held forgot to give him his insulin injection.
In May 2019, López was transferred back to ICE custody after being sentenced to time served by a federal judge. From there, he was held in Ohio immigration detention centers as he applied for protection from persecution in Honduras. Bradley, the immigration attorney, explained that three of López’s nephews were killed by a gang in Honduras in 2010. In October, he lost his case and subsequently appealed the decision.
Anna Babel, a professor of Hispanic linguistics at Ohio State University, started visiting López late last year as a volunteer. She documented much of what López told her in emails to immigrant advocate Danya Contractor, who helped set up a fund to raise money for López’s family. In February, López told Babel that a man in his unit punched him in the chest when López went to use the bathroom during the night. He said that criminal inmates stashed marijuana in a bathroom light fixture and used electrical wires to light it. (The sheriff’s office announced last month that it was investigating three suspected overdoses that occurred within the jail; Sheriff John Hinton did not reply to an interview request.)
A doctor told López he had a cracked rib but that the injury might have occurred a few years before, Babel wrote in an email. López believed that was absurd because he’d never been hit in the chest before then. She could still see the swelling when she visited a week after the incident.
Babel and López kept in touch by phone after ICE cut off social visitation in March in response to the pandemic. She remembered him as a sweet and mild-mannered man, as well as a devout Christian. Even before COVID-19, López told Babel he feared he would die in ICE custody. “I think it was very hard for him to aguantar, to survive those conditions,” she said.
On March 16, ICE informed López that he would not be released while his immigration appeal was pending. About a month later, two people were transferred into the general population at Morrow County from another Ohio jail without first being quarantined, according to a lawsuit filed on April 24 by the ACLU of Ohio. While it’s unclear how the virus entered the jail, one of the transferred men was the first person to test positive. He spent about 10 days in the shared dorm before being removed, the lawsuit states. Sheriff Hinton has admitted that detainees and staff weren’t wearing masks until the first person tested positive.
The jail’s publicly available booking records show that ICE transferred five people to Morrow County on April 21, after the first signs of infection. Boubou Sow, a pseudonym chosen by a Mauritanian asylum seeker, said he and others asked guards to stop bringing new people in only to be threatened with solitary confinement. Sow said in a call from the jail last week that people got sick one by one, but that guards didn’t believe them at first. “We knew from the beginning that if one of us got it,” Sow said, “we all would because it’s just one big room with recycled air.” One of the men booked-in on April 21 was hospitalized with COVID-19 last week before being sent back to the jail, Contractor, the immigrant advocate, confirmed after calling a local hospital.
Others were released without being tested, Sow said. “We don’t even know if they got it,” he added about the people in López’s position. “They walked out of here without being tested.”
When Babel picked López up at the jail on April 24, she said he seemed in good health. As they drove to his home wearing masks, he told Babel he planned to bring his daughter from Honduras and get back to work. López usually worked construction during the summer and at a chicken farm in the winter. “I think it’s just really ironic that if he had been on the outside we would have been calling him an essential worker and a hero,” Babel said.
On Saturday, one day before he died, López texted Babel to say that he had been released from the hospital. Babel told him she was sorry for the nightmare he’d been through. “Sí, pero ya pasó,” López replied. Yes, but it’s over.
“I’m not a doctor. I can’t say what he died of.” Babel said. “But his wife said to me—and I agree with her—that ultimately what killed him was those 18 months in detention.”