motherjones--2020-09-08--Roger Stone to Headline Conservative Conference at Struggling Trump Resort

A pro-Trump political conference that last year featured a video depicting a fake Donald Trump violently killing political opponents announced Tuesday that it will return October 8-11 with Roger Stone , whose prison sentence Trump commuted in July , as a headliner .
And for the second straight year , the American Priority Conference , or AmpFest , is set to be held at Trump National Doral Miami Golf Club , potentially indoors .
In a press release Tuesday , American Priority did not say if the event will be held inside or outside .
Nor did it specify any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called Trump Doral ’ s reservations line , the person who answered said that events there may be held in the resort ’ s clubhouse , or outdoors , depending on rules in Miami which currently limits meetings and banquets to 50 percent of the room ’ s capacity , as the state endures an outbreak that has killed 12,000 or more Floridians .
Roger Stone and American Priority representatives did not respond to questions .
But the conference ’ s organizer , Alex Philips , has strong views on the matter .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ mask debator ” and he regularly posts attacks on coronavirus mitigation measures .
Speakers scheduled to appear at the conference include Robert F. Kennedy Jr. , known for spreading misinformation about vaccinations , and Dr. Simone Gold , who in July appeared in a viral video , later tweeted by Trump , in which she claimed hydroxychloroquine cures Covid-19 , among other misleading assertions .
( Gold appeared in the video with Dr. Stella Immanuel , who gained notice for claiming elsewhere that sex with demons in dreams causes illness . )
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ met in July with Vice President Mike Pence , as “ censored , ” in an apparent reference to social media companies removing the video for promoting coronavirus misinformation .
Stone has gone further than Gold in that regard .
In an April 13 radio interview with Joe Piscopo on New York City ’ s AM970 , Stone floated a bizarre and false theory that Bill Gates helped to create coronavirus so that he can plant microchips in people ’ s heads .
“ He and other globalists are using it for mandatory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if they ’ ve been tested , ” Stone said , summarizing a theory he described as “ open for vigorous debate.
” Last fall , a Washington DC jury convicted Stone of lying to Congress about his contacts with the Trump campaign about WikiLeaks ’ plans to release emails stolen from Democrats by Russian hackers .
Trump commuted Stone ’ s sentence in July , in a move that critics note personally benefits Trump .
Former Trump campaign chief Corey Lewandowski , George Papadopoulos , a former Trump campaign aide who pleaded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agents about his contacts with a suspected Russian agent , Rep. Matt Gaetz ( R-Fla. ) , and conservative pundit Dinesh D ’ Souza , who in 2018 received a pardon from Trump for a campaign finance conviction , are also listed as speakers .
Tickets range from $ 300 to $ 2,500 for VIPS .
Hosting the conference at Trump ’ s Doral resort outside of Miami is a gift to the president who has banked millions on conservative events that organizers have flocked to have hosted at his properties .
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financially , with revenues reported to have fallen since he was inaugurated .
In his most recent personal financial disclosure , Trump reported revenues at the resort were up , but that didn ’ t include the costs of running the golf resort .
Last fall , Trump attempted to pitch the resort , which he bought in 2012 with the help of a $ 125 million loan from Deutsche Bank , as a potential venue for this year ’ s G7 conference , in one of his most overt attempts to use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off due to bipartisan condemnation .
The American Priority Conference was first held in 2018 in Washington .
It moved to Doral last year , headlined by figures including Donald Trump Jr. and former White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders , alongside proponents of QAnon and other conspiracy theories .
But it drew wide attention when attendees saw a video that included a clip showing Trump ’ s head superimposed on the body of a man opening fire inside the “ Church of Fake News , ” killing figures with the faces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organizations superimposed on them .
Philips told the New York Times that video was part of a “ meme exhibit ” submitted by a third party .
“ American Priority rejects all political violence and aims to promote a healthy dialogue about the preservation of free speech , ” Philips said .

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A pro-Trump political conference that last year featured a video depicting a fake Donald Trump violently killing political opponents announced Tuesday that it will return October 8-11 with Roger Stone, whose prison sentence Trump commuted in July, as a headliner. And for the second straight year, the American Priority Conference, or AmpFest, is set to be held at Trump National Doral Miami Golf Club, potentially indoors.
In a press release Tuesday, American Priority did not say if the event will be held inside or outside. Nor did it specify any coronavirus mitigation plans. When Mother Jones called Trump Doral’s reservations line, the person who answered said that events there may be held in the resort’s clubhouse, or outdoors, depending on rules in Miami which currently limits meetings and banquets to 50 percent of the room’s capacity, as the state endures an outbreak that has killed 12,000 or more Floridians.
Roger Stone and American Priority representatives did not respond to questions. But the conference’s organizer, Alex Philips, has strong views on the matter. Philips’ Twitter handle is “Proud mask debator” and he regularly posts attacks on coronavirus mitigation measures.
What is going on?
Why are we still closed down in some states? Why are kids not in school. Why is the media still frightening the public?https://t.co/DV5qjUHXMZ — Proud mask debator (@AlexpHSL) September 7, 2020
Speakers scheduled to appear at the conference include Robert F. Kennedy Jr., known for spreading misinformation about vaccinations, and Dr. Simone Gold, who in July appeared in a viral video, later tweeted by Trump, in which she claimed hydroxychloroquine cures Covid-19, among other misleading assertions. (Gold appeared in the video with Dr. Stella Immanuel, who gained notice for claiming elsewhere that sex with demons in dreams causes illness.) The conference bills Gold, who says she met in July with Vice President Mike Pence, as “censored,” in an apparent reference to social media companies removing the video for promoting coronavirus misinformation.
Stone has gone further than Gold in that regard. In an April 13 radio interview with Joe Piscopo on New York City’s AM970, Stone floated a bizarre and false theory that Bill Gates helped to create coronavirus so that he can plant microchips in people’s heads. “He and other globalists are using it for mandatory vaccinations and microchipping people so we know if they’ve been tested,” Stone said, summarizing a theory he described as “open for vigorous debate.”
Last fall, a Washington DC jury convicted Stone of lying to Congress about his contacts with the Trump campaign about WikiLeaks’ plans to release emails stolen from Democrats by Russian hackers. Trump commuted Stone’s sentence in July, in a move that critics note personally benefits Trump.
Former Trump campaign chief Corey Lewandowski, George Papadopoulos, a former Trump campaign aide who pleaded guilty in 2017 to lying to FBI agents about his contacts with a suspected Russian agent, Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.), and conservative pundit Dinesh D’Souza, who in 2018 received a pardon from Trump for a campaign finance conviction, are also listed as speakers.
Tickets range from $300 to $2,500 for VIPS.
Hosting the conference at Trump’s Doral resort outside of Miami is a gift to the president who has banked millions on conservative events that organizers have flocked to have hosted at his properties. Since Trump’s election Doral has struggled financially, with revenues reported to have fallen since he was inaugurated. In his most recent personal financial disclosure, Trump reported revenues at the resort were up, but that didn’t include the costs of running the golf resort. Last fall, Trump attempted to pitch the resort, which he bought in 2012 with the help of a $125 million loan from Deutsche Bank, as a potential venue for this year’s G7 conference, in one of his most overt attempts to use the presidency to profit, before backing off due to bipartisan condemnation.
The American Priority Conference was first held in 2018 in Washington. It moved to Doral last year, headlined by figures including Donald Trump Jr. and former White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, alongside proponents of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. But it drew wide attention when attendees saw a video that included a clip showing Trump’s head superimposed on the body of a man opening fire inside the “Church of Fake News,” killing figures with the faces of his critics or logos of media organizations superimposed on them. Philips told the New York Times that video was part of a “meme exhibit” submitted by a third party. “American Priority rejects all political violence and aims to promote a healthy dialogue about the preservation of free speech,” Philips said.


motherjones--2020-09-08--Trump Used to Regularly Brag About Giving Money to the Pentagon. Now He’s Lashing Out at the Defense

Trump Used to Regularly Brag About Giving Money to the Pentagon. Now He’s Lashing Out at the Defense Industry.

On Monday , President Trump delivered one of his most baffling lines yet at a White House news conference .
Asked again about the Atlantic story detailing his disparagement of wounded veterans and soldiers who died in war , Trump said the “ top people ” in the military “ probably ” don ’ t love him “ because they want to do nothing but fight wars so all of those wonderful companies that make the bombs and make the planes and make everything else stay happy.
” The idea that special interests hold too much sway at the Pentagon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not a new one .
Elizabeth Warren made pretty much the same argument in 2018 when she said , “ It ’ s clear that the Pentagon is captured by the so-called ‘ Big Five ’ defense contractors-and taxpayers are picking up the bill.
” But it ’ s confusing to hear Trump express that idea given his past actions regarding the Pentagon .
Under Trump , the defense budget has risen for three straight years , an achievement he once was so proud of that he repeatedly exaggerated its scale and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he told a joint session of Congress that he planned to propose a budget “ that calls for one of the largest increases in national defense spending in American history.
” His resulting proposal did “ not appear to be a significant departure from the Obama defense budget , ” per the Center for Strategic and International Studies ’ budget guru Todd Harrison , and if enacted , would have only been the “ ninth-largest increase in the past four decades.
” Even Congress , which was controlled at the time by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and ended up appropriating $ 37 billion more than Trump requested for general Pentagon operations “ and another $ 60 billion for war operations overseas in Iraq , Syria , Afghanistan and elsewhere , ” the New York Times reported .
Trump ’ s budget proposals in 2018 and 2019 similarly raised defense spending , but not by nearly as much as Trump claimed in speeches on the campaign trail or in front of US service members .
His repeated claim that he invested $ 2 trillion to burnish a “ totally depleted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and over again .
But it ’ s not just the Pentagon ’ s budget ; Trump has gone out of his way to boost defense companies directly .
After the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was brutally murdered by agents of Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia , Trump defended the Saudi dictator by noting that the kingdom had committed to spend $ 110 billion on “ military equipment from Boeing , Lockheed Martin , Raytheon and many other great US defense contractors.
” During a meeting with the Vietnamese prime minister , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
“ We make the best military equipment in the world by far , whether it ’ s jet fighters or missiles or rockets or anything you want to name , we make , we ’ re acknowledged to have made , we make the best , ” Trump said .
He ’ s also used the White House Twitter feed to promote companies like Lockheed .
Far from being a critic of Pentagon waste , Trump has actively abetted it by rewarding defense contractors with high-level government jobs .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs , including onetime acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan .
Mark Esper , the current Defense secretary , used to lobby for Raytheon .
But now that his private remarks attacking the troops have become public , Trump , who spent three years exaggerating his own effort to boost defense spending , suddenly seems concerned about waste and corruption at the Pentagon .

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On Monday, President Trump delivered one of his most baffling lines yet at a White House news conference. Asked again about the Atlantic story detailing his disparagement of wounded veterans and soldiers who died in war, Trump said the “top people” in the military “probably” don’t love him “because they want to do nothing but fight wars so all of those wonderful companies that make the bombs and make the planes and make everything else stay happy.”
The idea that special interests hold too much sway at the Pentagon and ultimately benefit from its outsized budget is not a new one. Elizabeth Warren made pretty much the same argument in 2018 when she said, “It’s clear that the Pentagon is captured by the so-called ‘Big Five’ defense contractors-and taxpayers are picking up the bill.” But it’s confusing to hear Trump express that idea given his past actions regarding the Pentagon. Under Trump, the defense budget has risen for three straight years, an achievement he once was so proud of that he repeatedly exaggerated its scale and impact.
Two months after taking office, he told a joint session of Congress that he planned to propose a budget “that calls for one of the largest increases in national defense spending in American history.” His resulting proposal did “not appear to be a significant departure from the Obama defense budget,” per the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ budget guru Todd Harrison, and if enacted, would have only been the “ninth-largest increase in the past four decades.” Even Congress, which was controlled at the time by Republicans, thought Trump could do better and ended up appropriating $37 billion more than Trump requested for general Pentagon operations “and another $60 billion for war operations overseas in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere,” the New York Times reported.
Trump’s budget proposals in 2018 and 2019 similarly raised defense spending, but not by nearly as much as Trump claimed in speeches on the campaign trail or in front of US service members. His repeated claim that he invested $2 trillion to burnish a “totally depleted” fighting force has been debunked over and over again.
But it’s not just the Pentagon’s budget; Trump has gone out of his way to boost defense companies directly. After the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was brutally murdered by agents of Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, Trump defended the Saudi dictator by noting that the kingdom had committed to spend $110 billion on “military equipment from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and many other great US defense contractors.” During a meeting with the Vietnamese prime minister, Trump pitched him on importing weapons from the United States. “We make the best military equipment in the world by far, whether it’s jet fighters or missiles or rockets or anything you want to name, we make, we’re acknowledged to have made, we make the best,” Trump said. He’s also used the White House Twitter feed to promote companies like Lockheed.
Far from being a critic of Pentagon waste, Trump has actively abetted it by rewarding defense contractors with high-level government jobs. Several ex-Boeing executives received plush national security jobs, including onetime acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan. Mark Esper, the current Defense secretary, used to lobby for Raytheon. But now that his private remarks attacking the troops have become public, Trump, who spent three years exaggerating his own effort to boost defense spending, suddenly seems concerned about waste and corruption at the Pentagon.


motherjones--2020-09-06--A Federal Judge Stopped Trump From Scaling Back the Census

For more than a year , President Donald Trump has been attempting to undermine the 2020 census , pushing legal boundaries to ask respondents about their immigration status and exclude undocumented immigrants , even as the bureau struggled to mount its once-in-a-decade population count during the coronavirus pandemic .
But on Saturday , US District Judge Lucy Koh issued a temporary restraining order to stop Census Bureau officials from winding down door-knocking and online , phone , and mail response collection by September 30—a month early—writing that the shortened census timeline could cause “ irreparable harm.
” “ Because the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an inaccurate count would not be remedied for another decade , which would affect the distribution of federal and state funding , the deployment of services , and the allocation of local resources for a decade , ” Koh wrote .
The US Census Bureau had originally planned to end their count by October 31 , a date chosen to accommodate delays caused by the pandemic .
But on August 3 , the bureau announced that it would stop collecting census responses by the end of September , and was attempting to “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sacrificing completeness.
” At the time , just 63 percent of households had responded .
Immediately afterward , four former census bureau directors issued a public statement explaining that a shortened timeline would “ result in seriously incomplete enumerations in many areas of the country.
” Later that month , the Government Accountability Office , a nonpartisan watchdog , also reported that “ compressed timeframes ” in the 2020 census could undermine the overall quality of the census count .
Now , at least until a hearing on September 17 , the Census @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down its counting operations , such as terminating field staff .
The lawsuit was filed in mid-August by civil rights groups and local governments , as well as the Navajo Nation and Gila River Indian Community in Arizona .
They argued that an inaccurate census would violate their constitutional rights to political representation and put them at risk of losing important federal funding .
“ Today ’ s ruling buys the census some precious and indispensable time by barring the administration from shutting down the count while the federal courts are still considering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wolf , a Brennan Center for Justice attorney representing the plaintiffs , said in a statement to NPR .
Anyone who has not yet responded to the 2020 Census can do so here .

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For more than a year, President Donald Trump has been attempting to undermine the 2020 census, pushing legal boundaries to ask respondents about their immigration status and exclude undocumented immigrants, even as the bureau struggled to mount its once-in-a-decade population count during the coronavirus pandemic. But on Saturday, US District Judge Lucy Koh issued a temporary restraining order to stop Census Bureau officials from winding down door-knocking and online, phone, and mail response collection by September 30—a month early—writing that the shortened census timeline could cause “irreparable harm.”
“Because the decennial census is at issue here, an inaccurate count would not be remedied for another decade, which would affect the distribution of federal and state funding, the deployment of services, and the allocation of local resources for a decade,” Koh wrote.
The US Census Bureau had originally planned to end their count by October 31, a date chosen to accommodate delays caused by the pandemic. But on August 3, the bureau announced that it would stop collecting census responses by the end of September, and was attempting to “improve the speed of our count without sacrificing completeness.” At the time, just 63 percent of households had responded. Immediately afterward, four former census bureau directors issued a public statement explaining that a shortened timeline would “result in seriously incomplete enumerations in many areas of the country.” Later that month, the Government Accountability Office, a nonpartisan watchdog, also reported that “compressed timeframes” in the 2020 census could undermine the overall quality of the census count.
Now, at least until a hearing on September 17, the Census Bureau may not take steps to wind down its counting operations, such as terminating field staff.
The lawsuit was filed in mid-August by civil rights groups and local governments, as well as the Navajo Nation and Gila River Indian Community in Arizona. They argued that an inaccurate census would violate their constitutional rights to political representation and put them at risk of losing important federal funding.
“Today’s ruling buys the census some precious and indispensable time by barring the administration from shutting down the count while the federal courts are still considering our request for relief,” Thomas Wolf, a Brennan Center for Justice attorney representing the plaintiffs, said in a statement to NPR.
Anyone who has not yet responded to the 2020 Census can do so here.


motherjones--2020-09-09--Nobody Would Have Guessed That Newark Would Be a Model for Fighting COVID-19. But It Is.

For 12 years , Berlyne Vilcant has worked for the city of Newark , New Jersey , as a disease investigator , which means that when there ’ s a cluster of cases of a particular disease—salmonella at a restaurant , say , or norovirus in a hotel—it ’ s her job to figure out how it started , who caught it , and how to stop it from spreading further .
A lifelong Newark resident , she grew up in a family of Haitian immigrants , and even as a child knew that she wanted to work in healthcare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the character of a restaurant health inspector in the 2003 movie Deliver Us from Eva , she decided to go into public health .
In January , Vilcant was busy with run-of-the-mill outbreaks : hand , foot , and mouth disease at a daycare , Legionella at a senior center , isolated cases of giardia .
When she told her friends that she was worried about a new virus tearing through China , they reassured her .
Don ’ t worry , they said , it won ’ t come here .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remembers thinking , “ Oh my gosh , if it arrives in the United States , I know I will not have a life.
” On Saturday , March 14 , her supervisor at the health department called to tell her that someone in Newark had tested positive for the virus .
“ My heart fell to the floor , ” she recalls .
“ From that moment on , I knew that this was something that was going to be serious , and we needed to treat it as if it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , very long time.
” Over the next two months , Vilcant watched her worst nightmare come true , as the virus took hold of her city .
On the peak day of April 6 , there were 162 positive test results .
Local hospital intensive care units approached capacity .
Vilcant and her colleague were the only two disease investigators employed by the city , and there was no way that the two of them could call every person who tested positive for the coronavirus .
The health department had to bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vilcant ’ s premonition about work taking over her life proved correct : As the city ’ s lead disease investigator , she worked 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. seven days a week .
She rarely saw her two school-aged children .
During those frightening days , it sometimes seemed to Vilcant as if the long hours weren ’ t even making a difference .
All around her , people were sick and dying .
Sometimes , when a member of her team called someone to tell them that they had tested positive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hostile .
How dare she imply that their family had let the virus in ?
Even those who wanted to cooperate sometimes couldn ’ t .
In Newark , where 28 percent of residents live below the poverty line , staying home for two weeks was out of the question for many .
As the pandemic wore on , it became clear that Black and hispanic people were especially likely to suffer severe cases and die from the virus—these two groups make up 86 percent of the city ’ s population .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faced long odds .
Yet about two months into the pandemic , something astonishing happened : Cases in the city began to decline .
Plus , the trend continued .
By early May , there were 50–60 cases most days , by June , the numbers fell to the 20s .
This was remarkable , especially given the city ’ s proximity to New York City , where the virus was still raging .
Perry Halkitis , dean of the School of Public Health at nearby Rutgers University , attributes the city ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ factors : Newark Mayor Ras Baraka showed strong leadership , briefing the city every day in candid town halls on Facebook Live .
The university ’ s public health school provided expertise and a willing group of students ready to volunteer and work alongside Berlyne and her colleagues .
But probably the most important factor , says Halkitis , who helped coordinate Newark ’ s pandemic response , was the city ’ s investment in a particular strategy .
During an outbreak , infectious disease circles have a mantra : Test , trace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases , track down the people who each patient may have exposed , and quarantine people who may be sick until they have a negative test .
The strategy , which has been honed by public health workers around the world over several decades , has successfully controlled outbreaks of tuberculosis , SARS , and MERS , and Ebola .
As the last six months of the pandemic have shown , implementing that mantra is easier said than done .
Most parts of the United States are still struggling with the testing step @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But almost as soon as COVID-19 arrived in Newark , leaders—including the mayor , health department officials , and experts from the Rutgers—mobilized to build a test-trace-isolate infrastructure for the city .
“ We were all coming together , ” said Halkitis .
“ What was really good for Newark was that all hands were on deck.
” Against the backdrop of the national shortage of coronavirus tests , Newark public health officials strategized about how best to use the small number of tests they had .
Other cities ’ testing sites were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mark Wade , the head of the city ’ s Department of Health and Community Wellness , made a deliberate decision to make it as easy as possible for people without access to health care to get tested .
In the late spring , when it became clear that the coronavirus was especially severe in Black and Brown communities , the health department opened more testing sites in minority neighborhoods and made a special effort to reach senior citizens who lived there .
Elsewhere in the United States , cities built drive-through testing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t have cars , the sites took walk-up patients , as well .
The city also spent $ 2 million to set up a facility to test 2,200 homeless people at an airport hotel and to find temporary housing for those who were infected .
Hoping to ensure that they made the most out of each precious test , Newark officials focused their efforts on contact tracing .
Because the cash-strapped city didn ’ t have money to immediately hire a tracing corps , the health department recruited volunteers .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and running , but city leaders wanted to improve the data collection and put more muscle into the tracing effort .
They looked to nearby Massachusetts , whose innovative tracing program—the first and most ambitious in the country—was showing signs of success .
The force behind Massachusetts ’ program was a global public health organization called Partners in Health , and its tracing method combined carefully trained tracers and a sophisticated data management system .
With the help of an infusion of cash from the state , Newark hired Partners in Health and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Public Health to supercharge its tracing system .
In short order , the city hired 400 contact tracers , many of them nursing and public health students from Rutgers .
Many of the lessons that the PIH team learned in Massachusetts proved useful in Newark .
For example , they worked with cellphone carriers to make contact tracers ’ number appear as “ COVID-19 info ” rather than “ unlisted , ” in order to improve the chances that people would answer the call .
But there were other , more fundamental challenges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Massachusetts .
Setting up testing sites for the most vulnerable people in the city—especially those in the Black and Brown communities—only solved part of the problem .
A more serious one was that many residents were uncomfortable giving out personal information to contact tracers .
Some had experienced discrimination at doctors ’ offices , so they were naturally wary of sharing medical information with strangers .
In Newark , the contact tracers ran the risk of coming off as dispassionate data collectors—workers who were only interested in numbers , not individuals .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to explain clearly that the information they were gathering would be kept private .
They were also trained to listen carefully and to respond with empathy .
“ It ’ s not just about data collection , ” said Katie Bollbach , the Partners in Health liaison who led the group ’ s team in Newark .
“ It ’ s about ensuring people feel supported and cared for.
” Bollbach , who had worked on Partners in Health ’ s Ebola response in Rwanda and Sierra Leone before the pandemic , told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States was jarring , but not in the way you might expect .
She was immediately struck by how limited the access to healthcare many Americans had .
In Sierra Leone , one of the poorest countries in the world , most villages had free community clinics , along with workers who traveled door-to-door to check on residents during infectious disease outbreaks .
In America , that kind of outpouring of health support was unimaginable .
“ The emphasis on community-based care as the cornerstone of good public health in Sierra Leone is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system here in the United States , ” she told me .
“ Here , we ’ re focused on health as a commodity , rather than as a human right.
” What Partners in Health learned over many years spent working on outbreaks in Africa was that testing and tracing are useless without the final step of isolating .
Bollbach ’ s team in Sierra Leone found that most people in villages couldn ’ t afford food and other necessities during the 21-day quarantine period necessary to stop the spread of Ebola @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , soap , chlorine—as well as groceries , water , and other supplies to families in isolation .
At first it was Partners in Health that provided the supplies , then the government took over .
In addition to the material supplies , Partners in Health worked with the health department to send workers to check on people in quarantine : How were they doing ?
Did anyone else in the house have symptoms ?
These simple gestures increased the level of trust in the health department .
They also increased the likelihood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Regular check-ins , the team found , made people cooped up in their homes feel less alone .
Bollbach and her team brought those lessons to Newark and created support systems for people who had to quarantine at home .
One of them was Wendy Pillajo , who lives with her parents , father-in-law , husband , and three-year-old daughter in an apartment in Newark .
Pillajo , a medical assistant at an urgent care clinic , told me about her family ’ s battle with coronavirus .
In May , a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get-together , everyone in her household except her came down with COVID-19 .
The family ’ s symptoms ranged from mild ( her daughter had a fever for a day ) to severe—her parents had debilitating chest congestion , muscle aches , and stomach problems .
Remarkably , Pillajo , who was tested several times , never had a positive result .
A few months later , Pillajo ’ s mother tested positive again , and again the whole family quarantined for two weeks .
During each quarantine period , workers from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every day to check in .
They would ask how each member of the family was feeling , and whether anyone needed anything .
After Pillajo ’ s parents ’ tests came back positive , they told the rest of the family how to get to a free walk-up testing site .
When Pillajo said she might have trouble getting groceries delivered , the city sent hot meals : Chicken , mashed potatoes , cornbread , rice .
Pillajo told me she appreciated the groceries , but even more , she was grateful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ She was so worried about her father that she couldn ’ t concentrate on anything else .
Through the daily check-ins , “ we understood what was going on , and we saw they were getting better , ” she said .
“ That really helped , to know they care about us.
” By August , Newark ’ s hard work had paid off .
There were just a handful of new cases each day , a precipitous decline from more than a hundred a day at the peak in April .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ he noticed that the culture of public health had taken hold .
Citizens wore masks .
They kept their distance from one another .
They obeyed the 9:30 p.m. curfew .
“ People are taking this very seriously , ” he said .
If the intensive test-trace-isolate strategy has worked so well in Newark and Massachusetts , then why hasn ’ t it caught on in the rest of the country ?
Halkitis believes that one reason has to do with leadership .
From the very beginning , the Trump administration has provided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trustworthy pandemic response guidance , and many cities and states were far from coordinated in their actions .
In Newark , from the very beginning of the pandemic , Mayor Baraka had the support of New Jersey Gov .
Phil Murphy—their plans for controlling the pandemic aligned .
Other cities have not had the benefit of such a unified vision .
In New York City , Mayor Bill De Blasio clashed with Governor Andrew Cuomo during the early days of the pandemic—the governor scoffed at the mayor ’ s suggestion in March that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While the leaders bickered , the virus spread unchecked , and by the end of March , New York City became ground zero for the pandemic .
In Atlanta , Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms butted heads with Republican Governor Brian Kemp—he undermined her every step of the way , from loosening the rules for the initial shutdown to suing her over the mask ordinance she enacted .
( He later withdrew the lawsuit challenging the mask ordinance . )
Today , in a CDC ranking of coronavirus cases by state , Georgia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and local leaders have been on their own , forced to navigate their coronavirus plans with hardly any guidance at all from the federal government .
As President Donald Trump told governors in April , “ You ’ re going to call your own shots.
” Another problem with test-trace-isolate , says Halkitis , is that doesn ’ t work right away .
There is a tendency , he said , “ for a large portion of the American public to want the easy answers.
” Indeed , this fantasy is evident in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ silver-bullet cures like hydroxychloroquine .
Again , that kind of thinking extends beyond the current administration .
( How many times have you fantasized about what you ’ ll do when the vaccine arrives ? )
But in the actual work of infectious disease control , says Halkitis , “ This disease requires hard work , and it means that you have to give up some things.
” Joia Mukherjee , chief medical officer of Partners in Health , echoed those sentiments .
“ What ’ s a shame is that we as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” in contact tracing .
But she sees Newark as a bright spot : “ Newark is a very hard place to work , ” she told me .
“ There ’ s a lot of poverty .
But the Department of Public Health there has the same view that we do at Partners in Health , which is : Protect the vulnerable.
” Vilcant feels a surge of satisfaction when she sees the chart showing the decline in coronavirus cases in her beloved city .
By the beginning of September , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day .
At these moments , she feels that the hard conversations , the logistical morasses , the 70-hour work weeks—it was all worth it .
But the pandemic isn ’ t over yet , and she knows it would be a mistake to let down her guard .
“ My investigators and my contact traces are having that mindset to push forward and continue to do the work that they ’ ve been doing , ” she said .
After so many months , this is hard .
It ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kids tell her that they hate her job because it takes her away from them .
“ I have to tell them , ‘ This is not going to be forever .
In the long run , you will understand why mommy had to take a lot of time off from family to devote my time to make sure that this process is done .
’ ”

For 12 years, Berlyne Vilcant has worked for the city of Newark, New Jersey, as a disease investigator, which means that when there’s a cluster of cases of a particular disease—salmonella at a restaurant, say, or norovirus in a hotel—it’s her job to figure out how it started, who caught it, and how to stop it from spreading further. A lifelong Newark resident, she grew up in a family of Haitian immigrants, and even as a child knew that she wanted to work in health care. As a teenager, inspired by the character of a restaurant health inspector in the 2003 movie Deliver Us from Eva, she decided to go into public health.
In January, Vilcant was busy with run-of-the-mill outbreaks: hand, foot, and mouth disease at a daycare, Legionella at a senior center, isolated cases of giardia. When she told her friends that she was worried about a new virus tearing through China, they reassured her. Don’t worry, they said, it won’t come here. But as Vilcant read more reports, she remembers thinking, “Oh my gosh, if it arrives in the United States, I know I will not have a life.” On Saturday, March 14, her supervisor at the health department called to tell her that someone in Newark had tested positive for the virus. “My heart fell to the floor,” she recalls. “From that moment on, I knew that this was something that was going to be serious, and we needed to treat it as if it was going to be here for a very, very long time.”
Over the next two months, Vilcant watched her worst nightmare come true, as the virus took hold of her city. On the peak day of April 6, there were 162 positive test results. Local hospital intensive care units approached capacity. Vilcant and her colleague were the only two disease investigators employed by the city, and there was no way that the two of them could call every person who tested positive for the coronavirus. The health department had to bring in seven restaurant inspectors to help. Vilcant’s premonition about work taking over her life proved correct: As the city’s lead disease investigator, she worked 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. seven days a week. She rarely saw her two school-aged children.
During those frightening days, it sometimes seemed to Vilcant as if the long hours weren’t even making a difference. All around her, people were sick and dying. Sometimes, when a member of her team called someone to tell them that they had tested positive for the virus, the reaction was hostile. How dare she imply that their family had let the virus in? Even those who wanted to cooperate sometimes couldn’t. In Newark, where 28 percent of residents live below the poverty line, staying home for two weeks was out of the question for many. As the pandemic wore on, it became clear that Black and Latino people were especially likely to suffer severe cases and die from the virus—these two groups make up 86 percent of the city’s population.
In the battle against the coronavirus, Newark faced long odds. Yet about two months into the pandemic, something astonishing happened: Cases in the city began to decline. The trend continued: By early May, there were 50–60 cases most days, by June, the numbers fell to the 20s. This was remarkable, especially given the city’s proximity to New York City, where the virus was still raging.
Perry Halkitis, dean of the School of Public Health at nearby Rutgers University, attributes the city’s early success to a combination of factors: Newark Mayor Ras Baraka showed strong leadership, briefing the city every day in candid town halls on Facebook Live. The university’s public health school provided expertise and a willing group of students ready to volunteer and work alongside Berlyne and her colleagues. But probably the most important factor, says Halkitis, who helped coordinate Newark’s pandemic response, was the city’s investment in a particular strategy.
“We were all coming together. What was really good for Newark was that all hands were on deck.”
During an outbreak, infectious disease circles have a mantra: Test, trace, isolate. That is, diagnose cases, track down the people who each patient may have exposed, and quarantine people who may be sick until they have a negative test. The strategy, which has been honed by public health workers around the world over several decades, has successfully controlled outbreaks of tuberculosis, SARS, and MERS, and Ebola. As the last six months of the pandemic have shown, implementing that mantra is easier said than done. Most parts of the United States are still struggling with the testing step, much less tracing and isolating. But almost as soon as COVID-19 arrived in Newark, leaders—including the mayor, health department officials, and experts from the Rutgers—mobilized to build a test-trace-isolate infrastructure for the city. “We were all coming together,” said Halkitis. “What was really good for Newark was that all hands were on deck.”
Against the backdrop of the national shortage of coronavirus tests, Newark public health officials strategized about how best to use the small number of tests they had. Other cities’ testing sites were concentrated in affluent neighborhoods, but Dr. Mark Wade, the head of the city’s Department of Health and Community Wellness, made a deliberate decision to make it as easy as possible for people without access to health care to get tested. In the late spring, when it became clear that the coronavirus was especially severe in Black and Brown communities, the health department opened more testing sites in neighborhoods where people of color predominantly live, and made a special effort to reach senior citizens who lived there. Elsewhere in the United States, cities built drive-through testing centers—but in Newark, where many people don’t have cars, the sites took walk-up patients, as well. The city also spent $2 million to set up a facility to test 2,200 homeless people at an airport hotel and to find temporary housing for those who were infected.
Hoping to ensure that they made the most out of each precious test, Newark officials focused their efforts on contact tracing. Because the cash-strapped city didn’t have money to immediately hire a tracing corps, the health department recruited volunteers. By late April, the program was up and running, but city leaders wanted to improve the data collection and put more muscle into the tracing effort. They looked to nearby Massachusetts, whose innovative tracing program—the first and most ambitious in the country—was showing signs of success. The force behind Massachusetts’ program was a global public health organization called Partners in Health, and its tracing method combined carefully trained tracers and a sophisticated data management system. Newark teamed up with Partners in Health and the Rutgers School of Public Health to supercharge its tracing system. In short order, the city trained 400 contact tracers, many of them volunteers from Rutgers.
Many of the lessons that the PIH team learned in Massachusetts proved useful in Newark. For example, they worked with cellphone carriers to make contact tracers’ number appear as “COVID-19 info” rather than “unlisted,” in order to improve the chances that people would answer the call. But there were other, more fundamental challenges that they hadn’t faced in Massachusetts. Setting up testing sites for the most vulnerable people in the city—especially those in the Black and Brown communities—only solved part of the problem.
A more serious one was that many residents were uncomfortable giving out personal information to contact tracers. Some had experienced discrimination at doctors’ offices, so they were naturally wary of sharing medical information with strangers. In Newark, the contact tracers ran the risk of coming off as dispassionate data collectors—workers who were only interested in numbers, not individuals. For that reason, the workers were trained to explain clearly that the information they were gathering would be kept private. They were also trained to listen carefully and to respond with empathy. “It’s not just about data collection,” said Katie Bollbach, the Partners in Health liaison who led the group’s team in Newark. “It’s about ensuring people feel supported and cared for.”
Bollbach, who had worked on Partners in Health’s Ebola response in Rwanda and Sierra Leone before the pandemic, told me that her transition to the United States was jarring, but not in the way you might expect. She was immediately struck by how limited the access to health care many Americans had. In Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the world, most villages had free community clinics, along with workers who traveled door-to-door to check on residents during infectious disease outbreaks. In America, that kind of outpouring of health support was unimaginable. “The emphasis on community-based care as the cornerstone of good public health in Sierra Leone is just really stark as compared to our system here in the United States,” she told me. “Here, we’re focused on health as a commodity, rather than as a human right.”
“The emphasis on community-based care as the cornerstone of good public health in Sierra Leone is just really stark as compared to our system here in the United States.”
What Partners in Health learned over many years spent working on outbreaks in Africa was that testing and tracing are useless without the final step of isolating. Bollbach’s team in Sierra Leone found that most people in villages couldn’t afford food and other necessities during the 21-day quarantine period necessary to stop the spread of Ebola. So officials handed out cleaning supplies—gloves, soap, chlorine—as well as groceries, water, and other supplies to families in isolation. At first it was Partners in Health that provided the supplies, then the government took over. In addition to the material supplies, Partners in Health worked with the health department to send workers to check on people in quarantine: How were they doing? Did anyone else in the house have symptoms? These simple gestures increased the level of trust in the health department. They also increased the likelihood that people would finish the quarantine. Regular check-ins, the team found, made people cooped up in their homes feel less alone.
Bollbach and her team brought those lessons to Newark and created support systems for people who had to quarantine at home. One of them was Wendy Pillajo, who lives with her parents, father-in-law, husband, and three-year-old daughter in an apartment in Newark. Pillajo, a medical assistant at an urgent care clinic, told me about her family’s battle with coronavirus. In May, a few days after her mother attended a family get-together, everyone in her household except her came down with COVID-19. The family’s symptoms ranged from mild (her daughter had a fever for a day) to severe—her parents had debilitating chest congestion, muscle aches, and stomach problems. Remarkably, Pillajo, who was tested several times, never had a positive result. A few months later, Pillajo’s mother tested positive again, and again the whole family quarantined for two weeks.
During each quarantine period, workers from the health department called Pillajo’s family every day to check in. They would ask how each member of the family was feeling, and whether anyone needed anything. After Pillajo’s parents’ tests came back positive, they told the rest of the family how to get to a free walk-up testing site. When Pillajo said she might have trouble getting groceries delivered, the city sent hot meals: Chicken, mashed potatoes, cornbread, rice. Pillajo told me she appreciated the groceries, but even more, she was grateful to have someone to ask questions. She was so worried about her father that she couldn’t concentrate on anything else. Through the daily check-ins, “we understood what was going on, and we saw they were getting better,” she said. “That really helped, to know they care about us.”
By August, Newark’s hard work had paid off. There were just a handful of new cases each day, a precipitous decline from more than a hundred a day at the peak in April. As Halkitis walked around the city, he noticed that the culture of public health had taken hold. Citizens wore masks. They kept their distance from one another. They obeyed the 9:30 p.m. curfew. “People are taking this very seriously,” he said.
If the intensive test-trace-isolate strategy has worked so well in Newark and Massachusetts, then why hasn’t it caught on in the rest of the country? Halkitis believes that one reason has to do with leadership. From the very beginning, the Trump administration has provided little in the way of comprehensive and trustworthy pandemic response guidance, and many cities and states were far from coordinated in their actions. In Newark, from the very beginning of the pandemic, Mayor Baraka had the support of New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy—their plans for controlling the pandemic aligned.
Other cities have not had the benefit of such a unified vision. In New York City, Mayor Bill De Blasio clashed with Governor Andrew Cuomo during the early days of the pandemic—the governor scoffed at the mayor’s suggestion in March that he might need to close the schools. While the leaders bickered, the virus spread unchecked, and by the end of March, New York City became ground zero for the pandemic. In Atlanta, Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms butted heads with Republican Governor Brian Kemp—he undermined her every step of the way, from loosening the rules for the initial shutdown to suing her over the mask ordinance she enacted. (He later withdrew the lawsuit challenging the mask ordinance.) Today, in a CDC ranking of coronavirus cases by state, Georgia ranks fourth in the nation. State and local leaders have been on their own, forced to navigate their coronavirus plans with hardly any guidance at all from the federal government. As President Donald Trump told governors in April, “You’re going to call your own shots.”
Another problem with test-trace-isolate, says Halkitis, is that doesn’t work right away. There is a tendency, he said, “for a large portion of the American public to want the easy answers.” Indeed, this fantasy is evident in Trump’s insistence on promoting supposed silver-bullet cures like hydroxychloroquine. Again, that kind of thinking extends beyond the current administration. (How many times have you fantasized about what you’ll do when the vaccine arrives?) But in the actual work of infectious disease control, says Halkitis, “This disease requires hard work, and it means that you have to give up some things.”
Joia Mukherjee, chief medical officer of Partners in Health, echoed those sentiments. “What’s a shame is that we as the United States have been totally unambitious” in contact tracing. But she sees Newark as a bright spot: “Newark is a very hard place to work,” she told me. “There’s a lot of poverty. But the Department of Public Health there has the same view that we do at Partners in Health, which is: Protect the vulnerable.”
Vilcant feels a surge of satisfaction when she sees the chart showing the decline in coronavirus cases in her beloved city. By the beginning of September, there were only a handful of cases every day. At these moments, she feels that the hard conversations, the logistical morasses, the 70-hour work weeks—it was all worth it. But the pandemic isn’t over yet, and she knows it would be a mistake to let down her guard. “My investigators and my contact traces are having that mindset to push forward and continue to do the work that they’ve been doing,” she said. After so many months, this is hard. It’s a marathon. Sometimes, Vilcant’s kids tell her that they hate her job because it takes her away from them. “I have to tell them, ‘This is not going to be forever. In the long run, you will understand why mommy had to take a lot of time off from family to devote my time to make sure that this process is done.’”


motherjones--2020-09-09--Why Is the DOJ Intervening in E. Jean Carroll’s Suit Against Trump? A Former US Attorney Explains

Yesterday , in what the New York Times dubbed a “ highly unusual legal move , ” the Department of Justice moved to take over the defense of President Donald Trump in the defamation lawsuit filed against him by E. Jean Carroll , a writer and advice columnist , who alleges Trump raped her in a Bergdorf Goodman dressing room in the mid-1990s .
Carroll sued Trump for defamation in New York state court last November , months after New York Magazine first published a story containing her allegations .
Her lawsuit claims that the president defamed her when , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ story was published that June , Trump denied it at least three times , saying that her story was fabricated , that he had never met Carroll ( despite a 1987 photograph showing them together at a party ) , and that he would not have assaulted Carroll because she was “ not [ his ] type.
” “ The rape of a woman is a violent crime ; compounding that crime with acts of malicious libel is abhorrent , ” her lawsuit states .
Earlier this summer , Trump tried and failed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , arguing that under the Constitution , a sitting president was immune from civil lawsuits in state court .
A judge rejected that theory last month ; then yesterday , on the last day for Trump to appeal that ruling , the Department of Justice moved to get involved , theorizing that because Trump was acting as a government employee when he denied Carroll ’ s claims , the “ United States ” is the proper defendant .
If a federal judge permits the move , it would allow government lawyers , paid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president—and would likely result in Carroll ’ s case being dismissed .
I chatted with Barbara McQuade , a law professor at the University of Michigan and former US Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan , to break down what the remarkable motion could mean for Carroll ’ s quest to hold Trump accountable .
Our conversation has been condensed and edited for length and clarity .
Yesterday , the Department of Justice filed a motion to move the case to federal court and substitute the United States in as a defendant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s lawsuit .
What does that mean ?
This is a fairly routine thing that the government does from time to time : Somebody who is a government employee gets sued and they take it to the boss and say , “ Look , I got sued for this .
What do we do ?
” The boss takes it , it works its way to DOJ , and DOJ says , “ We got this .
We ’ ll take care of it.
” The Department of Justice routinely will [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ federal court , and substitute the United States for the individual defendant , if the tort allegedly occurred within the scope of the [ person ’ s ] employment .
A typical case might be a mail carrier who ’ s involved in a car accident with a postal truck .
It was within the scope of her duties , and so the United States will substitute itself for the defendant , and will defend that case [ with ] Department of Justice lawyers instead of private attorneys .
Taxpayers will pay the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should prevail and there is some sort of money judgment , it ’ s the taxpayers who would pay those damages .
That is what DOJ has endeavored to do with Donald Trump .
The question , the legal question , is whether his remarks occurred within the scope of his employment as president of the United States .
I think there will be some legal analysis , and perhaps disagreement , about that view .
Is there a general understanding of what it means to be acting within the scope of one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shift would be one thing .
For a letter carrier , if they ’ re driving their mail truck after they ’ ve punched in for the morning , that ’ s a pretty easy case to say they ’ re within the scope of their duties .
If the postal employee was driving his personal vehicle on the weekend and was involved in a car accident , I think we could quite clearly say he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time .
But whether you ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capacity , when it comes to the president , can be a little more gray .
The presidency is kind of a 24/7 job .
So it ’ s difficult to say you were off duty when this occurred .
So if you ’ re a politician , and you use an official press conference to say that a woman accusing you of rape is “ not your type , ” the DOJ is saying that that sort of blatant misogyny is within the scope of your office ?
Is that really the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t think they look at the content of the statement .
That issue will be litigated .
The question is , when he uttered the words—regardless what those words are—did he do so in the scope of his employment ?
I see three separate statements that Jean Carroll alleges were defamatory .
Two of them occurred in response to questions by members of the press .
I think one could argue that those are within the scope of his employment , because it is part of his duties to be a spokesperson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s asked questions , question one is about China , question two is about the coronavirus , and question three is about these allegations , and he denies them , I think one could argue that occurred within the scope of his employment .
But I think the one that will fail to survive scrutiny is [ when ] he issued a written statement denying the allegations and saying it was fabricated .
I don ’ t think one could make a reasonable argument that that was issued in the scope of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looks not at what he said , at least at this point in the case , but at the context the statement was made in .
If this motion succeeds—if the federal judge decides , yes , this is within the scope of Trump ’ s employment and the United States is the proper defendant—you have said that the case will likely be dismissed .
Can you explain why ?
There ’ s a concept called sovereign immunity , which says the government can not be sued unless Congress has created an exception @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There are some circumstances where Congress says , “ It is ok to sue the United States.
” One of those things is for negligence—so in the case of the postal worker involved in an accident , that suit could proceed .
But the United States has not consented to be sued for defamation .
So if the DOJ is successful in substituting in the United States for Donald Trump , then its next step will very likely be a motion to dismiss for sovereign immunity .
I think if they get that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ win .
That would result in dismissal of the entire case .
That ’ s the whole game , then .
Yep .
It all comes down to scope of employment .
I ’ m definitely not an expert , but this argument seems…bonkers .
How normal is this ?
Very common in routine cases .
Involving the president ?
I ’ ve never heard of one .
Carroll reacted to the filing yesterday by writing on Twitter that Trump has sicced the DOJ on her just at the moment he was required @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discovery .
What ’ s the significance of the timing here ?
It ’ s odd that this case has been litigated , and lots of activity has occurred in the state court , and only now , 10 months later , has DOJ said , “ Oh , wait , this case belongs in federal court and United States is the real party here.
” It seems to me that they were playing a strategic game : “ Let ’ s see if we can win in state court first , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The next step would be discovery , things like turning over DNA samples , sitting for a deposition , and turning over documents .
No doubt those are things that President Trump would like to avoid leading up to an election .
Even if he ultimately loses this argument about scope of employment , by delaying , he has probably won what he really wants to win , which is keeping this languishing past the election .
How much further past the election could this development push things ?
First , this [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision , which may occur sometime in the next month or so .
If [ it denies the motion and ] Trump ’ s lawyers appeal that decision , it could take a year to get that decision back .
He could then appeal that to the Supreme Court , which could take another year .
So now we ’ re in , you know , 2022 or somewhere like that , before the case actually gets remanded back to court .
Then it ’ s back to square one .
So I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ couple of years if he wants to .
What does this all mean for Carroll ’ s attempts to get a DNA sample from Trump ?
It certainly delays things .
Ultimately , she may get the sample that she demands , but I think not for a while .
There are lots of creative ways of using DNA in legal cases that have been invented in the last few years—I ’ m thinking about genetic genealogy , the technique used to identify the Golden State Killer through DNA from his distant relatives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mary Trump [ Trump ’ s niece who recently wrote a damning book about her uncle ] from spitting in a tube and giving it to Roberta Kaplan , Carroll ’ s lawyer ?
She could do it voluntarily .
That ’ s a really interesting theory .
I don ’ t think there ’ s anything that would preclude her because she has control of her own DNA , even if it might match .
What would happen if Carroll was able to prove that there was a DNA match to Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this way ?
Well , she wouldn ’ t be able to use it in court .
She might be able to use it in the court of public opinion to entice Trump to settle the case .
She would share that , as very powerful evidence that she ’ s likely to prevail at the end of the day .
So it might be an incentive for him to resolve the case .
In the meantime , it can ’ t be used .

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Yesterday, in what the New York Times dubbed a “highly unusual legal move,” the Department of Justice moved to take over the defense of President Donald Trump in the defamation lawsuit filed against him by E. Jean Carroll, a writer and advice columnist, who alleges Trump raped her in a Bergdorf Goodman dressing room in the mid-1990s.
Carroll sued Trump for defamation in New York state court last November, months after New York Magazine first published a story containing her allegations. Her lawsuit claims that the president defamed her when, in the hours and days after the story was published that June, Trump denied it at least three times, saying that her story was fabricated, that he had never met Carroll (despite a 1987 photograph showing them together at a party), and that he would not have assaulted Carroll because she was “not [his] type.” “The rape of a woman is a violent crime; compounding that crime with acts of malicious libel is abhorrent,” her lawsuit states.
“The legal question is whether his remarks occurred within the scope of his employment as president of the United States. I think there will be some legal analysis, and perhaps disagreement, about that view.”
Earlier this summer, Trump tried and failed to have the lawsuit put on hold, arguing that under the Constitution, a sitting president was immune from civil lawsuits in state court. A judge rejected that theory last month; then yesterday, on the last day for Trump to appeal that ruling, the Department of Justice moved to get involved, theorizing that because Trump was acting as a government employee when he denied Carroll’s claims, the “United States” is the proper defendant. If a federal judge permits the move, it would allow government lawyers, paid with taxpayer money, to defend the president—and would likely result in Carroll’s case being dismissed.
I chatted with Barbara McQuade, a law professor at the University of Michigan and former US Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, to break down what the remarkable motion could mean for Carroll’s quest to hold Trump accountable. Our conversation has been condensed and edited for length and clarity.
Yesterday, the Department of Justice filed a motion to move the case to federal court and substitute the United States in as a defendant for Donald Trump in E. Jean Carroll’s lawsuit. What does that mean?
This is a fairly routine thing that the government does from time to time: Somebody who is a government employee gets sued and they take it to the boss and say, “Look, I got sued for this. What do we do?” The boss takes it, it works its way to DOJ, and DOJ says, “We got this. We’ll take care of it.”
The Department of Justice routinely will [send] a case from state to federal court, and substitute the United States for the individual defendant, if the tort allegedly occurred within the scope of the [person’s] employment. A typical case might be a mail carrier who’s involved in a car accident with a postal truck. It was within the scope of her duties, and so the United States will substitute itself for the defendant, and will defend that case [with] Department of Justice lawyers instead of private attorneys. Taxpayers will pay the legal defense bills. If the plaintiff should prevail and there is some sort of money judgment, it’s the taxpayers who would pay those damages.
“Whether you’re acting in your personal or official capacity, when it comes to the president, can be a little more gray. The presidency is kind of a 24/7 job.”
That is what DOJ has endeavored to do with Donald Trump. The question, the legal question, is whether his remarks occurred within the scope of his employment as president of the United States. I think there will be some legal analysis, and perhaps disagreement, about that view.
Is there a general understanding of what it means to be acting within the scope of one’s office?
During your job shift would be one thing. For a letter carrier, if they’re driving their mail truck after they’ve punched in for the morning, that’s a pretty easy case to say they’re within the scope of their duties. If the postal employee was driving his personal vehicle on the weekend and was involved in a car accident, I think we could quite clearly say he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time. But whether you’re acting in your personal or official capacity, when it comes to the president, can be a little more gray. The presidency is kind of a 24/7 job. So it’s difficult to say you were off duty when this occurred.
So if you’re a politician, and you use an official press conference to say that a woman accusing you of rape is “not your type,” the DOJ is saying that that sort of blatant misogyny is within the scope of your office? Is that really the argument being made here?
I don’t think they look at the content of the statement. That issue will be litigated. The question is, when he uttered the words—regardless what those words are—did he do so in the scope of his employment?
I see three separate statements that Jean Carroll alleges were defamatory. Two of them occurred in response to questions by members of the press. I think one could argue that those are within the scope of his employment, because it is part of his duties to be a spokesperson for the White House. If he’s asked questions, question one is about China, question two is about the coronavirus, and question three is about these allegations, and he denies them, I think one could argue that occurred within the scope of his employment. But I think the one that will fail to survive scrutiny is [when] he issued a written statement denying the allegations and saying it was fabricated. I don’t think one could make a reasonable argument that that was issued in the scope of his official duties.
So the law looks not at what he said, at least at this point in the case, but at the context the statement was made in.
Right.
“Even if he ultimately loses this argument about scope of employment, by delaying, he has probably won what he really wants to win, which is keeping this languishing past the election.”
If this motion succeeds—if the federal judge decides, yes, this is within the scope of Trump’s employment and the United States is the proper defendant—you have said that the case will likely be dismissed. Can you explain why?
There’s a concept called sovereign immunity, which says the government cannot be sued unless Congress has created an exception to that [with] legislation. There are some circumstances where Congress says, “It is ok to sue the United States.” One of those things is for negligence—so in the case of the postal worker involved in an accident, that suit could proceed. But the United States has not consented to be sued for defamation. So if the DOJ is successful in substituting in the United States for Donald Trump, then its next step will very likely be a motion to dismiss for sovereign immunity. I think if they get that far, that argument is likely to win. That would result in dismissal of the entire case.
That’s the whole game, then.
Yep. It all comes down to scope of employment.
I’m definitely not an expert, but this argument seems…bonkers. How normal is this?
Very common in routine cases. Involving the president? I’ve never heard of one.
Carroll reacted to the filing yesterday by writing on Twitter that Trump has sicced the DOJ on her just at the moment he was required to produce documents, DNA, and discovery. What’s the significance of the timing here?
It’s odd that this case has been litigated, and lots of activity has occurred in the state court, and only now, 10 months later, has DOJ said, “Oh, wait, this case belongs in federal court and United States is the real party here.” It seems to me that they were playing a strategic game: “Let’s see if we can win in state court first, and drag this out for a while.”
The next step would be discovery, things like turning over DNA samples, sitting for a deposition, and turning over documents. No doubt those are things that President Trump would like to avoid leading up to an election. Even if he ultimately loses this argument about scope of employment, by delaying, he has probably won what he really wants to win, which is keeping this languishing past the election.
How much further past the election could this development push things?
First, this [federal] court has to make a decision, which may occur sometime in the next month or so. If [it denies the motion and] Trump’s lawyers appeal that decision, it could take a year to get that decision back. He could then appeal that to the Supreme Court, which could take another year. So now we’re in, you know, 2022 or somewhere like that, before the case actually gets remanded back to court. Then it’s back to square one. So I think he could delay it by a couple of years if he wants to.
“Very common in routine cases. Involving the president? I’ve never heard of one.”
What does this all mean for Carroll’s attempts to get a DNA sample from Trump?
It certainly delays things. Ultimately, she may get the sample that she demands, but I think not for a while.
There are lots of creative ways of using DNA in legal cases that have been invented in the last few years—I’m thinking about genetic genealogy, the technique used to identify the Golden State Killer through DNA from his distant relatives. Does anything preclude, say, Mary Trump [Trump’s niece who recently wrote a damning book about her uncle] from spitting in a tube and giving it to Roberta Kaplan, Carroll’s lawyer?
She could do it voluntarily. That’s a really interesting theory. I don’t think there’s anything that would preclude her because she has control of her own DNA, even if it might match.
What would happen if Carroll was able to prove that there was a DNA match to Trump while the case was being stalled in this way?
Well, she wouldn’t be able to use it in court. She might be able to use it in the court of public opinion to entice Trump to settle the case. She would share that, as very powerful evidence that she’s likely to prevail at the end of the day. So it might be an incentive for him to resolve the case. In the meantime, it can’t be used.


motherjones--2020-09-09--Former Intelligence Official Says He Was Pressured to Alter Findings to Back Trump

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In a wide-ranging whistleblower complaint unveiled Wednesday , a former top-ranking Homeland Security official alleges that members of the Trump administration repeatedly pressured him to manipulate intelligence assessments to match the president ’ s false public assertions .
Brian Murphy—who previously served as acting head of DHS ’ s intelligence unit—says in the complaint that Chad Wolf , the acting head of DHS , ordered him to withhold intelligence assessments detailing Russian efforts to spread disinformation aimed at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made the President look bad.
” Murphy says Wolf claimed that directive reflected instructions to him from White House national security adviser Robert O ’ Brien .
Murphy also claims that acting Deputy DHS Secretary Ken Cuccinelli and former DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen pushed him to tailor intelligence reports to support Trump ’ s political messaging .
That included pressure in 2018 to help Nielsen play up the danger of suspected terrorists entering the United States from Mexico .
It also allegedly included pressure this year from Wolf and Cuccinelli to doctor a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comments about Antifa and left-leaning groups , while downplaying the dangers posed by white supremacist groups .
Murphy was ousted from his position in July amid allegations that his office improperly compiled information on journalists and protesters .
His whistleblower complaint was released by the House Intelligence Committee on Wednesday .

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motherjones--2020-09-09--Donald Trump Is Considering Pouring $100 Million Into His Campaign. Does He Even Have the Cash?

Responding to a report that his campaign was a facing a possible cash crunch in the final weeks before the election , Donald Trump tweeted Tuesday morning that , if his reelection operation comes up short , he ’ d put his own money into the race .
According to Bloomberg , Trump is considering ponying up as much as $ 100 million .
But does he even have that kind of money to spend ?
In 2016 , Trump pledged to spend $ 100 million on his campaign , but that never actually happened .
He loaned his campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forgave these debts ) .
After making his wealth and ability to self fund his presidential run a central theme of his campaign—and claiming he alone among his Republican rivals would not be beholden to the megadonors who had Washington politicians in their pockets—Trump gladly accepted help from big contributors in the general election .
So far in 2020 Trump hasn ’ t spent any of his own money on the race , but according to the New York Times , Trump ’ s campaign may be running low on cash .
Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 1.1 billion for his reelection , but by the end of July they had spent more than $ 800 million ( including on such pricey expenditures as an $ 11 million Super Bowl ad buy ) .
Trump has yet to report his August fundraising numbers , but Democratic nominee Joe Biden had a monster haul last month—he raised more than $ 360 million , which is more than , say , John McCain spent on his entire 2008 campaign .
Unless Trump ’ s campaign matches that figure , Trump may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final stretch unless he digs into his own pockets .
But even wealthy businessmen sometimes don ’ t have lots of cash on hand , and Trump may not be in a position to personally muster enough money to cover the gap he ’ s facing against Biden .
The last , best picture we have of Trump ’ s assets comes from his most recent personal financial disclosure .
It shows that at the end of 2019 Trump had anywhere between $ 46.7 million and $ 156.6 million available in checking or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cash reserves are near the top of that range , a $ 100 million loan would consume most of his available cash .
Even a loan of $ 50 million might be a heavy lift .
Trump does have a stock portfolio and plenty of properties he could sell , but most of those would be hard to convert to cash in a short period of time .
Also , a lot has happened since Trump filed that financial disclosure .
In particular , a pandemic that battered the international travel and hotel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Trump ’ s annual business revenues .
At one point last spring , nearly every Trump property was closed .
At least one—his Vancouver hotel—seems to have been permanently shuttered .
Given the impact on his business , which was already struggling in some areas before the pandemic , Trump might have more pressing needs for his cash .
For example , his Scottish golf resorts have been losing money for years , and that was before the COVID-19 essentially cancelled the 2020 summer golf season for international travelers .
On top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has about $ 479 million in loans coming due in the next four years that Trump will either have to pay off or refinance .
Ultimately , Trump may have to make a difficult choice between rescuing his political operation and his business empire .

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Responding to a report that his campaign was a facing a possible cash crunch in the final weeks before the election, Donald Trump tweeted Tuesday morning that, if his reelection operation comes up short, he’d put his own money into the race. According to Bloomberg, Trump is considering ponying up as much as $100 million. But does he even have that kind of money to spend?
….Like I did in the 2016 Primaries, if more money is needed, which I doubt it will be, I will put it up! — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) September 8, 2020
In 2016, Trump pledged to spend $100 million on his campaign, but that never actually happened. He loaned his campaign roughly $47 million (and eventually forgave these debts). After making his wealth and ability to self fund his presidential run a central theme of his campaign—and claiming he alone among his Republican rivals would not be beholden to the megadonors who had Washington politicians in their pockets—Trump gladly accepted help from big contributors in the general election.
So far in 2020 Trump hasn’t spent any of his own money on the race, but according to the New York Times, Trump’s campaign may be running low on cash. Trump and the Republican National Committee have raised $1.1 billion for his reelection, but by the end of July they had spent more than $800 million (including on such pricey expenditures as an $11 million Super Bowl ad buy). Trump has yet to report his August fundraising numbers, but Democratic nominee Joe Biden had a monster haul last month—he raised more than $360 million, which is more than, say, John McCain spent on his entire 2008 campaign. Unless Trump’s campaign matches that figure, Trump may find himself coming up short in the final stretch unless he digs into his own pockets.
But even wealthy businessmen sometimes don’t have lots of cash on hand, and Trump may not be in a position to personally muster enough money to cover the gap he’s facing against Biden. The last, best picture we have of Trump’s assets comes from his most recent personal financial disclosure. It shows that at the end of 2019 Trump had anywhere between $46.7 million and $156.6 million available in checking or money-market accounts. Assuming Trump’s cash reserves are near the top of that range, a $100 million loan would consume most of his available cash. Even a loan of $50 million might be a heavy lift. Trump does have a stock portfolio and plenty of properties he could sell, but most of those would be hard to convert to cash in a short period of time.
If Trump has access to $100m in cash, then I have a gold plated rainbow unicorn. https://t.co/pazmtS2UmO — Martyn McLaughlin (@MartynMcL) September 8, 2020
Also, a lot has happened since Trump filed that financial disclosure. In particular, a pandemic that battered the international travel and hotel business, which makes up about two-thirds of Trump’s annual business revenues. At one point last spring, nearly every Trump property was closed. At least one—his Vancouver hotel—seems to have been permanently shuttered.
Given the impact on his business, which was already struggling in some areas before the pandemic, Trump might have more pressing needs for his cash. For example, his Scottish golf resorts have been losing money for years, and that was before the COVID-19 essentially cancelled the 2020 summer golf season for international travelers. On top of that, Trump’s company has about $479 million in loans coming due in the next four years that Trump will either have to pay off or refinance.
Ultimately, Trump may have to make a difficult choice between rescuing his political operation and his business empire.


motherjones--2020-09-09--The City of Newark’s Scrappy and Remarkable Fight Against COVID-19

For 12 years , Berlyne Vilcant has worked for the city of Newark , New Jersey , as a disease investigator , which means that when there ’ s a cluster of cases of a particular disease—salmonella at a restaurant , say , or norovirus in a hotel—it ’ s her job to figure out how it started , who caught it , and how to stop it from spreading further .
A lifelong Newark resident , she grew up in a family of Haitian immigrants , and even as a child knew that she wanted to work in health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the character of a restaurant health inspector in the 2003 movie Deliver Us from Eva , she decided to go into public health .
In January , Vilcant was busy with run-of-the-mill outbreaks : hand , foot , and mouth disease at a daycare , Legionella at a senior center , isolated cases of giardia .
When she told her friends that she was worried about a new virus tearing through China , they reassured her .
Don ’ t worry , they said , it won ’ t come here .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ she remembers thinking , “ Oh my gosh , if it arrives in the United States , I know I will not have a life.
” On Saturday , March 14 , her supervisor at the health department called to tell her that someone in Newark had tested positive for the virus .
“ My heart fell to the floor , ” she recalls .
“ From that moment on , I knew that this was something that was going to be serious , and we needed to treat it as if it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very , very long time.
” Over the next two months , Vilcant watched her worst nightmare come true , as the virus took hold of her city .
On the peak day of April 6 , there were 162 positive test results .
Local hospital intensive care units approached capacity .
Vilcant and her colleague were the only two disease investigators employed by the city , and there was no way that the two of them could call every person who tested positive for the coronavirus .
The health department had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Vilcant ’ s premonition about work taking over her life proved correct : As the city ’ s lead disease investigator , she worked 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. seven days a week .
She rarely saw her two school-aged children .
During those frightening days , it sometimes seemed to Vilcant as if the long hours weren ’ t even making a difference .
All around her , people were sick and dying .
Sometimes , when a member of her team called someone to tell them that they had tested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was hostile .
How dare she imply that their family had let the virus in ?
Even those who wanted to cooperate sometimes couldn ’ t .
In Newark , where 28 percent of residents live below the poverty line , staying home for two weeks was out of the question for many .
As the pandemic wore on , it became clear that Black and Latino people were especially likely to suffer severe cases and die from the virus—these two groups make up 86 percent of the city ’ s population .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Newark faced long odds .
Yet about two months into the pandemic , something astonishing happened : Cases in the city began to decline .
The trend continued : By early May , there were 50–60 cases most days , by June , the numbers fell to the 20s .
This was remarkable , especially given the city ’ s proximity to New York City , where the virus was still raging .
Perry Halkitis , dean of the School of Public Health at nearby Rutgers University , attributes the city ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Newark Mayor Ras Baraka showed strong leadership , briefing the city every day in candid town halls on Facebook Live .
The university ’ s public health school provided expertise and a willing group of students ready to volunteer and work alongside Berlyne and her colleagues .
But probably the most important factor , says Halkitis , who helped coordinate Newark ’ s pandemic response , was the city ’ s investment in a particular strategy .
During an outbreak , infectious disease circles have a mantra : Test , trace , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , track down the people who each patient may have exposed , and quarantine people who may be sick until they have a negative test .
The strategy , which has been honed by public health workers around the world over several decades , has successfully controlled outbreaks of tuberculosis , SARS , and MERS , and Ebola .
As the last six months of the pandemic have shown , implementing that mantra is easier said than done .
Most parts of the United States are still struggling with the testing step , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost as soon as COVID-19 arrived in Newark , leaders—including the mayor , health department officials , and experts from the Rutgers—mobilized to build a test-trace-isolate infrastructure for the city .
“ We were all coming together , ” said Halkitis .
“ What was really good for Newark was that all hands were on deck.
” Against the backdrop of the national shortage of coronavirus tests , Newark public health officials strategized about how best to use the small number of tests they had .
Other cities ’ testing sites were concentrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wade , the head of the city ’ s Department of Health and Community Wellness , made a deliberate decision to make it as easy as possible for people without access to health care to get tested .
In the late spring , when it became clear that the coronavirus was especially severe in Black and Brown communities , the health department opened more testing sites in neighborhoods where people of color predominantly live , and made a special effort to reach senior citizens who lived there .
Elsewhere in the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Newark , where many people don ’ t have cars , the sites took walk-up patients , as well .
The city also spent $ 2 million to set up a facility to test 2,200 homeless people at an airport hotel and to find temporary housing for those who were infected .
Hoping to ensure that they made the most out of each precious test , Newark officials focused their efforts on contact tracing .
Because the cash-strapped city didn ’ t have money to immediately hire a tracing corps , the health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the program was up and running , but city leaders wanted to improve the data collection and put more muscle into the tracing effort .
They looked to nearby Massachusetts , whose innovative tracing program—the first and most ambitious in the country—was showing signs of success .
The force behind Massachusetts ’ program was a global public health organization called Partners in Health , and its tracing method combined carefully trained tracers and a sophisticated data management system .
Newark teamed up with Partners in Health and the Rutgers School of Public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In short order , the city trained 400 contact tracers , many of them volunteers from Rutgers .
Many of the lessons that the PIH team learned in Massachusetts proved useful in Newark .
For example , they worked with cellphone carriers to make contact tracers ’ number appear as “ COVID-19 info ” rather than “ unlisted , ” in order to improve the chances that people would answer the call .
But there were other , more fundamental challenges that they hadn ’ t faced in Massachusetts .
Setting up testing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the city—especially those in the Black and Brown communities—only solved part of the problem .
A more serious one was that many residents were uncomfortable giving out personal information to contact tracers .
Some had experienced discrimination at doctors ’ offices , so they were naturally wary of sharing medical information with strangers .
In Newark , the contact tracers ran the risk of coming off as dispassionate data collectors—workers who were only interested in numbers , not individuals .
For that reason , the workers were trained to explain clearly that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private .
They were also trained to listen carefully and to respond with empathy .
“ It ’ s not just about data collection , ” said Katie Bollbach , the Partners in Health liaison who led the group ’ s team in Newark .
“ It ’ s about ensuring people feel supported and cared for.
” Bollbach , who had worked on Partners in Health ’ s Ebola response in Rwanda and Sierra Leone before the pandemic , told me that her transition to the United States was jarring , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
She was immediately struck by how limited the access to health care many Americans had .
In Sierra Leone , one of the poorest countries in the world , most villages had free community clinics , along with workers who traveled door-to-door to check on residents during infectious disease outbreaks .
In America , that kind of outpouring of health support was unimaginable .
“ The emphasis on community-based care as the cornerstone of good public health in Sierra Leone is just really stark as compared to our system here in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Here , we ’ re focused on health as a commodity , rather than as a human right.
” What Partners in Health learned over many years spent working on outbreaks in Africa was that testing and tracing are useless without the final step of isolating .
Bollbach ’ s team in Sierra Leone found that most people in villages couldn ’ t afford food and other necessities during the 21-day quarantine period necessary to stop the spread of Ebola .
So officials handed out cleaning supplies—gloves , soap , chlorine—as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other supplies to families in isolation .
At first it was Partners in Health that provided the supplies , then the government took over .
In addition to the material supplies , Partners in Health worked with the health department to send workers to check on people in quarantine : How were they doing ?
Did anyone else in the house have symptoms ?
These simple gestures increased the level of trust in the health department .
They also increased the likelihood that people would finish the quarantine .
Regular check-ins , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their homes feel less alone .
Bollbach and her team brought those lessons to Newark and created support systems for people who had to quarantine at home .
One of them was Wendy Pillajo , who lives with her parents , father-in-law , husband , and three-year-old daughter in an apartment in Newark .
Pillajo , a medical assistant at an urgent care clinic , told me about her family ’ s battle with coronavirus .
In May , a few days after her mother attended a family get-together , everyone in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 .
The family ’ s symptoms ranged from mild ( her daughter had a fever for a day ) to severe—her parents had debilitating chest congestion , muscle aches , and stomach problems .
Remarkably , Pillajo , who was tested several times , never had a positive result .
A few months later , Pillajo ’ s mother tested positive again , and again the whole family quarantined for two weeks .
During each quarantine period , workers from the health department called Pillajo ’ s family every day to check @ @ @ @ @ @ @ member of the family was feeling , and whether anyone needed anything .
After Pillajo ’ s parents ’ tests came back positive , they told the rest of the family how to get to a free walk-up testing site .
When Pillajo said she might have trouble getting groceries delivered , the city sent hot meals : Chicken , mashed potatoes , cornbread , rice .
Pillajo told me she appreciated the groceries , but even more , she was grateful to have someone to ask questions .
She was so worried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t concentrate on anything else .
Through the daily check-ins , “ we understood what was going on , and we saw they were getting better , ” she said .
“ That really helped , to know they care about us.
” By August , Newark ’ s hard work had paid off .
There were just a handful of new cases each day , a precipitous decline from more than a hundred a day at the peak in April .
As Halkitis walked around the city , he noticed that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Citizens wore masks .
They kept their distance from one another .
They obeyed the 9:30 p.m. curfew .
“ People are taking this very seriously , ” he said .
If the intensive test-trace-isolate strategy has worked so well in Newark and Massachusetts , then why hasn ’ t it caught on in the rest of the country ?
Halkitis believes that one reason has to do with leadership .
From the very beginning , the Trump administration has provided little in the way of comprehensive and trustworthy pandemic response guidance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far from coordinated in their actions .
In Newark , from the very beginning of the pandemic , Mayor Baraka had the support of New Jersey Gov .
Phil Murphy—their plans for controlling the pandemic aligned .
Other cities have not had the benefit of such a unified vision .
In New York City , Mayor Bill De Blasio clashed with Governor Andrew Cuomo during the early days of the pandemic—the governor scoffed at the mayor ’ s suggestion in March that he might need to close the schools .
While the leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and by the end of March , New York City became ground zero for the pandemic .
In Atlanta , Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms butted heads with Republican Governor Brian Kemp—he undermined her every step of the way , from loosening the rules for the initial shutdown to suing her over the mask ordinance she enacted .
( He later withdrew the lawsuit challenging the mask ordinance . )
Today , in a CDC ranking of coronavirus cases by state , Georgia ranks fourth in the nation .
State and local leaders have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ navigate their coronavirus plans with hardly any guidance at all from the federal government .
As President Donald Trump told governors in April , “ You ’ re going to call your own shots.
” Another problem with test-trace-isolate , says Halkitis , is that doesn ’ t work right away .
There is a tendency , he said , “ for a large portion of the American public to want the easy answers.
” Indeed , this fantasy is evident in Trump ’ s insistence on promoting supposed silver-bullet cures like hydroxychloroquine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extends beyond the current administration .
( How many times have you fantasized about what you ’ ll do when the vaccine arrives ? )
But in the actual work of infectious disease control , says Halkitis , “ This disease requires hard work , and it means that you have to give up some things.
” Joia Mukherjee , chief medical officer of Partners in Health , echoed those sentiments .
“ What ’ s a shame is that we as the United States have been totally unambitious ” in contact tracing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bright spot : “ Newark is a very hard place to work , ” she told me .
“ There ’ s a lot of poverty .
But the Department of Public Health there has the same view that we do at Partners in Health , which is : Protect the vulnerable.
” Vilcant feels a surge of satisfaction when she sees the chart showing the decline in coronavirus cases in her beloved city .
By the beginning of September , there were only a handful of cases every day .
At these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conversations , the logistical morasses , the 70-hour work weeks—it was all worth it .
But the pandemic isn ’ t over yet , and she knows it would be a mistake to let down her guard .
“ My investigators and my contact traces are having that mindset to push forward and continue to do the work that they ’ ve been doing , ” she said .
After so many months , this is hard .
It ’ s a marathon .
Sometimes , Vilcant ’ s kids tell her that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her away from them .
“ I have to tell them , ‘ This is not going to be forever .
In the long run , you will understand why mommy had to take a lot of time off from family to devote my time to make sure that this process is done .
’ ”


motherjones--2020-09-08--Roger Stone is Set to Headline a Conservative Conference at a Struggling Trump Resort