theamericanconservative--2020-01-07--Was James Mattis the Last Check on Trump?

In January of 2017 , while awaiting Senate confirmation as Donald Trump ’ s secretary of defense , retired Marine General James Mattis was warned about the new president in a telephone call from Democratic Congressman Adam Smith .
“ I called him and said , ‘ Trump has no idea what he ’ s doing , but isn ’ t afraid to do it , ” Smith recounted , then explained that he warned Mattis that Trump ’ s closest advisers were likely to feed the new president ’ s worst instincts .
“ You ’ re across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hall , ” Smith explained to Mattis .
“ Your job is to make sure these morons don ’ t get up in the morning and advance some lamebrained idea.
” Over the next months , Mattis had ample opportunity to heed Smith ’ s warning .
In April of 2017 , the newly minted defense secretary received a call from Trump , who was enraged by Syrian dictator Bashar Assad ’ s chemical attack in Idlib .
Trump had seen pictures gathered by U.S. intelligence agencies of the attack ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He wanted Assad dead : “ Let ’ s f-cking kill him , ” Trump shouted in his telephone exchange with Mattis .
“ Let ’ s go in .
Let ’ s kill the f-cking lot of them.
” Mattis reassured Trump that he would come up with military response options , then ended the call .
He turned to an aide : “ We ’ re not going to do any of that , ” he announced .
“ We ’ re going to be much more measured.
” It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Mattis ignored the president .
Just weeks after the Syria incident , Mattis had a telephone conversation with then-National Security Adviser H.R .
McMaster , who pressed the Pentagon chief to provide military plans for countering Iranian threats to international shipping in the Persian Gulf—including strikes on Iranian missile emplacements and the sinking of Iranian speedboats .
Mattis refused .
McMaster , according to a Pentagon official privy to the incident , could hardly believe what he was hearing , cleared his office of NSC aides , and went head-to-head with Mattis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran , McMaster told Mattis , had come directly from the president .
Saying “ no ” wasn ’ t an option .
Mattis dug in his heels—and the plans the president had requested never arrived .
Mattis ’ s handling of Trump has become a touchstone for senior Pentagon officials who fear that the president ’ s instincts are now leading the U.S. into an unnecessary and preventable war—and one that Mattis was intent to prevent .
“ Taking out Soleimani would not have happened under Mattis , ” a senior administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mattis was opposed to all of this.
” A senior Pentagon official who spoke to TAC within hours of the Soleimani killing was as outspoken—and worried that a Mattis-like voice of caution was absent in any of the administration ’ s deliberations .
“ This is dangerous and reckless , ” he said .
“ But this is what happens when there aren ’ t any adults left in the room.
” In fact , there are plenty of adults left in the room , they ’ re just not the kind of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mattis might have preferred .
Two of the most important , South Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham and former Army vice chief of staff Jack Keane , don ’ t serve in the administration—but have an outsized influence on Trump ’ s foreign policy decisions .
Both weighed in on the Soleimani operation .
“ The Soleimani killing has Graham and Keane ’ s fingerprints all over it , ” a senior Pentagon official told TAC .
“ Graham is the Trump whisperer , and Jack Keane is buddy-buds with Mike Pompeo .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was their idea , because the idea has been out there for a long time , but there ’ s no question their input was important , maybe even really important .
They don ’ t have a veto , but Pompeo and Trump listen to them.
” In fact , as Graham has claimed , he was briefed on “ the potential operation ” while visiting with Trump in Florida in the days prior to the killing ( and endorsed it ) , while Keane ’ s views were solicited by Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon official with whom I spoke ) as “ pretty regular.
” Surprisingly , while Graham ’ s influence on Trump is widely known , Keane has been traditionally viewed as a Mattis-like check on Trump ’ s off-the-cuff decisions as well as his “ let ’ s kill the f – cking lot of them ” eruptions .
For instance , Keane single-handedly persuaded Trump to leave U.S. troops in Syria when the president wanted to withdraw them back in October and , the previous June , dissuaded Trump from responding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by hitting major Iranian military installations—communicating his opposition during an appearance on Fox News .
But Keane did not say ‘ no ’ this time and endorsed the Soleimani operation , primarily because he believes the Iranians crossed a red line when rockets launched by a militia under their control killed an American contractor at a U.S. base on December 27 .
Keane has since supported Trump ’ s actions in public , which has solidified his standing as perhaps the single most important military voice in the administration—and perhaps the most influential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ John Kennedy more than half-a-century ago .
But while Graham and Keane ’ s views were important , the most crucial voice arguing that killing Soleimani be included in the Pentagon ’ s list of Iran response options belonged to Mike Pompeo .
The increasingly high profile Pompeo is not only “ the administration ’ s most veteran anti-Iran crusader , ” but also the “ single most important foreign policy voice in the administration ” —as the senior Pentagon official with whom TAC spoke describes him .
“ With Tillerson and Mattis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bolton gone , this guy doesn ’ t have any competitors , ” this official added .
Pompeo ’ s emergence as a kind of “ deputy president ” ( as this same official describes him ) has chilled the views of those who had hoped that Mark Esper , Pompeo ’ s Pentagon counterpart and his West Point classmate ( Class of ’ 86 ) , would emerge as someone who would make sure the “ morons don ’ t get up in the morning and advance some lamebrained idea.
” For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows that that has not turned out to be true .
“ Pompeo drove this decision , ” a retired senior military officer notes , “ and you can be sure that if either Esper or [ J.C.S .
Chairman Mark ] Milley had objected , they would have been overruled.
” Which is not to say that senior military officers disagree with Trump ’ s decision to kill Qassem Soleimani .
By all account , the vast proportion and most influential among them don ’ t .
“ This man was breathing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breathing and I shed no tears over his death , ” retired Colonel and West Point graduate Kevin Benson says .
“ But this was a big step .
I trust that folks on the Joint Staff and at Centcom really have an honest-to-God well-thought-out strategy in place to follow up on this tactical action .
This is an opportunity for those folks from the West Point Class of ’ 86 to step up.
” But while the vast portion of the military support the Soleimani decision , a number of them offer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration ’ s decision making process is , in fact , an actual process—or whether the voices from across the hall—or from Foggy Bottom—are silencing the voices from across the river .
“ Everyone always talks about how an administration needs to speak with one voice , and that ’ s true when a decision is announced , ” the Pentagon official with whom TAC spoke notes .
“ But before that happens there has to be someone in the room who says ‘ hey , wait a second.
’ And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t there.
” Mark Perry is a journalist , author , and contributing editor at The American Conservative .
His latest book is The Pentagon ’ s Wars .
He tweets @ markperrydc .

In January of 2017, while awaiting Senate confirmation as Donald Trump’s secretary of defense, retired Marine General James Mattis was warned about the new president in a telephone call from Democratic Congressman Adam Smith. “I called him and said, ‘Trump has no idea what he’s doing, but isn’t afraid to do it,” Smith recounted, then explained that he warned Mattis that Trump’s closest advisers were likely to feed the new president’s worst instincts. “You’re across the river, and they’re across the hall,” Smith explained to Mattis. “Your job is to make sure these morons don’t get up in the morning and advance some lamebrained idea.”
Over the next months, Mattis had ample opportunity to heed Smith’s warning. In April of 2017, the newly minted defense secretary received a call from Trump, who was enraged by Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s chemical attack in Idlib. Trump had seen pictures gathered by U.S. intelligence agencies of the attack’s civilian victims, and he was outraged. He wanted Assad dead: “Let’s f-cking kill him,” Trump shouted in his telephone exchange with Mattis. “Let’s go in. Let’s kill the f-cking lot of them.” Mattis reassured Trump that he would come up with military response options, then ended the call. He turned to an aide: “We’re not going to do any of that,” he announced. “We’re going to be much more measured.”
It wouldn’t be the first time that Mattis ignored the president. Just weeks after the Syria incident, Mattis had a telephone conversation with then-National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, who pressed the Pentagon chief to provide military plans for countering Iranian threats to international shipping in the Persian Gulf—including strikes on Iranian missile emplacements and the sinking of Iranian speedboats. Mattis refused. McMaster, according to a Pentagon official privy to the incident, could hardly believe what he was hearing, cleared his office of NSC aides, and went head-to-head with Mattis. The request for military plans against Iran, McMaster told Mattis, had come directly from the president. Saying “no” wasn’t an option. Mattis dug in his heels—and the plans the president had requested never arrived.
Mattis’s handling of Trump has become a touchstone for senior Pentagon officials who fear that the president’s instincts are now leading the U.S. into an unnecessary and preventable war—and one that Mattis was intent to prevent. “Taking out Soleimani would not have happened under Mattis,” a senior administration official told The Washington Post. “Mattis was opposed to all of this.” A senior Pentagon official who spoke to TAC within hours of the Soleimani killing was as outspoken—and worried that a Mattis-like voice of caution was absent in any of the administration’s deliberations. “This is dangerous and reckless,” he said. “But this is what happens when there aren’t any adults left in the room.”
In fact, there are plenty of adults left in the room, they’re just not the kind of adults that either Adam Smith or James Mattis might have preferred. Two of the most important, South Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham and former Army vice chief of staff Jack Keane, don’t serve in the administration—but have an outsized influence on Trump’s foreign policy decisions. Both weighed in on the Soleimani operation.
“The Soleimani killing has Graham and Keane’s fingerprints all over it,” a senior Pentagon official told TAC. “Graham is the Trump whisperer, and Jack Keane is buddy-buds with Mike Pompeo. I won’t say that killing Soleimani was their idea, because the idea has been out there for a long time, but there’s no question their input was important, maybe even really important. They don’t have a veto, but Pompeo and Trump listen to them.”
In fact, as Graham has claimed, he was briefed on “the potential operation” while visiting with Trump in Florida in the days prior to the killing (and endorsed it), while Keane’s views were solicited by Pompeo during conversations that were described (by the Pentagon official with whom I spoke) as “pretty regular.”
Surprisingly, while Graham’s influence on Trump is widely known, Keane has been traditionally viewed as a Mattis-like check on Trump’s off-the-cuff decisions as well as his “let’s kill the f – cking lot of them” eruptions. For instance, Keane single-handedly persuaded Trump to leave U.S. troops in Syria when the president wanted to withdraw them back in October and, the previous June, dissuaded Trump from responding to the downing of a U.S. drone by hitting major Iranian military installations—communicating his opposition during an appearance on Fox News. But Keane did not say ‘no’ this time and endorsed the Soleimani operation, primarily because he believes the Iranians crossed a red line when rockets launched by a militia under their control killed an American contractor at a U.S. base on December 27. Keane has since supported Trump’s actions in public, which has solidified his standing as perhaps the single most important military voice in the administration—and perhaps the most influential out-of-uniform military officer since Maxwell Taylor advised John Kennedy more than half-a-century ago.
But while Graham and Keane’s views were important, the most crucial voice arguing that killing Soleimani be included in the Pentagon’s list of Iran response options belonged to Mike Pompeo. The increasingly high profile Pompeo is not only “the administration’s most veteran anti-Iran crusader,” but also the “single most important foreign policy voice in the administration”—as the senior Pentagon official with whom TAC spoke describes him.
“With Tillerson and Mattis and [national security adviser John] Bolton gone, this guy doesn’t have any competitors,” this official added. Pompeo’s emergence as a kind of “deputy president” (as this same official describes him) has chilled the views of those who had hoped that Mark Esper, Pompeo’s Pentagon counterpart and his West Point classmate (Class of ’86), would emerge as someone who would make sure the “morons don’t get up in the morning and advance some lamebrained idea.” For these Pentagon officials, the Soleimani decision shows that that has not turned out to be true. “Pompeo drove this decision,” a retired senior military officer notes, “and you can be sure that if either Esper or [J.C.S. Chairman Mark] Milley had objected, they would have been overruled.”
Which is not to say that senior military officers disagree with Trump’s decision to kill Qassem Soleimani.
By all account, the vast proportion and most influential among them don’t. “This man was breathing air a good man could have been breathing and I shed no tears over his death,” retired Colonel and West Point graduate Kevin Benson says. “But this was a big step. I trust that folks on the Joint Staff and at Centcom really have an honest-to-God well-thought-out strategy in place to follow up on this tactical action. This is an opportunity for those folks from the West Point Class of ’86 to step up.”
But while the vast portion of the military support the Soleimani decision, a number of them offer a cautionary note. They question whether the Trump administration’s decision making process is, in fact, an actual process—or whether the voices from across the hall—or from Foggy Bottom—are silencing the voices from across the river.
“Everyone always talks about how an administration needs to speak with one voice, and that’s true when a decision is announced,” the Pentagon official with whom TAC spoke notes. “But before that happens there has to be someone in the room who says ‘hey, wait a second.’ And right now, that voice isn’t there.”
Mark Perry is a journalist, author, and contributing editor at The American Conservative. His latest book is The Pentagon’s Wars. He tweets @markperrydc.


theamericanconservative--2020-01-06--The Postal Service Rings in the New Year by Bleeding Cash

As 2020 kicks off , the gift-giving season already feels like it was eons ago .
But to the beleaguered and overextended United States Postal Service ( USPS ) , the frantic pace of holiday shipping will continue well into January .
Thanks to increasingly generous , “ no questions asked ” returns policies by leading e-commerce sellers , an astounding one third of shipped packages will be returned to manufacturers .
But the USPS , which is bleeding red ink and scheduled to run out of cash by 2024 , collects little from this shipping bonanza due to opaque @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of major sellers .
Absent significant reforms , gift receipts will continue to cost taxpayers and consumers dearly .
We all have that quirky great aunt who sends the strangest gifts or that ridiculously ugly sweater that doesn ’ t fit .
Many of these gifts get returned via the USPS .
Yet thanks to the prepaid return policies of most online sellers , consumers usually don ’ t have to bear any cost for returning those packages .
But someone has to pay for the return service , which , after all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ i.e .
mail trucks and scanners ) .
That ’ s where e-commerce companies are supposed to kick in , paying the USPS for the return fare for either the entire journey or at least the first leg before the merchandise is handed off to a private delivery company .
Not so fast .
Consumers are being left in the dark about how much leading e-commerce companies compensate the federal agency and if revenues are meeting costs .
The actual formulas that lead the USPS to determine which shipping prices are reasonable to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Observers trying to figure out how the agency goes about charging e-commerce companies will be greeted with thick redactions on Inspector General documents , to the point that they start to resemble the Mueller Report .
But there are plenty of hints that something is seriously wrong with the way the USPS calculates its prices .
In its recently released fiscal year ( FY ) 2019 Annual Compliance Report , the agency notes that revenue from mail items such as packages covers 23.4 percent of the agency ’ s “ total institutional costs.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ good for the Postal Regulatory Commission , which only requires packages to be priced high enough so that revenues cover 8.8 percent of agency costs like scanners and delivery trucks .
But such a threshold is bizarre , considering that packages make up more than 45 percent of total mail weight lugged around by the USPS .
And obviously packages tend to be far larger than letters and are increasing in volume as letters go by the wayside .
Basically every business and procurement decision that the USPS made in the 2010s has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from buying larger trucks to purchasing package-friendly scanners .
Yet somehow , the agency manages to charge e-commerce giants such insanely low prices that revenues aren ’ t even covering a quarter of , say , new truck purchases .
And this revenue voodoo hasn ’ t deterred the USPS .
A 2019 IG report notes that the agency has “ eliminated a number of fees for returns aimed at commercial shippers ” in its quest to compete with the likes of FedEx and UPS .
But the USPS is struggling to get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rest of its delivery services , and returns volume and revenue “ have been growing rapidly , though not nearly as fast as outbound package volume and revenue.
” It ’ s tempting for the Postal Service to try to keep pace with private shippers for returns business even though the agency lost nearly $ 9 billion just in FY 2019 .
But before the USPS tries to lure in e-commerce companies with 60 percent discounts , it should first make sure that its pricing formulas are in lockstep with reality .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be a great first step and signal its resolve to get its house in order .
Because unless the agency stems the flood of red ink , taxpayers and stamp buyers will almost certainly foot the bailout bill .
We should be able to return Aunt Phyllis ’ s sweaters as often as we like—just not on the public dime .
Ross Marchand is the director of policy for the Taxpayers Protection Alliance .

As 2020 kicks off, the gift-giving season already feels like it was eons ago. But to the beleaguered and overextended United States Postal Service (USPS), the frantic pace of holiday shipping will continue well into January.
Thanks to increasingly generous, “no questions asked” returns policies by leading e-commerce sellers, an astounding one third of shipped packages will be returned to manufacturers. But the USPS, which is bleeding red ink and scheduled to run out of cash by 2024, collects little from this shipping bonanza due to opaque, deeply misguided pricing policies vis-à-vis thousands of major sellers. Absent significant reforms, gift receipts will continue to cost taxpayers and consumers dearly.
We all have that quirky great aunt who sends the strangest gifts or that ridiculously ugly sweater that doesn’t fit. Many of these gifts get returned via the USPS. Yet thanks to the prepaid return policies of most online sellers, consumers usually don’t have to bear any cost for returning those packages. But someone has to pay for the return service, which, after all, involves substantial labor and capital (i.e. mail trucks and scanners). That’s where e-commerce companies are supposed to kick in, paying the USPS for the return fare for either the entire journey or at least the first leg before the merchandise is handed off to a private delivery company.
Not so fast. Consumers are being left in the dark about how much leading e-commerce companies compensate the federal agency and if revenues are meeting costs. The actual formulas that lead the USPS to determine which shipping prices are reasonable to charge are a closely guarded secret. Observers trying to figure out how the agency goes about charging e-commerce companies will be greeted with thick redactions on Inspector General documents, to the point that they start to resemble the Mueller Report. But there are plenty of hints that something is seriously wrong with the way the USPS calculates its prices. In its recently released fiscal year (FY) 2019 Annual Compliance Report, the agency notes that revenue from mail items such as packages covers 23.4 percent of the agency’s “total institutional costs.”
That’s all well and good for the Postal Regulatory Commission, which only requires packages to be priced high enough so that revenues cover 8.8 percent of agency costs like scanners and delivery trucks. But such a threshold is bizarre, considering that packages make up more than 45 percent of total mail weight lugged around by the USPS. And obviously packages tend to be far larger than letters and are increasing in volume as letters go by the wayside. Basically every business and procurement decision that the USPS made in the 2010s has been to facilitate exploding package volume, from buying larger trucks to purchasing package-friendly scanners.
Yet somehow, the agency manages to charge e-commerce giants such insanely low prices that revenues aren’t even covering a quarter of, say, new truck purchases. And this revenue voodoo hasn’t deterred the USPS. A 2019 IG report notes that the agency has “eliminated a number of fees for returns aimed at commercial shippers” in its quest to compete with the likes of FedEx and UPS. But the USPS is struggling to get its returns business up to par with the rest of its delivery services, and returns volume and revenue “have been growing rapidly, though not nearly as fast as outbound package volume and revenue.”
It’s tempting for the Postal Service to try to keep pace with private shippers for returns business even though the agency lost nearly $9 billion just in FY 2019. But before the USPS tries to lure in e-commerce companies with 60 percent discounts, it should first make sure that its pricing formulas are in lockstep with reality. Opening up its books to independent analysts would be a great first step and signal its resolve to get its house in order. Because unless the agency stems the flood of red ink, taxpayers and stamp buyers will almost certainly foot the bailout bill.
We should be able to return Aunt Phyllis’s sweaters as often as we like—just not on the public dime.
Ross Marchand is the director of policy for the Taxpayers Protection Alliance.


theamericanconservative--2020-01-06--Why Steve Mnuchin Wants To Be Secretary of State

The Treasury chief would be a surprise successor to Mike Pompeo—but only to those not paying attention .
Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin provides an update on Iran Policy and Sanctions at the Foreign Press Center in Washington , D.C. , on November 5 , 2018 .
[ State Department photo/ Public Domain ] Mike Pompeo ’ s departure from the State Department before the election in November is treated as a fait accompli in Washington .
This is to say nothing of the fact that Pompeo would be renouncing the post once held by Dean Acheson to seek @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fact the impeachment imbroglio has ensnared the careerist Pompeo , as well .
Or that Pompeo ’ s relentless job-hunting—from congressman to CIA director to secretary of state to prospective Senate candidate in under three years—collides with the emergence of real consequences of his tenure , unmasked today in the streets of Baghdad .
From Pompeo ’ s perspective , a Senate seat has manifold perks .
If the president is pushed out this fall ( or earlier ) it provides the Kansas Republican a career ballast , keeping him in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president wins again , and governs disastrously , it affords the Machiavellian diplomat some distance .
If Pompeo runs for president in 2024 , a clear ambition , he ’ ll attempt to sell himself a statesman with a diverse portfolio , not merely a Trumpapparatchik .
And if Pompeo passes on a crowded 2024 field—a surly crew likely to include Vice President Mike Pence , former U.N .
Ambassador Nikki Haley , Senator Josh Hawley , maybe even Fox ringer Tucker Carlson—he ’ d do so from Congress ’ upper chamber @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his time .
Pompeo is gambling that he can wait until perhaps late spring or even summer and clear the senatorial primary field , which includes populist favorite Kris Kobach , and win the general in typically Republican Kansas .
The precedent is his would-be colleague , Senator Marco Rubio , a potential Pompeo heir , who entered the 2016 Senate race late after his failed presidential bid , but was handily swept back to power with establishment backing .
A succession struggle is afoot , with Pompeo ’ s own senior advisers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as policy aides appointed by Pompeo personally are known , fretting over their future jobs .
Many renounced lucrative private sector work to serve the successor to Rex Tillerson .
But c ’ est la vie in Donald Trump ’ s ephemeral Washington .
Josh Rogin of The Washington Post reports the short list : Robert C. O ’ Brien , the new national security adviser ( NSA ) , Rubio , überhawk Senator Tom Cotton , the Iran envoy Brian Hook , and a wildcard , Steve Mnuchin , the Treasury secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , to put it mildly , with personnel , it ’ s a lineup remarkably similar to the cadre considered for NSA last fall .
In this new decade , let ’ s focus on who in some ways would be the most daring pick : Mnuchin .
A pedigreed , posh former financier and political operator , the former Treasury secretary is no stranger to a gamble .
Sensing an arbitrage opportunity , Mnuchin served as Trump ’ s finance director when his campaign was viewed as a joke .
The banker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the truth is that raw politics a marrow-deep concern for the Treasury .
At Yale , he was one of the youngest publishers of the Yale Daily News in its history , and was tapped for the secretive Skull and Bones , alma mater of the Presidents Bush and former Secretary of State John Kerry .
Quietly but decidedly , Mnuchin has demonstrated an audacious political appetite , beyond that of his famous recent predecessors , the finance-focused former executives Hank Paulson and Timothy Geithner .
Later this month , Mnuchin will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but this is hardly his first foray into foreign policy .
The political case for Mnuchin is fourfold .
First , he is widely viewed as having had at least a hand in the September ouster of former national security adviser John Bolton .
Appearing with Pompeo hours after the Bolton ’ s departure , Mnuchin referred to his former ally as a mere “ staff person , ” while Mnuchin emphasized , “ The president ’ s view on the Iraq War and ambassador Bolton ’ s was very different.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s banishment was noted in the Washington press corp. At the behest of Senator Rand Paul , Pompeo has also conceded Iraq was a mistake .
Second , Mnuchin has wet his beak on the subject matter by overseeing—from Iran to Venezuela to North Korea—arguably the most zealous sanctions regime in American history .
Mnuchin ’ s approach is the heir in spirit to the one pioneered by former George W. Bush administration official Juan Zarate , the first-ever Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Treasury ’ s War , Zarate , tight personally with Pompeo , laid out the affirmative case for “ a new brand of financial war.
” Treasury secretaries , especially those interested in politics , don ’ t just sign T-bills anymore .
Third , in an impeachment and election year , the keep-his-head-down Mnuchin would likely encounter a relatively breezy confirmation battle .
Finally , Mnuchin ’ s crossover would have recent precedent .
Jack Lew was President Barack Obama ’ s fix-it man , heading the Office of Management and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House chief of staff , before moving over to Treasury .
Mick Mulvaney , Trump ’ s current acting chief of staff , has had a similar rotating portfolio .
And John Kelly , Mulvaney ’ s predecessor , moved up from Homeland Security .
Beyond personal ambition , and an enthusiasm for the power of the purse , Mnuchin ’ s core ideology is unknown .
He clearly dissents from Bolton ’ s Manichean view of the international arena , but has not looked askance at a sanctions approach producing questionable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he would be a stand-in for Pompeo , but a less garrulous one .
Curt Mills is senior writer for The American Conservative .

Mike Pompeo’s departure from the State Department before the election in November is treated as a fait accompli in Washington.
This is to say nothing of the fact that Pompeo would be renouncing the post once held by Dean Acheson to seek a non-assured backbench Senate seat. Or the fact the impeachment imbroglio has ensnared the careerist Pompeo, as well. Or that Pompeo’s relentless job-hunting—from congressman to CIA director to secretary of state to prospective Senate candidate in under three years—collides with the emergence of real consequences of his tenure, unmasked today in the streets of Baghdad.
From Pompeo’s perspective, a Senate seat has manifold perks. If the president is pushed out this fall (or earlier) it provides the Kansas Republican a career ballast, keeping him in the game in newly Democratic D.C. If the president wins again, and governs disastrously, it affords the Machiavellian diplomat some distance. If Pompeo runs for president in 2024, a clear ambition, he’ll attempt to sell himself a statesman with a diverse portfolio, not merely a Trumpapparatchik.
And if Pompeo passes on a crowded 2024 field—a surly crew likely to include Vice President Mike Pence, former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, Senator Josh Hawley, maybe even Fox ringer Tucker Carlson—he’d do so from Congress’ upper chamber, quietly building a record and biding his time. Pompeo is gambling that he can wait until perhaps late spring or even summer and clear the senatorial primary field, which includes populist favorite Kris Kobach, and win the general in typically Republican Kansas. The precedent is his would-be colleague, Senator Marco Rubio, a potential Pompeo heir, who entered the 2016 Senate race late after his failed presidential bid, but was handily swept back to power with establishment backing.
A succession struggle is afoot, with Pompeo’s own senior advisers, particularly “the politicals,” as policy aides appointed by Pompeo personally are known, fretting over their future jobs. Many renounced lucrative private sector work to serve the successor to Rex Tillerson. But c’est la vie in Donald Trump’s ephemeral Washington. Josh Rogin of The Washington Post reports the short list: Robert C. O’Brien, the new national security adviser (NSA), Rubio, überhawk Senator Tom Cotton, the Iran envoy Brian Hook, and a wildcard, Steve Mnuchin, the Treasury secretary. In an administration that has struggled, to put it mildly, with personnel, it’s a lineup remarkably similar to the cadre considered for NSA last fall.
In this new decade, let’s focus on who in some ways would be the most daring pick: Mnuchin. A pedigreed, posh former financier and political operator, the former Treasury secretary is no stranger to a gamble.
Sensing an arbitrage opportunity, Mnuchin served as Trump’s finance director when his campaign was viewed as a joke. The banker cuts the figure of a technocrat, but the truth is that raw politics a marrow-deep concern for the Treasury. At Yale, he was one of the youngest publishers of the Yale Daily News in its history, and was tapped for the secretive Skull and Bones, alma mater of the Presidents Bush and former Secretary of State John Kerry.
Quietly but decidedly, Mnuchin has demonstrated an audacious political appetite, beyond that of his famous recent predecessors, the finance-focused former executives Hank Paulson and Timothy Geithner. Later this month, Mnuchin will lead the American delegation to Davos, but this is hardly his first foray into foreign policy.
The political case for Mnuchin is fourfold.
First, he is widely viewed as having had at least a hand in the September ouster of former national security adviser John Bolton. Appearing with Pompeo hours after the Bolton’s departure, Mnuchin referred to his former ally as a mere “staff person,” while Mnuchin emphasized, “The president’s view on the Iraq War and ambassador Bolton’s was very different.” The duo’s chipper demeanor after Bolton’s banishment was noted in the Washington press corp. At the behest of Senator Rand Paul, Pompeo has also conceded Iraq was a mistake.
Second, Mnuchin has wet his beak on the subject matter by overseeing—from Iran to Venezuela to North Korea—arguably the most zealous sanctions regime in American history. Mnuchin’s approach is the heir in spirit to the one pioneered by former George W. Bush administration official Juan Zarate, the first-ever Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, a post-9/11 innovation. In his 2013 memoir, Treasury’s War, Zarate, tight personally with Pompeo, laid out the affirmative case for “a new brand of financial war.” Treasury secretaries, especially those interested in politics, don’t just sign T-bills anymore.
Third, in an impeachment and election year, the keep-his-head-down Mnuchin would likely encounter a relatively breezy confirmation battle. Finally, Mnuchin’s crossover would have recent precedent. Jack Lew was President Barack Obama’s fix-it man, heading the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), serving as White House chief of staff, before moving over to Treasury. Mick Mulvaney, Trump’s current acting chief of staff, has had a similar rotating portfolio. And John Kelly, Mulvaney’s predecessor, moved up from Homeland Security.
Beyond personal ambition, and an enthusiasm for the power of the purse, Mnuchin’s core ideology is unknown. He clearly dissents from Bolton’s Manichean view of the international arena, but has not looked askance at a sanctions approach producing questionable results. The optimists’ case is that he would be a stand-in for Pompeo, but a less garrulous one.
Curt Mills is senior writer for The American Conservative.


theamericanconservative--2020-01-03--Why Iraq is Much Worse than ‘Trump’s Benghazi’

Hundreds of Iraqi protesters gathered early Dec. 31 near the U.S. embassy in Baghdad ( Photo by Murtadha Sudani/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images ) “ The anti-Benghazi !
” President Donald Trump replied after liberals referred to the storming of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad as his Benghazi , referencing the assault on the American consulate in Libya under the previous administration .
Trump , supporters maintained , did not hesitate to repel the attack .
In fact , in breaking news Wednesday night it was reported that the U.S. military , at the direction of President Trump , killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , General Qassem Soleimani , in an airstrike at Baghdad ’ s international airport .
The United States has a right to defend its embassies and military bases overseas as well as the duty to protect Americans and other personnel .
But the partisan finger-pointers are overlooking the real significance of Benghazi : it was the symbol of a failed military intervention for which Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton bore greater culpability than the grisly murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and his colleagues .
The regime change war Washington launched left Libya teeming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was chaotic , violent and unsafe .
So too the war in Iraq , which initially created a power vacuum that empowered radicals who resemble the militant forces that attacked America on 9/11 .
In recent years , our focus has been on fighting ISIS rather than nation-building .
But the longer-term result of the Iraq misadventure was to overthrow the Sunni state that controlled Baghdad and replace it with a Shiite government that would inevitably mean greater Iranian influence .
The toppled Iraqi government was Iran ’ s main counterweight in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq was a grievous— “ big , fat ” —mistake .
“ We ’ ve destabilized the Middle East and it ’ s a mess , ” he said in 2015 .
It “ may have been the worst decision ” in U.S. history .
“ It started ISIS , it started Libya , it started Syria , ” Trump said as George W. Bush ’ s brother looked on .
“ Everything that ’ s happening started with us stupidly going into the war in Iraq… .
and people talk about me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the one that doesn ’ t want to do this , okay ?
” Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference in his first year as president of the United States , Trump laid into the Mesopotamian mishaps .
“ We ’ ve spent trillions of dollars overseas , while allowing our own infrastructure to fall into total disrepair and decay .
In the Middle East , we ’ ve spent as of four weeks ago , $ 6 trillion .
Think of it , ” he said .
“ And by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — I mean , it ’ s not even close , it ’ s in much worse shape than it was 15 years ago .
If our presidents would have gone to the beach for 15 years , we would be in much better shape than we are right now , that I can tell you.
” “ Great nations do not fight endless wars , ” Trump declared in his State of the Union address just last year .
“ Our brave troops have now been fighting in the Middle East for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq , nearly 7,000 American heroes have given their lives .
More than 52,000 Americans have been badly wounded .
We have spent more than $ 7 trillion in the Middle East.
” Yet Iran has always been the unprincipled exception to Trump ’ s skepticism of regime change .
In his zeal to reverse Obama ’ s legacy , he risks repeating Obama ’ s folly .
For the 44th president also owed his election to the fact that he recognized Iraq was a “ dumb war.
” He left office with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choice than before , including interventions in Libya , Yemen and Syria that have to varying degrees kept smoldering under Trump .
Trump ’ s foreign policy team is replete with advisers ready to turn proxy wars with Iran inside Iraq into a wider conflict , people whose vision of “ America First ” is indistinguishable from the vision that gave us endless wars in the first place .
So far , the president has held them off .
But his present course creates a high risk of war with Iran , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limited to the fight against ISIS , whether he knows it or not .
At the very least , Trump may cede the war issue to the Democrats .
“ We should end the forever wars , not start new ones , ” tweeted Elizabeth Warren , the liberal presidential candidate who trails Trump in the battleground states and is even losing to him in Virginia , according to the latest Mason-Dixon poll , which hasn ’ t voted for a Republican White House aspirant since 2004 .
Why throw her a lifeline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he defeated in 2016 ?
Trump was elected to guard American borders .
Patrolling the Iran-Iraq border will not get him reelected .
W. James Antle III is the editor of The American Conservative .

“The anti-Benghazi!” President Donald Trump replied after liberals referred to the storming of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad as his Benghazi, referencing the assault on the American consulate in Libya under the previous administration. Trump, supporters maintained, did not hesitate to repel the attack. In fact, in breaking news Wednesday night it was reported that the U.S. military, at the direction of President Trump, killed the leader of the Iranian Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, in an airstrike at Baghdad’s international airport.
The United States has a right to defend its embassies and military bases overseas as well as the duty to protect Americans and other personnel. But the partisan finger-pointers are overlooking the real significance of Benghazi: it was the symbol of a failed military intervention for which Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton bore greater culpability than the grisly murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and his colleagues. The regime change war Washington launched left Libya teeming with terrorists, full of territory that was chaotic, violent and unsafe.
So too the war in Iraq, which initially created a power vacuum that empowered radicals who resemble the militant forces that attacked America on 9/11. In recent years, our focus has been on fighting ISIS rather than nation-building. But the longer-term result of the Iraq misadventure was to overthrow the Sunni state that controlled Baghdad and replace it with a Shiite government that would inevitably mean greater Iranian influence. The toppled Iraqi government was Iran’s main counterweight in the region.
Candidate Donald Trump understood that Iraq was a grievous—“big, fat”—mistake. “We’ve destabilized the Middle East and it’s a mess,” he said in 2015. It “may have been the worst decision” in U.S. history. “It started ISIS, it started Libya, it started Syria,” Trump said as George W. Bush’s brother looked on. “Everything that’s happening started with us stupidly going into the war in Iraq…. and people talk about me with the button. I’m the one that doesn’t want to do this, okay?”
Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference in his first year as president of the United States, Trump laid into the Mesopotamian mishaps. “We’ve spent trillions of dollars overseas, while allowing our own infrastructure to fall into total disrepair and decay. In the Middle East, we’ve spent as of four weeks ago, $6 trillion. Think of it,” he said. “And by the way, the Middle East is in — I mean, it’s not even close, it’s in much worse shape than it was 15 years ago. If our presidents would have gone to the beach for 15 years, we would be in much better shape than we are right now, that I can tell you.”
“Great nations do not fight endless wars,” Trump declared in his State of the Union address just last year. “Our brave troops have now been fighting in the Middle East for almost 19 years. In Afghanistan and Iraq, nearly 7,000 American heroes have given their lives. More than 52,000 Americans have been badly wounded. We have spent more than $7 trillion in the Middle East.”
Yet Iran has always been the unprincipled exception to Trump’s skepticism of regime change. In his zeal to reverse Obama’s legacy, he risks repeating Obama’s folly. For the 44th president also owed his election to the fact that he recognized Iraq was a “dumb war.” He left office with the U.S. mired in more wars of choice than before, including interventions in Libya, Yemen and Syria that have to varying degrees kept smoldering under Trump.
Trump’s foreign policy team is replete with advisers ready to turn proxy wars with Iran inside Iraq into a wider conflict, people whose vision of “America First” is indistinguishable from the vision that gave us endless wars in the first place. So far, the president has held them off. But his present course creates a high risk of war with Iran, and a resumption of hostilities in Iraq not limited to the fight against ISIS, whether he knows it or not.
At the very least, Trump may cede the war issue to the Democrats. “We should end the forever wars, not start new ones,” tweeted Elizabeth Warren, the liberal presidential candidate who trails Trump in the battleground states and is even losing to him in Virginia, according to the latest Mason-Dixon poll, which hasn’t voted for a Republican White House aspirant since 2004. Why throw her a lifeline by implementing the foreign policy of candidates he defeated in 2016?
Trump was elected to guard American borders. Patrolling the Iran-Iraq border will not get him reelected.
W. James Antle III is the editor of The American Conservative.


theamericanconservative--2020-01-02--The Real Tyranny in Government Affirmative Action Cases

On November 29 , multinational tech company Oracle filed suit in the United States District Court against Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ( OFCCP ) Director Craig Leen .
The complaint alleges the OFCCP ’ s enforcement and adjudication protocols violate the Constitution , the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 , among other things .
Scalia should overhaul OFCCP ’ s procedures to align with due process .
And President Trump should direct other executive agencies to ensure their enforcement practices comply with procedural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overdue to question the administrative tyranny that earmarks our regulatory state by combining legislative , executive , and judicial powers in a single authority .
The OFCCP in the U.S. Department of Labor acts as legislator , prosecutor , judge , jury , and appellate court in the enforcement of Executive Order 11246 .
The decree , signed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 , mandates not only nondiscrimination but also affirmative action by federal government contractors , including the elimination of employment standards with a disparate impact on minorities or women .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s mission to question its combination of powers .
James Madison , father of the Constitution , explained in Federalist 47 , that “ the accumulation of all powers , legislative , executive , and judiciary , in the same hands , whether of one , a few , or many , and whether hereditary , self -appointed , or elective , may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
” Furthermore , Justice Felix Frankfurter observed in McNabb v. United States in 1943 , “ the history of liberty has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ procedural safeguards.
” The nondiscrimination-affirmative action standards of the OFCCP were decreed by the executive branch alone .
The executive prosecutes and adjudicates alleged violations .
The executive imposes sanctions , including fines or permanent disbarment from future federal government contracts—a death sentence for many companies .
For them , discretion is the better part of valor .
They typically negotiate some type of consent decree with OFCCP to avoid the staggering costs of litigation and the prospect of bankruptcy .
That explains the dearth of suits challenging its administrative tyranny .
Due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claims .
The United States Supreme Court elaborated in Marshall v. Jerrico , Inc. ( 1980 ) : “ The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases .
This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process , the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.
” An initial due process violation at the administrative stage is not cured by a second @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impartiality is honored .
The Supreme Court held in Ward v. City of Monroeville ( 1972 ) that a defendant “ is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.
” The OFCCP clearly flunks the due process imperative of impartiality .
How can an enforcement office remain agnostic about charges it has previously concluded are substantiated ?
The doctrine in Anglo-American jurisprudence that a man can not be a judge in his own case goes back to Dr. Bonham ’ s Case ( 1610 ) more than four centuries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bias in Alice in Wonderland : “ I ’ ll be judge , I ’ ll be jury , said the cunning old Fury : I ’ ll try the whole case and condemn you to death.
” The Trump administration ’ s defense of OFCCP ’ s administrative tyranny is dumbfounding .
Two days before President Donald Trump was inaugurated , the U.S. Department of Labor filed a lawsuit against Oracle America , Inc. alleging systematic compensation discrimination against female , African-American , and Asian employees compared with their Caucasian male counterparts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s inauguration .
The OFCCP ’ s discrimination theory relies on simplistic , undigested pay disparities that ignore many relevant factors , including education , experience , choice of industry and occupation , hours worked , and flexible work schedules .
OFCCP is attempting to resurrect a standard of equal pay for work of “ comparable value ” which the Supreme Court largely dismissed in County of Washington v. Gunther ( 1981 ) .
Administrative tyranny was born of the fears of the Great Depression that something—anything-must be tried to alleviate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the tyranny that the ends justify the means .
But violations of the Constitution ’ s separation of powers are not legitimated by longevity .
The United States Supreme Court invalidated hundreds of legislative vetoes that had endured for up to 50 years in INS v. Chadha ( 1983 ) .
Similarly , the Court should not shy from ending longstanding procedural tyranny in regulatory agencies generally , including the Federal Communications Commission , the Federal Trade Commission , the Securities and Exchange Commission , and the Federal Reserve Board .
Bruce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ General Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission under President Reagan .

On November 29, multinational tech company Oracle filed suit in the United States District Court against Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) Director Craig Leen. The complaint alleges the OFCCP’s enforcement and adjudication protocols violate the Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, among other things.
Secretary Scalia should concede Oracle’s claims.
Scalia should overhaul OFCCP’s procedures to align with due process. And President Trump should direct other executive agencies to ensure their enforcement practices comply with procedural due process. The time is long overdue to question the administrative tyranny that earmarks our regulatory state by combining legislative, executive, and judicial powers in a single authority.
The OFCCP in the U.S. Department of Labor acts as legislator, prosecutor, judge, jury, and appellate court in the enforcement of Executive Order 11246. The decree, signed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, mandates not only nondiscrimination but also affirmative action by federal government contractors, including the elimination of employment standards with a disparate impact on minorities or women.
It is no disrespect to the OFCCP’s mission to question its combination of powers. James Madison, father of the Constitution, explained in Federalist 47, that “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self -appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Furthermore, Justice Felix Frankfurter observed in McNabb v. United States in 1943, “the history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.”
The nondiscrimination-affirmative action standards of the OFCCP were decreed by the executive branch alone. The executive prosecutes and adjudicates alleged violations. The executive imposes sanctions, including fines or permanent disbarment from future federal government contracts—a death sentence for many companies. For them, discretion is the better part of valor. They typically negotiate some type of consent decree with OFCCP to avoid the staggering costs of litigation and the prospect of bankruptcy. That explains the dearth of suits challenging its administrative tyranny.
Due process requires an impartial adjudication of legal claims. The United States Supreme Court elaborated in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980):
“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.”
An initial due process violation at the administrative stage is not cured by a second proceeding in a court of law where impartiality is honored. The Supreme Court held in Ward v. City of Monroeville (1972) that a defendant “is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.”
The OFCCP clearly flunks the due process imperative of impartiality. How can an enforcement office remain agnostic about charges it has previously concluded are substantiated? The doctrine in Anglo-American jurisprudence that a man cannot be a judge in his own case goes back to Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) more than four centuries ago. Lewis Carroll captured the procedural bias in Alice in Wonderland: “I’ll be judge, I’ll be jury, said the cunning old Fury: I’ll try the whole case and condemn you to death.”
The Trump administration’s defense of OFCCP’s administrative tyranny is dumbfounding. Two days before President Donald Trump was inaugurated, the U.S. Department of Labor filed a lawsuit against Oracle America, Inc. alleging systematic compensation discrimination against female, African-American, and Asian employees compared with their Caucasian male counterparts. The suit continues years after President Trump’s inauguration. The OFCCP’s discrimination theory relies on simplistic, undigested pay disparities that ignore many relevant factors, including education, experience, choice of industry and occupation, hours worked, and flexible work schedules. OFCCP is attempting to resurrect a standard of equal pay for work of “comparable value” which the Supreme Court largely dismissed in County of Washington v. Gunther (1981).
Administrative tyranny was born of the fears of the Great Depression that something—anything-must be tried to alleviate economic hardship. Time-honored procedural safeguards succumbed to the tyranny that the ends justify the means. But violations of the Constitution’s separation of powers are not legitimated by longevity. The United States Supreme Court invalidated hundreds of legislative vetoes that had endured for up to 50 years in INS v. Chadha (1983). Similarly, the Court should not shy from ending longstanding procedural tyranny in regulatory agencies generally, including the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.
Bruce Fein was Associate Deputy Attorney General and General Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission under President Reagan.


theamericanconservative--2020-01-02--Pelosi’s Game of Chicken Will Leave Her Party Fried

After holding a vote to impeach President Donald Trump , House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has decided to wait on sending the impeachment articles to the Senate .
According to many in the media , this brilliant bit of strategy gives her leverage to force Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to provide a fair trial in the Senate .
There ’ s so many reasons this is wrong , but let ’ s start with the most obvious : according to the Democrats ’ own impeachment witness , Harvard law professor Noah Feldman , Trump isn ’ t actually impeached until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and “ an indefinite delay would pose a serious problem.
” “ If the House does not communicate its impeachment to the Senate , it hasn ’ t actually impeached the president .
If the articles are not transmitted , Trump could legitimately say that he wasn ’ t truly impeached at all , ” writes Feldman .
There ’ s no moral victory in the House holding a vote to impeach Trump if Pelosi indefinitely sits on the articles , and she holds no leverage over the Senate because McConnell isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trial , and so long as she twiddles her thumbs , he doesn ’ t have to .
McConnell can use time that would have been spent on impeachment to confirm another 15 to 20 federal judges to lifetime appointments .
He ’ s already said it ’ s the transformation of the judiciary that he sees as Trump ’ s legacy .
“ It ’ s beyond me how the Speaker and Democratic leader in the Senate think withholding the articles of impeachment and not sending them over gives them leverage , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passed the articles .
“ Frankly , I ’ m not anxious to have the trial .
If she thinks her case is so weak she doesn ’ t want to send it over , throw me into that briar patch , ” McConnell added .
Should the House send the impeachment articles , McConnell has said he wants two resolutions , one to deal with procedure and one for potential witnesses , similar to what Democrats and Republicans agreed to in the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton .
He is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wants each side to present their case before a majority vote is held on witnesses .
But Democrats say they want an agreement on specific witnesses before opening arguments are made .
Sen .
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer argued on Monday that the Senate needs to hear from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former advisor John Bolton , especially in light of a newly published New York Times report that both men urged Trump not to withhold the Ukraine aid .
“ This shows all four witnesses we requested — [ acting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Bolton , Duffey , [ White House aide Robert ] Blair — were intimately involved & had direct knowledge of Pres .
Trump ’ s decision to cut off aid to benefit himself , ” Schumer tweeted .
Of course in order to decide whether or not to impeach , Senators needs to hear from these witnesses .
But Pelosi made this problem for herself .
She could have utilized the House subpoena powers to compel these fact witnesses to appear before her chamber , where she makes the rules .
She @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be tested in the courts .
Instead , she rushed the vote on an artificial timeline “ before Christmas , ” twisting the arms of members in purple districts and alienating moderate Democrats in the process .
There are 30 odd freshmen Democrats who were elected in 2018 in districts Trump carried in 2016 .
Now they ’ re getting shouted down at townhalls over their impeachment vote .
All this Pelosi did because she said Trump is a threat to democracy and he is a threat to national security .
Yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she now sit on the very same articles until the Senate agrees to do things her way ?
Suddenly there is no urgency to impeachment .
The insistence on specific witnesses appearing in the Senate trial also points to the weaknesses in the House case .
Most view it a foregone conclusion that the Republican-controlled Senate will acquit .
No leverage is gained in this delay , but the four Democratic senators running for president will be seriously impeded by a delayed trial , given that they face the Iowa caucuses at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Trump , McConnell and Attorney General William Barr have “ gone rogue.
” But it ’ s really her belief that she can dictate how impeachment will unfold in the Senate that is roguest of all .

After holding a vote to impeach President Donald Trump, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has decided to wait on sending the impeachment articles to the Senate. According to many in the media, this brilliant bit of strategy gives her leverage to force Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to provide a fair trial in the Senate.
There’s so many reasons this is wrong, but let’s start with the most obvious: according to the Democrats’ own impeachment witness, Harvard law professor Noah Feldman, Trump isn’t actually impeached until the articles are sent to the Senate, and “an indefinite delay would pose a serious problem.”
“If the House does not communicate its impeachment to the Senate, it hasn’t actually impeached the president. If the articles are not transmitted, Trump could legitimately say that he wasn’t truly impeached at all,” writes Feldman.
There’s no moral victory in the House holding a vote to impeach Trump if Pelosi indefinitely sits on the articles, and she holds no leverage over the Senate because McConnell isn’t interested in holding an impeachment trial, and so long as she twiddles her thumbs, he doesn’t have to.
McConnell can use time that would have been spent on impeachment to confirm another 15 to 20 federal judges to lifetime appointments. He’s already said it’s the transformation of the judiciary that he sees as Trump’s legacy.
“It’s beyond me how the Speaker and Democratic leader in the Senate think withholding the articles of impeachment and not sending them over gives them leverage,” McConnell told reporters after the House passed the articles.
“Frankly, I’m not anxious to have the trial. If she thinks her case is so weak she doesn’t want to send it over, throw me into that briar patch,” McConnell added.
Should the House send the impeachment articles, McConnell has said he wants two resolutions, one to deal with procedure and one for potential witnesses, similar to what Democrats and Republicans agreed to in the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton. He is not rejecting witnesses out of hand, but wants each side to present their case before a majority vote is held on witnesses.
But Democrats say they want an agreement on specific witnesses before opening arguments are made. Sen. Minority Leader Chuck Schumer argued on Monday that the Senate needs to hear from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former advisor John Bolton, especially in light of a newly published New York Times report that both men urged Trump not to withhold the Ukraine aid.
“This shows all four witnesses we requested — [acting White House chief of staff] Mulvaney, Bolton, Duffey, [White House aide Robert] Blair — were intimately involved & had direct knowledge of Pres. Trump’s decision to cut off aid to benefit himself,” Schumer tweeted.
Of course in order to decide whether or not to impeach, Senators needs to hear from these witnesses.
But Pelosi made this problem for herself. She could have utilized the House subpoena powers to compel these fact witnesses to appear before her chamber, where she makes the rules. She could have allowed the executive privilege claim to be tested in the courts. Instead, she rushed the vote on an artificial timeline “before Christmas,” twisting the arms of members in purple districts and alienating moderate Democrats in the process. There are 30 odd freshmen Democrats who were elected in 2018 in districts Trump carried in 2016. Now they’re getting shouted down at townhalls over their impeachment vote.
All this Pelosi did because she said Trump is a threat to democracy and he is a threat to national security.
Yet if she believes that, how can she now sit on the very same articles until the Senate agrees to do things her way? Suddenly there is no urgency to impeachment.
The insistence on specific witnesses appearing in the Senate trial also points to the weaknesses in the House case.
Most view it a foregone conclusion that the Republican-controlled Senate will acquit. No leverage is gained in this delay, but the four Democratic senators running for president will be seriously impeded by a delayed trial, given that they face the Iowa caucuses at the beginning of February.
Pelosi has said that Trump, McConnell and Attorney General William Barr have “gone rogue.” But it’s really her belief that she can dictate how impeachment will unfold in the Senate that is roguest of all.


theamericanconservative--2020-01-08--How Congress Can Stop Trump’s Iran War

How Congress Can Stop Trump’s Iran War

The United States ’ targeted airstrike against Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq has placed the U.S. on the precipice of an undeclared war with Iran , a hostile and militarily sophisticated foreign government , all without the consent of Congress .
Trump ’ s decision to strike without notifying congressional leaders is without precedent in history .
There ’ s also no precedent for an American president openly ordering the killing of a senior state official of a country on which the U.S. has not officially declared war .
Iraq also didn ’ t consent to the drone strike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress in the dark , Haaretz reports that Israel was briefed ahead of the attack .
On Saturday , the Trump administration sent Congress a classified letter saying it had met its obligation to notify Congress under the War Powers resolution .
Trump ’ s letter prompts “ serious and urgent questions about the timing , manner , and justification of the administration ’ s decision to engage in hostilities against Iran , ” said House Speaker Nancy Pelosi , who received Trump ’ s letter .
In order “ to limit the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” the House will vote on a war powers resolution this week , Pelosi told House Democrats Sunday .
The non-binding resolution is similar to the one introduced by Senator Tim Kaine in the Senate and seeks to reassert “ Congress ’ s long-established oversight responsibilities by mandating that if no further Congressional action is taken , the Administration ’ s military hostilities with regard to Iran cease within 30 days.
” But is that enough ?
“ Congress must reassert its constitutional responsibility over war , ” wrote Senator Bernie Sanders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and House must vote to immediately defund unauthorized military action against Iran.
” Several questions have been raised by the Trump administration ’ s actions and the competing legal justifications cited .
Did President Trump have the authority to unilaterally take military action against a uniformed member of a foreign military service without a declaration of war ?
Is he required to notify Congress first ?
Does an extrajudicial assassination , like the airstrike against Soleimani , count as an act of war ?
Doesn ’ t the Constitution say the power to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And how does the war powers resolution figure into this ?
Because the letter provided to Pelosi is classified , we are in the dark as to whether evidence of an “ imminent strike ” as required by the war powers resolution was provided .
Instead we must rely on the justifications provided by officials ’ public statements .
National Security Adviser Robert O ’ Brien claims the strike was “ authorized ” in part by the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force ( AUMF ) , which provided the legal basis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump is using his presidential sharpie , it ’ s not at all clear how this 17-year-old statute authorizes what seems to be a major escalation that could start a whole new war , ” said Gene Healy , vice president of the Cato Institute , in an interview with The American Conservative .
 As for the war powers resolution justification provided by the administration , that legislation was not designed to alter the fundamental constitutional balance , but to restore it , Healy says .
Critically , it does not give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military action for 60 days without congressional approval , as some have suggested .
The war powers resolution itself was introduced after Congress discovered Nixon ’ s secret war in Cambodia in 1973 .
It was designed to allow Congress to terminate any unauthorized actions taken by the executive branch and to require transparency .
If the president responds to any “ imminent threat ” not covered by an existing statute or law authorizing use of force , then the president must within 48 hours report to Congress what actions have been taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ the Pentagon statement doesn ’ t mention any imminent attacks , ” notes Healy .
Secretary of State Mike “ Pompeo says Soleimani was planning an attack that could have killed hundreds of lives , but he ’ s provided no evidence for that .
I think it ’ s hardly cynical to verify , instead of blindly trusting , given the track record of this administration and recent past administrations.
” “ With the Soleimani strike , the administration is saying they ’ re responding to an imminent threat , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat is , ” said Kate Kizer , policy director at Win Without War , in an interview with TAC .
“ From reporting , there ’ s not a lot of evidence of an imminent attack .
So they should have come to Congress first and said what they were going to do.
” That ’ s because there ’ s simply  “ no viable argument ” that the 2002 AUMF authorizes force against Iran , according to Brian Egan , a former legal adviser to both the State Department and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a senior fellow at NYU School of Law and former associate counsel to the president .
  The 2002 AUMF allows the president to “ defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq ” and “ enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq ”  ( emphasis added ) .
“ Those are plainly not relevant to the situation ” today , Egan and Bridgeman write. The Trump administration also said it does not  ” need congressional sign off from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because of the president ’ s authority as commander-in-chief under Article II of the Constitution , CNN reported .
The Constitution clearly gives the power to declare war to Congress .
Article II states that the president can act without Congress only when it is necessary to do so against imminent threats to U.S. territories , possessions , or citizens. That ’ s why Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , Pentagon chief Mark Esper , and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley were so emphatic Monday that the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ”  But so far , no evidence of that has been provided .
While a 2018 Office of Legal Council ( OLC ) opinion offers a very liberal definition of executive authority and provides  “ very little constraint on modern presidential uses of force , ” it appears to classify the Soleimani strike as an act of war , since Iran is a nation state that will likely escalate its military retaliation in response to the killing of their uniformed military member .
Indeed , the U.S. has already said it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East “ after Iran vowed to exact ‘ severe revenge.
’ ” The U.S. has warned its citizens to leave Iraq , and Iran has already begun firing at housing for American forces in Iraq : all signs that point to escalation .
Moreover , targeted political assassinations , like the kind used against Soleimani , have been banned by executive order since the Ford administration .
Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 , which reads : “ No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in , assassination.
” Soleimani was “ not a rogue outlaw , but a military official of a sovereign government we were not at war with , making his killing an assassination , ” writes Ben Friedman , policy director at Defense Priorities .
“ His actions , however evil , served Iranian policy.
” “ The idea that the president can , without going to Congress , take out a top level official of a country we ’ re not in an authorized war with , is crossing a Rubicon , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Congress has several choices to make in the days ahead .
It can pass empty , non-binding resolutions , that require the president ’ s sign-off , like the kind suggested by Kaine and Pelosi .
Or it can repeal the decades-old AUMFs that have been used to justify continuing U.S. escalations in the Middle East .
Congress could also pass bills like those by Representative Khanna and Senator Sanders to strip funding for offensive military action against Iran from the NDAA .
It remains to be seen if Congress will choose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , over window dressing .

The United States’ targeted airstrike against Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq has placed the U.S. on the precipice of an undeclared war with Iran, a hostile and militarily sophisticated foreign government, all without the consent of Congress.
Trump’s decision to strike without notifying congressional leaders is without precedent in history. There’s also no precedent for an American president openly ordering the killing of a senior state official of a country on which the U.S. has not officially declared war.
Iraq also didn’t consent to the drone strike against Soleimani. Notably, despite leaving Congress in the dark, Haaretz reports that Israel was briefed ahead of the attack.
On Saturday, the Trump administration sent Congress a classified letter saying it had met its obligation to notify Congress under the War Powers resolution.
Trump’s letter prompts “serious and urgent questions about the timing, manner, and justification of the administration’s decision to engage in hostilities against Iran,” said House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who received Trump’s letter.
In order “to limit the president’s military actions regarding Iran,” the House will vote on a war powers resolution this week, Pelosi told House Democrats Sunday.
The non-binding resolution is similar to the one introduced by Senator Tim Kaine in the Senate and seeks to reassert “Congress’s long-established oversight responsibilities by mandating that if no further Congressional action is taken, the Administration’s military hostilities with regard to Iran cease within 30 days.”
But is that enough?
“Congress must reassert its constitutional responsibility over war,” wrote Senator Bernie Sanders in a tweet. “The Senate and House must vote to immediately defund unauthorized military action against Iran.”
Several questions have been raised by the Trump administration’s actions and the competing legal justifications cited. Did President Trump have the authority to unilaterally take military action against a uniformed member of a foreign military service without a declaration of war? Is he required to notify Congress first? Does an extrajudicial assassination, like the airstrike against Soleimani, count as an act of war? Doesn’t the Constitution say the power to declare war rests solely with Congress? And how does the war powers resolution figure into this? Because the letter provided to Pelosi is classified, we are in the dark as to whether evidence of an “imminent strike” as required by the war powers resolution was provided. Instead we must rely on the justifications provided by officials’ public statements. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien claims the strike was “authorized” in part by the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which provided the legal basis for the war in Iraq. “Unless Trump is using his presidential sharpie, it’s not at all clear how this 17-year-old statute authorizes what seems to be a major escalation that could start a whole new war,” said Gene Healy, vice president of the Cato Institute, in an interview with The American Conservative.  As for the war powers resolution justification provided by the administration, that legislation was not designed to alter the fundamental constitutional balance, but to restore it, Healy says. Critically, it does not give presidents a free pass to carry out military action for 60 days without congressional approval, as some have suggested. The war powers resolution itself was introduced after Congress discovered Nixon’s secret war in Cambodia in 1973. It was designed to allow Congress to terminate any unauthorized actions taken by the executive branch and to require transparency. If the president responds to any “imminent threat” not covered by an existing statute or law authorizing use of force, then the president must within 48 hours report to Congress what actions have been taken. In the case of Soleimani, “the Pentagon statement doesn’t mention any imminent attacks,” notes Healy. Secretary of State Mike“Pompeo says Soleimani was planning an attack that could have killed hundreds of lives, but he’s provided no evidence for that. I think it’s hardly cynical to verify, instead of blindly trusting, given the track record of this administration and recent past administrations.” “With the Soleimani strike, the administration is saying they’re responding to an imminent threat, but they have not publicly stated what that threat is,” said Kate Kizer, policy director at Win Without War, in an interview with TAC. “From reporting, there’s not a lot of evidence of an imminent attack. So they should have come to Congress first and said what they were going to do.” That’s because there’s simply “no viable argument” that the 2002 AUMF authorizes force against Iran, according to Brian Egan, a former legal adviser to both the State Department and the NSC, and Tess Bridgeman, a senior fellow at NYU School of Law and former associate counsel to the president.   The 2002 AUMF allows the president to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq” (emphasis added). “Those are plainly not relevant to the situation” today, Egan and Bridgeman write. The Trump administration also said it does not ”need congressional sign off from a legal standpoint” for the Soleimani strike because of the president’s authority as commander-in-chief under Article II of the Constitution, CNN reported. The Constitution clearly gives the power to declare war to Congress. Article II states that the president can act without Congress only when it is necessary to do so against imminent threats to U.S. territories, possessions, or citizens. That’s why Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Pentagon chief Mark Esper, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley were so emphatic Monday that the U.S. was responding to an “imminent threat.” But so far, no evidence of that has been provided. While a 2018 Office of Legal Council (OLC) opinion offers a very liberal definition of executive authority and provides “very little constraint on modern presidential uses of force,” it appears to classify the Soleimani strike as an act of war, since Iran is a nation state that will likely escalate its military retaliation in response to the killing of their uniformed military member. Indeed, the U.S. has already said it will send 3,500 additional troops to the Middle East “after Iran vowed to exact ‘severe revenge.’” The U.S. has warned its citizens to leave Iraq, and Iran has already begun firing at housing for American forces in Iraq: all signs that point to escalation. Moreover, targeted political assassinations, like the kind used against Soleimani, have been banned by executive order since the Ford administration. Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12333, which reads: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” Soleimani was “not a rogue outlaw, but a military official of a sovereign government we were not at war with, making his killing an assassination,” writes Ben Friedman, policy director at Defense Priorities. “His actions, however evil, served Iranian policy.” “The idea that the president can, without going to Congress, take out a top level official of a country we’re not in an authorized war with, is crossing a Rubicon,” said Healy. So what happens now? Congress has several choices to make in the days ahead. It can pass empty, non-binding resolutions, that require the president’s sign-off, like the kind suggested by Kaine and Pelosi. Or it can repeal the decades-old AUMFs that have been used to justify continuing U.S. escalations in the Middle East. Congress could also pass bills like those by Representative Khanna and Senator Sanders to strip funding for offensive military action against Iran from the NDAA. It remains to be seen if Congress will choose substantive actions, like defunding unauthorized wars, over window dressing.