theamericanconservative--2020-12-15--Three Vested Interests A New Administration Should Assail

The new administration , like all its predecessors since the start of the Cold War , will perpetuate three features of Washington life that Americans have been lulled into taking for granted , whose continuation is supported by powerful Washington bureaucracies in the defense-intelligence complex , in the FBI , and in the Treasury Department .
The practices are hard to curb because of the herd instinct of an increasingly decadent Washington press corps and the self-interest of thousands of job-holders .
The first of these is the security clearance culture , which for practical purposes did not exist until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1947 .
President Truman ’ s most influential aide , Clark Clifford , stated in his 1991 memoirs that his “ greatest regret ” was his failure “ to make more of an effort to kill the loyalty program at its inception in 1946-47.
” The program was adopted to defend the administration against criticism by the House Un-American Activities Committee and , later , Senator Joseph McCarthy .
It was subsequently greatly broadened by the Eisenhower administration to weed out not merely the “ disloyal ” but “ security risks.
” It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that posed by the hundred thousand odd American intellectuals that the Depression led into affiliation with the Communist party and its affiliates who were not readily distinguishable from the rest of the American population .
Its administration was rather unwisely confided to J. Edgar Hoover ’ s FBI , not the most tolerant of agencies .
Initially , applicants for federal employment had to fill out a brief questionnaire of about four pages listing such things as relatives and prior places of residence .
Over the years , this has metastisized into larger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further goblins to guard against and further information that might conceivably be useful .
There are now some five million Americans who have received security clearances ; awards of secret or top secret clearances involve not merely examination of police , litigation and tax records but field interviews with large number of persons who have crossed the applicant ’ s path , college landladies for example .
One wonders what some of these are supposed to discover : ( “ I remember him well .
He used to beat his wife regularly every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ terrible !
” ) .
The clearance process can take from 6 to 18 months , and is a major clog to the staffing of new administrations .
Worse still , it delays and burdens appointments to lesser posts , discouraging new high school and college graduates from federal service .
Indeed , possession of an extant security clearance is said to add 13 % to one ’ s expected salary .
When the program was instituted , these inquisitions into private behavior were not taken for granted .
The labor lawyer Lloyd @ @ @ @ @ @ @ University of Chicago Law Review in 1955 suggested needed reforms , including separating loyalty cases from security risk cases and treating the latter as part of the ordinary employment process and limiting loyalty cases to those involving truly secret information or the ability to mold national policy .
A more general objection was raised by the eminent journalist Alistair Cooke : The dangers presented by terrorists with their origins in more primitive countries are not equivalent to those of less readily identifiable native American Communist or Fascist fifth columnists .
The five million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that have taken place are a wretched and wasteful excess .
Curbing the culture would involve relegating to private life many of the less gifted members of the ever-expanding FBI assigned to counterintelligence investigations .
Tears should not be shed for them ; FBI-trained personnel are welcomed in local law enforcement .
The second even more remarkable excess is the document classification system .
This is not confined to papers like the plans for the Normandy invasion or to recently generated documents whose premature disclosure might inhibit free discussion .
Documents referring in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even if more than 50 years old are barred from disclosure until 75 years have passed ; even after that , they may be designated for nondisclosure .
A recent Freedom of Information request by the present writer relating to the alleged suicide of an official in 1953 was not responded to for seven years ; when documents were produced , there was scarcely a page without a “ sources ” redaction , although virtually all the “ sources ” were either dead or in nursing homes .
Commendable efforts have been made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these projects have involved 1.1 billion pages , which gives some idea of the extent of over-classification .
It is hard to believe that the decisions to classify or de-classify are done well ; as Justice Jackson once observed in a different context , “ he who must look for a needle in a haystack is apt to conclude that the needle is not worth the search.
” Taken in all , the program exists in its present dimensions not to protect vital secrets but to protect the reputation of agencies and of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drastically pruned .
Its administrators are not confined to the FBI ; they infest all government agencies .
The third yet more damaging practice , both from an humanitarian and political point of view , is the enthusiasm for economic sanctions on foreign governments and officials .
These are infected by the “ don ’ t stand there , do something !
” syndrome endemic in the foreign policy establishment .
As the former British Ambassador to the UN , Sir Jeremy Greenstock , has observed : “ there is nothing else between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to bring pressure on a government.
” The trouble is , as Herbert Hoover observed after viewing the consequences of the British blockade of Germany after the Armistice and before the Versailles peace conference , economic sanctions are not measures short of war , they are measures of total war .
They victimize and embitter innocent civilian populations while leaving privileged rulers untouched .
They increase the social controls imposed by the existing regime by fostering discretionary rationing .
Their usual object , as with Cuba , Iran , and Venezuela is regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in that object .
Their proponents seem to believe that if the population becomes sufficiently miserable , it will replicate the storming of the Bastille and will overthrow the government .
But totalitarian mechanisms of social control have been greatly perfected since 1789 ; modern dictatorships have at their disposal block captains , eavesdropping and surveillance devices , computers , and now facial and voice recognition .
Modern revolutions come from above , not below ; they require a failure of nerve and belief on the part of the existing leadership , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change .
Creating hermit kingdoms whose leadership is isolated from the outside world and rules over a static society is not the way to foster political change .
The decisive event in the fall of the Soviet Union was not the Star Wars program of the 1980s but took place in the mid-1950s when two middle-level apparatchiks from Stavropol were allowed to take a two-week vacation in France and Italy .
The even more insulated leadership of Iran is accorded no such opportunity .
The celebrated diarist of Nazi and Communist Germany , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impression that a visit to France made on him while he was a member of the Volkskammer and a pillar of the East German regime .
Following Willy Brandt ’ s and Hans Dietrich Genscher ’ s Ostpolitik , a generation of Soviet middle managers had similar experiences .
Revolutions , Hannah Arendt observed , “ are not the result of conspiracies or the propaganda of revolutionary parties but the almost automatic outcome of processes of disintegration in the powers that be , of their loss of authority.
” “ The revolutionaries are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the street and then they can pick it up.
” There will not be many of them in North Korea , in Cuba , in Iran , or even in Venezuela if the sanctions bureaucrats in the American Treasury continue to pursue the policies that have failed since 1953 , 1962 , 1979 , and 2015 .
We will see whether the Biden administration is a change agent or whether it perpetuates vested interests .
Drift is more likely than mastery .
George Liebmann is the author of numerous works on law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Political Inventors ( Bloomsbury 2019 ) .

The new administration, like all its predecessors since the start of the Cold War, will perpetuate three features of Washington life that Americans have been lulled into taking for granted, whose continuation is supported by powerful Washington bureaucracies in the defense-intelligence complex, in the FBI, and in the Treasury Department. The practices are hard to curb because of the herd instinct of an increasingly decadent Washington press corps and the self-interest of thousands of job-holders.
The Bloated Security Clearance System
The first of these is the security clearance culture, which for practical purposes did not exist until President Truman’s loyalty-security order in 1947. President Truman’s most influential aide, Clark Clifford, stated in his 1991 memoirs that his “greatest regret” was his failure “to make more of an effort to kill the loyalty program at its inception in 1946-47.” The program was adopted to defend the administration against criticism by the House Un-American Activities Committee and, later, Senator Joseph McCarthy. It was subsequently greatly broadened by the Eisenhower administration to weed out not merely the “disloyal” but “security risks.” It was aimed at a real danger, that posed by the hundred thousand odd American intellectuals that the Depression led into affiliation with the Communist party and its affiliates who were not readily distinguishable from the rest of the American population. Its administration was rather unwisely confided to J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, not the most tolerant of agencies.
Initially, applicants for federal employment had to fill out a brief questionnaire of about four pages listing such things as relatives and prior places of residence. Over the years, this has metastisized into larger documents; each new administrator thinks of further goblins to guard against and further information that might conceivably be useful. There are now some five million Americans who have received security clearances; awards of secret or top secret clearances involve not merely examination of police, litigation and tax records but field interviews with large number of persons who have crossed the applicant’s path, college landladies for example. One wonders what some of these are supposed to discover: (“I remember him well. He used to beat his wife regularly every Wednesday evening. The screams were just terrible!”). The clearance process can take from 6 to 18 months, and is a major clog to the staffing of new administrations. Worse still, it delays and burdens appointments to lesser posts, discouraging new high school and college graduates from federal service. Indeed, possession of an extant security clearance is said to add 13% to one’s expected salary.
When the program was instituted, these inquisitions into private behavior were not taken for granted. The labor lawyer Lloyd Garrison in an article published in the University of Chicago Law Review in 1955 suggested needed reforms, including separating loyalty cases from security risk cases and treating the latter as part of the ordinary employment process and limiting loyalty cases to those involving truly secret information or the ability to mold national policy. A more general objection was raised by the eminent journalist Alistair Cooke:
“There was an alarmed minority ready to make political hay by blurring distinction between an old sympathizer and an old spy. [The trouble with the exploitation of the issue of domestic Communism] was that it brought back into favor the odious trade of the public informer. It gave the FBI an unparalleled power of inquiry into private lives that. . . could open up for generations of mischief-makers an official wholesale house of blackmail. It tended to make conformity sheepish and to limit by intimidation what no Western society worth the name can safely limit: the curiosity and idealism of the young. It helped therefore to usher in a period when a high premium would be put on the chameleon and the politically neutral slob.”
The dangers presented by terrorists with their origins in more primitive countries are not equivalent to those of less readily identifiable native American Communist or Fascist fifth columnists. The five million security clearance investigations of the present population that have taken place are a wretched and wasteful excess. Curbing the culture would involve relegating to private life many of the less gifted members of the ever-expanding FBI assigned to counterintelligence investigations. Tears should not be shed for them; FBI-trained personnel are welcomed in local law enforcement.
The Overclassification Crisis
The second even more remarkable excess is the document classification system. This is not confined to papers like the plans for the Normandy invasion or to recently generated documents whose premature disclosure might inhibit free discussion. Documents referring in any way to sources of information, even if more than 50 years old are barred from disclosure until 75 years have passed; even after that, they may be designated for nondisclosure. A recent Freedom of Information request by the present writer relating to the alleged suicide of an official in 1953 was not responded to for seven years; when documents were produced, there was scarcely a page without a “sources” redaction, although virtually all the “sources” were either dead or in nursing homes. Commendable efforts have been made since 1973 to declassify protected documents; these projects have involved 1.1 billion pages, which gives some idea of the extent of over-classification. It is hard to believe that the decisions to classify or de-classify are done well; as Justice Jackson once observed in a different context, “he who must look for a needle in a haystack is apt to conclude that the needle is not worth the search.” Taken in all, the program exists in its present dimensions not to protect vital secrets but to protect the reputation of agencies and of political actors. It needs to be drastically pruned. Its administrators are not confined to the FBI; they infest all government agencies.
Sanctions Regimes Run Amok
The third yet more damaging practice, both from an humanitarian and political point of view, is the enthusiasm for economic sanctions on foreign governments and officials. These are infected by the “don’t stand there, do something!” syndrome endemic in the foreign policy establishment.
As the former British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, has observed: “there is nothing else between words and military action if you want to bring pressure on a government.” The trouble is, as Herbert Hoover observed after viewing the consequences of the British blockade of Germany after the Armistice and before the Versailles peace conference, economic sanctions are not measures short of war, they are measures of total war. They victimize and embitter innocent civilian populations while leaving privileged rulers untouched. They increase the social controls imposed by the existing regime by fostering discretionary rationing. Their usual object, as with Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela is regime change, but they are rarely successful in that object.
Their proponents seem to believe that if the population becomes sufficiently miserable, it will replicate the storming of the Bastille and will overthrow the government. But totalitarian mechanisms of social control have been greatly perfected since 1789; modern dictatorships have at their disposal block captains, eavesdropping and surveillance devices, computers, and now facial and voice recognition. Modern revolutions come from above, not below; they require a failure of nerve and belief on the part of the existing leadership, the product of both comparative information and social change. Creating hermit kingdoms whose leadership is isolated from the outside world and rules over a static society is not the way to foster political change. The decisive event in the fall of the Soviet Union was not the Star Wars program of the 1980s but took place in the mid-1950s when two middle-level apparatchiks from Stavropol were allowed to take a two-week vacation in France and Italy. The even more insulated leadership of Iran is accorded no such opportunity.
The celebrated diarist of Nazi and Communist Germany, Victor Klemperer, has similarly recorded the impression that a visit to France made on him while he was a member of the Volkskammer and a pillar of the East German regime. Following Willy Brandt’s and Hans Dietrich Genscher’s Ostpolitik, a generation of Soviet middle managers had similar experiences. Revolutions, Hannah Arendt observed, “are not the result of conspiracies or the propaganda of revolutionary parties but the almost automatic outcome of processes of disintegration in the powers that be, of their loss of authority.” “The revolutionaries are those who know when power is lying in the street and then they can pick it up.” There will not be many of them in North Korea, in Cuba, in Iran, or even in Venezuela if the sanctions bureaucrats in the American Treasury continue to pursue the policies that have failed since 1953, 1962, 1979, and 2015.
We will see whether the Biden administration is a change agent or whether it perpetuates vested interests. Drift is more likely than mastery.
George Liebmann is the author of numerous works on law and history, most recently America’s Political Inventors (Bloomsbury 2019).


theamericanconservative--2020-12-15--China Is Not The Big Bad Guy In This Story

The globalist crowd seems intent on brushing aside the past four years as an anomaly .
Yet there are solid reasons why a reality TV star came out of nowhere in 2016 to defeat the establishment favorite .
No doubt it has something to do with the aforementioned celebrity broaching a taboo that officials on both sides of the aisle have studiously avoided .
That is , the subject of billionaires playing a vicious game of global labor arbitrage .
One that hollowed out America ’ s middle class by pitting national workforces against each other in an epic race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being ignored and betrayed , large segments of the electorate were receptive to the celebrity ’ s atypical bluntness .
Their misery had progressed to the point where some voters were willing to grasp at any alternative that might challenge the status quo .
The same status quo that is slowly crushing them by design .
Globalist factions , irritated by these disobedient subjects , leveraged gatekeepers in the press to issue a barrage of accusations .
Insinuating that anyone who dared to defy the New World Order™ was a racist , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dog whistles that would rouse activist wings in the Democratic Party which , in their ideological fervor , would promptly forget all about those woeful trade deals and the giant sucking sound of jobs vanishing .
It seems that regardless of how poor you get , the elites can always stir up a culture war .
Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain , advised Oz the great and terrible .
While China has been cast as the leading national security threat du jour , understand that there is calculated misdirection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past several decades ( e.g .
the decline of American manufacturing , the self-perpetuating war on terror , the economic collapse of 2008 , the wholesale strip-mining of working families ) was engineered through deliberate policymaking .
A process choreographed from coastal boardrooms and executed by political proxies on Capitol Hill .
Which , to a degree , may explain why a bill that will eliminate per-country limits for H-1B work visas quietly sailed through both the Senate and House of Representatives with very little public fanfare .
Far from being this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is merely the willing recipient of a gift that was bestowed upon it by American business interests .
Put another way , the United States has played a crucial role in the rise of China ’ s industrial capacity .
The same industrial capacity that will be brought to bear in future military conflicts .
Students of history will recall how certain powerful families in the United States profited by helping to finance the remilitarization of Germany in the period leading up to World War II .
As the old saying goes “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it rhymes.
” Notice how corporate bigwigs didn ’ t make a peep about China until hackers started stealing their trade secrets .
Which only serves to illustrate that America ’ s C-suites won ’ t take action until something impacts them directly .
As far as the globetrotting crowd is concerned , the decay of the United States is a “ negative externality.
” When push comes to shove they ’ ll simply jump on planes to New Zealand .
Which underscores a broader corollary : things won ’ t get any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ charge are able to escape the consequences of their narrow and short-sighted decisions .
Our job as patriotic citizens is to protect our values by ensuring that , one way or another , they can not .
Bill Blunden is an independent investigator focusing on information security , anti-forensics , and institutional analysis .
He is the author of several books , including The Rootkit Arsenal and Behold a Pale Farce : Cyberwar , Threat Inflation , and the Malware-Industrial Complex .
Bill is the lead investigator at Below Gotham Labs .

The globalist crowd seems intent on brushing aside the past four years as an anomaly. Yet there are solid reasons why a reality TV star came out of nowhere in 2016 to defeat the establishment favorite. No doubt it has something to do with the aforementioned celebrity broaching a taboo that officials on both sides of the aisle have studiously avoided. That is, the subject of billionaires playing a vicious game of global labor arbitrage. One that hollowed out America’s middle class by pitting national workforces against each other in an epic race to the bottom.
After years of being ignored and betrayed, large segments of the electorate were receptive to the celebrity’s atypical bluntness. Their misery had progressed to the point where some voters were willing to grasp at any alternative that might challenge the status quo. The same status quo that is slowly crushing them by design.
Globalist factions, irritated by these disobedient subjects, leveraged gatekeepers in the press to issue a barrage of accusations. Insinuating that anyone who dared to defy the New World Order™ was a racist, a fascist, or a Russian stooge. Dog whistles that would rouse activist wings in the Democratic Party which, in their ideological fervor, would promptly forget all about those woeful trade deals and the giant sucking sound of jobs vanishing. It seems that regardless of how poor you get, the elites can always stir up a culture war.
Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain, advised Oz the great and terrible. While China has been cast as the leading national security threat du jour, understand that there is calculated misdirection at work. The real devastation of the past several decades (e.g. the decline of American manufacturing, the self-perpetuating war on terror, the economic collapse of 2008, the wholesale strip-mining of working families) was engineered through deliberate policymaking. A process choreographed from coastal boardrooms and executed by political proxies on Capitol Hill. Which, to a degree, may explain why a bill that will eliminate per-country limits for H-1B work visas quietly sailed through both the Senate and House of Representatives with very little public fanfare.
Far from being this story’s principal antagonist, China is merely the willing recipient of a gift that was bestowed upon it by American business interests. Put another way, the United States has played a crucial role in the rise of China’s industrial capacity. The same industrial capacity that will be brought to bear in future military conflicts. Students of history will recall how certain powerful families in the United States profited by helping to finance the remilitarization of Germany in the period leading up to World War II. As the old saying goes “History may not repeat itself, but it rhymes.”
Notice how corporate bigwigs didn’t make a peep about China until hackers started stealing their trade secrets. Which only serves to illustrate that America’s C-suites won’t take action until something impacts them directly. As far as the globetrotting crowd is concerned, the decay of the United States is a “negative externality.” When push comes to shove they’ll simply jump on planes to New Zealand. Which underscores a broader corollary: things won’t get any better as long as the folks in charge are able to escape the consequences of their narrow and short-sighted decisions. Our job as patriotic citizens is to protect our values by ensuring that, one way or another, they cannot.
Bill Blunden is an independent investigator focusing on information security, anti-forensics, and institutional analysis. He is the author of several books, including The Rootkit Arsenal and Behold a Pale Farce: Cyberwar, Threat Inflation, and the Malware-Industrial Complex. Bill is the lead investigator at Below Gotham Labs.


theamericanconservative--2020-12-15--The World that Made Lisa Fithian

The World that Made Lisa Fithian

Organize Right is a regular column with not so much a beat as a meander on the subject of organizing : how the right does it , how the left does it , lessons from its history , and its implications for today .
When Florida governor Ron DeSantis and Texas governor Greg Abbot proposed legislation making particular radical tactics crimes — many of them felonies — carrying mandatory jail time , much commentary , positive and negative , focused on DeSentis ’ proposal ( previously made by other jurisdictions ) that a driver fleeing from safety from a mob @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death caused by hitting someone with his car .
That proposal was especially popular with those who , beyond supporting the right to physical safety and self-defense , fantasize about breaking radical Lefty movements by scaring them off with the prospect of force .
In reality , radical Lefties aren ’ t scared off by the prospect of force because radical Lefties aren ’ t cowardly .
What ’ s rare and remarkable , however , is that DeSantis ’ and Abbott ’ s proposals include something that actually does work : not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ re targeting supporting infrastructure .
DeSantis would allow allow people to sue for governmental negligence in protecting people or property from violent or disorderly assembly , and attach RICO liability to anyone funding or organizing a violent or disorderly assembly .
Abbott ’ s proposals included making “ aiding and abetting riots with funds or organizational assistance ” a felony requiring mandatory jail time , and empowering Texas ’ s Attorney General “ to pursue civil penalties against people and organizations ” involved .
This has the potential to cause considerable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t have an adequate appreciation of leftist infrastructure , or a good idea of what it looks like .
The elites are too lazy and too focused on policy nerd stuff ; the grassroots tends to fantasize about all-consuming conspiracies or get hung up on specific individuals .
But you can learn quite a lot about leftist radical infrastructure if you just sit down and read their books .
Here ’ s a recent one that ’ s worth your time : Lisa Fithian ’ s 2019 memoir Shut It Down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Resistance .
Conservative outlets spend a lot of ink criticizing the radical left .
But unless they ’ re reacting to mainstream media coverage they rarely mention names of prominent organizers like Lisa Fithian , which is rather like American newspapers in the 1940s never mentioning the name “ Erwin Rommel.
” This is , of course , an inexact comparison ; the two represent opposite ends of the political spectrum , and Fithian doesn ’ t issue orders from a position in a hierarchical structure ( so don ’ t get hung @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her name , like the obsessions with Alinsky and Soros ) .
But she is a prominent and influential strategist , and serves as a good example of other people like her .
The book is well worth reading for its tactical discussions of how campaigns are designed and conducted , and the principles that make them work .
But it ’ s also fascinating because of what it says about the career track that got Fithian to where she is today .
Born in 1961 , Fithian got her start in serious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yippie fame spoke at her college .
She went to work at his environmental organization upon graduation , which led to her radicalization on foreign policy : Hoffman and his partner Johanna Lawrenson were avid supporters of the leftist Sandinista government and travelled to Nicaragua regularly .
By 1984 , Fithian was organizing Nicaragua show tours ; when she took a job with an electoral pressure group in Boston in 1986 , she hooked up with the Pledge of Resistance campaign , which was a leftist Christian campaign against U.S. support for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After some organizing adventures that included a blockade of CIA headquarters , Fithian went over to the Washington Peace Center , where she was involved with blockading the Supreme Court , the White House , and the Pentagon before moving over to union organizing in 1993 .
After nearly bankrupting a local hotel with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union , she moved to SEIU , where she cut her teeth on the hugely important and influential Justice for Janitors campaign , about which I ’ ll write in a future column @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that present-day radical organizers talk about in the kind of rosy tones reserved for foundational myths .
From there , she went on to a host of causes : the Battle in Seattle , World Bank and WTO protests , Hurricane Katrina relief , the International Solidarity Movement , war protesting , Occupy Wall Street , Ferguson , Standing Rock , abortion rights in Texas , and protests against Justice Kavanaugh .
You should take two things from Fithian ’ s resume .
The first is that she ’ s a mercenary , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hoare , and her memoir is a sellsword ’ s memoir of a host of campaigns for a variety of causes on different battlefields .
Righties and Fithian herself might grimace at that comparison .
But what is use of coercion to achieve strategic and political goals , if not military ?
This is a book about what leftist military science looks like .
These techniques don ’ t use guns ; that ’ s all .
The second thing you should take away is this : look how many different organizations and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a part of from the jump .
Abbie Hoffman didn ’ t just come to her campus to collect a speaking fee and go home , like a host of prominent conservatives I could name ; he came to recruit people to an organization that actually did things outside of running campaigns for political office .
Joining that organization exposed Fithian to other causes on her side , and networking with larger groups that shared those and related ideals .
Note that these groups weren ’ t just producing content and hoping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ skills and going out and making use of them on the ground .
And they were working together and talking to each other all the time .
Fithian rose to her present state because she had a host of radical organizations to join .
When she was young and hungry , she started being trained in direct action .
When she needed a better-paying job that used those skills , union organizing was available to join .
She ’ s had opportunities to meaningfully collaborate with colleagues locally , across the country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ track that does not exist on the right , and the infrastructure in which it exists is key to leftist successes .
As Fithian describes it : “ When historic people-powered movements like this one [ Ferguson ] rise up , there are patterns that tend to repeat .
You ’ ll often see a grassroots groundswell from the margins that is ignored , shunned , or criminalized ; then grassroots organizers with skills to offer start hitting the ground .
As time goes on , national groups send people in , generating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaigns while more established local groups translate the resistance into political reforms.
” The Right never gets past the grassroots groundswells .
Maybe those people get dollars , sometimes , but there ’ s no framework for building skills , no network of people to make sure attention gets where it ’ s needed , and no lasting local groups with the skills to pressure local officials .
Most of Righty civilians ’ organizing energy is spent in getting people into office .
In Fithian ’ s view , this is a trap @ @ @ @ @ @ @ representation .
We think that somebody else is in power , and therefore our problems are somebody else ’ s responsibility .
If something is wrong , we feel powerless to fix it , always waiting for someone else to solve the problem , leading to resentment , weakness , apathy , or anger.
” This , to me , pretty neatly nails the powerlessness felt by the grassroots right : eternally hoping for Someone To Do Something .
By contrast , Fithian describes her focus as “ horizontal , network-based community organizing.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is that “ action is most effective when it takes place within a strong , moderately dense , linked network of participant groups with a focus on “ strategic , creative , nonviolent direct action.
” Her usual modus operandi is to create a strategic crisis that empowers her people , with the goal of forcing elites to resolve the crisis by acceding to change — in the form of a plan that organizers have conveniently ready to hand them .
“ The most difficult part of this work , ” writes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smashing the pillars but changing the foundation that creates the culture in which they operate .
The foundations are made of mental models , which I see as the steps .
The first step is history , the second is belief systems , the third is values , and the fourth is norms and practices .
Combined , these steps form the dominant culture in which we are socialized.
” Yes , that ’ s a real mask-off moment : Lisa Fithian really does want to destroy the world you care about and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But she ’ s not following the One Big Master Plan that Righties often imagine Lefties to have .
Lefties take much more of a scattered approach .
This has virtues and flaws , if you ’ re a Lefty .
But the biggest leg up it offers is that it ’ s okay to start small .
You don ’ t have to draw up a Great Big Plan to change the world .
You can change a small part of it , and help others to do the same .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ we can learn from that approach , too .
David Hines has a professional background in international human rights work with a focus on recovery from forced disappearances and mass homicide .
He lives in Los Angeles .

Organize Right is a regular column with not so much a beat as a meander on the subject of organizing: how the right does it, how the left does it, lessons from its history, and its implications for today.
When Florida governor Ron DeSantis and Texas governor Greg Abbot proposed legislation making particular radical tactics crimes — many of them felonies — carrying mandatory jail time, much commentary, positive and negative, focused on DeSantis’ proposal (previously made by other jurisdictions) that a driver fleeing from safety from a mob should not be liable for injury or death caused by hitting someone with his car.
That proposal was especially popular with those who, beyond supporting the right to physical safety and self-defense, fantasize about breaking radical Lefty movements by scaring them off with the prospect of force. In reality, radical Lefties aren’t scared off by the prospect of force because radical Lefties aren’t cowardly. What’s rare and remarkable, however, is that DeSantis’ and Abbott’s proposals include something that actually does work: not just thinking about dissuading individual leftists; they’re targeting supporting infrastructure. DeSantis would allow allow people to sue for governmental negligence in protecting people or property from violent or disorderly assembly, and attach RICO liability to anyone funding or organizing a violent or disorderly assembly. Abbott’s proposals included making “aiding and abetting riots with funds or organizational assistance” a felony requiring mandatory jail time, and empowering Texas’s Attorney General “to pursue civil penalties against people and organizations” involved. This has the potential to cause considerable damage to their movements.
Righties mostly don’t have an adequate appreciation of leftist infrastructure, or a good idea of what it looks like. The elites are too lazy and too focused on policy nerd stuff; the grassroots tends to fantasize about all-consuming conspiracies or get hung up on specific individuals. But you can learn quite a lot about leftist radical infrastructure if you just sit down and read their books. Here’s a recent one that’s worth your time: Lisa Fithian’s 2019 memoir Shut It Down: Stories from a Fierce, Loving Resistance.
Conservative outlets spend a lot of ink criticizing the radical left. But unless they’re reacting to mainstream media coverage they rarely mention names of prominent organizers like Lisa Fithian, which is rather like American newspapers in the 1940s never mentioning the name “Erwin Rommel.” This is, of course, an inexact comparison; the two represent opposite ends of the political spectrum, and Fithian doesn’t issue orders from a position in a hierarchical structure (so don’t get hung up on her just because you know her name, like the obsessions with Alinsky and Soros). But she is a prominent and influential strategist, and serves as a good example of other people like her. The book is well worth reading for its tactical discussions of how campaigns are designed and conducted, and the principles that make them work. But it’s also fascinating because of what it says about the career track that got Fithian to where she is today.
Born in 1961, Fithian got her start in serious activism in 1982 when Abbie Hoffman of Yippie fame spoke at her college. She went to work at his environmental organization upon graduation, which led to her radicalization on foreign policy: Hoffman and his partner Johanna Lawrenson were avid supporters of the leftist Sandinista government and travelled to Nicaragua regularly. By 1984, Fithian was organizing Nicaragua show tours; when she took a job with an electoral pressure group in Boston in 1986, she hooked up with the Pledge of Resistance campaign, which was a leftist Christian campaign against U.S. support for the Contras and anti-communism in Latin America.
After some organizing adventures that included a blockade of CIA headquarters, Fithian went over to the Washington Peace Center, where she was involved with blockading the Supreme Court, the White House, and the Pentagon before moving over to union organizing in 1993. After nearly bankrupting a local hotel with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union, she moved to SEIU, where she cut her teeth on the hugely important and influential Justice for Janitors campaign, about which I’ll write in a future column; it’s a seminal campaign that present-day radical organizers talk about in the kind of rosy tones reserved for foundational myths. From there, she went on to a host of causes: the Battle in Seattle, World Bank and WTO protests, Hurricane Katrina relief, the International Solidarity Movement, war protesting, Occupy Wall Street, Ferguson, Standing Rock, abortion rights in Texas, and protests against Justice Kavanaugh.
You should take two things from Fithian’s resume. The first is that she’s a mercenary, the leftist equivalent of a Mad Mike Hoare, and her memoir is a sellsword’s memoir of a host of campaigns for a variety of causes on different battlefields. Righties and Fithian herself might grimace at that comparison. But what is use of coercion to achieve strategic and political goals, if not military? This is a book about what leftist military science looks like. These techniques don’t use guns; that’s all.
The second thing you should take away is this: look how many different organizations and campaigns Lisa Fithian had an opportunity to be a part of from the jump. Abbie Hoffman didn’t just come to her campus to collect a speaking fee and go home, like a host of prominent conservatives I could name; he came to recruit people to an organization that actually did things outside of running campaigns for political office. Joining that organization exposed Fithian to other causes on her side, and networking with larger groups that shared those and related ideals. Note that these groups weren’t just producing content and hoping people listened; they were teaching practical skills and going out and making use of them on the ground. And they were working together and talking to each other all the time.
Fithian rose to her present state because she had a host of radical organizations to join. When she was young and hungry, she started being trained in direct action. When she needed a better-paying job that used those skills, union organizing was available to join. She’s had opportunities to meaningfully collaborate with colleagues locally, across the country, and internationally. This is a career track that does not exist on the right, and the infrastructure in which it exists is key to leftist successes. As Fithian describes it: “When historic people-powered movements like this one [Ferguson] rise up, there are patterns that tend to repeat. You’ll often see a grassroots groundswell from the margins that is ignored, shunned, or criminalized; then grassroots organizers with skills to offer start hitting the ground. As time goes on, national groups send people in, generating action alerts, starting publicity and fund-raising campaigns while more established local groups translate the resistance into political reforms.”
The Right never gets past the grassroots groundswells. Maybe those people get dollars, sometimes, but there’s no framework for building skills, no network of people to make sure attention gets where it’s needed, and no lasting local groups with the skills to pressure local officials. Most of Righty civilians’ organizing energy is spent in getting people into office. In Fithian’s view, this is a trap: “…people believe democracy is about representation. We think that somebody else is in power, and therefore our problems are somebody else’s responsibility. If something is wrong, we feel powerless to fix it, always waiting for someone else to solve the problem, leading to resentment, weakness, apathy, or anger.” This, to me, pretty neatly nails the powerlessness felt by the grassroots right: eternally hoping for Someone To Do Something.
By contrast, Fithian describes her focus as “horizontal, network-based community organizing.” What this means, she elaborates, is that “action is most effective when it takes place within a strong, moderately dense, linked network of participant groups with a focus on “strategic, creative, nonviolent direct action.” Her usual modus operandi is to create a strategic crisis that empowers her people, with the goal of forcing elites to resolve the crisis by acceding to change — in the form of a plan that organizers have conveniently ready to hand them. “The most difficult part of this work,” writes Fithian, “is not flattening or smashing the pillars but changing the foundation that creates the culture in which they operate. The foundations are made of mental models, which I see as the steps. The first step is history, the second is belief systems, the third is values, and the fourth is norms and practices. Combined, these steps form the dominant culture in which we are socialized.”
Yes, that’s a real mask-off moment: Lisa Fithian really does want to destroy the world you care about and build a new one on its rubble. But she’s not following the One Big Master Plan that Righties often imagine Lefties to have. Lefties take much more of a scattered approach. This has virtues and flaws, if you’re a Lefty. But the biggest leg up it offers is that it’s okay to start small. You don’t have to draw up a Great Big Plan to change the world. You can change a small part of it, and help others to do the same.
Here’s the nice thing: we can learn from that approach, too.
David Hines has a professional background in international human rights work with a focus on recovery from forced disappearances and mass homicide. He lives in Los Angeles.


theamericanconservative--2020-12-16--How Donald Trump Rescued the “Blob”

How Donald Trump Rescued the “Blob”

“ Joe Biden has the most progressive platform in history ” was a familiar talking point in the last months before the election , both from Republicans trying to paint the Democratic nominee as a socialist controlled by the “ radical left , ” and from moderate Democrats who hoped to convince that skeptical left wing of the party to support him .
While the President-elect has not endorsed some of the plans that more progressive Democrats would have liked him to—such as Medicare for All or the Green New Deal—many of his domestic stances represent a meaningful move to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the case in his foreign policy .
Judging by his rhetoric , advisors , and now nominees , Biden ’ s approach to national security places him at the center of current national discourse , sitting somewhere within the same space on the political spectrum as traditional , post-Cold War American Presidents .
This positioning can not be explained simply by ideology , which has rarely driven Biden ’ s approach to politics .
Throughout his long career , Biden has mostly moved with the party .
When it comes to the use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden has also shifted with the political winds .
He opposed the first Gulf war , aggressively advocated the NATO campaign in the Balkans in the early 1990s , supported George W. Bush ’ s decision to invade Iraq , and then , during the Obama years , reportedly became a voice of restraint in the Situation Room .
Instead of focusing on ideology , core beliefs , or some overriding guiding principle to understand the incoming president ’ s foreign policy , one should instead look to the man he will soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s domestic policies helped pull Biden to the left , his foreign policy has given Biden reason to stay smack in the center .
Biden ’ s leftward shift on domestic issues is a reflection of two complementary trends : The long-term move to the left by the Democratic base on the one hand , and intense opposition among progressive Democrats to Trump ’ s policies on the other .
On socio-economic issues , left-leaning Democrats and anti-Trumpism push in the same direction , shifting Biden ’ s policies in a more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , this calculus does not hold .
While elements of the Democratic Party have advocated a more progressive national security approach , Trump ’ s foreign policy has not been as clearly and systematically hostile to a progressive agenda .
His stances and policies in some respects hue more closely to the views of the anti-interventionist left .
In many instances , Trump has identified the same problem as the left has , but has responded to them in ways that progressives reject .
But Trump ’ s rash and clumsy approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria or hastily putting together an unseemly summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un without preparation or follow-up—have tarnished the worthy principles underlying both sets of actions .
That made it both more difficult to support them , and far easier to oppose .
In other words , unlike with what happened on race , health care , or immigrations , opposition to Trumpism has not automatically translated into espousal of a progressive agenda .
Reflexive opposition to Trumpism can go hand in hand with espousal of a more progressive agenda , as has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But the desire among so many Democrats to oppose anything and everything that the President says or does has enabled Biden to stick comfortably to the center on foreign policy , aligning himself with center-left opponents of Trump and Never-Trump Republicans .
Even if advocating the reverse of what Trump has done means espousing centrist , liberal interventionist or neo-conservative approaches , many opponents of the outgoing president are likely to do so .
During his four years in office , the outgoing president has managed to occupy such a large place in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reacting negatively to his path of choice has often replaced articulating logically consistent alternatives .
Biden can revert to a conventional form of foreign policy precisely because he can couch it as the opposite of Trump , making his approach one that appeals to a constituency that both opposes the current president ’ s foreign policy and craves a return to the status quo ante .
For this reason , just as Trump gave renewed energy to immigration , environmental and racial justice activists who have been critical of past administrations—both Democratic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and liberal internationalists whose influence appeared to be slipping away in 2016 .
Prominent Republicans who felt unwelcome in Trump ’ s party—David Frum , Bill Kristol , Max Boot , and others—have found new homes in Biden ’ s broad Democratic tent .
For the second consecutive election , a group of Republican former national security officials endorsed Trump ’ s opponent .
Because they share a common antipathy toward Trump , the Democratic Party is happy to join hands with Republicans who had been prominent architects and cheerleaders of some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in recent history .
What that has meant is that the former Vice President ’ s foreign policy—unlike its domestic counterpart—could comfortably be simultaneously centrist and strongly anti-Trump .
He can emphasize restoring American global leadership , out-tough President Trump on China , and criticize him for precipitous military withdrawals—positions that are all anathema to the left , yet at the same time plainly opposed to Trump ’ s .
The downside is that Biden runs the risk of ignoring some crucial questions the outgoing president asked about the United States ’ role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military commitments or the necessity to meet even with the most intransigent of American ’ s foes .
The former Vice President was highly critical of Trump ’ s decision to withdraw forces from Syria and , while agreeing with the drawdown of troops from Afghanistan , opposed the notion of a full pull-out , emphasizing the need to maintain some there in order to combat terrorism .
He asserts his support for diplomacy , yet blamed his soon-to-be predecessor for meeting with Kim Jun Un .
It is hard to understand why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while also taking a far more bellicose rhetoric towards North Korea than Trump—until you remember that Trump opposes diplomacy with Iran , but supports negotiating with Kim Jong Un .
Another example is Russia .
The Democratic Party ’ s stance with regards to the country has shifted dramatically since 2016 , because the country represents not only an authoritarian regime with whom Trump is thought to be close—but an authoritarian regime that is viewed as largely responsible for his ascension to the presidency .
Just eight years after Barack Obama ridiculed Mitt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geopolitical threat facing the United States , Democrats more closely resemble Cold Warriors than Republicans do .
The concerns over Russia may not be baseless , but the threat Putin poses to the United States has almost certainly been vastly exaggerated—and serves as another illustration of how single-minded fixation on opposing Trump can lead to questionable policy choices .
Over the last few years , figures on both the left and right have made piercing and important critiques of American foreign policy and global leadership .
In their fixation on opposing that Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign policy advisors have proved unable to walk that fine line of distancing themselves from the outgoing president ’ s dysfunctional approach without reverting to the unsatisfactory , pre-existing status quo .
Blaise Malley is a writer based in Washington , DC .
His work has appeared in The American Prospect .

“Joe Biden has the most progressive platform in history” was a familiar talking point in the last months before the election, both from Republicans trying to paint the Democratic nominee as a socialist controlled by the “radical left,” and from moderate Democrats who hoped to convince that skeptical left wing of the party to support him. While the President-elect has not endorsed some of the plans that more progressive Democrats would have liked him to—such as Medicare for All or the Green New Deal—many of his domestic stances represent a meaningful move to the left.
This has not been the case in his foreign policy. Judging by his rhetoric, advisors, and now nominees, Biden’s approach to national security places him at the center of current national discourse, sitting somewhere within the same space on the political spectrum as traditional, post-Cold War American Presidents.
This positioning cannot be explained simply by ideology, which has rarely driven Biden’s approach to politics. Throughout his long career, Biden has mostly moved with the party. When it comes to the use of force and global military engagement, Biden has also shifted with the political winds. He opposed the first Gulf war, aggressively advocated the NATO campaign in the Balkans in the early 1990s, supported George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, and then, during the Obama years, reportedly became a voice of restraint in the Situation Room.
Instead of focusing on ideology, core beliefs, or some overriding guiding principle to understand the incoming president’s foreign policy, one should instead look to the man he will soon replace. Paradoxically, while Donald Trump’s domestic policies helped pull Biden to the left, his foreign policy has given Biden reason to stay smack in the center.
Biden’s leftward shift on domestic issues is a reflection of two complementary trends: The long-term move to the left by the Democratic base on the one hand, and intense opposition among progressive Democrats to Trump’s policies on the other. On socio-economic issues, left-leaning Democrats and anti-Trumpism push in the same direction, shifting Biden’s policies in a more progressive direction.
On foreign policy, however, this calculus does not hold. While elements of the Democratic Party have advocated a more progressive national security approach, Trump’s foreign policy has not been as clearly and systematically hostile to a progressive agenda. His stances and policies in some respects hue more closely to the views of the anti-interventionist left. In many instances, Trump has identified the same problem as the left has, but has responded to them in ways that progressives reject. But Trump’s rash and clumsy approach to decisions—whether abruptly removing troops from northern Syria or hastily putting together an unseemly summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un without preparation or follow-up—have tarnished the worthy principles underlying both sets of actions. That made it both more difficult to support them, and far easier to oppose. In other words, unlike with what happened on race, health care, or immigrations, opposition to Trumpism has not automatically translated into espousal of a progressive agenda.
Reflexive opposition to Trumpism can go hand in hand with espousal of a more progressive agenda, as has been the case on domestic issues. But the desire among so many Democrats to oppose anything and everything that the President says or does has enabled Biden to stick comfortably to the center on foreign policy, aligning himself with center-left opponents of Trump and Never-Trump Republicans. Even if advocating the reverse of what Trump has done means espousing centrist, liberal interventionist or neo-conservative approaches, many opponents of the outgoing president are likely to do so. During his four years in office, the outgoing president has managed to occupy such a large place in the nation’s collective psyche that reacting negatively to his path of choice has often replaced articulating logically consistent alternatives. Biden can revert to a conventional form of foreign policy precisely because he can couch it as the opposite of Trump, making his approach one that appeals to a constituency that both opposes the current president’s foreign policy and craves a return to the status quo ante.
For this reason, just as Trump gave renewed energy to immigration, environmental and racial justice activists who have been critical of past administrations—both Democratic and Republican—his presidency also helped resuscitate the neoconservatives and liberal internationalists whose influence appeared to be slipping away in 2016. Prominent Republicans who felt unwelcome in Trump’s party—David Frum, Bill Kristol, Max Boot, and others—have found new homes in Biden’s broad Democratic tent. For the second consecutive election, a group of Republican former national security officials endorsed Trump’s opponent. Because they share a common antipathy toward Trump, the Democratic Party is happy to join hands with Republicans who had been prominent architects and cheerleaders of some of the most disastrous American foreign policy decisions in recent history.
What that has meant is that the former Vice President’s foreign policy—unlike its domestic counterpart—could comfortably be simultaneously centrist and strongly anti-Trump. He can emphasize restoring American global leadership, out-tough President Trump on China, and criticize him for precipitous military withdrawals—positions that are all anathema to the left, yet at the same time plainly opposed to Trump’s.
The downside is that Biden runs the risk of ignoring some crucial questions the outgoing president asked about the United States’ role in the world—about the value of open-ended military commitments or the necessity to meet even with the most intransigent of American’s foes. The former Vice President was highly critical of Trump’s decision to withdraw forces from Syria and, while agreeing with the drawdown of troops from Afghanistan, opposed the notion of a full pull-out, emphasizing the need to maintain some there in order to combat terrorism. He asserts his support for diplomacy, yet blamed his soon-to-be predecessor for meeting with Kim Jun Un.
It is hard to understand why Biden has simultaneously urged re-entering the JCPOA while also taking a far more bellicose rhetoric towards North Korea than Trump—until you remember that Trump opposes diplomacy with Iran, but supports negotiating with Kim Jong Un.
Another example is Russia. The Democratic Party’s stance with regards to the country has shifted dramatically since 2016, because the country represents not only an authoritarian regime with whom Trump is thought to be close—but an authoritarian regime that is viewed as largely responsible for his ascension to the presidency. Just eight years after Barack Obama ridiculed Mitt Romney for calling Russia the single biggest geopolitical threat facing the United States, Democrats more closely resemble Cold Warriors than Republicans do. The concerns over Russia may not be baseless, but the threat Putin poses to the United States has almost certainly been vastly exaggerated—and serves as another illustration of how single-minded fixation on opposing Trump can lead to questionable policy choices.
Over the last few years, figures on both the left and right have made piercing and important critiques of American foreign policy and global leadership. In their fixation on opposing that Trump has stood for, Biden and his foreign policy advisors have proved unable to walk that fine line of distancing themselves from the outgoing president’s dysfunctional approach without reverting to the unsatisfactory, pre-existing status quo.
Blaise Malley is a writer based in Washington, DC. His work has appeared in The American Prospect.


theamericanconservative--2020-12-16--Local Sheriffs Are Pushing Back on Some of the Lockdown’s Harsher Measures

The limits of the government ’ s power to follow through with some of its public-health orders are being tested as states impose new restrictions on private gatherings because of COVID-19 .
“ You have due process , ” said Sheriff Richard Giardino , of Fulton County , N.Y. “ We can ’ t just go into someone ’ s home without a search warrant , their consent or an emergency.
” Giardino , a Republican and former county judge , drew national attention when he spearheaded a group of several elected upstate sheriffs who publicly refused to enforce restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on private gatherings ahead of the Thanksgiving holiday .
Along with their counterparts in California who oppose aspects of a recent order from Democratic Gov .
Gavin Newsom , the sheriffs forced state officials to ask how much authority they have to compel individual citizens to follow public-health guidelines .
“ I took [ the position ] that an executive order in New York without a sanction or a punishment to go into somebody ’ s house or count how many people is unenforceable because it is not a law , ” Giardino @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which set a 10-person limit on gatherings in people ’ s homes .
He also pointed to the widespread protests and debate about the role of police that occurred over the summer .
“ There ’ s been a message preached by many elected officials that police officers get up in the morning to shoot somebody , that police officers are all bad , ” said Giardino , “ and then they turn around and they want police officers to enforce these ordinances in your home.
” Cuomo initially called Giardino and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to enforce the law or don ’ t call yourself a law enforcement official , ” a dispatch from Albany quoted him as saying .
By the end of the month , however , the governor had changed his tone , per an AP report .
“ Government is not capable of enforcing what you do in your home , ” Cuomo said .
“ It ’ s about people being smart.
” Cuomo ’ s office didn ’ t respond to an inquiry about the evident contradiction .
Sheriffs ’ offices are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ types of cops , like local police and federal agencies ; however , their status as elected officials makes them more likely to protest state authority they see as overreaching .
For example , sheriffs from small counties have been frequent critics of new gun-control laws .
In New York state , two of them butted heads with Cuomo back in 2013 when he signed into law the SAFE Act , which is among the strictest gun laws in the country .
At times , elected , sheriffs exercise a de facto power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrary to the politics and interests of their constituents .
Upstate sheriffs led opposition to the legislation , which enjoyed strong support in the state ’ s largest city but was unpopular in rural counties .
In the wake of the law ’ s passage , at least one sheriff said outright that his deputies would not make arrests for violations .
In California , a group of sheriffs from the state ’ s southern counties recently said they wouldn ’ t enforce a regional order for citizens to stay at home .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Barnes , who said in a statement that following health orders is “ a matter of personal responsibility and not a matter of law enforcement , ” and his office would not be dispatched for complaints about social events or face masks .
“ The law does not allow us to go out and detain people over a public health order , ” said Sgt .
Dennis Breckner , a spokesman for Barnes ’ department .
Whether law enforcement could do so is still an important question .
Rising numbers of new cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tighten restrictions at a time of year when people would normally gather with friends and family for the holidays .
At the same time , the onset of winter weather makes it harder for people to gather outdoors , as many did to maintain a semblance of normalcy during the warm months of this year .
Professor Seth Chandler of the University of Houston Law Center said that there are certain “ exigent circumstances ” —the Supreme Court has used the example of a fire that could spread to other property—when authorities have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a warrant or consent from the owners .
“ My own opinion is that these days , in many places , hosting a party with 20 people is actually quite dangerous and it ’ s not that much different from a fire , ” Chandler said .
At least some of those who would be tasked with enforcing the orders don ’ t see things that way .
Breckner said that deputies have no ability to enforce an executive order , which he categorized as being different from a law , against private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ portion of Cuomo ’ s order dealt with businesses like restaurants and bars , which are licensed by the state and can be fined or suspended .
“ The [ part ] that set me off , ” Giardino said , “ was that people actually felt , or thought , that the governor was suggesting that we go to their houses and count how many people they had , so that sent a chilling effect.
” Chandler posited that if an arrest was made , the defense would be able to question @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was lawful , as well as whether or not the governor had the authority to make the law by executive order .
Even so , it ’ s unlikely that anyone—neither those accused of holding an illicit party nor the cops who made the arrest—would like to be the first to go to court to figure out who was right .
Giardino proposed an alternative direction for mitigation efforts , citing the damage the pandemic and accompanying isolation are causing to people ’ s mental health : “ So we really need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stress to people ’ s lives.
” “ One thing that has not happened—they don ’ t ask the police to meet with any of the mental-health professionals and the medical professionals on how to enforce some of these rules , ” he added .
“ They just make an edict and tell you to enforce it.
” Gideon Bradshaw is a writer and reporter who lives in Pittsburgh .

The limits of the government’s power to follow through with some of its public-health orders are being tested as states impose new restrictions on private gatherings because of COVID-19.
“You have due process,” said Sheriff Richard Giardino, of Fulton County, N.Y. “We can’t just go into someone’s home without a search warrant, their consent or an emergency.”
Giardino, a Republican and former county judge, drew national attention when he spearheaded a group of several elected upstate sheriffs who publicly refused to enforce restrictions that Democratic Gov. Andrew Cuomo imposed on private gatherings ahead of the Thanksgiving holiday.
Along with their counterparts in California who oppose aspects of a recent order from Democratic Gov. Gavin Newsom, the sheriffs forced state officials to ask how much authority they have to compel individual citizens to follow public-health guidelines.
“I took [the position] that an executive order in New York without a sanction or a punishment to go into somebody’s house or count how many people is unenforceable because it is not a law,” Giardino said of Cuomo’s order, which set a 10-person limit on gatherings in people’s homes.
He also pointed to the widespread protests and debate about the role of police that occurred over the summer. “There’s been a message preached by many elected officials that police officers get up in the morning to shoot somebody, that police officers are all bad,” said Giardino, “and then they turn around and they want police officers to enforce these ordinances in your home.”
Cuomo initially called Giardino and the other sheriffs arrogant. “You have to enforce the law or don’t call yourself a law enforcement official,” a dispatch from Albany quoted him as saying.
By the end of the month, however, the governor had changed his tone, per an AP report. “Government is not capable of enforcing what you do in your home,” Cuomo said. “It’s about people being smart.”
Cuomo’s office didn’t respond to an inquiry about the evident contradiction.
Sheriffs’ offices are typically responsible for fewer arrests than other types of cops, like local police and federal agencies; however, their status as elected officials makes them more likely to protest state authority they see as overreaching. For example, sheriffs from small counties have been frequent critics of new gun-control laws.
In New York state, two of them butted heads with Cuomo back in 2013 when he signed into law the SAFE Act, which is among the strictest gun laws in the country.
At times, elected, sheriffs exercise a de facto power to veto—or dissent from—laws they see as contrary to the politics and interests of their constituents. Upstate sheriffs led opposition to the legislation, which enjoyed strong support in the state’s largest city but was unpopular in rural counties. In the wake of the law’s passage, at least one sheriff said outright that his deputies would not make arrests for violations.
In California, a group of sheriffs from the state’s southern counties recently said they wouldn’t enforce a regional order for citizens to stay at home. Among them was Orange County Sheriff Don Barnes, who said in a statement that following health orders is “a matter of personal responsibility and not a matter of law enforcement,” and his office would not be dispatched for complaints about social events or face masks. “The law does not allow us to go out and detain people over a public health order,” said Sgt. Dennis Breckner, a spokesman for Barnes’ department.
Whether law enforcement could do so is still an important question. Rising numbers of new cases are prompting officials in many states to tighten restrictions at a time of year when people would normally gather with friends and family for the holidays. At the same time, the onset of winter weather makes it harder for people to gather outdoors, as many did to maintain a semblance of normalcy during the warm months of this year.
Professor Seth Chandler of the University of Houston Law Center said that there are certain “exigent circumstances”—the Supreme Court has used the example of a fire that could spread to other property—when authorities have the right to enter private property without a warrant or consent from the owners. “My own opinion is that these days, in many places, hosting a party with 20 people is actually quite dangerous and it’s not that much different from a fire,” Chandler said.
At least some of those who would be tasked with enforcing the orders don’t see things that way. Breckner said that deputies have no ability to enforce an executive order, which he categorized as being different from a law, against private citizens. Similarly, Giardino said one portion of Cuomo’s order dealt with businesses like restaurants and bars, which are licensed by the state and can be fined or suspended.
“The [part] that set me off,” Giardino said, “was that people actually felt, or thought, that the governor was suggesting that we go to their houses and count how many people they had, so that sent a chilling effect.”
Chandler posited that if an arrest was made, the defense would be able to question both whether the substance of the order was lawful, as well as whether or not the governor had the authority to make the law by executive order. Even so, it’s unlikely that anyone—neither those accused of holding an illicit party nor the cops who made the arrest—would like to be the first to go to court to figure out who was right.
Giardino proposed an alternative direction for mitigation efforts, citing the damage the pandemic and accompanying isolation are causing to people’s mental health: “So we really need to focus on that, and not adding stress to people’s lives.”
“One thing that has not happened—they don’t ask the police to meet with any of the mental-health professionals and the medical professionals on how to enforce some of these rules,” he added. “They just make an edict and tell you to enforce it.”
Gideon Bradshaw is a writer and reporter who lives in Pittsburgh.


theamericanconservative--2020-12-17--The Conviction and Heroism of William Barr

He kept his calm and independence of mind while serving in one of our nastiest and most contentious political moments .
U.S. Attorney General William Barr testifies before the House Judiciary Committee in the Congressional Auditorium at the U.S. Capitol Visitors Center July 28 , 2020 in Washington , DC .
( Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images ) William Barr is a heroic figure .
At age 69 , he returned to the Justice Department as attorney general some 16 years after his last tenure in that job , and in doing so he stepped into one of the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in U.S. history .
In joining forces with President Trump , he subjected himself to vilification , denigration , and severe condemnation for nearly two years .
Through it all , he never lost his calm demeanor as he defended himself and his philosophy of government with measured clarity .
Even in announcing his early departure from the Trump administration , effective December 23 , Barr came under withering attack .
Typical was a thrust on the Esquire website by a writer named Charles P. Pierce , who called Barr ’ s resignation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” He added that Barr served an administration “ that most closely resembled Bonnie and 50 Clydes.
” In other words , Barr is a crook and a violent one at that .
Ultimately , the independence of mind that characterized Barr ’ s approach to his job ( never acknowledged or appreciated by his critics ) got him crosswise with his own boss , the president , who gigged Barr for not manipulating a criminal investigation to influence the presidential election and for stating , correctly , after the voting that his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a magnitude that would have overturned the outcome .
So after taking abuse from the president ’ s liberal critics for defending the president , Barr took abuse from the president for not defending him sufficiently .
Why would anyone with Barr ’ s distinguished record re-enter public service at his age with full knowledge that it meant taking a level of abuse that most people seek to avoid at all costs ?
The answer seems to be that it was a matter of conviction .
Barr felt that the office of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Constitution , was in danger of being undermined and enfeebled by the president ’ s opponents through the investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller .
A key to understanding this concern was Barr ’ s memo of June 8 , 2018 , to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein that questioned what seemed to be emerging as Mueller ’ s basis for pursuing obstruction-of-justice allegations against Trump .
In 19 tightly argued pages Barr explained why this development posed serious constitutional questions regarding separation of powers .
He called Mueller ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was of course the darling of the anti-Trump forces , and Barr ’ s apostasy marked him immediately as a bad guy .
When the memo was released after Trump nominated Barr for attorney general , Chicago Law School professors Daniel Hemel and Eric Posner promptly attacked , saying the memo “ seriously damages [ Barr ’ s ] credibility and raises questions about his fitness for the Justice Department ’ s top position.
” An Obama administration lawyer named Marty Lederman accused Barr of advocating “ absolute ” and “ all-encompassing ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law enforcement officials .
Lederman ’ s portrayal of Barr ’ s point of view was erroneous .
In fact , Barr made clear that a president or his officials can come under investigation if they commit “ bad acts ” designed to subvert the integrity of a legal proceeding .
“ Obviously , ” he writes , “ the President and any other official can commit obstruction in this classic sense of sabotaging a proceeding ’ s truth-finding function ” —for example , if they knowingly destroy or alter evidence , suborn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change testimony .
Indeed , both presidents Nixon and Clinton came under scrutiny for just such bad acts involving the impairment of evidence , and Barr considered both instances to be entirely appropriate .
But , argued Barr , the president enjoys certain plenary powers , granted by the Constitution , over law enforcement actions , such as his “ complete authority ” to exercise prosecutorial discretion on questions of whether to pursue a particular case or his prerogative of dismissing executive branch personnel .
When such authority produces actions that get defined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Barr , the president becomes susceptible to a kind of political harassment that undermines his constitutional authority .
“ All that is needed is a claim that a supervisor [ under the president ’ s authority ] is acting with an improper purpose and any act arguably constraining a case—such as removing a U.S. attorney—could be cast as a crime of obstruction.
” It isn ’ t difficult to see how this could disturb the equilibrium of powers painstakingly crafted by the Founders .
But what about a case in which the removal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation ?
One precipitating event in the Mueller probe , for example , was Trump ’ s firing of FBI director James Comey , who was pursuing a possible perjury case against Trump ’ s briefly installed national security adviser , Michael Flynn .
No , argued Barr , the president ’ s authority to fire Comey was absolute .
The president , he said , “ is the sole repository of all Executive powers conferred by the Constitution .
Thus , the full measure of law enforcement authority is placed in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limit is placed on the kinds of cases subject to his control and supervision.
” But with authority comes responsibility .
The Barr concept of the “ unitary president , ” in which the chief executive has full jurisdiction over executive decision-making , confers upon him also “ the active obligation to supervise that goes with it , ” as the Supreme Court noted in a 2010 case cited by Barr .
To those who might argue that the president needs to be held accountable in a more direct and detailed manner , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ granting broad discretion of action to the president , also granted counterforce prerogatives to the people and Congress , to maintain accountability .
“ Thus , ” he wrote , “ under the Framers ’ plan , the determination whether the President is making decisions based on ‘ improper ’ motives or whether he is ‘ faithfully ’ discharging his responsibilities is left to the People , through the election process , and the Congress , through the Impeachment process.
” Barr ’ s view of the constitutionally protected prerogatives of the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at issue , may be debatable , with reasonable people coming to disparate conclusions .
But it hardly constitutes an assault on the Constitution or a dangerous opening for executive abuse .
And yet in these highly charged times , his studious argument was widely dismissed as beyond the pale .
But for separation of powers to work as conceived , the president must be able to protect his political interests and constitutional prerogatives .
If he can ’ t fortify his presidency against institutional encroachment , he can ’ t govern .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ he can ’ t control , then he is no longer master of his administration .
And separation of powers inevitably will erode , perhaps even crumble .
Barr ’ s argument , far more detailed and nuanced than I can capture here , stands as a monument of thinking on a complex matter of crucial significance to the republic .
He is to be commended as well , upon his departure , for his political courage in standing up to his bitter and often malicious critics , for bringing propriety and sound @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been beset by political corruption , and for the example of a smooth , firm persona that never descended to the level of his would-be tormenters .
Robert W. Merry , longtime Washington , D.C. , journalist and publishing executive , is the author of five books on American history and foreign policy .

William Barr is a heroic figure. At age 69, he returned to the Justice Department as attorney general some 26 years after his last tenure in that job, and in doing so he stepped into one of the most furious and nasty periods of political contention in U.S. history. In joining forces with President Trump, he subjected himself to vilification, denigration, and severe condemnation for nearly two years. Through it all, he never lost his calm demeanor as he defended himself and his philosophy of government with measured clarity.
Even in announcing his early departure from the Trump administration, effective December 23, Barr came under withering attack. Typical was a thrust on the Esquire website by a writer named Charles P. Pierce, who called Barr’s resignation letter “insufferably self-important and cloyingly obsequious.” He added that Barr served an administration “that most closely resembled Bonnie and 50 Clydes.” In other words, Barr is a crook and a violent one at that.
Ultimately, the independence of mind that characterized Barr’s approach to his job (never acknowledged or appreciated by his critics) got him crosswise with his own boss, the president, who gigged Barr for not manipulating a criminal investigation to influence the presidential election and for stating, correctly, after the voting that his investigators didn’t find voter fraud of a magnitude that would have overturned the outcome. So after taking abuse from the president’s liberal critics for defending the president, Barr took abuse from the president for not defending him sufficiently.
Why would anyone with Barr’s distinguished record re-enter public service at his age with full knowledge that it meant taking a level of abuse that most people seek to avoid at all costs? The answer seems to be that it was a matter of conviction. Barr felt that the office of the presidency, as established and defined by the Constitution, was in danger of being undermined and enfeebled by the president’s opponents through the investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller.
A key to understanding this concern was Barr’s memo of June 8, 2018, to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein that questioned what seemed to be emerging as Mueller’s basis for pursuing obstruction-of-justice allegations against Trump. In 19 tightly argued pages Barr explained why this development posed serious constitutional questions regarding separation of powers. He called Mueller’s obstruction theory “fatally misconceived.”
Mueller was of course the darling of the anti-Trump forces, and Barr’s apostasy marked him immediately as a bad guy. When the memo was released after Trump nominated Barr for attorney general, Chicago Law School professors Daniel Hemel and Eric Posner promptly attacked, saying the memo “seriously damages [Barr’s] credibility and raises questions about his fitness for the Justice Department’s top position.” An Obama administration lawyer named Marty Lederman accused Barr of advocating “absolute” and “all-encompassing” constitutional authority over actions by executive branch law enforcement officials.
Lederman’s portrayal of Barr’s point of view was erroneous. In fact, Barr made clear that a president or his officials can come under investigation if they commit “bad acts” designed to subvert the integrity of a legal proceeding. “Obviously,” he writes, “the President and any other official can commit obstruction in this classic sense of sabotaging a proceeding’s truth-finding function”—for example, if they knowingly destroy or alter evidence, suborn perjury, or induce a witness to change testimony. Indeed, both presidents Nixon and Clinton came under scrutiny for just such bad acts involving the impairment of evidence, and Barr considered both instances to be entirely appropriate.
But, argued Barr, the president enjoys certain plenary powers, granted by the Constitution, over law enforcement actions, such as his “complete authority” to exercise prosecutorial discretion on questions of whether to pursue a particular case or his prerogative of dismissing executive branch personnel. When such authority produces actions that get defined as bad acts of obstruction, argued Barr, the president becomes susceptible to a kind of political harassment that undermines his constitutional authority. “All that is needed is a claim that a supervisor [under the president’s authority] is acting with an improper purpose and any act arguably constraining a case—such as removing a U.S. attorney—could be cast as a crime of obstruction.”
It isn’t difficult to see how this could disturb the equilibrium of powers painstakingly crafted by the Founders. But what about a case in which the removal of an official could actually impede an investigation? One precipitating event in the Mueller probe, for example, was Trump’s firing of FBI director James Comey, who was pursuing a possible perjury case against Trump’s briefly installed national security adviser, Michael Flynn.
No, argued Barr, the president’s authority to fire Comey was absolute. The president, he said, “is the sole repository of all Executive powers conferred by the Constitution. Thus, the full measure of law enforcement authority is placed in the President’s hands, and no limit is placed on the kinds of cases subject to his control and supervision.”
But with authority comes responsibility. The Barr concept of the “unitary president,” in which the chief executive has full jurisdiction over executive decision-making, confers upon him also “the active obligation to supervise that goes with it,” as the Supreme Court noted in a 2010 case cited by Barr. To those who might argue that the president needs to be held accountable in a more direct and detailed manner, Barr maintained that the Founders, in granting broad discretion of action to the president, also granted counterforce prerogatives to the people and Congress, to maintain accountability. “Thus,” he wrote, “under the Framers’ plan, the determination whether the President is making decisions based on ‘improper’ motives or whether he is ‘faithfully’ discharging his responsibilities is left to the People, through the election process, and the Congress, through the Impeachment process.”
Barr’s view of the constitutionally protected prerogatives of the president, even when his own interests are at issue, may be debatable, with reasonable people coming to disparate conclusions. But it hardly constitutes an assault on the Constitution or a dangerous opening for executive abuse. And yet in these highly charged times, his studious argument was widely dismissed as beyond the pale.
But for separation of powers to work as conceived, the president must be able to protect his political interests and constitutional prerogatives. If he can’t fortify his presidency against institutional encroachment, he can’t govern. And if executive-branch power centers emerge that he can’t control, then he is no longer master of his administration. And separation of powers inevitably will erode, perhaps even crumble.
Barr’s argument, far more detailed and nuanced than I can capture here, stands as a monument of thinking on a complex matter of crucial significance to the republic. He is to be commended as well, upon his departure, for his political courage in standing up to his bitter and often malicious critics, for bringing propriety and sound management to a Justice Department that had been beset by political corruption, and for the example of a smooth, firm persona that never descended to the level of his would-be tormenters.
Robert W. Merry, longtime Washington, D.C., journalist and publishing executive, is the author of five books on American history and foreign policy.