theamericanconservative--2020-12-07--Steve Jobs’ Widow’s Charity for Profit

Steve Jobs’ Widow’s Charity for Profit

SAN FRANCISCO , CA - SEPTEMBER 20 : Emerson Collective Founder and President Laurene Powell Jobs speaks onstage during TechCrunch Disrupt SF 2017 at Pier 48 on September 20 , 2017 in San Francisco , California .
( Photo by Steve Jennings/Getty Images for TechCrunch ) Emerson Collective ( EC ) may not have the name recognition of a Tides or an Open Society Foundation , but this Silicon Valley-based “ social change organization ” is just as ambitious , and nearly as important in the world of left-wing philanthropy .
It ’ s the brainchild of Lauren Powell Jobs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems the tech titans have put their own spin on giving .
EC is structured not as a foundation but as a Limited Liability Corporation ( LLC ) , making it a for-profit philanthropy .
Powell Jobs has previously said she structured EC as an LLC for more flexibility .
This is highly unusual for philanthropic organizations , but the same choice was made by Mark Zuckerberg and his wife , Laura Chan , in establishing the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative , LLC .
Brian Crowley is a Certified Public Accountant and owner of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the difference between an LLC and a traditional nonprofit is two-fold : “ ownership and taxation .
Nonprofits have no owners and are not taxed .
LLCs have owners and are taxed .
Obviously , LLCs are profit motivated , and nonprofits are philanthropically inclined.
” While traditional philanthropies structured as nonprofits release their tax returns , called 990s , which list each of their grants , Emerson Collective does not because an LLC is not required to disclose their financial documents .
Like many left-leaning philanthropic groups , EC ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact investing , ” which is essentially venture capital with a political bent .
EC invests resources in eight priority areas : immigration , social justice , health care , Chicago violence , education , media , a “ super school ” project , and elemental ( “ radical remedies of the commons designed to address nature ’ s tragedies of the commons ” ) .
The causes include standard liberal pet projects like climate change and support for immigrants ( legal and otherwise ) , but also general good works like cancer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overlap with the political .
One such project is Chicago CRED , which seeks to combat inner-city Chicago violence .
CRED is run by Arne Duncan , the former Secretary of Education under President Obama , who recently made a presentation on CRED ’ s progress at the City Club of Chicago .
While rejecting calls to defund the police altogether , Duncan did call for reducing police in Chicago and reallocating those resources .
He said Chicago has twice as many police per capita as Los Angeles but three times as much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capita as New York but twice as much crime .
Duncan said Chicago police use too many resources fighting mental illness and other issues not well suited for police intervention , and not enough time solving violent crime .
Duncan also noted that 80 % of Chicago crime occurs in fifteen of Chicago ’ s seventy-seven neighborhoods .
These neighborhoods , including Lawndale , Roselawn , Englewood , Auburn Gresham , and Chatham , are all on Chicago ’ s South and West side .
CRED recruits former gang members and criminals who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those who are trying to do the same .
It works .
Malik Tiger , who appeared at the event as well , was on his way to being a statistic after his most recent gun charge in 2014 .
Instead , he entered the program , has committed no new crimes , and works full time at the Greater Chicago Food Depository .
Malik also said his father went to jail when he was young , so drug dealers became his role models .
Malik recently had a child himself , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the bottom of one page of EC ’ s website is something like a disclaimer : “ Although Chicago CRED , Elemental Excelerator , and XQ Institute are related to Emerson Collective , they are separate entities.
” I sent a list of questions to EC , including a further explanation on this , but received no response ; I also reached out to Chicago CRED but they also did not respond .
Other EC projects are less impressive , and seemingly less substantial .
For instance , the LLC has partnered with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on slick 5-10 minute news videos which are primarily marketed through social media .
With Now This , Emerson Collective has produced a series of videos on climate change , a couple of which appeal directly to farmers .
They talk about regenerative farming , disappearing coast lines , hydropower , and more .
One video also backs the Green New Deal .
The videos range from 10,000 to several hundred thousand views on occasion , and sometimes to a million and more .
Calling agreement on climate change “ overwhelming , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ standard videos produced by other climate change interests .
One video features Ray Mabus , the former Navy Secretary under President Obama , who calls climate change a national security threat .
“ This president , ” Mabus says of Trump , “ not only is not taking climate change seriously , they ’ re saying it doesn ’ t exist.
” EC and NowThis also partnered for a series of videos on voting .
The videos either targeted traditional Democrat constituencies like women , minorities , and millennials , or they accused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is entitled “ How Texas Republicans are trying to stop people from voting.
” “ Texas Republicans have been waging a war on voting rights for many years now but it ’ s really heated up in 2020 , ” said Marc Elias , founder of Democracy Docket in the video , “ Texas is one of a handful of states that didn ’ t make voting easier during the pandemic , in general , and specifically did nothing to make it easier to vote by mail.
” Another video claimed Hispanic votes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are also videos on immigration promoting narratives from asylum seekers , immigrant families , and migrants in the country illegally .
All of it seems like a rather modest effort , especially when you consider the extent of the Jobs family ’ s resources and the ends they ’ ve been put to in the past .
Maybe that ’ s why Powell Jobs has recently stepped up the Emerson Collective ’ s activity in the media sphere .
In January 2020 , EC invested in a production company , Concordia Studio , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more from Deadline : By the following month , Concordia had four films entered at Sundance : A Thousand Cuts ; Time ; Bloody Nose , Empty Pockets ; and Boys State .
Time is a movie about Fox Rich , a successful entrepreneur who in the 1990s committed an armed robbery of a bank—she said out of desperation—with her husband .
She received three years in prison while he remains in prison on sixty year sentence ; the movie tracks Rich as she tries to get her husband out of jail .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ especially relevant to the progressive causes of the day , which Emerson Collective was established to support .
A Thousand Cuts , meanwhile , moves into international politics , tracking the battle between Philippine journalist Maria Ressa and Phillipine leader Rodrigo Duterte .
Duterte has waged a bloody war against drugs , killing tens of thousands and Ressa has been perhaps his chief critic , especially through her news website Rappler .
She has also been arrested multiple times , convicted of a seven-year-old crime , and faces six years in jail .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ global press freedom .
The narrative of the movie is that Duterte presents like a populist even as he engages in cut throat tactics like disinformation , threats , arrest , and indiscriminate killings .
“ We are witnessing a death by a thousand cuts to democracy in the Philippines , ” Ressa says in the movie , the line which gives its title .
The movie is also noteworthy for its remarkable access .
Not only was Ressa interviewed , but several other Rappler staff and her family .
The filmmaker also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Duterte ’ s chief media ally and Ronald De La Rosa , a former police chief turned senator .
But even this impressive foray into the documentary realm is hardly the entirety of Emerson Collective ’ s media activity .
Since 2017 , the little-known Silicon Valley LLC has been the majority owner of The Atlantic—one of the nation ’ s leading political magazines—and intends to move toward full ownership in the near future .
The move quickly made waves .
Here is more from VOX : By the end of 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was reporting that Laurene Powell Jobs was wrestling even more control : That changing of the guard , though , is hardly limited to Laurene Powell Jobs—four years earlier , tech titan Jeff Bezos had already purchased The Washington Post from D.C. ’ s old-guard Graham family .
That Emerson Collective , LLC now owns one of America ’ s oldest and most respected publications is simply indicative of the rise of a new elite—and given EC ’ s broad , ambitious goals , it may be suggestive of much more change to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a freelance journalist since 2009 , after spending more than a decade in finance , .
He ’ s based in Chicago .

Emerson Collective (EC) may not have the name recognition of a Tides or an Open Society Foundation, but this Silicon Valley-based “social change organization” is just as ambitious, and nearly as important in the world of left-wing philanthropy. It’s the brainchild of Lauren Powell Jobs, the widow of Steve Jobs—and it seems the tech titans have put their own spin on giving.
EC is structured not as a foundation but as a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), making it a for-profit philanthropy. Powell Jobs has previously said she structured EC as an LLC for more flexibility. This is highly unusual for philanthropic organizations, but the same choice was made by Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, in establishing the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, LLC.
Brian Crowley is a Certified Public Accountant and owner of Crowley Accounting and Consulting Services. He said the difference between an LLC and a traditional nonprofit is two-fold: “ownership and taxation. Nonprofits have no owners and are not taxed. LLCs have owners and are taxed. Obviously, LLCs are profit motivated, and nonprofits are philanthropically inclined.”
While traditional philanthropies structured as nonprofits release their tax returns, called 990s, which list each of their grants, Emerson Collective does not because an LLC is not required to disclose their financial documents. Like many left-leaning philanthropic groups, EC’s social change efforts rely heavily on “impact investing,” which is essentially venture capital with a political bent.
EC invests resources in eight priority areas: immigration, social justice, health care, Chicago violence, education, media, a “super school” project, and elemental (“radical remedies of the commons designed to address nature’s tragedies of the commons”). The causes include standard liberal pet projects like climate change and support for immigrants (legal and otherwise), but also general good works like cancer research.
These good works do sometimes overlap with the political. One such project is Chicago CRED, which seeks to combat inner-city Chicago violence. CRED is run by Arne Duncan, the former Secretary of Education under President Obama, who recently made a presentation on CRED’s progress at the City Club of Chicago.
While rejecting calls to defund the police altogether, Duncan did call for reducing police in Chicago and reallocating those resources. He said Chicago has twice as many police per capita as Los Angeles but three times as much crime, and as many cops per capita as New York but twice as much crime.
Duncan said Chicago police use too many resources fighting mental illness and other issues not well suited for police intervention, and not enough time solving violent crime. Duncan also noted that 80% of Chicago crime occurs in fifteen of Chicago’s seventy-seven neighborhoods. These neighborhoods, including Lawndale, Roselawn, Englewood, Auburn Gresham, and Chatham, are all on Chicago’s South and West side.
CRED recruits former gang members and criminals who have turned their lives around to mentor those who are trying to do the same. It works. Malik Tiger, who appeared at the event as well, was on his way to being a statistic after his most recent gun charge in 2014. Instead, he entered the program, has committed no new crimes, and works full time at the Greater Chicago Food Depository. Malik also said his father went to jail when he was young, so drug dealers became his role models. Malik recently had a child himself, who he is taking care of.
At the bottom of one page of EC’s website is something like a disclaimer: “Although Chicago CRED, Elemental Excelerator, and XQ Institute are related to Emerson Collective, they are separate entities.” I sent a list of questions to EC, including a further explanation on this, but received no response; I also reached out to Chicago CRED but they also did not respond.
Other EC projects are less impressive, and seemingly less substantial. For instance, the LLC has partnered with NowThis, a media company which focuses on slick 5-10 minute news videos which are primarily marketed through social media. With Now This, Emerson Collective has produced a series of videos on climate change, a couple of which appeal directly to farmers.
They talk about regenerative farming, disappearing coast lines, hydropower, and more. One video also backs the Green New Deal. The videos range from 10,000 to several hundred thousand views on occasion, and sometimes to a million and more. Calling agreement on climate change “overwhelming,” they aren’t much different from standard videos produced by other climate change interests.
One video features Ray Mabus, the former Navy Secretary under President Obama, who calls climate change a national security threat. “This president,” Mabus says of Trump, “not only is not taking climate change seriously, they’re saying it doesn’t exist.”
EC and NowThis also partnered for a series of videos on voting. The videos either targeted traditional Democrat constituencies like women, minorities, and millennials, or they accused Republicans of voter suppression. One video is entitled “How Texas Republicans are trying to stop people from voting.”
“Texas Republicans have been waging a war on voting rights for many years now but it’s really heated up in 2020,” said Marc Elias, founder of Democracy Docket in the video, “Texas is one of a handful of states that didn’t make voting easier during the pandemic, in general, and specifically did nothing to make it easier to vote by mail.” Another video claimed Hispanic votes were being suppressed in Florida.
There are also videos on immigration promoting narratives from asylum seekers, immigrant families, and migrants in the country illegally. All of it seems like a rather modest effort, especially when you consider the extent of the Jobs family’s resources and the ends they’ve been put to in the past.
Maybe that’s why Powell Jobs has recently stepped up the Emerson Collective’s activity in the media sphere. In January 2020, EC invested in a production company, Concordia Studio, with some industry heavyweights. Here is more from Deadline:
Oscar-winning director of An Inconvenient Truth Davis Guggenheim and former Participant exec Jonathan King have teamed with Laurene Powell Jobs and Emerson Collective to launch Concordia Studio. The new company will focus on creating innovative nonfiction and scripted films, series, and streaming content.
By the following month, Concordia had four films entered at Sundance: A Thousand Cuts; Time; Bloody Nose, Empty Pockets; and Boys State.
Time is a movie about Fox Rich, a successful entrepreneur who in the 1990s committed an armed robbery of a bank—she said out of desperation—with her husband. She received three years in prison while he remains in prison on sixty year sentence; the movie tracks Rich as she tries to get her husband out of jail. Its dealings with race and incarceration are especially relevant to the progressive causes of the day, which Emerson Collective was established to support.
A Thousand Cuts, meanwhile, moves into international politics, tracking the battle between Philippine journalist Maria Ressa and Phillipine leader Rodrigo Duterte. Duterte has waged a bloody war against drugs, killing tens of thousands and Ressa has been perhaps his chief critic, especially through her news website Rappler.
She has also been arrested multiple times, convicted of a seven-year-old crime, and faces six years in jail. Ressa has become a cause célèbre for global press freedom.
The narrative of the movie is that Duterte presents like a populist even as he engages in cut throat tactics like disinformation, threats, arrest, and indiscriminate killings. “We are witnessing a death by a thousand cuts to democracy in the Philippines,” Ressa says in the movie, the line which gives its title.
The movie is also noteworthy for its remarkable access. Not only was Ressa interviewed, but several other Rappler staff and her family. The filmmaker also sat for several interviews with Mocha, Duterte’s chief media ally and Ronald De La Rosa, a former police chief turned senator.
But even this impressive foray into the documentary realm is hardly the entirety of Emerson Collective’s media activity. Since 2017, the little-known Silicon Valley LLC has been the majority owner of The Atlantic—one of the nation’s leading political magazines—and intends to move toward full ownership in the near future.
The move quickly made waves. Here is more from VOX:
Laurene Powell Jobs, the Silicon Valley entrepreneur and philanthropist, is acquiring a majority stake in the Atlantic magazine. Jobs, in a statement, called the Atlantic “one of the country’s most important and enduring journalistic institutions,” and cited the links between her organization, the Emerson Collective, and the Atlantic’s founder, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who “created a magazine whose mission was to bring about equality for all people.”
By the end of 2019, the longtime CEO was out and Politico was reporting that Laurene Powell Jobs was wrestling even more control:
Billionaire philanthropist Laurene Powell Jobs will assume greater control of the legendary Atlantic magazine as it seeks a new president/CEO and longtime Atlantic Media chairman David Bradley prepares to step away from management duties, Atlantic officials told POLITICO. The move signals a changing of the guard in Washington media circles as Powell Jobs, the California-based widow of Apple founder Steve Jobs, asserts herself in the world of D.C. journalism, and Bradley, one of the city’s best-known hosts and connectors of power, steps away from day-to-day control of the magazine he has shaped for decades.
That changing of the guard, though, is hardly limited to Laurene Powell Jobs—four years earlier, tech titan Jeff Bezos had already purchased The Washington Post from D.C.’s old-guard Graham family. That Emerson Collective, LLC now owns one of America’s oldest and most respected publications is simply indicative of the rise of a new elite—and given EC’s broad, ambitious goals, it may be suggestive of much more change to come.
Michael Volpe has worked as a freelance journalist since 2009, after spending more than a decade in finance. He’s based in Chicago.


theamericanconservative--2020-12-07--Will Stormy Daniels Get Trump in the End?

Since the election sputtered to a conclusion Joe Biden signaled multiple times his taste for revenge is limited .
His former prosecutor VP , while showing some bloodlust during the primaries , has since been mostly silent on the matter .
The majority of the crowd demanding Trump face punishment sits in the cheap seats of Twitter .
While for them it seems there are multiple roads leading to prosecution , in fact under even light scrutiny things fall apart like tissue paper in the rain .
All that ’ s left to poke into is Stormy Daniels .
Her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose antics are all over the Internet ( oh , Google it yourself ) who has sex for money with a private businessman way back in 2006 .
She then takes more money in 2016 to sign a nondisclosure agreement ( NDA ) to keep silent .
Sensing an opportunity as the businessman runs for president , she willfully violates the NDA to blow new life into her career .
Meanwhile , when faced with jail time for all sorts of dirty deeds , the businessman ’ s now disbarred lawyer , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim on his word the NDA money was actually a complex technical violation of campaign finance law .
That ’ s the basic case someone would have to take to a grand jury to bring down Citizen Trump .
Think that ’ ll work ?
Fuhgettaboutit !
The problems begin with paying money as part of an NDA is not illegal ; lawyers regularly obtain discreet resolutions of issues threatening the interests of their clients .
Without admitting much of anything , money is paid from Party A to Party B in return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , agreeing to never mention something again , handing over documents or photos , whatever you ’ d like .
It happens all the time , and is the dirty little secret keeping sexual harassment alive and well .
Wealthy men pay women to remain silent under NDAs .
It does not change the legality of all this even if the media calls those payments hush money or payoffs .
In fact , you can create a NDA right at home ; here ’ s a fill-in-the-blanks version .
Things only fall into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them into a violation of a campaign finance law .
The idea is when Trump had his Stormy sexytime he was just another philandering scumbag .
However , Trump then became a philandering scumbag presidential candidate , and that NDA money shifted , maybe , from a legal payoff to something akin to a campaign contribution .
The what in this case ( money for silence ) is clear .
But it is the why , intent , that matters when you shift from a media kangaroo court to an actual court of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the supposition by Michael Cohen that he can speak to Trump ’ s intent , that the NDA was not , say , to spare Trump ’ s marriage from new embarrassment , but “ for the principal purpose of influencing an election ” amid everyone already knowing Trump was a serial philanderer .
If the whole , um , affair , was primarily for the purpose of hiding Stormy from voters instead of hiding Stormy from Trump ’ s wife , then the money was essentially a campaign contribution and whole new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem is campaign finance laws require proof a person was willfully violating the law .
Cohen ’ s testimony does not prove Trump knew the payments were illegal .
Prosecutors would have to demonstrate that willingness by Trump alongside showing his principal goal was to influence the election .
If this ever reaches court , Trump will simply deny that .
No jury can say weighing one liar ’ s word against another , especially these mugs , eliminates all reasonable doubt .
Prosecutors would also have to connect Trump directly to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , from Trump to Cohen , was supposedly part of $ 130k paid to Stormy Daniels .
Michael Cohen displayed the check during his 2019 Congressional hearing and alleges ten others exist .
The checks do not show what the payments were for in the memo field .
The checks do not have Stormy ’ s name on them .
Cohen simply claimed they were part of his reimbursement for “ illegal hush money I paid on his behalf.
” Cohen says he was a cut out , to avoid a direct Trump-Stormy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everyone out to try and save himself .
The checks are receipts for a crime only because Cohen says they are .
Under direct questioning , Cohen claimed there was no corroborating evidence linking Trump and Stormy .
He said he sent invoices to Trump only for “ legal retainer fees , ” so don ’ t bother with the invoices as evidence because Cohen now says he lied on them claiming it was a retainer fee .
The checks total over $ 400k , because supposedly Trump rolled Cohen ’ s fee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we just have to take his word for it that some of that money was for Stormy .
Cohen said some of the checks were signed by Don , Jr. and the Trump Organization ’ s CFO .
That means the checks would be used to implicate personally a person who did not sign them .
If this all sounds complicated , it ’ s because it is .
After all that for Stormy ’ s payoff to be illegal it will also be necessary to determine the money came from campaign funds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private money , even private money he donated to his own campaign , there is likely no case .
Even if the money is shown to be campaign funds , illegality is based on the $ 2,700 donation limit imposed on the supposed “ giver ” of record , Michael Cohen , in this case .
Such limits do not apply to candidates themselves .
The payment is also not a donation if it was made for an expense that would have been paid even if there were no campaign .
Say like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Or paying your lawyer .
And oh yeah , the NDA with Stormy will soon be outside the statute of limitations absent some very creative legal maneuvering which would itself be subject to extensive litigation .
But the core problem with this case is absent any hereto unknown witnesses it requires a jury to believe the uncorroborated words of Michael Cohen and a porn star .
Summing it up as dryly as only a lawyer can , a former longtime state prosecutor of white-collar and organized crime cases who later oversaw enforcement at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Finance said “ The burden of proof is substantial.
” Trump at worst would be shown to be a conspirator to a contested interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act , a de minimis violation .
The most likely result would be a fine for something like failure to properly report contributions .
There is a second bedtime story which is even less likely to matter .
Karen McDougal , a Playboy model , began an affair with Trump in 2006 , claiming she was attracted to his “ intelligence and charm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credibility .
As Trump ’ s candidacy gained momentum in 2016 , McDougal accepted a $ 150k fee from David Pecker ( you just can ’ t make this stuff up ) , a Trump friend and chairman of The National Enquirer , for the rights to her story .
The Enquirer never ran the story , technically known as “ an editorial decision ” but something which the media redubbed as the made-up crime of “ catch and kill.
” The idea was the Enquirer bought the story , which was soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
Sleazy , but not a crime .
Politicians are naughty boys , and have violated campaign finance laws before .
For example , Barack Obama ’ s 2008 campaign was guilty of violations involving nearly $ 2 million , an amount that dwarfs the money in Stormy ’ s case .
Obama ’ s own Justice Department somehow decided not to prosecute and instead quietly disposed of the problem with a fine levied by the Federal Election Commission .
People will also remember the 2012 failed prosecution of former Democratic vice-presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finance violations .
Edwards was accused of illegally arranging for two wealthy supporters to pay $ 925,000 to keep his pregnant galpal out of public view during the campaign .
As with Russiagate , impeachment , emoluments , and all the other serial sagas which were supposed to bring Trump down , the current basket of crimes is much more hopeful smoke and media hyperbole than actual fire .
The further back prosecutors reach into Trump ’ s life before he was president , and the more obscure parts of law they feature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minor civil offenses into major crimes , the more likely Trump will simply dispose of their efforts by claiming political motivation .
Trump will soon leave the White House .
Looking for more vengeance past that seems a dry hole .
Remember , you wrestle with pigs , you just end up dirty , and the pig usually likes it .
Best advice is stay out of the pen .
Peter Van Buren is the author of We Meant Well : How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War : A Novel of WWII Japan , and Ghosts of Tom Joad : A Story of the 99 Percent .

Since the election sputtered to a conclusion Joe Biden signaled multiple times his taste for revenge is limited. His former prosecutor VP, while showing some bloodlust during the primaries, has since been mostly silent on the matter. The majority of the crowd demanding Trump face punishment sits in the cheap seats of Twitter. While for them it seems there are multiple roads leading to prosecution, in fact under even light scrutiny things fall apart like tissue paper in the rain.
All that’s left to poke into is Stormy Daniels. Her story is of a former porn star whose antics are all over the Internet (oh, Google it yourself) who has sex for money with a private businessman way back in 2006. She then takes more money in 2016 to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) to keep silent. Sensing an opportunity as the businessman runs for president, she willfully violates the NDA to blow new life into her career.
Meanwhile, when faced with jail time for all sorts of dirty deeds, the businessman’s now disbarred lawyer, a felon himself, violates attorney-client privilege to claim on his word the NDA money was actually a complex technical violation of campaign finance law. That’s the basic case someone would have to take to a grand jury to bring down Citizen Trump. Think that’ll work? Fuhgettaboutit!
The problems begin with paying money as part of an NDA is not illegal; lawyers regularly obtain discreet resolutions of issues threatening the interests of their clients. Without admitting much of anything, money is paid from Party A to Party B in return for Party B dropping all future claims, agreeing to never mention something again, handing over documents or photos, whatever you’d like. It happens all the time, and is the dirty little secret keeping sexual harassment alive and well. Wealthy men pay women to remain silent under NDAs. It does not change the legality of all this even if the media calls those payments hush money or payoffs. In fact, you can create a NDA right at home; here’s a fill-in-the-blanks version.
Things only fall into a gray area if you can twist them into a violation of a campaign finance law. The idea is when Trump had his Stormy sexytime he was just another philandering scumbag. However, Trump then became a philandering scumbag presidential candidate, and that NDA money shifted, maybe, from a legal payoff to something akin to a campaign contribution. The what in this case (money for silence) is clear. But it is the why, intent, that matters when you shift from a media kangaroo court to an actual court of law.
The alleged illegality comes from the supposition by Michael Cohen that he can speak to Trump’s intent, that the NDA was not, say, to spare Trump’s marriage from new embarrassment, but “for the principal purpose of influencing an election” amid everyone already knowing Trump was a serial philanderer. If the whole, um, affair, was primarily for the purpose of hiding Stormy from voters instead of hiding Stormy from Trump’s wife, then the money was essentially a campaign contribution and whole new set of laws kick in.
The problem is campaign finance laws require proof a person was willfully violating the law. Cohen’s testimony does not prove Trump knew the payments were illegal. Prosecutors would have to demonstrate that willingness by Trump alongside showing his principal goal was to influence the election. If this ever reaches court, Trump will simply deny that. No jury can say weighing one liar’s word against another, especially these mugs, eliminates all reasonable doubt.
Prosecutors would also have to connect Trump directly to the payment. A check for $35,000, from Trump to Cohen, was supposedly part of $130k paid to Stormy Daniels. Michael Cohen displayed the check during his 2019 Congressional hearing and alleges ten others exist. The checks do not show what the payments were for in the memo field. The checks do not have Stormy’s name on them. Cohen simply claimed they were part of his reimbursement for “illegal hush money I paid on his behalf.” Cohen says he was a cut out, to avoid a direct Trump-Stormy connection, until of course he ratted everyone out to try and save himself.
The checks are receipts for a crime only because Cohen says they are. Under direct questioning, Cohen claimed there was no corroborating evidence linking Trump and Stormy. He said he sent invoices to Trump only for “legal retainer fees,” so don’t bother with the invoices as evidence because Cohen now says he lied on them claiming it was a retainer fee. The checks total over $400k, because supposedly Trump rolled Cohen’s fee and bonus into the amount, so we just have to take his word for it that some of that money was for Stormy. Cohen said some of the checks were signed by Don, Jr. and the Trump Organization’s CFO. That means the checks would be used to implicate personally a person who did not sign them. If this all sounds complicated, it’s because it is.
After all that for Stormy’s payoff to be illegal it will also be necessary to determine the money came from campaign funds. If it was Trump’s private money, even private money he donated to his own campaign, there is likely no case. Even if the money is shown to be campaign funds, illegality is based on the $2,700 donation limit imposed on the supposed “giver” of record, Michael Cohen, in this case. Such limits do not apply to candidates themselves.
The payment is also not a donation if it was made for an expense that would have been paid even if there were no campaign. Say like hiding an affair from your wife. Or paying your lawyer. And oh yeah, the NDA with Stormy will soon be outside the statute of limitations absent some very creative legal maneuvering which would itself be subject to extensive litigation.
But the core problem with this case is absent any hereto unknown witnesses it requires a jury to believe the uncorroborated words of Michael Cohen and a porn star. Summing it up as dryly as only a lawyer can, a former longtime state prosecutor of white-collar and organized crime cases who later oversaw enforcement at New York’s Department of Taxation and Finance said “The burden of proof is substantial.” Trump at worst would be shown to be a conspirator to a contested interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act, a de minimis violation. The most likely result would be a fine for something like failure to properly report contributions.
There is a second bedtime story which is even less likely to matter. Karen McDougal, a Playboy model, began an affair with Trump in 2006, claiming she was attracted to his “intelligence and charm” which already says something about her credibility. As Trump’s candidacy gained momentum in 2016, McDougal accepted a $150k fee from David Pecker (you just can’t make this stuff up), a Trump friend and chairman of The National Enquirer, for the rights to her story. The Enquirer never ran the story, technically known as “an editorial decision” but something which the media redubbed as the made-up crime of “catch and kill.” The idea was the Enquirer bought the story, which was soon featured across all media, to hide it. Sleazy, but not a crime.
Politicians are naughty boys, and have violated campaign finance laws before. For example, Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign was guilty of violations involving nearly $2 million, an amount that dwarfs the money in Stormy’s case. Obama’s own Justice Department somehow decided not to prosecute and instead quietly disposed of the problem with a fine levied by the Federal Election Commission.
People will also remember the 2012 failed prosecution of former Democratic vice-presidential nominee John Edwards on charges of campaign finance violations. Edwards was accused of illegally arranging for two wealthy supporters to pay $925,000 to keep his pregnant galpal out of public view during the campaign.
As with Russiagate, impeachment, emoluments, and all the other serial sagas which were supposed to bring Trump down, the current basket of crimes is much more hopeful smoke and media hyperbole than actual fire. The further back prosecutors reach into Trump’s life before he was president, and the more obscure parts of law they feature, the more they try to reshape minor civil offenses into major crimes, the more likely Trump will simply dispose of their efforts by claiming political motivation.
Trump will soon leave the White House. Looking for more vengeance past that seems a dry hole. Remember, you wrestle with pigs, you just end up dirty, and the pig usually likes it. Best advice is stay out of the pen.
Peter Van Buren is the author of We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, Hooper’s War: A Novel of WWII Japan, and Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the 99 Percent.


theamericanconservative--2020-12-08--Too Few of the President’s Men

Too Few of the President’s Men

Veterans of the conservative movement are familiar with Morton Blackwell ’ s Laws of the Public Policy Process .
His most quoted law is the 26th : “ Personnel is policy.
” Laws 21 and 30 are less famous , but inform a proper approach to number 26 : “ An ounce of loyalty is worth a pound of cleverness ” ; “ Better a snake in the grass than a viper in your bosom.
” Most politicians ignore Blackwell ’ s laws on personnel .
When they enter public office , they look to fill their teams with people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : experts in campaign machinery who helped win the election , subject-matter experts with prior experience in a similar office , and people with gravitas , who will impress the public as muscular hires and signal that the newly elected officeholder is serious .
What often gets overlooked—and what is without question the most important criterion to use when weighing potential hires—is philosophical alignment with the candidate and commitment to his program and governing agenda .
A president can only accomplish his policy objectives if administration personnel are both capable and ideologically aligned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ machinery of government and to bend it toward implementation of the president ’ s priorities .
This was especially so for President Trump , whose policy priorities either upended his own party ’ s orthodoxy—from economics and trade to foreign policy—or forcefully engaged on social and cultural issues where Republicans had long emphasized rhetoric over policy substance .
Nor is a strong inner circle sufficient .
A single cabinet official can not redirect an executive agency by sheer force of will , gravitas , or even expertise .
She requires assistance from philosophically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level and below—something that was missing in the Trump administration ’ s agencies , whose heads found themselves frequently undermined by their own political appointees .
The Trump administration suffered from an abundance of heavyweights , “ experts , ” and vipers , but a notable lack of loyalty to the president ’ s agenda .
The result was an unwillingness to subordinate D.C. political machinations to a focus on accomplishing the president ’ s agenda , and long periods of infighting , drift , and internal gridlock that hamstrung the Trump policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s personnel woes began long before his inauguration .
The Trump transition team exemplified the tension between gravitas and philosophical alignment .
In tapping former New Jersey Governor and seasoned political operative Chris Christie to lead the process , the president-elect assumed he would have a steady hand at the top .
But Christie was a rival , not just a former rival for the presidency , but a rival to the president ’ s son-in-law and closest advisor , Jared Kushner .
More importantly , Christie had no discernable connection or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laid out by the president-elect .
Even after Christie endorsed Trump in 2016 , he could barely articulate his support for the candidate ’ s policy agenda , even noting “ Donald Trump and I are not going to agree on every issue.
” While sycophancy is not a desirable characteristic , general philosophical alignment and a willingness to defend the president ’ s ideas should be baseline requirements for staff .
Christie possessed neither qualification .
The transition work was thus left to the team Christie assembled , including Rich Bagger , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palatucci , a corporate lobbyist with ties to the RNC ; and at least nine other lobbyists , including at least one who had done work for foreign governments .
All were “ qualified ” and politically experienced , but each lacked a tangible connection or commitment to the goals President Trump wanted to achieve .
The personnel process created by this team was geared solely toward finding people with conventionally Republican expertise and experience , who almost by definition lacked the commitment to or understanding of the unique set of issues that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process famously concluded the week after the election when the personnel binders created by the Christie operation were discarded in a Trump Tower dumpster .
As the incoming administration hurtled toward Inauguration Day , hiring did not improve .
Personnel selections for key White House staff were controlled by former Republican National Committee Chair Reince Priebus and his lieutenant , Katie Walsh—again , two political operators “ qualified ” and “ networked ” by Washington standards , but woefully unprepared or unwilling to distinguish between people who just wanted a White House job @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the president ’ s agenda .
Beyond Priebus and his aides , no one on the transition team was given visibility into the composition of the White House staff .
Perhaps the most consequential Priebus hire , which would leave an indelible mark on the entire Trump presidency , was the selection of John DeStefano as director of Presidential Personnel .
DeStefano was formerly an aide to John Boehner , the Speaker of the House who was ousted in a rebellion led by future White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a downtown Republican consulting outfit with ties to Karl Rove and Mitch McConnell ’ s American Crossroads .
DeStefano had no discernable expertise in personnel matters , and no connection to or understanding of Trump ’ s focus or the conservative movement itself .
Conservatives were vocal in their displeasure .
Yet it was DeStefano who would steer the personnel ship from February 2017 to the end of May 2019 , when he departed the White House to advise the vaping company , Juul .
His tenure largely served as a pipeline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the sake of their resumes , rather than to do the difficult spadework of confronting Washington ’ s toxic routines , which was what Trump made clear he intended .
The president also yielded tremendous deference in personnel to the Republican apparatus in Washington .
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell , who told Trump within the first few weeks , “ I don ’ t wan na hear any more of this ‘ drain the swamp ’ talk , ” ended up placing allies and D.C. regulars into key positions in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president also left much of the subcabinet level staffing to the discretion of his cabinet secretaries .
As a result , agencies were run by appointees pursuing the policy agendas ( and perhaps political ambitions ) of their respective secretaries or else functioning more as autonomous Republican political operatives than as shepherds of the president ’ s policy priorities .
The president ’ s own preference for people who he perceived as having the gravitas and heft to command respect compounded the staffing misfires .
His choice of Rex Tillerson , as Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than in execution .
Tillerson , though capable as CEO of ExxonMobil , was ill-prepared to navigate the perils and political landmines of managing an executive branch agency full of vipers with their own agendas , and who possessed both the skill and willingness to pursue their own priorities .
The president was seemingly drawn to the celebrity of people like Gary Cohn , the former President and COO of Goldman Sachs , whom he tapped to be his Director of the National Economic Council ( NEC ) .
But Cohn , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his own agenda , one he was unprepared to subordinate .
In a now-infamous anecdote , Cohn reportedly removed a letter from President Trump ’ s desk—without the president ’ s knowledge—that would have ended the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement .
Trump ’ s appointment of hedge fund manager , investment banker , and film producer Steven Mnuchin to Secretary of the Treasury was somewhat more successful .
This was due perhaps to Mnuchin ’ s lack of ideological constraints ( National Economic Council head Larry Kudlow once remarked that he didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican or a Democrat ) and his willingness to engage in passionless negotiations on behalf of the president .
Outcomes appeared to matter to Mnuchin more than any particular policy emphasis , and perhaps because of that , he has received substantial credit for securing passage of the first COVID-19 relief package , which included both direct payments to individuals and a robust small-business relief program .
But Mnuchin is still an investment banker at heart , and the bill also included an opaque $ 450 billion “ relief ” fund to big @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Larry Kudlow , who replaced Cohn at the NEC , was also a Wall Street veteran ( and a TV personality to boot ) and tended to elevate priorities that emphasized financial markets .
During the COVID-19 pandemic , for example , Kudlow publicly suggested tourism tax breaks as a remedy .
On the outside , Club for Growth co-founder Steve Moore came to influence the administration ’ s policy and received consideration for the Federal Reserve .
Moore influenced the administration ’ s economic approach to COVID-19 , strongly and publicly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefit businesses and workers affected by COVID-19 related closures .
The Department of Homeland Security provides a quintessential illustration of the administration ’ s personnel challenges .
Early in the administration , John Kelly , a retired four-star general , was tapped to be Secretary of Homeland Security and brought with him Kirstjen Nielsen to be his chief of staff .
His clashes with the administration began early , when it was clear he was not aligned with the administration ’ s muscular approach to immigration enforcement , stating in his confirmation hearings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ will not do the job.
” Nielsen , Kelly ’ s protege , was plagued by many of the same issues when she became DHS Secretary .
Conservatives questioned her belief in strong immigration enforcement , her remark that there was no need for a border wall “ from sea to shining sea , ” and her commitment to Trumpian priorities like ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ( “ Dreamers ” ) program .
Trump publicly aired his frustrations that illegal immigration at the border surged under her watch .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary , Chad Wolf , had a largely successful tenure due to his relentless focus on , and public commitment to , pursuing the president ’ s agenda .
Where Kelly and Nielsen appeared publicly squeamish about the president ’ s goals , Wolf appeared unflinching in his implementation of the administration ’ s more creative and successful border-control measures .
Wolf ’ s efforts were buttressed by the addition of Ken Cuccinelli , first as Acting Director of U.S .
Citizenship and Immigration Services , and then in an acting capacity as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was ideologically aligned with the president on tough immigration protocols and , like Wolf , he was not distracted by national politics .
A savvy operator with prior experience as Attorney General of Virginia , he muscled across a series of regulatory changes that resulted in substantial reform of the H1-B visa system .
Where Kelly and Nielsen oftentimes appeared buffeted by the political winds and eager to distance themselves from the president they served , Wolf and Cuccinelli asserted themselves forcefully , both “ within the building ” and in public , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president ’ s behalf .
Kelly , Nielsen , Wolf , and Cuccinelli all possessed the expertise and political experience necessary to do the job .
But Wolf and Cuccinelli distinguished themselves in two key areas : demonstrated rhetorical and substantive adherence to Trump ’ s goals , and a willingness to subordinate Washington politics to their pursuit .
Though the Trump administration was filled primarily by a combination of experts with ulterior ideological motives and outsider loyalists , a handful of ideologically aligned subject-matter experts stood out as Trump ’ s most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Trump administration ’ s otherwise poor personnel record , and case studies in how a well-staffed administration might have looked .
Robert Lighthizer was sworn in as the U.S. Trade Representative in the Trump administration ’ s first months and remained in the post throughout .
He possessed the rare combination of deep expertise , broad credibility , and a long intellectual record that aligned with Trump ’ s own outlook .
The administration ’ s negotiation and passage of the United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement , and savvy maneuvering at the World Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the quality of the team that he assembled around him .
He was aided by Peter Navarro , a long-time skeptic of China , whose views heavily shaped the administration ’ s aggressive posture toward the country .
Russell Vought ’ s elevation to director of the Office of Management and Budget ( OMB ) was another bright spot .
Vought , a former staffer for then-Congressman Mike Pence , had both extensive policy experience and a demonstrated willingness to battle with entrenched Washington interests , a skill he would need at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implementation of key executive orders and deregulatory policies , and efforts to rein in civil servants—from streamlining the process for their termination with the creation of a “ Schedule F ” employee category to prohibiting agency trainings on “ Critical Race Theory.
” Though late in the game , the administration finally solved its personnel vetting issue with the hiring of John McEntee as Director of Presidential Personnel .
McEntee inherited the office previously held by John DeStefano , and brought a critical difference in sensibilities to the job : McEntee thoroughly and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda , and the type of staffer it required to implement that agenda .
In a short time , he assembled a team of young talent who were deeply committed to the policy legacy that Trump wanted to leave and , importantly , who were unfazed by the bureaucracy .
McEntee and his team quickly began reversing the deference in personnel choices that DeStefano had shown to cabinet heads , instead placing savvy and trusted political operators into key agency positions .
Likewise , staff who publicly aired disagreement with the president ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Communications Commissioner Mike O ’ Rielly , found their nominations withdrawn .
No discussion of Trump personnel could be complete without considering Attorney General Jeff Sessions , one of the administration ’ s shortest-lived yet most consequential members , and at once a shining example of personnel done well and a cautionary tale of the cabinet level ’ s limits .
The best Trump personnel possessed expertise , gravitas , and philosophical alignment with the president .
No one embodied these qualities better than Sessions , who was both ideologically aligned on policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was one of the only cabinet members who had supported Trump in the primary .
Unfortunately , his tenure was rocked by Trump ’ s belief that he mishandled Special Counsel Robert Mueller ’ s investigation into allegations of Russian collusion , a belief which led to Sessions ’ downfall and exile from the administration .
A fascinating dimension of the Sessions saga is its demonstration of the need for dedication to the president ’ s policy agenda even within a department headed by a well-chosen secretary .
According to the standard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he recused himself from FBI Director James Comey ’ s investigation of the Trump campaign ’ s alleged ties to Russia .
But the recusal would not have been a problem were it not for several disastrous personnel moves .
As a prosecutor subject to an investigation , Sessions made the entirely customary choice , as recommended by DOJ ’ s recusal counsel .
Sessions rightly believed it would be impossible for him to lead or quash an investigation where he was personally a target .
But personnel decisions magnified the consequence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump loyalist .
The first was that Trump had not fired FBI Director Comey in January and installed a credible replacement .
The second , and perhaps more important , was that Rod Rosenstein , the Deputy Attorney General who assumed management of the investigation following the Sessions recusal , was a product of establishment Washington .
Rosenstein was selected by the Trump transition team , presumably due to experience , expertise , and command of the Justice Department bureaucracy .
But while Rosenstein was undoubtedly competent at wielding the levers of government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s larger policy goals .
He may have physically filled Sessions ’ role , but he left a large ideological vacancy for which Sessions was ultimately blamed .
The lesson is clear .
Commitment to the mission matters at all levels : White House staff , cabinet , subcabinet , and even lower .
The composition , priorities , and emphasis of the establishment Republicans in Washington , as well as the ruling class of Washington itself , uniquely shaped the personnel operation of the Trump White House in two ways @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shortage of expertise and ability available to the president , there was a stunning and unprecedented absence of individuals and institutions with a grasp of , and commitment to , the policy agenda that got Trump elected .
This speaks more to the entrenched , ideological nature of the establishment GOP than it does to Trump ’ s personnel operation , but it affected the White House in ways difficult to overstate .
Past Republican presidents have traditionally culled staff from long-standing policy institutions like the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Senate .
Trump drew on these resources , but many of them outright opposed Trump and what he stood for .
And even those who were cautiously supportive lacked the intellectual and policy prowess to advance his agenda with the creativity and forcefulness it required .
Second , the unprecedented rage directed at Trump by almost every mainstream media outlet perverted the incentives for administration staff in a way that rewarded those who actively undermined and publicly denounced the administration and its policies .
Staffers at all levels who publicly turned on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spots , book deals , pundit contracts , and speaking tours .
While every administration must deal with leaks , liars , and tell-alls , the Trump administration was bedeviled by them .
This was attributable in no small part to the lack of ideological commitment to the president and the broader agenda for which he stood .
It was also attributable to the management style of Trump himself , which , rather than fostering unity , tended to seed chaos and rivalries .
External forces will plague all future White House staffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge to the status quo facing the strongest pressure .
The best immunization is a community and institutions that build cohesion and loyalty , both internally and to the shared policy agenda .
Bad personnel choices are always a risk , but good ones will never be better than the pool from which they are drawn .
Donald Trump was in some senses a victim of his own success , refashioning the Republican Party ’ s electoral coalition and transforming the policy landscape much faster than existing institutions could adapt or new ones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ establishment will eagerly declare the resulting failures as proof of their own superiority .
But mostly it underscores their irrelevance .
America is a democracy , not a technocracy , and so it is the citizenry rather than the bureaucrats who choose the nation ’ s leaders and its direction .
If some public servants are proudly incapable of serving the public , new ones will soon enough replace them .
Rachel Bovard is the senior director of policy at the Conservative Partnership Institute , where she trains and advises congressional staff and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ From 2015 to 2017 , she was director of policy services at the Heritage Foundation , where she worked closely with the Trump transition team .
Previously , she spent a decade on Capitol Hill in both the House and the Senate .
The other articles in the series , “ What Happened : The Trump Presidency In Review , ” published in partnership with American Compass , can be found here : “ Foreword : The Work Remains , ” by Daniel McCarthy Introduction , from American Compass “ A Populism Deferred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Potpourri Presidency , ” by Wells King “ Some Like it Hot , ” by Oren Cass

Veterans of the conservative movement are familiar with Morton Blackwell’s Laws of the Public Policy Process. His most quoted law is the 26th: “Personnel is policy.” Laws 21 and 30 are less famous, but inform a proper approach to number 26: “An ounce of loyalty is worth a pound of cleverness”; “Better a snake in the grass than a viper in your bosom.”
Most politicians ignore Blackwell’s laws on personnel. When they enter public office, they look to fill their teams with people who fit into a few traditional categories: experts in campaign machinery who helped win the election, subject-matter experts with prior experience in a similar office, and people with gravitas, who will impress the public as muscular hires and signal that the newly elected officeholder is serious. What often gets overlooked—and what is without question the most important criterion to use when weighing potential hires—is philosophical alignment with the candidate and commitment to his program and governing agenda.
A president can only accomplish his policy objectives if administration personnel are both capable and ideologically aligned, willing and able to engage the machinery of government and to bend it toward implementation of the president’s priorities. This was especially so for President Trump, whose policy priorities either upended his own party’s orthodoxy—from economics and trade to foreign policy—or forcefully engaged on social and cultural issues where Republicans had long emphasized rhetoric over policy substance.
Nor is a strong inner circle sufficient. A single cabinet official cannot redirect an executive agency by sheer force of will, gravitas, or even expertise. She requires assistance from philosophically committed, expert staff at the subcabinet level and below—something that was missing in the Trump administration’s agencies, whose heads found themselves frequently undermined by their own political appointees.
The Trump administration suffered from an abundance of heavyweights, “experts,” and vipers, but a notable lack of loyalty to the president’s agenda. The result was an unwillingness to subordinate D.C. political machinations to a focus on accomplishing the president’s agenda, and long periods of infighting, drift, and internal gridlock that hamstrung the Trump policy agenda in key areas.
Vipers in Trump’s Bosom
The president’s personnel woes began long before his inauguration. The Trump transition team exemplified the tension between gravitas and philosophical alignment. In tapping former New Jersey Governor and seasoned political operative Chris Christie to lead the process, the president-elect assumed he would have a steady hand at the top. But Christie was a rival, not just a former rival for the presidency, but a rival to the president’s son-in-law and closest advisor, Jared Kushner.
More importantly, Christie had no discernable connection or commitment to the policy and ideological agenda laid out by the president-elect. Even after Christie endorsed Trump in 2016, he could barely articulate his support for the candidate’s policy agenda, even noting “Donald Trump and I are not going to agree on every issue.” While sycophancy is not a desirable characteristic, general philosophical alignment and a willingness to defend the president’s ideas should be baseline requirements for staff.
Christie possessed neither qualification. The transition work was thus left to the team Christie assembled, including Rich Bagger, his former chief of staff; Bill Palatucci, a corporate lobbyist with ties to the RNC; and at least nine other lobbyists, including at least one who had done work for foreign governments. All were “qualified” and politically experienced, but each lacked a tangible connection or commitment to the goals President Trump wanted to achieve.
The personnel process created by this team was geared solely toward finding people with conventionally Republican expertise and experience, who almost by definition lacked the commitment to or understanding of the unique set of issues that propelled Trump into office. The result of this process famously concluded the week after the election when the personnel binders created by the Christie operation were discarded in a Trump Tower dumpster.
As the incoming administration hurtled toward Inauguration Day, hiring did not improve. Personnel selections for key White House staff were controlled by former Republican National Committee Chair Reince Priebus and his lieutenant, Katie Walsh—again, two political operators “qualified” and “networked” by Washington standards, but woefully unprepared or unwilling to distinguish between people who just wanted a White House job and those who wanted to do battle for the president’s agenda. Beyond Priebus and his aides, no one on the transition team was given visibility into the composition of the White House staff.
Perhaps the most consequential Priebus hire, which would leave an indelible mark on the entire Trump presidency, was the selection of John DeStefano as director of Presidential Personnel. DeStefano was formerly an aide to John Boehner, the Speaker of the House who was ousted in a rebellion led by future White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows. He was the President of Data Trust, a downtown Republican consulting outfit with ties to Karl Rove and Mitch McConnell’s American Crossroads. DeStefano had no discernable expertise in personnel matters, and no connection to or understanding of Trump’s focus or the conservative movement itself. Conservatives were vocal in their displeasure.
Yet it was DeStefano who would steer the personnel ship from February 2017 to the end of May 2019, when he departed the White House to advise the vaping company, Juul. His tenure largely served as a pipeline to shuffle establishment Washington into administration jobs for the sake of their resumes, rather than to do the difficult spadework of confronting Washington’s toxic routines, which was what Trump made clear he intended.
The president also yielded tremendous deference in personnel to the Republican apparatus in Washington. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who told Trump within the first few weeks, “I don’t wanna hear any more of this ‘drain the swamp’ talk,” ended up placing allies and D.C. regulars into key positions in the White House and various agencies. The president also left much of the subcabinet level staffing to the discretion of his cabinet secretaries. As a result, agencies were run by appointees pursuing the policy agendas (and perhaps political ambitions) of their respective secretaries or else functioning more as autonomous Republican political operatives than as shepherds of the president’s policy priorities.
The president’s own preference for people who he perceived as having the gravitas and heft to command respect compounded the staffing misfires.
His choice of Rex Tillerson, as Secretary of State, was better in theory than in execution. Tillerson, though capable as CEO of ExxonMobil, was ill-prepared to navigate the perils and political landmines of managing an executive branch agency full of vipers with their own agendas, and who possessed both the skill and willingness to pursue their own priorities.
The president was seemingly drawn to the celebrity of people like Gary Cohn, the former President and COO of Goldman Sachs, whom he tapped to be his Director of the National Economic Council (NEC). But Cohn, a registered Democrat, was a principal with his own agenda, one he was unprepared to subordinate. In a now-infamous anecdote, Cohn reportedly removed a letter from President Trump’s desk—without the president’s knowledge—that would have ended the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
Trump’s appointment of hedge fund manager, investment banker, and film producer Steven Mnuchin to Secretary of the Treasury was somewhat more successful. This was due perhaps to Mnuchin’s lack of ideological constraints (National Economic Council head Larry Kudlow once remarked that he didn’t know if Mnuchin was a Republican or a Democrat) and his willingness to engage in passionless negotiations on behalf of the president.
Outcomes appeared to matter to Mnuchin more than any particular policy emphasis, and perhaps because of that, he has received substantial credit for securing passage of the first COVID-19 relief package, which included both direct payments to individuals and a robust small-business relief program. But Mnuchin is still an investment banker at heart, and the bill also included an opaque $450 billion “relief” fund to big business reminiscent of the 2008 bank bailout.
Larry Kudlow, who replaced Cohn at the NEC, was also a Wall Street veteran (and a TV personality to boot) and tended to elevate priorities that emphasized financial markets. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, Kudlow publicly suggested tourism tax breaks as a remedy. On the outside, Club for Growth co-founder Steve Moore came to influence the administration’s policy and received consideration for the Federal Reserve. Moore influenced the administration’s economic approach to COVID-19, strongly and publicly advocating for a payroll tax deferral to benefit businesses and workers affected by COVID-19 related closures.
A Tale of Two Staffs: Immigration Policy
The Department of Homeland Security provides a quintessential illustration of the administration’s personnel challenges. Early in the administration, John Kelly, a retired four-star general, was tapped to be Secretary of Homeland Security and brought with him Kirstjen Nielsen to be his chief of staff. His clashes with the administration began early, when it was clear he was not aligned with the administration’s muscular approach to immigration enforcement, stating in his confirmation hearings that Trump’s proposed border wall “will not do the job.”
Nielsen, Kelly’s protege, was plagued by many of the same issues when she became DHS Secretary. Conservatives questioned her belief in strong immigration enforcement, her remark that there was no need for a border wall “from sea to shining sea,” and her commitment to Trumpian priorities like ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“Dreamers”) program. Trump publicly aired his frustrations that illegal immigration at the border surged under her watch.
By contrast, the current acting DHS Secretary, Chad Wolf, had a largely successful tenure due to his relentless focus on, and public commitment to, pursuing the president’s agenda. Where Kelly and Nielsen appeared publicly squeamish about the president’s goals, Wolf appeared unflinching in his implementation of the administration’s more creative and successful border-control measures.
Wolf’s efforts were buttressed by the addition of Ken Cuccinelli, first as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and then in an acting capacity as Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. He was ideologically aligned with the president on tough immigration protocols and, like Wolf, he was not distracted by national politics. A savvy operator with prior experience as Attorney General of Virginia, he muscled across a series of regulatory changes that resulted in substantial reform of the H1-B visa system.
Where Kelly and Nielsen oftentimes appeared buffeted by the political winds and eager to distance themselves from the president they served, Wolf and Cuccinelli asserted themselves forcefully, both “within the building” and in public, to deliver concrete policy successes on the president’s behalf. Kelly, Nielsen, Wolf, and Cuccinelli all possessed the expertise and political experience necessary to do the job. But Wolf and Cuccinelli distinguished themselves in two key areas: demonstrated rhetorical and substantive adherence to Trump’s goals, and a willingness to subordinate Washington politics to their pursuit.
Loyal Experts: Exceptions that Prove the Rule
Though the Trump administration was filled primarily by a combination of experts with ulterior ideological motives and outsider loyalists, a handful of ideologically aligned subject-matter experts stood out as Trump’s most effective generals—the exceptions that prove the rule of the Trump administration’s otherwise poor personnel record, and case studies in how a well-staffed administration might have looked.
Robert Lighthizer was sworn in as the U.S. Trade Representative in the Trump administration’s first months and remained in the post throughout. He possessed the rare combination of deep expertise, broad credibility, and a long intellectual record that aligned with Trump’s own outlook.
The administration’s negotiation and passage of the United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and savvy maneuvering at the World Trade Organization were all testaments to his leadership and the quality of the team that he assembled around him. He was aided by Peter Navarro, a long-time skeptic of China, whose views heavily shaped the administration’s aggressive posture toward the country.
Russell Vought’s elevation to director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was another bright spot. Vought, a former staffer for then-Congressman Mike Pence, had both extensive policy experience and a demonstrated willingness to battle with entrenched Washington interests, a skill he would need at OMB. Vought oversaw the development and implementation of key executive orders and deregulatory policies, and efforts to rein in civil servants—from streamlining the process for their termination with the creation of a “Schedule F” employee category to prohibiting agency trainings on “Critical Race Theory.”
Though late in the game, the administration finally solved its personnel vetting issue with the hiring of John McEntee as Director of Presidential Personnel. McEntee inherited the office previously held by John DeStefano, and brought a critical difference in sensibilities to the job: McEntee thoroughly and intuitively understood the president, his policy agenda, and the type of staffer it required to implement that agenda. In a short time, he assembled a team of young talent who were deeply committed to the policy legacy that Trump wanted to leave and, importantly, who were unfazed by the bureaucracy.
McEntee and his team quickly began reversing the deference in personnel choices that DeStefano had shown to cabinet heads, instead placing savvy and trusted political operators into key agency positions. Likewise, staff who publicly aired disagreement with the president’s agenda, such as former Federal Communications Commissioner Mike O’Rielly, found their nominations withdrawn.
The Curious Case of Jeff Sessions
No discussion of Trump personnel could be complete without considering Attorney General Jeff Sessions, one of the administration’s shortest-lived yet most consequential members, and at once a shining example of personnel done well and a cautionary tale of the cabinet level’s limits.
The best Trump personnel possessed expertise, gravitas, and philosophical alignment with the president. No one embodied these qualities better than Sessions, who was both ideologically aligned on policy and personally loyal to the president—indeed, he was one of the only cabinet members who had supported Trump in the primary. Unfortunately, his tenure was rocked by Trump’s belief that he mishandled Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into allegations of Russian collusion, a belief which led to Sessions’ downfall and exile from the administration.
A fascinating dimension of the Sessions saga is its demonstration of the need for dedication to the president’s policy agenda even within a department headed by a well-chosen secretary.
According to the standard narrative, Sessions’ troubles began when he recused himself from FBI Director James Comey’s investigation of the Trump campaign’s alleged ties to Russia. But the recusal would not have been a problem were it not for several disastrous personnel moves. As a prosecutor subject to an investigation, Sessions made the entirely customary choice, as recommended by DOJ’s recusal counsel. Sessions rightly believed it would be impossible for him to lead or quash an investigation where he was personally a target.
But personnel decisions magnified the consequence of Sessions’ recusal and ultimately doomed the Trump loyalist. The first was that Trump had not fired FBI Director Comey in January and installed a credible replacement. The second, and perhaps more important, was that Rod Rosenstein, the Deputy Attorney General who assumed management of the investigation following the Sessions recusal, was a product of establishment Washington. Rosenstein was selected by the Trump transition team, presumably due to experience, expertise, and command of the Justice Department bureaucracy. But while Rosenstein was undoubtedly competent at wielding the levers of government, he had no discernable interest in Trump’s larger policy goals. He may have physically filled Sessions’ role, but he left a large ideological vacancy for which Sessions was ultimately blamed.
The lesson is clear. Commitment to the mission matters at all levels: White House staff, cabinet, subcabinet, and even lower.
The Role of Institutions
The composition, priorities, and emphasis of the establishment Republicans in Washington, as well as the ruling class of Washington itself, uniquely shaped the personnel operation of the Trump White House in two ways.
First, while there existed no shortage of expertise and ability available to the president, there was a stunning and unprecedented absence of individuals and institutions with a grasp of, and commitment to, the policy agenda that got Trump elected.
This speaks more to the entrenched, ideological nature of the establishment GOP than it does to Trump’s personnel operation, but it affected the White House in ways difficult to overstate. Past Republican presidents have traditionally culled staff from long-standing policy institutions like the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute or from congressional offices in the House and Senate.
Trump drew on these resources, but many of them outright opposed Trump and what he stood for. And even those who were cautiously supportive lacked the intellectual and policy prowess to advance his agenda with the creativity and forcefulness it required.
Second, the unprecedented rage directed at Trump by almost every mainstream media outlet perverted the incentives for administration staff in a way that rewarded those who actively undermined and publicly denounced the administration and its policies. Staffers at all levels who publicly turned on the president were rewarded with cable news spots, book deals, pundit contracts, and speaking tours.
While every administration must deal with leaks, liars, and tell-alls, the Trump administration was bedeviled by them. This was attributable in no small part to the lack of ideological commitment to the president and the broader agenda for which he stood. It was also attributable to the management style of Trump himself, which, rather than fostering unity, tended to seed chaos and rivalries.
External forces will plague all future White House staffs, with those seeking the most direct challenge to the status quo facing the strongest pressure. The best immunization is a community and institutions that build cohesion and loyalty, both internally and to the shared policy agenda. Bad personnel choices are always a risk, but good ones will never be better than the pool from which they are drawn.
Donald Trump was in some senses a victim of his own success, refashioning the Republican Party’s electoral coalition and transforming the policy landscape much faster than existing institutions could adapt or new ones could emerge. Many in the existing establishment will eagerly declare the resulting failures as proof of their own superiority. But mostly it underscores their irrelevance. America is a democracy, not a technocracy, and so it is the citizenry rather than the bureaucrats who choose the nation’s leaders and its direction. If some public servants are proudly incapable of serving the public, new ones will soon enough replace them.
Rachel Bovard is the senior director of policy at the Conservative Partnership Institute, where she trains and advises congressional staff and members regarding parliamentary and policy strategy. From 2015 to 2017, she was director of policy services at the Heritage Foundation, where she worked closely with the Trump transition team. Previously, she spent a decade on Capitol Hill in both the House and the Senate.
The other articles in the series, “What Happened: The Trump Presidency In Review,” published in partnership with American Compass, can be found here:
“Foreword: The Work Remains,” by Daniel McCarthy
Introduction, from American Compass
“A Populism Deferred,” by Julius Krein
“The Potpourri Presidency,” by Wells King
“Some Like it Hot,” by Oren Cass


theamericanconservative--2020-12-08--Foreword: The Work Remains

Foreword: The Work Remains

Donald Trump ’ s record as president is ripe for reevaluation even before he has left office .
For more than four years progressives have insisted that history will judge Republicans harshly for the Trump era .
Yet the Trump administration ’ s policy record , separated from Trump himself , is hardly a thing to shock historians ’ tender sensibilities .
Two key domestic achievements were of a bipartisan and even moderately progressive character : the passage of the USMCA trade deal and a distinctly libertarian criminal-justice reform package .
President Trump gave the Club for Growth and pro-life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2017 tax bill and the appointment of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court , two accomplishments for which left-of-center historians may fault him .
Yet neither of those moves departed from the GOP agenda that has been in place since the Reagan era .
Updates to a continental free-trade agreement , criminal-justice reform , tax cuts , and originalist judges do not add up to a radically right-wing program .
By conventional measures , Trump ’ s domestic record sits neatly beside those of President Reagan and each President Bush .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ different in degree , are not so different in kind from the steel tariffs imposed by George W. Bush or the protections that Reagan afforded the American motorcycle industry—the Gipper was the savior of Harley-Davidson .
Nor was the spirit of Trump ’ s economic nationalism a far cry from the spirit of Reagan ’ s Plaza Accords .
Trump was more ambitious and more haphazard in his industrial strategy , it ’ s true , and he undertook it amid far more difficult global conditions—China is a more serious rival in every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was , and to rebuild America ’ s industrial lead after so many years of anti-industrial policy was always going to take more than a single presidential term .
Yet policies that shifted industry and trade advantage from China to Vietnam are , in fact , a useful beginning in correcting the mistakes that facilitated the ascent of an economic arch-rival .
Trump has changed the policy debate about China , trade , and industry , in both parties , even if his own policies have not been a revolutionary break with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to trade and China will be seen by historians of the future will depend on the next few twists in the tale , not just on what happened during Trump ’ s own time in office .
If concern about China becomes a defining feature of American politics , as seems likely , Trump will be remembered as a trailblazer , whether or not his message is thought to have translated into immediate results .
His role was to show the way ; others must build the road .
Beijing ’ s regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ optimists have been predicting incorrectly since 1989 .
Maybe tomorrow they will prove right .
If not , however , history ’ s damning verdict is likely to fall not on Trump ’ s perception of U.S.-China rivalry but on the perceptions and policies of Trump ’ s loudest critics , the architects of globalization and Beijing ’ s concomitant empowerment .
Policy paradigms in our country arise and collapse messily , driven not by visionary academics and technocrats but by flexible politicians sensitive to the vox populi and willing to experiment and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ direction in mind—or at least a destination—but nothing like a roadmap .
The New Deal was haphazard too , and Reagan had neither the dogmatic consistency nor market fundamentalism of the Zombie Reaganism now worshipped across much of the American right .
The real Reagan offers a useful point of comparison for Trump : Reagan , too , had his critics among the gatekeepers of conservative orthodoxy , who loved the 40th president for his domestic agenda ( usually ) but found him far too soft on Mikhail Gorbachev and thought he ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Contrary to legend , neoconservatives in the Reagan administration ’ s latter years were distinctly unhappy with the president and hoped for a truly hardline successor .
But Reagan ’ s simple vision was right—he foresaw the peaceful end of the Cold War because he knew the Soviets were collapsing from within—while the neoconservatives , in all their sophistication , were wrong .
Likewise , Trump ’ s grasp of the stakes in the 21st-century economic struggle is simpler , clearer , and more correct than the highly theorized , well-articulated , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his critics .
Those critics fancy themselves free-marketeers and economic scientists more principled and dispassionate than other mere mortals but , truth be told , they are “ true believers ” of the same emotional sort who couldn ’ t accept Reagan ’ s bold diplomacy with the enemy .
Just as Reagan understood the Soviet Union ’ s rot , Trump has recognized the post–Cold War era ’ s political economy is basically gangrenous .
The difference is that the Soviet Union only had to be destroyed .
Applying ever greater pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear moral condemnation , and diplomatic engagement did the trick .
The present economic regime has to be replaced–not with democratic socialism or central planning , but with a more nuanced and less oligarchic conception of the relationship between economics , politics , security , and society .
Today ’ s dogmatic liberalism places the economy apart from and in some way above politics and strategic security .
Economics is purportedly scientific and moral , while politics and foreign relations are inherently compromising and reflect darkly on human nature .
What ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society , namely stock prices and gross domestic product .
If GDP is up , but life expectancy is down , that ’ s still progress .
If GDP is up , but more and more of the growth is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands , it can always be redistributed .
The scientific and philosophically righteous must come before the political and the socially pragmatic , or so goes the justification .
The reality is much simpler : the highly credentialed elites win , while traditional forms of family and labor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( or billionaire ) with a degree from Wharton , not a factory-floor worker with a high-school education .
But class politics , thankfully , is not identity politics .
Trump , for whatever reasons of his own , is not a “ true believer ” in the system that has served his class so well .
There ’ s a lot that he likes about it , and he boasts about stock-market records and GDP growth as much as any president .
But he dares to speak about the system ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feeling that he and millions of Americans share—including millions of Americans who didn ’ t vote for him—that the economic game is rigged with trade , immigration , education , and financial policies that benefit the mandarins and harm ordinary people .
This truth , however roughly articulated , is just as important as the truth Trump has told about China .
And these two truths are of course intimately related .
Yet telling the truth is not enough : one also has to act .
Trump accomplished a great deal in his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critics are wont to admit .
Most of the work that must go into renewing American life , however , remains to be done—not just by presidents and their staff but by the men and women outside of government who have the talent to put specific ideas on the policy agenda , and who can transform a needed iconoclasm into a well-wrought public argument , a plan of action , and substantive change .
The essays in this symposium , evaluating what has succeeded and failed in the last four years and what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the work .
They show the opportunity that Trump has created , which we now need to seize .
Daniel McCarthy is the editor of Modern Age : A Conservative Review .
The other articles in the series , “ What Happened : The Trump Presidency In Review , ” published in partnership with American Compass , can be found here : Introduction , from American Compass “ Too Few of the President ’ s Men , ” by Rachel Bovard “ A Populism Deferred , ” by Julius Krein “ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Some Like it Hot , ” by Oren Cass

Donald Trump’s record as president is ripe for reevaluation even before he has left office. For more than four years progressives have insisted that history will judge Republicans harshly for the Trump era. Yet the Trump administration’s policy record, separated from Trump himself, is hardly a thing to shock historians’ tender sensibilities. Two key domestic achievements were of a bipartisan and even moderately progressive character: the passage of the USMCA trade deal and a distinctly libertarian criminal-justice reform package. President Trump gave the Club for Growth and pro-life social conservatives exactly what they wanted with the 2017 tax bill and the appointment of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court, two accomplishments for which left-of-center historians may fault him. Yet neither of those moves departed from the GOP agenda that has been in place since the Reagan era. Updates to a continental free-trade agreement, criminal-justice reform, tax cuts, and originalist judges do not add up to a radically right-wing program. By conventional measures, Trump’s domestic record sits neatly beside those of President Reagan and each President Bush.
Even Trump’s tariffs, while different in degree, are not so different in kind from the steel tariffs imposed by George W. Bush or the protections that Reagan afforded the American motorcycle industry—the Gipper was the savior of Harley-Davidson. Nor was the spirit of Trump’s economic nationalism a far cry from the spirit of Reagan’s Plaza Accords. Trump was more ambitious and more haphazard in his industrial strategy, it’s true, and he undertook it amid far more difficult global conditions—China is a more serious rival in every respect than the Japan of the 1980s was, and to rebuild America’s industrial lead after so many years of anti-industrial policy was always going to take more than a single presidential term. Yet policies that shifted industry and trade advantage from China to Vietnam are, in fact, a useful beginning in correcting the mistakes that facilitated the ascent of an economic arch-rival. Trump has changed the policy debate about China, trade, and industry, in both parties, even if his own policies have not been a revolutionary break with the past.
How Trump’s approach to trade and China will be seen by historians of the future will depend on the next few twists in the tale, not just on what happened during Trump’s own time in office. If concern about China becomes a defining feature of American politics, as seems likely, Trump will be remembered as a trailblazer, whether or not his message is thought to have translated into immediate results. His role was to show the way; others must build the road. Beijing’s regime might yet falter, a turn that optimists have been predicting incorrectly since 1989. Maybe tomorrow they will prove right. If not, however, history’s damning verdict is likely to fall not on Trump’s perception of U.S.-China rivalry but on the perceptions and policies of Trump’s loudest critics, the architects of globalization and Beijing’s concomitant empowerment.
Policy paradigms in our country arise and collapse messily, driven not by visionary academics and technocrats but by flexible politicians sensitive to the vox populi and willing to experiment and muddle through; leaders who have a direction in mind—or at least a destination—but nothing like a roadmap. The New Deal was haphazard too, and Reagan had neither the dogmatic consistency nor market fundamentalism of the Zombie Reaganism now worshipped across much of the American right.
The real Reagan offers a useful point of comparison for Trump: Reagan, too, had his critics among the gatekeepers of conservative orthodoxy, who loved the 40th president for his domestic agenda (usually) but found him far too soft on Mikhail Gorbachev and thought he’d been duped by the wily Russian. Contrary to legend, neoconservatives in the Reagan administration’s latter years were distinctly unhappy with the president and hoped for a truly hardline successor. But Reagan’s simple vision was right—he foresaw the peaceful end of the Cold War because he knew the Soviets were collapsing from within—while the neoconservatives, in all their sophistication, were wrong. Likewise, Trump’s grasp of the stakes in the 21st-century economic struggle is simpler, clearer, and more correct than the highly theorized, well-articulated, policy-rich, yet fundamentally wrong view of his critics. Those critics fancy themselves free-marketeers and economic scientists more principled and dispassionate than other mere mortals but, truth be told, they are “true believers” of the same emotional sort who couldn’t accept Reagan’s bold diplomacy with the enemy.
Just as Reagan understood the Soviet Union’s rot, Trump has recognized the post–Cold War era’s political economy is basically gangrenous. The difference is that the Soviet Union only had to be destroyed. Applying ever greater pressure with a combination of firm deterrence, clear moral condemnation, and diplomatic engagement did the trick. The present economic regime has to be replaced–not with democratic socialism or central planning, but with a more nuanced and less oligarchic conception of the relationship between economics, politics, security, and society.
Today’s dogmatic liberalism places the economy apart from and in some way above politics and strategic security. Economics is purportedly scientific and moral, while politics and foreign relations are inherently compromising and reflect darkly on human nature. What’s good for the economy is good for society, namely stock prices and gross domestic product. If GDP is up, but life expectancy is down, that’s still progress. If GDP is up, but more and more of the growth is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, it can always be redistributed. The scientific and philosophically righteous must come before the political and the socially pragmatic, or so goes the justification. The reality is much simpler: the highly credentialed elites win, while traditional forms of family and labor lose.
Donald Trump is a millionaire (or billionaire) with a degree from Wharton, not a factory-floor worker with a high-school education. But class politics, thankfully, is not identity politics. Trump, for whatever reasons of his own, is not a “true believer” in the system that has served his class so well. There’s a lot that he likes about it, and he boasts about stock-market records and GDP growth as much as any president. But he dares to speak about the system’s shortcomings, about deindustrialization, about the feeling that he and millions of Americans share—including millions of Americans who didn’t vote for him—that the economic game is rigged with trade, immigration, education, and financial policies that benefit the mandarins and harm ordinary people. This truth, however roughly articulated, is just as important as the truth Trump has told about China. And these two truths are of course intimately related.
Yet telling the truth is not enough: one also has to act. Trump accomplished a great deal in his four years, considerably more than his critics are wont to admit. Most of the work that must go into renewing American life, however, remains to be done—not just by presidents and their staff but by the men and women outside of government who have the talent to put specific ideas on the policy agenda, and who can transform a needed iconoclasm into a well-wrought public argument, a plan of action, and substantive change. The essays in this symposium, evaluating what has succeeded and failed in the last four years and what is to be done next, carry on the work. They show the opportunity that Trump has created, which we now need to seize.
Daniel McCarthy is the editor of Modern Age: A Conservative Review.
The other articles in the series, “What Happened: The Trump Presidency In Review,” published in partnership with American Compass, can be found here:
Introduction, from American Compass
“Too Few of the President’s Men,” by Rachel Bovard
“A Populism Deferred,” by Julius Krein
“The Potpourri Presidency,” by Wells King
“Some Like it Hot,” by Oren Cass