theamericanconservative--2020-11-19--Susan Rice is Asia’s Worst Nightmare

Susan Rice is Asia’s Worst Nightmare

Chinese President Xi Jinping ( R ) meets US National Security Advisor Susan Rice at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing , on August 28 , 2015 .
( FRED DUFOUR/AFP via Getty Images ) There is a movement afoot to install Susan Rice as the decided nominee for Secretary of State .
Rice last served in government as National Security Advisor to Barack Obama ; at least one media report claims that he is personally lobbying Biden on her behalf .
Such high-powered lobbying is necessary for a figure of Rice ’ s notoriety .
The controversy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Benghazi attack ensured that the Obama administration could not nominate her for any position that required Senate confirmation in its second term .
But she is not just persona non grata to Republicans .
Reporting on her choice position in the wrangling over a Biden cabinet has stirred up a fury on the far left .
Anti-war activists remember that Rice was a prime instigator of America ’ s catastrophic intervention in Libya , and are outraged that one of the principal authors of this disaster could today be the front-running candidate for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems extend far past her role in America ’ s Libyan calamities .
This is an age where American diplomacy and international geopolitical maneuver is centered on what an older generation called the Far East—and Rice ’ s record on Asia is execrable .
This record , and the appalling reputation it has given her in the region , should have long ago disqualified her from ever being considered as a proper selection for America ’ s chief diplomat .
The disgust Rice generates in Asian diplomatic circles was expressed with unusual frankness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomat Bilahari Kausikan .
In response to rumors that Rice was a leading candidate in Biden ’ s search for a running mate , the former diplomat waxed undiplomatic : “ Susan Rice would be a disaster .
She has very little interest in Asia , no stomach for competition , and thinks of foreign policy as humanitarian intervention .
… [ with Rice at the helm ] we will look back on Trump with nostalgia.
” Look back on Trump with nostalgia !
What a shock those words must be to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been warned that the Trump administration has irreversibly harmed America ’ s standing in the world ?
Have we not been told that Trump and his nationalist rhetoric have ruptured America ’ s alliances , disintegrated her international partnerships , and destroyed all possible chance of working in concert with foreign powers ?
How then could one of Asia ’ s most renowned diplomatic voices prefer another Trump term over the return of an Obama-era advisor ?
To understand this dismal view of Rice , we must first pop some myths about American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Donald Trump .
Then we may proceed to Rice ’ s particular role in the worst mistakes of the Obama era .
Liberals often portray the post-Obama era as an unmitigated diplomatic crisis , a time when time erratic foreign policy swings and “ America first ” rhetoric wrecked America ’ s ability to influence world affairs .
There is truth to these accusations .
But these accusations are far truer in some regions and with some relationships than others .
As Jeremy Stern has convincingly argued , the Obama administration ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its nominal “ pivot to Asia ” but by a deep commitment to the transatlantic relationship .
Obama ’ s rosy reception by E.U .
elites was established with his Nobel Peace Prize award and was cemented through his strong working relationships with David Cameron , François Hollande , and Angela Merkel .
“ The administration shared decision-making power with Europe on regional conflicts in Libya , Syria , and Ukraine , ” Stern observes , “ and on global issues like climate change and arms control .
It saw and treated China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a far less significant event than Russia ’ s annexation of Crimea .
It negotiated the Iran Nuclear Agreement not with the consent of local stakeholders … but with Germany and the United Nations Security Council.
” Obama ’ s much ballyhooed commitment to multilateralism was a commitment to institutions and fora—like the European Union , NATO , and the U.N.—that privilege European interests and embody the values of the post-war transatlantic consensus .
It is little surprise that a Trump administration distrustful of multilateral organizations , disdainful of the technocratic ethos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Brussels , and fully willing to toss liberal shibboleths aside to pursue “ deals ” with authoritarian powers would cause waves of horror in European capitals .
But wellsprings of horror in Europe were often sources of strength in Asia .
In Asia , international politics moves to a different tune .
At the birth of the post-war consensus , Asian powers were colonies or recent conquests .
They have far less invested in these transatlantic multilateral structures than Paris or Berlin .
Asian elites are consequentially far less concerned with their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are Asian publics especially enamored with Western European norms and values .
European fear of nationalism has no purchase on a continent where political identity is shaped less by memories of the Western Front than by the glories of national revolt against Western imperialism .
Many Asian powers , including several of America ’ s treaty allies , are lukewarm on liberalism .
Trump ’ s diplomacy , focused on personal relationships with foreign leaders and framed as the simple pursuit of national interests , was not felt as a subversive force in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as it simply brought American diplomacy in line with existing regional norms .
Obama-era foreign policy , which often took the guise of a supercilious liberalism carried out at a cold remove , warmed few hearts to the American cause .
Even a regional ally such as Australia , heir to the same liberal tradition as the United States and equally committed to upholding the cause of global democracy , often found itself distraught at the Obama administration ’ s willingness to trade out its interests and security for some phantom scheme of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of China .
The Obama administration ’ s declared “ pivot ” to Asia was mostly rhetorical .
Throughout Obama ’ s two terms , America ’ s diplomatic energy and military power was unmovably absorbed with crises in the Middle East .
In contrast , the Trump administration ’ s focus on the ideological , intelligence , and military threat posed by growing Chinese power has put some fence-sitting Asian nations in a tough spot , but has been a relief to regional allies who feared that America lacked the focus or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaunting ambitions .
To America ’ s closest allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific , Susan Rice represents the worst aspects of Obama ’ s diplomacy distilled in human form .
She is associated with a foreign policy approach anchored on European perspectives and values , a high-handed , holier-than-thou style of diplomacy , and a consuming focus on Middle Eastern crises that distracts and detracts from America ’ s declared commitments in the Asia-Pacific .
But above all else , Rice has earned a well-deserved reputation as the senior American official most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partners to chase what Rice calls “ expanded cooperation ” with Beijing .
Susan Rice credits herself with a commanding role in the implementation of Obama ’ s China strategy .
In her memoir Rice describes why she , as National Security Advisor , needed to take control of America ’ s relationship with China , instead of allowing another NSC “ Principal ” ( like the Secretary of State ) to take charge : This framing may seem innocuous , but its sentiments raise alarm bells across Asia .
By elevating U.S.-China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign policy ( Rice often describes it as “ the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world ” ) , the one realm of cooperation that demands continuous cross-domain coordination from the White House itself , Rice devalues America ’ s actual partners in the region .
Taiwanese , Filipino , Australian , and Indian diplomats ( to say nothing of their Singaporean , Thai , or Vietnamese counterparts ) know that if all aspects of the China relationship are cross-linked , then their interests will always be traded out for better Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea , climate change , the cyber realm , or any other domain the Chinese decide to pull a tantrum over that week .
This framing is even more humiliating for the Japanese .
It forces them into an undeserved second-class spot .
Though Tokyo is America ’ s most important ally , the hub on which U.S. foreign policy depends , and a power more crucial to American-led financial and macroeconomic coordination than Beijing has ever been , Tokyo was not given the same bilateral access to the Obama White House that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Susan Rice owned the China relationship ; Japanese concerns did not command the attention of any of the Principals .
Obama hardly spoke to Putin without first hearing Merkel ’ s take ; the Japanese were given little input into American strategy for managing China .
Here again the Trump administration provides a surprising contrast .
Trump ’ s team did not just recognize the significance of the Chinese bid for supremacy .
They also recognized that any coherent response to the Chinese Communist Party ’ s plans must start with Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s personal performance .
In an essay explaining how Japanese officialdom warmed up to Trump , one anonymous Japanese official describes the President ’ s priorities : Before Trump , this sort of cooperation and engagement was reserved for the Chinese , favored European allies , and Middle Eastern countries then subject to American counterinsurgency campaigns .
Rice ’ s autobiography reflects this focus .
Of its 482 pages , only 13 cover China—most of which are spent celebrating the administration ’ s 2015 cyber agreement with Beijing ( which never had a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fully implemented at the end of Obama ’ s tenure , and was abandoned by the Chinese shortly after he left office ) and the administration ’ s unsuccessful efforts to convince the communists to take a harder line against North Korea .
But these 13 pages are a mountain compared to her sparse treatment of America ’ s Asian partners .
Across the book , Japan and India are only given a few scattered mentions .
The U.S.-Philippines relationship is reduced to a sentence .
There is no entry for “ Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in her book that she “ understands the interests and the idiosyncrasies ” of the Chinese , but never demonstrates similar knowledge or concern with any other power in the region .
And they know it !
“ Susan Rice , who served as the Obama administration ’ s National Security Adviser , has been floated as a potential vice presidential candidate for Mr. Biden , ” worried Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki , a prominent Japanese “ America hand , ” this spring .
“ Seeing the [ return of the ] name of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy ] will perturb the hearts of many of our officials.
” In a column responding to reports that Rice is the likely nominee for Secretary of State , former Indian diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar shares similar musings : “ Frankly , these reports cause a sinking feeling .
.
.
It is doubtful if [ Rice ] has any deep-rooted beliefs or convictions .
.
.
[ but ] China would heave a big sigh of relief if Biden picks Rice as his secretary of state.
” Lai I-chung , former director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DPP , Taiwan ’ s ruling party , echoed these concerns in a recent interview .
“ What has Susan Rice written about China or Taiwan ?
The lack of the deeper understanding on the issue of Taiwan by Biden advisers is something that causes a lot of concern here.
” Again and again we find Asian diplomats and analysts questioning Rice ’ s ability to understand their concerns or steel herself to stand up to the Chinese .
There is room for debate as to just how America ought to stand up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s authoritarian designs .
American allies and partners may push the United States to make commitments that are better for their interests than America ’ s .
There is no reason we must give them all that they ask for .
But the task of identifying where allied interests diverge from American ones , and the subsequent challenge of crafting coherent policy in the face of these divergent interests , requires a certain kind of diplomat—a diplomat who is respected by her foreign counterparts , has a crisp understanding of their political and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not to prioritize the neighborhood bully ’ s perspective over their own .
Susan Rice is not that diplomat .
Not in Asia .
Biden—and the Congress that confirms his personnel nominations—must decide how much affairs in Asia really matter .
Far from reassuring our allies , nominating Susan Rice—the Obama official most notorious for prioritizing Chinese complaints over allied entreaties , and Middle Eastern interventions over Asian affairs—would signal to America ’ s partners that the contest for the future of the Asia-Pacific region does not matter much to America at all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ analyst based in Washington DC .
His research focuses on the relationship between traditional Asian history and modern Asian politics .

There is a movement afoot to install Susan Rice as the decided nominee for Secretary of State. Rice last served in government as National Security Advisor to Barack Obama; at least one media report claims that he is personally lobbying Biden on her behalf. Such high-powered lobbying is necessary for a figure of Rice’s notoriety. The controversy that surrounded her handling of the 2012 Benghazi attack ensured that the Obama administration could not nominate her for any position that required Senate confirmation in its second term.
But she is not just persona non grata to Republicans. Reporting on her choice position in the wrangling over a Biden cabinet has stirred up a fury on the far left. Anti-war activists remember that Rice was a prime instigator of America’s catastrophic intervention in Libya, and are outraged that one of the principal authors of this disaster could today be the front-running candidate for any nomination.
But Rice’s problems extend far past her role in America’s Libyan calamities. This is an age where American diplomacy and international geopolitical maneuver is centered on what an older generation called the Far East—and Rice’s record on Asia is execrable. This record, and the appalling reputation it has given her in the region, should have long ago disqualified her from ever being considered as a proper selection for America’s chief diplomat.
The disgust Rice generates in Asian diplomatic circles was expressed with unusual frankness earlier this year by former senior Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan. In response to rumors that Rice was a leading candidate in Biden’s search for a running mate, the former diplomat waxed undiplomatic: “Susan Rice would be a disaster. She has very little interest in Asia, no stomach for competition, and thinks of foreign policy as humanitarian intervention. … [with Rice at the helm] we will look back on Trump with nostalgia.”
Look back on Trump with nostalgia! What a shock those words must be to the earnest Biden supporter! Have we not been warned that the Trump administration has irreversibly harmed America’s standing in the world? Have we not been told that Trump and his nationalist rhetoric have ruptured America’s alliances, disintegrated her international partnerships, and destroyed all possible chance of working in concert with foreign powers? How then could one of Asia’s most renowned diplomatic voices prefer another Trump term over the return of an Obama-era advisor?
To understand this dismal view of Rice, we must first pop some myths about American diplomacy in the age of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Then we may proceed to Rice’s particular role in the worst mistakes of the Obama era. Liberals often portray the post-Obama era as an unmitigated diplomatic crisis, a time when time erratic foreign policy swings and “America first” rhetoric wrecked America’s ability to influence world affairs. There is truth to these accusations. But these accusations are far truer in some regions and with some relationships than others.
As Jeremy Stern has convincingly argued, the Obama administration’s foreign policy was defined not by its nominal “pivot to Asia” but by a deep commitment to the transatlantic relationship. Obama’s rosy reception by E.U. elites was established with his Nobel Peace Prize award and was cemented through his strong working relationships with David Cameron, François Hollande, and Angela Merkel. “The administration shared decision-making power with Europe on regional conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine,” Stern observes, “and on global issues like climate change and arms control. It saw and treated China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal as a far less significant event than Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It negotiated the Iran Nuclear Agreement not with the consent of local stakeholders … but with Germany and the United Nations Security Council.” Obama’s much ballyhooed commitment to multilateralism was a commitment to institutions and fora—like the European Union, NATO, and the U.N.—that privilege European interests and embody the values of the post-war transatlantic consensus.
It is little surprise that a Trump administration distrustful of multilateral organizations, disdainful of the technocratic ethos that Obama shared with officials in Berlin and Brussels, and fully willing to toss liberal shibboleths aside to pursue “deals” with authoritarian powers would cause waves of horror in European capitals. But wellsprings of horror in Europe were often sources of strength in Asia. In Asia, international politics moves to a different tune.
At the birth of the post-war consensus, Asian powers were colonies or recent conquests. They have far less invested in these transatlantic multilateral structures than Paris or Berlin. Asian elites are consequentially far less concerned with their erosion than their European counterparts. Nor are Asian publics especially enamored with Western European norms and values. European fear of nationalism has no purchase on a continent where political identity is shaped less by memories of the Western Front than by the glories of national revolt against Western imperialism. Many Asian powers, including several of America’s treaty allies, are lukewarm on liberalism. Trump’s diplomacy, focused on personal relationships with foreign leaders and framed as the simple pursuit of national interests, was not felt as a subversive force in Asia as it was in Europe, as it simply brought American diplomacy in line with existing regional norms. Obama-era foreign policy, which often took the guise of a supercilious liberalism carried out at a cold remove, warmed few hearts to the American cause.
Even a regional ally such as Australia, heir to the same liberal tradition as the United States and equally committed to upholding the cause of global democracy, often found itself distraught at the Obama administration’s willingness to trade out its interests and security for some phantom scheme of harmony with the People’s Republic of China. The Obama administration’s declared “pivot” to Asia was mostly rhetorical. Throughout Obama’s two terms, America’s diplomatic energy and military power was unmovably absorbed with crises in the Middle East. In contrast, the Trump administration’s focus on the ideological, intelligence, and military threat posed by growing Chinese power has put some fence-sitting Asian nations in a tough spot, but has been a relief to regional allies who feared that America lacked the focus or capacity to respond to China’s vaunting ambitions.
To America’s closest allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, Susan Rice represents the worst aspects of Obama’s diplomacy distilled in human form. She is associated with a foreign policy approach anchored on European perspectives and values, a high-handed, holier-than-thou style of diplomacy, and a consuming focus on Middle Eastern crises that distracts and detracts from America’s declared commitments in the Asia-Pacific. But above all else, Rice has earned a well-deserved reputation as the senior American official most willing to sacrifice the interests of American partners to chase what Rice calls “expanded cooperation” with Beijing.
Susan Rice credits herself with a commanding role in the implementation of Obama’s China strategy. In her memoir Rice describes why she, as National Security Advisor, needed to take control of America’s relationship with China, instead of allowing another NSC “Principal” (like the Secretary of State) to take charge:
China has long preferred dealing directly with the White House on bilateral affairs . . . [and] given the complexity of the relationship, its many economic and strategic facets, and the need to ensure that multiple disparate agencies sing from the same hymnal, strong White House leadership makes sense. As NSA I embraced this responsibility.
This framing may seem innocuous, but its sentiments raise alarm bells across Asia. By elevating U.S.-China relations as the bilateral relationship in American foreign policy (Rice often describes it as “the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world”), the one realm of cooperation that demands continuous cross-domain coordination from the White House itself, Rice devalues America’s actual partners in the region. Taiwanese, Filipino, Australian, and Indian diplomats (to say nothing of their Singaporean, Thai, or Vietnamese counterparts) know that if all aspects of the China relationship are cross-linked, then their interests will always be traded out for better Chinese behavior with respect to Iran, North Korea, climate change, the cyber realm, or any other domain the Chinese decide to pull a tantrum over that week.
This framing is even more humiliating for the Japanese. It forces them into an undeserved second-class spot. Though Tokyo is America’s most important ally, the hub on which U.S. foreign policy depends, and a power more crucial to American-led financial and macroeconomic coordination than Beijing has ever been, Tokyo was not given the same bilateral access to the Obama White House that Rice arranged for the Chinese Communist Party. Susan Rice owned the China relationship; Japanese concerns did not command the attention of any of the Principals. Obama hardly spoke to Putin without first hearing Merkel’s take; the Japanese were given little input into American strategy for managing China.
Here again the Trump administration provides a surprising contrast. Trump’s team did not just recognize the significance of the Chinese bid for supremacy. They also recognized that any coherent response to the Chinese Communist Party’s plans must start with Japan. This was reflected in Trump’s personal performance. In an essay explaining how Japanese officialdom warmed up to Trump, one anonymous Japanese official describes the President’s priorities:
Trump has called [Japanese Prime Minister] Abe at every important occasion—before and after his meeting with Xi Jinping, for example, and as he planned his opening toward North Korea. According to media reports, as of May 2019, Abe and Trump had met 10 times, talked over the phone 30 times, and played golf 4 times. This volume of engagement, as measured in telephone calls, was already quadruple the number of engagements that Abe had with Obama [over both terms].
Before Trump, this sort of cooperation and engagement was reserved for the Chinese, favored European allies, and Middle Eastern countries then subject to American counterinsurgency campaigns. Rice’s autobiography reflects this focus. Of its 482 pages, only 13 cover China—most of which are spent celebrating the administration’s 2015 cyber agreement with Beijing (which never had a credible enforcement mechanism, was still not fully implemented at the end of Obama’s tenure, and was abandoned by the Chinese shortly after he left office) and the administration’s unsuccessful efforts to convince the communists to take a harder line against North Korea. But these 13 pages are a mountain compared to her sparse treatment of America’s Asian partners. Across the book, Japan and India are only given a few scattered mentions. The U.S.-Philippines relationship is reduced to a sentence. There is no entry for “Taiwan” in the index.
Rice boasts in her book that she “understands the interests and the idiosyncrasies” of the Chinese, but never demonstrates similar knowledge or concern with any other power in the region.
And they know it! “Susan Rice, who served as the Obama administration’s National Security Adviser, has been floated as a potential vice presidential candidate for Mr. Biden,” worried Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki, a prominent Japanese “America hand,” this spring. “Seeing the [return of the] name of the central figure of ‘Compromise-With-China’ [policy] will perturb the hearts of many of our officials.” In a column responding to reports that Rice is the likely nominee for Secretary of State, former Indian diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar shares similar musings: “Frankly, these reports cause a sinking feeling . . . It is doubtful if [Rice] has any deep-rooted beliefs or convictions . . . [but] China would heave a big sigh of relief if Biden picks Rice as his secretary of state.” Lai I-chung, former director of the foreign policy program of the DPP, Taiwan’s ruling party, echoed these concerns in a recent interview. “What has Susan Rice written about China or Taiwan? The lack of the deeper understanding on the issue of Taiwan by Biden advisers is something that causes a lot of concern here.” Again and again we find Asian diplomats and analysts questioning Rice’s ability to understand their concerns or steel herself to stand up to the Chinese.
There is room for debate as to just how America ought to stand up to the Communist Party of China’s authoritarian designs. American allies and partners may push the United States to make commitments that are better for their interests than America’s. There is no reason we must give them all that they ask for. But the task of identifying where allied interests diverge from American ones, and the subsequent challenge of crafting coherent policy in the face of these divergent interests, requires a certain kind of diplomat—a diplomat who is respected by her foreign counterparts, has a crisp understanding of their political and cultural quirks, and can be trusted not to prioritize the neighborhood bully’s perspective over their own. Susan Rice is not that diplomat. Not in Asia.
Biden—and the Congress that confirms his personnel nominations—must decide how much affairs in Asia really matter. Far from reassuring our allies, nominating Susan Rice—the Obama official most notorious for prioritizing Chinese complaints over allied entreaties, and Middle Eastern interventions over Asian affairs—would signal to America’s partners that the contest for the future of the Asia-Pacific region does not matter much to America at all.
Tanner Greer is a writer and analyst based in Washington DC. His research focuses on the relationship between traditional Asian history and modern Asian politics.


theamericanconservative--2020-11-20--Rand Paul Talks Trump, War, and Why the Cheneys Still Have ‘Blood on Their Hands’

Senator Rand Paul ( R-KY ) talks to reporters as he leaves the Republicans Policy Luncheon on October 26 , 2020 in Washington , DC .
( Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images ) It ’ s strange to think but Rand Paul is something of an institution now .
He ’ s still an insurgent , of course , as he always has been , but he ’ s been a member of the Senate for almost a decade .
He was first elected all the way back in 2010 on a platform of Tea Party government-cutting and the more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican debate stage by his father Congressman Ron Paul .
“ My dad began the process of bringing libertarians and people from a less hawkish foreign policy into the Republican Party , ” Paul told me on a phone call .
“ And we ’ ve kept that going , though we ’ re not there yet.
” Since then , Paul has fought some winning battles and plenty of losing ones , though always grounded in a commitment to liberty at home and realism abroad .
For a brief moment in 2013 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side , as he stood on the Senate floor for almost 13 hours to filibuster against the Obama administration ’ s refusal to rule out using drones against American citizens on U.S. soil .
Yet he ’ s also struggled to bring about change on issues like surveillance and war powers .
These days , Paul has found himself closer to the seat of power .
He ’ s emerged as something of a Trump whisperer , coaxing the president to follow his better instincts on foreign policy , countering the influence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I think what Trump is trying to do is a good thing , ” Paul said of the president ’ s attempts to shift the American military out of the Middle East .
“ I wish he ’ d done it sooner .
I hope he ’ ll do it to the maximum degree possible.
” Alas , Paul said , those around the president have often counseled him wrongly .
“ I told him John Bolton was a disaster , ” he said , adding that Trump ’ s advisors have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instincts the president has .
This was true of [ former defense secretary Mark ] Esper and all the others.
” As for Trump ’ s recently accelerated attempts to bring the troops home from Afghanistan , Paul is all in : “ I think zero ’ s a better number than 2,000 or 4,000 , ” he said of how many troops we ought to leave behind .
He conceded that we might need to keep a contingent of Marines in Afghanistan to guard the American embassy there , though he expressed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it could make it easier for a future president to escalate again .
Trump has lately been on something of a withdrawal spree , attempting to remove troops from Syria , Iraq , Afghanistan , Somalia , West Africa , and Germany , with mixed results .
Yet what of a report in the New York Times earlier this week that the president told his cabinet he wanted to bomb Iran over its continued nuclear program ?
The Times says it was the supposed hawks in the administration , Vice President Mike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who talked him down .
Paul expressed skepticism that Trump had said anything like that .
“ All of my conversations with the president about Iran have been him expressing to me restraint and not wanting to go in , ” he said .
( In that , Paul is in rare agreement with Senator Marco Rubio , who also questioned the Times ‘ account . )
There is a long-running internecine clash between congressional Republicans who take a more realist view on foreign policy , like Paul , and those who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Notable in the latter group is Congresswoman Liz Cheney , daughter of former vice president Dick Cheney , who is reported to have ambitions to be speaker of the House and even president .
Paul isn ’ t impressed .
“ There ’ s a lot of blood on their hands that frankly could have been avoided had we not listened to the Cheneys and the Bushes , ” he said .
Of his congressional colleagues , he estimates that “ three fourths of them still don ’ t want to leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Majority Leader Mitch McConnell as being the main problem .
“ McConnell ’ s been the leader of this , ” he said .
“ There ’ s not a lot of difference in the philosophies between McConnell and [ John ] McCain.
” Is there hope ?
Paul looks to a handful of newly elected Republicans who diverge from the hawkish establishment consensus .
He reserved special praise for Cynthia Lummis , the libertarian-leaning senator-elect from Wyoming whom he endorsed earlier this year .
He also expressed hope that a revitalized antiwar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And what of the most powerful Democrat in the country ?
Paul predicts that Joe Biden will be a weak chief executive , believing he ’ ll fall victim to interest-group liberalism , pulled in too many directions by too many voices .
Any policy accomplishments , as Paul sees it , will be a “ hodgepodge , ” heavily influenced by those outside the Oval Office .
In part , this is because Biden himself is a vacuum .
“ When I think of Biden and ideas , ” Paul says , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of them in the same sentence .
”

It’s strange to think but Rand Paul is something of an institution now. He’s still an insurgent, of course, as he always has been, but he’s been a member of the Senate for almost a decade. He was first elected all the way back in 2010 on a platform of Tea Party government-cutting and the more restrained foreign policy first brought to a Republican debate stage by his father Congressman Ron Paul.
“My dad began the process of bringing libertarians and people from a less hawkish foreign policy into the Republican Party,” Paul told me on a phone call. “And we’ve kept that going, though we’re not there yet.”
Since then, Paul has fought some winning battles and plenty of losing ones, though always grounded in a commitment to liberty at home and realism abroad. For a brief moment in 2013, public opinion was even on his side, as he stood on the Senate floor for almost 13 hours to filibuster against the Obama administration’s refusal to rule out using drones against American citizens on U.S. soil. Yet he’s also struggled to bring about change on issues like surveillance and war powers.
These days, Paul has found himself closer to the seat of power. He’s emerged as something of a Trump whisperer, coaxing the president to follow his better instincts on foreign policy, countering the influence of more hawkish advisors like John Bolton.
“I think what Trump is trying to do is a good thing,” Paul said of the president’s attempts to shift the American military out of the Middle East. “I wish he’d done it sooner. I hope he’ll do it to the maximum degree possible.”
Alas, Paul said, those around the president have often counseled him wrongly. “I told him John Bolton was a disaster,” he said, adding that Trump’s advisors have often blocked “the good impulses and instincts the president has. This was true of [former defense secretary Mark] Esper and all the others.”
As for Trump’s recently accelerated attempts to bring the troops home from Afghanistan, Paul is all in: “I think zero’s a better number than 2,000 or 4,000,” he said of how many troops we ought to leave behind. He conceded that we might need to keep a contingent of Marines in Afghanistan to guard the American embassy there, though he expressed concerns that if too many troops remained, it could make it easier for a future president to escalate again.
Trump has lately been on something of a withdrawal spree, attempting to remove troops from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, West Africa, and Germany, with mixed results. Yet what of a report in the New York Times earlier this week that the president told his cabinet he wanted to bomb Iran over its continued nuclear program? The Times says it was the supposed hawks in the administration, Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who talked him down.
Paul expressed skepticism that Trump had said anything like that. “All of my conversations with the president about Iran have been him expressing to me restraint and not wanting to go in,” he said. (In that, Paul is in rare agreement with Senator Marco Rubio, who also questioned the Times‘ account.)
There is a long-running internecine clash between congressional Republicans who take a more realist view on foreign policy, like Paul, and those who have changed little since the Bush years. Notable in the latter group is Congresswoman Liz Cheney, daughter of former vice president Dick Cheney, who is reported to have ambitions to be speaker of the House and even president.
Paul isn’t impressed. “There’s a lot of blood on their hands that frankly could have been avoided had we not listened to the Cheneys and the Bushes,” he said. Of his congressional colleagues, he estimates that “three fourths of them still don’t want to leave” the Middle East and cites Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell as being the main problem. “McConnell’s been the leader of this,” he said. “There’s not a lot of difference in the philosophies between McConnell and [John] McCain.”
Is there hope? Paul looks to a handful of newly elected Republicans who diverge from the hawkish establishment consensus. He reserved special praise for Cynthia Lummis, the libertarian-leaning senator-elect from Wyoming whom he endorsed earlier this year. He also expressed hope that a revitalized antiwar left could successfully pressure congressional Democrats.
And what of the most powerful Democrat in the country? Paul predicts that Joe Biden will be a weak chief executive, believing he’ll fall victim to interest-group liberalism, pulled in too many directions by too many voices. Any policy accomplishments, as Paul sees it, will be a “hodgepodge,” heavily influenced by those outside the Oval Office.
In part, this is because Biden himself is a vacuum. “When I think of Biden and ideas,” Paul says, “I don’t usually think of them in the same sentence.”


theamericanconservative--2020-11-20--President Joe Biden Confronts a Radically Different World Than When He Was Veep

After taking the oath of office President Joe Biden may be tempted to resume policy as if it was January 20 , 2017 .
But the nation and world with which he dealt as vice president no longer exist .
The first challenge will be political .
There was no blue wave .
Indeed , had President Donald Trump been only marginally less obnoxious , more competent , less offensive , or more empathetic , he would be returning for a second term and Biden would be the second shell-shocked Democratic paladin trying to understand how he had lost to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Far from suffering a collapse in support , Trump expanded his appeal in almost every demographic category , including Latinos and African-American males .
The Republican Party likely will hold onto Senate control ; the GOP also gained House seats , flipped two state legislative chambers , and won a governorship .
The American people remain deeply divided and Biden could find early failure confronting bitter obstructionist Republicans , angry squabbling Democrats , and disappointed progressive activists .
The second challenge will be domestic .
Foreign policy specialists have a long list of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , enjoys international affairs .
However , ugly reality will force him to focus on matters at home .
Biden ’ s number one priority must be the COVID-19 pandemic .
The most consequential event in American life for decades—only World War II , the Spanish flu epidemic , the Civil War , and Great Depression have transformed American life to a similar degree—much more remains to be done to stem rising infections , move vaccines into production , bolster the health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Everything else , at home and abroad , other than a threat of nuclear war , pales in comparison .
The second most important issue for the incoming president will be restoring a modicum of fiscal solvency to the federal government .
Tough choices must be made and difficult priorities must be set .
Inaugurating grand new international adventures can ’ t rank high on the president ’ s list .
Washington entered 2020 with an expected trillion-dollar deficit run up in good economic times , after simultaneously cutting taxes and increasing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fiscal year with $ 3.1 trillion in red ink due to the coronavirus pandemic .
The deficit will run more than $ 2 trillion this fiscal year , and that could double if Congress passes another bailout/stimulus bill .
National debt held by the public currently stands at $ 21 trillion , more than 100 percent of GDP , the highest since America exited World War II .
The Congressional Budget Office figures that existing policies will add another $ 10 trillion in red ink over the coming decade , while the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trillion , due to reduced income tax collections and increased program expenditures .
After that will come an explosion in entitlement spending , especially for Social Security and Medicare .
CBO warns that the debt to GDP ratio could be 195 percent mid-century , approaching five times the average over the last 50 years and much higher than in Greece when its unsustainable debt load triggered the Euro crisis .
Individual states , such as Illinois and New Jersey , already are in fiscal crisis .
There is no spare cash to toss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ setting international priorities .
Biden spent much of his career assuming U.S. primacy .
The foreign policy community from which he likely will draw his top appointees shares his commitment to American global domination .
Every week Washington , D.C. hosts numerous seminars covering Asia , Europe , the Middle East , and elsewhere , in which participants uniformly assert with great solemnity that events in their chosen region affect vital U.S. interests and require Washington ’ s urgent attention .
Today America is constantly engaging in military action or threatening military action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidizes the defense of European nations which devote their resources to funding more generous social programs than are available in America ; treats Russia as a defeated power to be forcibly confined within its own borders ; shapes Middle Eastern policy for the benefit of Saudi Arabian and Israeli interests ; assumes the U.S. should sort out a multi-sided civil war in Syria to the exclusion of more interested regional parties ; attempts to force Iran to surrender its independent foreign policy ; forgives friendly regimes as diverse as Saudi Arabia and Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forever occupies Afghanistan to bring democracy to Central Asia ; risks nuclear attack by North Korea to defend South Korea , whose national strengths vastly outrange those of the North ; considers protecting Taiwan despite its extraordinary distance and unwillingness to act seriously in its own defense ; treats failed , undemocratic , and lackadaisical Asian regimes as potential military dependents ; risks a very cold and possibly hot war with China to preserve U.S. influence a continent away ; and more .
The cost of maintaining sufficient force structure , lift capacity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primacy ” is prohibitive , far greater than the price of emphasizing national defense over global engineering , of deterrence over power projection .
Washington ’ s attempt to maintain a foreign policy which amounts to a global Monroe Doctrine , with America asserting its right to intervene against every nation in every region , will grow steadily less affordable .
Serious resource limits must inevitably affect military spending and foreign policy .
Indeed , even candidate Biden felt it necessary to support a halt to “ endless wars , ” though he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other purposes .
His recent dismissal of Beijing as an economic competitor appeared to downplay the prospect of military confrontation , though his advisers have evinced greater concern .
His rapprochement with Europe might be mostly cosmetic , since the Trump administration spent four years increasing financial outlays on and troop deployments to the continent despite the president ’ s caustic rhetoric .
Biden is less likely to cater to Riyadh ’ s whims , especially when the result is the slaughter of Yemeni civilians .
Overall , the result could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the Trump years in practice if not image .
However , the new president will need to more systematically set priorities for what he is prepared to defend , and how much he is prepared to spend doing so .
The U.S. no longer can do it all .
Which means the incoming president will be forced to abandon some of the military commitments that he once championed .
That is the only plausible course for managing the foreign policy of a bankrupt republic .
The Middle East has been the traditional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while losing its great importance to America .
The U.S. has become the world ’ s biggest energy producer and no longer needs to safeguard Israel , a regional superpower with nuclear weapons .
Popular support for promiscuous war-making in the Mideast also has flatlined : Americans are tired of being lied into counterproductive and bloody vanity crusades .
Biden will face pressure to moderate Washington ’ s ambitions and deployments in Afghanistan , Iraq , and Syria , despite the outrage expressed by many Democrats when Trump made a similar case for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serious challenge for the incoming president .
For all his experience in international affairs , Biden demonstrated extremely poor geopolitical judgment when he asserted : “ the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our—our security and our alliances is Russia.
” This is manifestly false , the same sort of idée fixe that afflicts Madeleine Albright and many others .
Russia is much smaller and weaker than the Soviet Union ; has no essential conflict with America , either ideological or territorial ; and could be deterred by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demographic , and technological advantages .
Moscow has behaved badly , but Washington has little credibility in complaining , having routinely interfered in other nations ’ elections ( including Russia in 1996 ) , launched cyber-attacks ( remember Stuxnet ) , and committed aggression that violated international law ( Serbia , Iraq ) .
Most important , Moscow is a declining power desperate to ensure respect and security , not a growing force determined to regain lost glories , like China .
Although Biden might identify with European leaders , current allied policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tilt toward China , effectively reversing Richard Nixon ’ s great strategic maneuver of 1972 .
This will be ever harder to justify at a time of increased budget stringency .
Desperately needed is a modus vivendi that both Washington and Moscow can live with , perhaps rooted in a promise to halt NATO expansion .
Even America ’ s presence in Asia is not sacrosanct .
It is ever more difficult to justify U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula seven decades after the Korean War , with the South well able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poorer , and weaker northern adversary can deploy .
And if North Korea becomes capable of striking the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons , involvement in what began as an old-style conventional conflict could ultimately result in the destruction of American cities .
Such a possibility would increase popular doubt as to the wisdom of entanglement in what amounts to the continuing Korean civil war at 75 years and counting .
As for China , it threatens American influence , not American security .
Is the former worth war with a nuclear power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should it not rely on Japanese rather than American lives and money for its defense ?
Is Washington prepared to lend its navy to a semi-failed state like the Philippines to protect such minor geographic features as Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef ?
How many lives is the U.S. willing to risk for the defense of Taiwan , a task comparable to China protecting Cuba from America ?
None of these objectives would be easy to fulfill over the long-term .
Committing to all of them—on top of addressing domestic crises and continuing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European welfare states—would be no mean feat .
Joe Biden and many of his supporters may be tempted to see his presidency as a restoration of the Obama administration and reapplication of traditional Democratic foreign policy nostrums .
However , underlying realities have changed dramatically .
Donald Trump didn ’ t find the right answers .
But he did ask some of the right questions .
The incoming president will need to do better if he is to meet the dramatic challenges facing our nation .
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Assistant to President Ronald Reagan , he is author of Foreign Follies : America ’ s New Global Empire .

After taking the oath of office President Joe Biden may be tempted to resume policy as if it was January 20, 2017. But the nation and world with which he dealt as vice president no longer exist.
The first challenge will be political. There was no blue wave. Indeed, had President Donald Trump been only marginally less obnoxious, more competent, less offensive, or more empathetic, he would be returning for a second term and Biden would be the second shell-shocked Democratic paladin trying to understand how he had lost to such an ill-qualified and ill-regarded figure.
Far from suffering a collapse in support, Trump expanded his appeal in almost every demographic category, including Latinos and African-American males. The Republican Party likely will hold onto Senate control; the GOP also gained House seats, flipped two state legislative chambers, and won a governorship. The American people remain deeply divided and Biden could find early failure confronting bitter obstructionist Republicans, angry squabbling Democrats, and disappointed progressive activists.
The second challenge will be domestic. Foreign policy specialists have a long list of pressing priorities for the president. Biden, as a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, enjoys international affairs. However, ugly reality will force him to focus on matters at home.
Biden’s number one priority must be the COVID-19 pandemic. The most consequential event in American life for decades—only World War II, the Spanish flu epidemic, the Civil War, and Great Depression have transformed American life to a similar degree—much more remains to be done to stem rising infections, move vaccines into production, bolster the health care system, and spur economic recovery. Everything else, at home and abroad, other than a threat of nuclear war, pales in comparison.
The second most important issue for the incoming president will be restoring a modicum of fiscal solvency to the federal government. Tough choices must be made and difficult priorities must be set. Inaugurating grand new international adventures can’t rank high on the president’s list.
Washington entered 2020 with an expected trillion-dollar deficit run up in good economic times, after simultaneously cutting taxes and increasing spending. The government exited the 2020 fiscal year with $3.1 trillion in red ink due to the coronavirus pandemic. The deficit will run more than $2 trillion this fiscal year, and that could double if Congress passes another bailout/stimulus bill.
National debt held by the public currently stands at $21 trillion, more than 100 percent of GDP, the highest since America exited World War II. The Congressional Budget Office figures that existing policies will add another $10 trillion in red ink over the coming decade, while the coronavirus deficit could ultimately total another $16 trillion, due to reduced income tax collections and increased program expenditures. After that will come an explosion in entitlement spending, especially for Social Security and Medicare. CBO warns that the debt to GDP ratio could be 195 percent mid-century, approaching five times the average over the last 50 years and much higher than in Greece when its unsustainable debt load triggered the Euro crisis. Individual states, such as Illinois and New Jersey, already are in fiscal crisis. There is no spare cash to toss around.
The third challenge will be setting international priorities. Biden spent much of his career assuming U.S. primacy. The foreign policy community from which he likely will draw his top appointees shares his commitment to American global domination. Every week Washington, D.C. hosts numerous seminars covering Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, in which participants uniformly assert with great solemnity that events in their chosen region affect vital U.S. interests and require Washington’s urgent attention.
Today America is constantly engaging in military action or threatening military action on every continent but Antarctica. Washington subsidizes the defense of European nations which devote their resources to funding more generous social programs than are available in America; treats Russia as a defeated power to be forcibly confined within its own borders; shapes Middle Eastern policy for the benefit of Saudi Arabian and Israeli interests; assumes the U.S. should sort out a multi-sided civil war in Syria to the exclusion of more interested regional parties; attempts to force Iran to surrender its independent foreign policy; forgives friendly regimes as diverse as Saudi Arabia and Turkey for domestic oppression and foreign aggression; forever occupies Afghanistan to bring democracy to Central Asia; risks nuclear attack by North Korea to defend South Korea, whose national strengths vastly outrange those of the North; considers protecting Taiwan despite its extraordinary distance and unwillingness to act seriously in its own defense; treats failed, undemocratic, and lackadaisical Asian regimes as potential military dependents; risks a very cold and possibly hot war with China to preserve U.S. influence a continent away; and more.
The cost of maintaining sufficient force structure, lift capacity, and military facilities to pursue “primacy” is prohibitive, far greater than the price of emphasizing national defense over global engineering, of deterrence over power projection. Washington’s attempt to maintain a foreign policy which amounts to a global Monroe Doctrine, with America asserting its right to intervene against every nation in every region, will grow steadily less affordable. Serious resource limits must inevitably affect military spending and foreign policy.
Indeed, even candidate Biden felt it necessary to support a halt to “endless wars,” though he contemplated greater long-term military involvement for counterterrorism and other purposes. His recent dismissal of Beijing as an economic competitor appeared to downplay the prospect of military confrontation, though his advisers have evinced greater concern. His rapprochement with Europe might be mostly cosmetic, since the Trump administration spent four years increasing financial outlays on and troop deployments to the continent despite the president’s caustic rhetoric. Biden is less likely to cater to Riyadh’s whims, especially when the result is the slaughter of Yemeni civilians. Overall, the result could be an administration a bit less interventionist than during the Trump years in practice if not image.
However, the new president will need to more systematically set priorities for what he is prepared to defend, and how much he is prepared to spend doing so. The U.S. no longer can do it all. Which means the incoming president will be forced to abandon some of the military commitments that he once championed. That is the only plausible course for managing the foreign policy of a bankrupt republic.
The Middle East has been the traditional tar baby entrapping a succession of presidents while losing its great importance to America. The U.S. has become the world’s biggest energy producer and no longer needs to safeguard Israel, a regional superpower with nuclear weapons. Popular support for promiscuous war-making in the Mideast also has flatlined: Americans are tired of being lied into counterproductive and bloody vanity crusades. Biden will face pressure to moderate Washington’s ambitions and deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, despite the outrage expressed by many Democrats when Trump made a similar case for leaving.
Europe also will pose a serious challenge for the incoming president. For all his experience in international affairs, Biden demonstrated extremely poor geopolitical judgment when he asserted: “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our—our security and our alliances is Russia.” This is manifestly false, the same sort of idée fixe that afflicts Madeleine Albright and many others.
Russia is much smaller and weaker than the Soviet Union; has no essential conflict with America, either ideological or territorial; and could be deterred by Europe, which enjoys overwhelming economic, demographic, and technological advantages. Moscow has behaved badly, but Washington has little credibility in complaining, having routinely interfered in other nations’ elections (including Russia in 1996), launched cyber-attacks (remember Stuxnet), and committed aggression that violated international law (Serbia, Iraq).
Most important, Moscow is a declining power desperate to ensure respect and security, not a growing force determined to regain lost glories, like China. Although Biden might identify with European leaders, current allied policy toward Russia ensures its enduring hostility and tilt toward China, effectively reversing Richard Nixon’s great strategic maneuver of 1972. This will be ever harder to justify at a time of increased budget stringency. Desperately needed is a modus vivendi that both Washington and Moscow can live with, perhaps rooted in a promise to halt NATO expansion.
Even America’s presence in Asia is not sacrosanct. It is ever more difficult to justify U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula seven decades after the Korean War, with the South well able to match whatever conventional forces its smaller, poorer, and weaker northern adversary can deploy. And if North Korea becomes capable of striking the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons, involvement in what began as an old-style conventional conflict could ultimately result in the destruction of American cities. Such a possibility would increase popular doubt as to the wisdom of entanglement in what amounts to the continuing Korean civil war at 75 years and counting.
As for China, it threatens American influence, not American security. Is the former worth war with a nuclear power? If Japan is at risk, should it not rely on Japanese rather than American lives and money for its defense? Is Washington prepared to lend its navy to a semi-failed state like the Philippines to protect such minor geographic features as Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef? How many lives is the U.S. willing to risk for the defense of Taiwan, a task comparable to China protecting Cuba from America? None of these objectives would be easy to fulfill over the long-term. Committing to all of them—on top of addressing domestic crises and continuing to remake the Middle East and safeguard European welfare states—would be no mean feat.
Joe Biden and many of his supporters may be tempted to see his presidency as a restoration of the Obama administration and reapplication of traditional Democratic foreign policy nostrums. However, underlying realities have changed dramatically. Donald Trump didn’t find the right answers. But he did ask some of the right questions. The incoming president will need to do better if he is to meet the dramatic challenges facing our nation.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.


theamericanconservative--2020-11-19--Stop the Lockdowns and Let People Take Their Own Risks

Government has no right to infringe on our liberties in this way , even if there is a pandemic going on .
Demonstrators rally outside the Pennsylvania Capitol Building regarding the continued closure of businesses due to the coronavirus pandemic on May 15 , 2020 in Harrisburg , Pennsylvania .
( Photo by Mark Makela/Getty Images ) The City of Philadelphia has announced that until January 1 , it will “ shut down indoor dining , gyms , museums , and ban public and private gatherings.
” This declaration comes after COVID-19 cases in the region peaked at 6,023 on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broad influence over the surrounding area , there is a reasonable probability that Montgomery , Chester , Bucks , and Delaware counties will all follow suit in forcing industries to close .
This comes after the declaration by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) a month ago pointing to the issue of locking down states for too long of a time .
“ Because of their severe economic , social & broader health impacts , lockdowns need to be limited in duration , ” they tweeted .
The WHO continued : “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their significant economic , social and broader health impacts.
” Pennsylvanians this summer were hit incredibly hard by government-mandated lockdowns .
It is quite cruel to think that the power we have given to the state is being used to determine which businesses are “ essential ” and “ non-essential ” to a free people .
By going along with this nonsense , we forget one simple fact : it is up to the American people to determine what is essential , not our power-intoxicated “ leaders.
” More jobs will be lost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will forever close their doors .
According to one study , 41 percent of black-owned businesses were unable to reopen after the brutal lockdowns in April .
Minorities are hit hardest by these tyrannical restrictions .
Even left-leaning Vox has admitted this .
But Governor Wolf does not understand .
To him and his elite diktats in Philadelphia , government must do what government wants .
Government can do what government wants .
First the narrative was “ stop the spread.
” Fair enough .
I am behind that .
But we have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ somehow come to the conclusion that we can “ cure the spread ” by forcing people into their homes for months on end , only prolonging the disease .
I know politicians are nice and comfortable in their luxurious homes , but it turns out they do not have the capability to battle a deadly pandemic .
A disease will do what a disease does .
It will infect people .
And government forcing us to hide away until a vaccine comes , whenever that is , is asinine .
I know Governor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ couch and drink champagne until the end of time—but normal Americans can ’ t .
It turns out that not a single country with high cases that ’ s locked down has handled this thing correctly .
Why ?
Because we can ’ t handle a pandemic at all .
We can only try and be responsible and live with it until a vaccine comes .
For instance , Italy was one of the first to institute lockdowns ; now they are back at 33,977 cases as of November 15 .
Iran also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 13,053 cases as of November 16 .
In fact , nearly every country in the world is peaking right now .
And locking us down again will only delay the inevitable .
We may very well have a vaccine soon .
We may very well not .
We don ’ t know .
And that is the fundamental truth .
It seems our government has become so enwrapped in this disturbing vision of protecting the people that they have forgotten to leave personal responsibility up to the people .
They do not trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and their inflated egos .
COVID-19 is a fatal disease .
But the consequences of locking down places like Philadelphia will do insurmountably more harm than good .
According to the CDC , 25.5 percent of Americans aged 18 to 24 “ seriously considered ” suicide after August ’ s lockdowns ; this number was as high was 16 percent for those 25 to 44 .
The past year has also seen the highest number of opioid-epidemic related deaths at approximately 71,000 .
And calls to distress helplines grew by an unbelievable 890 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the norm ) .
Simply put , we can not accept these outcomes .
And we can change them through practical policy .
My hope is that even in a Biden-Harris administration , the states will stay open .
Let the alarmists decide whether they want to camp out in their basements until the end of time .
Let the rest of us make a decent wage and not go broke .
Risk is something we humans have to calculate on a daily basis .
There will always be risk .
But for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fatality rate risk in the U.S. and can not stand the idea of not paying the bills and having to go on welfare , let them participate in the market economy .
The government needs to have the guts to believe in the American people and entrust them with the inalienable right to make decisions about the trajectories of their lives .
Gabe Kaminsky is a writer who has been featured in the Washington Times , Real Clear Politics , and the Washington Examiner .

The City of Philadelphia has announced that until January 1, it will “shut down indoor dining, gyms, museums, and ban public and private gatherings.” This declaration comes after COVID-19 cases in the region peaked at 6,023 on November 12.
Governor Tom Wolf issued the following statement today:
The significant increase in cases and percent positivity across much of the state is cause for concern. We need all Pennsylvanians to take a stand and answer the call to protect one another. We need Pennsylvanians to be united in wearing a mask, practicing social distancing, washing our hands and avoiding gatherings. It is only by working together that Pennsylvanians can prevent the spread of the virus.
Given Philadelphia’s broad influence over the surrounding area, there is a reasonable probability that Montgomery, Chester, Bucks, and Delaware counties will all follow suit in forcing industries to close. This comes after the declaration by the World Health Organization (WHO) a month ago pointing to the issue of locking down states for too long of a time. “Because of their severe economic, social & broader health impacts, lockdowns need to be limited in duration,” they tweeted.
The WHO continued: “Lockdowns are not sustainable solutions because of their significant economic, social and broader health impacts.”
Pennsylvanians this summer were hit incredibly hard by government-mandated lockdowns. It is quite cruel to think that the power we have given to the state is being used to determine which businesses are “essential” and “non-essential” to a free people. By going along with this nonsense, we forget one simple fact: it is up to the American people to determine what is essential, not our power-intoxicated “leaders.”
More jobs will be lost if this continues, and more businesses will forever close their doors. According to one study, 41 percent of black-owned businesses were unable to reopen after the brutal lockdowns in April. Minorities are hit hardest by these tyrannical restrictions. Even left-leaning Vox has admitted this.
But Governor Wolf does not understand. To him and his elite diktats in Philadelphia, government must do what government wants. Government can do what government wants.
First the narrative was “stop the spread.” Fair enough. I am behind that. But we have strayed far from that narrow path and somehow come to the conclusion that we can “cure the spread” by forcing people into their homes for months on end, only prolonging the disease. I know politicians are nice and comfortable in their luxurious homes, but it turns out they do not have the capability to battle a deadly pandemic. A disease will do what a disease does. It will infect people. And government forcing us to hide away until a vaccine comes, whenever that is, is asinine. I know Governor Wolf can afford to sit on the couch and drink champagne until the end of time—but normal Americans can’t.
It turns out that not a single country with high cases that’s locked down has handled this thing correctly. Why? Because we can’t handle a pandemic at all. We can only try and be responsible and live with it until a vaccine comes. For instance, Italy was one of the first to institute lockdowns; now they are back at 33,977 cases as of November 15. Iran also did, and now they are at 13,053 cases as of November 16. In fact, nearly every country in the world is peaking right now. And locking us down again will only delay the inevitable.
We may very well have a vaccine soon. We may very well not. We don’t know. And that is the fundamental truth. It seems our government has become so enwrapped in this disturbing vision of protecting the people that they have forgotten to leave personal responsibility up to the people. They do not trust us anymore. They only trust themselves and their inflated egos.
COVID-19 is a fatal disease. But the consequences of locking down places like Philadelphia will do insurmountably more harm than good. According to the CDC, 25.5 percent of Americans aged 18 to 24 “seriously considered” suicide after August’s lockdowns; this number was as high was 16 percent for those 25 to 44. The past year has also seen the highest number of opioid-epidemic related deaths at approximately 71,000. And calls to distress helplines grew by an unbelievable 890 percent this April (when lockdowns were the norm). Simply put, we cannot accept these outcomes. And we can change them through practical policy.
My hope is that even in a Biden-Harris administration, the states will stay open. Let the alarmists decide whether they want to camp out in their basements until the end of time. Let the rest of us make a decent wage and not go broke. Risk is something we humans have to calculate on a daily basis. There will always be risk.
But for those who acknowledge a 2.3 percent case fatality rate risk in the U.S. and cannot stand the idea of not paying the bills and having to go on welfare, let them participate in the market economy. The government needs to have the guts to believe in the American people and entrust them with the inalienable right to make decisions about the trajectories of their lives.
Gabe Kaminsky is a writer who has been featured in the Washington Times, Real Clear Politics, and the Washington Examiner.


theamericanconservative--2020-11-21--Why The GOP Should Tackle Student Debt

Why The GOP Should Tackle Student Debt

It ’ s the last taboo .
You can find hordes of self-identified conservatives who are all in on the LGBT agenda .
You ’ ll find plenty who see no problem with government-sanctioned infanticide , so long as we frame it in the language of rights .
On any number of economic issues the GOP is eager to reform .
But heaven forbid the Republicans talk about student debt .
The fundamental reason for this is fairly obvious , if you ’ re at least a little bit of a cynic : the vast majority of people with student @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Republicans one way or the other , so there ’ s no political benefit and plenty of political risk .
But there are also legitimate arguments against action , beyond the reflexive fiscal timidity of the dead consensus .
The most substantial , and the most common , is that any form of debt relief would benefit the upper classes at the expense of the lower .
The main premise is easily demonstrated : the bulk of student debt is held by people with high incomes .
It wouldn ’ t be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bail these people out at the expense of those who chose not to go to college , or who managed to pay their debt off already .
This populist posturing is usually accompanied by the familiar odes to personal responsibility and reminders that the debt-laden chose this path .
They made their beds , now they have to sleep in them .
But who really made the bed ?
The most glaring oversight of those who scorn debt forgiveness as unwelcome meddling in private affairs is that the current crisis , by and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy .
Are we just supposed to ignore the fact that the United States government has been aggressively selling this bill of goods to its young citizens for decades ?
College is the path to a better life , and Uncle Sam will help you along the way .
( For what it ’ s worth , neither one of these claims has turned out to be true . )
Virtually every cultural , social , and political force at play has been pressuring every 17-year-old toward college at every juncture .
Let @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blameless just because they used carrots over sticks .
What ’ s more , the reckless programs by which the state coaxed students into college simultaneously enabled the price gouging and institutional bloat that now define the American education system .
Years of refusal either to change their own practices or to rein in the abuses of the schools has created a disastrous feedback loop in which the costs rise every year at higher and higher rates , while the return on investment vanishes as the ranks of degree-holders swell to unsustainable magnitudes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individual choice alone , and none of it can be solved by individual choice alone .
When decades of bad policy have left a society teetering on the brink of collapse , the conservative—and even the market-conscious—thing to do is not to just pull back and say “ Well I really don ’ t think the government ought to get involved here.
” These may seem like panicked overstatements .
Respectable people left and right go to great lengths every time the subject comes up to convince us that there isn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one that threatens societal collapse .
Recourse is taken first to the income line : the people who hold the most debt tend to make enough money to pay it off in the long term .
It is often framed as a direct comparison ; the best-informed interlocutors will point to an Obama-era report estimating that a worker with a bachelor ’ s degree tends to make about $ 1 million more over the course of a career than a high-school-graduate counterpart .
It is a point of no small importance that this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The trends that underlie it can hardly be expected to hold fast when the government-created college bubble bursts .
The labor market a graduate enters in 2020 is not remotely the labor market graduates entered even in 1990 , and it is downright idiotic to base our current policies on decades-old conditions .
Prospects for the future look far more grim than school-lending optimists either realize or admit .
Even still , why the apocalyptic language ?
How bad is it , really , that debt is skyrocketing without any parallel trends in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worst then hard-luck degree-holders can enroll in income-based repayment plans , contributing a percentage of their paychecks to the outstanding balance for 25 years , at which point any remainder is forgiven .
And that ’ s only for the real tough cases ; most borrowers will manage to get by with a little austerity—many will even be paid off by the time they hit 35 .
The truth is , every critic is right .
We ’ re looking at a massive government bailout for the college-educated over a more or less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fair to those who resisted the pressures toward college and chose lower-cost—often now higher-reward—paths .
It ’ s certainly not fair to those who borrowed and already paid their debts ( though this line of argument tends to forget that pesky fact of changing market conditions—i.e.
, that outstanding borrowers do not have nearly the same prospects to earn and repay that previous generations did , precisely because the universal availability of loans has since saturated the market ) .
But it ’ s not about what ’ s fair .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deserve to have their loans cancelled , even in part .
It ’ s about the long-term , big-picture implications for the United States when our young professionals are saddled with substantial debt .
How is this generation ’ s behavior altered by their debt burdens ?
The most obvious impact , and one that should especially concern conservatives , is on fertility .
Fertility is cratering ; we all know that .
But there is an indefensible tendency on the right to attribute this to cultural shifts , to the dominance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family .
The assumption is not borne out by reality .
Evidence shows overwhelmingly that Americans are foregoing parenthood primarily because of material and economic conditions , not because of shifts in culture , tectonic though they may be .
There are a number of ways this hardship can ( and must ) be alleviated at lower socioeconomic strata , but for college graduates the obvious route is to tackle student debt—even graduates with relatively high incomes are far less likely to have kids with tens of thousands of dollars of debt hanging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is set to include more of the population than ever before ; as of 2019 , over 66 percent of high school graduates aged 16-24 were enrolled in college .
Maybe we wind up in the best case scenario , and they ’ re all paid off by 35 .
But 35 is just too late for the vast majority of a generation to settle down—to feel financially secure , to start to look for a house , to start to think about children .
The common objection , again , is one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , these people could start families if they wanted to .
This is true—it would just require a little scrimping .
But it ’ s not the point .
Yes , theoretically , the debt-burdened could start families .
But they won ’ t .
They aren ’ t .
We need to do away with the hypotheticals and start to reckon with the social costs of a body of student debt that totals 5 % of our GDP .
There is a great deal of speculation that , if Joe Biden wins @ @ @ @ @ @ @ executive action on student debt .
Chuck Schumer has requested that he cancel up to $ 50,000 via executive order .
Critics on the right have pointed out that this is an unfair policy , that it will overwhelmingly benefit those who have borrowed heavily and now have decent economic prospects if historical trends hold .
But just because it is an unfair policy does not inherently make it a bad policy .
There are better ways to go about it , to be sure—certainly more modest ones .
But at the end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an unfair subsidy to big-dollar borrowers over a long-term collapse in the American population and economy .
The real risk , and the place no conservative can follow , is to make this permanent policy .
The long-term solution is to take an axe to the government-university cartel .
The vast majority of government funding to colleges—including federal loans—must be cut , and mustn ’ t be replaced with anything .
Take the carrot away , and let the masses of young people drawn to college by Uncle Sam ’ s siren song @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their communities in the process .
Take the government money from the schools , and watch the bloat shrivel .
That is the only way to ensure that the next generation of Americans don ’ t find themselves in this situation to begin with .
But if something drastic is not done now to change their parents ‘ behavior , there won ’ t be much of a generation to speak of .

It’s the last taboo. You can find hordes of self-identified conservatives who are all in on the LGBT agenda. You’ll find plenty who see no problem with government-sanctioned infanticide, so long as we frame it in the language of rights. On any number of economic issues the GOP is eager to reform. But heaven forbid the Republicans talk about student debt.
The fundamental reason for this is fairly obvious, if you’re at least a little bit of a cynic: the vast majority of people with student debt aren’t going to vote for Republicans one way or the other, so there’s no political benefit and plenty of political risk. But there are also legitimate arguments against action, beyond the reflexive fiscal timidity of the dead consensus.
The most substantial, and the most common, is that any form of debt relief would benefit the upper classes at the expense of the lower. The main premise is easily demonstrated: the bulk of student debt is held by people with high incomes. It wouldn’t be fair, we are told, to bail these people out at the expense of those who chose not to go to college, or who managed to pay their debt off already. This populist posturing is usually accompanied by the familiar odes to personal responsibility and reminders that the debt-laden chose this path. They made their beds, now they have to sleep in them.
But who really made the bed? The most glaring oversight of those who scorn debt forgiveness as unwelcome meddling in private affairs is that the current crisis, by and large, is the product of government policy. Are we just supposed to ignore the fact that the United States government has been aggressively selling this bill of goods to its young citizens for decades? College is the path to a better life, and Uncle Sam will help you along the way. (For what it’s worth, neither one of these claims has turned out to be true.) Virtually every cultural, social, and political force at play has been pressuring every 17-year-old toward college at every juncture. Let’s not pretend the government is blameless just because they used carrots over sticks.
What’s more, the reckless programs by which the state coaxed students into college simultaneously enabled the price gouging and institutional bloat that now define the American education system. Years of refusal either to change their own practices or to rein in the abuses of the schools has created a disastrous feedback loop in which the costs rise every year at higher and higher rates, while the return on investment vanishes as the ranks of degree-holders swell to unsustainable magnitudes. None of this is caused by individual choice alone, and none of it can be solved by individual choice alone.
When decades of bad policy have left a society teetering on the brink of collapse, the conservative—and even the market-conscious—thing to do is not to just pull back and say “Well I really don’t think the government ought to get involved here.”
These may seem like panicked overstatements. Respectable people left and right go to great lengths every time the subject comes up to convince us that there isn’t a real crisis here—to say nothing of one that threatens societal collapse. Recourse is taken first to the income line: the people who hold the most debt tend to make enough money to pay it off in the long term. It is often framed as a direct comparison; the best-informed interlocutors will point to an Obama-era report estimating that a worker with a bachelor’s degree tends to make about $1 million more over the course of a career than a high-school-graduate counterpart.
It is a point of no small importance that this conclusion is based on retrospective data. The trends that underlie it can hardly be expected to hold fast when the government-created college bubble bursts. The labor market a graduate enters in 2020 is not remotely the labor market graduates entered even in 1990, and it is downright idiotic to base our current policies on decades-old conditions. Prospects for the future look far more grim than school-lending optimists either realize or admit.
Even still, why the apocalyptic language? How bad is it, really, that debt is skyrocketing without any parallel trends in post-graduation incomes? If worse comes to worst then hard-luck degree-holders can enroll in income-based repayment plans, contributing a percentage of their paychecks to the outstanding balance for 25 years, at which point any remainder is forgiven. And that’s only for the real tough cases; most borrowers will manage to get by with a little austerity—many will even be paid off by the time they hit 35.
The truth is, every critic is right. We’re looking at a massive government bailout for the college-educated over a more or less minor inconvenience. It’s not fair to those who resisted the pressures toward college and chose lower-cost—often now higher-reward—paths. It’s certainly not fair to those who borrowed and already paid their debts (though this line of argument tends to forget that pesky fact of changing market conditions—i.e., that outstanding borrowers do not have nearly the same prospects to earn and repay that previous generations did, precisely because the universal availability of loans has since saturated the market).
But it’s not about what’s fair. It’s not about whether our young professionals deserve to have their loans cancelled, even in part. It’s about the long-term, big-picture implications for the United States when our young professionals are saddled with substantial debt.
How is this generation’s behavior altered by their debt burdens? The most obvious impact, and one that should especially concern conservatives, is on fertility. Fertility is cratering; we all know that. But there is an indefensible tendency on the right to attribute this to cultural shifts, to the dominance of liberalism and the social breakdown of the family. The assumption is not borne out by reality. Evidence shows overwhelmingly that Americans are foregoing parenthood primarily because of material and economic conditions, not because of shifts in culture, tectonic though they may be.
There are a number of ways this hardship can (and must) be alleviated at lower socioeconomic strata, but for college graduates the obvious route is to tackle student debt—even graduates with relatively high incomes are far less likely to have kids with tens of thousands of dollars of debt hanging over their heads. And that category is set to include more of the population than ever before; as of 2019, over 66 percent of high school graduates aged 16-24 were enrolled in college.
Maybe we wind up in the best case scenario, and they’re all paid off by 35. But 35 is just too late for the vast majority of a generation to settle down—to feel financially secure, to start to look for a house, to start to think about children. The common objection, again, is one of choice. Even with substantial debt, these people could start families if they wanted to. This is true—it would just require a little scrimping. But it’s not the point. Yes, theoretically, the debt-burdened could start families. But they won’t. They aren’t. We need to do away with the hypotheticals and start to reckon with the social costs of a body of student debt that totals 5% of our GDP.
There is a great deal of speculation that, if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election, he will take executive action on student debt. Chuck Schumer has requested that he cancel up to $50,000 via executive order. Critics on the right have pointed out that this is an unfair policy, that it will overwhelmingly benefit those who have borrowed heavily and now have decent economic prospects if historical trends hold. But just because it is an unfair policy does not inherently make it a bad policy. There are better ways to go about it, to be sure—certainly more modest ones. But at the end of the day, I will take an unfair subsidy to big-dollar borrowers over a long-term collapse in the American population and economy.
The real risk, and the place no conservative can follow, is to make this permanent policy. The long-term solution is to take an axe to the government-university cartel. The vast majority of government funding to colleges—including federal loans—must be cut, and mustn’t be replaced with anything. Take the carrot away, and let the masses of young people drawn to college by Uncle Sam’s siren song filter back into productive work, reinvigorating their communities in the process. Take the government money from the schools, and watch the bloat shrivel.
That is the only way to ensure that the next generation of Americans don’t find themselves in this situation to begin with. But if something drastic is not done now to change their parents‘ behavior, there won’t be much of a generation to speak of.