theamericanconservative--2020-02-11--National Conservatives on the Front Lines of Ideological Battle

On the opening night of last week ’ s National Conservatism Conference in Rome , a crowd of civil servants , journalists , and public intellectuals burst into applause as a quotation from J.R.R .
Tolkien ’ s The Two Towers was invoked in the opening address : “ I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness , nor the arrow for its swiftness , nor the warrior for his glory .
I love only that which they defend.
” For the attendees in the room , the stakes were evident : they stood on the front lines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , battle that would define the future of their respective nations and Western civilization as a whole .
What do those uniting under the banner of “ national conservatism ” care about defending ?
While any coalition has some degree of diversity among its constituents , something of a consensus can be found in in the book The Virtue of Nationalism , which was recently published by the conference ’ s organizer , Yoram Hazony .
For Hazony , national conservatives categorically reject all forms of imperialism and totalitarianism in favor of something @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nations to defend faith , family , tradition , language , history , mutual loyalty , and shared memory—in a word , home—against the centralizing , utopian schemes of bureaucrats and technocrats , whether they be in Brussels , Washington , D.C. , or Silicon Valley .
For it ’ s only by defending the unique and foundational components of nation-states that national conservatives can hope for a world where peace , tolerance , productive competition , and free institutions can flourish .
While certain core concerns about protecting national sovereignty and identity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practical applications proposed varied greatly depending on the vocation and nationality of the speakers .
The two keynotes that best crystallized this dynamic were given by French politician Marion Maréchal and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán .
Marion spoke in aspirational terms about how a revival of a “ new humanism ” that seeks to preserve both nature and human dignity would serve as the best foundation for conservative thought in the 21st century .
For Marion , this vision of conservatism is universal because it reflects the fundamental needs of the human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Weil : order , liberty , obedience , responsibility , hierarchy , honor , and security .
While shared by all humanity , these virtues take shape in particular political communities with their own unique circumstances and customs .
In France , Marion has the challenge of pushing back against the vestiges of the radical enlightenment philosophy of the French Revolution that prioritized abstract reasoning and individual autonomy .
At the same time , what France lacks in terms of a “ conservative movement , ” it makes up for in “ conservative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among them its historically recognized place as the “ eldest daughter of the Church.
” These deep spiritual roots , even if they ’ ve been weakened over the past three centuries , allow her to draw from a rich tradition of Catholic social thought that has clearly influenced her vision of conservatism .
The principles of solidarity and subsidiarity that are the hallmark of this tradition were evident when Marion called for a politics of “ social engagement that resists socialism and government intervention without centralization.
” Her willingness to use political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerns , such as stewardship of the environment , declining birthrates , and protecting domestic agriculture , best encapsulates how she might use the state to implement these principles .
By stressing the subservience of markets to certain ends such as the common good and national interest , Marion distinguished French conservatism from its laissez-faire counterparts in other Western countries .
Yet she also set herself apart from the socialist left by noting that global problems rarely have global solutions and are best solved at the local level .
If Marion ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the new right ( and as a viable political alternative to French President Emmanuel Macron ) , Prime Minister Orbán wanted nothing of the sort .
Orbán ’ s disposition is realist in orientation .
His aim in politics is not to lead a multinational movement but to promote Hungarian interests—specifically to resist the worst excesses of the centralizing and homogenizing efforts of the European Union .
To the extent that this requires cultivating allies in other Western countries , he appeared willing to play the part , but emphasized that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Orbán is unapologetic about his vision for Hungary .
He believes that liberalism has failed , as evidenced by the fall of communism and the dystopian progressivism of EU technocrats , and that Hungarian politics is fundamentally post-liberal in nature .
Given his country ’ s culture and religious heritage , Christian democracy and Christian freedom are the operating principles .
He is unabashedly “ pro-family , ” and spends close to 5 percent of GDP promoting pro-natalist policies .
Immigration levels are at net-zero due to concerns about the potential long-term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s culture and economy .
And Orbán ’ s economic platform—a combination of lowering taxes , reducing debt , and industrial policy—have resulted in GDP growth of 4 to 5 percent annually and 3 percent unemployment .
Orbán candidly admitted that he picks and chooses his political battles out of necessity and survival .
He does not try to tell other European countries how to govern themselves , and he recognizes that every leader , especially those sympathetic to national conservatism , must deal with constraints based on unique circumstances .
While he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestically ( for now ) , the foreign policy challenges—both in terms of security and standing up to pressure from the European Union—are very exacting on a country of his size , geographic location , and economic output .
Sensing admiration from audience members during his interview , Orbán warned not to “ forget that politics here probably looks like an intellectual activity .
Don ’ t misunderstand , this is not the case .
We are doers—you are thinkers but we are doers .
Politics is about making decisions , gaining and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and getting the power and keeping the power.
” While he has continued to win elections , he stressed that his entire platform would be repudiated by voters without strong economic growth .
While free markets have certainly played a pivotal role in increasing Hungary ’ s prosperity , Orbán has also embraced economic nationalism as a means of reducing Hungary ’ s reliance on foreign debtors and promoting national champions in certain vital sectors to ensure economic independence , specifically for technological innovation .
While there are significant differences in style and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they both share an understanding of politics that is integral , which is to say that they aim to bring a certain degree of harmony between the economic , cultural , and religious interests of their respective societies .
In short , individual freedom is important to both leaders , but their primary concern is the stability , cohesion , and security of the whole society on which liberty depends .
There is a natural tension between the programs of these two politicians , embraced by a younger generation of conservatives , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Margaret Thatcher , which were eulogized by an older generation of conservatives at the conference .
For the latter , the threat of Soviet communism abroad and high taxes at home presented the great political challenges of their era .
Today , however , the challenges are different and in some cases new : Chinese mercantilism , endless war in the Middle East , woke capitalism , identity politics , tech monopolies , mass migration , declining fertility rates , stagnant wages , rising costs of living , the hollowing out of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so on .
New challenges and circumstances require new ideas and new statesman .
Many of the aforementioned problems can not be fixed with the old fusionist playbook .
Some of the solutions needed will likely push against the grain , if not explicitly contradict , the Reaganite and Thatcherite policies that ossified into dogmas in the post-Cold War era , especially at conservative think tanks in Washington .
To the extent that Reagan and Thatcher can be used as models to build a new fusionism that cuts across generational lines , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the old programs and slogans verbatim and ad nauseum , but rather by imitating the statecraft and moral imagination that empowered them to make prudential policy decisions in light of concrete threats and opportunities .
More urgently , if the existential challenges of our day are ignored by conservatives or go unaddressed by right-leaning institutions either afraid or unwilling to think anew , then they will cede our unique political moment to the left , and self-described socialists like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez will continue to pick up steam .
Despite a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” that President Trump rightly identified in his inaugural address has barely been ameliorated—it will take a generation to do so .
And so the need for a movement like National Conservatism , both in American and Europe , is more vital than ever .
While the policies of European conservatives , and the unique circumstances that enable them , can not and should not be replicated wholesale in the United States , to the extent that it ’ s prudent and constitutional , leaders of our own political realignment should imitate their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defend American interests and institutions .
The future of National Conservatism and the West may be uncertain , but one thing is clear : the globalists have been mugged by reality , as one speaker at the conference put it .
That ’ s something conservatives of all stripes should celebrate .
John A. Burtka IV is executive director of The American Conservative .
You can follow him on Twitter @ johnnyburtka .

On the opening night of last week’s National Conservatism Conference in Rome, a crowd of civil servants, journalists, and public intellectuals burst into applause as a quotation from J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Two Towers was invoked in the opening address: “I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend.” For the attendees in the room, the stakes were evident: they stood on the front lines of an ideological, and perhaps spiritual, battle that would define the future of their respective nations and Western civilization as a whole.
What do those uniting under the banner of “national conservatism” care about defending? While any coalition has some degree of diversity among its constituents, something of a consensus can be found in in the book The Virtue of Nationalism, which was recently published by the conference’s organizer, Yoram Hazony. For Hazony, national conservatives categorically reject all forms of imperialism and totalitarianism in favor of something much more vulnerable: the rights of nations to defend faith, family, tradition, language, history, mutual loyalty, and shared memory—in a word, home—against the centralizing, utopian schemes of bureaucrats and technocrats, whether they be in Brussels, Washington, D.C., or Silicon Valley. For it’s only by defending the unique and foundational components of nation-states that national conservatives can hope for a world where peace, tolerance, productive competition, and free institutions can flourish.
While certain core concerns about protecting national sovereignty and identity were cited in most presentations, the practical applications proposed varied greatly depending on the vocation and nationality of the speakers. The two keynotes that best crystallized this dynamic were given by French politician Marion Maréchal and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Maréchal spoke in aspirational terms about how a revival of a “new humanism” that seeks to preserve both nature and human dignity would serve as the best foundation for conservative thought in the 21st century. For Maréchal, this vision of conservatism is universal because it reflects the fundamental needs of the human soul as outlined by French philosopher Simone Weil: order, liberty, obedience, responsibility, hierarchy, honor, and security. While shared by all humanity, these virtues take shape in particular political communities with their own unique circumstances and customs.
In France, Maréchal has the challenge of pushing back against the vestiges of the radical enlightenment philosophy of the French Revolution that prioritized abstract reasoning and individual autonomy. At the same time, what France lacks in terms of a “conservative movement,” it makes up for in “conservative moments” throughout its past, chief among them its historically recognized place as the “eldest daughter of the Church.” These deep spiritual roots, even if they’ve been weakened over the past three centuries, allow her to draw from a rich tradition of Catholic social thought that has clearly influenced her vision of conservatism. The principles of solidarity and subsidiarity that are the hallmark of this tradition were evident when Maréchal called for a politics of “social engagement that resists socialism and government intervention without centralization.”
Her willingness to use political power to address certain ecological and social concerns, such as stewardship of the environment, declining birthrates, and protecting domestic agriculture, best encapsulates how she might use the state to implement these principles. By stressing the subservience of markets to certain ends such as the common good and national interest, Maréchal distinguished French conservatism from its laissez-faire counterparts in other Western countries. Yet she also set herself apart from the socialist left by noting that global problems rarely have global solutions and are best solved at the local level.
If Maréchal’s speech situated her as an intellectual leader of the new right (and as a viable political alternative to French President Emmanuel Macron), Prime Minister Orbán wanted nothing of the sort. Orbán’s disposition is realist in orientation. His aim in politics is not to lead a multinational movement but to promote Hungarian interests—specifically to resist the worst excesses of the centralizing and homogenizing efforts of the European Union. To the extent that this requires cultivating allies in other Western countries, he appeared willing to play the part, but emphasized that it was born of necessity and not vanity.
Orbán is unapologetic about his vision for Hungary. He believes that liberalism has failed, as evidenced by the fall of communism and the dystopian progressivism of EU technocrats, and that Hungarian politics is fundamentally post-liberal in nature. Given his country’s culture and religious heritage, Christian democracy and Christian freedom are the operating principles. He is unabashedly “pro-family,” and spends close to 5 percent of GDP promoting pro-natalist policies. Immigration levels are at net-zero due to concerns about the potential long-term effects of mass immigration on Hungary’s culture and economy. And Orbán’s economic platform—a combination of lowering taxes, reducing debt, and industrial policy—have resulted in GDP growth of 4 to 5 percent annually and 3 percent unemployment.
Orbán candidly admitted that he picks and chooses his political battles out of necessity and survival. He does not try to tell other European countries how to govern themselves, and he recognizes that every leader, especially those sympathetic to national conservatism, must deal with constraints based on unique circumstances. While he has a mandate to implement his agenda domestically (for now), the foreign policy challenges—both in terms of security and standing up to pressure from the European Union—are very exacting on a country of his size, geographic location, and economic output.
Sensing admiration from audience members during his interview, Orbán warned not to “forget that politics here probably looks like an intellectual activity. Don’t misunderstand, this is not the case. We are doers—you are thinkers but we are doers. Politics is about making decisions, gaining and keeping the trust of the nation, and getting the power and keeping the power.” While he has continued to win elections, he stressed that his entire platform would be repudiated by voters without strong economic growth. While free markets have certainly played a pivotal role in increasing Hungary’s prosperity, Orbán has also embraced economic nationalism as a means of reducing Hungary’s reliance on foreign debtors and promoting national champions in certain vital sectors to ensure economic independence, specifically for technological innovation.
While there are significant differences in style and substance between Marion Maréchal and Viktor Orbán, they both share an understanding of politics that is integral, which is to say that they aim to bring a certain degree of harmony between the economic, cultural, and religious interests of their respective societies. In short, individual freedom is important to both leaders, but their primary concern is the stability, cohesion, and security of the whole society on which liberty depends.
There is a natural tension between the programs of these two politicians, embraced by a younger generation of conservatives, and the programs of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, which were eulogized by an older generation of conservatives at the conference. For the latter, the threat of Soviet communism abroad and high taxes at home presented the great political challenges of their era. Today, however, the challenges are different and in some cases new: Chinese mercantilism, endless war in the Middle East, woke capitalism, identity politics, tech monopolies, mass migration, declining fertility rates, stagnant wages, rising costs of living, the hollowing out of the middle class, environmental degradation, and so on.
New challenges and circumstances require new ideas and new statesman. Many of the aforementioned problems cannot be fixed with the old fusionist playbook. Some of the solutions needed will likely push against the grain, if not explicitly contradict, the Reaganite and Thatcherite policies that ossified into dogmas in the post-Cold War era, especially at conservative think tanks in Washington.
To the extent that Reagan and Thatcher can be used as models to build a new fusionism that cuts across generational lines, it will not come to fruition by rebooting the old programs and slogans verbatim and ad nauseum, but rather by imitating the statecraft and moral imagination that empowered them to make prudential policy decisions in light of concrete threats and opportunities.
More urgently, if the existential challenges of our day are ignored by conservatives or go unaddressed by right-leaning institutions either afraid or unwilling to think anew, then they will cede our unique political moment to the left, and self-described socialists like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez will continue to pick up steam. Despite a growing GDP, the “American carnage” that President Trump rightly identified in his inaugural address has barely been ameliorated—it will take a generation to do so. And so the need for a movement like National Conservatism, both in American and Europe, is more vital than ever.
While the policies of European conservatives, and the unique circumstances that enable them, cannot and should not be replicated wholesale in the United States, to the extent that it’s prudent and constitutional, leaders of our own political realignment should imitate their rhetoric and ideas in order to better defend American interests and institutions.
The future of National Conservatism and the West may be uncertain, but one thing is clear: the globalists have been mugged by reality, as one speaker at the conference put it. That’s something conservatives of all stripes should celebrate.
John A. Burtka IV is executive director of The American Conservative. You can follow him on Twitter @johnnyburtka.


theamericanconservative--2020-02-11--Donald Trump: The Great Uniter

Donald Trump: The Great Uniter

He 's brought Republicans together like no one else—especially this past week .
In a way , Donald Trump might be called The Great Uniter .
Bear with me .
No Republican president in the lifetime of this writer , not even Ronald Reagan , united the party as did Trump in the week of his acquittal in the Senate and State of the Union address .
According to the Gallup poll , 94 percent of Republicans approve of his handling of his presidency , in his fourth year , despite the worst press any president has ever received and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Only Bush I in the first months of the 1991 Gulf War and Bush II in the first months of the 2003 Iraq War registered support like this .
Only one Republican , Senator Mitt Romney , and only after having consulted God himself , joined Speaker Nancy Pelosi and voted with Senator Chuck Schumer ’ s caucus to bring down the president .
When have Republicans ever exhibited the home-team enthusiasm they demonstrated during that State of the Union address and the post-acquittal gathering in the East Room ?
When have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a Republican as they do for Trump at his mammoth rallies ?
Heading for November , this is a party united .
But not only is Trump the great uniter of the GOP , he is the great uniter of Democrats .
Every Democrat but three in the House voted to impeach and remove him .
Every Democrat in the Senate voted to convict and expel him from office and prevent his ever running again .
In Iowa and New Hampshire , evicting Trump from the Oval Office seemed the one issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of the White House seems far more important to Democrats than getting U.S. troops out of the endless Middle East wars .
But while he has made more than a small contribution to our savage partisanship , is Trump really the cause of the uncivil war in America ?
Or is his presidency , like Gettysburg , simply the battlefield upon which America ’ s cultural and political war is currently engaged ?
Consider .
Bernie Sanders ’ nationalization of health care and abolition of private health insurance for 150 million Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never been reconcilable with Trump ’ s belief in the superiority of the private sector , a belief reflected in Trump ’ s tax cuts for corporations and individuals and his deregulation policies .
Democrats ’ unanimous support for “ reproductive rights ” is in eternal conflict with the traditionalist belief in a God-given right to life , as well as with Trump ’ s pledge to nominate justices who will overturn Roe v. Wade .
Still , the battles over the Supreme Court nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas predated by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Immigration may determine the destiny of the West .
Yet Democrats believe in tearing down Trump ’ s wall , an end to deportations , extending welfare benefits to border-crossers , and granting sanctuary from border security agents for criminals here illegally .
That Americans of European descent , 90 percent of the nation in 1960 , close to 60 percent today , will in 20 years be less than half of the population is for Democrats a cause of ceaseless celebration .
America , they contend , will be a far , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ known when a far smaller share of the population is white .
The greater the racial , credal , cultural , and ethnic diversity , the better the country .
Yet Americans of European descent , headed for minority status , provide 85 to 90 percent of all Republican votes in presidential elections .
What Democrats are cheering portends the demographic death of the GOP .
Republicans are a more nationalist and populist party than they were during the Bush presidencies .
But the Democratic Party has become a politically correct institution where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he took when he was a moderate Democratic senator from Delaware .
His opposition to the forced busing of children from neighborhood schools into inner-city schools was attacked as racist .
He had to apologize for his friendship with Southern senators like Jim Eastland and his role in the Clarence Thomas hearings .
He has been made to confess for voting to authorize the 2003 war on Iraq .
Biden is far to the left of where he used to be as a senator .
Apparently he has not moved far enough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own party ’ s candidates for talking about “ reparations or any kind of goofy left-wing thing out there.
” “ It ’ s like we ’ re losing our damn minds , ” said Carville .
Is Trump responsible for what Carville himself sees as an irrationality and irresponsibility taking on epidemic proportions inside the Democratic Party ?
Or has Trump ’ s success maddened Democrats into manifesting who they are and what they believe , and what may yet prevent them from being taken seriously as a party that can lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before Trump got here , and we will remain so long after he departs .
Patrick J. Buchanan is the author of Nixon ’ s White House Wars : The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever .
To find out more about Patrick Buchanan and read features by other Creators writers and cartoonists , visit the Creators website at www.creators.com .

In a way, Donald Trump might be called The Great Uniter.
Bear with me. No Republican president in the lifetime of this writer, not even Ronald Reagan, united the party as did Trump in the week of his acquittal in the Senate and State of the Union address.
According to the Gallup poll, 94 percent of Republicans approve of his handling of his presidency, in his fourth year, despite the worst press any president has ever received and the sustained hostility of our cultural elites.
Only Bush I in the first months of the 1991 Gulf War and Bush II in the first months of the 2003 Iraq War registered support like this.
Only one Republican, Senator Mitt Romney, and only after having consulted God himself, joined Speaker Nancy Pelosi and voted with Senator Chuck Schumer’s caucus to bring down the president.
When have Republicans ever exhibited the home-team enthusiasm they demonstrated during that State of the Union address and the post-acquittal gathering in the East Room? When have working- and middle-class voters shown such support for a Republican as they do for Trump at his mammoth rallies? Heading for November, this is a party united.
But not only is Trump the great uniter of the GOP, he is the great uniter of Democrats. Every Democrat but three in the House voted to impeach and remove him. Every Democrat in the Senate voted to convict and expel him from office and prevent his ever running again.
In Iowa and New Hampshire, evicting Trump from the Oval Office seemed the one issue that animated every candidate. Getting Trump out of the White House seems far more important to Democrats than getting U.S. troops out of the endless Middle East wars.
But while he has made more than a small contribution to our savage partisanship, is Trump really the cause of the uncivil war in America? Or is his presidency, like Gettysburg, simply the battlefield upon which America’s cultural and political war is currently engaged?
Consider. Bernie Sanders’ nationalization of health care and abolition of private health insurance for 150 million Americans is grounded in a socialism that has never been reconcilable with Trump’s belief in the superiority of the private sector, a belief reflected in Trump’s tax cuts for corporations and individuals and his deregulation policies.
Democrats’ unanimous support for “reproductive rights” is in eternal conflict with the traditionalist belief in a God-given right to life, as well as with Trump’s pledge to nominate justices who will overturn Roe v. Wade.
Still, the battles over the Supreme Court nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas predated by decades the battle over Brett Kavanaugh.
Immigration may determine the destiny of the West.
Yet Democrats believe in tearing down Trump’s wall, an end to deportations, extending welfare benefits to border-crossers, and granting sanctuary from border security agents for criminals here illegally.
That Americans of European descent, 90 percent of the nation in 1960, close to 60 percent today, will in 20 years be less than half of the population is for Democrats a cause of ceaseless celebration.
America, they contend, will be a far, far better place than we have ever known when a far smaller share of the population is white. The greater the racial, credal, cultural, and ethnic diversity, the better the country.
Yet Americans of European descent, headed for minority status, provide 85 to 90 percent of all Republican votes in presidential elections. What Democrats are cheering portends the demographic death of the GOP.
Republicans are a more nationalist and populist party than they were during the Bush presidencies. But the Democratic Party has become a politically correct institution where Joe Biden is forced to explain stands that he took when he was a moderate Democratic senator from Delaware.
His opposition to the forced busing of children from neighborhood schools into inner-city schools was attacked as racist. He had to apologize for his friendship with Southern senators like Jim Eastland and his role in the Clarence Thomas hearings. He has been made to confess for voting to authorize the 2003 war on Iraq.
Biden is far to the left of where he used to be as a senator. Apparently he has not moved far enough.
Even James Carville is castigating his own party’s candidates for talking about “reparations or any kind of goofy left-wing thing out there.”
“It’s like we’re losing our damn minds,” said Carville.
Is Trump responsible for what Carville himself sees as an irrationality and irresponsibility taking on epidemic proportions inside the Democratic Party?
Or has Trump’s success maddened Democrats into manifesting who they are and what they believe, and what may yet prevent them from being taken seriously as a party that can lead the nation?
We were divided long before Trump got here, and we will remain so long after he departs.
Patrick J. Buchanan is the author of Nixon’s White House Wars: The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever. To find out more about Patrick Buchanan and read features by other Creators writers and cartoonists, visit the Creators website at www.creators.com.


theamericanconservative--2020-02-13--Can Bernie Sanders Break the Stephenson-McGovern Curse?

Everyone knows that when the Democratic party loses the White House , the grassroots ascend -- and it does n't always end well .
Jesse Jackson attends the 1972 Democratic National Convention .
Senator George McGovern , a liberal Democrat , was nominated for president at the convention .
( Photo by © Wally McNamee/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images ) There ’ s a clear cycle—and thus a kind of predictability—to Democratic nomination contests such as this one , and that bodes well for Senator Bernie Sanders .
The cycle is this : when the Democrats lose the White House ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the grassroots activists—outside the Beltway , beyond the control of the Democratic establishment—seize the initiative .
And for good reason : the mere fact that the party lost can be taken as proof that the insiders didn ’ t know what they were doing , that they had sold out or grown tired .
This critique from the insurgents might not hold up on its merits , but there ’ s no use trying to explain that to them .
So with the establishment discredited , the activists seize control and next time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since that favored candidate , of course , is likely to be a left-wing true-believer , the prospects for the party in the general election grow dim .
This cycle has been observable since the dawn of televised politics .
For instance , way back in 1952 , the Democrats lost the White House to Republican Dwight Eisenhower .
The Democratic candidate that year was Adlai Stevenson , a liberal beloved by liberal activists .
To them , Stevenson was a breath of fresh air , a man independent of the party bosses—Southern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and their machines—who ran things from smoke-filled rooms .
Indeed , precisely because Stevenson was so beloved , the activists didn ’ t hold it against him that he lost to war hero Ike in a strongly Republican year .
And so four years later , in 1956 , something strange happened : the Democrats nominated Stevenson again , to face Eisenhower a second time .
It was hard for any sober realist to picture a scenario whereby Stevenson could win , and yet the activists so loved him— “ Madly for Adlai @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Stevenson was defeated in November 1956 by an even wider margin .
Interestingly , in 1960 , those same besotted activists wanted to nominate Stevenson a third time .
Yet by then , cooler Democratic heads prevailed .
The party machinery—those same Southern Protestants and Northern Catholics—reasserted itself and nominated John Kennedy , an insider-centrist , who , of course , won the ’ 60 election .
JFK ’ s victory thus ended the ’ 52- ’ 56 activist cycle ; the activists had their chance and they blew it .
Power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grassroots to the White House and back to the Democratic establishment .
There the matter sat until the next time Democrats lost the White House , which was in 1968 .
Once again , with the Democratic establishment in eclipse , the anti-establishment grassroots were energized anew .
These activists were mostly associated with the anti-war movement , yet they were also fired up by the nascent women ’ s and gay liberation movements .
Which is to say , they were deeply dissatisfied , even outright contemptuous , of the old-line Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a younger left-wing candidate , Senator George McGovern , to carry their banner .
Indeed , the hostility between the Old Guard and the New Left was so intense that at the 1972 Democratic convention in Miami Beach , the McGovernites unseated Richard J. Daley , the warhorse Democratic mayor of Chicago , as well as the entire Illinois delegation .
For the activists , that unprecedented intra-party purge must have been a satisfying moment of comeuppance , although , of course , the resulting party split didn ’ t help McGovern in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by nearly 19 points , and lost the whole country , too .
So again , the activists had seized control of the party , only to take it off a cliff .
And then , in the wake of that defeat , the Democrats ’ desire for ideological normalcy—and political victory—once again reasserted itself .
The activists were subordinated .
In 1976 , Jimmy Carter wasn ’ t the first choice of the Democratic party establishment , but as a moderate Southern white Protestant , he had the look of a general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we can see that in simplified form , the cycle for the Democrats is this : lose the first time , see the activists take the party to an ideological extreme—and thus to a bigger loss the second time—and then snap back to the middle the third time , usually to win , or at least make the election closer .
This was also the story , more recently , of the nominations of Walter Mondale in 1984 and of John Kerry in 2004 ; the left-leaning activists were comfortable with both , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 2020 , where Sanders , having pushed aside Senator Elizabeth Warren to be the leader of the left , has won the popular vote in both Iowa and New Hampshire .
Sanders is thus the anointed candidate of the hardcore activists , the people who will trudge through the snow on his behalf , man the barricades—and if need be , storm the Bastille .
He has plenty of zealous democratic socialists as allies , notably Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez , who held a series of rock-star rallies for Sanders in both Iowa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 , this author suggested that AOC ’ s hard-edged charisma would help push the Democrats to the left in 2020 , and that ’ s great news for Sanders .
Indeed , the online betting site PredictIt now shows him to be the solid favorite for the nomination .
So yes , a history-based augury looks good for Sanders , at least in the short run .
As for November , that ’ s much iffier , but history also shows that the Stevensons and McGoverns and their fans are happy just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; the general election is another day .
Of course , there is one giant standing athwart Sanders ’ train ride to the Finland Station—a financial giant .
And that plutocratic colossus , of course , is Michael Bloomberg .
The Manhattan mogul is the antithesis of everything Sanders and his comrades stand for , and he stands in contravention to the familiar Democratic nomination cycle .
Yet Bloomberg has so much money , and has spent so much money—hundreds of millions on his campaign and $ 5 billion to “ causes that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ —that we ’ re in some new Einsteinian realm , where the gravity of his money seems to be bending the political continuum .
Indeed , support for Bloomberg is popping up all over .
Sample headline in The New York Times : “ ‘ Mayors for Mike ’ : How Bloomberg ’ s Money Built a 2020 Political Network.
” Yes , the Democratic nomination cycle is strong in its predictive power .
But Capital is strong , too—and maybe stronger .

There’s a clear cycle—and thus a kind of predictability—to Democratic nomination contests such as this one, and that bodes well for Senator Bernie Sanders.
The cycle is this: when the Democrats lose the White House (as they did in 2016), the grassroots activists—outside the Beltway, beyond the control of the Democratic establishment—seize the initiative.
And for good reason: the mere fact that the party lost can be taken as proof that the insiders didn’t know what they were doing, that they had sold out or grown tired. This critique from the insurgents might not hold up on its merits, but there’s no use trying to explain that to them.
So with the establishment discredited, the activists seize control and next time around nominate their favorite candidate. And since that favored candidate, of course, is likely to be a left-wing true-believer, the prospects for the party in the general election grow dim.
This cycle has been observable since the dawn of televised politics. For instance, way back in 1952, the Democrats lost the White House to Republican Dwight Eisenhower. The Democratic candidate that year was Adlai Stevenson, a liberal beloved by liberal activists. To them, Stevenson was a breath of fresh air, a man independent of the party bosses—Southern Protestants and their courthouses, Northern Catholics and their machines—who ran things from smoke-filled rooms. Indeed, precisely because Stevenson was so beloved, the activists didn’t hold it against him that he lost to war hero Ike in a strongly Republican year.
And so four years later, in 1956, something strange happened: the Democrats nominated Stevenson again, to face Eisenhower a second time. It was hard for any sober realist to picture a scenario whereby Stevenson could win, and yet the activists so loved him—“Madly for Adlai”—that they gave him another try. Stevenson was defeated in November 1956 by an even wider margin.
Interestingly, in 1960, those same besotted activists wanted to nominate Stevenson a third time. Yet by then, cooler Democratic heads prevailed. The party machinery—those same Southern Protestants and Northern Catholics—reasserted itself and nominated John Kennedy, an insider-centrist, who, of course, won the ’60 election.
JFK’s victory thus ended the ’52-’56 activist cycle; the activists had their chance and they blew it. Power within the party had shifted from the grassroots to the White House and back to the Democratic establishment.
There the matter sat until the next time Democrats lost the White House, which was in 1968. Once again, with the Democratic establishment in eclipse, the anti-establishment grassroots were energized anew. These activists were mostly associated with the anti-war movement, yet they were also fired up by the nascent women’s and gay liberation movements.
Which is to say, they were deeply dissatisfied, even outright contemptuous, of the old-line Democratic establishment. And so the activists found a younger left-wing candidate, Senator George McGovern, to carry their banner.
Indeed, the hostility between the Old Guard and the New Left was so intense that at the 1972 Democratic convention in Miami Beach, the McGovernites unseated Richard J. Daley, the warhorse Democratic mayor of Chicago, as well as the entire Illinois delegation. For the activists, that unprecedented intra-party purge must have been a satisfying moment of comeuppance, although, of course, the resulting party split didn’t help McGovern in the general election. He lost Illinois by nearly 19 points, and lost the whole country, too.
So again, the activists had seized control of the party, only to take it off a cliff. And then, in the wake of that defeat, the Democrats’ desire for ideological normalcy—and political victory—once again reasserted itself. The activists were subordinated. In 1976, Jimmy Carter wasn’t the first choice of the Democratic party establishment, but as a moderate Southern white Protestant, he had the look of a general election winner—and he did win.
So we can see that in simplified form, the cycle for the Democrats is this: lose the first time, see the activists take the party to an ideological extreme—and thus to a bigger loss the second time—and then snap back to the middle the third time, usually to win, or at least make the election closer. This was also the story, more recently, of the nominations of Walter Mondale in 1984 and of John Kerry in 2004; the left-leaning activists were comfortable with both, and they both lost.
So now to 2020, where Sanders, having pushed aside Senator Elizabeth Warren to be the leader of the left, has won the popular vote in both Iowa and New Hampshire.
Sanders is thus the anointed candidate of the hardcore activists, the people who will trudge through the snow on his behalf, man the barricades—and if need be, storm the Bastille.
He has plenty of zealous democratic socialists as allies, notably Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who held a series of rock-star rallies for Sanders in both Iowa and New Hampshire. Back in July 2018, this author suggested that AOC’s hard-edged charisma would help push the Democrats to the left in 2020, and that’s great news for Sanders. Indeed, the online betting site PredictIt now shows him to be the solid favorite for the nomination.
So yes, a history-based augury looks good for Sanders, at least in the short run. As for November, that’s much iffier, but history also shows that the Stevensons and McGoverns and their fans are happy just to win their party’s nomination; the general election is another day.
Of course, there is one giant standing athwart Sanders’ train ride to the Finland Station—a financial giant. And that plutocratic colossus, of course, is Michael Bloomberg.
The Manhattan mogul is the antithesis of everything Sanders and his comrades stand for, and he stands in contravention to the familiar Democratic nomination cycle. Yet Bloomberg has so much money, and has spent so much money—hundreds of millions on his campaign and $5 billion to “causes that often dovetail with his political interests”—that we’re in some new Einsteinian realm, where the gravity of his money seems to be bending the political continuum.
Indeed, support for Bloomberg is popping up all over. Sample headline in The New York Times: “‘Mayors for Mike’: How Bloomberg’s Money Built a 2020 Political Network.”
Yes, the Democratic nomination cycle is strong in its predictive power. But Capital is strong, too—and maybe stronger.


theamericanconservative--2020-02-13--Can Bernie Sanders Break the Stevenson-McGovern Curse?

Everyone knows that when the Democratic party loses the White House , the grassroots ascend—and it does n't always end well .
Jesse Jackson attends the 1972 Democratic National Convention .
Senator George McGovern , a liberal Democrat , was nominated for president at the convention .
( Photo by © Wally McNamee/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images ) There ’ s a clear cycle—and thus a kind of predictability—to Democratic nomination contests such as this one , and that bodes well for Senator Bernie Sanders .
The cycle is this : when the Democrats lose the White House ( as they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activists—outside the Beltway , beyond the control of the Democratic establishment—seize the initiative .
And for good reason : the mere fact that the party lost can be taken as proof that the insiders didn ’ t know what they were doing , that they had sold out or grown tired .
This critique from the insurgents might not hold up on its merits , but there ’ s no use trying to explain that to them .
So with the establishment discredited , the activists seize control and next time around nominate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favored candidate , of course , is likely to be a left-wing true-believer , the prospects for the party in the general election grow dim .
This cycle has been observable since the dawn of televised politics .
For instance , way back in 1952 , the Democrats lost the White House to Republican Dwight Eisenhower .
The Democratic candidate that year was Adlai Stevenson , a liberal beloved by liberal activists .
To them , Stevenson was a breath of fresh air , a man independent of the party bosses—Southern Protestants and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ machines—who ran things from smoke-filled rooms .
Indeed , precisely because Stevenson was so beloved , the activists didn ’ t hold it against him that he lost to war hero Ike in a strongly Republican year .
And so four years later , in 1956 , something strange happened : the Democrats nominated Stevenson again , to face Eisenhower a second time .
It was hard for any sober realist to picture a scenario whereby Stevenson could win , and yet the activists so loved him— “ Madly for Adlai ” —that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was defeated in November 1956 by an even wider margin .
Interestingly , in 1960 , those same besotted activists wanted to nominate Stevenson a third time .
Yet by then , cooler Democratic heads prevailed .
The party machinery—those same Southern Protestants and Northern Catholics—reasserted itself and nominated John Kennedy , an insider-centrist , who , of course , won the ’ 60 election .
JFK ’ s victory thus ended the ’ 52- ’ 56 activist cycle ; the activists had their chance and they blew it .
Power within the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the White House and back to the Democratic establishment .
There the matter sat until the next time Democrats lost the White House , which was in 1968 .
Once again , with the Democratic establishment in eclipse , the anti-establishment grassroots were energized anew .
These activists were mostly associated with the anti-war movement , yet they were also fired up by the nascent women ’ s and gay liberation movements .
Which is to say , they were deeply dissatisfied , even outright contemptuous , of the old-line Democratic establishment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ left-wing candidate , Senator George McGovern , to carry their banner .
Indeed , the hostility between the Old Guard and the New Left was so intense that at the 1972 Democratic convention in Miami Beach , the McGovernites unseated Richard J. Daley , the warhorse Democratic mayor of Chicago , as well as the entire Illinois delegation .
For the activists , that unprecedented intra-party purge must have been a satisfying moment of comeuppance , although , of course , the resulting party split didn ’ t help McGovern in the general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 19 points , and lost the whole country , too .
So again , the activists had seized control of the party , only to take it off a cliff .
And then , in the wake of that defeat , the Democrats ’ desire for ideological normalcy—and political victory—once again reasserted itself .
The activists were subordinated .
In 1976 , Jimmy Carter wasn ’ t the first choice of the Democratic party establishment , but as a moderate Southern white Protestant , he had the look of a general election winner—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see that in simplified form , the cycle for the Democrats is this : lose the first time , see the activists take the party to an ideological extreme—and thus to a bigger loss the second time—and then snap back to the middle the third time , usually to win , or at least make the election closer .
This was also the story , more recently , of the nominations of Walter Mondale in 1984 and of John Kerry in 2004 ; the left-leaning activists were comfortable with both , and they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where Sanders , having pushed aside Senator Elizabeth Warren to be the leader of the left , has won the popular vote in both Iowa and New Hampshire .
Sanders is thus the anointed candidate of the hardcore activists , the people who will trudge through the snow on his behalf , man the barricades—and if need be , storm the Bastille .
He has plenty of zealous democratic socialists as allies , notably Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez , who held a series of rock-star rallies for Sanders in both Iowa and New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this author suggested that AOC ’ s hard-edged charisma would help push the Democrats to the left in 2020 , and that ’ s great news for Sanders .
Indeed , the online betting site PredictIt now shows him to be the solid favorite for the nomination .
So yes , a history-based augury looks good for Sanders , at least in the short run .
As for November , that ’ s much iffier , but history also shows that the Stevensons and McGoverns and their fans are happy just to win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general election is another day .
Of course , there is one giant standing athwart Sanders ’ train ride to the Finland Station—a financial giant .
And that plutocratic colossus , of course , is Michael Bloomberg .
The Manhattan mogul is the antithesis of everything Sanders and his comrades stand for , and he stands in contravention to the familiar Democratic nomination cycle .
Yet Bloomberg has so much money , and has spent so much money—hundreds of millions on his campaign and $ 5 billion to “ causes that often dovetail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re in some new Einsteinian realm , where the gravity of his money seems to be bending the political continuum .
Indeed , support for Bloomberg is popping up all over .
Sample headline in The New York Times : “ ‘ Mayors for Mike ’ : How Bloomberg ’ s Money Built a 2020 Political Network.
” Yes , the Democratic nomination cycle is strong in its predictive power .
But Capital is strong , too—and maybe stronger .


theamericanconservative--2020-02-14--As the Establishment Implodes, a Billionaire Emerges

But Bloomberg 's mayoral baggage may cut short his flight path , particularly with minority voters .
From the day he entered the race , Joe Biden was the great hope of the Democratic establishment to spare them from the horrifying prospect of a 2020 race between The Donald and Bernie Sanders .
Today , that same establishment wants Joe out of the race .
Why has Biden suddenly become an albatross ?
His feeble debate performances and fifth-place finish in New Hampshire all but ensure Joe will not be the nominee , and if he stays in , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Carolina that would go to candidates who might put together a majority and stop Sanders .
The panic of the establishment is traceable to the new political reality .
With popular-vote victories in Iowa and New Hampshire , Sanders has largely united the left-wing of his party and displaced Biden as the front-runner and favorite for the nomination .
Meanwhile , the non-socialist wing of the party has failed to coalesce around a champion to stop Sanders and is becoming ever more splintered .
In Nevada , Sanders now has three moderate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Buttigieg—who ran second in New Hampshire—and Sen. Amy Klobuchar , who ran third and took votes that might have given Buttigieg a win in the Granite State .
Biden , Buttigieg and Klobuchar are all now headed for the Nevada caucuses on Feb. 22 , where Sanders is favored .
And all three will be going on to South Carolina , a state into which billionaire Tom Steyer has poured millions of dollars .
Sanders , however , is not without his own problems .
Not only is he anathema to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his party ’ s left-wing until his senatorial soulmate Elizabeth Warren gets out .
Though she ran a poor fourth in New Hampshire , Warren is also going to Nevada to offer herself as a unity candidate .
But as Biden ’ s hour is up , so is hers .
And if she is not out of the race before Super Tuesday on March 3 , she risks being beaten in her own home state of Massachusetts .
Where does this leave the Democratic field ?
Two candidacies , Warren ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hospice care .
Two candidates , Buttigieg and Klobuchar , competing to be the moderate alternative to Sanders , are in danger of canceling each other out .
Two candidates , Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer , are billionaires who will be battling on Super Tuesday to crush the scourge of billionaires , Bernie Sanders .
Bloomberg , the three-term mayor of New York , upon whom the establishment has begun to look like the last best hope of stopping Sanders , has already dumped a third of a billion dollars into his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and he is probably the strongest challenger to Sanders now , because , with his $ 60 billion fortune , he can sustain himself and his organization through the convention .
But would Sanders lose gracefully to a plutocrat who deployed his billions to deny him a nomination Sanders has sought for half a decade ?
Would Bernie Bros , who believe they were cheated out of the nomination in 2016 , accept defeat and support a billionaire they believe robbed them of a prize they thought they had won fairly ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a candidate in a party of minorities .
Here is an excerpt from an audiotape of Mayor Mike at a 2015 conference in Aspen , Colorado , addressing the crime-fighting tactic of stop and frisk that he used for years as mayor .
“ Ninety-five percent of your murders and murderers and murder victims fit one M.O .
You can just take the description , Xerox it and pass it out to all the cops .
They are male minorities , 15 to 25 , ” said Bloomberg .
“ One of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ‘ Oh , my God , you are arresting kids for marijuana that are all minorities.
’ Yes , that ’ s true .
Why ?
Because we put all the cops in minority neighborhoods .
… Why do we do it ?
Because that is where all the crime is .
… And the way you get the guns out of the kids ’ hands is to throw them up against the wall and frisk them.
” Midweek , it was learned that Bloomberg , during the economic crisis in 2008 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” — a policy by which bankers routinely deny mortgages to low-income largely minority neighborhoods circled in red as risky — was to blame for the collapse .
In remarks at Georgetown University in 2008 , Bloomberg said : “ It all started back when there was a lot of pressure on banks to make loans to everyone .
… Redlining …was the term where banks took whole neighborhoods and said , ‘ People in these neighborhoods are poor , they ’ re not going to be able to pay off their mortgages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go into those areas . '
” In presidential elections , Democratic candidates win 90-95 % of the black vote .
After revelations of his candid discussions of the merits of redlining and the benefits of stop and frisk , Bloomberg may have a tough time climbing that hill .
Patrick J. Buchanan is the author of Nixon ’ s White House Wars : The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever .

From the day he entered the race, Joe Biden was the great hope of the Democratic establishment to spare them from the horrifying prospect of a 2020 race between The Donald and Bernie Sanders.
Today, that same establishment wants Joe out of the race.
Why has Biden suddenly become an albatross?
His feeble debate performances and fifth-place finish in New Hampshire all but ensure Joe will not be the nominee, and if he stays in, he will siphon off votes in Nevada and South Carolina that would go to candidates who might put together a majority and stop Sanders.
The panic of the establishment is traceable to the new political reality.
With popular-vote victories in Iowa and New Hampshire, Sanders has largely united the left-wing of his party and displaced Biden as the front-runner and favorite for the nomination.
Meanwhile, the non-socialist wing of the party has failed to coalesce around a champion to stop Sanders and is becoming ever more splintered.
In Nevada, Sanders now has three moderate challengers.
Biden, “Mayor Pete” Buttigieg—who ran second in New Hampshire—and Sen. Amy Klobuchar, who ran third and took votes that might have given Buttigieg a win in the Granite State.
Biden, Buttigieg and Klobuchar are all now headed for the Nevada caucuses on Feb. 22, where Sanders is favored. And all three will be going on to South Carolina, a state into which billionaire Tom Steyer has poured millions of dollars.
Sanders, however, is not without his own problems.
Not only is he anathema to the establishment, he cannot wholly unite his party’s left-wing until his senatorial soulmate Elizabeth Warren gets out. Though she ran a poor fourth in New Hampshire, Warren is also going to Nevada to offer herself as a unity candidate.
But as Biden’s hour is up, so is hers. And if she is not out of the race before Super Tuesday on March 3, she risks being beaten in her own home state of Massachusetts.
Where does this leave the Democratic field?
Two candidacies, Warren’s and Biden’s, are in hospice care.
Two candidates, Buttigieg and Klobuchar, competing to be the moderate alternative to Sanders, are in danger of canceling each other out.
Two candidates, Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer, are billionaires who will be battling on Super Tuesday to crush the scourge of billionaires, Bernie Sanders.
Bloomberg, the three-term mayor of New York, upon whom the establishment has begun to look like the last best hope of stopping Sanders, has already dumped a third of a billion dollars into his campaign
His poll numbers have risen accordingly, and he is probably the strongest challenger to Sanders now, because, with his $60 billion fortune, he can sustain himself and his organization through the convention.
But would Sanders lose gracefully to a plutocrat who deployed his billions to deny him a nomination Sanders has sought for half a decade?
Would Bernie Bros, who believe they were cheated out of the nomination in 2016, accept defeat and support a billionaire they believe robbed them of a prize they thought they had won fairly?
Bloomberg is now facing more serious matters as a candidate in a party of minorities. Here is an excerpt from an audiotape of Mayor Mike at a 2015 conference in Aspen, Colorado, addressing the crime-fighting tactic of stop and frisk that he used for years as mayor.
“Ninety-five percent of your murders and murderers and murder victims fit one M.O. You can just take the description, Xerox it and pass it out to all the cops. They are male minorities, 15 to 25,” said Bloomberg.
“One of the unintended consequences is people say, ‘Oh, my God, you are arresting kids for marijuana that are all minorities.’ Yes, that’s true. Why? Because we put all the cops in minority neighborhoods. … Why do we do it? Because that is where all the crime is. … And the way you get the guns out of the kids’ hands is to throw them up against the wall and frisk them.”
Midweek, it was learned that Bloomberg, during the economic crisis in 2008, said that getting rid of “redlining” — a policy by which bankers routinely deny mortgages to low-income largely minority neighborhoods circled in red as risky — was to blame for the collapse.
In remarks at Georgetown University in 2008, Bloomberg said:
“It all started back when there was a lot of pressure on banks to make loans to everyone. … Redlining …was the term where banks took whole neighborhoods and said, ‘People in these neighborhoods are poor, they’re not going to be able to pay off their mortgages, tell your salesmen don’t go into those areas.'”
In presidential elections, Democratic candidates win 90-95% of the black vote. After revelations of his candid discussions of the merits of redlining and the benefits of stop and frisk, Bloomberg may have a tough time climbing that hill.
Patrick J. Buchanan is the author of Nixon’s White House Wars: The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever.


theamericanconservative--2020-02-17--Would Chesterton Be a Bernie Bro?

Would Chesterton Be a Bernie Bro?

With his win ( in the popular vote , at least ) in Iowa and last week ’ s victory in New Hampshire , Bernie Sanders appears to have landed the much-coveted role of Trump ’ s arch-nemesis .
It ’ s fitting .
A showdown between the two has all the trappings of an archetypal confrontation with the Jungian shadow-self , though I ’ ll leave it to my readers to decide who is the hero and who the shadow .
Both speak the language of economic nationalism and both have been known to talk tough on immigration .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ even if Trump has oft been led astray by the cadre of bomb-happy neocons with which he ’ s surrounded himself .
Neither has much love for The New York Times .
Most importantly , though , both are populists , regarded as dangerous aberrations by power brokers in their own parties .
Don ’ t look now , but the DNC is this close to launching a # NeverBernie movement .
At least one Democratic commentator has said openly that keeping Bernie from becoming the nominee is “ almost as important ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Editorial Board wrote that to elect Bernie would be merely to exchange “ one over-promising , divisive figure in Washington for another.
” Every other candidate on the Democratic slate hopes to suppress the populist energies that Trump unleashed .
Bernie wants to re-direct them .
A Trump versus Bernie election would be a final rebuke to the political status quo .
Cross that Rubicon and American politics will be animated , perhaps for a generation , by an ideologically ambivalent anti-elitism .
The idols of both parties will be broken .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ categories and labels that previously organized our thinking are fast becoming obsolete , who better to turn to for re-orientation than the author known as the “ prince of paradox ” ?
G.K. Chesterton , the British theologian , poet , journalist , art critic , novelist , and wit active during the early 20th century , is difficult to pin down politically as a man of either the Right or Left .
The only thing that can be confidently said of him is that he was a populist .
“ I am @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ just as I am not a Tory ; because I have not lost faith in democracy.
” With this in mind , I found myself wondering what Chesterton would make of Bernie .
First and most obviously , it seems clear to me that Chesterton would approve of Bernie ’ s direct populist appeal and his willingness to take an adversarial stance toward the rich and powerful .
When the NYT Editorial Board questioned Bernie ’ s ability to get his agenda past a Republican-controlled Senate , his response highlighted this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You ’ re saying , how do I negotiate with Mitch McConnell ?
” Bernie said .
“ And I ’ ll tell you how I negotiate .
Because when the people of Kentucky are demanding to raise the minimum wage to $ 15 an hour or health care for all or making their schools , public colleges and universities tuition-free , that ’ s the basis of negotiation .
That ’ s how change comes about : you make an offer to Mitch McConnell that he can not refuse.
” This proposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the political class echoes a similar affinity that Chesterton detected between the medieval English monarchy and the peasantry .
In his Short History of England , he wrote that “ a tyrant and a rabble ” are alike in that “ neither tyrants nor rabbles are snobs ; they do not care a button what they do to wealthy people.
” Chesterton goes so far as to say that even a bad king can be a friend of the people if his “ oppression weakens the nobility and relieves the pressure on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters against the political class and curtail the power of the donor class , he will be doing exactly what Chesterton believed a strong executive should do .
Chesterton ’ s oligarchic “ nobility ” plays the same role in his political vision that “ billionaires ” and “ large corporations ” play in Bernie ’ s .
For Bernie as for Chesterton , the two-party system is largely a sham ; both parties have been bought and paid for by the wealthy ruling class .
Bernie ’ s website openly admits that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans .
In Chesterton ’ s History , he likewise attributes the partisan disputes of the early 18th century to nothing more than “ a difference about externals which divided the old agricultural gentry…from the new mercantile gentry.
” Nor is the idea that neolibs and neocons have conspired to rig our economy against working- and middle-class Americans limited to left-wingers .
Tucker Carlson has sparked debate across the American Right by railing against “ vulture capitalism ” and insisting that “ [ y ] ou ’ d have to be a fool @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So far , so good .
Chesterton and Bernie would seem to agree on the need to , as Chesterton puts it , “ resist the tendency of Capitalism to reach its natural culmination in slavery.
” They might disagree , however , as to what form that resistance ought to take .
Chesterton , who favored a distributist economy in which government regulation would prevent capital from accumulating in fewer and fewer hands , rejected socialism as a technocratic imposition that bore little relation to the actual values of the working class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about socialism , he ’ s using the classical definition : public ownership of the means of production .
In this sense , Bernie is not a socialist .
Instead , his democratic socialism follows the Nordic model and is ultimately “ an enhanced , super-charged welfare state , ” as Chuck Chalberg of Intellectual Takeout has written .
Free college , free health care , almost free child care , and higher taxes await , but President Sanders won ’ t have the government owning and operating factories .
For Chesterton , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state was just as threatening as utopian socialism .
Of the first true welfare state , created by Hohenzollern Germany in the years before World War I , Chesterton writes that “ the German regimentation of the poor was the relapse of barbarians into slavery.
” Capitalism may threaten the worker ’ s freedom , but so does the government dole .
In Chesterton ’ s view , the welfare state aims at “ protecting the poor against themselves ” by allowing “ an external power ” to have “ a finger in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s day , well-meaning social engineers wanted to ban alcohol .
Today they ’ re after our vape pens and large sodas .
Chesterton despised the nanny state and understood that government is no replacement for the family .
He would almost certainly have rejected Bernie ’ s plan for government-subsidized child care .
Chesterton ’ s ultimate goal was “ to restore the personal property of the poor and the personal freedom of the family.
” He didn ’ t want a working class propped up by government handouts ; he wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Of course , I would be remiss if I ended this article without addressing the elephant in the room .
If Sanders ’ welfare policies weren ’ t a deal breaker for Chesterton , his extreme position on abortion certainly would be .
It certainly is for me ( even more so than Bernie ’ s warm regard for communist butchers like Castro ) .
Legal abortion was still unthinkable in Chesterton ’ s time , but he was a staunch opponent of all forms of birth control .
He also opposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-eugenicists enjoyed roughly the same level of esteem that anti-vaxxers do today .
If Chesterton were alive today , he might applaud Bernie ’ s populism and dream of setting him like an attack dog on the American oligarchy and its political cronies .
But in the end , Chesterton ’ s elevation of the family over the state and his firm belief in the sanctity of human life would prevent him from going full Bernie bro .

With his win (in the popular vote, at least) in Iowa and last week’s victory in New Hampshire, Bernie Sanders appears to have landed the much-coveted role of Trump’s arch-nemesis. It’s fitting. A showdown between the two has all the trappings of an archetypal confrontation with the Jungian shadow-self, though I’ll leave it to my readers to decide who is the hero and who the shadow.
Both speak the language of economic nationalism and both have been known to talk tough on immigration. Both favor a restrained foreign policy, even if Trump has oft been led astray by the cadre of bomb-happy neocons with which he’s surrounded himself. Neither has much love for The New York Times. Most importantly, though, both are populists, regarded as dangerous aberrations by power brokers in their own parties. Don’t look now, but the DNC is this close to launching a #NeverBernie movement. At least one Democratic commentator has said openly that keeping Bernie from becoming the nominee is “almost as important” as defeating Trump, and the NYT Editorial Board wrote that to elect Bernie would be merely to exchange “one over-promising, divisive figure in Washington for another.” Every other candidate on the Democratic slate hopes to suppress the populist energies that Trump unleashed. Bernie wants to re-direct them.
A Trump versus Bernie election would be a final rebuke to the political status quo. Cross that Rubicon and American politics will be animated, perhaps for a generation, by an ideologically ambivalent anti-elitism. The idols of both parties will be broken. In this strange political moment in which the categories and labels that previously organized our thinking are fast becoming obsolete, who better to turn to for re-orientation than the author known as the “prince of paradox”?
G.K. Chesterton, the British theologian, poet, journalist, art critic, novelist, and wit active during the early 20th century, is difficult to pin down politically as a man of either the Right or Left. The only thing that can be confidently said of him is that he was a populist. “I am not a Socialist,” he wrote, “just as I am not a Tory; because I have not lost faith in democracy.” With this in mind, I found myself wondering what Chesterton would make of Bernie.
First and most obviously, it seems clear to me that Chesterton would approve of Bernie’s direct populist appeal and his willingness to take an adversarial stance toward the rich and powerful. When the NYT Editorial Board questioned Bernie’s ability to get his agenda past a Republican-controlled Senate, his response highlighted this aspect of his political style. “You’re saying, how do I negotiate with Mitch McConnell?” Bernie said. “And I’ll tell you how I negotiate. Because when the people of Kentucky are demanding to raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour or health care for all or making their schools, public colleges and universities tuition-free, that’s the basis of negotiation. That’s how change comes about: you make an offer to Mitch McConnell that he cannot refuse.”
This proposed alliance of the executive and the populace against the political class echoes a similar affinity that Chesterton detected between the medieval English monarchy and the peasantry. In his Short History of England, he wrote that “a tyrant and a rabble” are alike in that “neither tyrants nor rabbles are snobs; they do not care a button what they do to wealthy people.” Chesterton goes so far as to say that even a bad king can be a friend of the people if his “oppression weakens the nobility and relieves the pressure on the populace.” If Bernie can mobilize voters against the political class and curtail the power of the donor class, he will be doing exactly what Chesterton believed a strong executive should do.
Chesterton’s oligarchic “nobility” plays the same role in his political vision that “billionaires” and “large corporations” play in Bernie’s. For Bernie as for Chesterton, the two-party system is largely a sham; both parties have been bought and paid for by the wealthy ruling class. Bernie’s website openly admits that the Democrats are as crooked as the Republicans. In Chesterton’s History, he likewise attributes the partisan disputes of the early 18th century to nothing more than “a difference about externals which divided the old agricultural gentry…from the new mercantile gentry.” Nor is the idea that neolibs and neocons have conspired to rig our economy against working- and middle-class Americans limited to left-wingers. Tucker Carlson has sparked debate across the American Right by railing against “vulture capitalism” and insisting that “[y]ou’d have to be a fool to worship” the free market.
So far, so good. Chesterton and Bernie would seem to agree on the need to, as Chesterton puts it, “resist the tendency of Capitalism to reach its natural culmination in slavery.” They might disagree, however, as to what form that resistance ought to take. Chesterton, who favored a distributist economy in which government regulation would prevent capital from accumulating in fewer and fewer hands, rejected socialism as a technocratic imposition that bore little relation to the actual values of the working class. Of course, when Chesterton writes about socialism, he’s using the classical definition: public ownership of the means of production. In this sense, Bernie is not a socialist. Instead, his democratic socialism follows the Nordic model and is ultimately “an enhanced, super-charged welfare state,” as Chuck Chalberg of Intellectual Takeout has written. Free college, free health care, almost free child care, and higher taxes await, but President Sanders won’t have the government owning and operating factories.
For Chesterton, however, a government-administered, cradle-to-grave welfare state was just as threatening as utopian socialism. Of the first true welfare state, created by Hohenzollern Germany in the years before World War I, Chesterton writes that “the German regimentation of the poor was the relapse of barbarians into slavery.” Capitalism may threaten the worker’s freedom, but so does the government dole. In Chesterton’s view, the welfare state aims at “protecting the poor against themselves” by allowing “an external power” to have “a finger in the family pie.” In Chesterton’s day, well-meaning social engineers wanted to ban alcohol. Today they’re after our vape pens and large sodas. Chesterton despised the nanny state and understood that government is no replacement for the family. He would almost certainly have rejected Bernie’s plan for government-subsidized child care.
Chesterton’s ultimate goal was “to restore the personal property of the poor and the personal freedom of the family.” He didn’t want a working class propped up by government handouts; he wanted it to stand proudly on its own.
Of course, I would be remiss if I ended this article without addressing the elephant in the room. If Sanders’ welfare policies weren’t a deal breaker for Chesterton, his extreme position on abortion certainly would be. It certainly is for me (even more so than Bernie’s warm regard for communist butchers like Castro). Legal abortion was still unthinkable in Chesterton’s time, but he was a staunch opponent of all forms of birth control. He also opposed eugenics in an intellectual climate in which anti-eugenicists enjoyed roughly the same level of esteem that anti-vaxxers do today.
If Chesterton were alive today, he might applaud Bernie’s populism and dream of setting him like an attack dog on the American oligarchy and its political cronies. But in the end, Chesterton’s elevation of the family over the state and his firm belief in the sanctity of human life would prevent him from going full Bernie bro.
Grayson Quay is a freelance writer and M.A. at Georgetown University.


theamericanconservative--2020-02-17--All Our Drugs to Treat the Coronavirus Depend on Chinese Suppliers

The U.S. has allowed another country to take over the industrial production of our medicines , with no forethought or planning for crisis .
This photo taken on February 4 , 2020 shows staff members and volunteers transferring medical supplies at a warehouse of an exhibition centre which has been converted into a makeshift hospital in Wuhan .
( Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images ) .
The coronavirus outbreak in China reached a milestone last week with the sharpest one-day increase of new cases yet , 14,840 in Hubei province .
It ’ s a sign that things will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As the world watches China grapple with an unprecedented crisis , here at home the alarm is waking up some in Washington to a shocking vulnerability in our nation ’ s health security .
The U.S. depends on China for thousands of chemicals needed to make prescription drugs ; in fact , we depend on China for 80 percent of the core components to make our generic medicines .
And today , generics represent some 90 percent of all prescriptions dispensed here in the U.S. With China on lockdown to prevent the spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supply America ’ s pharmacies and medicine cabinets is at risk of interruption .
With just-in-time inventories , drug shortages and a lack of availability in the coming months are very real prospects that are keeping many people up at night .
Medicines to treat the coronavirus depend on Chinese suppliers Thankfully , the U.S. has been spared so far from a widespread outbreak .
But last week the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) said it expects the coronavirus to “ take a foothold ” here .
If that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the coronavirus and require hospitalization will be cared for using many medicines sourced from China .
Here are some examples : Sedatives such a fentanyl and propofol , which are administered to people placed on ventilators to help them breathe , are made with core ingredients from China .
Medicines to treat shock , such as epinephrine and dopamine , are also made with chemical components from China .
Antibiotics to treat sepsis , a life-threatening bloodstream infection , are make with raw materials supplied by China .
Shortages of medicines are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet whereas we have a response system in place for hurricanes , we neither predict nor have a response system for the very real possibility that our drug supply lines could be severed .
And unlike hurricanes , drug shortages are largely preventable .
The present predicament is the result of our treating generic medicines as cheap commodities rather than strategic assets to sustain human life .
It hasn ’ t helped that the outsourcing of our generic medicine manufacturing to China has been a well-kept secret .
That ’ s why it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for my book , China Rx : Exposing the Risks of America ’ s Dependence on China for Medicine , which first revealed this vulnerability .
As hospitals scramble at the last minute for a solution to a potentially very serious situation , the FDA has proposed that drug manufacturers prepare risk management plans that spotlight choke points in supply chains .
The agency would also require companies to identify alternative sources if a major disruption occurs .
But there ’ s a big problem with these proposals : they depend on Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facing a crisis .
Consider that China ’ s domestic businesses are making many of the generic drugs prescribed by doctors and taken by millions of Americans .
I predict they will capture 20 percent of the U.S. market share by 2025 .
And by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People ’ s Republic of China , Chinese domestic companies will supply at least 80 percent of America ’ s medicines .
With these projections , let ’ s go back to the FDA ’ s proposal .
It would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about their alternative sources in the event of a major disruption .
In effect , the FDA ’ s plan is for the U.S. government to rely on China to help us be prepared for emergencies .
Remarkable indeed .
In addition to supply problems , the quality of generics made in China is a big issue .
The FDA is already highly constrained when it conducts inspections of drug manufacturing facilities there .
Now the agency has recalled its inspectors from China because of the coronavirus , and it will be many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not require employees to go to China ; these assignments are voluntary .
And it ’ s unlikely that anyone will want to travel there for the foreseeable future .
Imagine you are an FDA employee inspecting a manufacturing facility in China and you observe serious violations of U.S. standards .
You write a report and submit it to the agency .
The FDA has the authority to stop the company from exporting medicines to the United States .
Would the Chinese government , and the company you inspected , want you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you want to go back , fearing possible retaliation ?
We have a strategic choice to make as a country .
We can continue down the current path , increase our dependence on China , and accept the risk to our survival that this entails .
Or we can invest in domestic manufacturing of a minimum level of production of essential medicines to prevent a situation where our supply is severed .
Some say the market should decide and government should not be involved .
But bear in mind that U.S. companies aren @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They are competing with the Chinese government , which subsidizes its industry .
This is hardly a free market .
The coronavirus outbreak in China is showing the world that the unthinkable can happen .
Next time , it could be New York , Chicago , Los Angeles , or Washington , D.C. We need a plan to predict , prepare , and respond , to ensure a sustainable supply of trustworthy medicines and medical supplies , including masks , gloves , and gowns , to protect doctors , nurses , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the plan .
But first , Washington policymakers in Congress and the executive branch need to make a decision .
The public awaits their answer .
Rosemary Gibson is senior advisor at the Hastings Center and author of China Rx : Exposing the Risks of America ’ s Dependence on China for Medicine .
Follow her on Twitter @ Rosemary100 .

The coronavirus outbreak in China reached a milestone last week with the sharpest one-day increase of new cases yet, 14,840 in Hubei province. It’s a sign that things will get worse before they get better.
As the world watches China grapple with an unprecedented crisis, here at home the alarm is waking up some in Washington to a shocking vulnerability in our nation’s health security. The U.S. depends on China for thousands of chemicals needed to make prescription drugs; in fact, we depend on China for 80 percent of the core components to make our generic medicines. And today, generics represent some 90 percent of all prescriptions dispensed here in the U.S.
With China on lockdown to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, industrial production to supply America’s pharmacies and medicine cabinets is at risk of interruption. With just-in-time inventories, drug shortages and a lack of availability in the coming months are very real prospects that are keeping many people up at night.
Medicines to treat the coronavirus depend on Chinese suppliers
Thankfully, the U.S. has been spared so far from a widespread outbreak. But last week the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) said it expects the coronavirus to “take a foothold” here.
If that happens, people who become seriously ill from the coronavirus and require hospitalization will be cared for using many medicines sourced from China. Here are some examples:
Sedatives such a fentanyl and propofol, which are administered to people placed on ventilators to help them breathe, are made with core ingredients from China.
Medicines to treat shock, such as epinephrine and dopamine, are also made with chemical components from China. Antibiotics to treat sepsis, a life-threatening bloodstream infection, are make with raw materials supplied by China.
Shortages of medicines are like hurricanes: both are predictable. Yet whereas we have a response system in place for hurricanes, we neither predict nor have a response system for the very real possibility that our drug supply lines could be severed. And unlike hurricanes, drug shortages are largely preventable.
The present predicament is the result of our treating generic medicines as cheap commodities rather than strategic assets to sustain human life.
It hasn’t helped that the outsourcing of our generic medicine manufacturing to China has been a well-kept secret. That’s why it took three years to do the research for my book, China Rx: Exposing the Risks of America’s Dependence on China for Medicine, which first revealed this vulnerability.
FDA: Rely on China for emergency preparedness
As hospitals scramble at the last minute for a solution to a potentially very serious situation, the FDA has proposed that drug manufacturers prepare risk management plans that spotlight choke points in supply chains. The agency would also require companies to identify alternative sources if a major disruption occurs. But there’s a big problem with these proposals: they depend on Chinese companies to help us when we are facing a crisis.
Consider that China’s domestic businesses are making many of the generic drugs prescribed by doctors and taken by millions of Americans. I predict they will capture 20 percent of the U.S. market share by 2025. And by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese domestic companies will supply at least 80 percent of America’s medicines.
With these projections, let’s go back to the FDA’s proposal. It would require Chinese manufacturers to tell the agency about their alternative sources in the event of a major disruption. In effect, the FDA’s plan is for the U.S. government to rely on China to help us be prepared for emergencies. Remarkable indeed.
In addition to supply problems, the quality of generics made in China is a big issue. The FDA is already highly constrained when it conducts inspections of drug manufacturing facilities there. Now the agency has recalled its inspectors from China because of the coronavirus, and it will be many months before they return. The FDA cannot require employees to go to China; these assignments are voluntary. And it’s unlikely that anyone will want to travel there for the foreseeable future.
Imagine you are an FDA employee inspecting a manufacturing facility in China and you observe serious violations of U.S. standards. You write a report and submit it to the agency. The FDA has the authority to stop the company from exporting medicines to the United States. Would the Chinese government, and the company you inspected, want you to conduct any more inspections? Would you want to go back, fearing possible retaliation?
A strategic choice
We have a strategic choice to make as a country. We can continue down the current path, increase our dependence on China, and accept the risk to our survival that this entails.
Or we can invest in domestic manufacturing of a minimum level of production of essential medicines to prevent a situation where our supply is severed.
Some say the market should decide and government should not be involved. But bear in mind that U.S. companies aren’t competing with Chinese companies. They are competing with the Chinese government, which subsidizes its industry. This is hardly a free market.
The coronavirus outbreak in China is showing the world that the unthinkable can happen. Next time, it could be New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington, D.C. We need a plan to predict, prepare, and respond, to ensure a sustainable supply of trustworthy medicines and medical supplies, including masks, gloves, and gowns, to protect doctors, nurses, and the public. And we need to execute the plan. But first, Washington policymakers in Congress and the executive branch need to make a decision. The public awaits their answer.
Rosemary Gibson is senior advisor at the Hastings Center and author of China Rx: Exposing the Risks of America’s Dependence on China for Medicine. Follow her on Twitter @Rosemary100.