Washington Shrugged

When a devotee of some obscure ideology turns to a subject like American history , the results are often fun , and sometimes even edifying .
Murray Rothbard ’ s Conceived in Liberty is one such enjoyable read , and as much as one can object to it being taught as gospel in public schools , reading a bit of Howard Zinn never hurt anybody either .
A healthy supply of cranks , obsessives , and marginal ideologues is part of the greatness of America .
But when these people claim to have made great strides in inaugurating a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around calumnies about “ anti-Americanism ” or calling other historians “ unqualified ” to review them , a response is called for , as is a closer look at the ideological project they ’ re carrying out .
The author of a new book called “ America ’ s Revolutionary Mind ” is C. Bradley Thompson , a BB & T-sponsored professor at Clemson who directs something called the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism .
Thompson was a doctoral student of Gordon Wood , the dean of revolutionary historians .
Wood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ it is sure to be provocative , ” is the sort of damning-with-faint-praise that only an objectivist could fail to notice .
In a similar way as Bernard Bailyn ’ s Ideological Origins attempted to recenter the ideal of liberty in the revolutionary story in response to Charles Beard , Thompson , in the face of both growing right-wing skepticism of liberal thought and new historiography focusing on the role of popular protest and British constitutionalism in the revolution , wishes to restate that , “ America ’ s revolutionary mind is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mind.
” It ’ s as if Thompson is trying to get today ’ s younger right-wingers to reject the inheritance of the Founding Fathers and the American project , though this is apparently not his intention .
Thompson calls his method a “ new moral history ” of the Revolution , and writers at two of the post-Trump right ’ s more important publications , American Greatness and the Claremont Review of Books , do not seem enamored with it .
Ken Masugi called it “ a sort of Jefferson Bible version @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faulted him for ignoring the role of religion in revolutionary thought .
The latter prompted a response from Thompson , also published in the CRB .
He accused Smith of believing in a “ Sunday-school version of history , ” and said he was “ clearly out of his depth in reviewing a book that leading scholars of the American Revolution have publicly described as the best book on the American Revolution of the last 50 years.
” As best as I can tell there is only one leading scholar who has said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Birzer , who said so in these pages , so Thompson seems to be embellishing praise for his own book and the depth of consensus in support of it .
The high rate of colonial churchgoing has “ little to no relevance to the Revolution ’ s causes or meaning , ” Thompson adds , mocking Smith , “ Presumably he wants an America that is based on intense religious belief and Christian sacrifice and love.
” An America based on intense religious belief and Christian sacrifice and love .
How awful !
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for moral instruction is irrelevant ; it is risible to claim to be writing a “ new moral history ” of the American revolution but exclude the main institution by which British colonials received moral guidance .
One might add , perhaps with some trepidation , that many of these churches espoused dissenting , nonconformist Christianity .
Thompson may see this as just so much superstition , but more sensitive historians would say it ’ s a belief system with distinct political implications .
Thompson makes a small concession to recent “ royalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his early chapters , noting that just before war broke out , the colonies appealed to the king rather than parliament .
He writes : “ Most colonies , they argued , were founded in the seventeenth century , before Parliament became the sovereign political authority in the British state .
Instead , they argued , their only political connection with Great Britain was through their legally chartered allegiance to the person of the king.
” As other historians have written , this sentiment also resembles an understanding of the British constitution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when John Locke hopped aboard a ship with the usurper Queen Mary II .
Thompson moves on after a single paragraph , but it would seem this constitutes a substantial challenge to his central argument—here are revolutionaries making their case in terms that are decidedly non-Lockean .
After his letter to the editor , Thompson followed up with a piece in the American Mind going after illiberals on the right , managing to lump together Patrick Deneen , Mencius Moldbug , and the Bronze Age Pervert into one “ anti-American ” stew .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for some years , one learns to recognize an example of giving someone enough rope to hang themself , and it seems this might be such a case .
It ’ s also the third time in the last few years he has cribbed William Safire ’ s annoying line about “ nattering nabobs ” for a column .
Anyone this enamored with a piece of rhetoric written for Spiro Agnew must have certain other deficiencies of thought .
As someone who would probably be considered part of the illiberal right—I have certainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his demands a response .
I also have a more favorable view toward America than the illiberals occasionally take in their writings ; certainly not because I think it ’ s “ the most moral nation known to man , ” as Thompson writes , but for the basically irrational reason that it ’ s my country .
Thompson ’ s point of view is especially frustrating because a lot depends on having a political right that does not reject the American project , and I certainly hope the illiberals can make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ classical liberalism is the only inheritance of any importance does not help .
This is another example of the strange way Thompson has of always missing where the argument is actually joined .
In the past he has argued that Adams rather than Jefferson is the true homo Americanus , but because Adams was the more truly radical one , who staked more personally on the revolutionary cause .
Virtually everyone else agrees Adams was the more conservative founding father , and only differ about whether that was good or bad .
Thompson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an odd claim to make about people whose wars , however misguided , were waged in the name of human rights and democracy and whose domestic policy involved trimming the welfare state .
And today , as the main debate on the right between liberal conservatives and nationalists has prompted a second look at the Revolution , Thompson arrives with a book that reads as if he was trying to get today ’ s young conservatives to reject the Founding entirely .
But what is his real goal ?
If his critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are incipient theocrats , then let ’ s apply the same interpretive lens to his own project .
Thompson has had a longtime affiliation with the Ayn Rand Institute , the “ high church ” of objectivists .
For all their barbs about the dark ages of scholastic philosophy , Ayn Rand Institute ’ s own philosophy is best described as a kind of scholasticism for psychopaths ; at once pedantic and nutty .
For example , his exegesis about his new historiographical breakthrough : Professor Birzer may find this compelling , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To his credit , Thompson has also been critical of neoconservatives in the past , but on the Randian grounds that they are insufficiently dogmatic in their support for capitalism .
He ’ s looking for that third cheer ; like Stalin he dislikes that Irving Kristol stopped clapping too soon .
In the realm of foreign policy the biggest divergence between neoconservatism and ARI ’ s beliefs is that the latter would prefer for the United States to ditch all the folderol about leadership , democracy and human rights , forget about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ otherwise do away with the “ primitive savages—Rand ’ s words—in Palestine .
The leading theorist of the Randian way of war is a co-author of Thompson ’ s , Yaron Brook , a former Israeli military intelligence officer who once told Bill O ’ Reilly that the way to win in Iraq was to “ start bringing this war to the civilians.
” To win , he said , we have to “ turn Fallujah into dust and tell the Iraqis , ‘ if you are going to continue to support the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You will not have schools .
You will not have mosques.
” It will not surprise the reader to learn that these people reject the concept of a common good .
Lest I be accused of dredging up old material , Thompson recently promoted his book on Brook ’ s podcast .
What any of this has to do with the philosophy of the Founding Fathers is beyond me , and I ’ d certainly prefer the views of a Daniel Bell or Irving Kristol to any of it .
Thompson may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Franklin , George Washington , Samuel and John Adams , Thomas Jefferson , James Wilson , James Madison , and Alexander Hamilton would not appreciate being told how to order their moral lives by Pope Francis and the Vatican ’ s lavender mafia , ” but they also might condone a little “ rough music ” for the St. Peter of objectivism , Leonard Peikoff , if they listened to his stupid Dear Abby podcasts about sex .
Thompson has painted a picture that indeed would make Americanism worthy of rejection , if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is not .

When a devotee of some obscure ideology turns to a subject like American history, the results are often fun, and sometimes even edifying. Murray Rothbard’s Conceived in Liberty is one such enjoyable read, and as much as one can object to it being taught as gospel in public schools, reading a bit of Howard Zinn never hurt anybody either. A healthy supply of cranks, obsessives, and marginal ideologues is part of the greatness of America.
But when these people claim to have made great strides in inaugurating a “new x history” and start throwing around calumnies about “anti-Americanism” or calling other historians “unqualified” to review them, a response is called for, as is a closer look at the ideological project they’re carrying out.
The author of a new book called “America’s Revolutionary Mind” is C. Bradley Thompson, a BB&T-sponsored professor at Clemson who directs something called the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism. Thompson was a doctoral student of Gordon Wood, the dean of revolutionary historians. Wood’s blurb of the book, “it is sure to be provocative,” is the sort of damning-with-faint-praise that only an objectivist could fail to notice.
In a similar way as Bernard Bailyn’s Ideological Origins attempted to recenter the ideal of liberty in the revolutionary story in response to Charles Beard, Thompson, in the face of both growing right-wing skepticism of liberal thought and new historiography focusing on the role of popular protest and British constitutionalism in the revolution, wishes to restate that, “America’s revolutionary mind is virtually synonymous with John Locke’s mind.” It’s as if Thompson is trying to get today’s younger right-wingers to reject the inheritance of the Founding Fathers and the American project, though this is apparently not his intention.
Thompson calls his method a “new moral history” of the Revolution, and writers at two of the post-Trump right’s more important publications, American Greatness and the Claremont Review of Books, do not seem enamored with it. Ken Masugi called it “a sort of Jefferson Bible version of America,” and Brian Smith faulted him for ignoring the role of religion in revolutionary thought.
The latter prompted a response from Thompson, also published in the CRB. He accused Smith of believing in a “Sunday-school version of history,” and said he was “clearly out of his depth in reviewing a book that leading scholars of the American Revolution have publicly described as the best book on the American Revolution of the last 50 years.”
As best as I can tell there is only one leading scholar who has said that, and it’s Brad Birzer, who said so in these pages, so Thompson seems to be embellishing praise for his own book and the depth of consensus in support of it. The high rate of colonial churchgoing has “little to no relevance to the Revolution’s causes or meaning,” Thompson adds, mocking Smith, “Presumably he wants an America that is based on intense religious belief and Christian sacrifice and love.”
An America based on intense religious belief and Christian sacrifice and love. How awful!
That Bradley does not find churches suitable for moral instruction is irrelevant; it is risible to claim to be writing a “new moral history” of the American revolution but exclude the main institution by which British colonials received moral guidance. One might add, perhaps with some trepidation, that many of these churches espoused dissenting, nonconformist Christianity. Thompson may see this as just so much superstition, but more sensitive historians would say it’s a belief system with distinct political implications.
Thompson makes a small concession to recent “royalist” histories of the Revolution in one of his early chapters, noting that just before war broke out, the colonies appealed to the king rather than parliament. He writes: “Most colonies, they argued, were founded in the seventeenth century, before Parliament became the sovereign political authority in the British state. Instead, they argued, their only political connection with Great Britain was through their legally chartered allegiance to the person of the king.”
As other historians have written, this sentiment also resembles an understanding of the British constitution that predates the so-called Glorious Revolution, when John Locke hopped aboard a ship with the usurper queen. Thompson moves on after a single paragraph, but it would seem this constitutes a substantial challenge to his central argument—here are revolutionaries making their case in terms that are decidedly non-Lockean.
After his letter to the editor, Thompson followed up with a piece in the American Mind going after illiberals on the right, managing to lump together Patrick Deneen, Mencius Moldbug, and the Bronze Age Pervert into one “anti-American” stew. Now, having been an opinion editor for some years, one learns to recognize an example of giving someone enough rope to hang themself, and it seems this might be such a case. It’s also the third time in the last few years he has cribbed William Safire’s annoying line about “nattering nabobs” for a column. Anyone this enamored with a piece of rhetoric written for Spiro Agnew must have certain other deficiencies of thought.
As someone who would probably be considered part of the illiberal right—I have certainly been open to publishing these people—this article of his demands a response. I also have a more favorable view toward America than the illiberals occasionally take in their writings; certainly not because I think it’s “the most moral nation known to man,” as Thompson writes, but for the basically irrational reason that it’s my country. Thompson’s point of view is especially frustrating because a lot depends on having a political right that does not reject the American project, and I certainly hope the illiberals can make their peace with it somehow. Insisting classical liberalism is the only inheritance of any importance does not help.
This is another example of the strange way Thompson has of always missing where the argument is actually joined. In the past he has argued that Adams rather than Jefferson is the true homo Americanus, but because Adams was the more truly radical one, who staked more personally on the revolutionary cause. Virtually everyone else agrees Adams was the more conservative founding father, and only differ about whether that was good or bad. Thompson argued that the neocons were crypto-fascist collectivists, an odd claim to make about people whose wars, however misguided, were waged in the name of human rights and democracy and whose domestic policy involved trimming the welfare state. And today, as the main debate on the right between liberal conservatives and nationalists has prompted a second look at the Revolution, Thompson arrives with a book that reads as if he was trying to get today’s young conservatives to reject the Founding entirely.
But what is his real goal? If his critics who argue for the importance of religion are incipient theocrats, then let’s apply the same interpretive lens to his own project. Thompson has had a longtime affiliation with the Ayn Rand Institute, the “high church” of objectivists. For all their barbs about the dark ages of scholastic philosophy, Ayn Rand Institute’s own philosophy is best described as a kind of scholasticism for psychopaths; at once pedantic and nutty. For example, his exegesis about his new historiographical breakthrough:
The new moral history begins with certain assumptions about human nature; first, that individuals are the primary unit of moral value; second, that human nature is knowable and sometimes predictable; third, that man’s faculty of reason can know cause-and-effect relationships in nature and human nature; fourth, that individuals are confronted every day with choices, and that they have the free will to choose between alternatives; fifth, that freely thinking (rationally and irrationally) and freely acting (morally and immorally) individuals are capable of making decisions and acting upon them; sixth, at purposive human agents cause events to happen; and finally, that human thought and action can have intended and unintended consequences. This view of human nature suggests that individuals are morally responsible for their decisions and actions and the consequences that follow therefrom. Thus the new moral history puts the thinking back into ideas, the judgment back into intentions, and the volition back into actions.
Professor Birzer may find this compelling, but it makes my eyes glaze over.
To his credit, Thompson has also been critical of neoconservatives in the past, but on the Randian grounds that they are insufficiently dogmatic in their support for capitalism. He’s looking for that third cheer; like Stalin he dislikes that Irving Kristol stopped clapping too soon. In the realm of foreign policy the biggest divergence between neoconservatism and ARI’s beliefs is that the latter would prefer for the United States to ditch all the folderol about leadership, democracy and human rights, forget about nation-building and just napalm the Vietnamese or otherwise do away with the “primitive savages”—Rand’s words—in Palestine. The leading theorist of the Randian way of war is a co-author of Thompson’s, Yaron Brook, a former Israeli military intelligence officer who once told Bill O’Reilly that the way to win in Iraq was to “start bringing this war to the civilians.” To win, he said, we have to “turn Fallujah into dust and tell the Iraqis, ‘if you are going to continue to support the insurgents, you will not have homes. You will not have schools. You will not have mosques.” It will not surprise the reader to learn that these people reject the concept of a common good. Lest I be accused of dredging up old material, Thompson recently promoted his book on Brook’s podcast.
What any of this has to do with the philosophy of the Founding Fathers is beyond me, and I’d certainly prefer the views of a Daniel Bell or Irving Kristol to any of it. Thompson may “feel confident in asserting that Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Samuel and John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Wilson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton would not appreciate being told how to order their moral lives by Pope Francis and the Vatican’s lavender mafia,” but they also might condone a little “rough music” for the St. Peter of objectivism, Leonard Peikoff, if they listened to his stupid Dear Abby podcasts about sex.
Thompson has painted a picture that indeed would make Americanism worthy of rejection, if it were accurate. Fortunately for everyone, it is not.


theamericanconservative--2020-05-20--Americans Have Always Politicized Public Health

A deadly disease has emerged .
There is no known treatment .
Public opinion is split on how to tackle the outbreak .
Those words could apply to the COVID-19 pandemic .
In fact , they also apply to the yellow fever outbreak that swept through America ’ s capital city not long after the American Revolution .
The 1793 episode shows us that the medical response to a crisis is easily politicized .
Yellow fever is a viral disease that ’ s spread by mosquitoes .
It often causes jaundiced or yellowed skin ( hence its name ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the late summer of 1793 , refugees from a yellow fever epidemic in the Caribbean fled to Philadelphia , which was then the capital city of the young United States of America .
Their ships unfortunately also carried Aedes aegypti mosquitoes—vectors of the yellow fever virus .
Within months , 11,000 people , or 20 percent of Philadelphia ’ s population at the time , contracted the disease .
Of that number , around 5,000 people or 45 percent died .
That amounted to about 10 percent of Philadelphia ’ s total population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Organization has estimated that the fatality rate for COVID-19 is 3.4 percent and a study in the British medical journal The Lancet suggestedthe fatality rate to be 3 percent .
Other estimates claim that the fatality rate is much lower than that .
While experts are still unsure of the true fatality rate of the current pandemic , no research suggests it to be anywhere near what the Philadelphians endured in 1793 .
Philadelphia ’ s yellow fever epidemic understandably created a mass panic in the capital and prompted 17,000 people , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials , to leave the city and seek refuge in the countryside .
Dr. Benjamin Rush , one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence , chose to remain in the city and tirelessly tended to the sick .
It is said that he sometimes visited a hundred patients in a single day .
Unfortunately , medicine was still primitive and many of Rush ’ s treatments were counterproductive .
They included bloodletting and prescribing calomel ( i.e .
toxic mercury chloride ) .
Rush believed that his methods saved his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ patients , however , Rush ’ s interventions almost certainly did more harm than good .
Another Founding Father who chose to remain in Philadelphia was the then Secretary of the Treasury , Alexander Hamilton .
Hamilton and his wife survived the disease and he attributed their recovery to comparatively mild treatments , including the quinine-rich bark of the cinchona tree .
It is now known that quinine , a stimulant and malaria treatment , does not destroy the yellow fever virus .
But it may have acted as a placebo .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political .
Rush was a member of the Democratic-Republican Party , while Hamilton was a Federalist .
Whether one favored mercury and bloodletting or milder treatments such as cinchona bark became a partisan issue .
Which treatments Philadelphians read about depended on their preferred media outlet .
The Federalist-sympathizing Gazette of the United States exclusively printed medical recommendations from Hamilton ’ s favored physician .
The ostensibly impartial Federal Gazette overwhelmingly published Rush ’ s advice and omitted conflicting viewpoints .
The cause of the illness was also a partisan matter .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in origin , while the Federalists blamed the recent refugees and their ships .
“ More than one-third of the most prominent national and local political leaders in Philadelphia took a public position on the cause of the epidemic , ” according to University of Michigan historian Martin Pernick .
“ With few exceptions the [ Democratic- ] Republicans backed a domestic source of the fever , while Federalists largely blamed importation.
” In that climate of extreme politicization , little progress was made toward finding an effective treatment .
In the end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by luck—a cold winter killed off the disease-carrying mosquitoes and ended the epidemic .
Over the years , as ships brought in more mosquitoes from abroad , other outbreaks of yellow fever flared up occasionally in coastal U.S. cities .
A vaccine would not come into use until 1938 .
As the country combats the current pandemic , we should refrain from politicizing the issue and evaluate available treatments based solely on scientific evidence .
Unfortunately , health policy discussions are often driven by party loyalty rather than evidence .
Polling shows that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have become divided along partisan lines .
Early on , President Donald Trump dismissed the threat posed by COVID-19 , and Republicans remain considerably less worried about the virus than Democrats .
Nowadays , it is the Democrats who stand in the way of more rapid re-opening of the economy pushed by the Republicans .
Of course , the true death rate of the novel coronavirus is still being studied , and hopefully political pressures will not hamper the search for the objective truth , whatever it may be .
Treatments for COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a drug that combats Ebola , and hydroxychloroquine , an anti-malaria drug , are both being studied as possible COVID-19 treatments .
In both cases , we have some initial ideas about their effectiveness , but more trials are needed to assess their efficacy against COVID-19 .
Yet partisan fighting about hydroxychloroquine has slowed down the process of determining the truth about that drug ’ s effectiveness against COVID-19 .
Let ’ s hope that similar pressures do not hamper further investigation of Remdesivir .
As another example of politicization , consider the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The method involves intermittently shining ultraviolet light through an endotracheal catheter , and is being explored as a potential treatment for coronavirus and other respiratory infections .
After President Trump ’ s seeming endorsement of the technique , there has been a considerable backlash against ultraviolet light therapies .
Under pressure from political activists , YouTube and Vimeo removed videos about the experimental treatment , which is being studied at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles .
Similarly , Twitter suspended the account of a biotechnology company behind the new therapy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ phase , but it should not be dismissed purely on partisan grounds—whatever the current president ’ s opinion on the subject .
We should not allow politics to drive what we believe about the virus or the best medical response , instead reviewing the available evidence with an open mind .
Reflexively supporting or opposing a particular medical approach because of the endorsements of politicians makes no sense .
The novel coronavirus pandemic may feel unprecedented , but of course humanity has dealt with the horrors of plagues and epidemics throughout history .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems presented by the current pandemic , we should learn the lessons of the past and know that beating COVID-19 will require clear heads and a reliance on reason and data .
Chelsea Follett is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute .

A deadly disease has emerged. There is no known treatment. Public opinion is split on how to tackle the outbreak. Those words could apply to the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, they also apply to the yellow fever outbreak that swept through America’s capital city not long after the American Revolution. The 1793 episode shows us that the medical response to a crisis is easily politicized.
Yellow fever is a viral disease that’s spread by mosquitoes. It often causes jaundiced or yellowed skin (hence its name), vomiting, bleeding and death. In the late summer of 1793, refugees from a yellow fever epidemic in the Caribbean fled to Philadelphia, which was then the capital city of the young United States of America. Their ships unfortunately also carried Aedes aegypti mosquitoes—vectors of the yellow fever virus.
Within months, 11,000 people, or 20 percent of Philadelphia’s population at the time, contracted the disease. Of that number, around 5,000 people or 45 percent died. That amounted to about 10 percent of Philadelphia’s total population.
For comparison, the World Health Organization has estimated that the fatality rate for COVID-19 is 3.4 percent and a study in the British medical journal The Lancet suggested the fatality rate to be 3 percent. Other estimates claim that the fatality rate is much lower than that. While experts are still unsure of the true fatality rate of the current pandemic, no research suggests it to be anywhere near what the Philadelphians endured in 1793.
Philadelphia’s yellow fever epidemic understandably created a mass panic in the capital and prompted 17,000 people, including President George Washington and many other government officials, to leave the city and seek refuge in the countryside.
Dr. Benjamin Rush, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, chose to remain in the city and tirelessly tended to the sick. It is said that he sometimes visited a hundred patients in a single day.
Unfortunately, medicine was still primitive and many of Rush’s treatments were counterproductive. They included bloodletting and prescribing calomel (i.e. toxic mercury chloride). Rush believed that his methods saved his own life from the illness. For most patients, however, Rush’s interventions almost certainly did more harm than good.
Another Founding Father who chose to remain in Philadelphia was the then Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton and his wife survived the disease and he attributed their recovery to comparatively mild treatments, including the quinine-rich bark of the cinchona tree. It is now known that quinine, a stimulant and malaria treatment, does not destroy the yellow fever virus. But it may have acted as a placebo.
The question of yellow fever treatment quickly became political. Rush was a member of the Democratic-Republican Party, while Hamilton was a Federalist. Whether one favored mercury and bloodletting or milder treatments such as cinchona bark became a partisan issue.
Which treatments Philadelphians read about depended on their preferred media outlet. The Federalist-sympathizing Gazette of the United States exclusively printed medical recommendations from Hamilton’s favored physician. The ostensibly impartial Federal Gazette overwhelmingly published Rush’s advice and omitted conflicting viewpoints.
The cause of the illness was also a partisan matter. The Democratic-Republicans believed that the disease was local in origin, while the Federalists blamed the recent refugees and their ships. “More than one-third of the most prominent national and local political leaders in Philadelphia took a public position on the cause of the epidemic,” according to University of Michigan historian Martin Pernick. “With few exceptions the [Democratic-]Republicans backed a domestic source of the fever, while Federalists largely blamed importation.”
In that climate of extreme politicization, little progress was made toward finding an effective treatment. In the end, the yellow fever outbreak was defeated by luck—a cold winter killed off the disease-carrying mosquitoes and ended the epidemic. Over the years, as ships brought in more mosquitoes from abroad, other outbreaks of yellow fever flared up occasionally in coastal U.S. cities. A vaccine would not come into use until 1938.
As the country combats the current pandemic, we should refrain from politicizing the issue and evaluate available treatments based solely on scientific evidence. Unfortunately, health policy discussions are often driven by party loyalty rather than evidence. Polling shows that opinions on the seriousness of the pandemic have become divided along partisan lines.
Early on, President Donald Trump dismissed the threat posed by COVID-19, and Republicans remain considerably less worried about the virus than Democrats. Nowadays, it is the Democrats who stand in the way of more rapid re-opening of the economy pushed by the Republicans. Of course, the true death rate of the novel coronavirus is still being studied, and hopefully political pressures will not hamper the search for the objective truth, whatever it may be.
Treatments for COVID-19 have also become politicized. Remdesivir, a drug that combats Ebola, and hydroxychloroquine, an anti-malaria drug, are both being studied as possible COVID-19 treatments. In both cases, we have some initial ideas about their effectiveness, but more trials are needed to assess their efficacy against COVID-19. Yet partisan fighting about hydroxychloroquine has slowed down the process of determining the truth about that drug’s effectiveness against COVID-19. Let’s hope that similar pressures do not hamper further investigation of Remdesivir.
As another example of politicization, consider the use of ultraviolet light against the virus. The method involves intermittently shining ultraviolet light through an endotracheal catheter, and is being explored as a potential treatment for coronavirus and other respiratory infections. After President Trump’s seeming endorsement of the technique, there has been a considerable backlash against ultraviolet light therapies. Under pressure from political activists, YouTube and Vimeo removed videos about the experimental treatment, which is being studied at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles. Similarly, Twitter suspended the account of a biotechnology company behind the new therapy.
The research is still in an early phase, but it should not be dismissed purely on partisan grounds—whatever the current president’s opinion on the subject.
We should not allow politics to drive what we believe about the virus or the best medical response, instead reviewing the available evidence with an open mind. Reflexively supporting or opposing a particular medical approach because of the endorsements of politicians makes no sense.
The novel coronavirus pandemic may feel unprecedented, but of course humanity has dealt with the horrors of plagues and epidemics throughout history. As humanity tackles the serious, global problems presented by the current pandemic, we should learn the lessons of the past and know that beating COVID-19 will require clear heads and a reliance on reason and data.
Chelsea Follett is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute.


theamericanconservative--2020-05-21--The Long, Lingering Death of the U.S. State Department

The Department of State drifted through the past handful of administrations , an agency without agency , adequate personnel , or budget , virtually obsolete in the 21st Century .
How did this happen ?
Traditional diplomacy began as a necessary expedient .
Nations had business with one another , but messages could take weeks to travel from one capital to another .
Instead , ambassadors were sent out , empowered in the case of the U.S. as the President ’ s personal representative .
Heady stuff .
Over time communications improved to the point where world leaders can now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and embassies remain like vestigial limbs .
With exceptions ( FDR stand outs ) , presidents did not conduct first-name diplomacy or tie themselves up with the details of foreign affairs .
They had secretaries of state for that .
Things shifted under Richard Nixon , whose interest in first-person diplomacy with China and ownership of the Vietnam War sent the State Department into a supporting role .
Soon enough , events both internal and external to the U.S. , its State Department , and the world , did their work .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department is still largely configured for the previous century .
State ’ s primary organizational unit is the nation-state , and so it divides itself into the “ China Desk ” or the “ Argentina Desk.
” It assumes the host country has a government that works more or less like ours , with a Foreign Ministry , a system for sending policies up to the leader , some sort of press , that sort of thing .
New diplomats arrive in foreign capitals in search of their one-to-one counterparts , from Albania @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has created regional divisions ( East Asia ) and topical divisions ( Science and Tech ) but overlaid these across the geographic ones so that ideas skitter sideways and up and down simultaneously .
The result is usually paralysis when it is not confusion .
The problem is not determining who is in charge per se , but that 10-12 people all think they are in charge .
The days of the world as a chessboard are over .
It ’ s now closer to a Rubik ’ s Cube Washington can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In many cases no one in State can get to the policy task itself , busy as they are arguing over who has the lead on some issue .
In most cases White House decision makers leave State to its internal fussing and seek timely guidance elsewhere — CIA , NSC , the Pentagon .
No one outside of official Washington can appreciate how much 9/11 altered the way the U.S. Government thinks about itself .
The shock changed the posture from one at times satisfied with passivity in its more distant foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The intel community , for example , pivoted from gathering information to lethally acting on it .
Presidents from that day forward would probably have preferred each Federal worker go out and strangle a terrorist personally , but if that was not possible everyone was to find a way to go to war .
State never really did .
The traditional image of the older gentleman from the embassy meeting with the local king is for the movies .
Foreign actors have gotten much more sophisticated in their ability to demand VIPs fly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ playing local staff off against the real decision makers scattered throughout Washington .
Those foreign actors understand today State is less a one-stop portal into the USG and more of just a player to manipulate alongside others .
In almost every nation , smaller bureaucracies allow easier bundling of issues , something which befuddles State — Country X says if you want that naval base you have to cut American tariffs on cinnamon imports .
State throws up its hands , paralyzed , knowing their real diplomacy will involve the Pentagon and whoever @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Treasury ?
Commerce ?
Senator Johnson ’ s office , whose district controls most cinnamon packaging ?
The other side is scheming clever demands while State organizes Zoom calls .
The joke at the Department is it is forced to practice more diplomacy inside the Beltway than out .
Similarly , in most places abroad the U.S. has three centers of representation who vie for primacy , and are played off one another by smart foreigners .
The Department of Defense maintains relationships with foreign militaries .
The intel community does the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State tries with everyone left over .
Depending on the country , the civilians State interfaces with may matter little in a power structure dominated by military commanders .
That renders the American ambassador second place on his own team .
That ambassador may not even know what his own military or spies are up to , leading to naughty surprises .
Negotiating in Iraq with a minor tribal leader for safe passage , he asked me as the State Department representative how many goats I was offering .
About five seconds into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ friendships , an U.S. Army major cut me off saying “ I can get goats ” and I no longer mattered to the negotiation , the war , maybe the 21st century itself .
It is all about resources .
The military has more people , more hardware , and more cash .
From Great Britain to some forgotten valley in Garbagestan the military can offer new friends shiny tools ( Section 1206 funding : for the first time since President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , President George W. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fund many weapons transfers directly , bypassing the State Department .
Conspicuously absent from the debate over Section 1206 was Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice . )
State has no tanks or battleships , just people as its primary way of getting things done .
In 1950 State had 7,710 foreign service officers .
Pre-9/11 they had 7,158 .
Today it ’ s still about 8,000 .
While the military organizes itself into terrain-sweeping regional combat commands run by professionals , about a third of State ’ s ambassadors are political appointees , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bucks for the president .
The United States is the only first world nation that allots ambassador jobs as political patronage .
By no means the worst , here ’ s one Obama-era ambassador who was into body building , and sent out official Christmas cards in his host country of Finland of himself flexing .
State ’ s once-valued competitive advantage was its from-the-ground reporting .
Times change : why read a “ cable ” on what some FSO thinks the Prime Minister will do when the NSA can provide real time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mistress ?
The uber revelation from the 2010 Wikileaks dump of documents was most of State ’ s reporting is of little practical value .
Never mind the rash of Hillary-era lip sync nerd prom videos , like this one from the U.S. Embassy in Manila of Call Me Maybe , or a million Gangnam Styles .
That ’ s in addition to diplomats involved in child porn , soliciting underage male prostitutes , and worse .
Almost as if with nothing to do discipline broke down .
Under the Trump administration the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself .
Even before the 2016 election , diplomats leaked a dissent memo calling for more intervention in Syria , a move opposed by Trump .
Soon after Rex Tillerson took office , his diplomats leaked another memo very close to insubordination opposing the Department ’ s role in Trump ’ s immigration plans .
In yet another dissent memo made annoyingly public , Foggy Bottom ’ s denizens claimed their boss violated a child soldier law .
Nothing substantive came of any of those leaks/memos except to show whose side folks were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last few years criss-crossed the State Department : slow-walking the release of Hillary ’ s emails ( after helping hide her private server for years ) , turning a blind eye to Clinton ’ s hiring her campaign aides as State employees ( remember Huma ? )
, the Foundation shenanigans , the crazy sorrow of Benghazi , and the Steele Dossier .
Most of the impeachment witnesses were from State , including one sweetheart who surreptitiously listened in on phone calls with his political appointee ambassador to tell all to Congress later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of partisanship woven into a supposedly non-partisan organization .
Nobody trusts a snitch ; who of any party will interact openly with tattletale diplomats now or in the future ?
What ’ s left is a State Department transitioned to America ’ s concierge abroad , its work mostly logistical .
Embassies are great bases for intel work , military offices , the occasional evacuation , and to grind out visas .
Someone has to be out there to arrange VIP visits .
While stationed in the UK , I escorted so many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official shopping trips I was labeled “ Ambassador to Harrod ’ s Department Store.
” Future presidents may try to change that , or , if history serves , live with it .
RIP Department of State .
Peter Van Buren , a 24-year State Department veteran , is the author of We Meant Well : How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People , Hooper ’ s War : A Novel of WWII Japan , and Ghosts of Tom Joad : A Story of the @ @ @ @

The Department of State drifted through the past handful of administrations, an agency without agency, adequate personnel, or budget, virtually obsolete in the 21st Century. How did this happen?
Traditional diplomacy began as a necessary expedient. Nations had business with one another, but messages could take weeks to travel from one capital to another. Instead, ambassadors were sent out, empowered in the case of the U.S. as the President’s personal representative. Heady stuff. Over time communications improved to the point where world leaders can now text each other, but those ambassadors and embassies remain like vestigial limbs.
With exceptions (FDR stand outs), presidents did not conduct first-name diplomacy or tie themselves up with the details of foreign affairs. They had secretaries of state for that. Things shifted under Richard Nixon, whose interest in first-person diplomacy with China and ownership of the Vietnam War sent the State Department into a supporting role. Soon enough, events both internal and external to the U.S., its State Department, and the world, did their work.
A Rubik’s Cube, Not a Chessboard
The world has changed even as the State Department is still largely configured for the previous century. State’s primary organizational unit is the nation-state, and so it divides itself into the “China Desk” or the “Argentina Desk.” It assumes the host country has a government that works more or less like ours, with a Foreign Ministry, a system for sending policies up to the leader, some sort of press, that sort of thing. New diplomats arrive in foreign capitals in search of their one-to-one counterparts, from Albania to Zimbabwe.
Over the years State has created regional divisions (East Asia) and topical divisions (Science and Tech) but overlaid these across the geographic ones so that ideas skitter sideways and up and down simultaneously. The result is usually paralysis when it is not confusion. The problem is not determining who is in charge per se, but that 10-12 people all think they are in charge.
The days of the world as a chessboard are over. It’s now closer to a Rubik’s Cube Washington can’t figure out how to manipulate. In many cases no one in State can get to the policy task itself, busy as they are arguing over who has the lead on some issue. In most cases White House decision makers leave State to its internal fussing and seek timely guidance elsewhere — CIA, NSC, the Pentagon.
No one outside of official Washington can appreciate how much 9/11 altered the way the U.S. Government thinks about itself. The shock changed the posture from one at times satisfied with passivity in its more distant foreign affairs to one demanding constant action. The intel community, for example, pivoted from gathering information to lethally acting on it. Presidents from that day forward would probably have preferred each Federal worker go out and strangle a terrorist personally, but if that was not possible everyone was to find a way to go to war. State never really did.
Growing Sophistication of Foreign Actors
The traditional image of the older gentleman from the embassy meeting with the local king is for the movies. Foreign actors have gotten much more sophisticated in their ability to demand VIPs fly in to finalize deals, and in playing local staff off against the real decision makers scattered throughout Washington. Those foreign actors understand today State is less a one-stop portal into the USG and more of just a player to manipulate alongside others.
In almost every nation, smaller bureaucracies allow easier bundling of issues, something which befuddles State — Country X says if you want that naval base you have to cut American tariffs on cinnamon imports. State throws up its hands, paralyzed, knowing their real diplomacy will involve the Pentagon and whoever the hell does spice tariffs in what, Treasury? Commerce? Senator Johnson’s office, whose district controls most cinnamon packaging? The other side is scheming clever demands while State organizes Zoom calls. The joke at the Department is it is forced to practice more diplomacy inside the Beltway than out.
Similarly, in most places abroad the U.S. has three centers of representation who vie for primacy, and are played off one another by smart foreigners. The Department of Defense maintains relationships with foreign militaries. The intel community does the same with local spies and cops. State tries with everyone left over. Depending on the country, the civilians State interfaces with may matter little in a power structure dominated by military commanders. That renders the American ambassador second place on his own team. That ambassador may not even know what his own military or spies are up to, leading to naughty surprises.
Militarization
Negotiating in Iraq with a minor tribal leader for safe passage, he asked me as the State Department representative how many goats I was offering. About five seconds into my response on the need for lasting friendships, an U.S. Army major cut me off saying “I can get goats” and I no longer mattered to the negotiation, the war, maybe the 21st century itself.
It is all about resources. The military has more people, more hardware, and more cash. From Great Britain to some forgotten valley in Garbagestan the military can offer new friends shiny tools (Section 1206 funding: for the first time since President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, President George W. Bush allowed that the U.S. military would fund many weapons transfers directly, bypassing the State Department. Conspicuously absent from the debate over Section 1206 was Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.)
State has no tanks or battleships, just people as its primary way of getting things done. In 1950 State had 7,710 foreign service officers. Pre-9/11 they had 7,158. Today it’s still about 8,000.
While the military organizes itself into terrain-sweeping regional combat commands run by professionals, about a third of State’s ambassadors are political appointees, amateurs selected because they raised big campaign bucks for the president. The United States is the only first world nation that allots ambassador jobs as political patronage. By no means the worst, here’s one Obama-era ambassador who was into body building, and sent out official Christmas cards in his host country of Finland of himself flexing.
Self-Destruction
State’s once-valued competitive advantage was its from-the-ground reporting. Times change: why read a “cable” on what some FSO thinks the Prime Minister will do when the NSA can provide real time audio of him explaining it to his mistress? The uber revelation from the 2010 Wikileaks dump of documents was most of State’s reporting is of little practical value.
Never mind the rash of Hillary-era lip sync nerd prom videos, like this one from the U.S. Embassy in Manila of Call Me Maybe, or a million Gangnam Styles. That’s in addition to diplomats involved in child porn, soliciting underage male prostitutes, and worse. Almost as if with nothing to do discipline broke down.
Under the Trump administration the State Department sought out opportunities to sideline itself. Even before the 2016 election, diplomats leaked a dissent memo calling for more intervention in Syria, a move opposed by Trump. Soon after Rex Tillerson took office, his diplomats leaked another memo very close to insubordination opposing the Department’s role in Trump’s immigration plans. In yet another dissent memo made annoyingly public, Foggy Bottom’s denizens claimed their boss violated a child soldier law. Nothing substantive came of any of those leaks/memos except to show whose side folks were on.
Too many scandals of the last few years criss-crossed the State Department: slow-walking the release of Hillary’s emails (after helping hide her private server for years), turning a blind eye to Clinton’s hiring her campaign aides as State employees (remember Huma?), the Foundation shenanigans, the crazy sorrow of Benghazi, and the Steele Dossier. Most of the impeachment witnesses were from State, including one sweetheart who surreptitiously listened in on phone calls with his political appointee ambassador to tell all to Congress later. That’s an awful lot of partisanship woven into a supposedly non-partisan organization. Nobody trusts a snitch; who of any party will interact openly with tattletale diplomats now or in the future?
America’s Concierge Abroad
What’s left is a State Department transitioned to America’s concierge abroad, its work mostly logistical. Embassies are great bases for intel work, military offices, the occasional evacuation, and to grind out visas. Someone has to be out there to arrange VIP visits. While stationed in the UK, I escorted so many Mrs. Important Somebody’s on official shopping trips I was labeled “Ambassador to Harrod’s Department Store.”
Future presidents may try to change that, or, if history serves, live with it. RIP Department of State.
Peter Van Buren, a 24-year State Department veteran, is the author of We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People,Hooper’s War: A Novel of WWII Japan, and Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99 Percent.


theamericanconservative--2020-05-21--Wanted During a Pandemic: Presidential Leadership

President Trump speaks to the press after meeting with Republican Senators in the Hart Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill , May 19 , 2020 in Washington , DC .
( Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images ) One of the few advantages of the coronavirus crisis has been the opportunity to engage our moral nature .
As our normal lives and routines are disrupted , it ’ s laid bare where we place our value and hope .
Some of us have been shocked by the loss of a loved one .
Most of us have realized how much we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distanced .
As the oft-cited theologian Paul Tillich wrote , those who endure suffering are taken beneath the routine busyness of life , where they find they are not who they believed themselves to be .
But the simple crucible of isolation and suffering is insufficient—because suffering without hope leads to disillusion .
And from disillusion we turn inward , unable to rise to the challenges and sacrifices that exceptional circumstances require .
In the aftermath of World War I , a deep sense of despair fell over Europe .
Historian Joseph Loconte @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Great War , “ The concepts of decline and collapse , of sickness and death , infected nearly every cultural endeavor : intellectual , artistic , literary , scientific , philosophical , and religious.
” Unlike the Second World War , the First was characterized by an acute meaningless , viewed as a pointless ordeal of human slaughter .
The coronavirus does not pose nearly the crisis of confidence .
However , the present suffering does suggest some of the meaninglessness of The Great War , having left people without an explanation and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despair .
The pandemic is a war that lacks the clarity of a war .
One solution to all of this is good leaders .
Leadership at its best can help give to suffering an arc of meaning , a sense of common cause outside ourselves that we can identify with .
Leaders remind us of the struggles we have overcome in the past and equip us to deal with the trials of the present .
Our leaders can also unite our diverse population and rouse the elements of our moral nature we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to our shared values when circumstances drive us to forget them , asking of us compassion , sacrifice , and love of neighbor and countrymen .
In the United Kingdom , the prime minister ( also the Crown ) often supplies that leadership .
And no one before or since has done so with such vigor and effect as Winston Churchill .
In the months leading up to his premiership , Churchill gave a number of broadcast speeches that sketched the outline of the coming war .
Historian Geoffrey Best writes that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ were ] fulfilling an immensely important function .
No other public figure had come forward with a convincing explanation of why the war was being fought.
” Eighty years ago , Churchill assumed the post of prime minister as Neville Chamberlain lost the confidence of Parliament and Lord Halifax balked at the open position .
The morning after Churchill ’ s appointment , Germany began its Blitzkrieg attack , sweeping across the Low Countries of Europe in a matter of days .
Within the course of a week , the fall of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Churchill gave his first address to the nation as prime minister , laying out the grim threat of a German invasion .
Erik Larson writes in the Splendid and the Vile , “ The speech set a pattern that would follow throughout the war , offering a sober appraisal of facts tempered with reason for optimism.
” Churchill emphasized the significance of the challenge while clarifying its meaning : “ It would be foolish , however , to disguise the gravity of the hour .
It would be still more foolish to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : “ After this battle in France abates its force , there will come the battle for our Island — for all that Britain is , and all the Britain means .
That will be the struggle.
” Churchill steeled the British public for the worst while reminding them of their strength and ability to meet the challenge .
As Larson explains , “ Churchill demonstrated a striking trait : his knack for making people feel loftier , stronger , and above all , more courageous .
John Martin , one of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gave forth a confidence and invincible will that called out everything that was brave and strong.
’ ” In America , the presidency has historically been the platform for that loftier call .
From Washington to Lincoln to FDR , history ’ s example has shown that alongside the presidency ’ s political power rests an equally if not more important rhetorical power .
The president can not only unite the country but mold the public imagination .
Today we lack leadership and unity .
Our national narrative around the coronavirus is viciously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That narrative is split between re-opening and staying closed , between saving our economic life and saving human life .
We ’ re ping-ponging between charts that show collapse and recovery .
We ’ re bickering over death counts to score political points .
Some of us have even declared masks the latest battleground in the political correctness culture war .
What ’ s gotten lost in this mix is not only clarity but foresight .
No one is preparing America for what is to come and the true scope of the consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pronounced as the virus runs its course at different speeds across the country .
President Trump is not the cause of most of this .
Our national politics have been polarized for years and both parties have proven unable to manage long-term threats .
But the presidency is one of the few , perhaps the only , platform that can provide an antidote to the present delirium .
And one of the most enduring legacies of this administration will be the vacuum of leadership that Trump has demonstrated .
The president may have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speeches that rose rhetorically to the challenge , but they ’ ve been drowned out by the Twitter tirades , tribalism , and dishonesty .
Churchill ’ s speeches helped embody and define his character to the public .
President Trump ’ s character and credibility are anchored to his Twitter feed .
As we enter the third month of lockdown , there ’ s a palpable hunger for the unflinching calm and hope of great leadership .
We can see glimpses of it in local and regional leaders whom many have rallied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have tuned in to Governor Andrew Cuomo ’ s live-streamed coronavirus briefings , and major cable news networks have broadcast them live .
A couple of weeks ago , thousands watched a video of a speech by President Bush , displaying all the hallmarks of leadership .
He recognized the medical as well as moral threats that the disease presents : “ The larger challenge we share is to confront an outbreak of fear and loneliness , ” he said .
And in the face of such a challenge , he recalled our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have faced times of testing before .
Following 9/11 , I saw a great nation rise as one to honor the brave , to grieve with the grieving and to embrace unavoidable new duties , and I have no doubt , none at all , that this spirit of service and sacrifice is alive and well in America.
” These displays of leadership are much needed but insufficient to the scope of the crisis .
The presidency is the platform for times like these .
Cuomo ’ s briefings are specific to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech was streamed during the Call To Unite virtual event , sandwiched among pop culture celebrities , religious leaders , and other past presidents ( Bill Clinton spoke as well ) .
In reality , the pandemic is not a war .
Where the one asks many of us to go fight an enemy in battle , the other asks many of us to simply stay home .
In many ways , the metaphor of war is insufficient to capture the meaning of this pandemic and can be abused .
But this only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important than in wartime .
Churchill was honest and direct with the British people .
He prepared them for the worst while also giving them something to strive for .
We need similar calls to service and sacrifice , reminders that love of neighbor can mean social distancing , and an honest forecast of what ’ s to come , whatever the political consequences .
While most of our attention is right now focused on the immediate policy failures and successes of the pandemic , it ’ s important to also recognize the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t measure this void like we can the effects of shutdowns and aid packages , but the lack of common meaning and solidarity will be felt all the same .
Grayson Logue is a writer living in New York and a contributor to Providence Magazine .

One of the few advantages of the coronavirus crisis has been the opportunity to engage our moral nature. As our normal lives and routines are disrupted, it’s laid bare where we place our value and hope. Some of us have been shocked by the loss of a loved one. Most of us have realized how much we rely on relationships that are now physically distanced. As the oft-cited theologian Paul Tillich wrote, those who endure suffering are taken beneath the routine busyness of life, where they find they are not who they believed themselves to be.
But the simple crucible of isolation and suffering is insufficient—because suffering without hope leads to disillusion. And from disillusion we turn inward, unable to rise to the challenges and sacrifices that exceptional circumstances require. In the aftermath of World War I, a deep sense of despair fell over Europe. Historian Joseph Loconte recounts how in the wake of the Great War, “The concepts of decline and collapse, of sickness and death, infected nearly every cultural endeavor: intellectual, artistic, literary, scientific, philosophical, and religious.” Unlike the Second World War, the First was characterized by an acute meaningless, viewed as a pointless ordeal of human slaughter.
The coronavirus does not pose nearly the crisis of confidence. However, the present suffering does suggest some of the meaninglessness of The Great War, having left people without an explanation and led them to sink into cynicism and despair. The pandemic is a war that lacks the clarity of a war.
One solution to all of this is good leaders. Leadership at its best can help give to suffering an arc of meaning, a sense of common cause outside ourselves that we can identify with. Leaders remind us of the struggles we have overcome in the past and equip us to deal with the trials of the present.
Our leaders can also unite our diverse population and rouse the elements of our moral nature we all share. They can recall us to our shared values when circumstances drive us to forget them, asking of us compassion, sacrifice, and love of neighbor and countrymen.
In the United Kingdom, the prime minister (also the Crown) often supplies that leadership. And no one before or since has done so with such vigor and effect as Winston Churchill. In the months leading up to his premiership, Churchill gave a number of broadcast speeches that sketched the outline of the coming war. Historian Geoffrey Best writes that “these broadcasts before he became Prime Minister…[were] fulfilling an immensely important function. No other public figure had come forward with a convincing explanation of why the war was being fought.”
Eighty years ago, Churchill assumed the post of prime minister as Neville Chamberlain lost the confidence of Parliament and Lord Halifax balked at the open position. The morning after Churchill’s appointment, Germany began its Blitzkrieg attack, sweeping across the Low Countries of Europe in a matter of days. Within the course of a week, the fall of France was imminent.
On May 19, Churchill gave his first address to the nation as prime minister, laying out the grim threat of a German invasion. Erik Larson writes in the Splendid and the Vile, “The speech set a pattern that would follow throughout the war, offering a sober appraisal of facts tempered with reason for optimism.”
Churchill emphasized the significance of the challenge while clarifying its meaning: “It would be foolish, however, to disguise the gravity of the hour. It would be still more foolish to lose heart and courage.” He continued: “After this battle in France abates its force, there will come the battle for our Island — for all that Britain is, and all the Britain means. That will be the struggle.” Churchill steeled the British public for the worst while reminding them of their strength and ability to meet the challenge. As Larson explains, “Churchill demonstrated a striking trait: his knack for making people feel loftier, stronger, and above all, more courageous. John Martin, one of his private secretaries, believed that he ‘gave forth a confidence and invincible will that called out everything that was brave and strong.’”
In America, the presidency has historically been the platform for that loftier call. From Washington to Lincoln to FDR, history’s example has shown that alongside the presidency’s political power rests an equally if not more important rhetorical power. The president can not only unite the country but mold the public imagination.
Today we lack leadership and unity. Our national narrative around the coronavirus is viciously polarized, cynical, and base. That narrative is split between re-opening and staying closed, between saving our economic life and saving human life. We’re ping-ponging between charts that show collapse and recovery. We’re bickering over death counts to score political points. Some of us have even declared masks the latest battleground in the political correctness culture war.
What’s gotten lost in this mix is not only clarity but foresight. No one is preparing America for what is to come and the true scope of the consequences. This confusion may become even more pronounced as the virus runs its course at different speeds across the country.
President Trump is not the cause of most of this. Our national politics have been polarized for years and both parties have proven unable to manage long-term threats. But the presidency is one of the few, perhaps the only, platform that can provide an antidote to the present delirium. And one of the most enduring legacies of this administration will be the vacuum of leadership that Trump has demonstrated. The president may have had moments at a press conference or speeches that rose rhetorically to the challenge, but they’ve been drowned out by the Twitter tirades, tribalism, and dishonesty. Churchill’s speeches helped embody and define his character to the public. President Trump’s character and credibility are anchored to his Twitter feed.
As we enter the third month of lockdown, there’s a palpable hunger for the unflinching calm and hope of great leadership. We can see glimpses of it in local and regional leaders whom many have rallied around. People from across the country have tuned in to Governor Andrew Cuomo’s live-streamed coronavirus briefings, and major cable news networks have broadcast them live.
A couple of weeks ago, thousands watched a video of a speech by President Bush, displaying all the hallmarks of leadership. He recognized the medical as well as moral threats that the disease presents: “The larger challenge we share is to confront an outbreak of fear and loneliness,” he said. And in the face of such a challenge, he recalled our fortitude in past trials: “We have faced times of testing before. Following 9/11, I saw a great nation rise as one to honor the brave, to grieve with the grieving and to embrace unavoidable new duties, and I have no doubt, none at all, that this spirit of service and sacrifice is alive and well in America.”
These displays of leadership are much needed but insufficient to the scope of the crisis. The presidency is the platform for times like these. Cuomo’s briefings are specific to the New York region. Bush’s speech was streamed during the Call To Unite virtual event, sandwiched among pop culture celebrities, religious leaders, and other past presidents (Bill Clinton spoke as well).
In reality, the pandemic is not a war. Where the one asks many of us to go fight an enemy in battle, the other asks many of us to simply stay home. In many ways, the metaphor of war is insufficient to capture the meaning of this pandemic and can be abused. But this only makes the clarity of leadership even more important than in wartime.
Churchill was honest and direct with the British people. He prepared them for the worst while also giving them something to strive for. We need similar calls to service and sacrifice, reminders that love of neighbor can mean social distancing, and an honest forecast of what’s to come, whatever the political consequences. While most of our attention is right now focused on the immediate policy failures and successes of the pandemic, it’s important to also recognize the absence of moral leadership. We can’t measure this void like we can the effects of shutdowns and aid packages, but the lack of common meaning and solidarity will be felt all the same.
Grayson Logue is a writer living in New York and a contributor to Providence Magazine.


theamericanconservative--2020-05-22--Exclusive: IG Fired Days After Inquiring About Pompeo’s ‘Donor Dinners’

The Secretary hosted elaborate unpublicized events with big wig political donors , CEOs , and media , all on the taxpayer dime .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his wife Susan Pompeo wave as they board their plane in Kansas City , Missouri , on March 18 , 2019 .
They were in Kansas City Monday to speak at the Global Entrepreneurship Summit .
( Photo credit : JIM YOUNG/AFP via Getty Images ) While Democrats are investigating whether State Department Inspector General Steve Linick was fired for probing into last year ’ s expedited $ 8 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American Conservative has learned of another , more direct reason for the IG ’ s abrupt firing : just days before Linick was removed , he sent a request for information about the “ donor dinners ” otherwise known as “ Madison Dinners ” that Pompeo has been hosting on the taxpayer dime for corporate and media big wigs .
Before coronavirus cancelled them , the “ Madison Dinners ” were elaborate , unpublicized State dinners that Pompeo and his wife Susan hosted in Diplomatic Reception Rooms beginning in 2018 .
A bevy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CEOs , and conservative news media celebrities were invited to the dinners funded by taxpayers .
As to whether these dinners were Hatch Act violations , “ it would fall into a legal gray area , but using taxpayer money to fund essentially a lavish donor dinner made people in the Office for Protocol feel very uncomfortable , ” a former senior State Department official told TAC .
The Office of Protocol exists to host State dinners and events for heads of state , monarchs , diplomats and U.S. officials in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s hard to argue that State Department business is taking place when the attendees are almost all American CEOs and media figures , a source told TAC .
The master list obtained by NBC includes the names of nearly 500 invitees and specifies who accepted , although it is possible some people responded but didn ’ t show .
The invitees are “ a who ’ s who list of big donors , as well as media that he wants to look good in front of , ” a former high-level State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lists told TAC .
“ Pompeo would invite one ambassador from some country or other so that way the dinner would technically qualify as a State function , ” said the source .
“ This is all with an eye to the presidential election in 2024 , ” another State Department source told TAC , noting that a 2024 presidential run would put Pompeo at odds with Vice President Mike Pence .
And rather than foreign policy experts or experienced diplomats , Pompeo has placed Silicon Valley titans and donors on the State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to a 2019 fiscal year report for the board provided to TAC by the State Department , the panel has recently included nine members .
Among them : Douglas Beck from Apple , Jared Cohen from Jigsaw ( Alphabet Inc. ) , James Donavan from Goldman Sachs , and William Roedy , former CEO of MTV .
In his first public comments on the firing , Pompeo claimed he was not aware that Linick was investigating him at the time he recommended that the IG be removed .
He said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a national security matter , ” reports the Post .
“ It is not possible that this decision , or my recommendation rather , to the President rather , was based on any effort to retaliate for any investigation that was going on , or is currently going on , ” Pompeo said .
“ Because I simply don ’ t know .
I ’ m not briefed on it .
I usually see these investigations in final draft form 24 hours , 48 hours before the IG is prepared to release them.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the IG was investigating last year ’ s decision to bypass Congress by declaring an emergency that expedited an $ 8 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to sit for an interview with the IG office on the issue , reports CNN .
“ Democratic lawmakers on a House committee last year began looking at a whistle-blower complaint that Mr. Pompeo , his wife and adult son were asking diplomatic security agents to run personal errands , including picking up Chinese food and the family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said agents had complained they were ‘ UberEats with guns , ’ according to CNN , which first reported on the accusations , ” reports The New York Times .
Susan Pompeo holds a very active role within the State Department , where she has her own political appointee staffer .
That is very unusual , because very few Trump administration officials have managed to secure one .
For example .
Richard Grennell , the Director of National Intelligence , had to fight for a year and a half to get one .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ several long , taxpayer-funded trips overseas .
“ In January 2019 , she went with him on an eight-day journey across the Middle East—which raised questions among some officials because most State Department employees , including those supporting the trip , were working without pay during a partial government shutdown , ” reports The New York Times .
“ Mrs .
Pompeo has also flown with her husband on multi-night trips to Switzerland and Italy , which included a visit to the secretary ’ s ancestral home region of Abruzzo.
” While she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , she has met with embassy families and local figures on some of these trips , and Pompeo calls her a “ force multiplier.
” Still , it is unlikely that the investigations of Susan Pompeo and the Saudi arms deal led to the IG ’ s abrupt ousting , because the Saudi arms deal investigation began a year ago , and would have been approved by several high-level Pentagon attorneys and Trump ’ s National Security Council .
Unlike the Saudi arms deal , however , the donor dinners have only recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a huge political embarrassment to Pompeo , who has so far stayed within the good graces of both President Trump and Vice President Mike Pence .
The Office of Protocol and the State Department did not respond to multiple requests for comment .
State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus to NBC , however , that the “ Madison Dinners ” are “ a world-class opportunity to discuss the mission of the State Department and the complex foreign policy matters facing our exceptional nation , ” and that invited guests included “ many foreign diplomats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders at many levels , business leaders , Members of Congress and the media —each of whom has a stake in America and its leadership in the world .
”

While Democrats are investigating whether State Department Inspector General Steve Linick was fired for probing into last year’s expedited $8 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia, The American Conservative has learned of another, more direct reason for the IG’s abrupt firing: just days before Linick was removed, he sent a request for information about the “donor dinners” otherwise known as “Madison Dinners” that Pompeo has been hosting on the taxpayer dime for corporate and media big wigs.
Before coronavirus cancelled them, the “Madison Dinners” were elaborate, unpublicized State dinners that Pompeo and his wife Susan hosted in Diplomatic Reception Rooms beginning in 2018. A bevy of big wig political donors, corporate CEOs, and conservative news media celebrities were invited to the dinners funded by taxpayers.
As to whether these dinners were Hatch Act violations, “it would fall into a legal gray area, but using taxpayer money to fund essentially a lavish donor dinner made people in the Office for Protocol feel very uncomfortable,” a former senior State Department official told TAC.
The Office of Protocol exists to host State dinners and events for heads of state, monarchs, diplomats and U.S. officials in order to advance the work of diplomacy.
It’s hard to argue that State Department business is taking place when the attendees are almost all American CEOs and media figures, a source told TAC.
The master list obtained by NBC includes the names of nearly 500 invitees and specifies who accepted, although it is possible some people responded but didn’t show.
The invitees are “a who’s who list of big donors, as well as media that he wants to look good in front of,” a former high-level State Department employee that has knowledge of the lists told TAC.
“Pompeo would invite one ambassador from some country or other so that way the dinner would technically qualify as a State function,” said the source.
“This is all with an eye to the presidential election in 2024,” another State Department source told TAC, noting that a 2024 presidential run would put Pompeo at odds with Vice President Mike Pence.
And rather than foreign policy experts or experienced diplomats, Pompeo has placed Silicon Valley titans and donors on the State Department’s Foreign Policy Advisory Board. According to a 2019 fiscal year report for the board provided to TAC by the State Department, the panel has recently included nine members. Among them: Douglas Beck from Apple, Jared Cohen from Jigsaw (Alphabet Inc.), James Donovan from Goldman Sachs, and William Roedy, former CEO of MTV.
In his first public comments on the firing, Pompeo claimed he was not aware that Linick was investigating him at the time he recommended that the IG be removed. He said he knew only about a case “involving a national security matter,” reports the Post.
“It is not possible that this decision, or my recommendation rather, to the President rather, was based on any effort to retaliate for any investigation that was going on, or is currently going on,” Pompeo said. “Because I simply don’t know. I’m not briefed on it. I usually see these investigations in final draft form 24 hours, 48 hours before the IG is prepared to release them.”
“So it’s simply not possible for this to be an act of retaliation. End of story,” Pompeo said. But sources tell a different story. A former State Department employee told TAC that as soon as the Office of Protocol was notified of the IG’s request, they immediately notified Pompeo’s office. Three days later, Linick was out. The dinners aren’t the only irregularities that the Inspector General of the State Department was probing, however.
According to a Democratic congressional aide, the IG was investigating last year’s decision to bypass Congress by declaring an emergency that expedited an $8 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to sit for an interview with the IG office on the issue, reports CNN.
“Democratic lawmakers on a House committee last year began looking at a whistle-blower complaint that Mr. Pompeo, his wife and adult son were asking diplomatic security agents to run personal errands, including picking up Chinese food and the family dog from a groomer. The whistle-blower said agents had complained they were ‘UberEats with guns,’ according to CNN, which first reported on the accusations,” reports The New York Times.
Susan Pompeo holds a very active role within the State Department, where she has her own political appointee staffer.
That is very unusual, because very few Trump administration officials have managed to secure one. For example. Richard Grennell, the Director of National Intelligence, had to fight for a year and a half to get one.
Susan Pompeo also accompanies her husband on several long, taxpayer-funded trips overseas.
“In January 2019, she went with him on an eight-day journey across the Middle East—which raised questions among some officials because most State Department employees, including those supporting the trip, were working without pay during a partial government shutdown,” reports The New York Times. “Mrs. Pompeo has also flown with her husband on multi-night trips to Switzerland and Italy, which included a visit to the secretary’s ancestral home region of Abruzzo.”
While she is not paid by the State Department, she has met with embassy families and local figures on some of these trips, and Pompeo calls her a “force multiplier.”
Still, it is unlikely that the investigations of Susan Pompeo and the Saudi arms deal led to the IG’s abrupt ousting, because the Saudi arms deal investigation began a year ago, and would have been approved by several high-level Pentagon attorneys and Trump’s National Security Council.
Unlike the Saudi arms deal, however, the donor dinners have only recently come to light, and could be a huge political embarrassment to Pompeo, who has so far stayed within the good graces of both President Trump and Vice President Mike Pence.
The Office of Protocol and the State Department did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus to NBC, however, that the “Madison Dinners” are “a world-class opportunity to discuss the mission of the State Department and the complex foreign policy matters facing our exceptional nation,” and that invited guests included “many foreign diplomats, thought leaders, academics, government leaders at many levels, business leaders, Members of Congress and the media —each of whom has a stake in America and its leadership in the world.”