theamericanconservative--2020-03-28--Why Didn’t We Test Our Trade’s ‘Antifragility’ Before COVID-19?

On April 21 , 2011 , the region of Amazon Web Services covering eastern North America crashed .
The crash brought down the sites of large customers such as Quora , Foursquare , and Reddit .
It took Amazon over a week to bring its system fully back online , and some customer data was lost permanently .
But one company whose site did not crash was Netflix .
It turns out that Netflix had made themselves “ antifragile ” by employing software they called “ Chaos Monkey , ” which regularly and randomly brought down Netflix servers .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learned how to nevertheless keep other portions of their network running .
And so when Amazon US-East crashed , Netflix ran on , unfazed .
This phenomenon is discussed by Nassim Taleb in his book Antifragile : a system that depends on the absence of change is fragile .
The companies that focused on keeping all of their servers up and running all the time went completely offline when Amazon crashed from under them .
But the company that had exposed itself to lots of little crashes could handle the big crash .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ undesirable ” changes stress the system in a way that can make it stronger .
The idea of antifragility does not apply only to computer networks .
For instance , by trying to eliminate minor downturns in the economy , central bank policy can make that economy extremely vulnerable to a major recession .
Running only on treadmills or tracks makes the joints extremely vulnerable when , say , one steps in a pothole in the sidewalk .
What does this have to do with trade policy ?
For many reasons , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of goods are subject to unexpected shocks .
Both a regime of “ unfettered ” free trade , and its opposite , that of complete autarchy , are fragile in the face of such shocks .
A trade policy aimed not at complete free trade or protectionism , but at making an economy better at absorbing and adapting to rapid change , is more sane and salutary than either extreme .
Furthermore , we suggest practicing for shocks can help make an economy antifragile .
Amongst academic economists , the pure free-trade position @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international trade , absent the artificial interference of government trade policy , is generally based upon the “ principle of comparative advantage , ” first formulated by the English economist David Ricardo in the early 19th century .
Ricardo pointed out , quite correctly , that even if , among two potential trading partners looking to trade a pair of goods , one of them is better at producing both of them , there still exist potential gains from trade—so long as one of them is relatively better at producing one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a consequence of this condition ) relatively better at producing the other .
For example , Lebron James may be better than his local house painter at playing basketball , and at painting houses , given his extreme athleticism and long reach .
But he is so much more “ better ” at basketball that it can still make sense for him to concentrate on basketball and pay the painter to paint his house .
And so , per Ricardo , it is among nations : even if , say , Sweden can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efficiently than Scotland , if Scotland is relatively less bad at producing sweaters than cars , it still makes sense for Scotland to produce only wool sweaters , and trade with Sweden for the cars it needs .
When we take comparative advantage to its logical conclusion at the global scale , it suggests that each agent ( say , nation ) should focus on one major industry domestically and that no two agents should specialize in the same industry .
To do so would be to sacrifice the supposed advantage of sourcing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to produce a particular good , with no gain for anyone .
Good so far , but Ricardo ’ s case contains two critical hidden assumptions : first , that the prices of the goods in question will remain more or less stable in the global marketplace , and second that the availability of imported goods from specialized producers will remain uninterrupted , such that sacrificing local capabilities for cheaper foreign alternatives .
So what happens in Scotland if the Swedes suddenly go crazy for yak hair sweaters ( produced in Tibet ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sweaters at all ?
The price of those sweaters crashes , and Scotland now finds itself with most of its productive capacity specialized in making a product that can only be sold at a loss .
Or what transpires if Scotland is no longer able , for whatever reason , to produce sweaters , but the Swedes need sweaters to keep warm ?
Swedes were perhaps once able to make their own sweaters , but have since funneled all their resources into making cars , and have even lost the knowledge of sweater-making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Swedes have to rapidly build the infrastructure and workforce needed to make sweaters , and regain the knowledge of how to do so , as the Scots had not only been their sweater supplier , but the only global sweater supplier .
So we see that the case for extreme specialization , based on a first-order understanding of comparative advantage , collapses when faced with a second-order effect of a dramatic change in relative prices or conditions of supply .
That all may sound very theoretical , but collapses due to over-specialization , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ based on naive comparative-advantage analysis , have happened all too often .
For instance , a number of African economies , persuaded to base their entire economy on a single good in which they had a comparative advantage ( e.g , gold , cocoa , oil , or bauxite ) , saw their economies crash when the price of that commodity fell .
People who had formerly been largely self-sufficient found themselves wage laborers for multinationals in good times , and dependents on foreign charity during bad times .
While the case for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letting prices vary , it gets even worse for the “ just specialize in the single thing you do best ” folks once we add in considerations of pandemics , wars , extreme climate change , and other such shocks .
We have just witnessed how relying on China for such a high percentage of our medical supplies and manufacturing has proven unwise when faced with an epidemic originating in China .
On a smaller scale , the great urban theorist Jane Jacobs stressed the need for economic diversity in a city if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s over-reliance on the automobile industry , and its subsequent collapse when that industry largely deserted it , is a prominent example of Jacobs ’ point .
And while Detroit is perhaps the most famous example of a city collapsing due to over-specialization , it is far from the only one .
All of this suggests that trade policy , at any level , should have , as its primary goal , the encouragement of diversity in that level ’ s economic activity .
To embrace the extremes of “ pure free trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to become more susceptible to catastrophe from changing conditions .
A region that can produce only a few goods is fragile in the face of an event , like the coronavirus , that disrupts the flow of outside goods .
On the other hand , turning completely inward , and cutting the region off from the outside , leaves it without outside help when confronting a local disaster , like an extreme drought .
To be resilient as a social entity , whether a nation , region , city , or family , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and external resources it can draw upon for sustenance .
Even for an individual , total specialization and complete autarchy are both bad bets .
If your only skill is repairing Sony Walkmen , you were probably pretty busy in 2000 , but by today you likely don ’ t have much work .
Complete individual autarchy isn ’ t ever really even attempted : if you watch YouTube videos of supposedly “ self-reliant ” people in the wilderness , you will find them using axes , radios , saws , solar panels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shoes , tents , and many more goods produced by others .
In the technical literature , having such diversity at multiple scales is referred to as “ multiscale variety.
” In a system that displays multiscale variety , no single scale accounts for all of the diversity of behavior in the system .
The practical importance of this is related to the fact that shocks themselves come at different scales .
Some shocks might be limited to a town or a region , for instance local weather events , while others can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus pandemic we are currently facing .
A system with multiscale variety is able to respond to shocks at the scale at which they occur : if one region experiences a drought while a neighboring region does not , agricultural supplementation from the currently abundant region can be leveraged .
At a smaller scale , if one field of potatoes becomes infested with a pest , while the adjacent cows in pasture are spared , the family who owns the farm will still be able to feed themselves and supply products to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question becomes how can trade policy , conceived broadly , promote the necessary variety and resiliency to mitigate and thrive in the face of the unexpected ?
Crucially , we should learn from the tech companies : practice disconnecting , and do it randomly .
In our view there are two important components to the intentional disruption : ( 1 ) it is regular enough to generate “ muscle memory ” type responses ; and ( 2 ) it is random enough that responses are not “ overfit ” to particular scenarios .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ such a policy might create some hardships , but there are few institutional barriers to doing so .
One week , simply declare , “ Let ’ s pretend all of the grocery stores are empty , and try getting by only on what we can produce in the yard or have stockpiled in our house !
” On another occasion , perhaps , see if you can keep your house warm for a few days without input from utility companies .
Businesses are also largely free of institutional barriers to practicing disconnecting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We are awfully dependent on supplier X : this week , we are not going to order from them , and let ’ s see what we can do instead !
” A business can also seek out external alternatives to over-reliance on crucial internal resources : for instance , if your top tech guy can hold your business hostage , it is a good idea to find an outside consulting firm that could potentially fill his role .
When we get up to the scale of the nation , things become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If Freedonia suddenly bans the import of goods from Ruritania , even for a week , Ruritania is likely to regard this as a “ trade war , ” and may very well go to the WTO and seek relief .
However , the point of this reorientation of trade policy is not to promote hostility to other countries , but to make one ’ s own country more resilient .
A possible solution to this problem is that a national government could periodically , at random times , buy all of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country , and stockpile them .
Then the foreign supplier would have no cause for complaint : its goods are still being purchased !
But domestic manufacturers would have to learn to adjust to a disappearance of the supply of palm oil from Indonesia , or tin from China , or oil from Norway .
Critics will complain that such government management of trade flows , even with the noble aim of rendering an economy antifragile , will inevitably be turned to less pure purposes , like protecting politically powerful industrialists .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ though the pursuit of free trade hasn ’ t itself yielded perverse outcomes , such as the NAFTA trade agreement that ran to over one thousand pages .
Any good aim is likely to suffer diversion as it passes through the rough-and-tumble of political reality .
Thus , we might as well set our sites on an ideal policy , even though it won ’ t be perfectly realized .
We must learn to deal with disruptions when success is not critical to survival .
The better we become at responding to unexpected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be each time we face an event beyond our control that demands an adaptive response .
To wait until adaptation is necessary makes us fragile when a real crisis appears .
We should begin to develop an antifragile economy today , by causing our own disruptions and learning to overcome them .
Deliberately disrupting our own economy may sound crazy .
But then , so did deliberately crashing one ’ s own servers , until Chaos Monkey proved that it works .
Gene Callahan teaches at the Tandon School of Engineering at New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ data scientist and researcher at the New England Complex Systems Institute .

On April 21, 2011, the region of Amazon Web Services covering eastern North America crashed. The crash brought down the sites of large customers such as Quora, Foursquare, and Reddit. It took Amazon over a week to bring its system fully back online, and some customer data was lost permanently.
But one company whose site did not crash was Netflix. It turns out that Netflix had made themselves “antifragile” by employing software they called “Chaos Monkey,” which regularly and randomly brought down Netflix servers. By continually crashing their own servers, Netflix learned how to nevertheless keep other portions of their network running. And so when Amazon US-East crashed, Netflix ran on, unfazed.
This phenomenon is discussed by Nassim Taleb in his book Antifragile: a system that depends on the absence of change is fragile. The companies that focused on keeping all of their servers up and running all the time went completely offline when Amazon crashed from under them. But the company that had exposed itself to lots of little crashes could handle the big crash. That is because the minor, “undesirable” changes stress the system in a way that can make it stronger.
The idea of antifragility does not apply only to computer networks. For instance, by trying to eliminate minor downturns in the economy, central bank policy can make that economy extremely vulnerable to a major recession. Running only on treadmills or tracks makes the joints extremely vulnerable when, say, one steps in a pothole in the sidewalk.
What does this have to do with trade policy? For many reasons, such as the recent coronavirus outbreak, flows of goods are subject to unexpected shocks.
Both a regime of “unfettered” free trade, and its opposite, that of complete autarchy, are fragile in the face of such shocks. A trade policy aimed not at complete free trade or protectionism, but at making an economy better at absorbing and adapting to rapid change, is more sane and salutary than either extreme. Furthermore, we suggest practicing for shocks can help make an economy antifragile.
Amongst academic economists, the pure free-trade position is more popular. The case for international trade, absent the artificial interference of government trade policy, is generally based upon the “principle of comparative advantage,” first formulated by the English economist David Ricardo in the early 19th century. Ricardo pointed out, quite correctly, that even if, among two potential trading partners looking to trade a pair of goods, one of them is better at producing both of them, there still exist potential gains from trade—so long as one of them is relatively better at producing one of the goods, and the other (as a consequence of this condition) relatively better at producing the other. For example, Lebron James may be better than his local house painter at playing basketball, and at painting houses, given his extreme athleticism and long reach. But he is so much more “better” at basketball that it can still make sense for him to concentrate on basketball and pay the painter to paint his house.
And so, per Ricardo, it is among nations: even if, say, Sweden can produce both cars and wool sweaters more efficiently than Scotland, if Scotland is relatively less bad at producing sweaters than cars, it still makes sense for Scotland to produce only wool sweaters, and trade with Sweden for the cars it needs.
When we take comparative advantage to its logical conclusion at the global scale, it suggests that each agent (say, nation) should focus on one major industry domestically and that no two agents should specialize in the same industry. To do so would be to sacrifice the supposed advantage of sourcing from the agent who is best positioned to produce a particular good, with no gain for anyone.
Good so far, but Ricardo’s case contains two critical hidden assumptions: first, that the prices of the goods in question will remain more or less stable in the global marketplace, and second that the availability of imported goods from specialized producers will remain uninterrupted, such that sacrificing local capabilities for cheaper foreign alternatives.
So what happens in Scotland if the Swedes suddenly go crazy for yak hair sweaters (produced in Tibet) and are no longer interested in Scottish sweaters at all? The price of those sweaters crashes, and Scotland now finds itself with most of its productive capacity specialized in making a product that can only be sold at a loss.
Or what transpires if Scotland is no longer able, for whatever reason, to produce sweaters, but the Swedes need sweaters to keep warm? Swedes were perhaps once able to make their own sweaters, but have since funneled all their resources into making cars, and have even lost the knowledge of sweater-making. Now to keep warm, the Swedes have to rapidly build the infrastructure and workforce needed to make sweaters, and regain the knowledge of how to do so, as the Scots had not only been their sweater supplier, but the only global sweater supplier.
So we see that the case for extreme specialization, based on a first-order understanding of comparative advantage, collapses when faced with a second-order effect of a dramatic change in relative prices or conditions of supply.
That all may sound very theoretical, but collapses due to over-specialization, prompted by international agencies advising developing economies based on naive comparative-advantage analysis, have happened all too often. For instance, a number of African economies, persuaded to base their entire economy on a single good in which they had a comparative advantage (e.g, gold, cocoa, oil, or bauxite), saw their economies crash when the price of that commodity fell. People who had formerly been largely self-sufficient found themselves wage laborers for multinationals in good times, and dependents on foreign charity during bad times.
While the case for extreme specialization in production collapses merely by letting prices vary, it gets even worse for the “just specialize in the single thing you do best” folks once we add in considerations of pandemics, wars, extreme climate change, and other such shocks. We have just witnessed how relying on China for such a high percentage of our medical supplies and manufacturing has proven unwise when faced with an epidemic originating in China.
On a smaller scale, the great urban theorist Jane Jacobs stressed the need for economic diversity in a city if it is to flourish. Detroit’s over-reliance on the automobile industry, and its subsequent collapse when that industry largely deserted it, is a prominent example of Jacobs’ point. And while Detroit is perhaps the most famous example of a city collapsing due to over-specialization, it is far from the only one.
All of this suggests that trade policy, at any level, should have, as its primary goal, the encouragement of diversity in that level’s economic activity. To embrace the extremes of “pure free trade” or “total self-sufficiency” is to become more susceptible to catastrophe from changing conditions. A region that can produce only a few goods is fragile in the face of an event, like the coronavirus, that disrupts the flow of outside goods. On the other hand, turning completely inward, and cutting the region off from the outside, leaves it without outside help when confronting a local disaster, like an extreme drought.
To be resilient as a social entity, whether a nation, region, city, or family, will have a diverse mix of internal and external resources it can draw upon for sustenance. Even for an individual, total specialization and complete autarchy are both bad bets. If your only skill is repairing Sony Walkmen, you were probably pretty busy in 2000, but by today you likely don’t have much work. Complete individual autarchy isn’t ever really even attempted: if you watch YouTube videos of supposedly “self-reliant” people in the wilderness, you will find them using axes, radios, saws, solar panels, pots and pans, shirts, shoes, tents, and many more goods produced by others.
In the technical literature, having such diversity at multiple scales is referred to as “multiscale variety.” In a system that displays multiscale variety, no single scale accounts for all of the diversity of behavior in the system. The practical importance of this is related to the fact that shocks themselves come at different scales. Some shocks might be limited to a town or a region, for instance local weather events, while others can be much more widespread, such as the coronavirus pandemic we are currently facing.
A system with multiscale variety is able to respond to shocks at the scale at which they occur: if one region experiences a drought while a neighboring region does not, agricultural supplementation from the currently abundant region can be leveraged. At a smaller scale, if one field of potatoes becomes infested with a pest, while the adjacent cows in pasture are spared, the family who owns the farm will still be able to feed themselves and supply products to the market.
Understanding this, the question becomes how can trade policy, conceived broadly, promote the necessary variety and resiliency to mitigate and thrive in the face of the unexpected? Crucially, we should learn from the tech companies: practice disconnecting, and do it randomly. In our view there are two important components to the intentional disruption: (1) it is regular enough to generate “muscle memory” type responses; and (2) it is random enough that responses are not “overfit” to particular scenarios.
For an individual or family, implementing such a policy might create some hardships, but there are few institutional barriers to doing so. One week, simply declare, “Let’s pretend all of the grocery stores are empty, and try getting by only on what we can produce in the yard or have stockpiled in our house!” On another occasion, perhaps, see if you can keep your house warm for a few days without input from utility companies.
Businesses are also largely free of institutional barriers to practicing disconnecting. A company can simply say, “We are awfully dependent on supplier X: this week, we are not going to order from them, and let’s see what we can do instead!” A business can also seek out external alternatives to over-reliance on crucial internal resources: for instance, if your top tech guy can hold your business hostage, it is a good idea to find an outside consulting firm that could potentially fill his role.
When we get up to the scale of the nation, things become (at least institutionally) trickier. If Freedonia suddenly bans the import of goods from Ruritania, even for a week, Ruritania is likely to regard this as a “trade war,” and may very well go to the WTO and seek relief. However, the point of this reorientation of trade policy is not to promote hostility to other countries, but to make one’s own country more resilient. A possible solution to this problem is that a national government could periodically, at random times, buy all of the imports of some good from some other country, and stockpile them. Then the foreign supplier would have no cause for complaint: its goods are still being purchased! But domestic manufacturers would have to learn to adjust to a disappearance of the supply of palm oil from Indonesia, or tin from China, or oil from Norway.
Critics will complain that such government management of trade flows, even with the noble aim of rendering an economy antifragile, will inevitably be turned to less pure purposes, like protecting politically powerful industrialists. But so what? It is not as though the pursuit of free trade hasn’t itself yielded perverse outcomes, such as the NAFTA trade agreement that ran to over one thousand pages. Any good aim is likely to suffer diversion as it passes through the rough-and-tumble of political reality. Thus, we might as well set our sites on an ideal policy, even though it won’t be perfectly realized.
We must learn to deal with disruptions when success is not critical to survival. The better we become at responding to unexpected shocks, the lower the cost will be each time we face an event beyond our control that demands an adaptive response. To wait until adaptation is necessary makes us fragile when a real crisis appears. We should begin to develop an antifragile economy today, by causing our own disruptions and learning to overcome them. Deliberately disrupting our own economy may sound crazy. But then, so did deliberately crashing one’s own servers, until Chaos Monkey proved that it works.
Gene Callahan teaches at the Tandon School of Engineering at New York University. Joe Norman is a data scientist and researcher at the New England Complex Systems Institute.


theamericanconservative--2020-03-27--Why I’m Nominating a Hong Kong Freedom Fighter for the Nobel

Hong Kong National Party member Andy Chan Ho-tin meets the media at the statue square in Central .
( Photo by Sam Tsang/South China Morning Post via Getty Images ) In February of this year , I nominated Andy Chan for the Nobel Peace Prize .
It wasn ’ t my idea .
Ishii Hidetoshi , the vice president of the Free Indo-Pacific Alliance—a partnership of Tibetans , Uyghurs , Mongolians , and many other ethnic and religious minorities—contacted me a couple of weeks before to ask me to be the official nominating party .
There are certain conditions that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and I happened to fit the bill .
I jumped at the chance to be a part of the nomination .
Why ?
The answer is simple : because of who Andy Chan is , and what the People ’ s Republic of China is .
Andy Chan is a Hong Kong political leader and one of the most prominent faces of the freedom movement in that city .
Chan is young , but he has spent much of his adult life working within the system to secure freedom and human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Umbrella Movement in 2014—a sea of protesters armed with brollies and parasols—and two years later founded the Hong Kong National Party , the first political party in history to call for the full independence of Hong Kong from the People ’ s Republic of China .
Chan was duly prohibited from running for election to the Legislative Council ( LegCo ) in September of that same year .
So much for one country , two systems .
In 2018 , the PRC puppet government in Hong Kong invoked an obscure colonial-era law to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chan was the first person ever prevented from running for election in Hong Kong .
His party was the first party in Hong Kong history to be dissolved .
Further harassment followed .
For example , I and my colleague Arimoto Takashi at Seiron—a storied and highly respected monthly news and opinion journal in Japan—were scheduled to interview Chan in Tokyo during the summer of 2019 .
But Chan was arrested just before boarding his flight , on laughable weapons charges ( including possession of bows and arrows ) .
Those charges were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had passed for Chan to take part in a key gathering of conservatives here , CPAC ’ s convention in Japan .
On the sidelines of that convention , I had the chance to interview China specialist Gordon Chang .
Chang reinforced for me the second reason I was eager to nominate Andy Chan for the Nobel Peace Prize : what the PRC is .
It is important to remember that Andy Chan is attempting to win freedom from what Chang describes as an authoritarian government , one that is now widely characterized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” regime .
This is not hyperbole ; the comparison is apt .
For example , veteran China researcher Steven Mosher has documented extensively the practice of “ gendercide ” within the PRC .
China ’ s one-child policy—a Club of Rome population control offshoot that mercifully was modified into a “ two-child policy ” in 2016—was the catalyst for perhaps the worst sex-based culling of a human population in history .
Tens of millions fewer females than males were born in China over the course of the one-child policy , many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government .
But this is just one aspect of the PRC .
To truly understand the country , and why Andy Chan and the vast majority of Hongkongers want nothing to do with it , we must X-ray the Chinese map to see what lies beneath the monochrome sea of crimson ink .
The People ’ s Republic of China , like the United States of America , is the product of brutal conquest .
Both empires shored up their positions by removing or simply exterminating ( right down to the cultural roots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the distant capital .
If you are reading this essay in English , and not Diné or Tsalagi , you ’ ll get the picture .
Also , both empires really got started in the wake of a civil war—America ’ s in the 1860s , China ’ s lasting intermittently from 1911 to 1949 , when the PRC was declared by Mao Zedong and the last of the Nationalist pretenders under Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan .
Both empires used the rural poor as cannon fodder while the urban elite grew rich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escape the summer heat .
There is a key difference , though , and it helps us understand the position of Hong Kong .
Unlike the American imperialist juggernaut , which looked out on a vast continent of variegated indigenous populations with little to no political cohesion , the Beijing imperialists had most of their work done for them by the Qing Empire , a Manchu polity the borders of which are very close to the borders of the PRC today .
The Americans forged an empire .
The Chinese inherited one .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Ottoman bent of mind , willing to tolerate a great diversity of customs and practices in their sprawling domains , the Han who succeeded them were rabid and racialist nationalists .
The existence of Tibetans , Mongolians , Uyghurs , Bai , Dai , Hmong , ethnic Koreans , Manchurians , Christians , Jews , and other minorities was offensive to the Han racio-imperialists .
Everything had to be Sinified , meaning Han-ified , clear-cut , eradicated , ethnically cleansed .
The Han went on a rampage , burning down lamaseries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muslims in slave camps , pillaging Mongolia , going on bride kidnapping raids into Vietnam , and generally terrorizing everyone who was not Han Chinese .
It was , and is , one of the most extensive genocides and cultural erasures in human history .
And it is Han Aryanism , pure and simple , that gives Beijing , in its mind , title over Hong Kong .
The Hongkongers look like us , the Beijing government thinks , and therefore we rule them .
Andy Chan disagrees .
Chinese history is replete @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the claims to monoculturalism that are the basis for China ’ s empire .
Hongkongers do not speak the language of the Beijing overlords , do not like their culture , do not eat their foods , do not appreciate their interference in their affairs , and have no truck with their gross human rights violations .
Ironically , some of this distinction stems from another strain of imperialism , namely the 15-some-odd decades of British rule .
But the die is cast regardless .
Hong Kong does not want to partner with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which have never once voted in an election , Hongkongers rather like political self-determination and are not about to give it up without a fight .
Hong Kong , in other words , is not China .
“ China ” is what every grad student who has read Benedict Anderson will immediately recognize : an imagined community .
There is no China , but the Communist Party in Beijing can not exist without it .
Therefore anyone who questions the concept must be destroyed .
In the press statement I issued during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chan for the Nobel Peace Prize , I mentioned briefly the Wuhan virus that was then exploding into what is now a global pandemic .
I should have known—Andy Chan could have told me—that the PRC authorities would deploy disinformation and outright deception to change the name of the sickness in order to hide the origins of the crisis .
The PRC—which has entire government departments dedicated to the production and dissemination of dezinformatsiya ( all the U.S. has is lowly NPR ) —planted a few stories in the American and European press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racist terminology , and the rest was ( manufactured ) history .
Still , as I think Andy would agree , it is absolutely essential that the world call this manmade plague , caused by the contempt for human life that the PRC has displayed in all of its dealings with its own and other people , by its toponym .
For the same reason that we remember Tiananmen Square and not “ square , ” Katyn Forest and not “ forest , ” the Inner Mongolia Purge and not “ purge , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed by communists by rendering them , as at Yad Vashem , “ a memorial and a name.
” “ Wuhan virus ” defeats PRC propaganda by pinning the disaster to the government responsible for it .
“ Wuhan virus ” makes it clear that Beijing can not erase chthonicity simply by declaring that places do not exist and that the people who live in those places do not matter .
We in the U.S. are just now waking up to what that government ( and our own ) is capable of .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chan and his fellows in Hong Kong have known for a very long time .
Jason Morgan is associate professor at Reitaku University in Kashiwa , Japan .

In February of this year, I nominated Andy Chan for the Nobel Peace Prize.
It wasn’t my idea. Ishii Hidetoshi, the vice president of the Free Indo-Pacific Alliance—a partnership of Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongolians, and many other ethnic and religious minorities—contacted me a couple of weeks before to ask me to be the official nominating party. There are certain conditions that the Nobel committee requires nominators to meet, and I happened to fit the bill.
I jumped at the chance to be a part of the nomination. Why? The answer is simple: because of who Andy Chan is, and what the People’s Republic of China is.
Andy Chan is a Hong Kong political leader and one of the most prominent faces of the freedom movement in that city. Chan is young, but he has spent much of his adult life working within the system to secure freedom and human rights for his polis-mates. He joined the Umbrella Movement in 2014—a sea of protesters armed with brollies and parasols—and two years later founded the Hong Kong National Party, the first political party in history to call for the full independence of Hong Kong from the People’s Republic of China.
Chan was duly prohibited from running for election to the Legislative Council (LegCo) in September of that same year. So much for one country, two systems.
In 2018, the PRC puppet government in Hong Kong invoked an obscure colonial-era law to dissolve the Hong Kong National Party.
Chan was the first person ever prevented from running for election in Hong Kong. His party was the first party in Hong Kong history to be dissolved.
Further harassment followed. For example, I and my colleague Arimoto Takashi at Seiron—a storied and highly respected monthly news and opinion journal in Japan—were scheduled to interview Chan in Tokyo during the summer of 2019. But Chan was arrested just before boarding his flight, on laughable weapons charges (including possession of bows and arrows). Those charges were perfunctorily dropped as soon as the chance had passed for Chan to take part in a key gathering of conservatives here, CPAC’s convention in Japan.
On the sidelines of that convention, I had the chance to interview China specialist Gordon Chang. Chang reinforced for me the second reason I was eager to nominate Andy Chan for the Nobel Peace Prize: what the PRC is.
It is important to remember that Andy Chan is attempting to win freedom from what Chang describes as an authoritarian government, one that is now widely characterized within Hong Kong as the “Chinazi” regime. This is not hyperbole; the comparison is apt.
For example, veteran China researcher Steven Mosher has documented extensively the practice of “gendercide” within the PRC. China’s one-child policy—a Club of Rome population control offshoot that mercifully was modified into a “two-child policy” in 2016—was the catalyst for perhaps the worst sex-based culling of a human population in history. Tens of millions fewer females than males were born in China over the course of the one-child policy, many of them forcibly aborted by order of the government.
(Steven Mosher was kicked out of the Ph.D. program at Stanford for telling the truth about this. The rest of the American establishment also remained largely silent about the holocaust in the People’s Republic. Some in the American government were complicit. The ostrich response to PRC devilry is a subject that will take most of our lifetimes to understand. There will have to be truth-and-reconciliation committees in the U.S. to get past our material cooperation with grave evil.)
But this is just one aspect of the PRC. To truly understand the country, and why Andy Chan and the vast majority of Hongkongers want nothing to do with it, we must X-ray the Chinese map to see what lies beneath the monochrome sea of crimson ink.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of America, is the product of brutal conquest. Both empires shored up their positions by removing or simply exterminating (right down to the cultural roots, preferably) any groups that defied the distant capital. If you are reading this essay in English, and not Diné or Tsalagi, you’ll get the picture.
Also, both empires really got started in the wake of a civil war—America’s in the 1860s, China’s lasting intermittently from 1911 to 1949, when the PRC was declared by Mao Zedong and the last of the Nationalist pretenders under Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan. Both empires used the rural poor as cannon fodder while the urban elite grew rich and built villas in the mountains to escape the summer heat.
There is a key difference, though, and it helps us understand the position of Hong Kong. Unlike the American imperialist juggernaut, which looked out on a vast continent of variegated indigenous populations with little to no political cohesion, the Beijing imperialists had most of their work done for them by the Qing Empire, a Manchu polity the borders of which are very close to the borders of the PRC today.
The Americans forged an empire. The Chinese inherited one.
But whereas the Manchus had been largely of the Ottoman bent of mind, willing to tolerate a great diversity of customs and practices in their sprawling domains, the Han who succeeded them were rabid and racialist nationalists. The existence of Tibetans, Mongolians, Uyghurs, Bai, Dai, Hmong, ethnic Koreans, Manchurians, Christians, Jews, and other minorities was offensive to the Han racio-imperialists. Everything had to be Sinified, meaning Han-ified, clear-cut, eradicated, ethnically cleansed.
The Han went on a rampage, burning down lamaseries, raping Tibetan Buddhist nuns, putting Muslims in slave camps, pillaging Mongolia, going on bride kidnapping raids into Vietnam, and generally terrorizing everyone who was not Han Chinese. It was, and is, one of the most extensive genocides and cultural erasures in human history.
And it is Han Aryanism, pure and simple, that gives Beijing, in its mind, title over Hong Kong. The Hongkongers look like us, the Beijing government thinks, and therefore we rule them.
Andy Chan disagrees. Chinese history is replete with ethnic and linguistic diversity that belies the claims to monoculturalism that are the basis for China’s empire. Hongkongers do not speak the language of the Beijing overlords, do not like their culture, do not eat their foods, do not appreciate their interference in their affairs, and have no truck with their gross human rights violations. Ironically, some of this distinction stems from another strain of imperialism, namely the 15-some-odd decades of British rule. But the die is cast regardless. Hong Kong does not want to partner with Beijing. Unlike citizens of the PRC, which have never once voted in an election, Hongkongers rather like political self-determination and are not about to give it up without a fight.
Hong Kong, in other words, is not China. “China” is what every grad student who has read Benedict Anderson will immediately recognize: an imagined community. There is no China, but the Communist Party in Beijing cannot exist without it. Therefore anyone who questions the concept must be destroyed.
In the press statement I issued during the conference announcing the nomination of Andy Chan for the Nobel Peace Prize, I mentioned briefly the Wuhan virus that was then exploding into what is now a global pandemic. I should have known—Andy Chan could have told me—that the PRC authorities would deploy disinformation and outright deception to change the name of the sickness in order to hide the origins of the crisis. The PRC—which has entire government departments dedicated to the production and dissemination of dezinformatsiya (all the U.S. has is lowly NPR)—planted a few stories in the American and European press alleging that “Wuhan virus” was racist terminology, and the rest was (manufactured) history.
Still, as I think Andy would agree, it is absolutely essential that the world call this manmade plague, caused by the contempt for human life that the PRC has displayed in all of its dealings with its own and other people, by its toponym. For the same reason that we remember Tiananmen Square and not “square,” Katyn Forest and not “forest,” the Inner Mongolia Purge and not “purge,” we must pay tribute to those killed by communists by rendering them, as at Yad Vashem, “a memorial and a name.” “Wuhan virus” defeats PRC propaganda by pinning the disaster to the government responsible for it. “Wuhan virus” makes it clear that Beijing cannot erase chthonicity simply by declaring that places do not exist and that the people who live in those places do not matter.
We in the U.S. are just now waking up to what that government (and our own) is capable of. Let’s not forget that Andy Chan and his fellows in Hong Kong have known for a very long time.
Jason Morgan is associate professor at Reitaku University in Kashiwa, Japan.


theamericanconservative--2020-03-27--Not Just China: U.S. Reliance on Foreign Medical Supplies is Staggering

Jericho , N.Y. : A cotton swab used in a nasal passage as health care professionals test for COVID-19 at the ProHEALTH testing site in Jericho , New York on March 24 , 2020 .
( Photo by Steve Pfost/Newsday RM via Getty Images ) With the CCP Virus pandemic having exposed scary domestic shortages of critical medical goods ranging from safety masks to ventilators , along with potential shortages of pharmaceuticals , political leaders across the spectrum are finally regretting having allowed so much output of these products to migrate offshore .
China ’ s role in global supply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alarm , since its government has all but threatened to withhold supplies of medicines whenever it wishes .
But all told , at least 38 countries ( including the 27-member European Union ) have curbed exports of anti-pandemic products at some point since the CCP Virus began dominating headlines .
So potential foreign chokeholds in the nation ’ s health care-related supply chains appear global in scope .
The federal government ’ s best data make clear just how widespread the problem has become , and how steadily it ’ s been growing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s statistics on industry-by-industry manufacturing output and on exports and imports .
( The output data can be accessed through databases created by the Census Bureau for its Annual Survey of Manufactures that are located at this link .
The trade numbers can be retrieved at an interactive database maintained by the U.S. International Trade Commission that ’ s located at this link . )
Put together , they reveal how big a share of the American markets for drugs , medical devices , and protective gear is controlled by goods made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nation could be in big enough trouble if supply disruptions were to occur in normal times ( say , due to natural disasters in manufacturing centers abroad ) .
During a high-mortality pandemic like the CCP Virus , these levels of foreign dependency are high enough to guarantee significant numbers of needless deaths .
These statistics aren ’ t problem-free .
Principally , because the manufacturing output figures are so granular , and therefore take so long to compile , import penetration rates for these ( and other manufactures ) can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more timely import numbers can provide a reasonable indication of whether vulnerabilities are worsening or shrinking .
At the same time , the government ’ s main trade data aren ’ t nearly as detailed as the production numbers .
As a result , it ’ s not possible to know the percentage of , say , safety masks used in the United States that are produced abroad .
But it ’ s easy to come up with this number for the category in which masks ( and other protective gear ) are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact , the import penetration trends for these products exemplify the nation ’ s health care security weaknesses .
In 2002—a good baseline , since that ’ s the first year China was a member of the World Trade Organization—imports overall accounted for 16.7 percent of all surgical appliances and supplies used in the United States ( measured by value , not numbers of masks or pairs of gloves ) .
During the first full year of the Great Recession , 2008 , this share totaled 28.08 percent .
Notably , these imports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2002 , and had actually dropped to 0.49 percent by 2008 .
By 2016 , they accounted for a seemingly modest 6.54 percent of American consumption .
But here ’ s where another weakness in the data emerges : they say nothing about the origin of the materials , parts , and components of the final goods .
Keeping this qualification in mind , overall , 32.41 percent of surgical appliances and supplies were imported from other countries by 2011 , according to these figures .
In 2016 , that number reached @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. market .
It may well be higher these days , as between then and last year , U.S. overseas purchases jumped by more than 29 percent .
( Interestingly , in light of domestic shortages , U.S. exports in appliances and supplies actually rose by more than 13 percent during this period ! )
Ventilators , sadly , have been in the news , too ; they and related products like oxygen tents and bronchoscopes and inhalators and suction equipment are found in a big goods category called surgical and medical instruments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corners of the world represented 22.04 percent of American consumption .
By 2016 , this figure stood at 35.91 percent of a $ 37.5 billion national market , and over the next three years , imports grew nearly 31 percent .
( Exports expanded at a relatively slow 11.84 percent . )
Again , the China figures are small beans—the import penetration rate for 2016 was a mere 2.35 percent .
But these products often contain lots of electronics parts , and half the world ’ s printed circuit boards , for example @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Republic .
In other words , lots of existing global surge capacity throughout the sector is ultimately controlled by Beijing .
Thanks to the work of researchers like the Hastings Center ’ s Rosemary Gibson and independent journalist Katherine Eban , heavy and sometimes exclusive U.S. reliance on China for the chemical ingredients of numerous medicines has now become a major federal government concern .
Indeed , the Food and Drug Administration is keeping an especially close eye on the availability of no fewer than 20 pharmaceutical products that use Chinese raw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won ’ t say what they are , which calls for some Freedom of Information Act requests , pronto . )
But the import penetration figures make clear that supply disruptions could also originate elsewhere .
Between 2002 and 2016 , drugs produced overseas more than doubled their share of America ’ s consumption ( which stood at nearly $ 200 billion three years ago ) , from 17.23 percent to 38.51 percent .
As of 2019 , moreover , U.S. drugs imports were 20.34 percent higher than in 2016 .
The main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as of last year look encouragingly diversified and encouragingly friendly .
For example , Ireland was number one , with 22.15 percent of such shipments , followed by Switzerland with 14.05 percent .
But third and fourth , with 8.87 percent and 8.39 percent of imports , were Germany and India , respectively , both of which have limited or embargoed their medical exports this year .
And number five , at 7.38 percent , was Italy—whose current CCP Virus devastation could easily bring about export restrictions .
Nor is this pattern restricted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s leading foreign supplier of surgical and medical instruments ( the ventilators category ) was Mexico , which sold U.S. customers 28.58 percent of the $ 17.62 billion of total imports .
But export-curber Germany was number three , at 9.43 percent , and China was sixth , at 6.93 percent .
For surgical appliances and supplies ( the masks and protective gear category ) , Ireland topped the 2019 foreign supplier list , selling the United States 24.09 percent of its $ 18.21 billion of total imports .
But China was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in third place , at 9.68 percent , stood Malaysia , which banned mask exports on March 20 .
Purely domestic policy steps , like mandating more stockpiling or new recycling and re-use strategies , undoubtedly can add to national medical products supplies .
But even these general import penetration figures , along with the shortage reports that keep pouring in , make clear that enduring national health care security can ’ t be restored without a major ramping up of domestic output .
And since export-heavy economies like China ’ s and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to keep their American health care customers—including with all manner of predatory economic practices—it ’ s similarly clear that big , lasting U.S. departures from standard free trade policies will be unavoidable .
Alan Tonelson is the founder of RealityChek , a public policy blog focusing on economics and national security , and the author of The Race to the Bottom .

With the CCP Virus pandemic having exposed scary domestic shortages of critical medical goods ranging from safety masks to ventilators, along with potential shortages of pharmaceuticals, political leaders across the spectrum are finally regretting having allowed so much output of these products to migrate offshore.
China’s role in global supply chains has understandably sparked much of the alarm, since its government has all but threatened to withhold supplies of medicines whenever it wishes. But all told, at least 38 countries (including the 27-member European Union) have curbed exports of anti-pandemic products at some point since the CCP Virus began dominating headlines. So potential foreign chokeholds in the nation’s health care-related supply chains appear global in scope. The federal government’s best data make clear just how widespread the problem has become, and how steadily it’s been growing.
The figures come from the government’s statistics on industry-by-industry manufacturing output and on exports and imports. (The output data can be accessed through databases created by the Census Bureau for its Annual Survey of Manufactures that are located at this link. The trade numbers can be retrieved at an interactive database maintained by the U.S. International Trade Commission that’s located at this link.)
Put together, they reveal how big a share of the American markets for drugs, medical devices, and protective gear is controlled by goods made overseas. The big takeaway is that the nation could be in big enough trouble if supply disruptions were to occur in normal times (say, due to natural disasters in manufacturing centers abroad). During a high-mortality pandemic like the CCP Virus, these levels of foreign dependency are high enough to guarantee significant numbers of needless deaths.
These statistics aren’t problem-free. Principally, because the manufacturing output figures are so granular, and therefore take so long to compile, import penetration rates for these (and other manufactures) can be calculated only through 2016. Yet the more timely import numbers can provide a reasonable indication of whether vulnerabilities are worsening or shrinking. At the same time, the government’s main trade data aren’t nearly as detailed as the production numbers. As a result, it’s not possible to know the percentage of, say, safety masks used in the United States that are produced abroad. But it’s easy to come up with this number for the category in which masks (and other protective gear) are grouped—surgical appliances and supplies.
And in fact, the import penetration trends for these products exemplify the nation’s health care security weaknesses. In 2002—a good baseline, since that’s the first year China was a member of the World Trade Organization—imports overall accounted for 16.7 percent of all surgical appliances and supplies used in the United States (measured by value, not numbers of masks or pairs of gloves). During the first full year of the Great Recession, 2008, this share totaled 28.08 percent.
Notably, these imports from China were a tiny 1.5 percent in 2002, and had actually dropped to 0.49 percent by 2008. By 2016, they accounted for a seemingly modest 6.54 percent of American consumption. But here’s where another weakness in the data emerges: they say nothing about the origin of the materials, parts, and components of the final goods.
Keeping this qualification in mind, overall, 32.41 percent of surgical appliances and supplies were imported from other countries by 2011, according to these figures. In 2016, that number reached 41.81 percent of a $33.71 billion U.S. market. It may well be higher these days, as between then and last year, U.S. overseas purchases jumped by more than 29 percent. (Interestingly, in light of domestic shortages, U.S. exports in appliances and supplies actually rose by more than 13 percent during this period!)
Ventilators, sadly, have been in the news, too; they and related products like oxygen tents and bronchoscopes and inhalators and suction equipment are found in a big goods category called surgical and medical instruments. In 2002, imports from all corners of the world represented 22.04 percent of American consumption. By 2016, this figure stood at 35.91 percent of a $37.5 billion national market, and over the next three years, imports grew nearly 31 percent. (Exports expanded at a relatively slow 11.84 percent.)
Again, the China figures are small beans—the import penetration rate for 2016 was a mere 2.35 percent. But these products often contain lots of electronics parts, and half the world’s printed circuit boards, for example, are made in the People’s Republic. In other words, lots of existing global surge capacity throughout the sector is ultimately controlled by Beijing.
Thanks to the work of researchers like the Hastings Center’s Rosemary Gibson and independent journalist Katherine Eban, heavy and sometimes exclusive U.S. reliance on China for the chemical ingredients of numerous medicines has now become a major federal government concern. Indeed, the Food and Drug Administration is keeping an especially close eye on the availability of no fewer than 20 pharmaceutical products that use Chinese raw materials. (Unfortunately, the FDA won’t say what they are, which calls for some Freedom of Information Act requests, pronto.)
But the import penetration figures make clear that supply disruptions could also originate elsewhere. Between 2002 and 2016, drugs produced overseas more than doubled their share of America’s consumption (which stood at nearly $200 billion three years ago), from 17.23 percent to 38.51 percent. As of 2019, moreover, U.S. drugs imports were 20.34 percent higher than in 2016.
The main foreign suppliers to the American pharmaceuticals market as of last year look encouragingly diversified and encouragingly friendly. For example, Ireland was number one, with 22.15 percent of such shipments, followed by Switzerland with 14.05 percent. But third and fourth, with 8.87 percent and 8.39 percent of imports, were Germany and India, respectively, both of which have limited or embargoed their medical exports this year. And number five, at 7.38 percent, was Italy—whose current CCP Virus devastation could easily bring about export restrictions.
Nor is this pattern restricted to pharmaceuticals. Last year, America’s leading foreign supplier of surgical and medical instruments (the ventilators category) was Mexico, which sold U.S. customers 28.58 percent of the $17.62 billion of total imports. But export-curber Germany was number three, at 9.43 percent, and China was sixth, at 6.93 percent.
For surgical appliances and supplies (the masks and protective gear category), Ireland topped the 2019 foreign supplier list, selling the United States 24.09 percent of its $18.21 billion of total imports. But China was second, at 15.29 percent, and in third place, at 9.68 percent, stood Malaysia, which banned mask exports on March 20.
Purely domestic policy steps, like mandating more stockpiling or new recycling and re-use strategies, undoubtedly can add to national medical products supplies. But even these general import penetration figures, along with the shortage reports that keep pouring in, make clear that enduring national health care security can’t be restored without a major ramping up of domestic output. And since export-heavy economies like China’s and Germany’s will undoubtedly work overtime to keep their American health care customers—including with all manner of predatory economic practices—it’s similarly clear that big, lasting U.S. departures from standard free trade policies will be unavoidable.
Alan Tonelson is the founder of RealityChek, a public policy blog focusing on economics and national security, and the author of The Race to the Bottom.


theamericanconservative--2020-03-26--Sorry AOC, COVID-19 is Not an Excuse for Economic Revolution

Progressives want budget-busting structural change , but the stimulus is a temporary measure to keep the economy afloat .
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez ( D-NY ) addresses supporters during a campaign rally for Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders on March 8 , 2020 in Ann Arbor , Michigan .
( Photo by Brittany Greeson/Getty Images ) As a $ 2 trillion aid package designed offset the economic effects of the COVID-19 epidemic makes its way through Congress , Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez expressed optimism about what this legislation means for her progressive platform .
“ One enormous , major lesson that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Resistance to revolutionary policy was never really about a lack of money , or capacity , or logistics , ” she wrote on Twitter .
“ It was always about power and a lack of political will.
” Not all of progressive Democrats ’ proposals are big-spending items .
But concluding that a costly emergency response to a widespread , imminent , non-permanent threat means we should create whatever permanent programs we want is illogical and narrow-sighted .
Federal spending as a percentage of total economic spending reached its three highest peaks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I , and the Civil War .
At these times , the U.S. perceived existential threats and sought to end them as quickly as possible .
As with war , the COVID-19 threat is temporal—there is a clear time frame in which the U.S. must respond to the problem , and should the issue go unresolved for too long , Americans will suffer drastic , permanent , life-altering consequences .
Based on the data we have about COVID-19 infection and mortality rates , should current trends hold , we ’ re looking at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deaths .
And that ’ s not even counting the deaths of those who aren ’ t infected but can ’ t receive needed treatments because hospitals are well above capacity .
Besides this obvious tragedy , there will be long-term economic consequences .
Sudden dramatic reductions to the labor force and productivity will lead to shortages and inflation , increasing financial stresses on those of us left behind .
A better alternative , as has been well established , is social distancing .
By severely limiting contact with each other until our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up , we can be better equipped to handle the pandemic until a vaccine is available sometime next year .
Employing this strategy full-force could save millions of lives .
Of course , firm social distancing will cause the economy to slow dramatically for at least a few weeks .
Appropriately , many governors have ordered stay-at-home measures , which means people aren ’ t going to concerts , eating out , or going shopping ( except for groceries ) .
This is going to cause severe financial stress .
Many businesses can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month and won ’ t be able to open again once the economy starts returning to normal .
That ’ s a recipe for a long-term employment problem .
Likewise , many people can ’ t last a month without income , and some will fall behind in rent or utility bills .
Housing problems , of course , will lead to other long-term socioeconomic strains .
These consequences will bite governments , too , as revenues plummet while social expenditures skyrocket .
This is the logic behind an emergency aid package—we borrow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are in healthier economic circumstance post-coronavirus to save lives and livelihoods now and facilitate a return to normalcy .
The final bill certainly has some politics in it , but its core is crucial—cash directly to people and their families , small businesses , hospitals , and hard-hit industries .
Also important are incentives for employee retention and assistance to hospitals .
Paired with social cooperation , this bill brightens the light at the end of the tunnel .
Such logic is remarkably different from progressives ’ arguments for an economic “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private health insurance and replace it with by far the most generous , most expensive government health care system in the world .
The Justice Democrats ’ platform contains a federal jobs guarantee .
AOC ’ s initial Green New Deal idea would have seen the government spend to the tune of three quarters of the U.S. economy , the highest in the developed world .
The details of these ideas are less important than their most essential feature—they are permanent , structural changes .
They do not intend to carry people through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to change the economy itself .
While the emergency aid package internalizes the tradeoff between now and the future , progressive economic policies make no temporal distinction .
Spend a lot today , they say , and spend a lot tomorrow .
While the federal government has indeed opened an enormous deficit , Americans should see it as a reflection of the seriousness of COVID-19 and not an indicator of how easy deficits are .
To be sure , we will pay for these deficits down the road through interest payments and slower @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be glad for the temporary cash assistance to those who need it , and why Congress should continue to avoid introducing any larger structural changes .
Revolutionary policy would permanently shift the production and distribution of American resources .
While Ocasio-Cortez ’ s progressive platform wants a new normal , this aid seeks to help Americans ’ lives get back to normal .
John Kristof is a fiscal policy analyst based in Indianapolis and a contributor with Young Voices .
Follow him on Twitter @ jmkristof .

As a $2 trillion aid package designed offset the economic effects of the COVID-19 epidemic makes its way through Congress, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez expressed optimism about what this legislation means for her progressive platform.
“One enormous, major lesson that I hope people realize in this moment: Resistance to revolutionary policy was never really about a lack of money, or capacity, or logistics,” she wrote on Twitter. “It was always about power and a lack of political will.”
Not all of progressive Democrats’ proposals are big-spending items. But concluding that a costly emergency response to a widespread, imminent, non-permanent threat means we should create whatever permanent programs we want is illogical and narrow-sighted.
Federal spending as a percentage of total economic spending reached its three highest peaks during World War II, World War I, and the Civil War. At these times, the U.S. perceived existential threats and sought to end them as quickly as possible. As with war, the COVID-19 threat is temporal—there is a clear time frame in which the U.S. must respond to the problem, and should the issue go unresolved for too long, Americans will suffer drastic, permanent, life-altering consequences.
Based on the data we have about COVID-19 infection and mortality rates, should current trends hold, we’re looking at anywhere from 500,000 to 10 million American deaths. And that’s not even counting the deaths of those who aren’t infected but can’t receive needed treatments because hospitals are well above capacity.
Besides this obvious tragedy, there will be long-term economic consequences. Sudden dramatic reductions to the labor force and productivity will lead to shortages and inflation, increasing financial stresses on those of us left behind.
A better alternative, as has been well established, is social distancing. By severely limiting contact with each other until our testing and health care capacities can ramp up, we can be better equipped to handle the pandemic until a vaccine is available sometime next year. Employing this strategy full-force could save millions of lives.
Of course, firm social distancing will cause the economy to slow dramatically for at least a few weeks. Appropriately, many governors have ordered stay-at-home measures, which means people aren’t going to concerts, eating out, or going shopping (except for groceries).
This is going to cause severe financial stress. Many businesses can’t last without revenue for a month and won’t be able to open again once the economy starts returning to normal. That’s a recipe for a long-term employment problem. Likewise, many people can’t last a month without income, and some will fall behind in rent or utility bills. Housing problems, of course, will lead to other long-term socioeconomic strains. These consequences will bite governments, too, as revenues plummet while social expenditures skyrocket.
This is the logic behind an emergency aid package—we borrow tax revenues from our future selves, who are in healthier economic circumstance post-coronavirus to save lives and livelihoods now and facilitate a return to normalcy.
The final bill certainly has some politics in it, but its core is crucial—cash directly to people and their families, small businesses, hospitals, and hard-hit industries. Also important are incentives for employee retention and assistance to hospitals. Paired with social cooperation, this bill brightens the light at the end of the tunnel.
Such logic is remarkably different from progressives’ arguments for an economic “revolution.” Bernie Sanders wants to abolish private health insurance and replace it with by far the most generous, most expensive government health care system in the world. The Justice Democrats’ platform contains a federal jobs guarantee. AOC’s initial Green New Deal idea would have seen the government spend to the tune of three quarters of the U.S. economy, the highest in the developed world.
The details of these ideas are less important than their most essential feature—they are permanent, structural changes. They do not intend to carry people through a temporary economic slowdown. They plan to change the economy itself. While the emergency aid package internalizes the tradeoff between now and the future, progressive economic policies make no temporal distinction. Spend a lot today, they say, and spend a lot tomorrow.
While the federal government has indeed opened an enormous deficit, Americans should see it as a reflection of the seriousness of COVID-19 and not an indicator of how easy deficits are. To be sure, we will pay for these deficits down the road through interest payments and slower growth. That’s why we should be glad for the temporary cash assistance to those who need it, and why Congress should continue to avoid introducing any larger structural changes.
Revolutionary policy would permanently shift the production and distribution of American resources. While Ocasio-Cortez’s progressive platform wants a new normal, this aid seeks to help Americans’ lives get back to normal.
John Kristof is a fiscal policy analyst based in Indianapolis and a contributor with Young Voices. Follow him on Twitter @jmkristof.


theamericanconservative--2020-03-24--Remembering Jon Basil Utley: Our Champion and Yours

Jon Utley at the TAC gala after receiving the Lifetime Achievement Award , May 2019 .
( Dan Delgado/TAC ) Jon Basil Utley , a friend of The American Conservative and so many individuals too numerous to count , passed away Friday , according to his wife Ana .
In my last phone call with him on Thursday , March 12 , I learned he had been undergoing chemotherapy .
This was his second bout with cancer in a handful of years .
He was 86 years old .
Friends had been trying to reach Jon for the last month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in like Utley suddenly stops calling , returning phone calls , showing up at events or emailing , it ’ s a shock .
We know now that unlike his previous health problems and a more recent tangle with the flu , this challenge wouldn ’ t be countenanced with his usual stubbornness and flinty resolve .
Now is the time for regretting that we did not have one more email exchange , one more phone call , before he went off the grid .
So many people called Utley “ friend ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He zeroed in on interesting , authentic people at every station in life and cultivated new bonds with unusual fervor .
He was known to use the standing room at conferences , empty spaces between tables at dinners , and hallways outside of events to introduce his new and old compatriots to one another , hoping to spark meaningful collaborations .
Business cards were passed , years-long friendships formed .
Though his mother Freda was a famous Soviet exile and anti-Communist intellectual , and Utley had been raised in circles most of us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ University ’ s prestigious School of Foreign Service and later leading a dashing career in finance in South America ) he was more an everyman than a snob in the truest sense of the word .
Utley eschewed phony baloneys and uptight Washington , with its superficial obsessions with status , instead seeking out sincere fellow travelers in liberty .
He wanted to stop war and repression in all forms .
He believed free and independent thinking was the ultimate weapon against the corrupting power of the state and the power elite .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ mission , you had a seat , and a sincere audience , with Jon Utley .
No matter who you were or where you came from .
Utley ’ s interest in journalism emerged during his time in Bogota , Colombia , and he was the associate editor of The Times of the Americas for 12 years , from 1985 to 2003 , debating free market issues , anti-communism , and current international affairs .
Carrying on the lifelong mission of his mother , Ultey appreciated the power of information and began writing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and libertarian publications , including The Washington Post , The Washington Times , National Review , and Reason .
He was able , too , to use his self-made wealth to invest in a number of philanthropic and ideas-driven organizations that shared his values , and worked tirelessly to promote them .
Meanwhile , his anti-war convictions were fierce , but never so brave as when he joined other conservatives to oppose the first Gulf War in 1991 .
By 9/11 he was fully entrenched in a non-interventionist movement that questioned the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in the Middle East , and the use of force to spread American-styled democracy in places like Bosnia and Kosovo .
After the start of the Afghanistan War and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 , he was primed to join the new efforts at TAC and an emergent conservative bulwark against the war party in Washington was enjoined .
This is where I come in .
Sometime after I began writing for TAC in 2007 , I began attending informal lunches every month with several other like-minded individuals to hash out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time .
Think Patriot Act , secret torture memos , Abu Ghraib , Gitmo , the Surge , secret CIA renderings , drones .
Joining us would be TAC co-founder Scott McConnell and contributors Phil Giraldi , Gareth Porter , Chuck Pena , and Jim Bovard .
Then-Rep. Ron Paul ’ s legislative aide Dan McAdams would pop in , as would defense lawyers from Guantanamo Bay working in Washington , and of course , Utley .
Already rounding 80 years , Utley would never miss one of our “ Liberty Lunches.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and like the rest of us , juiced by the discourse of opposition .
The lunches went on for years , and he became a steady confidant in our professional struggles and a booster of our ideas , personally and as a group , no matter how Quixotic .
We fancied ourselves a minor rebellion in the Imperial City , and that suited Jon just fine .
To me , he was a source of confidence who brought to me a boundless stream of ideas and new connections .
He sent me blushing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and work at TAC in front of strangers , and was an inspiration to this day .
I wasn ’ t the only one : I look over at the bookcase in my office ( his old office ) and see Sen. Rand Paul ’ s new book , The Case Against Socialism .
In it is a simple note from Paul : “ thanks for letting us share your story.
” Aside from his steadfast interest and support for what we were all doing , Utley became a financial supporter of TAC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the masthead as our publisher , and contributed many articles not only about the wars , but on free trade and the economy , and his continuing fight against socialism and communism abroad .
Just last year , he was awarded The American Conservative ’ s first Lifetime Achievement Award , with a fitting speech from his friend John Henry .
To say he touched an untold number of lives and selflessly promoted so many others ’ interests and efforts , would be an understatement .
From human rights to civil rights , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s wars , Utley was on the “ right ” side of history from the beginning .
He often referred back to his father , who was killed in a Soviet prison camp in 1939 as the foundational element of his entire approach to the world .
His mother , who was forced to flee Russia with the tiny Jon , was a model of integrity and a lodestar for what was really important .
That is what he leaves with me : a true spirit of friendship , bound by shared ideals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a fealty to one ’ s principles no matter the cost .
He will be missed .

Jon Basil Utley, a friend of The American Conservative and so many individuals too numerous to count, passed away Friday, according to his wife Ana. In my last phone call with him on Thursday, March 12, I learned he had been undergoing chemotherapy. This was his second bout with cancer in a handful of years. He was 86 years old.
Friends had been trying to reach Jon for the last month or so. When someone as plugged in like Utley suddenly stops calling, returning phone calls, showing up at events or emailing, it’s a shock. We know now that unlike his previous health problems and a more recent tangle with the flu, this challenge wouldn’t be countenanced with his usual stubbornness and flinty resolve. Now is the time for regretting that we did not have one more email exchange, one more phone call, before he went off the grid.
So many people called Utley “friend” because that is what he was. He zeroed in on interesting, authentic people at every station in life and cultivated new bonds with unusual fervor. He was known to use the standing room at conferences, empty spaces between tables at dinners, and hallways outside of events to introduce his new and old compatriots to one another, hoping to spark meaningful collaborations. Business cards were passed, years-long friendships formed.
Though his mother Freda was a famous Soviet exile and anti-Communist intellectual, and Utley had been raised in circles most of us only read about (graduating from Georgetown University’s prestigious School of Foreign Service and later leading a dashing career in finance in South America) he was more an everyman than a snob in the truest sense of the word. Utley eschewed phony baloneys and uptight Washington, with its superficial obsessions with status, instead seeking out sincere fellow travelers in liberty. He wanted to stop war and repression in all forms. He believed free and independent thinking was the ultimate weapon against the corrupting power of the state and the power elite. If you were on board with this mission, you had a seat, and a sincere audience, with Jon Utley. No matter who you were or where you came from.
Utley’s interest in journalism emerged during his time in Bogota, Colombia, and he was the associate editor of The Times of the Americas for 12 years, from 1985 to 2003, debating free market issues, anti-communism, and current international affairs. Carrying on the lifelong mission of his mother, Ultey appreciated the power of information and began writing for a number of mainstream, conservative, and libertarian publications, including The Washington Post, The Washington Times, National Review, and Reason. He was able, too, to use his self-made wealth to invest in a number of philanthropic and ideas-driven organizations that shared his values, and worked tirelessly to promote them.
Meanwhile, his anti-war convictions were fierce, but never so brave as when he joined other conservatives to oppose the first Gulf War in 1991. By 9/11 he was fully entrenched in a non-interventionist movement that questioned the military-industrial complex, the U.S. foreign policy role in the Middle East, and the use of force to spread American-styled democracy in places like Bosnia and Kosovo. After the start of the Afghanistan War and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, he was primed to join the new efforts at TAC and an emergent conservative bulwark against the war party in Washington was enjoined.
This is where I come in. Sometime after I began writing for TAC in 2007, I began attending informal lunches every month with several other like-minded individuals to hash out the roiling news cycle during peak war time. Think Patriot Act, secret torture memos, Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, the Surge, secret CIA renderings, drones. Joining us would be TAC co-founder Scott McConnell and contributors Phil Giraldi, Gareth Porter, Chuck Pena, and Jim Bovard. Then-Rep. Ron Paul’s legislative aide Dan McAdams would pop in, as would defense lawyers from Guantanamo Bay working in Washington, and of course, Utley.
Already rounding 80 years, Utley would never miss one of our “Liberty Lunches.” He was animated by the collective outrage and like the rest of us, juiced by the discourse of opposition. The lunches went on for years, and he became a steady confidant in our professional struggles and a booster of our ideas, personally and as a group, no matter how Quixotic. We fancied ourselves a minor rebellion in the Imperial City, and that suited Jon just fine.
To me, he was a source of confidence who brought to me a boundless stream of ideas and new connections. He sent me blushing constantly as he talked up my writing and work at TAC in front of strangers, and was an inspiration to this day. I wasn’t the only one: I look over at the bookcase in my office (his old office) and see Sen. Rand Paul’s new book, The Case Against Socialism. In it is a simple note from Paul: “thanks for letting us share your story.”
Aside from his steadfast interest and support for what we were all doing, Utley became a financial supporter of TAC during uncertain times. He remains on the masthead as our publisher, and contributed many articles not only about the wars, but on free trade and the economy, and his continuing fight against socialism and communism abroad. Just last year, he was awarded The American Conservative’s first Lifetime Achievement Award, with a fitting speech from his friend John Henry. To say he touched an untold number of lives and selflessly promoted so many others’ interests and efforts, would be an understatement.
From human rights to civil rights, from excoriating despotism to ending Washington’s wars, Utley was on the “right” side of history from the beginning. He often referred back to his father, who was killed in a Soviet prison camp in 1939 as the foundational element of his entire approach to the world. His mother, who was forced to flee Russia with the tiny Jon, was a model of integrity and a lodestar for what was really important. That is what he leaves with me: a true spirit of friendship, bound by shared ideals, a responsibility to the truth, and a fealty to one’s principles no matter the cost. He will be missed.


theamericanconservative--2020-03-31--When COVID-19 Renders Your Job Obsolete

When COVID-19 Renders Your Job Obsolete

Yes , the very wealthy will survive , but many of us may end up more dependent on the state than we ever bargained for .
The virus is a threat .
Yet at the same time , we are making fundamental changes to society that will outlive the virus .
It is not only possible to hold these two ideas in mind at once , it is vital .
Only two weeks ago , I had an hourly paid , part-time job .
That made me a lot like the 60 percent of the American workforce who are also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contractors , adjuncts , and the massive undocumented labor force behind our farms , hotels , and restaurants .
The government ordered us to stop working and we did .
Nobody is entirely sure if they can just do that , but they did .
Now we wait like baby birds for that same government to drop checks into our mouths .
Overnight we went from workers to dependent on handouts .
The balance of power between Americans and their government just changed dramatically .
Perhaps the clearest example has taken place among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worked frantically on their own time to eliminate the need for classrooms and move instruction online .
Something that might have been rejected as unacceptable six months ago , or expected to take years under normal circumstances , was done overnight at no new cost .
No consultants , no arguments from parents and unions , just worker bees radically transforming the American educational system .
It won ’ t take long for institutions to realize they don ’ t need so many teachers , classrooms , and janitors anymore .
The infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instruct hundreds or thousands of kids .
Why have 10 math professors teach 10 sections in 10 rooms when one person can more or less do it online ?
So teachers , thank you for your efforts to iron out the bugs in a mass proof-of-concept experiment .
Don ’ t worry when you ’ re out of work : there are always alternatives in a free market system , right ?
A live classroom teacher may soon become just another luxury available only to a select wealthy few .
Quality will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of what the corona is doing , helping people adjust to a new standard .
Remember , most white-collar jobs once came with a private office , a secretary , and a formal lunch hour , never mind a pension .
Manufacturing jobs paid a living wage .
Stuff happens , ya know ?
For the second time in about only a decade , we are seeing our homes endangered .
As mortgage payments slip , the banks are sniffing around like hyenas .
Some people will fail to pay rent on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Occupy Wall Street ?
No , occupied by Wall Street .
Of course , the stock market will go back up ; it always does .
What occurs in the space between it going down and going back up is that the wealthiest Americans , having money in reserve , buy cheaply once-expensive stocks that you were forced to sell at the bottom to feed your family .
In a few years , you ’ ll start buying in again—you know , when you get back to work—to push up prices and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The wealthiest 1 percent captured 95 percent of the post-2008 financial crisis growth , while the bottom 80 percent , whose wealth was in their homes not stocks , became poorer .
Their wealth , such as it was , was a Potemkin vision that they didn ’ t actually own .
The last recession caused the largest redistribution of money in a century .
What about 2020 ?
Since over half of all Americans now own no stock , the wealth in 2020 will be sucked out of the so-called 10 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the upper-middle class .
They are the only ones who actually have money for the hyper-wealthy to take .
The bottom 90 percent are basically too poor to steal from ( except our labor—see above ) .
A month ago , the richest 10 percent of Americans owned 84 percent of the total value of the market .
The One Percent are in the process of taking from the Nine Percent below them right now .
Fair enough , in a way : much of the Nine Percent ’ s wealth was harvested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least in 2008 , it was just our money they took .
We now live under multilayered federal , state , and city states of emergency .
We are still sort of free to go out , but since most stores , bars , restaurants , theaters , gyms , and so on are closed by fiat , freedom of movement is an illusion , like prisoners circling the rec yard .
Even the manager of my local grocery has been making up his own rationing rules , choosing what products in what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Freedom of assembly is gone .
No more questions about whether Milo can speak on campus .
No more marches .
A month ago , if anyone said that to a Black Lives Matter group , the riot would have been followed by a First Amendment case .
Before the virus , we made fun of George W. Bush , who in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 seemed to downplay the severity of it all by telling Americans to go shopping , to visit Disney World .
That seems generous to a population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are being conditioned to reject the comfort and solidarity of being in the presence of others even as the media explains to little JoJo ’ s and Yorki ’ s how to report gatherings to the authorities via an online form .
Politically , the progressive movement disappeared with a proverbial whisper , not a bang .
Talk of a brokered convention , third-party stuff , whatever , is all gone .
Frightened people ( they ’ ve long been scared about Bernie ’ s ideas but the end came quick once the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blanket over their heads .
Joe Biden ’ s campaign slogan seems to be “ Better Things Aren ’ t Really Possible.
” Joe is the political equivalent of an Obama tribute band .
You ’ ve seen them , imitators who look a little like the Rolling Stones .
They play the hits competently but not skillfully , showing how wide the gap is between someone who can pull “ Honky Tonk Woman ” from the ether and someone who can just play the cords with enthusiasm .
It ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Joe Biden , telling everyone things will look like 1958 , it might just be enough .
Pro-tip : don ’ t wager too many dineros on the political future of AOC and The Squad .
Orwell in 1984 never really explained how it all came to be .
He wanted to shock readers with a dystopian society on page one , something that felt like it always was and thus always will be .
For us , however , living in this time , the evolution is of some interest .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ some people would fight for freedom .
He did not envision how easy it would be to manipulate fear into learned helplessness such that Americans would in the space of a week voluntarily give up most of their freedoms , along with their actual jobs .
Orwell envisioned the need for a massive Ministry of Truth when in fact all it took was a handful of deaths , some prolefeed—worthless entertainment for the masses about whether calling it “ Chinese flu ” was racism—and a dash of sky-is-falling articles .
Make fear the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You have to give things up for a safe society .
If you don ’ t , you ’ re selfish ; you ’ ve committed a thoughtcrime .
When do we as a society cross the line where social control is no longer affecting the spread of the disease but is damaging the lives we lead ?
Even as many of the steps taken these past weeks are pulled back , some will stick .
The same thing happened after 9/11 , when , frightened by terrorism , Americans gave up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ search with great enthusiasm .
Unintended consequences ?
Doubt that .
This did not just happen .
Our governments made it happen near enough to overnight and we wanted them to .
No debate , no judicial challenge .
No one wants to die .
But think ahead to how we are going to live .
Peter Van Buren , a 24-year State Department veteran , is the authorof We Meant Well : How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People , Hooper ’ s War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Ghosts of Tom Joad : A Story of the # 99 Percent .

The virus is a threat. Yet at the same time, we are making fundamental changes to society that will outlive the virus. It is not only possible to hold these two ideas in mind at once, it is vital.
Only two weeks ago, I had an hourly paid, part-time job. That made me a lot like the 60 percent of the American workforce who are also hourly employees, not to mention independent contractors, adjuncts, and the massive undocumented labor force behind our farms, hotels, and restaurants. The government ordered us to stop working and we did. Nobody is entirely sure if they can just do that, but they did. Now we wait like baby birds for that same government to drop checks into our mouths. Overnight we went from workers to dependent on handouts. The balance of power between Americans and their government just changed dramatically.
Perhaps the clearest example has taken place among teachers, who from kindergarten through college worked frantically on their own time to eliminate the need for classrooms and move instruction online. Something that might have been rejected as unacceptable six months ago, or expected to take years under normal circumstances, was done overnight at no new cost. No consultants, no arguments from parents and unions, just worker bees radically transforming the American educational system.
It won’t take long for institutions to realize they don’t need so many teachers, classrooms, and janitors anymore. The infrastructure now assembled can enable one teacher to instruct hundreds or thousands of kids. Why have 10 math professors teach 10 sections in 10 rooms when one person can more or less do it online? So teachers, thank you for your efforts to iron out the bugs in a mass proof-of-concept experiment. Don’t worry when you’re out of work: there are always alternatives in a free market system, right?
A live classroom teacher may soon become just another luxury available only to a select wealthy few. Quality will be what you can afford. That is part of what the corona is doing, helping people adjust to a new standard. Remember, most white-collar jobs once came with a private office, a secretary, and a formal lunch hour, never mind a pension. Manufacturing jobs paid a living wage. Stuff happens, ya know?
For the second time in about only a decade, we are seeing our homes endangered. As mortgage payments slip, the banks are sniffing around like hyenas. Some people will fail to pay rent on the same homes they used to own. Occupy Wall Street? No, occupied by Wall Street.
Of course, the stock market will go back up; it always does. What occurs in the space between it going down and going back up is that the wealthiest Americans, having money in reserve, buy cheaply once-expensive stocks that you were forced to sell at the bottom to feed your family. In a few years, you’ll start buying in again—you know, when you get back to work—to push up prices and fuel the rich folks’ gains. The wealthiest 1 percent captured 95 percent of the post-2008 financial crisis growth, while the bottom 80 percent, whose wealth was in their homes not stocks, became poorer. Their wealth, such as it was, was a Potemkin vision that they didn’t actually own. The last recession caused the largest redistribution of money in a century.
What about 2020? Since over half of all Americans now own no stock, the wealth in 2020 will be sucked out of the so-called 10 percent, the remains of what was once the upper-middle class. They are the only ones who actually have money for the hyper-wealthy to take. The bottom 90 percent are basically too poor to steal from (except our labor—see above). A month ago, the richest 10 percent of Americans owned 84 percent of the total value of the market. The One Percent are in the process of taking from the Nine Percent below them right now. Fair enough, in a way: much of the Nine Percent’s wealth was harvested out of the 2008 crisis.
At least in 2008, it was just our money they took. We now live under multilayered federal, state, and city states of emergency. We are still sort of free to go out, but since most stores, bars, restaurants, theaters, gyms, and so on are closed by fiat, freedom of movement is an illusion, like prisoners circling the rec yard. Even the manager of my local grocery has been making up his own rationing rules, choosing what products in what quantities he allows us to purchase.
Freedom of assembly is gone. No more questions about whether Milo can speak on campus. No more marches. A month ago, if anyone said that to a Black Lives Matter group, the riot would have been followed by a First Amendment case. Before the virus, we made fun of George W. Bush, who in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 seemed to downplay the severity of it all by telling Americans to go shopping, to visit Disney World. That seems generous to a population now cowering in their bedrooms. We are being conditioned to reject the comfort and solidarity of being in the presence of others even as the media explains to little JoJo’s and Yorki’s how to report gatherings to the authorities via an online form.
Politically, the progressive movement disappeared with a proverbial whisper, not a bang. Talk of a brokered convention, third-party stuff, whatever, is all gone. Frightened people (they’ve long been scared about Bernie’s ideas but the end came quick once the virus arrived) want to pull the blanket over their heads. Joe Biden’s campaign slogan seems to be “Better Things Aren’t Really Possible.”
Joe is the political equivalent of an Obama tribute band. You’ve seen them, imitators who look a little like the Rolling Stones. They play the hits competently but not skillfully, showing how wide the gap is between someone who can pull “Honky Tonk Woman” from the ether and someone who can just play the cords with enthusiasm. It’s a way to make a living, and for Joe Biden, telling everyone things will look like 1958, it might just be enough. Pro-tip: don’t wager too many dineros on the political future of AOC and The Squad.
Orwell in 1984 never really explained how it all came to be. He wanted to shock readers with a dystopian society on page one, something that felt like it always was and thus always will be. For us, however, living in this time, the evolution is of some interest.
Orwell was also an amateur, imagining some people would fight for freedom. He did not envision how easy it would be to manipulate fear into learned helplessness such that Americans would in the space of a week voluntarily give up most of their freedoms, along with their actual jobs. Orwell envisioned the need for a massive Ministry of Truth when in fact all it took was a handful of deaths, some prolefeed—worthless entertainment for the masses about whether calling it “Chinese flu” was racism—and a dash of sky-is-falling articles. Make fear the problem and empowering government becomes the solution. You have to give things up for a safe society. If you don’t, you’re selfish; you’ve committed a thoughtcrime.
When do we as a society cross the line where social control is no longer affecting the spread of the disease but is damaging the lives we lead? Even as many of the steps taken these past weeks are pulled back, some will stick. The same thing happened after 9/11, when, frightened by terrorism, Americans gave up their rights to privacy and freedom from search with great enthusiasm.
Unintended consequences? Doubt that. This did not just happen. Our governments made it happen near enough to overnight and we wanted them to. No debate, no judicial challenge. No one wants to die. But think ahead to how we are going to live.
Peter Van Buren, a 24-year State Department veteran, is the author of We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, Hooper’s War: A Novel of WWII Japan, and Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99 Percent.