theamericanconservative--2020-06-06--Are Porn Laws and Quarantines Part of the ‘Tyranny of the Majority?’

Recently , porn star Brandi Love writing at The Federalist cited Alexis de Tocqueville and his use of the phrase , “ the tyranny of the majority , ” in her defense of pornography , arguing that “ the First Amendment , as part of the Bill of Rights , protects the viewpoints of those in the minority from being oppressed.
” Another recent article at Being Libertarian , in turn , suggests that excessive enforcement of quarantine restrictions — vis-a-vis the COVID-19 epidemic— tends toward a “ tyranny of the majority.
” And , quite curiously , one can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a deterrent against the “ tyranny of the majority , ” or a clear example of it .
What , exactly , is the “ tyranny of the majority , ” what did it ’ s originators intend when they coined it , and what contemporary examples accurately manifest it ?
For starters , Tocqueville is widely credited with originating the phrase , but it , or something very similar , was employed by several others before him .
James Madison , writing in Federalist 10 in 1787 , warned of the destabilizing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an interested and overbearing majority ” on a government .
John Adams , writing in March 1788 in defense of the Constitution and a “ mixed government , consisting of three branches , ” called “ a single sovereign assembly , each member…only accountable to his constituents ; and the majority of members who have been of one party ” a “ tyranny of the majority.
” Irish political theorist Edmund Burke , writing in a 1790 letter , asserted that , “ the tyranny of a multitude is a multiplied tyranny.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theorist Tocqueville , perhaps more than any other , who popularized the concept of the “ tyranny of the majority.
” In Part I , Chapter 8 of Democracy in America , on the Federal Constitution , Tocqueville observes that “ democracies are naturally inclined to concentrate all the power of society in the hands of the legislature , ” which “ establishes the tyranny of the majority.
” In other words , without any mediating institutions , whatever the people will is reflected through the legislature , whose members are directly selected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Elsewhere , in Part II Chapter 7 , Tocqueville cites Thomas Jefferson , who argued in 1789 that “ the tyranny of the legislators is the most formidable dread at present , and will be for years.
” Thus , Tocqueville reasons , the Founders created a separation of powers between the legislative , executive , and judicial branches .
The Senate , with its longer terms and more senior members , and the electoral college , also temper this concentration of power .
That pretty well syncs with Adams ’ use of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on this idea in Part II , Chapter 7 .
He notes the “ immense actual power and a power of opinion almost as great ” possessed by the American majority .
Indeed , this power is so expansive , “ the only authority one wishes to please is the majority , all its projects are supported with enthusiasm ; but as soon as its attention is drawn elsewhere , all efforts come to an end.
” In other words , the fickleness of majority opinion leads to a certain schizophrenia in government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters , are frequently forced to shift gears .
But the power wielded by the majority can be even more insidious .
Says Tocqueville : And what I find most repulsive in America is not the extreme freedom that prevails there but the shortage of any guarantee against tyranny .
When a man or a party suffers from an injustice in the United States , to whom can he turn ?
To public opinion ?
That is what forms the majority .
To the legislative body ?
That represents the majority and obeys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
That is appointed by the majority and serves as its passive instrument .
To the public police force ?
They are nothing but the majority under arms .
To the jury ?
That is the majority invested with the right to pronounce judgments ; the very judges in certain states are elected by the majority .
So , however unfair or unreasonable the measure which damages you , you must submit .
Tyranny may thus manifest itself not only in tangible , political pressure , but in the “ effects of modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Oklahoma professor Donald J. Maletz interprets the French thinker .
This , explains Maletz , is a “ soft tyranny ” over the mind , “ not a defect of democracy but its direct implication.
” Notre Dame professor Patrick J. Deneen , writing on Tocqueville , calls this effect an “ internalized psychological control , an anticipation of disapproval by majorities and a concomitant attempt to avoid public commitment on any issue.
” The result , paradoxically , is a “ loss of actual influence in political life , ” as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constantly before the potential indignities of public life , ” writes Deneen .
Mass media , augmented by social media , presents a perfect example of this psychological effect on democracy .
In our “ cancel culture , ” citizens who violate the sentiments of the majority—say , in their comments on gender identity , sexuality , or quarantine restrictions—become the objects of public censure until they repent and show proper deference to the opinions and ideologies of the majority .
Trea Turner , shortstop of my beloved Nationals , was one such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ homophobic ” tweets he wrote while in college , including using “ gay ” as a derogatory slur .
“ There are no excuses for my insensitive and offensive language on Twitter , ” Turner quickly announced , while Nationals General Manager Mike Rizzo called Turner ’ s comments “ inexcusable ” and declared that he had personally spoken with the shortstop .
Tocqueville identifies several moderating forces against the potential for a “ tyranny of the majority.
” One is the “ absence of administrative centralization , ” as local municipal and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imposition of public will .
Others are attorneys , whose love of law , order , and procedure offer a counterbalance to majoritarian sentimentality ( apparently Tocqueville met no ambulance-chasers or those skilled in emotional court rhetoric while in the United States ) .
The jury system , inherited from the English , does something similar , sobering men as they recognize that they , too , could be the subject of a criminal hearing or lawsuit .
Thus we see two different forms of majoritarian tyranny described by Tocqueville : one the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the other a social and psychological paradigm that imposes uniformity of opinion on citizens who fear reprisals or social excommunication .
However , the ambiguity of what constitutes tyranny allows contemporary appropriators of this “ Tocquevellian ” phrase to direct it at anything the majority believes which they don ’ t like .
Indeed , many antebellum Southerners categorized Northern opposition to the institution of slavery—and attempts to limit or abolish it—as “ tyrannical.
” Which , given we ’ re talking about the enslavement of a particular race of people is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alternatively , that a majority of Americans still view polygamy , pederasty , or bestiality as morally abhorrent is perceived as “ tyrannical ” for those who would like to see such practices legalized .
Thus , as a political concept , warnings of a “ tyranny of the majority ” must be tethered to other fundamental principles , lest it lose its probity and political potency , and be wielded as carelessly as the words “ freedom ” or “ liberty.
” Many of these principles can be found elsewhere in Tocqueville @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and customs that encourage virtue and sacrifice ; the encouragement of religious belief and practice to instill virtue in citizens ; and active participation in local civic and voluntary organizations .
Viewed through this lens , informed by a more robust conception of “ the common good , ” it ’ s hard to imagine Adams , Madison , Jefferson , or Tocqueville viewing restrictions on pornography—with its many well-established detrimental effects—as “ tyrannical.
” Nor would they label the electoral college as such , given they viewed that precise political lever as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As for enforcement of quarantine restrictions… well , tackling that would require another article .

Recently, porn star Brandi Love writing at The Federalist cited Alexis de Tocqueville and his use of the phrase, “the tyranny of the majority,” in her defense of pornography, arguing that “the First Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, protects the viewpoints of those in the minority from being oppressed.” Another recent article at Being Libertarian, in turn, suggests that excessive enforcement of quarantine restrictions — vis-a-vis the COVID-19 epidemic— tends toward a “tyranny of the majority.” And, quite curiously, one can find those who label the electoral college a deterrent against the “tyranny of the majority,” or a clear example of it. What, exactly, is the “tyranny of the majority,” what did it’s originators intend when they coined it, and what contemporary examples accurately manifest it?
For starters, Tocqueville is widely credited with originating the phrase, but it, or something very similar, was employed by several others before him. James Madison, writing in Federalist 10 in 1787, warned of the destabilizing effect of “the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority” on a government. John Adams, writing in March 1788 in defense of the Constitution and a “mixed government , consisting of three branches,” called “a single sovereign assembly, each member…only accountable to his constituents; and the majority of members who have been of one party” a “tyranny of the majority.” Irish political theorist Edmund Burke, writing in a 1790 letter, asserted that, “the tyranny of a multitude is a multiplied tyranny.”
Nevertheless, it is the French political theorist Tocqueville, perhaps more than any other, who popularized the concept of the “tyranny of the majority.” In Part I, Chapter 8 of Democracy in America, on the Federal Constitution, Tocqueville observes that “democracies are naturally inclined to concentrate all the power of society in the hands of the legislature,” which “establishes the tyranny of the majority.” In other words, without any mediating institutions, whatever the people will is reflected through the legislature, whose members are directly selected by and accountable to the electorate. Elsewhere, in Part II Chapter 7, Tocqueville cites Thomas Jefferson, who argued in 1789 that “the tyranny of the legislators is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for years.” Thus, Tocqueville reasons, the Founders created a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The Senate, with its longer terms and more senior members, and the electoral college, also temper this concentration of power. That pretty well syncs with Adams’ use of the phrase cited above.
Tocqueville expands on this idea in Part II, Chapter 7. He notes the “immense actual power and a power of opinion almost as great” possessed by the American majority. Indeed, this power is so expansive, “the only authority one wishes to please is the majority, all its projects are supported with enthusiasm; but as soon as its attention is drawn elsewhere, all efforts come to an end.” In other words, the fickleness of majority opinion leads to a certain schizophrenia in government, as politicians, beholden to the voters, are frequently forced to shift gears.
But the power wielded by the majority can be even more insidious. Says Tocqueville:
And what I find most repulsive in America is not the extreme freedom that prevails there but the shortage of any guarantee against tyranny. When a man or a party suffers from an injustice in the United States, to whom can he turn? To public opinion? That is what forms the majority. To the legislative body? That represents the majority and obeys it blindly. To the executive power? That is appointed by the majority and serves as its passive instrument. To the public police force? They are nothing but the majority under arms. To the jury? That is the majority invested with the right to pronounce judgments; the very judges in certain states are elected by the majority. So, however unfair or unreasonable the measure which damages you, you must submit.
Tyranny may thus manifest itself not only in tangible, political pressure, but in the “effects of modern majoritarianism on thought,” as University of Oklahoma professor Donald J. Maletz interprets the French thinker. This, explains Maletz, is a “soft tyranny” over the mind, “not a defect of democracy but its direct implication.” Notre Dame professor Patrick J. Deneen, writing on Tocqueville, calls this effect an “internalized psychological control, an anticipation of disapproval by majorities and a concomitant attempt to avoid public commitment on any issue.” The result, paradoxically, is a “loss of actual influence in political life,” as “democratic man retreat[s] constantly before the potential indignities of public life,” writes Deneen.
Mass media, augmented by social media, presents a perfect example of this psychological effect on democracy. In our “cancel culture,” citizens who violate the sentiments of the majority—say, in their comments on gender identity, sexuality, or quarantine restrictions—become the objects of public censure until they repent and show proper deference to the opinions and ideologies of the majority.
Trea Turner, shortstop of my beloved Nationals, was one such object, once someone dug up “homophobic” tweets he wrote while in college, including using “gay” as a derogatory slur. “There are no excuses for my insensitive and offensive language on Twitter,” Turner quickly announced, while Nationals General Manager Mike Rizzo called Turner’s comments “inexcusable” and declared that he had personally spoken with the shortstop.
Tocqueville identifies several moderating forces against the potential for a “tyranny of the majority.” One is the “absence of administrative centralization,” as local municipal and county authorities operate as barriers to the imposition of public will. Others are attorneys, whose love of law, order, and procedure offer a counterbalance to majoritarian sentimentality (apparently Tocqueville met no ambulance-chasers or those skilled in emotional court rhetoric while in the United States). The jury system, inherited from the English, does something similar, sobering men as they recognize that they, too, could be the subject of a criminal hearing or lawsuit.
Thus we see two different forms of majoritarian tyranny described by Tocqueville: one the concentration of power in one government body, the other a social and psychological paradigm that imposes uniformity of opinion on citizens who fear reprisals or social excommunication. However, the ambiguity of what constitutes tyranny allows contemporary appropriators of this “Tocquevellian” phrase to direct it at anything the majority believes which they don’t like. Indeed, many antebellum Southerners categorized Northern opposition to the institution of slavery—and attempts to limit or abolish it—as “tyrannical.” Which, given we’re talking about the enslavement of a particular race of people is ironic, to say the least. Alternatively, that a majority of Americans still view polygamy, pederasty, or bestiality as morally abhorrent is perceived as “tyrannical” for those who would like to see such practices legalized.
Thus, as a political concept, warnings of a “tyranny of the majority” must be tethered to other fundamental principles, lest it lose its probity and political potency, and be wielded as carelessly as the words “freedom” or “liberty.” Many of these principles can be found elsewhere in Tocqueville: the perpetuation of important American habits and customs that encourage virtue and sacrifice; the encouragement of religious belief and practice to instill virtue in citizens; and active participation in local civic and voluntary organizations. Viewed through this lens, informed by a more robust conception of “the common good,” it’s hard to imagine Adams, Madison, Jefferson, or Tocqueville viewing restrictions on pornography—with its many well-established detrimental effects—as “tyrannical.” Nor would they label the electoral college as such, given they viewed that precise political lever as a moderating force against majoritarian tyranny. As for enforcement of quarantine restrictions… well, tackling that would require another article.
Casey Chalk covers religion and other issues for The American Conservative and is a senior writer for Crisis Magazine. He has degrees in history and teaching from the University of Virginia, and a masters in theology from Christendom College.


theamericanconservative--2020-06-06--Party Leaders: Comrade Leonid, Comrade Donald

The National Security Archive , an under-appreciated jewel in the crown of the George Washington University , has now made available in English translation its latest volume of Anatoly S. Chernyaev ’ s journal .
A long-time adviser to senior Soviet officials , Chernyaev was a diarist in the tradition of the American diplomat George Kennan—shrewd , uncompromisingly honest , both a patriot and something of a romantic .
This new volume begins in January 1980 .
The month prior , the Red Army had intervened in Afghanistan , touching off a sequence of events destined to culminate in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ USSR itself .
In his diary , Chernyaev acknowledged that the Soviet Union was already in a state of advanced political , economic , and moral decay .
The problem started at the top , Chernyaev describing party leader Leonid Brezhnev as “ completely senile.
” ( p. 1 ) While little evidence to exists to suggest that President Donald Trump suffers from senility , the resemblance between the Soviet leadership in the Age of Brezhnev and America ’ s in the Age of Trump is unmistakable and more than a little troubling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s more telling observations .
On the supreme leader ’ s work ethic : “ He does not read anything himself anymore , except for short public speeches .
Texts are read aloud to him , and only the ones that someone deems necessary within the ‘ sparing regimen ’ he is on to avoid worrying him.
” ( 2 ) On the leader ’ s decision-making : He “ adjusts to others ’ opinions and acts as if he came up with it himself.
” ( 14 ) On the leader ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senility is affecting the entire structure , the mechanism of top-level power , due to the senility of its leader… Most things are done to cater to One man—and to disturb him as little as possible .
… .
The entire elite appears in the eyes of the people as money-grubbers – material and spiritual plunderers of the country .
” ( 6 , 18 , 31 ) On the regime ’ s credibility : “ Our moral-ideological prestige is below any conceivable level .
It keeps falling due to our lies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ourselves , to all other peoples and parties .
And whatever does not fit the lies , we consider anti-Soviet , enemy machinations , or revisionism .
( 43 ) On the leader ’ s party : “ Glorification of Brezhnev was in full-force at the Plenum .
Everyone began with frothy enthusiasm about Leonid Ilyich ’ s speech—the deepest Marxist-Leninist document , a plan of action for the entire historical period , permeated with Leninist wisdom and a scientific approach , genuine Party-spirit and so forth ; it inspires , elevates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy .
Everyone thanked ‘ our Leonid Ilyich , ’ everyone committed to him personally to fulfill the tasks he assigned .
The glorification reached its moronic climax in Brezhnev ’ s own speech.
” ( 46 ) On the Afghanistan War : “ Afghanistan is like a sore that eats away at public consciousness and international life .
… Whose idea was this ?
… What for ?
Who is supposed to answer for this ?
… It is pointless to look for logic .
We pour several million into Afghanistan daily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blood of our soldiers .
What for—nobody can explain.
” ( 4 , 5 , 48 ) On the possibility of further miscalculation : “ It ’ s scary to think about what would happen if our side decides to take that step .
And they might , because the person making the decisions does not have the necessary information ( he can not even read what ’ s at his fingertips ) to assess the consequences .
But even if he was physically capable of reading everything , he would hardly be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decisions and actions.
” ( 49 ) On dying for one ’ s country : “ The main thing that once again stunned me : a war memorial near the church—the standard figure of a woman with an olive branch in her hands , a wall a little distance behind her with names of the fallen .
I read them , crying .
… One hundred fifty people .
That ’ s just from one village !
An entire marching company .
For some reason , in moments like these I always feel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 52 ) On the durability of the existing order : “ We ’ ve had enough for our time !
Russia won ’ t collapse in five-six years , so why thump our chest , why attempt risky changes ?
!
And the people will endure—they have no other options anyway , plus , ‘ they aren ’ t hungry.
’ … It seems our leaders made up their minds : ‘ Fuck them all , let them say whatever they want , they won ’ t do a thing against us !
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ On the advantages of being a great power : “ Because we are Russia , we can stay in such a crisis and idiocy for decades.
” ( 42 ) The final diary entry for the year was dated December 26 , 1980 .
Eleven years later to the day , the seemingly impossible occurred : The Soviet Union ceased to exist .
Andrew Bacevich is president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft .

The National Security Archive, an under-appreciated jewel in the crown of the George Washington University, has now made available in English translation its latest volume of Anatoly S. Chernyaev’s journal. A long-time adviser to senior Soviet officials, Chernyaev was a diarist in the tradition of the American diplomat George Kennan—shrewd, uncompromisingly honest, both a patriot and something of a romantic.
This new volume begins in January 1980. The month prior, the Red Army had intervened in Afghanistan, touching off a sequence of events destined to culminate in the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the USSR itself. In his diary, Chernyaev acknowledged that the Soviet Union was already in a state of advanced political, economic, and moral decay. The problem started at the top, Chernyaev describing party leader Leonid Brezhnev as “completely senile.” (p. 1)
While little evidence to exists to suggest that President Donald Trump suffers from senility, the resemblance between the Soviet leadership in the Age of Brezhnev and America’s in the Age of Trump is unmistakable and more than a little troubling. Here are some of Chernyaev’s more telling observations.
On the supreme leader’s work ethic: “He does not read anything himself anymore, except for short public speeches. Texts are read aloud to him, and only the ones that someone deems necessary within the ‘sparing regimen’ he is on to avoid worrying him.” (2)
On the leader’s decision-making: He “adjusts to others’ opinions and acts as if he came up with it himself.” (14)
On the leader’s inner circle of advisers: “Senility is affecting the entire structure, the mechanism of top-level power, due to the senility of its leader… Most things are done to cater to One man—and to disturb him as little as possible. …. The entire elite appears in the eyes of the people as money-grubbers – material and spiritual plunderers of the country. ” (6, 18, 31)
On the regime’s credibility: “Our moral-ideological prestige is below any conceivable level. It keeps falling due to our lies. We keep lying to our people, to ourselves, to all other peoples and parties. And whatever does not fit the lies, we consider anti-Soviet, enemy machinations, or revisionism. (43)
On the leader’s party: “Glorification of Brezhnev was in full-force at the Plenum. Everyone began with frothy enthusiasm about Leonid Ilyich’s speech—the deepest Marxist-Leninist document, a plan of action for the entire historical period, permeated with Leninist wisdom and a scientific approach, genuine Party-spirit and so forth; it inspires, elevates, we now have a real Leninist strategy. Everyone thanked ‘our Leonid Ilyich,’ everyone committed to him personally to fulfill the tasks he assigned. The glorification reached its moronic climax in Brezhnev’s own speech.” (46)
On the Afghanistan War: “Afghanistan is like a sore that eats away at public consciousness and international life. … Whose idea was this? … What for? Who is supposed to answer for this? … It is pointless to look for logic. We pour several million into Afghanistan daily, and daily we pay with the blood of our soldiers. What for—nobody can explain.” (4, 5, 48)
On the possibility of further miscalculation: “It’s scary to think about what would happen if our side decides to take that step. And they might, because the person making the decisions does not have the necessary information (he cannot even read what’s at his fingertips) to assess the consequences. But even if he was physically capable of reading everything, he would hardly be able to comprehend the significance of his decisions and actions.” (49)
On dying for one’s country: “The main thing that once again stunned me: a war memorial near the church—the standard figure of a woman with an olive branch in her hands, a wall a little distance behind her with names of the fallen. I read them, crying. … One hundred fifty people. That’s just from one village! An entire marching company. For some reason, in moments like these I always feel bitterness towards Brezhnev & Co.” (52)
On the durability of the existing order: “We’ve had enough for our time! Russia won’t collapse in five-six years, so why thump our chest, why attempt risky changes?! And the people will endure—they have no other options anyway, plus, ‘they aren’t hungry.’ … It seems our leaders made up their minds: ‘Fuck them all, let them say whatever they want, they won’t do a thing against us!’” (45, 52)
On the advantages of being a great power: “Because we are Russia, we can stay in such a crisis and idiocy for decades.” (42)
The final diary entry for the year was dated December 26, 1980. Eleven years later to the day, the seemingly impossible occurred: The Soviet Union ceased to exist.
Andrew Bacevich is president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.


theamericanconservative--2020-06-07--Using Government to Serve and Save the American Family

We have to do what we can with the tools we have right now to help the people right in front of us .
Raising a family has always been challenging , but contemporary family life in America suffers from structural problems that previous generations never faced .
These problems are , largely but not entirely , the result of social and economic changes that have occurred over the last 100-150 years .
As the United States has ceased to be an agriculturally based society , children have lost their economic status as a “ production good.
” Even on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship children once had with farm labor .
The impact of this social and economic change has been profound .
Once a reliable source of income for their family—thanks to their role in farm work and other occupations of the pre-information-age economy—children today , considered in cold , economic terms , only offer substantial “ returns , ” generally speaking , after reaching maturity , and completing years of higher education .
Today ’ s growing families , in short , face fundamental hurdles on account of 21st-century life—hurdles that once were either @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be higher for new parents than in previous generations , ” as USA Today reported in February 2018 , “ thanks to a combination of changing demographics and economic pressures.
” Sounding a similar note for last year ’ s May/June issue of The American Conservative , Charles Fain Lehman wrote an article titled “ Reversing the Baby Bust , ” in which he looked at some of the more prominent challenges besetting the modern American family .
Among other topics , he cited and discussed the above economic and social trend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of USA Today are only two among many voices now putting focus on this problem .
Proposed solutions to the modern West ’ s family crisis have been offered by American political leaders like Marco Rubio , Ann Wagner , and Ivanka Trump , and enacted by countries like Poland and Hungary .
Supporting healthy and well-adjusted family units is becoming a renewed focus of policymakers both at home and internationally .
While social changes are partially to blame , many of the wounds that modern families bear are inflicted by bad policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ code , marriage itself has become an economic liability for working-class people .
As Institute for Family Studies research fellow Lyman Stone described in his testimony to the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee on September 10 of last year , the implied “ policy stance of the tax code , of our welfare programs , of almost everything the government does ” is that “ working-class people should not get married , but middle-class and wealthy people should.
” In fact , for those enrolled in the IRS ’ s Earned Income Tax @ @ @ @ @ @ @ getting married can reduce one ’ s tax benefit by several thousand dollars .
This “ marriage penalty , ” as Stone phrases it , is drastic enough to eliminate 15 percent—or even 25 percent—of a family ’ s income .
The practical effect of this is to discourage marriage among the very demographic that , arguably , most depends on family stability for its very survival .
The American tax code is so out of whack that merely getting married can vaporize one quarter of a household ’ s income .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quite as dilapidated as some think—the notion that “ 50 % of all marriages end in divorce ” being an example of a popular misconception , as Renée Peltz Dennison discussed in Psychology Today in 2017—it is still “ no mystery , ” as Stone says , “ why working-class Americans are getting married less.
” “ Today ’ s American families face three intersecting challenges , ” Lehman wrote in his American Conservative article .
“ The first is exorbitant child-rearing costs…The second is a child poverty rate , which , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ above the OECD norm .
The third is the cratering fertility rate.
” Modern times have created a “ perfect storm ” wherein these three stressors have simultaneously ganged up against the American family .
No longer useful for work and—thanks to Social Security—no longer needed to care for elderly parents , children in the 21st century have become , as Nobel Prize winning economist Gary S. Becker put it in a 1960 paper , a “ consumption good.
” Children today , in other words , benefit their parents mostly in terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” they provide .
In today ’ s world , whatever joy children may otherwise bring , their benefit is not , generally speaking , measured by the dividends they bring to the bank .
At least not until after their academic or trade-school education is finished , at which point , of course , they are no longer children .
Kids , to summarize , just don ’ t pay like they used to .
What kind of policy , then , would incentivize healthy family life , placing normality within reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , before any incentive is enacted , removing the disincentive by repairing our broken tax code would be a necessary first step .
But , once that is accomplished , we have several promising examples to guide our steps .
In light of the falling birth rate affecting Western countries today , Poland and Hungary have , over the last several years , adopted a portfolio of family-supporting laws meant to better the lives of their citizens .
Poland ’ s ruling Law and Justice Party ( Prawo i Sprawiedliwość , or “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to power in 2015 , and was recently reelected , based largely on the popularity of its “ Family 500+ ” program , which provides a monthly allowance of 500 złoty ( roughly $ 125 USD ) for each child a Polish family has .
Originally only provided for additional children , the 500 złoty benefit is now provided beginning with a family ’ s first-born .
The policy has been great , if nothing else , for Poland ’ s international children and family-spending rankings .
As Anna Louise Sussman explained in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Family Values ’ With Cash Handouts , ” published in The Atlantic in October 2019 : “ Since the early 1990s , Eastern and Central European countries have lagged behind Western European countries in spending on children and families as a share of GDP , but the Family 500+ program puts Poland on par with Germany and Norway.
” Of course , the rating Sussman describes is irrelevant if it does not correspond to an actual improvement in family life or another variable .
So what , exactly , does this policy accomplish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor of the program lies simply in its great popularity .
“ For progressives and other PiS opponents , ” Sussman says , “ these programs ’ popularity leave them with little room to maneuver.
” PiS , in other words , has spectacularly reclaimed the family benefit territory that was historically the domain of the Left .
While some have criticized Poland ’ s family programs for their supposed “ fiscal irresponsibility , ” even people who describe themselves as opponents of PiS admit the attraction of the party ’ s family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the University of Warsaw who also works as an “ activist on behalf of fertility patients , ” says that while she “ would never consider voting for PiS , ” she nonetheless admits that the party ’ s policies go “ a long way ” in helping her own family .
In fact , she uses the Family 500+ benefits to pay for her foster children ’ s therapy .
Consider , also , the example of Barbara Nowacka .
Ms. Nowacka , who operated the social policy campaign for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Sussman ’ s article that “ this 500+ satisfies people , ” and that “ everyone believes that it is better to have money than trust the state.
” The Polish progressives ’ drive for higher investment in public childcare , schools , and hospitals loses its luster , it seems , when placed next to the PiS plan of simply rerouting tax money directly into the pockets of growing families .
The Polish citizenry , apparently , feel more comfortable relying on what amounts to a tax rebate delivered under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trusting the state—hardly surprising for a country that lived under communism for much of the 20th century .
The Hungarian government has also introduced policies similar to Poland ’ s new family programs .
In 2011 , the Hungarian birth rate dropped to only 1.23 births per woman , and the government decided to take action to reverse the concerning trend .
In light of this , since 2015 Viktor Orbán ’ s Fidesz party has “ implemented progressively more generous family benefits such as tax breaks , ” and has also introduced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and government support for buying seven-seat cars.
” The topic , however , is more complicated than these examples might imply .
While Family 500+ was mainly intended to increase Poland ’ s unsettlingly low fertility rate—1.29 births per woman as of 2019—it has thus far , in the words of Sussman , actually “ proved more effective at reducing poverty and spurring consumer spending.
” As Reuters reported this October , the recent PiS victory strengthened the Polish market , and “ analysts said [ that ] PiS ’ s win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If nothing else , however , this should help convince skeptics that there is a near- to mid-term economic benefit to the sort of family policies PiS has introduced , and that time should be allowed to tell , in a more thorough , comprehensive way , how these policies will help Polish families in their day-to-day life struggles .
Even with the anecdotal evidence aside , after all , the economy is still getting a boost from the policy and the party supporting it .
In Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the authors argued : “ We…have to recognize that in some cases , the conditions for a market to emerge on its own are simply not there….It often ends up being cheaper , per person served , to distribute a service for free than to try to extract a nominal fee.
” Banerjee and Duflo made this statement with respect to the main subject of their book—how to understand the economic conditions in poor nations and encourage economic development .
By no means dismissive of the free market ( the authors in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the impact of microcredit and small businesses in the developing world ) they nonetheless reach the conclusion that , where “ the conditions for a market to emerge on its own are simply not there , ” it is actually more cost effective to distribute essential , life-improving goods and services that will improve the entire community and thereby , indirectly , the market itself .
The market , after all , needs people in order to exist .
One example the authors use to demonstrate their argument is the child vaccination incentive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India , and which they had previously discussed in a 2010 article in the British Medical Journal .
To encourage more families to vaccinate their children , in 30 test camps two pounds of dried beans were offered per immunization as an incentive .
For a completed course of immunizations , a set of stainless steel plates was offered .
This incentive program , Banerjee and Duflo report , was a great success .
It increased the vaccination rate sevenfold in the village where it was tested ; after the program was implemented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent , a great improvement .
As the authors explain , offering the dehydrated beans and steel plates actually lowered the overall costs involved in the vaccination program ; because the nurse was paid for her time , the incentives made her labor more efficient .
What this shows , with respect to the issue of family support programs , is that the idea of incentivizing or subsidizing beneficial actions to decrease overall cost—whether monetary cost or a more difficult-to-measure social cost—is , in principle , a sound one .
Those who respect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ book which won the Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award in 2011 , but who might otherwise be skeptical of the Polish and Hungarian family policies—or policies such as the one now being encouraged by Ivanka Trump—might find them more palatable to “ laissez-faire ” tastes if they consider the success of incentivizing constructive behavior .
Even if the comparison is conjectural , it is safe to say that—whether the intention is encouraging child immunizations or strengthening the families of our citizens—sometimes people need , if not a “ handout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand in the right direction .
This will encourage actions that benefit the people in question , the economy , and the community at large .
Recent events only bring this into sharper focus .
As Republican senator Josh Hawley said on Tucker Carlson Tonight on March 19 regarding the Coronavirus crisis : “ Working families need relief and they ought to get it.
” At this point , one might certainly field the argument : “ Well , what if Social Security itself is part of the problem ?
Why not work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the modern welfare system ?
Could that not help things ?
” Perhaps it could , but for one , it is probably fair to say that Social Security , and more fundamentally , the structure of political attitudes and programs that surround Social Security—whatever theoretical objections one might have—are not going anywhere anytime soon , if ever .
Moreover , the basic shifts in the economy and technology have nothing directly to do with government intervention .
That is not to say those objections to Social Security are invalid , far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there will come an unforeseen time when all these issues can be sorted out by private institutions—when a purist libertarian state is possible .
But the social landscape of contemporary society has found us , whether we would have it or not , struggling to meet the needs of our citizens in this area of life .
When viewed as a tax rebate , their supposed “ incompatibility ” with libertarianism or small government “ conservatarianism ” becomes unclear .
Instead of holding out for a politically promised era that might never @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we have to do what we can with the tools we have right now to help the people in front of us .
What , then , is the ultimate takeaway from this ?
Have the social policies of our country really been working at odds with the fundamental wellbeing of our citizens for so long ?
In America , “ We the People ” and “ One Nation Under God ” are the watchwords that point us to our proper destination .
If our nation does not serve the human needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is failing in a truly fundamental way .
If a tax code , social program , or monetary system is not benefiting “ We the People , ” or serving the just cause of God and nation , it is our right , as a certain document says , to “ alter or abolish it.
” The tendency ( that shows itself regularly enough ) in the economic field to detach the “ bottom line ” from any damage done to the community merely amounts to a crude , inhumane “ ends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who wish to support and revitalize the modern West , which ought to be the common goal of everyone involved in public policy today , must remind themselves that a market or society is only truly “ free ” when it does not enervate the lives and morals of those meant to exercise that freedom .
Jack H. Burke has contributed to National Review .
He is also a former White House intern and served as a U.S. congressional staff member .

Raising a family has always been challenging, but contemporary family life in America suffers from structural problems that previous generations never faced. These problems are, largely but not entirely, the result of social and economic changes that have occurred over the last 100-150 years. As the United States has ceased to be an agriculturally based society, children have lost their economic status as a “production good.” Even on modern farms, technology has changed the relationship children once had with farm labor. The impact of this social and economic change has been profound. Once a reliable source of income for their family—thanks to their role in farm work and other occupations of the pre-information-age economy—children today, considered in cold, economic terms, only offer substantial “returns,” generally speaking, after reaching maturity, and completing years of higher education. Today’s growing families, in short, face fundamental hurdles on account of 21st-century life—hurdles that once were either negligible or nonexistent. “The stakes may be higher for new parents than in previous generations,” as USA Today reported in February 2018, “thanks to a combination of changing demographics and economic pressures.”
Sounding a similar note for last year’s May/June issue of The American Conservative, Charles Fain Lehman wrote an article titled “Reversing the Baby Bust,” in which he looked at some of the more prominent challenges besetting the modern American family. Among other topics, he cited and discussed the above economic and social trend. But Mr. Lehman and the writers of USA Today are only two among many voices now putting focus on this problem. Proposed solutions to the modern West’s family crisis have been offered by American political leaders like Marco Rubio, Ann Wagner, and Ivanka Trump, and enacted by countries like Poland and Hungary. Supporting healthy and well-adjusted family units is becoming a renewed focus of policymakers both at home and internationally.
While social changes are partially to blame, many of the wounds that modern families bear are inflicted by bad policy. On account of the U.S. tax code, marriage itself has become an economic liability for working-class people. As Institute for Family Studies research fellow Lyman Stone described in his testimony to the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee on September 10 of last year, the implied “policy stance of the tax code, of our welfare programs, of almost everything the government does” is that “working-class people should not get married, but middle-class and wealthy people should.” In fact, for those enrolled in the IRS’s Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program, simply getting married can reduce one’s tax benefit by several thousand dollars. This “marriage penalty,” as Stone phrases it, is drastic enough to eliminate 15 percent—or even 25 percent—of a family’s income. The practical effect of this is to discourage marriage among the very demographic that, arguably, most depends on family stability for its very survival.
The American tax code is so out of whack that merely getting married can vaporize one quarter of a household’s income. Although marriage as an institution might not be quite as dilapidated as some think—the notion that “50% of all marriages end in divorce” being an example of a popular misconception, as Renée Peltz Dennison discussed in Psychology Today in 2017—it is still “no mystery,” as Stone says, “why working-class Americans are getting married less.” “Today’s American families face three intersecting challenges,” Lehman wrote in his American Conservative article. “The first is exorbitant child-rearing costs…The second is a child poverty rate, which, while down in recent years, remains well above the OECD norm. The third is the cratering fertility rate.” Modern times have created a “perfect storm” wherein these three stressors have simultaneously ganged up against the American family.
No longer useful for work and—thanks to Social Security—no longer needed to care for elderly parents, children in the 21st century have become, as Nobel Prize winning economist Gary S. Becker put it in a 1960 paper, a “consumption good.” Children today, in other words, benefit their parents mostly in terms of the “psychic income or satisfaction” they provide.
In today’s world, whatever joy children may otherwise bring, their benefit is not, generally speaking, measured by the dividends they bring to the bank. At least not until after their academic or trade-school education is finished, at which point, of course, they are no longer children.
Kids, to summarize, just don’t pay like they used to.
♦♦♦
What kind of policy, then, would incentivize healthy family life, placing normality within reach for struggling Americans? To begin with, before any incentive is enacted, removing the disincentive by repairing our broken tax code would be a necessary first step. But, once that is accomplished, we have several promising examples to guide our steps.
In light of the falling birth rate affecting Western countries today, Poland and Hungary have, over the last several years, adopted a portfolio of family-supporting laws meant to better the lives of their citizens. Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or “PiS” in Polish) first came to power in 2015, and was recently reelected, based largely on the popularity of its “Family 500+” program, which provides a monthly allowance of 500 złoty (roughly $125 USD) for each child a Polish family has. Originally only provided for additional children, the 500 złoty benefit is now provided beginning with a family’s first-born.
The policy has been great, if nothing else, for Poland’s international children and family-spending rankings. As Anna Louise Sussman explained in her article “The Poland Model—Promoting ‘Family Values’ With Cash Handouts,” published in The Atlantic in October 2019: “Since the early 1990s, Eastern and Central European countries have lagged behind Western European countries in spending on children and families as a share of GDP, but the Family 500+ program puts Poland on par with Germany and Norway.” Of course, the rating Sussman describes is irrelevant if it does not correspond to an actual improvement in family life or another variable. So what, exactly, does this policy accomplish on the ground?
One point in favor of the program lies simply in its great popularity. “For progressives and other PiS opponents,” Sussman says, “these programs’ popularity leave them with little room to maneuver.” PiS, in other words, has spectacularly reclaimed the family benefit territory that was historically the domain of the Left. While some have criticized Poland’s family programs for their supposed “fiscal irresponsibility,” even people who describe themselves as opponents of PiS admit the attraction of the party’s family policy. Anna Krawczak, a researcher at the University of Warsaw who also works as an “activist on behalf of fertility patients,” says that while she “would never consider voting for PiS,” she nonetheless admits that the party’s policies go “a long way” in helping her own family. In fact, she uses the Family 500+ benefits to pay for her foster children’s therapy.
Consider, also, the example of Barbara Nowacka. Ms. Nowacka, who operated the social policy campaign for a Polish left-wing coalition in 2015, admits in Sussman’s article that “this 500+ satisfies people,” and that “everyone believes that it is better to have money than trust the state.” The Polish progressives’ drive for higher investment in public childcare, schools, and hospitals loses its luster, it seems, when placed next to the PiS plan of simply rerouting tax money directly into the pockets of growing families. The Polish citizenry, apparently, feel more comfortable relying on what amounts to a tax rebate delivered under the header of the 500+ plan, than trusting the state—hardly surprising for a country that lived under communism for much of the 20th century.
The Hungarian government has also introduced policies similar to Poland’s new family programs. In 2011, the Hungarian birth rate dropped to only 1.23 births per woman, and the government decided to take action to reverse the concerning trend. In light of this, since 2015 Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has “implemented progressively more generous family benefits such as tax breaks,” and has also introduced “interest-free housing loans for young couples, and government support for buying seven-seat cars.”
The topic, however, is more complicated than these examples might imply. While Family 500+ was mainly intended to increase Poland’s unsettlingly low fertility rate—1.29 births per woman as of 2019—it has thus far, in the words of Sussman, actually “proved more effective at reducing poverty and spurring consumer spending.” As Reuters reported this October, the recent PiS victory strengthened the Polish market, and “analysts said [that] PiS’s win signaled a continuation of government policies.” If nothing else, however, this should help convince skeptics that there is a near- to mid-term economic benefit to the sort of family policies PiS has introduced, and that time should be allowed to tell, in a more thorough, comprehensive way, how these policies will help Polish families in their day-to-day life struggles. Even with the anecdotal evidence aside, after all, the economy is still getting a boost from the policy and the party supporting it.
In Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo’s award-winning 2011 book Poor Economics, the authors argued: “We…have to recognize that in some cases, the conditions for a market to emerge on its own are simply not there….It often ends up being cheaper, per person served, to distribute a service for free than to try to extract a nominal fee.” Banerjee and Duflo made this statement with respect to the main subject of their book—how to understand the economic conditions in poor nations and encourage economic development. By no means dismissive of the free market (the authors in fact dedicate much of their book to the impact of microcredit and small businesses in the developing world) they nonetheless reach the conclusion that, where “the conditions for a market to emerge on its own are simply not there,” it is actually more cost effective to distribute essential, life-improving goods and services that will improve the entire community and thereby, indirectly, the market itself. The market, after all, needs people in order to exist.
One example the authors use to demonstrate their argument is the child vaccination incentive program they themselves tested in Udaipur, India, and which they had previously discussed in a 2010 article in the British Medical Journal. To encourage more families to vaccinate their children, in 30 test camps two pounds of dried beans were offered per immunization as an incentive. For a completed course of immunizations, a set of stainless steel plates was offered. This incentive program, Banerjee and Duflo report, was a great success. It increased the vaccination rate sevenfold in the village where it was tested; after the program was implemented, the vaccination rate stood at 38 percent, a great improvement. As the authors explain, offering the dehydrated beans and steel plates actually lowered the overall costs involved in the vaccination program; because the nurse was paid for her time, the incentives made her labor more efficient.
What this shows, with respect to the issue of family support programs, is that the idea of incentivizing or subsidizing beneficial actions to decrease overall cost—whether monetary cost or a more difficult-to-measure social cost—is, in principle, a sound one. Those who respect the findings of Poor Economics, a book which won the Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award in 2011, but who might otherwise be skeptical of the Polish and Hungarian family policies—or policies such as the one now being encouraged by Ivanka Trump—might find them more palatable to “laissez-faire” tastes if they consider the success of incentivizing constructive behavior. Even if the comparison is conjectural, it is safe to say that—whether the intention is encouraging child immunizations or strengthening the families of our citizens—sometimes people need, if not a “handout,” then at least a helping hand in the right direction. This will encourage actions that benefit the people in question, the economy, and the community at large. Recent events only bring this into sharper focus. As Republican senator Josh Hawley said on Tucker Carlson Tonight on March 19 regarding the Coronavirus crisis: “Working families need relief and they ought to get it.”
♦♦♦
At this point, one might certainly field the argument: “Well, what if Social Security itself is part of the problem? Why not work to dismantle Social Security and the rest of the modern welfare system? Could that not help things?” Perhaps it could, but for one, it is probably fair to say that Social Security, and more fundamentally, the structure of political attitudes and programs that surround Social Security—whatever theoretical objections one might have—are not going anywhere anytime soon, if ever. Moreover, the basic shifts in the economy and technology have nothing directly to do with government intervention. That is not to say those objections to Social Security are invalid, far from it. Maybe, one day, there will come an unforeseen time when all these issues can be sorted out by private institutions—when a purist libertarian state is possible. But the social landscape of contemporary society has found us, whether we would have it or not, struggling to meet the needs of our citizens in this area of life. When viewed as a tax rebate, their supposed “incompatibility” with libertarianism or small government “conservatarianism” becomes unclear. Instead of holding out for a politically promised era that might never, and probably will never, come, we have to do what we can with the tools we have right now to help the people in front of us.
What, then, is the ultimate takeaway from this? Have the social policies of our country really been working at odds with the fundamental wellbeing of our citizens for so long?
In America, “We the People” and “One Nation Under God” are the watchwords that point us to our proper destination. If our nation does not serve the human needs of the people that inhabit it, it is failing in a truly fundamental way. If a tax code, social program, or monetary system is not benefiting “We the People,” or serving the just cause of God and nation, it is our right, as a certain document says, to “alter or abolish it.” The tendency (that shows itself regularly enough) in the economic field to detach the “bottom line” from any damage done to the community merely amounts to a crude, inhumane “ends justify the means” philosophy. Those who wish to support and revitalize the modern West, which ought to be the common goal of everyone involved in public policy today, must remind themselves that a market or society is only truly “free” when it does not enervate the lives and morals of those meant to exercise that freedom.
Jack H. Burke has contributed to National Review. He is also a former White House intern and served as a U.S. congressional staff member.


Against Conservative Doomerism

Optimism is a dirty word on the British Right .
With Toryism loosely defined as a political vehicle that resists needless change and longs for conservation , any hint of belief that things could improve is treated with disdain and refuted as a fanciful hope more befitting of a progressive .
Tories have traditionally opposed utopians , rightly noting that their dreams of paradise all too often end in the kind of misery , squalor and violence that would rival a Hobbesian state of nature .
This gives rise to a reliance on pessimism , with the late Sir Roger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Pessimism in 2010 , which uses the spirit of the conservative political tradition to take aim at the dangerous fallacies of false hope .
But the positive uses of pessimism also bring the burden of inaction .
You hear it all the time , that cosy line that communistic social justice wokery is inevitable , and leftists will continue to dominate , so why bother fighting it ?
Just relax , be pessimistic about it all and try to occupy your mind with something else .
This is the mentality of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throughout the British and American commentariat , and it ’ s got to be challenged .
Conservative journalist Ed West ’ s excellent new book Small Men on the Wrong Side of History : The Decline , Fall and Unlikely Return of Conservatism lists a litany of defeats suffered by British and American conservatives in a witty , and often movingly personal account .
West lets rip at the rise of the leftist activist base that props up the tax-guzzling charity sector , the huge amount of liberal success in the culture war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vast expansion of the university sector , and the thought-crushing effect of the PC brigade .
He is an immense writer ; his arguments are buttressed with references to Burke and Sowell that succinctly summarize conservative opinion on issues that most would need a whole book to express .
But he also brings an attitude of doomer defeatism , the fear that things are only going to get worse , and that while the populism of the last decade could bring opportunities for right-wing reform , it might also hurry a partisan politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ woven threads that produce the delicate fabric of civil society .
In one hilarious section , West discusses being courted for a job via telephone with one-time Trump strategist and then-Breitbart guru Steve Bannon , who kept telling him what he could “ weaponize ” in the culture war fight against the Left .
West rightly notes that with its size and broader diversity of opinion , American conservatism has been better placed to fight the leftist march through the institutions , which was essentially unopposed during Britain ’ s Blairite era .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Institutions like major legacy media organizations have been crippled by bias , with a 2004 Pew survey of journalists finding that just 7 percent identified as conservative ; a 1962 study showed that 28 percent of Washington correspondents described themselves as conservative .
Last week institutions like Vox and the New York Times were consumed by civil wars between data-driven , Popperesque liberals and the woke vanguard .
This radical shift and the 1987 removal of the ‘ Fairness Doctrine ’ by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission led to a starkly polarized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hosts lambasting barely hidden Obama worship by CNN correspondents .
West fears the same affliction reaching Britain , and has written about why it needs to retain the BBC—which even its most dogged supporter must concede is at least implicitly biased .
Its critics rightly note that it is packed with bias of a more explicit kind , especially on its flagship news analysis program .
This leads West to an interesting position : defend the institutions that support conservative downfall , because a revolutionary action that removes them would almost certainly lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse , fostering more political polarization and a body politic which is less of a mild-mannered debating chamber and more Mad Max-style winner-takes-all killing zone .
The doomers want us to put up with it , let the culture war rage on , because if we try to get stuck in , we ’ ll only make things worse .
I am sympathetic to this view and share much of it , but there are ways we can engage in the culture wars without giving additional attention and remuneration to the red-in-the-face raging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both sides of the Atlantic .
New generations of conservatives—who have not been withered by the endless fads of liberalism like ceaseless drops of acid rain on a rock—are increasingly fervent with optimism .
During our brief stints of being politically aware , we have seen a president elected to the White House on a national-conservative platform and a gigantic refutation of the British political quagmire through the Brexit vote .
Some might say it is just youthful naivete , but many of us feel like there are things we can achieve and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relying on the excessive pools of rage and partisanship that pervade alternative media .
If we don ’ t want to fight the culture war by going toe-to-toe in embarrassing media fights that no one truly wins , perhaps we should be looking to hamper our opponents by removing the apparatus that produces our enemy .
There is a ginormous surveillance-disciplinary network of organizations that exist almost exclusively to foster anti-conservative sentiment and give media-booking status to left-leaning activists .
A new creation is spawned every so often .
HateLab , which was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ global hub for data and insight into hate speech and crime.
” A quick browse of its website reveals that it is funded by the government money and revolves around a nexus of academics at Cardiff University .
It features some two-dozen publications , mostly revolving around policing ‘ hate speech ’ on Twitter .
HateLab receives British government funding , and , bafflingly , cash from the U.S. Department of Justice .
Are they accountable to the American or British taxpayer ?
Of course not .
Do they contribute to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beat down conservative voices online ?
Absolutely .
Britain is also burdened by an endless supply of semi-public administrative bodies ( derogatively referred to as “ quangos ” ) that rely on huge amounts of public money .
The conservatives attempted a ‘ bonfire of the quangos ’ after being elected in coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 2010 , but only 199 out of 900 were listed as being “ no longer a public body.
” Many of the senior positions in quangos and other public offices are held by left-leaning activists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diversity on the basis on gender , race , or disability , but not on socioeconomic background , leading to a rise in representation from middle-class women and minorities , who are more likely to be Leftist , and a massive underrepresentation from manual workers , who heavily vote Conservative .
A renewed ruthless mentality is needed to deal with these outfits .
We are also burdened by a bloated higher education system .
The pundits and so-called experts on the BBC that lament conservative reform often gain their stripes in the culture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them the necessary credentials to be booked by a producer .
Two quangos—the Economic and Social Research Council ( ESRC ) and the Arts and Humanities Research Council—chuck eye-watering amounts of public money at left-wing research projects .
Recent ESRC success stories include “ Reforming Legal Gender Identity : A Socio-Legal Evaluation ” and “ Public Discourses on the Silence of Inherited Trauma.
” The former taking place at the reputable King ’ s College London ; the latter at the less-notable Roehampton University .
Neither project can be said to be worthwhile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warring troops on the march .
They must be abolished .
Britain ’ s most-famous social conservative journalist and doomer-in-chief Peter Hitchens has been writing about his hopelessness in all political matters for decades .
He hates and disregards the Conservative Party , which he thinks is a Blairite project , and dismisses opportunities for right-wing reform on the grounds that they are either silly or won ’ t be achievable .
West voted to remain in the EU in 2016 on the understandable conservative grounds that the revolutionary aspects of Brexit would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system ; fervent eurosceptic Hitchens refused to even vote due to his long-held opposition to referenda , which he believes violate the norms of parliamentary democracy .
Nowadays , I only check his columns for his beautiful prose on travel and trains , which read like they are being written through a pair of nostalgia-wettened misty eyes .
If conservatism is going to be viable in any meaningful political and civil sense , its adherents must adopt strategies for its long-lasting implementation .
Achieving this might mean an overhaul of our typical approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mentality , and a move to abolish the institutions that serve to harm us .
Burke , cover your eyes , but I think we need a revolution .

Optimism is a dirty word on the British Right. With Toryism loosely defined as a political vehicle that resists needless change and longs for conservation, any hint of belief that things could improve is treated with disdain and refuted as a fanciful hope more befitting of a progressive.
Tories have traditionally opposed utopians, rightly noting that their dreams of paradise all too often end in the kind of misery, squalor and violence that would rival a Hobbesian state of nature. This gives rise to a reliance on pessimism, with the late Sir Roger Scruton writing a book titled The Uses of Pessimism in 2010, which uses the spirit of the conservative political tradition to take aim at the dangerous fallacies of false hope.
But the positive uses of pessimism also bring the burden of inaction. You hear it all the time, that cosy line that communistic social justice wokery is inevitable, and leftists will continue to dominate, so why bother fighting it? Just relax, be pessimistic about it all and try to occupy your mind with something else.
This is the mentality of the conservative doomers, it’s rife throughout the British and American commentariat, and it’s got to be challenged.
Conservative journalist Ed West’s excellent new book Small Men on the Wrong Side of History: The Decline, Fall and Unlikely Return of Conservatism lists a litany of defeats suffered by British and American conservatives in a witty, and often movingly personal account. West lets rip at the rise of the leftist activist base that props up the tax-guzzling charity sector, the huge amount of liberal success in the culture war that has been enjoyed due to the vast expansion of the university sector, and the thought-crushing effect of the PC brigade.
He is an immense writer; his arguments are buttressed with references to Burke and Sowell that succinctly summarize conservative opinion on issues that most would need a whole book to express.
But he also brings an attitude of doomer defeatism, the fear that things are only going to get worse, and that while the populism of the last decade could bring opportunities for right-wing reform, it might also hurry a partisan politics that causes irreparable harm to the intricately woven threads that produce the delicate fabric of civil society.
In one hilarious section, West discusses being courted for a job via telephone with one-time Trump strategist and then-Breitbart guru Steve Bannon, who kept telling him what he could “weaponize” in the culture war fight against the Left. West rightly notes that with its size and broader diversity of opinion, American conservatism has been better placed to fight the leftist march through the institutions, which was essentially unopposed during Britain’s Blairite era.
But America has endured the march nonetheless. Institutions like major legacy media organizations have been crippled by bias, with a 2004 Pew survey of journalists finding that just 7 percent identified as conservative; a 1962 study showed that 28 percent of Washington correspondents described themselves as conservative. Last week institutions like Vox and the New York Times were consumed by civil wars between data-driven, Popperesque liberals and the woke vanguard. This radical shift and the 1987 removal of the ‘Fairness Doctrine’ by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission led to a starkly polarized media landscape, with shock-jock Right-wing radio hosts lambasting barely hidden Obama worship by CNN correspondents.
West fears the same affliction reaching Britain, and has written about why it needs to retain the BBC—which even its most dogged supporter must concede is at least implicitly biased. Its critics rightly note that it is packed with bias of a more explicit kind, especially on its flagship news analysis program.
This leads West to an interesting position: defend the institutions that support conservative downfall, because a revolutionary action that removes them would almost certainly lead to them being replaced with something much worse, fostering more political polarization and a body politic which is less of a mild-mannered debating chamber and more Mad Max-style winner-takes-all killing zone.
The doomers want us to put up with it, let the culture war rage on, because if we try to get stuck in, we’ll only make things worse.
I am sympathetic to this view and share much of it, but there are ways we can engage in the culture wars without giving additional attention and remuneration to the red-in-the-face raging grifters that pervade the right-wing media on both sides of the Atlantic.
New generations of conservatives—who have not been withered by the endless fads of liberalism like ceaseless drops of acid rain on a rock—are increasingly fervent with optimism. During our brief stints of being politically aware, we have seen a president elected to the White House on a national-conservative platform and a gigantic refutation of the British political quagmire through the Brexit vote.
Some might say it is just youthful naivete, but many of us feel like there are things we can achieve and leftist encroachments we can roll back without relying on the excessive pools of rage and partisanship that pervade alternative media.
If we don’t want to fight the culture war by going toe-to-toe in embarrassing media fights that no one truly wins, perhaps we should be looking to hamper our opponents by removing the apparatus that produces our enemy.
There is a ginormous surveillance-disciplinary network of organizations that exist almost exclusively to foster anti-conservative sentiment and give media-booking status to left-leaning activists. A new creation is spawned every so often. HateLab, which was launched in 2017, describes itself as a “global hub for data and insight into hate speech and crime.” A quick browse of its website reveals that it is funded by the government money and revolves around a nexus of academics at Cardiff University. It features some two-dozen publications, mostly revolving around policing ‘hate speech’ on Twitter. HateLab receives British government funding, and, bafflingly, cash from the U.S. Department of Justice. Are they accountable to the American or British taxpayer? Of course not. Do they contribute to a policy discussion which is used to beat down conservative voices online? Absolutely.
Britain is also burdened by an endless supply of semi-public administrative bodies (derogatively referred to as “quangos”) that rely on huge amounts of public money. The conservatives attempted a ‘bonfire of the quangos’ after being elected in coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 2010, but only 199 out of 900 were listed as being “no longer a public body.” Many of the senior positions in quangos and other public offices are held by left-leaning activists, as the 2010 Equality Act protects diversity on the basis on gender, race, or disability, but not on socioeconomic background, leading to a rise in representation from middle-class women and minorities, who are more likely to be Leftist, and a massive underrepresentation from manual workers, who heavily vote Conservative. A renewed ruthless mentality is needed to deal with these outfits.
We are also burdened by a bloated higher education system. The pundits and so-called experts on the BBC that lament conservative reform often gain their stripes in the culture war fight from universities, which give them the necessary credentials to be booked by a producer. Two quangos—the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research Council—chuck eye-watering amounts of public money at left-wing research projects. Recent ESRC success stories include “Reforming Legal Gender Identity: A Socio-Legal Evaluation” and “Public Discourses on the Silence of Inherited Trauma.” The former taking place at the reputable King’s College London; the latter at the less-notable Roehampton University. Neither project can be said to be worthwhile, but they keep the left-wing culture warring troops on the march. They must be abolished.
Britain’s most-famous social conservative journalist and doomer-in-chief Peter Hitchens has been writing about his hopelessness in all political matters for decades. He hates and disregards the Conservative Party, which he thinks is a Blairite project, and dismisses opportunities for right-wing reform on the grounds that they are either silly or won’t be achievable. West voted to remain in the EU in 2016 on the understandable conservative grounds that the revolutionary aspects of Brexit would do too much harm to our political system; fervent eurosceptic Hitchens refused to even vote due to his long-held opposition to referenda, which he believes violate the norms of parliamentary democracy. Nowadays, I only check his columns for his beautiful prose on travel and trains, which read like they are being written through a pair of nostalgia-wettened misty eyes.
If conservatism is going to be viable in any meaningful political and civil sense, its adherents must adopt strategies for its long-lasting implementation. Achieving this might mean an overhaul of our typical approach, a rejection of the low-energy doomer mentality, and a move to abolish the institutions that serve to harm us. Burke, cover your eyes, but I think we need a revolution.
Charlie Peters writes from the UK.


theamericanconservative--2020-06-08--Where Are Our Heroes?

Where Are Our Heroes?

A shop owner looks over damage in a looted souvenir and electronics shop near Times Square after a night of protests and vandalism over the death of George Floyd early June 2 , 2020 in New York City .
( Photo by John Moore/Getty Images ) Last week , New York City suffered an 8 p.m. everyone-off-the streets curfew , the first in 75 years ( the COVID lockdown was also concurrently still in effect ) .
Protests continue , with several hundred people Tuesday night closing down streets adjacent to my apartment building .
Here ’ s the view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from 30,000 feet .
Many stores in my part of America ’ s richest city had already been boarded up ; the men putting up the plywood coming in from white working class neighborhoods in nearby Queens said to me they ’ re grateful for the work post-COVID , “ but if I ever have to do this for my own neighborhood some mf is gon na suffer.
” The protesters themselves were about two-thirds white , uniformly in their mid-to-late twenties .
People wearing Bernie T-shirts outnumbered those still practicing social distancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tell me where they lived said Brooklyn but if you live here you would have already guessed that by the piercings , oiled beardsmen , and shaved heads .
The black protesters appeared to be joining spontaneously from the surrounding public housing blocks and not mingling .
Their chants weren ’ t the organized ones of the white kids , mostly “ f*ck the police ” accompanied by gang signs or middle fingers , just rage cleansed of politics .
No Bernie shirts .
None of the black protesters would speak to me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t stop .
They knew media and my notebook drew them like shadows to a lamp .
Asked what they wanted , everyone had their lines down ( it was justice and peace ) but no one really had an answer to how this demonstration would help create those things .
What law could Congress pass to fix any of this ?
After a few suggestions to abolish the police , raising awareness seemed to be the closest anyone could get .
Some apartments in the area have hired private security , beefy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ night clubs .
One hotel employee I know said his five-star place had former SEALS at the door .
Two NYPD helicopters were overhead for almost two hours , top cover Baghdad-style , watching the rooftops .
Middle class people living nearby are angry and afraid , and such people will defend themselves , and that will be a terrible , terrible thing .
It seems leaders on all sides are setting us against each other and we are embracing that as a new normal way of life .
When was your last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
It was hard to connect the odd collection of impressions from street level with a new theme among the righteous but uneducated on social media .
They seem to think burning a Target is the modern equivalent of the American Revolution against the British .
I listened to the Hamilton score twice now , and even read the Klassic Komics version of Federalist Papers , and can ’ t find anywhere the American side whined about the British being too rough .
Instead , they understood a revolution meant risking their lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fortunes .
Denied representation under an undemocratic system , they fought .
The Founders took to the streets with none of the protections of the Bill of Rights .
It was only after they won they created a Bill of Rights .
It came as a package deal , because the Founders wanted to create a society where peaceful change was written into our marrow and so another bloody revolution was something their children would not have to undertake .
Yet the sad desire to convert violent actors into heroes , to claim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place in the midst of some portion of our society desperately seeking a classic hero to very undemocratically slay the dragon , Donald Trump .
And so America these are your new heroes , people who fraudulently invoke the grace of Dr. King to label riots as lawful protests , looting as reparations .
To be fair , most of that labeling is not by the thugs themselves , but by those who elevate them .
“ Destroying property which can be replaced is not violence , ” NYT ’ s Nikole Hannah-Jones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ Concerning nonviolence , it is criminal to teach a man not to defend himself when he is the constant victim of brutal attacks.
” The Democratic Party of Fairfax , Virginia , tweeted ( now deleted but the sentiment is widely shared ) , “ Riots are an integral part of this country ’ s march towards progress.
” Citing the freedom fighters in the streets , former labor secretary Robert Reich just generically proclaimed “ Trump ’ s presidency is over.
” The search for heroes leads down some odd @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the military ’ s arrival on mixed ground .
The lede is Trump has “ declared war on the American people ” and this will cost him the election , even though 58 percent of voters support the deployment of the military in response to protests , with only 30 percent opposing .
Meanwhile , the web is awash in uninformed fear mongering over martial law , posse comitatus , the Insurrection Act , and whatever else a Wikipedia search churns up—you know , maybe a military coup via martial law would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump .
It is not an unpopular idea ; almost a third of Americans would support a coup .
Ex-CIA head Michael Hayden—hah hah—jokingly talked about the idea .
We ’ ve heard this for years .
Upon General Mattis ‘ departure , the The New York Times asked , “ Who will protect America now ?
” Hopes have been expressed one of the ex-military men once in the White House , maybe John Kelly or H.R .
McMaster , would hero up and assume control .
If not directly , then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ patriot behind the throne .
Politics , and the search for heroes , makes for strange bedfellows .
Felon Michael Avenatti was a hero contender for longer than David Bowie ’ s “ just for one day.
” Porn star Stormy Daniels , and felon Michael Cohen , too .
Along the way JamesComey , John Brennan , Michael Hayden , Christopher Steele , and James Clapper were all given some hero time , and of course the run by Robert Mueller as Savior-in-Chief .
There was the anonymous whistleblower and a handful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hearings .
Even the virus was given the chance to end this presidency .
The hero-seeking media partnered with every Democratic black candidate of any type or plain white woman who could check boxes ( single mom , lesbian , HIV+ , veteran , etc ) .
The high point of this low point was reached with AOC and her Squad , whose only real accomplishments have been relentless self-promotion and helping push Nancy Pelosi into an impeachment process that squandered the Blue Wave .
At least most of those who held the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a sort .
But rioters as the new heroes ?
That ’ s who is left ?
Bring a Martin Luther King and I will march with him anywhere .
All I see are people finding ways to take advantage of a situation for their own advancement , materially , politically , or just for the clicks .
These are desperate times .
No one wants bad cops , and every day America suffers for its original sin of slavery and failure to find repentance .
The only answer the country seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow rioters to run amuck every few years to let the pressure reset .
Pick your favorite : the TV version following Rodney King , the blast from Ferguson , or something old school from the 1970s out of Watts or the Bronx .
Apart from letting off political steam to let politicians off the hook , riots are not a vehicle for political change in a democracy .
They are the antithesis of democratic change , change by force with no desire for compromise .
To claim violence in response to other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ systematically bad system only creates more violence .
It ’ s a circle , see ?
Was it was only a week ago people said protests against government ( specifically COVID restrictions ) were wrong and dangerous , we should listen to the authorities , and were glad the cops were out there enforcing social distancing ?
The heroes then were clerks stocking shelves .
In fact , the people I saw at yesterday ’ s protest looked a lot like the people hissing at me in Whole Foods for not wearing a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amendment protects their protests but not those of the rednecks at the statehouse .
To them every offense is a lynching , every day the apocalypse , every Tweet a blow to democracy , every misunderstanding racism .
Once you understand how shallow and tiresome and hypocritical such views are you will understand the 2016 election , and in about 150 very long days from now , the 2020 election .
No heroes , or Russians for that matter , necessary .
Peter Van Buren , a 24-year State Department veteran , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People , Hooper ’ s War : A Novel of WWII Japan , and Ghosts of Tom Joad : A Story of the # 99 Percent .

Last week, New York City suffered an 8 p.m. everyone-off-the streets curfew, the first in 75 years (the COVID lockdown was also concurrently still in effect). Protests continue, with several hundred people Tuesday night closing down streets adjacent to my apartment building. Here’s the view from street level, and the one from 30,000 feet.
Many stores in my part of America’s richest city had already been boarded up; the men putting up the plywood coming in from white working class neighborhoods in nearby Queens said to me they’re grateful for the work post-COVID, “but if I ever have to do this for my own neighborhood some mf is gonna suffer.”
The protesters themselves were about two-thirds white, uniformly in their mid-to-late twenties. People wearing Bernie T-shirts outnumbered those still practicing social distancing by about 6:1. Everyone who would tell me where they lived said Brooklyn but if you live here you would have already guessed that by the piercings, oiled beardsmen, and shaved heads. The black protesters appeared to be joining spontaneously from the surrounding public housing blocks and not mingling. Their chants weren’t the organized ones of the white kids, mostly “f*ck the police” accompanied by gang signs or middle fingers, just rage cleansed of politics. No Bernie shirts.
None of the black protesters would speak to me, but the white protesters wouldn’t stop. They knew media and my notebook drew them like shadows to a lamp. Asked what they wanted, everyone had their lines down (it was justice and peace) but no one really had an answer to how this demonstration would help create those things. What law could Congress pass to fix any of this? After a few suggestions to abolish the police, raising awareness seemed to be the closest anyone could get.
Some apartments in the area have hired private security, beefy guys you usually see checking IDs at night clubs. One hotel employee I know said his five-star place had former SEALS at the door. Two NYPD helicopters were overhead for almost two hours, top cover Baghdad-style, watching the rooftops. Middle class people living nearby are angry and afraid, and such people will defend themselves, and that will be a terrible, terrible thing. It seems leaders on all sides are setting us against each other and we are embracing that as a new normal way of life. When was your last pleasant but intense political discussion with friends?
It was hard to connect the odd collection of impressions from street level with a new theme among the righteous but uneducated on social media. They seem to think burning a Target is the modern equivalent of the American Revolution against the British. I listened to the Hamilton score twice now, and even read the Klassic Komics version of Federalist Papers, and can’t find anywhere the American side whined about the British being too rough. Instead, they understood a revolution meant risking their lives, their honor, and their sacred fortunes. Denied representation under an undemocratic system, they fought.
The Founders took to the streets with none of the protections of the Bill of Rights. It was only after they won they created a Bill of Rights. It came as a package deal, because the Founders wanted to create a society where peaceful change was written into our marrow and so another bloody revolution was something their children would not have to undertake.
Yet the sad desire to convert violent actors into heroes, to claim violence and looting are justified, takes place in the midst of some portion of our society desperately seeking a classic hero to very undemocratically slay the dragon, Donald Trump.
And so America these are your new heroes, people who fraudulently invoke the grace of Dr. King to label riots as lawful protests, looting as reparations. To be fair, most of that labeling is not by the thugs themselves, but by those who elevate them. “Destroying property which can be replaced is not violence,” NYT’s Nikole Hannah-Jones said. Colin Kaepernick quoted Malcolm X, “Concerning nonviolence, it is criminal to teach a man not to defend himself when he is the constant victim of brutal attacks.”
The Democratic Party of Fairfax, Virginia, tweeted (now deleted but the sentiment is widely shared), “Riots are an integral part of this country’s march towards progress.” Citing the freedom fighters in the streets, former labor secretary Robert Reich just generically proclaimed “Trump’s presidency is over.”
The search for heroes leads down some odd paths. The media met the prospect of the military’s arrival on mixed ground. The lede is Trump has “declared war on the American people” and this will cost him the election, even though 58 percent of voters support the deployment of the military in response to protests, with only 30 percent opposing.
Meanwhile, the web is awash in uninformed fear mongering over martial law, posse comitatus, the Insurrection Act, and whatever else a Wikipedia search churns up—you know, maybe a military coup via martial law would be okay if it gets rid of Trump. It is not an unpopular idea; almost a third of Americans would support a coup. Ex-CIA head Michael Hayden—hah hah—jokingly talked about the idea.
We’ve heard this for years. Upon General Mattis‘ departure, the The New York Times asked, “Who will protect America now?” Hopes have been expressed one of the ex-military men once in the White House, maybe John Kelly or H.R. McMaster, would hero up and assume control. If not directly, then maybe by running the country as the patriot behind the throne.
Politics, and the search for heroes, makes for strange bedfellows. Felon Michael Avenatti was a hero contender for longer than David Bowie’s “just for one day.” Porn star Stormy Daniels, and felon Michael Cohen, too. Along the way James Comey, John Brennan, Michael Hayden, Christopher Steele, and James Clapper were all given some hero time, and of course the run by Robert Mueller as Savior-in-Chief. There was the anonymous whistleblower and a handful of State Department drones at the impeachment hearings. Even the virus was given the chance to end this presidency.
The hero-seeking media partnered with every Democratic black candidate of any type or plain white woman who could check boxes (single mom, lesbian, HIV+, veteran, etc). The high point of this low point was reached with AOC and her Squad, whose only real accomplishments have been relentless self-promotion and helping push Nancy Pelosi into an impeachment process that squandered the Blue Wave.
At least most of those who held the hero title for a while were politicians of a sort. But rioters as the new heroes? That’s who is left? Bring a Martin Luther King and I will march with him anywhere. All I see are people finding ways to take advantage of a situation for their own advancement, materially, politically, or just for the clicks.
These are desperate times. No one wants bad cops, and every day America suffers for its original sin of slavery and failure to find repentance. The only answer the country seems to have come up with is to allow rioters to run amuck every few years to let the pressure reset. Pick your favorite: the TV version following Rodney King, the blast from Ferguson, or something old school from the 1970s out of Watts or the Bronx. Apart from letting off political steam to let politicians off the hook, riots are not a vehicle for political change in a democracy. They are the antithesis of democratic change, change by force with no desire for compromise. To claim violence in response to other violence is instead justifiable anger at a systematically bad system only creates more violence. It’s a circle, see?
Was it was only a week ago people said protests against government (specifically COVID restrictions) were wrong and dangerous, we should listen to the authorities, and were glad the cops were out there enforcing social distancing? The heroes then were clerks stocking shelves. In fact, the people I saw at yesterday’s protest looked a lot like the people hissing at me in Whole Foods for not wearing a mask. They likely believe the First Amendment protects their protests but not those of the rednecks at the statehouse. To them every offense is a lynching, every day the apocalypse, every Tweet a blow to democracy, every misunderstanding racism.
Once you understand how shallow and tiresome and hypocritical such views are you will understand the 2016 election, and in about 150 very long days from now, the 2020 election. No heroes, or Russians for that matter, necessary.
Peter Van Buren, a 24-year State Department veteran, is the author of We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People,Hooper’s War: A Novel of WWII Japan, and Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99 Percent.