southfront--2020-05-13--Afrin Liberation Forces Announced New Attacks On Turkish-Backed Militants

The Afrin Liberation Forces ( ALF ) announced on May 12 that their units had carried out a series of attacks on Turkish-backed militants in northern Aleppo .
In an official statement , the group summarized the new attacks as follows : • On May 5 , ALF fighters targeted a gathering of Turkish-backed militants on a road between the town of Deir Ballut and the district of Jindires .
Two militants were killed in the attack .
• On May 7 , ALF fighters targeted a gathering of Turkish-backed militants in the town of Basuta in southern Afrin with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Two militants were killed and two others were injured .
• On May 8 , a sniper of the ALF targeted a Turkish-backed militant near the city of Marea killing him .
• On May 11 , ALF fighters targeted a patrol of Turkish-backed militants in Afrin ’ s city center with an IED .
A militant was killed and another was injured .
A total of six Turkish-backed militants were allegedly killed and at least three others were injured in the ALF attacks in northern Aleppo .
The recent attacks demonstrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cells in Turkish-occupied areas .
In the last few months , the group ’ s agents began carrying out more and more such daring attacks .
The Turkish military and intelligence seem to be making no serious efforts to counter the ALF .
Most of the group ’ s attacks are targeting Syrian militants , which are considered to be easily replaceable .
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The Afrin Liberation Forces (ALF) announced on May 12 that their units had carried out a series of attacks on Turkish-backed militants in northern Aleppo.
In an official statement, the group summarized the new attacks as follows:
On May 5, ALF fighters targeted a gathering of Turkish-backed militants on a road between the town of Deir Ballut and the district of Jindires. Two militants were killed in the attack.
On May 7, ALF fighters targeted a gathering of Turkish-backed militants in the town of Basuta in southern Afrin with an improvised explosive device (IED). Two militants were killed and two others were injured.
On May 8, a sniper of the ALF targeted a Turkish-backed militant near the city of Marea killing him.
On May 11, ALF fighters targeted a patrol of Turkish-backed militants in Afrin’s city center with an IED. A militant was killed and another was injured.
A total of six Turkish-backed militants were allegedly killed and at least three others were injured in the ALF attacks in northern Aleppo.
The recent attacks demonstrated the capabilities of the ALF’s cells in Turkish-occupied areas. In the last few months, the group’s agents began carrying out more and more such daring attacks.
The Turkish military and intelligence seem to be making no serious efforts to counter the ALF. Most of the group’s attacks are targeting Syrian militants, which are considered to be easily replaceable.
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southfront--2020-05-13--Another Attack Targets Turkish-Backed Faylaq Sham Corps In Eastern Idlib

Early on May 13 , unidentified gunmen carried out yet another attack on the Turkish-backed Sham Corps in in the northwestern region of Greater Idlib .
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR ) said the gunmen attacked a headquarters of the group next to the towns of al-Fu ’ ah and Kafriya in the eastern countryside of Idlib .
“ The offensive began with the unidentified [ gunmen ] targeting the headquarters of the [ Sham ] Corps with an RPG round , after this , an exchange of fire took place between the unidentified gunmen on one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the other side , ” the SOHR said in a report .
According to the London-based monitoring group , the attack on the Turkish-backed group ’ s headquarters didn ’ t result in any casualties .
This was the second attack on the Sham Corps in the last three days .
On May 10 , a headquarters of the group located near the town of Binnish in eastern Idlib was targeted in a similar fashion .
Officials in the groups told opposition outlets that the attacks are being investigated without providing any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS ) , which dominates much of Greater Idlib , may be behind these attacks .
The terrorist group was recently provoked by the Sham Corps cooperation with Turkey to implement the March 5 agreement in the region .
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Early on May 13, unidentified gunmen carried out yet another attack on the Turkish-backed Sham Corps in in the northwestern region of Greater Idlib.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said the gunmen attacked a headquarters of the group next to the towns of al-Fu’ah and Kafriya in the eastern countryside of Idlib.
“The offensive began with the unidentified [gunmen] targeting the headquarters of the [Sham] Corps with an RPG round, after this, an exchange of fire took place between the unidentified gunmen on one side and the personnel of the headquarters on the other side,” the SOHR said in a report.
According to the London-based monitoring group, the attack on the Turkish-backed group’s headquarters didn’t result in any casualties.
This was the second attack on the Sham Corps in the last three days. On May 10, a headquarters of the group located near the town of Binnish in eastern Idlib was targeted in a similar fashion.
Officials in the groups told opposition outlets that the attacks are being investigated without providing any additional information.
Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which dominates much of Greater Idlib, may be behind these attacks. The terrorist group was recently provoked by the Sham Corps cooperation with Turkey to implement the March 5 agreement in the region.
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southfront--2020-05-13--In Photos: Libyan National Army Shot Down One More Bayraktar TB2

LNA leadership is scum that allied with NATO Zioterrorists to destroy the former nation of Libya , the least they @ @ @ @ @ low as CIA bithces is to keep downing Turkish drones and killing Turkish-imported mercenaries although @ @ @ @ @ wish either side wins this war .
Either way , Syria should sell them some @ @ @ @ @ Iran give them simply to fuck with Turkey .

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The Libyan National Army shot down one more Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle in Libya last night. The drone was reportedly downed near Tripoli.
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southfront--2020-05-13--Turkey Is Deploying Child Soldiers In Libya – Report

Turkey is recruiting Syrian child soldiers and sending them to fight for the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) in Libya , the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR ) reported on May 13 .
According to the UK-based monitoring group , at least 150 child soldiers , aging between 16 and 18 , have been deployed in Libya so far .
“ Many children under the age of 18 go from Idlib and the northern Aleppo countryside to Afrin … In Afrin they are recruited by pro-Turkey factions then sent to fight for the GNA in its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Army ( LNA ) ] on Libyan soil , ” the group ’ s report reads .
The SOHR also shared the story of a 15-year old child who told his parents he was going to work on a farmland in Afrin .
The parents lost contact with their child 20 days after his supposed trip to Afrin .
Later , the parents were shocked when they came across a video from Libya showing their son fighting for the GNA .
The parents found out that their son was recruited by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group told the parents that the fate of their son is unknown , but later they were told that their son was killed and that his body is with the LNA .
The SOHR said that the Sultan Murad Division , one of Turkey ’ s largest proxy groups , is responsible for most of the child soldiers deployed in Libya .
Currently , 8,700 Syrian militants are fighting for the GNA in Libya .
Despite the mounting losses and repeated scandals , Turkey is preparing to send more militants to Libya .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of deployment , according to the SOHR .
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Turkey is recruiting Syrian child soldiers and sending them to fight for the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on May 13.
According to the UK-based monitoring group, at least 150 child soldiers, aging between 16 and 18, have been deployed in Libya so far.
“Many children under the age of 18 go from Idlib and the northern Aleppo countryside to Afrin … In Afrin they are recruited by pro-Turkey factions then sent to fight for the GNA in its battles against Haftar forces [the Libyan National Army (LNA)] on Libyan soil,” the group’s report reads.
The SOHR also shared the story of a 15-year old child who told his parents he was going to work on a farmland in Afrin. The parents lost contact with their child 20 days after his supposed trip to Afrin.
Later, the parents were shocked when they came across a video from Libya showing their son fighting for the GNA. The parents found out that their son was recruited by the Turkish-backed Sultan Murad Division.
Initially the group told the parents that the fate of their son is unknown, but later they were told that their son was killed and that his body is with the LNA.
The SOHR said that the Sultan Murad Division, one of Turkey’s largest proxy groups, is responsible for most of the child soldiers deployed in Libya.
Currently, 8,700 Syrian militants are fighting for the GNA in Libya. Despite the mounting losses and repeated scandals, Turkey is preparing to send more militants to Libya. Around 3,550 militants are receiving training ahead of deployment, according to the SOHR.
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southfront--2020-05-13--Military Situation In Libya On May 13, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya : • According to pro-LNA @ @ @ @ @ Army ( LNA ) shot down a Turkish drone near Tripoli • Government of National @ @ @ @ @ destroyed two LNA military vehicles near Mazdah • On May 12 , the EU called @ @ @ @ @ the fighting in Libya and said it was “ determined ” to enforce a UN @ @ @ @ @ African country .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Libya On May @ @ @ @ @ Update )

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya:
According to pro-LNA media, the Libyan National Army (LNA) shot down a Turkish drone near Tripoli
Government of National Accord (GNA) warplanes destroyed two LNA military vehicles near Mazdah
On May 12, the EU called on warring parties to end the fighting in Libya and said it was “determined” to enforce a UN arms embargo on the North African country.
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southfront--2020-05-13--Unidentified Assailants Kill Two ‘Policemen’ In Turkish-Occupied Northern Aleppo

On May 13 , the dead bodies of two personnel serving in the ranks of the “ Free Syrian Police , ” a law enforcement body backed by Turkey , were found near the Turkish-occupied town of al-Rai in northern Aleppo .
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR ) , the policemen were killed on their way back home from al-Rai ’ s Police Station .
Local sources identified the slain policemen as Ahmad Shhadah and Mustafa Shhadah .
They are both from the town of al-Shuayha , south of al-Rai .
Last week , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been tied up and executed , were found in the Turkish-occupied region of Afrin .
One of the men was a military commander and a trainer of the Turkish-backed Hamza Division .
Kurdish guerilla groups are known for abducting and executing Turkish-backed militants .
Nevertheless , some other group may be behind the recent killings in Turkish-occupied areas .
In the last few months , the so-called Free Syrian Police engaged in several conflicts with Turkish-backed armed groups .
The recent killings could be related to these conflicts .
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On May 13, the dead bodies of two personnel serving in the ranks of the “Free Syrian Police,” a law enforcement body backed by Turkey, were found near the Turkish-occupied town of al-Rai in northern Aleppo.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the policemen were killed on their way back home from al-Rai’s Police Station.
“The identity of the perpetrators is still unclear,” the London-based monitoring group said in a report.
Local sources identified the slain policemen as Ahmad Shhadah and Mustafa Shhadah. They are both from the town of al-Shuayha, south of al-Rai.
Last week, the dead bodies of two men, who had been tied up and executed, were found in the Turkish-occupied region of Afrin. One of the men was a military commander and a trainer of the Turkish-backed Hamza Division.
Kurdish guerilla groups are known for abducting and executing Turkish-backed militants. Nevertheless, some other group may be behind the recent killings in Turkish-occupied areas.
In the last few months, the so-called Free Syrian Police engaged in several conflicts with Turkish-backed armed groups. The recent killings could be related to these conflicts.
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southfront--2020-05-13--Syrian Democratic Forces Arrest 20 People For Blocking U.S. Patrol

The Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) security body , Asayish , has arrested 20 civilians for blocking a U.S. @ @ @ @ @ , the Step News Agency reported on May 13 .
A source with knowledge on @ @ @ @ @ that the detainees are government supporters from the towns of al-Dishisha and al-Qahira .
The @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. forces near the town of Tell Tamr in the northern al-Hasakah countryside a @ @ @ @ @ , who were chanting for the Damascus government , forced the patrol to retreat .
@ @ @ @ @ in northern al-Hasakah in the last few months .
U.S. forces ’ movement in the @ @ @ @ @ This may be the first time the SDF moves to arrest civilians for blocking a @ @ @ @ @ will likely provoke many locals , especially Arabs that consider the SDF to be a @ @ @ @ @ THIS TOPIC :

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The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) security body, Asayish, has arrested 20 civilians for blocking a U.S. military patrol in northern al-Hasakah, the Step News Agency reported on May 13.
A source with knowledge on the matter told the outlet that the detainees are government supporters from the towns of al-Dishisha and al-Qahira.
“The SDF took the detainees to interrogate them,” the Step News Agency quoted the source as saying.
The detained civilians blocked a patrol of U.S. forces near the town of Tell Tamr in the northern al-Hasakah countryside a day earlier. The civilians, who were chanting for the Damascus government, forced the patrol to retreat.
Several similar incidents took place in northern al-Hasakah in the last few months. U.S. forces’ movement in the region was largely restricted.
This may be the first time the SDF moves to arrest civilians for blocking a U.S. patrol. The step will likely provoke many locals, especially Arabs that consider the SDF to be a Kurdish-dominated group.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Natural Gas Crisis Closely Following Its Crude Oil Counterpart

Following the crisis in the oil markets , closely behind it , is the crisis on the natural gas market .
And it risks closely repeating the scenario of what crude oil went through ( and is still going through ) .
Demand is constantly falling , and gas storages are filling up .
According to the Gas Infrastructure Europe trading group , European storages are 66 % full , while over the last five years the storage was only 38 % full on average .
Gazprom is responsible for a fair bit of natural gas imports into Europe .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The state-owned company Qatar Petroleum , after a collapse in demand in Asia , rerouted most of its supplies towards Europe , having booked all import capacities at the Belgian terminal in Zeebrug until 2044 .
Today , Qatar faces the same dilemma as Saudi Arabia .
To reduce production or try to expand its market share through dumping , which can lead to gas prices with negative values ( similarly to what happened with WTI ) .
Essentially , Qatar is at an impasse , it has no choice .
Any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same scenario that was observed with Saudi Arabia – it will be seen as some sort of defiance , and then , similarly to Riyadh will bend and begin cutting production in massive amounts .
If prices collapse , similarly to what happened with oil – the US shale industry would be the most affected .
Pipeline gas from Russia is much more competitive than LNG ( liquefied natural gas ) due to the peculiarities of liquefaction technology and transport losses .
owever , Qatar has an advantage over LNG producers such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Laffan plant is one of the three lowest cost in the world .
However , falling gas prices have already put Qatar at breakeven .
This year , prices fell to $ 2 per million btu ( British thermal unit ) , and in the 3rd quarter of 2018 gas cost more than $ 10 per million btu .
Qatar ’ s import schedules show that shipments to northwestern Europe will no longer grow .
17 LNG tankers ( more than usual at this time of year ) are idle off the coast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is no doubt that Qatar ’ s next step will be to reduce production .
There is one difference from the oil market , however : there is no OPEC , and as such there can be no coordinated actions that ’ s been demonstrated by the OPEC+ members in recent weeks .
As such , this could potentially lead to the forming of an organization of gas exporting countries , as even Bloomberg has outlined in one of its articles on the topic .
This , on the other hand , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s plans .
On one side , Washington is interested in reducing production , which will inevitably require the creation of a “ gas OPEC.
” From another direction , the consolidation of gas exporting countries has always been perceived by the United States as a threat to national interests .
The fact is that the creation of an organization of gas exporters and the consolidation of the world market radically changes the situation .
If Saudi Arabia plays the key role in the oil world , since it ’ s the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the gas landscape is much different .
Here , Iran and Russia ( as Moscow has the largest gas reserves ) are much more central players than in the oil world – and neither is partnering with the US .
Qatar is sure to have some influence , but limited .
And without control of the spot market , it is impossible to provide exchange control over pricing , as it is designed in the oil market .
The US long-term energy strategy aims to create an independent gas market , separating it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the deals in dollars .
This will allow Wall Street to fill the financial bubble with real assets .
There are more gas reserves on the planet than oil reserves , and potentially the gas market is more capacious .
The main thing is that “ paper gas ” ( futures and derivatives ) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange .
This is impossible to take place , since Iran and Russia are key players , the current political situation in both countries , according to the US entirely disallows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that whenever the idea of creating a “ gas OPEC ” is floated , the US reacts strongly to it .
The latest such reaction was expressed in a statement by a group of congressmen that the creation of a single operator of the gas commodity market would be regarded by the United States as a declaration of war .
The current situation the US finds itself in is that it needs to sacrifice something , and there is no situation which provides a complete “ victory.
” At the same time , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the Nord Stream 2 is soon to be complete and start pumping gas , and as a result Russia ’ s influence would also increase , since it would take a bigger piece of the EU market .
The Akademik Cherskiy vessel is close to the final location , the materials , needed for the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are there , and it is simply a matter of time .
The completion of the pipeline , in addition to Turk Stream and also the Power of Siberia to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the US would be even less inclined to condone the forming of a “ gas OPEC ” if it can not play an even remotely leading role .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Russia ’ s Shortfall In Oil And Gas Revenues To Total $ 726mln In April • Germany Says It ’ s “ Positive ” About Nord Stream 2 , Project Is On Its Last Stretch

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Following the crisis in the oil markets, closely behind it, is the crisis on the natural gas market.
And it risks closely repeating the scenario of what crude oil went through (and is still going through).
Demand is constantly falling, and gas storages are filling up.
According to the Gas Infrastructure Europe trading group, European storages are 66% full, while over the last five years the storage was only 38% full on average. Gazprom is responsible for a fair bit of natural gas imports into Europe.
The leading global LNG exporter is Qatar. The state-owned company Qatar Petroleum, after a collapse in demand in Asia, rerouted most of its supplies towards Europe, having booked all import capacities at the Belgian terminal in Zeebrug until 2044.
Today, Qatar faces the same dilemma as Saudi Arabia. To reduce production or try to expand its market share through dumping, which can lead to gas prices with negative values (similarly to what happened with WTI).
Essentially, Qatar is at an impasse, it has no choice. Any attempt to begin dumping would lead to the same scenario that was observed with Saudi Arabia – it will be seen as some sort of defiance, and then, similarly to Riyadh will bend and begin cutting production in massive amounts.
If prices collapse, similarly to what happened with oil – the US shale industry would be the most affected.
Pipeline gas from Russia is much more competitive than LNG (liquefied natural gas) due to the peculiarities of liquefaction technology and transport losses.
owever, Qatar has an advantage over LNG producers such as the United States; the Ras Laffan plant is one of the three lowest cost in the world.
However, falling gas prices have already put Qatar at breakeven. This year, prices fell to $2 per million btu (British thermal unit), and in the 3rd quarter of 2018 gas cost more than $10 per million btu.
Qatar’s import schedules show that shipments to northwestern Europe will no longer grow. 17 LNG tankers (more than usual at this time of year) are idle off the coast of the country.
In practice, there is no doubt that Qatar’s next step will be to reduce production.
There is one difference from the oil market, however: there is no OPEC, and as such there can be no coordinated actions that’s been demonstrated by the OPEC+ members in recent weeks.
As such, this could potentially lead to the forming of an organization of gas exporting countries, as even Bloomberg has outlined in one of its articles on the topic.
This, on the other hand, isn’t exactly according to Washington’s plans.
On one side, Washington is interested in reducing production, which will inevitably require the creation of a “gas OPEC.”
From another direction, the consolidation of gas exporting countries has always been perceived by the United States as a threat to national interests.
The fact is that the creation of an organization of gas exporters and the consolidation of the world market radically changes the situation.
If Saudi Arabia plays the key role in the oil world, since it’s the biggest exporter on a global scale, the gas landscape is much different.
Here, Iran and Russia (as Moscow has the largest gas reserves) are much more central players than in the oil world – and neither is partnering with the US.
Qatar is sure to have some influence, but limited. And without control of the spot market, it is impossible to provide exchange control over pricing, as it is designed in the oil market.
The US long-term energy strategy aims to create an independent gas market, separating it from the oil market, but preserving all the deals in dollars.
This will allow Wall Street to fill the financial bubble with real assets. There are more gas reserves on the planet than oil reserves, and potentially the gas market is more capacious.
The main thing is that “paper gas” (futures and derivatives) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
This is impossible to take place, since Iran and Russia are key players, the current political situation in both countries, according to the US entirely disallows that.
And it is no accident that whenever the idea of creating a “gas OPEC” is floated, the US reacts strongly to it. The latest such reaction was expressed in a statement by a group of congressmen that the creation of a single operator of the gas commodity market would be regarded by the United States as a declaration of war.
The current situation the US finds itself in is that it needs to sacrifice something, and there is no situation which provides a complete “victory.”
At the same time, the timeline is becoming ever shorter, since the Nord Stream 2 is soon to be complete and start pumping gas, and as a result Russia’s influence would also increase, since it would take a bigger piece of the EU market.
The Akademik Cherskiy vessel is close to the final location, the materials, needed for the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are there, and it is simply a matter of time.
The completion of the pipeline, in addition to Turk Stream and also the Power of Siberia to China threatens to further increase tensions, since the US would be even less inclined to condone the forming of a “gas OPEC” if it cannot play an even remotely leading role.
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southfront--2020-05-14--11th Joint Russian-Turkish Patrol Took Place In Southern Idlib (Video, Map)

On May 14 , an 11th joint Russian-Turkish patrol took place on the M4 highway in southern Idlib .
The @ @ @ @ @ area west of Saraqib and the eastern entrance of Arihah .
Supporters of radicals protested @ @ @ @ @ were not able to block it .
Earlier this week , the 10th joint Russian-Turkish @ @ @ @ @ .
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On May 14, an 11th joint Russian-Turkish patrol took place on the M4 highway in southern Idlib. The patrol took place between the area west of Saraqib and the eastern entrance of Arihah.
Supporters of radicals protested against the patrol but they were not able to block it. Earlier this week, the 10th joint Russian-Turkish patrol was attacked by militants.
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southfront--2020-05-14--U.S. Air Force Abandons 80% Mission-Capable Goal For Fighter Jets To Avoid Future Disappointment

The United States Air Force officially abandoned its directive to get its fleet of F-35 , F-22 and F-16 jets up to an 80 % mission-capable rate after failing to meet that goal in Fiscal Year 2019 .
Appearing at the 2019 Defense News Conference , Lt. Gen. Mark Kelly , deputy chief of staff for operations , said that the F-22 and F-35A would both fall short of the capability target set by Mattis shortly before his exit from the Pentagon .
The F-16 , however , “ should ” hit that target rate .
Of the 5,413 or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percentage able to fly at any given time decreased steadily each year since at least FY12 , when 77.9 % of aircraft were deemed flyable .
By FY17 , that metric plunged to 71.3 % , and it dipped again to 69.97 % in FY18 .
According to written responses by Air Force General Charles Q .
Brown ahead of his May 7 confirmation hearing , “ the F-16 mission capable rate reached a high of 75 % in June 2019 , the F-22 mission capable rate achieved a high of 68 % @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capability rate climbed to a high of 74 % in September 2019.
” Data obtained by Defense News and Air Forces Times , however , showed that over the entire 2019 the rate is also under 80 % , and wouldn ’ t be able to achieve the 80 % goal mandated by an order by back-then US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis , given in October 2018 .
The overall rates were , reportedly , “ much lower ” throughout the year .
The F-35A fighter jet , the conventional landing type @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mission-capable rate of 62 % , compared to 50 % in 2018 .
The F-16 mission-capable rate grew a bit , with F-16C going to 73 % in 2019 , compared to 70 % in 2018 .
The F-16D ’ s mission-capable rate rose from 66 percent to 70 percent over that time period .
The F-22 mission-capable rate decreased slightly , going to 51 % in 2019 , from 52 % in 2018 .
In order to avoid future disappointment , Pentagon leadership decided not to renew the effort in FY20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee .
Instead , the Air Force is returning to the practice of allowing commanders to set their mission-capable objectives .
In his hearing , Brown reiterated the Air Force ’ s need to grow to 386 squadrons over the long term .
He also said that the US Air Force was capable of carrying out the National Defense Strategy “ to an extent.
” He acknowledged the Air Force may come close but might not completely meet that goal , which was first laid out by previous Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unmanned technology would be of great assistance .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • In Photos : US Air Force Stages “ Moose Walk ” In Alaska • In Photos : F-35 Jets Of US Air Force Over Northeastern Syria

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The United States Air Force officially abandoned its directive to get its fleet of F-35, F-22 and F-16 jets up to an 80% mission-capable rate after failing to meet that goal in Fiscal Year 2019.
Appearing at the 2019 Defense News Conference, Lt. Gen. Mark Kelly, deputy chief of staff for operations, said that the F-22 and F-35A would both fall short of the capability target set by Mattis shortly before his exit from the Pentagon. The F-16, however, “should” hit that target rate.
Of the 5,413 or so aircraft in the fleet, the percentage able to fly at any given time decreased steadily each year since at least FY12, when 77.9% of aircraft were deemed flyable. By FY17, that metric plunged to 71.3%, and it dipped again to 69.97% in FY18.
According to written responses by Air Force General Charles Q. Brown ahead of his May 7 confirmation hearing, “the F-16 mission capable rate reached a high of 75% in June 2019, the F-22 mission capable rate achieved a high of 68% in April 2019 and the F-35 mission capability rate climbed to a high of 74% in September 2019.”
Data obtained by Defense News and Air Forces Times, however, showed that over the entire 2019 the rate is also under 80%, and wouldn’t be able to achieve the 80% goal mandated by an order by back-then US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, given in October 2018.
The overall rates were, reportedly, “much lower” throughout the year.
The F-35A fighter jet, the conventional landing type, actually improved in 2019, reaching a mission-capable rate of 62%, compared to 50% in 2018.
The F-16 mission-capable rate grew a bit, with F-16C going to 73% in 2019, compared to 70% in 2018. The F-16D’s mission-capable rate rose from 66 percent to 70 percent over that time period.
The F-22 mission-capable rate decreased slightly, going to 51% in 2019, from 52% in 2018.
In order to avoid future disappointment, Pentagon leadership decided not to renew the effort in FY20, Brown told the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“The Office of the Secretary of Defense determined the FY19 80-percent Mission Capable (MC) Rate initiative is not an FY20 requirement,” wrote Brown.
Instead, the Air Force is returning to the practice of allowing commanders to set their mission-capable objectives.
“We continue to balance near term readiness recovery with investment long-term combat capability,” Brown said. “While maintaining all of our aging fleets are difficult and expensive, we continuously examine emerging technologies, commercial best practices, and other methods to reduce the sustainment costs for our Air Force.”
In his hearing, Brown reiterated the Air Force’s need to grow to 386 squadrons over the long term. He also said that the US Air Force was capable of carrying out the National Defense Strategy “to an extent.”
“In the immediate term, I think we are, but we’ve still got to be able to grow to the 386” squadrons, Brown said. “Anything less than 386 incurs risk.”
He acknowledged the Air Force may come close but might not completely meet that goal, which was first laid out by previous Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson.
However, progress in terms of unmanned technology would be of great assistance.
“We may be a little bit smaller than 386, but we’ll be more capable,” Brown said. “It’s not just the manned platforms; it’s also how we do manned-unmanned teaming. The XQ-58 Valkyrie [combat drone] is one of those systems that we can team up with, particularly some of our fifth-gen capability to increase our range, increase our awareness, to increase our strike capability.”
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southfront--2020-05-14--In Video: Impact Of Taliban Attack On Military Base In Gardiz City

On May 14 , 5 people were killed and 19 others were injured in a car bomb explosion at the @ @ @ @ @ Defense ’ s base in the city of Gardiz .
Meanwhile , the Taliban continued @ @ @ @ @ forces : MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Afghanistan On May 13 @ @ @ @ @ )

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On May 14, 5 people were killed and 19 others were injured in a car bomb explosion at the gates of the Ministry Of Defense’s base in the city of Gardiz.
Meanwhile, the Taliban continued an active training of its forces:
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southfront--2020-05-14--Military Situation In Yemen On May 14, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen : • Clashes between Ansar @ @ @ @ @ continue in al-Baydha province .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Yemen @ @ @ @ @ ( Map Update )

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen:
Ceasefire violations were reported in al-Hudaydah;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck targets in Sanaa province 2 times;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Kitaf area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Zaher area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Qaniya area 2 times;
Clashes between Ansar Allah and Saudi-led coalition forces continue in al-Baydha province.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Violent Protests In Montenegro Following Arrest Of Bishop And Eight Priests

Montenegrin police used tear gas against demonstrators in the cities of Niksic and Plevlya , where local residents protested against the detention of representatives of the local clergy – Bishop of Budimlyan-Niksic Serbian Orthodox Church Joanikije and eight priests .
This was reported by Montenegrin outlet Vijesti .
There were also clashes between police and protesters .
The publication notes that in spite of the ban on holding mass events because of the coronavirus pandemic , the clergy held a meeting of believers for the occasion of the day of St. Vasily of Ostrog in Niksic .
Vasily Ostrozhsky – @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who lived in the XVII century .
Ostrogsky ’ s Memorial Day is celebrated annually on May 12th ( April 29th according to the Julian calendar ) – on the day of the clergyman ’ s death .
Hundreds of citizens gathered in front of the Nikšić Security Center , demanding that Bishop Joanikije of Budva and eight priests be released , and then go on a protest walk along Vuka Karadžića Street to the square .
They tried to block the roundabout , after which there was a clashwith the police .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ chanted “ Ustashas ” ( Fascists ) , while the police used tear gas and stun bombs , managed to break the citizens into smaller groups , but also to detain a larger number of them .
Several journalists were also arrested .
The coordinator of the Alternative party , Vesko Pejak from Nikšić , was invited to an informative conversation at the Nikšić Security Center last night , due to his status on the social network Facebook , in which he said earlier that he would be in front of CB Nikšić @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the arrest of clergy .
The gathered people chanted “ We will not give the shrines ” , “ Let the bishop go ” and sang “ Montenegro has risen to defend the see , Milo thieves.
” Essentially , protesters turned it into a demonstration in defense of religion , while the entire situation was caused by the fact that the bishop and the other priests were attempting to organize a gathering during a lockdown , when all such gatherings are still banned in Montenegro .
22 police officers were injured in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police arrested dozens of citizens and found a knife , dagger and axe in a city park near one group .
“ Vijesti ” was told at the top of the Police Directorate that the police officers mostly suffered minor bodily injuries , which is why they asked for medical help at the local hospital and the Health Center .
Police said that the gathered mass , which violated a large number of measures and orders of the Ministry of Health , moved along part of the lane and sidewalks and thus prevented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act on warnings and orders from the police to clear the road .
The entire situation is a result of the months-long attempts to change the canonic Orthodox church with another a government-controlled and pro-Western one .
This attempt has faced numerous protests and violent demonstrations .
Even if the arrest of the bishop and priests is not a part of this agenda , and they were simply refusing to follow government regulations in light of the COVID-19 lockdown , citizens are sensitive on the topic and regard it as such , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their religion .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Protests in Montenegro , As Church Law Puts It On Same Path as Ukraine • Montenegro SITREP : NATO persecutes the Orthodox Church ( again ! )
and risks civil war

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Montenegrin police used tear gas against demonstrators in the cities of Niksic and Plevlya, where local residents protested against the detention of representatives of the local clergy – Bishop of Budimlyan-Niksic Serbian Orthodox Church Joanikije and eight priests.
This was reported by Montenegrin outlet Vijesti.
upravo sad u Pljevljima za bracu apelase pic.twitter.com/KAWZTK8GX7 — ????zelenascg????1244 (@zelenascg) May 13, 2020
There were also clashes between police and protesters.
The publication notes that in spite of the ban on holding mass events because of the coronavirus pandemic, the clergy held a meeting of believers for the occasion of the day of St. Vasily of Ostrog in Niksic.
Vasily Ostrozhsky – the most revered saint in Montenegro, who lived in the XVII century. Ostrogsky’s Memorial Day is celebrated annually on May 12th (April 29th according to the Julian calendar) – on the day of the clergyman’s death.
Hundreds of citizens gathered in front of the Nikšić Security Center, demanding that Bishop Joanikije of Budva and eight priests be released, and then go on a protest walk along Vuka Karadžića Street to the square.
They tried to block the roundabout, after which there was a clashwith the police.
Citizens threw stones at the police and chanted “Ustashas” (Fascists), while the police used tear gas and stun bombs, managed to break the citizens into smaller groups, but also to detain a larger number of them.
Several journalists were also arrested.
The coordinator of the Alternative party, Vesko Pejak from Nikšić, was invited to an informative conversation at the Nikšić Security Center last night, due to his status on the social network Facebook, in which he said earlier that he would be in front of CB Nikšić at 6 pm to express revolt over the arrest of clergy.
The gathered people chanted “We will not give the shrines”, “Let the bishop go” and sang “Montenegro has risen to defend the see, Milo thieves.”
Essentially, protesters turned it into a demonstration in defense of religion, while the entire situation was caused by the fact that the bishop and the other priests were attempting to organize a gathering during a lockdown, when all such gatherings are still banned in Montenegro.
22 police officers were injured in the riots in Niksic, and the police arrested dozens of citizens and found a knife, dagger and axe in a city park near one group.
“Vijesti” was told at the top of the Police Directorate that the police officers mostly suffered minor bodily injuries, which is why they asked for medical help at the local hospital and the Health Center.
Police said that the gathered mass, which violated a large number of measures and orders of the Ministry of Health, moved along part of the lane and sidewalks and thus prevented normal traffic, and citizens did not act on warnings and orders from the police to clear the road.
“The crowd, which the police estimated was about 400 citizens, came to the roundabout and blocked traffic. Police officers issued several warnings and orders that the crowd deafened and refused to disperse. After that, they pelted the Police Administration officers with stones. Several police officers who are currently receiving medical treatment were injured and official vehicles and equipment were damaged in the incidents,” the police said.
The entire situation is a result of the months-long attempts to change the canonic Orthodox church with another a government-controlled and pro-Western one. This attempt has faced numerous protests and violent demonstrations. Even if the arrest of the bishop and priests is not a part of this agenda, and they were simply refusing to follow government regulations in light of the COVID-19 lockdown, citizens are sensitive on the topic and regard it as such, which results in violent demonstrations in protection of their religion.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Angela Merkel Says “Hard Evidence” Russia Targeted Her Emails

While the US remains too obsessed by the COVID-19 crisis to blame Russia for meddling into its elections , Germany seems to be taking the lead in the field .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Wednesday , she has “ hard evidence ” that Russia is behind a 2015 hack attack of her emails .
“ I can honestly say that it pains me .
Every day I try to build a better relationship with Russia and on the other hand , there is such hard evidence that Russian forces are doing this , ” she told the Bundestag ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Der Spiegel magazine reported last week that Russia ’ s GRU military intelligence service led the operation back in 2015 to steal a treasure trove of Merkel ’ s emails .
For years , there have been concerns of spying not just between Russia and Germany , but rather between the US and Germany .
We first pointed out , back in 2013 , that the spy spat between both countries was uncovered , and German journalists urged people to stop using Google and Yahoo because of NSA eavesdropping .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s spying tentacles were revealed via NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden ’ s release of secret documents .
This clearly upset German officials who asked for an investigation into the matter .
In 2017 , we noted how the spy spat worsened , it turned out that Germany returned the favor and was spying on numerous officials in Washington and key US business targets .
As Merkel voiced her frustrations about Russian attacks , saying she has proof of the “ outrageous ” spying , the evidence remains to be seen in public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no mention of the spy spat between US and Germany .

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While the US remains too obsessed by the COVID-19 crisis to blame Russia for meddling into its elections, Germany seems to be taking the lead in the field.
ZeroHedge (source):
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Wednesday, she has “hard evidence” that Russia is behind a 2015 hack attack of her emails.
“I can honestly say that it pains me. Every day I try to build a better relationship with Russia and on the other hand, there is such hard evidence that Russian forces are doing this,” she told the Bundestag (Germany’s lower house of parliament).
Der Spiegel magazine reported last week that Russia’s GRU military intelligence service led the operation back in 2015 to steal a treasure trove of Merkel’s emails.
Moscow has since denied previous allegations and said Merkel “will keep trying to improve ties with Russia, but the hacking attack doesn’t make it easier.”
Merkel bestätigt in Bundestag Abgreifen alter Mails ihres Bundestagsbüros durch Hackerangriff – und sieht starke Indizien, dass #Russland dahinter steckt. pic.twitter.com/KHDg7vzASx — Andreas Rinke (@Andreas__Rinke) May 13, 2020
For years, there have been concerns of spying not just between Russia and Germany, but rather between the US and Germany. We first pointed out, back in 2013, that the spy spat between both countries was uncovered, and German journalists urged people to stop using Google and Yahoo because of NSA eavesdropping.
By 2014, more revelations of the NSA’s spying tentacles were revealed via NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden’s release of secret documents. This clearly upset German officials who asked for an investigation into the matter.
In 2017, we noted how the spy spat worsened, it turned out that Germany returned the favor and was spying on numerous officials in Washington and key US business targets.
As Merkel voiced her frustrations about Russian attacks, saying she has proof of the “outrageous” spying, the evidence remains to be seen in public view, nevertheless, how there is no mention of the spy spat between US and Germany.
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southfront--2020-05-14--U.S. Appears To Lack Capability To Repair Its Nuclear Submarine Fleet

The USS Boise Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine is being moved to from Naval Station Norfolk , Virginia , to Huntington Ingalls Industries ’ ( HII ) Newport News Shipbuilding division in order to undergo an engineered overhaul ( EOH ) .
An EOH is a major multi-year overhaul near the mid-point of a submarine ’ s service life to perform necessary repairs , maintenance and modernization , to certify the submarine for unrestricted operations and to ensure the submarine is operating at full technical capacity and mission capability .
The USS Boise nuclear submarine returned from its last deployment at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that there were plans for it to undergo medium repairs .
In February 2017 , a ban on diving was introduced for the boat and after that it simply remained in Norfolk .
In 2017 , the U.S. Navy concluded a contract with Newport News Shipbuilding in the amount of $ 385.7 million for repairs of the USS Boise nuclear submarine .
On June 18th , 2018 , the USS Boise arrived for repair at Newport News , but the shipyard was not able to start repairing it due to delaying the repair @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( the USS Helena and USS Columbus ) , and as a result , the USS Boise was forced to return to Norfolk in March 2019 .
Now , one year and two months later , a renewed attempt will be made to repair the nuclear submarine .
Newport News systematically breaks the deadlines for repairs of all three of the above-mentioned nuclear submarines , which causes numerous complaints from the US Navy .
The reason is , in particular , the lack of experience in such repairs and the lack of qualified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact that more than 1,200 people were involved in the repair of the USS Helena and USS Columbus nuclear submarines in 2019 .
Four state shipyards that repair nuclear submarines of the US Navy are also facing similar problems .
According to the report of the US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) , released in 2018 , since 2008 , repairs of almost all US Navy nuclear submarines have been carried out either with a delay in the start of the planned dates for their implementation , or with delaying in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solve this problem , the U.S. Navy resorted to setting up boats for repair at private shipyards , including Newport News Shipbuilding .
However , at those establishments , the repair problems were also reproduced on a similar scale .
Newport News , which received contracts for the repair of three Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines , has delayed the delivery of USS Helena ( despite it simply carrying out routine repairs and USS Columbus , and it is incapable of beginning the USS Boise ’ s repair for three years .
The USS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in October 2017 and was due to be commissioned in 2018 , but only left the shipyard in the spring of 2020 , allowed for USS Boise to enter .
Repair of the USS Montpelier nuclear submarine ( also Los Angeles-class ) at the General Dynamics Electric Boats shipyard in Groton is being delayed in a similar way .
In total , from 1976 to 1996 , the United States Navy commissioned 62 Los Angeles-type multipurpose submarines , of which 30 are now in the fleet .
The repair time for such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and clearly , three years is a bit longer .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Russia ’ s Navy To Lay 6 Warships and Submarines By End Of April • U.S. To Develop New Nuclear-Armed Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile • US Navy ’ s $ 2.6Bn Submarine Losing Its Stealth Coating After One Deployment

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The USS Boise Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine is being moved to from Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, to Huntington Ingalls Industries’ (HII) Newport News Shipbuilding division in order to undergo an engineered overhaul (EOH).
An EOH is a major multi-year overhaul near the mid-point of a submarine’s service life to perform necessary repairs, maintenance and modernization, to certify the submarine for unrestricted operations and to ensure the submarine is operating at full technical capacity and mission capability.
The USS Boise nuclear submarine returned from its last deployment at the beginning of 2015, and after that there were plans for it to undergo medium repairs.
In February 2017, a ban on diving was introduced for the boat and after that it simply remained in Norfolk.
In 2017, the U.S. Navy concluded a contract with Newport News Shipbuilding in the amount of $385.7 million for repairs of the USS Boise nuclear submarine.
On June 18th, 2018, the USS Boise arrived for repair at Newport News, but the shipyard was not able to start repairing it due to delaying the repair of other boats of the same type (the USS Helena and USS Columbus), and as a result, the USS Boise was forced to return to Norfolk in March 2019.
Now, one year and two months later, a renewed attempt will be made to repair the nuclear submarine.
Newport News systematically breaks the deadlines for repairs of all three of the above-mentioned nuclear submarines, which causes numerous complaints from the US Navy.
The reason is, in particular, the lack of experience in such repairs and the lack of qualified personnel at the shipyard, despite the fact that more than 1,200 people were involved in the repair of the USS Helena and USS Columbus nuclear submarines in 2019.
Four state shipyards that repair nuclear submarines of the US Navy are also facing similar problems.
According to the report of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), released in 2018, since 2008, repairs of almost all US Navy nuclear submarines have been carried out either with a delay in the start of the planned dates for their implementation, or with delaying in the completion dates.
In an attempt to solve this problem, the U.S. Navy resorted to setting up boats for repair at private shipyards, including Newport News Shipbuilding.
However, at those establishments, the repair problems were also reproduced on a similar scale.
Newport News, which received contracts for the repair of three Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines, has delayed the delivery of USS Helena (despite it simply carrying out routine repairs and USS Columbus, and it is incapable of beginning the USS Boise’s repair for three years.
The USS Helena nuclear submarine arrived at Newport News in October 2017 and was due to be commissioned in 2018, but only left the shipyard in the spring of 2020, allowed for USS Boise to enter.
Repair of the USS Montpelier nuclear submarine (also Los Angeles-class) at the General Dynamics Electric Boats shipyard in Groton is being delayed in a similar way.
In total, from 1976 to 1996, the United States Navy commissioned 62 Los Angeles-type multipurpose submarines, of which 30 are now in the fleet. The repair time for such a nuclear submarine should be approximately 25 months, and clearly, three years is a bit longer.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Russia’s Misdemeanors In Syria: A US-Funded Think Tank Point Of View

On May 12th , the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) released its “ Moscow ’ s War in Syria ” report .
The report is free to download .
[ pdf ] The CSIS takes pride in being ranked the number one think tank in the United States as well as the defense and national security center of excellence for 2016-2018 by the University of Pennsylvania ’ s “ Global Go To Think Tank Index.
” Its list of donors and who specifically chose it as the # 1 think tank is showing for the opinions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ separate report includes the asterisk “ CSIS does not take specific policy positions ; accordingly , all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author ( s ) .
” In line with recent claims by US Syria Envoy James Jeffrey , who said that it was the US ’ job to turn Syria into a quagmire for Russia , Operation Inherent Resolve ’ s report saying that the US forces are focusing on Iran and Russia , as primary challenges , alongside ISIS , and so on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s military and diplomatic campaign in Syria , the largest and most significant Russian out-of-area operation since the end of the Cold War .
Russia ’ s experience in Syria will shape its military thinking , influence promotion and personnel decisions , impact research and development for its arms industry , and expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond for the foreseeable future .
Yet despite the importance of Russia ’ s involvement in Syria—especially as the United States competes with countries such as Russia and China—there has been little systematic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria .
This research aims to help fill the gap and provides some new analysis and data .
It conducts a broad assessment of the Russian campaign—including political objectives , diplomatic initiatives , and civilian targeting—which places the military campaign in a wider context .
In addition , it compiles a data set of Russia ’ s civilian targeting and analyzes satellite imagery of Russian activity.
” The report admits that Russia was “ relatively successful ” ( can ’ t praise the enemy too much , after all ) in achieving its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Syria – namely preventing the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad ’ s government ( “ the Assad regime ” ) and ( which is exactly the same thing ) preventing an US overthrow of Assad .
And , in line with all baseless accusations , the report repeats them again : Russia achieved this by “ systematic punishment ” by “ attacks against civilian and humanitarian infrastructure in an attempt to deny resources—including food , fuel , and medical aid—to the opposition while simultaneously eroding the will of civilians to support opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s goals and strategy in Syria are the following : • Russian leaders wanted to stabilize Syria , a strategically-important hub for Moscow in the Middle East that was under threat ; • Russian leaders assessed that the United States and its partners were attempting to overthrow Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime and were either attempting to replace it with a friendly government or would leave behind a collapsed state ; • Moscow ’ s decision was also significantly influenced by its ability to establish a viable military strategy at an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that combined airpower and ground maneuver to overwhelm a divided enemy .
And instead of relying on a big force being deployed , it relied on the Syrian Arab Army , Lebanese Hezbollah , and other militias and private military contractors as the main ground maneuver elements .
Russia ’ s military campaign in Syria was successful in achieving Moscow ’ s strategic objectives at a manageable cost in terms of Russian casualties and finances .
Russian efforts benefited from having limited objectives and facing rebel groups that failed to coordinate their activities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as anti-air weaponry .
CSIS calls it a “ Russian military intervention ” and it can be separated into three phases : • Stabilizing the Assad regime in core areas of western Syria ( September 2015 to spring 2016 ) ; • Conducting offensive operations in the west to recapture Aleppo ( spring 2016 to spring 2017 ) ; • Countering the Islamic State in central and eastern Syria ( spring 2017 to spring 2018 ) .
Completion of those phases cleared the way for the retaking of Idlib and putting it under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ northeastern Syria , and wrestling it away from the US and Turkey .
The report presents it as if these are sole Russian objectives , and the Syrian Arab Army is some sort of proxy that ’ s just pushing further towards achieving Moscow ’ s interests and not that it wishes to consolidate the country so that the Syrian citizens can return to some semblance of normality .
In addition to what it does in the military field , Russia carried out two separate campaigns , according to CSIS – a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” campaign .
“ According to data compiled by CSIS for this report , Russia used a systematic punishment campaign to escalate costs on the civilian population and undermine support for the opposition .
The most visible element of this punishment campaign was marked by large-scale attacks against civilian and humanitarian infrastructure in an attempt to deny resources—including food , fuel , and medical aid—to the opposition while simultaneously eroding the will of civilians to support opposition groups .
Russia also conducted a propaganda campaign using both diplomacy and disinformation to target Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign attempted to deflect blame for Russian and Syrian attacks against civilian infrastructure , undermine international efforts to hold the Assad regime accountable for abuses , and legitimize an ever-widening civilian target set .
Over time , these campaigns became synergistic , and their effects complemented each other to achieve regime goals such as retaking opposition-held territory.
” Regarding the diplomatic campaign , CSIS summarized the following : The lessons that can be derived from the Russian activity in Syria would take years to summarize and entirely realize , but at the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intermediate lessons : • Russia adopted a light footprint approach in Syria that constituted an evolution in Russian military thinking .
Rather than applying a heavy hand , Moscow leveraged air assets , unmanned aerial vehicles , civil-military units ( such as military police and “ reconciliation ” centers ) , special operations forces , and information assets .
For ground operations , Moscow relied on surrogate forces , such as the Syrian Tiger Forces , Lebanese Hezbollah , private military contractors , and militias from Iraq , Afghanistan , Pakistan , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major advance for the Russian military ; • Russia will likely build on its Syrian experience when weighing external military operations in Africa , Asia , the Middle East , and Latin America .
Where ground forces are an option , Russia is more likely to rely on its own special operation forces , state and non-state proxy forces , and private military contractors ; • The punishment of civilians continues to be an important component of Russian military operations .
Russia attempted to deny food , fuel , and medical aid to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fight or provide support to opposition groups .
Russian leaders concluded that punishment was effective in breaking the will and support of local populations for rebel groups ; • The Russian intervention in Syria was an opportunity to modernize Russia ’ s war-fighting capabilities and use Syria as a live-fire training range to constantly refine its application of force .
Perhaps the most important lesson in the technological sphere was Russia ’ s development of advanced command , control , communications , and intelligence ( C3I ) field systems on the battlefield @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throughput of airstrikes .
These systems were integrated into Russia ’ s overarching systems of “ reconnaissance strike complexes ” ( RSCs ) ; • Russia continually rotated mid- to senior-level leadership to the Syrian theater of operations .
Officers received valuable experience on the ground in advisory or leadership roles , which will likely impact Russian personnel decisions and thinking for years to come .
The above is focused on Russia ’ s alleged conduct and what can be deemed in regard to Moscow ’ s military thinking .
At the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West can also learn some lessons from Russia ’ s activity .
For example , Moscow generally respected the US forces and didn ’ t engage them , respecting deconfliction markers and so on .
But this was only the case when the US could demonstrate force , and allegedly Russia disregarded any scenario in which US directives were simply hollow .
The U.S. and allies “ failed to prevent ” Russia and its allies from “ conducting human rights abuses.
” Mostly because there was no evidence , but ample accusations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s unclear even happened .
The Russian political , diplomatic and military conduct were quite uniform , in comparison with the US which seemed rather sporadic and chaotic .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Operation Inherent Resolve ’ s Activity In Q1 2020 : Counter Iran , Not So Much ISIS • RAND Corporation Brings Back Cold War Era Assessment Of Russian Correlation of Forces and Means

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On May 12th, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released its “Moscow’s War in Syria” report.
The report is free to download. [pdf]
The CSIS takes pride in being ranked the number one think tank in the United States as well as the defense and national security center of excellence for 2016-2018 by the University of Pennsylvania’s “Global Go To Think Tank Index.”
Its list of donors and who specifically chose it as the #1 think tank is showing for the opinions its authors represent. Since, each separate report includes the asterisk “CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).”
In line with recent claims by US Syria Envoy James Jeffrey, who said that it was the US’ job to turn Syria into a quagmire for Russia, Operation Inherent Resolve’s report saying that the US forces are focusing on Iran and Russia, as primary challenges, alongside ISIS, and so on.
“This report examines Russia’s military and diplomatic campaign in Syria, the largest and most significant Russian out-of-area operation since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s experience in Syria will shape its military thinking, influence promotion and personnel decisions, impact research and development for its arms industry, and expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond for the foreseeable future. Yet despite the importance of Russia’s involvement in Syria—especially as the United States competes with countries such as Russia and China—there has been little systematic analysis of Russia’s campaign in Syria. This research aims to help fill the gap and provides some new analysis and data. It conducts a broad assessment of the Russian campaign—including political objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and civilian targeting—which places the military campaign in a wider context. In addition, it compiles a data set of Russia’s civilian targeting and analyzes satellite imagery of Russian activity.”
The report admits that Russia was “relatively successful” (can’t praise the enemy too much, after all) in achieving its “near-term political and military objectives” in Syria – namely preventing the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s government (“the Assad regime”) and (which is exactly the same thing) preventing an US overthrow of Assad.
And, in line with all baseless accusations, the report repeats them again: Russia achieved this by “systematic punishment” by “attacks against civilian and humanitarian infrastructure in an attempt to deny resources—including food, fuel, and medical aid—to the opposition while simultaneously eroding the will of civilians to support opposition groups.”
According to the report, Russia’s goals and strategy in Syria are the following:
Russian leaders wanted to stabilize Syria, a strategically-important hub for Moscow in the Middle East that was under threat;
Russian leaders assessed that the United States and its partners were attempting to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime and were either attempting to replace it with a friendly government or would leave behind a collapsed state;
Moscow’s decision was also significantly influenced by its ability to establish a viable military strategy at an acceptable cost. It adopted a strategy that combined airpower and ground maneuver to overwhelm a divided enemy. And instead of relying on a big force being deployed, it relied on the Syrian Arab Army, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other militias and private military contractors as the main ground maneuver elements.
Russia’s military campaign in Syria was successful in achieving Moscow’s strategic objectives at a manageable cost in terms of Russian casualties and finances.
Russian efforts benefited from having limited objectives and facing rebel groups that failed to coordinate their activities and lacked key defensive assets, such as anti-air weaponry.
“Russian operations and tactics were also well aligned to its strategic goals, focusing on airpower and special operations forces to enable regime offensives on the ground. Over the course of the war, Russia gradually improved its air-ground integration with pro-regime forces.”
CSIS calls it a “Russian military intervention” and it can be separated into three phases:
Stabilizing the Assad regime in core areas of western Syria (September 2015 to spring 2016); Conducting offensive operations in the west to recapture Aleppo (spring 2016 to spring 2017); Countering the Islamic State in central and eastern Syria (spring 2017 to spring 2018).
Completion of those phases cleared the way for the retaking of Idlib and putting it under government control.
Also increasing influence in northeastern Syria, and wrestling it away from the US and Turkey.
The report presents it as if these are sole Russian objectives, and the Syrian Arab Army is some sort of proxy that’s just pushing further towards achieving Moscow’s interests and not that it wishes to consolidate the country so that the Syrian citizens can return to some semblance of normality.
In addition to what it does in the military field, Russia carried out two separate campaigns, according to CSIS – a “punishment” campaign and a “diplomatic” campaign.
“According to data compiled by CSIS for this report, Russia used a systematic punishment campaign to escalate costs on the civilian population and undermine support for the opposition. The most visible element of this punishment campaign was marked by large-scale attacks against civilian and humanitarian infrastructure in an attempt to deny resources—including food, fuel, and medical aid—to the opposition while simultaneously eroding the will of civilians to support opposition groups. Russia also conducted a propaganda campaign using both diplomacy and disinformation to target Syria’s civilian population. The propaganda campaign attempted to deflect blame for Russian and Syrian attacks against civilian infrastructure, undermine international efforts to hold the Assad regime accountable for abuses, and legitimize an ever-widening civilian target set. Over time, these campaigns became synergistic, and their effects complemented each other to achieve regime goals such as retaking opposition-held territory.”
Regarding the diplomatic campaign, CSIS summarized the following:
“Moscow orchestrated an effective diplomatic campaign that complemented Russia’s military efforts. Russia coordinated its political and military efforts reasonably well to facilitate gains on the ground and maximize leverage at the international negotiating table. While the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiated ceasefires and de-escalation agreements in Geneva and Astana, the Ministry of Defense exploited those agreements to rest and refit pro-regime forces and then violate the agreements when feasible. While Russian diplomatic and military efforts were not always perfectly synchronized, they were better orchestrated than the United States and other Western countries, enabling Moscow to link battlefield gains to diplomatic leverage.”
The lessons that can be derived from the Russian activity in Syria would take years to summarize and entirely realize, but at the same time, CSIS attempted to provide some intermediate lessons:
Russia adopted a light footprint approach in Syria that constituted an evolution in Russian military thinking. Rather than applying a heavy hand, Moscow leveraged air assets, unmanned aerial vehicles, civil-military units (such as military police and “reconciliation” centers), special operations forces, and information assets. For ground operations, Moscow relied on surrogate forces, such as the Syrian Tiger Forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, private military contractors, and militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries. This approach was a major advance for the Russian military;
Russia will likely build on its Syrian experience when weighing external military operations in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Where ground forces are an option, Russia is more likely to rely on its own special operation forces, state and non-state proxy forces, and private military contractors;
The punishment of civilians continues to be an important component of Russian military operations. Russia attempted to deny food, fuel, and medical aid to rebels while simultaneously eroding civilians’ will to fight or provide support to opposition groups. Russian leaders concluded that punishment was effective in breaking the will and support of local populations for rebel groups;
The Russian intervention in Syria was an opportunity to modernize Russia’s war-fighting capabilities and use Syria as a live-fire training range to constantly refine its application of force. Perhaps the most important lesson in the technological sphere was Russia’s development of advanced command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) field systems on the battlefield, providing data to enable a higher throughput of airstrikes. These systems were integrated into Russia’s overarching systems of “reconnaissance strike complexes” (RSCs);
Russia continually rotated mid- to senior-level leadership to the Syrian theater of operations. Officers received valuable experience on the ground in advisory or leadership roles, which will likely impact Russian personnel decisions and thinking for years to come.
The above is focused on Russia’s alleged conduct and what can be deemed in regard to Moscow’s military thinking.
At the same time, the US and the collective West can also learn some lessons from Russia’s activity. For example, Moscow generally respected the US forces and didn’t engage them, respecting deconfliction markers and so on. But this was only the case when the US could demonstrate force, and allegedly Russia disregarded any scenario in which US directives were simply hollow.
The U.S. and allies “failed to prevent” Russia and its allies from “conducting human rights abuses.” Mostly because there was no evidence, but ample accusations, can’t really prevent something that’s unclear even happened.
The Russian political, diplomatic and military conduct were quite uniform, in comparison with the US which seemed rather sporadic and chaotic.
“Russia’s campaign in Syria provides an important opportunity to understand Russian strategy, operations, and tactics. Yet it was one campaign at one point in time. The long-term challenge will be to evaluate the evolution in Russian thinking and actions over time and across multiple geographic areas.”
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southfront--2020-05-14--Satellite Images: Iran Supposedly Created New Underground Weapon Storage Near Al-Bukamal

tell him off once or twice……but dont give the satanic jew any more satisfaction….. they are loud because they are @ @ @ @ @ sooner or later .
Why do you think they are killing hundreds of unarmed Folks @ @ @ @ @ ?
?
?
Because they are scared shitless .
The resistance is smart and tough.They @ @ @ @ @ attack and push will occur.The resistance , not them satanic jews.And the jeqws know it.All @ @ @ @ @ thousands of attacks in Palestine , syria , lebanomn , iraq , iran wont Change @ @ @ @ @ PUSH occurs………the fucking satanic JEWS have 3 Options .
1.lift off to .. whoever is @ @ @ @ @

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Israel’s ImageSat Intl. claims that its recent satellite images show a new underground weapon storage created by Iran near the Syrian city of al-Bukamal (Deir Ezor province).
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southfront--2020-05-14--Wasp-Class Landing Helicopter Dock Amphibious Assault Ship (Infographics)

From the destructive power of Iranian Noor missiles as amply demonstrated this week , this rusting US heap worth over @ @ @ @ @ sunk by a single missile .
Not a very good investment for a bankrupt failed @ @ @ @ @ homeless hapless people , who are without access to even rudimentary health care .
US @ @ @ @ @ before it totally implodes and the fragile racial , unequal economic and social compact totally @ @

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The Wasp is a class of landing helicopter dock (LHD) amphibious assault ships designed and built for the United States Navy.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Operation Inherent Resolve’s Activity In Q1 2020: Counter Iran, Not So Much ISIS

On May 21st , the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve released the quarterly report to the US Congress .
The period covers the period between January 1st and March 31st , 2020 of the fight against ISIS .
The entire report can be found and read online .
[ pdf ] Similarly , to everything else around the world , COVID-19 disrupted even the fight against terrorism .
On March 20th , the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve ( CJTF-OIR ) announced that the Iraqi Security Forces ( ISF ) suspended training in Iraq to prevent the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense Office of the Undersecretary for Policy , International Security Affairs , ( OUSD ( P ) /ISA ) reported that it was unlikely Coalition training activities would resume until after Ramadan , which ends on May 23 , 2020th .
Australia , Canada , the Czech Republic , Denmark , Estonia , France , Germany , Italy , Lithuania , the Netherlands , Portugal , Spain , and the United Kingdom announced the temporary withdrawal of forces , according to government statements and press reports .
In Syria , Syrian Democratic Forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ temporarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and urged all actors in the country to “ refrain from military actions and make an immediate commitment to a humanitarian truce ” in late March .
In addition , likely due to the US ’ actions in assassinating Iranian General Qassem Soleimani , and attacking positions of Kata ’ ib Hezbollah , which is part of the Iraqi Security Forces , some consolidation of positions was required , as it was unfeasible to attempt and defend every base throughout Iraq from the occasional missile strikes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was allegedly planned to do so , anyway , but the tensions between Washington and Tehran forced the timeline .
Four bases were vacated in March , and more is being prepared for withdrawal : • March 17 : CJTF-OIR transferred control of the Al Qaim military base , located on the Iraq-Syria border , to the ISF .
• March 26 : CJTF-OIR handed control of Qayyarah Airfield–West ( Q West ) , located near Mosul , to Iraqi forces .
• March 29 : The Coalition handed K-1 base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ISF .
• March 30 : The Coalition transferred Ninewa Operation Center–East to the ISF .
• As the quarter ended , CJTF-OIR was preparing to transfer the Taqaddum Air Base , located west of Baghdad .
This was possible because the Iraqi Security Forces increasingly became capable of carrying out their independent operations against ISIS , and the US presence wasn ’ t needed in such numbers .
Operation Inherent Resolve ’ s fight against terrorism moved into its third , of four , phases .
In Phase III , the Coalition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Raqqah in Syria , capitals of ISIS ’ s self-proclaimed “ caliphate , ” eliminate ISIS ’ s “ physical means and psychological will ” to fight , and support partner forces through training , advising , equipping , and assisting .
In Phase IV , the Coalition would provide security , planning , and required support to the Iraqi government and “ appropriate authorities ” in Syria to stabilize the region .
The operations against continued at a low level , since terrorist presence remained at remote areas .
CJTF-OIR reported that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is unable to recruit from , or gain control over , local populations .
However , it said that ISIS is more successful in recruiting small numbers of people in displacement camps , particularly in the Al Hol camp in Syria .
Pressure on ISIS , however , needs to remain , otherwise there would be a quick and complete resurgence .
USCENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie Jr. reported to Congress in March that the opinion among most of the U.S. intelligence community is that “ without sustained pressure levied against it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iraq and Syria in short order , beyond the current capabilities of the United Sates to neutralize it without a capable , partnered ground force.
” “ Media reports , think tank analyses , and DoD statements indicate that the threat from Iran and Iranian-backed militias continued throughout the quarter .
According to analysts , Iran intensified its political and military pressure in order to compel the United States to withdraw forces from Iraq.27 Iranian officials and Iranian-backed actors vowed to avenge the deaths of Iranian Qods Force Commander Major General Qassem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) Chief of Staff Abu Mahdi al Muhandis , killed by a U.S. aerial strike at the Baghdad International Airport on January 3 , 2020.28 Iranian-aligned factions within the Iraqi government also sought to evict U.S. forces from Iraq over the strike , but these efforts appear to have stalled due to Iraq ’ s ongoing political crisis .
Iranian proxies continued launching indirect fire attacks against Coalition forces after the deaths of Soleimani and al Muhandis , resulting in Coalition casualties.29 Most recently , on March 11 , a rocket attack on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British service members , according to a DoD press release.
” Russia , too , was causing problem , primarily in Northeastern Syria : Media reporting from January 2020 stated that the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights observed that the overlapping and shifting lines of control in northeastern Syria were producing friction among actors operating in the region .
Due to this friction , tensions were increasing in the oil-rich Hasakah province where Coalition forces , the Russian military , and PRF held positions .
“ CJTF-OIR reported to the DoD OIG that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presence in Syria , deemed a tactical challenge , by working through established deconfliction channels .
As reported last quarter , the Coalition amended deconfliction protocols due to changes in Coalition force posture in northeastern Syria and establishment of the ESSA .
In late January 2020 , a CJTF-OIR spokesperson stated that Coalition forces and the Russian military were continuing to deconflict movements through “ pre-existing communication channels and interlocutors , in order to prevent unnecessary and unplanned military interactions , and de-escalate between forces when necessary.
” ” The media reported on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian military , the PRF ( Syrian Arab Army , or as the US calls them “ Pro-Regime Forces ” ) , and Iranian proxies that occurred in January and February 2020 , including the following incidents : • January 16 : S. personnel prevented Russian soldiers heading to the Rumeylan oil field from passing through the city of Qamishli in Hasakah province ; • January 23 : S. forces intercepted an unidentified Russian general in northern Syria during deconfliction operations ; • January 28 : Russian helicopters flew very low over a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Mughawir al Thawra reported exchanging fire with the PRF and Iranian proxies in the deconfliction zone around Tanf .
• February 19 : S. forces escorted a Russian patrol out of an area near eastern Qamishli after it violated deconfliction protocols ; and • February 22 : S. personnel blocked the passing of a Russian patrol on the M4 Highway near Amuda .
A mention is also made of Russia and Turkey somewhat clashing in Idlib and the resulting negotiations and agreements .
In conclusion , the report essentially presents a picture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a threat and needs pressure , but Iran is much more dangerous , and Russia simply presents a “ tactical challenge ” since open confrontation with its forces is out of the question .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • In Less Than A Year , ISIS In Mozambique Has Gone Entirely Out Of Control

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On May 21st, the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve released the quarterly report to the US Congress.
The period covers the period between January 1st and March 31st, 2020 of the fight against ISIS.
The entire report can be found and read online. [pdf]
Similarly, to everything else around the world, COVID-19 disrupted even the fight against terrorism.
On March 20th, the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) announced that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) suspended training in Iraq to prevent the potential spread of COVID-19.2 The Department of Defense Office of the Undersecretary for Policy, International Security Affairs, (OUSD(P)/ISA) reported that it was unlikely Coalition training activities would resume until after Ramadan, which ends on May 23, 2020th.
Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom announced the temporary withdrawal of forces, according to government statements and press reports.
In Syria, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leaders suspended military operations temporarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and urged all actors in the country to “refrain from military actions and make an immediate commitment to a humanitarian truce” in late March.
In addition, likely due to the US’ actions in assassinating Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, and attacking positions of Kata’ib Hezbollah, which is part of the Iraqi Security Forces, some consolidation of positions was required, as it was unfeasible to attempt and defend every base throughout Iraq from the occasional missile strikes they were subject to.
“This quarter, the Coalition began consolidating forces to fewer bases in Iraq, which the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) stated was part of a long-term plan. This base transfer occurred amid force protection concerns sparked by escalating tensions between the United States and Iran and its proxy militias, which CJTF-OIR said led to an acceleration of the long-term transfer plan.”
As such, it was allegedly planned to do so, anyway, but the tensions between Washington and Tehran forced the timeline.
Four bases were vacated in March, and more is being prepared for withdrawal:
March 17: CJTF-OIR transferred control of the Al Qaim military base, located on the Iraq-Syria border, to the ISF.
CJTF-OIR transferred control of the Al Qaim military base, located on the Iraq-Syria border, to the ISF. March 26: CJTF-OIR handed control of Qayyarah Airfield–West (Q West), located near Mosul, to Iraqi forces.
CJTF-OIR handed control of Qayyarah Airfield–West (Q West), located near Mosul, to Iraqi forces. March 29: The Coalition handed K-1 base located near Kirkuk City over to the ISF.
The Coalition handed K-1 base located near Kirkuk City over to the ISF. March 30: The Coalition transferred Ninewa Operation Center–East to the ISF.
The Coalition transferred Ninewa Operation Center–East to the ISF. As the quarter ended, CJTF-OIR was preparing to transfer the Taqaddum Air Base, located west of Baghdad.
This was possible because the Iraqi Security Forces increasingly became capable of carrying out their independent operations against ISIS, and the US presence wasn’t needed in such numbers. Operation Inherent Resolve’s fight against terrorism moved into its third, of four, phases.
In Phase III, the Coalition sought to liberate Mosul in Iraq and Raqqah in Syria, capitals of ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate,” eliminate ISIS’s “physical means and psychological will” to fight, and support partner forces through training, advising, equipping, and assisting. In Phase IV, the Coalition would provide security, planning, and required support to the Iraqi government and “appropriate authorities” in Syria to stabilize the region.
The operations against continued at a low level, since terrorist presence remained at remote areas.
CJTF-OIR reported that ISIS remains largely relegated to remote areas and is unable to recruit from, or gain control over, local populations.
However, it said that ISIS is more successful in recruiting small numbers of people in displacement camps, particularly in the Al Hol camp in Syria.
“The DIA, citing open-source reporting, said ISIS is able to conduct localized recruiting in Iraq. CJTF-OIR said that it expects ISIS to focus on preserving its logistic and staging areas, and to take defensive measures to prevent security forces from disrupting activity in those areas. However, those actions are limited in scope, duration, and the number of fighters involved, indicating that ISIS lacks the resources to conduct an attack campaign, according to CJTF-OIR.”
Pressure on ISIS, however, needs to remain, otherwise there would be a quick and complete resurgence.
USCENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie Jr. reported to Congress in March that the opinion among most of the U.S. intelligence community is that “without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the current capabilities of the United Sates to neutralize it without a capable, partnered ground force.”
Iran remained a big threat:
“Media reports, think tank analyses, and DoD statements indicate that the threat from Iran and Iranian-backed militias continued throughout the quarter. According to analysts, Iran intensified its political and military pressure in order to compel the United States to withdraw forces from Iraq.27 Iranian officials and Iranian-backed actors vowed to avenge the deaths of Iranian Qods Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chief of Staff Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, killed by a U.S. aerial strike at the Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020.28 Iranian-aligned factions within the Iraqi government also sought to evict U.S. forces from Iraq over the strike, but these efforts appear to have stalled due to Iraq’s ongoing political crisis. Iranian proxies continued launching indirect fire attacks against Coalition forces after the deaths of Soleimani and al Muhandis, resulting in Coalition casualties.29 Most recently, on March 11, a rocket attack on Camp Taji killed two U.S. and one British service members, according to a DoD press release.”
Russia, too, was causing problem, primarily in Northeastern Syria:
Media reporting from January 2020 stated that the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights observed that the overlapping and shifting lines of control in northeastern Syria were producing friction among actors operating in the region. Due to this friction, tensions were increasing in the oil-rich Hasakah province where Coalition forces, the Russian military, and PRF held positions.
“CJTF-OIR reported to the DoD OIG that it continued to address the Russian military presence in Syria, deemed a tactical challenge, by working through established deconfliction channels. As reported last quarter, the Coalition amended deconfliction protocols due to changes in Coalition force posture in northeastern Syria and establishment of the ESSA. In late January 2020, a CJTF-OIR spokesperson stated that Coalition forces and the Russian military were continuing to deconflict movements through “pre-existing communication channels and interlocutors, in order to prevent unnecessary and unplanned military interactions, and de-escalate between forces when necessary.””
The media reported on numerous confrontations among Coalition forces, the Russian military, the PRF (Syrian Arab Army, or as the US calls them “Pro-Regime Forces”), and Iranian proxies that occurred in January and February 2020, including the following incidents:
January 16: S. personnel prevented Russian soldiers heading to the Rumeylan oil field from passing through the city of Qamishli in Hasakah province;
S. personnel prevented Russian soldiers heading to the Rumeylan oil field from passing through the city of Qamishli in Hasakah province; January 18: S. personnel stopped a Russian convoy heading to the Rumeylan oil field;
S. personnel stopped a Russian convoy heading to the Rumeylan oil field; January 23: S. forces intercepted an unidentified Russian general in northern Syria during deconfliction operations;
S. forces intercepted an unidentified Russian general in northern Syria during deconfliction operations; January 25: S. personnel intercepted a group of Russian military police;
S. personnel intercepted a group of Russian military police; January 28: Russian helicopters flew very low over a U.S. checkpoint;
Russian helicopters flew very low over a U.S. checkpoint; February 4: A Russian patrol circumvented a U.S. checkpoint;
A Russian patrol circumvented a U.S. checkpoint; February 16: The Mughawir al Thawra reported exchanging fire with the PRF and Iranian proxies in the deconfliction zone around Tanf.
The Mughawir al Thawra reported exchanging fire with the PRF and Iranian proxies in the deconfliction zone around Tanf. February 19: S. forces escorted a Russian patrol out of an area near eastern Qamishli after it violated deconfliction protocols; and
S. forces escorted a Russian patrol out of an area near eastern Qamishli after it violated deconfliction protocols; and February 22:S. personnel blocked the passing of a Russian patrol on the M4 Highway near Amuda.
A mention is also made of Russia and Turkey somewhat clashing in Idlib and the resulting negotiations and agreements.
In conclusion, the report essentially presents a picture in which, ISIS is still somewhat of a threat and needs pressure, but Iran is much more dangerous, and Russia simply presents a “tactical challenge” since open confrontation with its forces is out of the question.
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southfront--2020-05-14--In Video: Turkish Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Target Equipment Of Libyan Army Near Tripoli

On May 13 , pro-Turkish sources released a video showing Turkish drone strikes on equipment of the Libyan National Army @ @ @ @ @ hours earlier , the Libyan National Army shot down a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat @ @ @ @ @ area .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • In Photos : Libyan National Army Shot @ @ @ @ @

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On May 13, pro-Turkish sources released a video showing Turkish drone strikes on equipment of the Libyan National Army near Tripoli.
تواصل طائرات المسيرة تابعة لحكومة_الوفاق_الوطني الليبي استهداف مليشيات #الحفتر التي تهاجم عاصمة #طرابلس. pic.twitter.com/SlH0OOEQJ0 — Clash Report (@clashreport) May 13, 2020
A few hours earlier, the Libyan National Army shot down a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle in the same area.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Syrian Army Repels Large ISIS Attack In Northwestern Deir Ezzor

Late on May 11 , ISIS cells launched a large attack on Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) positions in @ @ @ @ @ Deir Ezzor countryside .
SAA troops , backed by the National Defense Forces ( NDF @ @ @ @ @ in the early hours of the next day following fierce clashes .
Heavy weapons were @ @ @ @ @ .
ISIS cells withdrew back to their positions in the Homs desert after the failed @ @ @ @ @ behind some of their equipment including a pick-up truck .
According to the London-based Syrian @ @ @ @ @ SOHR ) , the army lost six of its soldiers in the clashes .
Three @ @ @ @ @ killed .
The attack on Mount Bishri was one of ISIS ’ largest attacks in @ @ @ @ @ The mountain , which rises 825 m above sea level , overlooks vast parts of @ @ @ @ @ Raqqa and eastern Homs .
ISIS ’ attempt to capture positions in the mountain reflects @ @ @ @ @ to reestablish a foothold in western Euphrates .
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Late on May 11, ISIS cells launched a large attack on Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in Mount Bishri in the northwestern Deir Ezzor countryside.
SAA troops, backed by the National Defense Forces (NDF), repelled the attack in the early hours of the next day following fierce clashes. Heavy weapons were used by the both sides.
ISIS cells withdrew back to their positions in the Homs desert after the failed attack. The terrorist left behind some of their equipment including a pick-up truck.
NDF caputered ISIS pickup in Bishri mountain after today clashes pic.twitter.com/wywn8cpEPX — ZOKA (@200_zoka) May 12, 2020
According to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the army lost six of its soldiers in the clashes. Three terrorists of ISIS were also killed.
The attack on Mount Bishri was one of ISIS’ largest attacks in Deir Ezzor this year. The mountain, which rises 825 m above sea level, overlooks vast parts of western Deir Ezzor, southern Raqqa and eastern Homs.
ISIS’ attempt to capture positions in the mountain reflects the group’s ambition to reestablish a foothold in western Euphrates.
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southfront--2020-05-14--Los Angeles-Class Nuclear-Powered Fast Attack Submarine (Infographics)

With a bankrupt economy smaller than India , can the US afford to have all these useless weapons as China @ @ @ @ @ in strategic , military and economic terms and the One Belt will consolidate China ’ @ @ @ @ @ US decline accelerates .

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The Los Angeles is a class of nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN) in service with the US Navy.
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southfront--2020-05-14--New Attacks In Daraa Claim Lives Of More Syrian Service Members

Amid reports about a nearing security operation in Daraa , two new attacks targeted Syrian service members in the southern governorate on May 14 .
In the first attack , unidentified gunmen killed two service members of the Military Intelligence Directorate ( MID ) as they were heading to their checkpoint on Saida-al-Taebah road in the eastern countryside of Daraa .
Pro-government sources identified the victims as Mohamad Rihan and Mohamad Hood .
Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) service member Ayham Mohamad Ali al-Omar al-Fadel and his 14 years old civilian brother , Ali , were killed in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed the two brothers on a road linking the towns of al-Musayfrah and Eastern Ghariyah , also in the eastern Daraa countryside .
No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks , so far .
Nevertheless , cells of ISIS are known to be active in eastern Daraa .
In order to put an end to these attacks , the SAA and security forces are preparing to launch a large security operation in Daraa countryside .
Over the last two weeks , the army has amassed a large strike force in Daraa .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ upcoming few days .
According to the available information , the first phase will target the towns of Tafas and Muzayrib in the northern countryside .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Two ISIS Terrorists Blew Themselves Up During U.S.-led Coalition , SDF Operation In Deir Ezzor

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Amid reports about a nearing security operation in Daraa, two new attacks targeted Syrian service members in the southern governorate on May 14.
In the first attack, unidentified gunmen killed two service members of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) as they were heading to their checkpoint on Saida-al-Taebah road in the eastern countryside of Daraa. Pro-government sources identified the victims as Mohamad Rihan and Mohamad Hood.
Syrian Arab Army (SAA) service member Ayham Mohamad Ali al-Omar al-Fadel and his 14 years old civilian brother, Ali, were killed in the second attack. Unidentified gunmen shot and killed the two brothers on a road linking the towns of al-Musayfrah and Eastern Ghariyah, also in the eastern Daraa countryside.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, so far. Nevertheless, cells of ISIS are known to be active in eastern Daraa.
In order to put an end to these attacks, the SAA and security forces are preparing to launch a large security operation in Daraa countryside.
Over the last two weeks, the army has amassed a large strike force in Daraa. The operation will likely begin in the upcoming few days. According to the available information, the first phase will target the towns of Tafas and Muzayrib in the northern countryside.
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