southfront--2020-10-08--Economic Achievements And Setbacks Of Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Empire

Turkey ’ s economic situation has deteriorated dramatically over the last couple of years , exacerbated by domestic political instability and worsening relations with key trade and investment partners .
High levels of foreign debt and the plummeting value of the lira on currency markets threaten to implode the economy .
The government is betting on gas and oil transit fees from major pipelines , as well as domestically produced gas , to restore economic prosperity , however this will take years to fully realize and projected revenues may not arrive in time .
The government ’ s credit-fuelled growth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s preference for low interest rates have sent the lira to a new all-time low against the US dollar .
Turkey has large external financing needs , and its private sector is heavily indebted in foreign currency , raising risks of financial instability and a possible economic collapse in 2020-21 .
The economic crisis has been exacerbated by the political and military leadership ’ s expansionist and aggressive foreign policy and bitter disputes with major trade partners and traditional and more recent strategic allies alike ( in particular the US and European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which has isolated Turkey on the global stage , and makes international assistance to stabilize the dire economic situation much less likely ( other than from Qatar , which although vastly rich in gas will not be able to solve Turkey ’ s burgeoning economic problems alone ) .
While Turkey is conveniently located to capitalize on the gigantic oil and gas infrastructure projects that will connect the resource-rich regions in Russia , the Caspian and the Persian Gulf ( and possibly the eastern Mediterranean in the future ) with European markets , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as will the large gas deposits that were discovered in Turkey ’ s Black Sea economic zone in August .
Turkey ’ s economy is driven by its industry and , increasingly , service sectors , although the agriculture sector still accounts for about 25 % of employment .
The automotive , petrochemical , and electronics industries have risen in importance and have overtaken the traditional textiles and clothing sectors as Turkey ’ s main exports .
Although Turkey ’ s economy enjoyed a period of sustained growth during the first decade of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to uncertainty and security concerns due to both domestic and external developments , which are generating doubts on financial markets and casting a long shadow over Turkey ’ s economic outlook .
The government has relied on policies emphasize spending measures and low interest rates to stimulate the economy , however as debt reaches critical levels this can not be continued indefinitely .
The government has taken a more active role in some strategic sectors , however it has also used economic institutions and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermining private sector confidence .
Between July 2016 and March 2017 , three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey ’ s sovereign credit ratings , citing concerns about legal certainty and economic stability .
After a severe financial crisis in 2001 , Turkey adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program .
In the subsequent period the country ’ s economic fundamentals improved and there was a period of strong growth , averaging more than 6 % annually until 2008 .
An extensive privatization program was also adopted , reducing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , banking , transport , power generation , and communication .
Although this produced a financial surplus in the short term , it also reduced the State ’ s ability to influence economic development strategies .
Since 2001 when Turkey commenced a wide ranging restructuring of its energy markets in accordance with IMF demands , the country has moved from a state-owned , vertically-integrated model in most related sectors to a fully privatized electricity distribution network , and mostly privatized electricity , oil and natural gas markets .
It has also passed new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ established new regulatory agencies , and carried out price reforms .
In the subsequent period , Turkey has added about 31,000 MW market-based electricity generation capacity , including an additional 16,000 MW generation capacity based on renewable sources in the 2001-2014 period .
Although the Turkish oil market is now a ‘ highly regulated liberal market ’ , the State-owned enterprise BOTAŞ still controls natural gas supply and trade .
Even so , private natural gas trade and distribution companies play an active role in the market , and the private sector participates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Overall , agriculture accounts for approximately 7 % of GDP ( and 18 % of employment ) , industry and manufacturing accounts for 32 % of GDP ( 27 % of employment ) , and services account for 61 % of GDP ( 55 % of employment ) .
Major agricultural production includes tobacco , cotton , grain , olives , sugar beets , hazelnuts , pulses , citrus , and livestock .
Major industrial and manufacturing products includes textiles , food processing , automobiles , electronics , mining ( coal , chromate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , petroleum , construction , timber and paper .
Tourism is one of the most important of the services sectors , and has contributed between 11 % and 12 % of GDP over the last 10 years up until early this year .
Tourism had however already been hit hard by Turkey ’ s geopolitical disputes with Europe , Russia and the US , as well as the deteriorating security situation following Turkey ’ s intervention in northern Syria and intensification of the ongoing military campaign against Kurdish armed insurgent groups , before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flow of tourists almost completely .
Most exports ( as of 2017 ) were to Germany 9.6 % , UK 6.1 % , UAE 5.9 % , Iraq 5.8 % , US 5.5 % , Italy 5.4 % , France 4.2 % , and Spain 4 % .
Major export products include apparel , foodstuffs , textiles , metal manufactures , and transport equipment .
Most imports as of 2017 were from China 10 % , Germany 9.1 % , Russia 8.4 % , US 5.1 % , Italy 4.8 % .
Major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ semi-finished goods , fuels , and transport equipment .
Turkey has been running a constant trade deficit for many years , averaging around $ 40-50 billion per year .
The trade deficit blew out to over $ 6 billion in August 2020 up from around $ 2.3 billion in August 2019 due to both a fall in exports and an increase in imports .
The overall trend of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy .
Growth has stalled , and Turkey ’ s large current account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment inflows to finance economic activity , leaving the economy vulnerable to an adverse shift in investor confidence .
The last few years have also seen rising unemployment and inflation , compounded by the Turkish lira ’ s continuing depreciation against the dollar .
Approximately 20 % of the population lives below the poverty line .
Although government debt remains relatively low at about 30 % of GDP , bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a proportion of GDP during the past decade , prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face US unilateral sanctions since August 2018 , due to the detention of a US citizen suspected of involvement in the 2016 coup attempt .
US sanctions were extended in 2019 following Turkey ’ s invasion of northern Syria into areas occupied by armed groups supported by the US , and other punitive economic measures were imposed including a tariff increase on steel from Turkey and the cancellation of negotiations over a possible trade deal .
These concerns have deepened substantially as the economy has been hit by the dramatic global economic downturn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Although as in almost all other countries this latest ‘ external shock ’ is without precedent in modern times and could push the economic situation into free-fall , economists preaching the fiscal austerity dogma – as well as Turkey ’ s ‘ adversaries ’ and doomsayers – have been warning of an impending economic implosion for some time .
For example , last year an analysis in commented disparagingly : While Turkey ’ s consumption and growth-led strategy has defied the predictions of its many critics up until now , the risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater than ever in the current global economic conditions .
Nonetheless , most of those that would be likely to celebrate such a development are also deeply mired in their own economic problems , and the fallout from a generalized economic collapse in Turkey would have major ramifications throughout Europe , the Middle East and West Asia .
Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas , importing 92 % of its crude oil and almost all of its natural gas .
To address this it is pursuing several parallel strategies including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of international partners and increasing use of domestic energy sources including renewables , nuclear , and coal .
Turkey is also hoping to rectify the chronic trade and current account deficits with oil and gas revenues , both from transit fees from pipelines as well as by greatly increasing domestic production .
Turkey ’ s aggressive exploration program in the eastern Mediterranean has caused a dramatic increase in geopolitical tension in the region and threatened to provoke a military clash with Greece in particular ( backed by most members of the European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey ’ s exploration efforts in the Black Sea have however been much more successful , and without the controversy and associated security risks , as all exploration activities have taken place within Turkey ’ s universally recognized maritime zone .
Turkey has increased LNG purchases from Qatar and the US this year , taking advantage of lower spot prices , and also looking to reduce gas imports from Russia and Iran .
The LNG imports have also been facilitated by the expansion of Turkey ’ s LNG infrastructure capacity in recent years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keen to develop economic relations and infrastructure projects between the two countries , nothing has eventuated yet and they will require the cooperation of other countries for any major project to be successful .
LINK In August President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey has discovered a field in the Black Sea holding an estimated 320 billion cubic metres of gas .
The State-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation ( TPAO ) decided to conduct exploration activities directly , and purchased three drilling ships with this objective — Fatih , Yavuz , and Kanuni , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2017 and 2020 , deploying them in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea .
Fatih was instrumental in making the August discovery in the Black Sea .
Turkish authorities considered a potential collaboration with Russian and Iranian companies , but it seems less likely given current relations with both countries .
Turkey has increasingly diverging interests with Tehran and Moscow in Syria and is also trying to reduce dependence on Russian and Iranian gas supplies .
Turkey intensified its search for oil and gas in the offshore eastern Mediterranean in 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discover any oil or gas in the region .
The increased exploratory activity has however reignited unresolved maritime boundary disputes with its neighbours , particularly Greece and Cyprus , and led to an ongoing crisis in the region .
Over the last couple of months its main survey vessel has had a military escort , which has been confronted at sea on numerous occasions by Greek navy ships .
Turkey also concluded a maritime boundary agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya in November last year in an attempt to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The agreement has added additional fuel to the already extremely high tensions in the region , with Egypt and Greece signing an agreement several months ago which overlaps with the earlier agreement , and Turkey will not be able to continue exploratory activities in disputed areas in the eastern Mediterranean without provoking a major crisis , the imposition of sanctions by the European Union , and a real possibility of armed clashes with at least one of its neighbours .
Turkey ’ s other main hope for increasing revenues from the oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transit fees from major pipelines between production areas in the Middle East and Western Asia and markets in Europe .
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan ( BTC ) pipeline is 1,768 kilometres long and stretches from from the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan ’ s maritime zone in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea .
The crude oil pipeline commenced operation in 2006 , and has a capacity of up to 1 million barrels per day .
The pipeline cost US $ 3.9 billion to build , and employs around 1,000 people .
70 % @ @ @ @ @ @ @ third parties , including the International Finance Corporation ( a subsidiary of the World Bank ) , the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development , the export credit agencies of seven countries , as well as a syndicate of 15 commercial banks .
The pipeline is owned and operated by BTC Co , in which 11 companies are shareholders ( of which BP is the largest and has responsibility for operational management of the pipeline ) .
The shareholders are BP ( UK ) 30.1 % , State Oil Company of Azerbaijan ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Chevron ( US ) 8.9 % , Statoil ( Norway ) 8.71 % , Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı ( TPAO ) ( Turkey ) 6.53 % , Eni ( Italy ) 5 % , Total ( France ) 5 % , Itochu ( Japan ) 3.4 % , Inpex ( Japan ) 2.5 % , ExxonMobil ( US ) 2.5 % , and ONGC Videsh ( India ) 2.36 % .
The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline ( also known as the BTE pipeline , Shah Deniz Pipeline , or South Caucasus Pipeline ) is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to Turkey .
The pipeline runs parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline , and commenced operations in 2007 .
The 42-inch diameter gas pipeline has been laid alongside the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline until Erzurum , where the latter turns south towards the Mediterranean .
It is 692 kilometres long , of which 442 kilometres is in Azerbaijan and 248 kilometres in Georgia .
The initial capacity of the pipeline was 8.8 billion cubic metres ( 310 billion cubic feet ) of gas per year , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 bcm per year .
The pipeline is owned and operated by the South Caucasus Pipeline Company , whose shareholders are BP ( UK ) 28.83 % , TPAO ( Turkey ) 19 % , SOCAR ( Azerbaijan ) 16.67 % , Petronas ( Malaysia ) 15.5 % , Lukoil ( Russia ) 10 % , and Naftiran Intertrade ( Iran ) 10 % .
The construction of the Southern Gas Corridor , a chain of pipelines linking Azerbaijan to Italy , has cost $ 40 billion and the project is almost completed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ main source of gas is the Shah Deniz field , located in the economic zone of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea .
The project comprises three pipelines and has a total length of almost 4,000 km : The South Caucasus Pipeline ( SCP ) linking Azerbaijan with Georgia , the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline ( TANAP ) across Turkey , and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline ( TAP ) linking Greece , Albania and Italy .
Onshore work on the pipeline has been completed in Azerbaijan , Georgia , and Turkey .
Sixteen wells have been drilled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are ready for operations .
Eight of the wells are producing and gas is already flowing to Azerbaijan , Georgia and Turkey .
The rest will be gradually put on-stream once the final stretch in Italy is completed .
Work on the TAP section of the gas corridor is over 90 % completed and is estimated to be finished around the end of this year .
Turkey has been receiving gas in the pipeline since July 2018 .
It received approximately 2bcm in 2018 , 4bcm in 2019 , and in 2020 the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bcm .
Also , 2 bcm have been reserved for Greece and Bulgaria , which will be delivered once TAP enters operation .
A 25-year supply contract has been signed with Italy , and the first Azeri gas is expected to start flowing there before the end of 2020 , with supplies estimated to be at 8+bcm per year .
The Azerbaijani government ( Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan ) owns 51 % of the Southern Gas Corridor ; the other 49 % is owned by State Oil Company of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project has also been strongly promoted by the European Union , and even the US , as an important diversification of its energy sources : The planned Nabucco pipeline was eventually abandoned by the project ’ s proponents in 2013 .
Turkey and Azerbaijan having been steadily deepening their ties , a trend that has been boosted by the troubled relations of both with Armenia .
Several other major infrastructure projects apart from the Southern Gas Corridor also reflect the strength of their developing relationship : TurkStream connects the gas transmission systems of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has two strings with a combined throughput capacity of 31.5 billion cubic metres , and is 930 kilometres long .
The first string delivers gas to Turkey , while the second string is intended for gas transit to southern and south-eastern Europe through Turkish territory .
The Russian end of the TurkStream pipeline is the Russkaya compressor station , which is part of Russia ’ s Unified Gas Supply System and is located near Anapa .
The compressor station has a capacity of 224 MW , sufficient to supply the pressure required for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two strings up to the Turkish coast where the gas enters the receiving terminal .
The pipelaying for TurkStream took 15 months and was completed ahead of schedule in November 2018 .
The construction of the receiving terminal near Kiyikoy in Turkey was finished in 2019 , and the project was officially inaugurated in January of this year .
LINK Although Turkey ’ s strategic location means it is well placed to capitalize on the major oil and gas projects between the Caspian Sea , southern Russia , the Middle East and Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an aggressive negotiating approach has made it an undesirable project partner for many countries which will only reluctantly be engaged when there is no alternative .
While Turkey ’ s invasion of northern Syria did not concern the European Union greatly , its stand-off with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean is another matter and risks exposing it to sanctions from its major trading partner .
After the latest outbreak in hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan , Turkey seems to have realized that the confrontation with Greece is a step to far , apart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This would explain the decision to stop exploration activities in disputed parts of the eastern Mediterranean for the moment .
The decision to simultaneously confront Russia , Europe and the US is a dangerous policy , particularly when Turkey is also pursuing expansionist and provocative policies with many of its immediate neighbours .
Unless Turkey ’ s political and military leadership begins to take a more conciliatory approach , it could find it has played its allies and adversaries off against each other one time too many .
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Turkey’s economic situation has deteriorated dramatically over the last couple of years, exacerbated by domestic political instability and worsening relations with key trade and investment partners. High levels of foreign debt and the plummeting value of the lira on currency markets threaten to implode the economy. The government is betting on gas and oil transit fees from major pipelines, as well as domestically produced gas, to restore economic prosperity, however this will take years to fully realize and projected revenues may not arrive in time.
The government’s credit-fuelled growth policies and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s preference for low interest rates have sent the lira to a new all-time low against the US dollar. Turkey has large external financing needs, and its private sector is heavily indebted in foreign currency, raising risks of financial instability and a possible economic collapse in 2020-21.
The economic crisis has been exacerbated by the political and military leadership’s expansionist and aggressive foreign policy and bitter disputes with major trade partners and traditional and more recent strategic allies alike (in particular the US and European Union, and Russia, respectively), which has isolated Turkey on the global stage, and makes international assistance to stabilize the dire economic situation much less likely (other than from Qatar, which although vastly rich in gas will not be able to solve Turkey’s burgeoning economic problems alone).
While Turkey is conveniently located to capitalize on the gigantic oil and gas infrastructure projects that will connect the resource-rich regions in Russia, the Caspian and the Persian Gulf (and possibly the eastern Mediterranean in the future) with European markets, these will take time to develop, as will the large gas deposits that were discovered in Turkey’s Black Sea economic zone in August.
Overview of Turkey’s Economy
Turkey’s economy is driven by its industry and, increasingly, service sectors, although the agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. The automotive, petrochemical, and electronics industries have risen in importance and have overtaken the traditional textiles and clothing sectors as Turkey’s main exports.
Although Turkey’s economy enjoyed a period of sustained growth during the first decade of Erdogan’s leadership, the period of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to uncertainty and security concerns due to both domestic and external developments, which are generating doubts on financial markets and casting a long shadow over Turkey’s economic outlook.
The government has relied on policies emphasize spending measures and low interest rates to stimulate the economy, however as debt reaches critical levels this cannot be continued indefinitely.
The government has taken a more active role in some strategic sectors, however it has also used economic institutions and regulatory agencies to target political opponents, undermining private sector confidence. Between July 2016 and March 2017, three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, citing concerns about legal certainty and economic stability.
After a severe financial crisis in 2001, Turkey adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. In the subsequent period the country’s economic fundamentals improved and there was a period of strong growth, averaging more than 6% annually until 2008.
An extensive privatization program was also adopted, reducing the State’s role in basic industry, banking, transport, power generation, and communication. Although this produced a financial surplus in the short term, it also reduced the State’s ability to influence economic development strategies.
Since 2001 when Turkey commenced a wide ranging restructuring of its energy markets in accordance with IMF demands, the country has moved from a state-owned, vertically-integrated model in most related sectors to a fully privatized electricity distribution network, and mostly privatized electricity, oil and natural gas markets. It has also passed new renewable energy and energy efficiency legislation, established new regulatory agencies, and carried out price reforms.
In the subsequent period, Turkey has added about 31,000 MW market-based electricity generation capacity, including an additional 16,000 MW generation capacity based on renewable sources in the 2001-2014 period.
Although the Turkish oil market is now a ‘highly regulated liberal market’, the State-owned enterprise BOTAŞ still controls natural gas supply and trade. Even so, private natural gas trade and distribution companies play an active role in the market, and the private sector participates in gas exploration and production projects.
Overall, agriculture accounts for approximately 7% of GDP (and 18% of employment), industry and manufacturing accounts for 32% of GDP (27% of employment), and services account for 61% of GDP (55% of employment).
Major agricultural production includes tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, hazelnuts, pulses, citrus, and livestock. Major industrial and manufacturing products includes textiles, food processing, automobiles, electronics, mining (coal, chromate, copper, boron), steel, petroleum, construction, timber and paper.
Tourism is one of the most important of the services sectors, and has contributed between 11% and 12% of GDP over the last 10 years up until early this year. Tourism had however already been hit hard by Turkey’s geopolitical disputes with Europe, Russia and the US, as well as the deteriorating security situation following Turkey’s intervention in northern Syria and intensification of the ongoing military campaign against Kurdish armed insurgent groups, before the outbreak of the Coronavirus reduced the flow of tourists almost completely.
Most exports (as of 2017) were to Germany 9.6%, UK 6.1%, UAE 5.9%, Iraq 5.8%, US 5.5%, Italy 5.4%, France 4.2%, and Spain 4%. Major export products include apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal manufactures, and transport equipment.
Most imports as of 2017 were from China 10%, Germany 9.1%, Russia 8.4%, US 5.1%, Italy 4.8%. Major import products include machinery, chemicals, semi-finished goods, fuels, and transport equipment.
Turkey has been running a constant trade deficit for many years, averaging around $40-50 billion per year. The trade deficit blew out to over $6 billion in August 2020 up from around $2.3 billion in August 2019 due to both a fall in exports and an increase in imports.
The overall trend of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy. Growth has stalled, and Turkey’s large current account deficit means it must rely on external investment inflows to finance economic activity, leaving the economy vulnerable to an adverse shift in investor confidence.
The last few years have also seen rising unemployment and inflation, compounded by the Turkish lira’s continuing depreciation against the dollar. Approximately 20% of the population lives below the poverty line. Although government debt remains relatively low at about 30% of GDP, bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a proportion of GDP during the past decade, prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability.
The country has also had to face US unilateral sanctions since August 2018, due to the detention of a US citizen suspected of involvement in the 2016 coup attempt. US sanctions were extended in 2019 following Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria into areas occupied by armed groups supported by the US, and other punitive economic measures were imposed including a tariff increase on steel from Turkey and the cancellation of negotiations over a possible trade deal.
These concerns have deepened substantially as the economy has been hit by the dramatic global economic downturn this year caused by the Coronavirus outbreak. Although as in almost all other countries this latest ‘external shock’ is without precedent in modern times and could push the economic situation into free-fall, economists preaching the fiscal austerity dogma – as well as Turkey’s ‘adversaries’ and doomsayers – have been warning of an impending economic implosion for some time. For example, last year an analysis in The New York Times commented disparagingly:
Turkey has avoided the meltdown that seemed possible last summer when the lira plunged precipitously, but safety is remote. The palpable threat of imminent collapse has given way to a sense of muddling through as the government unleashes credit to defer an inevitable reckoning… Turkey’s currency remains battered, while its foreign debts remain vast. Inflation and joblessness are alarmingly high. Economic growth is minimal, and anxiety considerable amid the sense that more trouble lies ahead… For Mr. Erdogan, all available choices entail peril. Most economists maintain that he must accept interest rates above the now-stultifying level of 24 percent to dissuade investors from abandoning Turkey. That should prevent the lira from falling further, limiting inflation. But it would also deprive businesses of capital, yielding bankruptcy and joblessness, while constraining economic growth… All signs now point to Mr. Erdogan’s forcing interest rates lower, while pumping credit to Turkish businesses and households. That should spur spending and economic growth, but at the cost of remaining faith in the currency, yielding more inflation and bank losses that risk eventually exploding into a full-blown crisis…LINK
While Turkey’s consumption and growth-led strategy has defied the predictions of its many critics up until now, the risk that it will surpass all limits is greater than ever in the current global economic conditions.
Nonetheless, most of those that would be likely to celebrate such a development are also deeply mired in their own economic problems, and the fallout from a generalized economic collapse in Turkey would have major ramifications throughout Europe, the Middle East and West Asia.
Oil and Gas Sectors
Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas, importing 92% of its crude oil and almost all of its natural gas. To address this it is pursuing several parallel strategies including developing energy relationships with a broader set of international partners and increasing use of domestic energy sources including renewables, nuclear, and coal.
Turkey is also hoping to rectify the chronic trade and current account deficits with oil and gas revenues, both from transit fees from pipelines as well as by greatly increasing domestic production.
Turkey’s aggressive exploration program in the eastern Mediterranean has caused a dramatic increase in geopolitical tension in the region and threatened to provoke a military clash with Greece in particular (backed by most members of the European Union) as maritime boundaries remain unresolved.
Turkey’s exploration efforts in the Black Sea have however been much more successful, and without the controversy and associated security risks, as all exploration activities have taken place within Turkey’s universally recognized maritime zone.
Turkey has increased LNG purchases from Qatar and the US this year, taking advantage of lower spot prices, and also looking to reduce gas imports from Russia and Iran. The LNG imports have also been facilitated by the expansion of Turkey’s LNG infrastructure capacity in recent years.
Although Turkey and Qatar have been keen to develop economic relations and infrastructure projects between the two countries, nothing has eventuated yet and they will require the cooperation of other countries for any major project to be successful. LINK
Major Gas Find in the Black Sea
In August President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey has discovered a field in the Black Sea holding an estimated 320 billion cubic metres of gas.
But he also said that the discovery – which he hopes will be providing energy to the national power grid by the time Turkey celebrates its centennial in 2023 – will not slow the push to explore for reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. The Black Sea find “is a sizable discovery, but we still need more gas,” a government official said. “Our demand will still be 70% imported,” when the Black Sea gas goes online. LINK
The State-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) decided to conduct exploration activities directly, and purchased three drilling ships with this objective — Fatih, Yavuz, and Kanuni, all named after Ottoman sultans — between 2017 and 2020, deploying them in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Fatih was instrumental in making the August discovery in the Black Sea.
Turkish authorities considered a potential collaboration with Russian and Iranian companies, but it seems less likely given current relations with both countries. Turkey has increasingly diverging interests with Tehran and Moscow in Syria and is also trying to reduce dependence on Russian and Iranian gas supplies.
Therefore, Turkey will likely be reluctant to add another dimension to this complex web of relations by inviting a Russian or Iranian company to the project. Turkish companies are more likely to partner with companies from friendly states with experience developing such complex and costly projects. TPAO has already partnered with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in upstream projects in the Caspian Sea. Given the fraternal relations between the two countries, which have only solidified in light of the recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, SOCAR’s engagement in the project is not excluded. Ankara’s unequivocal support for Baku in the conflict with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s increasingly growing share in natural gas supplies to Turkey could be easily translated into cooperation in the oil and gas sector as well. LINK1, LINK2
Exploration in the eastern Mediterranean
Turkey intensified its search for oil and gas in the offshore eastern Mediterranean in 2018, but has so far failed to discover any oil or gas in the region. The increased exploratory activity has however reignited unresolved maritime boundary disputes with its neighbours, particularly Greece and Cyprus, and led to an ongoing crisis in the region. Over the last couple of months its main survey vessel has had a military escort, which has been confronted at sea on numerous occasions by Greek navy ships.
Turkey also concluded a maritime boundary agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya in November last year in an attempt to consolidate its claims in the eastern Mediterranean.
The agreement has added additional fuel to the already extremely high tensions in the region, with Egypt and Greece signing an agreement several months ago which overlaps with the earlier agreement, and Turkey will not be able to continue exploratory activities in disputed areas in the eastern Mediterranean without provoking a major crisis, the imposition of sanctions by the European Union, and a real possibility of armed clashes with at least one of its neighbours.
Turkey’s other main hope for increasing revenues from the oil and gas sectors involves the generation of transit fees from major pipelines between production areas in the Middle East and Western Asia and markets in Europe.
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is 1,768 kilometres long and stretches from from the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan’s maritime zone in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The crude oil pipeline commenced operation in 2006, and has a capacity of up to 1 million barrels per day.
The pipeline cost US$3.9 billion to build, and employs around 1,000 people. 70% of the construction cost was funded by third parties, including the International Finance Corporation (a subsidiary of the World Bank), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the export credit agencies of seven countries, as well as a syndicate of 15 commercial banks.
The pipeline is owned and operated by BTC Co, in which 11 companies are shareholders (of which BP is the largest and has responsibility for operational management of the pipeline). The shareholders are BP (UK) 30.1%, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) (Azerbaijan) 25%, Chevron (US) 8.9%, Statoil (Norway) 8.71%, Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) (Turkey) 6.53%, Eni (Italy) 5%, Total (France) 5%, Itochu (Japan) 3.4%, Inpex (Japan) 2.5%, ExxonMobil (US) 2.5%, and ONGC Videsh (India) 2.36%.
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurium gas pipeline
The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline (also known as the BTE pipeline, Shah Deniz Pipeline, or South Caucasus Pipeline) is a natural gas pipeline from the Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to Turkey. The pipeline runs parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, and commenced operations in 2007.
The 42-inch diameter gas pipeline has been laid alongside the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline until Erzurum, where the latter turns south towards the Mediterranean. It is 692 kilometres long, of which 442 kilometres is in Azerbaijan and 248 kilometres in Georgia. The initial capacity of the pipeline was 8.8 billion cubic metres (310 billion cubic feet) of gas per year, and has since been expanded to up to 20 bcm per year.
The pipeline is owned and operated by the South Caucasus Pipeline Company, whose shareholders are BP (UK) 28.83%, TPAO (Turkey) 19%, SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 16.67%, Petronas (Malaysia) 15.5%, Lukoil (Russia) 10%, and Naftiran Intertrade (Iran) 10%.
Southern Gas Corridor
The construction of the Southern Gas Corridor, a chain of pipelines linking Azerbaijan to Italy, has cost $40 billion and the project is almost completed.
The Southern Gas Corridor’s main source of gas is the Shah Deniz field, located in the economic zone of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea. The project comprises three pipelines and has a total length of almost 4,000 km: The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) linking Azerbaijan with Georgia, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) linking Greece, Albania and Italy.
Onshore work on the pipeline has been completed in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
Sixteen wells have been drilled in the Shah Deniz gas field and are ready for operations. Eight of the wells are producing and gas is already flowing to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.
The rest will be gradually put on-stream once the final stretch in Italy is completed. Work on the TAP section of the gas corridor is over 90% completed and is estimated to be finished around the end of this year.
Turkey has been receiving gas in the pipeline since July 2018. It received approximately 2bcm in 2018, 4bcm in 2019, and in 2020 the supplies are expected to be about 6 bcm. Also, 2 bcm have been reserved for Greece and Bulgaria, which will be delivered once TAP enters operation.
A 25-year supply contract has been signed with Italy, and the first Azeri gas is expected to start flowing there before the end of 2020, with supplies estimated to be at 8+bcm per year.
The Azerbaijani government (Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan) owns 51% of the Southern Gas Corridor; the other 49% is owned by State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).
The project has also been strongly promoted by the European Union, and even the US, as an important diversification of its energy sources:
SGC is a multinational natural gas pipeline supported by the European Commission and financed by the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Despite the US has not invested and will not get any commercial benefit from the project, Washington supports TANAP due to its promotion of diversification of energy supplies… Energy resources in the Caspian Basin are important for the EU, and the geographical location of Azerbaijan makes it ideal and more optimal point for the transportation of these resources; SGC is not long-distance route as Nabucco, therefore, it is affordable in terms of costs; SGC will create competitive prices in the energy market, especially for Southern Europe at the first stage, and later for CEE countries; SGC will strengthen Turkey’s position as a transit country, and enhance the EU-Azerbaijan relations. LINK
The planned Nabucco pipeline was eventually abandoned by the project’s proponents in 2013.
Turkey and Azerbaijan having been steadily deepening their ties, a trend that has been boosted by the troubled relations of both with Armenia. Several other major infrastructure projects apart from the Southern Gas Corridor also reflect the strength of their developing relationship:
Since the dissolution of USSR, the Azerbaijan-Turkey axis has brought positive trends both in the political and economic fields. For instance, despite several issues and obstacles at the end of XX century, Azerbaijan and Turkey managed to implement the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (oil pipeline), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (gas pipeline), and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (railway) projects and strengthen their geopolitical benefits in the world arena. Following this, TANAP project Turkey will gain a strategic momentum against Russia in the context of ensuring energy flow, especially to Europe in the near future.
Turkstream Gas Pipeline
TurkStream connects the gas transmission systems of Russia and Turkey. The gas pipeline has two strings with a combined throughput capacity of 31.5 billion cubic metres, and is 930 kilometres long.
The first string delivers gas to Turkey, while the second string is intended for gas transit to southern and south-eastern Europe through Turkish territory.
The Russian end of the TurkStream pipeline is the Russkaya compressor station, which is part of Russia’s Unified Gas Supply System and is located near Anapa. The compressor station has a capacity of 224 MW, sufficient to supply the pressure required for transmitting gas along the pipeline’s two strings up to the Turkish coast where the gas enters the receiving terminal.
The pipelaying for TurkStream took 15 months and was completed ahead of schedule in November 2018. The construction of the receiving terminal near Kiyikoy in Turkey was finished in 2019, and the project was officially inaugurated in January of this year. LINK
Conclusion
Although Turkey’s strategic location means it is well placed to capitalize on the major oil and gas projects between the Caspian Sea, southern Russia, the Middle East and Europe, its expansionist foreign policy coupled with an aggressive negotiating approach has made it an undesirable project partner for many countries which will only reluctantly be engaged when there is no alternative.
While Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria did not concern the European Union greatly, its stand-off with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean is another matter and risks exposing it to sanctions from its major trading partner. After the latest outbreak in hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey seems to have realized that the confrontation with Greece is a step to far, apart from being unnecessary at the moment. This would explain the decision to stop exploration activities in disputed parts of the eastern Mediterranean for the moment.
The decision to simultaneously confront Russia, Europe and the US is a dangerous policy, particularly when Turkey is also pursuing expansionist and provocative policies with many of its immediate neighbours. Unless Turkey’s political and military leadership begins to take a more conciliatory approach, it could find it has played its allies and adversaries off against each other one time too many.
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southfront--2020-10-08--Turkish F-16 Fighter Jets Spotted In Azerbaijani Airport

Two F-16 fighter jets believed to be of the Turkish Air Force have been spotted in Azerbaijan ’ s Ganja International Airport .
On October 7 , New York Times journalist Christiaan Triebert shared satellite images showing two F-16s and a possible CN-235 cargo aircraft in the Azerbaijani airport .
The fighter jets are most likely belonging to the Turkish Air Force .
The new images , which were taken on October 3 , are an evidence of Turkish involvement in the ongoing battle between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
The Ministry of Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in Azerbaijan ’ s aerial operations over Nagorno-Karabakh , a few days after the outbreak of the battle in the region on September 27 .
On September 29 , Armenia announced that one of its Su-25 fighter jets was shot down by a Turkish F-16 that took off from Ganja Airport in Azerbaijan .
Five days after the incident , Armenian forces carried out a large rocket strike on Ganja Airport .
The strike reportedly targeted Turkish military assists deployed in the airport .
Beside supporting Azerbaijan ’ s aerial operations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Syrian militants on Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s front lines .
Ankara ’ s real role in the ongoing conflict appears to be larger than what was officially declared .
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Two F-16 fighter jets believed to be of the Turkish Air Force have been spotted in Azerbaijan’s Ganja International Airport.
On October 7, New York Times journalist Christiaan Triebert shared satellite images showing two F-16s and a possible CN-235 cargo aircraft in the Azerbaijani airport. The fighter jets are most likely belonging to the Turkish Air Force.
The new images, which were taken on October 3, are an evidence of Turkish involvement in the ongoing battle between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
We compared the approximate measurements and visual characteristics (canard wings, color, etc.) with a variety of aircraft, including those operated by the Azerbaijani Air Force (MiG-21, MiG-29, Su-25, L-39). The Turkish-operated F-16 is the closest match. pic.twitter.com/dRCGUshyYp — Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc) October 7, 2020
The Ministry of Defense of Armenia accused Turkey of playing a role in Azerbaijan’s aerial operations over Nagorno-Karabakh, a few days after the outbreak of the battle in the region on September 27.
On September 29, Armenia announced that one of its Su-25 fighter jets was shot down by a Turkish F-16 that took off from Ganja Airport in Azerbaijan.
Five days after the incident, Armenian forces carried out a large rocket strike on Ganja Airport. The strike reportedly targeted Turkish military assists deployed in the airport.
Beside supporting Azerbaijan’s aerial operations, Turkey was behind the deployment of hundreds of Syrian militants on Nagorno-Karabakh’s front lines. Ankara’s real role in the ongoing conflict appears to be larger than what was officially declared.
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southfront--2020-10-08--Artsakh President Announced Major Counter-Attack (Video)

On October 7 , President of the de-facto state of Artsakh [ Nagorno-Karabakh ] Arayik Harutyunyan announced that his forces had launched a major counter attack against the Azerbaijani Armed Forces .
This video shows Armenian strikes on positions of Azerbaijani forces and their impact : In an official statement , Harutyunyan said his forces had , thus far , recaptured a position and lift the siege of 19 soldiers who had been fighting on their own for several days .
Earlier today , the Ministry of Defense of Armenia released videos showing some of the heavy losses Azerbaijani forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his interview with Russian edition RBK spoke about the success of the Karabakh army in the Jabrayil front .
According to him , the Azerbaijani side faced a crushing blow there .
“ Taking into account the information that came in the early morning , we can say that the tactic used by the Karabakh military leaders worked — they took tactical steps in the South , left the corridor and lured the Azerbaijani military corps there , ” the Armenian Prime Minister said .
Armenian sources are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ video that surfaced on social media shows the bodies of three dead Azerbaijani soldiers near an abandoned battle tank in an unspecified position that was recently recaptured .
In the last few days , Azerbaijani forces advanced in Nagorno-Karabakh capturing several towns and villages .
Armenian forces sustained heavy losses .
Now , Armenian forces , backed by hundreds of volunteers , are attempting to push Azerbaijani troops back .
This will not likely be an easy task .
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On October 7, President of the de-facto state of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] Arayik Harutyunyan announced that his forces had launched a major counter attack against the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
This video shows Armenian strikes on positions of Azerbaijani forces and their impact:
In an official statement, Harutyunyan said his forces had, thus far, recaptured a position and lift the siege of 19 soldiers who had been fighting on their own for several days.
“The Azerbaijanis were soundly routed as a result of this combined operation, leaving behind military equipment, armour and over 100 dead,” Harutyunyan said in the statement, without providing any additional details.
Earlier today, the Ministry of Defense of Armenia released videos showing some of the heavy losses Azerbaijani forces sustained in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Today, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his interview with Russian edition RBK spoke about the success of the Karabakh army in the Jabrayil front. According to him, the Azerbaijani side faced a crushing blow there.
“Taking into account the information that came in the early morning, we can say that the tactic used by the Karabakh military leaders worked — they took tactical steps in the South, left the corridor and lured the Azerbaijani military corps there,” the Armenian Prime Minister said.
Azerbaijan called these claims “unfounded and false”.
Armenian sources are sharing more footage now. A new video that surfaced on social media shows the bodies of three dead Azerbaijani soldiers near an abandoned battle tank in an unspecified position that was recently recaptured.
In the last few days, Azerbaijani forces advanced in Nagorno-Karabakh capturing several towns and villages. Armenian forces sustained heavy losses.
Now, Armenian forces, backed by hundreds of volunteers, are attempting to push Azerbaijani troops back. This will not likely be an easy task.
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southfront--2020-10-08--FBI Claims It Foiled Plot To Kidnap Michigan Governor

The FBI says it foiled a plot by six members of a militia to kidnap Michaigan Democratic Gov .
Gretchen Whitmer at her vacation home and overthrow the state government , according to an unsealed criminal complaint .
“ Several members talked about murdering ‘ tyrants ’ or ‘ taking ’ a sitting governor , ” according to an FBI agent .
“ The group decided they needed to increase their numbers and encouraged each other to talk to their neighbors and spread their message.
” Over 12 people were arrested late Wednesday on both state and federal charges , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plotters were charged with conspiring to kidnap Whitmer .
Four of the six men reportedly planned to meet on Wednesday to “ make a payment on explosives and exchange tactical gear , ” the agency said in an unsealed court filing .
The FBI quoted one of the accused as saying Whitmer “ has no checks and balances at all .
She has uncontrolled power right now .
All good things must come to an end.
” Authorities scheduled a Thursday afternoon news conference to talk about the case .
The government used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alleged plot .
–AP Two of the alleged conspirators “ agreed to unite others in their cause and take violent action against multiple state governments that they believe are violating the U.S. Constitution , ” reads the FBI criminal complaint – which names the six as Adam Fox , Ty Garbin , Kaleb Franks , Daniel Harris , Brandon Caserta , all of Michigan , as well as Barry Croft of Delaware .
Fox allegedly said he needed 200 men to storm the Capitol building in Lansing , take hostages , and try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was to be carried out before the Nov. 3 election , however the the suspects later shifted to kidnapping Whitmer at her vacation home .
In June , Croft , Fox and 13 others from multiple states held a meeting in Dublin , Ohio , near Columbus , according to the government .
Those present included an FBI confidential source who recorded the meetings .
The source has been paid $ 8,600 .
“ The group talked about creating a society that followed the U.S. Bill of Rights and where they could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
– According to , state AG Dana Nessel will join federal prosecutors to discuss the alleged conspiracy at 1 p.m. Thursday .
The investigation began in early 2020 , according to the complaint , however the unsealed complaint comes days after the Michigan Supreme Court struck down several of Whitmer ’ s pandemic restrictions which had been widely opposed .
In early 2020 , the FBI became aware through social media that a group of individuals were discussing the violent overthrow of certain government and law-enforcement components .
Among those individuals identified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communications , CROFT and FOX agreed to unite others in their cause and take violent action against multiple state governments that they believe are violating the U.S. Constitution .
“ They discussed different ways of achieving this goal from peaceful endeavors to violent actions .
At one point , several members talked about state governments they believed were violating the U.S. Constitution , including the government of Michigan and Governor Gretchen Whitmer , ” reads the complaint .
“ As part of that recruitment effort , Fox reached out to a Michigan-based militia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identified in the court filing , but members periodically meet in remote areas of the state for firearms training and tactical drills .
The FBI was already tracking the militia in March after a local police department learned members were trying to obtain addresses of local law-enforcement officers , the FBI agent wrote .
“ At the time , the FBI interviewed a member of the militia group who was concerned about the group ’ s plans to target and kill police officers , and that person agreed to become a ( confidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In late June , Fox posted on Facebook a video in which he complained about the state ’ s judicial system and COVID-19 restrictions on gyms operating in Michigan .
– “ Fox referred to Governor Whitmer as ‘ this tyrant bitch , ” adding “ ‘ I don ’ t know , boys , we got ta do something , ' ” “ You guys link with me on our other location system , give me some ideas of what we can do .
”

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Originally appeared at ZeroHedge
The FBI says it foiled a plot by six members of a militia to kidnap Michaigan Democratic Gov. Gretchen Whitmer at her vacation home and overthrow the state government, according to an unsealed criminal complaint.
“Several members talked about murdering ‘tyrants’ or ‘taking’ a sitting governor,” according to an FBI agent. “The group decided they needed to increase their numbers and encouraged each other to talk to their neighbors and spread their message.”
Over 12 people were arrested late Wednesday on both state and federal charges, while a core group of six alleged plotters were charged with conspiring to kidnap Whitmer.
Four of the six men reportedly planned to meet on Wednesday to “make a payment on explosives and exchange tactical gear,” the agency said in an unsealed court filing.
The FBI quoted one of the accused as saying Whitmer “has no checks and balances at all. She has uncontrolled power right now. All good things must come to an end.” Authorities scheduled a Thursday afternoon news conference to talk about the case. The government used informants and undercover agents to thwart the alleged plot. –AP
Two of the alleged conspirators “agreed to unite others in their cause and take violent action against multiple state governments that they believe are violating the U.S. Constitution,” reads the FBI criminal complaint – which names the six as Adam Fox, Ty Garbin, Kaleb Franks, Daniel Harris, Brandon Caserta, all of Michigan, as well as Barry Croft of Delaware.
Great statement from the Republican leader of the Michigan State Senate. https://t.co/gZBQwjL2mv — Frank Luntz (@FrankLuntz) October 8, 2020
Fox allegedly said he needed 200 men to storm the Capitol building in Lansing, take hostages, and try Whitmer for “treason.” The plan was to be carried out before the Nov. 3 election, however the the suspects later shifted to kidnapping Whitmer at her vacation home.
In June, Croft, Fox and 13 others from multiple states held a meeting in Dublin, Ohio, near Columbus, according to the government. Those present included an FBI confidential source who recorded the meetings. The source has been paid $8,600. “The group talked about creating a society that followed the U.S. Bill of Rights and where they could be self-sufficient,” the FBI agent wrote. –The Detroit News
According to NPR, state AG Dana Nessel will join federal prosecutors to discuss the alleged conspiracy at 1 p.m. Thursday.
The investigation began in early 2020, according to the complaint, however the unsealed complaint comes days after the Michigan Supreme Court struck down several of Whitmer’s pandemic restrictions which had been widely opposed.
In early 2020, the FBI became aware through social media that a group of individuals were discussing the violent overthrow of certain government and law-enforcement components. Among those individuals identified were CROFT and FOX. Through electronic communications, CROFT and FOX agreed to unite others in their cause and take violent action against multiple state governments that they believe are violating the U.S. Constitution.
“They discussed different ways of achieving this goal from peaceful endeavors to violent actions. At one point, several members talked about state governments they believed were violating the U.S. Constitution, including the government of Michigan and Governor Gretchen Whitmer,” reads the complaint. “As part of that recruitment effort, Fox reached out to a Michigan-based militia group.”
The militia group is not identified in the court filing, but members periodically meet in remote areas of the state for firearms training and tactical drills. The FBI was already tracking the militia in March after a local police department learned members were trying to obtain addresses of local law-enforcement officers, the FBI agent wrote. “At the time, the FBI interviewed a member of the militia group who was concerned about the group’s plans to target and kill police officers, and that person agreed to become a (confidential source),” the agent wrote In late June, Fox posted on Facebook a video in which he complained about the state’s judicial system and COVID-19 restrictions on gyms operating in Michigan. –The Detroit News
“Fox referred to Governor Whitmer as ‘this tyrant bitch,” adding “‘I don’t know, boys, we gotta do something,'”
“You guys link with me on our other location system, give me some ideas of what we can do.”
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southfront--2020-10-08--Main Development Directions Of US Ground Forces Till 2028

Written by Colonel V. Kodinov ; Originally appeared at Foreign Military Review 2020 # 1 , translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront The Ground Forces ( GF ) are a system-forming type of the US Armed Forces ( AF ) , designed both for the defence of the continental part of the country and for the protection of American interests in advanced zones .
They are able to independently or in cooperation with the national Air Force and Navy , as well as with allied troops , conduct active combat operations in any type and scale of modern local conflicts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( ToW ) .
At the same time , only the GF can solve the tasks of establishing control over the territory , resources and population of the enemy .
Taking into account the experience gained by the country ’ s Armed Forces in the course of participating in combat operations in the zones of the Iraqi and Afghan crises , the Pentagon leadership is conducting a set of measures to further increase the combat capabilities of these troops in the interests of timely and effective response to emerging challenges and threats .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ purpose of the GF will be to ensure the dominance of the country ’ s Armed Forces on land during military operations , including as part of interspecific groups of troops .
They should be prepared to meet the following main challenges : • conducting large-scale combat operations with a militarily equal enemy in various operational environments ( on land , at sea , in the air , in space , and in the cybersphere ) ; • ensuring the unhindered deployment and use of groups of American GF in remote theaters in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implementation of measures to prohibit access to American formations in the region and to restrict their freedom of action in the area of the operation ; • fight against terrorism and extremism , ensuring a high level of readiness of troops to conduct “ non-traditional ” combat operations ; • use of the military presence abroad in the interests of maintaining stability .
In this regard , the main efforts are expected to focus on building up the combat capabilities of the ground forces , as well as modernising weapons and military equipment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is planned to increase the capabilities of the ground forces and achieve this by bringing the number of the regular component to 500 thousand people , optimise the organisational and staff structure and combat personnel of the GF , increase the staffing of combat formations , and create formations that meet the requirements of the “ multi-sphere operations ” concept .
In total , by 2020 , the US military is expected to have 58 combat brigades .
The largest number of them is concentrated in the regular troops ( 31 brigades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ logistics support – in the National Guard and Army Reserve .
In accordance with the concept of the US Armed Forces “ multi-sphere operations ” , a new type of formation is being created in the US Ground Forces , which must have integrated capabilities to defeat the enemy in both ground and other areas of combat ( air , sea , space and cyber ) , thereby providing conditions for the successful solution of tasks for other types of armed forces – air and naval forces .
The versatility of such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relatively small number ( from 1,500 to 2,000 military personnel ) , will allow , according to US military experts , to effectively use firepower in conjunction with information support measures in order to identify and timely use shortcomings ( miscalculations ) in the building of combat order and enemy actions in all spheres to ensure the maneuvrability of their troops and gain superiority .
Testing the capabilities of a new type of experimental connection is planned over the next two years during operational and combat training activities .
In addition , guidelines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its combat use and comprehensive support .
Such formations are supposed to be placed in advanced zones in the immediate vicinity of the territory of a potential enemy .
According to the Pentagon , this will increase the effectiveness of solving the problems of ensuring access of groups of the country ’ s armed forces to the areas of operations .
Six training brigades ( military instructors ) have been formed in order to liberate combat formations , units and division of the ground forces from the functions of training foreign military formations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to staff the sixth brigade .
Each of these formations ( 500-900 officers and sergeants ) is focused on a specific region and is intended for operations in the area of responsibility of one of the joint commands of the US Armed Forces .
The peculiarity of the organisational structure of training brigades will allow , if necessary , for a short period of time to deploy combat infantry and armoured formations on their base ( after completing the enlisted personnel , weapons and military equipment ) .
For high-quality training of military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars of the future the ministry of the army is adjusting operational and combat training programmes .
The transition is underway from training troops to operate in local , time-limited conflicts to conduct large-scale operations , as well as effective combat in urban environments .
It is planned to increase the capabilities of the GF formations to organise intelligence support , use electronic warfare and counter the enemy in cyberspace .
Considerable attention will be paid to strengthening fire support for infantry and airborne units in the theater of operations .
During the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons and military equipment that are part of it are being modernised , as well as new models are being purchased .
So , by 2021 , it is planned to complete the modernisation of the M1A2 SEP Abrams main battle tanks in service to the M1A2C modification and begin testing the M1A2D version , which is scheduled for adoption in 2025 .
The main difference between the new modification of this main battle tank will be the use of integrated batch dynamic protection on the frontal armour of the hull and turret @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution will provide a reliable counteraction to modern and promising armour-piercing projectiles with a muzzle velocity of up to 2,000 m/s and a maximum armour penetration of up to 1,000 mm of homogeneous cold-rolled steel .
On-board protection , primarily against anti-tank close quarters combat weapons , is provided with mounted dynamic protection developed for previous modifications of the combat vehicle .
To increase the level of mine protection , it is planned to install a new station for radio-electronic suppression of control channels and neutralisation of radio-controlled explosive devices , which effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radio waves typical of dense urban development .
This measure is necessary to solve the problems of tracking and suppressing mobile cellular radio sources of the most common standards .
The new modification of the M1A2 tanks will include 120 mm armour-piercing sub-caliber and multi-purpose rounds .
Their special feature is the use of low-sensitive gunpowder in the propellant charge , so that the ballistic ammunition characteristics are preserved in a wide temperature range from -30°C to +60°C .
At the same time , a set of measures is being carried out to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In the course of the planned work , it is planned to replace the large-caliber 12.7 mm machine gun installed on them with a 30 mm automatic gun , place a low-power laser under development , designed to combat small unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ) , as well as electronic warfare equipment .
In the period up to 2021 , 81 vehicles will be upgraded .
This equipment is primarily sent to re-equip units of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment ( mechanised brigade “ Stryker ” ) , stationed in Germany .
Work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ JLTV light tactical armoured vehicles .
Subsequently , it should completely replace the outdated Humvee multi-purpose vehicles .
The new vehicle will receive additional protection from mines , while its weight will be reduced and its cross-country ability and maneuverability will be increased .
By 2028 , the ground forces plan to purchase more than 20 thousand units of such equipment , and by 2040 , about 30 thousand more .
In addition , by 2021 , it is expected to complete the programme for creating advanced short-takeoff FVL vehicles ( convertiplanes ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Apache ” attack helicopters and UH-60 “ Black Hawk ” combat support helicopters .
It is planned to spend about $ 310 million on the implementation of the development stage .
In October of this year , tests of the MQ-1C ER Grey Eagle multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle with an extended flight duration ( up to 48 hours ) were completed .
In the future , it is planned to mass-produce and deliver the MQ-1C ER Grey Eagle UAV to the US army , including the special operations forces command and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces are working with American corporations to develop combat lasers to combat air and ground targets .
Boeing produces a 10-kilowatt plant ( several successful tests took place ) , Lockheed-Martin – a 50 kW plant , Northrop-Grumman – 100 kW .
It is expected that the first serial samples of combat lasers will enter service in 2023 .
According to US military experts , the most urgent task at present is to increase the fire capabilities of the US Army .
This is expected to be achieved through the implementation of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and rocket artillery .
In the near future , it is planned to increase the number of high-precision ammunition of the Excalibur type , increase the interference immunity of their guidance systems and finalise the 155 mm self-propelled M109A6 Paladin howitzers to the M109A7 version and 155 mm towed M777A2 howitzers to the M777ER version ( with an increased firing range of up to 70 km ) .
The next step should be the development of a new HM1113 active-jet projectile increased accuracy with a range of up to 70-100 km and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hypersonic projectiles .
According to experts , to build up fire capabilities , it is also planned to return short-range air defence and multiple launch rockets systems to the divisions ( batteries ) of the army divisions .
Within the framework of the “ high-precision long-range weapons ” programme , it is planned to create a prototype of an operational-tactical missile system with a firing range of up to 500 km by the end of 2019 .
Its tests have already been announced for the second quarter of 2020 .
About 200 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this programme in fiscal year 2017 , 222.2 million in 2018 , and expenses for the period of up to 2022 are estimated at almost 600 million dollars .
In the interest of cost savings , it is proposed to use the chassis of the M142 Himars and M270 Himars MLRS as the base for a promising system .
At the same time , two transport and launch containers will be installed on a wheeled tractor and four on a tracked one .
Correction of the missile flight and guidance of the warhead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using satellite navigation .
According to the US Department of Defense , the adoption of the missile system is expected no earlier than 2027 .
First of all , they can be deployed in Europe as a response to the deployment of Russian Iskander-M complexes in the Kaliningrad region .
As part of the technical re-equipment of the GF , the main focus is expected to be on the deployment of more effective combat control , intelligence and communications systems that best meet the requirements of integration into a single information and intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the American command provide for achieving significant superiority over the Russian Federation and China in the field of information warfare , including electronic warfare , by 2023 .
Thus , at the initial stage , priority attention is planned to be directed to the implementation of the US air defence programme “ Countering Enemy UAVs ” .
In accordance with it , the ground forces intend to develop and test mobile electronic warfare systems that will be able to automatically detect unmanned aerial vehicles , determine their ownership , and intercept or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of implementing the projects to create methods of protection against radio-electronic impact , the main focus will be on designing systems that can automatically switch to backup and backup communication channels , as well as operate using alternative navigation tools that do not use GPS signals .
In addition , as part of the implementation of this direction , the possibilities of using important information to transmit through civil information and communication networks , including those operating on enemy territory , will be explored .
In order to solve the problems of integrating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in cybernetic space , the main efforts of the army department will be aimed at creating technologies that allow acting according to a single plan in order to reduce the enemy ’ s ability to assess the operational situation at an early stage of the conflict .
According to American military experts , the future direction of development of the US army will be tied to the development of information technology , the implementation of the concept “ multi-sphere operations ” , the fleet capacity advanced robotic and unmanned combat systems and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as progress in the field of confrontation in cyberspace .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Intelligence Community Of The Republic of Turkey • Views Of US Military Analysts On Use Of Special Operations Forces In Multi-Domain Operations

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Written by Colonel V. Kodinov; Originally appeared at Foreign Military Review 2020 #1, translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront
The Ground Forces (GF) are a system-forming type of the US Armed Forces (AF), designed both for the defence of the continental part of the country and for the protection of American interests in advanced zones. They are able to independently or in cooperation with the national Air Force and Navy, as well as with allied troops, conduct active combat operations in any type and scale of modern local conflicts and wars in various theaters of war (ToW). At the same time, only the GF can solve the tasks of establishing control over the territory, resources and population of the enemy.
Taking into account the experience gained by the country’s Armed Forces in the course of participating in combat operations in the zones of the Iraqi and Afghan crises, the Pentagon leadership is conducting a set of measures to further increase the combat capabilities of these troops in the interests of timely and effective response to emerging challenges and threats.
In the medium term, the main purpose of the GF will be to ensure the dominance of the country’s Armed Forces on land during military operations, including as part of interspecific groups of troops. They should be prepared to meet the following main challenges:
conducting large-scale combat operations with a militarily equal enemy in various operational environments (on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and in the cybersphere);
ensuring the unhindered deployment and use of groups of American GF in remote theaters in the conditions of the enemy’s implementation of measures to prohibit access to American formations in the region and to restrict their freedom of action in the area of the operation;
fight against terrorism and extremism, ensuring a high level of readiness of troops to conduct “non-traditional” combat operations;
use of the military presence abroad in the interests of maintaining stability.
In this regard, the main efforts are expected to focus on building up the combat capabilities of the ground forces, as well as modernising weapons and military equipment.
By 2028, in particular, it is planned to increase the capabilities of the ground forces and achieve this by bringing the number of the regular component to 500 thousand people, optimise the organisational and staff structure and combat personnel of the GF, increase the staffing of combat formations, and create formations that meet the requirements of the “multi-sphere operations” concept.
In total, by 2020, the US military is expected to have 58 combat brigades. The largest number of them is concentrated in the regular troops (31 brigades), and formations of combat and logistics support – in the National Guard and Army Reserve. In accordance with the concept of the US Armed Forces “multi-sphere operations”, a new type of formation is being created in the US Ground Forces, which must have integrated capabilities to defeat the enemy in both ground and other areas of combat (air, sea, space and cyber), thereby providing conditions for the successful solution of tasks for other types of armed forces – air and naval forces.
The versatility of such a “combat unit”, despite its relatively small number (from 1,500 to 2,000 military personnel), will allow, according to US military experts, to effectively use firepower in conjunction with information support measures in order to identify and timely use shortcomings (miscalculations) in the building of combat order and enemy actions in all spheres to ensure the maneuvrability of their troops and gain superiority.
Testing the capabilities of a new type of experimental connection is planned over the next two years during operational and combat training activities. In addition, guidelines will be developed for the organisation of its combat use and comprehensive support.
Such formations are supposed to be placed in advanced zones in the immediate vicinity of the territory of a potential enemy. According to the Pentagon, this will increase the effectiveness of solving the problems of ensuring access of groups of the country’s armed forces to the areas of operations.
Six training brigades (military instructors) have been formed in order to liberate combat formations, units and division of the ground forces from the functions of training foreign military formations. Currently, measures are being taken to staff the sixth brigade.
Each of these formations (500-900 officers and sergeants) is focused on a specific region and is intended for operations in the area of responsibility of one of the joint commands of the US Armed Forces. The peculiarity of the organisational structure of training brigades will allow, if necessary, for a short period of time to deploy combat infantry and armoured formations on their base (after completing the enlisted personnel, weapons and military equipment).
For high-quality training of military personnel to conduct combat operations in the wars of the future the ministry of the army is adjusting operational and combat training programmes. The transition is underway from training troops to operate in local, time-limited conflicts to conduct large-scale operations, as well as effective combat in urban environments.
It is planned to increase the capabilities of the GF formations to organise intelligence support, use electronic warfare and counter the enemy in cyberspace.
Considerable attention will be paid to strengthening fire support for infantry and airborne units in the theater of operations.
During the reorganisation of the American army, the weapons and military equipment that are part of it are being modernised, as well as new models are being purchased.
So, by 2021, it is planned to complete the modernisation of the M1A2 SEP Abrams main battle tanks in service to the M1A2C modification and begin testing the M1A2D version, which is scheduled for adoption in 2025.
The main difference between the new modification of this main battle tank will be the use of integrated batch dynamic protection on the frontal armour of the hull and turret. According to the developers, this solution will provide a reliable counteraction to modern and promising armour-piercing projectiles with a muzzle velocity of up to 2,000 m/s and a maximum armour penetration of up to 1,000 mm of homogeneous cold-rolled steel. On-board protection, primarily against anti-tank close quarters combat weapons, is provided with mounted dynamic protection developed for previous modifications of the combat vehicle.
To increase the level of mine protection, it is planned to install a new station for radio-electronic suppression of control channels and neutralisation of radio-controlled explosive devices, which effectively operates in conditions of chaotic re-reflection of radio waves typical of dense urban development. This measure is necessary to solve the problems of tracking and suppressing mobile cellular radio sources of the most common standards.
The new modification of the M1A2 tanks will include 120 mm armour-piercing sub-caliber and multi-purpose rounds. Their special feature is the use of low-sensitive gunpowder in the propellant charge, so that the ballistic ammunition characteristics are preserved in a wide temperature range from -30°C to +60°C.
At the same time, a set of measures is being carried out to modernise the Stryker armoured personnel carriers.
In the course of the planned work, it is planned to replace the large-caliber 12.7 mm machine gun installed on them with a 30 mm automatic gun, place a low-power laser under development, designed to combat small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as electronic warfare equipment. In the period up to 2021, 81 vehicles will be upgraded. This equipment is primarily sent to re-equip units of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (mechanised brigade “Stryker”), stationed in Germany.
Work is also underway on the creation of JLTV light tactical armoured vehicles.
Subsequently, it should completely replace the outdated Humvee multi-purpose vehicles. The new vehicle will receive additional protection from mines, while its weight will be reduced and its cross-country ability and maneuverability will be increased. By 2028, the ground forces plan to purchase more than 20 thousand units of such equipment, and by 2040, about 30 thousand more.
In addition, by 2021, it is expected to complete the programme for creating advanced short-takeoff FVL vehicles (convertiplanes), which should replace the specialised AH-64 “Apache” attack helicopters and UH-60 “Black Hawk” combat support helicopters. It is planned to spend about $310 million on the implementation of the development stage.
In October of this year, tests of the MQ-1C ER Grey Eagle multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle with an extended flight duration (up to 48 hours) were completed. In the future, it is planned to mass-produce and deliver the MQ-1C ER Grey Eagle UAV to the US army, including the special operations forces command and the intelligence and security command.
The ground forces are working with American corporations to develop combat lasers to combat air and ground targets. Boeing produces a 10-kilowatt plant (several successful tests took place), Lockheed-Martin – a 50 kW plant, Northrop-Grumman – 100 kW. It is expected that the first serial samples of combat lasers will enter service in 2023.
According to US military experts, the most urgent task at present is to increase the fire capabilities of the US Army.
This is expected to be achieved through the implementation of a multi-stage programme for the modernisation of barrel and rocket artillery. In the near future, it is planned to increase the number of high-precision ammunition of the Excalibur type, increase the interference immunity of their guidance systems and finalise the 155 mm self-propelled M109A6 Paladin howitzers to the M109A7 version and 155 mm towed M777A2 howitzers to the M777ER version (with an increased firing range of up to 70 km).
The next step should be the development of a new HM1113 active-jet projectile increased accuracy with a range of up to 70-100 km and the creation of advanced artillery systems for launching hypersonic projectiles. According to experts, to build up fire capabilities, it is also planned to return short-range air defence and multiple launch rockets systems to the divisions (batteries) of the army divisions.
Within the framework of the “high-precision long-range weapons” programme, it is planned to create a prototype of an operational-tactical missile system with a firing range of up to 500 km by the end of 2019. Its tests have already been announced for the second quarter of 2020. About 200 million dollars were spent on the implementation of this programme in fiscal year 2017, 222.2 million in 2018, and expenses for the period of up to 2022 are estimated at almost 600 million dollars.
In the interest of cost savings, it is proposed to use the chassis of the M142 Himars and M270 Himars MLRS as the base for a promising system.
At the same time, two transport and launch containers will be installed on a wheeled tractor and four on a tracked one. Correction of the missile flight and guidance of the warhead to the target will be carried out using satellite navigation. According to the US Department of Defense, the adoption of the missile system is expected no earlier than 2027. First of all, they can be deployed in Europe as a response to the deployment of Russian Iskander-M complexes in the Kaliningrad region.
As part of the technical re-equipment of the GF, the main focus is expected to be on the deployment of more effective combat control, intelligence and communications systems that best meet the requirements of integration into a single information and intelligence space.
In particular, the plans of the American command provide for achieving significant superiority over the Russian Federation and China in the field of information warfare, including electronic warfare, by 2023.
Thus, at the initial stage, priority attention is planned to be directed to the implementation of the US air defence programme “Countering Enemy UAVs”. In accordance with it, the ground forces intend to develop and test mobile electronic warfare systems that will be able to automatically detect unmanned aerial vehicles, determine their ownership, and intercept or physically destroy them.
In the course of implementing the projects to create methods of protection against radio-electronic impact, the main focus will be on designing systems that can automatically switch to backup and backup communication channels, as well as operate using alternative navigation tools that do not use GPS signals.
In addition, as part of the implementation of this direction, the possibilities of using important information to transmit through civil information and communication networks, including those operating on enemy territory, will be explored.
In order to solve the problems of integrating electronic warfare systems and conducting combat operations in cybernetic space, the main efforts of the army department will be aimed at creating technologies that allow acting according to a single plan in order to reduce the enemy’s ability to assess the operational situation at an early stage of the conflict.
According to American military experts, the future direction of development of the US army will be tied to the development of information technology, the implementation of the concept “multi-sphere operations”, the fleet capacity advanced robotic and unmanned combat systems and the empowerment of their application, as well as progress in the field of confrontation in cyberspace.
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southfront--2020-10-08--Azerbaijani Strikes Continue To Deplete Armenian Forces (Videos)

On October 7 and 8 , the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan and the country ’ s media released several @ @ @ @ @ Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
The videos show more than ten @ @ @ @ @ , including T-72 battle tanks and 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers .
The strikes seen in @ @ @ @ @ out with Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 combat drones and Israeli-made Harop and SkyStriker loitering munitions .
@ @ @ @ @ videos also show heavy rocket strikes on vehicles and positions of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh @ @ @ @ @ accurate fire power of Azerbaijani forces , Armenian troops are still holding onto their positions @ @ @ @ @ Armenian troops carried out successful counter-attacks in the region over the last 48 hours .
@ @ @ @ @ which broke out on September 27 , does not appear to be nearing its end @ @ @ @ @ still unwilling to cease military operations in the region .
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On October 7 and 8, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan and the country’s media released several videos showing recent strikes on Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The videos show more than ten strikes on Armenian military vehicles, including T-72 battle tanks and 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers.
The strikes seen in the videos were likely carried out with Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 combat drones and Israeli-made Harop and SkyStriker loitering munitions.
The Azerbaijani MoD’s videos also show heavy rocket strikes on vehicles and positions of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Video posted yesterday that appears to show Azerbaijani loitering munitions striking two targets and a UAV recording footage of another strike. Hard to tell what was hit. 796/https://t.co/PSvEP64XgU pic.twitter.com/DOXjsyRjw0 — Rob Lee (@RALee85) October 8, 2020
Longer video of those Azerbaijani loitering munition strikes on an Armenian 2S3 howitzer and a tank. 723/https://t.co/oyPFyWGJ9d pic.twitter.com/spVQhO271j — Rob Lee (@RALee85) October 7, 2020
Despite the heavy and accurate fire power of Azerbaijani forces, Armenian troops are still holding onto their positions in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Armenian troops carried out successful counter-attacks in the region over the last 48 hours.
The battle in Nagorno-Karabakh, which broke out on September 27, does not appear to be nearing its end. Azerbaijan and Armenian are still unwilling to cease military operations in the region.
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southfront--2020-10-08--Turkey Gets Bogged Down In Karabakh War As Armenian Forces Reclaim Initiative

Armenian forces have reclaimed the tactical initiative in the battle for the Nagorno-Karabakh region and conducted several counter-attacks taking back positions earlier captured by Azerbaijan on the Jabrayil front on the evening of October 7 .
Later , on the morning of October 8 , the Armenian Defense Ministry announced that Azerbaijani forces had launched a military offensive in the area , which had been repelled .
“ Early in the morning , at 08:30 , the enemy attempted an attack in the southern direction , but after losing 3 units of military equipment and about 20 soldiers , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” the representative of the Armenian Ministry of Defense Artsrun Hovhannisyan said .
“ Fighting continues .
our troops are performing their tasks brilliantly .
We have some good luck , but heavy fighting continues , ” he said .
It should be noted that , according to the Armenian side , Jabrayil remains a contested area despite Azerbaijani claims that it had been captured .
In their turn , Baku says that all Armenian reports are fake news and their statements about retaking some positions just confirm that they have lost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ released videos showing captured Armenian positions in the villages of Shaybey , Shukurbeyli and Chaxirli .
Armenian forces abandoned three T-72 battle tanks , three D-30 howitzers as well as many military vehicles and trucks , most of them were damaged to some extent .
As of October 8 , the Turkish-backed advance by Azerbaijan on Karabakh slowed down due to the fierce resistance of Armenian forces , complex mountain terrain and bad weather .
Nonetheless , the Azerbaijani leadership and its Big Brothers in Turkey demonstrate no indication of readiness for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiations .
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the “ attempt to achieve the ceasefire ” could be made only after the Armenian side provides an official schedule of the withdrawal of its forces from the contested region , which should be approved by the OSCE Minsk group .
The Azerbaijani military , with help from Turkey , still maintains full air dominance and has an upper hand in artillery , heavy military equipment and manpower .
Therefore , it seeks to develop the initial success gained in the first week of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Armenian forces and then dismantle the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic .
On the other hand , Armenian forces deployed in the contested region lack modern air-defense measures , heavy equipment and artillery .
They compensate this with a wide network of fortified positions in the mountain area and the better combat readiness of their infantry .
More and more evidence of Turkish involvement in the conflict surfaces online .
After multiple photos and videos with Turkish-backed Syrian militants deploying to the combat zone , satellite images show Turkish F-16 jets on the airbase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ satellite images confirm that as of October 3 , Turkish warplanes were still there .
On September 29 , Armenia announced that one of its Su-25 fighter jets had been shot down by a Turkish F-16 that had taken off from Ganja .
At that time , Turkey and Azerbaijan denounced these claims as fake news .
Nonetheless , it is clear that Turkey at least had the theoretical opportunity to have done so .
The Azerbaijani leadership and its Turkish ally can not agree on a new ceasefire and negotiations in Karabakh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the conflict otherwise this may lead to a political crisis in Azerbaijan .
Society , which was put in a state of military hysteria , will not accept such a decision from their government .
Thus , it is expected that if Azerbaijan experiences more difficulties in the conflict and is not able to develop momentum , Turkish involvement in the conflict will grow further .

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Armenian forces have reclaimed the tactical initiative in the battle for the Nagorno-Karabakh region and conducted several counter-attacks taking back positions earlier captured by Azerbaijan on the Jabrayil front on the evening of October 7. Later, on the morning of October 8, the Armenian Defense Ministry announced that Azerbaijani forces had launched a military offensive in the area, which had been repelled.
“Early in the morning, at 08:30, the enemy attempted an attack in the southern direction, but after losing 3 units of military equipment and about 20 soldiers, the enemy escaped from the battlefield near Jabrayil,” the representative of the Armenian Ministry of Defense Artsrun Hovhannisyan said.
“Fighting continues. our troops are performing their tasks brilliantly. We have some good luck, but heavy fighting continues,” he said.
It should be noted that, according to the Armenian side, Jabrayil remains a contested area despite Azerbaijani claims that it had been captured. In their turn, Baku says that all Armenian reports are fake news and their statements about retaking some positions just confirm that they have lost them.
Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani military released videos showing captured Armenian positions in the villages of Shaybey, Shukurbeyli and Chaxirli. Armenian forces abandoned three T-72 battle tanks, three D-30 howitzers as well as many military vehicles and trucks, most of them were damaged to some extent.
As of October 8, the Turkish-backed advance by Azerbaijan on Karabakh slowed down due to the fierce resistance of Armenian forces, complex mountain terrain and bad weather. Nonetheless, the Azerbaijani leadership and its Big Brothers in Turkey demonstrate no indication of readiness for a new prolonged ceasefire and the resumption of negotiations. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the “attempt to achieve the ceasefire” could be made only after the Armenian side provides an official schedule of the withdrawal of its forces from the contested region, which should be approved by the OSCE Minsk group. The Azerbaijani military, with help from Turkey, still maintains full air dominance and has an upper hand in artillery, heavy military equipment and manpower. Therefore, it seeks to develop the initial success gained in the first week of the war and further deliver a devastating blow to Armenian forces and then dismantle the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. On the other hand, Armenian forces deployed in the contested region lack modern air-defense measures, heavy equipment and artillery. They compensate this with a wide network of fortified positions in the mountain area and the better combat readiness of their infantry.
More and more evidence of Turkish involvement in the conflict surfaces online. After multiple photos and videos with Turkish-backed Syrian militants deploying to the combat zone, satellite images show Turkish F-16 jets on the airbase near Azerbaijan’s Ganza. The satellite images confirm that as of October 3, Turkish warplanes were still there. On September 29, Armenia announced that one of its Su-25 fighter jets had been shot down by a Turkish F-16 that had taken off from Ganja. At that time, Turkey and Azerbaijan denounced these claims as fake news. Nonetheless, it is clear that Turkey at least had the theoretical opportunity to have done so.
The Azerbaijani leadership and its Turkish ally cannot agree on a new ceasefire and negotiations in Karabakh without claiming at least a PR victory in the conflict otherwise this may lead to a political crisis in Azerbaijan. Society, which was put in a state of military hysteria, will not accept such a decision from their government. Thus, it is expected that if Azerbaijan experiences more difficulties in the conflict and is not able to develop momentum, Turkish involvement in the conflict will grow further.
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