southfront--2020-06-21--Ungrateful Somalia. Story Of Enduring Negative Sentiments Of Somalia’s Elites Against Kenya

Dear readers , SouthFront presents you an interesting article on the current state of relations between Somalia and Kenia and the situation in the Horn of Africa in general .
It was written by our reader Simon Ndiritu .
We thank Mr. Nidritu for the article .
There has been tacit muscling between two East African countries in which frail Somalia is trying to ‘ get back at ’ Kenya , which stood by Somalis through their years of anarchy .
The relationship between Kenya and Somalia has been historically complicated , primarily due to boarders inherited from European colonial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divided previously borderless Africa awkwardly into colonies that would later become countries .
The conflict-precipitating nature of African borders is exemplified by Kenya-Somalia relations .
The two countries ’ common boarder has generated serious friction between them , which emboldens the often-belligerent Somalia ’ s Elites .
From people-to-people relations , I posit , that Kenya has been sufficiently helpful to ordinary Somalis but Somalia ’ s elites have been ungrateful as I will illustrate in this article .
Meanwhile , I offer a short background to the bone of contention between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ context of their relations .
The bone of contention between the two countries is Northern Frontier District ( NFD ) , former north eastern province of Kenya .
This region was historically part of Jubaland , which was controlled by Somali Ajuran and later the Geledi Sultanates .
The British colonialists transferred Jubaland to British East Africa .
In 1925 , the British ceded some parts of the Jubaland to Italy , leading to this region ’ s division .
The rest ( NFD ) became part of British colony of Kenya .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jubaland gained independence alongside Somalia in 1960 and hoped to be rejoined by Kenya ’ s NFD .
Kenya obtained independence three years later and did not cede NFD to Somalia .
Therefore , Kenya retained a notable population of ethnic Somalis .
Somalia has always tried to attract this population ( and NFD ) to its side .
From Kenya ’ s perspective , it ( Kenya ) is not to blame for governing NFD as a part of the territory it inherited ; after all , Somalia did not exist before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NFD .
After various attempts by the Somalia government to wrestle NFD from Kenya , some of which were crushed by massacres by the Kenyan Government , Somalia keeps trying to take this region .
From my perspective , Kenya should have limited heavy handed approach when dealing with Kenya-Somali ’ s who had been misled by Somalia .
Beginning in the late 1980s , Somalia descended into civil war .
Kenya came in handy for poor Somalis who sought refuge there .
However , Somalia elites hired militias to protect them and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Somali Refugees started streaming into Kenya during the civil war .
After the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 , 1.1 million citizens fled into Kenya and Ethiopia .
Others have streamed into Kenya due to several cycles of violence or famine experienced in Somalia over the years .
Some have been integrated with their Kenyan relatives while others transit through Kenya to other countries , including in Europe and the US .
Therefore , the number of Somali citizens in Kenya has always change as new arrivals stream in waves while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hosted about half a million refugees in Dadaab in 2013 , ( 96 % being Somalis ) .
Guardian noted that Dadaab was the largest refugee camp globally in 2016 that hosted about 400,000 people .
The same organization noted that the Kakuma refugee camp hosted an additional 101 000 refugees ; this number constituted a significant percentage of Somali refugees .
Even after the Joint operation that repatriated about 200 000 Somali refugees , the UNHCR 2019 reported that there were 212,936 ; 191,500 and 74,758 refugees in Dadaab , Kakuma , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 96 % of Somali refugees in Dadaab and a significant percentage for others , it is safe to estimate that a quarter a million Somali refugees were in Kenya .
In the same year , the UNHCR reported that tens of thousands of refugees arrived in Kenya .
In addition to refugees , pew research estimated that 2million Somali refugees had attained citizenship in different countries including in Kenya .
Some Somalis easily get Kenyan citizenship due to their family ties to Kenyan-Somalis .
Also , there are tens of thousands of Somali @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ordinary Kenyans are comfortable with them except in instances when some of these foreigners are suspected of collaborating with Al-Shabaab .
A security operation to arrest Al-Shabaab operatives and sympathizers spanning three days in Eastleigh neighborhood led to arrest of 447 unregistered Somali immigrants .
A similar action throughout the country could potentially nub thousands of Somalia nationals but Kenya sees no need to return them to Somalia unless they cooperate with Al-Shabaab .
The strain that Somalia refugees ’ places on Kenya ’ s economy and resources is immeasurably massive .
Kenyan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationals participate in social and economic activities as Kenyans do .
It is rare to see any hate crime perpetrated by Kenyans against Somalis .
In 2011 , Kenya responded to the Somali government ’ s request and deployed its troops to support the government in battling al-Shabaab terrorists .
Kenya did not invade Somalia since Somalia Transitional Government Fighters ( TFG ) led the war .
Other Somali groups such as the Raskamboni Brigade ( a Jumbaland-based militia ) , Ahlu Sunna WalJama ’ a ( a Somali Sunni militia that was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Azania ( a militia group in the larger juba ) also participated with Kenya Defense Forces ( KDF ) assuming support role .
Then , Kenya ’ s ministry of defense was headed by a Kenyan-Somali who could be expected to safeguard the interests of Kenyans and Somalis .
Kenya sacrificed many lives and huge sums to stabilize what it believed was a brother country .
Standard Media estimated that it cost Kenya Ksh10.8million ( $ 108,000 ) annually to fight alongside TFG and later Somali National Army ( SNA ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ repairing roads , hospitals , and schools to facilitate return to a peaceful life .
Kenya has facilitated and participated in Eldoret ’ s meeting to promote a peaceful transition from a transitional government to the current government .
In 2012 , when the federal government took over , this became the beginning of Somalia ’ s elites undermining Kenya with the tacit assistance of Al-Shabaab and some European powers .
In 2009 and 2010 , Kenya and Somalia were in the receiving end of Al-Shabaab , which detonated several IEDs in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kidnapping tourists in Kenya for ransom .
After Kenya assisted Somalia to fight terrorists , assisted Somali refugees , and participated in a political process that created the transitional government , Somalia started undermining Kenya .
It started by claiming Kenya ’ s maritime territory , demanding that the boundary extends in the direction of its land border and took the matter to the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) headed by a Somali .
While I can not claim know which country is right , Somalia had honored the existing border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2014 ) .
Also , the boundaries of the African state along the Indian oceans run parallel to the equator as the existing Kenya-Somalia boarder .
Historically , Kenyan had access to the Indian ocean and thriving cultural exchange with India , Persia , and Oman through ocean routes , which negates Somalia ’ s proposal , which suggests that Kenyan communities were historically landlocked .
It is interesting to see if/how the ICJ grants Somalia ’ s request , which would deny Kenyans and East Africans access to open ocean , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Besides , Kenya feels betrayed by the aggressive behavior of Somalia .
However , a closer evaluation of Somalia ’ s action and alignment of Powers around this issue indicates that Somalia is being used as a battering ram against Kenya .
Norway and UK are pushing Somalis to claim Kenya ’ s maritime territory to expand their oil and gas interests , suggesting that Kenya has outlived its usefulness to them .
It illustrates that the UK views its oil interests to be more important than its relations with Kenya .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their preference for manipulating weaker states for their interests .
UK/Norway ’ s assistance appeals to Somalia ’ s elite that holds bitter sentiments against Kenya and not ordinary Somali nationals .
The same elites dragged the impoverished country into a civil ware leading to the collapse of Somalia before .
Ordinary citizens remained in Somalia or moved to Kenya or Ethiopia when their state collapsed .
Kenyans and ordinary Somali nationals have a mostly equal and symbiotic relations .
Therefore , Somalia needs to relook its stand against its neighbor .
Jostling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the field of telecommunication , and participants are not prepared to play fair .
There has been a string of destruction of telecommunication masts inside Kenya ’ s territory .
An investigation by the International Policy Group established that Somalis Telcom operator Hormuud was linked to the Al-Shabaab terror group .
According to this report , Hormuud paid Al-Shabaab $ 3million to demolish communication masts 50 kilometers into Kenya ’ s border .
Hormuud is also used by locals to pay taxes “ Zakat ” to Al-Shabaab .
Somalia ’ s government responded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Demolished a telecommunication mast in Somalia .
However , no independent body has confirmed this accusation .
Also , it is unlikely that KDF would demolish only one must in response to about seven that the terror group has destroyed .
Also , one wonders how KDF can demolish one mast while repairing roads and hospitals in southern Somalia .
Voices in Somalia ’ s government supported claims made by Hormuud and Al-Shabaab .
This suggests a possible tactic coalition between the three parties .
While accusing the Somalia government may seams extreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close associate of the Somalia ’ s president with diverting weapons meant for the Somali National Army to al-Shabaab .
It would help to ask why the government purporting to fight terrorists diverted military weapons to the same terrorists .
Noteworthy , Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya increased after the dates of these deliveries , and the group was able to conduct three of the deadliest terrorist attacks ( the Westgate , the El Adde , and the Garissa university Attacks ) afterwards .
Mogadishu ’ s ‘ assistance ’ to Al-Shabaab could have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In March of this year , The Somali National Army ( SNA ) attacked the Jubaland forces , near the Kenyan town of Mandera and jammed Kenya ’ s GSM signal .
A Kenyan was killed , and businesses were closed .
SNA also .
The Kenya government issued a statement and declined to engage its military .
However , the Somali government condemned Kenya ’ s encroachment into its territory .
Later , the Jubaland government claimed that the Somali government was seeking to overthrow it .
If these claims are valid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Siad Barre , which led to the collapse of Somalia republic in 1991 .
The situation was easily deescalated when Kenya ’ s president phoned Somalia ’ s .
One wonders why Somalia did not adopt this approach from the beginning .
Driving a Wedge between Kenyan-Somalis and other tribes ?
Somalia had tried to pull Kenyan-Somalis away from Kenya during Shifta War .
It also attempted to pull Somali speaking Ogaden from Ethiopia , leading to Ogaden War .
After Somalia collapsed in 1991 , one would expect that the new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last decade has seen Somalia and Al-Shabaab trying to pull Kenyan-Somalis away from Kenya .
For instance , during Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya , the group feigns sympathy for ethnic Somalis by sparing them while killing other ethnic groups .
The same group kills Somalis indiscriminately in Somalia .
Similarly , the Somalia ’ s elites/Government is luring Kenyan parliamentarians ( MPs ) of Somali origin for secret talks .
In March this year , 11 Kenya-Somali MPs flew to Somalia for undeclared meeting .
Kenyan government clarified that the MPs had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kenya in any official function .
Also , Kenya ’ s intelligence agency confirmed that these MPs had a secret meeting with the head of Somali ’ s intelligence , organized through shadowy third parties .
The agenda of this meeting remains unclear , and exclusions of parliamentarians of other communities makes it even more suspicious .
There is adequate reason to believe that the Somali government is up to something sinister .
Also , Somalia is not treating Kenya like a brother that stood with Somalis through trying times .
Its plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Hormuud .
They relate to its rush to ICJ or taring NFD from Kenya .
Whether this plan succeeds is another story .
Also , How Kenya reacts is subject to another deep analysis .
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Dear readers, SouthFront presents you an interesting article on the current state of relations between Somalia and Kenia and the situation in the Horn of Africa in general. It was written by our reader Simon Ndiritu. We thank Mr. Nidritu for the article.
Dear friends, you can submit your articles and overviews to SouthFront via info@southfront.org
Introduction
There has been tacit muscling between two East African countries in which frail Somalia is trying to ‘get back at’ Kenya, which stood by Somalis through their years of anarchy. The relationship between Kenya and Somalia has been historically complicated, primarily due to boarders inherited from European colonial masters’ scrabble for Africa. European divided previously borderless Africa awkwardly into colonies that would later become countries. The conflict-precipitating nature of African borders is exemplified by Kenya-Somalia relations. The two countries’ common boarder has generated serious friction between them, which emboldens the often-belligerent Somalia’s Elites. From people-to-people relations, I posit, that Kenya has been sufficiently helpful to ordinary Somalis but Somalia’s elites have been ungrateful as I will illustrate in this article. Meanwhile, I offer a short background to the bone of contention between the two countries for you to have basic context of their relations.
Background: Northern Frontier District
The bone of contention between the two countries is Northern Frontier District (NFD), former north eastern province of Kenya. This region was historically part of Jubaland, which was controlled by Somali Ajuran and later the Geledi Sultanates. The British colonialists transferred Jubaland to British East Africa. In 1925, the British ceded some parts of the Jubaland to Italy, leading to this region’s division. The rest (NFD) became part of British colony of Kenya. In 1960, the Somalian section of Jubaland gained independence alongside Somalia in 1960 and hoped to be rejoined by Kenya’s NFD. Kenya obtained independence three years later and did not cede NFD to Somalia. Therefore, Kenya retained a notable population of ethnic Somalis. Somalia has always tried to attract this population (and NFD) to its side. From Kenya’s perspective, it (Kenya) is not to blame for governing NFD as a part of the territory it inherited; after all, Somalia did not exist before the 60s has no legal claim to NFD.
After various attempts by the Somalia government to wrestle NFD from Kenya, some of which were crushed by massacres by the Kenyan Government, Somalia keeps trying to take this region. From my perspective, Kenya should have limited heavy handed approach when dealing with Kenya-Somali’s who had been misled by Somalia. Beginning in the late 1980s, Somalia descended into civil war. Kenya came in handy for poor Somalis who sought refuge there. However, Somalia elites hired militias to protect them and sent their children abroad for education.
Somalis in Kenya
Somali Refugees started streaming into Kenya during the civil war. After the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, 1.1 million citizens fled into Kenya and Ethiopia. Others have streamed into Kenya due to several cycles of violence or famine experienced in Somalia over the years.
Some have been integrated with their Kenyan relatives while others transit through Kenya to other countries, including in Europe and the US. Therefore, the number of Somali citizens in Kenya has always change as new arrivals stream in waves while others leave. For instance, Kenya hosted about half a million refugees in Dadaab in 2013, (96% being Somalis). Guardian noted that Dadaab was the largest refugee camp globally in 2016 that hosted about 400,000 people. The same organization noted that the Kakuma refugee camp hosted an additional 101 000 refugees; this number constituted a significant percentage of Somali refugees. Even after the Joint operation that repatriated about 200 000 Somali refugees, the UNHCR 2019 reported that there were 212,936; 191,500 and 74,758 refugees in Dadaab, Kakuma, and other urban areas respectively. Assuming 96% of Somali refugees in Dadaab and a significant percentage for others, it is safe to estimate that a quarter a million Somali refugees were in Kenya. In the same year, the UNHCR reported that tens of thousands of refugees arrived in Kenya.
In addition to refugees, pew research estimated that 2million Somali refugees had attained citizenship in different countries including in Kenya. Some Somalis easily get Kenyan citizenship due to their family ties to Kenyan-Somalis. Also, there are tens of thousands of Somali citizens who live in Kenya illegally. Ordinary Kenyans are comfortable with them except in instances when some of these foreigners are suspected of collaborating with Al-Shabaab. A security operation to arrest Al-Shabaab operatives and sympathizers spanning three days in Eastleigh neighborhood led to arrest of 447 unregistered Somali immigrants. A similar action throughout the country could potentially nub thousands of Somalia nationals but Kenya sees no need to return them to Somalia unless they cooperate with Al-Shabaab.
The strain that Somalia refugees’ places on Kenya’s economy and resources is immeasurably massive. Kenyan citizens shoulder this responsibility well. Somali nationals participate in social and economic activities as Kenyans do. It is rare to see any hate crime perpetrated by Kenyans against Somalis.
Fighting Al-Shabaab
In 2011, Kenya responded to the Somali government’s request and deployed its troops to support the government in battling al-Shabaab terrorists. Kenya did not invade Somalia since Somalia Transitional Government Fighters (TFG) led the war. Other Somali groups such as the Raskamboni Brigade (a Jumbaland-based militia), Ahlu Sunna WalJama’a (a Somali Sunni militia that was opposed to Wahhabi and Sharia law) and Azania (a militia group in the larger juba) also participated with Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) assuming support role. Then, Kenya’s ministry of defense was headed by a Kenyan-Somali who could be expected to safeguard the interests of Kenyans and Somalis. Kenya sacrificed many lives and huge sums to stabilize what it believed was a brother country. Standard Media estimated that it cost Kenya Ksh10.8million ($108,000) annually to fight alongside TFG and later Somali National Army (SNA). Also, Kenyan spent an additional amount repairing roads, hospitals, and schools to facilitate return to a peaceful life. Kenya has facilitated and participated in Eldoret’s meeting to promote a peaceful transition from a transitional government to the current government. In 2012, when the federal government took over, this became the beginning of Somalia’s elites undermining Kenya with the tacit assistance of Al-Shabaab and some European powers.
Betrayal
In 2009 and 2010, Kenya and Somalia were in the receiving end of Al-Shabaab, which detonated several IEDs in the capital Mogadishu killing hundreds of Somalia while kidnapping tourists in Kenya for ransom. After Kenya assisted Somalia to fight terrorists, assisted Somali refugees, and participated in a political process that created the transitional government, Somalia started undermining Kenya. It started by claiming Kenya’s maritime territory, demanding that the boundary extends in the direction of its land border and took the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) headed by a Somali. While I cannot claim know which country is right, Somalia had honored the existing border for 35 years (between 1979 and 2014). Also, the boundaries of the African state along the Indian oceans run parallel to the equator as the existing Kenya-Somalia boarder. Historically, Kenyan had access to the Indian ocean and thriving cultural exchange with India, Persia, and Oman through ocean routes, which negates Somalia’s proposal, which suggests that Kenyan communities were historically landlocked. It is interesting to see if/how the ICJ grants Somalia’s request, which would deny Kenyans and East Africans access to open ocean, which they have enjoyed for many centuries. Besides, Kenya feels betrayed by the aggressive behavior of Somalia. However, a closer evaluation of Somalia’s action and alignment of Powers around this issue indicates that Somalia is being used as a battering ram against Kenya.
Norway and UK are pushing Somalis to claim Kenya’s maritime territory to expand their oil and gas interests, suggesting that Kenya has outlived its usefulness to them. It illustrates that the UK views its oil interests to be more important than its relations with Kenya. The actions of these European powers results from their preference for manipulating weaker states for their interests. UK/Norway’s assistance appeals to Somalia’s elite that holds bitter sentiments against Kenya and not ordinary Somali nationals. The same elites dragged the impoverished country into a civil ware leading to the collapse of Somalia before. Ordinary citizens remained in Somalia or moved to Kenya or Ethiopia when their state collapsed. Kenyans and ordinary Somali nationals have a mostly equal and symbiotic relations. Therefore, Somalia needs to relook its stand against its neighbor.
Telco Wars
Jostling between Somalia and Kenya has spilled into the field of telecommunication, and participants are not prepared to play fair. There has been a string of destruction of telecommunication masts inside Kenya’s territory. An investigation by the International Policy Group established that Somalis Telcom operator Hormuud was linked to the Al-Shabaab terror group. According to this report, Hormuud paid Al-Shabaab $3million to demolish communication masts 50 kilometers into Kenya’s border. Hormuud is also used by locals to pay taxes “Zakat” to Al-Shabaab. Somalia’s government responded to these claims by accusing that KDF Demolished a telecommunication mast in Somalia. However, no independent body has confirmed this accusation. Also, it is unlikely that KDF would demolish only one must in response to about seven that the terror group has destroyed. Also, one wonders how KDF can demolish one mast while repairing roads and hospitals in southern Somalia.
Voices in Somalia’s government supported claims made by Hormuud and Al-Shabaab. This suggests a possible tactic coalition between the three parties. While accusing the Somalia government may seams extreme, a UNSC 2014 report implicated a close associate of the Somalia’s president with diverting weapons meant for the Somali National Army to al-Shabaab. It would help to ask why the government purporting to fight terrorists diverted military weapons to the same terrorists. Noteworthy, Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya increased after the dates of these deliveries, and the group was able to conduct three of the deadliest terrorist attacks (the Westgate, the El Adde, and the Garissa university Attacks) afterwards. Mogadishu’s ‘assistance’ to Al-Shabaab could have enabled the latter to attack Kenya.
Taking the War to Kenya
In March of this year, The Somali National Army (SNA) attacked the Jubaland forces, near the Kenyan town of Mandera and jammed Kenya’s GSM signal. A Kenyan was killed, and businesses were closed. SNA also. The Kenya government issued a statement and declined to engage its military. However, the Somali government condemned Kenya’s encroachment into its territory. Later, the Jubaland government claimed that the Somali government was seeking to overthrow it. If these claims are valid, they reflect a centralist attitude adopted by Siad Barre, which led to the collapse of Somalia republic in 1991. The situation was easily deescalated when Kenya’s president phoned Somalia’s. One wonders why Somalia did not adopt this approach from the beginning.
Driving a Wedge between Kenyan-Somalis and other tribes?
Somalia had tried to pull Kenyan-Somalis away from Kenya during Shifta War. It also attempted to pull Somali speaking Ogaden from Ethiopia, leading to Ogaden War. After Somalia collapsed in 1991, one would expect that the new frail state prioritizes development. Oppositely, the last decade has seen Somalia and Al-Shabaab trying to pull Kenyan-Somalis away from Kenya. For instance, during Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, the group feigns sympathy for ethnic Somalis by sparing them while killing other ethnic groups. The same group kills Somalis indiscriminately in Somalia.
Similarly, the Somalia’s elites/Government is luring Kenyan parliamentarians (MPs) of Somali origin for secret talks. In March this year, 11 Kenya-Somali MPs flew to Somalia for undeclared meeting. Kenyan government clarified that the MPs had not sought clearance or mandate to represent Kenya in any official function. Also, Kenya’s intelligence agency confirmed that these MPs had a secret meeting with the head of Somali’s intelligence, organized through shadowy third parties. The agenda of this meeting remains unclear, and exclusions of parliamentarians of other communities makes it even more suspicious.
Conclusion
There is adequate reason to believe that the Somali government is up to something sinister. Also, Somalia is not treating Kenya like a brother that stood with Somalis through trying times. Its plans are close to those pursued by Al-Shabaab and Hormuud. They relate to its rush to ICJ or taring NFD from Kenya. Whether this plan succeeds is another story. Also, How Kenya reacts is subject to another deep analysis.
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southfront--2020-06-21--Unidentified Gunmen Raid Sham Legion Headquarters In Idlib, Kill Field Commander

On June 21 , unidentified gunmen raided a headquarters of the Turkish-backed Sham Legion in the northwestern Syrian region of Greater Idlib .
The gunmen stormed the headquarters , which is located in the town of Killi near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing , in the early hours of the morning .
The Sham Legion ’ s militants clashed with the gunmen inside the headquarters .
As a result , one of the militants was killed .
Opposition activists revealed that the slain militant was a field commander and a so-called “ Emir ” of the Sham Legion .
His @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last two months , several positions and headquarters of the Sham Legion were attacked by unidentified gunmen .
In most cases , the attackers stole vehicles , weapons and equipment without killing anyone .
Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay ’ at Tahrir al-Sham ( HTS ) , which controls Greater Idlib , is the main suspect in these attacks .
HTS is known to be involved in a conflict with the Sham Legion , which has been supporting the Turkish military in its mission to implement the March 5 agreement with Russia .
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On June 21, unidentified gunmen raided a headquarters of the Turkish-backed Sham Legion in the northwestern Syrian region of Greater Idlib.
The gunmen stormed the headquarters, which is located in the town of Killi near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, in the early hours of the morning. The Sham Legion’s militants clashed with the gunmen inside the headquarters. As a result, one of the militants was killed.
Opposition activists revealed that the slain militant was a field commander and a so-called “Emir” of the Sham Legion. His name was not revealed.
In the last two months, several positions and headquarters of the Sham Legion were attacked by unidentified gunmen. In most cases, the attackers stole vehicles, weapons and equipment without killing anyone.
Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controls Greater Idlib, is the main suspect in these attacks. HTS is known to be involved in a conflict with the Sham Legion, which has been supporting the Turkish military in its mission to implement the March 5 agreement with Russia.
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southfront--2020-06-21--Russia Deploys Warplanes, Helicopters At Eastern Syria Airport

The Russian military has deployed warplanes and helicopters in the military section of the Deir Ezzor Airport in Syria ’ @ @ @ @ @ June 20 , Obretix , a Twitter defense blogger , released new satellite images of @ @ @ @ @ two Su-24 combat aircraft , two Mi-17 and two Mi-35 helicopters .
Furthermore , the @ @ @ @ @ Arab Air Force had deployed four Su-22 fighter-bombers in the airport .
The Russian and @ @ @ @ @ in Deir Ezzor to support operations against ISIS remnants in the central region .
Heavy @ @ @ @ @ ’ s personnel , equipment and hideouts between Homs , Raqqa and Hama in the @ @ @ @ @ helicopters , however , are supporting the Russian Military Police , which are overseeing a @ @ @ @ @ Syria .
While Russian forces in Syria are thought to be mainly based at the @ @ @ @ @ , a great part of these forces move around the country as the situation dictates @ @ @ @ @ to establish more bases in Syria .
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The Russian military has deployed warplanes and helicopters in the military section of the Deir Ezzor Airport in Syria’s eastern region.
On June 20, Obretix, a Twitter defense blogger, released new satellite images of the airport showing at least two Su-24 combat aircraft, two Mi-17 and two Mi-35 helicopters. Furthermore, the images revealed that the Syrian Arab Air Force had deployed four Su-22 fighter-bombers in the airport.
RuAF with two Su-24, two pairs of Mil Mi-8 and Mi-35 helicopters and 4 SyAAF Su-22 at Deir Ezzor Air Base today https://t.co/xSU3nvZsrA pic.twitter.com/0OtEVPKnpy — Samir (@obretix) June 20, 2020
The Russian and Syrian warplanes were likely deployed in Deir Ezzor to support operations against ISIS remnants in the central region. Heavy airstrikes targeted the terrorist group’s personnel, equipment and hideouts between Homs, Raqqa and Hama in the last few weeks.
The helicopters, however, are supporting the Russian Military Police, which are overseeing a Russian-Turkish ceasefire agreement in northeast Syria.
While Russian forces in Syria are thought to be mainly based at the Hmeimim Air Base in Lattakia, a great part of these forces move around the country as the situation dictates. Russia is now working to establish more bases in Syria.
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southfront--2020-06-21--Military Situation In Libya On June 21, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya : • According to the @ @ @ @ @ 600 Turkish-backed Syrian militants returned from Libya where they were fighting for GNA ; • @ @ @ @ @ new photos of what it claimed to be Russian warplanes deployed in Libya ; • @ @ @ @ @ said that any Egyptian intervention in Libya has international legitimacy and ordered his army to @ @ @ @ @ or outside Egypt .
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A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya:
According to the SOHR, more than 2 600 Turkish-backed Syrian militants returned from Libya where they were fighting for GNA;
The U.S. Africa Command released new photos of what it claimed to be Russian warplanes deployed in Libya;
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said that any Egyptian intervention in Libya has international legitimacy and ordered his army to be ready for missions inside or outside Egypt.
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southfront--2020-06-21--Military Situation In Iraq On June 21, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overivew of the recent developments in Yemen : • Turkish warplanes conducted @ @ @ @ @ positions in the Zakho district in Duhok governorate ; • The 35th brigade of Hashd @ @ @ @ @ the Zalaya area , south of Salah al-Din province ; • The Iraqi PM Mustafa @ @ @ @ @ of the Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani to discuss the pending issues between the federal government @ @ @ @ @ ; • In coordination with the Government of Iraq , the U.S.-led Coalition aircraft destroyed @ @ @ @ @ Wadi al-Shai area in Kirkuk province ; • After Turkish airstrikes killed 4 civilians , @ @ @ @ @ against Turkish aggression .
The police used tear gas to disperse protesters .
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A brief overivew of the recent developments in Yemen:
Turkish warplanes conducted the airstrikes on the PKK positions in the Zakho district in Duhok governorate;
The 35th brigade of Hashd al-Shaabi repelled ISIS attacks on the Zalaya area, south of Salah al-Din province;
The Iraqi PM Mustafa Al-Kadhimi met with the President of the Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani to discuss the pending issues between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government;
In coordination with the Government of Iraq, the U.S.-led Coalition aircraft destroyed 3 ISIS camps in the Wadi al-Shai area in Kirkuk province;
After Turkish airstrikes killed 4 civilians, people marched in Shiladze city against Turkish aggression. The police used tear gas to disperse protesters.
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southfront--2020-06-21--Kurdish Guerrilla Fighters Capture, Execute Three Turkish-Backed Militants In Northern Aleppo (Photo

Kurdish Guerrilla Fighters Capture, Execute Three Turkish-Backed Militants In Northern Aleppo (Photos)

The Kurdish Wrath of Olives Operations Room announced on June 21 that its cells had killed three Turkish-backed militants in northern Aleppo .
The operations room ’ s cells captured , then executed three militants , who were manning a post in the village of al-Nu ’ man near the city of al-Bab .
The three militants were serving in the ranks of the 211th Brigade .
“ Our operations , which are aimed at taking revenge against mercenaries , were and still are a part of the duty that our fighters perform towards our people , who have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mercenaries , ” the operations room said in an official statement .
The Wrath of Olives Operations Room also released graphic footage showing the three slain Turkish-backed militants .
The 211th Brigade , which is a faction of the Syrian National Army , acknowledged its losses in a statement , identifying the three slain militants as Faris Ahmad al-Issa , Bilal Khaled al-Ali and Alaa Mohamad Abid .
Nevertheless , the Turkish-backed faction falsely claimed the three militants were killed by “ ISIS criminal gangs.
” Kurdish guerrilla groups in northern Aleppo now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A recent attack by the Afrin Liberation Forces claimed the lives of at least eight militants .
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The Kurdish Wrath of Olives Operations Room announced on June 21 that its cells had killed three Turkish-backed militants in northern Aleppo.
The operations room’s cells captured, then executed three militants, who were manning a post in the village of al-Nu’man near the city of al-Bab. The three militants were serving in the ranks of the 211th Brigade.
“Our operations, which are aimed at taking revenge against mercenaries, were and still are a part of the duty that our fighters perform towards our people, who have been afflicted by the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries,” the operations room said in an official statement.
The Wrath of Olives Operations Room also released graphic footage showing the three slain Turkish-backed militants.
The 211th Brigade, which is a faction of the Syrian National Army, acknowledged its losses in a statement, identifying the three slain militants as Faris Ahmad al-Issa, Bilal Khaled al-Ali and Alaa Mohamad Abid. Nevertheless, the Turkish-backed faction falsely claimed the three militants were killed by “ISIS criminal gangs.”
Kurdish guerrilla groups in northern Aleppo now carry out more operations against Turkish-backed militants. A recent attack by the Afrin Liberation Forces claimed the lives of at least eight militants.
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southfront--2020-06-21--ISIS Terrorists Kill, Capture Eleven Syrian Service Members In Southern Deir Ezzor

Early on June 21 , ISIS terrorists launched a hit-and-run attack on Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) positions in @ @ @ @ @ of al-Mayadin in southern Deir Ezzor .
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR @ @ @ @ @ were ongoing at the al-Mzari ’ a [ farms ] area near al-Mayadin for several @ @ @ @ @ SOHR , ISIS terrorists killed eight service members and captured three others during the attack @ @ @ @ @ to be verified .
The attack was likely launched from the Homs desert , which @ @ @ @ @ and Homs .
Hundreds of ISIS terrorists are reportedly taking shelter there .
A recent @ @ @ @ @ SAA and its allies have put a significant pressure on ISIS cells in the Homs @ @ @ @ @ steeped up its attacks in response .
Earlier this week , 15 Syrian soldiers were @ @ @ @ @ attack by the group in eastern Hama .
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Early on June 21, ISIS terrorists launched a hit-and-run attack on Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in the vicinity of the city of al-Mayadin in southern Deir Ezzor.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that heavy clashes were ongoing at the al-Mzari’a [farms] area near al-Mayadin for several hours.
“The al-Mazari’a area is the largest gathering of Iranians and its militias in the region,” the monitoring group said in its report.
According to the SOHR, ISIS terrorists killed eight service members and captured three others during the attack. These claims are yet to be verified.
The attack was likely launched from the Homs desert, which lays between western Deir Ezzor and Homs. Hundreds of ISIS terrorists are reportedly taking shelter there.
A recent series of operations by the SAA and its allies have put a significant pressure on ISIS cells in the Homs desert. The terrorist group steeped up its attacks in response. Earlier this week, 15 Syrian soldiers were killed and injured in an attack by the group in eastern Hama.
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southfront--2020-06-21--Afrin Liberation Forces Share Combat Footage Of Recent Successful Operation

On June 21 , the Afrin Liberation Forces ( ALF ) released combat footage of their recent successful operation against @ @ @ @ @ area of Afrin .
The operation , which took place on June 19 , targeted @ @ @ @ @ Sham Legion next to the town of Bosoufane in southern Afrin .
The ALF killed @ @ @ @ @ the operation .
The newly-released footage of the operation shows ALF fighters storming the targeted @ @ @ @ @ rocket-propelled grenades .
Turkish-backed militants showed no resistance whatsoever .
In the course of the @ @ @ @ @ four AK-type assault rifles , a PK-type machine gun , an RPG-7 launcher , a @ @ @ @ @ night-vision scope .
The operation was apparently launched from the Tell Rifaat area south of @ @ @ @ @ jointly controlled by the Syrian Arab Army and the Kurdish People ’ s Protection Units @ @ @ @ @ Russian Military Police are also present in the area .
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On June 21, the Afrin Liberation Forces (ALF) released combat footage of their recent successful operation against Turkish-backed militants in the occupied area of Afrin.
The operation, which took place on June 19, targeted a position of the Turkish-backed Sham Legion next to the town of Bosoufane in southern Afrin. The ALF killed at least eight militants in the operation.
The newly-released footage of the operation shows ALF fighters storming the targeted position using assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Turkish-backed militants showed no resistance whatsoever.
In the course of the attack, ALF fighters seized four AK-type assault rifles, a PK-type machine gun, an RPG-7 launcher, a M1895 sniper rifle and a night-vision scope.
The operation was apparently launched from the Tell Rifaat area south of Afrin. The area is jointly controlled by the Syrian Arab Army and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). The Russian Military Police are also present in the area.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Military Situation In Libya On June 22, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya : • The LNA declared @ @ @ @ @ area from Eastern Sirte to the town of al-Hayshah ; • A LNA L-39 Albatros @ @ @ @ @ landing near the Libya-Niger border ; • GNA militias kidnapped 18 Egyptian workers in the @ @ @ @ @ Zawiya District ; • Two civilians were injured as a result of a mine explosion @ @ @ @ @ • The GNA denounced Egypt ’ s warning of military intervention in Libya and declared @ @ @ @ @ amounts to a declaration of war .
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A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya:
The LNA declared a no-fly zone over the area from Eastern Sirte to the town of al-Hayshah;
A LNA L-39 Albatros military aircraft made an emergency landing near the Libya-Niger border;
GNA militias kidnapped 18 Egyptian workers in the town of Subrata in the Zawiya District;
Two civilians were injured as a result of a mine explosion in the Sidra area;
The GNA denounced Egypt’s warning of military intervention in Libya and declared that Egypt’s move amounts to a declaration of war.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Military Situation In Yemen On June 22, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen : • Ansar Allah reported @ @ @ @ @ during the past 24 hours ; • Clashes between Ansar Allah and Saudi-led forces continue @ @ @ @ @ ; • Ansar Allah seized the areas of Jadaan , Rawdha and Harmasi south of @ @ @ @ @ ON THE TOPIC :

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen:
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 4 airstrikes on the Hazm area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 21 airstrikes on the Radman area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 3 airstrikes on the Haradh area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 7 airstrikes on the Majzar area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 3 airstrikes on the Sarwah area;
Ansar Allah reported 67 ceasefire violations in al-Hudaydah during the past 24 hours;
Clashes between Ansar Allah and Saudi-led forces continue north of the Radman district;
Ansar Allah seized the areas of Jadaan, Rawdha and Harmasi south of the Madghal district.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Militant Attacks In Nigeria and Niger Leave Dozens Dead

In recent days there ’ s been yet another escalation of terrorist activity in Nigeria and Niger .
On June 19th , unknown armed bandits killed one , injured six and kidnapped two people in attacks on seven different communities in Shiroro local government ’ s area in Niger .
Shiroro is a volatile area , where attacks of this kind are frequent .
On June 16th , once again five civilians were killed in the area .
And this itself came just several days after 4 police officers were killed in clashes .
In neighboring Nigeria , the situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 82 bodies were recovered in the northeast of the country , following four attacks in three different locations , allegedly carried out by Boko Haram members .
The Nigerian army said in a statement that only 20 Boko Haram militants were killed by troops while repelling an attack in Monguno , one of the locations of the four attacks this weekend .
The army said that the militants had “ attempted to breach the town ” but troops inflicted heavy casualties on them .
Some of the militants were captured and their equipment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ destroyed .
The media and other local sources , including humanitarian workers , confirmed some 20 soldiers were killed while repelling the attack in Monguno .
In Gubio and Nganzai , two other locations that came under intense attacks by the Boko Haram militants , a total of 42 civilians were killed on the same day , according to a top military officer .
On June 9th , at least 81 residents were killed by Boko Haram militants in another village in Gubio , according to local officials .
Boko Haram , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Al-Qaeda carry out frequent attacks in the region , and they seem to be operating largely undeterred , with the attacks becoming increasingly bloody .
This is happening despite claims by Nigerian authorities that an effective anti-terrorism operation is being carried out .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Over 100 Killed In Two Separate Attacks In Northern Nigeria • French Military Provides Details On Operation Against Al-Qaeda ’ s Northern Africa Chief ( Photos )

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In recent days there’s been yet another escalation of terrorist activity in Nigeria and Niger.
On June 19th, unknown armed bandits killed one, injured six and kidnapped two people in attacks on seven different communities in Shiroro local government’s area in Niger.
Shiroro is a volatile area, where attacks of this kind are frequent.
On June 16th, once again five civilians were killed in the area. And this itself came just several days after 4 police officers were killed in clashes.
In neighboring Nigeria, the situation is not much different. At least 82 bodies were recovered in the northeast of the country, following four attacks in three different locations, allegedly carried out by Boko Haram members.
The Nigerian army said in a statement that only 20 Boko Haram militants were killed by troops while repelling an attack in Monguno, one of the locations of the four attacks this weekend.
The army said that the militants had “attempted to breach the town” but troops inflicted heavy casualties on them. Some of the militants were captured and their equipment, including four gun trucks, was destroyed.
The media and other local sources, including humanitarian workers, confirmed some 20 soldiers were killed while repelling the attack in Monguno.
In Gubio and Nganzai, two other locations that came under intense attacks by the Boko Haram militants, a total of 42 civilians were killed on the same day, according to a top military officer.
On June 9th, at least 81 residents were killed by Boko Haram militants in another village in Gubio, according to local officials.
Boko Haram, and other terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda carry out frequent attacks in the region, and they seem to be operating largely undeterred, with the attacks becoming increasingly bloody.
This is happening despite claims by Nigerian authorities that an effective anti-terrorism operation is being carried out.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Military Situation In Syria On June 22, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • US-led coalition warplanes @ @ @ @ @ Kubaiba oil field in Hasakah province ; • The SDF arrested a woman and 3 @ @ @ @ @ al-Hol camp in Hasakah province ; • Demonstrations against the presence of SAA forces took @ @ @ @ @ Busra al-Sham ; • An ammo depot of the SDF exploded near the town of @ @ @ @ @ • 2 combat aircrafts , 4 helicopters of the Russian Air Forces and 4 fighter-bombers @ @ @ @ @ Force were deployed in the Deir Ezzor Airport ; • Cells of the Kurdish Wrath @ @ @ @ @ 3 Turkish-backed militants in the village of al-Nu ’ man near the city of al-Bab @ @ @ @ @ an attack on SAA positions near the city of al-Mayadin in the southern Deir Ezzor @ @ @ @ @ the headquarters of the Turkish-backed Sham Legion in the town of Killi near the Bab @ @ @ @ @ ON THE TOPIC :

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:
US-led coalition warplanes struck a motorbike near the Kubaiba oil field in Hasakah province;
The SDF arrested a woman and 3 children after they raided the al-Hol camp in Hasakah province;
Demonstrations against the presence of SAA forces took place in the town of Busra al-Sham;
An ammo depot of the SDF exploded near the town of Rmelan in al-Hasakah province;
2 combat aircrafts, 4 helicopters of the Russian Air Forces and 4 fighter-bombers of the Syrian Arab Air Force were deployed in the Deir Ezzor Airport ;
Cells of the Kurdish Wrath of Olives Operations Room killed 3 Turkish-backed militants in the village of al-Nu’man near the city of al-Bab;
ISIS terrorists launched an attack on SAA positions near the city of al-Mayadin in the southern Deir Ezzor;
Unidentified gunmen raided the headquarters of the Turkish-backed Sham Legion in the town of Killi near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Riots In Stuttgart After German Police Try To Carry Out Drug Checks

On June 20th and 21st , riots took place in the German city of Stuttgart .
It all began when police started carrying out drug checks at the city ’ s main square , Schlossplatz .
Eyewitnesses said that everything escalated after a teen tried to run away from the police and officers chased him .
At that moment , partiers from other groups stepped in “ out of solidarity ” with the teen and began attacking police .
An estimated 500 people , many of them teens or young adults , were involved .
Twenty-four suspects were eventually arrested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ riots , calling the violence “ unacceptable , ” and reiterating his support for law enforcement .
The riots had crossed a line that neither alcohol nor the will to show off on social media could excuse , he said in a statement , warning that “ violence against emergency services is not tolerated.
” The police were initially able to push back the crowd using pepper spray , but tensions escalated quickly , said the statement .
Several hundred people pushed police back by throwing stones , bottles and other objects from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were damaged , and nine reported looting .
12 police patrol cars were “ massively damaged , ” said the government statement .
Police say they have arrested 24 suspected rioters , about half of which are German .
19 officers have also been injured , with one “ unable to continue working ” due to a sustained hand injury .
Those involved in the violence were not politically motivated , the police said .
The police said the violence was caused by people partying , and others looking for a fight .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ brutal outbreak of violence ” , adding that “ criminal acts against people and property should be prosecuted and condemned ” .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Good Old France – No More • ‘ Nothing To See Here ’ : French Police Arrest Nobody As Chechen And Arab Gangs Clash In Dijon

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On June 20th and 21st, riots took place in the German city of Stuttgart.
It all began when police started carrying out drug checks at the city’s main square, Schlossplatz.
Eyewitnesses said that everything escalated after a teen tried to run away from the police and officers chased him. At that moment, partiers from other groups stepped in “out of solidarity” with the teen and began attacking police.
The city of Stuttgart was rocked by unprecedented violence last night after hundreds of youths rioted and attacked police, injuring dozens of officers. Piles of glass have been swept up outside of shops and with their broken windows boarded up. pic.twitter.com/yyiNxWgV99 — Rebecca Staudenmaier (@restaudenmaier) June 21, 2020
An estimated 500 people, many of them teens or young adults, were involved. Twenty-four suspects were eventually arrested.
Stuttgart Mayor Fritz Kuhn condemned the riots, calling the violence “unacceptable,” and reiterating his support for law enforcement. The riots had crossed a line that neither alcohol nor the will to show off on social media could excuse, he said in a statement, warning that “violence against emergency services is not tolerated.”
“Stuttgart is fully behind the police,” said Mayor Kuhn in the statement. “There is no getting used to such an outbreak.”
The police were initially able to push back the crowd using pepper spray, but tensions escalated quickly, said the statement.
Several hundred people pushed police back by throwing stones, bottles and other objects from construction sites.
At least 30 stores were damaged, and nine reported looting. 12 police patrol cars were “massively damaged,” said the government statement.
“Vehicles were hit with poles, posts and windows were smashed,” the police said.
Police say they have arrested 24 suspected rioters, about half of which are German. 19 officers have also been injured, with one “unable to continue working” due to a sustained hand injury.
Those involved in the violence were not politically motivated, the police said.
“We can rule out a left-wing political or any political motivation for these acts of violence,” said Franz Lutz, the Stuttgart police commissioner.
The police said the violence was caused by people partying, and others looking for a fight.
State premier Winfried Kretschmann spoke of a “brutal outbreak of violence”, adding that “criminal acts against people and property should be prosecuted and condemned”.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Locations Of US Carrier Strike Groups – June 22, 2020

This is the newst update of the ‘ U.S .
Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map ’ exclusive series showing the @ @ @ @ @ Strike Groups .
SouthFront : Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using @ @ @ @ @ No classified information was used in production of the map .
Carrier strike group ( @ @ @ @ @ formation of the United States Navy .
It is centered on an aircraft carrier and @ @ @ @ @ CVW ) of 65 to 70 aircrafts .
It ’ s composed of roughly 7,500 @ @ @ @ @ , at least one cruiser , a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or @ @ @ @ @ group also , on occasion , includes submarines , attached logistics ships and a supply @ @ @ @ @ comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world ’ s oceans .
@ @ @ @ @

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This is the newst update of the ‘U.S. Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map’ exclusive series showing the approximate locations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups. SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using the available open-source information. No classified information was used in production of the map.
Carrier strike group (CSG) is an operational formation of the United States Navy. It is centered on an aircraft carrier and a carrier air wing (CVW) of 65 to 70 aircrafts. It’s composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates. A carrier strike group also, on occasion, includes submarines, attached logistics ships and a supply ship. Carrier strike groups comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world’s oceans.
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southfront--2020-06-22--Turkey And Its Proxies React To Egypt’s Warning That It Is Prepared To Intervene In Libya

The announcement by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi that Egypt will intervene militarily in Libya if the GNA captures the city of Sirte or the Jufra air base has drawn responses from across the region .
Most importantly , the warning has been dismissed by the GNA and Turkey .
If they do not relent on their attacks on the two cities , they will push Egypt into a corner from which its only feasible option is a massive military intervention to prevent its arch enemy of recent years , Turkey , from gaining a major presence along the extensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported earlier , the Egyptian president announced on Saturday that “ any direct interference from Egypt [ in Libya ] has now acquired international legitimacy , either with the right to self-defence or at the request of the only legitimate elected authority in Libya , which is the House of Representatives [ based in Tobruk ] .
” He further stated that although Egypt did not want to intervene in Libya and generally favoured a political solution , “ the situation now is different.
” Speaking at a military base near the Libyan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some Libyan tribal leaders , Sisi said that “ If the Libyan people moved through you and asked us to intervene , this would be a signal to the world that Egypt and Libya are one country , one interest.
” He said Egypt is ready to provide arms and training for Libyan tribes to “ defend their country.
” He told tribal representatives attending his speech that if Egypt were to intervene , its forces would advance with tribal leaders at the vanguard .
LINK There were diverse responses to the Egyptian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The reported of the announcement : President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt warned on Saturday that his army is ready for intervention in Libya if the Turkey-backed forces of the internationally recognized Libyan government in Tripoli cross the ‘ ‘ red line ’ ’ of Sirte and Jufra airbase .
Libyan media quoted a spokesman for the Egyptian presidency said that any direct intervention from Egypt in Libya “ has become internationally legitimate , whether within the framework of the United Nations Charter ( the right to self-defence ) , or based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Libyan people ( the House of Representatives ) .
” Khalifa Haftar ’ s eastern-based Libyan National Army ( LNA ) is currently holding the battle line at Sirte 256 km east of Misrata and 549 km west of Benghazi… Sisi said that Egypt did not want to intervene in Libya and favoured a political solution .
Sisi called for the withdrawal of all “ foreign powers ” from Libya , and called on the two warring Libyan parties in Libya to respect the frontline and return to talks .
Sisi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saleh and LNA commander Khalifa Hafter , had on 6 June launched a ceasefire initiative in Cairo .
Whilst this was met with general approval , Tripoli and Turkey had rejected it .
Tripoli insists it is internationally recognized Libyan government and so has the legitimacy to rule all Libyan territory .
It insists there can only be a ceasefire if Hafter ’ s forces withdraw from Sirte , Jufra and the eastern oil crescent .
More practically , the current ceasefire line means three-quarters of Libya ’ s oil production lies within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Hafter ’ s forces .
LINK The reported Sisi ’ s comments , and added as a final comment : Egypt has been intervening in Libya for over six years by providing Haftar with political and military support , let alone carrying out airstrikes in Benghazi , Derna and Tripoli in support of Haftar ’ s forces .
Meanwhile , many Egyptian opposition figures ridiculed the Egyptian regime for the announcements of the death of soldiers in Sinai at the time of Tripoli offensive , which they say have stopped after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quoted Turkey ’ s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu as saying on Saturday ( 20 June ) that the LNA has lost the chance to engage in a political solution to the conflict because its commander Khalifa Haftar ignored previous calls for a peaceful solution .
However , other reports suggested that Turkey would consider a ceasefire , but on the condition that the LNA withdraw from Sirte and Jufra .
The call by Egypt earlier this month for a cease-fire in Libya as part of an initiative which also proposed an elected leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ received by the United States , Russia and the UAE .
However , Turkey dismissed it as an attempt to save Haftar from defeat following his battlefield losses .
reported that the ceasefire offer has been rejected by the GNA and Turkey , which responded by demanding that the LNA withdraw from Sirte : Al Jazeera ’ s Malik Traina , reporting from the Libyan city of Misrata , said el-Sisi ’ s remarks on Saturday were largely ignored by the GNA and its forces .
“ A GNA military commander we spoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and that they will enter Sirte .
It ’ s important to note that these are forces know the territory well , ” Traina said .
Meanwhile , Egypt ’ s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on Sunday told the Saudi-based Al Arabiya TV his country prioritised a political solution to the conflict , adding that the GNA misinterpreted el-Sisi ’ s comments… Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have expressed their support for the Egyptian president ’ s statements .
“ Saudi Arabia stands by and supports Egypt on the right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Saudi Arabia official news agency said in a statement .
Additionally , the UAE foreign ministry said it supports all actions by Egypt to ensure its stability and security .
LINK The developments passed largely unnoticed in Israel , not managing to push multiple reports and analysis of the existential threats posed by Iran , or the most recent spat between Bolton and Trump , from the main international news headlines , although the included a couple of reports syndicated from other agencies .
MORE ON THE TOPIC • Al Sisi says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vows to protect Sirte al Jufra • A reconsideration of domestic challenges to achieving a peaceful settlement in Libya

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The announcement by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi that Egypt will intervene militarily in Libya if the GNA captures the city of Sirte or the Jufra air base has drawn responses from across the region. Most importantly, the warning has been dismissed by the GNA and Turkey. If they do not relent on their attacks on the two cities, they will push Egypt into a corner from which its only feasible option is a massive military intervention to prevent its arch enemy of recent years, Turkey, from gaining a major presence along the extensive border with Libya.
As it was reported earlier, the Egyptian president announced on Saturday that “any direct interference from Egypt [in Libya] has now acquired international legitimacy, either with the right to self-defence or at the request of the only legitimate elected authority in Libya, which is the House of Representatives [based in Tobruk].” He further stated that although Egypt did not want to intervene in Libya and generally favoured a political solution, “the situation now is different.”
Speaking at a military base near the Libyan border, before an audience that included some Libyan tribal leaders, Sisi said that
“If the Libyan people moved through you and asked us to intervene, this would be a signal to the world that Egypt and Libya are one country, one interest.” He said Egypt is ready to provide arms and training for Libyan tribes to “defend their country.” He told tribal representatives attending his speech that if Egypt were to intervene, its forces would advance with tribal leaders at the vanguard. LINK
There were diverse responses to the Egyptian president’s announcement in Libya itself. The Libya Herald reported of the announcement:
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt warned on Saturday that his army is ready for intervention in Libya if the Turkey-backed forces of the internationally recognized Libyan government in Tripoli cross the ‘‘red line’’ of Sirte and Jufra airbase. Libyan media quoted a spokesman for the Egyptian presidency said that any direct intervention from Egypt in Libya “has become internationally legitimate, whether within the framework of the United Nations Charter (the right to self-defence), or based on the sole legitimate authority elected by the Libyan people (the House of Representatives).” Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) is currently holding the battle line at Sirte 256 km east of Misrata and 549 km west of Benghazi… Sisi said that Egypt did not want to intervene in Libya and favoured a political solution. Sisi called for the withdrawal of all “foreign powers” from Libya, and called on the two warring Libyan parties in Libya to respect the frontline and return to talks. Sisi, together with House of Representatives head Ageela Saleh and LNA commander Khalifa Hafter, had on 6 June launched a ceasefire initiative in Cairo. Whilst this was met with general approval, Tripoli and Turkey had rejected it. Tripoli insists it is the internationally recognized Libyan government and so has the legitimacy to rule all Libyan territory. It insists there can only be a ceasefire if Hafter’s forces withdraw from Sirte, Jufra and the eastern oil crescent. More practically, the current ceasefire line means three-quarters of Libya’s oil production lies within the eastern oil crescent under the control of Hafter’s forces. LINK
The Libya Observer reported Sisi’s comments, and added as a final comment:
Egypt has been intervening in Libya for over six years by providing Haftar with political and military support, let alone carrying out airstrikes in Benghazi, Derna and Tripoli in support of Haftar’s forces. Meanwhile, many Egyptian opposition figures ridiculed the Egyptian regime for the announcements of the death of soldiers in Sinai at the time of Tripoli offensive, which they say have stopped after the fighting has ended. LINK
Media reports quoted Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu as saying on Saturday (20 June) that the LNA has lost the chance to engage in a political solution to the conflict because its commander Khalifa Haftar ignored previous calls for a peaceful solution.
“On the contrary, he increased his aggression,” Cavusoglu said in a televised news conference. “He’s losing, he’s doomed to lose,” he added. “It’s impossible for him to win. He had an opportunity for a political process. He lost that as well.”
However, other reports suggested that Turkey would consider a ceasefire, but on the condition that the LNA withdraw from Sirte and Jufra.
The call by Egypt earlier this month for a cease-fire in Libya as part of an initiative which also proposed an elected leadership council for the country was generally well received by the United States, Russia and the UAE. However, Turkey dismissed it as an attempt to save Haftar from defeat following his battlefield losses.
Al Jazeera reported that the ceasefire offer has been rejected by the GNA and Turkey, which responded by demanding that the LNA withdraw from Sirte:
Al Jazeera’s Malik Traina, reporting from the Libyan city of Misrata, said el-Sisi’s remarks on Saturday were largely ignored by the GNA and its forces. “A GNA military commander we spoke to earlier said their forces are adamant and that they will enter Sirte. It’s important to note that these are forces know the territory well,” Traina said. Meanwhile, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on Sunday told the Saudi-based Al Arabiya TV his country prioritised a political solution to the conflict, adding that the GNA misinterpreted el-Sisi’s comments… Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have expressed their support for the Egyptian president’s statements. “Saudi Arabia stands by and supports Egypt on the right to protect its borders and people,” Saudi Arabia official news agency said in a statement. Additionally, the UAE foreign ministry said it supports all actions by Egypt to ensure its stability and security. LINK
Al Monitor reported of the developments:
The GNA denounced Sisi’s warning, saying any intervention would be a threat to Libya’s security. “We strongly reject what was said by al-Sisi and consider it a continuation of the war on the Libyan people, interference in Libyan affairs and a dangerous threat to national security,” said Mohammed Amari Zayed, a member of the GNA’s presidential council. “There can be no ‘red line’ within our borders. We reject any bid aimed at dividing the Libyan people or their territory… (and) we categorically reject any bid to impose guardianship on Libya,” he added. Earlier on Saturday, the GNA said it will boycott talks on the Libyan conflict to be held by Arab League’s foreign ministers next week. Foreign Minister Mohamad Taher Siala told the bloc’s executive council that the planned meeting would “merely deepen the rift” between Arab governments on the conflict, his ministry said. Turkey also vowed to continue supporting the GNA’s push for Sirte and demanded the evacuation of Haftar’s forces from the city for a “sustainable ceasefire.” …Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin told AFP in an interview that a ceasefire in Libya would be possible if Haftar’s forces withdrew from Sirte and Al-Jufra. “It should be a sustainable ceasefire, meaning that the other side, the LNA (Libyan National Army), should not be in a position to launch another attack on the legitimate Libyan government any time it wants,” Kalin told AFP in an interview in Istanbul. LINK
The developments passed largely unnoticed in Israel, not managing to push multiple reports and analysis of the existential threats posed by Iran, or the most recent spat between Bolton and Trump, from the main international news headlines, although the Jerusalem Post included a couple of reports syndicated from other agencies.
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southfront--2020-06-22--International Atomic Energy Agency Claims Iran May Be Holding Undeclared Nuclear Materials

The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a declassified letter released on Friday ( 19 June ) that earlier this year it had “ identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations in Iran that had not been declared by Iran.
” The agency requested “ clarifications ” from Iran several times regarding Iran ’ s nuclear activities , including its stockpiles of uranium and whether it had engaged in research and development of nuclear processes .
However , Iran refused to allow IAEA inspectors access to several locations where it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be ongoing .
Iran replied to the claims saying it does “ not recognize any allegation on past activities and does not consider itself obliged to respond to such allegations.
” The IAEA letter claims that the agency “ continued to request clarifications and access , ” though by early March Iran still had not allowed access to the locations .
The IAEA claimed that Iran ’ s refusal to provide access to the sites as requested was “ adversely affecting the Agency ’ s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
” Iran has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , and has been subjected to a stringent series of inspections by IAEA inspectors that few if any other countries have been subjected to .
Beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , Iran also signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) , an agreement with China , France , Germany , Russia , the United Kingdom and the United States ) in July 2015 , which was subsequently endorsed by UN Security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The JCPOA established a range of additional limitations on Iran ’ s nuclear program along with extensive monitoring and verification measures in return for sanctions relief and economic cooperation .
In May 2018 , the United States announced its withdrawal from the agreement and subsequently reinstated U.S. sanctions on Iran .
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The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a declassified letter released on Friday (19 June) that earlier this year it had “identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations in Iran that had not been declared by Iran.”
The agency requested “clarifications” from Iran several times regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, including its stockpiles of uranium and whether it had engaged in research and development of nuclear processes.
However, Iran refused to allow IAEA inspectors access to several locations where it is thought that possible nuclear projects might be ongoing. Iran replied to the claims saying it does “not recognize any allegation on past activities and does not consider itself obliged to respond to such allegations.”
The IAEA letter claims that the agency “continued to request clarifications and access,” though by early March Iran still had not allowed access to the locations.
The IAEA claimed that Iran’s refusal to provide access to the sites as requested was “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and thereby to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.”
The IAEA adopted a resolution on Friday called on Iran to “fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency.” LINK
Iran has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has been subjected to a stringent series of inspections by IAEA inspectors that few if any other countries have been subjected to.
Beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran also signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) in July 2015, which was subsequently endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The JCPOA established a range of additional limitations on Iran’s nuclear program along with extensive monitoring and verification measures in return for sanctions relief and economic cooperation. In May 2018, the United States announced its withdrawal from the agreement and subsequently reinstated U.S. sanctions on Iran.
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southfront--2020-06-22--On Anniversary Of Downing U.S. RQ-4A Global Hawk, Iran Popularizes Its 3rd Khordad SAM System

On June 20th , Iran released footage of its 3rd Khordad SAM system .
This took place on the 1-year anniversary of when the country downed a US RQ-4A Global Hawk drone , allegedly over its airspace on June 20th , 2019 .
Footage is shown including shots of the production of anti-aircraft missiles and self-propelled gun mounts of this complex in Iran , as well as shots of various firing , including tests from one of the auxiliary ships of the IRGC , as well as from the actual downing of the RQ-4A Global Hawk .
Iranian Air Force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be receiving more and more air defense systems of this type and they are increasingly appearing on satellite images from different parts of Iran .
The version of the 3rd Khordad SAM below appears to be a modified , new one .
Judging by what the warhead of the missile looks like , it is very likely that this is an option with an infrared or thermal imaging homing head for using the system using only passive optoelectronic detection and guidance systems , or on the basis of a “ fire-and-forget ” principle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advanced and powerful Iranian medium-range air defense missile system .
It was officially displayed in 2016 .
It uses a 6×6 wheeled chassis , based on IVECO commercial truck , though with many design changes .
This air defense system contains an active phased array radar on top in the front part and three missiles behind it .
It is capable of reaching targets within range of up to 105 km and at an altitude of up to 30 km altitude .
At least 3 battalions of 3rd Khordad are active .
Each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Radar ) can detect 100 targets at once .
It can engage 4 targets simultaneously and guide 2 missiles on each target .
A battery contains 1 TELAR and 2 TEL vehicles .
Thus , a single battery has 9 ready-to-fire missiles .
A battalion has 4 batteries with 4 TELARs and 8 TELs and can engage 16 targets simultaneously .
Each battalion additionally includes a Bashir S-band 3D phased array surveillance radar which has a detection range of 350 km .
The battalion also has a command and control ( C2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chassis .
The C2 unit provides communication between Sevom Khordad batteries .
Furthermore , the C2 unit can connect other air defense systems of the Raad family , including Raad and Tabas , into a single air defense network .
This allows to cover large area and targets can be engaged with a wide range of missiles from the cheapest Taer-1 missiles to the most capable Taer-2s .
This adds the capability of facing different types of threats with different types of interceptors .
In case of heavy jamming when even the X-band @ @ @ @ @ @ @ duty , the C2 unit can provide an additional data link , connecting the system to electro-optical engagement systems of Raad batteries , in order to guide missiles toward targets .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • On Brink Of War : What ’ s Going On After RQ-4A Global Hawk Shootdown ?

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On June 20th, Iran released footage of its 3rd Khordad SAM system.
This took place on the 1-year anniversary of when the country downed a US RQ-4A Global Hawk drone, allegedly over its airspace on June 20th, 2019.
Khordad #SAM TEL at #Natanz .
Even visible on #googleearth … but in a rather bad quality (as usual) pic.twitter.com/XIDF18twqQ — Tajo Takoya (@TajoTakoya) June 2, 2020
Footage is shown including shots of the production of anti-aircraft missiles and self-propelled gun mounts of this complex in Iran, as well as shots of various firing, including tests from one of the auxiliary ships of the IRGC, as well as from the actual downing of the RQ-4A Global Hawk.
Iranian Air Force Space Forces Air Defense Forces appear to be receiving more and more air defense systems of this type and they are increasingly appearing on satellite images from different parts of Iran.
The version of the 3rd Khordad SAM below appears to be a modified, new one. Judging by what the warhead of the missile looks like, it is very likely that this is an option with an infrared or thermal imaging homing head for using the system using only passive optoelectronic detection and guidance systems, or on the basis of a “fire-and-forget” principle.
3rd Khordad, is the most advanced and powerful Iranian medium-range air defense missile system. It was officially displayed in 2016. It uses a 6×6 wheeled chassis, based on IVECO commercial truck, though with many design changes.
This air defense system contains an active phased array radar on top in the front part and three missiles behind it. It is capable of reaching targets within range of up to 105 km and at an altitude of up to 30 km altitude. At least 3 battalions of 3rd Khordad are active.
Each 3rd Khordad TELAR (Transporter Erector Launcher and Radar) can detect 100 targets at once. It can engage 4 targets simultaneously and guide 2 missiles on each target.
A battery contains 1 TELAR and 2 TEL vehicles. Thus, a single battery has 9 ready-to-fire missiles.
A battalion has 4 batteries with 4 TELARs and 8 TELs and can engage 16 targets simultaneously. Each battalion additionally includes a Bashir S-band 3D phased array surveillance radar which has a detection range of 350 km.
The battalion also has a command and control (C2) unit, based on IVECO truck chassis. The C2 unit provides communication between Sevom Khordad batteries. Furthermore, the C2 unit can connect other air defense systems of the Raad family, including Raad and Tabas, into a single air defense network.
This allows to cover large area and targets can be engaged with a wide range of missiles from the cheapest Taer-1 missiles to the most capable Taer-2s.
This adds the capability of facing different types of threats with different types of interceptors. In case of heavy jamming when even the X-band engagement radar can’t handle its duty, the C2 unit can provide an additional data link, connecting the system to electro-optical engagement systems of Raad batteries, in order to guide missiles toward targets.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
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southfront--2020-06-22--New Study Dissects Development Of Russian Anti-Satellite Capabilities

A meticulously researched article recently appeared at The Space Review , documenting and dissecting the project history and likely capabilities of a new Russian laser system .
The analysis concludes that the Peresvet laser complex unveiled by President Putin in March 2018 has an anti-satellite role , and that the system is intended to conceal the movements of road-mobile ICBMs by temporarily dazzling or permanently blinding optical systems of enemy reconnaissance satellites .
While the study ’ s primary focus is the ground-based , mobile Peresvet laser system , it also reviews available information – from a quite staggering variety @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of defence procurement tenders and contracts to bank documents – concerning similar stationary and airborne systems with similar capabilities .
The author is suitably impressed by Russia ’ s achievements in the field , remarking that : Whatever the rationale for having at least three separate satellite dazzling/blinding systems , Russia clearly has a major interest in this type of directed energy counterspace technology , which has the advantage that it produces no space debris and may make it hard for the adversary to prove that its satellites have been affected or damaged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The country also seems to have invested in both ground-based and space-based electronic warfare systems against satellites , another type of non-destructive counterspace technology .
Still , all this has not stopped Russia from also developing more conventional kinetic ASAT weapons like the ground-launched Nudol and the air-launched Burevestnik systems .
Based on currently available information , it appears that the anti-satellite capabilities being developed by Russia are unmatched by any other nation ( or collective of nations , such as NATO ) , and has likely been motivated by the US @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular .
They are probably at least part of the reason why Russian President Vladimir Putin recently commented that he is not particularly concerned by the US ’ determination to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons as soon as possible .
In his State of the Union address in 2018 Putin announced the development of advanced weapons systems including nuclear powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles capable of penetrating US missile defence systems , and he also remarked that some laser weapons had already been deployed by the Russian Armed Forces , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The article posted by The Space Review elaborates at considerable depth on several of these projects .
With respect to the Peresvet system , it was revealed in a brief video accompanying Putin ’ s statements showing a laser mounted on a semi-trailer .
Later in 2018 the Ministry of Defence published another video featuring the Peresvet laser systems and stating that they were undergoing final preparations to enter combat duty .
From the brief footage of the shelters where they were located , by matching them with satellite imagery researchers managed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these bases are armed with the mobile Yars ICBMs , a three-stage solid fuel missile equipped with independently targetable warheads and with a range of up to 12,000km .
The conjecture that the primary purpose of the Peresvet laser system is to temporarily disable satellites is corroborated by an exhaustive examination of related documentation , including registered patents , defence contracts , corporate annual reports and bank documents .
Finally : In December 2018 , the Russian Ministry of Defense released another video of the trailer-mounted laser system on Facebook .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ experimental combat duty ” and could “ efficiently counter any aerial attack and even fight satellites in orbit , ” which was the first official acknowledgment that Peresvet has an ASAT capability .
The information was removed less than an hour after it appeared online , suggesting it was released by accident .
Late last year , the Chief of the General Staff of Russia ’ s Armed Forces Valeriy Gerasimov confirmed that Peresvet ’ s task is to “ conceal the movements ” of mobile missile systems .
[ 8 ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Peresvet had been declared operational at five missile divisions on December 1 , 2019 .
The Peresvet laser system is mounted on a KAMAZ-65225 tractor unit and a ChMZAP-99903 semi-trailer carrying several containers .
These units are called the technological container , environmental control container , equipment container , and support container .
The laser and its telescope are mounted in the aft container ( likely the “ equipment container ” ) , which has a sliding roof .
The videos also show several support vehicles accompanying the laser truck , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a command post and another to supply power to the laser .
The author identifies four of the deployed laser systems ’ ground support facilities from a review of contracts signed by the Ministry of Defence : the 54th Missile Division near Teykovo , the 39th Missile Division near Novosibirsk , the 35th Missile Division near Barnaul , and the 14th Missile Division near Yoshkar-Ola .
Last December Russian Deputy Defence Minister Aleksey Krivoruchko said that it is expected that the Peresvet system will be adapted so that it can be deployed on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been working on another system airborne laser system since 2002 , called Sokol-Eshelon , which is also thought to have ASAT capabilities and is carried on a modified Ilyushin-76MD transport aircraft .
One of the project ’ s designers stated that laser system was intended to “ counter air-based and space-based reconnaissance assets in the infrared part of the spectrum , ” an apparent reference to dazzling and/or blinding reconnaissance and guidance systems rather than being designed to destroy specific targets .
This requires lasers with much lower energy and is therefore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of laser selected for Sokol-Eshelon was a carbon monoxide laser .
Airborne laser ASAT systems are generally more flexible in the choice of targets and are less susceptible to adverse atmospheric conditions .
The current state of the project is unknown , and the author concludes that there is no connection between it and the Peresvet project , and raises the possibility that one of the systems may be intended as an anti-aircraft weapon , or even as a defence against enemy missiles .
In addition to the mobile and airborne variants , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capability to dazzle or blind satellite sensors at an optical/laser space surveillance facility in the North Caucasus .
The Kalina facility is located at the Krona complex , situated on the Chapal mountain near Storozhevaya , consists of a radar installation to identify satellites and categorize them .
Other documents related to the site however refer to it as a ‘ space security complex ’ and mention that it is involved in the development of ‘ laser systems for electro-optical warfare ’ , strongly suggesting it also has an ASAT role .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sokol-Eshelon and Kalina are clearly not point-defence systems like Peresvet , indicating their primary task may be blinding ( that is , permanently disabling ) rather than dazzling satellites .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • US strategic bombers trained for strikes on Russia when they were intercepted over the Black Sea • Apocalypse soon ?
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A meticulously researched article recently appeared at The Space Review, documenting and dissecting the project history and likely capabilities of a new Russian laser system. The analysis concludes that the Peresvet laser complex unveiled by President Putin in March 2018 has an anti-satellite role, and that the system is intended to conceal the movements of road-mobile ICBMs by temporarily dazzling or permanently blinding optical systems of enemy reconnaissance satellites.
While the study’s primary focus is the ground-based, mobile Peresvet laser system, it also reviews available information – from a quite staggering variety of sources ranging from almost twenty years of defence procurement tenders and contracts to bank documents – concerning similar stationary and airborne systems with similar capabilities. The author is suitably impressed by Russia’s achievements in the field, remarking that:
Whatever the rationale for having at least three separate satellite dazzling/blinding systems, Russia clearly has a major interest in this type of directed energy counterspace technology, which has the advantage that it produces no space debris and may make it hard for the adversary to prove that its satellites have been affected or damaged as the result of a hostile act. The country also seems to have invested in both ground-based and space-based electronic warfare systems against satellites, another type of non-destructive counterspace technology. Still, all this has not stopped Russia from also developing more conventional kinetic ASAT weapons like the ground-launched Nudol and the air-launched Burevestnik systems.
Based on currently available information, it appears that the anti-satellite capabilities being developed by Russia are unmatched by any other nation (or collective of nations, such as NATO), and has likely been motivated by the US’ growing fleet of military satellites in particular. They are probably at least part of the reason why Russian President Vladimir Putin recently commented that he is not particularly concerned by the US’ determination to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons as soon as possible.
In his State of the Union address in 2018 Putin announced the development of advanced weapons systems including nuclear powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles capable of penetrating US missile defence systems, and he also remarked that some laser weapons had already been deployed by the Russian Armed Forces, though he declined to provide further details.
The article posted by The Space Review elaborates at considerable depth on several of these projects. With respect to the Peresvet system, it was revealed in a brief video accompanying Putin’s statements showing a laser mounted on a semi-trailer. Later in 2018 the Ministry of Defence published another video featuring the Peresvet laser systems and stating that they were undergoing final preparations to enter combat duty. From the brief footage of the shelters where they were located, by matching them with satellite imagery researchers managed to pinpoint several of their locations:
The shelters were located at bases of the Strategic Missile Forces operating road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. More specifically, the shelters were seen at ICBM garrisons near Teykovo, Yoshkar-Ola, and Novosbirsk, with some of the imagery showing Peresvet laser trucks parked outside.
All of these bases are armed with the mobile Yars ICBMs, a three-stage solid fuel missile equipped with independently targetable warheads and with a range of up to 12,000km.
The author notes that:
The discovery that the laser trucks were based at ICBM sites made it possible to narrow down the possible objectives of Peresvet. Most analysts agreed that it was probably not powerful enough to physically destroy targets, but was designed to damage optical systems of vehicles trying to attack or image mobile ICBMs: aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, or satellites. The latter were considered by many to be the most likely targets for Peresvet.
The conjecture that the primary purpose of the Peresvet laser system is to temporarily disable satellites is corroborated by an exhaustive examination of related documentation, including registered patents, defence contracts, corporate annual reports and bank documents. Finally:
In December 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defense released another video of the trailer-mounted laser system on Facebook. The accompanying statement said that Peresvet had entered “experimental combat duty” and could “efficiently counter any aerial attack and even fight satellites in orbit,” which was the first official acknowledgment that Peresvet has an ASAT capability. The information was removed less than an hour after it appeared online, suggesting it was released by accident. Late last year, the Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces Valeriy Gerasimov confirmed that Peresvet’s task is to “conceal the movements” of mobile missile systems.[8] Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced somewhat later that Peresvet had been declared operational at five missile divisions on December 1, 2019.
The Peresvet laser system is mounted on a KAMAZ-65225 tractor unit and a ChMZAP-99903 semi-trailer carrying several containers. These units are called the technological container, environmental control container, equipment container, and support container. The laser and its telescope are mounted in the aft container (likely the “equipment container”), which has a sliding roof. The videos also show several support vehicles accompanying the laser truck, at least one of which is used as a command post and another to supply power to the laser.
The author identifies four of the deployed laser systems’ ground support facilities from a review of contracts signed by the Ministry of Defence: the 54th Missile Division near Teykovo, the 39th Missile Division near Novosibirsk, the 35th Missile Division near Barnaul, and the 14th Missile Division near Yoshkar-Ola.
Last December Russian Deputy Defence Minister Aleksey Krivoruchko said that it is expected that the Peresvet system will be adapted so that it can be deployed on ‘an airborne carrier’. Russia has been working on another system airborne laser system since 2002, called Sokol-Eshelon, which is also thought to have ASAT capabilities and is carried on a modified Ilyushin-76MD transport aircraft.
One of the project’s designers stated that laser system was intended to “counter air-based and space-based reconnaissance assets in the infrared part of the spectrum,” an apparent reference to dazzling and/or blinding reconnaissance and guidance systems rather than being designed to destroy specific targets. This requires lasers with much lower energy and is therefore less expensive and complex. The type of laser selected for Sokol-Eshelon was a carbon monoxide laser.
Airborne laser ASAT systems are generally more flexible in the choice of targets and are less susceptible to adverse atmospheric conditions. The current state of the project is unknown, and the author concludes that there is no connection between it and the Peresvet project, and raises the possibility that one of the systems may be intended as an anti-aircraft weapon, or even as a defence against enemy missiles.
In addition to the mobile and airborne variants, Russia has been developing a stationary ground-based capability to dazzle or blind satellite sensors at an optical/laser space surveillance facility in the North Caucasus. The Kalina facility is located at the Krona complex, situated on the Chapal mountain near Storozhevaya, consists of a radar installation to identify satellites and categorize them. Other documents related to the site however refer to it as a ‘space security complex’ and mention that it is involved in the development of ‘laser systems for electro-optical warfare’, strongly suggesting it also has an ASAT role.
The current status of Kalina is unknown. Sokol-Eshelon and Kalina are clearly not point-defence systems like Peresvet, indicating their primary task may be blinding (that is, permanently disabling) rather than dazzling satellites.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront