southfront--2020-04-29--Sea Hunter Autonomous Unmanned Surface Vehicle (Infographics)

The Sea Hunter is an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle developed and launhed as part of the DARPA Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel ( ACTUV ) program .
The U.S. Navy christened the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) developed autonomous surface vessel , named Sea Hunter , in Portland , Oregon on April 8th .
The vessel was moved on a barge to Naval Base San Diego , and extensive sea trials , planned to last two years , began May 2nd .
The vessel ’ s mission is to test the feasibility of a fully autonomous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently has accommodation for a small crew , who will be traveling on the vessel and conducting a multitude of tests .
The vessel has a length overall of 132 feet , and has a trimaran hull design .
It is reported that the vessel has a top speed of 27 knots .
While the hull design does not have the maneuverability of a mono-hull , it benefits from increased stability in a seaway .
DARPA partnered with Virginia-based Leidos , to develop the Anti-submarine Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel ( ACTUV ) program @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ACTUV concept envisions a fully-autonomous drone ship that can stay at sea for months at a time , without need of replenishment , and has an effective range of 10,000 nautical miles .
The main mission of the vessel would be to detect and track submarines , and possibly conduct mine-countermeasures missions .
The vessel will use a combination of new and proven technologies , such as GPS , advanced radars and sonar , to navigate the vessel , to acquire and track targets , and to develop an artificial sense of situational @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in accordance with the International Regulations to Prevent Collisions at Sea ( COLREGS ) .
In order to gain full autonomous capability , the vessel must be capable of operating in a safe manner and in accordance with all laws governing safe navigation at sea .
It is hoped that the two year training program will provide the insight and practical experience that will lead to full autonomy .
There are many hurdles that need to be overcome to take the Sea Hunter from concept to reality .
It is one thing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vessel to operate at sea , well away from coastal waters , but another thing all together for the vessel to be able to operate independently in high traffic areas .
It may end up being more feasible to retain the ability for human piloting of the vessel during arrival and departure from harbors and coastal waterways , transitioning to unmanned operation in open oceans .
As any naval officer or merchant mariner knows , the sea is a very unforgiving and unpredictable environment , and the difference between survival and tragedy often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and instincts that are honed in an individual over time .
Without the ability to learn , can a robot vessel hope to survive in the unpredictable environment of the high seas , let alone avoid accidents presented by man-made and natural hazards to navigation ?
There are many benefits of a high endurance naval platform that can detect and then track foreign submarines for an extended period of time , while requiring no replenishment , and that also incurs only a fraction of the cost of a traditional ASW surface combatant .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ACTUV in early development .
Considering that ASW warfare is an art as much as a science , and that human nature ( stealth , strategy , gambits , bluff ) and the relative human deductive reasoning associated with such behavior , are outside of the capability of autonomous drone capabilities ( or are they ? )
, it remains to be seen how effective the ACTUV will be in this naval warfare realm .
Perhaps , mine countermeasures ( MCM ) warfare is a more apt role for the ACTUV platform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasingly more complex and intelligent than ever , they do not have a human intelligence component like a submarine does .
An autonomous robot will have a greater degree of success detecting and countering a similar intelligence and will remove the human component from the inherently dangerous task of mine deactivation , removal and disposal .
It is easy to envision an ACTUV employing smaller “ suicide ” drones to fool advanced naval mines into attacking them and thus removing the mines as a threat to manned vessels .
Even as an MCM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , after the main naval engagement has been fought and naval mines need to be engaged and disposed of , this is a viable role for the ACTUV .
The potential number of human lives saved is well worth the $ 20 million USD per unit price tag estimated for the naval drone .
As has been the case with most U.S. military programs over the past twenty years , the cost will most likely increase substantially .
Not long after viable drone technology became common place on the battle fields of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the technology present themselves .
The more removed from the act of killing humans become , the easier the act becomes , and the less human emotional impulses to refrain from such abhorrent behavior hold sway in prohibiting such acts .
The most reprehensible and vile of all human acts , regardless of the circumstances and the intent , is the taking of other human life .
When technology allows humanity to absolve itself of the act of killing , through physical and spatial separation , there is a real danger that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to bear , and thus to absolve in the minds of men .
There are no present plans to arm the Sea Hunter ; however , with the move toward a completely autonomous robot vessel , the very real problem of responsibility and accountability presents itself .
Who is accountably for the damage to property and/or the loss of life that may result from a collision at sea ?
In a maritime law case , who can stand witness for the Sea Hunter ?
Would the recorded track and alterations to course steered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s “ memory ” be legally admissible in court ?
Could this recorded data be open to manipulation after the fact , to absolve the government of wrong doing and of legal responsibility ?
These are all considerations that must be weighed when considering the ethical ramifications of this technology .
Additionally , whenever new technologies are invented and utilized , so too are the means to circumvent or defeat them .
Talented computer hackers have increasingly exhibited their proficiency at hacking the most high-tech and encrypted systems , whether they be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ systems .
Sea Hunter is no different in concept .
It is easy to imagine the damage that could be inflicted by hijacking even an unarmed Sea Hunter .
Any ill-intentioned party could hijack such a vessel and steer it at full speed into a cruise ship .
If the autonomous vessel was armed , the outcome of such an event could be horrible .
Perhaps , in an attempt to steer attention away from the military applications and the accompanying controversy of the Sea Hunter , DARPA was quick to harp on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vessels .
It was hinted that the technology could usher in a new era of crew-less merchant vessels .
If the technology proves practicable , could containerships and tankers eventually ply the high seas absent costly crews ?
This would remove the highest overhead cost for ocean carriers other than fuel .
Once again , practical and ethical concerns present themselves when considering this technology for commercial application .
Can an autonomous system truly replace human intuition , judgement and experience in a profession such as the merchant marine ?
If this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ethical ramifications of replacing thousands of international merchant mariners with autonomous systems .
How will these people find replacement employment ?
What will become of the thousands of years of learned human experience , culture , and tradition of maritime science and art that was perfected by humanity over such a long period of time ?
As humanity devises greater technological accomplishments , mankind must struggle with the ethical implications inherent in such progress .
Without a doubt , a large , international audience that will be watching the progress of the Sea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
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The Sea Hunter is an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle developed and launhed as part of the DARPA Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program.
DARPA’s Sea Hunter: The Future of Anti-Submarine Warfare? (6.05.2016):
The U.S. Navy christened the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed autonomous surface vessel, named Sea Hunter, in Portland, Oregon on April 8th. The vessel was moved on a barge to Naval Base San Diego, and extensive sea trials, planned to last two years, began May 2nd. The vessel’s mission is to test the feasibility of a fully autonomous drone surface vessel.
The Sea Hunter currently has accommodation for a small crew, who will be traveling on the vessel and conducting a multitude of tests. The vessel has a length overall of 132 feet, and has a trimaran hull design. It is reported that the vessel has a top speed of 27 knots. While the hull design does not have the maneuverability of a mono-hull, it benefits from increased stability in a seaway.
DARPA partnered with Virginia-based Leidos, to develop the Anti-submarine Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program and build the Sea Hunter. The ACTUV concept envisions a fully-autonomous drone ship that can stay at sea for months at a time, without need of replenishment, and has an effective range of 10,000 nautical miles. The main mission of the vessel would be to detect and track submarines, and possibly conduct mine-countermeasures missions.
The vessel will use a combination of new and proven technologies, such as GPS, advanced radars and sonar, to navigate the vessel, to acquire and track targets, and to develop an artificial sense of situational awareness so that the vessel can maneuver in accordance with the International Regulations to Prevent Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). In order to gain full autonomous capability, the vessel must be capable of operating in a safe manner and in accordance with all laws governing safe navigation at sea. It is hoped that the two year training program will provide the insight and practical experience that will lead to full autonomy.
There are many hurdles that need to be overcome to take the Sea Hunter from concept to reality. It is one thing to attain enough collision avoidance capability for the vessel to operate at sea, well away from coastal waters, but another thing all together for the vessel to be able to operate independently in high traffic areas. It may end up being more feasible to retain the ability for human piloting of the vessel during arrival and departure from harbors and coastal waterways, transitioning to unmanned operation in open oceans. As any naval officer or merchant mariner knows, the sea is a very unforgiving and unpredictable environment, and the difference between survival and tragedy often depends upon the good judgement, insight and instincts that are honed in an individual over time. Without the ability to learn, can a robot vessel hope to survive in the unpredictable environment of the high seas, let alone avoid accidents presented by man-made and natural hazards to navigation?
Anti-Submarine Warfare and Mine Countermeasures
There are many benefits of a high endurance naval platform that can detect and then track foreign submarines for an extended period of time, while requiring no replenishment, and that also incurs only a fraction of the cost of a traditional ASW surface combatant. This was the primary role envisioned for the ACTUV in early development. Considering that ASW warfare is an art as much as a science, and that human nature (stealth, strategy, gambits, bluff) and the relative human deductive reasoning associated with such behavior, are outside of the capability of autonomous drone capabilities (or are they?), it remains to be seen how effective the ACTUV will be in this naval warfare realm.
Perhaps, mine countermeasures (MCM) warfare is a more apt role for the ACTUV platform. Even though naval mines have become increasingly more complex and intelligent than ever, they do not have a human intelligence component like a submarine does. An autonomous robot will have a greater degree of success detecting and countering a similar intelligence and will remove the human component from the inherently dangerous task of mine deactivation, removal and disposal. It is easy to envision an ACTUV employing smaller “suicide” drones to fool advanced naval mines into attacking them and thus removing the mines as a threat to manned vessels. Even as an MCM vessel employed in a low threat environment, after the main naval engagement has been fought and naval mines need to be engaged and disposed of, this is a viable role for the ACTUV. The potential number of human lives saved is well worth the $20 million USD per unit price tag estimated for the naval drone. As has been the case with most U.S. military programs over the past twenty years, the cost will most likely increase substantially.
Ethical Considerations and Vulnerabilities
Not long after viable drone technology became common place on the battle fields of the world, did the ethical ramifications of the technology present themselves. The more removed from the act of killing humans become, the easier the act becomes, and the less human emotional impulses to refrain from such abhorrent behavior hold sway in prohibiting such acts. The most reprehensible and vile of all human acts, regardless of the circumstances and the intent, is the taking of other human life. When technology allows humanity to absolve itself of the act of killing, through physical and spatial separation, there is a real danger that a propensity to conduct such behavior becomes easier to bear, and thus to absolve in the minds of men.
There are no present plans to arm the Sea Hunter; however, with the move toward a completely autonomous robot vessel, the very real problem of responsibility and accountability presents itself. Who is accountably for the damage to property and/or the loss of life that may result from a collision at sea? In a maritime law case, who can stand witness for the Sea Hunter? Would the recorded track and alterations to course steered and engine speed/direction in the autonomous drone’s “memory” be legally admissible in court? Could this recorded data be open to manipulation after the fact, to absolve the government of wrong doing and of legal responsibility? These are all considerations that must be weighed when considering the ethical ramifications of this technology.
Additionally, whenever new technologies are invented and utilized, so too are the means to circumvent or defeat them. Talented computer hackers have increasingly exhibited their proficiency at hacking the most high-tech and encrypted systems, whether they be information storage, communication or drone control systems. Sea Hunter is no different in concept. It is easy to imagine the damage that could be inflicted by hijacking even an unarmed Sea Hunter. Any ill-intentioned party could hijack such a vessel and steer it at full speed into a cruise ship. If the autonomous vessel was armed, the outcome of such an event could be horrible.
Non-Military Applications
Perhaps, in an attempt to steer attention away from the military applications and the accompanying controversy of the Sea Hunter, DARPA was quick to harp on the possible civil uses of autonomous surface vessels. It was hinted that the technology could usher in a new era of crew-less merchant vessels. If the technology proves practicable, could containerships and tankers eventually ply the high seas absent costly crews? This would remove the highest overhead cost for ocean carriers other than fuel.
Once again, practical and ethical concerns present themselves when considering this technology for commercial application. Can an autonomous system truly replace human intuition, judgement and experience in a profession such as the merchant marine? If this is theoretically possible, there are far reaching ethical ramifications of replacing thousands of international merchant mariners with autonomous systems. How will these people find replacement employment? What will become of the thousands of years of learned human experience, culture, and tradition of maritime science and art that was perfected by humanity over such a long period of time? As humanity devises greater technological accomplishments, mankind must struggle with the ethical implications inherent in such progress. Without a doubt, a large, international audience that will be watching the progress of the Sea Hunter closely over the next two years.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
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southfront--2020-04-29--OPCW Insiders Slam ‘Compromised’ New Syria Chemical Weapons Probe

Current and former staff members of the OPCW have denounced the organization ’ s IIT report alleging Syrian government sarin use at Ltamenah , criticizing its reliance on rumor , hearsay , “ scientifically flawed ” claims and the influence of unqualified , secret “ experts ” aligned with the Western-backed opposition .
Editor ’ s note : On April 8 , the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons released a report by its newly formed Investigation and Identification Team , a unit ostensibly established to identify alleged perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria .
The IIT investigation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ town of Ltamenah in March 2017 .
It concluded “ that there are reasonable grounds to believe ” that the Syrian army committed a sarin attack in two of the incidents , and a chlorine attack in the third .
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praised the IIT probe , calling it “ the latest in a large and growing body of evidence that the Assad regime uses chemical weapons attacks in Syria as part of a deliberate campaign of violence against the Syrian people .
The United States shares the OPCW @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo ’ s remarks and the ensuing U.S. media coverage across the spectrum is the crisis of credibility consuming the OPCW and its senior leadership .
The IIT report ’ s tenuous conclusion “ that there are reasonable grounds to believe ” the official version of events closely resembles the conclusion of an earlier OPCW report that is now the subject of major controversy and derision .
A series of leaks show that OPCW leaders suppressed the findings of inspectors who probed another much more consequential alleged Syrian chemical attack , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which triggered US airstrikes .
The evidence collected in Douma undermined allegations of Syrian government guilt and strongly suggested a staged event by the armed opposition .
Leaked internal OPCW emails and documents show that the Douma investigators protested the censorship of their findings , setting off an unfolding cover-up scandal that has called the OPCW ’ s impartiality into question .
The Grayzone has published a series of leaks from the OPCW ’ s Douma scandal , and plans to reveal new material that further undermines the official story .
The article @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OPCW ranks extends well beyond the Douma investigation .
Here , OPCW insiders offer a withering critique of the IIT report , blasting it as another hyper-politicized piece of bunk .
The Grayzone can verify that the authors represent the view of , at minimum , a small group of current and former OPCW officials who took part in its drafting and review .
We have read the first Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Investigation and Identification Team ( IIT ) April 2020 report on alleged chemical attacks at Ltamenah .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the IIT has been loyal to its raison d ’ être .
This has gone on for too long now .
What makes it worse is the IIT ’ s narrative has been presented to the world as a product of many peoples ’ work .
In fact , a number of impartial and principled professionals no longer wish to be associated with the politically motivated reports being issued by the OPCW FFM and now the IIT .
Many consider this work and these reports to be procedurally and scientifically flawed .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen as representing the work of OPCW inspectors at all .
The recent publication of the IIT report into alleged chemical attacks at Ltamenah on March 24 , 25 and 30 2017 , has highlighted again the misuse of the OPCW by influential state parties to further their political and foreign affairs objectives .
It was very clear to us during the creation and setup of the IIT that its intent was not to investigate alleged incidents of chemical attacks in Syria .
Instead , the team was created simply to find the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Its credibility was therefore compromised from its inception , and anyone who still thinks differently is either uninformed or naïve .
This first report of the IIT has clearly reinforced this fact .
First , it appears that the IIT investigation has conveniently glossed over the glaring technical weaknesses in the FFM reports .
Perhaps the best example of this , in one of the Ltamenah FFM reports , is the reporting by alleged witnesses claiming that the supposed munitions crater contained a “ black bubbling liquid ” that caused a burning sensation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persisted in the crater for days .
Many of the reported medical symptoms , too , had nothing to do with the possible presence of a nerve agent as alleged .
Similarly flawed , and unchallenged by the IIT , is the complete lack of understanding of physics and material properties in the acceptance of the alleged behavior of a chlorine cylinder .
But seeing as the IIT investigation was essentially an extension of the FFM reports , we take upon ourselves a responsibility to remind you of the technical weakness and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the IIT report .
What follows is a summary of the most obvious and detrimental flaws in the report : Before we go any further , let us admit we don ’ t understand the minds of the Syrian leadership .
Let ’ s assume that they were willing to risk everything , including perhaps their own survival , to escalate back to the “ red line ” of alleged chemical weapons usage ; to deliberately provide a reason for Western intervention and a justification for regime change .
Then let ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using sarin , a “ real ” chemical weapon that had been declared in their stockpile , for the first time since their accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention .
They did this by supposedly dropping a couple of sarin bombs on fields ; agricultural lands in the middle of nowhere .
Perhaps , for some reason we can not comprehend , they were deliberately thumbing their nose at Western powers .
They didn ’ t use sarin during the desperate times when they had their backs to the wall and were close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but for some reason chose a time when they were back in control .
And , since September 2015 , they had been receiving critical military support from the Russian Federation .
So they dropped chemical bombs despite a situation where , as a Russian officer reportedly explained to inspectors , his military command was working directly with the Syrians .
As he commented , “ Do you think we would be stupid enough to be sharing and coordinating airspace with the Syrians while they deploy chemical weapons from their aircraft in violation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important to us ?
” The question of motive figures squarely within the realm of criminal investigation .
Though this is not the usual line of work for OPCW inspectors , surely this questioning of motive must have been one of the fundamental starting points for the IIT investigation ?
Secondly , these March 2017 alleged chemical attacks ( and , it would later turn out , another sarin incident at Khan Sheikhoun on April 4 ) , happened shortly after the first high-profile OPCW inspections at the secretive military research facilities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SSRC ) facilities in Barzeh and Jamrayah .
Around this time , in the SSRC inspections and the work towards resolving issues described by the OPCW Declarations Assessment Team as “ inconsistencies ” in declarations submitted by the Syrians , delegations were aware the Syrians were putting in a substantial effort to clear up the headache of what they called “ the chemical dossier.
” Were they engaged in this hard work so that they could then drop a couple of sarin bombs to then guarantee they would galvanize the world against them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Opposition middlemen and the mishandling of evidence These issues have been debated ad nauseam , but the message appears to have fallen on deaf ears .
Surely it must be well understood by all readers now , that the foundation for the whole case is terminally fragile when no so-called “ fact-finder or investigator ” has even been to the alleged incident site .
That ’ s right , not one member of the IIT conducted a field investigation .
Literally everything in the case has been provided by the sworn enemies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces have brought all the so-called “ evidence ” for these allegations of chemical attacks , often in response to requests and guidance from the FFM , piecemeal over a period of months and years , to hand over to the FFM and IIT .
This handover has generally been at a safe location in Turkey .
The middlemen , representing some so-called NGOs that have been known to coordinate and coach the opposition groups and OPCW inspectors throughout the follow-up on these incidents , have reportedly been a couple of well-known British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ witness accounts , the soil samples , the metal fragments , the photographs and videos ; every item of so-called “ evidence ” had been provided by those who have everything to gain by implicating their enemies in a chemical attack .
So , to declare in the FFM reports that chain-of-custody on material and samples was strictly maintained “ after receipt of the items ” is quite simply laughable , and perhaps this meaningless excuse should better remain unsaid in the future .
It does little for the scientific reputation of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not the fault of the FFM or IIT , but it nonetheless puts them in a very weak position , where they need to start suggesting “ factual findings ” on the basis of circumstantial piecing-together and attempted corroboration of the narratives and items presented by the opposition forces .
If the bar for IIT findings hadn ’ t been set so conspicuously low , that of reporting “ there are reasonable grounds to believe ” that there had been a chemical attack , surely the whole case would have been dismissed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IIT ’ s experts come from ?
The OPCW has always operated on the principles of “ equitable geographic distribution ” .
This however does not apparently apply to missions where the outcomes are more important to the key Western delegations .
We see the composition of the IIT appears to reflect this bias , in that most of the investigators and analysts are of Western/NATO background .
But this is not the main point here .
There appears to be a hidden , more devious and sinister modus operandi at play .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , the JIM ( joint investigation mission ) , or the IIT have been self-contained in terms of military , scientific and/or engineering expertise .
The IIT is basically comprised of investigators without any background or expertise in chemistry , chemical weapons processes or technology , weapons systems or ballistics .
They are therefore completely reliant upon their “ approved ” list of experts , who are called upon to provide all the technical analysis required by the IIT .
One may innocently ask ; where do these experts come from ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western and NATO intelligence agencies , units , institutes , laboratories and individuals that have already become so heavily invested in “ proving ” the complicity of the Syrian government .
Their professional reputations are not at stake if they provide dubious advice , because they remain nameless , faceless “ experts.
” Therefore their findings are never subjected to any peer review .
One could argue that their insider reputation ( within the FFM , JIM and IIT fold ) is mainly enhanced by continuing to provide the desired goods to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is in itself perhaps sufficient to invalidate the working and conclusions of the IIT .
We have noted that the IIT has lent some credence to the question of “ staging ” in their first report .
Or so they appear to have done , with some convincing-sounding arguments about how and why they consider it unlikely that the alleged chemical attacks had been staged .
Upon closer examination , however , it is clear that the IIT report raises the topic of staging with the express purpose of dismissing it , again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts ” .
This represents another one of the more flawed scientific arguments in the IIT report .
Not much can be said about considerations of staging in the witness accounts and reports of medical treatment at hospitals , as these are essentially story-lines that can not be properly corroborated anyway , seeing as medical records were not available .
The main focus of the staging discussion , particularly in the cases of alleged use of sarin , thus relates to the items brought by opposition forces to hand over to the FFM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and gravel samples and metal fragments that were used , with advice from the IIT ’ s selected “ experts ” , to confirm their belief that the Syrian Arab Air Force had dropped M4000 aerial bombs containing sarin .
Never mind that taking seriously the handing over to the FFM of “ evidence ” by opposition forces – with some items delivered almost a year after the alleged incident – is somewhat dubious .
Let ’ s consider the staging possibilities .
Firstly , in evaluating the results of analysis on soil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported the “ sarin in question is consistent with the sarin of the stockpile and the production processes of the Syrian Arab Republic .
In particular , the IIT concluded that the chemical profile ( i.e.
, a collection of chemicals ) of the sarin used in Ltamenah on March 24 and 30 , 2017 strongly correlates to the chemical profile expected for sarin produced through a binary reaction in which the key binary component ( DF ) is manufactured via routes , as well as by using precursors and raw materials , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its sarin programme.
” This , if intended to support the assertion that Syrian sarin was implicated , or that staging by the use of “ spiking ” chemicals was unlikely , is bordering on ludicrous .
What possible reason could there be for the staging organizers , supporters ( or advisors ) to provide anything other than chemical samples carefully prepared by using the same precursors and sarin synthesis pathway as the well-known Syrian method ?
That chemistry has for many years been no secret ; it is universally known and ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the acid scavenger ) one of the “ standard ” ways of making sarin .
That immediately defeats the “ chemical marker ” argument presented by the IIT .
It is quite staggering that this argument has been taken seriously by any qualified or competent scientists .
Similarly , in the provision of metal fragments , there may well have been some work involved in sourcing the right bits and pieces to create a convincing scene .
There are chopped-up M4000 aerial bomb graveyards in a few locations in Syria , as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ munitions , part of the procedures required after they acceded to the Convention in late 2013 .
There is also the possibility of some bits and pieces of “ leftovers , ” perhaps also from exploded or non-functioning “ repurposed ” M4000 bombs .
( The Syrians had explained that some empty M4000 bombs , normally designed for chemical use , had prior to accession been taken away from the chemical arsenal , to be filled with high explosive for use as conventional munitions ) .
An inconvenience that would have precluded the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( assuming no intact and undeclared bombs were still around ) the bomb bodies had each been cut into three segments and the stirrers were cut up as part of the destruction of chemical weapons verified during the UN-OPCW Joint Mission .
This may be the explanation why in all three cases ( Ltamenah 24 and 30 March 2017 , and Khan Sheikhoun 4 April 2017 ) the only metal fragments in question were small scattered odds and ends .
So what happened to the main remaining parts of the bombs in such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scattered bits and pieces , representing a tiny part of the whole M4000 aerial bomb , all that were available for strategic placement by the opposition forces ( because that was all that was given to them ) – and thus all that was recovered despite their apparent diligence in scouting the area ?
It is well known that the relatively small burster charge on this type of munition does not shatter or vaporise the entire object ( as appears to be suggested by the IIT experts ) , and would not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isolated smallish fragments that are assessed as “ could have come from a M4000 aerial bomb ” .
That certainly smacks of staging ; seemingly effective but limited by the materials at hand .
One could argue that the IIT ’ s entire logic of staging is somewhat self-defeating , particularly it ’ s reasoning around the effort required and the lack of propaganda “ publicity ” for the opposition forces ( again , a line of argument raised by the IIT in their report ) .
If the staging was done by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , supported ( as has been alleged ) by Western agents , in order to provide a justification and perhaps prompt Western intervention , one would expect that the outcome that has been achieved with the IIT report has therefore been successful for both parties .
To recognize this , one only has to consider some of the renewed calls in the media for military intervention in Syria in the wake of the IIT report .
And if , as alleged – and , it seems , proven – Western NGOs and intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they would have provided the appropriate level of technical expertise to ensure the staging was successful ?
For example , looking at some other questionable “ compelling evidence ” , selecting or describing the type of crater required , and providing a fuse that had the appearance of having functioned “ normally , ” as of course this would all be reflected in the guidance , briefings and coordination provided to the opposition forces to give to the FFM .
One could even argue that the staging had elements of a self-contained loop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) Western/NATO experts being involved in setting up the scenario as those providing later assessments for the IIT .
Is that not a worthwhile endeavor in furthering the foreign policy agenda ?
It appears to have worked .
We found one rather disturbing comment , delivered almost as an aside , in the IIT report : “ The IIT obtained information that , in March 2017 , Shayrat airbase was used to store chemical weapons .
The IIT further obtained information that former members of the previously designated Branch 450 , a component @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chemical weapons programme responsible for storage , mixing , and filling of chemical weapons , including sarin , were present in Shayrat airbase in late March 2017.
” This passage is reminiscent of many previous throwaway accusations made at the political level .
It would be staggering , if true , that chemical weapons were being stored at Al-Shayrat .
Indeed , it could have been seen as close to a smoking gun .
But what level of credibility can we ascribe to such a comment ?
Did it come from US , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was it the product of a throwaway “ report ” provided by an OPCW delegate in The Hague ?
Is it “ incontrovertible evidence ” in the same way the supposedly clear evidence of proof of the now-discredited allegation of the Douma chemical attack was ?
We should perhaps take that comment of the IIT “ obtaining information ” as ranking alongside the credibility of similar intelligence reports leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq .
A flawed report is met with no scientific challenge The glaring weaknesses in the FFM and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the political bias , compromised “ evidence ” , lack of transparency , singular reliance upon only one side of the story ( the groups opposed to the Syrian government ) , and the flawed arguments on why staging would be “ too difficult ” for the opposition forces ; leads us to serious doubts about the conclusions in the IIT report .
Perhaps to the credit of the IIT members who argued against more definitive , stronger language in their report , what the IIT produced was the desired Western opinion about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stating that “ there are reasonable grounds to believe ” the official story , it could be argued , actually implies a 50/50 case in which there are similarly reasonable grounds “ not to believe ” it .
Perhaps , more accurately , it suggests that the IIT thought “ it ’ s not outside the realms of possibility ” that things occurred as suggested in the report , rather than the possibility that the incident had been staged .
But if the staging was considered unlikely , doesn ’ t it rank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of motive , of the Syrians galvanizing the world against them ( and angering their Russian supporters ) by dropping sarin bombs onto farmland ?
At the end of the day , we must be clear that this is little more than an expression of a one-sided opinion .
Unfortunately , lesser-informed elements encompassing practically all mainstream media outlets have interpreted the conclusion – the opinion – as fact .
True professionals prefer to stick to facts , so please don ’ t count us in .
It is most unfortunate that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , commentators , and the complicity of the mainstream media , has ensured that this flawed report is met with no scientific challenge whatsoever .
Such is the momentum of the prevailing Syria narrative that most of these aforementioned elements , being sufficiently delighted , have not bothered to read it .
We know there are many competent experts in forensics , chemistry and ballistics who would find the conclusions in the IIT report to be questionable .
The methodology and science of the Ltamenah IIT investigation should rather have been trusted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ internationally recognised scientists , investigators and weapons specialists , who would issue their assessment of the alleged chemical attacks in a transparent manner .
And , for the first time , the organization could have publicized the names and professional reputations of the “ experts ” behind their findings .

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Originally appeared on thegrayzone.com
Current and former staff members of the OPCW have denounced the organization’s IIT report alleging Syrian government sarin use at Ltamenah, criticizing its reliance on rumor, hearsay, “scientifically flawed” claims and the influence of unqualified, secret “experts” aligned with the Western-backed opposition.
By OPCW Insiders
Editor’s note: On April 8, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons released a report by its newly formed Investigation and Identification Team, a unit ostensibly established to identify alleged perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The IIT investigation examined three alleged incidents in the Syrian town of Ltamenah in March 2017. It concluded “that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the Syrian army committed a sarin attack in two of the incidents, and a chlorine attack in the third.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praised the IIT probe, calling it “the latest in a large and growing body of evidence that the Assad regime uses chemical weapons attacks in Syria as part of a deliberate campaign of violence against the Syrian people. The United States shares the OPCW’s conclusions.”
But missing from Pompeo’s remarks and the ensuing U.S. media coverage across the spectrum is the crisis of credibility consuming the OPCW and its senior leadership. The IIT report’s tenuous conclusion “that there are reasonable grounds to believe” the official version of events closely resembles the conclusion of an earlier OPCW report that is now the subject of major controversy and derision. A series of leaks show that OPCW leaders suppressed the findings of inspectors who probed another much more consequential alleged Syrian chemical attack, in the city of Douma in April 2018, which triggered US airstrikes.
The evidence collected in Douma undermined allegations of Syrian government guilt and strongly suggested a staged event by the armed opposition. Leaked internal OPCW emails and documents show that the Douma investigators protested the censorship of their findings, setting off an unfolding cover-up scandal that has called the OPCW’s impartiality into question.
The Grayzone has published a series of leaks from the OPCW’s Douma scandal, and plans to reveal new material that further undermines the official story. The article below reveals how the dissension within the OPCW ranks extends well beyond the Douma investigation.
Here, OPCW insiders offer a withering critique of the IIT report, blasting it as another hyper-politicized piece of bunk. The Grayzone can verify that the authors represent the view of, at minimum, a small group of current and former OPCW officials who took part in its drafting and review.
– Max Blumenthal and Aaron Maté, The Grayzone
We have read the first Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) April 2020 report on alleged chemical attacks at Ltamenah. We observe that, as expected, the IIT has been loyal to its raison d’être. This has gone on for too long now. What makes it worse is the IIT’s narrative has been presented to the world as a product of many peoples’ work.
In fact, a number of impartial and principled professionals no longer wish to be associated with the politically motivated reports being issued by the OPCW FFM and now the IIT. Many consider this work and these reports to be procedurally and scientifically flawed. Some of us believe they should not be seen as representing the work of OPCW inspectors at all.
The recent publication of the IIT report into alleged chemical attacks at Ltamenah on March 24, 25 and 30 2017, has highlighted again the misuse of the OPCW by influential state parties to further their political and foreign affairs objectives. It was very clear to us during the creation and setup of the IIT that its intent was not to investigate alleged incidents of chemical attacks in Syria. Instead, the team was created simply to find the Syrian government guilty of chemical attacks. Its credibility was therefore compromised from its inception, and anyone who still thinks differently is either uninformed or naïve. This first report of the IIT has clearly reinforced this fact.
First, it appears that the IIT investigation has conveniently glossed over the glaring technical weaknesses in the FFM reports. Perhaps the best example of this, in one of the Ltamenah FFM reports, is the reporting by alleged witnesses claiming that the supposed munitions crater contained a “black bubbling liquid” that caused a burning sensation on the skin, and that it persisted in the crater for days. Many of the reported medical symptoms, too, had nothing to do with the possible presence of a nerve agent as alleged. Similarly flawed, and unchallenged by the IIT, is the complete lack of understanding of physics and material properties in the acceptance of the alleged behavior of a chlorine cylinder.
But seeing as the IIT investigation was essentially an extension of the FFM reports, we take upon ourselves a responsibility to remind you of the technical weakness and the superficial reasoning that compromise the conclusions of the IIT report.
What follows is a summary of the most obvious and detrimental flaws in the report:
The question of motive
Before we go any further, let us admit we don’t understand the minds of the Syrian leadership. Let’s assume that they were willing to risk everything, including perhaps their own survival, to escalate back to the “red line” of alleged chemical weapons usage; to deliberately provide a reason for Western intervention and a justification for regime change. Then let’s say they took this wild risk by using sarin, a “real” chemical weapon that had been declared in their stockpile, for the first time since their accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. They did this by supposedly dropping a couple of sarin bombs on fields; agricultural lands in the middle of nowhere.
Really?
Perhaps, for some reason we cannot comprehend, they were deliberately thumbing their nose at Western powers. They didn’t use sarin during the desperate times when they had their backs to the wall and were close to being overrun by opposition groups; but for some reason chose a time when they were back in control. And, since September 2015, they had been receiving critical military support from the Russian Federation. So they dropped chemical bombs despite a situation where, as a Russian officer reportedly explained to inspectors, his military command was working directly with the Syrians. As he commented, “Do you think we would be stupid enough to be sharing and coordinating airspace with the Syrians while they deploy chemical weapons from their aircraft in violation of an international treaty that is very important to us?”
The question of motive figures squarely within the realm of criminal investigation. Though this is not the usual line of work for OPCW inspectors, surely this questioning of motive must have been one of the fundamental starting points for the IIT investigation?
Secondly, these March 2017 alleged chemical attacks (and, it would later turn out, another sarin incident at Khan Sheikhoun on April 4), happened shortly after the first high-profile OPCW inspections at the secretive military research facilities, the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) facilities in Barzeh and Jamrayah. Around this time, in the SSRC inspections and the work towards resolving issues described by the OPCW Declarations Assessment Team as “inconsistencies” in declarations submitted by the Syrians, delegations were aware the Syrians were putting in a substantial effort to clear up the headache of what they called “the chemical dossier.”
Were they engaged in this hard work so that they could then drop a couple of sarin bombs to then guarantee they would galvanize the world against them? One finds this hard to believe.
Opposition middlemen and the mishandling of evidence
These issues have been debated ad nauseam, but the message appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Surely it must be well understood by all readers now, that the foundation for the whole case is terminally fragile when no so-called “fact-finder or investigator” has even been to the alleged incident site. That’s right, not one member of the IIT conducted a field investigation. Literally everything in the case has been provided by the sworn enemies of the Syrian government.
The opposition forces have brought all the so-called “evidence” for these allegations of chemical attacks, often in response to requests and guidance from the FFM, piecemeal over a period of months and years, to hand over to the FFM and IIT. This handover has generally been at a safe location in Turkey.
The middlemen, representing some so-called NGOs that have been known to coordinate and coach the opposition groups and OPCW inspectors throughout the follow-up on these incidents, have reportedly been a couple of well-known British military figureheads. The narratives, the witness accounts, the soil samples, the metal fragments, the photographs and videos; every item of so-called “evidence” had been provided by those who have everything to gain by implicating their enemies in a chemical attack.
So, to declare in the FFM reports that chain-of-custody on material and samples was strictly maintained “after receipt of the items” is quite simply laughable, and perhaps this meaningless excuse should better remain unsaid in the future. It does little for the scientific reputation of the OPCW. One may argue that this is not the fault of the FFM or IIT, but it nonetheless puts them in a very weak position, where they need to start suggesting “factual findings” on the basis of circumstantial piecing-together and attempted corroboration of the narratives and items presented by the opposition forces.
If the bar for IIT findings hadn’t been set so conspicuously low, that of reporting “there are reasonable grounds to believe” that there had been a chemical attack, surely the whole case would have been dismissed at the start?
Where do the IIT’s experts come from?
The OPCW has always operated on the principles of “equitable geographic distribution”. This however does not apparently apply to missions where the outcomes are more important to the key Western delegations. We see the composition of the IIT appears to reflect this bias, in that most of the investigators and analysts are of Western/NATO background.
But this is not the main point here. There appears to be a hidden, more devious and sinister modus operandi at play. Neither the FFM (fact finding mission), the JIM (joint investigation mission), or the IIT have been self-contained in terms of military, scientific and/or engineering expertise.
The IIT is basically comprised of investigators without any background or expertise in chemistry, chemical weapons processes or technology, weapons systems or ballistics. They are therefore completely reliant upon their “approved” list of experts, who are called upon to provide all the technical analysis required by the IIT. One may innocently ask; where do these experts come from?
Very obviously, they represent the same Western and NATO intelligence agencies, units, institutes, laboratories and individuals that have already become so heavily invested in “proving” the complicity of the Syrian government. Their professional reputations are not at stake if they provide dubious advice, because they remain nameless, faceless “experts.” Therefore their findings are never subjected to any peer review. One could argue that their insider reputation (within the FFM, JIM and IIT fold) is mainly enhanced by continuing to provide the desired goods to the OPCW.
This one-sided array of experts is in itself perhaps sufficient to invalidate the working and conclusions of the IIT.
Behind-the-scenes “experts” and the staging argument
We have noted that the IIT has lent some credence to the question of “staging” in their first report. Or so they appear to have done, with some convincing-sounding arguments about how and why they consider it unlikely that the alleged chemical attacks had been staged. Upon closer examination, however, it is clear that the IIT report raises the topic of staging with the express purpose of dismissing it, again relying upon their battery of behind-the-scenes “experts”. This represents another one of the more flawed scientific arguments in the IIT report.
Not much can be said about considerations of staging in the witness accounts and reports of medical treatment at hospitals, as these are essentially story-lines that cannot be properly corroborated anyway, seeing as medical records were not available. The main focus of the staging discussion, particularly in the cases of alleged use of sarin, thus relates to the items brought by opposition forces to hand over to the FFM in Turkey. These are the soil and gravel samples and metal fragments that were used, with advice from the IIT’s selected “experts”, to confirm their belief that the Syrian Arab Air Force had dropped M4000 aerial bombs containing sarin.
Never mind that taking seriously the handing over to the FFM of “evidence” by opposition forces – with some items delivered almost a year after the alleged incident – is somewhat dubious. Let’s consider the staging possibilities.
Firstly, in evaluating the results of analysis on soil samples and metal fragments, the IIT reported the “sarin in question is consistent with the sarin of the stockpile and the production processes of the Syrian Arab Republic. In particular, the IIT concluded that the chemical profile (i.e., a collection of chemicals) of the sarin used in Ltamenah on March 24 and 30, 2017 strongly correlates to the chemical profile expected for sarin produced through a binary reaction in which the key binary component (DF) is manufactured via routes, as well as by using precursors and raw materials, pursued by the Syrian Arab Republic in its sarin programme.”
This, if intended to support the assertion that Syrian sarin was implicated, or that staging by the use of “spiking” chemicals was unlikely, is bordering on ludicrous. What possible reason could there be for the staging organizers, supporters (or advisors) to provide anything other than chemical samples carefully prepared by using the same precursors and sarin synthesis pathway as the well-known Syrian method? That chemistry has for many years been no secret; it is universally known and (apart from the use of hexamine as the acid scavenger) one of the “standard” ways of making sarin. That immediately defeats the “chemical marker” argument presented by the IIT. It is quite staggering that this argument has been taken seriously by any qualified or competent scientists.
Similarly, in the provision of metal fragments, there may well have been some work involved in sourcing the right bits and pieces to create a convincing scene. There are chopped-up M4000 aerial bomb graveyards in a few locations in Syria, as a result of their destruction of unfilled chemical munitions, part of the procedures required after they acceded to the Convention in late 2013. There is also the possibility of some bits and pieces of “leftovers,” perhaps also from exploded or non-functioning “repurposed” M4000 bombs. (The Syrians had explained that some empty M4000 bombs, normally designed for chemical use, had prior to accession been taken away from the chemical arsenal, to be filled with high explosive for use as conventional munitions).
An inconvenience that would have precluded the placement of larger parts, is that (assuming no intact and undeclared bombs were still around) the bomb bodies had each been cut into three segments and the stirrers were cut up as part of the destruction of chemical weapons verified during the UN-OPCW Joint Mission. This may be the explanation why in all three cases (Ltamenah 24 and 30 March 2017, and Khan Sheikhoun 4 April 2017) the only metal fragments in question were small scattered odds and ends.
So what happened to the main remaining parts of the bombs in such cases? In other words, were the scattered bits and pieces, representing a tiny part of the whole M4000 aerial bomb, all that were available for strategic placement by the opposition forces (because that was all that was given to them) – and thus all that was recovered despite their apparent diligence in scouting the area?
It is well known that the relatively small burster charge on this type of munition does not shatter or vaporise the entire object (as appears to be suggested by the IIT experts), and would not be expected to leave just a few isolated smallish fragments that are assessed as “could have come from a M4000 aerial bomb”. That certainly smacks of staging; seemingly effective but limited by the materials at hand.
One could argue that the IIT’s entire logic of staging is somewhat self-defeating, particularly it’s reasoning around the effort required and the lack of propaganda “publicity” for the opposition forces (again, a line of argument raised by the IIT in their report). If the staging was done by or on behalf of the opposition forces, supported (as has been alleged) by Western agents, in order to provide a justification and perhaps prompt Western intervention, one would expect that the outcome that has been achieved with the IIT report has therefore been successful for both parties. To recognize this, one only has to consider some of the renewed calls in the media for military intervention in Syria in the wake of the IIT report.
And if, as alleged – and, it seems, proven – Western NGOs and intelligence personnel were operating in Syria, surely they would have provided the appropriate level of technical expertise to ensure the staging was successful? For example, looking at some other questionable “compelling evidence”, selecting or describing the type of crater required, and providing a fuse that had the appearance of having functioned “normally,” as of course this would all be reflected in the guidance, briefings and coordination provided to the opposition forces to give to the FFM.
One could even argue that the staging had elements of a self-contained loop, with the same (or similar) Western/NATO experts being involved in setting up the scenario as those providing later assessments for the IIT. Is that not a worthwhile endeavor in furthering the foreign policy agenda? It appears to have worked.
Hearsay, rumor and information
We found one rather disturbing comment, delivered almost as an aside, in the IIT report: “The IIT obtained information that, in March 2017, Shayrat airbase was used to store chemical weapons. The IIT further obtained information that former members of the previously designated Branch 450, a component of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme responsible for storage, mixing, and filling of chemical weapons, including sarin, were present in Shayrat airbase in late March 2017.”
This passage is reminiscent of many previous throwaway accusations made at the political level. It would be staggering, if true, that chemical weapons were being stored at Al-Shayrat. Indeed, it could have been seen as close to a smoking gun.
But what level of credibility can we ascribe to such a comment? Did it come from US, British or French intelligence services? Or was it the product of a throwaway “report” provided by an OPCW delegate in The Hague? Is it “incontrovertible evidence” in the same way the supposedly clear evidence of proof of the now-discredited allegation of the Douma chemical attack was? We should perhaps take that comment of the IIT “obtaining information” as ranking alongside the credibility of similar intelligence reports leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
A flawed report is met with no scientific challenge
The glaring weaknesses in the FFM and IIT’s methodology are clear; the political bias, compromised “evidence”, lack of transparency, singular reliance upon only one side of the story (the groups opposed to the Syrian government), and the flawed arguments on why staging would be “too difficult” for the opposition forces; leads us to serious doubts about the conclusions in the IIT report.
Perhaps to the credit of the IIT members who argued against more definitive, stronger language in their report, what the IIT produced was the desired Western opinion about what could have happened. Weak language stating that “there are reasonable grounds to believe” the official story, it could be argued, actually implies a 50/50 case in which there are similarly reasonable grounds “not to believe” it.
Perhaps, more accurately, it suggests that the IIT thought “it’s not outside the realms of possibility” that things occurred as suggested in the report, rather than the possibility that the incident had been staged. But if the staging was considered unlikely, doesn’t it rank aside the unlikelihood, due to lack of motive, of the Syrians galvanizing the world against them (and angering their Russian supporters) by dropping sarin bombs onto farmland? At the end of the day, we must be clear that this is little more than an expression of a one-sided opinion.
Unfortunately, lesser-informed elements encompassing practically all mainstream media outlets have interpreted the conclusion – the opinion – as fact. True professionals prefer to stick to facts, so please don’t count us in. It is most unfortunate that the eagerness of the Western governments, NGOs, commentators, and the complicity of the mainstream media, has ensured that this flawed report is met with no scientific challenge whatsoever. Such is the momentum of the prevailing Syria narrative that most of these aforementioned elements, being sufficiently delighted, have not bothered to read it.
We know there are many competent experts in forensics, chemistry and ballistics who would find the conclusions in the IIT report to be questionable. The methodology and science of the Ltamenah IIT investigation should rather have been trusted to a panel of unbiased, impartial, internationally recognised scientists, investigators and weapons specialists, who would issue their assessment of the alleged chemical attacks in a transparent manner. And, for the first time, the organization could have publicized the names and professional reputations of the “experts” behind their findings.
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southfront--2020-04-29--ISIS Suicide Bomber Attacked Iraqi Intelligence Bureau Wounding 3

On April 28 , an alleged ISIS suicide bomber attacked an intelligence bureau in northern Iraq injuring at least 3 @ @ @ @ @ security forces had spotted two men , one wearing an explosive vest and a driver @ @ @ @ @ the Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Directorate in the Qadisiyah neighborhood in the northern city of Kirkuk @ @ @ @ @ .
The man hurled a grenade and then detonated his explosives vest before entering the @ @ @ @ @ .
The other man , apparently the driver , sped away from the the scene @ @ @ @ @ reported .

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On April 28, an alleged ISIS suicide bomber attacked an intelligence bureau in northern Iraq injuring at least 3 security personnel.
“Iraqi security forces had spotted two men, one wearing an explosive vest and a driver, approaching the gate of the Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Directorate in the Qadisiyah neighborhood in the northern city of Kirkuk, a security official said.
The man hurled a grenade and then detonated his explosives vest before entering the premises, the official said. The other man, apparently the driver, sped away from the the scene,” the Daily Sabah reported.


southfront--2020-04-29--Philip M. Giraldi: “Netanyahu Is Back Yet Again”

Written by Philip M. Giraldi ; Originally appeared at The Unz Review Rahm Emanuel , up until recently the mayor of Chicago and before that a top advisor to the president in the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama White Houses and still earlier a volunteer in the Israeli Army , famously once commented that a good crisis should never be allowed to go to waste .
He meant , of course , that a crisis can be exploited to provide cover for other shenanigans involving politicians .
It was an observation that was particularly true when one was working for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once attacked a “ terrorist ” pharmaceutical factory in Sudan to divert attention away from the breaking Monica Lewinski scandal .
To be sure , the United States government is focusing its attention on the coronavirus while also using the cover afforded to heighten the pressure on “ enemies ” near and far .
As the coronavirus continues to spread , the Trump White House and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have increased the ferocity of their sabre rattling , apparently in part to deter Russia , China , Iran and Venezuela .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the countries being intimidated are actually threatening the United States , but we Americans have long since learned that perceptions are more important than facts when it comes to the current occupant of the oval office and his two predecessors .
The latest bit of mendacity coming out of the White House was a presidential tweettargeting the usual punching bag , Iran .
Based on an incident that occurred two weeks ago , Trump threatened “ I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Iran ’ s flying gunboats are clearly a formidable force but it is certainly reassuring to note that naval anti-aircraft fire has been directed to deal with them .
The U.S. Navy ships in question are , one might also observe , in a body of water generally referred to as the Persian Gulf , where they are carrying out maneuvers right off of the Iranian coast .
Meanwhile , Iranian flying gunboats have not yet been observed off of New Jersey , but they are probably waiting to be transported to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gliders that once upon a time were allegedly being constructed by Saddam Hussein .
Given the cover provided by the virus , it should surprise no one that Israel is also playing the same game .
The Jewish state has been continuing its lethal bombings of Syria , with hardly any notice in the international media .
In a recent missile attack , nine people were killed near the historic city of Palmyra .
Three of the dead were Syrians while six others were presumed to be Lebanese Shi ’ ites supporting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ite as an “ Iranian ” or an “ Iranian proxy ” and therefore a “ terrorist ” eligible to be killed on sight .
But the bigger coronavirus story has to do with Israel ’ s domestic politics .
Benjamin Netanyahu and his principle opponent Benny Gantz have come to an agreement to form a national government , ostensibly to deal with the health crisis .
The wily Netanyahu , who will continue to be prime minister in the deal , has thereby retained his power over the government while also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judiciary to try and sentence him on corruption charges .
As part of the deal with Gantz , Netanyahu will have veto power over the naming of the new government ’ s attorney general and state prosecutor , guaranteeing the appointment of individuals who will dismiss the charges .
And more will be coming , with the acquiescence of Washington .
U.S. elections are little more than six months away and Donald Trump clearly believes that he needs the political support of Netanyahu to energize his rabid Christian Zionist supporters , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sheldon Adelson , Bernard Marcus and Paul Singer .
So , it is time to establish a , which will be Israeli government behind the scenes approaches to powerful and wealthy American Jews on behalf of Trump while the White House will look the other way while Israel annexes most of the remaining Palestinian West Bank .
Pompeo has welcomed the new Israeli government and has confirmed that the annexation of the Palestinian land will be “ ultimately Israel ’ s decision to make , ” which amounts to a green light for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on West Bank annexation will reportedly be taken by the Knesset at the beginning of July followed immediately by steps to incorporate Jewish settlements into Israel proper .
According to the Israeli liberal newspaper , the planned annexation has raised some concerns among a few liberal American Jewish organizations because it will convince many progressives in the U.S. that Israel has truly become an apartheid state .
J Street warned that annexation “ would severely imperil Israel ’ s future as a democratic homeland for the Jewish people , along with the future @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even suggested cutting U.S. aid if that step is actually taken .
Most other ostensibly liberal groups have adopted the usual Zionist two-step , i.e .
condemning the move but not advocating any effective steps to prevent it .
And it should also be noted that the largest and most powerful Jewish organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ( AIPAC ) and the Zionist Organization of America ( ZOA ) have not raised any objections at all .
Unaffiliated individual liberal Jews , to include those who consider themselves Zionists , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though their argument is quite hypocritical , based on their belief that annexation would destroy any possible two-state solution , damaging both Palestinian rights and “ Jewish democracy.
” Some have even welcomed the change , noting that it would create a single state which eventually would have to evolve into a modern democracy with equal rights for all .
Such thinking is , however , nonsense .
Israel under Netanyahu and whichever fascist retread that eventually succeeds him regards itself as a Jewish state and will do whatever it takes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabs of their land and possessions , stripping them of their legal status , and forcing them to leave as refugees .
That is something that might be referred to as ethnic cleansing , or even genocide .
And those Americans of conscience who are hoping for some change if someone named Joe Biden defeats Trump can also forget about that option .
Biden has told the New York Times that “ I believe a two-state solution remains the only way to ensure Israel ’ s long-term security while sustaining its Jewish and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only way to ensure Palestinian dignity and their legitimate interest in national self-determination .
And it is a necessary condition to take full advantage of the opening that exists for greater cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors .
For all these reasons , encouraging a two-state solution remains in the critical interest of the United States.
” Unfortunately , someone should tell Joe that that particular train has already left the station due to the expansion of the Jewish state ’ s settlements .
Nice words from the man who would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Israel Lobby for its political support and the money it provides as tightly as can be and he will fold before AIPAC and company like a cheap suit .
He has famously declared that “ You don ’ t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist – I am a Zionist ” and “ My Name is Joe Biden , and Everybody Knows I Love Israel.
” His vice-presidential candidates ’ debate with Sarah Palin in 2008 turned embarrassing when he and Palin both engaged in long soliloquys about how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do .
Every politician on the make loves Israel .
Philip M. Giraldi , Ph.D. , is Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest , a 501 ( c ) 3 tax deductible educational foundation ( Federal ID Number # 52-1739023 ) that seeks a more interests-based U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East .
Website is councilforthenationalinterest.org , address is P.O .
Box 2157 , Purcellville VA 20134 and its email is inform @ cnionline.org .

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Written by Philip M. Giraldi; Originally appeared at The Unz Review
Rahm Emanuel, up until recently the mayor of Chicago and before that a top advisor to the president in the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama White Houses and still earlier a volunteer in the Israeli Army, famously once commented that a good crisis should never be allowed to go to waste. He meant, of course, that a crisis can be exploited to provide cover for other shenanigans involving politicians. It was an observation that was particularly true when one was working for a sexual predator like Bill, who once attacked a “terrorist” pharmaceutical factory in Sudan to divert attention away from the breaking Monica Lewinski scandal.
To be sure, the United States government is focusing its attention on the coronavirus while also using the cover afforded to heighten the pressure on “enemies” near and far. As the coronavirus continues to spread, the Trump White House and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have increased the ferocity of their sabre rattling, apparently in part to deter Russia, China, Iran and Venezuela. Ironically, of course, none of the countries being intimidated are actually threatening the United States, but we Americans have long since learned that perceptions are more important than facts when it comes to the current occupant of the oval office and his two predecessors.
The latest bit of mendacity coming out of the White House was a presidential tweettargeting the usual punching bag, Iran. Based on an incident that occurred two weeks ago, Trump threatened “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.” Iran’s flying gunboats are clearly a formidable force but it is certainly reassuring to note that naval anti-aircraft fire has been directed to deal with them. The U.S. Navy ships in question are, one might also observe, in a body of water generally referred to as the Persian Gulf, where they are carrying out maneuvers right off of the Iranian coast. Meanwhile, Iranian flying gunboats have not yet been observed off of New Jersey, but they are probably waiting to be transported to the Eastern Seaboard by those huge trans-oceanic gliders that once upon a time were allegedly being constructed by Saddam Hussein.
Given the cover provided by the virus, it should surprise no one that Israel is also playing the same game. The Jewish state has been continuing its lethal bombings of Syria, with hardly any notice in the international media. In a recent missile attack, nine people were killed near the historic city of Palmyra. Three of the dead were Syrians while six others were presumed to be Lebanese Shi’ites supporting the Damascus government. Israel de facto regards any Shi’ite as an “Iranian” or an “Iranian proxy” and therefore a “terrorist” eligible to be killed on sight.
But the bigger coronavirus story has to do with Israel’s domestic politics. Benjamin Netanyahu and his principle opponent Benny Gantz have come to an agreement to form a national government, ostensibly to deal with the health crisis. The wily Netanyahu, who will continue to be prime minister in the deal, has thereby retained his power over the government while also putting a halt to bids from the judiciary to try and sentence him on corruption charges. As part of the deal with Gantz, Netanyahu will have veto power over the naming of the new government’s attorney general and state prosecutor, guaranteeing the appointment of individuals who will dismiss the charges.
And more will be coming, with the acquiescence of Washington. U.S. elections are little more than six months away and Donald Trump clearly believes that he needs the political support of Netanyahu to energize his rabid Christian Zionist supporters, as well as the cash coming from Jewish oligarchs Sheldon Adelson, Bernard Marcus and Paul Singer. So, it is time to establish a quid pro quo, which will be Israeli government behind the scenes approaches to powerful and wealthy American Jews on behalf of Trump while the White House will look the other way while Israel annexes most of the remaining Palestinian West Bank. Pompeo has welcomed the new Israeli government and has confirmed that the annexation of the Palestinian land will be “ultimately Israel’s decision to make,” which amounts to a green light for Netanyahu to go ahead.
A vote on West Bank annexation will reportedly be taken by the Knesset at the beginning of July followed immediately by steps to incorporate Jewish settlements into Israel proper. According to the Israeli liberal newspaper Haaretz, the planned annexation has raised some concerns among a few liberal American Jewish organizations because it will convince many progressives in the U.S. that Israel has truly become an apartheid state. J Street warned that annexation “would severely imperil Israel’s future as a democratic homeland for the Jewish people, along with the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship” and has even suggested cutting U.S. aid if that step is actually taken. Most other ostensibly liberal groups have adopted the usual Zionist two-step, i.e. condemning the move but not advocating any effective steps to prevent it. And it should also be noted that the largest and most powerful Jewish organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) have not raised any objections at all.
Unaffiliated individual liberal Jews, to include those who consider themselves Zionists, have generally been concerned about the move, though their argument is quite hypocritical, based on their belief that annexation would pari passu destroy any possible two-state solution, damaging both Palestinian rights and “Jewish democracy.” Some have even welcomed the change, noting that it would create a single state de facto which eventually would have to evolve into a modern democracy with equal rights for all. Such thinking is, however, nonsense. Israel under Netanyahu and whichever fascist retread that eventually succeeds him regards itself as a Jewish state and will do whatever it takes to maintain that, even including dispossessing remaining Arabs of their land and possessions, stripping them of their legal status, and forcing them to leave as refugees. That is something that might be referred to as ethnic cleansing, or even genocide.
And those Americans of conscience who are hoping for some change if someone named Joe Biden defeats Trump can also forget about that option. Biden has told the New York Times that “I believe a two-state solution remains the only way to ensure Israel’s long-term security while sustaining its Jewish and democratic identity. It is also the only way to ensure Palestinian dignity and their legitimate interest in national self-determination. And it is a necessary condition to take full advantage of the opening that exists for greater cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. For all these reasons, encouraging a two-state solution remains in the critical interest of the United States.”
Unfortunately, someone should tell Joe that that particular train has already left the station due to the expansion of the Jewish state’s settlements. Nice words from the man who would be president aside, Biden is bound to the Israel Lobby for its political support and the money it provides as tightly as can be and he will fold before AIPAC and company like a cheap suit. He has famously declared that “You don’t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist – I am a Zionist” and “My Name is Joe Biden, and Everybody Knows I Love Israel.” His vice-presidential candidates’ debate with Sarah Palin in 2008 turned embarrassing when he and Palin both engaged in long soliloquys about how much they cherish Israel. Indeed they do. Every politician on the make loves Israel.
Philip M. Giraldi, Ph.D., is Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, a 501(c)3 tax deductible educational foundation (Federal ID Number #52-1739023) that seeks a more interests-based U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Website is councilforthenationalinterest.org, address is P.O. Box 2157, Purcellville VA 20134 and its email is inform@cnionline.org.
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southfront--2020-04-29--SF Urgently Needs Your Help!

SF Urgently Needs Your Help!

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southfront--2020-04-29--Large Explosion Rocks Afrin City Killing At Least 39 People (Photos, Video)

I hope they can find if there is a timer or its detonated by phone .
If its by phone @ @ @ @ @ headers .
On our text TV its said it was kurds , but I see @ @ @ @ @ not .

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At least 39 people were killed and 50 others were wounded in a large explosion in the Turkish-occupied city of Afrin on April 28. The explosion was allegedly caused by an improvised explosive device installed on an oil tanker on the Raju road.
The blast occurred in the main #Afrin bazar. Casualties reported. pic.twitter.com/YLfWtGcK25 — Barzan Sadiq (@BarzanSadiq) April 28, 2020
Photos from the site:
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southfront--2020-04-29--Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyer (Infographics)

This rate rate rust bucketwith ill-trained murderous cowardly lardsass Americunt faggots shot down IR-655 airbus as supposedly the blind fuckers @ @ @ @ @ .
With such worthless murdering cunts on ships no wonder the cowardly Americunts lose every @ @ @ @ @ frustration kill women and children like their Zionist parasitic masters .

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The Arleigh Burke is a class of guided missile destroyers designed and built for the United States Navy.
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southfront--2020-04-29--Modern Medium Weight Tank (Infographics)

This is who is censoring Alex Jones and many others : “ Susan Diane Wojcicki ( /wʊˈtʃɪtski/ wuu-CHITS-kee [ 2 ] ; born July 5 , 1968 ) is an American technology executive .
She has been the CEO of YouTube since February 2014 .
[ 3 ] [ 4 ] Wojcicki was involved in the founding of Google , and became Google ’ s first marketing manager in 1999 .
She later led the company ’ s online advertising business and was put in charge of Google ’ s original video service .
After observing the success of YouTube @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Google in 2006 .
… Susan Diane Wojcicki was born on July 5 , 1968 to Esther Wojcicki , an educator of Russian-Jewish descent ” “ Sergey Mikhaylovich Brin ( Russian : Серге́й Миха́йлович Брин ; born August 21 , 1973 ) is an American software engineer and Internet entrepreneur .
Together with Larry Page , he co-founded Google .
Brin was the president of Google ’ s parent company Alphabet Inc , until stepping down from the role on December 3 , 2019 .
[ 3 ] Brin and Larry Page @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shareholders , board members , and employees .
… Brin was born on August 21 , 1973 , in Moscow in the Soviet Union , [ 6 ] to Jewish parents ” “ Mark Elliot Zuckerberg ( /ˈzʌkərbɜːrɡ/ ; born May 14 , 1984 ) is an American internet entrepreneur and philanthropist .
He is known for co-founding Facebook , Inc. and serves as its chairman , chief executive officer , and controlling shareholder .
… Zuckerberg was raised in a Reform Jewish household , … He had a Star Wars-themed bar mitzvah @

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The Modern Medium Weight Tank is a joint tank program between Turkish manufacturer FNSS and Indonesian manufacturer PT Pindad. The Turkish name for the battle tank is the Kaplan MT, while the Indonesian one is the Harimau.
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southfront--2020-04-29--ISIS Claims Its Cells Assassinated Another Syrian Soldier In Daraa

On April 29 , ISIS claimed that its cells in the southern governorate of Daraa assassinated a service member of the Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) .
According to the terrorist group ’ s news agency , Amaq , the soldier was targeted inside the town of Kiheel in the eastern countryside of Daraa .
“ With aid from God Almighty , the Islamic State ’ s soldiers targeted a service member of the apostate Nusayris regime [ ISIS ’ term for the SAA ] in the town of Kiheel in the eastern Daraa countryside with machine guns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be to God , ” Amaq said in a short press release .
Local sources in Daraa didn ’ t report any incident inside or near Kiheel on April 29 or the day before .
This indicates that ISIS claims are inaccurate .
In the last few weeks , ISIS cells carried out a series of attacks on Syrian service members in the northern and eastern Daraa countryside .
Several soldiers and officers were assassinated by the terrorist group .
Several attacks also targeted Syrian intelligence personnel in the same parts of Daraa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim responsibility for any of them .
The deteriorating security situation in Daraa will likely force the Syrian military and security forces to take a direct action soon .
Government forces could launch a large-scale operation against ISIS remnants and other radicals in the governorate .
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On April 29, ISIS claimed that its cells in the southern governorate of Daraa assassinated a service member of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).
According to the terrorist group’s news agency, Amaq, the soldier was targeted inside the town of Kiheel in the eastern countryside of Daraa.
“With aid from God Almighty, the Islamic State’s soldiers targeted a service member of the apostate Nusayris regime [ISIS’ term for the SAA] in the town of Kiheel in the eastern Daraa countryside with machine guns, which resulted in his death, praise be to God,” Amaq said in a short press release.
Local sources in Daraa didn’t report any incident inside or near Kiheel on April 29 or the day before. This indicates that ISIS claims are inaccurate.
In the last few weeks, ISIS cells carried out a series of attacks on Syrian service members in the northern and eastern Daraa countryside. Several soldiers and officers were assassinated by the terrorist group.
Several attacks also targeted Syrian intelligence personnel in the same parts of Daraa. Nevertheless, ISIS didn’t claim responsibility for any of them.
The deteriorating security situation in Daraa will likely force the Syrian military and security forces to take a direct action soon. Government forces could launch a large-scale operation against ISIS remnants and other radicals in the governorate.
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southfront--2020-04-29--Houthis Conclude Large-Scale Operation In Al-Jawf, Claim 95% Of The Province Is Under Control

On April 29 , the Houthis concluded their large-scale operation , dubbed “ Prevail Over Them , ” in the northern Yemeni province of al-Jawf .
A spokesman for the Yemeni group , Brig .
Gen. Yahya Sari , told the al-Masirah TV that the remaining regions of al-Jawf were captured , claiming that 95 % of the province is now clear from the Saudi-led coalition and its proxies .
Brig .
Gen. Sari added that the recently cleared areas , which include the al-Hzim desert and areas in the nearby district of Khabb wa al-Sha ’ af , stretch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spokesman , 1,200 Saudi-backed fighters were killed in the last phase of the operation .
Earlier this week , the Houthis released a combat video of the final phase of Operation Prevail Over Them , showing the capture of the al-Labanat Camp .
The military camp , which was one of the Saudi-led coalition ’ s last positions in al-Jawf , is a bridgehead to the nearby province of Ma ’ rib .
By imposing control of vast regions of al-Jawf , the Houthis have solidified their positions on the border with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Yemeni group has repeatedly demonstrated itself capable of launching cross-border raids from al-Jawf .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • In Video : Houthis Hunt Down Saudi-led Forces In Yemen ’ s Al-Jawf Province

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On April 29, the Houthis concluded their large-scale operation, dubbed “Prevail Over Them,” in the northern Yemeni province of al-Jawf.
A spokesman for the Yemeni group, Brig. Gen. Yahya Sari, told the al-Masirah TV that the remaining regions of al-Jawf were captured, claiming that 95% of the province is now clear from the Saudi-led coalition and its proxies.
“In the last phase of Operation Prevail Over Them, the al-Labanat Camp, al-Aqsh’a, al-Khasf and the nearby areas in al-Maraziq and al-Mahashmah in al-Jawf were cleared,” the spokesman said.
Brig. Gen. Sari added that the recently cleared areas, which include the al-Hzim desert and areas in the nearby district of Khabb wa al-Sha’af, stretch over 3,500 km2. According to the spokesman, 1,200 Saudi-backed fighters were killed in the last phase of the operation.
Earlier this week, the Houthis released a combat video of the final phase of Operation Prevail Over Them, showing the capture of the al-Labanat Camp. The military camp, which was one of the Saudi-led coalition’s last positions in al-Jawf, is a bridgehead to the nearby province of Ma’rib.
By imposing control of vast regions of al-Jawf, the Houthis have solidified their positions on the border with the Saudi province of Najran. Moreover, the Yemeni group has repeatedly demonstrated itself capable of launching cross-border raids from al-Jawf.
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southfront--2020-04-29--Your Support Is Vital To Keep SouthFront Alive

1 DAY UNTIL THE END OF APRIL Since April 1 , we have collected 2,462 USD .
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southfront--2020-04-29--Senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Visited Syria’s Al-Bukamal – Reports

On April 29 , Iranian forces in the eastern Syrian city of al-Bukamal , located on the border with Iraq @ @ @ @ @ .
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR ) , Iranian-backed fighters @ @ @ @ @ of the city , as a convoy of vehicles entered from Iraq .
Sada al-Sharqiyah @ @ @ @ @ , claimed that Brig .
Gen. Amir-Ali Hajizadeh , a senior IRGC commander , paid @ @ @ @ @ The commander reportedly inspected the region before returning to Iraq .
Hajizadeh is the commander @ @ @ @ @ Aerospace Force .
This branch of the revolutionary guard is not known to be highly-active @ @ @ @ @ reports about the Brig .
Gen. Hajizadeh visit are accurate , the IRGC Aerospace Force @ @ @ @ @ further operations in al-Bukamal .
The Aerospace Force operates ballistic missiles , air-defense systems , @ @ @ @ @ MORE ON THIS TOPIC :

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On April 29, Iranian forces in the eastern Syrian city of al-Bukamal, located on the border with Iraq, were placed on high-alert.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Iranian-backed fighters were deployed in the districts of the city, as a convoy of vehicles entered from Iraq.
“It [the state of alert] coincided with the entry of military vehicles of the [Iranian] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to al-Bukamal, coming from Iraq,” the London-based monitoring group said.
Sada al-Sharqiyah, a local Facebook page, claimed that Brig. Gen. Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, a senior IRGC commander, paid a visit to al-Bukamal. The commander reportedly inspected the region before returning to Iraq.
Hajizadeh is the commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force. This branch of the revolutionary guard is not known to be highly-active in al-Bukamal.
If the reports about the Brig. Gen. Hajizadeh visit are accurate, the IRGC Aerospace Force could be preparing for some further operations in al-Bukamal. The Aerospace Force operates ballistic missiles, air-defense systems, warplanes and combat drones.
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southfront--2020-04-29--Mozambican Forces Say 120 ISIS-Linked Militants Killed Over Past Month

Mozambican forces eliminated 129 terrorists in the northern province of Cabo Delgado province over the past month , the country ’ s Minister of Interior said on April 28 .
According to the minister , Amad Miquidade : • On April 7 , 39 terrorists were killed when they attempted to attack village in Cabo Delgado ; • On April 10 , 59 terrorists were killed on Quirimba island ; • On April 11 , 30 terrorists were killed after when they launched an attack in Ibo Island .
The minister said the operations against the militants were a response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xitaxi , in which 52 people were massacred .
The attack is now being investigated by the authorities , according to the minister .
“ We have identified where the enemy is located , where their bases are , their training camps and their movements … Meanwhile , the defense and security forces are strategically preparing for yet another offensive , ” Miquidade said , according to Barron ’ s .
In the last few months , ISIS branch in Mozambique , the Islamic State in Central Africa Province ( ISCAP ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cabo Delagdo .
One of the group ’ s attacks even targeted the town of Mocimboa de Praia , which is located near a $ 60bn gas project .
ISCAP terrorists launched a new attack on April 28 afternoon , targeting the town of Muaja .
The town ’ s buildings were burned by the terrorists .
However , no casualties were reported .
Muaja ’ s attack confirms that the situation in Cabo Delagdo is still spinning out of control .
The efforts being made by government forces are effective , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ province .
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Mozambican forces eliminated 129 terrorists in the northern province of Cabo Delgado province over the past month, the country’s Minister of Interior said on April 28.
According to the minister, Amad Miquidade:
On April 7, 39 terrorists were killed when they attempted to attack village in Cabo Delgado;
On April 10, 59 terrorists were killed on Quirimba island;
On April 11, 30 terrorists were killed after when they launched an attack in Ibo Island.
The minister said the operations against the militants were a response to the attack on the town of Xitaxi, in which 52 people were massacred. The attack is now being investigated by the authorities, according to the minister.
“We have identified where the enemy is located, where their bases are, their training camps and their movements … Meanwhile, the defense and security forces are strategically preparing for yet another offensive,” Miquidade said, according to Barron’s.
In the last few months, ISIS branch in Mozambique, the Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP), carried out a series of attacks in Cabo Delagdo. One of the group’s attacks even targeted the town of Mocimboa de Praia, which is located near a $60bn gas project.
ISCAP terrorists launched a new attack on April 28 afternoon, targeting the town of Muaja. The town’s buildings were burned by the terrorists. However, no casualties were reported.
Muaja’s attack confirms that the situation in Cabo Delagdo is still spinning out of control. The efforts being made by government forces are effective, but not sufficient to fully secure the gas-rich province.
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southfront--2020-04-29--Rouhani To US: This Waterway Is Called Persian Gulf, Not ‘New York’ Gulf

In light of Washington ’ s incessant acts of military adventurism in the Persian Gulf region , President Hassan Rouhani has once again reminded the United States to whom the waterway truly belongs .
“ The Americans should know that this waterway is called ‘ the Persian Gulf.
’ It is not called ‘ the New York Gulf ’ or ‘ the Washington Gulf , ’ ” President Rouhani told a cabinet session in Tehran on Wednesday , in remarks on the occasion of the National Persian Gulf Day .
“ They should understand the circumstances [ surrounding the body @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both its name and the nation that has preserved it for thousands of years , and , therefore , stop hatching plots against the Iranian nation every day , ” the president stated .
The Americans , he added , can clearly witness how the Iranian nation has been and continues to be successful in all areas , including providing security for the maritime area .
The Iranian Armed Forces , including the naval forces serving either the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps ( IRGC ) or the Army , as well as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Enforcement Force and volunteer Basij force have invariably guaranteed the security of the waterways and its coastline , Rouhani added .
The chief executive congratulated Iranians on the national occasion , laying emphasis on the nation ’ s entitlement to the waterway that bears special significance to the Islamic Republic given its contiguity with international waters and its being host to numerous fuel shipments .
The IRGC denounced the American vessels for their “ unprofessional and perilous ” behavior in the waterway , and said they had “ caused trouble ” for one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ships that was on a routine patrol .
A US Navy statement claimed that about a dozen IRGC boats had approached several US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf “ in dangerous and harassing ” ways .
The IRGC has strongly dismissed the statement , calling the account a “ Hollywood tale , ” and has reciprocally cautioned the terrorist US forces against taking any reckless move in the waterway .

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Press TV reports (source):
In light of Washington’s incessant acts of military adventurism in the Persian Gulf region, President Hassan Rouhani has once again reminded the United States to whom the waterway truly belongs.
“The Americans should know that this waterway is called ‘the Persian Gulf.’ It is not called ‘the New York Gulf’ or ‘the Washington Gulf,’” President Rouhani told a cabinet session in Tehran on Wednesday, in remarks on the occasion of the National Persian Gulf Day. “They should understand the circumstances [surrounding the body of water] by taking into consideration both its name and the nation that has preserved it for thousands of years, and, therefore, stop hatching plots against the Iranian nation every day,” the president stated.
The Americans, he added, can clearly witness how the Iranian nation has been and continues to be successful in all areas, including providing security for the maritime area.
The Iranian Armed Forces, including the naval forces serving either the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) or the Army, as well as the forces enlisted with Iran’s Law Enforcement Force and volunteer Basij force have invariably guaranteed the security of the waterways and its coastline, Rouhani added.
The chief executive congratulated Iranians on the national occasion, laying emphasis on the nation’s entitlement to the waterway that bears special significance to the Islamic Republic given its contiguity with international waters and its being host to numerous fuel shipments.
US President Donald Trump alleged in a recent tweet that he had ordered the US Navy to “shoot down and destroy” Iranian gunboats that “harass” American ships, following a recent confrontation between US warships and Iranian military boats in the waters.
The IRGC denounced the American vessels for their “unprofessional and perilous” behavior in the waterway, and said they had “caused trouble” for one of the elite force’s logistics ships that was on a routine patrol.
A US Navy statement claimed that about a dozen IRGC boats had approached several US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf “in dangerous and harassing” ways.
The IRGC has strongly dismissed the statement, calling the account a “Hollywood tale,” and has reciprocally cautioned the terrorist US forces against taking any reckless move in the waterway.
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