southfront--2020-07-24--Craziness In Ukraine 2.0: Former Soldier Took Police Officer Hostage In Poltava

The craziness is the new normality in Ukraine .
Just two days after the hostage incident in the city of Lutsk , another situation of this kind erupted in Poltava .
On July 23rd , a Ukrainian man took a police officer hostage by using a grenade in the city of Poltava .
The man was suspected of stealing a car , and he escaped arrest by taking the senior police officer hostage .
He was provided with a car , and drove away with it , according to the criminal investigation department of the National Police of Ukraine .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is underway .
Deputy Interior Minister Anton Gerashchenko said on Facebook that initially , police were trying to arrest a man suspected of hijacking a vehicle when he took out a grenade and threatened to kill one of the officers .
After negotiations , the man exchanged the police officer for a police colonel and drove off with him in a car provided by police .
The man was identified as Roman Skripnik and he fought in Eastern Ukraine , on the side of the Kiev forces .
Following is a short resume @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Anton Gerashchenko and the Register of Court Decisions .
• In 2007 , he was sentenced to pay a fine of 510 UAH ( $ 18 ) and recognizance for petty theft .
• In 2008 , he was sentenced to recognizance for 2 years for fraud .
• In 2014 , he was sentenced to 3 years of house arrest , for the production or storage of drugs .
Separately , following are some of the more interesting photographs of his social media : On the same day , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 60yo man that opened fire from his apartments with a gun .
The man also opened fire at police officers deployed to the site .
Meanwhile , the government-backed pseudo-church organization , the Orthodox Church of Ukraine continued its campaign against the canonic Ukrainian Orthodox Church ( Moscow Patriarchy ) .
On July 22 , the Kiev regime ’ s puppet church announced that it will hold prayers in support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople .
In a “ sign of prayer solidarity ” with Constantinople , Metropolian Epiphany ( Dumenko ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divine services ” on July 24 .
The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople remains the main , if not the only , backer of the non-canonic Orthodox Church of Ukraine as other local Orthodox churches continue to ignore it or have a strongly negative position towards this artificially-created organization .
At the same time , radicals loyal to the Kiev regime and supporting the ‘ independent ’ Ukrainian church continue attacking churches and priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church ( Moscow Patriarchy ) , which they declared the enemy of the state .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After the recent series of failed attacks of pro-Kiev forces , the Ukrainian Army increased mortar strikes on positions of self-defense forces of the Donetsk and People ’ s Republics often targeting civilian areas .
The current Ukrainain regime is not interested in the ceasefire and is sabotaging the implementation of the Minks agreements , including their political part ( about the de-escalation , a local autonomy and election ) .
On July 23 , a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry , Maria Zakharova , announced that Ukraine de-facto withdrew from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political solution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine .
The current situation in Ukraine demonstrates that if some state regularly employs the terror as a tool of the internal politics , various acts of terror will become an ordniary factor of the daily life in the state .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Real Face Of Pro-Kiev Forces : Estonian Killed In Eastern Ukraine Referred To Ukrainian Soldiers As “ Pigs ” Who Need “ A White Master ”

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The craziness is the new normality in Ukraine. Just two days after the hostage incident in the city of Lutsk, another situation of this kind erupted in Poltava.
On July 23rd, a Ukrainian man took a police officer hostage by using a grenade in the city of Poltava. The man was suspected of stealing a car, and he escaped arrest by taking the senior police officer hostage.
He was provided with a car, and drove away with it, according to the criminal investigation department of the National Police of Ukraine.
“The culprit took a criminal investigation officer hostage. After negotiations, the culprit exchanged the criminal investigation officer for the head of the criminal investigation department of the National Police’s main directorate in the Poltava region, Colonel Vitaliy Shyian, with whom he drove away from the city in a car provided to him according to his demands,” the report reads.
A special operation to detain the culprit is underway.
Deputy Interior Minister Anton Gerashchenko said on Facebook that initially, police were trying to arrest a man suspected of hijacking a vehicle when he took out a grenade and threatened to kill one of the officers.
After negotiations, the man exchanged the police officer for a police colonel and drove off with him in a car provided by police.
“Negotiations are ongoing to force the attacker to surrender to the police without harming himself or others,” Gerashchenko said.
The man was identified as Roman Skripnik and he fought in Eastern Ukraine, on the side of the Kiev forces.
Following is a short resume of Skripnik, according to Deputy Interior Minister Anton Gerashchenko and the Register of Court Decisions.
In 2007, he was sentenced to pay a fine of 510 UAH ($18) and recognizance for petty theft.
In 2008, he was sentenced to recognizance for 2 years for fraud.
In 2014, he was sentenced to 3 years of house arrest, for the production or storage of drugs.
Separately, following are some of the more interesting photographs of his social media:
On the same day, in the city of Ukraine, police detained a 60yo man that opened fire from his apartments with a gun. The man also opened fire at police officers deployed to the site.
Meanwhile, the government-backed pseudo-church organization, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine continued its campaign against the canonic Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy). On July 22, the Kiev regime’s puppet church announced that it will hold prayers in support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. In a “sign of prayer solidarity” with Constantinople, Metropolian Epiphany (Dumenko) announced that the organization will conduct “divine services” on July 24.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople remains the main, if not the only, backer of the non-canonic Orthodox Church of Ukraine as other local Orthodox churches continue to ignore it or have a strongly negative position towards this artificially-created organization. At the same time, radicals loyal to the Kiev regime and supporting the ‘independent’ Ukrainian church continue attacking churches and priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy), which they declared the enemy of the state.
The situation in eastern Ukraine is also distabilizing. After the recent series of failed attacks of pro-Kiev forces, the Ukrainian Army increased mortar strikes on positions of self-defense forces of the Donetsk and People’s Republics often targeting civilian areas. The current Ukrainain regime is not interested in the ceasefire and is sabotaging the implementation of the Minks agreements, including their political part (about the de-escalation, a local autonomy and election). On July 23, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, announced that Ukraine de-facto withdrew from the Minsk deal designed to promote a political solution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
The current situation in Ukraine demonstrates that if some state regularly employs the terror as a tool of the internal politics, various acts of terror will become an ordniary factor of the daily life in the state.
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southfront--2020-07-24--Militants Panic As Syrian Army Units Take Offensive Positions Around Greater Idlib

“ Turkish military presence in Greater Idlib will hinder any new operation by the SAA and its allies .
A new confrontation with Turkish forces will be inevitable.
” Will they hinder , and is it inevitable , I ’ m not so sure .
I linked this earlier for someone else to read but I think it ’ s also relevant to this story too , will the 5th army corps have to fight to take back territory , or will they just move in when the Turks move out .
“ Recalling that the deal stipulated the creation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the north and 6 kilometers to the south of the M4 highway , Çavuşoğlu provided an update on the ongoing arrangements to make the area safer .
The creation of a new safe zone in Idlib is one of the objectives , the minister said , hinting that it could lead to a new defense line for the Turkish troops deployed in the enclave .
That would result in the relocation of the Turkish troops in the area , including its observation posts in the southern parts of Idlib under full control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he added .
Turkey had established 12 observation posts in Idlib in line with the country ’ s Sochi deal with Russia in late 2018 , but half of them are now surrounded by the Syrian army as a result of a months-long operation by regime forces against opposition groups in the area .
Russia has long pressed Turkey to withdraw these troops , but Turkey has been reinforcing them against a potential regime attack.
” Çavuşoğlu implied that the Turkish troops may be relocated in line with the new realities in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Russians .
That would practically end the Sochi deal that led to the de-escalation zone in Idlib and replace it with a new order and a map in the region.
” Has a secret deal been done ?
It ’ s only the Russian backed 5th army corps that are getting ready for an attack , is that because they ’ re only going to attack HTS instead of attacking the Turkish backed terrorists as well .
Mmm I hope not , Assad ’ s been getting along very well with HTS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Turkish backed groups , so hopefully that ’ s who the tigers and the rest of the 5th army corps are going to come down hard on .
But if they do Turkey will have trouble reopening the M4 highway , their people won ’ t like the Russians attacking their terrorists , but if the Russian proxies attack HTS instead , Erdogan will be able to reopen that Goddamned highway a lot faster , and he ’ s getting desperate to get it reopened here in the west , the east @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia and their new bases in SDF held territory .
Everyone claps with glee as the heroic Russians take over more bases in SDF held territory , and I do too , unless they ’ re the ones near the Turkish border , when those bases are established joint Turkish/Russian patrols on the M4 follow , grrrr , and I don ’ t like those Russian border bases at all .
Why is Erdogan so desperate to reopen the whole Syrian M4 highway , all the way from latakia in the west to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does he really need it for , and why does he need Putin ’ s help , and what does he tell Putin when he asks for help , I ’ d love to know that .
Ask yourselves why , why does Erdogan need the whole Syrian M4 reopened , I know the reason why but most of you don ’ t , so do you want to know the reason why , it ’ s to save Erdogan ’ s arse , that ’ s why .
HTS and the Salvation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arse from one end of Idlib to the other , his alternative opposition government is losing the battle with HTS and the popular Salvation government , and they ’ ll eventually become so uninfluential in Idlib they ’ ll practically become politically insignificant in Syria full stop .
Assad does trade deals with HTS and Putin tries to reopen the M4 on Erdogan ’ s request , LOL , opposites in action , lol , grrrrrrrrr .

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The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had put several of its units, including the elite 25the Special Forces Division “Tiger Forces”, in offensive positions around the northwestern region of Greater Idlib, a number of pro-governmental activists reported on July 23.
The activists, some of whom are known to be close to the 25th Special Forces Division, claimed that the army will soon launch a new large-scale ground operation against the remaining terrorists in Greater Idlib.
Opposition sources confirmed that the SAA was accumulating forces for a large attack in southern Idlib. According to the sources, the militants in the region were placed on high-alert.
In the last battle, the SAA liberated a large part of Greater Idlib. The M5 highway, which links Aleppo and Damascus, was also secured.
Russia and Turkey reached an agreement to stabilize Greater Idlib on March 5. Ankara reopened the Lattakia-Aleppo highway, known as the M4, under the agreement. However, terrorist groups controlling the region were not neutralized by Turkish forces.
Over the past few months, the terrorists violated the ceasefire agreement many times. SAA positions around Greater Idlib were targeted on a regular basis. Furthermore, a number of drone attacks were launched from the region at the Russian Hmeimim Air Base on the Syrian coast.
Turkey maintains a large military presence in Greater Idlib. The Turkish military deployed thousands of troops to the region in recent months. Air-defense systems were also deployed there.
Turkish military presence in Greater Idlib will hinder any new operation by the SAA and its allies. A new confrontation with Turkish forces will be inevitable.
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southfront--2020-07-24--US State Department Bounty Hunters Offer Top Dollar For Venezuelan Scalps: Latest Target, The Chief

US State Department Bounty Hunters Offer Top Dollar For Venezuelan Scalps: Latest Target, The Chief Justice

The US is offering a reward of $ 5m ( £3.9m ) for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Venezuela , Maikel Moreno .
The US accuses Mr Moreno of participating in transnational organised crime .
Mr Moreno rejects the allegations .
He is the latest of many senior officials in the administration of President Nicolás Maduro for whom a multi-million dollar reward is being offered .
The bounties have been shrugged off by the Venezuelans as absurd and unfortunate , but ultimately of no importance .
Maikel Moreno , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judicial system , has been Chief Justice of Venezuela ’ s Supreme Court since February 2017 .
The US State Department alleges that Mr Moreno has received bribes in exchange for telling judges to release defendants or in return for dismissing cases altogether .
Earlier this year , he was charged with money laundering by a court in Florida .
On Tuesday , the US Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program offered $ 5m for information leading to his arrest or conviction for allegedly “ participating in transnational organised crime ” .
Mr Moreno @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ not the first time that the mouthpieces of the North American empire seek to attack me with their clumsy attacks , full of manipulations and lies ” .
He added that “ cowardly and unfounded accusations like these only strengthen my desire to keep working from the Supreme Court to guarantee access to justice and due process to all citizens of the land ” .
Previous offers of rewards for top Venezuelan officials have so far had little effect .
In March of this year , the US accused President Maduro of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pay $ 15m for information leading to his arrest .
Maybe the Department of State should speak with the Taliban , they say they have some very capable bounty hunters ?
Mr Moreno , who as chief justice wields considerable power , will not face any problems within Venezuela or should he decide to travel to any of Venezuela ’ s allies .
However , he could face arrest if he travels to any countries within the US orbit , and he and his wife are now banned from entering the US .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ have resorted to all possible measures in its failed efforts to overthrow the Venezuelan Government and install a client regime , outlined in a leaked SouthCom document in 2018 .
The measures have included a years-long economic blockade against shipments of essential goods and services , an assassination attempt against President Maduro at a military parade in 2018 , a massive media disinformation campaign to generate propaganda against the Venezuelan Government and officials , and an maritime invasion attempt by several small but heavily armed groups of mercenaries earlier this year .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the Venezuelan government for months , but is running out of additional targets and they appear more and more to be acts of frustration and spite .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • As Showdown Looms Over Iran ’ s Oil Shipments To Venezuela US Nato Forces Poised For Possible Interception • Venezuela : US Maximum Pressure Continues , More Details Of Failed Mercenary Attack Revealed • Preparations for the Final Phase of Regime Change in Venezuela

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The US is offering a reward of $5m (£3.9m) for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Venezuela, Maikel Moreno. The US accuses Mr Moreno of participating in transnational organised crime. Mr Moreno rejects the allegations. He is the latest of many senior officials in the administration of President Nicolás Maduro for whom a multi-million dollar reward is being offered. The bounties have been shrugged off by the Venezuelans as absurd and unfortunate, but ultimately of no importance.
Maikel Moreno, a 54-year-old veteran of Venezuela’s judicial system, has been Chief Justice of Venezuela’s Supreme Court since February 2017.
The US State Department alleges that Mr Moreno has received bribes in exchange for telling judges to release defendants or in return for dismissing cases altogether.
Earlier this year, he was charged with money laundering by a court in Florida.
On Tuesday, the US Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program offered $5m for information leading to his arrest or conviction for allegedly “participating in transnational organised crime”.
Mr Moreno dismissed the allegations, saying it was “not the first time that the mouthpieces of the North American empire seek to attack me with their clumsy attacks, full of manipulations and lies”. He added that “cowardly and unfounded accusations like these only strengthen my desire to keep working from the Supreme Court to guarantee access to justice and due process to all citizens of the land”.
Previous offers of rewards for top Venezuelan officials have so far had little effect. In March of this year, the US accused President Maduro of “narco-terrorism” and said it would pay $15m for information leading to his arrest.
Maybe the Department of State should speak with the Taliban, they say they have some very capable bounty hunters?
Mr Moreno, who as chief justice wields considerable power, will not face any problems within Venezuela or should he decide to travel to any of Venezuela’s allies.
However, he could face arrest if he travels to any countries within the US orbit, and he and his wife are now banned from entering the US. LINK
The US and its local collaborators have resorted to all possible measures in its failed efforts to overthrow the Venezuelan Government and install a client regime, outlined in a leaked SouthCom document in 2018.
The measures have included a years-long economic blockade against shipments of essential goods and services, an assassination attempt against President Maduro at a military parade in 2018, a massive media disinformation campaign to generate propaganda against the Venezuelan Government and officials, and an maritime invasion attempt by several small but heavily armed groups of mercenaries earlier this year. The US has been further tightening its sanctions on the Venezuelan government for months, but is running out of additional targets and they appear more and more to be acts of frustration and spite.
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southfront--2020-07-24--Russia Delivers First Arctic Oil To China Via Northern Sea Route

Russia ’ s leading position in the exploration and development of the Arctic ’ s huge gas deposits will enable it to dramatically increase its liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) output , confirming Russia ’ s status as an oil and gas superpower .
Russia ’ s ambitious exploration and development program in the Arctic is a key part of Russia ’ s plan to become the key gas supplier to China in the future .
With Russia ’ s presence in the Arctic gas sector secured , it is now shifting its focus to development of the oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s Gazprom Neft , the country ’ s third biggest oil company in terms of output and the oil arm of state gas giant Gazprom , shipped its first cargo of oil produced in the Arctic to China via the Northern Sea Route ( NSR ) .
This shipment to the East adds to its existing Western exports via the NSR to Europe .
According to Gazprom Neft , it took 47 days to deliver a full cargo of 144,000 tonnes of sweet , light Novy Port oil from the Yamal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yantai on the Bohai Sea .
The company can now complement its sales of Arctic oil in the European market with sales to the Asia-Pacific markets , allowing Gazprom Neft to offer Novy Port oil with a year-round logistics scheme tailored to prevailing market and climatic conditions .
The first trial voyage along the Northern Sea Route ( from the Far-Eastern Russian port of Vladivostok to St Petersburg ) by a large-sized and strengthened container ship took place in August 2018 .
It is now set to become a major transport hub .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ transport route to deliver cargoes both East and West .
Russia ’ s second largest gas producer after Gazprom , Novatek , also has projects on the Yamal Peninsula and has managed to deliver almost all of its Yamal Peninsular ( Yamal LNG ) projects on budget and on time , notwithstanding the full weight of US sanctions being imposed on Russia in 2014 .
Gazprom Neft started exporting oil produced in Russia ’ s Arctic exploration and development region in 2013 , and has delivered at least 40 million tons of oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ field ) and Novy Port ( Novoportovskoye field ) blends – to several European countries .
The Novy Port oil field is one of the largest oil and gas condensate fields in the Russian Arctic , with at least 250 million tons ( around 1.8 billion barrels ) of reserves .
Using a now proven system developed alongside Novatek – including the Prirazlomnaya oil production platform , the Arctic Gates oil terminal in the Gulf of Ob , a fleet of reinforced tankers including LNG vessels designed specifically to operate in the Arctic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and an offshore oil shipment terminal in Murmansk – Gazprom Neft says that it can transport oil year-round ( at minimal cost ) to Europe .
To the East , there are more natural constraints , as very thick ice makes deliveries outside the summer period extremely difficult for much of the time , and the costs are higher than those to Europe .
Prior to last week ’ s sale ( which reports probably went to state refiner , the China National Chemical Corporation , ChemChina ) , Novy Port oil had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Northern Sea Route .
However , the enormous hit to the European refining sector this year caused demand to drop substantially , while demand in China dipped by a much smaller degree and recovered much more quickly .
Russia ’ s number two oil company , Lukoil , also conducted a test crude oil delivery last September , featuring its Varandey blend .
This has very similar specifications to the Novy Port blend , with the latter having an API gravity of 35 degrees and a 0.1 per cent sulphur content , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 35-37 degrees and a sulphur content of around 0.5 per cent .
At the same time as opening up new export routes for its oil , Gazprom Neft is working towards dramatically increasing the oil volumes from the Arctic that it can offer to the East .
In 2017 , it acquired the development rights to the Tazovskoye and Severo-Samburgskoye fields in the Yamalo-Nenets region , with the subsoil usage rights to the Tazovskoye block running until 2025 , and those to the Severo-Samburgskoye block until 2027 .
The Tazovskoye field is estimated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least 72 million tonnes , condensate reserves of 4.6 million tonnes , and non-associated gas reserves of at elast 183.3 billion cubic metres .
The Severo-Samburgksoye block ’ s estimated oil reserves are even higher , at 90.5 million tonnes .
This followed the commissioning only a year before of the huge Novoportskoye oil and gas field ( estimated recoverable reserves of more than 250 million tonnes of crude and condensate , as well as more than 320 billion cubic metres of gas ) and the Vostochno-Messoyakhskoye oil and gas field ( recoverable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of oil and gas condensate , and 188 billion cubic metres of gas ) .
LINK MORE ON THE TOPIC : • A closer look at oil production cuts under OPEC deal

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Russia’s leading position in the exploration and development of the Arctic’s huge gas deposits will enable it to dramatically increase its liquefied natural gas (LNG) output, confirming Russia’s status as an oil and gas superpower. Russia’s ambitious exploration and development program in the Arctic is a key part of Russia’s plan to become the key gas supplier to China in the future. With Russia’s presence in the Arctic gas sector secured, it is now shifting its focus to development of the oil sector.
Oilprice.com reports that last week Russia’s Gazprom Neft, the country’s third biggest oil company in terms of output and the oil arm of state gas giant Gazprom, shipped its first cargo of oil produced in the Arctic to China via the Northern Sea Route (NSR). This shipment to the East adds to its existing Western exports via the NSR to Europe.
According to Gazprom Neft, it took 47 days to deliver a full cargo of 144,000 tonnes of sweet, light Novy Port oil from the Yamal peninsula developments to the Chinese port of Yantai on the Bohai Sea. The company can now complement its sales of Arctic oil in the European market with sales to the Asia-Pacific markets, allowing Gazprom Neft to offer Novy Port oil with a year-round logistics scheme tailored to prevailing market and climatic conditions.
The first trial voyage along the Northern Sea Route (from the Far-Eastern Russian port of Vladivostok to St Petersburg) by a large-sized and strengthened container ship took place in August 2018. It is now set to become a major transport hub.
Yamal-centred LNG projects can now use the transport route to deliver cargoes both East and West. Russia’s second largest gas producer after Gazprom, Novatek, also has projects on the Yamal Peninsula and has managed to deliver almost all of its Yamal Peninsular (Yamal LNG) projects on budget and on time, notwithstanding the full weight of US sanctions being imposed on Russia in 2014.
Gazprom Neft started exporting oil produced in Russia’s Arctic exploration and development region in 2013, and has delivered at least 40 million tons of oil – including both the ARCO (Prirazlomnoye field) and Novy Port (Novoportovskoye field) blends – to several European countries. The Novy Port oil field is one of the largest oil and gas condensate fields in the Russian Arctic, with at least 250 million tons (around 1.8 billion barrels) of reserves.
Using a now proven system developed alongside Novatek – including the Prirazlomnaya oil production platform, the Arctic Gates oil terminal in the Gulf of Ob, a fleet of reinforced tankers including LNG vessels designed specifically to operate in the Arctic’s icy waters, escort icebreakers and an offshore oil shipment terminal in Murmansk – Gazprom Neft says that it can transport oil year-round (at minimal cost) to Europe.
To the East, there are more natural constraints, as very thick ice makes deliveries outside the summer period extremely difficult for much of the time, and the costs are higher than those to Europe. Prior to last week’s sale (which OilPrice.com reports probably went to state refiner, the China National Chemical Corporation, ChemChina), Novy Port oil had not been exported east to China via the Northern Sea Route. However, the enormous hit to the European refining sector this year caused demand to drop substantially, while demand in China dipped by a much smaller degree and recovered much more quickly.
“Although Gazprom Neft has historically sent ESPO crude to China via the pipeline, this new capability will be useful to other Russian companies for oil as well, not just Novatek for LNG,” a senior oil and gas analyst in Moscow told OilPrice.com last week.
Russia’s number two oil company, Lukoil, also conducted a test crude oil delivery last September, featuring its Varandey blend. This has very similar specifications to the Novy Port blend, with the latter having an API gravity of 35 degrees and a 0.1 per cent sulphur content, whilst Varandey has an API gravity of 35-37 degrees and a sulphur content of around 0.5 per cent.
At the same time as opening up new export routes for its oil, Gazprom Neft is working towards dramatically increasing the oil volumes from the Arctic that it can offer to the East. In 2017, it acquired the development rights to the Tazovskoye and Severo-Samburgskoye fields in the Yamalo-Nenets region, with the subsoil usage rights to the Tazovskoye block running until 2025, and those to the Severo-Samburgskoye block until 2027. The Tazovskoye field is estimated to have recoverable oil reserves of at least 72 million tonnes, condensate reserves of 4.6 million tonnes, and non-associated gas reserves of at elast 183.3 billion cubic metres.
The Severo-Samburgksoye block’s estimated oil reserves are even higher, at 90.5 million tonnes. This followed the commissioning only a year before of the huge Novoportskoye oil and gas field (estimated recoverable reserves of more than 250 million tonnes of crude and condensate, as well as more than 320 billion cubic metres of gas) and the Vostochno-Messoyakhskoye oil and gas field (recoverable reserves of more than 470 million tonnes of oil and gas condensate, and 188 billion cubic metres of gas). LINK
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southfront--2020-07-24--Israeli Attack Helicopters Strike Targets In Southern Syria (Video)

Israeli helicopters have attacked Syrian Army targets in southern Syria , the Israeli Defence Forces said on July 25 evening @ @ @ @ @ , the attack came in response to munitions fired towards the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights earlier @ @ @ @ @ Israeli forces targeted three outposts in Quneitra , Southwest Syria at about 11 pm local @ @ @ @ @ least two injuries , Syria ’ s state news agency SANA reported .
MORE ON @ @ @ @ @ Responds With Force To Iranian Plans To Deploy Air Defense Systems In Syria

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Israeli helicopters have attacked Syrian Army targets in southern Syria, the Israeli Defence Forces said on July 25 evening. According to the IDF, the attack came in response to munitions fired towards the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights earlier on the same day.
Earlier today, munitions were fired from Syria toward Israel. In response, our aircraft struck military targets in southern Syria belonging to the Syrian Armed Forces. We hold the Syrian regime responsible & will respond to any violation of Israeli sovereignty. — Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) July 24, 2020
Israeli forces targeted three outposts in Quneitra, Southwest Syria at about 11 pm local time, resulting in at least two injuries, Syria’s state news agency SANA reported.
A fire was set on a military site for the Syrian regime forces near the town of #Hadhr in the #Quneitra countryside in southern Syria, and reports of targeting an air defense platform. pic.twitter.com/045JAk4KNZ — IDLIB POST (@IdlibEn) July 24, 2020
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southfront--2020-07-24--Ripple Effects: Greece And Turkey Open New Northern Front On Libyan Conflict

Greece ’ s navy has declared a state of heightened alert and deployed ships to the Aegean Sea in response to a Turkish vessel conducting seismic surveys for energy exploration purposes close to a disputed maritime area .
On Tuesday the Greek foreign ministry issued a formal protest to Turkey following the announcement that a Turkish drilling ship would conduct explorations in the maritime area south of the Greek island of Kastellorizo in the south eastern Aegean .
The foreign ministry also released a statement : “ We call on Turkey to immediately cease its illegal activities , which violate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security in the region.
” Following Turkey ’ s rejection of the protest , the Greek Navy has sent ships to patrol in the area .
“ Navy units have been deployed since yesterday in the south and southeastern Aegean , ” a navy source told AFP , declining to give further details .
Athens has stated that Turkish surveys in sections of the Greek continental shelf constitute an escalation of the tension in the region where the two countries dispute the boundary of their respective maritime areas .
LINK Experts cited in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conduct as designed to test Greece ’ s determination to defend its interests in the eastern Mediterranean region , and believe that the Turkish leadership ’ s moves may also be linked to the Libyan conflict .
According to this interpretation of the latest developments , President Recep Tayyip Erdogan apparently seeks to “ test ” the reaction of his opponents .
LINK A report in Xinhua suggests that Greece ’ s response is to draw even closer to Egypt .
Greece and Egypt have been holding negotiations over the demarcation of an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however the boundaries of the area they are discussing overlaps with the area which was subject to a maritime agreement signed by Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya late last year ( the two parties also signed a military agreement pursuant to which Turkey has sent thousands of fighters and a large amount of weapons and supplies to the Government of National Accord ) .
Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi received a phone call from Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Thursday , during which they discussed regional issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis .
According to the Xinhua report , Sisi expressed Egypt ’ s opposition to “ illegitimate foreign intervention ” in Libyan domestic affairs , citing that they would further exacerbate the security conditions in Libya in a way that affects the stability of the entire region , said Egyptian presidential spokesman Bassam Rady in a statement .
For his part , the Greek prime minister also voiced rejection of foreign interference in Libya , while highlighting the political course as a key solution for the Libyan issue .
He hailed Egypt ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a peaceful settlement to the Libyan crisis , according to the statement .
Over the past few years , the Egyptian-Greek ties have been growing closer , with their growing enmity with Turkey also resulting in them developing a similar position on Libya .
The talks between Sisi and Mitsotakis took place just a few days after the Egyptian parliament approved a possible troop deployment in Libya to defend Egypt ’ s western borders with the war-torn country .
LINK A perceptive analysis of the emerging Turkey-Libya ( Tripoli ) relations published last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation today : Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gambled big in Libya and won big – so far .
This victory portends important changes in the politics of the Mediterranean , for Turkey has succeeded not only in demonstrating its determination to become the dominant player in the Eastern Mediterranean , but also in showcasing its military prowess and wherewithal .
The latter might precipitate a deeper conflict and crisis in the region , extending north toward Greece .
Erdogan threw his support behind the UN-recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Libyan National Army ( LNA ) , which had besieged the GNA ’ s capital , Tripoli .
Haftar suffered a humiliating defeat as Turkish drones , troops , navy vessels and some 10,000 Syrian fighters transported by Ankara to Libya stopped him in his tracks and then forced him to abandon bases and territory .
A last-minute call for a ceasefire by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was rejected by the victorious GNA , which has set its aims at capturing other towns , including the critical port city of Sirte .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the countries that had backed Haftar : Egypt , the UAE and Russia .
The UAE had contributed military equipment and the Russians non-state mercenary forces .
Turkey ’ s Libya expedition has to be seen from two perspectives .
First , the GNA concluded a deal with Ankara that delineated their respective Exclusive Economic Zones ( EEZ ) in such a way that it divides the Mediterranean Sea into two sections .
Turkey ’ s purpose is to hinder efforts by Egypt , Cyprus , Israel and Greece to export natural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on LNG vessels , to Europe .
Turkey has aggressively interfered with efforts by these to drill for gas .
Ankara claims that most of the waters around Cyprus actually belong to Turkey or to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus , a country recognized only by Turkey .
However , more important than simply preventing Eastern Mediterranean gas exports is the underlying strategy driving this push against Haftar .
From the moment he assumed power in 2003 , Erdogan has striven to elevate Turkey ’ s international role to that of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Initially , his strategy was one of “ zero problems with neighbors , ” which served to emphasize Turkey ’ s soft power .
The primary driver , however , was the desire for Turkey to assume a hegemonic position over the Middle East .
This policy foundered and was essentially buried by the Arab Spring .
What has replaced it is a more aggressive and militarized posture that takes the fight to perceived enemies .
That could mean anyone and everyone , since Turks tend to see most countries as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
LINK While Turkey has bet big and won big so far , it appears that the period of relatively easy victories is over and its aggressive moves are going to face more resistance in future .
As Turkey continues to shows no sign of moderating its expansionist claims and manoeuvres , the region is now moving irrevocably towards a catastrophic military clash as Turkey and Egypt have drawn incompatible ‘ red lines ’ in Libya , with the coastal town of Sirte likely to be the detonator ( or possibly the Jufra @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international agreement promoted by the UN in 2014-2015 established an executive body and a legislative body to govern Libya and pave the way for a more permanent arrangement .
However , fundamental disagreements between the two quasi-State organizations resulted in a complete split , with the executive arm becoming the ‘ UN-backed ’ Government of National Accord based in Tripoli and the House of Representatives relocating to Tobruk ( thus the legislative arm is also ‘ UN-backed ’ , though this detail is usually omitted from mainstream media reports ) .
Turkey has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Accord ( GNA ) , Egypt has allied itself with the House of Representatives ( and its armed forces , the Libyan National Army – the LNA – headed by Khalifa Haftar ) .
More generally , Egypt , the United Arab Emirates and Russia are invariably reported as supporting the LNA , while the GNA is mainly backed by Turkey and Qatar .
Following the drastic changes on the battlefield over the last two months as the GNA swept the LNA from its positions around Tripoli following a failed attempt to capture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Egypt have committed themselves to positions that are in direct conflict , indicating that a major armed clash is inevitable unless there is a major diplomatic breakthrough or one of the two sides accepts a humiliating backdown .
Specifically , Turkey and the Government of National Accord are demanding that the Libyan National Army ( which recently gave Egypt permission to send its armed forces into Libya ) withdraw from the two areas ( Sirte and Jufra ) and have expressed their determination to take the areas by force if necessary .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that any attempt to capture the two areas will result in Egypt entering Libya in force , which would result in a direct confrontation between Turkey and Egypt .
While Egypt has the advantage of sharing a long land border with Libya , in the event of a major conflict air and maritime power could be decisive .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military intervention in Libya and Turkeys grand game in eastern Mediterranean • Al Sisi says Egypt has right to intervene in Libya vows to protect Sirte al Jufra • @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a peaceful settlement in Libya

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Greece’s navy has declared a state of heightened alert and deployed ships to the Aegean Sea in response to a Turkish vessel conducting seismic surveys for energy exploration purposes close to a disputed maritime area.
On Tuesday the Greek foreign ministry issued a formal protest to Turkey following the announcement that a Turkish drilling ship would conduct explorations in the maritime area south of the Greek island of Kastellorizo in the south eastern Aegean. The foreign ministry also released a statement:
“We call on Turkey to immediately cease its illegal activities, which violate our sovereign rights and undermine peace and security in the region.” Following Turkey’s rejection of the protest, the Greek Navy has sent ships to patrol in the area. “Navy units have been deployed since yesterday in the south and southeastern Aegean,” a navy source told AFP, declining to give further details.
Athens has stated that Turkish surveys in sections of the Greek continental shelf constitute an escalation of the tension in the region where the two countries dispute the boundary of their respective maritime areas. LINK
Experts cited in media reports have interpreted Turkey’s conduct as designed to test Greece’s determination to defend its interests in the eastern Mediterranean region, and believe that the Turkish leadership’s moves may also be linked to the Libyan conflict. According to this interpretation of the latest developments, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan apparently seeks to “test” the reaction of his opponents. LINK
A report in Xinhua suggests that Greece’s response is to draw even closer to Egypt. Greece and Egypt have been holding negotiations over the demarcation of an exclusive economic zone in the eastern Mediterranean, however the boundaries of the area they are discussing overlaps with the area which was subject to a maritime agreement signed by Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya late last year (the two parties also signed a military agreement pursuant to which Turkey has sent thousands of fighters and a large amount of weapons and supplies to the Government of National Accord).
Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi received a phone call from Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Thursday, during which they discussed regional issues, with a focus on the Libyan crisis.
According to the Xinhua report, Sisi expressed Egypt’s opposition to “illegitimate foreign intervention” in Libyan domestic affairs, citing that they would further exacerbate the security conditions in Libya in a way that affects the stability of the entire region, said Egyptian presidential spokesman Bassam Rady in a statement.
For his part, the Greek prime minister also voiced rejection of foreign interference in Libya, while highlighting the political course as a key solution for the Libyan issue.
He hailed Egypt’s “sincere efforts” that seek a peaceful settlement to the Libyan crisis, according to the statement.
Over the past few years, the Egyptian-Greek ties have been growing closer, with their growing enmity with Turkey also resulting in them developing a similar position on Libya. The talks between Sisi and Mitsotakis took place just a few days after the Egyptian parliament approved a possible troop deployment in Libya to defend Egypt’s western borders with the war-torn country. LINK
A perceptive analysis of the emerging Turkey-Libya (Tripoli) relations published last month remains just as salient to describe the situation today:
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gambled big in Libya and won big – so far. This victory portends important changes in the politics of the Mediterranean, for Turkey has succeeded not only in demonstrating its determination to become the dominant player in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in showcasing its military prowess and wherewithal. The latter might precipitate a deeper conflict and crisis in the region, extending north toward Greece. Erdogan threw his support behind the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) against General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), which had besieged the GNA’s capital, Tripoli. Haftar suffered a humiliating defeat as Turkish drones, troops, navy vessels and some 10,000 Syrian fighters transported by Ankara to Libya stopped him in his tracks and then forced him to abandon bases and territory. A last-minute call for a ceasefire by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was rejected by the victorious GNA, which has set its aims at capturing other towns, including the critical port city of Sirte. Indirectly, this was also a defeat for the countries that had backed Haftar: Egypt, the UAE and Russia. The UAE had contributed military equipment and the Russians non-state mercenary forces. Turkey’s Libya expedition has to be seen from two perspectives. First, the GNA concluded a deal with Ankara that delineated their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in such a way that it divides the Mediterranean Sea into two sections. Turkey’s purpose is to hinder efforts by Egypt, Cyprus, Israel and Greece to export natural gas, either through a pipeline or on LNG vessels, to Europe. Turkey has aggressively interfered with efforts by these to drill for gas. Ankara claims that most of the waters around Cyprus actually belong to Turkey or to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a country recognized only by Turkey. However, more important than simply preventing Eastern Mediterranean gas exports is the underlying strategy driving this push against Haftar. From the moment he assumed power in 2003, Erdogan has striven to elevate Turkey’s international role to that of a regional, if not global, power. Initially, his strategy was one of “zero problems with neighbors,” which served to emphasize Turkey’s soft power. The primary driver, however, was the desire for Turkey to assume a hegemonic position over the Middle East. This policy foundered and was essentially buried by the Arab Spring. What has replaced it is a more aggressive and militarized posture that takes the fight to perceived enemies. That could mean anyone and everyone, since Turks tend to see most countries as a threat, even if they are allies. LINK
While Turkey has bet big and won big so far, it appears that the period of relatively easy victories is over and its aggressive moves are going to face more resistance in future. As Turkey continues to shows no sign of moderating its expansionist claims and manoeuvres, the region is now moving irrevocably towards a catastrophic military clash as Turkey and Egypt have drawn incompatible ‘red lines’ in Libya, with the coastal town of Sirte likely to be the detonator (or possibly the Jufra airbase to the south).
An international agreement promoted by the UN in 2014-2015 established an executive body and a legislative body to govern Libya and pave the way for a more permanent arrangement. However, fundamental disagreements between the two quasi-State organizations resulted in a complete split, with the executive arm becoming the ‘UN-backed’ Government of National Accord based in Tripoli and the House of Representatives relocating to Tobruk (thus the legislative arm is also ‘UN-backed’, though this detail is usually omitted from mainstream media reports).
Turkey has allied itself with the Government of National Accord (GNA), Egypt has allied itself with the House of Representatives (and its armed forces, the Libyan National Army – the LNA – headed by Khalifa Haftar). More generally, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia are invariably reported as supporting the LNA, while the GNA is mainly backed by Turkey and Qatar.
Following the drastic changes on the battlefield over the last two months as the GNA swept the LNA from its positions around Tripoli following a failed attempt to capture the Libyan capital, both Turkey and Egypt have committed themselves to positions that are in direct conflict, indicating that a major armed clash is inevitable unless there is a major diplomatic breakthrough or one of the two sides accepts a humiliating backdown.
Specifically, Turkey and the Government of National Accord are demanding that the Libyan National Army (which recently gave Egypt permission to send its armed forces into Libya) withdraw from the two areas (Sirte and Jufra) and have expressed their determination to take the areas by force if necessary. The Libyan National Army and Egypt have stated that any attempt to capture the two areas will result in Egypt entering Libya in force, which would result in a direct confrontation between Turkey and Egypt. While Egypt has the advantage of sharing a long land border with Libya, in the event of a major conflict air and maritime power could be decisive.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
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southfront--2020-07-24--Sultan Erdogan Wants To Become Caliph Of Turkic People

On July 24 , Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated that all ‘ speculations ’ about the neo-Ottoman project that he ’ s implementing are no more speculations , but the reality .
By Erdogan actions , it becomes clear that the Turkish president positions himslef as the historical leader that restored the Ottoman Empire and once again turned the Hagia Sophia cathedral into a mosque .
In an unprecendented move , on July 25 Erdogan even led the first Muslim prayer at the Hagia Sophia .
The Turkish president officailly leading prayers in a mosque is something that goes contrary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the 1928 amendment of the Constitution of 1924 .
The 1928 amendment removed the provision declaring that the “ Religion of the State is Islam ” , and with the later reforms of Turkey ’ s first president Mustafa Kemal Ataturk , which set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern , democratic , secular state , aligned with Kemalism .
The current Turkish president just demonstrated to the world that the political heritage of Ataturk and his constitution are destroyed .
Instread , Erdogan pretends to be not only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unofficial leader of all Turkic people , but also the spiritual leader of at least Turkic muslims .
Taking into account the relatively successful work to contain the global economic crisis , the COVID-10 outbreak , the Kurdish insurgency and the Turkish ongoing operations in Syria , Iraq and Libya , one may make the conclusion that Erdogan could be a controversial , but pretty effective leader of Turkey .
Furthermore , the current developments in Syria , where the country is in fact split among various factions , Ankara has all chances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s northwest , first of all the Syrian regions of Afrin and Idlib .
These expansionist successes together with a strong position of Turkey in matters involving allied nations ( like support to Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia or the strengthening relations with Kyrgyzstan ) increases the influence and popularity of the Erdogan government in the Turkic world .
In general , in recent years , Erdogan looks even more effective than Russian President Putin .
Another message sent by Erdogan on July 24 is that his Turkey is going to provide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and further .
If Erdogan is able to find and prepare a smart and professional successor , there will be increasing chances that Turkey will become no only one of the regional leaders , but a real global player .
These chances will be increasingly high in the event of a possible decline of influence of the United States , Russia and EU states on the international scene .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Turkish President Attends First Official Prayer At Hagia Sophia For Eight Decades ( Videos )

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On July 24, Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated that all ‘speculations’ about the neo-Ottoman project that he’s implementing are no more speculations, but the reality. By Erdogan actions, it becomes clear that the Turkish president positions himslef as the historical leader that restored the Ottoman Empire and once again turned the Hagia Sophia cathedral into a mosque.
President Erdoğan beautifully reciting Surah Baqarah on the first Jummah prayer of Hagia Sophia Mosque. May Allah bless everything this man has done for the Ummah ❤ pic.twitter.com/I7P1LN86jV — Yasemin (@yaspsa) July 24, 2020
In an unprecendented move, on July 25 Erdogan even led the first Muslim prayer at the Hagia Sophia. The Turkish president officailly leading prayers in a mosque is something that goes contrary to the principle of the secularism introduced with the 1928 amendment of the Constitution of 1924. The 1928 amendment removed the provision declaring that the “Religion of the State is Islam”, and with the later reforms of Turkey’s first president Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, which set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern, democratic, secular state, aligned with Kemalism.
The current Turkish president just demonstrated to the world that the political heritage of Ataturk and his constitution are destroyed. Instread, Erdogan pretends to be not only the official leader of Turkey and the unofficial leader of all Turkic people, but also the spiritual leader of at least Turkic muslims.
Taking into account the relatively successful work to contain the global economic crisis, the COVID-10 outbreak, the Kurdish insurgency and the Turkish ongoing operations in Syria, Iraq and Libya, one may make the conclusion that Erdogan could be a controversial, but pretty effective leader of Turkey. Furthermore, the current developments in Syria, where the country is in fact split among various factions, Ankara has all chances to annex territories in the country’s northwest, first of all the Syrian regions of Afrin and Idlib. These expansionist successes together with a strong position of Turkey in matters involving allied nations (like support to Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia or the strengthening relations with Kyrgyzstan) increases the influence and popularity of the Erdogan government in the Turkic world. In general, in recent years, Erdogan looks even more effective than Russian President Putin.
Another message sent by Erdogan on July 24 is that his Turkey is going to provide its own independent foreign and internal policy and further. If Erdogan is able to find and prepare a smart and professional successor, there will be increasing chances that Turkey will become no only one of the regional leaders, but a real global player. These chances will be increasingly high in the event of a possible decline of influence of the United States, Russia and EU states on the international scene.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
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southfront--2020-07-24--Anti-Armenian Foreign Policy Of Armenian Nationalists

On July 23 , Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented Yerevan ’ s position on the tension on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the process of peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict .
In his statement , the Prime Minister expressed the main trends of Armenia ’ s foreign policy : the development of cooperation with the West in close strategic partnership with Russia .
However , this statement rather seems to be superficial and demonstrative , because in recent years Yerevan has done everything possible to weaken its close ties with Moscow .
The conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border escalated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the two countries clashed near the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan .
Since then , the situation has remained very tense .
Tovuz district is a strategic area for Azerbaijan .
There are three major energy pipelines : the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas pipeline , the Baku — Tbilisi — Erzerum gas pipeline , and the Baku — Supsa oil pipeline , which runs into the black sea ports of Georgia .
In addition , the Baku — Tbilisi — Kars railway and the Baku — Tbilisi highway are located there .
If in this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey , both political and military , it seems that Armenia should count on Russia ’ s help .
However , Moscow is in no hurry to intervene in the conflict and emphasized the importance of a diplomatic solution .
Russian position is preceded by many reasons , and one of them is the anti – Russian policy of the Prime Minister of Armenia , Nikol Pashinyan .
On May 8 , 2018 , after three weeks of demonstrations and protests , a young opposition Deputy Pashinyan , assumed the post of Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the population of Armenia is less than 3 million people , the protests initiated by Pashinyan attracted tens of thousands of protesters .
They led to the resignation of Sargsyan , who , after having been President for 10 years , carried out a constitutional reform , transferring power from President to Prime Minister , and tried to stay in power by taking the position of Prime Minister .
This caused indignation of the population .
In addition , the residents of Armenia were dissatisfied with the increasingly deteriorating economic situation : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decrease in remittances from Russia and an influx of Armenians from abroad , who faced difficulties to find work .
Meanwhile , Republican-linked structures effectively monopolized imports in many import sectors , prompting accusations of corruption .
Apparently inspired by Gandhi ’ s example , Pashinyan went by foot from Gyumri , Armenia ’ s second largest city , to the capital , Yerevan .
The journey took two weeks , and it made Pashinyan looking like an ordinary man of the people : he had a gray beard , and he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and cargo pants .
Pashinyan managed to mobilize young students and activists , and actively used social networks to promote the movement .
In order not to disappoint the forces that brought him to power , the new Prime Minister had to quickly change the course of Armenia ’ s foreign policy .
The war in Nagorno-Karabakh , which officially ended in 1994 , strengthened Armenia ’ s ties with its main ally , Russia , which ensured the country ’ s security .
Yerevan concluded a number of international agreements and agreements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military sphere : • Armenia received two targeted loans in the amount of 200 and 100 million dollars with a minimum interest rate ( 3 % per year ) for the purchase of modern weapons at domestic Russian prices , which is 3-5 times cheaper than prices on world markets ; • Armenia became the only country to which Russia has provided the Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile system ; • Russia and Armenia signed agreements on the creation of a joint air defense system and a common group of troops ; • @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was developed in Gyumri ; • the countries closely interacted in the field of strategic intelligence ; • Armenia has agreed to maintain the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri , four guards of the Border Troops Department of the FSB of Russia and the Russian Air Force base “ Erebuni ” in Yerevan .
Yerevan supported the formation of the CSTO and from the first days of its functioning became its reliable member .
In 2013 , Armenia joined the Customs Union and then the Eurasian Economic Union ( EEU ) in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primarily in the interests of strengthening its national security .
The strategic partnership is supported by the interaction of the two countries in key sectors of the economy : nuclear , gas , electricity , transport , etc .
However , over the past few years , Yerevan has begun to ignore the fact that Russia is the only country capable of ensuring Armenia ’ s security and sovereignty .
Yerevan , apparently , expects that Moscow will not give up military bases on the territory of Armenia and will be ready to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the strategic significance of the Armenian foothold for Russia has significantly decreased due to the expansion of Russian military infrastructure in the Middle East , including naval and air bases in Syria .
Also in the political dimension , the role of Armenia decreased , as Russia and Turkey had improved their bilateral relations .
Moreover , the economic significance of the Armenian market is insignificant both for the Russian state and for Russian private companies .
Thus , given that Moscow is much less interested in strategic partnership than Yerevan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his policy , is sacrificing the national security of his own country .
For a long time , Armenia has pursued a nationalist foreign policy that was significantly at odds with the foreign policy position of its formal strategic ally .
Furthermore , while enjoying Russian military protection , Armenia has declined to support Russia over key issues on the international agenda .
In 2014 Armenia voted against the UN resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine , but did not officially recognize the reunification of Crimea with Russia , aiming not to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Ukraine has paid off with Armenia , supporting Azerbaijan in the recent conflict .
In response to the statements of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry on the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border , protesters poured borsch ( a traditional Ukrainian dish ) over the building of the Ukrainian Embassy in Yerevan .
The arrests of the first President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic , Robert Kocharian , who was loyal to the pro-Russian foreign policy , became widely known .
The new government arrested him three times over the March 2008 crackdown .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Armenian Parliament adopted the law “ on audiovisual media ” by an overwhelming majority ( 79 against 17 ) .
Among other things , the law implied the removal of all foreign-language channels from the free state broadcasting network , which significantly restricted the broadcasting of Russian TV channels .
According to the National Commission on Television and Radio Broadcasting , these channels pose a threat to the national security of Armenia .
By ostentatiously restricting access to Russian channels , representatives of the new Armenian government are dealing another blow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the factors that influenced the turn of Armenia ’ s foreign policy was the creation of a legal regime favorable for the active development of various public organizations funded mainly by the West .
These NGOs already have the ability to attack the key national security agency – National Security Service of Armenia , to lobby for initiatives that contradict traditional values of Armenia , and even to launch activities in Nagorno-Karabakh .
One of their main aims is to undermine the stability of Russian-Armenian allied relations .
All of the above facts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actively engaged in activities that contradict the national interests of the country .
Foreign organizations such as the Soros Foundation , the European Foundation for Support of Democracy , and the American National Foundation for Support of Democracy fund the following NGOs in Armenia : Right SIDE of Lilit Martirosyan , Union of informed citizens of Daniel Ioannisyan , Helsinki Civic Assembly in Vanadzor of Arthur Sakunts , For Equal Rights of Gayane Abrahamyan , Asparez of Levon Barseghyan , etc .
Many representatives of the so-called fifth column in Armenia today not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but are also actively involved in the development of draft laws and other documents of national importance .
The projects of these organizations are characterized as anti-Russians .
Their focus is on finding negative consequences of Armenia ’ s membership in the EEU in the socio-economic and security spheres , as well as promoting the idea that Armenia ’ s military-political cooperation with Russia and the CSTO does not ensure the implementation of the country ’ s fundamental interests .
At the same time , financial support from the United States for Armenia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world .
The US Agency for International Development , an independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance , invested $ 106 million in the health sector of Armenia to combat COVID-19 .
In general , according to his data , Armenia has already received more than 27 million dollars from the US in 2020 , while the majority of this amount , 12 million , was invested in the sector of governance .
Large investment from the US is due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is home to a representative and influential Armenian Diaspora ( more than 1.5 million people ) , which has high economic , financial , technological , institutional , informational , scientific and lobbying resources .
Today , as the conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border escalated , thousands of Armenians staged protests near the Azerbaijani Embassy in Los Angeles , which led to clashes with Azerbaijanis .
This confirmed not only the large size of the Armenian Diaspora , which lives mainly in California , but also their political activity .
The American Diaspora @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy for expanding ties with the United States , exerting a beneficial influence on painful issues , and is a key part of the global Armenian factor .
The Armenian lobby in the United States actively works to protect the interests of the Armenian Diaspora , the Republic of Armenia , and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic .
Today , it is one of the most effective ethnic lobbies in America , and it has the following goals : • Recognition of independence and assistance to the NKR ; • The provision of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lobby is represented by the Armenian national Committee of America ( ANCA ) , which has 45 branches in 25 States , as well as representative offices in Europe .
The “ Armenian Assembly of America ” ( AAA ) operates separately from ANKA .
The house of representatives has a bipartisan group of congressmen on Armenian issues , the Armenian Caucus , which initiates consideration of Armenian issues .
There is also an Armenian Council in the Democratic Party ( Armenian-American Democratic Leadership Council ) and an Armenian Council in the Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Armenian lobby is making significant progress .
In addition to significant financial support , in 1992 , they managed to influence the adoption of the famous 907 amendment to the “ freedom support Act ” , which prohibited assistance to Azerbaijan .
The amendment had a short-term effect , but in the end it brought America more losses than profits .
In October 2019 , the United States recognized the mass deportations and killings of Armenians on the territory of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as an act of genocide .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Armenian lobby , was of great political significance .
If earlier the US avoided calling these events genocide because of the position of Turkey , its key NATO ally , the resolution was adopted at a time when American Congress was dissatisfied with Turkey ’ s policy – in particular , the operation against the Kurds in Northern Syria .
But this was not just because of the invasion of Syria .
Turkey ’ s desire to improve its relations with Russia , the purchase of Russian weapons , in particular the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey , played a major role .
A narrow group of the elite that is currently in power in Armenia is closely affiliated with the neo-liberal democratic forces of the United States .
Today , Pashinyan must be hoping for the coming to power of globalist Democrats after the elections in November this year , which will allow him to strengthen support from abroad for anti-Russian discourse , as well as attract significantly larger financial injections into civil society organizations and institutions that are aimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to bilateral interaction with the Western countries , Armenia does not refuse to cooperate with the NATO bloc in the context of studies , exercises , trainings , and peacekeeping actions , and apparently hopes for the development of the military-technical component of relations .
Since 2002 , Armenia has been involved in the planning and analysis of the NATO Partnership for peace program , which expands the opportunities for interaction with the Alliance .
In 2003 , Armenian military personnel participated in the NATO peacekeeping operation as part of a Greek battalion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group of Armenian military personnel was in Iraq as part of the NATO mission ’ s humanitarian tasks .
In 2010 , Yerevan sent a group of 40 peacekeepers to Afghanistan .
Later , the Armenian peacekeeping contingent was increased three times ( to 130 people ) .
Yerevan also signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan ( IPAP ) within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council , which is the basis for further cooperation with the Alliance .
Pashinyan also actively seeks to bring the country closer to the European Union .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eastern Partnership Program , signed in 2017 with the EU the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU .
If earlier cooperation with the European Union was complementary to Armenia ’ s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union , after Pashinyan came to power , discussions about leaving the Eurasian economic Union are increasingly promoted among the country ’ s leadership mainly at the behest of the pro-Western NGOs .
In turn , the United States is certainly interested in maintaining its influence in South Caucasus .
However , Azerbaijan is could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region than Armenia .
Back in 1994 , the “ Contract of the century ” was signed in Baku .
It represented a series of agreements for a period of 30 years with a number of major multinational companies for the joint exploitation of oil deposits in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian sea .
It was signed thanks to the trust placed in the independent state of Azerbaijan by the major world powers .
In fact , this event laid the foundation for cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan , after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of influential Western States , primarily of the United States .
US interests in Azerbaijan are linked to the expansion of influence in the Caspian region , the creation of safe transit zones for transportation and the development of energy resources .
For the United States , this task is beneficial from the point of view of energy security , trade , economic and strategic partnership .
The potential of Caspian oil and gas could partly offset Europe ’ s dependence on Russia and directly affect Europe ’ s security and US obligations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is obvious that the Americans ‘ interest in the Caspian region is aimed at strengthening regional security , deterring potential rivals , Russia and Iran , and promoting its interests .
Armenia ’ s nationalist foreign policy is very similar to the developments in Ukraine in 2013 .
Despite the Armenian population ’ s claim of fraternity with the Russian people , the country ’ s leadership is leading it not only to lose its main partner in the international arena , but also to sacrifice its national interests to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chosen course is not profitable for Armenia even in the short term , because western countries will not help Yerevan in today ’ s conflict and will certainly not oppose Azerbaijan , which is supported by Turkey .
At the same time , given the involvement of the OSCE Minsk group in the conflict , where France has a special influence , it is possible that the tension on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border may continue for a long period .
It is likely that the West , for example France , is interested in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Erdogan from military operations in Libya , where the Turkish-backed Government of National Unity is actively preparing for a battle with the Libyan National Army for control of the city of Sirte .
At the same time , France tacitly supports Haftar , who heads the LNA .
Thus , Nikol Pashinyan is ready to sacrifice the national interests of the country , its security , as well as the lives of its own citizens to realize the short-term interests of aliens .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Armenia Showcases Wreckage Of @ @ @ @ @

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On July 23, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented Yerevan’s position on the tension on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the process of peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
“The co-chairs countries of the OSCE Minsk group have made a great contribution to the resumption of the ceasefire. In this regard, the participation of the Russian Federation was particularly effective, which was shown at the level of both the Ministry of foreign Affairs and the General Staff of the Armed forces [of Russia]. ” – said Pashinyan.
In his statement, the Prime Minister expressed the main trends of Armenia’s foreign policy: the development of cooperation with the West in close strategic partnership with Russia. However, this statement rather seems to be superficial and demonstrative, because in recent years Yerevan has done everything possible to weaken its close ties with Moscow.
The conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border escalated on July 12, when military personnel of the two countries clashed near the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan. Since then, the situation has remained very tense. Tovuz district is a strategic area for Azerbaijan. There are three major energy pipelines: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas pipeline, the Baku — Tbilisi — Erzerum gas pipeline, and the Baku — Supsa oil pipeline, which runs into the black sea ports of Georgia. In addition, the Baku — Tbilisi — Kars railway and the Baku — Tbilisi highway are located there. If in this conflict Baku receives a large support from Turkey, both political and military, it seems that Armenia should count on Russia’s help. However, Moscow is in no hurry to intervene in the conflict and emphasized the importance of a diplomatic solution. Russian position is preceded by many reasons, and one of them is the anti – Russian policy of the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan.
On May 8, 2018, after three weeks of demonstrations and protests, a young opposition Deputy Pashinyan, assumed the post of Prime Minister of Armenia.
Despite the fact that the population of Armenia is less than 3 million people, the protests initiated by Pashinyan attracted tens of thousands of protesters. They led to the resignation of Sargsyan, who, after having been President for 10 years, carried out a constitutional reform, transferring power from President to Prime Minister, and tried to stay in power by taking the position of Prime Minister. This caused indignation of the population. In addition, the residents of Armenia were dissatisfied with the increasingly deteriorating economic situation: the devaluation of the ruble led to a decrease in remittances from Russia and an influx of Armenians from abroad, who faced difficulties to find work. Meanwhile, Republican-linked structures effectively monopolized imports in many import sectors, prompting accusations of corruption.
Apparently inspired by Gandhi’s example, Pashinyan went by foot from Gyumri, Armenia’s second largest city, to the capital, Yerevan. The journey took two weeks, and it made Pashinyan looking like an ordinary man of the people: he had a gray beard, and he changed his suit to a camouflage t-shirt and cargo pants. Pashinyan managed to mobilize young students and activists, and actively used social networks to promote the movement.
In order not to disappoint the forces that brought him to power, the new Prime Minister had to quickly change the course of Armenia’s foreign policy.
The war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which officially ended in 1994, strengthened Armenia’s ties with its main ally, Russia, which ensured the country’s security. Yerevan concluded a number of international agreements and agreements with Moscow, which primarily affected the military sphere:
Armenia received two targeted loans in the amount of 200 and 100 million dollars with a minimum interest rate (3% per year) for the purchase of modern weapons at domestic Russian prices, which is 3-5 times cheaper than prices on world markets;
Armenia became the only country to which Russia has provided the Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile system;
Russia and Armenia signed agreements on the creation of a joint air defense system and a common group of troops;
joint Russian-Armenian defense production using modern technologies was developed in Gyumri;
the countries closely interacted in the field of strategic intelligence;
Armenia has agreed to maintain the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri, four guards of the Border Troops Department of the FSB of Russia and the Russian Air Force base “Erebuni” in Yerevan.
Yerevan supported the formation of the CSTO and from the first days of its functioning became its reliable member. In 2013, Armenia joined the Customs Union and then the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in order to cooperate closer with Russia, primarily in the interests of strengthening its national security. The strategic partnership is supported by the interaction of the two countries in key sectors of the economy: nuclear, gas, electricity, transport, etc.
However, over the past few years, Yerevan has begun to ignore the fact that Russia is the only country capable of ensuring Armenia’s security and sovereignty.
Yerevan, apparently, expects that Moscow will not give up military bases on the territory of Armenia and will be ready to make concessions to preserve them. However, the strategic significance of the Armenian foothold for Russia has significantly decreased due to the expansion of Russian military infrastructure in the Middle East, including naval and air bases in Syria. Also in the political dimension, the role of Armenia decreased, as Russia and Turkey had improved their bilateral relations. Moreover, the economic significance of the Armenian market is insignificant both for the Russian state and for Russian private companies.
Thus, given that Moscow is much less interested in strategic partnership than Yerevan, Pashinyan, continuing the anti-Russian course of his policy, is sacrificing the national security of his own country. For a long time, Armenia has pursued a nationalist foreign policy that was significantly at odds with the foreign policy position of its formal strategic ally. Furthermore, while enjoying Russian military protection, Armenia has declined to support Russia over key issues on the international agenda.
In 2014 Armenia voted against the UN resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but did not officially recognize the reunification of Crimea with Russia, aiming not to spoil relations with the West. Today, Ukraine has paid off with Armenia, supporting Azerbaijan in the recent conflict. In response to the statements of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry on the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, protesters poured borsch (a traditional Ukrainian dish) over the building of the Ukrainian Embassy in Yerevan.
The arrests of the first President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Robert Kocharian, who was loyal to the pro-Russian foreign policy, became widely known. The new government arrested him three times over the March 2008 crackdown.
A few days ago, on July 16, the Armenian Parliament adopted the law “on audiovisual media” by an overwhelming majority (79 against 17). Among other things, the law implied the removal of all foreign-language channels from the free state broadcasting network, which significantly restricted the broadcasting of Russian TV channels. According to the National Commission on Television and Radio Broadcasting, these channels pose a threat to the national security of Armenia. By ostentatiously restricting access to Russian channels, representatives of the new Armenian government are dealing another blow to relations with Moscow.
“Against the background of Armenia’s statements about the allied, fraternal nature of our strategic relations, the thesis about “Russian TV channels that pose a threat to national security” is perplexing,” the Russian Embassy in Yerevan said.
One of the factors that influenced the turn of Armenia’s foreign policy was the creation of a legal regime favorable for the active development of various public organizations funded mainly by the West. These NGOs already have the ability to attack the key national security agency – National Security Service of Armenia, to lobby for initiatives that contradict traditional values of Armenia, and even to launch activities in Nagorno-Karabakh. One of their main aims is to undermine the stability of Russian-Armenian allied relations. All of the above facts confirm that pro-Western NGOs in Armenia are actively engaged in activities that contradict the national interests of the country.
Foreign organizations such as the Soros Foundation, the European Foundation for Support of Democracy, and the American National Foundation for Support of Democracy fund the following NGOs in Armenia: Right SIDE of Lilit Martirosyan, Union of informed citizens of Daniel Ioannisyan, Helsinki Civic Assembly in Vanadzor of Arthur Sakunts, For Equal Rights of Gayane Abrahamyan, Asparez of Levon Barseghyan, etc.
Many representatives of the so-called fifth column in Armenia today not only freely promote their political initiatives, but are also actively involved in the development of draft laws and other documents of national importance. The projects of these organizations are characterized as anti-Russians. Their focus is on finding negative consequences of Armenia’s membership in the EEU in the socio-economic and security spheres, as well as promoting the idea that Armenia’s military-political cooperation with Russia and the CSTO does not ensure the implementation of the country’s fundamental interests.
At the same time, financial support from the United States for Armenia is one of the largest in the world. The US Agency for International Development, an independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance, invested $106 million in the health sector of Armenia to combat COVID-19. In general, according to his data, Armenia has already received more than 27 million dollars from the US in 2020, while the majority of this amount, 12 million, was invested in the sector of governance.
Large investment from the US is due to various factors. The United States is home to a representative and influential Armenian Diaspora (more than 1.5 million people), which has high economic, financial, technological, institutional, informational, scientific and lobbying resources. Today, as the conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border escalated, thousands of Armenians staged protests near the Azerbaijani Embassy in Los Angeles, which led to clashes with Azerbaijanis. This confirmed not only the large size of the Armenian Diaspora, which lives mainly in California, but also their political activity.
The American Diaspora is the most important potential of Armenian diplomacy for expanding ties with the United States, exerting a beneficial influence on painful issues, and is a key part of the global Armenian factor. The Armenian lobby in the United States actively works to protect the interests of the Armenian Diaspora, the Republic of Armenia, and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Today, it is one of the most effective ethnic lobbies in America, and it has the following goals:
Recognition of the Armenian genocide;
Recognition of independence and assistance to the NKR;
The provision of U.S. assistance to Armenia;
Blocking arms deals with Turkey;
Fighting against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project;
Fighting against the Baku — Tbilisi — Kars project.
Today’s lobby is represented by the Armenian national Committee of America (ANCA), which has 45 branches in 25 States, as well as representative offices in Europe. The “Armenian Assembly of America” (AAA) operates separately from ANKA. The house of representatives has a bipartisan group of congressmen on Armenian issues, the Armenian Caucus, which initiates consideration of Armenian issues. There is also an Armenian Council in the Democratic Party (Armenian-American Democratic Leadership Council) and an Armenian Council in the Republican Party (Armenian-American Republican Council).
The Armenian lobby is making significant progress. In addition to significant financial support, in 1992, they managed to influence the adoption of the famous 907 amendment to the “freedom support Act”, which prohibited assistance to Azerbaijan. The amendment had a short-term effect, but in the end it brought America more losses than profits.
In October 2019, the United States recognized the mass deportations and killings of Armenians on the territory of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as an act of genocide. This issue, which was actively promoted by the Armenian lobby, was of great political significance. If earlier the US avoided calling these events genocide because of the position of Turkey, its key NATO ally, the resolution was adopted at a time when American Congress was dissatisfied with Turkey’s policy – in particular, the operation against the Kurds in Northern Syria. But this was not just because of the invasion of Syria. Turkey’s desire to improve its relations with Russia, the purchase of Russian weapons, in particular the S-400 air defense system, and the deal to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey, played a major role.
A narrow group of the elite that is currently in power in Armenia is closely affiliated with the neo-liberal democratic forces of the United States. Today, Pashinyan must be hoping for the coming to power of globalist Democrats after the elections in November this year, which will allow him to strengthen support from abroad for anti-Russian discourse, as well as attract significantly larger financial injections into civil society organizations and institutions that are aimed at undermining Armenian-Russian relations.
In addition to bilateral interaction with the Western countries, Armenia does not refuse to cooperate with the NATO bloc in the context of studies, exercises, trainings, and peacekeeping actions, and apparently hopes for the development of the military-technical component of relations.
Since 2002, Armenia has been involved in the planning and analysis of the NATO Partnership for peace program, which expands the opportunities for interaction with the Alliance. In 2003, Armenian military personnel participated in the NATO peacekeeping operation as part of a Greek battalion. From 2005 to 2008, a group of Armenian military personnel was in Iraq as part of the NATO mission’s humanitarian tasks. In 2010, Yerevan sent a group of 40 peacekeepers to Afghanistan. Later, the Armenian peacekeeping contingent was increased three times (to 130 people). Yerevan also signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which is the basis for further cooperation with the Alliance.
Pashinyan also actively seeks to bring the country closer to the European Union. Armenia, being a member of the Eastern Partnership Program, signed in 2017 with the EU the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU. If earlier cooperation with the European Union was complementary to Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, after Pashinyan came to power, discussions about leaving the Eurasian economic Union are increasingly promoted among the country’s leadership mainly at the behest of the pro-Western NGOs.
In the recent conflict on the border with Azerbaijan, Yerevan did not resort to the assistance of the CSTO, but stated that in order to achieve peace with Baku, “an international system of reliable monitoring of compliance with the ceasefire regime should be established”. In addition, he claimed that it was necessary to continue negotiations “within the framework of the OSCE Minsk group”, which in addition to Russia includes the United States and France, which are Turkey’s NATO allies.
In turn, the United States is certainly interested in maintaining its influence in South Caucasus. However, Azerbaijan is could be a more valuable partner in the region than Armenia.
Back in 1994, the “Contract of the century” was signed in Baku. It represented a series of agreements for a period of 30 years with a number of major multinational companies for the joint exploitation of oil deposits in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian sea. It was signed thanks to the trust placed in the independent state of Azerbaijan by the major world powers. In fact, this event laid the foundation for cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan, after which Baku became a profitable economic partner of influential Western States, primarily of the United States.
US interests in Azerbaijan are linked to the expansion of influence in the Caspian region, the creation of safe transit zones for transportation and the development of energy resources. For the United States, this task is beneficial from the point of view of energy security, trade, economic and strategic partnership. The potential of Caspian oil and gas could partly offset Europe’s dependence on Russia and directly affect Europe’s security and US obligations within NATO. At the same time, it is obvious that the Americans ‘ interest in the Caspian region is aimed at strengthening regional security, deterring potential rivals, Russia and Iran, and promoting its interests.
Armenia’s nationalist foreign policy is very similar to the developments in Ukraine in 2013. Despite the Armenian population’s claim of fraternity with the Russian people, the country’s leadership is leading it not only to lose its main partner in the international arena, but also to sacrifice its national interests to the dream of potential European integration.
The chosen course is not profitable for Armenia even in the short term, because western countries will not help Yerevan in today’s conflict and will certainly not oppose Azerbaijan, which is supported by Turkey. At the same time, given the involvement of the OSCE Minsk group in the conflict, where France has a special influence, it is possible that the tension on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border may continue for a long period. It is likely that the West, for example France, is interested in escalating the conflict, because it distracts Erdogan from military operations in Libya, where the Turkish-backed Government of National Unity is actively preparing for a battle with the Libyan National Army for control of the city of Sirte. At the same time, France tacitly supports Haftar, who heads the LNA. Thus, Nikol Pashinyan is ready to sacrifice the national interests of the country, its security, as well as the lives of its own citizens to realize the short-term interests of aliens.
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southfront--2020-07-24--Rocket Strike Hit Military Camp Hosting Coalition Troops Near Iraq’s Baghdad

Late on July 24 , four “ Katyusha ” rockets struck Pasmaya military camp which is located 60 km south of the Iraqi capital , Baghdad .
In a statement , Security Media cell said that one of the rockets had hit an armor garage , while another had hit the barracks of the camp ’ s security unit .
The two other rockets landed in empty areas .
Despite causing some material losses , the rocket attack didn ’ t result in any casualties .
Pasmaya military camp , which was primary used for training , is known to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coalition .
A day earlier , Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Ekman , Deputy Commander of the coalition , announced that the camp would be handed over to Iraqi government forces on July 25 .
The general said the coalition was slowly reducing the number of its troops in Iraq .
U.S. forces are facing increasing challenges in Iraq .
On July 23 , a drone armed with a 2 kg bomb was found in an area neighboring Baghdad ’ s Green Zone , where the U.S. embassy is located .
A rocket attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian-affiliated Shiite armed groups , like Kata ’ ib Hezbollah , are often blamed for these attacks .
However , there is no evidence to back these accusations .
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Late on July 24, four “Katyusha” rockets struck Pasmaya military camp which is located 60 km south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.
In a statement, Security Media cell said that one of the rockets had hit an armor garage, while another had hit the barracks of the camp’s security unit. The two other rockets landed in empty areas. Despite causing some material losses, the rocket attack didn’t result in any casualties.
“Initial information indicates that the rockets were launched from the area of al-Dainiyah in the governorate of Diyala,” the statement reads.
Pasmaya military camp, which was primary used for training, is known to be hosting some troops of the U.S.-led coalition.
سقوط ٤ صواريخ نوع كاتيوشا داخل معسكر بسماية عصر اليوم، حيث سقط الأول على مستودع للدورع والثاني على كرفانات تابعة لفوج حماية المعسكر والصاروخين الآخرين سقطا في ساحة فارغة، مما ادى الى أضرار مادية فقط دون وقوع خسائر بشرية … pic.twitter.com/n8WcgdHiNG — خلية الإعلام الأمني?? (@SecMedCell) July 24, 2020
A day earlier, Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Ekman, Deputy Commander of the coalition, announced that the camp would be handed over to Iraqi government forces on July 25. The general said the coalition was slowly reducing the number of its troops in Iraq.
U.S. forces are facing increasing challenges in Iraq. On July 23, a drone armed with a 2 kg bomb was found in an area neighboring Baghdad’s Green Zone, where the U.S. embassy is located. A rocket attack targeted the embassy on July 19.
Iranian-affiliated Shiite armed groups, like Kata’ib Hezbollah, are often blamed for these attacks. However, there is no evidence to back these accusations.
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southfront--2020-07-24--Turkish Drone Strike Targeted SDF Security Forces In Northeastern Syria

On July 24 , a Turkish drone strike targeted a checkpoint of the Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) near the town of al-Dardara in the northern al-Hasakah countryside .
The pro-opposition Shahed Agency claimed that the checkpoint was manned by personnel of the SDF ’ s security forces , commonly known as Asayish .
“ As a result of the strike three personnel of the SDF ’ s security body , Asayish , were severely injured , they were transported to a hospital in Tell Tamr town in northern al-Hasakah , ” the agency quoted local sources as saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strike remains unclear .
The SDF has not made any comment on the incident , thus far .
In the last few months , a number of Turkish drone strikes targeted northeastern Syria .
Last week , a drone attack believed to be carried out by Turkish forces injured six Russian and Syrian service members in northern al-Hasakah .
The attack is being investigated .
Turkish drone strikes are threatening stability in northeastern Syria .
Turkey committed to de-escalate tension in the region and ceasefire in two separate agreements with the U.S. and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s forces are still carrying some operations there .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • New Evidence Linked Turkish Forces To Recent Drone Attack On Russian Troops In Northeastern Syria ( Video )

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On July 24, a Turkish drone strike targeted a checkpoint of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near the town of al-Dardara in the northern al-Hasakah countryside.
The pro-opposition Shahed Agency claimed that the checkpoint was manned by personnel of the SDF’s security forces, commonly known as Asayish.
“As a result of the strike three personnel of the SDF’s security body, Asayish, were severely injured, they were transported to a hospital in Tell Tamr town in northern al-Hasakah,” the agency quoted local sources as saying.
The motive behind the Turkish drone strike remains unclear. The SDF has not made any comment on the incident, thus far.
In the last few months, a number of Turkish drone strikes targeted northeastern Syria. Last week, a drone attack believed to be carried out by Turkish forces injured six Russian and Syrian service members in northern al-Hasakah. The attack is being investigated.
Turkish drone strikes are threatening stability in northeastern Syria. Turkey committed to de-escalate tension in the region and ceasefire in two separate agreements with the U.S. and Russia last year. However, Ankara’s forces are still carrying some operations there.
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