southfront--2020-12-08--Failed Ukrainian Special Operation: New Details On Armed Clash On Ukrainian-Russian Border

On December 4 , the Russian Federal Security Service ( FSB ) reported that Russian border guards prevented an attempt of 3 armed men to cross the Russian border from Ukraine .
Gunmen resisted to the detention and opened fire at Russian personnel .
As a result of the armed clash , one of gunmen was eliminated , while two others fled back to Ukraine .
The FSB has not yet provided other details of the incident .
However , the intercepted group was likely a subversive reconnaissance unit affiliated with Ukrainian ( and thus Western ) intelligence services .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to reports , received a fire support from the territory of Ukraine during the incident .
Over the past years , Ukraine with help from its ‘ ’ democratic partners ” has repeatedly tried to stage terrorist attacks in Russia and there are no indications that these efforts were halted by the Zelensky administration .
Recently , in Russian media appeared some details of the incident indicating that the Security Service of Ukraine ( SBU ) and the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces continue active planning and conducting active operations ( even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the territory of Russia .
In particular , according to the version shared by Russian media , the armed clash erupted during an attempt of the Ukrainian unit to kidnap a Russian citizen from the territory of Russia .
The report claims that the Kiev regime tried to kidnap a former member of self-defense forces of the region of Donbass – Denis Kharitonov .
The kidnapping attempt reportedly appeared to be a continuation of the SBU provocation that led to a temporary detention of Russia-linked private military contractors ( some of them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donetsk and Lugansk People ’ s Republics ) in Belarus .
MORE HERE Then , the SBU staged a provocation luring this group of people on the territory of Belarus , as a supposed transport point under the fake security contract to protect Rosneft facilities in Venezuela .
At the same time , the Kiev government informed the Belarusian authorities that this group of Russia-linked PMCs are preparing to stage an armed coup in Belarus and after their detention , requested their extradition .
The operation failed , when the entire SBU plot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the version of events provided by the Ukrainian special services .
For example , Ukrainian media released a recording of phone calls between an SBU agent ( posing as a fake recruiter for the security agency ) and ther persons that the Ukrainian side described as three former members of self-defense forces of the region of Donbass – Denis Kharitonov , Sergey Sherbakov and Alexander Sidorov .
On the tape , the SBU agent requests them to describe their combat experience and skills under the pretext that this information is needed for signing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the man named Denis Kharitonov says that since 2014 he fought on the side of self-defense forces of Donbass in the Steppe battalion .
He allegedly shot down a helicopter and two military Su-25 attack aircraft via MANPADs .
Then , the SBU agent talks with another man , allegedly Sergey Shcherbakov , that confirms the data on the downed helicopter and warplanes .
Another person allegedly recorded by the SBU is Alexander Sidorov .
This man said that he fought in 2014 and 2015 in the Lugansk People ’ s Republic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the village of Peski , Donetsk region .
Just in August 2020 , the FSB already prevented an SBU plot to kidnap one of the leaders of the Eastern Ukraine ’ s people ’ s militia in Russia and taking him to Ukraine .
The name of the victim was not disclosed .
Seven defendants in the criminal case – Russian citizens – have already been arrested .
The development reportedly took place near Moscow .
The organizers and coordinators of the action were the citizens of Ukraine Andriy Baidala and Igor Mishchenko @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the increase of SBU attempts to conduct aggressive actions on the territory of Russia , these developments demonstrate the new trend .
Special services of Ukraine with support from their NATO partners are not even hiding their active planning and employing of sabotage and other activities against Russia .
This activity has slowly but steadily becoming a permanent factor of life in the Russian border regions .
So far , SBU-sponsored plots have been successfully repelled by Russian special services .
However , in the long run , this threat will continue to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • Armed Clashes Erupt At Russian-Ukrainian Border After Russian Border Guards Intercept Group Of Gunmen • CIA Sponsored the SBU Operation To Kidnap 33 Russians In Belarus

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On December 4, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that Russian border guards prevented an attempt of 3 armed men to cross the Russian border from Ukraine. Gunmen resisted to the detention and opened fire at Russian personnel. As a result of the armed clash, one of gunmen was eliminated, while two others fled back to Ukraine.
“In the area of the Border Directorate of the FSB of Russia for the Belgorod and Voronezh regions, on December 4, a frontier detachment suppressed an attempt to violate the border from Ukraine to the Russian Federation by three armed unknown persons. The violators showed armed resistance during the arrest attempt,” the FSB reported.
The FSB has not yet provided other details of the incident. However, the intercepted group was likely a subversive reconnaissance unit affiliated with Ukrainian (and thus Western) intelligence services. The neutralized group was well equipped and, according to reports, received a fire support from the territory of Ukraine during the incident. Over the past years, Ukraine with help from its ‘’democratic partners” has repeatedly tried to stage terrorist attacks in Russia and there are no indications that these efforts were halted by the Zelensky administration.
Recently, in Russian media appeared some details of the incident indicating that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces continue active planning and conducting active operations (even if they are not very successful) on the territory of Russia.
In particular, according to the version shared by Russian media, the armed clash erupted during an attempt of the Ukrainian unit to kidnap a Russian citizen from the territory of Russia. The report claims that the Kiev regime tried to kidnap a former member of self-defense forces of the region of Donbass – Denis Kharitonov.
The kidnapping attempt reportedly appeared to be a continuation of the SBU provocation that led to a temporary detention of Russia-linked private military contractors (some of them were previously members of forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics) in Belarus. MORE HERE Then, the SBU staged a provocation luring this group of people on the territory of Belarus, as a supposed transport point under the fake security contract to protect Rosneft facilities in Venezuela. At the same time, the Kiev government informed the Belarusian authorities that this group of Russia-linked PMCs are preparing to stage an armed coup in Belarus and after their detention, requested their extradition. The operation failed, when the entire SBU plot was revealed due to multiple contradictions in the version of events provided by the Ukrainian special services.
For example, Ukrainian media released a recording of phone calls between an SBU agent (posing as a fake recruiter for the security agency) and ther persons that the Ukrainian side described as three former members of self-defense forces of the region of Donbass – Denis Kharitonov, Sergey Sherbakov and Alexander Sidorov. On the tape, the SBU agent requests them to describe their combat experience and skills under the pretext that this information is needed for signing of the security contract.
The man named Denis Kharitonov says that since 2014 he fought on the side of self-defense forces of Donbass in the Steppe battalion. He allegedly shot down a helicopter and two military Su-25 attack aircraft via MANPADs. Then, the SBU agent talks with another man, allegedly Sergey Shcherbakov, that confirms the data on the downed helicopter and warplanes. Another person allegedly recorded by the SBU is Alexander Sidorov. This man said that he fought in 2014 and 2015 in the Lugansk People’s Republic and in 2016 in the area of the village of Peski, Donetsk region.
Just in August 2020, the FSB already prevented an SBU plot to kidnap one of the leaders of the Eastern Ukraine’s people’s militia in Russia and taking him to Ukraine. The name of the victim was not disclosed. Seven defendants in the criminal case – Russian citizens – have been arrested.
“As a result of a special operation, the FSB of the Russian Federation uncovered and suppressed an illegal action by the special services of Ukraine on the abduction on the territory of Russia and the forcible transfer to Ukraine of a citizen of the Russian Federation, one of the leaders of the Donbass people’s militia, who took an active part in hostilities against the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” the FSB press service reported.
The development reportedly took place near Moscow. The organizers and coordinators of the action were the citizens of Ukraine Andriy Baidala and Igor Mishchenko.
Additionally with multiple other reports about the increase of SBU attempts to conduct aggressive actions on the territory of Russia, these developments demonstrate the new trend. Special services of Ukraine with support from their NATO partners are not even hiding their active planning and employing of sabotage and other activities against Russia. This activity has slowly but steadily becoming a permanent factor of life in the Russian border regions. So far, SBU-sponsored plots have been successfully repelled by Russian special services. However, in the long run, this threat will continue to grow.
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southfront--2020-12-08--Military Situation In Afghanistan On December 7, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan : • On December 7 @ @ @ @ @ were wounded in a SVBIED attack near the Daman police HQ east of Kandahar ; @ @ @ @ @ at least 28 Taliban members were killed and 5 others were injured in clashes with @ @ @ @ @ and Uruzgan provinces , according to the Afghanistan Defense Ministry ; • On December 7 @ @ @ @ @ struck positions of Taliban in the Helmand area ; MORE ON THE TOPIC :

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan:
On December 7, more than 30 people were wounded in a SVBIED attack near the Daman police HQ east of Kandahar;
On December 6, at least 28 Taliban members were killed and 5 others were injured in clashes with security forces in southern Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces, according to the Afghanistan Defense Ministry;
On December 7, the Afghan Air Force struck positions of Taliban in the Helmand area;
On December 7, Afghan Army forces attacked Taliban positions near Kunduz.
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southfront--2020-12-08--Get SouthFront-Branded Items Now! Join The Resistance!

During the past years , SouthFront received multiple requests to provide you with an opportunity to buy branded items or @ @ @ @ @ , SouthFront is a mostly volunteer team that operates on audience ’ s donations and @ @ @ @ @ time and resources .
Nonetheless , thanks to your regular support , we finally set @ @ @ @ @ to obtain SouthFront-branded T-shirts , hoodies , mugs and other goods .
We are excited @ @ @ @ @ batch of SouthFront-branded items .
You can find the FULL LIST OF AVAILABLE ITEMS HERE @ @ @ @ @ BUYING THESE ITEMS YOU SUPPORT WORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHFRONT : YOU CAN ALSO SUPPORT @ @ @ @ @ Donate via VISA , PayPal , Paysafecard , Bitcoin and other options .

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southfront--2020-12-08--Houthis Make Fresh Gains In Battle With Saudi Proxies In Yemen’s Marib (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image Forces of the Ansar Allah movement ( more widely known as the Houthis ) @ @ @ @ @ on positions of Saudi proxies in the Yemeni province of Marib : • On December @ @ @ @ @ captured the Samra area north of Ajouz Height ; • On December 8 , Saudi-led @ @ @ @ @ Allah in the Madghal area ; • On December 7 , Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted @ @ @ @ @ Sarwah areas .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Saudi Arabia Claims It Intercepted Houthi @ @ @ @ @ Clashes Continue In Yemen ’ s Marib • Saudi-led Forces Are About To Lose Another @ @ @ @

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Forces of the Ansar Allah movement (more widely known as the Houthis) have been developing their advance on positions of Saudi proxies in the Yemeni province of Marib:
On December 8, Ansar Allah reportedly captured the Samra area north of Ajouz Height;
On December 8, Saudi-led forces attacked positions of Ansar Allah in the Madghal area;
On December 7, Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 12 airstrikes on Raghwan and Sarwah areas.
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Kurd Runner 2020

The situation in the northern Syrian provinces of Aleppo and al-Hasakah is once again escalating amid speculations on the upcoming Turkish advance in the area .
In recent weeks , the Turkish military and its proxies increased the intensity of strikes on positions of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) and even on nearby positions of the Syrian Army along the contact line in the northeast of Syria .
For example , on the evening of December 6 , Turkish strikes hit a position of the Syrian Army near Tall Tamr destroying a BMP vehicle and reportedly injuring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fighters affiliated with the SDF attacked a position of the Turkish Army near Bab al-Khayr .
According to pro-Kurdish sources , 2 Turkish soldiers were allegedly killed or injured in the attack .
On the same day , the Turkish military and its proxies launched over 150 artillery shells at targets near and inside the town of Ain Issa .
The shelling that lasted for several hours reportedly killed at least one SDF member and injured several others .
The activity of Turkish forces near Ain Issa was permanently high in the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation deteriorated even further .
A nearby observation post of the Russian Military Police and a position of the Syrian Army did not stop the Turks from violating the ceasefire .
In its own turn , pro-Ankara sources insist that the tensions in the region are a result of regular sabotage attacks by the SDF and affiliated Kurdish rebels near Ain Issa itself and in entire northern part of Syria in general .
For example , Kurdish groups linked with the SDF regularly inflict casualties on Turkish forces and their proxies in Afrin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is not linked with these attacks , nobody with at least one brain cell believes in this .
The strong SDF links with the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party ( PKK ) , a Kurdish separatist armed group that seeks to create an independent Kurdish state on the territory of southeastern Turkey , and if it is possible northern Iraq and northern Syria , also does not contribute to stability .
Turkey sees the group as a vital threat to its national security .
Recently , the SDF Commander-in-Chief Ferhat Abdi Şahin officially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ died in the battles in Syria fighting on the side of the SDF .
Abdi , better known by his nom de guerre Mazloum Kobani , is himself a senior member of the PKK and a personal friend of the group ’ s leader Abdullah Öcalan , who has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999 .
So , there is no surprise that Ankara sees claims of the United States leadership and SDF officials that the Kurdish-led group is not an offshoot of the PKK , but a ‘ democratically-oriented multiethnic alliance ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of hypocrisy .
In these conditions , the fate of the SDF is predetermined and the group remains under the permanent threat of a large-scale Turkish military attack .
At the same time , the main backer of the SDF , the United States , has never hurried up to openly back the group against its own important ally in the Middle East and a member of NATO .
Therefore , on the one hand , in its actions , the SDF relies on US support and has been consistently sabotaging Damascus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reintegration into Syria .
On the other hand , the Kurdish-led group has already lost a large part of the territories that it had controlled as a result of Turkish attacks .
This posture led to expected results and the last time the SDF even asked the Russians and the Syrian Army to rescue it from the Turkish advance in the northeast .
The deployment of the Russian and Syrian units along the contact line put an end to Turkey ’ s Operation Peace Spring in 2019 .
Immediately after this , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and started cooperation with Washington in the field looting Syrian oil on the eastern bank of the Euphrates .
Now , when the situation near Ain Issa is once again on the brink of military confrontation with Turkey , pro-SDF media have been crying and complaining about the alleged Russian demand to surrender the town to the Syrian Army to prevent the escalation .
SDF sources call this ‘ unfair ’ and ‘ unacceptable ’ .
It looks like that for the current Kurdish SDF leadership on Washington ’ s payroll it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of territory and provoke a bloodbath than to finally normalize relations with Damascus .

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The situation in the northern Syrian provinces of Aleppo and al-Hasakah is once again escalating amid speculations on the upcoming Turkish advance in the area.
In recent weeks, the Turkish military and its proxies increased the intensity of strikes on positions of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and even on nearby positions of the Syrian Army along the contact line in the northeast of Syria. For example, on the evening of December 6, Turkish strikes hit a position of the Syrian Army near Tall Tamr destroying a BMP vehicle and reportedly injuring or killing several soldiers. Meanwhile, fighters affiliated with the SDF attacked a position of the Turkish Army near Bab al-Khayr. According to pro-Kurdish sources, 2 Turkish soldiers were allegedly killed or injured in the attack. On the same day, the Turkish military and its proxies launched over 150 artillery shells at targets near and inside the town of Ain Issa. The shelling that lasted for several hours reportedly killed at least one SDF member and injured several others.
The activity of Turkish forces near Ain Issa was permanently high in the last few months but in recent weeks the situation deteriorated even further. A nearby observation post of the Russian Military Police and a position of the Syrian Army did not stop the Turks from violating the ceasefire. In its own turn, pro-Ankara sources insist that the tensions in the region are a result of regular sabotage attacks by the SDF and affiliated Kurdish rebels near Ain Issa itself and in entire northern part of Syria in general. For example, Kurdish groups linked with the SDF regularly inflict casualties on Turkish forces and their proxies in Afrin. While publicly the SDF pretends that it is not linked with these attacks, nobody with at least one brain cell believes in this.
The strong SDF links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist armed group that seeks to create an independent Kurdish state on the territory of southeastern Turkey, and if it is possible northern Iraq and northern Syria, also does not contribute to stability. Turkey sees the group as a vital threat to its national security. Recently, the SDF Commander-in-Chief Ferhat Abdi Şahin officially confirmed that at least 4,000 PKK members died in the battles in Syria fighting on the side of the SDF. Abdi, better known by his nom de guerre Mazloum Kobani, is himself a senior member of the PKK and a personal friend of the group’s leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999.
So, there is no surprise that Ankara sees claims of the United States leadership and SDF officials that the Kurdish-led group is not an offshoot of the PKK, but a ‘democratically-oriented multiethnic alliance’ as a bad joke and the highest level of hypocrisy. In these conditions, the fate of the SDF is predetermined and the group remains under the permanent threat of a large-scale Turkish military attack.
At the same time, the main backer of the SDF, the United States, has never hurried up to openly back the group against its own important ally in the Middle East and a member of NATO. Therefore, on the one hand, in its actions, the SDF relies on US support and has been consistently sabotaging Damascus’ proposals on the political and security reintegration into Syria. On the other hand, the Kurdish-led group has already lost a large part of the territories that it had controlled as a result of Turkish attacks.
This posture led to expected results and the last time the SDF even asked the Russians and the Syrian Army to rescue it from the Turkish advance in the northeast. The deployment of the Russian and Syrian units along the contact line put an end to Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in 2019. Immediately after this, the Kurds turned their back on their rescuers and started cooperation with Washington in the field looting Syrian oil on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. Now, when the situation near Ain Issa is once again on the brink of military confrontation with Turkey, pro-SDF media have been crying and complaining about the alleged Russian demand to surrender the town to the Syrian Army to prevent the escalation. SDF sources call this ‘unfair’ and ‘unacceptable’.
It looks like that for the current Kurdish SDF leadership on Washington’s payroll it would be more acceptable to lose another chunk of territory and provoke a bloodbath than to finally normalize relations with Damascus.
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southfront--2020-12-08--Egypt Announces Preemptive Strikes On Militants Deployed Near Border, In Eastern Libya (Video)

On December 8 , the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that they had carried out preemptive strikes on militants deployed near the country ’ s border , in eastern Libya .
According to the military , strikes eliminated 21 SUVs loaded with militants , arms and ammunition .
Actions of Egypt , one of the key backers of the Libyan National Army ( LNA ) , came as the LNA intercepted and captured a Turkish ship – the “ Mabrouka ” , sailing under a Jamaican flag , in Libyan waters .
According to the LNA , the ship was sailing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposedly delivering weapons .
“ The ship ’ s crew is made of nine Turks , seven Indians and one Azerbaijani sailor .
It is being investigated for its violations of maritime laws and regulations , ” LNA spokesman Brigadier General Ahmed al-Mismari said .
Turkey supports the LNA ’ s rival – the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord ( GNA ) .
Ankara regularly supplies the GNA with weapons and equipment , and has deployed its own troops and Turkish-backed Syrian militants to support the GNA .
Earlier , reports appeared that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resumed in the south of Libya .
This may indicate that the conflict is nearing the new round of escalation .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Turkey Plans To Deploy More Syrian Militants In Libya Despite Ongoing Peace Talks

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On December 8, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that they had carried out preemptive strikes on militants deployed near the country’s border, in eastern Libya. According to the military, strikes eliminated 21 SUVs loaded with militants, arms and ammunition.
Actions of Egypt, one of the key backers of the Libyan National Army (LNA), came as the LNA intercepted and captured a Turkish ship – the “Mabrouka”, sailing under a Jamaican flag, in Libyan waters. According to the LNA, the ship was sailing towards the port of Misrata and was supposedly delivering weapons.
“The ship’s crew is made of nine Turks, seven Indians and one Azerbaijani sailor. It is being investigated for its violations of maritime laws and regulations,” LNA spokesman Brigadier General Ahmed al-Mismari said.
Turkey supports the LNA’s rival – the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). Ankara regularly supplies the GNA with weapons and equipment, and has deployed its own troops and Turkish-backed Syrian militants to support the GNA.
Earlier, reports appeared that clashes between the LNA and Turkish-backed forces resumed in the south of Libya. This may indicate that the conflict is nearing the new round of escalation.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Turkish Forces Withdrew From Western Aleppo Post Besieged By Syrian Army Troops (Video)

On November 9 , the Turkish Armed Forces withdrew from yet another “ observation post ” in the northwestern part of Syria .
The observation post , which was located in the al-Rashidin district in western Aleppo , was besieged by the Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) earlier this year .
The SAA and its allies liberated the area surrounding the post in the course of a large-scale operation against al-Qaeda terrorists ten months ago .
A large Turkish convoy escorted by Russian forces entered western Aleppo a day earlier to move the very last batch of troops and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Sputnik news agency , Turkish troops blew up a number of tunnels they previously dug under the post before their withdrawal .
This was the second observation post in western Aleppo abandoned by Turkish forces .
The first post , that was located in the town of Kabtan al-Jabal , was evacuated on November 11 .
Turkish forces also withdrew from four other posts in northern Hama and southern Idlib in November .
While Turkey is withdrawing its troops from government-held areas , it is boosting its military presence in Greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were established in the region , mainly south of the M4 highway , during the last month .
Turkey has been working to fulfill some of its commitments under the March 5 agreement with Russia .
However , Ankara is yet to take a direct action against terrorist groups in Greater Idlib .
This may lead to a new military escalation in the region .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Syrian Army To Expand Its Presence In Northern Raqqa Under New Agreement With SDF

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On November 9, the Turkish Armed Forces withdrew from yet another “observation post” in the northwestern part of Syria.
The observation post, which was located in the al-Rashidin district in western Aleppo, was besieged by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) earlier this year. The SAA and its allies liberated the area surrounding the post in the course of a large-scale operation against al-Qaeda terrorists ten months ago.
A large Turkish convoy escorted by Russian forces entered western Aleppo a day earlier to move the very last batch of troops and equipment out of the post. According to the Sputnik news agency, Turkish troops blew up a number of tunnels they previously dug under the post before their withdrawal.
This was the second observation post in western Aleppo abandoned by Turkish forces. The first post, that was located in the town of Kabtan al-Jabal, was evacuated on November 11. Turkish forces also withdrew from four other posts in northern Hama and southern Idlib in November.
While Turkey is withdrawing its troops from government-held areas, it is boosting its military presence in Greater Idlib. A number of new posts were established in the region, mainly south of the M4 highway, during the last month.
Turkey has been working to fulfill some of its commitments under the March 5 agreement with Russia. However, Ankara is yet to take a direct action against terrorist groups in Greater Idlib. This may lead to a new military escalation in the region.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Syrian Army To Expand Its Presence In Northern Raqqa Under New Agreement With SDF

The Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) will expand its presence in the northern Raqqa countryside under a new agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) .
The move comes amid the increase in attacks by Turkish forces in the region .
On November 8 , the Hawar News Agency ( ANHA ) said that the new agreement was reached during a recent meeting that was attended by officials of the SDF , the Damascus government and Russian officers .
The meeting was held in the Coordination and Operations Center of the Russian Military Police in the town @ @ @ @ @ @ @ established last year following Turkey ’ s “ Peace Spring ” operation in northeastern Syria .
Under the agreement , the SAA and the SDF will establish three joint “ observation posts ” in the outskirts of Ain Issa .
In the last few months , the town was attacked by Turkish forces dozens of times .
The agreement confirms recent reports , which said Russia warned the SDF from a near Turkish-led attack on Ain Issa .
According to the reports , the U.S.-backed group refused to hand over the town to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open to the idea of allowing the SAA to expand its influence in northern Raqqa .
The Damascus government doesn ’ t usually comment on internal deals .
The SDF , on the other side , is yet to reveal the details of the agreement .
The new agreement is supposedly meant to “ observe ” the violations of Turkish forces around Issa .
However , it may only be the beginning of a wider cooperation between Damascus and the SDF with Russia ’ s support .
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The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) will expand its presence in the northern Raqqa countryside under a new agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The move comes amid the increase in attacks by Turkish forces in the region.
On November 8, the Hawar News Agency (ANHA) said that the new agreement was reached during a recent meeting that was attended by officials of the SDF, the Damascus government and Russian officers. The meeting was held in the Coordination and Operations Center of the Russian Military Police in the town of Ain Issa. The center was established last year following Turkey’s “Peace Spring” operation in northeastern Syria.
Under the agreement, the SAA and the SDF will establish three joint “observation posts” in the outskirts of Ain Issa. In the last few months, the town was attacked by Turkish forces dozens of times.
The agreement confirms recent reports, which said Russia warned the SDF from a near Turkish-led attack on Ain Issa. According to the reports, the U.S.-backed group refused to hand over the town to Damascus forces. However, it was open to the idea of allowing the SAA to expand its influence in northern Raqqa.
The Damascus government doesn’t usually comment on internal deals. The SDF, on the other side, is yet to reveal the details of the agreement.
The new agreement is supposedly meant to “observe” the violations of Turkish forces around Issa. However, it may only be the beginning of a wider cooperation between Damascus and the SDF with Russia’s support.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Russia Is Not Ready For Next-Generation War

SouthFront publishes translation of an interview with a senior official of Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies ( CAST ) , one of the few Russian think tanks that declare their formal independence emulating their Western counterparts .
In doing so , CAST regularly states that it fills orders of Russian official institutions .
A number of its studies are accompanied by comments of the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation .
In that light , the following interview is of particular interest for military specialists , as well as for a wide audience .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ course and results are being actively discussed all over the world , including in Russia .
The Azerbaijani victory over Armenia is often interpreted as the de facto victory of Turkish weaponry over the Russian one .
Russia is often treated as a losing party .
Are such claims true ?
Is the Nagorno-Karabakh war a sign for Russian defense industry ?
Why does not Russia have strike drones ?
All these question Russian outlet “ Moskovsky Komsomolets ” asked to Konstantin Makienko , analyst , Deputy Director of the Center for Analysis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey increased its military presence in Azerbaijan as a result of this war ?
It is quite obvious that the Turkish presence in Azerbaijan has dramatically increased following the Nagorno-Karabakh war .
It is important that not only physical presence , but also Ankara ’ s influence has grown up .
Moreover , Turkish prestige and influence will have an impact not only in the South Caucasus , but also in Central Asia and the North Caucasus , in the Volga region .
It is important to understand that military presence and growing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military component is only a part of overall power .
Turkey has increased both its military presence and influence .
At the same time , Russia has only increased its presence .
However , as a result of the efficient diplomatic and military work , Russia got a trump card – the keys to Karabakh , which has actually become its protectorate and are held in Moscow now .
In general , it seems that Russian diplomacy is highly effective in crises , seeking the maximum possible even under adverse circumstances .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the USSR collapse , Russia ’ s influence in the post-Soviet space is gradually weakening .
– Everyone is talking about the Turkish victory in this war… – First of all , it was Azerbaijani victory , convincingly and indisputably .
Baku won in military terms , as well as politically , diplomatically , and in informational aspects .
Azerbaijani networks of influence and lobbyists worked better , including in Moscow .
The famous Armenian diaspora turned out to be much less effective .
However , Turkish participation was very significant or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ planned by the Turkish headquarters .
Turkish officers provided support both at the headquarters level and directly on the battlefield .
It is highly likely that Turkish advisers were present in battle formations at the battalion level and above , even at the company level .
Turkish aviation jammed Armenian radio communications .
However , in general , this is a victory of Baku , which has more resources – demographic , oil , gas – and has managed to use these resources rationally .
– Russia has oil and gas resources , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s ally in an armed conflict , then they should possess a great power .
– Yes , but it would not be a conflict between the third world countries but a world war .
I hope this is not relevant yet .
Talking about the Nagorno-Karabakh war , the main conclusion for Russia lies on the surface : the maintenance and equipment of a combat-ready army provides a valuable resource that can be used at the right time to achieve important political goals .
A powerful and efficient military is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
– It sounds like a rebuff to Russian “ democrats ” who accuse the authorities of excessive militarization .
Russia did not invest in the creation of attack drones , so now not only the United States , but even Israel and Turkey have overtaken Moscow .
Now the Turks are selling their drones to both Azerbaijan and Ukraine .
– Yes , in technical terms , the Karabakh war demonstrated further war evolution towards the precision-guided weapon as the main mean of destruction .
It has become available for mass use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also in the third world .
– Probably , because they are cheaper than traditional weapons systems ?
– In fact , the use of high-precision weapons in terms of the cost-effectiveness ratio has become more economical than the mass use of unguided ammunition .
In addition , modern technologies make it possible to miniaturize high-precision weapons , thereby making them even cheaper .
– Do you mean that wars with their use will become cheaper ?
Thus , the danger is that the cheaper war is the more people want to fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traced .
We are entering an era of endless small military conflicts all over the world .
In the future , we can face the complete die-back of unguided weapons from ground artillery-missiles to aviation , as it has de facto happened in the West .
– Did the war in Nagorno-Karabakh show the increased importance of armed drones ?
– Of course .
Unmanned aircraft are useful as another way to reduce the cost of precision weapons and to increase their proliferation .
Azerbaijan and Turkey were able to establish effective air @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small squad of UAVs , which carried small-sized high-precision weapons – small guided missiles and guided aerial bombs .
The use of manned combat aircraft with similar weapons would theoretically give the same effect .
However , it would require much more resources and costs .
Drones are not only cheaper to purchase and operate than manned combat aircraft , but they are also expendable .
– When losing a drone , the military does not lose a pilot – a specialist , whose training is very expensive .
– Sure .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and psychologically insensitive .
At the same time , due to their smaller size and technical characteristics , drones are a more difficult target for air defense systems than manned combat aircraft .
Loitering munitions that are de facto disposable “ kamikaze drones ” clearly demonstrate this fact .
They represent a good example of cheap and covert high-precision weapons .
This explains their rapid spread .
– UAVs also made a breakthrough in reconnaissance and target designation… – That ’ s it .
And this is the second important reason of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long constant presence of the reconnaissance UAV over the battlefield dramatically changed the warfare .
Even at the current level of modern technologies , this makes possible to organize combat control , target designation and strike the enemy in almost real time .
But the main thing – I draw your attention to this fact – during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , UAVs have become something more important than a means of reconnaissance , target designation and carriers of high-precision weapons .
In this war , air supremacy was established with their help for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ why did the Russian army , in contrast to the Turkish or Israeli , lag behind in this segment ?
– The lag of the Russian Armed Forces in the implementation and development of unmanned technologies is not caused by technological reasons , but is a consequence of the wrong development priorities .
– Exactly !
I remember very well how 15-20 years ago at a press conference I asked the Air Force Commander : why are we lagging behind in the development of UAVs and , in particular , in the creation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answered absolutely seriously : why do we need them ?
We have enough planes and pilots .
– Exactly .
Such a point of view prevailed in our country for a very long time .
There were defects in the Soviet prospects determining system in the techno-military sphere that were not eliminated for a long time .
– And then the army leadership was assumed by people whose activities led to the fact that we no longer had enough pilots or planes .
Serdyukov stopped admission to aviation schools .
There were fewer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack drones .
The General Staff were arguing : who should take UAVs command – pilots or land forces ?
Who needs them more ?
And it turned out that nobody needed them .
– Yes , the UAVs development programs were not considered to be a priority in research and development work of the Ministry of Defense .
And this was a very important reason of our lagging behind .
We are still reaping the fruits of that policy .
There are still no centralized inter-service management bodies for such programs , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessary for UAVs ’ development ( engines , optoelectronic systems , and control systems ) , no proper political and administrative support , and no purposeful policy to create competence centers in this area .
The UAVs creation programs are left on their own fate and to the mercy of industrial organizations , sometimes rather weak .
As a result , we only have a lot of light small devices made with extensive use of imported components .
– But the use of imported components in military equipment for the Russian army is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem with attack drones ?
– To date , there are no strike drones in Russia yet .
The development of reconnaissance UAVs of a relatively high level is also a problem .
For more than ten years now , design office “ Luch ” has been engaged in the refinement of a simple “ Corsair ” , which is at the sane technical level as the Israeli devices created in the 1980s .
The creation of a heavy drone “ Altair ” in Kazan resulted in an endless dispute over the project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s a pity … Ten years ago , I visited Israel , one of the enterprises of the IAI concern , which above all is engaged in the UAVs production .
What struck me most was that almost everyone who made these devices in Israel was from the USSR , spoke Russian well .
It turns out that they were able to create the UAVs there , but not in Russia ?
– In Russia , perhaps , real progress in this matter has been achieved by the “ Kronstadt ” ( engineering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finally managed to bring the mid-level device Orion to the Armed Forces this year .
But you need to understand : in fact , this is an analogue of the American General Atomics Predator drone .
And its serial production in the United States began in 1995 , and it has been withdrawn from service a few years ago .
That is , we are 20-25 years behind our American “ partners ” in this area .
– But now , especially after the Nagorno-Karabakh war , have we started to reduce this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is no clear understanding in the domestic military-political circles that UAVs in combination with high-precision weapons offer a cheaper and more economical modern alternative of warfare .
But the Americans have clearly understood this long ago .
And now , after the Nagorno-Karabakh war , drawing on their experience of the Bayraktar TB2 using , the Turks have also understood this .
More insulting is that such a fairly simple reconnaissance and strike drone as the sensational Turkish Bayraktar TB2 , made with widespread use of commercial imported components , could have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if there were the proper concentration of resources and political will .
Thus , perhaps in a typical soviet style , the drones ’ demonstration in the Karabakh war will spur Russian unmanned programs .
A peasant needs thunder to cross himself and wonder .
There was the first thunderclap .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Nothing Is Safe : Unknown Individuals Stole Radio And Other Equipment From Russia ’ s “ Doomsday Plane ” • Russia Deploys S-300V4 To Kuril Islands .
Japan Complains That System Covers Half Of Country

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You can read this article in German. LINK
SouthFront publishes translation of an interview with a senior official of Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), one of the few Russian think tanks that declare their formal independence emulating their Western counterparts. In doing so, CAST regularly states that it fills orders of Russian official institutions. A number of its studies are accompanied by comments of the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. In that light, the following interview is of particular interest for military specialists, as well as for a wide audience.
The recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, its course and results are being actively discussed all over the world, including in Russia. The Azerbaijani victory over Armenia is often interpreted as the de facto victory of Turkish weaponry over the Russian one. Russia is often treated as a losing party. Are such claims true? Is the Nagorno-Karabakh war a sign for Russian defense industry? Why does not Russia have strike drones? All these question Russian outlet “Moskovsky Komsomolets” asked to Konstantin Makienko, analyst, Deputy Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.
– Has Turkey increased its military presence in Azerbaijan as a result of this war?
It is quite obvious that the Turkish presence in Azerbaijan has dramatically increased following the Nagorno-Karabakh war. It is important that not only physical presence, but also Ankara’s influence has grown up. Moreover, Turkish prestige and influence will have an impact not only in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia and the North Caucasus, in the Volga region. It is important to understand that military presence and growing influence are not identical concepts.
The military component is only a part of overall power. Turkey has increased both its military presence and influence. At the same time, Russia has only increased its presence. However, as a result of the efficient diplomatic and military work, Russia got a trump card – the keys to Karabakh, which has actually become its protectorate and are held in Moscow now. In general, it seems that Russian diplomacy is highly effective in crises, seeking the maximum possible even under adverse circumstances. This does not negate the fact that after the USSR collapse, Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space is gradually weakening.
– Everyone is talking about the Turkish victory in this war…
– First of all, it was Azerbaijani victory, convincingly and indisputably. Baku won in military terms, as well as politically, diplomatically, and in informational aspects. Azerbaijani networks of influence and lobbyists worked better, including in Moscow. The famous Armenian diaspora turned out to be much less effective. However, Turkish participation was very significant or even decisive.
Apparently, the offensive was planned by the Turkish headquarters. Turkish officers provided support both at the headquarters level and directly on the battlefield. It is highly likely that Turkish advisers were present in battle formations at the battalion level and above, even at the company level.
Turkish aviation jammed Armenian radio communications. However, in general, this is a victory of Baku, which has more resources – demographic, oil, gas – and has managed to use these resources rationally.
– Russia has oil and gas resources, too. If hypothetically China would be Russia’s ally in an armed conflict, then they should possess a great power.
– Yes, but it would not be a conflict between the third world countries but a world war. I hope this is not relevant yet. Talking about the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the main conclusion for Russia lies on the surface: the maintenance and equipment of a combat-ready army provides a valuable resource that can be used at the right time to achieve important political goals. A powerful and efficient military is a categorical imperative for a modern state.
– It sounds like a rebuff to Russian “democrats” who accuse the authorities of excessive militarization. Russia did not invest in the creation of attack drones, so now not only the United States, but even Israel and Turkey have overtaken Moscow. Now the Turks are selling their drones to both Azerbaijan and Ukraine.
– Yes, in technical terms, the Karabakh war demonstrated further war evolution towards the precision-guided weapon as the main mean of destruction. It has become available for mass use not only in developed countries, but also in the third world.
– Probably, because they are cheaper than traditional weapons systems?
– In fact, the use of high-precision weapons in terms of the cost-effectiveness ratio has become more economical than the mass use of unguided ammunition. In addition, modern technologies make it possible to miniaturize high-precision weapons, thereby making them even cheaper.
– Do you mean that wars with their use will become cheaper? Thus, the danger is that the cheaper war is the more people want to fight.
– This tendency can also be traced. We are entering an era of endless small military conflicts all over the world. In the future, we can face the complete die-back of unguided weapons from ground artillery-missiles to aviation, as it has de facto happened in the West.
– Did the war in Nagorno-Karabakh show the increased importance of armed drones?
– Of course. Unmanned aircraft are useful as another way to reduce the cost of precision weapons and to increase their proliferation.
Azerbaijan and Turkey were able to establish effective air supremacy in the area with a relatively small squad of UAVs, which carried small-sized high-precision weapons – small guided missiles and guided aerial bombs.
The use of manned combat aircraft with similar weapons would theoretically give the same effect. However, it would require much more resources and costs. Drones are not only cheaper to purchase and operate than manned combat aircraft, but they are also expendable.
– When losing a drone, the military does not lose a pilot – a specialist, whose training is very expensive.
– Sure. The loss of a drone is both politically and psychologically insensitive. At the same time, due to their smaller size and technical characteristics, drones are a more difficult target for air defense systems than manned combat aircraft.
Loitering munitions that are de facto disposable “kamikaze drones” clearly demonstrate this fact. They represent a good example of cheap and covert high-precision weapons. This explains their rapid spread.
– UAVs also made a breakthrough in reconnaissance and target designation…
– That’s it. And this is the second important reason of their mass distribution. The possibility of a long constant presence of the reconnaissance UAV over the battlefield dramatically changed the warfare. Even at the current level of modern technologies, this makes possible to organize combat control, target designation and strike the enemy in almost real time.
But the main thing – I draw your attention to this fact – during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, UAVs have become something more important than a means of reconnaissance, target designation and carriers of high-precision weapons. In this war, air supremacy was established with their help for the first time ever.
– So why did the Russian army, in contrast to the Turkish or Israeli, lag behind in this segment?
– The lag of the Russian Armed Forces in the implementation and development of unmanned technologies is not caused by technological reasons, but is a consequence of the wrong development priorities.
– Exactly! I remember very well how 15-20 years ago at a press conference I asked the Air Force Commander: why are we lagging behind in the development of UAVs and, in particular, in the creation of strike drones. To which he answered absolutely seriously: why do we need them? We have enough planes and pilots.
– Exactly. Such a point of view prevailed in our country for a very long time. There were defects in the Soviet prospects determining system in the techno-military sphere that were not eliminated for a long time.
– And then the army leadership was assumed by people whose activities led to the fact that we no longer had enough pilots or planes. Serdyukov stopped admission to aviation schools. There were fewer pilots, but there were no more attack drones. The General Staff were arguing: who should take UAVs command – pilots or land forces? Who needs them more? And it turned out that nobody needed them.
– Yes, the UAVs development programs were not considered to be a priority in research and development work of the Ministry of Defense. And this was a very important reason of our lagging behind. We are still reaping the fruits of that policy. There are still no centralized inter-service management bodies for such programs, including the creation of systems that are necessary for UAVs’ development (engines, optoelectronic systems, and control systems), no proper political and administrative support, and no purposeful policy to create competence centers in this area.
The UAVs creation programs are left on their own fate and to the mercy of industrial organizations, sometimes rather weak. As a result, we only have a lot of light small devices made with extensive use of imported components.
– But the use of imported components in military equipment for the Russian army is prohibited. So there is still a problem with attack drones?
– To date, there are no strike drones in Russia yet. The development of reconnaissance UAVs of a relatively high level is also a problem. For more than ten years now, design office “Luch” has been engaged in the refinement of a simple “Corsair”, which is at the sane technical level as the Israeli devices created in the 1980s. The creation of a heavy drone “Altair” in Kazan resulted in an endless dispute over the project and court cases.
– It’s a pity … Ten years ago, I visited Israel, one of the enterprises of the IAI concern, which above all is engaged in the UAVs production. What struck me most was that almost everyone who made these devices in Israel was from the USSR, spoke Russian well. It turns out that they were able to create the UAVs there, but not in Russia?
– In Russia, perhaps, real progress in this matter has been achieved by the “Kronstadt” (engineering company) in St. Petersburg which has finally managed to bring the mid-level device Orion to the Armed Forces this year. But you need to understand: in fact, this is an analogue of the American General Atomics Predator drone. And its serial production in the United States began in 1995, and it has been withdrawn from service a few years ago. That is, we are 20-25 years behind our American “partners” in this area.
– But now, especially after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, have we started to reduce this gap?
– In my opinion, there is no clear understanding in the domestic military-political circles that UAVs in combination with high-precision weapons offer a cheaper and more economical modern alternative of warfare. But the Americans have clearly understood this long ago. And now, after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, drawing on their experience of the Bayraktar TB2 using, the Turks have also understood this.
More insulting is that such a fairly simple reconnaissance and strike drone as the sensational Turkish Bayraktar TB2, made with widespread use of commercial imported components, could have been created in Russia ten years ago if there were the proper concentration of resources and political will.
Thus, perhaps in a typical soviet style, the drones’ demonstration in the Karabakh war will spur Russian unmanned programs. A peasant needs thunder to cross himself and wonder. There was the first thunderclap.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Footage Of Epic Clash Between Chinese And Indian Troops In Ladakh Border Region

On December 8th , a video showing an epic clash between Chinese forces and Indian forces at the LAC ( line of actual control ) in the Ladakh region .
According to geolocation , it happened a bit past the line of actual control , and around September 2020 .
Clashes similar to these are apparently a frequent occurrence .
Back in June 2020 , after a large-scale fight such as the one in the video , at least 20 Indian soldiers died , and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers were also killed .
Users on Defense.PK , also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was taken and what incident it showed .
The photograph shows the purported area where the video above was shot , and the clash took place .
It is a very pro-Indian point of view .
It also shows the position of an earlier video in which Indian soldiers taunted the Chinese .
An earlier video was released , back in early September , showing another clash .
It is unclear if it is the same situation or not .
Separately , a December 4 article in China ’ s state-run Global Times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ stir up regional conflict ” between China and India by weighing in on border clashes in the western Himalayas .
The article was written in response to the release of the 2020 report to the U.S. Congress by the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission .
Congress set up that body to inform the U.S. government about China ’ s activities on the global stage , including in matters of security , trade , politics and human rights .
Global Times cited a Tsinghua University academic who called the U.S. report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s administration of seeking to “ exacerbate China ’ s conflict with its neighbors to benefit the U.S. ” India ’ s External Affairs Minister , S. Jaishankar , told his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in June that the skirmishes were a “ pre-meditated and planned action ” by China .
The US also appears to claim that China pre-planned the incidents and they were orchestrated by Beijing .
For example , the U.S. commission said satellite images showed a large Chinese troop buildup in the Galwan Valley a week before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PLA [ People ’ s Liberation Army ] soldiers.
” The report stated that the “ proximate cause of the clash appeared to be India ’ s construction of a strategic access road to support troops ” along the LAC .
Regardless , the video is evidence that these clashes are taking place and are quite epic in scale .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • China Used ‘ Secret Microwave Pulse Weapon ’ Against Indian Troops In Border Battle

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On December 8th, a video showing an epic clash between Chinese forces and Indian forces at the LAC (line of actual control) in the Ladakh region.
According to geolocation, it happened a bit past the line of actual control, and around September 2020.
Clashes similar to these are apparently a frequent occurrence. Back in June 2020, after a large-scale fight such as the one in the video, at least 20 Indian soldiers died, and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers were also killed.
Wow! This looks like a classified map! Is this even allowed? Each day I tell my production team to use self-made maps and so as not to compromise security. And here it is. One-upmanship? Self-glorification? What drives such acts? pic.twitter.com/sRjwXzNR7a — Nitin A. Gokhale (@nitingokhale) September 5, 2020
Users on Defense.PK, also published a photograph explaining where the video was taken and what incident it showed.
The photograph shows the purported area where the video above was shot, and the clash took place. It is a very pro-Indian point of view. It also shows the position of an earlier video in which Indian soldiers taunted the Chinese.
An earlier video was released, back in early September, showing another clash.
It is unclear if it is the same situation or not.
Separately, a December 4 article in China’s state-run Global Times accused the United States of trying to “stir up regional conflict” between China and India by weighing in on border clashes in the western Himalayas.
The article was written in response to the release of the 2020 report to the U.S. Congress by the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission. Congress set up that body to inform the U.S. government about China’s activities on the global stage, including in matters of security, trade, politics and human rights.
Global Times cited a Tsinghua University academic who called the U.S. report “distorted,” accusing President Donald Trump’s administration of seeking to “exacerbate China’s conflict with its neighbors to benefit the U.S.”
India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, told his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in June that the skirmishes were a “pre-meditated and planned action” by China.
The US also appears to claim that China pre-planned the incidents and they were orchestrated by Beijing.
For example, the U.S. commission said satellite images showed a large Chinese troop buildup in the Galwan Valley a week before the melee, “including potentially 1,000 PLA [People’s Liberation Army] soldiers.”
The report stated that the “proximate cause of the clash appeared to be India’s construction of a strategic access road to support troops” along the LAC.
Regardless, the video is evidence that these clashes are taking place and are quite epic in scale.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Two Azerbaijani Troops Were Killed And Another One Was Injured In Mine Explosion In Karabakh (Map, V

Two Azerbaijani Troops Were Killed And Another One Was Injured In Mine Explosion In Karabakh (Map, Video)

Two Azerbaijani troops were killed and another one was injured in a mine explosion in the Nagorno-Karabakh region , according to pro-Armenian sources .
The incident allegedly took palce during demining works in Kalbajar District .
A brief summary of the recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh region : • On December 8 , 1,136 displaced persons returned from Yerevan to Stepanakert by buses with the assistance of Russian peacekeepers ; • As of December 9 , more than 36000 people have returned to Karabakh with the assistance of Russian peacekeepers ; • On December 8 , Arayik Harutyunyan , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the top law enforcement and military officials discussing the domestic and foreign security of Nagorno-Karabakh ; • Russia will allocate $ 2.25m to the International Committee of the Red Cross before the end of 2020 to improve the humanitarian situation in Karabakh , according to Russian Deputy Representative to UN Office in Geneva .
Meanwhwile , Azerbaijan is preparing to showcase the captured Armenian military equipment during its own military parade : MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Renewed Protests In Armenia As Nikol “ The Basement ” Pashinyan Shrugs Off Deadline @ @

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Two Azerbaijani troops were killed and another one was injured in a mine explosion in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, according to pro-Armenian sources. The incident allegedly took palce during demining works in Kalbajar District.
A brief summary of the recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh region:
On December 8, 1,136 displaced persons returned from Yerevan to Stepanakert by buses with the assistance of Russian peacekeepers;
As of December 9, more than 36000 people have returned to Karabakh with the assistance of Russian peacekeepers;
On December 8, Arayik Harutyunyan, the President of Artsakh, held a meeting with the top law enforcement and military officials discussing the domestic and foreign security of Nagorno-Karabakh;
Russia will allocate $2.25m to the International Committee of the Red Cross before the end of 2020 to improve the humanitarian situation in Karabakh, according to Russian Deputy Representative to UN Office in Geneva.
Meanwhwile, Azerbaijan is preparing to showcase the captured Armenian military equipment during its own military parade:
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southfront--2020-12-09--Turkish TV Shows Large Part Of Armenian Territory As Azerbaijan

Turkey ’ s TGRT Haber ( TGRT News ) showcased a large part of the territory of Armenia as Azerbaijan @ @ @ @ @ title : “ Armenia has no money .
Let ’ s give Zangezur.
” Zangezur @ @ @ @ @ that defines the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan ’ s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic .
The @ @ @ @ @ likely refers to claims of Azerbaijan that Armenia will have to pay $ 50B ” @ @ @ @ @ what Baku calls ‘ crimes against the Azerbaijani nation ’ in Karabakh .
So , @ @ @ @ @ media promote an idea that Armenia may pay this ‘ compensation ’ with some territories @ @ @ @ @ : • Renewed Protests In Armenia As Nikol “ The Basement ” Pashinyan Shrugs Off @ @ @

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Turkey’s TGRT Haber (TGRT News) showcased a large part of the territory of Armenia as Azerbaijan. The map included the title: “Armenia has no money. Let’s give Zangezur.” Zangezur Mountains is the mountain range that defines the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.
The title showcased by Turkish TV likely refers to claims of Azerbaijan that Armenia will have to pay$50B ”compensation’ to Azerbaijan for what Baku calls ‘crimes against the Azerbaijani nation’ in Karabakh. So, now, Turkish and Azerbaijani media promote an idea that Armenia may pay this ‘compensation’ with some territories.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Haftar’s LNA Is At War With Turkey, Ceasefire Is “Out Of Respective For International Community”

On December 8th , the Libyan National Army ( LNA ) spokesperson Brigadier General Ahmed al-Mismari said that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar ’ s forces were at war with Turkey .
According to him , the ceasefire with the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) was only signed out of respect to the efforts of the international community .
“ We are at war with Turkey , we have entered into a real confrontation where no one has declared an end to the fighting , but we have declared a ceasefire out of respect for the efforts of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to end the war , ” Al-Mismari told Sky News Arabia .
He said that Haftar ’ s forces “ are at war with Turkey , a real confrontation , exacerbated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
” “ The Turkish ship intercepted by the LNA on Monday , had entered a restricted military area , ” he said .
On the night of December 7th , LNA forces announced the interception of a Turkish vessel , which was heading towards the western port of Misrata , in violation of the arms embargo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we have banned even Libyan fishing boats from entering the Libyan military zone , we were surprised that the Turkish ship entered this area , without the coordination or knowledge of the Libyan coast guard.
” “ We appealed to the ship and it did not respond to us , nor did it carry out the international procedures in this situation .
So there are three mistakes by the ship ’ s captain.
” The Turkish Foreign Ministry condemned the detention of the cargo ship “ Mabrouka , ” demanding immediate steps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voyage , according to a statement .
“ The Turkish statement carries a tone of unacceptable arrogance and disrespect for international laws and norms , ” said Al-Mismari speaking to Sky News Arabia .
“ Since 2016 we have banned even Libyan fishing boats from entering the Libyan military zone , we were surprised that the Turkish ship entered this area , without the coordination or knowledge of the Libyan coast guard.
” He said that if Turkish troops and other foreigners such as Syrian militants that were deployed by Turkey leave the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the UN , then everything would be in order .
It is interesting that since Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his LNA say they are at war with Turkey , then that means the entire Eastern Libyan government is at war with Ankara ’ s forces .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Egypt Announces Preemptive Strikes On Militants Deployed Near Border , In Eastern ( Video )

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On December 8th, the Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson Brigadier General Ahmed al-Mismari said that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces were at war with Turkey.
According to him, the ceasefire with the Government of National Accord (GNA) was only signed out of respect to the efforts of the international community.
“We are at war with Turkey, we have entered into a real confrontation where no one has declared an end to the fighting, but we have declared a ceasefire out of respect for the efforts of the international community and the wishes of Libyans to end the war,” Al-Mismari told Sky News Arabia. He said that Haftar’s forces “are at war with Turkey, a real confrontation, exacerbated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.” “The Turkish ship intercepted by the LNA on Monday, had entered a restricted military area,” he said.
On the night of December 7th, LNA forces announced the interception of a Turkish vessel, which was heading towards the western port of Misrata, in violation of the arms embargo imposed on Libya.
“Since 2016, we have banned even Libyan fishing boats from entering the Libyan military zone, we were surprised that the Turkish ship entered this area, without the coordination or knowledge of the Libyan coast guard.” “We appealed to the ship and it did not respond to us, nor did it carry out the international procedures in this situation. So there are three mistakes by the ship’s captain.”
The Turkish Foreign Ministry condemned the detention of the cargo ship “Mabrouka,” demanding immediate steps to enable it to resume its planned voyage, according to a statement.
“The Turkish statement carries a tone of unacceptable arrogance and disrespect for international laws and norms,” said Al-Mismari speaking to Sky News Arabia. “Since 2016 we have banned even Libyan fishing boats from entering the Libyan military zone, we were surprised that the Turkish ship entered this area, without the coordination or knowledge of the Libyan coast guard.”
He said that if Turkish troops and other foreigners such as Syrian militants that were deployed by Turkey leave the country within a 90-day deadline set out by the UN, then everything would be in order.
Al-Mismari said:
“We are now waiting for the implementation of the removal of foreigners according to the 90-day deadline set by the United Nations mission, if the mission succeeds in removing them, we Libyans are very easy to understand.”
It is interesting that since Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his LNA say they are at war with Turkey, then that means the entire Eastern Libyan government is at war with Ankara’s forces.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Aliens Exist, They’re In Contact With Israel And The U.S. Only: Former Israeli Space Security Chief

Israel has been in contact with Aliens , according to Israel ’ s former space security program chief , retired General professor Haim Eshed .
Eshed , who has 30 years of experience as the head of Israel ’ s space security program , and is a three-time recipient of the Israel Security Award gave an interview to Yediot Aharonot .
He said that both the US and Israel have been communicating with Aliens for years .
According to him , however , the Aliens said that humanity wasn ’ t ready yet .
Eshed said cooperation agreements had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underground base in the depths of Mars ” where there are American astronauts and alien representatives .
Eshed added that President Donald Trump was aware of the extraterrestrials ’ existence and had been “ on the verge of revealing ” information but was asked not to in order to prevent “ mass hysteria.
” One could ask why he ’ s chosen to reveal this information now .
And to this Eshed explained that the timing was simply due to how much the academic landscape has changed , and how respected he is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today , they ’ re already talking differently .
I have nothing to lose .
I ’ ve received my degrees and awards ; I am respected in universities abroad , where the trend is also changing.
” He also used the chance to plug his new book “ The Universe Beyond the Horizon – conversations with Professor Haim Eshed ” .
It contains spicy content such as how aliens have prevented nuclear apocalypses and “ when we can jump in and visit the Men in Black.
” While it is unclear if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s claims , they did come just ahead of a recent announcement by SpaceIL , the group behind Israel ’ s failed attempt to land a spacecraft on the moon in 2019 .
Uploaded to social media with the text “ Ready to get excited again ?
, ” the announcement contained a 15-second video of the moon with text saying “ Back to the Moon , ” followed by the date of December 9 , 2020 .
It is true that too much excitement could be a precarious thing , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , explains why the US and Israel are such sworn allies , and the US forward ’ s Tel Aviv ’ s interests globally .
It could be because the Alien federation asked Washington to do so .
On a serious note , a spokesperson for NASA said one of the agency ’ s key goals was the search for life in the universe but that it had yet to find signs of extraterrestrial life .
And still , that ’ s exactly what everybody would expect him to say .
Regardless , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sell his new book filled with alleged documentary anecdotes of his interaction with Aliens , and saying that out of hundreds of countries on the planet , an Alien federation only decided to speak to the United States ( as the global superpower , which is still fact ) and Israel ( “ the only democracy in the Middle East ” ) , luckily they ’ re both allied .
This version of events could potentially explain how , according to Iran , Israel used an satellite-controlled , AI-using machine gun to assassinate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fakhrizadeh .
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Israel has been in contact with Aliens, according to Israel’s former space security program chief, retired General professor Haim Eshed.
Eshed, who has 30 years of experience as the head of Israel’s space security program, and is a three-time recipient of the Israel Security Award gave an interview to Yediot Aharonot.
He said that both the US and Israel have been communicating with Aliens for years.
Eshed claimed the existence of a “Galactic Federation.”
According to him, however, the Aliens said that humanity wasn’t ready yet.
“The Unidentified Flying Objects have asked not to publish that they are here, humanity is not ready yet,” Haim Eshed, former head of Israel’s Defense Ministry’s space directorate, told Israel’s Yediot Aharonot newspaper.
Eshed said cooperation agreements had been signed between species, including an “underground base in the depths of Mars” where there are American astronauts and alien representatives.
“There is an agreement between the U.S. government and the aliens. They signed a contract with us to do experiments here,” he said.
Eshed added that President Donald Trump was aware of the extraterrestrials’ existence and had been “on the verge of revealing” information but was asked not to in order to prevent “mass hysteria.”
“They have been waiting until today for humanity to develop and reach a stage where we will understand, in general, what space and spaceships are,” Eshed said, referring to the galactic federation.
One could ask why he’s chosen to reveal this information now.
And to this Eshed explained that the timing was simply due to how much the academic landscape has changed, and how respected he is in academia.
“If I had come up with what I’m saying today five years ago, I would have been hospitalized,” he said.
He added that “today, they’re already talking differently. I have nothing to lose. I’ve received my degrees and awards; I am respected in universities abroad, where the trend is also changing.”
He also used the chance to plug his new book “The Universe Beyond the Horizon – conversations with Professor Haim Eshed”.
It contains spicy content such as how aliens have prevented nuclear apocalypses and “when we can jump in and visit the Men in Black.”
While it is unclear if any evidence exists that could support Eshed’s claims, they did come just ahead of a recent announcement by SpaceIL, the group behind Israel’s failed attempt to land a spacecraft on the moon in 2019.
Uploaded to social media with the text “Ready to get excited again?,” the announcement contained a 15-second video of the moon with text saying “Back to the Moon,” followed by the date of December 9, 2020.
Ready to get excited again? pic.twitter.com/5IKRZxo9yJ — Israel To The Moon (@TeamSpaceIL) December 7, 2020
It is true that too much excitement could be a precarious thing, but … why not?
It, however, explains why the US and Israel are such sworn allies, and the US forward’s Tel Aviv’s interests globally. It could be because the Alien federation asked Washington to do so.
On a serious note, a spokesperson for NASA said one of the agency’s key goals was the search for life in the universe but that it had yet to find signs of extraterrestrial life.
And still, that’s exactly what everybody would expect him to say.
“Although we have yet to find signs of extraterrestrial life, NASA is exploring the solar system and beyond to help us answer fundamental questions, including whether we are alone in the universe,” the spokesperson said in a statement.
Regardless, an 85-year old expert is attempting to sell his new book filled with alleged documentary anecdotes of his interaction with Aliens, and saying that out of hundreds of countries on the planet, an Alien federation only decided to speak to the United States (as the global superpower, which is still fact) and Israel (“the only democracy in the Middle East”), luckily they’re both allied.
This version of events could potentially explain how, according to Iran, Israel used an satellite-controlled, AI-using machine gun to assassinate Tehran’s top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Conflict Armament Research Releases Report Showing Its Exquisitely Easy To Purchase Weapons, Even Fo

Conflict Armament Research Releases Report Showing Its Exquisitely Easy To Purchase Weapons, Even For Terrorists

On December 8th , Conflict Armament Research ( CAR ) released its report titled “ Procurement Networks Behind Islamic State Improvised Weapon Programmes.
” CAR is a UK-based investigative organization that tracks the supply of conventional weapons , ammunition , and related military materiel ( such as IEDs ) into conflict-affected areas .
This most recent report looks into the human and financial networks behind the global procurement of goods and technologies for Islamic State weapons production .
Shows how Islamic State procurers concealed their efforts behind front companies , pseudonymous communications and proxy purchasers .
This was the result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempt to map these same networks .
In short , more than 50 companies , in over 20 countries , produced or distributed goods that ISIS forces subsequently used to make IEDs , drones and improvised weapon systems .
The entire report can be read for free at this link : [ pdf ] The report ’ s key findings are as follows : • Until their territorial defeat , ISIS forces ’ weapon production programmes in Iraq and Syria procured key commodities through groups of linked , family-owned companies and individuals located @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
These groups were centered around the towns of Siverek and Akçakale in southern Turkey .
• These family groupings helped to procure multiple commodities – often unrelated to their primary businesses – and in some cases arranged their movement into Syria .
There is no evidence that they were witting accomplices to IS procurement efforts or were guilty of any wrongdoing .
They nonetheless acted as key junction points within the supply chains that provisioned IS forces : consolidating shipments of multiple commodities for onward distribution .
Such groupings therefore constituted choke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : points en route potentially vulnerable to law enforcement disruption .
• Purchases of bulk explosive precursors and electronic items through this network had unusual features , which made them potentially detectable .
‘ Red flags ’ included the following : • companies made large purchases of products that were incongruent with their business activities .
For example , a small mobile phone shop purchased six tonnes of aluminium paste from a large chemical distributor .
• parties ostensibly unconnected with the purchaser paid for products , or had products consigned to them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , together with an associate , paid nearly USD 200,000 for a consignment of 78 tonnes of a food additive ( sorbitol ) that was shipped to two Syrian companies via IS-held territory .
Similarly , a UK-based company operated by an IS member purchased high-specification motion-control units from a North American company , but an unrelated luxury car-hire company in Istanbul executed the payment of more than USD 18,000 on behalf of the UK company .
The same UK company purchased rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle ( UAV ) components from companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the sellers to ship them to the address of a mobile phone shop in Şanlıurfa , close to the Turkish– Syrian border .
• ISIS forces ’ procurers also sought goods and intangible knowledge to develop new , ambitious improvised weapon systems .
Their efforts included purchasing technical plans for a pulsejet engine with the intention of developing large , high-speed UAVs ; and contracting suppliers for an automated anti-aircraft system .
So , according to the findings , usually small family-run businesses actually supplied ISIS with weapons and equipment , and even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they never even suspected they were providing weapons to terrorists .
They were likely thinking they were supplying a private business or just a homeowner who wanted to redecorate .
The investigation that led to the report was a result of the CAR team tracking and documenting illicit weapons , ammunition , and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources .
A recovered ISIS document also showed that the extremist group ’ s operatives “ coordinated with established cross-border smugglers , who paid local Turkish officials to allow the passage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” But the CAR emphasised it has no evidence that the companies involved were “ witting accomplices ” to ISIS procurement efforts or guilty of any wrongdoing .
It said that purchases of bulk explosive precursors and electronic items through this network had unusual features that should have raised “ red flags.
” Companies made large purchases of products that were “ incongruent ” with their business activities , it said , pointing to how a small mobile phone shop purchased six tonnes of aluminium paste from a large chemical distributor .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows “ Red flags in supply chains ” that were detailed in the report .
The report , in conclusion , aims not to blame manufacturers or distributors , because there is apparently no way for them to track what their weapons or equipment is used for , before it reaches the hands of terrorists .
“ However , the examples in this report demonstrate that IS procurers relied not only on local interpersonal networks .
They also used global business platforms for e-commerce and recruitment .
While interpersonal trust might be important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relative anonymity in the latter .
Whenever possible , IS procurers made payments in small amounts via PayPal or international money transfer .
They used pseudonymous email addresses and messaging handles to communicate with potential suppliers and contractors , who may have been used to working with international clients and relying on email and messaging apps as the primary forms of communication .
Some online contracting platforms do not validate buyers or sellers , or necessarily vet job posts , even if they involve military applications .
Moreover , in the case of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were able to engage with suppliers using a UK front company registered using the names of fictitious directors and shareholders , whose identities the UK company register did not verify.
” Basically , e-business makes it exquisitely easy to actually order and procure weapons and military equipment , with little to none issue that ends up in war zone , with the knowing ( or unknowing ) assistance of small family-run businesses .
The supply chains described in the report were not reliant on territorial control or on capturing commercial goods or facilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hold territory , remaining IS cells in Iraq and Syria became increasingly active in 2020 ( ACLED , 2020 ) .
Disrupting their procurement efforts by spotting transactional red flags will therefore remain an important tool against the resurgence of IS forces and their successors .
This is no secret , as the COVID-19 pandemic has likely loosened control on many fronts , at the same time the necessity to profit is an universal one and was only made more severe by the fact that for parts of this year people needed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ war-making ” .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Ambush Claimed Lives Of Seven Al-Quds Brigade Fighters In Syria ’ s Deir Ezzor

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On December 8th, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released its report titled “Procurement Networks Behind Islamic State Improvised Weapon Programmes.”
CAR is a UK-based investigative organization that tracks the supply of conventional weapons, ammunition, and related military materiel (such as IEDs) into conflict-affected areas.
This most recent report looks into the human and financial networks behind the global procurement of goods and technologies for Islamic State weapons production. Shows how Islamic State procurers concealed their efforts behind front companies, pseudonymous communications and proxy purchasers.
This was the result of an 18-month investigation and a subsequent attempt to map these same networks.
In short, more than 50 companies, in over 20 countries, produced or distributed goods that ISIS forces subsequently used to make IEDs, drones and improvised weapon systems.
NEW from CAR: "Procurement networks behind Islamic State improvised weapon programmes." Read the report here – https://t.co/Sbw6q23yx7 — CAR (@conflictarm) December 8, 2020
The entire report can be read for free at this link: [pdf]
The report’s key findings are as follows:
Until their territorial defeat, ISIS forces’ weapon production programmes in Iraq and Syria procured key commodities through groups of linked, family-owned companies and individuals located near key border crossings into IS-held territory. These groups were centered around the towns of Siverek and Akçakale in southern Turkey.
These family groupings helped to procure multiple commodities – often unrelated to their primary businesses – and in some cases arranged their movement into Syria. There is no evidence that they were witting accomplices to IS procurement efforts or were guilty of any wrongdoing. They nonetheless acted as key junction points within the supply chains that provisioned IS forces: consolidating shipments of multiple commodities for onward distribution. Such groupings therefore constituted choke points in IS forces’ supply chains: points en route potentially vulnerable to law enforcement disruption.
Purchases of bulk explosive precursors and electronic items through this network had unusual features, which made them potentially detectable. ‘Red flags’ included the following:
companies made large purchases of products that were incongruent with their business activities. For example, a small mobile phone shop purchased six tonnes of aluminium paste from a large chemical distributor. parties ostensibly unconnected with the purchaser paid for products, or had products consigned to them. For example, a fertiliser dealer, together with an associate, paid nearly USD 200,000 for a consignment of 78 tonnes of a food additive (sorbitol) that was shipped to two Syrian companies via IS-held territory. Similarly, a UK-based company operated by an IS member purchased high-specification motion-control units from a North American company, but an unrelated luxury car-hire company in Istanbul executed the payment of more than USD 18,000 on behalf of the UK company. The same UK company purchased rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components from companies in North America and Germany but asked the sellers to ship them to the address of a mobile phone shop in Şanlıurfa, close to the Turkish– Syrian border.
ISIS forces’ procurers also sought goods and intangible knowledge to develop new, ambitious improvised weapon systems. Their efforts included purchasing technical plans for a pulsejet engine with the intention of developing large, high-speed UAVs; and contracting suppliers for an automated anti-aircraft system.
So, according to the findings, usually small family-run businesses actually supplied ISIS with weapons and equipment, and even materials for an anti-aircraft system, and they never even suspected they were providing weapons to terrorists.
They were likely thinking they were supplying a private business or just a homeowner who wanted to redecorate.
The investigation that led to the report was a result of the CAR team tracking and documenting illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources.
A recovered ISIS document also showed that the extremist group’s operatives “coordinated with established cross-border smugglers, who paid local Turkish officials to allow the passage of goods across the Akcakale border gate.”
But the CAR emphasised it has no evidence that the companies involved were “witting accomplices” to ISIS procurement efforts or guilty of any wrongdoing.
“They nonetheless acted as key junction points within the supply chains that provisioned ISIS forces,” it said.
It said that purchases of bulk explosive precursors and electronic items through this network had unusual features that should have raised “red flags.”
Companies made large purchases of products that were “incongruent” with their business activities, it said, pointing to how a small mobile phone shop purchased six tonnes of aluminium paste from a large chemical distributor.
The report also features a useful table that shows “Red flags in supply chains” that were detailed in the report.
The report, in conclusion, aims not to blame manufacturers or distributors, because there is apparently no way for them to track what their weapons or equipment is used for, before it reaches the hands of terrorists.
“However, the examples in this report demonstrate that IS procurers relied not only on local interpersonal networks. They also used global business platforms for e-commerce and recruitment. While interpersonal trust might be important in the former, IS forces exploited relative anonymity in the latter. Whenever possible, IS procurers made payments in small amounts via PayPal or international money transfer. They used pseudonymous email addresses and messaging handles to communicate with potential suppliers and contractors, who may have been used to working with international clients and relying on email and messaging apps as the primary forms of communication. Some online contracting platforms do not validate buyers or sellers, or necessarily vet job posts, even if they involve military applications. Moreover, in the case of Advance Technology Global Ltd, IS procurers were able to engage with suppliers using a UK front company registered using the names of fictitious directors and shareholders, whose identities the UK company register did not verify.”
Basically, e-business makes it exquisitely easy to actually order and procure weapons and military equipment, with little to none issue that ends up in war zone, with the knowing (or unknowing) assistance of small family-run businesses.
The supply chains described in the report were not reliant on territorial control or on capturing commercial goods or facilities. Although IS forces may no longer hold territory, remaining IS cells in Iraq and Syria became increasingly active in 2020 (ACLED, 2020). Disrupting their procurement efforts by spotting transactional red flags will therefore remain an important tool against the resurgence of IS forces and their successors.
This is no secret, as the COVID-19 pandemic has likely loosened control on many fronts, at the same time the necessity to profit is an universal one and was only made more severe by the fact that for parts of this year people needed to sit isolated, and that even impacted “war-making”.
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southfront--2020-12-09--Military Situation In Syria On December 9, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • On December 8 @ @ @ @ @ a military patrol in the vicinity of the Rumaylan oil fields ; • On December @ @ @ @ @ military convoy consisting 12 trucks with various equipment entered Syria ’ s Idlib via Kafr @ @ @ @ @ 8 , the Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) , the Syrian Arab Army ( @ @ @ @ @ reached an agreement to establish 3 joint military posts east and west of Ain Issa @ @ @ @ @ ; • On December 9 , artillery of Turkish-backed forces shelled SDF positions east of @ @ @ @ @ Kurdish Initial Response Team in Raqqa announced that it has recovered 6,100 bodies and identified @ @ @ @ @ beginning of 2018 .
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A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:
On December 8, the US coalition conducted a military patrol in the vicinity of the Rumaylan oil fields;
On December 8, a new Turkish military convoy consisting 12 trucks with various equipment entered Syria’s Idlib via Kafr Lusin;
On December 8, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces reached an agreement to establish 3 joint military posts east and west of Ain Issa town to monitor ceasefire violations;
On December 9, artillery of Turkish-backed forces shelled SDF positions east of Rass al-Ain;
The Kurdish Initial Response Team in Raqqa announced that it has recovered 6,100 bodies and identified 700 of them since the beginning of 2018.
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