southfront--2020-05-04--Power Of Siberia May Jeopardize US Energy Sales, As Power Of Siberia-2 Looms Around The Corner

The US Congress should look into what consequences the Power of Siberia pipeline between Russia and China will have on Washington ’ s interests .
This was said in a recommendation by US analysts , reviewed by RT .
According to the document , the operation of the pipeline , which began work in December 2019 , could potentially lead to a reduction of US liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) sales .
According to American experts , Washington is currently focused on confronting Nord Stream 2 , and not on deliveries of Russian energy to China .
Meanwhile , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is also purchasing more Russian crude oil than before .
China is the United States ’ biggest client , and it is in jeopardy of losing a big share of its business .
Russian-Chinese cooperation , which is necessary for the functioning of the gas pipeline , “ does not bode well for the United States as a whole , or for their relations with each country , ” the document reportedly reads .
At the same time , the authors of the report indicate that further interaction between the Russian Federation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to losses in the export of American liquefied natural gas ( LNG ) .
American experts recall that by 2025 , when the gas pipeline is operating at full capacity , the Power of Siberia will supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year to China .
This will be 13 % of all China ’ s demand in 2018 .
Thus , in five years , Beijing will become the second largest buyer of Russian natural gas after Germany .
The report emphasizes that , according to some experts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signal for Washington .
This is another aspect of the geopolitical competition between US and China , and US and Russia – in a way , the current biggest competitor for Washington is Beijing , but it is also one of the biggest , if not the biggest market for energy , and other products .
At the same time , Moscow is a competitor for that business , while at the same time , it is not in US interest to push Russia too much since it would risk causing Beijing and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is seen with the “ investments ” in the form of purchasing oil , even when there ’ s cheaper alternatives .
The launch of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline took place in December 2019 .
The contract for the supply of fuel under it to China is designed for 30 years .
It is expected that over this time over 1 trillion cubic meters of gas will be delivered .
The first six months , pumping will take place in commissioning mode , and the Power of Siberia will work at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pipeline is a joint project of Gazprom and the China National Petroleum and Gas Corporation ( CNPC ) .
Its length only in Russia is about 3 thousand km .
The Power of Siberia begins with the Kovykta gas field , then passes the Chayandinskoye and Amur gas processing plants , and then crosses the Chinese border .
According to Russian President Vladimir Putin , the Power of Siberia is an unprecedented in scale high-tech project .
The Chinese side , in turn , also considers the project strategically important .
So , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal with Russia will become a new incentive for practical cooperation between the two countries .
Meanwhile , the Congressional Research Service noted that the administration of US President Donald Trump does not pay due attention to the export of Russian gas to China .
The authorities are mainly focused on the dependence of Europe on fuel from the Russian Federation .
Washington has made a lot of efforts to try to stop the implementation of Nord Stream 2 .
So , on December 21st 2019 , Trump imposed sanctions against the project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company Allseas , which was laying the underwater elements of the pipeline , stopped its work and refused to return to construction .
All of this has been for naught , since construction on it continues and it will be active sooner , rather than later .
In addition , it should be mentioned that recently , there ’ s been hints that Gazprom is working towards the next mega project – Power of Siberia-2 and that it is not simply a rumour , but something likely to happen .
The idea to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was flaunted already in the early 2010s , its purpose being of meeting the gas requirements of Western Chinese provinces via Mongolia .
This late March Gazprom ’ s request of conducting a feasibility study for PoS-2 has found President Putin ’ s approval .
The projected pipeline would have a throughput capacity of 50 BCm per year and would be traversing Russia ’ s Altay region before crossing over to Mongolia and Western China .
The first thing that struck market observers was that at some point in early 2020 the capacity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a preliminary estimate of 30 BCm per year to an officially presented volume of 50 BCm per year .
The framework for Power of Siberia-2 ( also known as the Altai pipeline ) was laid down in 2015 when Gazprom and the Chinese state-owned company CNPC signed a preliminary gas supply deal , without specifying the technicalities of pricing .
Given that Pos-1 pricing talks took a decade to conclude , the tardiness of PoS-2 negotiations is hardly surprising .
Yet at the same time Russian authorities are betting heavily on it happening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pipeline gas exports reaching 300 BCm per year by 2035 , of which 80 BCm per year will go to China , with European pipeline exports effectively stalling for the next decade and half .
It has to be noted that the Energy Strategy also surmises a “ pessimistic scenario ” , whereby Gazprom ’ s gas exports increase from 220 BCm in the base year of 2018 to 255 BCm per year in 2035 , meaning a slight decline in European demand and Power of Siberia-1 remaining the only China-bound gas conduit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Russia ’ s Power Of Siberia Pipeline May Slow Down LNG Supply To China • The Launch of Power of Siberia and the Advent of Eurasian Economic Cooperation

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The US Congress should look into what consequences the Power of Siberia pipeline between Russia and China will have on Washington’s interests.
This was said in a recommendation by US analysts, reviewed by RT.
According to the document, the operation of the pipeline, which began work in December 2019, could potentially lead to a reduction of US liquefied natural gas (LNG) sales.
According to American experts, Washington is currently focused on confronting Nord Stream 2, and not on deliveries of Russian energy to China. Meanwhile, on top of Power of Siberia, China is also purchasing more Russian crude oil than before.
China is the United States’ biggest client, and it is in jeopardy of losing a big share of its business.
Russian-Chinese cooperation, which is necessary for the functioning of the gas pipeline, “does not bode well for the United States as a whole, or for their relations with each country,” the document reportedly reads.
At the same time, the authors of the report indicate that further interaction between the Russian Federation and China in the energy sector may lead to losses in the export of American liquefied natural gas (LNG).
“Although the Power of Siberia gas pipeline does not cause much concern to the United States, a larger agreement between Russia and China could usher in new market trends and promise US losses in future LNG exports,” the research service said.
American experts recall that by 2025, when the gas pipeline is operating at full capacity, the Power of Siberia will supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year to China. This will be 13% of all China’s demand in 2018. Thus, in five years, Beijing will become the second largest buyer of Russian natural gas after Germany.
The report emphasizes that, according to some experts, the pipeline was supposed to be a signal for Washington.
“Speaking about Russia, the launch of the gas pipeline showed that neither the USA nor Europe will be able to prevent the Russian Federation from pursuing its interests. In the case of China, the time of putting the gas pipeline into operation showed that American LNG has ceased to be a serious motivating factor in a trade dispute,” the service underlines.
This is another aspect of the geopolitical competition between US and China, and US and Russia – in a way, the current biggest competitor for Washington is Beijing, but it is also one of the biggest, if not the biggest market for energy, and other products. At the same time, Moscow is a competitor for that business, while at the same time, it is not in US interest to push Russia too much since it would risk causing Beijing and Moscow to cooperate even further, as is seen with the “investments” in the form of purchasing oil, even when there’s cheaper alternatives.
The launch of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline took place in December 2019. The contract for the supply of fuel under it to China is designed for 30 years. It is expected that over this time over 1 trillion cubic meters of gas will be delivered. The first six months, pumping will take place in commissioning mode, and the Power of Siberia will work at full capacity by 2025.
The gas pipeline is a joint project of Gazprom and the China National Petroleum and Gas Corporation (CNPC). Its length only in Russia is about 3 thousand km. The Power of Siberia begins with the Kovykta gas field, then passes the Chayandinskoye and Amur gas processing plants, and then crosses the Chinese border.
According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Power of Siberia is an unprecedented in scale high-tech project.
The Chinese side, in turn, also considers the project strategically important. So, Deputy Foreign Minister Le Yucheng said the deal with Russia will become a new incentive for practical cooperation between the two countries.
Meanwhile, the Congressional Research Service noted that the administration of US President Donald Trump does not pay due attention to the export of Russian gas to China. The authorities are mainly focused on the dependence of Europe on fuel from the Russian Federation.
Washington has made a lot of efforts to try to stop the implementation of Nord Stream 2. So, on December 21st 2019, Trump imposed sanctions against the project. As a result, the Swiss company Allseas, which was laying the underwater elements of the pipeline, stopped its work and refused to return to construction.
All of this has been for naught, since construction on it continues and it will be active sooner, rather than later.
In addition, it should be mentioned that recently, there’s been hints that Gazprom is working towards the next mega project – Power of Siberia-2 and that it is not simply a rumour, but something likely to happen.
The idea to construct Power of Siberia-2 (PoS-2) was flaunted already in the early 2010s, its purpose being of meeting the gas requirements of Western Chinese provinces via Mongolia. This late March Gazprom’s request of conducting a feasibility study for PoS-2 has found President Putin’s approval. The projected pipeline would have a throughput capacity of 50 BCm per year and would be traversing Russia’s Altay region before crossing over to Mongolia and Western China. The first thing that struck market observers was that at some point in early 2020 the capacity of Power of Siberia-2 was upgraded from a preliminary estimate of 30 BCm per year to an officially presented volume of 50 BCm per year.
The framework for Power of Siberia-2 (also known as the Altai pipeline) was laid down in 2015 when Gazprom and the Chinese state-owned company CNPC signed a preliminary gas supply deal, without specifying the technicalities of pricing. Given that Pos-1 pricing talks took a decade to conclude, the tardiness of PoS-2 negotiations is hardly surprising.
Yet at the same time Russian authorities are betting heavily on it happening – the recently issued Energy strategy-2035 sees pipeline gas exports reaching 300 BCm per year by 2035, of which 80 BCm per year will go to China, with European pipeline exports effectively stalling for the next decade and half. It has to be noted that the Energy Strategy also surmises a “pessimistic scenario”, whereby Gazprom’s gas exports increase from 220 BCm in the base year of 2018 to 255 BCm per year in 2035, meaning a slight decline in European demand and Power of Siberia-1 remaining the only China-bound gas conduit, with no Pos-2 construction taking place.
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southfront--2020-05-04--Military Situation In Libya On May 4, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya : • About 2,000 Turkish-backed @ @ @ @ @ reportedly fled to Europe ; • LNA warplanes bombed an ammunition depot of Turkish-backed forces @ @ @ @ @ ; • The LNA advanced on positions of Turkish-backed forces near Sidi Bin al-Bashiri .
@ @ @ @ @ • About 2,000 Syrian Militants Deployed By Turkey In Libya Fled To Europe : Report

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya:
About 2,000 Turkish-backed Syrian militants deployed in Libya reportedly fled to Europe;
Libyan National Army security forces detained an ISIS propagandist, Saeed Kamel al-Makani, near Sirte;
LNA warplanes bombed an ammunition depot of Turkish-backed forces in the Sorman Reserve area;
The LNA advanced on positions of Turkish-backed forces near Sidi Bin al-Bashiri.
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southfront--2020-05-04--In Video: Militants Launch Anti-Tank Guided Missile At Syrian Army’s Buldozer Near Jebal Zawiyah

Click to see the full-size image The situation is escalating on the contact line between the Syrian Army and Idlib @ @ @ @ @ .
Last night , militants launched an anti-tank guided missile at a Syrian Army buldozer @ @ @ @ @ of Jebal Zawiyah in the southern part of the Idlib zone .
MORE ON THE @ @ @ @ @ In Syria On May 4 , 2020 ( Map Update )

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The situation is escalating on the contact line between the Syrian Army and Idlib militant groups supported by Turkey. Last night, militants launched an anti-tank guided missile at a Syrian Army buldozer fortifying positions in the area of Jebal Zawiyah in the southern part of the Idlib zone.
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southfront--2020-05-04--Military Situation In Afghanistan On May 4, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan : • 4 employees of @ @ @ @ @ , Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat , were wounded in a blast in Kabul ; • @ @ @ @ @ were killed and 5 others were wounded in a car bomb attack in the Nahr-e-Siraj @ @ @ @ @ • The Taliban claimed that 3 civilians were killed by government forces in the Chamtal @ @ @ @ @ MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Afghanistan On May 3 , 2020 @ @ @ @

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan:
4 employees of the the power distribution company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, were wounded in a blast in Kabul;
At least 5 government fighters were killed and 5 others were wounded in a car bomb attack in the Nahr-e-Siraj district, Helmand province;
The Taliban claimed that 3 civilians were killed by government forces in the Chamtal district of Balkh province.
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southfront--2020-05-04--Military Situation In Syria On May 4, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • Ansar al-Tawhid has @ @ @ @ @ Harid al-Muminin operations room ; • The Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) suppressed a @ @ @ @ @ ; • Hay ’ at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohamad al-Julani paid a visit to @ @ @ @ @ in an unspecified hospital in Greater Idlib ; • Satellite images reveal the impact of @ @ @ @ @ on targets in Homs province ; MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In @ @ @ @ @ 2020 ( Map Update )

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:
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southfront--2020-05-04--German Police Desperate To Fill Its Migrant Hiring Quotas And Other Benefits Of “Multi-Kulti”

In additional evidence to how successful the bid for multi-culturalism by Germany ( and in part Austria ) is , an employee of the Berlin police spoke on quotas for migrants to be hired into the police force .
And these quotas must be met at any cost .
In addition , the entire entry system is heavily simplified and biased , just so that nobody would get rejected : the answers of the entry tests can easily be found online , and if , by chance , a candidate fails , they are given additional chances until they successfully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that any police employee , regarding of their rank is stripped of bonuses and work hours if they criticize any of the policies and what is taking place .
The video , with subtitles can be seen below : In recent years , applicants with a migration background made up around 30 % of all applicants in Berlin .
The hiring rate was similarly high .
In 2015 , 23.6 % and in 2016 29.2 % of the recruited police officers had a migration background .
In order to attract young people from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ participating in the nationwide campaign Diversity in Education .
There is also the “ Berlin needs you ” initiative , which is aimed at young people with a migration background .
The police have been working with the Turkish community since 2008 and enable internships with the police to those interested .
In job advertisements and on their website , the Berlin police expressly point out that applicants with a migration background are welcome and that foreign language skills and intercultural skills are a plus .
Many police authorities , not just in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase the proportion of colleagues with a migration background .
Self-employed integration officers , information events at schools , multilingual flyers or police officers with a migrant background as advertising faces are a few examples of the measures that are intended to encourage applicants from immigrant families to apply to the police .
Indeed , the police force has become a little more multicultural .
To a large degree this is necessary , since if the integration of foreign citizens does not work properly and tensions within society increase , it is often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feel the problems .
Then it is particularly helpful if the police can send colleagues to the scene who know other cultures and who have foreign language skills .
For this reason , cultural diversity has also become an important issue in the ranks of the police .
In almost all federal states , the police specifically look for applicants with a migration background and sometimes even come up with special advertising measures .
The federal police does not record a possible migration background as any sort of advantage to be hired , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the employees .
Nevertheless , the federal police also want to increase the cultural diversity in their ranks .
Federal police officers with a migration background participate in advertising campaigns and do public relations work .
In addition , the Federal Police work together with schools , associations and integration officers .
And on the website for promoting young people , federal police officers tell about their tasks and everyday work .
The graphic shows the proportion of newly hired police officers with a migration background .
This proportion is shown with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ available have been taken into account .
In comparison , the red bar shows the proportion of residents with a migration background in the respective federal state .
The data is from 2016 , as no such study has been made public in recent years .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Germany Bans All Hezbollah Activity , Designates It As Terrorist Organization • Germany May Simplify Visa Requirements For Russians Under 25 In Fierce Attempt To Deal With Own Social , Demographic Problems

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In additional evidence to how successful the bid for multi-culturalism by Germany (and in part Austria) is, an employee of the Berlin police spoke on quotas for migrants to be hired into the police force.
And these quotas must be met at any cost.
In addition, the entire entry system is heavily simplified and biased, just so that nobody would get rejected: the answers of the entry tests can easily be found online, and if, by chance, a candidate fails, they are given additional chances until they successfully pass the exam.
He further said that any police employee, regarding of their rank is stripped of bonuses and work hours if they criticize any of the policies and what is taking place.
The video, with subtitles can be seen below:
In recent years, applicants with a migration background made up around 30% of all applicants in Berlin. The hiring rate was similarly high. In 2015, 23.6% and in 2016 29.2% of the recruited police officers had a migration background.
In order to attract young people from immigrant families, the Berlin police are participating in the nationwide campaign Diversity in Education.
There is also the “Berlin needs you” initiative, which is aimed at young people with a migration background. The police have been working with the Turkish community since 2008 and enable internships with the police to those interested.
In job advertisements and on their website, the Berlin police expressly point out that applicants with a migration background are welcome and that foreign language skills and intercultural skills are a plus.
Many police authorities, not just in Berlin, are making an effort to increase the proportion of colleagues with a migration background.
Self-employed integration officers, information events at schools, multilingual flyers or police officers with a migrant background as advertising faces are a few examples of the measures that are intended to encourage applicants from immigrant families to apply to the police.
Indeed, the police force has become a little more multicultural.
To a large degree this is necessary, since if the integration of foreign citizens does not work properly and tensions within society increase, it is often the police who are the first to feel the problems.
Then it is particularly helpful if the police can send colleagues to the scene who know other cultures and who have foreign language skills.
For this reason, cultural diversity has also become an important issue in the ranks of the police.
In almost all federal states, the police specifically look for applicants with a migration background and sometimes even come up with special advertising measures.
The federal police does not record a possible migration background as any sort of advantage to be hired, but is planning a corresponding survey among the employees.
Nevertheless, the federal police also want to increase the cultural diversity in their ranks.
Federal police officers with a migration background participate in advertising campaigns and do public relations work. In addition, the Federal Police work together with schools, associations and integration officers. And on the website for promoting young people, federal police officers tell about their tasks and everyday work.
The graphic shows the proportion of newly hired police officers with a migration background. This proportion is shown with the blue bar. The most current figures available have been taken into account. In comparison, the red bar shows the proportion of residents with a migration background in the respective federal state. The data is from 2016, as no such study has been made public in recent years.
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southfront--2020-05-04--China Purchases More Venezuelan Oil In Push For Geopolitical Influence

Venezuelan crude oil exports are growing for the second month in a row .
This conclusion was made by Bloomberg based on the calculation data on the loading of tankers with Venezuelan oil .
In April , the amount of oil exported increased to 739,400 barrels per day and reached the highest level in three months .
This is 9.6 % more than in March .
At least 65 % of Venezuelan oil was exported to China in April .
This is a very apparent push by China to increase its influence , with a sort of investment in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead of the massively discounted crude that Saudi Arabia offers .
The same can be observed in the way Beijing has been steadily increasing purchases of Moscow , as Russia is struggling heavily with the economic downturn in the country .
Venezuela is similarly under US sanctions and economic pressure .
At the same time , the United States is accusing China of not fulfilling the terms of the trade agreement , under which it is obliged to purchase a guaranteed volume of US “ oil shale ” in the amount of $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the deal with the US , china is establishing a new pool of oil suppliers for itself , and it is specifically those that appear more willing to assist it in forwarding its geopolitical interests .
The main parameter for selection in this pool is the principle of political loyalty and the proximity of the strategic objectives of the oil exporting states to those of China .
As a result , a new bipolar world is beginning to form in regard to oil purchases .
However , it should be reminded that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to form around oil , regardless , as such this is nothing new .
Two of the most striking ( and still valid ) alliances : the energy charter between the United States and Great Britain , the Quincy Pact between the United States and Saudi Arabia .
And all the world wars began with the breakdown of the oil agreements .
Venezuela is also one of the country ’ s that supports China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative , and as there are still no significant direct investments , China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
The current standoff between the US and China seems exacerbated , with accusations against US ships in the South China Sea , Washington saying it has evidence that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory in Wuhan , China pushing its interests in every area it can , while the US does the same , amid the economic downturn and the continuing pandemic .
MORE ON THE TOPIC :

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Venezuelan crude oil exports are growing for the second month in a row.
This conclusion was made by Bloomberg based on the calculation data on the loading of tankers with Venezuelan oil.
In April, the amount of oil exported increased to 739,400 barrels per day and reached the highest level in three months.
This is 9.6% more than in March. At least 65% of Venezuelan oil was exported to China in April.
This is a very apparent push by China to increase its influence, with a sort of investment in the form of purchasing oil from Venezuela, instead of the massively discounted crude that Saudi Arabia offers.
The same can be observed in the way Beijing has been steadily increasing purchases of Moscow, as Russia is struggling heavily with the economic downturn in the country.
Venezuela is similarly under US sanctions and economic pressure.
At the same time, the United States is accusing China of not fulfilling the terms of the trade agreement, under which it is obliged to purchase a guaranteed volume of US “oil shale” in the amount of $52.4 billion.
It appears that, despite the deal with the US, china is establishing a new pool of oil suppliers for itself, and it is specifically those that appear more willing to assist it in forwarding its geopolitical interests.
The main parameter for selection in this pool is the principle of political loyalty and the proximity of the strategic objectives of the oil exporting states to those of China.
As a result, a new bipolar world is beginning to form in regard to oil purchases.
However, it should be reminded that all strategic alliances in the world began to form around oil, regardless, as such this is nothing new.
Two of the most striking (and still valid) alliances: the energy charter between the United States and Great Britain, the Quincy Pact between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
And all the world wars began with the breakdown of the oil agreements.
Venezuela is also one of the country’s that supports China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and as there are still no significant direct investments, China has pledged to fund numerous projects in the country.
The current standoff between the US and China seems exacerbated, with accusations against US ships in the South China Sea, Washington saying it has evidence that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, China pushing its interests in every area it can, while the US does the same, amid the economic downturn and the continuing pandemic.
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southfront--2020-05-04--Locations Of US Carrier Strike Groups – May 4, 2020

This is the newst update of the ‘ U.S .
Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map ’ exclusive series showing the @ @ @ @ @ Strike Groups .
SouthFront : Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using @ @ @ @ @ No classified information was used in production of the map .
Carrier strike group ( @ @ @ @ @ formation of the United States Navy .
It is centered on an aircraft carrier and @ @ @ @ @ CVW ) of 65 to 70 aircrafts .
It ’ s composed of roughly 7,500 @ @ @ @ @ , at least one cruiser , a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or @ @ @ @ @ group also , on occasion , includes submarines , attached logistics ships and a supply @ @ @ @ @ comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world ’ s oceans .
@ @ @ @ @

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This is the newst update of the ‘U.S. Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map’ exclusive series showing the approximate locations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups. SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using the available open-source information. No classified information was used in production of the map.
Carrier strike group (CSG) is an operational formation of the United States Navy. It is centered on an aircraft carrier and a carrier air wing (CVW) of 65 to 70 aircrafts. It’s composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates. A carrier strike group also, on occasion, includes submarines, attached logistics ships and a supply ship. Carrier strike groups comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world’s oceans.
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southfront--2020-05-04--There Is Now A Record 375 Million Barrels Of Oil Stored On Tankers

Last weekend we showed that as oil storage on land was rapidly filling up , a familiar sight was seen off the coast of Asia ’ s oil hub in Singapore : a record surge in tankers on anchor used as seaborne storage , and taking advantage of the supercontango just waiting for oil prices to rebound so they can deliver their ( formerly ) precious cargo .
So as more and more storage moves offshore , here is an update from Bank of America on the current status of the oil market as the “ oil glut moves from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five weeks , onshore inventories held in floating top tanks climbed 180mn bbl , suggesting that builds have averaged roughly 4.3mn b/d since mid-March .
These inventory increases reduce BofA ’ s estimates for available onshore crude storage capacity from roughly 910mn bbl to 730 mn bbl ( Chart 2 ) , although the bank still believes that this capacity is unlikely to be fully utilized due to logistical constraints and other issues .
How did we get here ?
As has been extensively reported here and elsewhere , WTI timespreads signalled a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would likely reach their operational limits within a few weeks ( Chart 3 ) .
More recently , the expiration of the May WTI contract demonstrated the lack of available capacity at the hub .
Cushing inventory builds are set to slow dramatically as much of the remaining capacity may be needed as an operational backstop for pipeline issues and blending needs ( Chart 4 ) .
Over the coming weeks and months , US inventory trends could even reverse as producers in Canada and the Bakken shut-in output and refiners increase runs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economy .
As Bank of America adds , land based crude oil inventories first surged in China , where the coronavirus outbreak originated ( Chart 5 ) .
Since then , China ’ s inventories have stagnated while stocks in the US and elsewhere ticked higher .
There is room for incremental builds in China going forward , especially if the government uses more commercial tank space for strategic petroleum reserves ( Chart 6 ) .
Elsewhere , inventories in Europe and the Middle East remain relatively lower .
In Europe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of some tank storage at refiners and terminals .
So , actual storage utilization rates may be higher than the data suggests .
In the Middle East , inventories have climbed in GCC countries but may also remain lower on average as these countries prefer to sell oil as exports before storing domestically .
In the US , producers have leased 23mn bbl of the roughly 70mn bbl of available SPR capacity and added 1.1mn bbl to SPR storage last week .
Of course , in addition to land based storage , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ storage as a spillover outlet .
Crude oil on the water has risen by roughly 150mn bbl since the start of the year , to more than 1.2bn bbl ( Chart 7 ) .
This is due to a combination of higher crude in transit stemming from OPEC ’ s oil price war and from increases in crude oil floating storage .
Since mid-March , crude oil floating storage has grown by an estimated 91mn bbl , or roughly 2.2mn b/d ( Chart 8 ) .
Asia and Europe saw the largest increases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 20mn bbl respectively over the same period .
According to data from Clarksons , there are more than 350 vessels currently being used for floating oil ( crude and product ) storage globally ( Chart 9 ) .
Of this total , roughly 100 are very large crude carriers ( VLCC ) and ultra-large crude carriers ( ULCC ) .
Total oil held in floating storage has risen to 375mn bbl , up 220mn bbl from mid-March and 230mn bbl from the start of the year ( Chart 10 ) .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ VLCCs and ULCCs , followed by Suezmax and Aframax vessels .
The first vessels booked for floating storage were primarily VLCCs and ULCCs , but demand for Suezmax and Aframax vessels has also increased dramatically since April ( Chart 11 ) .
As traders utilize more of the smaller vessels , the average amount of floating storage per vessel has decreased , implying an increase in the average cost for floating storage .
Since the beginning of the year , the average level of storage per vessel have collapsed from more than 1.5mn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chart 12 ) .
This rise in tanker rates for each ship type , combined with crude increasingly being stored on smaller vessels at the margin , is a double positive whammy on the marginal cost of crude storage and thus on the contango in the crude curves .
The abrupt demand contraction has forced crude oil forward curves into steep contango ( Chart 13 ) , with Brent 1-13 spreads widening to - $ 16/bbl at times to facilitate floating storage .
As demand for freight picked up , dirty tanker rates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curve for the TD3 dirty tanker route ( Middle East to Japan ) was very flat just eight weeks ago ( Chart 14 ) , but the increase in demand from Saudi Arabia and from floating storage pushed front month rates up nearly 400 % .
More recently , rates have subsided somewhat but still remain exceptionally high compared to historical levels .
Freight rates have been exceptionally volatile , with VLCC 12 month time charters spiking to $ 80,000/day in early April and falling to around $ 65,000/day recently ( Chart 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been less dramatic , with Suezmax and Aframax vessels peaking at $ 45,000/day and $ 34,000/day respectively .
The very steep contango in the front of the Brent curve ( e.g .
1-3m ) has allowed for floating storage to be economical .
Yet the 12 month contango in Brent was recently lower than the going rate for 12 month time charters for Suezmax and Aframax vessels .
Additional pressure on Brent timespreads will be needed in order to encourage more floating storage using these types of vessels ( Chart 16 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since lockdowns began on a global scale ( Chart 17 ) .
As refiners cut runs or shut down completely , margins experienced short term rebounds , but margins continue to trend towards zero on a spot basis as refined product inventories surge .
In the US , product inventories have risen counter-seasonally and are now nearly 70mn bbl above year ago levels and 26mn bbl above previous five-year highs from 2016 .
It is no surprise that refined product markets have also developed their own supercontango ( Chart 18 ) , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to take advantage of the significant price improvement for forward product prices by storing products on land on and the water .
Estimates for floating storage vary depending on methodology .
Some trackers classify floating storage as vessels that have remained idle for 10 days and others assume 14 days .
The types of vessels tracked may also vary , leading to higher or lower floating storage levels .
Nonetheless , all estimates point to rising volume on the water ( Chart 19 ) .
Refined product floating storage is not well tracked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used for floating storage .
Combining Clarksons data with other crude oil only floating storage data from Vortexa implies that refined product builds have been exceptional ( Chart 20 ) .
Even if total levels of implied refined product floating storage are off , there is little doubt that product storage is on the rise .
The oil surplus was initially visible in dirty tanker freight rates , but clean tanker rates are now beginning to surge as refiners and traders seek to float unsold product volumes ( Chart 21 ) .
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to $ 0.50/gal , shipping has become a disproportionately large component of the all-in cost of delivered fuel , making fuel movements exceptionally expensive .
The economics for floating product storage varies dramatically depending on the contango of each product market and on the density of individual products .
The recent surge in clean product tanker rates has challenged floating storage economics ( Chart 22 ) , but volatility in product forward curves should continue to offer opportunities for traders to float cargoes .
Another round of run cuts could bring renewed crude @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peaked in April as oil demand contracted by nearly 25mn b/d YoY .
Now , countries are emerging from lockdown , boosting oil demand just when OPEC+ cuts are kicking in and producers elsewhere are cutting output .
Even so , the market should remain in surplus for the remainder of 2Q20 , resulting in continued , albeit slower crude oil and product builds .
The oil market is forward looking and market balances look much better in 2H20 which should be supporting of prices .
That said , with so much product @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk of additional pressure on refining margins , even as global refinery outages hit record levels ( Chart 23 ) .
Any further reduction in refinery demand for crude could ultimately result in renewed weakness for crude oil prices ( Chart 24 ) and would likely warrant steeper contango .

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Originally appeared at ZeroHedge
Last weekend we showed that as oil storage on land was rapidly filling up, a familiar sight was seen off the coast of Asia’s oil hub in Singapore: a record surge in tankers on anchor used as seaborne storage, and taking advantage of the supercontango just waiting for oil prices to rebound so they can deliver their (formerly) precious cargo.
So as more and more storage moves offshore, here is an update from Bank of America on the current status of the oil market as the “oil glut moves from tanks to tankers.”
In the last five weeks, onshore inventories held in floating top tanks climbed 180mn bbl, suggesting that builds have averaged roughly 4.3mn b/d since mid-March. These inventory increases reduce BofA’s estimates for available onshore crude storage capacity from roughly 910mn bbl to 730 mn bbl (Chart 2), although the bank still believes that this capacity is unlikely to be fully utilized due to logistical constraints and other issues.
How did we get here? As has been extensively reported here and elsewhere, WTI timespreads signalled a massive build in Cushing inventories and stocks would likely reach their operational limits within a few weeks (Chart 3). More recently, the expiration of the May WTI contract demonstrated the lack of available capacity at the hub. Cushing inventory builds are set to slow dramatically as much of the remaining capacity may be needed as an operational backstop for pipeline issues and blending needs (Chart 4). Over the coming weeks and months, US inventory trends could even reverse as producers in Canada and the Bakken shut-in output and refiners increase runs on the back of the re-opening of the economy.
As Bank of America adds, land based crude oil inventories first surged in China, where the coronavirus outbreak originated (Chart 5). Since then, China’s inventories have stagnated while stocks in the US and elsewhere ticked higher. There is room for incremental builds in China going forward, especially if the government uses more commercial tank space for strategic petroleum reserves (Chart 6). Elsewhere, inventories in Europe and the Middle East remain relatively lower. In Europe, this may be due to the mothballing of some tank storage at refiners and terminals. So, actual storage utilization rates may be higher than the data suggests. In the Middle East, inventories have climbed in GCC countries but may also remain lower on average as these countries prefer to sell oil as exports before storing domestically. In the US, producers have leased 23mn bbl of the roughly 70mn bbl of available SPR capacity and added 1.1mn bbl to SPR storage last week.
Of course, in addition to land based storage, the market also uses tankers for crude oil storage as a spillover outlet. Crude oil on the water has risen by roughly 150mn bbl since the start of the year, to more than 1.2bn bbl (Chart 7). This is due to a combination of higher crude in transit stemming from OPEC’s oil price war and from increases in crude oil floating storage. Since mid-March, crude oil floating storage has grown by an estimated 91mn bbl, or roughly 2.2mn b/d (Chart 8). Asia and Europe saw the largest increases in floating storage, climbing 36mn bbl and 20mn bbl respectively over the same period.
According to data from Clarksons, there are more than 350 vessels currently being used for floating oil (crude and product) storage globally (Chart 9). Of this total, roughly 100 are very large crude carriers (VLCC) and ultra-large crude carriers (ULCC). Total oil held in floating storage has risen to 375mn bbl, up 220mn bbl from mid-March and 230mn bbl from the start of the year (Chart 10). A majority of this storage has occurred on VLCCs and ULCCs, followed by Suezmax and Aframax vessels.
The first vessels booked for floating storage were primarily VLCCs and ULCCs, but demand for Suezmax and Aframax vessels has also increased dramatically since April (Chart 11). As traders utilize more of the smaller vessels, the average amount of floating storage per vessel has decreased, implying an increase in the average cost for floating storage. Since the beginning of the year, the average level of storage per vessel have collapsed from more than 1.5mn bbl to just 1mn bbl. (Chart 12). This rise in tanker rates for each ship type, combined with crude increasingly being stored on smaller vessels at the margin, is a double positive whammy on the marginal cost of crude storage and thus on the contango in the crude curves.
The abrupt demand contraction has forced crude oil forward curves into steep contango (Chart 13), with Brent 1-13 spreads widening to -$16/bbl at times to facilitate floating storage. As demand for freight picked up, dirty tanker rates spiked. The shape of the forward curve for the TD3 dirty tanker route (Middle East to Japan) was very flat just eight weeks ago (Chart 14), but the increase in demand from Saudi Arabia and from floating storage pushed front month rates up nearly 400%. More recently, rates have subsided somewhat but still remain exceptionally high compared to historical levels.
Freight rates have been exceptionally volatile, with VLCC 12 month time charters spiking to $80,000/day in early April and falling to around $65,000/day recently (Chart 15). The increase in smaller vessels has been less dramatic, with Suezmax and Aframax vessels peaking at $45,000/day and $34,000/day respectively. The very steep contango in the front of the Brent curve (e.g. 1-3m) has allowed for floating storage to be economical. Yet the 12 month contango in Brent was recently lower than the going rate for 12 month time charters for Suezmax and Aframax vessels. Additional pressure on Brent timespreads will be needed in order to encourage more floating storage using these types of vessels (Chart 16).
Refining margins have been exceptionally volatile since lockdowns began on a global scale (Chart 17). As refiners cut runs or shut down completely, margins experienced short term rebounds, but margins continue to trend towards zero on a spot basis as refined product inventories surge. In the US, product inventories have risen counter-seasonally and are now nearly 70mn bbl above year ago levels and 26mn bbl above previous five-year highs from 2016. It is no surprise that refined product markets have also developed their own supercontango (Chart 18), as prompt prices plummeted. Refiners have attempted to take advantage of the significant price improvement for forward product prices by storing products on land on and the water.
Estimates for floating storage vary depending on methodology. Some trackers classify floating storage as vessels that have remained idle for 10 days and others assume 14 days. The types of vessels tracked may also vary, leading to higher or lower floating storage levels. Nonetheless, all estimates point to rising volume on the water (Chart 19). Refined product floating storage is not well tracked, but Clarksons does track total tankers used for floating storage. Combining Clarksons data with other crude oil only floating storage data from Vortexa implies that refined product builds have been exceptional (Chart 20). Even if total levels of implied refined product floating storage are off, there is little doubt that product storage is on the rise.
The oil surplus was initially visible in dirty tanker freight rates, but clean tanker rates are now beginning to surge as refiners and traders seek to float unsold product volumes (Chart 21). With refined product prices like Singapore gasoline falling to $0.50/gal, shipping has become a disproportionately large component of the all-in cost of delivered fuel, making fuel movements exceptionally expensive. The economics for floating product storage varies dramatically depending on the contango of each product market and on the density of individual products. The recent surge in clean product tanker rates has challenged floating storage economics (Chart 22), but volatility in product forward curves should continue to offer opportunities for traders to float cargoes.
Another round of run cuts could bring renewed crude weakness. The global oil rout likely peaked in April as oil demand contracted by nearly 25mn b/d YoY. Now, countries are emerging from lockdown, boosting oil demand just when OPEC+ cuts are kicking in and producers elsewhere are cutting output. Even so, the market should remain in surplus for the remainder of 2Q20, resulting in continued, albeit slower crude oil and product builds. The oil market is forward looking and market balances look much better in 2H20 which should be supporting of prices. That said, with so much product moving into floating storage, we see risk of additional pressure on refining margins, even as global refinery outages hit record levels (Chart 23). Any further reduction in refinery demand for crude could ultimately result in renewed weakness for crude oil prices (Chart 24) and would likely warrant steeper contango.
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southfront--2020-05-04--In Videos: Houthis Release More Combat Footage With Saudi-backed Forces

the US says that help from Iran is useless and will not change the balance of power for the war @ @ @ @ @ seems to blame Iran for providing help to the houthis .
Which to them is @ @ @ @ @ for the war has changed in favor of the houthis .
so which statement is @ @ @ @ @ each other

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The Houthis (Ansar Allah) continue their offensive operations against Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.
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southfront--2020-05-04--About 2,000 Syrian Militants Deployed By Turkey In Libya Fled To Europe: Report

No , I dont .
I am not from USA as well as its none of Your bussiness what taxpayers pay tax .
Maybee You also should learn to compare productivity pr inhabitant .
Much money in Your world might not be much in USA as well as in my country .
As usual only USA is mentioned in this infection .
You probatly also only are able to mention the poor ones and the rich mainly named as “ jews ” in USA , but facts are the middle class there being 275 millions dont exist , because it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ineffective and corrupt dictatorships .
Its so tempting for me to conclude fast about You too .
Id any , I do try to make the millions of civilians in Syria as well as the rest of the world visible .
Where are they .
How can they accept leaderships like that .
And too : Why are most of the refugees in the world muslims and prefare to live sekulars low Christians for muslims… You should wonder that .
Why do people emmigrate TO USA as well as TO Western Europe .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ unimplyment for men was 50 % and vomen hardly works .
WAs it because those Syrians was lazy bums .
No , they were prepared to take any job and the only available was being a well paid soldier of any kind .
Some extra Sharia didnt matter .
They got clothe , food , could protect themselves by weapons and even send some money home .
That was making opposition and it was and are exact same thing for most muslim countries .
You/They dont create jobs .
Its the same for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so You can feed the extra mouths you make by duty , for fun ot both .
Here in Denmark its number one to include and invest in people , if there comes less jobs .
We make long time things such as roads , bridges , hospitals and long time services for the Tourists .
We also educate people and by that update old people to the world of computers , so they at least can push bottoms about it .
By that people dont uprise .
They trust .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and up to a level , they tell the rest of us is possible .
ME mainly is about making the cake bigger is impossible because of ancient systems supported by ancient culture and religion .
Most farming in Syria is from the old days waterwasting and noe making more and more salty fields .
Its will be extra because of Turks taking water from Eufra and Tigris as well as the climate says less rain .
And the methods for growing much more already has been invented by others as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better by less people – AND – grow more by hektar and better products , which by the non implyed in the farmland can sell it to people needing cheep but good food .
Those are many nearby and they can send stuff like that all the way from Europe and USA , so why not from Syria with its cheep laubor ?
?
The same for SDFs and theior socalled oil stealing .
The real money in oil are , when the oil has left Syria , where we produce almost anything @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tiny things in computers and medical care .
But I not even see Assads educate a single person for better farming or being producers of plastic buckets .
You can buy whole systems for plastic as You wish .
The big ones replace the old ones bacuase the sallery for the workers are a lot , but laubor in Syria , Iraq and Iran is very very cheep .
And You just replace the old stuff , when the big ones replace theirs again .
I am sure You even can send cheep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They dont care about who did it .
Sudenly their shekels are worth someting too : )

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About 2,000 Syrian militants that were deployed by Turkey in Libya during the last five months have fled to Europe, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
“Some of the 2,000 Syrian fighters who were transported to Libya to fight with the UN-supported Government of National Accord (GNA) against its competitor Khalifa Haftar have in fact fled to Europe, according to the Libyan National Army (LNA),” the SOHR claimed.
Turkey deploys Syrian militants in Libya in order to support the GNA’s battle against the Libyan National Army for the country’s capital of Tripoli. However, a large part of the deployed fighters appeared to be poorly trained and having little motivation to sacrifice their lives for Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman dreams.
Syrian sources report that Turkish-backed militants are also unsatisfied with Turkey’s behavior towards them. For example, Ankara reportedly promised to grant the families of the dead militants with Turkish citizenship, but does not fulfil this promise.
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southfront--2020-05-04--Syrian Air Defense Forces Activated In Response To Missile Attack On Aleppo

The Syrian air defense was activated on April 4 in response to a missile attack on targets in the northern @ @ @ @ @ to reports , explosions were hear in the area of Safira , southeast of the @ @ @ @ @ s state media claimed that the air defense forces intercepted several ‘ hostile missiles ’ @ @ @ @ @ part of them ( about 10 were launched ) hit their targets in the country @ @ @ @ @ : • ISIS Rears Its Ugly Head In Southern Syria And Central Iraq • Military @ @ @ @ @ 4 , 2020 ( Map Update )

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The Syrian air defense was activated on April 4 in response to a missile attack on targets in the northern province of Aleppo. According to reports, explosions were hear in the area of Safira, southeast of the provincial capital.
Syria’s state media claimed that the air defense forces intercepted several ‘hostile missiles’, but at least a part of them (about 10 were launched) hit their targets in the country.
The sitaution is developing.
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southfront--2020-05-04--In Video: Russians Help To Rescue Turkish Vehicle That Stuck In Northeastern Syria

Units of the Russian Military Police helped to rescue a Turkish military vehicle that had stuck in the mud during @ @ @ @ @ the village of al-Muabbada in northeastern Syria .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military @ @ @ @ @ 4 , 2020 ( Map Update )

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Units of the Russian Military Police helped to rescue a Turkish military vehicle that had stuck in the mud during the joint Russian-Turkish patrol near the village of al-Muabbada in northeastern Syria.
#Qamişlo: Turkish armored vehicle stuck in the mud during joint Turkish-Russian military patrol in the countryside of Girkê Legê (Al-Muabbada). pic.twitter.com/HIiUUsXKeZ — Rojava Network (@RojavaNetwork) May 4, 2020
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southfront--2020-05-04--ISIS Rears Its Ugly Head In Southern Syria And Central Iraq

Tensions between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Army are growing in southern Idlib .
Recently , government forces repeatedly shelled positions of the terrorist groups in the Zawiya Mountain area .
The most intense shelling targeted Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorists near Fatterah and Sufuhon .
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the al-Qaeda-affiliated “ Wa Harid al-Muminin ” operations room described this as a blatant violation of the ceasefire regime and announced that they ’ d killed several pro-government fighters in retaliatory strikes .
At the same time , Hayat Tahrir al-Sham blocked several Turkish military vehicles near the town of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to local sources , the group is opposing the growth of the Turkish military presence there because earlier Turkish-backed forces opposed its attempt to reopen commercial crossings with the government-held area in western Aleppo and eastern Idlib .
Contraband traffic and various fees on commercial activities are an important source of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ’ s income .
Therefore , despite the public declarations to defeat the Assad regime , the group is interested in trade between the militant-held part of Greater Idlib and the government-controlled part of Syria .
Militant groups directly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of attacks .
On May 2 , a prominent commander of the Sham Corps , known as Haj Talib al-Khatib , survived an assassination attempt receiving light injures .
Unknown gunmen on a motorcycle fired on his vehicle on the road linking the towns of al-Nerab and Sarmin .
Late on the same day , Abu ‘ Arib , a field commander of the Ahrar al-Sham , died from a land mine explosion on the frontline in southern Idlib .
A part of Pro-Turkish sources accuses Hayat Tahrir al-Sham of staging such attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its Turkish-controlled counterparts even further .
ISIS cells assassinated two Syrian intelligence officers and a supposed Hezbollah member in the province of Daraa in attacks on April 30 and May 2 .
These assassinations became the latest in a series of ISIS attacks on government forces .
Using the instability on the frontline in Idlib , the terrorist group expanded its operations southern Syria .
The ISIS activity is also growing in Iraq .
Early on May 2 , ISIS cells carried out coordinated attacks on positions of the Popular Mobilization Forces in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Tigris Regiment were killed near Mukeshefah and a member of the 41th Brigade was killed near Balad .
ISIS militants also briefly seized the PMF positions in the Mukeshefah area .
Later on the same day , ISIS terrorists armed with machine guns and sniper rifles fired on a police station in the village of Zaghinah in Diyala province .
Four police officers were killed and nine others were injured .
In a separate development , ISIS units detonated an improvised explosive device on the route of a PMF convoy in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacked the convoy ’ s vehicles with machine guns .
A soldier was killed and 3 others were injured .
The increasing number of ISIS attacks in late April and early May even drew the attention of the US-led coalition .
On April 29 , coalition warplanes bombed the ISIS stronghold in the Hamrin Mountains .
The strikes followed a PMF security operation in the area .
Nonetheless , the following developments in the provinces of Saladin and Diyala demonstrated that the ISIS threat remains an important factor of the security situation in @ @ @

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Tensions between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Army are growing in southern Idlib. Recently, government forces repeatedly shelled positions of the terrorist groups in the Zawiya Mountain area. The most intense shelling targeted Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorists near Fatterah and Sufuhon.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the al-Qaeda-affiliated “Wa Harid al-Muminin” operations room described this as a blatant violation of the ceasefire regime and announced that they’d killed several pro-government fighters in retaliatory strikes.
At the same time, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham blocked several Turkish military vehicles near the town of Darat Izza in western Aleppo. According to local sources, the group is opposing the growth of the Turkish military presence there because earlier Turkish-backed forces opposed its attempt to reopen commercial crossings with the government-held area in western Aleppo and eastern Idlib.
Contraband traffic and various fees on commercial activities are an important source of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s income. Therefore, despite the public declarations to defeat the Assad regime, the group is interested in trade between the militant-held part of Greater Idlib and the government-controlled part of Syria.
Militant groups directly controlled by Turkey also faced a series of attacks. On May 2, a prominent commander of the Sham Corps, known as Haj Talib al-Khatib, survived an assassination attempt receiving light injures. Unknown gunmen on a motorcycle fired on his vehicle on the road linking the towns of al-Nerab and Sarmin. Late on the same day, Abu ‘Arib, a field commander of the Ahrar al-Sham, died from a land mine explosion on the frontline in southern Idlib. A part of Pro-Turkish sources accuses Hayat Tahrir al-Sham of staging such attacks in order to undermine the influence of its Turkish-controlled counterparts even further.
ISIS cells assassinated two Syrian intelligence officers and a supposed Hezbollah member in the province of Daraa in attacks on April 30 and May 2. These assassinations became the latest in a series of ISIS attacks on government forces. Using the instability on the frontline in Idlib, the terrorist group expanded its operations southern Syria.
The ISIS activity is also growing in Iraq.
Early on May 2, ISIS cells carried out coordinated attacks on positions of the Popular Mobilization Forces in the province of Saladin. Nine fighters of the Tigris Regiment were killed near Mukeshefah and a member of the 41th Brigade was killed near Balad. ISIS militants also briefly seized the PMF positions in the Mukeshefah area.
Later on the same day, ISIS terrorists armed with machine guns and sniper rifles fired on a police station in the village of Zaghinah in Diyala province. Four police officers were killed and nine others were injured.
In a separate development, ISIS units detonated an improvised explosive device on the route of a PMF convoy in the district of Udhaim, and then attacked the convoy’s vehicles with machine guns. A soldier was killed and 3 others were injured.
The increasing number of ISIS attacks in late April and early May even drew the attention of the US-led coalition. On April 29, coalition warplanes bombed the ISIS stronghold in the Hamrin Mountains. The strikes followed a PMF security operation in the area. Nonetheless, the following developments in the provinces of Saladin and Diyala demonstrated that the ISIS threat remains an important factor of the security situation in the country.
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southfront--2020-05-04--A New Frustrated Chapter in the Violent War Against Venezuela

In the early morning of May 3 , there was a thwarted mercenary raid on the coast of Macuto , in the state of La Guaira .
Interior , Justice , and Peace Minister Néstor Reverol reported that the Bolivarian National Armed Force ( FANB ) together with the Special Action Forces ( FAES ) of the Bolivarian National Police countered an invasion by “ sea ” on the coast by non-state actors , officially called “ Operation Negro Primero ” .
The Venezuelan authorities reportedly killed nine mercenaries and detained two others , who were part of what they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also seized 10 rifles , a Glock 9mm pistol , two AFAG machine guns that were part of the Federal Legislative Palace ’ s weapons park stolen by seditious groups on 30 April 2019 , six land vehicles in the form of pickup trucks , a boat with two outboard motors , two notebooks with details of the violent operation , satellite phones , identification , uniforms ( including a helmet with the United States flag ) and cartridges of various calibers .
Among those killed was former Captain Robert Colina , alias @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a video that went out on Twitter this morning that called for “ liberating ” Venezuela .
A few weeks ago , the Venezuelan fugitive from justice , now detained in the United States , Clíver Alcalá , admitted that he was one of his “ trusted ” men .
Last March , a defector from the FANB captured by local authorities , Rubén Darío Fernández ( alias “ Búho ” ) , confessed that the aforementioned “ Panther ” was leading a terrorist squad to carry out selective assassinations against the main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affirmed that this frustrated incursion came from Colombia ; since Riohacha , Clíver Alcalá had been organizing a plot that was also dismantled last March , in which a cache of combat weapons that would be moved via illegal routes to Venezuelan territory was intercepted and seized by the Colombian police .
At that time , the Minister of Communication and Information , Jorge Rodriguez , said that these weapons were going to be received by “ one of the three groups ” coordinated by Alcalá .
In addition , a recently published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a military contractor , Silvercorp , which has received at least a couple of contracts from the US government , was in charge of training mercenaries and FANB deserters from the Alcalá group in three camps in Colombia .
Shortly before noon today , May 3 , the president of the National Constituent Assembly , Diosdado Cabello , confirmed in a press conference that the maritime vehicles used in the operation came from Colombia because of the GPS information from the satellite phones seized in the operation .
Minister Reverol reported “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arrests are not ruled out as a thorough search is being made by land , sea , and air .
Cabello repeated this to the press at the Federal Legislative Palace , adding that one of the subjects arrested in the early hours of the morning confessed to being a drug trafficker , an agent of the DEA , the United States ’ anti-drug agency , and added : “ It is sad that those who call themselves Venezuelans are financed by drug trafficking , by drug money ” .
What is certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ electronic equipment seized in this operation coincide with the models used in last year ’ s incident , on April 30 , 2019 , when some defectors from the FANB and mercenaries took over the Altamira distribution center in Caracas in a failed attempt to overthrow the government of President Nicolás Maduro in order to place Juan Guaidó , the man chosen by Donald Trump ’ s administration , in power .
Among the weapon models that match both scenes is a rifle that does not correspond to those used by the Venezuelan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a Motorola XPR3500 radio seized in Macuto matches the model confiscated by the Colombian police in La Guajira last March , as well as the AR-15 rifles and the helmet with the American flag , equipment that was to be used by “ one of the three groups ” that Alcalá Cordones coordinated to carry out armed actions against Venezuelan institutions and leadership .
In addition , a source close to the official operation carried out by the FANB and the FAES in Macuto confirmed to Mision Verdad , under condition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sail from La Guajira in Colombia and made a stop in Aruba before running aground on the Venezuelan coast .
Aruba , along with Bonaire and Curaçao , is part of the Dutch crown colonies in the West Indies .
Curaçao is located 25 kilometers off the northwest coast of Venezuela , and the Netherlands decided last year to recognize Guaidó as “ president ” for the geopolitical benefit of the United States .
Both Aruba and Curaçao are territorial headquarters of two U.S. bases , respectively Reina Beatriz and Hato Rey , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Advanced Operations Center ( FOL ) , spearheading its alleged anti-drug operations .
It should be noted that the cruise ship Resolute rammed a Venezuelan Coast Guard vessel , the Naiguatá , on March 30 near La Tortuga Island ( in the absence of a request for permission ) , and subsequently fled to the port of Willemstad , in Curaçao .
The head of the FANB ’ s Strategic Operational Command ( CEOFANB ) , Admiral in Chief Remigio Ceballos , stated in mid-April that the Resolute was aimed at “ placing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( the participation of alias “ Pantera ” , the seized equipment and the stop in Aruba before arriving in La Guaira ) indicates that “ Operation Gideon ” is indeed part of the plot coordinated by Clíver Alcalá from Colombia with resources , financing , and logistics from the United States ( via a private security contractor ) and with the approval of the clique led by Juan Guaidó .
The frustrated incursions were anticipated by the Venezuelan state through an aggregation of information .
Diosdado Cabello said at the aforementioned press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the country ’ s Caribbean coasts .
Since the calls for insurrection by Óscar Pérez and former Captain Juan Carlos Caguaripano in 2017 and the attempted assassination by means of drone bombs against President Maduro in 2018 , the terrorist-mercenary agenda has been increasing in its coordination and attempts at implementation under different channels and actors .
This is how Venezuelan state agencies have been managing to dismantle this agenda , in which the most visible face in recent months has been Clíver Alcalá Cordones himself .
Minister Jorge Rodriguez informed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detailed follow-up to the plans that emerged from what was being plotted in Colombia .
Recently , on April 20 , four captains and one lieutenant of the Bolivarian National Guard ( GNB ) were arrested and charged before military courts for weapons theft at GNB detachment 441 in Puerta Morocha , Miranda state .
Before being arrested , and according to the opposition , these officers tried to take over the weapons park and proceed to the Ramo Verde detention center in Caracas , freeing other seditious officers held there and arming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to information from anti-Chávez journalist Luis Gonzalo Pérez of NTN24 , the “ uprising ” “ was going to be amphibious , both in La Guaira and in Falcón ” , and the detainees “ had conversations with external advisers in order to be able to carry out their armed uprising ” .
As a preventive measure , the Venezuelan state decided to block the accesses to the Caracas-La Guaira highway and the Cabrera tunnel based on the information provided ( whether from Colombia or from the recently arrested and prosecuted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by opposition journalists and Iván Simonovis , former commissary of the then Technical Judicial Police , head of Security in the Caracas Mayor ’ s Office at the time of the Puente Llaguno massacre in 2002 and now a US collaborator in an attempt to crystallize a coup d ’ état against the Bolivarian Government .
Clearly the Venezuelan authorities have anticipated such an agenda within this critical context of the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic , in which the state is responsible for most of the official health care efforts for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intended to exploit this “ opportunity ” to undermine the government of Nicolás Maduro , while the state neutralizes every attempt to impose a framework of violence , chaos and coup d ’ état leveraged again by the United States .

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Submitted via resumen-english.org
In the early morning of May 3, there was a thwarted mercenary raid on the coast of Macuto, in the state of La Guaira. Interior, Justice, and Peace Minister Néstor Reverol reported that the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) together with the Special Action Forces (FAES) of the Bolivarian National Police countered an invasion by “sea” on the coast by non-state actors, officially called “Operation Negro Primero”.
The Venezuelan authorities reportedly killed nine mercenaries and detained two others, who were part of what they called “Operation Gideon”.
They also seized 10 rifles, a Glock 9mm pistol, two AFAG machine guns that were part of the Federal Legislative Palace’s weapons park stolen by seditious groups on 30 April 2019, six land vehicles in the form of pickup trucks, a boat with two outboard motors, two notebooks with details of the violent operation, satellite phones, identification, uniforms (including a helmet with the United States flag) and cartridges of various calibers.
Among those killed was former Captain Robert Colina, alias “Panther,” who had recorded a video that went out on Twitter this morning that called for “liberating” Venezuela. A few weeks ago, the Venezuelan fugitive from justice, now detained in the United States, Clíver Alcalá, admitted that he was one of his “trusted” men.
Last March, a defector from the FANB captured by local authorities, Rubén Darío Fernández (alias “Búho”), confessed that the aforementioned “Panther” was leading a terrorist squad to carry out selective assassinations against the main leaders of the national executive.
Reverol affirmed that this frustrated incursion came from Colombia; since Riohacha, Clíver Alcalá had been organizing a plot that was also dismantled last March, in which a cache of combat weapons that would be moved via illegal routes to Venezuelan territory was intercepted and seized by the Colombian police.
At that time, the Minister of Communication and Information, Jorge Rodriguez, said that these weapons were going to be received by “one of the three groups” coordinated by Alcalá.
In addition, a recently published Associated Press (AP) story claims that a military contractor, Silvercorp, which has received at least a couple of contracts from the US government, was in charge of training mercenaries and FANB deserters from the Alcalá group in three camps in Colombia.
Shortly before noon today, May 3, the president of the National Constituent Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, confirmed in a press conference that the maritime vehicles used in the operation came from Colombia because of the GPS information from the satellite phones seized in the operation.
The remains of a shipwreck
Minister Reverol reported “that the operation is continuing and other arrests are not ruled out as a thorough search is being made by land, sea, and air.
Cabello repeated this to the press at the Federal Legislative Palace, adding that one of the subjects arrested in the early hours of the morning confessed to being a drug trafficker, an agent of the DEA, the United States’ anti-drug agency, and added: “It is sad that those who call themselves Venezuelans are financed by drug trafficking, by drug money”.
What is certain is that some of the weapons and electronic equipment seized in this operation coincide with the models used in last year’s incident, on April 30, 2019, when some defectors from the FANB and mercenaries took over the Altamira distribution center in Caracas in a failed attempt to overthrow the government of President Nicolás Maduro in order to place Juan Guaidó, the man chosen by Donald Trump’s administration, in power.
Among the weapon models that match both scenes is a rifle that does not correspond to those used by the Venezuelan state defense and security forces.
Likewise, a Motorola XPR3500 radio seized in Macuto matches the model confiscated by the Colombian police in La Guajira last March, as well as the AR-15 rifles and the helmet with the American flag, equipment that was to be used by “one of the three groups” that Alcalá Cordones coordinated to carry out armed actions against Venezuelan institutions and leadership.
In addition, a source close to the official operation carried out by the FANB and the FAES in Macuto confirmed to Mision Verdad, under condition of anonymity, that the maritime vehicles set sail from La Guajira in Colombia and made a stop in Aruba before running aground on the Venezuelan coast.
Aruba, along with Bonaire and Curaçao, is part of the Dutch crown colonies in the West Indies. Curaçao is located 25 kilometers off the northwest coast of Venezuela, and the Netherlands decided last year to recognize Guaidó as “president” for the geopolitical benefit of the United States.
Both Aruba and Curaçao are territorial headquarters of two U.S. bases, respectively Reina Beatriz and Hato Rey, from where the Southern Command coordinates an Advanced Operations Center (FOL), spearheading its alleged anti-drug operations.
It should be noted that the cruise ship Resolute rammed a Venezuelan Coast Guard vessel, the Naiguatá, on March 30 near La Tortuga Island (in the absence of a request for permission), and subsequently fled to the port of Willemstad, in Curaçao. The head of the FANB’s Strategic Operational Command (CEOFANB), Admiral in Chief Remigio Ceballos, stated in mid-April that the Resolute was aimed at “placing mercenaries” in Venezuela.
The evidence (the participation of alias “Pantera”, the seized equipment and the stop in Aruba before arriving in La Guaira) indicates that “Operation Gideon” is indeed part of the plot coordinated by Clíver Alcalá from Colombia with resources, financing, and logistics from the United States (via a private security contractor) and with the approval of the clique led by Juan Guaidó.
Early morning raids against the terrorist agenda
The frustrated incursions were anticipated by the Venezuelan state through an aggregation of information. Diosdado Cabello said at the aforementioned press conference that such an action was expected on the country’s Caribbean coasts.
Since the calls for insurrection by Óscar Pérez and former Captain Juan Carlos Caguaripano in 2017 and the attempted assassination by means of drone bombs against President Maduro in 2018, the terrorist-mercenary agenda has been increasing in its coordination and attempts at implementation under different channels and actors.
This is how Venezuelan state agencies have been managing to dismantle this agenda, in which the most visible face in recent months has been Clíver Alcalá Cordones himself. Minister Jorge Rodriguez informed the country last March that there was a detailed follow-up to the plans that emerged from what was being plotted in Colombia.
Recently, on April 20, four captains and one lieutenant of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) were arrested and charged before military courts for weapons theft at GNB detachment 441 in Puerta Morocha, Miranda state.
Before being arrested, and according to the opposition, these officers tried to take over the weapons park and proceed to the Ramo Verde detention center in Caracas, freeing other seditious officers held there and arming them for a “military uprising”.
According to information from anti-Chávez journalist Luis Gonzalo Pérez of NTN24, the “uprising” “was going to be amphibious, both in La Guaira and in Falcón”, and the detainees “had conversations with external advisers in order to be able to carry out their armed uprising”.
As a preventive measure, the Venezuelan state decided to block the accesses to the Caracas-La Guaira highway and the Cabrera tunnel based on the information provided (whether from Colombia or from the recently arrested and prosecuted military). This action was opposed by opposition journalists and Iván Simonovis, former commissary of the then Technical Judicial Police, head of Security in the Caracas Mayor’s Office at the time of the Puente Llaguno massacre in 2002 and now a US collaborator in an attempt to crystallize a coup d’état against the Bolivarian Government.
Clearly the Venezuelan authorities have anticipated such an agenda within this critical context of the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic, in which the state is responsible for most of the official health care efforts for the population. The planners of the plot intended to exploit this “opportunity” to undermine the government of Nicolás Maduro, while the state neutralizes every attempt to impose a framework of violence, chaos and coup d’état leveraged again by the United States.
Source: Mision Verdad, translation Internationalist 360
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southfront--2020-05-04--ZBD 2000 Amphibious Light Tank (Infographics)

@ SF : It would be nice to read some actual analysis , instead of just a few technical data @ @ @ @ @ technical data , Wikipedia does provide much more information anyway .
What is lacking is @ @ @ @ @ military equipment compares in the market , how it prospects are against competing solutions , @ @ @ @ @ or replacements , etc .
This can hardly be found on the web , at @ @ @ @ @ and would be truly beneficial compared to some superficial numbers that dont say much anyway @

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The ZBD 2000 amphibious light tank is a successor to the Chinese Type 63A amphibious light tank. The ZBD 2000 amphibious light tank is a variant of the ZBD 2000 infantry fighting vehicle.
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southfront--2020-05-05--U.S. Sanctions Civilians, Seizes Assets For Allegedly Supporting IRGC Quds Force

On May 1st , the US Treasury sanctioned a company allegedly tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) Quds Force .
“ The Iranian regime and its supporters continue to prioritize the funding of international terrorist organizations over the health and well-being of the Iranian people , ” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin .
“ The United States remains committed to working with financial institutions , non-profit organizations , and international partners to facilitate humanitarian trade and assistance to the Iranian people.
” The company , as well as its owner were sanctioned .
The owner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dianat , “ a longtime associate of senior officials of Iran ’ s IRGC-QF.
” Dianat is also reportedly know as “ Ameer Abdulazeez Jaafar Almthaje ” and is accused of being involved in efforts to generate revenue and smuggle weapons abroad .
The Office of Foreign Assets Control ( OFAC ) is also sanctioning Taif Mining Services LLC , a company owned , controlled , or directed by Dianat .
The government filed a forfeiture action to claim money used to purchase the Nautic , a 900-foot-long tanker that was previously named @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detained in the Gulf of Oman .
Together with that , the the U.S. Attorney ’ s Office for the District of Columbia filed criminal charges against Dianat and one of his business associates for violations of sanctions and money laundering laws , and filed a related civil forfeiture action alleging that approximately $ 12 million is subject to forfeiture as funds involved in these crimes and as assets of a foreign terrorist organization .
This is possible since the US in 2019 designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a terrorist organization .
Dianat , an associate of IRGC-QF officials Behnam Shahriyari and Rostam Ghasemi , “ has supported IRGC-QF smuggling operations for several years , including efforts aimed at the shipment of weapons including missiles.
” As per the statement , the IRGC-QF has relied on Dianat to secure entry for vessels carrying IRGC-QF shipments and has used his business connections to facilitate logistics requirements .
Allegedly , Dianat has been directly involved in IRGC-QF efforts to smuggle shipments from Iran to Yemen .
Finally , Dianat has been involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generate revenue for the IRGC-QF , and in 2019 , leveraged Taif Mining Services LLC , a company under his control , to procure an oil tanker .
This designation is a way for the US to show the world that its maximum pressure campaign against Iran wouldn ’ t stop regardless of any fallout from COVID-19 , for Washington or Tehran .
Sanctioning a relatively unknown individual , with a company that can ’ t be considered major by any means is evidence of that , since most Iranian officials , military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the time comes for any Iranian individual who has any arbitrary , proven or unproven ties to “ the regime.
” In March , the Treasury Department identified a group of Iran- and Iraq-based targets over their apparent support for the IRGC , its Quds Force foreign arm and Iranian-backed groups within the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Iran Changes Its Currency From “ Rial ” To “ Toman ” Cutting 4 Zeroes

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On May 1st, the US Treasury sanctioned a company allegedly tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.
Treasury designates IRGC-Qods Force front company and owner https://t.co/y9JAc9EGgi — Treasury Department (@USTreasury) May 1, 2020
“The Iranian regime and its supporters continue to prioritize the funding of international terrorist organizations over the health and well-being of the Iranian people,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States remains committed to working with financial institutions, non-profit organizations, and international partners to facilitate humanitarian trade and assistance to the Iranian people.”
The company, as well as its owner were sanctioned.
The owner is dual Iranian and Iraqi national Amir Dianat, “a longtime associate of senior officials of Iran’s IRGC-QF.”
Dianat is also reportedly know as “Ameer Abdulazeez Jaafar Almthaje” and is accused of being involved in efforts to generate revenue and smuggle weapons abroad.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is also sanctioning Taif Mining Services LLC, a company owned, controlled, or directed by Dianat.
Prosecutors also charged Dianat’s alleged business associate, Kamran Ali Lajmiri, 42.
The government filed a forfeiture action to claim money used to purchase the Nautic, a 900-foot-long tanker that was previously named the Gulf Sky, and is now detained in the Gulf of Oman.
Together with that, the the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia filed criminal charges against Dianat and one of his business associates for violations of sanctions and money laundering laws, and filed a related civil forfeiture action alleging that approximately $12 million is subject to forfeiture as funds involved in these crimes and as assets of a foreign terrorist organization.
This is possible since the US in 2019 designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization. In response, Iran designated US Central Command as a terrorist organization.
The U.S. sanctioned an IRGC-QF front company and its owner for funding terrorism and smuggling arms. While the world confronts #COVID19, the Iranian regime and its supporters are prioritizing terrorist funding over the health and well-being of the Iranian people. https://t.co/D3EUbO7aWh — NSC (@WHNSC) May 4, 2020
Dianat, an associate of IRGC-QF officials Behnam Shahriyari and Rostam Ghasemi, “has supported IRGC-QF smuggling operations for several years, including efforts aimed at the shipment of weapons including missiles.”
As per the statement, the IRGC-QF has relied on Dianat to secure entry for vessels carrying IRGC-QF shipments and has used his business connections to facilitate logistics requirements.
Allegedly, Dianat has been directly involved in IRGC-QF efforts to smuggle shipments from Iran to Yemen.
Finally, Dianat has been involved in developing additional illicit business opportunities to generate revenue for the IRGC-QF, and in 2019, leveraged Taif Mining Services LLC, a company under his control, to procure an oil tanker.
This designation is a way for the US to show the world that its maximum pressure campaign against Iran wouldn’t stop regardless of any fallout from COVID-19, for Washington or Tehran.
Sanctioning a relatively unknown individual, with a company that can’t be considered major by any means is evidence of that, since most Iranian officials, military or not are already sanctioned. Now, the time comes for any Iranian individual who has any arbitrary, proven or unproven ties to “the regime.”
In March, the Treasury Department identified a group of Iran- and Iraq-based targets over their apparent support for the IRGC, its Quds Force foreign arm and Iranian-backed groups within the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq.
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southfront--2020-05-05--U.S. Treasury To Borrow $3Trillion To Counter COVID-19 Economic Fallout

In order to abolish any doubts that a massive economic downturn is just beginning , the Wall Street Journal reported that the US Department of Treasury plans to borrow $ 3 trillion in order to deal with the COVID-19 fallout .
This sum would be borrowed in during the April-June quarter to deal with the coronavirus pandemic .
It ’ s an unprecedented level of deficit financing to match the historic economic hit caused by the virus .
In a single quarter , the government will borrow more than twice as much as it did all of last year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the entire plan sits at borrowing $ 4.5 trillion .
“ The increase in privately-held net marketable borrowing is primarily driven by the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak , including expenditures from new legislation to assist individuals and businesses , changes to tax receipts , including the deferral of individual and business taxes from April-June until July , and an increase in the assumed end-of-June Treasury cash balance , ” a statement by the Treasury said on May 4th .
The borrowing estimate is USD 3,055 billion higher than what was announced in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
During the third quarter , Treasury expects to borrow $ 677 billion in privately-held net marketable debt , assuming an end-of-September cash balance of $ 800 billion , the statement said .
During the first quarter , Treasury borrowed $ 477 billion in privately-held net marketable debt and ended the quarter with a cash of $ 515 billion , it said .
Meanwhile , with the economy cratering and unemployment climbing to levels not seen since the Great Depression , Congress has authorized trillions of dollars in relief payments , unemployment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as money for vaccine research and coronavirus testing .
To ensure that the borrowing costs remain relatively low , the Federal Reserve vowed to buy as much Treasury debt as necessary to face the consequences of the pandemic .
“ This is the time to use the great fiscal power of the United States to do what we can to support the economy and try to get through this with as little damage to the longer run productive capacity of the economy as possible , ” Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself as someone who has long argued against runaway federal deficits .
The Federal Reserve has cut its benchmark fed funds rate close to zero and purchased almost $ 2 trillion in Treasurys and mortgage related assets .
It has announced nine lending programs to lend another $ 2 trillion to calm all corners of the financial markets .
As a result , the Fed ’ s balance sheet has reached a record $ 6.6 trillion , up from $ 4.2 trillion in February .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • There Is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Oil Stored On Tankers • “ We Are Moving Into The End-Game ” : 27 Tankers Anchored Off California , Hundreds Off Singapore As Oil Industry Shuts Down

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In order to abolish any doubts that a massive economic downturn is just beginning, the Wall Street Journal reported that the US Department of Treasury plans to borrow $3 trillion in order to deal with the COVID-19 fallout.
This sum would be borrowed in during the April-June quarter to deal with the coronavirus pandemic.
It’s an unprecedented level of deficit financing to match the historic economic hit caused by the virus. In a single quarter, the government will borrow more than twice as much as it did all of last year.
In total for the fiscal year, the entire plan sits at borrowing $4.5 trillion.
“The increase in privately-held net marketable borrowing is primarily driven by the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak, including expenditures from new legislation to assist individuals and businesses, changes to tax receipts, including the deferral of individual and business taxes from April-June until July, and an increase in the assumed end-of-June Treasury cash balance,” a statement by the Treasury said on May 4th.
The borrowing estimate is USD 3,055 billion higher than what was announced in February this year, the US Treasury said.
During the third quarter, Treasury expects to borrow $677 billion in privately-held net marketable debt, assuming an end-of-September cash balance of $800 billion, the statement said.
During the first quarter, Treasury borrowed $477 billion in privately-held net marketable debt and ended the quarter with a cash of $515 billion, it said.
Meanwhile, with the economy cratering and unemployment climbing to levels not seen since the Great Depression, Congress has authorized trillions of dollars in relief payments, unemployment benefits and loans to small businesses, as well as money for vaccine research and coronavirus testing.
To ensure that the borrowing costs remain relatively low, the Federal Reserve vowed to buy as much Treasury debt as necessary to face the consequences of the pandemic.
“This is the time to use the great fiscal power of the United States to do what we can to support the economy and try to get through this with as little damage to the longer run productive capacity of the economy as possible,” Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell said. [pdf]
Powell described himself as someone who has long argued against runaway federal deficits.
“But this is not the time,” he said, “to let that get in the way of us winning this battle.”
The Federal Reserve has cut its benchmark fed funds rate close to zero and purchased almost $2 trillion in Treasurys and mortgage related assets.
It has announced nine lending programs to lend another $2 trillion to calm all corners of the financial markets. As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet has reached a record $6.6 trillion, up from $4.2 trillion in February.
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southfront--2020-05-05--Military Situation In Syria On May 5, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • Units of the @ @ @ @ @ rescue a Turkish military vehicle that had stuck in the mud during the joint Russian-Turkish @ @ @ @ @ al-Muabbada ; • A car bomb exploded near al-Zahraa Mosque in Al-Bab city .
At @ @ @ @ @ ; • The US troops deployed at a military facility in the Shadadi district received @ @ @ @ @ ; • Pro-militant sources claim that the Syrian Army tried to advance west of al-Jaradah @ @ @ @ @ : • Military Situation In Syria On May 4 , 2020 ( Map Update )