southfront--2020-06-14--A Reconsideration Of Domestic Challenges To Achieving A Peaceful Settlement In Libya

One of the greatest difficulties Libya faces is the restoration of legitimacy to governance and the reconstruction of the State .
The ‘ transitional ’ arrangements for governing Libya were imposed by the ‘ international community ’ after NATO destroyed the country ’ s State institutions and infrastructure with massive bombardments in 2011 , supposedly to enforce a ‘ no-fly zone ’ imposed by a Security Council resolution ( accompanied by a massive looting of Libya ’ s assets and reserves in Europe and the US ) .
The current situation of the country ( as of 2016 ) is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) chaos and instability that resulted from the UN-authorised bombing campaign of 2011 .
It is likely that how Libyans perceive the main belligerents ’ ( the ‘ LNA ’ and ‘ GNA ’ ) relations with their foreign benefactors , and how their respective military forces conduct themselves in areas under their control , will be at least as important as victories on the battlefield in determining the future course of the conflict and whether and on what terms peace can be achieved and viable State institutions established .
Libya comprises three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the east , and Fezzan in the southwest .
The Ottoman authorities recognized them as separate provinces .
Under Italian rule , they were unified to form a single colony , which gave way to independent Libya .
For much of Libya ’ s early history , both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were more closely linked with neighbouring territories than with one other .
Most of the country is covered by the Sahara desert , and most of its population is concentrated along the coast and its immediate hinterland .
The two main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contain about one quarter of the total population .
Tripoli , with the estimated population of about three million people , is the country formal capital and an important economic centre .
Benghazi , with the estimated population of more than one million people , is the primary city in Cyrenaica .
The modern cities have developed around the old city centres ( medinas ) , with satellite towns and villages in surrounding oases .
Shantytowns housing more recent migrants are also found near the two cities .
Other important centres include Gharyān @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sūq al-Jumʿah , Janzūr , and Zawiyah in the west and Ajdābiyā , Al-Marj , Al-Bayḍāʾ , Derna , and Tobruk ( Ṭubruq ) in the east .
These cities are primarily regional administrative and commercial centres with some light industry .
Several have petroleum refineries and petrochemical installations .
Libyan society is made up primarily of three main ethnic groups , Arabs , Berbers and Tebu .
The Arabs are the majority inhabitants of today ’ s Libya , and brought Islam to the region when they first arrived from Arabia during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The steady influx of Arab groups over time led to political upheavals and the gradual Arabization of many of Libya ’ s Amazigh populations .
The result was that by the 20th century the great majority of Libya ’ s inhabitants were Arabic-speaking Muslims of mixed descent .
The Berbers are the indigenous inhabitants of Libya and the Sahara .
There are numerous Berber tribes found in East Libya , West Libya , and across the entire Sahara desert , where they have been since the beginning of civilisation .
Their number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their nomadic nature the Tuareg of the Sahara were not fully included in any census .
However it was widely estimated that the Berbers constitute between 10 % and 23 % of the population of Libya , and therefore assuming an average of 17 % would give just under one million Berbers .
Generally , the western side of the Libyan Sahara is inhabited by the Tuareg , while the eastern side is the home of the Tebo .
Some experts noted that the population of the Berbers in 1950s was just under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and that the current drop in percentage is due to government policies , like the sudden increase of Arab nationalities granted by both King Idris and Gaddafi to large numbers of Tunisians , Egyptians and other ( so-called ) “ returned Libyans ” – just as today ’ s transitional rulers reportedly are doing… Libya ’ s total population is estimated at around 5 million .
There are an estimated 1.5 million immigrants .
Establishing an accurate census will be one of the most fundamental starting points for re-establishing legitimacy to the State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of order returns to the country .
The Libyan website comments in this respect : On the 6th of July 2018 former rebel prime minister Mr. Mahmoud Jibril warned the Libyans of the failure of the forthcoming elections ( of 2018 ) due to “ fake IDs ” being issued by Libyan officials to gather voters for their election campaigns .
He says that there is widespread fraud concerning the so-called “ National Number ” , pointing out that this may endanger the outcome of the forthcoming elections where the losing political parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of fake voters .
It has been reported previously that the authorities in Tripoli are implicated in the illegal trade in human beings and that many immigrants were given fake Libyan IDs .
The same practice was observed in the military where many militias ( from both the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Tripoli and from the Hor-controlled Benghazi ) are enlisting immigrants and mercenaries in their fight against each other and against the so-called foreign terrorists .
As we have reported in this website , previous elections , the elections hailed as successful by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from taking part in party elections and therefore were never fair or transparent .
Two days after Jibril ’ s warning the number of Libyans was reported by Libyas channel to have reached 7.7 million people ( including Libyans and non-Libyans ) .
According to Mr. Bouker , the former head of the Civil Registry Authority , tampering with the civil register and the national number had resulted in increasing the number of Libyans to nearly 7.7 million people , thereby endangering the national security of the country .
That is a jump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two years… Mr. Bouker said he has a copy of the original database that can reveal the fake one million identities that were added in the past two years , and that restoring the original database would not take more than 24 hours .
It is not known who could restore the database to its state before the 1969 foreign operation , and/or restore the Sahara motherland to its rightful owners ( the Tuareg Berbers ) before its desecration by the colonial French , Italian and the British .
One thing is clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Berbers of North Africa .
Most of the reported violations in national identity reported in the past two years occurred in neglected Fezzan – the homeland of the Tuareg Berbers… The major Arab centres of today ’ s Libya include Tripoli , Benghazi , Misrata , Zawiya , Sabratha , Khoms , Albayda , Darna , Tobruk and other smaller villages and settlements along the coast and in the interior .
After the installation of Gaddafi in 1969 the arabisation of the Sahara was intensified by making Sabha the new capital of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the stronghold of the various Berber tribes , to the extent it was also known as the Berber Mountain , before it was renamed “ ” by the ousted Colonel .
The oasis of Zuwarah in the western coast , the oases of Jalu and Awjla in eastern Libya , and the oasis of Ghadames at the edge of the Sahara are also Berber settlements ; while the Sahara herself is still the homeland of the various Berber Tuareg confederacies , as they were for thousands of years the dignified keepers of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the empire without borders ; before they were dispersed and split by colonial intruders into so many “ countries ” , without regard for their ethnic integrity or noble dignity .
The Berber Tuareg confederacies have always resisted the imposed borders to desecrate and divide their sacred homeland , just as they still do today .
The Tebo … are without a doubt native to the region , especially to the , whence the name Tibesti itself .
Like the Berbers , they have been persecuted by the previous regimes of Libya , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shelled by outlaws and sponsored rebels… LINK The ‘ Constitution ’ is a temporary Constitutional Declaration ( imposed by the National Transitional Council , which was installed on 3/10/ 2011 ) .
The main elements of the ‘ internationally recognized government ’ since then were a General National Congress ( elected on 7/7/2012 ) , followed by a Legislature ( House of Representatives , elected on 25 June 2014 ) and an Executive ( the UN-imposed Presidential Council ( PC/ GNA , installed on 17 December 2015 ) .
In Libya there are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nation-wide presence .
The majority constitute local or regional actors , some of whom are relevant at the national level while representing the interests of their region or city .
Many important participants , particularly outside of the largest cities , also have tribal allegiances .
Since the summer of 2014 , political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk , deriving from the transitional executive and legislative organs respectively .
The latter was recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidency Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces – in December 2015 .
At the moment Libya has two main centres of power .
The first is the Presidency Council ( PC ) , which has been based in Tripoli since 30 March 2016 .
The PC is headed by Fayez al-Sarraj – a former member of the Tobruk Parliament , where he represented a Tripoli constituency – and it was created by the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement ( LPA ) in December 2015 .
According to this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , also based in Tripoli .
The GNA was to have been endorsed by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives ( HoR ) according to the agreement , but on two occasions the HoR has voted down the list of ministers .
The GNA has had a string of major military victories over the last month following a large influx of weapons and fighters provided by Turkey .
The second centre of power is made up of the authorities based in Tobruk and Bayda , which were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The House of Representatives ( HoR ) in Tobruk was envisaged as the legitimate legislative authority under the LPA .
However , instead of working with the GNA the HoR endorsed the rival government of Abdullah al-Thinni which is based in the eastern Libyan city of Bayda .
The Libyan National Army ( LNA ) , commanded by Khalifa Haftar is largely the successor to the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , since it was formed by the Transitional National Council of Libya in 2011 , from some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as from parts of the opposition National Liberation Army .
The LNA supports the supreme legislative body of the State elected in 2014 – the House of Representatives , located in Tobruk .
In March 2015 , the House of Representatives officially appointed Haftar as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Libya .
In terms of foreign support , the LNA has received most assistance from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates .
Two other institutions are based in Tripoli and play a major role in Libya ’ s politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is where oil money is paid and government money is disbursed .
Though pledging loyalty to the PC , it has had an uneasy relationship with it .
The National Oil Corporation ( NOC ) is also formally loyal to the PC but has had relatively good working relations with Haftar ’ s LNA after its seizure of eastern oil ports .
Several other types of groups and sectors of society are also competing for power : domestic and foreign armed groups ; “ city-states ” , particularly in western and southern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which are primarily distributed throughout eastern and southern Libya ( particularly those derived from Tuareg and Tebo communities ) .
While many have been drawn into tactical or strategic alliances with the factions based around the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) or Libyan National Army ( LNA ) , many have retained a substantial degree of autonomy and have not committed to one side or the other .
Libya ’ s jihadist network can be divided along generational lines , starting with those who emerged in the 1980s .
Many from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Afghanistan .
These veterans later created a number of groups in opposition to Muammar Gaddafi , the largest of which was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group ( LIFG ) which is now defunct .
However , Libya still hosts a range of jihadist groups , from the Islamic State group ( ISIS ) to al Qaeda-linked groups , to other Salafi-jihadi factions .
Some are domestic and based in particular regions while others – particularly ISIS affiliates – include many foreigners .
Local returnees from Syria helped form Libya ’ s first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Derna in 2014 .
Many had fought as part of ISIS ’ s al-Battar unit in northern Syria before returning home to replicate the model with help from senior non-Libyan ISIS figures .
The leadership of ISIS in Libya has always been dominated by foreigners .
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi recognised the presence of ISIS in Libya in late 2014 , declaring three or provinces : Barqa ( eastern Libya ) , with Derna as its headquarters ; Tarablus ( Tripoli ) , with Sirte as its headquarters ; and Fezzan ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ central Mediterranean coast of Libya around the city of Sirte until a Misratan-led operation ( Misrata factions are currently allied with the GNA ) to defeat it .
ISIS has carried out attacks in all major Libyan cities , including the capital Tripoli .
ISIS has also had a presence in other parts of Libya , including Benghazi , where it was largely defeated by Haftar ’ s LNA .
Its affiliates have also mostly been driven out from the towns of Derna and Sabratha .
As described in a recent South Front @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is as follows : The LNA and the House of Representatives • Regular ground forces , consist of two mechanized infantry , one tank and three artillery brigades , as well as one brigade of special forces “ Saiga ” , two brigades of the “ Deterrence force ” numbering approximately 7,000 ; • Independent groups formally integrated into the LNA – up to 12 thousand fighters ; • Zintan brigades from the city of Zintan .
This is an independent power , currently allied with the LNA ; • Petroleum Facilities Guard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the LNA .
The PFG controls fields and refineries in the center and in the east of the country ; • The Egyptian Armed Forces as a force directly involved in the Libyan conflict .
According to various sources , Cairo has up to 3000 instructors and military personnel involved in the conflict .
• The Big Tripolitan Quartet , on which al-Sarraj personally relies : Special Deterrence Forces , Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade , Central Abu Salim Security Forces and Navashi Brigade .
These groups were given an officiall status by the Ministry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the GNA , including the 7th Kani Brigade of the Presidential Guard from Tarhuna , military formations of the Avalyad Suleiman tribe ; • Misrata forces – various groups from Misrata on which Vice Prime Minister of the GNA Ahmed Maiteeq relies .
This is an independent force currently allied to the GNA ; • Ghwell ’ s Libyan National Guard – allied to the Misrata clans and thus to the GNA ; • Syrian mercenaries and militants , brought in by Turkey – approximately 5,000 people ; • Turkish Armed Forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directly involved in the conflict .
The LNA is supported internationally by Egypt , the UAE , Russia and Saudi Arabia .
The GNA is supported by Turkey , Qatar , and NATO member states in the face of USA , Italy , France and the UK .
ISIS has three separate formations in Libya : • Wilayat al-Fezzan in the province of Fezzan in the desert in the south ; • Wilayat al-Barqah in the province of Cyrenaica in the east , • Wilayat al-Tarablus in the province of Tripolitania in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of active members vary from 800 to 5,000 .
After the defeat from the LNA , the Ansar al-Sharia group virtually disappeared , and became a part of ISIS .
ISIS also included part of the fighters of the Shura Council of Dern and the Shura Council of Sirte .
ISIS is a constant adversary of the LNA and situational opponents of the GNA .
As the conflict drags on , how the major tribes and regional groups and communities throughout Libya perceive and respond to the factions aligned around the GNA and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as whether Egypt enters openly and in force , particularly for long term prospects .
Ongoing developments in terms of their support for one side or the other might also provide some insights into how the Libyan people in different areas and sectors of the society are evaluating what is happening and whether one side or the other is perceived as being more ‘ legitimate ’ .
They may also provide clues as to whether some of them are being bought off by deep pockets or weapons supplies , or by some other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prospects For Resolving Conflict And Stabilizing Political Situation In Libya

Support SouthFront
DEAR FRIENDS. IF YOU LIKE THIS TYPE OF ANALYTICAL CONTENT, SUPPORT OUR WORK: PayPal: southfront@internet.ru Donation alerts: https://donationalerts.com/r/southfront Gumroad: https://gumroad.com/southfront Or via: http://southfront.org/donate/ or via: https://www.patreon.com/southfront, BTC: 3Gbs4rjcVUtQd8p3CiFUCxPLZwRqurezRZ, BCH ABC: qpf2cphc5dkuclkqur7lhj2yuqq9pk3hmukle77vhq, ETH: 0x9f4cda013e354b8fc285bf4b9a60460cee7f7ea9
One of the greatest difficulties Libya faces is the restoration of legitimacy to governance and the reconstruction of the State. The ‘transitional’ arrangements for governing Libya were imposed by the ‘international community’ after NATO destroyed the country’s State institutions and infrastructure with massive bombardments in 2011, supposedly to enforce a ‘no-fly zone’ imposed by a Security Council resolution (accompanied by a massive looting of Libya’s assets and reserves in Europe and the US).
The current situation of the country (as of 2016) is ‘stateless’ (due to the) chaos and instability that resulted from the UN-authorised bombing campaign of 2011. It is likely that how Libyans perceive the main belligerents’ (the ‘LNA’ and ‘GNA’) relations with their foreign benefactors, and how their respective military forces conduct themselves in areas under their control, will be at least as important as victories on the battlefield in determining the future course of the conflict and whether and on what terms peace can be achieved and viable State institutions established.
Libyan society, demographic features and geography
Libya comprises three principal regions—Tripolitania in the northwest, Cyrenaica in the east, and Fezzan in the southwest. The Ottoman authorities recognized them as separate provinces. Under Italian rule, they were unified to form a single colony, which gave way to independent Libya. For much of Libya’s early history, both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were more closely linked with neighbouring territories than with one other. Most of the country is covered by the Sahara desert, and most of its population is concentrated along the coast and its immediate hinterland.
The two main cities are Tripoli and Benghazi. They contain about one quarter of the total population. Tripoli, with the estimated population of about three million people, is the country formal capital and an important economic centre. Benghazi, with the estimated population of more than one million people, is the primary city in Cyrenaica. The modern cities have developed around the old city centres (medinas), with satellite towns and villages in surrounding oases. Shantytowns housing more recent migrants are also found near the two cities.
Other important centres include Gharyān, Al-Khums, Misurata, Tājūrāʾ, Sūq al-Jumʿah, Janzūr, and Zawiyah in the west and Ajdābiyā, Al-Marj, Al-Bayḍāʾ, Derna, and Tobruk (Ṭubruq) in the east. These cities are primarily regional administrative and commercial centres with some light industry. Several have petroleum refineries and petrochemical installations.
Libyan society is made up primarily of three main ethnic groups, Arabs, Berbers and Tebu. The Arabs are the majority inhabitants of today’s Libya, and brought Islam to the region when they first arrived from Arabia during the seventh century (640 AD). The steady influx of Arab groups over time led to political upheavals and the gradual Arabization of many of Libya’s Amazigh populations. The result was that by the 20th century the great majority of Libya’s inhabitants were Arabic-speaking Muslims of mixed descent.
The Berbers are the indigenous inhabitants of Libya and the Sahara. There are numerous Berber tribes found in East Libya, West Libya, and across the entire Sahara desert, where they have been since the beginning of civilisation. Their number is difficult to ascertain, since by their nomadic nature the Tuareg of the Sahara were not fully included in any census. However it was widely estimated that the Berbers constitute between 10% and 23% of the population of Libya, and therefore assuming an average of 17% would give just under one million Berbers. Generally, the western side of the Libyan Sahara is inhabited by the Tuareg, while the eastern side is the home of the Tebo.
Some experts noted that the population of the Berbers in 1950s was just under 50% of the total population, and that the current drop in percentage is due to government policies, like the sudden increase of Arab nationalities granted by both King Idris and Gaddafi to large numbers of Tunisians, Egyptians and other (so-called) “returned Libyans” – just as today’s transitional rulers reportedly are doing…
Libya’s total population is estimated at around 5 million. There are an estimated 1.5 million immigrants. Establishing an accurate census will be one of the most fundamental starting points for re-establishing legitimacy to the State once the violence subsides and some sort of order returns to the country. The Libyan website Temehu comments in this respect:
On the 6th of July 2018 former rebel prime minister Mr. Mahmoud Jibril warned the Libyans of the failure of the forthcoming elections (of 2018) due to “fake IDs” being issued by Libyan officials to gather voters for their election campaigns. He says that there is widespread fraud concerning the so-called “National Number”, pointing out that this may endanger the outcome of the forthcoming elections where the losing political parties may doubt the results on the basis of fake voters. It has been reported previously that the authorities in Tripoli are implicated in the illegal trade in human beings and that many immigrants were given fake Libyan IDs. The same practice was observed in the military where many militias (from both the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Tripoli and from the Hor-controlled Benghazi) are enlisting immigrants and mercenaries in their fight against each other and against the so-called foreign terrorists. As we have reported in this website, previous elections, the elections hailed as successful by the colonial masters, have barred the Berbers from taking part in party elections and therefore were never fair or transparent. Two days after Jibril’s warning the number of Libyans was reported by Libyas channel to have reached 7.7 million people (including Libyans and non-Libyans). According to Mr. Bouker, the former head of the Civil Registry Authority, tampering with the civil register and the national number had resulted in increasing the number of Libyans to nearly 7.7 million people, thereby endangering the national security of the country. That is a jump of one million people in just over two years… Mr. Bouker said he has a copy of the original database that can reveal the fake one million identities that were added in the past two years, and that restoring the original database would not take more than 24 hours. It is not known who could restore the database to its state before the 1969 foreign operation, and/or restore the Sahara motherland to its rightful owners (the Tuareg Berbers) before its desecration by the colonial French, Italian and the British. One thing is clear; there is a program to Arabise the Berbers of North Africa. Most of the reported violations in national identity reported in the past two years occurred in neglected Fezzan – the homeland of the Tuareg Berbers… The major Arab centres of today’s Libya include Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, Zawiya, Sabratha, Khoms, Albayda, Darna, Tobruk and other smaller villages and settlements along the coast and in the interior. After the installation of Gaddafi in 1969 the arabisation of the Sahara was intensified by making Sabha the new capital of Fezzan. Nafousa Mountain in the west is the stronghold of the various Berber tribes, to the extent it was also known as the Berber Mountain, before it was renamed “The Western Mountain” by the ousted Colonel. The oasis of Zuwarah in the western coast, the oases of Jalu and Awjla in eastern Libya, and the oasis of Ghadames at the edge of the Sahara are also Berber settlements; while the Sahara herself is still the homeland of the various Berber Tuareg confederacies, as they were for thousands of years the dignified keepers of the largest desert in the world – the empire without borders; before they were dispersed and split by colonial intruders into so many “countries”, without regard for their ethnic integrity or noble dignity. The Berber Tuareg confederacies have always resisted the imposed borders to desecrate and divide their sacred homeland, just as they still do today. The Tebo … are without a doubt native to the region, especially to the Tibesti Mountain, whence the name Tibesti itself. Like the Berbers, they have been persecuted by the previous regimes of Libya, just as today their homes are being shelled by outlaws and sponsored rebels… LINK
The ‘Transitional’ Arrangements
The ‘Constitution’ is a temporary Constitutional Declaration (imposed by the National Transitional Council, which was installed on 3/10/ 2011). The main elements of the ‘internationally recognized government’ since then were a General National Congress (elected on 7/7/2012), followed by a Legislature (House of Representatives, elected on 25 June 2014) and an Executive (the UN-imposed Presidential Council (PC/ GNA, installed on 17 December 2015).
In Libya there are very few political organizations and groups with a nation-wide presence. The majority constitute local or regional actors, some of whom are relevant at the national level while representing the interests of their region or city. Many important participants, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances.
Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk, deriving from the transitional executive and legislative organs respectively. The latter was recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidency Council (PC) – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces – in December 2015.
At the moment Libya has two main centres of power. The first is the Presidency Council (PC), which has been based in Tripoli since 30 March 2016. The PC is headed by Fayez al-Sarraj – a former member of the Tobruk Parliament, where he represented a Tripoli constituency – and it was created by the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2015. According to this agreement, the PC presides over the Government of National Accord (GNA), also based in Tripoli. The GNA was to have been endorsed by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) according to the agreement, but on two occasions the HoR has voted down the list of ministers. The GNA has had a string of major military victories over the last month following a large influx of weapons and fighters provided by Turkey.
The second centre of power is made up of the authorities based in Tobruk and Bayda, which were also supposed to work under the LPA. The House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk was envisaged as the legitimate legislative authority under the LPA. However, instead of working with the GNA the HoR endorsed the rival government of Abdullah al-Thinni which is based in the eastern Libyan city of Bayda.
The Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by Khalifa Haftar is largely the successor to the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, since it was formed by the Transitional National Council of Libya in 2011, from some of the late Gaddafi’s military personnel, as well as from parts of the opposition National Liberation Army.
The LNA supports the supreme legislative body of the State elected in 2014 – the House of Representatives, located in Tobruk. In March 2015, the House of Representatives officially appointed Haftar as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Libya. In terms of foreign support, the LNA has received most assistance from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
Two other institutions are based in Tripoli and play a major role in Libya’s politics. The Central Bank of Libya, which is where oil money is paid and government money is disbursed. Though pledging loyalty to the PC, it has had an uneasy relationship with it. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) is also formally loyal to the PC but has had relatively good working relations with Haftar’s LNA after its seizure of eastern oil ports.
Several other types of groups and sectors of society are also competing for power: domestic and foreign armed groups; “city-states”, particularly in western and southern Libya; and the tribal militias, which are primarily distributed throughout eastern and southern Libya (particularly those derived from Tuareg and Tebo communities). While many have been drawn into tactical or strategic alliances with the factions based around the Government of National Accord (GNA) or Libyan National Army (LNA), many have retained a substantial degree of autonomy and have not committed to one side or the other.
Libya’s jihadist network can be divided along generational lines, starting with those who emerged in the 1980s. Many from that older generation fought against Soviet-backed forces in Afghanistan. These veterans later created a number of groups in opposition to Muammar Gaddafi, the largest of which was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) which is now defunct.
However, Libya still hosts a range of jihadist groups, from the Islamic State group (ISIS) to al Qaeda-linked groups, to other Salafi-jihadi factions. Some are domestic and based in particular regions while others – particularly ISIS affiliates – include many foreigners. Local returnees from Syria helped form Libya’s first ISIS affiliate in the eastern town of Derna in 2014. Many had fought as part of ISIS’s al-Battar unit in northern Syria before returning home to replicate the model with help from senior non-Libyan ISIS figures. The leadership of ISIS in Libya has always been dominated by foreigners.
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi recognised the presence of ISIS in Libya in late 2014, declaring three wilayats or provinces: Barqa (eastern Libya), with Derna as its headquarters; Tarablus (Tripoli), with Sirte as its headquarters; and Fezzan (southwestern Libya).
ISIS controlled the central Mediterranean coast of Libya around the city of Sirte until a Misratan-led operation (Misrata factions are currently allied with the GNA) to defeat it. ISIS has carried out attacks in all major Libyan cities, including the capital Tripoli. ISIS has also had a presence in other parts of Libya, including Benghazi, where it was largely defeated by Haftar’s LNA. Its affiliates have also mostly been driven out from the towns of Derna and Sabratha.
As described in a recent South Front report, the current balance of forces is as follows:
The LNA and the House of Representatives
Regular ground forces, consist of two mechanized infantry, one tank and three artillery brigades, as well as one brigade of special forces “Saiga”, two brigades of the “Deterrence force” numbering approximately 7,000; Independent groups formally integrated into the LNA – up to 12 thousand fighters; Foreign military contingents consisting of private military contractors including Sudanese and Chadians; Zintan brigades from the city of Zintan. This is an independent power, currently allied with the LNA; Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) is mostly allied with the LNA. The PFG controls fields and refineries in the center and in the east of the country; The Egyptian Armed Forces as a force directly involved in the Libyan conflict. According to various sources, Cairo has up to 3000 instructors and military personnel involved in the conflict.
The GNA bloc
The Big Tripolitan Quartet, on which al-Sarraj personally relies: Special Deterrence Forces, Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, Central Abu Salim Security Forces and Navashi Brigade. These groups were given an officiall status by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Forces loyal to the GNA, including the 7th Kani Brigade of the Presidential Guard from Tarhuna, military formations of the Avalyad Suleiman tribe; Misrata forces – various groups from Misrata on which Vice Prime Minister of the GNA Ahmed Maiteeq relies. This is an independent force currently allied to the GNA; National Mobile Forces consist primarily of Amazigh; Ghwell’s Libyan National Guard – allied to the Misrata clans and thus to the GNA; Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries; Syrian mercenaries and militants, brought in by Turkey – approximately 5,000 people; Turkish Armed Forces, as a force that’s directly involved in the conflict.
The LNA is supported internationally by Egypt, the UAE, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The GNA is supported by Turkey, Qatar, and NATO member states in the face of USA, Italy, France and the UK.
ISIS has three separate formations in Libya:
Wilayat al-Fezzan in the province of Fezzan in the desert in the south; Wilayat al-Barqah in the province of Cyrenaica in the east, Wilayat al-Tarablus in the province of Tripolitania in the west.
Estimates of the total number of active members vary from 800 to 5,000.
After the defeat from the LNA, the Ansar al-Sharia group virtually disappeared, and became a part of ISIS. ISIS also included part of the fighters of the Shura Council of Dern and the Shura Council of Sirte. ISIS is a constant adversary of the LNA and situational opponents of the GNA.
As the conflict drags on, how the major tribes and regional groups and communities throughout Libya perceive and respond to the factions aligned around the GNA and LNA could be at least as important as whether Egypt enters openly and in force, particularly for long term prospects.
Ongoing developments in terms of their support for one side or the other might also provide some insights into how the Libyan people in different areas and sectors of the society are evaluating what is happening and whether one side or the other is perceived as being more ‘legitimate’. They may also provide clues as to whether some of them are being bought off by deep pockets or weapons supplies, or by some other trade-off.
MORE ON THE TOPIC
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--Combat Footage: Houthis Raid Saudi Positions In Jizan

On June 14 , the Houthis raided several positions of Saudi forces in the area of al-Azhur near the al-Qais @ @ @ @ @ s southern province of Jizan .
The Yemeni group ’ s media wing released a @ @ @ @ @ .
The video shows Houthi fighters targeting Saudi military fortifications with heavy machine guns , @ @ @ @ @ missiles ( ATGMs ) .
Houthi fighters stormed al-Azhur ’ s positions despite a series @ @ @ @ @ coalition warplanes .
The airstrikes were largely ineffective .
The Houthis stepped up their offensive @ @ @ @ @ s border in the recent few days .
The group also resumed drone and missile @ @ @ @ @ The Saudi-led coalition ’ s continued airstrikes and attacks could soon lead to the full @ @ @ @ @ in Yemen .
The Houthis ’ recent attacks indicate that they will not shy away @ @ @ @ @ MORE ON THIS TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
On June 14, the Houthis raided several positions of Saudi forces in the area of al-Azhur near the al-Qais Mount in the Kingdom’s southern province of Jizan.
The Yemeni group’s media wing released a 2-minute video of the raid. The video shows Houthi fighters targeting Saudi military fortifications with heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
Houthi fighters stormed al-Azhur’s positions despite a series of intense airstrikes by Saudi-led coalition warplanes. The airstrikes were largely ineffective.
The Houthis stepped up their offensive operations along Saudi Arabia’s border in the recent few days. The group also resumed drone and missile attacks on the Kingdom.
The Saudi-led coalition’s continued airstrikes and attacks could soon lead to the full collapse of the fragile ceasefire in Yemen. The Houthis’ recent attacks indicate that they will not shy away from a new confrontation.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--Russian Foreign, Defense Ministers Postpone Libya & Syria Talks In Turkey

The visit of Russian foreign and defense ministers to Turkey was postponed to a later date , the Turkish Foreign @ @ @ @ @ Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu had been scheduled to meet with their @ @ @ @ @ regional situation , including the conflicts in Libya and Syria , in Istanbul on June @ @ @ @ @ Turkish side , Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov decided @ @ @ @ @ have the ministerial talks at a later date .
The contacts and communications between the @ @ @ @ @ countries would continue in the coming period .
The decision to postppone talks on a @ @ @ @ @ and Turkey currently have critical contradictions on some topics , most likely the situation in @ @ @ @ @ the conflict in Libya .
MORE ON THE TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
The visit of Russian foreign and defense ministers to Turkey was postponed to a later date, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu had been scheduled to meet with their Turkish counterparts to discuss the regional situation, including the conflicts in Libya and Syria, in Istanbul on June 14.
According to the Turkish side, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov decided in a phone call to have the ministerial talks at a later date. The contacts and communications between the deputy ministers of the two countries would continue in the coming period.
The decision to postppone talks on a later date indicates that Russia and Turkey currently have critical contradictions on some topics, most likely the situation in Syria’s Idlib or the conflict in Libya.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--ISIS Spokesman Praises COVID-19, Slams Al-Qaeda & Qatar In New Audio Message

ISIS spokesman Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi has praised the COVID-19 outbreak as a holy punishment for the “ enemies of God ” in a new audio message .
The 39-minute message dubbed “ the disbelievers will know for whom is the final home , ” was released by ISIS ’ al-Furqan media organization on May 28 .
In the message , al-Qurashi says that the coronavirus has confused the “ tyrants and autocrats ” of the world , calling it a “ punishment ” from God .
Al-Qurashi went on in the message to slam al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for supposedly approaching @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in peace talks with the U.S .
The spokesman boasted about the increasing attacks of ISIS there .
Al-Qaeda in Africa was also criticized .
The ISIS representative accused the group of waging a war on ISIS on behalf of Mali , Niger , Burkina Faso and Algeria .
The spokesman claimed that al-Qaeda branches in Western Africa have “ shown desire ” to negotiate with governments in the region .
ISIS ’ spokesman also threatened Qatar .
Al-Qureshi said Doha has financed factions which fought against “ Mujahedeen ” in Iraq and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Qaeda-linked Hay ’ at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and to tribal forces in Iraq .
“ We have never forgotten that the al-Udeid base that the tyrants of Qatar built to host the American army was and still is the center of command of the Crusade against Muslims in Khorasan , Iraq , the Levant , and Yemen , ” the spokesman said .
Al-Qurashi concluded his message by delivering the “ blessings ” of ISIS ’ new leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi , who , according to him , praised the terrorist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Attrition.
” This was al-Qurashi ’ s third audio message since he succeeded Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir , who was killed by the U.S. last year .
The message was clearly meant to raise the low morale of the terrorist group supporters , while intimidating its enemies .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
ISIS spokesman Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi has praised the COVID-19 outbreak as a holy punishment for the “enemies of God” in a new audio message.
The 39-minute message dubbed “the disbelievers will know for whom is the final home,” was released by ISIS’ al-Furqan media organization on May 28.
In the message, al-Qurashi says that the coronavirus has confused the “tyrants and autocrats” of the world, calling it a “punishment” from God.
“Today, the circles have come upon you … Today, we rejoice over the suffering God has inflicted upon you,” Reuters quoted the spokesman as saying.
Al-Qurashi went on in the message to slam al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for supposedly approaching the Taliban, which is now involved in peace talks with the U.S. The spokesman boasted about the increasing attacks of ISIS there.
Al-Qaeda in Africa was also criticized. The ISIS representative accused the group of waging a war on ISIS on behalf of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Algeria. The spokesman claimed that al-Qaeda branches in Western Africa have “shown desire” to negotiate with governments in the region.
ISIS’ spokesman also threatened Qatar. Al-Qureshi said Doha has financed factions which fought against “Mujahedeen” in Iraq and Syria. The spokesman was referring to al-Qaeda-linked Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and to tribal forces in Iraq.
“We have never forgotten that the al-Udeid base that the tyrants of Qatar built to host the American army was and still is the center of command of the Crusade against Muslims in Khorasan, Iraq, the Levant, and Yemen,” the spokesman said.
Al-Qurashi concluded his message by delivering the “blessings” of ISIS’ new leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, who, according to him, praised the terrorist group’s recent “Battle Of Attrition.”
This was al-Qurashi’s third audio message since he succeeded Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, who was killed by the U.S. last year. The message was clearly meant to raise the low morale of the terrorist group supporters, while intimidating its enemies.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--‘Ninja Bomb’ Strike Eliminates Senior Horas Al-Din Commanders In Idlib City (Videos)

A suspected U.S. drone strike on Idlib ’ s city center has killed two senior commander of al-Qaeda-affiliated Horas al-Din , Qassam al-Urduni and Bilal al-Sanani .
The strike targeted the commanders ’ SUV as it was passing on a road in the western part of Idlib city .
The SUV , a silver Hyundai Santa Fe , was struck with what appears to be two U.S.-made AGM-114R9X Hellfire missile .
The AGM-114R9X Hellfire , dubbed “ Ninja Bomb , ” is armed with a kinetic warhead with pop-out blades .
The missile has been deployed in secret since 2017 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Pro-militant sources revealed that Qassam al-Urduni was the general military commander of Horas al-Din .
Bilal al-Sanani , on the other hand , was the commander of the group ’ s al-Badiya [ desert ] Army .
Both terrorists were Jordanian citizens .
In December of last year , a U.S. drone strike killed Abu Khadija al-Urduniyi , a senior Jordanian commander of Horas al-Din in northern Idlib .
Abu Khadija ’ s SUV was also struck with an AGM-114R9X Hellfire missile .
Qassam al-Urduni , Bilal al-Sanani and Abu Khadija al-Urduniyi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Hay ’ at Tahrir al-Sham .
The assassination of al-Urduni and al-Sanani is without a doubt a serious blow to Horas al-Din .
However , this attack will not likely affect the terrorist group ’ s influence in Greater Idlib .
Recently , the group and other al-Qaeda factions formed a new operations room in the northwestern Syrian region .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
A suspected U.S. drone strike on Idlib’s city center has killed two senior commanders of al-Qaeda-affiliated Horas al-Din: Qassam al-Urduni and Bilal al-Sanani.
The strike targeted the commanders’ SUV as it was passing on a road in the western part of Idlib city. The SUV, a silver Hyundai Santa Fe, was struck with what appears to be two U.S.-made AGM-114R9X Hellfire missile.
The AGM-114R9X Hellfire, dubbed “Ninja Bomb,” is armed with a kinetic warhead with pop-out blades. The missile has been deployed in secret since 2017, with its existence revealed in 2019.
Pro-militant sources revealed that Qassam al-Urduni was the general military commander of Horas al-Din. Bilal al-Sanani, on the other hand, was the commander of the group’s al-Badiya [desert] Army. Both terrorists were Jordanian citizens.
In December of last year, a U.S. drone strike killed Abu Khadija al-Urduniyi, a senior Jordanian commander of Horas al-Din in northern Idlib. Abu Khadija’s SUV was also struck with an AGM-114R9X Hellfire missile.
Qassam al-Urduni, Bilal al-Sanani and Abu Khadija al-Urduniyi were reportedly former commanders of al-Qaeda’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
The assassination of al-Urduni and al-Sanani is without a doubt a serious blow to Horas al-Din. However, this attack will not likely affect the terrorist group’s influence in Greater Idlib. Recently, the group and other al-Qaeda factions formed a new operations room in the northwestern Syrian region.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--What Happened In Czech Republic: Poison Plot Hoax And Expulsion Of Russian Diplomats

European states are enchained by Euro-Atlantic propaganda and fearmongering over the growing Russian threat .
The mainstream trend to paint Russia and the Russians as an immoral and artful enemy , which is responsible for any negative development , backfired and owned the leadership of EU states itself .
The interesting fact is that this overhyped , and for most cases baseless , image of the Russians as powerful and inescapable “ bad guys ” even became profitable for Moscow .
The never-ending fearmongering in mainstream media forced the public to respect and fear the Russians that supposedly know nothing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force to protect their interests .
For example , this image allowed business run by ethnic Russians to avoid looting and damage during the recent wave of protests across the United States .
Such an image is now pretty attractive for ordinary white people with a traditional sexual orientation in the West .
There is no secret in the fact that tattoos in Russian have been becoming popular among young conservative Latin Americans .
This is how the Russians are seen in the West , but inside Russia the situation is different .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s self-declared ‘ new aristocracy ’ has been increasing .
The situation is also complicated in Russian foreign policy structures .
Their employers that often got their jobs thanks to their family ties see themselves as a natural part of this ‘ new aristocracy ’ .
Infamous “ Rossotrudnichestvo ” ( the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States , Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation ) holds a specific place in these circles .
This organization spends billions of government money with very little result and almost without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often serves as a sinecure for children of the elites .
The most recent large diplomatic scandal involving “ Rossotrudnichestvo ” erupted in the Czech Republic .
On June 12 , the Czech Security Information Service ( BIS ) released a statement announcing that it had officially closed the case about the threat of poisoning three of Prague ’ s municipal politicians .
The statement said that the case was “ simple and sad story of hostility and envy ” .
According to the statement , the BIS received an anonymous email stating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prague poison ricin .
The information in the email was false and unreliable and was intended to harm the career of another Russian diplomat .
• On April 27 , Czech magazine Respekt released a report claiming that a Russian diplomat had brought ricin , a deadly poison , into the country to potentially kill Czech politicians who were involved in the removal of a statue commemorating Soviet war hero Marshal Ivan Konev in Prague .
• On June 5 Czech Prime Minister Andrew Babish said that the country has declared , acting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” in Prague Andrew Konchakova and an employee of the institution with the surname Ribakov persona non grata .
Commenting on the decision , a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova said that the expulsion of Russian diplomatic staff is not in the interests of the Czech Republic .
According to her , this move damaged the relations between the countries .
Zakharova added that the Czech Republic should wait a tit-for-tat response .
The ‘ poisoning story ’ incident demonstrated that “ Rossotrudnichestvo ” employers allow themselves to write reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to settle personal scores , not even for money or due to ideological reasons .
National interests for such persons are just empty words .
It is hard to remember any such odious incidents in the diplomatic staff of any state during the past decades .
How could this happen ?
The moral , intellectual and professional qualities of these pseudo diplomats are a result of the environment in which they were brought up and worked .
Many believe that Russia is the last bastion of the Western civilization .
However , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to understand what it is happening or to hew to their publicly declared line .
MORE ON THE TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
European states are enchained by Euro-Atlantic propaganda and fearmongering over the growing Russian threat. The mainstream trend to paint Russia and the Russians as an immoral and artful enemy, which is responsible for any negative development, backfired and owned the leadership of EU states itself.
The interesting fact is that this overhyped, and for most cases baseless, image of the Russians as powerful and inescapable “bad guys” even became profitable for Moscow. The never-ending fearmongering in mainstream media forced the public to respect and fear the Russians that supposedly know nothing about the tolerance and seek to use force to protect their interests. For example, this image allowed business run by ethnic Russians to avoid looting and damage during the recent wave of protests across the United States. Such an image is now pretty attractive for ordinary white people with a traditional sexual orientation in the West. There is no secret in the fact that tattoos in Russian have been becoming popular among young conservative Latin Americans.
BREAKING: Patriots carry American flags through Seattle Autonomous Zone pic.twitter.com/z2r4To6bhP — Jack Posobiec (@JackPosobiec) June 14, 2020
This is how the Russians are seen in the West, but inside Russia the situation is different. The rift between the Russian citizens and Russia’s self-declared ‘new aristocracy’ has been increasing. The situation is also complicated in Russian foreign policy structures. Their employers that often got their jobs thanks to their family ties see themselves as a natural part of this ‘new aristocracy’. Infamous “Rossotrudnichestvo” (the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation) holds a specific place in these circles. This organization spends billions of government money with very little result and almost without control. Often, “Rossotrudnichestvo” often serves as a sinecure for children of the elites. The most recent large diplomatic scandal involving “Rossotrudnichestvo” erupted in the Czech Republic.
On June 12, the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) released a statement announcing that it had officially closed the case about the threat of poisoning three of Prague’s municipal politicians. The statement said that the case was “simple and sad story of hostility and envy”.
“A few days ago, the BIS successfully closed the case regarding threats made on Czech politicians, which caused a range of speculations, conspiracy theories and heightened emotions. A media leak significantly complicated the work of the BIS and the police, and made it almost impossible to investigate the case,” the BIS said on its official website.
According to the statement, the BIS received an anonymous email stating that a Russian diplomat had delivered in Prague poison ricin. The information in the email was false and unreliable and was intended to harm the career of another Russian diplomat.
On April 27, Czech magazine Respekt released a report claiming that a Russian diplomat had brought ricin, a deadly poison, into the country to potentially kill Czech politicians who were involved in the removal of a statue commemorating Soviet war hero Marshal Ivan Konev in Prague.
On June 5, Czech Prime Minister Andrew Babish said that the country has declared, acting head of the branch of “Rossotrudnichestvo” in Prague Andrew Konchakova and an employee of the institution with the surname Ribakov persona non grata. Commenting on the decision, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova said that the expulsion of Russian diplomatic staff is not in the interests of the Czech Republic. According to her, this move damaged the relations between the countries. Zakharova added that the Czech Republic should wait a tit-for-tat response.
The ‘poisoning story’ incident demonstrated that “Rossotrudnichestvo” employers allow themselves to write reports about each other to foreign intelligence services to settle personal scores, not even for money or due to ideological reasons. National interests for such persons are just empty words. It is hard to remember any such odious incidents in the diplomatic staff of any state during the past decades. How could this happen? The moral, intellectual and professional qualities of these pseudo diplomats are a result of the environment in which they were brought up and worked. Many believe that Russia is the last bastion of the Western civilization. However, it seems that the Russian leadership either ceased to understand what it is happening or to hew to their publicly declared line.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--Gunmen Attack Syrian Intelligence Center, Police Station In Northern Daraa

Early on June 14 , unidentified gunmen attacked a police station and a center of the General Intelligence Directorate in @ @ @ @ @ the northern Daraa countryside .
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR @ @ @ @ @ out around the targeted positions .
Eventually , security forces managed to foil the attack @ @ @ @ @ new group dubbed the al-Sarout Regiments has claimed responsibility for the attack .
The alleged @ @ @ @ @ Baset al-Sarout , a rebel commander and a so called “ icon ” of the @ @ @ @ @ the Syrian military in northern Hama more than a year ago .
These claims are @ @ @ @ @ The attack may have been carried out by ISIS cells in Daraa .
The so-called @ @ @ @ @ a cover to hide the terrorist group ’ s activities in the southern governorate .
@ @ @ @ @ fighters in Daraa are being targeted on a regular basis .
A day earlier , @ @ @ @ @ killed three former rebels .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
Early on June 14, unidentified gunmen attacked a police station and a center of the General Intelligence Directorate in the town of Jasim in the northern Daraa countryside.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), heavy clashes broke out around the targeted positions. Eventually, security forces managed to foil the attack.
“the heavy clashes last for several hours, no information on human losses were received,” the UK-based monitoring group said in a report.
Opposition activists said a new group dubbed the al-Sarout Regiments has claimed responsibility for the attack. The alleged group is named after Abdul Baset al-Sarout, a rebel commander and a so called “icon” of the opposition that was killed by the Syrian military in northern Hama more than a year ago.
These claims are yet to be verified. The attack may have been carried out by ISIS cells in Daraa. The so-called al-Sarout Regiments may be just a cover to hide the terrorist group’s activities in the southern governorate.
Syrian service members and local fighters in Daraa are being targeted on a regular basis. A day earlier, an explosion in the city killed three former rebels.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--Syrian Warplanes Pound ISIS Remnants In Southeast Hama

The Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) security operation against ISIS remnants in the southeastern Hama countryside is still ongoing .
On June 14 , the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR ) reported intense clashes in the region between pro-government forces and ISIS cells .
“ Violent battles erupted , again , between the Islamic State on one hand , and regime forces and its armed forces on the other , at the Hama-Aleppo-Raqqa triangle , from the direction of the eastern Hama desert , ” the monitoring group said in a report .
During the clashes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provided SAA troops with an air support .
A number of airstrikes targeted ISIS terrorists and their equipment near the town of Uqayribat in southeast Hama .
The SAA launched its security operation in southeast Hama earlier this week .
The operation was a response to a large attack by ISIS terrorists on army positions there .
The SAA and its allies have been chasing ISIS cells from western Deir Ezzor to southwestern Raqqa , eastern Homs and southeastern Hama for a few months .
The group ’ s remnants are likely struggling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources have been depleted .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) security operation against ISIS remnants in the southeastern Hama countryside is still ongoing.
On June 14, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported intense clashes in the region between pro-government forces and ISIS cells.
“Violent battles erupted, again, between the Islamic State on one hand, and regime forces and its armed forces on the other, at the Hama-Aleppo-Raqqa triangle, from the direction of the eastern Hama desert,” the monitoring group said in a report.
During the clashes, warplanes of the Syrian Arab Air Force provided SAA troops with an air support. A number of airstrikes targeted ISIS terrorists and their equipment near the town of Uqayribat in southeast Hama.
The SAA launched its security operation in southeast Hama earlier this week. The operation was a response to a large attack by ISIS terrorists on army positions there.
The SAA and its allies have been chasing ISIS cells from western Deir Ezzor to southwestern Raqqa, eastern Homs and southeastern Hama for a few months. The group’s remnants are likely struggling to survive, as many of their resources have been depleted.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--Russian Millitary To Establish Large Base In Syria’s Palmyra – Report

Russia is preparing to establish a military base near the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria , the Zaman al-Wsl news outlet reported on June 14 .
Citing a special source , the outlet said the base will be established at the Palmyra Air Base .
A Syrian military delegation headed by Maj. Gen. Tawfiq Khaddour , commander of the air forces ’ 22nd Air Division , reportedly handed the base to the Russian military a while ago .
The air base was badly damaged during the second battle of Palmyra in 2017 .
According to Zaman al-Wsl , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rehabilitate the base .
The outlet claimed that warplanes will be deployed at the base , which will be also used as a commercial airport in the future .
However , this scenario is highly unlikely .
Last month , President Vladimir Putin has ordered Russia ’ s defense and foreign ministries to hold talks with Damascus to obtain additional facilities and maritime access in Syria .
The information provided by Zaman al-Wsl are yet to be verified .
Nonetheless , Russia may be indeed interested in boosting its presence in central Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forward anti-terrorism efforts in the region , where ISIS is still active .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Turkish Army Claims It Eliminated Kurdish Fighters In Iraq & Syria , Shares Old Footage

Support SouthFront
Russia is preparing to establish a military base near the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria, the Zaman al-Wsl news outlet reported on June 14.
Citing a special source, the outlet said the base will be established at the Palmyra Air Base. A Syrian military delegation headed by Maj. Gen. Tawfiq Khaddour, commander of the air forces’ 22nd Air Division, reportedly handed the base to the Russian military a while ago.
“The Iranians have evacuated the air base, in addition to everything related or belong to regime forces, whether it is military or logistical,” the source said.
The air base was badly damaged during the second battle of Palmyra in 2017. According to Zaman al-Wsl, the Russian military has begun work to rehabilitate the base. The outlet claimed that warplanes will be deployed at the base, which will be also used as a commercial airport in the future. However, this scenario is highly unlikely.
Last month, President Vladimir Putin has ordered Russia’s defense and foreign ministries to hold talks with Damascus to obtain additional facilities and maritime access in Syria.
The information provided by Zaman al-Wsl are yet to be verified. Nonetheless, Russia may be indeed interested in boosting its presence in central Syria. A Russian base in Palmyra could forward anti-terrorism efforts in the region, where ISIS is still active.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-14--Military Situation In Libya On June 14, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya : • Sporadic clashes between @ @ @ @ @ continue west of Sirte ; • The Turkish military released a video of its drills @ @ @ @ @ MORE ON THE TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya:
Libyan National Army (LNA) warplanes struck ISIS cells near Ubari;
Sporadic clashes between the LNA and Turkish-backed forces continue west of Sirte;
LNA airstrikes hit positions of Turkish-backed forces near Abu Qurayn;
The Turkish military released a video of its drills off the Libyan coast.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Russian Tor Air Defense Missile Systems Shot Down 45 Militant Drones In Syria

Russia ’ s Tor air defence missile systems have downed more than 45 drones used by militants in Syria , @ @ @ @ @ the Russian air defence forces , Lieutenant General Alexander Leonov .
“ Since the start @ @ @ @ @ calculations of the Tor combat vehicles targeted over 45 UAVs crafted by militants ” , @ @ @ @ @ with the Natsionalnaya Oborona ( National Defence ) magazine .
The Tor air defence systems @ @ @ @ @ together with the S-400 and Pantsir-S systems to protect facilities in Syria .
Lieutenant General @ @ @ @ @ will be supplied with the Tor-M2 air defence systems until 2027 .
MORE ON THE @ @

Support SouthFront
Russia’s Tor air defence missile systems have downed more than 45 drones used by militants in Syria, according to the chief of the Russian air defence forces, Lieutenant General Alexander Leonov.
“Since the start of combat duty, the calculations of the Tor combat vehicles targeted over 45 UAVs crafted by militants”, Leonov stated in an interview with the Natsionalnaya Oborona (National Defence) magazine.
The Tor air defence systems of various modifications are used together with the S-400 and Pantsir-S systems to protect facilities in Syria. Lieutenant General added the Russian armed forces will be supplied with the Tor-M2 air defence systems until 2027.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Military Situation In Afghanistan On June 15, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan : • At least 4 @ @ @ @ @ members were killed in clashes in the Tagab district of Kapisa province , according local @ @ @ @ @ of government forces were killed and 250 others were wounded in Taliban attacks during the @ @ @ @ @ reported ; • At least 1 civilian was killed and 2 others were wounded in @ @ @ @ @ of Jalalabad city ; • The Taliban announced that 934 Kabul administration workers joined the @ @ @ @ @ ON THE TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan:
At least 4 government fighters and 11 Taliban members were killed in clashes in the Tagab district of Kapisa province, according local authorities;
171 personnel of government forces were killed and 250 others were wounded in Taliban attacks during the past week, government sources reported;
At least 1 civilian was killed and 2 others were wounded in an IED blast in PD12 of Jalalabad city;
The Taliban announced that 934 Kabul administration workers joined the group in May.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Military Situation In Syria On June 15, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • A suspected U.S. @ @ @ @ @ s city center killed two commanders of al-Qaeda-affiliated Horas al-Din ; • The Turkish military @ @ @ @ @ 3 Kurdish rebels in northeastern Syria ; • Russia is allegedly preparing to establish a @ @ @ @ @ city of Palmyra ; MORE ON THE TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:
A suspected U.S. drone strike on Idlib’s city center killed two commanders of al-Qaeda-affiliated Horas al-Din;
The Turkish military claimed that it had eliminated 3 Kurdish rebels in northeastern Syria;
Russia is allegedly preparing to establish a military base near the ancient city of Palmyra;
Syrian warplanes conducted airstrikes on ISIS cells near Uqayribat;
Gunmen attacked Syrian government forces in Jasim.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Mexican Cartel CJNG Releases Statement Saying “State Cartel” Is Behind Killings In Some Provinces

The Mexican cartel “ Jalisco New Generation ” ( CJNG ) released two videos as a statement towards the San Luis Potosi provincial government .
In the video , they called the local government the “ Ministerial Cartel ” and said that the head of the Federal State police Jose Guadalupe Castillo Celestino is also head of the “ cartel.
” The cartel said in the statement that several killings in San Luis Potosi were not a result of its activities .
To find the guilty party , according to Jalisco New Generation , authorities had to look at Celestino @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Northeast , Golfo and Los Alemanes , “ selling ” to them part of the territory and real estate in the province .
Informing who should be thanked for the appearance of three criminal organizations at once , the Jalisco cartel also added that it should not be thought that the state governor was not aware of this transaction .
There ’ s a lot of confrontation between CJNG and other cartels , all throughout Mexico , despite them being present in more provinces than any other group .
The rise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the Sinaloa Cartel in 2010 , was rapid .
In January 2019 , InSight Crime named the CJNG one of its “ Criminal Winners ” for 2018 , based on its territorial presence , its income from cocaine and synthetic drug trafficking , its control of port infrastructure and its ability to launder money .
It is , however , difficult for it to be the most influential and strongest group , especially when it needs to spread its influence to other regions .
Understandably , it gets increasingly difficult to establish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and criminally , the larger the area becomes .
In most regions there ’ s clashes for influence , but notably in the “ Golden Triangle ” which is the key drug-producing region composed of the states of Sinaloa and Durango , as well as large parts of Chihuahua , the remainders of the Sinaloa cartel are the ones in power , despite El Chapo ( Joaquín Guzmán Loera ) in prison and there appearing to be a power struggle between his successor , Ismael Zambada García , alias “ El Mayo , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The local governments in most of the areas are often either incapable of countering cartel activities , or are on their payroll .
A recent example for this is a statement by the governor of the Puebla province , Miguel Barbosa .
His statement was absurd .
In his words , most of the women who disappeared in Mexico hadn ’ t disappeared , but had simply gone away somewhere with their boyfriends .
“ There have been cases where the police ministerial has found the people , declared missing , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Puebla .
Most of the allegations of missing persons are cases of people who do not have disappeared , that were absent from their homes for a day , two days , three days , through a very simple , and the time in which they had no contact with their family was very short , but it was one in which , the mom , the dad , the brother , was the Attorney –General of the State – to file the complaint was registered , ” he said .
As a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is being opened into him .
The National Commission of Honor and Justice ( CNHJ ) Brown said that an investigation was launched into Barbosa for his various statements .
On top of the one about abducted women simply going away with their boyfriends , he ’ s also said that only the rich are in danger of COVID-19 and that the poor were “ immune ” and other absurd statements .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Mexican Cartels Assault Security Forces , Clash Among Themselves In Increasingly Bloody Battles • Mexican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Photos , Videos

Support SouthFront
The Mexican cartel “Jalisco New Generation” (CJNG) released two videos as a statement towards the San Luis Potosi provincial government.
In the video, they called the local government the “Ministerial Cartel” and said that the head of the Federal State police Jose Guadalupe Castillo Celestino is also head of the “cartel.”
The cartel said in the statement that several killings in San Luis Potosi were not a result of its activities.
To find the guilty party, according to Jalisco New Generation, authorities had to look at Celestino, who struck deals with the cartels of the Northeast, Golfo and Los Alemanes, “selling” to them part of the territory and real estate in the province.
Informing who should be thanked for the appearance of three criminal organizations at once, the Jalisco cartel also added that it should not be thought that the state governor was not aware of this transaction.
There’s a lot of confrontation between CJNG and other cartels, all throughout Mexico, despite them being present in more provinces than any other group.
The rise of CJNG was rapid after its split from the Sinaloa Cartel in 2010, was rapid.
In January 2019, InSight Crime named the CJNG one of its “Criminal Winners” for 2018, based on its territorial presence, its income from cocaine and synthetic drug trafficking, its control of port infrastructure and its ability to launder money.
It is, however, difficult for it to be the most influential and strongest group, especially when it needs to spread its influence to other regions. Understandably, it gets increasingly difficult to establish a strong influence – politically, economically and criminally, the larger the area becomes.
In most regions there’s clashes for influence, but notably in the “Golden Triangle” which is the key drug-producing region composed of the states of Sinaloa and Durango, as well as large parts of Chihuahua, the remainders of the Sinaloa cartel are the ones in power, despite El Chapo (Joaquín Guzmán Loera) in prison and there appearing to be a power struggle between his successor, Ismael Zambada García, alias “El Mayo,” and Guzmán Loera’s sons.
The local governments in most of the areas are often either incapable of countering cartel activities, or are on their payroll.
A recent example for this is a statement by the governor of the Puebla province, Miguel Barbosa. His statement was absurd.
In his words, most of the women who disappeared in Mexico hadn’t disappeared, but had simply gone away somewhere with their boyfriends.
“There have been cases where the police ministerial has found the people, declared missing, as with your boyfriend at any place in Puebla. Most of the allegations of missing persons are cases of people who do not have disappeared, that were absent from their homes for a day, two days, three days, through a very simple, and the time in which they had no contact with their family was very short, but it was one in which, the mom, the dad, the brother, was the Attorney –General of the State – to file the complaint was registered,” he said.
As a result of his statement, an investigation is being opened into him.
The National Commission of Honor and Justice (CNHJ) Brown said that an investigation was launched into Barbosa for his various statements. On top of the one about abducted women simply going away with their boyfriends, he’s also said that only the rich are in danger of COVID-19 and that the poor were “immune” and other absurd statements.
La CNHJ informa que ha acordado la apertura de un Proceso de Oficio al C. Miguel Barbosa Huerta, por declaraciones que implican posibles faltas a los Documentos Básicos de Morena.
Se informará oportunamente de la resolución.@diazpol @arroyolegaspi @GabrielaRodr108 — CNHJ MORENA (@CNHJ_Morena) June 12, 2020
La Comisión Nacional de Honestidad y Justicia de #Morena abrió un proceso de oficio al gobernador de Puebla, Miguel Barbosa, por declaraciones sobre mujeres desaparecidas “que implican posibles faltas a los Documentos Básicos de Morena”. pic.twitter.com/uuqB0EFX3B — LupitaJuarez (@LupitaJuarezH) June 12, 2020
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Military Situation In Yemen On June 15, 2020 (Map Update)

A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen : • Ansar Allah reported 78 ceasefire violations in al-Hudaydah during @ @ @ @ @ Ansar Allah repelled Saudi-led forces ’ attack in the Hays area ; • Clashes between @ @ @ @ @ continue in the Jufrah area and south of Madghal .
Ansar Allah captured Bahrah mountain @ @ @ @ @ MORE ON THE TOPIC :

Support SouthFront
A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen:
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Zaher area 3 times;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Majzar area 34 times;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck Khab and Shaaf areas 5 times;
Ansar Allah reported 78 ceasefire violations in al-Hudaydah during the past 24 hours. Ansar Allah repelled Saudi-led forces’ attack in the Hays area;
Clashes between Ansar Allah and Saudi-led forces continue in the Jufrah area and south of Madghal. Ansar Allah captured Bahrah mountain and the Nakhlan camp.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Clashes Between Chechen And Arab Gangs In France, Speeding Car Flipped Over

As of June 12th , in Dijon , France , there have been clashes between Chechen and Arab gangs , with violence apparently escalating .
Footage was released of a car speeding towards a group of armed Chechens , when it flips over .
The speeding car rushes past the Chechens and flips over , with the individuals , armed with various pipes , knives and bats begins shouted and runs towards the crashed vehicle .
Local media reported that the driver was seriously injured and hospitalized .
Several unconfirmed reports claim the car was driven by a member of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on social media the previous week .
The Chechen community calls there for a rally to avenge one of their members : a 16-year-old boy who was allegedly “ beaten ” in Dijon by a group of older drug dealers .
The young man is said to be still hospitalized in serious condition ; a member of the Chechen community tells us .
On June 12th , Chechens from all over France attacked a hookah bar : the “ Black Pearl ” , Place de la République , where the potential culprits were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ circulated on social networks .
A fight left a dozen injured , some seriously : one of them was said to have a broken arm , some were unable to work .
There is sample footage showing the situation .
There appears to also be armed individuals , with gunshots being discernible in some footage .
The police intervened to disperse the crowd .
According to the prosecution , there were brawls and injuries , but no serious incidents .
The previous weekend , on June 6th – 7th there was a smaller-scale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is noteworthy , however , is this : The Twitter account “ Al Chechnya ” that shared some of the videos has labeled them with the symbols of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria .
It was active during the wars in Chechnya .
Militant groups ( many of them linked to al-Qaeda ) operating under this brand fought for independence of a part of Chechnya .
These are the same individuals that France grants asylum to from the “ evil Russian regime , ” who then thank it by organizing fights with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • France after “ Black Thursday ” : What Participants Of Largest Protests In 15 Years Want

Support SouthFront
As of June 12th, in Dijon, France, there have been clashes between Chechen and Arab gangs, with violence apparently escalating.
Footage was released of a car speeding towards a group of armed Chechens, when it flips over.
Après qu’un Jeune Homme D’origine #Tchetchene âgée de 16 ans a était frapper par des Homme âgée de 25 à 30 ans par traîtrise les Tchétchènes de partout en France ce sont réunis pour aller à Dijon . pic.twitter.com/ZOXy7mkYQ5 — al chechnya (@Alchechnya) June 13, 2020
Here's a better angle for the ongoing battle between algerians and chechen gangs in #dijon (france)
Looks like an ction movie lol pic.twitter.com/vfL9SCOAvg — ?? ?????? (@asabove_asbelow) June 15, 2020
The speeding car rushes past the Chechens and flips over, with the individuals, armed with various pipes, knives and bats begins shouted and runs towards the crashed vehicle.
Local media reported that the driver was seriously injured and hospitalized. Several unconfirmed reports claim the car was driven by a member of a rival gang.
Le traitement des événements sans précédents de #Dijon dans la presse pic.twitter.com/HqAnb7kfvj — Pierre Sautarel (@FrDesouche) June 14, 2020
La voiture qui a foncé dans la foule à #dijon #Tchetchene pic.twitter.com/kFtvH2GQlx — Pierre Sautarel (@FrDesouche) June 14, 2020
It all started on social media the previous week. The Chechen community calls there for a rally to avenge one of their members: a 16-year-old boy who was allegedly “beaten” in Dijon by a group of older drug dealers. The young man is said to be still hospitalized in serious condition; a member of the Chechen community tells us.
On June 12th, Chechens from all over France attacked a hookah bar: the “Black Pearl”, Place de la République, where the potential culprits were found. Videos of these scuffles then circulated on social networks. A fight left a dozen injured, some seriously: one of them was said to have a broken arm, some were unable to work.
Après qu’un jeune #Tchetchene s’est fait frapper par des hommes de 30 à Dijon. Des #Tchetchene de partout en France se son rejoint à Dijon pour rétablir l’ordre Allah y Akbar ! pic.twitter.com/69Pfl4L2Ok — al chechnya (@Alchechnya) June 13, 2020
There is sample footage showing the situation.
D'autres images des tensions à #nice entre "cités" et Tchétchènes pic.twitter.com/kXhzMRYNiQ — Pierre Sautarel (@FrDesouche) June 15, 2020
There appears to also be armed individuals, with gunshots being discernible in some footage.
? dans le quartier des liserons à #nice les jeune de quartier ce défendent contre une attaque des tchétchènes plusieurs coup de feu #nice #Tchetchene pic.twitter.com/jDYf16berW — C Pas Des Lol ♠ (@cpasdeslol18) June 14, 2020
The police intervened to disperse the crowd. According to the prosecution, there were brawls and injuries, but no serious incidents.
The previous weekend, on June 6th – 7th there was a smaller-scale fight between Maghreb and Chechen.
What is noteworthy, however, is this: The Twitter account “Al Chechnya” that shared some of the videos has labeled them with the symbols of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It was active during the wars in Chechnya. Militant groups (many of them linked to al-Qaeda) operating under this brand fought for independence of a part of Chechnya.
These are the same individuals that France grants asylum to from the “evil Russian regime,” who then thank it by organizing fights with hundreds of people and cause issues in public.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Survival Of SouthFront Is Not Possible Without Your Urgent Assistance

SOUTHFRONT TEAM HAS BEEN FACING UNPRECEDENTED TECHNICAL AND MEDIA PRESSURE .
In late April and early May , our main @ @ @ @ @ each with hundreds of thousands of subscribers were both deleted .
Furthermore , SouthFront is @ @ @ @ @ propaganda pressure .
In these conditions , SouthFront will not be able to continue your @ @ @ @ @ .
Since June 1 , we have collected 1,180 USD .
This is 23.6 % @ @ @ @ @ to keep SouthFront working and further .
IN THIS HARD TIME , YOUR SUPPORT IS @ @ @ @ @ VISA , PayPal , Paysafecard , Bitcoin and other options .
This systems accepts all @ @ @ @ @ , Amazon Payments , bitcoin ( FAQ is under the main text , in P.S @ @ @ @ @ for a monthly donation of $ 15 ( or any another amount ) OR make @ @ @ @ @ buttons below

Support SouthFront
SOUTHFRONT TEAM HAS BEEN FACING UNPRECEDENTED TECHNICAL AND MEDIA PRESSURE.
In late April and early May, our main YouTube channel and Facebook page each with hundreds of thousands of subscribers were both deleted. Furthermore, SouthFront is a target of the increasing propaganda pressure.
In these conditions, SouthFront will not be able to continue your work without your urgent help.
Since June 1, we have collected 1,240 USD. This is 24.8% of the monthly budget needed to keep SouthFront working and further.
IN THIS HARD TIME, YOUR SUPPORT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT:
PayPal
Account: southfront@list.ru
DonationAlerts
Donate via VISA, PayPal, Paysafecard, Bitcoin and other options.
Tinypass (Piano)
This systems accepts all types of cards, PayPal, Amazon Payments, bitcoin (FAQ is under the main text, in P.S.)
You can subscribe for a monthly donation of $15 (or any another amount) OR make one time donation by clicking buttons below
Patreon
Donate via SouthFront’s Patreon account (click here)
SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence Team
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--U.S. 64th Aggressor Squadron Repaints Its F-16s To Resemble Russian Su-57s

On June 11th , the US Air Force announced that its F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets , serving with the 64th Aggressor Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base , Nevada , were painted in the new “ spooky ” “ ghost ” paint scheme .
It is not specifically “ spooky ” because it ’ s called “ ghost ” , but rather because that ’ s the paint scheme of the Russian Su-57 fighter jets , and the painted F-16s are being used by an Aggressor Squadron .
An aggressor squadron or adversary squadron is a squadron that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in military wargames .
Aggressor squadrons use enemy tactics , techniques , and procedures to give a realistic simulation of air combat In this case , Russian Su-57 , their capability and tactics .
The paint scheme is intended to replicate an adversary ’ s fighter jet .
United States , allied , and partner-nation aircrews routinely train against accurate and realistic threats including aircraft painted to replicate those pilots might see in aerial combat .
Paint supervisor Dallas Porter said they laid the stencils on tables and on the shop floor trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sometimes it didn ’ t match up the way they thought .
The photo shoot depicts the repainting in this painting scheme of the F-16C Block 32D fighter with military number 86-0299 .
It is known that earlier in 2019 , at least one more F-16C aircraft from the 64th aggressor squadron with military number 84-1220 received such a paint scheme by Nellis airbase , however , they now turned to a specialized unit at Hill Airbase for repainting the fighter aircraft .
For Americans , this paint scheme turned out to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if applying the standard US Air Force paint scheme to an F-16 fighter takes an average of 11 days , then 12 people from the 576th squadron worked to apply the “ ghost ” paint scheme three shifts over 18 days .
This paint pattern and its name were actually voted by users on social media .
Novotny let the social media vote on several color schemes , some of those based on existing patterns , others designed by the users , narrowing down the choices and helping them picking the new pattern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , likes and comments , the winner was the pixelated camouflage that appeared in 2018 on the Russian Sukhoi Su-57 .
“ F-16C belonging to the 64th and 18th AGRS have been sporting different paint schemes for decades now .
As reported last year , when the 64th AGRS unveiled a new ‘ splinter ’ F-16 the purpose of these liveries is to make the Aggressor jets as similar as possible to the real threats and put the pilots in training against the Red Air in a similar situation to what they would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ combat air forces.
” MORE ON THE TOPIC : • U.S. Air Force Admits It Practiced Strikes On Russian Sea And Littoral Targets In B1-B Lancer Flights • Russia Is Testing Unmanned Regime Of Its Su-57 Fifth-Generation Fighter

Support SouthFront
On June 11th, the US Air Force announced that its F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets, serving with the 64th Aggressor Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, were painted in the new “spooky” “ghost” paint scheme.
It is not specifically “spooky” because it’s called “ghost”, but rather because that’s the paint scheme of the Russian Su-57 fighter jets, and the painted F-16s are being used by an Aggressor Squadron.
An aggressor squadron or adversary squadron is a squadron that is trained to act as an opposing force in military wargames. Aggressor squadrons use enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures to give a realistic simulation of air combat
In this case, Russian Su-57, their capability and tactics.
The paint scheme is intended to replicate an adversary’s fighter jet. United States, allied, and partner-nation aircrews routinely train against accurate and realistic threats including aircraft painted to replicate those pilots might see in aerial combat.
“The paint shop at Nellis did one of these planes last year and asked us to paint this one,” said Jim Gill 576th AMXS production flight chief. “They sent us pictures and gave us the pattern, but there were no instructions. We had to put it together ourselves.”
Paint supervisor Dallas Porter said they laid the stencils on tables and on the shop floor trying to figure out where everything went and sometimes it didn’t match up the way they thought.
“Laying on the flat ground, it was great, but once you get up there with those angles, stuff starts twisting and moving,” Porter said. “It’s tougher to get the angles and 90-degree turns, but something like this gets everybody involved, working as a team.”
The photo shoot depicts the repainting in this painting scheme of the F-16C Block 32D fighter with military number 86-0299.
It is known that earlier in 2019, at least one more F-16C aircraft from the 64th aggressor squadron with military number 84-1220 received such a paint scheme by Nellis airbase, however, they now turned to a specialized unit at Hill Airbase for repainting the fighter aircraft.
For Americans, this paint scheme turned out to be very laborious, it is reported that if applying the standard US Air Force paint scheme to an F-16 fighter takes an average of 11 days, then 12 people from the 576th squadron worked to apply the “ghost” paint scheme three shifts over 18 days.
This paint pattern and its name were actually voted by users on social media.
Novotny let the social media vote on several color schemes, some of those based on existing patterns, others designed by the users, narrowing down the choices and helping them picking the new pattern. After a few rounds of polls, likes and comments, the winner was the pixelated camouflage that appeared in 2018 on the Russian Sukhoi Su-57.
“F-16C belonging to the 64th and 18th AGRS have been sporting different paint schemes for decades now. As reported last year, when the 64th AGRS unveiled a new ‘splinter’ F-16 the purpose of these liveries is to make the Aggressor jets as similar as possible to the real threats and put the pilots in training against the Red Air in a similar situation to what they would see during an engagement with the opposing combat air forces.”
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Locations Of US Carrier Strike Groups – June 15, 2020

This is the newst update of the ‘ U.S .
Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map ’ exclusive series showing the @ @ @ @ @ Strike Groups .
SouthFront : Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using @ @ @ @ @ No classified information was used in production of the map .
Carrier strike group ( @ @ @ @ @ formation of the United States Navy .
It is centered on an aircraft carrier and @ @ @ @ @ CVW ) of 65 to 70 aircrafts .
It ’ s composed of roughly 7,500 @ @ @ @ @ , at least one cruiser , a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or @ @ @ @ @ group also , on occasion , includes submarines , attached logistics ships and a supply @ @ @ @ @ comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world ’ s oceans .
@ @ @ @ @

Support SouthFront
This is the newst update of the ‘U.S. Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map’ exclusive series showing the approximate locations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups. SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using the available open-source information. No classified information was used in production of the map.
Carrier strike group (CSG) is an operational formation of the United States Navy. It is centered on an aircraft carrier and a carrier air wing (CVW) of 65 to 70 aircrafts. It’s composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates. A carrier strike group also, on occasion, includes submarines, attached logistics ships and a supply ship. Carrier strike groups comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world’s oceans.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront


southfront--2020-06-15--Turkey Announces Beginning Of Yet Another Operation In Northern Iraq

Turkey launched its new operation in northern Iraq called “ Claw-Eagle ” on June 15th , the Defense Ministry announced .
The operation is being carried out against PKK ( Kurdistan Workers ’ Party ) positions in northern Iraq .
Operation Claw-Eagle has already started and it struck suspected PKK targets in several regions in Iraq ’ s north , according to a tweet from the military , which claimed 81 PKK targets were targeted , including shelters and caves .
The defence ministry said the air operation targeted the PKK in its stronghold at Qandil , near the Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Sinjar , Zap , Avasin-Basyan and Hakurk .
The Defense Ministry ’ s statement underlined that the operation has been launched in order to ensure the security of the Turkish people and the country ’ s borders by neutralizing the PKK and other terrorist organizations that have been stepping up harassment and attack attempts against the police and military bases .
Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and the Turkish Armed Forces Command will be managing and dispatching operation Claw-Eagle from the Air Force Command Control Center .
Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dundar , Air Forces Commander Gen. Hasan Kucukakyuz and Naval Forces Commander Adnan Ozbal will also be among the personnel directing operations from the center .
Even without the new operation , Turkey daily reports neutralizing PKK members in Iraq and Syria .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Spike In Turkey-Greece Tensions Over Ongoing Border , Resource And Security Disputes

Support SouthFront
Turkey launched its new operation in northern Iraq called “Claw-Eagle” on June 15th, the Defense Ministry announced.
Bu harekâtta azami oranda yerli ve milli mühimmat kullanılarak terör örgütünün anılan bölgelerdeki varlığına ağır bir darbe indirilmiştir. Harekâtın planlama ve icrasında sivil halkın can ve mal güvenliği ile çevrenin korunması konusunda azami hassasiyet gösterilmiştir. — T.C. Millî Savunma Bakanlığı (@tcsavunma) June 15, 2020
The operation is being carried out against PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) positions in northern Iraq.
Operation Claw-Eagle has already started and it struck suspected PKK targets in several regions in Iraq’s north, according to a tweet from the military, which claimed 81 PKK targets were targeted, including shelters and caves.
“The Claw-Eagle Operation has started. Our planes are bringing the caves down on the terrorists’ heads,” the defence ministry said.
The defence ministry said the air operation targeted the PKK in its stronghold at Qandil, near the Iranian border, as well as the areas of Sinjar, Zap, Avasin-Basyan and Hakurk.
“The PKK and other terrorist elements are threatening the security of our people and borders with attacks increasing every day on the areas of our outposts and bases,” it said.
The Defense Ministry’s statement underlined that the operation has been launched in order to ensure the security of the Turkish people and the country’s borders by neutralizing the PKK and other terrorist organizations that have been stepping up harassment and attack attempts against the police and military bases.
Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and the Turkish Armed Forces Command will be managing and dispatching operation Claw-Eagle from the Air Force Command Control Center.
Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar Guler, Land Forces Commander Gen. Umit Dundar, Air Forces Commander Gen. Hasan Kucukakyuz and Naval Forces Commander Adnan Ozbal will also be among the personnel directing operations from the center.
Even without the new operation, Turkey daily reports neutralizing PKK members in Iraq and Syria.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
Support SouthFront