southfront--2020-10-17--Azerbaijani Drones Continue To Inflict Heavy Losses On Armenian Forces In Nagorno-Karabakh (Videos)

Azerbaijani combat drones continue to inflict heavy losses on Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
On October @ @ @ @ @ Defense of Azerbaijan shared several videos of dozens of recent strikes on Armenian troops .
@ @ @ @ @ 50 strikes on gatherings and supply trucks of Armenian forces , as well as the @ @ @ @ @ MoD also shared footage of intense shelling with artillery and rocket launchers on Armenian positions @ @ @ @ @ the Azerbaijani media released a video showing a loitering munition strike at an Armenian BM-30 @ @ @ @ @ .
An Israeli-made IAI Harop loitering munition was likely used .
Despite sustaining heavy losses @ @ @ @ @ fierce resistance .
On October 17 , Azerbaijani troops failed to make any noticeable gains @ @ @ @ @ accepted a new ceasefire that ’ s set to begin at 12:00 PM local time @ @ @ @ @ : • New ‘ Humanitarian Ceasefire ’ And Prospects Of Azerbaijani-Armenian War

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Azerbaijani combat drones continue to inflict heavy losses on Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
On October 17, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan shared several videos of dozens of recent strikes on Armenian troops.
The videos show at least 50 strikes on gatherings and supply trucks of Armenian forces, as well as the targeting of:
11 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers;
7 T-72 battle tanks;
2 MT-LB armored vehicles;
1 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle;
1 9K33 Osa air-defense system.
The Azerbaijani MoD also shared footage of intense shelling with artillery and rocket launchers on Armenian positions in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Furthermore, the Azerbaijani media released a video showing a loitering munition strike at an Armenian BM-30 Smerch heavy multiple rocket launcher. An Israeli-made IAI Harop loitering munition was likely used.
Despite sustaining heavy losses, Armenian forces are showing fierce resistance. On October 17, Azerbaijani troops failed to make any noticeable gains in Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku also accepted a new ceasefire that’s set to begin at 12:00 PM local time.
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southfront--2020-10-17--New ‘Humanitarian Ceasefire’ And Prospects Of Azerbaijani-Armenian War

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war , which started on September 27 , continues in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region despite international diplomatic efforts to decrease tensions and motivate the sides to return back to the negotiating table .
The interesting fact is that intense clashes and offensive operations of Azerbaijani forces , supported by Turkey and Syrian militants , continue in the region at the same time as the Azerbaijani government claims that it is committed to the ceasefire regime , which entered force in Karabakh on October 10 , after the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations in Moscow .
At the same time , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committed to the ceasefire simultaneously conducting counter-attacks against the advancing Azerbaijani forces .
On October 17 evening , the Armenian Foreign Ministry announced that the sides once again reached a humanitarian ceasefire , which should start at 00:00 local time on October 18 .
Nonetheless , it is not expected that it will last for long in the current conditions .
No:357/20 , Information of the Press Service Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan .
The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia have agreed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 00h00 local time .
This decision was taken following the statement of the Presidents of the French Republic , the Russian Federation and the United States of America , representing the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group of 1 October 2020 , the Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group of 5 October , and in line with Moscow Statement of 10 October 2020 .
For the Armenian side , the situation is further complicated by the fat that the current Armenian leadership is not ready ( or do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ variety of its means and forces to fight back the ongoing Azerbaijani advance .
Instead of this , Armenian forces involved in the conflict are limited to those of the Nagorno-Karakbah Republic ( Republic of Artsakh ) , a self-proclaimed Armenia-affiliated independent state on the territory of Karabakh .
The government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has so far limited its support to Karabakh forces to supplying weapons , sending volunteers ( instead of regular forces ) , complaining in media and calling on other countries to recongize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has made no steps in this direction .
As of October 17 evening , the situation on the frontline demonstrates that the Azerbaijani-Turkish side has been slowly but steadily taking an upper hand in the war .
Azerbaijani forces have achieved a series of tactical successes in the northern and southern part of the region , capturing two dozens of small towns and villages .
The most important of them are Fuzuli , Jabrayl , Hadrut , Madaghis and Talish .
Over the past few days , especially heavy clashes were taking place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Armenian forces withdrew after Azerbaijan took control of surrounding heights .
Fuzuli experienced a similar fate as the Hadrut heights in fact overlook its countryside .
The Armenian side still insists that the town has not been captured by Azerbaijan .
But photo and video evidence from the ground , together with official announcements of the Azerbaijani government , indicate that in fact the town was lost .
The Azerbaijani military extensively uses its advantage in the air power ( an active usage of combat drones for strikes and reconnaissance operations ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is also supported by radical militant groups deployed by Turkey from the northwest of Syria and Turkish special forces and specialists ( especially in the field of EW operations , intelligence and the air domain warfare ) .
These factors , especially the air dominance , allowed to deliver a notable damage to Armenian forces destroying multiple pieces of their military euqipment and destroying fortified positions , manpower .
The oudtated air defense forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic appeared to be unable to deal with the threat from Azerbaijani military aircraft , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has no political will to employ its air defense .
Just recently , on October 17 , the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry released a video of strikes on the S-300 system in Armenia .
Azerbaijani strikes on the Armenian S-300 system ( deployed in Armenia ) : Earlier , Azerbaijan released videos of several strikes on components of the possible S-300 in the Nagorno-Karabakh region .
The previous videos include the moments of the alleged destruction of 35D6 ( ST-68U ) radars and alleged S-300 missile launcher of Armenian forces with Israeli IAI Harop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place near the village of Khojaly the Khojaly District , while another one near the village of Qubadlı in the Kashatagh District of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ( Republic of Artsakh ) .
The location of the destruction of the S-300 launcher remains unclear .
Meanwhile , the Azerbaijani side also released a video of the alleged destruction of the S-300 missile launcher .
The location of the strike is unclear , but it may have taken place near Qubadli : Azerbaijani sources also claimed that Azerbaijan destroyed several TOR surface-to-air missile systems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
These claims were not confirmed by video evidence .
At the same time , the Azerbaijani military conducts intense strikes on civilian infrastructure in the Nagorno-Karabakh region .
Despite the public claims of the Azerbaijani leadership that the conflict has no ethnic grounds and there is no threat to the Armenian population , in fact , Baku seeks to not only dismantle the self-proclaimed Armenian state , but also to remove or cleanse Armenians there .
The Armenian side responds in a similar manner regularly shelling settlements and towns near the contact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be considered as accidental , as Armenian sources claim , the recent strikes on the Azerbaijani city of Ganja with ballistic missiles are for sure not an accident .
According to Azerbaijani authorities , 13 civilians were killed and more than 40 others were injured in the last night attack on the city .
The strike was likely conducted with the Soviet R-17 Elbrus tactical ballistic missile complex , which is in service with Karabakh forces .
It is possible that the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc will develop its further advance along the Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zengilan .
For Azerbaijan , it will be profitable to extend the frontline because it will allow it to use the advantage in air power and manpower .
Meanwhile , the terrain in this part of the region is less complex than in the center or the south .
In the event of the success , such an advance will allow to undermine the entire southern flank of Armenian forces deployed in Stepankert and Shusha .
This will also create a threat of cutting off the so-called Lachin corridor , a mountain pass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , forming the shortest route between Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh .
Another direction of the possible strike is Martakert and Agdam .
Nonetheless , in this case , even if Azerbaijani forces achieve a success there , the further advance will be more complicated due to the more complex terrain .
In any case , if Baku wants to push the ‘ military solution ’ of the Karabakh question as its main option , it should regularly demonstrate field gains to its population in order to compensate the negative impacts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the war on September 27 , the Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance has achieved a notable tactical progress , but it still needs to turn it into the strategic success if it wants to capture the entire region and push Armenian forces out of it .
The new humanitarian ceasefire announced on October 17 seems like another attempt of the Minsk group , led by France , Russia and the United States , to de-escalate the conflict .
Nonetheless , the position of the current Armenian government , which was for years undermining its relations with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Azerbaijan and Turkey that already felt the flavour of the potential military victory will likely not allow to find a ‘ constructive ’ solution of the situation .
Thus , Ankara and Baku will continue demanding a full surrender of Armenia over the Karabakh question , which the Armenian government ( even if it wants to do so ) can not accept because this will lead to the immidiate collapse of the Pashinyan regime and the instability inside Armenia itself .
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The Armenian-Azerbaijani war, which started on September 27, continues in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region despite international diplomatic efforts to decrease tensions and motivate the sides to return back to the negotiating table. The interesting fact is that intense clashes and offensive operations of Azerbaijani forces, supported by Turkey and Syrian militants, continue in the region at the same time as the Azerbaijani government claims that it is committed to the ceasefire regime, which entered force in Karabakh on October 10, after the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations in Moscow. At the same time, the Armenian side also claims that it is committed to the ceasefire simultaneously conducting counter-attacks against the advancing Azerbaijani forces.
On October 17 evening, the Armenian Foreign Ministry announced that the sides once again reached a humanitarian ceasefire, which should start at 00:00 local time on October 18. Nonetheless, it is not expected that it will last for long in the current conditions.
The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry:
No:357/20, Information of the Press Service Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia have agreed to a humanitarian truce as of October 18th, 00h00 local time. This decision was taken following the statement of the Presidents of the French Republic, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, representing the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group of 1 October 2020, the Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group of 5 October, and in line with Moscow Statement of 10 October 2020.
For the Armenian side, the situation is further complicated by the fat that the current Armenian leadership is not ready (or do not want) to employ the entire variety of its means and forces to fight back the ongoing Azerbaijani advance. Instead of this, Armenian forces involved in the conflict are limited to those of the Nagorno-Karakbah Republic (Republic of Artsakh), a self-proclaimed Armenia-affiliated independent state on the territory of Karabakh. The government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has so far limited its support to Karabakh forces to supplying weapons, sending volunteers (instead of regular forces), complaining in media and calling on other countries to recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as an independent state, while Armenia itself has made no steps in this direction.
Azerbaijani strikes on Armenian positions and equipment:
As of October 17 evening, the situation on the frontline demonstrates that the Azerbaijani-Turkish side has been slowly but steadily taking an upper hand in the war. Azerbaijani forces have achieved a series of tactical successes in the northern and southern part of the region, capturing two dozens of small towns and villages. The most important of them are Fuzuli, Jabrayl, Hadrut, Madaghis and Talish.
Azerbaijani forces are in Hadrut:
Over the past few days, especially heavy clashes were taking place near the town of Hadrut, from which Armenian forces withdrew after Azerbaijan took control of surrounding heights. Fuzuli experienced a similar fate as the Hadrut heights in fact overlook its countryside. The Armenian side still insists that the town has not been captured by Azerbaijan. But photo and video evidence from the ground, together with official announcements of the Azerbaijani government, indicate that in fact the town was lost.
The Azerbaijani military extensively uses its advantage in the air power (an active usage of combat drones for strikes and reconnaissance operations), artillery and manpower. The advance is also supported by radical militant groups deployed by Turkey from the northwest of Syria and Turkish special forces and specialists (especially in the field of EW operations, intelligence and the air domain warfare).
These factors, especially the air dominance, allowed to deliver a notable damage to Armenian forces destroying multiple pieces of their military euqipment and destroying fortified positions, manpower. The oudtated air defense forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic appeared to be unable to deal with the threat from Azerbaijani military aircraft, while Armenia also seems to be unable or has no political will to employ its air defense. Just recently, on October 17, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry released a video of strikes on the S-300 system in Armenia.
Azerbaijani strikes on the Armenian S-300 system (deployed in Armenia):
Earlier, Azerbaijan released videos of several strikes on components of the possible S-300 in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
The previous videos include the moments of the alleged destruction of 35D6 (ST-68U) radars and alleged S-300 missile launcher of Armenian forces with Israeli IAI Harop loitering munitions. The first incident took place near the village of Khojaly the Khojaly District, while another one near the village of Qubadlı in the Kashatagh District of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (Republic of Artsakh). The location of the destruction of the S-300 launcher remains unclear.
The strike near Khojaly:
The strike near Qubadli:
Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani side also released a video of the alleged destruction of the S-300 missile launcher. The location of the strike is unclear, but it may have taken place near Qubadli:
Azerbaijani sources also claimed that Azerbaijan destroyed several TOR surface-to-air missile systems of Armenian forces in the combat zone. These claims were not confirmed by video evidence.
Azerbaijan struck Armenian ballistic missile systems (also inside Armenia):
At the same time, the Azerbaijani military conducts intense strikes on civilian infrastructure in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Despite the public claims of the Azerbaijani leadership that the conflict has no ethnic grounds and there is no threat to the Armenian population, in fact, Baku seeks to not only dismantle the self-proclaimed Armenian state, but also to remove or cleanse Armenians there.
The Armenian side responds in a similar manner regularly shelling settlements and towns near the contact line. While some of these strikes may be considered as accidental, as Armenian sources claim, the recent strikes on the Azerbaijani city of Ganja with ballistic missiles are for sure not an accident. According to Azerbaijani authorities, 13 civilians were killed and more than 40 others were injured in the last night attack on the city. The strike was likely conducted with the Soviet R-17 Elbrus tactical ballistic missile complex, which is in service with Karabakh forces.
It is possible that the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc will develop its further advance along the Iranian border aiming the towns of Qobadli and Zengilan. For Azerbaijan, it will be profitable to extend the frontline because it will allow it to use the advantage in air power and manpower. Meanwhile, the terrain in this part of the region is less complex than in the center or the south. In the event of the success, such an advance will allow to undermine the entire southern flank of Armenian forces deployed in Stepankert and Shusha. This will also create a threat of cutting off the so-called Lachin corridor, a mountain pass within the de jure borders of Azerbaijan, forming the shortest route between Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh.
Another direction of the possible strike is Martakert and Agdam. Nonetheless, in this case, even if Azerbaijani forces achieve a success there, the further advance will be more complicated due to the more complex terrain. In any case, if Baku wants to push the ‘military solution’ of the Karabakh question as its main option, it should regularly demonstrate field gains to its population in order to compensate the negative impacts of the war.
Since the start of the war on September 27, the Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance has achieved a notable tactical progress, but it still needs to turn it into the strategic success if it wants to capture the entire region and push Armenian forces out of it.
The new humanitarian ceasefire announced on October 17 seems like another attempt of the Minsk group, led by France, Russia and the United States, to de-escalate the conflict. Nonetheless, the position of the current Armenian government, which was for years undermining its relations with Russia, and the hardcore posture of Azerbaijan and Turkey that already felt the flavour of the potential military victory will likely not allow to find a ‘constructive’ solution of the situation. Thus, Ankara and Baku will continue demanding a full surrender of Armenia over the Karabakh question, which the Armenian government (even if it wants to do so) cannot accept because this will lead to the immediate collapse of the Pashinyan regime and the instability inside Armenia itself.
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southfront--2020-10-17--Azerbaijan Hit Armenian Military Hospital Claiming It Was Ammo Depot

On October 17 , the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan released a video of recent airstrikes on the Armenian-held town of Martakert in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
In an official statement , the ministry claimed that the airstrikes hit fuel and ammunition depots of Armenian forces .
Nevertheless , photos from the ground revealed that the target was a military hospital .
According to a report by the France-Press Agency , Azerbaijani airstrikes hit Martakert ’ s military hospital on October 14 .
Sources there told the agency that the airstrikes hit just as some wounded service members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ km away .
The Azerbaijani airstrikes wounded many people inside the hospital .
A number of nearby civilian houses were also damaged as a result of the airstrikes .
The airstrikes may have been carried out by Su-25 warplanes of the Azerbaijani Air Force , which are known to be active over Nagorno-Karabakh .
The aerial attack on Martakert ’ s military hospital amounts to a war crime .
The Azerbaijani MoD ’ s video confirms Baku responsibility for the attack .
The motives of the attack remain unclear .
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On October 17, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan released a video of recent airstrikes on the Armenian-held town of Martakert in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In an official statement, the ministry claimed that the airstrikes hit fuel and ammunition depots of Armenian forces. Nevertheless, photos from the ground revealed that the target was a military hospital.
According to a report by the France-Press Agency, Azerbaijani airstrikes hit Martakert’s military hospital on October 14. Sources there told the agency that the airstrikes hit just as some wounded service members were arriving from the frontlines some 10 km away.
The Azerbaijani airstrikes wounded many people inside the hospital. A number of nearby civilian houses were also damaged as a result of the airstrikes.
The airstrikes may have been carried out by Su-25 warplanes of the Azerbaijani Air Force, which are known to be active over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The aerial attack on Martakert’s military hospital amounts to a war crime. The Azerbaijani MoD’s video confirms Baku responsibility for the attack. The motives of the attack remain unclear.
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southfront--2020-10-17--Russian Woman Murdered In Notorious Al-Hawl Camp In Northeastern Syria

A Russian woman has been murdered in the notorious al-Hawl camp in northeastern Syria , several sources reported on October 17 .
The al-Hawl camp , which is located in eastern al-Hasakah , is hosting 67,000 people , including 40,000 family members of ISIS fighters .
The Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) is running the camp with support of the U.S.-led coalition .
The victim , who was in her third decade , was the wife of an ISIS fighter .
The woman was murdered in the late hours of October 15 .
Multiple hits on her head and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life .
Her identity was not unvealed .
Many of the foreigners being held in al-Hawl are Russian , including dozens of children .
Some of the children there lost their parents during the war on ISIS .
Russia is working with the local authorities in northeastern Syria to evacuate Russian children from al-Hawl .
Moscow announced on October 16 the evacuation of 27 children from the camp .
This was the ninth of such batches .
Earlier this month , the SDF allowed thousands of Syrians to leave the crowded camp in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the situation there is still dangerous .
Some ISIS wives are actively working to implement the terrorist group ’ s laws in the camp .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • ISIS Claimed Responsibility For Attack On Turkish-Backed Militants In Northern Aleppo ( Video ) • 16 Militants Killed In Another Ammunition Depot Explosion In Syria ’ s Greater Idlib ( Video )

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A Russian woman has been murdered in the notorious al-Hawl camp in northeastern Syria, several sources reported on October 17.
The al-Hawl camp, which is located in eastern al-Hasakah, is hosting 67,000 people, including 40,000 family members of ISIS fighters. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is running the camp with support of the U.S.-led coalition.
The victim, who was in her third decade, was the wife of an ISIS fighter. The woman was murdered in the late hours of October 15. Multiple hits on her head and other parts of hear body claimed her life. Her identity was not unvealed.
Many of the foreigners being held in al-Hawl are Russian, including dozens of children. Some of the children there lost their parents during the war on ISIS.
Russia is working with the local authorities in northeastern Syria to evacuate Russian children from al-Hawl. Moscow announced on October 16 the evacuation of 27 children from the camp. This was the ninth of such batches.
Earlier this month, the SDF allowed thousands of Syrians to leave the crowded camp in order to improve security there. However, the situation there is still dangerous. Some ISIS wives are actively working to implement the terrorist group’s laws in the camp.
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southfront--2020-10-17--Azerbaijani Air-Defense Force Shot Down Armenian Su-25 Warplane, Drone

The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan claimed on October 17 that an Armenian Su-25 warplane had been shot down over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
In a statement , the ministry said the warplane was shot down by the Azerbaijani Air Defense Force , without providing any further details .
The Azerbaijani MoD ’ s claims were dismissed by the Press Secretary of the Armenian Ministry of Defense , Shushan Stepanyan .
A few hours after the first announcement , the Azerbaijani MoD claimed an Armenian “ tactical drone ” was “ destroyed ” over Nagorno-Karabakh .
On its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three Azerbaijani drones were shot down on October 17 in the country ’ s airspace and another one was shot down over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
Since the outbreak of the battle in Nagorno-Karabakh , Armenian aerial losses has been limited to a single Su-25 that was shot down by a Turkish F-16 based in Azerbaijan on the 29th of September .
The Armenian Air Force maintains very limited involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh , whose airspace has been , thus far , dominated by the Azerbaijani side .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In Armenian Ballistic Missile Strike On Azerbaijan ’ s Ganja ( Videos )

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The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan claimed on October 17 that an Armenian Su-25 warplane had been shot down over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In a statement, the ministry said the warplane was shot down by the Azerbaijani Air Defense Force, without providing any further details.
The Azerbaijani MoD’s claims were dismissed by the Press Secretary of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, Shushan Stepanyan.
“The statement of the Azerbaijani defense Ministry that a SU-25 plane belonging to the Armenian side was shot down on October 17 is another misinformation,” Stepanyan said.
A few hours after the first announcement, the Azerbaijani MoD claimed an Armenian “tactical drone” was “destroyed” over Nagorno-Karabakh.
On its part, the Armenian MoD claimed that three Azerbaijani drones were shot down on October 17 in the country’s airspace and another one was shot down over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Since the outbreak of the battle in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian aerial losses has been limited to a single Su-25 that was shot down by a Turkish F-16 based in Azerbaijan on the 29th of September.
The Armenian Air Force maintains very limited involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh, whose airspace has been, thus far, dominated by the Azerbaijani side.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Washington Neo-Liberal Globalists Vow To Support Constantinople As ‘Center Of The Greek Orthodox Chu

Washington Neo-Liberal Globalists Vow To Support Constantinople As ‘Center Of The Greek Orthodox Church’

Joe Biden , the candidate from the pro-neo-liberal/globalist part of the elite of the United States , in the upcoming presidential election officially confirmed that the Washington establishment sees the Patriarchate of Constantinople as a useful tool of its neo-liberal agenda and vowed to support it .
Joe Biden Unwaveringly Supports Constantinople As “ Center Of The Greek Orthodox Church , ” Says Campaign Statement ( source ) : Joe Biden is a “ strong voice for religious freedom globally ” and fervent supporter of Constantinople ’ s “ role as the center of the Greek Orthodox Church ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Greek Orthodox Church , according to a new press release from the Biden-Harris campaign .
The statement , “ Joe Biden ’ s vision for Greek Americans and U.S.-Greece Relations , ” highlights both the presidential hopeful ’ s past achievements on Greek issues both at home and abroad and his promises for the future if elected president .
Regarding religious issues , the release emphasizes Biden ’ s “ unwavering support ” for the Patriarchate of Constantinople : Joe has long been a strong supporter of the Ecumenical Patriarchate , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Patriarchate to function in its role as the center of the Greek Orthodox Church .
He treasures his visit in 2011 to the Patriarchate and each of his meetings with His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew .
He has called on Turkey to permit the reopening of the Halki Seminary and criticized the recent decision of the Turkish government to convert the Hagia Sophia into a mosque .
Biden ’ s support for Pat .
Bartholomew and the Patriarchate also included support for their project of creating the schismatic “ Orthodox Church @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement also notes that Biden was the recipient of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese ’ s Athenagoras Human Rights Award in 2015 .
Vice President Biden promises to “ continue to be a strong voice for religious freedom globally , including the rights of the Greek Orthodox Church.
” Archbishop Elpidophoros of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese prayed for Biden ’ s presidency in August during the Democratic National Convention , though he declined to offer a blessing at the Republican National Convention .
The statement also refers to Biden ’ s position on Greek @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Twitter Refuses To Unlock NYPost Account Unless Paper Deletes Tweets About Hunter Biden • The Stormtroops Of Regime Change And Counter-Revolution

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Joe Biden, the candidate from the pro-neo-liberal/globalist part of the elite of the United States, in the upcoming presidential election officially confirmed that the Washington establishment sees the Patriarchate of Constantinople as a useful tool of its neo-liberal agenda and vowed to support it.
Joe Biden Unwaveringly Supports Constantinople As “Center Of The Greek Orthodox Church,” Says Campaign Statement (source):
Joe Biden is a “strong voice for religious freedom globally” and fervent supporter of Constantinople’s “role as the center of the Greek Orthodox Church” and will especially fight for the religious freedom of the Greek Orthodox Church, according to a new press release from the Biden-Harris campaign.
The statement, “Joe Biden’s vision for Greek Americans and U.S.-Greece Relations,” highlights both the presidential hopeful’s past achievements on Greek issues both at home and abroad and his promises for the future if elected president.
Regarding religious issues, the release emphasizes Biden’s “unwavering support” for the Patriarchate of Constantinople:
Joe has long been a strong supporter of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and given unwavering support for the ability of the Patriarchate to function in its role as the center of the Greek Orthodox Church. He treasures his visit in 2011 to the Patriarchate and each of his meetings with His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. He has called on Turkey to permit the reopening of the Halki Seminary and criticized the recent decision of the Turkish government to convert the Hagia Sophia into a mosque.
Biden’s support for Pat. Bartholomew and the Patriarchate also included support for their project of creating the schismatic “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” in 2018.
The statement also notes that Biden was the recipient of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese’s Athenagoras Human Rights Award in 2015.
Vice President Biden promises to “continue to be a strong voice for religious freedom globally, including the rights of the Greek Orthodox Church.”
Archbishop Elpidophoros of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese prayed for Biden’s presidency in August during the Democratic National Convention, though he declined to offer a blessing at the Republican National Convention.
The statement also refers to Biden’s position on Greek economic issues and the current tensions with Turkey.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Turkish Forces Are Preparing To Withdraw From Hama Post Besieged By Syrian Army – Reports

Turkish forces are preparing to withdraw from an observation posts in northwestern Syria , al-Watan Online reported on October 18 .
Mohammed Fadi al-Saadoun , charge d ’ affaires of Idlib governorate , told al-Watan Online that Turkish forces will withdraw from a post besieged by government forces within 48 hours .
The observation post is located next to the town of Murak in the northern countryside of Hama .
The post was established in April of 2018 .
Syrian government forces besieged it in August 2019 .
Several other posts are under a similar siege .
Pro-government activists shared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the removal of some equipment and fortifications by Turkish forces .
The al-Moharar Media , a news outlet affiliated with the Turkish-backed Sham Legion , confirmed that Turkish forces were making preparations to withdraw from Murak post .
In September , Turkey refused a Russian request to lower the number of its posts in the Syrian region of Greater Idlib .
The refusal led to some tension with Russia .
Turkish forces maintain more than 60 posts throughout Greater Idlib .
Thousands of troops and dozens of battle tanks , howitzers , rocket @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these posts , which are supposed to “ observe ” the ceasefire in the region .
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Turkish forces are preparing to withdraw from an observation posts in northwestern Syria, al-Watan Online reported on October 18.
Mohammed Fadi al-Saadoun, charge d’affaires of Idlib governorate, told al-Watan Online that Turkish forces will withdraw from a post besieged by government forces within 48 hours.
“We have information that Turkish occupation forces are preparing to withdraw from an observation post that’s besieged by the Syrian military,” al-Saadoun said, without providing any further details.
The observation post is located next to the town of Murak in the northern countryside of Hama. The post was established in April of 2018. Syrian government forces besieged it in August 2019. Several other posts are under a similar siege.
Pro-government activists shared recent photos of the observation post showing the removal of some equipment and fortifications by Turkish forces.
نقطة الإحتلال التركية بمدينة مورك تقوم بتفكيك المحارس وألواح التوتة والتجهيزات وكل شيء جلبته معها .
روحة بلا رجعة ، الله لا يردكم pic.twitter.com/RBic3lKoFT — عمر رحمون (@Rahmon83) October 18, 2020
The al-Moharar Media, a news outlet affiliated with the Turkish-backed Sham Legion, confirmed that Turkish forces were making preparations to withdraw from Murak post.
In September, Turkey refused a Russian request to lower the number of its posts in the Syrian region of Greater Idlib. The refusal led to some tension with Russia.
Turkish forces maintain more than 60 posts throughout Greater Idlib. Thousands of troops and dozens of battle tanks, howitzers, rocket launchers and air-defense systems are deployed in these posts, which are supposed to “observe” the ceasefire in the region.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Map Comparsion: Progress Of Azerbaijani Advance In Nagorno-Karabakh Through 2 Ceasefires

Click to see the full-size image These maps provides a general look at the progress of the Azerbaijani advance in @ @ @ @ @ start of the war with Armenia on September 27 and through two ‘ humanitarian ceasefires @ @ @ @ @ on October 10 and the second one on October 18 ) that did not put @ @ @ @ @ .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Azerbaijan Continues Its Advance On Armenian Positions In @ @ @ @ @ ( Map Update ) • New ‘ Humanitarian Ceasefire ’ And Prospects Of Azerbaijani-Armenian War

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These maps provides a general look at the progress of the Azerbaijani advance in the Nagorno-Karabakh region since the start of the war with Armenia on September 27 and through two ‘humanitarian ceasefires’ (the first one on October 10 and the second one on October 18) that did not put an end to military hostilities.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Azerbaijani Forces Captured Large Armenian Base In Nagorno-Karabakh, Forced Armenian Troops To Retre

Azerbaijani Forces Captured Large Armenian Base In Nagorno-Karabakh, Forced Armenian Troops To Retreat (Videos)

The Azerbaijani Armed Forces continue to advance in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh despite the new humanitarian ceasefire that was announced on October 17 .
On October 18 , the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan released a video showing a large base that was recently captured from Armenian forces .
The base , which is located in the district of Fizuli , was abandoned in a hurry .
Armenian troops left behind loads of weapons and equipment , including battle tanks , armored vehicles , howitzers and dozens of anti-tank guided missiles .
The Azerbaijani MoD also shared a video showing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an unspecified part of Nagorno-Karabakh .
The posts were captured by Azerbaijani troops .
Meanwhile , the Ministry of Defense of Armenia shared a video documenting a large attack by Azerbaijani troops early on October 18 .
The attack was launched a few hours after the new ceasefire .
The new humanitarian ceasefire appears to be a failure .
Azerbaijan is clearly unwilling to halt its military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh .
Armenian forces are making immense effort to hold onto their positions .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Azerbaijan Continues Its Advance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Humanitarian Ceasefire ( Map Update )

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The Azerbaijani Armed Forces continue to advance in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh despite the new humanitarian ceasefire that was announced on October 17.
On October 18, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan released a video showing a large base that was recently captured from Armenian forces. The base, which is located in the district of Fizuli, was abandoned in a hurry.
Armenian troops left behind loads of weapons and equipment, including battle tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers and dozens of anti-tank guided missiles.
The Azerbaijani MoD also shared a video showing Armenian Special Forces fleeing their posts in an unspecified part of Nagorno-Karabakh. The posts were captured by Azerbaijani troops.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense of Armenia shared a video documenting a large attack by Azerbaijani troops early on October 18. The attack was launched a few hours after the new ceasefire.
Video surveillance devices of the Artsakh Defense Army recorded the exact location and time of how the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of the Armenian positions in the early morning hours of October 18, violating the agreement for ceasefire. pic.twitter.com/XjSCvq6tle — Shushan Stepanyan (@ShStepanyan) October 18, 2020
The new humanitarian ceasefire appears to be a failure. Azerbaijan is clearly unwilling to halt its military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian forces are making immense effort to hold onto their positions.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Your Contribution Is Vital To Keep SouthFront Alive

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southfront--2020-10-18--Houthis Repel Advance Of Saudi Proxies In Yemen’s Sawrah Area (Video, Map)

Forces of the Ansar Allah movement ( also known as the Houthis ) have repelled an attack of Saudi proxies @ @ @ @ @ valley in Yemen ’ s Sarwah region .
The Houthi media wing also released the @ @ @ @ @ the clashes , including captured weapons and bodies of killed Saudi-backed fighters .
Meawnhile , @ @ @ @ @ other parts of Yemen : • Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted an airstrike on the Majzar @ @ @ @ @ and Coordination Officers ’ Operations Room ( loyal to Ansar Allah ) reported 127 ceasefire @ @ @ @ @ past 24 hours ; • The second stage of Ansar Allah and Saudi coalition POW @ @ @ @ @ , Ansar Allah chief negotiator confirmed release of 671 POWs .
MORE ON THE TOPIC @

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Forces of the Ansar Allah movement (also known as the Houthis) have repelled an attack of Saudi proxies in the al-Rabou’a valley in Yemen’s Sarwah region. The Houthi media wing also released the video showing the impact of the clashes, including captured weapons and bodies of killed Saudi-backed fighters.
Meawnhile, the situation remains tense in other parts of Yemen:
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 2 airstrikes on the Haradh area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 3 airstrikes on the Rahbah area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted an airstrike on the Majzar area;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes conducted 2 airstrikes on the Kitaf area;
The Liaison and Coordination Officers’ Operations Room (loyal to Ansar Allah) reported 127 ceasefire violations in al-Hudaydah over the past 24 hours;
A big explosion rocked the Ruwayk camp north of Marib;
The second stage of Ansar Allah and Saudi coalition POW exchange finished. Muhammad Abdulsalam, Ansar Allah chief negotiator confirmed release of 671 POWs.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Azerbaijan Continues Its Advance On Armenian Positions In Karabah Despite Second Humanitarian Ceasef

Azerbaijan Continues Its Advance On Armenian Positions In Karabah Despite Second Humanitarian Ceasefire (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image Forces of the Azerbaijani military supported by Syrian militatns and Turkish specialists continue their offensive in the southern part of the Nagorno-Karabakh region despite the start of the second ‘ humanitarian ceasefire ’ there .
• A humanitarian ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan entered force on October 18 .
Both sides immediately accused each others of violating it .
• According to Armenia , at 7:20 , October 18 , the Azerbaijan military launched a military operation in the southern direction in Khudaferin Reservoir in order to capture it .
4 Azerbaijani battle tanks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Azerbaijan , on October 18 , Armenian forces opened fire at positions of the Azerbaijani Army in Gadabay and Tovuz regions from Chambarak and Berd regions of Armenia .
• According to Azerbaijan MoD , on October 17 , at around 11:11 , an Armenian Su-25 plane was shot down by Azerbaijan air defense forces .
• According to Azerbaijan MoD , its forces destroyed 2 missile guiding stations of the S-300 , 5 T-72 battle tanks , 3 BM-21 “ Grad ” MLRS , 2 “ Smerch ” MLRS , 1 D-20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6 auto vehicles .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • New ‘ Humanitarian Ceasefire ’ And Prospects Of Azerbaijani-Armenian War

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Forces of the Azerbaijani military supported by Syrian militatns and Turkish specialists continue their offensive in the southern part of the Nagorno-Karabakh region despite the start of the second ‘humanitarian ceasefire’ there.
A humanitarian ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan entered force on October 18. Both sides immediately accused each others of violating it.
According to Armenia, at 7:20, October 18, the Azerbaijan military launched a military operation in the southern direction in Khudaferin Reservoir in order to capture it. 4 Azerbaijani battle tanks were reportedly destroyed.
According to Azerbaijan, on October 18, Armenian forces opened fire at positions of the Azerbaijani Army in Gadabay and Tovuz regions from Chambarak and Berd regions of Armenia.
According to Azerbaijan MoD, on October 17, at around 11:11, an Armenian Su-25 plane was shot down by Azerbaijan air defense forces.
According to Azerbaijan MoD, its forces destroyed 2 missile guiding stations of the S-300, 5 T-72 battle tanks, 3 BM-21 “Grad” MLRS, 2 “Smerch” MLRS, 1 D-20 gun-howitzer, 1 KS-19 anti-aircraft gun and 6 auto vehicles.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Twitter Refuses To Unlock NYPost Account Unless Paper Deletes Tweets About Hunter Biden

By immediately condemning the Hunter Biden emails and photos published by the New York Post as the work of Russian hackers colluding with Rudy Giuliani , the MSM destroyed any credibility it might have had .
As we pointed out earlier , more evidence has emerged to support Giuliani ’ s version of events – namely , that he was given a copy of the laptop ’ s hard drive and all of its contents by the owner of a Delaware computer-repair shop .
But despite apologizing and acknowledging “ straight up blocking of URLs was wrong ” , Twitter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ punishing the New York Post , because three days after the account was initially frozen , the New York Post hasn ’ t been able to tweet , and according to a NY Post report , Twitter has frozen the New York Post ’ s account until the paper ’ s social media managers agree to delete six tweets about Hunter Biden .
“ Anyone who looks at The Post ’ s Twitter feed can ’ t even see the tweets about the Biden stories , which have been replaced by messages saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ available , ' ” the Post wrote on Friday .
Twitter previously said the Post ’ s Hunter Biden stories violated the website ’ s Hacked Media Policy which prohibits the display of “ hacked ” information , an allegation that the Post called “ baseless.
” However , on Friday , Twitter updated that policy , saying it will start labeling content that violates its rules rather than remove it altogether “ unless it is directly shared by hackers or those acting in concert with them.
” Confusingly , though , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t apply retroactively , meaning that the NYP still must delete the tweets if it wants to use its account again , even though readers can ’ t even see them .

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Originally appeared at ZeroHedge
By immediately condemning the Hunter Biden emails and photos published by the New York Post as the work of Russian hackers colluding with Rudy Giuliani, the MSM destroyed any credibility it might have had. As we pointed out earlier, more evidence has emerged to support Giuliani’s version of events – namely, that he was given a copy of the laptop’s hard drive and all of its contents by the owner of a Delaware computer-repair shop.
But despite apologizing and acknowledging “straight up blocking of URLs was wrong”, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey has apparently not finished punishing the New York Post, because three days after the account was initially frozen, the New York Post hasn’t been able to tweet, and according to a NY Post report, Twitter has frozen the New York Post’s account until the paper’s social media managers agree to delete six tweets about Hunter Biden.
Day 3 @nypost account access has not been reinstated. — Emma-Jo Morris (@EmmaJoNYC) October 17, 2020
“Anyone who looks at The Post’s Twitter feed can’t even see the tweets about the Biden stories, which have been replaced by messages saying, ‘This Tweet is no longer available,'” the Post wrote on Friday.
Twitter previously said the Post’s Hunter Biden stories violated the website’s Hacked Media Policy which prohibits the display of “hacked” information, an allegation that the Post called “baseless.” However, on Friday, Twitter updated that policy, saying it will start labeling content that violates its rules rather than remove it altogether “unless it is directly shared by hackers or those acting in concert with them.”
Confusingly, though, the company said that these changes wouldn’t apply retroactively, meaning that the NYP still must delete the tweets if it wants to use its account again, even though readers can’t even see them.
Twitter confirmed in an interview with Fox Business that the NY Post “has been informed what is necessary to unlock their account.” Facebook, meanwhile, is temporarily restricting circulation of the story until an independent team of fact checkers has had time to investigate the claims, and certify they are real. While social media has been rife with speculation, in the days since the first NYP story was published, nobody has offered anything in the way of evidence – however circumstantial or unconvincing – that the materials were stolen by hackers. Beyond James Clapper’s ‘professional opinion’, the MSM has nothing to support these claims. “To me, this is just classic textbook Soviet Russian tradecraft at work,” former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says as authorities are investigating if recently published emails are tied to a Russian disinformation effort targeting Biden. https://t.co/shyMNnJ7Yr pic.twitter.com/GFSeIWXeY4 — CNN (@CNN) October 17, 2020
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southfront--2020-10-18--Britannic Impunity: The UK Overseas Operations Bill

It was praised by Michael Clarke , former Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute , as “ clear and entire laudable ” – at least up to a point .
The UK Overseas Operations ( Service Personnel and Veterans ) Bill would “ give [ British ] troops serving overseas much-needed extra protection against fraudulent or frivolous claims against them of criminal behaviour.
” It was also part of a commitment made by the Conservatives that British personnel would be padded with more legal protection against the nasty designs of future litigants .
Veterans minister Johnny Mercer had his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not particularly convincing .
“ This legislation is not about providing an amnesty or putting troops above the law but protecting them from lawyers intent on rewriting history to line their own pockets.
” For Mercer , Britannia is exceptional , a cut above the rest , suggesting , in the lingering wisdom of British imperialism , that they are just a bit more exceptional in hypocrisy than others .
The Ministry of Defence has been feathering grounds for such changes arguing that unnecessary claims have been made against its personnel .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations in Afghanistan and Iraq .
To this can be added 1,400 judicial review claims for investigations and compensations on the basis that human rights have been violated .
Of these , 70 percent assessed by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team were dismissed as having no case to answer .
Instances such as those of solicitor Phil Shiner are cited , that ever zealous creature who was found guilty on five counts of dishonesty by the Solicitor ’ s Disciplinary Tribunal in February 2017 for tampering with evidence submitted to the Al-Sweady inquiry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shiner was accused of showing a “ clear disregard for the rules ” in terms of his actions , having circulated “ deliberate and calculated lies ” regarding alleged atrocities by British soldiers after the commencement of the Iraq War .
The Bill has a particularly odious provision that serves to impose a five year time limit on prosecuting crimes that span offences committed by UK personnel while serving in overseas theatres , including a whole range of reprehensible offences , potentially including genocide , crimes against humanity and war crimes .
Operations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endeavours will also be covered .
What is being proposed is , in effect , a statute of limitations on grave criminality , a presumption against prosecution .
Out with such solemn declarations that genocide is so reprehensible a crime as to defy time itself .
In with more practical , paperwork limitations shielding abuses from legal review .
This would be part of what is described as a “ triple lock ” against unwanted suits against UK military personnel , the two other features involving a range of considerations prosecutors would have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against pursuing a case , and a requirement to obtain the consent of the Attorney General , or Advocate General in Northern Ireland , before commencing any prosecution .
The Bill would also impose a duty on the government to consider derogating from the European Convention on Human Rights regarding significant overseas military operations .
To round it all off , Part II of the Bill also adds a time bar on civil claims against the Ministry of Defence by both survivors of torture and UK soldiers themselves who might have a grievance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be barred by the time limit despite being unlawfully detained or impeded in bringing forth their actions .
Should it become law , the Bill will jar with obligations arising under the Geneva Conventions .
The Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 is a stand out on that score .
A range of other international legal instruments also risk being breached , including the Convention Against Torture .
As the legal action charity Reprieve argues in its submission to parliament on the Bill , “ This risks effectively decriminalising torture when committed by UK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The organisation even notes that the proposed law would run counter to a 300 year old tradition stretching back to the Long Parliament ’ s Abolition of the Star Chamber in 1640 .
The legal establishment is also concerned .
In the sober words of the Law Society , “ the proposal to introduce a presumption against prosecution amounts to a quasi-statute of limitations .
Introducing a time limit risks creating impunity for serious crimes and the proposal would be an exception to the normal law for a category of criminal matters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Another submission on the Bill , written by Samuel Beswick of the University of British Columbia , points to a potential violation of the Equality Principle found deep in the immemorial foundations of UK constitutional law , spectral as it is : “ that everyone is equally subjected to the ordinary law of the land : that the Crown and government officers do not benefit from more favourable rules than apply to the British people generally.
” Such concerns have not been the preserve of legal bleeding hearts and anti-torture charities .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expressed deep reservations .
In the middle of the year , he wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence noting “ significant misgivings ” about a bill “ ill-conceived ” and dangerous in potentially bringing “ the UK armed forces into disrepute ” .
As for David Greene , vice president of the Law Society , something more flame-on-the-hill was at stake , and he had little desire for snuffing it out .
“ Our armed forces are rightly known across the world for their courage and discipline .
Proposals to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including murder and torture – by service personnel outside the UK would undermine this well-deserved reputation and could break international law.
” The Bill is a classic , long overdue unmasking of the impunity that is British military power .
More than a Freudian slip , it is an elucidating admission .
In praising the standards of British military professionalism , Greene ignores the country ’ s thin record in prosecuting its own nationals for crimes committed in foreign theatres .
Clive Baldwin , Senior Legal Adviser to Human Rights Watch , points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reginald Dyer as a case in point .
The killing of hundreds of unarmed men , women and children on April 13 , 1919 at Jallianwala Bagh did little to even provoke an apology from the UK .
The most severe rebuke Dyer faced was enforced retirement .
“ You might want to rewrite history , but you can ’ t , ” sniffed the High Commissioner to India , Dominic Asquith , during commemoration proceedings held last year .
The deployment of torture in Kenya through the 1950s in response to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stirred the prosecutor ’ s brief .
In 2013 , UK Foreign Secretary William Hague recognised in the Commons “ that Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration.
” Sincere regrets were offered , including £19.9m in compensation .
But defiant to the last , Hague insisted that the UK had no legal responsibility for the actions of the colonial administration .
Britannic contempt is deathless .
In focusing on such exceptional instances of manipulation as Shiner , the Bill is a riposte @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in such theatres as Iraq .
Despite public inquiries and court rulings finding British forces culpable for abusing detainees , in some cases killing them , few prosecutions have been filed .
The death of Iraqi citizen Baha Mousa in September 2003 in Basra , the result of 93 surface injuries , led to an inquiry and a smattering of Court Martial proceedings .
It also saw the first open admission by a British soldier to committing a war crime , though Corporal Donald Payne denied manslaughter and perverting the course of justice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Queen ’ s Lancashire Regiment were ultimately acquitted .
Payne was jailed for one year .
A meagre return .
With the passage of this Bill , Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s Global Britain will abandon any pretence to Queensberry rules , or rules of any sort .
The jungle is there for the taking , and other powers in the jungle will finally be able to point this out .
Clarke , sounding sorrowful , uses the standard understatement : that this Bill “ opens up some intriguing possibilities for our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimacy for their blatantly illegal behaviour.
” It might be a suitable epitaph for British power for long stretches it has been exercised : legitimacy claimed for blatant illegality .
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College , Cambridge .
He lectures at RMIT University , Melbourne .
Email : bkampmark @ gmail.com MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Boris Johnson At Sea : Coronavirus Confusion In The UK

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Submitted by Dr. Binoy Kampmark
It was praised by Michael Clarke, former Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute, as “clear and entire laudable” – at least up to a point. The UK Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill would “give [British] troops serving overseas much-needed extra protection against fraudulent or frivolous claims against them of criminal behaviour.” It was also part of a commitment made by the Conservatives that British personnel would be padded with more legal protection against the nasty designs of future litigants.
Veterans minister Johnny Mercer had his lines in order, and they were not particularly convincing. “This legislation is not about providing an amnesty or putting troops above the law but protecting them from lawyers intent on rewriting history to line their own pockets.” For Mercer, Britannia is exceptional, a cut above the rest, suggesting, in the lingering wisdom of British imperialism, that they are just a bit more exceptional in hypocrisy than others.
The Ministry of Defence has been feathering grounds for such changes arguing that unnecessary claims have been made against its personnel. They include compensation claims for unlawful detention regarding operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. To this can be added 1,400 judicial review claims for investigations and compensations on the basis that human rights have been violated. Of these, 70 percent assessed by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team were dismissed as having no case to answer.
Instances such as those of solicitor Phil Shiner are cited, that ever zealous creature who was found guilty on five counts of dishonesty by the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal in February 2017 for tampering with evidence submitted to the Al-Sweady inquiry into allegations of atrocities in Iraq. Shiner was accused of showing a “clear disregard for the rules” in terms of his actions, having circulated “deliberate and calculated lies” regarding alleged atrocities by British soldiers after the commencement of the Iraq War.
The Bill has a particularly odious provision that serves to impose a five year time limit on prosecuting crimes that span offences committed by UK personnel while serving in overseas theatres, including a whole range of reprehensible offences, potentially including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Operations “dealing with terrorism” and peacekeeping endeavours will also be covered.
What is being proposed is, in effect, a statute of limitations on grave criminality, a presumption against prosecution. Out with such solemn declarations that genocide is so reprehensible a crime as to defy time itself. In with more practical, paperwork limitations shielding abuses from legal review.
This would be part of what is described as a “triple lock” against unwanted suits against UK military personnel, the two other features involving a range of considerations prosecutors would have to give “particular weight to” against pursuing a case, and a requirement to obtain the consent of the Attorney General, or Advocate General in Northern Ireland, before commencing any prosecution. The Bill would also impose a duty on the government to consider derogating from the European Convention on Human Rights regarding significant overseas military operations.
To round it all off, Part II of the Bill also adds a time bar on civil claims against the Ministry of Defence by both survivors of torture and UK soldiers themselves who might have a grievance with their employer. Claimants will also be barred by the time limit despite being unlawfully detained or impeded in bringing forth their actions.
Should it become law, the Bill will jar with obligations arising under the Geneva Conventions. The Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 is a stand out on that score. A range of other international legal instruments also risk being breached, including the Convention Against Torture. As the legal action charity Reprieve argues in its submission to parliament on the Bill, “This risks effectively decriminalising torture when committed by UK forces overseas more than five years ago.” The organisation even notes that the proposed law would run counter to a 300 year old tradition stretching back to the Long Parliament’s Abolition of the Star Chamber in 1640.
The legal establishment is also concerned. In the sober words of the Law Society, “the proposal to introduce a presumption against prosecution amounts to a quasi-statute of limitations. Introducing a time limit risks creating impunity for serious crimes and the proposal would be an exception to the normal law for a category of criminal matters that does not exist anywhere else.”
Another submission on the Bill, written by Samuel Beswick of the University of British Columbia, points to a potential violation of the Equality Principle found deep in the immemorial foundations of UK constitutional law, spectral as it is: “that everyone is equally subjected to the ordinary law of the land: that the Crown and government officers do not benefit from more favourable rules than apply to the British people generally.”
Such concerns have not been the preserve of legal bleeding hearts and anti-torture charities. The Judge Advocate General Jeff Blankett has also expressed deep reservations. In the middle of the year, he wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence noting “significant misgivings” about a bill “ill-conceived” and dangerous in potentially bringing “the UK armed forces into disrepute”.
As for David Greene, vice president of the Law Society, something more flame-on-the-hill was at stake, and he had little desire for snuffing it out. “Our armed forces are rightly known across the world for their courage and discipline. Proposals to prevent the prosecution of alleged serious offences – including murder and torture – by service personnel outside the UK would undermine this well-deserved reputation and could break international law.”
The Bill is a classic, long overdue unmasking of the impunity that is British military power. More than a Freudian slip, it is an elucidating admission. In praising the standards of British military professionalism, Greene ignores the country’s thin record in prosecuting its own nationals for crimes committed in foreign theatres. Clive Baldwin, Senior Legal Adviser to Human Rights Watch, points to the butcher of Amritsar Brigadier General Reginald Dyer as a case in point. The killing of hundreds of unarmed men, women and children on April 13, 1919 at Jallianwala Bagh did little to even provoke an apology from the UK. The most severe rebuke Dyer faced was enforced retirement. “You might want to rewrite history, but you can’t,” sniffed the High Commissioner to India, Dominic Asquith, during commemoration proceedings held last year.
The deployment of torture in Kenya through the 1950s in response to the Mau Mau revolt against British rule barely stirred the prosecutor’s brief. In 2013, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague recognised in the Commons “that Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration.” Sincere regrets were offered, including £19.9m in compensation. But defiant to the last, Hague insisted that the UK had no legal responsibility for the actions of the colonial administration. Britannic contempt is deathless.
In focusing on such exceptional instances of manipulation as Shiner, the Bill is a riposte to British responsibility for more recent abuses in such theatres as Iraq. Despite public inquiries and court rulings finding British forces culpable for abusing detainees, in some cases killing them, few prosecutions have been filed. The death of Iraqi citizen Baha Mousa in September 2003 in Basra, the result of 93 surface injuries, led to an inquiry and a smattering of Court Martial proceedings. It also saw the first open admission by a British soldier to committing a war crime, though Corporal Donald Payne denied manslaughter and perverting the course of justice. Six other colleagues from the 1 Queen’s Lancashire Regiment were ultimately acquitted. Payne was jailed for one year. A meagre return.
With the passage of this Bill, Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Global Britain will abandon any pretence to Queensberry rules, or rules of any sort. The jungle is there for the taking, and other powers in the jungle will finally be able to point this out. Clarke, sounding sorrowful, uses the standard understatement: that this Bill “opens up some intriguing possibilities for our adversaries, who love to claim international legitimacy for their blatantly illegal behaviour.” It might be a suitable epitaph for British power for long stretches it has been exercised: legitimacy claimed for blatant illegality.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com
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southfront--2020-10-18--Military Situation In Syria On October 18, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • An Syrian Arab @ @ @ @ @ was killed after being shot and killed by unidentified persons east of Daraa ; • @ @ @ @ @ a military patrol around the village of Ain Diwar near the city of Malikiyah ; @ @ @ @ @ the car belonging to the judge of the Military Court of Turkish proxies in Azaz @ @ @ @ @ were injured as a result of a bomb attack in Himo village ; • Russian @ @ @ @ @ HQs of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in southwestern Idlib .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • @ @ @ @ @ On Turkish-Backed Militants In Northern Aleppo ( Video )

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:
An Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldier was killed after being shot and killed by unidentified persons east of Daraa;
Russian Military Police carried out a military patrol around the village of Ain Diwar near the city of Malikiyah;
A bomb exploded in the car belonging to the judge of the Military Court of Turkish proxies in Azaz city;
Turkish-backed forces shelled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in Maraanaz and Malikiyah villages;
SAA artillery shelled Turkish-backed forces positons in Baylun and Barah villages;
2 people were injured as a result of a bomb attack in Himo village;
Russian airstrikes targeted training camps and HQs of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in southwestern Idlib.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Coast Guard Forces Of Southern Korea

Coast Guard Forces Of Southern Korea

Written by Lieutenant Colonel O. Perov ; Originally appeared at Foreign Military Review 2020 # 1 , translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront The Coast Guard ( CG ) of the Republic of Korea was established in 1953 and until 2014 was an independent agency called the National Maritime Police Department .
In October 2014 , by decree of the President of the Republic of Korea , it was transferred to the Public Security Agency .
The reason for this decision was the extremely ineffective actions of the management units during the rescue operation in the crash of the ferry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led to the death of more than 300 people .
In 2017 , the CG became a separate department within the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries .
The Coast Guard is designed to protect the interests of the state in the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone of the country , to combat illegal migration , smuggling , piracy and poaching , as well as to conduct search and rescue operations at sea .
In peacetime the department is subordinate to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries , in wartime it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chief of Staff ( Commander ) of the naval forces of the Republic of Korea The CG consists of more than 11 thousand people .
The Coast Guard performs the following main tasks : • monitoring the compliance with national legislation and international agreements on the law of the sea , as well as the situation in the waters under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea ; • protection of the country ’ s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf , island territories disputed by Japan and China in the Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ( WMD ) and their production technologies ; • monitoring the implementation of the sanction ’ s regime against the DPRK , as well as ensuring the safety of North Korean refugees when they attempt to cross into the ROK by sea ; • participation in the organisation of anti-amphibious and anti-sabotage defence of critical infrastructure , protection of sea communications and communication lines ; • removal of natural disasters results and use of WMD by the enemy .
The Coast Guard while performing these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police and customs services .
Training of personnel of the department is conducted at the CG academy in the city of Yeosu .
The head of the Directorate of the Coast Guard of Korea , is the Commissioner-General with the rank of Deputy Minister ( presently Cho Hyun Bay ) .
Organisationally , the department consists of the headquarters ( the main headquarters ) , located in Incheon .
It is responsible for the departments ( headquarters ) of the Coast Guard of five sea zones : Central ( Incheon ) , Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , Southern ( Busan ) and Jeju ( Jeju ) , the CG Academy with its research centre , the central search and rescue unit , and the centre for material and technical services .
Each zone consists of two to five sea areas ( Incheon , Seocheon , Taean , and Boryeong in the Central zone , Yeosu , Wando , Mokpo , Kunsan and Buan , in the West ; Sokcho , Donghae , Pohang and Uljin in the East ; Ulsan , Busan , Changwon and Tongyeong in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sea area of Jeju ) , control vessel traffic , aircraft group , and a detachment of special purpose .
In addition , the structure of the Central sea zone includes a permanent ship connection in the north-western sea area .
In total , the South Korean CG has 19 sea areas and about 100 coastal posts .
Tasks in the sea areas are assigned to the CG departments , which are subordinate to the ships and boats of the Coast Guard , as well as coastal posts equipped with radar and visual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CG operational zone includes the territorial and internal waters of the state , the South Korean exclusive economic zone , as well as areas of special attention near the border with the DPRK in the Yellow and Japan Seas , where armed clashes with the North Korean patrol forces are possible .
In addition , areas of joint fishing with neighboring states are established within this zone , the demarcation of which is regulated by bilateral treaties .
When searching and rescuing at sea , the ROK Coast Guard can operate in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parts of the Yellow and Japan Seas , as well as the Korean Strait .
The Coast Guard forces are armed with 35 large and about 40 medium patrol ships , up to 110 patrol boats , about 140 special vessels , 6 patrol aircraft and up to 20 helicopters .
The CG General Staff is currently considering the possibility of reorganising the agency from the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and reassigning it to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea as a separate agency .
At the same time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organisational structure of the central office with a reduction in the number of its divisions and the number of staff .
By 2020 , it is planned to merge the aviation groups of the Central and Western sea zones .
In addition , it is planned to reduce the number of air patrol routes of the South Korean exclusive economic zone from eight to six .
In the medium term ( up to 2022 ) in accordance with the concept “ Military Reform 2.0 ” the possibility of gradually transferring the Coast Guard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas of the country ground forces associated with the organisation of anti-landing defence of the coast of Korea and electronic control of surface conditions on the perimeter of the maritime borders of the state is being considered .
By 2020 , two new diving support vessels ( type D-1 ) are planned to be transferred to the West and East groups of the Central search and rescue unit of the CG .
It is assumed that they will be able to provide diving operations at a depth of up to 50 m for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is planned to equip Coast Guard units with two KUH-1P “ Surion ” multi-purpose helicopters , which will strengthen the existing aviation group .
In addition , it is planned to adopt an unmanned aerial vehicle of national development with rotary propellers ( tiltrotor ) , which has a flight range of 800 km and a duration of 4 hours in the air .
Its task is to perform the functions of monitoring and marine search .
By 2021 , it is planned to complete the creation of an automated system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by shipping control centres .
The programme budget is $ 10 million .
In peacetime , the CG plays a significant role in ensuring the country ’ s maritime security , monitoring compliance by neighboring states with international treaties and UN Security Council resolutions within the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Korea , and in wartime , it participates in the Navy , protecting the sea coast , defending naval bases and ports of the country .
According to South Korean experts , an increase in the department ’ s ship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is likely that a new organisational reform of the department will be prepared , including its transfer to the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea , while simultaneously expanding the functions of ensuring the state ’ s border protection .
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Written by Lieutenant Colonel O. Perov; Originally appeared at Foreign Military Review 2020 #1, translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront
The Coast Guard (CG) of the Republic of Korea was established in 1953 and until 2014 was an independent agency called the National Maritime Police Department. In October 2014, by decree of the President of the Republic of Korea, it was transferred to the Public Security Agency.
The reason for this decision was the extremely ineffective actions of the management units during the rescue operation in the crash of the ferry Sevol (April 2014), which led to the death of more than 300 people. In 2017, the CG became a separate department within the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.
The Coast Guard is designed to protect the interests of the state in the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone of the country, to combat illegal migration, smuggling, piracy and poaching, as well as to conduct search and rescue operations at sea.
In peacetime the department is subordinate to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, in wartime it is transferred to the operational management of the Chief of Staff (Commander) of the naval forces of the Republic of Korea
The CG consists of more than 11 thousand people.
The Coast Guard performs the following main tasks:
monitoring the compliance with national legislation and international agreements on the law of the sea, as well as the situation in the waters under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea;
conducting search and rescue operations at sea;
protection of the country’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, island territories disputed by Japan and China in the Japan and East China Seas;
combating the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their production technologies;
ensuring the safety of fishing;
the conduct of oceanographic research;
monitoring the implementation of the sanction’s regime against the DPRK, as well as ensuring the safety of North Korean refugees when they attempt to cross into the ROK by sea;
participation in the organisation of anti-amphibious and anti-sabotage defence of critical infrastructure, protection of sea communications and communication lines;
removal of natural disasters results and use of WMD by the enemy.
The Coast Guard while performing these tasks works closely with the Navy, police and customs services.
Training of personnel of the department is conducted at the CG academy in the city of Yeosu.
The head of the Directorate of the Coast Guard of Korea, is the Commissioner-General with the rank of Deputy Minister (presently Cho Hyun Bay).
Organisationally, the department consists of the headquarters (the main headquarters), located in Incheon. It is responsible for the departments (headquarters) of the Coast Guard of five sea zones: Central (Incheon), Western (Mokpo), Eastern (Tonghae), Southern (Busan) and Jeju (Jeju), the CG Academy with its research centre, the central search and rescue unit, and the centre for material and technical services.
Each zone consists of two to five sea areas (Incheon, Seocheon, Taean, and Boryeong in the Central zone, Yeosu, Wando, Mokpo, Kunsan and Buan, in the West; Sokcho, Donghae, Pohang and Uljin in the East; Ulsan, Busan, Changwon and Tongyeong in the South; Jeju-si and Seogwipo in the sea area of Jeju), control vessel traffic, aircraft group, and a detachment of special purpose. In addition, the structure of the Central sea zone includes a permanent ship connection in the north-western sea area. In total, the South Korean CG has 19 sea areas and about 100 coastal posts.
Tasks in the sea areas are assigned to the CG departments, which are subordinate to the ships and boats of the Coast Guard, as well as coastal posts equipped with radar and visual monitoring of the surface situation.
The CG operational zone includes the territorial and internal waters of the state, the South Korean exclusive economic zone, as well as areas of special attention near the border with the DPRK in the Yellow and Japan Seas, where armed clashes with the North Korean patrol forces are possible.
In addition, areas of joint fishing with neighboring states are established within this zone, the demarcation of which is regulated by bilateral treaties.
When searching and rescuing at sea, the ROK Coast Guard can operate in a larger area of water, including significant parts of the Yellow and Japan Seas, as well as the Korean Strait.
The Coast Guard forces are armed with 35 large and about 40 medium patrol ships, up to 110 patrol boats, about 140 special vessels, 6 patrol aircraft and up to 20 helicopters.
The CG General Staff is currently considering the possibility of reorganising the agency from the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and reassigning it to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea as a separate agency. At the same time, it is planned to change the organisational structure of the central office with a reduction in the number of its divisions and the number of staff.
By 2020, it is planned to merge the aviation groups of the Central and Western sea zones. In addition, it is planned to reduce the number of air patrol routes of the South Korean exclusive economic zone from eight to six.
In the medium term (up to 2022) in accordance with the concept “Military Reform 2.0” the possibility of gradually transferring the Coast Guard to command the defence of the rear areas of the country ground forces associated with the organisation of anti-landing defence of the coast of Korea and electronic control of surface conditions on the perimeter of the maritime borders of the state is being considered.
By 2020, two new diving support vessels (type D-1) are planned to be transferred to the West and East groups of the Central search and rescue unit of the CG. It is assumed that they will be able to provide diving operations at a depth of up to 50 m for 50 minutes.
Between 2019 and 2022, it is planned to equip Coast Guard units with two KUH-1P “Surion” multi-purpose helicopters, which will strengthen the existing aviation group. In addition, it is planned to adopt an unmanned aerial vehicle of national development with rotary propellers (tiltrotor), which has a flight range of 800 km and a duration of 4 hours in the air.
Its task is to perform the functions of monitoring and marine search.
By 2021, it is planned to complete the creation of an automated system for processing large volumes of data accumulated by shipping control centres. The programme budget is $10 million.
In peacetime, the CG plays a significant role in ensuring the country’s maritime security, monitoring compliance by neighboring states with international treaties and UN Security Council resolutions within the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Korea, and in wartime, it participates in the Navy, protecting the sea coast, defending naval bases and ports of the country.
According to South Korean experts, an increase in the department’s ship strength is expected in the future. It is likely that a new organisational reform of the department will be prepared, including its transfer to the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, while simultaneously expanding the functions of ensuring the state’s border protection.
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southfront--2020-10-18--Weapons Of Karabakh War: 2S1 Gvozdika Self-Propelled Howitzer

The 2S1 Gvozdika is a Russian-made 122mm self-propelled howitzer tracked armoured vehicle .
The first prototype was ready in 1969 .
The 2S1 entered service with the Soviet Army in the early 1970s and was first seen in public at a Polish Army parade in 1974 .
The 2S1 Gvozdika has a crew of four soldiers , including commander , gunner , loader and driver .
The 2S1 is actively used by many armed forces around the world but in the Russian army is only in service with reserve units , and was replaced by the 2S19 .
Both Azerbaijan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the hostilities in Nagorno-karabakh .
The 2S1 is armed with a modified version of the 2A31 cannon which is also fitted to the D-30 towed howitzer .
The 122 mm cannon is fitted with a fume extractor and muzzle brake and is held in position , when travelling , by a lock on the hull glacis plate which is operated by remote control by the driver .
The Gvozdika is compatible with all 122-mm munitions developed for the D-30 howitzer .
These include fragmentation , HE-FRAG , HEAT , cluster , smoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 40 rounds are carried , usually 35 HE-FRAG and 5 HEAT .
Maximum range of fire with HE-FRAG projectile is 15.2 km .
The main ammunition of the 2A31 howitzer includes high-explosive shells 3OF56 and 3OF56-1 with a contact fuse RGM-2M , 3OF7 and 3OF8 with an AR-30 radio fuse , as well as 3OF24 , 3OF24Zh , 53-OF-462 and 53-OF-462Zh , which can be equipped with both contact fuses RGM2 or V-90 , and radio fuses AR-5 .
The shells have an initial speed of 690 m/s at full charge and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For 2S1 , the Kitolov-2M adjustable shells have been developed that have the ability to destroy armored vehicles at locations where launchers , long-term defensive structures , bridges , and crossings are concentrated .
The all-welded steel hull of the 2S1 is divided into three compartments with the drivers at the front on the left , engine behind the driver and the turret at the rear .
The all-welded steel armor of 2S1 provides protection for the crew against small arms fire and shell splinters .
The chassis of the 2S1 ( SAU-122 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MT-LB multi-purpose conveyor tractor .
In order for the chassis to be able to provide the specified parameters , the design of the MT-LB chassis has undergone significant processing .
Compared to the base machine , an additional pair of track rollers has been introduced into the chassis .
Thus , the chassis consists of seven pairs of rubberized road wheels .
There are guide wheels in the rear of the machine , and drive wheels in the front .
The caterpillar track consists of small links with hinges connected by fingers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ mm with a pitch of 111 mm .
2S1 suspension – individual torsion bar .
Two-way hydraulic shock absorbers are installed on the first and seventh track rollers .
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The 2S1 Gvozdika is a Russian-made 122mm self-propelled howitzer tracked armoured vehicle. The first prototype was ready in 1969.
The 2S1 entered service with the Soviet Army in the early 1970s and was first seen in public at a Polish Army parade in 1974. The 2S1 Gvozdika has a crew of four soldiers, including commander, gunner, loader and driver.
The 2S1 is actively used by many armed forces around the world but in the Russian army is only in service with reserve units, and was replaced by the 2S19.
Both Azerbaijan and Armenia utilize the 2S1 Gvozdika actively in the hostilities in Nagorno-karabakh.
The 2S1 is armed with a modified version of the 2A31 cannon which is also fitted to the D-30 towed howitzer.
The 122 mm cannon is fitted with a fume extractor and muzzle brake and is held in position, when travelling, by a lock on the hull glacis plate which is operated by remote control by the driver.
The Gvozdika is compatible with all 122-mm munitions developed for the D-30 howitzer. These include fragmentation, HE-FRAG, HEAT, cluster, smoke and illumination projectiles.
A total of 40 rounds are carried, usually 35 HE-FRAG and 5 HEAT. Maximum range of fire with HE-FRAG projectile is 15.2 km.
The main ammunition of the 2A31 howitzer includes high-explosive shells 3OF56 and 3OF56-1 with a contact fuse RGM-2M, 3OF7 and 3OF8 with an AR-30 radio fuse, as well as 3OF24, 3OF24Zh, 53-OF-462 and 53-OF-462Zh, which can be equipped with both contact fuses RGM2 or V-90, and radio fuses AR-5.
The shells have an initial speed of 690 m/s at full charge and a maximum firing range of 15.2 km. For 2S1, the Kitolov-2M adjustable shells have been developed that have the ability to destroy armored vehicles at locations where launchers, long-term defensive structures, bridges, and crossings are concentrated.
The all-welded steel hull of the 2S1 is divided into three compartments with the drivers at the front on the left, engine behind the driver and the turret at the rear. The all-welded steel armor of 2S1 provides protection for the crew against small arms fire and shell splinters.
The chassis of the 2S1 (SAU-122) is a modified chassis of the MT-LB multi-purpose conveyor tractor. In order for the chassis to be able to provide the specified parameters, the design of the MT-LB chassis has undergone significant processing.
Compared to the base machine, an additional pair of track rollers has been introduced into the chassis.
Thus, the chassis consists of seven pairs of rubberized road wheels. There are guide wheels in the rear of the machine, and drive wheels in the front.
The caterpillar track consists of small links with hinges connected by fingers. The width of each truck is 350 mm with a pitch of 111 mm.
2S1 suspension – individual torsion bar. Two-way hydraulic shock absorbers are installed on the first and seventh track rollers.
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