southfront--2020-10-07--SpaceX Is Awarded $149M Contract For Missile-Tracking Satellites From The Pentagon

On October 5th , Space Exploration Technologies Corp. , of Hawthorne , California won a $ 149 million contract to build missile-tracking satellites .
This is the company ’ s first ever government contract to build satellites .
For those confused , the company is better known as Elon Musk ’ s SpaceX , which was presumably supposed to be an entirely civilian endeavor and not militarized in any way .
SpaceX , known for its reusable rockets and astronaut capsules , is ramping up satellite production for Starlink , a growing constellation of hundreds of internet-beaming satellites that chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revenue to help fund SpaceX ’ s interplanetary goals .
Under the SDA ( Space Development Agency ) contract , SpaceX will use its Starlink assembly plant in Redmond , Washington , to build four satellites fitted with a wide-angle infrared missile-tracking sensor supplied by a subcontractor , an SDA official said .
The contracts for both the tracking and transport layers are part of Tranche 0 of the NDSA .
Tranche 0 , he said , comprises 28 SDA satellites : 20 transport satellites and 8 tracking layer satellites .
Tournear said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launch those 28 satellites .
The other part of the contract will be carried out by L3Harris Technologies , Inc .
When tracking layer satellites detect a threat , such as a ballistic missile , they send that information to satellites in the transport layer .
“ The transport satellites are the backbone of the National Defense Space Architecture , ” Tournear said .
“ They take data from multiple tracking systems , fuse those , and are able to calculate a fire control solution , and then the transport satellites will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a weapons platform via a tactical data link , or some other means.
” “ With Tranche 0 in 2022 , we will provide enough capability to where people can start to experiment with what those data could do , and figure out how they could put that into their operational plans for battle , ” Tournear said .
Tranche 1 , due in 2024 , will include a couple hundred satellites in the transport layer , and a few dozen in the tracking layer .
With Tranche 2 , in 2026 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out the system as needed .
By then , he said , the SDA would have global coverage , ensuring that the capabilities provided by the NDSA could be available to warfighters anywhere in the world .
Tournear said that the NDSA is certainly based in space , its focus is mostly back on Earth — in support of service members conducting operations on land , at sea and in the air .
Regardless , it was expected that SpaceX would militarize its operations , since it already carried out at least 1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and more .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • U.S Space Force Deployed Off American Soil For The First Time Ever To … Qatar • Trump ’ s Space Force Conducts First Official Deployment… And It Is Not To The Moon

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On October 5th, Space Exploration Technologies Corp., of Hawthorne, California won a $149 million contract to build missile-tracking satellites.
This is the company’s first ever government contract to build satellites.
For those confused, the company is better known as Elon Musk’s SpaceX, which was presumably supposed to be an entirely civilian endeavor and not militarized in any way.
SpaceX, known for its reusable rockets and astronaut capsules, is ramping up satellite production for Starlink, a growing constellation of hundreds of internet-beaming satellites that chief executive Elon Musk hopes will generate enough revenue to help fund SpaceX’s interplanetary goals.
Under the SDA (Space Development Agency) contract, SpaceX will use its Starlink assembly plant in Redmond, Washington, to build four satellites fitted with a wide-angle infrared missile-tracking sensor supplied by a subcontractor, an SDA official said.
“The satellites will be able to provide missile tracking data for hypersonic glide vehicles and the next generation of advanced missile threats,” said Derek Tournear, the director of the Space Development Agency.
The contracts for both the tracking and transport layers are part of Tranche 0 of the NDSA. Tranche 0, he said, comprises 28 SDA satellites: 20 transport satellites and 8 tracking layer satellites. Tournear said there will be a separate solicitation to launch those 28 satellites.
The other part of the contract will be carried out by L3Harris Technologies, Inc.
“We call it ‘tracking’ because it’s missile tracking — so it provides detection, tracking and fire control formation for hypersonic glide vehicles, ballistic missiles … any of those kinds of threats,” Tournear said.
When tracking layer satellites detect a threat, such as a ballistic missile, they send that information to satellites in the transport layer.
“The transport satellites are the backbone of the National Defense Space Architecture,” Tournear said. “They take data from multiple tracking systems, fuse those, and are able to calculate a fire control solution, and then the transport satellites will be able to send those data down directly to a weapons platform via a tactical data link, or some other means.” “With Tranche 0 in 2022, we will provide enough capability to where people can start to experiment with what those data could do, and figure out how they could put that into their operational plans for battle,” Tournear said.
Tranche 1, due in 2024, will include a couple hundred satellites in the transport layer, and a few dozen in the tracking layer.
With Tranche 2, in 2026, the SDA would continue to build out the system as needed. By then, he said, the SDA would have global coverage, ensuring that the capabilities provided by the NDSA could be available to warfighters anywhere in the world.
“Every two years thereafter, we would continually spiral out and proliferate more satellites with new capabilities and, in essence, retire satellites with older capabilities as we develop new tranches,” he said.
Tournear said that the NDSA is certainly based in space, its focus is mostly back on Earth — in support of service members conducting operations on land, at sea and in the air.
“Our architecture is entirely warfighter-focused for the terrestrial battlefield,” Tournear said. “Our goal is to be able to provide real-time targeting data for targets, for time-sensitive targets and for missiles, so that the terrestrial warfighter can utilize space to be able to affect their mission in real time. We’re focused on making sure that we can provide capabilities from space.”
Regardless, it was expected that SpaceX would militarize its operations, since it already carried out at least 1 joint exercise assisting the US Air Force and more.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Armenia Claims Significant Success In Repelling Azerbaijan, Reportedly Dozens Killed, Equipment Dest

Armenia Claims Significant Success In Repelling Azerbaijan, Reportedly Dozens Killed, Equipment Destroyed

On October 6th , fighting in all directions of Nagorno-Karabakh continued .
According to the Armenian side , Azerbaijan had very limited success , if any .
After midnight , in the early hours of October 7th , the Azerbaijani forces tried to go on the offensive and strengthen in the South-Eastern direction , near the approaches to Jabrayil , but was reportedly hit by a well-aimed rocket and artillery strike of the Armenian armed forces .
A video recording is presumably available , it was not initially provided , but a bit later was shared .
“ Just recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Armenian units in the South-Eastern direction , a large fuel and raw material base of the enemy was hit .
The video will soon be published by the Armenian defense Ministry .
Opportunities have been created in various areas of the front to build on our success , ” Defense Ministry spokesperson Shushan Stepanyan said .
She , earlier , said that some areas were out of reach for Azerbaijani attacks due to effective defense , hyped up with a video .
Furthermore , Armenia announced that the enemy ’ s “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
No evidence at all is being provided .
Videos purportedly showing the front and some clashes were released by Armenia on October 7th .
An evidence video of Azerbaijani shelling on Stepanakert was also released .
The Azerbaijani side claimed that Armenian forces targeted a BTC oil pipeline , which Stepanyan denied .
Azerbaijan also began producing local propaganda videos , such as the one below : The conversation goes the following way : – I ’ m from Armenia , but I work here now .
– Do your relatives live @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Armenia and somewhere else .
– We are the Azerbaijani soldiers and we are in our Motherland .
This is somewhat clear evidence that Baku doesn ’ t plan on withdrawing anytime soon and plans to establish itself in the region .
Additionaly , sources of the @ wargonzo project in Odessa report that representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora are recruiting fighters from the Ukrainian Nazi-infested volunteer battalions “ Azov ” and “ Right Sector ” to be sent to the Nagorno-Karabakh front .
Salaries are offered between $ 1,500 and $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ videos of the frontline .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • There Is Conspiracy Against Armenia And Pashinyan Government Is In Center Of It • Azerbaijani-Turkish Alliance Is Taking Upper Hand In War With Armenia

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On October 6th, fighting in all directions of Nagorno-Karabakh continued.
According to the Armenian side, Azerbaijan had very limited success, if any.
After midnight, in the early hours of October 7th, the Azerbaijani forces tried to go on the offensive and strengthen in the South-Eastern direction, near the approaches to Jabrayil, but was reportedly hit by a well-aimed rocket and artillery strike of the Armenian armed forces.
“At 06:30 am, after another rocket and artillery strike, leaving 60 more dead on the battlefield, as well as 22 units of downed equipment, several dozen units of working equipment, the remnants of three enemy brigades fled in panic.”
A video recording is presumably available, it was not initially provided, but a bit later was shared.
“Just recently, as a result of accurate fire from Armenian units in the South-Eastern direction, a large fuel and raw material base of the enemy was hit. The video will soon be published by the Armenian defense Ministry. Opportunities have been created in various areas of the front to build on our success,” Defense Ministry spokesperson Shushan Stepanyan said.
During the night the enemy has attempted to advance and consolidate in the southeast direction (off Jebrail), but #Azerbaijani units have been engaged and defeated by accurate rocket-artillery fire of Armenian (Armed) Forces.1/3 — Shushan Stepanyan (@ShStepanyan) October 7, 2020
Not long before, a large enemy POL storage depot was destroyed in the southeastern direction by a pinpoint fire of the Armenian units.
There are now opportunities in various directions of the frontline for exploitation of success.3/3 — Shushan Stepanyan (@ShStepanyan) October 7, 2020
She, earlier, said that some areas were out of reach for Azerbaijani attacks due to effective defense, hyped up with a video.
Furthermore, Armenia announced that the enemy’s “terrorist army” is being mercilessly destroyed. No evidence at all is being provided.
Videos purportedly showing the front and some clashes were released by Armenia on October 7th.
An evidence video of Azerbaijani shelling on Stepanakert was also released.
The Azerbaijani side claimed that Armenian forces targeted a BTC oil pipeline, which Stepanyan denied.
Azerbaijan's allegation that the Armenian units tried to hit the BTC oil pipeline is a blatant lie. We have repeatedly stated, that we are not targeting oil & gas infrastructure. However, all mil. facilities and objectives from which #Artsakh will be fired at, will be destroyed. — Shushan Stepanyan (@ShStepanyan) October 6, 2020
Azerbaijan also began producing local propaganda videos, such as the one below:
The conversation goes the following way: “-Hello. – Hello. – What’s your name? – Azniv. – Mrs Azniv, are you Armenian? – Yes. – Where are you from? – I’m from Armenia, but I work here now. – What’s your job? – I’m a seller. – Do your relatives live here? – No, they live in Armenia and somewhere else. – We are the Azerbaijani soldiers and we are in our Motherland. – Welcome home.”
This is somewhat clear evidence that Baku doesn’t plan on withdrawing anytime soon and plans to establish itself in the region.
Additionaly, sources of the @wargonzo project in Odessa report that representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora are recruiting fighters from the Ukrainian Nazi-infested volunteer battalions “Azov” and “Right Sector” to be sent to the Nagorno-Karabakh front. Salaries are offered between $1,500 and $2,000.
The Azerbaijan side also released videos of the frontline.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Azerbaijan Says Armenian Forces Attacked Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline As Armenian PM Proposes Conces

Azerbaijan Says Armenian Forces Attacked Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline As Armenian PM Proposes Concessions

Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov ordered “ to plan actions to deliver strikes at the military-strategic infrastructure ” of Armenia “ using the weapons with great destructive power ” , the Defense Ministry reported on October 6 .
Accordng to the Azerbaijani side , the strikes will be delivered if Armenia employs its Iskander operational-tactical missile systems .
The Azerbaijani military released more videos with captured Armenian positions and equipment ( tanks were already showed in previous videos ) : Baku also reported that Armenian forces shelled the Yevlakh , Goranboy and Beylagan regions of Azerbaijan .
According to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan ( BTC ) oil pipeline .
Azerbaijani prosecutors said Armenian forces carried out the attack , that was prevented by the Azerbaijani military , on the pipeline in Yevlah at around 9 p.m. local time on October 6 .
The incident was described as a “ terrorist act ” .
The BTC pipeline delivers Azeri light crude oil ( mainly from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field ) through Georgia to Turkey ’ s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan for export via tankers .
The Armenian side denounced the Azerbaijani report as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces continue in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region .
The Armenian side continues insisting that it has been inflicting numerous losses on the ‘ enemy ’ .
However , it continues slowly retreating under strikes on the Azerbaijani military .
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan , that just recently promised to inflict a military defeat to Azerbaijan , made a new statement on October 6 de-facto proposing a peace .
Pashinyan told AFP news agency that Armenia is ready to make concessions in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but only if Baku is willing to do the same .
The pro-Western leader of Armenia also recalled about Russia as the guarantor of Armenian sovereignty .
It is strange that Pashinyan did not ask his Washington friends to protect Armenia from the ‘ aggression ’ of what he called the Turkish-Azerbaijani terror alliance .
Maybe the issue is that Turkey is a member of NATO , the military bloc that the new Armenian government likes so much .
Also , the Armenian claims that Moscow is somehow obliged to help Armenia in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the reality .
The security treaty framework between Russia and Armenia is related to Armenian territory only .
In own turn , Armenia has not even started making steps to formally include the contested region into its territory or recognize Karabakh as an independent state .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • There Is Conspiracy Against Armenia And Pashinyan Government Is In Center Of It • Armenia Shelled Ganja City While Stepanakert Is Under Azerbaijani Fire ( Video , Photos )

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Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov ordered “to plan actions to deliver strikes at the military-strategic infrastructure” of Armenia “using the weapons with great destructive power”, the Defense Ministry reported on October 6. Accordng to the Azerbaijani side, the strikes will be delivered if Armenia employs its Iskander operational-tactical missile systems.
The Azerbaijani military released more videos with captured Armenian positions and equipment (tanks were already showed in previous videos):
Baku also reported that Armenian forces shelled the Yevlakh, Goranboy and Beylagan regions of Azerbaijan.
According to the Azerbaijani side, Armenian forces launched a missile attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Azerbaijani prosecutors said Armenian forces carried out the attack, that was prevented by the Azerbaijani military, on the pipeline in Yevlah at around 9 p.m. local time on October 6. The incident was described as a “terrorist act”.
The BTC pipeline delivers Azeri light crude oil (mainly from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field) through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan for export via tankers.
The Armenian side denounced the Azerbaijani report as fake news.
Meanwhile, intense clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces continue in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Armenian side continues insisting that it has been inflicting numerous losses on the ‘enemy’. However, it continues slowly retreating under strikes on the Azerbaijani military.
Stepanakert is continuously being shelled by the #Azerbaijan|i Armed Forces. These photos were taken minutes ago#StopAzerbaijaniAggression#NKpeace#ArtsakhStrong pic.twitter.com/9r74ORgnyA — Armenian Unified Infocenter (@ArmenianUnified) October 6, 2020
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, that just recently promised to inflict a military defeat to Azerbaijan, made a new statement on October 6 de-facto proposing a peace.
Pashinyan told AFP news agency that Armenia is ready to make concessions in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Tuesday, but only if Baku is willing to do the same.
“Conflicts need to be resolved on the basis of mutual concessions,” Pashinyan said. “Nagorno-Karabakh is ready, and Armenia is ready, to mirror the concessions that Azerbaijan is ready to make.”
The pro-Western leader of Armenia also recalled about Russia as the guarantor of Armenian sovereignty.
“In case of a security threat to Armenia, Russia’s engagement will be subject to our treaty framework,” Pashinyan said. “I am confident that as per the situation, Russia will uphold its treaty obligations.”
It is strange that Pashinyan did not ask his Washington friends to protect Armenia from the ‘aggression’ of what he called the Turkish-Azerbaijani terror alliance. Maybe the issue is that Turkey is a member of NATO, the military bloc that the new Armenian government likes so much. Also, the Armenian claims that Moscow is somehow obliged to help Armenia in the war for the Nagorno-Karabakh goes contrary to the reality. The security treaty framework between Russia and Armenia is related to Armenian territory only. In own turn, Armenia has not even started making steps to formally include the contested region into its territory or recognize Karabakh as an independent state.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Navalny’s Novichok Poisoning Fairy Tales Collapse Under Pressure Of Evidence

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ( OPCW ) has handed over to Germany a report on poisoning of Russian hardcore neo-liberal and pro-Western opposition figure Alexey Navalny , the organization said in a statement on October 6 .
The statement confirms that Navalny was not ‘ poisoned with Novichok ’ .
Instead , it says that Blood and urine samples from Navalny contained a “ cholinesterase inhibitor ” with “ structural characteristics ” similar to Novichok chemicals , which are not even listed in the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention .
A statement issued on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ THE HAGUE , Netherlands—6 October 2020—The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ( OPCW ) transmitted yesterday to the Federal Republic of Germany the report of the OPCW ’ s mission to provide requested technical assistance in regard to the poisoning of Mr Alexei Navalny , on 20 August 2020 .
The results of the analysis by the OPCW designated laboratories of biomedical samples collected by the OPCW team and shared with the Federal Republic of Germany confirm that the biomarkers of the cholinesterase inhibitor found in Mr Navalny ’ s blood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the toxic chemicals belonging to schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15 that were added to the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention during the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019 .
This cholinesterase inhibitor is not listed in the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention .
The Permanent Representation of Germany to the OPCW requested that the Technical Secretariat share the summary of this report with all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and make it publicly available .
The Director-General , H.E .
Mr Fernando Arias @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supported the technical assistance request for their swift analysis .
He further considered that these results constitute a matter of grave concern .
States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention have declared the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances as reprehensible and wholly contrary to the legal norms established by the international community .
It is therefore important now for States Parties to uphold the norm they have decided to adhere to more than 25 years ago .
He reaffirmed the Secretariat ’ s readiness to continue assisting them through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Navalny and mainstream media outlets continues to blatantly push the claim that his analyzes have found a ‘ Novichok nerve agent ’ .
The words of the OPCW about “ structurally similar substance ” also leads to an apparent question .
How really “ similar ” it was to Novichok nerve agent ?
For example , dichlorvos is also a cholinesterase inhibitor and “ structurally similar ” to many substances .
The list of such substances is very wide .
Therefore , contrary to the mainstream narrative , the findings showed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapon .
This substance can be anything , but it is not ‘ deadly Novichok ’ and not a chemical weapon , since it is all covered by the protocols to the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention .
Therefore , any speculations about some ‘ usage of chemical weapons ’ and the vioaltion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are lie .
Actions of the EU , NATO , the US , reports of mainstream media outlets and Navalny himself cant say what they want but the supposedly existing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exist .
As to the mysterious ‘ bottle with Novichok ’ or other things of Navalny , which were transferred to the OPCW , they apparently also contained nothing besides a “ cholinesterase inhibitor ” with “ structural characteristics ” similar to dichlorvos .
Therefore , there are two main possible explanations of this situation : • Drug addict Navalny got an overdose of something that he has become used to eat , drink , sniff etc .
• Mariya Pevchikh , which spent the night in Navalny ’ s room before the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the main question is how the self-proclaimed leader of the Russian opposition is going to return to Russia , and what moral right he has to do this .
In the current conditions , it is also likely that the Navalny team and Navalny himself that continue lying about a ‘ Novichok attack ’ will face criminal cases for their libel actions .
There is also a possibility that this was a false flag operation by Russian special services – a kind of ‘ Putin-style two-move combination ’ in which , Pevchikh was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ON THE TOPIC : • Kremlin Alleges Navalny Is “ Working With CIA ” After Bombshell Charge : ‘ Putin Poisoned Me !
’ • MSM Putting Putin In Center Of Navalny ’ s Novichok Drama .
But What About The Evidence ?
• Novichok Allegedly Discovered On Water Bottle In Navalny ’ s Room , But It Traveled With Him To Germany

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The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has handed over to Germany a report on poisoning of Russian hardcore neo-liberal and pro-Western opposition figure Alexey Navalny, the organization said in a statement on October 6.
The statement confirms that Navalny was not ‘poisoned with Novichok’. Instead, it says that Blood and urine samples from Navalny contained a “cholinesterase inhibitor” with “structural characteristics” similar to Novichok chemicals, which are not even listed in the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention.
A statement issued on the OPCW official website says the following:
THE HAGUE, Netherlands—6 October 2020—The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) transmitted yesterday to the Federal Republic of Germany the report of the OPCW’s mission to provide requested technical assistance in regard to the poisoning of Mr Alexei Navalny, on 20 August 2020. The results of the analysis by the OPCW designated laboratories of biomedical samples collected by the OPCW team and shared with the Federal Republic of Germany confirm that the biomarkers of the cholinesterase inhibitor found in Mr Navalny’s blood and urine samples have similar structural characteristics as the toxic chemicals belonging to schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15 that were added to the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention during the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019. This cholinesterase inhibitor is not listed in the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention. The Permanent Representation of Germany to the OPCW requested that the Technical Secretariat share the summary of this report with all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and make it publicly available. The Director-General, H.E. Mr Fernando Arias, thanked the OPCW designated laboratories that supported the technical assistance request for their swift analysis. He further considered that these results constitute a matter of grave concern. States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention have declared the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances as reprehensible and wholly contrary to the legal norms established by the international community. It is therefore important now for States Parties to uphold the norm they have decided to adhere to more than 25 years ago. He reaffirmed the Secretariat’s readiness to continue assisting them through independent expertise.
Despite the OPCW statement, Navalny and mainstream media outlets continues to blatantly push the claim that his analyzes have found a ‘Novichok nerve agent’.
The words of the OPCW about “structurally similar substance” also leads to an apparent question. How really “similar” it was to Novichok nerve agent? For example, dichlorvos is also a cholinesterase inhibitor and “structurally similar” to many substances. The list of such substances is very wide.
Therefore, contrary to the mainstream narrative, the findings showed that Navalny was not poisoned by a chemical weapon. This substance can be anything, but it is not ‘deadly Novichok’ and not a chemical weapon, since it is all covered by the protocols to the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention. Therefore, any speculations about some ‘usage of chemical weapons’ and the vioaltion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are lie. Actions of the EU, NATO, the US, reports of mainstream media outlets and Navalny himself cant say what they want but the supposedly existing ‘evidence’ against Russia does not exist.
As to the mysterious ‘bottle with Novichok’ or other things of Navalny, which were transferred to the OPCW, they apparently also contained nothing besides a “cholinesterase inhibitor” with “structural characteristics” similar to dichlorvos.
Therefore, there are two main possible explanations of this situation:
Drug addict Navalny got an overdose of something that he has become used to eat, drink, sniff etc.
Mariya Pevchikh, which spent the night in Navalny’s room before the incident, poisoned him.
Now, the main question is how the self-proclaimed leader of the Russian opposition is going to return to Russia, and what moral right he has to do this. In the current conditions, it is also likely that the Navalny team and Navalny himself that continue lying about a ‘Novichok attack’ will face criminal cases for their libel actions. There is also a possibility that this was a false flag operation by Russian special services – a kind of ‘Putin-style two-move combination’ in which, Pevchikh was just exploited as a pawn.
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southfront--2020-10-07--US Withdraws Another 2,500 Troops From Iraq, Uncertainty Surrounds Future Plans

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi confirmed over the weekend that around 2,500 US troops have been withdrawn from Iraq recently due to increasing concerns over their security following the steady increase in attacks this year against military bases where US personnel are deployed , the Green Zone in Baghdad where the US Embassy is located , and military convoys supplying these areas .
The US military has completed its drawdown from about 5,200 to fewer than 3,000 troops in Iraq , Army Colonel Wayne Marotto , a spokesman for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declared that the intended schedule for complete withdrawal of US military personnel is three years , the period could be shortened or lengthened considerably depending on future developments .
The decision to make additional reductions of US troop numbers in Iraq was announced during Kadhimi ’ s US visit , and was given more urgency following US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s threat to close the embassy and withdraw US military personnel from Iraq completely after US positions and supply convoys were repeatedly subjected to rocket attacks from militias .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Iraq if this occurs .
According to officials in Baghdad , “ US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo informed the President of the Republic , Barham Salih , Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi , and Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi of the need to stop all attacks immediately , particularly against the US embassy in Baghdad ; otherwise , the embassy will close its doors in the Iraqi capital.
” “ The US will impose sanctions on 36 Iraqi persons who will be placed under an international warrant for arrest .
The US administration will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic aid to Iraq , including preventing it from exporting its oil .
Military options will be considered against the Popular Mobilisation Forces ( PMF ) , in particular , “ Asaib Ahl al-Haq ” and “ Kataeb Hezbollah Iraq ” .
The US forces are expected to target their bases and offices in Iraq in retaliation to the several rockets launched against the US embassy in Baghdad .
These attacks should stop immediately.
” This was the content of Pompeo ’ s message that was delivered to the highest Iraqi authorities .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ steadily after the US murdered Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani as well as senior members of the Popular Mobilization Units early in January this year , prompting the Iraqi parliament to unanimously demand the withdrawal of US military personnel from Iraq .
The apparent contradictions in the recent public statements as opposed to actual intentions revealed by ongoing actions on the ground make an interpretation of the latest developments an uncertain task .
After so many years , would the US really consider withdrawing all US military personnel , as well as diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the current Iraqi government is concerned by the possibility of a ‘ hasty ’ US withdrawal , and the effect this could have for Iraq ’ s international relations ( leaving aside the paradox of how a withdrawal could be considered hasty after so many years of military occupation ) , many in Iraq would welcome the move .
Nonetheless , the Iraqi government and parliament have moved quickly to investigate the rocket attacks and take extra measures to try and prevent them in the future .
The Iraqi news outlet has reported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iraqi Parliament revealed today , Tuesday , the reasons behind the decline of rocket strikes against US occupied installations in Baghdad over the last couple of weeks .
These installations include Baghdad airport , which includes a US military base , and the Green Zone , which have been subjected to frequent rocket attacks .
The attacks have been carried out by groups who call themselves ‘ resistance ’ to the US military presence in the country , while the US accuses Iranian-backed groups of being responsible for the attacks .
Member @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Al-Azzawi , told Shafaq News agency , “ Certainly , stopping the rocket strikes on the American embassy is a result of the American threats , especially since some factions have links to some political forces ” , adding , “ among the reasons behind stopping the rocket strikes , are the new security measures taken to protect these sites , as well as the tightening the military orders and sanctions against the officials of the sectors from which the rockets are usually launched ” .
Also earlier today , the Iraqi Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first meeting of a new supreme military and security committee established to investigate the attacks that have targeted diplomatic installations and other areas occupied by the US-led coalition in the past period .
LINK The PM stated that the committee is authorized to demand any information from any party , and is expecting to show results within 30 days .
The committee includes representatives of the security services , and the Security and Defence Committee of the Parliament .
The committee is headed by Qassem Al-Araji , National Security Adviser , and includes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Popular Mobilization forces , Abdul-Ghani Al-Asadi , head of the Iraqi National Security Service , and Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah , Chief of Staff of the Army , as well as other military commanders and representatives in the Parliament .
LINK MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Apocalypse soon ?
US still scrambling and surging to develop new high tech weapons systems • US on again off again partial troop withdrawal from Iraq on again

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Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi confirmed over the weekend that around 2,500 US troops have been withdrawn from Iraq recently due to increasing concerns over their security following the steady increase in attacks this year against military bases where US personnel are deployed, the Green Zone in Baghdad where the US Embassy is located, and military convoys supplying these areas.
The US military has completed its drawdown from about 5,200 to fewer than 3,000 troops in Iraq, Army Colonel Wayne Marotto, a spokesman for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria, has confirmed. LINK
Although official statements have declared that the intended schedule for complete withdrawal of US military personnel is three years, the period could be shortened or lengthened considerably depending on future developments.
The decision to make additional reductions of US troop numbers in Iraq was announced during Kadhimi’s US visit, and was given more urgency following US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s threat to close the embassy and withdraw US military personnel from Iraq completely after US positions and supply convoys were repeatedly subjected to rocket attacks from militias. The US has also threatened to impose sanctions on Iraq if this occurs.
According to officials in Baghdad, “US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo informed the President of the Republic, Barham Salih, Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi, and Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi of the need to stop all attacks immediately, particularly against the US embassy in Baghdad; otherwise, the embassy will close its doors in the Iraqi capital.” “The US will impose sanctions on 36 Iraqi persons who will be placed under an international warrant for arrest. The US administration will adopt measures that prevent any form of economic aid to Iraq, including preventing it from exporting its oil. Military options will be considered against the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), in particular, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq” and “Kataeb Hezbollah Iraq”. The US forces are expected to target their bases and offices in Iraq in retaliation to the several rockets launched against the US embassy in Baghdad. These attacks should stop immediately.” This was the content of Pompeo’s message that was delivered to the highest Iraqi authorities. LINK
The attacks against US positions increased steadily after the US murdered Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani as well as senior members of the Popular Mobilization Units early in January this year, prompting the Iraqi parliament to unanimously demand the withdrawal of US military personnel from Iraq.
The apparent contradictions in the recent public statements as opposed to actual intentions revealed by ongoing actions on the ground make an interpretation of the latest developments an uncertain task. After so many years, would the US really consider withdrawing all US military personnel, as well as diplomatic staff, from the country?
Although the current Iraqi government is concerned by the possibility of a ‘hasty’ US withdrawal, and the effect this could have for Iraq’s international relations (leaving aside the paradox of how a withdrawal could be considered hasty after so many years of military occupation), many in Iraq would welcome the move.
Nonetheless, the Iraqi government and parliament have moved quickly to investigate the rocket attacks and take extra measures to try and prevent them in the future.
The Iraqi news outlet Shafaq has reported that the Security and Defence Committee of the Iraqi Parliament revealed today, Tuesday, the reasons behind the decline of rocket strikes against US occupied installations in Baghdad over the last couple of weeks.
These installations include Baghdad airport, which includes a US military base, and the Green Zone, which have been subjected to frequent rocket attacks. The attacks have been carried out by groups who call themselves ‘resistance’ to the US military presence in the country, while the US accuses Iranian-backed groups of being responsible for the attacks.
Member of the committee, MP Abdul Khaleq Al-Azzawi, told Shafaq News agency, “Certainly, stopping the rocket strikes on the American embassy is a result of the American threats, especially since some factions have links to some political forces”, adding, “among the reasons behind stopping the rocket strikes, are the new security measures taken to protect these sites, as well as the tightening the military orders and sanctions against the officials of the sectors from which the rockets are usually launched”.
Also earlier today, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, chaired the first meeting of a new supreme military and security committee established to investigate the attacks that have targeted diplomatic installations and other areas occupied by the US-led coalition in the past period. LINK
The PM stated that the committee is authorized to demand any information from any party, and is expecting to show results within 30 days. The committee includes representatives of the security services, and the Security and Defence Committee of the Parliament.
The committee is headed by Qassem Al-Araji, National Security Adviser, and includes among its membership Falih Al-Fayyadh, Chairman of the Popular Mobilization forces, Abdul-Ghani Al-Asadi, head of the Iraqi National Security Service, and Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, Chief of Staff of the Army, as well as other military commanders and representatives in the Parliament. LINK
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southfront--2020-10-07--Economic Achievements And Setbacks Of Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Empire

Turkey ’ s economic situation has deteriorated dramatically over the last couple of years , exacerbated by domestic political instability and worsening relations with key trade and investment partners .
High levels of foreign debt and the plummeting value of the lira on currency markets threaten to implode the economy .
The government is betting on gas and oil transit fees from major pipelines , as well as domestically produced gas , to restore economic prosperity , however this will take years to fully realize and projected revenues may not arrive in time .
The government ’ s credit-fuelled growth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s preference for low interest rates have sent the lira to a new all-time low against the US dollar .
Turkey has large external financing needs , and its private sector is heavily indebted in foreign currency , raising risks of financial instability and a possible economic collapse in 2020-21 .
The economic crisis has been exacerbated by the political and military leadership ’ s expansionist and aggressive foreign policy and bitter disputes with major trade partners and traditional and more recent strategic allies alike ( in particular the US and European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which has isolated Turkey on the global stage , and makes international assistance to stabilize the dire economic situation much less likely ( other than from Qatar , which although vastly rich in gas will not be able to solve Turkey ’ s burgeoning economic problems alone ) .
While Turkey is conveniently located to capitalize on the gigantic oil and gas infrastructure projects that will connect the resource-rich regions in Russia , the Caspian and the Persian Gulf ( and possibly the eastern Mediterranean in the future ) with European markets , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as will the large gas deposits that were discovered in Turkey ’ s Black Sea economic zone in August .
Turkey ’ s economy is driven by its industry and , increasingly , service sectors , although the agriculture sector still accounts for about 25 % of employment .
The automotive , petrochemical , and electronics industries have risen in importance and have overtaken the traditional textiles and clothing sectors as Turkey ’ s main exports .
Although Turkey ’ s economy enjoyed a period of sustained growth during the first decade of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to uncertainty and security concerns due to both domestic and external developments , which are generating doubts on financial markets and casting a long shadow over Turkey ’ s economic outlook .
The government has relied on policies emphasize spending measures and low interest rates to stimulate the economy , however as debt reaches critical levels this can not be continued indefinitely .
The government has taken a more active role in some strategic sectors , however it has also used economic institutions and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermining private sector confidence .
Between July 2016 and March 2017 , three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey ’ s sovereign credit ratings , citing concerns about legal certainty and economic stability .
After a severe financial crisis in 2001 , Turkey adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program .
In the subsequent period the country ’ s economic fundamentals improved and there was a period of strong growth , averaging more than 6 % annually until 2008 .
An extensive privatization program was also adopted , reducing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , banking , transport , power generation , and communication .
Although this produced a financial surplus in the short term , it also reduced the State ’ s ability to influence economic development strategies .
Since 2001 when Turkey commenced a wide ranging restructuring of its energy markets in accordance with IMF demands , the country has moved from a state-owned , vertically-integrated model in most related sectors to a fully privatized electricity distribution network , and mostly privatized electricity , oil and natural gas markets .
It has also passed new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ established new regulatory agencies , and carried out price reforms .
In the subsequent period , Turkey has added about 31,000 MW market-based electricity generation capacity , including an additional 16,000 MW generation capacity based on renewable sources in the 2001-2014 period .
Although the Turkish oil market is now a ‘ highly regulated liberal market ’ , the State-owned enterprise BOTAŞ still controls natural gas supply and trade .
Even so , private natural gas trade and distribution companies play an active role in the market , and the private sector participates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Overall , agriculture accounts for approximately 7 % of GDP ( and 18 % of employment ) , industry and manufacturing accounts for 32 % of GDP ( 27 % of employment ) , and services account for 61 % of GDP ( 55 % of employment ) .
Major agricultural production includes tobacco , cotton , grain , olives , sugar beets , hazelnuts , pulses , citrus , and livestock .
Major industrial and manufacturing products includes textiles , food processing , automobiles , electronics , mining ( coal , chromate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , petroleum , construction , timber and paper .
Tourism is one of the most important of the services sectors , and has contributed between 11 % and 12 % of GDP over the last 10 years up until early this year .
Tourism had however already been hit hard by Turkey ’ s geopolitical disputes with Europe , Russia and the US , as well as the deteriorating security situation following Turkey ’ s intervention in northern Syria and intensification of the ongoing military campaign against Kurdish armed insurgent groups , before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flow of tourists almost completely .
Most exports ( as of 2017 ) were to Germany 9.6 % , UK 6.1 % , UAE 5.9 % , Iraq 5.8 % , US 5.5 % , Italy 5.4 % , France 4.2 % , and Spain 4 % .
Major export products include apparel , foodstuffs , textiles , metal manufactures , and transport equipment .
Most imports as of 2017 were from China 10 % , Germany 9.1 % , Russia 8.4 % , US 5.1 % , Italy 4.8 % .
Major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ semi-finished goods , fuels , and transport equipment .
Turkey has been running a constant trade deficit for many years , averaging around $ 40-50 billion per year .
The trade deficit blew out to over $ 6 billion in August 2020 up from around $ 2.3 billion in August 2019 due to both a fall in exports and an increase in imports .
The overall trend of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy .
Growth has stalled , and Turkey ’ s large current account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment inflows to finance economic activity , leaving the economy vulnerable to an adverse shift in investor confidence .
The last few years have also seen rising unemployment and inflation , compounded by the Turkish lira ’ s continuing depreciation against the dollar .
Approximately 20 % of the population lives below the poverty line .
Although government debt remains relatively low at about 30 % of GDP , bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a proportion of GDP during the past decade , prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face US unilateral sanctions since August 2018 , due to the detention of a US citizen suspected of involvement in the 2016 coup attempt .
US sanctions were extended in 2019 following Turkey ’ s invasion of northern Syria into areas occupied by armed groups supported by the US , and other punitive economic measures were imposed including a tariff increase on steel from Turkey and the cancellation of negotiations over a possible trade deal .
These concerns have deepened substantially as the economy has been hit by the dramatic global economic downturn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Although as in almost all other countries this latest ‘ external shock ’ is without precedent in modern times and could push the economic situation into free-fall , economists preaching the fiscal austerity dogma – as well as Turkey ’ s ‘ adversaries ’ and doomsayers – have been warning of an impending economic implosion for some time .
For example , last year an analysis in commented disparagingly : While Turkey ’ s consumption and growth-led strategy has defied the predictions of its many critics up until now , the risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater than ever in the current global economic conditions .
Nonetheless , most of those that would be likely to celebrate such a development are also deeply mired in their own economic problems , and the fallout from a generalized economic collapse in Turkey would have major ramifications throughout Europe , the Middle East and West Asia .
Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas , importing 92 % of its crude oil and almost all of its natural gas .
To address this it is pursuing several parallel strategies including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of international partners and increasing use of domestic energy sources including renewables , nuclear , and coal .
Turkey is also hoping to rectify the chronic trade and current account deficits with oil and gas revenues , both from transit fees from pipelines as well as by greatly increasing domestic production .
Turkey ’ s aggressive exploration program in the eastern Mediterranean has caused a dramatic increase in geopolitical tension in the region and threatened to provoke a military clash with Greece in particular ( backed by most members of the European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey ’ s exploration efforts in the Black Sea have however been much more successful , and without the controversy and associated security risks , as all exploration activities have taken place within Turkey ’ s universally recognized maritime zone .
Turkey has increased LNG purchases from Qatar and the US this year , taking advantage of lower spot prices , and also looking to reduce gas imports from Russia and Iran .
The LNG imports have also been facilitated by the expansion of Turkey ’ s LNG infrastructure capacity in recent years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keen to develop economic relations and infrastructure projects between the two countries , nothing has eventuated yet and they will require the cooperation of other countries for any major project to be successful .
LINK In August President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey has discovered a field in the Black Sea holding an estimated 320 billion cubic metres of gas .
The State-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation ( TPAO ) decided to conduct exploration activities directly , and purchased three drilling ships with this objective — Fatih , Yavuz , and Kanuni , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2017 and 2020 , deploying them in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea .
Fatih was instrumental in making the August discovery in the Black Sea .
Turkish authorities considered a potential collaboration with Russian and Iranian companies , but it seems less likely given current relations with both countries .
Turkey has increasingly diverging interests with Tehran and Moscow in Syria and is also trying to reduce dependence on Russian and Iranian gas supplies .
Turkey intensified its search for oil and gas in the offshore eastern Mediterranean in 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discover any oil or gas in the region .
The increased exploratory activity has however reignited unresolved maritime boundary disputes with its neighbours , particularly Greece and Cyprus , and led to an ongoing crisis in the region .
Over the last couple of months its main survey vessel has had a military escort , which has been confronted at sea on numerous occasions by Greek navy ships .
Turkey also concluded a maritime boundary agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya in November last year in an attempt to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The agreement has added additional fuel to the already extremely high tensions in the region , with Egypt and Greece signing an agreement several months ago which overlaps with the earlier agreement , and Turkey will not be able to continue exploratory activities in disputed areas in the eastern Mediterranean without provoking a major crisis , the imposition of sanctions by the European Union , and a real possibility of armed clashes with at least one of its neighbours .
Turkey ’ s other main hope for increasing revenues from the oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transit fees from major pipelines between production areas in the Middle East and Western Asia and markets in Europe .
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan ( BTC ) pipeline is 1,768 kilometres long and stretches from from the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan ’ s maritime zone in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea .
The crude oil pipeline commenced operation in 2006 , and has a capacity of up to 1 million barrels per day .
The pipeline cost US $ 3.9 billion to build , and employs around 1,000 people .
70 % @ @ @ @ @ @ @ third parties , including the International Finance Corporation ( a subsidiary of the World Bank ) , the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development , the export credit agencies of seven countries , as well as a syndicate of 15 commercial banks .
The pipeline is owned and operated by BTC Co , in which 11 companies are shareholders ( of which BP is the largest and has responsibility for operational management of the pipeline ) .
The shareholders are BP ( UK ) 30.1 % , State Oil Company of Azerbaijan ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Chevron ( US ) 8.9 % , Statoil ( Norway ) 8.71 % , Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı ( TPAO ) ( Turkey ) 6.53 % , Eni ( Italy ) 5 % , Total ( France ) 5 % , Itochu ( Japan ) 3.4 % , Inpex ( Japan ) 2.5 % , ExxonMobil ( US ) 2.5 % , and ONGC Videsh ( India ) 2.36 % .
The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline ( also known as the BTE pipeline , Shah Deniz Pipeline , or South Caucasus Pipeline ) is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to Turkey .
The pipeline runs parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline , and commenced operations in 2007 .
The 42-inch diameter gas pipeline has been laid alongside the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline until Erzurum , where the latter turns south towards the Mediterranean .
It is 692 kilometres long , of which 442 kilometres is in Azerbaijan and 248 kilometres in Georgia .
The initial capacity of the pipeline was 8.8 billion cubic metres ( 310 billion cubic feet ) of gas per year , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 bcm per year .
The pipeline is owned and operated by the South Caucasus Pipeline Company , whose shareholders are BP ( UK ) 28.83 % , TPAO ( Turkey ) 19 % , SOCAR ( Azerbaijan ) 16.67 % , Petronas ( Malaysia ) 15.5 % , Lukoil ( Russia ) 10 % , and Naftiran Intertrade ( Iran ) 10 % .
The construction of the Southern Gas Corridor , a chain of pipelines linking Azerbaijan to Italy , has cost $ 40 billion and the project is almost completed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ main source of gas is the Shah Deniz field , located in the economic zone of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea .
The project comprises three pipelines and has a total length of almost 4,000 km : The South Caucasus Pipeline ( SCP ) linking Azerbaijan with Georgia , the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline ( TANAP ) across Turkey , and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline ( TAP ) linking Greece , Albania and Italy .
Onshore work on the pipeline has been completed in Azerbaijan , Georgia , and Turkey .
Sixteen wells have been drilled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are ready for operations .
Eight of the wells are producing and gas is already flowing to Azerbaijan , Georgia and Turkey .
The rest will be gradually put on-stream once the final stretch in Italy is completed .
Work on the TAP section of the gas corridor is over 90 % completed and is estimated to be finished around the end of this year .
Turkey has been receiving gas in the pipeline since July 2018 .
It received approximately 2bcm in 2018 , 4bcm in 2019 , and in 2020 the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bcm .
Also , 2 bcm have been reserved for Greece and Bulgaria , which will be delivered once TAP enters operation .
A 25-year supply contract has been signed with Italy , and the first Azeri gas is expected to start flowing there before the end of 2020 , with supplies estimated to be at 8+bcm per year .
The Azerbaijani government ( Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan ) owns 51 % of the Southern Gas Corridor ; the other 49 % is owned by State Oil Company of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project has also been strongly promoted by the European Union , and even the US , as an important diversification of its energy sources : The planned Nabucco pipeline was eventually abandoned by the project ’ s proponents in 2013 .
Turkey and Azerbaijan having been steadily deepening their ties , a trend that has been boosted by the troubled relations of both with Armenia .
Several other major infrastructure projects apart from the Southern Gas Corridor also reflect the strength of their developing relationship : TurkStream connects the gas transmission systems of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has two strings with a combined throughput capacity of 31.5 billion cubic metres , and is 930 kilometres long .
The first string delivers gas to Turkey , while the second string is intended for gas transit to southern and south-eastern Europe through Turkish territory .
The Russian end of the TurkStream pipeline is the Russkaya compressor station , which is part of Russia ’ s Unified Gas Supply System and is located near Anapa .
The compressor station has a capacity of 224 MW , sufficient to supply the pressure required for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two strings up to the Turkish coast where the gas enters the receiving terminal .
The pipelaying for TurkStream took 15 months and was completed ahead of schedule in November 2018 .
The construction of the receiving terminal near Kiyikoy in Turkey was finished in 2019 , and the project was officially inaugurated in January of this year .
LINK Although Turkey ’ s strategic location means it is well placed to capitalize on the major oil and gas projects between the Caspian Sea , southern Russia , the Middle East and Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an aggressive negotiating approach has made it an undesirable project partner for many countries which will only reluctantly be engaged when there is no alternative .
While Turkey ’ s invasion of northern Syria did not concern the European Union greatly , its stand-off with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean is another matter and risks exposing it to sanctions from its major trading partner .
After the latest outbreak in hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan , Turkey seems to have realized that the confrontation with Greece is a step to far , apart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This would explain the decision to stop exploration activities in disputed parts of the eastern Mediterranean for the moment .
The decision to simultaneously confront Russia , Europe and the US is a dangerous policy , particularly when Turkey is also pursuing expansionist and provocative policies with many of its immediate neighbours .
Unless Turkey ’ s political and military leadership begins to take a more conciliatory approach , it could find it has played its allies and adversaries off against each other one time too many .
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Turkey’s economic situation has deteriorated dramatically over the last couple of years, exacerbated by domestic political instability and worsening relations with key trade and investment partners. High levels of foreign debt and the plummeting value of the lira on currency markets threaten to implode the economy. The government is betting on gas and oil transit fees from major pipelines, as well as domestically produced gas, to restore economic prosperity, however this will take years to fully realize and projected revenues may not arrive in time.
The government’s credit-fuelled growth policies and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s preference for low interest rates have sent the lira to a new all-time low against the US dollar. Turkey has large external financing needs, and its private sector is heavily indebted in foreign currency, raising risks of financial instability and a possible economic collapse in 2020-21.
The economic crisis has been exacerbated by the political and military leadership’s expansionist and aggressive foreign policy and bitter disputes with major trade partners and traditional and more recent strategic allies alike (in particular the US and European Union, and Russia, respectively), which has isolated Turkey on the global stage, and makes international assistance to stabilize the dire economic situation much less likely (other than from Qatar, which although vastly rich in gas will not be able to solve Turkey’s burgeoning economic problems alone).
While Turkey is conveniently located to capitalize on the gigantic oil and gas infrastructure projects that will connect the resource-rich regions in Russia, the Caspian and the Persian Gulf (and possibly the eastern Mediterranean in the future) with European markets, these will take time to develop, as will the large gas deposits that were discovered in Turkey’s Black Sea economic zone in August.
Overview of Turkey’s Economy
Turkey’s economy is driven by its industry and, increasingly, service sectors, although the agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment. The automotive, petrochemical, and electronics industries have risen in importance and have overtaken the traditional textiles and clothing sectors as Turkey’s main exports.
Although Turkey’s economy enjoyed a period of sustained growth during the first decade of Erdogan’s leadership, the period of political stability and economic dynamism has given way to uncertainty and security concerns due to both domestic and external developments, which are generating doubts on financial markets and casting a long shadow over Turkey’s economic outlook.
The government has relied on policies emphasize spending measures and low interest rates to stimulate the economy, however as debt reaches critical levels this cannot be continued indefinitely.
The government has taken a more active role in some strategic sectors, however it has also used economic institutions and regulatory agencies to target political opponents, undermining private sector confidence. Between July 2016 and March 2017, three credit ratings agencies downgraded Turkey’s sovereign credit ratings, citing concerns about legal certainty and economic stability.
After a severe financial crisis in 2001, Turkey adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an IMF program. In the subsequent period the country’s economic fundamentals improved and there was a period of strong growth, averaging more than 6% annually until 2008.
An extensive privatization program was also adopted, reducing the State’s role in basic industry, banking, transport, power generation, and communication. Although this produced a financial surplus in the short term, it also reduced the State’s ability to influence economic development strategies.
Since 2001 when Turkey commenced a wide ranging restructuring of its energy markets in accordance with IMF demands, the country has moved from a state-owned, vertically-integrated model in most related sectors to a fully privatized electricity distribution network, and mostly privatized electricity, oil and natural gas markets. It has also passed new renewable energy and energy efficiency legislation, established new regulatory agencies, and carried out price reforms.
In the subsequent period, Turkey has added about 31,000 MW market-based electricity generation capacity, including an additional 16,000 MW generation capacity based on renewable sources in the 2001-2014 period.
Although the Turkish oil market is now a ‘highly regulated liberal market’, the State-owned enterprise BOTAŞ still controls natural gas supply and trade. Even so, private natural gas trade and distribution companies play an active role in the market, and the private sector participates in gas exploration and production projects.
Overall, agriculture accounts for approximately 7% of GDP (and 18% of employment), industry and manufacturing accounts for 32% of GDP (27% of employment), and services account for 61% of GDP (55% of employment).
Major agricultural production includes tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, hazelnuts, pulses, citrus, and livestock. Major industrial and manufacturing products includes textiles, food processing, automobiles, electronics, mining (coal, chromate, copper, boron), steel, petroleum, construction, timber and paper.
Tourism is one of the most important of the services sectors, and has contributed between 11% and 12% of GDP over the last 10 years up until early this year. Tourism had however already been hit hard by Turkey’s geopolitical disputes with Europe, Russia and the US, as well as the deteriorating security situation following Turkey’s intervention in northern Syria and intensification of the ongoing military campaign against Kurdish armed insurgent groups, before the outbreak of the Coronavirus reduced the flow of tourists almost completely.
Most exports (as of 2017) were to Germany 9.6%, UK 6.1%, UAE 5.9%, Iraq 5.8%, US 5.5%, Italy 5.4%, France 4.2%, and Spain 4%. Major export products include apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal manufactures, and transport equipment.
Most imports as of 2017 were from China 10%, Germany 9.1%, Russia 8.4%, US 5.1%, Italy 4.8%. Major import products include machinery, chemicals, semi-finished goods, fuels, and transport equipment.
Turkey has been running a constant trade deficit for many years, averaging around $40-50 billion per year. The trade deficit blew out to over $6 billion in August 2020 up from around $2.3 billion in August 2019 due to both a fall in exports and an increase in imports.
The overall trend of Turkish GDP since 2016 has revealed persistent underlying imbalances in the Turkish economy. Growth has stalled, and Turkey’s large current account deficit means it must rely on external investment inflows to finance economic activity, leaving the economy vulnerable to an adverse shift in investor confidence.
The last few years have also seen rising unemployment and inflation, compounded by the Turkish lira’s continuing depreciation against the dollar. Approximately 20% of the population lives below the poverty line. Although government debt remains relatively low at about 30% of GDP, bank and corporate borrowing has almost tripled as a proportion of GDP during the past decade, prompting investor concerns about its long-term sustainability.
The country has also had to face US unilateral sanctions since August 2018, due to the detention of a US citizen suspected of involvement in the 2016 coup attempt. US sanctions were extended in 2019 following Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria into areas occupied by armed groups supported by the US, and other punitive economic measures were imposed including a tariff increase on steel from Turkey and the cancellation of negotiations over a possible trade deal.
These concerns have deepened substantially as the economy has been hit by the dramatic global economic downturn this year caused by the Coronavirus outbreak. Although as in almost all other countries this latest ‘external shock’ is without precedent in modern times and could push the economic situation into free-fall, economists preaching the fiscal austerity dogma – as well as Turkey’s ‘adversaries’ and doomsayers – have been warning of an impending economic implosion for some time. For example, last year an analysis in The New York Times commented disparagingly:
Turkey has avoided the meltdown that seemed possible last summer when the lira plunged precipitously, but safety is remote. The palpable threat of imminent collapse has given way to a sense of muddling through as the government unleashes credit to defer an inevitable reckoning… Turkey’s currency remains battered, while its foreign debts remain vast. Inflation and joblessness are alarmingly high. Economic growth is minimal, and anxiety considerable amid the sense that more trouble lies ahead… For Mr. Erdogan, all available choices entail peril. Most economists maintain that he must accept interest rates above the now-stultifying level of 24 percent to dissuade investors from abandoning Turkey. That should prevent the lira from falling further, limiting inflation. But it would also deprive businesses of capital, yielding bankruptcy and joblessness, while constraining economic growth… All signs now point to Mr. Erdogan’s forcing interest rates lower, while pumping credit to Turkish businesses and households. That should spur spending and economic growth, but at the cost of remaining faith in the currency, yielding more inflation and bank losses that risk eventually exploding into a full-blown crisis…LINK
While Turkey’s consumption and growth-led strategy has defied the predictions of its many critics up until now, the risk that it will surpass all limits is greater than ever in the current global economic conditions.
Nonetheless, most of those that would be likely to celebrate such a development are also deeply mired in their own economic problems, and the fallout from a generalized economic collapse in Turkey would have major ramifications throughout Europe, the Middle East and West Asia.
Oil and Gas Sectors
Turkey remains highly dependent on imported oil and gas, importing 92% of its crude oil and almost all of its natural gas. To address this it is pursuing several parallel strategies including developing energy relationships with a broader set of international partners and increasing use of domestic energy sources including renewables, nuclear, and coal.
Turkey is also hoping to rectify the chronic trade and current account deficits with oil and gas revenues, both from transit fees from pipelines as well as by greatly increasing domestic production.
Turkey’s aggressive exploration program in the eastern Mediterranean has caused a dramatic increase in geopolitical tension in the region and threatened to provoke a military clash with Greece in particular (backed by most members of the European Union) as maritime boundaries remain unresolved.
Turkey’s exploration efforts in the Black Sea have however been much more successful, and without the controversy and associated security risks, as all exploration activities have taken place within Turkey’s universally recognized maritime zone.
Turkey has increased LNG purchases from Qatar and the US this year, taking advantage of lower spot prices, and also looking to reduce gas imports from Russia and Iran. The LNG imports have also been facilitated by the expansion of Turkey’s LNG infrastructure capacity in recent years.
Although Turkey and Qatar have been keen to develop economic relations and infrastructure projects between the two countries, nothing has eventuated yet and they will require the cooperation of other countries for any major project to be successful. LINK
Major Gas Find in the Black Sea
In August President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey has discovered a field in the Black Sea holding an estimated 320 billion cubic metres of gas.
But he also said that the discovery – which he hopes will be providing energy to the national power grid by the time Turkey celebrates its centennial in 2023 – will not slow the push to explore for reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. The Black Sea find “is a sizable discovery, but we still need more gas,” a government official said. “Our demand will still be 70% imported,” when the Black Sea gas goes online. LINK
The State-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) decided to conduct exploration activities directly, and purchased three drilling ships with this objective — Fatih, Yavuz, and Kanuni, all named after Ottoman sultans — between 2017 and 2020, deploying them in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Fatih was instrumental in making the August discovery in the Black Sea.
Turkish authorities considered a potential collaboration with Russian and Iranian companies, but it seems less likely given current relations with both countries. Turkey has increasingly diverging interests with Tehran and Moscow in Syria and is also trying to reduce dependence on Russian and Iranian gas supplies.
Therefore, Turkey will likely be reluctant to add another dimension to this complex web of relations by inviting a Russian or Iranian company to the project. Turkish companies are more likely to partner with companies from friendly states with experience developing such complex and costly projects. TPAO has already partnered with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in upstream projects in the Caspian Sea. Given the fraternal relations between the two countries, which have only solidified in light of the recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, SOCAR’s engagement in the project is not excluded. Ankara’s unequivocal support for Baku in the conflict with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s increasingly growing share in natural gas supplies to Turkey could be easily translated into cooperation in the oil and gas sector as well. LINK1, LINK2
Exploration in the eastern Mediterranean
Turkey intensified its search for oil and gas in the offshore eastern Mediterranean in 2018, but has so far failed to discover any oil or gas in the region. The increased exploratory activity has however reignited unresolved maritime boundary disputes with its neighbours, particularly Greece and Cyprus, and led to an ongoing crisis in the region. Over the last couple of months its main survey vessel has had a military escort, which has been confronted at sea on numerous occasions by Greek navy ships.
Turkey also concluded a maritime boundary agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya in November last year in an attempt to consolidate its claims in the eastern Mediterranean.
The agreement has added additional fuel to the already extremely high tensions in the region, with Egypt and Greece signing an agreement several months ago which overlaps with the earlier agreement, and Turkey will not be able to continue exploratory activities in disputed areas in the eastern Mediterranean without provoking a major crisis, the imposition of sanctions by the European Union, and a real possibility of armed clashes with at least one of its neighbours.
Turkey’s other main hope for increasing revenues from the oil and gas sectors involves the generation of transit fees from major pipelines between production areas in the Middle East and Western Asia and markets in Europe.
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is 1,768 kilometres long and stretches from from the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan’s maritime zone in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The crude oil pipeline commenced operation in 2006, and has a capacity of up to 1 million barrels per day.
The pipeline cost US$3.9 billion to build, and employs around 1,000 people. 70% of the construction cost was funded by third parties, including the International Finance Corporation (a subsidiary of the World Bank), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the export credit agencies of seven countries, as well as a syndicate of 15 commercial banks.
The pipeline is owned and operated by BTC Co, in which 11 companies are shareholders (of which BP is the largest and has responsibility for operational management of the pipeline). The shareholders are BP (UK) 30.1%, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) (Azerbaijan) 25%, Chevron (US) 8.9%, Statoil (Norway) 8.71%, Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) (Turkey) 6.53%, Eni (Italy) 5%, Total (France) 5%, Itochu (Japan) 3.4%, Inpex (Japan) 2.5%, ExxonMobil (US) 2.5%, and ONGC Videsh (India) 2.36%.
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurium gas pipeline
The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline (also known as the BTE pipeline, Shah Deniz Pipeline, or South Caucasus Pipeline) is a natural gas pipeline from the Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to Turkey. The pipeline runs parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, and commenced operations in 2007.
The 42-inch diameter gas pipeline has been laid alongside the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline until Erzurum, where the latter turns south towards the Mediterranean. It is 692 kilometres long, of which 442 kilometres is in Azerbaijan and 248 kilometres in Georgia. The initial capacity of the pipeline was 8.8 billion cubic metres (310 billion cubic feet) of gas per year, and has since been expanded to up to 20 bcm per year.
The pipeline is owned and operated by the South Caucasus Pipeline Company, whose shareholders are BP (UK) 28.83%, TPAO (Turkey) 19%, SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 16.67%, Petronas (Malaysia) 15.5%, Lukoil (Russia) 10%, and Naftiran Intertrade (Iran) 10%.
Southern Gas Corridor
The construction of the Southern Gas Corridor, a chain of pipelines linking Azerbaijan to Italy, has cost $40 billion and the project is almost completed.
The Southern Gas Corridor’s main source of gas is the Shah Deniz field, located in the economic zone of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea. The project comprises three pipelines and has a total length of almost 4,000 km: The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) linking Azerbaijan with Georgia, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) linking Greece, Albania and Italy.
Onshore work on the pipeline has been completed in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
Sixteen wells have been drilled in the Shah Deniz gas field and are ready for operations. Eight of the wells are producing and gas is already flowing to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.
The rest will be gradually put on-stream once the final stretch in Italy is completed. Work on the TAP section of the gas corridor is over 90% completed and is estimated to be finished around the end of this year.
Turkey has been receiving gas in the pipeline since July 2018. It received approximately 2bcm in 2018, 4bcm in 2019, and in 2020 the supplies are expected to be about 6 bcm. Also, 2 bcm have been reserved for Greece and Bulgaria, which will be delivered once TAP enters operation.
A 25-year supply contract has been signed with Italy, and the first Azeri gas is expected to start flowing there before the end of 2020, with supplies estimated to be at 8+bcm per year.
The Azerbaijani government (Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan) owns 51% of the Southern Gas Corridor; the other 49% is owned by State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).
The project has also been strongly promoted by the European Union, and even the US, as an important diversification of its energy sources:
SGC is a multinational natural gas pipeline supported by the European Commission and financed by the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Despite the US has not invested and will not get any commercial benefit from the project, Washington supports TANAP due to its promotion of diversification of energy supplies… Energy resources in the Caspian Basin are important for the EU, and the geographical location of Azerbaijan makes it ideal and more optimal point for the transportation of these resources; SGC is not long-distance route as Nabucco, therefore, it is affordable in terms of costs; SGC will create competitive prices in the energy market, especially for Southern Europe at the first stage, and later for CEE countries; SGC will strengthen Turkey’s position as a transit country, and enhance the EU-Azerbaijan relations. LINK
The planned Nabucco pipeline was eventually abandoned by the project’s proponents in 2013.
Turkey and Azerbaijan having been steadily deepening their ties, a trend that has been boosted by the troubled relations of both with Armenia. Several other major infrastructure projects apart from the Southern Gas Corridor also reflect the strength of their developing relationship:
Since the dissolution of USSR, the Azerbaijan-Turkey axis has brought positive trends both in the political and economic fields. For instance, despite several issues and obstacles at the end of XX century, Azerbaijan and Turkey managed to implement the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (oil pipeline), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (gas pipeline), and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (railway) projects and strengthen their geopolitical benefits in the world arena. Following this, TANAP project Turkey will gain a strategic momentum against Russia in the context of ensuring energy flow, especially to Europe in the near future.
Turkstream Gas Pipeline
TurkStream connects the gas transmission systems of Russia and Turkey. The gas pipeline has two strings with a combined throughput capacity of 31.5 billion cubic metres, and is 930 kilometres long.
The first string delivers gas to Turkey, while the second string is intended for gas transit to southern and south-eastern Europe through Turkish territory.
The Russian end of the TurkStream pipeline is the Russkaya compressor station, which is part of Russia’s Unified Gas Supply System and is located near Anapa. The compressor station has a capacity of 224 MW, sufficient to supply the pressure required for transmitting gas along the pipeline’s two strings up to the Turkish coast where the gas enters the receiving terminal.
The pipelaying for TurkStream took 15 months and was completed ahead of schedule in November 2018. The construction of the receiving terminal near Kiyikoy in Turkey was finished in 2019, and the project was officially inaugurated in January of this year. LINK
Conclusion
Although Turkey’s strategic location means it is well placed to capitalize on the major oil and gas projects between the Caspian Sea, southern Russia, the Middle East and Europe, its expansionist foreign policy coupled with an aggressive negotiating approach has made it an undesirable project partner for many countries which will only reluctantly be engaged when there is no alternative.
While Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria did not concern the European Union greatly, its stand-off with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean is another matter and risks exposing it to sanctions from its major trading partner. After the latest outbreak in hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey seems to have realized that the confrontation with Greece is a step to far, apart from being unnecessary at the moment. This would explain the decision to stop exploration activities in disputed parts of the eastern Mediterranean for the moment.
The decision to simultaneously confront Russia, Europe and the US is a dangerous policy, particularly when Turkey is also pursuing expansionist and provocative policies with many of its immediate neighbours. Unless Turkey’s political and military leadership begins to take a more conciliatory approach, it could find it has played its allies and adversaries off against each other one time too many.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Turkish F-16 Fighter Jets Spotted In Azerbaijani Airport

Two F-16 fighter jets believed to be of the Turkish Air Force have been spotted in Azerbaijan ’ s Ganja International Airport .
On October 7 , New York Times journalist Christiaan Triebert shared satellite images showing two F-16s and a possible CN-235 cargo aircraft in the Azerbaijani airport .
The fighter jets are most likely belonging to the Turkish Air Force .
The new images , which were taken on October 3 , are an evidence of Turkish involvement in the ongoing battle between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
The Ministry of Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in Azerbaijan ’ s aerial operations over Nagorno-Karabakh , a few days after the outbreak of the battle in the region on September 27 .
On September 29 , Armenia announced that one of its Su-25 fighter jets was shot down by a Turkish F-16 that took off from Ganja Airport in Azerbaijan .
Five days after the incident , Armenian forces carried out a large rocket strike on Ganja Airport .
The strike reportedly targeted Turkish military assists deployed in the airport .
Beside supporting Azerbaijan ’ s aerial operations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Syrian militants on Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s front lines .
Ankara ’ s real role in the ongoing conflict appears to be larger than what was officially declared .
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Two F-16 fighter jets believed to be of the Turkish Air Force have been spotted in Azerbaijan’s Ganja International Airport.
On October 7, New York Times journalist Christiaan Triebert shared satellite images showing two F-16s and a possible CN-235 cargo aircraft in the Azerbaijani airport. The fighter jets are most likely belonging to the Turkish Air Force.
The new images, which were taken on October 3, are an evidence of Turkish involvement in the ongoing battle between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
We compared the approximate measurements and visual characteristics (canard wings, color, etc.) with a variety of aircraft, including those operated by the Azerbaijani Air Force (MiG-21, MiG-29, Su-25, L-39). The Turkish-operated F-16 is the closest match. pic.twitter.com/dRCGUshyYp — Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc) October 7, 2020
The Ministry of Defense of Armenia accused Turkey of playing a role in Azerbaijan’s aerial operations over Nagorno-Karabakh, a few days after the outbreak of the battle in the region on September 27.
On September 29, Armenia announced that one of its Su-25 fighter jets was shot down by a Turkish F-16 that took off from Ganja Airport in Azerbaijan.
Five days after the incident, Armenian forces carried out a large rocket strike on Ganja Airport. The strike reportedly targeted Turkish military assists deployed in the airport.
Beside supporting Azerbaijan’s aerial operations, Turkey was behind the deployment of hundreds of Syrian militants on Nagorno-Karabakh’s front lines. Ankara’s real role in the ongoing conflict appears to be larger than what was officially declared.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Artsakh President Announced Major Counter-Attack (Video)

On October 7 , President of the de-facto state of Artsakh [ Nagorno-Karabakh ] Arayik Harutyunyan announced that his forces had launched a major counter attack against the Azerbaijani Armed Forces .
This video shows Armenian strikes on positions of Azerbaijani forces and their impact : In an official statement , Harutyunyan said his forces had , thus far , recaptured a position and lift the siege of 19 soldiers who had been fighting on their own for several days .
Earlier today , the Ministry of Defense of Armenia released videos showing some of the heavy losses Azerbaijani forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his interview with Russian edition RBK spoke about the success of the Karabakh army in the Jabrayil front .
According to him , the Azerbaijani side faced a crushing blow there .
“ Taking into account the information that came in the early morning , we can say that the tactic used by the Karabakh military leaders worked — they took tactical steps in the South , left the corridor and lured the Azerbaijani military corps there , ” the Armenian Prime Minister said .
Armenian sources are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ video that surfaced on social media shows the bodies of three dead Azerbaijani soldiers near an abandoned battle tank in an unspecified position that was recently recaptured .
In the last few days , Azerbaijani forces advanced in Nagorno-Karabakh capturing several towns and villages .
Armenian forces sustained heavy losses .
Now , Armenian forces , backed by hundreds of volunteers , are attempting to push Azerbaijani troops back .
This will not likely be an easy task .
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On October 7, President of the de-facto state of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] Arayik Harutyunyan announced that his forces had launched a major counter attack against the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
This video shows Armenian strikes on positions of Azerbaijani forces and their impact:
In an official statement, Harutyunyan said his forces had, thus far, recaptured a position and lift the siege of 19 soldiers who had been fighting on their own for several days.
“The Azerbaijanis were soundly routed as a result of this combined operation, leaving behind military equipment, armour and over 100 dead,” Harutyunyan said in the statement, without providing any additional details.
Earlier today, the Ministry of Defense of Armenia released videos showing some of the heavy losses Azerbaijani forces sustained in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Today, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his interview with Russian edition RBK spoke about the success of the Karabakh army in the Jabrayil front. According to him, the Azerbaijani side faced a crushing blow there.
“Taking into account the information that came in the early morning, we can say that the tactic used by the Karabakh military leaders worked — they took tactical steps in the South, left the corridor and lured the Azerbaijani military corps there,” the Armenian Prime Minister said.
Azerbaijan called these claims “unfounded and false”.
Armenian sources are sharing more footage now. A new video that surfaced on social media shows the bodies of three dead Azerbaijani soldiers near an abandoned battle tank in an unspecified position that was recently recaptured.
In the last few days, Azerbaijani forces advanced in Nagorno-Karabakh capturing several towns and villages. Armenian forces sustained heavy losses.
Now, Armenian forces, backed by hundreds of volunteers, are attempting to push Azerbaijani troops back. This will not likely be an easy task.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Azerbaijani MoD Shared Footage Of Recently-Captured Armenian Positions, Equipment

On October 6 and 7 , the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan shared videos of recently-captured Armenian positions in the @ @ @ @ @ The videos show abandoned military positions in the towns of Shaybey , Shukurbeyli and Chaxirli @ @ @ @ @ out of this three villages and many others by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces over the @ @ @ @ @ Azerbaijani MoD and other sources also shared videos documenting some of the weapons and equipment @ @ @ @ @ The videos show three T-72 battle tanks , three D-30 howitzers as well as many @ @ @ @ @ Most of the captured weapons and equipment appeared to be damaged to some extent .
@ @ @ @ @ losses since the outbreak of the battle in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 27 .
But so @ @ @ @ @ The battle in Nagorno-Karabakh is escalating .
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces are now exchanging artillery @ @ @ @ @ .
Moreover , both sides are developing their operations on the ground .
MORE ON @ @ @

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On October 6 and 7, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan shared videos of recently-captured Armenian positions in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The videos show abandoned military positions in the towns of Shaybey, Shukurbeyli and Chaxirli. Armenian forces were pushed out of this three villages and many others by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces over the last few days.
The Azerbaijani MoD and other sources also shared videos documenting some of the weapons and equipment seized from Armenian forces.
The videos show three T-72 battle tanks, three D-30 howitzers as well as many military vehicles and trucks. Most of the captured weapons and equipment appeared to be damaged to some extent.
Armenian forces have sustained serious losses since the outbreak of the battle in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 27. But so do the Azerbaijani side.
The battle in Nagorno-Karabakh is escalating. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces are now exchanging artillery fire on a daily basis. Moreover, both sides are developing their operations on the ground.
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southfront--2020-10-07--Armenians Fight Back Against Azerbaijani Advance, Strike Key Oil Pipeline

Armenian forces launched a missile attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan ( BTC ) oil pipeline , according to Azerbaijan .
The country ’ s prosecutors said that Armenian forces had carried out the attack , which was prevented by the Azerbaijani military , on the pipeline in Yevlah at around 9 p.m. local time on October 6 .
The incident was described as a “ terrorist act ” .
The BTC pipeline delivers Azeri light crude oil ( mainly from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field ) through Georgia to Turkey ’ s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan for export via tankers .
Another crucial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become a potential target of Armenian attacks is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline , which connects the giant Shah Deniz gas field with Europe through Georgia and Turkey .
The Armenian side denounced the Azerbaijani report as fake news .
Both Azerbaijan and Armenia regularly accuse each other of striking civilian and infrastructure objects on their sovereign territory and denounce the opponent ’ s claims as propaganda and fakes .
It is interesting to note that just a few hours earlier Vahram Poghosyan , the press secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh ( Artsakh ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delivered powerful missile and rocket strikes on military objects in large Azerbaijani towns destroying multiple pieces of equipment and eliminating the enemy .
The Azerbaijani official narrative provides a similar position that Azerbaijani forces are pulverizing Armenian military targets .
Meanwhile , Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov threatened Armenia with “ using the weapons with great destructive power ” to deliver strikes on “ the military-strategic infrastructure ” of Armenia if it employs its Iskander operational-tactical missile systems against Azerbaijani forces .
However , it does not seem that the Armenian political leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its means and forces to fight back in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region .
Instead , the government of Nikol Pashinyan is now mostly focused on the diplomatic campaign in Western media in an attempt to convince the so-called international community to help it to keep control over Karabakh .
Mr. Pashinyan , who just a few days ago was promising to inflict a military defeat on what he called the Azerbaijani-Turkish terror alliance even declared that Armenia is ready for mutual concessions .
Nonetheless , Baku and Ankara do not seem to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the resumption of negotiations at the present time .
On the frontline in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region itself , the main hot point is the district of Jabrayil .
Using the worsening weather conditions ( fog and thick clouds ) , which complicate the work of Azerbaijani combat drones , Armenian forces were able to stabilize the frontline and prevent further gains of the Azerbaijani military in this part of Karabakh .
On October 7 , Armenia even claimed that a large-scale Azerbaijani attack had been repelled in the area .
The Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multiple equipment pieces were left by Azerbaijan on the battlefield .
Meanwhile , Armenian forces and cities of the region are still subjected to intense artillery bombardment by the Azerbaijani military .
Heavy destruction was inflicted on the city of Stepanakert .
As soon as the weather improves , Azerbaijan with help from Turkey will likely resume active drone strikes and launch a new phase of the ground offensive along the contact line .

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Armenian forces launched a missile attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, according to Azerbaijan. The country’s prosecutors said that Armenian forces had carried out the attack, which was prevented by the Azerbaijani military, on the pipeline in Yevlah at around 9 p.m. local time on October 6. The incident was described as a “terrorist act”.
The BTC pipeline delivers Azeri light crude oil (mainly from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field) through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan for export via tankers. Another crucial Azerbaijani energy infrastructure object, which could become a potential target of Armenian attacks is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, which connects the giant Shah Deniz gas field with Europe through Georgia and Turkey. The Armenian side denounced the Azerbaijani report as fake news. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia regularly accuse each other of striking civilian and infrastructure objects on their sovereign territory and denounce the opponent’s claims as propaganda and fakes.
It is interesting to note that just a few hours earlier Vahram Poghosyan, the press secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) President, claimed that Armenian forces had delivered powerful missile and rocket strikes on military objects in large Azerbaijani towns destroying multiple pieces of equipment and eliminating the enemy. The Azerbaijani official narrative provides a similar position that Azerbaijani forces are pulverizing Armenian military targets.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov threatened Armenia with “using the weapons with great destructive power” to deliver strikes on “the military-strategic infrastructure” of Armenia if it employs its Iskander operational-tactical missile systems against Azerbaijani forces.
However, it does not seem that the Armenian political leadership is ready to employ all the variety of its means and forces to fight back in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region. Instead, the government of Nikol Pashinyan is now mostly focused on the diplomatic campaign in Western media in an attempt to convince the so-called international community to help it to keep control over Karabakh. Mr. Pashinyan, who just a few days ago was promising to inflict a military defeat on what he called the Azerbaijani-Turkish terror alliance even declared that Armenia is ready for mutual concessions. Nonetheless, Baku and Ankara do not seem to be ready for a new ceasefire and the resumption of negotiations at the present time.
On the frontline in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region itself, the main hot point is the district of Jabrayil. Using the worsening weather conditions (fog and thick clouds), which complicate the work of Azerbaijani combat drones, Armenian forces were able to stabilize the frontline and prevent further gains of the Azerbaijani military in this part of Karabakh. On October 7, Armenia even claimed that a large-scale Azerbaijani attack had been repelled in the area. The Defense Ministry claimed that over 60 dead and multiple equipment pieces were left by Azerbaijan on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, Armenian forces and cities of the region are still subjected to intense artillery bombardment by the Azerbaijani military. Heavy destruction was inflicted on the city of Stepanakert. As soon as the weather improves, Azerbaijan with help from Turkey will likely resume active drone strikes and launch a new phase of the ground offensive along the contact line.
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