southfront--2020-05-27--Russian Warplanes In Libya

Russian Warplanes In Libya

The US has finally discovered whom to blame for the ongoing escalation of the conflict in Libya .
On May 26 , the US African Command ( AFRICOM ) claimed that Russia had deployed warplanes to Libya to support the Libyan National Army of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar .
It said that Russia is expanding its “ military footprint in Africa using government-supported mercenary groups like Wagner ” .
According to the US military , “ If Russia seizes basing on Libya ’ s coast , the next logical step is they deploy permanent long-range anti-access area denial ( A2AD @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ will create very real security concerns on Europe ’ s southern flank ” .
On top of this , it declared , as might be expected , that it is the Russians who are destabilizing the situation in the country ; like there was no 2011 NATO invasion that destroyed Libyan statehood and threw the country into a state of permanent chaos .
To make the fearmongering more successful , the Pentagon released shady undated photos of Russian MiG-29 , Su-24 , Su-34 , and Su-35s flying at undisclosed locations and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Libya with a single MiG-29 .
Earlier in May , sources loyal to the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord reported that the Libyan National Army received 8 fighter jets restored thanks to Russian assistance : six MiG-29s and two Sukhoi 24s .
Then , pro-Turkish sources also shared an image of the Al-Jufra air field with a single MiG-29 fighter jet to confirm their claims .
Where the rest of the air fleet supposedly supplied by Moscow to Haftar forces might be remains unclear .
Another interesting question is where are those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ US and Turkish officials like to mention in their reports .
While the presence of some Russian PMCs in the country is an open secret , photo and video evidence on the ground demonstrate that the scale of their presence is highly overestimated by mainstream media and Western diplomats .
Additionally , Moscow ’ s actions demonstrate that it prefers to avoid a direct involvement in the conflict .
However , if Turkey and NATO member states continue sending their own military specialists , weapons and military equipment to radical , al-Qaeda-like militant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Government of National Accord , Russia really could consider joining more directly the efforts of the UAE and Egypt , who back the Libyan National Army .
Until now , Moscow has been mostly focused on providing a distant diplomatic support to them .
Meanwhile , the number of militants deployed by Turkey from Syria ’ s northwest to Libya to fight on the side of the Government of National Accord reportedly reached 8,000 .
A large part of them either sympathizes with al-Qaeda ideology or has been directly involved in cooperation with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria , Hayat Tahrir al-Sham .
Over the past years , the Libyan National Army has broken the backs of al-Qaeda-linked groups and cleared them from most of the country .
The local branch of ISIS also lost its positions in northern Libya due to its inability to come to an understanding with pro-GNA forces and their foreign backers .
But now , the growing terrorist threat is once again becoming an important factor of the conflict .

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The US has finally discovered whom to blame for the ongoing escalation of the conflict in Libya.
On May 26, the US African Command (AFRICOM) claimed that Russia had deployed warplanes to Libya to support the Libyan National Army of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. It said that Russia is expanding its “military footprint in Africa using government-supported mercenary groups like Wagner”. According to the US military, “If Russia seizes basing on Libya’s coast, the next logical step is they deploy permanent long-range anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities.” This, AFRICOM warned, “will create very real security concerns on Europe’s southern flank”. On top of this, it declared, as might be expected, that it is the Russians who are destabilizing the situation in the country; like there was no 2011 NATO invasion that destroyed Libyan statehood and threw the country into a state of permanent chaos.
To make the fearmongering more successful, the Pentagon released shady undated photos of Russian MiG-29, Su-24, Su-34, and Su-35s flying at undisclosed locations and an image of the Al-Jufra air field in Libya with a single MiG-29.
Earlier in May, sources loyal to the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord reported that the Libyan National Army received 8 fighter jets restored thanks to Russian assistance: six MiG-29s and two Sukhoi 24s. Then, pro-Turkish sources also shared an image of the Al-Jufra air field with a single MiG-29 fighter jet to confirm their claims. Where the rest of the air fleet supposedly supplied by Moscow to Haftar forces might be remains unclear. Another interesting question is where are those hordes of Russian private military contractors that US and Turkish officials like to mention in their reports. While the presence of some Russian PMCs in the country is an open secret, photo and video evidence on the ground demonstrate that the scale of their presence is highly overestimated by mainstream media and Western diplomats. Additionally, Moscow’s actions demonstrate that it prefers to avoid a direct involvement in the conflict.
However, if Turkey and NATO member states continue sending their own military specialists, weapons and military equipment to radical, al-Qaeda-like militant groups operating under the brand of the Government of National Accord, Russia really could consider joining more directly the efforts of the UAE and Egypt, who back the Libyan National Army. Until now, Moscow has been mostly focused on providing a distant diplomatic support to them.
Meanwhile, the number of militants deployed by Turkey from Syria’s northwest to Libya to fight on the side of the Government of National Accord reportedly reached 8,000. A large part of them either sympathizes with al-Qaeda ideology or has been directly involved in cooperation with the former official branch of al-Qaeda in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Over the past years, the Libyan National Army has broken the backs of al-Qaeda-linked groups and cleared them from most of the country. The local branch of ISIS also lost its positions in northern Libya due to its inability to come to an understanding with pro-GNA forces and their foreign backers. But now, the growing terrorist threat is once again becoming an important factor of the conflict.
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southfront--2020-05-27--Libyan Army Showcases Remains Of Suicide Drone Used By Turkish Forces (Photos)

On May 27 , the Libyan National Army ( LNA ) showcased the remains of a Turkish-made KARGU suicide drone that targeted its troops near the country ’ s capital , Tripoli .
According to the army , the drone took off from the Mitiga International Airport , east of Tripoli , where Turkish forces are known to be present .
The drone targeted army troops near the town of Ain Zara .
Developed by Turkey ’ s defense contractor STM , KARGU can carry out reconnaissance and attack missions .
The drone has a rage of 15 km and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with an explosive charge .
KARGU drones can operate in a swarm and have an artificial intelligence ( AI ) image processing capabilities , including facial recognition .
Turkey ’ s KARGU drones were not spotted in Libya before .
Nevertheless , this was not the first time Turkish forces used suicide drones against the LNA .
Earlier this year , LNA forces uncovered the wreckage of an IAI Harop loitering munition near the village of Hamada in eastern Libya .
Turkish forces likely attempted to target one of the army ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ON THIS TOPIC : • US AFRICOM : Russia Deployed Fighter Aircraft To Support “ State-Sponsored Private Military Contractors ” In Libya

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On May 27, the Libyan National Army (LNA) showcased the remains of a Turkish-made KARGU suicide drone that targeted its troops near the country’s capital, Tripoli.
According to the army, the drone took off from the Mitiga International Airport, east of Tripoli, where Turkish forces are known to be present. The drone targeted army troops near the town of Ain Zara.
Developed by Turkey’s defense contractor STM, KARGU can carry out reconnaissance and attack missions. The drone has a rage of 15 km and an endurance of up to 30 minute with an explosive charge.
KARGU drones can operate in a swarm and have an artificial intelligence (AI) image processing capabilities, including facial recognition.
Turkey’s KARGU drones were not spotted in Libya before. Nevertheless, this was not the first time Turkish forces used suicide drones against the LNA.
Earlier this year, LNA forces uncovered the wreckage of an IAI Harop loitering munition near the village of Hamada in eastern Libya. Turkish forces likely attempted to target one of the army’s air-defense systems with the munition.
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southfront--2020-05-27--Russian Warplanes Pound ISIS Remnants Around Homs Desert As Ground Operations Continue (Photos)

On May 27 , warplanes of the Russian Aerospace Forces carried out a series of airstrikes on ISIS remnants around @ @ @ @ @ Syria .
According to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights ( SOHR ) , @ @ @ @ @ Raqqa countryside , which borders the northeastern part of the Homs desert .
The National @ @ @ @ @ are currently conducting a large-scale operation against ISIS cells in southwestern Raqqa .
Russian journalist @ @ @ @ @ the ongoing operation a few days ago .
ISIS launched a series of fierce attacks @ @ @ @ @ the last few months .
The Syrian Arab Army ( SAA ) and its allies @ @ @ @ @ combing operations .
The recent operations have forced ISIS remnants to abandon many areas around @ @ @ @ @ terrorist group also sustained heavy losses .
Nevertheless , more efforts will be needed to @ @ @ @ @ s cells in the central region .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Turkish Helicopters @ @ @ @ @ On M4 Highway In Syria ’ s Greater Idlib ( Videos )

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On May 27, warplanes of the Russian Aerospace Forces carried out a series of airstrikes on ISIS remnants around the Homs desert in central Syria.
According to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the airstrikes targeted the southwestern Raqqa countryside, which borders the northeastern part of the Homs desert.
The National Defense Forces (NDF) are currently conducting a large-scale operation against ISIS cells in southwestern Raqqa. Russian journalist Oleg Blokhin shared photos of the ongoing operation a few days ago.
ISIS launched a series of fierce attacks from the Homs desert in the last few months. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies responded with a series of combing operations.
The recent operations have forced ISIS remnants to abandon many areas around the Homs desert. The terrorist group also sustained heavy losses. Nevertheless, more efforts will be needed to fully neutralize the group’s cells in the central region.
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southfront--2020-05-27--Turkish Helicopters Evacuate Injured Fighters After Attack On M4 Highway In Syria’s Greater Idlib (V

Turkish Helicopters Evacuate Injured Fighters After Attack On M4 Highway In Syria’s Greater Idlib (Videos)

On May 27 , a convoy of the Turkish military and one of its proxy groups , the Sham Legion , was targeted on the M4 highway in the northwestern Syrian region of Greater Idlib .
As a result of the attack , a Turkish soldier and an officer were severely injured .
Turkish military helicopters evacuated service members from the explosion site .
Some sources said an improvised explosive devices ( IED ) struck the convoy as it was moving on the highway , near the town of al-Gassaneyah .
Others claimed that the Turkish convoy was damaged by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party ( TIP ) .
The mysterious large explosion wiped out the headquarters .
At least six Ughur members of the TIP were reportedly killed in the explosion .
According to several opposition sources , the Russian Military Police and the Turkish military planned to carry out a joint patrol on the M4 highway on May 27 .
After the recent incidents , the patrol was apparently canceled .
Turkey committed to open the M4 highway , which links the cities of Lattakia and Aleppo , under the March 5 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is yet to happen as terrorists are still blocking several parts of the highway .
This was not the first attack on Turkish forces attempting to secure the M4 .
Last March , a Turkish service member was killed in a similar explosion .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Mysterious Explosion Wipes Out Terrorist Headquarter Near M4 Highway In Syria ’ s Idlib ( Photos )

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On May 27, a convoy of the Turkish military and one of its proxy groups, the Sham Legion, was targeted on the M4 highway in the northwestern Syrian region of Greater Idlib.
As a result of the attack, a Turkish soldier and an officer were severely injured. Turkish military helicopters evacuated service members from the explosion site.
Some sources said an improvised explosive devices (IED) struck the convoy as it was moving on the highway, near the town of al-Gassaneyah. Others claimed that the Turkish convoy was damaged by an explosion at a headquarters of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
The mysterious large explosion wiped out the headquarters. At least six Ughur members of the TIP were reportedly killed in the explosion.
According to several opposition sources, the Russian Military Police and the Turkish military planned to carry out a joint patrol on the M4 highway on May 27. After the recent incidents, the patrol was apparently canceled.
Turkey committed to open the M4 highway, which links the cities of Lattakia and Aleppo, under the March 5 agreement with Russia. However, this is yet to happen as terrorists are still blocking several parts of the highway.
This was not the first attack on Turkish forces attempting to secure the M4. Last March, a Turkish service member was killed in a similar explosion.
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southfront--2020-05-27--Military Situation In Area Of Libya’s Tripoli On May 27, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya : • The US claims @ @ @ @ @ to Libya to support the Libyan National Army ( LNA ) ; • GNA forces @ @ @ @ @ but failed to recapture it from the LNA ; • Multiple drone strikes were reported @ @ @ @ @ .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Libya On May 25 , @ @ @ @ @

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Libya:
The US claims that Russia sent fighter jets to Libya to support the Libyan National Army (LNA);
Government of National Accord (GNA) forces shelled LNA positions at Al-Kazerma, Ain-Zara, Fatima Al Zahra, Al-Naklia;
GNA forces attacked Qasr bin Ghashir, but failed to recapture it from the LNA;
Multiple drone strikes were reported in the area of Tarhunah.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
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southfront--2020-05-27--North Koreans Keep Southerners Guessing Over Ceasefire Violation

The United Nations Command ( UNC ) said Tuesday that it could not ‘ definitively ’ determine whether North Korea started a recent exchange of gunfire with South Korea intentionally or by mistake but found that both sides violated the armistice agreement .
The U.S.-led UNC , which is commanded by a US general and administers the Demilitarized Zone ( DMZ ) and enforces the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War , came to the conclusion after an investigation into the incident that lasted several weeks .
During the exchange of fire which occurred on the 3rd of May @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a South Korean guard post , and South Korean troops returned fire .
According to South Korea ’ s Joint Chiefs of Staff , the South Korean troops fired about 15 rounds with a K-3 machine gun at the North Korean guard post from where the initial shots were fired .
Upon learning that the North had used a 14.5-millimeter anti-aircraft machine gun , however , the South fired another 15 rounds with a 12.7-mm K-6 heavy machine gun ‘ in accordance with the principle of proportional responses.
’ Right after the gunfire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the North and called for an explanation , but Pyongyang still has not responded .
It was the first exchange of gunfire between South and North Korea in years .
Under the Comprehensive Military Agreement signed in September 2018 , the two Koreas agreed to halt all hostile acts against each other , a move aimed at reducing tensions and building trust .
The DMZ , which is about 250 kilometres long and 4 km wide , is one of the world ’ s most heavily fortified borders and has often been a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the incident , the UNC dispatched a multinational special investigation team for a probe , which was observed by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in an attempt to ensure transparency and fairness , the command said , adding that the South Korean military fully cooperated with the investigation .
Earlier , South Korean military authorities said they believe the incident was not an intentional provocation based upon evidence secured from various intelligence sources .
According to the UNC investigation , North Korea committed the first violation as it fired four rounds of 14.5-millimeter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the northern side of the inter-Korean border which hit a South Korean guard post ( without causing any casualties ) .
The UN Command invited the North Korean military to provide information on the case , and the North acknowledged receipt of the request .
But it has not offered a formal response .
South Korea also violated the armistice by responding ‘ with two volleys of gunfire ’ toward North Korea , according to UNC .
South Korea ’ s defence ministry expressed regret that the UNC drew the conclusion without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea ’ s motives , and claimed that the South responded to the North ’ s gunfire appropriately and in accordance with a response manual .
The future of the peace dialogues appear bleak at the moment as both sides appear to be moving further away from the preliminary concessions and confidence-building measures taken to facilitate negotiations and explore additional steps to build cooperation and trust .
Although South Korean President Moon Jae-in has recently expressed the hope that cooperation projects can still progress in several fields , and in March North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to his counterpart expressing his belief that South Korea would prevail over the Coronavirus outbreak , and his wish for the good health of his compatriots in the south , recent developments are threatening to decisively derail the peace process for what could be a long time .
In this respect , the South Korean president ’ s belated efforts to keep the peace process alive also seem to be facing determined resistance from within his own military leadership as well as from the US .
Apart from the demand that the North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ substantive reciprocal measures will be taken , the military are still conducting what can easily be construed as aggressive exercises and ‘ war games ’ in areas near the 38th parallel that have been the location of armed confrontation in the past .
Perhaps , South Korea ’ s military leadership would point out that the North also conducts military exercises and war games too .
This is true : for instance , reported on 28 February of this year : They could also point out that numerous South Korea-US military exercises and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down considerably as gestures of good faith over the last couple of years .
This is certainly also correct , and has helped alleviate the hostility and tension that has characterized relations on the Korean Peninsula since the end of World War II .
The respective claims in this respect must be evaluated against the nature , scale and stated ( as well as probable but unstated ) purposes and objectives of such events .
How long will it take for a joint North-South mutual defence and assistance drill to be held ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scaling back of such exercises and drills is also a measure that can be reversed within a matter of hours ; this is definitely not the case if the North dismantles its nuclear weapons , which would probably be impossible to replace once given up .
Its nuclear arsenal is , moreover , the only real deterrent against a possible attack by the US , which has demonstrated time and time again its willingness , if not downright enthusiasm , triumphalism and glee , for launching wars of aggression ( sometimes called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ US , presumably to avoid any parallel with the Nuremburg Trials ) in flagrant violation of the most fundamental precepts and norms of international and also US law .
On the 6th of May , South Korea held military exercises around several islands near North Korea ’ s maritime border .
In response , a spokesperson for the Ministry of the People ’ s Armed Forces of the Democratic People ’ s Republic of Korea made public the following statement on the 8th of May : “ On Wednesday , the south Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hotspot waters in the West Sea of Korea with the involvement of more than twenty fighters of F-15K , KF-16 , F-4E and FA-50 belonging to the air combat command of the Air Force and storm boats under the Navy ’ s 2nd Fleet and others .
Such reckless move of the military warmongers of the south side … does not help the efforts to defuse tension on the Korean peninsula .
Everything is now going back to the starting point before the north-south summit meeting in 2018 .
The recent joint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sea in the biggest hotspot area in the West Sea of Korea in which military conflicts occurred between the north and the south in the past , and it was openly launched , assuming that there were a “ strange sign ” and “ provocation ” from us .
What merits more attention is that the south Korean military staged the said military drill while calling us their “ enemy.
” This is a grave provocation which can never be overlooked and this situation demands a necessary reaction from us… The south Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the joint military drill aimed at improving its capability to cope with the north ’ s firepower and surprise “ provocation ” and at striking the base of the “ enemy ’ s provocation ” and repelling the forces supporting it .
The reckless military provocation by the south Korean military is a total denial … ( of ) the north-south agreement … to stop all the hostile acts against the other party on the ground and in the sea and air , to turn the West Sea zone into the peaceful waters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ served as an opportunity which awakened us once again to the obvious fact that the enemies remain enemies all the time .
Should we remain a passive onlooker when the enemy gets zealous while openly calling for an attack on us ?
” ( LINK ) On 15 May the Korea Herald reported : “ A presidential spokesman confirmed in mid-May that it convened a meeting with military officials in charge of public relations with regard to North Korea ’ s strong criticism of South Korea ’ s recent border island drills , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media-related policy , not to “ reprimand ” the military .
The meeting concerned the revelation of an unannounced joint exercise conducted by the Navy and the Air Force on the 6th of May .
The next day , an official daily , affiliated with the Ministry of Defence , reported the training staged in the vicinity of northwestern islets near the sea border with the North .
The North ’ s military then issued a statement describing the action as a grave provocation .
It said the military practice was a reminder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the time.
” It added , “ Everything is now going back to the starting point before the North-South summit meeting in 2018.
” Pyongyang ’ s angry response came at a time when the Moon Jae-in administration is seeking to resume inter-Korean cooperation , especially against the coronavirus .
The presidential spokesman said the Cheong Wa Dae session was meant to review media-related policy , not military drills or operation.
” On the 18th of May Chosun Media group reported : Meanwhile , the US continues to take similar provocative steps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to keep tensions high and reinforce North Korea ’ s reluctance to unilaterally dismantle its nuclear deterrent capabilities , on Tuesday a Pentagon official asserted that the United States ’ nuclear forces are ready and deter all adversaries , including potentially North Korea .
The Pentagon official said during a virtual seminar hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies : The remarks follow a report in North Korean state media on Sunday that leader Kim Jong-un presided over a Central Military Commission meeting in which they discussed “ new policies for further @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country.
” ( LINK ) U.S. President Donald Trump has held three meetings with Kim , but progress has stalled as the US insists that the North completely dismantle its nuclear arsenal before any reciprocal steps will be considered , and the North has demanded sanctions relief and other concessions in return for suspending nuclear and missile tests .
The two sides last held working-level negotiations in October , however experts expect little action before the November presidential election in the U.S. MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Kim ’ s New ‘ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : South Korea

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The United Nations Command (UNC) said Tuesday that it could not ‘definitively’ determine whether North Korea started a recent exchange of gunfire with South Korea intentionally or by mistake but found that both sides violated the armistice agreement.
The U.S.-led UNC, which is commanded by a US general and administers the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and enforces the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War, came to the conclusion after an investigation into the incident that lasted several weeks. During the exchange of fire which occurred on the 3rd of May, four bullets from the North hit a South Korean guard post, and South Korean troops returned fire.
According to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, the South Korean troops fired about 15 rounds with a K-3 machine gun at the North Korean guard post from where the initial shots were fired. Upon learning that the North had used a 14.5-millimeter anti-aircraft machine gun, however, the South fired another 15 rounds with a 12.7-mm K-6 heavy machine gun ‘in accordance with the principle of proportional responses.’
Right after the gunfire, South Korea sent a notice to the North and called for an explanation, but Pyongyang still has not responded.
It was the first exchange of gunfire between South and North Korea in years. Under the Comprehensive Military Agreement signed in September 2018, the two Koreas agreed to halt all hostile acts against each other, a move aimed at reducing tensions and building trust.
The DMZ, which is about 250 kilometres long and 4 km wide, is one of the world’s most heavily fortified borders and has often been a flashpoint between the rival Koreas.
Following the incident, the UNC dispatched a multinational special investigation team for a probe, which was observed by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in an attempt to ensure transparency and fairness, the command said, adding that the South Korean military fully cooperated with the investigation.
Earlier, South Korean military authorities said they believe the incident was not an intentional provocation based upon evidence secured from various intelligence sources.
According to the UNC investigation, North Korea committed the first violation as it fired four rounds of 14.5-millimeter small arms from its guard post located on the northern side of the inter-Korean border which hit a South Korean guard post (without causing any casualties).
The UN Command invited the North Korean military to provide information on the case, and the North acknowledged receipt of the request. But it has not offered a formal response.
South Korea also violated the armistice by responding ‘with two volleys of gunfire’ toward North Korea, according to UNC.
“Based on the investigation’s comprehensive findings, UNC personnel will engage in follow-on discussions with both sides to encourage an implementation of measures to prevent a recurrence of Armistice violations,” the command said. According to Article 1 of the agreement, neither side “shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone.”
South Korea’s defence ministry expressed regret that the UNC drew the conclusion without being able to complete its investigation of North Korea’s motives, and claimed that the South responded to the North’s gunfire appropriately and in accordance with a response manual.
“We will continue to fully implement the Sept. 19 military agreement and take other measures to ease military tensions and to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula,” the ministry said, citing the inter-Korean military pact signed in 2018. Noting that the armistice agreement is meant to minimize the risk of incidents such as gunfire exchange, UNC said it will continue to identify and implement ways to improve conditions for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula…”
The future of the peace dialogues appear bleak at the moment as both sides appear to be moving further away from the preliminary concessions and confidence-building measures taken to facilitate negotiations and explore additional steps to build cooperation and trust. Although South Korean President Moon Jae-in has recently expressed the hope that cooperation projects can still progress in several fields, and in March North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a letter to his counterpart expressing his belief that South Korea would prevail over the Coronavirus outbreak, and his wish for the good health of his compatriots in the south, recent developments are threatening to decisively derail the peace process for what could be a long time.
In this respect, the South Korean president’s belated efforts to keep the peace process alive also seem to be facing determined resistance from within his own military leadership as well as from the US. Apart from the demand that the North completely dismantle its nuclear arsenal before any substantive reciprocal measures will be taken, the military are still conducting what can easily be construed as aggressive exercises and ‘war games’ in areas near the 38th parallel that have been the location of armed confrontation in the past.
Perhaps, South Korea’s military leadership would point out that the North also conducts military exercises and war games too. This is true: for instance, Stars and Stripes reported on 28 February of this year:
“North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw military drills that reduced an islet to a ‘sea of flames’, state-run media reported Saturday, two days after the United States and South Korea postponed planned joint exercises due to coronavirus fears. The ‘joint strike drill’ off the eastern coast was the North’s first reported military action of the year as nuclear talks with the United States remain deadlocked. It was aimed at testing the “mobility and the fire power strike ability” of defense units on the front and in the eastern part of the country, the Korean Central News Agency reported.”
They could also point out that numerous South Korea-US military exercises and war games have been suspended or scaled down considerably as gestures of good faith over the last couple of years. This is certainly also correct, and has helped alleviate the hostility and tension that has characterized relations on the Korean Peninsula since the end of World War II. The respective claims in this respect must be evaluated against the nature, scale and stated (as well as probable but unstated) purposes and objectives of such events.
How long will it take for a joint North-South mutual defence and assistance drill to be held? That would really be something…
However, the scaling back of such exercises and drills is also a measure that can be reversed within a matter of hours; this is definitely not the case if the North dismantles its nuclear weapons, which would probably be impossible to replace once given up. Its nuclear arsenal is, moreover, the only real deterrent against a possible attack by the US, which has demonstrated time and time again its willingness, if not downright enthusiasm, triumphalism and glee, for launching wars of aggression (sometimes called ‘wars of choice’ in the US, presumably to avoid any parallel with the Nuremburg Trials) in flagrant violation of the most fundamental precepts and norms of international and also US law.
On the 6th of May, South Korea held military exercises around several islands near North Korea’s maritime border.
In response, a spokesperson for the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made public the following statement on the 8th of May:
“On Wednesday, the south Korean military staged a joint military drill in the hotspot waters in the West Sea of Korea with the involvement of more than twenty fighters of F-15K, KF-16, F-4E and FA-50 belonging to the air combat command of the Air Force and storm boats under the Navy’s 2nd Fleet and others. Such reckless move of the military warmongers of the south side … does not help the efforts to defuse tension on the Korean peninsula. Everything is now going back to the starting point before the north-south summit meeting in 2018. The recent joint drill was staged in the air and sea in the biggest hotspot area in the West Sea of Korea in which military conflicts occurred between the north and the south in the past, and it was openly launched, assuming that there were a “strange sign” and “provocation” from us. What merits more attention is that the south Korean military staged the said military drill while calling us their “enemy.” This is a grave provocation which can never be overlooked and this situation demands a necessary reaction from us… The south Korean military did not hide the fact that the joint military drill aimed at improving its capability to cope with the north’s firepower and surprise “provocation” and at striking the base of the “enemy’s provocation” and repelling the forces supporting it. The reckless military provocation by the south Korean military is a total denial … (of) the north-south agreement … to stop all the hostile acts against the other party on the ground and in the sea and air, to turn the West Sea zone into the peaceful waters, in particular. The recent drill served as an opportunity which awakened us once again to the obvious fact that the enemies remain enemies all the time. Should we remain a passive onlooker when the enemy gets zealous while openly calling for an attack on us?” (LINK)
On 15 May the Korea Herald reported:
“A presidential spokesman confirmed in mid-May that it convened a meeting with military officials in charge of public relations with regard to North Korea’s strong criticism of South Korea’s recent border island drills, emphasizing that the meeting was to discuss media-related policy, not to “reprimand” the military. The meeting concerned the revelation of an unannounced joint exercise conducted by the Navy and the Air Force on the 6th of May. The next day, an official daily, affiliated with the Ministry of Defence, reported the training staged in the vicinity of northwestern islets near the sea border with the North. The North’s military then issued a statement describing the action as a grave provocation. It said the military practice was a reminder that, “The enemies remain enemies all the time.” It added, “Everything is now going back to the starting point before the North-South summit meeting in 2018.” Pyongyang’s angry response came at a time when the Moon Jae-in administration is seeking to resume inter-Korean cooperation, especially against the coronavirus. The presidential spokesman said the Cheong Wa Dae session was meant to review media-related policy, not military drills or operation.”
On the 18th of May Chosun Media group reported:
“The South Korean military has postponed a massive live-fire drill for the Army, Navy and Air Force from this week to June because of ‘bad weather’. Some critics accuse military authorities for trying not to agitate North Korea amid a quixotic government initiative to interest Pyongyang in cross-border business projects. A military spokesman on Sunday blamed ‘squalls and rain’ that have been forecast. The drill plan envisions identifying targets with detection devices and launching strikes against any armed provocation in the East Sea. The multiple rocket launcher Chunmoo and Apache helicopters of the Army, the Harpoon and Haeseong-1 ship-to-ship missiles of the Navy, and FA-50 fighter jets of the Air Force were slated to be mobilized. Earlier, the Defence Ministry declined to confirm whether the drill would be staged…”
Meanwhile, the US continues to take similar provocative steps. In a move that is certain to keep tensions high and reinforce North Korea’s reluctance to unilaterally dismantle its nuclear deterrent capabilities, on Tuesday a Pentagon official asserted that the United States’ nuclear forces are ready and deter all adversaries, including potentially North Korea.
The Pentagon official said during a virtual seminar hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies:
“I think the Department (of Defense) has taken a view that our nuclear forces, as they exist, are ready and robust and deter all adversaries, whether that’s from Russia to China, to potentially North Korea or Iran. Similarly, they assure allies, whether that’s NATO or South Korea or Japan.”
The remarks follow a report in North Korean state media on Sunday that leader Kim Jong-un presided over a Central Military Commission meeting in which they discussed “new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country.” (LINK)
U.S. President Donald Trump has held three meetings with Kim, but progress has stalled as the US insists that the North completely dismantle its nuclear arsenal before any reciprocal steps will be considered, and the North has demanded sanctions relief and other concessions in return for suspending nuclear and missile tests.
The two sides last held working-level negotiations in October, however experts expect little action before the November presidential election in the U.S.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Ex-Rebels Attack ISIS-Affiliated Group In Northwest Daraa In Response To Deadly Ambush (Video)

Early on May 28 , former rebels fighting in the ranks of the Russian-backed 5th Corps launched a fierce attack on an ISIS-affiliated group in the northwestern Daraa countryside in response to a well-planned ambush that targeted members of the governorate ’ s reconciliation council .
The ambush , that took place late on May 29 near the town of Muzayrib , claimed the lives of three prominent members of the reconciliation council , Uday al-Hasheesh , Adnan Yousef al-Shanbour and Raafat Al-Barazi .
Three others members of the council were injured , including Mahmoud al-Bardan .
The local commander @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Murshid , ” enjoys excellent relations with Russian forces .
Daraa ’ s former rebels held a small ISIS-affiliated group in Muzayrib , led by a man called “ al-Shaguri , ” responsible for the ambush .
The former rebels launched an attack to capture or kill the terrorists .
Heavy clashes took place in the town for several hours .
The attack on Muzayrib reportedly ended with the arrest of several suspects .
Nevertheless , the situation in the town is still tense .
The ambush was not the first attack by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , nine policemen were brutally killed in the town .
Daraa ’ s former rebels and the Syrian Arab Army could launch a large-scale operation against ISIS remnants in northern and northwestern Daraa in the upcoming few days .
A curfew was imposed in the town of Tafas , a known stronghold of radicals , by the reconciliation council following the attack on Muzayrib .
MORE ON THIS TOPIC : • Turkish Service Member Killed In Attack On Patrol In Syria ’ s Greater Idlib

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Early on May 28, former rebels fighting in the ranks of the Russian-backed 5th Corps launched a fierce attack on an ISIS-affiliated group in the northwestern Daraa countryside in response to a well-planned ambush that targeted members of the governorate’s reconciliation council.
The ambush, that took place late on May 29 near the town of Muzayrib, claimed the lives of prominent members of the reconciliation council, Uday al-Hasheesh, Adnan Yousef al-Shanbour and Raafat Al-Barazi.
Three others members of the council were injured, including Mahmoud al-Bardan. The local commander, who is known as “Abu Murshid,” enjoys excellent relations with Russian forces.
Daraa’s former rebels held a small ISIS-affiliated group in Muzayrib, led by a man called “al-Shaguri,” responsible for the ambush. The former rebels launched an attack to capture or kill the terrorists. Heavy clashes took place in the town for several hours.
The attack on Muzayrib reportedly ended with the arrest of several suspects. Nevertheless, the situation in the town is still tense.
The ambush was not the first attack by terrorists in Muzayrib. Earlier this months, nine policemen were brutally killed in the town.
Daraa’s former rebels and the Syrian Arab Army could launch a large-scale operation against ISIS remnants in northern and northwestern Daraa in the upcoming few days. A curfew was imposed in the town of Tafas, a known stronghold of radicals, by the reconciliation council following the attack on Muzayrib.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Prospects For Resolving Conflict And Stabilizing Political Situation In Libya

The current international conflict in Libya dates back to the armed intervention of the United States , some of the NATO member states and their allies against the legitimate government of Libya , led by Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 .
The overthrow of Gaddafi was prepared by external forces in advance .
Particular emphasis was placed on creating a large-scale disinformation curtain for organizing diplomatic support to anti-government forces .
The main interested parties were the USA , United Kingdom , France and Italy .
They had several main objectives : • The destruction of a strong independent state on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; • Capture of the oil and gas fields throughout Libya ; • Relief of the debt that they owed Gaddafi .
The active phase of the conflict began with the unrest in February 2011 , which quickly took the form of a civil war .
NATO countries and their Arab allies directly supported the anti-government National Transitional Council ( NTC ) and Islamists .
October 23rd , 2011 the last government bastion – Sirte – fell .
Muammar Gaddafi was killed without trial by militants .
Part of the forces loyal to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The foreign sponsors of the coup did not achieve the main economic goal – to obtain the stable control over the oil and gas fields of Libya .
Internal contradictions began .
The period between 2011 and 2014 is characterized by incessant armed clashes between various forces .
The current stage of the confrontation began in May 2014 , when the Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar , the leader of the Libyan National Army , announced the start of a large-scale operation against forces of the Government of National Accord ( not to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2011 ) and Islamist groups , including ISIS .
An importanf factor is that the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) is not recognized by the country ’ s highest legislative body .
The modern Libyan National Army ( LNA ) , commanded by Khalifa Haftar is largely the successor to the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , since it was formed by the Transitional National Council of Libya in 2011 , from the late Gaddafi ’ s military personnel , and from parts of the opposition National Liberation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legislative body of the State legally elected democratically in 2014 Libya – the House of Representatives .
It ’ s located in Tobruk .
In March 2015 , the House of Representatives officially appointed Haftar as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Libya .
Following the events of 2011 , the Libyan Armed Forces were not a singular entity , but were separated into two factions : • The first and the main is subordinated to Field Marshal Haftar since November 2011 .
This was legitimized by the House of Representatives .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the House of Representatives and prior to that to the National Salvation Government , but also had its interests as a group of professional officers ; • The second factin is under the command of Suleiman al-Obaidi , directly subordinate to civilian authorities : before the 2014 elections – the National Salvation Government ; after – the House of Representatives .
In March 2015 , both factions were united under the command of Haftar .
Fighting continued until the signing of the 2016 Skhirat Agreements , according to which a joint Presidential Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2017 , the House of Representatives suspended the Skhirat Agreements of December and the powers of the Presidential Council , led by the GNA leader Fayez al-Sarraj .
The fighting between the LNA and the forces loyal to the GNA , more specifically to al-Sarraj and various Islamist leaders , resumed .
Furthermore , in August 2017 , after the meeting of Haftar and al-Sarraj in Paris , the LNA suspended operations against forces of the GNA .
At the same time , it continued to conduct active hostilities against other groups of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more difficult to separate the radicals associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS from the supposedly “ moderate ” supporters of the Tripoli-based government of al-Sarraj .
The situation is a sort of the earlier version of Syria ’ s Idlib .
On January 5th , 2019 Field Marshal Haftar announced the beginning of another large-scale operation in the southwest of the country .
On April 4th , 2019 the LNA received an order to launch an offensive in Tripoli to “ liberate the city from terrorists.
” In early 2020 , Turkey officially intervened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Islamists .
On January 1st , 2020 four aircraft with members of Syrian militant groups from Idlib landed at Tripoli International Airport .
With a complete change in the nature and picture of the civil conflict in Libya , in 2020 , like in 2011 , the collective West , represented by NATO countries , actually acted on the side of radical militants , formally on the side of the head of the presidential council , the head of the GNA , infiltrated by Islamists , Fayez al-Sarraj .
The various @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the respective armed forces are now clustered around two blocs .
• The first is the LNA and the House of Representatives that can be characterized as conditionally “ secular ” ; • The second is the GNA bloc ( conditionally “ Islamic ” ) .
Anither force is various ISIS and al-Qaeda cells around the country .
The forces they include are the following : The LNA and the House of Representatives • Regular ground forces , consist of two mechanized infantry , one tank and three artillery brigades , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saiga ” , two brigades of the “ Deterrence force ” numbering approximately 7,000 ; • Independent groups formally integrated into the LNA – up to 12 thousand fighters ; • Zintan brigades from the city of Zintan .
This is an independent power , currently allied with the LNA ; • Petroleum Facilities Guard ( PFG ) is mostly allied with the LNA .
The PFG controls fields and refineries in the center and in the east of the country ; • The Egyptian Armed Forces as a force directly involved in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sources , Cairo has up to 3000 instructors and military personnel involved in the conflict .
• The Big Tripolitan Quartet , on which al-Sarraj personally relies : Special Deterrence Forces , Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade , Central Abu Salim Security Forces and Navashi Brigade .
These groups were given an officiall status by the Ministry of Internal Affairs .
• Forces loyal to the GNA , including the 7th Kani Brigade of the Presidential Guard from Tarhuna , military formations of the Avalyad Suleiman tribe ; • Misrata forces – various groups from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the GNA Ahmed Maiteeq relies .
This is an independent force currently allied to the GNA ; • Ghwell ’ s Libyan National Guard – allied to the Misrata clans and thus to the GNA ; • Syrian mercenaries and militants , brought in by Turkey – approximately 5,000 people ; • Turkish Armed Forces , as a force that ’ s directly involved in the conflict .
The LNA is supported internationally by Egypt , the UAE , Russia and Saudi Arabia .
The GNA is supported by Turkey , Qatar , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of USA , Italy , France and the UK .
ISIS has three separate formations in Libya : • Wilayat al-Fezzan in the province of Fezzan in the desert in the south ; • Wilayat al-Barqah in the province of Cyrenaica in the east , • Wilayat al-Tarablus in the province of Tripolitania in the west .
Estimates of the total number of active members vary from 800 to 5,000 .
After the defeat from the LNA , the Ansar al-Sharia group virtually disappeared , and became a part of ISIS .
ISIS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Shura Council of Dern and the Shura Council of Sirte .
ISIS is a constant adversary of the LNA and situational opponents of the GNA .
NATO countries , in their fight against ISIS cooperate with both the LNA and GNA .
The conflict of interests of the internal actors in Libya is due to clan and tribal contradictions that have existed for decades .
Various clans and groups seek to establish or expand control over : • Distribution of income from extraction , processing and sales of oil and gas resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to export about 34 million barrels of oil per month , which corresponds to revenue of $ 1.2 billion per month at current prices .
Actual exports are significantly less .
At the beginning of the year , NOC exported from 1.2 to 1.8 million barrels per month .
The interests of external actors are to obtain or maintain control over Libyan oil and gas facilities on dumping conditions , as well as control over the direction and volume of exports .
A related task arising from this motivation is to counteract the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government oriented either towards the national interests of Libya and/or to the interests of competing forces .
The external forces can be separated depending on their interests : • Egypt , Russia and the UAE .
These countries have related interests and seek long-term stabilization of the situation in the region with the strengthening of the sovereign power of a single Libyan government .
• None • For Egypt , it is an issue of national security to counter Islamists , including forces affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda , in Libya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ component is important .
Tatneft and Gazprom operate in the region .
The Russian Federation is interested in construction and infrastructure contracts , the Libyan arms market .
Also , for the Russian Federation , the sensitive topic is the fight against Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism “ on distant approaches.
” • The UAE in Libya solves a whole range of issues , both of an economic plan , and strengthens strategic cooperation in the triangle of Russia-Egypt-UAE , which , at least , will strengthen the influence of the UAE on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a long-term stabilization in Libya , but under the control of “ moderate ” Islamists from the GNA .
In the absence of its own energy resources , escalating international relations and the global crisis , Ankara relies on Libya as its potential oil province .
• The USA and the UK .
Royal Dutch Shell , BP left the country .
For the US and UK , instability in Libya is now beneficial , which plays into the hands of the US oil and gas sector .
• Qatar and Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
However , there is also the geopolitical interest of the ruling clans of these Islamic monarchies .
The Qatari clan continues to secretly support ISIS , the Saudi clan supports al-Qaeda as instruments of geopolitical influence .
• France ( Total ) , Italy ( Eni ) , Spain ( Repsol ) were forced to suspend work in early 2020 on a significant part of their objects in Libya .
Back in 2019 , Eni and Repsol withdrew their staff from Libya .
The interests of these three players are to stabilize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weak government in Tripoli , that is , a return to the “ status quo ” from 2017-2018 .
The above review of the forces and interests of the various parties to the Libyan conflict , at first glance , demonstrates the extreme difficulty of resolving the conflict .
However , there are at least two scenarios that the situation could be solved : • A military loss of one of the sides .
• The defeat of the LNA forces is possible with the further and increasing Turkish military involvement in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Egypt ’ s refusal of a direct military support of Haftar forces , the UAE stopping of its financial support , and the Russian Federation stops its diplomatic support .
In this case , if the number of pro-Turkish militants is brought up to 7-10,000 and the Turkish Armed Forces use their ground forces ( 5,000-10,000 military personnel ) with massive aviation support ( UAVs ) , the GNA ’ s military victory will be achieved before the end of 2020 .
Accelerating events may take place that would cause allied NATO countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces .
• The defeat of the GNA forces is possible with a significant increase of a direct military support from Egypt , the most militarily capable Arab state .
Using the geographic location and Haftar ’ s forces as advanced units , the Egyptian army and air force are capable of inflicting a crushing defeat on the GNA units and pro-Turkish forces in a very short timeline .
Even in the case of a massive air support , without an army ground operation , Haftar forces will be able to regain the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pressure on Tripoli .
If the intense conflict continues until 2021 , Turkey will be forced to either retreat or reduce the intensity of participation due to economic reasons .
• France , Italy and Spain , realizing that in the event of a military victory by Turkey or an ongoing civil war , they will lose a significant part of the oil and gas facilities and the export market of Libya , put pressure on or refuse to support the GNA .
There are a number of tools for this , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embargo to the threat of freezing of accounts of the al-Sarraj faction .
In this case , Turkey will find itself in an extremely difficult situation .
It is likely that it will have to reduce the military aid to the GNA and will be satisfied with limited control in the western part of the country .
The situation will stabilize and return to the status quo of 2017 .
In Libya , there will actually be two states .
Success is even more likely if EU ( led by Germany ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implementation of this scenario .
Such a development of the situation does not contradict the Russian agenda for the conflict .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Libya On May 25 , 2020 ( Map Update )

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The current international conflict in Libya dates back to the armed intervention of the United States, some of the NATO member states and their allies against the legitimate government of Libya, led by Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The overthrow of Gaddafi was prepared by external forces in advance. Particular emphasis was placed on creating a large-scale disinformation curtain for organizing diplomatic support to anti-government forces.
The main interested parties were the USA, United Kingdom, France and Italy. They had several main objectives:
The destruction of a strong independent state on the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea; Capture of the oil and gas fields throughout Libya; Relief of the debt that they owed Gaddafi.
The active phase of the conflict began with the unrest in February 2011, which quickly took the form of a civil war. NATO countries and their Arab allies directly supported the anti-government National Transitional Council (NTC) and Islamists.
October 23rd, 2011 the last government bastion – Sirte – fell. Muammar Gaddafi was killed without trial by militants. Part of the forces loyal to the government turned to guerrilla warfare.
The foreign sponsors of the coup did not achieve the main economic goal – to obtain the stable control over the oil and gas fields of Libya. Internal contradictions began. The period between 2011 and 2014 is characterized by incessant armed clashes between various forces.
The current stage of the confrontation began in May 2014, when the Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan National Army, announced the start of a large-scale operation against forces of the Government of National Accord (not to be confused with the National Transitional Council back in 2011) and Islamist groups, including ISIS. An importanf factor is that the Government of National Accord (GNA) is not recognized by the country’s highest legislative body.
The modern Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by Khalifa Haftar is largely the successor to the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, since it was formed by the Transitional National Council of Libya in 2011, from the late Gaddafi’s military personnel, and from parts of the opposition National Liberation Army.
The LNA supports the supreme legislative body of the State legally elected democratically in 2014 Libya – the House of Representatives. It’s located in Tobruk. In March 2015, the House of Representatives officially appointed Haftar as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Libya.
Following the events of 2011, the Libyan Armed Forces were not a singular entity, but were separated into two factions:
The first and the main is subordinated to Field Marshal Haftar since November 2011. This was legitimized by the House of Representatives. Formally the LNA represents the interests of the House of Representatives and prior to that to the National Salvation Government, but also had its interests as a group of professional officers; The second factin is under the command of Suleiman al-Obaidi, directly subordinate to civilian authorities: before the 2014 elections – the National Salvation Government; after – the House of Representatives.
In March 2015, both factions were united under the command of Haftar. Fighting continued until the signing of the 2016 Skhirat Agreements, according to which a joint Presidential Council was to be formed.
In March 2017, the House of Representatives suspended the Skhirat Agreements of December and the powers of the Presidential Council, led by the GNA leader Fayez al-Sarraj. The fighting between the LNA and the forces loyal to the GNA, more specifically to al-Sarraj and various Islamist leaders, resumed.
Furthermore, in August 2017, after the meeting of Haftar and al-Sarraj in Paris, the LNA suspended operations against forces of the GNA.
At the same time, it continued to conduct active hostilities against other groups of radical Islamists. However, it became more difficult to separate the radicals associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS from the supposedly “moderate” supporters of the Tripoli-based government of al-Sarraj. The situation is a sort of the earlier version of Syria’s Idlib.
On January 5th, 2019 Field Marshal Haftar announced the beginning of another large-scale operation in the southwest of the country. On April 4th, 2019 the LNA received an order to launch an offensive in Tripoli to “liberate the city from terrorists.”
In early 2020, Turkey officially intervened into the conflict on the side al-Sarraj and the Islamists. On January 1st, 2020 four aircraft with members of Syrian militant groups from Idlib landed at Tripoli International Airport.
With a complete change in the nature and picture of the civil conflict in Libya, in 2020, like in 2011, the collective West, represented by NATO countries, actually acted on the side of radical militants, formally on the side of the head of the presidential council, the head of the GNA, infiltrated by Islamists, Fayez al-Sarraj.
The various parties in the conflict in Libya and the respective armed forces are now clustered around two blocs.
The first is the LNA and the House of Representatives that can be characterized as conditionally “secular”;
The second is the GNA bloc (conditionally “Islamic”).
Anither force is various ISIS and al-Qaeda cells around the country.
The forces they include are the following:
The LNA and the House of Representatives
Regular ground forces, consist of two mechanized infantry, one tank and three artillery brigades, as well as one brigade of special forces “Saiga”, two brigades of the “Deterrence force” numbering approximately 7,000; Independent groups formally integrated into the LNA – up to 12 thousand fighters; Foreign military contingents consisting of private military contractors including Sudanese and Chadians; Zintan brigades from the city of Zintan. This is an independent power, currently allied with the LNA; Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) is mostly allied with the LNA. The PFG controls fields and refineries in the center and in the east of the country; The Egyptian Armed Forces as a force directly involved in the Libyan conflict. According to various sources, Cairo has up to 3000 instructors and military personnel involved in the conflict.
The GNA bloc
The Big Tripolitan Quartet, on which al-Sarraj personally relies: Special Deterrence Forces, Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, Central Abu Salim Security Forces and Navashi Brigade. These groups were given an officiall status by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Forces loyal to the GNA,including the 7th Kani Brigade of the Presidential Guard from Tarhuna, military formations of the Avalyad Suleiman tribe; Misrata forces – various groups from Misrata on which Vice Prime Minister of the GNA Ahmed Maiteeq relies. This is an independent force currently allied to the GNA; National Mobile Forces consist primarily of Amazigh; Ghwell’s Libyan National Guard – allied to the Misrata clans and thus to the GNA; Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries; Syrian mercenaries and militants, brought in by Turkey – approximately 5,000 people; Turkish Armed Forces, as a force that’s directly involved in the conflict.
The LNA is supported internationally by Egypt, the UAE, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The GNA is supported by Turkey, Qatar, and NATO member states in the face of USA, Italy, France and the UK.
ISIS has three separate formations in Libya:
Wilayat al-Fezzan in the province of Fezzan in the desert in the south; Wilayat al-Barqah in the province of Cyrenaica in the east, Wilayat al-Tarablus in the province of Tripolitania in the west.
Estimates of the total number of active members vary from 800 to 5,000.
After the defeat from the LNA, the Ansar al-Sharia group virtually disappeared, and became a part of ISIS. ISIS also included part of the fighters of the Shura Council of Dern and the Shura Council of Sirte. ISIS is a constant adversary of the LNA and situational opponents of the GNA. NATO countries, in their fight against ISIS cooperate with both the LNA and GNA.
The conflict of interests of the internal actors in Libya is due to clan and tribal contradictions that have existed for decades. Various clans and groups seek to establish or expand control over:
Territory and population; Distribution of income from extraction, processing and sales of oil and gas resources.
The Libyan oil sector is able to export about 34 million barrels of oil per month, which corresponds to revenue of $1.2 billion per month at current prices. Actual exports are significantly less. At the beginning of the year, NOC exported from 1.2 to 1.8 million barrels per month.
The interests of external actors are to obtain or maintain control over Libyan oil and gas facilities on dumping conditions, as well as control over the direction and volume of exports.
A related task arising from this motivation is to counteract the formation of a single “hostile” government oriented either towards the national interests of Libya and/or to the interests of competing forces.
The external forces can be separated depending on their interests:
Egypt, Russia and the UAE. These countries have related interests and seek long-term stabilization of the situation in the region with the strengthening of the sovereign power of a single Libyan government.
For Egypt , it is an issue of national security to counter Islamists, including forces affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, in Libya. For Russia , the economic component is important. Tatneft and Gazprom operate in the region. The Russian Federation is interested in construction and infrastructure contracts, the Libyan arms market. Also, for the Russian Federation, the sensitive topic is the fight against Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism “on distant approaches.” The UAE in Libya solves a whole range of issues, both of an economic plan, and strengthens strategic cooperation in the triangle of Russia-Egypt-UAE, which, at least, will strengthen the influence of the UAE on the Arabian Peninsula.
Turkey is nterested in a long-term stabilization in Libya, but under the control of “moderate” Islamists from the GNA. In the absence of its own energy resources, escalating international relations and the global crisis, Ankara relies on Libya as its potential oil province. The USA and the UK. Royal Dutch Shell, BP left the country. For the US and UK, instability in Libya is now beneficial, which plays into the hands of the US oil and gas sector. Qatar and Saudi Arabia. They pursue mainly situational goals. However, there is also the geopolitical interest of the ruling clans of these Islamic monarchies. The Qatari clan continues to secretly support ISIS, the Saudi clan supports al-Qaeda as instruments of geopolitical influence. France (Total), Italy (Eni), Spain (Repsol) were forced to suspend work in early 2020 on a significant part of their objects in Libya. Back in 2019, Eni and Repsol withdrew their staff from Libya. The interests of these three players are to stabilize the situation under the control of a weak government in Tripoli, that is, a return to the “status quo” from 2017-2018.
The above review of the forces and interests of the various parties to the Libyan conflict, at first glance, demonstrates the extreme difficulty of resolving the conflict. However, there are at least two scenarios that the situation could be solved:
A military loss of one of the sides.
The defeat of the LNA forces is possible with the further and increasing Turkish military involvement in the conflict, with the simultaneous factors: Egypt’s refusal of a direct military support of Haftar forces, the UAE stopping of its financial support, and the Russian Federation stops its diplomatic support. In this case, if the number of pro-Turkish militants is brought up to 7-10,000 and the Turkish Armed Forces use their ground forces (5,000-10,000 military personnel) with massive aviation support (UAVs), the GNA’s military victory will be achieved before the end of 2020. Accelerating events may take place that would cause allied NATO countries to provide an air support to GNA forces.
is possible with the further and increasing Turkish military involvement in the conflict, with the simultaneous factors: Egypt’s refusal of a direct military support of Haftar forces, the UAE stopping of its financial support, and the Russian Federation stops its diplomatic support. In this case, if the number of pro-Turkish militants is brought up to 7-10,000 and the Turkish Armed Forces use their ground forces (5,000-10,000 military personnel) with massive aviation support (UAVs), the GNA’s military victory will be achieved before the end of 2020. Accelerating events may take place that would cause allied NATO countries to provide an air support to GNA forces. The defeat of the GNA forces is possible with a significant increase of a direct military support from Egypt, the most militarily capable Arab state. Using the geographic location and Haftar’s forces as advanced units, the Egyptian army and air force are capable of inflicting a crushing defeat on the GNA units and pro-Turkish forces in a very short timeline. Even in the case of a massive air support, without an army ground operation, Haftar forces will be able to regain the positions lost in May 2020 and increase the pressure on Tripoli. If the intense conflict continues until 2021, Turkey will be forced to either retreat or reduce the intensity of participation due to economic reasons.
Reconfiguration of the forces supporting warring factions.
France, Italy and Spain, realizing that in the event of a military victory by Turkey or an ongoing civil war, they will lose a significant part of the oil and gas facilities and the export market of Libya, put pressure on or refuse to support the GNA. There are a number of tools for this, from the cessation of financing and the embargo to the threat of freezing of accounts of the al-Sarraj faction. In this case, Turkey will find itself in an extremely difficult situation. It is likely that it will have to reduce the military aid to the GNA and will be satisfied with limited control in the western part of the country. The situation will stabilize and return to the status quo of 2017. In Libya, there will actually be two states. Success is even more likely if EU (led by Germany) and UN bureaucrats are actively involved in the implementation of this scenario. Such a development of the situation does not contradict the Russian agenda for the conflict.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Military Situation In Afghanistan On May 27, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan : • At least 7 @ @ @ @ @ another one was injured after a Taliban attack on a security checkpoint in the Seyagerd @ @ @ @ @ • The US aims to bring troop levels down to 8,600 by July , according @ @ @ @ @ ; • The Taliban mostly halted active operations against government forces over the past few @ @ @ @ @ TOPIC : • Military Situation In Afghanistan On May 26 , 2020 ( Map Update @

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Afghanistan:
At least 7 government troops were killed and another one was injured after a Taliban attack on a security checkpoint in the Seyagerd district of Parwan province;
The US aims to bring troop levels down to 8,600 by July, according to Defense Secretary Mark Esper;
The Taliban mostly halted active operations against government forces over the past few days.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Military Situation In Yemen On May 28, 2020 (Map Update)

The situation for the dumbass Americunts and Saudi minicunts is getting worse by the day .
Iranian navy receives 112 @ @ @ @ @ .
They are based on the captured Americunt design and have the new NASR2 sea-skimming @ @ @ @ @ speed of 80 knots .
One of these can sink a carrier .
Another 300 @ @ @ @ @

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Yemen:
Ceasefire violations were reported in al-Hudaydah;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Hazm area 5 times;
Saudi-led coalition warplanes struck the Majzar area 19 times;
Clashes between Ansar Allah and Saudi-led forces continue in the northwestern part of Marib;
Due to the Ansar Allah missile attack on the Sahn al-Jin base, Gen. Saghir Hamud Aziz, Hadi forces’ Chief of Staff, was injured and his son died.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Military Situation In Syria On May 28, 2020 (Map Update)

Click to see the full-size image A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria : • A Turkish soldier @ @ @ @ @ was injured in an IED attack on a Turkish patrol near Jisr al-Shughur ; • @ @ @ @ @ right wing and engine parts of a Turkish-made TAI Anka unmanned combat aerial vehicle during @ @ @ @ @ • The Turkish Army and the Russian Military Police held a 13th joint patrol along @ @ @ @ @ of Saraqib ; • The Russian Aerosapce Forces conducted a series of airstrikes on ISIS @ @ @ @ @ • A SDF-linked person was shot on the road near the Omar oil fiels .
@ @ @ @ @ • Military Situation In Syria And Iraq On May 27 , 2020 ( Map Update @

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A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:
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southfront--2020-05-28--Video Shows Russian PMCs In Libya, Using UAE-Modded Equipment And Not Retreating

On May 27th , a video was published showing the Russians in Libya , their aircraft , as well as Pantsir-S1 air defense systems .
The Pantsir-S1 is noteworthy , as it is very evidently the UAE variant of the system , as can be seen on the screengrab from the video below .
Who it specifically belongs to , and what the glyphs on the side mean comes down to speculation .
As such , it would appear that , not only did the Russians not abandon Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar ’ s Libyan National Army ( LNA ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Naturally , reports immediately surfaced claiming these are troops from the mythical Wagner PMC .
However , a Russian official – Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov said that Russia hasn ’ t sent any troops to Libya .
Regardless , some claim that they are withdrawing , the video above shows that they ’ re arriving , but one thing is certain , the propaganda war is on-going in full force .
On the ground , the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , despite saying that it would not fight the LNA for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tripoli , and there were heavy clashes between the two sides in the south of the city .
There is calm around Misrata , with some occasional small skirmishes , according to the LNA spokesperson .
Brigadier General Ahmed al-Mesmari also said that the LNA was actually successful in Tripoli , despite the GNA actually capturing various neighborhoods .
He also denied that any of the aircraft that carried out the airstrikes in recent days was newly received , and that all of it was old .
There are no Russian combat aircraft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ head of the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council and former commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces , on May 27th .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Israel Joins US Propaganda Campaign Over ‘ Russian Invasion Of Libya ’

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On May 27th, a video was published showing the Russians in Libya, their aircraft, as well as Pantsir-S1 air defense systems.
The Pantsir-S1 is noteworthy, as it is very evidently the UAE variant of the system, as can be seen on the screengrab from the video below. Who it specifically belongs to, and what the glyphs on the side mean comes down to speculation.
As such, it would appear that, not only did the Russians not abandon Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), but rather they just arrived.
Naturally, reports immediately surfaced claiming these are troops from the mythical Wagner PMC.
However, a Russian official – Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov said that Russia hasn’t sent any troops to Libya.
Wagner's convoy reportedly heading south of Bani Walid after withdrawal. pic.twitter.com/u9pb7lxpoD — Status-6 (@Archer83Able) May 27, 2020
Regardless, some claim that they are withdrawing, the video above shows that they’re arriving, but one thing is certain, the propaganda war is on-going in full force.
On the ground, the Government of National Accord (GNA), despite saying that it would not fight the LNA for two days, captured several positions in Tripoli, and there were heavy clashes between the two sides in the south of the city.
عودة الاشتباكات بمحوري كازيرما وطريق المطار بعد فشلهم في التقدم صباح اليوم . — غصة الخوارج (@LiBya_73) May 27, 2020
الله اكبر الله اكبر #عاجل || قوات البركان تسيطر علي حي الكايخ بالكامل . — العبيدة الكاسحة (@ja2VQbcf3vihRUD) May 27, 2020
There is calm around Misrata, with some occasional small skirmishes, according to the LNA spokesperson.
عاجل | المتحدث باسم الجيش الليبي: هدوء حذر يسود محاور شرق مصراتة باستثناء مناوشات من وقت لآخر — العين الإخبارية – عاجل (@AlainBRK) May 27, 2020
Brigadier General Ahmed al-Mesmari also said that the LNA was actually successful in Tripoli, despite the GNA actually capturing various neighborhoods.
عاجل | المتحدث باسم الجيش الليبي: محاور العاصمة طرابلس تشهد تحركات دائمة وقواتنا قادرة على حسم المعركة بنجاح — العين الإخبارية – عاجل (@AlainBRK) May 27, 2020
He also denied that any of the aircraft that carried out the airstrikes in recent days was newly received, and that all of it was old.
عاجل | المتحدث باسم الجيش الليبي: جميع الطائرات التى قامت بعملية الكرامة قديمة وتم إصلاحها وإدخالها للخدمة مجددا — العين الإخبارية – عاجل (@AlainBRK) May 27, 2020
المسماري: ننفي استلامنا أي طائرات مقاتلة حديثة خلال السنوات الأخيرة — سكاي نيوز عربية-عاجل (@SkyNewsArabia_B) May 27, 2020
There are no Russian combat aircraft in Libya, said Viktor Bondarev, head of the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council and former commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, on May 27th.
“If there are planes in Libya, they are not Russian, but Soviet.”
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southfront--2020-05-28--At Least 40 Killed In “Allied Democratic Forces” Attack In Northeastern Congo

On May 27th , at least 40 people were killed in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo ( DRC ) in the latest of a series of attack along the Ugandan border .
Fighters from the Allied Democratic Forces ( ADF ) group , which was driven out of Uganda in the late 1990s , attacked Samboko village , about 100km southwest of the city of Bunia , Omar Kavota from rights group CEPADHO said .
Just a day earlier , ADF killed at least 17 in the nearby village of Makutano .
Both attacks were carried out with machetes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
More than 400 people have been killed in attacks attributed to the ADF since the army began an offensive to oust the group from its bases in 2019 , according to the Kivu Security Tracker ( KST ) .
KST is a research initiative that maps unrest in the region .
There were two months of relative quiet , and the attacks were renewed over the three weeks of May 2020 .
Rachel Tarwayo , a government administrator , said she was aware of the Samboko incursion but could not provide any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , some people have fled and others have given themselves the courage to stay for the moment , ” said Gili Gotabo , a rights activist in the region .
The ADF pledged their allegiance to ISIS but researchers say there is no evidence of close collaboration .
ISIL has also endorsed some ADF attacks .
Approximately 200,000 people have fled their homes in Ituri province , where the two villages are located , in the past two months because of the widespread violence by a variety of armed groups .
More than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since late 2017 , a United Nations report said in January , adding that some of the deaths might constitute a “ crime against humanity ” .
In April , 22 people from the Hema community were killed in attacks in the village of Koli in Ituri province , which were blamed on the Cooperative for the Development of Congo – an armed political-religious sect drawn from the Lendu ethnic group .
Conflict between the Lendu , mainly farmers , and the Hema , herders and traders , has a long history in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s also accusations that Congolese soldiers took parts in massacres since 2014 , due to competition for power in resource-rich lawless zones dominated by dozens of armed groups .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • At Least 20 People Reported Killed In Northeastern Congo • ISIS Says Al-Qaeda Started A War With It In West Africa

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On May 27th, at least 40 people were killed in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the latest of a series of attack along the Ugandan border.
Fighters from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) group, which was driven out of Uganda in the late 1990s, attacked Samboko village, about 100km southwest of the city of Bunia, Omar Kavota from rights group CEPADHO said.
Just a day earlier, ADF killed at least 17 in the nearby village of Makutano.
Both attacks were carried out with machetes, as the militants looted food and valuables.
More than 400 people have been killed in attacks attributed to the ADF since the army began an offensive to oust the group from its bases in 2019, according to the Kivu Security Tracker (KST).
KST is a research initiative that maps unrest in the region.
There were two months of relative quiet, and the attacks were renewed over the three weeks of May 2020.
Rachel Tarwayo, a government administrator, said she was aware of the Samboko incursion but could not provide any further details.
“On the ground, some people have fled and others have given themselves the courage to stay for the moment,” said Gili Gotabo, a rights activist in the region.
The ADF pledged their allegiance to ISIS but researchers say there is no evidence of close collaboration. ISIL has also endorsed some ADF attacks.
Approximately 200,000 people have fled their homes in Ituri province, where the two villages are located, in the past two months because of the widespread violence by a variety of armed groups.
More than 700 people have been killed in Ituri since late 2017, a United Nations report said in January, adding that some of the deaths might constitute a “crime against humanity”.
In April, 22 people from the Hema community were killed in attacks in the village of Koli in Ituri province, which were blamed on the Cooperative for the Development of Congo – an armed political-religious sect drawn from the Lendu ethnic group.
Conflict between the Lendu, mainly farmers, and the Hema, herders and traders, has a long history in the gold- and oil-rich region.
There’s also accusations that Congolese soldiers took parts in massacres since 2014, due to competition for power in resource-rich lawless zones dominated by dozens of armed groups.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Renewed Houthi Attacks And Infighting Leave Saudi Arabia In A Precarious Situation In Yemen

On May 27th , a Houthi ( Ansar Allah ) missile attack targeted Lt. Gen. Sagheer bin Aziz , chief of staff of Yemen ’ s Saudi-puppet government .
The attack left 8 dead , including bin Aziz ’ s son .
Lt. Gen. Sagheer bin Aziz survived the attack , which struck a military headquarters in Marib province , northeast of the capital Sanaa .
One of his sons and a nephew , both officers , were killed , along with six others .
After the attack , Gen. Bin Aziz issued a message saying the missile strikes had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ press ahead with military operations until the Houthis were expelled ( from the country which they ’ re the native population of ) .
Offering his condolences , President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi said the “ cowardly ” Houthi attack would not stop Yemeni army troops from liberating the country .
Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen intercepted and shot down a Houthi drone on May 27th launched at the Saudi border city of Najran .
Coalition spokesman Col. Turki Al-Maliki said the Houthis continued to violate international humanitarian law by targeting civilians and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a one-month ceasefire for the holy month of Ramadan expired on May 24th .
The UN attempts to broker a ceasefire , amidst the COVID-19 pandemic , and the Saudi-led coalition has expressed interest in such a development , all the while continuing its airstrike activity , and other attacks .
They also entirely blame the Houthis , claiming they have little interest in peace .
She said the Houthis were unlikely to seek peace while they remained militarily powerful .
The attack on Marib , however , is showing of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incapable of deterring attacks on its command facilities .
The Houthis also say they are committed to the peace , but it is also understandable that they wish to first put the Marib province under their control , which has a plethora of oil and gas facilities .
Meanwhile , infighting in the Saudi-led coalition is on-going , since on April 26th , the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council ( STC ) announced emergency rule of Aden and that the city would be made independent from the rest of the country .
This sparked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s puppet government .
Most recently , on May 21st , the situation appears to be at a standstill with Saudi and Yemen government forces appearing to have made no progress in restoring order in their ranks .
The STC said that it will only give up on some of the power it has gained in the south of Yemen if the political aspects of the Riyadh Agreement are honoured .
The agreement , signed in November 2019 , called for forming a joint government after military and security measures were taken to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however the STC has asked for the government to be formed prior to the fulfilment of the security aspects of the deal .
An STC delegation arrived in Saudi for talks on May 26th .
The STC expressed its willingness to abolish the “ self-rule administration ” decision , which it announced in April , in exchange for “ jumping over the security and military files in the Riyadh Agreement.
” The situation is such that Saudi Arabia is proving incapable of effectively fighting the Houthis , but also the STC , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is currently forces to submit to the demands of its “ allies ” or risk losing even more positions to the Houthis , which are becoming more assertive in their attacks even on the Kingdom ’ s soil .
MORE ON THE TOPIC : • Military Situation In Yemen On May 27 , 2020 ( Map Update ) • Military Situation In Yemen On May 26 , 2020 ( Map Update )

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On May 27th, a Houthi (Ansar Allah) missile attack targeted Lt. Gen. Sagheer bin Aziz, chief of staff of Yemen’s Saudi-puppet government. The attack left 8 dead, including bin Aziz’s son.
Lt. Gen. Sagheer bin Aziz survived the attack, which struck a military headquarters in Marib province, northeast of the capital Sanaa. One of his sons and a nephew, both officers, were killed, along with six others.
After the attack, Gen. Bin Aziz issued a message saying the missile strikes had made him all the more determined to press ahead with military operations until the Houthis were expelled (from the country which they’re the native population of).
Offering his condolences, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi said the “cowardly” Houthi attack would not stop Yemeni army troops from liberating the country.
Yemen’s parliamentary speaker Sultan Al-Barakani said:
“Our armed forces must respond to the criminals and punish them. The liberation battle will come. Losing a hero in the battle for dignity will boost our people’s determination to achieve victory.”
Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen intercepted and shot down a Houthi drone on May 27th launched at the Saudi border city of Najran. Coalition spokesman Col. Turki Al-Maliki said the Houthis continued to violate international humanitarian law by targeting civilians and residential areas.
The attack came just as a one-month ceasefire for the holy month of Ramadan expired on May 24th.
The UN attempts to broker a ceasefire, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Saudi-led coalition has expressed interest in such a development, all the while continuing its airstrike activity, and other attacks.
They also entirely blame the Houthis, claiming they have little interest in peace.
“The Houthis haven’t indicated that they want to de-escalate in the first place,” Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a Yemeni conflict analyst and a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Arab News.
She said the Houthis were unlikely to seek peace while they remained militarily powerful.
“We can’t have peace if the Houthis are not weakened militarily,” she said. “When the Houthis fail, they resort to using missile attacks and bombing residential neighborhoods. It has happened in Marib and Taiz repeatedly.”
The attack on Marib, however, is showing of the state of the Saudi-led coalition which proves incapable of deterring attacks on its command facilities.
The Houthis also say they are committed to the peace, but it is also understandable that they wish to first put the Marib province under their control, which has a plethora of oil and gas facilities.
Meanwhile, infighting in the Saudi-led coalition is on-going, since on April 26th, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) announced emergency rule of Aden and that the city would be made independent from the rest of the country.
This sparked clashes between the STC and Yemen’s puppet government.
Most recently, on May 21st, the situation appears to be at a standstill with Saudi and Yemen government forces appearing to have made no progress in restoring order in their ranks.
The STC said that it will only give up on some of the power it has gained in the south of Yemen if the political aspects of the Riyadh Agreement are honoured.
The agreement, signed in November 2019, called for forming a joint government after military and security measures were taken to restructure the formation of the state, however the STC has asked for the government to be formed prior to the fulfilment of the security aspects of the deal.
An STC delegation arrived in Saudi for talks on May 26th.
This comes as “Saudi Arabia is dissatisfied with the Southern Transitional Council’s actions, and considers its announced measures, including the ‘self-rule administration’, as a clear challenge to the kingdom, before the recognised government,” a Yemeni official said.
The STC expressed its willingness to abolish the “self-rule administration” decision, which it announced in April, in exchange for “jumping over the security and military files in the Riyadh Agreement.”
The situation is such that Saudi Arabia is proving incapable of effectively fighting the Houthis, but also the STC, which put Aden under its control, and is currently forces to submit to the demands of its “allies” or risk losing even more positions to the Houthis, which are becoming more assertive in their attacks even on the Kingdom’s soil.
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southfront--2020-05-28--Russia Began Work On First Prototype Of Next-Gen PAK DA Strategic Stealth Bomber

Russia began construction on the first prototype strategic stealth bomber as part of the Advanced Aviation Complex for Long-Range Aviation program ( PAK DA ) .
This was reported by TASS , citing two anonymous sources in the military-industrial complex .
As another TASS source specified , the aircraft cockpit is already being manufactured .
The Tupolev press office provided no comment when TASS attempted to confirm the information on the PAK DA .
In December 2019 , Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Alexei Krivoruchko in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper said that the outline design of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to develop working design documentation , and the creation of parts and components of prototypes PAK DA was started .
In February 2020 , Krivoruchko announced that this year the first engine for the PAK DA will be handed over for stand trials .
It is known that the PAK DA is designed using the flying wing scheme .
The machine will feature technologies and materials that reduce its radar visibility ( stealth technology ) .
The plane will be subsonic , and will be able to carry current and future cruise missiles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it will be provided with the newest communications and jamming equipment .
According to the documentation of PJSC Tupolev published on the public procurement website , a total of three flight prototypes of the aircraft should be built under the PAK DA program .
Preliminary tests of prototypes of the PAK DA aviation complex should be carried out from April 2023 to the end of 2025 , and the beginning of the State tests is scheduled for February 2026 .
The work is being carried out by PJSC Tupolev within the framework of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the development of the ROC under the code “ Messenger-1 ” .
Since 2009 , Tupolev PJSC has been fulfilling a contract for the outline design of the aircraft .
The military decided that the PAK DA would be subsonic and subtle , made according to the “ flying wing ” scheme ( the fuselage and wing of the aircraft represent a single structure , and the machine does not have tail ) .
At the beginning of 2017 , a full-size layout and digital model appeared .
The aircraft will have an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Tu-160 and carry a large combat load .
In addition to conventional and nuclear weapons , the PAK DA is also planned to be equipped with hypersonic weapons and air-to-air missiles for self-defense .
The crew of the new machine will consist of four people , as on the strategic missile carrier Tu-160 .
To equip the first PAK DA , 12 catapult seats will be manufactured .
Their creation and preparation for mass production will cost 500 million rubles ( $ 7 million ) .
Back in 2017 , Yuri Borisov @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said that flight tests of the first prototypes could begin in 2025 .
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Russia began construction on the first prototype strategic stealth bomber as part of the Advanced Aviation Complex for Long-Range Aviation program (PAK DA).
This was reported by TASS, citing two anonymous sources in the military-industrial complex.
“One of the aircraft factories in the structure of the United Aircraft Corporation will be engaged in the manufacture of glider elements of the first machine, the development of detailed design documentation has been completed, and the supply of materials has begun,” the source said.
As another TASS source specified, the aircraft cockpit is already being manufactured.
“The final assembly of the entire machine should be completed in 2021,” he said.
The Tupolev press office provided no comment when TASS attempted to confirm the information on the PAK DA.
In December 2019, Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Alexei Krivoruchko in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper said that the outline design of the aircraft was approved, PJSC Tupolev began to develop working design documentation, and the creation of parts and components of prototypes PAK DA was started.
In February 2020, Krivoruchko announced that this year the first engine for the PAK DA will be handed over for stand trials.
It is known that the PAK DA is designed using the flying wing scheme. The machine will feature technologies and materials that reduce its radar visibility (stealth technology). The plane will be subsonic, and will be able to carry current and future cruise missiles, precision bombs and hypersonic weapons, it will be provided with the newest communications and jamming equipment.
According to the documentation of PJSC Tupolev published on the public procurement website, a total of three flight prototypes of the aircraft should be built under the PAK DA program.
Preliminary tests of prototypes of the PAK DA aviation complex should be carried out from April 2023 to the end of 2025, and the beginning of the State tests is scheduled for February 2026.
The work is being carried out by PJSC Tupolev within the framework of the state contract concluded in 2017 for the development of the ROC under the code “Messenger-1”.
Since 2009, Tupolev PJSC has been fulfilling a contract for the outline design of the aircraft. The military decided that the PAK DA would be subsonic and subtle, made according to the “flying wing” scheme (the fuselage and wing of the aircraft represent a single structure, and the machine does not have tail). At the beginning of 2017, a full-size layout and digital model appeared.
The aircraft will have an increased flight duration without refueling compared to the Tu-160 and carry a large combat load. In addition to conventional and nuclear weapons, the PAK DA is also planned to be equipped with hypersonic weapons and air-to-air missiles for self-defense.
The crew of the new machine will consist of four people, as on the strategic missile carrier Tu-160. To equip the first PAK DA, 12 catapult seats will be manufactured. Their creation and preparation for mass production will cost 500 million rubles ($7 million).
Back in 2017, Yuri Borisov, the then Deputy Minister of Defense, said that flight tests of the first prototypes could begin in 2025.
“The transition to a new generation is a technically complex and long process, and most likely, state tests will stretch for more than two years. On a promising bomber, new chemical materials and paint are used, it is made in a different design,” honored Test Pilot, Hero of Russia, Igor Malikov said.
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