russia-insider--2020-05-09--WATCH FREE: Wonderful, High Quality, High Budget Christian Cartoon from Russia with English Captions

WATCH FREE: Wonderful, High Quality, High Budget Christian Cartoon from Russia with English Captions (Peter and Fevronia)

Action , romance , and traditional family values !
Prince Peter valiantly slays dragons , while his faithful wife skillfully heals people with herbs and prayer .
Peter & Fevronia are the patron saints of Christian marriage and family .
This is a must-see film for children of all ages , from 6 to 106 .
Last week we reported about this very positive trend coming out of Russia : Russia Is Making High-Budget , High Quality Christian Cartoons - Imagine If Disney Were Christian - Soon With English Subtitles .
Now you can watch this excellent one , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you ever wished that films would combine the moral quality of traditional Christianity with the production quality of Pixar and Disney ?
If so , then your wish has come true !
This spectacular film is now available , and your family can watch it in the link provided below .
In this tremendous film , the main characters not only fight dragons — they also pray to the Lord for deliverance from the great trials and troubles that come their way .
The strength and beauty of Christian marriage is front and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including many fantastic action scenes , the movie still reminds the viewer that faith , love , and fidelity are the most powerful weapons of all : This beautiful film came to Russian theaters in 2017 .
And now in 2020 , Russian Faith has released this wonderful movie with English subtitles !
This film is not historical — many things were added to the story , making it into a dramatic motion picture .
Some parts of the story were inspired by the lives of Peter & Fevronia , but this particular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ historical accounts .
Nevertheless , it is an uplifting film that does justice to the traditional values of patience , honesty , love , marriage , bravery , mercy , prayer , and a deep faith in Christ .
Love this movie ?
Then consider : • Want to see more great family films with English subtitles ?
Make a recurring donation to support this effort .
• Want to know how we add English subtitles to a movie ?
Read this detailed description of how we do it .
• Want to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Write a letter to us here : Modern Russia is experiencing Christian revival on an unprecedented scale , and it is positively influencing every aspect of the culture .
In less than 30 years , they have built over 30,000 new churches , overt displays of Christian faith are displayed in public places like restaurants and banks , and as you can see here , they are producing spectacular full-length movies which honor traditional family values .
Do n't forget to check out these great snapshots from the Peter & Fevronia film :

Action, romance, and traditional family values! Prince Peter valiantly slays dragons, while his faithful wife skillfully heals people with herbs and prayer. Peter & Fevronia are the patron saints of Christian marriage and family. This is a must-see film for children of all ages, from 6 to 106.
Last week we reported about this very positive trend coming out of Russia: Russia Is Making High-Budget, High Quality Christian Cartoons - Imagine If Disney Were Christian - Soon With English Subtitles. Now you can watch this excellent one, with English subs, for free.
Have you ever wished that films would combine the moral quality of traditional Christianity with the production quality of Pixar and Disney? If so, then your wish has come true! This spectacular film is now available, and your family can watch it in the link provided below.
In this tremendous film, the main characters not only fight dragons — they also pray to the Lord for deliverance from the great trials and troubles that come their way. The strength and beauty of Christian marriage is front and center throughout the story. Even while including many fantastic action scenes, the movie still reminds the viewer that faith, love, and fidelity are the most powerful weapons of all:
This beautiful film came to Russian theaters in 2017. And now in 2020, Russian Faith has released this wonderful movie with English subtitles! This film is not historical — many things were added to the story, making it into a dramatic motion picture. Some parts of the story were inspired by the lives of Peter & Fevronia, but this particular movie is only loosely based on the historical accounts. Nevertheless, it is an uplifting film that does justice to the traditional values of patience, honesty, love, marriage, bravery, mercy, prayer, and a deep faith in Christ.
Love this movie? Then consider:
Want to see more great family films with English subtitles?
Make a recurring donation to support this effort.
more great family films with English subtitles? Make a recurring donation to support this effort. Want to know how we add English subtitles to a movie?
Read this detailed description of how we do it.
how we add English subtitles to a movie? Read this detailed description of how we do it. Want to volunteer, helping us create subtitles?
Write a letter to us here:
Modern Russia is experiencing Christian revival on an unprecedented scale, and it is positively influencing every aspect of the culture. In less than 30 years, they have built over 30,000 new churches, overt displays of Christian faith are displayed in public places like restaurants and banks, and as you can see here, they are producing spectacular full-length movies which honor traditional family values.
Don't forget to check out these great snapshots from the Peter & Fevronia film:


russia-insider--2020-05-09--RT's Excellent 2018 WW2 Documentary - 'Corrects Distortions of Anglo Media' (Full Video)

Revisionist debates about WW2 are raging as the old media hegemony disintegrates , and others have a chance to present their side of the story .
On the Russian side , you have the argument that it was the Soviets who did the lion 's share of the job , and do n't get enough credit for it .
Ukrainian nationalists argue that they were on the right side in joining Hitler against the evil Bolsheviks .
And conservative voices , including in Germany , are arguing that Hitler never wanted war and that the war was forced on him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did want it , and that among other things , the Holocaust never happened .
RT 's documentary film division makes a high quality contribution to the debate supporting the Russian view .
It contains extensive interviews with German historians confirming much of what the Russians are saying .
From RT : A new RT documentary `` Remembrance '' examines the revisionist narratives about World War II that have muddied the Soviet Union ’ s role in defeating Nazi Germany , and obscured the sacrifices made by its people .
“ I think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Anglo-American media , and that ’ s because they wanted to diminish the role of Russia and Stalin who actually defeated Hitler , you know .
It wasn ’ t the United States and Britain that defeated him , it was really Stalin , ” says Dan Henderson , a US journalist .
As the crew journeys through Poland , one of the main ideological battlegrounds where perception of the conflict still influences present-day politics , it speaks to those who view the Red Army as liberators , and increasingly those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discusses war landmarks such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and lend-lease and sees how their perception changed during the Cold War , and again since the fall of the Iron Curtain .
“ Red Army soldiers as liberators ?
In Poland , the situation 's different .
It 's hard for Poles to speak of liberation .
We were liberated only in 1989 , it 's a different topic altogether , ” says Krzysztof Kowalec , professor at the Institute of National Remembrance .
“ In 50 years , Polish kids will think Poland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and not the Red Army .
But we wo n't allow that !
” responds Tadeusz Kowalczyk , a Polish army colonel , defending the opposite view .

Revisionist debates about WW2 are raging as the old media hegemony disintegrates, and others have a chance to present their side of the story.
On the Russian side, you have the argument that it was the Soviets who did the lion's share of the job, and don't get enough credit for it. Ukrainian nationalists argue that they were on the right side in joining Hitler against the evil Bolsheviks. And conservative voices, including in Germany, are arguing that Hitler never wanted war and that the war was forced on him by England and the US, who did want it, and that among other things, the Holocaust never happened.
RT's documentary film division makes a high quality contribution to the debate supporting the Russian view. It contains extensive interviews with German historians confirming much of what the Russians are saying. From RT:
A new RT documentary "Remembrance" examines the revisionist narratives about World War II that have muddied the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazi Germany, and obscured the sacrifices made by its people. “I think World War II has been distorted incredibly by the Anglo-American media, and that’s because they wanted to diminish the role of Russia and Stalin who actually defeated Hitler, you know. It wasn’t the United States and Britain that defeated him, it was really Stalin,” says Dan Henderson, a US journalist.
As the crew journeys through Poland, one of the main ideological battlegrounds where perception of the conflict still influences present-day politics, it speaks to those who view the Red Army as liberators, and increasingly those to whom they were invaders. It discusses war landmarks such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and lend-lease and sees how their perception changed during the Cold War, and again since the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Part of the demolished monument of the Gratitude for the Soviet Army Soldiers is pictured in Legnica, Poland


russia-insider--2020-05-09--Stunning Russian Folk Singers in Retro Uniforms Perform Wartime Favorite (Video)

This article from our archives was first published on RI in December 1969 This post first appeared on Russia Insider @ @ @ @ @ women never fails to amaze .
Watch these singers perform the song : `` In @ @ @ @ @ They sing as good as they look .
Screenshots below .

× Disabling adblock
Disabling adblock for a specific site just takes a couple of clicks.
Usually it is as simple as clicking on the adblock icon in your browser, and choosing the ‘disable on this page or domain’ option.
If that doesn’t work this wikihow article gives more detail: https://www.wikihow.com/Disable-AdBlock
Thank you for your support!


russia-insider--2020-05-09--Was Hitler's Invasion of Russia Defensive, to Foil an Attack by Stalin?

`` ... from the moment ( Stalin ) signed his long-term peace agreement with Hitler in 1939 and divided Poland , he ramped up his total-war economy to an even higher notch .
Embarking upon an unprecedented military buildup , he focused his production almost entirely upon purely offensive weapons systems ... By 1941 , his production cycle was complete . ''
This article from our archives was first published on RI in December 1969 The author is the founder and editor of the Unz Review , a conservative American political website , and a one-time candidate for the governor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maintained far too many magazine subscriptions , more periodicals than I could possibly read or even skim , so most weeks they went straight into storage , with scarcely more than a glance at the cover .
But every now and then , I might casually browse one of them , curious about what I had usually been missing .
Thus , in the summer of 2010 , I happened to leaf through an issue of Chronicles , the small-circulation flagship organ of the marginalized paleoconservative movement , and soon began reading a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so astonished me that it immediately justified all the many years of subscription payments I had sent to that magazine .
The reviewer was Andrei Navrozov , a Soviet emigre long resident in Britain , and he opened by quoting a passage from a previous 1990 book review , published almost exactly twenty years before : He himself had written that earlier book review , which ran in the prestigious Times Literary Supplement following the original English publication of Icebreaker , and his description was not overblown .
The work sought to overturn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Icebreaker ‘ s author , writing under the pen-name Viktor Suvorov , was a veteran Soviet military intelligence officer who had defected to the West in 1978 and subsequently published a number of well-regarded books on the Soviet military and intelligence services .
But here he advanced a far more radical thesis .
The “ Suvorov Hypothesis ” claimed that during the summer of 1941 Stalin was on the very verge of mounting a massive invasion and conquest of Europe , while Hitler ’ s sudden attack on June 22nd of that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blow .
Moreover , the author also argued that Stalin ’ s planned attack constituted merely the final act in a much longer geopolitical strategy that he had been developing since at least the early 1930s .
Following the Bolshevik Revolution , the new Soviet regime had been viewed with extreme suspicion and hostility by other European countries , most of which also regarded their own domestic Communist Parties as likely fifth columns .
So to fulfill Lenin ’ s dream and carry the revolution to Germany and the rest of Europe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and break their common line of resistance .
He allegedly viewed Hitler ’ s rise as exactly such a potential “ icebreaker , ” an opportunity to unleash another bloody European war and exhaust all sides , while the Soviet Union remained aloof and bided its strength , waiting for the right moment to sweep in and conquer the entire continent .
To this end , Stalin had directed his powerful German Communist Party to take political actions ensuring that Hitler came to power and then later lured the German dictator into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This led Britain and France to declare war on Germany , while also eliminating the Polish buffer state , thereby placing Soviet armies directly on the German border .
And from the very moment he signed that long-term peace agreement with Hitler , he abandoned all his defensive preparations , and instead embarked upon an enormous military build-up of the purely offensive forces he intended to use for European conquest .
Thus according to Suvorov , Stalin ranks as “ the chief culprit ” behind the outbreak of World War II in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his book bears that exact title .
To my great surprise I discovered that Suvorov ’ s remarkable theories had gained enormous worldwide prominence since 1990 , and had been widely discussed almost everywhere except in America and the other English-speaking countries .
As Navrozov explained : Since 1990 , Suvorov ’ s works have been translated into at least 18 languages and an international storm of scholarly controversy has swirled around the Suvorov Hypothesis in Russia , Germany , Israel , and elsewhere .
Numerous other authors have published books in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and even international academic conferences have been held to debate the theory .
But our own English-language media has almost entirely blacklisted and ignored this ongoing international debate , to such an extent that the name of the most widely-read military historian who ever lived had remained totally unknown to me .
Finally in 2008 , the prestigious Naval Academy Press of Annapolis decided to break this 18 year intellectual embargo and published an updated English edition of Suvorov ’ s work .
But once again , our media outlets almost entirely averted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ review appeared in an obscure ideological publication , where I chanced to encounter it .
This conclusively demonstrates that throughout most of the twentieth century a united front of English-language publishers and media organs could easily maintain a boycott of any important topic , ensuring that almost no one in America or the rest of the Anglosphere would ever hear of it .
Only with the recent rise of the Internet has this disheartening situation begun to change .
Determining Stalin ’ s true motives and the basis of his foreign policy during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his statements and actions are subject to multiple interpretations .
Therefore , the theory that the dictator spent all those years deftly preparing the outbreak of World War II appears quite speculative to me .
But the other central claim of the Suvorov Hypothesis—that the Soviets were themselves on the verge of attacking when the Germans struck—is an extremely factual question , which can be evaluated based on hard evidence .
I find the case quite compelling , at least if the facts and details that Suvorov cites in support are not totally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Naval Academy Press as his publisher .
The Eastern Front was the decisive theater of World War II , involving military forces vastly larger than those deployed in the West or the Pacific , and the standard narrative always emphasizes the ineptitude and weakness of the Soviets .
On June 22 , 1941 , Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa , a sudden , massive surprise attack on the USSR , which caught the Red Army completely unaware .
Stalin has been regularly ridiculed for his total lack of preparedness , with Hitler often described @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had ever fully trusted .
Although the defending Soviet forces were enormous in size , they were poorly led , with their officer corps still not recovered from the crippling purges of the late 1930s , and their obsolete equipment and poor tactics were absolutely no match for the modern panzer divisions of Germany ’ s hitherto undefeated Wehrmacht .
The Russians initially suffered gigantic losses , and only the onset of winter and the vast spaces of their territory saved them from a quick defeat .
After this , the war seesawed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ superior numbers and improved tactics finally carried the Soviets to the streets of a destroyed Berlin in 1945 .
Such is the traditional understanding of the titanic Russo-German struggle that we see endlessly echoed in every newspaper , book , television documentary , and film around us .
But even a cursory examination of the initial situation has always revealed strange anomalies .
Many years ago , while in Junior High , I became an avid war-gamer with a strong interest in military history , and the Eastern Front of World War II @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But every reconstruction of Operation Barbarossa always noted that the Germans owed much of their great initial success to the very odd deployment of the huge Soviet forces , which were all massed along the border in vulnerable formations almost as if preparing for an attack , and some writers casually suggested that this might have indeed been the case .
But the sheer volume of supporting evidence amassed by Suvorov goes far beyond this sort of idle speculation , and he produces a historical picture radically different than what our standard accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there was been a widespread belief in the superiority of Germany ’ s military technology , its tanks and its planes , this is almost entirely mythological .
In actual fact , Soviet tanks were far superior in main armament , armor , and maneuverability to their German counterparts , so much so that the overwhelming majority of panzers were almost obsolescent by comparison .
And the Soviet superiority in numbers was even more extreme , with Stalin deploying several times more tanks than the combined total of those held by Germany and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 27,000 against just 4,000 in Hitler ’ s forces .
Even during peacetime , a single Soviet factory in Kharkov produced more tanks in every six month period than the entire Third Reich had built prior to 1940 .
The Soviets held a similar superiority , though somewhat less extreme , in their ground-attack bombers .
The totally closed nature of the USSR meant that vast military forces remained entirely hidden from outside observers .
There is also little evidence that the quality of Soviet officers or military doctrine fell short .
Indeed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s first successful example of a “ blitzkrieg ” in modern warfare was the crushing August 1939 defeat that Stalin inflicted upon the Japanese 6th Army in Outer Mongolia , relying upon a massive surprise attack of tanks , bombers , and mobile infantry .
And Stalin apparently thought so highly of many of his top military strategists in 1941 , that despite his huge initial losses , many of them remained in command and were eventually promoted to the highest ranks of the Soviet military establishment by the end of the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soviet military machine were primitive , but exactly the same was true of their Nazi opponents .
Perhaps the most surprising detail about the technology of the invading Wehrmacht in 1941 was that its transportation system was still almost entirely pre-modern , relying upon wagons and carts drawn by 750,000 horses to maintain the vital flow of ammunition and replacements to its advancing armies .
Meanwhile , major categories of Soviet weapons systems seem almost impossible to explain except as important elements of Stalin ’ s offensive plans .
Although the bulk of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like the T-28 and T-34 , generally far superior to their German counterparts , the USSR had also pioneered the development of several lines of highly specialized tanks , most of which had no counterpart elsewhere in the world .
( * ) The Soviets had produced a remarkable line of light BT tanks , easily able to shed their tracks and continue on wheels , achieving a top speed of 60 miles per hour , two or three times faster than any other comparable armored vehicle , and ideally suited to exploitation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , such wheeled operation was only effective on paved highways , of which Soviet territory had none , hence were ideally suited for travel on Germany ’ s large network of autobahns .
In 1941 Stalin deployed almost 6,500 of these autobahn-oriented tanks , more than the rest of the world ’ s tanks combined .
( * ) For centuries , Continental conquerors from Napoleon to Hitler had been stymied by the barrier of the English Channel , but Stalin was far better prepared .
Although Stalin ’ s vast USSR was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world ’ s only series of fully amphibious light tanks , able to successfully cross large rivers , lakes , and even that notoriously wide moat last successfully traversed by William the Conqueror in 1066 .
By 1941 , the Soviets deployed 4,000 of these amphibious tanks , far more than 3,350 German tanks of all types used in the attack .
But being useless in defense , they were all ordered abandoned or destroyed .
( * ) The Soviets also fielded many thousands of heavy tanks , intended to engage and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had none at all .
In direct combat , a Soviet KV-1 or KV-2 could easily destroy four or five of the best German tanks , while remaining almost invulnerable to enemy shells .
Suvorov recounts the example of a KV which took 43 direct hits before finally becoming incapacitated , surrounded by the hulks of the ten German tanks it had first managed to destroy .
Other evidence of the scale and intent of Stalin ’ s armies in the summer of 1941 are equally telling : ( * ) During the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Germans effectively utilized paratroops and air-mobile forces to seize key enemy targets far behind the front lines during a major offensive , and this was an important component of their victories against France in 1940 and Greece in 1941 .
Such units are necessarily lightly armed and no match for regular infantry in a defensive battle ; hence their only role is an offensive one .
Germany entered the war with 4,000 paratroops , a far larger force than anything found in Britain , France , America , Italy , or Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least 1,000,000 trained paratroopers , and Suvorov believes that the true total was actually closer to 2,000,000 .
( * ) Sometimes the production decisions of major weapon systems provide strong hints of the broader strategy behind their development .
The most widely produced military aircraft in history was the heavily armored IL-2 , a powerful Soviet ground-attack bomber that was originally designed as a two-man system , with the rear gunner able to effectively defend the plane against enemy fighters during its missions .
However , Stalin personally ordered the design changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ armament , which left the bomber extremely vulnerable to enemy aircraft once the war broke out .
Stalin and his war-planners had seemingly banked on possessing near-total air supremacy during the entire course of any conflict , an assumption plausible only if the German luftwaffe were destroyed on the ground by a surprise attack on the very first day .
( * ) There is considerable evidence that in the weeks prior to the German surprise attack , Stalin had ordered the release of many hundreds of thousands of Gulag prisoners , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NKVD-led divisions and corps , constituting a substantial part of the Second Strategic Echelon located hundreds of miles from the German border .
These units may have been intended to serve as occupation troops , allowing the much more powerful front-line forces to press onward and complete the conquests of France , Italy , the Balkans , and Spain .
Otherwise , I can find no other plausible explanation for Stalin ’ s action .
( * ) The planned invasion and occupation of a large country whose population speaks a different language @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , prior to their attack the notoriously methodical Germans printed and distributed to their troops large numbers of German-Russian basic phrasebooks , allowing effective communication with the local Slavic villagers and townsmen .
Ironically enough , at around the same time , the USSR seems to have produced very similar Russian-German phrasebooks , allowing conquering Soviet troops to easily make themselves understood to German civilians .
Many millions of these phrasebooks had been distributed to Soviet forces on the German border during the early months of 1941 .
Suvorov ’ s reconstruction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of combat is a fascinating one , emphasizing the mirror-image actions taken by both the Soviet and German armies .
Each side moved its best striking units , airfields , and ammunition dumps close to the border , ideal for an attack but very vulnerable in defense .
Each side carefully deactivated any residual minefields and ripped out any barbed wire obstacles , lest these hinder the forthcoming attack .
Each side did its best to camouflage their preparations , talking loudly about peace while preparing for imminent war .
The Soviet deployment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their forces were so much larger and had far greater distances to cross , they were not yet quite ready for their attack when the Germans struck , and thereby shattered Stalin ’ s planned conquest of Europe .
All of the above examples of Soviet weapons systems or strategic decisions seem very difficult to explain under the conventional defensive narrative , but make perfect sense if Stalin ’ s orientation from 1939 onward had always been an offensive one , and he had decided that summer 1941 was the time to strike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the European states , just as Lenin had originally intended .
And Suvorov provides many dozens of additional examples , building brick by brick a very compelling case for this theory .
The book is not overly long , running perhaps 150,000 words , and $ 20 plus a few mouse clicks on Amazon will provide you a copy to read and judge for yourself .
But for those who desire a simple summary , Suvorov ’ s 2009 lecture at the Eurasia Forum of the Annapolis Naval Academy is conveniently available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his weak English : And also his C-SPAN Book TV lectures at the Woodrow Wilson Center : Controversial theories , even if backed by seemingly strong evidence , can hardly be properly evaluated until they have been weighed against the counter-arguments of their strongest critics , and this should certainly be the case with the Suvorov Hypothesis .
But although the last three decades have seen the development of a large secondary literature , much of it sharply critical , nearly all this international debate has taken place in Russian , German , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not read .
There are some exceptions .
Several years ago , I came across a website debate on the topic , and one strong critic claimed that Suvorov ’ s theories had been totally debunked by American military historian David M. Glantz in Stumbling Colossus , published in 1998 .
But when I ordered and read the book I was sorely disappointed .
Although purporting to refute Suvorov , the author seemed to ignore almost all of his central arguments , and merely provided a rather dull and pedantic recapitulation of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of times , laced with a few rhetorical excesses denouncing the unique vileness of the Nazi regime .
Most ironically , Glantz emphasizes that although Suvorov ’ s analysis of the titanic Russo-German military struggle had gained great attention and considerable support among both Russian and German scholars , it had been generally ignored in the Anglo-American world , and he almost seems to imply that it can probably be disregarded for that reason .
Perhaps this attitude reflected the cultural arrogance of many American intellectual elites during Russia ’ s disastrous Yeltsin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far superior book , generally supportive of Suvorov ’ s framework , was Stalin ’ s War of Annihilation , by prize-winning German military historian Joachim Hoffmann , originally commissioned by the German Armed Forces and published in 1995 with an English revised edition appearing in 2001 .
The cover carries a notice that the text was cleared by German government censors , and the author ’ s introduction recounts the repeated threats of prosecution he endured from elected officials and the other legal obstacles he faced , while elsewhere he directly addresses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he knows are reading over his shoulder .
When stepping too far outside the bounds of accepted history carries the serious risk that a book ’ s entire print-run will be burned and the author imprisoned , a reader must necessarily be cautious at evaluating the text since important sections have been skewed or preemptively excised in the interests of self-preservation .
Evaluating scholarly debates on historical issues becomes difficult when one sides faces incarceration if their arguments are too bold .
Can we say whether Suvorov is right ?
Since our information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last three decades closing their eyes and pretending that the Suvorov Hypothesis does not exist , the near-complete absence of any substantial reviews or critiques makes it very difficult for me to come to any definite conclusion .
But based on the available evidence , I believe it is far more likely than not that Suvorov ’ s theories are at least substantially correct .
And if so , our current understanding of World War II—the central formative event of our modern world—is entirely transformed .
Suvorov notes that treaties or pacts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which they are signed—the Warsaw Pact , the Baghdad Pact , the Munich Agreement—and thus the so-called “ Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ” signed in August 23 , 1939 by which Hitler and Stalin agreed to the division of Poland should more properly be called “ the Moscow Pact.
” As a direct result of that agreement , Stalin gained half of Poland , the Baltic States , and various other advantages , including a direct border with Germany .
Meanwhile , Hitler was punished by declarations of war from France and Britain , amid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Although Germany and Russia both invaded Poland , the latter managed to avoid being dragged into any war with Poland ’ s erstwhile allies .
Thus , the primary beneficiary of the Moscow Pact was clearly Moscow .
Given the long years of trench warfare on the Western front during the First World War , almost all outside observers expected the new round of the conflict to follow a very similar static pattern , gradually exhausting all sides , and the world has shocked when Germany ’ s innovative tactics allowed it to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in France during 1940 .
But at that point , Hitler regarded the war as essentially over , and was confident that the extremely generous peace terms he immediately offered the British would soon lead to a final settlement .
As a consequence , he returned Germany to a regular peacetime economy , choosing butter over guns in order to maintain his high domestic popularity Stalin , however , was under no such political constraints , and from the moment he had signed his long-term peace agreement with Hitler in 1939 and divided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy to an even higher notch .
Embarking upon an unprecedented military buildup , he focused his production almost entirely upon purely offensive weapons systems , while even discontinuing those armaments better suited for defense and dismantling his defensive lines of fortifications .
By 1941 , his production cycle was complete , and he made his plans accordingly .
And so , just as in our traditional narrative , we see that in the weeks and months leading up to Barbarossa , the most powerful offensive military force in the history of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the German-Russian border , preparing for the order that would unleash their surprise attack .
The enemy ’ s unprepared air force was to be destroyed on the ground in the first days of the battle , and enormous tank columns would begin deep penetration thrusts , surrounding and trapping the opposing forces , achieving a classic blitzkrieg victory , and ensuring the rapid occupation of vast territories .
But the forces preparing this unprecedented war of conquest were Stalin ’ s , and his military juggernaut would surely have seized all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remainder of the Eurasian landmass .
Then at almost the last moment , Hitler suddenly realized the strategic trap into which he had fallen , and ordered his heavily outnumbered and outgunned troops into a desperate surprise attack of their own on the assembling Soviets , fortuitously catching them at the very point at which their own final preparations for sudden attack had left them most vulnerable , and thereby snatching a major initial victory from the jaws of certain defeat .
Huge stockpiles of Soviet ammunition and weaponry had been positioned close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of invasion into Germany , and these quickly fell into German hands , providing an important addition to their own woefully inadequate resources .
The enormous and fully-militarized resources of the Soviet state , supplemented by the contributions of Britain and America , did eventually turn the tide of battle and lead to a Soviet victory , but Stalin ended up with only half of Europe rather than its entirety .
Suvorov argues that the fatal weakness of the Soviet system was its total inability to compete with non-Sovietized states in the peacetime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such states had still survived after the war , the Soviet Union was doomed to eventual collapse .
Navrozov , the Chronicles reviewer , is a Russian Slav and therefore hardly favorable to the German dictator .
But he closes his review with a remarkable statement :

" ... from the moment (Stalin) signed his long-term peace agreement with Hitler in 1939 and divided Poland, he ramped up his total-war economy to an even higher notch. Embarking upon an unprecedented military buildup, he focused his production almost entirely upon purely offensive weapons systems ... By 1941, his production cycle was complete."
This article from our archives was first published on RI in June 2018
The author is the founder and editor of the Unz Review, a conservative American political website, and a one-time candidate for the governor of California.
For many years I maintained far too many magazine subscriptions, more periodicals than I could possibly read or even skim, so most weeks they went straight into storage, with scarcely more than a glance at the cover. But every now and then, I might casually browse one of them, curious about what I had usually been missing.
Thus, in the summer of 2010, I happened to leaf through an issue of Chronicles, the small-circulation flagship organ of the marginalized paleoconservative movement, and soon began reading a blandly-titled book review. But the piece so astonished me that it immediately justified all the many years of subscription payments I had sent to that magazine.
The reviewer was Andrei Navrozov, a Soviet emigre long resident in Britain, and he opened by quoting a passage from a previous 1990 book review, published almost exactly twenty years before:
[Suvorov] is arguing with every book, every article, every film, every NATO directive, every Downing Street assumption, every Pentagon clerk, every academic, every Communist and anti-Communist, every neoconservative intellectual, every Soviet song, poem, novel and piece of music ever heard, written, made, sung, issued, produced, or born during the last 50 years. For this reason, Icebreaker is the most original work of history it has been my privilege to read.
He himself had written that earlier book review, which ran in the prestigious Times Literary Supplement following the original English publication of Icebreaker, and his description was not overblown. The work sought to overturn the settled history of World War II.
Icebreaker‘s author, writing under the pen-name Viktor Suvorov, was a veteran Soviet military intelligence officer who had defected to the West in 1978 and subsequently published a number of well-regarded books on the Soviet military and intelligence services. But here he advanced a far more radical thesis.
The “Suvorov Hypothesis” claimed that during the summer of 1941 Stalin was on the very verge of mounting a massive invasion and conquest of Europe, while Hitler’s sudden attack on June 22nd of that year was intended to forestall that looming blow. Moreover, the author also argued that Stalin’s planned attack constituted merely the final act in a much longer geopolitical strategy that he had been developing since at least the early 1930s.
Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet regime had been viewed with extreme suspicion and hostility by other European countries, most of which also regarded their own domestic Communist Parties as likely fifth columns. So to fulfill Lenin’s dream and carry the revolution to Germany and the rest of Europe, Stalin somehow needed to split the Europeans, and break their common line of resistance. He allegedly viewed Hitler’s rise as exactly such a potential “icebreaker,” an opportunity to unleash another bloody European war and exhaust all sides, while the Soviet Union remained aloof and bided its strength, waiting for the right moment to sweep in and conquer the entire continent.
To this end, Stalin had directed his powerful German Communist Party to take political actions ensuring that Hitler came to power and then later lured the German dictator into signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to divide Poland. This led Britain and France to declare war on Germany, while also eliminating the Polish buffer state, thereby placing Soviet armies directly on the German border. And from the very moment he signed that long-term peace agreement with Hitler, he abandoned all his defensive preparations, and instead embarked upon an enormous military build-up of the purely offensive forces he intended to use for European conquest. Thus according to Suvorov, Stalin ranks as “the chief culprit” behind the outbreak of World War II in Europe, and the updated English edition of his book bears that exact title.
To my great surprise I discovered that Suvorov’s remarkable theories had gained enormous worldwide prominence since 1990, and had been widely discussed almost everywhere except in America and the other English-speaking countries. As Navrozov explained:
[The English edition of the] book sold 800 copies. Some months later, a German edition of the book, under the title Der Eisbrecher: Hitler in Stalins Kaulkul, was published in Germany by a smallish house, Klett-Cotta, to timid and gingerly reviews. It sold 8,000 copies. In 1992, Suvorov’s manuscript was delivered to a maverick publisher in Moscow, and at last the book saw the light of day in the original Russian, quickly selling out its first print run of 100,000 copies. In the years that followed, over five million copies have been sold, making Suvorov the most-read military historian in history. And yet, in the nearly 20 years that have elapsed between Icebreaker‘s launch in England and the present publication of The Chief Culprit, no British, American, Canadian, or Australian publisher saw fit to exploit potentially global interest in the drifting Icebreaker—or to so much as touch Suvorov with a barge pole—despite the fact that the almost unobtainable $20 copies of the long-out-of print Hamish Hamilton edition have been changing hands on the internet for upward of $500.
Since 1990, Suvorov’s works have been translated into at least 18 languages and an international storm of scholarly controversy has swirled around the Suvorov Hypothesis in Russia, Germany, Israel, and elsewhere. Numerous other authors have published books in support or more often strong opposition, and even international academic conferences have been held to debate the theory. But our own English-language media has almost entirely blacklisted and ignored this ongoing international debate, to such an extent that the name of the most widely-read military historian who ever lived had remained totally unknown to me.
Finally in 2008, the prestigious Naval Academy Press of Annapolis decided to break this 18 year intellectual embargo and published an updated English edition of Suvorov’s work. But once again, our media outlets almost entirely averted their eyes, and only a single review appeared in an obscure ideological publication, where I chanced to encounter it. This conclusively demonstrates that throughout most of the twentieth century a united front of English-language publishers and media organs could easily maintain a boycott of any important topic, ensuring that almost no one in America or the rest of the Anglosphere would ever hear of it. Only with the recent rise of the Internet has this disheartening situation begun to change.
Determining Stalin’s true motives and the basis of his foreign policy during the 1930s is hardly easy, and his statements and actions are subject to multiple interpretations. Therefore, the theory that the dictator spent all those years deftly preparing the outbreak of World War II appears quite speculative to me. But the other central claim of the Suvorov Hypothesis—that the Soviets were themselves on the verge of attacking when the Germans struck—is an extremely factual question, which can be evaluated based on hard evidence. I find the case quite compelling, at least if the facts and details that Suvorov cites in support are not totally spurious, which seems unlikely with the Naval Academy Press as his publisher.
The Eastern Front was the decisive theater of World War II, involving military forces vastly larger than those deployed in the West or the Pacific, and the standard narrative always emphasizes the ineptitude and weakness of the Soviets. On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, a sudden, massive surprise attack on the USSR, which caught the Red Army completely unaware. Stalin has been regularly ridiculed for his total lack of preparedness, with Hitler often described as the only man the paranoid dictator had ever fully trusted. Although the defending Soviet forces were enormous in size, they were poorly led, with their officer corps still not recovered from the crippling purges of the late 1930s, and their obsolete equipment and poor tactics were absolutely no match for the modern panzer divisions of Germany’s hitherto undefeated Wehrmacht. The Russians initially suffered gigantic losses, and only the onset of winter and the vast spaces of their territory saved them from a quick defeat. After this, the war seesawed back-and-forth for four more years, until superior numbers and improved tactics finally carried the Soviets to the streets of a destroyed Berlin in 1945.
Such is the traditional understanding of the titanic Russo-German struggle that we see endlessly echoed in every newspaper, book, television documentary, and film around us. But even a cursory examination of the initial situation has always revealed strange anomalies.
Many years ago, while in Junior High, I became an avid war-gamer with a strong interest in military history, and the Eastern Front of World War II was certainly a very popular topic. But every reconstruction of Operation Barbarossa always noted that the Germans owed much of their great initial success to the very odd deployment of the huge Soviet forces, which were all massed along the border in vulnerable formations almost as if preparing for an attack, and some writers casually suggested that this might have indeed been the case. But the sheer volume of supporting evidence amassed by Suvorov goes far beyond this sort of idle speculation, and he produces a historical picture radically different than what our standard accounts have always implied.
First, although there was been a widespread belief in the superiority of Germany’s military technology, its tanks and its planes, this is almost entirely mythological. In actual fact, Soviet tanks were far superior in main armament, armor, and maneuverability to their German counterparts, so much so that the overwhelming majority of panzers were almost obsolescent by comparison. And the Soviet superiority in numbers was even more extreme, with Stalin deploying several times more tanks than the combined total of those held by Germany and every other nation in the world: 27,000 against just 4,000 in Hitler’s forces. Even during peacetime, a single Soviet factory in Kharkov produced more tanks in every six month period than the entire Third Reich had built prior to 1940. The Soviets held a similar superiority, though somewhat less extreme, in their ground-attack bombers. The totally closed nature of the USSR meant that vast military forces remained entirely hidden from outside observers.
There is also little evidence that the quality of Soviet officers or military doctrine fell short. Indeed, we often forget that history’s first successful example of a “blitzkrieg” in modern warfare was the crushing August 1939 defeat that Stalin inflicted upon the Japanese 6th Army in Outer Mongolia, relying upon a massive surprise attack of tanks, bombers, and mobile infantry. And Stalin apparently thought so highly of many of his top military strategists in 1941, that despite his huge initial losses, many of them remained in command and were eventually promoted to the highest ranks of the Soviet military establishment by the end of the war.
Certainly, many aspects of the Soviet military machine were primitive, but exactly the same was true of their Nazi opponents. Perhaps the most surprising detail about the technology of the invading Wehrmacht in 1941 was that its transportation system was still almost entirely pre-modern, relying upon wagons and carts drawn by 750,000 horses to maintain the vital flow of ammunition and replacements to its advancing armies.
Meanwhile, major categories of Soviet weapons systems seem almost impossible to explain except as important elements of Stalin’s offensive plans. Although the bulk of the Soviet armored forces were medium tanks like the T-28 and T-34, generally far superior to their German counterparts, the USSR had also pioneered the development of several lines of highly specialized tanks, most of which had no counterpart elsewhere in the world.
(*) The Soviets had produced a remarkable line of light BT tanks, easily able to shed their tracks and continue on wheels, achieving a top speed of 60 miles per hour, two or three times faster than any other comparable armored vehicle, and ideally suited to exploitation drives deep into enemy territory. However, such wheeled operation was only effective on paved highways, of which Soviet territory had none, hence were ideally suited for travel on Germany’s large network of autobahns. In 1941 Stalin deployed almost 6,500 of these autobahn-oriented tanks, more than the rest of the world’s tanks combined.
(*) For centuries, Continental conquerors from Napoleon to Hitler had been stymied by the barrier of the English Channel, but Stalin was far better prepared. Although Stalin’s vast USSR was entirely a land-power, he pioneered the world’s only series of fully amphibious light tanks, able to successfully cross large rivers, lakes, and even that notoriously wide moat last successfully traversed by William the Conqueror in 1066. By 1941, the Soviets deployed 4,000 of these amphibious tanks, far more than 3,350 German tanks of all types used in the attack. But being useless in defense, they were all ordered abandoned or destroyed.
(*) The Soviets also fielded many thousands of heavy tanks, intended to engage and defeat enemy armor, while the Germans had none at all. In direct combat, a Soviet KV-1 or KV-2 could easily destroy four or five of the best German tanks, while remaining almost invulnerable to enemy shells. Suvorov recounts the example of a KV which took 43 direct hits before finally becoming incapacitated, surrounded by the hulks of the ten German tanks it had first managed to destroy.
Other evidence of the scale and intent of Stalin’s armies in the summer of 1941 are equally telling:
(*) During the early years of World War II, the Germans effectively utilized paratroops and air-mobile forces to seize key enemy targets far behind the front lines during a major offensive, and this was an important component of their victories against France in 1940 and Greece in 1941. Such units are necessarily lightly armed and no match for regular infantry in a defensive battle; hence their only role is an offensive one. Germany entered the war with 4,000 paratroops, a far larger force than anything found in Britain, France, America, Italy, or Japan. However, the Soviets had at least 1,000,000 trained paratroopers, and Suvorov believes that the true total was actually closer to 2,000,000.
(*) Sometimes the production decisions of major weapon systems provide strong hints of the broader strategy behind their development. The most widely produced military aircraft in history was the heavily armored IL-2, a powerful Soviet ground-attack bomber that was originally designed as a two-man system, with the rear gunner able to effectively defend the plane against enemy fighters during its missions. However, Stalin personally ordered the design changed to eliminate the second man and defensive armament, which left the bomber extremely vulnerable to enemy aircraft once the war broke out. Stalin and his war-planners had seemingly banked on possessing near-total air supremacy during the entire course of any conflict, an assumption plausible only if the German luftwaffe were destroyed on the ground by a surprise attack on the very first day.
(*) There is considerable evidence that in the weeks prior to the German surprise attack, Stalin had ordered the release of many hundreds of thousands of Gulag prisoners, who were issued basic weapons and organized into NKVD-led divisions and corps, constituting a substantial part of the Second Strategic Echelon located hundreds of miles from the German border. These units may have been intended to serve as occupation troops, allowing the much more powerful front-line forces to press onward and complete the conquests of France, Italy, the Balkans, and Spain. Otherwise, I can find no other plausible explanation for Stalin’s action.
(*) The planned invasion and occupation of a large country whose population speaks a different language requires considerable logistical preparation. As an example, prior to their attack the notoriously methodical Germans printed and distributed to their troops large numbers of German-Russian basic phrasebooks, allowing effective communication with the local Slavic villagers and townsmen. Ironically enough, at around the same time, the USSR seems to have produced very similar Russian-German phrasebooks, allowing conquering Soviet troops to easily make themselves understood to German civilians. Many millions of these phrasebooks had been distributed to Soviet forces on the German border during the early months of 1941.
Suvorov’s reconstruction of the weeks directly preceding the outbreak of combat is a fascinating one, emphasizing the mirror-image actions taken by both the Soviet and German armies. Each side moved its best striking units, airfields, and ammunition dumps close to the border, ideal for an attack but very vulnerable in defense. Each side carefully deactivated any residual minefields and ripped out any barbed wire obstacles, lest these hinder the forthcoming attack. Each side did its best to camouflage their preparations, talking loudly about peace while preparing for imminent war. The Soviet deployment had begun much earlier, but since their forces were so much larger and had far greater distances to cross, they were not yet quite ready for their attack when the Germans struck, and thereby shattered Stalin’s planned conquest of Europe.
All of the above examples of Soviet weapons systems or strategic decisions seem very difficult to explain under the conventional defensive narrative, but make perfect sense if Stalin’s orientation from 1939 onward had always been an offensive one, and he had decided that summer 1941 was the time to strike and enlarge his Soviet Union to include all the European states, just as Lenin had originally intended. And Suvorov provides many dozens of additional examples, building brick by brick a very compelling case for this theory.
The book is not overly long, running perhaps 150,000 words, and $20 plus a few mouse clicks on Amazon will provide you a copy to read and judge for yourself. But for those who desire a simple summary, Suvorov’s 2009 lecture at the Eurasia Forum of the Annapolis Naval Academy is conveniently available on YouTube, though slightly hindered by his weak English:
And also his C-SPAN Book TV lectures at the Woodrow Wilson Center:
Controversial theories, even if backed by seemingly strong evidence, can hardly be properly evaluated until they have been weighed against the counter-arguments of their strongest critics, and this should certainly be the case with the Suvorov Hypothesis. But although the last three decades have seen the development of a large secondary literature, much of it sharply critical, nearly all this international debate has taken place in Russian, German, or Hebrew, languages that I do not read.
There are some exceptions. Several years ago, I came across a website debate on the topic, and one strong critic claimed that Suvorov’s theories had been totally debunked by American military historian David M. Glantz in Stumbling Colossus, published in 1998. But when I ordered and read the book I was sorely disappointed. Although purporting to refute Suvorov, the author seemed to ignore almost all of his central arguments, and merely provided a rather dull and pedantic recapitulation of the standard narrative I had previously seen hundreds of times, laced with a few rhetorical excesses denouncing the unique vileness of the Nazi regime. Most ironically, Glantz emphasizes that although Suvorov’s analysis of the titanic Russo-German military struggle had gained great attention and considerable support among both Russian and German scholars, it had been generally ignored in the Anglo-American world, and he almost seems to imply that it can probably be disregarded for that reason. Perhaps this attitude reflected the cultural arrogance of many American intellectual elites during Russia’s disastrous Yeltsin Era of the late 1990s.
A far superior book, generally supportive of Suvorov’s framework, was Stalin’s War of Annihilation, by prize-winning German military historian Joachim Hoffmann, originally commissioned by the German Armed Forces and published in 1995 with an English revised edition appearing in 2001. The cover carries a notice that the text was cleared by German government censors, and the author’s introduction recounts the repeated threats of prosecution he endured from elected officials and the other legal obstacles he faced, while elsewhere he directly addresses himself to the unseen government authorities who he knows are reading over his shoulder. When stepping too far outside the bounds of accepted history carries the serious risk that a book’s entire print-run will be burned and the author imprisoned, a reader must necessarily be cautious at evaluating the text since important sections have been skewed or preemptively excised in the interests of self-preservation. Evaluating scholarly debates on historical issues becomes difficult when one sides faces incarceration if their arguments are too bold.
Can we say whether Suvorov is right? Since our information gatekeepers of the English-language world have spent the last three decades closing their eyes and pretending that the Suvorov Hypothesis does not exist, the near-complete absence of any substantial reviews or critiques makes it very difficult for me to come to any definite conclusion. But based on the available evidence, I believe it is far more likely than not that Suvorov’s theories are at least substantially correct. And if so, our current understanding of World War II—the central formative event of our modern world—is entirely transformed.
Suvorov notes that treaties or pacts are traditionally named for the city in which they are signed—the Warsaw Pact, the Baghdad Pact, the Munich Agreement—and thus the so-called “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” signed in August 23, 1939 by which Hitler and Stalin agreed to the division of Poland should more properly be called “the Moscow Pact.” As a direct result of that agreement, Stalin gained half of Poland, the Baltic States, and various other advantages, including a direct border with Germany. Meanwhile, Hitler was punished by declarations of war from France and Britain, amid worldwide condemnation as a military aggressor. Although Germany and Russia both invaded Poland, the latter managed to avoid being dragged into any war with Poland’s erstwhile allies. Thus, the primary beneficiary of the Moscow Pact was clearly Moscow.
Given the long years of trench warfare on the Western front during the First World War, almost all outside observers expected the new round of the conflict to follow a very similar static pattern, gradually exhausting all sides, and the world has shocked when Germany’s innovative tactics allowed it to achieve a lightening defeat the allied armies in France during 1940. But at that point, Hitler regarded the war as essentially over, and was confident that the extremely generous peace terms he immediately offered the British would soon lead to a final settlement. As a consequence, he returned Germany to a regular peacetime economy, choosing butter over guns in order to maintain his high domestic popularity
Stalin, however, was under no such political constraints, and from the moment he had signed his long-term peace agreement with Hitler in 1939 and divided Poland, he ramped up his total-war economy to an even higher notch. Embarking upon an unprecedented military buildup, he focused his production almost entirely upon purely offensive weapons systems, while even discontinuing those armaments better suited for defense and dismantling his defensive lines of fortifications. By 1941, his production cycle was complete, and he made his plans accordingly.
And so, just as in our traditional narrative, we see that in the weeks and months leading up to Barbarossa, the most powerful offensive military force in the history of the world was quietly assembled in secret along the German-Russian border, preparing for the order that would unleash their surprise attack. The enemy’s unprepared air force was to be destroyed on the ground in the first days of the battle, and enormous tank columns would begin deep penetration thrusts, surrounding and trapping the opposing forces, achieving a classic blitzkrieg victory, and ensuring the rapid occupation of vast territories. But the forces preparing this unprecedented war of conquest were Stalin’s, and his military juggernaut would surely have seized all of Europe, probably soon followed by the remainder of the Eurasian landmass.
Then at almost the last moment, Hitler suddenly realized the strategic trap into which he had fallen, and ordered his heavily outnumbered and outgunned troops into a desperate surprise attack of their own on the assembling Soviets, fortuitously catching them at the very point at which their own final preparations for sudden attack had left them most vulnerable, and thereby snatching a major initial victory from the jaws of certain defeat. Huge stockpiles of Soviet ammunition and weaponry had been positioned close to the border to supply the army of invasion into Germany, and these quickly fell into German hands, providing an important addition to their own woefully inadequate resources.
The enormous and fully-militarized resources of the Soviet state, supplemented by the contributions of Britain and America, did eventually turn the tide of battle and lead to a Soviet victory, but Stalin ended up with only half of Europe rather than its entirety.
Suvorov argues that the fatal weakness of the Soviet system was its total inability to compete with non-Sovietized states in the peacetime production of civilian goods, and because such states had still survived after the war, the Soviet Union was doomed to eventual collapse.
Navrozov, the Chronicles reviewer, is a Russian Slav and therefore hardly favorable to the German dictator. But he closes his review with a remarkable statement:


russia-insider--2020-05-09--The Best 'Kalinka' Ever Recorded - Red Army Chorus Sings WW2 Favorite - 1965

This article from our archives was first published on RI in December 1969 This post first appeared on Russia Insider @ @ @ @ @ , copy , and redistribute the text in this content ( but not the images @ @ @ @ @ medium or format , with the right to remix , transform , and build upon @ @ @ @ @ as long as they provide a backlink and credit to Russia Insider .
It is @ @ @ @ @ Insider .
Licensed Creative Commons


russia-insider--2020-05-09--7 Favorite Russian Military Songs in Honor of May 9th, Victory Day

Editor 's note : It is hard to convey to Western readers how emotionally powerful Victory Day is in Russia .
It celebrates central national narrative of the Russian State , and is BY FAR the most popular secular holiday of the year .
The only one to match it in importance is Easter , the main religious holiday .
Put aside historical arguments around WW2 for a day , and get a taste of how Russians mark , what is for them , a quasi-religious memory .
The massive , awe-inspiring military parade , the bemedalled grandfatherly veterans , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of millions of Russians across the country with portraits of their ancestors who fought in the war ( The Immortal Regiment ) , is truly stupendous .
If you ever have a chance to be in Russia on May 9 , do n't miss the opportunity .
Russians are the world champs in pageantry , and May 9 is when they pull out all the stops .
It is a heart stopping , tear-jerking spectacle - all day long .
RI is publishing selected articles today from our archives about WW2 as Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extraordinary historical event .
This article originally appeared in The Moscow Times Russia will commemorate 70 years since the Allied victory over Nazi Germany this Saturday , May 9 .
The day will be marked by a huge parade through the center of Moscow , involving some 200 military vehicles along with 150 aircraft .
Another way in which Russian people remember the Great Patriotic War is through songs .
In the run-up to Saturday , The Moscow Times has compiled a list of the most popular military songs .
`` It sometimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Who never returned from bloody battlefields , Do not lie in the ground where they fell , For the full lyrics ( in Russian ) click here .
This famous song performed by Soviet actor and singer Mark Bernes originally came from a poem by Dagestani poet Rasul Gamzatov , who wrote it in his native Avar language in 1968 .
The text was translated into Russian by poet-translator Naum Grebnev and published in the `` Novy Mir '' ( New World ) literary magazine later that same year .
After reading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ together they adapted the lyrics for a song that they dedicated to the soldiers who died during the Great Patriotic War .
`` Dark is the night , only bullets whistle in the steppe , Only wind wails through the wires , stars dimly twinkle .
In this dark night , I know that you , darling , can not sleep And secretly wipe your tears away near the crib . ''
For the full lyrics ( in Russian ) click here .
The song was originally performed by Mark Bernes in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ '' In the film , Bernes plays a soldier who thinks about his wife and young baby at night while singing `` Dark Is The Night . ''
A Polish version of the song was popularized by singer Vera Gran in the 1960s and can be found here .
`` Oh , the roads… dust and fog , Cold , dismay , and wild grass of the steppe… Your friend in the wild grass is lying lifeless . ''
For the full lyrics ( in Russian ) click here .
The song was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Patriotic War ended by Soviet composer and conductor Anatoly Novikov , with lyrics supplied by Lev Oshanin .
Director Sergei Yutkevich had commissioned the song for a theatrical performance on November 7 called `` Victorious Spring , '' which is where `` Oh , the Roads… '' was first performed to the public .
`` Oh , The Roads '' recalls the hardships that the population experienced and endured throughout the course of the war .
Read the rest of this article .

Editor's note: It is hard to convey to Western readers how emotionally powerful Victory Day is in Russia. It celebrates the central national narrative of the Russian State, and is BY FAR the most popular secular holiday of the year. The only one to match it in importance is Easter, the main religious holiday.
Put aside historical arguments around WW2 for a day, and get a taste of how Russians mark, what is for them, a quasi-religious memory.
The massive, awe-inspiring military parade, the bemedalled grandfatherly veterans, and in recent years, the marching of millions of Russians across the country with portraits of their ancestors who fought in the war (The Immortal Regiment), is truly stupendous. If you ever have a chance to be in Russia on May 9, don't miss the opportunity. Russians are the world champs in pageantry, and May 9 is when they pull out all the stops. It is a heart stopping, tear-jerking spectacle - all day long.
RI is publishing selected articles today from our archives about WW2 as Russia takes the day off to remember this extraordinary historical event.
This article originally appeared in The Moscow Times
Russia will commemorate 70 years since the Allied victory over Nazi Germany this Saturday, May 9. The day will be marked by a huge parade through the center of Moscow, involving some 200 military vehicles along with 150 aircraft.
A former Soviet serviceman takes part in celebrations to mark Victory day in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, May 9, 2014.
Another way in which Russian people remember the Great Patriotic War is through songs. In the run-up to Saturday, The Moscow Times has compiled a list of the most popular military songs.
1. Cranes / Zhuravli
"It sometimes seems to me that all the soldiers,
Who never returned from bloody battlefields,
Do not lie in the ground where they fell,
But turned into white crane."
For the full lyrics (in Russian) click here.
This famous song performed by Soviet actor and singer Mark Bernes originally came from a poem by Dagestani poet Rasul Gamzatov, who wrote it in his native Avar language in 1968.
The text was translated into Russian by poet-translator Naum Grebnev and published in the "Novy Mir" (New World) literary magazine later that same year.
After reading the poem, Bernes phoned Grebnev and together they adapted the lyrics for a song that they dedicated to the soldiers who died during the Great Patriotic War.
2. Dark Is The Night / Tyomnaya Noch
"Dark is the night, only bullets whistle in the steppe,
Only wind wails through the wires, stars dimly twinkle.
In this dark night, I know that you, darling, cannot sleep
And secretly wipe your tears away near the crib."
For the full lyrics (in Russian) click here.
The song was originally performed by Mark Bernes in the 1943 war film "Two Soldiers."
In the film, Bernes plays a soldier who thinks about his wife and young baby at night while singing "Dark Is The Night."
A Polish version of the song was popularized by singer Vera Gran in the 1960s and can be found here.
3. Oh, The Roads... / Ekh, Dorogi...
"Oh, the roads… dust and fog,
Cold, dismay, and wild grass of the steppe…
Shot will breaks out, raven circling,
Your friend in the wild grass is lying lifeless."
For the full lyrics (in Russian) click here.
The song was written a few months after the Great Patriotic War ended by Soviet composer and conductor Anatoly Novikov, with lyrics supplied by Lev Oshanin.
Director Sergei Yutkevich had commissioned the song for a theatrical performance on November 7 called "Victorious Spring," which is where "Oh, the Roads…" was first performed to the public.
"Oh, The Roads" recalls the hardships that the population experienced and endured throughout the course of the war.
Read the rest of this article.


russia-insider--2020-05-09--'I Die With a Joyful Heart' - Hitler's Farewell Address to the German People

Overwhelmed by the combined armed forces of the Soviet Union , British and American empires the German armies laid down their arms on May 8 , 1945 .
The elected German chancellor and Reichstag parliamentary deputies never capitulated .
Denying the military victors the opportunity to parade his body through Red Square , the legitimate twice-elected chancellor of Germany took his own life .
Before doing so , on April 29 , he made a final address to the vanquished peoples of Europe .
This speech has never been published by conventional media .
We believe it should be published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a volunteer , I made my modest contribution to the World War ( 1914 – 1918 ) which was forced upon the Reich , over thirty years have passed .
In these three decades , only love and loyalty to my people have guided me in all my thoughts , actions , and life .
They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions , such as no mortal has yet had to face .
I have exhausted my time , my working energy , and my health in these three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or anybody else in Germany wanted war in 1939 .
It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who were either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests .
I have made so many offers for the reduction and elimination of armaments , which posterity can not explain away for all eternity , that the responsibility for the outbreak of this war can not rest on me .
Furthermore , I never desired that after the first terrible World War , a second war should arise against England or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but out of the ruins of our cities and monuments of art there will arise anew the hatred for the people who alone are ultimately responsible : International Jewry and its helpers !
As late as three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish War , I proposed to the British Ambassador in Berlin a solution for the German-Polish problem , similar to the problem of the Saar area , under international control .
This offer can not be explained away , either .
It was only rejected because the responsible circles in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the expectation of business advantages , partly driven by propaganda promoted by international Jewry .
But I left no doubt about the fact that if the peoples of Europe were again only regarded as so many packages of stock shares by these international money and finance conspirators , then that race , too , which is the truly guilty party in this murderous struggle would also have to be held to account : the Jews .
I further left no doubt that this time we would not permit millions of European children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , nor millions of grown-up men to suffer death , nor hundreds of thousands of women and children to be burned and bombed to death in their cities , without the truly guilty party having to atone for its guilt , even if through more humane means .
After six years of struggle , which in spite of all reverses will go down in history as the most glorious and most courageous manifestation of a people ’ s will to live ?
I can not separate myself from the city which is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces are too few to permit any further resistance against the enemy ’ s assaults , and because individual resistance is rendered valueless by blinded and characterless scoundrels , I desire to share the fate that millions of others have taken upon themselves , in that I shall remain in this city .
Furthermore , I do not want to fall into the hands of enemies who for the delectation of the hate-riddled masses require a new spectacle promoted by the Jews .
I have therefore resolved to remain in Berlin and there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the very moment when , as I believe the seat of the Fuehrer and Chancellor can no longer be defended .
I die with a joyful heart in the awareness the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front , of our women at home , the achievements of our peasants and workers , and the contribution , unique in history , of our youth , which bears my name .
It goes without saying that I thank them all from the bottom of my heart and that it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everything they should not give up the struggle , but continue fighting wherever they may be , faithful to the great Clausewitz , against the enemies of the Fatherland .
From the sacrifices of our soldiers and from my own comradeship with them , there will come in one way or another into German history the seed of a brilliant renaissance of the National Socialist movement and thus the realisation of a true national community .
Many very brave men and women have resolved to link their lives to mine to the very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and finally ordered them , not to do so , but instead to take part in the continuing struggle of the nation .
I ask the commanders of the army , navy , and air force to strengthen by all possible means the spirit of resistance of our soldiers in the spirit of National Socialism , emphasising especially that I too , as founder and creator of this movement , have preferred death to cowardly flight or even capitulation .
May it be one day a part of the code of honour ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that the surrender of an area or of a town is impossible , and above all in this respect , the leaders should give a shining example of faithful devotion to duty unto death .
Several brave men have joined me by their own free will and do not wish to leave the capital of the Reich under any circumstances , but on the contrary are willing to perish with me here .
Yet I must ask them to obey my request , and in this instance place the interests of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their work and loyalty , they will remain just as close to me as companions after my death , just as I hope that my spirit will remain amongst them and will always accompany them .
Let them be hard but never unjust ; above all , let them never allow fear to counsel their actions , but may they place the honour of the nation above everything on this earth .
Finally , may they be conscious of the fact that our task of building a National Socialist state represents the labour @ @ @ @ @ @ @ places every single person under an obligation always to serve the common interest and to subordinate his own interests .
I demand of all Germans , all National Socialists , men and women and all soldiers of the Armed Forces , that they remain faithful and obedient to the new government and to their President unto death .
Above all , I charge the leadership of the nation and their followers with the strict observance of the racial laws and with merciless resistance against the universal poisoners of all peoples , international Jewry.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 4 AM .
MICHAEL WALSH is a worldwide journalist , broadcaster and author of 64 book titles with 36 years experience .
Like other journalists of integrity , he no longer writes for corporate media , opting instead for true journalism .

Overwhelmed by the combined armed forces of the Soviet Union, British and American empires the German armies laid down their arms on May 8, 1945. The elected German chancellor and Reichstag parliamentary deputies never capitulated.
Denying the military victors the opportunity to parade his body through Red Square, the legitimate twice-elected chancellor of Germany took his own life. Before doing so, on April 29, he made a final address to the vanquished peoples of Europe.
This speech has never been published by conventional media. We believe it should be published:
"Since 1914, when as a volunteer, I made my modest contribution to the World War (1914 – 1918) which was forced upon the Reich, over thirty years have passed. In these three decades, only love and loyalty to my people have guided me in all my thoughts, actions, and life. They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions, such as no mortal has yet had to face. I have exhausted my time, my working energy, and my health in these three decades.
It is untrue that I or anybody else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who were either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests.
I have made so many offers for the reduction and elimination of armaments, which posterity cannot explain away for all eternity, that the responsibility for the outbreak of this war cannot rest on me.
Furthermore, I never desired that after the first terrible World War, a second war should arise against England or even against America. Centuries may pass, but out of the ruins of our cities and monuments of art there will arise anew the hatred for the people who alone are ultimately responsible: International Jewry and its helpers!
As late as three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish War, I proposed to the British Ambassador in Berlin a solution for the German-Polish problem, similar to the problem of the Saar area, under international control. This offer cannot be explained away, either. It was only rejected because the responsible circles in English politics wanted the war, partly in the expectation of business advantages, partly driven by propaganda promoted by international Jewry.
But I left no doubt about the fact that if the peoples of Europe were again only regarded as so many packages of stock shares by these international money and finance conspirators, then that race, too, which is the truly guilty party in this murderous struggle would also have to be held to account: the Jews.
I further left no doubt that this time we would not permit millions of European children of Aryan descent to die of hunger, nor millions of grown-up men to suffer death, nor hundreds of thousands of women and children to be burned and bombed to death in their cities, without the truly guilty party having to atone for its guilt, even if through more humane means.
After six years of struggle, which in spite of all reverses will go down in history as the most glorious and most courageous manifestation of a people’s will to live? I cannot separate myself from the city which is the capital of this Reich.
Because our forces are too few to permit any further resistance against the enemy’s assaults, and because individual resistance is rendered valueless by blinded and characterless scoundrels, I desire to share the fate that millions of others have taken upon themselves, in that I shall remain in this city. Furthermore, I do not want to fall into the hands of enemies who for the delectation of the hate-riddled masses require a new spectacle promoted by the Jews.
I have therefore resolved to remain in Berlin and there to choose death of my own will at the very moment when, as I believe the seat of the Fuehrer and Chancellor can no longer be defended. I die with a joyful heart in the awareness the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front, of our women at home, the achievements of our peasants and workers, and the contribution, unique in history, of our youth, which bears my name.
It goes without saying that I thank them all from the bottom of my heart and that it is also my desire that in spite of everything they should not give up the struggle, but continue fighting wherever they may be, faithful to the great Clausewitz, against the enemies of the Fatherland. From the sacrifices of our soldiers and from my own comradeship with them, there will come in one way or another into German history the seed of a brilliant renaissance of the National Socialist movement and thus the realisation of a true national community.
Many very brave men and women have resolved to link their lives to mine to the very end. I have requested them, and finally ordered them, not to do so, but instead to take part in the continuing struggle of the nation.
I ask the commanders of the army, navy, and air force to strengthen by all possible means the spirit of resistance of our soldiers in the spirit of National Socialism, emphasising especially that I too, as founder and creator of this movement, have preferred death to cowardly flight or even capitulation.
May it be one day a part of the code of honour; as it is already in the navy, that the surrender of an area or of a town is impossible, and above all in this respect, the leaders should give a shining example of faithful devotion to duty unto death.
Several brave men have joined me by their own free will and do not wish to leave the capital of the Reich under any circumstances, but on the contrary are willing to perish with me here. Yet I must ask them to obey my request, and in this instance place the interests of the nation above their own feelings.
Through their work and loyalty, they will remain just as close to me as companions after my death, just as I hope that my spirit will remain amongst them and will always accompany them. Let them be hard but never unjust; above all, let them never allow fear to counsel their actions, but may they place the honour of the nation above everything on this earth.
Finally, may they be conscious of the fact that our task of building a National Socialist state represents the labour of the coming centuries, and this places every single person under an obligation always to serve the common interest and to subordinate his own interests. I demand of all Germans, all National Socialists, men and women and all soldiers of the Armed Forces, that they remain faithful and obedient to the new government and to their President unto death.
Above all, I charge the leadership of the nation and their followers with the strict observance of the racial laws and with merciless resistance against the universal poisoners of all peoples, international Jewry.” ~ Berlin, 29 April 1945, 4 AM.
MICHAEL WALSH is a worldwide journalist, broadcaster and author of 64 book titles with 36 years experience. Like other journalists of integrity, he no longer writes for corporate media, opting instead for true journalism.


russia-insider--2020-05-11--Excellent Putin Interview on American Exceptionalism and Russia's Relationship With the US (Video)

While the world has been distracted by the COVID-19 saga , the ongoing geopolitical maneuvering between Russia and the United States continues but in a much less obvious mode .
A recent television appearance with Vladimir Putin sheds additional light on the relationship between the United States and Russia .
The televisions series 20 Questions with Vladimir Putin which is subtitled in English on the Tass website as well as on the Tass channel on YouTube gives us further insight into President Putin .
This interview given in March 2020 , looks at Russia 's place in the world and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Here is what he had to say about his strained relationship with Barak Obama and American exceptionalism : '' In any case , I had good relations with Bush ... .
it has nothing to do with `` being at odds '' ( with Obama ) .
It 's just that when a person says that ... when he said that the US is an exceptional nation with special , exclusive rights in the world , I can not agree .
God created us all equal and gave us equal rights .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say that some people should have exclusive rights to anything . ''
When asked how he rated Russia 's current relationship with the United States on a scale of one to five , here is his response : '' I could give it a three .
Between a two and a three .
More like a three though .
Look , we do cooperate on counter-terrorism .
It was actually I who called Trump to thank the U.S. for giving us the information ( that led to the arrests of two Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 2019 , charged with attempted terrorist attacks in St. Petersburg ) ... .That specific case was detected by the U.S .
I would like to thank them a lot for sharing that information with us ... .But , in the last two years under Trump , trade turnover started to grow .
In the area of security , a while ago we concluded an agreement with Obama , the New START Treaty was also signed when he was in office .
However , it has not been extended ... .yet .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. keeps imposing sanctions on Russia .
Another question .
Take Nord Stream 2 , they imposed sanctions on it as well .
The U.S. has always been against the development of our economic relations with Europe , even in the 1960s when we started the construction of , if you remember , the gas-for-pipes deal .
Thank God now we produced large-diameter pipes ourselves ... '' When asked why the United States opposed Nord Stream 2 , here is Putin 's response : '' Now they oppose Nord Stream 2 ... Why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
They wanted to ensure transit through Ukraine .
It 's rather strange , is n't it ?
So , they are working Ukraine and have established external control over it but they want Ukraine to be sustained by our money as well .
They do n't want to give Ukraine money themselves .
They want Ukraine to receive something from us through transit fees .
Okay , we agree , because we too will be interested in the growth in gas consumption in Europe in general and Ukraine in particular ...
However @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for imposing sanctions against Nord Stream 2 was the need to ensure transit through Ukraine .
But , we have signed a transit agreement with Ukraine ( on December 30 , 2019 ) .
What is needed now ?
They need to lift sanctions against Nord Stream .
There are no grounds for imposing them .
And , if the sanctions remain , it will mean that there is only one motive ; to ensure competitive advantages for their LNG , for their liquified gas .
The strongest player sets the rules .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ products exclusively in their own selfish interests and at the expense of European consumers . ''
`` I said that it is inadmissible that one country , the United States , extends its jurisdiction beyond its national borders .
Today , say , the German leadership says exactly that , that it is inadmissible that the United States imposes secondary sanctions i.e .
on companies that have no relation to the United States , trying to preventing them from pursuing their national interests . ''
`` However , what is a unipolar world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation , namely one centre of authority , one centre of force , one centre of decision-making .
It is world in which there is one master , one sovereign .
And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system , but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within .
And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy .
Because , as you know , democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ light of the interests and opinions of the minority .
Incidentally , Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy .
But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves .
I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today ’ s world .
And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today ’ s – and precisely in today ’ s – world , then the military , political and economic resources would not suffice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation .
Along with this , what is happening in today ’ s world – and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs , the concept of a unipolar world .
And with which results ?
Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems .
Moreover , they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as local and regional conflicts have not diminished .
Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently .
And no less people perish in these conflicts – even more are dying than before .
Significantly more , significantly more !
Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations , force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts .
As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts .
Finding a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is always interesting to listen to the `` other side '' of the Russia-America geopolitical divide since the Russian version of the story rarely makes it to the Western mainstream media .

While the world has been distracted by the COVID-19 saga, the ongoing geopolitical maneuvering between Russia and the United States continues but in a much less obvious mode. A recent television appearance with Vladimir Putin sheds additional light on the relationship between the United States and Russia.
The televisions series 20 Questions with Vladimir Putin which is subtitled in English on the Tass website as well as on the Tass channel on YouTube gives us further insight into President Putin. This interview given in March 2020, looks at Russia's place in the world and its relations with the United States:
Here is what he had to say about his strained relationship with Barak Obama and American exceptionalism:
"In any case, I had good relations with Bush.... it has nothing to do with "being at odds" (with Obama). It's just that when a person says that...when he said that the US is an exceptional nation with special, exclusive rights in the world, I cannot agree. God created us all equal and gave us equal rights. So, I think it is absolutely ungrounded to say that some people should have exclusive rights to anything."
When asked how he rated Russia's current relationship with the United States on a scale of one to five, here is his response:
"I could give it a three. Between a two and a three. More like a three though. Look, we do cooperate on counter-terrorism. It was actually I who called Trump to thank the U.S. for giving us the information (that led to the arrests of two Russia terrorists who were detained on December 27, 2019, charged with attempted terrorist attacks in St. Petersburg)....That specific case was detected by the U.S. I would like to thank them a lot for sharing that information with us....But, in the last two years under Trump, trade turnover started to grow. In the area of security, a while ago we concluded an agreement with Obama, the New START Treaty was also signed when he was in office. However, it has not been extended....yet. So, this raises a question. The U.S. keeps imposing sanctions on Russia. Another question. Take Nord Stream 2, they imposed sanctions on it as well. The U.S. has always been against the development of our economic relations with Europe, even in the 1960s when we started the construction of, if you remember, the gas-for-pipes deal. Thank God now we produced large-diameter pipes ourselves..."
When asked why the United States opposed Nord Stream 2, here is Putin's response:
"Now they oppose Nord Stream 2...Why did they do it, what for? They wanted to ensure transit through Ukraine. It's rather strange, isn't it? So, they are working Ukraine and have established external control over it but they want Ukraine to be sustained by our money as well. They don't want to give Ukraine money themselves. They want Ukraine to receive something from us through transit fees. Okay, we agree, because we too will be interested in the growth in gas consumption in Europe in general and Ukraine in particular... However, the main motivation, the excuse for imposing sanctions against Nord Stream 2 was the need to ensure transit through Ukraine. But, we have signed a transit agreement with Ukraine (on December 30, 2019). What is needed now? They need to lift sanctions against Nord Stream. There are no grounds for imposing them. And, if the sanctions remain, it will mean that there is only one motive; to ensure competitive advantages for their LNG, for their liquified gas. The strongest player sets the rules. They are securing a market for their products exclusively in their own selfish interests and at the expense of European consumers."
Putin then goes on to discuss his speech of February 10, 2007 at the Munich Security Conference at which he brought up the subject of the end of the unipolar, American-led world:
"I said that it is inadmissible that one country, the United States, extends its jurisdiction beyond its national borders. Today, say, the German leadership says exactly that, that it is inadmissible that the United States imposes secondary sanctions i.e. on companies that have no relation to the United States, trying to preventing them from pursuing their national interests."
For context, here is an excerpt from Putin's February 2007 speech:
"However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.
It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.
And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.
Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.
I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.
Along with this, what is happening in today’s world – and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.
And with which results?
Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less people perish in these conflicts – even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!
Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible."
It is always interesting to listen to the "other side" of the Russia-America geopolitical divide since the Russian version of the story rarely makes it to the Western mainstream media.