fivethirtyeight--2020-10-02--How Have People Responded To Other Political Leaders Getting COVID-19?

To state the obvious , we have no idea how the news that President Trump has COVID-19 will affect the presidential campaign — this is simply an unprecedented situation so close to an election .
Your best bet : Wait for new polls to be released over the coming days and weeks — any shift in the race should be reflected there .
That ’ s what we ’ ll be doing .
In the meantime , however , we can look at the closest possible analogy : how other political leaders have fared politically after they were diagnosed with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contracted COVID-19 this spring and summer , most prominently British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro .
And with the massive caveat that it was not election season in the United Kingdom ( which can make a real difference in the polls ) , it doesn ’ t appear that Johnson ’ s diagnosis affected his electoral fortunes .
According to Politico ’ s polling average of parliamentary voting intention , support for Johnson ’ s Conservative Party held steady at 51 percent for weeks following Johnson ’ s diagnosis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a small uptick in his approval rating .
According to Morning Consult , 62 percent of Britons approved of Johnson on the day of his diagnosis ; shortly after he was hospitalized , it reached a peak of 66 percent .
Similarly , YouGov found that approval of the ( Johnson-led ) British government largely did not change in the weeks following Johnson ’ s diagnosis , but the share of people viewing him favorably did increase , from 54 percent before he was hospitalized to 60 percent after .
So one possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or job approval rating will improve while the horse-race polls measuring vote intention generally stay the same — which perhaps makes sense in this era of intense partisanship .
Then again , maybe even Trump ’ s job approval rating won ’ t change — Bolsonaro ’ s didn ’ t after he announced he had tested positive on July 7 .
According to Morning Consult , Bolsonaro ’ s approval rating was 45 percent on July 7 and fluctuated between there and 47 percent until mid-August ( by which time he had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three governors have contracted COVID-19 : Oklahoma ’ s Kevin Stitt in July , and Missouri ’ s Mike Parson and Virginia ’ s Ralph Northam just last week .
And while Parson ’ s and Northam ’ s diagnoses are too recent for us to have any polling data on , Stitt ’ s popularity appeared to ebb after his diagnosis — though , of course , that could be due to any number of factors .
According to polls by Amber Integrated , 62 percent of Oklahomans approved of Stitt ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 56 percent did in September .
( While that might seem high , remember Stitt is a Republican and Oklahoma is a very red state ; by our Popularity Above Replacement Governor metric , Stitt is actually 7 points less popular than he “ should ” be based on Oklahoma ’ s partisan lean . )
Granted , Stitt ’ s July illness probably wasn ’ t fresh in people ’ s minds by September , but another survey did find that approval of how Stitt was handling the coronavirus outbreak specifically did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The COVID-19 Consortium for Understanding the Public ’ s Policy Preferences Across States gave him a 45 percent approval rating on the coronavirus in late June , but a 34 percent approval rating in late July ( and that number did not recover in late August ) .
Not many other governors experienced significant coronavirus approval rating drops during that same time frame , suggesting something specific to Oklahoma caused the decline .
If that happens to Trump , it could be bad news for him electorally , given that Americans consider the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” for the most important problem facing the country today .
That said , Trump ’ s approval rating on the coronavirus is already very low — 40 percent approval , 57 percent disapproval , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s tracker on the coronavirus — so he may not have much more room to fall .
Regardless , refocusing the national conversation on a poor issue for Trump during the final month of the election — as this news seems likely to do — is ominous for the incumbent .

How Have People Responded To Other Political Leaders Getting COVID-19? Trump isn’t the first world leader (or U.S. politician) to test positive, but he may be a unique case.
To state the obvious, we have no idea how the news that President Trump has COVID-19 will affect the presidential campaign — this is simply an unprecedented situation so close to an election. Your best bet: Wait for new polls to be released over the coming days and weeks — any shift in the race should be reflected there. That’s what we’ll be doing.
In the meantime, however, we can look at the closest possible analogy: how other political leaders have fared politically after they were diagnosed with COVID-19.
A handful of world leaders contracted COVID-19 this spring and summer, most prominently British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. And with the massive caveat that it was not election season in the United Kingdom (which can make a real difference in the polls), it doesn’t appear that Johnson’s diagnosis affected his electoral fortunes. According to Politico’s polling average of parliamentary voting intention, support for Johnson’s Conservative Party held steady at 51 percent for weeks following Johnson’s diagnosis.
However, it may have caused a small uptick in his approval rating. According to Morning Consult, 62 percent of Britons approved of Johnson on the day of his diagnosis; shortly after he was hospitalized, it reached a peak of 66 percent. Similarly, YouGov found that approval of the (Johnson-led) British government largely did not change in the weeks following Johnson’s diagnosis, but the share of people viewing him favorably did increase, from 54 percent before he was hospitalized to 60 percent after.
So one possibility is that Trump’s favorable rating or job approval rating will improve while the horse-race polls measuring vote intention generally stay the same — which perhaps makes sense in this era of intense partisanship. Then again, maybe even Trump’s job approval rating won’t change — Bolsonaro’s didn’t after he announced he had tested positive on July 7. According to Morning Consult, Bolsonaro’s approval rating was 45 percent on July 7 and fluctuated between there and 47 percent until mid-August (by which time he had recovered).
Closer to home, three governors have contracted COVID-19: Oklahoma’s Kevin Stitt in July, and Missouri’s Mike Parson and Virginia’s Ralph Northam just last week. And while Parson’s and Northam’s diagnoses are too recent for us to have any polling data on, Stitt’s popularity appeared to ebb after his diagnosis — though, of course, that could be due to any number of factors.
According to polls by Amber Integrated, 62 percent of Oklahomans approved of Stitt’s job performance in June, while 56 percent did in September. (While that might seem high, remember Stitt is a Republican and Oklahoma is a very red state; by our Popularity Above Replacement Governor metric, Stitt is actually 7 points less popular than he “should” be based on Oklahoma’s partisan lean.)
Granted, Stitt’s July illness probably wasn’t fresh in people’s minds by September, but another survey did find that approval of how Stitt was handling the coronavirus outbreak specifically did fall sharply right after his diagnosis. The COVID-19 Consortium for Understanding the Public’s Policy Preferences Across States gave him a 45 percent approval rating on the coronavirus in late June, but a 34 percent approval rating in late July (and that number did not recover in late August). Not many other governors experienced significant coronavirus approval rating drops during that same time frame, suggesting something specific to Oklahoma caused the decline.
If that happens to Trump, it could be bad news for him electorally, given that Americans consider the coronavirus tied with “the government/poor leadership” for the most important problem facing the country today. That said, Trump’s approval rating on the coronavirus is already very low — 40 percent approval, 57 percent disapproval, according to FiveThirtyEight’s tracker on the coronavirus — so he may not have much more room to fall.
Regardless, refocusing the national conversation on a poor issue for Trump during the final month of the election — as this news seems likely to do — is ominous for the incumbent.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-02--How Will Trump’s Positive COVID-19 Test Affect The Election?

Welcome to an emergency edition of FiveThirtyEight ’ s politics chat .
The transcript below has been lightly edited , and updated with the news that Joe Biden has tested negative for the coronavirus .
sarah ( Sarah Frostenson , politics editor ) : Very early Friday morning , President Trump tweeted that he and First Lady Melania Trump had tested positive for COVID-19 .
That news came just after reports on Thursday that White House senior advisor Hope Hicks had tested positive .
There ’ s a lot we still don ’ t know at this point , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or the severity of the president ’ s symptoms , but with about a month until Election Day , this is … an October surprise , to say the least .
Let ’ s start with one of the big questions : What does this mean for the election ?
natesilver ( Nate Silver , editor in chief ) : So for some reason I ’ m finding it hard to think through the electoral implications this morning .
Maybe I need even more coffee .
My thoughts right now are mostly some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ F*CK does this happen ?
Shouldn ’ t everybody in the president ’ s orbit have been tested constantly ?
• And , OF COURSE this happened because 2020 and because the president clearly was not taking that many precautions perry ( Perry Bacon Jr. , senior writer ) : My overall answer is , “ I have no idea how this affects the election.
” This is truly unprecedented , as far as I know , in American elections — the president getting a serious virus weeks before the election .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad who has gotten a virus like this weeks before the election either ( though I am not an expert on elections outside of the United States ) .
So while I have some general thoughts , I wanted to lay that out first .
I truly have no idea what to expect , how voters will react to Trump ’ s positive test , how the media will cover it or how other candidates will react .
ameliatd ( Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux , senior writer ) : Yeah — it ’ s such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on what happens next .
Does Trump get really sick ?
Does he stay mostly asymptomatic ?
How far did the virus spread in the White House ?
All questions we can ’ t answer right now , of course .
But hugely important for how people respond .
natesilver : Yeah .
We ’ re going to be saying “ I don ’ t know ” a lot in this chat .
I don ’ t think there ’ s anything wrong with thinking through the electoral implications .
There ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people have already voted .
So Americans are wrestling with this stuff .
We just don ’ t have a lot of good answers .
ameliatd : And , of course , there ’ s an open question about whether Joe Biden will test positive , after he and Trump were at the debate together on Tuesday .
[ Editor ’ s note : Biden tested negative for the coronavirus after the conclusion of this chat . ]
natesilver : Right , and one thing I ’ m not sure people realize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between exposure and a positive test .
So we won ’ t know for sure which people have or don ’ t have COVID-19 for a bit here .
ameliatd : In the meantime , though , this does mean that Trump can ’ t campaign for at a while , right ?
And what about the debates , which were supposed to be on Oct. 15 and 22 ?
Do those still happen ?
How much does it matter if Trump can ’ t campaign , though ?
This was already a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not sure his rallies were going to put him over the edge .
ameliatd : Everyone wanted that automatic mute last time !
natesilver : At a very basic , square-one level , COVID-19 is a huge liability for the president , and so placing more focus on COVID-19 probably isn ’ t great for him .
But I don ’ t know how useful that is as a prior .
Could Trump getting COVID-19 change his messaging around the virus and pandemic ?
Maybe .
But this is Donald Trump we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not inclined to be overly disciplined or deferential to scientists , etc .
He ’ s pretty unpredictable , and we don ’ t yet know a lot about how serious his symptoms are .
And this is a bad disease that can have cognitive effects in addition to physical ones .
Also in terms of very , basic , non-debatable priors : the president ’ s re-election bid was in DEEP trouble going into this , at least by conventional measures .
And the smattering of post-debate polls we ’ d gotten @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So just worth keeping that in mind .
sarah : Absolutely .
But on the question of how this happened … The Trump campaign has not taken precautions seriously .
They ’ ve continued to hold large , in-person events .
And they ’ ve even mocked the Biden campaign for wearing masks .
Is one possible scenario from this that Americans take the coronavirus more seriously ?
Views on COVID-19 and Trump ’ s response to it are polarized by party , but how could Trump ’ s positive test change public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happens with public opinion really depends on how sick Trump gets .
As I wrote over the summer , a big part of the reason Republicans are not as into COVID-19 restrictions is that they are much , much less likely to view the virus as a personal health threat to them .
And research has indicated that Trump downplaying the virus is probably a significant driver of that .
So I could see this playing out at least two ways … • Trump gets moderately or very sick and this does prompt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , this actually is serious and if it could happen to Trump it could happen to me ” ; • Trump remains mostly asymptomatic and it bolsters the idea that this is actually not such a big deal .
perry : So , writing this on Friday morning , here ’ s what I expect … The overwhelming majority of people , even those who are older , don ’ t die from COVID-19 .
So the most likely outcome is that Trump and some of his staffers have COVID-19 , stay somewhat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then Trump returns to campaigning for reelection ( I am not sure if he has the big rallies , but I wouldn ’ t rule that out . )
I am not even sure the next two debates have to be canceled — particularly the Oct 22 one .
And basically nothing has shaken Trump ’ s job approval ratings or really the race overall .
I don ’ t really expect this to shift things either .
The president testing positive for COVID-19 is obviously hugely significant , but it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not taking the virus seriously enough .
Now , we have a much more obvious manifestation of that fact , but nothing is really different .
Biden may not be able to attack Trump as bluntly on COVID now , for decorum reasons , but this positive test reinforces Biden ’ s message that Trump has let this crisis get out of hand .
So this matters , but I ’ m not sure it matters electorally in terms of shifting a lot of people ’ s votes .
ameliatd : I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the line now , but is it possible that battling and surviving COVID-19 could actually make Trump more popular in some corners ?
Especially if he doesn ’ t get very sick ?
natesilver : Amelia , I ’ m not sure I really buy that .
I mean , somehow if it made the president into a more empathetic person , maybe , I suppose ?
But ( i ) I ’ m not sure that ’ s how he ’ s likely to react as opposed to sending 6,000 tweets about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; and ( ii ) he ’ s been trying to project a lot of macho-ness/dominance and to portray Biden as old and feeble and I ’ m not sure how contracting a serious disease himself fits into that .
ameliatd : Well , but if he contracts a serious disease and doesn ’ t get very sick and recovers fairly quickly — that certainly doesn ’ t seem as bad for him .
natesilver : I guess if he recovers in a couple of weeks , which is still what happens for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say he kicked COVID ’ s ass and/or it wasn ’ t that serious .
But I don ’ t think that necessarily affects anything electorally .
ameliatd : So , is the main impact potentially less about politics and more about the way Americans think about the virus ?
Either prompting Republicans to take it more seriously or reinforcing their sense that this really isn ’ t a big deal ?
There was research back in March indicating that COVID-19 spreading at CPAC helped drive a brief moment when Republicans and Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seriousness of the virus .
perry : So I don ’ t buy this idea that Trump will get COVID-19 , be fine and then start calling it “ Fake News.
” We just learned Ronna McDaneil , the RNC chair , has also tested positive .
So has Hope Hicks , a top Trump adviser .
[ Editor ’ s note : Sen. Mike Lee of Utah has since announced that he has also tested positive . ]
I think enough people in Trump ’ s circle may have the virus that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , basically forcing him to as well .
natesilver : This is one sort of message we might hear , I guess : sarah : But this question of whether it will change how seriously people perceive the coronavirus is an interesting one .
Americans overall , as we saw in our debate polling with Ipsos , listed the coronavirus as their No .
1 issue : However , among potential Trump supporters a much smaller share ( 15.5 percent ) said the coronavirus was their most important issue , many more were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you could argue that the economy is probably linked to coronavirus among Trump supporters , but this could be a moment that has public health repercussions , yes ?
ameliatd : Well , there was a jobs report this morning — one that I suspect is now going to get a LOT less attention .
It was kinda positive — if you can consider the unemployment rate falling just under 8 percent positive .
perry : I think there could be a bunch of real , important health outcomes from this … • @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bit more hesitant to lift COVID restrictions ; • Democratic mayors and governors may cite Trump ’ s positive test as part of their messaging on keeping restrictions in place ; • Republican voters may become a bit less dismissive of COVID , in part because GOP elites take it more seriously ; • Overall , this news could be important and have a positive impact in terms of Americans taking the virus more seriously .
ameliatd : Yeah , I ’ m also wondering if this will change the way Republican governors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ completely lifted in some states .
Although I do think it ’ s important to note that the vast majority of Americans say they ’ ve been complying with public health guidelines like mask-wearing , even if Republicans are much less likely to agree with government restrictions on businesses .
perry : To take an example : Georgia Gov .
Brian Kemp , a Republican , is never going to give a press conference and say something like , “ I was downplaying COVID-19 but then Trump got it and it reinforced how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I think that will never happen ?
natesilver : I suppose I ’ m skeptical that this will necessarily change all that much .
As you can see from the Kelly Loeffler tweet above , there are lots of partisan responses that don ’ t necessarily involve taking the disease more seriously per se .
Now , if Trump said something like what Perry just laid out , i.e .
“ I wasn ’ t taking this seriously enough , and I now understand the error of my ways… ” then OK !
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ I ’ m not sure that ’ s necessarily the most likely outcome .
ameliatd : But for regular people , I think a lot of this is about the gut-level fear that this might happen to them .
Trump downplaying it , not wearing a mask , and not getting sick almost certainly helped reinforce the feeling among Republicans that it ’ s not a big deal .
So I also think the way this is presented in conservative media , how visible Trump ’ s illness is — all of that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s true that the partisan response is pretty baked in at this point .
But if Trump gets really sick , I could see that changing .
Of course , if Republican governors start being more cautious with restrictions again and more people lose their jobs — that raises questions for whether a new stimulus package might actually get off the ground , too .
I remain skeptical that will happen !
But maybe there ’ s more pressure to break the stalemate in Congress ?
sarah : There are a number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one , of course , is that Trump can ’ t campaign — not to mention if Vice President Mike Pence has to step in .
What should we be looking for as this story develops ?
ameliatd : Trump ’ s symptoms are obviously a big one .
And if they ’ re serious , there might be calls to take him off the ballot .
natesilver : Right , part of what makes this tough to predict — and I ’ m not against prediction !
— is that we don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a mild or severe case , how many people in his orbit are also infected , etc .
perry : Assuming Trump recovers , what does his campaign look like on Oct. 16 ?
Is he still holding big rallies ?
Is he wearing a mask ?
Are his staffers ?
Does the Oct. 22 debate take place , and in person ?
What about the Oct. 15 one ?
Is he further dismissing the virus because he survived it ?
natesilver : Let ’ s also keep in mind that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some people .
It can take months , or longer — long-term COVID symptoms are scary .

Welcome to an emergency edition of FiveThirtyEight’s politics chat. The transcript below has been lightly edited, and updated with the news that Joe Biden has tested negative for the coronavirus.
sarah (Sarah Frostenson, politics editor): Very early Friday morning, President Trump tweeted that he and First Lady Melania Trump had tested positive for COVID-19. That news came just after reports on Thursday that White House senior advisor Hope Hicks had tested positive.
There’s a lot we still don’t know at this point, including the extent of White House staff affected or the severity of the president’s symptoms, but with about a month until Election Day, this is … an October surprise, to say the least.
Let’s start with one of the big questions: What does this mean for the election?
natesilver (Nate Silver, editor in chief): So for some reason I’m finding it hard to think through the electoral implications this morning. Maybe I need even more coffee. My thoughts right now are mostly some combination of:
Seriously how the F*CK does this happen? Shouldn’t everybody in the president’s orbit have been tested constantly? And, OF COURSE this happened because 2020 and because the president clearly was not taking that many precautions
perry (Perry Bacon Jr., senior writer): My overall answer is, “I have no idea how this affects the election.” This is truly unprecedented, as far as I know, in American elections — the president getting a serious virus weeks before the election. I can’t think of any leader abroad who has gotten a virus like this weeks before the election either (though I am not an expert on elections outside of the United States).
So while I have some general thoughts, I wanted to lay that out first. I truly have no idea what to expect, how voters will react to Trump’s positive test, how the media will cover it or how other candidates will react.
I.
Don’t.
Know.
ameliatd (Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, senior writer): Yeah — it’s such a black box and honestly so dependent on what happens next. Does Trump get really sick? Does he stay mostly asymptomatic? How far did the virus spread in the White House? All questions we can’t answer right now, of course. But hugely important for how people respond.
natesilver: Yeah. We’re going to be saying “I don’t know” a lot in this chat. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with thinking through the electoral implications. There’s an election happening literally NOW — millions of people have already voted. So Americans are wrestling with this stuff. We just don’t have a lot of good answers.
ameliatd: And, of course, there’s an open question about whether Joe Biden will test positive, after he and Trump were at the debate together on Tuesday. [Editor’s note: Biden tested negative for the coronavirus after the conclusion of this chat.]
natesilver: Right, and one thing I’m not sure people realize is that there can be several days between exposure and a positive test. So we won’t know for sure which people have or don’t have COVID-19 for a bit here.
ameliatd: In the meantime, though, this does mean that Trump can’t campaign for at a while, right? And what about the debates, which were supposed to be on Oct. 15 and 22? Do those still happen?
How much does it matter if Trump can’t campaign, though? This was already a deeply bizarre year and I’m not sure his rallies were going to put him over the edge.
natesilver: Zoom debates?
ameliatd: Everyone wanted that automatic mute last time!
natesilver: At a very basic, square-one level, COVID-19 is a huge liability for the president, and so placing more focus on COVID-19 probably isn’t great for him. But I don’t know how useful that is as a prior. Could Trump getting COVID-19 change his messaging around the virus and pandemic? Maybe. But this is Donald Trump we’re talking about. He’s not inclined to be overly disciplined or deferential to scientists, etc. He’s pretty unpredictable, and we don’t yet know a lot about how serious his symptoms are. And this is a bad disease that can have cognitive effects in addition to physical ones.
Also in terms of very, basic, non-debatable priors: the president’s re-election bid was in DEEP trouble going into this, at least by conventional measures. And the smattering of post-debate polls we’d gotten had been particularly bad for him. So just worth keeping that in mind.
sarah: Absolutely. But on the question of how this happened … The Trump campaign has not taken precautions seriously. They’ve continued to hold large, in-person events. And they’ve even mocked the Biden campaign for wearing masks.
Is one possible scenario from this that Americans take the coronavirus more seriously? Views on COVID-19 and Trump’s response to it are polarized by party, but how could Trump’s positive test change public opinion?
ameliatd: I think what happens with public opinion really depends on how sick Trump gets. As I wrote over the summer, a big part of the reason Republicans are not as into COVID-19 restrictions is that they are much, much less likely to view the virus as a personal health threat to them.
And research has indicated that Trump downplaying the virus is probably a significant driver of that. So I could see this playing out at least two ways …
Trump gets moderately or very sick and this does prompt Republicans to think, “Oh geez, this actually is serious and if it could happen to Trump it could happen to me”; Trump remains mostly asymptomatic and it bolsters the idea that this is actually not such a big deal.
perry: So, writing this on Friday morning, here’s what I expect …
The overwhelming majority of people, even those who are older, don’t die from COVID-19. So the most likely outcome is that Trump and some of his staffers have COVID-19, stay somewhat distanced from everyone for two weeks and then Trump returns to campaigning for reelection (I am not sure if he has the big rallies, but I wouldn’t rule that out.) I am not even sure the next two debates have to be canceled — particularly the Oct 22 one. And basically nothing has shaken Trump’s job approval ratings or really the race overall. I don’t really expect this to shift things either.
The president testing positive for COVID-19 is obviously hugely significant, but it’s not revelatory. We already knew Trump was not taking the virus seriously enough. Now, we have a much more obvious manifestation of that fact, but nothing is really different. Biden may not be able to attack Trump as bluntly on COVID now, for decorum reasons, but this positive test reinforces Biden’s message that Trump has let this crisis get out of hand. So this matters, but I’m not sure it matters electorally in terms of shifting a lot of people’s votes.
ameliatd: I know we’re thinking way down the line now, but is it possible that battling and surviving COVID-19 could actually make Trump more popular in some corners? Especially if he doesn’t get very sick?
natesilver: Amelia, I’m not sure I really buy that. I mean, somehow if it made the president into a more empathetic person, maybe, I suppose? But (i) I’m not sure that’s how he’s likely to react as opposed to sending 6,000 tweets about the “China Virus” or something; and (ii) he’s been trying to project a lot of macho-ness/dominance and to portray Biden as old and feeble and I’m not sure how contracting a serious disease himself fits into that.
ameliatd: Well, but if he contracts a serious disease and doesn’t get very sick and recovers fairly quickly — that certainly doesn’t seem as bad for him.
natesilver: I guess if he recovers in a couple of weeks, which is still what happens for most people, maybe he’ll say he kicked COVID’s ass and/or it wasn’t that serious. But I don’t think that necessarily affects anything electorally.
ameliatd: So, is the main impact potentially less about politics and more about the way Americans think about the virus? Either prompting Republicans to take it more seriously or reinforcing their sense that this really isn’t a big deal?
There was research back in March indicating that COVID-19 spreading at CPAC helped drive a brief moment when Republicans and Democrats were on the same page about the seriousness of the virus.
perry: So I don’t buy this idea that Trump will get COVID-19, be fine and then start calling it “Fake News.” We just learned Ronna McDaneil, the RNC chair, has also tested positive. So has Hope Hicks, a top Trump adviser. [Editor’s note: Sen. Mike Lee of Utah has since announced that he has also tested positive.] I think enough people in Trump’s circle may have the virus that THOSE PEOPLE start taking this more seriously, basically forcing him to as well.
natesilver: This is one sort of message we might hear, I guess:
Remember: China gave this virus to our President @realDonaldTrump and First Lady @FLOTUS. WE MUST HOLD THEM ACCOUNTABLE. — Kelly Loeffler (@KLoeffler) October 2, 2020
sarah: But this question of whether it will change how seriously people perceive the coronavirus is an interesting one. Americans overall, as we saw in our debate polling with Ipsos, listed the coronavirus as their No. 1 issue:
COVID-19 and the economy are Americans’ top two issues Share of respondents who named each issue as the top one facing the U.S., according to a FiveThirtyEight/Ipsos poll issue share of all Respondents COVID-19 31.7% – The economy 21.6 – Health care 7.9 – Racial inequality 7.4 – Climate change 5.2 – Violent crime 4.8 – The Supreme Court 4.5 – Economic inequality 3.0 – Immigration 2.8 – Education 2.6 – Abortion 2.3 – Gun policy 1.9 – Other 1.6 – Data comes from polling done by Ipsos for FiveThirtyEight, using Ipsos’s KnowledgePanel, a probability-based online panel that is recruited to be representative of the U.S. population. The poll was conducted Sept. 21-28 among a general population sample of adults, with 3,133 respondents and a margin of error of +/- 1.9 percentage points.
However, among potential Trump supporters a much smaller share (15.5 percent) said the coronavirus was their most important issue, many more were concerned about the economy:
Potential Trump voters care most about the economy Among respondents who were more likely to vote for Trump than Biden, share who named each issue as the top one facing the U.S., according to a FiveThirtyEight/Ipsos poll issue share of trump supporters The economy 38.4% – COVID-19 15.5 – Violent crime 9.5 – The Supreme Court 6.2 – Abortion 5.4 – Health care 4.9 – Immigration 4.8 – Education 3.9 – Gun policy 3.4 – Other 2.4 – Racial inequality 1.8 – Economic inequality 1.6 – Climate change 0.5 – Respondents were asked to rate how likely they were to vote for each candidate on a scale of 0-10. Respondents were deemed more likely to vote for whichever candidate they gave a higher score. Respondents who gave both candidates the same score are not included. Data comes from polling done by Ipsos for FiveThirtyEight, using Ipsos’s KnowledgePanel, a probability-based online panel that is recruited to be representative of the U.S. population. The poll was conducted Sept. 21-28 among a general population sample of adults, with 3,133 respondents and a margin of error of +/- 1.9 percentage points.
I think you could argue that the economy is probably linked to coronavirus among Trump supporters, but this could be a moment that has public health repercussions, yes?
ameliatd: Well, there was a jobs report this morning — one that I suspect is now going to get a LOT less attention. It was kinda positive — if you can consider the unemployment rate falling just under 8 percent positive.
perry: I think there could be a bunch of real, important health outcomes from this …
GOP governors and mayors may be a bit more hesitant to lift COVID restrictions; Democratic mayors and governors may cite Trump’s positive test as part of their messaging on keeping restrictions in place; Republican voters may become a bit less dismissive of COVID, in part because GOP elites take it more seriously; Overall, this news could be important and have a positive impact in terms of Americans taking the virus more seriously.
ameliatd: Yeah, I’m also wondering if this will change the way Republican governors approach restrictions, which are all but completely lifted in some states.
Although I do think it’s important to note that the vast majority of Americans say they’ve been complying with public health guidelines like mask-wearing, even if Republicans are much less likely to agree with government restrictions on businesses.
perry: To take an example: Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp, a Republican, is never going to give a press conference and say something like, “I was downplaying COVID-19 but then Trump got it and it reinforced how serious this was.” At least, I think that will never happen?
natesilver: I suppose I’m skeptical that this will necessarily change all that much. As you can see from the Kelly Loeffler tweet above, there are lots of partisan responses that don’t necessarily involve taking the disease more seriously per se.
Now, if Trump said something like what Perry just laid out, i.e. “I wasn’t taking this seriously enough, and I now understand the error of my ways…” then OK! That could make a difference! But I’m not sure that’s necessarily the most likely outcome.
ameliatd: But for regular people, I think a lot of this is about the gut-level fear that this might happen to them. Trump downplaying it, not wearing a mask, and not getting sick almost certainly helped reinforce the feeling among Republicans that it’s not a big deal. So I also think the way this is presented in conservative media, how visible Trump’s illness is — all of that matters for how people respond.
It’s true that the partisan response is pretty baked in at this point. But if Trump gets really sick, I could see that changing. Of course, if Republican governors start being more cautious with restrictions again and more people lose their jobs — that raises questions for whether a new stimulus package might actually get off the ground, too. I remain skeptical that will happen! But maybe there’s more pressure to break the stalemate in Congress?
sarah: There are a number of possibilities here, the most pressing one, of course, is that Trump can’t campaign — not to mention if Vice President Mike Pence has to step in. What should we be looking for as this story develops?
ameliatd: Trump’s symptoms are obviously a big one. And if they’re serious, there might be calls to take him off the ballot.
natesilver: Right, part of what makes this tough to predict — and I’m not against prediction! — is that we don’t yet know if Trump will have a mild or severe case, how many people in his orbit are also infected, etc.
perry: Assuming Trump recovers, what does his campaign look like on Oct. 16? Is he still holding big rallies? Is he wearing a mask? Are his staffers? Does the Oct. 22 debate take place, and in person? What about the Oct. 15 one? Is he further dismissing the virus because he survived it?
natesilver: Let’s also keep in mind that the recovery process isn’t quick for some people. It can take months, or longer — long-term COVID symptoms are scary.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-05--More States Are Using Ballot Drop Boxes. Why Are They So Controversial?

When we first unveiled our guide of how to vote in the 2020 election in every state , the most common question we received was , “ What if I want to drop off my mail ballot in person ?
” Well , America , we heard you : The dashboard is now updated with information about whether you can and where to return your ballot .
The good news is almost every state allows you to drop off your mail ballot in person instead of mailing it ; the only states where you can ’ t are Mississippi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ category of absentee ballots in Oklahoma also can ’ t be delivered in person , but this applies to only a small fraction of voters . )
Typically , you can deliver your ballot to your local election office ; at least 20 states ( plus Washington , D.C. ) also accept mail ballots at polling places , but a lot of states explicitly don ’ t , so check our guide before trying that .
But an increasingly common option is drop boxes in which voters can deposit their ballots .
Going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regularly offered drop boxes in their elections , but with the expanded popularity of mail voting amid the pandemic , at least 38 states plus Washington , D.C. , are offering them for the 2020 general election .
However , as with seemingly every other aspect of election administration this year , drop boxes have become a controversial proposal .
To proponents , drop boxes are simply a more reliable delivery method given recent cutbacks at the U.S .
Postal Service that have slowed down mail service .
Consider states that require ballots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Voters who put their ballots in the mail within a week of that deadline are really leaving it up to chance whether the ballot will arrive in time .
By contrast , any ballot deposited in a drop box by the deadline is considered to have arrived on time , providing the voter with both peace of mind and an extra few days to fill out her ballot .
Drop boxes are more secure than your average blue postal box , too : Many states require them to be under video surveillance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ designed to be indestructible ( check out this photo of a drop box that survived a head-on collision from an SUV ) .
Still , opponents — including President Trump — argue that drop boxes do not sufficiently protect ballots from being tampered with , and they have opposed the boxes ’ use in at least one swing state this year .
Over the summer , Trump ’ s campaign and the Republican National Committee sued Pennsylvania over its use of drop boxes , arguing that they were not properly monitored during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the general election .
However , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected their argument , and ( as of now , anyway ) drop boxes remain an option for Pennsylvania voters .
But even when both parties agree that drop boxes are safe , debates can still erupt over their proliferation .
In August , Ohio ’ s Republican secretary of state directed county election officials to set up only one drop box in each county — despite the fact that some Ohio counties have more than 1 million residents .
( By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by mail have much more specific guidelines to alleviate overcrowding .
For example , Colorado requires counties to offer at least one drop box per 30,000 registered voters , and Washington requires one drop box per 15,000 voters . )
Furious Democrats challenged his directive in court , and on Friday a court ruled that the state can allow counties to set up more boxes ( it is unclear , however , whether the state will do so ) .
A similar fight is now unfolding in Texas , where the Republican governor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have only one drop site each — ordering counties with more than one , including Democratic strongholds like Harris and Travis counties , to close those extra sites .
Voting-rights groups quickly sued to overturn the order .
To voting-rights advocates , the convenience and ubiquity of drop boxes is one of their chief selling points .
States like California make an effort to put drop boxes at centrally located places around town , such as libraries , civic buildings and assisted living facilities , making it easier for voters to submit their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day .
And unlike election offices , drop boxes are often open 24 hours a day .
When they ’ re accessible , drop boxes are a hugely popular option with voters , too .
For example , in the 2016 general election , 57 percent of ballots in Washington ( which automatically mails all voters a ballot ) were cast via a drop box .
And given just how many states have expanded their use of drop boxes during the pandemic , it could become a favored method of voting across much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remember to check our guide to see if it ’ s available to you .

When we first unveiled our guide of how to vote in the 2020 election in every state, the most common question we received was, “What if I want to drop off my mail ballot in person?” Well, America, we heard you: The dashboard is now updated with information about whether you can and where to return your ballot.
The good news is almost every state allows you to drop off your mail ballot in person instead of mailing it; the only states where you can’t are Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee. (A special category of absentee ballots in Oklahoma also can’t be delivered in person, but this applies to only a small fraction of voters.)
Typically, you can deliver your ballot to your local election office; at least 20 states (plus Washington, D.C.) also accept mail ballots at polling places, but a lot of states explicitly don’t, so check our guide before trying that. But an increasingly common option is drop boxes in which voters can deposit their ballots. Going into this year, about 13 states regularly offered drop boxes in their elections, but with the expanded popularity of mail voting amid the pandemic, at least 38 states plus Washington, D.C., are offering them for the 2020 general election.
However, as with seemingly every other aspect of election administration this year, drop boxes have become a controversial proposal. To proponents, drop boxes are simply a more reliable delivery method given recent cutbacks at the U.S. Postal Service that have slowed down mail service. Consider states that require ballots to be received by a certain date. Voters who put their ballots in the mail within a week of that deadline are really leaving it up to chance whether the ballot will arrive in time. By contrast, any ballot deposited in a drop box by the deadline is considered to have arrived on time, providing the voter with both peace of mind and an extra few days to fill out her ballot.
Drop boxes are more secure than your average blue postal box, too: Many states require them to be under video surveillance or manually staffed, and they are designed to be indestructible (check out this photo of a drop box that survived a head-on collision from an SUV). Still, opponents — including President Trump — argue that drop boxes do not sufficiently protect ballots from being tampered with, and they have opposed the boxes’ use in at least one swing state this year.
Over the summer, Trump’s campaign and the Republican National Committee sued Pennsylvania over its use of drop boxes, arguing that they were not properly monitored during the primary and thus were susceptible to fraud in the general election. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected their argument, and (as of now, anyway) drop boxes remain an option for Pennsylvania voters.
But even when both parties agree that drop boxes are safe, debates can still erupt over their proliferation. In August, Ohio’s Republican secretary of state directed county election officials to set up only one drop box in each county — despite the fact that some Ohio counties have more than 1 million residents. (By contrast, states that regularly conduct elections by mail have much more specific guidelines to alleviate overcrowding. For example, Colorado requires counties to offer at least one drop box per 30,000 registered voters, and Washington requires one drop box per 15,000 voters.) Furious Democrats challenged his directive in court, and on Friday a court ruled that the state can allow counties to set up more boxes (it is unclear, however, whether the state will do so). A similar fight is now unfolding in Texas, where the Republican governor decreed just last week that counties could have only one drop site each — ordering counties with more than one, including Democratic strongholds like Harris and Travis counties, to close those extra sites. Voting-rights groups quickly sued to overturn the order.
To voting-rights advocates, the convenience and ubiquity of drop boxes is one of their chief selling points. States like California make an effort to put drop boxes at centrally located places around town, such as libraries, civic buildings and assisted living facilities, making it easier for voters to submit their ballot in the normal course of their day. And unlike election offices, drop boxes are often open 24 hours a day.
When they’re accessible, drop boxes are a hugely popular option with voters, too. For example, in the 2016 general election, 57 percent of ballots in Washington (which automatically mails all voters a ballot) were cast via a drop box. And given just how many states have expanded their use of drop boxes during the pandemic, it could become a favored method of voting across much of the country this year. Just remember to check our guide to see if it’s available to you.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-05--How Hatred Came To Dominate American Politics

To anyone following American politics , it ’ s not exactly news that Democrats and Republicans don ’ t like each other .
Take what happened in the presidential debate last week .
President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden did little to conceal their disdain of one another .
And although the debate marked a low point in our national discourse , it was a crystallization of a long-developing trend : loathing the opposing party .
This is hardly a new trend ; in fact , it ’ s increasingly common among American voters .
However , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ call “ negative partisanship ” — has reached levels that are not just bad for democracy , but are potentially destructive .
And extreme partisan animosity is a prelude to democratic collapse .
It wasn ’ t always this bad , though .
Forty years ago , when asked to rate how “ favorable and warm ” their opinion of each party was , the average Democrat and Republican said they felt OK-ish about the opposite party .
But for four decades now , partisans have increasingly turned against each other in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views of the other party are currently at an all-time low .
So how did we get to this point ?
Broadly speaking , there are three trends that we can point to .
The first is the steady nationalization of American politics .
The second is the sorting of Democrats and Republicans along urban/rural and culturally liberal/culturally conservative lines , and the third is the increasingly narrow margins in national elections .
The combination of these three trends has turned Washington , D.C. , into a high-stakes battle where cross-party compromise is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holding out for complete control .
Sixty years ago , state and local politics loomed larger than they do now , which meant national parties operated more like loose labels whose main function was to come together every four years to argue over who should run for president under that party .
As President Eisenhower reportedly quipped as late as 1950 , “ There is not one Republican Party , there are 48 state Republican parties.
” The same was true of the Democratic Party at the time .
By the 1970s , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that partisan politics had reached their end , with split-ticket voting hitting record-high levels as candidates successfully ran on local issues and pledges to better serve their constituents .
But beneath the surface , the parties were realigning .
The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s not only turned conservative Democrats into Republicans and liberal northeastern Republicans into Democrats , it also shifted the focus of politics such that Washington became the arbiter of national values .
National parties began building up major fundraising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ standardize their messaging so that it actually meant something to vote for a Democrat or a Republican .
Coupled with the steady decline of local media , this has resulted in a greater emphasis on national politics and less attention paid to local and state politics .
Practically speaking , elections are increasingly viewed as referendums on the president and the party that controls the White House , leaving little room for individual members of Congress to distinguish themselves from their national parties .
This brings us to the second trend that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : sorting .
The ideologies of the party were less hard and fast 40 years ago .
The Republican Party had a significant share of moderates and liberals , the inheritors of a tradition of moderate good-government Yankee republicanism that dated back to President Lincoln , and the Democratic Party once had a significant share of conservative populists from the South and the Great Plains .
In this sense , American politics operated more like a four-party system , with jumbled liberal and conservative coalitions within and across the two parties .
Senators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than their parties , with complex coalitions of urban liberals and rural conservatives in both parties .
However , as our politics became increasingly nationalized , the political sorting of the parties accelerated .
The civil rights movement is the most obvious example of this : Many in political science consider it the most significant issue ( though far from the only issue ) driving political sorting , as it changed the center of gravity in both parties .
Today , it ’ s simply harder for voters to hold a viewpoint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party .
For instance , there are far fewer anti-abortion Democrats or abortion-rights Republicans now than 30 years ago because these kinds of stances are unwelcome in the party .
Some voters changed their party to match their beliefs ; others changed their beliefs to match their party .
But ultimately , both shifts contributed to the parties taking clearer and more distinct stances on a growing number of social issues , which led to more and more voters adjusting their views to match their partisanship .
Political scientists have called this process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that as more issues have become nationalized , partisan conflicts have broadened to absorb these issues .
And as the parties have taken clearer national stances , particularly around cultural and identity-based issues , voters sort more clearly into parties based on these stances .
Cultural values are much more connected to geography than economic values .
Both the rich and poor live in cities , suburbs and exurbs .
But those who are socially liberal tend to live in cities , whereas those who are socially conservative tend to inhabit small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues has thus generated a significant partisan density divide .
And because geography also corresponds to racial and ethnic diversity ( basically , cities are multicultural and exurbs are mostly white ) , this adds another division onto the partisan divide : race .
With all these identities accumulating on top of each other , partisanship has become a kind of “ mega-identity , ” as political scientist Lilliana Mason argues , with party identification standing for much , much more .
In fact , it ’ s reached the point that when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ size them up as a “ Trump voter ” or a “ Biden voter.
” That kind of easy stereotyping leads us to see the other party as distant and different .
And typically , things that are distant and different are also more threatening .
But neither side has come to dominate .
Instead , America has experienced an extended period of national parity between the two parties .
Elections have swung back and forth in an almost predictable pendulum fashion since 1992 — unified control of one party , divided government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and so forth , over and over .
This back and forth has defied predictions of permanent Republican and Democratic majorities , but the closeness of elections has kept such elusive predictions of total domination both tantalizingly within reach ( for one side ) and dangerously close ( for the other side ) .
Simultaneously , the swings in power have imparted the lesson that when you ’ re down , the best thing to do is demonize the other side , refuse to compromise , wait for public opinion to tack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pendulum back to a majority .
These contradictory impulses lead to a few big policy swings ( consider the changes on health care and tax policy under the Trump administration ) during periods of unified government , and increasingly , in executive branch activities .
They also create gridlock elsewhere and lead to a politics of zero-sum messaging , in which the party trying to win back the White House never has any incentive to compromise because it just blurs the message and helps the party in power seem more successful and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the stakes of elections — keep rising .
Yet beneath the surface of hyper-partisan politics , the parties themselves actually have a lot of internal division , which means they share a version of the same dilemma : Republicans and Democrats can ’ t please all the different voters and groups who fall into their party and want their issue to be prioritized .
But in a polarized two-party system , they can make it clear why the other party is bad .
Coming into their convention , for instance , Democrats had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the moderates that were visible during the presidential primary .
But the convention focused less on policy and more on the existential risk presented by a second Trump term .
The party reminded people that , whatever concerns they have about Biden , a vote for Biden is also a vote against Trump .
Republicans similarly focused on messaging against the Democrats ( even if one of the reasons Trump emerged victorious in the 2016 primary was because the party was so divided that it couldn ’ t decide ) .
Trump has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but even for the few remaining Trump-skeptic Republicans , nothing unites like a common enemy .
And in a two-party system , being anti-anti-Trump counts the same as being pro-Trump .
If all of this seems unsustainable , it should .
The current levels of hyper-partisanship are clearly dangerous .
It ’ s bad news for a democracy when 60 to 70 percent of people view fellow citizens of the other party as a serious threat .
And the more the parties continue to unify their supporters by casting the other party as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will rise .
There are two possible ways this ends .
The first is the one we all fear — the unwinding of our democracy , because one or both sides hate each other so much that they are willing to support anti-democratic and authoritarian leadership in order to maintain power .
( This is the threat Democrats have explicitly raised in recent months . )
The other scenario is a major realignment and/or a collapse of one ( or both ) of the two major parties , which could reorient American political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of an earlier era .
The growing partisan hatreds and the forces driving them have been a long time in the making .
It ’ s possible they are coming to an end .
But more than any other time in the last century and a half , they are testing the very foundations of American democracy .

To anyone following American politics, it’s not exactly news that Democrats and Republicans don’t like each other. Take what happened in the presidential debate last week. President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden did little to conceal their disdain of one another. And although the debate marked a low point in our national discourse, it was a crystallization of a long-developing trend: loathing the opposing party.
This is hardly a new trend; in fact, it’s increasingly common among American voters. However, this level of hatred — which political scientists call “negative partisanship” — has reached levels that are not just bad for democracy, but are potentially destructive. And extreme partisan animosity is a prelude to democratic collapse.
Polling 101: Should You Trust The Polls In 2020? | FiveThirtyEight
It wasn’t always this bad, though. Forty years ago, when asked to rate how “favorable and warm” their opinion of each party was, the average Democrat and Republican said they felt OK-ish about the opposite party. But for four decades now, partisans have increasingly turned against each other in an escalating cycle of dislike and distrust — views of the other party are currently at an all-time low.
So how did we get to this point?
Broadly speaking, there are three trends that we can point to. The first is the steady nationalization of American politics. The second is the sorting of Democrats and Republicans along urban/rural and culturally liberal/culturally conservative lines, and the third is the increasingly narrow margins in national elections.
[Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems]
The combination of these three trends has turned Washington, D.C., into a high-stakes battle where cross-party compromise is difficult, and both sides are increasingly holding out for complete control.
Sixty years ago, state and local politics loomed larger than they do now, which meant national parties operated more like loose labels whose main function was to come together every four years to argue over who should run for president under that party. As President Eisenhower reportedly quipped as late as 1950, “There is not one Republican Party, there are 48 state Republican parties.” The same was true of the Democratic Party at the time. By the 1970s, in fact, many political observers declared that partisan politics had reached their end, with split-ticket voting hitting record-high levels as candidates successfully ran on local issues and pledges to better serve their constituents.
But beneath the surface, the parties were realigning. The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s not only turned conservative Democrats into Republicans and liberal northeastern Republicans into Democrats, it also shifted the focus of politics such that Washington became the arbiter of national values. National parties began building up major fundraising and campaign consultant-driven operations, helping to standardize their messaging so that it actually meant something to vote for a Democrat or a Republican.
Coupled with the steady decline of local media, this has resulted in a greater emphasis on national politics and less attention paid to local and state politics. Practically speaking, elections are increasingly viewed as referendums on the president and the party that controls the White House, leaving little room for individual members of Congress to distinguish themselves from their national parties.
This brings us to the second trend that has contributed to the rise of negative partisanship: sorting. The ideologies of the party were less hard and fast 40 years ago. The Republican Party had a significant share of moderates and liberals, the inheritors of a tradition of moderate good-government Yankee republicanism that dated back to President Lincoln, and the Democratic Party once had a significant share of conservative populists from the South and the Great Plains.
In this sense, American politics operated more like a four-party system, with jumbled liberal and conservative coalitions within and across the two parties. Senators and representatives’ distinct geographic outlooks mattered more than their parties, with complex coalitions of urban liberals and rural conservatives in both parties. However, as our politics became increasingly nationalized, the political sorting of the parties accelerated. The civil rights movement is the most obvious example of this: Many in political science consider it the most significant issue (though far from the only issue) driving political sorting, as it changed the center of gravity in both parties.
Today, it’s simply harder for voters to hold a viewpoint that doesn’t align with their party. For instance, there are far fewer anti-abortion Democrats or abortion-rights Republicans now than 30 years ago because these kinds of stances are unwelcome in the party. Some voters changed their party to match their beliefs; others changed their beliefs to match their party. But ultimately, both shifts contributed to the parties taking clearer and more distinct stances on a growing number of social issues, which led to more and more voters adjusting their views to match their partisanship.
Political scientists have called this process “conflict extension.” The basic idea is that as more issues have become nationalized, partisan conflicts have broadened to absorb these issues. And as the parties have taken clearer national stances, particularly around cultural and identity-based issues, voters sort more clearly into parties based on these stances.
Cultural values are much more connected to geography than economic values. Both the rich and poor live in cities, suburbs and exurbs. But those who are socially liberal tend to live in cities, whereas those who are socially conservative tend to inhabit small towns. This partisan sorting on cultural issues has thus generated a significant partisan density divide. And because geography also corresponds to racial and ethnic diversity (basically, cities are multicultural and exurbs are mostly white), this adds another division onto the partisan divide: race.
With all these identities accumulating on top of each other, partisanship has become a kind of “mega-identity,” as political scientist Lilliana Mason argues, with party identification standing for much, much more. In fact, it’s reached the point that when you meet somebody, you can immediately size them up as a “Trump voter” or a “Biden voter.” That kind of easy stereotyping leads us to see the other party as distant and different. And typically, things that are distant and different are also more threatening.
But neither side has come to dominate. Instead, America has experienced an extended period of national parity between the two parties. Elections have swung back and forth in an almost predictable pendulum fashion since 1992 — unified control of one party, divided government, unified control of the other party, and so forth, over and over.
This back and forth has defied predictions of permanent Republican and Democratic majorities, but the closeness of elections has kept such elusive predictions of total domination both tantalizingly within reach (for one side) and dangerously close (for the other side). Simultaneously, the swings in power have imparted the lesson that when you’re down, the best thing to do is demonize the other side, refuse to compromise, wait for public opinion to tack against the party in power and ride the pendulum back to a majority.
These contradictory impulses lead to a few big policy swings (consider the changes on health care and tax policy under the Trump administration) during periods of unified government, and increasingly, in executive branch activities. They also create gridlock elsewhere and lead to a politics of zero-sum messaging, in which the party trying to win back the White House never has any incentive to compromise because it just blurs the message and helps the party in power seem more successful and legitimate. Thus, frustration — and the stakes of elections — keep rising.
Yet beneath the surface of hyper-partisan politics, the parties themselves actually have a lot of internal division, which means they share a version of the same dilemma: Republicans and Democrats can’t please all the different voters and groups who fall into their party and want their issue to be prioritized. But in a polarized two-party system, they can make it clear why the other party is bad.
Coming into their convention, for instance, Democrats had to repair splits between the progressives and the moderates that were visible during the presidential primary. But the convention focused less on policy and more on the existential risk presented by a second Trump term. The party reminded people that, whatever concerns they have about Biden, a vote for Biden is also a vote against Trump.
Republicans similarly focused on messaging against the Democrats (even if one of the reasons Trump emerged victorious in the 2016 primary was because the party was so divided that it couldn’t decide). Trump has remade the party in his image, but even for the few remaining Trump-skeptic Republicans, nothing unites like a common enemy. And in a two-party system, being anti-anti-Trump counts the same as being pro-Trump.
If all of this seems unsustainable, it should. The current levels of hyper-partisanship are clearly dangerous. It’s bad news for a democracy when 60 to 70 percent of people view fellow citizens of the other party as a serious threat. And the more the parties continue to unify their supporters by casting the other party as the enemy, the higher this number will rise.
There are two possible ways this ends. The first is the one we all fear — the unwinding of our democracy, because one or both sides hate each other so much that they are willing to support anti-democratic and authoritarian leadership in order to maintain power. (This is the threat Democrats have explicitly raised in recent months.)
The other scenario is a major realignment and/or a collapse of one (or both) of the two major parties, which could reorient American political coalitions and resurrect some of the overlaps of an earlier era. The growing partisan hatreds and the forces driving them have been a long time in the making. It’s possible they are coming to an end. But more than any other time in the last century and a half, they are testing the very foundations of American democracy.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-05--Trump Is Giving Dangerous Advice. Being Afraid Of COVID-19 Has Helped Us Control COVID-19.

The president announced his own discharge from Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Monday afternoon , tweeting : One phrase stood out : “ Don ’ t be afraid of Covid.
” After announcing that he will be leaving the hospital following treatment for COVID-19 , President Trump said not to fear the disease that has killed more than 209,000 Americans and infected more than 7 million .
There ’ s a long history of the president of the United States imploring his people not to give in to fear .
But in this case , Trump is giving dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face of the most deadly pandemic in a century .
It ’ s also useful .
Fear has motivated us to understand as much as possible about how the virus spreads , and fear can drive us to take the actions necessary to stop it .
If we don ’ t acknowledge the legitimately frightening reality of this disease , we may not be motivated to act responsibly to reduce transmission .
Willfully ignoring that fear puts everyone at risk .
Early in the pandemic , much of the fear was stoked by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at our disposal for stopping its spread were limited and blunt .
We knew it was a good idea to wash your hands and not touch your face , but it quickly became apparent that those simple steps weren ’ t enough .
By the time states ’ initial lockdowns measures were starting to ease , researchers had learned a lot more about how COVID-19 spreads .
Thanks to vigorous scientific investigation , we learned that people can shed the virus before they even have symptoms .
We learned that tiny , airborne @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the larger , wet droplets we already knew carry it .
And we discovered that masks can help reduce the number of those virus-laden particles a person expels and inhales .
We also learned the virus wasn ’ t as deadly as initially thought , and some modes of transmission — like surfaces — weren ’ t as big of a threat .
We were getting a handle of what to be afraid of , and what not to be .
Armed with all of this information , public health experts were able @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and individuals can do to avoid getting and spreading the virus .
Keep six feet of distance between yourself and people who don ’ t live in the same house as you .
Wear a mask whenever you ’ re out in public .
Wash your hands ( still a good idea ! )
and try to limit how often you ’ re leaving your home .
These guidelines are recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , the World Health Organization , countless local public health organizations and , yes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And the best evidence we have suggests that these simple actions work .
A June study published in Nature estimated as many as 60 million COVID-19 infections were avoided thanks to social distancing and lockdown efforts .
And disease modelling projects that tens of thousands of lives could be spared with widespread adoption of social distancing and mask-wearing .
The president ’ s message not to be afraid of the virus is dangerous if it encourages Americans to reject the things they do because they ’ re afraid of the virus .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Think of the grocery store worker who has to stock shelves while dozens of strangers brush past them , or the nurse who has to come in close proximity with patients daily , many of whom may have active COVID-19 infections .
Without the fear of what this disease can do to you , there ’ s little motivation to protect them .
It ’ s easier to feel secure when you ’ re the president of the United States , of course .
But that ’ s not a reality the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In our reality , fear is rational , and it ’ s what pushes us to act .
By telling us there ’ s nothing to fear , Trump is both ignoring the experience of millions of Americans , and giving further fuel to those whose response to fear is denial .
Fear on its own isn ’ t useful .
But neither is a dismissal of reality .

The president announced his own discharge from Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Monday afternoon, tweeting:
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1313186529058136070
One phrase stood out: “Don’t be afraid of Covid.” After announcing that he will be leaving the hospital following treatment for COVID-19, President Trump said not to fear the disease that has killed more than 209,000 Americans and infected more than 7 million.
There’s a long history of the president of the United States imploring his people not to give in to fear. But in this case, Trump is giving dangerous advice.
Fear is natural in the face of the most deadly pandemic in a century. It’s also useful. Fear has motivated us to understand as much as possible about how the virus spreads, and fear can drive us to take the actions necessary to stop it. If we don’t acknowledge the legitimately frightening reality of this disease, we may not be motivated to act responsibly to reduce transmission. Willfully ignoring that fear puts everyone at risk.
Early in the pandemic, much of the fear was stoked by how little we knew. The tools at our disposal for stopping its spread were limited and blunt. We knew it was a good idea to wash your hands and not touch your face, but it quickly became apparent that those simple steps weren’t enough.
By the time states’ initial lockdowns measures were starting to ease, researchers had learned a lot more about how COVID-19 spreads. Thanks to vigorous scientific investigation, we learned that people can shed the virus before they even have symptoms. We learned that tiny, airborne particles can spread the virus just like the larger, wet droplets we already knew carry it. And we discovered that masks can help reduce the number of those virus-laden particles a person expels and inhales. We also learned the virus wasn’t as deadly as initially thought, and some modes of transmission — like surfaces — weren’t as big of a threat. We were getting a handle of what to be afraid of, and what not to be.
Armed with all of this information, public health experts were able to develop recommendations for exactly what communities and individuals can do to avoid getting and spreading the virus. Keep six feet of distance between yourself and people who don’t live in the same house as you. Wear a mask whenever you’re out in public. Wash your hands (still a good idea!) and try to limit how often you’re leaving your home. These guidelines are recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization, countless local public health organizations and, yes, the White House, too.
And the best evidence we have suggests that these simple actions work. A June study published in Nature estimated as many as 60 million COVID-19 infections were avoided thanks to social distancing and lockdown efforts. And disease modelling projects that tens of thousands of lives could be spared with widespread adoption of social distancing and mask-wearing.
The president’s message not to be afraid of the virus is dangerous if it encourages Americans to reject the things they do because they’re afraid of the virus. And that has implications for all of us. Think of the grocery store worker who has to stock shelves while dozens of strangers brush past them, or the nurse who has to come in close proximity with patients daily, many of whom may have active COVID-19 infections. Without the fear of what this disease can do to you, there’s little motivation to protect them.
It’s easier to feel secure when you’re the president of the United States, of course. But that’s not a reality the rest of us live day to day. In our reality, fear is rational, and it’s what pushes us to act. By telling us there’s nothing to fear, Trump is both ignoring the experience of millions of Americans, and giving further fuel to those whose response to fear is denial. Fear on its own isn’t useful. But neither is a dismissal of reality.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-05--What We Actually Know About The President’s Health

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses the president ’ s COVID-19 prognosis with two @ @ @ @ @ speak with Dr. Craig Spencer of Columbia University about President Trump ’ s current health @ @ @ @ @ to work and campaigning .
The crew also speaks with Lara Brown , a professor @ @ @ @ @ Washington University , about how past administrations have addressed presidential illnesses .

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses the president’s COVID-19 prognosis with two guests. First, they speak with Dr. Craig Spencer of Columbia University about President Trump’s current health and ability to get back to work and campaigning. The crew also speaks with Lara Brown, a professor of political science at George Washington University, about how past administrations have addressed presidential illnesses.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-05--Politics Podcast: How The President’s Health Could Shape The Rest Of The Campaign

In the four days since President Trump was diagnosed with COVID-19 , the public has received limited and conflicting information @ @ @ @ @ make sense of the patchy details we do have , the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew @ @ @ @ @ Craig Spencer about Trump ’ s prognosis and ability to get back to work and @ @ @ @ @ to presidential scholar Lara Brown about past presidents and how their illnesses have been addressed @ @ @ @ @ the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or @ @ @ @ @ , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to @ @ @ @ @ listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners @ @ @ @ @ us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or suggestion @ @ @ @ @ bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the @ @

In the four days since President Trump was diagnosed with COVID-19, the public has received limited and conflicting information about his health. To make sense of the patchy details we do have, the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew spoke with emergency room doctor Craig Spencer about Trump’s prognosis and ability to get back to work and campaigning. They also talked to presidential scholar Lara Brown about past presidents and how their illnesses have been addressed.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-05--Biden Has Made Some Modest Gains After The Debate

There ’ s been so much news going on that I nearly forgot about the existence of a Supreme Court vacancy when participating in a virtual conference this morning .
And in some ways , the news makes life hard for us polling analysts .
We have had , in rapid succession : the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg , a series of threats by President Trump in which he refused to commit to a peaceful transition of power , the announcement of Trump ’ s intention to nominate Amy Coney Barrett to replace Ginsburg , the release of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tax returns by the New York Times , the first presidential debate , the news of Trump ’ s COVID-19 diagnosis and subsequent hospitalization — along with a cluster of other cases at the White House — and now his plans to leave Walter Reed Medical Center later today .
With that said , the debate provides a clear enough line in the sand — with many pollsters planning releases just prior to or just after the debate — that it ’ s worth doing a before-and-after comparison of the polls .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national polling average , where Biden ’ s lead has inched up to 8.1 points from 7.1 points before the debate : Another way to see this is by comparing post-debate polls to the last , pre-debate version of both national polls and polls of the same states by the same polling firms .
That ’ s what I ’ ve done in the table below , covering the 11 national polls and 11 state polls that have been released since the debate .
And on average , Biden gained 1.5 percentage points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these polls .
In some cases , the pre-debate poll was conducted months before the debate .
But even if we only focus on the polls that released results at some point in September , the top line is similar : Biden ’ s gain is 1.4 percentage points , on average .
And for what it ’ s worth , a swing of 1 or 2 points toward Biden is consistent with the effects that first debates have had for challengers in the past — although we should note that sometimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of weeks .
These averages , of course , conceal a lot of variation within individual polls ; depending on which poll you look at , Biden ’ s national lead is as large as 14 points ( in the most recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll ) or as small as 2 points ( in a John Zogby Strategies poll ) .
I ’ ll admit to finding the NBC/WSJ poll intriguing , as it ’ s the only live-caller national poll we have since the debate , and NBC/WSJ polls tend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ averages .
Still , averaging the polls is the right strategy in the long run .
Because so many polls have recently been released , you ’ re going to have a few eccentricities .
Remember , an 800-person poll nominally has a 3.5-point margin of error .
However , that margin pertains only to one candidate ’ s vote share ; in a two-candidate race , the margin of error on the difference between the candidates will be roughly twice that then , or 7 points in this case .
That means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 8 points , it should be fairly routine to get everything from a 15-point Biden lead to a 1-point lead .
And keep in mind that with a confidence interval of 95 percent , the margin of error only covers 95 percent of polls ; 1 in 20 polls should fall outside that range .
( At least in theory ; in practice , pollsters are often reluctant to publish polls that appear to be large outliers . )
It ’ s harder to tell , though , what effect the president ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the race .
YouGov conducted polls right before and after the news and found Biden ahead by 8 points in both .
Morning Consult shows Biden having gained 1 point over the past few days .
And Ipsos had Biden ahead by 10 points in a poll conducted after the news of Trump ’ s diagnosis broke , compared to Biden ’ s 9-point advantage in a poll conducted after the debate but before the president ’ s diagnosis .
The John Zogby Strategies poll that showed Biden ahead by only 2 points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news , although that ’ s not a pollster I ’ d give a lot of credence to .
The series of state polls by the New York Times and Siena College are also worth mentioning here , since they ’ re the only live-caller polls in the mix apart from the NBC/WSJ one — and since they were conducted partly after Trump ’ s COVID-19 diagnosis .
And these contain strong results for Biden , showing him with leads of 8 points in Arizona , 7 points in Pennsylvania and 5 points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each state .
However , they ’ re still smaller leads than what previous NYT/Siena polls of those states found — Biden led by 9 points in their Arizona poll in September , for instance .
This raises an interesting question : Should you focus more on how a poll compares to a pollster ’ s previous poll or how it compares to other polls in that state ?
There isn ’ t really a right answer here , it ’ s a mix of both .
But to explain how our model @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the September Arizona poll , a 9-point lead had been a particularly strong result for Biden to the point of being a mild outlier .
So the most recent NYT/Siena poll counted as a good result for him on balance , as it confirmed he has a clear lead there now , and he gained ground in our Arizona polling average .
Finally , keep in mind that the reason it ’ s still so hard to understand the effects of the president ’ s COVID-19 diagnosis is because it is an evolving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his prognosis , which can vary from day to day under the coronavirus , but also the news about the cluster of cases at the White House and the lack of reliable information about his condition .
So if the public wasn ’ t initially sympathetic to Trump — and they mostly weren ’ t , in part because a large majority of the public thinks Trump didn ’ t take appropriate precautions — everything we ’ ve learned since then probably isn ’ t going to make public sentiment better for him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation remains unpredictable .
This year , of course , unpredictable news events haven ’ t always had a large effect on the polls .

There’s been so much news going on that I nearly forgot about the existence of a Supreme Court vacancy when participating in a virtual conference this morning. And in some ways, the news makes life hard for us polling analysts. We have had, in rapid succession: the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a series of threats by President Trump in which he refused to commit to a peaceful transition of power, the announcement of Trump’s intention to nominate Amy Coney Barrett to replace Ginsburg, the release of substantial information about the president’s tax returns by the New York Times, the first presidential debate, the news of Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis and subsequent hospitalization — along with a cluster of other cases at the White House — and now his plans to leave Walter Reed Medical Center later today.
With that said, the debate provides a clear enough line in the sand — with many pollsters planning releases just prior to or just after the debate — that it’s worth doing a before-and-after comparison of the polls. One way to discern this is via our national polling average, where Biden’s lead has inched up to 8.1 points from 7.1 points before the debate:
Another way to see this is by comparing post-debate polls to the last, pre-debate version of both national polls and polls of the same states by the same polling firms. That’s what I’ve done in the table below, covering the 11 national polls and 11 state polls that have been released since the debate. And on average, Biden gained 1.5 percentage points from the pre-debate to the post-debate versions of these polls.
Biden’s gained some ground since the debate Change in Joe Biden’s margin in each pollster’s post-debate poll compared to their latest, pre-debate version, at the state and national level Pre-debate poll Post-debate poll Pollster End date Biden lead or deficit end date Biden lead or deficit Diff. AZ NYT/Siena 9/15 +9.0 10/3 +8.0 -1.0 FL NYT/Siena 6/18 +6.0 10/1 +5.0 -1.0 GA Landmark Communications 8/31 -7.0 9/30 +2.0 +9.0 MI Public Policy Polling 8/29 +4.0 10/1 +6.0 +2.0 MO Remington 9/17 -8.0 10/1 -5.0 +3.0 NH Emerson College 11/26/19 +4.0 10/2 +8.0 +4.0 OH Trafalgar Group 10/3 -4.0 OH YouGov 7/24 -1.0 10/2 +0.0 +1.0 PA YouGov 9/21 +4.0 10/2 +7.0 +3.0 PA NYT/Siena 9/27 +9.0 10/2 +7.0 -2.0 US YouGov 9/23 +5.0 10/3 +8.0 +3.0 US YouGov 9/23 +5.0 10/2 +8.0 +3.0 US NBC/WSJ 9/16 +8.0 10/1 +14.0 +6.0 US John Zogby Strategies 8/29 +4.5 10/2 +2.0 -2.5 US IBD/TIPP 9/19 +6.0 10/1 +3.0 -3.0 US HarrisX 9/25 +5.0 10/1 +7.0 +2.0 US Data for Progress 9/15 +11.0 10/1 +10.0 -1.0 US Ipsos 9/29 +9.0 10/1 +9.0 +0.0 US Ipsos 9/29 +9.0 10/3 +10.0 +1.0 US Change Research 9/20 +9.0 9/30 +13.0 +4.0 US Morning Consult 9/29 +8.0 10/4 +9.0 +1.0 Trafalgar Group has not previously polled Ohio, so no comparison is available. For the John Zogby Strategies polls, versions with and without third-party candidates are averaged together. The previous NYT/Siena poll in Florida and the Emerson College poll in New Hampshire was conducted among registered voters, while the post-debate polls were conducted among likely voters.
In some cases, the pre-debate poll was conducted months before the debate. But even if we only focus on the polls that released results at some point in September, the top line is similar: Biden’s gain is 1.4 percentage points, on average. And for what it’s worth, a swing of 1 or 2 points toward Biden is consistent with the effects that first debates have had for challengers in the past — although we should note that sometimes a debate bounce fades after a couple of weeks.
These averages, of course, conceal a lot of variation within individual polls; depending on which poll you look at, Biden’s national lead is as large as 14 points (in the most recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll) or as small as 2 points (in a John Zogby Strategies poll). I’ll admit to finding the NBC/WSJ poll intriguing, as it’s the only live-caller national poll we have since the debate, and NBC/WSJ polls tend to stick pretty close to our polling averages. Still, averaging the polls is the right strategy in the long run.
Because so many polls have recently been released, you’re going to have a few eccentricities. Remember, an 800-person poll nominally has a 3.5-point margin of error. However, that margin pertains only to one candidate’s vote share; in a two-candidate race, the margin of error on the difference between the candidates will be roughly twice that then, or 7 points in this case. That means, if Biden is truly ahead by 8 points, it should be fairly routine to get everything from a 15-point Biden lead to a 1-point lead. And keep in mind that with a confidence interval of 95 percent, the margin of error only covers 95 percent of polls; 1 in 20 polls should fall outside that range. (At least in theory; in practice, pollsters are often reluctant to publish polls that appear to be large outliers.)
It’s harder to tell, though, what effect the president’s COVID-19 diagnosis may have had on the race. YouGov conducted polls right before and after the news and found Biden ahead by 8 points in both. Morning Consult shows Biden having gained 1 point over the past few days. And Ipsos had Biden ahead by 10 points in a poll conducted after the news of Trump’s diagnosis broke, compared to Biden’s 9-point advantage in a poll conducted after the debate but before the president’s diagnosis. The John Zogby Strategies poll that showed Biden ahead by only 2 points nationally was also conducted after the COVID-19 news, although that’s not a pollster I’d give a lot of credence to.
The series of state polls by the New York Times and Siena College are also worth mentioning here, since they’re the only live-caller polls in the mix apart from the NBC/WSJ one — and since they were conducted partly after Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis. And these contain strong results for Biden, showing him with leads of 8 points in Arizona, 7 points in Pennsylvania and 5 points in Florida– above his polling averages in each state. However, they’re still smaller leads than what previous NYT/Siena polls of those states found — Biden led by 9 points in their Arizona poll in September, for instance.
This raises an interesting question: Should you focus more on how a poll compares to a pollster’s previous poll or how it compares to other polls in that state? There isn’t really a right answer here, it’s a mix of both. But to explain how our model views this, in the case of the September Arizona poll, a 9-point lead had been a particularly strong result for Biden to the point of being a mild outlier. So the most recent NYT/Siena poll counted as a good result for him on balance, as it confirmed he has a clear lead there now, and he gained ground in our Arizona polling average.
Finally, keep in mind that the reason it’s still so hard to understand the effects of the president’s COVID-19 diagnosis is because it is an evolving story. It’s not just his prognosis, which can vary from day to day under the coronavirus, but also the news about the cluster of cases at the White House and the lack of reliable information about his condition. So if the public wasn’t initially sympathetic to Trump — and they mostly weren’t, in part because a large majority of the public thinks Trump didn’t take appropriate precautions — everything we’ve learned since then probably isn’t going to make public sentiment better for him.
With all that said, the situation remains unpredictable. This year, of course, unpredictable news events haven’t always had a large effect on the polls.