fivethirtyeight--2020-06-03--Jails Are Coronavirus Hotbeds. How Many People Should Be Released To Slow The Spread?

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic , epidemiologists warned that jails and prisons would be breeding grounds for infectious disease , thanks to their densely packed populations and uncertain access to hygiene products and medical care .
And , sure enough , the four biggest known clusters of outbreaks in the U.S. on June 3 were all linked to correctional facilities , according to a tracking project by The New York Times .
But while experts are unsurprised by the outbreaks in correctional facilities , it ’ s less obvious what should be done about it .
Computer simulations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ help control the spread of the virus inside and outside the jails .
And officials have been doing that — but they ’ re wrestling with where to draw the line .
Over the last week , police across the country have arrested at least 9,300 people protesting the police killing of George Floyd , prompting more urgent questions about law enforcement ’ s handling of the crisis .
To try to understand just how big a role jails could play in spreading COVID-19 in the U.S. , a team of researchers built @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moves in and around jails , simulating the spread from early April onward .
Several epidemiologists we spoke to said the model , developed by researchers at Washington State University , the University of Pennsylvania , the American Civil Liberties Union , Tusculum University and the University of Tennessee , is the first they ’ ve seen that considers the effects of jails on the disease ’ s spread , which leading models of the virus have ignored .
The study suggests common estimates are vastly undercounting the toll of COVID-19 because they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people into and out of jails ; thousands could die inside facilities , and many more could die in the communities surrounding jails .
Perhaps counterintuitively , the model found that if social distancing measures outside jails succeed in controlling the virus , jails would become a primary vector of spread , leading to large numbers of preventable infections , hospitalizations and deaths .
An otherwise effective virus response would thus be undone by ignoring jails .
On the other hand , the worse the pandemic is outside jails , the smaller jails @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Say businesses , schools , parks and other social hubs open without restriction all at once .
As the virus spreads like wildfire in the outside world , jails are no longer a primary source of infection , simply because the infection is rampant everywhere .
Of course , the model ’ s predictions are just estimates — and they depend on several assumptions that do not mirror reality .
( Anyone who wants to build a COVID-19 model has to make some educated guesses , not all of which will turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has explained in the past . )
The model , for example , only factored in larger jails , and it uses estimates for important characteristics of the virus , like exactly how the virus spreads and what percentage of the population is getting it , since there is still so much we don ’ t know about it .
The researchers also assumed that the country would be living under a nationwide shelter-in-place order for the full time period covered by the model , which extends for several more months .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case .
But while the model ’ s creators acknowledge that the model ’ s estimates won ’ t align precisely with reality , it can still tell us something about the dynamics of disease spread .
“ There ’ s no doubt the impact will be very , very large , ” said Lucia Tian , chief analytics officer for the ACLU , who took part in the research .
In the team ’ s simulations , the more jail populations are reduced , the more it flattens the curve inside jails @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populations — for instance by stopping 95 percent of arrests and doubling release rates , which the authors calculate would reduce the detainee population by more than 85 percent — are forecasted to be most effective in preventing deaths .
By demonstrating the relative effectiveness ( or ineffectiveness ) of several policies , Tian hopes the model can aid leaders and policymakers as they attempt to minimize the damage .
She explained with a classic adage of statistics : “ All models are wrong , but some are useful.
” Amid the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dramatic changes in an effort to empty out jails .
The number of people in state prisons — where people , generally those sentenced to a year or more , serve their time after they ’ ve been convicted — has barely budged .
But the typical jail , which holds mainly people who have not yet been tried or those serving short misdemeanor sentences , has lowered its population by over 30 percent , with a few reducing their populations by around 60 percent , according to a report by the criminal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cuts like these would have been hard to imagine before the virus — but are they enough ?
“ There ’ s no golden or perfect amount by which a population should be reduced , ” said Wanda Bertram , who contributed to the report and works as the Prison Policy Initiative ’ s communications strategist .
“ There ’ s simply the fact that compared to any other measure that a jail or prison can take , nothing is nearly as effective at slowing down the spread of the coronavirus as letting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been the epicenter of the virus in the United States , it provides a useful case study of the debate about the threat of COVID-19 to incarcerated populations .
Jail populations in the city have been dropping for years , down by more than half in the last decade .
Since the epidemic began , they have dropped another 25 percent — to their lowest levels since the 1940s — which city officials say is even more meaningful given the reductions of the last several years .
“ We ’ re diverting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we ’ re sending less people into the system .
I think that ’ s all happening , even before this pandemic hit , ” said New York City Police Commissioner Dermot Shea .
Shea pushes back against calls for further cuts , arguing that a significant portion of the people still in jail are charged with serious or violent crimes , or have previously been convicted of multiple serious offenses .
“ Each of these releases has a potential impact on public safety , and you try to weigh that against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disease in jail , ” Shea said .
“ We ’ re trying to strike that balance.
” But advocates still worry about the roughly 4,000 people still being held and point to hundreds of arrests made during the demonstrations of the last several days , which included clashes that led the Legal Aid Society to say that police were “ brutalizing ” protestors .
Many are calling for further reductions at Rikers Island and other city jails , which the president of the city ’ s corrections officers union referred to as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Agencies don ’ t always agree about who should be considered for release .
The Brooklyn district attorney ’ s office , which has consented to releasing hundreds of people awaiting trial during the COVID-19 outbreak , has clashed in the past with NYPD leadership over jail reduction policies .
But even for an office willing to consider alternatives to incarceration in more serious or gun-related cases , the pandemic has prompted some difficult decisions .
Jill Harris , chief of policy and strategy for the Brooklyn district attorney , is particularly worried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which may be rising even as other types of crime decline in shuttered cities .
Harris , who worked at the ACLU and the Drug Policy Alliance before coming to the district attorney ’ s office , says the pandemic adds to the existing complexities that make domestic violence especially difficult for victims to report and for law enforcement to disrupt .
Victims may feel even more conflicted about reporting abuse if it means potentially exposing their partner or family member to the virus in jail .
And as families shelter at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to report an abuser who is physically there all the time .
“ Reducing incarceration and increasing public safety go hand in hand , ” she said .
“ But there does get to be a point where the people who are there need to be there .
And I feel like we are approaching that point in Brooklyn.
” The virus has led to fast and unprecedented reductions in jail populations , and reformers are witnessing the nation ’ s jail system make the types of changes they ’ ve been told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last three months , legal experts and advocates have the same question : If jails can do it , can other parts of the country ’ s vast justice system change , too ?
“ It ’ s kind of an exciting time to work in criminal justice , because in a way , I think that [ the ] emergency could be the spark that leads to innovation , ” said Lucy Lang , a former assistant district attorney in Manhattan who now heads the John Jay College of Criminal Justice ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ If we mean that we ’ re going to really stick with the decreased population , then what are we going to do instead ?
” Lang said maintaining lower levels of incarceration is made possible by an all-hands-on-deck approach , where many agencies intervene to relieve some of the conditions that put people in danger of arrest .
Reformers also say more extensive use of alternative crime responses like special courts , violence interrupters ( people who try to prevent violent crimes by intervening with those likely to commit them before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diversion programs ( sending offenders to a rehabilitation program rather than prison ) , reduced sentencing and bail reform can pave the way for less incarceration .
Some of the ideas Lang described question long-held beliefs about crime and punishment .
She recounted a recent response to a homicide that included a restorative justice approach as an alternative to incarceration or trial .
In that instance , those harmed by the crime met with those responsible to ask the perpetrators to confront the consequences of their actions and reach consensus on how amends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be prevented .
“ It was clear [ the victims ] experienced a much greater sense of resolution and justice than if there was a trial.
” Eventually , though , the pandemic will ebb and the criminal justice system will have to figure out the new normal .
Christine Tartaro , professor of criminal justice at Stockton University , hopes advocates are right that this moment could be a turning point .
“ I am curious … as we reduce the census throughout all of these jails and prisons , if after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we need to go back to filling them again.
” But that ’ s far in the future .
For the moment , people are still thinking about how full jails should be right now .

This article was published in partnership with The Marshall Project, a nonprofit news organization covering the U.S. criminal justice system.
At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, epidemiologists warned that jails and prisons would be breeding grounds for infectious disease, thanks to their densely packed populations and uncertain access to hygiene products and medical care.
And, sure enough, the four biggest known clusters of outbreaks in the U.S. on June 3 were all linked to correctional facilities, according to a tracking project by The New York Times.
But while experts are unsurprised by the outbreaks in correctional facilities, it’s less obvious what should be done about it. Computer simulations suggest that reducing the jailed population could help control the spread of the virus inside and outside the jails. And officials have been doing that — but they’re wrestling with where to draw the line. Over the last week, police across the country have arrested at least 9,300 people protesting the police killing of George Floyd, prompting more urgent questions about law enforcement’s handling of the crisis.
To try to understand just how big a role jails could play in spreading COVID-19 in the U.S., a team of researchers built a statistical model of how the virus moves in and around jails, simulating the spread from early April onward. Several epidemiologists we spoke to said the model, developed by researchers at Washington State University, the University of Pennsylvania, the American Civil Liberties Union, Tusculum University and the University of Tennessee, is the first they’ve seen that considers the effects of jails on the disease’s spread, which leading models of the virus have ignored. The study suggests common estimates are vastly undercounting the toll of COVID-19 because they fail to account for the flow of people into and out of jails; thousands could die inside facilities, and many more could die in the communities surrounding jails.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the model found that if social distancing measures outside jails succeed in controlling the virus, jails would become a primary vector of spread, leading to large numbers of preventable infections, hospitalizations and deaths. An otherwise effective virus response would thus be undone by ignoring jails.
On the other hand, the worse the pandemic is outside jails, the smaller jails’ role in spreading the disease becomes. Say businesses, schools, parks and other social hubs open without restriction all at once. As the virus spreads like wildfire in the outside world, jails are no longer a primary source of infection, simply because the infection is rampant everywhere.
Of course, the model’s predictions are just estimates — and they depend on several assumptions that do not mirror reality. (Anyone who wants to build a COVID-19 model has to make some educated guesses, not all of which will turn out to be right, as FiveThirtyEight has explained in the past.) The model, for example, only factored in larger jails, and it uses estimates for important characteristics of the virus, like exactly how the virus spreads and what percentage of the population is getting it, since there is still so much we don’t know about it. The researchers also assumed that the country would be living under a nationwide shelter-in-place order for the full time period covered by the model, which extends for several more months. We already know that’s not the case.
But while the model’s creators acknowledge that the model’s estimates won’t align precisely with reality, it can still tell us something about the dynamics of disease spread.
“There’s no doubt the impact will be very, very large,” said Lucia Tian, chief analytics officer for the ACLU, who took part in the research.
In the team’s simulations, the more jail populations are reduced, the more it flattens the curve inside jails and out. Dramatic cuts in jail populations — for instance by stopping 95 percent of arrests and doubling release rates, which the authors calculate would reduce the detainee population by more than 85 percent — are forecasted to be most effective in preventing deaths.
By demonstrating the relative effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of several policies, Tian hopes the model can aid leaders and policymakers as they attempt to minimize the damage. She explained with a classic adage of statistics: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
Amid the pandemic, many agencies have made fast and dramatic changes in an effort to empty out jails. The number of people in state prisons — where people, generally those sentenced to a year or more, serve their time after they’ve been convicted — has barely budged. But the typical jail, which holds mainly people who have not yet been tried or those serving short misdemeanor sentences, has lowered its population by over 30 percent, with a few reducing their populations by around 60 percent, according to a report by the criminal justice think tank Prison Policy Initiative. Cuts like these would have been hard to imagine before the virus — but are they enough?
“There’s no golden or perfect amount by which a population should be reduced,” said Wanda Bertram, who contributed to the report and works as the Prison Policy Initiative’s communications strategist. “There’s simply the fact that compared to any other measure that a jail or prison can take, nothing is nearly as effective at slowing down the spread of the coronavirus as letting people go.”
Because New York City has been the epicenter of the virus in the United States, it provides a useful case study of the debate about the threat of COVID-19 to incarcerated populations. Jail populations in the city have been dropping for years, down by more than half in the last decade. Since the epidemic began, they have dropped another 25 percent — to their lowest levels since the 1940s — which city officials say is even more meaningful given the reductions of the last several years. “We’re diverting, we’re issuing probation, we’re sending less people into the system. I think that’s all happening, even before this pandemic hit,” said New York City Police Commissioner Dermot Shea.
Shea pushes back against calls for further cuts, arguing that a significant portion of the people still in jail are charged with serious or violent crimes, or have previously been convicted of multiple serious offenses. “Each of these releases has a potential impact on public safety, and you try to weigh that against the humanity issue of having someone contract the disease in jail,” Shea said. “We’re trying to strike that balance.”
But advocates still worry about the roughly 4,000 people still being held and point to hundreds of arrests made during the demonstrations of the last several days, which included clashes that led the Legal Aid Society to say that police were “brutalizing” protestors. Many are calling for further reductions at Rikers Island and other city jails, which the president of the city’s corrections officers union referred to as “the epicenter of the epicenter.”
Agencies don’t always agree about who should be considered for release. The Brooklyn district attorney’s office, which has consented to releasing hundreds of people awaiting trial during the COVID-19 outbreak, has clashed in the past with NYPD leadership over jail reduction policies.
But even for an office willing to consider alternatives to incarceration in more serious or gun-related cases, the pandemic has prompted some difficult decisions. Jill Harris, chief of policy and strategy for the Brooklyn district attorney, is particularly worried about releasing those charged with domestic violence, which may be rising even as other types of crime decline in shuttered cities. Harris, who worked at the ACLU and the Drug Policy Alliance before coming to the district attorney’s office, says the pandemic adds to the existing complexities that make domestic violence especially difficult for victims to report and for law enforcement to disrupt. Victims may feel even more conflicted about reporting abuse if it means potentially exposing their partner or family member to the virus in jail. And as families shelter at home, there may be fewer opportunities to report an abuser who is physically there all the time.
“Reducing incarceration and increasing public safety go hand in hand,” she said. “But there does get to be a point where the people who are there need to be there. And I feel like we are approaching that point in Brooklyn.”
The virus has led to fast and unprecedented reductions in jail populations, and reformers are witnessing the nation’s jail system make the types of changes they’ve been told for years are impossible. After the last three months, legal experts and advocates have the same question: If jails can do it, can other parts of the country’s vast justice system change, too?
“It’s kind of an exciting time to work in criminal justice, because in a way, I think that [the] emergency could be the spark that leads to innovation,” said Lucy Lang, a former assistant district attorney in Manhattan who now heads the John Jay College of Criminal Justice’s Institute for Innovation in Prosecution. “If we mean that we’re going to really stick with the decreased population, then what are we going to do instead?”
Lang said maintaining lower levels of incarceration is made possible by an all-hands-on-deck approach, where many agencies intervene to relieve some of the conditions that put people in danger of arrest. Reformers also say more extensive use of alternative crime responses like special courts, violence interrupters (people who try to prevent violent crimes by intervening with those likely to commit them before they happen), community policing, diversion programs (sending offenders to a rehabilitation program rather than prison), reduced sentencing and bail reform can pave the way for less incarceration.
Some of the ideas Lang described question long-held beliefs about crime and punishment. She recounted a recent response to a homicide that included a restorative justice approach as an alternative to incarceration or trial. In that instance, those harmed by the crime met with those responsible to ask the perpetrators to confront the consequences of their actions and reach consensus on how amends might be made and further harms might be prevented. “It was clear [the victims] experienced a much greater sense of resolution and justice than if there was a trial.”
Eventually, though, the pandemic will ebb and the criminal justice system will have to figure out the new normal. Christine Tartaro, professor of criminal justice at Stockton University, hopes advocates are right that this moment could be a turning point. “I am curious … as we reduce the census throughout all of these jails and prisons, if after this it makes us think about whether we need to go back to filling them again.”
But that’s far in the future. For the moment, people are still thinking about how full jails should be right now.
Additional reporting by Laura Bronner.
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fivethirtyeight--2020-06-03--Why Twitter’s Fact Check Of Trump Might Not Be Enough To Combat Misinformation

Last week , Twitter tried something new .
When President Trump tweeted that “ There is NO WAY ( ZERO ! )
that Mail-In Ballots will be anything less than substantially fraudulent , ” Twitter appended this message to Trump ’ s tweet : “ Get the facts about mail-in ballots ” — which in turn , linked to a page with the headline : “ Trump makes unsubstantiated claim that mail-in ballots will lead to voter fraud.
” Given the dangers misinformation poses to both democracy and public health , many believe social media platforms have a responsibility to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But can corrections like this even work ?
And what role should social media platforms play in combating misinformation ?
Well , it turns out there is evidence that fact checks do work .
Numerous studies have demonstrated that when confronted with a correction , a significant share of people do , in fact , update their beliefs .
Political scientists Ethan Porter and Thomas J .
Wood conducted an exhaustive battery of surveys on fact-checking , across more than 10,000 participants and 13 studies that covered a range of political , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that 60 percent of respondents gave accurate answers when presented with a correction , while just 32 percent of respondents who were not given a correction expressed accurate beliefs .
That ’ s pretty solid proof that fact-checking can work .
But Porter and Wood have found , alongside many other fact-checking researchers , some methods of fact-checking are more effective than others .
Broadly speaking , the most effective fact checks have this in common : • They are from highly credible sources ( with extra credit for those that are also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Democrats contradicting other Democrats ) .
• They offer a new frame for thinking about the issue ( that is , they don ’ t simply dismiss a claim as “ wrong ” or “ unsubstantiated ” ) .
So despite a few studies suggesting that fact checks may make misinformation more prevalent ( most prominently a widely-cited paper from political scientists Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler in 2010 , which popularized the concept of the “ backfire effect ” ) , the overwhelming majority of studies have found that fact checks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least , do no harm .
Still , some pieces of misinformation are harder to fight than others .
And this episode involving Trump has several qualities that may make Twitter ’ s “ get the facts ” approach not exactly effective .
First , there ’ s the source : Donald Trump .
Trust him or doubt him , chances are you have an opinion of the president .
And if you already trust him , who are you going to trust more in this particular disagreement ?
Trump ?
Or CNN @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sources Twitter listed in its fact check ) ?
But given Trump ’ s notoriety , his misstatements may just be harder to combat .
In one of Porter and Wood ’ s experiments , they took an op-ed by Trump and issued a correction on two versions of the piece : one ( correctly ) attributed to Trump and one attributed to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell .
The authors found that the fact-check of McConnell moved significantly more respondents toward the accurate position than did the fact check of Trump .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Twitter referenced articles from CNN and the Washington Post to correct the record .
Research shows that an unlikely , surprising source for debunking misinformation , like a fellow Republican criticizing Trump , is just much more effective at making a correction stick than a more predictable and unsurprising source ( like CNN or the Washington Post , both of which Trump has also cast as his enemies ) .
A Trump-supporting reader might take a closer look if told that Republican state officials in Idaho and Washington had complete confidence in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or that an exhaustive 17-month law enforcement inquiry into voter fraud in Florida , a state governed by fellow Republican Ron DeSantis , found no evidence of wrongdoing .
This combination of surprise and credibility , in theory , would activate a closer look — the kind of attention required for mental updating .
And although Republicans en masse did not criticize Trump ’ s tweet that equated voting by mail with voter fraud , one recent example of a surprising debunk ( and therefore , perhaps a maybe more effective fact check @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s editorial board ’ s take down of Trump ’ s allegation that cable news host Joe Scarborough was responsible for the death of a female staffer while he was a Republican congressman in Florida .
The WSJ editorial board wrote that Trump ’ s suggestion “ that the talk-show host is implicated in the woman ’ s death isn ’ t political hardball .
It ’ s a smear.
” But fact-checking Trump is also further complicated by the fact that he is just really good at making memorable — if misleading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s bizarre assertion that the hacker who released the DNC ’ s emails was not someone in Russia but instead “ somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds ?
” You probably do .
It was a memorable , specific image , and catchy enough that “ 400poundhacker ” briefly trended on Twitter .
And as a memory expert will tell you , the more specific and outrageous the image , the more likely you are to remember it .
This latest tweet was no exception .
And this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply dismissing it as “ not true ” especially ineffective .
Political scientist Emily Thorson calls this phenomenon a “ belief echo , ” or the phenomenon that even when an idea is rejected as false , it can still continue to shape attitudes .
Think about someone like President Nixon saying “ I ’ m not a crook ” in response to the allegations that he oversaw a break-in at the Watergate Hotel to wiretap his political opponents .
By refuting the allegation , he ’ s also repeating it , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And the more evocative and colorful the original claim , the stronger the echo , Thorson finds , if the rejection also repeats the claim .
“ Unfortunately , this means that the times when we are most tempted to repeat misinformation — a horrifyingly inaccurate graph , an offensive comment in a debate — are also the times when it is most likely to create belief echoes , ” Thorson wrote .
Rather than simply saying there is no evidence to support Trump ’ s claim that voting by mail will lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact check might offer an alternate explanation for why voting by mail doesn ’ t cause voter fraud .
For instance , a good fact check could explain that many governors support voting-by-mail to protect vulnerable family members from getting sick from the coronavirus , not because they think it will benefit their party politically .
Or it could detail all the specific measures governors are taking to ensure a secure process , like signature matching and ballot tracing .
But this brings us to perhaps the trickiest obstacles regarding effective corrections in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Research shows that people can easily incorporate new information — even if it ’ s inaccurate — as long as it fits in an existing worldview .
Take Trump ’ s misstatement on voting by mail causing voter fraud .
Even though there isn ’ t evidence to support this , it already fits within a preexisting narrative that many Republicans believe — that voter fraud is widespread and Democrats help perpetuate it .
This is what makes the problem of combating misinformation so challenging .
When premises are familiar ( e.g.
, @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s easier to incorporate new information uncritically , especially when partisanship is involved .
Partisans are typically much more receptive to any facts that make their side look good and any facts that make the other side look bad .
Likewise , they ’ re likely to reject facts that make their side look bad and make the other side look good .
Practically , this has meant that as Democrats and Republicans have cocooned themselves in separate information streams , they ’ ve increasingly incorporated not only different worldviews , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those worldviews .
The more partisanship itself becomes an identity , the more intense this motivated reasoning has become .
But there is one thing that might make this particular correction effective : It was issued simultaneously with the misstatement .
And research has shown that the most effective corrections are immediate responses .
A team of researchers led by Nyhan recently found that “ disputed ” tags , like the one Twitter issued , successfully reduce belief in false stories on social media .
There ’ s a very real question , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ platforms should be controlling what we do — and don ’ t — see .
Facebook , for instance , has taken a different approach than Twitter so far .
Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg criticized Twitter ’ s new policy , saying that , “ I just believe strongly that Facebook shouldn ’ t be the arbiter of truth of everything that people say online.
” Twitter and Facebook are also two of the very few places that both Democrats and Republicans turn to for news , even if their feeds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective fact check might not make the difference that policymakers are hoping for in political attitudes .
While it ’ s possible for fact checks to shift beliefs , attitudes are much harder to change and much more resilient to fact checks .
In other words , even if some Twitter users now know that voting by mail doesn ’ t cause voter fraud , it ’ s unlikely that their attitudes about Trump will change , let alone their attitudes about voting by mail ( they might find other reasons to oppose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the possibility of fraud , even if they don ’ t think it is widespread ) .
After all , in our two-party system , it is still a tremendous leap for a Trump supporter to defect to voting for a Democrat .
Fact-checking can help with updating and correcting prior knowledge , but breaking the hyper-partisanship that nurtures misinformation in the first place will require a whole lot more work .
But the more aggressively Twitter combats misinformation coming from Trump , the more it risks both the ire of the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican users .
A more comprehensive corrections department that fact checks all public figures ( not just Trump ) might allay some criticisms from the right that Twitter is biased against conservatives .
But it would also cost money to employ more fact-checkers , and it might still disproportionately correct conservative voices if they do share more misleading information than liberals .
If so , the information echo-chambers may fracture further , with liberals and conservatives seeking out their own platforms even more .
That could make fact-checking even harder .
Social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in deciding exactly how — and how much — they want to correct misinformation .
The good news is that fact-checking does work .
But the bad news is that it ’ s going to take a lot of concerted fact-checking efforts to make any difference — and even that might not be enough .

Last week, Twitter tried something new. When President Trump tweeted that “There is NO WAY (ZERO!) that Mail-In Ballots will be anything less than substantially fraudulent,” Twitter appended this message to Trump’s tweet: “Get the facts about mail-in ballots” — which in turn, linked to a page with the headline: “Trump makes unsubstantiated claim that mail-in ballots will lead to voter fraud.”
Given the dangers misinformation poses to both democracy and public health, many believe social media platforms have a responsibility to monitor and correct misinformation before it spreads. But can corrections like this even work? And what role should social media platforms play in combating misinformation?
Well, it turns out there is evidence that fact checks do work. Numerous studies have demonstrated that when confronted with a correction, a significant share of people do, in fact, update their beliefs.
Political scientists Ethan Porter and Thomas J. Wood conducted an exhaustive battery of surveys on fact-checking, across more than 10,000 participants and 13 studies that covered a range of political, economic and scientific topics. They found that 60 percent of respondents gave accurate answers when presented with a correction, while just 32 percent of respondents who were not given a correction expressed accurate beliefs. That’s pretty solid proof that fact-checking can work.
But Porter and Wood have found, alongside many other fact-checking researchers, some methods of fact-checking are more effective than others. Broadly speaking, the most effective fact checks have this in common:
So despite a few studies suggesting that fact checks may make misinformation more prevalent (most prominently a widely-cited paper from political scientists Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler in 2010, which popularized the concept of the “backfire effect”), the overwhelming majority of studies have found that fact checks do work — or at the very least, do no harm. Still, some pieces of misinformation are harder to fight than others. And this episode involving Trump has several qualities that may make Twitter’s “get the facts” approach not exactly effective.
First, there’s the source: Donald Trump. Trust him or doubt him, chances are you have an opinion of the president. And if you already trust him, who are you going to trust more in this particular disagreement? Trump? Or CNN and the Washington Post (the two sources Twitter listed in its fact check)?
But given Trump’s notoriety, his misstatements may just be harder to combat. In one of Porter and Wood’s experiments, they took an op-ed by Trump and issued a correction on two versions of the piece: one (correctly) attributed to Trump and one attributed to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. The authors found that the fact-check of McConnell moved significantly more respondents toward the accurate position than did the fact check of Trump.
Next, there’s the fact that Twitter referenced articles from CNN and the Washington Post to correct the record. Research shows that an unlikely, surprising source for debunking misinformation, like a fellow Republican criticizing Trump, is just much more effective at making a correction stick than a more predictable and unsurprising source (like CNN or the Washington Post, both of which Trump has also cast as his enemies).
A Trump-supporting reader might take a closer look if told that Republican state officials in Idaho and Washington had complete confidence in the security of voting by mail, or that an exhaustive 17-month law enforcement inquiry into voter fraud in Florida, a state governed by fellow Republican Ron DeSantis, found no evidence of wrongdoing. This combination of surprise and credibility, in theory, would activate a closer look — the kind of attention required for mental updating.
And although Republicans en masse did not criticize Trump’s tweet that equated voting by mail with voter fraud, one recent example of a surprising debunk (and therefore, perhaps a maybe more effective fact check) is the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board’s take down of Trump’s allegation that cable news host Joe Scarborough was responsible for the death of a female staffer while he was a Republican congressman in Florida. The WSJ editorial board wrote that Trump’s suggestion “that the talk-show host is implicated in the woman’s death isn’t political hardball. It’s a smear.”
But fact-checking Trump is also further complicated by the fact that he is just really good at making memorable — if misleading or completely baseless — allegations. Remember Trump’s bizarre assertion that the hacker who released the DNC’s emails was not someone in Russia but instead “somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds?” You probably do. It was a memorable, specific image, and catchy enough that “400poundhacker” briefly trended on Twitter. And as a memory expert will tell you, the more specific and outrageous the image, the more likely you are to remember it. This latest tweet was no exception. And this makes refuting Trump’s claim by simply dismissing it as “not true” especially ineffective. Political scientist Emily Thorson calls this phenomenon a “belief echo,” or the phenomenon that even when an idea is rejected as false, it can still continue to shape attitudes.
Think about someone like President Nixon saying “I’m not a crook” in response to the allegations that he oversaw a break-in at the Watergate Hotel to wiretap his political opponents. By refuting the allegation, he’s also repeating it, and therefore, making it more memorable. And the more evocative and colorful the original claim, the stronger the echo, Thorson finds, if the rejection also repeats the claim. “Unfortunately, this means that the times when we are most tempted to repeat misinformation — a horrifyingly inaccurate graph, an offensive comment in a debate — are also the times when it is most likely to create belief echoes,” Thorson wrote.
Rather than simply saying there is no evidence to support Trump’s claim that voting by mail will lead to widespread voter fraud, an effective fact check might offer an alternate explanation for why voting by mail doesn’t cause voter fraud. For instance, a good fact check could explain that many governors support voting-by-mail to protect vulnerable family members from getting sick from the coronavirus, not because they think it will benefit their party politically. Or it could detail all the specific measures governors are taking to ensure a secure process, like signature matching and ballot tracing.
But this brings us to perhaps the trickiest obstacles regarding effective corrections in this situation: partisanship and worldview. Research shows that people can easily incorporate new information — even if it’s inaccurate — as long as it fits in an existing worldview. Take Trump’s misstatement on voting by mail causing voter fraud. Even though there isn’t evidence to support this, it already fits within a preexisting narrative that many Republicans believe — that voter fraud is widespread and Democrats help perpetuate it. This is what makes the problem of combating misinformation so challenging.
When premises are familiar (e.g., Democrats perpetuate voter fraud), it’s easier to incorporate new information uncritically, especially when partisanship is involved. Partisans are typically much more receptive to any facts that make their side look good and any facts that make the other side look bad. Likewise, they’re likely to reject facts that make their side look bad and make the other side look good.
Practically, this has meant that as Democrats and Republicans have cocooned themselves in separate information streams, they’ve increasingly incorporated not only different worldviews, but also different sets of facts to support those worldviews. The more partisanship itself becomes an identity, the more intense this motivated reasoning has become.
But there is one thing that might make this particular correction effective: It was issued simultaneously with the misstatement. And research has shown that the most effective corrections are immediate responses. A team of researchers led by Nyhan recently found that “disputed” tags, like the one Twitter issued, successfully reduce belief in false stories on social media.
There’s a very real question, though, of how much these tech platforms should be controlling what we do — and don’t — see. Facebook, for instance, has taken a different approach than Twitter so far. Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg criticized Twitter’s new policy, saying that, “I just believe strongly that Facebook shouldn’t be the arbiter of truth of everything that people say online.” Twitter and Facebook are also two of the very few places that both Democrats and Republicans turn to for news, even if their feeds rarely overlap.
Finally, even an effective fact check might not make the difference that policymakers are hoping for in political attitudes. While it’s possible for fact checks to shift beliefs, attitudes are much harder to change and much more resilient to fact checks.
In other words, even if some Twitter users now know that voting by mail doesn’t cause voter fraud, it’s unlikely that their attitudes about Trump will change, let alone their attitudes about voting by mail (they might find other reasons to oppose it, or still be concerned about the possibility of fraud, even if they don’t think it is widespread). After all, in our two-party system, it is still a tremendous leap for a Trump supporter to defect to voting for a Democrat. Fact-checking can help with updating and correcting prior knowledge, but breaking the hyper-partisanship that nurtures misinformation in the first place will require a whole lot more work.
But the more aggressively Twitter combats misinformation coming from Trump, the more it risks both the ire of the Trump administration and a potential loss of angered Republican users. A more comprehensive corrections department that fact checks all public figures (not just Trump) might allay some criticisms from the right that Twitter is biased against conservatives. But it would also cost money to employ more fact-checkers, and it might still disproportionately correct conservative voices if they do share more misleading information than liberals. If so, the information echo-chambers may fracture further, with liberals and conservatives seeking out their own platforms even more. That could make fact-checking even harder.
Social media companies will have to balance competing demands in deciding exactly how — and how much — they want to correct misinformation. The good news is that fact-checking does work. But the bad news is that it’s going to take a lot of concerted fact-checking efforts to make any difference — and even that might not be enough.
Confidence Interval: If Trump Loses In 2020, Heâll Be The Nominee Again In 2024


fivethirtyeight--2020-06-03--Can You Buy A Presidential Election?

Can You Buy A Presidential Election?

After spending $ 1 billion on a presidential run , former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination following Super Tuesday , securing just 44 pledged delegates .
The national conversation quickly moved on , but the results of Bloomberg ’ s experiment are worth examining in more detail .
His campaign wasn ’ t successful , but did his spending have any impact at all ?
My colleagues and I set out to answer this question by linking data on Bloomberg ’ s TV ad spending with rolling national survey data from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and based on the results , we can infer that Bloomberg ’ s advertising did increase his support in media markets where he advertised .
Ultimately , however , his ads weren ’ t enough to overcome the challenges of rising press scrutiny and poor debate showings .
In media markets where Bloomberg advertised , he received 10 percent support , on average , in the Nationscape survey of the Democratic primary across the 12-week period from mid-December 2019 to late February 2020 , compared with 4 percent in markets where he did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ true even when we control for the demographics of survey respondents and the primary calendar .
These numbers might not sound particularly impressive , especially considering Bloomberg spent $ 1 billion overall , but as you can see in the chart below , his advertising push did pay off .
We found Bloomberg ’ s support grew more than three times as fast in markets where he advertised than where he didn ’ t , and in the week before his disastrous debate performance on Feb. 19 , he registered 15 percent support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in other markets .
Of course , that Feb. 19 debate changed everything for Bloomberg .
It was his first time taking the debate stage , but his performance was widely regarded as poor .
He took criticism for backing stop-and-frisk policing tactics as mayor and refused to address allegations of sexism and fostering a hostile workplace for women at his company .
His national support in the Nationscape survey fell 1 percentage point the week after the debate and 1 point the week before Super Tuesday .
Liberal voter support in markets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in half after the debate as well , from 11 percent the week before the debate to 9 percent after , and just 6 percent the week before Super Tuesday .
Support among Democrats age 50 and over in these markets — the age demographic most likely to be watching TV — fell , too , from 21 to 18 percent before dipping slightly to 17 percent in the last week of his campaign .
The logic of Bloomberg ’ s media blitz was that it would generate enough support in the Super @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states ’ 15 percent pledged delegate thresholds and allow him to command a sizable share of delegates in a fragmented field .
But when Bloomberg ran into trouble after the debate , his support among those in markets with his advertising proved soft and more easily reversible .
Bloomberg ’ s support from TV advertising also seemed to have its limits .
For instance , we found a minimal effect on his Nationscape polling numbers in markets where he spent more money .
Grouping markets on a per-household measure of spending , Bloomberg @ @ @ @ @ @ @ higher in markets where he spent more ( 10 percent ) than in markets where he spent less ( 9 percent ) .
On its own , Bloomberg ’ s experiment shows TV advertising can ’ t swing an entire election .
It could not overcome Bloomberg ’ s lack of charisma or skill as a debater .
Bloomberg ’ s campaign did show , however , that advertising can have a measurable , double-digit impact on the polls and vault a candidate into the top tier .
That ’ s not nothing @

Can You Buy A Presidential Election? Bloomberg showed us money can take you pretty far, but it takes more to win an election.
After spending $1 billion on a presidential run, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination following Super Tuesday, securing just 44 pledged delegates. The national conversation quickly moved on, but the results of Bloomberg’s experiment are worth examining in more detail.
His campaign wasn’t successful, but did his spending have any impact at all?
My colleagues and I set out to answer this question by linking data on Bloomberg’s TV ad spending with rolling national survey data from the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, and based on the results, we can infer that Bloomberg’s advertising did increase his support in media markets where he advertised. Ultimately, however, his ads weren’t enough to overcome the challenges of rising press scrutiny and poor debate showings.
In media markets where Bloomberg advertised, he received 10 percent support, on average, in the Nationscape survey of the Democratic primary across the 12-week period from mid-December 2019 to late February 2020, compared with 4 percent in markets where he did not advertise. And this effect holds true even when we control for the demographics of survey respondents and the primary calendar.
These numbers might not sound particularly impressive, especially considering Bloomberg spent $1 billion overall, but as you can see in the chart below, his advertising push did pay off. We found Bloomberg’s support grew more than three times as fast in markets where he advertised than where he didn’t, and in the week before his disastrous debate performance on Feb. 19, he registered 15 percent support in these markets compared with 6 percent in other markets.
Of course, that Feb. 19 debate changed everything for Bloomberg.
It was his first time taking the debate stage, but his performance was widely regarded as poor. He took criticism for backing stop-and-frisk policing tactics as mayor and refused to address allegations of sexism and fostering a hostile workplace for women at his company. His national support in the Nationscape survey fell 1 percentage point the week after the debate and 1 point the week before Super Tuesday.
Liberal voter support in markets where he’d advertised was cut in half after the debate as well, from 11 percent the week before the debate to 9 percent after, and just 6 percent the week before Super Tuesday. Support among Democrats age 50 and over in these markets — the age demographic most likely to be watching TV — fell, too, from 21 to 18 percent before dipping slightly to 17 percent in the last week of his campaign.
The logic of Bloomberg’s media blitz was that it would generate enough support in the Super Tuesday states for him to easily clear states’ 15 percent pledged delegate thresholds and allow him to command a sizable share of delegates in a fragmented field. But when Bloomberg ran into trouble after the debate, his support among those in markets with his advertising proved soft and more easily reversible.
Bloomberg’s support from TV advertising also seemed to have its limits. For instance, we found a minimal effect on his Nationscape polling numbers in markets where he spent more money. Grouping markets on a per-household measure of spending, Bloomberg’s support is just 1 point higher in markets where he spent more (10 percent) than in markets where he spent less (9 percent).
On its own, Bloomberg’s experiment shows TV advertising can’t swing an entire election. It could not overcome Bloomberg’s lack of charisma or skill as a debater. Bloomberg’s campaign did show, however, that advertising can have a measurable, double-digit impact on the polls and vault a candidate into the top tier. That’s not nothing.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: The data behind police violence


fivethirtyeight--2020-06-04--Why It’s Still So Rare For Police Officers To Face Legal Consequences For Misconduct

On Friday , former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was arrested and charged with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter after he was caught on video pressing his knee on George Floyd ’ s neck for nearly nine minutes , even though Floyd told him repeatedly he couldn ’ t breathe .
And now Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison is adding a second-degree murder charge , in addition to charging the three officers who were on the scene when Floyd was killed .
The fact that Chauvin was charged at all was significant .
The elevation of the charges — and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are also being charged — is even more so .
That ’ s because it ’ s still quite rare for police officers to be prosecuted .
A review of the data we have on police prosecutions shows that it ’ s uncommon for police officers to face any kind of legal consequences — let alone be convicted — for committing fatal violence against civilians .
The data we have on police misconduct is , admittedly , far from perfect .
There is no national system for reporting police misconduct , and state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ details about investigations into police wrongdoing .
That means some of the most reliable data sets on police misconduct — usually focusing on shootings — come from journalists , researchers or political activists who study it , not the federal government .
And according to data from Philip M. Stinson , a criminal justice professor at Bowling Green State University , who collects one of the most reliable data sets on police prosecutions , only a handful of police officers are charged with murder or manslaughter every year .
What ’ s more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ substantially more police officers are facing charges , despite an uptick in protests against the use of excessive force by police .
Many major cities continue to pay out millions of dollars each year to settle lawsuits against police officers , too , often without firing officers who have been repeatedly sued .
So even though police misconduct has drawn greater national attention , it ’ s still really difficult to hold police officers legally accountable for any kind of misconduct — including fatal violence .
Over the past few years , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of police officers , but it ’ s often hard to know whether more police are being prosecuted , or if the issue is just receiving more attention .
Stinson ’ s Henry A. Wallace Police Crime Database is among the best sources available on prosecutions of police ; it logs 10,287 criminal arrest cases between 2005 and 2014 involving 8,495 non-federal sworn law enforcement officers .
Updating this data is difficult and time-consuming , but Stinson was able to send us more recent data for prosecutions resulting from on-duty police shootings , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ track .
That doesn ’ t include police killings that aren ’ t shootings , but Stinson told us that prosecutions for deaths like Floyd ’ s are especially rare .
In fact , Stinson has found only 110 law enforcement officers nationwide have been charged with murder or manslaughter in an on-duty shooting — despite the fact that around around 1,000 people are fatally shot by police annually , according to a database maintained by The Washington Post .
Furthermore , only 42 officers were convicted .
Fifty were not and 18 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the table below shows , many of these convictions ended up being for a lesser offense — only five of these officers were convicted of murder ( and did not have that conviction overturned ) .
Most years , the number of officers charged with murder or manslaughter in connection with an on-duty shooting is in the single digits .
And despite the increased scrutiny on police violence since 2014 ( when the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson , Missouri , and the Black Lives Matter movement raised public awareness of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officers charged nor the number of convictions has meaningfully increased .
The number of officers charged has edged into the double digits in four of the last six years ( topping out at 18 in 2015 ) , but Stinson told us that the uptick was too small to be statistically significant .
What ’ s more , officers are still being convicted about as often as they are not — about the same rate as before 2014 — although many of the cases since 2016 are still pending .
Why are police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last few years , many cities have pledged to reform their police departments , and progressive prosecutors have even won on promises to hold police accountable for misconduct .
But Kate Levine , a professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law who studies police prosecutions , told us that not all misconduct — including use of excessive or even fatal force — is illegal .
“ If a civilian is displaying a weapon , it ’ s very hard to charge [ the police officer ] with murder for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she said .
“ And even if a civilian doesn ’ t have a weapon , it ’ s hard to charge a police officer if [ the officer ] can credibly say they feared for their life.
” There are other barriers to charging and convicting police , too .
Prosecutors work closely with police departments , which means they may be reluctant to jeopardize that relationship by pursuing cases against officers .
Police officers ’ contracts also often protect them from interrogation techniques that are often used on civilians , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that make it to trial , judges and juries may be more inclined to believe law enforcement officers when they say their lives were threatened .
All of these challenges are so baked into the system that it ’ s very difficult to make meaningful changes .
Altering prosecutors ’ relationship with police isn ’ t a simple or easy reform , for instance — it would be a fundamental shift in the way our criminal justice system works .
Of course , prosecution isn ’ t the only legal route for holding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can also sue if their constitutional rights are violated by police , which includes offenses like use of excessive force .
There ’ s no national data source for this either , but we looked at data on police misconduct settlements in New York , Los Angeles , Chicago and Philadelphia .
And New York has paid more than $ 100 million on police misconduct settlements each fiscal year between 2015 and 2018 , per data from the New York City Comptroller ’ s Office .
In total , New York Police Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million between the fiscal years of 2011 and 2017 .
In Los Angeles , they totaled more than $ 139 million in that same time period , according to data compiled by the Los Angeles Times .
And in Chicago , police misconduct settlements between the calendar years of 2011 to 2018 totaled $ 398 million , according to data compiled by The Chicago Reporter .
In Philadelphia , that number is nearly $ 90 million , per data from the city ’ s Law Department .
This might seem like a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not an especially effective way of promoting police accountability .
For one thing , according to research by Joanna Schwartz , a law professor at the University of California , Los Angeles , police almost never pay the settlements out of pocket — instead , the money comes from cities or police departments , and often in ways that don ’ t put financial strain on police departments .
That may help explain why some of the nation ’ s largest cities have a history of keeping officers on the force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many lawsuits — the legal actions may not actually prompt police departments to internally discipline or fire officers who are sued over and over again .
Part of the problem , according to Schwartz and others , is that it ’ s also very difficult to successfully sue a police officer for misconduct because the courts have granted them broad protections from legal liability for actions they take on the job .
This doctrine , called “ qualified immunity , ” protects government officials from being sued if there isn ’ t a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means , in practical terms , that a case against a police officer will often be dismissed if the alleged behavior hasn ’ t previously been found unconstitutional .
This has resulted in a bizarre and circular trap for people trying to sue police for misconduct : To succeed , they need to find previous cases where similar misconduct occurred , but there are very few other precedents because other plaintiffs hit the same stumbling block .
“ This is a big part of the reason victims of police misconduct are very rarely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for law enforcement officers who step out of line , ” said Jay Schweikert , a policy analyst with the libertarian Cato Institute .
His organization is one of many across the ideological spectrum that are currently urging the Supreme Court to reconsider the protections afforded to law enforcement professionals by this doctrine .
Nearly all of the experts we spoke with stressed that the legal system isn ’ t the only way — or even the best way — to prevent police misconduct .
Seth Stoughton , a former police officer who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the University of South Carolina , said he thinks police prosecutions shouldn ’ t overshadow other solutions that might also help change police culture .
This includes being more proactive about yanking police licenses or more transparent about misconduct data , so the scope of the problem is clearer .
“ Legal accountability is just one type of accountability , ” he told us .
“ It ’ s certainly very important — but it ’ s not the silver bullet I think a lot of people expect it to be .
”

UPDATE (September 23, 2020, 4:53 p.m.): On Wednesday, a grand jury decided not to charge any Louisville police officers with killing Breonna Taylor earlier this year. One former police officer was indicted for recklessly endangering Taylor’s neighbors, but the other two officers were not charged.
As we wrote earlier this summer, it’s actually quite rare for police officers to face criminal legal consequences for using excessive force — or even fatal violence — against civilians.
On Friday, former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was arrested and charged with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter after he was caught on video pressing his knee on George Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes, even though Floyd told him repeatedly he couldn’t breathe. And now Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison is adding a second-degree murder charge, in addition to charging the three officers who were on the scene when Floyd was killed.
The fact that Chauvin was charged at all was significant. The elevation of the charges — and the fact that the other three officers are also being charged — is even more so. That’s because it’s still quite rare for police officers to be prosecuted. A review of the data we have on police prosecutions shows that it’s uncommon for police officers to face any kind of legal consequences — let alone be convicted — for committing fatal violence against civilians.
The data we have on police misconduct is, admittedly, far from perfect. There is no national system for reporting police misconduct, and state agencies are often reluctant to release any details about investigations into police wrongdoing.
That means some of the most reliable data sets on police misconduct — usually focusing on shootings — come from journalists, researchers or political activists who study it, not the federal government. And according to data from Philip M. Stinson, a criminal justice professor at Bowling Green State University, who collects one of the most reliable data sets on police prosecutions, only a handful of police officers are charged with murder or manslaughter every year.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: The data behind police violence
What’s more, there’s no evidence that substantially more police officers are facing charges, despite an uptick in protests against the use of excessive force by police. Many major cities continue to pay out millions of dollars each year to settle lawsuits against police officers, too, often without firing officers who have been repeatedly sued. So even though police misconduct has drawn greater national attention, it’s still really difficult to hold police officers legally accountable for any kind of misconduct — including fatal violence.
Over the past few years, there have been a number of high-profile trials of police officers, but it’s often hard to know whether more police are being prosecuted, or if the issue is just receiving more attention. Stinson’s Henry A. Wallace Police Crime Database is among the best sources available on prosecutions of police; it logs 10,287 criminal arrest cases between 2005 and 2014 involving 8,495 non-federal sworn law enforcement officers.
Updating this data is difficult and time-consuming, but Stinson was able to send us more recent data for prosecutions resulting from on-duty police shootings, since those are rarer and easier to track. That doesn’t include police killings that aren’t shootings, but Stinson told us that prosecutions for deaths like Floyd’s are especially rare. In fact, Stinson has found only 110 law enforcement officers nationwide have been charged with murder or manslaughter in an on-duty shooting — despite the fact that around around 1,000 people are fatally shot by police annually, according to a database maintained by The Washington Post. Furthermore, only 42 officers were convicted. Fifty were not and 18 cases are still pending. And as the table below shows, many of these convictions ended up being for a lesser offense — only five of these officers were convicted of murder (and did not have that conviction overturned).
In shootings, police are rarely convicted of murder Charges on which nonfederal law enforcement officers arrested for murder or manslaughter in an on-duty shooting were convicted, since 2005 Charge Number of Convictions Manslaughter 11 Involuntary manslaughter 6 Murder* 5 Voluntary manslaughter 5 Federal criminal deprivation of civil rights 5 Official misconduct 3 Negligent homicide 3 Reckless homicide 2 Aggravated assault 1 Reckless discharge of a firearm 1 *Not counting convictions that were later overturned. Source: Philip Stinson
Most years, the number of officers charged with murder or manslaughter in connection with an on-duty shooting is in the single digits. And despite the increased scrutiny on police violence since 2014 (when the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the Black Lives Matter movement raised public awareness of the issue), neither the number of officers charged nor the number of convictions has meaningfully increased. The number of officers charged has edged into the double digits in four of the last six years (topping out at 18 in 2015), but Stinson told us that the uptick was too small to be statistically significant. What’s more, officers are still being convicted about as often as they are not — about the same rate as before 2014 — although many of the cases since 2016 are still pending.
Why are police prosecutions still so rare? In the last few years, many cities have pledged to reform their police departments, and progressive prosecutors have even won on promises to hold police accountable for misconduct. But Kate Levine, a professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law who studies police prosecutions, told us that not all misconduct — including use of excessive or even fatal force — is illegal. “If a civilian is displaying a weapon, it’s very hard to charge [the police officer] with murder for taking action against that civilian,” she said. “And even if a civilian doesn’t have a weapon, it’s hard to charge a police officer if [the officer] can credibly say they feared for their life.”
There are other barriers to charging and convicting police, too. Prosecutors work closely with police departments, which means they may be reluctant to jeopardize that relationship by pursuing cases against officers. Police officers’ contracts also often protect them from interrogation techniques that are often used on civilians, according to Levine. And in the cases that make it to trial, judges and juries may be more inclined to believe law enforcement officers when they say their lives were threatened. All of these challenges are so baked into the system that it’s very difficult to make meaningful changes. Altering prosecutors’ relationship with police isn’t a simple or easy reform, for instance — it would be a fundamental shift in the way our criminal justice system works.
Of course, prosecution isn’t the only legal route for holding police officers accountable for misconduct. People can also sue if their constitutional rights are violated by police, which includes offenses like use of excessive force. There’s no national data source for this either, but we looked at data on police misconduct settlements in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia. And New York has paid more than $100 million on police misconduct settlements each fiscal year between 2015 and 2018, per data from the New York City Comptroller’s Office. In total, New York Police Department misconduct settlements cost the city $630 million between the fiscal years of 2011 and 2017. In Los Angeles, they totaled more than $139 million in that same time period, according to data compiled by the Los Angeles Times. And in Chicago, police misconduct settlements between the calendar years of 2011 to 2018 totaled $398 million, according to data compiled by The Chicago Reporter. In Philadelphia, that number is nearly $90 million, per data from the city’s Law Department.
This might seem like a lot of money, but experts say it’s not an especially effective way of promoting police accountability. For one thing, according to research by Joanna Schwartz, a law professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, police almost never pay the settlements out of pocket — instead, the money comes from cities or police departments, and often in ways that don’t put financial strain on police departments. That may help explain why some of the nation’s largest cities have a history of keeping officers on the force even when their conduct has resulted in many lawsuits — the legal actions may not actually prompt police departments to internally discipline or fire officers who are sued over and over again.
Part of the problem, according to Schwartz and others, is that it’s also very difficult to successfully sue a police officer for misconduct because the courts have granted them broad protections from legal liability for actions they take on the job. This doctrine, called “qualified immunity,” protects government officials from being sued if there isn’t a violation of clearly established law — which means, in practical terms, that a case against a police officer will often be dismissed if the alleged behavior hasn’t previously been found unconstitutional.
This has resulted in a bizarre and circular trap for people trying to sue police for misconduct: To succeed, they need to find previous cases where similar misconduct occurred, but there are very few other precedents because other plaintiffs hit the same stumbling block. “This is a big part of the reason victims of police misconduct are very rarely compensated and there is no predictable accountability for law enforcement officers who step out of line,” said Jay Schweikert, a policy analyst with the libertarian Cato Institute. His organization is one of many across the ideological spectrum that are currently urging the Supreme Court to reconsider the protections afforded to law enforcement professionals by this doctrine.
Nearly all of the experts we spoke with stressed that the legal system isn’t the only way — or even the best way — to prevent police misconduct. Seth Stoughton, a former police officer who’s now a law professor at the University of South Carolina, said he thinks police prosecutions shouldn’t overshadow other solutions that might also help change police culture. This includes being more proactive about yanking police licenses or more transparent about misconduct data, so the scope of the problem is clearer. “Legal accountability is just one type of accountability,” he told us. “It’s certainly very important — but it’s not the silver bullet I think a lot of people expect it to be.”


fivethirtyeight--2020-06-04--How The Police See Issues Of Race And Policing

One important difference between the protests that have spread across the country for the past nine days and nights and other protest movements is their subject .
The demonstrators who have taken to the streets in response to the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers are protesting against police violence and the inequities of the criminal justice system , which as others have pointed out , call into question the role and neutrality of the law enforcement personnel who patrol those streets .
The police officers firing tear gas , pepper spray and rubber bullets — and generally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many ways like counterprotesters more than peacekeepers .
In fact , a majority of America ’ s police officers strongly disagree with the core arguments of the protests .
And that ’ s probably related to the fact that the police and the protesters are much different from each other in terms of politics and demographics .
And these underlying differences over identity , politics and policy are creating a toxic and potentially dangerous dynamic as the protests continue .
Most police officers think they treat black people fairly We don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police officers , but the Pew Research Center conducted an extensive survey of nearly 8,000 sworn police officers across the country in 2016 .
That was a few years ago , obviously , but well after the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement , and it offers some insight into how the views of law enforcement officers compare with the views of the general population .
In that survey , 67 percent of officers said they thought the deaths of black people in encounters with the police were isolated incidents , compared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were part of a broader pattern .
The public , by comparison , had almost exactly the opposite reaction — only 39 percent of Americans said the police killings of black Americans were isolated incidents , while 60 percent said they were part of a broader pattern .
( More recent surveys of the public also indicate that around 60 percent of Americans think that these incidents are part of a broader pattern . )
Just 35 percent of officers in the 2016 survey said they thought protests against the killings of black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a “ genuine desire to hold officers accountable ” for their actions .
In separate questions , almost all officers ( 92 percent ) said that these protests reflected at least some long-standing bias against the police , and 86 percent said that the attention surrounding high-profile incidents of police killings of black men and the resulting protests has made their jobs harder .
More anecdotally , police officers regularly speak in disparaging terms about Black Lives Matter activists , in particular .
“ Policing has always been a dangerous profession , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by inaccurately demonizing police as racists who kill innocent people , have made policing more dangerous than ever before , ” a police union leader in Boston wrote in a February letter to the local teachers union , as The Boston Globe reported .
“ Officers reject the notion that their behaviors are affected by racial bias , ” said Natalie Todak , a criminal justice professor at the University of Alabama at Birmingham who said she has interviewed hundreds of police officers for her work .
She added that “ many police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hypothesis.
” Essentially , that ’ s the belief that the police are simply targeting criminal behavior and that black people are committing crimes at a higher rate than white people .
Todak also noted that beyond these racial issues , “ throughout history , we can see a recurring pattern of officers and agencies resisting outside criticism and pressures to reform.
” Police officers don ’ t see much evidence of discrimination against black people Most police officers also diverge from the protesters on the issues underlying these high-profile killings .
Eighty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does not need to make more changes to ensure that black Americans have equal rights with white Americans , according to the 2016 Pew survey .
That ’ s much higher than the share of Americans overall who held that view ( 48 percent ) .
Similarly , survey results from the 2014 Cooperate Congressional Election Study suggest that white police officers in particular are less likely than white Americans overall to think that the lingering effects of slavery and current racial discrimination make it harder for black Americans to succeed .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea that “ blacks should work their way up without special favors , ” according to political scientist Brian Schaffner of Tufts University .
“ On a range of measures , white police officers are more racially conservative than white citizens , ” wrote sociology professor Ryan Jerome LeCount of Hamline University in St. Paul , Minnesota , in an academic paper published in 2017 , based on responses to surveys conducted as part of the General Social Survey .
White officers , according to LeCount ’ s research , are more likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-black discrimination is not a major problem for black Americans .
White officers are also significantly more likely than black officers and Americans overall to think that black people are more violent than white people .
Black and female officers often differ from officers overall As mentioned above , black officers tend to have somewhat different views from white officers .
For example , 69 percent of black officers said the protests against policing tactics reflected some genuine desire to hold the police accountable , compared with just 27 percent of white officers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 57 percent ) said that the deadly encounters between black people and the police were part of a broader pattern — a view shared by only 27 percent of white officers .
Black officers were also less likely than white or Hispanic officers to say that the public didn ’ t understand the risks and challenges they face on the job .
Most black officers — 69 percent — thought that America needed to make more changes for black Americans to have equal rights , putting the black officers fairly close to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pew poll ) .
White officers ( 6 percent ) were much less likely to hold this view .
According to LeCount ’ s research , the views of black officers on questions of both policing and broader racial issues in America were not much different from those of black Americans overall .
Female officers were also more likely to think that the protests over police violence were motivated by genuine concerns about holding the police accountable and that the police killings of black Americans reflected a broader pattern as opposed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more male and white than the country as a whole The data above suggests that America ’ s police officers have views informed specifically by their jobs , so it makes sense that they have more pro-police views than the general population does .
But the data also shows that law enforcement personnel are split along similar lines to Americans overall — women and black officers are more likely to have views associated with the Democratic Party than male and white officers are , similar to the splits among their counterparts in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s relevant that the police are much more male than the overall population , and slightly more white .
About 88 percent of local sworn police officers are men , compared with around 12 percent who are women , according to data from the U.S. Department of Justice .
( The country overall is about 51 percent women . )
And about 72 percent of officers are non-Hispanic white , about 11 percent are non-Hispanic black and about 13 percent are Hispanic .
By comparison , about 60 percent of Americans overall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are non-Hispanic black and about 18 percent are Hispanic , per 2019 estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau .
The police tend to like Trump About 60 percent of white men have voted for the Republican Party in recent elections , so it ’ s likely that America ’ s police officers have long leaned toward the GOP .
That includes supporting President Trump .
The Fraternal Order of Police , the nation ’ s largest police union , endorsed Trump in 2016 .
The FOP has not endorsed a Democratic presidential nominee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s winning the union ’ s support was not a given — the FOP opted not to endorse either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney in 2012 .
It ’ s not surprising that the police like Trump — he basically ran as the anti-Black Lives Matter candidate .
And while in office , Trump has rolled back policing reforms adopted by the Obama administration .
Indeed , policing is increasingly part of America ’ s broader partisan war — rank-and-file Republicans have much more favorable views of the police than Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the tension between the protesters and the police is so high because it reinforces America ’ s already deep partisan divide .
So the fact that Trump seems to disagree with the motives behind the protests may be reinforcing the officers ’ preexisting concerns about them — people tend to follow the views of their party ’ s political leaders .
The police , for example , seem to be treating the journalists covering the protests harshly — perhaps echoing Trump ’ s disdain for the Fourth Estate .
The protesters disagree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concepts — whether American society in general and the police in particular treat black people unfairly .
And underlying those differing viewpoints are gaps in identity and partisanship : The police officers are more likely to be white , male and Trump-supporting than the protesters .
So the divides over Floyd ’ s death run along the larger political fault lines in U.S. society .
Those fault lines seem at times intractable — and , right now , maybe even deadly .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

UPDATE (August 27, 2020, 2:59 p.m.): We originally published this article earlier this year, after a police officer killed George Floyd in Minneapolis. In light of the shooting of Jacob Blake, who was shot seven times by a police officer in Kenosha, Wisconsin, this week, we’ve decided to recirculate the article.
One important difference between the protests that have spread across the country for the past nine days and nights and other protest movements is their subject. The demonstrators who have taken to the streets in response to the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers are protesting against police violence and the inequities of the criminal justice system, which as others have pointed out, call into question the role and neutrality of the law enforcement personnel who patrol those streets. The police officers firing tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets — and generally roughing up protesters — have seemed in many ways like counterprotesters more than peacekeepers.
In fact, a majority of America’s police officers strongly disagree with the core arguments of the protests. And that’s probably related to the fact that the police and the protesters are much different from each other in terms of politics and demographics. And these underlying differences over identity, politics and policy are creating a toxic and potentially dangerous dynamic as the protests continue.
Most police officers think they treat black people fairly
We don’t have much data on the views of police officers, but the Pew Research Center conducted an extensive survey of nearly 8,000 sworn police officers across the country in 2016.
That was a few years ago, obviously, but well after the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement, and it offers some insight into how the views of law enforcement officers compare with the views of the general population.
In that survey, 67 percent of officers said they thought the deaths of black people in encounters with the police were isolated incidents, compared with 31 percent who said those deaths were part of a broader pattern. The public, by comparison, had almost exactly the opposite reaction — only 39 percent of Americans said the police killings of black Americans were isolated incidents, while 60 percent said they were part of a broader pattern. (More recent surveys of the public also indicate that around 60 percent of Americans think that these incidents are part of a broader pattern.)
Just 35 percent of officers in the 2016 survey said they thought protests against the killings of black Americans were motivated at least in part by a “genuine desire to hold officers accountable” for their actions. In separate questions, almost all officers (92 percent) said that these protests reflected at least some long-standing bias against the police, and 86 percent said that the attention surrounding high-profile incidents of police killings of black men and the resulting protests has made their jobs harder.
More anecdotally, police officers regularly speak in disparaging terms about Black Lives Matter activists, in particular.
“Policing has always been a dangerous profession, but groups like Black Lives Matter, by inaccurately demonizing police as racists who kill innocent people, have made policing more dangerous than ever before,” a police union leader in Boston wrote in a February letter to the local teachers union, as The Boston Globe reported.
“Officers reject the notion that their behaviors are affected by racial bias,” said Natalie Todak, a criminal justice professor at the University of Alabama at Birmingham who said she has interviewed hundreds of police officers for her work.
She added that “many police officers endorse the ‘differential involvement’ hypothesis.” Essentially, that’s the belief that the police are simply targeting criminal behavior and that black people are committing crimes at a higher rate than white people.
Todak also noted that beyond these racial issues, “throughout history, we can see a recurring pattern of officers and agencies resisting outside criticism and pressures to reform.”
Police officers don’t see much evidence of discrimination against black people
Most police officers also diverge from the protesters on the issues underlying these high-profile killings. Eighty percent of police officers said the country does not need to make more changes to ensure that black Americans have equal rights with white Americans, according to the 2016 Pew survey. That’s much higher than the share of Americans overall who held that view (48 percent).
Similarly, survey results from the 2014 Cooperate Congressional Election Study suggest that white police officers in particular are less likely than white Americans overall to think that the lingering effects of slavery and current racial discrimination make it harder for black Americans to succeed. They are more likely to agree with the idea that “blacks should work their way up without special favors,” according to political scientist Brian Schaffner of Tufts University.
“On a range of measures, white police officers are more racially conservative than white citizens,” wrote sociology professor Ryan Jerome LeCount of Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota, in an academic paper published in 2017, based on responses to surveys conducted as part of the General Social Survey.
White officers, according to LeCount’s research, are more likely than other white Americans to say that anti-black discrimination is not a major problem for black Americans. White officers are also significantly more likely than black officers and Americans overall to think that black people are more violent than white people.
Black and female officers often differ from officers overall
As mentioned above, black officers tend to have somewhat different views from white officers. For example, 69 percent of black officers said the protests against policing tactics reflected some genuine desire to hold the police accountable, compared with just 27 percent of white officers. And a majority of black officers (57 percent) said that the deadly encounters between black people and the police were part of a broader pattern — a view shared by only 27 percent of white officers. Black officers were also less likely than white or Hispanic officers to say that the public didn’t understand the risks and challenges they face on the job.
Most black officers — 69 percent — thought that America needed to make more changes for black Americans to have equal rights, putting the black officers fairly close to black Americans overall (84 percent per the Pew poll). White officers (6 percent) were much less likely to hold this view. According to LeCount’s research, the views of black officers on questions of both policing and broader racial issues in America were not much different from those of black Americans overall.
Female officers were also more likely to think that the protests over police violence were motivated by genuine concerns about holding the police accountable and that the police killings of black Americans reflected a broader pattern as opposed to being isolated incidents.
The police are more male and white than the country as a whole
The data above suggests that America’s police officers have views informed specifically by their jobs, so it makes sense that they have more pro-police views than the general population does. But the data also shows that law enforcement personnel are split along similar lines to Americans overall — women and black officers are more likely to have views associated with the Democratic Party than male and white officers are, similar to the splits among their counterparts in the general populace.
Which is why it’s relevant that the police are much more male than the overall population, and slightly more white.
About 88 percent of local sworn police officers are men, compared with around 12 percent who are women, according to data from the U.S. Department of Justice. (The country overall is about 51 percent women.) And about 72 percent of officers are non-Hispanic white, about 11 percent are non-Hispanic black and about 13 percent are Hispanic. By comparison, about 60 percent of Americans overall are non-Hispanic white, about 13 percent are non-Hispanic black and about 18 percent are Hispanic, per 2019 estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau.
The police tend to like Trump
About 60 percent of white men have voted for the Republican Party in recent elections, so it’s likely that America’s police officers have long leaned toward the GOP. That includes supporting President Trump. The Fraternal Order of Police, the nation’s largest police union, endorsed Trump in 2016. The FOP has not endorsed a Democratic presidential nominee since Bill Clinton in 1996, but Trump’s winning the union’s support was not a given — the FOP opted not to endorse either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney in 2012.
It’s not surprising that the police like Trump — he basically ran as the anti-Black Lives Matter candidate. And while in office, Trump has rolled back policing reforms adopted by the Obama administration.
Indeed, policing is increasingly part of America’s broader partisan war — rank-and-file Republicans have much more favorable views of the police than Democrats do. So, in some ways, the tension between the protesters and the police is so high because it reinforces America’s already deep partisan divide.
So the fact that Trump seems to disagree with the motives behind the protests may be reinforcing the officers’ preexisting concerns about them — people tend to follow the views of their party’s political leaders. The police, for example, seem to be treating the journalists covering the protests harshly — perhaps echoing Trump’s disdain for the Fourth Estate.
The protesters disagree with the police on the two major concepts — whether American society in general and the police in particular treat black people unfairly. And underlying those differing viewpoints are gaps in identity and partisanship: The police officers are more likely to be white, male and Trump-supporting than the protesters.
So the divides over Floyd’s death run along the larger political fault lines in U.S. society. Those fault lines seem at times intractable — and, right now, maybe even deadly.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: The data behind police violence


fivethirtyeight--2020-06-04--Politics Podcast: What History Can And Can’t Teach Us About Today’s Protests

It ’ s easy to compare today ’ s anti-police-violence protests to the protests of the 1960s , but those @ @ @ @ @ a full picture .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , history professor @ @ @ @ @ Jr. and Galen Druke to discuss which parallels are apt , how today ’ s @ @ @ @ @ what that says about where the movement is headed .
You can listen to the @ @ @ @ @ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , @ @ @ @ @ favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen @ @ @ @ @ publishes Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a @ @ @ @ @ .
Have a comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling @ @ @ @ @ by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

It’s easy to compare today’s anti-police-violence protests to the protests of the 1960s, but those comparisons don’t paint a full picture. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, history professor Yohuru Williams joins Perry Bacon Jr. and Galen Druke to discuss which parallels are apt, how today’s protests are different, and what that says about where the movement is headed.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Protests, then and now
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.