fivethirtyeight--2020-11-23--Politics Podcast: Trump Is Setting A Dangerous Precedent For American Democracy

Three weeks after the election , President Trump is still refusing to concede and making attempts to subvert the results of the election .
His legal arguments have largely failed in court , but his campaign has encouraged local election officials to refuse to certify results and suggested state legislators should choose electors who would vote for Trump regardless of their state ’ s vote .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the team discusses the extent to which these anti-democratic efforts have been successful and what precedent they set going forward .
The crew also considers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ current surge in coronavirus cases and asks what pollsters should do about falling response rates .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

Three weeks after the election, President Trump is still refusing to concede and making attempts to subvert the results of the election. His legal arguments have largely failed in court, but his campaign has encouraged local election officials to refuse to certify results and suggested state legislators should choose electors who would vote for Trump regardless of their state’s vote. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the team discusses the extent to which these anti-democratic efforts have been successful and what precedent they set going forward. The crew also considers how the government is responding to the current surge in coronavirus cases and asks what pollsters should do about falling response rates.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-11-23--The Birther Myth Stuck Around For Years. The Election Fraud Myth Might Too.

A significant number of Americans currently believe the 2020 election was stolen , even though it wasn ’ t .
A Reuters/Ipsos poll last week showed 52 percent of Republicans believe President Trump “ rightfully won ” the election .
But the only “ evidence ” of election fraud has been widely debunked .
An optimist might think the public will gradually drop this election fraud myth as the Trump campaign ’ s lawsuits are thrown out , recounts and audits are conducted , and , eventually , Joe Biden is sworn in as president .
But we ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president is illegitimate before , as he spent years claiming without evidence that President Obama wasn ’ t born in the United States , and thus ineligible to be president .
If this recent saga is anything like the birtherism movement , it ’ s not going anywhere .
What divided the electorate in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast “ If you ’ re asking if this is going to go away , I would bet a lot of money that it won ’ t , ” said Adam Berinsky , a political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a book about political conspiracy theories .
Birtherism first emerged in 2008 during Obama ’ s primary campaign through the now very quaint medium of chain emails .
After securing the nomination , Obama ’ s campaign published a copy of his certification of live birth in Hawaii .
Many assumed this would put an end to the myth that he wasn ’ t born in America .
Trump was one of the main people who ensured it did not .
In 2011 , Trump began aggressively beating the birtherism drum , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Conservative Political Action Conference in February .
Over the next five years , in media appearances , speeches and on Twitter , Trump repeatedly made false claims that Obama was not born in America .
This continued even after Obama released his long-form birth certificate in April 2011 , a piece of evidence Trump had demanded .
It wasn ’ t until Trump ’ s own campaign for president in 2016 — when his birtherism was thought to be among the reasons he wasn ’ t polling well among Black Americans — that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was born in the United States .
But that admission was brief ( the statement lasted less than a minute ) and included Trump blaming Hillary Clinton for originating the myth , which isn ’ t true .
When the birther myth first emerged , there wasn ’ t much in the way of public opinion polling about it .
It wasn ’ t until Trump revived the conspiracy theory in 2011 that pollsters started to track how much of the public believed it .
And over the years , even as more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ birth certificate and contemporaneous newspaper announcements — proving Obama was born in the U.S. , the belief has persisted .
As recently as last year , a YouGov poll found that 34 percent of Americans think it ’ s “ probably true ” or “ definitely true ” that Obama was born in Kenya , as the birther myth often claimed .
Among self-identified Republicans , that number was 56 percent .
“ There were these temporary dips in birther beliefs when major events happened and news coverage was reminding people of that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a professor of government at Dartmouth College .
“ But birther misperceptions typically reverted back to their prior levels after that information shock had dissipated.
” In April 2011 , for example , a YouGov poll found that 55 percent of Americans believed Obama was born in the U.S. That was before Obama released his birth certificate .
After he released it , the same pollster found that number had climbed to 67 percent .
But a year and a half later , the number had dipped again , down to 59 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percentage of people who reject the rumor , it doesn ’ t really move at all .
All of the movement is in and out of this ‘ not sure ’ category , ” said Berinsky .
There are a number of reasons why the birther myth remains so tenacious even in the face of hard evidence , according to Tali Sharot , a cognitive neuroscientist at University College London who studies how emotions influence people ’ s beliefs .
Sharot said myths are shored up by how much a person is motivated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that belief sits with their current worldview .
[ Related : What Trump ’ s Refusal To Concede Says About American Democracy ] “ Most beliefs we have are in fact true .
We believe the sun rises in the morning .
We believe that winter is cold and that if we walk forward we move forward , ” Sharot said .
“ If I come and tell you the sun won ’ t rise in the morning , you don ’ t believe me and you would be right .
It doesn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ belief every time there ’ s a piece of evidence that counters it .
How can you operate in a world where your beliefs are changing every second ?
” With birtherism , many Americans didn ’ t want Obama to be president , so the belief that he was ineligible was a convenient narrative and they were motivated to accept it .
It was also bolstered by racism against the first Black president .
But Sharot said the election fraud myth is likely going to be even more persistent because it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many pieces of disinformation that are harder to discredit .
There ’ s no single document — à la the long-form birth certificate — that can definitively say the election was free and fair .
Trump supporters are highly motivated to believe there was election fraud , because they want their candidate to have won .
Add in that Trump and the GOP establishment continue to spread their fraudulent narrative , and it ’ s understandable that so many Americans think something is wrong .
But even as more information is revealed and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fraud has occurred , it ’ s likely those beliefs will linger for years to come .
“ I think the current situation is going to be much , much worse than birtherism in terms of people believing it , and believing it for the long run , ” Sharot said .
‘ I buy that COVID was a factor in polls underestimating ’ GOP : Nate Silver

A significant number of Americans currently believe the 2020 election was stolen, even though it wasn’t. A Reuters/Ipsos poll last week showed 52 percent of Republicans believe President Trump “rightfully won” the election. But the only “evidence” of election fraud has been widely debunked.
An optimist might think the public will gradually drop this election fraud myth as the Trump campaign’s lawsuits are thrown out, recounts and audits are conducted, and, eventually, Joe Biden is sworn in as president. But we’ve seen Trump try to falsely claim a president is illegitimate before, as he spent years claiming without evidence that President Obama wasn’t born in the United States, and thus ineligible to be president. If this recent saga is anything like the birtherism movement, it’s not going anywhere.
What divided the electorate in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
“If you’re asking if this is going to go away, I would bet a lot of money that it won’t,” said Adam Berinsky, a political scientist at MIT who is working on a book about political conspiracy theories.
Birtherism first emerged in 2008 during Obama’s primary campaign through the now very quaint medium of chain emails. After securing the nomination, Obama’s campaign published a copy of his certification of live birth in Hawaii. Many assumed this would put an end to the myth that he wasn’t born in America. Trump was one of the main people who ensured it did not.
[Related: How Trump Changed America]
In 2011, Trump began aggressively beating the birtherism drum, including via some comments he made at the Conservative Political Action Conference in February. Over the next five years, in media appearances, speeches and on Twitter, Trump repeatedly made false claims that Obama was not born in America. This continued even after Obama released his long-form birth certificate in April 2011, a piece of evidence Trump had demanded.
It wasn’t until Trump’s own campaign for president in 2016 — when his birtherism was thought to be among the reasons he wasn’t polling well among Black Americans — that Trump admitted the obvious truth: Obama was born in the United States. But that admission was brief (the statement lasted less than a minute) and included Trump blaming Hillary Clinton for originating the myth, which isn’t true.
When the birther myth first emerged, there wasn’t much in the way of public opinion polling about it. It wasn’t until Trump revived the conspiracy theory in 2011 that pollsters started to track how much of the public believed it. And over the years, even as more evidence emerged — such as the long-form birth certificate and contemporaneous newspaper announcements — proving Obama was born in the U.S., the belief has persisted. As recently as last year, a YouGov poll found that 34 percent of Americans think it’s “probably true” or “definitely true” that Obama was born in Kenya, as the birther myth often claimed. Among self-identified Republicans, that number was 56 percent.
“There were these temporary dips in birther beliefs when major events happened and news coverage was reminding people of that evidence,” said Brendan Nyhan, a professor of government at Dartmouth College. “But birther misperceptions typically reverted back to their prior levels after that information shock had dissipated.”
Hard evidence of falsehood doesn’t sway birthers Share of respondents who say they believe Obama was born in the United States, or believe he was not born in the United States, 2009-17 Many Americans were wrongly skeptical after Obama was sworn in date pollster Born in U.S. Not Born in U.S. 8/17/09 PPP 62% 25% 9/21/09 PPP 59 23 4/12/10 CBS/NYT 58 20 4/25/10 ABC 77 20 6/3/10 CBS News 63 13 7/21/10 CNN/ORC 71 27 11/15/10 Knowledge Networks 55 15 3/13/11 CNN/ORC 72 25 4/5/11 Fox News 67 24 4/10/11 Pew 55 23 4/20/11 CBS/NYT 57 25 4/23/11 Gallup 57 24 4/26/11 YouGov 55 15 Releasing Obama’s long-form birth certificate in April 2011 didn’t have a lasting effect date pollster Born in U.S. Not Born in U.S. 5/1/11 CNN/ORC 80% 17% 5/1/11 The Washington Post 86 10 5/3/11 YouGov 67 13 5/8/11 Gallup 65 13 1/31/12 YouGov 59 17 7/2/12 YouGov 55 20 9/11/12 AP/GfK 49 39 9/17/12 YouGov 59 21 9/8/15 CNN/ORC 75 13 1/17/16 Morning Consult 48 34 5/9/16 PPP 57 30 Neither did Trump admitting Obama was born in the U.S. in September 2016 date pollster Born in U.S. Not Born in U.S. 9/19/16 YouGov 61% 22% 9/24/16 Selzer 75 11 3/5/17 Morning Consult 57 26 Numbers do not add up to 100 percent because respondents could indicate they were undecided on the matter.
In April 2011, for example, a YouGov poll found that 55 percent of Americans believed Obama was born in the U.S. That was before Obama released his birth certificate. After he released it, the same pollster found that number had climbed to 67 percent. But a year and a half later, the number had dipped again, down to 59 percent.
“If you look at the percentage of people who reject the rumor, it doesn’t really move at all. All of the movement is in and out of this ‘not sure’ category,” said Berinsky.
There are a number of reasons why the birther myth remains so tenacious even in the face of hard evidence, according to Tali Sharot, a cognitive neuroscientist at University College London who studies how emotions influence people’s beliefs. Sharot said myths are shored up by how much a person is motivated to believe them, and how well that belief sits with their current worldview.
[Related: What Trump’s Refusal To Concede Says About American Democracy]
“Most beliefs we have are in fact true. We believe the sun rises in the morning. We believe that winter is cold and that if we walk forward we move forward,” Sharot said. “If I come and tell you the sun won’t rise in the morning, you don’t believe me and you would be right. It doesn’t make sense to change your belief every time there’s a piece of evidence that counters it. How can you operate in a world where your beliefs are changing every second?”
With birtherism, many Americans didn’t want Obama to be president, so the belief that he was ineligible was a convenient narrative and they were motivated to accept it. It was also bolstered by racism against the first Black president. But Sharot said the election fraud myth is likely going to be even more persistent because it’s more personal, and based on many pieces of disinformation that are harder to discredit. There’s no single document — à la the long-form birth certificate — that can definitively say the election was free and fair.
Trump supporters are highly motivated to believe there was election fraud, because they want their candidate to have won. Add in that Trump and the GOP establishment continue to spread their fraudulent narrative, and it’s understandable that so many Americans think something is wrong. But even as more information is revealed and it becomes apparent that no widespread election fraud has occurred, it’s likely those beliefs will linger for years to come.
“I think the current situation is going to be much, much worse than birtherism in terms of people believing it, and believing it for the long run,” Sharot said.
Additional reporting by Mary Radcliffe
‘I buy that COVID was a factor in polls underestimating’ GOP: Nate Silver


fivethirtyeight--2020-11-24--Could Social Alienation Among Some Trump Supporters Help Explain Why Polls Underestimated Trump Agai

Could Social Alienation Among Some Trump Supporters Help Explain Why Polls Underestimated Trump Again?

Donald Trump was once again underestimated by the polls .
On the one hand , this polling error is fairly normal .
We ’ re not talking about huge polling misses , and the polls still “ called ” the election correctly : Joe Biden won .
But that said , it does seem as if polls are still failing to capture some of Trump ’ s support .
There are a number of possible explanations for this , and no definitive answers , but one thing I ’ ve come across in my public opinion research is that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disconnected from society is on the rise .
And these voters disproportionately support Trump .
The idea that some of Trump ’ s supporters are more likely to be disconnected from civic life is hardly a new one .
During the 2016 Republican primary , Yoni Appelbaum at The Atlantic noted that Trump was drawing support disproportionately from those who said they were civically disengaged .
An analysis by Emily Ekins of the conservative-leaning Cato Institute found that despite Trump ’ s continued strong support among white evangelical Protestants , he was actually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t involved in regular religious practice .
Finally , research on the 2016 election by David Shor , a Democratic pollster , echoed what we found in our own pre-election 2020 survey : There was a large swing to Trump among white voters who had low levels of social trust — a group that researchers have found is also less likely to participate in telephone surveys .
In our pre-election survey on the strength of Americans ’ social networks , we found that nearly one in five Americans ( 17 percent ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with , marking a 9 percentage point increase from 2013 .
What ’ s more , we found that these socially disconnected voters were far more likely to view Trump positively and support his reelection than those with more robust personal networks .
Biden was heavily favored by registered voters with larger social networks ( 53 percent to 37 percent ) , but it was Trump who had the edge among voters without any close social contacts ( 45 percent to 39 percent ) .
And this was especially true among white voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , education level , and racial attitudes .
Sixty percent of white voters without anyone in their immediate social network favored Trump , compared to less than half ( 46 percent ) of white voters with more robust social ties .
Of course , the fact that Trump had considerable appeal among those who report feeling socially disconnected is not conclusive proof that these folks were missed in the polls .
In fact , it is really hard to capture these people in the first place : Many who fall into this group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answer a survey .
However , there is good reason to believe that the polls might be missing some of these people who don ’ t have strong social ties .
Social isolation , or the lack of social integration , has long been thought to reduce willingness to participate in surveys .
Americans who feel alienated or isolated from society do not feel compelled to participate in surveys out of a sense of civic obligation .
Researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Hiroshima University have shown that Americans with weaker social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ survey requests and that some survey estimates may be “ systematically biased due to nonparticipation from socially isolated people.
” Our survey was not suited to uncover the reasons for why people didn ’ t participate , but we did find that those with smaller social networks are far less politically engaged .
For example , Americans with at least four social ties are three times more likely than those with none to have contacted an elected official in the last 12 months .
However , there may not be an easy solution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to bolster cooperation might help , as would increasing the duration of the survey field period .
These are standard practices in survey research to increase representation among difficult to reach groups .
But it ’ s not clear at this point whether incentivizing respondents or lengthening the interviewing period would increase participation rates among Americans who are socially isolated .
A 2000 study found that increasing an interview period from five days to eight weeks made little difference in the final results — although perceptions of the Republican Party were more positive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interviewing schedule .
The consequences of this , of course , extend much further than our elections .
When Americans are more distanced from society , they become untethered to local and national institutions andare less invested in their continuing function .
What ’ s more , they are more inclined to distrust political processes and believe they are serving illegitimate ends .
And they may lose faith in the messy and plodding process of democratic change .
A lot of time will be spent over the next few years trying to explain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic and political problems , but we should not forget that political reforms and economic fixes are not going to address more fundamental problems of loneliness and social isolation in this country .
And that may mean we increasingly have less insight into how a growing portion of the country feels .

Donald Trump was once again underestimated by the polls.
On the one hand, this polling error is fairly normal. We’re not talking about huge polling misses, and the polls still “called” the election correctly: Joe Biden won. But that said, it does seem as if polls are still failing to capture some of Trump’s support.
‘I buy that COVID was a factor in polls underestimating’ GOP: Nate Silver
There are a number of possible explanations for this, and no definitive answers, but one thing I’ve come across in my public opinion research is that the share of Americans who are more socially disconnected from society is on the rise. And these voters disproportionately support Trump.
[What We Know About How White and Latino Americans Voted In 2020]
The idea that some of Trump’s supporters are more likely to be disconnected from civic life is hardly a new one. During the 2016 Republican primary, Yoni Appelbaum at The Atlantic noted that Trump was drawing support disproportionately from those who said they were civically disengaged. An analysis by Emily Ekins of the conservative-leaning Cato Institute found that despite Trump’s continued strong support among white evangelical Protestants, he was actually viewed more positively by supporters who weren’t involved in regular religious practice. Finally, research on the 2016 election by David Shor, a Democratic pollster, echoed what we found in our own pre-election 2020 survey: There was a large swing to Trump among white voters who had low levels of social trust — a group that researchers have found is also less likely to participate in telephone surveys.
In our pre-election survey on the strength of Americans’ social networks, we found that nearly one in five Americans (17 percent) reported having no one they were close with, marking a 9 percentage point increase from 2013. What’s more, we found that these socially disconnected voters were far more likely to view Trump positively and support his reelection than those with more robust personal networks. Biden was heavily favored by registered voters with larger social networks (53 percent to 37 percent), but it was Trump who had the edge among voters without any close social contacts (45 percent to 39 percent).
And this was especially true among white voters even after accounting for differences in income, education level, and racial attitudes. Sixty percent of white voters without anyone in their immediate social network favored Trump, compared to less than half (46 percent) of white voters with more robust social ties.
Of course, the fact that Trump had considerable appeal among those who report feeling socially disconnected is not conclusive proof that these folks were missed in the polls. In fact, it is really hard to capture these people in the first place: Many who fall into this group, for instance, wouldn’t answer a survey.
However, there is good reason to believe that the polls might be missing some of these people who don’t have strong social ties. Social isolation, or the lack of social integration, has long been thought to reduce willingness to participate in surveys. Americans who feel alienated or isolated from society do not feel compelled to participate in surveys out of a sense of civic obligation.
Researchers at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Hiroshima University have shown that Americans with weaker social connections are less inclined to cooperate with survey requests and that some survey estimates may be “systematically biased due to nonparticipation from socially isolated people.” Our survey was not suited to uncover the reasons for why people didn’t participate, but we did find that those with smaller social networks are far less politically engaged. For example, Americans with at least four social ties are three times more likely than those with none to have contacted an elected official in the last 12 months.
[Trump Probably Won’t Be The Last Politician To Reject An Election Outcome Without Evidence]
However, there may not be an easy solution to this problem. Providing financial incentives to bolster cooperation might help, as would increasing the duration of the survey field period. These are standard practices in survey research to increase representation among difficult to reach groups. But it’s not clear at this point whether incentivizing respondents or lengthening the interviewing period would increase participation rates among Americans who are socially isolated. A 2000 study found that increasing an interview period from five days to eight weeks made little difference in the final results — although perceptions of the Republican Party were more positive in the survey that included the longer interviewing schedule.
The consequences of this, of course, extend much further than our elections. When Americans are more distanced from society, they become untethered to local and national institutions and are less invested in their continuing function. What’s more, they are more inclined to distrust political processes and believe they are serving illegitimate ends. And they may lose faith in the messy and plodding process of democratic change.
A lot of time will be spent over the next few years trying to explain the country’s growing social, economic and political problems, but we should not forget that political reforms and economic fixes are not going to address more fundamental problems of loneliness and social isolation in this country. And that may mean we increasingly have less insight into how a growing portion of the country feels.
Trump is setting a dangerous precedent for American democracy


fivethirtyeight--2020-11-24--Trump Probably Won’t Be The Last Politician To Reject An Election Outcome Without Evidence

In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses President Trump ’ s continued refusal to concede @ @ @ @ @ the results of the election .
They also consider how the government is responding to @ @ @ @ @ .

Trump Probably Won’t Be The Last Politician To Reject An Election Outcome Without Evidence
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses President Trump’s continued refusal to concede and his attempts to subvert the results of the election. They also consider how the government is responding to rising number of COVID-19 cases.


fivethirtyeight--2020-11-24--What We’ve Learned About The Biden Administration From His Staffing Choices So Far

Last week , President-elect Joe Biden selected many of his top White House aides .
This week , he ’ s announced some top Cabinet and national security posts .
There are many , many jobs left to fill — most notably defense secretary and attorney general — but here ’ s what we ’ re learning so far about Biden , the Biden administration and how he ’ ll govern … It ’ s back to normal — at least as far as Biden ’ s staffing is concerned As expected , Biden is appointing very traditional people , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — except for Biden ’ s immediate predecessor , of course .
President Trump initially picked a chief of staff ( Reince Priebus ) and secretary of state ( Rex Tillerson ) with no prior experience in the federal government and two top White House advisers ( Steve Bannon , Stephen Miller ) whose views were fairly outside of the elite GOP mainstream .
It is unlikely that a President Jeb Bush or Marco Rubio would have named any of those four to those posts .
In contrast , Biden ’ s staff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar jobs in the past and were in line for senior posts if Hillary Clinton had won in 2016 .
Biden ’ s pick for secretary of state , Antony Blinken , for example , was deputy secretary of state under President Barack Obama .
Avril Haines , who will be Biden ’ s director of national intelligence , was the deputy director of the CIA and then deputy national security adviser under Obama .
Nearly every person Biden has named to a very senior role was in a top post in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessarily mean that Biden will wind up carrying out what amounts to Obama ’ s third term ( although that might end up being true ) .
Rather , Biden is naming the most traditionally qualified people for these jobs , as previous presidents have done .
President George W. Bush ’ s first defense secretary ( Donald Rumsfeld ) and secretary of state ( Colin Powell ) had held top jobs in previous GOP administrations .
Obama ’ s first chief of staff ( Rahm Emanuel ) had been a top aide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s first attorney general ( Eric Holder ) had been deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration .
The Atlantic ’ s Graeme Wood captured the ethos of Biden ’ s selections nicely , referring to Blinken and Jake Sullivan , who has been designated to be national security adviser , as “ boring picks who , if you shook them awake and appointed them in the middle of the night at any time in the last decade , could have reported to their new jobs and started work competently by dawn.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ his party ’ s left wing Biden ran to the right of more liberal figures , such as Sens .
Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren , during the Democratic primary .
But he has generally tried to court his party ’ s left wing — more so than House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other senior Democrats , at least .
So Biden ’ s picks , particularly Ron Klain ( chief of staff ) and Janet Yellen ( treasury secretary ) are people who are well-liked by the party ’ s more liberal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrong : Biden is putting together a center-left administration , picking establishment figures who would be unlikely to get the same roles in a Sanders or Warren administration .
And Biden might still choose people for top jobs who more liberal Democrats really hate , most notably Emanuel and former Bill Clinton domestic policy adviser Bruce Reed .
But Biden seems to be trying to find people who are in the midpoint of the Democratic Party , a smart instinct in a party that is fairly fractured at its elite levels ( the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for example ) .
Biden is also trying not to annoy Republicans too much Biden might need some GOP votes to get his Cabinet picks confirmed in the U.S. Senate , so he ’ s trying not to antagonize Republicans too much either .
Susan Rice , who served as the national security adviser for Obama , was rumored to be under consideration to run the State Department .
But some Senate Republicans were already signaling opposition to her , so Blinken was a safer choice .
Democrats would control the Senate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ runoffs on Jan 5 , but there is a decent chance Democrats won ’ t win both ( or either ) of those races .
So Biden seems to be keeping that possibility in mind — none of his selections are anyone Senate Republicans are known to strongly oppose .
( So Republicans ’ potential role in the confirmation process may be pushing Biden ’ s choices right , even as his Democratic Party ’ s progressive wing pushes him left . )
Overall , Biden is living up to his diversity commitments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pick a diverse Cabinet during the campaign and is following through : Alejandro Mayorkas , a Cuban American , would be the first Latino person to serve as Homeland Security secretary ; Yellen would be the first woman to serve as treasury secretary .
Indeed , there are a lot of women in key posts — from White House counsel ( Dana Remus ) to intelligence director ( Haines ) .
Also remember that Vice President-elect Kamala Harris will be the first woman , first Black American and first person of South Asian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said , there ’ s less diversity among the positions with the most power and access to Biden In certain top-level jobs , you are basically guaranteed to speak to the president regularly ( chief of staff , counselor to the president ) or have a lot of decision-making power yourself , whether or not the president speaks to you regularly ( national security adviser , secretary of state ) .
The Biden administration , at least based on the picks so far , will look diverse but may not have much ideological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Women , as I noted earlier , will almost certainly be in top decision-making roles .
But the women chosen so far generally share Biden ’ s more centrist politics .
There isn ’ t an obvious Squad/Warren/Sanders liberal in any top job so far .
And while Biden ’ s picks overall are racially diverse , it ’ s easy to imagine that many key decisions will be made by a mostly white group .
Again , that could change and is based only on his hires so far .
Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So Biden might choose more liberal figures for domestic and economic policy posts , and he could name people of color to powerful posts like attorney general or defense secretary .
So where ’ s all this leave us ?
Overall , Biden looks like he ’ s trying to fulfill his unstated-but-obvious goal of making the U.S. government boring again .
And his picks so far are indeed boringly normal .
In terms of respecting democratic norms and values , that will likely be a very good thing .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as president might not allow him to have a boring presidency .
Biden is a centrist , establishment figure .
He ’ s long been a presence in Washington .
And he ’ s surrounding himself with similar people , many of whom have long histories with Biden himself .
The advantage of such people is that they understand how the government works .
The disadvantage is that Biden ’ s team may not be especially well-equipped to deal with new problems the nation faces , in particular the coronavirus outbreak , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a country growing more aware of its enduring racial divides and other issues that were not as pressing as in 2009 or 1993 .
So Biden is creating a normal team — but the big question is whether normal will work in these very abnormal times .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

Last week, President-elect Joe Biden selected many of his top White House aides. This week, he’s announced some top Cabinet and national security posts. There are many, many jobs left to fill — most notably defense secretary and attorney general — but here’s what we’re learning so far about Biden, the Biden administration and how he’ll govern …
It’s back to normal — at least as far as Biden’s staffing is concerned
As expected, Biden is appointing very traditional people, in the mode of most other presidents — except for Biden’s immediate predecessor, of course. President Trump initially picked a chief of staff (Reince Priebus) and secretary of state (Rex Tillerson) with no prior experience in the federal government and two top White House advisers (Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller) whose views were fairly outside of the elite GOP mainstream. It is unlikely that a President Jeb Bush or Marco Rubio would have named any of those four to those posts.
[Related: The Cabinet Appointments That Really Matter In The Incoming Biden Administration]
In contrast, Biden’s staff is heavy on people who have held similar jobs in the past and were in line for senior posts if Hillary Clinton had won in 2016. Biden’s pick for secretary of state, Antony Blinken, for example, was deputy secretary of state under President Barack Obama. Avril Haines, who will be Biden’s director of national intelligence, was the deputy director of the CIA and then deputy national security adviser under Obama. Nearly every person Biden has named to a very senior role was in a top post in the Obama administration. That doesn’t necessarily mean that Biden will wind up carrying out what amounts to Obama’s third term (although that might end up being true). Rather, Biden is naming the most traditionally qualified people for these jobs, as previous presidents have done. President George W. Bush’s first defense secretary (Donald Rumsfeld) and secretary of state (Colin Powell) had held top jobs in previous GOP administrations. Obama’s first chief of staff (Rahm Emanuel) had been a top aide to President Bill Clinton, and Obama’s first attorney general (Eric Holder) had been deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration.
The Atlantic’s Graeme Wood captured the ethos of Biden’s selections nicely, referring to Blinken and Jake Sullivan, who has been designated to be national security adviser, as “boring picks who, if you shook them awake and appointed them in the middle of the night at any time in the last decade, could have reported to their new jobs and started work competently by dawn.”
Trump is setting a dangerous precedent for American democracy
Biden is trying not to annoy his party’s left wing
Biden ran to the right of more liberal figures, such as Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, during the Democratic primary. But he has generally tried to court his party’s left wing — more so than House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other senior Democrats, at least. So Biden’s picks, particularly Ron Klain (chief of staff) and Janet Yellen (treasury secretary) are people who are well-liked by the party’s more liberal wing.
[What We Know About How White and Latino Americans Voted In 2020]
Don’t get me wrong: Biden is putting together a center-left administration, picking establishment figures who would be unlikely to get the same roles in a Sanders or Warren administration. And Biden might still choose people for top jobs who more liberal Democrats really hate, most notably Emanuel and former Bill Clinton domestic policy adviser Bruce Reed. But Biden seems to be trying to find people who are in the midpoint of the Democratic Party, a smart instinct in a party that is fairly fractured at its elite levels (the Squad vs. the moderates in the House, for example).
Biden is also trying not to annoy Republicans too much
Biden might need some GOP votes to get his Cabinet picks confirmed in the U.S. Senate, so he’s trying not to antagonize Republicans too much either. Susan Rice, who served as the national security adviser for Obama, was rumored to be under consideration to run the State Department. But some Senate Republicans were already signaling opposition to her, so Blinken was a safer choice. Democrats would control the Senate if they win both of the Georgia runoffs on Jan 5, but there is a decent chance Democrats won’t win both (or either) of those races. So Biden seems to be keeping that possibility in mind — none of his selections are anyone Senate Republicans are known to strongly oppose. (So Republicans’ potential role in the confirmation process may be pushing Biden’s choices right, even as his Democratic Party’s progressive wing pushes him left.)
Overall, Biden is living up to his diversity commitments
The former vice president said he would pick a diverse Cabinet during the campaign and is following through: Alejandro Mayorkas, a Cuban American, would be the first Latino person to serve as Homeland Security secretary; Yellen would be the first woman to serve as treasury secretary. Indeed, there are a lot of women in key posts — from White House counsel (Dana Remus) to intelligence director (Haines). Also remember that Vice President-elect Kamala Harris will be the first woman, first Black American and first person of South Asian descent to hold that job.
What divided the electorate in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
That said, there’s less diversity among the positions with the most power and access to Biden
In certain top-level jobs, you are basically guaranteed to speak to the president regularly (chief of staff, counselor to the president) or have a lot of decision-making power yourself, whether or not the president speaks to you regularly (national security adviser, secretary of state). The Biden administration, at least based on the picks so far, will look diverse but may not have much ideological or racial diversity in its top-level decision-making.
Women, as I noted earlier, will almost certainly be in top decision-making roles. But the women chosen so far generally share Biden’s more centrist politics. There isn’t an obvious Squad/Warren/Sanders liberal in any top job so far. And while Biden’s picks overall are racially diverse, it’s easy to imagine that many key decisions will be made by a mostly white group.
Again, that could change and is based only on his hires so far. Biden is far from filling out his team. So Biden might choose more liberal figures for domestic and economic policy posts, and he could name people of color to powerful posts like attorney general or defense secretary.
So where’s all this leave us?
Overall, Biden looks like he’s trying to fulfill his unstated-but-obvious goal of making the U.S. government boring again. And his picks so far are indeed boringly normal.
In terms of respecting democratic norms and values, that will likely be a very good thing. But the nature of the issues Biden will face as president might not allow him to have a boring presidency.
Biden is a centrist, establishment figure. He’s long been a presence in Washington. And he’s surrounding himself with similar people, many of whom have long histories with Biden himself. The advantage of such people is that they understand how the government works. The disadvantage is that Biden’s team may not be especially well-equipped to deal with new problems the nation faces, in particular the coronavirus outbreak, the increasingly anti-democratic tendencies of the Republican Party, a country growing more aware of its enduring racial divides and other issues that were not as pressing as in 2009 or 1993.
So Biden is creating a normal team — but the big question is whether normal will work in these very abnormal times.


fivethirtyeight--2020-11-30--What Makes A One-Term President?

What Makes A One-Term President?

Donald Trump is officially a one-term president , the first to fail a reelection bid in nearly 30 years .
But history shows his loss isn ’ t surprising , given the circumstances .
One-term presidents used to be a lot more common .
Take the period between 1837 ( when Andrew Jackson ’ s second term ended ) and 1860 , for example — no president served more than one term .
And between 1900 and 1932 , we had seven presidents , only one of whom served two full terms .
( Some died in office , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to run for another term . )
But in the modern era , presidents have increasingly left office because term limits prevent them from staying , not because the voters have turned them out .
One of the major questions about one-term presidents is whether their fates are shaped mainly by their actions and political failings , or primarily by conditions beyond their control .
This is , of course , a tricky question to answer , as there are some traits one-term presidents seem to share — a bad economy , poor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to know how much any of those factors are actually within their control .
Let ’ s start with the biggest factor that ties one-term presidents together : a major economic downturn .
Herbert Hoover , who was president at the start of the Great Depression , is perhaps the most extreme example .
It ’ s estimated that unemployment during the Great Depression was around 20 percent or more , and thousands of banks failed .
And although Hoover did take measures to address the crisis , his view that voluntary programs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stabilizing the economy ultimately cost him .
More recent presidents like Jimmy Carter , who was in office during a less severe but still serious economic recession , also paid for it at the ballot box .
Similarly , the same inflation problems that plagued Carter had previously dragged down Gerald Ford , who had lost to Carter four years earlier .
And the rising unemployment in 1992 quickly eroded support for George H.W .
Bush in that year ’ s election , even after he had been quite popular throughout his presidency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a president ’ s reelection bid also hinges on timing .
When a crisis or a recession hits in a reelection year , that tends to spell trouble .
In contrast , Ronald Reagan and Dwight Eisenhower both weathered recessions during their time in office , but those downturns hit a few years before they faced reelection .
So while the coronavirus pandemic was ( and is ) an extraordinary event , the economic crisis it produced actually falls somewhat in line with the situations faced by other one-term presidents .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a positive opinion of Trump ’ s handling of the economy even amid this year ’ s massive layoffs , but public opinion data also suggested that voters were particularly worried about the pandemic .
Furthemore , they generally thought Trump had done a poor job of handling it , making it difficult to untangle the public health crisis from the economic downturn it caused .
There ’ s also the question of how a president leads in a moment of crisis , which has been the downfall of many a one-term president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again , popular memory is especially unforgiving of his handling of the Great Depression .
At the time , his name was attached to camps built by unemployed Americans as shelter when they lost their homes , and a “ Hoover flag ” referred to an empty pocket turned inside out .
Of course , Hoover is an extreme example , but other one-term presidents have experienced a similar fate , earning reputations for being hapless and bumbling in the face of serious challenges .
This has certainly been the case with Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic and , by downplaying the severity of the disease , worsened the partisan divides on how to best combat it .
What ’ s hard , though , in analyzing one-term presidents is knowing just how much any of this is actually within their control .
We know that presidents are not infinitely powerful , especially when it comes to engineering major legislation to address complicated economic problems .
Take Carter .
Economists at the time thought government spending needed to be curtailed to stop inflation , which meant making major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was politically impossible for Carter , as Congress would have resisted and he would have lost support among New Deal Democrats , which were still an important part of the party ’ s coalition .
Political scientist Stephen Skowronek refers to this quandary , which presidents periodically find themselves in , as the “ politics of disjunction ” — circumstances in which a party coalition ( in Carter ’ s case , New Deal Democrats ) has dominated politics for decades , and politicians elected by that coalition feel beholden to the ideas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but those ideas are no longer a good match for addressing the problems facing the country .
Presidents in these situations often try to fix the crises that arise on their watch , but they face serious political limitations in doing so .
Hoover falls into this category as well .
He did engage in some policy experimentation , including the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation , which sought to provide some public support to banks and railroads .
But like Carter , Hoover was caught between pushing the boundaries of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially within his own party , and the reality that much greater change was needed to address the economic crisis .
How does this apply to Trump ?
In one way , we can sort of see how the problems of political feasibility have shaped the stimulus negotiations .
It would have been almost impossible to get congressional Republicans to agree to a big relief bill regardless of who was president .
But it ’ s also hard to say that the White House took the pandemic seriously and was then thwarted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Instead , Trump publicly battled with Democratic governors over whether to reopen some types of businesses , urged the public not to let the virus control their lives ( after being diagnosed with it himself ) , and denied the seriousness of the situation at almost every stage .
This isn ’ t a typical story , even for presidents who mishandled the crises they faced and subsequently lost reelection , which makes it especially hard to answer the question of how much of Trump ’ s failure to be reelected was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much was due to factors beyond his control .
What is interesting here , though , is that in spite of these conditions , Trump was a competitive incumbent .
Both parties benefited from record turnout , and , in the end , he will probably have won about 47 percent of the popular vote , compared to more like 40 percent for Hoover , Carter , and Bush .
Despite Trump ’ s low approval ratings , he didn ’ t face a serious primary challenger either — which also makes his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Carter and Bush .
This last point might give us a clue as to why it ’ s been so long since a president lost reelection .
We ’ ve become more polarized as a county , and as a result , the parties have become more ideologically uniform , making the factional politics that drive primary challengers less likely .
Negative partisanship has also raised the stakes , crowding out the possibilities for a centrist independent candidacy to divide a party .
In fact , the consolidation of party support around presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ George W. Bush and Barack Obama win reelection .
Ultimately , Trump ’ s presidency faced some of the same problems that have brought down other administrations : economic woes and political dissatisfaction with poor leadership .
But he also brought his own political baggage .
And while it might be difficult to disentangle the two , even in today ’ s highly polarized environment , that combination didn ’ t bode well for his reelection chances .

Donald Trump is officially a one-term president, the first to fail a reelection bid in nearly 30 years. But history shows his loss isn’t surprising, given the circumstances.
One-term presidents used to be a lot more common. Take the period between 1837 (when Andrew Jackson’s second term ended) and 1860, for example — no president served more than one term. And between 1900 and 1932, we had seven presidents, only one of whom served two full terms. (Some died in office, some lost reelection, and some chose not to run for another term.) But in the modern era, presidents have increasingly left office because term limits prevent them from staying, not because the voters have turned them out.
Trump is setting a dangerous precedent for American democracy
One of the major questions about one-term presidents is whether their fates are shaped mainly by their actions and political failings, or primarily by conditions beyond their control. This is, of course, a tricky question to answer, as there are some traits one-term presidents seem to share — a bad economy, poor leadership — but it’s hard to know how much any of those factors are actually within their control.
[The Birther Myth Stuck Around For Years. The Election Fraud Myth Might Too.]
Let’s start with the biggest factor that ties one-term presidents together: a major economic downturn. Herbert Hoover, who was president at the start of the Great Depression, is perhaps the most extreme example. It’s estimated that unemployment during the Great Depression was around 20 percent or more, and thousands of banks failed. And although Hoover did take measures to address the crisis, his view that voluntary programs were preferable to direct government involvement in stabilizing the economy ultimately cost him. More recent presidents like Jimmy Carter, who was in office during a less severe but still serious economic recession, also paid for it at the ballot box. Similarly, the same inflation problems that plagued Carter had previously dragged down Gerald Ford, who had lost to Carter four years earlier. And the rising unemployment in 1992 quickly eroded support for George H.W. Bush in that year’s election, even after he had been quite popular throughout his presidency.
The importance of the economy to a president’s reelection bid also hinges on timing. When a crisis or a recession hits in a reelection year, that tends to spell trouble. In contrast, Ronald Reagan and Dwight Eisenhower both weathered recessions during their time in office, but those downturns hit a few years before they faced reelection.
So while the coronavirus pandemic was (and is) an extraordinary event, the economic crisis it produced actually falls somewhat in line with the situations faced by other one-term presidents. It’s true that many voters still had a positive opinion of Trump’s handling of the economy even amid this year’s massive layoffs, but public opinion data also suggested that voters were particularly worried about the pandemic. Furthemore, they generally thought Trump had done a poor job of handling it, making it difficult to untangle the public health crisis from the economic downturn it caused.
There’s also the question of how a president leads in a moment of crisis, which has been the downfall of many a one-term president. For example, to cite Hoover again, popular memory is especially unforgiving of his handling of the Great Depression. At the time, his name was attached to camps built by unemployed Americans as shelter when they lost their homes, and a “Hoover flag” referred to an empty pocket turned inside out. Of course, Hoover is an extreme example, but other one-term presidents have experienced a similar fate, earning reputations for being hapless and bumbling in the face of serious challenges. This has certainly been the case with Trump, who is thought to have mismanaged the pandemic and, by downplaying the severity of the disease, worsened the partisan divides on how to best combat it.
What’s hard, though, in analyzing one-term presidents is knowing just how much any of this is actually within their control. We know that presidents are not infinitely powerful, especially when it comes to engineering major legislation to address complicated economic problems. Take Carter. Economists at the time thought government spending needed to be curtailed to stop inflation, which meant making major cuts to government programs, but this was politically impossible for Carter, as Congress would have resisted and he would have lost support among New Deal Democrats, which were still an important part of the party’s coalition.
Political scientist Stephen Skowronek refers to this quandary, which presidents periodically find themselves in, as the “politics of disjunction” — circumstances in which a party coalition (in Carter’s case, New Deal Democrats) has dominated politics for decades, and politicians elected by that coalition feel beholden to the ideas and policies that got them into office, but those ideas are no longer a good match for addressing the problems facing the country.
Presidents in these situations often try to fix the crises that arise on their watch, but they face serious political limitations in doing so. Hoover falls into this category as well. He did engage in some policy experimentation, including the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which sought to provide some public support to banks and railroads. But like Carter, Hoover was caught between pushing the boundaries of what was politically feasible at the time, especially within his own party, and the reality that much greater change was needed to address the economic crisis.
How does this apply to Trump? In one way, we can sort of see how the problems of political feasibility have shaped the stimulus negotiations. It would have been almost impossible to get congressional Republicans to agree to a big relief bill regardless of who was president. But it’s also hard to say that the White House took the pandemic seriously and was then thwarted by politics in Congress or anywhere else. Instead, Trump publicly battled with Democratic governors over whether to reopen some types of businesses, urged the public not to let the virus control their lives (after being diagnosed with it himself), and denied the seriousness of the situation at almost every stage.
[Could Social Alienation Among Some Trump Supporters Help Explain Why Polls Underestimated Trump Again?]
This isn’t a typical story, even for presidents who mishandled the crises they faced and subsequently lost reelection, which makes it especially hard to answer the question of how much of Trump’s failure to be reelected was Trump’s own fault and how much was due to factors beyond his control.
What is interesting here, though, is that in spite of these conditions, Trump was a competitive incumbent. Both parties benefited from record turnout, and, in the end, he will probably have won about 47 percent of the popular vote, compared to more like 40 percent for Hoover, Carter, and Bush. Despite Trump’s low approval ratings, he didn’t face a serious primary challenger either — which also makes his experience different from that of Ford, Carter and Bush.
This last point might give us a clue as to why it’s been so long since a president lost reelection. We’ve become more polarized as a county, and as a result, the parties have become more ideologically uniform, making the factional politics that drive primary challengers less likely. Negative partisanship has also raised the stakes, crowding out the possibilities for a centrist independent candidacy to divide a party. In fact, the consolidation of party support around presidential candidates has arguably even helped incumbents like George W. Bush and Barack Obama win reelection.
Ultimately, Trump’s presidency faced some of the same problems that have brought down other administrations: economic woes and political dissatisfaction with poor leadership. But he also brought his own political baggage. And while it might be difficult to disentangle the two, even in today’s highly polarized environment, that combination didn’t bode well for his reelection chances.
‘I buy that COVID was a factor in polls underestimating’ GOP: Nate Silver


fivethirtyeight--2020-11-30--Politics Podcast: Why Did Down-Ballot Democrats Have Such A Mediocre Showing?

Biden ’ s 2020 electoral map was ultimately a pretty good one for Democrats .
While several states may have been closer than Democrats would have liked , Biden won back the “ blue wall ” states in the Upper Midwest and expanded Democrats ’ map in the Sun Belt .
He also won a record breaking 80 million votes nationally .
Democrats down-ballot can ’ t quite say the same , though .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses the challenges that the party faced in House , Senate and state legislature races @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a good use of polling to survey preferences for the 2024 Republican primary before Trump has even left the White House .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

Biden’s 2020 electoral map was ultimately a pretty good one for Democrats. While several states may have been decided by smaller margins than Democrats would have liked, Biden won back the “blue wall” states in the Upper Midwest and expanded Democrats’ map in the Sun Belt. He also won a record-breaking 80 million votes nationally. Democrats further down the ballot didn’t fare quite as well, though. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses the challenges the party faced in House, Senate and state legislature races. They also ask whether it was a good use of polling to survey preferences for the 2024 Republican primary before Trump has even left the White House.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-01--Democrats’ 2020 House And Senate Map Could Spell Trouble In Future Elections

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses the challenges Democrats faced in House , Senate @ @ @ @ @ and whether it was a good use of polling to survey preferences for the 2024 @ @ @ @ @ has even left the White House .

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses the challenges Democrats faced in House, Senate and state legislature races — and whether it was a good use of polling to survey preferences for the 2024 Republican primary before President Trump has even left the White House.
[Related: There Wasn’t That Much Split-Ticket Voting In 2020]


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-02--There Wasn’t That Much Split-Ticket Voting In 2020

The narrative of the 2020 election is that Joe Biden did pretty well … but down-ballot Democrats , not so much .
And while this is true if you look simply at the results — Republicans defended most of their vulnerable Senate seats and gained several seats in the House — there wasn ’ t actually as much split-ticket voting as you might think .
For decades now , how a person votes for president has become a better and better predictor of how she votes in other races .
As we wrote after the 2018 midterms , the correlation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ base partisanship and how it voted for Senate or House that year was extremely strong .
And the same looks like it was true in 2020 as well .
The chart below shows the difference between Biden ’ s vote share and the Democratic Senate candidate ’ s vote share in the 33 states that held Senate elections contested by both major parties in 2020 .
And as you can see , people largely voted the same way for both president and Senate .
In all but three states , the Democratic Senate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5 percentage points of Biden ’ s .
( Similarly , Republican Senate candidates ’ vote shares were within 5 points of President Trump ’ s in all but three states . )
The Democratic Senate candidate who most outperformed Biden was Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island , who received 66.6 percent of the vote — 7.2 points better than Biden .
But this won ’ t surprise anyone familiar with Rhode Island politics .
An Army veteran and political moderate , Reed has always enjoyed significant crossover support , winning each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 70 percent of the vote .
However , it is perhaps a sign of these highly polarized times that Reed ’ s 2020 vote share was the lowest since he was first elected in 1996 .
( And it might have been even lower if his GOP opponent hadn ’ t been disavowed by the Rhode Island Republican Party after it learned of his 2019 arrest on charges of domestic assault . )
On the other end of the spectrum , the Democratic Senate candidate who most underperformed Biden was Chris Janicek @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the vote even as Biden received 39.3 percent .
The fact that Janicek underperformed Biden isn ’ t that surprising , though , as he was also a seriously flawed candidate .
The Nebraska Democratic Party asked Janicek to drop out after he made sexual comments about one of his campaign staffers in a group text message and ultimately endorsed a write-in candidate instead of him .
However , Republican Sen. Ben Sasse was also a strong incumbent ( he outperformed Trump by more than any Senate Republican in the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s occasional willingness to speak out against Trump may have helped him appeal to Trump-skeptical Republicans in the state .
The last state with a significant amount of split-ticket voting was Maine .
Democrat Sara Gideon did 10.6 points worse than Biden , while Republican Sen. Susan Collins did 7.1 points better than Trump .
Because Maine is a fairly competitive state , that was enough for Collins to win the state even though Trump lost it .
That gives Maine a unique distinction : It is the only state so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same party for president and Senate , something that used to be fairly common .
But this year , Collins was the only candidate whose bipartisan bona fides ( she voted against Trump more often than any other Republican senator , most recently her vote against now-Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett ) were strong enough to pull the trick .
All other Senate races hewed quite close to presidential results — and because this year ’ s Senate races took place largely on Republican turf , that was a big blow to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Before Election Day , Democrats were hopeful that strong candidates like Steve Bullock , Jaime Harrison and Barbara Bollier could swim against the partisan tide and pull out wins in Montana , South Carolina and Kansas , respectively .
But for all the money they raised , for all of their theoretical crossover appeal , Bullock ran just 4.6 points ahead of Biden , Harrison just 0.8 points ahead and Bollier just 0.3 points ahead .
As a result , none came particularly close to winning their very red states .
To @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates also underperformed Biden in states where running slightly ahead of him might have been enough to flip a Senate seat or two .
Maine is certainly an obvious example , but this category also includes states like Texas , where Democratic Senate candidate M.J. Hegar ran 2.6 points behind the president-elect ( perhaps because her opponent , Sen. John Cornyn , was more temperamentally palatable to suburban swing voters than Trump was ) , and North Carolina , where Democrat Cal Cunningham ran 1.6 points behind ( perhaps due to his sexting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia with 49.5 percent of the vote , Democrat Jon Ossoff got just 47.9 percent in the regular Senate election , and Democrats in the special election combined for just 48.4 percent — problems Ossoff and Raphael Warnock will need to solve in next month ’ s runoffs .
There was even some Democratic dropoff in Senate races Democrats won , like Colorado and Michigan .
Democrat John Hickenlooper did 1.9 points worse than Biden in the former , and Sen. Gary Peters did 0.7 points worse than Biden in the latter .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the strength of the Republican candidates .
Like Cornyn , Sen. Cory Gardner of Colorado may simply have benefited from being a Republican not named Trump in a once-red state that has zoomed leftward over the last few years .
And in Michigan , John James was probably the GOP ’ s strongest recruit of the cycle ; in a year where Democrats were consistently winning the fundraising battle , he raised more money than Peters in four consecutive quarters .
Again , though , these differences are quite small ; only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vote for anyone but Democrats in the Senate .
And , it turns out , the same is true in the House .
Even though Democrats lost seats in the lower chamber , there were very few people who voted for opposite parties for president and House .
Our second chart shows the difference between Biden ’ s vote share and the Democratic share of the House popular vote in the 44 states where more than 85 percent of House seats were contested by both major parties .
Again , the lack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way the dots bunch around the center line .
Indeed , the Democratic share of the House popular vote was within 5 percentage points of Biden ’ s vote share in every state .
And even though House Democrats did underperform Biden overall ( so far , they have received 50.6 percent of the national House popular vote to Biden ’ s 51.1 percent ) , that 0.5-point difference is nothing to write home about .
Of course , aggregating the House vote at the state or national level could be obscuring some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ split-ticket voting took place .
Ideally , we ’ d compare the results of each House race to the presidential result in that congressional district , but that data is still being calculated .
( Contrary to popular belief , those numbers aren ’ t usually available from official sources ; they have to be calculated by outside analysts after the fact . )
But based on the numbers we do have ( thanks to some fast work by Daily Kos Elections and Bloomberg ’ s Greg Giroux ) , so far it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most districts as well .
And The Atlantic ’ s Ronald Brownstein estimates that Biden carried about 223 House districts — almost exactly the same as the 222-224 seats Democrats will hold in the next Congress .
In seeking to explain why Biden racked up a gaudy electoral-vote total but Democrats performed poorly in the Senate and House , there have been all sorts of theories — one common one being that voters , anticipating a Biden win , preemptively voted Republican for Congress to give Biden some checks and balances .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isn ’ t much evidence for that .
The vast majority of voters voted the same way for president and Congress , and while there were undoubtedly some people who split their tickets between Biden and congressional Republicans , there were also some who split their tickets between Trump and congressional Democrats .
A better take is that Democrats “ performed poorly ” in the Senate and House simply compared with pre-election expectations .
But they still won more House seats than Republicans did , and arguably , the main reason they didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is because of the chamber ’ s Republican bias .
In reality , Democrats performed about the same in all three races , but the structures through which those results were filtered — the Electoral College , the Senate seats that happened to be up and a House map biased toward Republicans — produced different results .

The narrative of the 2020 election is that Joe Biden did pretty well … but down-ballot Democrats, not so much. And while this is true if you look simply at the results — Republicans defended most of their vulnerable Senate seats and gained several seats in the House — there wasn’t actually as much split-ticket voting as you might think.
For decades now, how a person votes for president has become a better and better predictor of how she votes in other races. As we wrote after the 2018 midterms, the correlation between a state or district’s base partisanship and how it voted for Senate or House that year was extremely strong. And the same looks like it was true in 2020 as well.
Why did down-ballot Democrats have such a mediocre showing?
The chart below shows the difference between Biden’s vote share and the Democratic Senate candidate’s vote share in the 33 states that held Senate elections contested by both major parties in 2020. And as you can see, people largely voted the same way for both president and Senate. In all but three states, the Democratic Senate candidate’s vote share was within 5 percentage points of Biden’s. (Similarly, Republican Senate candidates’ vote shares were within 5 points of President Trump’s in all but three states.)
The Democratic Senate candidate who most outperformed Biden was Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, who received 66.6 percent of the vote — 7.2 points better than Biden. But this won’t surprise anyone familiar with Rhode Island politics. An Army veteran and political moderate, Reed has always enjoyed significant crossover support, winning each of his last three elections with more than 70 percent of the vote. However, it is perhaps a sign of these highly polarized times that Reed’s 2020 vote share was the lowest since he was first elected in 1996. (And it might have been even lower if his GOP opponent hadn’t been disavowed by the Rhode Island Republican Party after it learned of his 2019 arrest on charges of domestic assault.)
[Related: Politics Podcast: Why Did Down-Ballot Democrats Have Such A Mediocre Showing?]
On the other end of the spectrum, the Democratic Senate candidate who most underperformed Biden was Chris Janicek in Nebraska, who garnered just 26.2 percent of the vote even as Biden received 39.3 percent. The fact that Janicek underperformed Biden isn’t that surprising, though, as he was also a seriously flawed candidate. The Nebraska Democratic Party asked Janicek to drop out after he made sexual comments about one of his campaign staffers in a group text message and ultimately endorsed a write-in candidate instead of him. However, Republican Sen. Ben Sasse was also a strong incumbent (he outperformed Trump by more than any Senate Republican in the country — 8.9 percentage points). Sasse’s occasional willingness to speak out against Trump may have helped him appeal to Trump-skeptical Republicans in the state.
The last state with a significant amount of split-ticket voting was Maine. Democrat Sara Gideon did 10.6 points worse than Biden, while Republican Sen. Susan Collins did 7.1 points better than Trump. Because Maine is a fairly competitive state, that was enough for Collins to win the state even though Trump lost it. That gives Maine a unique distinction: It is the only state so far that didn’t vote for the same party for president and Senate, something that used to be fairly common. But this year, Collins was the only candidate whose bipartisan bona fides (she voted against Trump more often than any other Republican senator, most recently her vote against now-Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett) were strong enough to pull the trick.
All other Senate races hewed quite close to presidential results — and because this year’s Senate races took place largely on Republican turf, that was a big blow to Democrats’ efforts to flip the chamber. Before Election Day, Democrats were hopeful that strong candidates like Steve Bullock, Jaime Harrison and Barbara Bollier could swim against the partisan tide and pull out wins in Montana, South Carolina and Kansas, respectively. But for all the money they raised, for all of their theoretical crossover appeal, Bullock ran just 4.6 points ahead of Biden, Harrison just 0.8 points ahead and Bollier just 0.3 points ahead. As a result, none came particularly close to winning their very red states.
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To make matters worse for Democrats, their candidates also underperformed Biden in states where running slightly ahead of him might have been enough to flip a Senate seat or two. Maine is certainly an obvious example, but this category also includes states like Texas, where Democratic Senate candidate M.J. Hegar ran 2.6 points behind the president-elect (perhaps because her opponent, Sen. John Cornyn, was more temperamentally palatable to suburban swing voters than Trump was), and North Carolina, where Democrat Cal Cunningham ran 1.6 points behind (perhaps due to his sexting scandal). And despite Biden winning Georgia with 49.5 percent of the vote, Democrat Jon Ossoff got just 47.9 percent in the regular Senate election, and Democrats in the special election combined for just 48.4 percent — problems Ossoff and Raphael Warnock will need to solve in next month’s runoffs.
There was even some Democratic dropoff in Senate races Democrats won, like Colorado and Michigan. Democrat John Hickenlooper did 1.9 points worse than Biden in the former, and Sen. Gary Peters did 0.7 points worse than Biden in the latter. These underperformances may also have been due to the strength of the Republican candidates. Like Cornyn, Sen. Cory Gardner of Colorado may simply have benefited from being a Republican not named Trump in a once-red state that has zoomed leftward over the last few years. And in Michigan, John James was probably the GOP’s strongest recruit of the cycle; in a year where Democrats were consistently winning the fundraising battle, he raised more money than Peters in four consecutive quarters.
Again, though, these differences are quite small; only a tiny fraction of Biden voters cast a vote for anyone but Democrats in the Senate. And, it turns out, the same is true in the House. Even though Democrats lost seats in the lower chamber, there were very few people who voted for opposite parties for president and House.
Our second chart shows the difference between Biden’s vote share and the Democratic share of the House popular vote in the 44 states where more than 85 percent of House seats were contested by both major parties. Again, the lack of split-ticket voting is apparent from the way the dots bunch around the center line. Indeed, the Democratic share of the House popular vote was within 5 percentage points of Biden’s vote share in every state. And even though House Democrats did underperform Biden overall (so far, they have received 50.6 percent of the national House popular vote to Biden’s 51.1 percent), that 0.5-point difference is nothing to write home about.
Of course, aggregating the House vote at the state or national level could be obscuring some individual districts where a significant amount of split-ticket voting took place. Ideally, we’d compare the results of each House race to the presidential result in that congressional district, but that data is still being calculated. (Contrary to popular belief, those numbers aren’t usually available from official sources; they have to be calculated by outside analysts after the fact.) But based on the numbers we do have (thanks to some fast work by Daily Kos Elections and Bloomberg’s Greg Giroux), so far it looks like split-ticket voting was minimal in most districts as well.
And The Atlantic’s Ronald Brownstein estimates that Biden carried about 223 House districts — almost exactly the same as the 222-224 seats Democrats will hold in the next Congress.
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In seeking to explain why Biden racked up a gaudy electoral-vote total but Democrats performed poorly in the Senate and House, there have been all sorts of theories — one common one being that voters, anticipating a Biden win, preemptively voted Republican for Congress to give Biden some checks and balances. But as we have seen, there just isn’t much evidence for that. The vast majority of voters voted the same way for president and Congress, and while there were undoubtedly some people who split their tickets between Biden and congressional Republicans, there were also some who split their tickets between Trump and congressional Democrats.
A better take is that Democrats “performed poorly” in the Senate and House simply compared with pre-election expectations. But they still won more House seats than Republicans did, and arguably, the main reason they didn’t do better in the Senate is because of the chamber’s Republican bias. In reality, Democrats performed about the same in all three races, but the structures through which those results were filtered — the Electoral College, the Senate seats that happened to be up and a House map biased toward Republicans — produced different results.
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