fivethirtyeight--2020-08-19--Women Won The Right To Vote 100 Years Ago. They Didn’t Start Voting Differently From Men Until 1980.

Women officially won the right to vote just a few months before the 1920 presidential election , and as soon as the 19th Amendment was ratified , suffragists were predicting a sea change in American politics .
One activist even proclaimed that “ the women ’ s vote is going to be a tremendous factor in this election.
” And that did happen , eventually .
In the century since women ’ s suffrage , women have transformed our politics — in particular , they ’ ve become a force to be reckoned with inside the Democratic Party .
Of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women — still vote Republican , but in election after election , it is the Democratic Party that has added more women to its ranks .
It was a “ women ’ s wave , ” after all , that swept Democrats into the House in 2018 , including a record number of female Democratic lawmakers .
And this week , Democrats will officially nominate Sen. Kamala Harris as their vice presidential candidate , just the fourth woman to ever be on a major party ’ s presidential ticket .
But it took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become the electoral force that suffragists predicted .
After the passage of the amendment , women were not broadly mobilized , and in many places , women of color continued to face barriers to voting .
This meant that the first women to vote were largely white , wealthy or living in states that made it easier for women to vote .
It wasn ’ t until 1980 , for instance , that equal shares of men and women cast a ballot .
That was also the first election where there was an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to exit polls , that year less than half ( 47 percent ) of women voted for Ronald Reagan compared to 55 percent of men .
And since then , the gap has largely expanded , with women becoming an increasingly large and influential base for Democratic candidates .
“ It ’ s a pretty stunning effect , ” said Elizabeth U. Cascio , an economist at Dartmouth and the co-author of a recent paper on the gender gap .
In her research , she and colleague Na ’ ama Shenhav @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , finding women went from being 10 percentage points less likely to vote than men in the 1940s to being about 4 points more likely to vote in 2016 .
At the same time , she added , women became increasingly likely to identify as Democrats , compared to men .
So what happened to make women turn out at a higher rate than men — and stick with the Democrats while many men have abandoned the party for the Republicans ?
The first question is easier to answer .
It took several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same rate as men , but once they did , they actually became more engaged voters .
Now , it ’ s routine for women to turn out at substantially higher rates than men .
“ It ’ s a story of generational replacement and change , ” said Christina Wolbrecht , a political science professor at the University of Notre Dame and the co-author of “ A Century of Votes for Women : American Elections Since Suffrage.
” Before 1920 , women hadn ’ t just been denied the right to vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and over that voting and politics were for men .
Reliable data about women ’ s voting patterns in the 1920s and 1930s is scarce , but according to Wolbrecht , some women in the years after suffrage never stopped believing that voting simply wasn ’ t their job .
That wasn ’ t how later generations of women saw the world , though .
To most women born in the mid-20th century , voting seemed like an entirely natural thing to do .
By the 1980s , it was so natural , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voting at higher rates than men .
That shift was driven in part by Black women : Despite facing systemic barriers to voting through the mid-1960s , they turned out at rates similar to white men — and only slightly lower than white women — by the mid-1990s .
But that story of generational replacement doesn ’ t explain why women became an increasingly important fixture of the Democratic base , starting with the 1980 election .
Before that year , men ’ s and women ’ s voting patterns looked pretty similar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates for the Republican and Democratic candidates in the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections , for instance .
That ’ s why it was so shocking when in 1980 , an 8-point gender gap emerged between the share of men and women who voted for Reagan , with 55 percent of men backing him but just 47 percent of women .
So what happened ?
Simply put , prior to 1980 , it hadn ’ t been as clear which party was more naturally aligned with most women ’ s views on policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Republican Party took a sharp right turn on a number of issues that mattered to women , including issues like spending on the social safety net , the environment , and the role of government .
( The GOP also opposed the Equal Rights Amendment for the first time that year in its party platform . )
And while a majority of men , who had been increasingly drawn toward the Republicans as the Democrats grew more liberal on issues of race , ended up in Reagan ’ s column , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As the parties became more and more polarized over the next few decades , this gap grew larger too , as women and men ’ s political allegiances continued to drift apart .
“ The issues that women tend to care about have largely been embraced by the Democratic Party , ” Cascio said .
Other factors may have also helped drive this shift .
For starters , several experts told us , women were increasingly likely to join the workforce , particularly in public sector jobs like teaching , which may have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety net .
At the same time , rising divorce rates , declining marriage rates and changing eligibility requirements for social welfare programs like Medicaid made many women more dependent on government support , which may have also drawn them to the Democratic Party , the party increasingly branded as supportive of big government .
And according to a 2017 study , single women are more likely than married women to see themselves as connected to other women , which in turn predicts a more liberal ideology , especially for white and Latina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be liberal regardless of their marital status . )
Black women ’ s support for Democratic candidates was also a crucial part of this shift .
“ Black women have consistently and strongly supported the Democratic Party for decades now , ” said Chaya Crowder , a political science professor at Loyola Marymount University .
But that ’ s not because the Democrats have done a particularly good job of engaging with Black women , or worked to win their votes .
Instead , according to research by Crowder and her co-authors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voting itself as an important and urgent act .
One reason they ’ ve continued to vote Democratic , despite the party ’ s long history of lackluster outreach , is that their policy goals are almost always more aligned with those of the Democrats .
Over the past few years , there ’ s evidence of yet another crucial shift in women ’ s political allegiances too : More white women are moving toward the Democratic Party .
The gender gap in 2018 was the largest in at least two decades , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of white women voting for Democrats than in 2016 .
This year , that trend could accelerate even further , thanks to President Trump ’ s presence on the ballot , the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter protests continuing to unfold around the country .
According to an analysis of likely voters in Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape surveys conducted from July 23 through August 12 , women are much likelier to support Biden over Trump , while men are fairly evenly divided between the two candidates .
Biden is also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — which is noteworthy , because a majority of white women supported Trump in 2016 .
Of course , we ’ re still several months away from the election , and these numbers could change .
But even before the pandemic hit , Trump ’ s lagging support among women sparked speculation that Republicans face a tough road with female voters .
For instance , Trump ’ s favorability among women overall is very low , according to the Nationscape data .
Of likely voters , only 37 percent of women said they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while 56 percent said they have a favorable view of Biden .
Likely male voters , on the other hand , tend to have a rosier view of Trump — 46 percent of men said they have a favorable view of the president — and a less positive impression of Biden .
Just 51 percent of men said they had a favorable view of Biden .
Additionally , several experts told us that there are good reasons to believe that Biden is on track to see record high support among women , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a political science professor at Augusta University who studies the gender gap , told us that for many women , the fallout from the pandemic could underscore their support for a strong government safety net and draw them toward Biden .
Faced with school closures and a historically high unemployment rate , Lizotte said , many women could feel especially inclined to support a party that promises significant government support .
Meanwhile , Erin Cassese , a political science professor at the University of Delaware , said that with Harris on the ballot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prominent issue , as it was in 2016 — which could help widen the gender gap even further .
The Black Lives Matter protests could also galvanize more women to turn out for Biden , according to Lizotte and Crowder , because women have been active in the protests and tend to score lower in racial resentment — a widely used measure in political science to capture racist attitudes — and tend to have more liberal perspectives on issues around race .
One big question , though , is whether women will turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with their kids out of school and the ordinary rhythms of life and work in disarray .
Lizotte said she thinks it ’ s possible that these barriers might deter some women from voting .
But it ’ s even likelier , she said , that women might be more motivated than usual to turn out .
“ These issues are so personal and so dramatic and so likely to affect women , ” she said .
“ Some of those people who haven ’ t been consistent voters might feel like it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And if that happens , women will do a lot to determine the fate of the 2020 election , just a few months into their second century of suffrage .

Women officially won the right to vote just a few months before the 1920 presidential election, and as soon as the 19th Amendment was ratified, suffragists were predicting a sea change in American politics. One activist even proclaimed that “the women’s vote is going to be a tremendous factor in this election.”
And that did happen, eventually. In the century since women’s suffrage, women have transformed our politics — in particular, they’ve become a force to be reckoned with inside the Democratic Party. Of course, many women — especially white women — still vote Republican, but in election after election, it is the Democratic Party that has added more women to its ranks.
It was a “women’s wave,” after all, that swept Democrats into the House in 2018, including a record number of female Democratic lawmakers. And this week, Democrats will officially nominate Sen. Kamala Harris as their vice presidential candidate, just the fourth woman to ever be on a major party’s presidential ticket.
But it took a surprisingly long time for women to become the electoral force that suffragists predicted. After the passage of the amendment, women were not broadly mobilized, and in many places, women of color continued to face barriers to voting. This meant that the first women to vote were largely white, wealthy or living in states that made it easier for women to vote. It wasn’t until 1980, for instance, that equal shares of men and women cast a ballot. That was also the first election where there was an observable gender gap in the presidential vote. According to exit polls, that year less than half (47 percent) of women voted for Ronald Reagan compared to 55 percent of men. And since then, the gap has largely expanded, with women becoming an increasingly large and influential base for Democratic candidates.
“It’s a pretty stunning effect,” said Elizabeth U. Cascio, an economist at Dartmouth and the co-author of a recent paper on the gender gap. In her research, she and colleague Na’ama Shenhav gathered voter turnout data in presidential elections, finding women went from being 10 percentage points less likely to vote than men in the 1940s to being about 4 points more likely to vote in 2016. At the same time, she added, women became increasingly likely to identify as Democrats, compared to men.
So what happened to make women turn out at a higher rate than men — and stick with the Democrats while many men have abandoned the party for the Republicans?
The first question is easier to answer. It took several decades for women to vote at the same rate as men, but once they did, they actually became more engaged voters. Now, it’s routine for women to turn out at substantially higher rates than men.
“It’s a story of generational replacement and change,” said Christina Wolbrecht, a political science professor at the University of Notre Dame and the co-author of “A Century of Votes for Women: American Elections Since Suffrage.” Before 1920, women hadn’t just been denied the right to vote — they had also been told over and over that voting and politics were for men. Reliable data about women’s voting patterns in the 1920s and 1930s is scarce, but according to Wolbrecht, some women in the years after suffrage never stopped believing that voting simply wasn’t their job.
That wasn’t how later generations of women saw the world, though. To most women born in the mid-20th century, voting seemed like an entirely natural thing to do. By the 1980s, it was so natural, in fact, that women were consistently voting at higher rates than men. That shift was driven in part by Black women: Despite facing systemic barriers to voting through the mid-1960s, they turned out at rates similar to white men — and only slightly lower than white women — by the mid-1990s.
But that story of generational replacement doesn’t explain why women became an increasingly important fixture of the Democratic base, starting with the 1980 election. Before that year, men’s and women’s voting patterns looked pretty similar — they voted at almost exactly equal rates for the Republican and Democratic candidates in the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections, for instance. That’s why it was so shocking when in 1980, an 8-point gender gap emerged between the share of men and women who voted for Reagan, with 55 percent of men backing him but just 47 percent of women.
So what happened? Simply put, prior to 1980, it hadn’t been as clear which party was more naturally aligned with most women’s views on policy issues. But in that election cycle, the Republican Party took a sharp right turn on a number of issues that mattered to women, including issues like spending on the social safety net, the environment, and the role of government. (The GOP also opposed the Equal Rights Amendment for the first time that year in its party platform.) And while a majority of men, who had been increasingly drawn toward the Republicans as the Democrats grew more liberal on issues of race, ended up in Reagan’s column, a majority of women did not.
As the parties became more and more polarized over the next few decades, this gap grew larger too, as women and men’s political allegiances continued to drift apart. “The issues that women tend to care about have largely been embraced by the Democratic Party,” Cascio said.
Other factors may have also helped drive this shift. For starters, several experts told us, women were increasingly likely to join the workforce, particularly in public sector jobs like teaching, which may have reinforced their support for a robust government safety net. At the same time, rising divorce rates, declining marriage rates and changing eligibility requirements for social welfare programs like Medicaid made many women more dependent on government support, which may have also drawn them to the Democratic Party, the party increasingly branded as supportive of big government. And according to a 2017 study, single women are more likely than married women to see themselves as connected to other women, which in turn predicts a more liberal ideology, especially for white and Latina women. (Black women tend to be liberal regardless of their marital status.)
Black women’s support for Democratic candidates was also a crucial part of this shift. “Black women have consistently and strongly supported the Democratic Party for decades now,” said Chaya Crowder, a political science professor at Loyola Marymount University. But that’s not because the Democrats have done a particularly good job of engaging with Black women, or worked to win their votes. Instead, according to research by Crowder and her co-authors, Black women are especially likely to see voting itself as an important and urgent act. One reason they’ve continued to vote Democratic, despite the party’s long history of lackluster outreach, is that their policy goals are almost always more aligned with those of the Democrats.
Over the past few years, there’s evidence of yet another crucial shift in women’s political allegiances too: More white women are moving toward the Democratic Party. The gender gap in 2018 was the largest in at least two decades, for instance, with a bigger share of white women voting for Democrats than in 2016.
This year, that trend could accelerate even further, thanks to President Trump’s presence on the ballot, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter protests continuing to unfold around the country. According to an analysis of likely voters in Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape surveys conducted from July 23 through August 12, women are much likelier to support Biden over Trump, while men are fairly evenly divided between the two candidates. Biden is also slightly ahead of Trump among white women — which is noteworthy, because a majority of white women supported Trump in 2016.
There’s a big gender gap for Biden — and Trump Share of male and female likely voters who are supporting Biden and Trump, according to surveys conducted July 23-Aug. 12 Biden Trump race Female Male margin Female Male margin Asian/Pacific Islander 67.3% 62.0% +5.3 24.7% 30.7% -5.9 Black 86.8 76.9 +10.0 6.5 16.7 -10.2 Hispanic 57.8 58.0 -0.2 31.1 35.8 -4.7 White 49.3 40.7 +8.6 45.0 54.7 -9.7 All 56.8 47.9 +8.8 36.3 46.8 -10.5 Source: Democracy fund + UCLA Nationscape
Of course, we’re still several months away from the election, and these numbers could change. But even before the pandemic hit, Trump’s lagging support among women sparked speculation that Republicans face a tough road with female voters. For instance, Trump’s favorability among women overall is very low, according to the Nationscape data. Of likely voters, only 37 percent of women said they had a favorable view of the president, while 56 percent said they have a favorable view of Biden. Likely male voters, on the other hand, tend to have a rosier view of Trump — 46 percent of men said they have a favorable view of the president — and a less positive impression of Biden. Just 51 percent of men said they had a favorable view of Biden.
Additionally, several experts told us that there are good reasons to believe that Biden is on track to see record high support among women, including white women. Mary-Kate Lizotte, a political science professor at Augusta University who studies the gender gap, told us that for many women, the fallout from the pandemic could underscore their support for a strong government safety net and draw them toward Biden. Faced with school closures and a historically high unemployment rate, Lizotte said, many women could feel especially inclined to support a party that promises significant government support. Meanwhile, Erin Cassese, a political science professor at the University of Delaware, said that with Harris on the ballot, sexism is likely to be a prominent issue, as it was in 2016 — which could help widen the gender gap even further.
The Black Lives Matter protests could also galvanize more women to turn out for Biden, according to Lizotte and Crowder, because women have been active in the protests and tend to score lower in racial resentment — a widely used measure in political science to capture racist attitudes — and tend to have more liberal perspectives on issues around race.
One big question, though, is whether women will turn out at high rates this year, with their kids out of school and the ordinary rhythms of life and work in disarray. Lizotte said she thinks it’s possible that these barriers might deter some women from voting.
But it’s even likelier, she said, that women might be more motivated than usual to turn out. “These issues are so personal and so dramatic and so likely to affect women,” she said. “Some of those people who haven’t been consistent voters might feel like it’s actually worth their time.”
And if that happens, women will do a lot to determine the fate of the 2020 election, just a few months into their second century of suffrage.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--What Went Down On The Second Night Of The Democratic National Convention

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fivethirtyeight--2020-08-19--The Democratic Party Wants You To Think It Has 17 Rising Stars

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew reacts to the second night of the 2020 Democratic @ @ @ @ @ the keynote speeches from the rising stars in the party and the virtual roll call @ @ @ @ @ states and territories .

The Democratic Party Wants You To Think It Has 17 Rising Stars
In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew reacts to the second night of the 2020 Democratic National Convention. Highlights include the keynote speeches from the rising stars in the party and the virtual roll call of delegates across the 57 states and territories.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-19--Support For Black Lives Matter Surged During Protests, But Is Waning Among White Americans

The recent protests against police brutality are some of the largest and most widespread in American history .
An estimated 15 million to 26 million Americans have taken to the streets to protest police violence and advocate for Black lives .
The remarkable size and scope of these demonstrations has translated into real policy gains , too .
Dozens of state and local police reforms have been enacted since the protests started .
And at the federal level , President Trump signed an executive order that outlines his administration ’ s priorities for police reform , including creating a national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House of Representatives passed an even more ambitious piece of legislation that proposes a series of reforms , like tying federal funding to bans on chokeholds and setting up a task force to address excessive police force , but the GOP-controlled Senate hasn ’ t taken it up .
Arguably , though , the protests ’ impact on public opinion has been even more immediate and wide-ranging .
Unfavorable views of the police , acknowledgement of widespread discrimination against African Americans and support for Black Lives Matter all jumped up by at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls conducted shortly before and after the protests by both Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape and Civiqs .
These changes in public opinion are being driven in large part by white Americans , who for years have been much less likely than Black Americans to acknowledge that racial inequality remains a real problem .
Since the first wave of large-scale Black Lives Matter protests in 2014 , white Americans ’ racial attitudes have gradually become more liberalized while Black Americans ’ views have remained relatively steady .
Trump ’ s many offensive statements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as they seem to be driving Democrats , particularly white Democrats , to adopt more liberal views on race in response .
That ’ s one reason so many white Democrats showed up at the most recent protests .
But the protests ’ impact on public opinion appears to be fading — particularly among white Americans , as you can see in the chart below .
Black Americans ’ opinions have stayed much steadier , as they have in the past .
Drawing on data from the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that unfavorable views of the police are trending back down toward their pre-protest levels among white Americans and have dipped among Black Americans .
White respondents are also becoming somewhat less likely to say that African Americans face “ a lot ” or “ a great deal ” of discrimination , though those numbers remain higher than they were before before George Floyd was killed in May .
Black Americans ’ views on the discrimination they face have remained essentially unchanged .
The same patterns are evident in tracking surveys from Civiqs and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , white respondents ’ net support ( support minus opposition ) for the Black Lives Matter movement surged from -4 shortly before the protests to +10 in early June , but has since dropped to 6 points underwater .
Meanwhile , Black Americans ’ net support went from +76 in early May to +85 in early June and has remained within a point of that mark ever since .
And in the YouGov/The Economist surveys , the share of white Americans who said racism is a big problem decreased from 45 percent in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was last asked in early August .
Three-quarters of Black Americans , on the other hand , said racism was a big problem in both surveys .
Why , then , do white Americans ’ views on racism and the police seem to be returning to their baseline , but Black Americans ’ views remain steady ?
Well , as media attention turns away from the protests , it may simply be easier for white people to forget about the issue , while the stakes were always greater for Black Americans .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cable news broadcasts from the TV News Archive , we found a huge spike in the number of clips that mentioned “ racism ” or “ Black Lives Matter ” as the protests raged during the first two weeks of June .
But , as you can see in the chart below , the amount of attention cable news paid to racism and the Black Lives Matter movement has dropped as we ’ ve moved farther away from peak protest activity .
( Coverage of these two issues is still higher than it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however . )
This surge and decline in media attention clearly corresponds to changes in public opinion among white Americans , and it ’ s possible that some of the historic gains we ’ ve seen in white views of the Black Lives Matter movement might not last .
This drop is not surprising , since we ’ ve seen it before in how public opinion changes on school shootings , for example .
Because media attention on even the most high-profile mass shootings tends to be fleeting , so are these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And now , white Americans ’ opinion of the Black Lives Matter movement may be following the same trajectory .
That ’ s driving a decline in overall public support even as Black Americans continue to back the movement at very high rates .
This decline in public opinion is consistent with a long line of political science research that tells us that the effects of events on public opinion tend to last only for as long as they are at the forefront of the country ’ s — or , in this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collective consciousness .
That also means that without prolonged activism and sustained media attention , the impact of this year ’ s protests on white public opinion could evaporate entirely .

The recent protests against police brutality are some of the largest and most widespread in American history. An estimated 15 million to 26 million Americans have taken to the streets to protest police violence and advocate for Black lives.
The remarkable size and scope of these demonstrations has translated into real policy gains, too. Dozens of state and local police reforms have been enacted since the protests started. And at the federal level, President Trump signed an executive order that outlines his administration’s priorities for police reform, including creating a national database that catalogues police misconduct. The House of Representatives passed an even more ambitious piece of legislation that proposes a series of reforms, like tying federal funding to bans on chokeholds and setting up a task force to address excessive police force, but the GOP-controlled Senate hasn’t taken it up.
Arguably, though, the protests’ impact on public opinion has been even more immediate and wide-ranging. Unfavorable views of the police, acknowledgement of widespread discrimination against African Americans and support for Black Lives Matter all jumped up by at least 10 percentage points, according to tracking polls conducted shortly before and after the protests by both Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape and Civiqs.
These changes in public opinion are being driven in large part by white Americans, who for years have been much less likely than Black Americans to acknowledge that racial inequality remains a real problem. Since the first wave of large-scale Black Lives Matter protests in 2014, white Americans’ racial attitudes have gradually become more liberalized while Black Americans’ views have remained relatively steady.
Trump’s many offensive statements may be contributing to this trend, as they seem to be driving Democrats, particularly white Democrats, to adopt more liberal views on race in response. That’s one reason so many white Democrats showed up at the most recent protests.
But the protests’ impact on public opinion appears to be fading — particularly among white Americans, as you can see in the chart below. Black Americans’ opinions have stayed much steadier, as they have in the past.
Drawing on data from the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape’s weekly tracking surveys, I found that unfavorable views of the police are trending back down toward their pre-protest levels among white Americans and have dipped among Black Americans. White respondents are also becoming somewhat less likely to say that African Americans face “a lot” or “a great deal” of discrimination, though those numbers remain higher than they were before before George Floyd was killed in May. Black Americans’ views on the discrimination they face have remained essentially unchanged.
The same patterns are evident in tracking surveys from Civiqs and YouGov/The Economist. In the Civiqs data, white respondents’ net support (support minus opposition) for the Black Lives Matter movement surged from -4 shortly before the protests to +10 in early June, but has since dropped to 6 points underwater. Meanwhile, Black Americans’ net support went from +76 in early May to +85 in early June and has remained within a point of that mark ever since. And in the YouGov/The Economist surveys, the share of white Americans who said racism is a big problem decreased from 45 percent in June to 33 percent when the question was last asked in early August. Three-quarters of Black Americans, on the other hand, said racism was a big problem in both surveys.
Why, then, do white Americans’ views on racism and the police seem to be returning to their baseline, but Black Americans’ views remain steady? Well, as media attention turns away from the protests, it may simply be easier for white people to forget about the issue, while the stakes were always greater for Black Americans.
In an analysis of closed captioning data of cable news broadcasts from the TV News Archive, we found a huge spike in the number of clips that mentioned “racism” or “Black Lives Matter” as the protests raged during the first two weeks of June. But, as you can see in the chart below, the amount of attention cable news paid to racism and the Black Lives Matter movement has dropped as we’ve moved farther away from peak protest activity. (Coverage of these two issues is still higher than it was prior to Floyd’s death, however.)
This surge and decline in media attention clearly corresponds to changes in public opinion among white Americans, and it’s possible that some of the historic gains we’ve seen in white views of the Black Lives Matter movement might not last.
This drop is not surprising, since we’ve seen it before in how public opinion changes on school shootings, for example. Because media attention on even the most high-profile mass shootings tends to be fleeting, so are these shootings’ effects on public opinion. And now, white Americans’ opinion of the Black Lives Matter movement may be following the same trajectory. That’s driving a decline in overall public support even as Black Americans continue to back the movement at very high rates.
This decline in public opinion is consistent with a long line of political science research that tells us that the effects of events on public opinion tend to last only for as long as they are at the forefront of the country’s — or, in this case, one group’s — collective consciousness. That also means that without prolonged activism and sustained media attention, the impact of this year’s protests on white public opinion could evaporate entirely.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-19--Democrats Weren’t Sure Who They Are On DNC Night 2

Instead of choosing a single rising star to deliver the keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention Tuesday night , @ @ @ @ @ politicians .
In this reaction to Night 2 of the convention , the FiveThirtyEight Politics @ @ @ @ @ Democrats are trying to appeal to and how .

Instead of choosing a single rising star to deliver the keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention Tuesday night, the party highlighted 17 up-and-coming politicians. In this reaction to Night 2 of the convention, the FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast crew discusses who the Democrats are trying to appeal to and how.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--DNC, Day 3: Live Updates And Analysis

DNC, Day 3: Live Updates And Analysis


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-20--Politics Podcast: Harris Makes History At Night 3 Of The DNC

If the guiding wisdom for a running mate is “ do no harm , ” Joe Biden ’ s VP @ @ @ @ @ has so far succeeded .
In this reaction to the third night of the Democratic @ @ @ @ @ Politics podcast crew discusses Harris ’ s speech and asks whether she can go beyond @ @ @ @ @ an asset for the Democrats this fall .

If the guiding wisdom for a running mate is “do no harm,” then Joe Biden’s vice presidential pick, Kamala Harris, has so far succeeded. In this reaction to the third night of the Democratic National Convention, the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses Harris’s speech and asks whether she can go beyond this guiding wisdom and become an asset for the Democrats this fall.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-20--Biden Had To Fight For The Presidential Nomination. But Most VPs Have To.

Aside from the unusual end to the primaries this year — the pandemic , of course , interrupted voting in some of the last key contests — how unique was Joe Biden ’ s experience as a former vice president seeking the presidential nomination ?
Turns out , despite the historically crowded field , his experience wasn ’ t all that unusual .
Most sitting and former vice presidents face some competition for the party nod , but what was unusual about Biden ’ s bid is how much he embraced the idea of being Barack Obama ’ s heir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to translate that into success .
Many VPs have had to distance themselves from the presidents they ’ ve served under , but that wasn ’ t the case with Biden .
So let ’ s take a closer look at how Biden ’ s path to the nomination has resembled that of other VPs and how it has differed .
First of all , sitting and former vice presidents tend to win their party ’ s nomination when they seek it , so in that way , Biden ’ s experience was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Dan Quayle , George H.W .
Bush ’ s vice president , who floated a presidential bid in the 2000 election but dropped out before the voting started . )
Part of the reason why so many vice presidents run for president , especially in recent years — that ’ s 10 of the 13 VPs since the end of World War II ( excluding Vice President Mike Pence ) — is that they have some serious advantages starting out , including widespread name recognition and relevant experience .
They have also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , minimizing the possibility of hidden personal scandals or problematic stances emerging .
However , vice presidents also face a number of disadvantages in the modern nomination system .
For instance , the primary process highlights the ideas , charisma and biography of individual candidates , which is potentially tricky for presidential hopefuls who are closely tied to a previous administration .
Additionally , the process sometimes gives an advantage to those who can claim status as an “ outsider , ” something that ’ s difficult for a sitting or former vice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even for a former vice president , it ’ s not necessarily easy to fend off competitors .
Before Biden , Al Gore was the most recent VP to win his party ’ s nomination , and he did manage to clear the field of any major challengers — former NBA player and New Jersey Sen. Bill Bradley didn ’ t win a single primary — but the fact that Biden faced stiff competition is actually more common than it might seem .
Take Walter Mondale and George H.W .
Bush .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ front-runners — when they entered their respective races , but they still faced stiff competition .
In fact , studies of the 1984 process suggest that it was unpledged superdelegates who helped Mondale defeat Colorado Sen. Gary Hart , who had won 26 contests , including the influential New Hampshire primary .
And even though civil rights leader Jesse Jackson won only a few contests against Mondale , he still drew a significant amount of media attention away from the former vice president due to his charismatic presence and the historic nature of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought the presidency at that time ) .
Likewise , in 1988 , Bush ultimately won the nomination , but not before coming in third in the Iowa caucuses and having some tense debates with Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole .
Therefore , it ’ s not uncommon that Biden ’ s entrance into the contest in April 2019 didn ’ t immediately clear the field .
The number of candidates was unprecedented , but even still , Biden remained a front-runner like Mondale and Bush , never really slipping in the polls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contests were still tough for Biden , and at points , Sen. Bernie Sanders looked as though he might win the nomination , or at least compete with Biden in a long , close contest .
Of course , the South Carolina primary was a major turning point , and then Biden swept Super Tuesday .
After that , he handily won the nomination despite having faced quite a bit of competition in the beginning .
Vice presidents often don ’ t buck the direction of a party , but they can expose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at politics within parties .
And nomination contests featuring vice presidents have not exactly resulted in ideological showdowns , as they tend not to stray too far from their administration ties .
That said , the primary process can still reveal different fault lines in the party .
Take Bradley ’ s brief run against Gore .
He tried to present himself as a progressive alternative to Bill Clinton ’ s vice president .
And while Mondale and Bush were not that different ideologically from their main competitors ( Sens .
Hart and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was large , which meant there was room for other candidates with more ideologically diverse viewpoints , or who represented a specific constituency within the party , to run .
In 1984 , Jackson pushed for racial equality and more left-leaning policies like single-payer health care , for instance .
And in 1988 , evangelical leader Pat Robertson , seeking the Republican nomination , embraced very conservative religious views and positioned himself as a critic of Ronald Reagan ’ s administration from the far right .
That said , Bradley , Jackson and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t see in 2020 .
( Remember Bradley didn ’ t win a single primary , Jackson won only a handful , and Robertson even fewer than that , so their ability to affect the direction of their parties was hobbled . )
The 2020 contest was different , however .
The historically crowded field meant that multiple candidates were able to make claims either to their progressive bona fides or to their more centrist credentials .
In fact , ideology ended up being the biggest distinction between the final two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more so than in previous contests , Sanders ( along with such candidates as Sen. Elizabeth Warren and former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julián Castro ) was able to mount a credible challenge to Biden ’ s claim as the party ’ s ideological standard-bearer .
Yes , Biden built the winning coalition in the end , but it ’ s hard to argue that a more progressive vision for the Democratic Party isn ’ t also part of the conversation now .
Vice presidents typically stick close to the administrations they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaigning tricky Vice presidents must always strike an awkward balance — develop their own political brands while also getting at least some credit for the accomplishments of the administrations they were part of .
And in a nomination battle , it ’ s particularly easy for other candidates to criticize the VP ’ s former administration for not being true enough to its promises and ideological ideals .
For example , in 1988 , Bush was pressed on whether he would raise taxes and whether the Reagan administration was tough enough on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a difficult position because , while facing criticism on the right for the administration ’ s decisions , he had also been brought on the ticket in 1980 as a more moderate presence .
Ultimately , though , Bush pivoted and appealed to the party ’ s increasingly conservative voters and activists , especially on taxes .
In 2000 , Gore ’ s status as Clinton ’ s “ heir apparent ” was enough to win him the nomination , but during the general election , Gore tried to distance himself from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s scandals and because he needed to establish a distinct brand that could answer critics of the administration ’ s policies .
Gore tried to do this by using populist critiques of the economy in his campaign rhetoric , highlighting growing inequality in the U.S. despite the overall strength of the economy .
Ultimately , Gore and Bush both found themselves in difficult situations .
They had to try to build on their respective administrations ’ legacies while also appeasing critics from their parties ’ ideological bases and yet still remain close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the general election .
To say the least , it ’ s a lot to balance .
And arguably , by having to run in a more competitive primary with opponents who embraced ideological views very different from his own , Biden was free of that dilemma .
Throughout the primary , he was able to embrace the idea of carrying on Obama ’ s legacy while also allowing others to criticize Obama ’ s record from the left .
And , as the Democrats ’ platform and policy plans are formulated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has continued to play this role .
That intersection of competition , ideology and connection with the previous administration illustrates one way that Biden differs from recent vice presidents who ’ ve sought the presidential nomination , making it clear that while Biden will be this year ’ s standard-bearer , his vision for the party is not — and does not have to be — the only one .
Instead , Biden is in a unique position to claim the legacy of a popular past president while allowing others to offer competing @ @ @ @ @ @ @

Aside from the unusual end to the primaries this year — the pandemic, of course, interrupted voting in some of the last key contests — how unique was Joe Biden’s experience as a former vice president seeking the presidential nomination?
Turns out, despite the historically crowded field, his experience wasn’t all that unusual. Most sitting and former vice presidents face some competition for the party nod, but what was unusual about Biden’s bid is how much he embraced the idea of being Barack Obama’s heir apparent, and how he was able to translate that into success. Many VPs have had to distance themselves from the presidents they’ve served under, but that wasn’t the case with Biden. So let’s take a closer look at how Biden’s path to the nomination has resembled that of other VPs and how it has differed.
First of all, sitting and former vice presidents tend to win their party’s nomination when they seek it, so in that way, Biden’s experience was perfectly normal. (The recent exception is Dan Quayle, George H.W. Bush’s vice president, who floated a presidential bid in the 2000 election but dropped out before the voting started.)
Most vice presidents run for president … but not all win Vice presidents since 1948 who have run for president, and whether they won their party’s nomination and the subsequent presidential election Vice President Party Won nomination Won pres. election Alben Barkley D Richard Nixon* R ✓ ✓ Lyndon Johnson† D ✓ ✓ Hubert Humphrey D ✓ Gerald Ford† R ✓ Walter Mondale D ✓ George H.W. Bush R ✓ ✓ Dan Quayle R Al Gore D ✓ Joe Biden D ✓ * Nixon lost the first time he ran for president, in 1960, after serving as vice president, but ran again in 1968 and won. † Johnson and Ford both became president upon the death or resignation of their predecessors, so they technically ran as incumbents. Spiro Agnew, Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney didn’t run for president after serving as vice president. This list does not include Vice President Mike Pence, as he could still run for president in the future.
Part of the reason why so many vice presidents run for president, especially in recent years — that’s 10 of the 13 VPs since the end of World War II (excluding Vice President Mike Pence) — is that they have some serious advantages starting out, including widespread name recognition and relevant experience. They have also already been vetted on the national stage, minimizing the possibility of hidden personal scandals or problematic stances emerging.
However, vice presidents also face a number of disadvantages in the modern nomination system. For instance, the primary process highlights the ideas, charisma and biography of individual candidates, which is potentially tricky for presidential hopefuls who are closely tied to a previous administration. Additionally, the process sometimes gives an advantage to those who can claim status as an “outsider,” something that’s difficult for a sitting or former vice president to do.
In other words, even for a former vice president, it’s not necessarily easy to fend off competitors. Before Biden, Al Gore was the most recent VP to win his party’s nomination, and he did manage to clear the field of any major challengers — former NBA player and New Jersey Sen. Bill Bradley didn’t win a single primary — but the fact that Biden faced stiff competition is actually more common than it might seem.
Take Walter Mondale and George H.W. Bush. Both were considered strong prospects — even front-runners — when they entered their respective races, but they still faced stiff competition. In fact, studies of the 1984 process suggest that it was unpledged superdelegates who helped Mondale defeat Colorado Sen. Gary Hart, who had won 26 contests, including the influential New Hampshire primary. And even though civil rights leader Jesse Jackson won only a few contests against Mondale, he still drew a significant amount of media attention away from the former vice president due to his charismatic presence and the historic nature of his candidacy (few Black Americans had sought the presidency at that time). Likewise, in 1988, Bush ultimately won the nomination, but not before coming in third in the Iowa caucuses and having some tense debates with Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole.
Therefore, it’s not uncommon that Biden’s entrance into the contest in April 2019 didn’t immediately clear the field. The number of candidates was unprecedented, but even still, Biden remained a front-runner like Mondale and Bush, never really slipping in the polls all that much. But the early contests were still tough for Biden, and at points, Sen. Bernie Sanders looked as though he might win the nomination, or at least compete with Biden in a long, close contest. Of course, the South Carolina primary was a major turning point, and then Biden swept Super Tuesday. After that, he handily won the nomination despite having faced quite a bit of competition in the beginning.
Vice presidents often don’t buck the direction of a party, but they can expose cracks
Ideology is tricky when we look at politics within parties. And nomination contests featuring vice presidents have not exactly resulted in ideological showdowns, as they tend not to stray too far from their administration ties. That said, the primary process can still reveal different fault lines in the party.
Take Bradley’s brief run against Gore. He tried to present himself as a progressive alternative to Bill Clinton’s vice president. And while Mondale and Bush were not that different ideologically from their main competitors (Sens. Hart and Dole, respectively), the field was large, which meant there was room for other candidates with more ideologically diverse viewpoints, or who represented a specific constituency within the party, to run. In 1984, Jackson pushed for racial equality and more left-leaning policies like single-payer health care, for instance. And in 1988, evangelical leader Pat Robertson, seeking the Republican nomination, embraced very conservative religious views and positioned himself as a critic of Ronald Reagan’s administration from the far right.
That said, Bradley, Jackson and Robertson were sidelined in a way we didn’t see in 2020. (Remember Bradley didn’t win a single primary, Jackson won only a handful, and Robertson even fewer than that, so their ability to affect the direction of their parties was hobbled.) The 2020 contest was different, however. The historically crowded field meant that multiple candidates were able to make claims either to their progressive bona fides or to their more centrist credentials. In fact, ideology ended up being the biggest distinction between the final two candidates, Biden and Sanders. And more so than in previous contests, Sanders (along with such candidates as Sen. Elizabeth Warren and former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julián Castro) was able to mount a credible challenge to Biden’s claim as the party’s ideological standard-bearer.
Yes, Biden built the winning coalition in the end, but it’s hard to argue that a more progressive vision for the Democratic Party isn’t also part of the conversation now.
Vice presidents typically stick close to the administrations they were part of, but that makes campaigning tricky
Vice presidents must always strike an awkward balance — develop their own political brands while also getting at least some credit for the accomplishments of the administrations they were part of.
And in a nomination battle, it’s particularly easy for other candidates to criticize the VP’s former administration for not being true enough to its promises and ideological ideals. For example, in 1988, Bush was pressed on whether he would raise taxes and whether the Reagan administration was tough enough on the Soviet Union. Bush found himself in a difficult position because, while facing criticism on the right for the administration’s decisions, he had also been brought on the ticket in 1980 as a more moderate presence. Ultimately, though, Bush pivoted and appealed to the party’s increasingly conservative voters and activists, especially on taxes.
In 2000, Gore’s status as Clinton’s “heir apparent” was enough to win him the nomination, but during the general election, Gore tried to distance himself from the Clinton administration – both because of Clinton’s scandals and because he needed to establish a distinct brand that could answer critics of the administration’s policies. Gore tried to do this by using populist critiques of the economy in his campaign rhetoric, highlighting growing inequality in the U.S. despite the overall strength of the economy.
Ultimately, Gore and Bush both found themselves in difficult situations. They had to try to build on their respective administrations’ legacies while also appeasing critics from their parties’ ideological bases and yet still remain close enough to the center to be competitive in the general election. To say the least, it’s a lot to balance. And arguably, by having to run in a more competitive primary with opponents who embraced ideological views very different from his own, Biden was free of that dilemma. Throughout the primary, he was able to embrace the idea of carrying on Obama’s legacy while also allowing others to criticize Obama’s record from the left. And, as the Democrats’ platform and policy plans are formulated, the Sanders wing of the party has continued to play this role.
That intersection of competition, ideology and connection with the previous administration illustrates one way that Biden differs from recent vice presidents who’ve sought the presidential nomination, making it clear that while Biden will be this year’s standard-bearer, his vision for the party is not — and does not have to be — the only one. Instead, Biden is in a unique position to claim the legacy of a popular past president while allowing others to offer competing visions of what that legacy means.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-20--How Clinton’s Loss Paved The Way For Biden

After a crowded and lengthy contest for the Democratic presidential nomination , the party fell in line on Super Tuesday , effectively choosing Joe Biden as the best nominee for the 2020 election .
But it would be a stretch to conclude that he was the best competitor in that contest .
His debate performances in 2019 and early 2020 were uneven and punctuated with awkward gaffes .
He changed stances on some high-profile issues .
And he ’ s never been a particularly distinguished public speaker or fundraiser .
Also , unlike other candidates , such as Bernie Sanders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden lacked a passionate following .
So how did he end up defeating everyone else ?
If we want to understand how Biden won the nomination , we first need to understand the Democratic Party in the aftermath of the 2016 election .
Biden won the 2020 nomination , arguably , because of the way Democrats interpreted Hillary Clinton ’ s loss four years ago .
As detailed in my upcoming book , “ Learning from Loss : The Democrats 2016-2020 , ” one of the most consistent and consequential lessons from my @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee members , officeholders , and other party insiders , was a post-election narrative that blamed Clinton ’ s loss on her use of “ identity politics.
” That ’ s obviously a loaded term , but I am using it to refer to Clinton ’ s outreach to women , people of color , the LGBTQIA community , and other marginalized groups during her 2016 campaign .
According to many think pieces published shortly after the election , this is why Clinton lost .
The argument went that by talking about race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ white people from a party they ’ d previously embraced .
In turn , they responded by voting for a candidate who was very explicitly courting them : Donald Trump .
Of course , “ identity politics ” wasn ’ t the only explanation for the surprisingly close results of the 2016 election .
A number of other theories propagated too , including that Clinton campaigned poorly or in the wrong places , that the party ’ s messaging was deficient , and that Russia and other outside actors tipped the scales for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gone to Wisconsin , ” “ Bernie would ’ ve won , ” etc.
, were all common post-election refrains .
These sorts of narratives are common when a party loses , and , in many ways , are ultimately healthy in helping a party decide how to move forward from loss .
An important caveat to these explanations , however , is that they often aren ’ t based on very much hard data .
That is , just because a candidate had a certain message and lost doesn ’ t mean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ message .
In fact , we know that most campaign decisions have pretty modest effects , if any , on actual voting outcomes .
Politicians and parties still crave these narratives , though , especially when they lose .
Winning , explains political scientist Marjorie Hershey , has a “ fairly blunt , conservatizing effect on campaigners.
” As long as they ’ re winning , they ’ re going to assume that whatever they ’ re doing is right , and they ’ ll continue to do it .
Conversely , Hershey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be very open to making changes the next time around , figuring that at least one of the actions they took last time was responsible for their loss .
To understand how these explanations of the 2016 election sat with Democratic Party insiders , I spoke with 65 Democratic activists — including party leaders and staff , campaign workers and donors — in Iowa , New Hampshire , Nevada , South Carolina and Washington , D.C. on a regular basis .
And over the course of these conversations , a pattern emerged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activists I spoke with cited “ identity politics ” as one reason for Clinton ’ s loss .
Now , this doesn ’ t mean this was the only explanation they gave .
In fact , more activists said that the campaign messaging and strategy were defective , or that Clinton herself was to blame .
A separate study I conducted of newspaper coverage in the wake of the 2016 election found that about a third of news stories and op-eds argued that Clinton lost because of her focus on identity politics .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ one way a losing party can reassess its strategy .
If a party believes , for instance , that Clinton lost because she was a bad candidate or because her campaign was flawed , it can pick a different candidate or improve its campaign tactics without needing to dramatically rethink what the party stands for .
But believing Clinton lost because of identity politics is a much harder pill to swallow .
Namely , because accepting that means undermining something many Democrats believe in — the importance of promoting diversity and enhancing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s a long history of this narrative being used to explain loss within the modern Democratic Party , too .
Pretty much any time it has lost at the presidential level , a substantial segment of the party is quick to blame its focus on diversity , and , in turn , urges the party to refocus on working-class white voters , who have been part of the Democratic coalition since the New Deal .
After Walter Mondale ’ s loss to Ronald Reagan in 1984 , for example , Tennessee ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perception is that we are the party that can ’ t say no , that caters to special interests and that does not have the interests of the middle class at heart.
” A national Democratic leader complained about the emphasis the party placed on Black voters , lamenting that “ White Protestant male Democrats are an endangered species.
” The post-2016 environment was no exception , with Democratic leaders warning the party not to abandon the white working class .
Even the Democratic activists and insiders I spoke with who strongly support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advancing underrepresented groups emerged from the 2016 election frightened and confused by its results .
As one New Hampshire activist — a lifelong feminist — told me in early 2017 , “ Based on what happened with Hillary , I think we now need to nominate a man.
” She added , “ [ Former President ] Barack Obama is an incredibly strong man .
He can ’ t do what he did and not be a strong man .
But he didn ’ t project raging masculinity , and I think you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to go up against Trump ] .
I hate to say that … I ’ m gon na get kicked out of the women ’ s club.
” Biden , then , was in many ways a logical choice for a party in this condition .
Surveys among Democratic voters and activists repeatedly showed that , even when they didn ’ t see Biden as their top candidate , they saw him as the most electable , and overall , they prioritized electability to a far greater degree than they had in recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some ways , a relatively easy choice for party insiders — he was broadly popular among the party ’ s voters , performed well in general election matchup polls , was closely tied to the Obama administration as its former VP , and was one of the only candidates who received widespread support from Black voters .
But , at the end of the day , Biden also represented a safe choice for a party that had tried something new in 2016 and , in the eyes of many , had been punished @ @ @

After a crowded and lengthy contest for the Democratic presidential nomination, the party fell in line on Super Tuesday, effectively choosing Joe Biden as the best nominee for the 2020 election. But it would be a stretch to conclude that he was the best competitor in that contest.
His debate performances in 2019 and early 2020 were uneven and punctuated with awkward gaffes. He changed stances on some high-profile issues. And he’s never been a particularly distinguished public speaker or fundraiser. Also, unlike other candidates, such as Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg, Biden lacked a passionate following.
So how did he end up defeating everyone else?
If we want to understand how Biden won the nomination, we first need to understand the Democratic Party in the aftermath of the 2016 election. Biden won the 2020 nomination, arguably, because of the way Democrats interpreted Hillary Clinton’s loss four years ago.
As detailed in my upcoming book, “Learning from Loss: The Democrats 2016-2020,” one of the most consistent and consequential lessons from my conversations with Democratic activists, Democratic National Committee members, officeholders, and other party insiders, was a post-election narrative that blamed Clinton’s loss on her use of “identity politics.”
That’s obviously a loaded term, but I am using it to refer to Clinton’s outreach to women, people of color, the LGBTQIA community, and other marginalized groups during her 2016 campaign. According to many think pieces published shortly after the election, this is why Clinton lost. The argument went that by talking about race and identity bluntly, Clinton excluded working-class white people from a party they’d previously embraced. In turn, they responded by voting for a candidate who was very explicitly courting them: Donald Trump.
Of course, “identity politics” wasn’t the only explanation for the surprisingly close results of the 2016 election. A number of other theories propagated too, including that Clinton campaigned poorly or in the wrong places, that the party’s messaging was deficient, and that Russia and other outside actors tipped the scales for Trump. “She should’ve gone to Wisconsin,” “Bernie would’ve won,” etc., were all common post-election refrains. These sorts of narratives are common when a party loses, and, in many ways, are ultimately healthy in helping a party decide how to move forward from loss.
An important caveat to these explanations, however, is that they often aren’t based on very much hard data. That is, just because a candidate had a certain message and lost doesn’t mean that the candidate lost because of that message. In fact, we know that most campaign decisions have pretty modest effects, if any, on actual voting outcomes.
Politicians and parties still crave these narratives, though, especially when they lose. Winning, explains political scientist Marjorie Hershey, has a “fairly blunt, conservatizing effect on campaigners.” As long as they’re winning, they’re going to assume that whatever they’re doing is right, and they’ll continue to do it. Conversely, Hershey argues, those who lose an election will be very open to making changes the next time around, figuring that at least one of the actions they took last time was responsible for their loss.
To understand how these explanations of the 2016 election sat with Democratic Party insiders, I spoke with 65 Democratic activists — including party leaders and staff, campaign workers and donors — in Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina and Washington, D.C. on a regular basis. And over the course of these conversations, a pattern emerged: Nearly a third of the party activists I spoke with cited “identity politics” as one reason for Clinton’s loss.
Now, this doesn’t mean this was the only explanation they gave. In fact, more activists said that the campaign messaging and strategy were defective, or that Clinton herself was to blame. A separate study I conducted of newspaper coverage in the wake of the 2016 election found that about a third of news stories and op-eds argued that Clinton lost because of her focus on identity politics.
This is significant because post-election narratives are one way a losing party can reassess its strategy. If a party believes, for instance, that Clinton lost because she was a bad candidate or because her campaign was flawed, it can pick a different candidate or improve its campaign tactics without needing to dramatically rethink what the party stands for. But believing Clinton lost because of identity politics is a much harder pill to swallow. Namely, because accepting that means undermining something many Democrats believe in — the importance of promoting diversity and enhancing the power of underrepresented groups.
There’s a long history of this narrative being used to explain loss within the modern Democratic Party, too. Pretty much any time it has lost at the presidential level, a substantial segment of the party is quick to blame its focus on diversity, and, in turn, urges the party to refocus on working-class white voters, who have been part of the Democratic coalition since the New Deal. After Walter Mondale’s loss to Ronald Reagan in 1984, for example, Tennessee’s Democratic Party chair said, “The perception is that we are the party that can’t say no, that caters to special interests and that does not have the interests of the middle class at heart.” A national Democratic leader complained about the emphasis the party placed on Black voters, lamenting that “White Protestant male Democrats are an endangered species.” The post-2016 environment was no exception, with Democratic leaders warning the party not to abandon the white working class.
Even the Democratic activists and insiders I spoke with who strongly support the party’s historical role in advancing underrepresented groups emerged from the 2016 election frightened and confused by its results. As one New Hampshire activist — a lifelong feminist — told me in early 2017, “Based on what happened with Hillary, I think we now need to nominate a man.” She added, “[Former President] Barack Obama is an incredibly strong man. He can’t do what he did and not be a strong man. But he didn’t project raging masculinity, and I think you kind of have to do that [to go up against Trump]. I hate to say that … I’m gonna get kicked out of the women’s club.”
Biden, then, was in many ways a logical choice for a party in this condition.
Surveys among Democratic voters and activists repeatedly showed that, even when they didn’t see Biden as their top candidate, they saw him as the most electable, and overall, they prioritized electability to a far greater degree than they had in recent elections.
Biden was also, in some ways, a relatively easy choice for party insiders — he was broadly popular among the party’s voters, performed well in general election matchup polls, was closely tied to the Obama administration as its former VP, and was one of the only candidates who received widespread support from Black voters. But, at the end of the day, Biden also represented a safe choice for a party that had tried something new in 2016 and, in the eyes of many, had been punished for it.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--What Went Down On Night 3 Of The DNC

What Went Down On Night 3 Of The DNC

What Went Down On Night 3 Of The DNC


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-20--America’s Introduction To Kamala Harris

America’s Introduction To Kamala Harris

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew reacts to the third night of the 2020 Democratic @ @ @ @ @ speeches from former President Barack Obama and vice presidential nominee Kamala Harris .

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew reacts to the third night of the 2020 Democratic National Convention, which included speeches from former President Barack Obama and vice presidential nominee Kamala Harris.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--DNC, Day 4: Live Updates And Analysis

DNC, Day 4: Live Updates And Analysis


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--What Went Down On The Final Night Of The DNC


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-21--Does Biden Have The Broad Appeal He Thinks He Does?

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew reacts to the fourth and final night of the @ @ @ @ @

Does Biden Have The Broad Appeal He Thinks He Does?
In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew reacts to the fourth and final night of the 2020 Democratic National Convention.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-21--Progressive Groups Are Getting More Selective In Targeting Incumbents. Is It Working?

In 2018 , now-Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ayanna Pressley shocked the political world by unseating 20-year incumbents in their Democratic primaries .
And this year , the trend continued with progressives Marie Newman , Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush winning their own upsets against long-serving congressmen .
Thanks to an increasingly powerful progressive campaign apparatus , there ’ s no question that the left is now an established player in the Democratic Party .
But is it strong enough to rival the political muscle of the party establishment ?
To find out , FiveThirtyEight has once again tracked hundreds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governor primary completed so far this year ( through Aug. 18 ) .
We looked at the win-loss records of the endorsees of eight key Democratic influencers : progressive groups Indivisible , Justice Democrats , Our Revolution and the Progressive Change Campaign Committee ; progressive figures Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Bernie Sanders ; and two arms of the national Democratic Party , the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee .
The result is the most complete picture yet of which wing of the party is doing better at the ballot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may have grabbed all the headlines , the numbers say the party establishment is still king of the hill .
Of the 217 Democratic incumbents who ran in the primaries we analyzed , 214 won or advanced to the general election .
Granted , that includes 19 incumbents — such as Reps. Ilhan Omar , Katie Porter , Rashida Tlaib and Ocasio-Cortez herself — who were supported by one or more of the six progressive endorsers we ’ re tracking .
But in the 17 primaries where progressives ( candidates endorsed by at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ went up against an incumbent , the progressive-backed candidate lost 14 times .
( Newman , Bowman and Bush were the only exceptions . )
In primaries where there wasn ’ t an incumbent on the ballot , progressives did better : 22 wins ( including Mondaire Jones in New York and Kara Eastman in Nebraska ) to 10 losses ( including Charles Booker in Kentucky ) .
That ’ s a 69 percent win rate .
However , the party establishment had even more success : 30 of the 31 candidates ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DCCC supported in incumbent-less primaries advanced to the general election .
The only exception was Senate candidate James Mackler in Tennessee .
Notably , Mackler was the first DSCC-endorsed candidate to lose a primary since 2010 .
These findings — that Democratic voters are generally voting for establishment candidates over insurgents — match what we saw in 2018 .
But that doesn ’ t mean progressive groups haven ’ t made progress in the last two years .
They ’ ve just changed their strategy .
Instead of endorsing dozens of candidates like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are picking their battles more carefully .
For instance , Justice Democrats has endorsed just three candidates in incumbent-less primaries this year , but two of them won .
Endorsing fewer candidates is part of a longer-term approach as the group ’ s political apparatus has grown more sophisticated .
As Alexandra Rojas , executive director of Justice Democrats , told HuffPost , “ We ’ ve been intentional about building infrastructure and an ecosystem that can take on decades worth of the establishment ’ s. ” This means withholding support from candidates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s but who are running in districts where challengers face long odds or where unseating the incumbent in a primary could hand the seat to the GOP in the general .
Certain progressive endorsers are also having more success this cycle .
Sanders has a 75 percent win rate in incumbent-less primaries so far this cycle ( 6 for 8 ) , up from 56 percent ( 5 for 9 ) around this point in 2018 .
And the PCCC has an 83 percent win rate ( 10 for 12 ) , whereas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 10 for 15 ) .
This could reflect that these endorsers ( and their ideas ) enjoy more clout in 2020 than they did in 2018 — or it could just mean they ’ ve become savvier in whom they endorse .
All told , the progressive group with the best win rate so far in primaries without an incumbent is Indivisible ; they ’ ve endorsed 10 candidates in those races , and nine of them have advanced .
Our Revolution has the worst win rate of the progressive endorsers we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also backed more candidates than the other groups ; of the 14 candidates they endorsed , five have advanced to the general .
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez ’ s Courage for Change PAC has a win rate of 50 percent ( 4 for 8 ) .
Of course , part of the difficulty here is that these groups are also endorsing candidates who are challenging incumbents , and incumbency , while not necessarily as potent as it once was , is still a pretty powerful force in American politics .
However , some groups we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In fact , Justice Democrats endorsed more candidates running against incumbents ( five ) than they did candidates in primaries without incumbents ( three ) , reflecting their status as one of the groups most urgently insisting upon drastic change in the halls of Congress .
And , notably , their challengers won three of those races against incumbents — an extremely impressive win rate considering how rarely incumbents lose overall .
Given Justice Democrats ’ success this cycle , Democratic incumbents should probably be expecting more progressive challengers in 2022 : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of candidates like Ocasio-Cortez and Pressley , liberal groups made clear their intention to continue to target incumbent Democrats whose records hadn ’ t kept pace with their districts ’ politics , especially in places where demographic changes favored progressives .
Notably , this was Newman ’ s second challenge against incumbent Rep. Dan Lipinski in Illinois ’ s 3rd District — in 2018 , Lipinski won by about 2,000 votes .
So , long term , the strategy of challenging incumbents could pay dividends for the left .

Progressive Groups Are Getting More Selective In Targeting Incumbents. Is It Working? We tracked candidates’ endorsements in hundreds of races. Here’s what we found.
In 2018, now-Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ayanna Pressley shocked the political world by unseating 20-year incumbents in their Democratic primaries. And this year, the trend continued with progressives Marie Newman, Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush winning their own upsets against long-serving congressmen.
Thanks to an increasingly powerful progressive campaign apparatus, there’s no question that the left is now an established player in the Democratic Party. But is it strong enough to rival the political muscle of the party establishment?
To find out, FiveThirtyEight has once again tracked hundreds of endorsements in every Senate, House and governor primary completed so far this year (through Aug. 18). We looked at the win-loss records of the endorsees of eight key Democratic influencers: progressive groups Indivisible, Justice Democrats, Our Revolution and the Progressive Change Campaign Committee; progressive figures Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Bernie Sanders; and two arms of the national Democratic Party, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. The result is the most complete picture yet of which wing of the party is doing better at the ballot box.
And while the progressive upsets may have grabbed all the headlines, the numbers say the party establishment is still king of the hill. Of the 217 Democratic incumbents who ran in the primaries we analyzed, 214 won or advanced to the general election. Granted, that includes 19 incumbents — such as Reps. Ilhan Omar, Katie Porter, Rashida Tlaib and Ocasio-Cortez herself — who were supported by one or more of the six progressive endorsers we’re tracking. But in the 17 primaries where progressives (candidates endorsed by at least one of these six entities) went up against an incumbent, the progressive-backed candidate lost 14 times. (Newman, Bowman and Bush were the only exceptions.)
Most progressive challengers lost to incumbents How candidates endorsed by Indivisible, Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, the Progressive Change Campaign Committee, Sen. Sanders or Rep. Ocasio-Cortez have fared against incumbents in Democratic primaries for Senate, House and governor, through Aug. 18, 2020 Endorsed by … Candidate Race Indiv. J. Dems Our Rev. PCCC Sanders AOC Result Eva Putzova AZ-01 ✓ Lost Robert Emmons Jr. IL-01 ✓ Lost Marie Newman IL-03 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Won Rachel Ventura IL-11 ✓ Lost Jill Carter MD-07 ✓ Lost Cori Bush MO-01 ✓ ✓ ✓ Won Arati Kreibich NJ-05 ✓ ✓ ✓ Lost Melanie D’Arrigo NY-03 ✓ Lost Adem Bunkeddeko NY-09 ✓ Lost Jamaal Bowman NY-16 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Won Morgan Harper OH-03 ✓ ✓ ✓ Lost Albert Lee OR-03 ✓ Lost Mark Gamba OR-05 ✓ Lost Keeda Haynes TN-05 ✓ ✓ ✓ Lost Jessica Cisneros TX-28 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Lost Jason Call WA-02 ✓ Lost Rebecca Parson WA-06 ✓ Lost Some candidates were endorsed by both progressive and party establishment organizations. Sources: Indivisible, Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, PCCC, Twitter, Courage to Change PAC, Associated Press
In primaries where there wasn’t an incumbent on the ballot, progressives did better: 22 wins (including Mondaire Jones in New York and Kara Eastman in Nebraska) to 10 losses (including Charles Booker in Kentucky). That’s a 69 percent win rate.
Progressives are winning lots of open primaries How candidates endorsed by Indivisible, Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, the Progressive Change Campaign Committee, Sen. Sanders or Rep. Ocasio-Cortez have fared in Democratic primaries for Senate, House and governor where no incumbent was running, through Aug. 18, 2020 Endorsed by … Candidate Race Indiv. J. Dems Our Rev. PCCC Sanders AOC Result Christy Smith CA-25 ✓ Advanced Ammar Campa-Najjar CA-50 ✓ Advanced Georgette Gómez CA-53 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Advanced Andrew Romanoff CO Sen. ✓ Lost Jillian Freeland CO-05 ✓ Won Nabilah Islam GA-07 ✓ ✓ Lost Kai Kahele HI-02 ✓ Won J.D. Scholten IA-04 ✓ Won Paulette Jordan ID Sen. ✓ Won Jim Harper IN-01 ✓ Lost E. Thomasina Marsili IN-08 ✓ Won Charles Booker KY Sen. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Lost Hank Linderman KY-02 ✓ Won Betsy Sweet ME Sen. ✓ ✓ Lost Jon Hoadley MI-06 ✓ Won Tom Winter MT-AL ✓ Lost Kara Eastman NE-02 ✓ ✓ ✓ Won Ben Ray Luján NM Sen. ✓ Won Teresa Leger Fernandez NM-03 ✓ Won Samelys López NY-15 ✓ ✓ ✓ Lost Mondaire Jones NY-17 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Won Dana Balter NY-24 ✓ ✓ Won Daniel Kilgore OH-15 ✓ Lost Renee Hoyos TN-02 ✓ Won Cristina Tzintzún Ramirez TX Sen. ✓ Lost Mike Siegel TX-10 ✓ ✓ ✓ Won Candace Valenzuela TX-24 ✓ Won David Zuckerman VT gov. ✓ ✓ Won Beth Doglio WA-10 ✓ ✓ Advanced Amanda Stuck WI-08 ✓ Won Stephen Smith WV gov. ✓ ✓ Lost Paula Jean Swearengin WV Sen. ✓ Won In California and Washington primaries, the top two finishers, regardless of party, advance to the general election. Some candidates were endorsed by both progressive and party establishment organizations. Sources: Indivisible, Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, PCCC, Twitter, Courage to Change PAC, Associated Press
However, the party establishment had even more success: 30 of the 31 candidates (97 percent) whom the DSCC and DCCC supported in incumbent-less primaries advanced to the general election. The only exception was Senate candidate James Mackler in Tennessee. Notably, Mackler was the first DSCC-endorsed candidate to lose a primary since 2010.
The party decides How candidates supported by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee or Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee have fared in Democratic primaries for Senate, House and governor where no incumbent was running, through Aug. 18, 2020 Candidate Race Result Al Gross AK Sen. Won Alyse Galvin AK-AL Won Mark Kelly AZ Sen. Won Hiral Tipirneni AZ-06 Won Christy Smith CA-25 Advanced John Hickenlooper CO Sen. Won Margaret Good FL-16 Won Theresa Greenfield IA Sen. Won Rita Hart IA-02 Won Betsy Dirksen Londrigan IL-13 Won Christina Hale IN-05 Won Barbara Bollier KS Sen. Won Michelle De La Isla KS-02 Won Amy McGrath KY Sen. Won Sara Gideon ME Sen. Won Hillary Scholten MI-03 Won Jon Hoadley MI-06 Won Dan Feehan MN-01 Won Jill Schupp MO-02 Won Mike Espy MS Sen. Won Kathleen Williams MT-AL Won Cal Cunningham NC Sen. Won Ben Ray Luján NM Sen. Won Jackie Gordon NY-02 Won Eugene DePasquale PA-10 Won Jaime Harrison SC Sen. Won James Mackler TN Sen. Lost MJ Hegar TX Sen. Won Wendy Davis TX-21 Won Gina Ortiz Jones TX-23 Won Carolyn Long WA-03 Advanced In California and Washington primaries, the top two finishers, regardless of party, advance to the general election. Some candidates were endorsed by both progressive and party establishment organizations. Sources: DSCC, DCCC, Associated Press
These findings — that Democratic voters are generally voting for establishment candidates over insurgents — match what we saw in 2018. But that doesn’t mean progressive groups haven’t made progress in the last two years. They’ve just changed their strategy. Instead of endorsing dozens of candidates like they did in 2018, progressive groups are picking their battles more carefully. For instance, Justice Democrats has endorsed just three candidates in incumbent-less primaries this year, but two of them won.
Endorsing fewer candidates is part of a longer-term approach as the group’s political apparatus has grown more sophisticated. As Alexandra Rojas, executive director of Justice Democrats, told HuffPost, “We’ve been intentional about building infrastructure and an ecosystem that can take on decades worth of the establishment’s.” This means withholding support from candidates whose values may match the organization’s but who are running in districts where challengers face long odds or where unseating the incumbent in a primary could hand the seat to the GOP in the general.
Certain progressive endorsers are also having more success this cycle. Sanders has a 75 percent win rate in incumbent-less primaries so far this cycle (6 for 8), up from 56 percent (5 for 9) around this point in 2018. And the PCCC has an 83 percent win rate (10 for 12), whereas two years ago it was 67 percent (10 for 15). This could reflect that these endorsers (and their ideas) enjoy more clout in 2020 than they did in 2018 — or it could just mean they’ve become savvier in whom they endorse.
All told, the progressive group with the best win rate so far in primaries without an incumbent is Indivisible; they’ve endorsed 10 candidates in those races, and nine of them have advanced. Our Revolution has the worst win rate of the progressive endorsers we looked at, but they’ve also backed more candidates than the other groups; of the 14 candidates they endorsed, five have advanced to the general. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Courage for Change PAC has a win rate of 50 percent (4 for 8).
Which progressive endorser has the best record? How candidates endorsed by six progressive figures and groups have fared in Democratic primaries for Senate, House and governor where no incumbent was running, through Aug. 18, 2020 num. endorsed endorsees who won percent Indivisible 10 9 90% PCCC 12 10 83 Sen. Sanders 8 6 75 Justice Dems 3 2 67 Rep. Ocasio-Cortez 8 4 50 Our Revolution 14 5 36 Some candidates were endorsed by both progressive and party establishment organizations. Sources: Indivisible, Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, PCCC, Twitter, Courage to Change PAC, Associated Press
Of course, part of the difficulty here is that these groups are also endorsing candidates who are challenging incumbents, and incumbency, while not necessarily as potent as it once was, is still a pretty powerful force in American politics. However, some groups we analyzed were willing to take the risk. In fact, Justice Democrats endorsed more candidates running against incumbents (five) than they did candidates in primaries without incumbents (three), reflecting their status as one of the groups most urgently insisting upon drastic change in the halls of Congress. And, notably, their challengers won three of those races against incumbents — an extremely impressive win rate considering how rarely incumbents lose overall.
Given Justice Democrats’ success this cycle, Democratic incumbents should probably be expecting more progressive challengers in 2022: After the 2018 midterms and the success of candidates like Ocasio-Cortez and Pressley, liberal groups made clear their intention to continue to target incumbent Democrats whose records hadn’t kept pace with their districts’ politics, especially in places where demographic changes favored progressives. Notably, this was Newman’s second challenge against incumbent Rep. Dan Lipinski in Illinois’s 3rd District — in 2018, Lipinski won by about 2,000 votes. So, long term, the strategy of challenging incumbents could pay dividends for the left.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-21--Politics Podcast: Biden Pitches Himself As The Good Guy

Joe Biden took center stage on the final night of the Democratic National Convention to accept his party ’ s @ @ @ @ @ a late-night taping , the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses his positioning as a “ @ @ @ @ @ appeal to a broad cross-section of Americans .
Will the left reject him ?
And @ @ @ @ @ ?

Joe Biden took center stage on the final night of the Democratic National Convention to accept his party’s nomination for president. In a late-night taping, the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses his positioning as a “good guy” who can appeal to a broad cross-section of Americans. Will the left reject him? And will former Republicans trust him?


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-24--No Sitting President Was As Far Behind As Trump Going Into The Conventions

Welcome to the FiveThirtyEight Election Update for Monday , August 24 !
As of 5 p.m. on Sunday , Joe Biden had a 73 in 100 chance of winning the 2020 presidential election , while President Trump had a 27 in 100 chance .
Biden also has a hefty lead in our forecast of the national popular vote : 53 percent to 46 percent .
This isn ’ t all that different from when we launched the forecast earlier in August , as Biden ’ s lead has been steady for months .
But with the Republican National Convention starting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ having ended last Thursday — we have entered a traditionally volatile period for presidential campaigns .
So we wanted to pause and take stock of where previous races stood ahead of the conventions .
We don ’ t have retroactive data on what our forecast — with all its bells and whistles — would have said in past elections , but we have calculated what our polling averages would have said just before the first party convention .
( You can download this data on our GitHub page if you want to play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ based only on the polls , Biden led nationally by an average of 8.0 percentage points last Sunday ( the day before the Democratic convention began ) .
That was the second-biggest lead for any Democratic candidate heading into the convention period since at least 1968 , and the largest for any candidate since 1996 , when Bill Clinton led by about 15 points .
Undoubtedly , it ’ s a bullish sign for Biden to be this far ahead of Trump .
In fact , since 1968 , no incumbent president has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the first convention .
However , before we get too carried away , the size of Biden ’ s pre-convention lead is unlikely to hold .
After all , two other presidential contenders led by margins similar to Biden ’ s : Jimmy Carter in 1976 and George W. Bush in 2000 , but by November their leads had all but evaporated .
Carter only narrowly beat Gerald Ford by about 2 points nationally , while Bush won the most highly contested election in modern times , which took the U.S. Supreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the final national margin has differed from the pre-convention polling margin by an average of about 5 points .
So if we were to apply that to the 2020 electoral environment , we ’ d be talking about only a 3-point national edge for Biden .
That , of course , would increase the possibility that Trump could win the Electoral College even while losing the national popular vote .
One thing we ’ re watching closely as the GOP convention begins is just how much of a bounce Biden and Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unprecedented virtual convention format , it ’ s hard to know how much of a bounce Trump or Biden will receive , especially considering it ’ s gotten smaller in recent years and the conventions are scheduled back-to-back .
And we ’ ve seen little change in Biden ’ s polling average — he ’ s averaged about 51 percent since last Sunday — and his lead has barely ticked up , going from 8 points to 9 points .
For his part , Trump ’ s standing in the polls also hasn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s slid ever so slightly , from 43 percent to 42 percent — but of course , we haven ’ t gotten that many polls yet either .
Bottom line : Ahead of the Democratic convention , Biden had the largest pre-convention lead in two decades , but past cycles show that the electoral environment can shift quite a bit from the start of the convention period to November .
In other words , this still gives Trump about two and a half months to narrow the gap , although because of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ convention period , it might be a little bit until we have a firmer grasp of where the race stands .

Welcome to the FiveThirtyEight Election Update for Monday, August 24! As of 5 p.m. on Sunday, Joe Biden had a 73 in 100 chance of winning the 2020 presidential election, while President Trump had a 27 in 100 chance. Biden also has a hefty lead in our forecast of the national popular vote: 53 percent to 46 percent.
This isn’t all that different from when we launched the forecast earlier in August, as Biden’s lead has been steady for months. But with the Republican National Convention starting today — and the Democratic National Convention having ended last Thursday — we have entered a traditionally volatile period for presidential campaigns. So we wanted to pause and take stock of where previous races stood ahead of the conventions.
We don’t have retroactive data on what our forecast — with all its bells and whistles — would have said in past elections, but we have calculated what our polling averages would have said just before the first party convention. (You can download this data on our GitHub page if you want to play around with it yourself.) And based only on the polls, Biden led nationally by an average of 8.0 percentage points last Sunday (the day before the Democratic convention began). That was the second-biggest lead for any Democratic candidate heading into the convention period since at least 1968, and the largest for any candidate since 1996, when Bill Clinton led by about 15 points.
Biden’s pre-convention lead was the biggest in two decades What the FiveThirtyEight nationapolling average would have said the day before the first national convention vs. the final election margin, for presidential elections since 1968 Election 1st convention Poll Margin November Margin Difference 1968 R R+4.1 R+0.7 D+3.4 1972 D R+19.6 R+23.2 R+3.6 1976 D D+7.0 D+2.1 R+4.9 1980 R R+4.3 R+9.7 R+5.4 1984 D R+12.2 R+18.2 R+6.1 1988 D D+1.7 R+7.7 R+9.4 1992 D R+2.7 D+5.6 D+8.2 1996 R D+15.3 D+8.5 R+6.8 2000 R R+7.5 D+0.5 D+8.0 2004 D D+1.3 R+2.5 R+3.8 2008 D D+1.5 D+7.3 D+5.7 2012 R D+0.0 D+3.9 D+3.9 2016 R D+2.3 D+2.1 R+0.2 2020 D D+8.0 — — Sources: Polls, Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections
Undoubtedly, it’s a bullish sign for Biden to be this far ahead of Trump. In fact, since 1968, no incumbent president has trailed by as much as Trump heading into the first convention. However, before we get too carried away, the size of Biden’s pre-convention lead is unlikely to hold. After all, two other presidential contenders led by margins similar to Biden’s: Jimmy Carter in 1976 and George W. Bush in 2000, but by November their leads had all but evaporated. Carter only narrowly beat Gerald Ford by about 2 points nationally, while Bush won the most highly contested election in modern times, which took the U.S. Supreme Court to sort out.
Since 1968, the final national margin has differed from the pre-convention polling margin by an average of about 5 points. So if we were to apply that to the 2020 electoral environment, we’d be talking about only a 3-point national edge for Biden. That, of course, would increase the possibility that Trump could win the Electoral College even while losing the national popular vote.
One thing we’re watching closely as the GOP convention begins is just how much of a bounce Biden and Trump receive from the conventions. Given the unprecedented virtual convention format, it’s hard to know how much of a bounce Trump or Biden will receive, especially considering it’s gotten smaller in recent years and the conventions are scheduled back-to-back. And we’ve seen little change in Biden’s polling average — he’s averaged about 51 percent since last Sunday — and his lead has barely ticked up, going from 8 points to 9 points. For his part, Trump’s standing in the polls also hasn’t moved very much — he’s slid ever so slightly, from 43 percent to 42 percent — but of course, we haven’t gotten that many polls yet either.
Bottom line: Ahead of the Democratic convention, Biden had the largest pre-convention lead in two decades, but past cycles show that the electoral environment can shift quite a bit from the start of the convention period to November. In other words, this still gives Trump about two and a half months to narrow the gap, although because of the uncertainty surrounding the polls during the convention period, it might be a little bit until we have a firmer grasp of where the race stands.