fivethirtyeight--2020-09-18--Democrats Are Slight Favorites To Take Back The Senate

Democrats are slight favorites to regain control of the Senate , according to the FiveThirtyEight Senate forecast , which launched today .
But the map is wide open , with at least a dozen competitive races — none of which are certain pickups for Democrats — including some states where Democrats are playing defense .
In fact , while it ’ s possible that Democrats will wind up controlling 54 seats or perhaps even more , the most likely outcome is a much more closely divided chamber , including the possibility of a 50/50 split in which control of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vice president is Kamala Harris or Mike Pence .
( Joe Biden and Harris currently have a 76 percent chance of winning the presidential race , according to our forecast . )
Our Congressional model ( our forecast for House races will be released soon ) is largely the same as the version we built in 2018 , which was quite accurate in predicting the number of Senate and House seats that each party would win .
We ’ ve made a handful of changes since 2018 , most of which were designed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forecast , including assuming that uncertainty is slightly higher this year because of an increase in mail voting under COVID-19 .
But these adjustments don ’ t greatly change the outlook .
For a complete list of changes , see our methodology guide .
As in 2018 , there are three versions of the model , which build on one another and become increasingly complex : The Lite version of the model relies as much as possible on polling .
In races that don ’ t have much or any polling , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ races that have been polled .
The Classic version relies on polling but also incorporates “ fundamentals ” such as fundraising , incumbency and a state ’ s partisan lean relative to the rest of the country .
Finally , the Deluxe version takes all of the above and adds in expert ratings from The Cook Political Report , Inside Elections and Sabato ’ s Crystal Ball .
By default , we ’ re showing you the “ Deluxe ” version of the model this year .
It ’ s supposed to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everything going on — we ’ re inclined to cut to the chase .
But you can toggle between the versions using the magnifying glass icon at the bottom of the page .
You might want to get in the habit of doing this , too , because there are some fairly large differences between the model versions this year .
This reflects the fact that the polling in individual Senate races is generally quite good for Democrats , while other indicators and expert ratings are more equivocal .
For instance , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gives Democrats a 68 percent chance of winning the Senate , as compared to a 64 percent chance in the Classic version and a 58 percent chance in the Deluxe version .
These differences stem from the fact that despite their strong polling , conditions for Democrats are inherently a little challenging in the Senate .
They need to gain a net of three or four seats to win control , depending on if they also win the presidency .
More likely , though , they will need to flip four or five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that one seat will flip from blue to red : Democrat Doug Jones is an underdog to keep his seat in Alabama , which he won against a very bad opponent in a special election in 2017 .
Furthermore , while there are a great many Republicans up for re-election this year , only two of them ( Colorado ’ s Sen. Cory Gardner and Maine ’ s Sen. Susan Collins ) are in states that Hillary Clinton won in 2016 .
Thus , Democrats will have to pick up seats in states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Georgia and North Carolina .
They also have some more ambitious ( but redder ) targets in races in Kansas , South Carolina and Alaska .
National conditions are pretty good for Democrats — they lead on the generic congressional ballot by 6.4 percentage points , and President Trump is fairly unpopular and an underdog for reelection — but they are not spectacular .
( Democrats won the popular vote for the House by nearly 9 points in 2018 , for example , a bigger margin than their current generic-ballot lead .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to defeat Republican incumbents , and even though the incumbency advantage has diminished in recent years , it ’ s rare that you can take much for granted in races featuring incumbents .
Still , the sheer number of plausible Democratic pickup opportunities is surprising — and favorable for the party — given that the conventional wisdom in 2019 was that Democrats might have trouble finding enough targets to take the Senate .
The table below is a list of Republican-held seats where Democrats have at least a 5 percent chance of winning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ model .
There are 16 ( ! )
of these .
In some cases , the model is being exceptionally conservative because of a lack of polling in the state , but the first dozen on the list are realistic pickup opportunities for Democrats .
Democrats ’ single best pickup opportunity is probably in Arizona , where Republican Sen. Martha McSally — who lost to Democrat Kyrsten Sinema in the race for Arizona ’ s other Senate seat two years ago — badly trails Democrat Mark Kelly in polls .
Nor is McSally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ following the death of Sen. John McCain , likely to benefit much from incumbency , as appointed incumbents typically perform much worse than elected ones .
Meanwhile , the two Republicans in Clinton-won states , Gardner and Collins , are also behind in polls .
Still , it may be premature to write their political obituaries , especially for Collins .
She won her last race by a large margin , she has a fairly moderate voting record , Maine only barely voted for Clinton in 2016 , and experts continue to rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ factors that help keep her afloat in our Classic and Deluxe models .
The fourth state where Democrats are currently favored for a pickup is in North Carolina , where Democrat Cal Cunningham , a former state senator , leads Republican incumbent Sen. Thom Tillis in polls and is also a slight favorite according to the “ fundamentals ” our model evaluates .
And troubling for Tillis is that he has some of the hallmarks of a weak incumbent : He only barely won his seat in 2014 , which was a much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face now , and he badly lags Cunningham in fundraising .
Indeed , many Republican incumbents , such as Sens .
Joni Ernst of Iowa , David Perdue of Georgia and Dan Sullivan of Alaska , face some version of this problem , as many of them won by single-digit margins in 2014 , a year when Republicans won the popular vote for the U.S. House by about 6 points .
But this year , the national environment favors Democrats by 6 or 7 points , so that ’ s around a 12-point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ narrow margins last time in the danger zone .
Other Demoratic opportunities are more idiosyncratic .
In Montana , they ’ re hoping to benefit from the personal popularity of Steve Bullock , who is currently the governor there ( although the Republican incumbent is favored in our forecast at the moment ) .
And in South Carolina , Democrat Jaime Harrison has run a surprisingly competitive race against incumbent Sen. Linsday Graham , who once had a reputation for moderation but has now become a major defender of Trump , a shift @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not satisfying voters in either camp .
In addition to Perdue ’ s seat , there is also a second seat open in Georgia , currently held by the appointed incumbent Sen. Kelly Loeffler .
( This special election is unusual , though , in that multiple candidates from both parties will face off on Election Day , and if no one gets a majority , two candidates will move to a runoff in January . )
In an average simulation , our forecast has Democrats picking up about six Republican-held seats in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Classic model and about four and a half in the Deluxe model .
And that would be enough for them to win control of the Senate — even if they fail to capture the presidency .
However , Democrats also have some seats of their own to defend .
Most notably , there is Jones ’ s seat in Alabama .
Running for reelection as a Democrat in one of the reddest states in the country puts him at a disadvantage , and this time around he doesn ’ t have the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who multiple women accused of pursuing sexual relationships with them while they were in their teens .
( Instead , his opponent is the former Auburn football coach Tommy Tuberville . )
But like Collins in Maine , whose chances shift significantly depending on which version of the model you look at , Jones might not be completely done for .
The polls do make it look like Jones is a goner ( hence his low chances in the Lite forecast ) , but the fundamentals — including the fact that he ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a track record of moderation — give Jones an uphill chance at victory .
After Alabama , there is a big drop-off in the likelihood of possible Republican pickups , but their next best chance is probably in Michigan , where John James , who ran a surprisingly vigorous race against Demoratic Sen. Debbie Stabenow in 2018 , is within striking distance of Michigan ’ s other Democratic senator , Gary Peters .
Minnesota , New Mexico and New Hampshire also represent long-shot opportunities for Republicans , although those seats will likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going very badly for Democrats .
So while we know you ’ re tired of hearing this … the outcome is , at this point , uncertain .
There are plausible upside scenarios for Democrats where tight polling margins against incumbents like Graham prove to be the canary in the coal mine for widespread Republican problems , and Biden and Harris get to craft an agenda with as many as 54 or 55 Democratic senators .
At the same time , though , the Senate is probably a heavier lift for Democrats than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for example , that Biden flipped Wisconsin , Michigan , Pennsylvania and Arizona and retained all the states Clinton won , which would imply a solid but not overwhelming margin in the presidential race .
In that scenario , even if every Senate race went the same way as the presidential election , Democrats would still come up one seat short , picking up Maine , Colorado and Arizona but losing Jones ’ s seat in Alabama .
And while it ’ s certainly possible that most of the toss-up races will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidential race , Senate races can be quirky .
Democrats got a mixed set of results in 2018 , for example , picking up seats in Arizona and Nevada — but also seeing four of their incumbents lose .
One thing Democrats don ’ t have to worry about : If they pick up the Senate , it ’ s very likely that they ’ ll have retained the House , too ; Republicans are starting out with a big deficit there and are playing at least as much defense as offense .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the House , but they involve the national climate unexpectedly turning into a Republcian landslide , in which case Democrats won ’ t be competitive in the Senate anyway .
But we ’ ll discuss that more when we release our House forecast .
In the meantime , please drop us a line if you have any questions about the Senate .

Democrats are slight favorites to regain control of the Senate, according to the FiveThirtyEight Senate forecast, which launched today. But the map is wide open, with at least a dozen competitive races — none of which are certain pickups for Democrats — including some states where Democrats are playing defense.
In fact, while it’s possible that Democrats will wind up controlling 54 seats or perhaps even more, the most likely outcome is a much more closely divided chamber, including the possibility of a 50/50 split in which control of the Senate would be determined by whether the vice president is Kamala Harris or Mike Pence. (Joe Biden and Harris currently have a 76 percent chance of winning the presidential race, according to our forecast. )
Our Congressional model (our forecast for House races will be released soon) is largely the same as the version we built in 2018, which was quite accurate in predicting the number of Senate and House seats that each party would win. We’ve made a handful of changes since 2018, most of which were designed to create more consistency with our presidential forecast, including assuming that uncertainty is slightly higher this year because of an increase in mail voting under COVID-19. But these adjustments don’t greatly change the outlook. For a complete list of changes, see our methodology guide.
As in 2018, there are three versions of the model, which build on one another and become increasingly complex:
The Lite version of the model relies as much as possible on polling. In races that don’t have much or any polling, it calculates the candidates’ standing from other races that have been polled.
The Classic version relies on polling but also incorporates “fundamentals” such as fundraising, incumbency and a state’s partisan lean relative to the rest of the country.
Finally, the Deluxe version takes all of the above and adds in expert ratings from The Cook Political Report, Inside Elections and Sabato’s Crystal Ball.
By default, we’re showing you the “Deluxe” version of the model this year. It’s supposed to be the most accurate one and — given everything going on — we’re inclined to cut to the chase. But you can toggle between the versions using the magnifying glass icon at the bottom of the page.
You might want to get in the habit of doing this, too, because there are some fairly large differences between the model versions this year. This reflects the fact that the polling in individual Senate races is generally quite good for Democrats, while other indicators and expert ratings are more equivocal. For instance, the poll-centric Lite version of the model currently gives Democrats a 68 percent chance of winning the Senate, as compared to a 64 percent chance in the Classic version and a 58 percent chance in the Deluxe version.
Model Talk: Democrats are slightly favored to win the Senate | FiveThirtyEight
These differences stem from the fact that despite their strong polling, conditions for Democrats are inherently a little challenging in the Senate. They need to gain a net of three or four seats to win control, depending on if they also win the presidency. More likely, though, they will need to flip four or five Republican-held seats, because chances are good that one seat will flip from blue to red: Democrat Doug Jones is an underdog to keep his seat in Alabama, which he won against a very bad opponent in a special election in 2017.
Furthermore, while there are a great many Republicans up for re-election this year, only two of them (Colorado’s Sen. Cory Gardner and Maine’s Sen. Susan Collins) are in states that Hillary Clinton won in 2016. Thus, Democrats will have to pick up seats in states that have traditionally been Republican-leaning, such as Georgia and North Carolina. They also have some more ambitious (but redder) targets in races in Kansas, South Carolina and Alaska.
National conditions are pretty good for Democrats — they lead on the generic congressional ballot by 6.4 percentage points, and President Trump is fairly unpopular and an underdog for reelection — but they are not spectacular. (Democrats won the popular vote for the House by nearly 9 points in 2018, for example, a bigger margin than their current generic-ballot lead.) Moreover, Democrats are mostly aiming to defeat Republican incumbents, and even though the incumbency advantage has diminished in recent years, it’s rare that you can take much for granted in races featuring incumbents.
Still, the sheer number of plausible Democratic pickup opportunities is surprising — and favorable for the party — given that the conventional wisdom in 2019 was that Democrats might have trouble finding enough targets to take the Senate. The table below is a list of Republican-held seats where Democrats have at least a 5 percent chance of winning in at least one version of our model. There are 16 (!) of these. In some cases, the model is being exceptionally conservative because of a lack of polling in the state, but the first dozen on the list are realistic pickup opportunities for Democrats.
Where Democrats are most likely to pick up Senate seats Republican-held seats where Democrats have at least a 5 percent chance of winning in at least one version of FiveThirtyEight’s model, as of 5 p.m on Sept. 17 Chance a Democrat wins State Incumbent Lite Classic Deluxe Arizona (special) McSally 86% 80% 78% Colorado Gardner 78 71 68 North Carolina Tillis 70 70 61 Maine Collins 75 54 51 Iowa Ernst 48 41 42 Montana Daines 40 32 32 Georgia Perdue 31 27 25 Kansas — 33 28 22 Georgia (special) Loeffler 17 19 17 South Carolina Graham 26 19 15 Alaska Sullivan 22 17 13 Texas Cornyn 15 13 11 Mississippi Hyde-Smith 14 11 5 Kentucky McConnell 7 6 5 Louisiana Cassidy 6 5 3 Tennessee — 11 <1 <1
Democrats’ single best pickup opportunity is probably in Arizona, where Republican Sen. Martha McSally — who lost to Democrat Kyrsten Sinema in the race for Arizona’s other Senate seat two years ago — badly trails Democrat Mark Kelly in polls. Nor is McSally, who was appointed to the seat following the death of Sen. John McCain, likely to benefit much from incumbency, as appointed incumbents typically perform much worse than elected ones.
Meanwhile, the two Republicans in Clinton-won states, Gardner and Collins, are also behind in polls. Still, it may be premature to write their political obituaries, especially for Collins. She won her last race by a large margin, she has a fairly moderate voting record, Maine only barely voted for Clinton in 2016, and experts continue to rate the race as a toss-up, all factors that help keep her afloat in our Classic and Deluxe models.
The fourth state where Democrats are currently favored for a pickup is in North Carolina, where Democrat Cal Cunningham, a former state senator, leads Republican incumbent Sen. Thom Tillis in polls and is also a slight favorite according to the “fundamentals” our model evaluates. And troubling for Tillis is that he has some of the hallmarks of a weak incumbent: He only barely won his seat in 2014, which was a much better political environment than the one Republicans face now, and he badly lags Cunningham in fundraising.
Indeed, many Republican incumbents, such as Sens. Joni Ernst of Iowa, David Perdue of Georgia and Dan Sullivan of Alaska, face some version of this problem, as many of them won by single-digit margins in 2014, a year when Republicans won the popular vote for the U.S. House by about 6 points. But this year, the national environment favors Democrats by 6 or 7 points, so that’s around a 12-point swing, putting Republicans who won by narrow margins last time in the danger zone.
Other Demoratic opportunities are more idiosyncratic. In Montana, they’re hoping to benefit from the personal popularity of Steve Bullock, who is currently the governor there (although the Republican incumbent is favored in our forecast at the moment). And in South Carolina, Democrat Jaime Harrison has run a surprisingly competitive race against incumbent Sen. Linsday Graham, who once had a reputation for moderation but has now become a major defender of Trump, a shift that may mean he’s now not satisfying voters in either camp. In addition to Perdue’s seat, there is also a second seat open in Georgia, currently held by the appointed incumbent Sen. Kelly Loeffler. (This special election is unusual, though, in that multiple candidates from both parties will face off on Election Day, and if no one gets a majority, two candidates will move to a runoff in January.)
In an average simulation, our forecast has Democrats picking up about six Republican-held seats in the Lite model, around five in the Classic model and about four and a half in the Deluxe model. And that would be enough for them to win control of the Senate — even if they fail to capture the presidency.
However, Democrats also have some seats of their own to defend. Most notably, there is Jones’s seat in Alabama. Running for reelection as a Democrat in one of the reddest states in the country puts him at a disadvantage, and this time around he doesn’t have the benefit of running against Roy Moore, who multiple women accused of pursuing sexual relationships with them while they were in their teens. (Instead, his opponent is the former Auburn football coach Tommy Tuberville.) But like Collins in Maine, whose chances shift significantly depending on which version of the model you look at, Jones might not be completely done for. The polls do make it look like Jones is a goner (hence his low chances in the Lite forecast), but the fundamentals — including the fact that he’s raised a lot of money and has a track record of moderation — give Jones an uphill chance at victory.
Where Republicans are most likely to pick up Senate seats Democrat-held seats where Republicans have at least a 5 percent chance of winning in at least one version of FiveThirtyEight’s model, as of 5 p.m. on Sept. 17 Chance a Republican wins State Incumbent Lite Classic Deluxe Alabama Jones 90% 64% 72% Michigan Peters 15 15 17 Minnesota Smith 15 14 7 New Mexico — 13 8 5 New Hampshire Shaheen 5 1 2
After Alabama, there is a big drop-off in the likelihood of possible Republican pickups, but their next best chance is probably in Michigan, where John James, who ran a surprisingly vigorous race against Demoratic Sen. Debbie Stabenow in 2018, is within striking distance of Michigan’s other Democratic senator, Gary Peters. Minnesota, New Mexico and New Hampshire also represent long-shot opportunities for Republicans, although those seats will likely change hands only if the night is going very badly for Democrats.
So while we know you’re tired of hearing this … the outcome is, at this point, uncertain.
There are plausible upside scenarios for Democrats where tight polling margins against incumbents like Graham prove to be the canary in the coal mine for widespread Republican problems, and Biden and Harris get to craft an agenda with as many as 54 or 55 Democratic senators.
At the same time, though, the Senate is probably a heavier lift for Democrats than the presidency. Let’s imagine, for example, that Biden flipped Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Arizona and retained all the states Clinton won, which would imply a solid but not overwhelming margin in the presidential race. In that scenario, even if every Senate race went the same way as the presidential election, Democrats would still come up one seat short, picking up Maine, Colorado and Arizona but losing Jones’s seat in Alabama.
And while it’s certainly possible that most of the toss-up races will break in the same direction as the presidential race, Senate races can be quirky. Democrats got a mixed set of results in 2018, for example, picking up seats in Arizona and Nevada — but also seeing four of their incumbents lose.
One thing Democrats don’t have to worry about: If they pick up the Senate, it’s very likely that they’ll have retained the House, too; Republicans are starting out with a big deficit there and are playing at least as much defense as offense. There are scenarios where Republicans could win the House, but they involve the national climate unexpectedly turning into a Republcian landslide, in which case Democrats won’t be competitive in the Senate anyway. But we’ll discuss that more when we release our House forecast. In the meantime, please drop us a line if you have any questions about the Senate.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-18--2020 Senate Election Forecast

2020 Senate Election Forecast

How the Senate forecast has changed See how each party ’ s forecasted seat total and chances of controlling the @ @ @ @ @ .
The forecast updates at least once a day and whenever we get a new @ @

How the Senate forecast has changed
See how each party’s forecasted seat total and chances of controlling the Senate have changed over time. The forecast updates at least once a day and whenever we get a new poll.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-18--Politics Podcast: Our 2020 Senate Forecast Is Live!

We ’ ve launched our 2020 Senate forecast , and it shows that the Democrats are slightly favored to win @ @ @ @ @ of “ Model Talk ” on the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Nate Silver and Galen @ @ @ @ @ the forecast model makes as well as which races are worth watching .
You can @ @ @ @ @ clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it @ @ @ @ @ App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn @ @ @ @ @ FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show @ @ @ @ @ and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or suggestion for “ good @ @ @ @ @ ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

We’ve launched our 2020 Senate forecast, and it shows that the Democrats are slightly favored to win control. In this episode of “Model Talk” on the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the various considerations the forecast model makes as well as which races are worth watching.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-18--Why Our Forecast Says Democrats Are Slightly Favored To Win The Senate

In this episode of Model Talk , Nate Silver and Galen Druke introduce our 2020 Senate forecast — and answer @ @ @ @

Why Our Forecast Says Democrats Are Slightly Favored To Win The Senate
In this episode of Model Talk, Nate Silver and Galen Druke introduce our 2020 Senate forecast — and answer some listener questions.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-19--What Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Death Could Mean For 2020 And The Supreme Court

Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away on Friday night — a pivotal moment in the history of the nation ’ s highest court .
Ginsburg ’ s death is one of the biggest developments yet in 2020 , a year that has already included the impeachment of the sitting president , a deadly virus killing nearly 200,000 Americans and an economic collapse .
Ginsburg not only reshaped U.S. jurisprudence — in particular , as an advocate for women ’ s rights — but she became a cultural and political icon too , especially for liberals and progressives .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight to fill her seat , may have a number of political implications .
Those will become clearer over the next days and weeks , of course , with the election right around the corner , but here ’ s a first look at what some of those potential implications might be : 1 .
Republicans have to decide whether they will break from their “ no election year confirmations ” stance from 2016 Back in 2016 , when Senate Republicans blocked the nomination of then-President Barack Obama ’ s Supreme Court nominee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Leader Mitch McConnell argued that voters should get to choose the president and that president should get to pick the next justice .
Then-Justice Antonin Scalia died in February 2016 , and Obama nominated Garland that March .
Ginsburg ’ s death comes even closer to the 2020 election — 46 days away .
In all of American history , we have had only two Supreme Court vacancies closer to Election Day than we have now .
In both instances , the incumbent president won reelection and nominated a replacement shortly after Election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actual confirmation , one was confirmed in December , one in March . )
So by historical standards — and , notably , McConnell ’ s own previous standard — Trump would not nominate anyone unless he won a second term in November , since the election is less than two months away .
Back in 2016 , Democrats pushed forward Garland ’ s nomination .
Unsurprisingly , the parties have now flipped their positions .
McConnell said on Friday night that he intends to allow a floor vote to confirm a Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the winner of the election should choose the next justice .
This is a huge opportunity for Republicans — to have six GOP-appointed judges on the court at once .
It is hard to imagine they will pass it up .
It ’ s not guaranteed that 49 of the other 52 Senate Republicans would push forward and support a Trump nominee , particularly if Trump lost the election , but it seems likely .
2 .
It ’ s not clear if a confirmation process could finish before the election .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entire confirmation process in less than 46 days , the time left before the Nov. 3 election .
( The average confirmation process since the Harry Truman administration has lasted 50 days . )
That doesn ’ t mean there isn ’ t enough time for Trump to confirm a new justice , but it would be on the fast side .
Nevertheless , it ’ s possible that sometime in October , a judge has been nominated and perhaps confirmation hearings are taking place , right on the eve of the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loses the election and perhaps Republicans lose control of the Senate , but the lame duck president and some senators who have lost reelection put a justice on the Supreme Court — a move that will enrage Democrats .
Alternatively , Trump could win the election and see a new justice appointed before he even begins his second term .
3 .
Ginsburg ’ s death creates new dynamics if there is an election-related dispute before the Court With a 5-4 GOP majority , Chief Justice John Roberts has been a swing vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Court ’ s Democratic appointees .
Whether the court is 5-3 ( with Ginsburg ’ s seat not filled ) or 6-3 ( with a Trump nominee seated ) , Democrats would need two votes from GOP-appointed justices to win a case .
So if there is some kind of electoral dispute that gets to the court , that ’ s bad news for Democrats .
It raises the specter of a 4-4 tie in a pivotal election-related case , a potential deadlock that could complicate knowing who won the presidential race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Court is now an even bigger electoral issue Both parties already intensely cared about the Supreme Court .
But now , there is the potential for a Supreme Court nomination ( or discussion of an open seat ) in the middle of the election .
For Trump , this choice is a big opportunity in two ways .
First , the Supreme Court nomination process might distract the media and public ’ s attention away from his mistakes in handling the COVID-19 outbreak and give him a way to galvanize conservatives who really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abortion .
Secondly , Trump is struggling in particular with women voters .
Trump may pick a woman to replace Ginsburg and make his nominee part of his pitch to women voters .
Biden , too , would likely need to talk about judicial issues more and perhaps describe the kind of person he would put in this seat .
( He has already promised to nominate a Black woman in the event of a Supreme Court vacancy if he becomes president . )
Also , Democratic vice-presidential nominee Kamala Harris is on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be involved in any kind of confirmation process .
This is also now a big issue in Senate races .
GOP incumbents like Sen. Martha McSally of Arizona and Sen. Susan Collins of Maine may be faced with the choice of irritating GOP voters if they oppose a Trump pick or irritating more moderate voters if they back someone who is viewed as too conservative .
This is a particularly acute issue for Collins , who is struggling in her reelection campaign in part because she backed Trump Supreme Court nominee Brett @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the most divisive elections in America history will now likely be even more tense and fraught .
5. Who Trump chooses is a really big deal Assuming that Trump opts to nominate someone , who he chooses is a really big deal .
With the election looming , does he nominate someone more moderate than he otherwise would have ?
Does he nominate a woman ?
A woman of color ?
Someone with a long record of opinions or someone who is more unknown ?
6 .
If there are six @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law in America could fundamentally move to the right This is the most important implication , even if it is not the most immediate .
If Trump is able to appoint a justice who is similar in ideology to Neil Gorsuch and Kavanagh , his first two picks , it seems likely that abortion and affirmative action could be severely limited in the future , the Affordable Care Act overturned and a host of other conservative rulings issued .
That is not guaranteed , but seems quite possible .
Trump and Republicans putting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or post-election , in the case that he Trump loses , is also likely to trigger an aggressive Democratic response that could have long-lasting implications .
Democratic activists were already floating the idea of increasing the number of justices on the Supreme Court to make up for the Garland seat , and I would expect so-called court-packing ideas to accelerate if Trump puts another conservative justice on the court before or right after he loses a presidential election .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away on Friday night — a pivotal moment in the history of the nation’s highest court. Ginsburg’s death is one of the biggest developments yet in 2020, a year that has already included the impeachment of the sitting president, a deadly virus killing nearly 200,000 Americans and an economic collapse. Ginsburg not only reshaped U.S. jurisprudence — in particular, as an advocate for women’s rights — but she became a cultural and political icon too, especially for liberals and progressives.
Indeed, her death, and the fight to fill her seat, may have a number of political implications. Those will become clearer over the next days and weeks, of course, with the election right around the corner, but here’s a first look at what some of those potential implications might be:
1. Republicans have to decide whether they will break from their “no election year confirmations” stance from 2016
Back in 2016, when Senate Republicans blocked the nomination of then-President Barack Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Merrick Garland, Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell argued that voters should get to choose the president and that president should get to pick the next justice. Then-Justice Antonin Scalia died in February 2016, and Obama nominated Garland that March.
Emergency Podcast: The SCOTUS vacancy | FiveThirtyEight
Ginsburg’s death comes even closer to the 2020 election — 46 days away. In all of American history, we have had only two Supreme Court vacancies closer to Election Day than we have now. In both instances, the incumbent president won reelection and nominated a replacement shortly after Election Day. (In terms of the actual confirmation, one was confirmed in December, one in March.) So by historical standards — and, notably, McConnell’s own previous standard — Trump would not nominate anyone unless he won a second term in November, since the election is less than two months away.
Filling a seat this close to the election is unheard of Supreme Court vacancies in presidential election years, by how many days before the election they occurred and whether a replacement was confirmed before the election Before election, replacement was… Justice Date of Vacancy Days before Election Nominated Confirmed S. Minton Oct. 15, 1956 22 R. Taney Oct. 12, 1864 27 R. B. Ginsburg Sept. 18, 2020 46 ? ? R. Trimble Aug. 25, 1828 67 J. McKinley July 19, 1852 106 ✓ C. E. Hughes June 16, 1916 144 ✓ ✓ P. V. Daniel May 31, 1860 159 H. Baldwin April 21, 1844 194 ✓ M. R. Waite March 23, 1888 228 ✓ ✓ A. Scalia Feb. 13, 2016 269 ✓ A. Moore Jan. 26, 1804 281 ✓ ✓ J. P. Bradley Jan. 22, 1892 291 ✓ ✓ O. W. Holmes Jan. 12, 1932 301 ✓ ✓ J. R. Lamar Jan. 2, 1916 310 ✓ ✓ In the early 19th century, the election was held over the course of multiple days; the number of days before the election is the number of days before voting began. Source: U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Senate
Back in 2016, Democrats pushed forward Garland’s nomination. Unsurprisingly, the parties have now flipped their positions. McConnell said on Friday night that he intends to allow a floor vote to confirm a Trump nominee, while Democrats are suggesting that the winner of the election should choose the next justice.
This is a huge opportunity for Republicans — to have six GOP-appointed judges on the court at once. It is hard to imagine they will pass it up. It’s not guaranteed that 49 of the other 52 Senate Republicans would push forward and support a Trump nominee, particularly if Trump lost the election, but it seems likely.
2. It’s not clear if a confirmation process could finish before the election
It would be unusually fast to finish the entire confirmation process in less than 46 days, the time left before the Nov. 3 election. (The average confirmation process since the Harry Truman administration has lasted 50 days.) That doesn’t mean there isn’t enough time for Trump to confirm a new justice, but it would be on the fast side.
Nevertheless, it’s possible that sometime in October, a judge has been nominated and perhaps confirmation hearings are taking place, right on the eve of the election. This creates the possibility that Trump loses the election and perhaps Republicans lose control of the Senate, but the lame duck president and some senators who have lost reelection put a justice on the Supreme Court — a move that will enrage Democrats. Alternatively, Trump could win the election and see a new justice appointed before he even begins his second term.
3. Ginsburg’s death creates new dynamics if there is an election-related dispute before the court
With a 5-4 GOP majority, Chief Justice John Roberts has been a swing vote, and one who occasionally joins with the court’s Democratic appointees. Whether the court is 5-3 (with Ginsburg’s seat not filled) or 6-3 (with a Trump nominee seated), Democrats would need two votes from GOP-appointed justices to win a case. So if there is some kind of electoral dispute that gets to the court, that’s bad news for Democrats. It raises the specter of a 4-4 tie in a pivotal election-related case, a potential deadlock that could complicate knowing who won the presidential race.
4. The future of the court is now an even bigger electoral issue
Both parties already intensely cared about the Supreme Court. But now, there is the potential for a Supreme Court nomination (or discussion of an open seat) in the middle of the election. For Trump, this choice is a big opportunity in two ways. First, the Supreme Court nomination process might distract the media and public’s attention away from his mistakes in handling the COVID-19 outbreak and give him a way to galvanize conservatives who really care about judicial nominations and issues like abortion. Secondly, Trump is struggling in particular with women voters. Trump may pick a woman to replace Ginsburg and make his nominee part of his pitch to women voters.
Biden, too, would likely need to talk about judicial issues more and perhaps describe the kind of person he would put in this seat. (He has already promised to nominate a Black woman in the event of a Supreme Court vacancy if he becomes president.) Also, Democratic vice-presidential nominee Kamala Harris is on the Senate Judiciary Committee, so she would be involved in any kind of confirmation process.
This is also now a big issue in Senate races. GOP incumbents like Sen. Martha McSally of Arizona and Sen. Susan Collins of Maine may be faced with the choice of irritating GOP voters if they oppose a Trump pick or irritating more moderate voters if they back someone who is viewed as too conservative. This is a particularly acute issue for Collins, who is struggling in her reelection campaign in part because she backed Trump Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh in 2018.
More broadly, one of the most divisive elections in American history will now likely be even more tense and fraught.
5. Who Trump chooses is a really big deal
Assuming that Trump opts to nominate someone, who he chooses is a really big deal. With the election looming, does he nominate someone more moderate than he otherwise would have? Does he nominate a woman? A woman of color? Someone with a long record of opinions or someone who is more unknown?
6. If there are six GOP-appointed justices on the Supreme Court, law in America could fundamentally move to the right
This is the most important implication, even if it is not the most immediate. If Trump is able to appoint a justice who is similar in ideology to Neil Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, his first two picks, it seems likely that abortion and affirmative action could be severely limited in the future, the Affordable Care Act overturned and a host of other conservative rulings issued. That is not guaranteed, but seems quite possible.
Trump and Republicans putting another justice on the bench either pre- or post-election, in the case that he loses, is also likely to trigger an aggressive Democratic response that could have long-lasting implications. Democratic activists were already floating the idea of increasing the number of justices on the Supreme Court to make up for the Garland seat, and I would expect so-called court-packing ideas to accelerate if Trump puts another conservative justice on the court before or right after he loses a presidential election.
CORRECTION (September 24, 2020, 12:53 p.m.): An earlier version of this article misspelled Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s last name.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-19--Will The Supreme Court Be The Most Important Issue For Voters In 2020?

In this emergency installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses the implications of Supreme Court Justice Ruth @ @ @ @ @ and what that might mean for the election and the future of the court .

Will The Supreme Court Be The Most Important Issue For Voters In 2020?
In this emergency installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses the implications of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death and what that might mean for the election and the future of the court.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-19--Politics Podcast: How A Supreme Court Vacancy Will Shape The Election

In this emergency installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ’ @ @ @ @ @ political fight over the court ’ s new vacancy might unfold .
You can listen @ @ @ @ @ the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in @ @ @ @ @ or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how @ @ @ @ @ Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by @ @ @ @ @ review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling @ @ @ @ @ Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

In this emergency installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death and how the political fight over the court’s new vacancy might unfold.
Emergency Podcast: The SCOTUS vacancy | FiveThirtyEight
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-21--Politics Podcast: What Comes Next In The Fight To Fill Ginsburg’s Seat

So far , two Republican senators — Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski — have announced their opposition to filling the @ @ @ @ @ belonged to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg before the 2020 election takes place .
In this @ @ @ @ @ podcast , the crew discusses the political calculations for both Republicans and Democrats over how @ @ @ @ @ .
They also look at the dynamics at play in key Senate races in Maine @ @ @ @ @ You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the @ @ @ @ @ downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If @ @ @ @ @ , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays @ @ @ @ @ the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment @ @ @ @ @ “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on @ @ @ @ @ .

So far, two Republican senators — Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski — have announced their opposition to filling the Supreme Court seat that once belonged to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg before the 2020 election takes place. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses the political calculations for both Republicans and Democrats over how to proceed in replacing Ginsburg. They also look at the dynamics at play in key Senate races in Maine, Iowa and Arizona.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-21--A Record Number Of Black Americans Could Vote Early This Year

In the face of the continued threat of the coronavirus , many Americans won ’ t be voting in person on Election Day .
Instead , polls show that a much larger share of voters intend to cast ballots by mail or vote early in person than in previous elections .
For instance , in a recent AP/NORC poll , as many as 54 percent said they would vote early this year — whether by mail or in person .
If that happens , that would mark a massive shift from 2016 , when just 40 percent of voters voted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Assistance Commission .
Who votes early , though , hasn ’ t historically mattered that much .
There is , for example , no evidence of a big partisan split .
There also aren ’ t any really big gaps by race that aren ’ t explained by geographic differences ( early voting rules differ by state ) .
Broadly speaking , voting early is something that has steadily grown in popularity but is still largely dependent on where someone lives .
But that could change this year .
Charles Stewart , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its Election Data and Science Lab , told me that , “ Prior to 2020 , differences in racial makeup or use of these different [ voting ] modes was driven by where you live , what the opportunities were , what the campaigns were encouraging people to do , ” but in 2020 , he said , “ It ’ s varying heavily according to what party you ’ re in.
” Polls show that Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to say they ’ ll vote early , sometimes by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means it ’ s not only likely that there will be a partisan split in ballots cast this year , but we might also see a change in voting behavior among many non-white voters , since they are much more Democratic-leaning than white voters .
This is especially true for Black voters , whom polls suggest are now 25 percentage points more likely to cast an early ballot than they were in 2016 .
Granted , the share of voters who plan to cast an early ballot is up across the board , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stands out .
In fact , based on the polls we looked at , it ’ s possible that around one and half times as many Black voters will cast an early ballot in 2020 compared to 2016 .
This could potentially make a big difference in battleground states , where we see signs high shares of Black voters are saying they will vote early .
However , there are still real questions about how much Black voters trust the early voting process .
A number of polls have found , for instance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about casting mail or absentee ballots .
Studies have also shown that Black and Hispanic voters have their mail ballots rejected at a higher rate than white voters .
And according to an early August survey from the Voter Participation Center , two-thirds of Black voters in six battleground states thought their vote was more likely to count if they voted in person , so there ’ s definitely a tension between how Black voters might prefer to vote in “ normal ” times and what they are planning to do in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those concerns about not voting in person , Black voters look set to sharply increase their rate of voting by mail .
In fact , our average of recent polls suggests Black voters might be almost as likely as Hispanic and white voters to use a mail ballot this fall , even though they ’ ve historically been less likely to vote that way , according to the Survey of the Performance of American Elections .
( Instead Black voters have tended to vote in person early more than white or Hispanic voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be the most likely to vote by mail in 2020 , which may have to do with the fact that many Hispanic voters live in states where voting by mail is the norm .
Additionally , states with large Hispanic populations like Arizona , California and Florida have greatly expanded access to voting by mail in recent years .
In fact , almost half the country ’ s Hispanic population lives in states that entirely vote by mail or have high rates of mail balloting .
This doesn ’ t mean that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote won ’ t be counted , however .
Similar to Black voters , Latino voters expressed doubts about their vote being counted if they voted early .
Not to mention , despite states expanding access to voting by mail this year , there is still the question of whether Americans will trust the U.S .
Postal Service to handle their ballot , as there are concerns that the USPS will be unable to handle the increase in volume of mail ballots .
This , in turn , could affect how many voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That leaves voters with one other alternative to cast their ballot early : voting in person before Election Day .
Yet at the moment , it doesn ’ t look like there will be a huge uptick in the use of in-person early voting .
Recent polls found that about a fifth of voters intend to go to the polls in person before Election Day , which is very similar to the share of voters who cast their ballots this way in 2016 .
There is one exception : Black voters are much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say they will vote early in person .
In fact , according to recent polls , we could see a 9-point change in how many Black voters vote in person early from 2016 .
Part of this is because Black voters are just more familiar with in-person early voting .
Roughly 60 percent of Black people in the U.S. live in the South , where voting in person early is more prevalent .
In fact , campaigns in that region have long urged voters to go to the polls early with get-out-the-vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” which encourages Black churchgoers to vote on the Sunday before the election .
Additionally , calls to vote early in person by leading Democratic voices like Michelle Obama may also influence Black voters ’ voting plans this year .
Still , it ’ s worth noting that eight states will not offer early in-person voting in 2020 , including four states with populations that are at least 20 percent Black : Alabama , Delaware , Mississippi and South Carolina .
Of course , how voters plan to cast their ballots could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nonetheless , it ’ s pretty clear that there will be a sharp uptick in early voting , especially among Black voters .
Much of that change seems to be driven by an increased preference to vote by mail , although more Black voters look set to use in-person early voting , too .
At the very least , we can probably expect far fewer votes to be cast in-person on Election Day .

In the face of the continued threat of the coronavirus, many Americans won’t be voting in person on Election Day. Instead, polls show that a much larger share of voters intend to cast ballots by mail or vote early in person than in previous elections.
For instance, in a recent AP/NORC poll, as many as 54 percent said they would vote early this year — whether by mail or in person. If that happens, that would mark a massive shift from 2016, when just 40 percent of voters voted early, according to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
Who votes early, though, hasn’t historically mattered that much. There is, for example, no evidence of a big partisan split. There also aren’t any really big gaps by race that aren’t explained by geographic differences (early voting rules differ by state). Broadly speaking, voting early is something that has steadily grown in popularity but is still largely dependent on where someone lives.
But that could change this year.
Charles Stewart, a political scientist at MIT and director of its Election Data and Science Lab, told me that, “Prior to 2020, differences in racial makeup or use of these different [voting] modes was driven by where you live, what the opportunities were, what the campaigns were encouraging people to do,” but in 2020, he said, “It’s varying heavily according to what party you’re in.”
Polls show that Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to say they’ll vote early, sometimes by as much as 31 points. This means it’s not only likely that there will be a partisan split in ballots cast this year, but we might also see a change in voting behavior among many non-white voters, since they are much more Democratic-leaning than white voters.
This is especially true for Black voters, whom polls suggest are now 25 percentage points more likely to cast an early ballot than they were in 2016.
Black voters are the most likely to vote early in 2020 Average share of voters who said they planned to vote early in person or by mail in recent polls, compared to vote method used in 2016, by race or ethnicity Share voting early in person or by mail Race 2020 2016 Difference Black 66% 42% +25 Hispanic 61 51 +11 White 55 45 +10 Overall 57 45 +12 Figures for 2020 are an average of nine polls conducted since the end of the Republican National Convention, with multiple polls from the same pollster averaged together to avoid over-weighting one pollster. Figures for 2016 are estimates calculated from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, based on validated voters and removing a small number of respondents who said they didn’t know how they voted. Figures are rounded after calculation. Source: COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, POLLS
Granted, the share of voters who plan to cast an early ballot is up across the board, but the increase among Black voters truly stands out. In fact, based on the polls we looked at, it’s possible that around one and half times as many Black voters will cast an early ballot in 2020 compared to 2016. This could potentially make a big difference in battleground states, where we see signs high shares of Black voters are saying they will vote early.
However, there are still real questions about how much Black voters trust the early voting process. A number of polls have found, for instance, that Black voters are more concerned about casting mail or absentee ballots. Studies have also shown that Black and Hispanic voters have their mail ballots rejected at a higher rate than white voters. And according to an early August survey from the Voter Participation Center, two-thirds of Black voters in six battleground states thought their vote was more likely to count if they voted in person, so there’s definitely a tension between how Black voters might prefer to vote in “normal” times and what they are planning to do in the face of the coronavirus.
But despite those concerns about not voting in person, Black voters look set to sharply increase their rate of voting by mail. In fact, our average of recent polls suggests Black voters might be almost as likely as Hispanic and white voters to use a mail ballot this fall, even though they’ve historically been less likely to vote that way, according to the Survey of the Performance of American Elections. (Instead Black voters have tended to vote in person early more than white or Hispanic voters.)
Voting by mail is up across the board in 2020 Average share of voters who said they planned to vote by mail in recent polls, compared to the share that voted by mail in 2016, by race or ethnicity Percentage voting by mail Race/Ethnicity 2020 2016 Difference Hispanic 37% 28% +9 White 35 25 +10 Black 33 17 +16 Overall 35 24 +11 Figures for 2020 are an average of nine polls conducted since the end of the Republican National Convention, with multiple polls from the same pollster averaged together to avoid over-weighting one pollster. Figures for 2016 are estimates calculated from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, based on validated voters and removing a small number of respondents who said they didn’t know how they voted. Figures are rounded after calculation. Source: COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, POLLS
Latino voters, however, may be the most likely to vote by mail in 2020, which may have to do with the fact that many Hispanic voters live in states where voting by mail is the norm. Additionally, states with large Hispanic populations like Arizona, California and Florida have greatly expanded access to voting by mail in recent years. In fact, almost half the country’s Hispanic population lives in states that entirely vote by mail or have high rates of mail balloting.
This doesn’t mean that Latino voters aren’t concerned their vote won’t be counted, however. Similar to Black voters, Latino voters expressed doubts about their vote being counted if they voted early. Not to mention, despite states expanding access to voting by mail this year, there is still the question of whether Americans will trust the U.S. Postal Service to handle their ballot, as there are concerns that the USPS will be unable to handle the increase in volume of mail ballots. This, in turn, could affect how many voters actually end up voting by mail.
That leaves voters with one other alternative to cast their ballot early: voting in person before Election Day. Yet at the moment, it doesn’t look like there will be a huge uptick in the use of in-person early voting. Recent polls found that about a fifth of voters intend to go to the polls in person before Election Day, which is very similar to the share of voters who cast their ballots this way in 2016. There is one exception: Black voters are much more likely than white and Hispanic voters to say they will vote early in person. In fact, according to recent polls, we could see a 9-point change in how many Black voters vote in person early from 2016.
Only Black voters are more likely to vote in person early Average share of voters who said they planned to vote early in person in recent polls, compared to the share that voted early in person in 2016, by race or ethnicity Percentage voting early in person Race/Ethnicity 2020 2016 Difference Black 33% 24% +9 Hispanic 25 23 +2 White 20 20 0 Overall 22 21 +1 Figures for 2020 are an average of nine polls conducted since the end of the Republican National Convention, with multiple polls from the same pollster averaged together to avoid over-weighting one pollster. Figures for 2016 are estimates calculated from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, based on validated voters and removing a small number of respondents who said they didn’t know how they voted. Figures are rounded after calculation. Source: COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, POLLS
Part of this is because Black voters are just more familiar with in-person early voting. Roughly 60 percent of Black people in the U.S. live in the South, where voting in person early is more prevalent. In fact, campaigns in that region have long urged voters to go to the polls early with get-out-the-vote initiatives like “Souls to the Polls,” which encourages Black churchgoers to vote on the Sunday before the election. Additionally, calls to vote early in person by leading Democratic voices like Michelle Obama may also influence Black voters’ voting plans this year. Still, it’s worth noting that eight states will not offer early in-person voting in 2020, including four states with populations that are at least 20 percent Black: Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi and South Carolina.
Of course, how voters plan to cast their ballots could change between now and Election Day. Nonetheless, it’s pretty clear that there will be a sharp uptick in early voting, especially among Black voters. Much of that change seems to be driven by an increased preference to vote by mail, although more Black voters look set to use in-person early voting, too. At the very least, we can probably expect far fewer votes to be cast in-person on Election Day.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-21--Will Senate Republicans Back Trump’s Push To Fill Ginsburg’s Seat — Even If He Loses Reelection?

Two of the biggest questions in the aftermath of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ’ s death are , “ Will whomever President Trump chooses to replace Ginsburg be confirmed ?
” and “ How will the nomination and confirmation process affect the 2020 elections ?
” Those two questions are , of course , connected .
And the place where they really intersect is the U.S. Senate .
The Senate will play a pivotal role in deciding the answer to the first question , but its members will also be on the receiving end of whatever political fallout the fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up .
So let ’ s look at both the confirmation process and the electoral process from the perspective of senators .
Electoral concerns will play a big role in the confirmation process Republican Sens .
Cory Gardner of Colorado , Martha McSally of Arizona and Thom Tillis of North Carolina are the three GOP incumbents most in danger of losing reelection , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s Senate forecast .
In fact , they ’ re all underdogs at the moment .
Two other GOP senators , Susan Collins of Maine and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toss-up races .
On the other side of the aisle , Democratic Sen. Doug Jones of Alabama is also facing an uphill battle for reelection .
Given that it ’ s the final stretch of the campaign and all these senators are at risk of losing their seats , you can bet that electoral factors will be weighing heavily in however they decide to vote on Trump ’ s nominee and the process to confirm her .
Even senators with safer seats , including Republicans Steve Daines of Montana , David Perdue of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , will be trying to figure out how the Supreme Court vacancy factors into their races .
And as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee , Graham would be leading the confirmation hearings for a Trump Supreme Court nominee .
( Ernst and Tillis are also on the committee . )
Before we can make any firm conclusions about how the politics of this will play out , we ’ ll need to wait for Trump to make his pick and for more polling to come out , but out of the gate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Jones have the most to lose in this process .
The confirmation fight is likely to be highly partisan and highly polarized — and it ’ s likely to be a major part of the discussion in the campaign ’ s final weeks .
Democratic voters almost universally oppose anything Trump does , while Republican voters almost universally support the president .
Trump and many prominent Republicans are demanding that any nominee be voted on — implying that they will support a confirmation vote before the November election or one after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden .
Meanwhile , Democrats are largely united in their view that whichever candidate wins the presidential election should choose Ginsburg ’ s replacement .
So all 100 senators are going to be pressed on the question , “ Should whoever wins the presidential election choose Ginsburg ’ s replacement ?
” The senators themselves ( and probably voters too ) will know that the position of the Democratic Party is yes and the position of the Republican Party is no .
Having a highly partisan issue dominate the political debate is problematic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular because all three senators are running for reelection in states where the majority of voters are aligned with the other party .
At the same time , breaking with their party on a high-profile issue like this could annoy their base , which would also make it harder for them to win reelection .
Take Trump ’ s approval rating in each of these states .
The president is significantly more popular in Alabama ( 57 percent approval , 40 percent disapproval , per Civiqs ) than he is nationally ( 42 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Civiqs ; 43-53 per FiveThirtyEight ’ s average of a number of polls ) .
Trump ’ s net ratings in Maine ( -23 points ) and Colorado ( -19 points ) are significantly worse than his national standing .
And in Arizona ( -11 for Trump ) and North Carolina ( -8 ) , the president ’ s standing is fairly similar to where he is nationally .
These general electoral dynamics have perfectly predicted the reactions of these senators in the days since Ginsburg ’ s death .
McSally and Tillis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Senate should vote on a Trump nominee , whether the president wins the election or not .
That makes sense for them — on a highly partisan issue like this in a closely divided state , the safe bet is to just stick with your party .
( Perdue , in Georgia , has also said he supports Trump ’ s nominee moving forward , regardless of the November election results . )
In contrast , Collins ( in blue-leaning Maine ) has adopted the Democratic position — that the winner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s replacement .
Gardner and Jones have been noncommittal so far .
That makes sense too — their choices are basically to either annoy their party ’ s base or annoy the clear majority of the electorate in their states .
Neither stance is ideal , so it ’ s not surprising that they are hesitant to say anything .
In the end , the vast majority of senators will stick with their party No matter what their electoral considerations are , however , expect most senators to align with their party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on high-profile issues .
For example , the confirmation vote for Brett Kavanaugh ’ s Supreme Court nomination was also on the eve of an election ( Oct. 6 , 2018 ) .
West Virginia Democrat Joe Manchin , up for reelection that November in a very pro-Trump state , broke with his party to vote in favor of Kavanaugh ’ s nomination .
But the other nine Democrats who were up for reelection in 2018 in states that Trump won in 2016 voted against Kavanaugh .
The one GOP senator up for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clinton won in 2016 , Dean Heller of Nevada , also voted the party line , supporting Kavanagh .
Overall , Manchin was the only Senate Democrat to back Kavanaugh ; Alaska ’ s Lisa Murkowski was the only Republican who didn ’ t support him .
( More on Murkowski in a bit . )
Similarly , on the Trump impeachment votes in February , senators up for reelection this year aligned with their parties instead of their states ’ politics when the two conflicted .
( Collins and Gardner opposed both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Gary Peters and Jones voted in favor of both articles . )
Utah ’ s Mitt Romney was the only Republican to vote for Trump ’ s removal , which all Senate Democrats supported .
( More on Romney in a bit . )
What explains this ?
First of all , senators may put their personal ideological views ahead of their electoral considerations , particularly on judicial nominations .
After all , it ’ s likely that a Republican senator would be fairly aligned with someone like Kavanaugh on most issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Second , the electoral effects of these kinds of votes are not totally clear .
For example , Montana is more Republican-leaning than Florida , but Montana Democratic incumbent Jon Tester won reelection in 2018 while longtime Florida Democrat Bill Nelson lost .
( Both voted against Kavanaugh . )
Manchin voted for Kavanaugh and won , but it ’ s not clear he won because he voted for Kavanaugh .
Third , members of Congress , particularly those in states where they are not electorally safe , must consider their futures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the career incentives for politicians usually point toward sticking with your party on key votes .
Jones was a prominent U.S. attorney , so it ’ s easy to imagine him serving in some legal post in a Biden administration if he should lose reelection in Alabama in November and Biden should win .
But Democrats would probably be less eager to put Jones in a high-profile role in a Biden administration if Jones had voted for Kavanaugh , opposed impeachment and spent the weeks before the 2020 election urging the Senate to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nominee to replace Ginsburg .
Senators like Gardner and McSally who have been down in the polls for months are probably aware that they are unlikely to be in Congress next year .
So they might be positioning themselves for lobbying jobs ( which usually involves maintaining strong relationships with the people in your party who are still in Congress ) or future runs for other offices .
So to keep doors open to them in GOP circles , Gardner and McSally may align with their party ’ s general posture in this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slightly reduces their chances of winning reelection .
Murkowski and Romney will really matter Murkowski has broken with her party in two major ways in the Trump years : opposing the push to repeal Obamacare and opposing Kavanaugh ’ s confirmation .
Romney ’ s impeachment vote was arguably one of the biggest rebukes of a sitting president from a member of his own party in recent history .
So it would not be surprising if they didn ’ t align with Trump on this issue .
Murkowski said over the weekend that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seat before the election .
That is similar to the stance being taken by Senate Democrats and Collins , but not exactly the same .
Murkowski has not ruled out supporting the confirmation of a Trump nominee postelection — even if Trump loses in November .
Speaking of that possibility … The disagreement between the parties is really over who gets to pick the nominee ( Trump or whoever wins the election ) , not over the timing .
I doubt Democrats will strongly object to Republicans confirming a new justice in late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clearly won the presidential election .
That said , the considerations for individual senators are much different .
Collins , in the context of her reelection campaign , is suggesting that she would not support Trump picking a nominee if he loses the election .
But if Collins herself loses reelection and a vote on the nominee comes up in December , her pledge to Maine voters isn ’ t binding .
She might feel comfortable reneging on it .
It ’ s not just Collins — there is no guarantee that preelection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Also , the postelection period might have another wrinkle .
Since McSally was appointed to her Senate seat , Arizona law suggests that her Democratic opponent , Mark Kelly , could be seated as soon as late November if he wins that race .
The math for Republicans is harder if they must confirm a judge with a 52-48 majority instead of a 53-47 one , so I would assume that they would push for a vote while McSally is still there .
Based on what we know right now , here ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dominoes will fall : Trump chooses a nominee this week .
The Senate holds hearings in October , but there is not a vote on the nominee before the election .
Biden beats Trump .
In the postelection , lame-duck Senate session , 50 Republican senators and Vice President Mike Pence combine for 51 votes to confirm Trump ’ s nominee , with the 47 Democrats , Collins , Murkowski and Romney in opposition .
I ’ m not predicting all this will happen — there ’ s plenty of time for things @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the picture we have right now .
We can expect a lot of drama over the next few weeks , but in reality , only one question really matters : How many sitting Republican senators will prevent a sitting Republican president from adding a sixth Republican-appointed justice to the Supreme Court , giving the party a dominant majority on the court for perhaps a generation ?
The answer is , of course , not very many .
But there might be four .

Two of the biggest questions in the aftermath of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death are, “Will whomever President Trump chooses to replace Ginsburg be confirmed?” and “How will the nomination and confirmation process affect the 2020 elections?” Those two questions are, of course, connected. And the place where they really intersect is the U.S. Senate.
The Senate will play a pivotal role in deciding the answer to the first question, but its members will also be on the receiving end of whatever political fallout the fight to fill Ginsburg’s seat kicks up. So let’s look at both the confirmation process and the electoral process from the perspective of senators.
Electoral concerns will play a big role in the confirmation process
Republican Sens. Cory Gardner of Colorado, Martha McSally of Arizona and Thom Tillis of North Carolina are the three GOP incumbents most in danger of losing reelection, according to FiveThirtyEight’s Senate forecast. In fact, they’re all underdogs at the moment. Two other GOP senators, Susan Collins of Maine and Joni Ernst of Iowa, are in toss-up races. On the other side of the aisle, Democratic Sen. Doug Jones of Alabama is also facing an uphill battle for reelection.
The outlook for incumbent senators up for reelection Chances of winning reelection according to FiveThirtyEight’s “deluxe” forecast, as of Sept. 20, 2020, at 9 p.m. ET State Incumbent Party DEM CHANCES GOP CHANCES Rhode Island Reed D 100% <1% Massachusetts Markey D 100 <1 Delaware Coons D 100 <1 Oregon Merkley D 100 <1 New Jersey Booker D 99 1 Illinois Durbin D 99 1 Virginia Warner D 99 1 New Hampshire Shaheen D 99 1 Minnesota Smith D 93 7 Michigan Peters D 81 19 Arizona McSally R 78 22 Colorado Gardner R 69 31 North Carolina Tillis R 62 38 Maine Collins R 53 47 Iowa Ernst R 44 56 Montana Daines R 35 65 Alabama Jones D 28 72 Georgia Perdue R 27 73 South Carolina Graham R 16 84 Alaska Sullivan R 14 86 Texas Cornyn R 12 88 Louisiana* Cassidy R 3 92 Mississippi Hyde-Smith R 5 95 Kentucky McConnell R 4 96 South Dakota Rounds R 1 99 Idaho Risch R <1 100 Nebraska Sasse R <1 100 West Virginia Capito R <1 100 Oklahoma Inhofe R <1 100 Arkansas Cotton R <1 100 *In Louisiana’s Senate election, multiple candidates from each party will be on the ballot on Election Day. If one candidate gets at least 50 percent of the vote, that person wins the seat, but if no candidate clears that bar, the top two vote-getters advance to a runoff election. This table shows the chance that Bill Cassidy will win reelection rather than the chance that any Republican will win the seat.
Given that it’s the final stretch of the campaign and all these senators are at risk of losing their seats, you can bet that electoral factors will be weighing heavily in however they decide to vote on Trump’s nominee and the process to confirm her.
Even senators with safer seats, including Republicans Steve Daines of Montana, David Perdue of Georgia and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, will be trying to figure out how the Supreme Court vacancy factors into their races. And as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Graham would be leading the confirmation hearings for a Trump Supreme Court nominee. (Ernst and Tillis are also on the committee.)
Emergency Podcast: The SCOTUS vacancy | FiveThirtyEight
Before we can make any firm conclusions about how the politics of this will play out, we’ll need to wait for Trump to make his pick and for more polling to come out, but out of the gate it seems as though Collins, Gardner and Jones have the most to lose in this process.
The confirmation fight is likely to be highly partisan and highly polarized — and it’s likely to be a major part of the discussion in the campaign’s final weeks. Democratic voters almost universally oppose anything Trump does, while Republican voters almost universally support the president. Trump and many prominent Republicans are demanding that any nominee be voted on — implying that they will support a confirmation vote before the November election or one after the election even if Trump loses to Joe Biden. Meanwhile, Democrats are largely united in their view that whichever candidate wins the presidential election should choose Ginsburg’s replacement. So all 100 senators are going to be pressed on the question, “Should whoever wins the presidential election choose Ginsburg’s replacement?” The senators themselves (and probably voters too) will know that the position of the Democratic Party is yes and the position of the Republican Party is no.
Having a highly partisan issue dominate the political debate is problematic for Jones, Collins and Gardner in particular because all three senators are running for reelection in states where the majority of voters are aligned with the other party. At the same time, breaking with their party on a high-profile issue like this could annoy their base, which would also make it harder for them to win reelection.
Take Trump’s approval rating in each of these states. The president is significantly more popular in Alabama (57 percent approval, 40 percent disapproval, per Civiqs) than he is nationally (42 percent approval, 55 percent disapproval per Civiqs; 43-53 per FiveThirtyEight’s average of a number of polls). Trump’s net ratings in Maine (-23 points) and Colorado (-19 points) are significantly worse than his national standing. And in Arizona (-11 for Trump) and North Carolina (-8), the president’s standing is fairly similar to where he is nationally.
These general electoral dynamics have perfectly predicted the reactions of these senators in the days since Ginsburg’s death. McSally and Tillis are among the Republicans who already announced that the Senate should vote on a Trump nominee, whether the president wins the election or not. That makes sense for them — on a highly partisan issue like this in a closely divided state, the safe bet is to just stick with your party. (Perdue, in Georgia, has also said he supports Trump’s nominee moving forward, regardless of the November election results.)
In contrast, Collins (in blue-leaning Maine) has adopted the Democratic position — that the winner of the presidential election should choose Ginsburg’s replacement.
Gardner and Jones have been noncommittal so far. That makes sense too — their choices are basically to either annoy their party’s base or annoy the clear majority of the electorate in their states. Neither stance is ideal, so it’s not surprising that they are hesitant to say anything.
In the end, the vast majority of senators will stick with their party
No matter what their electoral considerations are, however, expect most senators to align with their party. That’s what usually happens on high-profile issues.
For example, the confirmation vote for Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court nomination was also on the eve of an election (Oct. 6, 2018). West Virginia Democrat Joe Manchin, up for reelection that November in a very pro-Trump state, broke with his party to vote in favor of Kavanaugh’s nomination. But the other nine Democrats who were up for reelection in 2018 in states that Trump won in 2016 voted against Kavanaugh. The one GOP senator up for reelection in 2018 in a state Hillary Clinton won in 2016, Dean Heller of Nevada, also voted the party line, supporting Kavanagh.
Overall, Manchin was the only Senate Democrat to back Kavanaugh; Alaska’s Lisa Murkowski was the only Republican who didn’t support him. (More on Murkowski in a bit.)
Similarly, on the Trump impeachment votes in February, senators up for reelection this year aligned with their parties instead of their states’ politics when the two conflicted. (Collins and Gardner opposed both articles of impeachment, whereas Michigan’s Gary Peters and Jones voted in favor of both articles.) Utah’s Mitt Romney was the only Republican to vote for Trump’s removal, which all Senate Democrats supported. (More on Romney in a bit.)
What explains this? First of all, senators may put their personal ideological views ahead of their electoral considerations, particularly on judicial nominations. After all, it’s likely that a Republican senator would be fairly aligned with someone like Kavanaugh on most issues while a Democratic senator would be opposed. Second, the electoral effects of these kinds of votes are not totally clear. For example, Montana is more Republican-leaning than Florida, but Montana Democratic incumbent Jon Tester won reelection in 2018 while longtime Florida Democrat Bill Nelson lost. (Both voted against Kavanaugh.) Manchin voted for Kavanaugh and won, but it’s not clear he won because he voted for Kavanaugh.
Third, members of Congress, particularly those in states where they are not electorally safe, must consider their futures if they lose those elections. And the career incentives for politicians usually point toward sticking with your party on key votes. Jones was a prominent U.S. attorney, so it’s easy to imagine him serving in some legal post in a Biden administration if he should lose reelection in Alabama in November and Biden should win. But Democrats would probably be less eager to put Jones in a high-profile role in a Biden administration if Jones had voted for Kavanaugh, opposed impeachment and spent the weeks before the 2020 election urging the Senate to hold a vote on Trump’s nominee to replace Ginsburg.
Senators like Gardner and McSally who have been down in the polls for months are probably aware that they are unlikely to be in Congress next year. So they might be positioning themselves for lobbying jobs (which usually involves maintaining strong relationships with the people in your party who are still in Congress) or future runs for other offices. So to keep doors open to them in GOP circles, Gardner and McSally may align with their party’s general posture in this nomination process, even if that approach slightly reduces their chances of winning reelection.
Murkowski and Romney will really matter
Murkowski has broken with her party in two major ways in the Trump years: opposing the push to repeal Obamacare and opposing Kavanaugh’s confirmation. Romney’s impeachment vote was arguably one of the biggest rebukes of a sitting president from a member of his own party in recent history. So it would not be surprising if they didn’t align with Trump on this issue.
Murkowski said over the weekend that Republicans should not fill Ginsburg’s seat before the election. That is similar to the stance being taken by Senate Democrats and Collins, but not exactly the same. Murkowski has not ruled out supporting the confirmation of a Trump nominee postelection — even if Trump loses in November. Speaking of that possibility …
Preelection commitments could change postelection
The disagreement between the parties is really over who gets to pick the nominee (Trump or whoever wins the election), not over the timing. I doubt Democrats will strongly object to Republicans confirming a new justice in late November or early December if Trump has clearly won the presidential election.
That said, the considerations for individual senators are much different. Collins, in the context of her reelection campaign, is suggesting that she would not support Trump picking a nominee if he loses the election. But if Collins herself loses reelection and a vote on the nominee comes up in December, her pledge to Maine voters isn’t binding. She might feel comfortable reneging on it. It’s not just Collins — there is no guarantee that preelection statements from senators mean much postelection.
Also, the postelection period might have another wrinkle. Since McSally was appointed to her Senate seat, Arizona law suggests that her Democratic opponent, Mark Kelly, could be seated as soon as late November if he wins that race. The math for Republicans is harder if they must confirm a judge with a 52-48 majority instead of a 53-47 one, so I would assume that they would push for a vote while McSally is still there.
Based on what we know right now, here’s the most likely way that the dominoes will fall: Trump chooses a nominee this week. The Senate holds hearings in October, but there is not a vote on the nominee before the election. Biden beats Trump. In the postelection, lame-duck Senate session, 50 Republican senators and Vice President Mike Pence combine for 51 votes to confirm Trump’s nominee, with the 47 Democrats, Collins, Murkowski and Romney in opposition.
I’m not predicting all this will happen — there’s plenty of time for things to change — but that’s the picture we have right now. We can expect a lot of drama over the next few weeks, but in reality, only one question really matters: How many sitting Republican senators will prevent a sitting Republican president from adding a sixth Republican-appointed justice to the Supreme Court, giving the party a dominant majority on the court for perhaps a generation? The answer is, of course, not very many. But there might be four.
Remembering Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg