fivethirtyeight--2020-07-23--Republicans And Democrats See COVID-19 Very Differently. Is That Making People Sick?

Americans have changed their behavior in ways that would have been unthinkable even a few months ago .
Masks are an essential accessory .
Social distancing is the norm .
And even as states moved to reopen their economies in May and June , many Americans continued to think it was better for people to stay home .
But underneath that apparent consensus is a large — and growing — partisan divide .
Even as cases and hospitalizations spike in red states that mostly escaped the early effects of the virus , Republicans and Democrats remain stubbornly split on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was only in July that President Trump wore a mask in public for the first time .
And perhaps thanks to Trump ’ s repeated downplaying of the threat that COVID-19 poses , Republicans are much less concerned than Democrats are about the virus .
On the one hand , according to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center , Republicans have consistently been less likely than Democrats to say that they fear being hospitalized because of COVID-19 or that they might unknowingly spread the virus to others .
But on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ widened significantly between April and June .
It ’ s hard to find a more extreme test of our tribal political attachments than the current pandemic , where Trump continues to downplay the risks of the virus in the face of near-universal opposition from medical experts .
It also raises a thorny issue : In the midst of a pandemic , partisanship appears to be shaping people ’ s perceptions of their risk and personal behaviors — to the point that our divided politics actually affects our health .
For Americans , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stay home , wear a mask or to see friends and family without social distancing are filtered through a partisan lens .
In other words , do our politics risk making us sick ?
It ’ s pretty clear that at this point , Republicans ’ and Democrats ’ experiences of the pandemic have been steadily diverging for months .
It ’ s much harder to say , though , what that means for transmission of the virus .
Some surveys offer a glimmer of hope , suggesting that the partisan gaps in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they wear a mask , for example — are much narrower than the divides on questions about what they think the government should do in response to the virus or whether the worst is behind us .
It ’ s possible , too , that some of the partisan divides we ’ re seeing now could start to narrow as outbreaks spiral out of control in states like Arizona , Florida and Texas .
These trends are cause for alarm among the small army of social scientists who have tried to figure out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the beginning of the pandemic — from the conflicting signals they ’ ve received from Trump and other political leaders , to changing guidelines from public health experts .
“ Some Republicans are much less freaked out by the virus than they were a few months ago , ” said Marc Hetherington , a political scientist at the University of North Carolina who is tracking Americans ’ perspectives of the coronavirus through a panel survey .
“ But things are changing so quickly — these new outbreaks could scare them and maybe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doesn ’ t mean the politicization of the virus isn ’ t having an impact , though .
Take the political fighting around whether people should be required to wear masks or the timeline around when businesses should reopen .
The virus is spiking in Georgia , with thousands of new cases each day , but the state ’ s Republican governor is suing the Democratic mayor of Atlanta over the city ’ s decision to revert to its most restrictive opening phase and mandate the wearing of masks .
“ The national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic has been so colored by the partisan divide that it ’ s becoming impossible to talk rationally about the risks we are and are not willing to tolerate , ” said Dr. Sandro Galea , an epidemiologist and the dean of the Boston University School of Public Health who studies the politics of public health .
“ If both sides were pushed out of their corners , they would both have to concede quite a bit , and we ’ d frankly all be safer.
” Understanding how Americans are responding to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ task ; there are essentially two methods at researchers ’ disposal .
The first is to use a survey .
The second is to look at mobility trends , such as geolocation or credit card data , to see if people are actually behaving the way they say they are .
And over the past few months , political scientists and economists have leaned on both methods to figure out how Americans are thinking about the COVID-19 pandemic and how that relates to their behavior .
With the exception of a few studies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when fear of the pandemic ground the economy to a complete halt , all of this research has uncovered an accelerating partisan divide , too .
For example , as early as March , a group of researchers found that Democrats in a large panel survey exhibited more worries than Republicans about the pandemic and were also likelier to embrace health behaviors like more frequent hand-washing or avoiding mass gatherings .
The first round of Hetherington ’ s survey suggests a partisan divide in Americans ’ support for some public health interventions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with these surveys , of course , is that there ’ s no way to figure out , for example , whether someone who says they ’ re quarantining is actually doing so .
So a number of other studies have tried to figure out what people were actually doing by using geolocation data to follow people ’ s movements .
This research has found basically the same thing as the surveys : People in Republican-leaning counties , or counties that voted for Trump in 2016 , didn ’ t reduce their activity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Another study that looked at individual-level smartphone data found a similar pattern .
And one team of researchers examined both survey data and geolocation data and determined that the trend held up for both — people in more Republican areas were less likely to feel at risk because of COVID-19 , and they were also less likely to stay at home .
But this mobility data has its own limitations , according to Rebecca Katz , a professor at Georgetown University Medical Center .
It can only tell you whether people are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re going or whether they ’ re taking precautions .
“ We ’ re all using this data because it ’ s the data we have , but it ’ s imperfect , ” she said .
“ Sometimes , I pack my kids in a car and we just drive for a little while so we can get out of the house — by my cell phone , we ’ re moving .
But that doesn ’ t tell someone looking at that data if we are interacting with other people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ masks.
” Geography is another confounding factor ; people in rural areas are more likely to drive places , even if they ’ re otherwise following public health guidelines , and less densely populated parts of the country were also less hard hit by the virus in the beginning .
The problem is that Republicans are more likely to live in those parts of the country — and the effects of political segregation and the virus ’ s trajectory are very difficult to untangle , especially for studies that were conducted a month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partisan split was hard to deny , though , so early on , a couple of research teams tried to figure out why Republicans and Democrats were responding to the pandemic differently .
Two usual culprits — politicians and the media — emerged as possible factors in the divide .
One study conducted from late February through the end of March found that the partisan divide on risk perception and health behavior only narrowed after the White House issued federal social distancing guidelines , suggesting that Trump ’ s role as a national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Several other studies dug into the impact of cable TV , with one survey finding that an MSNBC viewer ’ s response to the pandemic was quite different than that of a Fox News watcher .
Another study focused only on the impact of Fox News and concluded that an increase in viewership did appear to result in less social distancing .
The evidence for the effects of politicians and differing media sources is less robust because there aren ’ t as many studies , but it does suggest that even when there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how both talk about the virus and the public health response may affect the way people behave .
Shana Gadarian , a professor of political science at Syracuse University who is helping to conduct one of the panel surveys , said she was surprised to see such enormous divides emerge as the pandemic wore on .
According to other research she ’ s conducted , moments of extreme anxiety and uncertainty can actually make people more open to new sources of information — including public health experts and leaders from the opposing party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic , she and her team expected that Americans would coalesce around public health experts ’ recommendations , or that other demographic factors — like age — would turn into key dividing lines .
Scientists and doctors do still enjoy a high level of trust from most Americans , as Maggie Koerth wrote for FiveThirtyEight in May .
But that doesn ’ t mean they are entirely immune to the winds of partisanship — for example , Democrats are likelier than Republicans to trust the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention .
Crucially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t emerged everywhere .
According to the latest wave of the Democracy Fund ’ s Voter Study Group , conducted between July 2 to 8 , the vast majority ( 88 percent ) of Republicans said they wore a mask when going out in public , even though Republicans in greater numbers have said in other surveys that the government shouldn ’ t require people to wear masks .
And according to Robert Griffin , research director of the Voter Study Group , that ’ s significantly higher than in any wave of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 28 .
There was more of a partisan gap in responses to other questions about coronavirus-related behavior , although it was still fairly modest .
So are these partisan splits actually driving the spread of the virus ?
As it turns out , it ’ s hard to prove that Republicans ’ resistance to mask mandates or social distancing is actually worsening the pandemic .
One reason is that political scientists and economists don ’ t feel equipped to take on the epidemiological modeling that would be necessary to measure what , say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means for the spread of the disease .
Yael Hochberg , an economist at Rice University , said that the lack of uniformity in testing data made her reluctant to wade into the public health data .
“ There are places where testing still isn ’ t widely available , ” Hochberg said .
“ And if testing isn ’ t uniform , it ’ s hard to compare what you ’ re seeing in one county versus another.
” One study tried to pin down the effect of differing levels of compliance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats using individual geolocation data .
It concluded that a Trump voter who contracts COVID-19 infects 16 percent more people than a comparable Clinton voter .
That ’ s a striking finding — but it ’ s also only one study , and several infectious disease experts who reviewed the paper at my request were a little skeptical of its conclusions .
Samuel Scarpino , a professor at Northeastern University who studies infectious diseases , said that it can be very difficult , even in a sophisticated model , to separate all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play , like geography .
And Katz said that without information about whether people are wearing masks or engaging in social distancing , it ’ s hard to draw very solid conclusions about transmission from mobility data .
Scarpino was quick to add , though , that polarization can still be a serious problem , even if it ’ s hard to quantify its precise impact .
“ If politicians ’ messaging is making people feel like they ’ re safe from COVID , those are people who are unnecessarily being put at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s also concerned that public health experts ’ credibility will erode as certain health behaviors , like mask-wearing or social distancing , become associated with one party or another .
“ We ’ re kind of building the airplane as we fly it and we need to be able to change course when we get new evidence , ” he said .
“ But it becomes harder to have those conversations and get buy-in from the public as the whole process becomes more politicized.
” There ’ s danger in exaggerating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Galea told me that he ’ s been struck by the fact that so many Americans — including nearly all Republicans — report they are going along with health experts ’ recommendations , like wearing masks , at least to some degree .
And it would be a mistake , Galea said , to gloss over this unusual level of partisan unity , because it ’ s a sign that health behaviors aren ’ t as divisive as they could be , given the strength of partisan loyalties .
“ Nobody should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political extremes are embracing polarizing positions on health behavior that should not be polarized , ” Galea said .
“ But I think the evidence we have indicates that most people have tried to be responsible and adopt the recommended behaviors , even at a time of immense polarization and confusion and discomfort.
” That said , he still thinks some politicians — and in particular , Trump — need to do more to get on the same page as public health experts .
“ It ’ s not that politics is making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , because we see that many ordinary people are getting on board regardless of what political leadership is saying , ” he said .
“ But that doesn ’ t mean we should give politicians a pass for turning these serious , serious health conversations into a political football , because that is very much to our detriment .
”

Americans have changed their behavior in ways that would have been unthinkable even a few months ago. Masks are an essential accessory. Social distancing is the norm. And even as states moved to reopen their economies in May and June, many Americans continued to think it was better for people to stay home.
But underneath that apparent consensus is a large — and growing — partisan divide. Even as cases and hospitalizations spike in red states that mostly escaped the early effects of the virus, Republicans and Democrats remain stubbornly split on the threat it poses. For instance, it was only in July that President Trump wore a mask in public for the first time. And perhaps thanks to Trump’s repeated downplaying of the threat that COVID-19 poses, Republicans are much less concerned than Democrats are about the virus.
On the one hand, according to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, Republicans have consistently been less likely than Democrats to say that they fear being hospitalized because of COVID-19 or that they might unknowingly spread the virus to others. But on the other hand, that partisan gap has widened significantly between April and June.
It’s hard to find a more extreme test of our tribal political attachments than the current pandemic, where Trump continues to downplay the risks of the virus in the face of near-universal opposition from medical experts. It also raises a thorny issue: In the midst of a pandemic, partisanship appears to be shaping people’s perceptions of their risk and personal behaviors — to the point that our divided politics actually affects our health. For Americans, that might mean that questions of whether to stay home, wear a mask or to see friends and family without social distancing are filtered through a partisan lens.
In other words, do our politics risk making us sick?
It’s pretty clear that at this point, Republicans’ and Democrats’ experiences of the pandemic have been steadily diverging for months. It’s much harder to say, though, what that means for transmission of the virus. Some surveys offer a glimmer of hope, suggesting that the partisan gaps in how people are actually behaving — whether they wear a mask, for example — are much narrower than the divides on questions about what they think the government should do in response to the virus or whether the worst is behind us. It’s possible, too, that some of the partisan divides we’re seeing now could start to narrow as outbreaks spiral out of control in states like Arizona, Florida and Texas.
These trends are cause for alarm among the small army of social scientists who have tried to figure out how Americans are responding to the virus since the beginning of the pandemic — from the conflicting signals they’ve received from Trump and other political leaders, to changing guidelines from public health experts.
“Some Republicans are much less freaked out by the virus than they were a few months ago,” said Marc Hetherington, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina who is tracking Americans’ perspectives of the coronavirus through a panel survey. “But things are changing so quickly — these new outbreaks could scare them and maybe some of that polarization disappears.”
That doesn’t mean the politicization of the virus isn’t having an impact, though. Take the political fighting around whether people should be required to wear masks or the timeline around when businesses should reopen. The virus is spiking in Georgia, with thousands of new cases each day, but the state’s Republican governor is suing the Democratic mayor of Atlanta over the city’s decision to revert to its most restrictive opening phase and mandate the wearing of masks. “The national conversation about how we behave during this pandemic has been so colored by the partisan divide that it’s becoming impossible to talk rationally about the risks we are and are not willing to tolerate,” said Dr. Sandro Galea, an epidemiologist and the dean of the Boston University School of Public Health who studies the politics of public health. “If both sides were pushed out of their corners, they would both have to concede quite a bit, and we’d frankly all be safer.”
Understanding how Americans are responding to the pandemic isn’t an easy task; there are essentially two methods at researchers’ disposal. The first is to use a survey. The second is to look at mobility trends, such as geolocation or credit card data, to see if people are actually behaving the way they say they are. And over the past few months, political scientists and economists have leaned on both methods to figure out how Americans are thinking about the COVID-19 pandemic and how that relates to their behavior. With the exception of a few studies conducted in late March and early April, when fear of the pandemic ground the economy to a complete halt, all of this research has uncovered an accelerating partisan divide, too.
For example, as early as March, a group of researchers found that Democrats in a large panel survey exhibited more worries than Republicans about the pandemic and were also likelier to embrace health behaviors like more frequent hand-washing or avoiding mass gatherings. The first round of Hetherington’s survey suggests a partisan divide in Americans’ support for some public health interventions, like widespread testing.
The problem with these surveys, of course, is that there’s no way to figure out, for example, whether someone who says they’re quarantining is actually doing so. So a number of other studies have tried to figure out what people were actually doing by using geolocation data to follow people’s movements. This research has found basically the same thing as the surveys: People in Republican-leaning counties, or counties that voted for Trump in 2016, didn’t reduce their activity as much as people in Democratic counties.
Another study that looked at individual-level smartphone data found a similar pattern. And one team of researchers examined both survey data and geolocation data and determined that the trend held up for both — people in more Republican areas were less likely to feel at risk because of COVID-19, and they were also less likely to stay at home.
But this mobility data has its own limitations, according to Rebecca Katz, a professor at Georgetown University Medical Center. It can only tell you whether people are leaving their homes, not where they’re going or whether they’re taking precautions. “We’re all using this data because it’s the data we have, but it’s imperfect,” she said. “Sometimes, I pack my kids in a car and we just drive for a little while so we can get out of the house — by my cell phone, we’re moving. But that doesn’t tell someone looking at that data if we are interacting with other people, or if we’re wearing masks.”
Geography is another confounding factor; people in rural areas are more likely to drive places, even if they’re otherwise following public health guidelines, and less densely populated parts of the country were also less hard hit by the virus in the beginning. The problem is that Republicans are more likely to live in those parts of the country — and the effects of political segregation and the virus’s trajectory are very difficult to untangle, especially for studies that were conducted a month or two into the pandemic.
The partisan split was hard to deny, though, so early on, a couple of research teams tried to figure out why Republicans and Democrats were responding to the pandemic differently. Two usual culprits — politicians and the media — emerged as possible factors in the divide.
One study conducted from late February through the end of March found that the partisan divide on risk perception and health behavior only narrowed after the White House issued federal social distancing guidelines, suggesting that Trump’s role as a national Republican leader could be quite significant. Several other studies dug into the impact of cable TV, with one survey finding that an MSNBC viewer’s response to the pandemic was quite different than that of a Fox News watcher. Another study focused only on the impact of Fox News and concluded that an increase in viewership did appear to result in less social distancing. The evidence for the effects of politicians and differing media sources is less robust because there aren’t as many studies, but it does suggest that even when there are serious health risks at stake, how both talk about the virus and the public health response may affect the way people behave.
Shana Gadarian, a professor of political science at Syracuse University who is helping to conduct one of the panel surveys, said she was surprised to see such enormous divides emerge as the pandemic wore on. According to other research she’s conducted, moments of extreme anxiety and uncertainty can actually make people more open to new sources of information — including public health experts and leaders from the opposing party. So at the beginning of the pandemic, she and her team expected that Americans would coalesce around public health experts’ recommendations, or that other demographic factors — like age — would turn into key dividing lines.
Scientists and doctors do still enjoy a high level of trust from most Americans, as Maggie Koerth wrote for FiveThirtyEight in May. But that doesn’t mean they are entirely immune to the winds of partisanship — for example, Democrats are likelier than Republicans to trust the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Crucially, though, big divides haven’t emerged everywhere. According to the latest wave of the Democracy Fund’s Voter Study Group, conducted between July 2 to 8, the vast majority (88 percent) of Republicans said they wore a mask when going out in public, even though Republicans in greater numbers have said in other surveys that the government shouldn’t require people to wear masks. And according to Robert Griffin, research director of the Voter Study Group, that’s significantly higher than in any wave of the weekly data going back to May 28. There was more of a partisan gap in responses to other questions about coronavirus-related behavior, although it was still fairly modest.
So are these partisan splits actually driving the spread of the virus?
As it turns out, it’s hard to prove that Republicans’ resistance to mask mandates or social distancing is actually worsening the pandemic. One reason is that political scientists and economists don’t feel equipped to take on the epidemiological modeling that would be necessary to measure what, say, a partisan divide on hand-washing actually means for the spread of the disease. Yael Hochberg, an economist at Rice University, said that the lack of uniformity in testing data made her reluctant to wade into the public health data. “There are places where testing still isn’t widely available,” Hochberg said. “And if testing isn’t uniform, it’s hard to compare what you’re seeing in one county versus another.”
One study tried to pin down the effect of differing levels of compliance with social distancing policies among Republicans and Democrats using individual geolocation data. It concluded that a Trump voter who contracts COVID-19 infects 16 percent more people than a comparable Clinton voter. That’s a striking finding — but it’s also only one study, and several infectious disease experts who reviewed the paper at my request were a little skeptical of its conclusions.
Samuel Scarpino, a professor at Northeastern University who studies infectious diseases, said that it can be very difficult, even in a sophisticated model, to separate all of the confounding factors that could be at play, like geography. And Katz said that without information about whether people are wearing masks or engaging in social distancing, it’s hard to draw very solid conclusions about transmission from mobility data.
Scarpino was quick to add, though, that polarization can still be a serious problem, even if it’s hard to quantify its precise impact. “If politicians’ messaging is making people feel like they’re safe from COVID, those are people who are unnecessarily being put at risk,” he said. He’s also concerned that public health experts’ credibility will erode as certain health behaviors, like mask-wearing or social distancing, become associated with one party or another. “We’re kind of building the airplane as we fly it and we need to be able to change course when we get new evidence,” he said. “But it becomes harder to have those conversations and get buy-in from the public as the whole process becomes more politicized.”
There’s danger in exaggerating the extent of the partisan divide, though. Galea told me that he’s been struck by the fact that so many Americans — including nearly all Republicans — report they are going along with health experts’ recommendations, like wearing masks, at least to some degree. And it would be a mistake, Galea said, to gloss over this unusual level of partisan unity, because it’s a sign that health behaviors aren’t as divisive as they could be, given the strength of partisan loyalties.
“Nobody should ignore the fact that people on the political extremes are embracing polarizing positions on health behavior that should not be polarized,” Galea said. “But I think the evidence we have indicates that most people have tried to be responsible and adopt the recommended behaviors, even at a time of immense polarization and confusion and discomfort.”
That said, he still thinks some politicians — and in particular, Trump — need to do more to get on the same page as public health experts. “It’s not that politics is making it impossible to implement these health behaviors, because we see that many ordinary people are getting on board regardless of what political leadership is saying,” he said. “But that doesn’t mean we should give politicians a pass for turning these serious, serious health conversations into a political football, because that is very much to our detriment.”


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-24--Americans Support Voting By Mail — But Not All Of Them Want To, Or Can

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
How do you hold an election during a pandemic ?
Most states are encouraging voters to cast their ballots by mail this November to avoid spreading the coronavirus , and some of them are revising their election laws to make that easier .
Under normal circumstances , 34 states ( plus Washington , D.C. ) have allowed people to vote absentee for any reason , including five that conduct vote-by-mail elections by default ( i.e.
, every voter is automatically mailed a ballot ) .
But as of Thursday , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote absentee this fall , including seven states and Washington , D.C. , that will mail voters ballots by default .
That leaves approximately 54 million eligible voters across nine states who must provide an excuse to vote absentee this fall ( though some of those states may still change their laws before Election Day ) .
And a new poll out this week found the American people largely supportive of efforts to expand absentee voting .
According to the Pew Research Center , 65 percent of adults said that any voter should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without an excuse .
Furthermore , an additional 14 percent thought a documented reason should be required , but that COVID-19 should count as one of the reasons .
As a result , only 19 percent of Americans believed that voters should need an excuse other than the pandemic to vote absentee .
However , as on so many other issues , Republicans and Democrats don ’ t agree on this .
While a whopping 83 percent of Democrats supported no-excuse absentee voting ( and another 11 percent thought COVID-19 should be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Republicans thought so .
Another 17 percent thought COVID-19 should be an acceptable excuse , but that still left 37 percent of Republicans believing voters must provide a non-pandemic-related excuse to vote absentee .
You might be tempted to chalk up this divide to President Trump ’ s recent rants against voting by mail .
And according to another poll released this week , from ABC News/The Washington Post , 78 percent of Trump supporters do see mail-in voting as “ vulnerable to significant levels of fraud.
” ( It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actually long been a partisan issue : The party splits in the Pew poll were similar in October 2018 .
( That said , Republican opposition to no-excuse absentee voting has grown a bit since then . )
However , just because voters want the option to vote absentee doesn ’ t mean they ’ ll actually do it .
The ABC News/Washington Post poll also found that 59 percent of Americans would prefer to vote in person in this year ’ s election , while 38 percent would prefer to vote by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along demographic lines , which could put heightened stress on our democracy this November .
For instance , Republican respondents told ABC News/The Washington Post that they preferred to vote in person , 79 percent to 20 percent .
But Democratic respondents preferred to vote by mail , 51 percent to 46 percent .
That could mean that votes cast in person will skew toward Republicans this fall , while mail-in votes skew toward Democrats .
And since in-person votes are typically reported first on election night , that could mean that initial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favorable to Trump — perhaps causing him to claim victory prematurely .
But Biden could actually turn out to be the winner days after Election Day in this scenario , as mailed ballots are counted and Democratic votes are added to the till .
This could cause a national crisis if Trump decries those late-counted ballots as fraudulent or if he refuses to concede .
In addition , the poll found that college-educated and wealthier voters were more comfortable voting by mail .
Specifically , respondents with postgraduate degrees said they preferred voting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; those with just a four-year college degree were split 49 percent to 49 percent .
Respondents with less than four years of college said they preferred to vote in person , 59 percent to 37 percent , and respondents with a high school diploma or less opted for in-person voting 68 percent to 29 percent .
As a result , underprivileged voters could be disproportionately affected if the pandemic forces the closure or consolidation of polling places this November , either putting them at heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 while waiting in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ According to the Kaiser Family Foundation , 60 percent of parents with schoolchildren wanted schools to wait to restart in-person classes , while only 34 percent wanted schools to reopen sooner .
This preference was largely driven by parents of color , 91 percent of whom were worried that their child will catch COVID-19 if schools reopen .
Only 55 percent of white parents shared that concern .
• A Morning Consult poll found that the vast majority of Americans — 72 percent — supported mandating face masks in public spaces in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who refused to do so ) .
Despite perceptions that wearing a mask has become a partisan issue , even Republicans supported the policy , 58 percent to 35 percent .
• According to another part of the ABC News/Washington Post poll , a record 69 percent of Americans said that they think white and nonwhite people do not receive equal treatment in the criminal justice system ; only 26 percent said they do receive equal treatment .
Black respondents have long held this view in ABC News/Washington Post polling , but for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majority of white people .
• As evidenced by the fact that Opening Day was yesterday ( four months late ) , this year ’ s Major League Baseball season will look a little different from usual .
Most obviously , the season will only have 60 games — down from the standard 162 — but it will still crown a World Series champion .
According to Morning Consult , though , a plurality of fans think the 2020 champion deserves an asterisk .
Forty-four percent of baseball fans said that winning the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be less meaningful than winning after a full regular season , while 35 percent believed it would be just as meaningful .
( In reality , a 60-game season isn ’ t that much worse at assessing a team ’ s true talent than a 162-game season — but neither is perfect . )
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 40.3 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president , while 55.6 percent disapprove ( a net approval rating of -15.3 points ) .
At this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 55.6 percent disapproved ( a net approval rating of -15.2 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 41.0 percent and a disapproval rating of 55.3 percent , for a net approval rating of -14.3 points .
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 8.2 percentage points ( 49.4 percent to 41.2 percent ) .
A week ago , Democrats led Republicans by 8.3 points ( 49.0 percent to 40.7 percent ) .
At this time last month , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 48.7 percent to 40.5 percent ) .
Check out all the polls we ’ ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
How do you hold an election during a pandemic? Most states are encouraging voters to cast their ballots by mail this November to avoid spreading the coronavirus, and some of them are revising their election laws to make that easier.
Under normal circumstances, 34 states (plus Washington, D.C.) have allowed people to vote absentee for any reason, including five that conduct vote-by-mail elections by default (i.e., every voter is automatically mailed a ballot). But as of Thursday, at least 41 states are allowing anyone to vote absentee this fall, including seven states and Washington, D.C., that will mail voters ballots by default. That leaves approximately 54 million eligible voters across nine states who must provide an excuse to vote absentee this fall (though some of those states may still change their laws before Election Day).
And a new poll out this week found the American people largely supportive of efforts to expand absentee voting. According to the Pew Research Center, 65 percent of adults said that any voter should be able to vote early or absentee without an excuse. Furthermore, an additional 14 percent thought a documented reason should be required, but that COVID-19 should count as one of the reasons. As a result, only 19 percent of Americans believed that voters should need an excuse other than the pandemic to vote absentee.
However, as on so many other issues, Republicans and Democrats don’t agree on this. While a whopping 83 percent of Democrats supported no-excuse absentee voting (and another 11 percent thought COVID-19 should be a valid excuse), only 44 percent of Republicans thought so. Another 17 percent thought COVID-19 should be an acceptable excuse, but that still left 37 percent of Republicans believing voters must provide a non-pandemic-related excuse to vote absentee.
You might be tempted to chalk up this divide to President Trump’s recent rants against voting by mail. And according to another poll released this week, from ABC News/The Washington Post, 78 percent of Trump supporters do see mail-in voting as “vulnerable to significant levels of fraud.” (It’s not.) But absentee-voting access has actually long been a partisan issue: The party splits in the Pew poll were similar in October 2018. (That said, Republican opposition to no-excuse absentee voting has grown a bit since then.)
However, just because voters want the option to vote absentee doesn’t mean they’ll actually do it. The ABC News/Washington Post poll also found that 59 percent of Americans would prefer to vote in person in this year’s election, while 38 percent would prefer to vote by mail. And there were stark differences along demographic lines, which could put heightened stress on our democracy this November.
For instance, Republican respondents told ABC News/The Washington Post that they preferred to vote in person, 79 percent to 20 percent. But Democratic respondents preferred to vote by mail, 51 percent to 46 percent. That could mean that votes cast in person will skew toward Republicans this fall, while mail-in votes skew toward Democrats. And since in-person votes are typically reported first on election night, that could mean that initial results on Nov. 3 will be overly favorable to Trump — perhaps causing him to claim victory prematurely. But Biden could actually turn out to be the winner days after Election Day in this scenario, as mailed ballots are counted and Democratic votes are added to the till. This could cause a national crisis if Trump decries those late-counted ballots as fraudulent or if he refuses to concede.
In addition, the poll found that college-educated and wealthier voters were more comfortable voting by mail. Specifically, respondents with postgraduate degrees said they preferred voting by mail 54 percent to 44 percent; those with just a four-year college degree were split 49 percent to 49 percent. Respondents with less than four years of college said they preferred to vote in person, 59 percent to 37 percent, and respondents with a high school diploma or less opted for in-person voting 68 percent to 29 percent. As a result, underprivileged voters could be disproportionately affected if the pandemic forces the closure or consolidation of polling places this November, either putting them at heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 while waiting in line or disenfranchising them altogether.
Other polling bites
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, 60 percent of parents with schoolchildren wanted schools to wait to restart in-person classes, while only 34 percent wanted schools to reopen sooner. This preference was largely driven by parents of color, 91 percent of whom were worried that their child will catch COVID-19 if schools reopen. Only 55 percent of white parents shared that concern.
A Morning Consult poll found that the vast majority of Americans — 72 percent — supported mandating face masks in public spaces in their state (and imposing penalties for those who refused to do so). Despite perceptions that wearing a mask has become a partisan issue, even Republicans supported the policy, 58 percent to 35 percent.
According to another part of the ABC News/Washington Post poll, a record 69 percent of Americans said that they think white and nonwhite people do not receive equal treatment in the criminal justice system; only 26 percent said they do receive equal treatment. Black respondents have long held this view in ABC News/Washington Post polling, but for the first time, so did a majority of white people.
As evidenced by the fact that Opening Day was yesterday (four months late), this year’s Major League Baseball season will look a little different from usual. Most obviously, the season will only have 60 games — down from the standard 162 — but it will still crown a World Series champion. According to Morning Consult, though, a plurality of fans think the 2020 champion deserves an asterisk. Forty-four percent of baseball fans said that winning the World Series in a shortened season will be less meaningful than winning after a full regular season, while 35 percent believed it would be just as meaningful. (In reality, a 60-game season isn’t that much worse at assessing a team’s true talent than a 162-game season — but neither is perfect.)
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 40.3 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 55.6 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -15.3 points). At this time last week, 40.3 percent approved and 55.6 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -15.2 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 41.0 percent and a disapproval rating of 55.3 percent, for a net approval rating of -14.3 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 8.2 percentage points (49.4 percent to 41.2 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 8.3 points (49.0 percent to 40.7 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 8.2 points (48.7 percent to 40.5 percent).
Check out all the polls we’ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-24--Confidence Interval: Democrats Could Win 60 Seats In The Senate

Welcome to another episode of Confidence Interval , where we make a persuasive case for a hot take … and @ @ @ @ @ really feel about the idea .
This time , elections analyst Nathaniel Rakich ponders whether @ @ @ @ @ 13 seats in the U.S. Senate this November to have a 60-seat filibuster-proof majority .

Welcome to another episode of Confidence Interval, where we make a persuasive case for a hot take … and then reveal how confident we really feel about the idea. This time, elections analyst Nathaniel Rakich ponders whether the Democrats can pick up 13 seats in the U.S. Senate this November to have a 60-seat filibuster-proof majority.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-24--Politics Podcast: The U.S. Isn’t Prepared For A Pandemic Election

The clock is ticking for states to make sure they can safely and effectively administer this November ’ s general election .
In March , it became clear that states needed to reconfigure in-person voting and significantly scale up mail voting so that Americans could cast their ballots during the coronavirus pandemic .
During the primaries , voters experienced postponed elections , consolidated polling places , long lines , mail ballots that never reached them and long delays in counting those ballots .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , election attorney Myrna Pérez of the Brennan Center @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rakich to discuss how prepared states are for the general election , with only 100 days remaining .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

The clock is ticking for states to make sure they can safely and effectively administer this November’s general election. In March, it became clear that states needed to reconfigure in-person voting and significantly scale up mail voting so that Americans could cast their ballots during the coronavirus pandemic. During the primaries, voters experienced postponed elections, consolidated polling places, long lines, mail ballots that never reached them and long delays in counting those ballots.
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, election attorney Myrna Pérez of the Brennan Center for Justice joins Galen Druke and Nathaniel Rakich to discuss how prepared states are for the general election, with only 100 days remaining.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-24--Americans Mostly Support Voting By Mail

Americans Mostly Support Voting By Mail


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-27--Do You Buy That … Coronavirus Will Be What Makes Or Breaks Trump’s Re-election Prospects?

Do You Buy That … Coronavirus Will Be What Makes Or Breaks Trump ’ s Re-election Prospects ?


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-27--Why Florida Could Go Blue In 2020

Why Florida Could Go Blue In 2020

This is the second in a series of articles examining the politics and demographics of 2020 ’ s expected swing states .
Electorally , Florida bounces around like a beach ball .
In 2008 and 2012 , as Americans nationwide backed Barack Obama for president , Florida voted Democratic too .
But in 2016 , when Donald Trump reclaimed the White House for the Republicans , Florida switched its allegiance to the GOP .
Indeed , the Sunshine State has voted for the national winner in each of the past six presidential elections .
But in 2018 , Florida stopped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year for Democrats nationwide , which saw them net 40 House seats and seven governorships , the “ blue wave ” stopped at Florida ’ s sandy beaches .
Although the national political environment leaned almost 9 percentage points in Democrats ’ favor , Republican Rick Scott defeated incumbent Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson by 0.1 points , and Republican Ron DeSantis defeated Democrat Andrew Gillum by 0.4 points in the open-seat race for governor .
The results prompted some pundits to relabel Florida a “ red state ” going into the pivotal 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a degree : Florida has long been a slightly red state .
Since 2004 , it has consistently voted 3 or 4 points more Republican than the nation as a whole in presidential elections .
( Indeed , polls of Florida are currently 0.9 points better for President Trump than national polls , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s polling averages . )
But could what happened in 2018 — when Florida was so much redder than the nation that it was out of reach for Democrats , even in a wave election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s true that , on the surface , Nelson and Gillum barely improved upon Hillary Clinton ’ s 1.2-point loss in Florida in 2016 .
Accounting for the much bluer national environment , that would imply either that Florida is immune to shifts in the national mood or that the state lurched to the right sometime in the intervening two years .
But as the map below shows , Nelson actually performed from 3 to 14 points better than Clinton in a majority of Florida counties , even though he lost many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( Gillum ’ s map told a similar story , so we ’ re not showing it , as of the two 2018 Democratic candidates , Nelson — a moderate white man in his 70s — is a better stand-in for the party ’ s presumptive 2020 presidential nominee , Joe Biden . )
This is important because it underscores that the state is not “ wave-proof ” ; instead , it ’ s made up of some complex coalitions that we ’ ll dive into more momentarily .
Ultimately , Scott @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did significantly better than Trump in a handful of big counties , virtually erasing Democratic gains elsewhere .
Most glaringly , Miami-Dade County — Florida ’ s most populated county — and Osceola County voted more than 8 points more Republican in the 2018 Senate race than in the 2016 presidential race .
In addition , Nelson underperformed Clinton by 6 points in the much less populous Hendry County .
What ’ s so special about these counties ?
They are Florida ’ s three majority-Hispanic counties , and it turns out that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 than in 2016 .
According to exit polls , Hispanic voters voted for Nelson 54 percent to 45 percent ( the gubernatorial numbers were virtually identical ) , two years after they supported Clinton 62 percent to 35 percent .
So the big question for Democrats in 2020 is whether Biden can return to Clinton ’ s level of support among Hispanics .
It ’ s hard to say for sure , as the reasons for Democrats ’ 2018 underperformance in Florida are as diverse as the state ’ s Hispanic population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( who make up 32 percent of Osceola County ) strongly dislike Trump , but they actually gave Scott high marks for focusing on their community in the wake of Hurricane Maria .
But with Trump back on the ballot in 2020 , there ’ s good reason to think that their Republican sympathies will evaporate once again .
According to Carlos Odio , the co-founder of data firm EquisLabs , a private poll recently gave Biden a 41-point lead among Puerto Rican voters in Florida , which would be close to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Decisions poll immediately before the 2016 election .
Democrats may not be able to solve their problems so easily with Cuban Americans , though , who make up the plurality ( 36 percent ) of crucial Miami-Dade County .
Cuban Americans are the rare bloc of Hispanic voters who truly lean Republican ; in fact , they outright backed Trump in 2016 .
Trump is estimated to have won between 50 percent and 58 percent of Florida ’ s Cuban American vote in 2016 , and this group has been even more Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote strongly Republican in elections for lower offices as well .
For instance , the Florida International University Cuba Poll , which has measured public opinion among Cuban Americans for almost 30 years , found that Scott and DeSantis each won about 70 percent of the Cuban American vote in Miami-Dade .
This was likely instrumental in Miami-Dade ’ s rightward shift in 2018 : An analysis of the 2016 and 2018 results by Democratic data consultant Matthew Isbell found that the Miami-Dade precincts that swung hardest toward the GOP were its most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden , Trump ’ s crusades against socialism and hardline stance against Cuba and its close ally Venezuela may have elevated his standing among Cuban Americans .
An EquisLabs poll from November 2019 found that 63 percent of Cuban American voters in Florida would vote to reelect Trump ( though , of course , that was long before the pandemic started dragging down his polling numbers across the board ) .
That wouldn ’ t be as bad for Democrats as 2018 , but EquisLabs estimates that level of support would be worth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Florida than in 2016 .
However , even if Trump makes inroads with Cuban Americans , some historical trends suggest that Miami-Dade will not be as red as it was in 2018 .
For reasons ranging from disproportionately low Democratic turnout in midterms to the Cuban American habit of voting more Republican in nonpresidential races , the margin in Miami-Dade is almost always less Democratic in midterm years than in the presidential years on either side .
So Miami-Dade ’ s right turn in 2018 was actually completely predictable — and it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The real question mark is whether Miami-Dade will follow the pattern of recent years in 2020 and be bluer than it was in 2016 .
For reasons ranging from generational change ( Cuban Americans born in the U.S. are more likely than their immigrant parents and grandparents to vote Democratic ) to the ubiquitous urban and suburban realignment , the county has voted more Democratic in every successive presidential election since 2004 .
Of course , there ’ s always the possibility that this trend won ’ t continue .
One final point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s large population of older Americans .
Of all the states in the union , Florida has the largest proportion of residents age 65 or older ( 20 percent ) — and polls indicate that Biden is winning among these voters nationally .
That ’ s unusual for a Democrat these days , too , which speaks to Biden ’ s current electoral strength .
There is evidence that Biden isn ’ t doing quite as well among older Floridians ( Trump was leading among them by 8 points in both a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New York Times Upshot/Siena College poll ) , but the former vice president is still doing better than either Clinton ( who lost among voters age 65 or older by 17 points ) or Nelson ( who lost among them by 14 ) did , according to the exit polls .
If this trend holds , it has the potential to help Biden all across the state , but especially in counties with lots of retirement communities .
Two of these counties are where Democrats also lost ground in the 2018 Senate race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ redder in 2018 than in 2016 ) and Sumter ( which was 3 points redder ) .
Collier , on the southwest coast , is home to Naples and is 31 percent age 65 or older .
And Sumter , the location of famously massive retirement community The Villages , is a whopping 56 percent age 65 or older .
Unlike Miami-Dade and Osceola , these counties might really be drifting toward Republicans in the long term , but Biden may have what it takes to temporarily reverse that trend .
In summary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that Biden will be able to hold onto ( or build upon ) Nelson ’ s gains in the blue counties in the map above , thanks to the current pro-Democratic national environment .
And with the help of Hispanic voters , older voters , or both , it ’ s also not hard to imagine Biden returning to Clinton ’ s levels of support in some of the counties that drifted red in 2018 .
However , Trump is fighting to build upon his 2016 support among these voters too , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a hard time winning the state — as 2018 showed .
The bottom line : The outlook is bright for Democrats in the Sunshine State .
On average , polls of Florida show Biden leading Trump by a healthy 7.1 points .
If that holds , it would be a blowout by Florida standards — the widest margin for a presidential candidate since George H.W .
Bush won by 22 points in 1988 .
But , of course , if Florida does go blue again in 2020 , it would put the state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a beach ball once again .

This is the second in a series of articles examining the politics and demographics of 2020’s expected swing states.
Electorally, Florida bounces around like a beach ball. In 2008 and 2012, as Americans nationwide backed Barack Obama for president, Florida voted Democratic too. But in 2016, when Donald Trump reclaimed the White House for the Republicans, Florida switched its allegiance to the GOP. Indeed, the Sunshine State has voted for the national winner in each of the past six presidential elections.
But in 2018, Florida stopped following national trends. In a great year for Democrats nationwide, which saw them net 40 House seats and seven governorships, the “blue wave” stopped at Florida’s sandy beaches. Although the national political environment leaned almost 9 percentage points in Democrats’ favor, Republican Rick Scott defeated incumbent Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson by 0.1 points, and Republican Ron DeSantis defeated Democrat Andrew Gillum by 0.4 points in the open-seat race for governor. The results prompted some pundits to relabel Florida a “red state” going into the pivotal 2020 election.
[Related: How Arizona Became A Swing State]
They’re right, to a degree: Florida has long been a slightly red state. Since 2004, it has consistently voted 3 or 4 points more Republican than the nation as a whole in presidential elections. (Indeed, polls of Florida are currently 0.9 points better for President Trump than national polls, according to FiveThirtyEight’s polling averages.) But could what happened in 2018 — when Florida was so much redder than the nation that it was out of reach for Democrats, even in a wave election — happen again in 2020?
It’s true that, on the surface, Nelson and Gillum barely improved upon Hillary Clinton’s 1.2-point loss in Florida in 2016. Accounting for the much bluer national environment, that would imply either that Florida is immune to shifts in the national mood or that the state lurched to the right sometime in the intervening two years. But as the map below shows, Nelson actually performed from 3 to 14 points better than Clinton in a majority of Florida counties, even though he lost many of her voters elsewhere in the state. (Gillum’s map told a similar story, so we’re not showing it, as of the two 2018 Democratic candidates, Nelson — a moderate white man in his 70s — is a better stand-in for the party’s presumptive 2020 presidential nominee, Joe Biden.) This is important because it underscores that the state is not “wave-proof”; instead, it’s made up of some complex coalitions that we’ll dive into more momentarily.
Ultimately, Scott (and DeSantis) won because they did significantly better than Trump in a handful of big counties, virtually erasing Democratic gains elsewhere. Most glaringly, Miami-Dade County — Florida’s most populated county — and Osceola County voted more than 8 points more Republican in the 2018 Senate race than in the 2016 presidential race. In addition, Nelson underperformed Clinton by 6 points in the much less populous Hendry County.
What’s so special about these counties? They are Florida’s three majority-Hispanic counties, and it turns out that Hispanic voters voted significantly less Democratic in 2018 than in 2016. According to exit polls, Hispanic voters voted for Nelson 54 percent to 45 percent (the gubernatorial numbers were virtually identical), two years after they supported Clinton 62 percent to 35 percent. So the big question for Democrats in 2020 is whether Biden can return to Clinton’s level of support among Hispanics.
[Related: How Popular Is President Donald Trump?]
It’s hard to say for sure, as the reasons for Democrats’ 2018 underperformance in Florida are as diverse as the state’s Hispanic population. For example, Puerto Rican Floridians (who make up 32 percent of Osceola County) strongly dislike Trump, but they actually gave Scott high marks for focusing on their community in the wake of Hurricane Maria. But with Trump back on the ballot in 2020, there’s good reason to think that their Republican sympathies will evaporate once again. According to Carlos Odio, the co-founder of data firm EquisLabs, a private poll recently gave Biden a 41-point lead among Puerto Rican voters in Florida, which would be close to the 46-point lead Clinton enjoyed in a Latino Decisions poll immediately before the 2016 election.
Democrats may not be able to solve their problems so easily with Cuban Americans, though, who make up the plurality (36 percent) of crucial Miami-Dade County. Cuban Americans are the rare bloc of Hispanic voters who truly lean Republican; in fact, they outright backed Trump in 2016. Trump is estimated to have won between 50 percent and 58 percent of Florida’s Cuban American vote in 2016, and this group has been even more Republican in past presidential elections. They still vote strongly Republican in elections for lower offices as well. For instance, the Florida International University Cuba Poll, which has measured public opinion among Cuban Americans for almost 30 years, found that Scott and DeSantis each won about 70 percent of the Cuban American vote in Miami-Dade. This was likely instrumental in Miami-Dade’s rightward shift in 2018: An analysis of the 2016 and 2018 results by Democratic data consultant Matthew Isbell found that the Miami-Dade precincts that swung hardest toward the GOP were its most Cuban American precincts.
[Related: The Latest Political Polls Collected By FiveThirtyEight]
And unfortunately for Biden, Trump’s crusades against socialism and hardline stance against Cuba and its close ally Venezuela may have elevated his standing among Cuban Americans. An EquisLabs poll from November 2019 found that 63 percent of Cuban American voters in Florida would vote to reelect Trump (though, of course, that was long before the pandemic started dragging down his polling numbers across the board). That wouldn’t be as bad for Democrats as 2018, but EquisLabs estimates that level of support would be worth a net of 90,000 more Trump votes in Florida than in 2016.
However, even if Trump makes inroads with Cuban Americans, some historical trends suggest that Miami-Dade will not be as red as it was in 2018. For reasons ranging from disproportionately low Democratic turnout in midterms to the Cuban American habit of voting more Republican in nonpresidential races, the margin in Miami-Dade is almost always less Democratic in midterm years than in the presidential years on either side. So Miami-Dade’s right turn in 2018 was actually completely predictable — and it might not mean anything for 2020.
The real question mark is whether Miami-Dade will follow the pattern of recent years in 2020 and be bluer than it was in 2016. For reasons ranging from generational change (Cuban Americans born in the U.S. are more likely than their immigrant parents and grandparents to vote Democratic) to the ubiquitous urban and suburban realignment, the county has voted more Democratic in every successive presidential election since 2004.
Of course, there’s always the possibility that this trend won’t continue.
One final point in Biden’s favor is Florida’s large population of older Americans. Of all the states in the union, Florida has the largest proportion of residents age 65 or older (20 percent) — and polls indicate that Biden is winning among these voters nationally. That’s unusual for a Democrat these days, too, which speaks to Biden’s current electoral strength. There is evidence that Biden isn’t doing quite as well among older Floridians (Trump was leading among them by 8 points in both a recent CBS News/YouGov poll and the latest New York Times Upshot/Siena College poll), but the former vice president is still doing better than either Clinton (who lost among voters age 65 or older by 17 points) or Nelson (who lost among them by 14) did, according to the exit polls.
If this trend holds, it has the potential to help Biden all across the state, but especially in counties with lots of retirement communities. Two of these counties are where Democrats also lost ground in the 2018 Senate race: Collier (which was 4 points redder in 2018 than in 2016) and Sumter (which was 3 points redder). Collier, on the southwest coast, is home to Naples and is 31 percent age 65 or older. And Sumter, the location of famously massive retirement community The Villages, is a whopping 56 percent age 65 or older. Unlike Miami-Dade and Osceola, these counties might really be drifting toward Republicans in the long term, but Biden may have what it takes to temporarily reverse that trend.
[Related: Our 2020 National Polling Averages]
In summary, it’s not unreasonable to believe that Biden will be able to hold onto (or build upon) Nelson’s gains in the blue counties in the map above, thanks to the current pro-Democratic national environment. And with the help of Hispanic voters, older voters, or both, it’s also not hard to imagine Biden returning to Clinton’s levels of support in some of the counties that drifted red in 2018. However, Trump is fighting to build upon his 2016 support among these voters too, and without them, Biden will have a hard time winning the state — as 2018 showed.
The bottom line: The outlook is bright for Democrats in the Sunshine State. On average, polls of Florida show Biden leading Trump by a healthy 7.1 points. If that holds, it would be a blowout by Florida standards — the widest margin for a presidential candidate since George H.W. Bush won by 22 points in 1988. But, of course, if Florida does go blue again in 2020, it would put the state in a very familiar role: as a beach ball once again.
Confidence Interval: Democrats could win 60 Senate seats | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-27--How The Pandemic Could Force A Generation Of Mothers Out Of The Workforce

For the past few months , Alicia Wertz has barely seen her husband .
Since schools closed in their northern Alabama town in March , they ’ ve been single-mindedly focused on a single goal : making sure that someone was watching their three kids .
At first , Wertz tried working from home .
But she wasn ’ t getting anything done , so they tried splitting the hours : Wertz ’ s husband watches the children in the morning , then a sitter comes to relieve him in the afternoon until Wertz takes over when she returns from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not working , we ’ re by ourselves with the children .
It almost feels like you ’ re a single parent .
All you do is go to work and care for the kids , ” Wertz said .
In her mind , Wertz is counting down the days until schools reopen .
But there ’ s a nagging worry at the back of her head — what if they don ’ t open at all ?
“ The thought of [ my kids ] not going back in the fall is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spoke in early July .
“ It raises this question of — if one of us has to stay home with the children , whose job is more important ?
I think it was something that we did have conversations about before , but COVID-19 has made it much worse.
” [ Related : Where The Latest COVID-19 Models Think We ’ re Headed — And Why They Disagree ] Wertz isn ’ t the only working mother for whom the thought of the fall calendar sparks both relief and dread .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and long-lasting — effects on the careers of countless women across the country .
Studies have shown that women already shoulder much of the burden of caring for and educating their children at home ; now , they ’ re also more likely than men to have lost their jobs thanks to the pandemic .
And the collapse of the child care and public education infrastructure that so many parents rely on will only magnify these problems , even pushing some women out of the labor force entirely .
“ We ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we ’ ve made for women over the past few decades , and especially women of color , ” said Melissa Boteach , Vice President for Income Security and Child Care/Early Learning at the National Women ’ s Law Center .
The crux of the issue : Child care just isn ’ t as available as it was before the pandemic .
Data provided to FiveThirtyEight by the job-search website Indeed shows that child-care services have been much slower to hire again ( a useful proxy for re-opening ) than other areas of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news that many schools will remain closed in the fall , and it ’ s easy to see the crisis at hand .
If polling is any indication , the vast majority of the fallout is being weathered by mothers , who were already doing the majority of household work even before the pandemic began .
In 2015 , the Pew Research Center asked parents about how they divide family responsibilities when both work full-time .
Some tasks were split relatively evenly : Twenty percent of respondents said the mother disciplined children more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more , and 61 percent said that responsibility was shared equally .
For every task , however , more respondents reported that the mother carried a greater amount of the load than those who said the father did — including areas involving managing children ’ s schedules , caring for children when they ’ re sick and handling household chores .
Along similar lines , Pew also found in a poll from 2019 that 80 percent of women living with a partner who had children did the primary grocery shopping and meal-preparation duties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Bureau of Labor Statistics ’ American Time Use Survey — which tracks the average amount of time people spend per day on different categories of activity — married mothers with full-time jobs spent 56 percent more time doing childcare and housework than corresponding fathers .
By contrast , fathers spent more time on work-related tasks , travel and leisure activities .
Even under normal circumstances , it was difficult for mothers of young children to balance work against the heavy burden of child care .
The BLS found that in 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with children under age 6 was 66.4 percent , well below the rate for women with children age 6 or older ( 76.8 percent ) .
According to a 2014 survey by the U.S. Census Bureau , 61 percent of women who were out of a job and have young children listed “ caretaking ” as a reason why they were not employed .
Forty-six percent of women who were out of a job and have older children said the same .
To put that in perspective , only 10 percent of all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caregiving as a reason .
A similar strain is apparent in working mothers ’ decisions to take unpaid leave , or even part-time jobs instead of full-time ones .
According to that same census survey from 2014 , 30 percent of women who were part-time workers with young children — and 19 percent of women with older children — said caretaking was a reason they worked part-time .
( Among part-time workers , the overall share is just 7 percent . )
Now , with schools closed and day cares struggling to remain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the best — or perhaps the only — choice for their family and their own sanity is to reduce their hours , or even press “ pause ” on their career .
“ Sometimes I ’ ll get to a point where I ’ m like , ‘ I ’ m so tired , I ’ ll have to go part-time to make it all work , ’ ” said Lee Dunham , a lawyer who lives in Delaware .
Since the pandemic started , Dunham has been mostly responsible for her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means her work day doesn ’ t start until 8 p.m. and usually wraps around 2 a.m.. “ I ’ m just basically not getting enough sleep because I ’ m watching the baby 40 hours a week and doing my job 40 hours a week .
It ’ s really rough.
” Dunham feels she ’ s lucky to have an understanding employer who told her earlier this year that they ’ d be cutting all of their employees some slack because of the pandemic .
But at the time , she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be up and running by mid-summer .
“ It might be that I have to dial back my hours , which of course means I will get paid less.
” This kind of calculus already depresses women ’ s wages and makes it harder for their careers to progress .
According to the National Women ’ s Law Center , mothers are typically only paid 71 cents for every dollar paid to fathers .
In fact , a lot of recent research into the gender pay gap has found that much of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on working mothers .
For instance , a 2018 analysis of data from Denmark — which offers a counterpoint to the United States in terms of social safety net , yet still has a very large and persistent gender wage gap — found that women ’ s earnings drop significantly after having their first child , while men ’ s earnings aren ’ t affected at all .
And crucially , several studies in the U.S. and other countries have found that the trajectory of wages for women who don ’ t have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have kids or not ( although some research has actually suggested that becoming a father can contribute to men ’ s career success ) .
This disparity is particularly intense for women of color .
Black mothers are paid only 54 cents for every dollar paid to a white father , according to NWLC ; for Latina mothers , it ’ s 46 cents .
Low-income women of color are also among the likeliest to have lost their jobs in the current recession .
And they ’ re disproportionately likely to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to come back to work , sometimes in unsafe working conditions , for low wages .
“ We ’ re in a vicious cycle where we need child care as one of the tools to get women to equal pay , and yet unequal pay is one of the primary reasons that women are pushed into staying home , ” Boteach said .
[ Related : How Americans View The Coronavirus Crisis And Trump ’ s Response ] Leaving the workforce , even if it ’ s just for a year or two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a woman for the rest of her life , even depressing her earnings in retirement .
Finding a new job after a few years on hiatus can be very difficult for mothers , who may be stereotyped as less serious about their careers because they took time off to be with their children .
One study from 2007 found that mothers were perceived to be less competent than fathers , and their recommended salaries were also lower .
During this pandemic , you can already see the disproportionate impact taking shape .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 16.2 percent , higher than it has been in any month since at least 1948 , before dropping to 11.7 percent in June — a percentage point higher than the rate for men ( 10.6 percent ) .
Even more striking , labor force participation for women dipped to 54.7 percent in April before rising to 56.1 percent last month .
Both of those numbers are reminiscent of the rates for women from the 1980s — back when the very notion of women in the workforce was still gaining momentum .
Wertz has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least for now .
“ I worked incredibly hard to get to where I am now , ” she said .
“ I essentially paid my way through school with no family support .
For years I worked entirely too hard for not enough money.
” Already , she worries that she ’ s perceived differently in the workplace because she ’ s a mother .
“ Even if it was just a year , I know how that gap would look on my resume , ” she said .
“ If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I just don ’ t know if I ’ d recover from it.
” How a 60-year-old drug became our best hope for saving people with COVID-19

For the past few months, Alicia Wertz has barely seen her husband. Since schools closed in their northern Alabama town in March, they’ve been single-mindedly focused on a single goal: making sure that someone was watching their three kids. At first, Wertz tried working from home. But she wasn’t getting anything done, so they tried splitting the hours: Wertz’s husband watches the children in the morning, then a sitter comes to relieve him in the afternoon until Wertz takes over when she returns from work.
“When we’re not working, we’re by ourselves with the children. It almost feels like you’re a single parent. All you do is go to work and care for the kids,” Wertz said.
In her mind, Wertz is counting down the days until schools reopen. But there’s a nagging worry at the back of her head — what if they don’t open at all? “The thought of [my kids] not going back in the fall is devastating,” Wertz said when we spoke in early July. “It raises this question of — if one of us has to stay home with the children, whose job is more important? I think it was something that we did have conversations about before, but COVID-19 has made it much worse.”
[Related: Where The Latest COVID-19 Models Think We’re Headed — And Why They Disagree]
Wertz isn’t the only working mother for whom the thought of the fall calendar sparks both relief and dread. And what comes next could have disproportionate — and long-lasting — effects on the careers of countless women across the country. Studies have shown that women already shoulder much of the burden of caring for and educating their children at home; now, they’re also more likely than men to have lost their jobs thanks to the pandemic. And the collapse of the child care and public education infrastructure that so many parents rely on will only magnify these problems, even pushing some women out of the labor force entirely.
“We’re in danger of erasing the limited gains we’ve made for women over the past few decades, and especially women of color,” said Melissa Boteach, Vice President for Income Security and Child Care/Early Learning at the National Women’s Law Center.
The crux of the issue: Child care just isn’t as available as it was before the pandemic. Data provided to FiveThirtyEight by the job-search website Indeed shows that child-care services have been much slower to hire again (a useful proxy for re-opening) than other areas of the economy:
Combine that with the news that many schools will remain closed in the fall, and it’s easy to see the crisis at hand. If polling is any indication, the vast majority of the fallout is being weathered by mothers, who were already doing the majority of household work even before the pandemic began.
In 2015, the Pew Research Center asked parents about how they divide family responsibilities when both work full-time. Some tasks were split relatively evenly: Twenty percent of respondents said the mother disciplined children more, 17 percent said the father disciplined more, and 61 percent said that responsibility was shared equally. For every task, however, more respondents reported that the mother carried a greater amount of the load than those who said the father did — including areas involving managing children’s schedules, caring for children when they’re sick and handling household chores.
Moms usually shoulder more of the load at home Share of parents in households with two full-time working parents who say each parent does more work in a given category, according to a Pew poll Share of parents who say… Category Mother does more Father does more Work split equally Managing children’s schedules/activities 54% 6% 39% Taking care of sick children 47 6 47 Handling household chores, etc. 31 9 59 Playing/doing activities with children 22 13 64 Disciplining children 20 17 61 Based on 2015 poll by Pew Research, with a sample size of 531 respondents. The sample included male/female married couples only. Source: Pew Research center
Along similar lines, Pew also found in a poll from 2019 that 80 percent of women living with a partner who had children did the primary grocery shopping and meal-preparation duties for their families. And according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American Time Use Survey — which tracks the average amount of time people spend per day on different categories of activity — married mothers with full-time jobs spent 56 percent more time doing childcare and housework than corresponding fathers. By contrast, fathers spent more time on work-related tasks, travel and leisure activities.
All that extra time moms spend really adds up Daily time spent doing various activities by married parents of children under 18 who both worked full-time, according to the American Time Use Survey Hours spent per day Activity Mothers Fathers Diff. Household activities 1.87 1.23 +0.64 Physical care for children 0.59 0.28 0.31 Child care – other 0.36 0.22 0.14 Child-related travel 0.25 0.13 0.12 Education-related activities 0.10 0.06 0.04 Reading with children 0.05 0.03 0.02 Playing/hobbies with children 0.27 0.29 -0.02 Total 3.49 2.24 1.25 Survey data covers the combined years of 2015 through 2019 and includes both opposite- and same-sex couples. Source: bls.gov
Even under normal circumstances, it was difficult for mothers of young children to balance work against the heavy burden of child care. The BLS found that in 2019, the labor force participation rate for women with children under age 6 was 66.4 percent, well below the rate for women with children age 6 or older (76.8 percent). According to a 2014 survey by the U.S. Census Bureau, 61 percent of women who were out of a job and have young children listed “caretaking” as a reason why they were not employed. Forty-six percent of women who were out of a job and have older children said the same. To put that in perspective, only 10 percent of all respondents who were out of work gave caregiving as a reason.
A similar strain is apparent in working mothers’ decisions to take unpaid leave, or even part-time jobs instead of full-time ones. According to that same census survey from 2014, 30 percent of women who were part-time workers with young children — and 19 percent of women with older children — said caretaking was a reason they worked part-time. (Among part-time workers, the overall share is just 7 percent.)
Now, with schools closed and day cares struggling to remain open, even more women may conclude that the best — or perhaps the only — choice for their family and their own sanity is to reduce their hours, or even press “pause” on their career.
“Sometimes I’ll get to a point where I’m like, ‘I’m so tired, I’ll have to go part-time to make it all work,’” said Lee Dunham, a lawyer who lives in Delaware. Since the pandemic started, Dunham has been mostly responsible for her 10-month-old daughter during the day — which means her work day doesn’t start until 8 p.m. and usually wraps around 2 a.m.. “I’m just basically not getting enough sleep because I’m watching the baby 40 hours a week and doing my job 40 hours a week. It’s really rough.”
Dunham feels she’s lucky to have an understanding employer who told her earlier this year that they’d be cutting all of their employees some slack because of the pandemic. But at the time, she added, everyone was assuming day care would be up and running by mid-summer. “It might be that I have to dial back my hours, which of course means I will get paid less.”
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This kind of calculus already depresses women’s wages and makes it harder for their careers to progress. According to the National Women’s Law Center, mothers are typically only paid 71 cents for every dollar paid to fathers. In fact, a lot of recent research into the gender pay gap has found that much of it is simply due to the constraints on working mothers. For instance, a 2018 analysis of data from Denmark — which offers a counterpoint to the United States in terms of social safety net, yet still has a very large and persistent gender wage gap — found that women’s earnings drop significantly after having their first child, while men’s earnings aren’t affected at all. And crucially, several studies in the U.S. and other countries have found that the trajectory of wages for women who don’t have children resembles those of men, whether they have kids or not (although some research has actually suggested that becoming a father can contribute to men’s career success).
This disparity is particularly intense for women of color. Black mothers are paid only 54 cents for every dollar paid to a white father, according to NWLC; for Latina mothers, it’s 46 cents. Low-income women of color are also among the likeliest to have lost their jobs in the current recession. And they’re disproportionately likely to be the child-care workers who are being asked to come back to work, sometimes in unsafe working conditions, for low wages. “We’re in a vicious cycle where we need child care as one of the tools to get women to equal pay, and yet unequal pay is one of the primary reasons that women are pushed into staying home,” Boteach said.
[Related: How Americans View The Coronavirus Crisis And Trump’s Response]
Leaving the workforce, even if it’s just for a year or two, has ripple effects that can follow a woman for the rest of her life, even depressing her earnings in retirement. Finding a new job after a few years on hiatus can be very difficult for mothers, who may be stereotyped as less serious about their careers because they took time off to be with their children. One study from 2007 found that mothers were perceived to be less competent than fathers, and their recommended salaries were also lower.
During this pandemic, you can already see the disproportionate impact taking shape. The unemployment rate for women in April was 16.2 percent, higher than it has been in any month since at least 1948, before dropping to 11.7 percent in June — a percentage point higher than the rate for men (10.6 percent). Even more striking, labor force participation for women dipped to 54.7 percent in April before rising to 56.1 percent last month. Both of those numbers are reminiscent of the rates for women from the 1980s — back when the very notion of women in the workforce was still gaining momentum.
Wertz has no plans to leave her job — at least for now. “I worked incredibly hard to get to where I am now,” she said. “I essentially paid my way through school with no family support. For years I worked entirely too hard for not enough money.” Already, she worries that she’s perceived differently in the workplace because she’s a mother. “Even if it was just a year, I know how that gap would look on my resume,” she said. “If I had to take that step back, I just don’t know if I’d recover from it.”
How a 60-year-old drug became our best hope for saving people with COVID-19


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-28--Voters Are Starting To Doubt Trump’s Reelection Chances

For months now , President Trump has trailed Joe Biden in the polls .
First , it was only a 5- or 6-percentage-point gap , but since the middle of June , that margin has widened to anywhere from 8 to 9 points , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s national polling average .
But until very recently , voters didn ’ t seem all that convinced that Biden could win .
In poll after poll , comparatively more voters said they thought Trump would win reelection in November .
Now , though , that view may be shifting .
Over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the share of voters who said they expect Trump to win has fallen from about 45 percent to around 40 percent in polling by The Economist/YouGov , as the chart below shows , while Biden ’ s share has slowly ticked up to where Trump ’ s numbers are .
( Roughly a fifth of respondents still say they ’ re “ not sure.
” ) Trump ’ s decline may not seem that dramatic — and it ’ s not ; it ’ s only a few points lower — but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ June , he had trailed on this question only once since The Economist/YouGov first asked it in December .
But it ’ s not just the Economist/YouGov polling that supports this finding .
USA Today/Suffolk University found a more substantial drop in Trump ’ s numbers .
In late June , 41 percent of voters said they expected Trump to win , whereas 50 percent said the same in the pollster ’ s late October 2019 survey .
Conversely , 45 percent said Biden would win in June , an improvement from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in October .
Republican pollster Echelon Insights has also observed a downward trend in Trump ’ s numbers : In a survey completed last week , 33 percent of likely voters said they expected Trump to win , which was down from 39 percent in the pollster ’ s June survey .
Meanwhile , the share who thought Biden would win ticked up to 43 percent in July from 40 percent in June .
On the whole , it seems voters are now less confident in Trump ’ s reelection chances , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be independent voters .
In USA Today/Suffolk ’ s June survey , 47 percent of independents picked Biden versus 35 percent who chose Trump , a reversal from the October 2019 poll , when 54 percent of independents expected Trump to win compared with 30 percent who said the Democratic nominee would win .
And looking across the Economist/YouGov data since early May , the share of independents who expect Trump to win has slid as well , from the low 40s to the mid-to-high 30s .
As for Democrats and Republicans , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ win , although that wasn ’ t always the case in 2016 , as many Republicans thought Hillary Clinton would win .
Nonetheless , that doesn ’ t seem to be happening in 2020 .
The Economist/YouGov and USA Today/Suffolk surveys found that Democratic voters are largely confident in Biden ’ s chances , while most Republicans believe that Trump will win .
However , since May , the Economist/YouGov polls show an increase in Democrats ’ belief in Biden ’ s chances and a slight downtick in Republicans ’ faith in Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to diminished confidence in Trump ’ s reelection chances .
From mid-March to late May , the president usually led Biden in RealClearPolitics ’ average of betting odds : Trump ’ s chances hovered mostly around 50 percent , while Biden ’ s stood in the low 40s .
But in early June , Biden ’ s odds surged and outstripped Trump ’ s ; now the markets give Biden about a 60 percent chance of victory , while Trump ’ s chances have fallen into the mid-30s .
This change isn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mostly follow the polling averages .
But it ’ s also not difficult to intuit why more Americans might think Trump will lose the election now than before .
The president has consistently received poor marks for his handling of the coronavirus pandemic as well as for his handling of nationwide protests precipitated by the police killing of George Floyd in late May .
And Trump ’ s overall job approval rating has now dipped to around 40 percent in FiveThirtyEight ’ s tracker .
Simply put , past incumbent presidents with those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reelection .
This is coupled with the fact that Biden ’ s national lead has grown , and his margin over Trump is now larger than Clinton ’ s edge at any point during the 2016 cycle .
Looking at the Electoral College , Biden also holds sizable leads in key battleground states , which could make it difficult for Trump to win despite those states ’ tending to lean more Republican than the country as a whole .
If anything , Trump ’ s surprise victory in 2016 is likely the biggest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take a dimmer view of his reelection odds .
After all , he was behind in the polls four years ago and yet went on to win , so it ’ s understandable that even though the margins are larger now , some Americans might be taking an attitude of “ fool me once , shame on you ; fool me twice , shame on me.
” Tellingly , a Monmouth University survey of Pennsylvania voters earlier this month found that about a quarter of respondents believe there ’ s a “ secret @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s little evidence to support the idea that “ shy ” Trump voters exist .
All in all , though , voter expectations and election betting markets suggest that Americans increasingly view Biden as at least an even bet to win in November .
None of this means Biden will actually defeat Trump , but these shifts do suggest that the conventional wisdom is catching up to what the state and national election polls have been telling us about the race .
The electoral environment could very well change in the next three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ starting to coalesce around the idea that Trump is a real underdog to win reelection .

For months now, President Trump has trailed Joe Biden in the polls. First, it was only a 5- or 6-percentage-point gap, but since the middle of June, that margin has widened to anywhere from 8 to 9 points, according to FiveThirtyEight’s national polling average.
But until very recently, voters didn’t seem all that convinced that Biden could win. In poll after poll, comparatively more voters said they thought Trump would win reelection in November. Now, though, that view may be shifting.
Over the past two and a half months, the share of voters who said they expect Trump to win has fallen from about 45 percent to around 40 percent in polling by The Economist/YouGov, as the chart below shows, while Biden’s share has slowly ticked up to where Trump’s numbers are. (Roughly a fifth of respondents still say they’re “not sure.”)
Trump’s decline may not seem that dramatic — and it’s not; it’s only a few points lower — but it’s notable because prior to June, he had trailed on this question only once since The Economist/YouGov first asked it in December.
But it’s not just the Economist/YouGov polling that supports this finding. USA Today/Suffolk University found a more substantial drop in Trump’s numbers. In late June, 41 percent of voters said they expected Trump to win, whereas 50 percent said the same in the pollster’s late October 2019 survey. Conversely, 45 percent said Biden would win in June, an improvement from the 40 percent who picked the Democratic nominee in October. Republican pollster Echelon Insights has also observed a downward trend in Trump’s numbers: In a survey completed last week, 33 percent of likely voters said they expected Trump to win, which was down from 39 percent in the pollster’s June survey. Meanwhile, the share who thought Biden would win ticked up to 43 percent in July from 40 percent in June.
[Related: Our 2020 National Polling Averages]
On the whole, it seems voters are now less confident in Trump’s reelection chances, and the main driver of that shift may be independent voters. In USA Today/Suffolk’s June survey, 47 percent of independents picked Biden versus 35 percent who chose Trump, a reversal from the October 2019 poll, when 54 percent of independents expected Trump to win compared with 30 percent who said the Democratic nominee would win. And looking across the Economist/YouGov data since early May, the share of independents who expect Trump to win has slid as well, from the low 40s to the mid-to-high 30s.
As for Democrats and Republicans, they mostly say their respective nominee will win, although that wasn’t always the case in 2016, as many Republicans thought Hillary Clinton would win. Nonetheless, that doesn’t seem to be happening in 2020. The Economist/YouGov and USA Today/Suffolk surveys found that Democratic voters are largely confident in Biden’s chances, while most Republicans believe that Trump will win. However, since May, the Economist/YouGov polls show an increase in Democrats’ belief in Biden’s chances and a slight downtick in Republicans’ faith in Trump’s.
[Related: How Popular Is President Donald Trump?]
Betting markets also point to diminished confidence in Trump’s reelection chances. From mid-March to late May, the president usually led Biden in RealClearPolitics’ average of betting odds: Trump’s chances hovered mostly around 50 percent, while Biden’s stood in the low 40s. But in early June, Biden’s odds surged and outstripped Trump’s; now the markets give Biden about a 60 percent chance of victory, while Trump’s chances have fallen into the mid-30s.
This change isn’t necessarily surprising, as betting markets mostly follow the polling averages. But it’s also not difficult to intuit why more Americans might think Trump will lose the election now than before. The president has consistently received poor marks for his handling of the coronavirus pandemic as well as for his handling of nationwide protests precipitated by the police killing of George Floyd in late May. And Trump’s overall job approval rating has now dipped to around 40 percent in FiveThirtyEight’s tracker. Simply put, past incumbent presidents with those sorts of marks have failed to win reelection.
[Related: Our Pollster Ratings]
This is coupled with the fact that Biden’s national lead has grown, and his margin over Trump is now larger than Clinton’s edge at any point during the 2016 cycle. Looking at the Electoral College, Biden also holds sizable leads in key battleground states, which could make it difficult for Trump to win despite those states’ tending to lean more Republican than the country as a whole.
If anything, Trump’s surprise victory in 2016 is likely the biggest reason why more people don’t take a dimmer view of his reelection odds. After all, he was behind in the polls four years ago and yet went on to win, so it’s understandable that even though the margins are larger now, some Americans might be taking an attitude of “fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” Tellingly, a Monmouth University survey of Pennsylvania voters earlier this month found that about a quarter of respondents believe there’s a “secret” Trump vote, although there’s little evidence to support the idea that “shy” Trump voters exist.
All in all, though, voter expectations and election betting markets suggest that Americans increasingly view Biden as at least an even bet to win in November. None of this means Biden will actually defeat Trump, but these shifts do suggest that the conventional wisdom is catching up to what the state and national election polls have been telling us about the race. The electoral environment could very well change in the next three months, but these indicators are all starting to coalesce around the idea that Trump is a real underdog to win reelection.
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