fivethirtyeight--2020-05-04--Justin Amash Could Cause Some Trouble In November

The 2020 presidential election just got its first notable third-party challenger .
Last Tuesday , Michigan Rep. Justin Amash , who left the Republican Party nine months ago and became an independent , announced he would run for president as a Libertarian .
And while we won ’ t know whether Amash wins his new party ’ s nomination until later this month , here ’ s what we do know about third-party candidacies more broadly and what that could mean for President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden in the general election .
First , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in November .
Take what happened in 2016 .
Third-party candidates won 6 percent of the vote , which was the largest share of the vote since Ross Perot ran for a second time in 1996 , but it was still just 6 percent .
As you can see in the chart below , third-party candidates don ’ t tend to win that much support .
Our system just isn ’ t set up for successful third-party presidential bids .
However , that doesn ’ t mean Amash ( or other third-party contenders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In this era of close elections , small shifts in the margins can matter a great deal to the final result , and third-party contenders can play a part in that .
Amash ’ s candidacy , in particular , could affect the margins in some key battleground states , including his home state of Michigan , which was pivotal to Trump ’ s victory four years ago .
Consider what happened in 2016 : In 11 states , Libertarian nominee Gary Johnson ’ s raw vote total exceeded the vote margin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that doesn ’ t mean Johnson necessarily changed who won in each of those states , but he and other third-party contenders ( like Jill Stein of the Green Party ) may have helped shape the outcome , especially in the three states that proved decisive in the Electoral College : Michigan , Pennsylvania and Wisconsin .
So who might Amash ’ s candidacy hurt more in 2020 — Biden or Trump ?
This is a hard question to answer , but there are some reasons as to why an Amash bid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Estimates vary for how many Americans are “ libertarian ” — perhaps anywhere from 4 percent to 22 percent of the public — though most voters back one of the two major parties , so we ’ re not talking about a huge portion of the electorate .
That said , there is evidence that more libertarian-minded voters are more likely to vote Republican than Democratic , which could cost Trump at the ballot box .
What ’ s more , a relatively high-profile Libertarian nominee like Amash could be more successful in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This group might include the small slice of conservative and/or Republican voters — including some “ Never Trumpers ” — who may be uncomfortable with Trump or even dislike the president .
These voters in particular might like Amash because of his conservative record , support for limited government and long-standing opposition to Trump — for instance , he was the only non-Democrat to vote for Trump ’ s impeachment in the House .
Still , an Amash bid could still present problems for Biden , too .
If 2020 is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden may not want another well-known candidate in the race to give potential anti-Trump voters a different choice .
Polls have long shown that a majority of voters prefer an alternative candidate to Trump , but that doesn ’ t mean that alternative has to be Biden .
So it ’ s possible that Amash could win over some of these voters , lowering Biden ’ s ceiling and narrowing the race between the major-party nominees .
Trump seems to have adopted this view , responding to Amash ’ s announcement by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Stein , who some on the left think spoiled the election for Clinton in 2016 .
And looking at the Electoral College , Amash ’ s impact could be most deeply felt in Michigan , where he could actually win enough votes to influence the outcome .
We would expect Amash to win a larger share of the vote in his home state , considering Johnson did his best in 2016 in New Mexico , where he ’ d been a two-term GOP governor , winning 9 percent of the vote .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ t held a statewide office , but he probably would still have an advantage in the western part of Michigan , which he ’ s represented in the House for nearly 10 years .
That could get in the way of Democrats ’ hopes of making gains in traditionally Republican Kent County — Amash ’ s base and home to Grand Rapids — because of its sizable share of college-educated voters .
While Biden has led most early Michigan polls , Amash could complicate the race there .
But it ’ s also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that good of an environment for third-party candidates .
One reason for this comes down to a familiar feature of American politics : partisan polarization .
Take 2016 .
On the one hand , it probably should have been a better year for third-party candidates , as political science research shows that third-party support is often strongest when partisans dislike their parties ’ nominees but don ’ t want to cross over and vote for the other major party .
But as we saw in 2016 , two historically unpopular nominees weren ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters and create a meaningful movement around an alternative .
And some of this may be due to negative partisanship — or voters staying fully loyal to their party rather than casting a protest vote because they loathe the idea of the other party winning more .
It ’ s also possible that there just isn ’ t enough overlap between the two parties in 2020 .
The parties are ideologically distinct and very attuned to their activists on cultural and social issues as well as economic ones , meaning there is less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dent in the electorate .
For instance , one reason Perot emerged in the 1990s as such a strong alternative is both Republicans and Democrats were still struggling over the role economic and identity issues would play in their respective parties , with Republicans split between traditional ( George H.W .
Bush ) and culturally conservative ( Pat Buchanan ) camps .
Democrats were also split , searching for their ideological identity after 12 years out of the White House , ultimately turning to the center with the nomination of Bill Clinton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that often make a third-party bid successful , but they also require some fluidity in the party system that might not be there today .
Ultimately , the evidence is mixed about whether an Amash run on the Libertarian ticket would make much of an impact on the general election outcome .
And it remains to be seen whether Amash has the potential to become the next Perot , or whether his candidacy will look more like that of Johnson or Ralph Nader .
One thing shared across many of these third-party bids @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t go well for the incumbent party in the White House .

The 2020 presidential election just got its first notable third-party challenger. Last Tuesday, Michigan Rep. Justin Amash, who left the Republican Party nine months ago and became an independent, announced he would run for president as a Libertarian. And while we won’t know whether Amash wins his new party’s nomination until later this month, here’s what we do know about third-party candidacies more broadly and what that could mean for President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden in the general election.
First, it’s unlikely Amash wins much of the vote in November. Take what happened in 2016. Third-party candidates won 6 percent of the vote, which was the largest share of the vote since Ross Perot ran for a second time in 1996, but it was still just 6 percent. As you can see in the chart below, third-party candidates don’t tend to win that much support. Our system just isn’t set up for successful third-party presidential bids.
However, that doesn’t mean Amash (or other third-party contenders) won’t matter in November. In this era of close elections, small shifts in the margins can matter a great deal to the final result, and third-party contenders can play a part in that. Amash’s candidacy, in particular, could affect the margins in some key battleground states, including his home state of Michigan, which was pivotal to Trump’s victory four years ago. Consider what happened in 2016: In 11 states, Libertarian nominee Gary Johnson’s raw vote total exceeded the vote margin separating Trump and Hillary Clinton. Now, that doesn’t mean Johnson necessarily changed who won in each of those states, but he and other third-party contenders (like Jill Stein of the Green Party) may have helped shape the outcome, especially in the three states that proved decisive in the Electoral College: Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
So who might Amash’s candidacy hurt more in 2020 — Biden or Trump? This is a hard question to answer, but there are some reasons as to why an Amash bid might hurt Trump more than Biden. Estimates vary for how many Americans are “libertarian” — perhaps anywhere from 4 percent to 22 percent of the public — though most voters back one of the two major parties, so we’re not talking about a huge portion of the electorate. That said, there is evidence that more libertarian-minded voters are more likely to vote Republican than Democratic, which could cost Trump at the ballot box.
What’s more, a relatively high-profile Libertarian nominee like Amash could be more successful in attracting some GOP-leaning voters away from Trump. This group might include the small slice of conservative and/or Republican voters — including some “Never Trumpers” — who may be uncomfortable with Trump or even dislike the president. These voters in particular might like Amash because of his conservative record, support for limited government and long-standing opposition to Trump — for instance, he was the only non-Democrat to vote for Trump’s impeachment in the House.
Still, an Amash bid could still present problems for Biden, too. If 2020 is a referendum election on Trump’s presidency, Biden may not want another well-known candidate in the race to give potential anti-Trump voters a different choice. Polls have long shown that a majority of voters prefer an alternative candidate to Trump, but that doesn’t mean that alternative has to be Biden. So it’s possible that Amash could win over some of these voters, lowering Biden’s ceiling and narrowing the race between the major-party nominees. Trump seems to have adopted this view, responding to Amash’s announcement by egging on the congressman and comparing him to Stein, who some on the left think spoiled the election for Clinton in 2016.
And looking at the Electoral College, Amash’s impact could be most deeply felt in Michigan, where he could actually win enough votes to influence the outcome. We would expect Amash to win a larger share of the vote in his home state, considering Johnson did his best in 2016 in New Mexico, where he’d been a two-term GOP governor, winning 9 percent of the vote. Amash, unlike Johnson, hasn’t held a statewide office, but he probably would still have an advantage in the western part of Michigan, which he’s represented in the House for nearly 10 years. That could get in the way of Democrats’ hopes of making gains in traditionally Republican Kent County — Amash’s base and home to Grand Rapids — because of its sizable share of college-educated voters. While Biden has led most early Michigan polls, Amash could complicate the race there.
But it’s also possible that 2020 might just not be that good of an environment for third-party candidates. One reason for this comes down to a familiar feature of American politics: partisan polarization. Take 2016. On the one hand, it probably should have been a better year for third-party candidates, as political science research shows that third-party support is often strongest when partisans dislike their parties’ nominees but don’t want to cross over and vote for the other major party. But as we saw in 2016, two historically unpopular nominees weren’t enough to dampen support among partisan voters and create a meaningful movement around an alternative. And some of this may be due to negative partisanship — or voters staying fully loyal to their party rather than casting a protest vote because they loathe the idea of the other party winning more.
It’s also possible that there just isn’t enough overlap between the two parties in 2020. The parties are ideologically distinct and very attuned to their activists on cultural and social issues as well as economic ones, meaning there is less opportunity for a third-party candidate to make a dent in the electorate. For instance, one reason Perot emerged in the 1990s as such a strong alternative is both Republicans and Democrats were still struggling over the role economic and identity issues would play in their respective parties, with Republicans split between traditional (George H.W. Bush) and culturally conservative (Pat Buchanan) camps. Democrats were also split, searching for their ideological identity after 12 years out of the White House, ultimately turning to the center with the nomination of Bill Clinton. These are the kinds of conditions that often make a third-party bid successful, but they also require some fluidity in the party system that might not be there today.
Ultimately, the evidence is mixed about whether an Amash run on the Libertarian ticket would make much of an impact on the general election outcome. And it remains to be seen whether Amash has the potential to become the next Perot, or whether his candidacy will look more like that of Johnson or Ralph Nader. One thing shared across many of these third-party bids is this, though: They didn’t go well for the incumbent party in the White House.
Why switching to vote-by-mail is tougher than it seems | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-04--What We Know About Crises And Domestic Violence — And What That Could Mean For COVID-19

The novel coronavirus pandemic , in addition to its direct impact on people ’ s health , has unleashed a perfect storm of conditions that may increase the rate of domestic violence .
Social isolation , for example , is one of the most common tactics used by abusers to distance survivors from their support networks , and now physical isolation is government-sanctioned .
Unemployment claims are hitting historic highs , as are levels of economic anxiety ; both of these circumstances are linked to a higher incidence of domestic violence .
Firearm ownership is tied to a greater chance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the U.S. rocketed in March , with reports that many of those sales were to first-time gun buyers .
National hotlines even have to devise strategies to combat abusers ’ weaponizing COVID-19 itself to terrorize survivors — e.g.
, threatening to infect someone with COVID-19 or hiding cleaning supplies so the survivor can not access them .
The relationship between these factors and domestic violence is well researched and well documented , as many other articles have discussed .
But tracking the pandemic ’ s actual effects on domestic violence is nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t report it through official channels .
Stigma and fear of retribution are just a few of the reasons someone wouldn ’ t contact the police .
Because of that , we don ’ t have good data showing domestic violence incidence in normal times , let alone now .
In fact , we ’ re getting conflicting signals at the moment — while the National Domestic Violence Hotline continued to see its average of 1,800 to 2,000 contacts a day through March and April , New York Gov .
Andrew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic violence rose in the state during that same time .
So while we have solid , empirically derived reasons to believe that COVID-19 might increase the rate of domestic violence across the country , we don ’ t have the numbers to back that claim .
That can make the issue feel less real to the public and to policymakers , even though , due to the impact of COVID-19 , the increase in intimate partner violence ( IPV ) — i.e.
, physical , psychological or sexual harm in an intimate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant ?
There ’ s no perfect case study to draw from , but we can make some reasonable conclusions by looking at research on IPV and past disasters with some similarities to the COVID-19 crisis .
Economic hardship , employment instability , unemployment and perceptions of economic strain have all been linked to IPV , according to Jennifer Copp , a professor at Florida State University ’ s College of Criminology and Criminal Justice .
Domestic violence is about power and control , and when your job , finances and livelihood are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becomes a place where people seek to regain that sense of control .
Indeed , a 2001 research report from the National Institute of Justice found that rates of violence in couples experiencing high levels of financial stress were 3 1/2 times the rates in couples with low levels of stress — rising to 9.5 percent from 2.7 percent .
According to a working paper by the Center for Global Development , the effects of unemployment on IPV vary across populations due to cultural differences , but in the U.S. , the NIJ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a man in a heterosexual relationship are correlated with significantly elevated rates of abuse .
That paper didn ’ t show a causal link but found that couples in which the man was employed had a 4.7 percent prevalence of abuse , while that figure was 7.5 percent for couples in which the man experienced one period of unemployment and 12.3 percent for couples in which the man experienced two or more periods of unemployment .
Economically , the most recent circumstances analogous to the current pandemic may be those caused by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unemployment rate doubled from 5 percent in December 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009 and the net worth of households and nonprofits fell over 20 percent , a loss of some $ 14 trillion , in a year and a half .
A 2016 study published in “ Demography ” on economic indicators and IPV during the Great Recession found that an increase in the unemployment rate was correlated with a small but significant change in IPV — a 50 percent increase in the unemployment rate over the prior 12-month period , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 to 12 percent increase in the prevalence of physically violent or controlling behavior in intimate relationships .
Of course , a correlation between economic hardship and IPV may be due to other factors that are linked to greater hardship or job loss and IPV — such as mental illness , stress or substance abuse .
Establishing a causal relationship is much more difficult since economic hardship typically goes hand in hand with many other variables .
Yet coupled with what we know about the interplay of economic precarity and domestic violence , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the greatest risks in terms of increasing abuse .
It ’ s more difficult to draw comparisons between behavior after natural disasters and the current COVID-19 pandemic .
Generally , though , women have a much more precarious social and economic standing than men , and that vulnerability only increases during a disaster .
Normal resources and social support that usually curb abuse can disappear entirely depending on the type of disaster — hotlines , access to legal help and shelter availability can all be disrupted .
On top of that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disasters , but many factors are at play that don ’ t apply as much to COVID-19 — most notably displacement , which is not yet a major effect of the pandemic .
While research has shown that economic downturns are accompanied by physical , mental and emotional violence , the intersection of gender-based violence and disasters is only a recent area of focus .
It ’ s unclear whether increased violence is a simple matter of proximity or of stress or some other unknown variable .
Still , it ’ s worth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lessons for dealing with the current pandemic , as long as we keep in mind that the circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis are quite different .
In 2011 , a 6.2 magnitude earthquake hit Christchurch , New Zealand , causing 185 deaths and thousands of injuries in addition to severe structural damage .
Two weeks after the earthquake , area police said that reports of domestic violence had risen by a fifth .
Afterward , police cited business closures as a reason why more people were drinking at home , aggravating the risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after Hurricane Katrina , as many people were forced into temporary shelters .
In the first six months after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita , nearly 40 percent of sexual assaults were committed by strangers ( versus the 19.5 percent committed by strangers in all reported cases of sexual assault in the U.S. ) ; 31 percent of these assaults took place in shelters or evacuation sites .
For people whose lives were highly disrupted by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska , there was a nearly threefold increase in the likelihood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people who experienced no disruption .
One of the most striking findings to come out of research on domestic violence in the wake of a natural disaster is that , separate from the rate of abuse changing , the severity of abuse can increase as well .
In the aforementioned study of sexual assaults after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita , researchers found that in the early aftermath of the disaster , “ rapes appeared to be more brutal , often involving multiple offenders , ” and then returned to a more typical pattern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Red River Valley flood , which displaced over 50,000 people in Grand Forks , North Dakota , and East Grand Forks , Minnesota , and damaged nearly all homes in the area , referrals to domestic violence shelters from emergency rooms increased , possibly pointing to a rise in severity of physical abuse .
Even now , Katie Ray-Jones , CEO of the National Domestic Violence Hotline , said that survivors contacting them have seen an escalation in abuse tactics — including one person who said her partner pulled out a gun to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ something that had never happened before .
In some ways at least , the COVID-19 pandemic is less problematic regarding IPV than other disasters : Most hotlines are still operational , and while shelter availability varies depending on locale , there hasn ’ t been a natural event that wipes out the structures .
Many domestic violence services are still operating and are able to offer support , although survivors may be less willing to go to one for fear of catching COVID-19 .
Nathaniel Fields , CEO of Urban Resource Institute in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources and shelter for survivors of domestic violence , said that their priority right now is communication — when everyone , including your friends , neighbors and the government , is telling you to stay home , it can be hard to leave an abusive situation .
Survivors find themselves doing the mental calculus of whether it ’ s safer to stay home with the devil you know or risk the COVID-19 you don ’ t .
But those silver linings aside , the COVID-19 pandemic is still likely meaningfully increasing the rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disasters doubled or even tripled those rates .
Those were each unique circumstances , making it hard to say if something similar will happen now .
Indeed , Claire Renzetti , a professor of sociology at the University of Kentucky , didn ’ t offer any speculation as to the scale of an increase .
But she said that knowing what we know from previous experiences that haven ’ t been as bad as this one , our current economic climate will likely increase IPV .
Moreover , in normal times , domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equally , and these inequities are likely to be exacerbated during the pandemic .
Some studies have found that low-income , black and Hispanic populations are more likely to experience IPV than white populations or those with post-secondary education .
Those are the same groups bearing a disproportionate share of the direct health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic .
We probably won ’ t have the data to show much of this for years , if ever .
Data collection during disasters suffers from logistical difficulties , and quantitative insights on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that doesn ’ t mean it ’ s not happening .
Help is available .
If you or someone you know is experiencing domestic violence , reach out to the confidential National Domestic Violence Hotline .
( Call 1−800−799−7233 or TTY 1−800−787−3224 or chat online at thehotline.org . )

The novel coronavirus pandemic, in addition to its direct impact on people’s health, has unleashed a perfect storm of conditions that may increase the rate of domestic violence. Social isolation, for example, is one of the most common tactics used by abusers to distance survivors from their support networks, and now physical isolation is government-sanctioned. Unemployment claims are hitting historic highs, as are levels of economic anxiety; both of these circumstances are linked to a higher incidence of domestic violence. Firearm ownership is tied to a greater chance of domestic homicide, and gun sales in the U.S. rocketed in March, with reports that many of those sales were to first-time gun buyers. National hotlines even have to devise strategies to combat abusers’ weaponizing COVID-19 itself to terrorize survivors — e.g., threatening to infect someone with COVID-19 or hiding cleaning supplies so the survivor cannot access them.
The relationship between these factors and domestic violence is well researched and well documented, as many other articles have discussed. But tracking the pandemic’s actual effects on domestic violence is nearly impossible. Many people who experience abuse don’t report it through official channels. Stigma and fear of retribution are just a few of the reasons someone wouldn’t contact the police. Because of that, we don’t have good data showing domestic violence incidence in normal times, let alone now. In fact, we’re getting conflicting signals at the moment — while the National Domestic Violence Hotline continued to see its average of 1,800 to 2,000 contacts a day through March and April, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo announced on Friday that reports of domestic violence rose in the state during that same time.
So while we have solid, empirically derived reasons to believe that COVID-19 might increase the rate of domestic violence across the country, we don’t have the numbers to back that claim. That can make the issue feel less real to the public and to policymakers, even though, due to the impact of COVID-19, the increase in intimate partner violence (IPV) — i.e., physical, psychological or sexual harm in an intimate relationship — may be significant.
How significant? There’s no perfect case study to draw from, but we can make some reasonable conclusions by looking at research on IPV and past disasters with some similarities to the COVID-19 crisis.
Economic anxiety and joblessness
Economic hardship, employment instability, unemployment and perceptions of economic strain have all been linked to IPV, according to Jennifer Copp, a professor at Florida State University’s College of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Domestic violence is about power and control, and when your job, finances and livelihood are all up in the air, abuse becomes a place where people seek to regain that sense of control.
Indeed, a 2001 research report from the National Institute of Justice found that rates of violence in couples experiencing high levels of financial stress were 3 1/2 times the rates in couples with low levels of stress — rising to 9.5 percent from 2.7 percent. According to a working paper by the Center for Global Development, the effects of unemployment on IPV vary across populations due to cultural differences, but in the U.S., the NIJ found in 2009 that periods of unemployment by a man in a heterosexual relationship are correlated with significantly elevated rates of abuse. That paper didn’t show a causal link but found that couples in which the man was employed had a 4.7 percent prevalence of abuse, while that figure was 7.5 percent for couples in which the man experienced one period of unemployment and 12.3 percent for couples in which the man experienced two or more periods of unemployment.
Economically, the most recent circumstances analogous to the current pandemic may be those caused by the Great Recession, when the overall unemployment rate doubled from 5 percent in December 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009 and the net worth of households and nonprofits fell over 20 percent, a loss of some $14 trillion, in a year and a half. A 2016 study published in “Demography” on economic indicators and IPV during the Great Recession found that an increase in the unemployment rate was correlated with a small but significant change in IPV — a 50 percent increase in the unemployment rate over the prior 12-month period, for example, was associated with a 10 to 12 percent increase in the prevalence of physically violent or controlling behavior in intimate relationships.
Of course, a correlation between economic hardship and IPV may be due to other factors that are linked to greater hardship or job loss and IPV — such as mental illness, stress or substance abuse. Establishing a causal relationship is much more difficult since economic hardship typically goes hand in hand with many other variables. Yet coupled with what we know about the interplay of economic precarity and domestic violence, the economic fallout of COVID-19 presents perhaps one of the greatest risks in terms of increasing abuse.
Natural disasters
It’s more difficult to draw comparisons between behavior after natural disasters and the current COVID-19 pandemic. Generally, though, women have a much more precarious social and economic standing than men, and that vulnerability only increases during a disaster. Normal resources and social support that usually curb abuse can disappear entirely depending on the type of disaster — hotlines, access to legal help and shelter availability can all be disrupted. On top of that, IPV increases in the aftermath of disasters, but many factors are at play that don’t apply as much to COVID-19 — most notably displacement, which is not yet a major effect of the pandemic.
While research has shown that economic downturns are accompanied by physical, mental and emotional violence, the intersection of gender-based violence and disasters is only a recent area of focus. It’s unclear whether increased violence is a simple matter of proximity or of stress or some other unknown variable.
Still, it’s worth looking at some examples that may hold lessons for dealing with the current pandemic, as long as we keep in mind that the circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis are quite different. In 2011, a 6.2 magnitude earthquake hit Christchurch, New Zealand, causing 185 deaths and thousands of injuries in addition to severe structural damage. Two weeks after the earthquake, area police said that reports of domestic violence had risen by a fifth. Afterward, police cited business closures as a reason why more people were drinking at home, aggravating the risk of domestic violence. Sexual violence rose after Hurricane Katrina, as many people were forced into temporary shelters. In the first six months after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, nearly 40 percent of sexual assaults were committed by strangers (versus the 19.5 percent committed by strangers in all reported cases of sexual assault in the U.S.); 31 percent of these assaults took place in shelters or evacuation sites. For people whose lives were highly disrupted by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, there was a nearly threefold increase in the likelihood of experiencing domestic violence afterward compared with people who experienced no disruption.
One of the most striking findings to come out of research on domestic violence in the wake of a natural disaster is that, separate from the rate of abuse changing, the severity of abuse can increase as well. In the aforementioned study of sexual assaults after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, researchers found that in the early aftermath of the disaster, “rapes appeared to be more brutal, often involving multiple offenders,” and then returned to a more typical pattern a year later. After the 1997 Red River Valley flood, which displaced over 50,000 people in Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota, and damaged nearly all homes in the area, referrals to domestic violence shelters from emergency rooms increased, possibly pointing to a rise in severity of physical abuse. Even now, Katie Ray-Jones, CEO of the National Domestic Violence Hotline, said that survivors contacting them have seen an escalation in abuse tactics — including one person who said her partner pulled out a gun to prevent her from leaving the house, something that had never happened before.
In some ways at least, the COVID-19 pandemic is less problematic regarding IPV than other disasters: Most hotlines are still operational, and while shelter availability varies depending on locale, there hasn’t been a natural event that wipes out the structures. Many domestic violence services are still operating and are able to offer support, although survivors may be less willing to go to one for fear of catching COVID-19. Nathaniel Fields, CEO of Urban Resource Institute in New York, an organization that provides resources and shelter for survivors of domestic violence, said that their priority right now is communication — when everyone, including your friends, neighbors and the government, is telling you to stay home, it can be hard to leave an abusive situation. Survivors find themselves doing the mental calculus of whether it’s safer to stay home with the devil you know or risk the COVID-19 you don’t.
But those silver linings aside, the COVID-19 pandemic is still likely meaningfully increasing the rate of domestic violence. Past downturns and disasters doubled or even tripled those rates. Those were each unique circumstances, making it hard to say if something similar will happen now. Indeed, Claire Renzetti, a professor of sociology at the University of Kentucky, didn’t offer any speculation as to the scale of an increase. But she said that knowing what we know from previous experiences that haven’t been as bad as this one, our current economic climate will likely increase IPV.
Moreover, in normal times, domestic violence doesn’t affect all populations equally, and these inequities are likely to be exacerbated during the pandemic. Some studies have found that low-income, black and Hispanic populations are more likely to experience IPV than white populations or those with post-secondary education. Those are the same groups bearing a disproportionate share of the direct health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
We probably won’t have the data to show much of this for years, if ever. Data collection during disasters suffers from logistical difficulties, and quantitative insights on domestic violence are chronically underreported. But that doesn’t mean it’s not happening.
Laura Bronner contributed research.
Help is available. If you or someone you know is experiencing domestic violence, reach out to the confidential National Domestic Violence Hotline. (Call 1−800−799−7233 or TTY 1−800−787−3224 or chat online at thehotline.org.)
Why does COVID-19 make some people sicker than others? l FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-04--Politics Podcast: Biden Responds To Sexual Assault Allegation

On Friday , former Vice President Joe Biden personally denied a sexual assault allegation made by Tara Reade , one @ @ @ @ @ .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the team reviews how elected @ @ @ @ @ to the accusation so far and what it means for Biden politically .
They also @ @ @ @ @ are in the course of the coronavirus pandemic and weigh the effect on the 2020 @ @ @ @ @ run for president by Rep. Justin Amash .
You can listen to the episode by @ @ @ @ @ button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN @ @ @ @ @ platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The @ @ @ @ @ and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and @ @ @ @ @ a comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
@ @ @ @ @ , on Twitter or in the comments .

On Friday, former Vice President Joe Biden personally denied a sexual assault allegation made by Tara Reade, one of his former Senate staffers. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the team reviews how elected Democrats and voters are reacting to the accusation so far and what it means for Biden politically. They also check in on where we are in the course of the coronavirus pandemic and weigh the effect on the 2020 election of a likely third-party run for president by Rep. Justin Amash.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Biden responds to sexual assault allegations
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-05--How The Media Has — And Hasn’t — Covered Tara Reade’s Allegation

Rather than dominating the news cycle , former Senate staffer Tara Reade ’ s recent allegation that former Vice President Joe Biden sexually assaulted her has been slow to receive coverage in many outlets .
Reade first stepped forward in spring 2019 as one of several women who accused Biden of inappropriate touching , but it wasn ’ t until March 25 , 2020 , that Reade alleged Biden had sexually assaulted her while she was a staffer in his office in 1993 .
In a podcast interview with left-leaning commentator Katie Halper , Reade accused Biden of pushing her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ skirt and penetrating her with his fingers .
( While some of Reade ’ s family and friends say Reade told them about the incident shortly thereafter , other Biden staffers at the time do not recall hearing about it , and Biden has denied that it ever took place . )
But the story wasn ’ t really featured in the mainstream media until after April 12 , when The New York Times published an in-depth investigation of Reade ’ s claims .
Since then , the accusation has gotten more attention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ Larry King Live ” clip from 1993 emerged in which a caller who may be Reade ’ s mother describes her daughter ’ s “ problems ” with a “ prominent senator.
” Coverage continued to climb after April 27 , when Reade ’ s former neighbor said that Reade had told her details about the alleged assault in the mid-1990s , and May 1 , when Biden himself made his first public comment on the allegation .
Nevertheless , our analysis of closed captioning data for Fox News , MSNBC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ News Archive , and of online news articles from the Media Cloud database finds that the volume of coverage of the allegation remained low until very recently , and it has gotten more attention from right-leaning outlets , both on television and online .
Of the three major cable news channels , Fox News has devoted the most attention to Reade so far .
Through Friday , May 1 , Fox News mentioned Reade in 371 clips collected by the TV News Archive — 344 of them on or after April 24 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ channel ’ s conservative commentators criticizing Democrats and the media for not giving Reade ’ s allegation more air time .
By contrast , CNN and MSNBC mostly covered the story with on-air interviews of reporters who had investigated the allegation — but these channels also covered Reade much less .
Through May 1 , CNN had only mentioned Reade in 35 clips , the first of which aired on April 25 .
And MSNBC barely mentioned her until last Friday , when Biden personally appeared on the network to deny Reade ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reade has told The New York Times , neither CNN nor MSNBC has asked to interview her on air , though they have spoken to her off camera . )
But while cable news didn ’ t mention Reade at all when the sexual assault allegation was first revealed , online news outlets did .
After the story broke on March 25 , conservative news organizations like The Blaze and the Daily Caller picked it up right away .
But while right-leaning outlets covered the story most heavily , HuffPost , Vox and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in March .
The Guardian and Vox even noted then how the story wasn ’ t yet appearing in mainstream news outlets .
Fox News , which hadn ’ t yet mentioned Reade on TV , also published an article online about the allegations on March 27 .
Starting in April , mainstream media coverage of the allegation began to pick up , but the volume of coverage mentioning Reade has still increased the most in conservative-leaning online media , which sometimes published multiple articles a day on the story .
At first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allegation were similar regardless of the outlet ’ s ideological bent — compare Breitbart ’ s “ Joe Biden Faces New Sexual Assault Allegation from Former Staffer ” to HuffPost ’ s “ Joe Biden Accused Of Sexually Assaulting Senate Aide In 1993 , ” for example .
But if you were looking for articles about the story ’ s day-to-day developments , such as the emergence of the “ Larry King Live ” clip , conservative outlets were generally the place to look ( although the King clip was originally reported by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left-leaning ) .
And after The New York Times ’ s investigation into Reade ’ s claims , many conservative outlets also criticized its handling of the story , which evolved into articles about the lack of mainstream media coverage of the allegation .
Once the Times published its investigation in mid-April , other mainstream news organizations began covering the story as well .
Some , like Time and Reuters , devoted entire articles to the allegation , but for others , like The Atlantic and Politico , early mentions of Reade appeared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her .
And others , like CNN and CBS News , mentioned Reade ’ s allegation not as a straightforward breaking news story but in the context of how other Democrats were reacting .
In general , the mainstream media was less likely than conservative outlets to publish follow-up stories containing new developments in the allegation , although that began to change last week as some mainstream outlets joined conservative ones in questioning Biden ’ s silence on the allegation , which may have led to his appearance on MSNBC on Friday .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ can ’ t tell us is how much coverage the allegation should be receiving ; there is no “ correct ” answer .
It could be , as some have argued , that mainstream media outlets have a liberal bias and are avoiding the story for that reason — or it could be that conservative media outlets are simply likelier to run with a story that makes a Democrat look bad .
It ’ s also possible that mainstream outlets investigated the claims and felt that the supporting evidence they were able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ publish the story .
It ’ s also difficult to compare coverage of these sexual assault allegations with coverage of the allegations made against President Trump , Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh or other politicians who have faced similar scandals .
Any number of factors — such as the prominence of the person being accused , the seriousness of the allegations and the number of accusers — can influence the amount of media coverage a sexual assault allegation receives , and Biden ’ s situation is not necessarily a close match along all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the only other politician of similar prominence to face sexual assault allegations recently — Trump — faced several of them , and also was infamously caught on video bragging about his sexual pursuits . )
And perhaps the biggest confounder is the news environment in which this story has arisen .
The coronavirus pandemic is currently sucking up so much of the media oxygen that it is unlikely that any political story would be covered as thoroughly as it would be in normal times .
So while it seems clear that coverage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far been limited , it ’ s hard to pinpoint exactly why that is .

Rather than dominating the news cycle, former Senate staffer Tara Reade’s recent allegation that former Vice President Joe Biden sexually assaulted her has been slow to receive coverage in many outlets.
Reade first stepped forward in spring 2019 as one of several women who accused Biden of inappropriate touching, but it wasn’t until March 25, 2020, that Reade alleged Biden had sexually assaulted her while she was a staffer in his office in 1993. In a podcast interview with left-leaning commentator Katie Halper, Reade accused Biden of pushing her against a wall, reaching under her skirt and penetrating her with his fingers. (While some of Reade’s family and friends say Reade told them about the incident shortly thereafter, other Biden staffers at the time do not recall hearing about it, and Biden has denied that it ever took place.) But the story wasn’t really featured in the mainstream media until after April 12, when The New York Times published an in-depth investigation of Reade’s claims.
Since then, the accusation has gotten more attention, starting on April 24, when a “Larry King Live” clip from 1993 emerged in which a caller who may be Reade’s mother describes her daughter’s “problems” with a “prominent senator.” Coverage continued to climb after April 27, when Reade’s former neighbor said that Reade had told her details about the alleged assault in the mid-1990s, and May 1, when Biden himself made his first public comment on the allegation. Nevertheless, our analysis of closed captioning data for Fox News, MSNBC and CNN, pulled from the TV News Archive, and of online news articles from the Media Cloud database finds that the volume of coverage of the allegation remained low until very recently, and it has gotten more attention from right-leaning outlets, both on television and online.
Of the three major cable news channels, Fox News has devoted the most attention to Reade so far. Through Friday, May 1, Fox News mentioned Reade in 371 clips collected by the TV News Archive — 344 of them on or after April 24. Many of these mentions were by the channel’s conservative commentators criticizing Democrats and the media for not giving Reade’s allegation more air time.
By contrast, CNN and MSNBC mostly covered the story with on-air interviews of reporters who had investigated the allegation — but these channels also covered Reade much less. Through May 1, CNN had only mentioned Reade in 35 clips, the first of which aired on April 25. And MSNBC barely mentioned her until last Friday, when Biden personally appeared on the network to deny Reade’s claims. (According to what Reade has told The New York Times, neither CNN nor MSNBC has asked to interview her on air, though they have spoken to her off camera.)
But while cable news didn’t mention Reade at all when the sexual assault allegation was first revealed, online news outlets did. After the story broke on March 25, conservative news organizations like The Blaze and the Daily Caller picked it up right away. But while right-leaning outlets covered the story most heavily, HuffPost, Vox and The Guardian also wrote about the allegations in March. The Guardian and Vox even noted then how the story wasn’t yet appearing in mainstream news outlets. Fox News, which hadn’t yet mentioned Reade on TV, also published an article online about the allegations on March 27. Starting in April, mainstream media coverage of the allegation began to pick up, but the volume of coverage mentioning Reade has still increased the most in conservative-leaning online media, which sometimes published multiple articles a day on the story.
At first, though, the headlines about the allegation were similar regardless of the outlet’s ideological bent — compare Breitbart’s “Joe Biden Faces New Sexual Assault Allegation from Former Staffer” to HuffPost’s “Joe Biden Accused Of Sexually Assaulting Senate Aide In 1993,” for example. But if you were looking for articles about the story’s day-to-day developments, such as the emergence of the “Larry King Live” clip, conservative outlets were generally the place to look (although the King clip was originally reported by The Intercept, which is regarded as left-leaning). And after The New York Times’s investigation into Reade’s claims, many conservative outlets also criticized its handling of the story, which evolved into articles about the lack of mainstream media coverage of the allegation.
Once the Times published its investigation in mid-April, other mainstream news organizations began covering the story as well. Some, like Time and Reuters, devoted entire articles to the allegation, but for others, like The Atlantic and Politico, early mentions of Reade appeared in articles that did not focus on her. And others, like CNN and CBS News, mentioned Reade’s allegation not as a straightforward breaking news story but in the context of how other Democrats were reacting. In general, the mainstream media was less likely than conservative outlets to publish follow-up stories containing new developments in the allegation, although that began to change last week as some mainstream outlets joined conservative ones in questioning Biden’s silence on the allegation, which may have led to his appearance on MSNBC on Friday.
Of course, one thing this data can’t tell us is how much coverage the allegation should be receiving; there is no “correct” answer. It could be, as some have argued, that mainstream media outlets have a liberal bias and are avoiding the story for that reason — or it could be that conservative media outlets are simply likelier to run with a story that makes a Democrat look bad. It’s also possible that mainstream outlets investigated the claims and felt that the supporting evidence they were able to find was not enough for them to publish the story.
It’s also difficult to compare coverage of these sexual assault allegations with coverage of the allegations made against President Trump, Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh or other politicians who have faced similar scandals. Any number of factors — such as the prominence of the person being accused, the seriousness of the allegations and the number of accusers — can influence the amount of media coverage a sexual assault allegation receives, and Biden’s situation is not necessarily a close match along all of these dimensions. (Most obviously, the only other politician of similar prominence to face sexual assault allegations recently — Trump — faced several of them, and also was infamously caught on video bragging about his sexual pursuits.)
And perhaps the biggest confounder is the news environment in which this story has arisen. The coronavirus pandemic is currently sucking up so much of the media oxygen that it is unlikely that any political story would be covered as thoroughly as it would be in normal times. So while it seems clear that coverage of Reade’s allegation has so far been limited, it’s hard to pinpoint exactly why that is.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Biden responds to sexual assault allegations


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-05--How Democrats Are Responding To The Sexual Assault Allegation Against Biden

On this week ’ s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the team takes a look at how elected Democrats and voters @ @ @ @ @ assault allegation against former Vice President Joe Biden .
They also discuss what a likely @ @ @ @ @ Amash could mean for the 2020 election .

On this week’s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the team takes a look at how elected Democrats and voters are reacting to the sexual assault allegation against former Vice President Joe Biden. They also discuss what a likely third-party run by Rep. Justin Amash could mean for the 2020 election.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-05--How ‘Never Trumpers’ Crashed The Democratic Party

Anti-Donald Trump activism among conservatives — known informally as the “ # NeverTrump ” movement — started in early 2016 as a way to stop the businessman from winning the GOP nomination .
It failed .
Even by the slightly broader standard of influencing Republican politics , # NeverTrump has been largely unsuccessful .
Trump won around 90 percent of self-identified Republican voters in 2016 , similar to past GOP presidential nominees .
About 90 percent of Republicans have approved of Trump throughout his first term , similar to George W. Bush ’ s standing in his first four years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of the party , Republican congressional candidates won around 90 percent of the GOP vote in the 2018 midterms , just as in recent midterm elections .
There is really only one anti-Trump figure among the 249 Republicans on Capitol Hill : Sen. Mitt Romney .
“ Never Trumpers ” tried to draft a high-profile Republican like Maryland Gov .
Larry Hogan to run against Trump for the GOP nomination .
That didn ’ t pan out either .
Facing fairly weak opponents , Trump easily won the GOP primaries that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggest most Republicans will be strongly behind Trump this November too — he is getting about 90 percent of the Republican vote in head-to-head match-ups with the presumptive Democratic nominee , former Vice President Joe Biden .
But “ Never Trumpers ” are increasingly involved in the Democratic Party and have gradually shifted their tactics in that direction — effectively becoming a “ Never Trump ” and “ Never Bernie Sanders ” coalition .
And they appear to be having more success shaping their new party than the one that many of them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their lives .
Here ’ s how that shift has happened .
By pure numbers , the anti-Trump conservative bloc is both fairly small and not that remarkable .
The group of Republican voters who disapprove of Trump is similar ( but slightly smaller ) than Democrats who disapproved of then-President Barack Obama during his first term .
Conservatives who really hate Trump probably no longer identify as Republicans — 11 percent of Republicans switched their party affiliation between December 2015 and March 2017 , according to Pew .
But surveys suggest that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that same period is about the same .
It ’ s hard to be precise about this : Data suggests at most 10 percent of American voters overall are anti-Trump but generally lean Republican .
That ’ s not nothing , but between 40 and 50 percent of Americans are likely to vote for Trump in November .
But while this hard to prove conclusively , anti-Trump conservatives are arguably way overrepresented in elite media , at least compared to their numbers in the general population .
The New York Times , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opinion columnists — David Brooks , Ross Douthat , Bret Stephens — and no columnists who regularly align with the president .
MSNBC has programs fronted by two anti-Trump hosts once closely aligned with the GOP establishment — ex-Rep. Joe Scarborough and Nicolle Wallace , a former communications director for President George W. Bush — and no explicitly pro-Trump hosts .
Among the 53 Washington Post opinion writers highlighted on the paper ’ s website , seven are people who have identified with conservatives and/or the Republican Party in the past but regularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who regularly defend the president .
Numerous anti-Trump conservatives are also featured prominently on CNN .
How did this happen ?
Well , from the media perspective , the prominence of “ Never Trump ” conservatives makes perfect sense .
The readers and watchers of The Post , The Times and MSNBC in particular are disproportionately left-leaning .
So these audiences probably don ’ t want too much explicitly pro-Trump commentary .
At the same time , news outlets usually like to present themselves as both offering a diverse set of voices and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or the other .
So by featuring , for example , George Conway , a conservative lawyer turned “ Never Trump ” leader who sharply criticizes the president in his cable news appearances and columns in The Washington Post , the press can essentially suggest , “ It ’ s not just the ‘ liberal media , ’ even Republicans were angry when Trump did X.
” But it ’ s not simply as if the media has hired every Republican who says that they don ’ t like Trump .
Many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Brooks ) were there before Trump ’ s rise .
Robert Saldin , a political science professor at the University of Montana and co-author of a new book on anti-Trump conservatives , said the kind of conservatives who get jobs at places like CNN were predisposed to dislike a Trump-style GOP politician .
Many prominent “ Never Trumpers , ” Saldin said , operate and make a living in liberal institutions .
“ They think of their jobs as translating conservative ideas to liberals .
They had invested in the idea that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In particular , Saldin said , these figures had worked hard to suggest that racism was not a major feature of conservatism .
“ So they were particularly horrified by Trump because he embodied what they had spent their careers saying was not conservatism , ” he added .
In my interviews with several prominent “ Never Trump ” conservatives , they not only suggested the group ’ s high-media profile was somewhat accidental , but were kind of defensive about it .
Tim Miller , a prominent “ Never Trump ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and former Florida Gov .
Jeb Bush ’ s presidential campaigns , dismissed the notion that “ ‘ Never Trumpers ’ are only in green rooms.
” But getting into media consumed by liberals is in some ways the only game in town for anti-Trump conservatives , since Fox News is very pro-Trump and features few critics of the president .
And that platform to reach Democrats has been particularly useful for “ Never Trump ” conservatives because … They allied with more centrist Democrats The core argument of “ Never Trump ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump is a much worse person and leader than other recent GOP presidents ( the Bushes ) or presidential nominees ( McCain , Romney ) .
• Democrats and Republicans who disagree on issues such as abortion and tax policy should put aside those differences for now and unite in opposing Trump because he is a threat to fundamental American values like the rule of law .
• And finally , there is a sizable bloc of Republicans who will join with Democrats to challenge Trump — so long as Democrats don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left .
This argument may not be totally true .
And the “ Never Trump ” narrative is clearly self-serving — of course a group of conservatives who feel like they don ’ t fit in the current Republican Party prefer a more conservative Democratic Party that they can align with .
But true or not , this narrative matters because it has mirrored and likely influenced the Democratic Party ’ s post-Trump strategy .
Since Trump ’ s victory , Democrats have done a lot of soul-searching .
Is the party too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and centrist ?
Are Democrats ignorant of the concerns of the Americans who don ’ t live on the coasts ?
Are they too focused on nonwhite voters — or not focused on them enough ?
Faced with these complicated questions in 2017 and 2018 , Democrats took an approach that was broadly similar to the “ Never Trumpers ” — attacking Trump as a uniquely dangerous threat to American democracy while resisting more liberal policy ideas and recruiting fairly centrist candidates in key congressional races .
This approach led some “ Never @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the midterms — moving beyond simply opposing Trump to fighting the Republican Party more broadly .
“ By at least early 2018 , if not late 2017 , there was general understanding that we needed to build a cross-partisan pro-democracy coalition that could prevail over Trumpism , which meant helping to unite Democrats , independents and principled conservatives , ” said Evan McMullin , the anti-Trump conservative who ran for president in 2016 and now runs a group called Stand Up Republic that focuses on defending democratic values .
“ Fortunately , Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ naturally understood this opportunity and what it required , ” he added .
“ Unifying candidates like Ben McAdams in Utah and Abigail Spanberger in Virginia were examples of those who attracted the support of principled conservatives and Republicans.
” It ’ s hard to quantify exactly how many anti-Trump conservatives backed Democrats in 2018 and how big a role they played in Democrats taking the House and winning many key governor ’ s races .
But that temporary alliance between “ Never Trump ” Republicans and Democrats was strengthened in 2019 for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ” Republicans found there was little appetite in the GOP for a primary challenge to Trump — another illustration of their declining influence within the party .
And second , in a final blow for some of them , Republicans largely stood by Trump even as details emerged about his efforts to pressure Ukraine to investigate the Bidens .
“ I was so sure there was going to be a handful of Republicans who were going to say it was clearly wrong , ” said Sarah Longwell , a longtime Republican strategist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to recruit a challenger to Trump .
She added , “ It ’ s been a slow realization that there isn ’ t anybody left who is going to say anything.
” In response , many of the “ Never Trumpers ” decided to get even deeper into Democratic politics , injecting themselves into the party ’ s fractious presidential primary .
And they had an obvious path to take : While Sens .
Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren were pushing Democrats to take more liberal policy stands , several candidates were echoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Former South Bend , Indiana , Mayor Pete Buttigieg was arguing that a Democratic candidate with fairly moderate policy ideas could win over Republicans in a general election , emphasizing his potential appeal to “ future former Republicans.
” Sen. Amy Klobuchar made similar arguments .
Biden was publicly noting how much he likes the writings of The New York Times ’ s Brooks , who was calling for Democrats to avoid going too far left .
When Sanders did well in the early primaries and seemed like he could win the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservatives turned into a “ Never Bernie ” coalition .
The “ Never Trumpers ” argument — that Sanders couldn ’ t win the general election , in part because anti-Trump Republicans ( like themselves ) wouldn ’ t vote for him– was compelling , particularly for a Democratic Party obsessed with beating Trump .
And the “ Never Trumpers ” were already in the ideal positions to make these arguments and reach Democratic Party elites and primary voters — the web pages of The Atlantic , The New York Times and The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in an anti-Trump publication called The Bulwark , described how he and other Republicans had failed to mobilize effectively against Trump in the 2016 GOP primary and laid out a step-by-step guide for how Democrats could avoid the same fate .
( The piece was widely circulated on Twitter . )
Sanders ’ s allies noticed all of this , of course , and started to publicly complain that MSNBC , in particular , was covering his candidacy too negatively .
It ’ s hard to prove that a lot of Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or that Democratic voters were particularly swayed by the group ’ s warning about Sanders .
But “ Never Trump ” conservatives were thrilled with Biden ’ s victories on Super Tuesday — and think they played a part in it .
“ One group that really mattered in the primaries were the high-information voters , the people who watch MSNBC , listen to ‘ The Daily , ’ ” said Miller , referring to a popular New York Times podcast .
“ A lot of these people went from Harris to Warren @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For these voters , it was all an assessment of who could defeat Trump .
For them , we [ “ Never Trumpers ” ] have a unique experience and insight.
” “ Our message before and during the early primary elections was that principled conservatives and Republicans were a winnable bloc and could provide the decisive votes in general election swing states as long as Democrats didn ’ t nominate a divisive , far-left candidate , ” McMullin said .
“ Appropriately , Democratic voters prioritized replacing Trump in 2020 above @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a faction of the Democratic Party As I explained earlier , it is possible that 5 to 10 percent of the people who will vote for Biden in November backed either Romney in 2012 or Trump in 2016 and at some point identified as conservative or Republican .
So while “ Never Trump ” conservatives are a smaller and less formal constituency in the Democratic Party than black voters , for example , some of them feel exiled from a Republican Party dominated by Trump , backed Democrats in the 2018 midterms and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Michael Halle , a strategist on Buttigieg ’ s campaign , said about 50 of the campaign ’ s county precinct captains in Iowa were former Republicans who changed their party registration to become Democrats so they could participate in the caucuses and back the former mayor .
Those exiled Republicans are already mobilizing behind Biden in the general election .
They are urging fellow conservatives not to support Rep. Justin Amash , who left the GOP in 2019 and last week announced an exploratory committee for a presidential run as the Libertarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidacy might increase Trump ’ s chances of reelection .
So “ Never Trump ” conservatives can probably make some demands of Biden , just like any other constituency in the party , and he might feel some need to court them .
And that seems to be happening .
The former vice president hinted recently that he might name some Republicans to his cabinet or transition team .
Rumors of his consideration of Klobuchar for vice president is no doubt largely about her potential appeal to voters in the Midwest , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a favorite of some moderate Republicans .
“ I don ’ t know that Biden needs a message for ‘ Never Trumpers ’ — most ‘ Never Trumpers ’ are going to vote for Biden , ” Miller said .
But , he added , “ I do think eventually the campaign should have a message for them.
” Mostly , “ Never Trumpers ” simply want Biden to run a general election campaign similar to his primary run , emphasizing more moderate policies and appealing to more centrist voters .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crazy sacrifices to the left that he doesn ’ t need to make , ” Miller said .
The extent to which “ Never Trumpers ” become card-carrying members of the Democratic Party might have broad implications for the party ’ s future .
Are we seeing the birth of a new , ex-conservative faction in the Democratic Party or the resurgence of an existing one , with “ Never Trump ” conservatives joining with longtime Democratic moderates ?
Could that wing of the party become as strong as it was in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2020 primaries suggest more centrist Democratic candidates are winning among white , college-educated voters in the suburbs against both Trump Republicans but also Sanders Democrats .
That ’ s an opportunity for Democrats to expand their coalition — after all , white voters are the majority of American voters .
It ’ s also likely to be a challenge : The more liberal bloc of the Democratic Party increasingly favors big , transformative policies on economic issues that longtime moderate Democrats and ex-Republicans are unlikely to ever embrace .
On the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ” conservatives and Democrats could be a fleeting one .
If Trump loses badly in November , perhaps anti-Trump Republicans can regain influence in the party many of them still want to be in .
“ If he loses , there is a lot of room for a fight over the soul of the party , ” Longwell said .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

Anti-Donald Trump activism among conservatives — known informally as the “#NeverTrump” movement — started in early 2016 as a way to stop the businessman from winning the GOP nomination. It failed.
Even by the slightly broader standard of influencing Republican politics, #NeverTrump has been largely unsuccessful. Trump won around 90 percent of self-identified Republican voters in 2016, similar to past GOP presidential nominees. About 90 percent of Republicans have approved of Trump throughout his first term, similar to George W. Bush’s standing in his first four years in office. And with Trump as the face of the party, Republican congressional candidates won around 90 percent of the GOP vote in the 2018 midterms, just as in recent midterm elections. There is really only one anti-Trump figure among the 249 Republicans on Capitol Hill: Sen. Mitt Romney.
“Never Trumpers” tried to draft a high-profile Republican like Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan to run against Trump for the GOP nomination. That didn’t pan out either. Facing fairly weak opponents, Trump easily won the GOP primaries that occurred earlier this year. Polls also suggest most Republicans will be strongly behind Trump this November too — he is getting about 90 percent of the Republican vote in head-to-head match-ups with the presumptive Democratic nominee, former Vice President Joe Biden.
But “Never Trumpers” are increasingly involved in the Democratic Party and have gradually shifted their tactics in that direction — effectively becoming a “Never Trump” and “Never Bernie Sanders” coalition. And they appear to be having more success shaping their new party than the one that many of them had been associated with for much of their lives. Here’s how that shift has happened.
‘Never Trumpers’ found a home in the media
By pure numbers, the anti-Trump conservative bloc is both fairly small and not that remarkable. The group of Republican voters who disapprove of Trump is similar (but slightly smaller) than Democrats who disapproved of then-President Barack Obama during his first term. Conservatives who really hate Trump probably no longer identify as Republicans — 11 percent of Republicans switched their party affiliation between December 2015 and March 2017, according to Pew. But surveys suggest that the share of Democrats switching affiliation in that same period is about the same. It’s hard to be precise about this: Data suggests at most 10 percent of American voters overall are anti-Trump but generally lean Republican. That’s not nothing, but between 40 and 50 percent of Americans are likely to vote for Trump in November.
But while this hard to prove conclusively, anti-Trump conservatives are arguably way overrepresented in elite media, at least compared to their numbers in the general population. The New York Times, for example, has three conservative-leaning but Trump-skeptical opinion columnists — David Brooks, Ross Douthat, Bret Stephens — and no columnists who regularly align with the president. MSNBC has programs fronted by two anti-Trump hosts once closely aligned with the GOP establishment — ex-Rep. Joe Scarborough and Nicolle Wallace, a former communications director for President George W. Bush — and no explicitly pro-Trump hosts. Among the 53 Washington Post opinion writers highlighted on the paper’s website, seven are people who have identified with conservatives and/or the Republican Party in the past but regularly attack Trump. Just four are conservatives who regularly defend the president. Numerous anti-Trump conservatives are also featured prominently on CNN.
How did this happen? Well, from the media perspective, the prominence of “Never Trump” conservatives makes perfect sense. The readers and watchers of The Post, The Times and MSNBC in particular are disproportionately left-leaning. So these audiences probably don’t want too much explicitly pro-Trump commentary. At the same time, news outlets usually like to present themselves as both offering a diverse set of voices and not too closely aligned with one party or the other. So by featuring, for example, George Conway, a conservative lawyer turned “Never Trump” leader who sharply criticizes the president in his cable news appearances and columns in The Washington Post, the press can essentially suggest, “It’s not just the ‘liberal media,’ even Republicans were angry when Trump did X.”
But it’s not simply as if the media has hired every Republican who says that they don’t like Trump. Many of the conservatives in high-profile media slots (like Brooks) were there before Trump’s rise. Robert Saldin, a political science professor at the University of Montana and co-author of a new book on anti-Trump conservatives, said the kind of conservatives who get jobs at places like CNN were predisposed to dislike a Trump-style GOP politician.
Many prominent “Never Trumpers,” Saldin said, operate and make a living in liberal institutions. “They think of their jobs as translating conservative ideas to liberals. They had invested in the idea that conservatism was respectable,” he said. In particular, Saldin said, these figures had worked hard to suggest that racism was not a major feature of conservatism.
“So they were particularly horrified by Trump because he embodied what they had spent their careers saying was not conservatism,” he added.
In my interviews with several prominent “Never Trump” conservatives, they not only suggested the group’s high-media profile was somewhat accidental, but were kind of defensive about it.
Tim Miller, a prominent “Never Trump” activist who worked on Sen. John McCain and former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush’s presidential campaigns, dismissed the notion that “‘Never Trumpers’ are only in green rooms.”
But getting into media consumed by liberals is in some ways the only game in town for anti-Trump conservatives, since Fox News is very pro-Trump and features few critics of the president. And that platform to reach Democrats has been particularly useful for “Never Trump” conservatives because …
They allied with more centrist Democrats
The core argument of “Never Trump” Republicans goes something like this:
This argument may not be totally true. And the “Never Trump” narrative is clearly self-serving — of course a group of conservatives who feel like they don’t fit in the current Republican Party prefer a more conservative Democratic Party that they can align with.
But true or not, this narrative matters because it has mirrored and likely influenced the Democratic Party’s post-Trump strategy. Since Trump’s victory, Democrats have done a lot of soul-searching. Is the party too left? Or is it too establishment and centrist? Are Democrats ignorant of the concerns of the Americans who don’t live on the coasts? Are they too focused on nonwhite voters — or not focused on them enough?
Faced with these complicated questions in 2017 and 2018, Democrats took an approach that was broadly similar to the “Never Trumpers” — attacking Trump as a uniquely dangerous threat to American democracy while resisting more liberal policy ideas and recruiting fairly centrist candidates in key congressional races. This approach led some “Never Trumpers” to get behind Democrats in the midterms — moving beyond simply opposing Trump to fighting the Republican Party more broadly.
“By at least early 2018, if not late 2017, there was general understanding that we needed to build a cross-partisan pro-democracy coalition that could prevail over Trumpism, which meant helping to unite Democrats, independents and principled conservatives,” said Evan McMullin, the anti-Trump conservative who ran for president in 2016 and now runs a group called Stand Up Republic that focuses on defending democratic values.
“Fortunately, Democratic leadership and many candidates in competitive districts naturally understood this opportunity and what it required,” he added. “Unifying candidates like Ben McAdams in Utah and Abigail Spanberger in Virginia were examples of those who attracted the support of principled conservatives and Republicans.”
It’s hard to quantify exactly how many anti-Trump conservatives backed Democrats in 2018 and how big a role they played in Democrats taking the House and winning many key governor’s races. But that temporary alliance between “Never Trump” Republicans and Democrats was strengthened in 2019 for two reasons. First, “Never Trump” Republicans found there was little appetite in the GOP for a primary challenge to Trump — another illustration of their declining influence within the party. And second, in a final blow for some of them, Republicans largely stood by Trump even as details emerged about his efforts to pressure Ukraine to investigate the Bidens.
“I was so sure there was going to be a handful of Republicans who were going to say it was clearly wrong,” said Sarah Longwell, a longtime Republican strategist who was heavily involved in the effort to recruit a challenger to Trump. She added, “It’s been a slow realization that there isn’t anybody left who is going to say anything.”
In response, many of the “Never Trumpers” decided to get even deeper into Democratic politics, injecting themselves into the party’s fractious presidential primary. And they had an obvious path to take: While Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren were pushing Democrats to take more liberal policy stands, several candidates were echoing the views of the “Never Trumpers.” Former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg was arguing that a Democratic candidate with fairly moderate policy ideas could win over Republicans in a general election, emphasizing his potential appeal to “future former Republicans.” Sen. Amy Klobuchar made similar arguments. Biden was publicly noting how much he likes the writings of The New York Times’s Brooks, who was calling for Democrats to avoid going too far left.
When Sanders did well in the early primaries and seemed like he could win the Democratic nomination, “Never Trump” conservatives turned into a “Never Bernie” coalition. The “Never Trumpers” argument — that Sanders couldn’t win the general election, in part because anti-Trump Republicans (like themselves) wouldn’t vote for him– was compelling, particularly for a Democratic Party obsessed with beating Trump. And the “Never Trumpers” were already in the ideal positions to make these arguments and reach Democratic Party elites and primary voters — the web pages of The Atlantic, The New York Times and The Washington Post and on MSNBC. Miller, in an anti-Trump publication called The Bulwark, described how he and other Republicans had failed to mobilize effectively against Trump in the 2016 GOP primary and laid out a step-by-step guide for how Democrats could avoid the same fate. (The piece was widely circulated on Twitter.)
Sanders’s allies noticed all of this, of course, and started to publicly complain that MSNBC, in particular, was covering his candidacy too negatively. It’s hard to prove that a lot of Democratic primary voters were “Never Trumpers” or that Democratic voters were particularly swayed by the group’s warning about Sanders. But “Never Trump” conservatives were thrilled with Biden’s victories on Super Tuesday — and think they played a part in it.
“One group that really mattered in the primaries were the high-information voters, the people who watch MSNBC, listen to ‘The Daily,’” said Miller, referring to a popular New York Times podcast. “A lot of these people went from Harris to Warren to Buttigieg and finally landed on Biden. For these voters, it was all an assessment of who could defeat Trump. For them, we [“Never Trumpers”] have a unique experience and insight.”
“Our message before and during the early primary elections was that principled conservatives and Republicans were a winnable bloc and could provide the decisive votes in general election swing states as long as Democrats didn’t nominate a divisive, far-left candidate,” McMullin said. “Appropriately, Democratic voters prioritized replacing Trump in 2020 above other issues.”
They’ve become a faction of the Democratic Party
As I explained earlier, it is possible that 5 to 10 percent of the people who will vote for Biden in November backed either Romney in 2012 or Trump in 2016 and at some point identified as conservative or Republican. So while “Never Trump” conservatives are a smaller and less formal constituency in the Democratic Party than black voters, for example, some of them feel exiled from a Republican Party dominated by Trump, backed Democrats in the 2018 midterms and participated in the 2020 Democratic primaries. Michael Halle, a strategist on Buttigieg’s campaign, said about 50 of the campaign’s county precinct captains in Iowa were former Republicans who changed their party registration to become Democrats so they could participate in the caucuses and back the former mayor.
Those exiled Republicans are already mobilizing behind Biden in the general election. They are urging fellow conservatives not to support Rep. Justin Amash, who left the GOP in 2019 and last week announced an exploratory committee for a presidential run as the Libertarian candidate. They argue Amash’s candidacy might increase Trump’s chances of reelection.
So “Never Trump” conservatives can probably make some demands of Biden, just like any other constituency in the party, and he might feel some need to court them.
And that seems to be happening. The former vice president hinted recently that he might name some Republicans to his cabinet or transition team. Rumors of his consideration of Klobuchar for vice president is no doubt largely about her potential appeal to voters in the Midwest, but her more centrist politics also make her a favorite of some moderate Republicans.
“I don’t know that Biden needs a message for ‘Never Trumpers’ — most ‘Never Trumpers’ are going to vote for Biden,” Miller said. But, he added, “I do think eventually the campaign should have a message for them.”
Mostly, “Never Trumpers” simply want Biden to run a general election campaign similar to his primary run, emphasizing more moderate policies and appealing to more centrist voters.
“I don’t want him to make crazy sacrifices to the left that he doesn’t need to make,” Miller said.
The extent to which “Never Trumpers” become card-carrying members of the Democratic Party might have broad implications for the party’s future. Are we seeing the birth of a new, ex-conservative faction in the Democratic Party or the resurgence of an existing one, with “Never Trump” conservatives joining with longtime Democratic moderates? Could that wing of the party become as strong as it was in the 1990s? The 2018 general elections and the 2020 primaries suggest more centrist Democratic candidates are winning among white, college-educated voters in the suburbs against both Trump Republicans but also Sanders Democrats. That’s an opportunity for Democrats to expand their coalition — after all, white voters are the majority of American voters. It’s also likely to be a challenge: The more liberal bloc of the Democratic Party increasingly favors big, transformative policies on economic issues that longtime moderate Democrats and ex-Republicans are unlikely to ever embrace.
On the other hand, the alliance between “Never Trump” conservatives and Democrats could be a fleeting one. If Trump loses badly in November, perhaps anti-Trump Republicans can regain influence in the party many of them still want to be in.
“If he loses, there is a lot of room for a fight over the soul of the party,” Longwell said.
“If he wins, then it’s pretty definitive.”
‘I totally buy â¦ Democrats have a chance at winning (Senate)’: Nate Silver