fivethirtyeight--2020-09-15--Why Pennsylvania Could Decide The 2020 Election

This is the fourth in a series of articles examining the politics and demographics of 2020 ’ s expected swing states .
Right now , Pennsylvania looks like the single most important state of the 2020 election .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential forecast , Pennsylvania is by far the likeliest state to provide either President Trump or Joe Biden with the decisive vote in the Electoral College : It has a 31 percent chance of being the tipping-point state .
( That ’ s what happens when you take one of the most evenly divided states in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . )
In fact , Pennsylvania is so important that our model gives Trump an 84 percent chance of winning the presidency if he carries the state — and it gives Biden a 96 percent chance of winning if Pennsylvania goes blue .
Few could have guessed that the Keystone State would eventually become the “ keystone ” of the Electoral College , since going into 2016 , Pennsylvania had voted for the Democrat in six straight presidential elections .
More impressively , Pennsylvania had been more Democratic-leaning than the national popular vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But both streaks were snapped in 2016 , when Trump carried Pennsylvania by 0.7 percentage points — making it 2.9 points redder than the nation as a whole .
Pennsylvania ’ s eventual defection shouldn ’ t have surprised us , though .
Non-Hispanic white people without bachelor ’ s degrees make up 55 percent of Pennsylvania ’ s population age 25 or older , and Trump accelerated their migration to the Republican Party in 2016 .
According to the Center for American Progress , the turnout rate among these voters increased from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2016 — and they went from voting for Mitt Romney by 20.3 points to voting for Trump by 28.6 points .
Pennsylvania ’ s run to the right , however , has been a long time in the making .
For much of the 20th century , blue-collar , white Pennsylvanians were considered part of the Democratic base .
But the share of workers in Pennsylvania belonging to labor unions ( which have historically played a huge role advocating and organizing for Democratic candidates ) has fallen from 27.5 percent in 1983 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many have blamed trade and environmental policies pushed by Democrats for the decline of the state ’ s manufacturing and mining industries .
Campaigns have also been forced to reconsider their conception of Pennsylvania ’ s political geography .
The conventional wisdom was that western and eastern Pennsylvania were Democratic and central Pennsylvania was solidly Republican ( memorably summarized by Democratic strategist James Carville ’ s quote that , between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia , Pennsylvania was just Alabama ) .
While this may have been true ( at least politically ) in , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ northeastern Pennsylvania have slowly but surely been getting redder .
As a result , Pennsylvania ’ s new geographic divide is between southeastern Pennsylvania and the rest of the state — in other words , the parts of the state that are culturally Northeastern and the parts that are culturally Midwestern or Appalachian .
Granted , even this is an oversimplified description of Pennsylvania ’ s political divide .
Pittsburgh ’ s Allegheny County is one of the few counties in the state that is getting bluer ( the Midwest has upper-class suburbs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actually voted more Republican in 2016 , despite having the state ’ s smallest non-college-educated white population ( by percentage ) .
This hints at another problem Democrats would like to solve : returning to their former strength among Black voters .
( Philadelphia County is 44 percent Black . )
According to CAP , Clinton won “ only ” 89.8 percent of the Black vote in Pennsylvania .
That ’ s obviously very high , but it ’ s short of the 96.0 percent that Barack Obama received four years earlier — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had matched Obama ’ s share of the Black vote , CAP found , she would have narrowly carried Pennsylvania in 2016 — even with her poor performance among white voters without a bachelor ’ s degree .
Apart from winning back non-college-educated white voters or Black voters , some Democrats may see a third way forward in Pennsylvania : running up their margin in the suburbs .
The other trend evident from the map above is that Democrats are gaining ground in the affluent , well-educated counties around Philadelphia .
Philly ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bucks , Chester , Delaware and Montgomery — went from voting for Obama by 10 points in 2012 to voting for Clinton by 14 points .
But the problem for Democrats is that those four counties contain only 22 percent of Pennsylvania ’ s 2016 voters , and they are moving to the left far more slowly than the rest of the state is moving to the right .
For example , the 24 counties in western Pennsylvania other than Allegheny contain a similar 19 percent of Pennsylvania voters , yet they went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to voting for Trump by 32 points .
Of course , Democrats don ’ t have to choose just one group of voters to appeal to .
Biden has been making overtures to suburban voters , Black voters and non-college-educated white voters — and there are signs he ’ s succeeding on multiple fronts .
The last two polls ( one Democratic , one Republican ) to ask about the presidential race in Pennsylvania ’ s 1st Congressional District — which is almost coterminous with Bucks County — both gave Biden a 9-point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by only 2 points .
And a February poll by Mercyhurst University showed Biden at 48 percent and Trump at 44 percent in post-industrial Erie County , which Trump won by 2 points in 2016 — although Biden ’ s lead was still a far cry from the 16 points by which Obama carried Erie in 2012 .
And , in a stroke of luck for Biden , he may be uniquely positioned to reverse some of Democrats ’ most severe 2016 losses : the 24 points shaved off the Democratic margin in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the heart of the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre metropolitan area , where Biden was born , grew up and speaks of often on the campaign trail .
All told , Biden currently leads the FiveThirtyEight polling average in Pennsylvania by 4.9 points .
Adjusting for demographics and the possibility of change over the next two months , our forecast projects that the Democrat will ultimately carry the Keystone State by 4.6 points .
However , both numbers are closer than Biden ’ s lead nationally , implying that if the overall race tightens , Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that made Pennsylvania so inhospitable for Clinton in 2016 .
In other words , it ’ s no coincidence that Biden ’ s 75 in 100 chance of winning Pennsylvania is nearly identical to his chance of winning the election : As goes Pennsylvania , so goes the Electoral College .

This is the fourth in a series of articles examining the politics and demographics of 2020’s expected swing states.
Right now, Pennsylvania looks like the single most important state of the 2020 election. According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecast, Pennsylvania is by far the likeliest state to provide either President Trump or Joe Biden with the decisive vote in the Electoral College: It has a 31 percent chance of being the tipping-point state. (That’s what happens when you take one of the most evenly divided states in the union and give it 20 electoral votes.) In fact, Pennsylvania is so important that our model gives Trump an 84 percent chance of winning the presidency if he carries the state — and it gives Biden a 96 percent chance of winning if Pennsylvania goes blue.
Few could have guessed that the Keystone State would eventually become the “keystone” of the Electoral College, since going into 2016, Pennsylvania had voted for the Democrat in six straight presidential elections. More impressively, Pennsylvania had been more Democratic-leaning than the national popular vote in every presidential election since 1952. But both streaks were snapped in 2016, when Trump carried Pennsylvania by 0.7 percentage points — making it 2.9 points redder than the nation as a whole.
Is Pennsylvania now a Republican-leaning state? How Pennsylvania has voted relative to the nation as a whole in presidential elections since 1952 Pennsylvania Year Dem. GOP Margin Nat’l Margin Penn. Lean 1952 46.9% 52.7% R+5.9 R+10.5 D+4.6 1956 43.3 56.5 R+13.2 R+15.9 D+2.7 1960 51.1 48.7 D+2.3 D+0.2 D+2.1 1964 64.9 34.7 D+30.2 D+22.4 D+7.9 1968 47.6 44.0 D+3.6 R+1.1 D+4.7 1972 39.1 59.1 R+20.0 R+23.0 D+3.0 1976 50.4 47.7 D+2.7 D+2.1 D+0.6 1980 42.5 49.6 R+7.1 R+9.4 D+2.3 1984 46.0 53.3 R+7.4 R+18.0 D+10.7 1988 48.4 50.7 R+2.3 R+7.6 D+5.2 1992 45.1 36.1 D+9.0 D+5.8 D+3.2 1996 49.2 40.0 D+9.2 D+8.5 D+0.7 2000 50.6 46.4 D+4.2 D+0.5 D+3.7 2004 51.0 48.5 D+2.5 R+2.4 D+4.9 2008 54.7 44.3 D+10.3 D+7.3 D+3.1 2012 52.1 46.7 D+5.4 D+3.9 D+1.5 2016 47.9 48.6 R+0.7 D+2.2 R+2.9 Sources: Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, Pennsylvania Department of State, U.S. House of Representatives
Pennsylvania’s eventual defection shouldn’t have surprised us, though. Non-Hispanic white people without bachelor’s degrees make up 55 percent of Pennsylvania’s population age 25 or older, and Trump accelerated their migration to the Republican Party in 2016. According to the Center for American Progress, the turnout rate among these voters increased from 53.0 percent in 2012 to 57.4 percent in 2016 — and they went from voting for Mitt Romney by 20.3 points to voting for Trump by 28.6 points.
Pennsylvania’s run to the right, however, has been a long time in the making. For much of the 20th century, blue-collar, white Pennsylvanians were considered part of the Democratic base. But the share of workers in Pennsylvania belonging to labor unions (which have historically played a huge role advocating and organizing for Democratic candidates) has fallen from 27.5 percent in 1983 to 12.0 percent in 2019, and many have blamed trade and environmental policies pushed by Democrats for the decline of the state’s manufacturing and mining industries.
Campaigns have also been forced to reconsider their conception of Pennsylvania’s political geography. The conventional wisdom was that western and eastern Pennsylvania were Democratic and central Pennsylvania was solidly Republican (memorably summarized by Democratic strategist James Carville’s quote that, between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was just Alabama). While this may have been true (at least politically) in, say, 2000, working-class western and northeastern Pennsylvania have slowly but surely been getting redder. As a result, Pennsylvania’s new geographic divide is between southeastern Pennsylvania and the rest of the state — in other words, the parts of the state that are culturally Northeastern and the parts that are culturally Midwestern or Appalachian.
Granted, even this is an oversimplified description of Pennsylvania’s political divide. Pittsburgh’s Allegheny County is one of the few counties in the state that is getting bluer (the Midwest has upper-class suburbs too!). And Philadelphia County actually voted more Republican in 2016, despite having the state’s smallest non-college-educated white population (by percentage). This hints at another problem Democrats would like to solve: returning to their former strength among Black voters. (Philadelphia County is 44 percent Black.) According to CAP, Clinton won “only” 89.8 percent of the Black vote in Pennsylvania. That’s obviously very high, but it’s short of the 96.0 percent that Barack Obama received four years earlier — and those margins matter. If Clinton had matched Obama’s share of the Black vote, CAP found, she would have narrowly carried Pennsylvania in 2016 — even with her poor performance among white voters without a bachelor’s degree.
Apart from winning back non-college-educated white voters or Black voters, some Democrats may see a third way forward in Pennsylvania: running up their margin in the suburbs. The other trend evident from the map above is that Democrats are gaining ground in the affluent, well-educated counties around Philadelphia. Philly’s four “collar counties” — Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery — went from voting for Obama by 10 points in 2012 to voting for Clinton by 14 points. But the problem for Democrats is that those four counties contain only 22 percent of Pennsylvania’s 2016 voters, and they are moving to the left far more slowly than the rest of the state is moving to the right. For example, the 24 counties in western Pennsylvania other than Allegheny contain a similar 19 percent of Pennsylvania voters, yet they went from voting for Romney by 18 points to voting for Trump by 32 points.
Of course, Democrats don’t have to choose just one group of voters to appeal to. Biden has been making overtures to suburban voters, Black voters and non-college-educated white voters — and there are signs he’s succeeding on multiple fronts. The last two polls (one Democratic, one Republican) to ask about the presidential race in Pennsylvania’s 1st Congressional District — which is almost coterminous with Bucks County — both gave Biden a 9-point lead in a suburban district Clinton carried by only 2 points. And a February poll by Mercyhurst University showed Biden at 48 percent and Trump at 44 percent in post-industrial Erie County, which Trump won by 2 points in 2016 — although Biden’s lead was still a far cry from the 16 points by which Obama carried Erie in 2012. And, in a stroke of luck for Biden, he may be uniquely positioned to reverse some of Democrats’ most severe 2016 losses: the 24 points shaved off the Democratic margin in Lackawanna and Luzerne counties. These counties are the heart of the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre metropolitan area, where Biden was born, grew up and speaks of often on the campaign trail.
All told, Biden currently leads the FiveThirtyEight polling average in Pennsylvania by 4.9 points. Adjusting for demographics and the possibility of change over the next two months, our forecast projects that the Democrat will ultimately carry the Keystone State by 4.6 points. However, both numbers are closer than Biden’s lead nationally, implying that if the overall race tightens, Biden could fall victim to the same trends that made Pennsylvania so inhospitable for Clinton in 2016. In other words, it’s no coincidence that Biden’s 75 in 100 chance of winning Pennsylvania is nearly identical to his chance of winning the election: As goes Pennsylvania, so goes the Electoral College.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: How Ohio is preparing for a pandemic election


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-17--What’s The Chance That Trump Loses The Popular Vote But Wins The Election Again?

Elections analyst Nathaniel Rakich takes a look at our presidential forecast and asks what weird ( and not-so-weird ) scenarios @ @ @ @ @ 2020 election .

What’s The Chance That Trump Loses The Popular Vote But Wins The Election Again?
Elections analyst Nathaniel Rakich takes a look at our presidential forecast and asks what weird (and not-so-weird) scenarios could shake out in the 2020 election.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-17--North Carolina Is Already Rejecting Black Voters’ Mail-In Ballots More Often Than White Voters’

In every election , a small percentage of mail-in ballots get rejected .
But this election is likely to have a whole lot of mail-in ballots .
And in an election where a record number of voters are expected to cast their ballots by mail , you ’ re likely to hear a whole lot about ballots that don ’ t count , especially because voters of color have ballots rejected at a higher rate than white voters .
It ’ s already happening .
In North Carolina , absentee ballots have already been sent back and the state has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As of September 17 , Black voters ’ ballots are being rejected at more than four times the rate of white voters , according to the state ’ s numbers .
Black voters have mailed in 13,747 ballots , with 642 rejected , or 4.7 percent .
White voters have cast 60,954 mail-in ballots , with 681 — or 1.1 percent — rejected .
In addition , 434 ballots cast by white voters and 127 ballots cast by Black voters were marked “ spoiled , ” which can mean literally spoiled or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the election office that the address they had requested a ballot to is wrong .
( These are a tiny portion of the votes from one state , so obviously we have a long way to go before we know the full landscape of ballot rejection rates . )
The vast majority of these ballots were rejected because voters made a mistake or failed to fill out the witness information , according to state records .
A rejected ballot does not necessarily mean the voter is denied his or her vote : North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote curing , ” where voters are notified that there ’ s a mistake and given a chance to fix their ballot .
But that ’ s not an option in every state : only 19 states currently allow some form of ballot curing .
And even that isn ’ t foolproof .
In Nevada ’ s statewide primary in June , for example , 12,366 ballots had a missing or mismatched signature , but even after voters were notified to fix it , only 45 percent were successfully cured .
Meanwhile , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not a problem unique to North Carolina .
Black voters and other voters of color frequently have their ballots rejected at a higher rate than white votes ( so do younger voters , on average ) .
In Florida ’ s 2018 midterm elections , ballots cast by Black voters , Hispanic voters and voters from other racial and ethnic minorities were rejected at twice the rate of ballots cast by white voters , according to a report from the Florida ACLU .
A team of university researchers found a similar pattern in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black voters were rejected at a higher rate than those from white voters , even when accounting for county-level differences in rejection rates .
Part of this gap could be due to the fact that many Black voters and voters of color casting mail ballots are doing so for the first time , and first time vote-by-mail voters tend to make more mistakes because they ’ re less familiar with the requirements .
That ’ s true in North Carolina , too .
Michael Bitzer , a political scientist at Catawba College in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the state and found that most voters who had their ballot rejected so far voted in person in 2016 .
“ We ’ re seeing already a lack of familiarity with the process , whether it ’ s signing the ballot or having the witness information completed , ” Bitzer said .
“ There tends to be a greater number from voters who were previously in-person voters .
If you look at the numbers [ from Sept. 14 ] , the ballots denied due to incomplete witness information , 55 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016.
” That the barrier to entry is hitting voters of color harder than white voters is indicative of broader , systemic issues with enfranchisement .
“ When there ’ s a barrier , it ’ s going to fall hardest on the most disadvantaged and disenfranchised in the community , which is very frequently going to be poor voters and voters of color , ” said Myrna Pérez , the director of the voting rights and elections program at the Brennan Center for Justice .
Even if inexperience is largely to blame @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for concern since we ’ re expecting a record influx in mail-in voters this year .
In North Carolina alone , 837,685 of the state ’ s 7.1 million voters have requested absentee ballots so far .
And that ’ s part of the problem : In 2016 , nationally , 1 percent of mail-in ballots were rejected , according to the Election Assistance Commission ’ s aggregation of state reports .
( This number varies by state .
In Oregon , which has had mail-only elections for 20 years , 0.69 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia , 5.8 percent of mail-in ballots were rejected . )
But there were a lot fewer voters casting ballots by mail in 2016 .
Any vote lost is a problem , but 1 percent of a few million votes can be an election-defining one .
What ’ s the chance Trump loses the popular vote but wins the election again ?

In every election, a small percentage of mail-in ballots get rejected. But this election is likely to have a whole lot of mail-in ballots. And in an election where a record number of voters are expected to cast their ballots by mail, you’re likely to hear a whole lot about ballots that don’t count, especially because voters of color have ballots rejected at a higher rate than white voters.
It’s already happening. In North Carolina, absentee ballots have already been sent back and the state has been updating statistics on those ballots daily. As of September 17, Black voters’ ballots are being rejected at more than four times the rate of white voters, according to the state’s numbers. Black voters have mailed in 13,747 ballots, with 642 rejected, or 4.7 percent. White voters have cast 60,954 mail-in ballots, with 681 — or 1.1 percent — rejected. In addition, 434 ballots cast by white voters and 127 ballots cast by Black voters were marked “spoiled,” which can mean literally spoiled or something as simple as a voter informing the election office that the address they had requested a ballot to is wrong. (These are a tiny portion of the votes from one state, so obviously we have a long way to go before we know the full landscape of ballot rejection rates.)
The vast majority of these ballots were rejected because voters made a mistake or failed to fill out the witness information, according to state records. A rejected ballot does not necessarily mean the voter is denied his or her vote: North Carolina allows for a process called “vote curing,” where voters are notified that there’s a mistake and given a chance to fix their ballot. But that’s not an option in every state. And even that isn’t foolproof. In Nevada’s statewide primary in June, for example, 12,366 ballots had a missing or mismatched signature, but even after voters were notified to fix it, only 45 percent were successfully cured.
Meanwhile, the racial gap in rejected ballots is not a problem unique to North Carolina.
Black voters and other voters of color frequently have their ballots rejected at a higher rate than white votes (so do younger voters, on average). In Florida’s 2018 midterm elections, ballots cast by Black voters, Hispanic voters and voters from other racial and ethnic minorities were rejected at twice the rate of ballots cast by white voters, according to a report from the Florida ACLU. A team of university researchers found a similar pattern in Georgia that year, where ballots from Black voters were rejected at a higher rate than those from white voters, even when accounting for county-level differences in rejection rates.
Part of this gap could be due to the fact that many Black voters and voters of color casting mail ballots are doing so for the first time, and first time vote-by-mail voters tend to make more mistakes because they’re less familiar with the requirements. That’s true in North Carolina, too. Michael Bitzer, a political scientist at Catawba College in North Carolina, compared historical voter records in the state and found that most voters who had their ballot rejected so far voted in person in 2016.
“We’re seeing already a lack of familiarity with the process, whether it’s signing the ballot or having the witness information completed,” Bitzer said. “There tends to be a greater number from voters who were previously in-person voters. If you look at the numbers [from Sept. 14], the ballots denied due to incomplete witness information, 55 percent of those voters had voted in person in 2016.”
That the barrier to entry is hitting voters of color harder than white voters is indicative of broader, systemic issues with enfranchisement.
“When there’s a barrier, it’s going to fall hardest on the most disadvantaged and disenfranchised in the community, which is very frequently going to be poor voters and voters of color,” said Myrna Pérez, the director of the voting rights and elections program at the Brennan Center for Justice.
Even if inexperience is largely to blame, that’s still a reason for concern since we’re expecting a record influx in mail-in voters this year. In North Carolina alone, 837,685 of the state’s 7.1 million voters have requested absentee ballots so far.
And that’s part of the problem: In 2016, nationally, 1 percent of mail-in ballots were rejected, according to the Election Assistance Commission’s aggregation of state reports. (This number varies by state. In Oregon, which has had mail-only elections for 20 years, 0.69 percent of mail ballots were rejected. In Georgia, 5.8 percent of mail-in ballots were rejected.) But there were a lot fewer voters casting ballots by mail in 2016. Any vote lost is a problem, but 1 percent of a few million votes can be an election-defining one.
CORRECTION (September 21, 2020, 11:55 a.m.): An earlier version of this article relied on an out-of-date list of states that allow ballot curing. To avoid confusion, we have removed the number of states that allow this.
What’s the chance Trump loses the popular vote but wins the election again?


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-17--More And More Americans Aren’t Religious. Why Are Democrats Ignoring These Voters?

Democrats are once again doubling down on religion this year .
Faith was on full display during the Democratic National Convention , where Joe Biden closed out the week with several pointed references to his Catholic faith .
And the Biden campaign is also making an ambitious play for white evangelical Protestants and Mormons , two loyal Republican groups where Democrats hope to make some inroads .
Often lost in this , though , is the fact that Democrats are mostly ignoring a massive group of voters who are becoming an increasingly crucial part of their base : people who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all .
Right now , voters with no religious affiliation look like they might back Biden in record numbers .
According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in early August , 72 percent of nonreligious voters — a group that includes people who identify as atheists , agnostics and nothing in particular — are planning to support Biden .
That ’ s 4 percentage points higher than the 68 percent who supported Hillary Clinton in 2016 .
And that ’ s a big deal , because despite being frequently overlooked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of the electorate .
An analysis of validated voters by Pew found that religiously unaffiliated voters accounted for one-quarter of the electorate in 2016 , and 30 percent in 2018 .
The unaffiliated are a key demographic for Democratic candidates in particular .
More than one-third of the people who voted for Clinton in 2016 were religiously unaffiliated , making them just as electorally important for Democrats as white evangelical Protestants are for Republicans .
Yet despite constantly hearing about the importance of white evangelical voters in an election cycle , Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growing number of nonreligious people who vote for them .
Why ?
In the past , the challenges of organizing the religiously unaffiliated have made it easy to understand why Democrats haven ’ t made a real effort to appeal to them more .
As most don ’ t regularly gather like a church congregation , religiously unaffiliated Americans can be difficult to reach .
A lack of institutional leadership also means there aren ’ t many prominent people or groups showing up to nudge politicians to pay attention to their issues .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ nonreligious people in American culture , overt appeals to the nonreligious still run the risk of turning off the majority of voters who are people of faith .
But there are signs that antipathy toward President Trump has mobilized some religiously unaffiliated voters in unprecedented ways .
Although Trump is not an overtly pious figure , he ’ s embraced a vision of American culture that privileges Christian identity and heritage .
That ’ s a view that most nonreligious Americans reject , which is likely a part of the reason that their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the campaign ’ s minimal outreach efforts .
In the coming years , though , that calculus might have to change , since the growing size of the country ’ s nonreligious population could make these voters more difficult for Democrats to ignore .
“ I think in future elections we ’ re going to see more of an effort to reach a secular voting bloc and the reason is simply that they ’ re continuing to grow , ” said David Campbell , a political science professor at the University of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ It ’ s too ripe a target for politicians to ignore.
” Over the past 10 years , the share of Americans who identify as Christian has fallen by 12 percentage points , while the share of people who say they have no religious affiliation is up 9 percentage points .
That breaks down to 1 in every 4 Americans who are now religiously unaffiliated , including 40 percent of millennials .
Meanwhile , there ’ s no sign that nonreligious Americans are returning to religion as they get older .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ than they benefit Republicans .
Nearly two-thirds of religiously unaffiliated Americans identify as Democrats , a sharp increase from just a few decades ago , when the ( much smaller ) nonreligious population was fairly evenly split between the parties .
And in 2018 , a record-high share ( 75 percent ) of religiously unaffiliated voters supported Democratic candidates .
As the table below shows , that kind of extreme partisan tilt is rivaled by only two other major religious groups : Black Protestants and white evangelical Protestants .
One reason we haven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unaffiliated people is because they are often dismissed as less likely to vote , even as their share of the total population has grown .
But that perception of nonreligious voters as less engaged could be increasingly wrong , as there are indications that the voting gap between secular and religious Americans has shrunk in recent elections .
And surveys also indicate that nonreligious people are just as likely as religious Americans to donate and engage in other political activities .
A recent working paper also suggests that a lack of religious engagement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lower turnout among secular people .
Instead , religiously unaffiliated voters were more likely to have other characteristics ( in particular , being young ) that also correlate with low turnout .
“ It turns out that when you put in basic statistical controls , most of the secular voting gap in recent years disappears and nonreligious people appear to turn out at about the same rate as [ religiously ] affiliated people , ” said Evan Stewart , the study ’ s author and a sociology professor at the University of Massachusetts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters are now older — roughly one-third of nonreligious people are younger than 30 — it ’ s possible that this bloc will start voting more regularly , too .
Additionally , anger at Trump is motivating many nonreligious voters to get more politically involved .
A majority ( 56 percent ) of religiously unaffiliated Americans — including nearly three-quarters ( 73 percent ) of atheists and agnostics — say Trump has been a “ terrible ” president .
And there are signs that religiously unaffiliated people have become more politically engaged since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2018 found that nonreligious people were more likely than their religious peers to have attended a rally or contacted a political official .
That anger and energy could help drive up support for Biden among religiously unaffiliated voters this year , even without much outreach from the campaign .
( Not to mention , nonreligious voters ’ views on issues like abortion , immigration , health care and climate change do tend to align pretty well with Democratic policies overall — which might suggest that Democrats can reach this group simply by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . )
But Sarah Levin , a political consultant who focuses on secular groups and communities , said Democrats shouldn ’ t see this election as a sign that they can take nonreligious voters for granted .
Secular people have values too , she said , and hearing politicians and parties speak to those values can motivate them to get more politically involved .
Meanwhile , support for progressive policies doesn ’ t necessarily translate to enthusiasm for mainstream Democratic candidates .
Sen. Bernie Sanders , for instance , was consistently the favorite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primary , and Democratic candidates appear to have gotten record-high support from nonreligious voters in the 2018 midterms in part because they peeled off people who voted for third-party candidates like Jill Stein and Gary Johnson in 2016 .
Levin said there are ways to make appeals to secular voters that can also speak to religious Democrats — for example , emphasizing the importance of protecting religious minorities and nonreligious people through the separation of church and state , or focusing on science-based issues like climate change .
That kind of big-tent strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The last thing Democrats want is to be portrayed as the godless party , because that would probably turn off a lot of voters , ” Campbell said .
But he added that Democrats may be missing a big political opportunity if they don ’ t start thinking about ways to engage with nonreligious voters as a group .
“ Until parties and politicians start talking to secular voters as a bloc , voters won ’ t see themselves that way either , ” he said .
“ What you have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a distinct group that can be courted and discussed .
The left hasn ’ t figured out how to do that with nonreligious voters .
But we could see more efforts in that direction going forward.
” What ’ s the chance Trump loses the popular vote but wins the election again ?

Democrats are once again doubling down on religion this year. Faith was on full display during the Democratic National Convention, where Joe Biden closed out the week with several pointed references to his Catholic faith. And the Biden campaign is also making an ambitious play for white evangelical Protestants and Mormons, two loyal Republican groups where Democrats hope to make some inroads.
Often lost in this, though, is the fact that Democrats are mostly ignoring a massive group of voters who are becoming an increasingly crucial part of their base: people who don’t have any religion at all.
Right now, voters with no religious affiliation look like they might back Biden in record numbers. According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in early August, 72 percent of nonreligious voters — a group that includes people who identify as atheists, agnostics and nothing in particular — are planning to support Biden. That’s 4 percentage points higher than the 68 percent who supported Hillary Clinton in 2016. And that’s a big deal, because despite being frequently overlooked, nonreligious people make up a sizable part of the electorate. An analysis of validated voters by Pew found that religiously unaffiliated voters accounted for one-quarter of the electorate in 2016, and 30 percent in 2018.
The unaffiliated are a key demographic for Democratic candidates in particular. More than one-third of the people who voted for Clinton in 2016 were religiously unaffiliated, making them just as electorally important for Democrats as white evangelical Protestants are for Republicans. Yet despite constantly hearing about the importance of white evangelical voters in an election cycle, Democratic politicians have been slow to embrace the growing number of nonreligious people who vote for them. Why?
In the past, the challenges of organizing the religiously unaffiliated have made it easy to understand why Democrats haven’t made a real effort to appeal to them more. As most don’t regularly gather like a church congregation, religiously unaffiliated Americans can be difficult to reach. A lack of institutional leadership also means there aren’t many prominent people or groups showing up to nudge politicians to pay attention to their issues. And despite rising tolerance for atheists and nonreligious people in American culture, overt appeals to the nonreligious still run the risk of turning off the majority of voters who are people of faith.
But there are signs that antipathy toward President Trump has mobilized some religiously unaffiliated voters in unprecedented ways. Although Trump is not an overtly pious figure, he’s embraced a vision of American culture that privileges Christian identity and heritage. That’s a view that most nonreligious Americans reject, which is likely a part of the reason that their support for Biden is so high, despite the campaign’s minimal outreach efforts. In the coming years, though, that calculus might have to change, since the growing size of the country’s nonreligious population could make these voters more difficult for Democrats to ignore.
“I think in future elections we’re going to see more of an effort to reach a secular voting bloc and the reason is simply that they’re continuing to grow,” said David Campbell, a political science professor at the University of Notre Dame who studies religion and politics. “It’s too ripe a target for politicians to ignore.”
Over the past 10 years, the share of Americans who identify as Christian has fallen by 12 percentage points, while the share of people who say they have no religious affiliation is up 9 percentage points. That breaks down to 1 in every 4 Americans who are now religiously unaffiliated, including 40 percent of millennials. Meanwhile, there’s no sign that nonreligious Americans are returning to religion as they get older.
These shifts stand to benefit Democrats more than they benefit Republicans. Nearly two-thirds of religiously unaffiliated Americans identify as Democrats, a sharp increase from just a few decades ago, when the (much smaller) nonreligious population was fairly evenly split between the parties. And in 2018, a record-high share (75 percent) of religiously unaffiliated voters supported Democratic candidates. As the table below shows, that kind of extreme partisan tilt is rivaled by only two other major religious groups: Black Protestants and white evangelical Protestants.
Most nonreligious voters voted for a Democrat in 2018 Share of voters who reported voting for Democratic and Republican candidates in 2018 Dem. Rep. Margin Black Protestant 94% 5% D+89 Religiously unaffiliated 75 22 D+53 Hispanic Catholic 71 27 D+44 Jewish 72 28 D+44 Other 66 33 D+33 Protestant, other race 47 50 R+3 White mainline Protestant 42 55 R+13 White Catholic 39 59 R+20 White evangelical Protestant 17 81 R+64 Source: Pew Research Center
One reason we haven’t heard as much about religiously unaffiliated people is because they are often dismissed as less likely to vote, even as their share of the total population has grown. But that perception of nonreligious voters as less engaged could be increasingly wrong, as there are indications that the voting gap between secular and religious Americans has shrunk in recent elections. And surveys also indicate that nonreligious people are just as likely as religious Americans to donate and engage in other political activities. A recent working paper also suggests that a lack of religious engagement may not be the main driver of lower turnout among secular people. Instead, religiously unaffiliated voters were more likely to have other characteristics (in particular, being young) that also correlate with low turnout.
“It turns out that when you put in basic statistical controls, most of the secular voting gap in recent years disappears and nonreligious people appear to turn out at about the same rate as [religiously] affiliated people,” said Evan Stewart, the study’s author and a sociology professor at the University of Massachusetts Boston. And because more religiously unaffiliated voters are now older — roughly one-third of nonreligious people are younger than 30 — it’s possible that this bloc will start voting more regularly, too.
Additionally, anger at Trump is motivating many nonreligious voters to get more politically involved. A majority (56 percent) of religiously unaffiliated Americans — including nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of atheists and agnostics — say Trump has been a “terrible” president. And there are signs that religiously unaffiliated people have become more politically engaged since Trump was elected — one survey conducted in 2018 found that nonreligious people were more likely than their religious peers to have attended a rally or contacted a political official.
That anger and energy could help drive up support for Biden among religiously unaffiliated voters this year, even without much outreach from the campaign. (Not to mention, nonreligious voters’ views on issues like abortion, immigration, health care and climate change do tend to align pretty well with Democratic policies overall — which might suggest that Democrats can reach this group simply by doing what they’re already doing.)
But Sarah Levin, a political consultant who focuses on secular groups and communities, said Democrats shouldn’t see this election as a sign that they can take nonreligious voters for granted. Secular people have values too, she said, and hearing politicians and parties speak to those values can motivate them to get more politically involved.
Meanwhile, support for progressive policies doesn’t necessarily translate to enthusiasm for mainstream Democratic candidates. Sen. Bernie Sanders, for instance, was consistently the favorite of religiously unaffiliated voters during the Democratic primary, and Democratic candidates appear to have gotten record-high support from nonreligious voters in the 2018 midterms in part because they peeled off people who voted for third-party candidates like Jill Stein and Gary Johnson in 2016.
Levin said there are ways to make appeals to secular voters that can also speak to religious Democrats — for example, emphasizing the importance of protecting religious minorities and nonreligious people through the separation of church and state, or focusing on science-based issues like climate change. That kind of big-tent strategy isn’t without risk, though. “The last thing Democrats want is to be portrayed as the godless party, because that would probably turn off a lot of voters,” Campbell said. But he added that Democrats may be missing a big political opportunity if they don’t start thinking about ways to engage with nonreligious voters as a group.
“Until parties and politicians start talking to secular voters as a bloc, voters won’t see themselves that way either,” he said. “What you have on the right with white evangelical Protestants is a distinct group that can be courted and discussed. The left hasn’t figured out how to do that with nonreligious voters. But we could see more efforts in that direction going forward.”
What’s the chance Trump loses the popular vote but wins the election again?


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-16--Election Update: Where Biden And Trump Have Gained The Most Ground

From 30,000 feet , the presidential race looks much as it did when we first launched our presidential election forecast in August .
Joe Biden has about a 3 in 4 chance of winning compared to President Trump ’ s roughly 1 in 4 shot , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s forecast .
Biden ’ s chances did dip down to a 2 in 3 shot after the Republican National Convention on Aug. 31 , but overall , his chances of winning have hung out in the low- to mid-70 percent range .
By contrast , Trump ’ s chances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to high-20s .
But underneath the topline numbers , there has still been some fairly big movement in a handful of key battleground states , and the news has been mostly good for Biden .
If we look at how much Biden ’ s odds have changed in states where both he and Trump have at least a 1 in 10 shot of winning since we launched the forecast on Aug. 12 , Biden has improved his chances in 17 of 20 states .
And in some cases , Biden ’ s improvement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Minnesota , +12 points in Arizona and +10 points in Wisconsin , for instance .
By comparison , Trump ’ s odds have really only improved in Florida , although he hasn ’ t lost much ground in states such as Georgia and Ohio , which may signal that Biden ’ s electoral gains will not be that expansive .
( Trump still leads in Texas , for instance , despite Biden ’ s improvement there . )
But Biden ’ s improvement in Arizona is particularly noteworthy as Arizona is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Trump wins .
That is , if Trump carries the state , he wins the election 59 percent of time , according to our forecast ; but if Biden wins Arizona , Trump has less than a 7 percent chance of winning overall .
And three polls released in the last few days show Biden ahead in the Grand Canyon State , although by varying margins .
A CBS News/YouGov poll found him up by 3 points while a Gravis Marketing survey gave him just a 2-point lead over Trump .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a much larger 10-point advantage , 52 percent to 42 percent .
Meanwhile , Biden ’ s improvement in Minnesota is also bad news for Trump , as the campaign has long viewed Minnesota as a potential target to expand the map — the president only lost the state by about 2 points in 2016 .
However , Minnesota seems to be steadily moving away from Trump .
An ABC News/Washington Post survey released today gave Biden a sizable 16-point edge , 57 percent to 41 percent , among likely voters .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CBS News/YouGov and the New York Times/Siena College each found Biden ahead by 9 points in Minnesota , 50 percent to 41 percent .
Still , a Morning Consult survey released yesterday might buoy the Trump campaign ’ s hopes of breaking through in Minnesota , as it put Biden ’ s lead at only 4 points .
And Trump is doing better in Wisconsin , although he ’ s still an underdog there as recent polls suggest Biden has a fairly sizable advantage .
A CNN/SSRS survey released yesterday gave Biden a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Post survey out today gave Biden a 6-point edge .
And this past weekend , the New York Times/Siena College found Biden up by 5 points there .
Florida is the only battleground state where Trump ’ s odds have increased appreciably , but that ’ s an important silver lining for the president , as winning Florida is make or break for Trump ’ s chances of winning the election .
If Trump wins the Sunshine State , he wins the presidency in 57 percent of our forecast ’ s simulations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump less than a 2 percent shot at victory .
And at this point , Florida polls continue to give Trump a decent shot at winning the state , although they haven ’ t been universally positive .
Perhaps most notably , a poll released on Tuesday by Monmouth University found Biden up by 3 to 5 points among likely voters , depending on turnout .
However , another poll out yesterday from Florida Atlantic University found the two candidates tied in a dead heat at 50 percent after undecided voters were pushed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this point , Florida remains ultra-competitive with Trump gaining ground there .
Trump ’ s chances haven ’ t improved much elsewhere , but it ’ s worth noting that his standing hasn ’ t really worsened in a couple of right-leaning battleground states that Democrats have eyed , like Georgia and Ohio , either .
That ’ s important for Trump because not only would losing either state dramatically hurt his chances of winning overall ( Trump would have about a 1 percent chance of winning if he lost in either one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this election might not be a blowout where Democrats turn states like Georgia and Texas blue .
Bottom line : The broad electoral picture hasn ’ t changed much since we launched the forecast in mid-August , but we ’ ve observed some real changes in a number of key battleground states .
The problem for the president is that most of those shifts have been to Biden ’ s benefit , except for the all-important state of Florida .
Trump very much remains in contention , but he is an underdog for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Texas could go blue in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight

From 30,000 feet, the presidential race looks much as it did when we first launched our presidential election forecast in August. Joe Biden has about a 3 in 4 chance of winning compared to President Trump’s roughly 1 in 4 shot, according to FiveThirtyEight’s forecast. Biden’s chances did dip down to a 2 in 3 shot after the Republican National Convention on Aug. 31, but overall, his chances of winning have hung out in the low- to mid-70 percent range. By contrast, Trump’s chances have mostly bounced around in the mid- to high-20s.
But underneath the topline numbers, there has still been some fairly big movement in a handful of key battleground states, and the news has been mostly good for Biden. If we look at how much Biden’s odds have changed in states where both he and Trump have at least a 1 in 10 shot of winning since we launched the forecast on Aug. 12, Biden has improved his chances in 17 of 20 states. And in some cases, Biden’s improvement has been considerable — +15 percentage points in Minnesota, +12 points in Arizona and +10 points in Wisconsin, for instance. By comparison, Trump’s odds have really only improved in Florida, although he hasn’t lost much ground in states such as Georgia and Ohio, which may signal that Biden’s electoral gains will not be that expansive. (Trump still leads in Texas, for instance, despite Biden’s improvement there.)
Biden’s odds improved in most battleground states Change in Joe Biden’s chances of winning in states where he or Donald Trump has at least a 10 percent chance of winning, between forecast launch on Aug. 12 and Sept. 16 (as of 9:30 a.m. ET) Biden’s chance of winning State Aug. 12 Sept. 16 Change Minnesota 71.8% 86.6% +14.8 Arizona 55.2 67.6 +12.4 Wisconsin 69.8 79.9 +10.0 Michigan 81.2 86.9 +5.7 Maine 77.3 82.6 +5.3 North Carolina 49.0 52.9 +3.9 Nevada 76.7 80.2 +3.5 Pennsylvania 73.4 75.8 +2.4 Texas 29.1 31.4 +2.3 Iowa 31.4 33.5 +2.0 Colorado 84.9 86.4 +1.5 New Hampshire 71.6 73.0 +1.3 Georgia 34.3 35.4 +1.2 Montana 12.1 13.0 +1.0 Alaska 19.0 19.6 +0.7 Ohio 44.8 45.2 +0.4 Mississippi 12.8 12.9 +0.1 South Carolina 12.8 12.8 +0.0 Missouri 12.9 10.3 -2.6 Florida 64.1 60.7 -3.4
But Biden’s improvement in Arizona is particularly noteworthy as Arizona is a cornerstone of most Electoral College maps in which Trump wins. That is, if Trump carries the state, he wins the election 59 percent of time, according to our forecast; but if Biden wins Arizona, Trump has less than a 7 percent chance of winning overall. And three polls released in the last few days show Biden ahead in the Grand Canyon State, although by varying margins. A CBS News/YouGov poll found him up by 3 points while a Gravis Marketing survey gave him just a 2-point lead over Trump. But an OH Predictive Insights poll gave Biden a much larger 10-point advantage, 52 percent to 42 percent.
Meanwhile, Biden’s improvement in Minnesota is also bad news for Trump, as the campaign has long viewed Minnesota as a potential target to expand the map — the president only lost the state by about 2 points in 2016. However, Minnesota seems to be steadily moving away from Trump. An ABC News/Washington Post survey released today gave Biden a sizable 16-point edge, 57 percent to 41 percent, among likely voters. And two separate polls released this weekend by CBS News/YouGov and the New York Times/Siena College each found Biden ahead by 9 points in Minnesota, 50 percent to 41 percent. Still, a Morning Consult survey released yesterday might buoy the Trump campaign’s hopes of breaking through in Minnesota, as it put Biden’s lead at only 4 points. And Trump is doing better in Wisconsin, although he’s still an underdog there as recent polls suggest Biden has a fairly sizable advantage. A CNN/SSRS survey released yesterday gave Biden a 10-point lead, while an ABC News/Washington Post survey out today gave Biden a 6-point edge. And this past weekend, the New York Times/Siena College found Biden up by 5 points there.
Florida is the only battleground state where Trump’s odds have increased appreciably, but that’s an important silver lining for the president, as winning Florida is make or break for Trump’s chances of winning the election. If Trump wins the Sunshine State, he wins the presidency in 57 percent of our forecast’s simulations, while a Biden win there would give Trump less than a 2 percent shot at victory. And at this point, Florida polls continue to give Trump a decent shot at winning the state, although they haven’t been universally positive. Perhaps most notably, a poll released on Tuesday by Monmouth University found Biden up by 3 to 5 points among likely voters, depending on turnout. However, another poll out yesterday from Florida Atlantic University found the two candidates tied in a dead heat at 50 percent after undecided voters were pushed to pick a candidate, so at this point, Florida remains ultra-competitive with Trump gaining ground there.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Trump Narrows The Gap With Latino Voters
Trump’s chances haven’t improved much elsewhere, but it’s worth noting that his standing hasn’t really worsened in a couple of right-leaning battleground states that Democrats have eyed, like Georgia and Ohio, either. That’s important for Trump because not only would losing either state dramatically hurt his chances of winning overall (Trump would have about a 1 percent chance of winning if he lost in either one), but it also signals that this election might not be a blowout where Democrats turn states like Georgia and Texas blue.
Bottom line: The broad electoral picture hasn’t changed much since we launched the forecast in mid-August, but we’ve observed some real changes in a number of key battleground states. The problem for the president is that most of those shifts have been to Biden’s benefit, except for the all-important state of Florida. Trump very much remains in contention, but he is an underdog for reelection at this point.
Confidence Interval: Texas could go blue in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-16--Trump Has Lost His Edge In TV Advertising

For months , President Trump ’ s campaign boasted that its campaign operation was a “ juggernaut ” and compared it to the powerful Death Star .
Nowhere was that more evident to the general public than on the television airwaves .
According to data from Kantar/Campaign Media Analysis Group , from early May through July 28 , 2020 , the Trump campaign and Republican outside groups spent an estimated $ 80.1 million to air 161,744 ads on local broadcast , national network and national cable TV for the presidential general election .
By contrast , Joe Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ estimated $ 44.2 million and aired only 66,875 ads for the presidential general election during that period .
But as you can see in the chart below , the Republican Death Star stopped being fully armed and operational in late July — while Democrats began to step up their game .
From July 29 through Sept. 14 , Republican forces aired just 107,816 ads at an estimated cost of $ 71.5 million , while Democratic forces aired 183,341 ads for an estimated $ 107.1 million .
What happened in July ?
Trump appointed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who was tasked with fixing the campaign ’ s cash flow problems and sudden fundraising woes .
For most of the year , Trump and the Republican National Committee had comfortably outraised Biden and the Democratic National Committee , but that advantage had evaporated by the end of July .
And in August , Bidenworld outraised Trumpworld $ 365 million to $ 210 million .
Accordingly , Stepien has reportedly been working to tighten the campaign ’ s belt — which has included cutting back on TV ads in several key states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through Aug. 24 , Republicans outaired Democrats 20,904 ads to 18,548 in Arizona-based media markets .
But the Trump campaign went dark in the Grand Canyon State on Aug. 25 , and after that Democrats outaired Republicans 8,922 ads to 3,226 in the state ( all but two of the Republican ads were from outside groups ) .
It ’ s a similar story in Pennsylvania : From early May through July 29 , Republicans aired 28,438 ads to Democrats ’ 17,322 .
But from July 30 through Sept. 14 , Democrats out-advertised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large part because the Trump campaign aired only two ads during those six weeks .
That should be especially alarming to Republicans , since the FiveThirtyEight model believes that Pennsylvania is the likeliest state to decide the 2020 election .
The Trump campaign also didn ’ t air a single commercial in a Michigan-based media market from July 23 through Sept. 7 .
Although the campaign is now back on the air , Michiganders saw 38,261 pro-Biden ads from early May through Sept. 14 and only 15,866 pro-Trump ads .
Trump is still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , such as Florida , North Carolina and Wisconsin — but even in those states , Democrats have been airing more ads than Republicans since late July .
Here are the shifts in each major swing state — defined as the states with more than a 1 percent chance of being the Electoral College tipping point , per the FiveThirtyEight model .
In sum , these numbers look damning for Trump .
And they are indeed another sign that Trump ’ s campaign may be in trouble , especially considering he is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a larger war chest at his disposal .
But it ’ s also important to remember that TV advertising isn ’ t the be-all and end-all for campaigns .
In fact , political scientists disagree about whether TV ads even have a significant effect on elections at all !
And the Trump campaign points to the fact that it is outspending Biden in other areas , such as field offices ( Trump has opened more than 280 , while Biden , due to the coronavirus pandemic , has opened none ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sept. 5 , Trump spent $ 66.8 million on Facebook and Google ads while Biden spent $ 46.2 million ) .
And of course , there are still seven weeks left in the campaign — plenty of time for Trump to return to dominance on the airwaves .
Confidence Interval : Texas could go blue in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight

For months, President Trump’s campaign boasted that its campaign operation was a “juggernaut” and compared it to the powerful Death Star. Nowhere was that more evident to the general public than on the television airwaves. According to data from Kantar/Campaign Media Analysis Group, from early May through July 28, 2020, the Trump campaign and Republican outside groups spent an estimated $80.1 million to air 161,744 ads on local broadcast, national network and national cable TV for the presidential general election. By contrast, Joe Biden’s campaign and Democratic outside groups spent an estimated $44.2 million and aired only 66,875 ads for the presidential general election during that period.
But as you can see in the chart below, the Republican Death Star stopped being fully armed and operational in late July — while Democrats began to step up their game. From July 29 through Sept. 14, Republican forces aired just 107,816 ads at an estimated cost of $71.5 million, while Democratic forces aired 183,341 ads for an estimated $107.1 million.
What happened in July? Trump appointed a new campaign manager, Bill Stepien, who was tasked with fixing the campaign’s cash flow problems and sudden fundraising woes. For most of the year, Trump and the Republican National Committee had comfortably outraised Biden and the Democratic National Committee, but that advantage had evaporated by the end of July. And in August, Bidenworld outraised Trumpworld $365 million to $210 million.
Accordingly, Stepien has reportedly been working to tighten the campaign’s belt — which has included cutting back on TV ads in several key states. For example, from early May through Aug. 24, Republicans outaired Democrats 20,904 ads to 18,548 in Arizona-based media markets. But the Trump campaign went dark in the Grand Canyon State on Aug. 25, and after that Democrats outaired Republicans 8,922 ads to 3,226 in the state (all but two of the Republican ads were from outside groups).
It’s a similar story in Pennsylvania: From early May through July 29, Republicans aired 28,438 ads to Democrats’ 17,322. But from July 30 through Sept. 14, Democrats out-advertised Republicans 30,882 spots to 15,702 — in large part because the Trump campaign aired only two ads during those six weeks. That should be especially alarming to Republicans, since the FiveThirtyEight model believes that Pennsylvania is the likeliest state to decide the 2020 election.
The Trump campaign also didn’t air a single commercial in a Michigan-based media market from July 23 through Sept. 7. Although the campaign is now back on the air, Michiganders saw 38,261 pro-Biden ads from early May through Sept. 14 and only 15,866 pro-Trump ads.
Trump is still on the air in other crucial states, such as Florida, North Carolina and Wisconsin — but even in those states, Democrats have been airing more ads than Republicans since late July. Here are the shifts in each major swing state — defined as the states with more than a 1 percent chance of being the Electoral College tipping point, per the FiveThirtyEight model.
Democrats are now airing more swing-state ads How many ads each party aired for the presidential general election on broadcast TV in the states with the highest chance of deciding the 2020 election, from May 5 to July 28 vs. from July 29 to Sept. 14 May 5 – July 28 July 29 – Sept. 14 State Tipping Point Dem. ads GOP ads Dem. ads GOP ads Pennsylvania 31% chance 16,899 28,204 31,305 15,936 Florida 14 8,373 27,114 40,547 19,786 Wisconsin 10 13,150 17,817 24,400 17,701 Arizona 7 7,717 13,165 19,753 10,965 Michigan 6 15,486 10,043 22,775 5,823 Minnesota 5 0 1,814 3,621 3,345 North Carolina 4 4,303 19,339 21,603 16,248 Nevada 4 70 5,884 5,676 22 Colorado 3 0 49 30 1 Ohio 3 93 9,037 3,648 29 New Hampshire 2 13 0 8 0 Georgia 2 3 10,395 33 12,293 Texas 2 40 584 165 2 Virginia 1 0 0 16 0 “Tipping-point chance” is the chance that a given state will provide the decisive vote in the Electoral College. Tipping-point chances are as of Sept. 15 at 10 a.m. Eastern. Source: Kantar/Campaign Media Analysis Group
In sum, these numbers look damning for Trump. And they are indeed another sign that Trump’s campaign may be in trouble, especially considering he is the incumbent and, as such, should have a larger war chest at his disposal. But it’s also important to remember that TV advertising isn’t the be-all and end-all for campaigns. In fact, political scientists disagree about whether TV ads even have a significant effect on elections at all! And the Trump campaign points to the fact that it is outspending Biden in other areas, such as field offices (Trump has opened more than 280, while Biden, due to the coronavirus pandemic, has opened none) and digital advertising (from Aug. 1 through Sept. 5, Trump spent $66.8 million on Facebook and Google ads while Biden spent $46.2 million). And of course, there are still seven weeks left in the campaign — plenty of time for Trump to return to dominance on the airwaves.
Confidence Interval: Texas could go blue in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-15--Why Some Latino Voters Are Backing Trump

In this week ’ s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew talks to Carlos Odio , the co-founder of Equis @ @ @ @ @ among Latino voters .
They also discuss whether polls in the Midwest have corrected their @ @ @ @ @ matter .

In this week’s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew talks to Carlos Odio, the co-founder of Equis Research, about political trends among Latino voters. They also discuss whether polls in the Midwest have corrected their biases and whether scandals still matter.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-18--How Asian Americans Are Thinking About The 2020 Election

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
Asian American voters didn ’ t always lean Democratic .
In 1992 , less than a third of Asian Americans voted Democratic .
But nowadays , most Asian Americans identify as Democrats , with more than half saying they plan to back Joe Biden and less than a third saying they ’ d vote for President Trump , according to the latest Asian American Voter Survey released this week .
Asian American voters are hardly a monolith .
The different groups that comprise Asian American voters are divided over how much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden for president .
For instance , Filipino Americans are more evenly divided among supporting Biden and Trump than Japanese Americans .
And Indian Americans , who have been reliably Democratic for years , now show some signs of slowly shifting to the right .
Finally , Vietnamese Americans lean pretty consistently Republican .
Asian Americans are one of the fastest growing racial or ethnic segments of eligible voters in the United States .
and make up 4.7 percent of all eligible voters , but there hasn ’ t been that much reliable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ survey provides one of the few snapshots of how Asian American voters feel about the upcoming presidential election .
That said , it ’ s important that we don ’ t read too much into one survey .
Only about 250 respondents were in each subgroup , putting the margin of error at +/- 6 percentage points for each group .
But by looking at how Asian Americans have politically identified since 2012 , we can more clearly see some of the trends in this most recent survey .
What immediately jumps out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic-leaning overall , Republicans have been making some headway — particularly among certain groups of national origin — over the last few elections .
Take Vietnamese Americans , who among Asian Americans are the most likely to identify as Republican .
Anabelle Vo , a 30-year-old video editor based in Los Angeles who started a podcast called Mỹ Gốc Việt ( “ Americans from Vietnam ” ) along with her childhood friend Bee Ngo , told me this is partly because the Vietnam War still looms large in how many older Vietnamese Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the U.S. after the war , and Vo said they may support the Republican Party because they view it as more strongly anti-communist than the Democratic Party .
Her friend and podcast co-host , Ngo , also pointed out that many Vietnamese Americans who identify as Catholic may be more socially conservative , a factor that could also explain why Filipino Americans , 65 percent of whom are Catholic , are more likely to support Republicans than other groups of Asian Americans .
But it ’ s unclear how strong some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vo , a professor in the Department of Asian American Studies at the University of California , Irvine .
For instance , even though many Vietnamese Americans identify as Republicans , there is some evidence that they might be moving away from the party .
And much of this comes down to age , which was a possible cleavage among Asian American voters in the Democratic primary .
Both Anabelle Vo and Ngo have noticed a distinct generational divide in their own personal experiences , with younger Vietnamese Americans much more likely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their parents or grandparents .
This is something that Linda Vo has also noticed in her research .
“ [ T ] here is a definite generational divide , ” Vo said .
“ That younger generation tends to be for the Democratic Party and tends to have more progressive politics.
” She did say the politics of Vietnamese Americans were changing , but slowly .
On the other hand , Republicans have seen modest gains among Indian Americans , who are the most Democratic-leaning group of Asian Americans .
Some of this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts by activist groups like the Republican Hindu Coalition , who capitalized on ideological overlaps between Trump and India ’ s popular nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2016 , leading some Indian Americans to vote Republican .
Only 21 percent of Indian Americans identify with , or lean towards , the Republican Party , but that ’ s still roughly double what it was in 2012 .
However , the majority of Asian Americans do identify as Democrats .
And that could be in part because there is a lot of overlap @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of every stripe and those espoused by the Democratic Party .
For instance , according to the survey , 81 percent of Asian Americans support stricter gun laws , 77 percent support stronger legislation to address climate change , 70 percent support affirmative action in higher education , 63 percent believe the government should do more to give Black Americans equal rights with white Americans , 59 percent support a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants , 59 percent support shifting funding away from law enforcement , and 55 percent support expanding access @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of legal status .
“ When you break it down to certain issues like health care and things like that , that ’ s how it gets easier for me to discuss things with older folks , ” Anabelle Vo said .
Vo describes herself as more progressive than the typical Democratic voter and has attended demonstrations and marches for like-minded causes .
And interestingly , there weren ’ t significant divides on these issues between more conservative Asian American groups , like Vietnamese Americans , and more liberal Asian American groups , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vietnamese Americans were more likely to favor stricter gun control legislation , policies to curb climate change and affirmative action , than Asian Americans as a whole .
If Republicans are looking to persuade Asian Americans , however , there is one potential issue where they may have the upperhand .
Ninety percent of Asian Americans said that jobs and the economy are either “ extremely ” or “ very ” important .
And on that issue , 35 percent said that Republicans are doing a better job , while only 31 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there was no difference , or that they don ’ t know .
It is hard to imagine that Asian American voters will greatly shift in their support before the election , so the real question is whether they ’ ll come out to the polls ( or mail in their ballot ) .
The survey did find high levels of enthusiasm for voting ( 82 percent said they were at least as enthusiastic about voting this year as they were in previous elections , with more than half saying they were more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties has been very low .
Only 30 percent of Asian American voters said they have been contacted by the Democratic Party in the past year , and only 24 percent said they have been contacted by the Republican Party .
And if the race ends up being anything like 2016 , where Trump won key states like Michigan with razor-thin margins , turnout among this relatively small — but growing — subset of the electorate could matter .
• A Quinnipiac University poll of Maine voters found that Sen. Susan Collins , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the upper chamber , is trailing Democratic challenger Sara Gideon by double digits ( 54 percent to 42 percent ) among likely voters .
Most of the recent polling in Maine has shown Gideon in the lead as well , although not by as large of a margin .
FiveThirtyEight ’ s new Senate forecast , however , shows a tight race , with Collins having a roughly 50-50 shot at winning reelection .
That ’ s because the forecast also takes into account factors other than polling , such as fundraising , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lean and expert ratings .
However , the Lite version of the forecast , which is based on polling alone , gives Collins only about a 1 in 4 chance of keeping her seat .
Either way , it will be a race to watch closely !
• Support for the Black Lives Matter movement is down to 55 percent , compared with 67 percent in June , according to a survey conducted in September by the Pew Research Center .
And while support for the movement remains high among Black Americans at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has dropped from 60 to 45 percent .
The drop in support among white Americans came primarily from white Republicans .
Support among white Democrats fell from 92 percent to 88 percent , but support among white Republicans dropped by more than half , from 37 percent to 16 percent .
• According to a YouGov/NBCLX poll , 57 percent of Americans who plan to cast their ballot by mail said they plan to do so a month or more before Election Day , 29 percent two to three weeks before , 5 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 9 percent on Election Day .
Recent polling has shown that about a third of Americans intend to cast their ballot by mail this year , and Democrats appear more likely to do so than Republicans .
• According to this week ’ s YouGov/Economist poll , 37 percent of Americans said that we will know who won the presidency this November either on the night of the election or the day after .
Thirty-nine percent said that we will know the results either a few days or a week after the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know a few weeks after the election , 8 percent said a month after the election or later , and 17 percent said they didn ’ t know .
• In other news , teens think school sucks … more than usual .
Fifty-nine percent of teens said online learning is either “ worse ” or “ much worse ” than in-person schooling , according to a SurveyMonkey poll .
The silver lining ?
Twenty-one percent said it is the same , and 19 percent said it is either “ better ” or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scheduled to finally head to the polls next month to elect a new president .
The elections , originally planned for May , come amid a flurry of protests as the interim President Jeanine Áñez has already postponed the election twice , citing COVID-19-related concerns , and the Council of Foreign Relations reports a deep erosion of trust among Bolivians .
A poll by Fundación Jubileo and a host of other Bolivian academic and media institutions found that Luis Arce , a socialist candidate who is loyal to ousted ex-president Evo Morales , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the vote , followed by Carlos Mesa , a former president who got 19 percent .
A handful of other candidates , including Áñez , each got 10 percent or less .
To win outright , a candidate needs either a majority of the vote or more than 40 percent of the vote with at least a 10-point advantage ; otherwise , the election proceeds to a second round .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 43.3 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ net approval rating of -9.5 points ) .
At this time last week , 42.7 percent approved and 53.1 percent disapproved ( a net approval rating of -10.4 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 42.0 percent and a disapproval rating of 54.0 percent , for a net approval rating of -12.0 points .
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 6.4 percentage points ( 48.6 percent to 42.2 percent ) .
A week ago , Democrats led Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 42.0 percent ) .
At this time last month , voters preferred Democrats by 7.3 points ( 48.5 percent to 41.2 percent ) .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll of the week
Asian American voters didn’t always lean Democratic. In 1992, less than a third of Asian Americans voted Democratic. But nowadays, most Asian Americans identify as Democrats, with more than half saying they plan to back Joe Biden and less than a third saying they’d vote for President Trump, according to the latest Asian American Voter Survey released this week.
Asian American voters are hardly a monolith. The different groups that comprise Asian American voters are divided over how much — and whether — they will back Biden for president. For instance, Filipino Americans are more evenly divided among supporting Biden and Trump than Japanese Americans. And Indian Americans, who have been reliably Democratic for years, now show some signs of slowly shifting to the right. Finally, Vietnamese Americans lean pretty consistently Republican.
Asian Americans are one of the fastest growing racial or ethnic segments of eligible voters in the United States. and make up 4.7 percent of all eligible voters, but there hasn’t been that much reliable polling on Asian Americans, so this survey provides one of the few snapshots of how Asian American voters feel about the upcoming presidential election.
That said, it’s important that we don’t read too much into one survey. Only about 250 respondents were in each subgroup, putting the margin of error at +/- 6 percentage points for each group. But by looking at how Asian Americans have politically identified since 2012, we can more clearly see some of the trends in this most recent survey. What immediately jumps out is that while Asian Americans are very Democratic-leaning overall, Republicans have been making some headway — particularly among certain groups of national origin — over the last few elections.
Take Vietnamese Americans, who among Asian Americans are the most likely to identify as Republican. Anabelle Vo, a 30-year-old video editor based in Los Angeles who started a podcast called Mỹ Gốc Việt (“Americans from Vietnam”) along with her childhood friend Bee Ngo, told me this is partly because the Vietnam War still looms large in how many older Vietnamese Americans identify politically. Many Vietnamese Americans fled to the U.S. after the war, and Vo said they may support the Republican Party because they view it as more strongly anti-communist than the Democratic Party. Her friend and podcast co-host, Ngo, also pointed out that many Vietnamese Americans who identify as Catholic may be more socially conservative, a factor that could also explain why Filipino Americans, 65 percent of whom are Catholic, are more likely to support Republicans than other groups of Asian Americans.
But it’s unclear how strong some of these trends are, according to Linda Vo, a professor in the Department of Asian American Studies at the University of California, Irvine. For instance, even though many Vietnamese Americans identify as Republicans, there is some evidence that they might be moving away from the party. And much of this comes down to age, which was a possible cleavage among Asian American voters in the Democratic primary. Both Anabelle Vo and Ngo have noticed a distinct generational divide in their own personal experiences, with younger Vietnamese Americans much more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than would their parents or grandparents. This is something that Linda Vo has also noticed in her research. “[T]here is a definite generational divide,” Vo said. “That younger generation tends to be for the Democratic Party and tends to have more progressive politics.” She did say the politics of Vietnamese Americans were changing, but slowly.
On the other hand, Republicans have seen modest gains among Indian Americans, who are the most Democratic-leaning group of Asian Americans. Some of this may have to do with increased mobilization efforts by activist groups like the Republican Hindu Coalition, who capitalized on ideological overlaps between Trump and India’s popular nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2016, leading some Indian Americans to vote Republican. Only 21 percent of Indian Americans identify with, or lean towards, the Republican Party, but that’s still roughly double what it was in 2012.
However, the majority of Asian Americans do identify as Democrats. And that could be in part because there is a lot of overlap between the policy preferences of Asian Americans of every stripe and those espoused by the Democratic Party. For instance, according to the survey, 81 percent of Asian Americans support stricter gun laws, 77 percent support stronger legislation to address climate change, 70 percent support affirmative action in higher education, 63 percent believe the government should do more to give Black Americans equal rights with white Americans, 59 percent support a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, 59 percent support shifting funding away from law enforcement, and 55 percent support expanding access to health insurance to all immigrants regardless of legal status.
“When you break it down to certain issues like health care and things like that, that’s how it gets easier for me to discuss things with older folks,” Anabelle Vo said. Vo describes herself as more progressive than the typical Democratic voter and has attended demonstrations and marches for like-minded causes. And interestingly, there weren’t significant divides on these issues between more conservative Asian American groups, like Vietnamese Americans, and more liberal Asian American groups, like Indian Americans. For instance, Vietnamese Americans were more likely to favor stricter gun control legislation, policies to curb climate change and affirmative action, than Asian Americans as a whole.
If Republicans are looking to persuade Asian Americans, however, there is one potential issue where they may have the upperhand. Ninety percent of Asian Americans said that jobs and the economy are either “extremely” or “very” important. And on that issue, 35 percent said that Republicans are doing a better job, while only 31 percent said Democrats are. The rest said there was no difference, or that they don’t know.
It is hard to imagine that Asian American voters will greatly shift in their support before the election, so the real question is whether they’ll come out to the polls (or mail in their ballot). The survey did find high levels of enthusiasm for voting (82 percent said they were at least as enthusiastic about voting this year as they were in previous elections, with more than half saying they were more enthusiastic), but outreach from political parties has been very low. Only 30 percent of Asian American voters said they have been contacted by the Democratic Party in the past year, and only 24 percent said they have been contacted by the Republican Party.
And if the race ends up being anything like 2016, where Trump won key states like Michigan with razor-thin margins, turnout among this relatively small — but growing — subset of the electorate could matter.
Other polling bites
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 43.3 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 52.7 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -9.5 points). At this time last week, 42.7 percent approved and 53.1 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -10.4 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 42.0 percent and a disapproval rating of 54.0 percent, for a net approval rating of -12.0 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 6.4 percentage points (48.6 percent to 42.2 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 6.6 points (48.5 percent to 42.0 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 7.3 points (48.5 percent to 41.2 percent).