fivethirtyeight--2020-05-26--How Accurate Have State Polls Been?

How Accurate Have State Polls Been?

Our latest recap of the accuracy of polling in American elections reinforced something we ’ ve been saying for a while : The polls are all right .
In particular , polls of presidential general elections have historically been quite accurate .
Polls conducted in the final 21 days before the last five presidential general elections had a weighted average error of 4.0 points .
( We define error as the absolute difference between a poll ’ s margin between the top two candidates and the actual vote share margin .
For example , if a poll gave the Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the Democrat won the election by 2 points , that poll had a 5-point error . )
And even in 2016 , when many people blamed the polls for not predicting President Trump ’ s victory , the polls within 21 days of the election performed decently well , with a weighted average error of 4.9 points .
But in the United States , the Electoral College picks the winner of presidential elections , which means state polls are what really matter .
And state polls did have an off year in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the long-term average ) .
They had a weighted average error of 5.3 points , compared with 3.2 for national polls .
Plus , that error systematically overestimated Democrats : State polls had a weighted average statistical bias ( a metric that tells us which direction the error ran ) of 3.5 points toward Hillary Clinton .
However , it is not unusual for state polls to be less accurate than national ones ( although they did diverge a lot in 2016 ) .
Since 2000 , state polls have a weighted average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls have a weighted average error of 2.9 points .
Some states have more accurate polls than others , though .
Thanks to our pollster ratings data set , we can quantify which states ’ presidential general election polls are the most and least accurate , which can help us better understand the state polls we ’ ll get later this year .
Below is a table of the weighted average error and statistical bias of each state ’ s polls in the last five presidential general elections for states that had at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 21 days of the campaign .
This eliminates states where the sample size of polls is too small to draw meaningful conclusions and narrows the list to each election ’ s main battleground states ( which tend to get polled the most often anyway ) .
The first thing that might jump out to you are the trouble spots in the 2016 election — many state polls had a statistical bias toward Democrats , for instance .
In Michigan , polls had a weighted average statistical bias of 4.4 points toward Democrats , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weighted average statistical bias of 4.6 points toward Democrats .
North Carolina and Ohio get less attention but were even more inaccurate .
But setting 2016 aside , the most consistent story the table tells is how good swing-state polls typically are .
Their weighted average error is usually not that high — even in the states that tripped us up in 2016 .
In 2008 , for example , North Carolina polls had a weighted average error of just 2.4 points .
And while Ohio polls missed the mark in 2016 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1.8 points ) .
The weighted average error of Florida polls has been below 4.0 in four out of the five elections .
Pennsylvania polls exhibited very low weighted average errors of 2.0 ( in 2004 ) and 2.4 ( in 2008 ) before their off year in 2016 .
And the polls of other likely 2020 swing states , such as Arizona ( 2.4 in 2016 ) and Wisconsin ( 2.9 in 2012 ) , have also boasted very low weighted average errors in the past .
None of these states appears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Just like polls overall are not getting any more or less accurate over time , the error and statistical bias of state polling bounces around unpredictably from year to year .
While there are some reasons to be concerned that some flaws in state-level 2016 polling , including lack of weighting by education , have not been fixed , the accuracy of a state ’ s polls one election does not appear to have any bearing on their accuracy the next .
So as we enter the thick of the 2020 general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the knowledge that polls of swing states are about as trustworthy as polls can get — though of course , polls aren ’ t perfect .
Even an error of 3 points can be the difference in a close election .

Our latest recap of the accuracy of polling in American elections reinforced something we’ve been saying for a while: The polls are all right. In particular, polls of presidential general elections have historically been quite accurate.
Polls conducted in the final 21 days before the last five presidential general elections had a weighted average error of 4.0 points. (We define error as the absolute difference between a poll’s margin between the top two candidates and the actual vote share margin. For example, if a poll gave the Republican candidate a lead of 3 percentage points but the Democrat won the election by 2 points, that poll had a 5-point error.) And even in 2016, when many people blamed the polls for not predicting President Trump’s victory, the polls within 21 days of the election performed decently well, with a weighted average error of 4.9 points.
But in the United States, the Electoral College picks the winner of presidential elections, which means state polls are what really matter. And state polls did have an off year in 2016 (although still pretty close to the long-term average). They had a weighted average error of 5.3 points, compared with 3.2 for national polls. Plus, that error systematically overestimated Democrats: State polls had a weighted average statistical bias (a metric that tells us which direction the error ran) of 3.5 points toward Hillary Clinton.
State polls are more error-prone than national polls Weighted average error and statistical bias of national and state polls in the final 21 days before presidential general elections, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database Weighted Average Error Weighted Average Statistical Bias Cycle National State National State 2000 3.8 4.6 R+3.1 R+2.2 2004 2.2 3.5 D+0.9 D+1.2 2008 2.2 3.8 0.0 D+1.2 2012 3.3 3.7 R+3.2 R+2.3 2016 3.2 5.3 D+2.4 D+3.5 All years 2.9 4.3 R+0.5 D+0.6 Averages are weighted by the square root of the number of polls that a particular pollster conducted in that particular cycle. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis.
However, it is not unusual for state polls to be less accurate than national ones (although they did diverge a lot in 2016). Since 2000, state polls have a weighted average error of 4.3 points, while national polls have a weighted average error of 2.9 points. Some states have more accurate polls than others, though. Thanks to our pollster ratings data set, we can quantify which states’ presidential general election polls are the most and least accurate, which can help us better understand the state polls we’ll get later this year.
Below is a table of the weighted average error and statistical bias of each state’s polls in the last five presidential general elections for states that had at least 15 polls conducted during the last 21 days of the campaign. This eliminates states where the sample size of polls is too small to draw meaningful conclusions and narrows the list to each election’s main battleground states (which tend to get polled the most often anyway).
Swing state polls are usually pretty good Weighted average error and statistical bias of state polls in the final 21 days before presidential general elections, for states with at least 15 such polls, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database 2000 Election State No. of Polls Weighted Average Error Weighted Average Statistical Bias Michigan 21 4.1 R+3.6 Pennsylvania 21 3.8 R+2.3 New York 17 7.7 R+7.7 Florida 15 3.3 D+1.0 2004 Election State No. of Polls Weighted Average Error Weighted Average Statistical Bias Florida 28 4.9 D+4.3 Ohio 25 3.4 D+2.5 Pennsylvania 24 2.0 R+0.1 Iowa 16 2.8 R+0.5 2008 Election State No. of Polls Weighted Average Error Weighted Average Statistical Bias Ohio 31 3.5 D+1.1 Florida 29 2.1 R+0.3 North Carolina 28 2.4 D+1.6 Pennsylvania 28 2.4 R+0.8 Virginia 24 2.2 D+0.1 Missouri 18 1.4 0.0 Colorado 16 3.4 R+1.9 New Hampshire 16 4.8 D+1.1 Nevada 15 7.2 R+7.2 2012 Election State No. of Polls Weighted Average Error Weighted Average Statistical Bias Ohio 44 1.8 R+0.2 Florida 32 2.4 R+1.9 Virginia 27 3.4 R+3.0 Colorado 21 4.0 R+3.9 Wisconsin 21 2.9 R+2.5 Iowa 19 3.8 R+3.6 New Hampshire 19 3.6 R+3.3 2016 Election State No. of Polls Weighted Average Error Weighted Average Statistical Bias Florida 36 3.8 D+2.9 Pennsylvania 29 4.8 D+4.6 North Carolina 26 5.7 D+5.2 New Hampshire 21 4.8 D+3.2 Nevada 21 3.1 R+1.8 Michigan 20 4.7 D+4.4 Virginia 19 2.8 D+1.3 Ohio 18 5.8 D+5.8 Arizona 17 2.4 D+1.5 Colorado 16 2.7 R+1.3 Georgia 16 3.0 D+1.8 Averages are weighted by the square root of the number of polls that a particular pollster conducted in that particular cycle. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis.
The first thing that might jump out to you are the trouble spots in the 2016 election — many state polls had a statistical bias toward Democrats, for instance. In Michigan, polls had a weighted average statistical bias of 4.4 points toward Democrats, and in Pennsylvania, polls had a weighted average statistical bias of 4.6 points toward Democrats. North Carolina and Ohio get less attention but were even more inaccurate.
But setting 2016 aside, the most consistent story the table tells is how good swing-state polls typically are. Their weighted average error is usually not that high — even in the states that tripped us up in 2016. In 2008, for example, North Carolina polls had a weighted average error of just 2.4 points. And while Ohio polls missed the mark in 2016, they were dead on in 2012 (1.8 points). The weighted average error of Florida polls has been below 4.0 in four out of the five elections. Pennsylvania polls exhibited very low weighted average errors of 2.0 (in 2004) and 2.4 (in 2008) before their off year in 2016. And the polls of other likely 2020 swing states, such as Arizona (2.4 in 2016) and Wisconsin (2.9 in 2012), have also boasted very low weighted average errors in the past.
None of these states appears to be systematically difficult to poll either. Just like polls overall are not getting any more or less accurate over time, the error and statistical bias of state polling bounces around unpredictably from year to year. While there are some reasons to be concerned that some flaws in state-level 2016 polling, including lack of weighting by education, have not been fixed, the accuracy of a state’s polls one election does not appear to have any bearing on their accuracy the next.
So as we enter the thick of the 2020 general election, we can be secure in the knowledge that polls of swing states are about as trustworthy as polls can get — though of course, polls aren’t perfect. Even an error of 3 points can be the difference in a close election.
‘The VP effect is probably real, but it’s pretty small’: Nate Silver


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-26--Don’t Expect A Quick Recovery. Our Survey Of Economists Says It Will Likely Take Years.

All across the country , the gears of the economy are grinding slowly and creakily into motion .
Retail stores are newly open for in-person shopping in California .
It ’ s possible to get a much-needed haircut in Alabama .
And in Alaska , bartenders are even slinging drinks again — albeit with strict capacity and spacing limits .
The reopening of the economy might seem like a promising sign .
After all , as shuttered stores and restaurants reopen , workers can return to their jobs or look for new positions , and industries that have seen slowdowns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including President Trump — have promised a fast recovery .
But how quickly will the economy really be able to bounce back ?
How long will we be stuck with a double-digit unemployment rate and a host of other historically bad economic indicators ?
We wanted to get a sense of what the experts were thinking .
So we partnered with the Initiative on Global Markets , a research center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business , to survey a group of quantitative macroeconomic researchers who work in academic settings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In consultation with Jonathan Wright of Johns Hopkins University and Allan Timmermann of the University of California , San Diego , two experts on macroeconomic forecasting , we asked the panel questions like what the shape of the recovery will resemble , when gross domestic product will return to its pre-crisis levels , and what the unemployment rate will be at the end of the year .
The survey was conducted May 22 to 25 .
Overall , the researchers predicted that although the economy will probably start to improve in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won ’ t be a quick rally from this recession .
“ The panelists believe , on the whole , that the recovery from this crisis is going to be a very , very lengthy process , ” Timmermann said .
“ We ’ re going to be seeing serious effects for years and years.
” Our sample of economists thought it was more likely than not — with an average probability of 54 percent — that the next quarter to see positive real GDP growth in the U.S. ( relative to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quarter of 2020 .
But that ’ s probably a low bar to clear ; the economy shrunk by 4.8 percent in the first quarter and is likely to contract even more in the second quarter .
And there ’ s a significant chance that the contractions could continue further into the future : The forecasters we polled thought there was a 23 percent chance that the economy would not grow again until the fourth quarter of 2020 and a 22 percent chance that it wouldn ’ t grow until the first quarter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy almost has to grow [ in the third quarter ] because we ’ ll be starting from such a low base , ” Wright said .
“ Unless , of course , things seem to be looking good right now and then in July or August there ’ s another wave and we go straight back to lockdown .
Then you could have another negative quarter.
” Another way to think about the recovery process is by considering the shape of the recession .
We presented the economists with four specific options @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look as charted over 2020 and beyond : V-shaped , with a sharp fall and a sharp rebound ; U-shaped , with a long period between the beginning of the recession and the recovery ; W-shaped , with a sharp recovery followed by another sharp fall and recovery ; or “ Swoosh ” -shaped , with a sharp decline followed by a very slow recovery ( picture the Nike logo ) .
More than half of respondents — 58 percent — thought the long , slow recovery of a “ Swoosh ” shape @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predicting a U-shape and 13 percent calling for a W-shape with multiple declines and recoveries .
Tellingly , only 1 out of 31 economists forecasted a V-shape , which would see a quick recovery after the sharp decline of the past few months .
That pessimistic outlook also came through in our panel ’ s predictions for when the economy might return to the way it was before the pandemic .
The researchers predicted , on average , only an 11 percent chance that real GDP will have caught up to its pre-crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the first half of 2021 and only a 17 percent chance that it will have caught up to its pre-crisis level by the end of 2021 .
On average , they thought there was roughly a 40 percent probability that GDP would return to its pre-crisis levels sometime in 2022 .
But they assigned a 32 percent chance to the possibility that GDP wouldn ’ t return to its pre-crisis level until 2023 or later .
Wright pointed out , too , that matching the pre-crisis GDP still isn ’ t a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have continued to grow if the recession hadn ’ t happened .
There was a similarly bleak prediction for the unemployment rate .
The forecasters ’ median estimate for the unemployment rate in May ’ s jobs report , which will come out on June 5 , was 20 percent .
By the end of the year , they think the unemployment rate will still be very high by historical standards — the median estimate for the unemployment rate in the December jobs report , which will come out in January 2021 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the consensus of the forecasters was that there is only an 18 percent chance that the unemployment rate will fall below 10 percent this year , and a 36 percent chance that it won ’ t fall below 10 percent until after the second quarter of 2021 — over a year from now .
To give you an idea of how terrible a double-digit unemployment rate potentially sustained over 21 months would be , the unemployment rate had been at or above 10 percent for only 11 months total from 1948 through 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a challenging business even when we ’ re not in the middle of a global pandemic .
And as our respondents filled out their questionnaires , they were weighing a lot of unknowns and making their own assumptions about the trajectory of the virus and the economic crisis — including when a vaccine will be developed , how quickly businesses can get up and running , and even whether there will be a second wave of COVID-19 outbreaks in the summer or fall .
Our economic indicators aren ’ t really designed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which makes it even more difficult to predict what they ’ ll be saying a month or a year from now .
“ I assumed a base scenario where there ’ s a slow lifting of lockdown orders and no reversal , ” Wright said .
He also assumed there would be continued support from the Federal Reserve and Congress .
“ But what if there ’ s a big standoff in Congress and unemployment benefits don ’ t get extended ?
What if there ’ s a second wave of the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the experts predicted a wide range of possible outcomes , particularly on questions that required them to project more than a few months into the future .
For example , the economists ’ median prediction for what the unemployment rate would be in the December 2020 jobs report — 12 percent — was just a little lower than the unemployment rate in the April jobs report ( 14.7 percent ) .
But the experts ’ confidence in their responses varied a lot — with upper-bound estimates ranging from 10 to 30 percent and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent .
You can also see this uncertainty in our earlier question about when GDP will finally recover .
The economists agreed that it was unlikely for real GDP to return to where it was before the COVID-19 pandemic anytime soon .
But beyond that , they weren ’ t particularly sure when a recovery might happen .
None of these projections are especially encouraging — remember , the unemployment rate was only 3.5 percent back in February , and the peak during the Great Recession was 10 percent .
But they ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how much is up in the air right now , as we scramble to simultaneously contain the virus and rev up the economy .
We ’ ll be checking in with the panel of economists periodically as the pandemic and economic crisis continue to unfold .
Their predictions will likely shift as the economy reopens and the long-term public health response becomes clearer .
But right now , even the experts don ’ t seem to be expecting a rapid rebound from this recession — in fact , the economic pain of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .

All across the country, the gears of the economy are grinding slowly and creakily into motion. Retail stores are newly open for in-person shopping in California. It’s possible to get a much-needed haircut in Alabama. And in Alaska, bartenders are even slinging drinks again — albeit with strict capacity and spacing limits.
The reopening of the economy might seem like a promising sign. After all, as shuttered stores and restaurants reopen, workers can return to their jobs or look for new positions, and industries that have seen slowdowns can resume operations. Some politicians — including President Trump — have promised a fast recovery.
But how quickly will the economy really be able to bounce back? How long will we be stuck with a double-digit unemployment rate and a host of other historically bad economic indicators?
We wanted to get a sense of what the experts were thinking. So we partnered with the Initiative on Global Markets, a research center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, to survey a group of quantitative macroeconomic researchers who work in academic settings about the trajectory of the economic crisis. In consultation with Jonathan Wright of Johns Hopkins University and Allan Timmermann of the University of California, San Diego, two experts on macroeconomic forecasting, we asked the panel questions like what the shape of the recovery will resemble, when gross domestic product will return to its pre-crisis levels, and what the unemployment rate will be at the end of the year. The survey was conducted May 22 to 25.
Overall, the researchers predicted that although the economy will probably start to improve in the second half of this year, there won’t be a quick rally from this recession. “The panelists believe, on the whole, that the recovery from this crisis is going to be a very, very lengthy process,” Timmermann said. “We’re going to be seeing serious effects for years and years.”
Our sample of economists thought it was more likely than not — with an average probability of 54 percent — that the next quarter to see positive real GDP growth in the U.S. (relative to the previous quarter) would be the third quarter of 2020. But that’s probably a low bar to clear; the economy shrunk by 4.8 percent in the first quarter and is likely to contract even more in the second quarter. And there’s a significant chance that the contractions could continue further into the future: The forecasters we polled thought there was a 23 percent chance that the economy would not grow again until the fourth quarter of 2020 and a 22 percent chance that it wouldn’t grow until the first quarter of 2021 or later.
“The economy almost has to grow [in the third quarter] because we’ll be starting from such a low base,” Wright said. “Unless, of course, things seem to be looking good right now and then in July or August there’s another wave and we go straight back to lockdown. Then you could have another negative quarter.”
Another way to think about the recovery process is by considering the shape of the recession. We presented the economists with four specific options of how the trajectory of GDP might look as charted over 2020 and beyond: V-shaped, with a sharp fall and a sharp rebound; U-shaped, with a long period between the beginning of the recession and the recovery; W-shaped, with a sharp recovery followed by another sharp fall and recovery; or “Swoosh”-shaped, with a sharp decline followed by a very slow recovery (picture the Nike logo). More than half of respondents — 58 percent — thought the long, slow recovery of a “Swoosh” shape was most likely, with 19 percent predicting a U-shape and 13 percent calling for a W-shape with multiple declines and recoveries. Tellingly, only 1 out of 31 economists forecasted a V-shape, which would see a quick recovery after the sharp decline of the past few months.
That pessimistic outlook also came through in our panel’s predictions for when the economy might return to the way it was before the pandemic. The researchers predicted, on average, only an 11 percent chance that real GDP will have caught up to its pre-crisis (fourth quarter of 2019) level by the first half of 2021 and only a 17 percent chance that it will have caught up to its pre-crisis level by the end of 2021. On average, they thought there was roughly a 40 percent probability that GDP would return to its pre-crisis levels sometime in 2022. But they assigned a 32 percent chance to the possibility that GDP wouldn’t return to its pre-crisis level until 2023 or later. Wright pointed out, too, that matching the pre-crisis GDP still isn’t a full recovery, since the economy would have continued to grow if the recession hadn’t happened.
There was a similarly bleak prediction for the unemployment rate. The forecasters’ median estimate for the unemployment rate in May’s jobs report, which will come out on June 5, was 20 percent. By the end of the year, they think the unemployment rate will still be very high by historical standards — the median estimate for the unemployment rate in the December jobs report, which will come out in January 2021, was 12 percent.
In general, the consensus of the forecasters was that there is only an 18 percent chance that the unemployment rate will fall below 10 percent this year and a 37 percent chance that it won’t fall below 10 percent until after the second quarter of 2021 — over a year from now.
To give you an idea of how terrible a double-digit unemployment rate potentially sustained over 21 months would be, the unemployment rate had been at or above 10 percent for only 11 months total from 1948 through 2019.
But forecasting our economic future is a challenging business even when we’re not in the middle of a global pandemic. And as our respondents filled out their questionnaires, they were weighing a lot of unknowns and making their own assumptions about the trajectory of the virus and the economic crisis — including when a vaccine will be developed, how quickly businesses can get up and running, and even whether there will be a second wave of COVID-19 outbreaks in the summer or fall. Our economic indicators aren’t really designed to capture such a quickly unfolding crisis, which makes it even more difficult to predict what they’ll be saying a month or a year from now. “I assumed a base scenario where there’s a slow lifting of lockdown orders and no reversal,” Wright said. He also assumed there would be continued support from the Federal Reserve and Congress. “But what if there’s a big standoff in Congress and unemployment benefits don’t get extended? What if there’s a second wave of the virus?”
As such, many of the experts predicted a wide range of possible outcomes, particularly on questions that required them to project more than a few months into the future. For example, the economists’ median prediction for what the unemployment rate would be in the December 2020 jobs report — 12 percent — was just a little lower than the unemployment rate in the April jobs report (14.7 percent). But the experts’ confidence in their responses varied a lot — with upper-bound estimates ranging from 10 to 30 percent and lower-bound estimates ranging from 6 to 15 percent.
You can also see this uncertainty in our earlier question about when GDP will finally recover. The economists agreed that it was unlikely for real GDP to return to where it was before the COVID-19 pandemic anytime soon. But beyond that, they weren’t particularly sure when a recovery might happen.
None of these projections are especially encouraging — remember, the unemployment rate was only 3.5 percent back in February, and the peak during the Great Recession was 10 percent. But they’re also an important reminder of just how much is up in the air right now, as we scramble to simultaneously contain the virus and rev up the economy.
We’ll be checking in with the panel of economists periodically as the pandemic and economic crisis continue to unfold. Their predictions will likely shift as the economy reopens and the long-term public health response becomes clearer. But right now, even the experts don’t seem to be expecting a rapid rebound from this recession — in fact, the economic pain of the COVID-19 crisis could be with us for years.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-26--How Accurate Are State Polls? And What Could That Mean For November?

Our latest recap of the accuracy of polling in American elections reinforced something we ’ ve been saying for a while : The polls are all right .
In particular , polls of presidential general elections have historically been quite accurate .
Polls conducted in the final 21 days before the last five presidential general elections had a weighted average error of 4.0 points .
( We define error as the absolute difference between a poll ’ s margin between the top two candidates and the actual vote share margin .
For example , if a poll gave the Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the Democrat won the election by 2 points , that poll had a 5-point error . )
And even in 2016 , when many people blamed the polls for not predicting President Trump ’ s victory , the polls within 21 days of the election performed decently well , with a weighted average error of 4.9 points .
But in the United States , the Electoral College picks the winner of presidential elections , which means state polls are what really matter .
And state polls did have an off year in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the long-term average ) .
They had a weighted average error of 5.3 points , compared with 3.2 for national polls .
Plus , that error systematically overestimated Democrats : State polls had a weighted average statistical bias ( a metric that tells us which direction the error ran ) of 3.5 points toward Hillary Clinton .
However , it is not unusual for state polls to be less accurate than national ones ( although they did diverge a lot in 2016 ) .
Since 2000 , state polls have a weighted average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls have a weighted average error of 2.9 points .
Some states have more accurate polls than others , though .
Thanks to our pollster ratings data set , we can quantify which states ’ presidential general election polls are the most and least accurate , which can help us better understand the state polls we ’ ll get later this year .
Below is a table of the weighted average error and statistical bias of each state ’ s polls in the last five presidential general elections for states that had at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 21 days of the campaign .
This eliminates states where the sample size of polls is too small to draw meaningful conclusions and narrows the list to each election ’ s main battleground states ( which tend to get polled the most often anyway ) .
The first thing that might jump out to you are the trouble spots in the 2016 election — many state polls had a statistical bias toward Democrats , for instance .
In Michigan , polls had a weighted average statistical bias of 4.4 points toward Democrats , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weighted average statistical bias of 4.6 points toward Democrats .
North Carolina and Ohio get less attention but were even more inaccurate .
But setting 2016 aside , the most consistent story the table tells is how good swing-state polls typically are .
Their weighted average error is usually not that high — even in the states that tripped us up in 2016 .
In 2008 , for example , North Carolina polls had a weighted average error of just 2.4 points .
And while Ohio polls missed the mark in 2016 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1.8 points ) .
The weighted average error of Florida polls has been below 4.0 in four out of the five elections .
Pennsylvania polls exhibited very low weighted average errors of 2.0 ( in 2004 ) and 2.4 ( in 2008 ) before their off year in 2016 .
And the polls of other likely 2020 swing states , such as Arizona ( 2.4 in 2016 ) and Wisconsin ( 2.9 in 2012 ) , have also boasted very low weighted average errors in the past .
None of these states appears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Just like polls overall are not getting any more or less accurate over time , the error and statistical bias of state polling bounces around unpredictably from year to year .
While there are some reasons to be concerned that some flaws in state-level 2016 polling , including lack of weighting by education , have not been fixed , the accuracy of a state ’ s polls one election does not appear to have any bearing on their accuracy the next .
So as we enter the thick of the 2020 general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the knowledge that polls of swing states are about as trustworthy as polls can get — though of course , polls aren ’ t perfect .
Even an error of 3 points can be the difference in a close election .
‘ The VP effect is probably real , but it ’ s pretty small ’ : Nate Silver


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-27--3 States Have Made It Easier To Vote By Mail In November. Trump Isn’t Happy.

Last week , President Trump fired off an angry tweet attacking Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson , a Democrat , for expanding access to mail voting amid the COVID-19 pandemic : Trump has previously expressed his opposition to mail voting — falsely claiming that it contributes to voter fraud and that it benefits Democratic candidates — but this attack still seemed to come out of the blue .
As Benson pointed out in her response , several other states , including seven with Republican secretaries of state , also automatically mailed or are mailing absentee-ballot applications to voters for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a tweet from Trump .
But Benson ’ s decision was different in that it applied not only to Michigan ’ s Aug. 4 primary , but also to the Nov. 3 general — an election in which Trump will be on the ballot .
By our count , only two other states have announced rule changes to the general election on account of the pandemic so far — New Hampshire and California .
• On April 9 , Republican Gov .
Chris Sununu announced that New Hampshire voters afraid to vote in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is still a threat in the fall .
Under normal circumstances , New Hampshire requires an excuse to vote absentee , but the state has advised that any voter can use the “ disability ” excuse during the pandemic .
• And on May 8 , Democratic Gov .
Gavin Newsom ordered California to conduct the November election predominantly by mail , the same way states like Oregon and Washington already do .
That means California will mail ballots to all 20.7 million registered voters , but limited in-person voting will still be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Golden State already vote by mail , so while this will still be a major logistical undertaking , it will not be a big change for most Californians .
Why Trump didn ’ t attack New Hampshire probably has something to do with the fact that Sununu is a Republican and the change he announced was fairly minor ( it simply brought New Hampshire in line with the 29 other states , plus the District of Columbia , that don ’ t require voters to give an excuse to vote absentee ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also took aim at California , erroneously claiming that the state will send ballots to “ anyone living in the state , no matter who they are or how they got there , ” and calling it a “ Rigged Election.
” The Republican National Committee is also suing California in an effort to reverse Newsom ’ s order .
Trump ’ s tweets came out at a time when many states are debating what changes , if any , to make to the administration of the general election in the face of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Steve Simon is considering sending absentee-ballot applications to every voter , like Michigan .
The Illinois legislature recently voted to send absentee-ballot applications to an estimated 5 million voters .
And the Missouri legislature has passed a bill that would allow voters there to request an absentee ballot without an excuse , although most would have to get their ballots notarized .
But Trump ’ s tweets threaten to harden this issue along partisan lines .
Minnesota and Illinois may go ahead with their plans , as their decision-makers are Democrats , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think twice about signing Missouri ’ s bill .
And other Republican-led states may decide against expanding the use of mail voting out of fear of invoking Trump ’ s wrath .
Given how much time is necessary to prepare for a smooth mail election , that could have serious consequences if the coronavirus makes in-person voting inadvisable or impossible in the fall .

Last week, President Trump fired off an angry tweet attacking Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, a Democrat, for expanding access to mail voting amid the COVID-19 pandemic:
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1263170880298942464
Trump has previously expressed his opposition to mail voting — falsely claiming that it contributes to voter fraud and that it benefits Democratic candidates — but this attack still seemed to come out of the blue. As Benson pointed out in her response, several other states, including seven with Republican secretaries of state, also automatically mailed or are mailing absentee-ballot applications to voters for their primary elections, and none elicited a tweet from Trump. But Benson’s decision was different in that it applied not only to Michigan’s Aug. 4 primary, but also to the Nov. 3 general — an election in which Trump will be on the ballot.
By our count, only two other states have announced rule changes to the general election on account of the pandemic so far — New Hampshire and California.
On April 9, Republican Gov. Chris Sununu announced that New Hampshire voters afraid to vote in person could vote absentee if the coronavirus is still a threat in the fall. Under normal circumstances, New Hampshire requires an excuse to vote absentee, but the state has advised that any voter can use the “disability” excuse during the pandemic.
And on May 8, Democratic Gov. Gavin Newsom ordered California to conduct the November election predominantly by mail, the same way states like Oregon and Washington already do. That means California will mail ballots to all 20.7 million registered voters, but limited in-person voting will still be available. A majority of voters in the Golden State already vote by mail, so while this will still be a major logistical undertaking, it will not be a big change for most Californians.
Why Trump didn’t attack New Hampshire probably has something to do with the fact that Sununu is a Republican and the change he announced was fairly minor (it simply brought New Hampshire in line with the 29 other states, plus the District of Columbia, that don’t require voters to give an excuse to vote absentee). But on Tuesday morning, he also took aim at California, erroneously claiming that the state will send ballots to “anyone living in the state, no matter who they are or how they got there,” and calling it a “Rigged Election.” The Republican National Committee is also suing California in an effort to reverse Newsom’s order.
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Trump’s tweets came out at a time when many states are debating what changes, if any, to make to the administration of the general election in the face of the pandemic. Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon is considering sending absentee-ballot applications to every voter, like Michigan. The Illinois legislature recently voted to send absentee-ballot applications to an estimated 5 million voters. And the Missouri legislature has passed a bill that would allow voters there to request an absentee ballot without an excuse, although most would have to get their ballots notarized.
But Trump’s tweets threaten to harden this issue along partisan lines. Minnesota and Illinois may go ahead with their plans, as their decision-makers are Democrats, but Republican Gov. Mike Parson may now think twice about signing Missouri’s bill. And other Republican-led states may decide against expanding the use of mail voting out of fear of invoking Trump’s wrath. Given how much time is necessary to prepare for a smooth mail election, that could have serious consequences if the coronavirus makes in-person voting inadvisable or impossible in the fall.
Why switching to vote-by-mail is tougher than it seems | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-27--Are Arizona, Georgia And Texas Really In Play?

Welcome to FiveThirtyEight ’ s weekly politics chat .
The transcript below has been lightly edited .
sarah ( Sarah Frostenson , politics editor ) : Former Vice President Joe Biden ’ s team is talking a big game about an expanded electoral map with Arizona , Georgia and Texas in play , even though those states haven ’ t voted for a Democratic presidential nominee in two decades .
So let ’ s talk about just how feasible this strategy is .
How competitive are those three states at this point ?
And what ’ s more , how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — Democratic efforts to pick up Midwestern battleground states like Michigan , Wisconsin and Pennsylvania , or perennial swing states like Florida ?
First up , Arizona .
What do we think ?
Does Biden have a shot there ?
geoffrey.skelley ( Geoffrey Skelley , elections analyst ) : Of the three states we ’ re looking at , I think it ’ s pretty clear that Arizona is the most in play — and that Biden may even have the lead there , based on the limited polling we have .
President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 while losing the national popular vote by 2 points .
So it stands to reason that if Biden is up 6 points or so nationally , Arizona is a toss-up , and that ’ s before we consider other things that may have shifted between 2016 and now .
nrakich ( Nathaniel Rakich , elections analyst ) : I agree , although I have been surprised at the degree to which Arizona seems to have moved to the left since 2016. sarah : What other evidence do we have that Arizona has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geoffrey.skelley : Well , unlike in Georgia and Texas , Democrats actually won major statewide contests in Arizona in 2018 — including the state ’ s marquee Senate race — and election turnout was nearly as high as the 2016 presidential contest , meaning that performance may reflect a broader shift toward the Democrats rather than just a side effect of the midterms ’ blue wave .
nrakich : G. Elliott Morris of The Economist had an interesting newsletter item recently that showed how much various states have moved left or right since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so far .
Arizona had the starkest movement .
And Geoffrey ’ s right that , if Arizona were still 6 points redder than the nation and Biden led by 6 points nationally , we ’ d expect polls of Arizona to show a tied race .
But Biden has consistently led in Arizona polls so far .
On the other hand , I ’ m still somewhat skeptical of the idea Arizona has moved that much to the left .
Some of the higher-quality polls , like from Marist and Monmouth , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tie , whereas the polls suggesting Arizona has gotten significantly more Democratic ( e.g.
, by showing Biden up by 8 points ) are not coming from gold-standard pollsters .
sarah : One other thing about Arizona that makes me think it might be fertile ground for Democrats in 2020 is that Democratic Senate challenger Mark Kelly seems to have the upper hand against Sen. Martha McSally , and if that race ends up close — or flips blue — that bodes well for Democrats in the long run , as it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becoming more of a blue state .
nrakich : Yeah , Kelly has been a monster fundraiser .
He ’ s taken in more than $ 31 million since the beginning of last year .
Although I don ’ t think a down-ballot race is likely to drive turnout for the presidential .
If anything , Kelly might run ahead of Biden because of his money and great bio .
👨🚀 geoffrey.skelley : That ’ s fair , but it ’ s worth remembering that every Senate seat that was up in 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state at the presidential level , so the fact a Democrat is polling that well in the Senate contest is probably a decent sign for the party ’ s chances as a whole .
sarah : For sure .
It ’ s less that a down-ballot race would affect the top of the ticket , but more that Arizona really might go blue in 2020 .
It sounds like we agree with the Biden campaign ’ s assessment that Arizona is in play , so does it make sense for them to campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be made that they should keep an eye on it , but maybe not commit fully ?
I definitely think Biden should spend more time and money in Arizona than in Georgia and Texas .
But I still think Arizona is unlikely to be the tipping-point state , and Biden should spend even more time and money in must-win states like Wisconsin , Pennsylvania and Michigan .
geoffrey.skelley : Oh , they should definitely fully commit .
Arizona gives them another possible path to 270 in the Electoral College .
Arizona ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it could sub in for , say , Wisconsin ( 10 electoral votes ) if Trump were to narrowly carry the Badger State .
nrakich : Now you have me questioning myself , Geoffrey !
*whips out calculator* Hmmm , Florida and Wisconsin were 3 points to the right of the nation in 2016 .
Arizona , as discussed , was 6 .
That ’ s not a big gap at all ; maybe they do converge this year ?
geoffrey.skelley : Another thing to keep in mind is that Democrats have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urban areas .
Maricopa County ( Phoenix and its environs ) was the most populous county in the country to vote for Trump in 2016 , but Trump only won it narrowly by about 3 points , and in 2018 , Democratic Sen. Kyrsten Sinema carried it by 4 points .
So Democrats may be hoping for a repeat in 2020 .
Win Maricopa , win Arizona .
sarah : OK , it sounds like focusing on Arizona is smart for the Biden campaign , but maybe we ’ re a bit more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other two states the campaign has included in its “ expanded ” electoral map ?
nrakich : Yeah .
Georgia was 7 points to the right of the nation in 2016 , and Texas was 11 points to the right .
Given long-term trends , they have both probably moved a little to the left , but they have further to go than Arizona .
That said , Biden may well win those states — take a look at the polling there : But if he does , he will probably already have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Arizona or Florida .
geoffrey.skelley : Georgia is interesting .
On the one hand , Biden could target the increasingly Democratic suburbs of Atlanta .
On the other hand , it ’ s one of the most inelastic states in the country — meaning voters there are among the most likely to stick with their usual party regardless of which way the rest of the country swings — in part because its white voters remain predominantly Republican and its large black population is heavily Democratic , and there just isn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , if Democrats couldn ’ t carry Georgia in 2018 when the electoral environment was very pro-Democratic , that makes me skeptical they can win it in a presidential year , when partisan conditions could be more balanced .
That said , if Biden is winning by 6 or 7 points nationally , that might be enough to put Georgia in his column , as Trump only carried it by 5 points in 2016 .
But as Nathaniel was saying earlier , that ’ s not a situation where Georgia is an integral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s gravy at that point , though maybe it helps Democrats in the two Senate contests there .
nrakich : Yeah , Georgia is definitely inelastic .
But on the other hand , Georgia has inched leftward ( relative to the nation as a whole ) in the last three presidential elections .
And I think there is room for more suburban whites to move toward Democrats , not only in Georgia but also in Texas and Arizona .
sarah : That ’ s a good point , and I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Texas will be competitive is just how much the trends of 2018 — namely , suburban white voters moving to the Democratic Party — hold true .
This is an extreme hypothetical , but earlier this year , Nathaniel looked at what would happen if a state ’ s presidential vote was based strictly on how rural or urban the state is , and he found that Georgia would remain in the R column , but both Arizona and Texas would swing blue : What do we make of this ?
Might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nrakich : We have a tendency to think about elections through the lens of the decisive voters in the previous election , which for 2018 was suburbanites .
But as I showed in that urbanization article , Georgia does have a lot of rural voters too , and there is still room for them to move even more toward Trump .
So , actually , maybe those two trends will cancel each other out .
geoffrey.skelley : OK , but Georgia was still notably closer to going for Clinton than Texas — Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by 9 points , which is a fairly sizable difference .
And while Georgia may be more inelastic than Texas , Texas is not that elastic .
Our 2018 elasticity score for Texas was 1.03 — not that far above the baseline of 1 — while Georgia ’ s was 0.90 .
Texas is changing , but Barack Obama lost it by 12 points in 2008 , which was a really good environment overall for Democrats .
nrakich : Yeah , there ’ s just too far for it to go .
geoffrey.skelley @ @ @ @ @ @ @ questions about when Texas could go blue , it depends on how fast the political environment changes , but it still probably won ’ t happen until sometime after 2020 , given what we know currently .
sarah : People seem to agree that the Biden campaign shouldn ’ t invest too much in Georgia and Texas if it comes at the expense of other battleground states in the Midwest or Florida .
Is that fair ?
nrakich : I think there ’ s a case for keeping your options open in Georgia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foolish to invest significantly in Texas .
If Texas votes Democratic , Biden will already have won virtually every other swing state and , therefore , the election .
It ’ s simply not a part of his path to 270 electoral votes — more like a part of his path to 400 .
Also , Texas is an extremely expensive state in which to campaign , so it just wouldn ’ t be an efficient use of his money .
geoffrey.skelley : If Trump really is doing a lot worse among older @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be foolish for Biden to abandon Florida , which has one of the oldest populations in the country .
I could see reasons for Democrats to worry about Florida being a mirage after they failed to win the gubernatorial and Senate races there in 2018 , but it ’ s just been too close in recent presidential elections to actually give up on it .
Trump only won it by 1 point in 2016 !
nrakich : Oh , I have strong feelings about Florida .
nrakich : Florida is definitely still a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as inelastic as the 2018 results implied .
The Democratic nominees for governor and senator , Andrew Gillum and Bill Nelson , still outperformed Hillary Clinton in most counties ; they just underperformed Clinton in a few key areas , especially Miami-Dade County .
( This article by Florida Democratic consultant Matthew Isbell does a great job showing that . )
The reason for this is probably that their Republican opponents , Ron DeSantis and Rick Scott , did a lot better among Hispanic voters than Trump did .
According to exit polls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latino vote in Florida in 2016 , while DeSantis got 44 percent and Scott got 45 percent .
In 2020 , I don ’ t think Trump will be able to match DeSantis ’ s and Scott ’ s numbers .
So if Biden can pair Clinton ’ s performance among Hispanic Floridians with Nelson ’ s and Gillum ’ s among other voters , he can absolutely win Florida .
geoffrey.skelley : We ’ ve talked a lot about how Biden might be able to expand his electoral map , but he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Michigan , Pennsylvania and Wisconsin .
In 2016 , they were collectively decided by 78,000 votes , and who wins them in 2020 will likely be consequential as well .
The bigger questions in the Midwest and Rust Belt are probably whether to invest in Iowa and Ohio , which Trump carried by about 9 and 8 points , respectively .
Those two states might be harder for Democrats to win back considering how they swung hard toward the GOP in 2016 after backing Obama in 2012 .
That said , Iowa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swingy .
It ’ s also cheaper to advertise in Iowa than Ohio , and if we ’ re talking down-ballot races , there is more at stake there , too .
Potentially four competitive House races and a Senate seat in Iowa , whereas Ohio has no Senate race and is likely to have only one or two close House races .
nrakich : Yeah , if Biden wants to be an effective president , he ’ ll need a Democratic Senate .
IMO , that means he should give extra credit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to allocate his resources .
sarah : The balancing act that the Biden campaign will inevitably have to engage in isn ’ t entirely clear to me yet .
How much will they actually invest in states like Arizona , Georgia and Texas versus doubling down on states like Michigan , Pennsylvania and Wisconsin ?
Much of this will inevitably boil down to what the tipping-point state is in 2020 , but one thing that ’ s hard to figure out is how much of the map already realigned in 2016 .
Put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eyes on states like Arizona because winning states like Wisconsin back will be difficult ?
nrakich : But I think that ’ s the needle we need to thread : Arizona might be moving in one direction and Wisconsin in the other , but even in the “ realigned ” ( really more “ recalibrated ” ) 2016 map , Arizona was redder than Wisconsin .
geoffrey.skelley : It ’ s curious because some of this comes down to the national environment .
Maybe Wisconsin is a point or two redder than it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wins by 4 or 5 points nationally , maybe that ’ s enough to carry it even if Wisconsin is continuing to move toward the GOP .
But how exactly that plays out in each state is hard to say .

Welcome to FiveThirtyEight’s weekly politics chat. The transcript below has been lightly edited.
sarah (Sarah Frostenson, politics editor): Former Vice President Joe Biden’s team is talking a big game about an expanded electoral map with Arizona, Georgia and Texas in play, even though those states haven’t voted for a Democratic presidential nominee in two decades.
So let’s talk about just how feasible this strategy is. How competitive are those three states at this point? And what’s more, how does this strategy complement — or counteract — Democratic efforts to pick up Midwestern battleground states like Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, or perennial swing states like Florida?
First up, Arizona. What do we think? Does Biden have a shot there?
geoffrey.skelley (Geoffrey Skelley, elections analyst): Of the three states we’re looking at, I think it’s pretty clear that Arizona is the most in play — and that Biden may even have the lead there, based on the limited polling we have.
President Trump won Arizona by 3.5 points in 2016 while losing the national popular vote by 2 points. So it stands to reason that if Biden is up 6 points or so nationally, Arizona is a toss-up, and that’s before we consider other things that may have shifted between 2016 and now.
nrakich (Nathaniel Rakich, elections analyst): I agree, although I have been surprised at the degree to which Arizona seems to have moved to the left since 2016.
sarah: What other evidence do we have that Arizona has moved to the left since 2016?
geoffrey.skelley: Well, unlike in Georgia and Texas, Democrats actually won major statewide contests in Arizona in 2018 — including the state’s marquee Senate race — and election turnout was nearly as high as the 2016 presidential contest, meaning that performance may reflect a broader shift toward the Democrats rather than just a side effect of the midterms’ blue wave.
nrakich: G. Elliott Morris of The Economist had an interesting newsletter item recently that showed how much various states have moved left or right since 2016, based on the 2020 polls so far. Arizona had the starkest movement.
And Geoffrey’s right that, if Arizona were still 6 points redder than the nation and Biden led by 6 points nationally, we’d expect polls of Arizona to show a tied race. But Biden has consistently led in Arizona polls so far.
Biden has the edge in Arizona polling so far Presidential general election polls of Arizona conducted since March 1 Dates Pollster Biden Trump Margin May 18-22 HighGround 47% 45% D+2 May 10-14 Redfield & Wilton 45 41 D+4 May 9-11 OH Predictive Insights 50 43 D+8 April 7-8 OH Predictive Insights 52 43 D+9 March 10-15 Marist 47 46 D+1 March 11-14 Monmouth 46 43 D+3 March 6-11 Latino Decisions 50 42 D+8 March 3-4 OH Predictive Insights 49 43 D+6 March 2-3 Public Policy Polling 48 47 D+1 Source: Polls
On the other hand, I’m still somewhat skeptical of the idea Arizona has moved that much to the left. Some of the higher-quality polls, like from Marist and Monmouth, do have the race closer to a tie, whereas the polls suggesting Arizona has gotten significantly more Democratic (e.g., by showing Biden up by 8 points) are not coming from gold-standard pollsters.
sarah: One other thing about Arizona that makes me think it might be fertile ground for Democrats in 2020 is that Democratic Senate challenger Mark Kelly seems to have the upper hand against Sen. Martha McSally, and if that race ends up close — or flips blue — that bodes well for Democrats in the long run, as it’s more evidence that Arizona might be becoming more of a blue state.
nrakich: Yeah, Kelly has been a monster fundraiser. He’s taken in more than $31 million since the beginning of last year.
Although I don’t think a down-ballot race is likely to drive turnout for the presidential. If anything, Kelly might run ahead of Biden because of his money and great bio. 👨🚀
geoffrey.skelley: That’s fair, but it’s worth remembering that every Senate seat that was up in 2016 went for the party that carried the state at the presidential level, so the fact a Democrat is polling that well in the Senate contest is probably a decent sign for the party’s chances as a whole.
sarah: For sure. It’s less that a down-ballot race would affect the top of the ticket, but more that Arizona really might go blue in 2020.
It sounds like we agree with the Biden campaign’s assessment that Arizona is in play, so does it make sense for them to campaign there?
Or is there an argument to be made that they should keep an eye on it, but maybe not commit fully?
nrakich: I mean … both?
It’s a spectrum.
I definitely think Biden should spend more time and money in Arizona than in Georgia and Texas. But I still think Arizona is unlikely to be the tipping-point state, and Biden should spend even more time and money in must-win states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan.
geoffrey.skelley: Oh, they should definitely fully commit. Arizona gives them another possible path to 270 in the Electoral College. Arizona’s worth 11 electoral votes, so it could sub in for, say, Wisconsin (10 electoral votes) if Trump were to narrowly carry the Badger State.
nrakich: Now you have me questioning myself, Geoffrey! *whips out calculator*
Hmmm, Florida and Wisconsin were 3 points to the right of the nation in 2016. Arizona, as discussed, was 6. That’s not a big gap at all; maybe they do converge this year?
geoffrey.skelley: Another thing to keep in mind is that Democrats have been making inroads in the suburbs and dominating urban areas. Maricopa County (Phoenix and its environs) was the most populous county in the country to vote for Trump in 2016, but Trump only won it narrowly by about 3 points, and in 2018, Democratic Sen. Kyrsten Sinema carried it by 4 points. So Democrats may be hoping for a repeat in 2020. Win Maricopa, win Arizona.
sarah: OK, it sounds like focusing on Arizona is smart for the Biden campaign, but maybe we’re a bit more skeptical of Georgia and Texas, the other two states the campaign has included in its “expanded” electoral map?
nrakich: Yeah. Georgia was 7 points to the right of the nation in 2016, and Texas was 11 points to the right. Given long-term trends, they have both probably moved a little to the left, but they have further to go than Arizona.
That said, Biden may well win those states — take a look at the polling there:
Georgia polls are extremely close Presidential general election polls of Georgia conducted since March 1 Dates Pollster Biden Trump Margin May 16-18 Civiqs 48% 47% D+1 May 11-13 BK Strategies 46 48 R+2 May 4-7 Public Opinion Strategies 47 46 D+1 April 25-27 Cygnal 44 45 R+1 March 31-April 1 Battleground Connect 46 48 R+2 Source: Polls
Can Biden shock Trump in Texas? Presidential general election polls of Texas conducted since March 1 Dates Pollster Biden Trump Margin May 8-10 Emerson College 48% 52% R+3 April 27-28 Public Policy Polling 47 46 D+1 April 18-27 University of Texas at Tyler 43 43 EVEN April 10-19 YouGov 44 49 R+5 Source: Polls
But if he does, he will probably already have clinched the Electoral College in the Midwest, Arizona or Florida.
geoffrey.skelley: Georgia is interesting. On the one hand, Biden could target the increasingly Democratic suburbs of Atlanta. On the other hand, it’s one of the most inelastic states in the country — meaning voters there are among the most likely to stick with their usual party regardless of which way the rest of the country swings — in part because its white voters remain predominantly Republican and its large black population is heavily Democratic, and there just isn’t a ton of movement there.
Additionally, if Democrats couldn’t carry Georgia in 2018 when the electoral environment was very pro-Democratic, that makes me skeptical they can win it in a presidential year, when partisan conditions could be more balanced. That said, if Biden is winning by 6 or 7 points nationally, that might be enough to put Georgia in his column, as Trump only carried it by 5 points in 2016. But as Nathaniel was saying earlier, that’s not a situation where Georgia is an integral part of Biden winning 270 electoral votes. It’s gravy at that point, though maybe it helps Democrats in the two Senate contests there.
nrakich: Yeah, Georgia is definitely inelastic. But on the other hand, Georgia has inched leftward (relative to the nation as a whole) in the last three presidential elections. And I think there is room for more suburban whites to move toward Democrats, not only in Georgia but also in Texas and Arizona.
sarah: That’s a good point, and I think a real question determining whether Georgia and Texas will be competitive is just how much the trends of 2018 — namely, suburban white voters moving to the Democratic Party — hold true.
This is an extreme hypothetical, but earlier this year, Nathaniel looked at what would happen if a state’s presidential vote was based strictly on how rural or urban the state is, and he found that Georgia would remain in the R column, but both Arizona and Texas would swing blue:
What if the urban-rural divide dictated the 2020 election? The results of a hypothetical presidential election if a state’s urbanization were the only factor, based on the relationship between FiveThirtyEight’s urbanization index and 2016 presidential election results State Result State Result Alabama R+16.0 Montana R+30.8 Alaska R+27.3 Nebraska R+8.2 Arizona D+6.1 Nevada D+12.3 Arkansas R+20.5 New Hampshire R+11.9 California D+17.7 New Jersey D+18.3 Colorado D+4.2 New Mexico R+12.2 Connecticut D+7.6 New York D+22.5 Delaware D+2.3 North Carolina R+6.6 Florida D+8.3 North Dakota R+23.2 Georgia R+3.6 Ohio D+0.6 Hawaii D+3.3 Oklahoma R+11.6 Idaho R+16.1 Oregon R+1.5 Illinois D+10.3 Pennsylvania D+4.1 Indiana R+5.5 Rhode Island D+11.6 Iowa R+16.1 South Carolina R+9.4 Kansas R+9.3 South Dakota R+27.4 Kentucky R+13.6 Tennessee R+8.3 Louisiana R+8.6 Texas D+4.5 Maine R+23.4 Utah D+1.7 Maryland D+11.5 Vermont R+25.9 Massachusetts D+13.2 Virginia D+1.0 Michigan R+0.3 Washington D+3.8 Minnesota R+4.9 West Virginia R+22.4 Mississippi R+25.1 Wisconsin R+8.3 Missouri R+8.2 Wyoming R+33.6 Source: American Community Survey
What do we make of this? Might Texas actually turn blue before Georgia?
nrakich: We have a tendency to think about elections through the lens of the decisive voters in the previous election, which for 2018 was suburbanites. But as I showed in that urbanization article, Georgia does have a lot of rural voters too, and there is still room for them to move even more toward Trump. So, actually, maybe those two trends will cancel each other out.
geoffrey.skelley: OK, but Georgia was still notably closer to going for Clinton than Texas — Trump won Georgia by 5 points and Texas by 9 points, which is a fairly sizable difference. And while Georgia may be more inelastic than Texas, Texas is not that elastic. Our 2018 elasticity score for Texas was 1.03 — not that far above the baseline of 1 — while Georgia’s was 0.90.
Texas is changing, but Barack Obama lost it by 12 points in 2008, which was a really good environment overall for Democrats.
nrakich: Yeah, there’s just too far for it to go.
geoffrey.skelley: As is often the case with questions about when Texas could go blue, it depends on how fast the political environment changes, but it still probably won’t happen until sometime after 2020, given what we know currently.
sarah: People seem to agree that the Biden campaign shouldn’t invest too much in Georgia and Texas if it comes at the expense of other battleground states in the Midwest or Florida. Is that fair?
nrakich: I think there’s a case for keeping your options open in Georgia. But the Biden campaign would be foolish to invest significantly in Texas. If Texas votes Democratic, Biden will already have won virtually every other swing state and, therefore, the election. It’s simply not a part of his path to 270 electoral votes — more like a part of his path to 400.
Also, Texas is an extremely expensive state in which to campaign, so it just wouldn’t be an efficient use of his money.
geoffrey.skelley: If Trump really is doing a lot worse among older voters than in 2016, it would be foolish for Biden to abandon Florida, which has one of the oldest populations in the country.
I could see reasons for Democrats to worry about Florida being a mirage after they failed to win the gubernatorial and Senate races there in 2018, but it’s just been too close in recent presidential elections to actually give up on it. Trump only won it by 1 point in 2016!
nrakich: Oh, I have strong feelings about Florida.
sarah: 👂
nrakich: Florida is definitely still a swing state; it’s not as inelastic as the 2018 results implied. The Democratic nominees for governor and senator, Andrew Gillum and Bill Nelson, still outperformed Hillary Clinton in most counties; they just underperformed Clinton in a few key areas, especially Miami-Dade County. (This article by Florida Democratic consultant Matthew Isbell does a great job showing that.)
The reason for this is probably that their Republican opponents, Ron DeSantis and Rick Scott, did a lot better among Hispanic voters than Trump did. According to exit polls, Trump got 35 percent of the Latino vote in Florida in 2016, while DeSantis got 44 percent and Scott got 45 percent. In 2020, I don’t think Trump will be able to match DeSantis’s and Scott’s numbers.
So if Biden can pair Clinton’s performance among Hispanic Floridians with Nelson’s and Gillum’s among other voters, he can absolutely win Florida.
geoffrey.skelley: We’ve talked a lot about how Biden might be able to expand his electoral map, but he can’t afford to give up on Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. In 2016, they were collectively decided by 78,000 votes, and who wins them in 2020 will likely be consequential as well.
The bigger questions in the Midwest and Rust Belt are probably whether to invest in Iowa and Ohio, which Trump carried by about 9 and 8 points, respectively. Those two states might be harder for Democrats to win back considering how they swung hard toward the GOP in 2016 after backing Obama in 2012.
That said, Iowa does have some history of being pretty swingy. It’s also cheaper to advertise in Iowa than Ohio, and if we’re talking down-ballot races, there is more at stake there, too. Potentially four competitive House races and a Senate seat in Iowa, whereas Ohio has no Senate race and is likely to have only one or two close House races.
nrakich: Yeah, if Biden wants to be an effective president, he’ll need a Democratic Senate. IMO, that means he should give extra credit to Georgia and Iowa when deciding where to allocate his resources.
sarah: The balancing act that the Biden campaign will inevitably have to engage in isn’t entirely clear to me yet. How much will they actually invest in states like Arizona, Georgia and Texas versus doubling down on states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin?
Much of this will inevitably boil down to what the tipping-point state is in 2020, but one thing that’s hard to figure out is how much of the map already realigned in 2016. Put another way, does Biden have his eyes on states like Arizona because winning states like Wisconsin back will be difficult?
nrakich: But I think that’s the needle we need to thread: Arizona might be moving in one direction and Wisconsin in the other, but even in the “realigned” (really more “recalibrated”) 2016 map, Arizona was redder than Wisconsin.
geoffrey.skelley: It’s curious because some of this comes down to the national environment. Maybe Wisconsin is a point or two redder than it was in 2016, but if Biden wins by 4 or 5 points nationally, maybe that’s enough to carry it even if Wisconsin is continuing to move toward the GOP.
But how exactly that plays out in each state is hard to say.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Questions about Biden and Trump’s bases


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-27--Does Trump Really Have Unique Appeal Among Working-Class Whites?

In this week ’ s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the team discusses comments former Vice President Joe Biden made during @ @ @ @ @ .
The crew also talks through the findings of a new study about white working @ @ @ @ @ election .

In this week’s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the team discusses comments former Vice President Joe Biden made during a conversation about black voters. The crew also talks through the findings of a new study about white working class voters in the 2016 election.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-27--Politics Podcast: Questions About The Parties’ Bases

This installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast keys in on the presumptive presidential nominees ’ relationships with important parts of their coalitions .
First , in an interview on “ The Breakfast Club , ” former Vice President Joe Biden said , “ If you have a problem figuring out whether you ’ re for me or Trump , then you ain ’ t black.
” The crew talks about Biden ’ s relationship with black voters , then debates the findings of a new study suggesting that — contrary to the conventional wisdom — President Trump does not have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
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This installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast keys in on the presumptive presidential nominees’ relationships with important parts of their coalitions. First, in an interview on “The Breakfast Club,” former Vice President Joe Biden said, “If you have a problem figuring out whether you’re for me or Trump, then you ain’t black.” The crew talks about Biden’s relationship with black voters, then debates the findings of a new study suggesting that — contrary to the conventional wisdom — President Trump does not have a unique appeal to white working-class voters.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Questions about Biden and Trump’s bases
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-27--How Much Trump Could Help (Or Harm) Down-Ballot Republicans In November

Looking ahead to November , the presidential race could decide more than just who the next president is .
It could also determine which party controls the Senate or House or even a state ’ s legislature .
And that ’ s because of something political science calls the “ coattail effect , ” which is when the popularity of a candidate at the top of the ticket — we ’ re most interested in presidential coattails — boosts the fortunes of candidates from the same party lower down on the ballot .
Political science has long tried to measure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is , and most research does suggest that down-ballot candidates gain at least a few votes thanks to the performance of the candidate at the top of the ticket , but estimates vary as to the actual size of the coattail effect .
For instance , in House races , where we have the most data , some studies have found anywhere from a 0.2-point to 0.5-point bump for a House candidate for every 1-point increase the presidential candidate experiences in the vote share .
That may not sound like much , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seat has attracted 48 percent of the vote by herself , a strong performance by the same party ’ s presidential candidate could boost her vote share just enough that she clears the 50 percent mark and wins .
And as the chart below shows , the margins in presidential and House races do tend to move together .
This alone doesn ’ t prove the existence of a coattail effect , but it does show how closely these votes are connected .
For instance , in 2004 , President George W. Bush @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GOP won the national House vote by 2.6 points .
Of course , it ’ s not always so symmetrical — in 1996 , President Bill Clinton won reelection by 8.5 points , but Democrats won the House vote by only 0.3 points .
Overall , though , from 1992 to 2016 , we found a strong correlation ( 0.655 ) between the national margins for presidential and House races .
James Campbell , a political scientist at SUNY Buffalo who has studied the presidential coattail effect in congressional races , found that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1868 to 1988 , a party picked up an average of two to three House seats because of the coattail effect .
And from election to election , the effect might be even stronger .
Political scientists Franco Mattei and Joshua Glasgow looked at House contests from 1976 to 2000 and found that a strong presidential candidate could swing almost 10 percent of contested House races .
There ’ s been less work on the coattail effect in the Senate because , unlike the House , it doesn ’ t have truly national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Campbell and Joe Sumners found that Senate contenders got an average boost of 0.2 points per 1 percent increase in the vote of the same party ’ s presidential candidate between 1972 and 1988 , which they concluded affected the outcomes in two to three races per cycle .
Again , that might not sound like much , but that ’ s enough to flip the chamber if it ’ s closely divided — as it is right now .
Additionally , a non-presidential study of the coattail effect by Marc Meredith @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Pennsylvania , found that gubernatorial candidates improved the votes of lower-office contenders from their party by 0.1 to 0.2 points .
Estimating the coattail effect in a given cycle is difficult , though , as there ’ s no real consensus about its size .
The studies cited here all have different estimates , and one study of House contests from 1916 to 2006 by political scientist Ray Fair found that House candidates ’ vote shares were boosted anywhere from 0.8 points to -0.7 points , which calls into question how much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect of coattails .
The experts I spoke with were unsure of coattails ’ precise effect because of other factors that can affect voting , like incumbency or the state of the economy .
For instance , some studies have found the coattail effect is notably stronger in open-seat contests where no incumbent is running for reelection .
And according to Campbell , something like the economy has more electoral consequences than the coattail effect by itself , but the effect is often a by-product of those big-picture electoral conditions .
“ If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to vote for Trump , that ’ s going to help Republicans as they ’ re going to be there to vote in congressional races , ” said Campbell .
Experts argue that where we really see the coattail effect is in turnout among a party ’ s base .
“ The way [ the top of the ticket is ] going to benefit the down-ticket candidates the most is by getting members of that party to show up to vote , ” said Meredith .
This is especially true in our polarized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voting .
“ For every 10 partisans to get out to vote for a presidential candidate , you ’ re probably getting eight or nine of them voting for the [ same party ’ s ] House candidate , ” added Campbell .
But one reason why the coattail effect isn ’ t more pronounced is a countervailing force at work known as “ balancing , ” which is when someone votes against the party they think will win the presidency in down-ballot races .
Looking at elections from 1948 to 2012 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found that if a presidential candidate was heavily favored to win , highly engaged , moderate voters often cast House votes for the other party — an “ ideological hedge ” of sorts .
It ’ s true that only a relatively small number of voters do this , and split-ticket voting for president and Congress has generally declined in recent years , but enough voters still do this that it can make a difference in House races .
Consider the 2016 election .
Some high-information voters split their tickets in Senate and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was betting markets or election forecasts — pointed to Hillary Clinton winning the presidency .
And that probably helped the GOP hold on to some districts that Clinton carried , particularly highly educated seats in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas , such as Virginia ’ s 10th District outside of Washington , D.C. and Minnesota ’ s 3rd District outside Minneapolis .
That said , there aren ’ t many of these “ crossover ” seats , or seats where the party that wins it in the House doesn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The 2016 election had 35 such House seats , which was up only very slightly from 2012 , when there were just 26 split results .
And in the Senate , every seat went for the same party that won the state at the presidential level .
Part of the reason there aren ’ t more crossover seats is that the coattail effect generally plays a larger role than balancing .
Erikson even told me that he didn ’ t think balancing was enough by itself to hinder a party with a clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ considering the potential upside of the coattail effect in 2020 , don ’ t be surprised to hear Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden emphasize their ability to help their party ticket as the election campaign heats up .
For instance , Biden has already begun to campaign on the idea that he can help Democrats put more Senate seats in play and protect the party ’ s House majority .
And for their part , Republicans are already showing signs of concern that Trump ’ s handling of the coronavirus pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harm Republicans in down-ballot races and jeopardize the party ’ s Senate majority .
It ’ s unlikely that Trump or Biden ’ s candidacy will make up all the difference in these key races , but for some down-ballot candidates , it might not hurt to grab hold of their presidential candidate ’ s coattails .

Looking ahead to November, the presidential race could decide more than just who the next president is. It could also determine which party controls the Senate or House or even a state’s legislature. And that’s because of something political science calls the “coattail effect,” which is when the popularity of a candidate at the top of the ticket — we’re most interested in presidential coattails — boosts the fortunes of candidates from the same party lower down on the ballot.
Political science has long tried to measure just how big of an effect this is, and most research does suggest that down-ballot candidates gain at least a few votes thanks to the performance of the candidate at the top of the ticket, but estimates vary as to the actual size of the coattail effect. For instance, in House races, where we have the most data, some studies have found anywhere from a 0.2-point to 0.5-point bump for a House candidate for every 1-point increase the presidential candidate experiences in the vote share. That may not sound like much, but if a candidate in a competitive House seat has attracted 48 percent of the vote by herself, a strong performance by the same party’s presidential candidate could boost her vote share just enough that she clears the 50 percent mark and wins.
And as the chart below shows, the margins in presidential and House races do tend to move together. This alone doesn’t prove the existence of a coattail effect, but it does show how closely these votes are connected. For instance, in 2004, President George W. Bush won reelection by 2.5 points while the GOP won the national House vote by 2.6 points. Of course, it’s not always so symmetrical — in 1996, President Bill Clinton won reelection by 8.5 points, but Democrats won the House vote by only 0.3 points. Overall, though, from 1992 to 2016, we found a strong correlation (0.655) between the national margins for presidential and House races.
James Campbell, a political scientist at SUNY Buffalo who has studied the presidential coattail effect in congressional races, found that in a typical presidential election year from 1868 to 1988, a party picked up an average of two to three House seats because of the coattail effect. And from election to election, the effect might be even stronger. Political scientists Franco Mattei and Joshua Glasgow looked at House contests from 1976 to 2000 and found that a strong presidential candidate could swing almost 10 percent of contested House races.
There’s been less work on the coattail effect in the Senate because, unlike the House, it doesn’t have truly national elections. Still, a 1991 study by Campbell and Joe Sumners found that Senate contenders got an average boost of 0.2 points per 1 percent increase in the vote of the same party’s presidential candidate between 1972 and 1988, which they concluded affected the outcomes in two to three races per cycle. Again, that might not sound like much, but that’s enough to flip the chamber if it’s closely divided — as it is right now. Additionally, a non-presidential study of the coattail effect by Marc Meredith, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that gubernatorial candidates improved the votes of lower-office contenders from their party by 0.1 to 0.2 points.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Questions about Biden and Trump’s bases
Estimating the coattail effect in a given cycle is difficult, though, as there’s no real consensus about its size. The studies cited here all have different estimates, and one study of House contests from 1916 to 2006 by political scientist Ray Fair found that House candidates’ vote shares were boosted anywhere from 0.8 points to -0.7 points, which calls into question how much we can really generalize about the positive effect of coattails.
The experts I spoke with were unsure of coattails’ precise effect because of other factors that can affect voting, like incumbency or the state of the economy. For instance, some studies have found the coattail effect is notably stronger in open-seat contests where no incumbent is running for reelection. And according to Campbell, something like the economy has more electoral consequences than the coattail effect by itself, but the effect is often a by-product of those big-picture electoral conditions. “If the economy brings some more Republicans out to vote for Trump, that’s going to help Republicans as they’re going to be there to vote in congressional races,” said Campbell.
Experts argue that where we really see the coattail effect is in turnout among a party’s base. “The way [the top of the ticket is] going to benefit the down-ticket candidates the most is by getting members of that party to show up to vote,” said Meredith. This is especially true in our polarized era that has high rates of straight-ticket voting. “For every 10 partisans to get out to vote for a presidential candidate, you’re probably getting eight or nine of them voting for the [same party’s] House candidate,” added Campbell.
But one reason why the coattail effect isn’t more pronounced is a countervailing force at work known as “balancing,” which is when someone votes against the party they think will win the presidency in down-ballot races. Looking at elections from 1948 to 2012, political scientist Robert Erikson of Columbia University found that if a presidential candidate was heavily favored to win, highly engaged, moderate voters often cast House votes for the other party — an “ideological hedge” of sorts. It’s true that only a relatively small number of voters do this, and split-ticket voting for president and Congress has generally declined in recent years, but enough voters still do this that it can make a difference in House races.
Consider the 2016 election. Some high-information voters split their tickets in Senate and House races because most signs — whether it was betting markets or election forecasts — pointed to Hillary Clinton winning the presidency. And that probably helped the GOP hold on to some districts that Clinton carried, particularly highly educated seats in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas, such as Virginia’s 10th District outside of Washington, D.C. and Minnesota’s 3rd District outside Minneapolis.
That said, there aren’t many of these “crossover” seats, or seats where the party that wins it in the House doesn’t carry it at the presidential level. The 2016 election had 35 such House seats, which was up only very slightly from 2012, when there were just 26 split results. And in the Senate, every seat went for the same party that won the state at the presidential level.
Part of the reason there aren’t more crossover seats is that the coattail effect generally plays a larger role than balancing. Erikson even told me that he didn’t think balancing was enough by itself to hinder a party with a clear lead in the presidential polls. So considering the potential upside of the coattail effect in 2020, don’t be surprised to hear Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden emphasize their ability to help their party ticket as the election campaign heats up. For instance, Biden has already begun to campaign on the idea that he can help Democrats put more Senate seats in play and protect the party’s House majority. And for their part, Republicans are already showing signs of concern that Trump’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic and the state of the economy could harm Republicans in down-ballot races and jeopardize the party’s Senate majority.
It’s unlikely that Trump or Biden’s candidacy will make up all the difference in these key races, but for some down-ballot candidates, it might not hurt to grab hold of their presidential candidate’s coattails.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-28--Is Trump Losing Among Voters Who Don’t Like Him Or Biden?

Four years ago , when President Trump was the Republican nominee , he won over voters who didn ’ t like him or his Democratic opponent , Hillary Clinton , which gave him a boost in a general election that featured the two most disliked major-party nominees in history .
According to exit polls , 18 percent of voters had an unfavorable view of both Trump and Clinton , but when they cast their ballots , they broke 47 percent to 30 percent in favor of Trump .
The president ’ s advantage among these voters was pivotal , too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 21 and 37 percentage points in Michigan , Pennsylvania and Wisconsin , the three states that put him over the top in the Electoral College .
But now , in 2020 , Trump may have lost his edge among the “ haters ” — that is , the voters who hold an unfavorable view of both presidential candidates .
Two recent national surveys found that former Vice President Joe Biden has a big lead over Trump among those who have unfavorable views of them both .
An April survey from NBC News/Wall Street @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent to 10 percent , and an early May survey from Morning Consult gave Biden a lead of 46 percent to 14 percent .
However , there are a couple of things to keep in mind when talking about the “ hater ” vote .
First , this voting bloc is probably not as big as it was in 2016 .
According to the RealClearPolitics average of favorability polls , the two nominees aren ’ t as disliked this time around .
As you can see in the table below , the net @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unfavorable rating ) for both Trump and Biden is around 10 points higher than the figures for Trump and Clinton in November 2016 .
It ’ s possible that Biden ’ s and Trump ’ s favorability will deteriorate the closer we get to Election Day , but there ’ s also evidence that Trump really has made gains since 2016 , thanks to his improved position among Republicans .
For example , take the last poll from The Economist/YouGov before the 2016 election and its most recent 2020 survey : In November @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they had a favorable impression of Trump , whereas in the latest iteration of the poll , 84 percent of Republicans said they had a favorable view of him .
Other polls show a similar sort of increase .
We know less about Biden ’ s net favorability and how it might change , but it is higher than Clinton ’ s .
And , based on the polling we have so far , Biden ’ s net favorability among Democrats is comparable to Clinton ’ s , although his standing among independents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Second , the makeup of the hater vote likely differs from that of 2016 .
With Trump ’ s higher favorability among Republicans , fewer Republican-leaning voters are likely to fall into this group ; instead , there ’ s probably a larger share of voters who lean Democratic than in 2016 .
For instance , it ’ s possible that a disproportionate share of left-leaning voters who backed a Biden rival in the Democratic presidential primary , such as Sen. Bernie Sanders , falls in this group .
The same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t like either candidate .
The question is whether these haters will disproportionately vote for one candidate , as they did in 2016 .
It ’ s possible that these voters will break for Biden , as the NBC News/Wall Street Journal and Morning Consult polls suggest , because they view the election as a referendum on Trump .
Yet it ’ s also possible that these voters will be more divided on whom they back by Election Day — 41 percent said they were still undecided or had no opinion in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent didn ’ t back Biden or Trump in the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll .
The share of haters in the electorate could grow or shrink in the coming months , too .
In fact , we already have one poll from Monmouth University released earlier this month that suggests the percentage of voters who don ’ t like either candidate might be as large as ( or larger than ) what we saw in 2016 .
( Monmouth put the share at nearly a quarter of registered voters ; the share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent . )
Granted , this is only one poll , but any group that makes up 15 to 25 percent of the electorate could have a significant effect on the election .
It ’ s also possible that Trump ’ s and Biden ’ s net favorability ratings change .
In 2016 , for instance , Hillary Clinton ’ s net favorability got a slight boost after the Democratic convention in late July , likely because some Democrats came home to roost .
So if some Democrats with unfavorable views of Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this August , that could reduce the share of voters who dislike both candidates ( as most Democrats have an unfavorable impression of Trump ) .
Conversely , Trump ’ s ratings could slide further if the country can ’ t get out of a coronavirus-induced economic tailspin .
This scenario could sour even a few Republicans on Trump and increase the share of voters who don ’ t like both candidates ( as most Republicans have an unfavorable view of Biden ) .
But , as was the case in 2016 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 election boils down to a choice between the lesser of two evils .
We ’ ll be keeping an eye on just how many voters view both candidates unfavorably and what their preferences are .

Four years ago, when President Trump was the Republican nominee, he won over voters who didn’t like him or his Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton, which gave him a boost in a general election that featured the two most disliked major-party nominees in history.
According to exit polls, 18 percent of voters had an unfavorable view of both Trump and Clinton, but when they cast their ballots, they broke 47 percent to 30 percent in favor of Trump. The president’s advantage among these voters was pivotal, too. Trump carried these voters by between 21 and 37 percentage points in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, the three states that put him over the top in the Electoral College.
But now, in 2020, Trump may have lost his edge among the “haters” — that is, the voters who hold an unfavorable view of both presidential candidates. Two recent national surveys found that former Vice President Joe Biden has a big lead over Trump among those who have unfavorable views of them both. An April survey from NBC News/Wall Street Journal put Biden ahead of Trump 60 percent to 10 percent, and an early May survey from Morning Consult gave Biden a lead of 46 percent to 14 percent.
However, there are a couple of things to keep in mind when talking about the “hater” vote. First, this voting bloc is probably not as big as it was in 2016. According to the RealClearPolitics average of favorability polls, the two nominees aren’t as disliked this time around. As you can see in the table below, the net favorability (the favorable rating minus the unfavorable rating) for both Trump and Biden is around 10 points higher than the figures for Trump and Clinton in November 2016.
The 2020 candidates are better liked … for now Presidential candidates’ average favorable and unfavorable ratings the day before the 2016 election versus May 27, 2020 Republican favorability Democratic favorability Year Fav. Unfav. Net Fav. Unfav. Net 2020 41.8% 53.9% -12.1 43.7% 46.2% -2.5 2016 37.5 58.5 -21.0 41.8 54.4 -12.6 Source: RealClearPolitics
It’s possible that Biden’s and Trump’s favorability will deteriorate the closer we get to Election Day, but there’s also evidence that Trump really has made gains since 2016, thanks to his improved position among Republicans. For example, take the last poll from The Economist/YouGov before the 2016 election and its most recent 2020 survey: In November 2016, 75 percent of Republicans said they had a favorable impression of Trump, whereas in the latest iteration of the poll, 84 percent of Republicans said they had a favorable view of him. Other polls show a similar sort of increase. We know less about Biden’s net favorability and how it might change, but it is higher than Clinton’s. And, based on the polling we have so far, Biden’s net favorability among Democrats is comparable to Clinton’s, although his standing among independents is notably better (though still negative).
Second, the makeup of the hater vote likely differs from that of 2016. With Trump’s higher favorability among Republicans, fewer Republican-leaning voters are likely to fall into this group; instead, there’s probably a larger share of voters who lean Democratic than in 2016. For instance, it’s possible that a disproportionate share of left-leaning voters who backed a Biden rival in the Democratic presidential primary, such as Sen. Bernie Sanders, falls in this group. The same could be said for independents who don’t like either candidate. The question is whether these haters will disproportionately vote for one candidate, as they did in 2016.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Questions about Biden and Trump’s bases
It’s possible that these voters will break for Biden, as the NBC News/Wall Street Journal and Morning Consult polls suggest, because they view the election as a referendum on Trump. Yet it’s also possible that these voters will be more divided on whom they back by Election Day — 41 percent said they were still undecided or had no opinion in the Morning Consult poll, and 30 percent didn’t back Biden or Trump in the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll.
The share of haters in the electorate could grow or shrink in the coming months, too. In fact, we already have one poll from Monmouth University released earlier this month that suggests the percentage of voters who don’t like either candidate might be as large as (or larger than) what we saw in 2016. (Monmouth put the share at nearly a quarter of registered voters; the share in the 2016 exit polls was 18 percent.) Granted, this is only one poll, but any group that makes up 15 to 25 percent of the electorate could have a significant effect on the election.
It’s also possible that Trump’s and Biden’s net favorability ratings change. In 2016, for instance, Hillary Clinton’s net favorability got a slight boost after the Democratic convention in late July, likely because some Democrats came home to roost. So if some Democrats with unfavorable views of Biden warm up to him at the convention this August, that could reduce the share of voters who dislike both candidates (as most Democrats have an unfavorable impression of Trump). Conversely, Trump’s ratings could slide further if the country can’t get out of a coronavirus-induced economic tailspin. This scenario could sour even a few Republicans on Trump and increase the share of voters who don’t like both candidates (as most Republicans have an unfavorable view of Biden).
But, as was the case in 2016, some voters may ultimately feel that the 2020 election boils down to a choice between the lesser of two evils. We’ll be keeping an eye on just how many voters view both candidates unfavorably and what their preferences are.