fivethirtyeight--2020-07-16--Yes, Biden Has A Big Lead, But It’s Probably Not 15 Points

A bombshell poll from Quinnipiac University sent the political world into a tizzy on Wednesday when it showed Joe Biden leading President Trump 52 percent to 37 percent nationally .
While it ’ s been well documented for a while now that Biden is solidly ahead of Trump in the polls , could the Democrat really be up by 15 points ?
!
No other poll has given Biden that big of a national lead all year , so that ’ s one reason it grabbed so much attention .
But as we ’ ve warned you in the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls like this one .
Even high-quality pollsters like Quinnipiac ( which uses the gold standard of polling methodology and has historically been very accurate ) produce outliers sometimes , and that ’ s OK .
In fact , it ’ s better than OK — it ’ s a sign that they are not cooking the books , as polls are supposed to disagree somewhat , statistically speaking , due to things like sampling error .
This week was also a good reminder that outliers can occur in either direction .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too good to be true for Democrats .
But there was also a CBS News/YouGov poll that showed Biden and Trump tied in Arizona — which seems too good to be true for Trump , given Biden ’ s lead in most other Arizona polls .
But in part because they point in opposite directions , even after you account for these two outlier polls , the bulk of this week ’ s polling data tells the same old story : Biden leads nationally by around 8-11 percentage points among registered voters .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ found : A Yahoo News/YouGov poll gave Biden an 8-point lead .
A Reuters/Ipsos poll had him up by 10 .
The Economist/YouGov found him up by 9 .
An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll put him ahead by 11 .
Morning Consult had him winning by 8 .
Swing-state polls of likely voters painted a similar picture .
Another CBS News/YouGov poll , of light-red Florida , gave Biden a 6-point lead .
Another Arizona poll , by OH Predictive Insights , had Biden up by 5 .
A CNBC/Change Research poll of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national Biden lead in the high single digits .
And finally , Monmouth University , the highest-quality pollster to release a state poll this week , found Biden ahead by 10 points in Pennsylvania according to a high voter-turnout model and ahead by 7 points according to a low voter-turnout model .
Put it all together , and Biden currently leads Trump by an average of 9.1 percentage points , according to the FiveThirtyEight national polling average , which isn ’ t all that different from Biden ’ s lead one week ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month ago ( 9.3 points ) .
Notably , the state polling averages have not moved much in the past several weeks either .
Biden continues to lead the polling averages of states worth 368 electoral votes , while Trump leads in states with only 170 electoral votes .
Simply put , since the protests against police violence appeared to erode Trump ’ s standing at the beginning of the summer , there hasn ’ t been a lot of action in the race .
The campaign is not dominating the headlines , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic — which is dominating the headlines — hasn ’ t improved in Americans ’ eyes .
However , the party conventions start in one month , and we can probably expect the presidential campaign to command people ’ s attention between then and November , pandemic or no .
And , of course , developments in the coronavirus crisis — or some other breaking news story that we can ’ t predict yet , like a scandal — could cause voters to view the candidates in a different light .
While Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to withstand even a major polling error , there are still three and a half months left for the polling to change .

A bombshell poll from Quinnipiac University sent the political world into a tizzy on Wednesday when it showed Joe Biden leading President Trump 52 percent to 37 percent nationally. While it’s been well documented for a while now that Biden is solidly ahead of Trump in the polls, could the Democrat really be up by 15 points?!
No other poll has given Biden that big of a national lead all year, so that’s one reason it grabbed so much attention. But as we’ve warned you in the past, don’t overreact to outlier polls like this one. Even high-quality pollsters like Quinnipiac (which uses the gold standard of polling methodology and has historically been very accurate) produce outliers sometimes, and that’s OK. In fact, it’s better than OK — it’s a sign that they are not cooking the books, as polls are supposed to disagree somewhat, statistically speaking, due to things like sampling error.
This week was also a good reminder that outliers can occur in either direction. There was the Quinnipiac poll, which seemed too good to be true for Democrats. But there was also a CBS News/YouGov poll that showed Biden and Trump tied in Arizona — which seems too good to be true for Trump, given Biden’s lead in most other Arizona polls.
But in part because they point in opposite directions, even after you account for these two outlier polls, the bulk of this week’s polling data tells the same old story: Biden leads nationally by around 8-11 percentage points among registered voters.
Take what other national polls this week found: A Yahoo News/YouGov poll gave Biden an 8-point lead. A Reuters/Ipsos poll had him up by 10. The Economist/YouGov found him up by 9. An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll put him ahead by 11. Morning Consult had him winning by 8.
Swing-state polls of likely voters painted a similar picture. Another CBS News/YouGov poll, of light-red Florida, gave Biden a 6-point lead. Another Arizona poll, by OH Predictive Insights, had Biden up by 5. A CNBC/Change Research poll of several swing states was consistent with a national Biden lead in the high single digits. And finally, Monmouth University, the highest-quality pollster to release a state poll this week, found Biden ahead by 10 points in Pennsylvania according to a high voter-turnout model and ahead by 7 points according to a low voter-turnout model.
Put it all together, and Biden currently leads Trump by an average of 9.1 percentage points, according to the FiveThirtyEight national polling average, which isn’t all that different from Biden’s lead one week ago (9.6 points) or even one month ago (9.3 points).
Notably, the state polling averages have not moved much in the past several weeks either. Biden continues to lead the polling averages of states worth 368 electoral votes, while Trump leads in states with only 170 electoral votes.
Biden is still outpolling Trump in most swing states FiveThirtyEight polling averages as of July 16, 2020, at 2 p.m. Eastern State Biden Trump Margin Change Since Last Month Colorado 54.7% 37.7% D+17.0 D+0.1 New Mexico 54.0 40.3 D+13.7 D+0.4 Maine 53.0 40.9 D+12.1 R+1.3 Virginia 50.5 39.4 D+11.1 D+0.5 Minnesota 53.9 43.7 D+10.2 D+3.7 Michigan 49.5 40.4 D+9.1 R+1.0 National 50.3 41.2 D+9.1 R+0.2 Nevada 48.2 39.7 D+8.5 D+0.6 New Hampshire 49.8 41.8 D+8.0 D+0.4 Pennsylvania 49.8 42.1 D+7.7 D+2.5 Wisconsin 49.0 41.4 D+7.6 D+1.1 Florida 49.2 42.4 D+6.8 None North Carolina 47.9 45.1 D+2.9 None Arizona 47.4 44.8 D+2.6 R+1.4 Ohio 47.8 45.6 D+2.2 R+0.4 Georgia 47.0 46.1 D+0.9 None Texas 45.9 46.2 R+0.3 D+0.4 Iowa 45.3 46.0 R+0.7 D+0.1
Simply put, since the protests against police violence appeared to erode Trump’s standing at the beginning of the summer, there hasn’t been a lot of action in the race. The campaign is not dominating the headlines, and Trump’s handling of the pandemic — which is dominating the headlines — hasn’t improved in Americans’ eyes. However, the party conventions start in one month, and we can probably expect the presidential campaign to command people’s attention between then and November, pandemic or no.
And, of course, developments in the coronavirus crisis — or some other breaking news story that we can’t predict yet, like a scandal — could cause voters to view the candidates in a different light. While Biden’s current lead is robust enough to withstand even a major polling error, there are still three and a half months left for the polling to change.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-17--Americans Increasingly Dislike How Republican Governors Are Handling The Coronavirus Outbreak

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
Throughout the coronavirus pandemic , governors have generally received better marks for the way they ’ ve handled the crisis than President Trump has .
However , new polling suggests that may be changing , especially for Republican governors in states where the number of coronavirus cases has spiked in recent weeks .
Gallup recently found that Americans in the 26 states governed by Republicans are souring on their leaders ’ approach to the public health crisis , while sentiment remains steadily positive among residents of the 24 states governed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past month , the share of respondents who agreed that their governor cared about the safety and health of their community fell by 8 points , from 61 percent to 53 percent , in states where a Republican is governor ; opinion in Democratic-run states hovered around 65 percent , despite some movement week to week .
And on the question of how clearly governors were communicating their plans to address the coronavirus , the GOP also got low marks .
Among respondents in Republican-run states , just 43 percent said their governor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 54 percent about a month ago .
Meanwhile , 58 percent of respondents in Democratic-run states said that their governor was communicating clearly , which was nearly identical to the share who said so in early June .
Gallup isn ’ t the only pollster to find GOP leaders getting lower scores for the way they ’ re dealing with the coronavirus pandemic .
Change Research ’ s polling of six battleground states found especially poor numbers for Republican governors in two states where the number of coronavirus cases surged in the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In Change ’ s polling , 57 percent disapproved of Florida Gov .
Ron DeSantis ’ s handling of the outbreak , and a whopping 71 percent disapproved of Arizona Gov .
Doug Ducey ’ s response .
Additional polling in Arizona and Florida second these findings .
OH Predictive Insights found that opinion of Ducey ’ s approach went from a net positive in June ( 59 percent approved , 37 percent disapproved ) to a net negative in July ( 35 percent approved , 63 percent disapproved ) .
Likewise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Floridians said DeSantis was doing a somewhat or very bad job and 62 percent of Arizonans said the same of Ducey .
Not every Republican governor ’ s pandemic-response ratings are underwater , however .
Some , in fact , have sterling numbers .
In late June , a survey from the University of New Hampshire found Gov .
Chris Sununu had a 78 percent approval rating for his handling of the virus .
Considering Sununu is up for reelection this November , his response could help him win another two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ohio , 77 percent of respondents in a late-June Quinnipiac University poll approved of Gov .
Mike DeWine ’ s performance .
And in Massachusetts , another late-June survey from Suffolk University found 81 percent approved of Gov .
Charlie Baker ’ s handling of the outbreak .
What these three governors have in common is the coronavirus hasn ’ t been surging in their states recently as much as it has in Arizona or Florida , but that doesn ’ t explain everything .
Texas ’ s case rate has also shot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Greg Abbott has gotten better marks than either DeSantis or Ducey .
A CBS News/YouGov survey , for instance , found that public opinion was split as to how well he was handling the crisis : 50 percent said he was doing a good job and 50 percent said he was doing a bad job .
And in another early-July survey from The Dallas Morning News/UT-Tyler , 49 percent approved of Abbott ’ s response while 40 percent disapproved ( 10 percent said they neither approved nor disapproved ) .
Some Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Change Research ’ s early-July survey found , for instance , that 56 percent approved of Wisconsin Gov .
Tony Evers ’ s handling of the pandemic , while 55 percent approved of Michigan Gov .
Gretchen Whitmer and Pennsylvania Gov .
Tom Wolf ’ s responses .
And just 51 percent approved of North Carolina Gov .
Roy Cooper ’ s efforts .
Wolf got some better numbers from a Monmouth University poll released earlier this week , in which 67 percent said he ’ d done a good job handling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be stuck around 50 percent .
A late-June survey from East Carolina University found 53 percent approved of his response .
But on the whole , Americans have a somewhat more favorable view of the way Democratic governors have handled the pandemic than the way Republican governors are responding .
In late June , a consortium of universities conducted a poll of governors ’ handling of the coronavirus across all 50 states and found that the median approval rating for Democratic governors was about 55 percent , compared to 49 percent for Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sky-high numbers for how they ’ ve handled the pandemic .
A late-June poll from Siena College gave New York Gov .
Andrew Cuomo a 76 percent approval rating for his handling of the coronavirus , while a Garin Hart Yang Research Group survey found that 69 percent of Kentucky voters approved of Gov .
Andy Beshear ’ s response .
Of course , as president , Trump ’ s response to the coronavirus has continued to garner the most attention , but unfortunately for him , public opinion of his efforts has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disapprove of his handling of the pandemic while just 38 percent approve , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s coronavirus polling tracker .
• Trump wants to reopen schools in the fall , but a Politico/Morning Consult survey found that 53 percent of Americans are either somewhat or strongly opposed to fully reopening schools for in-person instruction .
Just 38 percent supported the move .
Additionally , 50 percent also opposed a full reopening of colleges and universities while just 40 backed that idea .
Respondents also reacted very poorly to the Trump administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for schools if they didn ’ t completely reopen , with 65 percent opposed to such a policy .
• In a similar vein , 71 percent of parents told Axios/Ipsos that sending their kids back to school poses a moderate to large risk .
Though the poll had a small sample size ( 219 parents ) , it did find that parents of color were more worried than white parents , and parents who identified as Democrats were more concerned than their Republican counterparts .
• In general , though , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ showed , nonwhite Americans are more worried about the coronavirus than white Americans .
The survey found that 79 percent of people of color and 65 percent of white people were either very or somewhat worried about exposure to the coronavirus .
Additionally , 56 percent of nonwhite Americans said they ’ re very worried that the outbreak will negatively affect their household finances compared to only a third of white Americans .
• White House officials have criticized Dr. Anthony Fauci , the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s COVID-19 response , but two surveys suggest that he remains a trusted source of information for many people .
A new poll from The Economist/YouGov found that 52 percent of Americans trust his medical advice to some extent , while only 20 percent don ’ t trust him .
Similarly , the survey found that 55 percent of Americans have a favorable view of him and only 25 percent have an unfavorable view .
And a Politico/Morning Consult survey found that 62 percent of voters rate Fauci ’ s handling of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to just 36 percent who said the same about Trump .
• Washington , D.C. ’ s NFL team will be changing its name , but a new Morning Consult survey found that 49 percent of Americans think the franchise should keep the nickname .
And only 29 percent said the team should change the name while another 22 percent said they didn ’ t know or that they had no opinion .
The move was most popular among the youngest respondents ( those born between 1997 and 2012 ) and black respondents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changing the name .
However , many still think the outgoing name and logo are offensive .
Of the eight professional and college team nicknames the poll tested , only the MLB ’ s Cleveland Indians and their partially retired logo , which features a cartoon caricature of a Native American , was rated as more offensive .
• Regional barbecue is a source of eternal epicurean debate , but a new Huffpost/YouGov survey may finally settle which BBQ style is Americans ’ top choice : Texas-style barbecue sauce led the pack with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a three-way tie for second place as Carolina style , Kansas City style and Memphis style got 10 percent each , while the only other named option — Alabama style — got just 3 percent .
An additional 10 percent of respondents picked “ another style , ” while the remaining respondents weren ’ t sure ( 25 percent ) or said they didn ’ t like barbecue ( 10 percent ) .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 40.3 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( a net approval rating of -15.2 points ) .
At this time last week , 40.1 percent approved and 55.9 percent disapproved ( a net approval rating of -15.8 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 40.8 percent and a disapproval rating of 55.1 percent , for a net approval rating of -14.3 points .
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 8.3 percentage points ( 49.0 percent to 40.7 percent ) .
A week ago , Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent to 40.4 percent ) .
At this time last month , voters preferred Democrats by 7.9 points ( 48.5 percent to 40.6 percent ) .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, governors have generally received better marks for the way they’ve handled the crisis than President Trump has. However, new polling suggests that may be changing, especially for Republican governors in states where the number of coronavirus cases has spiked in recent weeks.
Gallup recently found that Americans in the 26 states governed by Republicans are souring on their leaders’ approach to the public health crisis, while sentiment remains steadily positive among residents of the 24 states governed by Democrats. In fact, over the past month, the share of respondents who agreed that their governor cared about the safety and health of their community fell by 8 points, from 61 percent to 53 percent, in states where a Republican is governor; opinion in Democratic-run states hovered around 65 percent, despite some movement week to week.
And on the question of how clearly governors were communicating their plans to address the coronavirus, the GOP also got low marks. Among respondents in Republican-run states, just 43 percent said their governor offered a clear plan, down from 54 percent about a month ago. Meanwhile, 58 percent of respondents in Democratic-run states said that their governor was communicating clearly, which was nearly identical to the share who said so in early June.
Gallup isn’t the only pollster to find GOP leaders getting lower scores for the way they’re dealing with the coronavirus pandemic. Change Research’s polling of six battleground states found especially poor numbers for Republican governors in two states where the number of coronavirus cases surged in the first half of July: Florida and Arizona. In Change’s polling, 57 percent disapproved of Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis’s handling of the outbreak, and a whopping 71 percent disapproved of Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey’s response. Additional polling in Arizona and Florida second these findings. OH Predictive Insights found that opinion of Ducey’s approach went from a net positive in June (59 percent approved, 37 percent disapproved) to a net negative in July (35 percent approved, 63 percent disapproved). Likewise, surveys by CBS News/YouGov found 53 percent of Floridians said DeSantis was doing a somewhat or very bad job and 62 percent of Arizonans said the same of Ducey.
Not every Republican governor’s pandemic-response ratings are underwater, however. Some, in fact, have sterling numbers. In late June, a survey from the University of New Hampshire found Gov. Chris Sununu had a 78 percent approval rating for his handling of the virus. Considering Sununu is up for reelection this November, his response could help him win another two years in office. Meanwhile, in Ohio, 77 percent of respondents in a late-June Quinnipiac University poll approved of Gov. Mike DeWine’s performance. And in Massachusetts, another late-June survey from Suffolk University found 81 percent approved of Gov. Charlie Baker’s handling of the outbreak.
What these three governors have in common is the coronavirus hasn’t been surging in their states recently as much as it has in Arizona or Florida, but that doesn’t explain everything. Texas’s case rate has also shot up since late June, but Gov. Greg Abbott has gotten better marks than either DeSantis or Ducey. A CBS News/YouGov survey, for instance, found that public opinion was split as to how well he was handling the crisis: 50 percent said he was doing a good job and 50 percent said he was doing a bad job. And in another early-July survey from The Dallas Morning News/UT-Tyler, 49 percent approved of Abbott’s response while 40 percent disapproved (10 percent said they neither approved nor disapproved).
Some Democratic governors have middling approval ratings, too. Change Research’s early-July survey found, for instance, that 56 percent approved of Wisconsin Gov. Tony Evers’s handling of the pandemic, while 55 percent approved of Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer and Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf’s responses. And just 51 percent approved of North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper’s efforts. Wolf got some better numbers from a Monmouth University poll released earlier this week, in which 67 percent said he’d done a good job handling the coronavirus, but Cooper seems to be stuck around 50 percent. A late-June survey from East Carolina University found 53 percent approved of his response.
But on the whole, Americans have a somewhat more favorable view of the way Democratic governors have handled the pandemic than the way Republican governors are responding. In late June, a consortium of universities conducted a poll of governors’ handling of the coronavirus across all 50 states and found that the median approval rating for Democratic governors was about 55 percent, compared to 49 percent for Republican governors. And some Democratic executives have sky-high numbers for how they’ve handled the pandemic. A late-June poll from Siena College gave New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo a 76 percent approval rating for his handling of the coronavirus, while a Garin Hart Yang Research Group survey found that 69 percent of Kentucky voters approved of Gov. Andy Beshear’s response.
Of course, as president, Trump’s response to the coronavirus has continued to garner the most attention, but unfortunately for him, public opinion of his efforts has only worsened. About 58 percent now disapprove of his handling of the pandemic while just 38 percent approve, according to FiveThirtyEight’s coronavirus polling tracker.
Other polling bites
Trump wants to reopen schools in the fall, but a Politico/Morning Consult survey found that 53 percent of Americans are either somewhat or strongly opposed to fully reopening schools for in-person instruction. Just 38 percent supported the move. Additionally, 50 percent also opposed a full reopening of colleges and universities while just 40 backed that idea. Respondents also reacted very poorly to the Trump administration’s plan to reduce federal funding for schools if they didn’t completely reopen, with 65 percent opposed to such a policy.
In a similar vein, 71 percent of parents told Axios/Ipsos that sending their kids back to school poses a moderate to large risk. Though the poll had a small sample size (219 parents), it did find that parents of color were more worried than white parents, and parents who identified as Democrats were more concerned than their Republican counterparts.
In general, though, as a new NBC News/SurveyMonkey weekly tracking poll showed, nonwhite Americans are more worried about the coronavirus than white Americans. The survey found that 79 percent of people of color and 65 percent of white people were either very or somewhat worried about exposure to the coronavirus. Additionally, 56 percent of nonwhite Americans said they’re very worried that the outbreak will negatively affect their household finances compared to only a third of white Americans.
White House officials have criticized Dr. Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and a leader in the country’s COVID-19 response, but two surveys suggest that he remains a trusted source of information for many people. A new poll from The Economist/YouGov found that 52 percent of Americans trust his medical advice to some extent, while only 20 percent don’t trust him. Similarly, the survey found that 55 percent of Americans have a favorable view of him and only 25 percent have an unfavorable view. And a Politico/Morning Consult survey found that 62 percent of voters rate Fauci’s handling of the coronavirus as excellent or good compared to just 36 percent who said the same about Trump.
Washington, D.C.’s NFL team will be changing its name, but a new Morning Consult survey found that 49 percent of Americans think the franchise should keep the nickname. And only 29 percent said the team should change the name while another 22 percent said they didn’t know or that they had no opinion. The move was most popular among the youngest respondents (those born between 1997 and 2012) and black respondents — a plurality of both groups supported changing the name. However, many still think the outgoing name and logo are offensive. Of the eight professional and college team nicknames the poll tested, only the MLB’s Cleveland Indians and their partially retired logo, which features a cartoon caricature of a Native American, was rated as more offensive.
Regional barbecue is a source of eternal epicurean debate, but a new Huffpost/YouGov survey may finally settle which BBQ style is Americans’ top choice: Texas-style barbecue sauce led the pack with 22 percent. Meanwhile, there was a three-way tie for second place as Carolina style, Kansas City style and Memphis style got 10 percent each, while the only other named option — Alabama style — got just 3 percent. An additional 10 percent of respondents picked “another style,” while the remaining respondents weren’t sure (25 percent) or said they didn’t like barbecue (10 percent).
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 40.3 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 55.6 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -15.2 points). At this time last week, 40.1 percent approved and 55.9 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -15.8 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 40.8 percent and a disapproval rating of 55.1 percent, for a net approval rating of -14.3 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 8.3 percentage points (49.0 percent to 40.7 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 9.0 points (49.4 percent to 40.4 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 7.9 points (48.5 percent to 40.6 percent).


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-17--White Democrats Want To Reduce Racial Inequalities … Until They Don’t

On this FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Perry Bacon Jr. and political science professor Meredith Conroy join Galen Druke to discuss @ @ @ @ @ opinion on policies aimed at ending racial disparities in the U.S .

White Democrats Want To Reduce Racial Inequalities … Until They Don’t
On this FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Perry Bacon Jr. and political science professor Meredith Conroy join Galen Druke to discuss what we know about public opinion on policies aimed at ending racial disparities in the U.S.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-17--Politics Podcast: How White Democrats Feel About Policies Aimed At Reducing Racial Inequalities

In recent weeks , public opinion on Black Lives Matter has swung significantly in favor of the movement , and @ @ @ @ @ that Black people face discrimination in America .
But is there public support for policies @ @ @ @ @ ?
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Perry Bacon Jr. and political @ @ @ @ @ what the polls can tell us .
You can listen to the episode by clicking @ @ @ @ @ in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App @ @ @ @ @ .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight @ @ @ @ @ Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review @ @ @ @ @ comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get @ @ @ @ @ on Twitter or in the comments .

In recent weeks, public opinion on Black Lives Matter has swung significantly in favor of the movement, and people are taking the view that Black people face discrimination in America. But is there public support for policies that could address that discrimination? In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Perry Bacon Jr. and political science professor Meredith Conroy discuss what the polls can tell us.
White Democrats are wary of big ideas to address racial inequality
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-17--Polls Policy And FAQs

Polls Policy And FAQs

At FiveThirtyEight , we strive to accumulate and analyze polling data in a way that is honest , informed , comprehensive and accurate .
While we do occasionally commission polls , most of our understanding of American public opinion comes from aggregating polling data conducted by other firms and organizations .
This data forms the foundation of our polling averages , election forecasts and much of our political coverage .
In building our polling database , we aim to be as inclusive as possible .
This means we will collect any poll that has been made publicly available and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The poll must include the name of the pollster , survey dates , sample sizes and details about the population sampled .
If these are not included in the poll ’ s release , we must be able to obtain them in order to include the poll .
• Pollsters must also be able to answer basic questions about their methodology , including but not limited to the medium through which their polling was conducted ( e.g.
, landline calls , text , etc . )
, the source of their voter files @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are some types of polls we don ’ t include , such as : • “ Nonscientific ” polls that don ’ t attempt to survey a representative sample of the population or electorate .
• Polls like Civiqs or Microsoft News tracking polls that are produced using MRP ( short for “ multilevel regression with poststratification ” ) , a modeling technique that produces estimates based on survey interviews that are then used to calculate probabilities ; these probabilities are then projected onto the composition of the population in question .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ understanding public opinion data , we exclude them because we consider them more like models than individual polls .
( As an analogy , we think of this as using someone else ’ s barbecue sauce as an ingredient in your own barbecue sauce . )
An additional list of edge cases in which we may exclude polls can be found in this article .
For instance , we exclude polls that ask voters who they support only after revealing leading information about the candidates .
We do include internal polls that are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ circumstance ( a general election poll sponsored by a candidate ’ s rival in the primary ) .
Internal and partisan polls have an asterisk next to the pollster ’ s name .
The asterisk does not indicate whether the pollster itself is partisan , but whether the money that paid for the poll came from a partisan source .
Polls are considered partisan if they ’ re conducted on behalf of a political party , campaign committee , PAC , super PAC , 501 ( c ) ( 4 ) , 501 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 501 ( c ) ( 6 ) that conducts a large majority of its political activity on behalf of one political party .
Additionally , if we find that a sponsor organization is selectively releasing polls favorable to a certain candidate or party , we may also categorize that organization as partisan .
We generally go out of our way to not characterize news organizations as partisan , even if they have a liberal or conservative view .
But selectively releasing data that favors one party is a partisan action , and such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ These classifications may be revisited if a sponsor ceases engaging in this behavior .
Polls we suspect are fake will also not be included until we conduct a thorough investigation and can confirm their veracity .
We will permanently ban any pollster found to be falsifying data .
Additionally , we reserve the right to ban polls sponsored by a particular organization that consistently engages in dishonest or nontransparent behavior that goes beyond editorializing and political spin .
Our guidelines for inclusion are intentionally permissive .
We aim to capture all publicly available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faith .
While some polls have a more established track record of accuracy than others — and we do take that into account in our models and political analysis — we exclude polls from our dataset only in exceptional circumstances .
Below are some questions we ’ ve been asked often over the years about the types of polls we collect .
Take a look and if you still have questions or find a poll we don ’ t have , please email us at polls @ fivethirtyeight.com .
Q : Which races @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : We collect polls for presidential , Senate , House and gubernatorial races in addition to presidential approval polls and congressional generic ballot polls at the national level .
At this time , we do not collect primary polls other than for the presidency — except in cases of a “ jungle primary , ” as it ’ s possible for a candidate to win the seat outright .
The latest polls page includes all polls publicly released within two years of an election .
If we don ’ t have any polls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that means we weren ’ t aware of any polls there .
Q : Can I download this data ?
A : Yes !
There are links at the bottom of the latest polls page , but you can also download this data and more from our data repository for all our polls , forecasts and other data projects .
Unfortunately , however , we are not able to share historical data for presidents ’ approval ratings .
You can find additional information on historical presidential approval ratings , and guidelines for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Center ’ s website .
Q : Why do you sometimes add old polls to the latest polls page ?
A : Polls are added to our latest polls page as soon as they are added to our database .
If older polls show up on the polls page , it is because they have recently been added to our database — either because we were only just made aware of them or because they had previously been unreleased .
Q : What do the pollster grades mean ?
A : We calculate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its historical accuracy and methodology .
You can read our full ratings and methodology to better understand how we calculate the grades .
Q : What does it mean when a pollster has a rating like “ A/B ” or a dotted circle around the rating ?
A : For pollsters with a relatively small sample of polling within three weeks of an election , we show a provisional rating ( “ A/B , ” “ B/C , ” or “ C/D ” ) rather than a precise letter grade and use a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is provisional .
Q : Why do some pollsters not have a grade ?
A : For some pollsters , we do not have any polls from the last three weeks of an election cycle , which means we can ’ t evaluate their historical performance .
We do include polls from these pollsters in our polling averages and models , but we are unable to assign them a rating based on their historical performance ; therefore , they receive less weight in our averages and models .
Q : Do you weight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When we calculate our polling averages , some polls get more weight than others .
For example , polls that survey more people or have a historical track record of accuracy get more consideration in calculating the average than polls with small sample sizes or polls that have been historically less accurate .
Additionally , our polling averages apply adjustments for things like a pollster ’ s house effect ( a measure for how consistently a pollster leans toward one party or candidate ) or trends in polls from similar states .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and adjust polls for polling averages , read this detailed explanation of our 2020 methodology .
Q : When do you show third-party candidates on the latest polls page or in your polling averages ?
A : We include third-party candidates in polls that ask about them .
To find those polls , enter the candidate ’ s last name in the search box on our latest polls page .
As for our averages , if enough pollsters ask questions that include a specific third-party candidate , we will include that candidate .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ sometimes missing for polls ?
A : If a poll does not have a sample size listed , the pollster or sponsor did not report it and we are actively working to obtain it .
These polls are still included in our averages and models with an imputed sample size until we obtain the actual sample size .
Q : Why do the values in some polls add up to more than 100 percent ?
A : Values in some polls may add up to more than 100 percent due to rounding .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a poll with an approval rating of 46.5 percent and a disapproval rating of 53.5 percent , then both options would automatically round up to 47 percent and 54 percent , respectively .
Q : Why do the margins in some polls not match what the pollster reports ?
A : This also boils down to rounding .
For example , if a pollster puts one candidate at 45.2 percent and another at 45.6 percent , we ’ ll display these two candidates at 45 percent and 46 percent , respectively .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a difference of 0 even though the actual margin is 0.4 .
Q : Why are there sometimes multiple versions of a specific poll question ?
A : There are several reasons for this , but here are three of the most common explanations .
First , a pollster may release a question with multiple populations , such as all adults , registered voters or likely voters , and we include all these populations in our database and on our polls page .
Second , a pollster may publish multiple results by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different ways ; in such cases , we may include all of them if the pollster does not specify one result as its preferred estimate .
Third , a pollster may ask a horse race question in different ways ; for example , there may be one head-to-head question between two candidates , and a second question asking about every candidate running .
We include all versions of this question in our database , averaging poll questions with identical populations for our averages and models .
Still have questions ?
Send us an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ best to sort it out .

At FiveThirtyEight, we strive to accumulate and analyze polling data in a way that is honest, informed, comprehensive and accurate. While we do occasionally commission polls, most of our understanding of American public opinion comes from aggregating polling data conducted by other firms and organizations. This data forms the foundation of our polling averages, election forecasts and much of our political coverage.
In building our polling database, we aim to be as inclusive as possible. This means we will collect any poll that has been made publicly available and meets a few basic standards:
The poll must include the name of the pollster, survey dates, sample sizes and details about the population sampled. If these are not included in the poll’s release, we must be able to obtain them in order to include the poll. Pollsters must also be able to answer basic questions about their methodology, including but not limited to the polling medium used (e.g., landline calls, text, etc.), the source of their voter files, their weighting criteria, and the source of the poll’s funding.
However, there are some types of polls we don’t include, such as:
“Nonscientific” polls that don’t attempt to survey a representative sample of the population or electorate. Polls that blend or smooth their data using methods like MRP (short for “multilevel regression with poststratification”). While this is a valid technique for understanding public opinion data, we exclude these polls because we consider them more like models than individual polls. (As an analogy, we think of this as using someone else’s barbecue sauce as an ingredient in your own barbecue sauce.) DIY polls commissioned by nonprofessional hobbyists on online platforms like Google Surveys or SurveyMonkey. (Professional or campaign polls using these platforms are fine.) Subsamples of multistate polls are not treated as individual polls of those states unless there is some method employed to verify the geographic location of the respondents and each state in the poll is weighted individually. Polls that reveal leading information about the candidates before asking voters who they support. If, for instance, a poll says “Joe Biden loves puppies. Who do you plan to support: Biden or Trump?”, we won’t include it.
Polls that include hypothetical candidates — for instance, a poll testing a hypothetical three-way presidential race between Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Liz Cheney — are included on our polls page, but are not included in our polling averages or models unless and until every politician in the question has declared their intention to seek the office in question and has had their name included on the ballot.
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Additionally, if we find that a sponsor organization is selectively releasing polls favorable to a certain candidate or party, we may also categorize that organization as partisan. We generally go out of our way to not characterize news organizations as partisan, even if they have a liberal or conservative view. But selectively releasing data that favors one party is a partisan action, and such polls will be treated as such. These classifications may be revisited if a sponsor ceases engaging in this behavior.
In rare cases where a pollster routinely conducts polls for partisan sponsors and we learn that it is not being transparent about sponsorship, we will count all of its polls as partisan. We also count all of a pollster’s polls as partisan if it is formally affiliated with a partisan organization; for instance, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee has an in-house polling operation that is always considered partisan. These cases are noted with a solid diamond next to the pollster’s name.
Polls we suspect are fake will also not be included until we conduct a thorough investigation and can confirm their veracity. We will permanently ban any pollster found to be falsifying data or engaging in betting markets that may be directly impacted by their survey work. We reserve the right to ban polls sponsored by any organization that consistently engages in dishonest or nontransparent behavior that goes beyond editorializing and political spin.
Our guidelines for inclusion are intentionally permissive. We aim to capture all publicly available polls that are being conducted in good faith. While some polls have a more established track record of accuracy than others — and we do take that into account in our models and political analysis — we exclude polls from our dataset only in exceptional circumstances.
Below are some questions we’ve been asked often over the years about the types of polls we collect. Take a look, and if you still have questions or find a poll we don’t have, please email us at polls@fivethirtyeight.com.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: Which races do you collect polls for?
A: We collect polls for presidential, Senate, House and gubernatorial general elections in addition to presidential approval polls, vice presidential approval polls and congressional generic ballot polls at the national level. At this time, we do not collect primary polls other than for the presidency — except in cases of a “jungle primary,” as it’s possible for a candidate to win the seat outright. We also collect favorability polls for certain notable politicians.
Q: Why don’t you have any polls of the race I’m interested in?
A: The latest polls page includes all polls publicly released within two years of an election, beginning with the 2018 election cycle. If we don’t have any polls for a particular race, that means we weren’t aware of any polls for that race.
Q: Can I download this data?
A: Yes! There is a dropdown menu containing all our polling datasets at the bottom of the latest polls page, but you can also download this data and more from our data repository, which includes all our polls, forecasts and other data projects. Unfortunately, we are not able to share data on presidents’ approval ratings before Donald Trump. You can find additional information on historical presidential approval ratings, and guidelines for acquiring that dataset, on the Roper Center’s website.
Q: How do you account for a pollster that publishes multiple results for a question?
A: When a pollster publishes multiple subsamples (for example, all adults, only registered voters, and only likely voters), we include all of them in our database. Similarly, if a pollster asks a horse-race question with different sets of candidates — for example, with and without a third-party candidate — we include all versions of this question in our database. If the pollster includes multiple likely voter models, as in this Monmouth poll, we first check if the pollster indicates that one of the versions is its preferred option. If it does, we use that version; otherwise, we include them all in our database. Our election models take these multiple versions into account, preferring likely voters over other subsamples and averaging results in the case of multiple topline questions. Our approval and favorability models work similarly, though these models prefer questions among all adults over those among likely or registered voters.
Q: How do you account for a pollster that publishes numbers with and without “leaners”?
A: When a pollster publishes one version of a question with “leaners” — respondents who may be uncertain about their vote but say that they lean toward a particular candidate or party — and one without, we include only the version with leaners. If the question including leaners is a “forced-choice” question, in which respondents are not given an option of saying they are undecided when asked which way they lean, we still include only that version of the question instead of the version without leaners.
Q: What do the pollster grades mean?
A: We calculate a grade for each pollster by analyzing its historical accuracy and methodology. You can read our full ratings and methodology to better understand how we calculate the grades.
Q: What does it mean when a pollster has a rating like “A/B” and a dotted circle around the rating?
A: For pollsters with a relatively small sample of polling within three weeks of an election, we show a provisional rating (“A/B,” “B/C,” or “C/D”) rather than a precise letter grade and use a dotted circle to emphasize that the rating is provisional.
Q: Why do some pollsters not have a grade?
A: For some pollsters, we do not have any polls from the last three weeks of an election cycle, which means we can’t evaluate their historical performance. We do include polls from these pollsters in our polling averages and models, but we are unable to assign them a rating based on their historical performance; therefore, they receive less weight in our averages and models.
Q: Do you weight or adjust polls?
A: Yes. When we calculate our polling averages, some polls get more weight than others. For example, polls that survey more people or have a historical track record of accuracy get more consideration in calculating the average than polls with small sample sizes or polls that have been historically less accurate. Our polling averages also apply adjustments for things like a pollster’s house effect (a measure for how consistently a pollster leans toward one party or candidate) or trends in polls from similar states. For more information on how we weight and adjust polls for polling averages, see this detailed explanation of our forecast methodology.
Q: When do you show third-party candidates on the latest polls page or in your polling averages?
A: We include third-party candidates in every poll that asks about them. To find those polls, enter the candidate’s last name in the search box on our latest polls page or use the drop-down menus to select the corresponding race. You may have to click “More” to see all candidates for a given question. Our polling averages include every candidate who has received at least five percent support in at least five different polls from at least three different pollsters.
Q: Why do some races not have a polling average?
A: In order to ensure a polling average has enough data to accurately represent the state of the race, we do not publish an average for a race until the major party candidates have been officially selected in primaries and we have collected at least five different polls from at least three different pollsters for that race. In addition, we may not have polling averages for races that use an instant runoff, as the candidates included in the questions may differ from pollster to pollster.
Q: Why are the sample sizes sometimes missing for polls?
A: If a poll does not have a sample size listed, the pollster or sponsor did not report it and we are actively working to obtain it. These polls are still included in our averages and models with an imputed sample size (400 for district-level polls, 600 for state-level polls and 1,200 for national polls) until we obtain the actual sample size.
Q: Why do the values in some polls add up to more than 100 percent?
A: Values in some polls may add up to more than 100 percent due to rounding. For example, if a pollster published a poll that gave the president an approval rating of 46.5 percent and a disapproval rating of 53.5 percent, then those numbers would round up to 47 percent and 54 percent, respectively.
Q: Why do the margins in some polls not match what the pollster reports?
A: This often boils down to rounding. For example, if a pollster puts one candidate at 45.2 percent and another at 45.6 percent, we’ll display these two candidates at 45 percent and 46 percent, respectively. That means we’ll display their margin as a difference of 0 even though the actual margin is 0.4.
This may also occur if the pollster publicizes a version of the question that differs from the version that FiveThirtyEight includes on our polls page. For example, a pollster may publicize a horse-race question that does not include leaners, but FiveThirtyEight publishes only the version that does include leaners.
Still have questions? Send us an email and we’ll do our best to sort it out.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-20--Politics Podcast: There Aren’t Secret Trump Voters

A recent Monmouth poll showed that a majority of Pennsylvanians — 57 percent — believe there are “ secret voters @ @ @ @ @ support Trump but won ’ t tell anyone about it .
In this installment of @ @ @ @ @ the crew explains why that is unlikely .
They also consider the future of Black @ @ @ @ @ Civil Rights Era , like Rep. John Lewis , leave office .
Plus , they @ @ @ @ @ of the race for the Senate .
You can listen to the episode by clicking @ @ @ @ @ in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App @ @ @ @ @ .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight @ @ @ @ @ Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review @ @ @ @ @ comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get @ @ @ @ @ on Twitter or in the comments .

A recent Monmouth poll showed that a majority of Pennsylvanians — 57 percent — believe there are “secret” voters in their communities who support Trump but won’t tell anyone about it. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew explains why that is unlikely. They also consider the future of Black politics as politicians who were leaders of the civil rights movement, like Rep. John Lewis, die or leave office. Plus, they check in on the state of the race for the Senate.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: There Aren’t Secret Trump Voters
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-21--Economists Think Congress Should Keep Paying Unemployed Workers $600 A Week — Or Even More

Congress is back in session , and it has a weighty task before it — figuring out what to do about the economy as COVID-19 infections spike across the country and states roll back their reopenings .
One central point of tension : the $ 600-per-week supplemental unemployment insurance benefit that was enacted in March as part of the CARES Act and is set to expire on July 31 .
Democrats have proposed extending the payment until jobless rates in states fall below a certain threshold .
Republicans , meanwhile , are leery of continuing the full payments , saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work .
And it ’ s true that research has shown that many workers are making more money on the beefed-up benefits than they would be at their old jobs .
But in the latest installment of our regular survey of quantitative macroeconomic economists , conducted in partnership with the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business , the 33 economists in our study collectively thought there was a 59 percent chance that either keeping the payment steady or increasing it to above $ 600 per week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They said there was about a 33 percent chance that reducing the weekly payment to less than $ 600 would most benefit the economy , and only a 7 percent chance that letting the program completely lapse would be most beneficial .
This makes sense considering that another recent IGM survey found that most economists blamed high unemployment on companies that weren ’ t hiring — not on people choosing not to work because of unemployment payments .
Jonathan Wright , an economics professor at Johns Hopkins University who has been consulting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ survey , pointed out that some extension of unemployment insurance is important because many workers are still out of a job .
States can continue to offer benefits regardless of what the federal government does , but those don ’ t last forever , either — and some states are less generous than others .
Of course , the perspectives on Congress ’ s response are nuanced , and many of the economists think the benefits should ideally be phased out as the economy improves , assuming there are no logistical hurdles .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ways that federal policymakers could aid jobless workers , the experts thought there was a 37 percent chance that the best strategy would be to continue paying jobless workers $ 600 weekly for now but peg federal unemployment benefits to key economic indicators so they become gradually less generous as the economy improves .
They said there was a 26 percent chance it would benefit the economy more if the workers were paid less than $ 600 per week for a fixed period of time , and a 22 percent probability that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers $ 600 a week even if it meant some would make more than they did while working .
Deborah Lucas , an economist at MIT , said she would opt for temporarily leaving the weekly payment at $ 600 , or even increasing it a bit , although she said the payments should ramp down if the economy improved enough .
“ The fact that a considerable number of people are making more this way than when they were working seems like a good thing , ” she said , adding that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earners , who might otherwise feel pressure to take jobs that would endanger their health .
“ In effect , it enhances social insurance protections and is a step towards universal basic income , both policies I think would improve social welfare even in the absence of a pandemic.
” Not all of the economists were a fan of expanding or maintaining the $ 600 weekly payment , though .
Annette Vissing-Jørgensen , an economist at the University of California , Berkeley , said it was fundamentally unfair that some essential workers were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were out of a job .
She added that while she ’ s concerned overall about making it more financially attractive for workers to stay home from their jobs , particularly if hiring starts to pick up again , there “ could be a role for continuing some level of extra benefits ” in states that are less generous .
Others noted that while the extra payment made sense as a short-term stimulus measure , economists might approach the long-term consequences of such a generous supplement differently .
Still , it was notable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question above was an alternative to the $ 600-per-week payment that ’ s been floated by some Republicans , who have proposed a “ back to work bonus ” for people who return to their jobs instead of continuing to supplement workers ’ unemployment benefits .
Economists thought there was only a 16 percent chance this would do the most to benefit the economy .
“ Continued unemployment support has the twin benefits of alleviating poverty for jobless workers and sustaining consumer demand in the economy , ” said Allan Timmermann , professor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of California , San Diego .
Timmermann has also been consulting with us on the survey .
“ [ It ] is viewed as a highly effective tool to prevent the economy from stalling.
” Along similar lines , we asked economists how they would allocate $ 1 trillion in a hypothetical COVID-19 stimulus package if they wanted to do the most good for the entire economy ( with the assumption that the health crisis itself would be addressed with a separate bill ) .
The economists ranked their top three priorities and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ No .
1 responses .
But though that benefit was in the top three of priorities for a majority of the experts , at 67 percent , it didn ’ t see the highest share of overall top-three responses .
By that measure , the clear priority according to economists was funding state and local governments — which is consistent with a previous survey in which they thought one of the most likely causes of economic disaster would be an unwillingness to bail out those governments .
In this week ’ s survey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be among lawmakers ’ top three priorities , and 36 percent said it should be No .
1 .
“ State and local is going to be a huge drag on the economy because they are a sizable share of spending , can not really run much in the way of deficits , their tax revenue is badly hit and Congress has done little to help so far , ” Wright said .
So cushioning states and localities could do a lot to support the economy , he said .
Other areas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economists ’ top three priorities were funding for small businesses ( 48 percent ) and public K-12 schools ( 45 percent ) and another round of individual stimulus checks ( 36 percent ) .
None of our economists , however , thought funding either large corporations or colleges and other institutions of higher learning was a priority .
In addition to our usual questions about gross domestic product in the second and fourth quarters , we asked the economists to forecast third-quarter real GDP growth in this installment of the survey .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ how much the prospect of a true “ second wave ” of coronavirus in the winter could slow down economic growth .
On average , economists thought real GDP in the second quarter of 2020 — which ended June 30 , with an advance GDP estimate set to be released later this month — declined by an annualized rate of 27 percent compared with the first quarter .
They also thought real GDP would grow by about 8 percentage points quarter-over-quarter in the third quarter , with an upper-bound estimate of 17 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But their forecasts looked bleaker for the fourth quarter , with a median forecast of 3 percent growth , a 90th-percentile forecast of 9 percent and a 10th-percentile forecast in the red again ( at -3 percent ) — all more pessimistic than in the third quarter .
Some of that reflects the increased economic activity of the summer ( relative to the early spring ) , even with the virus circulating around the country ; the likelihood of some kind of third-quarter bounce back was high , given how bad economists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But the forecast also speaks to the uncertain course that the virus — and therefore , the economy — might take over the rest of 2020 .
Robert Barbera , an economist at Johns Hopkins University , said part of the problem in forecasting quarterly shifts is that month-to-month change can be so extreme .
His forecast for the third quarter was less optimistic because he expected most of the initial bounce back to happen in May and June , which are both part of the second quarter .
The third quarter might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and look quite a bit better than the second quarter , he said , but that ’ s partially because the second quarter was so bad .
Predicting the fourth quarter is even more difficult — in part because a bounce back in the economy is so dependent on Americans ’ willingness to resume ordinary life .
However the course of the recession plays out , our economists think America could be due for a massive wave of personal bankruptcies in the second half of the year .
During the first half of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vast majority of which were by individuals — were actually down 23 percent relative to the first half of 2019 , according to court data from Epiq AACER .
But don ’ t be fooled : That was almost certainly because of the heavy use of grace periods and extensions by creditors , which will eventually expire ( if they haven ’ t already ) .
In our survey , 67 percent of economists thought total filings would increase significantly in the second half of 2020 relative to the second half of 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see the same kind of year-over-year decrease in the second half of 2020 that they saw in the first half .
Taken as a whole , the economic picture painted by this week ’ s survey is no brighter than in previous installments .
The panel ’ s predictions for future GDP have scarcely budged over the past two weeks , and the experts remain wary that whatever gains the economy is making over the summer could be wiped out by the virus before year ’ s end .
But they also clearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its disposal to avoid making the recovery harder than it needs to be .
The big question is — will policymakers use them ?

Congress is back in session, and it has a weighty task before it — figuring out what to do about the economy as COVID-19 infections spike across the country and states roll back their reopenings. One central point of tension: the $600-per-week supplemental unemployment insurance benefit that was enacted in March as part of the CARES Act and is set to expire on July 31.
Democrats have proposed extending the payment until jobless rates in states fall below a certain threshold. Republicans, meanwhile, are leery of continuing the full payments, saying they will discourage people from returning to work. And it’s true that research has shown that many workers are making more money on the beefed-up benefits than they would be at their old jobs.
But in the latest installment of our regular survey of quantitative macroeconomic economists, conducted in partnership with the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, the 33 economists in our study collectively thought there was a 59 percent chance that either keeping the payment steady or increasing it to above $600 per week would be most beneficial to the economy. They said there was about a 33 percent chance that reducing the weekly payment to less than $600 would most benefit the economy, and only a 7 percent chance that letting the program completely lapse would be most beneficial. This makes sense considering that another recent IGM survey found that most economists blamed high unemployment on companies that weren’t hiring — not on people choosing not to work because of unemployment payments.
Jonathan Wright, an economics professor at Johns Hopkins University who has been consulting with FiveThirtyEight on the design of the survey, pointed out that some extension of unemployment insurance is important because many workers are still out of a job. States can continue to offer benefits regardless of what the federal government does, but those don’t last forever, either — and some states are less generous than others.
How should Congress handle unemployment insurance? Likelihood that each federal policy choice would most benefit the entire economy over the rest of 2020, according to economists Option Probability Keep the weekly payment at $600 37% Reduce the weekly payment to less than $600 33 Increase the weekly payment to more than $600 22 Allow federal pandemic unemployment insurance to completely lapse 7 The survey of 33 economists was conducted July 17-20. Source: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT/IGM COVID-19 ECONOMIC SURVEY
Of course, the perspectives on Congress’s response are nuanced, and many of the economists think the benefits should ideally be phased out as the economy improves, assuming there are no logistical hurdles. When we drilled into some of the ways that federal policymakers could aid jobless workers, the experts thought there was a 37 percent chance that the best strategy would be to continue paying jobless workers $600 weekly for now but peg federal unemployment benefits to key economic indicators so they become gradually less generous as the economy improves. They said there was a 26 percent chance it would benefit the economy more if the workers were paid less than $600 per week for a fixed period of time, and a 22 percent probability that it would be better to continue paying jobless workers $600 a week even if it meant some would make more than they did while working.
Deborah Lucas, an economist at MIT, said she would opt for temporarily leaving the weekly payment at $600, or even increasing it a bit, although she said the payments should ramp down if the economy improved enough. “The fact that a considerable number of people are making more this way than when they were working seems like a good thing,” she said, adding that this will only be true for low earners, who might otherwise feel pressure to take jobs that would endanger their health. “In effect, it enhances social insurance protections and is a step towards universal basic income, both policies I think would improve social welfare even in the absence of a pandemic.”
[Related: Where The Latest COVID-19 Models Think We’re Headed — And Why They Disagree]
Not all of the economists were a fan of expanding or maintaining the $600 weekly payment, though. Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, said it was fundamentally unfair that some essential workers were making less money than nonessential workers who were out of a job. She added that while she’s concerned overall about making it more financially attractive for workers to stay home from their jobs, particularly if hiring starts to pick up again, there “could be a role for continuing some level of extra benefits” in states that are less generous. Others noted that while the extra payment made sense as a short-term stimulus measure, economists might approach the long-term consequences of such a generous supplement differently.
Still, it was notable that the least popular response to the question above was an alternative to the $600-per-week payment that’s been floated by some Republicans, who have proposed a “back to work bonus” for people who return to their jobs instead of continuing to supplement workers’ unemployment benefits. Economists thought there was only a 16 percent chance this would do the most to benefit the economy.
“Continued unemployment support has the twin benefits of alleviating poverty for jobless workers and sustaining consumer demand in the economy,” said Allan Timmermann, professor of finance and economics at the University of California, San Diego. Timmermann has also been consulting with us on the survey. “[It] is viewed as a highly effective tool to prevent the economy from stalling.”
Along similar lines, we asked economists how they would allocate $1 trillion in a hypothetical COVID-19 stimulus package if they wanted to do the most good for the entire economy (with the assumption that the health crisis itself would be addressed with a separate bill). The economists ranked their top three priorities and gave unemployment insurance the highest share of No. 1 responses. But though that benefit was in the top three of priorities for a majority of the experts, at 67 percent, it didn’t see the highest share of overall top-three responses. By that measure, the clear priority according to economists was funding state and local governments — which is consistent with a previous survey in which they thought one of the most likely causes of economic disaster would be an unwillingness to bail out those governments. In this week’s survey, 85 percent of respondents thought that should be among lawmakers’ top three priorities, and 36 percent said it should be No. 1.
What should be the priorities of a federal stimulus? Priorities for a hypothetical federal stimulus package in order to have the greatest overall economic benefit, ranked by economists Share of economists who ranked it as priority … Category No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 In Top 3 State and local governments 36% 21% 27% 85% Jobless workers (via unemployment insurance) 39 15 12 67 Small businesses 6 21 21 48 Public K-12 schools 12 15 18 45 Individuals (via stimulus checks) 3 21 12 36 Health care institutions 0 6 9 15 Other 3 0 0 3 Higher education 0 0 0 0 Large corporations 0 0 0 0 The survey of 33 economists was conducted July 17-20. Source: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT/IGM COVID-19 ECONOMIC SURVEY
“State and local is going to be a huge drag on the economy because they are a sizable share of spending, cannot really run much in the way of deficits, their tax revenue is badly hit and Congress has done little to help so far,” Wright said. So cushioning states and localities could do a lot to support the economy, he said.
Other areas of focus that frequently came up among the economists’ top three priorities were funding for small businesses (48 percent) and public K-12 schools (45 percent) and another round of individual stimulus checks (36 percent). None of our economists, however, thought funding either large corporations or colleges and other institutions of higher learning was a priority.
In addition to our usual questions about gross domestic product in the second and fourth quarters, we asked the economists to forecast third-quarter real GDP growth in this installment of the survey. The results shed some light on just how much the prospect of a true “second wave” of coronavirus in the winter could slow down economic growth.
On average, economists thought real GDP in the second quarter of 2020 — which ended June 30, with an advance GDP estimate set to be released later this month — declined by an annualized rate of 27 percent compared with the first quarter. They also thought real GDP would grow by about 8 percentage points quarter-over-quarter in the third quarter, with an upper-bound estimate of 17 percent and little chance of negative growth again. But their forecasts looked bleaker for the fourth quarter, with a median forecast of 3 percent growth, a 90th-percentile forecast of 9 percent and a 10th-percentile forecast in the red again (at -3 percent) — all more pessimistic than in the third quarter.
Some of that reflects the increased economic activity of the summer (relative to the early spring), even with the virus circulating around the country; the likelihood of some kind of third-quarter bounce back was high, given how bad economists think second-quarter GDP will end up. But the forecast also speaks to the uncertain course that the virus — and therefore, the economy — might take over the rest of 2020.
[Related: How Americans View The Coronavirus Crisis And Trump’s Response]
Robert Barbera, an economist at Johns Hopkins University, said part of the problem in forecasting quarterly shifts is that month-to-month change can be so extreme. His forecast for the third quarter was less optimistic because he expected most of the initial bounce back to happen in May and June, which are both part of the second quarter. The third quarter might see an uptick in August and September and look quite a bit better than the second quarter, he said, but that’s partially because the second quarter was so bad. Predicting the fourth quarter is even more difficult — in part because a bounce back in the economy is so dependent on Americans’ willingness to resume ordinary life.
However the course of the recession plays out, our economists think America could be due for a massive wave of personal bankruptcies in the second half of the year. During the first half of 2020, total bankruptcy filings — the vast majority of which were by individuals — were actually down 23 percent relative to the first half of 2019, according to court data from Epiq AACER. But don’t be fooled: That was almost certainly because of the heavy use of grace periods and extensions by creditors, which will eventually expire (if they haven’t already). In our survey, 67 percent of economists thought total filings would increase significantly in the second half of 2020 relative to the second half of 2019; only 6 percent thought they would see the same kind of year-over-year decrease in the second half of 2020 that they saw in the first half.
Taken as a whole, the economic picture painted by this week’s survey is no brighter than in previous installments. The panel’s predictions for future GDP have scarcely budged over the past two weeks, and the experts remain wary that whatever gains the economy is making over the summer could be wiped out by the virus before year’s end. But they also clearly think Congress has a few tools at its disposal to avoid making the recovery harder than it needs to be. The big question is — will policymakers use them?
Subscribe to our coronavirus podcast, PODCAST-19


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-21--Secret Trump Voters Didn’t Decide 2016 And Probably Won’t Swing 2020

A recent poll showed that the majority of Pennsylvanians think people in their community secretly support President Trump .
In @ @ @ @ @ Politics podcast , the crew explains why that is unlikely .
They also consider the @ @ @ @ @ leaders of the civil rights movement — like Rep. John Lewis — die or leave @ @

A recent poll showed that the majority of Pennsylvanians think people in their community secretly support President Trump. In this week’s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew explains why that is unlikely. They also consider the future of politics as Black leaders of the civil rights movement — like Rep. John Lewis — die or leave office.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-22--How Can A Senator Vote With Trump Most Of The Time And Still Be A Moderate?

A number of GOP senators — especially those from states that backed Hillary Clinton in 2016 — are in competitive reelection fights in 2020 , including Sens .
Cory Gardner of Colorado and Susan Collins of Maine .
In their campaign pitches , these senators have been presenting themselves as moderates worthy of representing moderate states , using words and phrases like “ bipartisan , ” “ building consensus ” and “ both sides of the aisle.
” But just how moderate are Gardner and Collins anyway ?
That question is surprisingly difficult to answer , as it really depends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That is , someone like Gardner can both vote with President Trump on nearly all major issues and still be one of the three most bipartisan members of the Senate .
The same is true of Collins .
At the risk of getting a little bit wonky , I want to dig into three of the most commonly used metrics for measuring a senator ’ s ideology to show you how each of them can be spun .
Let ’ s first start with a metric that FiveThirtyEight has developed , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senator or representative votes in line with what Trump wants .
According to this metric , Collins has voted with Trump 67 percent of the time in the past three and a half years , while Gardner has done so 89 percent of the time .
This is one of the easier metrics to grasp , and if you don ’ t like Trump , someone who does what he wants two times out of three — or nine times out of ten — doesn ’ t sound so great .
But what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For starters , the president is not a member of the Senate .
So one limitation of this metric is that it can ’ t determine whether a senator agrees with the president unless the president announces his preferences on a bill .
And that ’ s a fairly big caveat , because more often than not , presidents don ’ t publicly state an opinion on individual bills .
What ’ s more , the bills the White House does weigh in on aren ’ t a random sample of all bills @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the president supports bills that are a priority for him or for his party — in other words , they ’ re usually bills his party largely agrees on .
And bills the president doesn ’ t like often don ’ t reach the Senate floor for a vote anyway , since Republicans control the chamber .
That means we would expect agreement with the president to be pretty high among members of his party .
And as the chart below shows , most Republican senators agree with Trump most of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump at least 80 percent of the time .
Even someone like Sen. Mitt Romney , who voted to remove the president from office just a few months ago , still votes with Trump 81 percent of the time .
Collins ’ s 67 percent is the lowest Trump score among GOP senators .
Gardner ’ s 89 percent is just below the median score of 92 .
But is how often a senator votes with Trump a good measure of his or her overall ideology ?
Only sort of .
On the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do an OK job of identifying more moderate Republicans like Collins or Sen. Lisa Murkowski , but on the other hand , it isn ’ t very good at identifying other ideological splits in the party .
Sens .
Rand Paul and Mike Lee , for example , have something of a libertarian bent , but their Trump scores are similar to those of Collins and Murkowski , who are moderates .
We know about these shortcomings thanks to one of political science ’ s most widely accepted measures of legislator ideology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for each member of Congress from every roll call vote cast in a legislative session .
Of course , these scores aren ’ t perfect either , as they ’ re heavily influenced by which bills actually get to the floor and which don ’ t , but they ’ re still useful for helping us distinguish conservatives from liberals from moderates .
[ Related : An Updating Estimate Of The Congressional Generic Ballot ] For instance , if we compare Republican senators ’ Trump scores to their DW-Nominate scores , we find @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s agenda to some extent , so there isn ’ t much difference between the two scores for most GOP senators .
However , DW-Nominate shows us that there are two types of Republicans who buck the mainstream of the party : relative moderates like Collins and libertarian conservatives like Paul .
But this still doesn ’ t tell us very much about senators ’ claims to bipartisanship , or how someone like Gardner — who is a mainstream conservative according to both his Trump score and his DW-Nominate score — can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most bipartisan senators .
This is where our third metric for understanding senators ’ behavior comes in : The Bipartisan Index , calculated by the Lugar Center and Georgetown University ’ s McCourt School of Public Policy , tells us how often a senator cosponsors a bill with a member of the other party .
Notably , this index isn ’ t based on a senator ’ s voting record .
That doesn ’ t mean the metric isn ’ t influenced by a senator ’ s moderation or conservativism , though .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ scores against their DW-Nominate scores in the chart below , and although I did find a strong relationship between more moderate members co-sponsoring more cross-party bills ( see Collins , who by and large leads on this metric ) , that wasn ’ t true of every Republican : Senators like Gardner and Rob Portman cosponsored bills across party lines more often than their voting record would suggest .
Gardner , for instance , has co-sponsored a bill by Sen. Elizabeth Warren that aims to protect veterans who work in the marijuana industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Colorado constituents as marijuana is legal there ) as well as a number of bills authored by his fellow Coloradan , Sen. Michael Bennet , this session .
He ’ s even joined Collins and many others in co-sponsoring Democratic Sen. Ed Markey ’ s bill to make Juneteenth a national holiday .
But how much does this metric really speak to Gardner ’ s or Collins ’ s bipartisan track record ?
Many of these co-sponsorships are largely symbolic : Most Democrat-authored bills are not going anywhere in the Republican-controlled Senate right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that .
So senators risk very little by attaching their names to such measures , and they get to claim bipartisan records regardless of their actual voting behavior .
In the case of Gardner and Collins , they probably hope these gestures across the aisle will help them in their reelection battles .
To be clear , though , when senators like Collins or Gardner say they have a strong record of being moderate or bipartisan while critics say they still usually vote with Trump , neither group is wrong .
They ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ behavior .
And as you ’ ve hopefully learned from this article , there are quite a few ways to measure ideology .

How Can A Senator Vote With Trump Most Of The Time And Still Be A Moderate? It all depends on how you measure their ideology.
A number of GOP senators — especially those from states that backed Hillary Clinton in 2016 — are in competitive reelection fights in 2020, including Sens. Cory Gardner of Colorado and Susan Collins of Maine. In their campaign pitches, these senators have been presenting themselves as moderates worthy of representing moderate states, using words and phrases like “bipartisan,” “building consensus” and “both sides of the aisle.”
But just how moderate are Gardner and Collins anyway?
That question is surprisingly difficult to answer, as it really depends on what senatorial behavior is being examined. That is, someone like Gardner can both vote with President Trump on nearly all major issues and still be one of the three most bipartisan members of the Senate. The same is true of Collins. At the risk of getting a little bit wonky, I want to dig into three of the most commonly used metrics for measuring a senator’s ideology to show you how each of them can be spun.
Let’s first start with a metric that FiveThirtyEight has developed, the Trump score, or how often a senator or representative votes in line with what Trump wants. According to this metric, Collins has voted with Trump 67 percent of the time in the past three and a half years, while Gardner has done so 89 percent of the time. This is one of the easier metrics to grasp, and if you don’t like Trump, someone who does what he wants two times out of three — or nine times out of ten — doesn’t sound so great.
But what do these scores actually tell us?
[Related: How Popular Is President Donald Trump?]
For starters, the president is not a member of the Senate. So one limitation of this metric is that it can’t determine whether a senator agrees with the president unless the president announces his preferences on a bill. And that’s a fairly big caveat, because more often than not, presidents don’t publicly state an opinion on individual bills. What’s more, the bills the White House does weigh in on aren’t a random sample of all bills that reach the Senate floor. Typically, the president supports bills that are a priority for him or for his party — in other words, they’re usually bills his party largely agrees on. And bills the president doesn’t like often don’t reach the Senate floor for a vote anyway, since Republicans control the chamber.
That means we would expect agreement with the president to be pretty high among members of his party. And as the chart below shows, most Republican senators agree with Trump most of the time; all but four vote with Trump at least 80 percent of the time. Even someone like Sen. Mitt Romney, who voted to remove the president from office just a few months ago, still votes with Trump 81 percent of the time. Collins’s 67 percent is the lowest Trump score among GOP senators. Gardner’s 89 percent is just below the median score of 92.
But is how often a senator votes with Trump a good measure of his or her overall ideology? Only sort of. On the one hand, the measure does seem to do an OK job of identifying more moderate Republicans like Collins or Sen. Lisa Murkowski, but on the other hand, it isn’t very good at identifying other ideological splits in the party. Sens. Rand Paul and Mike Lee, for example, have something of a libertarian bent, but their Trump scores are similar to those of Collins and Murkowski, who are moderates.
We know about these shortcomings thanks to one of political science’s most widely accepted measures of legislator ideology: DW-Nominate scores, which are compiled for each member of Congress from every roll call vote cast in a legislative session. Of course, these scores aren’t perfect either, as they’re heavily influenced by which bills actually get to the floor and which don’t, but they’re still useful for helping us distinguish conservatives from liberals from moderates.
[Related: An Updating Estimate Of The Congressional Generic Ballot]
For instance, if we compare Republican senators’ Trump scores to their DW-Nominate scores, we find that nearly all Republicans back Trump’s agenda to some extent, so there isn’t much difference between the two scores for most GOP senators. However, DW-Nominate shows us that there are two types of Republicans who buck the mainstream of the party: relative moderates like Collins and libertarian conservatives like Paul.
But this still doesn’t tell us very much about senators’ claims to bipartisanship, or how someone like Gardner — who is a mainstream conservative according to both his Trump score and his DW-Nominate score — can be called one of the chamber’s most bipartisan senators. This is where our third metric for understanding senators’ behavior comes in: The Bipartisan Index, calculated by the Lugar Center and Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy, tells us how often a senator cosponsors a bill with a member of the other party. Notably, this index isn’t based on a senator’s voting record.
That doesn’t mean the metric isn’t influenced by a senator’s moderation or conservativism, though. I plotted GOP senators’ bipartisan index scores against their DW-Nominate scores in the chart below, and although I did find a strong relationship between more moderate members co-sponsoring more cross-party bills (see Collins, who by and large leads on this metric), that wasn’t true of every Republican: Senators like Gardner and Rob Portman cosponsored bills across party lines more often than their voting record would suggest.
Gardner, for instance, has co-sponsored a bill by Sen. Elizabeth Warren that aims to protect veterans who work in the marijuana industry (obviously important to Gardner’s Colorado constituents as marijuana is legal there) as well as a number of bills authored by his fellow Coloradan, Sen. Michael Bennet, this session. He’s even joined Collins and many others in co-sponsoring Democratic Sen. Ed Markey’s bill to make Juneteenth a national holiday.
[Related: The Latest Political Polls Collected By FiveThirtyEight]
But how much does this metric really speak to Gardner’s or Collins’s bipartisan track record? Many of these co-sponsorships are largely symbolic: Most Democrat-authored bills are not going anywhere in the Republican-controlled Senate right now, and Gardner and Collins know that. So senators risk very little by attaching their names to such measures, and they get to claim bipartisan records regardless of their actual voting behavior. In the case of Gardner and Collins, they probably hope these gestures across the aisle will help them in their reelection battles.
To be clear, though, when senators like Collins or Gardner say they have a strong record of being moderate or bipartisan while critics say they still usually vote with Trump, neither group is wrong. They’re just examining different aspects of lawmakers’ behavior. And as you’ve hopefully learned from this article, there are quite a few ways to measure ideology.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: There Aren’t Secret Trump Voters