fivethirtyeight--2020-03-25--Trump’s Reelection May Hinge On The Economy — And Coronavirus

President Trump ’ s approval rating has improved slightly amid the coronavirus pandemic .
But the short-term gains , reflecting a possible rally-around-the-flag effect at the time of national emergency , may not hold .
On the contrary , the strong likelihood of a potentially very deep recession triggered by coronavirus puts Trump ’ s reelection chances in jeopardy .
Aggressive measures to slow the spread of the disease , and economic stimulus packages that soften the economic blow , could allow the United States to rev back up to speed in the second half of the year and improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — even though there isn ’ t any perfect analogy to coronavirus in recent electoral history — the bulk of what we do know suggests that he could be in trouble .
We ’ ve written a lot about the effect of the economy on presidential elections here at FiveThirtyEight , especially in the run-up to the 2012 general election , when the economic recovery was a major focal point in the contest between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney .
For that reason , I ’ m going to compress a very complicated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • First , I ’ ll explain my basic view on how to implement an election forecast based on economic conditions .
• Next , we ’ ll see what a series of relatively simple economic models would say about Trump ’ s potential performance in the fall .
• Finally , we ’ ll run through some possible objections — do econometric models really apply for a president like Trump in the case of something like coronavirus ?
To be clear : This is meant to be an opening bid rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many of which will be worth exploring at greater length between now and November .
A bad economy makes life harder for the incumbent party .
Beyond that , we don ’ t know much .
I ’ ve often found myself trying to carve out a middle ground between people who think that presidential elections are strictly predicted by economic conditions — and people who think it all boils down to idiosyncratic factors such as candidate charisma and campaign strategy .
It might surprise you to learn that I ’ m agnostic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the seemingly more data-driven economic “ fundamentalist ” approach .
The problem with the data-driven approach is that … there just isn ’ t all that much data to work with .
There have been only 18 presidential elections since World War II .
( Before that U.S. economic data isn ’ t very robust . )
To account for all of the various ways that the economy can impact people ’ s lives ( for example , joblessness , inflation , take-home income , etc . )
— plus all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as incumbency , wars , pandemics , scandals , etc . )
— is not easy to do with only 18 data points .
In particular , we don ’ t have enough data to make overly specific claims about the economy .
That is , any time you see what you might call a “ magic bullet ” claim , such as that second-quarter GDP is crucial or that per-capita disposable income is the key economic variable , you should be wary .
In fact , magic-bullet models such as these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of sample .
That ’ s because they ’ re prone to suffer from p-hacking and overfitting because of the small sample size of post-WWII elections and the large number of ways to design a model .
In practice , what this means is that people designing these models can twist enough knobs so that they fit the past data well , but they don ’ t actually predict future election outcomes effectively when the modelers don ’ t know the outcome in advance .
At the same time , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of meaningful correlation between economic performance and the performance of the incumbent party ’ s presidential candidate .
If you look at a wide range of economic variables , you ’ ll find that most of the more obvious ones ( GDP or employment numbers ) indicate that a stronger economy predicts a better performance for the incumbent party .
The best approach in our view — and the one we ’ ve used in FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential forecasts — is to combine various major economic variables into an overall index of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we choose variables that reflect a cross-section of economic activity rather than picking ones that happen to fit the results from a small number of presidential elections .
In addition , FiveThirtyEight ’ s Economic Index averages how these numbers have changed at various points , instead of focusing on one particular time frame such as the second quarter .
Overall , the data shows a reasonably clear — although far from perfect — correlation between the economy and incumbent-party performance .
Since 1968 , the worst years for economic performance as of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each of which were associated with steep losses for the incumbent party .
The next-worst economic year was 1992 , in which incumbent George H.W .
Bush lost to Bill Clinton .
The best years for the economy , 1984 and 1972 , resulted in incumbent-party landslides , although another good year , 1968 , produced a narrow loss for the incumbent Democrats .
A recession would probably make Trump an underdog — although not hopelessly so OK , let ’ s plug in some numbers to our Economic Index and see what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here is to predict Trump ’ s margin of victory — or defeat — in the popular vote ; the Electoral College is another issue and a potential advantage for Trump ; we ’ ll talk about that more in a moment .
I ’ m going to run four versions of the model : • Model 1 : Predict the performance of the incumbent party based on the FiveThirtyEight Economic Index as of Election Day .
We ’ ve calculated the Economic Index back to 1968 , so that ’ s the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Model 2 : The same as above , but using the data for incumbents only .
That means we ’ d include 1972 ( Richard Nixon ) , 1980 ( Jimmy Carter ) , 1984 ( Ronald Reagan ) , 1992 ( George H.W .
Bush ) , 1996 ( Bill Clinton ) , 2004 ( George W. Bush ) , and 2012 ( Barack Obama ) but exclude 1968 , 1976 ( Gerald Ford was an unelected incumbent ) , 1988 , 2000 , 2008 and 2016 .
• Model 3 : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ based on the FiveThirtyEight Economic Index as of Election Day and the incumbent president ’ s approval rating as of this point in the election year .
For Trump ’ s approval rating , that ’ d be 45 percent — which is his approval in polls of likely or registered voters as of March 24 in the FiveThirtyEight presidential approval tracker .
• Model 4 : The same as above , but for incumbent presidents only .
And for each model , I ’ ll run through five economic scenarios : • @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meaning booming growth .
• 1992 , meaning a mild recession , although on the brink of recovery .
All right , here ’ s what each economic scenario looks like under each model : Note that the models are reasonably similar to one another .
However , there are some differences .
Namely , the predictions are more sensitive to economic performance when we use data for elected incumbents only ( Models 2 and 4 ) .
That means incumbents like Trump get a larger share of credit or blame when they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than when the torch is being passed , such as between Clinton and Al Gore in 2000 or George W. Bush and John McCain in 2008 .
The economy also matters a bit less once you account for a president ’ s approval ratings ( Models 3 and 4 ) since approval ratings gives us some sense for how popular the president actually is in practice , rather than how popular he “ should ” be based on the economy .
In the pre-coronavirus economy , Trump was less popular than you might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That could limit his upside in the event the economy recovers or somehow manages to avoid recession .
At the same time , he ’ s popular enough — and partisanship is strong enough — to potentially limit his downside in the case of a recession .
Nonetheless , in the event of a mild recession — with economic conditions tantamount to 1992 — all four models predict that Trump would lose the popular vote by a solid amount , by margins ranging from 4.0 percentage points ( Model 3 ) to 5.7 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the event of a severe , 2008-style recession , they predict a potential landslide loss , by amounts ranging from 9.1 percentage points ( Model 3 ) to 14.6 points ( Model 2 ) .
However , Trump has two potential saving graces : • First , the Electoral College .
In 2016 , there was roughly a 3-point gap between Trump ’ s performance in the popular vote , which he lost by 2 percentage points to Hillary Clinton , and in the tipping-point state , Wisconsin , which he won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular vote by 4 to 6 points would probably not be enough to save Trump in the Electoral College , but it would at least be an open question .
• Second , these models have fairly high margins of error , which ranges between roughly 5 points and 10 points depending on which version you use .
Thus , a model showing Trump losing the popular vote by 4 to 6 points wouldn ’ t have to be that far off for Trump to win the Electoral College ( and perhaps even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a mild recession .
In the case of a severe recession , a popular vote win would be quite unlikely , but he ’ d retain some outside chances at drawing an inside straight in the Electoral College .
Will models like these really work in 2020 ?
Do models built on ordinary business cycle crests and slumps work in the midst of a global pandemic — something that the U.S. hasn ’ t experienced in any recent election year ?
I ’ m reserving my right to change my mind on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the truth is , we can ’ t really know for sure .
When we release the full-fledged FiveThirtyEight 2020 election model later this year , we may have it use a combination of several different priors , some of which use our Economic Index and some of which do not .
All of this is still in the whiteboard stage at the moment .
At the same time , there are some objections that I don ’ t necessarily find compelling .
Each of these could make for its own article @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them at more length later .
But let ’ s run through them quickly in a lighting round : Could voters give Trump a pass because coronavirus is the cause of the recession ?
Maybe .
But even in the case of ordinary economic booms and busts , it ’ s never entirely clear how much credit or blame the president actually deserves — and the answer is , probably less than he typically gets from the public .
Does Trump deserve more blame for a coronavirus-triggered recession than Bush did for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Carter did for the rampant inflation and the oil crisis of 1979 and 1980 ?
Well , the Democrats will say yes — especially given Trump ’ s slow-footed , erratic response on coronavirus — and the White House will say no .
But the more a recession brings hardship to families and communities , the more the Republican side of the argument will be pushing uphill .
But what about Trump ’ s approval rating improving since the coronavirus crisis began ?
Indeed , Trump ’ s approval rating has improved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s among the highest ratings of his presidency .
As I mentioned , his approval rating among voters is now roughly 45 percent , which is up from 43 or 44 percent since early March , while his disapproval rating has fallen from 52 to 53 percent to 51 percent .
However , compared with typical rally-around-the-flag effects that follow national crises , these gains are fairly meager .
For instance , Bush ’ s approval rating improved from 51 percent to 86 percent following the September 11 attacks , and Carter ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the immediate wake of the Iran hostage crisis .
( Granted , both of their ratings declined sharply from there . )
But Trump is also not seeing nearly as much of an approval rating bounce as other leaders in Western countries , such as Italy ’ s Giuseppe Conte , France ’ s Emmanuel Macron , and the UK ’ s Boris Johnson .
So it ’ s not clear that a small approval rating gain is a bullish sign for Trump .
Do “ the fundamentals ” even apply anymore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the age of Trump ?
Sorry , but this is dumb .
The 2016 election result — a narrow popular vote win for the incumbent Democrats given the mediocre economy — was actually fairly well-predicted by economic models .
( These models don ’ t say anything about the Electoral College . )
The 2018 midterms also went pretty much exactly how the fundamentals predicted given Trump ’ s middling approval rating and the typical midterm backlash against the incumbent party .
Heck , even this year ’ s Democratic primary , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ winner , has been good for the fundamentals-driven “ Party Decides ” view of the primaries in which the party establishment has a lot of influence .
Could partisanship dull the response to a recession ?
This is a better objection .
With more polarization in the electorate and fewer swing voters , it stands to reason that Trump ’ s approval ratings will be less responsive to different news events than an earlier president ’ s might have been .
And indeed , Trump ’ s approval ratings have trended within a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his presidency , despite tumultuous events such as the Ukraine scandal and the impeachment proceeding against him .
There is an important catch , however .
If the range of possible outcomes is narrower for Trump , that also means the margin of error is lower since the outcome is more predictable .
Suppose that in less polarized times , a sharp recession would result in Trump being projected to lose by 12 points , plus or minus 10 percentage points .
Given polarization , however , he might only be projected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or 6 points — but the margin of error would also be half as much , or 5 points .
It ’ s also worth noting that Trump currently trails Biden in most general election polls by a wide enough margin that the Electoral College probably wouldn ’ t save him .
So if higher partisanship means the outcome is more “ locked in ” and less likely to change , that isn ’ t great news for Trump .
Could an economic recovery in the second half of the year help Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s a sharp decline in economic activity over the next few months , and then a steep rebound , I wouldn ’ t want to have a model that only used second-quarter GDP and pretended everything that happened afterward didn ’ t matter .
At the same time , there is not a lot of certainty in how long the coronavirus crisis will last , nor how long the economic recovery would take .
Moreover , a lot of epidemiologists worry about a potential second wave of the coronavirus in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic of 1918 .
If I were Trump , I ’ d want to think six months ahead to the fall .
That means I ’ d want a broad-based stimulus plan that helps ordinary Americans and small businesses to stay afloat during the weeks — or months-long shutdown .
I ’ d want to stamp out the disease as much as possible — even if that means social distancing is in effect for a bit longer .
And I ’ d want to have a Manhattan Project on treatments , testing and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manageable until a vaccine is developed , which is unlikely until well after Election Day .
Frankly , this isn ’ t that complicated , and Trump ’ s incentives are well-aligned .
The better off America is by November , the more likely he is to be re-elected .
Could A New Therapy Provide Immunity To COVID-19 ?

President Trump’s approval rating has improved slightly amid the coronavirus pandemic. But the short-term gains, reflecting a possible rally-around-the-flag effect at the time of national emergency, may not hold. On the contrary, the strong likelihood of a potentially very deep recession triggered by coronavirus puts Trump’s reelection chances in jeopardy.
Aggressive measures to slow the spread of the disease, and economic stimulus packages that soften the economic blow, could allow the United States to rev back up to speed in the second half of the year and improve Trump’s position. Without that — even though there isn’t any perfect analogy to coronavirus in recent electoral history — the bulk of what we do know suggests that he could be in trouble.
We’ve written a lot about the effect of the economy on presidential elections here at FiveThirtyEight, especially in the run-up to the 2012 general election, when the economic recovery was a major focal point in the contest between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. For that reason, I’m going to compress a very complicated discussion into under 3,000 words here:
First, I’ll explain my basic view on how to implement an election forecast based on economic conditions.
Next, we’ll see what a series of relatively simple economic models would say about Trump’s potential performance in the fall.
Finally, we’ll run through some possible objections — do econometric models really apply for a president like Trump in the case of something like coronavirus?
To be clear: This is meant to be an opening bid rather than a comprehensive evaluation of these questions, many of which will be worth exploring at greater length between now and November.
A bad economy makes life harder for the incumbent party. Beyond that, we don’t know much.
I’ve often found myself trying to carve out a middle ground between people who think that presidential elections are strictly predicted by economic conditions — and people who think it all boils down to idiosyncratic factors such as candidate charisma and campaign strategy.
It might surprise you to learn that I’m agnostic in this debate, rather than siding with the seemingly more data-driven economic “fundamentalist” approach. The problem with the data-driven approach is that … there just isn’t all that much data to work with. There have been only 18 presidential elections since World War II. (Before that U.S. economic data isn’t very robust.) To account for all of the various ways that the economy can impact people’s lives (for example, joblessness, inflation, take-home income, etc.) — plus all of the other factors that influence elections (such as incumbency, wars, pandemics, scandals, etc.) — is not easy to do with only 18 data points.
In particular, we don’t have enough data to make overly specific claims about the economy. That is, any time you see what you might call a “magic bullet” claim, such as that second-quarter GDP is crucial or that per-capita disposable income is the key economic variable, you should be wary.
In fact, magic-bullet models such as these don’t perform very well out of sample. That’s because they’re prone to suffer from p-hacking and overfitting because of the small sample size of post-WWII elections and the large number of ways to design a model. In practice, what this means is that people designing these models can twist enough knobs so that they fit the past data well, but they don’t actually predict future election outcomes effectively when the modelers don’t know the outcome in advance.
At the same time, it’s very likely that there is some type of meaningful correlation between economic performance and the performance of the incumbent party’s presidential candidate. If you look at a wide range of economic variables, you’ll find that most of the more obvious ones (GDP or employment numbers) indicate that a stronger economy predicts a better performance for the incumbent party.
The best approach in our view — and the one we’ve used in FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecasts — is to combine various major economic variables into an overall index of economic conditions. To avoid overfitting, we choose variables that reflect a cross-section of economic activity rather than picking ones that happen to fit the results from a small number of presidential elections. In addition, FiveThirtyEight’s Economic Index averages how these numbers have changed at various points, instead of focusing on one particular time frame such as the second quarter.
Overall, the data shows a reasonably clear — although far from perfect — correlation between the economy and incumbent-party performance. Since 1968, the worst years for economic performance as of Election Day were 1980 and 2008, each of which were associated with steep losses for the incumbent party. The next-worst economic year was 1992, in which incumbent George H.W. Bush lost to Bill Clinton. The best years for the economy, 1984 and 1972, resulted in incumbent-party landslides, although another good year, 1968, produced a narrow loss for the incumbent Democrats.
A recession would probably make Trump an underdog — although not hopelessly so
OK, let’s plug in some numbers to our Economic Index and see what it says about Trump. The goal here is to predict Trump’s margin of victory — or defeat — in the popular vote; the Electoral College is another issue and a potential advantage for Trump; we’ll talk about that more in a moment. I’m going to run four versions of the model:
Model 1 : Predict the performance of the incumbent party based on the FiveThirtyEight Economic Index as of Election Day. We’ve calculated the Economic Index back to 1968, so that’s the data we’ll use.
: Predict the performance of the incumbent party based on the FiveThirtyEight Economic Index as of Election Day. We’ve calculated the Economic Index back to 1968, so that’s the data we’ll use. Model 2 : The same as above, but using the data for incumbents only . That means we’d include 1972 (Richard Nixon), 1980 (Jimmy Carter), 1984 (Ronald Reagan), 1992 (George H.W. Bush), 1996 (Bill Clinton), 2004 (George W. Bush), and 2012 (Barack Obama) but exclude 1968, 1976 (Gerald Ford was an unelected incumbent), 1988, 2000, 2008 and 2016.
: The same as above, but using the data for . That means we’d include 1972 (Richard Nixon), 1980 (Jimmy Carter), 1984 (Ronald Reagan), 1992 (George H.W. Bush), 1996 (Bill Clinton), 2004 (George W. Bush), and 2012 (Barack Obama) but exclude 1968, 1976 (Gerald Ford was an unelected incumbent), 1988, 2000, 2008 and 2016. Model 3 : Predict the performance of the incumbent party based on the FiveThirtyEight Economic Index as of Election Day and the incumbent president’s approval rating as of this point in the election year. For Trump’s approval rating, that’d be 45 percent — which is his approval in polls of likely or registered voters as of March 24 in the FiveThirtyEight presidential approval tracker.
: Predict the performance of the incumbent party based on the FiveThirtyEight Economic Index as of Election Day as of this point in the election year. For Trump’s approval rating, that’d be 45 percent — which is his approval in polls of likely or registered voters as of March 24 in the FiveThirtyEight presidential approval tracker. Model 4: The same as above, but for incumbent presidents only.
And for each model, I’ll run through five economic scenarios:
If the economy looks like 1984, meaning booming growth.
1996, meaning above-average growth.
2012, meaning sluggish but positive growth.
1992, meaning a mild recession, although on the brink of recovery.
Finally, 2008, meaning a severe recession.
All right, here’s what each economic scenario looks like under each model:
Even a mild recession could make Trump an underdog Projected Trump margin of victory or defeat in the popular vote Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 IF THE ECONOMY LOOKS LIKE … 538 Economic Index 538 Index With incumbents only 538 Index + Pres. Approval 538 Index + Pres. Approval with incumbents only 1984 R+12 R+18 R+9 R+11 1996 R+5 R+9 R+4 R+5 2012 R+2 R+4 R+2 R+2 1992* D+5 D+6 D+4 D+5 2008* D+11 D+15 D+9 D+11 * 1992 and 2008 indicate mild and severe recessionary scenarios, respectively.
Note that the models are reasonably similar to one another. However, there are some differences. Namely, the predictions are more sensitive to economic performance when we use data for elected incumbents only (Models 2 and 4). That means incumbents like Trump get a larger share of credit or blame when they’re managing the economy, rather than when the torch is being passed, such as between Clinton and Al Gore in 2000 or George W. Bush and John McCain in 2008.
The economy also matters a bit less once you account for a president’s approval ratings (Models 3 and 4) since approval ratings gives us some sense for how popular the president actually is in practice, rather than how popular he “should” be based on the economy. In the pre-coronavirus economy, Trump was less popular than you might have expected based on economic conditions. That could limit his upside in the event the economy recovers or somehow manages to avoid recession. At the same time, he’s popular enough — and partisanship is strong enough — to potentially limit his downside in the case of a recession.
Nonetheless, in the event of a mild recession — with economic conditions tantamount to 1992 — all four models predict that Trump would lose the popular vote by a solid amount, by margins ranging from 4.0 percentage points (Model 3) to 5.7 points (Model 2). And in the event of a severe, 2008-style recession, they predict a potential landslide loss, by amounts ranging from 9.1 percentage points (Model 3) to 14.6 points (Model 2). However, Trump has two potential saving graces:
First, the Electoral College. In 2016, there was roughly a 3-point gap between Trump’s performance in the popular vote, which he lost by 2 percentage points to Hillary Clinton, and in the tipping-point state, Wisconsin, which he won by about 1 point. Losing the popular vote by 4 to 6 points would probably not be enough to save Trump in the Electoral College, but it would at least be an open question.
Second, these models have fairly high margins of error, which ranges between roughly 5 points and 10 points depending on which version you use. Thus, a model showing Trump losing the popular vote by 4 to 6 points wouldn’t have to be that far off for Trump to win the Electoral College (and perhaps even the popular vote) in the event of a mild recession. In the case of a severe recession, a popular vote win would be quite unlikely, but he’d retain some outside chances at drawing an inside straight in the Electoral College.
Will models like these really work in 2020?
Do models built on ordinary business cycle crests and slumps work in the midst of a global pandemic — something that the U.S. hasn’t experienced in any recent election year?
I’m reserving my right to change my mind on this subject upon deeper philosophical reflection — but the truth is, we can’t really know for sure. When we release the full-fledged FiveThirtyEight 2020 election model later this year, we may have it use a combination of several different priors, some of which use our Economic Index and some of which do not. All of this is still in the whiteboard stage at the moment.
At the same time, there are some objections that I don’t necessarily find compelling. Each of these could make for its own article, and we may cover some of them at more length later. But let’s run through them quickly in a lighting round:
Could voters give Trump a pass because coronavirus is the cause of the recession? Maybe. But even in the case of ordinary economic booms and busts, it’s never entirely clear how much credit or blame the president actually deserves — and the answer is, probably less than he typically gets from the public.
Does Trump deserve more blame for a coronavirus-triggered recession than Bush did for the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, or Carter did for the rampant inflation and the oil crisis of 1979 and 1980? Well, the Democrats will say yes — especially given Trump’s slow-footed, erratic response on coronavirus — and the White House will say no. But the more a recession brings hardship to families and communities, the more the Republican side of the argument will be pushing uphill.
But what about Trump’s approval rating improving since the coronavirus crisis began? Indeed, Trump’s approval rating has improved in recent days so that it’s among the highest ratings of his presidency. As I mentioned, his approval rating among voters is now roughly 45 percent, which is up from 43 or 44 percent since early March, while his disapproval rating has fallen from 52 to 53 percent to 51 percent.
However, compared with typical rally-around-the-flag effects that follow national crises, these gains are fairly meager. For instance, Bush’s approval rating improved from 51 percent to 86 percent following the September 11 attacks, and Carter’s approval rating nearly doubled in 1979 in the immediate wake of the Iran hostage crisis. (Granted, both of their ratings declined sharply from there.) But Trump is also not seeing nearly as much of an approval rating bounce as other leaders in Western countries, such as Italy’s Giuseppe Conte, France’s Emmanuel Macron, and the UK’s Boris Johnson. So it’s not clear that a small approval rating gain is a bullish sign for Trump.
Do “the fundamentals” even apply anymore? Isn’t everything different in the age of Trump? Sorry, but this is dumb. The 2016 election result — a narrow popular vote win for the incumbent Democrats given the mediocre economy — was actually fairly well-predicted by economic models. (These models don’t say anything about the Electoral College.) The 2018 midterms also went pretty much exactly how the fundamentals predicted given Trump’s middling approval rating and the typical midterm backlash against the incumbent party. Heck, even this year’s Democratic primary, in which Joe Biden is the very likely winner, has been good for the fundamentals-driven “Party Decides” view of the primaries in which the party establishment has a lot of influence.
Could partisanship dull the response to a recession? This is a better objection. With more polarization in the electorate and fewer swing voters, it stands to reason that Trump’s approval ratings will be less responsive to different news events than an earlier president’s might have been. And indeed, Trump’s approval ratings have trended within a narrow range so far throughout the course of his presidency, despite tumultuous events such as the Ukraine scandal and the impeachment proceeding against him.
There is an important catch, however. If the range of possible outcomes is narrower for Trump, that also means the margin of error is lower since the outcome is more predictable. Suppose that in less polarized times, a sharp recession would result in Trump being projected to lose by 12 points, plus or minus 10 percentage points. Given polarization, however, he might only be projected to lose by half as much, or 6 points — but the margin of error would also be half as much, or 5 points.
It’s also worth noting that Trump currently trails Biden in most general election polls by a wide enough margin that the Electoral College probably wouldn’t save him. So if higher partisanship means the outcome is more “locked in” and less likely to change, that isn’t great news for Trump.
Could an economic recovery in the second half of the year help Trump? Yes, it could. If there’s a sharp decline in economic activity over the next few months, and then a steep rebound, I wouldn’t want to have a model that only used second-quarter GDP and pretended everything that happened afterward didn’t matter.
At the same time, there is not a lot of certainty in how long the coronavirus crisis will last, nor how long the economic recovery would take. Moreover, a lot of epidemiologists worry about a potential second wave of the coronavirus in the fall, as occurred in the flu pandemic of 1918.
If I were Trump, I’d want to think six months ahead to the fall. That means I’d want a broad-based stimulus plan that helps ordinary Americans and small businesses to stay afloat during the weeks — or months-long shutdown. I’d want to stamp out the disease as much as possible — even if that means social distancing is in effect for a bit longer. And I’d want to have a Manhattan Project on treatments, testing and surveillance so that the coronavirus is more manageable until a vaccine is developed, which is unlikely until well after Election Day.
Frankly, this isn’t that complicated, and Trump’s incentives are well-aligned. The better off America is by November, the more likely he is to be re-elected.
How blood from recovered patients could slow the spread of coronavirus


fivethirtyeight--2020-03-26--The Coronavirus Could Change How We Vote, In 2020 And Beyond

The 2020 election will likely be different thanks to the new coronavirus .
In fact , COVID-19 has already left its mark on the Democratic nomination race , with many states postponing their primaries .
So it ’ s likely that in the coming months , states will begin to move toward allowing more voters to mail in their ballots , or at least cast votes early to spread people out .
It ’ s entirely possible that Election Day 2020 will be more like Election Month ( or perhaps months , depending on how long it takes to count @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now and November , states and election administrators are going to have to make lots of decisions about how they conduct elections .
How they manage this may affect who votes and whose vote is counted , how campaigns operate , and perhaps even the level of uncertainty in the polls .
In short , the mechanisms of the voting process may turn out to be as important this year as what the candidates say .
We ’ re not starting from scratch , however .
In 2016 , roughly two in five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mail , which marked a record share of ballots cast by methods other than in person on Election Day .
Political scientist Paul Gronke has called this transformation a “ quiet revolution , ” as over the last several decades , voting in America has gone from being a unique one-day mega-social experience to more and more of a multi-week and increasingly individualized affair .
And 2020 may mark a sharp turning point , where one-day in-person voting becomes a relic of the past , like landlines and cassette tapes .
Some quick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Until the late 1970s , pretty much all voting happened on Election Day , with the main exceptions being military personnel , who were allowed to cast absentee ballots .
But in 1978 , California became the first state to let any voter request a mail-in ballot for any reason .
And many other states followed suit .
Flash forward to today , and five states have switched to full vote-by-mail .
Oregon became the first in 2000 , following a 1998 statewide referendum .
Washington ( 2011 ) and Colorado ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Utah and Hawaii .
Other states , especially in the South , have expanded in-person early voting , with Texas starting the trend back in 1987 .
But there are still a number of states that will need to play catch-up if the November election relies heavily on remote voting .
In total , 10 states lack any type of early voting option and 17 states lack no-excuse absentee balloting , meaning they have limited experience handling mailed ballots .
The potential effects on 2020 are hard to predict from past elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voting appears to have raised turnout a little , at least in some places — but only by a few percentage points , and with no clear advantage to either party .
But results vary , both by which group of voters you ’ re looking at and by the type of election .
Turnout , for instance , has increased most among older people who tend to vote at the highest rates already .
And turnout has generally gone up most in lower-profile elections , like primaries and off-year contests .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limited , perhaps because more people already tend to vote in them .
So on one hand , the move to an expanded voting period may not shake up 2020 that much , as most voters do so habitually .
That is , most people who vote in any election vote in almost every election .
And most people who don ’ t vote in any one election don ’ t vote in almost any other election .
Let ’ s start with the voters who never vote .
Many of them are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think their vote doesn ’ t matter .
Or they ’ ve never voted .
Convenience , in other words , isn ’ t necessarily the issue .
So don ’ t expect them to start voting even if states expand their early-vote offerings .
On the other hand , the people who always vote are , on average , better educated , older , wealthier and more partisan .
That means they ’ re more likely to have some predictable free time and more likely to have made up their mind before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ typically been the people most likely to take advantage of the added convenience of early voting .
Mailing in a ballot is convenient if you know who you want to vote for and can easily keep an eye on the ballot submission deadline .
Conversely , studies have found that lower-income voters and younger voters have a harder time with voting by mail and are more likely to vote on Election Day .
Their ballots have also been rejected at higher rates .
This doesn ’ t mean this gap in early voting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts were expanded in response to a health crisis like the coronavirus .
But closing the gap we currently see in early voting does probably depend on whether states put in the extra effort to make sure that everyone ’ s vote gets counted .
This means making sure voter registration lists have current addresses , ballots are processed in a timely fashion so voters can correct mistakes before it might be too late , and making it easy for citizens to follow the progress of their ballots .
And this is where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bill currently on the table appears to include $ 400 million for election support , which may not be enough to help states fully transition to voting by mail .
( Democrats were initially demanding $ 4 billion to expand voting access ; the Brennan Center estimated it would cost about $ 2 billion to implement voting reforms . )
So states and local jurisdictions must not only find extra funding , they ’ ll also have to decide on their own rules , which requires a number of choices be made .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ second chance do election administrators give voters who mess up their ballots ?
How much do they do to ensure everyone is on the voter rolls , even if they ’ ve moved recently ?
Or how do election administrators monitor potential fraud ?
How states decide to act could have huge consequences , too , for whose votes get counted and how quickly .
Turnout will certainly depend on how states roll out new programs and how much they invest in ensuring every vote gets counted .
But it will also depend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primary educators of voters .
Rather than focus on massive last-minute “ get out the vote ” efforts , campaigns may spread out their efforts over a longer period , and the campaigns that can best track who has voted already and who still needs to vote will have a significant advantage .
Campaigns may also start to place an even greater effort on mobilization than persuasion , since mobilization will be easier to track .
This could have significant effects on the kinds of campaigns candidates run ( even more partisan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states don ’ t do adequate voter education ( expect quality to vary ) , more responsibility will fall on campaigns to fill in the gaps , which could further exacerbate the divides in our hyper-partisan politics .
There is the question , too , of when we ’ ll know who won .
In a close election , it might take weeks to ensure an accurate final count .
Consider how long California — a state with experience handling mail-in ballots — is taking to count ballots from its primary .
Given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contested election at a time when our electoral system is already facing a broad legitimacy threat ( don ’ t forget about the possibility of foreign meddling ! )
, room for error is small .
The experience voters have in 2020 could have long-term effects .
Presumably most voters , especially the most engaged and active , will like the convenience of mailed ballots or early voting .
And once states put these systems in place , officials will likely be under pressure to keep them in place — even if they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Then again , it ’ s also possible the rollout could be a disaster , akin to Iowa ’ s caucuses this year , and states quickly move away from mail-in voting .
We don ’ t know .
But the former possibility — that citizens mostly like the experience and want to keep it — seems likely .
If so , what has long been a slow and steady revolution in early voting would get a sudden , tremendous boost .
If 2020 does deliver the high levels of turnout that were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put in place , many citizens ’ first experience voting could be through the mail rather than in person .
If they become habitual voters , they might well become lifetime users of mail-in ballots .
And if previous trends in mail-in voting hold , that could mean we ’ ll see higher turnout in traditionally lower-turnout elections , like primaries , which tend to get the biggest boost from more convenient voting methods .
But for now , the simplest takeaway may just be that a potentially massive and difficult-to-administer change in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of uncertainty to our ability to predict the outcome of the 2020 election .

The 2020 election will likely be different thanks to the new coronavirus. In fact, COVID-19 has already left its mark on the Democratic nomination race, with many states postponing their primaries.
So it’s likely that in the coming months, states will begin to move toward allowing more voters to mail in their ballots, or at least cast votes early to spread people out. It’s entirely possible that Election Day 2020 will be more like Election Month (or perhaps months, depending on how long it takes to count the ballots).
That means between now and November, states and election administrators are going to have to make lots of decisions about how they conduct elections. How they manage this may affect who votes and whose vote is counted, how campaigns operate, and perhaps even the level of uncertainty in the polls. In short, the mechanisms of the voting process may turn out to be as important this year as what the candidates say.
We’re not starting from scratch, however. In 2016, roughly two in five voters cast their ballots early or by mail, which marked a record share of ballots cast by methods other than in person on Election Day.
Political scientist Paul Gronke has called this transformation a “quiet revolution,” as over the last several decades, voting in America has gone from being a unique one-day mega-social experience to more and more of a multi-week and increasingly individualized affair. And 2020 may mark a sharp turning point, where one-day in-person voting becomes a relic of the past, like landlines and cassette tapes.
Some quick history of the revolution up till now: Until the late 1970s, pretty much all voting happened on Election Day, with the main exceptions being military personnel, who were allowed to cast absentee ballots. But in 1978, California became the first state to let any voter request a mail-in ballot for any reason. And many other states followed suit.
Flash forward to today, and five states have switched to full vote-by-mail. Oregon became the first in 2000, following a 1998 statewide referendum. Washington (2011) and Colorado (2013) joined more recently, followed by Utah and Hawaii. Other states, especially in the South, have expanded in-person early voting, with Texas starting the trend back in 1987. But there are still a number of states that will need to play catch-up if the November election relies heavily on remote voting. In total, 10 states lack any type of early voting option and 17 states lack no-excuse absentee balloting, meaning they have limited experience handling mailed ballots.
The potential effects on 2020 are hard to predict from past elections, though. On balance, early voting appears to have raised turnout a little, at least in some places — but only by a few percentage points, and with no clear advantage to either party. But results vary, both by which group of voters you’re looking at and by the type of election. Turnout, for instance, has increased most among older people who tend to vote at the highest rates already. And turnout has generally gone up most in lower-profile elections, like primaries and off-year contests. But the effects on general elections are more limited, perhaps because more people already tend to vote in them.
So on one hand, the move to an expanded voting period may not shake up 2020 that much, as most voters do so habitually. That is, most people who vote in any election vote in almost every election. And most people who don’t vote in any one election don’t vote in almost any other election.
Let’s start with the voters who never vote. Many of them are checked out of politics. Or they think their vote doesn’t matter. Or they’ve never voted. Convenience, in other words, isn’t necessarily the issue. So don’t expect them to start voting even if states expand their early-vote offerings.
On the other hand, the people who always vote are, on average, better educated, older, wealthier and more partisan. That means they’re more likely to have some predictable free time and more likely to have made up their mind before Election Day, so they’ve typically been the people most likely to take advantage of the added convenience of early voting. Mailing in a ballot is convenient if you know who you want to vote for and can easily keep an eye on the ballot submission deadline. Conversely, studies have found that lower-income voters and younger voters have a harder time with voting by mail and are more likely to vote on Election Day. Their ballots have also been rejected at higher rates.
This doesn’t mean this gap in early voting is inevitable, especially if early voting efforts were expanded in response to a health crisis like the coronavirus. But closing the gap we currently see in early voting does probably depend on whether states put in the extra effort to make sure that everyone’s vote gets counted. This means making sure voter registration lists have current addresses, ballots are processed in a timely fashion so voters can correct mistakes before it might be too late, and making it easy for citizens to follow the progress of their ballots.
And this is where partisan politics intrudes: The coronavirus stimulus bill currently on the table appears to include $400 million for election support, which may not be enough to help states fully transition to voting by mail. (Democrats were initially demanding $4 billion to expand voting access; the Brennan Center estimated it would cost about $2 billion to implement voting reforms.) So states and local jurisdictions must not only find extra funding, they’ll also have to decide on their own rules, which requires a number of choices be made. For instance, how much of a second chance do election administrators give voters who mess up their ballots? How much do they do to ensure everyone is on the voter rolls, even if they’ve moved recently? Or how do election administrators monitor potential fraud?
How states decide to act could have huge consequences, too, for whose votes get counted and how quickly.
Turnout will certainly depend on how states roll out new programs and how much they invest in ensuring every vote gets counted. But it will also depend on political campaigns, which are the primary educators of voters. Rather than focus on massive last-minute “get out the vote” efforts, campaigns may spread out their efforts over a longer period, and the campaigns that can best track who has voted already and who still needs to vote will have a significant advantage.
Campaigns may also start to place an even greater effort on mobilization than persuasion, since mobilization will be easier to track. This could have significant effects on the kinds of campaigns candidates run (even more partisan, and more micro-targeted). And if states don’t do adequate voter education (expect quality to vary), more responsibility will fall on campaigns to fill in the gaps, which could further exacerbate the divides in our hyper-partisan politics.
There is the question, too, of when we’ll know who won. In a close election, it might take weeks to ensure an accurate final count. Consider how long California — a state with experience handling mail-in ballots — is taking to count ballots from its primary. Given widespread expectations of a high-turnout and closely contested election at a time when our electoral system is already facing a broad legitimacy threat (don’t forget about the possibility of foreign meddling!), room for error is small.
The experience voters have in 2020 could have long-term effects. Presumably most voters, especially the most engaged and active, will like the convenience of mailed ballots or early voting. And once states put these systems in place, officials will likely be under pressure to keep them in place — even if they start out as temporary or provisional.
Then again, it’s also possible the rollout could be a disaster, akin to Iowa’s caucuses this year, and states quickly move away from mail-in voting. We don’t know.
But the former possibility — that citizens mostly like the experience and want to keep it — seems likely. If so, what has long been a slow and steady revolution in early voting would get a sudden, tremendous boost.
If 2020 does deliver the high levels of turnout that were predicted before all the coronavirus protections were put in place, many citizens’ first experience voting could be through the mail rather than in person. If they become habitual voters, they might well become lifetime users of mail-in ballots. And if previous trends in mail-in voting hold, that could mean we’ll see higher turnout in traditionally lower-turnout elections, like primaries, which tend to get the biggest boost from more convenient voting methods.
But for now, the simplest takeaway may just be that a potentially massive and difficult-to-administer change in how people vote adds an extra level of uncertainty to our ability to predict the outcome of the 2020 election.


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-16--Politics Podcast: How To Hold An Election During A Crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic has turned election administration upside down .
Sixteen presidential primary contests have been postponed , and Wisconsin , which held its election as planned , saw large-scale polling place closures and unfulfilled requests for mail ballots .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , we look at voting during times of crisis from two perspectives .
First , FiveThirtyEight ’ s Geoffrey Skelley describes how the country has gone about holding elections during historical crises like the Civil War and Spanish Flu .
Then , Wendy Weiser of the Brennan Center for Justice discusses a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensure this fall ’ s election runs smoothly .
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast : US has held elections during times of crisis before You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

The COVID-19 pandemic has turned election administration upside down. Sixteen presidential primary contests have been postponed, and Wisconsin, which held its election as planned, saw large-scale polling place closures and unfulfilled requests for mail ballots.
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, we look at voting during times of crisis from two perspectives. First, FiveThirtyEight’s Geoffrey Skelley describes how the country has gone about holding elections during historical crises like the Civil War and Spanish Flu. Then, Wendy Weiser of the Brennan Center for Justice discusses a plan she’s proposing to help ensure this fall’s election runs smoothly.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: US has held elections during times of crisis before
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-16--How Much Can Obama Help Biden In 2020?

How Much Can Obama Help Biden In 2020?

In 2019 , Barack Obama and Donald Trump were America ’ s most-admired men .
Which is just one reason why Obama ’ s endorsement of Joe Biden this week was billed as a momentous political event .
Obama is a divisive figure — could the first black president in a country like America have ever been anything but ?
— but he ’ s the last Democrat to cobble together a winning coalition .
He motivated a massive turnout of black voters , played on his pop cultural cache to excite millennials and persuaded upper Midwestern whites to support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s candidacy is premised on restoring that halcyon Obama era — electorally as much as politically .
That ’ s why Obama will be key to Biden ’ s success , perhaps more so than any other campaign surrogate in the modern era .
The former vice president , while respected , was seen as a weak candidate until his blowout primary victory in South Carolina .
Yet the support of those who helped him win that race — black Democrats — is premised largely on his having served under Obama .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of gaining sufficient support from white Obama-Trump voters in key states , and his campaign is at an unprecedented stand-still , as at least 28,000 Americans have perished in a pandemic that threatens to overshadow the next months , if not years , of the nation ’ s life .
Obama , possessed of an almost preternatural equanimity , could be a comfort to Americans as an unsettling presidential campaign plays out .
There ’ s one question that looms large , though : Are Obama ’ s political powers in 2020 the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former president retains great political assets .
His average approval rating in 2009 , the first year of his presidency , which was dominated by the Great Recession , was 56.5 percent , and while it dipped into the 40s for much of his tenure , Obama ’ s post-presidential approval numbers have been strong .
Gallup ’ s first retrospective job approval rating for Obama in 2018 — a barometer for how his presidential legacy was faring — was 63 percent .
An average of YouGov polling collected between February 2019 and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans have a positive opinion of Obama .
That ’ s higher than Biden ’ s approval in polling averages , which is about 45.7 percent , according to RealClearPolitics .
Obama also outpaces Trump , who is currently at a 44.1 percent approval rate , according to the FiveThirtyEight tracker .
A popular surrogate at his side during a time of crisis should be nothing but a boon to Biden .
Obama ’ s specific appeal to demographics that turned out in lower numbers during the 2016 election could be another way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Democrats ’ narrow loss in 2016 could have been due to any number of factors , but some have pointed to decreased black turnout in key states as a potential culprit .
While Biden has done well with black voters already — his win in the South Carolina primary propelled him to the nomination — Obama ’ s presence will likely continue to help him .
The same goes for young voters .
While Biden , by dint of being a Democrat , is likely to do well with the youth vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the primary .
Obama ’ s presence on the campaign trail — even a virtual one — could be the youthful tonic that Biden needs , after the reputational hit he ’ s taken with left-leaning millennial and Gen Z voters .
Biden ’ s ultimate test , though , will be whether he can win back the largely white Obama-Trump voters in the general election , and it ’ s unclear whether even Obama himself can help him do that .
Obama ’ s presidency accelerated a political realignment that came to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a college education making an exodus out of the Democratic Party .
States with large populations of these white voters , like Wisconsin , Ohio and Pennsylvania , which Obama counted as key to his winning coalitions , slipped away from Clinton .
In 2008 , roughly half of non-college-educated white people identified as Democrats , and half identified as Republican .
By 2015 , only a third were Democratic-leaning .
Gallup data shows that Obama ’ s approval ratings with whites nose-dived over the course of his presidency : In January 2009 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him , but only 47 percent did by January 2017 , when he left office .
Biden , who has long played up his “ middle class Joe ” persona , is not yet faring well with the kind of middle-class white voters his candidacy is premised on winning back .
A recent analysis from Nate Cohn at the New York Times shows that Biden doesn ’ t have a wide lead in key states that swung the election in 2016 — his margin over Trump in states packed with Obama-Trump voters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ranges from 1 to 4 points , according to the analysis .
That not even Biden has won over these voters could start to smart for some Democrats , especially since the party put forth its most diverse field of primary candidates only to nominate an older , white man .
Finding relative political safety in a white nominee , however , was long in the making .
In 2017 , I wrote about a newly prominent group of young , white male politicians whose political resumes and communication styles reeked of Obama-imitation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the former president — type-A discipline , good resumes and relatively moderate politics — but of course , they were all white .
They were less likely , perhaps , to spook moderate white voters who had come to resent the party of the first black president .
In some ways , Biden is the ultimate “ white Obama ” candidate — a white , male Democrat trying to ride the former president ’ s “ hope and change ” coattails , but also put the traditional white American male face to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2020 election , including what form campaigning and voting will even take , so it ’ s hard to say if Obama ’ s resurging presence in the news during a time of crisis — which might very well extend into the high campaign season of the fall — could remind Obama-Trump voters what they liked about him ( and Biden by extension ) to begin with .
But that ’ s a big “ if.
” America , which has ridden an emotional political roller coaster for the past four years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apex of another steep peak on the ride .
The next seven months remain largely uncertain , but , queasily , seem to promise only one thing for sure : a terrifying ride .
It ’ s anyone ’ s guess if Obama , a figure from our calmer past , will have the power to soothe and motivate key voters in our uncertain times .

In 2019, Barack Obama and Donald Trump were America’s most-admired men.
Which is just one reason why Obama’s endorsement of Joe Biden this week was billed as a momentous political event. Obama is a divisive figure — could the first black president in a country like America have ever been anything but? — but he’s the last Democrat to cobble together a winning coalition. He motivated a massive turnout of black voters, played on his pop cultural cache to excite millennials and persuaded upper Midwestern whites to support him.
At its core, Biden’s candidacy is premised on restoring that halcyon Obama era — electorally as much as politically. That’s why Obama will be key to Biden’s success, perhaps more so than any other campaign surrogate in the modern era. The former vice president, while respected, was seen as a weak candidate until his blowout primary victory in South Carolina. Yet the support of those who helped him win that race — black Democrats — is premised largely on his having served under Obama. Biden has yet to crack the nut of gaining sufficient support from white Obama-Trump voters in key states, and his campaign is at an unprecedented stand-still, as at least 28,000 Americans have perished in a pandemic that threatens to overshadow the next months, if not years, of the nation’s life.
Obama, possessed of an almost preternatural equanimity, could be a comfort to Americans as an unsettling presidential campaign plays out. There’s one question that looms large, though: Are Obama’s political powers in 2020 the same as they once were?
The former president retains great political assets. His average approval rating in 2009, the first year of his presidency, which was dominated by the Great Recession, was 56.5 percent, and while it dipped into the 40s for much of his tenure, Obama’s post-presidential approval numbers have been strong. Gallup’s first retrospective job approval rating for Obama in 2018 — a barometer for how his presidential legacy was faring — was 63 percent. An average of YouGov polling collected between February 2019 and February 2020 found that 55 percent of Americans have a positive opinion of Obama. That’s higher than Biden’s approval in polling averages, which is about 45.7 percent, according to RealClearPolitics. Obama also outpaces Trump, who is currently at a 44.1 percent approval rate, according to the FiveThirtyEight tracker. A popular surrogate at his side during a time of crisis should be nothing but a boon to Biden.
Obama’s specific appeal to demographics that turned out in lower numbers during the 2016 election could be another way that he helps his former vice president. Democrats’ narrow loss in 2016 could have been due to any number of factors, but some have pointed to decreased black turnout in key states as a potential culprit. While Biden has done well with black voters already — his win in the South Carolina primary propelled him to the nomination — Obama’s presence will likely continue to help him. The same goes for young voters. While Biden, by dint of being a Democrat, is likely to do well with the youth vote, he struggled with the demographic during the primary. Obama’s presence on the campaign trail — even a virtual one — could be the youthful tonic that Biden needs, after the reputational hit he’s taken with left-leaning millennial and Gen Z voters.
Biden’s ultimate test, though, will be whether he can win back the largely white Obama-Trump voters in the general election, and it’s unclear whether even Obama himself can help him do that.
Obama’s presidency accelerated a political realignment that came to define the 2016 election: whites without a college education making an exodus out of the Democratic Party. States with large populations of these white voters, like Wisconsin, Ohio and Pennsylvania, which Obama counted as key to his winning coalitions, slipped away from Clinton. In 2008, roughly half of non-college-educated white people identified as Democrats, and half identified as Republican. By 2015, only a third were Democratic-leaning.
Gallup data shows that Obama’s approval ratings with whites nose-dived over the course of his presidency: In January 2009, 63 percent of whites approved of him, but only 47 percent did by January 2017, when he left office. Biden, who has long played up his “middle class Joe” persona, is not yet faring well with the kind of middle-class white voters his candidacy is premised on winning back. A recent analysis from Nate Cohn at the New York Times shows that Biden doesn’t have a wide lead in key states that swung the election in 2016 — his margin over Trump in states packed with Obama-Trump voters, like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan, ranges from 1 to 4 points, according to the analysis.
That not even Biden has won over these voters could start to smart for some Democrats, especially since the party put forth its most diverse field of primary candidates only to nominate an older, white man. Finding relative political safety in a white nominee, however, was long in the making. In 2017, I wrote about a newly prominent group of young, white male politicians whose political resumes and communication styles reeked of Obama-imitation. They had all of the hallmarks of the former president — type-A discipline, good resumes and relatively moderate politics — but of course, they were all white. They were less likely, perhaps, to spook moderate white voters who had come to resent the party of the first black president.
In some ways, Biden is the ultimate “white Obama” candidate — a white, male Democrat trying to ride the former president’s “hope and change” coattails, but also put the traditional white American male face to the presidency. Much remains fluid about the 2020 election, including what form campaigning and voting will even take, so it’s hard to say if Obama’s resurging presence in the news during a time of crisis — which might very well extend into the high campaign season of the fall — could remind Obama-Trump voters what they liked about him (and Biden by extension) to begin with.
But that’s a big “if.” America, which has ridden an emotional political roller coaster for the past four years, seems to be only approaching the apex of another steep peak on the ride. The next seven months remain largely uncertain, but, queasily, seem to promise only one thing for sure: a terrifying ride. It’s anyone’s guess if Obama, a figure from our calmer past, will have the power to soothe and motivate key voters in our uncertain times.


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-16--Who Do Americans Trust Most On COVID-19?

Trust is the foundation of any successful relationship — including the relationship between the government and the governed .
And during a pandemic like this one , it ’ s no abstract matter .
When people trust their government , they are more likely to listen to its advice , such as staying 6 feet away from other people and not gathering in large groups ; studies have found that people with lower trust in government take fewer safety measures for their health , as Maggie Koerth wrote for FiveThirtyEight last month .
In the U.S. , public trust in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades .
However , when it comes to dealing with the coronavirus , recent polls do show that Americans generally have faith in their government .
We collected all the polls we could find that asked whether people have trust or confidence in the federal government to handle the coronavirus pandemic or to disseminate reliable information about it .
In every such poll conducted since the beginning of March , more Americans said they were very or somewhat confident in the government than said they were not very or not at all confident @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fair amount of variation ( e.g.
, the total who generally trusted the government ranged anywhere from 45 percent to 66 percent ) .
On average , 56 percent of Americans said they were at least somewhat confident in the government on the coronavirus , compared with 39 percent who said they were not very or not at all confident .
Notably , Americans ’ level of trust in the government hasn ’ t changed noticeably over time , even after the White House started holding daily briefings and Congress has passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through the crisis .
But “ federal government ” is a very vague term that can encompass everything from specific politicians to professional agencies .
And indeed , it turns out that Americans trust certain institutions or people more than others .
For example , Americans overwhelmingly have confidence in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention .
Total trust for the CDC has consistently been in the 80s since the beginning of March , while mistrust has hovered in the teens .
On the other hand , President Trump consistently gets low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poll since the beginning of March , 43 percent of Americans say they at least somewhat trust him on the coronavirus , and 53 percent say they only trust him a little bit or not at all .
Again , these numbers have barely moved over the course of the crisis , even when his overall approval rating experienced a small bump .
Still , those numbers track pretty closely with Trump ’ s overall approval rating , suggesting that this is good old partisan polarization at play — those who like Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ specific issue , and those who don ’ t say they don ’ t trust him on the coronavirus .
Although not every poll was broken down by party , in those that were , Republicans said they trusted Trump 82 percent to 15 percent , while Democrats said they mistrusted him by almost the exact same margin : 83 percent to 14 percent .
Trust in coronavirus task force chair Vice President Mike Pence was also polarized by party , but not as severely .
On average , Republicans say they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 15 percent , while Democrats say they mostly are not , 72 percent to 21 percent .
And overall , Americans are split right down the middle on whether to trust Pence on the coronavirus : In the average poll since the beginning of March , 45 percent mostly trust him , and 46 percent mostly don ’ t .
We only have a couple recent polls on whether Americans have confidence in Congress on the issue of the coronavirus , but they fall closer to Trump ’ s numbers than the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ipsos/USA Today poll conducted April 9-10 , 41 percent of adults said they had a “ great deal ” or “ fair amount ” of trust in Congress to provide accurate information about the coronavirus , while 53 percent said they had “ not very much ” or “ none at all.
” Finally , it ’ s not part of the government , but the news media is arguably the most important institution in terms of having public trust .
But unfortunately , the country is divided on whether to trust the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
On average since the beginning of March , 46 percent of Americans say they mostly trust the media to report accurately on the coronavirus , and 46 percent say they mostly do not .
That could be a problem , since an astonishing 89 percent of Americans said that they are following news on the coronavirus either fairly or very closely , according to a poll from the Pew Research Center conducted in mid-March .
If the public doesn ’ t trust the news it ’ s hearing on the coronavirus — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was at least slightly exaggerating the crisis — it could hinder efforts to stop the virus ’ s spread .
Check out all the latest coronavirus polling we ’ ve collected .
How close are we to a COVID-19 vaccine ?
l FiveThirtyEight

Trust is the foundation of any successful relationship — including the relationship between the government and the governed. And during a pandemic like this one, it’s no abstract matter.
When people trust their government, they are more likely to listen to its advice, such as staying 6 feet away from other people and not gathering in large groups; studies have found that people with lower trust in government take fewer safety measures for their health, as Maggie Koerth wrote for FiveThirtyEight last month.
In the U.S., public trust in government has been on the decline for decades. However, when it comes to dealing with the coronavirus, recent polls do show that Americans generally have faith in their government. We collected all the polls we could find that asked whether people have trust or confidence in the federal government to handle the coronavirus pandemic or to disseminate reliable information about it. In every such poll conducted since the beginning of March, more Americans said they were very or somewhat confident in the government than said they were not very or not at all confident. That said, there was still a fair amount of variation (e.g., the total who generally trusted the government ranged anywhere from 45 percent to 66 percent).
On average, 56 percent of Americans said they were at least somewhat confident in the government on the coronavirus, compared with 39 percent who said they were not very or not at all confident. Notably, Americans’ level of trust in the government hasn’t changed noticeably over time, even after the White House started holding daily briefings and Congress has passed several stimulus packages to help the country through the crisis.
But “federal government” is a very vague term that can encompass everything from specific politicians to professional agencies. And indeed, it turns out that Americans trust certain institutions or people more than others. For example, Americans overwhelmingly have confidence in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Total trust for the CDC has consistently been in the 80s since the beginning of March, while mistrust has hovered in the teens.
On the other hand, President Trump consistently gets low grades on trust. In the average poll since the beginning of March, 43 percent of Americans say they at least somewhat trust him on the coronavirus, and 53 percent say they only trust him a little bit or not at all. Again, these numbers have barely moved over the course of the crisis, even when his overall approval rating experienced a small bump.
Still, those numbers track pretty closely with Trump’s overall approval rating, suggesting that this is good old partisan polarization at play — those who like Trump overall say they trust him on this specific issue, and those who don’t say they don’t trust him on the coronavirus. Although not every poll was broken down by party, in those that were, Republicans said they trusted Trump 82 percent to 15 percent, while Democrats said they mistrusted him by almost the exact same margin: 83 percent to 14 percent.
Trust in coronavirus task force chair Vice President Mike Pence was also polarized by party, but not as severely. On average, Republicans say they are mostly confident in Pence, 78 percent to 15 percent, while Democrats say they mostly are not, 72 percent to 21 percent. And overall, Americans are split right down the middle on whether to trust Pence on the coronavirus: In the average poll since the beginning of March, 45 percent mostly trust him, and 46 percent mostly don’t.
We only have a couple recent polls on whether Americans have confidence in Congress on the issue of the coronavirus, but they fall closer to Trump’s numbers than the CDC’s. According to an Ipsos/USA Today poll conducted April 9-10, 41 percent of adults said they had a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in Congress to provide accurate information about the coronavirus, while 53 percent said they had “not very much” or “none at all.”
Finally, it’s not part of the government, but the news media is arguably the most important institution in terms of having public trust. But unfortunately, the country is divided on whether to trust the accuracy of news reports on the coronavirus. On average since the beginning of March, 46 percent of Americans say they mostly trust the media to report accurately on the coronavirus, and 46 percent say they mostly do not.
That could be a problem, since an astonishing 89 percent of Americans said that they are following news on the coronavirus either fairly or very closely, according to a poll from the Pew Research Center conducted in mid-March. If the public doesn’t trust the news it’s hearing on the coronavirus — 62 percent told Pew that the media was at least slightly exaggerating the crisis — it could hinder efforts to stop the virus’s spread.
Mary Radcliffe and Derek Shan contributed research.
Check out all the latest coronavirus polling we’ve collected.
How close are we to a COVID-19 vaccine? l FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-17--How Are Americans Adjusting To Life In A Pandemic?

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
For weeks now , the coronavirus pandemic has dominated the news cycle , which means it has dominated polling as well .
This week alone , we ’ ve gotten several more surveys asking Americans how they feel amid the crisis and how it has affected their lives .
Here ’ s the latest .
First , in case you missed it , FiveThirtyEight now has an updating tracker for common polling questions on the coronavirus .
On the question of how concerned Americans are that they or someone they know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either very ( 33.7 percent ) or somewhat ( 37.8 percent ) concerned .
The share of Americans who say they are not very ( 19.2 percent ) or not at all ( 8.1percent ) concerned remains low .
However , we ’ ve seen a turn this week in which the number who are very concerned appears to have decreased while more people are reporting they are not very concerned .
A majority of Americans ( 57.0 percent ) are also very worried about the coronavirus ’ s effect on the economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worried .
President Trump ’ s handling of the crisis continues to be polarizing .
As of Thursday evening , 47.5 percent approved of his response , while 48.7 percent disapproved .
And according to a The Economist/YouGov poll conducted from April 12 to 14 , 52 percent of Americans believe Trump waited too long to take action on the pandemic , while 33 percent think he acted at the appropriate time .
In terms of being personally affected by the virus , 2 percent of adults also told The Economist/YouGov that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and another 13 percent had a close friend or family member who has tested positive .
In The Economist/YouGov ’ s March 22-24 poll , those numbers were 1 percent and 5 percent , respectively .
In the most recent survey , 9 percent said that a close friend or family member had died due to complications from the disease .
Many jurisdictions have reported COVID-19 death rates that are dramatically higher among the black and/or Hispanic population than among the white population , and this shows up in the polling as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 14 percent of black respondents , said a close friend or family member had died of COVID-19 in that Economist/YouGov poll .
Only 7 percent of white respondents said so .
And far more people have been affected indirectly .
According to Monmouth University ’ s latest poll ( conducted April 3-7 ) , 62 percent of adults said the pandemic had a major impact on their life , and another 27 percent said it had a minor one .
In addition , 27 percent said the pandemic forced them to start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 41 percent said they had lost income due to a decrease in work hours or less business , 63 percent said they were spending more time watching TV and movies and 77 percent said they were going out to stores and businesses less often than normal .
All of these numbers have ticked up at least 6 percentage points from Monmouth ’ s March 18-22 poll , too .
Monmouth also reported that a plurality of Americans ( 48 percent ) aren ’ t having trouble finding supplies that they need .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of respondents said they were having trouble finding it ) and hand sanitizer ( 16 percent ) remain the most difficult items to obtain .
According to Elucd ’ s national coronavirus tracker , 29 percent of Americans are self-isolating nearly all of the time , and an additional 56 percent are doing so most of the time ( i.e.
, they only leave home when they need to ) .
Those numbers have been pretty consistent since the beginning of April .
And one new precaution that Americans seem to be taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Economist/YouGov poll , 53 percent of Americans said they have worn a face mask in public — up from 34 percent last week .
When asked when they think it will be safe to end social distancing measures and reopen businesses , 6 percent of respondents told The Economist/YouGov right now , and 8 percent said in about two weeks — meaning about 14 percent agree with Trump ’ s timeline to reopen much of the country around May 1 .
However , a majority of Americans think it will take much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it will be safe in about a month , while a plurality ( 36 percent ) think it will take several months .
Eight percent predicted it will take a year or longer , while 15 percent just weren ’ t sure .
And according to The Harris Poll ’ s COVID-19 Tracker from April 11 to 13 , 84 percent of Americans are worried that lifting restrictions too early would result in another surge of COVID-19 cases .
Harris also found that the event that would make the most Americans ( 62 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as flying or attending sporting events , would be the development of a COVID-19 vaccine .
A sobering 13 percent , however , said that there was no action that could be taken that would make them comfortable returning to those activities .
And overall , Americans did not express a lot of confidence that things would return to “ normal ” after the pandemic has passed .
Only 19 percent said they were very confident that would happen , 35 percent said they were somewhat confident , 22 percent said they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said they were not at all confident or that things would “ never be the same.
” Overall , the pandemic is taking a toll on Americans ’ happiness .
Gallup runs a regular survey asking adults to rate their satisfaction with their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10 ; in the latest poll , 58 percent of adults gave themselves a 7 or higher .
That ’ s down from 68 percent in Gallup ’ s survey last fall .
Only 61 percent reported feeling enjoyment on a daily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and 59 percent reported feeling worry ( up from 38 percent ) .
Relatedly , a majority of respondents told Monmouth that their stress level has gone up either a little ( 28 percent ) or a lot ( 27 percent ) during the pandemic , while 40 percent said it ’ s stayed about the same .
However , to end on a slightly positive note , although 25 percent of people told Monmouth they felt lonelier than usual during the lockdown , a strong majority ( 68 percent ) said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changed .
And , going back to Gallup ’ s satisfaction survey , 68 percent of adults anticipated that their life satisfaction in five years would rate an 8 or higher on a 10-point scale .
That ’ s actually a small increase from last year ’ s survey .
• Now that former Vice President Joe Biden is the presumptive Democratic nominee for president , HuffPost/YouGov asked Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters how they felt about that .
Thirty-five percent said they were enthusiastic , 33 percent said they were satisfied but not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dissatisfied but not upset and 13 percent said they were upset .
However , liberals and young voters were less thrilled about Biden ; for example , only 13 percent of Democrats under age 45 felt enthusiastic , 36 percent felt satisfied , 21 percent felt dissatisfied and 26 percent felt upset .
• Biden has committed to picking a female running mate , but otherwise it ’ s an open question whom he will choose .
According to Morning Consult , 34 percent of registered voters think it ’ s very or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and 31 percent think it ’ s important she have executive experience .
However , if Biden wants to reassure those aforementioned young voters , he might want to pick someone more liberal than he is ; 27 percent of Democrats under age 45 thought that was a very or somewhat important trait in a running mate .
Among several possible vice-presidential contenders Morning Consult asked about , Sen. Elizabeth Warren was viewed the most favorably by those younger Democrats .
• A new Public Policy Polling survey finds that Democratic state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the former Kansas secretary of state , 44 percent to 42 percent in Kansas ’ s U.S. Senate race — even as a generic Republican candidate defeats a generic Democrat , 50 percent to 40 percent .
Republicans and Democrats alike feel that this normally deep-red state could be competitive if Kobach is the Republican nominee .
However , because the poll was sponsored by pro-Democratic group 314 Action , it may be too good to be true for Democrats .
• The Public Religion Research Institute ’ s 2019 American Values @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the demographics of LGBT Americans and support for gay rights .
Self-identified LGBT Americans are significantly more likely than the general population to be young ( 47 percent are between ages 18 and 29 , compared with 21 percent of all Americans ) and religiously unaffiliated ( 47 percent vs. 24 percent ) .
Meanwhile , at least 59 percent of respondents in all 50 states support nondiscrimination protections for LGBT people .
• According to YouGov , 53 percent of adults do not have a will .
Fourteen percent say they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in at least five years , while only 5 percent say they updated or prepared a will in the last month .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 44.2 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president , while 51.7 percent disapprove ( a net approval rating of -7.5 points ) .
At this time last week , 44.6 percent approved and 50.3 percent disapproved ( for a net approval rating of -5.7 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 53.1 percent , for a net approval rating of -10.4 points .
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 7.8 percentage points ( 48.6 percent to 40.8 percent ) .
A week ago , Democrats led Republicans by 7.8 points ( 48.9 percent to 41.1 percent ) .
At this time last month , voters preferred Democrats by 7.3 points ( 48.7 percent to 41.4 percent ) .
Check out all the polls we ’ ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
For weeks now, the coronavirus pandemic has dominated the news cycle, which means it has dominated polling as well. This week alone, we’ve gotten several more surveys asking Americans how they feel amid the crisis and how it has affected their lives. Here’s the latest.
First, in case you missed it, FiveThirtyEight now has an updating tracker for common polling questions on the coronavirus. On the question of how concerned Americans are that they or someone they know will contract COVID-19, a majority remains either very (33.7 percent) or somewhat (37.8 percent) concerned. The share of Americans who say they are not very (19.2 percent) or not at all (8.1percent) concerned remains low. However, we’ve seen a turn this week in which the number who are very concerned appears to have decreased while more people are reporting they are not very concerned.
A majority of Americans (57.0 percent) are also very worried about the coronavirus’s effect on the economy, and another 29.9 percent are somewhat worried.
President Trump’s handling of the crisis continues to be polarizing. As of Thursday evening, 47.5 percent approved of his response, while 48.7 percent disapproved. And according to a The Economist/YouGov poll conducted from April 12 to 14, 52 percent of Americans believe Trump waited too long to take action on the pandemic, while 33 percent think he acted at the appropriate time.
In terms of being personally affected by the virus, 2 percent of adults also told The Economist/YouGov that they had tested positive for the coronavirus, and another 13 percent had a close friend or family member who has tested positive. In The Economist/YouGov’s March 22-24 poll, those numbers were 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively. In the most recent survey, 9 percent said that a close friend or family member had died due to complications from the disease.
Many jurisdictions have reported COVID-19 death rates that are dramatically higher among the black and/or Hispanic population than among the white population, and this shows up in the polling as well. Sixteen percent of Hispanic respondents, and 14 percent of black respondents, said a close friend or family member had died of COVID-19 in that Economist/YouGov poll. Only 7 percent of white respondents said so.
And far more people have been affected indirectly. According to Monmouth University’s latest poll (conducted April 3-7), 62 percent of adults said the pandemic had a major impact on their life, and another 27 percent said it had a minor one. In addition, 27 percent said the pandemic forced them to start working from home for the first time, 41 percent said they had lost income due to a decrease in work hours or less business, 63 percent said they were spending more time watching TV and movies and 77 percent said they were going out to stores and businesses less often than normal. All of these numbers have ticked up at least 6 percentage points from Monmouth’s March 18-22 poll, too.
Monmouth also reported that a plurality of Americans (48 percent) aren’t having trouble finding supplies that they need. However, toilet paper (23 percent of respondents said they were having trouble finding it) and hand sanitizer (16 percent) remain the most difficult items to obtain.
According to Elucd’s national coronavirus tracker, 29 percent of Americans are self-isolating nearly all of the time, and an additional 56 percent are doing so most of the time (i.e., they only leave home when they need to). Those numbers have been pretty consistent since the beginning of April. And one new precaution that Americans seem to be taking is wearing masks. In the latest The Economist/YouGov poll, 53 percent of Americans said they have worn a face mask in public — up from 34 percent last week.
When asked when they think it will be safe to end social distancing measures and reopen businesses, 6 percent of respondents told The Economist/YouGov right now, and 8 percent said in about two weeks — meaning about 14 percent agree with Trump’s timeline to reopen much of the country around May 1. However, a majority of Americans think it will take much longer. Twenty-eight percent said they think it will be safe in about a month, while a plurality (36 percent) think it will take several months. Eight percent predicted it will take a year or longer, while 15 percent just weren’t sure. And according to The Harris Poll’s COVID-19 Tracker from April 11 to 13, 84 percent of Americans are worried that lifting restrictions too early would result in another surge of COVID-19 cases.
Harris also found that the event that would make the most Americans (62 percent) comfortable resuming certain activities, such as flying or attending sporting events, would be the development of a COVID-19 vaccine. A sobering 13 percent, however, said that there was no action that could be taken that would make them comfortable returning to those activities. And overall, Americans did not express a lot of confidence that things would return to “normal” after the pandemic has passed. Only 19 percent said they were very confident that would happen, 35 percent said they were somewhat confident, 22 percent said they were not very confident and 23 percent said they were not at all confident or that things would “never be the same.”
Overall, the pandemic is taking a toll on Americans’ happiness. Gallup runs a regular survey asking adults to rate their satisfaction with their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10; in the latest poll, 58 percent of adults gave themselves a 7 or higher. That’s down from 68 percent in Gallup’s survey last fall. Only 61 percent reported feeling enjoyment on a daily basis (down from 81 percent), and 59 percent reported feeling worry (up from 38 percent). Relatedly, a majority of respondents told Monmouth that their stress level has gone up either a little (28 percent) or a lot (27 percent) during the pandemic, while 40 percent said it’s stayed about the same.
However, to end on a slightly positive note, although 25 percent of people told Monmouth they felt lonelier than usual during the lockdown, a strong majority (68 percent) said their level of loneliness hasn’t changed. And, going back to Gallup’s satisfaction survey, 68 percent of adults anticipated that their life satisfaction in five years would rate an 8 or higher on a 10-point scale. That’s actually a small increase from last year’s survey.
Other polling bites
Now that former Vice President Joe Biden is the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, HuffPost/YouGov asked Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters how they felt about that. Thirty-five percent said they were enthusiastic, 33 percent said they were satisfied but not enthusiastic, 15 percent said they were dissatisfied but not upset and 13 percent said they were upset. However, liberals and young voters were less thrilled about Biden; for example, only 13 percent of Democrats under age 45 felt enthusiastic, 36 percent felt satisfied, 21 percent felt dissatisfied and 26 percent felt upset.
enthusiastic, 15 percent said they were dissatisfied but not upset and 13 percent said they were upset. However, liberals and young voters were less thrilled about Biden; for example, only 13 percent of Democrats under age 45 felt enthusiastic, 36 percent felt satisfied, 21 percent felt dissatisfied and 26 percent felt upset. Biden has committed to picking a female running mate, but otherwise it’s an open question whom he will choose. According to Morning Consult, 34 percent of registered voters think it’s very or somewhat important that she have legislative experience, and 31 percent think it’s important she have executive experience. However, if Biden wants to reassure those aforementioned young voters, he might want to pick someone more liberal than he is; 27 percent of Democrats under age 45 thought that was a very or somewhat important trait in a running mate. Among several possible vice-presidential contenders Morning Consult asked about, Sen. Elizabeth Warren was viewed the most favorably by those younger Democrats.
A new Public Policy Polling survey finds that Democratic state Sen. Barbara Bollier leads Republican Kris Kobach, the former Kansas secretary of state, 44 percent to 42 percent in Kansas’s U.S. Senate race — even as a generic Republican candidate defeats a generic Democrat, 50 percent to 40 percent. Republicans and Democrats alike feel that this normally deep-red state could be competitive if Kobach is the Republican nominee. However, because the poll was sponsored by pro-Democratic group 314 Action, it may be too good to be true for Democrats.
The Public Religion Research Institute’s 2019 American Values Atlas took a close look this week at the demographics of LGBT Americans and support for gay rights. Self-identified LGBT Americans are significantly more likely than the general population to be young (47 percent are between ages 18 and 29, compared with 21 percent of all Americans) and religiously unaffiliated (47 percent vs. 24 percent). Meanwhile, at least 59 percent of respondents in all 50 states support nondiscrimination protections for LGBT people.
According to YouGov, 53 percent of adults do not have a will. Fourteen percent say they do but haven’t updated it in at least five years, while only 5 percent say they updated or prepared a will in the last month.
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 44.2 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 51.7 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -7.5 points). At this time last week, 44.6 percent approved and 50.3 percent disapproved (for a net approval rating of -5.7 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 42.7 percent and a disapproval rating of 53.1 percent, for a net approval rating of -10.4 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 7.8 percentage points (48.6 percent to 40.8 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 7.8 points (48.9 percent to 41.1 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 7.3 points (48.7 percent to 41.4 percent).
Check out all the polls we’ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections.


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-17--What Happens If A Nominee Dies Before The General Election?

Former Vice President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump are among the oldest candidates to ever vie for the presidency @ @ @ @ @ in the middle of a global pandemic .
This might be morbid , but what @ @ @ @ @ is , er , incapacitated before the general election ?
Elections analyst Geoffrey Skelley explains @

Former Vice President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump are among the oldest candidates to ever vie for the presidency. And we’re in the middle of a global pandemic. This might be morbid, but what happens if one of them is, er, incapacitated before the general election? Elections analyst Geoffrey Skelley explains.