fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--When Conventions Have Mattered

When Conventions Have Mattered

With both the Democratic National Convention and Republican National Convention going virtual this year , there are once again questions about what it is exactly that the national party conventions do .
For instance , conventions haven ’ t really picked the nominees for president and vice president since party reforms in the 1970s — arguably even earlier — so it raises the question : At this point , are they just really expensive events with lots of balloons and TV cameras ?
If we look at the history of modern conventions , it ’ s tempting to dismiss the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from all around the country as pageantry .
But if you look closer , you ’ ll notice that conventions have played an important role for different wings of the party , who may disagree with party leadership and want to generate their own media attention .
Granted , this has become harder to do over the years , especially as conventions have become more TV-centric and prepackaged .
And that will likely be particularly true this year given the pandemic .
But that doesn ’ t mean conventions have lost all meaning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the conventions , they still shine a spotlight on the parties , illuminating emerging factions and up-and-coming politicians , setting the stage for — and creating — the future of each party .
That ’ s why it ’ s unfortunate that this year ’ s format has to be virtual — and why one should hope that it won ’ t be the new normal .
It ’ s hard to imagine that there will be a big clash in the parties this year given the virtual aspect of the conventions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the physical environment of the conventions has , at times , created memorable confrontations between conflicting wings of the party .
Take the 1948 “ Dixiecrat walkout , ” in which delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the Democratic convention in protest of the party ’ s embrace of the civil-rights movement in both its platform and floor speeches .
The delegates didn ’ t just walk out either .
Several in the party broke away and formed the States ’ Rights Party , which ran its own presidential ticket @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s true that this infighting didn ’ t actually affect the convention all that much .
For instance , it didn ’ t stop Democrats from including language on civil rights in its platform .
Nor did it prevent the nominee , Harry Truman , from winning the actual election .
But it did foreshadow the gradual loss of power of the Southern faction within the Democratic Party .
Similarly , in 1964 , the Republicans went into their convention deeply divided , between moderate and liberal Republicans on the one hand and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sen. Barry Goldwater on the other .
When New York Gov .
Nelson Rockefeller , one of the liberal old guard , spoke on the floor against extremism , convention delegates booed .
Historian Geoffrey Kabaservice reports the impressions of those who had been on the floor : one moderate Republican activist , Tanya Melich , said it “ felt like Nazi Germany , ” while former president Dwight Eisenhower commented on the anti-democratic spirit of the moment .
Of course , Goldwater was resoundingly defeated , but the lasting impact of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unity in post-election discussions , and in the selection of the next RNC chair .
( This clash also foreshadowed the party ’ s movement in a more Goldwater direction . )
Over time , conventions have become more scripted and less spontaneous , making moments like 1948 and 1964 harder to see .
But that doesn ’ t mean that dissension is completely hidden now .
The 2016 Democratic convention had some tense moments between Sen. Bernie Sanders supporters and Hillary Clinton supporters , for example , with Sanders supporters chanting and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s first night .
Of course , this didn ’ t change the result of the already-determined floor vote — Clinton still walked away the nominee — but it did serve as a vivid reminder of the fissures within the party .
And after Clinton ’ s loss in November , the idea that the party lacked cohesion became part of the explanation for why she lost .
This engendered some resentment among Clinton supporters , but it also led to some fairly large concessions to the Sanders faction .
Party leaders , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of superdelegates in the conventions , a change Sanders supporters had long advocated , and which the party adopted in 2018 .
Fights over convention rules can be more than just procedural Although fights over convention rules might seem arcane , they are often motivated by larger , and more meaningful , party disagreements .
Let ’ s go back to 1964 for a moment .
The Democratic Party was in a moment of great upheaval over civil rights , with members from some states , like Mississippi , actively fighting against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s state party had banned African Americans from party meetings , and thus its delegation lacked any Black members .
This angered some Democrats in the state , and so as a way of protesting segregation and the years of intimidation and disenfranchisement that Black voters had faced , a group of activists organized the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party .
Their intention was to highlight the injustice and illegitimacy of the official delegation , and they hoped to take their places on the convention floor .
Party leadership offered the group two non-voting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be reached .
Instead , the MFDP occupied empty seats on the convention floor and sang freedom songs in protest when the chairs were removed .
As historian Sam Rosenfeld writes in “ The Polarizers , ” the MFDP actually had a pretty weak case under convention rules , but the moral force of their stance left a lasting mark on the party .
The national party moved to ban racial discrimination among state delegations , and some of the members of the MFDP were seated at the convention in 1968 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans had their own — albeit very different — skirmish over rules .
Then-Rep. Ron Paul hadn ’ t won a single primary , but thanks to states that choose delegates through caucuses and conventions , his supporters were able to take over several state delegations .
Although the nomination of Mitt Romney was not in question , there was still some conflict on the floor — fights over the seating of Paul delegates and a push to place his name officially in contention for the nomination , which would have given him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party leaders , however , wanted to present a unified party and direct media attention toward Romney .
So they changed the rules to thwart the Paul movement to prevent something like this from happening again : In order to be eligible to be nominated at the convention , a candidate needed to win the majority of delegates in at least eight states .
This was a substantial change — previously , a candidate needed only a plurality of delegates in only five states — and it had unintended consequences .
One of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in her book on primary rules , was that the new rule would have prevented party leaders dissatisfied with the possibility of a Trump nomination from entering any other names into consideration .
Accordingly , the party changed the rule , again — back to a candidate needing only a plurality of delegates in five states — and leaders talked about whether it could be changed for 2016 so that it could place a more mainstream Republican , like Ted Cruz or John Kasich , into contention .
But ultimately , this didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up securing the nomination before the convention anyway .
Convention speeches can also shape our politics Let ’ s face it , convention speeches can be a little stilted .
They ’ re usually pretty safe and predictable .
But a few have proven memorable — maybe even influential .
Former New York Gov .
Mario Cuomo ’ s 1984 convention speech certainly deserves at least a brief mention here .
It tackled economic inequality and challenged incumbent president Ronald Reagan ’ s rhetoric about American individualism .
In the words of historian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the things that Democrats wished themselves to be but no longer felt they were as a party.
” And when Cuomo died in 2015 , some commentators connected his legacy , including the ideas expressed in this speech , to reemerging progressive politics in the Democratic Party , and to figures like Elizabeth Warren .
Eight years later , Pat Buchanan , a former Richard Nixon and Reagan aide and political commentator , made his own splash at the 1992 GOP convention after his somewhat successful challenge to incumbent President George H.W .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservative and more populist wing of the party , Buchanan had long had reservations about Bush , so he used his speaking slot at the convention to talk about the impending “ culture wars.
” His line , “ this election is about more than who gets what .
It is about who we are , ” helped usher in a new form of politics , in which compromise was outdated , and outrage the dominant mode of discourse .
But perhaps the most consequential convention speech of the modern era was delivered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Delivering his remarks in Boston , Barack Obama famously said , “ [ T ] here is not a liberal America and a conservative America , there is the United States of America.
” By emphasizing the common ties and values across a divided nation , Obama became , if not a household name , a national political figure .
His bid for the presidency four years later still required several hard-fought campaigns , but the speech certainly made Democratic voters and party leaders alike take notice .
Live conventions do not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nominee .
They may not even persuade very many people .
But in-person proceedings , and the ability to disrupt them , offers an opportunity for voices within the party that are not easily amplified on Zoom .
The story of jeers , walkouts , and credential fights is also the story of how the two parties have transformed themselves and sorted out their distinct and sometimes competing ideological identities .
The television era , the end of contested nominations at the convention , and the emphasis on party unity have all changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place to resolve conflict within parties .
And in an era with no shortage of political conflict — whether over race , class , gender , or public health — we ’ ll have one fewer venue for conflict to play out in public view .
Conventions may not be worth the cost or the time , and during a pandemic they ’ re certainly too risky , but moving to a virtual format forever would involve risks , and losses , of its own .

With both the Democratic National Convention and Republican National Convention going virtual this year, there are once again questions about what it is exactly that the national party conventions do.
For instance, conventions haven’t really picked the nominees for president and vice president since party reforms in the 1970s — arguably it’s been even longer than that — so it raises the question: At this point, are they just really expensive events with lots of balloons and TV cameras?
If we look at the history of modern conventions, it’s tempting to dismiss the large, in-person gatherings of power players from around the country as pageantry. But if you look closer, you’ll notice that conventions have played an important role for some wings of the party, who may disagree with party leadership and want to attract media attention for themselves.
Granted, this has become harder to do over the years, especially as conventions have become more TV-centric and prepackaged. And that will likely be particularly true this year given the pandemic. But that doesn’t mean conventions have lost all meaning. Even if nothing is actually decided at the conventions, they still shine a spotlight on the parties, illuminating emerging factions and up-and-coming politicians, setting the stage for — and creating — the future of each party. That’s why it’s unfortunate that this year’s format has to be virtual, and why one should hope that it won’t be the new normal.
Convention clashes often underscore big party divisions
It’s hard to imagine that we’ll see big internal clashes in the parties this year given the virtual conventions, but it’s worth noting that the physical environment of the conventions has, at times, created memorable confrontations between conflicting wings of the party.
Take the 1948 “Dixiecrat walkout,” in which delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the Democratic convention in protest of the party’s embrace of the civil rights movement in both its platform and floor speeches. The delegates didn’t just walk out either. Several members of the party broke away and formed the States’ Rights Party, which ran its own presidential ticket that year.
Now, it’s true that this infighting didn’t actually affect the convention all that much. For instance, it didn’t stop Democrats from including language supporting civil rights in their platform. Nor did it prevent the nominee, Harry Truman, from winning the actual election. But it did foreshadow the gradual loss of power of the Southern faction within the Democratic Party.
Similarly, in 1964, the Republicans went into their convention deeply divided, with moderate and liberal Republicans on the one hand and a growing conservative faction that supported Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater on the other. When New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, one of the liberal old guard, spoke on the floor against extremism, convention delegates booed.
Historian Geoffrey Kabaservice reports the impressions of those who had been on the floor: One moderate Republican activist, Tanya Melich, said it “felt like I was in Nazi Germany,” while former president Dwight Eisenhower commented on the anti-democratic spirit of the moment. Of course, Goldwater was resoundingly defeated in November, but the lasting impact of the 1964 convention was an emphasis on party unity in post-election discussions, and in the selection of the next RNC chair. (This clash also foreshadowed the party’s movement in a more Goldwater-esque direction.)
Over time, conventions have become more scripted and less spontaneous, making it harder to produce unexpected moments like the memorable events of 1948 and 1964. But that doesn’t mean that dissension is completely hidden now. The 2016 Democratic convention had some tense moments between Sen. Bernie Sanders supporters and Hillary Clinton supporters, for example, with Sanders supporters chanting and booing during speeches on the convention’s first night.
Of course, this didn’t change the result of the already-determined floor vote — Clinton still walked away the nominee — but it did serve as a vivid reminder of the fissures within the party. And after Clinton’s loss in November, the idea that the party lacked cohesion became part of the explanation for why she lost. This engendered some resentment among Clinton supporters, but it also led to some fairly large concessions to the Sanders faction. Party leaders, for instance, recommended limiting the role of superdelegates in the conventions, a change Sanders supporters had long advocated, and which the party adopted in 2018.
Fights over convention rules can be more than just procedural
Although fights over convention rules might seem arcane, they are often motivated by larger, and more meaningful, party disagreements.
Let’s go back to 1964 for a moment. The Democratic Party was in a moment of great upheaval over civil rights, with members from some states, like Mississippi, actively fighting the movement. In fact, Mississippi’s state party had banned African Americans from party meetings, and thus its delegation lacked any Black members. This angered some Democrats in the state, and so as a way of protesting segregation and the years of intimidation and disenfranchisement that Black voters had faced, a group of activists organized the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. Their intention was to highlight the injustice and illegitimacy of the official delegation, and they hoped to take their places on the convention floor.
Party leadership offered the group two nonvoting delegate seats, but a compromise could not be reached. Instead, the MFDP occupied empty seats on the convention floor and sang freedom songs in protest when the chairs were removed. As historian Sam Rosenfeld writes in “The Polarizers,” the MFDP actually had a pretty weak case under convention rules, but the moral force of their stance left a lasting mark on the party. The national party moved to ban racial discrimination among state delegations, and some of the members of the MFDP were seated at the convention in 1968.
Fast forward to 2012, when the Republicans had their own — albeit very different — skirmish over rules. Then-Rep. Ron Paul hadn’t won a single primary, but thanks to states that choose delegates through caucuses and conventions, his supporters were able to take over several state delegations. Although the nomination of Mitt Romney was not in question, there was still some conflict on the floor — fights over the seating of Paul delegates and a push to place his name officially in contention for the nomination, which would have given him a speaking slot at the convention.
Party leaders, however, wanted to present a unified party and direct media attention toward Romney. So they changed the rules to thwart the Paul movement to prevent something like this from happening again: In order to be eligible to be nominated at the convention, a candidate needed to win the majority of delegates in at least eight states.
[newsletter-politics]
This was a substantial change — previously, a candidate needed only a plurality of delegates in five states — and it had unintended consequences. One of which, political scientist Caitlin Jewitt argues in her book on primary rules, was that the new rule would have prevented party leaders dissatisfied with the possibility of a Trump nomination from entering any other names into consideration. Accordingly, the party changed the rule, again — back to a candidate needing only a plurality of delegates in five states — and leaders talked about whether it could be changed for 2016 so that it could place a more mainstream Republican, like Ted Cruz or John Kasich, into contention. But ultimately, this didn’t matter, as Trump ended up securing the nomination before the convention anyway.
Convention speeches can also shape our politics
Let’s face it, convention speeches can be a little stilted. They’re usually pretty safe and predictable. But a few have proven memorable — maybe even influential. Former New York Gov. Mario Cuomo’s 1984 convention speech certainly deserves at least a brief mention here. It tackled economic inequality and challenged incumbent President Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric about American individualism. In the words of historian Jeff Shesol, “It was all the things that Democrats wished themselves to be but no longer felt they were as a party.” And when Cuomo died in 2015, some commentators connected his legacy, including the ideas expressed in this speech, to reemerging progressive politics in the Democratic Party, and to figures like Sen. Elizabeth Warren.
Eight years later, Pat Buchanan, a former aide to President Richard Nixon and Reagan and a political commentator, made his own splash at the 1992 GOP convention after his somewhat successful challenge to incumbent President George H.W. Bush. As part of the socially conservative and more populist wing of the party, Buchanan had long had reservations about Bush, so he used his speaking slot at the convention to talk about the impending “culture wars.” His line, “This election is about more than who gets what. It is about who we are,” helped usher in a new form of politics, in which compromise was deemed outdated and outrage became the dominant mode of discourse.
But perhaps the most consequential convention speech of the modern era was delivered by an Illinois state senator in 2004. Delivering his remarks in Boston, Barack Obama famously said,“There is not a liberal America and a conservative America, there is the United States of America.” By emphasizing the common ties and values across a divided nation, Obama became, if not a household name, a national political figure. His bid for the presidency four years later still required several hard-fought campaigns, but the speech certainly made Democratic voters and party leaders alike take notice.
Live conventions do not necessarily result in a new platform or nominee. They may not even persuade very many people. But in-person proceedings, and the ability to disrupt them, offer an opportunity for voices within the party that are not easily amplified on Zoom. The story of jeers, walkouts and credential fights is also the story of how the parties have transformed themselves and sorted out their distinct and sometimes competing ideological identities.
The television era, the end of contested nominations at the convention, and the emphasis on party unity have all changed this, but conventions are still a place to resolve conflict within parties. And in an era with no shortage of political conflict — whether over race, class, gender or public health — losing conventions means we have one less venue where conflict can play out in public view.
Conventions may not be worth the cost or the time, and during a pandemic they’re certainly too risky, but moving to a virtual format forever would involve risks, and losses, of its own.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--Our Election Forecast Didn’t Say What I Thought It Would

My editors are forever asking me to take the long Twitter threads I write and turn them into articles here at FiveThirtyEight .
So I ’ m actually going to give that a try !
What follows are some follow-up thoughts on our election model , which was originally composed in the form of a V E R Y L O N G tweetstorm that I never published .
( See if you can guess where the 240-character breaks would have been . )
In this thread … err , article … I ’ ll try to walk you through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of our model and respond to a few thoughtful critiques I ’ ve seen elsewhere .
Before you dive in , it may help to read our summary of the state of the race , or at least skim our very detailed methodology guide .
But the basic starting point for a probabilistic , poll-driven model ought to be this : Is polling in August a highly reliable way to predict the outcome in November ?
Polling in August is somewhat predictive .
You ’ d much rather be ahead than behind .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ wild swings .
You can see that in the daily threads that Nathaniel Rakich , one of our elections analysts , puts together .
Here is what a national polling average would have looked like in elections dating back to 1976 : OK , I cheated a bit .
I ’ m using a version that Nathaniel published last week , partly because this was the exact moment in the campaign when Michael Dukakis , the 1988 Democratic nominee , started to blow his large lead , which he never regained .
Still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there !
John Kerry led at this point in 2004 .
George W. Bush had a 10-point lead at this point in the 2000 race , but , as we know , he didn ’ t win the popular vote that year .
In other cases , the leading candidate won , but the margin was off by as much as 20 points ( Jimmy Carter in 1976 ) .
Now , as I wrote last week , there are some caveats here .
Several of these polling averages were taken while one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and although there are ways to correct for those , every time you correct for something so your model fits the past data better , you raise the possibility that you ’ re overfitting the data and that your model won ’ t be as accurate as claimed when applied to situations where you don ’ t already know the outcome .
There are also decent arguments that polling averages have become more stable in recent years .
In that case , the wild fluctuations in the polls from , say , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relevant .
Our model actually agrees with these theories , up to a point !
The fact that voters are more polarized now ( more polarization means fewer swing voters , which means less volatility ) is encoded into our model as part of our “ uncertainty index , ” for instance .
But we think it ’ s pretty dangerous to go all in on these theories and assume that poll volatility is necessarily much lower than it was before .
For one thing , the theory is not based on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most recent elections , for instance .
The 2004 and 2012 elections featured highly stable polling — 2012 especially so .
But 2000 and 2016 ( ! )
did not , and 2008 election polling was not especially stable , either .
Small sample sizes are already an issue in election forecasting , so it seems risky to come to too many firm conclusions about polling volatility based on what amounts to two or three examples .
Meanwhile , other people have pointed out that the most recent two presidents , Trump and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approval ratings .
But the president just before them , George W. Bush , did not .
His approval rating went through some of the wildest fluctuations ever , in fact , even though polarization was also fairly high from 2000 to 2008 .
That said , polls have been stable so far this year .
Indeed , that ’ s another factor that our uncertainty index accounts for .
But don ’ t get too carried away extrapolating from this stability .
Case in point : Polls were extremely stable throughout most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the voting started , we saw huge swings from the Iowa caucuses through Super Tuesday .
Poll volatility tends to predict future volatility , but only up to a point .
Remember , too , that voters haven ’ t yet been exposed to the traditional set pieces of the campaign , namely the conventions and the debates , which are often associated with higher volatility .
Now , suppose that despite all the weirdness to come in the general election campaign , Biden just plows through , leads by 6 to 9 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wins by that amount on Nov. 3 ?
If that happens , then we ’ ve got more evidence for the hypothesis that elections have become more stable , even when voters are confronted with a lot of surprising news .
But , crucially , we don ’ t have that evidence yet .
So some of the models that are more confident in Biden ’ s chances seem to be begging the question , presuming that polls will remain stable when I ’ m not sure we can say that yet .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 .
Sometimes — though people may not say this outright — you ’ ll get a sense that critics think it ’ s sort of cheating for a model to account for COVID-19 because it ’ s never happened before , so it ’ s too ad hoc to adjust for it now .
I don ’ t really agree .
Models should reflect the real world , and COVID-19 is a big part of the real world in 2020 .
Given the choice between mild ad-hockery and ignoring COVID-19 entirely , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ However , I also think there are good ways to account for COVID-19 without being particularly ad hoc about it .
If you ’ re designing a model , whenever you encounter an outlier or an edge case or a new complication , the question you ask yourself should be , “ What lessons can I draw from this that generalize well ?
” That is : Are there things you can do to handle the edge case well that will also make your model more robust overall ?
As an aside , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think people should pay a lot of attention to edge cases and outliers .
For instance , I pay a lot of attention to how our model is handling Washington , D.C. Why Washington ?
Well , if you take certain shortcuts — don ’ t account for the fact that vote shares are constrained between 0 and 100 percent of the vote — you might wind up with impossible results , like Biden winning 105 percent of the vote there .
Or when designing an NBA model , I may pay a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russell Westbrook , who has long caused issues for statistical systems .
I don ’ t like taking shortcuts in models ; I think they come back to bite you later in ways you don ’ t necessarily anticipate .
But if you can handle the outliers well , you ’ ve probably built a mathematically elegant model that works well under ordinary circumstances , too .
But back to COVID-19 : What this pandemic encouraged us to do was to think even more deeply about the sources of uncertainty in our forecast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the aforementioned uncertainty index , which has eight components ( described in more depth in our methodology post ) : • The number of undecided voters in national polls .
More undecided voters means more uncertainty .
• The number of undecided plus third-party voters in national polls .
More third-party voters means more uncertainty .
• Polarization , as measured elsewhere in the model , which is based on how far apart the parties are in roll call votes cast in the U.S. House .
More polarization means less uncertainty since there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ volatility of the national polling average .
Volatility tends to predict itself , so a stable polling average tends to remain stable .
• The overall volume of national polling .
More polling means less uncertainty .
• The magnitude of the difference between the polling-based national snapshot and the fundamentals forecast .
A wider gap means more uncertainty .
• The standard deviation of the component variables used in the FiveThirtyEight economic index .
More economic volatility means more overall uncertainty in the forecast .
• The volume of major news , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New York Times headlines in the past 500 days , with more recent days weighted more heavily .
More news means more uncertainty .
Previous versions of our model had basically just accounted for factors 1 and 2 ( undecided and third-party voters ) , so there are quite a few new factors here .
And indeed , factors 7 and 8 are very high thanks to COVID-19 and , therefore , boost our uncertainty measure .
However , we ’ re also considering several factors for the first time ( like polarization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the end , though , our model isn ’ t even saying that the uncertainty is especially high this year .
The uncertainty index would have been considerably higher in 1980 , for instance .
Rather , this year ’ s uncertainty is about average , which means that the historical accuracy of polls in past campaigns is a reasonably good guide to how accurate they are this year .
That seems to me like a pretty good gut check .
It might seem counterintuitive that uncertainty would be about average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accounting for multiple types of uncertainty means that some can work to balance each other out .
We don ’ t have a large sample of elections to begin with ; depending on how you count , somewhere between 10 and 15 past presidential races had reasonably frequent polling .
So your default position might be that you should use all of that data to calibrate your estimates of uncertainty , rather than to try to predict under which conditions polls might be more or less reliable .
If you are going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though , then we think you need to be pretty exhaustive about thinking through sources of uncertainty .
Accounting for greater polarization but not the additional disruptions brought about by the pandemic would be a mistake , we think ; likewise , so would be considering the pandemic but not accounting for polarization .
I ’ ve also seen some objections to the particular variables we ’ ve included in the uncertainty index .
For instance , not everybody likes that our way of specifying “ the volume of major news ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I agree that this isn ’ t ideal .
The New York Times takes its headlining choices very seriously , but as we learned from thumbing through years of its headlines , it also makes some idiosyncratic choices .
However , I don ’ t think anybody would say there hasn ’ t been a ton of important news this year , much of which could continue to reverberate later in the race .
Nor should people doubt that poll volatility is often news-driven .
Polls generally don ’ t move on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to major political events ( such as debates ) and news events ( such as wars starting or ending ) .
Even before COVID-19 , we were trying to incorporate some of this logic into our polling averages by , for instance , having them move more aggressively after debates .
Other people have suggested that we ought to have accounted for incumbency in the uncertainty index , on the theory that when incumbents are running for reelection , they are known commodities , which should reduce volatility .
That ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I ’ d thought to look at , although after taking a very brief glance at it now , I ’ m not sure how much it would have mattered .
The 1980 and 1992 elections , which featured incumbents , were notably volatile , for instance .
So if it ’ s too soon to be all that confident that Biden will win based on the polls — not that a 71 percent of winning the Electoral College ( and an 82 percent chance of winning the popular vote ) are anything @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else that might justify that confidence ?
In our view , not really .
I ’ ll be briefer on these points , since we covered them at length in our introductory feature .
But forecasts based on economic “ fundamentals ” — which have never been as accurate as claimed — are a mess this year .
Depending on which variables you look at ( gross domestic product or disposable income ? )
and over what time period ( third quarter or second quarter ? )
you could predict anything from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of elections to a big Trump win .
Furthermore , FiveThirtyEight ’ s version of a fundamentals model actually shows the race as a tie — it expects the race to tighten given the high polarization and projected economic improvement between now and November .
So although we don ’ t weigh the fundamentals all that much , they aren ’ t exactly a reason to be more confident in Biden .
What about Trump ’ s approval rating ?
It ’ s been poor for a long time , obviously .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of their fundamentals calculation .
But I have trouble with that for two reasons .
First , the idea behind the fundamentals is that they ’ re … well , fundamental , meaning they ’ re the underlying factors ( like economic conditions and political polarization ) that drive political outcomes .
An approval rating , on the other hand , should really be the result of those conditions .
Second , especially against a well-known opponent like Biden , approval ratings are largely redundant with the polls .
That is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approval rating ( favorable rating minus unfavorable rating ) is -12 or -13 in polls of registered and likely voters , then his being down 8 or 9 points in head-to-head polls against Biden is pretty much exactly what you ’ d expect .
( Empirically , though , the spread in approval ratings are a bit wider than the spreads in head-to-head polls .
A candidate with a -20 approval rating , like Carter had at the end of the 1980 campaign , wouldn ’ t expect to lose the election by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that include a lot of highly correlated variables can have serious problems , and approval ratings and head-to-head polls are very highly correlated .
I ’ m not saying you couldn ’ t work your way around these issues , but unless you were very careful , they could lead to underestimates of out-of-sample errors and other problems .
One last topic : the role of intuition when building an election model .
To the largest extent possible , when I build election models , I try to do it “ blindfolded , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as many decisions as possible about the structure of the model before seeing what the model would say about the current year ’ s election .
That ’ s not to say we don ’ t kick the tires on a few things at the end , but it ’ s pretty minimal , and it ’ s mostly to look at bugs and edge cases rather than to change our underlying assumptions .
The process is designed to limit the role my priors play when building a model .
Sometimes , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ model run , the results come close to my intuition anyway .
But this year they didn ’ t .
I was pretty sure we ’ d have Biden with at least a 75 percent chance of winning and perhaps as high as a 90 percent chance .
Instead , our initial tests had Biden with about a 70 percent chance , and he stayed there until we launched the model .
Why was my intuition wrong ?
I suspect because it was conditioned on recent elections where polls were fairly stable — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close , making Biden ’ s 8-point lead look humongous by comparison .
If I had vividly remembered Dukakis blowing his big lead in 1988 , when I was 10 years old , maybe my priors would have been different .
But as I said earlier , I ’ m not necessarily sure we can expect the polls to be quite so stable this time around .
And when you actually check how accurate summer polling has been historically , it yields some pretty wide margins of error .

Our Election Forecast Didn’t Say What I Thought It Would Why we factored in COVID-19, why we ignored approval ratings, and other deep cuts from our election model
My editors are forever asking me to take the long Twitter threads I write and turn them into articles here at FiveThirtyEight. So I’m actually going to give that a try!
What follows are some follow-up thoughts on our election model, which was originally composed in the form of a V E R Y L O N G tweetstorm that I never published. (See if you can guess where the 240-character breaks would have been.)
In this thread … err, article … I’ll try to walk you through my thought process on a few elements of our model and respond to a few thoughtful critiques I’ve seen elsewhere. Before you dive in, it may help to read our summary of the state of the race, or at least skim our very detailed methodology guide.
But the basic starting point for a probabilistic, poll-driven model ought to be this: Is polling in August a highly reliable way to predict the outcome in November?
The short answer is “no.”
Polling in August is somewhat predictive. You’d much rather be ahead than behind. But there can still be some very wild swings.
You can see that in the daily threads that Nathaniel Rakich, one of our elections analysts, puts together. Here is what a national polling average would have looked like in elections dating back to 1976:
The @FiveThirtyEight nat'l polling average with 84 days until E-Day: 2020: Biden+8.3
2016: Clinton+6.6
2012: Obama+0.5
2008: Obama+2.6
2004: Kerry+2.5
2000: Bush+10.0
1996: Clinton+11.3
1992: Clinton+20.1
1988: Dukakis+5.6
1984: Reagan+16.0
1980: Reagan+22.1
1976: Carter+26.6 — Nathaniel Rakich (@baseballot) August 11, 2020
OK, I cheated a bit. I’m using a version that Nathaniel published last week, partly because this was the exact moment in the campaign when Michael Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic nominee, started to blow his large lead, which he never regained. Still, there’s some wild stuff there! John Kerry led at this point in 2004. George W. Bush had a 10-point lead at this point in the 2000 race, but, as we know, he didn’t win the popular vote that year. In other cases, the leading candidate won, but the margin was off by as much as 20 points (Jimmy Carter in 1976).
Now, as I wrote last week, there are some caveats here. Several of these polling averages were taken while one or both candidates were experiencing convention bonuses, and although there are ways to correct for those, every time you correct for something so your model fits the past data better, you raise the possibility that you’re overfitting the data and that your model won’t be as accurate as claimed when applied to situations where you don’t already know the outcome.
There are also decent arguments that polling averages have become more stable in recent years. In that case, the wild fluctuations in the polls from, say, 1976 or 1988 might not be as relevant.
Our model actually agrees with these theories, up to a point! The fact that voters are more polarized now (more polarization means fewer swing voters, which means less volatility) is encoded into our model as part of our “uncertainty index,” for instance.
But we think it’s pretty dangerous to go all in on these theories and assume that poll volatility is necessarily much lower than it was before. For one thing, the theory is not based on a ton of data. Take the five most recent elections, for instance. The 2004 and 2012 elections featured highly stable polling — 2012 especially so. But 2000 and 2016 (!) did not, and 2008 election polling was not especially stable, either. Small sample sizes are already an issue in election forecasting, so it seems risky to come to too many firm conclusions about polling volatility based on what amounts to two or three examples.
Meanwhile, other people have pointed out that the most recent two presidents, Trump and Barack Obama, have had highly stable approval ratings. But the president just before them, George W. Bush, did not. His approval rating went through some of the wildest fluctuations ever, in fact, even though polarization was also fairly high from 2000 to 2008.
That said, polls have been stable so far this year. Indeed, that’s another factor that our uncertainty index accounts for. But don’t get too carried away extrapolating from this stability. Case in point: Polls were extremely stable throughout most of the Democratic primaries … but when the voting started, we saw huge swings from the Iowa caucuses through Super Tuesday. Poll volatility tends to predict future volatility, but only up to a point.
Remember, too, that voters haven’t yet been exposed to the traditional set pieces of the campaign, namely the conventions and the debates, which are often associated with higher volatility.
Now, suppose that despite all the weirdness to come in the general election campaign, Biden just plows through, leads by 6 to 9 points the whole way … and then wins by that amount on Nov. 3? If that happens, then we’ve got more evidence for the hypothesis that elections have become more stable, even when voters are confronted with a lot of surprising news.
But, crucially, we don’t have that evidence yet. So some of the models that are more confident in Biden’s chances seem to be begging the question, presuming that polls will remain stable when I’m not sure we can say that yet.
Then there’s the issue of COVID-19. Sometimes — though people may not say this outright — you’ll get a sense that critics think it’s sort of cheating for a model to account for COVID-19 because it’s never happened before, so it’s too ad hoc to adjust for it now.
I don’t really agree. Models should reflect the real world, and COVID-19 is a big part of the real world in 2020. Given the choice between mild ad-hockery and ignoring COVID-19 entirely, I think mild ad-hockery is better.
However, I also think there are good ways to account for COVID-19 without being particularly ad hoc about it. If you’re designing a model, whenever you encounter an outlier or an edge case or a new complication, the question you ask yourself should be, “What lessons can I draw from this that generalize well?” That is: Are there things you can do to handle the edge case well that will also make your model more robust overall?
As an aside, when testing models on historical data I think people should pay a lot of attention to edge cases and outliers. For instance, I pay a lot of attention to how our model is handling Washington, D.C. Why Washington? Well, if you take certain shortcuts — don’t account for the fact that vote shares are constrained between 0 and 100 percent of the vote — you might wind up with impossible results, like Biden winning 105 percent of the vote there. Or when designing an NBA model, I may pay a lot of attention to a player like Russell Westbrook, who has long caused issues for statistical systems. I don’t like taking shortcuts in models; I think they come back to bite you later in ways you don’t necessarily anticipate. But if you can handle the outliers well, you’ve probably built a mathematically elegant model that works well under ordinary circumstances, too.
But back to COVID-19: What this pandemic encouraged us to do was to think even more deeply about the sources of uncertainty in our forecast. That led to the development of the aforementioned uncertainty index, which has eight components (described in more depth in our methodology post):
The number of undecided voters in national polls. More undecided voters means more uncertainty. The number of undecided plus third-party voters in national polls. More third-party voters means more uncertainty. Polarization, as measured elsewhere in the model, which is based on how far apart the parties are in roll call votes cast in the U.S. House. More polarization means less uncertainty since there are fewer swing voters. The volatility of the national polling average. Volatility tends to predict itself, so a stable polling average tends to remain stable. The overall volume of national polling. More polling means less uncertainty. The magnitude of the difference between the polling-based national snapshot and the fundamentals forecast. A wider gap means more uncertainty. The standard deviation of the component variables used in the FiveThirtyEight economic index. More economic volatility means more overall uncertainty in the forecast. The volume of major news, as measured by the number of full-width New York Times headlines in the past 500 days, with more recent days weighted more heavily. More news means more uncertainty.
Previous versions of our model had basically just accounted for factors 1 and 2 (undecided and third-party voters), so there are quite a few new factors here. And indeed, factors 7 and 8 are very high thanks to COVID-19 and, therefore, boost our uncertainty measure. However, we’re also considering several factors for the first time (like polarization and poll volatility) that reduce uncertainty.
[newsletter-politics]
In the end, though, our model isn’t even saying that the uncertainty is especially high this year. The uncertainty index would have been considerably higher in 1980, for instance. Rather, this year’s uncertainty is about average, which means that the historical accuracy of polls in past campaigns is a reasonably good guide to how accurate they are this year. That seems to me like a pretty good gut check.
It might seem counterintuitive that uncertainty would be about average in such a weird year, but accounting for multiple types of uncertainty means that some can work to balance each other out. We don’t have a large sample of elections to begin with; depending on how you count, somewhere between 10 and 15 past presidential races had reasonably frequent polling. So your default position might be that you should use all of that data to calibrate your estimates of uncertainty, rather than to try to predict under which conditions polls might be more or less reliable. If you are going to try to fine-tune your margin of error, though, then we think you need to be pretty exhaustive about thinking through sources of uncertainty. Accounting for greater polarization but not the additional disruptions brought about by the pandemic would be a mistake, we think; likewise, so would be considering the pandemic but not accounting for polarization.
I’ve also seen some objections to the particular variables we’ve included in the uncertainty index. For instance, not everybody likes that our way of specifying “the volume of major news” is based on New York Times headlines. I agree that this isn’t ideal. The New York Times takes its headlining choices very seriously, but as we learned from thumbing through years of its headlines, it also makes some idiosyncratic choices.
However, I don’t think anybody would say there hasn’t been a ton of important news this year, much of which could continue to reverberate later in the race. Nor should people doubt that poll volatility is often news-driven. Polls generally don’t move on their own, but rather in response to major political events (such as debates) and news events (such as wars starting or ending). Even before COVID-19, we were trying to incorporate some of this logic into our polling averages by, for instance, having them move more aggressively after debates.
Other people have suggested that we ought to have accounted for incumbency in the uncertainty index, on the theory that when incumbents are running for reelection, they are known commodities, which should reduce volatility. That’s a smart suggestion, and something I wish I’d thought to look at, although after taking a very brief glance at it now, I’m not sure how much it would have mattered. The 1980 and 1992 elections, which featured incumbents, were notably volatile, for instance.
So if it’s too soon to be all that confident that Biden will win based on the polls — not that a 71 percent of winning the Electoral College (and an 82 percent chance of winning the popular vote) are anything to sneeze at — is there anything else that might justify that confidence?
In our view, not really.
I’ll be briefer on these points, since we covered them at length in our introductory feature. But forecasts based on economic “fundamentals” — which have never been as accurate as claimed — are a mess this year. Depending on which variables you look at (gross domestic product or disposable income?) and over what time period (third quarter or second quarter?) you could predict anything from the most epic Biden landslide in the history of elections to a big Trump win.
Furthermore, FiveThirtyEight’s version of a fundamentals model actually shows the race as a tie — it expects the race to tighten given the high polarization and projected economic improvement between now and November. So although we don’t weigh the fundamentals all that much, they aren’t exactly a reason to be more confident in Biden.
What about Trump’s approval rating? It’s been poor for a long time, obviously. And some other models do use it as part of their fundamentals calculation. But I have trouble with that for two reasons. First, the idea behind the fundamentals is that they’re … well, fundamental, meaning they’re the underlying factors (like economic conditions and political polarization) that drive political outcomes. An approval rating, on the other hand, should really be the result of those conditions.
Second, especially against a well-known opponent like Biden, approval ratings are largely redundant with the polls. That is to say, if Trump’s net approval rating (favorable rating minus unfavorable rating) is -12 or -13 in polls of registered and likely voters, then his being down 8 or 9 points in head-to-head polls against Biden is pretty much exactly what you’d expect. (Empirically, though, the spread in approval ratings are a bit wider than the spreads in head-to-head polls. A candidate with a -20 approval rating, like Carter had at the end of the 1980 campaign, wouldn’t expect to lose the election by 20 points.)
Also, models that include a lot of highly correlated variables can have serious problems, and approval ratings and head-to-head polls are very highly correlated. I’m not saying you couldn’t work your way around these issues, but unless you were very careful, they could lead to underestimates of out-of-sample errors and other problems.
One last topic: the role of intuition when building an election model. To the largest extent possible, when I build election models, I try to do it “blindfolded,” by which I mean I make as many decisions as possible about the structure of the model before seeing what the model would say about the current year’s election. That’s not to say we don’t kick the tires on a few things at the end, but it’s pretty minimal, and it’s mostly to look at bugs and edge cases rather than to change our underlying assumptions. The process is designed to limit the role my priors play when building a model.
Sometimes, though, when we do our first real model run, the results come close to my intuition anyway. But this year they didn’t. I was pretty sure we’d have Biden with at least a 75 percent chance of winning and perhaps as high as a 90 percent chance. Instead, our initial tests had Biden with about a 70 percent chance, and he stayed there until we launched the model.
Why was my intuition wrong? I suspect because it was conditioned on recent elections where polls were fairly stable — and where the races were also mostly close, making Biden’s 8-point lead look humongous by comparison. If I had vividly remembered Dukakis blowing his big lead in 1988, when I was 10 years old, maybe my priors would have been different.
But as I said earlier, I’m not necessarily sure we can expect the polls to be quite so stable this time around. And when you actually check how accurate summer polling has been historically, it yields some pretty wide margins of error.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--Democratic National Convention, Day 1: Live Updates And Analysis

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fivethirtyeight--2020-08-18--What To Watch In Today’s Elections In Alaska, Florida And Wyoming

From sea to shining sea ( via purple mountains majesty ) , today ’ s primary elections have it all .
To have a prayer in November , Alaska Democrats may have to nominate … candidates who are not Democrats .
In Florida , three campaigns for Congress have devolved into backbiting and criminal accusations .
And in deep-red Wyoming , today ’ s primary will essentially decide the state ’ s next U.S. senator .
Here ’ s everything you need to know .
In 2018 , Republican Rep. Don Young — the longest-serving member of Congress — won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Notably , his opponent in that race , businesswoman Alyse Galvin , wasn ’ t even technically a Democrat .
She was an independent who ran for and won the Democratic nomination .
Two years later , Democrats are trying to double their luck with the same trick : Galvin is running again for U.S. House , and independent Al Gross is the prohibitive favorite in the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate .
Gross , a surgeon and fisherman with a bear of an introductory ad , enjoys the endorsement of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 5.2 million .
Of course , both Galvin and Gross will still face uphill general election campaigns in this red state , but Alaska has a strong independent streak , so Young and Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan can ’ t take anything for granted .
Fresh off a victory in the 2018 election , Republican Rep. Ross Spano of Florida ’ s 15th Congressional District was riding high — until he was faced with the possibility he violated campaign finance law .
In a December 2018 filing with the Federal Election Commission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 180,000 from two friends and then loaned $ 167,000 to his own campaign .
Since individuals were not allowed to give a candidate more than $ 2,700 per election in 2018 , this could be seen as laundering campaign contributions .
The House Ethics Committee launched an investigation , and in November 2019 we learned that the Justice Department had opened a criminal inquiry .
Unsurprisingly , Spano is now facing stiff reelection challenges from both parties .
In the Republican primary , Lakeland City Commissioner Scott Franklin has hammered Spano as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insists he didn ’ t know his actions were illegal and is framing himself as a victim of a partisan witch hunt .
For his part , Spano has tried to paint Franklin as insufficiently loyal to President Trump — something that has become par for the course in GOP primaries .
Both candidates have also accused the other of not being tough enough on illegal immigration .
While Spano has the support of the party establishment , including most of the Republicans serving Florida in Congress , a few high-profile local conservatives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 29 , Spano had outspent Franklin , $ 824,000 to $ 483,000 , and the incumbent ’ s allies at the anti-tax Club for Growth also invested more than $ 270,000 .
But an upset may nonetheless be brewing : Last week , St. Pete Polls found the two men locked in a virtual tie .
Whoever wins will face either investigative journalist Alan Cohn or state Rep. Adam Hattersley , who are squaring off in an evenly matched Democratic primary of their own .
As of July 29 , Cohn had spent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 406,600 ) , but Hattersley had more cash on hand for the final three weeks ( $ 236,000 to $ 130,000 ) .
Although the two don ’ t differ much on policy , Cohn has dinged Hattersley for being too moderate ( he has some endorsements from moderate groups and didn ’ t register as a Democrat until 2018 ) .
Hattersley , though , has appropriated that argument to claim he ’ s the more electable candidate — which might be persuasive given that Trump carried this central Florida district @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other Republican primaries in Florida are also on our radar because they ’ ll likely determine future members of Congress due to the GOP lean of the seats .
First , the 19th Congressional District in southwest Florida is open following the retirement of Republican Rep. Francis Rooney , and there are four candidates in serious contention : businessman Casey Askar , state Rep. Byron Donalds , state House Majority Leader Dane Eagle and physician William Figlesthaler .
One of Figlesthaler ’ s ads aptly describes the contest as “ the race to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the candidates are fighting for pole position .
Figlesthaler says he ’ ll back Trump ’ s “ America First agenda , ” while Eagle argues his experience as a GOP leader makes him the best choice to stand with Trump and “ fight for America.
” Donalds emphasizes that he ’ s a “ Trump-supporting , gun-owning , liberty-loving , pro-life , politically incorrect Black man.
” And Askar proclaims that he ’ ll “ always have the president ’ s back ” in Trump ’ s battle against the media , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And as the race has heated up , things have gotten nasty .
In one ad , Askar stresses that when he was 18 , he signed up for the Marines , whereas Donalds was arrested for drug possession at 19 and Eagle got a DUI at 31 .
He ’ s also argued that Donalds lied to get a state job and opposed Trump in the past , attacks that got a “ Mostly False ” rating from PolitiFact .
But Askar ’ s military service and educational background have been called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for his opponents .
And outside groups have also dinged Askar for past contributions to Mitt Romney .
They ’ ve also criticized Figlesthaler for giving money to former Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson ( who lost in 2018 ) and not donating to Trump in the 2016 presidential race .
However , because Askar and Figlesthaler are largely self-funding their campaigns , they ’ ve dramatically outspent Donalds and Eagle .
Askar has raised about $ 3.7 million ( with $ 3 million from personal loans ) , while Figlesthaler has brought in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 1.9 million self-funded ) .
Conversely , Donalds has collected roughly $ 1.2 million and Eagle just about $ 741,000 .
However , Donalds has far and away the most outside help thanks to his endorsement from the Club for Growth .
The group ’ s campaign arm has spent about $ 1.4 million boosting Donalds and another $ 1.1 million hitting the other three candidates ( mainly Askar ) .
And Conservative Outsider PAC , another Donalds ally , has also spent $ 459,000 attacking Eagle .
As the campaign draws @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looks like anyone ’ s race .
An early August survey from St. Pete Polls found the four candidates separated by just 6 points , with Donalds attracting 22 percent support , Figlesthaler 21 percent , Eagle 20 percent and Askar 16 percent .
Meanwhile , the 3rd Congressional District in north Florida also has a busy primary to replace retiring Republican Rep. Ted Yoho .
The contest lacks a front-runner , but the most prominent contenders appear to be former Yoho staffer Kat Cammack , businessman Judson Sapp and physician James St. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ race has centered on Cammack , who has gained notoriety for running fowl-themed ads in which she calls her opponents and D.C. Republicans too “ chicken ” to stand up for conservative values .
She ’ s played up her connections to Yoho , too , but those ties have recently come under scrutiny .
In late June , Yoho ’ s son claimed Cammack had been fired as his father ’ s chief of staff and expressed frustration that Cammack made it sound like the congressman backed her .
Following his son @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Cammack had been demoted to deputy chief of staff and reassigned to the district office in 2013 “ for reasons not to be disclosed , ” and later reiterated that he wasn ’ t endorsing anyone .
As for St. George and Sapp , they have also touted their conservative credentials , support for Trump and opposition to the political left .
They ’ ve also brought more financial resources to the race than Cammack .
As of July 29 , St. George had raised about $ 922,000 ( $ 600,000 from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who won 24 percent in the 2018 primary against Yoho , had collected $ 770,000 ( $ 500,000 self-funded ) .
By comparison , Cammack had gathered about $ 492,000 in contributions with very little self-funding .
But Cammack has benefited from the only significant outside spending in the race : $ 300,000 by the Sen. Rand Paul-aligned Protect Freedom PAC .
( Paul has endorsed Cammack . )
And the only recent poll we have of the race suggests Cammack might come out on top with a plurality of the vote .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cammack garnering 25 percent , Sapp 15 percent and St. George 13 percent .
However , 20 percent were still undecided and seven other candidates also attracted support .
Cammack doesn ’ t have an overwhelming lead , so it ’ s entirely possible one of the other contenders might still best her today .
With the retirement of Republican Sen. Mike Enzi , the GOP primary for Wyoming ’ s Senate seat is also in the cards , and the winner of this election is essentially guaranteed to become the state ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arguably the most Republican state in the nation .
Admittedly , there ’ s not much drama here as former Rep. Cynthia Lummis is a pretty clear front-runner despite the fact that there are 10 candidates on the GOP primary ballot .
But we mention this race because Lummis ’ s likely election could be meaningful for Republican gender diversity in the Senate .
At present , just nine of the 26 women in the Senate are Republicans .
Six of them are up for election this November , with four in real @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go poorly for the GOP , Lummis could be important to shoring up gender representation within the party ’ s caucus .
Things are busiest in Florida today , but there are intriguing reasons to watch what happens in Alaska and Wyoming , too .
There aren ’ t many primary or runoff contests left in 2020 , so enjoy primary season while it lasts .

From sea to shining sea (via purple mountains majesty), today’s primary elections have it all. To have a prayer in November, Alaska Democrats may have to nominate … candidates who are not Democrats. In Florida, three campaigns for Congress have devolved into backbiting and criminal accusations. And in deep-red Wyoming, today’s primary will essentially decide the state’s next U.S. senator. Here’s everything you need to know.
Alaska
In 2018, Republican Rep. Don Young — the longest-serving member of Congress — won reelection by less than 7 percentage points. Notably, his opponent in that race, businesswoman Alyse Galvin, wasn’t even technically a Democrat. She was an independent who ran for and won the Democratic nomination.
Two years later, Democrats are trying to double their luck with the same trick: Galvin is running again for U.S. House, and independent Al Gross is the prohibitive favorite in the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate. Gross, a surgeon and fisherman with a bear of an introductory ad, enjoys the endorsement of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and has raised $5.2 million. Of course, both Galvin and Gross will still face uphill general election campaigns in this red state, but Alaska has a strong independent streak, so Young and Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan can’t take anything for granted.
Florida
Fresh off a victory in the 2018 election, Republican Rep. Ross Spano of Florida’s 15th Congressional District was riding high — until he was faced with the possibility he violated campaign finance law. In a December 2018 filing with the Federal Election Commission, Spano disclosed that he borrowed $180,000 from two friends and then loaned $167,000 to his own campaign. Since individuals were not allowed to give a candidate more than $2,700 per election in 2018, this could be seen as laundering campaign contributions. The House Ethics Committee launched an investigation, and in November 2019 we learned that the Justice Department had opened a criminal inquiry.
Unsurprisingly, Spano is now facing stiff reelection challenges from both parties. In the Republican primary, Lakeland City Commissioner Scott Franklin has hammered Spano as a “criminal” in ads; Spano insists he didn’t know his actions were illegal and is framing himself as a victim of a partisan witch hunt. For his part, Spano has tried to paint Franklin as insufficiently loyal to President Trump — something that has become par for the course in GOP primaries. Both candidates have also accused the other of not being tough enough on illegal immigration.
While Spano has the support of the party establishment, including most of the Republicans serving Florida in Congress, a few high-profile local conservatives have endorsed Franklin. As of July 29, Spano had outspent Franklin, $824,000 to $483,000, and the incumbent’s allies at the anti-tax Club for Growth also invested more than $270,000. But an upset may nonetheless be brewing: Last week, St. Pete Polls found the two men locked in a virtual tie.
Whoever wins will face either investigative journalist Alan Cohn or state Rep. Adam Hattersley, who are squaring off in an evenly matched Democratic primary of their own. As of July 29, Cohn had spent more than Hattersley ($459,000 to $406,600), but Hattersley had more cash on hand for the final three weeks ($236,000 to $130,000). Although the two don’t differ much on policy, Cohn has dinged Hattersley for being too moderate (he has some endorsements from moderate groups and didn’t register as a Democrat until 2018). Hattersley, though, has appropriated that argument to claim he’s the more electable candidate — which might be persuasive given that Trump carried this central Florida district by 10 points in 2016.
[newsletter-politics]
Two other Republican primaries in Florida are also on our radar because they’ll likely determine future members of Congress due to the GOP lean of the seats. First, the 19th Congressional District in southwest Florida is open following the retirement of Republican Rep. Francis Rooney, and there are four candidates in serious contention: businessman Casey Askar, state Rep. Byron Donalds, state House Majority Leader Dane Eagle and physician William Figlesthaler.
One of Figlesthaler’s ads aptly describes the contest as “the race to support President Trump,” and all the candidates are fighting for pole position. Figlesthaler says he’ll back Trump’s “America First agenda,” while Eagle argues his experience as a GOP leader makes him the best choice to stand with Trump and “fight for America.” Donalds emphasizes that he’s a “Trump-supporting, gun-owning, liberty-loving, pro-life, politically incorrect Black man.” And Askar proclaims that he’ll “always have the president’s back” in Trump’s battle against the media, bureaucrats and the “radical socialists.”
And as the race has heated up, things have gotten nasty. In one ad, Askar stresses that when he was 18, he signed up for the Marines, whereas Donalds was arrested for drug possession at 19 and Eagle got a DUI at 31. He’s also argued that Donalds lied to get a state job and opposed Trump in the past, attacks that got a “Mostly False” rating from PolitiFact. But Askar’s military service and educational background have been called into question, providing plenty of ammunition for his opponents. And outside groups have also dinged Askar for past contributions to Mitt Romney. They’ve also criticized Figlesthaler for giving money to former Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson (who lost in 2018) and not donating to Trump in the 2016 presidential race.
However, because Askar and Figlesthaler are largely self-funding their campaigns, they’ve dramatically outspent Donalds and Eagle. Askar has raised about $3.7 million (with $3 million from personal loans), while Figlesthaler has brought in a little over $2.5 million ($1.9 million self-funded). Conversely, Donalds has collected roughly $1.2 million and Eagle just about $741,000. However, Donalds has far and away the most outside help thanks to his endorsement from the Club for Growth. The group’s campaign arm has spent about $1.4 million boosting Donalds and another $1.1 million hitting the other three candidates (mainly Askar). And Conservative Outsider PAC, another Donalds ally, has also spent $459,000 attacking Eagle.
As the campaign draws to a close, though, it looks like anyone’s race. An early August survey from St. Pete Polls found the four candidates separated by just 6 points, with Donalds attracting 22 percent support, Figlesthaler 21 percent, Eagle 20 percent and Askar 16 percent.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Congressional District in north Florida also has a busy primary to replace retiring Republican Rep. Ted Yoho. The contest lacks a front-runner, but the most prominent contenders appear to be former Yoho staffer Kat Cammack, businessman Judson Sapp and physician James St. George.
The principal drama in the race has centered on Cammack, who has gained notoriety for running fowl-themed ads in which she calls her opponents and D.C. Republicans too “chicken” to stand up for conservative values. She’s played up her connections to Yoho, too, but those ties have recently come under scrutiny. In late June, Yoho’s son claimed Cammack had been fired as his father’s chief of staff and expressed frustration that Cammack made it sound like the congressman backed her. Following his son’s statement, Rep. Yoho stated that Cammack had been demoted to deputy chief of staff and reassigned to the district office in 2013 “for reasons not to be disclosed,” and later reiterated that he wasn’t endorsing anyone.
As for St. George and Sapp, they have also touted their conservative credentials, support for Trump and opposition to the political left. They’ve also brought more financial resources to the race than Cammack. As of July 29, St. George had raised about $922,000 ($600,000 from his own pocket) while Sapp, who won 24 percent in the 2018 primary against Yoho, had collected $770,000 ($500,000 self-funded). By comparison, Cammack had gathered about $492,000 in contributions with very little self-funding. But Cammack has benefited from the only significant outside spending in the race: $300,000 by the Sen. Rand Paul-aligned Protect Freedom PAC. (Paul has endorsed Cammack.)
And the only recent poll we have of the race suggests Cammack might come out on top with a plurality of the vote. Earlier this month, Meer Research found Cammack garnering 25 percent, Sapp 15 percent and St. George 13 percent. However, 20 percent were still undecided and seven other candidates also attracted support. Cammack doesn’t have an overwhelming lead, so it’s entirely possible one of the other contenders might still best her today.
Wyoming
With the retirement of Republican Sen. Mike Enzi, the GOP primary for Wyoming’s Senate seat is also in the cards, and the winner of this election is essentially guaranteed to become the state’s next senator, as Wyoming is arguably the most Republican state in the nation. Admittedly, there’s not much drama here as former Rep. Cynthia Lummis is a pretty clear front-runner despite the fact that there are 10 candidates on the GOP primary ballot.
But we mention this race because Lummis’s likely election could be meaningful for Republican gender diversity in the Senate. At present, just nine of the 26 women in the Senate are Republicans. Six of them are up for election this November, with four in real danger of defeat. So if things go poorly for the GOP, Lummis could be important to shoring up gender representation within the party’s caucus.
Things are busiest in Florida today, but there are intriguing reasons to watch what happens in Alaska and Wyoming, too. There aren’t many primary or runoff contests left in 2020, so enjoy primary season while it lasts.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--What Went Down On The First Night Of The Democratic National Convention


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-18--Sanders And Kasich’s DNC Speeches Show Democrats Are Going After All Kinds Of Voters

The 2020 Democratic National Convention kicked off on Monday , and we will be recording daily podcasts to follow along @ @ @ @ @ the crew discusses speeches from former first lady Michelle Obama and Sen. Bernie Sanders and @ @ @ @ @ Night 1 of the DNC .

The 2020 Democratic National Convention kicked off on Monday, and we will be recording daily podcasts to follow along. In this episode, the crew discusses speeches from former first lady Michelle Obama and Sen. Bernie Sanders and gives their overall impressions from Night 1 of the DNC.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-18--Politics Podcast: Michelle Obama Ripped President Trump On Night One Of The Convention

Late Monday , the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew reacted to the first night of the virtual Democratic National Convention .
@ @ @ @ @ criticized President Trump forcefully , and a variety of politicians called for unity behind Joe @ @ @ @ @ to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above @ @ @ @ @ iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new @ @ @ @ @ to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new @ @ @ @ @ leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or @ @ @ @ @ vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in @ @ @

Late Monday, the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew reacted to the first night of the virtual Democratic National Convention. Former First Lady Michelle Obama criticized President Trump forcefully, and a variety of politicians called for unity behind Joe Biden.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--DNC, Day 2: Live Updates And Analysis

DNC, Day 2: Live Updates And Analysis


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-17--Why Conventions Still Matter

Why Conventions Still Matter

With both the Democratic National Convention and Republican National Convention going virtual this year , there are once again questions about what it is exactly that the national party conventions do .
For instance , conventions haven ’ t really picked the nominees for president and vice president since party reforms in the 1970s — arguably it ’ s been even longer than that — so it raises the question : At this point , are they just really expensive events with lots of balloons and TV cameras ?
If we look at the history of modern conventions , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in-person gatherings of power players from around the country as pageantry .
But if you look closer , you ’ ll notice that conventions have played an important role for some wings of the party , who may disagree with party leadership and want to attract media attention for themselves .
Granted , this has become harder to do over the years , especially as conventions have become more TV-centric and prepackaged .
And that will likely be particularly true this year given the pandemic .
But that doesn ’ t mean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if nothing is actually decided at the conventions , they still shine a spotlight on the parties , illuminating emerging factions and up-and-coming politicians , setting the stage for — and creating — the future of each party .
That ’ s why it ’ s unfortunate that this year ’ s format has to be virtual , and why one should hope that it won ’ t be the new normal .
It ’ s hard to imagine that we ’ ll see big internal clashes in the parties this year given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s worth noting that the physical environment of the conventions has , at times , created memorable confrontations between conflicting wings of the party .
Take the 1948 “ Dixiecrat walkout , ” in which delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the Democratic convention in protest of the party ’ s embrace of the civil rights movement in both its platform and floor speeches .
The delegates didn ’ t just walk out either .
Several members of the party broke away and formed the States ’ Rights Party , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Now , it ’ s true that this infighting didn ’ t actually affect the convention all that much .
For instance , it didn ’ t stop Democrats from including language supporting civil rights in their platform .
Nor did it prevent the nominee , Harry Truman , from winning the actual election .
But it did foreshadow the gradual loss of power of the Southern faction within the Democratic Party .
Similarly , in 1964 , the Republicans went into their convention deeply divided , with moderate and liberal Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservative faction that supported Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater on the other .
When New York Gov .
Nelson Rockefeller , one of the liberal old guard , spoke on the floor against extremism , convention delegates booed .
Historian Geoffrey Kabaservice reports the impressions of those who had been on the floor : One moderate Republican activist , Tanya Melich , said it “ felt like I was in Nazi Germany , ” while former president Dwight Eisenhower commented on the anti-democratic spirit of the moment .
Of course , Goldwater was resoundingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact of the 1964 convention was an emphasis on party unity in post-election discussions , and in the selection of the next RNC chair .
( This clash also foreshadowed the party ’ s movement in a more Goldwater-esque direction . )
Over time , conventions have become more scripted and less spontaneous , making it harder to produce unexpected moments like the memorable events of 1948 and 1964 .
But that doesn ’ t mean that dissension is completely hidden now .
The 2016 Democratic convention had some tense moments between Sen. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for example , with Sanders supporters chanting and booing during speeches on the convention ’ s first night .
Of course , this didn ’ t change the result of the already-determined floor vote — Clinton still walked away the nominee — but it did serve as a vivid reminder of the fissures within the party .
And after Clinton ’ s loss in November , the idea that the party lacked cohesion became part of the explanation for why she lost .
This engendered some resentment among Clinton supporters , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concessions to the Sanders faction .
Party leaders , for instance , recommended limiting the role of superdelegates in the conventions , a change Sanders supporters had long advocated , and which the party adopted in 2018 .
Fights over convention rules can be more than just procedural Although fights over convention rules might seem arcane , they are often motivated by larger , and more meaningful , party disagreements .
Let ’ s go back to 1964 for a moment .
The Democratic Party was in a moment of great upheaval over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states , like Mississippi , actively fighting the movement .
In fact , Mississippi ’ s state party had banned African Americans from party meetings , and thus its delegation lacked any Black members .
This angered some Democrats in the state , and so as a way of protesting segregation and the years of intimidation and disenfranchisement that Black voters had faced , a group of activists organized the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party .
Their intention was to highlight the injustice and illegitimacy of the official delegation , and they hoped to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Party leadership offered the group two nonvoting delegate seats , but a compromise could not be reached .
Instead , the MFDP occupied empty seats on the convention floor and sang freedom songs in protest when the chairs were removed .
As historian Sam Rosenfeld writes in “ The Polarizers , ” the MFDP actually had a pretty weak case under convention rules , but the moral force of their stance left a lasting mark on the party .
The national party moved to ban racial discrimination among state delegations , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were seated at the convention in 1968 .
Fast forward to 2012 , when the Republicans had their own — albeit very different — skirmish over rules .
Then-Rep. Ron Paul hadn ’ t won a single primary , but thanks to states that choose delegates through caucuses and conventions , his supporters were able to take over several state delegations .
Although the nomination of Mitt Romney was not in question , there was still some conflict on the floor — fights over the seating of Paul delegates and a push to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nomination , which would have given him a speaking slot at the convention .
Party leaders , however , wanted to present a unified party and direct media attention toward Romney .
So they changed the rules to thwart the Paul movement to prevent something like this from happening again : In order to be eligible to be nominated at the convention , a candidate needed to win the majority of delegates in at least eight states .
This was a substantial change — previously , a candidate needed only a plurality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it had unintended consequences .
One of which , political scientist Caitlin Jewitt argues in her book on primary rules , was that the new rule would have prevented party leaders dissatisfied with the possibility of a Trump nomination from entering any other names into consideration .
Accordingly , the party changed the rule , again — back to a candidate needing only a plurality of delegates in five states — and leaders talked about whether it could be changed for 2016 so that it could place a more mainstream Republican , like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contention .
But ultimately , this didn ’ t matter , as Trump ended up securing the nomination before the convention anyway .
Convention speeches can also shape our politics Let ’ s face it , convention speeches can be a little stilted .
They ’ re usually pretty safe and predictable .
But a few have proven memorable — maybe even influential .
Former New York Gov .
Mario Cuomo ’ s 1984 convention speech certainly deserves at least a brief mention here .
It tackled economic inequality and challenged incumbent President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individualism .
In the words of historian Jeff Shesol , “ It was all the things that Democrats wished themselves to be but no longer felt they were as a party.
” And when Cuomo died in 2015 , some commentators connected his legacy , including the ideas expressed in this speech , to reemerging progressive politics in the Democratic Party , and to figures like Sen. Elizabeth Warren .
Eight years later , Pat Buchanan , a former aide to President Richard Nixon and Reagan and a political commentator , made his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after his somewhat successful challenge to incumbent President George H.W .
Bush .
As part of the socially conservative and more populist wing of the party , Buchanan had long had reservations about Bush , so he used his speaking slot at the convention to talk about the impending “ culture wars.
” His line , “ This election is about more than who gets what .
It is about who we are , ” helped usher in a new form of politics , in which compromise was deemed outdated and outrage became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perhaps the most consequential convention speech of the modern era was delivered by an Illinois state senator in 2004 .
Delivering his remarks in Boston , Barack Obama famously said , “ There is not a liberal America and a conservative America , there is the United States of America.
” By emphasizing the common ties and values across a divided nation , Obama became , if not a household name , a national political figure .
His bid for the presidency four years later still required several hard-fought campaigns , but the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders alike take notice .
Live conventions do not necessarily result in a new platform or nominee .
They may not even persuade very many people .
But in-person proceedings , and the ability to disrupt them , offer an opportunity for voices within the party that are not easily amplified on Zoom .
The story of jeers , walkouts and credential fights is also the story of how the parties have transformed themselves and sorted out their distinct and sometimes competing ideological identities .
The television era , the end of contested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emphasis on party unity have all changed this , but conventions are still a place to resolve conflict within parties .
And in an era with no shortage of political conflict — whether over race , class , gender or public health — losing conventions means we have one less venue where conflict can play out in public view .
Conventions may not be worth the cost or the time , and during a pandemic they ’ re certainly too risky , but moving to a virtual format forever would involve risks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @