fivethirtyeight--2020-05-18--Are These Scandals Going To Hurt Republican Chances Of Holding On To The Senate?

Two senators have come under fire for suspiciously timed stock market trades that came right as the market tumbled in February amid the deepening coronavirus crisis : Republican Sens .
Richard Burr of North Carolina and Kelly Loeffler of Georgia .
Both Burr and Loeffler have been accused of insider trading , and scandals such as this can have electoral repercussions , particularly if either is forced to resign .
But what are the odds this might actually harm Republican chances of holding on to the Senate in November ?
The GOP holds a 53-47 edge over the Democrats in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a path to a majority , it is a narrow one .
Assuming Democratic Sen. Doug Jones is unable to retain his seat in deeply Republican Alabama , Democrats will need to win four seats and also win the vice presidency to take back control .
GOP incumbents facing reelection in at least four states — Arizona , Colorado , Maine and North Carolina ( the other seat , not Burr ’ s ) — look to be in some danger , so Democrats might be able to thread the needle , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a state like Iowa or Montana .
But it would certainly help Democratic chances if more Republican-held seats came into serious contention , which is where Burr and Loeffler might come in .
Let ’ s start with Burr .
As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee , he was privy to daily briefings on the coronavirus before it seriously hit the U.S. On Feb. 13 , the senator sold off a huge share of his portfolio just before the stock market crashed .
The Justice Department is now investigating Burr , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a cellphone owned by the senator .
On Thursday , Burr announced he was temporarily stepping aside as chairman of the Intelligence Committee during the ongoing investigation .
The question now is , will Burr resign ?
Burr ’ s seat isn ’ t up until 2022 , but he could be forced out of office because of the scandal , and if he were , the timing of his departure could definitely affect the 2020 election .
Namely , if Burr resigned before Sept. 4 , there would be a special election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would add another battleground contest to the Senate map .
North Carolina ’ s other seat — held by Republican Sen. Thom Tillis — is already shaping up to be an expensive , hard-fought contest , so another special election in the Tar Heel State could mean double trouble for Republicans .
It ’ s no wonder Tillis has tried to separate himself from the embattled Burr , saying in April that Burr “ owes everybody ” an explanation for the stock sales .
And public opinion is against Burr , too , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ couple of left-leaning firms .
In two March surveys of North Carolina from Data for Progress and Public Policy Polling , half of the respondents said Burr should resign while only about a quarter said he shouldn ’ t .
However , even if some Republicans might want him gone , it seems unlikely Burr would leave office soon enough to necessitate a special election this November , as Republicans really don ’ t want another swing seat in play this year .
But if Burr ’ s position were to become untenable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sept. 4 , a Republican would still be appointed in his place even though North Carolina Gov .
Roy Cooper is a Democrat .
North Carolina law requires the governor to appoint a replacement from a list of three candidates named by the incumbent party .
( Regardless of when a resignation occurred , Cooper would have to appoint a Republican .
But if the resignation happened after Sept. 4 , the seat wouldn ’ t be up for election until 2022 . )
As for Loeffler , she was already up for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a stock trading scandal could hit her hard .
Loeffler has said that third-party account managers handle her portfolio , so she had no input in the trades , but the same day she attended a classified briefing about the coronavirus , she and her husband started selling millions of dollars worth of stock and invested in companies positioned to do well during the pandemic .
Loeffler hasn ’ t said whether the FBI has contacted her , but she provided records of the stock trades to the Justice Department , the Securities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee .
Loeffler already appears to be quite vulnerable in her special election , too , which will be the first time she faces voters since Republican Gov .
Brian Kemp appointed her to the Senate in January .
A late April GOP internal poll conducted by Cygnal found that only 20 percent of voters had a favorable view of Loeffler compared to 47 percent who had an unfavorable impression .
The survey also found her with just 11 percent support , well behind Republican Rep. Doug Collins ’ s 29 percent .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ remember the special election is a jungle primary in which all candidates run regardless of party . )
Granted , the Cygnal poll ’ s sponsor is allied to Collins , but even a survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies on behalf of a group backing Loeffler ally Kemp found her polling at only 18 percent in the special election , about tied with Collins , who had 19 percent .
For his part , Collins has been only too happy to try to connect Burr ’ s case to Loeffler and attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s unclear , though , just how much Loeffler ’ s problems would harm the GOP ’ s chances of retaining the seat .
That is , just because Loeffler may be in trouble , it doesn ’ t mean it ’ ll be easy for Democrats to take over the seat .
After all , Georgia still leans toward the GOP and although former state Rep. Stacey Abrams came close to defeating Kemp in 2018 , the last time a Democrat won a statewide election was in 2006 .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think Republicans will hold the seat .
That said , with six Republicans and eight Democrats on the ballot in the jungle primary ( plus six third-party or independent candidates ) , it ’ s also pretty unlikely that one candidate will win an outright majority in November , which means it ’ s likely headed to a runoff in January 2021 anyway .
Based on early polling , Collins may be the most likely Republican to advance to a runoff , and he might be as good a bet — or a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — for Republicans to hold on to the seat , especially as Georgia Democrats have historically struggled in general election runoffs .
In fact , with eight Democrats running , there ’ s even a chance that it will be Collins and Loeffler who advance to the runoff , ensuring continued Republican control of the seat .
It ’ s worth noting Burr and Loeffler aren ’ t the only senators who have come under scrutiny for their stock trades .
Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California recently spoke with FBI investigators regarding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suspiciously timed stock moves made by Republican Sen. James Inhofe of Oklahoma have also received attention .
However , both the California and Oklahoma seats would be very unlikely to switch parties — California being very Democratic , Oklahoma being very Republican — so even if Feinstein or Inhofe got into trouble , their problems would be very unlikely to affect the makeup of the Senate .
That ’ s not necessarily the case for Burr and Loeffler — especially Burr if he were to resign before Sept. 4 .
Nonetheless , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won ’ t alter the Senate election math in 2020 , either .

Two senators have come under fire for suspiciously timed stock market trades that came right as the market tumbled in February amid the deepening coronavirus crisis: Republican Sens. Richard Burr of North Carolina and Kelly Loeffler of Georgia.
Both Burr and Loeffler have been accused of insider trading, and scandals such as this can have electoral repercussions, particularly if either is forced to resign. But what are the odds this might actually harm Republican chances of holding on to the Senate in November?
The GOP holds a 53-47 edge over the Democrats in the Senate, and while Democrats have a path to a majority, it is a narrow one. Assuming Democratic Sen. Doug Jones is unable to retain his seat in deeply Republican Alabama, Democrats will need to win four seats and also win the vice presidency to take back control. GOP incumbents facing reelection in at least four states — Arizona, Colorado, Maine and North Carolina (the other seat, not Burr’s) — look to be in some danger, so Democrats might be able to thread the needle, especially if they can also win a seat in a state like Iowa or Montana. But it would certainly help Democratic chances if more Republican-held seats came into serious contention, which is where Burr and Loeffler might come in.
Let’s start with Burr. As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, he was privy to daily briefings on the coronavirus before it seriously hit the U.S. On Feb. 13, the senator sold off a huge share of his portfolio just before the stock market crashed. The Justice Department is now investigating Burr, and last Wednesday, the FBI seized a cellphone owned by the senator. On Thursday, Burr announced he was temporarily stepping aside as chairman of the Intelligence Committee during the ongoing investigation.
The question now is, will Burr resign? Burr’s seat isn’t up until 2022, but he could be forced out of office because of the scandal, and if he were, the timing of his departure could definitely affect the 2020 election.
Namely, if Burr resigned before Sept. 4, there would be a special election for the seat this November, which would add another battleground contest to the Senate map. North Carolina’s other seat — held by Republican Sen. Thom Tillis — is already shaping up to be an expensive, hard-fought contest, so another special election in the Tar Heel State could mean double trouble for Republicans. It’s no wonder Tillis has tried to separate himself from the embattled Burr, saying in April that Burr “owes everybody” an explanation for the stock sales. And public opinion is against Burr, too, at least based on polling from a couple of left-leaning firms. In two March surveys of North Carolina from Data for Progress and Public Policy Polling, half of the respondents said Burr should resign while only about a quarter said he shouldn’t.
However, even if some Republicans might want him gone, it seems unlikely Burr would leave office soon enough to necessitate a special election this November, as Republicans really don’t want another swing seat in play this year. But if Burr’s position were to become untenable and he was forced to resign before Sept. 4, a Republican would still be appointed in his place even though North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper is a Democrat. North Carolina law requires the governor to appoint a replacement from a list of three candidates named by the incumbent party. (Regardless of when a resignation occurred, Cooper would have to appoint a Republican. But if the resignation happened after Sept. 4, the seat wouldn’t be up for election until 2022.)
As for Loeffler, she was already up for election in Georgia this November, so a stock trading scandal could hit her hard. Loeffler has said that third-party account managers handle her portfolio, so she had no input in the trades, but the same day she attended a classified briefing about the coronavirus, she and her husband started selling millions of dollars worth of stock and invested in companies positioned to do well during the pandemic. Loeffler hasn’t said whether the FBI has contacted her, but she provided records of the stock trades to the Justice Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Senate Ethics Committee.
Loeffler already appears to be quite vulnerable in her special election, too, which will be the first time she faces voters since Republican Gov. Brian Kemp appointed her to the Senate in January. A late April GOP internal poll conducted by Cygnal found that only 20 percent of voters had a favorable view of Loeffler compared to 47 percent who had an unfavorable impression. The survey also found her with just 11 percent support, well behind Republican Rep. Doug Collins’s 29 percent. (If that seems especially low, remember the special election is a jungle primary in which all candidates run regardless of party.)
Granted, the Cygnal poll’s sponsor is allied to Collins, but even a survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies on behalf of a group backing Loeffler ally Kemp found her polling at only 18 percent in the special election, about tied with Collins, who had 19 percent. For his part, Collins has been only too happy to try to connect Burr’s case to Loeffler and attack Loeffler over her own stock dealings.
It’s unclear, though, just how much Loeffler’s problems would harm the GOP’s chances of retaining the seat. That is, just because Loeffler may be in trouble, it doesn’t mean it’ll be easy for Democrats to take over the seat. After all, Georgia still leans toward the GOP and although former state Rep. Stacey Abrams came close to defeating Kemp in 2018, the last time a Democrat won a statewide election was in 2006. At this point, major election handicappers still think Republicans will hold the seat.
That said, with six Republicans and eight Democrats on the ballot in the jungle primary (plus six third-party or independent candidates), it’s also pretty unlikely that one candidate will win an outright majority in November, which means it’s likely headed to a runoff in January 2021 anyway. Based on early polling, Collins may be the most likely Republican to advance to a runoff, and he might be as good a bet — or a better one given Loeffler’s troubles — for Republicans to hold on to the seat, especially as Georgia Democrats have historically struggled in general election runoffs. In fact, with eight Democrats running, there’s even a chance that it will be Collins and Loeffler who advance to the runoff, ensuring continued Republican control of the seat.
It’s worth noting Burr and Loeffler aren’t the only senators who have come under scrutiny for their stock trades. Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California recently spoke with FBI investigators regarding deals made by her husband, and suspiciously timed stock moves made by Republican Sen. James Inhofe of Oklahoma have also received attention. However, both the California and Oklahoma seats would be very unlikely to switch parties — California being very Democratic, Oklahoma being very Republican — so even if Feinstein or Inhofe got into trouble, their problems would be very unlikely to affect the makeup of the Senate. That’s not necessarily the case for Burr and Loeffler — especially Burr if he were to resign before Sept. 4. Nonetheless, it’s still a longshot that likely won’t alter the Senate election math in 2020, either.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Does Trump Really Want A Fight With Obama?


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-18--Are Older Voters Turning Away From Trump?

There are different “ gaps ” in American politics , but one that has consistently shown up in recent presidential elections is the age gap .
That is , younger voters tend to vote more Democratic and older voters tend to vote more Republican .
In 2016 , for instance , President Trump performed best among voters 65 years and older .
He also won among those between the ages of 45 and 64 .
So looking ahead to November , you might expect Trump to once again do well with older voters .
However , recent public polls — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polling — suggest that Trump may be doing worse among older voters against former Vice President Joe Biden , the presumptive Democratic nominee .
In national head-to-head polls conducted since April 1 , Trump is barely breaking even with most older Americans — and in some age groups , he ’ s even trailing Biden by as much as 1.4 points ( see 45- to 64-year-olds ) .
( Pollsters don ’ t all use the same age brackets , so there is some overlap in the different age categories . )
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among voters age 65 and older .
Four years ago , Trump bested Hillary Clinton by 13 points , 55 percent to 42 percent , according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study , a survey of more than 60,000 voters organized by Harvard University and administered by YouGov .
But now Biden narrowly leads Trump 48 percent to 47 percent , based on an average of 48 national polls that included that age group .
If those figures hold until November , they would represent a seismic shift in the voting behavior of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last Democratic nominee who won voters 65 and older was Al Gore in 2000 , according to national exit poll data .
But at the time , that was the trend .
Older Americans — those who came of age during the Great Depression and New Deal era , a period in which the Democratic Party was dominant — were disproportionately Democratic-leaning in the late 1990s and early 2000s .
And political science has found evidence that party loyalties developed at a young age can persist over the course of a person ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just among voters 65 and older where Trump is slipping .
He ’ s also fallen almost as far among voters 55 and older .
Trump is essentially tied with Biden among that age group , even after winning these voters by 10 points in 2016 , 53 percent to 43 percent , according to the CCES .
Trump ’ s numbers have also fallen with 45- to 64-year-olds , as well as 50- to 64-year-olds ( an alternate category employed by many pollsters ) , but the last Democrat to win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2008 — albeit barely , 50 percent to 49 percent .
We don ’ t have as much state-level polling to work with , but there ’ s evidence that Biden is also doing better with older voters in some key swing states .
Take two recent surveys from Florida , a state with one of the oldest populations in the country .
A Fox News poll from mid-April found Biden with a slim 3-point lead over Trump and running even among voters 45 and older , while a Quinnipiac University survey from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points overall in Florida and leading Trump 52 percent to 42 percent among voters 65 and older .
If this holds , this would represent a big swing from 2016 , when Trump won Florida voters 45 and older by 13 points , and those 65 and older by 22 points , according to the CCES .
But that ’ s a big if .
Polls can — and will — shift between now and Election Day .
We averaged a large number of national polls in our analysis ( 54 in total @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wide range in the margins from pollster to pollster .
Part of that comes down to the challenges of estimating data for subgroups — like different age groups — which have smaller sample sizes and larger margins of error .
But there were also sizable differences from pollster to pollster , even those using large sample sizes .
For instance , in early April , the Pew Research Center found Biden trailing Trump by 9 points among those 65 and older , more in line with Trump ’ s 2016 margin .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Consult found Biden and Trump about tied , on average , among that same age group .
Democrats also tend to poll better among registered voters than among likely voters , the group most pollsters are interviewing now , so Biden ’ s overall lead might be smaller among those most likely to vote in November .
Still , an average of recent tracking polls from Firehouse Strategies/Øptimus — one of the only pollsters currently using a likely-voter screen — has Biden up by 2 points among those 65 and older and up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 64-year-olds .
So he holds a small lead , but nevertheless , it ’ s still a sign that Trump is currently underwater with older voters .
Going forward , we ’ ll keep a careful eye on things to see if this shift in voter sentiment holds .
Because if it does , it could have a major impact on the outcome in November .

There are different “gaps” in American politics, but one that has consistently shown up in recent presidential elections is the age gap. That is, younger voters tend to vote more Democratic and older voters tend to vote more Republican.
In 2016, for instance, President Trump performed best among voters 65 years and older. He also won among those between the ages of 45 and 64. So looking ahead to November, you might expect Trump to once again do well with older voters. However, recent public polls — and the president’s own private polling — suggest that Trump may be doing worse among older voters against former Vice President Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee.
In national head-to-head polls conducted since April 1, Trump is barely breaking even with most older Americans — and in some age groups, he’s even trailing Biden by as much as 1.4 points (see 45- to 64-year-olds). (Pollsters don’t all use the same age brackets, so there is some overlap in the different age categories.)
Trump is polling worse with older voters than in 2016 Comparison of Donald Trump’s 2016 vote margin and the average margin in national head-to-head polls between Trump and Joe Biden since April 1, by different age groups Age group Trump 2016 margin Trump 2020 margin Difference 45 to 64 +4.0 -1.4 -5.4 50 to 64 +5.8 +0.6 -5.2 55+ +9.9 -0.4 -10.3 65+ +13.3 -1.0 -14.3 Polls were averaged by pollster to avoid overweighting one pollster. Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Polls
The most startling shift, though, is among voters age 65 and older. Four years ago, Trump bested Hillary Clinton by 13 points, 55 percent to 42 percent, according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a survey of more than 60,000 voters organized by Harvard University and administered by YouGov. But now Biden narrowly leads Trump 48 percent to 47 percent, based on an average of 48 national polls that included that age group. If those figures hold until November, they would represent a seismic shift in the voting behavior of America’s oldest voters.
The last Democratic nominee who won voters 65 and older was Al Gore in 2000, according to national exit poll data. But at the time, that was the trend. Older Americans — those who came of age during the Great Depression and New Deal era, a period in which the Democratic Party was dominant — were disproportionately Democratic-leaning in the late 1990s and early 2000s. And political science has found evidence that party loyalties developed at a young age can persist over the course of a person’s life.
But it’s not just among voters 65 and older where Trump is slipping. He’s also fallen almost as far among voters 55 and older. Trump is essentially tied with Biden among that age group, even after winning these voters by 10 points in 2016, 53 percent to 43 percent, according to the CCES. Trump’s numbers have also fallen with 45- to 64-year-olds, as well as 50- to 64-year-olds (an alternate category employed by many pollsters), but the last Democrat to win 45- to 64-year-olds was Barack Obama in 2008 — albeit barely, 50 percent to 49 percent.
We don’t have as much state-level polling to work with, but there’s evidence that Biden is also doing better with older voters in some key swing states. Take two recent surveys from Florida, a state with one of the oldest populations in the country. A Fox News poll from mid-April found Biden with a slim 3-point lead over Trump and running even among voters 45 and older, while a Quinnipiac University survey from the same period found Biden up 4 points overall in Florida and leading Trump 52 percent to 42 percent among voters 65 and older. If this holds, this would represent a big swing from 2016, when Trump won Florida voters 45 and older by 13 points, and those 65 and older by 22 points, according to the CCES.
But that’s a big if. Polls can — and will — shift between now and Election Day. We averaged a large number of national polls in our analysis (54 in total), but there was still a wide range in the margins from pollster to pollster. Part of that comes down to the challenges of estimating data for subgroups — like different age groups — which have smaller sample sizes and larger margins of error. But there were also sizable differences from pollster to pollster, even those using large sample sizes. For instance, in early April, the Pew Research Center found Biden trailing Trump by 9 points among those 65 and older, more in line with Trump’s 2016 margin. But throughout April and early May, Morning Consult found Biden and Trump about tied, on average, among that same age group. Democrats also tend to poll better among registered voters than among likely voters, the group most pollsters are interviewing now, so Biden’s overall lead might be smaller among those most likely to vote in November.
Still, an average of recent tracking polls from Firehouse Strategies/Øptimus — one of the only pollsters currently using a likely-voter screen — has Biden up by 2 points among those 65 and older and up by about 7 points among 45- to 64-year-olds. So he holds a small lead, but nevertheless, it’s still a sign that Trump is currently underwater with older voters. Going forward, we’ll keep a careful eye on things to see if this shift in voter sentiment holds. Because if it does, it could have a major impact on the outcome in November.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Why COVID-19 conspiracy theories are spreading


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-19--Why Democrats Can’t Rely On Voter Anger This November

One dominating response to Donald Trump ’ s presidency has been anger .
Trump has stoked outrage among his supporters , who have echoed his rhetoric and fury , and his detractors , who have launched anti-Trump resistance protests and helped recruit new congressional candidates in 2018 .
It has also set the mood for the 2020 election .
There ’ s only one problem for Democrats looking to replicate Barack Obama ’ s multiracial coalition : The voters most energized by anger are white .
According to the book “ The Anger Gap ” by political scientist Davin Phoenix @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans — are a lot more likely to be motivated by anger than black Americans and , to a lesser extent , Latino and Asian Americans .
White Americans , Phoenix finds , express more anger about politics in public opinion polls , and they ’ re also more likely to turn out to vote because they are angry .
Since 1980 , he finds , black Democrats have been seven points less likely to report feeling angry about the Republican presidential candidate than white Democrats , according to data from the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power leveraged from being mad as hell is largely reserved only for white Americans , ” he writes .
Many of the underlying reasons , Phoenix argues , are systemic .
Simply put , nonwhite voters have far fewer expectations of the political system working for them .
Instead , Phoenix found nonwhite voters are more likely to be motivated to vote if they feel pride or hope — as they did in 2008 due to Obama ’ s historic presidential nomination .
Expressing anger is also difficult for nonwhite voters to navigate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the “ potential stigma that comes from the label of being an angry black woman or an angry black man , ” Phoenix told me .
White Democrats and Republicans , in contrast , haven ’ t been afraid to publicly display their polarized opinions in the Trump era — on protest signs and in online comments and polls .
Increased anger isn ’ t a new phenomenon , but it is a rising one .
Political scientist Steven Webster argues in his book , “ American Rage , ” that this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ culmination of a long pattern of increased anger in American politics .
Webster finds that politicians in both parties and those who appear on partisan cable news channels increasingly use angry rhetoric , especially in election years , fueling the fire .
Public anger , in turn , fuels negative impressions of the other party and declining trust in government .
But if 2020 is an election driven primarily by anger , that might backfire on Democrats .
Take the 2016 election .
One reason former Sen. Hillary Clinton was less successful in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her focus on Trump ’ s bigoted comments attracted some who shared her views but did not resonate with nonwhite voters .
“ The Clinton campaign bet big on the strategy of highlighting the racist and xenophobic undertones of the Trump campaign , ” Phoenix writes , “ but its ‘ basket of deplorables ’ messaging appeared to engender more of a rise from Trump supporters falling under this label than people of color feeling targeted .
… [ It was ] a severe miscalculation of the way people of color respond to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden faces enormous pressure to turn out nonwhite voters in 2020 , but if 2016 is any indication , liberal policy positions alone won ’ t be enough .
Because like the broader anti-Trump resistance movement , the leftward movement of the Democratic Party has been most pronounced among white voters .
Even on issues of race , nonwhite voters are no longer significantly more liberal than white Democrats .
And research finds that many African American voters identify as conservative despite their strong collective identification with the Democratic Party .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic — 88 percent in 2016 — but Biden shouldn ’ t take that support for granted .
That was down from 94 percent in 2012 , and there is growing evidence that those who don ’ t vote regularly are less likely to support Democrats .
And some early polls show Biden is already lagging behind Clinton in support among nonwhite voters .
Black voters formed the bedrock of Biden ’ s victory in the Democratic primaries , but Phoenix does not see that necessarily translating into motivation to vote in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for Biden in the primaries spoke more to black voters ’ skepticism that the broader electorate would support a less conventional candidate against Trump in the general election than their enthusiasm for Biden .
But it is possible for Biden to make gains .
In the book “ Steadfast Democrats , ” political scientists and FiveThirtyEight contributors Ismail White and Chryl Laird found that one reason black voters are so loyal to the Democratic Party is because of the social pressure they face from other black voters .
So if Biden is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the black community — as he did in South Carolina in the primary — that could help him turn out African American voters in November .
It ’ s also possible that his role as Obama ’ s former vice president could carry additional weight .
“ If you want blacks to support you , you have to get the people within their social networks to help mobilize them in terms of helping to ensure a high turnout , ” said White .
Unfortunately , thanks to the coronavirus pandemic , that ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently homebound campaign to heed at the moment .
But he will need to keep it in mind .
He can not count on anger at Trump to be motivation enough for voters who aren ’ t white .

One dominating response to Donald Trump’s presidency has been anger.
Trump has stoked outrage among his supporters, who have echoed his rhetoric and fury, and his detractors, who have launched anti-Trump resistance protests and helped recruit new congressional candidates in 2018. It has also set the mood for the 2020 election. There’s only one problem for Democrats looking to replicate Barack Obama’s multiracial coalition: The voters most energized by anger are white.
According to the book “The Anger Gap” by political scientist Davin Phoenix, white Americans — both Democrats and Republicans — are a lot more likely to be motivated by anger than black Americans and, to a lesser extent, Latino and Asian Americans. White Americans, Phoenix finds, express more anger about politics in public opinion polls, and they’re also more likely to turn out to vote because they are angry. Since 1980, he finds, black Democrats have been seven points less likely to report feeling angry about the Republican presidential candidate than white Democrats, according to data from the American National Election Studies.
“The political power leveraged from being mad as hell is largely reserved only for white Americans,” he writes.
Many of the underlying reasons, Phoenix argues, are systemic. Simply put, nonwhite voters have far fewer expectations of the political system working for them. Instead, Phoenix found nonwhite voters are more likely to be motivated to vote if they feel pride or hope — as they did in 2008 due to Obama’s historic presidential nomination.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Does Trump Really Want A Fight With Obama?
Expressing anger is also difficult for nonwhite voters to navigate politically — especially black voters. There is the “potential stigma that comes from the label of being an angry black woman or an angry black man,” Phoenix told me. White Democrats and Republicans, in contrast, haven’t been afraid to publicly display their polarized opinions in the Trump era — on protest signs and in online comments and polls.
Increased anger isn’t a new phenomenon, but it is a rising one. Political scientist Steven Webster argues in his book, “American Rage,” that this current moment of partisan rancor is the culmination of a long pattern of increased anger in American politics. Webster finds that politicians in both parties and those who appear on partisan cable news channels increasingly use angry rhetoric, especially in election years, fueling the fire. Public anger, in turn, fuels negative impressions of the other party and declining trust in government.
But if 2020 is an election driven primarily by anger, that might backfire on Democrats. Take the 2016 election. One reason former Sen. Hillary Clinton was less successful in mobilizing Obama’s base was because her focus on Trump’s bigoted comments attracted some who shared her views but did not resonate with nonwhite voters. “The Clinton campaign bet big on the strategy of highlighting the racist and xenophobic undertones of the Trump campaign,” Phoenix writes, “but its ‘basket of deplorables’ messaging appeared to engender more of a rise from Trump supporters falling under this label than people of color feeling targeted. … [It was] a severe miscalculation of the way people of color respond to political threats.”
Former Vice President Joe Biden faces enormous pressure to turn out nonwhite voters in 2020, but if 2016 is any indication, liberal policy positions alone won’t be enough. Because like the broader anti-Trump resistance movement, the leftward movement of the Democratic Party has been most pronounced among white voters. Even on issues of race, nonwhite voters are no longer significantly more liberal than white Democrats. And research finds that many African American voters identify as conservative despite their strong collective identification with the Democratic Party.
It’s true that black voters overwhelmingly vote Democratic — 88 percent in 2016 — but Biden shouldn’t take that support for granted. That was down from 94 percent in 2012, and there is growing evidence that those who don’t vote regularly are less likely to support Democrats. And some early polls show Biden is already lagging behind Clinton in support among nonwhite voters.
Black voters formed the bedrock of Biden’s victory in the Democratic primaries, but Phoenix does not see that necessarily translating into motivation to vote in the general election. He argues that robust support for Biden in the primaries spoke more to black voters’ skepticism that the broader electorate would support a less conventional candidate against Trump in the general election than their enthusiasm for Biden.
But it is possible for Biden to make gains. In the book “Steadfast Democrats,” political scientists and FiveThirtyEight contributors Ismail White and Chryl Laird found that one reason black voters are so loyal to the Democratic Party is because of the social pressure they face from other black voters. So if Biden is able to successfully energize key leaders in the black community — as he did in South Carolina in the primary — that could help him turn out African American voters in November. It’s also possible that his role as Obama’s former vice president could carry additional weight.
“If you want blacks to support you, you have to get the people within their social networks to help mobilize them in terms of helping to ensure a high turnout,” said White. Unfortunately, thanks to the coronavirus pandemic, that’s hard advice for Biden’s currently homebound campaign to heed at the moment. But he will need to keep it in mind. He cannot count on anger at Trump to be motivation enough for voters who aren’t white.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-19--Why Is President Trump Taking Hydroxychloroquine?

cwick ( Chadwick Matlin , deputy editor ) : Clare , Kaleigh and Maggie , thanks for joining me to talk about the president ’ s medicine cabinet .
Yesterday , President Trump revealed that he ’ s taking hydroxychloroquine , an anti-malarial medication , to help prevent him from contracting COVID-19 .
Trump ’ s comments were the culmination of his interest in the drug , which he has hyped for months as a way to help fight the pandemic .
Let ’ s talk about what the science says about hydroxychloroquine , what Trump has said about it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he ’ s taking it .
So , let ’ s start with the science , which is about the only thing that can ground us in this frenzied moment .
Can hydroxychloroquine prevent someone from getting COVID-19 ?
clare.malone ( Clare Malone , senior political writer ) : ( Readers can , on their own time , imagine what else is in the president ’ s gold-plated medicine cabinet . )
maggie ( Maggie Koerth , senior science writer ) : What we ’ re basically looking at here is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chad .
kaleigh ( Kaleigh Rogers , science and politics reporter ) : The results from the few studies that have been done are mixed , at best .
Some have found hydroxychloroquine reduced the duration of COVID-19 , others have found no difference between using the drug and not , and at least one found there was actually a worse outcome for patients who were on hydroxychloroquine versus those who were not .
maggie : There are ongoing studies of better quality happening — I ’ m particularly interested in one that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcomes in lupus patients who were already taking hydroxychloroquine for their chronic illness — but we just don ’ t have evidence to say it does anything .
kaleigh : We do know from past trials of hydroxychloroquine that it can cause abnormal heart rhythms , so the president ’ s claim that there ’ s no harm in trying it is not based on evidence .
This isn ’ t like taking vitamin C. cwick : And are these all studies that test for whether hydroxychloroquine prevents COVID-19 ?
Or are they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disease ?
kaleigh : Most trials I ’ ve seen are to treat COVID-19 , not to prevent it .
( Though there is at least one trial currently testing it out for preventive use . )
cwick : So Trump ’ s decision to take it preventively complicates things further .
We ’ re in the dearth-iest corner of the dearth of evidence .
maggie : You have the science side of things , which is mostly proceeding as it ought to , and you have the political side , which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cwick : With that said , Clare , why is Trump doing this ?
Or maybe the better question : Why is Trump telling us he ’ s doing it ?
clare.malone : On a personal level , Trump is likely taking it because of the recent infections of White House staff and because , well , as we all know , he ’ s a germaphobe !
But I think it ’ s a piece of his public response to the outbreak .
He attempted , in a quite pitched way at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things were not as bad as they were made out to be .
He promised a non-entity of a disease at first and compared it to the flu .
The idea of taking this drug plays into all that , in a more tamped-down way , because he ’ s offering the public a sort of “ cure ” or hope .
I don ’ t think it ’ s a slip of the tongue , but it is a key part of his own thinking about the virus and a key part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it in public .
cwick : That ’ s interesting , Clare .
One of the defining characteristics of this disease has been its uncertainty .
That ’ s in part because we haven ’ t known how to treat those who are sick ( let alone make the rest of us immune ) .
Trump seems to be saying : If a medication is good enough to make the president feel safer , it ’ s good enough to make you feel safer .
maggie : I ’ m interested , Clare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidents get so specific in their hope-peddling before .
It seems normal for a president to say , “ Oh there ’ s all this research being done and we will have options , let ’ s fund them.
” But it feels to me like Trump has uniquely used the bully pulpit to tout specific products — hydroxychloroquine , that Abbott Laboratories test — when there was more than one option out there .
And it ’ s come back to bite him multiple times .
Because when science is moving fast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” are going to fail at first .
Pinning hope on specific brands and products seems like a real risk he ’ s taken on .
clare.malone : Right , Chad .
The president has gotten A TON of flak for his refusal to wear a mask , but that ’ s also part of his messaging !
It ’ s certainly odd that he ’ s taking this drug and not wearing a mask , but he ’ s a big believer in the sort of traditional displays of “ masculine ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public likes to see .
His no-mask thing is the pandemic equivalent of presidential candidates not wearing winter coats while campaigning in Iowa in January .
cwick : This isn ’ t about promoting promising research , or the latest trial results .
He is , in effect , becoming part of the trial himself .
kaleigh : Except it ’ s not controlled , randomized or blind , so his “ trial ” is scientifically meaningless .
I drink coffee every day and haven ’ t gotten COVID-19 yet — maybe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This is the logic of anecdotal evidence .
maggie : So this reminds me of the study I saw about how men were significantly less likely than women to take non-pharmaceutical preventive measures in a health crisis , like wearing masks , but were more likely than women to take pharmaceutical measures .
kaleigh : His announcement that he ’ s taking it certainly felt defiant , like he ’ s doubling down in spite of the evidence .
He also spent some time yesterday criticizing a Veterans Affairs study , which found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ higher risk of death .
cwick : Kaleigh , your point about the VA study is super interesting .
We ’ ve seen how the president can dismiss news and findings that run counter to the narrative he wants to promote , and part of his political struggle during this crisis has been knowing when to embrace the science and when to reject it out of hand .
By putting his chips in on one drug , the drug itself becomes a cause to rally behind , and news that disputes its power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Essentially , hydroxychloroquine has become part of the White House policy agenda .
clare.malone : Also , if you ’ ve eschewed a lot of the science in your initial stages of your response , you might as well bet big on a miracle cure , right ?
Maybe you ’ ll be right and people will credit with you being early to the party .
Americans do love pharmaceutical solutions to their problems .
Shoutout here to former Sen. Bob Dole , the OG American politician-pharmaceuticals spokesman .
kaleigh : It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this one possible treatment , though .
The antiviral drug Remdesivir , by contrast , actually has some promising early results .
Why is Trump so interested in hydroxychloroquine ?
He has scoffed at questions about whether he , say , owns stock in a company that produces the drug , but he also hasn ’ t provided a lot of explanation about why he ’ s so fascinated with it .
cwick : Some would have you believe that it might be an issue of cronyism .
Here ’ s the New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ associates of Mr. Trump ’ s have financial interests in the issue .
Sanofi ’ s largest shareholders include Fisher Asset Management , the investment company run by Ken Fisher , a major donor to Republicans , including Mr. Trump .
A spokesman for Mr. Fisher declined to comment.
” clare.malone : It ’ s a good question .
I ’ m a bit skeptical of the stock interests answer , since what Trump seems to own is quite negligible .
But to Chad ’ s point , Trump ’ s personal phone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to friends outside the White House !
In the initial stages of the crisis , there ’ s a sense that he was hesitant to trigger portions of the Defense Production Act because of feedback from the Chamber of Commerce and private industry .
maggie : And meanwhile , his political advocacy has pushed for millions to be spent on it … supplies acquired by the VA and the Strategic National Stockpile .
kaleigh : One thing is clear : When Trump touts a treatment , interest goes up .
Not only do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one online prescription service reported a nearly six-fold increase in demand for hydroxychloroquine prescriptions after Trump first mentioned the drug .
maggie : We know there were people from the anti-vaccine movement promoting the so-called ” miracle mineral solution ” to him — a pseudoscience “ treatment ” that basically amounts to industrial bleach — before he spent that one press conference talking about treating yourself with disinfectant .
clare.malone : And we know Trump is susceptible to anti-vaxxers from earlier in his time in public life .
maggie : I can see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work in real estate — hot backdoor tips from buddies .
But that doesn ’ t really work in science .
clare.malone : But isn ’ t it more politics masquerading as science ?
Which might be the whole problem .
cwick : Right , it seems like we ’ re all arriving at the same terminus : The president has long demonstrated a contrarian approach to science , so his taking hydroxychloroquine despite iffy science is as much about the political as it is about the personal .
kaleigh : What is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drug and also continue to tout it against all current evidence ?
clare.malone : Momentum .
You ’ ve already been saying it : Why stop saying it ?
!
You ’ ll just look more fallible .
cwick : Politicians don ’ t like to be wrong .
maggie : This politician in particular really doesn ’ t like to be wrong — maybe even more so than others .
clare.malone : It ’ s the spin zone , y ’ all !
Hop on in .
It ’ s dark , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
kaleigh : Right , changing your mind based on new and better information is bad in politics , for some reason .
clare.malone : Is it ?
?
That ’ s actually an interesting question .
cwick : I ’ d say that I ’ m reconsidering , but then you ’ d think I was weak…

cwick (Chadwick Matlin, deputy editor): Clare, Kaleigh and Maggie, thanks for joining me to talk about the president’s medicine cabinet. Yesterday, President Trump revealed that he’s taking hydroxychloroquine, an anti-malarial medication, to help prevent him from contracting COVID-19. Trump’s comments were the culmination of his interest in the drug, which he has hyped for months as a way to help fight the pandemic. Let’s talk about what the science says about hydroxychloroquine, what Trump has said about it, and what it says about Trump that he’s taking it.
Trump says heâs taking hydroxychloroquine
So, let’s start with the science, which is about the only thing that can ground us in this frenzied moment. Can hydroxychloroquine prevent someone from getting COVID-19?
clare.malone (Clare Malone, senior political writer): (Readers can, on their own time, imagine what else is in the president’s gold-plated medicine cabinet.)
maggie (Maggie Koerth, senior science writer): What we’re basically looking at here is a massive lack of evidence for anything, Chad.
kaleigh (Kaleigh Rogers, science and politics reporter): The results from the few studies that have been done are mixed, at best. Some have found hydroxychloroquine reduced the duration of COVID-19, others have found no difference between using the drug and not, and at least one found there was actually a worse outcome for patients who were on hydroxychloroquine versus those who were not.
maggie: There are ongoing studies of better quality happening — I’m particularly interested in one that’s looking at COVID-19 incidence and outcomes in lupus patients who were already taking hydroxychloroquine for their chronic illness — but we just don’t have evidence to say it does anything.
kaleigh: We do know from past trials of hydroxychloroquine that it can cause abnormal heart rhythms, so the president’s claim that there’s no harm in trying it is not based on evidence. This isn’t like taking vitamin C.
cwick: And are these all studies that test for whether hydroxychloroquine prevents COVID-19? Or are they testing whether it improves treatment of the disease?
kaleigh: Most trials I’ve seen are to treat COVID-19, not to prevent it. (Though there is at least one trial currently testing it out for preventive use.)
cwick: So Trump’s decision to take it preventively complicates things further. We’re in the dearth-iest corner of the dearth of evidence.
maggie: You have the science side of things, which is mostly proceeding as it ought to, and you have the political side, which is full of hype and boom-or-bust demand.
cwick: With that said, Clare, why is Trump doing this? Or maybe the better question: Why is Trump telling us he’s doing it?
clare.malone: On a personal level, Trump is likely taking it because of the recent infections of White House staff and because, well, as we all know, he’s a germaphobe!
But I think it’s a piece of his public response to the outbreak. He attempted, in a quite pitched way at first, to convince the public that things were not as bad as they were made out to be. He promised a non-entity of a disease at first and compared it to the flu. The idea of taking this drug plays into all that, in a more tamped-down way, because he’s offering the public a sort of “cure” or hope. I don’t think it’s a slip of the tongue, but it is a key part of his own thinking about the virus and a key part of how he wants to talk about it in public.
cwick: That’s interesting, Clare. One of the defining characteristics of this disease has been its uncertainty. That’s in part because we haven’t known how to treat those who are sick (let alone make the rest of us immune). Trump seems to be saying: If a medication is good enough to make the president feel safer, it’s good enough to make you feel safer.
maggie: I’m interested, Clare, in whether we’ve seen presidents get so specific in their hope-peddling before. It seems normal for a president to say, “Oh there’s all this research being done and we will have options, let’s fund them.” But it feels to me like Trump has uniquely used the bully pulpit to tout specific products — hydroxychloroquine, that Abbott Laboratories test — when there was more than one option out there. And it’s come back to bite him multiple times. Because when science is moving fast, most of the “good ideas” are going to fail at first. Pinning hope on specific brands and products seems like a real risk he’s taken on.
clare.malone: Right, Chad. The president has gotten A TON of flak for his refusal to wear a mask, but that’s also part of his messaging! It’s certainly odd that he’s taking this drug and not wearing a mask, but he’s a big believer in the sort of traditional displays of “masculine” strength that American politicians have thought the public likes to see. His no-mask thing is the pandemic equivalent of presidential candidates not wearing winter coats while campaigning in Iowa in January.
cwick: This isn’t about promoting promising research, or the latest trial results. He is, in effect, becoming part of the trial himself.
kaleigh: Except it’s not controlled, randomized or blind, so his “trial” is scientifically meaningless. I drink coffee every day and haven’t gotten COVID-19 yet — maybe that’s a prophylactic, too! This is the logic of anecdotal evidence.
maggie: So this reminds me of the study I saw about how men were significantly less likely than women to take non-pharmaceutical preventive measures in a health crisis, like wearing masks, but were more likely than women to take pharmaceutical measures.
kaleigh: His announcement that he’s taking it certainly felt defiant, like he’s doubling down in spite of the evidence. He also spent some time yesterday criticizing a Veterans Affairs study, which found that patients on hydroxychloroquine actually had a higher risk of death.
cwick: Kaleigh, your point about the VA study is super interesting. We’ve seen how the president can dismiss news and findings that run counter to the narrative he wants to promote, and part of his political struggle during this crisis has been knowing when to embrace the science and when to reject it out of hand. By putting his chips in on one drug, the drug itself becomes a cause to rally behind, and news that disputes its power becomes easier for Trump to critique. Essentially, hydroxychloroquine has become part of the White House policy agenda.
clare.malone: Also, if you’ve eschewed a lot of the science in your initial stages of your response, you might as well bet big on a miracle cure, right? Maybe you’ll be right and people will credit with you being early to the party. Americans do love pharmaceutical solutions to their problems.
Shoutout here to former Sen. Bob Dole, the OG American politician-pharmaceuticals spokesman.
kaleigh: It is strange that he got so fixated on this one possible treatment, though. The antiviral drug Remdesivir, by contrast, actually has some promising early results. Why is Trump so interested in hydroxychloroquine? He has scoffed at questions about whether he, say, owns stock in a company that produces the drug, but he also hasn’t provided a lot of explanation about why he’s so fascinated with it.
cwick: Some would have you believe that it might be an issue of cronyism. Here’s the New York Times from April: “Some associates of Mr. Trump’s have financial interests in the issue. Sanofi’s largest shareholders include Fisher Asset Management, the investment company run by Ken Fisher, a major donor to Republicans, including Mr. Trump. A spokesman for Mr. Fisher declined to comment.”
clare.malone: It’s a good question. I’m a bit skeptical of the stock interests answer, since what Trump seems to own is quite negligible. But to Chad’s point, Trump’s personal phone line is always known to be open to friends outside the White House! In the initial stages of the crisis, there’s a sense that he was hesitant to trigger portions of the Defense Production Act because of feedback from the Chamber of Commerce and private industry.
maggie: And meanwhile, his political advocacy has pushed for millions to be spent on it … supplies acquired by the VA and the Strategic National Stockpile.
kaleigh: One thing is clear: When Trump touts a treatment, interest goes up. Not only do Google searches soar, but at least one online prescription service reported a nearly six-fold increase in demand for hydroxychloroquine prescriptions after Trump first mentioned the drug.
maggie: We know there were people from the anti-vaccine movement promoting the so-called ”miracle mineral solution” to him — a pseudoscience “treatment” that basically amounts to industrial bleach — before he spent that one press conference talking about treating yourself with disinfectant.
clare.malone: And we know Trump is susceptible to anti-vaxxers from earlier in his time in public life.
maggie: I can see why the open phone line thing would work in real estate — hot backdoor tips from buddies. But that doesn’t really work in science.
clare.malone: But isn’t it more politics masquerading as science? Which might be the whole problem.
cwick: Right, it seems like we’re all arriving at the same terminus: The president has long demonstrated a contrarian approach to science, so his taking hydroxychloroquine despite iffy science is as much about the political as it is about the personal.
kaleigh: What is the political motivation to fixate on one drug and also continue to tout it against all current evidence?
clare.malone: Momentum. You’ve already been saying it: Why stop saying it?! You’ll just look more fallible.
cwick: Politicians don’t like to be wrong.
maggie: This politician in particular really doesn’t like to be wrong — maybe even more so than others.
clare.malone: It’s the spin zone, y’all! Hop on in. It’s dark, but that’s what it is.
kaleigh: Right, changing your mind based on new and better information is bad in politics, for some reason.
clare.malone: Flip flopping.
cwick: It’s considered bad in broader society, too!
clare.malone: Is it?? That’s actually an interesting question.
cwick: I’d say that I’m reconsidering, but then you’d think I was weak…


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-19--Does Trump Really Want A Fight With Obama?

On this week ’ s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the team looks into evidence that the response to the new @ @ @ @ @ .
They also discuss the rationale for an election year conflict between Obama and Trump @

On this week’s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the team looks into evidence that the response to the new coronavirus has grown more partisan. They also discuss the rationale for an election year conflict between Obama and Trump.


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-19--We’ve Updated Our Pollster Ratings Ahead Of The 2020 General Election

The competitive phase of the 2020 presidential primaries is over — which means we ’ ve updated FiveThirtyEight ’ s pollster ratings .
These ratings cover this year ’ s presidential primaries , the 2019 gubernatorial elections and the occasional straggler poll we only just discovered from a past election .
They include polls conducted in the final 21 days before every presidential , U.S. Senate , U.S. House and gubernatorial general election ( including special elections ) , as well as every presidential primary , since 1998 .
We encourage you to check out the new ratings , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you want to gauge its reliability .
So far , it hasn ’ t been a great year for pollsters .
The 2020 presidential primary polls had a weighted average error — i.e.
, the absolute difference between a poll ’ s margin ( between the top two candidates ) and the actual vote share margin — of 10.2 percentage points .
That ’ s roughly tied with the 2016 presidential primaries for the biggest error in primary polling this century .
But we don ’ t blame pollsters too much for this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2020 Democratic primary race changed so quickly .
In the span of a week ( from roughly Feb. 25 to Super Tuesday ) , former Vice President Joe Biden dramatically reversed his electoral fortunes , and surveys just weren ’ t able to keep up with how fast the mood of the electorate was changing .
We can see that by breaking down the error of 2020 primary polls by election date : • Polls of the contests on Super Tuesday had a weighted average error of 12.8 points , with 60 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s big South Carolina win and subsequent endorsements by onetime 2020 presidential contenders former South Bend , Indiana , Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Sen. Amy Klobuchar .
• South Carolina polls had a weighted average error of 17.2 points ( ! )
, and 75 percent of them were conducted mostly before Rep. Jim Clyburn ’ s endorsement of Biden .
• Polls of all other contests — Iowa , New Hampshire , Nevada and every post-Super Tuesday state — had a weighted average error of 7.1 points , which is quite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In addition , some pollsters fared better in the 2020 primaries than others .
We ’ d encourage you not to read too much into a pollster ’ s performance in the 2020 primaries , as it typically takes a larger sample size to ascertain a pollster ’ s true accuracy .
But if there was a “ winner ” for the 2020 primaries , it was Monmouth University , whose average error of 7.5 points was the lowest among firms that released five or more primary polls .
Probably not by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ FiveThirtyEight pollster rating overall — a sterling A+ .
In general , pollsters that use the time-honored methodology of interviewing respondents live over the phone are more reliable than those that use alternative platforms like the internet , and that was mostly true in the 2020 primaries too .
Suffolk University , another live-caller pollster , also performed pretty well ( an average error of 8.0 ) , although Marist College had an off year ( 13.3 ) .
Among online pollsters , YouGov — whose online methodology is more proven than most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost matching Monmouth ’ s accuracy .
The pollster with the highest average error ( at least among those with five or more polls to analyze ) was Change Research , at 16.1 points .
Finally , as is our custom when updating the pollster ratings , let ’ s take a look at the accuracy of polls as a whole through three different lenses — error , “ calling ” elections correctly and statistical bias — each with an accompanying heat map .
The first lens is polling error — a.k.a .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ using so far in this article .
Here ’ s the weighted average error of polls for each election cycle since 1998 , broken down by office .
We already mentioned how polls of the 2020 primaries were not all that accurate historically speaking .
But the limited polls we have for governor and U.S. House races this cycle have been pretty accurate so far .
They had weighted average errors of 4.9 and 6.0 , respectively , which is perfectly normal for these types of elections , although the sample size is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is arguably the best way to think about the accuracy of polls , but there are other lenses too .
But say all you care about is whether polls “ called ” the election correctly — i.e.
, how often the candidate who led a poll ended up winning the election .
We ’ ve got a heat map for that too ( although this isn ’ t our preferred method , as it ’ s a bit simplistic ) .
Overall , since 1998 , polls have picked the winner 79 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measure , the accuracy of 2020 primary polls clocked in at exactly average .
Frankly , though , this isn ’ t a great way to think about polls .
Say a poll had the Republican ahead by 1 point but the Democrat ended up winning the election by 1 point — that ’ s a pretty accurate result even though the winner was incorrectly identified .
On the other hand , if the Republican ended up winning by 20 points , the poll did correctly identify the winner — but the absolute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls of close elections unsurprisingly make the wrong call much more frequently than races where there is no doubt which candidate is going to win .
In both the 2020 primaries and overall , polls showing a blowout ( i.e.
, the leader led by 20 points or more ) picked the correct winner almost all the time , but they were right only about half the time when they showed a lead smaller than 3 points .
This is why , when a poll shows a close race , your takeaway shouldn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leads by 1 point !
” but rather , “ This race is a toss-up.
” Polls ’ true utility isn ’ t in telling us who will win , but rather in roughly how close a race is — and , therefore , how confident we should be in the outcome .
The third and final lens we ’ ll use is polls ’ statistical bias .
Statistical bias is different from error in that it tells us in which direction the error ran — i.e.
, did the polls consistently under- @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Not much has changed in this final table since the last time we published it , because we exclude presidential primaries from calculations of statistical bias ( since all primary candidates belong to the same party ) , but we think it ’ s worth reemphasizing its findings as we enter the 2020 general election .
Those findings : Over the long term , there is no meaningful partisan statistical bias in polling .
All the polls in our data set combine for a weighted average statistical bias of 0.3 points toward Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant biases — and , importantly , it usually runs in the same direction for every office — but there is no pattern from year to year .
In other words , just because polls overestimated Democrats in 2016 does not mean they will do the same in 2020 .
It ’ s good to be aware of the potential for polling error heading into the election , but that error could benefit either party .
In fact , we ’ ve observed that preelection attempts to guess which way the polling error @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knack for being wrong — which could be a coincidence or could reflect very real overcompensation .
So despite a rocky primary season , we recommend that you trust the polls in 2020 .
Of course , “ trust the polls ” doesn ’ t mean trust all the polls ; that ’ s why we have our pollster ratings .
In addition to our handy letter grades , that page contains each pollster ’ s average error , statistical bias and the share of races it called correctly , plus details on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a lot more .
You can also download our entire pollster ratings data set , including all the polls that went into the tables in this article , to investigate further on your own .
( Wondering how much more accurate live-caller polls are than online ones ?
Or which state ’ s polls are the most error-prone ?
Wonder no more . )
For a detailed methodology of the pollster ratings , check out this 2014 article ; we made a few tweaks in 2016 and 2019 , such as giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ e.g.
, “ A/B ” ) to pollsters with a smaller body of work .
There are no methodological changes this year , except we do have a bit of housekeeping that probably only pollsters will be interested in : Starting with our next pollster ratings update ( after the 2020 elections ) , we will no longer give active pollsters a ratings boost for once belonging to the National Council on Public Polls ( a now-defunct polling consortium whose members were committed to methodological transparency ) .
Active pollsters will need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Opinion Research ’ s Transparency Initiative or contribute to the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research archive to get credit in the “ NCPP/AAPOR/Roper ” column , which also determines which pollsters we consider “ gold standard.
” As always , if anyone has any questions about any aspect of the pollster ratings , you can always reach us at polls @ fivethirtyeight.com .
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast : Does Trump Really Want A Fight With Obama ?

The competitive phase of the 2020 presidential primaries is over — which means we’ve updated FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings. These ratings cover this year’s presidential primaries, the 2019 gubernatorial elections and the occasional straggler poll we only just discovered from a past election. They include polls conducted in the final 21 days before every presidential, U.S. Senate, U.S. House and gubernatorial general election (including special elections), as well as every presidential primary, since 1998. We encourage you to check out the new ratings, especially when a new poll comes out and you want to gauge its reliability.
So far, it hasn’t been a great year for pollsters. The 2020 presidential primary polls had a weighted average error — i.e., the absolute difference between a poll’s margin (between the top two candidates) and the actual vote share margin — of 10.2 percentage points. That’s roughly tied with the 2016 presidential primaries for the biggest error in primary polling this century.
But we don’t blame pollsters too much for this: They have some good excuses because the 2020 Democratic primary race changed so quickly. In the span of a week (from roughly Feb. 25 to Super Tuesday), former Vice President Joe Biden dramatically reversed his electoral fortunes, and surveys just weren’t able to keep up with how fast the mood of the electorate was changing. We can see that by breaking down the error of 2020 primary polls by election date:
Polls of the contests on Super Tuesday had a weighted average error of 12.8 points, with 60 percent of them conducted mostly before Biden’s big South Carolina win and subsequent endorsements by onetime 2020 presidential contenders former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Sen. Amy Klobuchar.
South Carolina polls had a weighted average error of 17.2 points (!), and 75 percent of them were conducted mostly before Rep. Jim Clyburn’s endorsement of Biden.
Polls of all other contests — Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and every post-Super Tuesday state — had a weighted average error of 7.1 points, which is quite good by historical standards for primary polls.
One week torpedoed the 2020 primary polls Weighted average error of polls in the final 21 days* before each contest, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database Contest Error Iowa 5.3 New Hampshire 4.9 Nevada 8.8 South Carolina 17.2 Super Tuesday 12.8 March 10 9.7 March 17 6.6 Averages are weighted by the square root of the number of polls that a particular pollster conducted for that particular election date. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis. *Excluding New Hampshire primary polls taken before the Iowa caucuses, other states’ primary polls taken before the New Hampshire primary, and primary polls whose leader or runner-up dropped out before that primary was held.
In addition, some pollsters fared better in the 2020 primaries than others. We’d encourage you not to read too much into a pollster’s performance in the 2020 primaries, as it typically takes a larger sample size to ascertain a pollster’s true accuracy. But if there was a “winner” for the 2020 primaries, it was Monmouth University, whose average error of 7.5 points was the lowest among firms that released five or more primary polls. Probably not by coincidence, Monmouth also has the highest FiveThirtyEight pollster rating overall — a sterling A+.
In general, pollsters that use the time-honored methodology of interviewing respondents live over the phone are more reliable than those that use alternative platforms like the internet, and that was mostly true in the 2020 primaries too. Suffolk University, another live-caller pollster, also performed pretty well (an average error of 8.0), although Marist College had an off year (13.3). Among online pollsters, YouGov — whose online methodology is more proven than most — excelled with a 7.6-point error, almost matching Monmouth’s accuracy. The pollster with the highest average error (at least among those with five or more polls to analyze) was Change Research, at 16.1 points.
The best and worst pollsters of the 2020 primaries Average error of polls in the final 21 days* before 2020 presidential primaries and caucuses, for pollsters that conducted at least five polls, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database Pollster Methodology No. of Polls Average Error Monmouth University Live 7 7.5 YouGov Online 9 7.6 Suffolk University Live 6 8.0 Emerson College IVR/Online/Text 13 8.5 AtlasIntel Online 8 8.8 Data for Progress Online/Text 29 9.3 Point Blank Political Online/Text 6 10.7 Swayable Online 22 12.0 Marist College Live 6 13.3 University of Massachusetts Lowell Online 6 14.0 Change Research Online 7 16.1 *Excluding New Hampshire primary polls taken before the Iowa caucuses, other states’ primary polls taken before the New Hampshire primary, and primary polls whose leader or runner-up dropped out before that primary was held.
Finally, as is our custom when updating the pollster ratings, let’s take a look at the accuracy of polls as a whole through three different lenses — error, “calling” elections correctly and statistical bias — each with an accompanying heat map.
The first lens is polling error — a.k.a. the same metric we’ve been using so far in this article. Here’s the weighted average error of polls for each election cycle since 1998, broken down by office. We already mentioned how polls of the 2020 primaries were not all that accurate historically speaking. But the limited polls we have for governor and U.S. House races this cycle have been pretty accurate so far. They had weighted average errors of 4.9 and 6.0, respectively, which is perfectly normal for these types of elections, although the sample size is still quite small.
2020 primary polls misfired, but the polls are still all right Weighted average error of polls in the final 21 days before elections, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database President Cycle Governor U.S. Senate U.S. House General Primary Combined 1998 8.2 7.5 7.1 7.7 1999-2000 4.8 6.1 4.4 4.4 7.7 5.6 2001-02 5.2 4.8 5.5 5.2 2003-04 4.8 5.0 5.5 3.2 6.9 4.6 2005-06 5.0 4.2 6.2 5.2 2007-08 4.2 4.7 5.7 3.5 7.6 5.4 2009-10 4.8 4.8 6.7 5.7 2011-12 4.9 4.7 5.3 3.7 9.0 5.3 2013-14 4.6 5.4 6.7 5.4 2015-16 5.4 4.9 5.8 4.9 10.3 6.8 2017-18 5.1 4.3 5.0 4.9 2019-20* 4.9 TBD 6.0 TBD 10.2 TBD All years 5.3 5.2 6.1 4.0 9.3 6.0 Averages are weighted by the square root of the number of polls that a particular pollster conducted for that particular type of election in that particular cycle. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis. *The gubernatorial and U.S. House figures are preliminary and based on small sample sizes. Because there are no polls of Senate or presidential general elections to incorporate, no combined score is given.
Quantifying polling error is arguably the best way to think about the accuracy of polls, but there are other lenses too. But say all you care about is whether polls “called” the election correctly — i.e., how often the candidate who led a poll ended up winning the election. We’ve got a heat map for that too (although this isn’t our preferred method, as it’s a bit simplistic). Overall, since 1998, polls have picked the winner 79 percent of the time. And by this measure, the accuracy of 2020 primary polls clocked in at exactly average.
Polls pick the winner 79 percent of the time Weighted average share of polls that correctly identified the winner in the final 21 days before elections, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database President Cycle Governor U.S. Senate U.S. House General Primary Combined 1998 86% 87% 49% 76% 1999-2000 81 84 54 67% 95% 76 2001-02 87 82 73 81 2003-04 76 82 64 79 94 79 2005-06 89 92 73 84 2007-08 95 95 84 94 79 88 2009-10 85 85 77 82 2011-12 91 87 70 82 62 77 2013-14 80 75 76 77 2015-16 68 78 58 71 86 77 2017-18 74 74 79 75 2019-20* 88 TBD 41 TBD 79 TBD All years 82 83 72 79 81 79 Pollsters get half-credit if they show a tie for the lead and one of the leading candidates wins. Averages are weighted by the square root of the number of polls that a particular pollster conducted for that particular type of election in that particular cycle. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis. *The gubernatorial and U.S. House figures are preliminary and based on small sample sizes. Because there are no polls of Senate or presidential general elections to incorporate, no combined score is given.
Frankly, though, this isn’t a great way to think about polls. Say a poll had the Republican ahead by 1 point but the Democrat ended up winning the election by 1 point — that’s a pretty accurate result even though the winner was incorrectly identified. On the other hand, if the Republican ended up winning by 20 points, the poll did correctly identify the winner — but the absolute error was quite large.
Additionally, polls of close elections unsurprisingly make the wrong call much more frequently than races where there is no doubt which candidate is going to win. In both the 2020 primaries and overall, polls showing a blowout (i.e., the leader led by 20 points or more) picked the correct winner almost all the time, but they were right only about half the time when they showed a lead smaller than 3 points.
Polls often miss close races Share of polls that correctly identified the winner in the final 21 days before elections, by how close the poll showed the race % of Polls Picking Winner Margin 2020 Primaries All Races Since 1998 <3 pts 46% 57% 3-6 72 70 6-10 79 84 10-15 75 93 15-20 82 97 ≥20 98 99 Pollsters get half-credit if they show a tie for the lead and one of the leading candidates wins. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis.
This is why, when a poll shows a close race, your takeaway shouldn’t be, “This candidate leads by 1 point!” but rather, “This race is a toss-up.” Polls’ true utility isn’t in telling us who will win, but rather in roughly how close a race is — and, therefore, how confident we should be in the outcome.
The third and final lens we’ll use is polls’ statistical bias. Statistical bias is different from error in that it tells us in which direction the error ran — i.e., did the polls consistently under- or overrate a specific political party? Not much has changed in this final table since the last time we published it, because we exclude presidential primaries from calculations of statistical bias (since all primary candidates belong to the same party), but we think it’s worth reemphasizing its findings as we enter the 2020 general election.
Polling bias is small and unpredictable Weighted average statistical bias of polls in the final 21 days before general elections, among polls in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings database Cycle Governor U.S. Senate U.S. House President Combined 1998 R+5.6 R+4.5 R+0.8 R+3.8 1999-2000 R+0.4 R+2.7 D+1.2 R+2.4 R+1.9 2001-02 D+3.0 D+1.3 D+1.5 D+2.2 2003-04 D+1.7 D+1.1 D+2.7 D+1.1 D+1.5 2005-06 D+0.2 R+1.3 D+0.7 D+0.0 2007-08 R+0.1 D+0.4 D+1.1 D+1.0 D+0.8 2009-10 R+0.1 R+0.7 D+1.7 D+0.6 2011-12 R+1.6 R+3.1 R+2.9 R+2.5 R+2.8 2013-14 D+2.3 D+2.6 D+3.8 D+2.7 2015-16 D+3.3 D+2.7 D+4.1 D+3.3 D+3.0 2017-18 R+0.9 D+0.1 R+0.6 R+0.5 2019-20* D+2.9 TBD D+6.0 TBD TBD All years D+0.5 D+0.1 D+0.8 D+0.3 D+0.3 Bias is calculated only for elections where the top two finishers were a Republican and a Democrat. Therefore, it is not calculated for presidential primaries. Averages are weighted by the square root of the number of polls that a particular pollster conducted for that particular type of election in that particular cycle. Polls that are banned by FiveThirtyEight because we know or suspect they faked data are excluded from the analysis. *The gubernatorial and U.S. House figures are preliminary and based on small sample sizes. Because there are no polls of Senate or presidential races to incorporate, no combined score is given.
Those findings: Over the long term, there is no meaningful partisan statistical bias in polling. All the polls in our data set combine for a weighted average statistical bias of 0.3 points toward Democrats. Individual election cycles can have more significant biases — and, importantly, it usually runs in the same direction for every office — but there is no pattern from year to year. In other words, just because polls overestimated Democrats in 2016 does not mean they will do the same in 2020. It’s good to be aware of the potential for polling error heading into the election, but that error could benefit either party. In fact, we’ve observed that preelection attempts to guess which way the polling error will run seem to have an uncanny knack for being wrong — which could be a coincidence or could reflect very real overcompensation.
So despite a rocky primary season, we recommend that you trust the polls in 2020. Of course, “trust the polls” doesn’t mean trust all the polls; that’s why we have our pollster ratings. In addition to our handy letter grades, that page contains each pollster’s average error, statistical bias and the share of races it called correctly, plus details on whether it adheres to methodological best practices and a lot more. You can also download our entire pollster ratings data set, including all the polls that went into the tables in this article, to investigate further on your own. (Wondering how much more accurate live-caller polls are than online ones? Or which state’s polls are the most error-prone? Wonder no more.)
For a detailed methodology of the pollster ratings, check out this 2014 article; we made a few tweaks in 2016 and 2019, such as giving a “slashed” letter grade (e.g., “A/B”) to pollsters with a smaller body of work. There are no methodological changes this year, except we do have a bit of housekeeping that probably only pollsters will be interested in: Starting with our next pollster ratings update (after the 2020 elections), we will no longer give active pollsters a ratings boost for once belonging to the National Council on Public Polls (a now-defunct polling consortium whose members were committed to methodological transparency). Active pollsters will need to participate in the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s Transparency Initiative or contribute to the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research archive to get credit in the “NCPP/AAPOR/Roper” column, which also determines which pollsters we consider “gold standard.” As always, if anyone has any questions about any aspect of the pollster ratings, you can always reach us at polls@fivethirtyeight.com.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Does Trump Really Want A Fight With Obama?


fivethirtyeight--2020-05-19--Why Anger At Trump May Not Help Democrats Win

One dominating response to Donald Trump ’ s presidency has been anger .
Trump has stoked outrage among his supporters , who have echoed his rhetoric and fury , and his detractors , who have launched anti-Trump resistance protests and helped recruit new congressional candidates in 2018 .
It has also set the mood for the 2020 election .
There ’ s only one problem for Democrats looking to replicate Barack Obama ’ s multiracial coalition : The voters most energized by anger are white .
According to the book “ The Anger Gap ” by political scientist Davin Phoenix @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans — are a lot more likely to be motivated by anger than black Americans and , to a lesser extent , Latino and Asian Americans .
White Americans , Phoenix finds , express more anger about politics in public opinion polls , and they ’ re also more likely to turn out to vote because they are angry .
Since 1980 , he finds , black Democrats have been seven points less likely to report feeling angry about the Republican presidential candidate than white Democrats , according to data from the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power leveraged from being mad as hell is largely reserved only for white Americans , ” he writes .
Many of the underlying reasons , Phoenix argues , are systemic .
Simply put , nonwhite voters have far fewer expectations of the political system working for them .
Instead , Phoenix found nonwhite voters are more likely to be motivated to vote if they feel pride or hope — as they did in 2008 due to Obama ’ s historic presidential nomination .
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast : Does Trump Really Want A Fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficult for nonwhite voters to navigate politically — especially black voters .
There is the “ potential stigma that comes from the label of being an angry black woman or an angry black man , ” Phoenix told me .
White Democrats and Republicans , in contrast , haven ’ t been afraid to publicly display their polarized opinions in the Trump era — on protest signs and in online comments and polls .
Increased anger isn ’ t a new phenomenon , but it is a rising one .
Political scientist Steven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American Rage , ” that this current moment of partisan rancor is the culmination of a long pattern of increased anger in American politics .
Webster finds that politicians in both parties and those who appear on partisan cable news channels increasingly use angry rhetoric , especially in election years , fueling the fire .
Public anger , in turn , fuels negative impressions of the other party and declining trust in government .
But if 2020 is an election driven primarily by anger , that might backfire on Democrats .
Take the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hillary Clinton was less successful in mobilizing Obama ’ s base was because her focus on Trump ’ s bigoted comments attracted some who shared her views but did not resonate with nonwhite voters .
“ The Clinton campaign bet big on the strategy of highlighting the racist and xenophobic undertones of the Trump campaign , ” Phoenix writes , “ but its ‘ basket of deplorables ’ messaging appeared to engender more of a rise from Trump supporters falling under this label than people of color feeling targeted .
… [ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way people of color respond to political threats.
” Former Vice President Joe Biden faces enormous pressure to turn out nonwhite voters in 2020 , but if 2016 is any indication , liberal policy positions alone won ’ t be enough .
Because like the broader anti-Trump resistance movement , the leftward movement of the Democratic Party has been most pronounced among white voters .
Even on issues of race , nonwhite voters are no longer significantly more liberal than white Democrats .
And research finds that many African American voters identify as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Democratic Party .
It ’ s true that black voters overwhelmingly vote Democratic — 88 percent in 2016 — but Biden shouldn ’ t take that support for granted .
That was down from 94 percent in 2012 , and there is growing evidence that those who don ’ t vote regularly are less likely to support Democrats .
And some early polls show Biden is already lagging behind Clinton in support among nonwhite voters .
Black voters formed the bedrock of Biden ’ s victory in the Democratic primaries , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into motivation to vote in the general election .
He argues that robust support for Biden in the primaries spoke more to black voters ’ skepticism that the broader electorate would support a less conventional candidate against Trump in the general election than their enthusiasm for Biden .
But it is possible for Biden to make gains .
In the book “ Steadfast Democrats , ” political scientists and FiveThirtyEight contributors Ismail White and Chryl Laird found that one reason black voters are so loyal to the Democratic Party is because of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters .
So if Biden is able to successfully energize key leaders in the black community — as he did in South Carolina in the primary — that could help him turn out African American voters in November .
It ’ s also possible that his role as Obama ’ s former vice president could carry additional weight .
“ If you want blacks to support you , you have to get the people within their social networks to help mobilize them in terms of helping to ensure a high turnout , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus pandemic , that ’ s hard advice for Biden ’ s currently homebound campaign to heed at the moment .
But he will need to keep it in mind .
He can not count on anger at Trump to be motivation enough for voters who aren ’ t white .