fivethirtyeight--2020-09-08--A Big Chunk Of People Of Color And White People With Degrees Are Behind Trump

The overarching story of recent American elections is that 1 ) voters of color , who have long been Democratic-leaning , are a growing share of the electorate ; 2 ) white voters with college degrees are increasingly shifting to the Democrats ; and 3 ) white voters without degrees are aligning more with the GOP .
But those trends , because they get so much focus , can warp our understanding of the electorate as it exists right now .
Demographics are not yet destiny in American elections — millions of people don ’ t align with the party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predict .
Case in point : In 2016 , more than a third of President Trump ’ s support nationally came from non-Hispanic white Americans with college degrees ( 26 percent ) and Asian , Black and Hispanic voters ( 12 percent ) , according to Pew Research Center data .
On the flip side , about a quarter of Hillary Clinton ’ s supporters were non-Hispanic white Americans without degrees .
White Americans without degrees aren ’ t as likely to vote for Trump as in 2016 , according to polls — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national polls and key swing states like Pennsylvania .
But a big reason Trump could still win the Electoral College , despite the poor marks Americans give him for his handling of COVID-19 and his job performance overall , is that the Black , Hispanic and college-educated white voters who backed him in 2016 are largely still with him , particularly in key swing states .
In other words , while Trump is a radical departure from previous GOP candidates in terms of personal style and his frequent racist comments , voters haven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amid his rise in U.S. politics — the Americans who voted for Mitt Romney in 2012 overwhelmingly backed Trump in 2016 ( about 90 percent ) and those who backed Trump in 2016 are overwhelmingly behind him in 2020 ( about 94 percent ) .
That fact helps explain how Trump won in 2016 and why he might still come back in 2020 .
Here ’ s a more detailed look at those three groups : Polls suggest white people with college degrees nationally are likely to be more supportive of Biden than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggests that Clinton won whites with degrees by 17 percentage points , while Biden leads among them by 23 percentage points . )
But Biden ’ s advantage with white Americans with college degrees varies a lot by state , and that ’ s key .
In Democratic-leaning swing states such as Maine , New Hampshire and Minnesota , only about a third of white voters with college degrees are supporting Trump , according to recent polls .
That ’ s why he may not win any of those three states , even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the more pro-Trump demographic groups — account for the majority of voters in all three .
This represents a continuation of what we ’ ve seen over the last four years — polls showed college-educated white voters in Maine and Minnesota , in particular , were significantly more Democratic-leaning than those in the rest of the country in 2016 and 2018 .
The good news for Trump is that white voters with degrees in the South remain more conservative-leaning than those in other regions of the country .
Polls suggest a majority of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prefer Trump over Biden — as do more than 40 percent in Florida and North Carolina .
Again , this isn ’ t too surprising : In 2018 , white liberals nationally and in their states were enamored with Georgia Democratic gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams and Texas Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Beto O ’ Rourke .
But white college graduates overall preferred Abrams and O ’ Rourke ’ s GOP opponents — by double digits in both races .
White voters with degrees in Georgia and Texas remaining fairly pro-Trump is hugely important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state , it would severely complicate his path to winning 270 electoral votes .
But he ’ s effectively tied in Georgia and Texas — even as white voters without degrees are a clear minority of the electorate in both states ( just 32 percent in Texas and 36 percent in Georgia ) .
Outside of the South , a clear majority of white college graduates prefer Biden to Trump in most battleground states .
In fact , it ’ s likely that white voters with degrees will vote Democratic at higher rates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said , at least a third of white college graduates are likely to back Trump in basically every swing state .
What ’ s keeping this bloc with Trump ?
Many of these voters are simply longtime Republicans who hold conservative views .
But particularly in Georgia and Texas , it ’ s worth thinking about religion and race .
Being white and also an evangelical Protestant is strongly correlated with voting Republican — much more so than being white and not having a college degree .
According to data provided to us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polling initiative , Georgia ranks seventh among states in terms of the percentage of its white registered voters who are evangelical Protestants ( about a third ) , with North Carolina 10th and Texas 13th .
For comparison , Virginia is the state that backed Hillary Clinton in 2016 with the highest percentage of its white registered voters who are evangelical Protestants — it was 17th among the 50 states by this measure .
In its surveys , Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape asks respondents their views on issues like whether they prefer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same race and whether they agree or disagree with statements like , “ Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
” Robert Griffin , research director for the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group , analyzed responses to these questions to create an overall “ score ” for voters on their racial attitudes .
Georgia ’ s white registered voters are more likely to express more negative sentiments about people of color than those in all but nine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely than white registered voters in other states to reject the view that slavery and discrimination are holding back Black people and more likely to be unsupportive of their relatives dating people outside of their race . )
Florida ( No .
11 ) , Texas ( No .
12 ) and North Carolina ( No .
13 ) rank similarly on these measures of racial attitudes .
Again , for comparison , the blue state where white registered voters hold the highest level of negative attitudes about minorities by this measure is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 50 states .
So while white voters with college degrees are often portrayed as a monolith , and a Democratic monolith at that … they ’ re not .
And that fact is crucial to Trump ’ s reelection chances .
Polls suggest between a quarter and a third of Hispanics nationally are backing Trump — fairly similar to 2016 .
And like in 2016 , a sizable bloc of Hispanics in Arizona , Florida and Texas — three important swing states that have fairly large Hispanic electorates — are likely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last two decades have shown about 30 percent of Hispanics identity as Republican .
And despite his nasty rhetoric toward Mexico in particular , about as many Hispanics backed Trump as other recent Republican presidential nominees .
As we wrote in 2018 , there are plenty of explanations for that enduring pro-Trump Hispanic bloc : the anti-abortion views and Catholic and evangelical faiths of some Hispanic Americans ; the priorization of issues like jobs over immigration policy for many Hispanic voters , and the longtime courting of Hispanic voters by the GOP in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , again , the fact that the bottom hasn ’ t dropped out of Trump ’ s support among Hispanic voters is hugely significant to his continued competitiveness .
Polls suggest about 10 percent of black voters both nationally and in key swing states with large black electorates are supporting Trump .
That is similar to 2016 as well and again reflects broader partisan dynamics — surveys over the last three decades have shown about one of every 10 Black Americans identifies as a Republican .
If the race is really tight , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black support could be critical .
In an analysis of the 2016 election , Griffin , John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira argued that Clinton would have won Michigan and Pennsylvania if Black voters in those states had supported her at the levels they did Barack Obama .
( About 95 percent of black voters in those states backed Obama , and about 90 percent supported Clinton . )
I don ’ t want to belabor that point too much — the Clinton-Trump matchup in those two states was so close that basically any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have won it for Clinton .
And it ’ s not surprising that black voters supported Obama , the first-ever Black president , at slightly higher levels than they did Clinton .
But again , the bottom hasn ’ t fallen out for Trump among Black voters — he is basically as popular as previous GOP candidates .
Last month ’ s Republican National Convention featured a lot of non-white speakers for a party whose voters are more than 80 percent white , and I think this analysis explains why .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by further growing the GOP ’ s advantage among white voters without degrees , who are likely to represent more than 40 percent of the electorate .
That might happen to some extent , particularly among white men .
But polls suggest that white women without degrees won ’ t be as GOP-leaning in 2020 as they were in 2016 , either because they like Biden more than Clinton , have grown tired of Trump or some combination of both .
So Trump probably needs the white college graduates and Black and Hispanic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and perhaps a few more , to back him again to win this election .
And they might .
Make sure to check out FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential forecast in full ; you can also see all the 2020 polls we ’ ve collected , including national polls , Colorado polls , Florida polls , Michigan polls , Minnesota polls , North Carolina polls and … well … all the states , really .


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-10--Why Trump Might Be Scaring Off Older Voters

“ Most of the activities you normally have here in adult Disney World are closed down , ” Bryan Casey told me recently by phone from The Villages , Florida , one of the country ’ s largest retirement communities .
COVID-19 has dulled the normally vibrant social lives of Villages residents , who typically spend their days on eternal summer vacation .
The town squares that anchor the sprawling development , usually filled with drinking and dancing and music , have been shut down .
“ Open The Squares ?
Look At What Is Happening At The Colleges , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter to the editor at Villages News .
In Sumter County , where The Villages is situated , Donald Trump won 68.3 percent of the vote in 2016 , and no other county in Florida had a higher turnout .
But , Casey — the communications director of the Villages Democratic Club — said , “ I have a couple of friends I know who voted for Trump in 2016 who say that they won ’ t do that this time.
” But few would be willing to admit that publicly .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to understand that , ” he said .
If that ’ s the case , Casey ’ s friends wouldn ’ t be alone .
The pandemic has killed some 190,000 Americans , and 8 in 10 of the deaths reported have been among those 65 or over .
President Trump ’ s delayed and fractured response to the outbreak appears to have reshaped the political dynamics for older Americans .
Four years ago , he won voters 65 or over by a margin of 13.3 percentage points .
But looking at an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls , voters age 65 or over favored Biden to Trump by 49.5 percent to 45.7 percent .
Who are the older voters abandoning Trump ?
A look at the polls from 2016 to 2020 shows movement mostly among white voters .
But why are they increasingly abandoning him ?
There ’ s the pandemic , of course , but I ’ m not sure that explains everything .
An average of six national polls from May — before the beginning of widespread protests against police violence that would come to dominate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Biden tied among voters 65 or over .
Perhaps this other national crisis is driving away older Americans .
Trump ’ s inflammatory rhetoric about race and crime could be alienating them as well .
The Villages is perhaps best known , of late , for a viral video of a pro-Trump golf-cart parade ( these parades are among the primary modes of political expression in The Villages , since golf carts abound and lawn signs are prohibited ) .
In the clip , first retweeted by the president and later deleted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be heard shouting “ white power ” at a group of counterprotesters .
Despite these provocative pro-Trump images coming out of Florida , the shift toward Biden is evident in the state , a key to winning the Electoral College .
A late August Quinnipiac University poll in Florida showed Biden leading Trump among older voters , by 54 percent to 44 percent and another late August poll of Florida voters , this one by Public Policy Polling , showed Biden in the lead among the same group , by 52 percent to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the sentiments of older Florida voters at around this time four years ago .
An early September 2016 CBS News poll found Trump leading Hillary Clinton by 8 points among Florida voters age 65 or over , while a CNN/ORC International poll found him with an even bigger , 15-point , lead .
And sure enough , on Election Day 2016 , exit polls indicated that Trump won this demographic group in Florida by 57 percent to Clinton ’ s 40 percent .
I asked Jerry Prince , the president of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the trend away from Trump among older voters .
“ I think it is false and propaganda by the media and Democrats , ” he wrote in an email .
“ The seniors here have worked hard , retired and remember what Law and Order is and know that what is happening in America today is being denied and pushed by the Democrats .
Again , I think this is false and without some true numbers I will continue to believe it is false.
” A recent Quinnipiac University poll conducted following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discernible theme that “ violence in the largely Black cities of America makes everyone , including white suburbanites , unsafe ” — showed Biden leading by 10 points overall .
Voters age 65 or over said they supported Biden over Trump by 50 percent to 46 percent , and when asked if Trump made them feel “ more safe ” or “ less safe , ” 46 percent said that Trump made them feel less safe ; 44 percent said the opposite .
In attempting to speak what he thinks is the language @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — racially tinged talk about the destruction of the suburbs , for instance — Trump might actually be shooting himself in the foot .
Even as white Americans ’ support for the Black Lives Matter movement has waned over the course of the summer , this doesn ’ t appear to have had a significant effect on Biden ’ s lead .
Voters seem to separate him from the movement even as Trump has tried to tie it to him .
( My colleague Perry Bacon Jr. took a deeper look at this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suburbanites , the sort with culturally conservative values who might look askance at the present-day Democratic party , also matured in an America that harshly stigmatized overt racism .
These voters might share Trump ’ s views on race but be turned off by the way he expresses them .
Ronald Reagan , the original Republican disrupter of the political status quo , was good at talking to these voters .
He ’ s famous for popularizing the racist trope of the “ welfare queen , ” for instance , a way to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the guise of people abusing a government benefit .
His administration ’ s public-health stance of “ just say no ” to drugs was largely geared toward suburban voters , a softer way to talk about substance abuse , while the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 promoted harsher mandatory minimum sentences for possession of crack , a drug largely associated with Black inner-city populations , compared with the punishments for possession of powder cocaine .
Trump ’ s rhetoric focused on the suburban American idyll might , ironically , be making the people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these nerve-wracking times .
He might have been better off sticking with the pandemic — cases appear to be flattening out ever so slightly , though thousands of new cases are reported daily — than with the red meat of racial politics .

“Most of the activities you normally have here in adult Disney World are closed down,” Bryan Casey told me recently by phone from The Villages, Florida, one of the country’s largest retirement communities. COVID-19 has dulled the normally vibrant social lives of Villages residents, who typically spend their days on eternal summer vacation. The town squares that anchor the sprawling development, usually filled with drinking and dancing and music, have been shut down. “Open The Squares? Look At What Is Happening At The Colleges,” read the headline on a recent letter to the editor at Villages News.
In Sumter County, where The Villages is situated, Donald Trump won 68.3 percent of the vote in 2016, and no other county in Florida had a higher turnout. But, Casey — the communications director of the Villages Democratic Club — said, “I have a couple of friends I know who voted for Trump in 2016 who say that they won’t do that this time.” But few would be willing to admit that publicly. “You’ve got to live here to understand that,” he said.
If that’s the case, Casey’s friends wouldn’t be alone. The pandemic has killed some 190,000 Americans, and 8 in 10 of the deaths reported have been among those 65 or over. President Trump’s delayed and fractured response to the outbreak appears to have reshaped the political dynamics for older Americans. Four years ago, he won voters 65 or over by a margin of 13.3 percentage points. But looking at an average of the nine most recent national polls, voters age 65 or over favored Biden to Trump by 49.5 percent to 45.7 percent.
Who are the older voters abandoning Trump? A look at the polls from 2016 to 2020 shows movement mostly among white voters. But why are they increasingly abandoning him? There’s the pandemic, of course, but I’m not sure that explains everything. An average of six national polls from May — before the beginning of widespread protests against police violence that would come to dominate the news over the summer — showed Trump and Biden tied among voters 65 or over. Perhaps this other national crisis is driving away older Americans. Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric about race and crime could be alienating them as well.
The Villages is perhaps best known, of late, for a viral video of a pro-Trump golf-cart parade (these parades are among the primary modes of political expression in The Villages, since golf carts abound and lawn signs are prohibited). In the clip, first retweeted by the president and later deleted by him, a Trump supporter can be heard shouting “white power” at a group of counterprotesters.
Despite these provocative pro-Trump images coming out of Florida, the shift toward Biden is evident in the state, a key to winning the Electoral College. A late August Quinnipiac University poll in Florida showed Biden leading Trump among older voters, by 54 percent to 44 percent and another late August poll of Florida voters, this one by Public Policy Polling, showed Biden in the lead among the same group, by 52 percent to 47 percent. This stands in contrast to the sentiments of older Florida voters at around this time four years ago. An early September 2016 CBS News poll found Trump leading Hillary Clinton by 8 points among Florida voters age 65 or over, while a CNN/ORC International poll found him with an even bigger, 15-point, lead. And sure enough, on Election Day 2016, exit polls indicated that Trump won this demographic group in Florida by 57 percent to Clinton’s 40 percent.
I asked Jerry Prince, the president of the Villages Republican Club, what he made of the trend away from Trump among older voters. “I think it is false and propaganda by the media and Democrats,” he wrote in an email. “The seniors here have worked hard, retired and remember what Law and Order is and know that what is happening in America today is being denied and pushed by the Democrats. Again, I think this is false and without some true numbers I will continue to believe it is false.”
A recent Quinnipiac University poll conducted following the RNC — an event with the discernible theme that “violence in the largely Black cities of America makes everyone, including white suburbanites, unsafe” — showed Biden leading by 10 points overall. Voters age 65 or over said they supported Biden over Trump by 50 percent to 46 percent, and when asked if Trump made them feel “more safe” or “less safe,” 46 percent said that Trump made them feel less safe; 44 percent said the opposite.
In attempting to speak what he thinks is the language of an older generation of white Americans — racially tinged talk about the destruction of the suburbs, for instance — Trump might actually be shooting himself in the foot. Even as white Americans’ support for the Black Lives Matter movement has waned over the course of the summer, this doesn’t appear to have had a significant effect on Biden’s lead. Voters seem to separate him from the movement even as Trump has tried to tie it to him. (My colleague Perry Bacon Jr. took a deeper look at this issue last month.)
Older white suburbanites, the sort with culturally conservative values who might look askance at the present-day Democratic party, also matured in an America that harshly stigmatized overt racism. These voters might share Trump’s views on race but be turned off by the way he expresses them. Ronald Reagan, the original Republican disrupter of the political status quo, was good at talking to these voters. He’s famous for popularizing the racist trope of the “welfare queen,” for instance, a way to talk about Black Americans in cities under the guise of people abusing a government benefit. His administration’s public-health stance of “just say no” to drugs was largely geared toward suburban voters, a softer way to talk about substance abuse, while the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 promoted harsher mandatory minimum sentences for possession of crack, a drug largely associated with Black inner-city populations, compared with the punishments for possession of powder cocaine.
Trump’s rhetoric focused on the suburban American idyll might, ironically, be making the people living that dream even more nervous in these nerve-wracking times. He might have been better off sticking with the pandemic — cases appear to be flattening out ever so slightly, though thousands of new cases are reported daily — than with the red meat of racial politics.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-11--Trump And Biden Both Got Small Convention Bounces. But Only Biden Got More Popular.

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
More so than Joe Biden , President Trump got a small boost in head-to-head polls coming out of the party conventions ( although it appears to have been short-lived ) .
But Biden got a convention bounce of sorts , too : The share of voters with a favorable opinion of him has ticked up .
Several pollsters have asked Americans whether they have a favorable or unfavorable view of both Trump and Biden since the Republican National Convention ended on Aug. 27 .
On average , these polls gave Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 46 percent unfavorable rating — or a net favorability rating of +3 percentage points .
That ’ s a slight , 4-point increase from his net favorability rating in the same polls before the conventions .
To be more minute about it , his net favorability rating actually went from -2 points in polls conducted entirely or mostly before the conventions , to +3 points in polls conducted entirely or mostly between the two conventions ( after the Democratic National Convention spent four days talking him up ) , to +3 points in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , this uptick was within the polls ’ margins of error , but the overall upward trend was still pretty clear .
Trump , on the other hand , went into the convention period with lower favorables than Biden and does not appear to have emerged from it any better liked .
Before the conventions , his average net favorability ( according to these same pollsters ) was -13 percentage points .
After the DNC started , but before the RNC , his net favorability rating ticked down to -15 points .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to boost his standing .
In the most recent round of surveys from these pollsters , Trump has an average favorable rating of 41 percent and an average unfavorable rating of 55 percent .
In other words , his net favorability rating is now -14 points .
I don ’ t want to overstate the bump Biden got relative to Trump , though : The increase in Biden ’ s favorables , much like Trump ’ s improvement in head-to-head polls , was small by historical standards .
As former FiveThirtyEight writer Harry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jimmy Carter in 1980 to Bill Clinton in 1992 to Al Gore in 2000 to George W. Bush in 2004 saw double-digit surges in their net favorability rating after the conventions , as measured by CBS News polling .
That definitely didn ’ t happen this year .
In addition , Enten found that favorable ratings can also fluctuate a lot after this point in the election cycle .
The average candidate between 1980 and 2012 experienced a 6.4-point change in his net favorability between CBS News ’ s post-convention poll and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s plenty of time for Biden to sink , or Trump to rise — or Biden to rise , or Trump to sink — in popularity .
On the other hand , the conventions ’ failure to budge the candidates ’ favorable ratings more than a few points could suggest that opinions of both Trump and Biden are already baked in , thanks to intense political polarization .
Speaking of polarization , a handful of the post-convention polls also asked respondents how strongly favorable or unfavorable they felt toward the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ very favorable ” and “ very unfavorable ” ratings , both candidates are underwater ; that is , they are both more hated than they are loved .
But Biden still has the advantage in the polls that have asked about this .
On average in these polls , since the conventions ended , 26 percent of Americans have said they view Biden very favorably , and 36 percent have said they view him very unfavorably ( that ’ s -10 points on net ) .
By contrast , Trump has an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 29 percent and an average “ very unfavorable ” rating of 47 percent ( -18 points on net ) .
That ’ s a much narrower gap than FiveThirtyEight contributor Michael Tesler found in late June , when Biden was at -3 points and Trump was at -23 points in that measure .
But it still suggests that voters ’ motivations to vote against Trump are higher than their motivations to vote against Biden .
As Tesler argued earlier this summer , this could mean that Biden , not Trump , is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election .
• Late last week , The Atlantic reported that Trump called fallen American troops “ losers ” and “ suckers ” during a 2018 trip to France .
Trump and a number of other administration officials vigorously denied the report .
This week , YouGov found that 50 percent of Americans believed the report , while 31 percent thought it was false .
Nineteen percent didn ’ t know .
• Despite Trump ’ s claims that a coronavirus vaccine could be available before Election Day , the American public is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found that 81 percent of Americans didn ’ t think a vaccine will be ready by then .
And if a free coronavirus vaccine is developed and approved by the Food and Drug Administration before the election , just 42 percent of Americans said they would want to get it .
Why ?
Sixty-two percent of respondents said they worried that political pressure would lead the FDA to rush to approve the vaccine before it is proven to be safe and effective .
• A new Pew Research Center survey of thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voted in 2016 and 2018 — found that Democrats ’ gains in the 2018 midterms came from several sources : More Hillary Clinton voters turned out to vote in the midterms than Trump voters did , more Trump voters defected to Democrats than Clinton voters to Republicans , and those who voted for a third-party candidate or didn ’ t vote at all in 2016 broke for Democrats in 2018 .
• Voters in Portland , Oregon , will vote on a ballot measure this November that would set up an new system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the community .
This week , a group campaigning for the measure released an internal poll that found 70 percent of Portland voters in favor of it .
The poll also gave Mayor Ted Wheeler , who is up for reelection , a 26 percent favorable rating and 63 percent unfavorable rating .
• A SurveyUSA poll of California ’ s 50th Congressional District , conducted for KGTV-TV and the San Diego Union-Tribune , puts Republican Darrell Issa at 46 percent and Democrat Ammar Campa-Najjar at 45 percent — a surprising result , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by 15 points in 2016 .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 42.7 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president , while 53.1 percent disapprove ( a net approval rating of -10.4 points ) .
At this time last week , 43.4 percent approved and 52.3 percent disapproved ( a net approval rating of -8.9 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 41.4 percent and a disapproval rating of 54.8 percent , for a net approval rating of -13.4 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 6.6 percentage points ( 48.5 percent to 42.0 percent ) .
A week ago , Democrats led Republicans by 7.4 points ( 48.7 percent to 41.3 percent ) .
At this time last month , voters preferred Democrats by 7.6 points ( 48.5 percent to 40.9 percent ) .
Check out all the polls we ’ ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
More so than Joe Biden, President Trump got a small boost in head-to-head polls coming out of the party conventions (although it appears to have been short-lived). But Biden got a convention bounce of sorts, too: The share of voters with a favorable opinion of him has ticked up.
Several pollsters have asked Americans whether they have a favorable or unfavorable view of both Trump and Biden since the Republican National Convention ended on Aug. 27. On average, these polls gave Biden a 48 percent favorable rating and a 46 percent unfavorable rating — or a net favorability rating of +3 percentage points. That’s a slight, 4-point increase from his net favorability rating in the same polls before the conventions. To be more minute about it, his net favorability rating actually went from -2 points in polls conducted entirely or mostly before the conventions, to +3 points in polls conducted entirely or mostly between the two conventions (after the Democratic National Convention spent four days talking him up), to +3 points in the post-convention period. In some cases, this uptick was within the polls’ margins of error, but the overall upward trend was still pretty clear.
Biden left the conventions a bit more popular Polls of Joe Biden’s net favorability (favorable rating minus unfavorable rating) before, between and after the conventions Net Favorability Pollster Pop.* Pre-DNC Between Conventions Post-RNC Change SSRS/CNN RV -1 — +9 +10 Ipsos/ABC News A -3 +5 +6 +9 Monmouth University RV -5 — +3 +8 Global Strategy Group/GBAO/Navigator Research RV -1 +9 +5 +6 Morning Consult/Politico RV -2 — +4 +6 Harris/Harvard RV +1 — +6 +5 YouGov/The Economist RV +1 -1 +5 +4 Morning Consult LV 0 +6 +4 +4 SurveyMonkey/Axios A -7 -1 -6 +1 Change Research/CNBC LV -5 -2 -6 -1 YouGov/Yahoo News RV +2 +6 -2 -4 Average -2 +3 +3 +4 *Population surveyed: Adults (A), registered voters (RV), or likely voters (LV). Includes only pollsters that conducted surveys of the same type of respondent (e.g., registered voters) of Biden’s favorability both shortly before and after the conventions. Polls that were fielded during one of the conventions are grouped by whether they were fielded mostly before or mostly after the first night of the convention. The Morning Consult inter-convention, Morning Consult post-RNC, and YouGov/The Economist post-RNC numbers are averages of two polls each. Source: Polls
Trump, on the other hand, went into the convention period with lower favorables than Biden and does not appear to have emerged from it any better liked. Before the conventions, his average net favorability (according to these same pollsters) was -13 percentage points. After the DNC started, but before the RNC, his net favorability rating ticked down to -15 points. And the RNC didn’t do much to boost his standing. In the most recent round of surveys from these pollsters, Trump has an average favorable rating of 41 percent and an average unfavorable rating of 55 percent. In other words, his net favorability rating is now -14 points.
The RNC didn’t give Trump a favorability boost Polls of President Trump’s net favorability (favorable rating minus unfavorable rating) before, between and after the conventions Net Favorability Pollster Pop.* Pre-DNC Between Conventions Post-RNC Change Morning Consult/Politico RV -18 — -13 +5 YouGov/Yahoo News RV -14 -17 -13 +1 Monmouth University RV -14 — -13 +1 Morning Consult LV -12 -12 -12 0 SurveyMonkey/Axios A -10 -10 -11 -1 YouGov/The Economist RV -13 -11 -14 -1 Harris/Harvard RV -12 — -13 -1 Global Strategy Group/GBAO/Navigator Research RV -9 -16 -11 -2 SSRS/CNN RV -12 — -14 -2 Change Research/CNBC LV -10 -13 -14 -4 Ipsos/ABC News A -23 -28 -28 -5 Average -13 -15 -14 -1 *Population surveyed: Adults (A), registered voters (RV), or likely voters (LV). Includes only pollsters that conducted surveys of the same type of respondent (e.g., registered voters) of Trump’s favorability both shortly before and after the conventions. Polls that were fielded during one of the conventions are grouped by whether they were fielded mostly before or mostly after the first night of the convention. The Morning Consult and YouGov/The Economist post-RNC numbers are averages of two polls each. Source: Polls
I don’t want to overstate the bump Biden got relative to Trump, though: The increase in Biden’s favorables, much like Trump’s improvement in head-to-head polls, was small by historical standards. As former FiveThirtyEight writer Harry Enten found in 2016, candidates from Jimmy Carter in 1980 to Bill Clinton in 1992 to Al Gore in 2000 to George W. Bush in 2004 saw double-digit surges in their net favorability rating after the conventions, as measured by CBS News polling. That definitely didn’t happen this year.
In addition, Enten found that favorable ratings can also fluctuate a lot after this point in the election cycle. The average candidate between 1980 and 2012 experienced a 6.4-point change in his net favorability between CBS News’s post-convention poll and its final poll of the election. So there’s plenty of time for Biden to sink, or Trump to rise — or Biden to rise, or Trump to sink — in popularity. On the other hand, the conventions’ failure to budge the candidates’ favorable ratings more than a few points could suggest that opinions of both Trump and Biden are already baked in, thanks to intense political polarization.
Speaking of polarization, a handful of the post-convention polls also asked respondents how strongly favorable or unfavorable they felt toward the two nominees. And going just by their “very favorable” and “very unfavorable” ratings, both candidates are underwater; that is, they are both more hated than they are loved.
But Biden still has the advantage in the polls that have asked about this. On average in these polls, since the conventions ended, 26 percent of Americans have said they view Biden very favorably, and 36 percent have said they view him very unfavorably (that’s -10 points on net). By contrast, Trump has an average “very favorable” rating of 29 percent and an average “very unfavorable” rating of 47 percent (-18 points on net).
That’s a much narrower gap than FiveThirtyEight contributor Michael Tesler found in late June, when Biden was at -3 points and Trump was at -23 points in that measure. But it still suggests that voters’ motivations to vote against Trump are higher than their motivations to vote against Biden. As Tesler argued earlier this summer, this could mean that Biden, not Trump, is the candidate with the enthusiasm edge in this election.
Other polling bites
Late last week, The Atlantic reported that Trump called fallen American troops “losers” and “suckers” during a 2018 trip to France. Trump and a number of other administration officials vigorously denied the report. This week, YouGov found that 50 percent of Americans believed the report, while 31 percent thought it was false. Nineteen percent didn’t know.
Despite Trump’s claims that a coronavirus vaccine could be available before Election Day, the American public is skeptical. A Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 81 percent of Americans didn’t think a vaccine will be ready by then. And if a free coronavirus vaccine is developed and approved by the Food and Drug Administration before the election, just 42 percent of Americans said they would want to get it. Why? Sixty-two percent of respondents said they worried that political pressure would lead the FDA to rush to approve the vaccine before it is proven to be safe and effective.
A new Pew Research Center survey of thousands of verified voters — who Pew independently confirmed voted in 2016 and 2018 — found that Democrats’ gains in the 2018 midterms came from several sources: More Hillary Clinton voters turned out to vote in the midterms than Trump voters did, more Trump voters defected to Democrats than Clinton voters to Republicans, and those who voted for a third-party candidate or didn’t vote at all in 2016 broke for Democrats in 2018.
Voters in Portland, Oregon, will vote on a ballot measure this November that would set up an new system for police oversight with more input from the community. This week, a group campaigning for the measure released an internal poll that found 70 percent of Portland voters in favor of it. The poll also gave Mayor Ted Wheeler, who is up for reelection, a 26 percent favorable rating and 63 percent unfavorable rating.
A SurveyUSA poll of California’s 50th Congressional District, conducted for KGTV-TV and the San Diego Union-Tribune, puts Republican Darrell Issa at 46 percent and Democrat Ammar Campa-Najjar at 45 percent — a surprising result, given that this district voted for Trump by 15 points in 2016.
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 42.7 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 53.1 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -10.4 points). At this time last week, 43.4 percent approved and 52.3 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -8.9 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 41.4 percent and a disapproval rating of 54.8 percent, for a net approval rating of -13.4 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 6.6 percentage points (48.5 percent to 42.0 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 7.4 points (48.7 percent to 41.3 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 7.6 points (48.5 percent to 40.9 percent).
Check out all the polls we’ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-11--The Challenges Of Holding An Election During A Pandemic

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Galen Druke speaks with Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose about @ @ @ @ @ help prepare the state for the upcoming election .

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Galen Druke speaks with Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose about what LaRose is doing to help prepare the state for the upcoming election.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-11--Politics Podcast: How Ohio Is Preparing For The Pandemic Election

Election Day is just over 50 days away and elections officials around the country are preparing for an unprecedented election @ @ @ @ @ In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose @ @ @ @ @ the challenges of the 2020 election .
You can listen to the episode by clicking @ @ @ @ @ in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App @ @ @ @ @ .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight @ @ @ @ @ and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and @ @ @ @ @ a comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
@ @ @ @ @ , on Twitter or in the comments .

Election Day is just over 50 days away and elections officials around the country are preparing for an unprecedented election amid the coronavirus pandemic. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose discusses how he is addressing the challenges of the 2020 election.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-11--Confidence Interval: Will Texas Go Blue In 2020?

Welcome to another episode of Confidence Interval , where we make a persuasive case for a hot take … and @ @ @ @ @ really feel about the idea .
This time , politics podcast host and producer Galen @ @ @ @ @ be the year Democrats win Texas for the first time since 1976 .

Welcome to another episode of Confidence Interval, where we make a persuasive case for a hot take … and then reveal how confident we really feel about the idea. This time, politics podcast host and producer Galen Druke asks if this could be the year Democrats win Texas for the first time since 1976.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-14--Why Coming Up With Effective Interventions To Address COVID-19 Is So Hard

It has been hard to measure the effects of the novel coronavirus .
Not only is COVID-19 far-reaching — it ’ s touched nearly every corner of the globe at this point — but its toll on society has also been devastating .
It is responsible for the deaths of over 905,000 people around the world , and more than 190,000 people in the United States alone .
The associated economic fallout has been crippling .
In the U.S. , more people lost their jobs in the first three months of the pandemic than in the first two years of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are some signs the economy might be recovering , but the truth is , we ’ re just beginning to understand the pandemic ’ s full impact , and we don ’ t yet know what the virus has in store for us .
This is all complicated by the fact that we ’ re still figuring out how best to combat the pandemic.Without a vaccine readily available , it has been challenging to get people to engage in enough of the behaviors that can help slow the virus .
Some policy makers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for guidance , which is encouraging because this doesn ’ t always happen .
We ’ ve seen many universities ignore the warnings of behavioral scientists and reopen their campuses , only to have to quickly shut them back down .
But this has also meant that there are a lot of new studies to wade through .
In the field of psychology alone , between Feb. 10 and Aug. 30 , 541 papers about COVID-19 were uploaded to the field ’ s primary preprint server , PsyArXiv .
With so much research @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard to know what to trust — and I say that as someone who makes a living researching what types of interventions motivate people to change their behaviors .
As I tell my students , if you want to use behavioral science research to address real-world problems , you have to look very closely at the details .
Often , a simple question like , “ What research should policy makers and practitioners use to help combat the pandemic ?
” is surprisingly difficult to answer .
For starters , there are often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the people and situations some social scientists typically study as part of our day-to-day research ) and the real world ( or the people and situations policy-makers and practitioners have in mind when crafting interventions ) .
Take , for example , the fact that social scientists tend to study people from richer countries that are generally highly educated , industrialized , democratic and in the Western hemisphere .
And some social scientific fields ( e.g.
, psychology ) focus overwhelmingly on whiter , wealthier and more highly educated groups of people within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue in the social sciences and something that researchers have been talking about for decades .
But it ’ s important to mention now , too , as Black and brown people have been disproportionately affected by the coronavirus — they are dying at much higher rates than white people and working more of the lower-paying “ essential ” jobs that expose them to greater risks .
Here you can start to see very real research limitations creep in : The people whose lives have been most adversely affected by the virus have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are supposed to help them .
When samples and the methods used are not representative of the real world , it becomes very difficult to reach accurate and actionable conclusions .
Additionally , the things we have participants do , or report that they are going to do in the laboratory , do not always map onto how they behave in real life .
Take , for example , wearing face masks — something many Americans are still not doing .
Convincing people to wear masks sounds like it should be easy to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re not wearing masks in the first place is pretty complicated .
It might be a risk perception problem ( they don ’ t perceive COVID-19 to be that risky , or they underestimate their likelihood of getting infected ) .
Or maybe it ’ s a perceived efficacy problem ( they don ’ t think wearing the masks will actually reduce their risk ) .
Or maybe it ’ s even a norm perception problem ( they don ’ t think anyone else is wearing masks ) .
Understanding why people are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because if the goal is to design a successful intervention to change this behavior , we then as social scientists must first figure out which of these reasons — or more likely , which combination of them — is the root of the problem .
Until we know what is driving much of the behavior we see , we can not generate effective solutions for changing that behavior .
And all this doesn ’ t even take into account that we now live in a world where everything — including the pandemic — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people are willing to pay attention to the messages in an intervention .
Research on other infectious diseases has shown that who is doing the intervening ( i.e.
, who is delivering the message ) matters , as experts are often more effective than non-experts .
Studies have also shown it helps if the person doing the intervention shares characteristics , such as gender or race , with the people for whom the messaging is targeted .
Additionally giving people laundry lists of things they can ’ t do is less helpful than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ e.g.
, two to three ) of things they can do .
Lastly , researchers need to address the seemingly cold and calculating question of whether an intervention is cost-effective .
Resources are limited — especially in a situation like a pandemic — so social scientists are also trying to factor in which interventions are likely to have the biggest societal effect .
To do that , we have to look at things like “ effect sizes ” of previous studies and translate them into pandemic-relevant metrics .
For instance , if we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persuaded policymakers to buy air time in all 210 U.S. media markets , how much of an increase in mask-wearing should we expect ?
One percent ?
Five percent ?
The answer to that matters a great deal , because we have to decide whether that is a better or worse use of ( limited ) resources than investing in other strategies , such as more COVID-19 tests — something the U.S. also doesn ’ t have enough of .
Ultimately , figuring these things out often takes time , and it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledge that .
We need to say what we don ’ t know and when we need more time .
After all , there ’ s a risk of acting too quickly , before we actually understand the problem or the effects an intervention might have .
Being overconfident and wrong can come with very real costs : We in the scientific community lose future credibility and trustworthiness ( not to mention the costs associated with any harm done between the initial flawed intervention and the eventual correct one ) .
Think about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which was fairly opaque .
As some countries mandated masks , figures like the U.S. surgeon general tweeted that masks are “ NOT effective.
” Of course , scientists and policymakers later had to backtrack when studies showed that wearing masks is effective for reducing transmission of COVID-19 .
And that brings me to one last thing I want to discuss : the ethics of scientific research .
Data can be instructive , but it does not speak for itself .
Behind every data point is a person .
And with something like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deeply affected , we have to think about the ethics of intervening in people ’ s lives .
Those ethics again involve considering things like who is represented in , versus missing from , the data we use and whose lives will be affected by those decisions .
Extreme levels of inequality in the U.S. and around the world have created power imbalances that often result in uneven distribution of the risks and benefits of interventions .
Some groups are subject to disproportionate risks so that other groups reap disproportionate benefits .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ winners and losers , and in both historical and modern society — including the COVID-19 era — the people who lose are usually those already on the margins of society .
We have to remember that , and be vigilant in our efforts so that we do not reproduce these patterns .
I was reminded of this when I read a FiveThirtyEight article on changes in public opinion about reopening the economy .
The article noted that between March and June , polling data showed a 22 percent increase in the share of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses to open back up , even if it meant putting some people at risk .
On its surface , that looks like a large increase in support for reopening the economy , and thus reopening might seem supported by the public .
But looking closer , it becomes clear why it may be unwise to act on that evidence on its own : The observed trend was largely among white Americans .
Eighty-two percent of Black Americans still thought that public health should be prioritized over the economy — roughly unchanged from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minds : 49 percent thought the government should reopen the economy , even if it means putting some people at risk , compared with 24 percent in March .
This is an important reminder that the pandemic has not been the “ great equalizer , ” as it was initially described .
The racial disparities in the pandemic have been so stark that early estimates suggest that about one in 2,000 of the entire Black population in the U.S. has died from COVID-19 .
It is therefore imperative we consider these different experiences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we should use when responding to the pandemic .
Who is included in the data we ’ re using ?
And who isn ’ t ?
If we heavily weigh the opinions and other data gathered from one group as we design interventions , what happens to other groups ?
These real-world differences matter , and matter greatly .
We have to ask ourselves those questions as scientists and remember that — especially in times like the pandemic era we ’ re living in — we ’ re betting people ’ s lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @

It has been hard to measure the effects of the novel coronavirus. Not only is COVID-19 far-reaching — it’s touched nearly every corner of the globe at this point — but its toll on society has also been devastating. It is responsible for the deaths of over 905,000 people around the world, and more than 190,000 people in the United States alone. The associated economic fallout has been crippling. In the U.S., more people lost their jobs in the first three months of the pandemic than in the first two years of the Great Recession. Yes, there are some signs the economy might be recovering, but the truth is, we’re just beginning to understand the pandemic’s full impact, and we don’t yet know what the virus has in store for us.
This is all complicated by the fact that we’re still figuring out how best to combat the pandemic. Without a vaccine readily available, it has been challenging to get people to engage in enough of the behaviors that can help slow the virus. Some policy makers have turned to social and behavioral scientists for guidance, which is encouraging because this doesn’t always happen. We’ve seen many universities ignore the warnings of behavioral scientists and reopen their campuses, only to have to quickly shut them back down.
But this has also meant that there are a lot of new studies to wade through. In the field of psychology alone, between Feb. 10 and Aug. 30, 541 papers about COVID-19 were uploaded to the field’s primary preprint server, PsyArXiv. With so much research to wade through, it’s hard to know what to trust — and I say that as someone who makes a living researching what types of interventions motivate people to change their behaviors.
As I tell my students, if you want to use behavioral science research to address real-world problems, you have to look very closely at the details. Often, a simple question like, “What research should policy makers and practitioners use to help combat the pandemic?” is surprisingly difficult to answer.
For starters, there are often key differences between the lab (or the people and situations some social scientists typically study as part of our day-to-day research) and the real world (or the people and situations policy-makers and practitioners have in mind when crafting interventions).
Take, for example, the fact that social scientists tend to study people from richer countries that are generally highly educated, industrialized, democratic and in the Western hemisphere. And some social scientific fields (e.g., psychology) focus overwhelmingly on whiter, wealthier and more highly educated groups of people within those nations.
This is a major issue in the social sciences and something that researchers have been talking about for decades. But it’s important to mention now, too, as Black and brown people have been disproportionately affected by the coronavirus — they are dying at much higher rates than white people and working more of the lower-paying “essential” jobs that expose them to greater risks. Here you can start to see very real research limitations creep in: The people whose lives have been most adversely affected by the virus have largely been excluded from the studies that are supposed to help them. When samples and the methods used are not representative of the real world, it becomes very difficult to reach accurate and actionable conclusions.
Additionally, the things we have participants do, or report that they are going to do in the laboratory, do not always map onto how they behave in real life. Take, for example, wearing face masks — something many Americans are still not doing. Convincing people to wear masks sounds like it should be easy to fix, but understanding why they’re not wearing masks in the first place is pretty complicated. It might be a risk perception problem (they don’t perceive COVID-19 to be that risky, or they underestimate their likelihood of getting infected). Or maybe it’s a perceived efficacy problem (they don’t think wearing the masks will actually reduce their risk). Or maybe it’s even a norm perception problem (they don’t think anyone else is wearing masks).
Understanding why people are choosing not to wear masks is important because if the goal is to design a successful intervention to change this behavior, we then as social scientists must first figure out which of these reasons — or more likely, which combination of them — is the root of the problem. Until we know what is driving much of the behavior we see, we cannot generate effective solutions for changing that behavior. And all this doesn’t even take into account that we now live in a world where everything — including the pandemic — is politicized, which also affects whether people are willing to pay attention to the messages in an intervention.
Research on other infectious diseases has shown that who is doing the intervening (i.e., who is delivering the message) matters, as experts are often more effective than non-experts. Studies have also shown it helps if the person doing the intervention shares characteristics, such as gender or race, with the people for whom the messaging is targeted. Additionally giving people laundry lists of things they can’t do is less helpful than providing them with a reasonable number (e.g., two to three) of things they can do.
Lastly, researchers need to address the seemingly cold and calculating question of whether an intervention is cost-effective. Resources are limited — especially in a situation like a pandemic — so social scientists are also trying to factor in which interventions are likely to have the biggest societal effect. To do that, we have to look at things like “effect sizes” of previous studies and translate them into pandemic-relevant metrics.
For instance, if we developed a message to increase mask-wearing and persuaded policymakers to buy air time in all 210 U.S. media markets, how much of an increase in mask-wearing should we expect? One percent? Five percent? The answer to that matters a great deal, because we have to decide whether that is a better or worse use of (limited) resources than investing in other strategies, such as more COVID-19 tests — something the U.S. also doesn’t have enough of.
Ultimately, figuring these things out often takes time, and it’s important for scientists and policymakers to acknowledge that. We need to say what we don’t know and when we need more time. After all, there’s a risk of acting too quickly, before we actually understand the problem or the effects an intervention might have. Being overconfident and wrong can come with very real costs: We in the scientific community lose future credibility and trustworthiness (not to mention the costs associated with any harm done between the initial flawed intervention and the eventual correct one). Think about the early messaging around face masks, which was fairly opaque. As some countries mandated masks, figures like the U.S. surgeon general tweeted that masks are “NOT effective.” Of course, scientists and policymakers later had to backtrack when studies showed that wearing masks is effective for reducing transmission of COVID-19.
And that brings me to one last thing I want to discuss: the ethics of scientific research. Data can be instructive, but it does not speak for itself. Behind every data point is a person. And with something like the coronavirus, where people are so deeply affected, we have to think about the ethics of intervening in people’s lives. Those ethics again involve considering things like who is represented in, versus missing from, the data we use and whose lives will be affected by those decisions.
Extreme levels of inequality in the U.S. and around the world have created power imbalances that often result in uneven distribution of the risks and benefits of interventions. Some groups are subject to disproportionate risks so that other groups reap disproportionate benefits. As a result, policy decisions often have winners and losers, and in both historical and modern society — including the COVID-19 era — the people who lose are usually those already on the margins of society. We have to remember that, and be vigilant in our efforts so that we do not reproduce these patterns.
I was reminded of this when I read a FiveThirtyEight article on changes in public opinion about reopening the economy. The article noted that between March and June, polling data showed a 22 percent increase in the share of Americans who said the government should allow businesses to open back up, even if it meant putting some people at risk. On its surface, that looks like a large increase in support for reopening the economy, and thus reopening might seem supported by the public. But looking closer, it becomes clear why it may be unwise to act on that evidence on its own: The observed trend was largely among white Americans. Eighty-two percent of Black Americans still thought that public health should be prioritized over the economy — roughly unchanged from March. White Americans had changed their minds: 49 percent thought the government should reopen the economy, even if it means putting some people at risk, compared with 24 percent in March.
This is an important reminder that the pandemic has not been the “great equalizer,” as it was initially described. The racial disparities in the pandemic have been so stark that early estimates suggest that about one in 2,000 of the entire Black population in the U.S. has died from COVID-19. It is therefore imperative we consider these different experiences of the coronavirus when considering what research we should use when responding to the pandemic.
Who is included in the data we’re using? And who isn’t? If we heavily weigh the opinions and other data gathered from one group as we design interventions, what happens to other groups? These real-world differences matter, and matter greatly. We have to ask ourselves those questions as scientists and remember that — especially in times like the pandemic era we’re living in — we’re betting people’s lives on the answers to those questions.


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-14--What If Trump Loses And Won’t Leave?

What If Trump Loses And Won’t Leave?

For months now , President Trump has carefully planted the seed that he might not leave the office of the presidency willingly if he loses .
Whether it ’ s tweeting that the election should be delayed as it “ will be the most inaccurate and fraudulent election in history ” or that there will be widespread voter fraud because of the expected uptick in mail ballots due to the coronavirus , Trump seems intent on undermining the electoral process .
This , in turn , raises a rather thorny and unprecedented question : What happens if Trump won ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Experts tell me that the president actually has a lot of power at his discretion to contest the election , and some of the scenarios that could bring us to the edge of a crisis are actually very plausible .
Consider this one : It ’ s late on Election Day , and hundreds of thousands of votes in key battleground states still have to be counted due to the increased use of mail and absentee voting because of the pandemic .
As a result , media outlets have largely avoided calling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ votes that have been counted , Trump leads in enough states to reach at least 270 electoral votes , which would be enough to win the election if his election-night lead holds .
Trump claims victory , but because Democrats were much more likely to vote by mail than Republicans , Joe Biden eventually pulls ahead because of the Democratic lean of the remaining votes — a phenomenon known as the “ blue shift.
” That ’ s just one of the many scenarios the Transition Integrity Project , a bipartisan collection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while researching how a possible election crisis could unfold .
Rosa Brooks , a professor at Georgetown University Law School who co-founded the Transition Integrity Project , told me she and her colleagues weren ’ t interested in predicting the likelihood of any one scenario they looked at , but more so in understanding the range of possibilities .
Ultimately , they don ’ t know to what extent this year ’ s election result will be contested — would Trump deploy federal agents from the Department of Justice to secure vote counting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Twitter to bemoan the results ?
— but Brooks told me they do think the election will be contested at least on some level .
So the question they ’ re asking is : How much ?
One big takeaway from the Transition Integrity Project ’ s simulations was just how much power Trump has at his disposal should he choose to contest the election .
“ You have just a tremendous differential between the president of the United States of America , who has just awesome coercive powers at his disposal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power whatsoever in our system , ” said Brooks .
“ Joe Biden can call a press conference ; Donald Trump could call on the 82nd Airborne.
” This , of course , would be a doomsday scenario , and one reason why so much of this is hard to fathom .
A cornerstone of American elections has been the peaceful transition of power , but as research from the Transition Integrity Project and others underscores , there are multiple ways to contest an election .
And it ’ s not limited to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very possible were Trump to win in the Electoral College , where he has an advantage , but lose the popular vote to Biden , that Democrats would dismiss the election as unfair .
We , of course , do not have to look too far back in our electoral history to know that Americans have survived a disputed election before — see the 2000 presidential race .
But experts I talked to were worried , given Trump ’ s inflammatory rhetoric around the election and his own track record of openly flouting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t be able to handle another full-throttle election dispute .
Take how low the public ’ s trust in the election already is .
Last week , an NBC News/SurveyMonkey poll found that 59 percent of Americans were not too confident or not confident at all that the election would be conducted in a free and equal way , in line with its polling since early August on this question .
It might be hard to remember now , but in the 2000 presidential election , Florida ’ s GOP-controlled state legislature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new slate of electors to vote for George W. Bush had a court-ordered manual recount imposed by the Florida Supreme Court dragged on .
Of course , it ultimately didn ’ t come to that because the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and halted Florida ’ s recount , famously deciding in a 5-4 decision that the state Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds and that a recount could not be held in time to meet the federal deadline for the selection of presidential electors .
Edward Foley of Ohio State University ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar could happen this year if the president and his backers contest the results in the Electoral College .
In Foley ’ s scenario , Trump leads in the tipping-point state of Pennsylvania on election night , but because of Democratic gains in ballots counted in the following days , Biden pulls ahead by a few thousand votes .
What happens next quickly devolves into a partisan dispute .
Democratic Gov .
Tom Wolf signs Pennsylvania ’ s certificate of ascertainment , confirming Biden ’ s victory by listing the Democratic electors as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Electoral College , while the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania legislature appoints a different set of electors at Trump ’ s behest as he has claimed there was widespread election fraud .
This , were it to happen , would likely be met immediately with legal challenges in state and federal court , perhaps followed by another intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court .
But the significance is that even if a court ruled against the validity of one set of electors , Congress still has the power to consider both sets of electors as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certificate naming them .
The Electoral Count Act of 1887 , which governs the electoral vote counting process , was designed to help Congress decide how to handle such a situation .
But it is especially ambiguous on what would happen if the Senate and House disagree on which set of electors should count , which could happen if the GOP retains control of the Senate and Democrats keep the House .
In Foley ’ s scenario , Vice President Mike Pence — as president of the Senate , he would oversee the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the law , arguing that neither set of electors should count because they conflict .
That removes Pennsylvania ’ s votes from the total number of electors and gives Trump a majority based on the remaining 518 electoral votes .
Democrats , however , counter , claiming the certificate bearing the governor ’ s seal , which supports Biden , is given preference by the law .
Ultimately , though , neither side finds a compromise and we find ourselves in the midst of a full-blown constitutional crisis .
In this scenario @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if , for instance , Democrats seek an injunction to stop Pence from not counting Pennsylvania ’ s votes .
But it ’ s also possible the court would try to avoid making a ruling on the counting dispute , in keeping with a dissent from Bush v. Gore that argued neither the Constitution nor the Electoral Count Act provided a role for the judiciary in this process .
Under the 20th Amendment , we know someone must take office on Jan. 20 as president , yet the amendment is curiously silent on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether someone has actually qualified to take office .
“ The thing that we know for sure is the current term ends , ” said Foley , but he added that doesn ’ t mean it would be straightforward to figure out who should take office next if there ’ s a disagreement .
In fact , it ’ s possible that House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could claim that under the Presidential Succession Act , she is next in line to become president and that she would be willing to resign her House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is ruled the election winner .
But if Republicans claimed Trump had won reelection , they very well might object to Pelosi being sworn in .
Given a crisis on this scale , it ’ s hard to unpack what exactly might happen , but it ’ s very likely things would spiral out of control , and the resulting uncertainty could spark unrest and protests that could very well lead to violence .
Gaming out these different scenarios demonstrates that , should Trump dispute the result , a key factor will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the federal and state level cooperate with him .
Brooks pointed out that while Trump has significant power to contest the results as president , he can ultimately only go so far if supporters don ’ t follow his lead .
For instance , in one of its simulations , the Transition Integrity Project found that GOP leaders might support some of Trump ’ s claims of fraud or maneuvers to manipulate the vote count , but that didn ’ t mean they ’ d go along with every move he tried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans might oppose an attempt to federalize and deploy the National Guard .
And in Foley ’ s scenario , much hinged on what Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and other Republicans — including Pence — chose to do when it came to deciding which Pennsylvania electors should count .
The relative closeness of the election is a factor here , too .
In a different simulation the Transition Integrity Project looked at that put Biden in a stronger position on election night , Trump attracted less support from Republican leaders and Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some degree of bipartisan cooperation so that the country didn ’ t slide into a full-blown electoral crisis .
Still , throughout its different scenarios , the project found it likely that the Trump campaign would try to raise enough doubts about the vote so as to undermine what might even seem like a clear result .
Considering Trump claimed millions of people illegally voted when he won in 2016 , it doesn ’ t take much to imagine he ’ d do the same this year if he thought it would improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That ’ s one reason researchers at the Transition Integrity Project rank Trump ’ s allegations of voter fraud among the most dangerous threats currently facing the election .
Of course , considering how high the existential stakes seem to be in this election , it ’ s not out of the question that Biden might be the one who disputes the result .
Tellingly , in another simulation the Transition Integrity Project played out , a crisis unfolded after Trump won in the Electoral College but lost the national popular vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was fraud that explained Biden ’ s popular vote edge , but Biden retracted an election night concession and pushed Democratic governors in Michigan and Wisconsin to send appointed slates of electors to Congress , in conflict with the elected ones backing Trump .
In his work , Foley also explored an alternate scenario in which Arizona was the tipping-point state and Republican Gov .
Doug Ducey refused to certify the results to give Biden the state ’ s electors .
During Congress ’ s counting , congressional Democrats argued that Arizona ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden the victory — the same argument Pence made in the Pennsylvania scenario to claim Trump had won .
The scenarios laid out by the Transition Integrity Project and Foley shouldn ’ t be taken as definite outcomes , but they do make clear that the rickety apparatus governing our electoral process could collapse if key actors decide to push against it .
Worryingly , the public may be especially vulnerable to attempts to delegitimize the election , too .
Faith in the Electoral College is already shaky because of the possibility of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2000 and 2016 , and worse yet , support for the Electoral College is increasingly polarized by party .
A conflict over which electors should count would only exacerbate those concerns .
And because many Americans still expect to know who won on election night , this could create a situation where much of the public isn ’ t ready for — or is ready to reject — sizable shifts in the vote after Election Day , which could make it easier to cast doubt on the outcome .
But even if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pass , the fact that we lack a neutral electoral arbiter is surely a ticking time bomb for our democracy .
Such an institution may sound difficult to create , but many individual states have used judicial panels to successfully sort through close elections , and other democratic nations have far better laws to adjudicate contested elections .
For now , though , in the absence of such measures , the peaceful transfer of power hinges on the expectation that that is how American elections work , but that may be increasingly hanging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in this incredibly polarized era of U.S. politics will tell you .

UPDATE (September 24, 2020, 9:15 a.m.): On Wednesday, President Trump refused to say whether he would commit to a peaceful transition of power if he lost in the upcoming election, telling reporters: “We’re going to have to see what happens.”
Earlier this month, we looked at a number of different scenarios for what could happen.
For months now, President Trump has carefully planted the seed that he might not leave the office of the presidency willingly if he loses.
Whether it’s tweeting that the election should be delayed as it “will be the most inaccurate and fraudulent election in history” or that there will be widespread voter fraud because of the expected uptick in mail ballots due to the coronavirus, Trump seems intent on undermining the electoral process.
This, in turn, raises a rather thorny and unprecedented question: What happens if Trump won’t go? The answer is bleak. Experts tell me that the president actually has a lot of power at his discretion to contest the election, and some of the scenarios that could bring us to the edge of a crisis are actually very plausible.
Consider this one: It’s late on Election Day, and hundreds of thousands of votes in key battleground states still have to be counted due to the increased use of mail and absentee voting because of the pandemic. As a result, media outlets have largely avoided calling the race, but based on the votes that have been counted, Trump leads in enough states to reach at least 270 electoral votes, which would be enough to win the election if his election-night lead holds. Trump claims victory, but because Democrats were much more likely to vote by mail than Republicans, Joe Biden eventually pulls ahead because of the Democratic lean of the remaining votes — a phenomenon known as the “blue shift.”
That’s just one of the many scenarios the Transition Integrity Project, a bipartisan collection of over 100 experts, explored this summer while researching how a possible election crisis could unfold.
Rosa Brooks, a professor at Georgetown University Law School who co-founded the Transition Integrity Project, told me she and her colleagues weren’t interested in predicting the likelihood of any one scenario they looked at, but more so in understanding the range of possibilities. Ultimately, they don’t know to what extent this year’s election result will be contested — would Trump deploy federal agents from the Department of Justice to secure vote counting sites or would he just take to Twitter to bemoan the results? — but Brooks told me they do think the election will be contested at least on some level. So the question they’re asking is: How much?
One big takeaway from the Transition Integrity Project’s simulations was just how much power Trump has at his disposal should he choose to contest the election. “You have just a tremendous differential between the president of the United States of America, who has just awesome coercive powers at his disposal, and a challenger who really has no power whatsoever in our system,” said Brooks. “Joe Biden can call a press conference; Donald Trump could call on the 82nd Airborne.”
This, of course, would be a doomsday scenario, and one reason why so much of this is hard to fathom. A cornerstone of American elections has been the peaceful transition of power, but as research from the Transition Integrity Project and others underscores, there are multiple ways to contest an election. And it’s not limited to just Trump either. It’s very possible were Trump to win in the Electoral College, where he has an advantage, but lose the popular vote to Biden, that Democrats would dismiss the election as unfair.
We, of course, do not have to look too far back in our electoral history to know that Americans have survived a disputed election before — see the 2000 presidential race. But experts I talked to were worried, given Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric around the election and his own track record of openly flouting democratic norms, that the country wouldn’t be able to handle another full-throttle election dispute. Take how low the public’s trust in the election already is. Last week, an NBC News/SurveyMonkey poll found that 59 percent of Americans were not too confident or not confident at all that the election would be conducted in a free and equal way, in line with its polling since early August on this question.
It might be hard to remember now, but in the 2000 presidential election, Florida’s GOP-controlled state legislature was on the verge of appointing a new slate of electors to vote for George W. Bush had a court-ordered manual recount imposed by the Florida Supreme Court dragged on. Of course, it ultimately didn’t come to that because the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and halted Florida’s recount, famously deciding in a 5-4 decision that the state Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds and that a recount could not be held in time to meet the federal deadline for the selection of presidential electors.
Edward Foley of Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law thinks something similar could happen this year if the president and his backers contest the results in the Electoral College.
In Foley’s scenario, Trump leads in the tipping-point state of Pennsylvania on election night, but because of Democratic gains in ballots counted in the following days, Biden pulls ahead by a few thousand votes. What happens next quickly devolves into a partisan dispute. Democratic Gov. Tom Wolf signs Pennsylvania’s certificate of ascertainment, confirming Biden’s victory by listing the Democratic electors as the state’s official slate for the Electoral College, while the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania legislature appoints a different set of electors at Trump’s behest as he has claimed there was widespread election fraud.
This, were it to happen, would likely be met immediately with legal challenges in state and federal court, perhaps followed by another intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court. But the significance is that even if a court ruled against the validity of one set of electors, Congress still has the power to consider both sets of electors as long as they have in hand the certificate naming them.
The Electoral Count Act of 1887, which governs the electoral vote counting process, was designed to help Congress decide how to handle such a situation. But it is especially ambiguous on what would happen if the Senate and House disagree on which set of electors should count, which could happen if the GOP retains control of the Senate and Democrats keep the House.
In Foley’s scenario, Vice President Mike Pence — as president of the Senate, he would oversee the count in Congress — follows one interpretation of the law, arguing that neither set of electors should count because they conflict. That removes Pennsylvania’s votes from the total number of electors and gives Trump a majority based on the remaining 518 electoral votes. Democrats, however, counter, claiming the certificate bearing the governor’s seal, which supports Biden, is given preference by the law.
Ultimately, though, neither side finds a compromise and we find ourselves in the midst of a full-blown constitutional crisis. In this scenario, the Supreme Court could become involved if, for instance, Democrats seek an injunction to stop Pence from not counting Pennsylvania’s votes. But it’s also possible the court would try to avoid making a ruling on the counting dispute, in keeping with a dissent from Bush v. Gore that argued neither the Constitution nor the Electoral Count Act provided a role for the judiciary in this process.
Under the 20th Amendment, we know someone must take office on Jan. 20 as president, yet the amendment is curiously silent on how to deal with a dispute over whether someone has actually qualified to take office. “The thing that we know for sure is the current term ends,” said Foley, but he added that doesn’t mean it would be straightforward to figure out who should take office next if there’s a disagreement.
In fact, it’s possible that House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could claim that under the Presidential Succession Act, she is next in line to become president and that she would be willing to resign her House seat to serve as president until Biden is ruled the election winner. But if Republicans claimed Trump had won reelection, they very well might object to Pelosi being sworn in. Given a crisis on this scale, it’s hard to unpack what exactly might happen, but it’s very likely things would spiral out of control, and the resulting uncertainty could spark unrest and protests that could very well lead to violence.
Gaming out these different scenarios demonstrates that, should Trump dispute the result, a key factor will be the extent to which leading Republican officials at the federal and state level cooperate with him. Brooks pointed out that while Trump has significant power to contest the results as president, he can ultimately only go so far if supporters don’t follow his lead.
For instance, in one of its simulations, the Transition Integrity Project found that GOP leaders might support some of Trump’s claims of fraud or maneuvers to manipulate the vote count, but that didn’t mean they’d go along with every move he tried. For instance, it found many Republicans might oppose an attempt to federalize and deploy the National Guard. And in Foley’s scenario, much hinged on what Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and other Republicans — including Pence — chose to do when it came to deciding which Pennsylvania electors should count.
The relative closeness of the election is a factor here, too. In a different simulation the Transition Integrity Project looked at that put Biden in a stronger position on election night, Trump attracted less support from Republican leaders and Biden’s campaign was able to get some degree of bipartisan cooperation so that the country didn’t slide into a full-blown electoral crisis. Still, throughout its different scenarios, the project found it likely that the Trump campaign would try to raise enough doubts about the vote so as to undermine what might even seem like a clear result. Considering Trump claimed millions of people illegally voted when he won in 2016, it doesn’t take much to imagine he’d do the same this year if he thought it would improve his chances of winning a contested election. That’s one reason researchers at the Transition Integrity Project rank Trump’s allegations of voter fraud among the most dangerous threats currently facing the election.
Of course, considering how high the existential stakes seem to be in this election, it’s not out of the question that Biden might be the one who disputes the result. Tellingly, in another simulation the Transition Integrity Project played out, a crisis unfolded after Trump won in the Electoral College but lost the national popular vote by 5 points. Trump claimed it was fraud that explained Biden’s popular vote edge, but Biden retracted an election night concession and pushed Democratic governors in Michigan and Wisconsin to send appointed slates of electors to Congress, in conflict with the elected ones backing Trump. In his work, Foley also explored an alternate scenario in which Arizona was the tipping-point state and Republican Gov. Doug Ducey refused to certify the results to give Biden the state’s electors. During Congress’s counting, congressional Democrats argued that Arizona’s electors should be disqualified to give Biden the victory — the same argument Pence made in the Pennsylvania scenario to claim Trump had won.
The scenarios laid out by the Transition Integrity Project and Foley shouldn’t be taken as definite outcomes, but they do make clear that the rickety apparatus governing our electoral process could collapse if key actors decide to push against it.
Worryingly, the public may be especially vulnerable to attempts to delegitimize the election, too. Faith in the Electoral College is already shaky because of the possibility of a popular vote-electoral vote split like in 2000 and 2016, and worse yet, support for the Electoral College is increasingly polarized by party. A conflict over which electors should count would only exacerbate those concerns. And because many Americans still expect to know who won on election night, this could create a situation where much of the public isn’t ready for — or is ready to reject — sizable shifts in the vote after Election Day, which could make it easier to cast doubt on the outcome.
But even if the worst scenarios don’t come to pass, the fact that we lack a neutral electoral arbiter is surely a ticking time bomb for our democracy. Such an institution may sound difficult to create, but many individual states have used judicial panels to successfully sort through close elections, and other democratic nations have far better laws to adjudicate contested elections. For now, though, in the absence of such measures, the peaceful transfer of power hinges on the expectation that that is how American elections work, but that may be increasingly hanging in the balance, as anyone living in this incredibly polarized era of U.S. politics will tell you.
Confidence Interval: Texas could go blue in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-09-14--Politics Podcast: Trump Is Narrowing The Gap With Latino Voters

Recent polling shows that President Trump is improving his standing among Latino voters in the presidential race , particularly in @ @ @ @ @ of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew talks to pollster Carlos Odio about political @ @ @ @ @ also discuss whether polls in the Midwest could be biased against Republicans ( as they @ @ @ @ @ whether scandals still matter .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ @ @ @ @ @ audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your @ @ @ @ @ you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast @ @ @ @ @ .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on @ @ @ @ @ , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in @ @ @ @ @ Twitter or in the comments .

Recent polling shows that President Trump is improving his standing among Latino voters in the presidential race, particularly in Florida. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew talks to Carlos Odio, the co-founder of Equis Research, about political trends among Latinos. They also discuss whether polls in the Midwest could be biased against Republicans (as they were in 2016) and whether scandals still matter.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.