fivethirtyeight--2020-08-24--Why There Are So Few Moderate Republicans Left

Monday marks the first night of the Republican National Convention , and things could certainly be going better for President Trump .
He is trailing Joe Biden in the national polls as well as in several key swing states .
And FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential forecast currently says Biden — not Trump — is favored to win the election .
In fact , circumstances seem so dire for the GOP that election handicappers like the Cook Political Report think the Democrats — once underdogs — are slightly favored to take back the GOP-controlled Senate , too .
So if Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the House , the Senate and the presidency — that raises the question : Would the GOP change course ?
This is a question I ’ ve thought about a lot , and it ’ s one of the reasons why I argue in my book , “ Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop , ” that America ’ s two-party system is failing us .
With the two parties now fully nationalized , deeply sorted by geography and culture , and locked in a tightly contested , zero-sum battle over “ the soul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American way of life , ” it ’ s nearly impossible to break that cycle .
And so I think it ’ s unlikely that Republicans will become more moderate even if they were to take the shellacking I ’ ve outlined above .
The problem is that political parties are not singular entities capable of easily changing course .
They are , instead , a loose coalition of office-holders , interest groups , donors , activists , media personalities and many others , all jockeying and competing for power .
Think of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the tugs have been toward more extreme and more confrontational versions of the party .
In the GOP ’ s internal rope pull , this has meant that over the past few decades , and particularly since 2010 , almost all the would-be moderates have either gravitated toward Trump to stay relevant or simply broken away altogether .
And all that momentum in the Republican party is pulling toward a more confrontational , Trumpian direction — even if he is no longer at the helm .
Moderate Republicans are few and far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Perry Bacon Jr. described five wings of the Republican Party from most to least Trumpian .
The takeaway was clear .
The fortunes of those who were the most solidly aligned with Trump ( Bacon listed Rep. Matt Gaetz of Florida , Rep. Jim Jordan of Ohio and Rep. Mark Meadows of North Carolina as prominent examples ; I ’ d add Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton and Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley ) were rising within the party , while the fortunes of the so-called Trump skeptics were falling .
Some , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have left the party .
Others , like Rep. Will Hurd of Texas , are retiring .
And then there are the anti-Trumpers , like former Ohio Gov .
and 2016 presidential contender John Kasich , who are now endorsing Biden .
Anybody with any ambitions within the party has , in other words , embraced Trump and Trumpism .
These recent shifts aren ’ t entirely new , either .
They are the latest iteration of a decades-long transformation of the GOP .
In short , moderates have been bowing out .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ more evangelical , and now more Trumpian Republicans have been stepping up .
In the 2018 midterms , for example , congressional Republicans ’ biggest losses came among their most moderate members .
The same could happen again in 2020 .
Not to mention , a good chunk of this cycle ’ s retiring Republicans are leaving because they not only are tired of Trump and Trumpism but also anticipate being in the House minority again , where they would be powerless .
As political scientist Danielle Thomsen has shown , more and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress altogether , choosing not to run because they no longer see a place for themselves .
This is true in both parties , Thomsen found — but especially among Republicans .
Moderates increasingly feel as if they just don ’ t “ fit.
” And that feeling of not belonging may stem in part from party leaders and party activists who want more extreme candidates to run .
( It also helps that more partisan candidates are the ones who are naturally drawn to politics . )
In a survey of party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) branch of government in 2013 — well before Trump became president — local party leaders said they preferred more extreme candidates to more centrist candidates .
This finding was true especially among Republicans , who preferred extreme candidates by a 10-to-1 margin .
( Democrats preferred more extreme candidates just 2 to 1 . )
If anything , this ratio may be even more lopsided among Republicans .
One of the underappreciated changes in the past few years is the extent to which Trump-styled Republicans have taken over the machinery of state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll be able to shape the GOP well beyond 2020 , too .
This swing toward more radical candidates may sound surprising — after all , shouldn ’ t party leaders want to nominate moderates to win ?
But considering that the overwhelming majority of legislative elections are now safe for one party , most parties can win regardless of who they nominate .
In fact , there ’ s even evidence that the long-standing electoral price of extremism has all but vanished .
These patterns are all part of a vicious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for decades .
The more extreme the Republican Party has become , the more moderates have opted out or just been passed over .
The more moderates have opted out or been passed over , the more extreme the party has become .
And the more the Republican Party recedes to just elected officials in solidly conservative states and districts , the more they define the party .
Of course , it ’ s not just elected officials in the Republican Party who are becoming more extreme .
Conservative media is part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has long played a central role in shaping the GOP .
On some days , it ’ s hard to tell who ’ s running the country — Trump , or the Fox News hosts who give him many of his ideas ( not to mention the rotating cast of characters who have jumped between the administration and the network ) .
But , at its core , right-wing media is opposition media , built around rejecting liberalism .
It is a business driven by outrage and anger .
And in its increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has helped set the tone for the GOP ’ s existential struggle against liberals ’ so-called plans to control everything — media , culture , college campuses .
So if Republicans were to go back to being the opposition party because of massive losses in November , right-wing media in its current form would also make it difficult for any would-be moderate Republicans to break through .
As for the rest of the power players in the GOP coalition ?
They do not offer a moderating influence , either .
Key GOP activist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups , gun-rights groups , and billionaire donors are far more extreme than the rest of the party .
For instance , the Koch brothers have organized something akin to a party within a party at the state level , where they have influenced Republicans to take unpopular positions on taxes , social benefits and climate policy .
Libertarian megadonor Robert Mercer has also played an outsize role , funding a variety of conservative organizations that propelled Trump to power , including media outlets like Breitbart .
As a result of these groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with messaging and advocacy that paint the electorate as more conservative than it really is .
This , too , has had the effect of moving the party further to the right .
To be sure , the more libertarian business conservatives and more populist social conservatives maintain an uneasy partnership in forming this coalition , but the more they both occupy unpopular positions , the more they must stick together around the shared proposition that the biggest threat to their joint interests is the Democratic Party .
Voters are becoming more extreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The GOP is more and more a party of disaffected non-college-educated white people — especially men and those over age 50 .
And as the Republican Party has traded its younger , college-educated white people — especially women — for the Democrats ’ non-college-educated , older white people — especially men — the Republican party ’ s primary electorate has shifted in ways that make anti-establishment , pro-Trump candidates more prevalent than they were even four years ago , and certainly eight years ago .
Consider , for example , fervently pro-Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won a surpising primary victory over five-term Republican Rep. Scott Tipton in Colorado ; Laura Loomer , whose anti-Muslim remarks got her banned from social media , running in Florida ; or Marjorie Taylor Greene , the QAnon enthusiast running in Georgia .
These candidates are very much products of the 2020 Republican Party .
It has also meant that Republican voters are more anti-establishment and pro-Trump .
Political science shows us that voters follow cues from their parties , and are more likely to change their opinions on issues to align with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change their partisan identity to fit with preexisting opinions .
So by redefining what it means to be a Republican , Trump has moved opinions of many GOP voters over the past four years .
It is possible that another leader could emerge and reorient the Republican Party again , as Trump did .
But many of these trends predate Trump .
So it ’ s far more likely that ambitious politicians will try to work with , rather than against , the sentiments that Trump has kicked up .
Case in point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to stick with Trump , and almost all 2024 presidential hopefuls are tacking in a very Trumpian direction .
Some may point to Maryland ’ s Larry Hogan , the popular moderate Republican governor who has also been rumored to have 2024 aspirations , as a potential future for the Republican Party ( noting in the same breath , perhaps , two other popular Republican governors , Charlie Baker of Massachusetts and Phil Scott of Vermont ) .
These three governors , however , don ’ t fit with the national Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four most highly educated states , where the last vestiges of socially liberal Yankee Republicanism still thrive , and state legislatures are so Democratic that voters like having a check on runaway spending .
It ’ s hard to see Hogan , or a similar candidate , having much appeal to Republican voters outside the Northeast .
And even as popular as Baker might be in liberal Massachusetts , he is more beloved by Democrats than Republicans .
But wait , you say : Isn ’ t America moving in a much more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else , won ’ t that put pressure on the GOP to moderate ?
It ’ s certainly easy to think America is moving in a much more liberal direction if you look at trends in public opinion over the past few years .
Historically , though , public opinion is most liberal precisely when liberal policies are least likely to be enacted ( like now , and especially in 2017 and 2018 , when Republicans had unified control in Washington ) .
Once Democrats regain control , however , and then try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opinion will likely shift against them , in a more conservative direction — or at least this is how it has worked historically .
Americans favor government until they get it .
( Remember in 2009 when it was fashionable to proclaim a permanent Democratic majority ? )
This is the great irony of American public opinion : It mitigates against moderation because it tells the out-party that they don ’ t need to move to the middle — that public opinion is moving in their direction .
That is , right until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
To be sure , Democrats ’ electoral fortunes have risen considerably since 2016 , enough to take control of the U.S. House in 2018 and pick up seats across multiple state legislatures .
The political “ mood ” of the country ( based on aggregated polling ) has moved left , to levels not seen since the early 1960s .
But it ’ s a good bet that this shift , particularly on social issues , is partly anti-Trump backlash , which will dampen when Trump is no longer president .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats , after losing three consecutive presidential elections , nominated Bill Clinton in 1992 and moved in a more centrist direction .
This might feel like a tempting comparison to make with the GOP now , but the key difference is that the Democrats of the early 1990s had a more diverse coalition to draw on that made that kind of pivot possible ( even as late as the 1990s , the Democratic Party had plenty of rural and Southern supporters ) .
By contrast , the Republican coalition of today lacks any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pull it back to a more centrist position .
The bottom line : American political parties are not top-down entities , capable of turning on a dime .
They are loose networks and coalitions of many actors and groups .
And because the Republican Party has been pulling in a more extreme direction for decades now , most Republican moderates have either quit the team or reoriented themselves in a more combative , Trumpian direction to stay alive .
And these forces will most likely continue to tug at the party , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve faced for decades : Quit , or get on board .

Monday marks the first night of the Republican National Convention, and things could certainly be going better for President Trump.
He is trailing Joe Biden in the national polls as well as in several key swing states. And FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecast currently says Biden — not Trump — is favored to win the election. In fact, circumstances seem so dire for the GOP that election handicappers like the Cook Political Report think the Democrats — once underdogs — are slightly favored to take back the GOP-controlled Senate, too.
So if Republicans were to lose on that scale — the House, the Senate and the presidency — that raises the question: Would the GOP change course?
This is a question I’ve thought about a lot, and it’s one of the reasons why I argue in my book, “Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop,” that America’s two-party system is failing us. With the two parties now fully nationalized, deeply sorted by geography and culture, and locked in a tightly contested, zero-sum battle over “the soul of the nation” and the “American way of life,” it’s nearly impossible to break that cycle. And so I think it’s unlikely that Republicans will become more moderate even if they were to take the shellacking I’ve outlined above.
The problem is that political parties are not singular entities capable of easily changing course. They are, instead, a loose coalition of office-holders, interest groups, donors, activists, media personalities and many others, all jockeying and competing for power. Think of a giant tug of war in which all the tugs have been toward more extreme and more confrontational versions of the party.
In the GOP’s internal rope pull, this has meant that over the past few decades, and particularly since 2010, almost all the would-be moderates have either gravitated toward Trump to stay relevant or simply broken away altogether. And all that momentum in the Republican party is pulling toward a more confrontational, Trumpian direction — even if he is no longer at the helm.
Moderate Republicans are few and far between
Back in March 2019, FiveThirtyEight’s Perry Bacon Jr. described five wings of the Republican Party from most to least Trumpian. The takeaway was clear. The fortunes of those who were the most solidly aligned with Trump (Bacon listed Rep. Matt Gaetz of Florida, Rep. Jim Jordan of Ohio and Rep. Mark Meadows of North Carolina as prominent examples; I’d add Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton and Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley) were rising within the party, while the fortunes of the so-called Trump skeptics were falling. Some, like Rep. Justin Amash of Michigan, have left the party. Others, like Rep. Will Hurd of Texas, are retiring. And then there are the anti-Trumpers, like former Ohio Gov. and 2016 presidential contender John Kasich, who are now endorsing Biden.
Anybody with any ambitions within the party has, in other words, embraced Trump and Trumpism.
These recent shifts aren’t entirely new, either. They are the latest iteration of a decades-long transformation of the GOP. In short, moderates have been bowing out. And more conservative, more combative, more evangelical, and now more Trumpian Republicans have been stepping up.
In the 2018 midterms, for example, congressional Republicans’ biggest losses came among their most moderate members. The same could happen again in 2020. Not to mention, a good chunk of this cycle’s retiring Republicans are leaving because they not only are tired of Trump and Trumpism but also anticipate being in the House minority again, where they would be powerless.
As political scientist Danielle Thomsen has shown, more and more would-be moderates are opting out of Congress altogether, choosing not to run because they no longer see a place for themselves. This is true in both parties, Thomsen found — but especially among Republicans. Moderates increasingly feel as if they just don’t “fit.”
And that feeling of not belonging may stem in part from party leaders and party activists who want more extreme candidates to run. (It also helps that more partisan candidates are the ones who are naturally drawn to politics.) In a survey of party chairs at the county-level (or equivalent) branch of government in 2013 — well before Trump became president — local party leaders said they preferred more extreme candidates to more centrist candidates. This finding was true especially among Republicans, who preferred extreme candidates by a 10-to-1 margin. (Democrats preferred more extreme candidates just 2 to 1.) If anything, this ratio may be even more lopsided among Republicans. One of the underappreciated changes in the past few years is the extent to which Trump-styled Republicans have taken over the machinery of state and local parties, which means they’ll be able to shape the GOP well beyond 2020, too.
This swing toward more radical candidates may sound surprising — after all, shouldn’t party leaders want to nominate moderates to win? But considering that the overwhelming majority of legislative elections are now safe for one party, most parties can win regardless of who they nominate. In fact, there’s even evidence that the long-standing electoral price of extremism has all but vanished.
These patterns are all part of a vicious cycle that has been feeding on itself for decades. The more extreme the Republican Party has become, the more moderates have opted out or just been passed over. The more moderates have opted out or been passed over, the more extreme the party has become. And the more the Republican Party recedes to just elected officials in solidly conservative states and districts, the more they define the party.
Extreme right-wing media, activists and donors are increasingly influential
Of course, it’s not just elected officials in the Republican Party who are becoming more extreme. Conservative media is part of this trend as well, as it has long played a central role in shaping the GOP. On some days, it’s hard to tell who’s running the country — Trump, or the Fox News hosts who give him many of his ideas (not to mention the rotating cast of characters who have jumped between the administration and the network).
But, at its core, right-wing media is opposition media, built around rejecting liberalism. It is a business driven by outrage and anger. And in its increasingly prominent role in the GOP, it has helped set the tone for the GOP’s existential struggle against liberals’ so-called plans to control everything — media, culture, college campuses. So if Republicans were to go back to being the opposition party because of massive losses in November, right-wing media in its current form would also make it difficult for any would-be moderate Republicans to break through.
As for the rest of the power players in the GOP coalition? They do not offer a moderating influence, either. Key GOP activist groups, including evangelical groups, anti-immigration groups, gun-rights groups, and billionaire donors are far more extreme than the rest of the party. For instance, the Koch brothers have organized something akin to a party within a party at the state level, where they have influenced Republicans to take unpopular positions on taxes, social benefits and climate policy. Libertarian megadonor Robert Mercer has also played an outsize role, funding a variety of conservative organizations that propelled Trump to power, including media outlets like Breitbart.
As a result of these groups’ efforts, elected Republicans are confronted with messaging and advocacy that paint the electorate as more conservative than it really is. This, too, has had the effect of moving the party further to the right. To be sure, the more libertarian business conservatives and more populist social conservatives maintain an uneasy partnership in forming this coalition, but the more they both occupy unpopular positions, the more they must stick together around the shared proposition that the biggest threat to their joint interests is the Democratic Party.
Voters are becoming more extreme
Finally, there are the Republican voters. The GOP is more and more a party of disaffected non-college-educated white people — especially men and those over age 50. And as the Republican Party has traded its younger, college-educated white people — especially women — for the Democrats’ non-college-educated, older white people — especially men — the Republican party’s primary electorate has shifted in ways that make anti-establishment, pro-Trump candidates more prevalent than they were even four years ago, and certainly eight years ago.
Consider, for example, fervently pro-Trump House candidates like Lauren Boebert, who won a surpising primary victory over five-term Republican Rep. Scott Tipton in Colorado; Laura Loomer, whose anti-Muslim remarks got her banned from social media, running in Florida; or Marjorie Taylor Greene, the QAnon enthusiast running in Georgia. These candidates are very much products of the 2020 Republican Party.
It has also meant that Republican voters are more anti-establishment and pro-Trump. Political science shows us that voters follow cues from their parties, and are more likely to change their opinions on issues to align with their partisan identity than they are to change their partisan identity to fit with preexisting opinions. So by redefining what it means to be a Republican, Trump has moved opinions of many GOP voters over the past four years.
It is possible that another leader could emerge and reorient the Republican Party again, as Trump did. But many of these trends predate Trump. So it’s far more likely that ambitious politicians will try to work with, rather than against, the sentiments that Trump has kicked up. Case in point: Republican senators facing reelection this November continue to stick with Trump, and almost all 2024 presidential hopefuls are tacking in a very Trumpian direction.
Some may point to Maryland’s Larry Hogan, the popular moderate Republican governor who has also been rumored to have 2024 aspirations, as a potential future for the Republican Party (noting in the same breath, perhaps, two other popular Republican governors, Charlie Baker of Massachusetts and Phil Scott of Vermont). These three governors, however, don’t fit with the national Republican Party. They represent three of the four most highly educated states, where the last vestiges of socially liberal Yankee Republicanism still thrive, and state legislatures are so Democratic that voters like having a check on runaway spending. It’s hard to see Hogan, or a similar candidate, having much appeal to Republican voters outside the Northeast. And even as popular as Baker might be in liberal Massachusetts, he is more beloved by Democrats than Republicans.
Public opinion flips between two extremes
But wait, you say: Isn’t America moving in a much more liberal direction? And, if nothing else, won’t that put pressure on the GOP to moderate? It’s certainly easy to think America is moving in a much more liberal direction if you look at trends in public opinion over the past few years. Historically, though, public opinion is most liberal precisely when liberal policies are least likely to be enacted (like now, and especially in 2017 and 2018, when Republicans had unified control in Washington).
Once Democrats regain control, however, and then try to enact more liberal policies, public opinion will likely shift against them, in a more conservative direction — or at least this is how it has worked historically. Americans favor government until they get it. (Remember in 2009 when it was fashionable to proclaim a permanent Democratic majority?) This is the great irony of American public opinion: It mitigates against moderation because it tells the out-party that they don’t need to move to the middle — that public opinion is moving in their direction. That is, right until they win and start governing based on it.
To be sure, Democrats’ electoral fortunes have risen considerably since 2016, enough to take control of the U.S. House in 2018 and pick up seats across multiple state legislatures. The political “mood” of the country (based on aggregated polling) has moved left, to levels not seen since the early 1960s. But it’s a good bet that this shift, particularly on social issues, is partly anti-Trump backlash, which will dampen when Trump is no longer president.
Few forces of moderation remain
Political analysts will sometimes recount how the Democrats, after losing three consecutive presidential elections, nominated Bill Clinton in 1992 and moved in a more centrist direction. This might feel like a tempting comparison to make with the GOP now, but the key difference is that the Democrats of the early 1990s had a more diverse coalition to draw on that made that kind of pivot possible (even as late as the 1990s, the Democratic Party had plenty of rural and Southern supporters). By contrast, the Republican coalition of today lacks any significant liberal or moderate factions who might pull it back to a more centrist position.
The bottom line: American political parties are not top-down entities, capable of turning on a dime. They are loose networks and coalitions of many actors and groups. And because the Republican Party has been pulling in a more extreme direction for decades now, most Republican moderates have either quit the team or reoriented themselves in a more combative, Trumpian direction to stay alive. And these forces will most likely continue to tug at the party, leaving would-be moderates with the same choice they’ve faced for decades: Quit, or get on board.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-25--RNC, Day 1: Live Updates And Analysis

RNC, Day 1: Live Updates And Analysis

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fivethirtyeight--2020-08-24--What To Watch For On Night 1 Of The RNC

What To Watch For On Night 1 Of The RNC

It ’ s the first night of the Republican National Convention , and FiveThirtyEight ’ s political team will be @ @ @ @ @ Here , the crew discusses what to expect tonight and throughout the week .
Will @ @ @ @ @ than the DNC ?
Will Republicans appeal to the center ?
How will they address @ @ @ @ @ justice reform or the coronavirus pandemic ?

It’s the first night of the Republican National Convention, and FiveThirtyEight’s political team will be watching and live blogging! Here, the crew discusses what to expect tonight and throughout the week. Will the GOP put on a better show than the Democratic convention? Will Republicans try to appeal to the center? How will the party address major issues, like criminal justice reform or the coronavirus pandemic?


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-25--If You Wait Until Your State’s Deadline To Mail Your Ballot, You May Be Too Late

All eyes are on the post office lately .
( Yet another sentence we never thought we ’ d write in 2020 . )
In the past few weeks , Democrats have alleged that Postmaster General Louis DeJoy , a major donor to the GOP and President Trump , is trying to slow down mail delivery and thus disrupt the election .
And the U.S .
Postal Service itself sent a letter ( naturally ) to 46 states and Washington , D.C. , warning them that there could be delays in ballot deliveries .
Depending on your political worldview , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other .
But the letter isn ’ t part of a master plan to forestall democracy .
It was instead about states assuming mail works differently than it does — regardless of who the postmaster is .
And that could have a major effect on whether your mail-in vote is counted .
The post office has long-standing guidelines ( which predate DeJoy ) that recommend how much time voters and election officials should allow to apply for , send and receive mail-in ballots .
“ We ’ ve been working on this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encourage states to update their laws to reflect the realities of how the post office actually works , ” said Amber McReynolds , CEO for the National Vote At Home Institute , a nonprofit organization that lobbies for policies that make it easier for voters to cast absentee ballots .
In almost all states , even people who meet the deadline to request or mail back their ballot run the risk of their ballot not arriving on time simply because of how long the mail takes .
The USPS recommends voters allow one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and when they would like to receive it , and another week between when they put their completed ballot in the mail and the state ’ s deadline for receiving it .
But many states allow mail ballots to be requested up until a few days before Election Day , which this year falls on Nov. 3 , even if the deadline for returning the ballot is the day of the election .
“ The reality is that voters are going to fail if election officials are being asked to mail ballots out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So if you ’ re among the 64 percent of voters who say they ’ re likely to cast a mail-in ballot this year , don ’ t wait until the last minute to request or return your ballot .
When should you request or send it , then ?
We have a table for that : We calculated these dates by applying the USPS guidelines to each state ’ s deadline for receiving ballots .
As you can see , 33 out of the 39 states that require would-be mail voters to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have statutory deadlines later than the USPS recommends .
Alaska , Iowa , Maryland , New Mexico , New York and Virginia are the only states whose deadlines comply with USPS guidelines .
Similarly , in eight states that theoretically allow you to postmark your ballot by Nov. 2 or 3 , you ’ ll want to put your ballot in the mail before that deadline to ensure it arrives in time to count .
But don ’ t worry if you don ’ t get your act together in time , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decide who to vote for .
In most states , you can both request a “ mail ” ballot in person and drop off a completed ballot at your local election office or an official ballot drop box instead of mailing it .
If you ’ re willing to do that , it ’ s fine to wait until the statutory deadlines to request and submit your ballot .
It ’ s not a perfect solution , but you can also pay extra to send your ballot by priority or overnight mail , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So while we urge people to meet the recommended deadlines in the chart , it ’ s important to know you have options if you don ’ t .

If You Wait Until Your State’s Deadline To Mail Your Ballot, You May Be Too Late Check the USPS’s recommendations before dropping your vote or paperwork in the mail.
All eyes are on the post office lately. (Yet another sentence we never thought we’d write in 2020.) In the past few weeks, Democrats have alleged that Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, a major donor to the GOP and President Trump, is trying to slow down mail delivery and thus disrupt the election. And the U.S. Postal Service itself sent a letter (naturally) to 46 states and Washington, D.C., warning them that there could be delays in ballot deliveries.
Depending on your political worldview, one event seemed to be evidence of the other. But the letter isn’t part of a master plan to forestall democracy. It was instead about states assuming mail works differently than it does — regardless of who the postmaster is. And that could have a major effect on whether your mail-in vote is counted.
The post office has long-standing guidelines (which predate DeJoy) that recommend how much time voters and election officials should allow to apply for, send and receive mail-in ballots.
“We’ve been working on this for a while across the country to encourage states to update their laws to reflect the realities of how the post office actually works,” said Amber McReynolds, CEO for the National Vote At Home Institute, a nonprofit organization that lobbies for policies that make it easier for voters to cast absentee ballots.
In almost all states, even people who meet the deadline to request or mail back their ballot run the risk of their ballot not arriving on time simply because of how long the mail takes.
The USPS recommends voters allow one week between when they request their ballot and when they would like to receive it, and another week between when they put their completed ballot in the mail and the state’s deadline for receiving it. But many states allow mail ballots to be requested up until a few days before Election Day, which this year falls on Nov. 3, even if the deadline for returning the ballot is the day of the election. “The reality is that voters are going to fail if election officials are being asked to mail ballots out that late,” said McReynolds.
So if you’re among the 64 percent of voters who say they’re likely to cast a mail-in ballot this year, don’t wait until the last minute to request or return your ballot. When should you request or send it, then? We have a table for that:
Over 30 states have risky mail-in ballot deadlines When voters should request and send back their mail ballots, according to USPS guidelines, and how different that is from each jurisdiction’s deadline Recommended deadline How many days later jurisdiction deadlines are jurisdiction ▲ ▼
Request by … ▲ ▼
Send by … ▲ ▼
Request ▲ ▼
Postmark ▲ ▼
Conn. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 days — Del. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — Mont. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — N.H. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — R.I. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — S.D. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — Wyo. 10/20/20 10/27/20 13 — La. 10/19/20 10/26/20 11 — Ga. 10/20/20 10/27/20 10 — Mich. 10/20/20 10/27/20 10 — S.C. 10/20/20 10/27/20 10 — Ala. 10/20/20 10/27/20 9 6 days Maine 10/20/20 10/27/20 9 — Wis. 10/20/20 10/27/20 9 — Ark. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Okla. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Pa. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Tenn. 10/20/20 10/27/20 7 — Minn. 10/27/20 11/3/20 6 0 Mass. 10/23/20 10/30/20 5 4 Ohio 10/26/20 11/2/20 5 0 Kan. 10/23/20 10/30/20 4 4 Ky. 10/23/20 10/30/20 4 4 N.C. 10/23/20 10/30/20 4 4 Fla. 10/20/20 10/27/20 4 — Ariz. 10/20/20 10/27/20 3 — Idaho 10/20/20 10/27/20 3 — Neb. 10/20/20 10/27/20 3 — Texas 10/21/20 10/28/20 2 6 W.Va. 10/26/20 11/2/20 2 1 Ill. 10/27/20 11/3/20 2 0 Ind. 10/20/20 10/27/20 2 — Mo. 10/20/20 10/27/20 1 — Va. 10/23/20 10/30/20 0 4 Alaska 10/24/20 11/3/20 0 0 Iowa 10/24/20 11/2/20 0 0 Md. 10/20/20 11/3/20 0 0 N.Y. 10/27/20 11/3/20 0 0 N.M. 10/20/20 10/27/20 0 — Calif. — 11/3/20 — 0 D.C. — 11/3/20 — 0 Miss. 10/27/20 11/3/20 — 0 Nev. — 11/3/20 — 0 N.J. — 11/3/20 — 0 N.D. 10/26/20 11/2/20 — 0 Utah — 11/2/20 — 0 Wash. — 11/3/20 — 0 Colo. — 10/27/20 — — Hawaii — 10/27/20 — — Ore. — 10/27/20 — — Vt. — 10/27/20 — — Show more rows Mississippi and North Dakota have no statutory ballot-request deadline. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Washington, D.C., are currently planning to automatically mail ballots to every voter, so they also do not have ballot-request deadlines. Sources: State Election Officials, U.S. Postal Service
We calculated these dates by applying the USPS guidelines to each state’s deadline for receiving ballots. As you can see, 33 out of the 39 states that require would-be mail voters to request a ballot by a certain date have statutory deadlines later than the USPS recommends. Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York and Virginia are the only states whose deadlines comply with USPS guidelines. Similarly, in eight states that theoretically allow you to postmark your ballot by Nov. 2 or 3, you’ll want to put your ballot in the mail before that deadline to ensure it arrives in time to count.
But don’t worry if you don’t get your act together in time, or simply want to take more time to decide who to vote for. In most states, you can both request a “mail” ballot in person and drop off a completed ballot at your local election office or an official ballot drop box instead of mailing it. If you’re willing to do that, it’s fine to wait until the statutory deadlines to request and submit your ballot. It’s not a perfect solution, but you can also pay extra to send your ballot by priority or overnight mail, which are faster than standard mail service. So while we urge people to meet the recommended deadlines in the chart, it’s important to know you have options if you don’t.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-25--What Went Down On Night 1 Of The RNC

What Went Down On Night 1 Of The RNC

What Went Down On Night 1 Of The RNC


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-28--RNC 2020, Day 4: Live Updates And Analysis


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--What To Watch For On The Final Night Of The RNC

The FiveThirtyEight Politics crew discusses what to expect on the fourth and final night of the 2020 Republican National Convention @ @ @ @ @ what they think President Trump will talk about in his closing speech .

What To Watch For On The Final Night Of The RNC
The FiveThirtyEight Politics crew discusses what to expect on the fourth and final night of the 2020 Republican National Convention, and in particular, what they think President Trump will talk about in his closing speech.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--Could A Backlash Against Black Lives Matter Hurt Biden? The Two Don’t Appear Linked So Far.

In the wake of the police killing of George Floyd on May 25 , the popularity of the Black Lives Matter movement skyrocketed .
By early June , 53 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement , compared with just 28 percent who said they opposed it , according to polling by Civiqs .
In particular , white Democratic support of the movement increased from about 80 percent to 90 percent , and there were both more white independents expressing support for BLM and fewer expressing opposition .
At about the same time , Joe Biden led President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points in FiveThirtyEight ’ s average of national polls .
But between that time and the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha , Wisconsin , on Sunday ( we have barely any new polling since Blake ’ s shooting ) , Black Lives Matter ’ s surge in popularity ended : About 49 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement , compared with around 38 percent in opposition — similar to BLM ’ s net approval before Floyd ’ s death .
That drop in popularity has largely been driven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 80 percent of whom oppose the movement , higher than before Floyd ’ s death ) and white independents ( who now support BLM at similar levels as before Floyd ’ s death ) .
And at the moment , Biden leads Trump by just over 8 points in FiveThirtyEight ’ s polling average .
Why does all of this polling data matter ?
Because it suggests that Biden ’ s electoral prospects and the popularity of Black Lives Matter are not closely linked — at least not so far .
Some political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for Black Lives Matter and the increased focus from both Republicans and the media on riots that have accompanied some of the protests of police violence against Black people might boost Trump and hurt Biden .
Republicans certainly seem to think so — numerous speakers at the Republican National Convention have condemned the rioting and implied that state and local Democratic leaders are being too lenient toward the protesters , who are generally associated with Black Lives Matter .
“ Law and order , ” meanwhile , was a heavy theme in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the convention on Wednesday night , including the line , “ The hard truth is you won ’ t be safe in Joe Biden ’ s America.
” These dynamics could hurt Biden .
It ’ s hard to predict the future .
But be wary of any confident arguments that they will hurt him , since the popularity of Black Lives Matter dipped weeks ago but Biden ’ s did not .
In fact , there are a few fairly logical reasons that would explain why BLM ’ s support has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have anything to do with Biden and that wouldn ’ t affect his electoral prospects : • The surge in support for BLM came in the wake of constant media coverage of Floyd ’ s death , which was recorded on video and depicted hard-to-defend behavior from the police .
It ’ s not surprising that those numbers gradually came back to earth once media coverage of Floyd and the resulting protests became less pervasive .
• Second , BLM is a social-activist movement , not an electoral or political organization .
BLM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and trying to maximize public support , and they generally keep some distance from party politics .
In fact , in the weeks after Floyd ’ s death , Black Lives Matter activists started pushing controversial ideas , such as defunding the police , and controversial tactics , such as blocking traffic when they were protesting .
I doubt it shocked BLM activists that defunding the police , in particular , was not popular .
And I would assume that at least some of the dip in BLM ’ s popularity among white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embrace of cutting police funding , in addition to the rioting .
• Finally , as BLM started taking more controversial stands — particularly defunding the police — Republican politicians started attacking those positions .
Voters often follow cues from the elites in their party , so it ’ s not surprising that BLM has grown more unpopular with Republicans and some independents .
Biden , in contrast , has repeatedly condemned rioting and also repeatedly said that he opposes defunding the police .
So it would make sense that voters don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In fact , there was speculation at the start of the Floyd protests that they would boost Trump and hurt Biden — and that was not borne out .
An emphasis on “ law and order ” helped the Republicans win the 1968 presidential election , and both parties embraced tough-on-crime , tough-on-Black-people approaches to win elections in the 1980s and 1990s .
But the case that Trump won the 2016 election largely because of identity and racial issues has perhaps been overstated by the media in the years since .
And the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggests that the electorate in 2020 may not be responding to issues around race and policing in the way it did in those earlier eras .
That might be because of the growing number of non-white and college-educated voters , who tend to have more liberal views on these issues .
It might be because Americans are more uncomfortable with Trump ’ s approach to race than Biden ’ s , or because of the increased media focus on the more radical racial views of white people , such as the Trump-supporting teenager @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in Kenosha on Tuesday .
But let ’ s say we wake up in a week and Biden ’ s lead in national polls is down to 4 or 5 percentage points .
Let ’ s say Trump has even pulled ahead of Biden in our polling averages in Wisconsin and Florida .
And let ’ s say we get a bunch of new polls in the wake of Blake ’ s shooting that show public opinion firmly opposed to the rioting .
Could we conclude that there is an anti-BLM backlash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be hard to say for sure .
First , a Trump surge in the polls might simply be a traditional “ convention bounce ” from the Republican National Convention , which has taken place amid the unrest in Kenosha .
Second , it would be a bit odd ( and perhaps disingenuous ) for voters to switch from Biden to Trump , or from undecided to Trump , because of riots that Biden has condemned .
Such voters might be people who traditionally vote Republican , backed Trump in 2016 and have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are looking for a rationale to stick with their party and support Trump again .
Third , it would be hard to unpack which voters are annoyed by the riots specifically , as opposed to the months of protests against racial injustice , Black athletes striking and other actions that aren ’ t rioting but still might offend people who are more broadly wary of pushes for racial equality made by Black Americans .
We should be skeptical of claims that Americans overall will support Black people ’ s demands for equality if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manner that America ’ s white majority prefers — history suggests that even peaceful tactics like kneeling can generate a ton of backlash .
( Remember that the March on Washington and Martin Luther King Jr. were both fairly unpopular in the 1960s . )
And we should acknowledge what the past five decades of American electoral history has shown : Being the political party aligned with Black people seems very well correlated with the plurality of white people opposing that party .
It might be the case that the best thing electorally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black Lives Matter activists to keep quiet until February , but BLM activists might not want to delay their push for racial justice to focus on Trump ’ s defeat .
All that said , there could be a bloc of voters who support the protests and currently back Biden but who will shift to Trump because of the riots .
We can ’ t rule out that group emerging .
But , crucially , that group has not emerged yet , despite plenty of opportunity .
And based on what we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ August of this year , there are a lot of reasons to be skeptical that such a group will emerge .
In terms of racial issues , America is much different from how it was in 1968 or 1988 — and maybe even in 2016 .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

In the wake of the police killing of George Floyd on May 25, the popularity of the Black Lives Matter movement skyrocketed. By early June, 53 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement, compared with just 28 percent who said they opposed it, according to polling by Civiqs. In particular, white Democratic support of the movement increased from about 80 percent to 90 percent, and there were both more white independents expressing support for BLM and fewer expressing opposition.
At about the same time, Joe Biden led President Trump by about 6 to 7 percentage points in FiveThirtyEight’s average of national polls.
But between that time and the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on Sunday (we have barely any new polling since Blake’s shooting), Black Lives Matter’s surge in popularity ended: About 49 percent of registered voters said they supported the movement, compared with around 38 percent in opposition — similar to BLM’s net approval before Floyd’s death. That drop in popularity has largely been driven by increased opposition among white Republicans (80 percent of whom oppose the movement, higher than before Floyd’s death) and white independents (who now support BLM at similar levels as before Floyd’s death).
And at the moment, Biden leads Trump by just over 8 points in FiveThirtyEight’s polling average.
Why does all of this polling data matter?
Because it suggests that Biden’s electoral prospects and the popularity of Black Lives Matter are not closely linked — at least not so far. Some political analysts have suggested that the decline in support for Black Lives Matter and the increased focus from both Republicans and the media on riots that have accompanied some of the protests of police violence against Black people might boost Trump and hurt Biden. Republicans certainly seem to think so — numerous speakers at the Republican National Convention have condemned the rioting and implied that state and local Democratic leaders are being too lenient toward the protesters, who are generally associated with Black Lives Matter. “Law and order,” meanwhile, was a heavy theme in Vice President Mike Pence’s address at the convention on Wednesday night, including the line, “The hard truth is you won’t be safe in Joe Biden’s America.”
These dynamics could hurt Biden. It’s hard to predict the future. But be wary of any confident arguments that they will hurt him, since the popularity of Black Lives Matter dipped weeks ago but Biden’s did not. In fact, there are a few fairly logical reasons that would explain why BLM’s support has gone down that don’t really have anything to do with Biden and that wouldn’t affect his electoral prospects:
The surge in support for BLM came in the wake of constant media coverage of Floyd’s death, which was recorded on video and depicted hard-to-defend behavior from the police. It’s not surprising that those numbers gradually came back to earth once media coverage of Floyd and the resulting protests became less pervasive. Second, BLM is a social-activist movement, not an electoral or political organization. BLM activists aren’t conducting endless polling and trying to maximize public support, and they generally keep some distance from party politics. In fact, in the weeks after Floyd’s death, Black Lives Matter activists started pushing controversial ideas, such as defunding the police, and controversial tactics, such as blocking traffic when they were protesting. I doubt it shocked BLM activists that defunding the police, in particular, was not popular. And I would assume that at least some of the dip in BLM’s popularity among white Republicans and white independents stemmed from its embrace of cutting police funding, in addition to the rioting. Finally, as BLM started taking more controversial stands — particularly defunding the police — Republican politicians started attacking those positions. Voters often follow cues from the elites in their party, so it’s not surprising that BLM has grown more unpopular with Republicans and some independents.
Biden, in contrast, has repeatedly condemned rioting and also repeatedly said that he opposes defunding the police. So it would make sense that voters don’t link his views to BLM.
In fact, there was speculation at the start of the Floyd protests that they would boost Trump and hurt Biden — and that was not borne out. An emphasis on “law and order” helped the Republicans win the 1968 presidential election, and both parties embraced tough-on-crime, tough-on-Black-people approaches to win elections in the 1980s and 1990s. But the case that Trump won the 2016 election largely because of identity and racial issues has perhaps been overstated by the media in the years since. And the evidence — at least so far — suggests that the electorate in 2020 may not be responding to issues around race and policing in the way it did in those earlier eras. That might be because of the growing number of non-white and college-educated voters, who tend to have more liberal views on these issues. It might be because Americans are more uncomfortable with Trump’s approach to race than Biden’s, or because of the increased media focus on the more radical racial views of white people, such as the Trump-supporting teenager who shot three protesters, killing two, in Kenosha on Tuesday.
But let’s say we wake up in a week and Biden’s lead in national polls is down to 4 or 5 percentage points. Let’s say Trump has even pulled ahead of Biden in our polling averages in Wisconsin and Florida. And let’s say we get a bunch of new polls in the wake of Blake’s shooting that show public opinion firmly opposed to the rioting. Could we conclude that there is an anti-BLM backlash helping Trump?
Maybe, but it would be hard to say for sure. First, a Trump surge in the polls might simply be a traditional “convention bounce” from the Republican National Convention, which has taken place amid the unrest in Kenosha.
Second, it would be a bit odd (and perhaps disingenuous) for voters to switch from Biden to Trump, or from undecided to Trump, because of riots that Biden has condemned. Such voters might be people who traditionally vote Republican, backed Trump in 2016 and have been on the fence this year but are looking for a rationale to stick with their party and support Trump again.
Third, it would be hard to unpack which voters are annoyed by the riots specifically, as opposed to the months of protests against racial injustice, Black athletes striking and other actions that aren’t rioting but still might offend people who are more broadly wary of pushes for racial equality made by Black Americans. We should be skeptical of claims that Americans overall will support Black people’s demands for equality if only they made those demands in the manner that America’s white majority prefers — history suggests that even peaceful tactics like kneeling can generate a ton of backlash. (Remember that the March on Washington and Martin Luther King Jr. were both fairly unpopular in the 1960s.) And we should acknowledge what the past five decades of American electoral history has shown: Being the political party aligned with Black people seems very well correlated with the plurality of white people opposing that party. It might be the case that the best thing electorally for the Democratic Party would be for Black Lives Matter activists to keep quiet until February, but BLM activists might not want to delay their push for racial justice to focus on Trump’s defeat.
All that said, there could be a bloc of voters who support the protests and currently back Biden but who will shift to Trump because of the riots. We can’t rule out that group emerging. But, crucially, that group has not emerged yet, despite plenty of opportunity. And based on what we’ve seen in June, July and August of this year, there are a lot of reasons to be skeptical that such a group will emerge. In terms of racial issues, America is much different from how it was in 1968 or 1988 — and maybe even in 2016.
Geoffrey Skelley contributed analysis to this article.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--Why Trump’s Racist Appeals Might Be Less Effective In 2020 Than They Were In 2016

In the closing days of the 2018 midterms campaign , with the economy on a historic run , President Trump tried to focus Americans ’ attention on a caravan of Central American migrants heading toward the United States .
He seemed to believe that by highlighting the migrants , he might rally voters back to the GOP in advance of the vote .
In recent weeks , Trump has telegraphed that racialized wedge issues are again a central element of his political strategy and seems to see a consistent political advantage in overt or dog-whistle racist appeals and the condemnation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump has promised to protect “ the suburban housewife ” from lower-income neighbors ; threatened to veto a bill that contained a provision to rename military bases named for Confederate leaders ; waved off the problem of Black Americans being disproportionately killed by police by saying “ so are white people ; ” focused his campaign advertising on crime and protests ; and repeated baseless , racist allegations about Democratic vice presidential nominee Sen. Kamala Harris .
In using racial appeals , the president is the latest in a generations-long line of politicians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics .
But is there sometimes a political logic to such appeals ?
They didn ’ t work in 2018 .
Democrats would go on to take control of the U.S. House and a bunch of governorships .
That was a midterm election , though , and this is a contest for the presidency .
So , are racialized wedge issues likely to work to the GOP ’ s advantage in November ?
To answer that question , it ’ s valuable to turn back to a case in which the effects of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on voting have already been extensively analyzed : the 2016 general election .
Then , too , Trump was widely seen as using racial wedge issues to build political support .
One good starting point in assessing the impact of white voters ’ racial attitudes in 2016 is the influential book “ Identity Crisis ” by John Sides , FiveThirtyEight contributor Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck .
The authors build from a long-standing framework in political science which holds that lots of voters have political attitudes that point in opposite directions in terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Consider , for example , someone who opposes abortion but believes we need to take immediate action on climate change . )
Campaigns matter , in this view , because they can make specific issues more or less relevant in voters ’ evaluation of their choice , a concept sometimes called priming or activation .
The telltale sign of activation is that an attitude — in our example , the voter ’ s opposition to abortion — becomes a more powerful factor in their vote choice after the campaign highlights abortion-related rhetoric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who believes in climate change might vote for a climate-change denier because that issue has become less of a factor in the voter ’ s choice .
How did this play out in the real world ?
In 2012 , Barack Obama , the nation ’ s first Black president , was reelected by a coalition that included a meaningful number of voters with “ conservative ” views on race-related issues and immigration , particularly in pivotal states .
Then , in 2016 , many of those voters ’ views on racial issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choice after exposure to racialized campaign rhetoric , according to a panel survey Sides , Tesler and Vavreck collected tracking the same group of individuals over time .
They concluded that Trump won a small but influential sliver of the electorate with conservative views on race and immigration after his campaign foregrounded those identity-infused issues .
Those are striking findings given that the nation ’ s first Black president had been running for reelection in 2012 , and given that racial attitudes were already very predictive of whether a white voter is likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Still , it ’ s broadly consistent with other research on the activation of whites ’ racial attitudes in 2016 , including Diana Mutz ’ s research on “ status threat ” and Matt Baretto and Christopher Parker ’ s research on racial attitudes and support for the pre-Trump tea party .
On its own , that body of research seems to suggest that Trump could win votes by using racial appeals , especially if activating racialized issues plays to the GOP ’ s advantage in swing states .
Still , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that activation can cut both ways , since those with liberal racial attitudes can shift away from the GOP just as those with conservative racial attitudes shift toward it .
Indeed , we ’ ve seen exactly that , with college-educated white voters — who tend to have more liberal attitudes on race — moving towards the Democratic Party since Obama ’ s election in 2008 .
Also , activation isn ’ t the only way to measure a concept as broad and important as “ racialized voting.
” In a recent paper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out that , relative to 2012 GOP nominee Mitt Romney , Trump actually gained more support from voters with moderate views on race than from voters with more conservative racial views .
One key difference between Grimmer and Marble ’ s approach and those detailed above is that they measure whites ’ racial attitudes separately in 2012 and 2016 .
Since white Americans ’ racial attitudes overall became more liberal and less prejudiced between those two elections , it stands to reason that fewer Trump supporters would take conservative positions on race-related issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 general election , I found results generally consistent with Sides and co-authors ’ evidence of activation : Respondents at the 20th percentile of anti-Black prejudice ( low levels of prejudice ) supported Trump 4 percentage points less than did respondents at the 80th percentile ( high levels of prejudice ) , holding constant partisanship and various demographics .
( That doesn ’ t mean Trump got a 4-point advantage , since that number partly reflects low-prejudice white voters shifting away from the GOP . )
In the 2016 GOP primary , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much more clear-cut .
There , if we compare white voters who identify with the GOP with prejudice scores ( measured years earlier ) at the 20th percentile to those at the 80th percentile , Trump was doing a striking 10 percentage points better with the latter group in the GOP primary as of January 2016 .
That association is far stronger than any comparable association observed in the 2008 primaries .
In the Democratic primary that year , Obama did a more modest 3 percentage points worse among the group that scored @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , knowing white Republicans ’ prejudice scores doesn ’ t really explain vote choice at all in the 2008 GOP primary .
So where did using racial wedge issues arguably work to Trump ’ s advantage most ?
In the 2016 GOP primaries .
Fast forward four years , past Trump ’ s reaction to the violence in Charlottesville , Virginia , cursing NFL players who kneel for the national anthem , referring to Haiti and African nations as “ shithole countries , ” and much else .
Looking at that panel survey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we can see how the relationship between white respondents ’ prejudice and their presidential intentions has changed .
In the January 2020 survey wave , the poll included a question about a potential Trump-Biden general election match-up .
And respondents who reported especially high levels of prejudice back in 2012 were roughly as firmly with Trump as of this January as they had been in fall 2016 .
But notice the histogram at the bottom , which show how many respondents registered each level of prejudice : The high-prejudice portion of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Romney accounts for roughly a quarter of all white respondents ( to say nothing of nonwhite voters or voters too young to appear in a 12-year-old panel ) .
Further activating this group is likely to have diminishing returns for Trump because there aren ’ t many of them and they are already strongly behind the president .
By contrast , white voters with lower levels of prejudice are far more numerous , and also less likely to be with Trump than in 2016 .
In other words , Trump has far more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ larger number of white Americans with lower levels of prejudice .
Remember , this wave of the panel was conducted in January — before COVID-19 and , crucially , before the protests following the killing of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor and the shooting of Jacob Blake .
The protests may have changed the relationship between racial attitudes and voting in ways not detected in this survey .
But the evidence to date suggests that , if anything , the protests may have continued to push white Americans ’ racial attitudes in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Democrats are now arguably more unified on race-related issues than Republicans , meaning that relative to 2016 , there are fewer voters with the mix of attitudes that might make them responsive to racial appeals .
Other issues , like the coronavirus and the government ’ s response , have also crowded the political agenda , limiting Trump ’ s ability to change the subject .
True , Grimmer and Marble disagree with Sides , Tesler and Vavreck on the role racial attitudes played in 2016 .
But when looking ahead to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreement .
In an email , Grimmer offered a conclusion similar to Tesler ’ s , noting that “ in 2016 , Trump was already winning almost all of the declining fraction of voters who are highest in racial resentment .
So he has a lot more room for growth among those in the middle of the racial resentment scale , both in terms of turning out and choosing him over Biden.
” It ’ s surely too soon to count Trump out .
But if Trump does win reelection in November , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to gains with white voters lower in prejudice or with nonwhite voters .
Using racist appeals and racialized wedge issues won him support most clearly in the 2016 GOP primary .
But there are key differences between that contest and the 2020 general election — differences that may make racial appeals less impactful this year .
And judging from the RNC ’ s periodic efforts to counter the charge that Trump is racially divisive , some of its planners seem to agree .

In the closing days of the 2018 midterms campaign, with the economy on a historic run, President Trump tried to focus Americans’ attention on a caravan of Central American migrants heading toward the United States. He seemed to believe that by highlighting the migrants, he might rally voters back to the GOP in advance of the vote.
In recent weeks, Trump has telegraphed that racialized wedge issues are again a central element of his political strategy and seems to see a consistent political advantage in overt or dog-whistle racist appeals and the condemnation they invariably draw. For example, Trump has promised to protect “the suburban housewife” from lower-income neighbors; threatened to veto a bill that contained a provision to rename military bases named for Confederate leaders; waved off the problem of Black Americans being disproportionately killed by police by saying “so are white people;” focused his campaign advertising on crime and protests; and repeated baseless, racist allegations about Democratic vice presidential nominee Sen. Kamala Harris.
In using racial appeals, the president is the latest in a generations-long line of politicians tapping into a dangerous vein in American politics. But is there sometimes a political logic to such appeals? They didn’t work in 2018. Democrats would go on to take control of the U.S. House and a bunch of governorships. That was a midterm election, though, and this is a contest for the presidency. So, are racialized wedge issues likely to work to the GOP’s advantage in November?
To answer that question, it’s valuable to turn back to a case in which the effects of white voters’ racial attitudes and prejudices on voting have already been extensively analyzed: the 2016 general election. Then, too, Trump was widely seen as using racial wedge issues to build political support.
White voters’ racial attitudes in 2016
One good starting point in assessing the impact of white voters’ racial attitudes in 2016 is the influential book “Identity Crisis” by John Sides, FiveThirtyEight contributor Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck. The authors build from a long-standing framework in political science which holds that lots of voters have political attitudes that point in opposite directions in terms of which party they might support. (Consider, for example, someone who opposes abortion but believes we need to take immediate action on climate change.)
Campaigns matter, in this view, because they can make specific issues more or less relevant in voters’ evaluation of their choice, a concept sometimes called priming or activation. The telltale sign of activation is that an attitude — in our example, the voter’s opposition to abortion — becomes a more powerful factor in their vote choice after the campaign highlights abortion-related rhetoric. In this way, a voter who believes in climate change might vote for a climate-change denier because that issue has become less of a factor in the voter’s choice.
How did this play out in the real world? In 2012, Barack Obama, the nation’s first Black president, was reelected by a coalition that included a meaningful number of voters with “conservative” views on race-related issues and immigration, particularly in pivotal states. Then, in 2016, many of those voters’ views on racial issues became more closely integrated with their vote choice after exposure to racialized campaign rhetoric, according to a panel survey Sides, Tesler and Vavreck collected tracking the same group of individuals over time. They concluded that Trump won a small but influential sliver of the electorate with conservative views on race and immigration after his campaign foregrounded those identity-infused issues.
Those are striking findings given that the nation’s first Black president had been running for reelection in 2012, and given that racial attitudes were already very predictive of whether a white voter is likely to be a Republican or a Democrat. Still, it’s broadly consistent with other research on the activation of whites’ racial attitudes in 2016, including Diana Mutz’s research on “status threat” and Matt Baretto and Christopher Parker’s research on racial attitudes and support for the pre-Trump tea party.
On its own, that body of research seems to suggest that Trump could win votes by using racial appeals, especially if activating racialized issues plays to the GOP’s advantage in swing states. Still, it’s critical to keep in mind that activation can cut both ways, since those with liberal racial attitudes can shift away from the GOP just as those with conservative racial attitudes shift toward it. Indeed, we’ve seen exactly that, with college-educated white voters — who tend to have more liberal attitudes on race — moving towards the Democratic Party since Obama’s election in 2008.
Also, activation isn’t the only way to measure a concept as broad and important as “racialized voting.” In a recent paper, Justin Grimmer and Will Marble pointed out that, relative to 2012 GOP nominee Mitt Romney, Trump actually gained more support from voters with moderate views on race than from voters with more conservative racial views. One key difference between Grimmer and Marble’s approach and those detailed above is that they measure whites’ racial attitudes separately in 2012 and 2016. Since white Americans’ racial attitudes overall became more liberal and less prejudiced between those two elections, it stands to reason that fewer Trump supporters would take conservative positions on race-related issues than Romney supporters did. In the 2016 general election, I found results generally consistent with Sides and co-authors’ evidence of activation: Respondents at the 20th percentile of anti-Black prejudice (low levels of prejudice) supported Trump 4 percentage points less than did respondents at the 80th percentile (high levels of prejudice), holding constant partisanship and various demographics. (That doesn’t mean Trump got a 4-point advantage, since that number partly reflects low-prejudice white voters shifting away from the GOP.)
In the 2016 GOP primary, though, the role of anti-Black prejudice was much more clear-cut. There, if we compare white voters who identify with the GOP with prejudice scores (measured years earlier) at the 20th percentile to those at the 80th percentile, Trump was doing a striking 10 percentage points better with the latter group in the GOP primary as of January 2016. That association is far stronger than any comparable association observed in the 2008 primaries. In the Democratic primary that year, Obama did a more modest 3 percentage points worse among the group that scored higher on the prejudice scale. Meanwhile, knowing white Republicans’ prejudice scores doesn’t really explain vote choice at all in the 2008 GOP primary. So where did using racial wedge issues arguably work to Trump’s advantage most? In the 2016 GOP primaries.
Where Things Stand Now
Fast forward four years, past Trump’s reaction to the violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, cursing NFL players who kneel for the national anthem, referring to Haiti and African nations as “shithole countries,” and much else.
Looking at that panel survey I used in the Political Behavior study, we can see how the relationship between white respondents’ prejudice and their presidential intentions has changed. In the January 2020 survey wave, the poll included a question about a potential Trump-Biden general election match-up. And respondents who reported especially high levels of prejudice back in 2012 were roughly as firmly with Trump as of this January as they had been in fall 2016.
But notice the histogram at the bottom, which show how many respondents registered each level of prejudice: The high-prejudice portion of the white electorate where Trump was clearly outperforming Romney accounts for roughly a quarter of all white respondents (to say nothing of nonwhite voters or voters too young to appear in a 12-year-old panel). Further activating this group is likely to have diminishing returns for Trump because there aren’t many of them and they are already strongly behind the president. By contrast, white voters with lower levels of prejudice are far more numerous, and also less likely to be with Trump than in 2016. In other words, Trump has far more room to increase his support among the larger number of white Americans with lower levels of prejudice.
Remember, this wave of the panel was conducted in January — before COVID-19 and, crucially, before the protests following the killing of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor and the shooting of Jacob Blake. The protests may have changed the relationship between racial attitudes and voting in ways not detected in this survey. But the evidence to date suggests that, if anything, the protests may have continued to push white Americans’ racial attitudes in a liberal direction. And as Tesler contends, Democrats are now arguably more unified on race-related issues than Republicans, meaning that relative to 2016, there are fewer voters with the mix of attitudes that might make them responsive to racial appeals. Other issues, like the coronavirus and the government’s response, have also crowded the political agenda, limiting Trump’s ability to change the subject.
True, Grimmer and Marble disagree with Sides, Tesler and Vavreck on the role racial attitudes played in 2016. But when looking ahead to 2020, the researchers are more in agreement. In an email, Grimmer offered a conclusion similar to Tesler’s, noting that “in 2016, Trump was already winning almost all of the declining fraction of voters who are highest in racial resentment. So he has a lot more room for growth among those in the middle of the racial resentment scale, both in terms of turning out and choosing him over Biden.”
It’s surely too soon to count Trump out. But if Trump does win reelection in November, it’s very likely to be due to gains with white voters lower in prejudice or with nonwhite voters. Using racist appeals and racialized wedge issues won him support most clearly in the 2016 GOP primary. But there are key differences between that contest and the 2020 general election — differences that may make racial appeals less impactful this year. And judging from the RNC’s periodic efforts to counter the charge that Trump is racially divisive, some of its planners seem to agree.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--How Did Night 3 Of The RNC Address (Or Not Address) Kenosha And Hurricane Laura?

How Did Night 3 Of The RNC Address ( Or Not Address ) Kenosha And Hurricane Laura ?


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--Not All Americans Can Get A COVID-19 Test When They Want One

In many cities in America , your access to COVID-19 testing depends on the color of your skin .
FiveThirtyEight @ @ @ @ @ reporting on the state of testing access in America .
Watch the video and explore @ @ @ @ @ racial disparities in testing .

Not All Americans Can Get A COVID-19 Test When They Want One
In many cities in America, your access to COVID-19 testing depends on the color of your skin.
FiveThirtyEight and ABC News spent months reporting on the state of testing access in America. Watch the video and explore which cities have the biggest racial disparities in testing.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--Politics Podcast: Pence Makes A ‘Law And Order’ Appeal On Night 3 Of The RNC

After the third night of the 2020 Republican National Convention , the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses the keynote address @ @ @ @ @ , who used Nixonian law-and-order rhetoric to appeal to voters .

Politics Podcast: Pence Makes A ‘Law And Order’ Appeal On Night 3 Of The RNC
After the third night of the 2020 Republican National Convention, the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses the keynote address by Vice President Mike Pence, who used Nixonian law-and-order rhetoric to appeal to voters.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-27--What Went Down On Night 3 Of The RNC

What Went Down On Night 3 Of The RNC

What Went Down On Night 3 Of The RNC


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-26--What To Watch For On Night 3 Of The RNC

What To Watch For On Night 3 Of The RNC

The FiveThirtyEight Politics crew discusses what to expect on the third night of the 2020 Republican National Convention .
Will @ @ @ @ @ in Kenosha , Wisconsin ?
Will President Trump or Vice President Mike Pence mention Hurricane @ @ @ @ @ Gulf Coast ?

What To Watch For On Night 3 Of The RNC
The FiveThirtyEight Politics crew discusses what to expect on the third night of the 2020 Republican National Convention. Will the speakers address the protests in Kenosha, Wisconsin? Will President Trump or Vice President Mike Pence mention Hurricane Laura as it threatens the Gulf Coast?


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-26--Almost Everyone Trump Endorses Wins Their Primary … But Is He Padding His Record?

When businesswoman Lynda Bennett lost the GOP runoff for North Carolina ’ s 11th Congressional District on June 23 , it ended the political equivalent of Joe DiMaggio ’ s hitting streak : It was the first time this year that a candidate endorsed by President Trump did not win his or her primary .
As long as Trump has been in office , he has been the central issue in Republican primaries : Candidates talk up their own support for the president and commonly attack their opponents by saying they were once a “ never Trumper ” or won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Unsurprisingly , Trump ’ s endorsement has quickly become the most coveted prize in Republican primaries .
In 2018 , we found that Trump-supported candidates went 15-for-17 in GOP primaries for the U.S. Senate , U.S. House and governorships in which no incumbent ran — a higher win rate than the other 11 endorsers we tracked .
In 2020 , FiveThirtyEight has once again been tracking endorsements in every Senate , House and governor primary so far ( i.e.
, those decided by Aug. 25 ) .
Trump has endorsed 111 candidates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them won the Republican nomination or advanced to the general election .
That 98 percent win rate is nothing short of extraordinary — and Trump has not been shy about bragging about it on Twitter .
But a closer look at the circumstances of those endorsements reveals that Trump ’ s win-loss record isn ’ t solely due to his influence on Republican voters .
It ’ s also the product of a strategy of endorsing candidates who are already in a good position to win — perhaps with the explicit goal of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ therefore his reputation .
Most obviously , Trump endorsed 21 candidates who were unopposed in their primaries , including 20 incumbents and Army veteran Sean Parnell , a Trump favorite who is running in a swing district in Pennsylvania .
Among his 90 endorsements in contested races were also 67 incumbents , who almost always win renomination .
Rep. Scott Tipton was the only incumbent Trump endorsed this year who lost his primary .
That leaves only 23 non-incumbent candidates whom Trump has endorsed in contested primaries .
And , to Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ excellent record in these races : 22 of his endorsees advanced to November .
( The aforementioned Bennett was the only exception . )
And some of these were truly competitive races where Trump ’ s involvement probably did make the difference .
For example , former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville led former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions by less than 2 percentage points in the first round of Alabama ’ s Senate primary — but then Trump endorsed Tuberville , and Tuberville beat Sessions in the runoff by 21 points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jackson and Tony Gonzales once looked like at least mild underdogs , with their opponents securing valuable local endorsements — but then Trump endorsed them and they eked out wins .
On the other hand , some of these primaries were contested in name only , such as the one for Senate in Minnesota ( Trump endorsee and former Rep. Jason Lewis defeated his closest challenger 78 percent to 7 percent ) and Georgia ’ s 6th Congressional District ( former Rep. Karen Handel beat her closest competition 74 percent to 15 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump endorsed extremely late in the race — sometimes even the day before the primary — which could be more about trying to run up his win rate than making a major impact on the race .
It ’ s easy for Trump to make last-minute endorsements given his preferred method for bestowing his support : tweeting .
Twitter allows Trump to make many more endorsements , including last-minute endorsements that don ’ t require much ( if any ) planning .
In some cases , the planning is so minimal that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates or the party .
So it seems like Trump is endorsing at least some of these candidates on a whim .
In other cases , the rollout of endorsements was much more organized .
Take Pennsylvania .
On May 22 , a little more than a week before the Pennsylvania primary , Trump sent a slew of tweets endorsing candidates and linking to each candidate ’ s page on WinRed , the Republican fundraising platform hoping to counter the Democrats ’ ActBlue .
All told , Trump endorsed candidates in 10 out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of those candidates were running unopposed .
That said , the same level of organization was not evident in every primary : Trump let the early-August primaries in Wisconsin , Kansas and Michigan pass unmentioned on Twitter .
Indeed , there have been dozens of Republican primaries in which Trump has not endorsed — primaries of all ilks , from uncontested Senate races in Michigan and Georgia to bitter intraparty battles like those in Tennessee ’ s 1st Congressional District or New Mexico ’ s 2nd .
There was also at least one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where Trump was urged to weigh in but didn ’ t , possibly because he didn ’ t want to come down on the wrong side .
Even though Trump ’ s endorsements come in fits and starts , it seems to work for him : His high win rate provides evidence both that he is picking his battles smartly and that he has at least some pull with GOP primary voters .
Even if you look only at contested , incumbent-less primaries in which Trump endorsed well before Election Day , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ record — since only two Trump-endorsed candidates have lost primaries so far this year , his record is heavily weighted to the win column no matter how you cut the data .
But Trump ’ s endorsement may not hold the same power over the electorate as a whole .
In a recent academic paper looking at 2018 congressional races , political scientists Andrew Ballard , Hans Hassell and Michael Heseltine found that , while Trump ’ s public endorsement provided a financial windfall for Republican Senate candidates , it also boosted fundraising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was ultimately detrimental to the endorsees ’ chances .
Given this finding , Trump should be cautious about assuming his golden win rate can extend to the general election .

When businesswoman Lynda Bennett lost the GOP runoff for North Carolina’s 11th Congressional District on June 23, it ended the political equivalent of Joe DiMaggio’s hitting streak: It was the first time this year that a candidate endorsed by President Trump did not win his or her primary.
As long as Trump has been in office, he has been the central issue in Republican primaries: Candidates talk up their own support for the president and commonly attack their opponents by saying they were once a “never Trumper” or won’t support Trump’s agenda. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s endorsement has quickly become the most coveted prize in Republican primaries. In 2018, we found that Trump-supported candidates went 15-for-17 in GOP primaries for the U.S. Senate, U.S. House and governorships in which no incumbent ran — a higher win rate than the other 11 endorsers we tracked.
In 2020, FiveThirtyEight has once again been tracking endorsements in every Senate, House and governor primary so far (i.e., those decided by Aug. 25). Trump has endorsed 111 candidates in these primaries, and 109 of them won the Republican nomination or advanced to the general election.
That 98 percent win rate is nothing short of extraordinary — and Trump has not been shy about bragging about it on Twitter. But a closer look at the circumstances of those endorsements reveals that Trump’s win-loss record isn’t solely due to his influence on Republican voters. It’s also the product of a strategy of endorsing candidates who are already in a good position to win — perhaps with the explicit goal of inflating his top-line win rate, and therefore his reputation.
Most obviously, Trump endorsed 21 candidates who were unopposed in their primaries, including 20 incumbents and Army veteran Sean Parnell, a Trump favorite who is running in a swing district in Pennsylvania. Among his 90 endorsements in contested races were also 67 incumbents, who almost always win renomination. Rep. Scott Tipton was the only incumbent Trump endorsed this year who lost his primary.
Almost everyone Trump endorses wins How candidates endorsed by President Trump have fared in Republican primaries for Senate, House and governor, through Aug. 25, 2020 Type of Endorsee Endorsements Wins Win rate Challengers to incumbents 0 0 — Opposed Incumbents 67 66 99% Non-incumbents 23 22 96 Unopposed Incumbents 20 20 100 Non-incumbents 1 1 100 Total 111 109 98 Sources: Twitter, Associated Press
That leaves only 23 non-incumbent candidates whom Trump has endorsed in contested primaries. And, to Trump’s credit, he still has an excellent record in these races: 22 of his endorsees advanced to November. (The aforementioned Bennett was the only exception.) And some of these were truly competitive races where Trump’s involvement probably did make the difference. For example, former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville led former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions by less than 2 percentage points in the first round of Alabama’s Senate primary — but then Trump endorsed Tuberville, and Tuberville beat Sessions in the runoff by 21 points. Likewise, Texas congressional candidates Ronny Jackson and Tony Gonzales once looked like at least mild underdogs, with their opponents securing valuable local endorsements — but then Trump endorsed them and they eked out wins.
Trump endorsed in a lot of blowout races How Senate, House and governor candidates who were endorsed by President Trump have fared in contested Republican primaries where no incumbent was running, through Aug. 25, 2020 Candidate Race Result Margin Tommy Tuberville AL Sen. Won +21 Jay Obernolte CA-08 Advanced +24 Carlos Gimenez FL-26 Won +20 Karen Handel GA-06 Won +60 Ashley Hinson IA-01 Won +56 David Young IA-03 Won +39 Jason Lewis MN Sen. Won +71 Lacy Johnson MN-05 Won +58 Michelle Fischbach MN-07 Won +37 Matt Rosendale MT-AL Won +15 Lynda Bennett NC-11 Lost -32 Nicole Malliotakis NY-11 Won +38 Claudia Tenney NY-22 Won +20 Chris Jacobs NY-27 Won +38 Lisa Scheller PA-07 Won +4 Bill Hagerty TN Sen. Won +11 Wesley Hunt TX-07 Won +34 August Pfluger TX-11 Won +37 Ronny Jackson TX-13 Won +11 Tony Gonzales TX-23 Won 0 Beth Van Duyne TX-24 Won +44 Scott Taylor VA-02 Won +19 Cynthia Lummis WY Sen. Won +47 Margin is between the Trump-endorsed candidate and the leading non-Trump-endorsed Republican. In primaries with both a first round and a runoff, the margin is from the runoff. In California and Washington primaries, the top two finishers, regardless of party, advance to the general election. In those states, margin is calculated among votes cast for Republicans only. Sources: Twitter, Associated Press, state election offices
On the other hand, some of these primaries were contested in name only, such as the one for Senate in Minnesota (Trump endorsee and former Rep. Jason Lewis defeated his closest challenger 78 percent to 7 percent) and Georgia’s 6th Congressional District (former Rep. Karen Handel beat her closest competition 74 percent to 15 percent). And in some races, Trump endorsed extremely late in the race — sometimes even the day before the primary — which could be more about trying to run up his win rate than making a major impact on the race.
It’s easy for Trump to make last-minute endorsements given his preferred method for bestowing his support: tweeting. Twitter allows Trump to make many more endorsements, including last-minute endorsements that don’t require much (if any) planning. In some cases, the planning is so minimal that the endorsement comes as a surprise to the candidates or the party. So it seems like Trump is endorsing at least some of these candidates on a whim.
In other cases, the rollout of endorsements was much more organized. Take Pennsylvania. On May 22, a little more than a week before the Pennsylvania primary, Trump sent a slew of tweets endorsing candidates and linking to each candidate’s page on WinRed, the Republican fundraising platform hoping to counter the Democrats’ ActBlue. All told, Trump endorsed candidates in 10 out of 18 races in Pennsylvania; nine of those candidates were running unopposed.
That said, the same level of organization was not evident in every primary: Trump let the early-August primaries in Wisconsin, Kansas and Michigan pass unmentioned on Twitter. Indeed, there have been dozens of Republican primaries in which Trump has not endorsed — primaries of all ilks, from uncontested Senate races in Michigan and Georgia to bitter intraparty battles like those in Tennessee’s 1st Congressional District or New Mexico’s 2nd. There was also at least one race, for Senate in Kansas, where Trump was urged to weigh in but didn’t, possibly because he didn’t want to come down on the wrong side.
Even though Trump’s endorsements come in fits and starts, it seems to work for him: His high win rate provides evidence both that he is picking his battles smartly and that he has at least some pull with GOP primary voters. Even if you look only at contested, incumbent-less primaries in which Trump endorsed well before Election Day, he’d still have a nearly perfect record — since only two Trump-endorsed candidates have lost primaries so far this year, his record is heavily weighted to the win column no matter how you cut the data.
But Trump’s endorsement may not hold the same power over the electorate as a whole. In a recent academic paper looking at 2018 congressional races, political scientists Andrew Ballard, Hans Hassell and Michael Heseltine found that, while Trump’s public endorsement provided a financial windfall for Republican Senate candidates, it also boosted fundraising for their Democratic opponent, so it was ultimately detrimental to the endorsees’ chances. Given this finding, Trump should be cautious about assuming his golden win rate can extend to the general election.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-26--Did Night 2 Of The RNC Violate The Hatch Act? And … Does It Matter?

Did Night 2 Of The RNC Violate The Hatch Act ?
And … Does It Matter ?


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-26--Politics Podcast: Cognitive Dissonance On Night 2 Of The RNC

On the second night of the 2020 Republican National Convention , the party ’ s speakers were softer on issues @ @ @ @ @ ’ s record would suggest .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses why the GOP @ @ @ @ @ both ways .

On the second night of the 2020 Republican National Convention, the party’s speakers were softer on issues like immigration than President Trump’s record would suggest. The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast crew discusses why the GOP might want to play it both ways.