fivethirtyeight--2020-10-08--Trump Doesn’t Know Why Crime Rises or Falls. Neither Does Biden. Or Any Other Politician.

The billboards started popping up around Minneapolis in June .
“ Uptown reels after gunfire , bloodshed.
” “ Multiple shootings in metro area overnight.
” Referencing quotes from local newspapers and TV stations , the signs were part of an ad campaign aimed at turning concerns over a spike in gun violence into a pro-police political movement .
The city of Minneapolis had a long , exhausting spring and summer .
COVID-19 lockdowns starting in March were followed by the release of a graphic video showing a police officer killing George Floyd , sparking massive protests against police brutality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made news around the world .
Then came the heat wave .
And a withered job market that disproportionately affected Black residents .
In August , another , smaller bout of unrest broke out after a murder suspect shot himself and community members initially believed that he ’ d been killed by police .
Through it all , crime ticked upward .
By September 1 , the city ’ s violent crime rate was 16.8 % higher than the previous five-year average .
The rise in crime in Minneapolis has been mirrored across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city seeing an increase in murder compared with recent years .
It ’ s enough of a trend that op-eds have begun to refer to a “ Minneapolis effect , ” a nationwide crime spike driven , ostensibly , by civil unrest in one city .
President Trump has blamed the increase in crime on Democratic mayors and positioned a return to law and order as a major platform of his reelection campaign .
Stop criticizing police and crack down on crime , the argument goes , and the problem will be solved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but here ’ s the catch : We don ’ t actually know why crime went up this year .
To be fair , we don ’ t truly know why crime goes up … well , ever .
Nor do we know how to make it go down in the long term .
Despite — or perhaps because of — half a century of modern criminology data keeping and analysis , all researchers have to go on are correlations — and none of them clearly explain all the times crime has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim they know how to bring down crime , even though no single political policy can reduce crime or stop it from rising in the first place .
When political figures push solutions to crime , they ’ re effectively trying to build a platform on the deck of a ghost ship — and their proposals and prevarications are often about something other than crime itself .
It all started with Goldwater On September 10 , 1964 , Barry Goldwater flew a chartered jet to Minneapolis to warn the people of the city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech was part of the senator ’ s presidential campaign , and crime was a major feature of his platform .
Crime wasn ’ t just a safety problem for America , Goldwater told voters ; it was part of an identity problem .
“ [ N ] othing prepares the way for tyranny more than the failure of public officials to keep the streets safe from bullies and marauders , ” he said in his speech accepting the Republican nomination .
America was in danger .
Americans , personally , were in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do something about it .
This campaign marked the first time crime became a national issue in American society , said Katherine Beckett , a professor of sociology at the University of Washington .
Sure , Americans had thought about crime on a national scale before — during the Prohibition era , the federal government created an entire agency to enforce a federal law banning alcohol sales .
But Goldwater was the first national politician to turn local crime into a national issue solvable by the executive branch .
Crime was trending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the violent crime rate — murder and nonnegligent manslaughter , rape , robbery and aggravated assault — had been about 161 offenses per 100,000 people .
By the year of the presidential election , it was up to about 191 , according to the FBI ’ s Uniform Crime Reports , a collection of data from thousands of local law enforcement agencies used to estimate national averages .
The fact that crime was rising in the mid-1960s did not come as a huge surprise to criminologists , said Richard Rosenfeld , a professor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Louis .
Even today , experts seem to treat this particular increase in crime as almost boring .
That ’ s because it correlated strongly with demographic shifts .
The perpetration of crime isn ’ t evenly distributed across our lifespans .
Instead , it ’ s a curve , peaking in our late teens and early 20s .
Why that happens so reliably is a question that could fill a whole other article , but suffice it to say , a population that is disproportionately young is one of the very few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in crime .
In other words , Goldwater should have blamed the Baby Boomers .
The simple explanations aren ’ t the right ones But there ’ s never just one thing that causes crime to go up or down .
The national crime rise of the mid-1960s is probably the most straightforward , everybody-agrees situation we have on record , but even there , a swell of young people wasn ’ t the only thing going on that could have led to an increase in crime .
“ What do you need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asked Gary LaFree , a professor of criminology at the University of Maryland .
“ Someone willing to do it .
Things like legitimacy really play into that.
” To LaFree , it matters that during the mid-to-late 1960s many Americans were questioning and challenging the legitimacy of police and government .
“ In the ’ 60s , respect for police was so low , ” he said .
“ It wasn ’ t uncommon in Baltimore for a body to show up at 2 a.m. with no witnesses and no one willing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other , confounding factors wipe away the possibility of demographic determinism as a neat , tidy explanation for crime .
And that ’ s even before you get to the far steeper crime increase of the mid-1980s ( which experts told us no one saw coming ) or the crime decline of the mid-1990s ( ditto ) .
Neither cleanly fits with the Youth Cause Crime theory of the 1960s .
This is the main problem with all theories of what causes a crime wave : Everything is based on correlation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ obligated to remind you — finding a correlation ain ’ t the same thing as identifying a cause .
“ There ’ s no way to conduct a randomized controlled experiment on changes in aggregate-level crime rates , and even if we could , we shouldn ’ t , ” Rosenfeld said .
Instead , researchers are left to look for other shifts in society that match with the timing of the shifts in crime .
That might be demographic changes .
Or economic ones .
It could be social distress and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the introduction of a new drug , like crack cocaine in the ’ 80s .
It could be environmental contaminants , like leaded gasoline .
It could be a political change , like the legalization of abortion .
Too many guns , not enough guns .
They all can sound pretty damn convincing on their own .
But dig too hard at any one correlation and its explanatory power falls apart .
At least as a single , predictable cause .
One way to really poke at crime-cause theories is by comparing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar nations , such as Canada .
That ’ s what Franklin Zimring , a professor of criminology at Berkeley Law , did in the mid-2000s .
He was looking at the massive decline in crime that began in the U.S. around 1994 and found that Canada had a large increase in crime about the same time , and a large decrease that also closely tracked the timing in the U.S .
Between 1990 and 2000 , crime fell by 35 percent in the U.S. and 33 percent in Canada .
But many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as causes of crime decline in the U.S. — the falling popularity of crack , a booming economy in the ’ 90s , higher abortion rates in the ’ 70s and ’ 80s , increased imprisonment rates , more police on the street — didn ’ t necessarily happen in Canada .
Canada ’ s unemployment rate , for example , peaked much higher in the early 1990s and never recovered to the extent that it did in the U.S. Why would two countries that share a border and many cultural characteristics have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shared correlational causes ?
The mystery eventually led Zimring to suspect that crime is cyclical .
It ’ s going to go up , and it ’ s going to go down .
And eventually it will go up again .
When we told him we didn ’ t understand how that explained anything , he was cheerfully blunt .
“ Neither do I !
When you see that cyclicality , what I ’ m telling you is to be puzzled , ” he said .
All of this leaves a vacuum that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
More often than not during a crime wave , they want to deter crime by imposing stricter punishments .
But talk to social scientists and they ’ ll probably tell you that because we don ’ t know what the primary driver of crime is , we should be expansive in our solutions .
That includes thinking about nonpunitive measures that appear to help reduce crime — like education , health care access or after-school programs — in addition to more standard responses like putting more police on the streets .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea what helped drive the decline in violence , after all .
Research by Patrick Sharkey , a sociology professor at Princeton University , has indicated that a huge expansion of nonprofits and neighborhood groups contributed to the crime decline in the 1990s .
But the expansion of police forces and mass incarceration also seem to have had an impact , and even changes like the growth of surveillance technology and cellphone ownership appear to have helped drive down property crime like car thefts .
The trouble for researchers trying to pick apart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ none of those effects happened independently of one another .
“ The efforts of nonprofits to take back parks and playgrounds would probably have been less effective if the police hadn ’ t been cracking down at the same time , ” Sharkey said .
“ But similarly , it wasn ’ t just that the police came in and kicked ass and cleared the streets of troublemakers .
It was also that residents were out in public spaces demanding that those communities would no longer be places where kids were not allowed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not allowed to go to a park.
” Trying to untangle which of those factors was responsible for more of the decline , he said , is a “ misleading exercise.
” In other words , there are multiple control levers policymakers can try pulling .
Research even shows that people who live in high-crime neighborhoods want to see all the levers pulled at once , in addition to police reform .
But politicians tend to gravitate toward law-and-order solutions — a trend that dates back to the first push to make crime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Goldwater speech in Minneapolis in 1964 .
His rhetoric didn ’ t leave space for a mixture of increased law enforcement and nonpunitive measures .
That ’ s because he saw things like government-funded social-welfare programs as the cause of crime .
“ If it is entirely proper for government to take from some to give to others , then won ’ t some be led to believe that they can rightfully take from anyone who has more than they ?
” Goldwater said .
His law-and-order speeches freely bounced between people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights activists participating in lawful protest and people participating in riots linked to racial injustice .
At the time , it was enough for the executive secretary of the NAACP to warn that a Goldwater win would likely lead to the creation of a police state .
And even though Goldwater lost , that punishment-first attitude came to define our national strategy — in part because Richard Nixon picked it up and used it , successfully , in his 1968 presidential campaign .
Politicians on both sides of the aisle ran with that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joe Biden , for example , was deeply involved in tough-on-crime legislation throughout the ’ 70s , ’ 80s , and ’ 90s , working with Sen. Strom Thurmond on a series of bills that helped create America ’ s system of minimum sentences and mass incarceration .
It ’ s a record Biden apologizes for now , but at the time , he seemed confident in the merits of punitive measures , and confident it was what his constituents wanted .
This , too , tracks with research .
Researchers have found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20th century , so did Americans ’ support for punitive measures .
Peter K. Enns , a political scientist at Cornell University who studies public opinion , analyzed Americans ’ attitudes toward crime and punishment from the 1960s through the 1990s and found that the public grew significantly more enthusiastic about harsher disciplinary responses to crime on a variety of metrics , including the death penalty .
Part of that was in response to genuine anxiety about crime .
But those fears were amplified by the fact that crime became a fixture of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common refrain from politicians .
Michael Fortner , a political science professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center , told us that the rising crime rates created the backdrop for politicians to focus on crime .
The crime wave , he said , “ allow [ ed ] political elites to develop narratives and programs and use them strategically , ” so even if people weren ’ t personally affected by crime , their fear could be “ mobilized for political purposes.
” Over this period , politicians were focused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some grassroots efforts to push for more comprehensive reform , according to Lisa Miller , a political science professor at Rutgers University who studies the politics of crime .
But it was harder for those complicated responses to gain traction , in part because responses to crime tend to be handled at the local level .
( This is , to some extent , why nationalized police reform remains a near political impossibility — it ’ s just difficult for the federal government to force the country ’ s 18,000 police departments to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Meanwhile , Miller said , “ it ’ s not that hard to push money down from the federal government to build new prisons and hire more police ” — which is exactly what happened .
And the politics of crime — something that ’ s never really been free of racial dimensions — became hopelessly entangled with the backlash to the civil rights movement , which was happening just as the first crime wave was taking off .
According to Beckett , both Goldwater and Nixon conflated protest and crime in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t believe their law-and-order rhetoric was rooted in any careful observation of the data , ” she said .
“ With a sleight of hand they combined [ protest and crime ] and equated all protests and riots with crime and violence.
” Over the following decades , crime became a code word for much more than homicide or property crime — politicians used it to harness white voters ’ racial fears and resentments .
“ It was an effective way of tapping into and amplifying racial tensions in a way that affords @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calls you out for being racist , ” Beckett said .
And it still is .
Research shows that , regardless of actual crime levels , Americans report feeling less safe in their neighborhoods if more young black men also live there .
All of this helps explain why law and order is resurfacing as one of the major themes of the 2020 campaign .
A summer of simultaneously spiking crime rates and nationwide protests against racialized police brutality makes for a brew that ’ s similar to what we saw in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on rising racial resentment , protests and riots across the country , and an actual crime wave in his presidential campaign .
Then — as now — Nixon , Goldwater , and other politicians didn ’ t really know why crime was rising , or whether the trend would continue .
They also didn ’ t know what would bring the crime rate down .
But that didn ’ t stop them from turning the nascent trend to their political advantage — something that could have long-term consequences .
If the crime spike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we ’ ll have to grapple with the fact that although the punitive responses of the 1980s and 1990s are now largely regarded as a mistake , they probably did something to reduce crime .
Adaner Usmani , a sociologist at Harvard University who studies crime and punishment , said that it ’ s too easy to forget that a policy can be at least partially effective and also the wrong choice to make .
“ I ’ m in agreement with many people that [ criminal justice ] policy choices over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But there ’ s a lot of good evidence that they ’ ve had the effect that , narrowly speaking , politicians and the public hoped they would have , ” he said .
That ’ s not a politically easy answer — that our past response to crime may have worked , but at a cost too great to repeat .
That ’ s the trouble with responses to crime , though , Sharkey said .
There ’ s no incentive for politicians , thinking about their next reelection cycle , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that could keep crime rates down .
Instead , there are potentially great political rewards for using crime as a dog whistle for other things , like mobilizing racial resentment .
The irony is that this political pattern may actually worsen crime itself , insofar as it makes certain communities less likely to trust politicians and political institutions , and resources aren ’ t directed to the parts of communities that can actually prevent crime from rising .
Remember LaFree ’ s theories about how the loss of institutional legitimacy can lead to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t trust the police to treat them fairly , they ’ re also unlikely to report crimes or work with police in ways that could prevent crime .
The stories politicians tell us about why crime matters , how much it matters and what to do about it have not done a great job of matching up with reality , Miller said .
The consequence is that our view of potential solutions to crime gets narrower — punishment starts to seem like the silver bullet , but anyone with an eye @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And the more that picture of the world narrows , the more people of color get crushed by it .
From Goldwater to Minneapolis ( and long before ) law and order has affected those groups differently than it has white Americans .
After half a century of dog whistles , it ’ s hard to disentangle tough-on-crime rhetoric from white fears about Black and brown people .
And it ’ s impossible to impose tough-on-crime solutions without disproportionate ( and unfair ) impacts on their lives .
It matters that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in all its complexity , because there are people at that other end of society ’ s sticks and carrots .
“ We just sort of fill in with whatever causal explanation is most recent and most at the ready , which I guess is just how our brains work , ” Miller said .
“ But if we get the causal story wrong , they ’ re the ones who will [ bear ] the brunt .
”

The billboards started popping up around Minneapolis in June. “Uptown reels after gunfire, bloodshed.” “Multiple shootings in metro area overnight.” Referencing quotes from local newspapers and TV stations, the signs were part of an ad campaign aimed at turning concerns over a spike in gun violence into a pro-police political movement.
The city of Minneapolis had a long, exhausting spring and summer. COVID-19 lockdowns starting in March were followed by the release of a graphic video showing a police officer killing George Floyd, sparking massive protests against police brutality — some of which turned violent and made news around the world. Then came the heat wave. And a withered job market that disproportionately affected Black residents. In August, another, smaller bout of unrest broke out after a murder suspect shot himself and community members initially believed that he’d been killed by police.
Through it all, crime ticked upward. By September 1, the city’s violent crime rate was 16.8% higher than the previous five-year average.
The rise in crime in Minneapolis has been mirrored across the nation, with nearly every major city seeing an increase in murder compared with recent years. It’s enough of a trend that op-eds have begun to refer to a “Minneapolis effect,” a nationwide crime spike driven, ostensibly, by civil unrest in one city. President Trump has blamed the increase in crime on Democratic mayors and positioned a return to law and order as a major platform of his reelection campaign. Stop criticizing police and crack down on crime, the argument goes, and the problem will be solved.
It’s a neat explanation, but here’s the catch: We don’t actually know why crime went up this year. To be fair, we don’t truly know why crime goes up … well, ever. Nor do we know how to make it go down in the long term. Despite — or perhaps because of — half a century of modern criminology data keeping and analysis, all researchers have to go on are correlations — and none of them clearly explain all the times crime has gone up.
But politicians continue to claim they know how to bring down crime, even though no single political policy can reduce crime or stop it from rising in the first place. When political figures push solutions to crime, they’re effectively trying to build a platform on the deck of a ghost ship — and their proposals and prevarications are often about something other than crime itself.
1964
DENVER POST VIA GETTY IMAGES
It all started with Goldwater
On September 10, 1964, Barry Goldwater flew a chartered jet to Minneapolis to warn the people of the city about crime in the streets. The speech was part of the senator’s presidential campaign, and crime was a major feature of his platform. Crime wasn’t just a safety problem for America, Goldwater told voters; it was part of an identity problem. “[N]othing prepares the way for tyranny more than the failure of public officials to keep the streets safe from bullies and marauders,” he said in his speech accepting the Republican nomination. America was in danger. Americans, personally, were in danger, and the federal government needed to do something about it.
This campaign marked the first time crime became a national issue in American society, said Katherine Beckett, a professor of sociology at the University of Washington. Sure, Americans had thought about crime on a national scale before — during the Prohibition era, the federal government created an entire agency to enforce a federal law banning alcohol sales. But Goldwater was the first national politician to turn local crime into a national issue solvable by the executive branch.
Crime was trending upward in 1964. In 1960, the violent crime rate — murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery and aggravated assault — had been about 161 offenses per 100,000 people. By the year of the presidential election, it was up to about 191, according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, a collection of data from thousands of local law enforcement agencies used to estimate national averages.
The fact that crime was rising in the mid-1960s did not come as a huge surprise to criminologists, said Richard Rosenfeld, a professor of criminology at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Even today, experts seem to treat this particular increase in crime as almost boring. That’s because it correlated strongly with demographic shifts.
The perpetration of crime isn’t evenly distributed across our lifespans. Instead, it’s a curve, peaking in our late teens and early 20s. Why that happens so reliably is a question that could fill a whole other article, but suffice it to say, a population that is disproportionately young is one of the very few variables that can consistently predict a rise in crime. In other words, Goldwater should have blamed the Baby Boomers.
1976
DENVER POST VIA GETTY IMAGES
The simple explanations aren’t the right ones
But there’s never just one thing that causes crime to go up or down. The national crime rise of the mid-1960s is probably the most straightforward, everybody-agrees situation we have on record, but even there, a swell of young people wasn’t the only thing going on that could have led to an increase in crime.
“What do you need for a crime to happen?” asked Gary LaFree, a professor of criminology at the University of Maryland. “Someone willing to do it. Things like legitimacy really play into that.” To LaFree, it matters that during the mid-to-late 1960s many Americans were questioning and challenging the legitimacy of police and government. “In the ’60s, respect for police was so low,” he said. “It wasn’t uncommon in Baltimore for a body to show up at 2 a.m. with no witnesses and no one willing to work with the system.”
This and other, confounding factors wipe away the possibility of demographic determinism as a neat, tidy explanation for crime. And that’s even before you get to the far steeper crime increase of the mid-1980s (which experts told us no one saw coming) or the crime decline of the mid-1990s (ditto). Neither cleanly fits with the Youth Cause Crime theory of the 1960s.
This is the main problem with all theories of what causes a crime wave: Everything is based on correlation. And — as we’re contractually obligated to remind you — finding a correlation ain’t the same thing as identifying a cause.
“There’s no way to conduct a randomized controlled experiment on changes in aggregate-level crime rates, and even if we could, we shouldn’t,” Rosenfeld said.
Instead, researchers are left to look for other shifts in society that match with the timing of the shifts in crime. That might be demographic changes. Or economic ones. It could be social distress and the delegitimization of police. It could be the introduction of a new drug, like crack cocaine in the ’80s. It could be environmental contaminants, like leaded gasoline. It could be a political change, like the legalization of abortion. Too many guns, not enough guns. They all can sound pretty damn convincing on their own. But dig too hard at any one correlation and its explanatory power falls apart. At least as a single, predictable cause.
One way to really poke at crime-cause theories is by comparing the correlations in the U.S. with those in similar nations, such as Canada. That’s what Franklin Zimring, a professor of criminology at Berkeley Law, did in the mid-2000s. He was looking at the massive decline in crime that began in the U.S. around 1994 and found that Canada had a large increase in crime about the same time, and a large decrease that also closely tracked the timing in the U.S. Between 1990 and 2000, crime fell by 35 percent in the U.S. and 33 percent in Canada. But many of the things that experts have proposed as causes of crime decline in the U.S. — the falling popularity of crack, a booming economy in the ’90s, higher abortion rates in the ’70s and ’80s, increased imprisonment rates, more police on the street — didn’t necessarily happen in Canada. Canada’s unemployment rate, for example, peaked much higher in the early 1990s and never recovered to the extent that it did in the U.S. Why would two countries that share a border and many cultural characteristics have a decline in crime but no obvious shared correlational causes?
The mystery eventually led Zimring to suspect that crime is cyclical. It’s going to go up, and it’s going to go down. And eventually it will go up again. When we told him we didn’t understand how that explained anything, he was cheerfully blunt. “Neither do I! When you see that cyclicality, what I’m telling you is to be puzzled,” he said.
2016
SAMUEL CORUM / ANADOLU AGENCY / GETTY IMAGES
How politicians fill the void
All of this leaves a vacuum that politicians are more than happy to fill. More often than not during a crime wave, they want to deter crime by imposing stricter punishments. But talk to social scientists and they’ll probably tell you that because we don’t know what the primary driver of crime is, we should be expansive in our solutions. That includes thinking about nonpunitive measures that appear to help reduce crime — like education, health care access or after-school programs — in addition to more standard responses like putting more police on the streets.
It’s not that we have no idea what helped drive the decline in violence, after all. Research by Patrick Sharkey, a sociology professor at Princeton University, has indicated that a huge expansion of nonprofits and neighborhood groups contributed to the crime decline in the 1990s. But the expansion of police forces and mass incarceration also seem to have had an impact, and even changes like the growth of surveillance technology and cellphone ownership appear to have helped drive down property crime like car thefts. The trouble for researchers trying to pick apart what was the biggest driver is that none of those effects happened independently of one another.
“The efforts of nonprofits to take back parks and playgrounds would probably have been less effective if the police hadn’t been cracking down at the same time,” Sharkey said. “But similarly, it wasn’t just that the police came in and kicked ass and cleared the streets of troublemakers. It was also that residents were out in public spaces demanding that those communities would no longer be places where kids were not allowed to go outside at night, or not allowed to go to a park.” Trying to untangle which of those factors was responsible for more of the decline, he said, is a “misleading exercise.”
1970
OLIVA FALL / THE DENVER POST VIA GETTY IMAGES
In other words, there are multiple control levers policymakers can try pulling. Research even shows that people who live in high-crime neighborhoods want to see all the levers pulled at once, in addition to police reform.
But politicians tend to gravitate toward law-and-order solutions — a trend that dates back to the first push to make crime a national issue.
Think back to that Goldwater speech in Minneapolis in 1964. His rhetoric didn’t leave space for a mixture of increased law enforcement and nonpunitive measures. That’s because he saw things like government-funded social-welfare programs as the cause of crime. “If it is entirely proper for government to take from some to give to others, then won’t some be led to believe that they can rightfully take from anyone who has more than they?” Goldwater said.
His law-and-order speeches freely bounced between people committing illegal acts of violence, civil rights activists participating in lawful protest and people participating in riots linked to racial injustice. At the time, it was enough for the executive secretary of the NAACP to warn that a Goldwater win would likely lead to the creation of a police state.
And even though Goldwater lost, that punishment-first attitude came to define our national strategy — in part because Richard Nixon picked it up and used it, successfully, in his 1968 presidential campaign. Politicians on both sides of the aisle ran with that baton for the next few decades. Joe Biden, for example, was deeply involved in tough-on-crime legislation throughout the ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, working with Sen. Strom Thurmond on a series of bills that helped create America’s system of minimum sentences and mass incarceration. It’s a record Biden apologizes for now, but at the time, he seemed confident in the merits of punitive measures, and confident it was what his constituents wanted.
This, too, tracks with research. Researchers have found that as crime rose in the late 20th century, so did Americans’ support for punitive measures. Peter K. Enns, a political scientist at Cornell University who studies public opinion, analyzed Americans’ attitudes toward crime and punishment from the 1960s through the 1990s and found that the public grew significantly more enthusiastic about harsher disciplinary responses to crime on a variety of metrics, including the death penalty.
Part of that was in response to genuine anxiety about crime. But those fears were amplified by the fact that crime became a fixture of media coverage during this period and a common refrain from politicians. Michael Fortner, a political science professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center, told us that the rising crime rates created the backdrop for politicians to focus on crime. The crime wave, he said, “allow[ed] political elites to develop narratives and programs and use them strategically,” so even if people weren’t personally affected by crime, their fear could be “mobilized for political purposes.”
Over this period, politicians were focused primarily on punitive solutions. There were some grassroots efforts to push for more comprehensive reform, according to Lisa Miller, a political science professor at Rutgers University who studies the politics of crime. But it was harder for those complicated responses to gain traction, in part because responses to crime tend to be handled at the local level. (This is, to some extent, why nationalized police reform remains a near political impossibility — it’s just difficult for the federal government to force the country’s 18,000 police departments to play by the same rules.) Meanwhile, Miller said, “it’s not that hard to push money down from the federal government to build new prisons and hire more police” — which is exactly what happened.
2020
STEPHEN MATUREN / GETTY IMAGES
And the politics of crime — something that’s never really been free of racial dimensions — became hopelessly entangled with the backlash to the civil rights movement, which was happening just as the first crime wave was taking off. According to Beckett, both Goldwater and Nixon conflated protest and crime in their presidential campaigns. “I don’t believe their law-and-order rhetoric was rooted in any careful observation of the data,” she said. “With a sleight of hand they combined [protest and crime] and equated all protests and riots with crime and violence.” Over the following decades, crime became a code word for much more than homicide or property crime — politicians used it to harness white voters’ racial fears and resentments. “It was an effective way of tapping into and amplifying racial tensions in a way that affords [a politician] protection if someone calls you out for being racist,” Beckett said. And it still is. Research shows that, regardless of actual crime levels, Americans report feeling less safe in their neighborhoods if more young black men also live there.
All of this helps explain why law and order is resurfacing as one of the major themes of the 2020 campaign. A summer of simultaneously spiking crime rates and nationwide protests against racialized police brutality makes for a brew that’s similar to what we saw in the late 1960s, when Nixon successfully capitalized on rising racial resentment, protests and riots across the country, and an actual crime wave in his presidential campaign. Then — as now — Nixon, Goldwater, and other politicians didn’t really know why crime was rising, or whether the trend would continue. They also didn’t know what would bring the crime rate down. But that didn’t stop them from turning the nascent trend to their political advantage — something that could have long-term consequences.
If the crime spike of this summer turns into a wave, we’ll have to grapple with the fact that although the punitive responses of the 1980s and 1990s are now largely regarded as a mistake, they probably did something to reduce crime. Adaner Usmani, a sociologist at Harvard University who studies crime and punishment, said that it’s too easy to forget that a policy can be at least partially effective and also the wrong choice to make. “I’m in agreement with many people that [criminal justice] policy choices over the last 30 years have been disastrous. But there’s a lot of good evidence that they’ve had the effect that, narrowly speaking, politicians and the public hoped they would have,” he said.
That’s not a politically easy answer — that our past response to crime may have worked, but at a cost too great to repeat. That’s the trouble with responses to crime, though, Sharkey said. There’s no incentive for politicians, thinking about their next reelection cycle, to prioritize the long-term investments in communities that could keep crime rates down. Instead, there are potentially great political rewards for using crime as a dog whistle for other things, like mobilizing racial resentment.
The irony is that this political pattern may actually worsen crime itself, insofar as it makes certain communities less likely to trust politicians and political institutions, and resources aren’t directed to the parts of communities that can actually prevent crime from rising. Remember LaFree’s theories about how the loss of institutional legitimacy can lead to crime — if people in a community don’t trust the police to treat them fairly, they’re also unlikely to report crimes or work with police in ways that could prevent crime.
The stories politicians tell us about why crime matters, how much it matters and what to do about it have not done a great job of matching up with reality, Miller said. The consequence is that our view of potential solutions to crime gets narrower — punishment starts to seem like the silver bullet, but anyone with an eye on the data knows it is not.
And the more that picture of the world narrows, the more people of color get crushed by it. From Goldwater to Minneapolis (and long before) law and order has affected those groups differently than it has white Americans. After half a century of dog whistles, it’s hard to disentangle tough-on-crime rhetoric from white fears about Black and brown people. And it’s impossible to impose tough-on-crime solutions without disproportionate (and unfair) impacts on their lives. It matters that we get the story on crime right, in all its complexity, because there are people at that other end of society’s sticks and carrots.
“We just sort of fill in with whatever causal explanation is most recent and most at the ready, which I guess is just how our brains work,” Miller said. “But if we get the causal story wrong, they’re the ones who will [bear] the brunt.”


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-08--The Vice Presidential Debate Was Civil. But Did It Shake Up The Race?

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew reacts to the first and only vice presidential debate @

The Vice Presidential Debate Was Civil. But Did It Shake Up The Race?
In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew reacts to the first and only vice presidential debate.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-09--Trump’s Bout With COVID-19 Might Be Hurting His Reelection Chances

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
It ’ s been exactly one week since we learned that President Trump had tested positive for COVID-19 .
While it ’ s still hard to know what effect his diagnosis has had on the race , we do have some new polls to share ; they don ’ t necessarily paint a consistent picture , though .
As my colleagues Geoffrey Skelley and Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux wrote on Monday , polls conducted in the immediate aftermath of Trump ’ s diagnosis found that an overwhelming majority of Americans believed that Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoid getting sick .
Newer polling agrees : For instance , CNN/SSRS found that 63 percent of Americans thought Trump acted irresponsibly in risking the health of the people around him .
However , it ’ s not clear that this affected people ’ s perceptions of whether Trump could continue to govern effectively .
Sixty-six percent of respondents in the poll said they weren ’ t concerned about the government ’ s ability to operate while Trump was ill .
There is some evidence , though , that Trump ’ s illness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SurveyUSA was in the field with a national poll from Oct. 1 ( before Trump announced his diagnosis ) to Oct. 4 ( when Trump was in the hospital ) , and the pollster found that Joe Biden led Trump by just 4 points in interviews conducted before Trump was hospitalized .
But in interviews after Trump ’ s hospitalization , Biden led by 16 points .
A Franklin Pierce University/Boston Herald poll identified a similar pattern : Biden led by 5 points in interviews conducted before Trump ’ s diagnosis and by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
But not every poll showed this shift .
Monmouth University , one of the best pollsters in the business , was also in the field with a Pennsylvania survey late last week , and it found that the horse race largely did not change after Trump ’ s diagnosis .
Biden led by 12 points in interviews on Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 and by 13 points in interviews from Oct. 2 to Oct. 4 .
Civiqs/Daily Kos , polling just after Trump ’ s diagnosis , asked a detailed question @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or in [ their ] daily life ” might affect people ’ s votes , but they found that essentially no one was changing their minds .
In addition , Skelley and Thomson-DeVeaux talked to multiple political scientists who said that attitudes on the coronavirus have hardened over the past several months , especially along party lines , so a big shift in public opinion is unlikely .
Not to mention , a solid majority of Americans already believed that Trump was mishandling the pandemic ; to them , his illness may merely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believed , whereas Trump ’ s defenders may not be inclined to change their minds since he has downplayed his illness .
Indeed , our tracker of Trump ’ s approval rating on the coronavirus hasn ’ t budged since last week — and it is still heavily split by party .
But these surveys are far from the final word .
Trump ’ s illness is an incredibly fluid story , and public opinion may change if his condition worsens — or depending on the actions he takes now that he ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week alone , he briefly left the hospital to wave to well-wishers from an enclosed car with Secret Service agents ; tweeted , “ Don ’ t be afraid of Covid ” ; returned to the White House after only three days of hospitalization ; and took his mask off before stepping inside .
And these actions were pretty unpopular .
For example , Americans told YouGov , 62 percent to 28 percent , that it was inappropriate for Trump to leave the hospital to wave to supporters .
And Morning Consult/Politico found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump was wrong to tell Americans not to be afraid of COVID-19 , whereas only 28 percent said he was right .
Finally , by a 56 percent to 29 percent margin , Americans said it was a bad idea for him to discharge himself from the hospital and return to the White House , according to a separate YouGov poll .
Trump ’ s illness could also have a domino effect on the rest of the campaign .
For instance , it appears as though the next two debates will be delayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debate being held on Oct. 15 .
But according to Morning Consult/Politico , a virtual format is actually a fairly popular solution , at least when compared with the alternatives .
In a poll conducted before the announcement , 41 percent of voters thought the rest of the debates should be held virtually , versus only 12 percent who wanted the debates to be canceled or delayed .
Thirty-six percent of voters thought the debates should be held in person , either indoors ( 16 percent ) or out ( 20 percent ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s rollout of Amy Coney Barrett as his nominee for the Supreme Court has been pretty successful .
Despite people ’ s belief that the current Supreme Court vacancy should not be filled before the election , registered voters told YouGov/HuffPost , 43 percent to 38 percent , that they would like their senators to vote in favor of Barrett .
And respondents approved of Trump ’ s decision to appoint Barrett , 47 percent to 42 percent .
Similarly , Morning Consult/Politico found 46 percent of voters in favor of confirming Barrett @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And in a shift from late September , a plurality of voters now say Barrett should be confirmed as soon as possible .
• On Tuesday , Trump announced that he was cutting off negotiations over a new coronavirus relief bill and that nothing would be passed before the election .
But Morning Consult/Politico finds that this tactic could play poorly with the American public .
Sixty-eight percent of registered voters said “ stimulating the economy to recover from COVID-19 ” should be a top priority for Congress .
Thirty-two percent of respondents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and another 23 percent blamed Republicans in Congress ; 35 percent , however , blamed congressional Democrats .
• A new University of North Florida poll finds a close race for Florida ’ s Amendment 3 , which would implement a top-two primary system ( similar to California ’ s and Washington ’ s ) in the Sunshine State .
Likely voters said 58 percent to 36 percent that they would vote for the amendment , but it requires 60 percent in order to pass .
• The pandemic could make for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Leger poll , only 54 percent of Americans whose children went trick-or-treating last year said they would allow their kids to go door to door this year .
Meanwhile , 43 percent of Americans said that governments should proactively cancel Halloween this year .
• Now this is a good icebreaker question for parties : On Monday , YouGov asked Americans , “ How many enemies , if any , do you have ?
” Forty-four percent of respondents said they had no enemies , 5 percent said they had one enemy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or three and 2 percent said they had four or five .
A concerning 4 percent of Americans said they have five or more enemies .
The remaining 36 percent were like , “ WTF , YouGov ?
” ( read : they said they didn ’ t know ) .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 43.2 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president , while 53.4 percent disapprove ( a net approval rating of -10.2 points ) .
At this time last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disapproved ( a net approval rating of -8.9 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 43.1 percent and a disapproval rating of 52.7 percent , for a net approval rating of -9.6 points .
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 6.5 percentage points ( 49.3 percent to 42.8 percent ) .
A week ago , Democrats led Republicans by 6.1 points ( 48.8 percent to 42.7 percent ) .
At this time last month , voters preferred Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 41.4 percent ) .
Check out all the polls we ’ ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
It’s been exactly one week since we learned that President Trump had tested positive for COVID-19. While it’s still hard to know what effect his diagnosis has had on the race, we do have some new polls to share; they don’t necessarily paint a consistent picture, though.
As my colleagues Geoffrey Skelley and Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux wrote on Monday, polls conducted in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s diagnosis found that an overwhelming majority of Americans believed that Trump did not take the proper precautions to avoid getting sick. Newer polling agrees: For instance, CNN/SSRS found that 63 percent of Americans thought Trump acted irresponsibly in risking the health of the people around him. However, it’s not clear that this affected people’s perceptions of whether Trump could continue to govern effectively. Sixty-six percent of respondents in the poll said they weren’t concerned about the government’s ability to operate while Trump was ill.
There is some evidence, though, that Trump’s illness may be hurting his reelection chances. SurveyUSA was in the field with a national poll from Oct. 1 (before Trump announced his diagnosis) to Oct. 4 (when Trump was in the hospital), and the pollster found that Joe Biden led Trump by just 4 points in interviews conducted before Trump was hospitalized. But in interviews after Trump’s hospitalization, Biden led by 16 points. A Franklin Pierce University/Boston Herald poll identified a similar pattern: Biden led by 5 points in interviews conducted before Trump’s diagnosis and by a shocking 21 points in interviews after it.
But not every poll showed this shift. Monmouth University, one of the best pollsters in the business, was also in the field with a Pennsylvania survey late last week, and it found that the horse race largely did not change after Trump’s diagnosis. Biden led by 12 points in interviews on Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 and by 13 points in interviews from Oct. 2 to Oct. 4. Civiqs/Daily Kos, polling just after Trump’s diagnosis, asked a detailed question about how “anything in the news or in [their] daily life” might affect people’s votes, but they found that essentially no one was changing their minds.
Recent events are not changing people’s minds Share of adults in a national Oct. 2-5 Civiqs/Daily Kos poll who gave each answer to the question, “A lot has happened in the past few weeks. Thinking back, has anything in the news or in your daily life affected how you plan to vote in the presidential election?” Response Share I was going to vote for Biden, and I still am 46% I was going to vote for Trump, and I still am 40 I was going to vote for Biden, but I am reconsidering 1 I was going to vote for Trump, but I am reconsidering 1 I was going to vote for Biden, but I have changed my mind 1 I was going to vote for Trump, but I have changed my mind 1 I already voted 4 I am not going to vote 1 Unsure 5 Source: Civiqs/Daily Kos
In addition, Skelley and Thomson-DeVeaux talked to multiple political scientists who said that attitudes on the coronavirus have hardened over the past several months, especially along party lines, so a big shift in public opinion is unlikely. Not to mention, a solid majority of Americans already believed that Trump was mishandling the pandemic; to them, his illness may merely serve as confirmation of what they already believed, whereas Trump’s defenders may not be inclined to change their minds since he has downplayed his illness. Indeed, our tracker of Trump’s approval rating on the coronavirus hasn’t budged since last week — and it is still heavily split by party.
But these surveys are far from the final word. Trump’s illness is an incredibly fluid story, and public opinion may change if his condition worsens — or depending on the actions he takes now that he’s sick.
For instance, this week alone, he briefly left the hospital to wave to well-wishers from an enclosed car with Secret Service agents; tweeted, “Don’t be afraid of Covid”; returned to the White House after only three days of hospitalization; and took his mask off before stepping inside. And these actions were pretty unpopular. For example, Americans told YouGov, 62 percent to 28 percent, that it was inappropriate for Trump to leave the hospital to wave to supporters. And Morning Consult/Politico found that 60 percent of registered voters said Trump was wrong to tell Americans not to be afraid of COVID-19, whereas only 28 percent said he was right. Finally, by a 56 percent to 29 percent margin, Americans said it was a bad idea for him to discharge himself from the hospital and return to the White House, according to a separate YouGov poll.
Trump’s illness could also have a domino effect on the rest of the campaign. For instance, it appears as though the next two debates will be delayed by a week instead of a virtual debate being held on Oct. 15. But according to Morning Consult/Politico, a virtual format is actually a fairly popular solution, at least when compared with the alternatives. In a poll conducted before the announcement, 41 percent of voters thought the rest of the debates should be held virtually, versus only 12 percent who wanted the debates to be canceled or delayed. Thirty-six percent of voters thought the debates should be held in person, either indoors (16 percent) or out (20 percent).
Other polling bites
It looks like Trump’s rollout of Amy Coney Barrett as his nominee for the Supreme Court has been pretty successful. Despite people’s belief that the current Supreme Court vacancy should not be filled before the election, registered voters told YouGov/HuffPost, 43 percent to 38 percent, that they would like their senators to vote in favor of Barrett. And respondents approved of Trump’s decision to appoint Barrett, 47 percent to 42 percent. Similarly, Morning Consult/Politico found 46 percent of voters in favor of confirming Barrett, with only 31 percent opposed. And in a shift from late September, a plurality of voters now say Barrett should be confirmed as soon as possible.
On Tuesday, Trump announced that he was cutting off negotiations over a new coronavirus relief bill and that nothing would be passed before the election. But Morning Consult/Politico finds that this tactic could play poorly with the American public. Sixty-eight percent of registered voters said “stimulating the economy to recover from COVID-19” should be a top priority for Congress. Thirty-two percent of respondents blamed Trump for the breakdown in negotiations, and another 23 percent blamed Republicans in Congress; 35 percent, however, blamed congressional Democrats.
A new University of North Florida poll finds a close race for Florida’s Amendment 3, which would implement a top-two primary system (similar to California’s and Washington’s) in the Sunshine State. Likely voters said 58 percent to 36 percent that they would vote for the amendment, but it requires 60 percent in order to pass.
The pandemic could make for an eerily quiet Halloween. According to a Leger poll, only 54 percent of Americans whose children went trick-or-treating last year said they would allow their kids to go door to door this year. Meanwhile, 43 percent of Americans said that governments should proactively cancel Halloween this year.
Now this is a good icebreaker question for parties: On Monday, YouGov asked Americans, “How many enemies, if any, do you have?” Forty-four percent of respondents said they had no enemies, 5 percent said they had one enemy, 8 percent said they had two or three and 2 percent said they had four or five. A concerning 4 percent of Americans said they have five or more enemies. The remaining 36 percent were like, “WTF, YouGov?” (read: they said they didn’t know).
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 43.2 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 53.4 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -10.2 points). At this time last week, 43.9 percent approved and 52.8 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -8.9 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 43.1 percent and a disapproval rating of 52.7 percent, for a net approval rating of -9.6 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 6.5 percentage points (49.3 percent to 42.8 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 6.1 points (48.8 percent to 42.7 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 7.2 points (48.7 percent to 41.4 percent).
Check out all the polls we’ve been collecting ahead of the 2020 elections.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-09--A Contested 2020 Election Would Be Way Worse Than Bush v. Gore

It ’ s Wednesday , Nov. 4 , and the vote count is too close to call .
Neither President Trump nor former Vice President Joe Biden is conceding defeat , recounts are being conducted , disputes over recounts are being lodged , and a court case will soon be making its way to the Supreme Court of the United States .
Trump has voiced his belief that there is widespread ballot fraud and as a result there ’ s already some degree of civil unrest .
This is the nightmare scenario for 2020 , one in which a disputed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s also one that ’ s vaguely familiar .
In 2000 , there was no clear winner in the contest between Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush .
That triggered a recount and a controversial Supreme Court decision that ultimately determined the presidency for Bush .
Yet even in the direct aftermath of Bush v. Gore , Americans still kept the faith in democratic institutions and the process .
I went looking for lessons from that period of disruption .
But all I found were the first cancer cells @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the past 20 years .
It ’ s not that Americans didn ’ t think something had gone wrong in 2000 — in a CBS News poll conducted after the Supreme Court ’ s decision in mid-December , 60 percent of people said there had not been a fair and accurate count of votes .
Still , 59 percent of people in an ABC News/Washington Post poll from the same time said their opinion of the court remained unchanged .
The same poll asked what people would think if there were an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ winner .
Would they consider Bush legitimately elected ?
Eighty-four percent answered , “ Yes.
” It ’ s difficult to imagine similar sentiments in December 2020 if the Supreme Court intervened .
Already , Americans say they are worried about something going wrong .
In a late September Monmouth University poll , 39 percent of people said they were “ not too confident ” or “ not at all confident ” that the 2020 election would be conducted “ fairly and accurately.
” A FiveThirtyEight/Ipsos poll from about the same time found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the election would be fair , 39 percent said it wouldn ’ t be .
The open seat on the Supreme Court has only complicated matters .
Journalists ’ recitation of engrained partisanship is now somewhat rote , but the scale of our almost-religious alienation from one another is sort of breathtaking ; we were not this divided a nation in 2000 .
Pew Research tracked partisanship trends in America from 1994 to 2017 by measuring responses to the same questions about things like views on gay marriage and immigration .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Democrats and Republicans on these questions .
In 2017 , the difference was 36 points .
But man , did we think we had it bad back in the 15-point difference world .
The history of the 2000 election recount generally tells about the partisan spin that polluted the airwaves during the counting of the ballots .
( If you are too young to know what a “ hanging chad ” is , please Google ; it was important in American life for a few weeks , but I just don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it here . )
Gore ’ s team wanted officials to recount ballots by hand in four heavily Democratic counties where the vote was quite close , while Bush ’ s team wanted to stop the recount entirely .
James Baker was Bush ’ s point-man in Florida , having served as George H.W .
Bush ’ s secretary of state , and was quick to realize that the campaign would need to wage a war for public opinion .
“ We ’ re getting killed on ‘ count all the votes.
’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
” Jeffrey Toobin quoted Baker as saying in his book about the recount , “ Too Close to Call.
” Gore ’ s team thought it had the “ moral authority to make his case , ” according to a New York Times report from two days after Election Day .
It allowed “ Democrats to suggest that the Republicans are trying to subvert the will of the people.
” As the drama unfolded , many Americans thought more votes needed to be tallied , but they also thought Gore should concede @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from late November , the plurality of people , 47 percent , thought that not all the votes in Florida had been counted .
But the same survey also found that 56 percent of people thought Gore should concede .
This psychology is fascinating when seen through 2020 ’ s rearview mirror .
It speaks to a certain satisfaction some people had with the general political state of things : Either Bush or Gore would do just fine .
It ’ s the sort of laissez-faire attitude toward election outcomes that 15-point partisan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ era , we ’ re discussing all-out civil war if things are too close to call on election night .
We have accelerated the formation of our separate partisan worlds over the past four years .
These worlds accept different realities .
Democrats generally accept fact-based conclusions ( alongside their partisan , subjective beliefs ) , and Republicans — or at least the Republican Party — generally eschew the conclusions of experts on things like climate change and COVID-19 ( alongside their partisan , subjective beliefs ) .
Given all this , doesn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would continue down this garden path of separate realities when it comes to an initially indeterminate election outcome ?
One version of reality accepts a President Biden while the other accepts a President Trump , each with baroque arguments — about the eligibility of certain ballots or the legitimacy of the Electoral College — nicely retrofitted to match a predetermined conclusion .
In a piece in the 2010 collection “ The Presidency of George W. Bush : A First Historical Assessment , ” David Greenberg , a professor of journalism and media studies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to accept a common reality to the 2000 election and the postmodern brilliance of Baker and company : “ The Bush team didn ’ t just contend that a recount would fail to identify the true winner more accurately ; more radically , they argued that any accurate tally was unattainable — that the truth was unknowable.
” Greenberg points to a famous quote given to the New York Times Magazine by a Bush aide for further proof of the roots of this kind of thinking : The aide said that guys like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the reality-based community , ” which he defined as people who “ believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.
” I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism .
He cut me off .
“ That ’ s not the way the world really works anymore , ” he continued .
“ We ’ re an empire now , and when we act , we create our own reality .
And while you ’ re studying that reality — judiciously , as you will — we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realities , which you can study too , and that ’ s how things will sort out .
We ’ re history ’ s actors … and you , all of you , will be left to just study what we do.
” Professionally , I ’ m a member of the reality-based community .
I try to think empirically about America , her culture , people and oh-so-screwy politics .
That ’ s been a challenge as Trump and the Republican Party have perfected the creation of one ’ s own reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During the first debate , the president waffled on whether he would concede defeat , falling back on his go-to line about the fraudulent — and unfounded — dangers of mail voting .
If he actually does this post-Election Day , media organizations will be forced to grapple with reporting on the news of the day — the president ’ s words — and battling misinformation and mistrust .
It ’ s more than the press had to contend with in 2000 , and it ’ s an unwinnable scenario .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 36-point world .

It’s Wednesday, Nov. 4, and the vote count is too close to call. Neither President Trump nor former Vice President Joe Biden is conceding defeat, recounts are being conducted, disputes over recounts are being lodged, and a court case will soon be making its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. Trump has voiced his belief that there is widespread ballot fraud and as a result there’s already some degree of civil unrest.
This is the nightmare scenario for 2020, one in which a disputed election drives the country further apart. It’s also one that’s vaguely familiar. In 2000, there was no clear winner in the contest between Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush. That triggered a recount and a controversial Supreme Court decision that ultimately determined the presidency for Bush. Yet even in the direct aftermath of Bush v. Gore, Americans still kept the faith in democratic institutions and the process. I went looking for lessons from that period of disruption. But all I found were the first cancer cells that have metastasized in our political system over the past 20 years.
Model Talk: Trump’s position worsens | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
It’s not that Americans didn’t think something had gone wrong in 2000 — in a CBS News poll conducted after the Supreme Court’s decision in mid-December, 60 percent of people said there had not been a fair and accurate count of votes. Still, 59 percent of people in an ABC News/Washington Post poll from the same time said their opinion of the court remained unchanged. The same poll asked what people would think if there were an unofficial recount and Gore were declared the winner. Would they consider Bush legitimately elected? Eighty-four percent answered, “Yes.”
It’s difficult to imagine similar sentiments in December 2020 if the Supreme Court intervened. Already, Americans say they are worried about something going wrong. In a late September Monmouth University poll, 39 percent of people said they were “not too confident” or “not at all confident” that the 2020 election would be conducted “fairly and accurately.” A FiveThirtyEight/Ipsos poll from about the same time found that while 60 percent of people surveyed said the election would be fair, 39 percent said it wouldn’t be. The open seat on the Supreme Court has only complicated matters.
Journalists’ recitation of engrained partisanship is now somewhat rote, but the scale of our almost-religious alienation from one another is sort of breathtaking; we were not this divided a nation in 2000. Pew Research tracked partisanship trends in America from 1994 to 2017 by measuring responses to the same questions about things like views on gay marriage and immigration. In 1999, there was a 15-point difference between Democrats and Republicans on these questions. In 2017, the difference was 36 points.
But man, did we think we had it bad back in the 15-point difference world.
The history of the 2000 election recount generally tells about the partisan spin that polluted the airwaves during the counting of the ballots. (If you are too young to know what a “hanging chad” is, please Google; it was important in American life for a few weeks, but I just don’t have the strength to get into it here.) Gore’s team wanted officials to recount ballots by hand in four heavily Democratic counties where the vote was quite close, while Bush’s team wanted to stop the recount entirely.
James Baker was Bush’s point-man in Florida, having served as George H.W. Bush’s secretary of state, and was quick to realize that the campaign would need to wage a war for public opinion. “We’re getting killed on ‘count all the votes.’ Who the hell could be against that?” Jeffrey Toobin quoted Baker as saying in his book about the recount, “Too Close to Call.” Gore’s team thought it had the “moral authority to make his case,” according to a New York Times report from two days after Election Day. It allowed “Democrats to suggest that the Republicans are trying to subvert the will of the people.”
As the drama unfolded, many Americans thought more votes needed to be tallied, but they also thought Gore should concede defeat. In a Fox News survey from late November, the plurality of people, 47 percent, thought that not all the votes in Florida had been counted. But the same survey also found that 56 percent of people thought Gore should concede.
This psychology is fascinating when seen through 2020’s rearview mirror. It speaks to a certain satisfaction some people had with the general political state of things: Either Bush or Gore would do just fine. It’s the sort of laissez-faire attitude toward election outcomes that 15-point partisan differences buy you. In the 36-point era, we’re discussing all-out civil war if things are too close to call on election night.
We have accelerated the formation of our separate partisan worlds over the past four years. These worlds accept different realities. Democrats generally accept fact-based conclusions (alongside their partisan, subjective beliefs), and Republicans — or at least the Republican Party — generally eschew the conclusions of experts on things like climate change and COVID-19 (alongside their partisan, subjective beliefs). Given all this, doesn’t it necessarily follow that we would continue down this garden path of separate realities when it comes to an initially indeterminate election outcome? One version of reality accepts a President Biden while the other accepts a President Trump, each with baroque arguments — about the eligibility of certain ballots or the legitimacy of the Electoral College — nicely retrofitted to match a predetermined conclusion.
In a piece in the 2010 collection “The Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical Assessment,” David Greenberg, a professor of journalism and media studies at Rutgers University, traced this inability to accept a common reality to the 2000 election and the postmodern brilliance of Baker and company: “The Bush team didn’t just contend that a recount would fail to identify the true winner more accurately; more radically, they argued that any accurate tally was unattainable — that the truth was unknowable.”
Greenberg points to a famous quote given to the New York Times Magazine by a Bush aide for further proof of the roots of this kind of thinking:
The aide said that guys like me were “in what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. “That’s not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors … and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”
Professionally, I’m a member of the reality-based community. I try to think empirically about America, her culture, people and oh-so-screwy politics. That’s been a challenge as Trump and the Republican Party have perfected the creation of one’s own reality and the belittling of the reality-based community. During the first debate, the president waffled on whether he would concede defeat, falling back on his go-to line about the fraudulent — and unfounded — dangers of mail voting. If he actually does this post-Election Day, media organizations will be forced to grapple with reporting on the news of the day — the president’s words — and battling misinformation and mistrust. It’s more than the press had to contend with in 2000, and it’s an unwinnable scenario. But it’s the reality of our 36-point world.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-09--The Politics Podcast Answers Your Questions About The Forecast

In this episode of Model Talk , Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the latest movements in our 2020 election @ @ @ @ @ questions .

The Politics Podcast Answers Your Questions About The Forecast
In this episode of Model Talk, Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the latest movements in our 2020 election forecasts and answer some listener questions.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-09--Politics Podcast: How The Model Is Responding To Biden’s Double-Digit Lead In The Polls

Joe Biden ’ s lead over President Trump in the presidential race grew to double digits in our national polling @ @ @ @ @ this episode of “ Model Talk ” on the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Nate Silver @ @ @ @ @ why Trump ’ s national position has worsened , how it compares with his polls @ @ @ @ @ what the forecasts of the House and Senate look like .
They also answer listener @ @ @ @ @ to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above @ @ @ @ @ iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new @ @ @ @ @ to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new @ @ @ @ @ leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or @ @ @ @ @ vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in @ @ @

Joe Biden’s lead over President Trump in the presidential race grew to double digits in our national polling average on Friday. In this episode of “Model Talk” on the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Nate Silver talks to Galen Druke about why Trump’s national position has worsened, how it compares with his polls in key battleground states and what the forecasts of the House and Senate look like. They also answer listener questions.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-09--What Are The Possible Side Effects Of Trump’s COVID-19 Treatment?

President Trump has boasted that the treatment he has received for COVID-19 has cured him of the disease and made him feel better than ever .
It ’ s very difficult to know whether that ’ s true , given how little we know about his condition , how unreliable his health reports have been and how experimental his course of treatment is .
But we do know that these drugs often come with considerable side effects — side effects that could change the behavior of the leader of the free world .
In particular , one of the drugs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can cause psychiatric side effects , which has raised concerns .
Of course , just because side effects could affect behavior doesn ’ t mean they are doing so .
“ We need to exercise caution in attributing any particular form of behavior to side effects of medication , ” said Edward Shorter , a medical historian at the University of Toronto .
“ Trump has such a long history of bizarre and erratic behavior that the latest manifestation of it need not be a medication side effect at all.
” Rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ helpful to take a step back and consider what the science tells us about these therapeutics .
Let ’ s run through the three major drugs doctors have prescribed to Trump and what their side effects might be .
Regeneron : Little is known This antibody cocktail is the treatment we know the least about , because it ’ s a new , experimental therapeutic that has not yet been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration .
Regeneron has conducted a drug trial of its treatment — which uses lab-grown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ help fight off an infection — but the results have not been published , aside from a promising press release from the company last week .
The release didn ’ t mention any potential side effects .
We do know the cocktail is administered intravenously , and any IV treatment can potentially cause certain side effects like fever and chills .
But other than that , until more details are published , it ’ s hard to say whether the cocktail changed anything for the president , including his claims of it “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was originally developed in 2009 as a potential treatment for hepatitis-C .
While it didn ’ t prove effective for that disease , early trials in the COVID-19 pandemic found it could reduce the duration of infection and increase the likelihood of survival .
It was authorized for emergency use by the FDA in May .
While there is still work to be done to learn the full scope of the drug ’ s effects , so far the most common side effects reported , such as nausea and constipation , are mild @ @ @ @ @ @ @ severe symptoms while taking remdesivir , including worsening respiratory failure and high levels of certain enzymes in the liver , which can cause damage , but these are more rare .
In a phase 3 trial of remdesivir published in May , 8 percent of patients experienced worsening respiratory distress and 7 percent had elevated enzymes in their liver .
But because the research on this drug is still limited , we don ’ t fully understand the link between the drug and these adverse effects .
“ Even though any drug can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on balance it doesn ’ t have a lot , ” said Dr. Rajesh Gandhi , an infectious diseases physician at Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School .
“ It can have effects on the liver occasionally , which is why we routinely do liver checks and I ’ m sure the president is having routine liver checks.
” Indeed , in a briefing on Sunday , Trump ’ s physicians said they ’ re monitoring the president ’ s liver functions , which are indicating “ normal findings.
” ( Though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ norm they ’ re comparing Trump ’ s levels .
Normal for a COVID-19 patient , or normal for a healthy person ? )
On Monday , his doctors said Trump was given a five-day course of remdesivir , with the final dose on Tuesday .
We know the most about this drug because it ’ s been around for half a century , and perhaps as a result it comes with the longest list of possible side effects , ranging from acne and hair growth to severe psychiatric effects .
This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re versatile and effective but also can wreak all kinds of havoc on the body and mind .
Corticosteroids are synthetic versions of hormones the body naturally produces and are effective in reducing inflammation .
For this reason , they ’ re typically used to treat conditions such as lupus and rheumatoid arthritis .
But dexamethasone has also been found to be effective in treating COVID-19 in cases in which the patient required oxygen or ventilation .
How a 60-year-old drug became our best hope for saving people with COVID-19 Naturally , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given Trump ’ s job .
Nobody wants the guy with the nuclear codes to be experiencing psychosis .
But we don ’ t have a great understanding of how common the psychiatric effects are .
“ This has not been widely studied because dexamethasone largely went out of style , ” Shorter said .
A meta-analysis published in 2006 ( the most recent I could find ) looked at psychiatric side effects of corticosteroids broadly .
The analysis found that studies have placed the rate of psychiatric side effects at everything from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ range the authors chalk up to both the lack of understanding and the different definitions used .
If someone has a bit of trouble falling asleep while taking a steroid , one researcher might consider that an adverse psychiatric event , while another might not even clock it .
Another review , from 1983 , reported a similar range , with adverse effects occurring in from 1.6 percent to 62 percent of patients , depending on the study .
But those figures include the full range of psychiatric symptoms , and the majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — the 1983 review found severe effects occurred only 5 percent of the time .
Even mania , which sounds concerning , can manifest in a mild way that basically just means the patient feels a little more energetic or “ revved up , ” according to Ghandi .
That ’ s not to say that the more severe side effects aren ’ t worth paying attention to .
Some patients experience serious psychiatric impacts from these drugs , including hallucinations and psychosis — a case study published last year described a patient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of dexamethasone and then experienced such intense psychosis he tried to cut out his own testicle with a kitchen knife .
While it ’ s not totally clear how often these side effects occur , we do know they typically have a lot to do with dose and duration .
The higher the dose , and the longer a person is on it , the higher the risk of adverse effects .
The trials of dexamethasone for COVID-19 recommended no more than 10 days on the drug , at a dose of 6 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the lower end of the risk range .
Trump ’ s age and sex don ’ t put him at any higher risk for these adverse effects , either .
Studies have found no link between age and psychiatric side effects and when it comes to sex , women are at a slightly higher risk than men .
Even if Trump has not had any side effects yet , there is a risk that some could still develop .
What research we do have shows that these symptoms can arrive after several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even after completing the course of the drug .
“ The vast majority of these patients develop symptoms less than two weeks from [ the first dose ] and more typically three or four days after the initiation of corticosteroid therapy , ” the 2019 case study read .
“ In most cases , any associated delirium commonly resolves within days and psychosis within a week , though depression or manic symptoms may last up to six weeks after discontinuation of steroids.
” On Monday , Trump ’ s doctors said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s unclear how long he will be receiving the drug .
On Friday , he told reporters he was not currently taking any medication for COVID-19 .
“ He ’ s probably no longer on it , is my guess , ” said Dr. David Juurlink , the head of clinical pharmacology and toxicology at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre in Toronto .
“ The study that guided our decision-making on that was up to 10 days , and it was only patients who needed oxygen.
” Of course , all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individual patient is different .
Understanding the risks associated with the drugs can provide useful context , but without more transparency from Trump and his doctors , it ’ s impossible to guess what , if any , side effects he may be experiencing .

President Trump has boasted that the treatment he has received for COVID-19 has cured him of the disease and made him feel better than ever. It’s very difficult to know whether that’s true, given how little we know about his condition, how unreliable his health reports have been and how experimental his course of treatment is. But we do know that these drugs often come with considerable side effects — side effects that could change the behavior of the leader of the free world.
In particular, one of the drugs he has been given, dexamethasone, can cause psychiatric side effects, which has raised concerns. Of course, just because side effects could affect behavior doesn’t mean they are doing so.
“We need to exercise caution in attributing any particular form of behavior to side effects of medication,” said Edward Shorter, a medical historian at the University of Toronto. “Trump has such a long history of bizarre and erratic behavior that the latest manifestation of it need not be a medication side effect at all.”
Rather than jumping to conclusions, it’s helpful to take a step back and consider what the science tells us about these therapeutics. Let’s run through the three major drugs doctors have prescribed to Trump and what their side effects might be.
Regeneron: Little is known
This antibody cocktail is the treatment we know the least about, because it’s a new, experimental therapeutic that has not yet been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Regeneron has conducted a drug trial of its treatment — which uses lab-grown, antibodies specific to the novel coronavirus to help fight off an infection — but the results have not been published, aside from a promising press release from the company last week. The release didn’t mention any potential side effects. We do know the cocktail is administered intravenously, and any IV treatment can potentially cause certain side effects like fever and chills. But other than that, until more details are published, it’s hard to say whether the cocktail changed anything for the president, including his claims of it “curing” him.
Remdesivir: Mostly mild side effects
This antiviral drug was originally developed in 2009 as a potential treatment for hepatitis-C. While it didn’t prove effective for that disease, early trials in the COVID-19 pandemic found it could reduce the duration of infection and increase the likelihood of survival. It was authorized for emergency use by the FDA in May.
While there is still work to be done to learn the full scope of the drug’s effects, so far the most common side effects reported, such as nausea and constipation, are mild. Some COVID-19 patients have experienced more severe symptoms while taking remdesivir, including worsening respiratory failure and high levels of certain enzymes in the liver, which can cause damage, but these are more rare. In a phase 3 trial of remdesivir published in May, 8 percent of patients experienced worsening respiratory distress and 7 percent had elevated enzymes in their liver. But because the research on this drug is still limited, we don’t fully understand the link between the drug and these adverse effects.
“Even though any drug can have side effects, including remdesivir, on balance it doesn’t have a lot,” said Dr. Rajesh Gandhi, an infectious diseases physician at Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School. “It can have effects on the liver occasionally, which is why we routinely do liver checks and I’m sure the president is having routine liver checks.”
Indeed, in a briefing on Sunday, Trump’s physicians said they’re monitoring the president’s liver functions, which are indicating “normal findings.” (Though we don’t know to what norm they’re comparing Trump’s levels. Normal for a COVID-19 patient, or normal for a healthy person?) On Monday, his doctors said Trump was given a five-day course of remdesivir, with the final dose on Tuesday.
Dexamethasone: A long list of side effects
We know the most about this drug because it’s been around for half a century, and perhaps as a result it comes with the longest list of possible side effects, ranging from acne and hair growth to severe psychiatric effects. This is typical for corticosteroids like dexamethasone — they’re versatile and effective but also can wreak all kinds of havoc on the body and mind. Corticosteroids are synthetic versions of hormones the body naturally produces and are effective in reducing inflammation. For this reason, they’re typically used to treat conditions such as lupus and rheumatoid arthritis. But dexamethasone has also been found to be effective in treating COVID-19 in cases in which the patient required oxygen or ventilation.
How a 60-year-old drug became our best hope for saving people with COVID-19
Naturally, the potential psychiatric side effects are concerning given Trump’s job. Nobody wants the guy with the nuclear codes to be experiencing psychosis. But we don’t have a great understanding of how common the psychiatric effects are.
“This has not been widely studied because dexamethasone largely went out of style,” Shorter said.
A meta-analysis published in 2006 (the most recent I could find) looked at psychiatric side effects of corticosteroids broadly. The analysis found that studies have placed the rate of psychiatric side effects at everything from 1.8 percent to 57 percent, a range the authors chalk up to both the lack of understanding and the different definitions used. If someone has a bit of trouble falling asleep while taking a steroid, one researcher might consider that an adverse psychiatric event, while another might not even clock it. Another review, from 1983, reported a similar range, with adverse effects occurring in from 1.6 percent to 62 percent of patients, depending on the study.
But those figures include the full range of psychiatric symptoms, and the majority of those reported are mild or moderate — the 1983 review found severe effects occurred only 5 percent of the time. Even mania, which sounds concerning, can manifest in a mild way that basically just means the patient feels a little more energetic or “revved up,” according to Ghandi. That’s not to say that the more severe side effects aren’t worth paying attention to. Some patients experience serious psychiatric impacts from these drugs, including hallucinations and psychosis — a case study published last year described a patient who received just one 5 mg shot of dexamethasone and then experienced such intense psychosis he tried to cut out his own testicle with a kitchen knife.
While it’s not totally clear how often these side effects occur, we do know they typically have a lot to do with dose and duration. The higher the dose, and the longer a person is on it, the higher the risk of adverse effects. The trials of dexamethasone for COVID-19 recommended no more than 10 days on the drug, at a dose of 6 mg per day, which would be on the lower end of the risk range.
Trump’s age and sex don’t put him at any higher risk for these adverse effects, either. Studies have found no link between age and psychiatric side effects and when it comes to sex, women are at a slightly higher risk than men.
Even if Trump has not had any side effects yet, there is a risk that some could still develop. What research we do have shows that these symptoms can arrive after several days, and sometimes last for weeks, even after completing the course of the drug.
“The vast majority of these patients develop symptoms less than two weeks from [the first dose] and more typically three or four days after the initiation of corticosteroid therapy,” the 2019 case study read. “In most cases, any associated delirium commonly resolves within days and psychosis within a week, though depression or manic symptoms may last up to six weeks after discontinuation of steroids.”
On Monday, Trump’s doctors said he was “continuing” dexamethasone, but it’s unclear how long he will be receiving the drug. On Friday, he told reporters he was not currently taking any medication for COVID-19.
“He’s probably no longer on it, is my guess,” said Dr. David Juurlink, the head of clinical pharmacology and toxicology at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre in Toronto. “The study that guided our decision-making on that was up to 10 days, and it was only patients who needed oxygen.”
Of course, all of these statistics are averages, and each individual patient is different. Understanding the risks associated with the drugs can provide useful context, but without more transparency from Trump and his doctors, it’s impossible to guess what, if any, side effects he may be experiencing.