fivethirtyeight--2020-08-12--It’s Way Too Soon To Count Trump Out

It’s Way Too Soon To Count Trump Out

Joe Biden currently has a robust lead in polls .
If the election were held today , he might even win in a landslide , carrying not only traditional swing states such as Florida and Pennsylvania but potentially adding new states such as Georgia and Texas to the Democratic coalition .
But the election is not being held today .
While the polls have been stable so far this year , it ’ s still only August .
The debates and the conventions have yet to occur .
Biden only named his running mate yesterday .
And the campaign is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of which the United States has not seen in more than 100 years , which is also causing an unprecedented and volatile economy .
Nor has it been that uncommon , historically , for polls to shift fairly radically from mid-August until Election Day .
Furthermore , there are some reasons to think the election will tighten , and President Trump is likely to have an advantage in a close election because of the Electoral College .
That , in a nutshell , is why the FiveThirtyEight presidential election forecast , which we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 29 percent chance of winning the Electoral College , despite his current deficit in the polls .
This is considerably higher than some other forecasts , which put Trump ’ s chances at around 10 percent .
Biden ’ s chances are 71 percent in the FiveThirtyEight forecast , conversely .
If these numbers give you a sense of deja vu , it may be because they ’ re very similar to our final forecast in 2016 … when Trump also had a 29 percent chance of winning !
( And Hillary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) So if you ’ re not taking a 29 percent chance as a serious possibility , I ’ m not sure there ’ s much we can say at this point , although there ’ s a Zoom poker game that I ’ d be happy to invite you to .
One last parallel to 2016 — when some models gave Clinton as high as a 99 percent chance of winning — is that FiveThirtyEight ’ s forecast tends to be more conservative than others .
( For a more complete description @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is handling some complications related to COVID-19 , please see our methodology guide . )
With that said , one shouldn ’ t get too carried away with the comparisons to four years ago .
In 2016 , the reason Trump had a pretty decent chance in our final forecast was mostly just because the polls were fairly close ( despite the media narrative to the contrary ) , close enough that even a modest-sized polling error in the right group of states could be enough to give Trump a victory in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ current 2020 forecast , conversely , stems mostly from the fact that there ’ s still a long way to go until the election .
Take what happens if we lie to our model and tell it that the election is going to be held today .
It spits out that Biden has a 93 percent chance of winning .
In other words , a Trump victory would require a much bigger polling error than what we saw in 2016 .
Let ’ s briefly expand on the points I made above .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ corrective against what I see as overconfident assessments elsewhere — I ’ m mostly focused on the reasons why Trump ’ s chances are higher than they might appear .
But we should be clear : Trump ’ s current position in the polls is poor .
Biden is currently ahead in our polling averages in Florida , Wisconsin , Michigan , Pennsylvania , Arizona , Ohio and in the second congressional district in Nebraska — all places that Clinton lost in 2016 .
If he won those states ( and held the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be enough to give him 352 electoral votes .
He ’ s also within roughly 1 percentage point of Trump in Texas , Georgia , Iowa and Maine ’ s second congressional district .
If he won those , too , he ’ d be up to a whopping 412 electoral votes .
It ’ s important to remember that the uncertainty in our forecast runs in both directions .
There ’ s the chance that Trump could come back — but there ’ s also the chance that things could get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Our model thinks there ’ s a 19 percent chance that Biden will win Alaska , for example , and a 13 percent chance that he will win South Carolina .
The model also gives Biden a 30 percent chance of a double-digit win in the popular vote , which would be the first time that happened since 1984 .
But there are downside scenarios for Biden .
Polls often change substantially between now and November Every day , my colleague Nathaniel Rakich tweets out a list of what our national polling average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in past campaigns .
And it can be a pretty wild ride .
Here is Tuesday ’ s version , for instance .
Three of the candidates leading in national polls at this point — Michael Dukakis in 1988 , George W. Bush in 2000 , and John Kerry in 2004 — did not actually win the popular vote .
Bush blew a 10-point lead , in fact , which is larger than Biden ’ s current advantage .
( Luckily for Bush , he won the Electoral College . )
In other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ called ” the winner correctly , but the margins were way off .
Jimmy Carter eventually beat Gerald Ford by just 2.1 percentage points — not the 26.6-point lead he had at this point in the campaign .
Bill Clinton won by 5.6 points — not 20.1 points .
And Barack Obama won a considerably more commanding victory in 2008 than polls at this point projected .
Now , there are some mitigating factors here .
Some of these polls were taken at the height of a candidate ’ s convention bounce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to correct for those .
And in general , polls have become less volatile over time , probably because increased polarization means there are fewer swing voters than there once were .
The polls have been particularly stable so far this year , in fact .
But while there are some factors that reduce uncertainty , there are other factors that increase it .
COVID-19 is a big reason to avoid feeling overly confident about the outcome The COVID-19 pandemic has led to more than 150,000 fatalities and has upended pretty much every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s approval ratings for his handling of it have been awful .
But to the extent this is an election about COVID-19 , there ’ s the possibility that the situation could improve between now and November .
Cases have recently begun to come down after an early-summer spike , and recent economic data has shown improvement there , too .
There ’ s also the possibility that a vaccine could be approved — or rushed out — by November , though it ’ s highly unlikely it could be widely distributed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this ?
No , we aren ’ t building a COVID-19 projection model .
( It ’ s really hard . )
But we have built an “ uncertainty index ” that essentially governs the margin of error in our forecast .
It contains eight components , two of which are very high because of COVID-19 .
Specifically , these are the high volatility in recent economic data , and the volume of major news events , as measured by the number of full-width New York Times headlines .
There ’ s more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 , but the protests around police brutality , Trump ’ s impeachment earlier this year , etc .
— than in any recent election campaign .
We also expect turnout to be harder to predict this year based on primary elections held during the pandemic that had highly variable turnout — which , in turn , could lead to more polling error .
So even if the polls don ’ t change that much between now and November , that could create some additional uncertainty on Election Day .
See the methodology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 .
But the other components of the uncertainty index are low , pointing toward a stable campaign .
For instance , polarization is high , poll movement so far has been limited , and there aren ’ t that many undecided voters ; the index accounts for all of those things .
In fact , the uncertainty index points toward the overall uncertainty going into November being about average relative to past presidential campaigns .
So our model isn ’ t necessarily saying that things are going to get crazy , although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also saying you shouldn ’ t necessarily expect highly stable campaigns like 2012 to be the new normal in the time of COVID-19 .
( And keep in mind that 2016 was a pretty volatile campaign , too , even without COVID-19 . )
Empirically , the polls can move quite a bit from August to November , more than you might expect intuitively !
There are some sources of uncertainty that the model doesn ’ t account for , however .
We assume that there are reasonable efforts to allow eligible citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ballots , and that electors are awarded to the popular-vote winner in each state .
The model also does not account for the possibility of extraconstitutional shenanigans by Trump or by anyone else , such as trying to prevent mail ballots from being counted .
It ’ s hard to know what the “ fundamentals ” say I ’ ve long been critical of models that use economic “ fundamentals ” to try to predict election results , mostly because — although they claim to be highly precise — they haven ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcome of an election where they don ’ t already know the results .
And those models are especially likely to have problems this year because of highly variable economic data .
One model based on second quarter GDP projects Trump to win -453 ( negative 453 ! )
electoral votes , for example .
But if you built a model based on third-quarter GDP , which is expected to be highly positive , it might predict a Trump landslide .
This isn ’ t to say that we don ’ t employ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We do , but it ’ s much less confident than others , and it receives relatively little weight in the overall forecast .
It also isn ’ t currently that bad for Trump .
In fact , it essentially predicts the popular vote to be roughly tied .
Why ?
• Although three of the economic factors we use in the model ( jobs , spending , manufacturing ) have been terrible , a fourth component ( income ) has been very strong because of government subsidies in the form of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if stimulus payments lapse .
The fifth and sixth components , inflation and the stock market , have also been reasonably favorable .
• Most of the variables that declined are now improving , and are expected to continue to improve .
( Our model projects what the economy will look like by November rather than relying on current data . )
• Trump is an elected incumbent , and elected incumbents are usually favored for reelection .
• We extended our analysis back to elections since 1880 ( ! )
to expand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship between the economy and the election likely isn ’ t as strong as other models claim , anyway .
In other words , our forecast thinks it ’ s far from obvious that the economy will doom Trump , especially if he can tell a story of recovery by November .
Indeed , Trump ’ s approval ratings on the economy are still fairly good , so our model seems to be doing a reasonably good job of capturing how voters actually feel about the economy .
Another way to look at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying that , in a highly polarized environment , the race is more likely than not to tighten in the stretch run .
Empirically , large leads like the one Biden has now tend to dissipate to some degree by Election Day .
And if the race does tighten… Trump appears to have an Electoral College advantage again Our model says there ’ s an 81 percent chance that Biden wins the popular vote — compared to his 71 percent chance in the Electoral College .
That means there ’ s about a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote .
( Conversely , the model puts the chance that Biden wins the Electoral College but loses the popular vote at only around 1 in 750 . )
That reflects the fact that the tipping-point state — the state that would provide the decisive 270th electoral vote — is somewhat to the right of the national popular vote .
More specifically , our projection as of Tuesday had Biden winning the popular vote by 6.3 percentage points nationally , but winning the tipping-point state , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4.5 percentage points : That 1.8-point gap is actually smaller than what Clinton experienced in 2016 , when there was about a 3-point gap between her losing margin in Wisconsin ( which was also the tipping-point state in 2016 ) and her winning margin in the national popular vote .
This analysis is a simplification , too .
There ’ s a lot of uncertainty in the outlook , so the tipping-point state could easily turn out to be Florida or Pennsylvania or something more unexpected like North Carolina .
Still , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subtract 2 points from Biden ’ s current lead in national polls to get a sense for what his standing in the tipping point states looks like .
Add it all up , and you can start to see why the model is being fairly cautious .
Biden ’ s current roughly 8-point lead in national polls is really more like a 6-point lead in the tipping point states .
And 6-point leads in August are historically not very safe .
That margin is perhaps more likely than not to tighten and at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fair amount of uncertainty about what COVID-19 and the rest the world will look like by November .
Biden is in a reasonably strong position : Having a 70-ish percent chance of beating an incumbent in early August before any conventions or debates is far better than the position that most challengers find themselves in .
And his chances will improve in our model if he maintains his current lead .
But for the time being , the data does not justify substantially more confidence than that .

Joe Biden currently has a robust lead in polls. If the election were held today, he might even win in a landslide, carrying not only traditional swing states such as Florida and Pennsylvania but potentially adding new states such as Georgia and Texas to the Democratic coalition.
But the election is not being held today. While the polls have been stable so far this year, it’s still only August. The debates and the conventions have yet to occur. Biden only named his running mate yesterday. And the campaign is being conducted amidst a pandemic the likes of which the United States has not seen in more than 100 years, which is also causing an unprecedented and volatile economy.
Nor has it been that uncommon, historically, for polls to shift fairly radically from mid-August until Election Day. Furthermore, there are some reasons to think the election will tighten, and President Trump is likely to have an advantage in a close election because of the Electoral College.
That, in a nutshell, is why the FiveThirtyEight presidential election forecast, which we launched today, still has Trump with a 29 percent chance of winning the Electoral College, despite his current deficit in the polls. This is considerably higher than some other forecasts, which put Trump’s chances at around 10 percent. Biden’s chances are 71 percent in the FiveThirtyEight forecast, conversely.
If these numbers give you a sense of deja vu, it may be because they’re very similar to our final forecast in 2016 … when Trump also had a 29 percent chance of winning! (And Hillary Clinton had a 71 percent chance.) So if you’re not taking a 29 percent chance as a serious possibility, I’m not sure there’s much we can say at this point, although there’s a Zoom poker game that I’d be happy to invite you to.
One last parallel to 2016 — when some models gave Clinton as high as a 99 percent chance of winning — is that FiveThirtyEight’s forecast tends to be more conservative than others. (For a more complete description of our model, including how it is handling some complications related to COVID-19, please see our methodology guide.)
With that said, one shouldn’t get too carried away with the comparisons to four years ago. In 2016, the reason Trump had a pretty decent chance in our final forecast was mostly just because the polls were fairly close (despite the media narrative to the contrary), close enough that even a modest-sized polling error in the right group of states could be enough to give Trump a victory in the Electoral College.
The uncertainty in our current 2020 forecast, conversely, stems mostly from the fact that there’s still a long way to go until the election. Take what happens if we lie to our model and tell it that the election is going to be held today. It spits out that Biden has a 93 percent chance of winning. In other words, a Trump victory would require a much bigger polling error than what we saw in 2016.
Let’s briefly expand on the points I made above.
Biden’s lead is pretty impressive
In this article — partly as a corrective against what I see as overconfident assessments elsewhere — I’m mostly focused on the reasons why Trump’s chances are higher than they might appear. But we should be clear: Trump’s current position in the polls is poor.
Biden is currently ahead in our polling averages in Florida, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Ohio and in the second congressional district in Nebraska — all places that Clinton lost in 2016. If he won those states (and held the other states Clinton won), that would be enough to give him 352 electoral votes. He’s also within roughly 1 percentage point of Trump in Texas, Georgia, Iowa and Maine’s second congressional district. If he won those, too, he’d be up to a whopping 412 electoral votes.
It’s important to remember that the uncertainty in our forecast runs in both directions. There’s the chance that Trump could come back — but there’s also the chance that things could get really out of hand for him. Our model thinks there’s a 19 percent chance that Biden will win Alaska, for example, and a 13 percent chance that he will win South Carolina. The model also gives Biden a 30 percent chance of a double-digit win in the popular vote, which would be the first time that happened since 1984.
But there are downside scenarios for Biden.
Polls often change substantially between now and November
Every day, my colleague Nathaniel Rakich tweets out a list of what our national polling average would have looked like at this stage in past campaigns. And it can be a pretty wild ride. Here is Tuesday’s version, for instance.
The @FiveThirtyEight nat'l polling average with 84 days until E-Day: 2020: Biden+8.3
2016: Clinton+6.6
2012: Obama+0.5
2008: Obama+2.6
2004: Kerry+2.5
2000: Bush+10.0
1996: Clinton+11.3
1992: Clinton+20.1
1988: Dukakis+5.6
1984: Reagan+16.0
1980: Reagan+22.1
1976: Carter+26.6 — Nathaniel Rakich (@baseballot) August 11, 2020
Three of the candidates leading in national polls at this point — Michael Dukakis in 1988, George W. Bush in 2000, and John Kerry in 2004 — did not actually win the popular vote. Bush blew a 10-point lead, in fact, which is larger than Biden’s current advantage. (Luckily for Bush, he won the Electoral College.) In other cases, the polls at this point “called” the winner correctly, but the margins were way off. Jimmy Carter eventually beat Gerald Ford by just 2.1 percentage points — not the 26.6-point lead he had at this point in the campaign. Bill Clinton won by 5.6 points — not 20.1 points. And Barack Obama won a considerably more commanding victory in 2008 than polls at this point projected.
Now, there are some mitigating factors here. Some of these polls were taken at the height of a candidate’s convention bounce, although there are ways to try to correct for those. And in general, polls have become less volatile over time, probably because increased polarization means there are fewer swing voters than there once were. The polls have been particularly stable so far this year, in fact.
But while there are some factors that reduce uncertainty, there are other factors that increase it.
COVID-19 is a big reason to avoid feeling overly confident about the outcome
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to more than 150,000 fatalities and has upended pretty much every American’s life, and Trump’s approval ratings for his handling of it have been awful.
But to the extent this is an election about COVID-19, there’s the possibility that the situation could improve between now and November. Cases have recently begun to come down after an early-summer spike, and recent economic data has shown improvement there, too. There’s also the possibility that a vaccine could be approved — or rushed out — by November, though it’s highly unlikely it could be widely distributed by then.
How to account for this? No, we aren’t building a COVID-19 projection model. (It’s really hard.) But we have built an “uncertainty index” that essentially governs the margin of error in our forecast. It contains eight components, two of which are very high because of COVID-19. Specifically, these are the high volatility in recent economic data, and the volume of major news events, as measured by the number of full-width New York Times headlines. There’s more news this year — not just about COVID-19, but the protests around police brutality, Trump’s impeachment earlier this year, etc. — than in any recent election campaign.
We also expect turnout to be harder to predict this year based on primary elections held during the pandemic that had highly variable turnout — which, in turn, could lead to more polling error. So even if the polls don’t change that much between now and November, that could create some additional uncertainty on Election Day. See the methodology guide for more on how we handle COVID-19.
But the other components of the uncertainty index are low, pointing toward a stable campaign. For instance, polarization is high, poll movement so far has been limited, and there aren’t that many undecided voters; the index accounts for all of those things.
In fact, the uncertainty index points toward the overall uncertainty going into November being about average relative to past presidential campaigns. So our model isn’t necessarily saying that things are going to get crazy, although they could. But it’s also saying you shouldn’t necessarily expect highly stable campaigns like 2012 to be the new normal in the time of COVID-19. (And keep in mind that 2016 was a pretty volatile campaign, too, even without COVID-19.) Empirically, the polls can move quite a bit from August to November, more than you might expect intuitively!
There are some sources of uncertainty that the model doesn’t account for, however. We assume that there are reasonable efforts to allow eligible citizens to vote and to count all legal ballots, and that electors are awarded to the popular-vote winner in each state. The model also does not account for the possibility of extraconstitutional shenanigans by Trump or by anyone else, such as trying to prevent mail ballots from being counted.
It’s hard to know what the “fundamentals” say
I’ve long been critical of models that use economic “fundamentals” to try to predict election results, mostly because — although they claim to be highly precise — they haven’t actually been very good at predicting the outcome of an election where they don’t already know the results.
And those models are especially likely to have problems this year because of highly variable economic data. One model based on second quarter GDP projects Trump to win -453 (negative 453!) electoral votes, for example. But if you built a model based on third-quarter GDP, which is expected to be highly positive, it might predict a Trump landslide.
This isn’t to say that we don’t employ a fundamentals forecast of our own. We do, but it’s much less confident than others, and it receives relatively little weight in the overall forecast. It also isn’t currently that bad for Trump. In fact, it essentially predicts the popular vote to be roughly tied. Why?
Although three of the economic factors we use in the model (jobs, spending, manufacturing) have been terrible, a fourth component (income) has been very strong because of government subsidies in the form of the CARES Act, though that could change if stimulus payments lapse. The fifth and sixth components, inflation and the stock market, have also been reasonably favorable.
because of government subsidies in the form of the CARES Act, though that could change if stimulus payments lapse. The fifth and sixth components, inflation and the stock market, have also been reasonably favorable. Most of the variables that declined are now improving, and are expected to continue to improve. (Our model projects what the economy will look like by November rather than relying on current data.)
High polarization potentially blunts the impact of a poor economy.
Trump is an elected incumbent, and elected incumbents are usually favored for reelection.
We extended our analysis back to elections since 1880 (!) to expand the sample size, and found the relationship between the economy and the election likely isn’t as strong as other models claim, anyway.
In other words, our forecast thinks it’s far from obvious that the economy will doom Trump, especially if he can tell a story of recovery by November. Indeed, Trump’s approval ratings on the economy are still fairly good, so our model seems to be doing a reasonably good job of capturing how voters actually feel about the economy.
Another way to look at it is that our model is just saying that, in a highly polarized environment, the race is more likely than not to tighten in the stretch run. Empirically, large leads like the one Biden has now tend to dissipate to some degree by Election Day. And if the race does tighten…
Trump appears to have an Electoral College advantage again
Our model says there’s an 81 percent chance that Biden wins the popular vote — compared to his 71 percent chance in the Electoral College. That means there’s about a 10 percent chance that Trump again wins the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote. (Conversely, the model puts the chance that Biden wins the Electoral College but loses the popular vote at only around 1 in 750.)
That reflects the fact that the tipping-point state — the state that would provide the decisive 270th electoral vote — is somewhat to the right of the national popular vote. More specifically, our projection as of Tuesday had Biden winning the popular vote by 6.3 percentage points nationally, but winning the tipping-point state, Wisconsin, by a smaller margin, 4.5 percentage points:
The Electoral College could once again help Trump Forecasted vote margin in battleground states and lean relative to the nation, from FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecast as of Aug. 11 State forecasted vote margin Lean relative to nation New Mexico D+11.8 D+5.5 Virginia D+10.6 D+4.3 Colorado D+9.2 D+2.9 Maine statwide D+8.2 D+1.9 Michigan D+6.9 D+0.6 New Hampshire D+6.4 D+0.1 National D+6.3 EVEN Nevada D+6.2 R+0.1 Minnesota D+4.7 R+1.6 Pennsylvania D+4.7 R+1.6 Wisconsin* D+4.5 R+1.8 Florida D+3.2 R+3.1 Nebraska 2nd District D+0.9 R+5.4 Arizona D+0.8 R+5.5 North Carolina D+0.3 R+6.0 Ohio R+1.0 R+7.3 Georgia R+2.8 R+9.1 Maine 2nd District R+3.9 R+10.2 Iowa R+4.3 R+10.6 Texas R+4.4 R+10.7 * Wisconsin is the tipping-point state as of Aug. 11.
That 1.8-point gap is actually smaller than what Clinton experienced in 2016, when there was about a 3-point gap between her losing margin in Wisconsin (which was also the tipping-point state in 2016) and her winning margin in the national popular vote. This analysis is a simplification, too. There’s a lot of uncertainty in the outlook, so the tipping-point state could easily turn out to be Florida or Pennsylvania or something more unexpected like North Carolina.
Still, as a rough rule-of-thumb, perhaps you can subtract 2 points from Biden’s current lead in national polls to get a sense for what his standing in the tipping point states looks like. Add it all up, and you can start to see why the model is being fairly cautious. Biden’s current roughly 8-point lead in national polls is really more like a 6-point lead in the tipping point states. And 6-point leads in August are historically not very safe. That margin is perhaps more likely than not to tighten and at the very least, there’s a fair amount of uncertainty about what COVID-19 and the rest the world will look like by November.
Biden is in a reasonably strong position: Having a 70-ish percent chance of beating an incumbent in early August before any conventions or debates is far better than the position that most challengers find themselves in. And his chances will improve in our model if he maintains his current lead. But for the time being, the data does not justify substantially more confidence than that.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-12--What A Biden-Harris Ticket Says About The Democratic Party

In this FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew reacts to Joe Biden ’ s announcement that California Sen. Kamala Harris @ @ @ @ @ .

What A Biden-Harris Ticket Says About The Democratic Party
In this FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew reacts to Joe Biden’s announcement that California Sen. Kamala Harris will be his running mate.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-12--Model Talk: How The 2020 Presidential Forecast Works

FiveThirtyEight ’ s 2020 presidential election forecast is live !
In this edition of “ Model Talk , ” Nate @ @ @ @ @ down what ’ s new in this year ’ s forecast and discuss where the @ @ @

FiveThirtyEight’s 2020 presidential election forecast is live! In this edition of “Model Talk,” Nate Silver and Galen Druke break down what’s new in this year’s forecast and discuss where the uncertainty lies.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-12--Politics Podcast: The 2020 Presidential Forecast Is Live!

On Wednesday , we launched our 2020 presidential election forecast .
It currently shows Joe Biden with a 71 percent @ @ @ @ @ and President Trump with a 29 percent chance .
In this “ Model Talk ” @ @ @ @ @ podcast , Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the new additions to the forecast and @ @ @ @ @ s outcome so uncertain .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ @ @ @ @ @ audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your @ @ @ @ @ you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast @ @ @ @ @ .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on @ @ @ @ @ , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in @ @ @ @ @ Twitter or in the comments .

On Wednesday, we launched our 2020 presidential election forecast. It currently shows Joe Biden with a 71 percent chance of winning the election and President Trump with a 29 percent chance. In this “Model Talk” edition of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Nate Silver and Galen Druke discuss the new additions to the forecast and what makes this election’s outcome so uncertain.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-13--How We Designed The Look Of Our 2020 Forecast

An election year in the FiveThirtyEight newsroom is unlike any other year .
We started off by launching our Democratic primary forecast in January , and once Joe Biden had effectively clinched the nomination in April , we were ready to hit the gas on our general election forecast .
But 2020 has its own agenda : a global pandemic , a crashing U.S. economy , changes to the way we conduct elections , and a reckoning with systemic racism and police brutality .
This week , however , we kicked off the main event : We launched our 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put a lot of thought into how to forecast an election amid world-altering events , and into how to design and let users interact with that forecast .
How do you present a forecast that communicates what we know but also what we don ’ t know and what might change ?
That question became especially pressing given the added uncertainty introduced by COVID-19 , but we ’ ve been thinking about it for years , especially after the 2016 election .
Our impression was that people who read a lot of our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spent a good amount of time with our forecast thought we gave a pretty accurate picture of the election — polls showed Clinton leading , but not by much , and President Trump had a clear chance of winning given his advantage in crucial battleground states .
People who were looking only at our top-line forecast numbers , on the other hand , thought we bungled it .
Given the brouhaha after the 2016 election , we knew we had to thoughtfully approach how we delivered the forecast .
When readers came looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the election , we needed to make sure that information lived in a well-designed structure that helped people understand where those numbers are coming from and what circumstances were affecting them .
We started by putting some major goals for the design on paper .
We aimed to : • Construct a clear narrative that helps readers better understand how the election actually works .
• Focus almost exclusively on the model and put related information into other projects .
• Help users find our other content , like video , podcasts and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
• Design for desktop and mobile devices so readers can have a great experience no matter how they access the forecast .
• Use art to let that weird visual quality that FiveThirtyEight is known for shine .
In the 2016 and 2018 , we built straightforward interfaces : a sidebar and a series of modules that weren ’ t really linked by a narrative flow .
One of our goals this time was to form a narrative , so we figured , why not rethink how the user explores the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a number of experimental experiences , including interfaces where readers could shuffle the House , Senate and presidential forecasts like a deck of cards , or ones where users could sort of choose their own adventure .
Ultimately , we chose a fairly simple structure for displaying the presidential forecast , leaving behind some of the more complicated user experiences .
The final version is modular and the pieces of the forecast are visualized on cards .
Each card gives the reader a different lens on the election .
Some also offer a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or hovering on elements like dots or lines .
This structure also helped us nail our goal of designing for flexibility .
Adapting for smaller screen sizes and other platforms ( like social media , TV and video ) was much easier because each piece of content was designed to stand alone .
Now that we had a sound foundation , we needed great data visualizations to build on it .
To iron out what we wanted to show in this year ’ s forecast , we sifted through all the work we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past forecasts and documented what every chart aimed to accomplish and how successful we felt it was .
This approach helped us prioritize visualizations that effectively communicate what is most valuable to readers .
We divvied up the design of the individual graphics across our team of visual journalists .
To ensure some consistency in the results , we asked each person to consider a standard set of questions about their design .
No visualization in this forecast received more design attention than the top line , which is what we call the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a candidate or party winning the election .
Whether we show the chances in percentages or odds , this is the portion of an election forecast that is most anticipated — and has the most potential to be misunderstood .
In 2016 , we aimed for simplicity , both visually and conceptually .
In 2018 , we leaned into the complexity of the forecast .
For 2020 , we wanted to land somewhere in between .
We also knew we wanted to try to lift the curtain a little on how that top-line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place .
To really oversimplify things : Each candidate ’ s odds of winning at least 270 electoral votes come from their chances of winning in each state and D.C. To get from polling averages to probabilities , we simulate the election thousands of times to account for a whole bunch of uncertainties : How accurate will the polls be overall ?
What if they ’ re off in only certain states ?
What if Trump beats his polls , but only in the Midwest ?
What if Biden overperforms in the states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the economy improves a ton between now and Election Day ?
What if it gets worse ?
What if the coronavirus or vote-by-mail laws affect turnout ?
I could go on , but let ’ s stop there .
Those simulations give us a universe of possibilities , and focusing on the scope of that universe is eventually how we chose the design for the top-line chart .
We came up with dozens of concepts , from dead-simple bar charts and conventional visualization types to universes within universes .
In each iteration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the design .
Some were relatively undemanding .
Others were … pretty bizarre !
We tried to get creative rather than boxing ourselves into things we knew would work .
Ultimately , we landed on two elements to lead off the forecast .
First — before we get to any numbers — we give the reader the headline and a sense of the range of possible electoral outcomes in the form of a grid of maps : There are a number of ways a candidate can win , depending on which states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these maps represents one simulated scenario .
We want to prime readers to focus on the states as the drivers of the overall odds , and we want to tease the idea of multiple possible outcomes .
Second , we follow the maps with a chart that we affectionately call “ the ball swarm , ” a reference to a type of chart sometimes called a bee swarm : Similar to the grid of maps , the ball swarm shows readers 100 representative electoral outcomes from our model .
The dots huddle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a candidate wins the Electoral College by in each scenario .
Hover over each of the dots to see how the map shook out in that simulation .
Those maps — some of which you ’ ve already seen at the top of the forecast — are intended to hammer home how the states power the overall probabilities and show the huge range of potential outcomes that would be consistent with the data currently being input into the model .
Forecasting an election is more like predicting the weather than predicting whether a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; it ’ s complicated , and one of the chief benefits of building a model is to measure the real-world uncertainty about the outcome .
We hope the ball swarm ’ s universe of 2020 outcomes communicates that uncertainty .
Our guess is that you won ’ t see something like the ball swarm in other publications ’ election coverage and we hope that you think it ’ s as weird and informative as we do .
As for the rest of our presidential forecast , let our forecast mascot Fivey Fox @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s more to come from the forecast and no doubt from 2020 , so buckle up and give it a scroll !

An election year in the FiveThirtyEight newsroom is unlike any other year. We started off by launching our Democratic primary forecast in January, and once Joe Biden had effectively clinched the nomination in April, we were ready to hit the gas on our general election forecast. But 2020 has its own agenda: a global pandemic, a crashing U.S. economy, changes to the way we conduct elections, and a reckoning with systemic racism and police brutality.
This week, however, we kicked off our main event: We launched our 2020 presidential election forecast on Wednesday. We put a lot of thought into how to forecast an election amid world-altering events, and into how to design and let users interact with that forecast. How do you present a forecast that communicates what we know but also what we don’t know and what might change? That question became especially pressing given the added uncertainty introduced by COVID-19, but we’ve been thinking about it for years, especially after the 2016 election.
Our impression was that people who read a lot of our coverage in the lead-up to 2016 and spent a good amount of time with our forecast thought we gave a pretty accurate picture of the election — polls showed Clinton leading, but not by much, and President Trump had a clear chance of winning given his advantage in crucial battleground states. People who were looking only at our top-line forecast numbers, on the other hand, thought we bungled it. Given the brouhaha after the 2016 election, we knew we had to thoughtfully approach how we delivered the forecast. When readers came looking to see who was favored to win the election, we needed to make sure that information lived in a well-designed structure that helped people understand where those numbers are coming from and what circumstances were affecting them.
Building the foundation
We started by putting some major goals for the design on paper. We aimed to:
Construct a clear narrative that helps readers better understand how the election actually works.
Focus almost exclusively on the model and put related information into other projects.
Help users find our other content, like video, podcasts and stories, to give the model context.
Design for desktop and mobile devices so readers can have a great experience no matter how they access the forecast.
Use art to let that weird visual quality that FiveThirtyEight is known for shine.
In the 2016 and 2018, we built straightforward interfaces: a sidebar and a series of modules that weren’t really linked by a narrative flow.
One of our goals this time was to form a narrative, so we figured, why not rethink how the user explores the election? This time around, we considered a number of experimental experiences, including interfaces where readers could shuffle the House, Senate and presidential forecasts like a deck of cards, or ones where users could sort of choose their own adventure.
Ultimately, we chose a fairly simple structure for displaying the presidential forecast, leaving behind some of the more complicated user experiences. The final version is modular and the pieces of the forecast are visualized on cards. Each card gives the reader a different lens on the election. Some also offer a chance to explore deeper by switching tabs or hovering on elements like dots or lines. This structure also helped us nail our goal of designing for flexibility. Adapting for smaller screen sizes and other platforms (like social media, TV and video) was much easier because each piece of content was designed to stand alone.
Designing the floor plan
Now that we had a sound foundation, we needed great data visualizations to build on it. To iron out what we wanted to show in this year’s forecast, we sifted through all the work we’ve done before. We surveyed past forecasts and documented what every chart aimed to accomplish and how successful we felt it was.
This approach helped us prioritize visualizations that effectively communicate what is most valuable to readers. We divvied up the design of the individual graphics across our team of visual journalists. To ensure some consistency in the results, we asked each person to consider a standard set of questions about their design.
Choosing the most expensive couch
No visualization in this forecast received more design attention than the top line, which is what we call the chart that shows the overall chances of a candidate or party winning the election.
Whether we show the chances in percentages or odds, this is the portion of an election forecast that is most anticipated — and has the most potential to be misunderstood. In 2016, we aimed for simplicity, both visually and conceptually. In 2018, we leaned into the complexity of the forecast. For 2020, we wanted to land somewhere in between. We also knew we wanted to try to lift the curtain a little on how that top-line chart comes to exist in the first place.
To really oversimplify things: Each candidate’s odds of winning at least 270 electoral votes come from their chances of winning in each state and D.C. To get from polling averages to probabilities, we simulate the election thousands of times to account for a whole bunch of uncertainties: How accurate will the polls be overall? What if they’re off in only certain states? What if Trump beats his polls, but only in the Midwest? What if Biden overperforms in the states hit hardest by the pandemic? What if the economy improves a ton between now and Election Day? What if it gets worse? What if the coronavirus or vote-by-mail laws affect turnout? I could go on, but let’s stop there.
Those simulations give us a universe of possibilities, and focusing on the scope of that universe is eventually how we chose the design for the top-line chart.
We came up with dozens of concepts, from dead-simple bar charts and conventional visualization types to universes within universes.
In each iteration we tried to add a visual twist to the design. Some were relatively undemanding. Others were … pretty bizarre! We tried to get creative rather than boxing ourselves into things we knew would work. Ultimately, we landed on two elements to lead off the forecast.
First — before we get to any numbers — we give the reader the headline and a sense of the range of possible electoral outcomes in the form of a grid of maps:
There are a number of ways a candidate can win, depending on which states they put in their column. Each of these maps represents one simulated scenario. We want to prime readers to focus on the states as the drivers of the overall odds, and we want to tease the idea of multiple possible outcomes.
Second, we follow the maps with a chart that we affectionately call “the ball swarm,” a reference to a type of chart sometimes called a bee swarm:
Similar to the grid of maps, the ball swarm shows readers 100 representative electoral outcomes from our model. The dots huddle on an x-axis showing how many votes a candidate wins the Electoral College by in each scenario. Hover over each of the dots to see how the map shook out in that simulation.
Those maps — some of which you’ve already seen at the top of the forecast — are intended to hammer home how the states power the overall probabilities and show the huge range of potential outcomes that would be consistent with the data currently being input into the model. Forecasting an election is more like predicting the weather than predicting whether a coin will land on heads or tails; it’s complicated, and one of the chief benefits of building a model is to measure the real-world uncertainty about the outcome. We hope the ball swarm’s universe of 2020 outcomes communicates that uncertainty.
Our guess is that you won’t see something like the ball swarm in other publications’ election coverage and we hope that you think it’s as weird and informative as we do. As for the rest of our presidential forecast, let our forecast mascot Fivey Fox guide you through it. There’s more to come from the forecast and no doubt from 2020, so buckle up and give it a scroll!


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-13--Could Kamala Harris Win The Presidency In 2024? Here’s What History Tells Us.

The fact that California Sen. Kamala Harris is Joe Biden ’ s vice presidential nominee is undeniably historic .
She is only the third woman to run as vice president on a major-party ticket , and of the two main parties , she is the first Asian American and the first Black woman to run in the general election as president or vice president .
As my colleague Perry Bacon Jr. noted on Tuesday , Biden ’ s choice could also have ramifications that extend far beyond the 2020 election .
If Biden wins in November , his VP pick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ woman president .
That presents a number of challenges , which we ’ ll discuss later , but first , let ’ s look at the track record of VPs making it to the Oval Office .
Since John Adams first held the VP post in 1789 , 14 of 47 vice presidents have gone on to become president , making it the most likely — albeit still far from certain — stepping stone to the White House .
The number of vice presidents who have sought the presidency has really skyrocketed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 13 VPs since the end of World War II ( excluding Vice President Mike Pence ) , eight — or more than half — have gone on to become their party ’ s presidential nominee .
However , as you can see in the table below , far fewer — just three — have won a presidential election , and just four have become president at all .
Biden , of course , is hoping to become the fifth modern VP to accomplish this feat .
That ’ s not a great batting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford first became president because their predecessors could not finish their terms — in Johnson ’ s case , because John F. Kennedy was assassinated , and , in Ford ’ s case , because Richard Nixon resigned .
At 77 , Biden is the oldest major-party nominee in history and , if elected , would be the oldest president to hold the office , so without getting too macabre , there could easily be a scenario in which his VP must finish his term .
Biden ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assign huge importance to his vice presidential pick and what it might signal for the future of the Democratic Party .
Even if Biden wins and serves out his term , it ’ s not clear that he ’ d run for a second one .
He has portrayed himself as a transitional candidate , describing his campaign as a “ bridge ” to the next generation of Democratic leaders , so it ’ s entirely possible that Harris , who is 55 , will be thought of as the future of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely eyeing a future White House run , too .
For one thing , she campaigned for it in 2020 .
And , as we mentioned at the outset , it ’ s pretty common for VPs to run .
Just three of the vice presidents since 1948 — Spiro Agnew , Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney — didn ’ t seek the presidency after serving as VP .
But that doesn ’ t mean if Harris were to run it would be easy .
It turns out that running for president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mixed bag .
Take someone like Ford .
After assuming the presidency in 1974 when Nixon resigned , Ford mounted a run for a full term in 1976 , but it was hardly a coronation .
Before he won the GOP nomination , he had to fend off a serious primary challenge from Ronald Reagan that went all the way to the national convention .
Some elected vice presidents , like Nixon , George H.W .
Bush and Al Gore , have had an easier time winning their party nominations against weak opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Dan Quayle , didn ’ t even make it to the general election .
It ’ s impossible to say which of these comparisons might prove most apt for Harris — we don ’ t even know if she ’ ll be vice president — but it ’ s not hard to imagine her facing a major intraparty challenge in the future .
For one , we ’ ve never had a woman vice president , let alone a woman president — and past elections have shown us just how challenging it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to win .
For his part , Biden has sparked criticism for botching the selection process — the only thing we knew up until Tuesday was that he would pick a woman to be his running mate — making the conversation less about his running mate ’ s credentials and more about whether she was the “ right ” kind of woman for the job .
It ’ s also possible that four years from now , the Democratic Party will have moved even further to the left , and Biden and Harris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fallen out of fashion , encouraging a primary challenge .
Nevertheless , if Harris does become vice president , it undoubtedly raises her odds that she might one day occupy the White House and lead the Democratic Party in a presidential election .
Even after her underwhelming 2020 bid , one only has to look at Biden ’ s career arc to see how Harris ’ s presidential aspirations could benefit from serving as VP .
It wasn ’ t until Barack Obama made Biden his vice president in 2008 that he established @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to become its preferred choice in 2020 .
( His two prior presidential bids were unsuccessful . )
It is , of course , too soon to say whether Biden will win in November , but he could become the 15th vice president to reach the White House .
And someday Harris could easily become the 16th .

The fact that California Sen. Kamala Harris is Joe Biden’s vice presidential nominee is undeniably historic. She is only the third woman to run as vice president on a major-party ticket, and of the two main parties, she is the first Asian American and the first Black woman to run in the general election as president or vice president.
As my colleague Perry Bacon Jr. noted on Tuesday, Biden’s choice could also have ramifications that extend far beyond the 2020 election. If Biden wins in November, his VP pick could go on to become the first woman president. That presents a number of challenges, which we’ll discuss later, but first, let’s look at the track record of VPs making it to the Oval Office.
Since John Adams first held the VP post in 1789, 14 of 47 vice presidents have gone on to become president, making it the most likely — albeit still far from certain — stepping stone to the White House. The number of vice presidents who have sought the presidency has really skyrocketed in modern times, too. Of the 13 VPs since the end of World War II (excluding Vice President Mike Pence), eight — or more than half — have gone on to become their party’s presidential nominee. However, as you can see in the table below, far fewer — just three — have won a presidential election, and just four have become president at all. Biden, of course, is hoping to become the fifth modern VP to accomplish this feat.
Most vice presidents run for president … but not all win Vice presidents since 1948 who have run for president, and whether they won their party’s nomination and the subsequent presidential election Vice President Party Won nomination Won pres. election Alben Barkley D Richard Nixon* R ✓ ✓ Lyndon Johnson† D ✓ ✓ Hubert Humphrey D ✓ Gerald Ford† R ✓ Walter Mondale D ✓ George H.W. Bush R ✓ ✓ Dan Quayle R Al Gore D ✓ Joe Biden D ✓ * Nixon lost the first time he ran for president, in 1960, after serving as vice president, but ran again in 1968 and won. † Johnson and Ford both became president upon the death or resignation of their predecessors, so they technically ran as incumbents. Spiro Agnew, Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney didn’t run for president after serving as vice president. This list does not include Vice President Mike Pence, as he could still run for president in the future.
That’s not a great batting average, especially when you consider that both Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford first became president because their predecessors could not finish their terms — in Johnson’s case, because John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and, in Ford’s case, because Richard Nixon resigned. At 77, Biden is the oldest major-party nominee in history and, if elected, would be the oldest president to hold the office, so without getting too macabre, there could easily be a scenario in which his VP must finish his term.
Biden’s advanced age has understandably prompted many to assign huge importance to his vice presidential pick and what it might signal for the future of the Democratic Party. Even if Biden wins and serves out his term, it’s not clear that he’d run for a second one. He has portrayed himself as a transitional candidate, describing his campaign as a “bridge” to the next generation of Democratic leaders, so it’s entirely possible that Harris, who is 55, will be thought of as the future of the party no matter what.
Harris is likely eyeing a future White House run, too. For one thing, she campaigned for it in 2020. And, as we mentioned at the outset, it’s pretty common for VPs to run. Just three of the vice presidents since 1948 — Spiro Agnew, Nelson Rockefeller and Dick Cheney — didn’t seek the presidency after serving as VP. But that doesn’t mean if Harris were to run it would be easy. It turns out that running for president after being VP is kind of a mixed bag.
Take someone like Ford. After assuming the presidency in 1974 when Nixon resigned, Ford mounted a run for a full term in 1976, but it was hardly a coronation. Before he won the GOP nomination, he had to fend off a serious primary challenge from Ronald Reagan that went all the way to the national convention. Some elected vice presidents, like Nixon, George H.W. Bush and Al Gore, have had an easier time winning their party nominations against weak opposition, but others, like Alben Barkley and Dan Quayle, didn’t even make it to the general election.
It’s impossible to say which of these comparisons might prove most apt for Harris — we don’t even know if she’ll be vice president — but it’s not hard to imagine her facing a major intraparty challenge in the future. For one, we’ve never had a woman vice president, let alone a woman president — and past elections have shown us just how challenging it can be for a highly qualified woman to win. For his part, Biden has sparked criticism for botching the selection process — the only thing we knew up until Tuesday was that he would pick a woman to be his running mate — making the conversation less about his running mate’s credentials and more about whether she was the “right” kind of woman for the job. It’s also possible that four years from now, the Democratic Party will have moved even further to the left, and Biden and Harris’s more moderate politics will have fallen out of fashion, encouraging a primary challenge.
Nevertheless, if Harris does become vice president, it undoubtedly raises her odds that she might one day occupy the White House and lead the Democratic Party in a presidential election. Even after her underwhelming 2020 bid, one only has to look at Biden’s career arc to see how Harris’s presidential aspirations could benefit from serving as VP. It wasn’t until Barack Obama made Biden his vice president in 2008 that he established a strong enough profile within the party to become its preferred choice in 2020. (His two prior presidential bids were unsuccessful.) It is, of course, too soon to say whether Biden will win in November, but he could become the 15th vice president to reach the White House. And someday Harris could easily become the 16th.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-14--Biden’s Pledge To Choose A Woman For VP Was Popular — And So Is Harris

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
Before Joe Biden announced Sen. Kamala Harris as his running mate on Tuesday , criticism of his VP search was heating up .
For some , the announcement back in March that he would pick a woman started to ring hollow the longer the search dragged on .
For others , it felt like an off-key consolation prize , especially after Biden had defeated a number of high-profile women for the Democratic nomination .
And , of course , an added complication was that while he was conducting his vice presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across the country , leading some to demand that Biden pick not just a woman , but a Black woman .
Yet these criticisms don ’ t seem to carry much weight with the public .
Polls over the past few months show that Americans , especially Democrats , overwhelmingly support Biden ’ s decision to choose a woman as his running mate .
For instance , after Biden initially made the announcement during a Democratic primary debate , a late-March Fox News poll found that 63 percent of voters approved of it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fast forward to late July , and these numbers haven ’ t really changed .
A Yahoo News/YouGov survey found that 62 percent of voters — including 90 percent of Democrats — thought Biden had made the right decision by pledging to choose a woman .
Support for Biden picking a Black woman was pretty high among Democrats , too , when they were asked whether they thought this was important .
A USA Today/Suffolk University survey from late June found that 72 percent of Democrats thought it was important to pick a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ News/YouGov poll from late July found that 60 percent of Democrats felt it was important to pick a Black woman .
A New York Times/Siena College survey from late June found much lower levels of support ( just 25 percent of Democrats said Biden should choose a Black running mate ) , but that may have more to do on how the question was phrased — respondents weren ’ t asked if this was important .
Instead , they were asked if Biden should choose a white person , choose a Black person @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision .
One other thing that ’ s clear from the polls ?
Harris was the leading contender .
A late-July SurveyUSA/FairVote poll of Democrats and independents found that Harris had the strongest favorability rating among potential VP picks , for instance .
And using ranked-choice voting , the poll also found Harris was the preferred option , beating Sen. Elizabeth Warren 55 percent to 45 percent after second- and third-choice votes were allocated .
( Harris also led 26 percent to 22 percent over Warren in first-choice votes . )
Other favorability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an early-August survey from The Economist/YouGov and a late-July Politico/Morning Consult poll found Harris had better marks among Democrats than any other VP contender save Warren , although they ran about even in the YouGov survey .
Each poll also found Harris with a slightly better net favorability rating ( favorable percentage minus unfavorable percentage ) than Warren among all respondents .
Two early polls suggest that the public has had a reasonably positive reaction to Harris ’ s selection , too .
A snap poll by YouGov after the pick found that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choice while 36 percent disapproved .
And 47 percent told ABC News/Ipsos that Harris was an excellent or good choice — including 83 percent of Democrats .
Only 29 percent said the choice was not so good or poor .
Bottom line : Biden ’ s decision to pick a woman as his VP has remained widely popular , and in Harris , he ’ s found a solid No .
2 .
As a former presidential contender , she ’ s already been through public scrutiny of her record and background , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she has high-level political experience .
She ’ s also a relatively popular choice according to the polls , so her history-making nomination should please many Democrats .
• We already knew that Americans ’ faith in elections was flagging , but another poll from NBC News/SurveyMonkey found the situation isn ’ t getting any better .
A majority of Americans said they were not at all or not too confident that the November election would be conducted in a fair and equal way .
Republicans were the most likely to express a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 65 percent ) , while a majority of independents ( 56 percent ) said the same .
Only 46 percent of Democrats said they lacked confidence in the process .
• According to Morning Consult polling , Biden isn ’ t as disliked as Hillary Clinton was four years ago .
In its latest survey , 35 percent of voters held very unfavorable views of Biden , compared with 43 percent who felt the same about Clinton in early August 2016 .
Broken down by party , the largest difference , by far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent viewed Biden very unfavorably , compared with 51 percent who viewed Clinton very unfavorably .
• New polling from Gallup found that Americans , particularly women , do not think women have achieved gender equality in the workplace or in politics .
Overall , a whopping 69 percent of Americans said women had not achieved equality with men in the workplace , while 66 percent said the same of the political sphere .
Among women , the share was much higher — 79 percent said gender equality hadn ’ t happened in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same of politics .
By comparison , a slimmer majority of men didn ’ t think women had achieved gender equality in the workplace ( 58 percent ) or in politics ( 57 percent ) .
• According to a new report from the Pew Research Center , 79 percent of Americans think houses of worship should be required to follow the same rules about social distancing and large gatherings as other organizations and businesses .
But there was a staggering partisan split on this question : 93 percent of Democrats thought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules , compared with 65 percent of Republicans .
A third of Republicans said places of worship should be allowed more flexibility with the rules , while only 7 percent of Democrats agreed .
• Gallup measured Americans ’ level of confidence in 16 U.S. institutions and found that white and Black adults differed the most in their feelings toward the police .
Whereas 56 percent of white respondents had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police , only 19 percent of Black respondents said the same .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Black and white adults ’ attitudes differed little except in one other area : the presidency .
Nearly half ( 47 percent ) of white respondents had confidence in the presidency , compared with just 13 percent of Black respondents .
• YouGov asked Americans how they felt about the National Rifle Association ’ s political power after New York Attorney General Letitia James filed a lawsuit to dissolve the organization .
Nearly half ( 48 percent ) said that the NRA wielded too much influence , while 23 percent said it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent said it held too little sway , while 20 percent said they didn ’ t know .
Unsurprisingly , most Democrats ( 73 percent ) thought the NRA had too much influence , although about half of independents ( 46 percent ) said they felt the same way .
Conversely , 49 percent of Republicans believed the group had the right amount of power , and 20 percent said it held too little sway .
• Morning Consult found that star players in the National Football League and National Basketball Association may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League .
When asked to name their favorite player in each league , respondents were more likely to name big-name athletes in the NFL , such as Tom Brady and Patrick Mahomes , and in the NBA , such as LeBron James and Steph Curry .
By comparison , the answers for favorite players in the MLB and NHL were more diffuse , possibly reflecting a more regional appeal .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 41.6 percent of Americans approve of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while 54.6 percent disapprove ( a net approval rating of -13.0 points ) .
At this time last week , 41.3 percent approved and 54.7 percent disapproved ( a net approval rating of -13.5 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 40.4 percent and a disapproval rating of 55.2 percent , for a net approval rating of -14.7 points .
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot , Democrats currently lead by 7.6 percentage points ( 48.5 percent to 40.9 percent ) .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 7.8 points ( 48.2 percent to 40.5 percent ) .
At this time last month , voters preferred Democrats by 9.0 points ( 49.4 percent to 40.4 percent ) .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
Before Joe Biden announced Sen. Kamala Harris as his running mate on Tuesday, criticism of his VP search was heating up. For some, the announcement back in March that he would pick a woman started to ring hollow the longer the search dragged on. For others, it felt like an off-key consolation prize, especially after Biden had defeated a number of high-profile women for the Democratic nomination. And, of course, an added complication was that while he was conducting his vice presidential search, protests against police brutality rippled across the country, leading some to demand that Biden pick not just a woman, but a Black woman.
Yet these criticisms don’t seem to carry much weight with the public. Polls over the past few months show that Americans, especially Democrats, overwhelmingly support Biden’s decision to choose a woman as his running mate.
For instance, after Biden initially made the announcement during a Democratic primary debate, a late-March Fox News poll found that 63 percent of voters approved of it, including 86 percent of Democrats. Fast forward to late July, and these numbers haven’t really changed. A Yahoo News/YouGov survey found that 62 percent of voters — including 90 percent of Democrats — thought Biden had made the right decision by pledging to choose a woman.
Support for Biden picking a Black woman was pretty high among Democrats, too, when they were asked whether they thought this was important. A USA Today/Suffolk University survey from late June found that 72 percent of Democrats thought it was important to pick a woman of color. And a Yahoo News/YouGov poll from late July found that 60 percent of Democrats felt it was important to pick a Black woman. A New York Times/Siena College survey from late June found much lower levels of support (just 25 percent of Democrats said Biden should choose a Black running mate), but that may have more to do on how the question was phrased — respondents weren’t asked if this was important. Instead, they were asked if Biden should choose a white person, choose a Black person, or not factor race into the decision.
One other thing that’s clear from the polls? Harris was the leading contender. A late-July SurveyUSA/FairVote poll of Democrats and independents found that Harris had the strongest favorability rating among potential VP picks, for instance. And using ranked-choice voting, the poll also found Harris was the preferred option, beating Sen. Elizabeth Warren 55 percent to 45 percent after second- and third-choice votes were allocated. (Harris also led 26 percent to 22 percent over Warren in first-choice votes.)
Other favorability polling echoes the SurveyUSA/FairVote findings. Both an early-August survey from The Economist/YouGov and a late-July Politico/Morning Consult poll found Harris had better marks among Democrats than any other VP contender save Warren, although they ran about even in the YouGov survey. Each poll also found Harris with a slightly better net favorability rating (favorable percentage minus unfavorable percentage) than Warren among all respondents.
Two early polls suggest that the public has had a reasonably positive reaction to Harris’s selection, too. A snap poll by YouGov after the pick found that 51 percent of voters approved of the choice while 36 percent disapproved. And 47 percent told ABC News/Ipsos that Harris was an excellent or good choice — including 83 percent of Democrats. Only 29 percent said the choice was not so good or poor.
Bottom line: Biden’s decision to pick a woman as his VP has remained widely popular, and in Harris, he’s found a solid No. 2. As a former presidential contender, she’s already been through public scrutiny of her record and background, and, as a U.S. senator, she has high-level political experience. She’s also a relatively popular choice according to the polls, so her history-making nomination should please many Democrats.
Other polling bites
We already knew that Americans’ faith in elections was flagging, but another poll from NBC News/SurveyMonkey found the situation isn’t getting any better. A majority of Americans said they were not at all or not too confident that the November election would be conducted in a fair and equal way. Republicans were the most likely to express a lack of faith in the process (65 percent), while a majority of independents (56 percent) said the same. Only 46 percent of Democrats said they lacked confidence in the process.
According to Morning Consult polling, Biden isn’t as disliked as Hillary Clinton was four years ago. In its latest survey, 35 percent of voters held very unfavorable views of Biden, compared with 43 percent who felt the same about Clinton in early August 2016. Broken down by party, the largest difference, by far, was among independents: Just 31 percent viewed Biden very unfavorably, compared with 51 percent who viewed Clinton very unfavorably.
New polling from Gallup found that Americans, particularly women, do not think women have achieved gender equality in the workplace or in politics. Overall, a whopping 69 percent of Americans said women had not achieved equality with men in the workplace, while 66 percent said the same of the political sphere. Among women, the share was much higher — 79 percent said gender equality hadn’t happened in the workplace, and 75 percent said the same of politics. By comparison, a slimmer majority of men didn’t think women had achieved gender equality in the workplace (58 percent) or in politics (57 percent).
According to a new report from the Pew Research Center, 79 percent of Americans think houses of worship should be required to follow the same rules about social distancing and large gatherings as other organizations and businesses. But there was a staggering partisan split on this question: 93 percent of Democrats thought houses of worship should follow the same rules, compared with 65 percent of Republicans. A third of Republicans said places of worship should be allowed more flexibility with the rules, while only 7 percent of Democrats agreed.
Gallup measured Americans’ level of confidence in 16 U.S. institutions and found that white and Black adults differed the most in their feelings toward the police. Whereas 56 percent of white respondents had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police, only 19 percent of Black respondents said the same. Among the other institutions Gallup asked about, Black and white adults’ attitudes differed little except in one other area: the presidency. Nearly half (47 percent) of white respondents had confidence in the presidency, compared with just 13 percent of Black respondents.
YouGov asked Americans how they felt about the National Rifle Association’s political power after New York Attorney General Letitia James filed a lawsuit to dissolve the organization. Nearly half (48 percent) said that the NRA wielded too much influence, while 23 percent said it had the right amount. Only 9 percent said it held too little sway, while 20 percent said they didn’t know. Unsurprisingly, most Democrats (73 percent) thought the NRA had too much influence, although about half of independents (46 percent) said they felt the same way. Conversely, 49 percent of Republicans believed the group had the right amount of power, and 20 percent said it held too little sway.
Morning Consult found that star players in the National Football League and National Basketball Association may have more national appeal than those in Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League. When asked to name their favorite player in each league, respondents were more likely to name big-name athletes in the NFL, such as Tom Brady and Patrick Mahomes, and in the NBA, such as LeBron James and Steph Curry. By comparison, the answers for favorite players in the MLB and NHL were more diffuse, possibly reflecting a more regional appeal.
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 41.6 percent of Americans approve of the job Trump is doing as president, while 54.6 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -13.0 points). At this time last week, 41.3 percent approved and 54.7 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -13.5 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 40.4 percent and a disapproval rating of 55.2 percent, for a net approval rating of -14.7 points.
Generic ballot
In our average of polls of the generic congressional ballot, Democrats currently lead by 7.6 percentage points (48.5 percent to 40.9 percent). A week ago, Democrats led Republicans by 7.8 points (48.2 percent to 40.5 percent). At this time last month, voters preferred Democrats by 9.0 points (49.4 percent to 40.4 percent).


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-14--Why We’re Planning For An Election Day That Could Last Months

Election Day isn ’ t one day anymore .
The 2020 election is shaping up to be a whole “ election month ” — or even election months , depending how things go .
Instead of Americans going to the polls en masse on Nov. 3 , many voters will probably make their decisions and cast their ballots over the course of October .
And instead of learning who won on election night , we ’ ll likely have to wait days — or in some states , weeks — for full results , as the counting of mail ballots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we are accustomed to .
The coronavirus pandemic is responsible for this : Concerns over public health have prompted dozens of states to change their election laws and procedures to make it easier to vote before Election Day .
Not every state has followed suit , but the changes have been pretty sweeping so far : • Four places ( California , Nevada , Vermont and Washington , D.C. ) are mailing ballots to all voters , joining the five states ( Colorado , Hawaii , Oregon , Utah and Washington ) that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Montana is also giving individual counties the option to mail ballots to voters .
• Twelve states ( Arizona , Delaware , Iowa , Illinois , Maryland , Massachusetts , Michigan , Nebraska , North Dakota , South Dakota , Wisconsin and Wyoming ) decided to mail absentee-ballot applications to all or most voters , joining Ohio , which has done so in every general election since 2012 .
• Eight states ( Alabama , Arkansas , Connecticut , Delaware , Massachusetts , Missouri , New Hampshire and West Virginia ) have loosened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to vote absentee so anyone can request a ballot .
• Six states ( California , Massachusetts , Minnesota , Mississippi , Nevada and New York ) have extended the deadline for mail ballots to be sent or received .
• Five states ( Minnesota , Missouri , North Carolina , Oklahoma and Rhode Island ) have totally or partially eased requirements that mail ballot envelopes be notarized or signed by a witness .
• Three states ( Georgia , Michigan and New York ) are building or have launched a portal to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
• Two states ( Massachusetts and Texas ) are providing more days of early voting .
It ’ s dizzying enough to keep up with all of the changes and deadlines in your state — let alone across the entire nation .
So FiveThirtyEight is doing it for you .
Today we ’ re proud to unveil our new state-by-state guide on how to vote in all 50 states and Washington , D.C. , which not only aggregates these changes by state and category but is also a compendium of election laws @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
First and foremost , this is a public service project meant to help voters navigate the latest voting rules in their state .
Maybe you feel more comfortable voting by mail this year , but you ’ re not sure how ; we ’ ll tell you how to request an absentee ballot ( and mail it back in time to count ) .
Maybe you prefer voting in person ; we ’ ve got info on whether polling places will be open as usual and when you might be able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not even registered yet ; we ’ ve got all you need to know about joining the rolls .
And since states aren ’ t done making changes , neither are we : We ’ ve highlighted aspects of election administration that are still in flux in the “ What we ’ re watching ” section for relevant states , and we ’ ll keep the guide up to date with further revisions to each state ’ s voting process — right up until Nov. 3 .
We ’ ve made every effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it must be said : Always double-check this information with your local election official before acting upon it .
Election laws in the age of COVID-19 are moving targets , and certain voters — like those living overseas or in the armed forces — may be subject to special rules .
Always follow directions from official sources , like those on your absentee-ballot envelope , over ours .
If you ever see something you think is wrong or needs to be updated , please shoot us an email .
We also created @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holistic sense for how different the 2020 election might look .
That includes how different it might look from past elections , and also how different the 2020 election might look in one state versus another .
Thanks to the U.S. ’ s decentralized election system , each state is responding to the pandemic in different ways — as is clear from the map at the top of the guide , which illustrates which states have the most permissive mail-voting laws and which have the most restrictive .
For instance , as of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eight states are not planning to allow all voters to vote absentee .
And as you can see in our map , they are , by and large , Southern states with Republican-controlled legislatures .
( New York is a notable exception . )
We ’ re also using this guide to help us anticipate which states might encounter problems during election month — either because they failed to adapt their election procedures to the pandemic , or because they made a big change that they are not up to the task of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that states that are mailing ballots , or even applications for mail-in ballots , to every voter for the first time overwhelm the election workers tasked with processing those materials .
In primary elections over the last few months , states that rapidly expanded mail voting often had trouble delivering ballots to voters on time .
Another common problem in primaries has been long lines ( sometimes as long as seven hours ! )
to vote in person in states that opened fewer polling places .
This is not usually a deliberate change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to consolidate polling places because so many poll workers — who tend to be older and thus at higher risk from the coronavirus — have opted out .
Accordingly , we don ’ t yet know much about what in-person voting access will look like on Nov. 3 ; as far as we ’ ve been able to ascertain , only Maryland , Montana , North Dakota and Washington , D.C. , have announced plans to offer fewer in-person polling places on Election Day itself .
( However , two states — California @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about polling-place consolidation in an attempt to mitigate its ill effects . )
But more will almost certainly join them , and given the potential it brings for Election Day chaos , we will add that information to the guide as it emerges .
Lastly , there ’ s a very real chance that we won ’ t know the winner of the election on election night , or even the day after .
This is the other half of election month : the multiple weeks that it will probably take to count @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the winner of the election before that , though , because some states will count much quicker than others — something else the guide can help with .
In general , states that encourage voting by mail will likely be slower to count their votes , since mail-in ballots take longer to process than in-person votes : Their envelopes need to be opened , signatures need to be verified and special machines are often needed to count them .
In addition , a number of states only require ballots to be postmarked by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ballots will still be in the mail on election night in those states , so it will be impossible for initial results there to be complete .
This was only an issue in a handful of states ( e.g.
, California , Utah , Washington ) before 2020 , because few people voted by mail in most states with postmark deadlines ( e.g.
, Illinois , Maryland , North Carolina ) — but that won ’ t be the case this year .
And the list of slow-counting states will only grow if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadlines in response to the pandemic or recent issues with slow postal service .
And with the caveat that a thorough count is better than a fast one , there is a particular sense of urgency that this election be resolved quickly to avoid claims that the election is illegitimate .
President Trump has already decried mail ballots as fraudulent and hinted he will not concede the election , and polls show that Americans are already losing faith in the electoral process .
The spread of vote by mail , missing ballots , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these are just some of the issues FiveThirtyEight will be using the guide to track over the next three months .
We invite you to do so as well .
But if nothing else , make a plan to vote today .

Election Day isn’t one day anymore. The 2020 election is shaping up to be a whole “election month” — or even election months, depending how things go.
Instead of Americans going to the polls en masse on Nov. 3, many voters will probably make their decisions and cast their ballots over the course of October. And instead of learning who won on election night, we’ll likely have to wait days — or in some states, weeks — for full results, as the counting of mail ballots proceeds at a much slower pace than we are accustomed to.
The coronavirus pandemic is responsible for this: Concerns over public health have prompted dozens of states to change their election laws and procedures to make it easier to vote before Election Day. Not every state has followed suit, but the changes have been pretty sweeping so far:
It’s dizzying enough to keep up with all of the changes and deadlines in your state — let alone across the entire nation. So FiveThirtyEight is doing it for you. Today we’re proud to unveil our new state-by-state guide on how to vote in all 50 states and Washington, D.C., which not only aggregates these changes by state and category but is also a compendium of election laws that existed before the pandemic even started.
First and foremost, this is a public service project meant to help voters navigate the latest voting rules in their state. Maybe you feel more comfortable voting by mail this year, but you’re not sure how; we’ll tell you how to request an absentee ballot (and mail it back in time to count). Maybe you prefer voting in person; we’ve got info on whether polling places will be open as usual and when you might be able to vote early. Maybe you’re not even registered yet; we’ve got all you need to know about joining the rolls.
And since states aren’t done making changes, neither are we: We’ve highlighted aspects of election administration that are still in flux in the “What we’re watching” section for relevant states, and we’ll keep the guide up to date with further revisions to each state’s voting process — right up until Nov. 3. We’ve made every effort to ensure the guide is accurate, but it must be said: Always double-check this information with your local election official before acting upon it. Election laws in the age of COVID-19 are moving targets, and certain voters — like those living overseas or in the armed forces — may be subject to special rules. Always follow directions from official sources, like those on your absentee-ballot envelope, over ours. If you ever see something you think is wrong or needs to be updated, please shoot us an email.
We also created the guide in part to get a holistic sense for how different the 2020 election might look. That includes how different it might look from past elections, and also how different the 2020 election might look in one state versus another. Thanks to the U.S.’s decentralized election system, each state is responding to the pandemic in different ways — as is clear from the map at the top of the guide, which illustrates which states have the most permissive mail-voting laws and which have the most restrictive. For instance, as of the publication of this article, only eight states are not planning to allow all voters to vote absentee. And as you can see in our map, they are, by and large, Southern states with Republican-controlled legislatures. (New York is a notable exception.)
We’re also using this guide to help us anticipate which states might encounter problems during election month — either because they failed to adapt their election procedures to the pandemic, or because they made a big change that they are not up to the task of implementing. One very real possibility is that states that are mailing ballots, or even applications for mail-in ballots, to every voter for the first time overwhelm the election workers tasked with processing those materials. In primary elections over the last few months, states that rapidly expanded mail voting often had trouble delivering ballots to voters on time.
Another common problem in primaries has been long lines (sometimes as long as seven hours!) to vote in person in states that opened fewer polling places. This is not usually a deliberate change; rather, jurisdictions have been forced to consolidate polling places because so many poll workers — who tend to be older and thus at higher risk from the coronavirus — have opted out. Accordingly, we don’t yet know much about what in-person voting access will look like on Nov. 3; as far as we’ve been able to ascertain, only Maryland, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio and Washington, D.C., have announced plans to offer fewer in-person polling places on Election Day itself. (However, two states — California and Nevada — have passed new rules about polling-place consolidation in an attempt to mitigate its ill effects.) But more will almost certainly join them, and given the potential it brings for Election Day chaos, we will add that information to the guide as it emerges.
Lastly, there’s a very real chance that we won’t know the winner of the election on election night, or even the day after. This is the other half of election month: the multiple weeks that it will probably take to count every vote. We will likely know the winner of the election before that, though, because some states will count much quicker than others — something else the guide can help with. In general, states that encourage voting by mail will likely be slower to count their votes, since mail-in ballots take longer to process than in-person votes: Their envelopes need to be opened, signatures need to be verified and special machines are often needed to count them.
In addition, a number of states only require ballots to be postmarked by Nov. 3. That means many valid ballots will still be in the mail on election night in those states, so it will be impossible for initial results there to be complete. This was only an issue in a handful of states (e.g., California, Utah, Washington) before 2020, because few people voted by mail in most states with postmark deadlines (e.g., Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina) — but that won’t be the case this year. And the list of slow-counting states will only grow if more states decide to switch to postmark deadlines in response to the pandemic or recent issues with slow postal service.
And with the caveat that a thorough count is better than a fast one, there is a particular sense of urgency that this election be resolved quickly to avoid claims that the election is illegitimate. President Trump has already decried mail ballots as fraudulent and hinted he will not concede the election, and polls show that Americans are already losing faith in the electoral process.
The spread of vote by mail, missing ballots, in-person voting access, delayed results — these are just some of the issues FiveThirtyEight will be using the guide to track over the next three months. We invite you to do so as well. But if nothing else, make a plan to vote today.
Editor’s note: We will not be updating this article as new election procedures are announced, but we are tracking these changes in our state-by-state voting guide. The original version of this article omitted a few changes to state election procedures that had already been announced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We have made those additions, but subsequent changes will be tracked only in our interactive.


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-14--How To Vote In The 2020 Election

How To Vote In The 2020 Election

Everyone can vote absentee , and ballots are automatically mailed to voters Everyone can vote absentee , and absentee-ballot applications @ @ @ @ @ Everyone can vote absentee , but nothing is being mailed to voters* You can vote @ @ @ @ @ a valid excuse ( the pandemic doesn ’ t count )

Everyone can vote by mail, and ballots are automatically mailed to voters
Everyone can vote by mail, and mail-ballot applications are automatically mailed to voters
Everyone can vote by mail, but nothing is automatically mailed to voters*
You can vote by mail only if you have a valid excuse (the pandemic doesn’t count)


fivethirtyeight--2020-08-14--Nate Silver Introduces The 2020 Election Forecast

FiveThirtyEight editor-in-chief Nate Silver walks us through the 2020 Presidential Election Forecast .
Learn how to navigate the new model @ @ @ @ @ to keep an eye on as Election Day approaches .

FiveThirtyEight editor-in-chief Nate Silver walks us through the 2020 Presidential Election Forecast. Learn how to navigate the new model — and find out what to keep an eye on as Election Day approaches.