fivethirtyeight--2020-04-15--What Happens If A Presidential Nominee Can No Longer Run For Office?

President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden are well on their way to facing off in November , but this hasn ’ t stopped the new coronavirus from casting a pall of uncertainty over the campaign .
Numerous primaries have been postponed and the Democrats have already delayed their convention .
In fact , there ’ s a decent chance that neither party will be able to hold one in person , possibly necessitating the first virtual convention in U.S. history .
There ’ s also a real question mark around the general election , as it may fall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the virus .
But if we ’ re going to entertain doomsday scenarios , let ’ s consider one that ’ s always lurking but may be disturbingly relevant in 2020 : the death or incapacitation of a presidential nominee .
How would the parties — and the public — respond to such a tragic event ?
We know this is macabre , but Trump and Biden are both in their 70s ( Trump turns 74 in June , and Biden is 77 ) , making them the oldest major-party nominees in American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reality that the elderly simply have a greater chance of dying , COVID-19 is particularly dangerous for those 65 and over .
So if there were ever an election cycle to worry about this morbid hypothetical , it ’ s this one .
If something were to happen to the presumptive nominee before the convention , the parties have a plan — they ’ d proceed as normal and use the convention to pick the nominee .
And if something happened after the convention but before the election , there ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party committees would step in .
After the election , though , things get murkier , as it ’ s uncertain how the result would work out in the Electoral College .
Let ’ s tackle that first scenario — something happens to either Biden or Trump before their respective conventions .
In the case of the Democratric nomination , that would all of a sudden open up the race , according to Lara Brown , director of the Graduate School of Political Management at George Washington University .
The delayed primaries would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could create a free-for-all with Sen. Bernie Sanders and the other candidates .
“ Let ’ s face it , none of the candidates have officially withdrawn , ” said Brown .
“ They ’ ve all just suspended [ their campaigns ] .
” But if tragedy didn ’ t strike until the convention , Biden delegates would have to choose someone else to support .
Richard Pildes , a constitutional law professor at the New York University School of Law , stressed , however , that even under normal circumstances , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the first ballot to vote their conscience.
” As for the GOP convention rules , Pildes told me they specifically bind the delegates , and as Trump is the only candidate who will really have delegates , the party might need to issue an “ interpretation ” of the rules or even vote to change them to deal with this unforeseen situation .
Brown and Pildes said it wouldn ’ t necessarily prevent a drawn-out convention battle , but if Biden had picked a running mate , that might go a long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats would already have someone to rally around rather than being split among a host of alternatives .
On the other hand , Vice President Pence would automatically ascend to the presidency should something happen to Trump , giving the Republicans a pretty straightforward pick if disaster struck before their August convention .
If something happened after the conventions but before the election , the national party committees would pick another nominee .
Under Republican rules , the Republican National Committee could reconvene the national convention , although Pildes told me it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So in both parties , national committee members would vote to elect a new nominee .
Pence would once again be the obvious choice for Republicans , although the GOP would also have to pick a new vice presidential nominee ( as would the Democrats if this situation arose for them ) .
And while Democrats could try to back a former candidate or an outsider who didn ’ t run — say , New York Gov .
Andrew Cuomo — Brown said a crisis like this would likely push the Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nominee at the top of the ticket .
“ I assume that the Democrats would attempt to follow that same pattern [ as the GOP ] , ” she said .
Neither party has ever had to replace someone at the top of the ticket , but Democrats do have some experience with replacing someone in the No .
2 spot .
In 1972 , the national convention nominated Missouri Sen. Thomas Eagleton to be George McGovern ’ s running mate , but after reports surfaced that Eagleton had received electroconvulsive therapy for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DNC chose Sargent Shriver to fill the vacancy .
Brown cautioned me not to read too much into how this worked , though , because she argued that the process would work differently if someone died .
“ It ’ s different with a death because a death is unexpected , ” said Brown .
“ Whereas by the time you get to Eagleton withdrawing at McGovern ’ s request , the whole party is kind of on board with that already.
” And what if something happens very close to Election Day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard to pick a replacement in time to update ballots , as most deadlines to certify state ballots would have passed by early October — not to mention other logistical hurdles that could pose problems , such as mailing ballots for overseas military service members in time , or making last-minute adjustments to absentee ballots .
It ’ s entirely possible that if the candidate died only a few days before Nov. 3 , voters might not know who the party ’ s nominee was when they go to the polls .
Again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the top of the ticket , but Republicans did have this happen to a vice presidential candidate in 1912 , when sitting Vice President James Sherman died on Oct. 30 , just days before the election .
This left insufficient time for the RNC to meet and nominate a replacement to join President William Howard Taft on the GOP ticket , but it was also largely a moot point as Taft lost to Woodrow Wilson .
The RNC still chose a replacement , Nicholas Murray Butler , president of Columbia University , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ electoral votes , but it ’ s unclear whether a new presidential pick would receive the electoral votes intended for the original nominee today .
That ’ s because , unlike in 1912 , more than half the states have laws that attempt to bind electors to a state ’ s vote .
In fact , there ’ s an ongoing case in front of the Supreme Court about whether members of the Electoral College are free to vote for whomever they want or whether state laws can require them to vote a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the court rules , that could affect the ability of individual states to adjust for the unexpected death of a presidential nominee .
For instance , Michigan ’ s law requires an elector to vote for the ticket named on the ballot whereas Florida ’ s rules say that an elector is to “ vote for the candidates of the party that he or she was nominated to represent.
” Finally , if the nominee was incapacitated after Election Day , a lot might depend on whether he is considered the “ president-elect.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s actually pretty straightforward — the 20th Amendment says the vice president-elect shall become president .
But if it all happened before the Electoral College votes on Dec. 14 or even before Congress counts the electoral votes on Jan. 6 , 2021 , it ’ s not clear what would happen next , as he might not be considered the president-elect .
There is one instance of this happening — in 1872 , Horace Greeley died on Nov. 29 , just before the Electoral College ’ s Dec. 4 gathering and most of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four alternate candidates ( including Greeley ’ s vice presidential nominee , Benjamin Gratz Brown ) , but this example is largely academic , too , as Greeley had already lost to Republican President Ulysses S. Grant .
It ’ s hard to know what exactly might unfold , but none of these timelines would leave much time for the near-certain legal wrangling over the fallout from a candidate ’ s death , a problem that we haven ’ t adjusted for even after the messy recount in the 2000 presidential election .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve been lucky .
We have actually had some presidents who have died shortly after taking office but not somebody who died either between the convention and the election , or after being elected and becoming the president-elect.
” And if that were to happen this year , it would likely create intraparty division , uncertainty among voters or a tidal wave of litigation .
Let ’ s hope that the country ’ s luck doesn ’ t run out in 2020 .
The U.S. Has Held Elections During Times Of Crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

UPDATE (Oct. 2, 2020, 10:34 a.m.): Early Friday, President Trump tweeted that he and First Lady Melania Trump had tested positive for COVID-19. That news came on the heel of reports that White House senior advisor Hope Hicks had tested positive on Thursday. Earlier this year, we asked the question: What happens if a president (or presidential nominee) can no longer run for office?
President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden are well on their way to facing off in November, but this hasn’t stopped the new coronavirus from casting a pall of uncertainty over the campaign. Numerous primaries have been postponed and the Democrats have already delayed their convention. In fact, there’s a decent chance that neither party will be able to hold one in person, possibly necessitating the first virtual convention in U.S. history. There’s also a real question mark around the general election, as it may fall in the midst of a resurgence of the virus.
What happens if a nominee becomes incapacitated before an election? l FiveThirtyEight
But if we’re going to entertain doomsday scenarios, let’s consider one that’s always lurking but may be disturbingly relevant in 2020: the death or incapacitation of a presidential nominee. How would the parties — and the public — respond to such a tragic event?
We know this is macabre, but Trump and Biden are both in their 70s (Trump turns 74 in June, and Biden is 77), making them the oldest major-party nominees in American history.
And on top of the reality that the elderly simply have a greater chance of dying, COVID-19 is particularly dangerous for those 65 and over. So if there were ever an election cycle to worry about this morbid hypothetical, it’s this one.
If something were to happen to the presumptive nominee before the convention, the parties have a plan — they’d proceed as normal and use the convention to pick the nominee. And if something happened after the convention but before the election, there’s a plan for that, too — national party committees would step in. After the election, though, things get murkier, as it’s uncertain how the result would work out in the Electoral College.
Let’s tackle that first scenario — something happens to either Biden or Trump before their respective conventions. In the case of the Democratric nomination, that would all of a sudden open up the race, according to Lara Brown, director of the Graduate School of Political Management at George Washington University. The delayed primaries would become far more relevant, and this could create a free-for-all with Sen. Bernie Sanders and the other candidates. “Let’s face it, none of the candidates have officially withdrawn,” said Brown. “They’ve all just suspended [their campaigns].”
But if tragedy didn’t strike until the convention, Biden delegates would have to choose someone else to support. Richard Pildes, a constitutional law professor at the New York University School of Law, stressed, however, that even under normal circumstances, the Democratic delegates are technically free “on the first ballot to vote their conscience.” As for the GOP convention rules, Pildes told me they specifically bind the delegates, and as Trump is the only candidate who will really have delegates, the party might need to issue an “interpretation” of the rules or even vote to change them to deal with this unforeseen situation.
Brown and Pildes said it wouldn’t necessarily prevent a drawn-out convention battle, but if Biden had picked a running mate, that might go a long way in limiting the intraparty fighting because Democrats would already have someone to rally around rather than being split among a host of alternatives. On the other hand, Vice President Pence would automatically ascend to the presidency should something happen to Trump, giving the Republicans a pretty straightforward pick if disaster struck before their August convention.
If something happened after the conventions but before the election, the national party committees would pick another nominee. Under Republican rules, the Republican National Committee could reconvene the national convention, although Pildes told me it’s hard to imagine that being feasible. So in both parties, national committee members would vote to elect a new nominee. Pence would once again be the obvious choice for Republicans, although the GOP would also have to pick a new vice presidential nominee (as would the Democrats if this situation arose for them). And while Democrats could try to back a former candidate or an outsider who didn’t run — say, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo — Brown said a crisis like this would likely push the Democratic National Committee to put the vice presidential nominee at the top of the ticket. “I assume that the Democrats would attempt to follow that same pattern [as the GOP],” she said.
Neither party has ever had to replace someone at the top of the ticket, but Democrats do have some experience with replacing someone in the No. 2 spot. In 1972, the national convention nominated Missouri Sen. Thomas Eagleton to be George McGovern’s running mate, but after reports surfaced that Eagleton had received electroconvulsive therapy for depression, he withdrew, and the DNC chose Sargent Shriver to fill the vacancy. Brown cautioned me not to read too much into how this worked, though, because she argued that the process would work differently if someone died. “It’s different with a death because a death is unexpected,” said Brown. “Whereas by the time you get to Eagleton withdrawing at McGovern’s request, the whole party is kind of on board with that already.”
And what if something happens very close to Election Day? It’d probably be really hard to pick a replacement in time to update ballots, as most deadlines to certify state ballots would have passed by early October — not to mention other logistical hurdles that could pose problems, such as mailing ballots for overseas military service members in time, or making last-minute adjustments to absentee ballots. It’s entirely possible that if the candidate died only a few days before Nov. 3, voters might not know who the party’s nominee was when they go to the polls.
Again, neither party has experienced this at the top of the ticket, but Republicans did have this happen to a vice presidential candidate in 1912, when sitting Vice President James Sherman died on Oct. 30, just days before the election. This left insufficient time for the RNC to meet and nominate a replacement to join President William Howard Taft on the GOP ticket, but it was also largely a moot point as Taft lost to Woodrow Wilson. The RNC still chose a replacement, Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, who received all eight of Sherman’s electoral votes, but it’s unclear whether a new presidential pick would receive the electoral votes intended for the original nominee today.
That’s because, unlike in 1912, more than half the states have laws that attempt to bind electors to a state’s vote. In fact, there’s an ongoing case in front of the Supreme Court about whether members of the Electoral College are free to vote for whomever they want or whether state laws can require them to vote a certain way. And depending on how the court rules, that could affect the ability of individual states to adjust for the unexpected death of a presidential nominee. For instance, Michigan’s law requires an elector to vote for the ticket named on the ballot whereas Florida’s rules say that an elector is to “vote for the candidates of the party that he or she was nominated to represent.”
Finally, if the nominee was incapacitated after Election Day, a lot might depend on whether he is considered the “president-elect.” If he is, it’s actually pretty straightforward — the 20th Amendment says the vice president-elect shall become president. But if it all happened before the Electoral College votes on Dec. 14 or even before Congress counts the electoral votes on Jan. 6, 2021, it’s not clear what would happen next, as he might not be considered the president-elect. There is one instance of this happening — in 1872, Horace Greeley died on Nov. 29, just before the Electoral College’s Dec. 4 gathering and most of his 66 electoral votes were split among four alternate candidates (including Greeley’s vice presidential nominee, Benjamin Gratz Brown), but this example is largely academic, too, as Greeley had already lost to Republican President Ulysses S. Grant.
It’s hard to know what exactly might unfold, but none of these timelines would leave much time for the near-certain legal wrangling over the fallout from a candidate’s death, a problem that we haven’t adjusted for even after the messy recount in the 2000 presidential election. Pildes put it bluntly: “We’ve been lucky. We have actually had some presidents who have died shortly after taking office but not somebody who died either between the convention and the election, or after being elected and becoming the president-elect.” And if that were to happen this year, it would likely create intraparty division, uncertainty among voters or a tidal wave of litigation. Let’s hope that the country’s luck doesn’t run out in 2020.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: US has held elections during times of crisis before


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-15--Americans Are Skeptical Of The Government — Except When There’s A Crisis

The approval ratings of many world leaders and government officials — including President Trump — have increased amid the COVID-19 crisis .
Even U.S. government agencies , such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , have experienced a boost in popularity , despite public criticism of the government ’ s delayed response to the pandemic .
Greater public trust in government officials and agencies is the typical response to crises , including pandemics .
Political scientists Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian find that when Americans feel anxious about threats like infectious disease , they are more likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they think may protect them .
You can see this playing out in real time .
Despite an initial , flat-footed response involving delays in providing widespread testing and medical equipment , trust in the U.S. government started out high as people sought information on how best to counter the threat .
Americans are also paying a lot more attention to the government : They are glued to their television screens , heeding medical advice and supporting policies that restrict their movement .
But that does not mean views of the government will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when the urgency of the crisis fades , the public is likely to once again sour on the government .
Americans may hold the government in even lower esteem if the current situation exacerbates perceptions that the government is unable to effectively solve problems .
Americans traditionally voice a lot of skepticism about the government , but political scientists Chanita Intawan and Stephen P. Nicholson find that the public also has an implicit trust in authority figures , which can be activated in times of crisis .
Take the 9/11 terrorist attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assaults , then-President George W. Bush ’ s approval ratings nonetheless reached historic high points .
The public ’ s need to feel safe in a time of crisis triggers a desire to believe officials can offer protection .
That may seem like an opening for permanently advancing the government ’ s role in the economy and society by nationalizing health care or broadening social welfare programs .
But Americans ’ anti-government attitudes are deeply ingrained — and some may even be accentuated by the crisis .
Trust in government is very polarized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidents from a different political party .
Republicans , in particular , are unwilling to trust Democrats in power .
Democrats may have given the benefit of the doubt to Bush — or now to Trump — but that does not mean Republicans will return the favor .
If a Democrat retakes the White House next year , conservatives are likely to change course and distrust the government again .
It ’ s not just a partisan issue , though .
As political scientist Amy E. Lerman demonstrates , even people who want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still tend to consider the government inefficient , slow and mediocre .
This group may profess to want a larger government compared with most conservatives , but that does not mean they will be any more likely to think government programs work well .
Lerman says that these views are also self-reinforcing : “ We ’ re really in a reputation crisis , which goes beyond what we think of as the usual low trust in government , and is really [ a ] downward spiral.
” Because so many Americans already hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ notice when it is unable to solve problems while also failing to notice when it does work , which reinforces their initial negative opinion .
Another problem is that even when the public likes government services , they often consider them private services and neglect to give the government credit .
Take garbage pickup , for example .
Lerman finds that regardless of who is actually picking up the trash , when Americans like their garbage service , they believe it is provided by a private company , yet if they don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is provided by the government .
So one can imagine that as COVID-19 testing ramps up in the U.S. , the public may credit companies that produce or deliver the tests rather than credit the government .
Trump has been promoting this perception too , touting a quick testing device by Abbott Laboratories and drive-through testing sites at large pharmacy chains like Walgreens .
But won ’ t it be hard to hide the positive role the government plays in reviving the economy ?
Not necessarily .
Economic stimulus efforts still take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tax credits and business support , which keeps the government behind the scenes .
As political scientist Suzanne Mettler has written , many Americans do not credit government policy for the benefits they receive .
And those who have been helped the most by government services are often the least positive about the government , especially if they do not even recognize the public programs they rely on .
In this current crisis , people may credit their employers for staying afloat ( despite government grants and loans ) if they keep their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cash payment as an earned refund on their taxes rather than a public handout .
But that doesn ’ t mean the government won ’ t still get the blame if the checks come late or if some people think others are benefiting more than they are .
Bottom line : Americans ’ views of the government are difficult to change .
They will trust agencies and officials while they have to take quick action to avoid impending risk , but the crisis may also reinforce their view that the public sector is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans will welcome the benefits , they may consider any economic gain another success of the private sector — and any downturn a failure of government .
How Close Are We To A COVID-19 Vaccine ?

The approval ratings of many world leaders and government officials — including President Trump — have increased amid the COVID-19 crisis. Even U.S. government agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, have experienced a boost in popularity, despite public criticism of the government’s delayed response to the pandemic.
Greater public trust in government officials and agencies is the typical response to crises, including pandemics. Political scientists Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian find that when Americans feel anxious about threats like infectious disease, they are more likely to trust government officials and support policies they think may protect them.
You can see this playing out in real time. Despite an initial, flat-footed response involving delays in providing widespread testing and medical equipment, trust in the U.S. government started out high as people sought information on how best to counter the threat. Americans are also paying a lot more attention to the government: They are glued to their television screens, heeding medical advice and supporting policies that restrict their movement.
But that does not mean views of the government will improve over the long term. Rather, when the urgency of the crisis fades, the public is likely to once again sour on the government. Americans may hold the government in even lower esteem if the current situation exacerbates perceptions that the government is unable to effectively solve problems.
Americans traditionally voice a lot of skepticism about the government, but political scientists Chanita Intawan and Stephen P. Nicholson find that the public also has an implicit trust in authority figures, which can be activated in times of crisis. Take the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Despite intelligence failures in anticipating the assaults, then-President George W. Bush’s approval ratings nonetheless reached historic high points. The public’s need to feel safe in a time of crisis triggers a desire to believe officials can offer protection.
That may seem like an opening for permanently advancing the government’s role in the economy and society by nationalizing health care or broadening social welfare programs. But Americans’ anti-government attitudes are deeply ingrained — and some may even be accentuated by the crisis.
Trust in government is very polarized, with Americans less likely to trust presidents from a different political party. Republicans, in particular, are unwilling to trust Democrats in power. Democrats may have given the benefit of the doubt to Bush — or now to Trump — but that does not mean Republicans will return the favor. If a Democrat retakes the White House next year, conservatives are likely to change course and distrust the government again.
It’s not just a partisan issue, though. As political scientist Amy E. Lerman demonstrates, even people who want a larger government and more public services still tend to consider the government inefficient, slow and mediocre. This group may profess to want a larger government compared with most conservatives, but that does not mean they will be any more likely to think government programs work well.
Lerman says that these views are also self-reinforcing: “We’re really in a reputation crisis, which goes beyond what we think of as the usual low trust in government, and is really [a] downward spiral.” Because so many Americans already hold the government in low esteem, they notice when it is unable to solve problems while also failing to notice when it does work, which reinforces their initial negative opinion.
Another problem is that even when the public likes government services, they often consider them private services and neglect to give the government credit. Take garbage pickup, for example. Lerman finds that regardless of who is actually picking up the trash, when Americans like their garbage service, they believe it is provided by a private company, yet if they don’t like their service, they believe it is provided by the government.
So one can imagine that as COVID-19 testing ramps up in the U.S., the public may credit companies that produce or deliver the tests rather than credit the government. Trump has been promoting this perception too, touting a quick testing device by Abbott Laboratories and drive-through testing sites at large pharmacy chains like Walgreens.
But won’t it be hard to hide the positive role the government plays in reviving the economy? Not necessarily.
Economic stimulus efforts still take the typical American policy form: using tax credits and business support, which keeps the government behind the scenes. As political scientist Suzanne Mettler has written, many Americans do not credit government policy for the benefits they receive. And those who have been helped the most by government services are often the least positive about the government, especially if they do not even recognize the public programs they rely on.
In this current crisis, people may credit their employers for staying afloat (despite government grants and loans) if they keep their jobs. Or they may see a cash payment as an earned refund on their taxes rather than a public handout. But that doesn’t mean the government won’t still get the blame if the checks come late or if some people think others are benefiting more than they are.
Bottom line: Americans’ views of the government are difficult to change. They will trust agencies and officials while they have to take quick action to avoid impending risk, but the crisis may also reinforce their view that the public sector is weak and unprepared. And while many Americans will welcome the benefits, they may consider any economic gain another success of the private sector — and any downturn a failure of government.
How close are we to a COVID-19 vaccine? l FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-15--How Much Does Obama’s Endorsement Of Biden Matter?

Welcome to FiveThirtyEight ’ s weekly politics chat .
The transcript below has been lightly edited .
sarahf ( Sarah Frostenson , politics editor ) : Former Vice President Joe Biden picked up three notable endorsements this week .
The first was from his former rival , Sen. Bernie Sanders , who endorsed him on Monday , less than a week after he dropped out of the race .
The second was from his former running mate , former President Barack Obama , who endorsed him on Tuesday .
[ Editor ’ s Note : And Sen. Elizabeth Warren endorsed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concluded . ]
These endorsements point to a party coalescing behind its nominee , and Obama ’ s endorsement , in particular , could be especially influential as he remains popular among Democrats and is seen as a kingmaker in the party .
So just how important is Obama ’ s endorsement , especially at this stage in the primary ?
nrakich ( Nathaniel Rakich , elections analyst ) : How best to put this … Obama ’ s endorsement is simultaneously completely unsurprising/pro forma and also an important part of political pageantry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Obama would endorse the eventual Democratic nominee .
And I don ’ t think it will really matter in terms of winning Biden votes in the general election ( although I expect we ’ ll debate that below ) .
But it is still a nice little bit of free media for Biden and has come to be an expected part of the modern presidential campaign — the old party leader draping his arm around the new one .
Certainly without that moment , Biden would have had a problem , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t Obama endorsed ?
” would hang over his campaign .
So it ’ s important in that respect .
julia_azari ( Julia Azari , political science professor at Marquette University and FiveThirtyEight contributor ) : I was just thinking about that as I watched the endorsement video — I ’ m not sure who would care about the Obama endorsement who wasn ’ t already basically fine with Biden .
But I do think this is a move to get things going into the general election .
geoffrey.skelley ( Geoffrey Skelley , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pretty typical for a president to eventually endorse his former VP , but it would ’ ve been far more memorable had Obama publicly endorsed Biden before the Democratic primary was over .
julia_azari : I totally agree with that , Geoffrey .
I ’ ll try to come up with something to disagree about so as to be less boring .
sarahf : Geoffrey also raises something that ’ s been asked a number of times this primary : Should Obama have backed Biden sooner from the standpoint of Democrats ?
nrakich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of course !
From Obama ’ s perspective , nah .
Obviously , Biden would have loved Obama ’ s endorsement from the get-go .
It would have scared a lot of other contenders out of the race and made him even more of a favorite than he already was .
But Obama ’ s motives may have been different .
geoffrey.skelley : Obama was smart not to publicly endorse until now , as he was able to avoid exacerbating intraparty divisions .
nrakich : Obama also has his legacy to think of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all corners of the party — why risk that ?
Also , why risk having your endorsed candidate lose , thus showing that your own party doesn ’ t care what you have to say anymore ?
julia_azari : I think there ’ s a sense after 2016 ( and 2004 , and 2000 ) that assembling a winning coalition for Democrats is tricky and requires a lot of pieces to be in place .
And although Bill Clinton endorsed Al Gore in December 1999 , helping to clear the field , I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sort of field-clearing would have been ill-advised this time around .
The timing and informal politics of presidential nominations have changed .
sarahf : Why is that , Julia ?
julia_azari : Part of it has to do with the fallout from 2016 and accusations that the process was “ rigged.
” While I don ’ t think that the conspiracy theories about the DNC are right , it is true that ( per “ The Party Decides ” ) party actors try to do things like clearing the field for former vice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was far from obvious that Biden was going to be the nominee .
So as Geoffrey and Nathaniel are saying , if you ’ re Obama , why stick your neck out to endorse Biden before things are settled ?
geoffrey.skelley : However , there are rumors — and some evidence — that Obama may have been moving behind the scenes to get the party ’ s establishment to coalesce behind Biden right after South Carolina , which may have contributed to the timing of former Mayor of South Bend , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Klobuchar ’ s departures and subsequent endorsements of Biden ahead of Super Tuesday .
sarahf : The New York Times reported he met with Sanders ’ s team at least four times and played a big role in getting Sanders to drop out when he did .
That ’ s … pretty big , right ?
geoffrey.skelley : Yeah , I would say convincing Sanders to not extend the primary fight might be a bigger deal than Obama endorsing Biden , if only because a drawn-out primary might have left room for more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t want to overstate things , though , because Sanders was doing much worse than he did in 2016 , so he also had some incentive to not hang around this time .
nrakich : Yeah , I think Obama ’ s reported orchestration of the dropouts of Sanders , Buttigieg or Klobuchar is much more important than Tuesday ’ s public endorsement .
Maybe that was a way for Obama to achieve the outcome of an earlier Biden endorsement without incurring any of its backlash .
Obama ’ s main incentive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if he was strongly opposed to another candidate ( i.e.
, Sanders ) and his vision for the party .
But he may have decided to address that concern behind the scenes rather than stick his neck out publicly .
julia_azari : And as I noted last year , there were several candidates running in 2020 who might have carried on Obama ’ s legacy : Sen. Kamala Harris , Sen. Cory Booker and Buttigieg .
So again , there ’ s no real incentive for Obama to endorse sooner .
In fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be made that Biden wasn ’ t the best candidate to carry on Obama ’ s legacy despite his closeness to the president .
New York Magazine ’ s Eric Levitz has suggested as much — Biden was selected in 2008 in part because he wouldn ’ t pose a threat to his legacy by running for president later .
Of course , that didn ’ t pan out , but I think that argument is persuasive .
geoffrey.skelley : It ’ s worth noting that Obama dissuaded Biden from running against Hillary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too .
julia_azari : But the main reason I think Obama got in this game so late was the changing norms about competition in presidential primaries ( i.e.
, there should be some rules for when a former president can endorse ) and not because it was Biden , his former running mate , per se .
geoffrey.skelley : That makes sense , Julia .
If there was a sense that someone was putting a thumb on the scale , that would rankle a significant chunk of the Democratic primary electorate and potentially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do think there ’ s a question of how big a role Obama has played quietly behind the scenes since he left office .
As we know , he played a part in keeping Biden out ahead of 2016 , and then it seems as if he played a part in the party coalescing around Biden instead of Sanders in 2020 .
So maybe he ’ s always been maneuvering behind the scenes where possible to get his preferred result under the circumstances .
nrakich : Yeah , Geoffrey — maybe Obama has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backroom dealing and we just don ’ t know the full extent !
geoffrey.skelley : We ’ ll need someone ’ s great tell-all book on the subject in a few years to help us out .
sarahf : But some of the timing question must have also had to do with how Obama would handle the role of “ sidekick to his former sidekick , ” right ?
That is , there is a real risk that Obama ’ s star power overshadows Biden , and the primary becomes about him .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ few days ago , for instance : “ Barack Obama wins the Democratic primary.
” Obviously , Biden wanted Obama ’ s endorsement , but I think there ’ s a real question of how much of a role he wants Obama to have in his campaign moving forward .
julia_azari : I ’ ve been thinking a lot about this .
There ’ s a very odd role reversal in Obama now being the sidekick because Biden was the more experienced politician to start with .
Also , Biden has embraced the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strikes me as somewhat novel .
Most former or sitting VPs try to make their own pitch , but Biden has really tried to connect himself to Obama ’ s legacy .
Given the power of norms and normalcy at this moment ( even pre-COVID-19 , though I think that exacerbates it ) it isn ’ t a dumb political move .
But it is sort of uncharted in modern politics , where politicians ’ individual qualities are often more important than their affiliations .
This might only be tangentially related , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ve been thinking a lot about the absence of actors who have real influence .
Rep. James Clyburn ’ s endorsement of Biden showed that there are still some actors with informal influence in the Democratic Party .
Obama is another such actor , and perhaps his late entry into the race signals that he understands the scope and potential downsides of that power .
But a healthy party has more people like that and doesn ’ t rely on popular former presidents — former presidents , for one thing , lack any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ informal influence .
nrakich : As we ’ ve discussed before , though , Biden doesn ’ t really have a party-unity problem — at least no more than past nominees .
I just don ’ t think there ’ s anyone out there who is saying , “ Well , I was on the fence about Biden , but now that Obama has endorsed him , he has my support.
” julia_azari : I think Obama ’ s endorsement is a signal to less-attentive voters , like , ‘ OK , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is it possible though , that Obama ’ s endorsement backfires or is something Trump can use against Biden ?
geoffrey.skelley : There ’ s obviously a major chunk of the Republican base that has great antipathy for Obama , but you ’ d think most of those voters would already vote for Trump regardless .
nrakich : Right , polarization is king .
Most people already know if they are going to vote for Biden or Trump .
Obama ’ s endorsement is unsurprising , so it ’ s unlikely to make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news events like impeachment or the coronavirus ( so far ) barely move the needle .
sarahf : What about Obama ’ s popularity among the ever-coveted independents ?
geoffrey.skelley : I guess it can ’ t hurt with independents , but Trump ’ s underwater ratings among them hurts much more than Obama ’ s endorsement of Biden helps .
julia_azari : One question I have moving forward is whether politicians will have to develop a different calculus to attract news coverage .
I expect that stories about the coronavirus will dominate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yeah … how much more would Obama ’ s endorsement have meant if it was him and Biden at a campaign stop when he took the stage in front of hundreds ( or thousands ) of supporters ?
I think we ’ re starting to see some of the real limitations of remote campaigning .
But given what Obama has reportedly done behind the scenes for Biden already ( help coalesce the party , get Sanders to drop out ) and what he can do now that he ’ s publicly backed Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I think that is still a win for Biden at the end of the day .
nrakich : I think that ’ s right , Sarah .
Under normal conditions where the presidential race were still the top story , this would dominate the news cycle ( rightly or wrongly ) , which might lead to a free-media bump for Biden .
sarahf : The timing , though , of Sanders ( the rival ) endorsing yesterday and Obama ( the former commander-in-chief ) endorsing today was smart .
Especially if Obama helped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not real life , but this is pretty impressive : Although people who are Very Online are probably especially unlikely to be swayed by this !
sarahf : I think you might be underestimating the cues of this , Nathaniel , for less-attentive voters as Julia said .
julia_azari : Yeah , I really stand by my statement that this is a reminder for marginally attentive people that the primary happened , has concluded , and the general election is starting with Biden as the party nominee .
And if you liked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now , the former president ’ s endorsement is telling you , ‘ This is the guy.
’ nrakich : I ’ m not trying to minimize that !
But I don ’ t think this is changing minds .
I agree it ’ s a cue to maybe start tuning in .
And as I said at the beginning , it ’ s an important part of political pageantry .
julia_azari : Speaking of pageantry , I was struck by just how partisan the announcement was .
Obama accused Republicans of being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempts to dismantle the Affordable Care Act and stressed that some of our democratic values are under attack .
geoffrey.skelley : Maybe that approach is part of trying to make sure that this election is a referendum on the president ?
Given Trump ’ s consistently mediocre approval rating , that would seem like a wise approach .
julia_azari : It also tells you that this was about cueing people for the general and not really about consolidating the party at the end of the primary .
sarahf : Which maybe goes back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s less about Obama ’ s endorsement convincing people to vote for Biden , and more about setting the stage for what ’ s at stake here in 2020 .
But OK , to wrap — just how big of a deal is Obama ’ s endorsement ?
geoffrey.skelley : On a scale from 1 to 10 , I give it a … 4 ?
If we knew for sure that he was central in helping get much of the party behind Biden , I would give that a 10 out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drop out , though , that ’ s like an 8 or 9. nrakich : I agree with Geoffrey that it would be very important if Obama was helping Biden behind the scenes , but I don ’ t think of that as the same as this public endorsement .
He could have done one without the other .
julia_azari : If we mean “ likely to help Biden , ” then I give it a 2 .
If we mean “ indicative of other forces around nomination politics , ” I give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real lesson here is that Obama has been pretty involved in politics for a past president .
Some of this has to do with the tenor of partisan politics , and some of it has to do with the fact that he ’ s quite popular and still a pretty young former president .
geoffrey.skelley : The popularity of Obama really stands out to me .
George W. Bush was not a much-desired figure at GOP events four years after his presidency , much less during the 2008 campaign to succeed him .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former president can help , and down-ballot Democrats will love having him , too .
Politics Podcast : These Are Our Priors For The General Election

Welcome to FiveThirtyEight’s weekly politics chat. The transcript below has been lightly edited.
sarahf (Sarah Frostenson, politics editor): Former Vice President Joe Biden picked up three notable endorsements this week. The first was from his former rival, Sen. Bernie Sanders, who endorsed him on Monday, less than a week after he dropped out of the race. The second was from his former running mate, former President Barack Obama, who endorsed him on Tuesday. [Editor’s Note: And Sen. Elizabeth Warren endorsed Biden on Wednesday, after this chat concluded.]
These endorsements point to a party coalescing behind its nominee, and Obama’s endorsement, in particular, could be especially influential as he remains popular among Democrats and is seen as a kingmaker in the party. So just how important is Obama’s endorsement, especially at this stage in the primary?
nrakich (Nathaniel Rakich, elections analyst): How best to put this … Obama’s endorsement is simultaneously completely unsurprising/pro forma and also an important part of political pageantry.
Like, obviously no one doubted that Obama would endorse the eventual Democratic nominee. And I don’t think it will really matter in terms of winning Biden votes in the general election (although I expect we’ll debate that below).
But it is still a nice little bit of free media for Biden and has come to be an expected part of the modern presidential campaign — the old party leader draping his arm around the new one. Certainly without that moment, Biden would have had a problem, as the question of “Why hasn’t Obama endorsed?” would hang over his campaign. So it’s important in that respect.
julia_azari (Julia Azari, political science professor at Marquette University and FiveThirtyEight contributor): I was just thinking about that as I watched the endorsement video — I’m not sure who would care about the Obama endorsement who wasn’t already basically fine with Biden.
But I do think this is a move to get things going into the general election.
geoffrey.skelley (Geoffrey Skelley, elections analyst): It’s pretty typical for a president to eventually endorse his former VP, but it would’ve been far more memorable had Obama publicly endorsed Biden before the Democratic primary was over.
julia_azari: I totally agree with that, Geoffrey. I’ll try to come up with something to disagree about so as to be less boring.
sarahf: Geoffrey also raises something that’s been asked a number of times this primary: Should Obama have backed Biden sooner from the standpoint of Democrats?
nrakich: From Biden’s perspective, of course! From Obama’s perspective, nah.
Obviously, Biden would have loved Obama’s endorsement from the get-go. It would have scared a lot of other contenders out of the race and made him even more of a favorite than he already was. But Obama’s motives may have been different.
geoffrey.skelley: Obama was smart not to publicly endorse until now, as he was able to avoid exacerbating intraparty divisions.
nrakich: Obama also has his legacy to think of. He is beloved by pretty much all corners of the party — why risk that? Also, why risk having your endorsed candidate lose, thus showing that your own party doesn’t care what you have to say anymore?
julia_azari: I think there’s a sense after 2016 (and 2004, and 2000) that assembling a winning coalition for Democrats is tricky and requires a lot of pieces to be in place. And although Bill Clinton endorsed Al Gore in December 1999, helping to clear the field, I think for a variety of reasons that sort of field-clearing would have been ill-advised this time around. The timing and informal politics of presidential nominations have changed.
sarahf: Why is that, Julia?
julia_azari: Part of it has to do with the fallout from 2016 and accusations that the process was “rigged.” While I don’t think that the conspiracy theories about the DNC are right, it is true that (per “The Party Decides”) party actors try to do things like clearing the field for former vice presidents and other establishment-type candidates. Also, it was far from obvious that Biden was going to be the nominee. So as Geoffrey and Nathaniel are saying, if you’re Obama, why stick your neck out to endorse Biden before things are settled?
geoffrey.skelley: However, there are rumors — and some evidence — that Obama may have been moving behind the scenes to get the party’s establishment to coalesce behind Biden right after South Carolina, which may have contributed to the timing of former Mayor of South Bend, Indiana, Pete Buttigieg and Sen. Amy Klobuchar’s departures and subsequent endorsements of Biden ahead of Super Tuesday.
sarahf: The New York Times reported he met with Sanders’s team at least four times and played a big role in getting Sanders to drop out when he did. That’s … pretty big, right?
geoffrey.skelley: Yeah, I would say convincing Sanders to not extend the primary fight might be a bigger deal than Obama endorsing Biden, if only because a drawn-out primary might have left room for more ruffled feathers and division. I don’t want to overstate things, though, because Sanders was doing much worse than he did in 2016, so he also had some incentive to not hang around this time.
nrakich: Yeah, I think Obama’s reported orchestration of the dropouts of Sanders, Buttigieg or Klobuchar is much more important than Tuesday’s public endorsement. Maybe that was a way for Obama to achieve the outcome of an earlier Biden endorsement without incurring any of its backlash. Obama’s main incentive to endorse Biden earlier would have been if he was strongly opposed to another candidate (i.e., Sanders) and his vision for the party. But he may have decided to address that concern behind the scenes rather than stick his neck out publicly.
julia_azari: And as I noted last year, there were several candidates running in 2020 who might have carried on Obama’s legacy: Sen. Kamala Harris, Sen. Cory Booker and Buttigieg. So again, there’s no real incentive for Obama to endorse sooner. In fact, there’s an argument to be made that Biden wasn’t the best candidate to carry on Obama’s legacy despite his closeness to the president. New York Magazine’s Eric Levitz has suggested as much — Biden was selected in 2008 in part because he wouldn’t pose a threat to his legacy by running for president later. Of course, that didn’t pan out, but I think that argument is persuasive.
geoffrey.skelley: It’s worth noting that Obama dissuaded Biden from running against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 Democratic primary, too.
julia_azari: But the main reason I think Obama got in this game so late was the changing norms about competition in presidential primaries (i.e., there should be some rules for when a former president can endorse) and not because it was Biden, his former running mate, per se.
geoffrey.skelley: That makes sense, Julia. If there was a sense that someone was putting a thumb on the scale, that would rankle a significant chunk of the Democratic primary electorate and potentially create more discord.
However, I do think there’s a question of how big a role Obama has played quietly behind the scenes since he left office.
As we know, he played a part in keeping Biden out ahead of 2016, and then it seems as if he played a part in the party coalescing around Biden instead of Sanders in 2020. So maybe he’s always been maneuvering behind the scenes where possible to get his preferred result under the circumstances.
nrakich: Yeah, Geoffrey — maybe Obama has actually always been extremely active in intraparty backroom dealing and we just don’t know the full extent!
geoffrey.skelley: We’ll need someone’s great tell-all book on the subject in a few years to help us out.
sarahf: But some of the timing question must have also had to do with how Obama would handle the role of “sidekick to his former sidekick,” right? That is, there is a real risk that Obama’s star power overshadows Biden, and the primary becomes about him. Take this headline from Politico from a few days ago, for instance: “Barack Obama wins the Democratic primary.”
Obviously, Biden wanted Obama’s endorsement, but I think there’s a real question of how much of a role he wants Obama to have in his campaign moving forward.
julia_azari: I’ve been thinking a lot about this. There’s a very odd role reversal in Obama now being the sidekick because Biden was the more experienced politician to start with.
Also, Biden has embraced the Obama legacy idea in a way that strikes me as somewhat novel. Most former or sitting VPs try to make their own pitch, but Biden has really tried to connect himself to Obama’s legacy. Given the power of norms and normalcy at this moment (even pre-COVID-19, though I think that exacerbates it) it isn’t a dumb political move. But it is sort of uncharted in modern politics, where politicians’ individual qualities are often more important than their affiliations.
This might only be tangentially related, but since the 2016 Republican primary I’ve been thinking a lot about the absence of actors who have real influence. Rep. James Clyburn’s endorsement of Biden showed that there are still some actors with informal influence in the Democratic Party. Obama is another such actor, and perhaps his late entry into the race signals that he understands the scope and potential downsides of that power.
But a healthy party has more people like that and doesn’t rely on popular former presidents — former presidents, for one thing, lack any formal power to go along with their informal influence.
nrakich: As we’ve discussed before, though, Biden doesn’t really have a party-unity problem — at least no more than past nominees.
I just don’t think there’s anyone out there who is saying, “Well, I was on the fence about Biden, but now that Obama has endorsed him, he has my support.”
julia_azari: I think Obama’s endorsement is a signal to less-attentive voters, like, ‘OK, we’re doing this.’
sarahf: Is it possible though, that Obama’s endorsement backfires or is something Trump can use against Biden?
geoffrey.skelley: There’s obviously a major chunk of the Republican base that has great antipathy for Obama, but you’d think most of those voters would already vote for Trump regardless.
nrakich: Right, polarization is king. Most people already know if they are going to vote for Biden or Trump. Obama’s endorsement is unsurprising, so it’s unlikely to make a difference. Heck, even huge news events like impeachment or the coronavirus (so far) barely move the needle.
sarahf: What about Obama’s popularity among the ever-coveted independents?
geoffrey.skelley: I guess it can’t hurt with independents, but Trump’s underwater ratings among them hurts much more than Obama’s endorsement of Biden helps.
julia_azari: One question I have moving forward is whether politicians will have to develop a different calculus to attract news coverage. I expect that stories about the coronavirus will dominate for a long time.
sarahf: Yeah … how much more would Obama’s endorsement have meant if it was him and Biden at a campaign stop when he took the stage in front of hundreds (or thousands) of supporters? I think we’re starting to see some of the real limitations of remote campaigning.
But given what Obama has reportedly done behind the scenes for Biden already (help coalesce the party, get Sanders to drop out) and what he can do now that he’s publicly backed Biden (fundraise, fundraise!), I think that is still a win for Biden at the end of the day.
nrakich: I think that’s right, Sarah. Under normal conditions where the presidential race were still the top story, this would dominate the news cycle (rightly or wrongly), which might lead to a free-media bump for Biden.
sarahf: The timing, though, of Sanders (the rival) endorsing yesterday and Obama (the former commander-in-chief) endorsing today was smart. Especially if Obama helped orchestrate the former.
nrakich: Twitter is not real life, but this is pretty impressive:
NEW: @BarackObama's video endorsing @JoeBiden hit 1 million views on Twitter in 39 minutes, @Twitter says. — Evan McMurry (@evanmcmurry) April 14, 2020
Although people who are Very Online are probably especially unlikely to be swayed by this!
sarahf: I think you might be underestimating the cues of this, Nathaniel, for less-attentive voters as Julia said.
julia_azari: Yeah, I really stand by my statement that this is a reminder for marginally attentive people that the primary happened, has concluded, and the general election is starting with Biden as the party nominee. And if you liked life under the Obama administration better than now, the former president’s endorsement is telling you, ‘This is the guy.’
nrakich: I’m not trying to minimize that! But I don’t think this is changing minds.
I agree it’s a cue to maybe start tuning in.
And as I said at the beginning, it’s an important part of political pageantry.
julia_azari: Speaking of pageantry, I was struck by just how partisan the announcement was.
Obama accused Republicans of being interested in power, talked about their attempts to dismantle the Affordable Care Act and stressed that some of our democratic values are under attack.
geoffrey.skelley: Maybe that approach is part of trying to make sure that this election is a referendum on the president? Given Trump’s consistently mediocre approval rating, that would seem like a wise approach.
julia_azari: It also tells you that this was about cueing people for the general and not really about consolidating the party at the end of the primary.
sarahf: Which maybe goes back to Nathaniel’s point that it’s less about Obama’s endorsement convincing people to vote for Biden, and more about setting the stage for what’s at stake here in 2020.
But OK, to wrap — just how big of a deal is Obama’s endorsement?
geoffrey.skelley: On a scale from 1 to 10, I give it a … 4? If we knew for sure that he was central in helping get much of the party behind Biden, I would give that a 10 out of 10 for importance.
Encouraging Sanders to drop out, though, that’s like an 8 or 9.
nrakich: I agree with Geoffrey that it would be very important if Obama was helping Biden behind the scenes, but I don’t think of that as the same as this public endorsement. He could have done one without the other.
julia_azari: If we mean “likely to help Biden,” then I give it a 2. If we mean “indicative of other forces around nomination politics,” I give it an 8. I think the real lesson here is that Obama has been pretty involved in politics for a past president. Some of this has to do with the tenor of partisan politics, and some of it has to do with the fact that he’s quite popular and still a pretty young former president.
geoffrey.skelley: The popularity of Obama really stands out to me. George W. Bush was not a much-desired figure at GOP events four years after his presidency, much less during the 2008 campaign to succeed him. Whereas Biden will happily deploy Obama wherever the former president can help, and down-ballot Democrats will love having him, too.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Our 2020 Election Priors


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-14--Has New York Bent The Curve?

Has New York Bent The Curve?

There is increasing evidence that New York City and New York state are turning a corner in their efforts to fight back COVID-19 , and the timing suggests that the shifts may be a result of social distancing measures .
Whether the state and city have merely flattened the curve to a plateau or actually begin to turn it around is somewhat ambiguous .
In his daily press conferences , New York Gov .
Andrew Cuomo has described recent data on hospitalizations as good news and emphasized that the curve has become quite flat .
On Tuesday , for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ net decline in hospitalizations , although it remains to be seen whether the trend can be sustained..
The number of people reported as dying from COVID-19 has also been at a plateau in recent days .
But data on the share of New Yorkers who are testing positive for COVID-19 suggests that the curve has not merely flattened but probably begun to turn down .
Among tests conducted Monday , April 13 ( and reported on Tuesday afternoon ) , 34.5 percent were positive , down from a peak of 50.4 percent on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the share of positive tests has been fairly robust across most parts of New York state , including in all five New York City ’ s five boroughs , although some more clearly so than others .
Still , if the decline has been steady , it has so far been slow .
That may imply that while current social distancing measures are enough to gradually decrease the number of new cases in New York , the number of new cases may continue to simmer at relatively high levels for several weeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase again if these measures are relaxed .
All the numbers in this article come from publicly available data from the New York State Department of Health .
( There ’ s also a downloadable version . )
The state has been releasing detailed reports on the number of positive and negative tests conducted each day in each county in the state , including in the boroughs of New York City ( which are each their own counties ) .
Information on the overall number of tests — both positive and negative — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apparent changes in the number of cases can reflect changes in testing volume rather than the actual incidence of disease in the population .
In tests conducted on Sunday and disclosed on the state ’ s website on Monday , for example , 6,337 New Yorkers were found to have COVID-19 , the lowest number of new cases since March 24 and a seemingly huge decline from the 10,575 new cases found on Thursday .
( The number ticked up again a bit in tests conducted on Monday , to 7,177 . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ only 16,756 tests were conducted on Sunday , the lowest number since March 31 .
( By comparison , 26,336 tests were done on Thursday . )
There are many such fluctuations in the data : Evaluating the share of tests that turned up positive can paint a clearer picture .
The rate of positive tests was climbing statewide through March 31 but has been falling slowly since then .
It turns out that this Sunday was a pretty good day for New York .
The share of tests returning positive results on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) — in fact , the lowest in almost three weeks up to that point ( since March 25 ) , although Monday ’ s figure was lower still .
It just wasn ’ t quite as good a day as the raw numbers imply because of the relative lack of testing .
Adjusting for testing volume doesn ’ t answer every question .
It could be that New York ’ s criteria for getting tests are becoming more liberal , or more conservative , which could affect positive test rates .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sample of the population , in other words .
The still-high rate of positive tests among those who are being tested suggests that there are probably a very large number of undiagnosed cases in New York ( as there are in other places ) .
It may even be that literally millions of people in New York City have or had COVID-19 .
Testing of pregnant women at one NYC hospital late last month and early this month , as reported in a letter to the New England Journal of Medicine , found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had COVID-19 , and that was at an earlier point in the epidemic than the one we find ourselves in now .
Still , across most of the scenarios that I described in my earlier article on testing , the share of people who tested positive was a more accurate reflection of the shape of the epidemic curve than the raw number of positive tests was without adjusting for testing volume .
( Feel free to download our Excel sheet and explore your own assumptions . )
Furthermore , changes in the share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not merely a reflection of where in New York those tests are being conducted .
Since upstate New York has a lower rate of positive tests than New York City , for example , doing more tests upstate but fewer in New York City could artificially depress the statewide positive test rate .
That is not what ’ s happening here , however .
Instead , if we break New York into three parts , we find a decline in the rate of positive tests in each one .
In New York @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smooth out slight fluctuations from day to day — the share of positive tests has declined from a peak of around 57 percent on March 30 to around 42 percent now .
In five suburban counties that are part of the New York City metro area — Suffolk and Nassau Counties on Long Island , and Westchester , Rockland and Putnam Counties in the Hudson Valley — positives have fallen from a peak of around 50 percent on April 1 to 38 percent now .
And in the rest of the state — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ upstate New York , though the definition of “ upstate ” is controversial — positives peaked at around 22 percent on April 2 and have now fallen to about 17 percent .
These communities haven ’ t followed exactly the same curves .
The suburbs were home to some initial , very bad outbreaks .
However , the city then had steeper , sharper growth and a higher but slightly earlier peak than the suburbs .
In upstate New York , the rate of positive tests was never as high as it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it also hasn ’ t declined as much .
The five New York City boroughs have also had different trajectories .
Queens had the highest peak , but has since seen the steepest decline .
Manhattan had a lower rate of positive tests than the other boroughs , although that could reflect the fact that residents of Manhattan are wealthier and could find ways to get tested even with limited symptoms .
Staten Island has followed a slightly worrying path , with the rate of positive tests having declined somewhat from their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than continuing to decline as sharply as in the other four boroughs and in the suburbs .
Staten Island is home to many essential service workers such as police and firefighters who are testing positive for COVID-19 at high rates .
But overall , the news is positive in New York .
It ’ s also a sign of the importance of social distancing — which means that the rates of new cases could increase again if measures are relaxed .
If the peak in the rate of positive tests came on or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely that the peak in actual infections came sooner than that — probably two or perhaps even three weeks sooner , given the lag between when people get infected and when they become symptomatic , and how long it takes for symptomatic people to get tested and for their tests to show up in the data .
That would mean it came in mid-March , a time when New York City was — belatedly , according to some public health officials — closing schools , along with bars , restaurants and other businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order , meanwhile , didn ’ t formally begin until the evening of March 22 , which could be reflected in the slightly later peaks outside of New York City .
The decline in the rate of positive tests has not been especially steep , however — at least not until the past two days , when it was sharper .
If taken at face value , it would imply that the effective reproduction number ( sometimes called R ) , or how many additional infections are produced by each infected person , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slightly below 1 .
When that number is above 1 , the number of new infections will continue to increase , while if it ’ s below 1 , the number of new infections will decrease .
But if the reproduction number is close to 1 — say , 1.1 or 0.9 — the increases or decreases will be gradual , with a long , relatively flat plateau rather than a sharp peak .
We don ’ t know for sure yet whether New York is going to follow that course .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of positive tests was initially fairly modest , producing a plateau for a week or two , before later picking up steam .
Warmer weather could also help , although the evidence for this is mixed .
There is also a lot of uncertainty about how many people in New York ultimately have or had the coronavirus .
If many people had it — as implied by the New England Journal of Medicine letter — then herd immunity could potentially play some role in lowering R , though likely not enough to reduce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a large share of the population has become immune .
It ’ s perhaps more likely , though , that New York has been beating COVID-19 by a relatively thin margin so far , and therefore it doesn ’ t have a lot of margin for error .
That ’ s a lot better than the alternative case where the city and state were losing the fight and the number of hospitalized patients continued to rise at their earlier rates .
But it also means that city , state and regional leaders will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy and relaxing social distancing measures .

There is increasing evidence that New York City and New York state are turning a corner in their efforts to fight back COVID-19, and the timing suggests that the shifts may be a result of social distancing measures.
Whether the state and city have merely flattened the curve to a plateau or actually begin to turn it around is somewhat ambiguous. In his daily press conferences, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo has described recent data on hospitalizations as good news and emphasized that the curve has become quite flat. On Tuesday, for the first time, New York reported a net decline in hospitalizations, although it remains to be seen whether the trend can be sustained.. The number of people reported as dying from COVID-19 has also been at a plateau in recent days.
But data on the share of New Yorkers who are testing positive for COVID-19 suggests that the curve has not merely flattened but probably begun to turn down. Among tests conducted Monday, April 13 (and reported on Tuesday afternoon), 34.5 percent were positive, down from a peak of 50.4 percent on Tuesday, March 31. The decline in the share of positive tests has been fairly robust across most parts of New York state, including in all five New York City’s five boroughs, although some more clearly so than others.
Still, if the decline has been steady, it has so far been slow. That may imply that while current social distancing measures are enough to gradually decrease the number of new cases in New York, the number of new cases may continue to simmer at relatively high levels for several weeks or longer — and that they could increase again if these measures are relaxed.
All the numbers in this article come from publicly available data from the New York State Department of Health. (There’s also a downloadable version.) The state has been releasing detailed reports on the number of positive and negative tests conducted each day in each county in the state, including in the boroughs of New York City (which are each their own counties).
Information on the overall number of tests — both positive and negative — is critical, because without it, apparent changes in the number of cases can reflect changes in testing volume rather than the actual incidence of disease in the population. In tests conducted on Sunday and disclosed on the state’s website on Monday, for example, 6,337 New Yorkers were found to have COVID-19, the lowest number of new cases since March 24 and a seemingly huge decline from the 10,575 new cases found on Thursday. (The number ticked up again a bit in tests conducted on Monday, to 7,177.) However, perhaps because of Easter, only 16,756 tests were conducted on Sunday, the lowest number since March 31. (By comparison, 26,336 tests were done on Thursday.) There are many such fluctuations in the data:
Evaluating the share of tests that turned up positive can paint a clearer picture. The rate of positive tests was climbing statewide through March 31 but has been falling slowly since then.
It turns out that this Sunday was a pretty good day for New York. The share of tests returning positive results on Sunday was relatively low (37.8 percent) — in fact, the lowest in almost three weeks up to that point (since March 25), although Monday’s figure was lower still. It just wasn’t quite as good a day as the raw numbers imply because of the relative lack of testing.
Adjusting for testing volume doesn’t answer every question. It could be that New York’s criteria for getting tests are becoming more liberal, or more conservative, which could affect positive test rates. These tests are hardly coming from a random sample of the population, in other words.
The still-high rate of positive tests among those who are being tested suggests that there are probably a very large number of undiagnosed cases in New York (as there are in other places). It may even be that literally millions of people in New York City have or had COVID-19. Testing of pregnant women at one NYC hospital late last month and early this month, as reported in a letter to the New England Journal of Medicine, found that around 14 percent of asymptomatic women had COVID-19, and that was at an earlier point in the epidemic than the one we find ourselves in now.
Still, across most of the scenarios that I described in my earlier article on testing, the share of people who tested positive was a more accurate reflection of the shape of the epidemic curve than the raw number of positive tests was without adjusting for testing volume. (Feel free to download our Excel sheet and explore your own assumptions.)
Furthermore, changes in the share of positive tests in New York state are not merely a reflection of where in New York those tests are being conducted. Since upstate New York has a lower rate of positive tests than New York City, for example, doing more tests upstate but fewer in New York City could artificially depress the statewide positive test rate. That is not what’s happening here, however. Instead, if we break New York into three parts, we find a decline in the rate of positive tests in each one.
In New York City — applying a trend line to smooth out slight fluctuations from day to day — the share of positive tests has declined from a peak of around 57 percent on March 30 to around 42 percent now. In five suburban counties that are part of the New York City metro area — Suffolk and Nassau Counties on Long Island, and Westchester, Rockland and Putnam Counties in the Hudson Valley — positives have fallen from a peak of around 50 percent on April 1 to 38 percent now. And in the rest of the state — which I’m referring to as upstate New York, though the definition of “upstate” is controversial — positives peaked at around 22 percent on April 2 and have now fallen to about 17 percent.
These communities haven’t followed exactly the same curves. The suburbs were home to some initial, very bad outbreaks. However, the city then had steeper, sharper growth and a higher but slightly earlier peak than the suburbs.
In upstate New York, the rate of positive tests was never as high as it was in the city or the suburbs, but it also hasn’t declined as much.
The five New York City boroughs have also had different trajectories. Queens had the highest peak, but has since seen the steepest decline. Manhattan had a lower rate of positive tests than the other boroughs, although that could reflect the fact that residents of Manhattan are wealthier and could find ways to get tested even with limited symptoms.
Staten Island has followed a slightly worrying path, with the rate of positive tests having declined somewhat from their peak, but then leveling off rather than continuing to decline as sharply as in the other four boroughs and in the suburbs. Staten Island is home to many essential service workers such as police and firefighters who are testing positive for COVID-19 at high rates.
But overall, the news is positive in New York. It’s also a sign of the importance of social distancing — which means that the rates of new cases could increase again if measures are relaxed.
If the peak in the rate of positive tests came on or around March 31, it’s likely that the peak in actual infections came sooner than that — probably two or perhaps even three weeks sooner, given the lag between when people get infected and when they become symptomatic, and how long it takes for symptomatic people to get tested and for their tests to show up in the data. That would mean it came in mid-March, a time when New York City was — belatedly, according to some public health officials — closing schools, along with bars, restaurants and other businesses.
The governor’s statewide stay-at-home order, meanwhile, didn’t formally begin until the evening of March 22, which could be reflected in the slightly later peaks outside of New York City.
The decline in the rate of positive tests has not been especially steep, however — at least not until the past two days, when it was sharper. If taken at face value, it would imply that the effective reproduction number (sometimes called R), or how many additional infections are produced by each infected person, is below 1, but perhaps only slightly below 1. When that number is above 1, the number of new infections will continue to increase, while if it’s below 1, the number of new infections will decrease. But if the reproduction number is close to 1 — say, 1.1 or 0.9 — the increases or decreases will be gradual, with a long, relatively flat plateau rather than a sharp peak.
We don’t know for sure yet whether New York is going to follow that course. In Italy, the decline in the rate of positive tests was initially fairly modest, producing a plateau for a week or two, before later picking up steam.
Warmer weather could also help, although the evidence for this is mixed. There is also a lot of uncertainty about how many people in New York ultimately have or had the coronavirus. If many people had it — as implied by the New England Journal of Medicine letter — then herd immunity could potentially play some role in lowering R, though likely not enough to reduce it below 1 on its own until a large share of the population has become immune.
It’s perhaps more likely, though, that New York has been beating COVID-19 by a relatively thin margin so far, and therefore it doesn’t have a lot of margin for error. That’s a lot better than the alternative case where the city and state were losing the fight and the number of hospitalized patients continued to rise at their earlier rates. But it also means that city, state and regional leaders will have to be smart about reopening the economy and relaxing social distancing measures.


fivethirtyeight--2020-04-14--How Urban Or Rural Is Your State? And What Does That Mean For The 2020 Election?

The 2016 election may not have been a realignment by historical standards , but it did bring the country ’ s political divides more in line with its cultural divides — the biggest of which may be the growing chasm between urban and rural Americans .
Essentially , it boils down to this : Cities and ( especially these days ) suburbs vote Democratic , and rural areas vote Republican .
Some research suggests that these patterns hold up even after accounting for other important political predictors like race or gender .
And there ’ s evidence that the urban-rural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For example , San Diego has historically voted Republican , but the GOP was shut out of the 2020 mayoral election after two Democrats won the most votes in the city ’ s March jungle primary .
At the same time , Republicans widened their margins in rural areas even amid their defeat in the 2018 midterms , and parts of Appalachia that had voted Democratic for generations now vote Republican up and down the ballot , completing their conversion to the GOP under President Trump .
It ’ s hard , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or rural a place is ( although CityLab ’ s Congressional Density Index and The New York Times Upshot ’ s “ neighborhood density ” are good starts ) .
So FiveThirtyEight came up with one of its own , which has already played a role in our 2020 primary forecast ’ s “ fundamentals ” calculations .
Essentially , we calculated the average number of people living within a five-mile radius of every census tract and took the natural logarithm to create an “ urbanization index , ” or a calculation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is .
And this number can be calculated ( via a weighted average based on each census tract ’ s population ) for states , congressional districts , counties — or anything that is made up of census tracts .
Here is a calculation for how urban or rural each of the 50 states is : You may have noticed a pattern in the table above .
The states with the highest urbanization indices include a lot of blue states , like New York , New Jersey and California .
Meanwhile , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with red states like Wyoming , Montana and South Dakota .
Indeed , if we directly compare this metric with the results of the 2016 presidential election , we can quantify just how important the urban-rural divide has become in our politics .
As you can see in the chart below , 10 of the 13 most urban states voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 , while 12 of the 14 most rural states voted for Trump .
The exceptions : the fairly urbanized states of Florida , Arizona and Texas , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rural states of Vermont and Maine , which cast their ballots for Clinton .
It ’ s possible , too , that this relationship between a state ’ s “ urbanness ” and its presidential vote will get even stronger in 2020 , as the correlation got noticeably tighter from 2012 to 2016 ( the correlation coefficient was 0.55 in 2012 and 0.69 in 2016 ) .
So let ’ s indulge in a little hypothetical and take this possibility to the extreme .
What if the 2020 presidential vote were based purely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our calculations , Democrats would win such a presidential election handily — 323 electoral votes to 215 .
And the election would produce a pretty funky-looking Electoral College map — one that looks simultaneously impossible and yet also like the logical conclusion of the way our politics has been trending .
Here ’ s what the margin of victory would look like in each state : Yes , some of the results are fantasies .
Utah , despite being a bit more urban than your average state , is not going to vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vermont votes Republican by nearly 26 points , please pinch me .
But other results look more plausible , even if they are maybe a few election cycles away from this reality .
In this scenario , the Midwest continues its embrace of the GOP , enough to make Minnesota a red state and Wisconsin go Republican by more than 8 points .
Thanks to Chicago , Illinois would be the only Democratic bastion left in the region ; Michigan and Ohio , though , would remain swing states .
Democrats , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ losses in the Midwest with wins in the Sun Belt .
Florida , Arizona and Texas would become light blue states in this hypothetical .
And given that these three states were decided by single digits in 2016 , it ’ s actually not that far-fetched that they could vote Democratic in 2020 in real life .
That said , two other emerging Democratic targets , Georgia and North Carolina , remain red states in a world where elections break down exactly along urban-rural lines .
Bear in mind that this exercise was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purposes only .
The urban-rural divide will never explain everything about our politics ; indeed , analysis that places too much weight on it misses the fact that many African Americans in rural areas vote Democratic , or that many Cuban Americans in urban areas like Miami vote Republican .
But it does help to illustrate why so many Democrats believe the path forward for their party is through the Sun Belt .
And indeed , early polls suggest former Vice President Joe Biden is competitive with Trump in Florida , Arizona and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In a simple average of eight Florida polls conducted since Jan. 1 , Biden leads Trump 48 percent to 46 percent .
And in a simple average of eight Arizona polls so far this year , Biden leads Trump 47 percent to 45 percent .
But Biden still trails Trump , 48 percent to 44 percent , in a simple average of this year ’ s Texas polls .
Still , that would be remarkably close for a state that Mitt Romney carried by nearly 16 points in 2012 .
Obviously , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have yet to come into their full predictive value .
But if Biden does carry one or more of these states , he could have their high rate of urbanization to thank .
Politics Podcast : These Are Our Priors For The General Election

How Urban Or Rural Is Your State? And What Does That Mean For The 2020 Election?
The 2016 election may not have been a realignment by historical standards, but it did bring the country’s political divides more in line with its cultural divides — the biggest of which may be the growing chasm between urban and rural Americans.
Essentially, it boils down to this: Cities and (especially these days) suburbs vote Democratic, and rural areas vote Republican. Some research suggests that these patterns hold up even after accounting for other important political predictors like race or gender. And there’s evidence that the urban-rural divide has continued to increase since 2016. For example, San Diego has historically voted Republican, but the GOP was shut out of the 2020 mayoral election after two Democrats won the most votes in the city’s March jungle primary. At the same time, Republicans widened their margins in rural areas even amid their defeat in the 2018 midterms, and parts of Appalachia that had voted Democratic for generations now vote Republican up and down the ballot, completing their conversion to the GOP under President Trump.
It’s hard, however, to measure just how urban or rural a place is (although CityLab’s Congressional Density Index and The New York Times Upshot’s “neighborhood density” are good starts). So FiveThirtyEight came up with one of its own, which has already played a role in our 2020 primary forecast’s “fundamentals” calculations. Essentially, we calculated the average number of people living within a five-mile radius of every census tract and took the natural logarithm to create an “urbanization index,” or a calculation of how urban or rural a given area is. And this number can be calculated (via a weighted average based on each census tract’s population) for states, congressional districts, counties — or anything that is made up of census tracts. Here is a calculation for how urban or rural each of the 50 states is:
How urban or rural is your state? FiveThirtyEight’s partisan lean and urbanization index for each state State Partisan Lean Urbanization Index State Partisan Lean Urbanization Index New York D+22 12.56 North Carolina R+5 10.32 New Jersey D+13 12.24 Missouri R+19 10.20 California D+24 12.19 Nebraska R+24 10.20 Massachusetts D+29 11.84 Tennessee R+28 10.20 Nevada R+1 11.77 Wisconsin R+1 10.19 Rhode Island D+26 11.72 Louisiana R+17 10.18 Maryland D+23 11.71 Kansas R+23 10.12 Illinois D+13 11.62 South Carolina R+17 10.11 Florida R+5 11.46 Oklahoma R+34 9.94 Connecticut D+11 11.41 New Hampshire R+2 9.92 Arizona R+9 11.30 New Mexico D+7 9.90 Texas R+17 11.17 Kentucky R+23 9.79 Colorado D+1 11.15 Alabama R+27 9.61 Pennsylvania R+1 11.15 Idaho R+35 9.59 Washington D+12 11.12 Iowa R+6 9.59 Hawaii D+36 11.09 Arkansas R+24 9.26 Delaware D+14 11.01 West Virginia R+30 9.11 Utah R+31 10.96 North Dakota R+33 9.05 Virginia EVEN 10.91 Maine D+5 9.04 Ohio R+7 10.88 Mississippi R+15 8.91 Michigan D+1 10.81 Vermont D+24 8.84 Oregon D+9 10.71 Alaska R+15 8.74 Georgia R+12 10.55 South Dakota R+31 8.73 Minnesota D+2 10.46 Montana R+18 8.47 Indiana R+18 10.41 Wyoming R+47 8.26 Partisan lean is the average difference between how a state votes and how the country votes overall, with 2016 presidential election results weighted at 50 percent, 2012 presidential election results weighted at 25 percent and results from elections for the state legislature weighted at 25 percent. Note that FiveThirtyEight’s current partisan leans do not yet incorporate the results of the 2018 election. FiveThirtyEight’s urbanization index is calculated as the natural logarithm of the average number of people living within a five-mile radius of a given resident. Source: American Community Survey
You may have noticed a pattern in the table above. The states with the highest urbanization indices include a lot of blue states, like New York, New Jersey and California. Meanwhile, the rural end of the spectrum is populated with red states like Wyoming, Montana and South Dakota. Indeed, if we directly compare this metric with the results of the 2016 presidential election, we can quantify just how important the urban-rural divide has become in our politics.
As you can see in the chart below, 10 of the 13 most urban states voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016, while 12 of the 14 most rural states voted for Trump. The exceptions: the fairly urbanized states of Florida, Arizona and Texas, which went for Trump, and the more rural states of Vermont and Maine, which cast their ballots for Clinton.
It’s possible, too, that this relationship between a state’s “urbanness” and its presidential vote will get even stronger in 2020, as the correlation got noticeably tighter from 2012 to 2016 (the correlation coefficient was 0.55 in 2012 and 0.69 in 2016).
So let’s indulge in a little hypothetical and take this possibility to the extreme. What if the 2020 presidential vote were based purely on our urbanization index? According to our calculations, Democrats would win such a presidential election handily — 323 electoral votes to 215. And the election would produce a pretty funky-looking Electoral College map — one that looks simultaneously impossible and yet also like the logical conclusion of the way our politics has been trending. Here’s what the margin of victory would look like in each state:
What if the urban-rural divide dictated the 2020 election? The results of a hypothetical presidential election if a state’s urbanization were the only factor, based on the relationship between FiveThirtyEight’s urbanization index and 2016 presidential election results State Result State Result Alabama R+16.0 Montana R+30.8 Alaska R+27.3 Nebraska R+8.2 Arizona D+6.1 Nevada D+12.3 Arkansas R+20.5 New Hampshire R+11.9 California D+17.7 New Jersey D+18.3 Colorado D+4.2 New Mexico R+12.2 Connecticut D+7.6 New York D+22.5 Delaware D+2.3 North Carolina R+6.6 Florida D+8.3 North Dakota R+23.2 Georgia R+3.6 Ohio D+0.6 Hawaii D+3.3 Oklahoma R+11.6 Idaho R+16.1 Oregon R+1.5 Illinois D+10.3 Pennsylvania D+4.1 Indiana R+5.5 Rhode Island D+11.6 Iowa R+16.1 South Carolina R+9.4 Kansas R+9.3 South Dakota R+27.4 Kentucky R+13.6 Tennessee R+8.3 Louisiana R+8.6 Texas D+4.5 Maine R+23.4 Utah D+1.7 Maryland D+11.5 Vermont R+25.9 Massachusetts D+13.2 Virginia D+1.0 Michigan R+0.3 Washington D+3.8 Minnesota R+4.9 West Virginia R+22.4 Mississippi R+25.1 Wisconsin R+8.3 Missouri R+8.2 Wyoming R+33.6 Source: American Community Survey
Yes, some of the results are fantasies. Utah, despite being a bit more urban than your average state, is not going to vote Democratic any time soon. And if Vermont votes Republican by nearly 26 points, please pinch me.
But other results look more plausible, even if they are maybe a few election cycles away from this reality. In this scenario, the Midwest continues its embrace of the GOP, enough to make Minnesota a red state and Wisconsin go Republican by more than 8 points. Thanks to Chicago, Illinois would be the only Democratic bastion left in the region; Michigan and Ohio, though, would remain swing states.
Democrats, however, would more than make up for losses in the Midwest with wins in the Sun Belt. Florida, Arizona and Texas would become light blue states in this hypothetical. And given that these three states were decided by single digits in 2016, it’s actually not that far-fetched that they could vote Democratic in 2020 in real life. That said, two other emerging Democratic targets, Georgia and North Carolina, remain red states in a world where elections break down exactly along urban-rural lines.
Bear in mind that this exercise was, as they say, for entertainment purposes only. The urban-rural divide will never explain everything about our politics; indeed, analysis that places too much weight on it misses the fact that many African Americans in rural areas vote Democratic, or that many Cuban Americans in urban areas like Miami vote Republican. But it does help to illustrate why so many Democrats believe the path forward for their party is through the Sun Belt.
And indeed, early polls suggest former Vice President Joe Biden is competitive with Trump in Florida, Arizona and, to a lesser extent, Texas. In a simple average of eight Florida polls conducted since Jan. 1, Biden leads Trump 48 percent to 46 percent. And in a simple average of eight Arizona polls so far this year, Biden leads Trump 47 percent to 45 percent. But Biden still trails Trump, 48 percent to 44 percent, in a simple average of this year’s Texas polls. Still, that would be remarkably close for a state that Mitt Romney carried by nearly 16 points in 2012.
Obviously, these numbers can change; general-election polls have yet to come into their full predictive value. But if Biden does carry one or more of these states, he could have their high rate of urbanization to thank.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: Our 2020 Election Priors