fivethirtyeight--2020-10-19--The Most Vulnerable Incumbent In The House Is A Democrat, But Republicans Are Defending More Competi

The Most Vulnerable Incumbent In The House Is A Democrat, But Republicans Are Defending More Competitive Seats

In the face of a whirlwind presidential campaign and massive fundraising numbers coming out of marquee U.S. Senate contests , it ’ s easy to overlook what ’ s happening in the race for the U.S. House of Representatives .
That might be because Democrats look like strong bets to hold onto power there .
In fact , FiveThirtyEight ’ s forecast is most confident about the House , as the Deluxe version of our model gives Democrats a 95 in 100 shot at retaining control of the House , better than Joe Biden ’ s 88 in 100 chance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ 74 in 100 chance of capturing the Senate .
However , even if Democrats do hold onto the House , that doesn ’ t mean they ’ ll retain every seat they control .
In fact , there are a number of seats they might lose , including that of Minnesota Rep. Collin Peterson , the most vulnerable House incumbent seeking reelection in 2020 .
The Deluxe version of our House forecast only gives him about a 1 in 4 shot of winning in Minnesota ’ s 7th Congressional District against Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come down partly to the makeup of his rural district in western Minnesota .
The 7th Congressional District is 26 points more Republican than the country as a whole , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s partisan lean metric , making it the most GOP-leaning House seat held by a Democrat .
Seeking his 16th term in office , Peterson has won past elections as a Democrat thanks to his moderate views , his anti-abortion stance and his focus on agricultural issues .
And as the chair of the House Agriculture Committee , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interests , especially the sugar beet industry , which is important to his constituency .
Still , the rightward shift in his district in the last decade or so narrowed his margin of victory to about 4 points in 2018 .
But beyond the seat ’ s increasingly deep red hue , Peterson is up against his most daunting challenger in years .
Fischbach served as the state ’ s lieutenant governor and , before that , as president of the Minnesota Senate .
And unlike recent Peterson opponents , Fischbach has nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , Republican groups have spent $ 5 million on her behalf , while Peterson has received a little less than $ 4 million in outside support .
It ’ s no wonder then that the expert handicappers at The Cook Political Report , Inside Elections and Sabato ’ s Crystal Ball all rate this race as a toss-up , which factors into the Deluxe version of our forecast .
However , despite Peterson ’ s trying circumstances , the good news for Democrats is that his vulnerability makes him a rare bird @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic-held House seats , Democrats are clear underdogs in just Peterson ’ s district .
In fact , as the table below shows , Democrats are slightly favored in most competitive seats they are defending ( races where they have less than a 3 in 4 shot of winning ) .
Just two other Democratic incumbents face toss-up races : Rep. Kendra Horn in Oklahoma ’ s 5th Congressional District and Rep. TJ Cox in California ’ s 21st Congressional District .
Horn ’ s race is particularly close , as the district @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more Republican than the country as a whole ) and she won in 2018 by just 1 point .
Meanwhile , Cox is defending more Democratic-leaning turf , but he ’ s faced scrutiny over owing back taxes and is running against former Republican Rep. David Valadao , whom Cox edged out by a slim margin in 2018 ( less than 1 point ) .
And in California ’ s top-two primary system back in March , Cox trailed Valadao by 11 points , which could be a poor harbinger for the freshman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the others where Democrats are marginally favored , could be especially vulnerable if things go better for Trump than currently expected .
Nevertheless , Democrats are helped out by the fact that they have incumbents running in all but one of these seats , and 12 are freshmen incumbents who have raised huge sums of money .
By comparison , Republicans find themselves defending far more vulnerable seats than Democrats despite controlling fewer seats overall .
This is mostly thanks to redistricting , retirements and the Democratic-leaning electoral environment .
As the table @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in three Republican-held seats , roughly 50-50 in nine others and have less than a 3 in 4 shot of winning in 13 more .
Two North Carolina seats are almost surefire Democratic pickups due to court-ordered redistricting , while retiring Rep. Will Hurd ’ s seat in Texas ’ s 23rd Congressional District is leaning toward the Democrats , too .
Retirements and primary losses have left five of the nine GOP toss-up seats open , which helps Democrats even if the incumbency advantage isn ’ t what it once was .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward Republicans are all seats that could conceivably flip toward Democrats if 2020 is another “ blue wave ” election .
Put it all together and you can see why the Democrats ’ chances of holding onto the House look pretty good , even if they do have the most endangered incumbent up in 2020 .

In the face of a whirlwind presidential campaign and massive fundraising numbers coming out of marquee U.S. Senate contests, it’s easy to overlook what’s happening in the race for the U.S. House of Representatives. That might be because Democrats look like strong bets to hold onto power there. In fact, FiveThirtyEight’s forecast is most confident about the House, as the Deluxe version of our model gives Democrats a 95 in 100 shot at retaining control of the House, better than Joe Biden’s 88 in 100 chance of winning the presidency or the Democrats’ 74 in 100 chance of capturing the Senate.
However, even if Democrats do hold onto the House, that doesn’t mean they’ll retain every seat they control. In fact, there are a number of seats they might lose, including that of Minnesota Rep. Collin Peterson, the most vulnerable House incumbent seeking reelection in 2020. The Deluxe version of our House forecast only gives him about a 1 in 4 shot of winning in Minnesota’s 7th Congressional District against Republican Michelle Fischbach.
Peterson’s chances come down partly to the makeup of his rural district in western Minnesota. The 7th Congressional District is 26 points more Republican than the country as a whole, according to FiveThirtyEight’s partisan lean metric, making it the most GOP-leaning House seat held by a Democrat. Seeking his 16th term in office, Peterson has won past elections as a Democrat thanks to his moderate views, his anti-abortion stance and his focus on agricultural issues. And as the chair of the House Agriculture Committee, he’s been very attentive to farming interests, especially the sugar beet industry, which is important to his constituency. Still, the rightward shift in his district in the last decade or so narrowed his margin of victory to about 4 points in 2018.
But beyond the seat’s increasingly deep red hue, Peterson is up against his most daunting challenger in years. Fischbach served as the state’s lieutenant governor and, before that, as president of the Minnesota Senate. And unlike recent Peterson opponents, Fischbach has nearly matched his fundraising. On top of that, Republican groups have spent $5 million on her behalf, while Peterson has received a little less than $4 million in outside support. It’s no wonder then that the expert handicappers at The Cook Political Report, Inside Elections and Sabato’s Crystal Ball all rate this race as a toss-up, which factors into the Deluxe version of our forecast.
However, despite Peterson’s trying circumstances, the good news for Democrats is that his vulnerability makes him a rare bird in 2020. Of the most endangered Democratic-held House seats, Democrats are clear underdogs in just Peterson’s district. In fact, as the table below shows, Democrats are slightly favored in most competitive seats they are defending (races where they have less than a 3 in 4 shot of winning). Just two other Democratic incumbents face toss-up races: Rep. Kendra Horn in Oklahoma’s 5th Congressional District and Rep. TJ Cox in California’s 21st Congressional District.
Endangered Democrats are still mostly favored Democratic-held seats that Democrats have less than a 75 in 100 shot of winning in the Deluxe version of FiveThirtyEight’s House forecast, as of 4:30 p.m. on Oct. 19 District Democratic Incumbent Partisan Lean Win chance Rating MN-07 Collin Peterson R+26 24% Likely R OK-05 Kendra Horn R+13 49 Toss-up CA-21 TJ Cox D+9 53 Toss-up UT-04 Ben McAdams R+19 63 Lean D NM-02 Xochitl Torres Small R+10 64 Lean D SC-01 Joe Cunningham R+18 64 Lean D CA-48 Harly Rouda R+8 66 Lean D GA-06 Lucy McBath R+15 68 Lean D NY-22 Anthony Brindisi R+12 69 Lean D NV-04 Steven Horsford D+2 70 Lean D IA-02 OPEN R+3 71 Lean D NY-11 Max Rose R+7 72 Lean D NJ-07 Tom Malinowski R+6 72 Lean D CA-39 Gil Cisneros R+1 73 Lean D TX-07 Lizzie Fletcher R+12 74 Lean D
Horn’s race is particularly close, as the district is still heavily red (13 points more Republican than the country as a whole) and she won in 2018 by just 1 point. Meanwhile, Cox is defending more Democratic-leaning turf, but he’s faced scrutiny over owing back taxes and is running against former Republican Rep. David Valadao, whom Cox edged out by a slim margin in 2018 (less than 1 point). And in California’s top-two primary system back in March, Cox trailed Valadao by 11 points, which could be a poor harbinger for the freshman incumbent.
These three seats, plus the others where Democrats are marginally favored, could be especially vulnerable if things go better for Trump than currently expected. Nevertheless, Democrats are helped out by the fact that they have incumbents running in all but one of these seats, and 12 are freshmen incumbents who have raised huge sums of money.
By comparison, Republicans find themselves defending far more vulnerable seats than Democrats despite controlling fewer seats overall. This is mostly thanks to redistricting, retirements and the Democratic-leaning electoral environment. As the table below shows, GOP candidates are underdogs in three Republican-held seats, roughly 50-50 in nine others and have less than a 3 in 4 shot of winning in 13 more.
Republicans hold more vulnerable seats than Democrats Republican-held seats that Republicans have less than a 75 in 100 shot of winning in the Deluxe version of FiveThirtyEight’s House forecast, as of 4:30 p.m. on Oct. 19 District Republican incumbent Partisan Lean Win chance Rating NC-02 OPEN D+20 <1% Safe D NC-06 OPEN D+19 <1 Safe D TX-23 OPEN R+4 27 Lean D NY-02 OPEN R+7 43 Toss-up CA-25 Mike Garcia R+2 45 Toss-up VA-05 OPEN R+7 48 Toss-up IN-05 OPEN R+15 54 Toss-up NJ-02 Jeff Van Drew R+5 53 Toss-up PA-10 Scott Perry R+11 55 Toss-up GA-07 OPEN R+18 56 Toss-up NE-02 Don Bacon R+5 58 Toss-up TX-24 OPEN R+17 60 Toss-up CO-03 OPEN R+15 60 Lean R NY-24 John Katko D+6 60 Lean R TX-22 OPEN R+19 64 Lean R OH-01 Steve Chabot R+8 65 Lean R AZ-06 David Schweikert R+16 66 Lean R IL-13 Rodney Davis R+8 67 Lean R NC-08 Richard Hudson R+8 67 Lean R TX-21 Chip Roy R+20 69 Lean R MN-01 Jim Hagedorn R+12 70 Lean R MO-02 Ann Wagner R+17 70 Lean R MI-06 Fred Upton R+3 72 Lean R AR-02 French Hill R+11 73 Lean R MT-AL OPEN R+18 73 Lean R
Two North Carolina seats are almost surefire Democratic pickups due to court-ordered redistricting, while retiring Rep. Will Hurd’s seat in Texas’s 23rd Congressional District is leaning toward the Democrats, too. Retirements and primary losses have left five of the nine GOP toss-up seats open, which helps Democrats even if the incumbency advantage isn’t what it once was. Lastly, the 13 seats that lean toward Republicans are all seats that could conceivably flip toward Democrats if 2020 is another “blue wave” election.
Put it all together and you can see why the Democrats’ chances of holding onto the House look pretty good, even if they do have the most endangered incumbent up in 2020.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-19--Do You Buy That … Republicans Should Be Worried About The Early Voting Turnout So Far?

Do You Buy That … Republicans Should Be Worried About The Early Voting Turnout So Far ?


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-20--Could Democrats Win Full Control Of More State Governments Than Republicans?

According to the FiveThirtyEight forecast , Democrats have a 72 percent chance of winning a federal government trifecta : that is , control of the presidency , Senate and House .
But the 2020 election could also usher in a number of new trifectas on the state level .
Single-party control of the governor ’ s office , state Senate and state House can enable that party to pass its agenda unencumbered , as Democrats showed after the 2018 midterms .
The party used the six state-government trifectas it gained that year to pass major liberal legislation like funding full-day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wage in Illinois and setting ambitious renewable-energy goals in New Mexico .
Democrats also broke up total Republican control of four other states , allowing them to take a hard line in negotiations with the GOP and bend legislation to their will .
However , thanks to their dominance of state-level elections during the Obama administration , Republicans still enjoy more state-government trifectas than their rivals : They have full control of 21 state governments , while Democrats have full control of 15 .
Going by population , that means roughly 40 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican control , while 37 percent live in Democratic trifecta states .
Now , with another Democratic wave election looming in 2020 , the balance of power in state governments could finally flip .
Thanks to the more than 5,800 state legislative seats and 11 governorships on the ballot on Nov. 3 , control of at least 11 state governments is up for grabs in 2020 .
That means Democrats have at least eight chances to either break up a Republican trifecta or gain one of their own .
But don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also has quite a few opportunities of its own .
Of all the states where Republicans are in danger of losing their grip on state government , Texas would be the most consequential .
Democrats would gain a seat at the table in not only policymaking that affects 27.9 million people , but also the drawing of almost 40 congressional districts in the upcoming redistricting process .
( More on that next week . )
Just a few years ago , Republicans losing control of Austin would have been unthinkable — but in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seats in the Texas state House , meaning the party needs to net only nine more seats to take control of the chamber .
And thanks to Texas ’ s recent leftward shift ( especially in the suburbs ) , there ’ s a clear path for them to do it : In 2018 , Democratic Senate candidate Beto O ’ Rourke carried exactly nine state House seats that are still held by Republicans — showing that those districts are willing to vote Democratic in the right circumstances — and he came close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats are targeting about 22 seats in the chamber , though they also need to defend the 12 they picked up in 2018 .
Democrats could also take control of the Arizona state Legislature , although the trifecta is out of reach as Republican Gov .
Doug Ducey still has two years left in his term .
In her successful 2018 Senate campaign , Democrat Kyrsten Sinema carried three state Senate seats currently held by Republicans — exactly the number Democrats need to now flip in order to control the chamber .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the state House ( 31 seats to 29 ) , prompting one Republican consultant to tell The Arizona Republic that he thought Democrats had a good chance to win it for the first time in 54 years .
Democrats could also end the Republican trifecta in Iowa by flipping the state House , which Republicans control 53 seats to 47 .
However , this will be more of a challenge , as Democrats must also defend 13 of their own members who sit in districts that voted for President Trump in 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are targeting at least 10 Republican-held seats , while Republicans hope to flip at least five Democratic-held ones .
Finally , Democrats also have an outside shot at ending total Republican control of Missouri state government if Democrat and state Auditor Nicole Galloway defeats Republican incumbent Mike Parson in the governor ’ s race .
However , this is probably a long shot , as Parson has led handily in most polls .
Where Democrats could take full control Democrats already capitalized on their most realistic trifecta opportunities in 2018 , but there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the party could take full control of government .
The most obvious is Minnesota , where the local Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party lacks control of only the state Senate .
The DFL has six Republican-held seats in its sights , although it needs to net just two to win a majority .
Conveniently enough , Republicans currently represent two suburban Twin Cities districts that voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and are only getting more Democratic with time .
However , Republicans have plenty of ways to stop a DFL trifecta even if they lose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eyeing five DFL-held Senate seats and would love to flip the state House as well , although the math — the DFL has a 16-seat advantage in the lower chamber — makes the latter more unlikely .
If Democrats are really lucky , they could also give Democratic Gov .
Tom Wolf a Democratic legislature to work with in Pennsylvania .
Despite maps that were drawn to favor Republicans , Democrats steamrolled Republicans in metro Philadelphia in 2018 , cutting their deficit to four seats in the state Senate and nine seats in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the remaining competitive seats are the heaviest lifts for Democrats , although they do have around 15 pickup opportunities in the House ( though Republicans have 12 of their own ) .
And in the Senate , Democrats have no margin for error on their path to a majority : They must flip all four vulnerable Republican-held seats while defending two seats around Pittsburgh .
It ’ s a tall order , but not impossible given that Biden is leading by an average of 7 points in Pennsylvania .
Where Republicans could take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much less populous states , Republicans could also gain power from the 2020 election .
For example , Republican Rep. Greg Gianforte is leading in polls for Montana governor , an open seat being vacated by Democrat Steve Bullock .
And with both chambers of the Montana state Legislature firmly in Republican hands , a Gianforte win would produce another Republican trifecta .
Republicans could also take full control of Alaska state government simply by standing pat in the state House .
( They already control the governorship and state Senate . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ House has been controlled by a coalition of Democrats , independents and moderate Republicans despite Republicans technically occupying 23 of the chamber ’ s 40 seats .
However , with the defeat of two of those moderate Republicans in this year ’ s primaries and the defection of at least two others , Republicans appear to have the numbers to form a state House majority next year — even if no seats switch parties in the election .
On the other hand , Republicans have only one realistic chance of ending a Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s state Senate or state House .
But although national handicappers and state experts disagree on which chamber is more endangered , all parties agree that Democrats have the upper hand in both .
A recent Bangor Daily News/Digital Research poll found that Democrats led Republicans , 51 percent to 44 percent , on the generic legislative ballot , and outside Democratic groups have spent nearly four times as much as Republican ones .
Where either party could take full control Finally , there are two states where all three components of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either party could emerge with total control of government .
However , the most likely outcome in both may be a split decision .
In North Carolina , Republican legislators drew themselves very safe districts for a majority of the decade , but court-ordered redistricting has opened the door for Democrats to net the five seats they need in the state Senate and the six seats they need in the state House .
However , the new maps still lean Republican overall : The tipping-point district went for Trump by 10 points in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the state House .
And Republicans could still seize the trifecta by defeating Democratic Gov .
Roy Cooper , but virtually every poll has shown the incumbent ahead , usually by double digits .
The parties ’ positions are flipped in New Hampshire , where Republican Chris Sununu sits in the governor ’ s office and Democrats currently control both chambers of the legislature .
Although New Hampshire is likely to go blue on the presidential level , Sununu is unlikely to lose his bid for a third term .
That leaves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they need in the state Senate and 44 seats they need in the House .
That second part might sound impossible — and it will definitely be a challenge — but New Hampshire ’ s oddly drawn , 400-member state House is known for swinging wildly back and forth between the parties depending on the mood of the electorate .
Finally , one state without a trifecta in play deserves an honorable mention .
With neither Democratic Gov .
Gretchen Whitmer nor the Republican-held state Senate up for election in 2020 , Michigan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the next two years .
However , the Michigan state House is one of the most competitive legislative chambers in the country this year .
Republicans hold just a 58-52 majority and are defending four seats Whitmer carried in 2018 — three of which are open seats due to term limits .
If Democrats flip the chamber , it would be the culmination of a decade-long Democratic effort : According to Daily Kos Elections , Michigan Democrats won the state House popular vote in 2012 , 2014 and 2018 , yet fell @ @ @ @ @ @ @

According to the FiveThirtyEight forecast, Democrats have a 72 percent chance of winning a federal government trifecta: that is, control of the presidency, Senate and House. But the 2020 election could also usher in a number of new trifectas on the state level.
[Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems]
Single-party control of the governor’s office, state Senate and state House can enable that party to pass its agenda unencumbered, as Democrats showed after the 2018 midterms. The party used the six state-government trifectas it gained that year to pass major liberal legislation like funding full-day kindergarten in Colorado, raising the minimum wage in Illinois and setting ambitious renewable-energy goals in New Mexico. Democrats also broke up total Republican control of four other states, allowing them to take a hard line in negotiations with the GOP and bend legislation to their will.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: What full Democratic control would look like
However, thanks to their dominance of state-level elections during the Obama administration, Republicans still enjoy more state-government trifectas than their rivals: They have full control of 21 state governments, while Democrats have full control of 15. Going by population, that means roughly 40 percent of Americans live in states under complete Republican control, while 37 percent live in Democratic trifecta states.
Which party controls state government? Control of the governorship, state Senate and state House in all 50 states State Governor State Senate State House Trifecta? Alabama R R R ✓ Alaska* R R D Arizona R R R ✓ Arkansas R R R ✓ California D D D ✓ Colorado D D D ✓ Connecticut D D D ✓ Delaware D D D ✓ Florida R R R ✓ Georgia R R R ✓ Hawaii D D D ✓ Idaho R R R ✓ Illinois D D D ✓ Indiana R R R ✓ Iowa R R R ✓ Kansas D R R Kentucky D R R Louisiana D R R Maine D D D ✓ Maryland R D D Massachusetts R D D Michigan D R R Minnesota D R D Mississippi R R R ✓ Missouri R R R ✓ Montana D R R Nebraska† R R ✓ Nevada D D D ✓ New Hampshire R D D New Jersey D D D ✓ New Mexico D D D ✓ New York D D D ✓ North Carolina D R R North Dakota R R R ✓ Ohio R R R ✓ Oklahoma R R R ✓ Oregon D D D ✓ Pennsylvania D R R Rhode Island D D D ✓ South Carolina R R R ✓ South Dakota R R R ✓ Tennessee R R R ✓ Texas R R R ✓ Utah R R R ✓ Vermont R D D Virginia D D D ✓ Washington D D D ✓ West Virginia R R R ✓ Wisconsin D R R Wyoming R R R ✓ For the purposes of this table, House refers to a state’s lower legislative chamber. *The Alaska state House has been controlled by a coalition of Democrats, independents and moderate Republicans. †Nebraska has only one legislative chamber. It is nominally nonpartisan but in practice is controlled by Republicans. Sources: National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors Association
Now, with another Democratic wave election looming in 2020, the balance of power in state governments could finally flip. Thanks to the more than 5,800 state legislative seats and 11 governorships on the ballot on Nov. 3, control of at least 11 state governments is up for grabs in 2020. That means Democrats have at least eight chances to either break up a Republican trifecta or gain one of their own. But don’t count Republicans out either — the GOP also has quite a few opportunities of its own.
Where Democrats could break Republican trifectas
Of all the states where Republicans are in danger of losing their grip on state government, Texas would be the most consequential. Democrats would gain a seat at the table in not only policymaking that affects 27.9 million people, but also the drawing of almost 40 congressional districts in the upcoming redistricting process. (More on that next week.)
Just a few years ago, Republicans losing control of Austin would have been unthinkable — but in the 2018 midterms, Democrats flipped 12 seats in the Texas state House, meaning the party needs to net only nine more seats to take control of the chamber. And thanks to Texas’s recent leftward shift (especially in the suburbs), there’s a clear path for them to do it: In 2018, Democratic Senate candidate Beto O’Rourke carried exactly nine state House seats that are still held by Republicans — showing that those districts are willing to vote Democratic in the right circumstances — and he came close in several more. In total, Democrats are targeting about 22 seats in the chamber, though they also need to defend the 12 they picked up in 2018.
Democrats could also take control of the Arizona state Legislature, although the trifecta is out of reach as Republican Gov. Doug Ducey still has two years left in his term. In her successful 2018 Senate campaign, Democrat Kyrsten Sinema carried three state Senate seats currently held by Republicans — exactly the number Democrats need to now flip in order to control the chamber. And Republicans currently have an even narrower advantage in the state House (31 seats to 29), prompting one Republican consultant to tell The Arizona Republic that he thought Democrats had a good chance to win it for the first time in 54 years.
Democrats could also end the Republican trifecta in Iowa by flipping the state House, which Republicans control 53 seats to 47. However, this will be more of a challenge, as Democrats must also defend 13 of their own members who sit in districts that voted for President Trump in 2016. Based on TV spending, Democrats are targeting at least 10 Republican-held seats, while Republicans hope to flip at least five Democratic-held ones.
Finally, Democrats also have an outside shot at ending total Republican control of Missouri state government if Democrat and state Auditor Nicole Galloway defeats Republican incumbent Mike Parson in the governor’s race. However, this is probably a long shot, as Parson has led handily in most polls.
Where Democrats could take full control
Democrats already capitalized on their most realistic trifecta opportunities in 2018, but there are still a few states left where the party could take full control of government. The most obvious is Minnesota, where the local Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party lacks control of only the state Senate. The DFL has six Republican-held seats in its sights, although it needs to net just two to win a majority. Conveniently enough, Republicans currently represent two suburban Twin Cities districts that voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and are only getting more Democratic with time. However, Republicans have plenty of ways to stop a DFL trifecta even if they lose those two seats. The GOP is eyeing five DFL-held Senate seats and would love to flip the state House as well, although the math — the DFL has a 16-seat advantage in the lower chamber — makes the latter more unlikely.
If Democrats are really lucky, they could also give Democratic Gov. Tom Wolf a Democratic legislature to work with in Pennsylvania. Despite maps that were drawn to favor Republicans, Democrats steamrolled Republicans in metro Philadelphia in 2018, cutting their deficit to four seats in the state Senate and nine seats in the state House. Of course, the remaining competitive seats are the heaviest lifts for Democrats, although they do have around 15 pickup opportunities in the House (though Republicans have 12 of their own). And in the Senate, Democrats have no margin for error on their path to a majority: They must flip all four vulnerable Republican-held seats while defending two seats around Pittsburgh. It’s a tall order, but not impossible given that Biden is leading by an average of 7 points in Pennsylvania.
Where Republicans could take full control
Although their opportunities come in much less populous states, Republicans could also gain power from the 2020 election. For example, Republican Rep. Greg Gianforte is leading in polls for Montana governor, an open seat being vacated by Democrat Steve Bullock. And with both chambers of the Montana state Legislature firmly in Republican hands, a Gianforte win would produce another Republican trifecta.
Republicans could also take full control of Alaska state government simply by standing pat in the state House. (They already control the governorship and state Senate.) For the last two years, the House has been controlled by a coalition of Democrats, independents and moderate Republicans despite Republicans technically occupying 23 of the chamber’s 40 seats. However, with the defeat of two of those moderate Republicans in this year’s primaries and the defection of at least two others, Republicans appear to have the numbers to form a state House majority next year — even if no seats switch parties in the election.
How voting is going so far in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
Where Republicans could break a Democratic trifecta
On the other hand, Republicans have only one realistic chance of ending a Democratic trifecta: by flipping either Maine’s state Senate or state House. But although national handicappers and state experts disagree on which chamber is more endangered, all parties agree that Democrats have the upper hand in both. A recent Bangor Daily News/Digital Research poll found that Democrats led Republicans, 51 percent to 44 percent, on the generic legislative ballot, and outside Democratic groups have spent nearly four times as much as Republican ones.
Where either party could take full control
Finally, there are two states where all three components of a trifecta are competitive in 2020, meaning either party could emerge with total control of government. However, the most likely outcome in both may be a split decision.
In North Carolina, Republican legislators drew themselves very safe districts for a majority of the decade, but court-ordered redistricting has opened the door for Democrats to net the five seats they need in the state Senate and the six seats they need in the state House. However, the new maps still lean Republican overall: The tipping-point district went for Trump by 10 points in the state Senate and by 12 points in the state House. And Republicans could still seize the trifecta by defeating Democratic Gov. Roy Cooper, but virtually every poll has shown the incumbent ahead, usually by double digits.
The parties’ positions are flipped in New Hampshire, where Republican Chris Sununu sits in the governor’s office and Democrats currently control both chambers of the legislature. Although New Hampshire is likely to go blue on the presidential level, Sununu is unlikely to lose his bid for a third term. That leaves Republicans fighting to flip the three seats they need in the state Senate and 44 seats they need in the House. That second part might sound impossible — and it will definitely be a challenge — but New Hampshire’s oddly drawn, 400-member state House is known for swinging wildly back and forth between the parties depending on the mood of the electorate.
One last competitive chamber
Finally, one state without a trifecta in play deserves an honorable mention. With neither Democratic Gov. Gretchen Whitmer nor the Republican-held state Senate up for election in 2020, Michigan is guaranteed to still have divided government for the next two years. However, the Michigan state House is one of the most competitive legislative chambers in the country this year. Republicans hold just a 58-52 majority and are defending four seats Whitmer carried in 2018 — three of which are open seats due to term limits. If Democrats flip the chamber, it would be the culmination of a decade-long Democratic effort: According to Daily Kos Elections, Michigan Democrats won the state House popular vote in 2012, 2014 and 2018, yet fell short of the majority every time.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-20--Why Trump Is Losing White Suburban Women

Over the past few months , President Trump has framed the 2020 election as a defense of suburbia .
In a Wall Street Journal column in August , he and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Ben Carson promised to protect the suburbs from being transformed into “ dysfunctional cities.
” And in a tweet several days later , Trump warned that suburban women should be wary of Democrats , as they would allow crime to drift into suburban communities .
More recently , the president has grown less subtle , imploring suburban women at his rally in Johnstown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ [ C ] an I ask you to do me a favor , suburban women ?
Will you please like me ?
Please .
Please .
I saved your damn neighborhood , OK ?
” The suburbs , in Trump ’ s telling , are under siege — and a Joe Biden presidency would transform them beyond recognition .
But it might be that Trump doesn ’ t actually recognize what suburbia looks like today .
Establishing what constitutes a “ suburb ” is hard ; there is no single definition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the past 40 years , the suburbs have become much more diverse .
This is bad news for Trump , as his vision of suburbia seems largely stuck in the 1950s — a manicured lawn , a husband heading into the city to work at a white-collar job , and a “ housewife ” tending to the children and preparing dinner .
Only this version of suburbia doesn ’ t really exist anymore .
It wasn ’ t that long ago , though , that Trump had an edge among suburban voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 47 percent to 45 percent , according to an analysis of validated voters by the Pew Research Center .
But by 2018 , 52 percent of suburban voters supported Democratic candidates for Congress , compared with 45 percent who supported Republican candidates .
And according to our analysis of polling data from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape , Trump is losing suburban voters to Biden , by 54 percent to 44 percent .
What is driving this move away from Trump and Republicans in the suburbs ?
According to our analysis of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beyond the diversification of the suburbs , it ’ s mostly because of white suburban women : 54 percent of them support Biden , while just 45 percent support Trump ( very few are undecided ) .
Meanwhile , white suburban men haven ’ t stopped backing Trump — he ’ s winning them 57 percent to 41 percent .
( The reason we ’ re zooming in on white suburban voters is that nonwhite voters in the suburbs are much more likely to say they ’ ll back Biden — 83 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islander , and 57 percent of Hispanic likely voters said they supported Biden , according to our analysis . )
There is , of course , still a significant share of white women in the suburbs who are on Trump ’ s side ( 45 percent ) , but as you can see in the chart above , white men support Trump much more overall .
And Trump may actually be reaching those men with pleas ostensibly geared toward women , according to Jane Junn , a political science professor at the University @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talked about suburban housewives , I think the message was as much to men as it was to women , ” Junn said .
“ It was a shoutout to their masculinity.
” One reason why white suburban men might be more receptive to Trump ’ s racially coded appeals and callouts to traditional gender roles is that white suburban men tend to score higher than white suburban women on questions of racial resentment and hostile sexism , even among Democrats .
The one exception to this , as the chart below shows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In this case , men ’ s and women ’ s racial resentment scores are basically the same , which is somewhat expected as partisanship is a big driver of issues like racial discrimination and sexism .
However , white suburban Republican women were less likely to score high on the question we used to measure gender resentment , about whether women who complain of harassment often cause more problems than they solve .
This signals that , compared with white men , they may be less receptive to Trump ’ s rhetoric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that could be a big problem for Trump since sexist attitudes strongly correlated with support for him in 2016 .
The same is true of some of Trump ’ s core campaign issues , like immigration , which don ’ t seem to resonate as much with white suburban Republican women as with white suburban Republican men .
Of the five issues we looked at , white Republican women in the suburbs were far less hard-line than their male counterparts .
On some issues , like support for building a wall along the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t much difference , but on the question of separating a child if their parents could be prosecuted for entering the U.S. illegally , the gap in support was huge : Just 25 percent of white suburban Republican women supported that policy compared with 46 percent of white suburban Republican men .
There was also a sizable gap on support for the deportation of all undocumented immigrants .
While not directly related to the law-and-order rhetoric that Trump has been leaning into recently , immigration is a good example of why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a souring effect on white women , but not on white men .
Claiming that immigration and crime are threats to the suburbs is a strategy that often works to remind white Republican women why they ’ re Republican , according to Jessica Trounstine , a political science professor at University of California , Merced , but this might not land with voters in the same way this year .
That ’ s because the white women most likely to find Trump ’ s messages appealing are probably the ones who stuck with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ words , according to Junn of USC , the white women who abandoned Republicans in 2018 aren ’ t likely to be persuaded to come back based on this messaging .
White suburban men , however , don ’ t seem to be as badly shaken , and because their more traditionalist gender views make that retro vision of the suburbs more appealing , their support for the president might even be reinforced by his talk about suburban women .
The trouble for Trump is that simply holding onto the votes of white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he needs to make up for lost ground among white suburban women , too .
But with only two weeks left until Election Day , there might not be much he can do to bring them back .

Over the past few months, President Trump has framed the 2020 election as a defense of suburbia. In a Wall Street Journal column in August, he and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Ben Carson promised to protect the suburbs from being transformed into “dysfunctional cities.” And in a tweet several days later, Trump warned that suburban women should be wary of Democrats, as they would allow crime to drift into suburban communities. More recently, the president has grown less subtle, imploring suburban women at his rally in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, last week to like him. “[C]an I ask you to do me a favor, suburban women? Will you please like me? Please. Please. I saved your damn neighborhood, OK?”
How does early voting affect the forecast? l FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
The suburbs, in Trump’s telling, are under siege — and a Joe Biden presidency would transform them beyond recognition. But it might be that Trump doesn’t actually recognize what suburbia looks like today.
[Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems]
Establishing what constitutes a “suburb” is hard; there is no single definition, and what’s more, in the past 40 years, the suburbs have become much more diverse. This is bad news for Trump, as his vision of suburbia seems largely stuck in the 1950s — a manicured lawn, a husband heading into the city to work at a white-collar job, and a “housewife” tending to the children and preparing dinner. Only this version of suburbia doesn’t really exist anymore.
It wasn’t that long ago, though, that Trump had an edge among suburban voters. In 2016, Trump won them, 47 percent to 45 percent, according to an analysis of validated voters by the Pew Research Center. But by 2018, 52 percent of suburban voters supported Democratic candidates for Congress, compared with 45 percent who supported Republican candidates. And according to our analysis of polling data from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, Trump is losing suburban voters to Biden, by 54 percent to 44 percent.
What is driving this move away from Trump and Republicans in the suburbs? According to our analysis of Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape data, beyond the diversification of the suburbs, it’s mostly because of white suburban women: 54 percent of them support Biden, while just 45 percent support Trump (very few are undecided). Meanwhile, white suburban men haven’t stopped backing Trump — he’s winning them 57 percent to 41 percent. (The reason we’re zooming in on white suburban voters is that nonwhite voters in the suburbs are much more likely to say they’ll back Biden — 83 percent of Black, 69 percent of Asian/Pacific Islander, and 57 percent of Hispanic likely voters said they supported Biden, according to our analysis.)
There is, of course, still a significant share of white women in the suburbs who are on Trump’s side (45 percent), but as you can see in the chart above, white men support Trump much more overall. And Trump may actually be reaching those men with pleas ostensibly geared toward women, according to Jane Junn, a political science professor at the University of Southern California. “When he talked about suburban housewives, I think the message was as much to men as it was to women,” Junn said. “It was a shoutout to their masculinity.”
One reason why white suburban men might be more receptive to Trump’s racially coded appeals and callouts to traditional gender roles is that white suburban men tend to score higher than white suburban women on questions of racial resentment and hostile sexism, even among Democrats. The one exception to this, as the chart below shows, is among white suburban Republicans. In this case, men’s and women’s racial resentment scores are basically the same, which is somewhat expected as partisanship is a big driver of issues like racial discrimination and sexism.
However, white suburban Republican women were less likely to score high on the question we used to measure gender resentment, about whether women who complain of harassment often cause more problems than they solve. This signals that, compared with white men, they may be less receptive to Trump’s rhetoric concerning women this time around. And that could be a big problem for Trump since sexist attitudes strongly correlated with support for him in 2016.
The same is true of some of Trump’s core campaign issues, like immigration, which don’t seem to resonate as much with white suburban Republican women as with white suburban Republican men. Of the five issues we looked at, white Republican women in the suburbs were far less hard-line than their male counterparts. On some issues, like support for building a wall along the southern U.S. border with Mexico, there wasn’t much difference, but on the question of separating a child if their parents could be prosecuted for entering the U.S. illegally, the gap in support was huge: Just 25 percent of white suburban Republican women supported that policy compared with 46 percent of white suburban Republican men. There was also a sizable gap on support for the deportation of all undocumented immigrants.
White suburban Republicans are divided on immigration Share of white suburban Republican likely voters who said they support the following immigration policies, by gender Policy Men Women The border wall 75% 72% Child separation 46 25 Path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants 41 37 Deportation of all undocumented immigrants 64 52 Path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants brought to U.S. as children 60 64 Averaged from surveys conducted Sept. 3 to Oct. 7. Source: DEMOCRACY FUND + UCLA NATIONSCAPE
While not directly related to the law-and-order rhetoric that Trump has been leaning into recently, immigration is a good example of why Trump’s presidency may have had a souring effect on white women, but not on white men. Claiming that immigration and crime are threats to the suburbs is a strategy that often works to remind white Republican women why they’re Republican, according to Jessica Trounstine, a political science professor at University of California, Merced, but this might not land with voters in the same way this year. That’s because the white women most likely to find Trump’s messages appealing are probably the ones who stuck with the Republicans in 2018. In other words, according to Junn of USC, the white women who abandoned Republicans in 2018 aren’t likely to be persuaded to come back based on this messaging.
White suburban men, however, don’t seem to be as badly shaken, and because their more traditionalist gender views make that retro vision of the suburbs more appealing, their support for the president might even be reinforced by his talk about suburban women. The trouble for Trump is that simply holding onto the votes of white suburban men isn’t enough — he needs to make up for lost ground among white suburban women, too. But with only two weeks left until Election Day, there might not be much he can do to bring them back.
Over 25 million have already voted, but this is what pollsters expected: Nate Silver


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-20--The Most Competitive Races Aren’t In Michigan, Wisconsin or Pennsylvania

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew keys in on the most competitive races of 2020 @ @ @ @ @ re not in Michigan , Wisconsin or Pennsylvania , even though those states may be @ @ @ @ @ deciding the presidential race

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew keys in on the most competitive races of 2020. Spoiler: They’re not in Michigan, Wisconsin or Pennsylvania, even though those states may be the most important ones in deciding the presidential race


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-20--Politics Podcast: The Most Competitive Races In 2020

In covering the 2020 election , we ’ ve focused plenty on the likeliest tipping-point states — the states likeliest to give the winning candidate his 270th electoral vote .
Those states include Pennsylvania , Wisconsin , Florida and Michigan .
While they may be the most important states in 2020 , they aren ’ t actually the most competitive .
Those contests are in Georgia , Iowa , Ohio and even Texas , which are polling closer to a dead heat .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Micah Cohen and Sarah Frostenson discuss where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , House and Senate .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Twitter or in the comments .

In covering the 2020 election, we’ve focused plenty on the likeliest tipping-point states — the states likeliest to give the winning candidate his 270th electoral vote. Those states include Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Florida and Michigan. While they may be the most important states in 2020, they aren’t actually the most competitive. Those contests are in Georgia, Iowa, Ohio and even Texas, which are polling closer to a dead heat. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Micah Cohen and Sarah Frostenson discuss where the most competitive races are for the presidency, House and Senate.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-20--Why A Gamer Started A Web Of Disinformation Sites Aimed At Latino Americans

This article was written in collaboration with First Draft , a nonprofit organization that provides investigative research to newsrooms tracking and reporting on mis- and disinformation .
When we picture the entity behind a network of disinformation websites , a few archetypes spring to mind : shadowy figures intent on interfering with democracy , Russian agents , Macedonian teens .
Not usually included : a gamer from a suburb of New York City who sells coffee beans with his wife at the local farmers market on weekends .
But that ’ s precisely who was behind three sites that , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ misleading , hyperpartisan Spanish-language content on both the left and right .
They were just a few sites in a broader ecosystem of misinformation — and disinformation — that spreads such narratives to millions of Americans .
But their story has something to tell us about the misinformation industrial complex overall .
Sean Reynolds , a YouTuber , gamer and entrepreneur , was the owner and operator of three websites and affiliated Facebook pages that peddled in misinformation , predominantly in Spanish .
The existence of the network was first reported by Politico @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Reynolds revealed why he started the sites .
Namely , he said , he saw an opportunity .
“ These websites and the content on them do not reflect my personal political leanings , ” Reynolds wrote in a direct message on Twitter .
“ I am non-discriminating towards opportunities where there is demand and no supply , which in this case , there was no political opinion pieces written in Spanish on Facebook , so I found writers ( ghostwriters ) interested to fill that demand.
” Reynolds did not respond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but did say he does not personally write the content on the sites .
In a video he posted on his gaming channel , he identified as half Jamaican and half German .
Since 2017 , Reynolds has operated the three websites and their affiliated Facebook pages : PoliticaVeraz.com , which published right-leaning content , AlertaPolitica.org , which published left-leaning content , and LeftOverRights.com , a left-leaning site which initially ran English-language stories but switched to publishing in Spanish this August .
When all three sites were active , they would each regularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread those stories through Facebook , where they would typically attract thousands of shares .
After FiveThirtyEight contacted him , Reynolds took all three sites and their Facebook pages offline .
A FiveThirtyEight investigation found multiple links that tied Reynolds to the sites , including a common server and IP address among his personal website and his other confirmed businesses , the same Google AdSense and Analytics code for his personal sites and these pages and corporate records listing Reynolds as a process agent for both Left Over Rights LLC and Alerta Politica @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an LLC for Politica Veraz ) .
Reynolds also confirmed to FiveThirtyEight that he ran the sites .
Much of the content these sites published was misleading and hyperpartisan .
A recent story on Politica Veraz , for example , claimed that Joe Biden had “ forgotten the words to the Pledge of Allegiance , ” when in actuality he quoted part of the pledge for emphasis in a speech .
Meanwhile , recent stories published on Left Over Rights deployed spin from a left-leaning perspective , such as a story about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had “ destroyed ” Vice President Mike Pence by asking him not to interrupt her .
The disinformation on Politica Veraz , in particular , often echoed messaging that was already circulating in far-right communities online and among followers of the QAnon conspiracy theory , pushing it towards a more mainstream audience .
One article claimed that President Trump ’ s life was in mortal danger after he gave a speech at a Whirlpool Corporation Manufacturing Plant in Clyde , Ohio , where he said he had many enemies and that “ this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ me for a while ” when discussing lower prices for pharmaceuticals .
And while Reynolds said the sites ’ content had minimal reach , that story was shared more than 6,000 times on Facebook , according to social media data tool BuzzSumo , and received nearly 40,000 interactions ( reactions , shares , and comments combined ) .
Similar messaging had been amplified by right-leaning users on Twitter before the Politica Veraz piece was published , including a tweet from an account that regularly shares theories associated with QAnon that was retweeted or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reynolds ’ s sites are far from the only source of misinformation targeting the Latino community .
There are sites , Facebook pages and YouTube channels that operate on the margins , attracting little mainstream notice while garnering audiences in the hundreds of thousands .
Their stories — rife with misleading spins on the news and outright falsehoods — are shared across social media and privately in messaging apps .
They target communities that have fewer trusted sources that cater directly to them , according to media experts we spoke to , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And experts say this kind of misinformation can lead to voters not only being misinformed , but also feeling disillusioned by the political process .
Nevertheless , Reynolds said his goals weren ’ t necessarily to inform , misinform or disinform , but to make a little bit of money .
So little money that he didn ’ t think twice about taking the sites down as soon as he was contacted by a reporter .
“ I will say , though , that these websites ( all three ) were scheduled to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not posting and not generating any income to keep them running , ” Reynolds wrote .
( Two of the sites stopped uploading new posts in August and September , respectively . )
“ But now I ’ m getting contacted about them , and I just don ’ t have time for anything else , so I will have their closings sped up.
” Reynolds ’ s sites represent a brand of misinformation fueled by the ease and profitability of building an audience on social media , according to Joan Donovan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Social media companies have incentivized disinformation by rewarding it with financial dollars , ” Donovan explained .
“ The fact that he was targeting Latinos with Spanish-language disinformation or misinformation from either side of the aisle shows a kind of willingness to create chaos so long as it makes money.
” It ’ s not as if the content was simply a translated version of English-language misinformation , either .
It clearly targeted the Latino community , playing into existing fears such as worries about socialism , given its history in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Some of the key narratives are around the perceived threat of socialism coming into the United States , and connecting that to Joe Biden and Kamala Harris , ” said Jacobo Licona , a disinformation researcher for Equis Labs , a Latinx voter research group .
“ Another one we often see is trying to discredit Black Lives Matter and paint them as violent .
Since the murder of George Floyd , we ’ ve seen an increased effort by these bad actors in Latinx spaces to fuel racial tension in Black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posted stories that played into these threads , like one that called the Obamas “ Marxists ” or another that inaccurately reported two Los Angeles County Sheriff ’ s Department deputies shot in Compton were “ ambushed by Black Lives Matter.
” This misinformation is being seeded in the midst of an election where Latino voters represent a powerful voting bloc .
While Trump is trailing Biden among Latino voters in national polls , the margin is narrower in the key battleground state Florida .
In a Univision poll released on Sept. 28 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said they planned to cast a ballot for Biden , compared to 19 percent who were committed to Trump .
But in Florida , 36 percent of Latino voters said they favored Trump .
Reynolds said his content was not effective and that the sites were not profitable or popular , and that he had been planning to shut them down before he was contacted by FiveThirtyEight .
But data tells a different story .
Combined , the three site ’ s Facebook pages had nearly 1 million likes and followers , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interactions on its Facebook posts since July , according to data from Crowdtangle .
The allure of sensational , emotionally provocative misinformation is well documented .
But this content was also able to appeal to an audience facing a dearth of targeted media , according to Randy Pestana , the assistant director of research at Florida International University ’ s Institute for Public Policy .
“ The media outlets that appeal to Hispanics are limited .
There are not a lot of them out there , and the ones that are out there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Pestana said .
“ There ’ s this movement where everything is ‘ fake news ’ if it doesn ’ t align with your opinion.
” He also noted that many Latino Americans consume news through social media , including Facebook and WhatsApp , making it easier for this kind of content to spread .
The share of Latino Americans who get their news from the internet is higher than that of the U.S. population overall , according to surveys from the Pew Research Center .
In a 2016 survey , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respondents got their news online on a typical weekday , whereas a 2017 Pew survey found that 43 percent of the total population “ often ” got their news online .
And while social media platforms have been cracking down on English-language misinformation to a certain degree , Spanish-language disinformation doesn ’ t always receive the same treatment , Pestana said .
Reynolds ’ s sites are now shut down , but there are plenty of other misinformation sources targeting Latino Americans .
As we head into the final weeks of an election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most influential voting blocs continue to be bombarded with false information .
“ The worst examples of the potential consequences of this is what we saw in 2016 : People felt so disenfranchised by the political process that they opted not to participate in it , ” said Steven Renderos , the executive director of MediaJustice , a nonprofit that focuses on racial inequality in communications .
“ That ’ s the risk we ’ re facing here today , that people will just opt out of engaging .
”

This article was written in collaboration with First Draft, a nonprofit organization that provides investigative research to newsrooms tracking and reporting on mis- and disinformation.
When we picture the entity behind a network of disinformation websites, a few archetypes spring to mind: shadowy figures intent on interfering with democracy, Russian agents, Macedonian teens. Not usually included: a gamer from a suburb of New York City who sells coffee beans with his wife at the local farmers market on weekends. But that’s precisely who was behind three sites that, until last week, were pumping out misleading, hyperpartisan Spanish-language content on both the left and right. They were just a few sites in a broader ecosystem of misinformation — and disinformation — that spreads such narratives to millions of Americans. But their story has something to tell us about the misinformation industrial complex overall.
Sean Reynolds, a YouTuber, gamer and entrepreneur, was the owner and operator of three websites and affiliated Facebook pages that peddled in misinformation, predominantly in Spanish. The existence of the network was first reported by Politico last week, but an exclusive interview with Reynolds revealed why he started the sites.
Namely, he said, he saw an opportunity.
“These websites and the content on them do not reflect my personal political leanings,” Reynolds wrote in a direct message on Twitter. “I am non-discriminating towards opportunities where there is demand and no supply, which in this case, there was no political opinion pieces written in Spanish on Facebook, so I found writers (ghostwriters) interested to fill that demand.” Reynolds did not respond when FiveThirtyEight asked whether he speaks Spanish but did say he does not personally write the content on the sites. In a video he posted on his gaming channel, he identified as half Jamaican and half German.
Since 2017, Reynolds has operated the three websites and their affiliated Facebook pages: PoliticaVeraz.com, which published right-leaning content, AlertaPolitica.org, which published left-leaning content, and LeftOverRights.com, a left-leaning site which initially ran English-language stories but switched to publishing in Spanish this August. When all three sites were active, they would each regularly publish 5-10 stories per day and then spread those stories through Facebook, where they would typically attract thousands of shares. After FiveThirtyEight contacted him, Reynolds took all three sites and their Facebook pages offline.
A FiveThirtyEight investigation found multiple links that tied Reynolds to the sites, including a common server and IP address among his personal website and his other confirmed businesses, the same Google AdSense and Analytics code for his personal sites and these pages and corporate records listing Reynolds as a process agent for both Left Over Rights LLC and Alerta Politica LLC (there was no record of an LLC for Politica Veraz). Reynolds also confirmed to FiveThirtyEight that he ran the sites.
Much of the content these sites published was misleading and hyperpartisan. A recent story on Politica Veraz, for example, claimed that Joe Biden had “forgotten the words to the Pledge of Allegiance,” when in actuality he quoted part of the pledge for emphasis in a speech. Meanwhile, recent stories published on Left Over Rights deployed spin from a left-leaning perspective, such as a story about the vice presidential debate declaring Sen. Kamala Harris had “destroyed” Vice President Mike Pence by asking him not to interrupt her.
The disinformation on Politica Veraz, in particular, often echoed messaging that was already circulating in far-right communities online and among followers of the QAnon conspiracy theory, pushing it towards a more mainstream audience. One article claimed that President Trump’s life was in mortal danger after he gave a speech at a Whirlpool Corporation Manufacturing Plant in Clyde, Ohio, where he said he had many enemies and that “this may be the last time you see me for a while” when discussing lower prices for pharmaceuticals. And while Reynolds said the sites’ content had minimal reach, that story was shared more than 6,000 times on Facebook, according to social media data tool BuzzSumo, and received nearly 40,000 interactions (reactions, shares, and comments combined). Similar messaging had been amplified by right-leaning users on Twitter before the Politica Veraz piece was published, including a tweet from an account that regularly shares theories associated with QAnon that was retweeted or quote tweeted more than 12,000 times.
Reynolds’s sites are far from the only source of misinformation targeting the Latino community. There are sites, Facebook pages and YouTube channels that operate on the margins, attracting little mainstream notice while garnering audiences in the hundreds of thousands. Their stories — rife with misleading spins on the news and outright falsehoods — are shared across social media and privately in messaging apps. They target communities that have fewer trusted sources that cater directly to them, according to media experts we spoke to, and amplify misinformation originating from extremist communities. And experts say this kind of misinformation can lead to voters not only being misinformed, but also feeling disillusioned by the political process.
Nevertheless, Reynolds said his goals weren’t necessarily to inform, misinform or disinform, but to make a little bit of money. So little money that he didn’t think twice about taking the sites down as soon as he was contacted by a reporter.
“I will say, though, that these websites (all three) were scheduled to be fully closed after the months of not posting and not generating any income to keep them running,” Reynolds wrote. (Two of the sites stopped uploading new posts in August and September, respectively.) “But now I’m getting contacted about them, and I just don’t have time for anything else, so I will have their closings sped up.”
Reynolds’s sites represent a brand of misinformation fueled by the ease and profitability of building an audience on social media, according to Joan Donovan, a researcher of disinformation at Harvard University.
“Social media companies have incentivized disinformation by rewarding it with financial dollars,” Donovan explained. “The fact that he was targeting Latinos with Spanish-language disinformation or misinformation from either side of the aisle shows a kind of willingness to create chaos so long as it makes money.”
It’s not as if the content was simply a translated version of English-language misinformation, either. It clearly targeted the Latino community, playing into existing fears such as worries about socialism, given its history in authoritarian Central and South American governments.
“Some of the key narratives are around the perceived threat of socialism coming into the United States, and connecting that to Joe Biden and Kamala Harris,” said Jacobo Licona, a disinformation researcher for Equis Labs, a Latinx voter research group. “Another one we often see is trying to discredit Black Lives Matter and paint them as violent. Since the murder of George Floyd, we’ve seen an increased effort by these bad actors in Latinx spaces to fuel racial tension in Black and brown communities.”
Politica Veraz regularly posted stories that played into these threads, like one that called the Obamas “Marxists” or another that inaccurately reported two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies shot in Compton were “ambushed by Black Lives Matter.”
This misinformation is being seeded in the midst of an election where Latino voters represent a powerful voting bloc. While Trump is trailing Biden among Latino voters in national polls, the margin is narrower in the key battleground state Florida. In a Univision poll released on Sept. 28, 52 percent of Latino voters nationally said they planned to cast a ballot for Biden, compared to 19 percent who were committed to Trump. But in Florida, 36 percent of Latino voters said they favored Trump.
Reynolds said his content was not effective and that the sites were not profitable or popular, and that he had been planning to shut them down before he was contacted by FiveThirtyEight. But data tells a different story. Combined, the three site’s Facebook pages had nearly 1 million likes and followers, and Politica Veraz alone attracted more than 500,000 interactions on its Facebook posts since July, according to data from Crowdtangle.
The allure of sensational, emotionally provocative misinformation is well documented. But this content was also able to appeal to an audience facing a dearth of targeted media, according to Randy Pestana, the assistant director of research at Florida International University’s Institute for Public Policy.
“The media outlets that appeal to Hispanics are limited. There are not a lot of them out there, and the ones that are out there more recently have been called fake news,” Pestana said. “There’s this movement where everything is ‘fake news’ if it doesn’t align with your opinion.”
He also noted that many Latino Americans consume news through social media, including Facebook and WhatsApp, making it easier for this kind of content to spread. The share of Latino Americans who get their news from the internet is higher than that of the U.S. population overall, according to surveys from the Pew Research Center. In a 2016 survey, Pew found that 74 percent of Latino respondents got their news online on a typical weekday, whereas a 2017 Pew survey found that 43 percent of the total population “often” got their news online. And while social media platforms have been cracking down on English-language misinformation to a certain degree, Spanish-language disinformation doesn’t always receive the same treatment, Pestana said.
Reynolds’s sites are now shut down, but there are plenty of other misinformation sources targeting Latino Americans. As we head into the final weeks of an election, many members of one of the most influential voting blocs continue to be bombarded with false information.
“The worst examples of the potential consequences of this is what we saw in 2016: People felt so disenfranchised by the political process that they opted not to participate in it,” said Steven Renderos, the executive director of MediaJustice, a nonprofit that focuses on racial inequality in communications. “That’s the risk we’re facing here today, that people will just opt out of engaging.”


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-21--Why A Surge In Republican Voter Registration Might Not Mean A Surge In Trump Support

In the past couple of weeks , key battleground states like Florida , North Carolina and Pennsylvania have received a lot of attention because Republicans have seen a spike in voter registration numbers .
This is often cited as a counterpoint to Joe Biden ’ s sizable lead over President Trump in the polls , as all these Republican registrations must be a sign of support for Trump that the polls are missing , right ?
Well , it ’ s hard to say what ’ s happening exactly .
Dave Wasserman , the House editor for The Cook Political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found in early October that Republicans had made much larger gains in voter registration than Democrats in key states since the presidential primaries earlier this year , perhaps in part due to Republicans ’ efforts to knock on doors and Democrats ’ reluctance to do the same .
But the problem is party registration numbers can be a hard way to get a read on what ’ s happening in the election .
Like early voting numbers , there are all kinds of pitfalls in how you should think about this data .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ : A voter ’ s party registration is a strong indicator of who they ’ ll support , but it ’ s not a guarantee .
In fact , many voters registered with one party have actually been voting for the other party in recent elections but haven ’ t necessarily switched their registration to reflect the party they actually support .
Take Pennsylvania , for example .
The once-Democratic southwestern part has shifted sharply toward the GOP over the past couple of decades .
However , party registration figures haven ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you might expect .
For instance , Greene County along the West Virginia border voted for Trump by 40 percentage points in 2016 , yet preelection registration figures show that party identification is split almost evenly , with registered Republicans and Democrats each making up 45 percent of the county ’ s voters .
Part of what ’ s going on is that many older voters in that region are still registered as Democrats , even if they back Republicans for most federal offices .
Conversely , the suburban counties around Philadelphia in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to form the base of the state Republican Party , but even though that area has moved toward the Democrats in recent elections , some Democratic-leaning voters haven ’ t changed their party registration .
In other words , big shifts in party registration sometimes tell us something we already know , and aren ’ t a signal of a new shift in attitudes .
The election calendar also influences party registration trends , as key dates and campaign events drive interest in participation .
For instance , a presidential primary or the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can spark a flood of registrations .
But sometimes this can create a disproportionate number of registrations from one party .
Consider the 2020 presidential primary .
Democrats had a competitive race , which drove interest in voting in 2019 and early in 2020 among Democrats and voters who wanted to have a say in the party ’ s nomination contest .
Meanwhile , Trump was practically unopposed in the GOP nomination contest , so there wasn ’ t the same motivation among Republican-leaning voters to register ahead of the primaries in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general election .
Florida provides a clear example of this .
Much has been made of the GOP registering about 147,000 more voters than the Democrats in the roughly eight months since the February registration deadline for the state ’ s March 17 presidential primary .
Yet in the eight months before the primary deadline ( so , going back to the end of June 2019 ) , Democrats registered about 42,000 more voters than the GOP due to the high interest in the Democratic presidential race .
Now , that might still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — because if we subtract the two , Republicans registered 105,000 more voters — but it ’ s not as simple as that .
Not only is party registration sometimes a lagging indicator as we mentioned above , but there are also a lot more people registering as independent now , and more of those voters may lean Democratic .
In recent years , a growing number of voters don ’ t want to be associated with either of the two major parties , and instead register as independent .
After hovering in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1980s to the late 2000s , the share of Americans who identify as politically independent has now reached or even topped 40 percent in recent years , according to Gallup .
And in the states where there is party registration data available , the share of registered independents has grown to more than a quarter of the electorate while the percentage of registered Democrats and Republicans has decreased .
That , in turn , makes it harder to know which party has an advantage in a given state because there ’ s this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t tell us which party they prefer .
The reality , of course , is that most independents lean toward one party , but their preferences are still masked at the voter registration level .
This is especially tricky in battleground states such as Florida , North Carolina and Pennsylvania that have seen major upticks in the share of voters who have registered with no party affiliation .
But we ’ re not completely in the dark when it comes to who registers as an independent voter .
For instance , younger voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than older voters .
And importantly , younger voters of color are also more likely to register as independents , as Florida ’ s registration figures have shown .
Both of these groups tend to lean Democratic which means that even if many of these voters don ’ t openly identify as Democrats , they ’ re more likely to vote for Democrats than not .
More broadly , polls show Biden ahead of Trump among voters who identify as independent .
That means even if Republicans are winning the registration battle in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be enough to offset the number of registered Democrats and independents who may back Biden in the end .
In other words , despite the surge in GOP registrations in a few swing states , it ’ s hard to read that as a clear sign of success for the GOP in November .
It could be a good sign , but it could also be a lot of noise , and you ’ re better off looking at the polls instead .

In the past couple of weeks, key battleground states like Florida, North Carolina and Pennsylvania have received a lot of attention because Republicans have seen a spike in voter registration numbers. This is often cited as a counterpoint to Joe Biden’s sizable lead over President Trump in the polls, as all these Republican registrations must be a sign of support for Trump that the polls are missing, right?
[Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems]
Well, it’s hard to say what’s happening exactly. Dave Wasserman, the House editor for The Cook Political Report and an NBC News contributor, found in early October that Republicans had made much larger gains in voter registration than Democrats in key states since the presidential primaries earlier this year, perhaps in part due to Republicans’ efforts to knock on doors and Democrats’ reluctance to do the same.
Over 25 million have already voted, but this is what pollsters expected: Nate Silver
But the problem is party registration numbers can be a hard way to get a read on what’s happening in the election. Like early voting numbers, there are all kinds of pitfalls in how you should think about this data. Here are three of the biggest problems:
Party registration is often a lagging indicator
A voter’s party registration is a strong indicator of who they’ll support, but it’s not a guarantee. In fact, many voters registered with one party have actually been voting for the other party in recent elections but haven’t necessarily switched their registration to reflect the party they actually support.
Take Pennsylvania, for example. The once-Democratic southwestern part has shifted sharply toward the GOP over the past couple of decades. However, party registration figures haven’t necessarily reflected that movement as much as you might expect. For instance, Greene County along the West Virginia border voted for Trump by 40 percentage points in 2016, yet preelection registration figures show that party identification is split almost evenly, with registered Republicans and Democrats each making up 45 percent of the county’s voters.
Part of what’s going on is that many older voters in that region are still registered as Democrats, even if they back Republicans for most federal offices. Conversely, the suburban counties around Philadelphia in the eastern part of the state used to form the base of the state Republican Party, but even though that area has moved toward the Democrats in recent elections, some Democratic-leaning voters haven’t changed their party registration. In other words, big shifts in party registration sometimes tell us something we already know, and aren’t a signal of a new shift in attitudes.
Registration surges follow the campaign calendar
The election calendar also influences party registration trends, as key dates and campaign events drive interest in participation. For instance, a presidential primary or the registration deadline ahead of the general election can spark a flood of registrations. But sometimes this can create a disproportionate number of registrations from one party.
Consider the 2020 presidential primary. Democrats had a competitive race, which drove interest in voting in 2019 and early in 2020 among Democrats and voters who wanted to have a say in the party’s nomination contest. Meanwhile, Trump was practically unopposed in the GOP nomination contest, so there wasn’t the same motivation among Republican-leaning voters to register ahead of the primaries in the spring until we got closer to the general election.
Florida provides a clear example of this. Much has been made of the GOP registering about 147,000 more voters than the Democrats in the roughly eight months since the February registration deadline for the state’s March 17 presidential primary. Yet in the eight months before the primary deadline (so, going back to the end of June 2019), Democrats registered about 42,000 more voters than the GOP due to the high interest in the Democratic presidential race. Now, that might still be a net win for the GOP — because if we subtract the two, Republicans registered 105,000 more voters — but it’s not as simple as that. Not only is party registration sometimes a lagging indicator as we mentioned above, but there are also a lot more people registering as independent now, and more of those voters may lean Democratic.
How voting is going so far in 2020 | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
Independent voters complicate things
In recent years, a growing number of voters don’t want to be associated with either of the two major parties, and instead register as independent. After hovering in the low- to high-30s from the late 1980s to the late 2000s, the share of Americans who identify as politically independent has now reached or even topped 40 percent in recent years, according to Gallup. And in the states where there is party registration data available, the share of registered independents has grown to more than a quarter of the electorate while the percentage of registered Democrats and Republicans has decreased.
That, in turn, makes it harder to know which party has an advantage in a given state because there’s this big block of voters who won’t tell us which party they prefer. The reality, of course, is that most independents lean toward one party, but their preferences are still masked at the voter registration level. This is especially tricky in battleground states such as Florida, North Carolina and Pennsylvania that have seen major upticks in the share of voters who have registered with no party affiliation.
But we’re not completely in the dark when it comes to who registers as an independent voter. For instance, younger voters are more likely to identify as independent than older voters. And importantly, younger voters of color are also more likely to register as independents, as Florida’s registration figures have shown. Both of these groups tend to lean Democratic which means that even if many of these voters don’t openly identify as Democrats, they’re more likely to vote for Democrats than not. More broadly, polls show Biden ahead of Trump among voters who identify as independent. That means even if Republicans are winning the registration battle in some key states, it might not be enough to offset the number of registered Democrats and independents who may back Biden in the end.
In other words, despite the surge in GOP registrations in a few swing states, it’s hard to read that as a clear sign of success for the GOP in November. It could be a good sign, but it could also be a lot of noise, and you’re better off looking at the polls instead.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-21--We’re Letting You Mess With Our Presidential Forecast, But Try Not To Make The Map Too Weird

The 2020 election might feel like either a dream or a nightmare , depending on who you ’ re rooting for .
But with our new interactive , you ’ ll at least be able to choose your own election adventure and explore how winning a state or a combination of states will affect President Trump ’ s and Joe Biden ’ s chances of winning the Electoral College .
When you first open the interactive , it ’ ll show you a map that ’ s shaded based on our presidential forecast and the 40,000 simulations we run each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ California , for example , is almost certain to go to Biden , while Trump is favored but not a lock in light-red Texas given their current odds .
But what happens if , say , Trump gets some swing states called for him on Nov. 3 ?
How might the probabilities change ?
That ’ s what this interactive is all about .
Unlike other tools that explore paths to 270 electoral votes — many of which are very cool and we like a lot !
— ours focuses specifically on how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Click on Kentucky to turn it red , for instance , and the forecast barely budges , since Trump is almost certain to win Kentucky anyway , and that assumption is already built into the forecast .
Upset wins or decisions in states that our model considers toss-ups could matter a lot more , though .
If Biden wins Florida , for instance , his chances of winning the Electoral College shoot up to greater than 99 percent , which could be important on Nov. 3 because Florida generally counts its votes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to determine who won the state on election night .
But if Trump wins Florida , his Electoral College chances rise to 39 percent , making the race practically a toss-up .
Why such big swings based on just one state ?
It ’ s not simply that Florida ’ s 29 electoral votes are valuable , although they are .
It ’ s also that Florida provides an indication of how other states might vote .
Polling errors are correlated , so if Trump wins Florida — where he ’ s slightly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his polls in other states too .
You can also look at how states behave in combination with one another , according to our forecast .
Say that Trump wins Florida but that Biden wins North Carolina , another state that usually tallies its votes quickly .
This is a good trade for Biden , on balance .
His projected number of electoral votes declines from our initial forecast — he ’ s averaging 345 electoral votes in our forecast as of Tuesday afternoon , and he ’ d drop to around 309 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he won ’ t have any sort of runaway , landslide victory .
But Biden ’ s probability of winning some combination of 270 electoral votes and therefore the Electoral College increases to 92 percent if he loses Florida but wins North Carolina , because it ’ s hard for Trump to win the Electoral College unless he wins both states .
In general , Biden has more paths to 270 than Trump , which reflects the fact that he has the polling lead in most swing states .
But problems in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden , as it did for Hillary Clinton in 2016 .
Trump has a 75 percent chance of winning the election if he wins Wisconsin , for instance .
Another “ fun ” challenge is to seek out scenarios that could produce a 269-269 Electoral College tie .
For instance , if Trump wins Florida , Pennsylvania and North Carolina but Biden wins Michigan , Wisconsin , Minnesota and Arizona , then we wind up with a tie about 12 percent of the time .
And before you ask , yes : The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of each congressional district in Nebraska and Maine , states that give one of their electoral votes to the winner of each district — those single votes are sometimes important in breaking ties .
Our simulations also reflect that states that are more geographically and demographically similar are more likely to swing in the same direction .
If Trump wins both North Carolina and Florida , for instance , then Biden ’ s chances of winning neighboring Georgia fall to just 4 percent .
If Biden wins North Carolina and Florida , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 74 percent .
By contrast , the candidates ’ chances of winning Montana don ’ t go up or down much based on what you tell the interactive to do in Florida and North Carolina because Montana is so dissimilar to them .
But we ’ d encourage you to stick to relatively realistic scenarios .
The interactive will allow you to do weird things , but only up to a point .
Namely , it won ’ t let you call a state for a candidate if he has less than a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our initial forecast .
But say you want to see what happens if Biden wins Ohio but loses Michigan .
You can test that , but be warned : Although both Ohio and Michigan are competitive , that combination of outcomes is rare , since Ohio and Michigan are similar states but Michigan is usually much bluer .
The model will still spit out an answer , but it ’ s hard to know how reliable it will be — very few of the 40,000 simulations we run in our forecast will have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In cases like this where there are few simulations that match the map you ’ ve chosen , the interactive instead uses a regression-based technique and essentially runs some new simulations on the fly .
Still , that could lead to a “ garbage in , garbage out ” problem .
The goal of our forecast is to figure out which scenarios are most plausible in the real world , and if you deliberately choose some implausible ones , it may be hard to know what to make of the output .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll find the interactive both fun and informative — and if you ’ ve got any questions , please don ’ t hesitate to drop us a line .

The 2020 election might feel like either a dream or a nightmare, depending on who you’re rooting for. But with our new interactive, you’ll at least be able to choose your own election adventure and explore how winning a state or a combination of states will affect President Trump’s and Joe Biden’s chances of winning the Electoral College.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: What full Democratic control would look like
When you first open the interactive, it’ll show you a map that’s shaded based on our presidential forecast and the 40,000 simulations we run each time we update the model. Deep-blue California, for example, is almost certain to go to Biden, while Trump is favored but not a lock in light-red Texas given their current odds. But what happens if, say, Trump gets some swing states called for him on Nov. 3? How might the probabilities change? That’s what this interactive is all about.
[Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems]
Unlike other tools that explore paths to 270 electoral votes — many of which are very cool and we like a lot! — ours focuses specifically on how the states are related to one another. Click on Kentucky to turn it red, for instance, and the forecast barely budges, since Trump is almost certain to win Kentucky anyway, and that assumption is already built into the forecast.
Upset wins or decisions in states that our model considers toss-ups could matter a lot more, though. If Biden wins Florida, for instance, his chances of winning the Electoral College shoot up to greater than 99 percent, which could be important on Nov. 3 because Florida generally counts its votes quickly and the networks might be able to determine who won the state on election night. But if Trump wins Florida, his Electoral College chances rise to 39 percent, making the race practically a toss-up.
Why such big swings based on just one state? It’s not simply that Florida’s 29 electoral votes are valuable, although they are. It’s also that Florida provides an indication of how other states might vote. Polling errors are correlated, so if Trump wins Florida — where he’s slightly behind right now — he could beat his polls in other states too.
You can also look at how states behave in combination with one another, according to our forecast. Say that Trump wins Florida but that Biden wins North Carolina, another state that usually tallies its votes quickly. This is a good trade for Biden, on balance. His projected number of electoral votes declines from our initial forecast — he’s averaging 345 electoral votes in our forecast as of Tuesday afternoon, and he’d drop to around 309 in this scenario — because without Florida, he won’t have any sort of runaway, landslide victory. But Biden’s probability of winning some combination of 270 electoral votes and therefore the Electoral College increases to 92 percent if he loses Florida but wins North Carolina, because it’s hard for Trump to win the Electoral College unless he wins both states.
In general, Biden has more paths to 270 than Trump, which reflects the fact that he has the polling lead in most swing states. But problems in the Upper Midwest could spell trouble for Biden, as it did for Hillary Clinton in 2016. Trump has a 75 percent chance of winning the election if he wins Wisconsin, for instance.
Another “fun” challenge is to seek out scenarios that could produce a 269-269 Electoral College tie. For instance, if Trump wins Florida, Pennsylvania and North Carolina but Biden wins Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Arizona, then we wind up with a tie about 12 percent of the time. And before you ask, yes: The interactive does let you choose the winners of each congressional district in Nebraska and Maine, states that give one of their electoral votes to the winner of each district — those single votes are sometimes important in breaking ties.
Our simulations also reflect that states that are more geographically and demographically similar are more likely to swing in the same direction. If Trump wins both North Carolina and Florida, for instance, then Biden’s chances of winning neighboring Georgia fall to just 4 percent. If Biden wins North Carolina and Florida, though, his chances in Georgia soar to 74 percent. By contrast, the candidates’ chances of winning Montana don’t go up or down much based on what you tell the interactive to do in Florida and North Carolina because Montana is so dissimilar to them.
But we’d encourage you to stick to relatively realistic scenarios. The interactive will allow you to do weird things, but only up to a point. Namely, it won’t let you call a state for a candidate if he has less than a 1.5 percent chance of winning it in our initial forecast. But say you want to see what happens if Biden wins Ohio but loses Michigan. You can test that, but be warned: Although both Ohio and Michigan are competitive, that combination of outcomes is rare, since Ohio and Michigan are similar states but Michigan is usually much bluer.
Confidence Interval: Will Democrats win the trifecta? l FiveThirtyEight
The model will still spit out an answer, but it’s hard to know how reliable it will be — very few of the 40,000 simulations we run in our forecast will have Biden winning Ohio but Trump winning Michigan. In cases like this where there are few simulations that match the map you’ve chosen, the interactive instead uses a regression-based technique and essentially runs some new simulations on the fly. Still, that could lead to a “garbage in, garbage out” problem.
The goal of our forecast is to figure out which scenarios are most plausible in the real world, and if you deliberately choose some implausible ones, it may be hard to know what to make of the output. Overall, though, we hope you’ll find the interactive both fun and informative — and if you’ve got any questions, please don’t hesitate to drop us a line.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-21--Explore The Ways Trump Or Biden Could Win The Election

When you choose the winner in one place , our model updates its projections everywhere else .

Explore The Ways Trump Or Biden Could Win The Election Pick the winner of each state to see how FiveThirtyEight’s presidential forecast would change. 2020 election forecastHow our forecast works
Our 2020 presidential forecast is final and no longer updating. You can keep making selections here to see how the results you pick would change our pre-election forecast.
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fivethirtyeight--2020-10-21--States Changed Laws To Make It Easier To Vote In 2020. It’s Resulted In Hundreds Of Lawsuits.

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses how voting laws and procedures have changed ahead @ @ @ @ @ how they ’ re being litigated right now .

States Changed Laws To Make It Easier To Vote In 2020. It’s Resulted In Hundreds Of Lawsuits.
In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses how voting laws and procedures have changed ahead of the 2020 election and how they’re being litigated right now.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-21--Politics Podcast: How Voting Is Going So Far In 2020

Voting laws and procedures around the country have changed to accommodate mail voting and safe in-person voting during the coronavirus pandemic .
As a result , Americans are voting early and by mail more than ever before .
The changes have also been accompanied by hundreds of lawsuits at the state and federal levels .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux and Nathaniel Rakich break down how the rules have changed , how it ’ s affecting Americans ’ ability to vote and what kinds of arguments are still being hashed out in court .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments @

Voting laws and procedures around the country have changed to accommodate mail voting and safe in-person voting during the coronavirus pandemic. As a result, Americans are voting early and by mail more than ever before. The changes have also been accompanied by hundreds of lawsuits at the state and federal levels. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux and Nathaniel Rakich break down how the rules have changed, how it’s affecting Americans’ ability to vote and what kinds of arguments are still being hashed out in court.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.