fivethirtyeight--2020-04-16--Americans Trust The CDC On COVID-19. Trump, Not So Much.

Trust is the foundation of any successful relationship — including the relationship between the government and the governed .
And during a pandemic like this one , it ’ s no abstract matter .
When people trust their government , they are more likely to listen to its advice , such as staying 6 feet away from other people and not gathering in large groups ; studies have found that people with lower trust in government take fewer safety measures for their health , as Maggie Koerth wrote for FiveThirtyEight last month .
In the U.S. , public trust in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades .
However , when it comes to dealing with the coronavirus , recent polls do show that Americans generally have faith in their government .
We collected all the polls we could find that asked whether people have trust or confidence in the federal government to handle the coronavirus pandemic or to disseminate reliable information about it .
In every such poll conducted since the beginning of March , more Americans said they were very or somewhat confident in the government than said they were not very or not at all confident @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fair amount of variation ( e.g.
, the total who generally trusted the government ranged anywhere from 45 percent to 66 percent ) .
On average , 56 percent of Americans said they were at least somewhat confident in the government on the coronavirus , compared with 39 percent who said they were not very or not at all confident .
Notably , Americans ’ level of trust in the government hasn ’ t changed noticeably over time , even after the White House started holding daily briefings and Congress has passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through the crisis .
But “ federal government ” is a very vague term that can encompass everything from specific politicians to professional agencies .
And indeed , it turns out that Americans trust certain institutions or people more than others .
For example , Americans overwhelmingly have confidence in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention .
Total trust for the CDC has consistently been in the 80s since the beginning of March , while mistrust has hovered in the teens .
On the other hand , President Trump consistently gets low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poll since the beginning of March , 43 percent of Americans say they at least somewhat trust him on the coronavirus , and 53 percent say they only trust him a little bit or not at all .
Again , these numbers have barely moved over the course of the crisis , even when his overall approval rating experienced a small bump .
Still , those numbers track pretty closely with Trump ’ s overall approval rating , suggesting that this is good old partisan polarization at play — those who like Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ specific issue , and those who don ’ t say they don ’ t trust him on the coronavirus .
Although not every poll was broken down by party , in those that were , Republicans said they trusted Trump 82 percent to 15 percent , while Democrats said they mistrusted him by almost the exact same margin : 83 percent to 14 percent .
Trust in coronavirus task force chair Vice President Mike Pence was also polarized by party , but not as severely .
On average , Republicans say they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 15 percent , while Democrats say they mostly are not , 72 percent to 21 percent .
And overall , Americans are split right down the middle on whether to trust Pence on the coronavirus : In the average poll since the beginning of March , 45 percent mostly trust him , and 46 percent mostly don ’ t .
We only have a couple recent polls on whether Americans have confidence in Congress on the issue of the coronavirus , but they fall closer to Trump ’ s numbers than the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ipsos/USA Today poll conducted April 9-10 , 41 percent of adults said they had a “ great deal ” or “ fair amount ” of trust in Congress to provide accurate information about the coronavirus , while 53 percent said they had “ not very much ” or “ none at all.
” Finally , it ’ s not part of the government , but the news media is arguably the most important institution in terms of having public trust .
But unfortunately , the country is divided on whether to trust the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
On average since the beginning of March , 46 percent of Americans say they mostly trust the media to report accurately on the coronavirus , and 46 percent say they mostly do not .
That could be a problem , since an astonishing 89 percent of Americans said that they are following news on the coronavirus either fairly or very closely , according to a poll from the Pew Research Center conducted in mid-March .
If the public doesn ’ t trust the news it ’ s hearing on the coronavirus — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was at least slightly exaggerating the crisis — it could hinder efforts to stop the virus ’ s spread .

Trust is the foundation of any successful relationship — including the relationship between the government and the governed. And during a pandemic like this one, it’s no abstract matter.
When people trust their government, they are more likely to listen to its advice, such as staying 6 feet away from other people and not gathering in large groups; studies have found that people with lower trust in government take fewer safety measures for their health, as Maggie Koerth wrote for FiveThirtyEight last month.
In the U.S., public trust in government has been on the decline for decades. However, when it comes to dealing with the coronavirus, recent polls do show that Americans generally have faith in their government. We collected all the polls we could find that asked whether people have trust or confidence in the federal government to handle the coronavirus pandemic or to disseminate reliable information about it. In every such poll conducted since the beginning of March, more Americans said they were very or somewhat confident in the government than said they were not very or not at all confident. That said, there was still a fair amount of variation (e.g., the total who generally trusted the government ranged anywhere from 45 percent to 66 percent).
On average, 56 percent of Americans said they were at least somewhat confident in the government on the coronavirus, compared with 39 percent who said they were not very or not at all confident. Notably, Americans’ level of trust in the government hasn’t changed noticeably over time, even after the White House started holding daily briefings and Congress has passed several stimulus packages to help the country through the crisis.
But “federal government” is a very vague term that can encompass everything from specific politicians to professional agencies. And indeed, it turns out that Americans trust certain institutions or people more than others. For example, Americans overwhelmingly have confidence in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Total trust for the CDC has consistently been in the 80s since the beginning of March, while mistrust has hovered in the teens.
On the other hand, President Trump consistently gets low grades on trust. In the average poll since the beginning of March, 43 percent of Americans say they at least somewhat trust him on the coronavirus, and 53 percent say they only trust him a little bit or not at all. Again, these numbers have barely moved over the course of the crisis, even when his overall approval rating experienced a small bump.
Still, those numbers track pretty closely with Trump’s overall approval rating, suggesting that this is good old partisan polarization at play — those who like Trump overall say they trust him on this specific issue, and those who don’t say they don’t trust him on the coronavirus. Although not every poll was broken down by party, in those that were, Republicans said they trusted Trump 82 percent to 15 percent, while Democrats said they mistrusted him by almost the exact same margin: 83 percent to 14 percent.
Trust in coronavirus task force chair Vice President Mike Pence was also polarized by party, but not as severely. On average, Republicans say they are mostly confident in Pence, 78 percent to 15 percent, while Democrats say they mostly are not, 72 percent to 21 percent. And overall, Americans are split right down the middle on whether to trust Pence on the coronavirus: In the average poll since the beginning of March, 45 percent mostly trust him, and 46 percent mostly don’t.
We only have a couple recent polls on whether Americans have confidence in Congress on the issue of the coronavirus, but they fall closer to Trump’s numbers than the CDC’s. According to an Ipsos/USA Today poll conducted April 9-10, 41 percent of adults said they had a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in Congress to provide accurate information about the coronavirus, while 53 percent said they had “not very much” or “none at all.”
Finally, it’s not part of the government, but the news media is arguably the most important institution in terms of having public trust. But unfortunately, the country is divided on whether to trust the accuracy of news reports on the coronavirus. On average since the beginning of March, 46 percent of Americans say they mostly trust the media to report accurately on the coronavirus, and 46 percent say they mostly do not.
That could be a problem, since an astonishing 89 percent of Americans said that they are following news on the coronavirus either fairly or very closely, according to a poll from the Pew Research Center conducted in mid-March. If the public doesn’t trust the news it’s hearing on the coronavirus — 62 percent told Pew that the media was at least slightly exaggerating the crisis — it could hinder efforts to stop the virus’s spread.
Mary Radcliffe and Derek Shan contributed research.
Check out all the latest coronavirus polling we’ve collected.
How close are we to a COVID-19 vaccine? l FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-07--Georgia’s Got A New Senator While Other Candidates Are Deciding Whether To Run

The Democratic presidential primary is about to hit full throttle , but the battle for control of the U.S. Senate is also shifting up a gear .
Since we last checked in on the race for the Senate , a new senator from Georgia who will have to defend her seat has joined the chamber , while the candidate fields in some other 2020 elections are starting to crystallize .
Let ’ s dig into some of the recent developments .
America ’ s newest senator may have to fight to keep her seat On Monday , Republican Sen. Kelly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means she ’ ll now have to run in a special election in November to keep her seat — and with a possible GOP challenger , it could be an action-packed race .
Republican Gov .
Brian Kemp picked Loeffler , a businesswoman and co-owner of the WNBA ’ s Atlanta Dream , to take over for GOP Sen. Johnny Isakson , who resigned at the end of 2019 , but Loeffler was not a consensus pick .
President Trump had wanted Kemp to appoint Rep. Doug Collins , the ranking member on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ front and center during the impeachment hearings defending the president .
Collins has fueled speculation that he might mount a bid against Loeffler in November , but hasn ’ t yet decided on whether he will .
Loeffler hasn ’ t held political office before , but she ’ s already busy working to prove her conservative credentials .
She has described herself as “ pro-Second Amendment , pro-military , pro-Trump and pro-wall , ” in an attempt to combat claims made by some on the right that she ’ s not conservative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spend $ 20 million of her own money on the race , which could scare off opponents like Collins or other Republicans from running .
Whether Collins runs , the special election next November will be a jungle primary , which means all candidates , regardless of party , run at the same time .
If no candidate wins a majority of the vote , a runoff between the top two will take place on Jan. 5 , 2021 .
At this point , the only notable Democrat running is Matt Lieberman , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , although a number of better-known Georgia Democrats are running for the party ’ s nomination in the contest for the state ’ s other Senate seat , which is also up in 2020 .
Election handicappers favor the GOP to hold onto both seats in 2020 .
To run or not to run , that is the question For many politicians considering Senate bids , upcoming filing deadlines and the pressure to raise money mean there ’ s not too much time left to dilly-dally .
But one prospective candidate who ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past year or so is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , who has said several times that he doesn ’ t plan to run for Kansas ’ s open seat , but has acted like someone who is actually quite interested in a bid .
Yet on Monday , The New York Times reported that Pompeo told Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell that he “ does not plan to run.
” It ’ s tough to define that as a categorical refusal , though , so we wouldn ’ t pour the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because Pompeo has made a number of trips to Kansas during his time in the State Department — a little surprising for the president ’ s chief adviser on foreign affairs — and there have been reports he ’ d spoken to potential donors about a campaign .
Although he ’ s said he ’ s not planning on a bid , Pompeo does have plenty of time to change his mind , especially as Kansas ’ s filing deadline is one of the latest in the country — June 1 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to run because they fear controversial former Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach might cost them the seat .
Kobach is currently the front-runner for the GOP nomination , but he ’ s coming off a 5-point loss in Kansas ’ s 2018 gubernatorial race , and Democrats are rallying around state Sen. Barbara Bollier , an ex-Republican who might have the right profile to make hay in a state where Democrats haven ’ t won a Senate seat since 1932 .
But if Pompeo is truly out , that could free up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other GOP contenders .
While there might be lingering doubts about Pompeo ’ s intentions , former Trump 2016 campaign manager Corey Lewandowski was pretty definitive when he said last week that he won ’ t challenge Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire .
Lewandowski ’ s decision might be a relief to some Republicans who felt he ’ s too controversial , but at the same time , his ties to Trump — who encouraged Lewandowski to run in the first place — could have enabled him to bring in huge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what the current crop of three GOP candidates have raised from donors , with nobody exceeding about $ 235,000 . )
Instead , it looks like Shaheen might escape facing an obvious top-tier opponent .
And while Wyoming is unlikely to be in play in the general , the state ’ s open Senate seat might have two more challengers in the not-so-distant future .
Republican Rep. Liz Cheney has said she ’ ll soon make a decision about whether to run , but she may not be the only major Republican nearing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who finished second in Wyoming ’ s 2018 GOP primary for governor , has also expressed interest .
So far , the one notable candidate in the race is former Republican Rep. Cynthia Lummis .
• GOP Sen. Thom Tillis of North Carolina got some welcome news when his main primary opponent , businessman Garland Tucker , dropped out of the race on Dec. 2 .
Tillis had seemed vulnerable to losing renomination after initially opposing Trump ’ s declaration of a national emergency on the U.S.-Mexico border last February .
But Tillis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s endorsement , and although personally wealthy , Tucker decided he couldn ’ t raise enough money to beat Tillis .
• In mid-December , Republican Sen. Susan Collins of Maine officially launched her reelection bid .
Collins will be one of the Democrats ’ top targets in November because she holds the most Democratic-leaning seat of any Republican up for reelection in 2020 .
But her formidable electoral track record suggests that she ’ ll be tough to beat despite Maine ’ s slight Democratic tilt .
• Arizona will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2020 .
An early December survey from OH Predictive Insights found Democrat Mark Kelly , a former astronaut , with a slight edge over appointed Republican Sen. Martha McSally , 47 percent to 44 percent .
The result is consistent with previous polls from the past few months , which have also found a very close race .
• Democratic Sen. Doug Jones of Alabama is the most endangered senator up for reelection in 2020 , and a December poll from JMC Analytics testing Jones against some of the declared Republican challengers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is for Jones .
The Democrat trailed former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville by 7 points , former Sen. Jeff Sessions by 5 points and Rep. Bradley Byrne by 4 points .
Jones did lead state Rep. Arnold Mooney by 6 points and former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore — whom Jones beat in a 2017 special election — by 14 points , but neither Mooney nor Moore are likely to win the GOP nomination .

The Democratic presidential primary is about to hit full throttle, but the battle for control of the U.S. Senate is also shifting up a gear. Since we last checked in on the race for the Senate, a new senator from Georgia who will have to defend her seat has joined the chamber, while the candidate fields in some other 2020 elections are starting to crystallize. Let’s dig into some of the recent developments.
America’s newest senator may have to fight to keep her seat
On Monday, Republican Sen. Kelly Loeffler of Georgia took office, which means she’ll now have to run in a special election in November to keep her seat — and with a possible GOP challenger, it could be an action-packed race. Republican Gov. Brian Kemp picked Loeffler, a businesswoman and co-owner of the WNBA’s Atlanta Dream, to take over for GOP Sen. Johnny Isakson, who resigned at the end of 2019, but Loeffler was not a consensus pick. President Trump had wanted Kemp to appoint Rep. Doug Collins, the ranking member on the House Judiciary Committee, who was front and center during the impeachment hearings defending the president. Collins has fueled speculation that he might mount a bid against Loeffler in November, but hasn’t yet decided on whether he will.
Loeffler hasn’t held political office before, but she’s already busy working to prove her conservative credentials. She has described herself as “pro-Second Amendment, pro-military, pro-Trump and pro-wall,” in an attempt to combat claims made by some on the right that she’s not conservative enough. Loeffler has also promised to spend $20 million of her own money on the race, which could scare off opponents like Collins or other Republicans from running.
Whether Collins runs, the special election next November will be a jungle primary, which means all candidates, regardless of party, run at the same time. If no candidate wins a majority of the vote, a runoff between the top two will take place on Jan. 5, 2021. At this point, the only notable Democrat running is Matt Lieberman, son of former Connecticut Sen. Joe Lieberman, although a number of better-known Georgia Democrats are running for the party’s nomination in the contest for the state’s other Senate seat, which is also up in 2020. Election handicappers favor the GOP to hold onto both seats in 2020.
To run or not to run, that is the question
For many politicians considering Senate bids, upcoming filing deadlines and the pressure to raise money mean there’s not too much time left to dilly-dally. But one prospective candidate who’s embraced his inner Hamlet over the past year or so is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who has said several times that he doesn’t plan to run for Kansas’s open seat, but has acted like someone who is actually quite interested in a bid. Yet on Monday, The New York Times reported that Pompeo told Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell that he “does not plan to run.” It’s tough to define that as a categorical refusal, though, so we wouldn’t pour the concrete just yet.
We say this because Pompeo has made a number of trips to Kansas during his time in the State Department — a little surprising for the president’s chief adviser on foreign affairs — and there have been reports he’d spoken to potential donors about a campaign. Although he’s said he’s not planning on a bid, Pompeo does have plenty of time to change his mind, especially as Kansas’s filing deadline is one of the latest in the country — June 1. The fact is that many Republicans want Pompeo to run because they fear controversial former Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach might cost them the seat. Kobach is currently the front-runner for the GOP nomination, but he’s coming off a 5-point loss in Kansas’s 2018 gubernatorial race, and Democrats are rallying around state Sen. Barbara Bollier, an ex-Republican who might have the right profile to make hay in a state where Democrats haven’t won a Senate seat since 1932. But if Pompeo is truly out, that could free up donors and supporters to now move to other GOP contenders.
While there might be lingering doubts about Pompeo’s intentions, former Trump 2016 campaign manager Corey Lewandowski was pretty definitive when he said last week that he won’t challenge Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire. Lewandowski’s decision might be a relief to some Republicans who felt he’s too controversial, but at the same time, his ties to Trump — who encouraged Lewandowski to run in the first place — could have enabled him to bring in huge fundraising hauls. (Probably more than what the current crop of three GOP candidates have raised from donors, with nobody exceeding about $235,000.) Instead, it looks like Shaheen might escape facing an obvious top-tier opponent.
And while Wyoming is unlikely to be in play in the general, the state’s open Senate seat might have two more challengers in the not-so-distant future. Republican Rep. Liz Cheney has said she’ll soon make a decision about whether to run, but she may not be the only major Republican nearing a decision: Megadonor Foster Friess, who finished second in Wyoming’s 2018 GOP primary for governor, has also expressed interest. So far, the one notable candidate in the race is former Republican Rep. Cynthia Lummis.
Other news and polls


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-07--Trump Is The Most Unpopular President Since Ford To Run For Reelection

Now that the 2020 election has gone from “ next year ” to “ this year , ” it ’ s worth taking a step back and asking a question that we first posed in early 2017 : How popular is Donald Trump ?
After all , a president ’ s job approval rating can be predictive of his reelection chances , especially as November draws closer .
On Jan. 1 , 42.6 percent of Americans approved of President Trump ’ s job performance , according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker ( 52.9 percent disapproved ) .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ( although it ’ s worth noting that , since Jan. 1 , the U.S. and Iran have taken actions that could shake Trump ’ s approval rating loose from that anchor ) , but ominously for the president , that ’ s the second-lowest FiveThirtyEight average approval rating of any recent president on the first day of their reelection year .
Only Gerald Ford ( 39.3 percent on Jan. 1 , 1976 ) was less popular — and , of course , Ford lost that campaign to Jimmy Carter .
However @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the fact that past presidents ’ approval ratings have tended to shift over the course of the year — and sometimes by Election Day bear very little resemblance to their Jan. 1 approval .
Those shifts haven ’ t tended to be predictable , either : Five of the last 11 presidents running for reelection saw their approval ratings rise during the year , and six saw them decline .
So Trump ’ s low approval ratings as of January aren ’ t necessarily a problem for him in November .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unfolds , a potential conflict with Iran could certainly affect them . )
This is a good news/bad news situation for Trump : The smart money is against his approval rating budging very much , simply because he ’ s had a remarkably steady approval rating .
As my colleague Geoffrey Skelley wrote last year , it ’ s fluctuated about 9 points over the course of his presidency — much less than most previous presidents ’ approval ratings have fluctuated .
Part of this is because of the very polarized era we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have already made up their minds about what they think about the occupant of the White House .
Take Barack Obama , who had a similarly intractable approval rating over the course of his presidency .
From Jan. 1 to Nov. 6 , 2012 — the year of his reelection campaign — his numbers ticked up by only 3.8 points .
What this means in practical terms is that it ’ s increasingly difficult for presidents to win over new supporters .
That puts Trump in an unenviable but ambiguous position for reelection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a FiveThirtyEight average approval rating of 48.4 percent or higher on Election Day all won their reelection campaigns , and presidents with a FiveThirtyEight average approval rating of 43.6 percent or lower all lost .
If , in 10 months , Trump ’ s approval rating is still in the same range it has occupied for the past two years ( roughly , between 39 percent and 43 percent ) , he would obviously fit into the latter group .
And that would not bode well for his chances of being reelected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a Harry S. Truman-caliber upset .
( The owner of a 39.6 percent approval rating on Nov. 2 , 1948 , Truman was widely predicted to lose the election but ended up narrowly defeating Thomas “ Your Future Is Still Ahead Of You ” Dewey . )
On the other hand , even a modest , Obama-esque improvement would put Trump in the purgatory between the presidents who won and the presidents who lost — between 43.6 percent and 48.4 percent .
So in the end , Trump ’ s current approval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signal one way or the other on the question of his reelection — but it does maybe hint that he starts off the new year at a disadvantage .

Now that the 2020 election has gone from “next year” to “this year,” it’s worth taking a step back and asking a question that we first posed in early 2017: How popular is Donald Trump? After all, a president’s job approval rating can be predictive of his reelection chances, especially as November draws closer.
On Jan. 1, 42.6 percent of Americans approved of President Trump’s job performance, according to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker (52.9 percent disapproved). That’s a pretty typical number for Trump (although it’s worth noting that, since Jan. 1, the U.S. and Iran have taken actions that could shake Trump’s approval rating loose from that anchor), but ominously for the president, that’s the second-lowest FiveThirtyEight average approval rating of any recent president on the first day of their reelection year. Only Gerald Ford (39.3 percent on Jan. 1, 1976) was less popular — and, of course, Ford lost that campaign to Jimmy Carter.
Trump starts his reelection year with a low approval rating Recent presidents’ average approval ratings on Jan. 1 and Election Day of the year they ran for reelection Approval Rating President Election Year On Jan. 1 On Election Day Change Lyndon B. Johnson*† 1964 76.0% 74.0% -2.0 Dwight D. Eisenhower 1956 75.5 67.9 -7.6 George W. Bush 2004 56.7 48.4 -8.3 Jimmy Carter 1980 55.9 37.9 -18.0 Ronald Reagan 1984 54.1 57.9 +3.8 Harry S. Truman* 1948 54.0 39.6 -14.3 Bill Clinton 1996 52.5 54.6 +2.2 Richard Nixon 1972 50.7 61.3 +10.6 George H.W. Bush 1992 48.9 32.6 -16.3 Barack Obama 2012 45.7 49.5 +3.8 Donald Trump 2020 42.6 ? ? Gerald Ford*† 1976 39.3 43.6 +4.3 *Acceded to the presidency mid-term. In Johnson’s case, he took office mere weeks before the calendar turned to 1964, which also may have affected his numbers. † Due to the limited amount of public polling on presidential approval available in the 1964 and 1976 cycles, Johnson and Ford’s Election Day approval figures do not include data from after June of the election year. Source: Polls
However, working in Trump’s favor is the fact that past presidents’ approval ratings have tended to shift over the course of the year — and sometimes by Election Day bear very little resemblance to their Jan. 1 approval. Those shifts haven’t tended to be predictable, either: Five of the last 11 presidents running for reelection saw their approval ratings rise during the year, and six saw them decline. So Trump’s low approval ratings as of January aren’t necessarily a problem for him in November. (For example, depending on how it unfolds, a potential conflict with Iran could certainly affect them.)
This is a good news/bad news situation for Trump: The smart money is against his approval rating budging very much, simply because he’s had a remarkably steady approval rating. As my colleague Geoffrey Skelley wrote last year, it’s fluctuated about 9 points over the course of his presidency — much less than most previous presidents’ approval ratings have fluctuated. Part of this is because of the very polarized era we live in, in which most voters have already made up their minds about what they think about the occupant of the White House. Take Barack Obama, who had a similarly intractable approval rating over the course of his presidency. From Jan. 1 to Nov. 6, 2012 — the year of his reelection campaign — his numbers ticked up by only 3.8 points. What this means in practical terms is that it’s increasingly difficult for presidents to win over new supporters.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: How the Iran conflict could affect the 2020 electio
That puts Trump in an unenviable but ambiguous position for reelection. Since Dwight D. Eisenhower, presidents with a FiveThirtyEight average approval rating of 48.4 percent or higher on Election Day all won their reelection campaigns, and presidents with a FiveThirtyEight average approval rating of 43.6 percent or lower all lost. If, in 10 months, Trump’s approval rating is still in the same range it has occupied for the past two years (roughly, between 39 percent and 43 percent), he would obviously fit into the latter group. And that would not bode well for his chances of being reelected; he’d have to hope for a Harry S. Truman-caliber upset. (The owner of a 39.6 percent approval rating on Nov. 2, 1948, Truman was widely predicted to lose the election but ended up narrowly defeating Thomas “Your Future Is Still Ahead Of You” Dewey.)
On the other hand, even a modest, Obama-esque improvement would put Trump in the purgatory between the presidents who won and the presidents who lost — between 43.6 percent and 48.4 percent. So in the end, Trump’s current approval rating doesn’t sound a clear signal one way or the other on the question of his reelection — but it does maybe hint that he starts off the new year at a disadvantage.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-06--Politics Podcast: How The Iran Conflict Could Affect The 2020 Election

Late Thursday , the Pentagon announced that the United States killed Iran ’ s Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani , “ @ @ @ @ @ President ” in an airstrike in Iraq .
Iran has since vowed retaliation .
In @ @ @ @ @ Politics podcast , the crew discusses how the current conflict or any further escalation could @ @ @ @ @ 2020 election .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” @ @ @ @ @ above or by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast @ @ @ @ @ new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays @ @ @ @ @ listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have @ @ @ @ @ suggestion for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email @ @ @ @ @ the comments .

Late Thursday, the Pentagon announced that the United States killed Iran’s Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, “at the direction of the President,” in an airstrike in Iraq. Iran has since vowed retaliation. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses how the current conflict or any further escalation could reshape the dynamics of the 2020 election.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: How the Iran conflict could affect the 2020 electio


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-06--Trump’s Approach To Iran Highlights Both Parties’ Internal Divides

President Trump ’ s decision to authorize a drone strike that killed Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani near the Baghdad airport last week has reignited broader questions about both the role of the United States in the Middle East and how and when the U.S. should use military force .
And the reactions to the strike among elected Republicans and Democrats show divides not only between the two parties but within the parties as well — at least at the level of elites , and potentially among Republican voters .
For the last three years , splits in the GOP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brand of conservatism ( his emphasis on issues like immigration and regular attacks on institutions such as the judiciary and the press ) and how much the party should adhere to Trump ’ s approach .
But even congressional Republicans who often criticize the president , such as Sen. Ben Sasse of Nebraska , are largely praising ( or at least not criticizing ) his decision to authorize the attack .
Instead , the prominent Republican criticism of the military strike so far has come largely from two people : Fox News ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You might reasonably ask why it ’ s worth highlighting Republican opposition to the Trump strike if we can only cite two people .
Two reasons : First , Carlson matters .
( Yes , perhaps more than a sitting senator . )
Trump is reportedly a regular viewer of Carlson ’ s show , and some of Trump ’ s tweets suggest he ’ s repeating ideas that he saw on Carlson ’ s show .
The president also reportedly talks privately with Carlson about policy on occasion .
And Carlson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ News , reaches more than 2 million people daily , giving him real clout in conservative circles .
Secondly , Carlson and Paul may be representative of a broader and very important group : Republican voters wary of the U.S. getting too entangled in conflicts abroad .
Remember , Trump , in his 2016 primary campaign , distinguished himself from others in the party , particularly former Florida Gov .
Jeb Bush , by strongly criticizing the Iraq War .
It ’ s not clear whether that criticism played a big role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates .
( In contrast , there is fairly strong evidence that Trump ’ s positions on immigration helped him win votes in the primary ) .
But a Pew Research Center poll conducted during the 2016 Republican primary found that Trump supporters were more likely than other GOP voters to say that “ the U.S. does too much to solve world problems.
” On the other hand , a clear majority of Trump supporters ( 70 percent ) were in favor of the U.S. deploying ground troops to fight ISIS , putting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 66 percent of whom favored ground troops ) on that issue and suggesting that Trump ’ s base isn ’ t overly opposed to military intervention .
Still , it is likely that there is a bloc of pro-Trump Republican voters who don ’ t want the U.S. to get into a protracted conflict with Iran .
The debate over Iran policy has , unsurprisingly , been connected to the Iraq War ever since the U.S. went into Iraq in 2003 , and you can see evidence of GOP attitudes in polling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ March 2018 Pew poll , for example , 61 percent of Republicans thought using military force in Iraq was a good decision , which leaves about 40 percent of the GOP who either thought it was a bad decision or weren ’ t sure either way .
( Among all Americans , 48 percent thought it was a bad decision . )
According to the same survey , about half of Republicans disagreed with the statement that the U.S. “ mostly succeeded ” in Iraq .
In terms of Iran itself , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran shot down an American drone found that 59 percent of Republicans supported further military action against Iran , 22 percent opposed it , and 19 percent were not sure .
If Trump started aggressively campaigning for an extended conflict with Iran , I suspect that Republican support for it would go up .
Voters sometimes follow the opinions of leaders of their party and other political elites .
Two recent polls conducted by YouGov have shown that an overwhelming majority of Republicans approved of the strike ( 73 percent in a YouGov @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a HuffPost/YouGov poll released on Monday ) .
I expect other polls will find an overwhelming majority of Republicans in favor of the killing , largely because Trump and most key officials in the party are strongly behind it .
( I doubt most Republicans — or Americans overall — knew Soleimani ’ s name before his death .
I did not .
So I assume voters are taking their cues from elites on this issue . )
That said , there will likely be a number of Republican voters — though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be wary of a war with Iran ( beyond the targeted killing of a specific individual ) even if Trump is pushing for it .
( Remember , there was a bloc of GOP voters who never got behind separating children from their families at the border or the Obamacare repeal , even as Trump stood behind both policies . )
And the presence ( or even potential presence ) of an anti-Iran-war bloc of Republicans is really important : It might constrain how aggressive Trump is in taking on Iran if he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wary of significant U.S. military action there .
For Democrats , the divide is more clear and predictable : It ’ s another version of the left vs. center-left fissure we ’ ve seen manifest itself throughout the party ’ s 2020 presidential primary .
Sens .
Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren , along with other more liberal figures in the party , are describing the killing of Soleimani as an “ assassination ” ; urging lawmakers to pass legislation that would block funding for any further military action against Iran without a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this killing to U.S. foreign policy more broadly , arguing that the U.S. should take a more limited approach to military interventions .
Former Vice President Joe Biden and more center-left figures in the party have not echoed the assassination language , and instead have been more focused on this particular strike — was it the right decision and did Trump fail to sufficiently involve Congress , either through a vote or by at least briefing key members before the strike ?
The broader context for this debate is that Sanders opposed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long been skeptical of U.S. military interventions abroad .
Biden voted for the Iraq War initially , and he and other center-left figures in the party generally haven ’ t been as wary of deploying the U.S. military to other countries .
I ’ m not sure this divide will really apply to Democratic voters — my bet would be that polls show they largely oppose the strike , following the comments of their party ’ s leaders and reflecting their broader concerns about Trump .
( Seven-one percent of Democrats opposed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 15 percent were not sure , according to the HuffPost/YouGov survey .
That high-but-not-unanimous opposition — it ’ s lower than Democratic support for removing Trump from office , for example — suggests Democrats are hearing the conflicting signals from party leaders that I described above . )
Even if Democratic voters aren ’ t necessarily tuned in to these divides , they matter .
Foreign policy is another area where Sanders and Warren in particular are essentially proposing a break with Obama-era policies , Biden and former South Bend , Indiana @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more like Obama , and Democatic voters will be making a choice between these two approaches over the next few months .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

President Trump’s decision to authorize a drone strike that killed Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani near the Baghdad airport last week has reignited broader questions about both the role of the United States in the Middle East and how and when the U.S. should use military force. And the reactions to the strike among elected Republicans and Democrats show divides not only between the two parties but within the parties as well — at least at the level of elites, and potentially among Republican voters.
For the last three years, splits in the GOP have mostly revolved around Trump’s brand of conservatism (his emphasis on issues like immigration and regular attacks on institutions such as the judiciary and the press) and how much the party should adhere to Trump’s approach. But even congressional Republicans who often criticize the president, such as Sen. Ben Sasse of Nebraska, are largely praising (or at least not criticizing) his decision to authorize the attack.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: How the Iran conflict could affect the 2020 electio
Instead, the prominent Republican criticism of the military strike so far has come largely from two people: Fox News’ Tucker Carlson and Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul. You might reasonably ask why it’s worth highlighting Republican opposition to the Trump strike if we can only cite two people. Two reasons: First, Carlson matters. (Yes, perhaps more than a sitting senator.) Trump is reportedly a regular viewer of Carlson’s show, and some of Trump’s tweets suggest he’s repeating ideas that he saw on Carlson’s show. The president also reportedly talks privately with Carlson about policy on occasion. And Carlson, with a prime-time show on Fox News, reaches more than 2 million people daily, giving him real clout in conservative circles.
Secondly, Carlson and Paul may be representative of a broader and very important group: Republican voters wary of the U.S. getting too entangled in conflicts abroad. Remember, Trump, in his 2016 primary campaign, distinguished himself from others in the party, particularly former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, by strongly criticizing the Iraq War. It’s not clear whether that criticism played a big role in motivating Republicans to choose Trump over other candidates. (In contrast, there is fairly strong evidence that Trump’s positions on immigration helped him win votes in the primary). But a Pew Research Center poll conducted during the 2016 Republican primary found that Trump supporters were more likely than other GOP voters to say that “the U.S. does too much to solve world problems.” On the other hand, a clear majority of Trump supporters (70 percent) were in favor of the U.S. deploying ground troops to fight ISIS, putting them in line with the non-Trump Republicans (66 percent of whom favored ground troops) on that issue and suggesting that Trump’s base isn’t overly opposed to military intervention.
Still, it is likely that there is a bloc of pro-Trump Republican voters who don’t want the U.S. to get into a protracted conflict with Iran. The debate over Iran policy has, unsurprisingly, been connected to the Iraq War ever since the U.S. went into Iraq in 2003, and you can see evidence of GOP attitudes in polling on that issue. According to a March 2018 Pew poll, for example, 61 percent of Republicans thought using military force in Iraq was a good decision, which leaves about 40 percent of the GOP who either thought it was a bad decision or weren’t sure either way. (Among all Americans, 48 percent thought it was a bad decision.) According to the same survey, about half of Republicans disagreed with the statement that the U.S. “mostly succeeded” in Iraq. In terms of Iran itself, a Morning Consult poll conducted last year after Iran shot down an American drone found that 59 percent of Republicans supported further military action against Iran, 22 percent opposed it, and 19 percent were not sure.
If Trump started aggressively campaigning for an extended conflict with Iran, I suspect that Republican support for it would go up. Voters sometimes follow the opinions of leaders of their party and other political elites. Two recent polls conducted by YouGov have shown that an overwhelming majority of Republicans approved of the strike (73 percent in a YouGov poll released on Friday, 84 percent in a HuffPost/YouGov poll released on Monday). I expect other polls will find an overwhelming majority of Republicans in favor of the killing, largely because Trump and most key officials in the party are strongly behind it. (I doubt most Republicans — or Americans overall — knew Soleimani’s name before his death. I did not. So I assume voters are taking their cues from elites on this issue.)
That said, there will likely be a number of Republican voters — though still a clear minority — who will be wary of a war with Iran (beyond the targeted killing of a specific individual) even if Trump is pushing for it. (Remember, there was a bloc of GOP voters who never got behind separating children from their families at the border or the Obamacare repeal, even as Trump stood behind both policies.) And the presence (or even potential presence) of an anti-Iran-war bloc of Republicans is really important: It might constrain how aggressive Trump is in taking on Iran if he knows a segment in his party is wary of significant U.S. military action there.
For Democrats, the divide is more clear and predictable: It’s another version of the left vs. center-left fissure we’ve seen manifest itself throughout the party’s 2020 presidential primary. Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, along with other more liberal figures in the party, are describing the killing of Soleimani as an “assassination”; urging lawmakers to pass legislation that would block funding for any further military action against Iran without a formal authorization from Congress; and connecting this killing to U.S. foreign policy more broadly, arguing that the U.S. should take a more limited approach to military interventions. Former Vice President Joe Biden and more center-left figures in the party have not echoed the assassination language, and instead have been more focused on this particular strike — was it the right decision and did Trump fail to sufficiently involve Congress, either through a vote or by at least briefing key members before the strike?
The broader context for this debate is that Sanders opposed the Iraq War at the start and has long been skeptical of U.S. military interventions abroad. Biden voted for the Iraq War initially, and he and other center-left figures in the party generally haven’t been as wary of deploying the U.S. military to other countries.
I’m not sure this divide will really apply to Democratic voters — my bet would be that polls show they largely oppose the strike, following the comments of their party’s leaders and reflecting their broader concerns about Trump. (Seventy-one percent of Democrats opposed the strike, while 14 percent supported it and 15 percent were not sure, according to the HuffPost/YouGov survey. That high-but-not-unanimous opposition — it’s lower than Democratic support for removing Trump from office, for example — suggests Democrats are hearing the conflicting signals from party leaders that I described above.)
Even if Democratic voters aren’t necessarily tuned in to these divides, they matter. Foreign policy is another area where Sanders and Warren in particular are essentially proposing a break with Obama-era policies, Biden and former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg would likely govern more like Obama, and Democatic voters will be making a choice between these two approaches over the next few months.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-06--Big-Dollar Party Donors Like Biden … And Warren

Knowing who the Democratic Party wants as the nominee can be difficult , especially with a field this large .
Arguably , the party hasn ’ t even reached a conclusion yet this cycle .
But this doesn ’ t mean we can ’ t look for clues as to where party elites might be leaning .
There are , of course , endorsements from party leaders , and as I ’ ve written about for FiveThirtyEight , the preferences of early-state activists to consider , but there ’ s another metric we haven ’ t looked at yet — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party committees .
These donors are different than , say , the army of small donors who have fueled Sen. Bernie Sanders ’ s campaign , as they have demonstrated a vested interest in both a candidate and the Democratic Party as a whole .
Such donors tend to have both the party ’ s and the candidate ’ s interests at heart , and , at least in the past , other party resources tend to lean the same direction they do .
As political scientist Hans Hassell argues in his book @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” these donors ’ donation patterns can give us a pretty good idea of which candidate a party is leaning toward .
Their support can often signal to other donors , endorsers and party actors that a candidate is to be taken seriously .
( I wrote a bit about this previously at the political science blog , Mischiefs of Faction . )
So using the campaign finance data collected by the National Institute on Money in Politics for the 2020 presidential cycle , I compiled all the donations of $ 200 or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first three quarters of 2019 , in addition to all the donations made to state or national Democratic Party committees during that same time period .
I then grouped donations made to the candidates based on the following criteria : • First , to establish a baseline , I looked at the share of all donors who gave to a candidate in 2019 .
( Because some donors gave to multiple candidates , candidates ’ donor shares might add up to more than 100 . )
• Then , I filtered that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who gave to both a party committee and to a candidate — “ candidate-and-committee ” donors .
• Finally , I filtered that group of candidate-and-committee donors down to just the high-dollar contributors — individuals who gave at least $ 1,000 to a presidential candidate and also contributed to a party committee ( although not necessarily $ 1,000 ) .
If you add up the total number of unique donors — those who gave $ 200 or more to just one candidate — from each of the first three quarters of 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ total .
( Remember , though , that this isn ’ t the cycle ’ s entire universe of donors .
There are thousands more donors who have given $ 1 , $ 5 , etc.
, but the Federal Election Commission doesn ’ t capture their donations in the same level of detail . )
Only 3.5 percent of these donors have also donated to a party committee , and just 1.7 percent have given at least $ 1,000 to a presidential candidate .
So even though these candidate-and-committee donors can help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaning , we ’ re still talking about a pretty small slice of the overall share of Democratic donors this cycle As you can see in the chart below , no single candidate has received an overwhelming share of donations from candidate and committee donors , high-dollar or otherwise .
This should give us pause , as it ’ s more evidence that there isn ’ t a clear consensus yet , but there are some takeaways nonetheless .
For one , although Sanders has a substantial share of overall donors ( roughly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has the backing of only around 5 percent of the candidate-and-committee donors , which could signal his lack of support from traditional party supporters .
This isn ’ t necessarily damning for Sanders — the whole rationale for his campaign is about bringing new voices into the political system — but he is nonetheless not doing as well among those who traditionally exert influence in the Democratic Party ’ s nomination process .
Instead , candidates like Pete Buttigieg , former mayor of South Bend , Indiana , and former Vice President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ donors .
( As did Sen. Kamala Harris , although enthusiasm for her dried up in the second and third quarters , which could help explain why she dropped out in early December — her campaign was low on cash . )
Biden , meanwhile , has done very well among party-aligned donors after his entry into the race a month into the second quarter : Indeed , he dominated the field among high-dollar party donors ( those who gave at least $ 1,000 ) in the third quarter .
But perhaps the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s rise among these candidate-and-committee donors .
She began in the number two position among these donors in the first quarter ( Harris led ) but shot up to number one by the third quarter , with nearly 40 percent of her donations from candidate-and-committee donors .
Whether this will be true in the fourth quarter , at a time when her polling position has declined , remains to be seen , however .
It ’ s also important to remember that Biden has maintained a decent edge over Warren in terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least $ 1,000 to a candidate , so these donors are also a significant area of strength for him .
So while this is yet another data point in favor of the idea that party elites have not really decided — they remain somewhat split between Biden , Buttigieg and Warren — Biden does have the healthiest advantage among donors who have given at least $ 1,000 .
This could indicate that the party is coalescing around him ( even if his position as front-runner isn ’ t as strong or unanimous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — but whether majorities of caucusgoers and voters will agree remains to be seen .

Knowing who the Democratic Party wants as the nominee can be difficult, especially with a field this large. Arguably, the party hasn’t even reached a conclusion yet this cycle. But this doesn’t mean we can’t look for clues as to where party elites might be leaning. There are, of course, endorsements from party leaders, and as I’ve written about for FiveThirtyEight, the preferences of early-state activists to consider, but there’s another metric we haven’t looked at yet — donors who contribute to both candidates and party committees.
These donors are different than, say, the army of small donors who have fueled Sen. Bernie Sanders’s campaign, as they have demonstrated a vested interest in both a candidate and the Democratic Party as a whole. Such donors tend to have both the party’s and the candidate’s interests at heart, and, at least in the past, other party resources tend to lean the same direction they do. As political scientist Hans Hassell argues in his book “The Party’s Primary,” these donors’ donation patterns can give us a pretty good idea of which candidate a party is leaning toward. Their support can often signal to other donors, endorsers and party actors that a candidate is to be taken seriously. (I wrote a bit about this previously at the political science blog, Mischiefs of Faction.)
So using the campaign finance data collected by the National Institute on Money in Politics for the 2020 presidential cycle, I compiled all the donations of $200 or more made to Democratic presidential candidates across the first three quarters of 2019, in addition to all the donations made to state or national Democratic Party committees during that same time period. I then grouped donations made to the candidates based on the following criteria:
First, to establish a baseline, I looked at the share of all donors who gave to a candidate in 2019. (Because some donors gave to multiple candidates, candidates’ donor shares might add up to more than 100.) Then, I filtered that group to look at just those donors who gave to both a party committee and to a candidate — “candidate-and-committee” donors. Finally, I filtered that group of candidate-and-committee donors down to just the high-dollar contributors — individuals who gave at least $1,000 to a presidential candidate and also contributed to a party committee (although not necessarily $1,000).
If you add up the total number of unique donors — those who gave $200 or more to just one candidate — from each of the first three quarters of 2019, there are just over 131,000 donors in total. (Remember, though, that this isn’t the cycle’s entire universe of donors. There are thousands more donors who have given $1, $5, etc., but the Federal Election Commission doesn’t capture their donations in the same level of detail.) Only 3.5 percent of these donors have also donated to a party committee, and just 1.7 percent have given at least $1,000 to a presidential candidate. So even though these candidate-and-committee donors can help us understand where party elites may be leaning, we’re still talking about a pretty small slice of the overall share of Democratic donors this cycle
As you can see in the chart below, no single candidate has received an overwhelming share of donations from candidate and committee donors, high-dollar or otherwise. This should give us pause, as it’s more evidence that there isn’t a clear consensus yet, but there are some takeaways nonetheless. For one, although Sanders has a substantial share of overall donors (roughly 13 percent of the total), he has the backing of only around 5 percent of the candidate-and-committee donors, which could signal his lack of support from traditional party supporters. This isn’t necessarily damning for Sanders — the whole rationale for his campaign is about bringing new voices into the political system — but he is nonetheless not doing as well among those who traditionally exert influence in the Democratic Party’s nomination process.
Instead, candidates like Pete Buttigieg, former mayor of South Bend, Indiana, and former Vice President Joe Biden have done well among these donors. (As did Sen. Kamala Harris, although enthusiasm for her dried up in the second and third quarters, which could help explain why she dropped out in early December — her campaign was low on cash.) Biden, meanwhile, has done very well among party-aligned donors after his entry into the race a month into the second quarter: Indeed, he dominated the field among high-dollar party donors (those who gave at least $1,000) in the third quarter.
But perhaps the most striking story is Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s rise among these candidate-and-committee donors. She began in the number two position among these donors in the first quarter (Harris led) but shot up to number one by the third quarter, with nearly 40 percent of her donations from candidate-and-committee donors. Whether this will be true in the fourth quarter, at a time when her polling position has declined, remains to be seen, however. It’s also important to remember that Biden has maintained a decent edge over Warren in terms of the candidate-and-committee donors who have given at least $1,000 to a candidate, so these donors are also a significant area of strength for him.
So while this is yet another data point in favor of the idea that party elites have not really decided — they remain somewhat split between Biden, Buttigieg and Warren — Biden does have the healthiest advantage among donors who have given at least $1,000. This could indicate that the party is coalescing around him (even if his position as front-runner isn’t as strong or unanimous as that of some previous nominees) — but whether majorities of caucusgoers and voters will agree remains to be seen.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-06--What Decades Of Primary Polls Tell Us About The 2020 Democratic Presidential Race

Back in April , we put together a three-part series on how well national presidential primary polls conducted in the calendar year before the primary predicted who eventually won a party ’ s nomination .
That analysis covered every competitive nomination contest from 1972 to 2016 , and it found that early polls are somewhat predictive of the final outcome , especially when polling averages are adjusted for how well-known a candidate was at the time .
We then applied what we gleaned from 40-plus years of primary polls to all the polls from the first half of 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had the best chance of winning the nomination .
His odds weren ’ t nearly as good as say , Hillary Clinton ’ s in 2016 , but he was still in the lead .
Now , with 2019 behind us , we can analyze surveys from the second half of the year to get an updated look at who might be best positioned to win the Democratic nomination .
Using national polls conducted between July 1 and Dec. 31 , 2019 , we calculated a polling average for each Democratic candidate — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and then adjusted it based on how well-known a candidate was during that period of time ( measured on a slightly subjective five-tier scale , which is represented by the black boxes in the table below , where more boxes means higher name recognition ) .
And although his unadjusted average fell slightly from the first half to the second half of the year , Biden continued to lead in the second half of 2019 .
( Note : This is a different approach than the one our forecast will take when it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ below are not the same as a candidate ’ s chances of winning , and the forecast will take many more factors into account than this somewhat quick-and-dirty analysis does . )
In fact , Biden ’ s steady polling average over the year echoes what happened with three previous front-runners : Ronald Reagan in 1979 , Bob Dole in 1995 and Al Gore in 1999 , all of whom were leading the field in the second half of the calendar year before the election .
All three had an unadjusted polling average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first half of the year and were within 3 percentage points of their original number in the second half of the year ( Reagan went from 34 to 37 percent ; Dole , 46 to 44 percent ; Gore , 54 to 55 percent ) .
So the fact that Biden ’ s polling average has been pretty stable isn ’ t unprecedented — or even a bad sign .
While only Reagan won the general election , all three went on to win their party ’ s nomination .
A fourth candidate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a similar situation the year before the election , and while he fell short of the nomination , it took a sitting president — Jimmy Carter — to block his path .
However , those candidates all polled better than Biden — some significantly better — so Biden is by no means a sure bet to win the Democratic nomination , especially as he seems to have experienced a small downturn in the second half of the year , and not an uptick .
But according to our analysis , someone polling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ half of the year has roughly a 35 percent chance of claiming the Democratic nomination .
A 1-in-3 chance isn ’ t great , but this is still better than , say , Bernie Sanders ’ s or Elizabeth Warren ’ s chances .
They essentially tied for second , with an unadjusted polling average around 16 percent in the second half of the year , which historically has meant a 10 percent chance of winning .
Former South Bend , Indiana , Mayor Pete Buttigieg has also received top-tier billing in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ half of 2019 , he actually only polled at about 6 percent nationally ( without adjusting for name recognition ) , which historically has translated to roughly a 3 percent shot at winning the nomination .
If you ’ re surprised that his odds aren ’ t higher , remember that in the first half of 2019 , very few people knew who Buttigieg was .
He was the only contender with between 20 and 40 percent name recognition to do well enough to have an adjusted polling average in the double digits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better-known quantity in the past few months , his adjusted average hasn ’ t grown accordingly .
It actually dropped from the first half to the second half of the year — despite an uptick in his unadjusted average .
In other words , although Buttigieg has become better known , his campaign may not be approaching its ceiling .
Then again , Buttigieg remains less well-known than Biden , Sanders or Warren , so his unadjusted polling average might undersell his chances .
After all , he is battling for the lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contests that traditionally have had an outsized influence on modern presidential primaries .
So Buttigieg ’ s disproportionate strength in those two states may point to one of the limitations of this analysis .
Early national polls conducted in the year before the first nominating contests do have predictive value , but remember there isn ’ t one national primary .
Instead , parties choose presidential nominees via state-by-state elections over the course of a few months .
And that sequential nature of the primary makes it hard for national polls to capture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a candidate falling short of expectations in Iowa or unexpectedly winning both Iowa and New Hampshire can swiftly alter the playing field for the remaining primaries .
But having examined all the national polls from the last six months of 2019 , the bottom line is that , at this point , Biden remains the favorite to win the Democratic nomination .
That said , his grasp on the lead is tenuous .
For instance , when thinking about Biden ’ s odds , it ’ s important to remember that the historical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic field combined has a larger chance of winning than Biden does on his own — 44 percent for all of the other candidates still in the race compared with Biden ’ s 35 percent shot .
And this uncertainty around Biden as the front-runner lines up with what else we know about the race — Biden , Buttigieg and Sanders are fighting for the lead in Iowa while Biden and Sanders are neck-and-neck in New Hampshire , and Biden raised less money than either Sanders or Buttigieg in the final quarter of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the new year and brace ourselves for the first two nominating contests , remember that Biden has the best chance of winning his party ’ s nomination , but it ’ s also quite possible that someone else will be facing off against President Trump this November .

Back in April, we put together a three-part series on how well national presidential primary polls conducted in the calendar year before the primary predicted who eventually won a party’s nomination. That analysis covered every competitive nomination contest from 1972 to 2016, and it found that early polls are somewhat predictive of the final outcome, especially when polling averages are adjusted for how well-known a candidate was at the time.
We then applied what we gleaned from 40-plus years of primary polls to all the polls from the first half of 2019, finding that former Vice President Joe Biden had the best chance of winning the nomination. His odds weren’t nearly as good as say, Hillary Clinton’s in 2016, but he was still in the lead. Now, with 2019 behind us, we can analyze surveys from the second half of the year to get an updated look at who might be best positioned to win the Democratic nomination.
Using national polls conducted between July 1 and Dec. 31, 2019, we calculated a polling average for each Democratic candidate — including those who have dropped out — and then adjusted it based on how well-known a candidate was during that period of time (measured on a slightly subjective five-tier scale, which is represented by the black boxes in the table below, where more boxes means higher name recognition). And although his unadjusted average fell slightly from the first half to the second half of the year, Biden continued to lead in the second half of 2019. (Note: This is a different approach than the one our forecast will take when it publishes sometime soon. The polling averages below are not the same as a candidate’s chances of winning, and the forecast will take many more factors into account than this somewhat quick-and-dirty analysis does.)
How the Democratic field polled throughout 2019 Candidates’ polling averages in the first half and second half of 2019, plus an adjusted version that accounts for name recognition NAME RECOGNITION POLL AVG. ADJ. POLL AVG. CANDIDATE 1ST HALF 2ND HALF 1ST 2ND 1ST 2ND Joe Biden ◼◼◼◼◼ ◼◼◼◼◼ 31.6% 28.7% 31.6% 28.7% Elizabeth Warren ◼◼◼◼◻ ◼◼◼◼◻ 9.5 16.3 11.9 20.4 Bernie Sanders ◼◼◼◼◼ ◼◼◼◼◼ 18.6 16.5 18.6 16.5 Pete Buttigieg ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◼◻◻ 4.5 5.6 11.4 9.4 Kamala Harris ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◼◻ 8.7 5.9 14.6 7.4 Andrew Yang ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◼◼◻◻ 0.8 2.3 4.0 3.9 Tulsi Gabbard ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.9 Beto O’Rourke ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◼◻ 5.2 2.2 8.7 2.7 Cory Booker ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◼◻ 3.0 2.1 4.9 2.6 Amy Klobuchar ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◻◻ 1.5 1.4 2.5 2.4 Tom Steyer — ◼◼◻◻◻ — 0.9 0.0 2.3 Julián Castro ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◻◻ 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.9 Michael Bennet ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.4 Marianne Williamson ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.2 John Delaney ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.2 Tim Ryan ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2 Steve Bullock ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.3 0.4 1.4 1.1 Michael Bloomberg ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◼◻ 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.9 Joe Sestak ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◻◻◻◻ 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 Bill de Blasio ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◻◻ 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Kirsten Gillibrand ◼◼◼◻◻ ◼◼◼◻◻ 0.8 0.2 1.3 0.4 Wayne Messam ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◻◻◻◻ 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 John Hickenlooper ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.6 0.1 1.5 0.3 Seth Moulton ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◻◻◻◻ 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 Mike Gravel ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◻◻◻◻ 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 Jay Inslee ◼◼◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.2 Deval Patrick — ◼◼◻◻◻ — 0.1 0.0 0.1 Eric Swalwell ◼◻◻◻◻ ◼◼◻◻◻ 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 Because the Democratic field is historically large, pollsters have asked about many candidates and potential candidates in 2019. We limited the table to individuals named in at least eight national surveys in the second half of 2019. Second-half data is based on polls that were conducted between July 1 and Dec. 31, 2019, and released by Jan. 3, 2020. Source: Polls
In fact, Biden’s steady polling average over the year echoes what happened with three previous front-runners: Ronald Reagan in 1979, Bob Dole in 1995 and Al Gore in 1999, all of whom were leading the field in the second half of the calendar year before the election. All three had an unadjusted polling average of 30 percent or more in the first half of the year and were within 3 percentage points of their original number in the second half of the year (Reagan went from 34 to 37 percent; Dole, 46 to 44 percent; Gore, 54 to 55 percent). So the fact that Biden’s polling average has been pretty stable isn’t unprecedented — or even a bad sign. While only Reagan won the general election, all three went on to win their party’s nomination. A fourth candidate, Ted Kennedy in 1979, was in a similar situation the year before the election, and while he fell short of the nomination, it took a sitting president — Jimmy Carter — to block his path. However, those candidates all polled better than Biden — some significantly better — so Biden is by no means a sure bet to win the Democratic nomination, especially as he seems to have experienced a small downturn in the second half of the year, and not an uptick.
But according to our analysis, someone polling around where Biden was in the second half of the year has roughly a 35 percent chance of claiming the Democratic nomination. A 1-in-3 chance isn’t great, but this is still better than, say, Bernie Sanders’s or Elizabeth Warren’s chances. They essentially tied for second, with an unadjusted polling average around 16 percent in the second half of the year, which historically has meant a 10 percent chance of winning.
Former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg has also received top-tier billing in the 2020 primary, but in the second half of 2019, he actually only polled at about 6 percent nationally (without adjusting for name recognition), which historically has translated to roughly a 3 percent shot at winning the nomination. If you’re surprised that his odds aren’t higher, remember that in the first half of 2019, very few people knew who Buttigieg was. He was the only contender with between 20 and 40 percent name recognition to do well enough to have an adjusted polling average in the double digits, but as he has become a better-known quantity in the past few months, his adjusted average hasn’t grown accordingly. It actually dropped from the first half to the second half of the year — despite an uptick in his unadjusted average. In other words, although Buttigieg has become better known, his campaign may not be approaching its ceiling.
Then again, Buttigieg remains less well-known than Biden, Sanders or Warren, so his unadjusted polling average might undersell his chances. After all, he is battling for the lead in Iowa and New Hampshire, two contests that traditionally have had an outsized influence on modern presidential primaries. So Buttigieg’s disproportionate strength in those two states may point to one of the limitations of this analysis.
Early national polls conducted in the year before the first nominating contests do have predictive value, but remember there isn’t one national primary. Instead, parties choose presidential nominees via state-by-state elections over the course of a few months. And that sequential nature of the primary makes it hard for national polls to capture all the dynamics of the race — a candidate falling short of expectations in Iowa or unexpectedly winning both Iowa and New Hampshire can swiftly alter the playing field for the remaining primaries.
But having examined all the national polls from the last six months of 2019, the bottom line is that, at this point, Biden remains the favorite to win the Democratic nomination. That said, his grasp on the lead is tenuous. For instance, when thinking about Biden’s odds, it’s important to remember that the historical data suggests that the rest of the Democratic field combined has a larger chance of winning than Biden does on his own — 44 percent for all of the other candidates still in the race compared with Biden’s 35 percent shot. And this uncertainty around Biden as the front-runner lines up with what else we know about the race — Biden, Buttigieg and Sanders are fighting for the lead in Iowa while Biden and Sanders are neck-and-neck in New Hampshire, and Biden raised less money than either Sanders or Buttigieg in the final quarter of 2019. So as we jump into the new year and brace ourselves for the first two nominating contests, remember that Biden has the best chance of winning his party’s nomination, but it’s also quite possible that someone else will be facing off against President Trump this November.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-03--Our Poll Finds A Majority Of Americans Think The Evidence Supports Trump’s Removal

After the House of Representatives voted to impeach President Trump on Dec. 18 , the president ’ s fate is in the Senate ’ s hands .
The process for the trial still isn ’ t clear , but there are signs that it will likely be smoother sailing for the president going forward : Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has said he will coordinate with White House counsel , and there ’ s no indication that the Senate is anywhere near the 67 votes needed to remove Trump from office .
And according to our impeachment and removal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broad public support for that either — just 47 percent of Americans favor removing Trump .
But in the latest installment of our survey with Ipsos , where we use Ipsos ’ s KnowledgePanel to poll the same group of respondents every two weeks , a majority ( 57 percent ) of Americans said they think Trump committed an impeachable offense .
Fifty-two percent said they think Trump ’ s actions regarding Ukraine or his refusal to cooperate with the impeachment inquiry constitute enough evidence to remove him from office .
That might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since other recent polls have put support for removal in the low- to mid-40s — but the picture is complicated .
As always , there are big partisan divisions : The vast majority of Democrats think there ’ s sufficient evidence to remove Trump from office , while most Republicans think there isn ’ t .
And there is still a small but notable number of Americans who think there is enough evidence for removal , but also believe the upcoming presidential election — and not Congress — should determine whether Trump remains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of our survey , we found that about 15 percent of Americans think that there is enough evidence to remove Trump from office on matters related to Ukraine or his attempts to stymie the impeachment inquiry , but also think his fate should be decided by voters in the 2020 election , not Congress .
Most Americans want the trial to expand on the evidence in the impeachment articles There might not be a broad consensus about whether Trump should be removed from office , but our survey found that a majority of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about one thing — they want a Senate trial with new witnesses who did not appear during the impeachment process in the House .
According to the survey , 57 percent of Americans think it would be better if the upcoming trial included new witnesses who could potentially shed light on Trump ’ s conduct , while 39 percent said it would be better to keep the focus solely on the evidence introduced in the House hearings and included in the articles of impeachment , without calling new witnesses .
Perhaps unsurprisingly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ witnesses in the Senate trial .
But 48 percent of Republicans also support calling new witnesses — although about the same number still want the trial to proceed with only the evidence introduced in the House hearings ( 50 percent ) .
If it seems surprising that significant shares of Democrats and Republicans both prefer a trial with new witnesses , it ’ s important to remember that Democrats and Republicans may have very different kinds of Senate witnesses in mind .
Democrats in Congress have been pressing Republican leaders to call senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advisor John Bolton and acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney , who were reportedly involved in the freezing of U.S. military aid to Ukraine and a subsequent effort to get the freeze lifted .
Trump and some congressional Republicans , meanwhile , have suggested that Joe Biden and his son Hunter should testify about Hunter ’ s time on the board of a Ukrainian energy company while his father was vice president , which Trump has portrayed as a conflict of interest that led to corrupt actions by Joe Biden , although there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim .
The survey also found that Americans are divided on House Democrats ’ current strategy of refusing to transmit the articles of impeachment until their concerns around a fair trial have been addressed .
Roughly half of Americans say the Democrats should not wait to deliver the articles of impeachment , compared with 45 percent who say they should withhold the articles .
Even though the public generally supports a broader call for a new slate of witnesses , Democrats ’ game of brinksmanship with the articles of impeachment may also backfire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasingly certain Over the past few waves of the survey , as we check back in with respondents , we ’ ve been keeping an eye on a small but crucial group — those who are less certain about whether Trump committed an impeachable offense , and are therefore perhaps more likely to change their minds about whether he should be impeached and removed from office .
And while the overall share of respondents who think Trump committed an impeachable offense hasn ’ t really shifted , there is evidence that people are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and those people mostly think Trump did something impeachable .
Back in mid-November , when we polled respondents for the first time , people who thought Trump had committed an impeachable offense weren ’ t much more certain of their view than people who believed he hadn ’ t .
About 75 percent of respondents who thought Trump ’ s behavior was impeachable were either “ absolutely ” or “ pretty ” certain of their view , compared to 71 percent of people who thought Trump ’ s conduct wasn ’ t impeachable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of respondents who think Trump committed an impeachable offense are certain of their view , while the share of respondents who think Trump ’ s conduct isn ’ t impeachable is at 72 percent , without a similar uptick .
This isn ’ t a huge swing , of course .
But because it ’ s proven exceptionally difficult so far to change Americans ’ minds about Trump ’ s impeachment , any shifts — even if they ’ re relatively minor — are worth noting .
This doesn ’ t mean that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will change , but there is evidence that some of those potentially persuadable respondents have been drawn more firmly into the pro-impeachment camp over the course of the process .

After the House of Representatives voted to impeach President Trump on Dec. 18, the president’s fate is in the Senate’s hands. The process for the trial still isn’t clear, but there are signs that it will likely be smoother sailing for the president going forward: Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has said he will coordinate with White House counsel, and there’s no indication that the Senate is anywhere near the 67 votes needed to remove Trump from office. And according to our impeachment and removal polling trackers, there isn’t broad public support for that either — just 47 percent of Americans favor removing Trump.
But in the latest installment of our survey with Ipsos, where we use Ipsos’s KnowledgePanel to poll the same group of respondents every two weeks, a majority (57 percent) of Americans said they think Trump committed an impeachable offense. Fifty-two percent said they think Trump’s actions regarding Ukraine or his refusal to cooperate with the impeachment inquiry constitute enough evidence to remove him from office.
That might seem like good news for Democrats, since other recent polls have put support for removal in the low- to mid-40s — but the picture is complicated. As always, there are big partisan divisions: The vast majority of Democrats think there’s sufficient evidence to remove Trump from office, while most Republicans think there isn’t. And there is still a small but notable number of Americans who think there is enough evidence for removal, but also believe the upcoming presidential election — and not Congress — should determine whether Trump remains in office. Consistent with previous rounds of our survey, we found that about 15 percent of Americans think that there is enough evidence to remove Trump from office on matters related to Ukraine or his attempts to stymie the impeachment inquiry, but also think his fate should be decided by voters in the 2020 election, not Congress.
Most Americans want the trial to expand on the evidence in the impeachment articles
There might not be a broad consensus about whether Trump should be removed from office, but our survey found that a majority of the public is on the same page about one thing — they want a Senate trial with new witnesses who did not appear during the impeachment process in the House.
According to the survey, 57 percent of Americans think it would be better if the upcoming trial included new witnesses who could potentially shed light on Trump’s conduct, while 39 percent said it would be better to keep the focus solely on the evidence introduced in the House hearings and included in the articles of impeachment, without calling new witnesses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 65 percent of Democrats support calling new witnesses in the Senate trial. But 48 percent of Republicans also support calling new witnesses — although about the same number still want the trial to proceed with only the evidence introduced in the House hearings (50 percent).
If it seems surprising that significant shares of Democrats and Republicans both prefer a trial with new witnesses, it’s important to remember that Democrats and Republicans may have very different kinds of Senate witnesses in mind. Democrats in Congress have been pressing Republican leaders to call senior White House aides like former national security advisor John Bolton and acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney, who were reportedly involved in the freezing of U.S. military aid to Ukraine and a subsequent effort to get the freeze lifted. Trump and some congressional Republicans, meanwhile, have suggested that Joe Biden and his son Hunter should testify about Hunter’s time on the board of a Ukrainian energy company while his father was vice president, which Trump has portrayed as a conflict of interest that led to corrupt actions by Joe Biden, although there’s no evidence to support that claim.
The survey also found that Americans are divided on House Democrats’ current strategy of refusing to transmit the articles of impeachment until their concerns around a fair trial have been addressed. Roughly half of Americans say the Democrats should not wait to deliver the articles of impeachment, compared with 45 percent who say they should withhold the articles. Even though the public generally supports a broader call for a new slate of witnesses, Democrats’ game of brinksmanship with the articles of impeachment may also backfire.
Americans’ feelings on impeachment are increasingly certain
Over the past few waves of the survey, as we check back in with respondents, we’ve been keeping an eye on a small but crucial group — those who are less certain about whether Trump committed an impeachable offense, and are therefore perhaps more likely to change their minds about whether he should be impeached and removed from office. And while the overall share of respondents who think Trump committed an impeachable offense hasn’t really shifted, there is evidence that people are getting more certain in their views — and those people mostly think Trump did something impeachable.
Back in mid-November, when we polled respondents for the first time, people who thought Trump had committed an impeachable offense weren’t much more certain of their view than people who believed he hadn’t. About 75 percent of respondents who thought Trump’s behavior was impeachable were either “absolutely” or “pretty” certain of their view, compared to 71 percent of people who thought Trump’s conduct wasn’t impeachable. Now, though, 81 percent of respondents who think Trump committed an impeachable offense are certain of their view, while the share of respondents who think Trump’s conduct isn’t impeachable is at 72 percent, without a similar uptick.
This isn’t a huge swing, of course. But because it’s proven exceptionally difficult so far to change Americans’ minds about Trump’s impeachment, any shifts — even if they’re relatively minor — are worth noting. This doesn’t mean that the expected outcome of the Senate trial will change, but there is evidence that some of those potentially persuadable respondents have been drawn more firmly into the pro-impeachment camp over the course of the process.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-02--Julián Castro Never Really Found His Base

On Thursday , former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro finally called it quits .
Castro ’ s campaign had been on the rocks for some time now — in late October , he even threatened to drop out if he didn ’ t raise enough money to make the November debate — but after missing that debate and the December one , it seems as if Castro has finally determined there isn ’ t a way forward for him .
As I wrote back in January when Castro announced he was running for president , he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He ’ d been out of the political spotlight after his two and a half year term as President Obama ’ s housing secretary ended , and his candidacy may have been overshadowed by former Rep. Beto O ’ Rourke , who also hails from Texas .
But what Castro did have going for him was an inspirational personal story about rising out of poverty to eventually become the mayor of San Antonio , one of the country ’ s largest cities .
Also as a young ( 45 years old ) Latino @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over Hispanic voters and younger voters .
He even ran unabashedly to the left on issues like immigration , pushing the Democratic Party to engage with ideas like decriminalizing unauthorized border crossings .
But unlike some other candidates , such as former South Bend , Indiana , Mayor Pete Buttigieg or even Sen. Kamala Harris , Castro never found his footing .
As the chart below shows — he languished at 1 or 2 percent nationally .
Part of the reason Castro might not have been able to break out in the polls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with former Vice President Joe Biden in the September debate .
Castro attacked Biden on health care , accusing him of not working to insure every American and forgetting something he had said only minutes earlier — a clear shot at Biden ’ s advanced age — but as it turned out , Biden hadn ’ t said what Castro claimed he said .
Castro ’ s net favorability rating ( favorable percentage minus unfavorable percentage ) had improved markedly after the first debate , in which he had a heated exchange with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this time his attacks on Biden backfired .
In FiveThirtyEight ’ s polling with Ipsos , primary voters gave Castro the lowest September debate performance rating of the 10 candidates on stage .
And his net favorability rating tumbled , going from +22 before the debate to just +10 afterward .
Tellingly , Castro only made one more debate after September — the October debate — he missed out on both the November and December ones .
However , he always managed to meet the Democratic National Committee ’ s donor thresholds — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the 200,000 for December .
In fact , when Harris dropped out of the race in early December , Castro was able to attract some of her supporters by arguing that she was held to a double standard by the media .
It was reportedly Castro ’ s best fundraising day of the quarter , and did help him reach 200,000 donors , but there was no sign of a polling surge .
In the end , Castro failed to get a single qualifying poll for either the November or December @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less hope of picking up a poll to make the stage in January , where the thresholds are even higher .
Considering his poll numbers , Castro ’ s exit doesn ’ t come as a shock .
But it does reduce the diversity of the Democratic field , which was once heralded as the most diverse ever .
It ’ s hard to imagine that this is the final chapter of his political career , though .
Castro is only 45 years old , and as Sen. Elizabeth Warren said on Twitter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a leader in our party and our country for many years to come.
” And having been a contender for the 2016 vice presidential nomination , it wouldn ’ t be all that surprising if the 2020 Democratic nominee ends up considering Castro for that job , too .
( Maybe Warren herself . )

On Thursday, former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro finally called it quits. Castro’s campaign had been on the rocks for some time now — in late October, he even threatened to drop out if he didn’t raise enough money to make the November debate — but after missing that debate and the December one, it seems as if Castro has finally determined there isn’t a way forward for him.
As I wrote back in January when Castro announced he was running for president, he was always something of a long-shot candidate. He’d been out of the political spotlight after his two-and-a-half-year term as President Barack Obama’s housing secretary ended, and his candidacy may have been overshadowed by that of former Rep. Beto O’Rourke, who also hails from Texas. But what Castro did have going for him was an inspirational personal story about rising out of poverty to eventually become the mayor of San Antonio, one of the country’s largest cities. Also as a young (45-year-old) Latino, he had the potential to win over Hispanic voters and younger voters. He even ran unabashedly to the left on issues like immigration, pushing the Democratic Party to engage with ideas like decriminalizing unauthorized border crossings. But unlike some other candidates, such as former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg or even Sen. Kamala Harris, Castro never found his footing. As the chart below shows — he languished at 1 or 2 percent nationally.
Part of the reason Castro might not have been able to break out in the polls was because of an exchange he had with former Vice President Joe Biden in the September debate. Castro attacked Biden on health care, accusing him of not working to insure every American and forgetting something he had said only minutes earlier — a clear shot at Biden’s advanced age — but as it turned out, Biden hadn’t said what Castro claimed he said.
Castro’s net favorability rating (favorable percentage minus unfavorable percentage) had improved markedly after the first debate, in which he had a heated exchange with O’Rourke over immigration, but this time his attacks on Biden backfired. In FiveThirtyEight’s polling with Ipsos, primary voters gave Castro the lowest September debate performance rating of the 10 candidates on stage. And his net favorability rating tumbled, going from +20 before the debate to just +10 afterward.
Tellingly, Castro only made one more debate after September — the October debate — he missed out on both the November and December ones. However, he always managed to meet the Democratic National Committee’s donor thresholds — amassing the 165,000 donors needed for November, and the 200,000 for December. In fact, when Harris dropped out of the race in early December, Castro was able to attract some of her supporters by arguing that she was held to a double standard by the media. It was reportedly Castro’s best fundraising day of the quarter, and it did help him reach 200,000 donors, but there was no sign of a polling surge. In the end, Castro failed to get a single qualifying poll for either the November or December debates, and he probably had even less hope of picking up a poll to make the stage in January, where the thresholds are even higher.
Considering his poll numbers, Castro’s exit doesn’t come as a shock. But it does reduce the diversity of the Democratic field, which was once heralded as the most diverse ever. It’s hard to imagine that this is the final chapter of his political career, though. Castro is still fairly young, and as Sen. Elizabeth Warren said on Twitter, she expects him “to be a leader in our party and our country for many years to come.” And having been a contender for the 2016 vice presidential nomination, it wouldn’t be all that surprising if the 2020 Democratic nominee ends up considering Castro for that job, too. (Maybe Warren herself.)
CORRECTION (Jan. 9, 2020, 1:13 p.m.): A previous version of this story misstated Julián Castro’s net favorability before the September Democratic debate. It was +20, not +22.
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