fivethirtyeight--2020-10-14--What We’ve Managed To Learn About How Amy Coney Barrett Would Rule On Abortion And The Election

Modern Supreme Court confirmation hearings seem like they should be deeply consequential — especially when the nominee has the power to fundamentally shift the balance of the court .
But in reality , they can feel like an exercise in futility .
Amy Coney Barrett ’ s hearings , which just wrapped up their third day , are no exception .
As my colleague Perry Bacon Jr. wrote yesterday , we ’ ve mostly learned that Barrett is very good at politely declining to answer senators ’ questions .
And at one point during the hearings on Wednesday , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among the Republican senators about the Houston Astros .
There were some crumbs of information that came out of the two days of questioning , though .
Here are three takeaways from the hearings on Tuesday and Wednesday : Barrett refused to answer basic questions about how she ’ d rule on the election One of the biggest questions looming over the hearings was how Barrett might rule in a dispute about the election — which could arrive at the Supreme Court ’ s doorstep just days after she ’ s confirmed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be Trump ’ s “ pawn , ” but then she mostly evaded questions about presidential power and how she ’ d rule in various situations involving the 2020 election , including a query from Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein about whether the president has the power to unilaterally delay the election .
( Short answer : He can ’ t . )
Democrats pressed Barrett to say she ’ d recuse herself from any election-related case , but she refused to do so , although she said she ’ d take the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a case came her way .
When asked by Democratic Sen. Amy Klobuchar if she thought absentee ballots were “ an essential way to vote for millions of Americans right now , ” she said she couldn ’ t comment .
And she also declined to answer a question about whether voter intimidation was illegal — even though this question arguably has an easy , factual answer .
These responses might seem like they ’ re largely in keeping with Barrett ’ s broader tactic of batting away the senators ’ hypotheticals .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on even fairly straightforward legal issues is perhaps a sign of just how important she knows her views on all of these issues could be in just a few weeks .
She may not view precedents on abortion and birth control as “ settled law ” If you tuned into the confirmation hearings on Tuesday and Wednesday , you probably learned a lot of Constitutional Law 101 — because if there was a theme during the second and third day of Barrett ’ s hearings , it was precedent .
Specifically , what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more recent ) Supreme Court precedents on issues like school segregation , birth control , abortion and same-sex marriage .
For the most part , Barrett wasn ’ t willing to say that these major precedents were “ settled law ” — a term that ’ s generally used to refer to cases that are so well-established that the high court wouldn ’ t revisit them .
She did confirm that she saw Brown v. Board of Education , which struck down school segregation , and Loving v. Virginia , which struck down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decided .
But she wasn ’ t willing to do the same for any other case .
Roe v. Wade , the 1973 ruling that established a constitutional right to abortion , was one such case where Barrett refused to declare a perspective .
In fairness , every would-be Supreme Court justice gets asked about it , and they typically tend to dodge — for instance , during his confirmation hearings in 2018 , Brett Kavanaugh said , “ one of the important things to keep in mind about Roe v. Wade is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the past 45 years.
” But Barrett was perhaps even more cautious in her response .
In response to another question from Klobuchar , she said that while there are some cases that are clearly so settled that nobody is pushing for them to be overruled , the fact that she was answering a lot of questions from the senators about Roe indicated to her that Roe wasn ’ t among them .
Barrett was very careful , of course , to say that her silence on Roe was not a sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Barrett also demurred when several senators asked her about Griswold v. Connecticut , the 1965 ruling that struck down a law criminalizing birth control as an invasion of marital privacy .
Her answer to a series of questions about the case was essentially — Griswold isn ’ t up for debate because no one is challenging Griswold .
She did not , notably , say that she thought the case was correctly decided — which is a stark contrast from previous Republican nominees , including Chief Justice John Roberts , who said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I agree with the Griswold court ’ s conclusion that marital privacy extends to contraception and availability of that.
” She presented herself as an independent thinker with an “ open mind ” While she repeatedly acknowledged her debt to her mentor , the late Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia , she also said she ’ d be her own justice who keeps an “ open mind ” about every case .
But she didn ’ t elaborate further about what that would mean in practice .
It ’ s an interesting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was known as an extremely conservative judge , he also had an independent streak , which was most visible in some occasional liberal votes in cases involving policing and the rights of criminal defendants .
It ’ s possible that Barrett will also have issues where she similarly breaks the conservative mold — but we didn ’ t get many clues for what those might be .
We do know from a recent analysis from her votes as a judge on the 7th Circuit that she is much closer to the middle of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employment discrimination and criminal defendants .
But those were not the issues that took center stage on Tuesday and Wednesday — and overall , the hearings ended without much of a sense of what an “ open mind ” means to Barrett .

Modern Supreme Court confirmation hearings seem like they should be deeply consequential — especially when the nominee has the power to fundamentally shift the balance of the court. But in reality, they can feel like an exercise in futility. Amy Coney Barrett’s hearings, which just wrapped up their third day, are no exception. As my colleague Perry Bacon Jr. wrote yesterday, we’ve mostly learned that Barrett is very good at politely declining to answer senators’ questions. And at one point during the hearings on Wednesday, the question-and-answer session devolved into some friendly wrangling among the Republican senators about the Houston Astros.
There were some crumbs of information that came out of the two days of questioning, though. Here are three takeaways from the hearings on Tuesday and Wednesday:
Barrett refused to answer basic questions about how she’d rule on the election
One of the biggest questions looming over the hearings was how Barrett might rule in a dispute about the election — which could arrive at the Supreme Court’s doorstep just days after she’s confirmed. Barrett said she didn’t intend to be Trump’s “pawn,” but then she mostly evaded questions about presidential power and how she’d rule in various situations involving the 2020 election, including a query from Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein about whether the president has the power to unilaterally delay the election. (Short answer: He can’t.)
Democrats pressed Barrett to say she’d recuse herself from any election-related case, but she refused to do so, although she said she’d take the idea “very seriously” if such a case came her way. When asked by Democratic Sen. Amy Klobuchar if she thought absentee ballots were “an essential way to vote for millions of Americans right now,” she said she couldn’t comment. And she also declined to answer a question about whether voter intimidation was illegal — even though this question arguably has an easy, factual answer.
These responses might seem like they’re largely in keeping with Barrett’s broader tactic of batting away the senators’ hypotheticals. But her refusal to take a stand on even fairly straightforward legal issues is perhaps a sign of just how important she knows her views on all of these issues could be in just a few weeks.
She may not view precedents on abortion and birth control as “settled law”
If you tuned into the confirmation hearings on Tuesday and Wednesday, you probably learned a lot of Constitutional Law 101 — because if there was a theme during the second and third day of Barrett’s hearings, it was precedent. Specifically, what Barrett thinks about long-standing (and some more recent) Supreme Court precedents on issues like school segregation, birth control, abortion and same-sex marriage. For the most part, Barrett wasn’t willing to say that these major precedents were “settled law” — a term that’s generally used to refer to cases that are so well-established that the high court wouldn’t revisit them. She did confirm that she saw Brown v. Board of Education, which struck down school segregation, and Loving v. Virginia, which struck down bans on interracial marriage, as correctly decided. But she wasn’t willing to do the same for any other case.
Roe v. Wade, the 1973 ruling that established a constitutional right to abortion, was one such case where Barrett refused to declare a perspective. In fairness, every would-be Supreme Court justice gets asked about it, and they typically tend to dodge — for instance, during his confirmation hearings in 2018, Brett Kavanaugh said, “one of the important things to keep in mind about Roe v. Wade is that it has been reaffirmed many times over the past 45 years.” But Barrett was perhaps even more cautious in her response. In response to another question from Klobuchar, she said that while there are some cases that are clearly so settled that nobody is pushing for them to be overruled, the fact that she was answering a lot of questions from the senators about Roe indicated to her that Roe wasn’t among them.
Barrett was very careful, of course, to say that her silence on Roe was not a sign that she thought it should be overruled. Barrett also demurred when several senators asked her about Griswold v. Connecticut, the 1965 ruling that struck down a law criminalizing birth control as an invasion of marital privacy. Her answer to a series of questions about the case was essentially — Griswold isn’t up for debate because no one is challenging Griswold. She did not, notably, say that she thought the case was correctly decided — which is a stark contrast from previous Republican nominees, including Chief Justice John Roberts, who said during his confirmation hearings in 2005, “I agree with the Griswold court’s conclusion that marital privacy extends to contraception and availability of that.”
She presented herself as an independent thinker with an “open mind”
While she repeatedly acknowledged her debt to her mentor, the late Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia, she also said she’d be her own justice who keeps an “open mind” about every case. But she didn’t elaborate further about what that would mean in practice. It’s an interesting question, though, because while Scalia was known as an extremely conservative judge, he also had an independent streak, which was most visible in some occasional liberal votes in cases involving policing and the rights of criminal defendants.
It’s possible that Barrett will also have issues where she similarly breaks the conservative mold — but we didn’t get many clues for what those might be. We do know from a recent analysis from her votes as a judge on the 7th Circuit that she is much closer to the middle of the court on issues involving labor and employment discrimination and criminal defendants. But those were not the issues that took center stage on Tuesday and Wednesday — and overall, the hearings ended without much of a sense of what an “open mind” means to Barrett.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-14--Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems

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fivethirtyeight--2020-10-15--Voting In The 2020 Primaries Didn’t Worsen The COVID-19 Pandemic

We ’ re less than three weeks away from Election Day , and although we ’ ve already seen an enormous uptick in the number of absentee ballots requested — more than a third of Americans plan to vote by mail because of the coronavirus — many people will still cast their votes in person .
This means that people will assemble at polling places , as they did in the primaries held earlier this year and as they ’ re doing in states that have started early voting .
This , of course , raises a difficult question : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a public health disaster ?
We have spent seven months now living under the threat of the novel coronavirus .
And unfortunately , given the increasingly politicized way in which COVID-19 has been handled , voting during the pandemic has itself become a partisan issue .
Distrust in science is high , even though now is when such trust is most needed , and we find ourselves in a situation where the discussion around potential effects of the election on the pandemic is transpiring in the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undertook an analysis of in-person voting in the primaries to better understand the risks of voting in the general election .
Of course , a comparison between primaries and the general election is imperfect , but our analysis does offer us a window into the impact voting could have on the spread of COVID-19 .
And what we found should offer some comfort to those who plan to vote in person : We saw no increase in overall COVID-19 mortality due to in-person voting in the primaries .
Modeling the spread of COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underlying data is of uneven quality .
The U.S. has struggled to test enough people since the very beginning of the outbreak ; particularly in the early days , there were simply not enough tests to track the number of cases .
That ’ s why our analysis used mortality data collected by The New York Times , instead of the number of reported positive test results , since mortality data remains the most reliable measure for assessing the status of the epidemic .
Second , to better capture the dynamics of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from statistical and epidemiological modeling .
( The current preprint of our paper , along with data and code , is available here . )
We should note that our analysis is what statisticians call “ ecological.
” We examined whether primary elections affected the course of the pandemic in a county , not whether , at the individual level , going to the polls affects an individual ’ s risk of contracting the infection .
Our first approach relies on a technique called “ matching.
” In an ideal world ( at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of view ) , we would be able to explore a counterfactual — “ What if this state had not held its primary during a pandemic ?
” — and then compare the number of COVID-19 deaths under each scenario .
Of course , we only have access to the world as it actually unfolds .
So , we approximate this alternate world by using “ matches , ” defined for our purposes as counties that did not hold a primary but otherwise have similar characteristics relevant to the incidence of COVID-19 ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the population over 65 , median income , the share of the vote President Trump won in the 2016 election ) and that , most importantly , share a similar cumulative COVID-19 death rate in the 20-day period surrounding the primary .
Accordingly , matched counties are similar to one other when it comes to the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and risk factors — but one county held its primary and the other has not .
Let ’ s look at Chippewa County , Wisconsin as an example .
Wisconsin ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first major election with in-person voting since states began issuing stay-at-home orders .
We matched Chippewa with five of the most demographically similar counties that had similar cumulative COVID-19 death rates but had not held their primary , including Sumner County , Kansas ; Madison County , Kentucky ; and Rensselaer County , New York .
These counties each had cumulative death rates similar to Chippewa in the period around the Wisconsin primary , and scored relatively closely on our demographic measures .
Once we had this set of counties , we compared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Chippewa to the average of its five matches over the same ( post-primary ) period .
Performing this procedure across all of the counties that held primaries in our data , we found that there was no overall average increase in the mortality rate in counties that held primary elections compared to their matches .
In our second approach to the data , we wanted to replicate our results using a method specifically tailored to study the transmission of a virus but that relied on a wholly different set of assumptions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect of two key dates : the date a state ’ s governor issued a stay-at-home order and the date of the state ’ s primary election ( if applicable , in either case ) .
We then combined information from across the U.S. into a single model that estimated the overall effect of holding a primary election .
While statewide lockdowns appeared to have reduced the transmission of COVID-19 , the primary elections had no effect .
Below , you can see the rate at which the virus spreads in Florida and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primaries in the early phase of the virus , throughout the spring .
This is only two of the 34 states we looked at , but the effects on COVID-19 transmission in Florida and Illinois are representative of the overall average that we calculated across all of the states included in our analysis .
In other words , we found no evidence in our two separate analyses that the primaries had any effect on the spread of the coronavirus .
That said , we should interpret these findings cautiously .
There ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know about the coronavirus ; moreover , tracking the spread of COVID-19 in the U.S. has been challenging due to the aforementioned testing shortages and reporting delays .
Additionally , we faced difficulties in uncovering certain aspects of the primaries — for example , there is no reliable data on in-person turnout at the county level .
In short , we did not find a spike in the mortality rate associated with the primary elections .
This led us to conclude , based on our analysis , that in-person voting remains a viable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heard this November .
There are , though , several key differences between the primaries and the general election in November that should be kept in mind with respect to the safety of voting in person .
First , most of the primary elections were held under fair-weather conditions , enabling individuals to wait in long lines outside , at a lower risk of transmission .
That risk will be higher if voters are crammed indoors to avoid cold weather .
Second , turnout numbers are generally much higher in the general election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the particularly contentious nature of this presidential election , it could be that above-average turnout increases the risk of the virus spreading , perhaps because of large crowds at the polls .
Superspreader events do happen when people assemble .
A single wedding in Maine has been linked to at least 270 cases and eight deaths , representing over 5 percent of the total deaths in the state , and Trump ’ s recent bout with COVID-19 , linked to a White House event , has already been associated with more than two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
However , these superspreader events are intimate affairs associated with close contact and a lack of precautions .
Voting , on the other hand , is generally not a social activity .
People tend to stay apart , and are often in relatively large and well-ventilated spaces such as school gymnasiums .
What ’ s more , people tend to be quiet , or even silent , while voting ( loud talking and singing have been associated with viral transmission and outbreaks ) .
And as our research shows , there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the primaries and the spread of COVID-19 .
If anything , voting may be similar to shopping at a grocery store in terms of risk .
Provided that voting sites equip poll workers with personal protective gear and voters take the necessary precautions , such as wearing a mask and physically distancing while waiting in line , there ’ s no reason why people who do not fall into high-risk groups for COVID-19 should rule out voting in person .
This research was supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation .

We’re less than three weeks away from Election Day, and although we’ve already seen an enormous uptick in the number of absentee ballots requested — more than a third of Americans plan to vote by mail because of the coronavirus — many people will still cast their votes in person. This means that people will assemble at polling places, as they did in the primaries held earlier this year and as they’re doing in states that have started early voting. This, of course, raises a difficult question: Could the simple act of voting worsen a public health disaster?
We have spent seven months now living under the threat of the novel coronavirus. And unfortunately, given the increasingly politicized way in which COVID-19 has been handled, voting during the pandemic has itself become a partisan issue. Distrust in science is high, even though now is when such trust is most needed, and we find ourselves in a situation where the discussion around potential effects of the election on the pandemic is transpiring in the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the risks.
Earlier this year, we undertook an analysis of in-person voting in the primaries to better understand the risks of voting in the general election. Of course, a comparison between primaries and the general election is imperfect, but our analysis does offer us a window into the impact voting could have on the spread of COVID-19. And what we found should offer some comfort to those who plan to vote in person: We saw no increase in overall COVID-19 mortality due to in-person voting in the primaries.
Modeling the spread of COVID-19 is very challenging. First, the underlying data is of uneven quality. The U.S. has struggled to test enough people since the very beginning of the outbreak; particularly in the early days, there were simply not enough tests to track the number of cases. That’s why our analysis used mortality data collected by The New York Times, instead of the number of reported positive test results, since mortality data remains the most reliable measure for assessing the status of the epidemic.
Second, to better capture the dynamics of the epidemic, we used two different techniques from statistical and epidemiological modeling. (The current preprint of our paper, along with data and code, is available here.)
We should note that our analysis is what statisticians call “ecological.” We examined whether primary elections affected the course of the pandemic in a county, not whether, at the individual level, going to the polls affects an individual’s risk of contracting the infection.
Our first approach relies on a technique called “matching.” In an ideal world (at least from a statistician’s point of view), we would be able to explore a counterfactual — “What if this state had not held its primary during a pandemic?” — and then compare the number of COVID-19 deaths under each scenario.
Of course, we only have access to the world as it actually unfolds. So, we approximate this alternate world by using “matches,” defined for our purposes as counties that did not hold a primary but otherwise have similar characteristics relevant to the incidence of COVID-19 (e.g., population density, the percentage of the population over 65, median income, the share of the vote President Trump won in the 2016 election) and that, most importantly, share a similar cumulative COVID-19 death rate in the 20-day period surrounding the primary. Accordingly, matched counties are similar to one other when it comes to the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and risk factors — but one county held its primary and the other has not.
Let’s look at Chippewa County, Wisconsin as an example. Wisconsin’s chaotic April 7 primary was the first major election with in-person voting since states began issuing stay-at-home orders. We matched Chippewa with five of the most demographically similar counties that had similar cumulative COVID-19 death rates but had not held their primary, including Sumner County, Kansas; Madison County, Kentucky; and Rensselaer County, New York. These counties each had cumulative death rates similar to Chippewa in the period around the Wisconsin primary, and scored relatively closely on our demographic measures.
Once we had this set of counties, we compared the observed mortality rate after the primary in Chippewa to the average of its five matches over the same (post-primary) period. Performing this procedure across all of the counties that held primaries in our data, we found that there was no overall average increase in the mortality rate in counties that held primary elections compared to their matches.
In our second approach to the data, we wanted to replicate our results using a method specifically tailored to study the transmission of a virus but that relied on a wholly different set of assumptions. In our analysis, we tested the effect of two key dates: the date a state’s governor issued a stay-at-home order and the date of the state’s primary election (if applicable, in either case). We then combined information from across the U.S. into a single model that estimated the overall effect of holding a primary election.
While statewide lockdowns appeared to have reduced the transmission of COVID-19, the primary elections had no effect. Below, you can see the rate at which the virus spreads in Florida and Illinois, two populous states that held primaries in the early phase of the virus, throughout the spring. This is only two of the 34 states we looked at, but the effects on COVID-19 transmission in Florida and Illinois are representative of the overall average that we calculated across all of the states included in our analysis.
In other words, we found no evidence in our two separate analyses that the primaries had any effect on the spread of the coronavirus. That said, we should interpret these findings cautiously. There’s a lot we still don’t know about the coronavirus; moreover, tracking the spread of COVID-19 in the U.S. has been challenging due to the aforementioned testing shortages and reporting delays. Additionally, we faced difficulties in uncovering certain aspects of the primaries — for example, there is no reliable data on in-person turnout at the county level.
In short, we did not find a spike in the mortality rate associated with the primary elections. This led us to conclude, based on our analysis, that in-person voting remains a viable way for Americans to have their voices heard this November.
There are, though, several key differences between the primaries and the general election in November that should be kept in mind with respect to the safety of voting in person. First, most of the primary elections were held under fair-weather conditions, enabling individuals to wait in long lines outside, at a lower risk of transmission. That risk will be higher if voters are crammed indoors to avoid cold weather. Second, turnout numbers are generally much higher in the general election than in the primaries. And given the particularly contentious nature of this presidential election, it could be that above-average turnout increases the risk of the virus spreading, perhaps because of large crowds at the polls.
Superspreader events do happen when people assemble. A single wedding in Maine has been linked to at least 270 cases and eight deaths, representing over 5 percent of the total deaths in the state, and Trump’s recent bout with COVID-19, linked to a White House event, has already been associated with more than two dozen positive test results in his circle. However, these superspreader events are intimate affairs associated with close contact and a lack of precautions. Voting, on the other hand, is generally not a social activity. People tend to stay apart, and are often in relatively large and well-ventilated spaces such as school gymnasiums. What’s more, people tend to be quiet, or even silent, while voting (loud talking and singing have been associated with viral transmission and outbreaks).
And as our research shows, there is no inherent relationship between voting in person in the primaries and the spread of COVID-19. If anything, voting may be similar to shopping at a grocery store in terms of risk. Provided that voting sites equip poll workers with personal protective gear and voters take the necessary precautions, such as wearing a mask and physically distancing while waiting in line, there’s no reason why people who do not fall into high-risk groups for COVID-19 should rule out voting in person.
This research was supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-15--What Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation Could Mean For Roe v. Wade

When pressed about her views on abortion during the confirmation hearings , Judge Amy Coney Barrett dodged .
“ If I express a view on a precedent one way or another , whether I say I love it or I hate it , it signals to litigants that I might tilt one way or another on a pending case , ” Barrett said , in response to a question from Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein about Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey , two key precedents on abortion rights .
It ’ s not at all unusual , of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ try to avoid answering questions about how they ’ d vote on hot-button issues like abortion .
But Barrett , unlike other recent Supreme Court nominees , has a fairly clear perspective on abortion , having previously joined groups and signed public statements opposing it .
That stance appears to fall significantly to the right of where most Americans are on the issue , and her unwillingness to answer questions about these precedents is a reminder of just how dangerous the topic could be for both the Supreme Court and the Republicans .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ when in a pregnancy abortions can be performed , but the public ’ s views on abortion are complex , according to recent polling data we looked at .
And overall , a majority of the public does not want Roe , the 1973 decision that established a constitutional right to an abortion , to be overturned , though liberals and conservatives alike think that might happen with Barrett on the court .
Here ’ s an overview of how Americans feel about abortion ( spoiler : It ’ s complicated ! )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the court could lead to rulings on abortion that are more conservative than what most Americans want .
Not all abortion restrictions are unpopular Over the past 10 years , states have passed hundreds of laws making it harder to get an abortion , and though a number were blocked by the courts , these regulations still resulted in significantly reduced abortion access in large swathes of the country .
However , these restrictions aren ’ t uniformly unpopular .
Public opinion differs quite a bit on when an abortion should be legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 that 60 percent of Americans think abortion should generally be legal in the first three months of a pregnancy , while support fell to 28 percent in the second trimester and just 13 percent in the third trimester .
Similarly , Americans were much more likely to support abortion if the pregnant person ’ s life was in danger or the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest than they were if an abortion was being considered for other reasons , like fetal abnormalities or simply not wanting to carry the pregnancy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reason that many of the abortion restrictions passed in the past decade have aimed to chip away at the edges of the Supreme Court ’ s precedents on abortion rights rather than attack them directly .
During Barrett ’ s hearing , for instance , Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham mentioned an incremental bill he ’ s been pushing unsuccessfully in Congress for several years , which would prohibit abortion after 20 weeks post-fertilization , several weeks before when medical professionals generally agree that a fetus is viable .
That ’ s important because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has now largely superseded Roe , states are mostly free to regulate abortion after the point of fetal viability ; before that , restrictions can ’ t impose an “ undue burden ” on the person seeking an abortion .
Laws like Graham ’ s — which are in effect in 17 states , according to the Guttmacher Institute — therefore don ’ t necessarily challenge the constitutional right to abortion directly ; instead , they could be used to argue for a different standard under which states are allowed to restrict abortion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Graham ’ s approach might be more in line with public opinion — and might eventually have a better chance of success with a Supreme Court justice like John Roberts , who seems cautious about moving too quickly to the right on hot-button issues .
“ The status quo with more restrictions wouldn ’ t be that unpopular , especially if the restrictions are focused later in pregnancy , ” said Mary Ziegler , a law professor at Florida State University who studies the history and politics of abortion law .
If Barrett @ @ @ @ @ @ @ though , all of this could change , and there would likely be more pressure from the conservative bloc to consider cases that could take restrictions on abortion rights well outside many Americans ’ comfort zone .
Barrett could push the Supreme Court outside the mainstream Barrett might have demurred on direct questions about Roe in the hearings this week , but she admitted that she does not view Roe as a “ super-precedent ” — a ruling so ensconced in American law that no one is making any serious efforts to get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dame law professor in 2006 , she signed an ad condemning the “ barbaric legacy ” of Roe .
This signals that she might be open to more dramatic changes in abortion law than the Supreme Court has recently been willing to consider , and she ’ s potentially joining the court at a moment when anti-abortion advocates are taking increasingly bold swings at the legal foundation of abortion rights .
In the past few years , some anti-abortion advocates have grown fed up with the incrementalist approach and have successfully pushed for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or restrict it to be allowed only very early in a pregnancy .
Seven states , for example , have passed laws prohibiting abortion after fetal cardiac activity can be detected , which effectively bans abortion after six or seven weeks of pregnancy .
Those laws directly challenge the right to abortion in the early months of pregnancy that was established in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey , and in many cases , they make abortion illegal even in circumstances when most Americans would prefer the procedure was permitted , like when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or incest .
And they are also much less likely to be popular with the public — according to polling by Gallup , even many people who identify as “ pro-life ” want abortion to be available in at least a few circumstances .
Americans are also much more divided over early abortion bans than they are over restrictions later in pregnancy , because as we noted earlier , support for abortion in the second trimester is actually quite low .
But according to a Kaiser Family Foundation poll conducted in 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be prohibited when a fetal heartbeat can be detected ( 49 percent are in favor , and 50 percent are opposed ) .
And support for that restriction fell to 38 percent when respondents were told that a fetal heartbeat could be detected as early as six weeks into a pregnancy , before many women even know they ’ re pregnant .
It ’ s possible that even if she ’ s confirmed , Barrett won ’ t be the crucial swing vote on an abortion case — it ’ s hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be .
But because four of the nine justices must agree on whether the court will take a case , the presence of an additional conservative could mean the justices are more likely to agree to hear a far-reaching abortion case , putting the court in the crosshairs of public opinion .
Ziegler noted that over the past few years , Justice Clarence Thomas — who used to be the most zealous anti-abortion advocate among the justices — has been joined in many opinions by Justice Samuel Alito , and she said that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dramatic changes to abortion law , based on his dissent in an abortion rights case from earlier this summer .
“ [ Americans ] don ’ t like the idea of outright [ abortion ] bans , they don ’ t like the idea of criminalization , and they don ’ t like the idea of overturning Roe , ” Ziegler said .
But with a six-justice conservative majority on the court , advocates of the anti-abortion movement may ramp up their efforts to push more dramatic restrictions — and more justices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their efforts .

When pressed about her views on abortion during the confirmation hearings, Judge Amy Coney Barrett dodged. “If I express a view on a precedent one way or another, whether I say I love it or I hate it, it signals to litigants that I might tilt one way or another on a pending case,” Barrett said, in response to a question from Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein about Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, two key precedents on abortion rights.
It’s not at all unusual, of course, for Supreme Court nominees to try to avoid answering questions about how they’d vote on hot-button issues like abortion. But Barrett, unlike other recent Supreme Court nominees, has a fairly clear perspective on abortion, having previously joined groups and signed public statements opposing it. That stance appears to fall significantly to the right of where most Americans are on the issue, and her unwillingness to answer questions about these precedents is a reminder of just how dangerous the topic could be for both the Supreme Court and the Republicans.
Many Americans do support some limitations on when in a pregnancy abortions can be performed, but the public’s views on abortion are complex, according to recent polling data we looked at. And overall, a majority of the public does not want Roe, the 1973 decision that established a constitutional right to an abortion, to be overturned, though liberals and conservatives alike think that might happen with Barrett on the court.
Here’s an overview of how Americans feel about abortion (spoiler: It’s complicated!) and how Barrett’s presence on the court could lead to rulings on abortion that are more conservative than what most Americans want.
Not all abortion restrictions are unpopular
Over the past 10 years, states have passed hundreds of laws making it harder to get an abortion, and though a number were blocked by the courts, these regulations still resulted in significantly reduced abortion access in large swathes of the country. However, these restrictions aren’t uniformly unpopular.
Public opinion differs quite a bit on when an abortion should be legal. For instance, Gallup found in 2018 that 60 percent of Americans think abortion should generally be legal in the first three months of a pregnancy, while support fell to 28 percent in the second trimester and just 13 percent in the third trimester. Similarly, Americans were much more likely to support abortion if the pregnant person’s life was in danger or the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest than they were if an abortion was being considered for other reasons, like fetal abnormalities or simply not wanting to carry the pregnancy to term.
That may be one reason that many of the abortion restrictions passed in the past decade have aimed to chip away at the edges of the Supreme Court’s precedents on abortion rights rather than attack them directly. During Barrett’s hearing, for instance, Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham mentioned an incremental bill he’s been pushing unsuccessfully in Congress for several years, which would prohibit abortion after 20 weeks post-fertilization, several weeks before when medical professionals generally agree that a fetus is viable. That’s important because under Casey, the 1992 case that has now largely superseded Roe, states are mostly free to regulate abortion after the point of fetal viability; before that, restrictions can’t impose an “undue burden” on the person seeking an abortion. Laws like Graham’s — which are in effect in 17 states, according to the Guttmacher Institute — therefore don’t necessarily challenge the constitutional right to abortion directly; instead, they could be used to argue for a different standard under which states are allowed to restrict abortion.
Compared to overturning Roe directly, Graham’s approach might be more in line with public opinion — and might eventually have a better chance of success with a Supreme Court justice like John Roberts, who seems cautious about moving too quickly to the right on hot-button issues. “The status quo with more restrictions wouldn’t be that unpopular, especially if the restrictions are focused later in pregnancy,” said Mary Ziegler, a law professor at Florida State University who studies the history and politics of abortion law.
If Barrett is confirmed to the Supreme Court, though, all of this could change, and there would likely be more pressure from the conservative bloc to consider cases that could take restrictions on abortion rights well outside many Americans’ comfort zone.
Barrett could push the Supreme Court outside the mainstream
Barrett might have demurred on direct questions about Roe in the hearings this week, but she admitted that she does not view Roe as a “super-precedent” — a ruling so ensconced in American law that no one is making any serious efforts to get it overturned — and as a Notre Dame law professor in 2006, she signed an ad condemning the “barbaric legacy” of Roe. This signals that she might be open to more dramatic changes in abortion law than the Supreme Court has recently been willing to consider, and she’s potentially joining the court at a moment when anti-abortion advocates are taking increasingly bold swings at the legal foundation of abortion rights.
In the past few years, some anti-abortion advocates have grown fed up with the incrementalist approach and have successfully pushed for state laws that either ban abortion entirely, or restrict it to be allowed only very early in a pregnancy. Seven states, for example, have passed laws prohibiting abortion after fetal cardiac activity can be detected, which effectively bans abortion after six or seven weeks of pregnancy.
Those laws directly challenge the right to abortion in the early months of pregnancy that was established in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey, and in many cases, they make abortion illegal even in circumstances when most Americans would prefer the procedure was permitted, like when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. And they are also much less likely to be popular with the public — according to polling by Gallup, even many people who identify as “pro-life” want abortion to be available in at least a few circumstances.
Pro-choice and pro-life labels obscure nuance in views Share of self-described “pro-choice” or “pro-life” Americans by when they think abortion should be legal SELF-IDENTIFY AS … Legality of Abortion Pro-choice Pro-life Overall Legal under any circumstances 55% 3% 29% Legal in most circumstances 23 4 13 Legal in only a few circumstances 18 53 35 Illegal in all circumstances 3 38 20 Gallup survey conducted May 1-13, 2020. Respondents who answered “no opinion” or who said abortion should be legal under some circumstances but didn’t say if it should be under “most” or “only a few” circumstances are not shown. Source: GALLUP
Americans are also much more divided over early abortion bans than they are over restrictions later in pregnancy, because as we noted earlier, support for abortion in the second trimester is actually quite low. But according to a Kaiser Family Foundation poll conducted in 2019, Americans are basically split on whether abortions should be prohibited when a fetal heartbeat can be detected (49 percent are in favor, and 50 percent are opposed). And support for that restriction fell to 38 percent when respondents were told that a fetal heartbeat could be detected as early as six weeks into a pregnancy, before many women even know they’re pregnant.
It’s possible that even if she’s confirmed, Barrett won’t be the crucial swing vote on an abortion case — it’s hard to predict exactly what her ideology will be. But because four of the nine justices must agree on whether the court will take a case, the presence of an additional conservative could mean the justices are more likely to agree to hear a far-reaching abortion case, putting the court in the crosshairs of public opinion. Ziegler noted that over the past few years, Justice Clarence Thomas — who used to be the most zealous anti-abortion advocate among the justices — has been joined in many opinions by Justice Samuel Alito, and she said that even Justice Neil Gorsuch might be open to dramatic changes to abortion law, based on his dissent in an abortion rights case from earlier this summer.
“[Americans] don’t like the idea of outright [abortion] bans, they don’t like the idea of criminalization, and they don’t like the idea of overturning Roe,” Ziegler said. But with a six-justice conservative majority on the court, advocates of the anti-abortion movement may ramp up their efforts to push more dramatic restrictions — and more justices on the court could be open to their efforts.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-15--Politics Podcast: What We Learned From The Amy Coney Barrett Hearings

Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett is on track for confirmation , as judiciary committee hearings wrapped up on Thursday @ @ @ @ @ the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Perry Bacon Jr. and Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux discuss the Republican and @ @ @ @ @ the hearings and how Barrett ’ s addition to the court will shape its decisions @ @ @ @ @ .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in @ @ @ @ @ by downloading it in iTunes , the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform .
@ @ @ @ @ podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and @ @ @ @ @ discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a @ @ @ @ @ for “ good polling vs. bad polling ” ?
Get in touch by email , @ @ @ @ @ comments .

Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett is on track for confirmation, as judiciary committee hearings wrapped up on Thursday. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Perry Bacon Jr. and Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux discuss the Republican and Democratic tactics on display during the hearings and how Barrett’s addition to the court will shape its decisions in the years to come.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-15--Despite A Sexting Scandal, Democrat Cal Cunningham Is Favored In North Carolina’s Senate Race

When the polls don ’ t change after a scandal happens , what do we make of it ?
That ’ s the question we ’ re asking after news broke on Friday , Oct. 2 , that North Carolina Democratic Senate nominee Cal Cunningham had been sexting a woman who wasn ’ t his wife .
This development seemingly presented an opening for embattled Republican Sen. Thom Tillis , who has trailed Cunningham in most polls in one of the most important Senate contests on the ballot this November .
But despite concentrated Republican attacks over Cunningham ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence that the trajectory of the race has changed — at least so far .
On Oct. 2 , Cunningham had a 67 in 100 shot of winning ; today , Cunningham has a 67 in 100 chance , according to the Deluxe version of FiveThirtyEight ’ s Senate forecast .
In other words , he was a slight favorite to win before the scandal broke and remains so today .
FiveThirtyEight ’ s Senate forecast currently gives Democrats a 73 in 100 chance of winning control of the Senate , and Cunningham @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pivotal to that .
If Democrats can capture GOP-held seats in Arizona and Colorado , where they have better odds , along with more competitive races in Maine and North Carolina , that would give them the bare minimum of 50 seats they need to have a shot at control ( assuming they lose control of Alabama ’ s seat but retain Michigan ’ s ) .
And as long as Joe Biden wins — no certainty , but he is favored — that would hand Sen. Kamala Harris the vice presidency and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Cunningham ’ s odds haven ’ t budged because the polls haven ’ t shifted .
Four pollsters who have surveyed the race since the scandal broke had also polled in late August or September , and as you can see in the table below , none of them found that much of a change from their previous polls .
Of course , this doesn ’ t mean the scandal helped Cunningham — polls do show his reputation has taken a hit .
The New York Times/Siena College ’ s surveys found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of him fell from 46 percent to 40 percent , and the share with a negative impression of him increased from 29 percent to 42 percent .
Monmouth University ’ s poll had more voters who had no opinion of Cunningham , but Cunningham ’ s favorables still fell from 34 percent to 25 percent , while his unfavorable numbers rose from 22 percent to 33 percent .
So while this downtick in public perception hasn ’ t hurt Cunningham ’ s horse-race numbers , we can ’ t rule out the possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once votes are counted .
Our past research has found that new scandals in the middle of a campaign can be a drag on a candidate ’ s vote share , especially in more competitive races .
That ’ s why our Senate forecast includes a scandal variable , and Cunningham ’ s chances of winning did fall slightly after we added his scandal to our model — but this hasn ’ t shown up in the polls , at least not yet .
In theory , though , Americans are harsh critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in May , for instance , that 89 percent of Americans said married men and women having affairs was immoral — and it ’ s hard to get 9 in 10 Americans to agree on much of anything these days .
So we can ’ t rule out further revelations that keep the story in the news , like when more messages sent by Cunningham became public a few days after the initial scandal broke .
But it will be challenging for the GOP to fully capitalize on Cunningham ’ s scandal .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say infidelity is immoral , sex scandals involving politicians are nothing new for voters .
So in some ways , as long as the details of this one don ’ t get any more lurid or troubling , it may not hurt Cunningham that much .
That ’ s especially so when you consider that partisanship and the overall national electoral environment probably mitigate much of the damage for Cunningham .
Few Democrats are likely to abandon Cunningham over the scandal , and considering Tillis ’ s favorability ratings are also mediocre @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely to flock to him .
Moreover , the scandal has largely been overshadowed by the presidential race , as Trump ’ s poorly received debate performance and COVID-19 diagnosis blunted some of the impact of the Cunningham news .
This race ’ s trajectory isn ’ t locked in , by any means , but it ’ s good news for Democrats , who almost certainly need to win the North Carolina seat to gain a majority in the Senate .

When the polls don’t change after a scandal happens, what do we make of it? That’s the question we’re asking after news broke on Friday, Oct. 2, that North Carolina Democratic Senate nominee Cal Cunningham had been sexting a woman who wasn’t his wife. This development seemingly presented an opening for embattled Republican Sen. Thom Tillis, who has trailed Cunningham in most polls in one of the most important Senate contests on the ballot this November.
But despite concentrated Republican attacks over Cunningham’s extramarital affair, there’s little evidence that the trajectory of the race has changed — at least so far. On Oct. 2, Cunningham had a 67 in 100 shot of winning; today, Cunningham has a 67 in 100 chance, according to the Deluxe version of FiveThirtyEight’s Senate forecast.
In other words, he was a slight favorite to win before the scandal broke and remains so today.
FiveThirtyEight’s Senate forecast currently gives Democrats a 73 in 100 chance of winning control of the Senate, and Cunningham’s fortunes in North Carolina are pivotal to that. If Democrats can capture GOP-held seats in Arizona and Colorado, where they have better odds, along with more competitive races in Maine and North Carolina, that would give them the bare minimum of 50 seats they need to have a shot at control (assuming they lose control of Alabama’s seat but retain Michigan’s). And as long as Joe Biden wins — no certainty, but he is favored — that would hand Sen. Kamala Harris the vice presidency and the Senate tiebreaker.
On the whole, Cunningham’s odds haven’t budged because the polls haven’t shifted. Four pollsters who have surveyed the race since the scandal broke had also polled in late August or September, and as you can see in the table below, none of them found that much of a change from their previous polls.
Cunningham’s scandal hasn’t really moved the polls Change in Cunningham’s margin in polls conducted before and after news of his sexting scandal broke late on Oct. 2 pollster Before Scandal After Scandal Change Siena College/NYT Upshot +5 +4 -1 Ipsos +4 +4 0 Monmouth University* +1 +3 +2 SurveyUSA +7 +10 +3 Average +4 +5 +1 *Monmouth University’s polls are averages of two likely voter turnout figures. Includes only pollsters that conducted surveys entirely before and after the scandal became public, with the “before” poll conducted in August or September. Source: polls
Of course, this doesn’t mean the scandal helped Cunningham — polls do show his reputation has taken a hit. The New York Times/Siena College’s surveys found that the share with a positive impression of him fell from 46 percent to 40 percent, and the share with a negative impression of him increased from 29 percent to 42 percent. Monmouth University’s poll had more voters who had no opinion of Cunningham, but Cunningham’s favorables still fell from 34 percent to 25 percent, while his unfavorable numbers rose from 22 percent to 33 percent.
So while this downtick in public perception hasn’t hurt Cunningham’s horse-race numbers, we can’t rule out the possibility that it will have a negative effect once votes are counted. Our past research has found that new scandals in the middle of a campaign can be a drag on a candidate’s vote share, especially in more competitive races. That’s why our Senate forecast includes a scandal variable, and Cunningham’s chances of winning did fall slightly after we added his scandal to our model — but this hasn’t shown up in the polls, at least not yet. In theory, though, Americans are harsh critics of marital infidelity. Gallup found back in May, for instance, that 89 percent of Americans said married men and women having affairs was immoral — and it’s hard to get 9 in 10 Americans to agree on much of anything these days. So we can’t rule out further revelations that keep the story in the news, like when more messages sent by Cunningham became public a few days after the initial scandal broke.
But it will be challenging for the GOP to fully capitalize on Cunningham’s scandal. First, even though Americans are quick to say infidelity is immoral, sex scandals involving politicians are nothing new for voters. So in some ways, as long as the details of this one don’t get any more lurid or troubling, it may not hurt Cunningham that much. That’s especially so when you consider that partisanship and the overall national electoral environment probably mitigate much of the damage for Cunningham. Few Democrats are likely to abandon Cunningham over the scandal, and considering Tillis’s favorability ratings are also mediocre, independents aren’t any more likely to flock to him. Moreover, the scandal has largely been overshadowed by the presidential race, as Trump’s poorly received debate performance and COVID-19 diagnosis blunted some of the impact of the Cunningham news.
This race’s trajectory isn’t locked in, by any means, but it’s good news for Democrats, who almost certainly need to win the North Carolina seat to gain a majority in the Senate.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-15--QAnon’s Obsession With #SaveTheChildren Is Making It Harder To Save Kids From Traffickers

It ’ s hard to argue against a phrase like “ save the children.
” Which , presumably , is why QAnon uses it as a hashtag .
The growing online conspiracy cult has co-opted the phrase to push falsehoods about pedophiles who run the world .
But in promoting its radical worldview , QAnon has made life difficult for the organizations actually trying to save children .
And the results could be putting kids at risk .
QAnon is a baseless conspiracy regardless of how deep you go , but its fixation on pedophilia is particularly unmoored .
Devoted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of detail — that there is a secret cabal of powerful elites who run an underground pedophilia ring , and that President Trump is currently working to bring these evildoers to justice .
If you go all the way down the rabbit hole you ’ ll find theories about Bill Gates injecting tracking devices into every citizen , blood libel , devil worship and draining kids of a chemical compound called adrenochrome to become immortal .
But the underlying connective tissue of QAnon is that bad people , mainly Democrats , are trafficking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who can stop them .
Over the summer , Q followers began using # savethechildren to spread the conspiracy theory , and it worked .
From Aug. 9 through Aug. 15 , more than 12,000 public Facebook posts used the hashtag , according to the social media tracking tool CrowdTangle .
The rest of the year , the hashtag tended to garner fewer than 200 posts per week .
But most of the content shared using # savethechildren was based on a Q-fueled and completely warped picture of what child trafficking looks like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made life difficult for the people who actually do anti-trafficking work .
“ It ’ s extraordinarily frustrating , ” said Lisa Goldblatt Grace , co-founder and executive director of My Life My Choice , an anti-trafficking nonprofit .
“ We ’ ve worked so hard for the last 18 years to shift the narrative and have people understand this is happening in our communities .
QAnon instead gives folks this incredibly sensationalized ‘ other ’ to fear and be angry about.
” In reality , child trafficking in the U.S. doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and D.C. elites performing satanic rituals on children they stole from suburban playgrounds .
Instead , kids who are sexually exploited are often poor , children of color , immigrants , or some combination of the three , and they ’ ve often been in the child welfare system or run away from home .
In 2018 , 1 in 7 kids who were reported as runaways to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children were likely victims of child sex trafficking , according to UNICEF .
“ We see minors who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ ve run away from home , maybe they ’ ve been kicked out of their home — and then engage in sex acts for money in order to have food to eat and a place to stay , ” said Jean Bruggeman , executive director of Freedom Network USA , an anti-trafficking group .
“ Almost never is there any kind of abduction or solely a use of physical force or locking people away .
It ’ s generally much more subtle coercion.
” The spectre of pedophilia and child sex @ @ @ @ @ @ @ QAnon lore since the very beginning .
Q , the anonymous poster who feeds the conspiracy by claiming to “ drop ” highly classified government information on image boards known for attracting white supremacists and violent misogynists , has been alluding to underground child trafficking rings in his messages for years .
“ Perhaps [ Trump ] could not stomach the thought of children being kidnapped , drugged , and raped while leaders/law enforcement of the world turn a blind eye , ” reads one message from November 2017 .
“ Some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clintons do to children , what the deep state does to children , satanic trafficking and sacrifices , ” said Mike Rothschild , a conspiracy theory researcher currently working on a book about QAnon .
The # savethechildren hashtag , however , didn ’ t come onto the QAnon radar until this year .
The hashtag had been used before ( notably to promote the charity Save The Children , which has been around for a century and is unaffiliated with QAnon ) , but in July and August , the number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major portion of those posts were Q-affiliated .
This was likely due in part to the pandemic , Rothschild said : With more people stuck indoors , out of work and feeling hopeless , it ’ s easy to get sucked into an online world that claims to have all the answers .
But it also coincided with a crackdown from Twitter to remove Q-related content .
Suddenly , Q followers couldn ’ t spread their message as openly as they had before , so it ’ s possible that ’ s why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wholesome , social media sites couldn ’ t possibly ban it .
It was more of an organic growth than any kind of coordinated campaign , said Annie Kelly , a PhD candidate at the University of East Anglia who studies far-right political movements and digital culture .
“ It ’ s incorrect to frame it as some kind of mastermind pulling the strings , ” Kelly said .
“ The # savethechildren evolution wasn ’ t a coordinated effort to hide QAnon ’ s agenda , but it had the effect of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s QAnon.
” To some extent , this growing population of people concerned about child trafficking has translated into a genuine support for organizations that work to end it .
I spoke to representatives from six anti-trafficking groups and four told me they have seen a recent increase in donations .
Freedom Network USA , for example , received 102 donations totalling $ 23,200 from April to September this year , more than 50 times the amount it received in the same period last year , when it got five donations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to give specific figures but said they had seen an increase in donations this year , particularly over the summer .
That said , it ’ s really hard to say for sure how many , if any , of those donations were from Q followers .
“ Nobody was sending in donations with a note saying ‘ In Q we trust , ’ you know ?
” Goldblatt Grace said .
And the increased attention has come with plenty of drawbacks .
Polaris , the charity that operates the National Human Trafficking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discouraging people from reporting that children were not being sold inside expensive cabinets online because callers were flooding its phones with a Q-adjacent conspiracy .
The inundated hotline is one example of a problem each of the anti-trafficking representatives I spoke to raised : Even if QAnon is bringing people ’ s attention to child trafficking in general , it ’ s focusing that attention specifically on a sensationalized , largely inaccurate picture of what trafficking looks like .
And that can pull focus and resources away from the actual problem .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ misunderstanding of the issue , but also a wrong response , ” said Borislav Gerasimov , the program coordinator for communications and advocacy at the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women .
As an example , Gerasimov cited the gunman who fired inside a pizza shop in 2016 because he wrongly believed it was the location of an underground pedophile ring , a conspiracy theory called Pizzagate that is a precursor to QAnon .
“ If you portray human trafficking as something that a secret cabal is doing , the solution becomes guns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the solution to trafficking.
” The solutions that anti-trafficking groups advocate for aren ’ t about raiding pizza shops or decoding Justin Bieber ’ s headwear choices , they ’ re about improving social programs so kids don ’ t fall through the cracks and end up in situations that leave them vulnerable to exploitation .
That ’ s not as easy of a sell to the QAnon crowd .
“ I don ’ t find that I ’ m able to translate the kind of fervor and excitement and investment people get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus and excitement in caring for the most marginalized among us , ” said Goldblatt Grace .
Each of the nonprofit representatives I spoke to said they ’ re grateful for any donation and are hopeful the increased attention can create opportunities for outreach and education .
But for that to happen , Q followers would have to give up on some of their most cherished beliefs and admit that the real problem , while no less concerning , looks less like the action movie playing in their head and more like the @ @ @ @ @ @ @

It’s hard to argue against a phrase like “save the children.” Which, presumably, is why QAnon uses it as a hashtag. The growing online conspiracy cult has co-opted the phrase to push falsehoods about pedophiles who run the world. But in promoting its radical worldview, QAnon has made life difficult for the organizations actually trying to save children. And the results could be putting kids at risk.
QAnon is a baseless conspiracy regardless of how deep you go, but its fixation on pedophilia is particularly unmoored. Devoted QAnon followers believe — to varying levels of detail — that there is a secret cabal of powerful elites who run an underground pedophilia ring, and that President Trump is currently working to bring these evildoers to justice. If you go all the way down the rabbit hole you’ll find theories about Bill Gates injecting tracking devices into every citizen, blood libel, devil worship and draining kids of a chemical compound called adrenochrome to become immortal. But the underlying connective tissue of QAnon is that bad people, mainly Democrats, are trafficking children and Trump is the only one who can stop them.
Over the summer, Q followers began using #savethechildren to spread the conspiracy theory, and it worked. From Aug. 9 through Aug. 15, more than 12,000 public Facebook posts used the hashtag, according to the social media tracking tool CrowdTangle. The rest of the year, the hashtag tended to garner fewer than 200 posts per week.
But most of the content shared using #savethechildren was based on a Q-fueled and completely warped picture of what child trafficking looks like in this country. And that has made life difficult for the people who actually do anti-trafficking work.
“It’s extraordinarily frustrating,” said Lisa Goldblatt Grace, co-founder and executive director of My Life My Choice, an anti-trafficking nonprofit. “We’ve worked so hard for the last 18 years to shift the narrative and have people understand this is happening in our communities. QAnon instead gives folks this incredibly sensationalized ‘other’ to fear and be angry about.”
In reality, child trafficking in the U.S. doesn’t look like a bunch of Hollywood and D.C. elites performing satanic rituals on children they stole from suburban playgrounds. Instead, kids who are sexually exploited are often poor, children of color, immigrants, or some combination of the three, and they’ve often been in the child welfare system or run away from home. In 2018, 1 in 7 kids who were reported as runaways to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children were likely victims of child sex trafficking, according to UNICEF.
“We see minors who are in a vulnerable position — maybe they’ve run away from home, maybe they’ve been kicked out of their home — and then engage in sex acts for money in order to have food to eat and a place to stay,” said Jean Bruggeman, executive director of Freedom Network USA, an anti-trafficking group. “Almost never is there any kind of abduction or solely a use of physical force or locking people away. It’s generally much more subtle coercion.”
The spectre of pedophilia and child sex trafficking has been a part of the QAnon lore since the very beginning. Q, the anonymous poster who feeds the conspiracy by claiming to “drop” highly classified government information on image boards known for attracting white supremacists and violent misogynists, has been alluding to underground child trafficking rings in his messages for years. “Perhaps [Trump] could not stomach the thought of children being kidnapped, drugged, and raped while leaders/law enforcement of the world turn a blind eye,” reads one message from November 2017.
“Some of the earliest drops are about what the Clintons do to children, what the deep state does to children, satanic trafficking and sacrifices,” said Mike Rothschild, a conspiracy theory researcher currently working on a book about QAnon.
The #savethechildren hashtag, however, didn’t come onto the QAnon radar until this year. The hashtag had been used before (notably to promote the charity Save The Children, which has been around for a century and is unaffiliated with QAnon), but in July and August, the number of posts using it surged, and a major portion of those posts were Q-affiliated. This was likely due in part to the pandemic, Rothschild said: With more people stuck indoors, out of work and feeling hopeless, it’s easy to get sucked into an online world that claims to have all the answers. But it also coincided with a crackdown from Twitter to remove Q-related content. Suddenly, Q followers couldn’t spread their message as openly as they had before, so it’s possible that’s why they adopted a hashtag that was so wholesome, social media sites couldn’t possibly ban it. It was more of an organic growth than any kind of coordinated campaign, said Annie Kelly, a PhD candidate at the University of East Anglia who studies far-right political movements and digital culture.
“It’s incorrect to frame it as some kind of mastermind pulling the strings,” Kelly said. “The #savethechildren evolution wasn’t a coordinated effort to hide QAnon’s agenda, but it had the effect of drawing in people to QAnon without realizing it’s QAnon.”
To some extent, this growing population of people concerned about child trafficking has translated into a genuine support for organizations that work to end it. I spoke to representatives from six anti-trafficking groups and four told me they have seen a recent increase in donations. Freedom Network USA, for example, received 102 donations totalling $23,200 from April to September this year, more than 50 times the amount it received in the same period last year, when it got five donations totalling $428. Other organizations declined to give specific figures but said they had seen an increase in donations this year, particularly over the summer.
That said, it’s really hard to say for sure how many, if any, of those donations were from Q followers. “Nobody was sending in donations with a note saying ‘In Q we trust,’ you know?” Goldblatt Grace said. And the increased attention has come with plenty of drawbacks. Polaris, the charity that operates the National Human Trafficking Hotline, had to issue a statement discouraging people from reporting that children were being sold inside expensive cabinets online because callers were flooding its phones with a Q-adjacent conspiracy.
The inundated hotline is one example of a problem each of the anti-trafficking representatives I spoke to raised: Even if QAnon is bringing people’s attention to child trafficking in general, it’s focusing that attention specifically on a sensationalized, largely inaccurate picture of what trafficking looks like. And that can pull focus and resources away from the actual problem.
“It can lead to not only a misunderstanding of the issue, but also a wrong response,” said Borislav Gerasimov, the program coordinator for communications and advocacy at the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women.
As an example, Gerasimov cited the gunman who fired inside a pizza shop in 2016 because he wrongly believed it was the location of an underground pedophile ring, a conspiracy theory called Pizzagate that is a precursor to QAnon. “If you portray human trafficking as something that a secret cabal is doing, the solution becomes guns and surveillance. This is totally not the solution to trafficking.”
The solutions that anti-trafficking groups advocate for aren’t about raiding pizza shops or decoding Justin Bieber’s headwear choices, they’re about improving social programs so kids don’t fall through the cracks and end up in situations that leave them vulnerable to exploitation. That’s not as easy of a sell to the QAnon crowd.
“I don’t find that I’m able to translate the kind of fervor and excitement and investment people get for #savethechildren into an investment and focus and excitement in caring for the most marginalized among us,” said Goldblatt Grace.
Each of the nonprofit representatives I spoke to said they’re grateful for any donation and are hopeful the increased attention can create opportunities for outreach and education. But for that to happen, Q followers would have to give up on some of their most cherished beliefs and admit that the real problem, while no less concerning, looks less like the action movie playing in their head and more like the rest of America’s problems.


fivethirtyeight--2020-10-16--Wisconsin Was Never A Safe Blue State

Wisconsin Was Never A Safe Blue State

This is the fifth in a series of articles examining the politics and demographics of 2020 ’ s expected swing states .
Wisconsin is proof that politicos have short memories .
In 2004 , Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry carried Wisconsin by just 0.4 percentage points — making it the closest state in the country .
Four years earlier , it had been even closer — Democrat Al Gore won the Badger State by just 5,708 votes , or 0.2 points .
But Democrat Barack Obama really connected with Wisconsin voters , winning the state by 14 points in 2008 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into 2016 , that contributed to a sense that Wisconsin was a safe bet for Hillary Clinton — part of the mythical “ blue wall.
” It had , after all , voted Democratic in seven consecutive presidential elections by that point .
We all know what happened next : Now-President Trump carried Wisconsin by 0.8 percentage points , reaffirming its status as a swing state .
It was the third time in five presidential elections that Wisconsin was decided by less than a point .
Fast forward to 2020 , and both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential tipping point state .
According to the FiveThirtyEight forecast , Wisconsin has a 13 percent chance of providing the decisive vote in the Electoral College ; only Pennsylvania and Florida are likelier tipping points .
Conventional wisdom says that Clinton lost Wisconsin because she infamously did not visit the state at all during the final seven months of the 2016 campaign .
But that ’ s probably not true ; Clinton devoted a lot of effort to winning Pennsylvania and still lost there , for instance .
Instead , Wisconsin probably got @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Pennsylvania and other Midwestern states did : demographics .
The one-time home of progressive stalwarts like Robert “ Fighting Bob ” La Follette and Victor Berger could not escape the modern reality that white people without a bachelor ’ s degree — who make up 59 percent of Wisconsin ’ s population age 25 and older — have become more and more Republican , especially in the Trump era .
According to an analysis by the Center for American Progress , white voters without a college degree in Wisconsin went from supporting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2012 to supporting Trump 56 percent to 38 percent in 2016 .
And as you can see in the map below , counties with the highest shares of white residents without a college degree veered the sharpest to the right : These trends have left Wisconsin a light red state ; according to FiveThirtyEight ’ s partisan lean metric ( newly updated for the 2020 cycle ! )
, the state is 2.8 points more Republican-leaning than the nation as a whole .
Yet Democrats could easily still win it in 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Trump nationally , and considering they have multiple ( non-mutually exclusive ) paths forward in the state .
First , they could keep improving among suburban voters .
As the map above shows , the Milwaukee suburbs were pretty much the only part of Wisconsin that actually moved toward Democrats in 2016 .
The problem is that , unlike , say , the Philadelphia suburbs , Milwaukee ’ s are still deeply Republican .
The so-called “ WOW counties ” — Waukesha , Ozaukee and Washington — have historically been the center @ @ @ @ @ @ @ producing such politicians as former Republican National Committee Chair Reince Priebus and former Gov .
Scott Walker .
And all the Trump era has done is turn them from maroon to crimson : Even as Republicans bombed in other suburban areas around the country , Trump still carried the WOW counties in 2016 by 28 percentage points , and Walker carried them by 35 points in Wisconsin ’ s 2018 gubernatorial race .
It will be very interesting to see if Biden can continue to eat into that margin , though — if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Wisconsin politics .
Second , Democrats could fix their turnout problem among Black voters .
According to the CAP analysis , 74 percent of eligible Black voters turned out to vote in Wisconsin in 2012 , but only 55 percent did in 2016 .
Given that Black Wisconsinites voted for Clinton 92 percent to 4 percent , that was a huge blow to Democrats : According to CAP ’ s calculations , Clinton would have won Wisconsin if Black voters had turned out at 2012 levels but everything else had stayed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats could win back some non-college-educated white voters .
This may be the path of least resistance : In the 2018 gubernatorial race , Democrat Tony Evers won six predominantly white , working-class counties in southwest Wisconsin that Trump carried in 2016 .
And according to a Siena College/The New York Times Upshot poll of Wisconsin from early October , Trump led Biden just 50 percent to 44 percent among white voters without a bachelor ’ s degree — much closer to the 2012 margin than 2016 ’ s .
Indeed , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ something much closer to the comfortable Democratic victories he and his old boss enjoyed in Wisconsin in 2008 and 2012 than Clinton ’ s showing in 2016 .
The FiveThirtyEight forecast gives Biden an 88 in 100 chance of winning the state ; the average projected vote share margin is Biden 53.0 percent , Trump 46.1 percent .
But Biden owes that commanding lead mostly to his overall national strength : We ’ re expecting him to win the national popular vote by 8.3 points — which means that Wisconsin is still more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama-level Biden win would not solve Democrats ’ underlying problems in the state .
If Trump were to make a national comeback , or if there ’ s a significant polling error , or even just looking ahead to 2024 , Republicans could be well-positioned to win Wisconsin once again .
The combination of high support among white voters without a college degree , suburbs that are still dark red and the decisiveness of Black turnout makes Wisconsin , in the long term , arguably the most likely brick in the Midwestern “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

This is the fifth in a series of articles examining the politics and demographics of 2020’s expected swing states.
Wisconsin is proof that politicos have short memories. In 2004, Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry carried Wisconsin by just 0.4 percentage points — making it the closest state in the country. Four years earlier, it had been even closer — Democrat Al Gore won the Badger State by just 5,708 votes, or 0.2 points.
But Democrat Barack Obama really connected with Wisconsin voters, winning the state by 14 points in 2008 and 7 points in 2012. Going into 2016, that contributed to a sense that Wisconsin was a safe bet for Hillary Clinton — part of the mythical “blue wall.” It had, after all, voted Democratic in seven consecutive presidential elections by that point.
We all know what happened next: Now-President Trump carried Wisconsin by 0.8 percentage points, reaffirming its status as a swing state. It was the third time in five presidential elections that Wisconsin was decided by less than a point. Fast forward to 2020, and both sides are rightly treating it as a potential tipping point state. According to the FiveThirtyEight forecast, Wisconsin has a 13 percent chance of providing the decisive vote in the Electoral College; only Pennsylvania and Florida are likelier tipping points.
[Live Updates: We’re Tracking The Vote And Voting Problems]
Conventional wisdom says that Clinton lost Wisconsin because she infamously did not visit the state at all during the final seven months of the 2016 campaign. But that’s probably not true; Clinton devoted a lot of effort to winning Pennsylvania and still lost there, for instance. Instead, Wisconsin probably got redder in 2016 for the same reason that Pennsylvania and other Midwestern states did: demographics. The one-time home of progressive stalwarts like Robert “Fighting Bob” La Follette and Victor Berger could not escape the modern reality that white people without a bachelor’s degree — who make up 59 percent of Wisconsin’s population age 25 and older — have become more and more Republican, especially in the Trump era. According to an analysis by the Center for American Progress, white voters without a college degree in Wisconsin went from supporting Mitt Romney 52 percent to 47 percent in 2012 to supporting Trump 56 percent to 38 percent in 2016. And as you can see in the map below, counties with the highest shares of white residents without a college degree veered the sharpest to the right:
These trends have left Wisconsin a light red state; according to FiveThirtyEight’s partisan lean metric (newly updated for the 2020 cycle!), the state is 2.8 points more Republican-leaning than the nation as a whole. Yet Democrats could easily still win it in 2020, given Biden’s double-digit lead against Trump nationally, and considering they have multiple (non-mutually exclusive) paths forward in the state.
First, they could keep improving among suburban voters. As the map above shows, the Milwaukee suburbs were pretty much the only part of Wisconsin that actually moved toward Democrats in 2016. The problem is that, unlike, say, the Philadelphia suburbs, Milwaukee’s are still deeply Republican. The so-called “WOW counties” — Waukesha, Ozaukee and Washington — have historically been the center of Republican power in the state, powering such politicians as former Republican National Committee Chair Reince Priebus and former Gov. Scott Walker. And all the Trump era has done is turn them from maroon to crimson: Even as Republicans bombed in other suburban areas around the country, Trump still carried the WOW counties in 2016 by 28 percentage points, and Walker carried them by 35 points in Wisconsin’s 2018 gubernatorial race. It will be very interesting to see if Biden can continue to eat into that margin, though — if so, it could have long-term implications for Wisconsin politics.
Second, Democrats could fix their turnout problem among Black voters. According to the CAP analysis, 74 percent of eligible Black voters turned out to vote in Wisconsin in 2012, but only 55 percent did in 2016. Given that Black Wisconsinites voted for Clinton 92 percent to 4 percent, that was a huge blow to Democrats: According to CAP’s calculations, Clinton would have won Wisconsin if Black voters had turned out at 2012 levels but everything else had stayed the same.
Third, of course, Democrats could win back some non-college-educated white voters. This may be the path of least resistance: In the 2018 gubernatorial race, Democrat Tony Evers won six predominantly white, working-class counties in southwest Wisconsin that Trump carried in 2016. And according to a Siena College/The New York Times Upshot poll of Wisconsin from early October, Trump led Biden just 50 percent to 44 percent among white voters without a bachelor’s degree — much closer to the 2012 margin than 2016’s.
Indeed, it appears that Biden is on track for something much closer to the comfortable Democratic victories he and his old boss enjoyed in Wisconsin in 2008 and 2012 than Clinton’s showing in 2016. The FiveThirtyEight forecast gives Biden an 88 in 100 chance of winning the state; the average projected vote share margin is Biden 53.0 percent, Trump 46.1 percent. But Biden owes that commanding lead mostly to his overall national strength: We’re expecting him to win the national popular vote by 8.3 points — which means that Wisconsin is still more Trump-friendly than average.
So even an Obama-level Biden win would not solve Democrats’ underlying problems in the state. If Trump were to make a national comeback, or if there’s a significant polling error, or even just looking ahead to 2024, Republicans could be well-positioned to win Wisconsin once again. The combination of high support among white voters without a college degree, suburbs that are still dark red and the decisiveness of Black turnout makes Wisconsin, in the long term, arguably the most likely brick in the Midwestern “blue wall” to be painted red.
CLARIFICATION (Oct. 16, 2020, 10:15 a.m.): This story has been updated to more precisely describe Reince Priebus’s and Scott Walker’s connections to “WOW counties.”