fivethirtyeight--2020-12-09--Why So Many Men Stuck With Trump In 2020

Given how unreliable the exit polls were this year , it will likely be a while before we know exactly how differently men and women voted in 2020 .
But a new survey from the American Enterprise Institute ’ s Survey Center on American Life offers some clues , indicating that once again , gender and sexism may have been a big dividing line , as was the case in 2016 .
That may seem surprising since this year ’ s contest pitted President Trump against another white man instead of a woman , much less the first woman to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It certainly seemed possible heading into this election that the gender gap might be smaller , especially as Joe Biden seemed poised to pick up more support among male voters than Hillary Clinton did .
Only that doesn ’ t appear to have happened , at least not in a widespread way .
Men ’ s and women ’ s voting patterns have been diverging for the past few decades .
But according to research conducted before and after the election , the COVID-19 pandemic may have played a large role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This split wasn ’ t enough for Trump to win this time , of course , but his attitude toward the coronavirus crisis may actually have been a bonus for some men , which could present a real challenge for Biden moving forward .
Overall , most Americans consistently disapproved of the way Trump handled the pandemic , but the AEI poll found one notable exception — men who identify as “ completely masculine.
” As the table below shows , a majority ( 52 percent ) of men who identified as completely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration has a strategy on COVID-19 — setting them apart from all other men and women .
( Compared with other respondents , completely masculine men were also much more evenly split on the Trump administration ’ s handling of the pandemic , more likely to believe that wearing a mask was more about being politically correct than about preventing the spread of COVID-19 , and more likely to oppose a national mask mandate . )
Of course , the idea that men who identify as more masculine would be more supportive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much of a shocker considering they have been among his biggest fans from the beginning .
According to the AEI survey , that was true this year as well : When broken out by how masculine or feminine they identified themselves , completely masculine men were the only group where the majority ( 60 percent ) said they had voted for Trump .
These men may also be more likely to subscribe to a more traditional ideal of masculinity that echoes Trump ’ s “ just shrug it off ” attitude toward the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before the election found that these men , or men who fall into a similar category , were less likely to wear masks in the first place or take other precautions to stop the spread of COVID-19 , including social distancing .
One analysis even found that men who were considered more sexist were more likely to report having contracted the virus .
Daniel Cassino , a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University and the author of one of the studies that found more masculine men dismissing COVID-19 precautions , told us that this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among men to take fewer health precautions period — like wearing seat belts or going to the doctor regularly .
Cassino said that traditional stereotypes around masculinity encourage men to shake off vulnerability , such as hiding a fear of illness and instead projecting strength .
The pandemic , he added , may have sent these tendencies into overdrive , leading some men to oppose public health restrictions and forgo protective health measures like wearing masks .
“ COVID-19 makes men focus more on their masculine identity than they otherwise would have , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and demonstrate , ‘ Yeah , this big scary medical crisis is happening , but it ’ s not going to affect me , ’ ” Cassino said .
It ’ s hard to completely untangle these effects from the impact of partisanship .
Men who identify as completely masculine are disproportionately likely to be Republican , and as we ’ ve written before , Republicans have been consistently less likely to report feeling worried about the pandemic and to support public health restrictions on businesses and individuals .
But arguably , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views about gender roles have become intertwined with their partisan identity , according to Daniel Cox , director of AEI ’ s Survey Center on American Life and a FiveThirtyEight contributor .
“ Reaffirming that you are traditionally masculine is itself a political statement today — a way to push back on changes to the way society is organized , ” he said .
But there is some evidence from the studies on COVID-19 and masculinity that identifying as more masculine or supporting conventional gender roles has had an independent effect on men @ @ @ @ @ @ @ separate from how they identify politically .
In the AEI poll , too , Republican men who identified as completely masculine were somewhat more likely than less-masculine Republican men to approve of the way Trump has handled the pandemic , although the difference wasn ’ t necessarily all that huge ( 79 percent compared with 69 percent ) .
One possible explanation is that the threat of business closures or other restrictions on the economy may have been alarming especially to men who identify as completely masculine .
“ Because employment and working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ job loss is seen as a threat to masculinity , ” said Emily Carian , a professor of sociology at California State University , San Bernardino .
Data shows that women were actually more likely than men to lose their jobs as a result of the pandemic , but the very prospect of being unemployed may have been unsettling particularly to men who have stronger masculine identities , leading them to oppose limitations on how businesses operate .
Responses to the pandemic likely would have been different among different types of men and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president .
And , of course , Trump ’ s response overall wasn ’ t very popular .
But by actively seizing on the spread of COVID-19 as an opportunity to emphasize his own brand of hypermasculinity and portray his opponent as weak and ineffective , Trump may have crafted a tailor-made pitch for men whose own sense of masculinity was threatened by the pandemic .
Those men may have actually appreciated Trump ’ s bravado in rejecting masks and repeatedly calling to reopen the economy over the objections of the public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conducted in 2016 , Carian found that when men ’ s masculinity was threatened by the prospect of job loss , they were more likely to say they wanted a masculine president — and of the two candidates , Trump was perceived as more masculine .
It ’ s possible that Trump may have managed to use the pandemic to create a similar impression among some voters this year , even though he wasn ’ t running against a woman .
That ’ s because a male candidate like Biden could still be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
Biden ’ s choice to wear a mask may have appeared masculine to some , but it was unlikely to resonate with men who were already more likely to see mask-wearing as a sign of weakness .
In other words , even though Trump ’ s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic was not a winning electoral strategy overall , it wasn ’ t uniformly unpopular .
In fact , COVID-19 might partially explain why Trump managed to hang onto so many male supporters .
It ’ s also an important reminder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very different vision for how to address the pandemic , these are the very Americans who are among the likeliest to resent — or even resist — his strategy for getting the coronavirus under control .

Given how unreliable the exit polls were this year, it will likely be a while before we know exactly how differently men and women voted in 2020. But a new survey from the American Enterprise Institute’s Survey Center on American Life offers some clues, indicating that once again, gender and sexism may have been a big dividing line, as was the case in 2016.
That may seem surprising since this year’s contest pitted President Trump against another white man instead of a woman, much less the first woman to run for president on a major-party ticket. It certainly seemed possible heading into this election that the gender gap might be smaller, especially as Joe Biden seemed poised to pick up more support among male voters than Hillary Clinton did.
The electoral problems facing Republicans | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
Only that doesn’t appear to have happened, at least not in a widespread way. Men’s and women’s voting patterns have been diverging for the past few decades. But according to research conducted before and after the election, the COVID-19 pandemic may have played a large role in exacerbating gender divisions in the electorate. This split wasn’t enough for Trump to win this time, of course, but his attitude toward the coronavirus crisis may actually have been a bonus for some men, which could present a real challenge for Biden moving forward.
[Related: How The 2020 Election Changed The Electoral Map]
Overall, most Americans consistently disapproved of the way Trump handled the pandemic, but the AEI poll found one notable exception — men who identify as “completely masculine.” As the table below shows, a majority (52 percent) of men who identified as completely masculine on the survey agreed that the Trump administration has a strategy on COVID-19 — setting them apart from all other men and women. (Compared with other respondents, completely masculine men were also much more evenly split on the Trump administration’s handling of the pandemic, more likely to believe that wearing a mask was more about being politically correct than about preventing the spread of COVID-19, and more likely to oppose a national mask mandate.)
Trump’s handling of COVID-19 didn’t turn off masculine men Survey responses of men and women according to how completely they identify as masculine or feminine Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling the response to the coronavirus (COVID-19)? Masc. Men Fem. Women Response Total Completely Less Diff Completely Less Diff Approve 38% 47% 31 +16 38% 35% +3 Disapprove 60 52 68 -16 59 64 -5 Do you think the Trump administration has had a strategy for responding to the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19) or do you think there has not been a strategy? Masc. Men Fem. Women Response Total Completely Less Diff Completely Less Diff Yes, has a strategy 40% 52% 32 +20 40% 34% +6 No, does not have a strategy 58 47 67 -20 58 64 -6 Source: AEI Survey Center on American Life
Of course, the idea that men who identify as more masculine would be more supportive of the president isn’t that much of a shocker considering they have been among his biggest fans from the beginning. According to the AEI survey, that was true this year as well: When broken out by how masculine or feminine they identified themselves, completely masculine men were the only group where the majority (60 percent) said they had voted for Trump. These men may also be more likely to subscribe to a more traditional ideal of masculinity that echoes Trump’s “just shrug it off” attitude toward the pandemic. In fact, research conducted before the election found that these men, or men who fall into a similar category, were less likely to wear masks in the first place or take other precautions to stop the spread of COVID-19, including social distancing. One analysis even found that men who were considered more sexist were more likely to report having contracted the virus.
Daniel Cassino, a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University and the author of one of the studies that found more masculine men dismissing COVID-19 precautions, told us that this conclusion lines up with a broader tendency among men to take fewer health precautions period — like wearing seat belts or going to the doctor regularly. Cassino said that traditional stereotypes around masculinity encourage men to shake off vulnerability, such as hiding a fear of illness and instead projecting strength. The pandemic, he added, may have sent these tendencies into overdrive, leading some men to oppose public health restrictions and forgo protective health measures like wearing masks. “COVID-19 makes men focus more on their masculine identity than they otherwise would have, because they feel this pressure to say and demonstrate, ‘Yeah, this big scary medical crisis is happening, but it’s not going to affect me,’” Cassino said.
[How To Make Sure People Come Back For Their Second COVID-19 Vaccine Dose]
It’s hard to completely untangle these effects from the impact of partisanship. Men who identify as completely masculine are disproportionately likely to be Republican, and as we’ve written before, Republicans have been consistently less likely to report feeling worried about the pandemic and to support public health restrictions on businesses and individuals. But arguably, this reflects the extent to which Americans’ views about gender roles have become intertwined with their partisan identity, according to Daniel Cox, director of AEI’s Survey Center on American Life and a FiveThirtyEight contributor. “Reaffirming that you are traditionally masculine is itself a political statement today — a way to push back on changes to the way society is organized,” he said.
But there is some evidence from the studies on COVID-19 and masculinity that identifying as more masculine or supporting conventional gender roles has had an independent effect on men’s response to the pandemic, separate from how they identify politically. In the AEI poll, too, Republican men who identified as completely masculine were somewhat more likely than less-masculine Republican men to approve of the way Trump has handled the pandemic, although the difference wasn’t necessarily all that huge (79 percent compared with 69 percent).
One possible explanation is that the threat of business closures or other restrictions on the economy may have been alarming especially to men who identify as completely masculine. “Because employment and working is so central to American masculinity, job loss is seen as a threat to masculinity,” said Emily Carian, a professor of sociology at California State University, San Bernardino. Data shows that women were actually more likely than men to lose their jobs as a result of the pandemic, but the very prospect of being unemployed may have been unsettling particularly to men who have stronger masculine identities, leading them to oppose limitations on how businesses operate.
Responses to the pandemic likely would have been different among different types of men and women even if Trump weren’t the president. And, of course, Trump’s response overall wasn’t very popular. But by actively seizing on the spread of COVID-19 as an opportunity to emphasize his own brand of hypermasculinity and portray his opponent as weak and ineffective, Trump may have crafted a tailor-made pitch for men whose own sense of masculinity was threatened by the pandemic.
[Do You Buy That … Suburban Voters Helped Biden?]
Those men may have actually appreciated Trump’s bravado in rejecting masks and repeatedly calling to reopen the economy over the objections of the public health community. In an experimental study conducted in 2016, Carian found that when men’s masculinity was threatened by the prospect of job loss, they were more likely to say they wanted a masculine president — and of the two candidates, Trump was perceived as more masculine. It’s possible that Trump may have managed to use the pandemic to create a similar impression among some voters this year, even though he wasn’t running against a woman. That’s because a male candidate like Biden could still be perceived as the less-masculine option, Carian said. Biden’s choice to wear a mask may have appeared masculine to some, but it was unlikely to resonate with men who were already more likely to see mask-wearing as a sign of weakness.
In other words, even though Trump’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic was not a winning electoral strategy overall, it wasn’t uniformly unpopular. In fact, COVID-19 might partially explain why Trump managed to hang onto so many male supporters. It’s also an important reminder that as Biden enters office with a very different vision for how to address the pandemic, these are the very Americans who are among the likeliest to resent — or even resist — his strategy for getting the coronavirus under control.
Not all Americans can get a COVID-19 test when they want | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-09--Why The GOP Isn’t Able To Win The Popular Vote

In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses how an incumbent president lost the 2020 election @ @ @ @ @ facing the Republican Party .
The team also checks in the state of the Senate @ @ @ @ @

In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses how an incumbent president lost the 2020 election and considers the electoral challenges facing the Republican Party. The team also checks in the state of the Senate runoff elections in Georgia.
[Related: How The 2020 Election Changed The Electoral Map]
How Trump’s pardons compare to other presidents | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-09--How Black, Latino And Progressive Democrats Are Forcing Biden To Rethink His Cabinet Picks

California Attorney General Xavier Becerra , who has run the Justice Department for America ’ s largest state since 2017 , seemed like a logical candidate for a top job in the Biden administration .
His name cropped up in connection to one job in particular : U.S. Attorney General .
And in the days before and right after the election , media speculation about who Biden would tap to run the Department of Justice almost always included Becerra .
But over the last week , Becerra seemingly emerged out of nowhere as a potential candidate to run the Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in one of the more interesting and surprising choices for a top appointment made so far by President-elect Joe Biden and his team , Biden ultimately did choose Becerra as his nominee for secretary of HHS .
It ’ s one of Biden ’ s most important choices — Becerra will be running a department heavily involved in helping to manage the COVID-19 pandemic , including hopefully getting millions of Americans vaccinated over the next year .
How did Becerra end up at HHS ?
The gist , according to published reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexico Gov .
Michelle Lujan Grisham , a Latina , for the HHS job , but opted against her for reasons that aren ’ t totally clear .
Biden and his team then considered Rhode Island Gov .
Gina Raimondo , but progressives in the party criticized that potential choice , as they view Raimondo as too conservative .
And Latino Democratic leaders would probably have been annoyed if Biden not only didn ’ t choose Lujan Grisham , who they were pushing hard for HHS , but then chose Raimondo , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Mexican American and had a fairly progressive record both during his days as a California congressman and as the state A.G. , emerged as an alternative that all sides could live with .
Ideological , racial and ethnic considerations and tensions are normal in the presidential transition and appointment process , particularly for Democrats , who are a much more racially diverse party than the GOP .
But the Biden team ’ s choices in navigating them tell us a lot about the current distribution of power within the party — or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advisers see it .
So far , based on Biden ’ s choices , three trends are clear .
• Both the Black establishment and the Latino establishment within the Democratic Party have real clout , able to essentially force Biden to pick some Black and Latino appointees for key posts and to block some people they don ’ t want .
• The progressive wing of the party doesn ’ t seem to have enough clout to get its people key jobs , but does have enough power to prevent Biden from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And other blocs in the Democratic Party , most notably anti-Trump Republicans or former Republicans who backed Biden , don ’ t have a lot of clout in the appointment process , at least so far .
( We should note that this article refers often to stories first broken by The American Prospect and Politico in particular , as both outlets have done stellar reporting on Biden ’ s transition process . )
Let me unpack those ideas a bit more , starting with the power of the Black and Latino establishments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is not clear that rank-and-file Black or Latino voters particularly care who Biden chooses for these top administration roles , or play a big role in this process .
It is also fairly clear that the people Biden and his team are really trying to placate are more center-left establishment Black and Latino elites in the party , such as Rep. James Clyburn of South Carolina , rather than more left-wing Democrats who are also people of color , such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York .
So how is this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reportedly hesitant to name former Sen. Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota , who is white , as his agriculture secretary , because the Congressional Black Caucus was pushing for its longtime member Rep. Marcia Fudge of Ohio .
( Fudge reportedly will be the nominee to run the Department of Housing and Urban Development . )
After naming white people as his nominees for two of what are considered the four most important Cabinet positions — Antony Blinken at State and Janet Yellen at Treasury — Biden was pushed strongly to choose a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or the Pentagon .
Biden eventually chose retired Gen. Lloyd Austin , who is Black , to run the Defense Department .
Similar dynamics are evident among Latino Democrats .
Biden had already named Cuban-born Alejandro Mayorkas as his nominee for secretary of the Department of Homeland Security , and his aides were suggesting that DHS will play as important a role as the traditional “ big four ” ( Defense , Justice , State , Treasury ) .
But Latino leaders in the party were not placated by Mayorkas ’ s appointment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choice .
Again , there ’ s nothing new or wrong or improper about racial and ethnic considerations playing a role in Cabinet appointments .
About 40 percent of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters are people of color — mostly Black ( around 20 percent ) and Latino ( 13 percent ) .
So it ’ s perfectly natural that those groups would want to be represented in the administration , since they played a big role in electing Biden .
Secondly , because Biden is white , and so are many in his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initial choices for key jobs are often other white people .
( We can ’ t be totally sure , since much of this process is happening behind closed doors . )
So while it looked like the CBC and Fudge were racializing the debate over the Department of Agriculture job , the racializing could have happened earlier , with Biden and his team initially viewing a fellow white person — Heitkamp — as the most logical person for the post and eventually settling on one-time Obama administration Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , you could argue that many selection processes in America , in and outside of politics , are and have always been racialized but this is not acknowledged because picking white people is considered normal and disconnected from racial considerations .
In terms of the progressive left , virtually no one who was a prominent supporter of Sens .
Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren during the primaries has been appointed to a top job yet .
This suggests that the party ’ s progressive wing isn ’ t powerful enough to force Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ something like one-third of Democratic voters align with Sanders or Warren .
That said , people who progressives have urged Biden not to appoint , such as Raimondo , also aren ’ t getting major jobs .
So progressives have enough clout to exercise something like a veto .
The best examples of this progressive veto are two people who served in senior roles in both the Clinton and Obama administrations , have been included in speculation for top Biden posts , but have yet to be chosen for anything : Rahm Emanuel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden ’ s chief of staff in the Obama administration and a top adviser on his 2020 campaign .
I am sure the former vice president will eventually appoint him to some role .
But Reed was a major architect of the Democratic Party ’ s rightward shift in the 1980s and 90s — a shift that many on the left think was a mistake .
So the party ’ s left wing didn ’ t want Reed in a big job like chief of staff or head of the Office of Budget @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t appoint him to either .
Emanuel also doesn ’ t seem likely to land a big-time role , despite having strong credentials on paper .
( He was a senior White House adviser under Clinton ; a Democratic congressman on the leadership team in the 2000s ; White House chief of staff under Obama ; and mayor of Chicago . )
But he is drawing criticism from both progressives and Black leaders .
He was involved in the party ’ s Clinton-era move right , and his administration in Chicago made unpopular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public schools in the city and at first refusing to release the video of the police killing of a Black 17-year-old named Laquan McDonald .
What about other blocs in the party ?
Some Asian Americans have been tapped for key jobs , most notably Neera Tanden ( Office of Management and Budget ) and Dr. Vivek Murthy ( surgeon general ) .
Both are Indian American .
But Asian-American Democrats , Jewish Democrats , lesbian , gay and transgender Democrats , Muslim Democrats and other fairly small blocs in the party haven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyone from getting a key job thus far , so we don ’ t know if they have the clout to veto someone .
We are , however , about to see a test of the power of Native American Democrats .
They are urging Biden to name Rep. Deb Haaland of New Mexico his nominee for secretary of the interior , which could make her the first-ever Native American Cabinet secretary .
Haaland is not a shoe-in for the job , in part because Biden ’ s team is wary of appointing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration , since both chambers are so closely divided between the two parties .
But Biden has chosen Rep. Cedric Richmond of Louisiana , who is Black , as a senior White House adviser and Fudge to run HUD .
So this is not a hard-and-fast rule .
Biden ’ s decision on Haaland will in some ways be a test of how willing he is to annoy Native American activists in the party .
And Haaland endorsed Warren during the Democratic primaries , so bypassing her for the Interior slot would likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slight at them .
Biden doesn ’ t seem to be that concerned about appointing former or current Republicans to top posts , and the “ Never Trump ” bloc in the party isn ’ t pushing him too hard for such appointments .
For example , both Clinton ( William Cohen ) and Obama ( Robert Gates , Chuck Hagel ) appointed people who had previously been aligned with the GOP to run the Defense Department at some point in their presidencies .
But it ’ s clear that Biden was much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to run the Pentagon than a Republican .
Anti-Trump Republicans aren ’ t as big a bloc in the party as Black people , Latinos or progressives ( they are around 10 percent , at most ) .
They don ’ t seem that organized to fight over Cabinet appointments .
And because the Senate is so closely divided and Biden may need Republicans to back some of his picks to get them confirmed , Biden is choosing more moderate figures for his cabinet anyway , so the “ Never Trump ” bloc @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asking for it — a not-too-progressive Biden administration .
I think it is still very likely that Biden appoints a prominent conservative or two to some post — keep an eye on California businesswoman Meg Whitman , for example — but it ’ s not likely to be a very powerful one .
Biden ’ s choices for these positions are not determinative — Biden , not his staff , will make the most important decisions .
But these appointments reflect how the Democratic Party is shifting .
In the 1992-93 transition , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough Black people were getting top jobs in the Clinton administration .
In the 2008-09 transition , with Obama newly elected , Black representation wasn ’ t as big of a sticking point , but there was some debate about whether there were enough women in top roles .
Compared to 1992-93 and even 2008-09 , Latino and progressive Democrats have significantly more influence in the party , so they are making demands that they didn ’ t in previous transitions .
Black Democrats were arguably more instrumental in boosting Biden during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so they have outsized clout .
Meanwhile , white moderate women are firmly enmeshed in the party establishment , so Biden can and has already picked a number of white moderate women for key roles , so women ’ s groups in the party aren ’ t having to mobilize to get more women in key posts .
None of this is too surprising .
Remember , even before the election Biden had made a choice that illustrated how he saw power in the party : picking Sen. Kamala Harris as his running @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have criticized an all-white ticket ; women would have slammed an all-male ticket ; progressives would have been really mad if someone like the centrist Sen. Amy Klobuchar was chosen ; and Biden himself probably would have been uncomfortable with a very liberal person like Warren .
Harris was a consensus choice in an ideologically and racially diverse party .
And Xavier Becerra is a similar one .

Perry Bacon Jr. (perry.bacon@fivethirtyeight.com)

California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, who has run the Justice Department for America’s largest state since 2017, seemed like a logical candidate for a top job in the Biden administration. His name cropped up in connection to one job in particular: U.S. Attorney General. And in the days before and right after the election, media speculation about who Biden would tap to run the Department of Justice almost always included Becerra.
[Related: What We’ve Learned About The Biden Administration From His Staffing Choices So Far]
But over the last week, Becerra seemingly emerged out of nowhere as a potential candidate to run the Department of Health and Human Services. Then, in one of the more interesting and surprising choices for a top appointment made so far by President-elect Joe Biden and his team, Biden ultimately did choose Becerra as his nominee for secretary of HHS. It’s one of Biden’s most important choices — Becerra will be running a department heavily involved in helping to manage the COVID-19 pandemic, including hopefully getting millions of Americans vaccinated over the next year.
Why did down-ballot Democrats have such a mediocre showing?
How did Becerra end up at HHS? The gist, according to published reports, is that Biden was considering New Mexico Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham, a Latina, for the HHS job, but opted against her for reasons that aren’t totally clear. Biden and his team then considered Rhode Island Gov. Gina Raimondo, but progressives in the party criticized that potential choice, as they view Raimondo as too conservative. And Latino Democratic leaders would probably have been annoyed if Biden not only didn’t choose Lujan Grisham, who they were pushing hard for HHS, but then chose Raimondo, who is white. So Becerra, who is Mexican American and had a fairly progressive record both during his days as a California congressman and as the state A.G., emerged as an alternative that all sides could live with.
Ideological, racial and ethnic considerations and tensions are normal in the presidential transition and appointment process, particularly for Democrats, who are a much more racially diverse party than the GOP. But the Biden team’s choices in navigating them tell us a lot about the current distribution of power within the party — or at least how Biden and his top advisers see it. So far, based on Biden’s choices, three trends are clear.
Both the Black establishment and the Latino establishment within the Democratic Party have real clout, able to essentially force Biden to pick some Black and Latino appointees for key posts and to block some people they don’t want. The progressive wing of the party doesn’t seem to have enough clout to get its people key jobs, but does have enough power to prevent Biden from picking people they strenuously oppose. And other blocs in the Democratic Party, most notably anti-Trump Republicans or former Republicans who backed Biden, don’t have a lot of clout in the appointment process, at least so far. (We should note that this article refers often to stories first broken by The American Prospect and Politico in particular, as both outlets have done stellar reporting on Biden’s transition process.)
Let me unpack those ideas a bit more, starting with the power of the Black and Latino establishments.
I chose those words carefully. It is not clear that rank-and-file Black or Latino voters particularly care who Biden chooses for these top administration roles, or play a big role in this process. It is also fairly clear that the people Biden and his team are really trying to placate are more center-left establishment Black and Latino elites in the party, such as Rep. James Clyburn of South Carolina, rather than more left-wing Democrats who are also people of color, such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York.
[How The 2020 Election Changed The Electoral Map]
So how is this playing out? Well, Biden was reportedly hesitant to name former Sen. Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, who is white, as his agriculture secretary, because the Congressional Black Caucus was pushing for its longtime member Rep. Marcia Fudge of Ohio. (Fudge reportedly will be the nominee to run the Department of Housing and Urban Development.) After naming white people as his nominees for two of what are considered the four most important Cabinet positions — Antony Blinken at State and Janet Yellen at Treasury — Biden was pushed strongly to choose a Black person to run either the DOJ or the Pentagon. Biden eventually chose retired Gen. Lloyd Austin, who is Black, to run the Defense Department.
Similar dynamics are evident among Latino Democrats. Biden had already named Cuban-born Alejandro Mayorkas as his nominee for secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and his aides were suggesting that DHS will play as important a role as the traditional “big four” (Defense, Justice, State, Treasury). But Latino leaders in the party were not placated by Mayorkas’s appointment alone, helping lead to the Becerra choice.
Again, there’s nothing new or wrong or improper about racial and ethnic considerations playing a role in Cabinet appointments. About 40 percent of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters are people of color — mostly Black (around 20 percent) and Latino (13 percent). So it’s perfectly natural that those groups would want to be represented in the administration, since they played a big role in electing Biden. Secondly, because Biden is white, and so are many in his political circle, it appears that his initial choices for key jobs are often other white people. (We can’t be totally sure, since much of this process is happening behind closed doors.) So while it looked like the CBC and Fudge were racializing the debate over the Department of Agriculture job, the racializing could have happened earlier, with Biden and his team initially viewing a fellow white person — Heitkamp — as the most logical person for the post and eventually settling on one-time Obama administration Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, who is also white. In fact, you could argue that many selection processes in America, in and outside of politics, are and have always been racialized but this is not acknowledged because picking white people is considered normal and disconnected from racial considerations.
In terms of the progressive left, virtually no one who was a prominent supporter of Sens. Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren during the primaries has been appointed to a top job yet. This suggests that the party’s progressive wing isn’t powerful enough to force Biden to choose its people, even though something like one-third of Democratic voters align with Sanders or Warren.
That said, people who progressives have urged Biden not to appoint, such as Raimondo, also aren’t getting major jobs. So progressives have enough clout to exercise something like a veto.
The best examples of this progressive veto are two people who served in senior roles in both the Clinton and Obama administrations, have been included in speculation for top Biden posts, but have yet to be chosen for anything: Rahm Emanuel and Bruce Reed. Reed served as Biden’s chief of staff in the Obama administration and a top adviser on his 2020 campaign. I am sure the former vice president will eventually appoint him to some role. But Reed was a major architect of the Democratic Party’s rightward shift in the 1980s and 90s — a shift that many on the left think was a mistake. So the party’s left wing didn’t want Reed in a big job like chief of staff or head of the Office of Budget and Management, and Biden didn’t appoint him to either.
The electoral problems facing Republicans | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
Emanuel also doesn’t seem likely to land a big-time role, despite having strong credentials on paper. (He was a senior White House adviser under Clinton; a Democratic congressman on the leadership team in the 2000s; White House chief of staff under Obama; and mayor of Chicago.) But he is drawing criticism from both progressives and Black leaders. He was involved in the party’s Clinton-era move right, and his administration in Chicago made unpopular decisions such as closing dozens of majority-Black public schools in the city and at first refusing to release the video of the police killing of a Black 17-year-old named Laquan McDonald.
What about other blocs in the party? Some Asian Americans have been tapped for key jobs, most notably Neera Tanden (Office of Management and Budget) and Dr. Vivek Murthy (surgeon general). Both are Indian American. But Asian-American Democrats, Jewish Democrats, lesbian, gay and transgender Democrats, Muslim Democrats and other fairly small blocs in the party haven’t mobilized to try to stop anyone from getting a key job thus far, so we don’t know if they have the clout to veto someone.
[5 Ways Biden Might Differ From — Or Agree With — Trump On Technology]
We are, however, about to see a test of the power of Native American Democrats. They are urging Biden to name Rep. Deb Haaland of New Mexico his nominee for secretary of the interior, which could make her the first-ever Native American Cabinet secretary. Haaland is not a shoo-in for the job, in part because Biden’s team is wary of appointing current Democratic members of Congress to the administration, since both chambers are so closely divided between the two parties.
But Biden has chosen Rep. Cedric Richmond of Louisiana, who is Black, as a senior White House adviser and Fudge to run HUD. So this is not a hard-and-fast rule. Biden’s decision on Haaland will in some ways be a test of how willing he is to annoy Native American activists in the party. And Haaland endorsed Warren during the Democratic primaries, so bypassing her for the Interior slot would likely be interpreted by the progressives as another slight at them.
Biden doesn’t seem to be that concerned about appointing former or current Republicans to top posts, and the “Never Trump” bloc in the party isn’t pushing him too hard for such appointments. For example, both Clinton (William Cohen) and Obama (Robert Gates, Chuck Hagel) appointed people who had previously been aligned with the GOP to run the Defense Department at some point in their presidencies. But it’s clear that Biden was much more focused on finding a Black person to run the Pentagon than a Republican. Anti-Trump Republicans aren’t as big a bloc in the party as Black people, Latinos or progressives (they are around 10 percent, at most). They don’t seem that organized to fight over Cabinet appointments. And because the Senate is so closely divided and Biden may need Republicans to back some of his picks to get them confirmed, Biden is choosing more moderate figures for his cabinet anyway, so the “Never Trump” bloc is getting what it wants without really asking for it — a not-too-progressive Biden administration.
I think it is still very likely that Biden appoints a prominent conservative or two to some post — keep an eye on California businesswoman Meg Whitman, for example — but it’s not likely to be a very powerful one.
Biden’s choices for these positions are not determinative — Biden, not his staff, will make the most important decisions. But these appointments reflect how the Democratic Party is shifting. In the 1992-93 transition, there was a big debate about whether enough Black people were getting top jobs in the Clinton administration. In the 2008-09 transition, with Obama newly elected, Black representation wasn’t as big of a sticking point, but there was some debate about whether there were enough women in top roles.
Compared to 1992-93 and even 2008-09, Latino and progressive Democrats have significantly more influence in the party, so they are making demands that they didn’t in previous transitions. Black Democrats were arguably more instrumental in boosting Biden during the Democratic primaries than Obama in 2008, so they have outsized clout. Meanwhile, white moderate women are firmly enmeshed in the party establishment, so Biden can and has already picked a number of white moderate women for key roles, so women’s groups in the party aren’t having to mobilize to get more women in key posts.
[Related: Do You Buy That … Suburban Voters Helped Biden?]
None of this is too surprising. Remember, even before the election Biden had made a choice that illustrated how he saw power in the party: picking Sen. Kamala Harris as his running mate. Black and Latino Democrats would have criticized an all-white ticket; women would have slammed an all-male ticket; progressives would have been really mad if someone like the centrist Sen. Amy Klobuchar was chosen; and Biden himself probably would have been uncomfortable with a very liberal person like Warren. Harris was a consensus choice in an ideologically and racially diverse party. And Xavier Becerra is a similar one.
Don’t believe anything 2020 exit polls tell you | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-10--Trump’s Pardons Have Been Sparse and Self-Serving — And That’s Without Even Pardoning His Kids

As President Donald Trump heads into his last few weeks in the White House , there are signs that a slew of high-profile pardons could be coming , including those for close allies like Trump ’ s personal lawyer Rudolph W. Giuliani , Trump ’ s family members or even Trump himself .
These pardons , if they happen , could be quite expansive — granting blanket immunity for crimes for which Trump ’ s allies and family members haven ’ t even been charged , much less convicted .
At the very least , they would almost certainly be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s pardons already have been .
Trump wouldn ’ t be the first president to issue a lot of pardons at the end of his presidency , nor the first to grant a controversial pardon .
But legal experts say Trump ’ s record on pardons — especially if he ends up using his last days in office to issue get-out-of-jail-free cards to family members or himself — could set a dangerous precedent for two reasons .
First , Trump has been unusually stingy with the pardon power up until now , even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost all of his acts of clemency ( which include commutations as well as pardons ) have gone to people he knows , like former national security adviser Michael Flynn , or to those with whom he may curry political favor , like the two Oregon cattle ranchers who were at the center of a dispute over federal land involving states ’ rights activist Ammon Bundy .
That track record , legal experts told me , is pretty much the exact opposite of how the presidential pardon power was intended to function , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the legislative or judicial branches .
“ Many of Trump ’ s pardons … could fairly be characterized as more about his personal interests than serving justice , ” Jeffrey Crouch , a law professor at American University and an expert on executive clemency , said in an email .
“ Pardons are normally granted to people who have turned their lives around , shown remorse and want a pardon , ” Crouch told me , adding that this just isn ’ t the story line that has emerged from four years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clemency approach is that clemency is less available to average people than it is to those with the right group of connections.
” Trump wouldn ’ t be the first president to go on a lame-duck pardoning binge If Trump ends up issuing a large number of pardons and commutations in the waning days of his presidency , that wouldn ’ t be a huge surprise .
As the table below shows , modern presidents have tended to wait until the end of their presidency to start breaking out their pardoning pen in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instance , granted clemency to more than 100 people on the last day of his presidency alone , including an especially controversial pardon for Marc Rich , a fugitive financier who had fled the country and was living in Switzerland , and whose ex-wife was a longtime financial supporter of Clinton ’ s .
And President Barack Obama , as part of a broader effort to help federal prisoners serving long sentences as the result of the tough-on-crime policies of the 1980s and 1990s , commuted the sentences of nearly 2,000 drug offenders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fear of political backlash has often kept presidents from using their pardon power until they have one foot out the door , according to Rachel Barkow , a professor at New York University Law School who has studied the clemency power .
“ They ’ re not as worried about taking a political hit at that point if someone they [ grant clemency to ] unfortunately commits a heinous crime , ” she said .
That might explain why some of the most controversial pardons in modern history have come as a president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ preemptive ” pardon , in which the recipient is absolved of federal crimes of which they haven ’ t been convicted .
Trump is reportedly considering such pardons for Giuliani and some of his adult children .
Preemptive pardons are rare , but Trump wouldn ’ t be the first president to grant one .
A month after taking office , President Gerald Ford pardoned President Richard Nixon , who had resigned after being named a co-conspirator in a case involving the cover-up of the Watergate break-in .
Ford pardoned Nixon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and he didn ’ t pardon him for just one specific crime either — his pardon forgave him for any federal crimes that he may have committed during his time in office .
On Christmas Eve in 1992 , President George H.W .
Bush pardoned former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger and several other people for their participation in the Reagan-era Iran-Contra scandal , effectively ending six years of legal proceedings before their trials started .
That pardon was especially controversial because Bush was scheduled to testify as a witness in Weinberger ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case to accuse Bush of participating in a “ cover-up.
” Trump ’ s pardons have been simultaneously sparse and self-serving For most presidents , though , controversial pardons are the exception , not the rule .
Preemptive pardons are few and far between , and it ’ s similarly rare for presidents to pardon family members .
Clinton did pardon his brother Roger , as part of his last-minute clemency spree , but Roger Clinton had already served time in prison .
So it would still be very far outside the norm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — much less issue a pardon for himself , which no president has ever attempted ( and may not be constitutional ) .
And even if Trump doesn ’ t preemptively pardon family members , allies or himself , experts pointed out that his use of the clemency power still looks quite different than other presidents .
For one thing , Trump has been unusually sparing with pardons and commutations — even compared to other modern presidents who were criticized for using the power too stingily .
Of course , there ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but so far he ’ s granted clemency to fewer people than any other president in the modern era .
Additionally , according to an analysis by Lawfare , Trump ’ s pardons and commutations have gone almost exclusively to people he knows personally ( like former Maricopa County , Arizona , sheriff Joe Arpaio ) or whose stories he heard about on Fox News ( like former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich ) — and not ordinary people who usually receive clemency because a president concludes that their sentences were unjust or that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society .
“ He ’ s done virtually nothing for people who aren ’ t high-profile but want to cleanse their records or remove the collateral consequences of federal convictions , ” said Daniel Kobil , a professor at Capital University Law School who studies executive clemency .
“ Instead , his pardons and commutations are mostly self-serving — he ’ s given them to people who are cronies or who can help him somehow in his political battles.
” But perhaps what is especially worrying when it comes to presidential pardons is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ basically unlimited : Preemptive pardons are constitutional , and even a pardon obtained through bribery or a presidential self-pardon might end up standing up in court .
Ultimately , the Biden administration would likely have to be willing to challenge a Trump self-pardon in court — and it ’ s far from clear that Biden , who has been calling for unity in the wake of the election , would be willing to do that .
Because it ’ s so hard to contest a pardon — even one that is clearly outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intended use — the legal experts I spoke with were concerned that Trump ’ s use of the clemency power could pave the way for even further abuses .
A president could , for instance , convince subordinates to commit crimes with the promise of a pardon on the other end .
That last scenario isn ’ t even all that far-fetched .
As the Watergate scandal unraveled , Nixon secretly promised his aides that they would be pardoned , although he ultimately didn ’ t follow through .
So far , presidents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pardon power by norms and fear of political backlash .
What ’ s more , Congress can ’ t rein in a president ’ s pardon power .
Any limits on a president ’ s ability to grant clemency — short of a Supreme Court ruling on something undecided , like a self-pardon — would have to come via a constitutional amendment , which would be very difficult to do .
In the meantime , though , Americans might come to conclude that pardons and commutations are simply an avenue for presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more of a political minefield .
That would be an issue , too , Barkow said , since people who are convicted of federal crimes aren ’ t usually eligible for parole , meaning an act of presidential clemency may be their only hope for a reprieve .
“ I ’ m a big believer in clemency , because there ’ s always a need for it — laws are written too broadly , judges give sentences that are too long , people change over time and they need their records cleared , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I think presidents should be using it a lot more .
But when the power is abused , it becomes a lot harder to make that case .
”

As President Donald Trump heads into his last few weeks in the White House, there are signs that a slew of high-profile pardons could be coming, including those for close allies like Trump’s personal lawyer Rudolph W. Giuliani, Trump’s family members or even Trump himself. These pardons, if they happen, could be quite expansive — granting blanket immunity for crimes for which Trump’s allies and family members haven’t even been charged, much less convicted. At the very least, they would almost certainly be controversial, as many of Trump’s pardons already have been.
The electoral problems facing Republicans | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast
Trump wouldn’t be the first president to issue a lot of pardons at the end of his presidency, nor the first to grant a controversial pardon. But legal experts say Trump’s record on pardons — especially if he ends up using his last days in office to issue get-out-of-jail-free cards to family members or himself — could set a dangerous precedent for two reasons.
[How Trump Changed America]
First, Trump has been unusually stingy with the pardon power up until now, even by modern standards. And second, almost all of his acts of clemency (which include commutations as well as pardons) have gone to people he knows, like former national security adviser Michael Flynn, or to those with whom he may curry political favor, like the two Oregon cattle ranchers who were at the center of a dispute over federal land involving states’ rights activist Ammon Bundy.
That track record, legal experts told me, is pretty much the exact opposite of how the presidential pardon power was intended to function, which was as a check on abuses by the legislative or judicial branches. “Many of Trump’s pardons … could fairly be characterized as more about his personal interests than serving justice,” Jeffrey Crouch, a professor at American University and an expert on executive clemency, said in an email. “Pardons are normally granted to people who have turned their lives around, shown remorse and want a pardon,” Crouch told me, adding that this just isn’t the story line that has emerged from four years of Trump. “[His] clemency approach is that clemency is less available to average people than it is to those with the right group of connections.”
Trump wouldn’t be the first president to go on a lame-duck pardoning binge
If Trump ends up issuing a large number of pardons and commutations in the waning days of his presidency, that wouldn’t be a huge surprise. As the table below shows, modern presidents have tended to wait until the end of their presidency to start breaking out their pardoning pen in earnest.
Presidents often wait to issue pardons Share of total pardons, commutations and other clemency grants issued by each president in the last fiscal year of their presidency FY President share of total clemency grants issued 1981 Carter 14% – 1989 Reagan 8 – 1993 HW Bush 49 – 2001 Clinton 56 – 2009 W Bush 19 – 2017 Obama 61 – Federal fiscal years run from Oct. 1 – Sept. 30, so this reflects the last four months of a presidency. Source: Office of the U.S. Pardon Attorney
President Bill Clinton, for instance, granted clemency to more than 100 people on the last day of his presidency alone, including an especially controversial pardon for Marc Rich, a fugitive financier who had fled the country and was living in Switzerland, and whose ex-wife was a longtime financial supporter of Clinton’s. And President Barack Obama, as part of a broader effort to help federal prisoners serving long sentences as the result of the tough-on-crime policies of the 1980s and 1990s, commuted the sentences of nearly 2,000 drug offenders during his last week in office.
Fear of political backlash has often kept presidents from using their pardon power until they have one foot out the door, according to Rachel Barkow, a professor at New York University Law School who has studied the clemency power. “They’re not as worried about taking a political hit at that point if someone they [grant clemency to] unfortunately commits a heinous crime,” she said.
That might explain why some of the most controversial pardons in modern history have come as a president was leaving office — particularly something like a “preemptive” pardon, in which the recipient is absolved of federal crimes of which they haven’t been convicted. Trump is reportedly considering such pardons for Giuliani and some of his adult children.
[What Makes A One-Term President?]
Preemptive pardons are rare, but Trump wouldn’t be the first president to grant one. A month after taking office, President Gerald Ford pardoned President Richard Nixon, who had resigned after being named a co-conspirator in a case involving the cover-up of the Watergate break-in. Ford pardoned Nixon before he could actually be charged, and he didn’t pardon him for just one specific crime either — his pardon forgave him for any federal crimes that he may have committed during his time in office.
On Christmas Eve in 1992, President George H.W. Bush pardoned former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger and several other people for their participation in the Reagan-era Iran-Contra scandal, effectively ending six years of legal proceedings before their trials started. That pardon was especially controversial because Bush was scheduled to testify as a witness in Weinberger’s trial, leading the prosecutor in the case to accuse Bush of participating in a “cover-up.”
Trump’s pardons have been simultaneously sparse and self-serving
For most presidents, though, controversial pardons are the exception, not the rule. Preemptive pardons are few and far between, and it’s similarly rare for presidents to pardon family members. Clinton did pardon his brother Roger, as part of his last-minute clemency spree, but Roger Clinton had already served time in prison. So it would still be very far outside the norm for Trump to pardon his family members — much less issue a pardon for himself, which no president has ever attempted (and may not be constitutional).
And even if Trump doesn’t preemptively pardon family members, allies or himself, experts pointed out that his use of the clemency power still looks quite different than other presidents. For one thing, Trump has been unusually sparing with pardons and commutations — even compared to other modern presidents who were criticized for using the power too stingily. Of course, there’s still time for that to change, but so far he’s granted clemency to fewer people than any other president in the modern era.
President Trump hasn’t used his pardon power much Total pardons, commutations and other forms of clemency granted by each president during their time in office President Pardons Commutations Other All Clemency Carter 534 29 3 566 Reagan 393 13 0 406 H.W. Bush 74 3 0 77 Clinton 396 61 2 459 W. Bush 189 11 0 200 Obama 212 1,715 0 1,927 Trump* 28 16 0 44 *Data from the Office of the U.S. Pardon Attorney except for the six issued in fiscal year 2021, which is sourced from news reports and is as of Dec. 9, 2020. “Other” includes forms of clemency that are less commonly used in the modern era, like respites and remissions. Source: Office of the U.S. Pardon Attorney, news reports
Additionally, according to an analysis by Lawfare, Trump’s pardons and commutations have gone almost exclusively to people he knows personally (like former Maricopa County, Arizona, sheriff Joe Arpaio) or whose stories he heard about on Fox News (like former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich) — and not ordinary people who usually receive clemency because a president concludes that their sentences were unjust or that they’ve repaid their debt to society.
“He’s done virtually nothing for people who aren’t high-profile but want to cleanse their records or remove the collateral consequences of federal convictions,” said Daniel Kobil, a professor at Capital University Law School who studies executive clemency. “Instead, his pardons and commutations are mostly self-serving — he’s given them to people who are cronies or who can help him somehow in his political battles.”
Trump’s pardons could set a dangerous precedent
But perhaps what is especially worrying when it comes to presidential pardons is that the president’s power is basically unlimited: Preemptive pardons are constitutional, and even a pardon obtained through bribery or a presidential self-pardon might end up standing up in court. Ultimately, the Biden administration would likely have to be willing to challenge a Trump self-pardon in court — and it’s far from clear that Biden, who has been calling for unity in the wake of the election, would be willing to do that.
Because it’s so hard to contest a pardon — even one that is clearly outside the scope of the power’s intended use — the legal experts I spoke with were concerned that Trump’s use of the clemency power could pave the way for even further abuses. A president could, for instance, convince subordinates to commit crimes with the promise of a pardon on the other end. That last scenario isn’t even all that far-fetched. As the Watergate scandal unraveled, Nixon secretly promised his aides that they would be pardoned, although he ultimately didn’t follow through.
[How The 2020 Election Changed The Electoral Map]
So far, presidents have been constrained in their use of the pardon power by norms and fear of political backlash. What’s more, Congress can’t rein in a president’s pardon power. Any limits on a president’s ability to grant clemency — short of a Supreme Court ruling on something undecided, like a self-pardon — would have to come via a constitutional amendment, which would be very difficult to do. In the meantime, though, Americans might come to conclude that pardons and commutations are simply an avenue for presidential corruption, turning their use into even more of a political minefield. That would be an issue, too, Barkow said, since people who are convicted of federal crimes aren’t usually eligible for parole, meaning an act of presidential clemency may be their only hope for a reprieve.
“I’m a big believer in clemency, because there’s always a need for it — laws are written too broadly, judges give sentences that are too long, people change over time and they need their records cleared,” Barkow said. “In fact, I think presidents should be using it a lot more. But when the power is abused, it becomes a lot harder to make that case.”
Don’t believe anything 2020 exit polls tell you | FiveThirtyEight


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-11--Trump Hasn’t Pardoned Many People — But So Far They Have Been Mostly His Friends

In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Galen Druke speaks with Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux about presidential pardons — why @ @ @ @ @ how they ’ ve used it in the past and how Trump ’ s record @ @ @ @ @ predecessors .

Trump Hasn’t Pardoned Many People — But So Far They Have Been Mostly His Friends
In this episode of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Galen Druke speaks with Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux about presidential pardons — why presidents have that power, how they’ve used it in the past and how Trump’s record compares with that of his predecessors.
The electoral problems facing Republicans | FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-10--Politics Podcast: How Trump’s Pardons Compare With Other Presidents’

According to various reports , President Trump is considering preemptively pardoning family members and allies before he leaves office , @ @ @ @ @ oldest children and his lawyer Rudy Giuliani .
Trump has already pardoned his ally Roger @ @ @ @ @ security adviser Michael Flynn .
In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , Galen @ @ @ @ @ about why presidents have the power to pardon , how that power has been used @ @ @ @ @ s record compares with that of his predecessors .
You can listen to the episode @ @ @ @ @ ” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes , the @ @ @ @ @ podcast platform .
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@ @ @ @ @ recorded Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a @ @ @ @ @ .
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According to various reports, President Trump is considering preemptively pardoning family members and allies before he leaves office, which could include his three oldest children and his lawyer Rudy Giuliani. Trump has already pardoned his ally Roger Stone and his former national security adviser Michael Flynn. In this installment of the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, Galen Druke speaks with Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux about why presidents have the power to pardon, how that power has been used historically and how Trump’s record compares with that of his predecessors.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast is recorded Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion for “good polling vs. bad polling”? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.


fivethirtyeight--2020-12-11--Many Black Americans, Republicans, Women Aren’t Sure About Taking A COVID-19 Vaccine

Welcome to Pollapalooza , our weekly polling roundup .
Most Americans say they will take one of the vaccines to immunize themselves from COVID-19 when they become available , according to a series of recent polls .
( And that could be soon , since the Food and Drug Administration ’ s vaccine advisory panel this week recommended that the FDA authorize a vaccine created by Pfizer , likely clearing a path for formal approval and some Americans to be given it as early as next week . )
But at least right now , there are several demographic groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which might lead people in those groups to become ill from the virus at higher rates and prevent the U.S. overall from having the kind of widespread immunization from COVID-19 that medical experts and U.S. government officials would like to see .
Overall , 60 percent of American adults said that they would “ definitely ” ( 29 percent ) or “ probably ” ( 31 percent ) take a vaccine “ if it were available today , ” according to a Pew Research Center poll conducted Nov. 18-29 .
Eighteen percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” take the vaccine , and 21 percent said that they would “ probably not.
” Other polls have revealed similar findings ( for the most part ) .
A Morning Consult survey on behalf of National Geographic conducted Nov. 20-23 found 61 percent of Americans were either “ likely ” or “ somewhat likely ” to take a vaccine if it were approved by the FDA and made available to them .
In that poll , 30 percent said they were unlikely to take the vaccine , including 19 percent who indicated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Gallup poll conducted Nov. 16-29 showed roughly the same splits .
These surveys show some clear demographic divides around being vaccinated for COVID-19 .
Here are Pew ’ s results , for example : Let ’ s look more closely at those differences ( note that these groups are in alphabetical order ) : Age .
Willingness to take a vaccine generally increases with age , with people over age 65 in particular willing to take it , according to the surveys .
The Morning Consult poll found 68 percent of those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would take the vaccine , compared to 54 percent ages 18-34 .
It is not surprising that older people would be more eager to be vaccinated for COVID-19 compared to younger ones , since people over age 65 are dying at higher rates from the virus than younger people .
Education .
Willingness to take a vaccine generally goes up with education levels too .
In Gallup ’ s survey , 68 percent of people with a college degree said they would take a vaccine , compared to 61 percent without a degree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people with postgraduate degrees ( 75 percent would take a vaccine ) compared to those with only a high school education ( 55 percent ) .
It could be that people with higher levels of education are more aware of the importance of taking vaccines to prevent the spread of diseases and/or are more confident the vaccine will both immunize them and not result in them getting sick .
Alternatively , this education finding could just be a proxy for partisanship ( more on that in a bit ) , since people with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be more Democratic-leaning than those without degrees .
Gender .
Men are notably more willing than women to say that they will take the vaccine , according to these surveys .
For example , 67 percent of men but just 54 percent of women said they would take the vaccine , per Pew .
There is not an obvious explanation for this finding , which showed up not only in all four of these polls but surveys done recently of people in Colorado , North Carolina and even Ireland .
In fact , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American health — women generally take more preventative measures than men .
For example , women tend to be more likely than men to get flu vaccinations and men are more likely than women to go a year or more without seeing a doctor .
One potential explanation : women are viewing not taking a vaccine as a pro-health measure , because they aren ’ t sure that the vaccines are safe .
In the Elon University survey of North Carolina residents , women who said they would not take a COVID-19 vaccine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happened too quickly , leaving them worried that the vaccine process was politicized and that there might be side effects that are not being publicized or aren ’ t yet known .
“ Women are already well-represented in the anti-vaccination movement and in wellness blogging communities that advocate for “ natural ” alternatives to vaccines , ” said Kelly McGuire , a professor of gender at Ontario-based Trent University .
She added , “ There are also numerous studies indicating that women may be conditioned to be more risk-averse than men , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that was developed much more quickly than most people anticipated.
” Partisanship .
Democrats are more willing than Republicans to be vaccinated , per the surveys .
For example , 75 percent of Democrats said they would take the vaccine in the Gallup poll , compared to 50 percent of Republicans .
This is not too surprising .
There are not a lot of prominent politicians who are publicly skeptical of vaccines , but those ranks are dominated by conservatives .
Even before the coronavirus outbreak , rank-and-file Republicans tended to be more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ illnesses like the measles .
And amid the COVID-19 outbreak specifically , those Republicans have expressed less concern about the spread of the virus compared to Democrats and are less likely to wear masks .
Race .
Black people are notably less likely than other racial and ethnic groups to say they are going to take a COVID-19 vaccine , according to these surveys .
For example , per the Pew survey , 83 percent of Asian Americans , 63 percent of Hispanics , 61 percent of non-Hispanic white Americans and just 42 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take a vaccine .
Black Americans are very Democratic leaning but also less likely than Asian or white Americans to have college degrees .
So those two factors may not be good explanations for the wariness of Black Americans in particular about the vaccine .
Instead , experts say there is long-standing mistreatment of Black Americans in U.S. health care research and lingering suspicion from that mistreatment about how the American health care system treats them .
The most prominent example of this mistreatment is the Tuskegee study , in which a group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had syphilis , were denied treatment that would have lessened the effects of the disease because researchers at Tuskegee wanted to secretly study how the men dealt with the illness .
The study ran from the 1930s to the 1970s before its details became public and it was shut down .
Overall , wariness about taking a COVID-19 vaccine is a major potential problem for the U.S .
Some government officials are suggesting that the U.S. could eventually achieve “ herd immunity ” — a condition in which enough people have had the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread rapidly through a geographic area .
That would involve at least 60 percent of people ( if not more ) taking a vaccine .
We should be hesitant about these notions of herd immunity , as it ’ s not clear if the vaccines prevent people from transmitting the virus , even if they are preventing people from getting a severe case of COVID-19 .
That said , there is general agreement that the higher the rate of COVID-19 vaccination , the better .
And the numbers of Americans willing to take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next few weeks and months , we are likely to see more and more people being vaccinated and not having major side effects , Thousands of American health care workers and elderly people — and potentially millions of others — will likely receive a COVID-19 vaccine by the end of this month .
Former Presidents Bush , Clinton and Obama have all indicated that they will take a vaccine as soon as they are allowed to and would be willing to do so in public .
It is hard to imagine in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who say they are willing to get a vaccine ( and ultimately do ) doesn ’ t go up , even among vaccine-wary demographic groups .
Also , we are likely to see targeted efforts at specific demographic groups ( like Black people ) to encourage them to take a COVID-19 vaccine , which might also increase their enthusiasm about the idea .
Conversely , if say , thousands of people get really sick from the vaccine ( this is not likely , I am raising a worst-case scenario ) or people take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases of COVID-19 say a month later ( also unlikely ) that might drive even more people to say that they are not willing to take it .
Bottom line — take these COVID-19 poll numbers seriously and literally , but not predictively .
It is not great that 40 percent of Americans , including huge blocs of Black people , Republicans and women , seem wary of taking a vaccine right now .
And it ’ s possible those numbers go down , but seems more likely that they go up as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people took a COVID-19 vaccine and not have any major health incidents as a result .
• About 82 percent of Americans agree with the Center for Diseases Control ’ s guidance that health care workers and residents of nursing homes should get COVID-19 vaccines before other Americans , according to a YouGov poll conducted Dec 2-3 .
• Just 29 percent of Americans think that prison inmates should be prioritized for getting COVID-19 vaccines , according to a YouGov poll conducted on Dec. 7 , even as prisons are one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Another 45 percent of Americans oppose this idea , 26 percent said they didn ’ t know their view on the subject .
• Black people are much more likely than other groups to say they “ have a lot of common interests and concerns ” with other Black people , according to a recent poll conducted by HuffPost and YouGov .
In the survey , 52 percent of Black people indicated they have commonalities with other Black Americans , compared to 29 percent of Black people indicating that “ race and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” and 19 percent saying they were not sure .
Just 36 percent of Hispanics and 17 percent of white people indicated they have a lot of commonality with people who they share their race or ethnicity .
This finding is consistent with other research that suggests Black Americans in particular view themselves as having “ shared fate ” with one another .
• According to that same survey , Americans tend not to say they have a lot of common concerns with people who share their gender , income level , age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ area .
But more than half of Democrats , Republicans , white people , Black people , men and women say they have a lot of commonality with people who are in the same political party that they are .
• Age and race are big fault lines among Georgia voters in the two U.S. Senate races there .
In his race against Democrat Jon Ossoff , incumbent GOP Sen. David Perdue leads 71-26 percent among Georgia ’ s white voters , according to a Data for Progress poll released this week .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead 89-9 .
Among voters over 45 , Perdue leads 56-41 .
Among voters under 45 , Ossoff leads 57-40 .
• In the other Senate race in Georgia , incumbent Republican Sen. Kelly Loeffler leads her Democratic opponent Raphael Warnock 67-30 percent among white voters and 54-44 among those over 45 .
Warnock is ahead 89-7 among Black voters and 58-36 among those under 45 .
Overall , the DFP survey showed both races effectively tied ( Warnock ahead 50-47 over Loeffler , Perdue ahead 50-48 over Ossoff . )
FiveThirtyEight is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls in Georgia , which you can see here .
• Sixty-six percent of Americans , including 51 percent of Republicans , said they supported a recent U.S. House vote to decriminalize marijuana , compared to just 25 who opposed it , according to a Politico/Morning Consult poll conducted Dec 4-6 .
According to FiveThirtyEight ’ s presidential approval tracker , 43.3 percent of Americans approve of the job President Trump is doing , while 52.5 percent disapprove ( a net approval rating of -9.2 points ) .
At this time last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disapproved ( a net approval rating of -9.2 points ) .
One month ago , Trump had an approval rating of 44.8 percent and a disapproval rating of 52.0 percent , for a net approval rating of -7.3 points .

Welcome to Pollapalooza, our weekly polling roundup.
Poll(s) of the week
Most Americans say they will take one of the vaccines to immunize themselves from COVID-19 when they become available, according to a series of recent polls. (And that could be soon, since the Food and Drug Administration’s vaccine advisory panel this week recommended that the FDA authorize a vaccine created by Pfizer, likely clearing a path for formal approval and some Americans to be given it as early as next week.) But at least right now, there are several demographic groups that are disproportionately hesitant to be vaccinated, which might lead people in those groups to become ill from the virus at higher rates and prevent the U.S. overall from having the kind of widespread immunization from COVID-19 that medical experts and U.S. government officials would like to see.
How COVID-19 vaccines work
Overall, 60 percent of American adults said that they would “definitely” (29 percent) or “probably” (31 percent) take a vaccine “if it were available today,” according to a Pew Research Center poll conducted Nov. 18-29. Eighteen percent said that they would “definitely not” take the vaccine, and 21 percent said that they would “probably not.” Other polls have revealed similar findings (for the most part). A Morning Consult survey on behalf of National Geographic conducted Nov. 20-23 found 61 percent of Americans were either “likely” or “somewhat likely” to take a vaccine if it were approved by the FDA and made available to them. In that poll, 30 percent said they were unlikely to take the vaccine, including 19 percent who indicated they were “very unlikely.” And a Gallup poll conducted Nov. 16-29 showed roughly the same splits.
[Related: How To Make Sure People Come Back For Their Second COVID-19 Vaccine Dose]
These surveys show some clear demographic divides around being vaccinated for COVID-19. Here are Pew’s results, for example:
Let’s look more closely at those differences (note that these groups are in alphabetical order):
Age. Willingness to take a vaccine generally increases with age, with people over age 65 in particular willing to take it, according to the surveys. The Morning Consult poll found 68 percent of those who are over age 65 said they would take the vaccine, compared to 54 percent ages 18-34.
It is not surprising that older people would be more eager to be vaccinated for COVID-19 compared to younger ones, since people over age 65 are dying at higher rates from the virus than younger people.
Education. Willingness to take a vaccine generally goes up with education levels too. In Gallup’s survey, 68 percent of people with a college degree said they would take a vaccine, compared to 61 percent without a degree. Pew found a larger gap between people with postgraduate degrees (75 percent would take a vaccine) compared to those with only a high school education (55 percent).
It could be that people with higher levels of education are more aware of the importance of taking vaccines to prevent the spread of diseases and/or are more confident the vaccine will both immunize them and not result in them getting sick. Alternatively, this education finding could just be a proxy for partisanship (more on that in a bit), since people with college degrees and postgraduate degrees tend to be more Democratic-leaning than those without degrees.
Gender. Men are notably more willing than women to say that they will take the vaccine, according to these surveys. For example, 67 percent of men but just 54 percent of women said they would take the vaccine, per Pew. There is not an obvious explanation for this finding, which showed up not only in all four of these polls but surveys done recently of people in Colorado, North Carolina and even Ireland. In fact, this finding contradicts the general trend in American health — women generally take more preventative measures than men. For example, women tend to be more likely than men to get flu vaccinations and men are more likely than women to go a year or more without seeing a doctor.
[Related: Why So Many Men Stuck With Trump In 2020]
One potential explanation: women are viewing not taking a vaccine as a pro-health measure, because they aren’t sure that the vaccines are safe. In the Elon University survey of North Carolina residents, women who said they would not take a COVID-19 vaccine suggested that the vaccine approval process had happened too quickly, leaving them worried that the vaccine process was politicized and that there might be side effects that are not being publicized or aren’t yet known.
“Women are already well-represented in the anti-vaccination movement and in wellness blogging communities that advocate for “natural” alternatives to vaccines,” said Kelly McGuire, a professor of gender at Ontario-based Trent University. She added, “There are also numerous studies indicating that women may be conditioned to be more risk-averse than men, which could be informing response to a vaccine that was developed much more quickly than most people anticipated.”
Partisanship. Democrats are more willing than Republicans to be vaccinated, per the surveys. For example, 75 percent of Democrats said they would take the vaccine in the Gallup poll, compared to 50 percent of Republicans.
This is not too surprising. There are not a lot of prominent politicians who are publicly skeptical of vaccines, but those ranks are dominated by conservatives. Even before the coronavirus outbreak, rank-and-file Republicans tended to be more wary of mandatory vaccinations for children for illnesses like the measles. And amid the COVID-19 outbreak specifically, those Republicans have expressed less concern about the spread of the virus compared to Democrats and are less likely to wear masks.
Race. Black people are notably less likely than other racial and ethnic groups to say they are going to take a COVID-19 vaccine, according to these surveys. For example, per the Pew survey, 83 percent of Asian Americans, 63 percent of Hispanics, 61 percent of non-Hispanic white Americans and just 42 percent of Black Americans indicated they would take a vaccine.
Black Americans are very Democratic leaning but also less likely than Asian or white Americans to have college degrees. So those two factors may not be good explanations for the wariness of Black Americans in particular about the vaccine. Instead, experts say there is long-standing mistreatment of Black Americans in U.S. health care research and lingering suspicion from that mistreatment about how the American health care system treats them. The most prominent example of this mistreatment is the Tuskegee study, in which a group of Black men, many of whom had syphilis, were denied treatment that would have lessened the effects of the disease because researchers at Tuskegee wanted to secretly study how the men dealt with the illness. The study ran from the 1930s to the 1970s before its details became public and it was shut down.
Overall, wariness about taking a COVID-19 vaccine is a major potential problem for the U.S. Some government officials are suggesting that the U.S. could eventually achieve “herd immunity” — a condition in which enough people have had the vaccine that the virus can’t spread rapidly through a geographic area. That would involve at least 60 percent of people (if not more) taking a vaccine. We should be hesitant about these notions of herd immunity, as it’s not clear if the vaccines prevent people from transmitting the virus, even if they are preventing people from getting a severe case of COVID-19. That said, there is general agreement that the higher the rate of COVID-19 vaccination, the better.
And the numbers of Americans willing to take a vaccine might go up. In the next few weeks and months, we are likely to see more and more people being vaccinated and not having major side effects.
Thousands of American health care workers and elderly people — and potentially millions of others — will likely receive a COVID-19 vaccine by the end of this month. Former Presidents Bush, Clinton and Obama have all indicated that they will take a vaccine as soon as they are allowed to and would be willing to do so in public. It is hard to imagine in this scenario that the number of Americans who say they are willing to get a vaccine (and ultimately do) doesn’t go up, even among vaccine-wary demographic groups.
[Related: How To Trust That A COVID-19 Vaccine Is Safe]
Also, we are likely to see targeted efforts at specific demographic groups (like Black people) to encourage them to take a COVID-19 vaccine, which might also increase their enthusiasm about the idea.
Conversely, if say, thousands of people get really sick from the vaccine (this is not likely, I am raising a worst-case scenario) or people take the vaccine but still get really bad cases of COVID-19 say a month later (also unlikely) that might drive even more people to say that they are not willing to take it.
Bottom line — take these COVID-19 poll numbers seriously and literally, but not predictively. It is not great that 40 percent of Americans, including huge blocs of Black people, Republicans and women, seem wary of taking a vaccine right now. And it’s possible those numbers go up, but seems more likely that they go down as Americans watch news coverage describing how millions of people took a COVID-19 vaccine and not have any major health incidents as a result.
Other polling bites
Trump approval
According to FiveThirtyEight’s presidential approval tracker, 43.3 percent of Americans approve of the job President Trump is doing, while 52.5 percent disapprove (a net approval rating of -9.2 points). At this time last week, 43.6 percent approved and 52.8 percent disapproved (a net approval rating of -9.2 points). One month ago, Trump had an approval rating of 44.8 percent and a disapproval rating of 52.0 percent, for a net approval rating of -7.3 points.
COVID vaccine delivery day