fivethirtyeight--2020-07-14--White Democrats Are Wary Of Big Ideas To Address Racial Inequality

Even before a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd , leading to a renewed national conversation about racial inequality , white Democrats were already pretty “ woke ” on some issues .
An overwhelming majority of white Democrats said that racial discrimination was a major barrier to Black people getting ahead in America , that the police and the broader criminal justice system in America treated Black people unfairly and that the legacy of slavery still affected Black Americans today .
And on issues of criminal justice and policing in particular , white and Black Democrats held fairly similar views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have shown even greater wokeness among white Democrats ( and Americans more broadly ) .
White Democrats now view the police even less favorably and the Black Lives Matter movement more favorably , and they are also more likely to agree that Black people face “ a great deal ” or “ a lot ” of discrimination in America today .
What we don ’ t know yet is whether white Democrats have moved significantly on racial issues beyond policing and discrimination in general — issues that deal with more material concerns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Most polling since Floyd ’ s death has focused on policing , Confederate monuments and other topics that have been in the news .
But here ’ s what we do know right now .
In polling both before and even since Floyd ’ s death , white Democrats have been fairly opposed to giving reparations to the descendants of enslaved people , an idea supported by a clear majority of Black Democrats .
And on a wide range of other policy ideas intended to address racial inequality , white Democrats are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more opposed to all these policies across the board , which is why we ’ re focusing on white Democrats here . )
To look at these differences more closely , we focused on areas of American life where there is documented racial inequality .
We then searched for polling on those issues .
Our aim was to find the most recent polling available , in part to see whether views on major issues had changed in the wake of Floyd ’ s death , but for many issues , we had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Floyd was killed .
We found results in four major areas : income inequality , education , housing and the workplace .
The wage gap between Black and white Americans has been rising for decades , and this gap persists , even accounting for educational levels , with white college graduates earning much more than Black college graduates .
Moreover , wealth in the United States is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of white Americans .
Experts argue that mere changes in individual behavior is not enough to reduce these gaps , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda to address racial income and wealth disparities .
White Democrats support increasing taxes on the incomes of very high-earning Americans as well as taxing the wealth of people with a high net worth , according to polls .
Recent surveys suggest that white Democrats may be even more supportive of these ideas than Black Democrats .
That said , white Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of providing reparations to Black Americans as restitution for slavery or to make up for past and current discrimination that African Americans have faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across a number of surveys , is telling , because reparations are clearly intended to benefit Black people specifically and in a way that , for example , expanding health care through a wealth tax is not .
Floyd ’ s death and the heightened discussion around racism that followed have not led to substantial support for reparations among white Democrats .
In late April and early May this year , a quarter of white Democrats supported reparations , according to polling from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape .
In more recent polls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of white Democrats .
That ’ s a substantial increase but still nowhere near the support this policy has among Black Democrats .
About two-thirds of Black Americans supported reparations both before and after Floyd ’ s death .
Education experts generally favor greater school integration and argue that it is an important tool in ensuring black Americans get a high-quality education .
White Democrats are fairly supportive of ideas like creating magnet schools that may draw in kids from across a community and redrawing school district lines to increase racial diversity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about as supportive of these policies as Black Democrats are .
White Democrats are also mostly in favor of having the federal government take actions to increase school integration , a step that was strongly opposed by many white Americans in the era after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling .
( There are reasons to be skeptical of this polling and think that some white Democrats may be lying about their true preferences , but we ’ ll come back to that later . )
There is division @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of forcing students to attend a school farther away from their home or in a school district outside their neighborhood to ensure schools are integrated .
Those policies have some echoes of the controversial “ busing ” policies implemented after Brown v. Board and subsequent rulings that resulted in greater racial integration of schools but that also angered many white Americans .
Notably , both Black and white Democrats are wary of race and ethnicity being factors in college admissions decisions , at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Schools normally take this step , in part , to increase the number of Black students attending , so it ’ s somewhat surprising that this policy is not more popular among Black Democrats .
In all , though , we see the same trend in education as in income : Support among white Democrats dips for more aggressive policies , particularly ones with explicit trade-offs or downsides for white people .
On these education questions , the only polling we have available was conducted before Floyd ’ s death , so it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But if views on wealth and income policies are any guide , we might still see gaps between white and Black Democrats regardless .
Many U.S. cities have distinct areas with predominantly Black populations , often because of policies created in the past to keep Black people in certain neighborhoods and out of others .
Many heavily Black areas have high numbers of people living in poverty and relatively few amenities like supermarkets .
Some of these communities face an intense and at times unwelcome police presence .
Therefore , racial inequality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to polls , white Democrats say they support efforts to build more housing in their neighborhoods , even low-income housing in suburban and upper-income areas .
( Again , we will come back to why you should be somewhat skeptical of these responses . )
But white Democrats don ’ t really prioritize residential integration , according to a 2019 Pew poll .
Only about one-third of white Democrats said they wished their community were more racially mixed , with the vast majority ( 60 percent ) saying they were fine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
Black Democrats answered fairly similarly to white Democrats on these questions — favoring more housing in their neighborhoods and low-income housing in the suburbs , but most ( 62 percent ) said they were happy with the current racial composition of their community .
But , unlike with measures aimed at reducing racial inequalities in income and education , where Black and white Democrats disagreed , white Democrats , like their Black counterparts , support aggressive interventions to reduce racial inequality in housing .
The finding that Black Democrats are happy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communities is not surprising .
Black Democrats living in heavily Black areas may want some of the positive attributes of heavily white neighborhoods ( like grocery stores and other amenities ) but may not necessarily want to move to whiter neighborhoods themselves — or have more white people move to their neighborhoods and change the character of the area .
Again , this data was collected before Floyd ’ s death , so we ’ ll need new polling to see whether views among white or Black Democrats have changed .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overwhelmingly want racially diverse workplaces and , when generally defined , support affirmative action .
Though a minority of white men believe that affirmative action has made it harder for them to find work , the vast majority of white and Black Democrats agree that Black people are treated less fairly than white people in employment situations .
But while both white and Black Democrats value workplace diversity and recognize unfairness in employment situations , neither group thinks race and ethnicity should be taken into account when making decisions about promotions or hiring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase workplace diversity .
That view in some ways contradicts Black and white Democrats ’ support of affirmative action and a racially diverse workplace , but nevertheless , Black Democrats share white Democrats ’ reluctance to embrace a more aggressive position that might increase racial equality in the workplace .
What ’ s going on here ?
Considering the long history of racial discrimination in employment , it ’ s likely that Black Democrats are worried that factoring race into the job application or promotion process would hurt them , even if that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Alternatively , Black Democrats and their white counterparts might be hoping that diversity can be achieved without the direct consideration of race at the individual level , therefore explaining their wariness about considering race in hiring and promotions , as well as in college admissions .
That may or may not change in the wake of Floyd ’ s death and the national conversation about systemic racism ; again , we ’ ll need new polls to know .
Does the data overstate — or understate — white Democrats ’ commitment to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear : White Democrats — definitely before Floyd was killed but most likely afterward too — are more circumspect about ideas promoting racial equality that might be disruptive to the status quo for white people .
But it ’ s worth considering two other readings of these numbers .
It ’ s possible that this data is overstating the support of white Democrats , even for more mild policy proposals to reduce racial inequality .
Indeed , before the protests precipitated by Floyd ’ s death , the Democratic Party was increasingly connected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if you identify as a Democrat or liberal , there may be pressure to say in a survey that you support ideas to address racial inequality — whether you really do or not .
Experts refer to this as “ social desirability bias ” and say it plagues polling around racial issues , in particular .
“ [ F ] or scholars studying White liberals in this period , you must take into account [ the ] possibility that White liberals are responding expressively .
That is , they are aware of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answer that ‘ bad ’ White people give , and don ’ t wan na be bad White ppl , ” Stanford University political science professor Hakeem Jefferson wrote in a Twitter thread last year , raising doubts about polling results that show white liberals expressing as high or higher concerns about racial inequality than some Black Americans .
“ I ’ m not saying we ought not believe White liberals when they tell us on surveys they are racially progressive .
I am , however , suggesting that we treat these data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ date , ” he added .
“ I stand by these points and have made them again recently — the key point is that we need to think about tradeoffs and consider what happens when white folks are forced to give up their privilege , ” Jefferson told us recently .
Another reason to be skeptical of white Democrats ’ commitment to addressing racial inequality is to look at their actions .
In cities such as New York and San Francisco , where white voters tend to be Democratic-leaning , schools and neighborhoods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s not clear that a lot of elected officials in these cities are trying that hard to change those dynamics , which suggests that voters may have elected people they knew would maintain the racial status quo .
Finally , a sizable gap remains between Black Democrats and white Democrats even on issues that would seem less fraught than , say , reparations or school integration .
White Democrats , for example , are significantly less likely than Black Democrats to support taking down Confederate monuments , according to a recent ABC News/Ipsos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of policies and views that don ’ t fall neatly into one of the buckets we covered above , there is still a significant gap between white and Black Democrats .
But it ’ s also worth considering whether this data is understating the potential support of white Democrats for fairly drastic proposals to address racial inequality .
After all , we have seen huge increases in the past decade in the share of white Democrats who say America must take additional steps to ensure equal rights for Black people and who say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s still less than half .
These recent shifts are likely due in part to the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement — in addition , views on race and identity are now one of the major dividing lines between the two parties , and party rhetoric on these issues is crystallizing .
( Increasingly , when people who identify as Democrats see their party leaders suggest that the police are treating Black people unfairly , they ’ ll adopt that stance as well , new research indicates . )
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more general , policies and views .
The recent protests against systemic racism and police brutality against Black people could cause a racial awakening — a second one just in this decade — for white Democrats .
People who are trying to learn more about systemic racism and what they can do to reverse it ( books about racial equality are in high demand , for example ) may end up shifting their views in ways that may not be apparent in polls right now or even three months from now .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ by signaling from elites — for instance , the push by leaders of the University of California system to allow race to once again be considered in the admissions process and a New York Times Magazine cover story calling for reparations .
Also , we may be entering a period of peak “ white collective guilt , ” which scholars define as “ remorse that a white person experiences due to her group ’ s actions toward black people , ” not necessarily due to her individual actions .
White Democrats are more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collective guilt , and these feelings predict support for affirmative action and general aid for Black Americans .
“ It is one thing to say one believes in the existence of systemic racism and another to do something about it , ” said Robert Griffin , a polling and public opinion expert who is the research director of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group .
“ However , these somewhat superficial changes are still important .
For the public , they create opportunities to recognize the gap between stated belief and lived action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feeling pressured to bring the two into closer alignment.
” Finally , many of these polls are asking fairly imprecise questions about racial policy ideas that aren ’ t totally fleshed out .
Specific plans for reparations , particularly proposals that would be funded largely by new taxes on the very wealthy or some other mechanism that does not target the incomes of most white Americans , might be fairly popular with white Democrats , or at least less unpopular than reparations defined generically and without details .
To conclude , you should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats are very “ woke ” on policy matters of substance , or even more concerned about racial inequality than Black Americans are .
That doesn ’ t seem true — at least not yet , whether you are reading polls or visiting a public school and notice that , though it ’ s in a liberal-leaning area of the country , it ’ s still not very racially mixed .
That said , however , it seems that white Democrats have dramatically shifted their views on racial issues over the past 10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they hadn ’ t picked up on ( or had even ignored ) before .
And so their views and priorities may keep shifting — which could translate to more substantive actions , like looking for integrated schools for their children or even supporting some kind of modest approach to reparations .

Even before a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd, leading to a renewed national conversation about racial inequality, white Democrats were already pretty “woke” on some issues. An overwhelming majority of white Democrats said that racial discrimination was a major barrier to Black people getting ahead in America, that the police and the broader criminal justice system in America treated Black people unfairly and that the legacy of slavery still affected Black Americans today. And on issues of criminal justice and policing in particular, white and Black Democrats held fairly similar views. Surveys since Floyd’s death have shown even greater wokeness among white Democrats (and Americans more broadly). White Democrats now view the police even less favorably and the Black Lives Matter movement more favorably, and they are also more likely to agree that Black people face “a great deal” or “a lot” of discrimination in America today.
What we don’t know yet is whether white Democrats have moved significantly on racial issues beyond policing and discrimination in general — issues that deal with more material concerns, such as school integration and wealth redistribution. Most polling since Floyd’s death has focused on policing, Confederate monuments and other topics that have been in the news.
[Related: There’s A Huge Gap In How Republicans And Democrats See Discrimination]
But here’s what we do know right now. In polling both before and even since Floyd’s death, white Democrats have been fairly opposed to giving reparations to the descendants of enslaved people, an idea supported by a clear majority of Black Democrats. And on a wide range of other policy ideas intended to address racial inequality, white Democrats are fairly tentative. (Republicans are much more opposed to all these policies across the board, which is why we’re focusing on white Democrats here.)
To look at these differences more closely, we focused on areas of American life where there is documented racial inequality. We then searched for polling on those issues. Our aim was to find the most recent polling available, in part to see whether views on major issues had changed in the wake of Floyd’s death, but for many issues, we had to rely on older polling, conducted before Floyd was killed. We found results in four major areas: income inequality, education, housing and the workplace.
Income Inequality
The wage gap between Black and white Americans has been rising for decades, and this gap persists, even accounting for educational levels, with white college graduates earning much more than Black college graduates. Moreover, wealth in the United States is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of white Americans. Experts argue that mere changes in individual behavior is not enough to reduce these gaps, and that the government must have a specific agenda to address racial income and wealth disparities.
White Democrats support increasing taxes on the incomes of very high-earning Americans as well as taxing the wealth of people with a high net worth, according to polls. Recent surveys suggest that white Democrats may be even more supportive of these ideas than Black Democrats.
That said, white Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of providing reparations to Black Americans as restitution for slavery or to make up for past and current discrimination that African Americans have faced. That divide, which is consistent across a number of surveys, is telling, because reparations are clearly intended to benefit Black people specifically and in a way that, for example, expanding health care through a wealth tax is not.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at addressing racial wealth and income inequality Percentage of respondents who support each policy or issue Policy Pollster Month/year of poll White Democrats Black Democrats Democratic race gap Wealth Tax Reuters/Ipsos 12/19 82% 69% +13 Wealth Tax Nationscape 6/20-7/20 82 71 +11 Issue Pollster Month/year of poll White Democrats Black Democrats Democratic race gap Reparations AP-NORC 9/19 28% 81% -54 Reparations Gallup 6/19-7/19 32 80 -48 Reparations ABC/Ipsos 6/20 36 78 -42 Reparations Nationscape 6/20-7/20 33 69 -36 Reparations Vice/Ipsos 1/20 34 68 -34 Each poll used slightly different question wording; respondents were counted in favor if they said they somewhat or strongly supported the idea, or if they said the policy should be enacted. The Nationscape question on taxing the wealthy specified raising taxes on households making more than $600,000 a year.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Floyd’s death and the heightened discussion around racism that followed have not led to substantial support for reparations among white Democrats. In late April and early May this year, a quarter of white Democrats supported reparations, according to polling from Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape. In more recent polls, that support has grown to 33 percent of white Democrats. That’s a substantial increase but still nowhere near the support this policy has among Black Democrats. About two-thirds of Black Americans supported reparations both before and after Floyd’s death.
Education
Education experts generally favor greater school integration and argue that it is an important tool in ensuring black Americans get a high-quality education.
White Democrats are fairly supportive of ideas like creating magnet schools that may draw in kids from across a community and redrawing school district lines to increase racial diversity. In fact, they’re about as supportive of these policies as Black Democrats are. White Democrats are also mostly in favor of having the federal government take actions to increase school integration, a step that was strongly opposed by many white Americans in the era after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling. (There are reasons to be skeptical of this polling and think that some white Democrats may be lying about their true preferences, but we’ll come back to that later.)
There is division about more aggressive ideas, however. White Democrats are much less supportive than Black Democrats of forcing students to attend a school farther away from their home or in a school district outside their neighborhood to ensure schools are integrated. Those policies have some echoes of the controversial “busing” policies implemented after Brown v. Board and subsequent rulings that resulted in greater racial integration of schools but that also angered many white Americans.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at integrating schools Percentage of respondents who favor each policy Policy Pollster Month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Busing kids to other school districts Gallup 7/19 49% 71% -22 Having students attend schools outside their local community Pew Research 1/19-2/19 52 71 -19 Involving the federal government in school integration Gallup 7/19 65 83 -18 Creating more magnet schools Gallup 7/19 80 86 -6 Considering race and ethnicity in college admissions decisions Pew Research 1/19-2/19 34 39 -5 Redrawing school district lines Gallup 7/19 75 77 -2 Respondents were counted in favor if they said the policy should be enacted, they favored the proposal, or race and ethnicity should be a major or minor factor in college admissions.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Notably, both Black and white Democrats are wary of race and ethnicity being factors in college admissions decisions, at least according to a 2019 Pew survey. Schools normally take this step, in part, to increase the number of Black students attending, so it’s somewhat surprising that this policy is not more popular among Black Democrats.
In all, though, we see the same trend in education as in income: Support among white Democrats dips for more aggressive policies, particularly ones with explicit trade-offs or downsides for white people. On these education questions, the only polling we have available was conducted before Floyd’s death, so it’s possible that opinions have shifted. But if views on wealth and income policies are any guide, we might still see gaps between white and Black Democrats regardless.
Housing
Many U.S. cities have distinct areas with predominantly Black populations, often because of policies created in the past to keep Black people in certain neighborhoods and out of others. Many heavily Black areas have high numbers of people living in poverty and relatively few amenities like supermarkets. Some of these communities face an intense and at times unwelcome police presence. Therefore, racial inequality experts generally want to increase housing integration.
According to polls, white Democrats say they support efforts to build more housing in their neighborhoods, even low-income housing in suburban and upper-income areas. (Again, we will come back to why you should be somewhat skeptical of these responses.) But white Democrats don’t really prioritize residential integration, according to a 2019 Pew poll. Only about one-third of white Democrats said they wished their community were more racially mixed, with the vast majority (60 percent) saying they were fine with the current racial mix of their community.
Black Democrats answered fairly similarly to white Democrats on these questions — favoring more housing in their neighborhoods and low-income housing in the suburbs, but most (62 percent) said they were happy with the current racial composition of their community. But, unlike with measures aimed at reducing racial inequalities in income and education, where Black and white Democrats disagreed, white Democrats, like their Black counterparts, support aggressive interventions to reduce racial inequality in housing.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at integrating neighborhoods and their own communities Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or hold each view Policy or view Pollster Month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems DEM
RACE GAP Building more houses, condos and apartments in their community Cato 3/19 66% 70% -4 Building more low-income housing in the suburbs Gallup 7/19 79 82 -3 Saying their community is not racially diverse enough Pew Research 1/19-2/19 36 31 +5 Cato respondents were counted in favor if they said they somewhat or strongly favored the policy. Pew Research respondents were asked whether they wished their community were more racially mixed, less racially mixed or about as racially mixed as it is.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
The finding that Black Democrats are happy with the current racial composition of their communities is not surprising. Black Democrats living in heavily Black areas may want some of the positive attributes of heavily white neighborhoods (like grocery stores and other amenities) but may not necessarily want to move to whiter neighborhoods themselves — or have more white people move to their neighborhoods and change the character of the area. Again, this data was collected before Floyd’s death, so we’ll need new polling to see whether views among white or Black Democrats have changed.
The workplace
According to polls, both white and Black Democrats overwhelmingly want racially diverse workplaces and, when generally defined, support affirmative action. Though a minority of white men believe that affirmative action has made it harder for them to find work, the vast majority of white and Black Democrats agree that Black people are treated less fairly than white people in employment situations.
But while both white and Black Democrats value workplace diversity and recognize unfairness in employment situations, neither group thinks race and ethnicity should be taken into account when making decisions about promotions or hiring, even though the objective is to increase workplace diversity. That view in some ways contradicts Black and white Democrats’ support of affirmative action and a racially diverse workplace, but nevertheless, Black Democrats share white Democrats’ reluctance to embrace a more aggressive position that might increase racial equality in the workplace.
How white and Black Democrats view policies aimed at increasing workplace diversity Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or agree with each view Policy or view Pollster Month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Race should be considered in hiring and promotions Pew Research 1/19-2/19 37% 38% -1 Affirmative action Gallup 11/18-12/18 79 78 +1 Companies should promote racial diversity Pew Research 1/19-2/19 89 82 +7 Respondents were counted in favor if they said the policy was very important or somewhat important to enact, they generally favored the idea, or the policy should be enacted.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
What’s going on here? Considering the long history of racial discrimination in employment, it’s likely that Black Democrats are worried that factoring race into the job application or promotion process would hurt them, even if that racial factor is supposed to benefit them. Alternatively, Black Democrats and their white counterparts might be hoping that diversity can be achieved without the direct consideration of race at the individual level, therefore explaining their wariness about considering race in hiring and promotions, as well as in college admissions.
That may or may not change in the wake of Floyd’s death and the national conversation about systemic racism; again, we’ll need new polls to know.
Does the data overstate — or understate — white Democrats’ commitment to equality?
The broader finding here is clear: White Democrats — definitely before Floyd was killed but most likely afterward too — are more circumspect about ideas promoting racial equality that might be disruptive to the status quo for white people. But it’s worth considering two other readings of these numbers.
It’s possible that this data is overstating the support of white Democrats, even for more mild policy proposals to reduce racial inequality. Indeed, before the protests precipitated by Floyd’s death, the Democratic Party was increasingly connected with racial justice movements. So, if you identify as a Democrat or liberal, there may be pressure to say in a survey that you support ideas to address racial inequality — whether you really do or not. Experts refer to this as “social desirability bias” and say it plagues polling around racial issues, in particular.
[Related: When Proof Is Not Enough]
“[F]or scholars studying White liberals in this period, you must take into account [the] possibility that White liberals are responding expressively. That is, they are aware of the ‘right’ answer, understand the answer that ‘bad’ White people give, and don’t wanna be bad White ppl,” Stanford University political science professor Hakeem Jefferson wrote in a Twitter thread last year, raising doubts about polling results that show white liberals expressing as high or higher concerns about racial inequality than some Black Americans.
“I’m not saying we ought not believe White liberals when they tell us on surveys they are racially progressive. I am, however, suggesting that we treat these data with more skepticism than we have to date,” he added.
“I stand by these points and have made them again recently — the key point is that we need to think about tradeoffs and consider what happens when white folks are forced to give up their privilege,” Jefferson told us recently.
[Related: How Biden Is Winning An Identity Politics Election So Far]
Another reason to be skeptical of white Democrats’ commitment to addressing racial inequality is to look at their actions. In cities such as New York and San Francisco, where white voters tend to be Democratic-leaning, schools and neighborhoods are very segregated. And it’s not clear that a lot of elected officials in these cities are trying that hard to change those dynamics, which suggests that voters may have elected people they knew would maintain the racial status quo.
Finally, a sizable gap remains between Black Democrats and white Democrats even on issues that would seem less fraught than, say, reparations or school integration. White Democrats, for example, are significantly less likely than Black Democrats to support taking down Confederate monuments, according to a recent ABC News/Ipsos survey.
Indeed, on a range of policies and views that don’t fall neatly into one of the buckets we covered above, there is still a significant gap between white and Black Democrats.
Where white and Black Democrats diverge on race issues Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or agree with each view Policy or view Pollster month/year of poll White Dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Police officers can generally not be trusted Data for Progress 6/20 33% 71% -38 Police do only a fair or poor job of protecting people from crime Pew Research 6/20 50 72 -22 Our country has “not gone far enough” in giving Black people equal rights with white people Pew Research 1/19-2/19 64 82 -18 Confederate monuments should be removed from public spaces ABC News/Ipsos 6/20 68 84 -16 U.S. military bases named after Confederates should be renamed ABC News/Ipsos 6/20 63 73 -10 Respondents were counted in favor if they said they somewhat or strongly supported the idea.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
But it’s also worth considering whether this data is understating the potential support of white Democrats for fairly drastic proposals to address racial inequality. After all, we have seen huge increases in the past decade in the share of white Democrats who say America must take additional steps to ensure equal rights for Black people and who say they support reparations, even though it’s still less than half. These recent shifts are likely due in part to the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement — in addition, views on race and identity are now one of the major dividing lines between the two parties, and party rhetoric on these issues is crystallizing. (Increasingly, when people who identify as Democrats see their party leaders suggest that the police are treating Black people unfairly, they’ll adopt that stance as well, new research indicates.)
And Black and white Democrats agree on many, more general, policies and views.
Where white and Black Democrats agree on race issues Percentage of respondents who favor each policy or agree with each view Policy or view Pollster Month/year of poll White dems Black Dems Dem
Race Gap Legacy of slavery affects the position of Black people today Pew Research 1/19-2/19 80% 87% -6 Police do a poor job of treating racial and ethnic groups equally Data for Progress 6/20 48 46 -2 Increase government aid to poor Americans Pew Research 9/19 72 73 -1 Decrease spending on police Pew Research 6/20 43 42 +1 Redirect funding from police to education and other community services Data for Progress 6/20 56 51 +5 Police killing of Black Americans is a sign of broader problems Data for Progress 6/20 72 66 +6 Respondents were counted in favor if they said they agreed with the statement a great deal or fair amount, they somewhat or strongly supported the idea, they said the policy should be enacted or they said spending on policing in their area should be decreased a lot or a little.
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
The recent protests against systemic racism and police brutality against Black people could cause a racial awakening — a second one just in this decade — for white Democrats. People who are trying to learn more about systemic racism and what they can do to reverse it (books about racial equality are in high demand, for example) may end up shifting their views in ways that may not be apparent in polls right now or even three months from now. The general public may also be influenced by signaling from elites — for instance, the push by leaders of the University of California system to allow race to once again be considered in the admissions process and a New York Times Magazine cover story calling for reparations.
Also, we may be entering a period of peak “white collective guilt,” which scholars define as “remorse that a white person experiences due to her group’s actions toward black people,” not necessarily due to her individual actions. White Democrats are more likely than white Republicans to feel white collective guilt, and these feelings predict support for affirmative action and general aid for Black Americans.
[Related: Is Police Reform A Fundamentally Flawed Idea?]
“It is one thing to say one believes in the existence of systemic racism and another to do something about it,” said Robert Griffin, a polling and public opinion expert who is the research director of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. “However, these somewhat superficial changes are still important. For the public, they create opportunities to recognize the gap between stated belief and lived action. Such recognition can result in people feeling pressured to bring the two into closer alignment.”
Finally, many of these polls are asking fairly imprecise questions about racial policy ideas that aren’t totally fleshed out. Specific plans for reparations, particularly proposals that would be funded largely by new taxes on the very wealthy or some other mechanism that does not target the incomes of most white Americans, might be fairly popular with white Democrats, or at least less unpopular than reparations defined generically and without details.
To conclude, you should be skeptical of stories that suggest white Democrats are very “woke” on policy matters of substance, or even more concerned about racial inequality than Black Americans are. That doesn’t seem true — at least not yet, whether you are reading polls or visiting a public school and notice that, though it’s in a liberal-leaning area of the country, it’s still not very racially mixed. That said, however, it seems that white Democrats have dramatically shifted their views on racial issues over the past 10 years, and are recognizing racial inequalities that they hadn’t picked up on (or had even ignored) before. And so their views and priorities may keep shifting — which could translate to more substantive actions, like looking for integrated schools for their children or even supporting some kind of modest approach to reparations.
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fivethirtyeight--2020-07-15--Why Trump — Not Biden — Might Have An Enthusiasm Problem

The Trump campaign has found its silver lining in an avalanche of awful polling numbers : Voters who support Donald Trump are enthusiastic about his candidacy .
Polls consistently show that Trump ’ s supporters are more excited to vote for him than presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden ’ s supporters are to vote for him .
For example , half of Trump supporters in a recent USA Today/Suffolk University poll said they were “ very excited ” about their candidate , compared to just 27 percent of Biden backers .
Trump campaign manager Brad Parscale even described their enthusiasm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important factor in the campaign.
” But the significance of this “ enthusiasm gap ” is exaggerated .
Enthusiastic votes count just as much as unenthusiastic ones , meaning an enthusiasm gap would only really matter in a close election .
And right now , it isn ’ t a close election : Biden leads Trump in national polls by nearly 9 points .
No enthusiasm advantage — no matter how big — could possibly make up for that kind of a gap .
Let ’ s pretend , though , that voter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump and Biden ’ s candidacies .
The Trump campaign would still have a problem , and that ’ s because the 2020 enthusiasm gap is mostly a myth .
First , while Biden voters may not be all that excited about voting for Biden , they ’ re very enthusiastic about voting against Trump .
And that gives Biden a pretty strong edge , because Trump supporters don ’ t despise Biden the way they despised Hillary Clinton in 2016 .
In fact , according to survey data from the Democracy Fund @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Trump voters who rate Biden unfavorably is consistently much lower than the share of Biden voters who rate Trump negatively — nearly 30 percentage points lower as of the last survey conducted at the end of June .
Second , because Trump voters don ’ t dislike Biden as much as Biden voters dislike Trump , Biden actually has an advantage in net enthusiasm ( calculated as the difference between a candidate ’ s “ very favorable ” and “ very unfavorable ” rating ) .
The gap on this metric has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month , too .
What ’ s especially notable here is that Biden ’ s net enthusiasm rating is near zero , which is similar to most major-party presidential candidates ’ ratings from 1980 to 2012 .
Trump ’ s current score of around -20 , on the other hand , has only one historical comparison other than his own campaign four years ago : Hillary Clinton in 2016 .
Trump should know better than anyone that this isn ’ t good .
After all , he won in 2016 in part because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negative opinions of both major candidates broke decisively in his favor .
But right now , Trump can ’ t count on the “ haters ” to swing the election for him again .
Registered voters with negative opinions of both Trump and Biden preferred Biden to Trump by a whopping 23-point margin in the polling Nationscape conducted in June .
They also rated Biden less negatively overall , with only 33 percent of this group saying they had a very unfavorable opinion of Biden compared to 62 percent who said the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when combined with recent political science research on the power of negative partisanship , suggest that the public ’ s stronger dislike of Trump is probably the more consequential enthusiasm gap in 2020 .
To be sure , that negative enthusiasm gap will almost certainly narrow as Trump ratchets up his attacks on Biden .
But it ’ s unlikely Biden will engender the same level of hatred that Clinton did .
Even though she ’ s spent four years out of the political limelight , Republicans are still more hostile to Clinton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from last month found that 76 percent had a “ strongly unfavorable ” opinion of Clinton , compared to 64 percent of Republicans who held the same opinion of Biden .
Additionally , social science research suggests that antipathy toward the other side is driven in large part by racial and cultural differences between the parties — differences that Clinton and former President Barack Obama exemplify in ways that a 77-year-old white moderate male Democrat doesn ’ t .
As The Atlantic ’ s Adam Serwer astutely put it , “ The notion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provoke the visceral rage that Clinton and Obama did — not in Trump , and not in his supporters.
” So long as Biden ’ s campaign does not evoke such negativity , Trump will likely be the one on the short end of the 2020 enthusiasm gap .

The Trump campaign has found its silver lining in an avalanche of awful polling numbers: Voters who support Donald Trump are enthusiastic about his candidacy.
Polls consistently show that Trump’s supporters are more excited to vote for him than presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden’s supporters are to vote for him. For example, half of Trump supporters in a recent USA Today/Suffolk University poll said they were “very excited” about their candidate, compared to just 27 percent of Biden backers. Trump campaign manager Brad Parscale even described their enthusiasm advantage over Biden as “the most important factor in the campaign.”
‘I’m not sure (enthusiasm) will be enough to save (Trump)’ in 2020: Silver
But the significance of this “enthusiasm gap” is exaggerated. Enthusiastic votes count just as much as unenthusiastic ones, meaning an enthusiasm gap would only really matter in a close election. And right now, it isn’t a close election: Biden leads Trump in national polls by nearly 9 points. No enthusiasm advantage — no matter how big — could possibly make up for that kind of a gap.
[Related: The Latest Presidential Polling Averages]
Let’s pretend, though, that voter enthusiasm is an important metric for understanding Trump and Biden’s candidacies. The Trump campaign would still have a problem, and that’s because the 2020 enthusiasm gap is mostly a myth.
First, while Biden voters may not be all that excited about voting for Biden, they’re very enthusiastic about voting against Trump. And that gives Biden a pretty strong edge, because Trump supporters don’t despise Biden the way they despised Hillary Clinton in 2016. In fact, according to survey data from the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape project, the share of Trump voters who rate Biden unfavorably is consistently much lower than the share of Biden voters who rate Trump negatively — nearly 30 percentage points lower as of the last survey conducted at the end of June.
Second, because Trump voters don’t dislike Biden as much as Biden voters dislike Trump, Biden actually has an advantage in net enthusiasm (calculated as the difference between a candidate’s “very favorable” and “very unfavorable” rating). The gap on this metric has widened between the two in the past month, too.
What’s especially notable here is that Biden’s net enthusiasm rating is near zero, which is similar to most major-party presidential candidates’ ratings from 1980 to 2012. Trump’s current score of around -20, on the other hand, has only one historical comparison other than his own campaign four years ago: Hillary Clinton in 2016.
[Related: How Popular Is President Donald Trump?]
Trump should know better than anyone that this isn’t good. After all, he won in 2016 in part because the record number of voters who had negative opinions of both major candidates broke decisively in his favor.
But right now, Trump can’t count on the “haters” to swing the election for him again. Registered voters with negative opinions of both Trump and Biden preferred Biden to Trump by a whopping 23-point margin in the polling Nationscape conducted in June. They also rated Biden less negatively overall, with only 33 percent of this group saying they had a very unfavorable opinion of Biden compared to 62 percent who said the same of Trump.
[Related: The Voters Who Don’t Like Trump Or Biden]
These results, especially when combined with recent political science research on the power of negative partisanship, suggest that the public’s stronger dislike of Trump is probably the more consequential enthusiasm gap in 2020.
To be sure, that negative enthusiasm gap will almost certainly narrow as Trump ratchets up his attacks on Biden. But it’s unlikely Biden will engender the same level of hatred that Clinton did. Even though she’s spent four years out of the political limelight, Republicans are still more hostile to Clinton than Biden. A Fox News poll from last month found that 76 percent had a “strongly unfavorable” opinion of Clinton, compared to 64 percent of Republicans who held the same opinion of Biden.
[Related: So … About That Supposed Lack Of Enthusiasm For Biden?]
Additionally, social science research suggests that antipathy toward the other side is driven in large part by racial and cultural differences between the parties — differences that Clinton and former President Barack Obama exemplify in ways that a 77-year-old white moderate male Democrat doesn’t.
As The Atlantic’s Adam Serwer astutely put it, “The notion of a Biden presidency simply does not provoke the visceral rage that Clinton and Obama did — not in Trump, and not in his supporters.” So long as Biden’s campaign does not evoke such negativity, Trump will likely be the one on the short end of the 2020 enthusiasm gap.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-16--Why It Took So Long For Politicians To Treat The Child Care Crisis As A Crisis

America is a little matryoshka doll of panic right now ; pop open each layer to reveal a new , worrying scenario .
For months the country was focused on reopening the economy , which had its own complicated set of problems .
But only recently has a broader swath of America tuned into the mess nestled inside it , one that parents have been sitting with for months : what to do with the kids .
There has been no federal plan to help American parents with child care , and they continue to wonder whether schools will really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
That lack of action is in direct contrast to other crises that have struck America recently .
After the financial crash of 2008 , there was a bailout and a stimulus plan .
After the protests against police over the last few months , officials in cities and states responded with promises of better actions in the future but also , immediate policy implementation : New York state repealed a law that had shielded police personnel files , while the Minneapolis City Council voted to begin a process that could eventually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police as it ’ s now known .
[ Related : Where The Latest COVID-19 Models Think We ’ re Headed — And Why They Disagree ] But on child care and school , a specific , urgent response has been missing , or at least one that acknowledges our new reality .
President Trump threatened to withhold federal funding for education if schools didn ’ t open back up , counter to schools ’ insistence they need more money to provide a safe education amid the pandemic .
While the CARES Act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into law in late March , gave extra stimulus funding to families with children , schools and child care businesses so they could remain afloat , a Democratic-backed bill to give a $ 50 billion bailout of the child care industry has gotten little attention .
Teachers around the country have voiced doubt that necessary safety measures for in-school teaching will be sufficient , and Los Angeles Unified School District , one of the country ’ s largest school systems , has decided not to reopen classrooms when schools go back in session @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distance learning is safer , socially different children and those without stable internet connections or computers — who are already at the margins in normal times — will fall irrevocably behind .
There is no cohesive solution to America ’ s child care problem .
But the relative inattention to this crisis , one that ’ s so foundational to a functioning society , the economy and family units across the country , is revealing .
It shows that for all the changes that have happened in American life — more female elected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workforce that is around 47 percent female — our power dynamics remain fundamentally skewed .
We are failing to collectively understand what our most critical and pressing problems actually are .
“ Care in general has always been seen as a sideline issue , ” Vicki Shabo of the left-leaning think tank New America said .
“ A nice-to-have and not something that ’ s necessary , and not something that ’ s central for adults to be productive in the economy.
” Of course , now we ’ re seeing how much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a country where most men and women work even when they have children , having child care is inextricably linked to economic productivity — and not having it often hurts women most .
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 2015 found that in households with children under 6 , women spent an hour a day doing child care , compared to the 25 minutes of care provided by men .
It ’ s easy to extrapolate this trend for pandemic times : American women will bear the brunt of the school and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : COVID-19 deaths are rising .
What will the U.S. do ?
Yet , child care in particular hasn ’ t often found itself at the forefront of political debate .
Experts and activists I talked to for this story all used the same framing to talk about why : an American narrative that child care problems are individuals ’ problems , not society ’ s .
“ If you think about child care traditionally before the pandemic , you probably didn ’ t think about it too much before you had kids @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of income security and child care at the National Women ’ s Law Center , said .
“ Then you have kids , you ’ re in the most stressful and resource-strapped part of your life : You ’ re operating on three hours of sleep a night , you ’ re financially squeezed , because at the very time you ’ re taking off of work , you have diapers and wipes and formula and whatever else .
You ’ re in this total daze of early motherhood .
That ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ‘ You know what , I ’ m going to call my member of Congress.
’ You ’ re feeling it like a personal issue.
” Child care isn ’ t necessarily seen as a macroeconomic issue or a driver of labor force participation or GDP , Shabo said .
And because of that , she said , it often takes a backseat to economic issues like wages when lobbying efforts happen .
This is not to say that child care issues don ’ t get attention — in the 2020 Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates , child care plans took a more front and center role in the campaign than they had in the past .
One leading candidate , Sen. Elizabeth Warren , co-authored a 2004 book , “ The Two-Income Trap , ” which was about the ways the rising incomes of households with two full-time employed adults belied the heavy costs of essentials like child care .
Warren thought child care costs were among the reasons the American middle class was in an economic crisis .
[ Related : How Americans View The Coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Our workplaces were built for white men , ” said Danielle Atkinson , the founder and director of Mothering Justice , a Detroit-area advocacy group for working families .
The fact that parents are left to fend for themselves from birth to kindergarten and then during the after-school , pre-dinner hours , is an American tradition that seems to assume a readily available , at-home caregiver .
( Atkinson pointed out the inextricable role black women have played in American child care ; enslaved women often took care of white children .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ parent ( usually a mother ) is an ideal that persists , or at the very least lingers in American life : only 18 percent of Americans in a 2018 Pew Research Survey thought it was ideal for both parents to work full time .
“ This conversation about school is really a conversation about work , ” Atkinson said .
“ The conversation about returning to school is not based on health .
It ’ s about returning those workers to working and not looking after their children , so those children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in particular are being forced to make difficult choices about their children ’ s care — many essential-worker jobs are lower wage — and many child care providers are in strapped situations .
The work of child care providers , Atkinson said , is often undervalued — their median annual wage in 2017 was a little more than $ 22,000 annually , which is just above the federal government ’ s poverty line for a family of three — and as Boteach pointed out , those workers could continue to risk greater infection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up .
She highlighted the plan put forth by Senate Democrats , the Child Care Is Essential Act — which would provide a bailout to the suffering industry and additional money for those providers to buy personal protective equipment — and cited an estimate that the U.S. child care industry would need a $ 9.6 billion injection monthly to survive the pandemic .
It ’ s more likely the next governmental nod to parents and their school-age children will come in the next iteration of the omnibus coronavirus relief package .
Congressional Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for schools and universities to purchase PPE and clean their facilities .
Republicans agree about more funds , though it ’ s not clear what their proposed number is — some have argued that since many schools will be operating on a partly virtual basis , less federal funding is needed .
The moral tussling that many parents have been doing — go back to work and risk potential COVID-19 infection at day care or school — will likely continue to be subjected to partisan politics .
Trump and his Secretary of Education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in recent days about sending children back to school at all costs , much to the chagrin of teachers , many of whom feel ill-prepared for the safety precautions necessary for in-person pandemic teaching .
Ultimately , though , it is parents who are forced to make a choice .
Atkinson , a mother of six , told me she would be keeping her children home in the fall .
For those who focus on child care , the pandemic has perversely presented an opportunity to advance the cause of greater access to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ created greater alignment of experience , potentially , between white middle class folks who saw this as an individual issue that they were struggling with and outraged by but hadn ’ t really taken action on and the longtime , long-standing lived experience of lower wage folks and people of color who have struggled for decades with the unaffordability of child care and the lack of care options to meet their work schedules , ” Shabo said .
Atkinson said she also hoped the individualism narrative would be shattered by the current crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ veil away and help women , especially white women , know that you ’ ve been lied to .
You were sold a bunch of lies : ‘ if you just work harder , if you just slay sexism , you ’ ll be OK. ’ But really , it ’ s a tool to divide , ” she said .
The pandemic has shattered norms and paradigms ever since it arrived in the U.S. — our expectations of child care is no exception .
What some politicians and activists had long sought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working parents and their child care crisis on the center stage of American politics — the virus has done in a matter of months .

America is a little matryoshka doll of panic right now; pop open each layer to reveal a new, worrying scenario. For months the country was focused on reopening the economy, which had its own complicated set of problems. But only recently has a broader swath of America tuned into the mess nestled inside it, one that parents have been sitting with for months: what to do with the kids.
There has been no federal plan to help American parents with child care, and they continue to wonder whether schools will really open their doors come the new school year. That lack of action is in direct contrast to other crises that have struck America recently. After the financial crash of 2008, there was a bailout and a stimulus plan. After the protests against police over the last few months, officials in cities and states responded with promises of better actions in the future but also, immediate policy implementation: New York state repealed a law that had shielded police personnel files, while the Minneapolis City Council voted to begin a process that could eventually lead to the dissolution of the city police as it’s now known.
[Related: Where The Latest COVID-19 Models Think We’re Headed — And Why They Disagree]
But on child care and school, a specific, urgent response has been missing, or at least one that acknowledges our new reality. President Trump threatened to withhold federal funding for education if schools didn’t open back up, counter to schools’ insistence they need more money to provide a safe education amid the pandemic. While the CARES Act, an omnibus COVID-19 relief bill signed into law in late March, gave extra stimulus funding to families with children, schools and child care businesses so they could remain afloat, a Democratic-backed bill to give a $50 billion bailout of the child care industry has gotten little attention. Teachers around the country have voiced doubt that necessary safety measures for in-school teaching will be sufficient, and Los Angeles Unified School District, one of the country’s largest school systems, has decided not to reopen classrooms when schools go back in session in August. Some worry that while distance learning is safer, socially different children and those without stable internet connections or computers — who are already at the margins in normal times — will fall irrevocably behind.
There is no cohesive solution to America’s child care problem. But the relative inattention to this crisis, one that’s so foundational to a functioning society, the economy and family units across the country, is revealing. It shows that for all the changes that have happened in American life — more female elected officials, a MeToo movement and a workforce that is around 47 percent female — our power dynamics remain fundamentally skewed. We are failing to collectively understand what our most critical and pressing problems actually are.
“Care in general has always been seen as a sideline issue,” Vicki Shabo of the left-leaning think tank New America said. “A nice-to-have and not something that’s necessary, and not something that’s central for adults to be productive in the economy.” Of course, now we’re seeing how much of a misunderstanding that is. In a country where most men and women work even when they have children, having child care is inextricably linked to economic productivity — and not having it often hurts women most. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 2015 found that in households with children under 6, women spent an hour a day doing child care, compared to the 25 minutes of care provided by men. It’s easy to extrapolate this trend for pandemic times: American women will bear the brunt of the school and child care crisis.
FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast: COVID-19 deaths are rising. What will the U.S. do?
Yet, child care in particular hasn’t often found itself at the forefront of political debate. Experts and activists I talked to for this story all used the same framing to talk about why: an American narrative that child care problems are individuals’ problems, not society’s.
“If you think about child care traditionally before the pandemic, you probably didn’t think about it too much before you had kids,” Melissa Boteach, vice president of income security and child care at the National Women’s Law Center, said. “Then you have kids, you’re in the most stressful and resource-strapped part of your life: You’re operating on three hours of sleep a night, you’re financially squeezed, because at the very time you’re taking off of work, you have diapers and wipes and formula and whatever else. You’re in this total daze of early motherhood. That’s probably not the time when you say, ‘You know what, I’m going to call my member of Congress.’ You’re feeling it like a personal issue.”
Child care isn’t necessarily seen as a macroeconomic issue or a driver of labor force participation or GDP, Shabo said. And because of that, she said, it often takes a backseat to economic issues like wages when lobbying efforts happen. This is not to say that child care issues don’t get attention — in the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries, which featured several female candidates, child care plans took a more front and center role in the campaign than they had in the past. One leading candidate, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, co-authored a 2004 book, “The Two-Income Trap,” which was about the ways the rising incomes of households with two full-time employed adults belied the heavy costs of essentials like child care. Warren thought child care costs were among the reasons the American middle class was in an economic crisis.
[Related: How Americans View The Coronavirus Crisis And Trump’s Response]
“Our workplaces were built for white men,” said Danielle Atkinson, the founder and director of Mothering Justice, a Detroit-area advocacy group for working families. The fact that parents are left to fend for themselves from birth to kindergarten and then during the after-school, pre-dinner hours, is an American tradition that seems to assume a readily available, at-home caregiver. (Atkinson pointed out the inextricable role black women have played in American child care; enslaved women often took care of white children.) The nuclear family with a stay-at-home parent (usually a mother) is an ideal that persists, or at the very least lingers in American life: only 18 percent of Americans in a 2018 Pew Research Survey thought it was ideal for both parents to work full time.
“This conversation about school is really a conversation about work,” Atkinson said. “The conversation about returning to school is not based on health. It’s about returning those workers to working and not looking after their children, so those children have to be somewhere.” Essential workers in particular are being forced to make difficult choices about their children’s care — many essential-worker jobs are lower wage — and many child care providers are in strapped situations. The work of child care providers, Atkinson said, is often undervalued — their median annual wage in 2017 was a little more than $22,000 annually, which is just above the federal government’s poverty line for a family of three — and as Boteach pointed out, those workers could continue to risk greater infection rates as schools and work open back up. She highlighted the plan put forth by Senate Democrats, the Child Care Is Essential Act — which would provide a bailout to the suffering industry and additional money for those providers to buy personal protective equipment — and cited an estimate that the U.S. child care industry would need a $9.6 billion injection monthly to survive the pandemic.
Subscribe to our coronavirus podcast, PODCAST-19
It’s more likely the next governmental nod to parents and their school-age children will come in the next iteration of the omnibus coronavirus relief package. Congressional Democrats have proposed $350 billion in funds for schools and universities to purchase PPE and clean their facilities. Republicans agree about more funds, though it’s not clear what their proposed number is — some have argued that since many schools will be operating on a partly virtual basis, less federal funding is needed.
The moral tussling that many parents have been doing — go back to work and risk potential COVID-19 infection at day care or school — will likely continue to be subjected to partisan politics. Trump and his Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos have been the loudest voices in recent days about sending children back to school at all costs, much to the chagrin of teachers, many of whom feel ill-prepared for the safety precautions necessary for in-person pandemic teaching. Ultimately, though, it is parents who are forced to make a choice. Atkinson, a mother of six, told me she would be keeping her children home in the fall.
[Related: The Latest Political Polls Collected By FiveThirtyEight]
For those who focus on child care, the pandemic has perversely presented an opportunity to advance the cause of greater access to guaranteed services. “This pandemic has created greater alignment of experience, potentially, between white middle class folks who saw this as an individual issue that they were struggling with and outraged by but hadn’t really taken action on and the longtime, long-standing lived experience of lower wage folks and people of color who have struggled for decades with the unaffordability of child care and the lack of care options to meet their work schedules,” Shabo said.
Atkinson said she also hoped the individualism narrative would be shattered by the current crisis. “We want to lift the veil away and help women, especially white women, know that you’ve been lied to. You were sold a bunch of lies: ‘if you just work harder, if you just slay sexism, you’ll be OK.’ But really, it’s a tool to divide,” she said.
The pandemic has shattered norms and paradigms ever since it arrived in the U.S. — our expectations of child care is no exception. What some politicians and activists had long sought to do to no avail — place working parents and their child care crisis on the center stage of American politics — the virus has done in a matter of months.


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-16--Roberts Is The New Swing Justice. That Doesn’t Mean He’s Becoming More Liberal.

This Supreme Court term belonged to John Roberts .
The chief justice was in the majority in nearly every case .
And he quite literally had the last word , as he wrote the opinion for the last two cases released this term , which dealt with President Trump ’ s much sought-after financial records .
The rulings were largely interpreted as a rebuke to Trump , and considering Roberts unexpectedly joined the liberals in several other cases this term , some have speculated that the conservative chief might be moving to the center .
But is Roberts actually becoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Court researchers indicates that Roberts is firmly at the center of the court .
According to this year ’ s Martin-Quinn scores , a prominent measure of the justices ’ ideology , there is an 82 percent chance that Roberts was the median justice in the term that just wrapped .
However , as the chart below shows , there is some uncertainty about where he actually falls — or how much daylight exists between Roberts ’ s ideological position this term and the positions of Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ court does not mean Roberts is becoming a liberal or even a centrist .
Yes , he joined the liberals in several high-profile cases , and according to justice pairing data analyzed by Adam Feldman for SCOTUSBlog , he aligned with Justice Elena Kagan , a liberal , more frequently than with fellow conservative Justice Clarence Thomas .
But many of the cases where Roberts sided with the liberals were limited in scope or temporary in effect .
Roberts also helped push forward several long-held conservative goals — including dramatically expanding the definition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote in many cases .
Roberts has long been perceived as a conservative , both ideologically and temperamentally — a justice who would prefer to gradually chip away at liberal precedents rather than dispatching them with one swift blow .
And on an increasingly conservative Supreme Court , it ’ s not hard to see how that incrementalist sentiment — combined with a fear of what would happen if the court moved too quickly out of the mainstream — might lead Roberts to some unexpected places and deliver some unwelcome losses to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t mean he ’ s changing in any fundamental way , or that he won ’ t continue to quietly steer the court in a conservative direction .
“ People seem to see Roberts moving to the center of the court and assume that he ’ s becoming more liberal , ” said Melissa Murray , a law professor at New York University .
“ I would read it a different way — that the court is moving to the right.
” The idea that Roberts is becoming more liberal didn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past few years , his ideological position on the court — as measured by the Martin-Quinn scores — has inched toward the center .
In 2005 , when he joined the court , he was basically indistinguishable ideologically from Justice Samuel Alito , who was appointed around the same time .
Now , however , Alito is probably the second most conservative justice on the court , while Roberts is the fifth most conservative .
The easiest way to interpret that trend is simply to conclude that Roberts is becoming more liberal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t be the first Republican-appointed justice to move left over time .
In perhaps the most dramatic example in modern Supreme Court history , a Nixon appointee , Justice Harry Blackmun , started off conservative but was the court ’ s most liberal member by the time he retired in 1994 .
Other factors could explain Roberts ’ s shift , though , starting with a limitation of the Martin-Quinn scores themselves .
The scores are estimates produced by a model based on how the justices vote — they are not a direct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or what ’ s motivating their votes .
The scores also can shift as the composition of the court changes , and the court is still adjusting after the previous longtime swing justice , Anthony Kennedy , retired and was replaced in 2018 by Kavanaugh , who has so far proven to be much more reliably conservative .
[ Related : The Supreme Court ’ s Big Rulings Were Surprisingly Mainstream This Year ] Think about it this way : One justice has to be in the middle of the court .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a more conservative judge , someone else had to take his place in the center .
In this case , that somebody was Roberts .
“ It could be the case that Roberts is actually drifting left , ” said Tom Clark , a political science professor at Emory University .
“ But it could also be an artifact of the statistical model trying to sort out what happens to the space when you add a new person .
At this point , we don ’ t know which one it is.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scores for past years at the end of each term .
The changes can be substantial with new justices , since the model has little data about their positions when they first join the court .
Case in point : In last year ’ s Martin-Quinn data , Kennedy was deemed to be the most likely median justice in 2017 and Kavanaugh took the role in 2018 , not Roberts .
But with the addition of 2019 data , Roberts is now estimated to have actually been the likely median in both years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now have a better understanding of how Kavanaugh tends to rule ; it also reflects the a fairly high probability that Roberts was already the median justice in the 2017 term , because Kennedy hardly swung at all in his final year on the court .
[ Related : John Roberts Will Probably Be The Supreme Court ’ s Next Swing Justice ] Meanwhile , it ’ s also possible that Roberts just appears to be moving to the left because the kinds of cases that make it to the court are shifting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measure and the Martin-Quinn scores can only account for it in a limited way .
But Clark said if the types of cases being brought before the court are changing , that could matter a lot to how liberal or conservative each justice ’ s rulings really are .
Because it could be that the Trump administration and conservative legal advocates , emboldened by the solid slate of conservatives on the court , are simply pushing Roberts to move to the right faster than he ’ s willing to go .
Take one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the justices considered a Louisiana abortion restriction that was functionally identical to a Texas law the court had struck down in 2016 .
In the previous case , Kennedy — who over the course of his career was ideologically unpredictable on a handful of high-salience issues , including the abortion , affirmative action and the death penalty — voted with the liberals against the Texas law .
This year , though , Roberts broke the tie , saying that while he still disagreed with the 2016 ruling , he felt he had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t mean Roberts ’ s fundamental stance toward abortion changed , though .
Instead , the change in the court ’ s composition put him in a situation where institutional considerations — like not wanting to overturn a recent precedent on an extremely hot-button issue four months before a presidential election — may have trumped his own ideological preferences .
[ Related : The Supreme Court Struck Down A Louisiana Abortion Law .
Here ’ s Where The Fight Could Head Next . ]
That ’ s significant because in the vast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be basically as conservative as he ’ s ever been .
According to The Supreme Court Database , a clearinghouse for data about the court , the share of opinions where he voted in a conservative direction hasn ’ t actually changed much in the past few years — when Kennedy ’ s departure and the addition of Trump ’ s more solidly conservative appointees gave Roberts an increasingly pivotal vote — compared to his opinions between the 2005 and the 2017 terms .
( This data is not yet available for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other words , Roberts is still very conservative .
( For the record , so was Kennedy . )
But several experts told us it ’ s possible that in Kennedy ’ s absence , Roberts may be increasingly willing to rule narrowly with the liberals in certain high-stakes cases .
Part of his motivation is likely that as chief justice , he feels a responsibility to ensure that the court maintains its reputation as an even-handed institution .
This year was a perfect storm for a chief justice trying to keep the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ muck of partisan politics , too .
“ The country is deeply polarized , we ’ re heading into a presidential election , there ’ s a pandemic , an economic crisis , significant social unrest , ” said Marin Levy , a professor at Duke Law who studies chief justices .
“ This is a moment where it ’ s critical to someone like Roberts that the public maintain its faith in the court.
” And in fact , even though this term ’ s docket was full of hot-button issues , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in step with public opinion , thanks in part to Roberts ’ s willingness to join the liberals .
So if Kennedy ’ s forays to the left were motivated by a couple of issues on which his views were more liberal than the rest of the conservative bloc , like gay rights and sometimes abortion , Roberts ’ s recent swings appear to be be driven by more strategic — and even political — considerations .
“ He ’ s concerned about maintaining his own power and the power of the court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ professor of law at the University of Michigan .
It was perhaps a sign of Roberts ’ s success that some of the biggest conservative victories this term mostly flew under the radar , such as when the conservatives continued to expand the circumstances under which religious schools can qualify for public funding , building on a case from 2017 .
Litman and others said that Roberts could follow a similar blueprint for eroding something like abortion rights in the future .
Rather than overturning precedents outright , he might prefer to whittle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pass a patchwork of restrictions , until landmark precedents on abortion eventually become functionally hollow .
Right now , of course , Roberts is still the closest thing we have to a swing justice .
But he ’ s not really a wild card — especially compared to Kennedy , who was genuinely unpredictable on a handful of issues , including abortion .
Clark said a better description for Roberts might be the “ pivotal ” justice , or the person with the power to broker compromises between left and right , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s direction .
That moniker is especially apt given that Roberts was so frequently in the majority this term .
At SCOTUSBlog , Feldman suggested calling him the “ anchor ” justice for that reason .
The fact that Roberts is chief justice gives him additional power when he votes with the majority , too : He gets to assign the opinion to a specific justice , and that can do a lot to shape the breadth and impact of the final ruling .
[ Related : The Supreme Court Put DACA ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] One thing does seem clear : Roberts is now by far the most powerful person on the Supreme Court .
And he is not willing — at least not yet — to let his fellow conservatives veer sharply to the right .
But his occasional votes with the liberals shouldn ’ t obscure the fact that he ’ s still a very conservative justice overall .
As with Kennedy , the handful of times he swings to the left may come to define his career .
And this term he ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legal advocates — can ’ t expect him to rubber-stamp any argument they lay at his feet .
But when he does swing , it will likely be political and institutional factors , not a shift in his ideology , that guide his vote .
And that means liberals really can ’ t rely on him to rule their way in the future .
FiveThirtyEight Politics : Conservatives didn ’ t get the SCOTUS they wanted this term

This Supreme Court term belonged to John Roberts. The chief justice was in the majority in nearly every case. And he quite literally had the last word, as he wrote the opinion for the last two cases released this term, which dealt with President Trump’s much sought-after financial records. The rulings were largely interpreted as a rebuke to Trump, and considering Roberts unexpectedly joined the liberals in several other cases this term, some have speculated that the conservative chief might be moving to the center.
But is Roberts actually becoming more liberal?
New data from Supreme Court researchers indicates that Roberts is firmly at the center of the court. According to this year’s Martin-Quinn scores, a prominent measure of the justices’ ideology, there is an 82 percent chance that Roberts was the median justice in the term that just wrapped. However, as the chart below shows, there is some uncertainty about where he actually falls — or how much daylight exists between Roberts’s ideological position this term and the positions of Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch.
But moving to the center of the court does not mean Roberts is becoming a liberal or even a centrist. Yes, he joined the liberals in several high-profile cases, and according to justice pairing data analyzed by Adam Feldman for SCOTUSBlog, he aligned with Justice Elena Kagan, a liberal, more frequently than with fellow conservative Justice Clarence Thomas. But many of the cases where Roberts sided with the liberals were limited in scope or temporary in effect. Roberts also helped push forward several long-held conservative goals — including dramatically expanding the definition of religious liberty — as the pivotal vote in many cases.
Roberts has long been perceived as a conservative, both ideologically and temperamentally — a justice who would prefer to gradually chip away at liberal precedents rather than dispatching them with one swift blow. And on an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, it’s not hard to see how that incrementalist sentiment — combined with a fear of what would happen if the court moved too quickly out of the mainstream — might lead Roberts to some unexpected places and deliver some unwelcome losses to the conservative legal movement. But that doesn’t mean he’s changing in any fundamental way, or that he won’t continue to quietly steer the court in a conservative direction. “People seem to see Roberts moving to the center of the court and assume that he’s becoming more liberal,” said Melissa Murray, a law professor at New York University. “I would read it a different way — that the court is moving to the right.”
The idea that Roberts is becoming more liberal didn’t come out of nowhere. Over the past few years, his ideological position on the court — as measured by the Martin-Quinn scores — has inched toward the center. In 2005, when he joined the court, he was basically indistinguishable ideologically from Justice Samuel Alito, who was appointed around the same time. Now, however, Alito is probably the second most conservative justice on the court, while Roberts is the fifth most conservative.
The easiest way to interpret that trend is simply to conclude that Roberts is becoming more liberal. After all, he wouldn’t be the first Republican-appointed justice to move left over time. In perhaps the most dramatic example in modern Supreme Court history, a Nixon appointee, Justice Harry Blackmun, started off conservative but was the court’s most liberal member by the time he retired in 1994.
Other factors could explain Roberts’s shift, though, starting with a limitation of the Martin-Quinn scores themselves. The scores are estimates produced by a model based on how the justices vote — they are not a direct window into what the justices actually believe or what’s motivating their votes. The scores also can shift as the composition of the court changes, and the court is still adjusting after the previous longtime swing justice, Anthony Kennedy, retired and was replaced in 2018 by Kavanaugh, who has so far proven to be much more reliably conservative.
[Related: The Supreme Court’s Big Rulings Were Surprisingly Mainstream This Year]
Think about it this way: One justice has to be in the middle of the court. So when Kennedy retired and was replaced by a more conservative judge, someone else had to take his place in the center. In this case, that somebody was Roberts. “It could be the case that Roberts is actually drifting left,” said Tom Clark, a political science professor at Emory University. “But it could also be an artifact of the statistical model trying to sort out what happens to the space when you add a new person. At this point, we don’t know which one it is.”
The model also retroactively updates justices’ scores for past years at the end of each term. The changes can be substantial with new justices, since the model has little data about their positions when they first join the court. Case in point: In last year’s Martin-Quinn data, Kennedy was deemed to be the most likely median justice in 2017 and Kavanaugh took the role in 2018, not Roberts. But with the addition of 2019 data, Roberts is now estimated to have actually been the likely median in both years. That’s partly because we now have a better understanding of how Kavanaugh tends to rule; it also reflects the a fairly high probability that Roberts was already the median justice in the 2017 term, because Kennedy hardly swung at all in his final year on the court.
[Related: John Roberts Will Probably Be The Supreme Court’s Next Swing Justice]
Meanwhile, it’s also possible that Roberts just appears to be moving to the left because the kinds of cases that make it to the court are shifting. This effect is especially difficult to measure and the Martin-Quinn scores can only account for it in a limited way. But Clark said if the types of cases being brought before the court are changing, that could matter a lot to how liberal or conservative each justice’s rulings really are. Because it could be that the Trump administration and conservative legal advocates, emboldened by the solid slate of conservatives on the court, are simply pushing Roberts to move to the right faster than he’s willing to go.
Take one high-profile case from this term, where the justices considered a Louisiana abortion restriction that was functionally identical to a Texas law the court had struck down in 2016. In the previous case, Kennedy — who over the course of his career was ideologically unpredictable on a handful of high-salience issues, including the abortion, affirmative action and the death penalty — voted with the liberals against the Texas law. This year, though, Roberts broke the tie, saying that while he still disagreed with the 2016 ruling, he felt he had to adhere to the precedent. That doesn’t mean Roberts’s fundamental stance toward abortion changed, though. Instead, the change in the court’s composition put him in a situation where institutional considerations — like not wanting to overturn a recent precedent on an extremely hot-button issue four months before a presidential election — may have trumped his own ideological preferences.
[Related: The Supreme Court Struck Down A Louisiana Abortion Law. Here’s Where The Fight Could Head Next.]
That’s significant because in the vast majority of cases, Roberts appears to be basically as conservative as he’s ever been. According to The Supreme Court Database, a clearinghouse for data about the court, the share of opinions where he voted in a conservative direction hasn’t actually changed much in the past few years — when Kennedy’s departure and the addition of Trump’s more solidly conservative appointees gave Roberts an increasingly pivotal vote — compared to his opinions between the 2005 and the 2017 terms. (This data is not yet available for the term that just ended.)
Roberts hasn’t really become more liberal Share of Roberts’s votes that were coded as conservative, before and after the 2016 Supreme Court term Pre-Trump Post-Trump Cases Votes Conservative Rulings Votes Conservative Rulings Diff. Close 198 81.8% 38 78.9% -2.9 All 914 58.2 137 55.5 -2.7 “Pre-Trump” includes case data for the 2005-2016 terms, while “post-Trump” covers the 2017 and 2018 terms. The 2016 term is counted as pre-Trump because it started before Trump was elected, but it ended in 2017. “Close cases” are defined as those in which the majority was four or five and the minority was three or four. Source: The Supreme Court Database
In other words, Roberts is still very conservative. (For the record, so was Kennedy.) But several experts told us it’s possible that in Kennedy’s absence, Roberts may be increasingly willing to rule narrowly with the liberals in certain high-stakes cases. Part of his motivation is likely that as chief justice, he feels a responsibility to ensure that the court maintains its reputation as an even-handed institution.
This year was a perfect storm for a chief justice trying to keep the Supreme Court from being dragged into the muck of partisan politics, too. “The country is deeply polarized, we’re heading into a presidential election, there’s a pandemic, an economic crisis, significant social unrest,” said Marin Levy, a professor at Duke Law who studies chief justices. “This is a moment where it’s critical to someone like Roberts that the public maintain its faith in the court.” And in fact, even though this term’s docket was full of hot-button issues, the court’s rulings were largely in step with public opinion, thanks in part to Roberts’s willingness to join the liberals.
[Related: Justice Kennedy Wasn’t A Moderate]
So if Kennedy’s forays to the left were motivated by a couple of issues on which his views were more liberal than the rest of the conservative bloc, like gay rights and sometimes abortion, Roberts’s recent swings appear to be be driven by more strategic — and even political — considerations. “He’s concerned about maintaining his own power and the power of the court,” said Leah Litman, a professor of law at the University of Michigan. It was perhaps a sign of Roberts’s success that some of the biggest conservative victories this term mostly flew under the radar, such as when the conservatives continued to expand the circumstances under which religious schools can qualify for public funding, building on a case from 2017. Litman and others said that Roberts could follow a similar blueprint for eroding something like abortion rights in the future. Rather than overturning precedents outright, he might prefer to whittle away at abortion access by allowing states to pass a patchwork of restrictions, until landmark precedents on abortion eventually become functionally hollow.
Right now, of course, Roberts is still the closest thing we have to a swing justice. But he’s not really a wild card — especially compared to Kennedy, who was genuinely unpredictable on a handful of issues, including abortion. Clark said a better description for Roberts might be the “pivotal” justice, or the person with the power to broker compromises between left and right, allowing him to determine the court’s direction. That moniker is especially apt given that Roberts was so frequently in the majority this term. At SCOTUSBlog, Feldman suggested calling him the “anchor” justice for that reason. The fact that Roberts is chief justice gives him additional power when he votes with the majority, too: He gets to assign the opinion to a specific justice, and that can do a lot to shape the breadth and impact of the final ruling.
[Related: The Supreme Court Put DACA’s Fate In The Hands Of Voters]
One thing does seem clear: Roberts is now by far the most powerful person on the Supreme Court. And he is not willing — at least not yet — to let his fellow conservatives veer sharply to the right. But his occasional votes with the liberals shouldn’t obscure the fact that he’s still a very conservative justice overall. As with Kennedy, the handful of times he swings to the left may come to define his career. And this term he’s certainly proved that Trump — and conservative legal advocates — can’t expect him to rubber-stamp any argument they lay at his feet. But when he does swing, it will likely be political and institutional factors, not a shift in his ideology, that guide his vote. And that means liberals really can’t rely on him to rule their way in the future.
FiveThirtyEight Politics: Conservatives didn’t get the SCOTUS they wanted this term


fivethirtyeight--2020-07-15--COVID-19 Deaths Are Increasing. Americans Disagree With Trump On What To Do About It.

In this week ’ s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast , the crew discusses whether Americans and politicians agree on how to @ @ @ @ @ in coronavirus cases .
They also question what some Democrats took to be the lesson @ @ @ @ @ that the party should focus less on “ identity politics .
”

COVID-19 Deaths Are Increasing. Americans Disagree With Trump On What To Do About It.
In this week’s FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast, the crew discusses whether Americans and politicians agree on how to respond to the recent surge in coronavirus cases. They also question what some Democrats took to be the lesson of the 2016 election — that the party should focus less on “identity politics.”