fivethirtyeight--2020-01-02--Democratic Party Activists May Be Cooling On Warren And Warming To Biden

In my last round of interviews with Democratic activists in early-primary states , Sen. Elizabeth Warren , at long last , seemed to be getting traction .
Forty-eight percent ( 14 of 29 activists I interviewed ) said they were either supporting her or considering supporting her .
However , the most recent results suggest that has changed .
Activists still haven ’ t coalesced around any one candidate , but former Vice President Joe Biden has made gains in this survey .
This is now the seventh installment of my series about the preferences of Democratic activists in Iowa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nevada and Washington , DC .
I ’ ve been interviewing early-state activists on who they are committed to — or considering supporting — in 2020 as part of my upcoming book , which will look at how the Democratic Party has changed since 2016 .
In addition to finding out about their candidate preferences , I ’ ve been asking these activists who they thought other Democrats in their community might be leaning toward and who they don ’ t want to see as the nominee .
Thirty-one activists responded to my @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have declared their support for a candidate , up from 15 of 29 activists in October .
Only one activist I interviewed switched their allegiance from one active candidate to another since the last round .
However , one of the newly committed activists was actually recommitting to a candidate she had backed in a previous round : former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julián Castro .
( She withdrew her support in October when she felt his campaign was going nowhere , but she ’ s now backing him again , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is impressed that he is “ unapologetically progressive.
” ) Meanwhile , Sen. Amy Klobuchar has picked up her first two committed supporters in this round .
One of them was previously undecided , and the other had previously been backing former Rep. Beto O ’ Rourke .
One of Klobuchar ’ s new supporters cited her Midwestern connections and her “ moderate , pragmatic ” style as a reason for supporting her , adding that Klobuchar was also appealing because she was “ plain-spoken and direct [ and a ] good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 31 activists , Sen. Bernie Sanders leads the pack with four activists committed to backing him .
Warren and Sen. Cory Booker have three each , while Biden , Klobuchar and former South Bend , Indiana , Mayor Pete Buttigieg each have two , and Castro and Sen. Michael Bennet each have one .
But this still left 13 activists uncommitted .
So as in previous rounds of this survey , I also asked those who were uncommitted to tell me who they were considering supporting .
Warren still leads by this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with 13 of 31 activists ( 42 percent ) supporting or considering her in this round , but Biden is in a close second place with 12 of 31 ( 39 percent ) considering him .
In October , only nine out of 29 activists ( 31 percent ) were considering him .
Booker , Klobuchar , Buttigieg and Sanders round out the upper tier of candidates being considered , with between seven and nine activists considering each of them .
( In the table below , I combined the number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committed to each candidate to show their total support . )
As in previous rounds of this survey , I also asked activists whom they do not want to see as the nominee .
Spiritual author Marianne Williamson and Hawaii Rep. Tulsi Gabbard continue to top this list , with 24 of 31 activists ( 77 percent ) and 22 of 31 activists ( 71 percent ) opposing them .
But the field ’ s two billionaires , Tom Steyer and Michael Bloomberg , are also very disliked , with 16 of 31 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of them , although Sanders notably still solicits a stronger negative reaction with 19 of 31 activists ( 61 percent ) opposing him .
However , this metric contains a bit of good news for Biden , who is now only opposed by five of 31 activists ( 16 percent ) , down from 24 percent ( seven of 29 activists ) in October and 31 percent ( nine of 29 activists ) in August .
This doesn ’ t mean that Biden has pacified all his detractors , but it is telling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his support has slowly ticked upward ; party insiders may well be warming to him .
Another area in which Biden may be building support is in respondents ’ answers to my question about which candidate activists think other Democrats who are active in their communities are leaning toward , regardless of the activists ’ own preferences .
In October , 14 of 29 activists ( 48 percent ) said that their communities were leaning toward Warren .
But her numbers have dropped pretty significantly , with only six of 31 ( 19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s numbers , on the other hand , have increased from three of 29 ( 10 percent ) two months ago to eight of 31 ( 26 percent ) .
Buttigieg is showing strength here as well , with six of 31 ( 19 percent ) saying they think their communities lean toward him ; only one activist has said this in any of the previous rounds .
However , seven of 31 ( 23 percent ) maintain that people in their communities haven ’ t made up their minds .
Two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s rise was roughly in line with her rise in the polls and activist support was largely following public opinion .
That lesson holds for this round as well , as Warren ’ s decline in public opinion polls is reflected in this survey , where many activists are less bullish on her .
And although Biden did make gains , suggesting that many early-state activists may be making peace with the candidate who has been the persistent , if not runaway , poll leader for much of 2019 , there is still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these activists at this stage .
Once again , the main takeaway here is that it would appear that party insiders are still uncomfortable with getting too far ahead of voters .
With just over a month to go before the first nominating contest in Iowa , it ’ s unclear how much this will change before the caucuses .

In my last round of interviews with Democratic activists in early-primary states, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, at long last, seemed to be getting traction. Forty-eight percent (14 of 29 activists I interviewed) said they were either supporting her or considering supporting her. However, the most recent results suggest that has changed. Activists still haven’t coalesced around any one candidate, but former Vice President Joe Biden has made gains in this survey.
This is now the seventh installment of my series about the preferences of Democratic activists in Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Nevada and Washington, DC. I’ve been interviewing early-state activists on who they are committed to — or considering supporting — in 2020 as part of my upcoming book, which will look at how the Democratic Party has changed since 2016. In addition to finding out about their candidate preferences, I’ve been asking these activists who they thought other Democrats in their community might be leaning toward and who they don’t want to see as the nominee.
Thirty-one activists responded to my latest survey, and 18 of them have declared their support for a candidate, up from 15 of 29 activists in October. Only one activist I interviewed switched their allegiance from one active candidate to another since the last round. However, one of the newly committed activists was actually recommitting to a candidate she had backed in a previous round: former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julián Castro. (She withdrew her support in October when she felt his campaign was going nowhere, but she’s now backing him again, as she feels he has a strong platform and is impressed that he is “unapologetically progressive.”)
Meanwhile, Sen. Amy Klobuchar has picked up her first two committed supporters in this round. One of them was previously undecided, and the other had previously been backing former Rep. Beto O’Rourke. One of Klobuchar’s new supporters cited her Midwestern connections and her “moderate, pragmatic” style as a reason for supporting her, adding that Klobuchar was also appealing because she was “plain-spoken and direct [and a] good communicator.”
Overall, in this group of 31 activists, Sen. Bernie Sanders leads the pack with four activists committed to backing him. Warren and Sen. Cory Booker have three each, while Biden, Klobuchar and former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg each have two, and Castro and Sen. Michael Bennet each have one.
But this still left 13 activists uncommitted. So as in previous rounds of this survey, I also asked those who were uncommitted to tell me who they were considering supporting. Warren still leads by this metric, as she did in October, with 13 of 31 activists (42 percent) supporting or considering her in this round, but Biden is in a close second place with 12 of 31 (39 percent) considering him. In October, only nine out of 29 activists (31 percent) were considering him. Booker, Klobuchar, Buttigieg and Sanders round out the upper tier of candidates being considered, with between seven and nine activists considering each of them. (In the table below, I combined the number of respondents considering each candidate with the number committed to each candidate to show their total support.)
Warren is still on the top, but Biden is gaining ground Share of respondents who said they were considering a candidate or had already committed to support a candidate in the 2020 Democratic presidential primary Activists considering or committed to candidate in … candidate Dec. ’18 feb. ’19 april june aug. oct. dec. Warren 24% 40% 35% 48% 34% 48% 42% – Biden 39 34 21 48 34 31 39 – Booker 45 49 47 59 31 38 29 – Buttigieg — 17 29 45 38 31 26 – Klobuchar 34 37 26 28 17 28 26 – Sanders 29 29 24 24 21 24 23 – Castro — 17 15 28 21 14 16 – Steyer — — — — 7 14 13 – Harris 61 54 53 52 38 38 10 – Bennet — — 12 14 10 14 10 – Yang — — 9 7 7 3 10 – Bloomberg — — — — — — 6 – Gabbard — 9 9 7 3 3 3 – Delaney 16 17 3 3 3 3 3 – Williamson — — — 3 3 3 3 – Patrick — — — — — — 3 – The December 2019 results are based on interviews with 31 Democratic activists who were asked about the 16 candidates listed above. The number of activists who responded in previous rounds of interviews is varied. Source: SETH MASKET, “LEARNING FROM LOSS: THE DEMOCRATS, 2016-2020”
As in previous rounds of this survey, I also asked activists whom they do not want to see as the nominee. Spiritual author Marianne Williamson and Hawaii Rep. Tulsi Gabbard continue to top this list, with 24 of 31 activists (77 percent) and 22 of 31 activists (71 percent) opposing them. But the field’s two billionaires, Tom Steyer and Michael Bloomberg, are also very disliked, with 16 of 31 activists (52 percent) opposing both of them, although Sanders notably still solicits a stronger negative reaction with 19 of 31 activists (61 percent) opposing him. However, this metric contains a bit of good news for Biden, who is now only opposed by five of 31 activists (16 percent), down from 24 percent (seven of 29 activists) in October and 31 percent (nine of 29 activists) in August. This doesn’t mean that Biden has pacified all his detractors, but it is telling that his opposition number has decreased while his support has slowly ticked upward; party insiders may well be warming to him.
Another area in which Biden may be building support is in respondents’ answers to my question about which candidate activists think other Democrats who are active in their communities are leaning toward, regardless of the activists’ own preferences. In October, 14 of 29 activists (48 percent) said that their communities were leaning toward Warren. But her numbers have dropped pretty significantly, with only six of 31 (19 percent) saying so now. Biden’s numbers, on the other hand, have increased from three of 29 (10 percent) two months ago to eight of 31 (26 percent). Buttigieg is showing strength here as well, with six of 31 (19 percent) saying they think their communities lean toward him; only one activist has said this in any of the previous rounds. However, seven of 31 (23 percent) maintain that people in their communities haven’t made up their minds.
Two months ago I noted that Warren’s rise was roughly in line with her rise in the polls and activist support was largely following public opinion. That lesson holds for this round as well, as Warren’s decline in public opinion polls is reflected in this survey, where many activists are less bullish on her. And although Biden did make gains, suggesting that many early-state activists may be making peace with the candidate who has been the persistent, if not runaway, poll leader for much of 2019, there is still little evidence of a consensus candidate among these activists at this stage. Once again, the main takeaway here is that it would appear that party insiders are still uncomfortable with getting too far ahead of voters. With just over a month to go before the first nominating contest in Iowa, it’s unclear how much this will change before the caucuses.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-08--How Might Iran Change The 2020 Race?

How Might Iran Change The 2020 Race?

Welcome to FiveThirtyEight ’ s weekly politics chat .
The transcript below has been lightly edited .
sarahf ( Sarah Frostenson , politics editor ) : Last week , U.S. officials announced that President Trump had authorized a drone strike that killed one of Iran ’ s most powerful military leaders , Qassem Soleimani .
The move took many by surprise , including some within Trump ’ s own administration , and now the U.S. is bracing for retaliation from Iran and an escalation of conflict in the region .
More than 3,000 U.S. soldiers have already been deployed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ than a dozen ballistic missiles targeting two U.S. military bases in Iraq .
Let ’ s first unpack what we understand Trump ’ s Iran strategy to be and the risks and challenges there .
( How does it play with Republicans ?
His base ?
Can we expect this to be a unifying moment where Americans “ rally around the flag ” and his approval rating goes up ? )
Then , let ’ s turn to how this conflict could potentially change the dynamics of the Democratic primary .
OK , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do we know at this point ?
perry ( Perry Bacon Jr. , senior writer ) : In terms of Trump ’ s Iran POLICY strategy , I ’ m not sure how much we know .
We know his administration feels like it needs to get tough with Iran .
And we know that any action by the Iranians in retaliation is likely to get a very aggressive response from the United States .
( See Trump ’ s remark about identifying 52 sites in Iran to attack , including some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy seems to imply that anyone who disagrees with killing Soleimani doesn ’ t care about defending U.S. troops and interests , which is not unlike how the Bush administration defended their policies in the Middle East in the early 2000s .
clare.malone ( Clare Malone , senior political writer ) : Trump ’ s Iran strategy is also one that is largely tinged by domestic politics .
What I mean by that is that Trump made a really drastic decision when he decided to green-light Soleimani ’ s assassination , something Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do for years .
And if you go to the reasoning of “ why ?
” I think you come out with the educated guess that Trump wanted to look decisive in the face of a real threat from an enemy .
But the decision was a pretty extreme one that doesn ’ t necessarily have the interests of the stability of the region at its heart .
It might have the interests of regime change at heart , but that is , of course , a controversial point of action , one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former National Security Advisor John Bolton ) have tended to favor .
sarahf : And at this point , how have Republicans responded ?
Republicans in Congress largely seem to support Trump ’ s decision , right ?
clare.malone : Well , even some Never Trumpers like it !
It ’ s the return of the neo-conservative ( early aughts , much ? )
nrakich ( Nathaniel Rakich , elections analyst ) : According to a HuffPost/YouGov poll conducted immediately after the attack , 84 percent of Republicans approved of the airstrike .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ would probably agree with anything Trump does — and on foreign policy especially , the political science literature argues that people form their opinions based on elite cues ( specifically , the elites they already are inclined or disinclined to like ) .
clare.malone : But I think one thing that will probably bother Democrats and Republicans alike is the outpouring of nationalism and grief for Soleimani this week in Iran .
That ’ s perhaps something the Trump administration didn ’ t anticipate .
sarahf : It is interesting , too , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iraq War , even going as far as to attack George W. Bush during the 2016 campaign , and how he promised to prevent the U.S. from getting further entangled in conflicts abroad .
And when you look at some of the Republicans who make up his base , there is evidence that these voters are a bit less hawkish or more isolationist than other Republicans .
A Pew Research Center poll conducted during the 2016 Republican primary found , for instance , that Trump supporters were more likely than other GOP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does too much to solve world problems.
” So that does make me wonder how this recent military action reconciles with his base .
Do we have a sense yet of just how supportive the broader American public would be of a war with Iran ?
clare.malone : I think this is the most interesting question at hand .
I ’ m not sure that the “ rally around the flag ” effect that we ’ ve seen with actions like , say , invading Iraq in 2003 , will hold in our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yeah , Sarah , there is a tension there .
Some political science research has also found that the American public knows more about foreign policy , and holds more consistent ( if broad ) views on it , than it typically gets credit for .
But I personally tend toward the hypothesis that voters will change their views on foreign policy to match the politicians they support on domestic issues .
clare.malone : You ’ re already seeing the partisan dividing lines ; all the Democratic presidential candidates condemning the attacks ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former U.S .
Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley : sarahf : This chart is from a story that our colleague Dhrumil Mehta wrote in September , but what stood out to me was that Americans seem more willing to support military action in Iran than anywhere else .
This is especially true if Iran ’ s nuclear capabilities are perceived as a threat .
According to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey conducted in June , 70 percent of respondents , including 82 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops to Iran to stop them from obtaining nuclear weapons .
nrakich : Yeah , Sarah , a lot of the polling we have on Iran is based on the premise of stopping Iran ’ s nuclear program , which wasn ’ t the reasoning behind the Soleimani attack .
So we need more polling to really understand where Americans stand , as polling on Iran is somewhat difficult to interpret .
For example , in July , Gallup found that only 18 percent of Americans wanted to take military action against Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But 42 percent of that latter group said that the U.S. should take military action if diplomatic efforts fail .
perry : “ War with Iran ” tends to imply the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. troops and a declaration of war from Congress .
And if that is actually proposed , I think it will be fairly unpopular — regardless of whatever the polls say right now .
The Trump administration is even saying this attack will not lead to a full-blown war ( they may be wrong , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perceive as the political realities ) .
We know Americans don ’ t want another protracted conflict in the Middle East .
Unless there is an attack on American soil by Iran — then the dynamics are different .
clare.malone : Yeah , I ’ m with Perry .
The last two decades of American political life have been dominated by foreign intervention .
Of course , the Quds force that Soleimani ran specializes in supporting more agile attacks on countries , aka terrorist attacks .
And if a terrorist attack were to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that could really shake up an election .
You ’ ve only got to look back at the 2016 primary to see an example of that .
After the San Bernardino attack , Trump called for his “ Muslim ban , ” and I think more people may have found that palatable in part because there had just been an ISIS-inspired massacre in California .
People are more likely to want punitive action when they are frightened and angry .
nrakich : I will be interested to see , though , if people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — especially those who oppose Trump ) start off skeptical of the administration ’ s intel on Iran and its decision to attack .
It would make for quite a contrast with the Bush administration ’ s line about weapons of mass destruction , which the public initially accepted as a good reason to go to war in Iraq .
This time around , though , Democrats don ’ t appear to be giving the Trump administration the benefit of the doubt on its assertion that attacks from Iran were “ imminent.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s calculus for handling the situation with Iran is that there has to be a perceived threat to the U.S .
Otherwise , he risks entangling the U.S. in another drawn-out conflict in the Middle East , which , as Perry said , probably doesn ’ t have that much built-in support .
Does that seem accurate ?
And if there is indeed evidence of a real threat , does that do well for him politically ?
clare.malone : Sure , fear is the great motivator .
But I also think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they ’ re coming up with retroactive reasoning for an attack , that won ’ t pass the smell test with voters .
The interesting thing with Trump is that he hasn ’ t faced a whole lot of external crisis situations ; often he is the maker of his own crisis .
perry : Trump can do a lot in Iran — as long as it ’ s not a “ war ” with the deployment of lots of U.S. troops .
sarahf : And considering Trump is not highly rated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international crisis to begin with , the situation in Iran could have a large upside for him , if it ’ s handled well .
perry : I don ’ t think there is an upside here for him .
I tend to think that Fox News ’ s Tucker Carlson ( who has been critical of the attack on Soleimani ) is right .
In my view , Trump won GOP voters in the primary and swing voters in the general who were wary of Bush-style Republicanism , which , of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trump is better off talking about the economy .
Although , perhaps there is less downside for him focusing on Iran , as opposed to issues like repealing Obamacare or tweeting mean things about members of Congress .
sarahf : That ’ s interesting , Perry .
It just seems like a step so extreme that one would think Trump has a greater Iran strategy at play .
Although , there has been speculation that this might be a diversion to everything happening with impeachment .
Which , whoa , if true @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation with Iran does continue to dominate headlines — how does this shake up the 2020 primary ?
As we ’ ve noted , Democratic candidates have been universally critical of Trump ’ s decision , so far .
Does that change ?
Or what kind of positioning do we expect to see from the candidates ?
Does anyone aside from Biden , given his experience as Obama ’ s VP , stand to benefit ?
clare.malone : I mean , I think Pete Buttigieg is trying to use this new dynamic as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service .
But I ’ m not sure that ’ s going to track with voters , who still know he ’ s relatively inexperienced , compared to the rest of the top of the field .
Bernie Sanders is certainly seeing his opening to point out that Biden was a proponent of the Iraq invasion in the early 2000s : perry : So on the Democratic side , this is interesting .
Many of the debates and the broader discussion of the primary are framed around , “ Do you prioritize bold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And that framing helps Biden .
I ’ m not sure what the Medicare for All equivalent ( bold policy that can be painted as electorally risky ) is for Iran .
The issue just doesn ’ t have the same dynamics .
So this could be an issue where the non-Biden candidates can make arguments without being trapped in a dilemma over how their stances poll .
Sanders has really leaned into this issue by connecting it to his broader opposition to the Iraq War , as well as his view that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervene abroad .
Biden , by contrast , has struggled to reconcile his vote in support of the Iraq War .
A voter in Iowa asked him about it on Saturday — and he said he opposed the war from the beginning , which is not accurate .
perry : So because the foreign policy lines are less clear , I think it ’ s an opportunity for the non-Biden candidates to challenge him in a fresh way .
And it ’ s harder to imagine that Biden ’ s Iraq vote won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s debate .
clare.malone : I think that there is definitely potential upside for Sanders : He can point out that he ’ s principled and anti-war , which the progressive base will like , but he has also pointed out that his policy stance of getting out of the Middle East is exactly what Trump promised .
So , in some ways , he ’ s trying to showcase what he thinks is his general election advantage : a different kind of ( populist or outsider ) appeal to Trump voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how big of a role Biden ’ s Iraq vote will play .
I feel like other candidates are seizing on it out of necessity — since otherwise , foreign policy is an issue where voters give Biden a big advantage : perry : Whatever the electoral effects , I also basically agree with what Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez said yesterday .
This conversation around Iran solidifies the idea that she ( and Sanders ) would be in a different party than Biden if we had a multi-party system .
Biden and Sanders have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the latter perhaps being the most serious anti-war presidential candidate in decades .
clare.malone : Yeah , and the fact that it ’ s not entirely crazy that a major party candidate could have an anti-war stance says a lot about how conflicts in the Middle East have shaped the American psyche over the past couple of decades .
sarahf : Is this what the conversation will center on among Democrats next Tuesday during the debate , Perry ?
If the conversation has less to do with Trump ’ s actions and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in comparison to Biden , I wonder how that plays with voters .
perry : Voters don ’ t really know much about policy , and generally , the differences between candidates in the same party are hard for them to understand .
That said , someone will be declared to have “ won ” the debate on Tuesday — and that kind of coverage can matter .
The press is already covering Sanders like he ’ s surging .
So a debate in which Iraq comes up a fair amount is one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advantage .
And it may be a disadvantage for Biden — especially if he gets flustered and is unable to just concede that he voted for the Iraq War .
But if the moderators and/or Biden turn the Iran questions into basically , “ Do you trust Trump on foreign policy ?
” then yes , that ’ s less useful for other candidates .
At this point , it seems as if Americans ’ feelings around heightened escalation with Iran are a bit of a black box .
They ’ re unsure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And their opinions on whether to intervene in Iran are largely tied to whether they perceive Iran as a nuclear threat , although that may change if Iran continues to be hostile to the U.S .
So what will you be looking for as an indication that the situation with Iran has escalated to the point that it could have a real effect in 2020 ?
clare.malone : I think a lot of public opinion depends on how Iran chooses to respond to the assassination .
There are many potential unknowns for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but definitely a few ways that would anger the American public enough to shuffle some dynamics in the presidential campaign .
nrakich : I think whether this stays in the news for a while or whether other stories ( e.g.
, impeachment ) overtake it will be something to watch — as will be whether the Democratic candidates continue to draw a sharp contrast with Trump on the issue .
According to political science research , those are two of the rare circumstances when foreign policy actually matters in elections .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for any changes in Trump ’ s approval rating , too .

Welcome to FiveThirtyEight’s weekly politics chat. The transcript below has been lightly edited.
sarahf (Sarah Frostenson, politics editor): Last week, U.S. officials announced that President Trump had authorized a drone strike that killed one of Iran’s most powerful military leaders, Qassem Soleimani. The move took many by surprise, including some within Trump’s own administration, and now the U.S. is bracing for retaliation from Iran and an escalation of conflict in the region. More than 3,000 U.S. soldiers have already been deployed. And early Wednesday, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles targeting two U.S. military bases in Iraq.
Let’s first unpack what we understand Trump’s Iran strategy to be and the risks and challenges there. (How does it play with Republicans? His base? Can we expect this to be a unifying moment where Americans “rally around the flag” and his approval rating goes up?) Then, let’s turn to how this conflict could potentially change the dynamics of the Democratic primary.
OK, Trump’s Iran strategy. What do we know at this point?
perry (Perry Bacon Jr., senior writer): In terms of Trump’s Iran POLICY strategy, I’m not sure how much we know. We know his administration feels like it needs to get tough with Iran. And we know that any action by the Iranians in retaliation is likely to get a very aggressive response from the United States. (See Trump’s remark about identifying 52 sites in Iran to attack, including some of cultural significance.)
So his political strategy seems to imply that anyone who disagrees with killing Soleimani doesn’t care about defending U.S. troops and interests, which is not unlike how the Bush administration defended their policies in the Middle East in the early 2000s.
clare.malone (Clare Malone, senior political writer): Trump’s Iran strategy is also one that is largely tinged by domestic politics. What I mean by that is that Trump made a really drastic decision when he decided to green-light Soleimani’s assassination, something Democratic and Republican presidents had chosen not to do for years. And if you go to the reasoning of “why?” I think you come out with the educated guess that Trump wanted to look decisive in the face of a real threat from an enemy. But the decision was a pretty extreme one that doesn’t necessarily have the interests of the stability of the region at its heart. It might have the interests of regime change at heart, but that is, of course, a controversial point of action, one that more hawkish Republicans (a la former National Security Advisor John Bolton) have tended to favor.
sarahf: And at this point, how have Republicans responded? Republicans in Congress largely seem to support Trump’s decision, right?
clare.malone: Well, even some Never Trumpers like it! It’s the return of the neo-conservative (early aughts, much?)
nrakich (Nathaniel Rakich, elections analyst): According to a HuffPost/YouGov poll conducted immediately after the attack, 84 percent of Republicans approved of the airstrike. Of course, 84 percent of Republicans would probably agree with anything Trump does — and on foreign policy especially, the political science literature argues that people form their opinions based on elite cues (specifically, the elites they already are inclined or disinclined to like).
clare.malone: But I think one thing that will probably bother Democrats and Republicans alike is the outpouring of nationalism and grief for Soleimani this week in Iran. That’s perhaps something the Trump administration didn’t anticipate.
sarahf: It is interesting, too, when you consider how much Trump criticized the Iraq War, even going as far as to attack George W. Bush during the 2016 campaign, and how he promised to prevent the U.S. from getting further entangled in conflicts abroad. And when you look at some of the Republicans who make up his base, there is evidence that these voters are a bit less hawkish or more isolationist than other Republicans. A Pew Research Center poll conducted during the 2016 Republican primary found, for instance, that Trump supporters were more likely than other GOP voters to say that “the U.S. does too much to solve world problems.” So that does make me wonder how this recent military action reconciles with his base. Do we have a sense yet of just how supportive the broader American public would be of a war with Iran?
clare.malone: I think this is the most interesting question at hand. I’m not sure that the “rally around the flag” effect that we’ve seen with actions like, say, invading Iraq in 2003, will hold in our age of extreme partisanship.
nrakich: Yeah, Sarah, there is a tension there. Some political science research has also found that the American public knows more about foreign policy, and holds more consistent (if broad) views on it, than it typically gets credit for. But I personally tend toward the hypothesis that voters will change their views on foreign policy to match the politicians they support on domestic issues.
clare.malone: You’re already seeing the partisan dividing lines; all the Democratic presidential candidates condemning the attacks; Republicans calling Democrats unpatriotic, a la former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley:
“The only ones mourning the loss of Soleimani are our Democrat leadership and Democrat Presidential candidates.” pic.twitter.com/IZJJqpxkBE — Nikki Haley (@NikkiHaley) January 7, 2020
sarahf: This chart is from a story that our colleague Dhrumil Mehta wrote in September, but what stood out to me was that Americans seem more willing to support military action in Iran than anywhere else.
This is especially true if Iran’s nuclear capabilities are perceived as a threat. According to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey conducted in June, 70 percent of respondents, including 82 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of Democrats, said they support sending U.S. troops to Iran to stop them from obtaining nuclear weapons.
nrakich: Yeah, Sarah, a lot of the polling we have on Iran is based on the premise of stopping Iran’s nuclear program, which wasn’t the reasoning behind the Soleimani attack. So we need more polling to really understand where Americans stand, as polling on Iran is somewhat difficult to interpret.
For example, in July, Gallup found that only 18 percent of Americans wanted to take military action against Iran, and 78 percent preferred diplomatic efforts. But 42 percent of that latter group said that the U.S. should take military action if diplomatic efforts fail.
perry: “War with Iran” tends to imply the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. troops and a declaration of war from Congress. And if that is actually proposed, I think it will be fairly unpopular — regardless of whatever the polls say right now. The Trump administration is even saying this attack will not lead to a full-blown war (they may be wrong, but it still speaks to what they perceive as the political realities).
We know Americans don’t want another protracted conflict in the Middle East. Unless there is an attack on American soil by Iran — then the dynamics are different.
clare.malone: Yeah, I’m with Perry. The last two decades of American political life have been dominated by foreign intervention. Of course, the Quds force that Soleimani ran specializes in supporting more agile attacks on countries, aka terrorist attacks. And if a terrorist attack were to happen, especially on American soil, that could really shake up an election.
You’ve only got to look back at the 2016 primary to see an example of that. After the San Bernardino attack, Trump called for his “Muslim ban,” and I think more people may have found that palatable in part because there had just been an ISIS-inspired massacre in California. People are more likely to want punitive action when they are frightened and angry.
nrakich: I will be interested to see, though, if people (voters, the media, politicians — especially those who oppose Trump) start off skeptical of the administration’s intel on Iran and its decision to attack. It would make for quite a contrast with the Bush administration’s line about weapons of mass destruction, which the public initially accepted as a good reason to go to war in Iraq. This time around, though, Democrats don’t appear to be giving the Trump administration the benefit of the doubt on its assertion that attacks from Iran were “imminent.”
sarahf: So it sounds as if Trump’s calculus for handling the situation with Iran is that there has to be a perceived threat to the U.S. Otherwise, he risks entangling the U.S. in another drawn-out conflict in the Middle East, which, as Perry said, probably doesn’t have that much built-in support. Does that seem accurate? And if there is indeed evidence of a real threat, does that do well for him politically?
clare.malone: Sure, fear is the great motivator. But I also think that if it’s too obvious that they’re coming up with retroactive reasoning for an attack, that won’t pass the smell test with voters.
The interesting thing with Trump is that he hasn’t faced a whole lot of external crisis situations; often he is the maker of his own crisis.
perry: Trump can do a lot in Iran — as long as it’s not a “war” with the deployment of lots of U.S. troops.
sarahf: And considering Trump is not highly rated on his ability to respond in an international crisis to begin with, the situation in Iran could have a large upside for him, if it’s handled well.
perry: I don’t think there is an upside here for him. I tend to think that Fox News’s Tucker Carlson (who has been critical of the attack on Soleimani) is right. In my view, Trump won GOP voters in the primary and swing voters in the general who were wary of Bush-style Republicanism, which, of course, is tied to the Iraq War. Trump is better off talking about the economy.
Although, perhaps there is less downside for him focusing on Iran, as opposed to issues like repealing Obamacare or tweeting mean things about members of Congress.
sarahf: That’s interesting, Perry. It just seems like a step so extreme that one would think Trump has a greater Iran strategy at play. Although, there has been speculation that this might be a diversion to everything happening with impeachment. Which, whoa, if true. But let’s say this situation with Iran does continue to dominate headlines — how does this shake up the 2020 primary? As we’ve noted, Democratic candidates have been universally critical of Trump’s decision, so far. Does that change? Or what kind of positioning do we expect to see from the candidates? Does anyone aside from Biden, given his experience as Obama’s VP, stand to benefit?
clare.malone: I mean, I think Pete Buttigieg is trying to use this new dynamic as a way to play up his military service. But I’m not sure that’s going to track with voters, who still know he’s relatively inexperienced, compared to the rest of the top of the field. Bernie Sanders is certainly seeing his opening to point out that Biden was a proponent of the Iraq invasion in the early 2000s:
Presidential candidate @BernieSanders hammers Joe Biden for his Iraq War, NAFTA votes. “I just don’t think that that kind of record is going to bring forth the kind energy we need to defeat Trump.” pic.twitter.com/3JIIVCNE48 — Anderson Cooper 360° (@AC360) January 7, 2020
perry: So on the Democratic side, this is interesting. Many of the debates and the broader discussion of the primary are framed around, “Do you prioritize bold change or winning the election?” And that framing helps Biden. I’m not sure what the Medicare for All equivalent (bold policy that can be painted as electorally risky) is for Iran. The issue just doesn’t have the same dynamics. So this could be an issue where the non-Biden candidates can make arguments without being trapped in a dilemma over how their stances poll.
Sanders has really leaned into this issue by connecting it to his broader opposition to the Iraq War, as well as his view that the U.S. should be less eager to intervene abroad. Biden, by contrast, has struggled to reconcile his vote in support of the Iraq War. A voter in Iowa asked him about it on Saturday — and he said he opposed the war from the beginning, which is not accurate.
clare.malone: Yeah, that was a weird moment.
perry: So because the foreign policy lines are less clear, I think it’s an opportunity for the non-Biden candidates to challenge him in a fresh way. And it’s harder to imagine that Biden’s Iraq vote won’t come up in next week’s debate.
clare.malone: I think that there is definitely potential upside for Sanders: He can point out that he’s principled and anti-war, which the progressive base will like, but he has also pointed out that his policy stance of getting out of the Middle East is exactly what Trump promised. So, in some ways, he’s trying to showcase what he thinks is his general election advantage: a different kind of (populist or outsider) appeal to Trump voters.
nrakich: Yeah, I wonder how big of a role Biden’s Iraq vote will play. I feel like other candidates are seizing on it out of necessity — since otherwise, foreign policy is an issue where voters give Biden a big advantage:
Biden has maintained a large lead in primary polling on the best candidate to handle foreign policy (48% to 14% Bernie):https://t.co/o9lGd8jiGe
It has not been the most important issue for many Dem voters thus far, but foreign policy crisis could increase its salience pic.twitter.com/ez90wUwil8 — Matt Grossmann (@MattGrossmann) January 3, 2020
perry: Whatever the electoral effects, I also basically agree with what Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez said yesterday. This conversation around Iran solidifies the idea that she (and Sanders) would be in a different party than Biden if we had a multi-party system. Biden and Sanders have really different perspectives on foreign policy — with the latter perhaps being the most serious anti-war presidential candidate in decades.
clare.malone: Yeah, and the fact that it’s not entirely crazy that a major party candidate could have an anti-war stance says a lot about how conflicts in the Middle East have shaped the American psyche over the past couple of decades.
sarahf: Is this what the conversation will center on among Democrats next Tuesday during the debate, Perry? If the conversation has less to do with Trump’s actions and more about Sanders’s anti-war stance in comparison to Biden, I wonder how that plays with voters.
perry: Voters don’t really know much about policy, and generally, the differences between candidates in the same party are hard for them to understand. That said, someone will be declared to have “won” the debate on Tuesday — and that kind of coverage can matter. The press is already covering Sanders like he’s surging. So a debate in which Iraq comes up a fair amount is one that may play to Sanders’s advantage. And it may be a disadvantage for Biden — especially if he gets flustered and is unable to just concede that he voted for the Iraq War.
But if the moderators and/or Biden turn the Iran questions into basically, “Do you trust Trump on foreign policy?” then yes, that’s less useful for other candidates.
sarahf: 🔥
At this point, it seems as if Americans’ feelings around heightened escalation with Iran are a bit of a black box. They’re unsure whether they approve of the drone strike. And their opinions on whether to intervene in Iran are largely tied to whether they perceive Iran as a nuclear threat, although that may change if Iran continues to be hostile to the U.S. So what will you be looking for as an indication that the situation with Iran has escalated to the point that it could have a real effect in 2020?
clare.malone: I think a lot of public opinion depends on how Iran chooses to respond to the assassination. There are many potential unknowns for how they’ll continue to retaliate, but definitely a few ways that would anger the American public enough to shuffle some dynamics in the presidential campaign.
nrakich: I think whether this stays in the news for a while or whether other stories (e.g., impeachment) overtake it will be something to watch — as will be whether the Democratic candidates continue to draw a sharp contrast with Trump on the issue. According to political science research, those are two of the rare circumstances when foreign policy actually matters in elections. And obviously, I’ll be watching for any changes in Trump’s approval rating, too.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-08--Foreign Policy Doesn’t Usually Affect Elections. Could Iran Be Different?

The American-ordered drone strike that killed one of Iran ’ s most powerful military leaders , Qassem Soleimani , has triggered retaliation from Iran and put American troops in the Middle East on heightened alert .
It has also brought foreign policy to the top of the news cycle .
How events unfold from here is uncertain , but we leave that analysis to others with more expertise in world affairs .
Instead , we ’ d like to take a step back and use political science and polling data to explore the question of how heightened tensions with Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elections .
First , most political science research has found that foreign policy doesn ’ t significantly affect people ’ s votes .
But this isn ’ t always the case .
For example , foreign policy can have more of an impact when it ’ s a big part of the national conversation and when the two parties have clearly contrasting positions on it — two conditions that this Iran episode could meet .
We don ’ t actually know that much about the role international affairs play in primaries , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a primary candidate to be experienced in foreign policy .
But this year , we have such a candidate in former Vice President Joe Biden .
And two recent polls say that Democratic primary voters do trust him the most on foreign policy .
According to CNN , nearly half ( 48 percent ) of Democrats and Democratic leaners said they thought Biden could best handle foreign policy ; Sen. Bernie Sanders came in second place with just 14 percent .
And in a poll taken immediately after the strike that killed Soleimani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats and Democratic leaners trust Biden on Iran , although Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren weren ’ t too far behind , with 47 percent trusting each of them ( respondents were allowed to select multiple candidates they trusted ) .
But even if the initial setup of the chessboard privileges Biden , how the candidates move on the issue could also be determinative .
Someone like Sanders , who has been critical of Biden ’ s vote to go to war with Iraq , could seize the upper hand if the primary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most anti-war .
Voters will likely be listening closely to what the candidates say about Iran in next week ’ s debate , and that could be a make-or-break moment for many of the candidates , as one theory of how foreign policy can affect primaries is that it serves as a litmus test that all serious candidates must pass .
Take the 2016 Republican primaries , when Ben Carson may have flunked such a test when , after the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 , he struggled to articulate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his own advisers said publicly how unprepared he was on the issue .
And although it ’ s impossible to know exactly how much this hurt Carson in voters ’ eyes , he had been running even with now-President Trump in the polls at the time of the attacks , but he sharply declined thereafter and ceased to be a serious threat for the nomination .
Extreme examples aside , though , Iran ’ s effect on the primary might be fleeting .
News cycles move on , and past events touted as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ permanently change the state of the race .
So remember any polling bump that Biden ( or anyone else ) gets this week could wear off quickly , especially if the conflict defuses .
For Iran to have any real effect on the general election , it would likely have to stay in the news for the next several months .
And even then , it ’ s not that clear what that effect might be .
In theory , you might expect Republicans to have the advantage in an election focused around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been seen as better than Democrats at protecting the country from external threats , according to Gallup polling .
However , the gap has narrowed during the Trump era ( as of 2019 , 50 percent trusted Republicans , and 44 percent trusted Democrats ) , and other polls suggest Trump himself is not very well trusted on foreign policy .
It ’ s possible that Trump could become more popular in the wake of this month ’ s attacks thanks to something called the “ rally-around-the-flag effect , ” or the idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country around the commander-in-chief .
But it ’ s not an ironclad rule ; context plays a major role in whether a rally-around-the-flag polling bump develops at all .
Generally speaking , political scientists attribute rally-around-the-flag effects to two things : patriotism and the fact that a president ’ s opposition typically stops criticizing him during times of war .
This episode with Iran , however , meets at best one of these two criteria : While the situation might tug at the country ’ s patriotic heartstrings , lack of dissent for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Democrats running for president and in Congress have already expressed alarm at the strike against Soleimani and questioned Trump ’ s decision-making process .
In addition , factors like the seriousness of the event , whether the country is already fatigued by war , the president ’ s approval rating before the event , and the level of media coverage of the event can all influence the size of the rally-around-the-flag effect , or even whether there is one at all .
Studies have shown , for instance , that small deployments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of full-scale war — barely produce any effect .
All of these factors probably combine to make a rally-around-the-flag effect unlikely in the current circumstances .
And , of course , Trump ’ s approval rating has been remarkably stable for the last few years , despite several major news events , so our prior should probably be that one more won ’ t make a huge difference .
Ultimately , in keeping with our highly polarized times , the most plausible theory is probably that opinion on Iran will break down along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t do much to change the trajectory of the general election .
One of political science ’ s most consistent findings on this issue is that elite cues drive public opinion on foreign policy .
In other words , if the president ’ s critics support a conflict and bend the metaphorical knee to the commander-in-chief , the public takes note and does the same .
But if elite opinion splits along partisan lines — as it is doing so far on Iran — then so will public opinion .

The American-ordered drone strike that killed one of Iran’s most powerful military leaders, Qassem Soleimani, has triggered retaliation from Iran and put American troops in the Middle East on heightened alert. It has also brought foreign policy to the top of the news cycle. How events unfold from here is uncertain, but we leave that analysis to others with more expertise in world affairs. Instead, we’d like to take a step back and use political science and polling data to explore the question of how heightened tensions with Iran could affect the 2020 primary and general elections.
First, most political science research has found that foreign policy doesn’t significantly affect people’s votes. But this isn’t always the case. For example, foreign policy can have more of an impact when it’s a big part of the national conversation and when the two parties have clearly contrasting positions on it — two conditions that this Iran episode could meet.
We don’t actually know that much about the role international affairs play in primaries, though, as it’s rare for a primary candidate to be experienced in foreign policy. But this year, we have such a candidate in former Vice President Joe Biden. And two recent polls say that Democratic primary voters do trust him the most on foreign policy. According to CNN, nearly half (48 percent) of Democrats and Democratic leaners said they thought Biden could best handle foreign policy; Sen. Bernie Sanders came in second place with just 14 percent. And in a poll taken immediately after the strike that killed Soleimani, HuffPost/YouGov found that 62 percent of Democrats and Democratic leaners trust Biden on Iran, although Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren weren’t too far behind, with 47 percent trusting each of them (respondents were allowed to select multiple candidates they trusted).
But even if the initial setup of the chessboard privileges Biden, how the candidates move on the issue could also be determinative. Someone like Sanders, who has been critical of Biden’s vote to go to war with Iraq, could seize the upper hand if the primary becomes a question of who is the most anti-war. Voters will likely be listening closely to what the candidates say about Iran in next week’s debate, and that could be a make-or-break moment for many of the candidates, as one theory of how foreign policy can affect primaries is that it serves as a litmus test that all serious candidates must pass.
Take the 2016 Republican primaries, when Ben Carson may have flunked such a test when, after the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, he struggled to articulate how he would combat terrorism. Even his own advisers said publicly how unprepared he was on the issue. And although it’s impossible to know exactly how much this hurt Carson in voters’ eyes, he had been running even with now-President Trump in the polls at the time of the attacks, but he sharply declined thereafter and ceased to be a serious threat for the nomination.
Extreme examples aside, though, Iran’s effect on the primary might be fleeting. News cycles move on, and past events touted as “game changers” have failed to permanently change the state of the race. So remember any polling bump that Biden (or anyone else) gets this week could wear off quickly, especially if the conflict defuses.
For Iran to have any real effect on the general election, it would likely have to stay in the news for the next several months. And even then, it’s not that clear what that effect might be. In theory, you might expect Republicans to have the advantage in an election focused around national security: The GOP has long been seen as better than Democrats at protecting the country from external threats, according to Gallup polling. However, the gap has narrowed during the Trump era (as of 2019, 50 percent trusted Republicans, and 44 percent trusted Democrats), and other polls suggest Trump himself is not very well trusted on foreign policy.
It’s possible that Trump could become more popular in the wake of this month’s attacks thanks to something called the “rally-around-the-flag effect,” or the idea that major international crises can unite the country around the commander-in-chief. But it’s not an ironclad rule; context plays a major role in whether a rally-around-the-flag polling bump develops at all. Generally speaking, political scientists attribute rally-around-the-flag effects to two things: patriotism and the fact that a president’s opposition typically stops criticizing him during times of war. This episode with Iran, however, meets at best one of these two criteria: While the situation might tug at the country’s patriotic heartstrings, lack of dissent for Trump’s leadership hardly seems guaranteed. Democrats running for president and in Congress have already expressed alarm at the strike against Soleimani and questioned Trump’s decision-making process.
In addition, factors like the seriousness of the event, whether the country is already fatigued by war, the president’s approval rating before the event, and the level of media coverage of the event can all influence the size of the rally-around-the-flag effect, or even whether there is one at all. Studies have shown, for instance, that small deployments of force — basically, anything short of full-scale war — barely produce any effect. All of these factors probably combine to make a rally-around-the-flag effect unlikely in the current circumstances. And, of course, Trump’s approval rating has been remarkably stable for the last few years, despite several major news events, so our prior should probably be that one more won’t make a huge difference.
Ultimately, in keeping with our highly polarized times, the most plausible theory is probably that opinion on Iran will break down along partisan lines — and therefore won’t do much to change the trajectory of the general election. One of political science’s most consistent findings on this issue is that elite cues drive public opinion on foreign policy. In other words, if the president’s critics support a conflict and bend the metaphorical knee to the commander-in-chief, the public takes note and does the same. But if elite opinion splits along partisan lines — as it is doing so far on Iran — then so will public opinion.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-08--What Kind Of Trial Awaits President Trump In The Senate?

It ’ s been three weeks since the House of Representatives voted to impeach President Trump , and yet the outlines of the process that will decide whether he remains in office are still stuck in political limbo .
Republican leaders are calling for a swift , minimalist trial while Democrats demand new witnesses and evidence .
And on Monday , it seemed as if Democrats might actually be able to nab a high-profile witness .
Former national security advisor John Bolton announced that he would finally testify before Congress if subpoenaed by the Senate , introducing the possibility that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could still appear , perhaps shifting the narrative and public opinion on impeachment .
But Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell looks unlikely to cooperate , or at least , unlikely to make a decision on whether to call new witnesses immediately .
On Tuesday , he said he had the votes to open the trial now in spite of Democrats objections , arguing that he ’ s just following the precedents set by the Clinton impeachment trial .
This negotiation and ambiguity might seem bizarre or unfair to observers , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s design .
The Constitution gives virtually no guidance about what an impeachment trial is supposed to look like , and the courts have also said they can ’ t weigh in .
There are Senate procedures on how impeachment trials should run , but they ’ re fairly vague , providing more guidance about how decisions are made than the substance of the trial itself .
So just as Republicans had little control over the impeachment inquiry in the House , Democrats are now faced with a process where a majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the road .
When most people think of a trial , they probably imagine a courtroom with a judge in black robes , a box with rows of jurors , and tables for the defense and prosecution .
The trouble with understanding how an impeachment trial works is that all of these components are present in some form — for example , a few House lawmakers appointed to be impeachment managers will serve as prosecutors , and Trump ’ s legal team will offer a defense .
Those parallels can make an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ criminal or civil counterparts , but the process is different in fundamental ways .
For one thing , as I wrote a few months ago , Trump doesn ’ t have a right to protections like due process because he hasn ’ t been charged with a crime .
Meanwhile , while ordinary legal trials follow a set of detailed procedures , in a 1993 case involving the impeachment of a federal judge , the Supreme Court ruled that the Senate has free rein to make its own rules without courts getting involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which stages will be public or private , and whether or how evidence can be admitted .
( Chief Justice John Roberts will preside over the trial and can rule on questions of evidence and break ties , but his actions can be overridden by a majority of senators . )
Another key aspect of how an impeachment trial is different from other legal proceedings is that senators don ’ t just have to determine whether the facts add up to a specifically defined crime , they also have to determine which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That ’ s because there ’ s no clear definition for what an impeachable offense is under the Constitution , or at least not in the way a criminal statute would define wrongdoing .
And when the senators are deciding whether to convict or acquit the president , it ’ s up to them to decide which standards of evidence they ’ ll apply to determine whether Trump is guilty .
Senators also aren ’ t really called upon to be impartial in the same way jurors ordinarily are .
The Constitution does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on oath or affirmation , ” but it doesn ’ t say more about what that means .
In the oath , senators swear to “ impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws.
” But what that means in practice is pretty much up to each individual , as there ’ s no clear mechanism for disqualifying a senator from participating in the trial because of a lack of neutrality , according to Sarah Binder , a political science professor at George Washington University .
And in the end , even though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , most of the key decisions will be made by a simple majority vote .
“ It all comes down to what 51 elected senators want to do , ” said Frank Bowman , a professor at the University of Missouri School of Law and the author of “ High Crimes and Misdemeanors : A History of Impeachment for the Age of Trump.
” That means for better or worse , there are few objective standards for either side to lean on as they move forward — and plenty of room for dispute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like .
In the past , questions of fairness and impartiality haven ’ t been as heated , largely because the rule-setting process simply wasn ’ t as partisan .
The initial procedures for Clinton ’ s impeachment trial , for instance , were subject to intense negotiation but then adopted by a unanimous vote .
But even though McConnell has said he ’ s just following the example set in Clinton ’ s impeachment trial by punting the question of witnesses until the next stage , following past precedents won ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since additional witnesses appeared in both of the country ’ s previous presidential impeachment trials .
It will be hard for McConnell to argue that an impeachment trial without witnesses is the norm .
Admittedly , the scope in testimony in the previous two cases was very different — more than 40 witnesses testified publicly before raucous and overflowing crowds during the 19th-century trial of President Johnson , while only three witnesses were privately deposed during President Clinton ’ s trial in 1999 .
But Philip Bobbitt , a professor at Columbia University @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Impeachment : A Handbook , ” said that McConnell ’ s attitude toward the trial is unusual .
“ What we have here is a Senate majority essentially acting like a criminal defense attorney trying to bar testimony.
” But , he added , Democrats also have little recourse if McConnell manages to keep his majority in line .
“ There ’ s no higher power [ Democrats ] can appeal to , ” he said .
“ Impeachment is a system that depends on the judgment of the officials who enforce it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There is one bright spot for Democrats : Their position is currently more popular than McConnell ’ s .
According to our recent poll with Ipsos , a majority of Americans think it would be better if the upcoming trial included new witnesses who could potentially shed light on Trump ’ s conduct , while only 39 percent said it would be better to keep the focus solely on the evidence introduced in the House hearings , without calling new witnesses .
Binder said Democrats can try to force votes on whether to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , too , which could keep the spotlight on the issue .
But ultimately , once the articles of impeachment are transmitted to the Senate , disputes over fairness in the impeachment trial will mostly be decided by majority rule .
That might not be the kind of trial most people are used to — but it ’ s the one the Constitution mandates .
And it means even after the trial starts , the debate over how rules and witnesses will likely be far from over .

It’s been three weeks since the House of Representatives voted to impeach President Trump, and yet the outlines of the process that will decide whether he remains in office are still stuck in political limbo. Republican leaders are calling for a swift, minimalist trial while Democrats demand new witnesses and evidence. And on Monday, it seemed as if Democrats might actually be able to nab a high-profile witness. Former national security advisor John Bolton announced that he would finally testify before Congress if subpoenaed by the Senate, introducing the possibility that new and potentially damaging evidence against Trump could still appear, perhaps shifting the narrative and public opinion on impeachment.
But Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell looks unlikely to cooperate, or at least, unlikely to make a decision on whether to call new witnesses immediately. On Tuesday, he said he had the votes to open the trial now in spite of Democrats objections, arguing that he’s just following the precedents set by the Clinton impeachment trial.
This negotiation and ambiguity might seem bizarre or unfair to observers, but it’s actually part of the Constitution’s design. The Constitution gives virtually no guidance about what an impeachment trial is supposed to look like, and the courts have also said they can’t weigh in. There are Senate procedures on how impeachment trials should run, but they’re fairly vague, providing more guidance about how decisions are made than the substance of the trial itself. So just as Republicans had little control over the impeachment inquiry in the House, Democrats are now faced with a process where a majority of Republican senators can set the rules of the road.
When most people think of a trial, they probably imagine a courtroom with a judge in black robes, a box with rows of jurors, and tables for the defense and prosecution. The trouble with understanding how an impeachment trial works is that all of these components are present in some form — for example, a few House lawmakers appointed to be impeachment managers will serve as prosecutors, and Trump’s legal team will offer a defense. Those parallels can make an impeachment trial seem superficially similar to its criminal or civil counterparts, but the process is different in fundamental ways. For one thing, as I wrote a few months ago, Trump doesn’t have a right to protections like due process because he hasn’t been charged with a crime.
Meanwhile, while ordinary legal trials follow a set of detailed procedures, in a 1993 case involving the impeachment of a federal judge, the Supreme Court ruled that the Senate has free rein to make its own rules without courts getting involved — including how quickly the trial proceeds, which stages will be public or private, and whether or how evidence can be admitted. (Chief Justice John Roberts will preside over the trial and can rule on questions of evidence and break ties, but his actions can be overridden by a majority of senators.)
Another key aspect of how an impeachment trial is different from other legal proceedings is that senators don’t just have to determine whether the facts add up to a specifically defined crime, they also have to determine which facts are relevant to begin with. That’s because there’s no clear definition for what an impeachable offense is under the Constitution, or at least not in the way a criminal statute would define wrongdoing. And when the senators are deciding whether to convict or acquit the president, it’s up to them to decide which standards of evidence they’ll apply to determine whether Trump is guilty.
Senators also aren’t really called upon to be impartial in the same way jurors ordinarily are. The Constitution does specify that the senators “shall be on oath or affirmation,” but it doesn’t say more about what that means. In the oath, senators swear to “impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws.” But what that means in practice is pretty much up to each individual, as there’s no clear mechanism for disqualifying a senator from participating in the trial because of a lack of neutrality, according to Sarah Binder, a political science professor at George Washington University.
And in the end, even though there are rules to guide the process, most of the key decisions will be made by a simple majority vote. “It all comes down to what 51 elected senators want to do,” said Frank Bowman, a professor at the University of Missouri School of Law and the author of “High Crimes and Misdemeanors: A History of Impeachment for the Age of Trump.” That means for better or worse, there are few objective standards for either side to lean on as they move forward — and plenty of room for dispute about what a fair trial really looks like.
In the past, questions of fairness and impartiality haven’t been as heated, largely because the rule-setting process simply wasn’t as partisan. The initial procedures for Clinton’s impeachment trial, for instance, were subject to intense negotiation but then adopted by a unanimous vote. But even though McConnell has said he’s just following the example set in Clinton’s impeachment trial by punting the question of witnesses until the next stage, following past precedents won’t end the debate over new evidence, since additional witnesses appeared in both of the country’s previous presidential impeachment trials. It will be hard for McConnell to argue that an impeachment trial without witnesses is the norm.
Admittedly, the scope in testimony in the previous two cases was very different — more than 40 witnesses testified publicly before raucous and overflowing crowds during the 19th-century trial of President Johnson, while only three witnesses were privately deposed during President Clinton’s trial in 1999. But Philip Bobbitt, a professor at Columbia University Law School and the co-author of “Impeachment: A Handbook,” said that McConnell’s attitude toward the trial is unusual. “What we have here is a Senate majority essentially acting like a criminal defense attorney trying to bar testimony.” But, he added, Democrats also have little recourse if McConnell manages to keep his majority in line. “There’s no higher power [Democrats] can appeal to,” he said. “Impeachment is a system that depends on the judgment of the officials who enforce it and the people who elect them.”
There is one bright spot for Democrats: Their position is currently more popular than McConnell’s. According to our recent poll with Ipsos, a majority of Americans think it would be better if the upcoming trial included new witnesses who could potentially shed light on Trump’s conduct, while only 39 percent said it would be better to keep the focus solely on the evidence introduced in the House hearings, without calling new witnesses.
Binder said Democrats can try to force votes on whether to call witnesses as the process moves forward, too, which could keep the spotlight on the issue. But ultimately, once the articles of impeachment are transmitted to the Senate, disputes over fairness in the impeachment trial will mostly be decided by majority rule. That might not be the kind of trial most people are used to — but it’s the one the Constitution mandates. And it means even after the trial starts, the debate over how rules and witnesses will likely be far from over.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-08--What Is Trump’s Strategy On Iran?

What Is Trump’s Strategy On Iran?


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-09--How A Raucous Convention Revolutionized Our Primary System

By casting a ballot in a primary or caucus , voters in the U.S. have the chance to decide who @ @ @ @ @ free world .
But that wasn ’ t always the case .
The rules governing @ @ @ @ @ t in the Constitution , and average Americans have only been able to have their @ @ @ @ @ the 1970s .
This monumental change might not have happened if it weren ’ t @ @ @ @ @ 1968 .
Over the next few weeks , we ’ ll be looking into how @ @ @ @ @ primaries and caucuses came to be as part of our podcast and video series , @ @ @ @ @ episode is about that 1968 convention , and in the following episodes , we ’ @ @ @ @ @ we have today works as well as we ’ d like .
Want more videos @ @ @ @ @ FiveThirtyEight on YouTube .
And subscribe to FiveThirtyEight ’ s Politics Podcast feed for an @ @ @ @

By casting a ballot in a primary or caucus, voters in the U.S. have the chance to decide who will vie to lead the free world. But that wasn’t always the case. The rules governing our primary system aren’t in the Constitution, and average Americans have only been able to have their vote guaranteed to count since the 1970s. This monumental change might not have happened if it weren’t for a disastrous convention in 1968.
Over the next few weeks, we’ll be looking into how our our modern system of primaries and caucuses came to be as part of our podcast and video series, The Primaries Project. This episode is about that 1968 convention, and in the following episodes, we’ll ask if the system we have today works as well as we’d like.
Want more videos like this? Subscribe to FiveThirtyEight on YouTube. And subscribe to FiveThirtyEight’s Politics Podcast feed for an even deeper dive.


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-09--Our Presidential Primary System Is An Accident

It ’ s going to be hard to avoid coverage of the Democratic primary in the coming months .
It ’ ll be portrayed as a grand exercise in democracy , a way for voters to express their opinions about the future of a party , and potentially the nation .
But unlike the general election , presidential primaries are not laid out in the Constitution .
Instead , they ’ re the product of happenstance and reactionary decision-making , most notably in response to a single disastrous nominating convention in 1968 .
Modern presidential campaigns wouldn ’ t be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neither would the country .
For the past few months , the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast has been reporting on exactly how our modern primary system came to be , and what effect it has had on recent American history .
Over the next few weeks , in an audio documentary series we ’ re calling the Primaries Project , we ’ ll tackle three key questions : 1 ) how we got the system we have today , 2 ) what its consequences are and 3 ) how things could be different .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ first episode , answering the first of those questions : Prior to the 1970s , presidential nominees were chosen by the party establishment , with little input from rank-and-file voters .
The parties generally used caucuses , where party insiders would select delegates to eventually go to the national convention .
The delegates were usually well-known people within the parties , not required to vote for any one candidate and often chosen before candidates even entered the race .
At the national convention , delegates would wheel and deal and eventually land on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago , where the Democratic Party fractured dramatically over support for the war in Vietnam .
To hear the story of how those events led to the creation of our modern primary system , click play above or subscribe to the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast .
Check back throughout the month of January as we investigate the consequences of the modern system and how it could be different .
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “ play ” button in the audio player above or by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ App or your favorite podcast platform .
If you are new to podcasts , learn how to listen .
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays .
Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes .
Have a comment , question or suggestion ?
Get in touch by email , on Twitter or in the comments .

It’s going to be hard to avoid coverage of the Democratic primary in the coming months. It’ll be portrayed as a grand exercise in democracy, a way for voters to express their opinions about the future of a party, and potentially the nation. But unlike the general election, presidential primaries are not laid out in the Constitution. Instead, they’re the product of happenstance and reactionary decision-making, most notably in response to a single disastrous nominating convention in 1968. Modern presidential campaigns wouldn’t be the same without that convention, and neither would the country.
For the past few months, the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast has been reporting on exactly how our modern primary system came to be, and what effect it has had on recent American history. Over the next few weeks, in an audio documentary series we’re calling The Primaries Project, we’ll tackle three key questions: 1) how we got the system we have today, 2) what its consequences are and 3) how things could be different.
Today, we’re releasing the first episode, answering the first of those questions:
Prior to the 1970s, presidential nominees were chosen by the party establishment, with little input from rank-and-file voters. The parties generally used caucuses, where party insiders would select delegates to eventually go to the national convention. The delegates were usually well-known people within the parties, not required to vote for any one candidate and often chosen before candidates even entered the race. At the national convention, delegates would wheel and deal and eventually land on a nominee.
That all changed after the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago, where the Democratic Party fractured dramatically over support for the war in Vietnam. To hear the story of how those events led to the creation of our modern primary system, click play above or subscribe to the FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast. Check back throughout the month of January as we investigate the consequences of the modern system and how it could be different.
You can listen to the episode by clicking the “play” button in the audio player above or by downloading it in iTunes, the ESPN App or your favorite podcast platform. If you are new to podcasts, learn how to listen.
The FiveThirtyEight Politics podcast publishes Mondays and Thursdays. Help new listeners discover the show by leaving us a rating and review on iTunes. Have a comment, question or suggestion? Get in touch by email, on Twitter or in the comments.
How a raucous convention revolutionized our primary system


fivethirtyeight--2020-01-09--Who Will Win The 2020 Democratic Nomination?

Our latest forecast for how many pledged delegates each candidate will win after all states have voted FiveThirtyEight ’ s model simulates the primary season thousands of times to find the most likely outcome for each candidate .
The chart shows how many delegates , on average , each candidate is projected to have pledged to them at each point in the primary season , along with a range of possible delegate counts .
We ’ re also showing the distribution of simulated final pledged delegate counts in the table , where taller bars mean a more likely outcome .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the front-runners , wind up with tall bars close to zero — generally , those are simulations where the candidate dropped out before having a chance to accumulate many delegates .
FiveThirtyEight ’ s model simulates the primary season thousands of times to find the most likely outcome for each candidate .
We ’ re showing the distribution of simulated final pledged delegate counts , where taller bars mean a more likely outcome .
Right now , many candidates , even the front-runners , wind up with tall bars close to zero — @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidate dropped out before having a chance to accumulate many delegates .

Our latest forecast for how many pledged delegates each candidate will win after all states have voted
FiveThirtyEight’s model simulates the primary season thousands of times to find the most likely outcome for each candidate, accounting for the margin of their wins and losses, plus the possibility that a trailing candidate might drop out. The chart shows how many delegates, on average, each candidate is projected to have pledged to them at each point in the primary season, along with a range of possible delegate counts. We’re also showing the distribution of simulated final pledged delegate counts in the table, where taller bars mean a more likely outcome.
FiveThirtyEight’s model simulates the primary season thousands of times to find the most likely outcome for each candidate, accounting for the margin of their wins and losses, plus the possibility that a trailing candidate might drop out. We’re showing the distribution of simulated final pledged delegate counts in the table, where taller bars mean a more likely outcome.