airwars--2020-09-14--The siege of Tripoli: visualising a year of violence

At least 200 civilians died during the siege of the capital - with the future still looking uncertain for Libya Two months after the brutal siege of Libya ’ s capital ended , new interactive Airwars mapping shows the impact of 14 months of fighting between two rival governments on the city ’ s beleaguered civilians .
Airwars has visualised every allegation of civilian harm from air and artillery strikes during the period of war in and around Tripoli between April 2019 and June 2020 .
Glasgow-based consultants Rectangle designed the innovative mapping , in an effort to find fresh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern battlefield .
The new Airwars mapping uses a sliding timeline to enable an overview of often indiscriminate air and artillery strikes on Tripoli and its suburbs .
A fine-detail satellite map of Tripoli and its suburbs makes it possible to see the siege evolving over the 14 months of its duration .
The map utilises a 1km radius hexagonal system , whose height represents the number of civilians reported killed in an incident .
This in turn enables users to see the extent of shelling on various neighbourhoods , with casualty spikes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Salaheddin , Abu Salim and Tajoura .
The new mapping can also be used as a portal to access individual civilian harm assessments on the Airwars website .
Lizzie Malcolm and Daniel Powers of design consultancy Rectangle explain their rationale behind the new approach : “ The challenge of mapping and visualising civilian harm is to balance the presentation of aggregated information and individual details .
Maps of large areas and timelines of conflicts are useful for understanding scale .
But any visualisation should be a gateway to the evidence and stories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tell Airwars .
Over the course of the siege , Airwars recorded 339 civilian harm events in Libya , 197 of which around Tripoli , nearly tripling the number of locally reported incidents since the end of the NATO campaign in 2011 .
At least 197 civilians were killed by the violence and another 537 were injured by the violence , as the LNA and GNA fought for control of Tripoli .
The LNA ’ s Tripoli offensive introduced Libyans to a degree of conflict violence not seen since NATO ’ s intervention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the conflict was over , LNA forces and Wagner mercenaries reportedly booby-trapped houses and planted landmines , leading to gruesome additional reports of killed and injured civilians .
The siege of Tripoli has previously been visualised by other organisations , though not via an interactive map .
UN agency OCHA has for example provided infographics summing up their findings .
And Dzsihad Hadelli has previously visualised Airwars data on civilian casualties for the Libya Observer .
Mapping and recording harm in conflicts can help both with the proper investigation of civilian casualties , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading to reconciliation and justice in those parts of society affected by the fighting .
“ There is no way out of this without people being held accountable , “ says Elham Saudi , Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya .
Her organisation seeks to document violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Libya , in turn hoping for accountability .
“ If you ’ re aiming for criminal responsibility , the threshold is really high .
First hand accounts and witnesses are the most important thing , “ Saudi explains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leads to an event in question is another crucial point , she adds .
As a former resident of Tripoli suburbs , Saudi knows from friends and family what the siege did to Tripoli ’ s population : “ The impact was felt throughout the city , the fear and anticipation of being targeted was quite overwhelming – even if you didn ’ t live in the areas being targeted , because of the indiscriminate nature of the attacks .
You always felt like you were a target.
” However , her organisation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around Tripoli but investigates violations committed in the civil war across the country .
The highly polarised political landscape poses an additional challenge , as activists and media in Libya are often affiliated with one of the parties to the conflict : “ The hyper-politicisation of everything makes it very difficult to keep the distance from what ’ s being said in the media .
I don ’ t disregard anything just because it belongs to a certain party.
” “ Things get lost if you don ’ t preserve evidence in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it ’ s not just about the present but also about the future for civil society , “ the lawyer elaborates .
Social media plays an increasing role there as “ Perpetrators help you because they incriminate themselves.
“ Mahmoud Werfalli ’ s arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court , for example , was based on social media accounts of extrajudicial killings .
The former LNA commander is accused of executing ten prisoners in Benghazi in 2018 , a case that was widely documented on social networks – as are many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
At this point it remains difficult to predict which alleged incidents might potentially bear fruit in court .
War crimes were alleged on both sides of the conflict .
“ The US is promising because Haftar , as a US citizen , is subject to its jurisdiction ; it also allows for individuals to pursue civil responsibility , ” Saudi says .
Three civil lawsuits attempting to do that have been filed in the US for example , whereby affected families are suing the General for compensation for his alleged responsibility in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result of the indiscriminate shelling of Tripoli neighbourhoods by his forces .
Even as the search for accountability continues , rifts remain deep within Libyan society after so many years of civil war .
The big question is : how might Libya finally find a way towards a peaceful future ?
A pause in fighting between Libya ’ s rival camps might be expected to generate optimism in a country riven by intermittent civil war since 2011 .
But instead of improving the livelihoods of the population , both seem keen to return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the siege of Tripoli in the first place .
Infighting within both the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) and the Libyan National Army ( LNA ) ; profound economic problems ; and deep distrust between all the main political actors , make a peaceful future more uncertain .
Recently popular protests erupted in both GNA- and LNA-controlled territories , that were in turn met with violence by both governments .
At the same time , a new military build-up around Sirte has raised fears of another escalation in violence – @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Covid-19 pandemic has pushed the population into ever deeper poverty .
Virginie Collombier , Professor of Social and Political Dynamics in Libya at the European University Institute of Florence , has been working on grassroots mediation processes led by Libyans for many years .
She sees the first step to a lasting ceasefire taking place at the international level – getting countries now meddling in Libya to respect the commitments they made during the Berlin peace conference : “ The aim of the mediation process is to find someone who has the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The UN can ’ t do anything alone as we see ; and the EU doesn ’ t have the capacities or willingness.
“ “ Who has the capacities to influence things on the ground : Russia ?
Turkey ?
“ Collombier asks .
Neither seems a likely candidate given the ongoing geopolitical struggle between these two states : “ Most importantly [ there is ] the US , but will they work as a guarantor on broader issues related to the economy , and the political framework ?
“ The current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Professor Collombier believes : “ There is clearly a sense of exhaustion , the meaning of the war is lost , which is something we can see on both sides of the divide.
“ She adds : “ There is not much we can achieve through violence and weapons , the situation has stabilised around two camps that can block each other.
“ However , internal divisions in both the GNA and in Haftar ’ s camp show that the situation could turn violent again if issues are not resolved .
Collombier stresses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all Libyans , beyond the GNA and LNA : “ Voices of Libyans can be heard and put pressure on politics ; and diversifying the political sphere is absolutely crucial .
There is a need for alternative voices and leaders .
There is deep distrust in the current political elite.
” Whatever the result of both reconciliation and accountability processes in Libya , there is a long way ahead for the country to finally find peace .
Documenting and archiving the crimes committed during the civil war is only an initial step towards @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between former enemies .

Two months after the brutal siege of Libya’s capital ended, new interactive Airwars mapping shows the impact of 14 months of fighting between two rival governments on the city’s beleaguered civilians.
Airwars has visualised every allegation of civilian harm from air and artillery strikes during the period of war in and around Tripoli between April 2019 and June 2020. Glasgow-based consultants Rectangle designed the innovative mapping, in an effort to find fresh ways of visualising civilian harm on the modern battlefield.
The new Airwars mapping uses a sliding timeline to enable an overview of often indiscriminate air and artillery strikes on Tripoli and its suburbs. A fine-detail satellite map of Tripoli and its suburbs makes it possible to see the siege evolving over the 14 months of its duration.
The map utilises a 1km radius hexagonal system, whose height represents the number of civilians reported killed in an incident. This in turn enables users to see the extent of shelling on various neighbourhoods, with casualty spikes clearly revealed in heavily hit areas such as Salaheddin, Abu Salim and Tajoura. The new mapping can also be used as a portal to access individual civilian harm assessments on the Airwars website.
Lizzie Malcolm and Daniel Powers of design consultancy Rectangle explain their rationale behind the new approach: “The challenge of mapping and visualising civilian harm is to balance the presentation of aggregated information and individual details. Maps of large areas and timelines of conflicts are useful for understanding scale. But any visualisation should be a gateway to the evidence and stories about individuals and families,” they tell Airwars.
Over the course of the siege, Airwars recorded 339 civilian harm events in Libya, 197 of which around Tripoli, nearly tripling the number of locally reported incidents since the end of the NATO campaign in 2011. At least 197 civilians were killed by the violence and another 537 were injured by the violence, as the LNA and GNA fought for control of Tripoli.
The LNA’s Tripoli offensive introduced Libyans to a degree of conflict violence not seen since NATO’s intervention almost a decade earlier. Even when the conflict was over, LNA forces and Wagner mercenaries reportedly booby-trapped houses and planted landmines, leading to gruesome additional reports of killed and injured civilians.
The siege of Tripoli has previously been visualised by other organisations, though not via an interactive map. UN agency OCHA has for example provided infographics summing up their findings. And Dzsihad Hadelli has previously visualised Airwars data on civilian casualties for the Libya Observer.
The war on Tripoli is now one year old. But already in this period, as many civilians have been killed by air raids as in all Libyan civil war conflicts since 2012 (Airwars annual report 2020). Here's a map of all reported air strikes/shellings of the last 12 months. pic.twitter.com/tTYoEaaDSM — Dzsihad Hadelli (@dhadelli) April 5, 2020
Is justice possible?
Mapping and recording harm in conflicts can help both with the proper investigation of civilian casualties, and of possible war crimes – potentially leading to reconciliation and justice in those parts of society affected by the fighting. “There is no way out of this without people being held accountable,“ says Elham Saudi, Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya.
Her organisation seeks to document violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Libya, in turn hoping for accountability. “If you’re aiming for criminal responsibility, the threshold is really high. First hand accounts and witnesses are the most important thing,“ Saudi explains. Establishing the chain of command that leads to an event in question is another crucial point, she adds.
As a former resident of Tripoli suburbs, Saudi knows from friends and family what the siege did to Tripoli’s population: “The impact was felt throughout the city, the fear and anticipation of being targeted was quite overwhelming – even if you didn’t live in the areas being targeted, because of the indiscriminate nature of the attacks. You always felt like you were a target.”
However, her organisation does not focus only upon recent events around Tripoli but investigates violations committed in the civil war across the country. The highly polarised political landscape poses an additional challenge, as activists and media in Libya are often affiliated with one of the parties to the conflict: “The hyper-politicisation of everything makes it very difficult to keep the distance from what’s being said in the media. I don’t disregard anything just because it belongs to a certain party.”
“Things get lost if you don’t preserve evidence in a conflict. Preserving evidence is absolutely vital, it’s not just about the present but also about the future for civil society,“ the lawyer elaborates. Social media plays an increasing role there as “Perpetrators help you because they incriminate themselves.“
Mahmoud Werfalli’s arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, for example, was based on social media accounts of extrajudicial killings. The former LNA commander is accused of executing ten prisoners in Benghazi in 2018, a case that was widely documented on social networks – as are many cases of potential war crimes in Libya.
At this point it remains difficult to predict which alleged incidents might potentially bear fruit in court. War crimes were alleged on both sides of the conflict. “The US is promising because Haftar, as a US citizen, is subject to its jurisdiction; it also allows for individuals to pursue civil responsibility,” Saudi says. Three civil lawsuits attempting to do that have been filed in the US for example, whereby affected families are suing the General for compensation for his alleged responsibility in the deaths of family members as a result of the indiscriminate shelling of Tripoli neighbourhoods by his forces.
Bringing Libyans back to the negotiations table
Even as the search for accountability continues, rifts remain deep within Libyan society after so many years of civil war. The big question is: how might Libya finally find a way towards a peaceful future?
A pause in fighting between Libya’s rival camps might be expected to generate optimism in a country riven by intermittent civil war since 2011. But instead of improving the livelihoods of the population, both seem keen to return to the status quo that partly led to the siege of Tripoli in the first place. Infighting within both the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA); profound economic problems; and deep distrust between all the main political actors, make a peaceful future more uncertain.
Recently popular protests erupted in both GNA- and LNA-controlled territories, that were in turn met with violence by both governments. At the same time, a new military build-up around Sirte has raised fears of another escalation in violence – while a dire economic situation exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic has pushed the population into ever deeper poverty.
Virginie Collombier, Professor of Social and Political Dynamics in Libya at the European University Institute of Florence, has been working on grassroots mediation processes led by Libyans for many years. She sees the first step to a lasting ceasefire taking place at the international level – getting countries now meddling in Libya to respect the commitments they made during the Berlin peace conference: “The aim of the mediation process is to find someone who has the capacities to provide guarantees and enforce things. The UN can’t do anything alone as we see; and the EU doesn’t have the capacities or willingness.“
“Who has the capacities to influence things on the ground: Russia? Turkey?“ Collombier asks. Neither seems a likely candidate given the ongoing geopolitical struggle between these two states: “Most importantly [there is] the US, but will they work as a guarantor on broader issues related to the economy, and the political framework?“
The current stalemate may however make things easier, Professor Collombier believes: “There is clearly a sense of exhaustion, the meaning of the war is lost, which is something we can see on both sides of the divide.“ She adds: “There is not much we can achieve through violence and weapons, the situation has stabilised around two camps that can block each other.“
However, internal divisions in both the GNA and in Haftar’s camp show that the situation could turn violent again if issues are not resolved. Collombier stresses the need for a dialogue that includes all Libyans, beyond the GNA and LNA: “Voices of Libyans can be heard and put pressure on politics; and diversifying the political sphere is absolutely crucial. There is a need for alternative voices and leaders. There is deep distrust in the current political elite.”
Whatever the result of both reconciliation and accountability processes in Libya, there is a long way ahead for the country to finally find peace. Documenting and archiving the crimes committed during the civil war is only an initial step towards accountability that can then lead to reconciliation between former enemies.


airwars--2020-09-22--A statement from organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict calling on the Uni

A statement from organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict calling on the United States to immediately end sanctions against members of the International Criminal Court

Airwars adds voice to partners calling on the US government to end its targeting of the ICC The United States Government recently applied sanctions to senior officers of the International Criminal Court – a court of last resort established by treaty , and endorsed by a majority of countries including most of the US ’ s closest allies .
In partnership with a number of organisations working on the protection of civilians in conflict , Airwars is calling upon the US Government to end its targeting of ICC officials .
The public statement also calls on both Presidential campaigns to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passed by President Trump in June , which formed the basis of the ICC sanctions .
We the undersigned , representing human rights and humanitarian non-governmental organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict , write in opposition to United States sanctions against named senior personnel within the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) .
We call on President Trump to revoke these harmful sanctions immediately and to rescind Executive Order 13928 on “ Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court.
” We also call on the Presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commit to reversing this harmful Executive Order .
The United States should support the rule of law rather than punish those seeking to provide redress to victims of harm .
The ICC exists as a court of last resort to hold government officials and other powerful actors accountable when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute the most serious international crimes .
The Court has secured successful prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity .
The primary beneficiaries are the many civilian victims who can secure no justice elsewhere and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by impunity .
They include many victims and survivors of violence for whom the United States has been a strong , vocal advocate for justice and accountability .
We understand that the United States takes issue with some of the ICC ’ s jurisprudence and assertions of jurisdiction .
However , we believe that concerted diplomatic efforts and engagement with the ICC will enhance its effectiveness more than punishing individuals who have dedicated their careers to delivering justice to victims of egregious crimes .
As condemnatory statements from close U.S. allies make clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international standing through these sanctions , which have undermined the international rule of law and provided succour to war criminals seeking to evade justice .
The United States should recommit to an independent and credible domestic process of investigating and holding to account U.S. citizens for alleged abuses , free from executive interference and consistent with U.S. and international law .
That is the best way to ensure that U.S. service members are afforded due process of law in a domestic forum for any alleged wrongdoing and that the U.S. is recognized as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justice and accountability .

Airwars adds voice to partners calling on the US government to end its targeting of the ICC
The United States Government recently applied sanctions to senior officers of the International Criminal Court – a court of last resort established by treaty, and endorsed by a majority of countries including most of the US’s closest allies. In partnership with a number of organisations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, Airwars is calling upon the US Government to end its targeting of ICC officials. The public statement also calls on both Presidential campaigns to publicly commit to rescinding an Executive Order passed by President Trump in June, which formed the basis of the ICC sanctions.
We the undersigned, representing human rights and humanitarian non-governmental organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, write in opposition to United States sanctions against named senior personnel within the International Criminal Court (ICC).
We call on President Trump to revoke these harmful sanctions immediately and to rescind Executive Order 13928 on “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court.” We also call on the Presidential campaigns of both major parties to publicly commit to reversing this harmful Executive Order. The United States should support the rule of law rather than punish those seeking to provide redress to victims of harm.
The ICC exists as a court of last resort to hold government officials and other powerful actors accountable when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute the most serious international crimes. The Court has secured successful prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The primary beneficiaries are the many civilian victims who can secure no justice elsewhere and the communities subject to cycles of violence fuelled by impunity. They include many victims and survivors of violence for whom the United States has been a strong, vocal advocate for justice and accountability.
We understand that the United States takes issue with some of the ICC’s jurisprudence and assertions of jurisdiction. However, we believe that concerted diplomatic efforts and engagement with the ICC will enhance its effectiveness more than punishing individuals who have dedicated their careers to delivering justice to victims of egregious crimes.
As condemnatory statements from close U.S. allies make clear, the United States has lost significant international standing through these sanctions, which have undermined the international rule of law and provided succour to war criminals seeking to evade justice.
The United States should recommit to an independent and credible domestic process of investigating and holding to account U.S. citizens for alleged abuses, free from executive interference and consistent with U.S. and international law. That is the best way to ensure that U.S. service members are afforded due process of law in a domestic forum for any alleged wrongdoing and that the U.S. is recognized as a leader in the pursuit of global justice and accountability.
Signed,
Action on Armed Violence
Airwars
Amnesty International USA
Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)
Human Rights First
Oxfam America
Oxford Research Group
Saferworld


airwars--2020-09-22--A statement from organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, calling on the Un

A statement from organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, calling on the United States to immediately end sanctions against members of the International Criminal Court


airwars--2020-09-30--On eve of Belgium’s return to war on ISIS, groups call for improved civilian harm accountability

Open letter from 11 Belgian and international organisations calls on the Defence Minister to increase transparency and accountability for civilian harm .
On October 1st 2020 , Belgium will send four F-16s to Iraq and Northeast Syria for a period of 12 months , to once again participate in Operation Inherent Resolve – the international campaign against so-called Islamic State .
Yet Belgium has been one of the least transparent countries in the Coalition , refusing publicly to concede any civilian harm from its own actions and with no additional accountability mechanisms being put in place during the new deployment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parliament.. Airwars , together with our Belgian and international partners , is today publishing a joint open letter recently sent to Minister of Defence Philippe Goffin , which urges the Belgian government to take concrete steps to improve its transparency and accountability for civilian harm resulting from its own military actions .
The full text is reprinted below .
On October 1st , 2020 , Belgium will send four F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve .
As a collective of civil society organisations , we have concerns about the limited levels of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Belgium ’ s past participation in Operation Inherent Resolve still remains highly secretive .
As a result , Belgian members of Parliament can not thoroughly exercise democratic oversight , while the Belgian , Syrian and Iraqi public are kept in the dark about possible cases of civilian harm as the result of previous Belgian airstrikes or other activities in support of airstrikes in the fight against the so-called Islamic State .
Previous comparative research by Airwars has highlighted that Belgium remains one of the least transparent countries in the US-led International Coalition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , BBC , De Morgen and Liberation revealed in March 2020 , Belgium refuses to acknowledge civilian casualties from its actions , even where the US-led Coalition has conceded these same cases as credible .
In response to this investigation , the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces ( BAF ) were “ certainly not involved in all events ” , without providing any more details or proof for such a bold claim .
Belgium ’ s focus thus far in the debate on civilian harm and accountability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As long as the Belgian Ministry of Defence does not consider civilian harm incidents to have breached international humanitarian law , it refrains from engaging in exercises or lessons learnt , or in evaluations that are publicly available .
We believe that this position is not sustainable .
As we have seen in the Netherlands , where media uncovered in October 2019 that the Netherlands had been responsible for a 2015 airstrike on Hawijah , Iraq , in which at least 70 civilians died , once the truth about civilian harm incidents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to major national blowback and severely harm the trust of both Parliament and the public in its government .
So far , the Belgium Ministry of Defence has given few signs that it is committed to improving its transparency and accountability practices during the coming deployment of four F-16s , even while there has been a clear message from Parliament that more transparency is required .
We , therefore , urge the Ministry of Defence to fully comply with a parliamentary resolution of June 25th , 2020 .
Specifically , Amendment number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ motion request the federal government to do the following ( unofficial translation ) : 4 .
To demonstrate militarily responsible maximum transparency vis-à-vis the Chamber of Representatives , with regard to the prevention , monitoring and reporting of possible civilian casualties as a result of our military efforts , in particular through strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of the actions of the national Red Card Holder .
6 .
To actively consult with the Dutch government in order to take note of all the lessons learned from the Hawija tragedy , to understand them and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Representatives on how these lessons will be used during the Belgian military deployment , in order to avoid civilian casualties as much as possible .
17 .
To communicate publicly , after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations , about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations ( emphasis added ) .
Currently , consultative processes are ongoing [ with militaries ] in the United States , the United Kingdom and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilian harm and to implement policies to better protect civilians in armed conflict .
These processes are taking place in consultation with various civil society organisations , including academics and NGOs , such as Airwars , CIVIC , Amnesty International and local civil society organisations .
We believe that it is crucial that Belgium commits itself to improve its poor transparency and accountability track record .
We hereby wish to inform you that we , as a collective of civil society organisations , stand ready to actively work together and share our expertise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in order to make concrete progress towards improved transparency and accountability of Belgium ’ s upcoming military deployment in Iraq and Syria .
The undersigned organisations call upon the Belgian government to , at the minimum : • Publish the exact date and near location of all Belgian air raids carried out in the fight against ISIS ; • Publish the results of all investigations into civilian casualties – including the data , location , targets and number of civilian casualties of military action – even if the Ministry of Defence ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no violation of international humanitarian law ; • Draft guidelines for proactively publishing this information ( in the future ) as open data in a machine-readable overview that enables control by independent parties ; • To work together with external parties , including NGOs , by drawing up standards for the minimum criteria that external claims for civilian victims must meet in order for the Ministry of Defence to be able to assess them ; • Provide capacity at the Ministry of Defence so that officials can focus on monitoring and actively publishing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ armed conflict , including in future military interventions so that the consequences of military intervention are systematically monitored and published ; • Introduce or support a mechanism where potential victims of Coalition bombardments can come forward and report issues of concern ; • Adopt a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas with a clear commitment to data collection and transparent reporting .
While the Belgian military has decided to use precise small diameter bombs during the coming deployment period , we believe that it is crucial to emphasise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilian infrastructure , in particular in urban areas , requires more than using precision weapons .
The undersigned organisations are preparing to publicly communicate on this matter and share a copy of this letter with the Belgian press by the end of September , as we believe this discussion concerns the Belgian public .
We hope that you will respond positively to our call for cooperation and exchange on this important matter , and we are happy to enter into dialogue with the Ministry of Defence for further discussion of our recommendations .

Open letter from 11 Belgian and international organisations calls on the Defence Minister to increase transparency and accountability for civilian harm.
On October 1st 2020, Belgium will send four F-16s to Iraq and Northeast Syria for a period of 12 months, to once again participate in Operation Inherent Resolve – the international campaign against so-called Islamic State.
Yet Belgium has been one of the least transparent countries in the Coalition, refusing publicly to concede any civilian harm from its own actions and with no additional accountability mechanisms being put in place during the new deployment. despite the urgings of the Belgian parliament..
Airwars, together with our Belgian and international partners, is today publishing a joint open letter recently sent to Minister of Defence Philippe Goffin, which urges the Belgian government to take concrete steps to improve its transparency and accountability for civilian harm resulting from its own military actions. The full text is reprinted below.
Dear Mr Goffin,
On October 1st, 2020, Belgium will send four F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve. As a collective of civil society organisations, we have concerns about the limited levels of transparency and accountability of this military deployment. Belgium’s past participation in Operation Inherent Resolve still remains highly secretive. As a result, Belgian members of Parliament cannot thoroughly exercise democratic oversight, while the Belgian, Syrian and Iraqi public are kept in the dark about possible cases of civilian harm as the result of previous Belgian airstrikes or other activities in support of airstrikes in the fight against the so-called Islamic State.
Previous comparative research by Airwars has highlighted that Belgium remains one of the least transparent countries in the US-led International Coalition. As a joint investigation by Airwars, BBC, De Morgen and Liberation revealed in March 2020, Belgium refuses to acknowledge civilian casualties from its actions, even where the US-led Coalition has conceded these same cases as credible. In response to this investigation, the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces (BAF) were “certainly not involved in all events”, without providing any more details or proof for such a bold claim.
Belgium’s focus thus far in the debate on civilian harm and accountability has been on the legality of airstrikes. As long as the Belgian Ministry of Defence does not consider civilian harm incidents to have breached international humanitarian law, it refrains from engaging in exercises or lessons learnt, or in evaluations that are publicly available.
We believe that this position is not sustainable. As we have seen in the Netherlands, where media uncovered in October 2019 that the Netherlands had been responsible for a 2015 airstrike on Hawijah, Iraq, in which at least 70 civilians died, once the truth about civilian harm incidents inevitably comes to light, it can lead to major national blowback and severely harm the trust of both Parliament and the public in its government.
Call for greater transparency
So far, the Belgium Ministry of Defence has given few signs that it is committed to improving its transparency and accountability practices during the coming deployment of four F-16s, even while there has been a clear message from Parliament that more transparency is required. We, therefore, urge the Ministry of Defence to fully comply with a parliamentary resolution of June 25th, 2020. Specifically, Amendment number 4, 6 and 17 of this motion request the federal government to do the following (unofficial translation):
4. To demonstrate militarily responsible maximum transparency vis-à-vis the Chamber of Representatives, with regard to the prevention, monitoring and reporting of possible civilian casualties as a result of our military efforts, in particular through strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of the actions of the national Red Card Holder.
6. To actively consult with the Dutch government in order to take note of all the lessons learned from the Hawija tragedy, to understand them and to subsequently report to the Chamber of Representatives on how these lessons will be used during the Belgian military deployment, in order to avoid civilian casualties as much as possible.
17. To communicate publicly, after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations, about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations (emphasis added).
Currently, consultative processes are ongoing [with militaries] in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to improve transparency and accountability for civilian harm and to implement policies to better protect civilians in armed conflict. These processes are taking place in consultation with various civil society organisations, including academics and NGOs, such as Airwars, CIVIC, Amnesty International and local civil society organisations.
We believe that it is crucial that Belgium commits itself to improve its poor transparency and accountability track record. We hereby wish to inform you that we, as a collective of civil society organisations, stand ready to actively work together and share our expertise and knowledge with the Ministry of Defence in order to make concrete progress towards improved transparency and accountability of Belgium’s upcoming military deployment in Iraq and Syria.
Recommendations
The undersigned organisations call upon the Belgian government to, at the minimum:
Publish the exact date and near location of all Belgian air raids carried out in the fight against ISIS;
Publish the results of all investigations into civilian casualties – including the data, location, targets and number of civilian casualties of military action – even if the Ministry of Defence’s own investigation concludes that there has been no violation of international humanitarian law;
Draft guidelines for proactively publishing this information (in the future) as open data in a machine-readable overview that enables control by independent parties;
To work together with external parties, including NGOs, by drawing up standards for the minimum criteria that external claims for civilian victims must meet in order for the Ministry of Defence to be able to assess them;
Provide capacity at the Ministry of Defence so that officials can focus on monitoring and actively publishing data on airstrikes and civilian casualties in armed conflict, including in future military interventions so that the consequences of military intervention are systematically monitored and published;
Introduce or support a mechanism where potential victims of Coalition bombardments can come forward and report issues of concern;
Adopt a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas with a clear commitment to data collection and transparent reporting.
While the Belgian military has decided to use precise small diameter bombs during the coming deployment period, we believe that it is crucial to emphasise that protecting the lives of civilians and civilian infrastructure, in particular in urban areas, requires more than using precision weapons.
The undersigned organisations are preparing to publicly communicate on this matter and share a copy of this letter with the Belgian press by the end of September, as we believe this discussion concerns the Belgian public. We hope that you will respond positively to our call for cooperation and exchange on this important matter, and we are happy to enter into dialogue with the Ministry of Defence for further discussion of our recommendations.
Signed,
11.11.11
Agir pour la Paix
Airwars
Amnesty Belgium
CNAPD
GRIP
Humanity & Inclusion
Oxfam Belgium
Pax Christi Flanders
Vredesactie
Vrede vzw


airwars--2020-09-30--Syria’s civilians pay high price for years of foreign military interventions

At least 17 nations have intervened militarily in Syria in recent years .
In their own words , Syrians describe the often devastating consequences for civilians .
In 1996 , the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked by reporter Lesley Stahl about sanctions against Saddam Hussein ’ s Iraq : “ We have heard that a half million children have died .
I mean , that ’ s more children than died in Hiroshima .
And , you know , is the price worth it ?
” Stahl asked .
The Secretary of State responded : “ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but the price–we think the price is worth it.
” Airwars data collected from local sources indicates that since 2014 , at least 15,000 civilians were likely killed as a result of airstrikes and shelling from at least 17 foreign powers fighting within Syria , including members of the US-led Coalition ; Russia ; Iran ; Turkey ; and Israel .
Thousands more have been injured .
Here the Airwars Syria team asks : has the price paid by civilians been worth it ?
For some Syrians , the intervention of so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ origins in the Assad government ’ s mishandling of mass demonstrations in the early days of a national uprising .
Jala , a Syrian woman now living in London , told Airwars “ Had the crisis been managed correctly by the Syrian regime back in 2011 , and had the regime focused on a political solution and refrained from using power against its own people and from deploying the army in Dara ’ a , the intervening powers wouldn ’ t have found a pretext , and we wouldn ’ t be talking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the intervention of so many foreign powers in Syria vary widely .
For Russia , assistance to the Assad government has helped deliver long dreamt of access to a Mediterranean port .
For Iran , its costly efforts to ensure the survival of the Syrian regime while seeking to promote a regional anti-Israel axis have been paramount .
For the United States and its Coalition allies , a desire to defeat the terrorist group Islamic State has more recently been supplemented by a desire to counter Iranian and Russian plans for Syria .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ chaos of Syria ’ s wars to impose a buffer zone in northern Syria and disrupt Kurdish efforts to carve out a new state .
And Israel , although not involved in the ground conflict , has nevertheless conducted hundreds of airstrikes against both Iranian and Hezbollah forces within Syria in recent years .
With so many foreign powers and their proxy actors fighting within Syria , this chart by analyst Charles Lister from 2016 indicates the sheer complexity of the situation .
Without the intervention of so many foreign powers in Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have looked very different .
Starved of Russian and Iranian support , the Assad government would most likely have been overrun by rebel forces .
ISIS would also likely have surged , using the vast arsenal of weapons it had captured in Iraq during 2014 to occupy more and more Syrian territory .
So did the international intervention save the Syrian peoples ?
Or instead has it elongated and exacerbated the conflict , and consequently the suffering of civilians ?
Following an earlier military intervention in Syria by Iran in support of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this week the US-led Coalition launched its first airstrikes in Syria on September 23rd 2014 , targeting both the so-called Islamic State that now controlled vast swathes of Syria ; and also al-Qaeda ’ s local Syrian faction .
Dozens of strikes by US , Saudi , Emirati and Jordanian aircraft that day – as well as Tomahawk missiles fired from US warships – led to the Coalition ’ s first reported massacre of civilians in Syria in Kafar Dryan .
The Coalition still denies civilian casualties in that attack .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ground since 2014 , the long running Coalition campaign against ISIS in Syria has so far likely killed at least 5,658 civilians , a high proportion of whom were women and children .
Almost four thousand more civilians have reportedly been injured .
The alliance itself presently concedes 671 non combatants killed by its actions .
Hasan Al-Kassab is an activist from Raqqa , who worked in the research unit of the Euphrates Project which funds many reconstruction and body retrieval projects in Raqqa .
Hasan told Airwars that he lost two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Raqqa campaign in 2017 .
One uncle , Abdul Latif Hasan Al-kassab , was taking water from the Euphrates river when a Coalition airstrike targeted the area on June 25th 2017 .
His uncle was immediately killed along with two other civilians .
His other uncle died when another Coalition airstrike targeted a building in Raqqa days before the city was liberated .
“ There is no mechanism to contact the Coalition who I believe is responsible for the death of my two uncles to investigate their death , ” says Hasan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Initial Response Team in Raqqa has so far found 28 mass graves in Raqqa , containing more than 6,000 bodies , with two thirds of them believed to be civilians .
Zain Al-Abidin Al-A ’ kedi , an activist from Deir Ezzor living in northern Syria , told Airwars that he believes that the Coalition ’ s intervention against ISIS in Syria was necessary , but had come too late .
“ The wasted time led to an increase in the number of deaths and casualties by ISIS and the US-led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ damage in the cities and towns , ” Zain said .
Firas Hanosh , an activist from Raqqa and a former doctor with Medecins Sans Frontières in one of Raqqa ’ s field hospitals , also believes that the US-led Coalition intervention in Syria was necessary , because local forces were unable to defeat ISIS .
However , he argues that the Coalition ’ s choice of the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces as its ground proxy was a mistake .
“ The US-led Coalition didn ’ t choose the right partner on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is racist against the Arab civilians.
” Firas told Airwars that it is unsafe for him to return to his ravaged home city .
He says he is also worried about being arrested by the SDF , because of his work as an activist monitoring the situation in Raqqa .
Wary of intervening on the ground in Syria or getting involved in the civil war , the US still needed to combat ISIS .
It therefore turned to the Kurds – initially helping the newly formed SDF to drive out ISIS from its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s intervention forces , we would have lost Kobane , Qamishli and other Kurdish areas.
” Dlshad , a Syrian cyber security engineer now living in Washington DC , said .
However , as the SDF then advanced against ISIS in primarily Arabic-population territory , tensions rose .
Other Syrians believe the US and its allies had hidden motives .
Jala , a Syrian woman now living in London , believes that the US intervention in Syria , though declared to be against ISIS , was in fact aimed at controlling the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Trump has done little to dispel this view , and US troops today occupy many of Syria ’ s oil fields .
Even as the US-led Coalition was ramping up its attacks against ISIS in Syria , the regime was losing badly on the ground to rebel forces .
Reports estimated that despite Iranian and Hezbollah support , Bashar al-Assad held only 25 % of Syria by late 2015 .
Assad asked for support from his Russian allies – leading to Moscow ’ s largest foreign intervention since its disastrous Afghanistan campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would prove to be very different .
The first Russian airstrikes in Syria took place on September 30th 2015 , targeting the towns of Za ` faranah , Talbisah and Ar-Rastan in Homs ; and Al Makrmeya and Jisr al Shughour in Idlib .
From the first day , the effects on civilians were devastating .
At least 43 civilians reportedly died in Russia ’ s initial airstrikes – with more than 150 more injured .
Accused of indifference to civilian harm from its actions in Syria – and even the deliberate targeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ admit to a single civilian death in five years of war .
Airwars monitoring has so far recorded 4,487 locally reported problem airstrikes by Russia in partnership with the Assad government from 2015 to 2020 – which between them reportedly led to the deaths of as many as 22,000 non combatants , and the injuring of up to 40,000 more .
“ The Russian intervention in Syria is not new , ” argues Dlshad , a cyber security engineer now living in Washington DC : “ I come from Rmeilan city which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been in the city for a long time.
” That said , Dlshad believes the Russian intervention both extended the life of Bashar Al-Assad ’ s regime – and in some cases curbed his actions .
He argues for example that Assad would have been more brutal against his own people without Russian control .
“ The Russian military involvement changed the military equation , ” argues Abdulkarim Ekzayez , a Research Associate at the Department of War Studies at King ’ s College , University of London and himself a Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infrastructure such as hospitals , schools and bakeries have weakened the resilience of the targeted communities in opposition held areas .
Consequently the regime was able to take control over most of the opposition pockets in central and southern Syria , pushing all opposition factions into the north west with clearly defined contact lines between the two warring parties.
” Mohammed Al Fares , the nom de plume of a humanitarian worker living in Idlib , believes that the Russians have followed a systematic plan to target civilians in Syria – something the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ says .
However , Jala believes that none of the actors in the Syrian conflict cared deeply about civilians , including Syrian fighters on the ground because they focused only on achieving military gains and not on civilians .
The other key ally of the Assad government , Iran , has taken a different approach .
Years of sanctions have left it with a poorly equipped air force .
Instead Tehran ’ s efforts in Syria focused on its domestic rocket and drone programmes , in turn channelling them to both Hezbollah and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iranian ground forces have played a key role in the fighting .
The Quds Brigade is known to be involved at a senior level in the Syrian conflict and even in changing the structure of the Syrian army .
The Syrian 4th Brigade is close to Iran for example , while the 5th Brigade has closer links to Russian forces .
With a weak government in Damascus , multiple foreign powers have for years conducted unilateral actions in Syria in support of their own national interests .
The United States has long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for example ; while the British conducted a controversial targeted killing of a UK citizen in 2015 .
Two nations in particular have fought lengthy unilateral campaigns .
Turkey has launched several massive operations in North East Syria , alongside its earlier targeting of ISIS in Idlib .
In January 2018 , Ankara launched Operation Olive Branch in Afrin , and later Operation Peace Spring in October 2019 .
Overall , hundreds of Syrian civilians have been locally reported killed by Turkish actions – both against Kurdish forces , and ISIS-occupied areas such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this article were strongly opposed to Turkey ’ s interventions .
“ There was no threat against Turkey .
Why did Turkey intervene ?
Turkey is racist against the Kurds and that ’ s it , ” claimed Dlshad .
H.J , a female architect from Damascus who asked not to be fully named for safety reasons , argued : “ Syrians thought that Erdogan was helping the Syrian cause , but he eventually used it as a bargaining chip with Europe ; causing destruction and division between Arabs and Kurds , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel ’ s own unilateral aerial campaign in Syria has proved devastating against both Iranian and Hezbollah forces .
In early 2019 , a senior Israeli commander declared that the Israel Defence Forces ( IDF ) had dropped more than 2,000 bombs on Syria during the previous year , while Prime Minister Binyamin Netenyahu said that “ the IDF has attacked hundreds of times Iranian and Hezbollah targets.
” Despite the significant scale of Israel ’ s intervention , international attention has been limited .
This may in part be due to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli strikes in Syria compared with other foreign powers .
Since 2019 , Airwars monitoring indicates that between 13 and 22 civilians were killed and over 40 injured in nine Israeli airstrikes of concern .
With its focus in Syria almost exclusively on military targets , Israel appears to have limited the widescale civilian harm seen in the actions of others .
According to Mohammed Al Fares , a Syrian spoken to for this article , “ It is good that Israel is destroying the regime ’ s military installations .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t want Iran to get an upper hand in Syria , not for the sake of the Syrian people.
” Years of conflict in Syria , combined with external intervention by at least 17 foreign powers , have changed the face of the country for ever .
According to the UNHCR , there are 6.2 million people , including 2.5 million children , currently internally displaced within Syria , the largest such population in the world .
Beyond Syria ’ s borders , the total number of registered Syrian refugees has so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ links between external interventions and the displacement of civilians can be challenging to unpack .
In North East Syria for example actions by rebels ; by ISIS ; and later by Turkish forces , saw more than 215,000 people driven from their homes .
While many have returned , an estimated 100,000 remain displaced .
Similarly , Syrian Arab Army operations supported from the air by Russia have proved highly disruptive .
During the last major campaign between December 2019 and March 2020 in North West Syria , the UN reported a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including more than 575,000 children .
Humanitarian worker Mohammed Al Fares , himself an IDP , told Airwars about his own experience .
“ When you are forced outside your residence , you die slowly .
You lose everything , your home , your land , your job and your money .
You try to start over and build a new life , but it is difficult.
” The destruction of Syria ’ s infrastructure over the past nine years has also been extreme – much of it the result of foreign actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been Aleppo and Raqqa – the first significantly at the hands of Russian forces ; the latter mostly as a result of the US-led Coalition ’ s targeting of ISIS .
According to ReliefWeb : “ About a third of homes in Syria were thought to have been damaged or destroyed by 2017 .
In 2018 , the UN estimated the cost of material destruction in Syria at $ 120 billion.
” Hasan Al-Kassab told Airwars that eleven bridges in Raqqa were destroyed including Raqqa ’ s New Bridge during the Coalition ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are only slowly starting to return because of a lack of basic services .
For example , 60 % of Raqqa is still without electricity .
East Aleppo , which witnessed brutal bombing by the Assad government supported by its Russian ally , experienced a similar fate .
Battles which began in 2012 reached their climax in November 2016 , when SAA troops began a decisive campaign that ended a month later with the retaking of the city .
This caused very significant damage to Aleppo .
H.J , the architect from Damascus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been systemic and not just ‘ collateral damage ’ as militaries claim .
“ The destruction caused by all different actors is called many things , of which : Urbicide/ Identicide .
That is , to commit a massacre against the urban environment ; to target relationships that connect people and places , erasing their identities .
Nowadays , one third of Syria is destroyed , and about 80 % of Syria ’ s Night lights are gone.
” Significant opposition remains from many countries to the reconstruction process in Syria while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the US is implementing small scale rebuilding activities in areas under SDF control , focusing on basic services like water , electricity and rubble removal that don ’ t reach the level of reconstruction .
At the same time , with Russia and Iran unable significantly to support the regime financially as it seeks to rebuild Syria , limited scale investments risk lining the pockets of warlords , profiteers and cronies .
Mohammed Al Fares believes that overall , external intervention by so many foreign powers has had a negative impact on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and on the general situation in the country .
“ Syrians had been in a state of solidarity with each other when the revolution started and [ they eventually ] controlled about 70 % of Syria .
External intervention including money channelling , divided the Syrians and brought into the decision making people who were not fit to lead .
This in turn made the revolution very political until it lost its momentum .
However , the revolution continues with its youth , women , elders and children despite all the obstacles it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to Hasan Al-Kassab from Raqqa : “ We can ’ t put all the interventions in the same basket .
The Coalition intervened to eliminate ISIS , Russia intervened to oppress the people and legitimise the regime against the civilians , while Turkey intervened to fight the PKK and secure its borders .
However every intervention is still an occupation , because there is no mechanism to give oversight to the people .
They built military bases and disturbed the fabric of the Syrian people.
” From her side , H.J @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argues that after the regime started killing civilians in 2012 , the Syrian people tolerated even ‘ allying with the devil ’ to oust Bashar Al-Assad .
‘ ’ I didn ’ t personally support this opinion , but we needed any offerings , we naively thought that the world would help us without anything in return .
We were wrong , and all interventions were bad .
The country was divided , and military bases were established.
” With peace still nowhere in sight in Syria – and fighting likely to resume @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is little sign of foreign powers withdrawing any time soon .
While their interventions have radically changed conflict dynamics , they have done little to support the Syrian peoples in their aspirations for freedom and justice .
Yet if the same kind of resource spent by foreign powers on bombs and missiles could one day be diverted to Syria ’ s infrastructure development , to education , and to the fostering of civil society , another future remains possible .

At least 17 nations have intervened militarily in Syria in recent years. In their own words, Syrians describe the often devastating consequences for civilians.
In 1996, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked by reporter Lesley Stahl about sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: “We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that’s more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?” Stahl asked. The Secretary of State responded: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price–we think the price is worth it.”
Airwars data collected from local sources indicates that since 2014, at least 15,000 civilians were likely killed as a result of airstrikes and shelling from at least 17 foreign powers fighting within Syria, including members of the US-led Coalition; Russia; Iran; Turkey; and Israel. Thousands more have been injured. Here the Airwars Syria team asks: has the price paid by civilians been worth it?
For some Syrians, the intervention of so many foreign powers in Syria has its origins in the Assad government’s mishandling of mass demonstrations in the early days of a national uprising. Jala, a Syrian woman now living in London, told Airwars “Had the crisis been managed correctly by the Syrian regime back in 2011, and had the regime focused on a political solution and refrained from using power against its own people and from deploying the army in Dara’a, the intervening powers wouldn’t have found a pretext, and we wouldn’t be talking about the intervention now.”
Reasons for the intervention of so many foreign powers in Syria vary widely. For Russia, assistance to the Assad government has helped deliver long dreamt of access to a Mediterranean port. For Iran, its costly efforts to ensure the survival of the Syrian regime while seeking to promote a regional anti-Israel axis have been paramount. For the United States and its Coalition allies, a desire to defeat the terrorist group Islamic State has more recently been supplemented by a desire to counter Iranian and Russian plans for Syria. President Erdogan of Turkey has used the chaos of Syria’s wars to impose a buffer zone in northern Syria and disrupt Kurdish efforts to carve out a new state. And Israel, although not involved in the ground conflict, has nevertheless conducted hundreds of airstrikes against both Iranian and Hezbollah forces within Syria in recent years.
With so many foreign powers and their proxy actors fighting within Syria, this chart by analyst Charles Lister from 2016 indicates the sheer complexity of the situation.
This *simple* chart shows all states of hostility currently being played out on #Syria’s territory#IntractableWar pic.twitter.com/1inprNB6U0 — Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) February 13, 2016
The US-led Coalition and civilian harm
Without the intervention of so many foreign powers in Syria, the recent history of the nation would have looked very different. Starved of Russian and Iranian support, the Assad government would most likely have been overrun by rebel forces. ISIS would also likely have surged, using the vast arsenal of weapons it had captured in Iraq during 2014 to occupy more and more Syrian territory.
So did the international intervention save the Syrian peoples? Or instead has it elongated and exacerbated the conflict, and consequently the suffering of civilians?
Following an earlier military intervention in Syria by Iran in support of the Assad government, six years ago this week the US-led Coalition launched its first airstrikes in Syria on September 23rd 2014, targeting both the so-called Islamic State that now controlled vast swathes of Syria; and also al-Qaeda’s local Syrian faction. Dozens of strikes by US, Saudi, Emirati and Jordanian aircraft that day – as well as Tomahawk missiles fired from US warships – led to the Coalition’s first reported massacre of civilians in Syria in Kafar Dryan. The Coalition still denies civilian casualties in that attack.
According to Airwars data gathered from local sources on the ground since 2014, the long running Coalition campaign against ISIS in Syria has so far likely killed at least 5,658 civilians, a high proportion of whom were women and children. Almost four thousand more civilians have reportedly been injured. The alliance itself presently concedes 671 non combatants killed by its actions.
Hasan Al-Kassab is an activist from Raqqa, who worked in the research unit of the Euphrates Project which funds many reconstruction and body retrieval projects in Raqqa. Hasan told Airwars that he lost two of his uncles during the Coalition’s Raqqa campaign in 2017. One uncle, Abdul Latif Hasan Al-kassab, was taking water from the Euphrates river when a Coalition airstrike targeted the area on June 25th 2017. His uncle was immediately killed along with two other civilians. His other uncle died when another Coalition airstrike targeted a building in Raqqa days before the city was liberated. “There is no mechanism to contact the Coalition who I believe is responsible for the death of my two uncles to investigate their death,” says Hasan today.
Additionally, Hasan told Airwars that the Initial Response Team in Raqqa has so far found 28 mass graves in Raqqa, containing more than 6,000 bodies, with two thirds of them believed to be civilians.
Zain Al-Abidin Al-A’kedi, an activist from Deir Ezzor living in northern Syria, told Airwars that he believes that the Coalition’s intervention against ISIS in Syria was necessary, but had come too late. “The wasted time led to an increase in the number of deaths and casualties by ISIS and the US-led Coalition airstrikes, in addition to huge damage in the cities and towns,” Zain said.
Firas Hanosh, an activist from Raqqa and a former doctor with Medecins Sans Frontières in one of Raqqa’s field hospitals, also believes that the US-led Coalition intervention in Syria was necessary, because local forces were unable to defeat ISIS. However, he argues that the Coalition’s choice of the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces as its ground proxy was a mistake. “The US-led Coalition didn’t choose the right partner on the ground (SDF) , which is racist against the Arab civilians.” Firas told Airwars that it is unsafe for him to return to his ravaged home city. He says he is also worried about being arrested by the SDF, because of his work as an activist monitoring the situation in Raqqa.
Wary of intervening on the ground in Syria or getting involved in the civil war, the US still needed to combat ISIS. It therefore turned to the Kurds – initially helping the newly formed SDF to drive out ISIS from its own areas. “Without the Coalition’s intervention forces, we would have lost Kobane, Qamishli and other Kurdish areas.” Dlshad, a Syrian cyber security engineer now living in Washington DC ,said. However, as the SDF then advanced against ISIS in primarily Arabic-population territory, tensions rose.
Other Syrians believe the US and its allies had hidden motives. Jala, a Syrian woman now living in London, believes that the US intervention in Syria, though declared to be against ISIS, was in fact aimed at controlling the oil fields of North East Syria. President Trump has done little to dispel this view, and US troops today occupy many of Syria’s oil fields.
Assad’s allies: Russia and Iran in Syria
Even as the US-led Coalition was ramping up its attacks against ISIS in Syria, the regime was losing badly on the ground to rebel forces. Reports estimated that despite Iranian and Hezbollah support, Bashar al-Assad held only 25% of Syria by late 2015. Assad asked for support from his Russian allies – leading to Moscow’s largest foreign intervention since its disastrous Afghanistan campaign of 1979-1989. The outcome in Syria would prove to be very different.
The first Russian airstrikes in Syria took place on September 30th 2015, targeting the towns of Za`faranah, Talbisah and Ar-Rastan in Homs; and Al Makrmeya and Jisr al Shughour in Idlib. From the first day, the effects on civilians were devastating. At least 43 civilians reportedly died in Russia’s initial airstrikes – with more than 150 more injured.
Accused of indifference to civilian harm from its actions in Syria – and even the deliberate targeting of communities – Moscow has yet to admit to a single civilian death in five years of war. Airwars monitoring has so far recorded 4,487 locally reported problem airstrikes by Russia in partnership with the Assad government from 2015 to 2020 – which between them reportedly led to the deaths of as many as 22,000 non combatants, and the injuring of up to 40,000 more.
“The Russian intervention in Syria is not new,” argues Dlshad, a cyber security engineer now living in Washington DC: “I come from Rmeilan city which is rich with oil, and the Russians have been in the city for a long time.” That said, Dlshad believes the Russian intervention both extended the life of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime – and in some cases curbed his actions. He argues for example that Assad would have been more brutal against his own people without Russian control.
“The Russian military involvement changed the military equation,” argues Abdulkarim Ekzayez, a Research Associate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, University of London and himself a Syrian: “Large-scale aerial attacks on vital infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and bakeries have weakened the resilience of the targeted communities in opposition held areas. Consequently the regime was able to take control over most of the opposition pockets in central and southern Syria, pushing all opposition factions into the north west with clearly defined contact lines between the two warring parties.”
Mohammed Al Fares, the nom de plume of a humanitarian worker living in Idlib, believes that the Russians have followed a systematic plan to target civilians in Syria – something the US-led Coalition tried to avoid, he says. However, Jala believes that none of the actors in the Syrian conflict cared deeply about civilians, including Syrian fighters on the ground because they focused only on achieving military gains and not on civilians.
The other key ally of the Assad government, Iran, has taken a different approach. Years of sanctions have left it with a poorly equipped air force. Instead Tehran’s efforts in Syria focused on its domestic rocket and drone programmes, in turn channelling them to both Hezbollah and to the Syrian regime.
In addition, Iranian ground forces have played a key role in the fighting. The Quds Brigade is known to be involved at a senior level in the Syrian conflict and even in changing the structure of the Syrian army. The Syrian 4th Brigade is close to Iran for example, while the 5th Brigade has closer links to Russian forces.
Unilateral interventions in Syria
With a weak government in Damascus, multiple foreign powers have for years conducted unilateral actions in Syria in support of their own national interests. The United States has long targeted al Qaeda-linked fighters in western Syria for example; while the British conducted a controversial targeted killing of a UK citizen in 2015. Two nations in particular have fought lengthy unilateral campaigns.
Turkey has launched several massive operations in North East Syria, alongside its earlier targeting of ISIS in Idlib. In January 2018, Ankara launched Operation Olive Branch in Afrin, and later Operation Peace Spring in October 2019.
Overall, hundreds of Syrian civilians have been locally reported killed by Turkish actions – both against Kurdish forces, and ISIS-occupied areas such as al Bab.
Syrians interviewed for this article were strongly opposed to Turkey’s interventions. “There was no threat against Turkey. Why did Turkey intervene? Turkey is racist against the Kurds and that’s it,” claimed Dlshad.
H.J, a female architect from Damascus who asked not to be fully named for safety reasons, argued: “Syrians thought that Erdogan was helping the Syrian cause, but he eventually used it as a bargaining chip with Europe; causing destruction and division between Arabs and Kurds, and turning Syrian youth into mercenaries”.
Israel’s own unilateral aerial campaign in Syria has proved devastating against both Iranian and Hezbollah forces. In early 2019, a senior Israeli commander declared that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had dropped more than 2,000 bombs on Syria during the previous year, while Prime Minister Binyamin Netenyahu said that “the IDF has attacked hundreds of times Iranian and Hezbollah targets.”
Despite the significant scale of Israel’s intervention, international attention has been limited. This may in part be due to the low levels of reported civilian harm from Israeli strikes in Syria compared with other foreign powers. Since 2019, Airwars monitoring indicates that between 13 and 22 civilians were killed and over 40 injured in nine Israeli airstrikes of concern. With its focus in Syria almost exclusively on military targets, Israel appears to have limited the widescale civilian harm seen in the actions of others.
According to Mohammed Al Fares, a Syrian spoken to for this article, “It is good that Israel is destroying the regime’s military installations. However, they are doing it because they don’t want Iran to get an upper hand in Syria, not for the sake of the Syrian people.”
The reverberating effects of foreign intervention
Years of conflict in Syria, combined with external intervention by at least 17 foreign powers, have changed the face of the country for ever. According to the UNHCR, there are 6.2 million people, including 2.5 million children, currently internally displaced within Syria, the largest such population in the world. Beyond Syria’s borders, the total number of registered Syrian refugees has so far reached 5.5 million.
The direct links between external interventions and the displacement of civilians can be challenging to unpack.
In North East Syria for example actions by rebels; by ISIS; and later by Turkish forces, saw more than 215,000 people driven from their homes. While many have returned, an estimated 100,000 remain displaced.
Similarly, Syrian Arab Army operations supported from the air by Russia have proved highly disruptive. During the last major campaign between December 2019 and March 2020 in North West Syria, the UN reported a new displacement of more than 960,000 people, including more than 575,000 children.
Humanitarian worker Mohammed Al Fares, himself an IDP, told Airwars about his own experience. “When you are forced outside your residence, you die slowly. You lose everything, your home, your land, your job and your money. You try to start over and build a new life, but it is difficult.”
The destruction of Syria’s infrastructure over the past nine years has also been extreme – much of it the result of foreign actions. Among the most brutal examples have been Aleppo and Raqqa – the first significantly at the hands of Russian forces; the latter mostly as a result of the US-led Coalition’s targeting of ISIS. According to ReliefWeb: “About a third of homes in Syria were thought to have been damaged or destroyed by 2017. In 2018, the UN estimated the cost of material destruction in Syria at $120 billion.”
Hasan Al-Kassab told Airwars that eleven bridges in Raqqa were destroyed including Raqqa’s New Bridge during the Coalition’s 2017 campaign, and that civilians are only slowly starting to return because of a lack of basic services. For example, 60% of Raqqa is still without electricity.
East Aleppo, which witnessed brutal bombing by the Assad government supported by its Russian ally, experienced a similar fate. Battles which began in 2012 reached their climax in November 2016, when SAA troops began a decisive campaign that ended a month later with the retaking of the city. This caused very significant damage to Aleppo.
H.J, the architect from Damascus, believes that the destruction in Syria has been systemic and not just ‘collateral damage’ as militaries claim. “The destruction caused by all different actors is called many things, of which: Urbicide/ Identicide. That is, to commit a massacre against the urban environment; to target relationships that connect people and places, erasing their identities. Nowadays, one third of Syria is destroyed, and about 80% of Syria’s Night lights are gone.”
Significant opposition remains from many countries to the reconstruction process in Syria while Bashar al-Assad remains in power. However, the US is implementing small scale rebuilding activities in areas under SDF control, focusing on basic services like water, electricity and rubble removal that don’t reach the level of reconstruction. At the same time, with Russia and Iran unable significantly to support the regime financially as it seeks to rebuild Syria, limited scale investments risk lining the pockets of warlords, profiteers and cronies.
A price worth paying?
Mohammed Al Fares believes that overall, external intervention by so many foreign powers has had a negative impact on the course of the Syrian revolution, and on the general situation in the country. “Syrians had been in a state of solidarity with each other when the revolution started and [they eventually] controlled about 70% of Syria. External intervention including money channelling, divided the Syrians and brought into the decision making people who were not fit to lead. This in turn made the revolution very political until it lost its momentum. However, the revolution continues with its youth, women, elders and children despite all the obstacles it faces”
However others see more subtlety. According to Hasan Al-Kassab from Raqqa: “We can’t put all the interventions in the same basket. The Coalition intervened to eliminate ISIS, Russia intervened to oppress the people and legitimise the regime against the civilians, while Turkey intervened to fight the PKK and secure its borders. However every intervention is still an occupation, because there is no mechanism to give oversight to the people. They built military bases and disturbed the fabric of the Syrian people.”
From her side, H.J, the female architect from Damascus, argues that after the regime started killing civilians in 2012, the Syrian people tolerated even ‘allying with the devil’ to oust Bashar Al-Assad. ‘’I didn’t personally support this opinion, but we needed any offerings, we naively thought that the world would help us without anything in return. We were wrong, and all interventions were bad. The country was divided, and military bases were established.”
With peace still nowhere in sight in Syria – and fighting likely to resume as the Covid pandemic recedes – there is little sign of foreign powers withdrawing any time soon. While their interventions have radically changed conflict dynamics, they have done little to support the Syrian peoples in their aspirations for freedom and justice. Yet if the same kind of resource spent by foreign powers on bombs and missiles could one day be diverted to Syria’s infrastructure development, to education, and to the fostering of civil society, another future remains possible.


airwars--2020-10-02--Belgian airstrikes and the myth of zero civilian casualties

As Belgium 's F-16s return to the skies of Iraq and Syria , significant accountability improvements for civilian harm are needed .
On October 1st , Belgium once again sent its F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve , fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria .
Yet the Belgian , Iraqi and Syrian publics are still kept in the dark when it comes to civilian harm during previous deployments .
The Belgian military to this day refuses to take responsibility for civilians its actions might have killed or injured .
Also this week , an open letter to defence minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including Airwars – calling for greater transparency and accountability for reported civilian harm – has been widely covered by the Belgian media .
Until the end of 2017 , Belgium was one of the more active Coalition allies , alternating with the Dutch military .
During some 991 declared missions , the Belgians fired nearly one thousand bombs and missiles .
A total of 95 Belgian military personnel and a team of four Red Card Holders will now be deployed again until September 2021 .
According to the parliamentary resolution approving this latest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria “ covers only a buffer zone on the border with Iraq and is much more restricted than in 2017 ” .
The stated aim of the mission is to protect troops on the ground , and to carry out planned or ad-hoc targeted attacks on ISIS .
In August , the Belgian news organisation HLN reported that the Belgian military had updated its weapons to ‘ precision bombs ’ .
F-16s will be armed with bombs of the type GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb .
According to a Belgian military technician , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surgical precision ” .
According to Alma Al Osta , Arms Advocacy Manager with Humanity And Inclusion , this change of munition is not enough : “ There is much more to protecting civilians than just choosing a precise weapon .
Belgium has indeed chosen GBU-39/B bombs , which are known for their precision , but these bombs weigh around 115kg and are capable of penetrating one meter of steel-reinforced concrete .
If this weapon is used on open battlefields without the presence of civilians , then the risk would be smaller .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and cities where people live , children go to school , and civilians gather on markets.
” Besides the direct impact of explosive weapons in urban areas , Al Osta is worried about their secondary effects : “ We have no information on how Belgium will prevent civilian harm and mitigate the so-called domino effects of airstrikes , such as trauma , damage to civilian objects , displacement , lack of access to education , health care and agricultural land , contamination with unexploded ordnances , damage to the environment and further instability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , Commander of the Belgian Air Component Frederik Vansina refused to answer any questions on Belgian involvement in specific civilian harm incidents and told De Morgen : “ Countries within the Coalition show solidarity and neither confirm nor deny [ involvement ] .
Let ’ s talk about how the Syrian regime and Russia operate there .
That ’ s a different story .
Just look at the images of Homs and Aleppo.
” Back in 2017 , a senior Belgian official had told Airwars that the government was planning to admit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Al Qaim on February 27th 2017 and the second incident on March 21st of that year in the vicinity of Mosul .
According to the US-led Coalition itself , the strikes had killed at least two civilians and injured four others .
However , the Belgian government then publicly failed to take responsibility for these incidents , and even asserted that its actions had killed zero civilians .
In March 2020 , a joint investigation by Airwars , RTL Netherlands , BBC , De Morgen and Liberation revealed that Belgium consistently refuses to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even where the US-led Coalition has conceded particular Belgian strikes to have killed and injured non combatants .
In response to this investigation , the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces ( BAF ) were “ certainly not involved in all events.
” Previous comments by Colonel J. Poesen , head of operations at the Belgian Air Force , indicated that only incidents in which international humanitarian law was possibly violated were being investigated .
However , the acknowledged civilian harm events recognised by the Coalition show that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even where they might comply with international humanitarian law .
A major bottleneck to greater transparency and accountability for Belgian military actions abroad is a lack of effective parliamentary oversight .
According to a 2018 report by Pax Christi Vlaanderen and Vredesactie , “ there is no binding parliamentary approval for foreign missions , nor mandatory evaluations during and after the operation .
Moreover , there is no formal and transparent framework under which the government periodically informs parliament about the specific objectives , content and consequences of military operations.
” In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Missions , established in the early 2000s , MPs are confidentially briefed about military interventions .
Yf Reykers , Assistant Professor in International Relations at Maastricht University notes : “ This commission is special in the sense that there are not many countries having such a commission in which high-level classified information is shared .
However , that information can not be used by MPs who are part of that commission because they are bound to strict confidentiality .
They are also unable to verify this information independently with other sources.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does include several amendments that call on the government to improve its transparency and accountability practices .
For example , Parliament requests the federal government “ to communicate publicly , after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations , about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations.
” Reykers is generally positive about the amendments : “ It is progress that Parliament is even considering transparency and accountability practices .
That is really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ago .
We see that Belgium is learning from its neighbouring countries , such as the Netherlands , especially after the Hawijah scandal.
” However , Reykers also sees possibilities for the Government to manoeuvre itself through the amendments with minimum levels of transparency and accountability : “ The question is if these amendments will bring about structural change .
One of the things that is really needed is systematic evaluations [ of civilian harm claims ] before , during and after a mission , ideally publicly available.
” While the new parliamentary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its transparency and accountability during the upcoming deployment , it is yet to be seen whether Belgium will structurally change its practices – and whether the civilian victims of its previous airstrikes will receive answers .
• This is an English-language version of an Opinion piece by Laurie Treffers for Airwars , published in the Belgian daily De Standaard on September 24th 2020 .

As Belgium's F-16s return to the skies of Iraq and Syria, significant accountability improvements for civilian harm are needed.
On October 1st, Belgium once again sent its F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve, fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Yet the Belgian, Iraqi and Syrian publics are still kept in the dark when it comes to civilian harm during previous deployments. The Belgian military to this day refuses to take responsibility for civilians its actions might have killed or injured.
Also this week, an open letter to defence minister Philippe Goffin from eleven civil society organisations including Airwars – calling for greater transparency and accountability for reported civilian harm – has been widely covered by the Belgian media.
Until the end of 2017, Belgium was one of the more active Coalition allies, alternating with the Dutch military. During some 991 declared missions, the Belgians fired nearly one thousand bombs and missiles. A total of 95 Belgian military personnel and a team of four Red Card Holders will now be deployed again until September 2021. According to the parliamentary resolution approving this latest weapon deployment, any possible action in Syria “covers only a buffer zone on the border with Iraq and is much more restricted than in 2017”. The stated aim of the mission is to protect troops on the ground, and to carry out planned or ad-hoc targeted attacks on ISIS.
In August, the Belgian news organisation HLN reported that the Belgian military had updated its weapons to ‘precision bombs’. F-16s will be armed with bombs of the type GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb. According to a Belgian military technician, the munition was chosen because of its “surgical precision”.
According to Alma Al Osta, Arms Advocacy Manager with Humanity And Inclusion, this change of munition is not enough: “There is much more to protecting civilians than just choosing a precise weapon. Belgium has indeed chosen GBU-39/B bombs, which are known for their precision, but these bombs weigh around 115kg and are capable of penetrating one meter of steel-reinforced concrete. If this weapon is used on open battlefields without the presence of civilians, then the risk would be smaller. But wars nowadays are fought in towns and cities where people live, children go to school, and civilians gather on markets.”
Besides the direct impact of explosive weapons in urban areas, Al Osta is worried about their secondary effects: “We have no information on how Belgium will prevent civilian harm and mitigate the so-called domino effects of airstrikes, such as trauma, damage to civilian objects, displacement, lack of access to education, health care and agricultural land, contamination with unexploded ordnances, damage to the environment and further instability,” she notes.
The zero civilian casualty myth
In March 2020, Commander of the Belgian Air Component Frederik Vansina refused to answer any questions on Belgian involvement in specific civilian harm incidents and told De Morgen: “Countries within the Coalition show solidarity and neither confirm nor deny [involvement]. Let’s talk about how the Syrian regime and Russia operate there. That’s a different story. Just look at the images of Homs and Aleppo.”
Back in 2017, a senior Belgian official had told Airwars that the government was planning to admit two civilian harm incidents – one at Al Qaim on February 27th 2017 and the second incident on March 21st of that year in the vicinity of Mosul. According to the US-led Coalition itself, the strikes had killed at least two civilians and injured four others. However, the Belgian government then publicly failed to take responsibility for these incidents, and even asserted that its actions had killed zero civilians.
In March 2020, a joint investigation by Airwars, RTL Netherlands, BBC, De Morgen and Liberation revealed that Belgium consistently refuses to acknowledge civilian casualties from its actions, even where the US-led Coalition has conceded particular Belgian strikes to have killed and injured non combatants. In response to this investigation, the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces (BAF) were “certainly not involved in all events.”
Previous comments by Colonel J. Poesen, head of operations at the Belgian Air Force, indicated that only incidents in which international humanitarian law was possibly violated were being investigated. However, the acknowledged civilian harm events recognised by the Coalition show that civilians are nevertheless killed in military actions, even where they might comply with international humanitarian law.
Lack of parliamentary overview
A major bottleneck to greater transparency and accountability for Belgian military actions abroad is a lack of effective parliamentary oversight. According to a 2018 report by Pax Christi Vlaanderen and Vredesactie, “there is no binding parliamentary approval for foreign missions, nor mandatory evaluations during and after the operation. Moreover, there is no formal and transparent framework under which the government periodically informs parliament about the specific objectives, content and consequences of military operations.”
In the special parliamentary commission Follow-up of Foreign Missions, established in the early 2000s, MPs are confidentially briefed about military interventions. Yf Reykers, Assistant Professor in International Relations at Maastricht University notes: “This commission is special in the sense that there are not many countries having such a commission in which high-level classified information is shared. However, that information cannot be used by MPs who are part of that commission because they are bound to strict confidentiality. They are also unable to verify this information independently with other sources.”
The Parliamentary resolution approving the upcoming weapon deployment does include several amendments that call on the government to improve its transparency and accountability practices. For example, Parliament requests the federal government “to communicate publicly, after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations, about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations.”
Reykers is generally positive about the amendments: “It is progress that Parliament is even considering transparency and accountability practices. That is really a change compared to a few years ago. We see that Belgium is learning from its neighbouring countries, such as the Netherlands, especially after the Hawijah scandal.”
However, Reykers also sees possibilities for the Government to manoeuvre itself through the amendments with minimum levels of transparency and accountability: “The question is if these amendments will bring about structural change. One of the things that is really needed is systematic evaluations [of civilian harm claims] before, during and after a mission, ideally publicly available.”
While the new parliamentary resolution urges the federal Government to improve its transparency and accountability during the upcoming deployment, it is yet to be seen whether Belgium will structurally change its practices – and whether the civilian victims of its previous airstrikes will receive answers.