airwars--2020-06-22--Ongoing ceasefire between Russia and Turkey brings respite for Syrian civilians

Civilians are continuing to benefit from a months-long ceasefire in northern Syria , which has seen casualty numbers sharply fall to levels last seen in the early months of the civil war .
Experts remain divided however , on how long this pause in fighting will last – and what it means for Syria and its divided people .
April and May 2020 marked the first complete months since the beginning of the Russian campaign in Syria in September 2015 , in which Airwars did not monitor any civilian casualty allegations against Moscow .
A ceasefire beginning in early March @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Covid-19 crisis – brought an end to months of violent air raids on Idlib governorate , which had killed up to 556 civilians .
On March 5th , 2020 , Russia and Turkey reached agreement on a ceasefire in Idlib governorate , after recent escalations had led to the deaths of 36 Turkish soldiers .
Terms included the provision of a 12 kilometre long safety corridor alongside the M4 highway , which connects Aleppo with Latakia ; and joint patrols by Russian and Turkish forces .
“ The reason why Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what it wanted .
Their endgame has always been to secure the integrity of the Syrian regime , ” argues Alexey Khlebnikov , a Middle East expert and Russian foreign policy analyst with the Russian International Affairs Council ( RIAC ) .
“ The priority in Idlib was never to take it over in its entirety .
The campaign was not targeted at getting every centimetre .
There were and there are two major goals : securing the M5 , which connects Aleppo and Damascus , and the M4 highway , connecting Aleppo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Turkey did less well out of that agreement .
Gerhard Mangott , a professor at the University of Innsbruck specialising in international relations and security in the post-Soviet region , notes : “ The ceasefire is a compromise between Russian and Turkish interests , with poor results for Turkey and good results for Russia .
Turkey had set an ultimatum to the Syrian government to withdraw to the front line of April 2019 , when Syrian and allied forces started their offensive in Idlib .
Due to Russian pressure , Turkey had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As the last remaining opposition stronghold , north west Syria was targeted heavily during a three-month campaign by the Assad regime and Russia as they sought to gain control of the region .
Russian-backed pro-government forces ( made up of Syrian Government forces , Hezbollah , and allied armed groups ) attempted to push into both Idlib and Aleppo Governorates , and defeat remaining anti-government rebels .
The beginning of the offensive saw pro-government forces make quick advances against rebel troops .
By the end of December 2019 , the Assad government had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arat Al Nu ’ man countryside including Jarjnaz , the largest town in the area ; and had completely encircled the main Turkish observation point in Sarman .
Then , following a short-lived ceasefire between January 9th and 15th , the Syrian Government made some of its most significant advances in Idlib since the civil war began in 2011 .
By January 28th , pro-government forces had managed to capture Ma ’ arat Al Nu ’ man , a city of major strategic and symbolic importance due to its position on the Aleppo-Damascus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s main economic arteries to areas under government control in northwestern Syria .
Just eight days later , the town of Saraqib – another locale which had served as a bastion against the Assad Government for many years – was captured .
The following weeks saw more government advances including the full capture of the province of Aleppo for the first time since the outbreak of the civil war .
Russian airpower has been crucial to each pro-government advance .
However , these military victories came at a catastrophic cost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Aleppo .
Heavily populated urban areas were pummelled before each incursion , with almost no respite for residents .
During the three months of the campaign , Russia was allegedly involved in 250 separate civilian harm incidents – averaging more than three events every day .
These airstrikes led to between 423 and 556 civilian deaths and the injuring of up to 1,137 more , Airwars monitoring of local sources indicates .
At least 128 children were killed during the campaign – more than a quarter of all tracked fatalities – showing that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a ruthless air campaign .
Additionally , crucial civilian infrastructure was hit numerous times .
Schools were targeted on at least 15 occasions , while hospitals and medical centres were struck at least nine times .
This targeting of civilian infrastructure by Assad and Russia was not new .
According to the World Health Organisation , there have been 83 attacks on healthcare facilities in Syria since April 2019 .
The Idlib campaign triggered a widespread displacement crisis in northern Syria .
By the end of the assault , at least 980,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ children , were forced to flee the violence .
According to Mark Lowcock , UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs , these displaced people were struggling to survive in what he described as “ horrific conditions ” .
The fighting in Idlib eventually stopped after Turkey escalated its own operations against pro-Assad government forces , following a devastating airstrike on a Turkish infantry battalion on the road between al-Bara and Balyun , which had left 32 Turkish soldiers dead and many others wounded .
Following this event , Ankara took the bold decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rebels .
The ferociousness of Turkey ’ s intervention was unprecedented , with Turkish forces launching a barrage of attacks on pro-regime positions , destroying dozens of military vehicles , equipment and several Russian-made air defence systems .
These attacks devastated the Syrian Government , with the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reporting that 170 pro-regime forces died .
Turkish defence minister Hulusi Akar put the toll far higher – claiming that Turkish forces had destroyed two Syrian Su-24 fighter jets , two drones , 135 tanks , and five air defence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than 2,500 fighters loyal to the Syrian government .
The risk of being embroiled in an all-out confrontation with Turkey forced the hands of both the Syrian and Russian governments , and prompted a formal ceasefire agreement between Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and Vladmir Putin of Russia .
While the eventual ceasefire provided a much-needed respite for civilians in northwestern Syria , millions continued to suffer from the after-effects of the brutal campaign .
And with the COVID-19 pandemic showing no signs of abating in the region , refugees from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overcrowded camps , may remain most at risk of suffering from the virus .
Khlebnikov at RIAC says he does not , however , think the Covid-19 crisis was the main driver of the ceasefire : “ I wouldn ’ t say it is a game-changer or a strong factor in this ceasefire .
The Ukraine crisis did not impact Russia ’ s foreign policy , even though the economy was under great distress .
So why would Covid-19 ?
It might affect the intensity of the conflict in the long run , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and leaders are unable to meet in person.
” Elizabeth Tsurkov , a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a Syria expert , agrees : “ I don ’ t think the Covid-19 crisis impacted the calculations of the warring parties in this conflict.
” That the ceasefire has lasted following the Covid-19 outbreak might seem paradoxical , given that both Russia and Turkey recently increased their involvement in Libya .
However , those contributions are relatively small for now , compared to Syria .
That said , the conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria – with Russia and Turkey again on opposite sides – and also a continuation of the civil war on different soil , as Syrian mercenaries recruited by both Turkey and Russia now fight each other in the Maghreb .
Talks between Moscow and Ankara to explore a deal that might see the fates of Syria and Libya connected have been put off for now .
“ Costs of violating the ceasefire are much higher now ” Previous Syria ceasefires have been fairly short-lived .
So why is the Idlib pause still holding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The situation on the ground is different from two years ago .
Idlib is now the only lasting stronghold of opposition armed groups and terrorists .
And a ceasefire during a civil war , it is not a literal thing .
There are certain violations , ” asserts Khlebnikov .
According to his own estimates , there were 80 violations of the ceasefire in the first half of May .
Even so , Khlebnikov sees the ceasefire as quite successful : “ Since March 5th , the violence fell significantly .
The first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were 5 or 7 kilometres long , now they are 25 kilometres long .
This builds trust ; and the Russian and Turkish militaries are getting used to interacting with each other on hostile ground .
That creates a certain restraint for [ other ] armed groups to escalate.
” Mangott also views the results of the ceasefire as so far positive : “ I think it will last .
Russia is in a difficult economic and financial situation , the GDP will drop by 10 % this year .
There will probably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The current spending priority is on social causes [ at home ] to take care of the economic crisis , so there is no money for an escalation in Syria.
” In mid June there were some reports of violations of the ceasefire , with Russian airstrikes on Idlib and reports of civilian casualties .
These appeared to be in retaliation for attempts by the HTS to seize several villages , and attack Russian targets , however .
Dr Elizabeth Tsurkov remains positive : “ This is the first time in the history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the regime will be punished for violating it .
Turkish drones will be up the skies , killing soldiers .
The costs will be much higher for them .
It is difficult to make predictions , because there are too many uncertain factors right now , also looking at the elections in the US coming up .
But I think the ceasefire will last for the rest of 2020.
” Tsurkov adds : “ The area north of the M4 highway will remain out of regime hands for the foreseeable future .
Until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will essentially be annexed into Turkey .
We are already seeing the dynamics of that in northern Aleppo.
” Amplifying fears in Damascus of a de facto annexation , in mid June Turkish-backed opposition groups introduced the Turkish Lira and the US dollar as local currencies in cities and towns across Idlib governorate in an effort , they claimed , to stabilise the local economy after the ongoing depreciation of the Syrian pound .
Whenever it might end , Khlebnikov sees the ongoing ceasefire between Russia , the regime and Turkey in northern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is definitely not a final solution .
There are two options with the ceasefire : it will be cancelled , or updated .
I don ’ t think there will be any major breaches.
” “ On the other hand , there is a certain risk of escalation , because if Turkey won ’ t be able to deliver on its promises to clear the buffer zone , that may become a legitimate reason for Russia and the Syrian army to launch operations.
” But , warns Khlebnikov : “ In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15.000 troops and upped military equipment .
It is amassing its forces in Idlib .
Any fight with Turkey will be a disaster for Russia.
” With a mass outbreak of the Covid-19 virus still threatening Syria – with its heavily weakened health care system after nearly a decade of war – a fight between Russia and Turkey on Syrian territory would not only carry great risk for Moscow .
It is likely that Syrian civilians would bear the greatest losses , once again .

Foreign power involvement risks linking Syria and Libya wars, experts warn.
Civilians are continuing to benefit from a months-long ceasefire in northern Syria, which has seen casualty numbers sharply fall to levels last seen in the early months of the civil war. Experts remain divided however, on how long this pause in fighting will last – and what it means for Syria and its divided people.
April and May 2020 marked the first complete months since the beginning of the Russian campaign in Syria in September 2015, in which Airwars did not monitor any civilian casualty allegations against Moscow. A ceasefire beginning in early March – and international pressure in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis – brought an end to months of violent air raids on Idlib governorate, which had killed up to 556 civilians.
On March 5th, 2020, Russia and Turkey reached agreement on a ceasefire in Idlib governorate, after recent escalations had led to the deaths of 36 Turkish soldiers. Terms included the provision of a 12 kilometre long safety corridor alongside the M4 highway, which connects Aleppo with Latakia; and joint patrols by Russian and Turkish forces.
“The reason why Russia signed the ceasefire is because it got what it wanted. Their endgame has always been to secure the integrity of the Syrian regime,” argues Alexey Khlebnikov, a Middle East expert and Russian foreign policy analyst with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). “The priority in Idlib was never to take it over in its entirety. The campaign was not targeted at getting every centimetre. There were and there are two major goals: securing the M5, which connects Aleppo and Damascus, and the M4 highway, connecting Aleppo with Latakia.”
According to some experts, Turkey did less well out of that agreement. Gerhard Mangott, a professor at the University of Innsbruck specialising in international relations and security in the post-Soviet region, notes: “The ceasefire is a compromise between Russian and Turkish interests, with poor results for Turkey and good results for Russia. Turkey had set an ultimatum to the Syrian government to withdraw to the front line of April 2019, when Syrian and allied forces started their offensive in Idlib. Due to Russian pressure, Turkey had to accept the actual front line.”
Idlib offensive: at least 423 civilian deaths
As the last remaining opposition stronghold, north west Syria was targeted heavily during a three-month campaign by the Assad regime and Russia as they sought to gain control of the region. Russian-backed pro-government forces (made up of Syrian Government forces, Hezbollah, and allied armed groups) attempted to push into both Idlib and Aleppo Governorates, and defeat remaining anti-government rebels.
The beginning of the offensive saw pro-government forces make quick advances against rebel troops. By the end of December 2019, the Assad government had captured large parts of the Ma’arat Al Nu’man countryside including Jarjnaz, the largest town in the area; and had completely encircled the main Turkish observation point in Sarman.
Then, following a short-lived ceasefire between January 9th and 15th, the Syrian Government made some of its most significant advances in Idlib since the civil war began in 2011. By January 28th, pro-government forces had managed to capture Ma’arat Al Nu’man, a city of major strategic and symbolic importance due to its position on the Aleppo-Damascus Highway, which serves as one of the country’s main economic arteries to areas under government control in northwestern Syria.
Just eight days later, the town of Saraqib – another locale which had served as a bastion against the Assad Government for many years – was captured. The following weeks saw more government advances including the full capture of the province of Aleppo for the first time since the outbreak of the civil war.
Russian airpower has been crucial to each pro-government advance. However, these military victories came at a catastrophic cost to civilians, in both Idlib and Aleppo. Heavily populated urban areas were pummelled before each incursion, with almost no respite for residents.
During the three months of the campaign, Russia was allegedly involved in 250 separate civilian harm incidents – averaging more than three events every day. These airstrikes led to between 423 and 556 civilian deaths and the injuring of up to 1,137 more, Airwars monitoring of local sources indicates. At least 128 children were killed during the campaign – more than a quarter of all tracked fatalities – showing that the most vulnerable often bore the brunt of a ruthless air campaign.
Additionally, crucial civilian infrastructure was hit numerous times. Schools were targeted on at least 15 occasions, while hospitals and medical centres were struck at least nine times. This targeting of civilian infrastructure by Assad and Russia was not new. According to the World Health Organisation, there have been 83 attacks on healthcare facilities in Syria since April 2019.
The Idlib campaign triggered a widespread displacement crisis in northern Syria. By the end of the assault, at least 980,000 people, most of them women and children, were forced to flee the violence. According to Mark Lowcock, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, these displaced people were struggling to survive in what he described as “horrific conditions”.
Impact of Covid-19
The fighting in Idlib eventually stopped after Turkey escalated its own operations against pro-Assad government forces, following a devastating airstrike on a Turkish infantry battalion on the road between al-Bara and Balyun, which had left 32 Turkish soldiers dead and many others wounded.
Following this event, Ankara took the bold decision to intervene directly on the side of the rebels. The ferociousness of Turkey’s intervention was unprecedented, with Turkish forces launching a barrage of attacks on pro-regime positions, destroying dozens of military vehicles, equipment and several Russian-made air defence systems. These attacks devastated the Syrian Government, with the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reporting that 170 pro-regime forces died. Turkish defence minister Hulusi Akar put the toll far higher – claiming that Turkish forces had destroyed two Syrian Su-24 fighter jets, two drones, 135 tanks, and five air defence systems; and had “neutralised” more than 2,500 fighters loyal to the Syrian government.
The risk of being embroiled in an all-out confrontation with Turkey forced the hands of both the Syrian and Russian governments, and prompted a formal ceasefire agreement between Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and Vladmir Putin of Russia. While the eventual ceasefire provided a much-needed respite for civilians in northwestern Syria, millions continued to suffer from the after-effects of the brutal campaign. And with the COVID-19 pandemic showing no signs of abating in the region, refugees from the violence in Syria, clustered into overcrowded camps, may remain most at risk of suffering from the virus.
Khlebnikov at RIAC says he does not, however, think the Covid-19 crisis was the main driver of the ceasefire: “I wouldn’t say it is a game-changer or a strong factor in this ceasefire. The Ukraine crisis did not impact Russia’s foreign policy, even though the economy was under great distress. So why would Covid-19? It might affect the intensity of the conflict in the long run, and it slows things down because diplomats and leaders are unable to meet in person.”
Elizabeth Tsurkov, a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a Syria expert, agrees: “I don’t think the Covid-19 crisis impacted the calculations of the warring parties in this conflict.”
That the ceasefire has lasted following the Covid-19 outbreak might seem paradoxical, given that both Russia and Turkey recently increased their involvement in Libya. However, those contributions are relatively small for now, compared to Syria. That said, the conflict in Libya has become both interlinked with Syria – with Russia and Turkey again on opposite sides – and also a continuation of the civil war on different soil, as Syrian mercenaries recruited by both Turkey and Russia now fight each other in the Maghreb. Talks between Moscow and Ankara to explore a deal that might see the fates of Syria and Libya connected have been put off for now.
“Costs of violating the ceasefire are much higher now”
Previous Syria ceasefires have been fairly short-lived. So why is the Idlib pause still holding more than three months on? “The situation on the ground is different from two years ago. Idlib is now the only lasting stronghold of opposition armed groups and terrorists. And a ceasefire during a civil war, it is not a literal thing. There are certain violations,” asserts Khlebnikov.
According to his own estimates, there were 80 violations of the ceasefire in the first half of May. Even so, Khlebnikov sees the ceasefire as quite successful: “Since March 5th, the violence fell significantly. The first [joint Russian and Turkish] patrols were 5 or 7 kilometres long, now they are 45 kilometres long. This builds trust; and the Russian and Turkish militaries are getting used to interacting with each other on hostile ground. That creates a certain restraint for [other] armed groups to escalate.”
Mangott also views the results of the ceasefire as so far positive: “I think it will last. Russia is in a difficult economic and financial situation, the GDP will drop by 10% this year. There will probably be a drop in military spending. The current spending priority is on social causes [at home] to take care of the economic crisis, so there is no money for an escalation in Syria.”
In mid June there were some reports of violations of the ceasefire, with Russian airstrikes on Idlib and reports of civilian casualties. These appeared to be in retaliation for attempts by the HTS to seize several villages, and attack Russian targets, however. Dr Elizabeth Tsurkov remains positive: “This is the first time in the history of ceasefires in Syria when Russia and the regime will be punished for violating it. Turkish drones will be up the skies, killing soldiers. The costs will be much higher for them. It is difficult to make predictions, because there are too many uncertain factors right now, also looking at the elections in the US coming up. But I think the ceasefire will last for the rest of 2020.”
Tsurkov adds: “The area north of the M4 highway will remain out of regime hands for the foreseeable future. Until a deal is reached, the area will essentially be annexed into Turkey. We are already seeing the dynamics of that in northern Aleppo.”
Amplifying fears in Damascus of a de facto annexation, in mid June Turkish-backed opposition groups introduced the Turkish Lira and the US dollar as local currencies in cities and towns across Idlib governorate in an effort, they claimed, to stabilise the local economy after the ongoing depreciation of the Syrian pound.
Russia’s endgame in Syria
Whenever it might end, Khlebnikov sees the ongoing ceasefire between Russia, the regime and Turkey in northern Syria as a temporary solution: “It is definitely not a final solution. There are two options with the ceasefire: it will be cancelled, or updated. I don’t think there will be any major breaches.”
“On the other hand, there is a certain risk of escalation, because if Turkey won’t be able to deliver on its promises to clear the buffer zone, that may become a legitimate reason for Russia and the Syrian army to launch operations.” But, warns Khlebnikov: “In the last four months, Turkey allocated about 15.000 troops and upped military equipment. It is amassing its forces in Idlib. Any fight with Turkey will be a disaster for Russia.”
With a mass outbreak of the Covid-19 virus still threatening Syria – with its heavily weakened health care system after nearly a decade of war – a fight between Russia and Turkey on Syrian territory would not only carry great risk for Moscow. It is likely that Syrian civilians would bear the greatest losses, once again.


airwars--2020-07-07--Dutch defence minister announces fresh transparency moves

Ministry of Defence says it is revising current civilian harm reporting procedures The Dutch Minister of Defence , Ank Bijleveld , has reported to Parliament on the latest progress made by the Government in improving transparency regarding civilian harm as a result of Dutch military actions .
Coupled with other steps taken in the months after the Hawijah scandal , the Netherlands appears slowly to be shedding its reputation as one of the least transparent members of the international Coalition fighting so-called Islamic State .
In her June 29th letter to Parliament , the Minister laid out a number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transparency and accountability .
The letter followed on from a fourth parliamentary debate on May 14th on the Hawijah case .
Back in October 2019 , it was revealed that the Dutch military had been responsible for a 2015 airstrike in Iraq , which had led to the deaths of an estimated 70 civilians .
The Government had then withheld that fact from the public for more than four years .
An important topic during the fourth debate was the April 21st release of key US military documents on the Hawijah incident .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ those previously classified documents to Dutch media , after a judicial procedure following an unanswered Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA ) request .
Four months earlier , Minister Bijleveld had filed a request with her US counterpart Defense Secretary Mark Esper publicly to share the documents , including the American DoD ’ s own investigation into Hawijah .
She received a negative response to that request on February 28th .
However , MPs say they found it difficult to understand why the Minister was not given permission to share the documents , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ press just two months later .
The contents of those documents revealed that US officials had been aware that an airstrike on the targeted ISIS IED factory in Hawijah could possibly present a significant risk to civilians .
CIA informants had , for example , warned the Coalition about civilians living in the area .
Furthermore , while Minister Bijleveld has continuously stated that all procedures leading up to the Hawijah strike were followed correctly , the US investigation revealed that Coalition target development processes had been amended after the deadly event , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This was not reported to Parliament by Dutch defence officials .
It was in this context that the Minister , once again , recently had to explain herself in front of a clearly frustrated Parliament .
During the May 14th debate , Bijleveld said she shared the frustration of MPs regarding what was characterised as poor communication from the Americans and the Coalition .
In her letter of June 29th to MPs , the Minister wrote that she had met with her US counterpart Mark Esper earlier that day and that he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deplored the course of events , endorsed the importance of transparency and indicated that his department had done everything possible to provide the correct information.
” One major criticism of Hawijah was that the Dutch ‘ red card holder ’ had agreed on the strike taking place – despite the known risk to civilians in the area .
The Red Card Holder ( RCH ) was the Dutch representative in the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar , with the option of vetoing actions which fell outside Dutch rules of engagement .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the instructions for the Dutch Red Card Holder have been updated in line with a successful parliamentary motion .
From now on , she noted , the red card holder must proactively request important information related to future airstrikes the Dutch military may carry out .
In the case of Hawijah , the Dutch RCH was , for example , unaware that the Americans had intelligence suggesting that a possible airstrike posed a risk to civilians .
The Minister ’ s latest letter also states that the MoD expects to complete its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harm in the second half of 2020 .
The process of informing the Public Prosecutor ’ s Office ( OM ) has already been updated : from now on , the OM will be informed as soon as the MoD starts an investigation into any civilian harm allegation .
In the case of Hawijah , it took Defensie nine months to inform the OM .
On June 23rd , the minister additionally proposed a new procedure to inform Parliament of any investigations into civilian harm during future Dutch missions .
Whereas the initial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Minister now suggests that due to “ the importance the parliament attaches to public transparency ” , the default will instead be for the defence ministry to publicly inform parliament of such cases , unless this “ is impossible , according to the Minister.
” According to Lauren Gould , Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies at Utrecht University and project leader of the Intimacies of Remote Warfare project , the Minister ’ s proposal contains several loopholes : “ This is history just repeating itself : the Minister uses the catchphrase ‘ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is exempt from being transparent or being held to account for a lack of transparency .
It should be clearly defined when the parliament finds it acceptable that a minister does not inform the broader public .
The minister will have to prove that these exceptional circumstances are at play.
” Gould continued : “ Furthermore , the question remains : what information will Defensie share with parliament ?
They ’ ve stated multiple times that as a small country , the Netherlands is unequipped to independently investigate the nature of targets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There ’ s nothing in the procedure about how they will tackle one of the main problems in the Hawijah case : that crucial information collected by the US about Dutch military actions was withheld from the Dutch parliament and public.
” In her June 29th letter to Parliament , the minister also noted that on June 10th , Defensie personnel had spoken with Basim Razzo , a survivor of another 2015 Dutch airstrike , which had killed four relatives when Mr Razzo ’ s Mosul home was bombed by a Dutch F-16 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Mr Razzo himself was severely injured .
According to Minister Bijleveld , discussions are continuing with Mr Razzo ’ s counsel , human rights lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld .
Earlier , the Minister had promised to explore possibilities to voluntarily aid local projects for the devastated community in Hawijah .
There have , it ’ s now emerged , been talks between the Dutch embassy and local authorities on the matter .
The Minister writes that Defensie has identified several local organisations operating in Hawijah ; and that these have been asked what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hopes to inform Parliament of developments after the summer recess .
“ To prevent this information from reaching Parliament in another manner ” , the Minister also note that local authorities in Hawijah have expressed concerns about possible undefined radiation after the Dutch airstrike in June 2015 .
According to Bijleveld however , the munitions used in the attack were not capable of producing radiation .
Both the MoD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs say they will explore whether the concerns of Hawijans can be verified in another manner .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by human rights lawyer Zegveld in the name of Hawijah ’ s victims .
According to Bijleveld , the Dutch Cabinet has sent a note of sympathy to the victims and their relatives , but claimed that an offer to begin a conversation was rejected .
Explaining that rejection , lawyer Zegveld told Airwars : “ [ The Minister ] wanted to have a one on one conversation ‘ human being to human being ’ with the Hawijah victim living in the Netherlands .
He was expected to come alone , without me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agree to that .
It ’ s not about the person Bijleveld , but about her responsibility as a Minister.
” Along with the Minister ’ s latest June 29th letter to Parliament , the MoD has now also published its weekly reports of all anti-ISIS airstrikes in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2018 as open data , after recent requests from Airwars and the Open State Foundation .
“ While Airwars welcomes this next step towards a more transparent Defensie , the content of the data is still below standard , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Other Coalition allies such as the UK already report the specific date , targets and near locations of their airstrikes .
For Defensie to become more transparent , improving their reporting on airstrikes really is one of the first steps to take .
”

Ministry of Defence says it is revising current civilian harm reporting procedures
The Dutch Minister of Defence, Ank Bijleveld, has reported to Parliament on the latest progress made by the Government in improving transparency regarding civilian harm as a result of Dutch military actions. Coupled with other steps taken in the months after the Hawijah scandal, the Netherlands appears slowly to be shedding its reputation as one of the least transparent members of the international Coalition fighting so-called Islamic State.
In her June 29th letter to Parliament, the Minister laid out a number of changes which she claimed would improve both transparency and accountability. The letter followed on from a fourth parliamentary debate on May 14th on the Hawijah case. Back in October 2019, it was revealed that the Dutch military had been responsible for a 2015 airstrike in Iraq, which had led to the deaths of an estimated 70 civilians. The Government had then withheld that fact from the public for more than four years.
An important topic during the fourth debate was the April 21st release of key US military documents on the Hawijah incident. The US Department of Defense had provided those previously classified documents to Dutch media, after a judicial procedure following an unanswered Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
Four months earlier, Minister Bijleveld had filed a request with her US counterpart Defense Secretary Mark Esper publicly to share the documents, including the American DoD’s own investigation into Hawijah. She received a negative response to that request on February 28th. However, MPs say they found it difficult to understand why the Minister was not given permission to share the documents, when they were publicly released to the press just two months later.
The contents of those documents revealed that US officials had been aware that an airstrike on the targeted ISIS IED factory in Hawijah could possibly present a significant risk to civilians. CIA informants had, for example, warned the Coalition about civilians living in the area. Furthermore, while Minister Bijleveld has continuously stated that all procedures leading up to the Hawijah strike were followed correctly, the US investigation revealed that Coalition target development processes had been amended after the deadly event, as they had proved to be insufficient. This was not reported to Parliament by Dutch defence officials.
It was in this context that the Minister, once again, recently had to explain herself in front of a clearly frustrated Parliament. During the May 14th debate, Bijleveld said she shared the frustration of MPs regarding what was characterised as poor communication from the Americans and the Coalition.
In her letter of June 29th to MPs, the Minister wrote that she had met with her US counterpart Mark Esper earlier that day and that he had, in her words, “deplored the course of events, endorsed the importance of transparency and indicated that his department had done everything possible to provide the correct information.”
Red Card Holder
One major criticism of Hawijah was that the Dutch ‘red card holder’ had agreed on the strike taking place – despite the known risk to civilians in the area. The Red Card Holder (RCH) was the Dutch representative in the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, with the option of vetoing actions which fell outside Dutch rules of engagement. According to Bijleveld, as of July 1st, the instructions for the Dutch Red Card Holder have been updated in line with a successful parliamentary motion. From now on, she noted, the red card holder must proactively request important information related to future airstrikes the Dutch military may carry out. In the case of Hawijah, the Dutch RCH was, for example, unaware that the Americans had intelligence suggesting that a possible airstrike posed a risk to civilians.
The Minister’s latest letter also states that the MoD expects to complete its updating of internal reporting procedure on civilian harm in the second half of 2020. The process of informing the Public Prosecutor’s Office (OM) has already been updated: from now on, the OM will be informed as soon as the MoD starts an investigation into any civilian harm allegation. In the case of Hawijah, it took Defensie nine months to inform the OM.
On June 23rd, the minister additionally proposed a new procedure to inform Parliament of any investigations into civilian harm during future Dutch missions. Whereas the initial plan was to inform Parliament confidentially, the Minister now suggests that due to “the importance the parliament attaches to public transparency”, the default will instead be for the defence ministry to publicly inform parliament of such cases, unless this “is impossible, according to the Minister.”
According to Lauren Gould, Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies at Utrecht University and project leader of the Intimacies of Remote Warfare project, the Minister’s proposal contains several loopholes: “This is history just repeating itself: the Minister uses the catchphrase ‘national, operational and personnel security’ and is exempt from being transparent or being held to account for a lack of transparency. It should be clearly defined when the parliament finds it acceptable that a minister does not inform the broader public. The minister will have to prove that these exceptional circumstances are at play.”
Gould continued: “Furthermore, the question remains: what information will Defensie share with parliament? They’ve stated multiple times that as a small country, the Netherlands is unequipped to independently investigate the nature of targets or the civilian casualties that occur. There’s nothing in the procedure about how they will tackle one of the main problems in the Hawijah case: that crucial information collected by the US about Dutch military actions was withheld from the Dutch parliament and public.”
Victim compensation
In her June 29th letter to Parliament, the minister also noted that on June 10th, Defensie personnel had spoken with Basim Razzo, a survivor of another 2015 Dutch airstrike, which had killed four relatives when Mr Razzo’s Mosul home was bombed by a Dutch F-16 as a result of an intelligence error. Mr Razzo himself was severely injured. According to Minister Bijleveld, discussions are continuing with Mr Razzo’s counsel, human rights lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld.
Earlier, the Minister had promised to explore possibilities to voluntarily aid local projects for the devastated community in Hawijah. There have, it’s now emerged, been talks between the Dutch embassy and local authorities on the matter. The Minister writes that Defensie has identified several local organisations operating in Hawijah; and that these have been asked what their community needs. Bijleveld says she hopes to inform Parliament of developments after the summer recess.
“To prevent this information from reaching Parliament in another manner”, the Minister also note that local authorities in Hawijah have expressed concerns about possible undefined radiation after the Dutch airstrike in June 2015. According to Bijleveld however, the munitions used in the attack were not capable of producing radiation. Both the MoD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs say they will explore whether the concerns of Hawijans can be verified in another manner.
The Minister also reports on a lawsuit filed by human rights lawyer Zegveld in the name of Hawijah’s victims. According to Bijleveld, the Dutch Cabinet has sent a note of sympathy to the victims and their relatives, but claimed that an offer to begin a conversation was rejected.
Explaining that rejection, lawyer Zegveld told Airwars: “[The Minister] wanted to have a one on one conversation ‘human being to human being’ with the Hawijah victim living in the Netherlands. He was expected to come alone, without me or anyone else. We did not agree to that. It’s not about the person Bijleveld, but about her responsibility as a Minister.”
Republishing data
Along with the Minister’s latest June 29th letter to Parliament, the MoD has now also published its weekly reports of all anti-ISIS airstrikes in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2018 as open data, after recent requests from Airwars and the Open State Foundation.
“While Airwars welcomes this next step towards a more transparent Defensie, the content of the data is still below standard,” says Airwars deputy director Dmytro Chupryna. “Other Coalition allies such as the UK already report the specific date, targets and near locations of their airstrikes. For Defensie to become more transparent, improving their reporting on airstrikes really is one of the first steps to take.”


airwars--2020-07-09--New UN report insists Soleimani assassination by US was ‘unlawful’

Killing of Iranian commander by US drone strike represents 'not just a slippery slope .
It is a cliff ' , warns Special Rapporteur The US assassination of Qasem Soleimani , the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) , in Baghdad in January 2020 , was unlawful on several counts , according to a new report submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council by its expert on extrajudicial killings .
Dr Agnes Callamard , the current UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Executions , asserts in her latest report that Soleimani ’ s controversial assassination by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Airport on January 3rd 2020 had violated international law in several ways .
Noting that the US drone strike had also killed several Iraqi military personnel , Dr Callamard notes that “ By killing General Soleimani on Iraqi soil without first obtaining Iraq ’ s consent , the US violated the territorial integrity of Iraq.
” The Special Rapporteur also argues that by failing to demonstrate that Soleimani represented an imminent threat to the United States – and instead focusing on his past actions dating back to 2006 – that his killing “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ , the criteria by which a state may engage in war .
In the bluntest condemnation yet of the Trump Administration ’ s killing of Iran ’ s leading military commander , Dr Callamard argues that “ the targeted killing of General Soleimani , coming in the wake of 20 years of distortions of international law , and repeated massive violations of humanitarian law , is not just a slippery slope .
It is a cliff.
” She also warns that the killing of Iran ’ s top general may see other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the assassination : “ The international community must now confront the very real prospect that States may opt to ‘ strategically ’ eliminate high ranking military officials outside the context of a ‘ known ’ war , and seek to justify the killing on the grounds of the target ’ s classification as a ‘ terrorist ’ who posed a potential future threat.
” Speaking to Airwars from Geneva ahead of her presentation to the UNHRC , Dr Callamard described the US killing of General Soleimani as “ a significant escalation in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the use of extraterritorial force .
Until now , drones have focused on terrorism and on counterterrorism responses .
Here we ’ re seeing the displacement of a counterterrorism strategy onto State officials.
” She described the Trump administration ’ s justification of the assassination of a senior Iranian government official as “ a distortion of self defence.
” Dr Callamard ’ s denouncement of the US ’ s killing of Qasem Soleimani marks the latest in almost 20 years of concerns raised by United Nations experts on the use of armed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , following the killing of five al Qaeda suspects in Yemen by the CIA , then-rapporteur Asma Jahangir warned for example that the attack constituted “ a clear case of extrajudicial killing ” .
UN reports since then have tended to focus on controversial drone campaigns outside the hot battlefield , in countries including Pakistan , Yemen , Somalia and Palestine ’ s West Bank and Gaza Strip .
With her new report , delivered to the UNHRC on July 9th , Dr Callamard seeks to bring the discussion on armed drone use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world has entered what has been called the ‘ second drone age ’ with a now vast array of State and non-State actors deploying ever more advanced drone technologies , making their use a major and fast becoming international security issue.
” The term ‘ second drone age ’ was originally coined by Airwars director Chris Woods , to reflect a growing wave of armed drone proliferation among state and non-state actors .
As Dr Callamard and her team write : “ The present report seeks to update previous findings .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the legal implications of their promises ; questions the legal bases upon which their use is founded and legitimized ; and identifies the mechanisms and institutions ( or lack thereof ) to regulate drones ’ use and respond to targeted killings .
The report shows that drones are a lightning rod for key questions about protection of the right to life in conflicts , asymmetrical warfare , counter-terrorism operations , and so-called peace situations.
” Many of the conflicts monitored by Airwars are referenced by Dr Callamard .
• In Iraq , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ISIS deployed armed drones , sometimes to devastating effect .
“ In 2017 in Mosul , Iraq , for example , within a 24-hour period ‘ there were no less than 82 drones of all shapes and sizes ’ striking at Iraqi , Kurdish , US , and French forces.
” • In Libya , the Special Rapporteur asserts that “ The Haftar Armed Forces carried out over 600 drone strikes against opposition targets resulting allegedly in massive civilian casualties , including , in August 2019 , against a migrant detention center.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unwilling or unable to act ’ defence – first used by George W Bush ’ s administration to justify drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere – had been employed by several nations , including Turkey and Israel , to justify attacks in Syria .
• The UN Special Rapporteur also cautions that as more States acquire armed drones , their use domestically has increased : “ Turkey has reportedly used drones domestically against the Kurdistan Worker ’ s Party ( PKK ) , while Nigeria first confirmed attack was carried out against a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2015 Pakistan allegedly used its armed drones for the very first time in an operation to kill three ‘ high profile terrorists.
’ Iraq has similarly purchased drones to carry out strikes against ISIS in Anbar province in 2016.
” • Finally , Dr Callamard warns that non-State actors including terrorist groups increasingly have access to remotely piloted technologies – noting that “ At least 20 armed non-State actors have reportedly obtained armed and unarmed drone systems.
” “ Drones are now the weapon of choice for many countries .
They are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ save lives – though we have insufficient evidence to conclude either , ” Dr Callamard told Airwars .
“ Drones may save the lives of ‘ our ’ soldiers – but on the ground is another matter.
” The UN Special Rapporteur ’ s latest report highlights concerns about ongoing risks to civilians from armed drone use .
Citing multiple studies , she writes that “ even when a drone ( eventually ) strikes its intended target , accurately and ‘ successfully ’ , the evidence shows that frequently many more people die @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Callamard also cautions that “ Civilian harm caused by armed drone strikes extends far beyond killings , with many more wounded .
While the consequences of both armed and non-combat drones remain to be systematically studied , evidence shows that the populations living under ‘ drones ’ persistent stare and noise experience generalized threat and daily terror ’ .
” The UN ’ s expert on extrajudicial killings additionally notes the key role drones play in helping militaries to determine likely civilian harm : “ Without on-the-ground , post-strike assessment , authorities rely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detect civilian casualties leaving potentially significant numbers of civilian casualties , including of those misidentified as ‘ enemies ’ , undiscovered .
Studies showed that in Syria and Iraq the initial military estimates missed 57 % of casualties.
” The Special Rapporteur does however point out that civilian harm can be reduced by militaries , “ through stronger coordination , improved data analysis , better training of drones ’ operators , and systematic evaluation of strikes .
”

Killing of Iranian commander by US drone strike represents 'not just a slippery slope. It is a cliff', warns Special Rapporteur
The US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in Baghdad in January 2020, was unlawful on several counts, according to a new report submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council by its expert on extrajudicial killings.
Dr Agnes Callamard, the current UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Executions, asserts in her latest report that Soleimani’s controversial assassination by a US drone strike on Baghdad International Airport on January 3rd 2020 had violated international law in several ways.
Noting that the US drone strike had also killed several Iraqi military personnel, Dr Callamard notes that “By killing General Soleimani on Iraqi soil without first obtaining Iraq’s consent, the US violated the territorial integrity of Iraq.”
The Special Rapporteur also argues that by failing to demonstrate that Soleimani represented an imminent threat to the United States – and instead focusing on his past actions dating back to 2006 – that his killing “would be unlawful under jus ad bellum“, the criteria by which a state may engage in war.
In the bluntest condemnation yet of the Trump Administration’s killing of Iran’s leading military commander, Dr Callamard argues that “the targeted killing of General Soleimani, coming in the wake of 20 years of distortions of international law, and repeated massive violations of humanitarian law, is not just a slippery slope. It is a cliff.”
She also warns that the killing of Iran’s top general may see other nations exploit the US’s justification for the assassination: “The international community must now confront the very real prospect that States may opt to ‘strategically’ eliminate high ranking military officials outside the context of a ‘known’ war, and seek to justify the killing on the grounds of the target’s classification as a ‘terrorist’ who posed a potential future threat.”
Speaking to Airwars from Geneva ahead of her presentation to the UNHRC, Dr Callamard described the US killing of General Soleimani as “a significant escalation in the use of armed drones, and in the use of extraterritorial force. Until now, drones have focused on terrorism and on counterterrorism responses. Here we’re seeing the displacement of a counterterrorism strategy onto State officials.” She described the Trump administration’s justification of the assassination of a senior Iranian government official as “a distortion of self defence.”
‘The second drone age’
Dr Callamard’s denouncement of the US’s killing of Qasem Soleimani marks the latest in almost 20 years of concerns raised by United Nations experts on the use of armed drones for targeted assassinations. In 2002, following the killing of five al Qaeda suspects in Yemen by the CIA, then-rapporteur Asma Jahangir warned for example that the attack constituted “a clear case of extrajudicial killing”.
UN reports since then have tended to focus on controversial drone campaigns outside the hot battlefield, in countries including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Palestine’s West Bank and Gaza Strip.
With her new report, delivered to the UNHRC on July 9th, Dr Callamard seeks to bring the discussion on armed drone use up to date, noting that “the world has entered what has been called the ‘second drone age’ with a now vast array of State and non-State actors deploying ever more advanced drone technologies, making their use a major and fast becoming international security issue.” The term ‘second drone age’ was originally coined by Airwars director Chris Woods, to reflect a growing wave of armed drone proliferation among state and non-state actors.
My latest report to the UN #HRC44 focus on targeted killings by armed drones: https://t.co/qLsqubaMpA The world has entered a “second drone age”, in which State and non-State actors are deploying ever more advanced drone technologies, a major international, security issue. — Agnes Callamard (@AgnesCallamard) July 8, 2020
As Dr Callamard and her team write: “The present report seeks to update previous findings. It interrogates the reasons for drones’ proliferation and the legal implications of their promises; questions the legal bases upon which their use is founded and legitimized; and identifies the mechanisms and institutions (or lack thereof) to regulate drones’ use and respond to targeted killings. The report shows that drones are a lightning rod for key questions about protection of the right to life in conflicts, asymmetrical warfare, counter-terrorism operations, and so-called peace situations.”
Many of the conflicts monitored by Airwars are referenced by Dr Callamard.
In Iraq, she notes that non state actors including ISIS deployed armed drones, sometimes to devastating effect. “In 2017 in Mosul, Iraq, for example, within a 24-hour period ‘there were no less than 82 drones of all shapes and sizes’ striking at Iraqi, Kurdish, US, and French forces.”
In Libya, the Special Rapporteur asserts that “The Haftar Armed Forces carried out over 600 drone strikes against opposition targets resulting allegedly in massive civilian casualties, including, in August 2019, against a migrant detention center.”
Callamard notes that a ‘nations unwilling or unable to act’ defence – first used by George W Bush’s administration to justify drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere – had been employed by several nations, including Turkey and Israel, to justify attacks in Syria.
The UN Special Rapporteur also cautions that as more States acquire armed drones, their use domestically has increased: “Turkey has reportedly used drones domestically against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), while Nigeria first confirmed attack was carried out against a Boko Haram logistics base in 2016. In 2015 Pakistan allegedly used its armed drones for the very first time in an operation to kill three ‘high profile terrorists.’ Iraq has similarly purchased drones to carry out strikes against ISIS in Anbar province in 2016.”
Finally, Dr Callamard warns that non-State actors including terrorist groups increasingly have access to remotely piloted technologies – noting that “At least 20 armed non-State actors have reportedly obtained armed and unarmed drone systems.”
“Drones are now the weapon of choice for many countries. They are claimed to be both surgical and to save lives – though we have insufficient evidence to conclude either,” Dr Callamard told Airwars. “Drones may save the lives of ‘our’ soldiers – but on the ground is another matter.”
Civilian harm concerns
The UN Special Rapporteur’s latest report highlights concerns about ongoing risks to civilians from armed drone use. Citing multiple studies, she writes that “even when a drone (eventually) strikes its intended target, accurately and ‘successfully’, the evidence shows that frequently many more people die, sometimes because of multiple strikes.”
Callamard also cautions that “Civilian harm caused by armed drone strikes extends far beyond killings, with many more wounded. While the consequences of both armed and non-combat drones remain to be systematically studied, evidence shows that the populations living under ‘drones’ persistent stare and noise experience generalized threat and daily terror’.”
The UN’s expert on extrajudicial killings additionally notes the key role drones play in helping militaries to determine likely civilian harm: “Without on-the-ground, post-strike assessment, authorities rely on pre- and post-strike drone-video feeds to detect civilian casualties leaving potentially significant numbers of civilian casualties, including of those misidentified as ‘enemies’, undiscovered. Studies showed that in Syria and Iraq the initial military estimates missed 57% of casualties.”
The Special Rapporteur does however point out that civilian harm can be reduced by militaries, “through stronger coordination, improved data analysis, better training of drones’ operators, and systematic evaluation of strikes.”


airwars--2020-08-07--Six years after the war against ISIS began, where now for Iraqis?

A protracted conflict against the terror group ISIS has left much of Iraq in ruins - though there are signs of rebirth .
On the fateful evening of August 7th 2014 , then-US President Barack Obama gave a live address to the nation announcing the beginning of military actions in Iraq against so-called Islamic State ( also known as ISIS and Daesh ) , ushering in a new era of US involvement .
The following day , US Navy F-18 Hornet fighters launched the first airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq .
Six years on , and 14,700 international air and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more by Iraq government forces , Iraqis are still reeling from the war against ISIS and its aftermath .
The conflict itself displaced over five million Iraqis and left schools , hospitals and other vital infrastructure in affected provinces across northern and central Iraq in utter ruin .
While statistics on the number of civilians who perished overall during the war against ISIS varies , Iraq Body Count estimates that 67,376 civilians were killed between January 2014 and December 2017 .
According to the World Bank , the total cost of the conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dinars ( $ 107 billion ) , which is equivalent to 73 % of the country ’ s entire GDP in 2013 .
It is also estimated that 138,051 residential buildings and units were damaged , half of which were destroyed beyond repair in Iraq during the long war on ISIS .
Meanwhile , the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ( UNOCHA ) has estimated that the conflict left 6.2 million people in need of targeted humanitarian assistance .
Beyond the cold statistics showing the impact of war on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Iraqis themselves give a more visceral idea of life under ISIS , and the aftermath of the military campaign .
They also speak to the ongoing challenges that Iraqis living in formerly ISIS-occupied areas continue to face six years on .
By the time the US began its military campaign in Iraq , so-called Islamic State had already seized significant territories in northern and western parts of the country including Mosul , Iraq ’ s second largest city – plunging the nation into its most serious crisis since the US-British invasion in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ air campaign came shortly after ISIS ’ s genocidal campaign on the Yazidi community in Sinjar and its surrounding areas in Nineveh province had begun – and almost two months after ISIS ’ s notorious massacre [ Warning : GRAPHIC ] of up to 1,700 unarmed Iraqi military cadets in Camp Speicher .
The next three years would see the lives of millions of people change radically .
The terror group ’ s occupation of these territories ravaged communities and decimated the social fabric of many of the cities under the group ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under ISIS occupation recount wanton acts of brutality by the group , in a bid to enforce their control and dominance .
Khalid al-Rawi , a musician and community activist in Mosul [ see main picture ] , describes the state of fear instilled by the group during their occupation of Iraq ’ s second city .
“ I know many musicians who destroyed their instruments [ out of fear of being caught ] or would go far away in order to play a bit of music… If anyone played music openly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ musicians wouldn ’ t have dared to do this ” , Khalid recalled to Airwars this week .
“ People were killed for the smallest reasons by them [ ISIS ] – I was one of the people who if they caught me , I would have been killed instantly.
” Ziad Ghanim Sha ’ ban , a lawyer from Tikrit in Salahuddin province , paints a similar picture of violence and fear under ISIS , particularly when it came to religious and ethnic coexistence .
“ Iraqi society , as you know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different ethnic and religious groups ] , ” explains Ziad .
“ We have Kurds , we have Sunnis with Shia parents and Shias with Sunni parents , as well as Turkmen in our community – we are one country , but when ISIS came , this changed .
They rejected and fought this vigorously , and killed anyone promoting this [ coexistence ] – this instilled great fear in society and many families were torn from the community.
” Ziad goes on to recall how some husbands and wives who had spouses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is predominantly Shia Muslim – divorced and ran away to avoid persecution by the group .
War on ISIS and the legacy of the International Coalition Following a series of gains made by ISIS throughout 2014 that saw the terror group control up to a fifth of Iraq ’ s territory and 6.3 million people ( 19 % of the population ) , the Iraqi Government , with the support of the Popular Mobilisation Units ( PMUs ) consisting of numerous armed groups , as well as international allies led by the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , slowly reclaiming territory until the group ’ s territorial defeat in December 2017 .
The role played by the US-led Coalition was instrumental in eventually defeating ISIS .
The US-led alliance has declared 14,771 air and artillery strikes in Iraq since its inception , providing air cover for Iraqi Security Forces ( ISF ) and decimating ISIS positions in northern and western Iraq .
Today the group exists only on the margins of Iraq , harried by ISF and Coalition attacks .
However , the human and material cost of this campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exclusively by Iraqis themselves .
ISIS killed and injured many thousands of civilians during its occupation , and many more died in ISF actions .
Using local sources , Airwars has also to date tracked 895 separate civilian harm allegations against the International Coalition in Iraq .
According to local reports , between 9,801 and 14,037 civilians were claimed killed in these incidents and up to 12,248 others injured .
The US-led alliance itself has so far publicly admitted 688 deaths from its actions in Iraq .
Beyond this , the military campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in ruins , making it almost impossible for hundreds of thousands of civilians – still displaced by the conflict – to return to their homes .
Khalid recalls a number of instances where families were caught up in airstrikes targeting ISIS militants : “ I have a friend whose family , including uncles and aunts , were living in the same house .
From what was explained to me , there was one ISIS member on the roof of the house so an International Coalition missile struck the building , killing 13 or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also recounts the tragic story of his younger brother , who was killed by what he says was an International Coalition airstrike in Tikrit .
“ I have my brother , a child , named Muhanad aged only 11 years old , who was injured in an airstrike and died immediately and we have still , to this day , not received any compensation or acknowledgement from the Coalition.
” In almost all cases , those interviewed say that very few , if anyone , receives any form of acknowledgement or compensation from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Coalition .
“ The reality is that as a lawyer , as part of a team of lawyers , we submitted more than a hundred complaints against Coalition forces , calling for compensation…In the end we didn ’ t even receive 5 % of the compensation we were entitled to , ” Ziad told Airwars .
Six years on from the beginning of the International Coalition ’ s own campaign against ISIS , the societal impact of the group ’ s occupation and the conflict that ensued has been transformative , and will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In many parts of the country that were under ISIS rule , communities remain divided , and little effort has been made by central and local governments to bring people together .
In the absence of government action , locals have taken it upon themselves to repair the social fabric of their communities , in the days following liberation from ISIS .
Khalid al-Rawi points out that despite the immense challenges faced by the people of Mosul and the difficulties of the last few years , the re-emergence of a vibrant civil society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet significant silver lining in the post-ISIS years .
“ A number of initiatives have emerged aimed at promoting reconciliation , which I myself have taken part in .
For example , we went to Hamdaniya , [ a predominantly Assyrian district , with a significant Christian population ] and cleaned and helped rebuild churches ; and a number of young people helped clean another church in Mosul.
” He also says that the city ’ s experience under ISIS rule has changed many people ’ s attitudes about music and the arts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looked down upon by many in more conservative parts of the city .
“ There is a positive I see [ from this experience ] , a new page has been turned for the youth of this community – a revolution has occurred….from an artistic perspective , before people [ used to say to me ] music is wrong and haram and if you learn music it means you work in a bar .
Now that is not the case , there has been a lot more acceptance after liberation from ISIS.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the societal impact of ISIS rule and the subsequent fighting that emerged .
In contrast to Mosul ’ s civic revival , many in Tikrit are afraid to engage in civic activities , he says .
“ Since the violence we saw in Hawijah and Tikrit in 2013 against protesters and by ISIS during their rule , activists have not emerged in our areas because they saw the executions that would take place if they did come out… Even when protests emerged in Baghdad and the south [ in 2019 and 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Salahuddin , Anbar , Hawijah and Mosul because [ people ] knew they could be killed , ” explains Ziad .
In terms of reconstruction , efforts by the Government have often seemed futile , with progress slow and , in many cases , non-existent .
Despite liberation from ISIS , residents of Anbar , Salahuddin and Nineveh provinces face an uphill task in rebuilding their cities and communities , made even more difficult by government incompetence and widespread corruption .
Abdulrahman Mohammad , a businessman and community leader in Fallujah , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ISIS back in 2014 , explains that upon returning to his city after three years , he found a city in ruins and a devastated local economy .
“ When we came back after ISIS , everything we had was lost .
Our factories were destroyed .
In the end , the economy of the province [ of Anbar ] had halted , ” explains Abdulrahman .
“ Work is not given to anyone except to a specific group [ of people ] through patronage networks , ” he elaborates .
“ Anbar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each employing 500 people .
To this day , these factories remain damaged and unusable , ” laments Abdulrahman , adding that “ Efforts to create jobs by the government are non-existent .
None.
” The situation in other towns such as Sinjar in Nineveh , and Baiji in Salahuddin , is even more dire .
According to the World Bank , 70 % of housing assets in Sinjar were damaged , while in Baiji , 94 % of residential buildings were damaged .
As Iraq now enters its seventh year following the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many Iraqis have little faith in government efforts to rebuild their cities , and are instead forced to put up with the devastation wrought upon them by ISIS and years of war .
While the post-ISIS period has brought security to the liberated provinces of Iraq – and has also created a space for local civil activism to flourish in certain areas – many know that there is still a long way to go before the majority can truly taste the fruits of liberation from ISIS .

A protracted conflict against the terror group ISIS has left much of Iraq in ruins - though there are signs of rebirth.
On the fateful evening of August 7th 2014, then-US President Barack Obama gave a live address to the nation announcing the beginning of military actions in Iraq against so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS and Daesh), ushering in a new era of US involvement. The following day, US Navy F-18 Hornet fighters launched the first airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. Six years on, and 14,700 international air and artillery strikes later as well as thousands more by Iraq government forces, Iraqis are still reeling from the war against ISIS and its aftermath.
The conflict itself displaced over five million Iraqis and left schools, hospitals and other vital infrastructure in affected provinces across northern and central Iraq in utter ruin. While statistics on the number of civilians who perished overall during the war against ISIS varies, Iraq Body Count estimates that 67,376 civilians were killed between January 2014 and December 2017. According to the World Bank, the total cost of the conflict amounts to a staggering 124 trillion Iraqi Dinars ($107 billion), which is equivalent to 73% of the country’s entire GDP in 2013.
It is also estimated that 138,051 residential buildings and units were damaged, half of which were destroyed beyond repair in Iraq during the long war on ISIS. Meanwhile, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has estimated that the conflict left 6.2 million people in need of targeted humanitarian assistance.
Beyond the cold statistics showing the impact of war on an already beleaguered country, personal testimonies of Iraqis themselves give a more visceral idea of life under ISIS, and the aftermath of the military campaign. They also speak to the ongoing challenges that Iraqis living in formerly ISIS-occupied areas continue to face six years on.
Life under ISIS
By the time the US began its military campaign in Iraq, so-called Islamic State had already seized significant territories in northern and western parts of the country including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city – plunging the nation into its most serious crisis since the US-British invasion in 2003.
The announcement of a US air campaign came shortly after ISIS’s genocidal campaign on the Yazidi community in Sinjar and its surrounding areas in Nineveh province had begun – and almost two months after ISIS’s notorious massacre [Warning: GRAPHIC] of up to 1,700 unarmed Iraqi military cadets in Camp Speicher. The next three years would see the lives of millions of people change radically. The terror group’s occupation of these territories ravaged communities and decimated the social fabric of many of the cities under the group’s rule. Locals living in areas under ISIS occupation recount wanton acts of brutality by the group, in a bid to enforce their control and dominance.
Khalid al-Rawi, a musician and community activist in Mosul [see main picture], describes the state of fear instilled by the group during their occupation of Iraq’s second city. “I know many musicians who destroyed their instruments [out of fear of being caught] or would go far away in order to play a bit of music… If anyone played music openly, they could have been killed, but musicians wouldn’t have dared to do this”, Khalid recalled to Airwars this week. “People were killed for the smallest reasons by them [ISIS] – I was one of the people who if they caught me, I would have been killed instantly.”
Ziad Ghanim Sha’ban, a lawyer from Tikrit in Salahuddin province, paints a similar picture of violence and fear under ISIS, particularly when it came to religious and ethnic coexistence. “Iraqi society, as you know, is like a mosaic [of different ethnic and religious groups],” explains Ziad. “We have Kurds, we have Sunnis with Shia parents and Shias with Sunni parents, as well as Turkmen in our community – we are one country, but when ISIS came, this changed. They rejected and fought this vigorously, and killed anyone promoting this [coexistence] – this instilled great fear in society and many families were torn from the community.”
Ziad goes on to recall how some husbands and wives who had spouses from southern Iraq – where the population is predominantly Shia Muslim – divorced and ran away to avoid persecution by the group.
War on ISIS and the legacy of the International Coalition
Following a series of gains made by ISIS throughout 2014 that saw the terror group control up to a fifth of Iraq’s territory and 6.3 million people (19% of the population), the Iraqi Government, with the support of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) consisting of numerous armed groups, as well as international allies led by the United States, began pushing back against ISIS, slowly reclaiming territory until the group’s territorial defeat in December 2017.
The role played by the US-led Coalition was instrumental in eventually defeating ISIS. The US-led alliance has declared 14,771 air and artillery strikes in Iraq since its inception, providing air cover for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and decimating ISIS positions in northern and western Iraq. Today the group exists only on the margins of Iraq, harried by ISF and Coalition attacks. However, the human and material cost of this campaign has been immense – and experienced almost exclusively by Iraqis themselves.
ISIS killed and injured many thousands of civilians during its occupation, and many more died in ISF actions. Using local sources, Airwars has also to date tracked 895 separate civilian harm allegations against the International Coalition in Iraq. According to local reports, between 9,801 and 14,037 civilians were claimed killed in these incidents and up to 12,248 others injured. The US-led alliance itself has so far publicly admitted 688 deaths from its actions in Iraq.
Beyond this, the military campaign has left vast swathes of the country in ruins, making it almost impossible for hundreds of thousands of civilians – still displaced by the conflict – to return to their homes.
Khalid recalls a number of instances where families were caught up in airstrikes targeting ISIS militants: “I have a friend whose family, including uncles and aunts, were living in the same house. From what was explained to me, there was one ISIS member on the roof of the house so an International Coalition missile struck the building, killing 13 or 14 members of that family.”
Ziad also recounts the tragic story of his younger brother, who was killed by what he says was an International Coalition airstrike in Tikrit. “I have my brother, a child, named Muhanad aged only 11 years old, who was injured in an airstrike and died immediately and we have still, to this day, not received any compensation or acknowledgement from the Coalition.”
In almost all cases, those interviewed say that very few, if anyone, receives any form of acknowledgement or compensation from the Iraqi Government or from the International Coalition. “The reality is that as a lawyer, as part of a team of lawyers, we submitted more than a hundred complaints against Coalition forces, calling for compensation…In the end we didn’t even receive 5% of the compensation we were entitled to,” Ziad told Airwars.
Reconstruction and Reconciliation
Six years on from the beginning of the International Coalition’s own campaign against ISIS, the societal impact of the group’s occupation and the conflict that ensued has been transformative, and will likely remain with Iraqis for decades. In many parts of the country that were under ISIS rule, communities remain divided, and little effort has been made by central and local governments to bring people together. In the absence of government action, locals have taken it upon themselves to repair the social fabric of their communities, in the days following liberation from ISIS.
Khalid al-Rawi points out that despite the immense challenges faced by the people of Mosul and the difficulties of the last few years, the re-emergence of a vibrant civil society in the city has been an unexpected yet significant silver lining in the post-ISIS years. “A number of initiatives have emerged aimed at promoting reconciliation, which I myself have taken part in. For example, we went to Hamdaniya, [a predominantly Assyrian district, with a significant Christian population] and cleaned and helped rebuild churches; and a number of young people helped clean another church in Mosul.”
He also says that the city’s experience under ISIS rule has changed many people’s attitudes about music and the arts, which were previously, perhaps, looked down upon by many in more conservative parts of the city.
“There is a positive I see [from this experience], a new page has been turned for the youth of this community – a revolution has occurred….from an artistic perspective, before people [used to say to me] music is wrong and haram and if you learn music it means you work in a bar. Now that is not the case, there has been a lot more acceptance after liberation from ISIS.”
Music is back to Mosul.
Mosul produced music for centuries and now it is all over the place again.
Let's play music… #Mosul2019 #ReviveThespiritOfMosul pic.twitter.com/dTqIrTuDlq — Mosul Eye عين الموصل (@MosulEye) October 24, 2019
However, Ziad paints a bleaker image of the societal impact of ISIS rule and the subsequent fighting that emerged. In contrast to Mosul’s civic revival, many in Tikrit are afraid to engage in civic activities, he says. “Since the violence we saw in Hawijah and Tikrit in 2013 against protesters and by ISIS during their rule, activists have not emerged in our areas because they saw the executions that would take place if they did come out… Even when protests emerged in Baghdad and the south [in 2019 and 2020], there were no protests in Salahuddin, Anbar, Hawijah and Mosul because [people] knew they could be killed,” explains Ziad.
In terms of reconstruction, efforts by the Government have often seemed futile, with progress slow and, in many cases, non-existent. Despite liberation from ISIS, residents of Anbar, Salahuddin and Nineveh provinces face an uphill task in rebuilding their cities and communities, made even more difficult by government incompetence and widespread corruption.
Abdulrahman Mohammad, a businessman and community leader in Fallujah, who fled his hometown after the arrival of ISIS back in 2014, explains that upon returning to his city after three years, he found a city in ruins and a devastated local economy. “When we came back after ISIS, everything we had was lost. Our factories were destroyed. In the end, the economy of the province [of Anbar] had halted,” explains Abdulrahman. “Work is not given to anyone except to a specific group [of people] through patronage networks,” he elaborates.
“Anbar had 30 very large cement factories, each employing 500 people. To this day, these factories remain damaged and unusable,” laments Abdulrahman, adding that “Efforts to create jobs by the government are non-existent. None.”
The situation in other towns such as Sinjar in Nineveh, and Baiji in Salahuddin, is even more dire. According to the World Bank, 70% of housing assets in Sinjar were damaged, while in Baiji, 94% of residential buildings were damaged.
As Iraq now enters its seventh year following the beginning of the war against ISIS, many Iraqis have little faith in government efforts to rebuild their cities, and are instead forced to put up with the devastation wrought upon them by ISIS and years of war. While the post-ISIS period has brought security to the liberated provinces of Iraq – and has also created a space for local civil activism to flourish in certain areas – many know that there is still a long way to go before the majority can truly taste the fruits of liberation from ISIS.


airwars--2020-08-19--New funding will improve Airwars investigations into civilian harm concerns

Support from the Reva and David Logan Foundation follows recent study showing challenges of mainstream media coverage of civilian casualties .
A new Senior Investigator will be joining the Airwars core team in the coming weeks , thanks to a two year grant from the Reva and David Logan Foundation – a Chicago based family philanthropic fund .
Over the past six years , Airwars has consistently shown that its groundbreaking work has a powerful impact on the public understanding of civilian harm – and can lead to positive changes in both policies and practices among militaries .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the issue being poorly reported .
Our recent study News In Brief , authored by US investigative reporter Alexa O ’ Brien and also funded by the Logan Foundation , explored the many obstacles to good reporting of this critical issue .
Responding to this deficit , new funding will enable Airwars to majorly enhance its own capacity for much-needed investigations into civilian casualties and their causes , in particular with the appointment of an in-house Senior Investigator – who will be supported by a wider team of geolocation , research and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partnerships with key US and international media on the most vital and controversial cases and stories .
In doing so , it aims to bridge a critical gap in the mainstream reporting of civilian harm from war – and bring many more stories to public awareness .
A key focus will be to explore innovative approaches to engaging new audiences on civilian harm issues .
Since its founding , Airwars has published several major investigations into civilian harm .
In 2017 our then-inhouse reporter Samuel Oakford revealed with Foreign Policy that , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 80 civilians had been killed in non-US international airstrikes in Iraq and Syria .
That investigation still serves as a key point of engagement for our advocacy work with individual belligerents .
In June 2019 , Airwars partnered with Amnesty International on a major project War in Raqqa : Rhetoric versus Reality – which found that at least 1,600 civilian deaths had likely been caused by the US-led Coalition during the battle of Raqqa .
More recently , Airwars has played a prominent role in reporting the scandal surrounding Dutch responsibility for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in which 70 or more civilians likely died .
And in early 2020 – in partnership with the BBC , Liberation , De Morgen and RTL Netherlands – Airwars revealed that European militaries were failing to declare civilian deaths from their own actions in the war against ISIS , even where US military personnel had concluded otherwise .
“ Airwars is unique .
There are few organisations that shine a light so intensely on the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians caught up in the fury of war .
The Airwars team has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and has delivered their consequent findings with authority to governments , the military and the public , ” commented Richard Logan , President of the Reva and David Logan Foundation .
“ Their work has consistently brought changes in perceptions and in the conduct of war .
It has contributed to a significant reduction of non-combatant battlefield deaths and injuries .
For these and other related reasons , it is crucial to magnify Airwars ’ investigative capacity to ensure that the plight of the most vulnerable stays at the forefront of all our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their efforts .
”

Support from the Reva and David Logan Foundation follows recent study showing challenges of mainstream media coverage of civilian casualties.
A new Senior Investigator will be joining the Airwars core team in the coming weeks, thanks to a two year grant from the Reva and David Logan Foundation – a Chicago based family philanthropic fund.
Over the past six years, Airwars has consistently shown that its groundbreaking work has a powerful impact on the public understanding of civilian harm – and can lead to positive changes in both policies and practices among militaries. However, systemic challenges in many newsrooms can result in the issue being poorly reported. Our recent study News In Brief, authored by US investigative reporter Alexa O’Brien and also funded by the Logan Foundation, explored the many obstacles to good reporting of this critical issue.
Responding to this deficit, new funding will enable Airwars to majorly enhance its own capacity for much-needed investigations into civilian casualties and their causes, in particular with the appointment of an in-house Senior Investigator – who will be supported by a wider team of geolocation, research and design professionals.
Airwars will then seek partnerships with key US and international media on the most vital and controversial cases and stories. In doing so, it aims to bridge a critical gap in the mainstream reporting of civilian harm from war – and bring many more stories to public awareness. A key focus will be to explore innovative approaches to engaging new audiences on civilian harm issues.
Major investigations
Since its founding, Airwars has published several major investigations into civilian harm. In 2017 our then-inhouse reporter Samuel Oakford revealed with Foreign Policy that, according to senior US military officials, more than 80 civilians had been killed in non-US international airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. That investigation still serves as a key point of engagement for our advocacy work with individual belligerents.
In June 2019, Airwars partnered with Amnesty International on a major project War in Raqqa: Rhetoric versus Reality – which found that at least 1,600 civilian deaths had likely been caused by the US-led Coalition during the battle of Raqqa. More recently, Airwars has played a prominent role in reporting the scandal surrounding Dutch responsibility for a 2015 airstrike in Hawijah, Iraq, in which 70 or more civilians likely died. And in early 2020 – in partnership with the BBC, Liberation, De Morgen and RTL Netherlands – Airwars revealed that European militaries were failing to declare civilian deaths from their own actions in the war against ISIS, even where US military personnel had concluded otherwise.
“Airwars is unique. There are few organisations that shine a light so intensely on the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians caught up in the fury of war. The Airwars team has developed groundbreaking methodology to track these horrors and has delivered their consequent findings with authority to governments, the military and the public,” commented Richard Logan, President of the Reva and David Logan Foundation.
“Their work has consistently brought changes in perceptions and in the conduct of war. It has contributed to a significant reduction of non-combatant battlefield deaths and injuries. For these and other related reasons, it is crucial to magnify Airwars’ investigative capacity to ensure that the plight of the most vulnerable stays at the forefront of all our minds. We are honoured to support their efforts.”