conservativehome--2020-02-18--We bring to the negotiations not tactics but what it means to be an independent country. The Prime M

We bring to the negotiations not tactics but what it means to be an independent country. The Prime Minister’s Brexit negotiator’s speech.

David Frost is Boris Johnson ’ s Europe adviser and delivered this speech yesterday at ULB Brussels University .
Thank you much everyone for that very kind introduction .
It is a really huge pleasure to be here at your university .
I would like to say thank you also to the Institute for hosting me , and your distinguished President , Ramona Coman , for being kind enough to host me here tonight .
Your institute here has really made a huge contribution to the study of European politics and European integration – and long may that continue .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ explain a bit better why people like me think as we do – how we see the world and why we think Britain is better off out of the European Union .
And I want also to give you a bit of insight about how that might influence the British positioning in the negotiation that are to come .
Let us go back once again in history , though this time not quote so far as to Charles the Bold .
Instead , to the title of my lecture reflections on the Revolutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Burke , one of my country ’ s great political philosophers , wrote a pamphlet that is justly famous , in the UK in any case called Reflections on the Revolution in France .
And my title echoes that tonight .
It is not just history , that work is highly relevant today and indeed lots of modern British Conservatives politicians who would consider themselves to be intellectual heirs of Burke .
Tonight I want to give you some reflections on the revolutions , plural , in Europe – because I actually think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but two revolutions , both in governments and simultaneous .
So , the first is the creation of the European Union itself – the greatest revolution in European governance since 1648 .
A new governmental system overlaid on an old one , purportedly a Europe of nation states , but in reality the paradigm of a new system of transnational collective governance .
The second revolution is of course the reaction to the first – the reappearance on the political scene not just of national feeling but also of the wish for national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state .
Brexit is the most obvious example for that , but who can deny that we see something a bit like it in different forms across the whole Continent of Europe ?
I don ’ t think it is right to dismiss this just as a reaction to austerity or economic problems or a passing phase , or something to be ‘ seen off ’ over time .
I believe it is something deeper .
Actually , I don ’ t find it surprising – if you can ’ t change policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t in this situation – then opposition becomes expressed as opposition to the system itself .
Brexit was surely above all a revolt against a system – against as it were , an ‘ authorised version ’ of European politics , against a system in which there is only one way to do politics and one policy choice to be made in many cases and against a politics in which the key texts are as hard to read for the average citizen as the Latin Bible was at the time of Charles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to explain why I moved in my own lifetime , my own professional experience , from supporting the first revolution that I talked about to moving to support the second .
I want to begin my explanation by turning back to Burke .
He had a very particular attitude to government .
In Reflections he wrote : ‘ The state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee , calico or tobacco , or some other such low concern , It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is a partnership in all science ; a partnership in all art ; a partnership in every virtue , and in all perfection.
’ This is of course exactly how the EU began in a way – ‘ a partnership agreement in a trade … or some other such low concern ’ , not of pepper and coffee , but coal and steel , and then much more .
The question is – did it make the shift , did the EU make that shift to being ‘ looked on with reverence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and in all perfection ?
’ Well , I think in much of Europe it arguably did , in a way .
Coal and steel were the engines of war ; and the sources of power and resource .
Managing them collectively meant that , on the European continent , doing this had more profound political implications straight away .
It was a noble project .
And post-war British leaders such as Attlee and Churchill certainly understood this but didn ’ t feel the same moral force behind it as people in France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I think the answer is different – it didn ’ t , the EU for most , make that shift .
I think Burke understood why .
Burke ’ s argument was essentially that the abstract foundations of the French Revolution ignored the complexities of human nature and of human society .
The state , to Burke , was more of an organic creation , entwined with custom , of tradition and spirit .
I think in Britain , the EU ’ s institutions to be honest never felt like that .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technocratic , they were more disconnected from or indeed actively hostile to national feeling .
So in a country like Britain where institutions just evolved and where governance is pretty deep-rooted in historical precedent , it was always going to feel a bit unnatural to a lot of people to be governed by an organisation whose institutions seemed created by design not than by evolution , and which vested authority outside the country elsewhere .
I think that is why the slogan of the Leave campaign in 2016 ‘ Take Back Control ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such resonance .
Now if I am honest , much of this still does not seem to me to be understood here in Brussels and in large parts of the EU .
I think one of the reasons why people here failed to see Brexit coming and often still see it as some kind of horrific , unforeseeable natural disaster is that – like the meteorite that wiped out the dinosaurs – is at root , they were unable to take British Euroscepticism seriously , but saw it as some kind of irrational @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looking at the world .
I think that is also why so many commentators seem to find it odd for someone of my background to support Brexit .
I recognise I am unusual in doing that .
Media profiles regularly say I am ‘ one of the few Brexit-voting diplomats ’ .
( Actually , there are a few more of us , but it ’ s not for me to identify who they are ! )
Even last month , a former Perm Rep , a former British Permanent Representative in Brussels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitution and the Lisbon Treaty , Lord John Kerr , whom I worked for many years and for whom I have huge respect even though I am profoundly disagreeing with him , said in the Financial Times of me ‘ that he ’ ll be extremely diligent in doing what he is told ’ , as if no member of the UK foreign service could possibly have the same view of the European Union as our current Prime Minister without having been instructed to do so .
In real life my story is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Brussels in 1993 , as , I guess , a typical pro-European .
That view did not long survive my exposure to the institutions here in Brussels and I rapidly became a persistent private critic of them .
Yet in public I had to spend most of my life in the Justus Lipsius building , or if not there in the FCO ’ s Europe Directorate .
I spent a number of years in both .
I wasn ’ t the only critic of the union – I recall a secret drink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a Foreign Office back room when the Dutch voted against the European Constitution – but it was definitely a minority taste amongst my colleagues .
In short , I too was experiencing in daily life a form of cognitive dissonance if you like about the value of my work .
It was this that eventually drove me out of the foreign service in 2013 – and then back as an adviser to the now Prime Minister in 2016 .
Returning once again to lead the Brexit negotiations in 2019 , it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear about what I thought and to have a government that was aligned to it – and for me , to help finally take the UK out of the EU too .
My doubts about British membership of the EU came principally from the fact that I could see Britain was never going to be genuinely committed to the project of turning the EU from a ‘ partnership agreement in trade ’ to an ‘ object of reverence ’ .
Indeed , not only were the EU ’ s institutions abstract and distant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in my view committed to the same goals at all .
Some people try to question this now , and argue that Britain had in many way found the sweet spot in the Union – the ideal mix between economic integration and political absenteeism – only to then carelessly cast it aside in 2016 without really thinking about it .
I don ’ t think this is entirely realistic or entirely fair .
Instead , I think Britain was more like a guest who has had enough of a party and wants to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ By 2016 we had already found our way to the hallway without anyone really noticing at the party .
It was only when we picked up our coat and waved goodbye that it felt like people said ‘ oh , are you going ?
’ as if they haven ’ t realised what had been happening .
The tactical problem with this approach was obviously time-inconsistency : so nobody knew whether a deal with Britain would stick or whether we were really willing to invest in the contacts and all the underpinning of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The strategic problem was that it made it all too clear we never knew what we really wanted to achieve , other than stop other countries doing things that they wanted to do .
So given this background I actually find it bizarre that so many people can have told themselves some version of ‘ Britain is winning the arguments ’ or , I heard this quite recently , that ‘ the EU is in many ways a British project ’ .
It plainly is not and it is surely a genuine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is .
Brexit is a re-establishment of underlying reality , in my view , not some sort of freakish divergence from it .
And one reason why ‘ take back control ’ as the slogan was so powerful was that that was part of it – we had clearly lost that control .
So much for the politics .
What about the economics ?
It ’ s clear that many in Britain more or less unenthusiastically went along with the EU for mainly economic rather than political reasons .
It is this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequences of leaving .
Indeed for many it seems to be a simple fact , rather than a prediction , that Brexit is going to do economic harm .
They include it seems Michel Barnier , who said in Belfast that Brexit was ‘ always a matter of damage limitation ’ .
I believe this is wrong and I will explain why .
There have been many economic studies of Brexit in the last few years , including famously the 2018 studies from the British Government and from the Bank of England .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ have entered the soul of Britain ’ s political class , in a kind of distorted form .
Speculative predictions about the economy in 15 years ’ time have become in many minds an unarguable depiction of inevitable reality next year .
I am reminded of Keynes ’ s remark that practical men who believe themselves exempt from any intellectual influence ‘ are usually the slaves of some defunct economist ’ .
As you may have guessed , I would question some of the specifics of all those studies .
This probably isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the detail – maybe I will get a chance in the future to do so .
But , in brief , all these studies exaggerate – in my view – the impact of non-tariff barriers they exaggerate customs costs , in some cases by orders of magnitude .
Even more importantly , they also assume that this unproven decline in trade will have implausible large effects on Britain ’ s productivity .
Yet there is at least as much evidence that the relationship is the other way around – that it is actually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that trade drives productivity are often in fact based on the very specific experience of emerging countries opening up to world markets , beginning to trade on global terms after a period of authoritarian or communist government – these are transitions that involve a huge improvement in the institutional framework and which make big productivity improvements almost inevitable .
And I think the relevance of such experiences drawn from that for the UK , a high-income economy which has been extremely open for over a century , seems highly limited to me .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem very keen to ignore or minimise any of the upsides , whether these be connected to expanded trade with the rest of the world or regulatory change – often assuming the smallest possible impacts from such changes while insisting on the largest possible effects through changes in our relationship with the EU .
Finally , all of these studies imply to me a fantastic ability to predict the micro-detail of the economy over a long period which I simply just don ’ t buy .
There is obviously a one-off cost from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and regulatory border , but I am simply not convinced it is on anything like the scale or with the effects these studies suggest .
In any case , we aim to manage it down as far as we can through modern customs facilitation arrangements – and I am convinced that other factors will outweigh it .
Indeed if we have learned anything on economics from the last few years , and in particular from the British economy refusal to behave as people predicted after the referendum , it is that modern advanced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , capable of responding in ways which we do not foresee , and finding solutions which we did not expect .
So all this explains why the British government is confident in the strategy we have chosen .
We are clear that we want the Canada-Free Trade Agreement-type relationship which the EU has so often said is on offer – even if the EU itself now seems to be experiencing some doubts about that , unfortunately .
If those doubts persist , we are ready to trade on Australia-style terms if we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
We understand the trade-offs involved – people sometimes say we don ’ t but we do – and we will be setting out in written form next week actually how we see the shape of the future relationship in more detail .
But I do not rest my case on Brexit entirely on looking at the numbers .
There is a deeper point involved here once again .
I made the point just now that some of the studies of the benefits of trade were really studies of the benefits of good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ my view is where the gains of Brexit are going to come .
Some argue that sovereignty is a meaningless construct in the modern world , that what matters is sharing it to gain more influence over others .
So we take the opposite view .
We believe sovereignty is meaningful and what it enables us to do is to set our rules for our own benefit .
Sovereignty is about the ability to get your own rules right in a way that suits our own conditions .
Much of the debate about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think misses this point .
We are clear – and the PM was clear in the speech he gave in Greenwich in London that we are not going to be a low-standard economy .
That ’ s clear .
But it is perfectly possible to have high standards , and indeed similar or better standards to those prevailing in the EU , without our laws and regulations necessarily doing exactly the same thing .
One obvious example I think is the ability to support our own agriculture to promote environmental goods relevant to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crops that reflect our own climate , rather than being forced to work with rules designed for growing conditions in central France .
I struggle to see why this is so controversial .
The proposition that we will not wish to diverge , that we would wish not to change our rules , is the same thing as the rules governing us , on 31 December this year , are the most perfect rules that can be designed and need never be changed .
That is self-evidently absurd .
I think we should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sensible political debate .
I think looking forward , we are going to have a huge advantage over the EU – the ability to set regulations for new sectors , the new ideas , and new conditions – quicker than the EU can , and based on sound science not fear of the future .
I have no doubt that we will be able to encourage new investment and new ideas in this way – particularly given our plans to boost spend on scientific research , attract scientists and make Britain the best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There are other broader advantages to running your own affairs .
One obvious one is that it is much easier to get people involved in taking decisions .
Another , less obvious advantage , is the ability to change those decisions .
My experience of the EU is that it has extreme difficulty in reversing bad decisions it takes .
Yet every state gets things wrong .
That ’ s clear .
Course correction is , therefore , an important part of good government .
Britain will be able to experiment , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is going to find this much , much more difficult .
I am confident that these political economy factors really matter .
In an age of huge change , being able to anticipate to adapt , and to encourage really counts .
Brexit is about a medium-term belief in that reality that this is true – that even if there is a short-run cost , it will be overwhelmed rapidly by the huge gains of having your own policy regimes in certain areas .
It ’ s a personal view , but I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country and its people to have its fate in its own hands and for their own decisions to matter .
When I look round Europe , by and large it ’ s the smaller countries , who know they must swim in the waves that others make , seem to have higher quality decision making –they can ’ t afford not to .
Being responsible for your own policies produces better outcomes .
So , that is why , once again , we approach the upcoming negotiations in a pretty , confident fashion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggestions there is going to be friction , there is going to be greater barriers .
We know that and have factored this in and we look further forward – to the gains of the future .
Finally , that is also why we are not prepared to compromise on some fundamentals of our negotiating position .
One of those fundamentals is that we are negotiating as one country .
To return again to Burke , his conception of the state was and is one that allows for differences , for different habits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is one which means that our own multi-state union in the UK has grown in different ways across the EU – each playing unique roles in its historical development .
It is actually rather fashionable at the moment amongst some to run down that state which has been very successful historically .
We can not be complacent about the Union in the UK , but I nevertheless believe that all parts of the UK are going to survive and thrive together as one country .
In particular , I am clear that I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as for every other part of the UK .
A second fundamental is that we bring to the negotiations not some clever tactical positioning but the fundamentals of what it means to be an independent country .
It is central to our vision that we must have the ability to set laws that suit us – to claim the right that every other non-EU country in the world has .
So to think that we might accept EU supervision on so-called level playing field issues simply fails to see the point of what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t a simple negotiating position which might move under pressure – it is the point of the whole project .
That ’ s also why we are not going to extend the transition period beyond the end of this year .
At the end of this year , we would recover our political and economic independence in full – why would we want to postpone it ?
That is the point of Brexit .
In short , we only want what other independent countries have .
To underline this I want to finish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s speech in Greenwich a couple of weeks ago set out a record of consistently high standards of regulation and behaviour in the UK , in many cases better than EU norms or practice .
So , how would you feel if the UK demanded that , to protect ourselves , the EU must dynamically harmonise with our national laws set in Westminster and the decisions of our own regulators and courts ?
Now I assume , many in the EU would simply dismiss the suggestion out of hand .
But perhaps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an approach would compromise the EU ’ s sovereign legal order ; that there would be no democratic legitimacy in the EU for the decisions which the UK would take and to which the EU would be bound ; and that such decisions are so fundamental to the way the population of a territory feels bound into the legitimacy of its government , that this structure would be simply unsustainable : at some point democratic consent would snap – dramatically and finally .
So however amusing and however tempting it would be for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the reasons we would not do so and will not do so is that these arguments of our more thoughtful people on the EU side would have very significant force .
The reason we expect – for example – to have open and fair competition provisions is based on FTA precedent is not that we are looking for a minimalist outcome on competition law .
It is that the model of an FTA and the precedents that exist in actual agreed FTAs are the most appropriate ones for the relationship of sovereign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how their jurisdictions are governed and how their populations give consent to it .
So if it is true , as we hear from our friends in the Commission and the 27 , that the EU wants a durable and sustainable relationship in this highly sensitive area , the only way forward is to build on the approach we want of a relationship of equals .
I do believe this needs to be internalised on the EU side .
I do think the EU needs to understand , I mean genuinely understand , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geographically in Europe can , if they choose it , be independent countries .
Independence does not mean a limited degree of freedom in return for accepting some of the norms of the central power .
It means – independence – just that .
I recognise that some in Brussels might be uncomfortable with that – but the EU must , if it is to achieve what it wants in the world , find a way of relating to its neighbours as friends and genuinely sovereign equals .
So let me conclude .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ week that ‘ Not one single person has ever convinced me of the added value of Brexit ’ .
So , Michel , I hope I will convince you when you read this to see things differently – and maybe even think that a Britain doing things differently might be good for Europe as well as for Britain .
And in concluding , I draw inspiration from three sources in believing we are going to get a good conclusion in negotiations this year .
First , we can do this quickly .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have enough time .
But we should take inspiration , I think , from the original Treaty of Rome back in 1957 .
This was negotiated and signed in just under 9 months – surely we can do as well as that as well as our great predecessors , with all the advantages we have got now ?
Second source of inspiration is from President De Gaulle .
I know that Michel is a great admirer of Charles de Gaulle .
He probably doesn ’ t know that I am as well .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ believed in a Europe of nations .
He was the man who always behaved as if his country was a great country even when it seemed to have fallen very low , and thus made it become a great country yet again .
That has been an inspiration to me , and those who think like me , in the low moments of the last three years .
And last , source of inspiration once again from Edmund Burke , who gave a famous speech to the electors of Bristol in 1780 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ applaud us when we run , console us when we fall , cheer us when we recover !
’ in 2016 we ran ; in 2018 , we fell ; so cheer us now as we in Britain recover , and go on , I am sure , to great things .
Thank you very much .

David Frost is Boris Johnson’s Europe adviser and delivered this speech yesterday at ULB Brussels University.
Thank you much everyone for that very kind introduction. It is a really huge pleasure to be here at your university. I would like to say thank you also to the Institute for hosting me, and your distinguished President, Ramona Coman, for being kind enough to host me here tonight. Your institute here has really made a huge contribution to the study of European politics and European integration – and long may that continue.
My aim tonight is to try to explain a bit better why people like me think as we do – how we see the world and why we think Britain is better off out of the European Union.
And I want also to give you a bit of insight about how that might influence the British positioning in the negotiation that are to come.
Let us go back once again in history, though this time not quote so far as to Charles the Bold. Instead, to the title of my lecture reflections on the Revolutions in Europe.
So in 1790 Edmund Burke, one of my country’s great political philosophers, wrote a pamphlet that is justly famous, in the UK in any case called Reflections on the Revolution in France. And my title echoes that tonight. It is not just history, that work is highly relevant today and indeed lots of modern British Conservatives politicians who would consider themselves to be intellectual heirs of Burke.
Tonight I want to give you some reflections on the revolutions, plural, in Europe – because I actually think we are looking at not one revolution but two revolutions, both in governments and simultaneous.
So, the first is the creation of the European Union itself – the greatest revolution in European governance since 1648. A new governmental system overlaid on an old one, purportedly a Europe of nation states, but in reality the paradigm of a new system of transnational collective governance.
The second revolution is of course the reaction to the first – the reappearance on the political scene not just of national feeling but also of the wish for national decision-making and the revival of the nation state. Brexit is the most obvious example for that, but who can deny that we see something a bit like it in different forms across the whole Continent of Europe? I don’t think it is right to dismiss this just as a reaction to austerity or economic problems or a passing phase, or something to be ‘seen off’ over time. I believe it is something deeper. Actually, I don’t find it surprising – if you can’t change policies by voting, as you increasingly can’t in this situation – then opposition becomes expressed as opposition to the system itself.
Brexit was surely above all a revolt against a system – against as it were, an ‘authorised version’ of European politics, against a system in which there is only one way to do politics and one policy choice to be made in many cases and against a politics in which the key texts are as hard to read for the average citizen as the Latin Bible was at the time of Charles the Bold.
So, I want to explain why I moved in my own lifetime, my own professional experience, from supporting the first revolution that I talked about to moving to support the second.
I want to begin my explanation by turning back to Burke. He had a very particular attitude to government. In Reflections he wrote:
‘The state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, It is to be looked on with reverence … It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection.’
This is of course exactly how the EU began in a way – ‘a partnership agreement in a trade … or some other such low concern’, not of pepper and coffee, but coal and steel, and then much more.
The question is – did it make the shift, did the EU make that shift to being ‘looked on with reverence … a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection?’
Well, I think in much of Europe it arguably did, in a way. Coal and steel were the engines of war; and the sources of power and resource. Managing them collectively meant that, on the European continent, doing this had more profound political implications straight away. It was a noble project.
And post-war British leaders such as Attlee and Churchill certainly understood this but didn’t feel the same moral force behind it as people in France and Germany.
But in Britain, I think the answer is different – it didn’t, the EU for most, make that shift. I think Burke understood why. Burke’s argument was essentially that the abstract foundations of the French Revolution ignored the complexities of human nature and of human society. The state, to Burke, was more of an organic creation, entwined with custom, of tradition and spirit.
I think in Britain, the EU’s institutions to be honest never felt like that. They were more abstract, they were more technocratic, they were more disconnected from or indeed actively hostile to national feeling. So in a country like Britain where institutions just evolved and where governance is pretty deep-rooted in historical precedent, it was always going to feel a bit unnatural to a lot of people to be governed by an organisation whose institutions seemed created by design not than by evolution, and which vested authority outside the country elsewhere. I think that is why the slogan of the Leave campaign in 2016 ‘Take Back Control’ became such a powerful slogan and had such resonance .
Now if I am honest, much of this still does not seem to me to be understood here in Brussels and in large parts of the EU. I think one of the reasons why people here failed to see Brexit coming and often still see it as some kind of horrific, unforeseeable natural disaster is that – like the meteorite that wiped out the dinosaurs – is at root, they were unable to take British Euroscepticism seriously, but saw it as some kind of irrational false consciousness and fundamentally wrong way of looking at the world.
I think that is also why so many commentators seem to find it odd for someone of my background to support Brexit. I recognise I am unusual in doing that. Media profiles regularly say I am ‘one of the few Brexit-voting diplomats’. (Actually, there are a few more of us, but it’s not for me to identify who they are!)
Even last month, a former Perm Rep, a former British Permanent Representative in Brussels and one of the architects of the constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, Lord John Kerr, whom I worked for many years and for whom I have huge respect even though I am profoundly disagreeing with him, said in the Financial Times of me ‘that he’ll be extremely diligent in doing what he is told’, as if no member of the UK foreign service could possibly have the same view of the European Union as our current Prime Minister without having been instructed to do so.
In real life my story is completely different. I began my time in Brussels in 1993, as, I guess, a typical pro-European. That view did not long survive my exposure to the institutions here in Brussels and I rapidly became a persistent private critic of them. Yet in public I had to spend most of my life in the Justus Lipsius building, or if not there in the FCO’s Europe Directorate. I spent a number of years in both. I wasn’t the only critic of the union – I recall a secret drink in 2005 with a couple of colleagues in a Foreign Office back room when the Dutch voted against the European Constitution – but it was definitely a minority taste amongst my colleagues. In short, I too was experiencing in daily life a form of cognitive dissonance if you like about the value of my work. It was this that eventually drove me out of the foreign service in 2013 – and then back as an adviser to the now Prime Minister in 2016. Returning once again to lead the Brexit negotiations in 2019, it was a relief to be able to be clear about what I thought and to have a government that was aligned to it – and for me, to help finally take the UK out of the EU too.
My doubts about British membership of the EU came principally from the fact that I could see Britain was never going to be genuinely committed to the project of turning the EU from a ‘partnership agreement in trade’ to an ‘object of reverence’. Indeed, not only were the EU’s institutions abstract and distant in Britain, we were never really in my view committed to the same goals at all.
Some people try to question this now, and argue that Britain had in many way found the sweet spot in the Union – the ideal mix between economic integration and political absenteeism – only to then carelessly cast it aside in 2016 without really thinking about it. I don’t think this is entirely realistic or entirely fair. Instead, I think Britain was more like a guest who has had enough of a party and wants to find a way of slipping out. By 2016 we had already found our way to the hallway without anyone really noticing at the party. It was only when we picked up our coat and waved goodbye that it felt like people said ‘oh, are you going?’ as if they haven’t realised what had been happening.
The tactical problem with this approach was obviously time-inconsistency: so nobody knew whether a deal with Britain would stick or whether we were really willing to invest in the contacts and all the underpinning of relationships that make them work over time. The strategic problem was that it made it all too clear we never knew what we really wanted to achieve, other than stop other countries doing things that they wanted to do.
So given this background I actually find it bizarre that so many people can have told themselves some version of ‘Britain is winning the arguments’ or, I heard this quite recently, that ‘the EU is in many ways a British project’. It plainly is not and it is surely a genuine form of false consciousness to think that it is. Brexit is a re-establishment of underlying reality, in my view, not some sort of freakish divergence from it. And one reason why ‘take back control’ as the slogan was so powerful was that that was part of it – we had clearly lost that control.
So much for the politics. What about the economics?
It’s clear that many in Britain more or less unenthusiastically went along with the EU for mainly economic rather than political reasons. It is this group who they now fear the economic consequences of leaving. Indeed for many it seems to be a simple fact, rather than a prediction, that Brexit is going to do economic harm. They include it seems Michel Barnier, who said in Belfast that Brexit was ‘always a matter of damage limitation’. I believe this is wrong and I will explain why.
There have been many economic studies of Brexit in the last few years, including famously the 2018 studies from the British Government and from the Bank of England. The iron of those studies seems to have entered the soul of Britain’s political class, in a kind of distorted form. Speculative predictions about the economy in 15 years’ time have become in many minds an unarguable depiction of inevitable reality next year. I am reminded of Keynes’s remark that practical men who believe themselves exempt from any intellectual influence ‘are usually the slaves of some defunct economist’.
As you may have guessed, I would question some of the specifics of all those studies. This probably isn’t the moment to go into the detail – maybe I will get a chance in the future to do so. But, in brief, all these studies exaggerate – in my view – the impact of non-tariff barriers they exaggerate customs costs, in some cases by orders of magnitude. Even more importantly, they also assume that this unproven decline in trade will have implausible large effects on Britain’s productivity. Yet there is at least as much evidence that the relationship is the other way around – that it is actually productivity which drives trade. The claims that trade drives productivity are often in fact based on the very specific experience of emerging countries opening up to world markets, beginning to trade on global terms after a period of authoritarian or communist government – these are transitions that involve a huge improvement in the institutional framework and which make big productivity improvements almost inevitable. And I think the relevance of such experiences drawn from that for the UK, a high-income economy which has been extremely open for over a century, seems highly limited to me.
I also note that many Brexit studies seem very keen to ignore or minimise any of the upsides, whether these be connected to expanded trade with the rest of the world or regulatory change – often assuming the smallest possible impacts from such changes while insisting on the largest possible effects through changes in our relationship with the EU.
Finally, all of these studies imply to me a fantastic ability to predict the micro-detail of the economy over a long period which I simply just don’t buy. There is obviously a one-off cost from the introduction of friction at a customs and regulatory border, but I am simply not convinced it is on anything like the scale or with the effects these studies suggest. In any case, we aim to manage it down as far as we can through modern customs facilitation arrangements – and I am convinced that other factors will outweigh it.
Indeed if we have learned anything on economics from the last few years, and in particular from the British economy refusal to behave as people predicted after the referendum, it is that modern advanced economies are hugely complex and adaptive systems, capable of responding in ways which we do not foresee, and finding solutions which we did not expect.
So all this explains why the British government is confident in the strategy we have chosen. We are clear that we want the Canada-Free Trade Agreement-type relationship which the EU has so often said is on offer – even if the EU itself now seems to be experiencing some doubts about that, unfortunately.
If those doubts persist, we are ready to trade on Australia-style terms if we can’t agree a Canada type FTA. We understand the trade-offs involved – people sometimes say we don’t but we do – and we will be setting out in written form next week actually how we see the shape of the future relationship in more detail.
But I do not rest my case on Brexit entirely on looking at the numbers. There is a deeper point involved here once again.
I made the point just now that some of the studies of the benefits of trade were really studies of the benefits of good institutions and good politics. That in my view is where the gains of Brexit are going to come.
Some argue that sovereignty is a meaningless construct in the modern world, that what matters is sharing it to gain more influence over others.
So we take the opposite view. We believe sovereignty is meaningful and what it enables us to do is to set our rules for our own benefit.
Sovereignty is about the ability to get your own rules right in a way that suits our own conditions. Much of the debate about will Britain diverge from the EU I think misses this point. We are clear – and the PM was clear in the speech he gave in Greenwich in London that we are not going to be a low-standard economy. That’s clear. But it is perfectly possible to have high standards, and indeed similar or better standards to those prevailing in the EU, without our laws and regulations necessarily doing exactly the same thing. One obvious example I think is the ability to support our own agriculture to promote environmental goods relevant to our own countryside, and to produce crops that reflect our own climate, rather than being forced to work with rules designed for growing conditions in central France.
I struggle to see why this is so controversial. The proposition that we will not wish to diverge, that we would wish not to change our rules, is the same thing as the rules governing us, on 31 December this year, are the most perfect rules that can be designed and need never be changed. That is self-evidently absurd. I think we should dismiss the ‘divergence’ phantasm from sensible political debate.
I think looking forward, we are going to have a huge advantage over the EU – the ability to set regulations for new sectors, the new ideas, and new conditions – quicker than the EU can, and based on sound science not fear of the future. I have no doubt that we will be able to encourage new investment and new ideas in this way – particularly given our plans to boost spend on scientific research, attract scientists and make Britain the best country in the world to do science.
There are other broader advantages to running your own affairs. One obvious one is that it is much easier to get people involved in taking decisions. Another, less obvious advantage, is the ability to change those decisions. My experience of the EU is that it has extreme difficulty in reversing bad decisions it takes. Yet every state gets things wrong. That’s clear. Course correction is, therefore, an important part of good government. Britain will be able to experiment, correct mistakes and improve. The EU is going to find this much, much more difficult.
I am confident that these political economy factors really matter. In an age of huge change, being able to anticipate to adapt, and to encourage really counts. Brexit is about a medium-term belief in that reality that this is true – that even if there is a short-run cost, it will be overwhelmed rapidly by the huge gains of having your own policy regimes in certain areas.
It’s a personal view, but I also believe it is good for a country and its people to have its fate in its own hands and for their own decisions to matter. When I look round Europe, by and large it’s the smaller countries, who know they must swim in the waves that others make, seem to have higher quality decision making –they can’t afford not to. Being responsible for your own policies produces better outcomes.
So, that is why, once again, we approach the upcoming negotiations in a pretty, confident fashion. We aren’t frightened by suggestions there is going to be friction, there is going to be greater barriers. We know that and have factored this in and we look further forward – to the gains of the future.
Finally, that is also why we are not prepared to compromise on some fundamentals of our negotiating position.
One of those fundamentals is that we are negotiating as one country. To return again to Burke, his conception of the state was and is one that allows for differences, for different habits, and for different customs. It is one which means that our own multi-state union in the UK has grown in different ways across the EU – each playing unique roles in its historical development. It is actually rather fashionable at the moment amongst some to run down that state which has been very successful historically. We cannot be complacent about the Union in the UK, but I nevertheless believe that all parts of the UK are going to survive and thrive together as one country. In particular, I am clear that I am negotiating on behalf of Northern Ireland as for every other part of the UK.
A second fundamental is that we bring to the negotiations not some clever tactical positioning but the fundamentals of what it means to be an independent country. It is central to our vision that we must have the ability to set laws that suit us – to claim the right that every other non-EU country in the world has. So to think that we might accept EU supervision on so-called level playing field issues simply fails to see the point of what we are doing. That isn’t a simple negotiating position which might move under pressure – it is the point of the whole project. That’s also why we are not going to extend the transition period beyond the end of this year. At the end of this year, we would recover our political and economic independence in full – why would we want to postpone it? That is the point of Brexit.
In short, we only want what other independent countries have.
To underline this I want to finish with a thought experiment. Boris Johnson’s speech in Greenwich a couple of weeks ago set out a record of consistently high standards of regulation and behaviour in the UK, in many cases better than EU norms or practice. So, how would you feel if the UK demanded that, to protect ourselves, the EU must dynamically harmonise with our national laws set in Westminster and the decisions of our own regulators and courts?
Now I assume, many in the EU would simply dismiss the suggestion out of hand. But perhaps the more thoughtful would say that such an approach would compromise the EU’s sovereign legal order; that there would be no democratic legitimacy in the EU for the decisions which the UK would take and to which the EU would be bound; and that such decisions are so fundamental to the way the population of a territory feels bound into the legitimacy of its government, that this structure would be simply unsustainable: at some point democratic consent would snap – dramatically and finally.
So however amusing and however tempting it would be for us to run these arguments in reverse, the reasons we would not do so and will not do so is that these arguments of our more thoughtful people on the EU side would have very significant force.
The reason we expect – for example – to have open and fair competition provisions is based on FTA precedent is not that we are looking for a minimalist outcome on competition law. It is that the model of an FTA and the precedents that exist in actual agreed FTAs are the most appropriate ones for the relationship of sovereign countries in highly sensitive areas relating to how their jurisdictions are governed and how their populations give consent to it. So if it is true, as we hear from our friends in the Commission and the 27, that the EU wants a durable and sustainable relationship in this highly sensitive area, the only way forward is to build on the approach we want of a relationship of equals.
I do believe this needs to be internalised on the EU side. I do think the EU needs to understand, I mean genuinely understand, not just say it, that countries geographically in Europe can, if they choose it, be independent countries. Independence does not mean a limited degree of freedom in return for accepting some of the norms of the central power. It means – independence – just that. I recognise that some in Brussels might be uncomfortable with that – but the EU must, if it is to achieve what it wants in the world, find a way of relating to its neighbours as friends and genuinely sovereign equals.
So let me conclude. Michel Barnier said in Belfast in other week that ‘Not one single person has ever convinced me of the added value of Brexit’.
So, Michel, I hope I will convince you when you read this to see things differently – and maybe even think that a Britain doing things differently might be good for Europe as well as for Britain.
And in concluding, I draw inspiration from three sources in believing we are going to get a good conclusion in negotiations this year.
First, we can do this quickly. We are always told we don’t have enough time. But we should take inspiration, I think, from the original Treaty of Rome back in 1957. This was negotiated and signed in just under 9 months – surely we can do as well as that as well as our great predecessors, with all the advantages we have got now?
Second source of inspiration is from President De Gaulle. I know that Michel is a great admirer of Charles de Gaulle. He probably doesn’t know that I am as well. De Gaulle, was the man who believed in a Europe of nations. He was the man who always behaved as if his country was a great country even when it seemed to have fallen very low, and thus made it become a great country yet again. That has been an inspiration to me, and those who think like me, in the low moments of the last three years.
And last, source of inspiration once again from Edmund Burke, who gave a famous speech to the electors of Bristol in 1780, and he urged his voters to ‘applaud us when we run, console us when we fall, cheer us when we recover!’ in 2016 we ran; in 2018, we fell; so cheer us now as we in Britain recover, and go on, I am sure, to great things.
Thank you very much.


conservativehome--2020-02-18--Stephen Booth: Checks in the Irish Sea.  What they are, why the UK and EU disgree about them – and h

Stephen Booth: Checks in the Irish Sea.  What they are, why the UK and EU disgree about them – and how they could wreck the talks

Stephen Booth is the Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange .
Border arrangements on the island of Ireland dominated the first phase of Brexit , almost derailing the wider withdrawal negotiations between the UK and the EU altogether .
It took the personal interventions of Boris Johnson and Leo Varadkar to break the impasse , unblocking the path to the eventual UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement .
Agreeing how to implement the compromises they reached within the Northern Ireland Protocol could yet prove to be just as complex and politically controversial in the next phase of talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and EU officials have been increasingly at odds over what the post-Brexit arrangements will mean for goods crossing the Irish sea .
The EU insists that a strict implementation of the commitments included in the Protocol necessitates various border checks to be made on goods flowing from Great Britain to Northern Ireland .
However , the UK Government has ruled out intrusive checks on trade in either direction and argues that the implementation of procedures envisioned under the Protocol remains subject to discussion and agreement .
To recap , the Protocol , due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the transition period on 1st January 2021 , avoids the need for new North-South border checks on the island of Ireland by creating a special economic status for Northern Ireland .
Northern Ireland remains in the UK ’ s customs territory and will therefore be subject to the UK ’ s independent trade policy and can be included in any new UK trade agreements .
However , Northern Ireland will be subject to the EU ’ s customs procedures to ensure that goods “ at risk ” of ending up in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consumed in Northern Ireland , are subject to the correct EU tariffs and regulations .
UK authorities are responsible for ensuring procedural compliance , but EU representatives can request to be present at customs or regulatory inspections .
Northern Ireland will effectively remain in the EU ’ s single market for goods , aligning with EU rules for agricultural and manufactured goods .
Finally , the Protocol provides a mechanism whereby , after four years , Stormont can withdraw its consent for the special arrangements , in which case Northern Ireland would revert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the UK , after a two-year cooling off period .
Confusion flows from the fact that , while the Protocol sets out the provisions of EU law that will apply in Northern Ireland , there is much left unsaid about how these provisions are implemented , supervised and enforced in practice .
Exactly how trade across the Irish Sea works will therefore be determined by decisions yet to be taken in a UK-EU Joint Committee , and by the wider UK-EU trade relationship , which is yet to be negotiated .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU achieve their stated ambition of a free trade agreement , some tariff and regulatory issues could be simplified .
Ultimately , the debate is beset by the same conflicting interests witnessed in the previous talks .
For the EU , having avoided the prospect of a North-South border for now , the primary concern is the integrity of its external border , which will be shifted to the Northern Ireland border .
In the first instance , the EU ’ s approach to such questions is , as ever , a legalistic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the usual checks should apply .
On the other hand , the Government not only wants to protect Northern Ireland ’ s place in the UK internal market .
It is also mindful of the potential political instability that could result from any measures that would further alarm Northern Ireland ’ s Unionist community .
It therefore favours pragmatism .
Indeed , it is in the New Decade , New Approach paper , which helped restore power-sharing at Stormont , that the Government commits to negotiating “ additional flexibilities and sensible practical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that are supported by business groups in Northern Ireland and maximise the free flow of trade.
” Achieving a flexible and light-touch approach to policing the Protocol will require intense diplomatic efforts on the UK ’ s part over the next ten months .
However , the UK can argue that it was the EU which previously suggested that any GB-NI procedures could be “ de-dramatised ” , with the vast majority of regulatory checks taking place in the marketplace rather than at points of entry .
Indeed , Article 6 ( 2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joint Committee “ shall adopt appropriate recommendations with a view to avoiding controls at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland to the extent possible.
” Since the island of Ireland is treated as a single unit for the purposes of animal health and disease prevention , there are already checks on animal imports from Great Britain to Northern Ireland .
Reaching a mutual recognition agreement on agricultural standards , similar to that between the EU and New Zealand , could minimise the need for any further checks , though this might also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divergence .
Ultimately , as the EU eventually conceded , the Protocol will only work over the long-term if there is broad-based political consent for it in Northern Ireland .
Gaining this consent is going to be a difficult challenge , given the circumstances from which we have started this process .
It will certainly require more political sensitivity and less legal rigidity from the EU than we have seen up to now .
The Government has wisely committed to ensuring that the Northern Ireland Executive is represented at the UK-EU Joint Committee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ representatives from the Irish government .
However , the UK must also convince the EU , and the Republic of Ireland in particular , that this is a shared political challenge and there is a joint interest in establishing workable , pragmatic solutions .

Stephen Booth is the Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.
Border arrangements on the island of Ireland dominated the first phase of Brexit, almost derailing the wider withdrawal negotiations between the UK and the EU altogether. It took the personal interventions of Boris Johnson and Leo Varadkar to break the impasse, unblocking the path to the eventual UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement. Agreeing how to implement the compromises they reached within the Northern Ireland Protocol could yet prove to be just as complex and politically controversial in the next phase of talks.
In recent weeks, UK ministers and EU officials have been increasingly at odds over what the post-Brexit arrangements will mean for goods crossing the Irish sea. The EU insists that a strict implementation of the commitments included in the Protocol necessitates various border checks to be made on goods flowing from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. However, the UK Government has ruled out intrusive checks on trade in either direction and argues that the implementation of procedures envisioned under the Protocol remains subject to discussion and agreement.
To recap, the Protocol, due to come into force at the end of the transition period on 1st January 2021, avoids the need for new North-South border checks on the island of Ireland by creating a special economic status for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland remains in the UK’s customs territory and will therefore be subject to the UK’s independent trade policy and can be included in any new UK trade agreements. However, Northern Ireland will be subject to the EU’s customs procedures to ensure that goods “at risk” of ending up in the EU single market, rather than being consumed in Northern Ireland, are subject to the correct EU tariffs and regulations. UK authorities are responsible for ensuring procedural compliance, but EU representatives can request to be present at customs or regulatory inspections.
Northern Ireland will effectively remain in the EU’s single market for goods, aligning with EU rules for agricultural and manufactured goods. Finally, the Protocol provides a mechanism whereby, after four years, Stormont can withdraw its consent for the special arrangements, in which case Northern Ireland would revert back to full alignment with the rest of the UK, after a two-year cooling off period.
Confusion flows from the fact that, while the Protocol sets out the provisions of EU law that will apply in Northern Ireland, there is much left unsaid about how these provisions are implemented, supervised and enforced in practice. Exactly how trade across the Irish Sea works will therefore be determined by decisions yet to be taken in a UK-EU Joint Committee, and by the wider UK-EU trade relationship, which is yet to be negotiated. For example, if the UK and the EU achieve their stated ambition of a free trade agreement, some tariff and regulatory issues could be simplified.
Ultimately, the debate is beset by the same conflicting interests witnessed in the previous talks. For the EU, having avoided the prospect of a North-South border for now, the primary concern is the integrity of its external border, which will be shifted to the Northern Ireland border. In the first instance, the EU’s approach to such questions is, as ever, a legalistic one and its base case is that all the usual checks should apply.
On the other hand, the Government not only wants to protect Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market. It is also mindful of the potential political instability that could result from any measures that would further alarm Northern Ireland’s Unionist community. It therefore favours pragmatism. Indeed, it is in the New Decade, New Approach paper, which helped restore power-sharing at Stormont, that the Government commits to negotiating “additional flexibilities and sensible practical measures across all aspects of the Protocol that are supported by business groups in Northern Ireland and maximise the free flow of trade.”
Achieving a flexible and light-touch approach to policing the Protocol will require intense diplomatic efforts on the UK’s part over the next ten months. However, the UK can argue that it was the EU which previously suggested that any GB-NI procedures could be “de-dramatised”, with the vast majority of regulatory checks taking place in the marketplace rather than at points of entry. Indeed, Article 6(2) of the Protocol states that the Joint Committee “shall adopt appropriate recommendations with a view to avoiding controls at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland to the extent possible.”
Since the island of Ireland is treated as a single unit for the purposes of animal health and disease prevention, there are already checks on animal imports from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Reaching a mutual recognition agreement on agricultural standards, similar to that between the EU and New Zealand, could minimise the need for any further checks, though this might also depend on the degree of UK regulatory divergence.
Ultimately, as the EU eventually conceded, the Protocol will only work over the long-term if there is broad-based political consent for it in Northern Ireland. Gaining this consent is going to be a difficult challenge, given the circumstances from which we have started this process. It will certainly require more political sensitivity and less legal rigidity from the EU than we have seen up to now. The Government has wisely committed to ensuring that the Northern Ireland Executive is represented at the UK-EU Joint Committee, which will also be attended by representatives from the Irish government. However, the UK must also convince the EU, and the Republic of Ireland in particular, that this is a shared political challenge and there is a joint interest in establishing workable, pragmatic solutions.


conservativehome--2020-02-18--Judy Terry: Tighter rules are needed on councils setting up unaccountable subsidiaries

Judy Terry is a marketing professional and a former local councillor in Suffolk .
The Financial Reporting Council ( FRC ) watchdog is reportedly going to “ crackdown ” on boards in the wake of major recent accounting scandals at a number of big-name companies , by introducing new regulations to hold directors to account .
The public sector also needs to answer questions .
At Suffolk County Council , for example , a respected and successful specialist committee monitors investments in shares for employees ’ pensions , reviewing performance and auditors ’ reports in some depth .
The same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as independent investors ; trusting the information provided is crucial to protect ‘ ordinary ’ people ’ s retirement .
It may be naïve , but it is surely a question of transparency – if the City is to recover international respect , still in short supply following the 2008 crash and the significant recent business failures .
Financial Services are vital to continuing confidence in the UK ’ s economy and growth after Brexit .
Whilst the FRC fined auditors £32m in 2018-19 , company bosses have largely escaped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Chief Executives , especially , are required to get a grip .
The same must be true of Non-Executive directors , whose role is to be the eyes and ears of investors , challenging information and recommendations ; they should question awarding excessive salaries and undeserved multi-million pound bonuses , adding to shareholders ’ resentment as profits dive and borrowings rise .
The FRC should also assess how non-executives are recruited and lay down some rules when the process appears to be rather incestuous , with some individuals sitting on a number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experience of a particular business – for which they receive substantial payments .
Given the commitment demanded of such positions , it is hardly surprising if they can not devote sufficient time to the paperwork , enabling them to challenge , and evaluate the nuances in auditors ’ reports .
Rules should extend to the public sector , with councils increasingly setting up subsidiaries using taxpayers ’ money to acquire commercial property , including out of town retail centres instead of boosting the High Street , without full and effective public scrutiny and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rise , these companies should be required to provide detailed Annual Reports , setting out long-term investment strategies alongside income/expenditure , identifying directors and any payments they receive .
Meanwhile , last year , the National Audit Office ( NAO ) criticised the Ministry of Housing , Communities & Local Government , which funds the 38 Local Enterprise Partnerships for “ making no effort to evaluate the value for money of nearly £12 billion in public funding , nor does it have plans to do so ” .
With LEPs responsible for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ medium sized businesses , there is evidently a need for greater transparency .
It recently emerged that Manchester ’ s Business Growth Hub , owned by the Growth Company , made provisions for ‘ financial irregularities ’ of £325,000 in 2015 and £136,000 the following year , and an employee was dismissed for allegedly falsifying evidence .
LEPs recruit local business leaders to their boards , so this is a warning to ensure tighter scrutiny of both applications for funding and their management .
Sadly , it took a decade for lessons to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ – if , indeed , they have been learnt .
Post Offices are at the heart of communities , as important as pubs , libraries , and neighbourhood shops , yet the network was ravaged by scandal from 2000 , following the installation of a new computer system .
Software failings subsequently led to financial shortfalls with accusations of theft and false accounting resulting in bankruptcies , prosecutions , and even jail sentences , for some of the 550 former Sub-Postmasters , whose lives and reputations were destroyed , despite their attempts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their tills .
Rather than accept responsibility when the failings were eventually exposed , highly paid Post Office executives and directors spent £23m of taxpayers ’ money on legal fees when Sub-Postmasters sought redress for their treatment through the courts .
At the end of last year , after a three-year court battle , they finally won £58 million in compensation , with the Judge criticising Post Office denials that its IT system had been plagued with bugs .
Victims are rightly calling for a public inquiry and for those who led their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Regrettably , that is unlikely to happen .
The former Chief Executive , who recently stood down after seven years , continues to enjoy non-executive positions in both the private and public sector , including in the Cabinet Office and chairing an NHS Trust , funded by the taxpayer .
Tighter regulation should also apply to public sector appointments , as well as charities .
The collapse of the Kid ’ s Company , largely funded by Government , in 2015 , has disappeared off the radar ; has anyone been held to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corporate mismanagement rewarded , at the cost of ‘ ordinary ’ people .
Fiscal illiteracy appears to be a prerequisite for director-level positions in too many flagship organisations – and amongst those commissioning projects .
HS2 and the Garden Bridge are just two examples of what happens daily across the country .
It ’ s more a question of who you know , rather than what you know .
Directors walk away with millions , but the thousands of people who lose their jobs as the result of their bosses ’ incompetence , @ @ @

Judy Terry is a marketing professional and a former local councillor in Suffolk.
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) watchdog is reportedly going to “crackdown” on boards in the wake of major recent accounting scandals at a number of big-name companies, by introducing new regulations to hold directors to account.
The public sector also needs to answer questions.
At Suffolk County Council, for example, a respected and successful specialist committee monitors investments in shares for employees’ pensions, reviewing performance and auditors’ reports in some depth. The same procedures will apply to other pension providers, as well as independent investors; trusting the information provided is crucial to protect ‘ordinary’ people’s retirement.
It may be naïve, but it is surely a question of transparency – if the City is to recover international respect, still in short supply following the 2008 crash and the significant recent business failures. Financial Services are vital to continuing confidence in the UK’s economy and growth after Brexit.
Whilst the FRC fined auditors £32m in 2018-19, company bosses have largely escaped detailed scrutiny and accountability; Finance Directors and Chief Executives, especially, are required to get a grip. The same must be true of Non-Executive directors, whose role is to be the eyes and ears of investors, challenging information and recommendations; they should question awarding excessive salaries and undeserved multi-million pound bonuses, adding to shareholders’ resentment as profits dive and borrowings rise.
The FRC should also assess how non-executives are recruited and lay down some rules when the process appears to be rather incestuous, with some individuals sitting on a number of different boards – often without any experience of a particular business – for which they receive substantial payments. Given the commitment demanded of such positions, it is hardly surprising if they cannot devote sufficient time to the paperwork, enabling them to challenge, and evaluate the nuances in auditors’ reports.
Rules should extend to the public sector, with councils increasingly setting up subsidiaries using taxpayers’ money to acquire commercial property, including out of town retail centres instead of boosting the High Street, without full and effective public scrutiny and independent accountability. With Council Tax continuing to rise, these companies should be required to provide detailed Annual Reports, setting out long-term investment strategies alongside income/expenditure, identifying directors and any payments they receive.
Meanwhile, last year, the National Audit Office (NAO) criticised the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, which funds the 38 Local Enterprise Partnerships for “making no effort to evaluate the value for money of nearly £12 billion in public funding, nor does it have plans to do so”.
With LEPs responsible for Growth Hubs, which support small and medium sized businesses, there is evidently a need for greater transparency. It recently emerged that Manchester’s Business Growth Hub, owned by the Growth Company, made provisions for ‘financial irregularities’ of £325,000 in 2015 and £136,000 the following year, and an employee was dismissed for allegedly falsifying evidence. LEPs recruit local business leaders to their boards, so this is a warning to ensure tighter scrutiny of both applications for funding and their management.
Sadly, it took a decade for lessons to be learnt at the state-owned Post Office – if, indeed, they have been learnt.
Post Offices are at the heart of communities, as important as pubs, libraries, and neighbourhood shops, yet the network was ravaged by scandal from 2000, following the installation of a new computer system. Software failings subsequently led to financial shortfalls with accusations of theft and false accounting resulting in bankruptcies, prosecutions, and even jail sentences, for some of the 550 former Sub-Postmasters, whose lives and reputations were destroyed, despite their attempts to raise the alarm by reporting discrepancies on their tills.
Rather than accept responsibility when the failings were eventually exposed, highly paid Post Office executives and directors spent £23m of taxpayers’ money on legal fees when Sub-Postmasters sought redress for their treatment through the courts.
At the end of last year, after a three-year court battle, they finally won £58 million in compensation, with the Judge criticising Post Office denials that its IT system had been plagued with bugs. Victims are rightly calling for a public inquiry and for those who led their persecution to be held to account. Regrettably, that is unlikely to happen. The former Chief Executive, who recently stood down after seven years, continues to enjoy non-executive positions in both the private and public sector, including in the Cabinet Office and chairing an NHS Trust, funded by the taxpayer.
Tighter regulation should also apply to public sector appointments, as well as charities. The collapse of the Kid’s Company, largely funded by Government, in 2015, has disappeared off the radar; has anyone been held to account? No. Another example of corporate mismanagement rewarded, at the cost of ‘ordinary’ people.
Fiscal illiteracy appears to be a prerequisite for director-level positions in too many flagship organisations – and amongst those commissioning projects. HS2 and the Garden Bridge are just two examples of what happens daily across the country.
It’s more a question of who you know, rather than what you know. Directors walk away with millions, but the thousands of people who lose their jobs as the result of their bosses’ incompetence, deserve better.


conservativehome--2020-02-18--Cameron noted the Environment Agency’s flawed approach to flooding. But the problem has still not be

Cameron noted the Environment Agency’s flawed approach to flooding. But the problem has still not been dealt with.

Boris Johnson memorably described his predecessor , David Cameron , as a “ girly swot.
” Others accused Cameron of “ chillaxing ” – an “ essay crisis ” prime minister with an insouciance towards keeping on top of the detail .
The length of Cameron ’ s memoirs , For the Record , suggests that Johnson ’ s swipe is closer to the mark .
The good news for Johnson is that means that often , when a problem comes along , he doesn ’ t need to pick up the phone to Cameron for advice but just reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ index .
Let us consider flooding , for example .
Cameron writes : “ Politics is about whatever nature throws at you .
And as 2013 became 2014 , nature threw everything it had got at Britain .
Coastal storms hit East Anglia and floods inundated Kent .
Rainfall turned the Somerset Levels into lakes , and lashed Wales and the south coast .
Then , in February , the cliffs at Dawlish in Devon collapsed , destroying the mainline railway track and cutting Cornwall off from the rest of the country .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a tardy response to disasters , so I visited several of the places affected .
I hadn ’ t yet made it to the Somerset Levels .
This low-lying manmade environment was dredged and irrigated centuries ago .
But not enough had been done to protect it .
Some experts genuinely thought we should let the floods run their course .
I was outraged – you can ’ t say that about someone ’ s home , someone ’ s farm .
If it ’ s a place where people live then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sadly , the Environment Agency had failed on that score .
It seemed to worry more these days about newts and butterflies than homes and livelihoods .
And while the number of homes and businesses that were flooded was just a tenth of that in the floods of 2007 , the papers portrayed us as fiddling while Britain was submerged .
“ To make up for our slow start , we had to go overboard to compensate .
I visited Somerset several times and chaired a series of COBR meetings .
I saw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Somerset , Ian Liddell-Grainger , on a weekly basis , and promised the people living there that we would dredge all the waterways – I ’ d do it myself it I had to.
” Before 1989 , flood defence was managed by the National Rivers Authority .
Rivers were dredged regularly when needed .
After that the Environment Agency took over and dredging was generally discontinued .
That could mean the difference between it taking five days of heavy rain for overtopping to be a risk – or just two days .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ convincing .
Welland and Deepings Internal Drainage Board has kept rainfall records since 1829 .
The heaviest rain was in 1880 .
The issue is not that the rain in recent years has been heavier in the area – it is neglect from the EA .
The River Welland is “ clogged with weed ” while the River Witham “ is in dire need of being slubbed ” .
If climate change really does mean more heavy rainfall in the future then that is hardly a reason to tolerate the EA ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also become vastly more expensive with the Environment Agency spending “ £500 per vole to remove them from where flood defence work was due to start .
In another case , a £20,000 repair job ballooned to £200,000 by the time badgers were moved to man-made setts – which they promptly abandoned.
” A whistleblower blog has given abundant evidence of wasteful spending .
Not that the abject failure to prevent flooding is a great triumph for animal welfare .
Sheep , as well as people , have drowned .
Yet the EA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It spent nearly £1.4 billion last year .
The more hopeless the performance , the more of our money DEFRA hands over .
Jamie Blackett , a farmer and author , writes in the Daily Telegraph : “ The greater problem lies in the Environment Agency .
Officials there are simply incapable of understanding that , like it or not , most of our watercourses are now in some way artificial and need human action .
Their refusal to countenance dredging has resulted in millions of small mammals , insects and invertebrates being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ birdlife.
” He proposes that “ responsibility for river management be removed from his agency and given back to local boards.
” Would that not be consistent with the Government ’ s policy of localism ?
The media pressure when there is a flood is on the Prime Minister of the day to visit – wade about in wellington boots .
Perhaps bring along a mop .
Then move on to the next thing .
Cameron was enough of a “ girly swot ” to identify the flawed approach of the EA and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his memoirs .
But then when it came to actually doing something about it – which would really mean the difficult and controversial task of abolishing the EA – he found it easier to chillaxe .
How much more unnecessary flooding must be endured before this piece of unfinished business is dealt with ?

Boris Johnson memorably described his predecessor, David Cameron, as a “girly swot.” Others accused Cameron of “chillaxing” – an “essay crisis” prime minister with an insouciance towards keeping on top of the detail. The length of Cameron’s memoirs, For the Record, suggests that Johnson’s swipe is closer to the mark. The good news for Johnson is that means that often, when a problem comes along, he doesn’t need to pick up the phone to Cameron for advice but just reach for this useful volume and check the index.
Let us consider flooding, for example. Cameron writes:
“Politics is about whatever nature throws at you. And as 2013 became 2014, nature threw everything it had got at Britain. Coastal storms hit East Anglia and floods inundated Kent. Rainfall turned the Somerset Levels into lakes, and lashed Wales and the south coast. Then, in February, the cliffs at Dawlish in Devon collapsed, destroying the mainline railway track and cutting Cornwall off from the rest of the country.
“I knew by now the dangers of a tardy response to disasters, so I visited several of the places affected. I hadn’t yet made it to the Somerset Levels. This low-lying manmade environment was dredged and irrigated centuries ago. But not enough had been done to protect it. Some experts genuinely thought we should let the floods run their course. I was outraged – you can’t say that about someone’s home, someone’s farm. If it’s a place where people live then it has to be protected.
“Sadly, the Environment Agency had failed on that score. It seemed to worry more these days about newts and butterflies than homes and livelihoods. And while the number of homes and businesses that were flooded was just a tenth of that in the floods of 2007, the papers portrayed us as fiddling while Britain was submerged.
“To make up for our slow start, we had to go overboard to compensate. I visited Somerset several times and chaired a series of COBR meetings. I saw the local MP for Bridgwater and West Somerset, Ian Liddell-Grainger, on a weekly basis, and promised the people living there that we would dredge all the waterways – I’d do it myself it I had to.”
Before 1989, flood defence was managed by the National Rivers Authority. Rivers were dredged regularly when needed. After that the Environment Agency took over and dredging was generally discontinued. That could mean the difference between it taking five days of heavy rain for overtopping to be a risk – or just two days. Attempts to blame climate change are not convincing. Welland and Deepings Internal Drainage Board has kept rainfall records since 1829. The heaviest rain was in 1880. The issue is not that the rain in recent years has been heavier in the area – it is neglect from the EA. The River Welland is “clogged with weed” while the River Witham “is in dire need of being slubbed”. If climate change really does mean more heavy rainfall in the future then that is hardly a reason to tolerate the EA’s lamentable approach.
Flood defence work has also become vastly more expensive with the Environment Agency spending “£500 per vole to remove them from where flood defence work was due to start. In another case, a £20,000 repair job ballooned to £200,000 by the time badgers were moved to man-made setts – which they promptly abandoned.” A whistleblower blog has given abundant evidence of wasteful spending.
Not that the abject failure to prevent flooding is a great triumph for animal welfare. Sheep, as well as people, have drowned.
Yet the EA’s funding keeps being increased. It spent nearly £1.4 billion last year. The more hopeless the performance, the more of our money DEFRA hands over.
Jamie Blackett, a farmer and author, writes in the Daily Telegraph:
“The greater problem lies in the Environment Agency. Officials there are simply incapable of understanding that, like it or not, most of our watercourses are now in some way artificial and need human action. Their refusal to countenance dredging has resulted in millions of small mammals, insects and invertebrates being drowned, with a consequent impact on birdlife.”
He proposes that “responsibility for river management be removed from his agency and given back to local boards.” Would that not be consistent with the Government’s policy of localism?
The media pressure when there is a flood is on the Prime Minister of the day to visit – wade about in wellington boots. Perhaps bring along a mop. Then move on to the next thing. Cameron was enough of a “girly swot” to identify the flawed approach of the EA and to remember to include a reprimand in his memoirs. But then when it came to actually doing something about it – which would really mean the difficult and controversial task of abolishing the EA – he found it easier to chillaxe.
How much more unnecessary flooding must be endured before this piece of unfinished business is dealt with?


conservativehome--2020-02-19--Robert Palmer: Johnson needs to walk the walk on rebalancing tax to win the ‘Red Wall’ for good

The tremors that accompanied the resignation of Sajid Javid exposed a fault line underpinning the Government ’ s new electoral coalition of leafy shire seats and so-called ‘ Red Wall ’ constituencies in the Midlands and North of England .
Rumours splashed across the papers in the run up to the reshuffle included plans to cut pensions ’ tax relief for higher earners , changes to capital gains tax , and a new mansion tax .
All of this was briefed as on the cards to help fund increased public spending to “ level up ” previously forgotten parts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anathema to traditional Conservative voters in places such as Maidenhead and Sevenoaks .
But what do people in the former Red Wall areas think ?
In the wake of the election my organisation , Tax Justice UK , decided to see what voters thought about politics , government promises on spending , and how best to fund these .
Along with the research company Survation , and with the support of the University of Sheffield , we carried out seven focus groups .
We spoke to people in the new Conservative seats of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and as part of the project we also went to Long Eaton , London , and Reading .
Somewhat predictably , Brexit dominated people ’ s decision-making .
But we also got a real sense that the Prime Minister was right to describe many of his new supporters as lending him their votes .
One new Conservative voter in Blyth Valley told us : “ I felt terrible the next day , did I do the right thing ?
” But there was also no love lost for the Labour leader , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I struggled between Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn … I don ’ t particularly like either of them but there was no way I was voting for Corbyn … Boris Johnson is just the best of a bad bunch ” .
Voters in Blyth and Wrexham told us that they felt abandoned by politicians from all sides .
One person in Blyth said : “ Public services are falling apart on a massive scale .
Austerity has shafted the North East ” .
Across all the areas we visited , we heard a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ improved public services .
No one called for tax cuts .
As part of our research we explored different ways in which the Government could fund extra spending .
In particular we were curious to hear voters views on taxing wealth .
The current tax system relies heavily on taxes on income and consumption .
A number of Conservative thinkers have argued that the government should rebalance this towards taxing wealth more .
Will Tanner , now head of the influential think tank Onward and originator of “ Workington man ” , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labour but higher on “ unproductive parts of the economy , such as property ” .
Tim Pitt , a former senior Treasury advisor , recently argued that the Conservatives need to tackle inequality and should look at higher taxes on wealth to help do this .
Since the reshuffle the mansion tax seems to be off the agenda but Rishi Sunak , the new Chancellor , is reportedly still looking at other forms of tax on wealth .
This chimes with a promise in the Conservative manifesto to “ redesign the tax @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wages and investment and limits arbitrary tax advantages for the wealthiest in society ” .
We asked people their views on this statement , initially not telling them where it was from .
The language was seen as positive .
Participants were surprised when we told them it was a Conservative commitment , but they hoped to see it happen .
As part of the focus groups we also tested specific proposals for how to tax wealth more .
The people we spoke to supported the idea of bringing capital gains tax into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy last introduced by Nigel Lawson in 1988 .
Last year we carried out a poll with YouGov and found that 66 per cent of Conservative voters agreed that income from wealth should be taxed at least at the same level as income from work .
As one participant in Blyth put it , “ Why should someone who is working hard to stay on the breadline , why should they pay more tax than someone who makes all that money from shares ” .
We also tested reducing pension tax relief for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bands to council tax .
Both proposals received more qualified support .
The voters we spoke to wanted to see more action to tackle tax avoidance .
However , blanket calls for much higher taxes on wealth went down badly .
Most people supported the idea that the wealthy had by and large earned it .
Our research shows that the Prime Minister needs to deliver for his new voters if he wants to keep their votes .
People expect to see more investment in local services .
And they ’ re prepared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wealth to help pay for it .
You can read the full report here .

Robert Palmer is Executive Director of Tax Justice UK.
The tremors that accompanied the resignation of Sajid Javid exposed a fault line underpinning the Government’s new electoral coalition of leafy shire seats and so-called ‘Red Wall’ constituencies in the Midlands and North of England.
Rumours splashed across the papers in the run up to the reshuffle included plans to cut pensions’ tax relief for higher earners, changes to capital gains tax, and a new mansion tax. All of this was briefed as on the cards to help fund increased public spending to “level up” previously forgotten parts of the country.
Such policies might be anathema to traditional Conservative voters in places such as Maidenhead and Sevenoaks. But what do people in the former Red Wall areas think?
In the wake of the election my organisation, Tax Justice UK, decided to see what voters thought about politics, government promises on spending, and how best to fund these. Along with the research company Survation, and with the support of the University of Sheffield, we carried out seven focus groups. We spoke to people in the new Conservative seats of Blyth Valley, Bury, and Wrexham, and as part of the project we also went to Long Eaton, London, and Reading.
Somewhat predictably, Brexit dominated people’s decision-making. But we also got a real sense that the Prime Minister was right to describe many of his new supporters as lending him their votes. One new Conservative voter in Blyth Valley told us: “I felt terrible the next day, did I do the right thing?”
But there was also no love lost for the Labour leader, with one person in Wrexham saying “I struggled between Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn … I don’t particularly like either of them but there was no way I was voting for Corbyn … Boris Johnson is just the best of a bad bunch”.
Voters in Blyth and Wrexham told us that they felt abandoned by politicians from all sides. One person in Blyth said: “Public services are falling apart on a massive scale. Austerity has shafted the North East”. Across all the areas we visited, we heard a consistent message that people expected to see improved public services. No one called for tax cuts.
As part of our research we explored different ways in which the Government could fund extra spending. In particular we were curious to hear voters views on taxing wealth. The current tax system relies heavily on taxes on income and consumption. A number of Conservative thinkers have argued that the government should rebalance this towards taxing wealth more.
Will Tanner, now head of the influential think tank Onward and originator of “Workington man”, has written that taxes should be low on labour but higher on “unproductive parts of the economy, such as property”. Tim Pitt, a former senior Treasury advisor, recently argued that the Conservatives need to tackle inequality and should look at higher taxes on wealth to help do this.
Since the reshuffle the mansion tax seems to be off the agenda but Rishi Sunak, the new Chancellor, is reportedly still looking at other forms of tax on wealth.
This chimes with a promise in the Conservative manifesto to “redesign the tax system so that it boosts growth, wages and investment and limits arbitrary tax advantages for the wealthiest in society”. We asked people their views on this statement, initially not telling them where it was from. The language was seen as positive. Participants were surprised when we told them it was a Conservative commitment, but they hoped to see it happen.
As part of the focus groups we also tested specific proposals for how to tax wealth more.
The people we spoke to supported the idea of bringing capital gains tax into line with income tax rates, a policy last introduced by Nigel Lawson in 1988. Last year we carried out a poll with YouGov and found that 66 per cent of Conservative voters agreed that income from wealth should be taxed at least at the same level as income from work. As one participant in Blyth put it, “Why should someone who is working hard to stay on the breadline, why should they pay more tax than someone who makes all that money from shares”.
We also tested reducing pension tax relief for higher earners and adding a few extra bands to council tax. Both proposals received more qualified support. The voters we spoke to wanted to see more action to tackle tax avoidance.
However, blanket calls for much higher taxes on wealth went down badly. Most people supported the idea that the wealthy had by and large earned it.
Our research shows that the Prime Minister needs to deliver for his new voters if he wants to keep their votes. People expect to see more investment in local services. And they’re prepared to see some increases in taxes on wealth to help pay for it.
You can read the full report here.