conservativehome--2020-12-09--Daniel Hannan: How the EU must wish it had accepted May’s Chequers offer

Daniel Hannan is a writer and columnist .
He was a Conservative MEP from 1999 to 2020 , and is now President of the Initiative for Free Trade .
Liam Fox was right .
The former trade secretary has been much mocked for his remark that a trade deal with the EU would be “ one of the easiest in human history ” .
Two and a half years later , that deal has still not been done and , as I write , there is a real prospect that the talks will break down .
Yet Fox ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aspects of trade negotiations , in general , are the opening of markets and the recognition of each other ’ s standards .
In this instance , neither issue arises .
Britain and the EU already have access to each other ’ s markets and reciprocal standards .
Every barrier would be a costly move away from the status quo .
For once , the inertia bias pulls towards free trade .
So what is the problem ?
Why wasn ’ t a deal struck long ago ?
Well – and this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t because of differences over trade .
The purely commercial aspects of the deal seem to have been agreed easily enough .
The hold-up , as everyone knows , is over other matters , notably fisheries and what Brussels negotiators ( and most British media ) misleadingly call the “ level playing field ” .
Neither of these disputes is primarily economic .
We keep being told that the fishing industry accounts for a tiny proportion of Britain ’ s GDP , but the same is true for the EU .
More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which EU trawlers would be wholly excluded from British waters is if there were no deal .
A deal would mean a phased reduction in access for Continental vessels , but not a reduction to zero .
Whatever the EU ’ s reasons for holding out on fisheries , concern for French skippers is plainly not one of them .
Similarly , when it comes to the level playing field , Brussels doesn ’ t truly fear that Britain will abolish the minimum wage , scrap its environmental rules or subsidise its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
British social and employment standards are higher than the EU ’ s requirements , its green targets more ambitious and its levels of state aid lower .
No , in both cases , the issue is emotional rather than economic .
Eurocrats are still affronted by the 2016 referendum result .
A few explicitly want Britain to suffer , even if that means that the 27 suffer , too .
Even those who , rationally , accept that the best way to maximise their own prosperity is to have a free and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sometimes struggle , psychologically , to follow that logic all the way through .
Hence all their snide remarks and passive-aggressive tweets .
Britain ’ s other trade talks – first with Japan , Australia and New Zealand , then with the United States , then with India , Mercosur and the Gulf states – have been premised on the idea that both sides want to maximise their prosperity .
We recently agreed a deal with Switzerland which covers pretty much the same ground as the EU talks .
Foxite in its simplicity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreeing to leave things as they were .
Indeed , the main complicating factor was EU pressure on Switzerland not to agree to too much .
Why , then , do Brussels negotiators talk of “ granting ” tariff-free access as if trade were an act of kindness ?
Because , in truth , they have not come to terms with Brexit .
The EU thinks of itself as a modern empire ( see speeches by José Manuel Barroso , Guy Verhofstadt et al ) and its attitude to Britain is that of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They find it hard to let go .
They want some remaining emblems of suzerainty .
We British should understand .
We have , from time to time , found ourselves in the EU ’ s shoes .
When the bulk of Ireland broke away , for example , London struggled to reconcile itself to the notion that there was now a truly independent country next door .
It imposed all sorts of conditions on the new state , including an oath of allegiance to the Crown , the continuing use of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Anglo-Irish Treaty would have legal precedence over measures adopted by the Irish parliament .
In truth , these measures were more decorative than functional .
Ireland after 1921 was , in its essentials , an independent country ; but another generation passed before it formally assumed the final attributes of sovereignty without British opposition .
Fisheries and the level playing field are , so to speak , the EU ’ s treaty ports and oath of allegiance – symbols that Britain is a semi-protectorate rather than with an equal sovereign power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ sentence differently , the truth is that they see Britain as a rule-taking dependent , like Macedonia or Ukraine , rather than as a wholly independent nation .
The funny thing is that , when Theresa May offered them such a relationship at the 2018 Salzburg summit , they threw it back in her face .
Perhaps , as reports suggested at the time , they were simply put off by her manner .
Perhaps they were not prepared , on principle , to agree to anything proposed by the renegade province .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ they had grabbed that deal .

Daniel Hannan is a writer and columnist. He was a Conservative MEP from 1999 to 2020, and is now President of the Initiative for Free Trade.
Liam Fox was right. The former trade secretary has been much mocked for his remark that a trade deal with the EU would be “one of the easiest in human history”. Two and a half years later, that deal has still not been done and, as I write, there is a real prospect that the talks will break down. Yet Fox’s reasoning was sound. The most difficult aspects of trade negotiations, in general, are the opening of markets and the recognition of each other’s standards. In this instance, neither issue arises. Britain and the EU already have access to each other’s markets and reciprocal standards. Every barrier would be a costly move away from the status quo. For once, the inertia bias pulls towards free trade.
So what is the problem? Why wasn’t a deal struck long ago? Well – and this is where Foxie was correct – it wasn’t because of differences over trade. The purely commercial aspects of the deal seem to have been agreed easily enough. The hold-up, as everyone knows, is over other matters, notably fisheries and what Brussels negotiators (and most British media) misleadingly call the “level playing field”.
Neither of these disputes is primarily economic. We keep being told that the fishing industry accounts for a tiny proportion of Britain’s GDP, but the same is true for the EU. More to the point, the only way in which EU trawlers would be wholly excluded from British waters is if there were no deal. A deal would mean a phased reduction in access for Continental vessels, but not a reduction to zero. Whatever the EU’s reasons for holding out on fisheries, concern for French skippers is plainly not one of them.
Similarly, when it comes to the level playing field, Brussels doesn’t truly fear that Britain will abolish the minimum wage, scrap its environmental rules or subsidise its industries with a view to hostile dumping. British social and employment standards are higher than the EU’s requirements, its green targets more ambitious and its levels of state aid lower.
No, in both cases, the issue is emotional rather than economic. Eurocrats are still affronted by the 2016 referendum result. A few explicitly want Britain to suffer, even if that means that the 27 suffer, too. Even those who, rationally, accept that the best way to maximise their own prosperity is to have a free and open trading relationship with their biggest market sometimes struggle, psychologically, to follow that logic all the way through. Hence all their snide remarks and passive-aggressive tweets.
Britain’s other trade talks – first with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, then with the United States, then with India, Mercosur and the Gulf states – have been premised on the idea that both sides want to maximise their prosperity. We recently agreed a deal with Switzerland which covers pretty much the same ground as the EU talks. Foxite in its simplicity, it largely involved the two sides agreeing to leave things as they were. Indeed, the main complicating factor was EU pressure on Switzerland not to agree to too much.
Why, then, do Brussels negotiators talk of “granting” tariff-free access as if trade were an act of kindness? Because, in truth, they have not come to terms with Brexit. The EU thinks of itself as a modern empire (see speeches by José Manuel Barroso, Guy Verhofstadt et al) and its attitude to Britain is that of a metropolitan power toward a renegade province. They find it hard to let go. They want some remaining emblems of suzerainty.
We British should understand. We have, from time to time, found ourselves in the EU’s shoes. When the bulk of Ireland broke away, for example, London struggled to reconcile itself to the notion that there was now a truly independent country next door. It imposed all sorts of conditions on the new state, including an oath of allegiance to the Crown, the continuing use of three Irish ports and a guarantee that the Anglo-Irish Treaty would have legal precedence over measures adopted by the Irish parliament.
In truth, these measures were more decorative than functional. Ireland after 1921 was, in its essentials, an independent country; but another generation passed before it formally assumed the final attributes of sovereignty without British opposition.
Fisheries and the level playing field are, so to speak, the EU’s treaty ports and oath of allegiance – symbols that Britain is a semi-protectorate rather than with an equal sovereign power. While Eurocrats would no doubt phrase that sentence differently, the truth is that they see Britain as a rule-taking dependent, like Macedonia or Ukraine, rather than as a wholly independent nation.
The funny thing is that, when Theresa May offered them such a relationship at the 2018 Salzburg summit, they threw it back in her face. Perhaps, as reports suggested at the time, they were simply put off by her manner. Perhaps they were not prepared, on principle, to agree to anything proposed by the renegade province. Either way, they must now wish they had grabbed that deal.


conservativehome--2020-12-09--Ryan Bourne: First, Covid-19 lockdowns. Next, climate change ones – rationed car use, no red meat.

Ryan Bourne: First, Covid-19 lockdowns. Next, climate change ones – rationed car use, no red meat.  Coming soon to a country near you?

Ryan Bourne is Chair in Public Understanding of Economics at the Cato Institute .
We are at the beginning of the end .
Provided vaccines prove as efficacious as trial results indicate , and absent unobserved side effects , the rollout to vulnerable groups should reduce Covid-19 death risks substantially and rapidly .
Inoculations down through the priority list will then put us within reach of a herd immunity robust to ordinary behaviour .
Life , it seems , could be “ back to normal ” by the spring or summer of next year .
I ’ ve never been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy .
You can ’ t switch economic life on and off without causing permanent damage .
But there is nevertheless reason to be optimistic of a robust recovery next year .
What is more uncertain are the longer-term consequences of this experience on our collective psyche and politics .
American economists Julian Kozlowski , Laura Veldkamp , and Venky Venkateswaran have warned of a depressive “ scarring ” effect , as we use the experience to revise our assumptions on the probabilities of major shocks .
If we collectively infer that tail-end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , then investments become less attractive .
Think alone about the willingness of entrepreneurs to go into the travel , hospitality or leisure industries after this .
Then think of the effect of the risk of having to pivot to home working again , generalised across other sectors .
Alongside that are the impacts on the role of the state .
Economic historian Robert Higgs ’ work has highlighted how crises generate a ratchet of government power .
Wars , depressions , and emergencies see powers centralised , before receding again .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same size and scope as before .
After the Coronavirus , we will see more taxpayer funds for virus-related public health , vaccination research , and the subsidisation of PPE production capacity .
Government will also be met with demands to maintain Covid-level welfare benefits and industry-specific stimulus as a tool for future downturns , a la Eat Out to Help Out .
Lockdowns are the obvious area where these two effects could come together most damagingly .
Highly crude shutdowns had a strong logic in Spring , given the high uncertainty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus , and with Italy highlighting the dangers of overburdened hospitals .
More recent national measures reflect instead an ongoing policy failure to institute better control of Covid-19 , but may nevertheless have passed a cost-benefit test given the arrival of vaccines ( a case that the Government did not adequately prove ) .
Whatever your position on the desirability or consequences of lockdowns in this particular crisis , however , it ’ s clear that suspending economic and social liberties today brings with it the temptation for politicians to utilise such powers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suspect that they could .
Given the way that politicians throw around terms such as “ emergency ” or “ epidemic , ” it is not an intellectual leap to imagine future leaders demanding similar measures for other ambitions .
And therein lies a source of economic discontent—an incalculable drag or doubt for a generation .
Already , the economist Mariana Mazzucato has pitched the idea of “ climate lockdowns , ” should governments not deliver the green revolution she desires .
In the service of mitigating the “ climate emergency , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use , ban consumption of red meat , and impose energy-saving measures , while fossil-fuel companies would have to stop drilling.
” Of course , we can avoid all that , she says , if we are willing to “ reorient our energy system around renewable energy ” and “ evict fossil-fuel interests and short-termism from business , finance , and politics ” —the goals Mazzucato wants to achieve with her threats warning of what might be needed otherwise .
Now , it might seem far-fetched to imagine a world where one could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too much , or eating steak frites .
But before this year , one could have said the same about meeting four households on Christmas Day , or not eating at least a scotch egg with your pint .
Madeleine Grant worries about how the example of this pandemic might normalise health surveillance or screening for colds or flu .
But it ’ s the everyday lifestyle regulations that have been truly novel – including the forced closure of certain businesses and the bans on gatherings .
The threat of repeats predicated on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we should be most attentive to .
To mitigate this temptation requires a reaffirmation of the legitimate justifications for government interventions .
From an economic perspective , there is a defensible consequentialist claim that governments should act where huge , dangerous externalities result from collective action problems .
Yet in doing so they have a duty to both prove the case and to account for these externalities in the least harmful way possible , only reaching for the most extreme measures when the consequences of inaction are grave or imminent .
The climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the imminent threat is absent .
The reasoning presumes that governments should go beyond accounting for the externality , say through carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes , instead using the “ emergency ” to justify actively ignoring market conceptions of value , threatening vast restrictions on how you live your life unless the planners ’ vision of the world is achieved .
Mazzucato ’ s argument is not just about reducing CO2 , in other words , but about using the threat of lockdowns to push for abandoning consumer-led markets entirely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thinking proliferate during this crisis .
Last week , Jenny Kleeman wrote for the Guardian about lab-grown meat , which many see as a useful pathway to reducing the environmental impact of farming and the ethical concerns many have with meat consumption .
Rather than embrace these innovations as a way to work with consumer preferences to reduce the impacts of meat eating , Kleeman simply declared it would be preferable if we “ simply stopped eating meat , or ate it far less often.
” Her inspiration ?
The sacrifices of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we are “ able to make ” in extremis .
As we exit this crisis , we must not forget that underpinning a healthy market economy is the idea of the sovereign consumer , who knows what he or she wants , and whose welfare is enhanced by acting on those preferences .
The bar for curbing activities that bring us joy or happiness should be very high indeed .
And to the extent that economic or social problems do require government interventions , they should work with the preferences of consumers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economic welfare costs spiral .
Lockdowns were a panic button reaction to an acute emergency .
Their re-use was a signal of the government ’ s dismal failure to mitigate the virus in less costly ways .
But we must quell talk of them becoming a model for solving future economic and social challenges , or else the expectation of them could itself be economically corrupting today .

Ryan Bourne is Chair in Public Understanding of Economics at the Cato Institute.
We are at the beginning of the end. Provided vaccines prove as efficacious as trial results indicate, and absent unobserved side effects, the rollout to vulnerable groups should reduce Covid-19 death risks substantially and rapidly.
Inoculations down through the priority list will then put us within reach of a herd immunity robust to ordinary behaviour. Life, it seems, could be “back to normal” by the spring or summer of next year.
I’ve never been a “V-shaper” Panglossian on the economy. You can’t switch economic life on and off without causing permanent damage. But there is nevertheless reason to be optimistic of a robust recovery next year. What is more uncertain are the longer-term consequences of this experience on our collective psyche and politics.
American economists Julian Kozlowski, Laura Veldkamp, and Venky Venkateswaran have warned of a depressive “scarring” effect, as we use the experience to revise our assumptions on the probabilities of major shocks. If we collectively infer that tail-end risks such as global pandemics are larger, then investments become less attractive.
Think alone about the willingness of entrepreneurs to go into the travel, hospitality or leisure industries after this. Then think of the effect of the risk of having to pivot to home working again, generalised across other sectors.
Alongside that are the impacts on the role of the state. Economic historian Robert Higgs’ work has highlighted how crises generate a ratchet of government power. Wars, depressions, and emergencies see powers centralised, before receding again.
But the state never quite falls back to the same size and scope as before. After the Coronavirus, we will see more taxpayer funds for virus-related public health, vaccination research, and the subsidisation of PPE production capacity. Government will also be met with demands to maintain Covid-level welfare benefits and industry-specific stimulus as a tool for future downturns, a la Eat Out to Help Out.
Lockdowns are the obvious area where these two effects could come together most damagingly. Highly crude shutdowns had a strong logic in Spring, given the high uncertainty about the prevalence and risks of the virus, and with Italy highlighting the dangers of overburdened hospitals.
More recent national measures reflect instead an ongoing policy failure to institute better control of Covid-19, but may nevertheless have passed a cost-benefit test given the arrival of vaccines (a case that the Government did not adequately prove).
Whatever your position on the desirability or consequences of lockdowns in this particular crisis, however, it’s clear that suspending economic and social liberties today brings with it the temptation for politicians to utilise such powers again – and for businesses and individuals to suspect that they could.
Given the way that politicians throw around terms such as “emergency” or “epidemic,” it is not an intellectual leap to imagine future leaders demanding similar measures for other ambitions. And therein lies a source of economic discontent—an incalculable drag or doubt for a generation.
Already, the economist Mariana Mazzucato has pitched the idea of “climate lockdowns,” should governments not deliver the green revolution she desires. In the service of mitigating the “climate emergency,” the “state would limit private-vehicle use, ban consumption of red meat, and impose energy-saving measures, while fossil-fuel companies would have to stop drilling.”
Of course, we can avoid all that, she says, if we are willing to “reorient our energy system around renewable energy” and “evict fossil-fuel interests and short-termism from business, finance, and politics”—the goals Mazzucato wants to achieve with her threats warning of what might be needed otherwise.
Now, it might seem far-fetched to imagine a world where one could face fines or jail time for driving too much, or eating steak frites. But before this year, one could have said the same about meeting four households on Christmas Day, or not eating at least a scotch egg with your pint.
Madeleine Grant worries about how the example of this pandemic might normalise health surveillance or screening for colds or flu. But it’s the everyday lifestyle regulations that have been truly novel – including the forced closure of certain businesses and the bans on gatherings. The threat of repeats predicated on the ends justifying the means is what we should be most attentive to.
To mitigate this temptation requires a reaffirmation of the legitimate justifications for government interventions. From an economic perspective, there is a defensible consequentialist claim that governments should act where huge, dangerous externalities result from collective action problems. Yet in doing so they have a duty to both prove the case and to account for these externalities in the least harmful way possible, only reaching for the most extreme measures when the consequences of inaction are grave or imminent.
The climate lockdowns idea is so pernicious not just because the imminent threat is absent. The reasoning presumes that governments should go beyond accounting for the externality, say through carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes, instead using the “emergency” to justify actively ignoring market conceptions of value, threatening vast restrictions on how you live your life unless the planners’ vision of the world is achieved. Mazzucato’s argument is not just about reducing CO2, in other words, but about using the threat of lockdowns to push for abandoning consumer-led markets entirely.
We have seen this type of thinking proliferate during this crisis. Last week, Jenny Kleeman wrote for the Guardian about lab-grown meat, which many see as a useful pathway to reducing the environmental impact of farming and the ethical concerns many have with meat consumption. Rather than embrace these innovations as a way to work with consumer preferences to reduce the impacts of meat eating, Kleeman simply declared it would be preferable if we “simply stopped eating meat, or ate it far less often.” Her inspiration? The sacrifices of the Coronavirus in showing the massive behavioural changes we are “able to make” in extremis.
As we exit this crisis, we must not forget that underpinning a healthy market economy is the idea of the sovereign consumer, who knows what he or she wants, and whose welfare is enhanced by acting on those preferences. The bar for curbing activities that bring us joy or happiness should be very high indeed. And to the extent that economic or social problems do require government interventions, they should work with the preferences of consumers, not treat them with contempt, lest the economic welfare costs spiral.
Lockdowns were a panic button reaction to an acute emergency. Their re-use was a signal of the government’s dismal failure to mitigate the virus in less costly ways. But we must quell talk of them becoming a model for solving future economic and social challenges, or else the expectation of them could itself be economically corrupting today.


conservativehome--2020-12-09--Chris Criscione: Councillors should have the power to intervene earlier with planning applications

Cllr Chris Criscione is the Leader of the Conservative Group on Uttlesford District Council .
Why do residents get so upset when a developer leaflet drops into their area as part of a consultation ; with the plans drawn up , proposals near to set in stone , and little in the way of prior input from residents as the rule rather than the exception ?
Well – simply put – it comes down to the all-too-familiar exclusion of residents and their representatives from the pre-application process , secret discussions surrounding planning obligations , and the very little influence that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consulted on as part of the formal application process .
As someone straddling industry and politics , with passion and commitment to see planning work for communities , I say this with confidence : in my experience , the most successful development proposals are those where councillors are written to in the first week that a developer or promoter takes ownership of the site .
That sort of approach , at the earliest possible outset , gives the councillor the ability to relay concerns and objections , hopes , ambitions and desires to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scheme , within the constraints of policy and an applicant ’ s obligations or minimum requirements .
Notwithstanding the respect that national , regional , and local planning policy needs to be afforded in the formulation of proposals , from pre-application stage through to determination , it should seem alien to us all – although it is a seemingly normal means of operating – that councillors are excluded from discussions on the basis of probity in planning , where policy and opinion actually encourages to the contrary .
At this juncture , I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predetermination is inevitable in councillors ’ early interaction with applicants .
It is not , and councillors ought to be trusted in this respect .
What I ’ m calling the “ probity obstruction ” seems a cop-out of significant magnitude , which is not backed up in policy or law .
In reality it is leading to the under-delivery of new homes when planning committee ’ s feel obliged to refuse plans under pressure from rightly disgruntled locals , leading to poor quality and inappropriate development where they are consented because local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the largely ineffective neighbour consultation stages , but also leading to developer contributions being spent on projects that are not popular or desirable amongst residents .
To be very clear , decision-makers ’ involvement in the planning process should not replace the need for the local authority to consider planning policy , that is obvious .
But the lack of councillor involvement does create a vicious cycle of resentment between communities , local authorities , and developers which could be easily solved through greater councillor input at the outset .
In this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and with developers to reach mutual satisfaction .
The idea that councillors should be involved early on is not a new one .
In statute and in guidance published by the Planning Officers ’ Society and the Local Government Association , it is clear that there is a desire and encouragement to do this .
Why , then , does it not happen in practice ?
Frankly , it ’ s become an industry standard that public consultation takes place late in the process and when proposals have already been largely set in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many and I ’ m proud in my own professional life to have bucked the trend with my colleagues at Anderson in this regard .
However , if that is an industry trend overall then involving councillors early on in the evolution of proposals would make that reality more acceptable to residents : they can then say that at least one of their own has been part of the work up to that point ; that their voice had been heard .
Without this involvement – bar any cosmetic or token changes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ – people see a developer-officer led process and that ’ s bound to cause indignation in communities across the land .
My recommendation is simple : councillors should be allowed – both in policy and in practice – to maintain relationships with developers in their area .
They need the freedom to tell an applicant in no uncertain terms what residents expect .
There is nothing underhand about that , I would argue as far as saying it is remiss of a councillor not to do this .
The relationships I have built @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the benefits of continued engagement with developers from day one through to completion and beyond can not be understated for their value .
The stigma needs to be removed and councillors should be able to represent those who expect representation in the planning process , beyond the statutory consultation which often feeds into the aforementioned vicious cycle of resentment .
It ’ s on councillors , officers , and developers , to make that happen for well-planned , healthy and happy communities in the UK .

Cllr Chris Criscione is the Leader of the Conservative Group on Uttlesford District Council.
Why do residents get so upset when a developer leaflet drops into their area as part of a consultation; with the plans drawn up, proposals near to set in stone, and little in the way of prior input from residents as the rule rather than the exception?
Well – simply put – it comes down to the all-too-familiar exclusion of residents and their representatives from the pre-application process, secret discussions surrounding planning obligations, and the very little influence that communities have as proposals come to be consulted on as part of the formal application process.
As someone straddling industry and politics, with passion and commitment to see planning work for communities, I say this with confidence: in my experience, the most successful development proposals are those where councillors are written to in the first week that a developer or promoter takes ownership of the site. That sort of approach, at the earliest possible outset, gives the councillor the ability to relay concerns and objections, hopes, ambitions and desires to those responsible for the creation of a scheme, within the constraints of policy and an applicant’s obligations or minimum requirements.
Notwithstanding the respect that national, regional, and local planning policy needs to be afforded in the formulation of proposals, from pre-application stage through to determination, it should seem alien to us all – although it is a seemingly normal means of operating – that councillors are excluded from discussions on the basis of probity in planning, where policy and opinion actually encourages to the contrary. At this juncture, I would also contest the widely-held notion that predetermination is inevitable in councillors’ early interaction with applicants. It is not, and councillors ought to be trusted in this respect.
What I’m calling the “probity obstruction” seems a cop-out of significant magnitude, which is not backed up in policy or law. In reality it is leading to the under-delivery of new homes when planning committee’s feel obliged to refuse plans under pressure from rightly disgruntled locals, leading to poor quality and inappropriate development where they are consented because local people haven’t been represented outside of the largely ineffective neighbour consultation stages, but also leading to developer contributions being spent on projects that are not popular or desirable amongst residents.
To be very clear, decision-makers’ involvement in the planning process should not replace the need for the local authority to consider planning policy, that is obvious. But the lack of councillor involvement does create a vicious cycle of resentment between communities, local authorities, and developers which could be easily solved through greater councillor input at the outset. In this setting, they can work within policy and with developers to reach mutual satisfaction.
The idea that councillors should be involved early on is not a new one. In statute and in guidance published by the Planning Officers’ Society and the Local Government Association, it is clear that there is a desire and encouragement to do this. Why, then, does it not happen in practice?
Frankly, it’s become an industry standard that public consultation takes place late in the process and when proposals have already been largely set in stone. This is hugely disappointing for many and I’m proud in my own professional life to have bucked the trend with my colleagues at Anderson in this regard. However, if that is an industry trend overall then involving councillors early on in the evolution of proposals would make that reality more acceptable to residents: they can then say that at least one of their own has been part of the work up to that point; that their voice had been heard. Without this involvement – bar any cosmetic or token changes to “show willing” by the applicant – people see a developer-officer led process and that’s bound to cause indignation in communities across the land.
My recommendation is simple: councillors should be allowed – both in policy and in practice – to maintain relationships with developers in their area. They need the freedom to tell an applicant in no uncertain terms what residents expect. There is nothing underhand about that, I would argue as far as saying it is remiss of a councillor not to do this.
The relationships I have built over the years with councillors who see the benefits of continued engagement with developers from day one through to completion and beyond cannot be understated for their value. The stigma needs to be removed and councillors should be able to represent those who expect representation in the planning process, beyond the statutory consultation which often feeds into the aforementioned vicious cycle of resentment.
It’s on councillors, officers, and developers, to make that happen for well-planned, healthy and happy communities in the UK.


conservativehome--2020-12-09--Gove’s bargain to break the deadlock on trade with Ulster leaves big questions unanswered

The most important thing to remember , as Michael Gove prepares to give us the details of the deal he has struck to protect trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain after Brexit , is that regardless of those details the whole thing is a unionist defeat .
In fairness , so too was Theresa May ’ s deal .
The defeat lies not in the specifics but in the very principle , wrongly conceded by British politicians who have never thought about Ulster enough , that we were somehow committed to privileging the Province ’ s trading relationship with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainland .
The Belfast Agreement does not say this .
But Dublin and Brussels were not shy about praying in aid of it to justify their maximalist interpretation of British obligations and London , lacking its own coherent understanding and interpretation of the treaty , was swiftly enspelled by the ‘ Good Friday Agreement ’ meme .
So the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was only ever trying to make the best of a bad job .
Did he succeed ?
In his statement today , Gove set out the yardsticks by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We had to ensure that Northern Ireland businesses retained unfettered access to the rest of the UK market .
Northern Ireland ’ s place in the UK ’ s customs territory had to be protected – and that meant that goods that stayed in the UK were not subject to tariffs .
And we had to ensure that the important GB-NI trade flows , on which lives and livelihoods depend , were not disrupted ; and we need to ensure a smooth flow of trade , with no need for new physical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ although it ’ s worth noting that the first has nothing to do with the EU – allowing unilateral trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain was always in London ’ s gift – and that it was never likely that there would be tariffs on internal British trade .
Nonetheless , today ’ s announcement does suggest that real progress has been made on the third point .
The two sides have apparently agreed a ‘ trusted trader scheme ’ which will see tariff exemptions for 98 per cent of goods moving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of checks is apparently “ broadly positive “ .
Where agreement has not yet been reached , for example on meat products , grace periods have been secured for further negotiations .
It also allows the Government to signal to the US and others that it “ takes account of the Belfast ( Good Friday ) Agreement in all of its dimensions ” , and to withdraw the controversial ‘ international law-breaking ’ clauses of the UK Internal Market Bill ( which some Government sources suggest helped unlock this breakthrough ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UKIM Bill , with its controversial but important provisions regarding mutual recognition and regional spending , through the Lords ( although there are reports that Gove plans to abandon these too ) .
He can also take some satisfaction in having apparently overcome the EU ’ s insistence that there would be no ‘ mini deals ’ to ameliorate the impact of a No Deal exit .
As this agreement applies “ whether we have a Free Trade Agreement with the EU or not ” , it would appear to be just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand , gone is the slender hope held out by May ’ s proposals that ‘ alternative arrangements ’ might be found in the future to lift the Irish Sea border altogether .
The DUP have also pointed out Irish claims that the ‘ grace periods ’ are intended only to allow Ulster supermarkets to source products from the Republic , and it is worrying that in response to this Gove offered only a bromide about Northern Irish goods and offered no concrete assurances about mainland ones .
There is also as yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this deal .
In his statement , Gove said : “ We know that we now need to get on and give further clarity to business as to the specifics of what this deal means for them , and how it will all work in detail in practice .
And we will do this through the publication of further guidance.
” Questions are already being raised about the extent to which his understandable focus on the high-profile problem of supermarket supply chains belies ongoing problems for other businesses .
Urgent clarification is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Government has sought to prevent the situation wherein “ a company in Great Britain , with only a peripheral link to commercial operations in Northern Ireland , could be caught inadvertently by the tests within the Protocol ’ s text ” .
In his statement , Gove says of his deal : “ It means firms in GB stay outside state aid rules where there is no ‘ genuine and direct ’ link to Northern Ireland , and no ‘ real foreseeable ’ impact on NI-EU trade.
” ‘ Genuine and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are phrases which will end up in front of a court .
Which one ?
If it is the European courts , one doesn ’ t need to be a European Research Group hardliner to imagine how that ’ s going to play out over the next ten or twenty years .
And in that vein , this seems to do nothing about the fact that Northern Ireland will henceforth be subject to rules and regulations set by institutions in which it is unrepresented .
All in all , then , there are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Gove claims to have ameliorated the vast majority of the practical difficulties raised by the Prime Minister ’ s u-turn on an Irish Sea border , and he may yet prove to have done so .
But given the Government ’ s previous form on Northern Ireland , and his evasiveness today , they have not earned the benefit of the doubt .

The most important thing to remember, as Michael Gove prepares to give us the details of the deal he has struck to protect trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain after Brexit, is that regardless of those details the whole thing is a unionist defeat.
In fairness, so too was Theresa May’s deal. The defeat lies not in the specifics but in the very principle, wrongly conceded by British politicians who have never thought about Ulster enough, that we were somehow committed to privileging the Province’s trading relationship with the EU over its one with the mainland.
The Belfast Agreement does not say this. But Dublin and Brussels were not shy about praying in aid of it to justify their maximalist interpretation of British obligations and London, lacking its own coherent understanding and interpretation of the treaty, was swiftly enspelled by the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ meme.
So the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was only ever trying to make the best of a bad job. Did he succeed?
In his statement today, Gove set out the yardsticks by which he hopes to be measured:
“We had to ensure that Northern Ireland businesses retained unfettered access to the rest of the UK market. Northern Ireland’s place in the UK’s customs territory had to be protected – and that meant that goods that stayed in the UK were not subject to tariffs. And we had to ensure that the important GB-NI trade flows, on which lives and livelihoods depend, were not disrupted; and we need to ensure a smooth flow of trade, with no need for new physical customs infrastructure.”
All worthy objectives, although it’s worth noting that the first has nothing to do with the EU – allowing unilateral trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain was always in London’s gift – and that it was never likely that there would be tariffs on internal British trade.
Nonetheless, today’s announcement does suggest that real progress has been made on the third point. The two sides have apparently agreed a ‘trusted trader scheme’ which will see tariff exemptions for 98 per cent of goods moving from the mainland to Ulster. The level of checks is apparently “broadly positive“. Where agreement has not yet been reached, for example on meat products, grace periods have been secured for further negotiations.
It also allows the Government to signal to the US and others that it “takes account of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in all of its dimensions”, and to withdraw the controversial ‘international law-breaking’ clauses of the UK Internal Market Bill (which some Government sources suggest helped unlock this breakthrough). This may help get the rest of the UKIM Bill, with its controversial but important provisions regarding mutual recognition and regional spending, through the Lords (although there are reports that Gove plans to abandon these too).
He can also take some satisfaction in having apparently overcome the EU’s insistence that there would be no ‘mini deals’ to ameliorate the impact of a No Deal exit. As this agreement applies “whether we have a Free Trade Agreement with the EU or not”, it would appear to be just such a thing.
On the other hand, gone is the slender hope held out by May’s proposals that ‘alternative arrangements’ might be found in the future to lift the Irish Sea border altogether.
The DUP have also pointed out Irish claims that the ‘grace periods’ are intended only to allow Ulster supermarkets to source products from the Republic, and it is worrying that in response to this Gove offered only a bromide about Northern Irish goods and offered no concrete assurances about mainland ones.
There is also as yet too much uncertainty about the practical operation of this deal. In his statement, Gove said: “We know that we now need to get on and give further clarity to business as to the specifics of what this deal means for them, and how it will all work in detail in practice. And we will do this through the publication of further guidance.” Questions are already being raised about the extent to which his understandable focus on the high-profile problem of supermarket supply chains belies ongoing problems for other businesses.
Urgent clarification is also needed on the state aid compromise. The Government has sought to prevent the situation wherein “a company in Great Britain, with only a peripheral link to commercial operations in Northern Ireland, could be caught inadvertently by the tests within the Protocol’s text”. In his statement, Gove says of his deal:
“It means firms in GB stay outside state aid rules where there is no ‘genuine and direct’ link to Northern Ireland, and no ‘real foreseeable’ impact on NI-EU trade.”
‘Genuine and direct’ and ‘real foreseeable’ are phrases which will end up in front of a court. Which one? If it is the European courts, one doesn’t need to be a European Research Group hardliner to imagine how that’s going to play out over the next ten or twenty years. And in that vein, this seems to do nothing about the fact that Northern Ireland will henceforth be subject to rules and regulations set by institutions in which it is unrepresented.
All in all, then, there are still plenty of grounds for unionist unease. Gove claims to have ameliorated the vast majority of the practical difficulties raised by the Prime Minister’s u-turn on an Irish Sea border, and he may yet prove to have done so. But given the Government’s previous form on Northern Ireland, and his evasiveness today, they have not earned the benefit of the doubt.


conservativehome--2020-12-09--WATCH: The Chancellor of the Duchy is asked if EU officials will direct UK ones in Northern Ireland

.
@ eastantrimmp asks Cabinet Minister @ michaelgove if he thinks we have gained back our sovereignty if we 're @ @ @ @ @ direct our officials and other governments , to tell us where we can get our @ @ @ @ @

.@eastantrimmp asks Cabinet Minister @michaelgove if he thinks we have gained back our sovereignty if we're "allowing EU officials to direct our officials and other governments, to tell us where we can get our food from?" pic.twitter.com/WgsEKjRVZo
— DUP (@duponline) December 9, 2020


conservativehome--2020-12-09--The Northern Ireland Protocol. It’s a deal even if there’s No Deal. Gove’s Commons statement. Full t

The Northern Ireland Protocol. It’s a deal even if there’s No Deal. Gove’s Commons statement. Full text.

“ With your permission , Mr Speaker , I would like to update the House , and the people of Northern Ireland , on the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol as part of the Withdrawal Agreement with the European Union .
Throughout 2020 we have worked intensively to ensure that the Withdrawal Agreement , in particular the Northern Ireland Protocol , will be fully operational on 1 January 2021 .
Our aims , and the proportionate and pragmatic way we intended to pursue them , were set out in the Command Paper we published in May , ‘ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ireland Protocol ’ .
This set three key commitments that we believe needed to be respected in all scenarios : We had to ensure that Northern Ireland businesses retained unfettered access to the rest of the UK market .
Northern Ireland ’ s place in the UK ’ s customs territory had to be protected – and that meant that goods that stayed in the UK were not subject to tariffs .
And we had to ensure that the important GB-NI trade flows , on which lives and livelihoods depend , were not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a smooth flow of trade , with no need for new physical customs infrastructure .
And Mr Speaker , I am pleased to say that on Monday the European Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič and I – as co-chairs of the Joint Committee set up to negotiate the implementation of the protocol – came to an agreement in principle on a deal which meets all of those commitments , and puts the people of Northern Ireland first .
I would like to begin by paying tribute to Maroš and his team for their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their determination to get a deal done that would work for both sides .
And I ’ d also like to thank the first minister , the deputy first minister and all the members of the Northern Ireland executive for their crucial intervention at significant moments in order to ensure that the rights of the people of Northern Ireland were protected .
Turning now to that first Government commitment , the deal protects unfettered access for Northern Ireland businesses to their most important market .
As the Prime Minister underlined , this had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that meant removing any prospect of export declarations for Northern Ireland goods moving from Northern Ireland to Great Britain .
And that ’ s what our agreement will do .
There will be no additional requirements will be placed on Northern Ireland businesses for these movements , with the very limited and specific exception of trade in endangered species and conflict diamonds .
On the second commitment , Mr Speaker , the deal safeguards Northern Ireland ’ s place in the UK ’ s customs territory .
As recently as July , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which , and I quote : If that had been implemented that would have raised the prospect of a 58 per cent tariff on a pint of milk going from Scotland to a supermarket in Strabane or 96 per cent on a bag of sugar going from Liverpool to the shops of Belfast .
As we ’ ve repeatedly made clear , this could never have been an acceptable outcome .
So instead , I am pleased to say that under the agreement that we ’ ve reached , Northern Ireland businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Northern Ireland will be free of all tariffs .
Whether that is Nissan ’ s cars from Sunderland ; or lamb from Montgomeryshire .
Internal UK trade will be protected as we promised – whether we have a Free Trade Agreement with the EU or not .
And third , Mr Speaker , this deal would keep goods flowing between Great Britain and Northern Ireland in January , and indeed provide some necessary additional flexibilities .
It protects Northern Ireland supermarket supplies .
We heard throughout the year that traders needed time to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we have a grace period for supermarkets to update their procedures .
And our agreement also prevents any disruption at the end of the transition period on the movements of chilled meats .
British sausages will continue to make their way to Belfast and Ballymena in the new year .
And we have also got time for reciprocal agreements between the UK and EU on agri food to be discussed in the months ahead .
This deal also protects the flow of medicines and vet medicines into Northern Ireland .
This means we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up to 12 months to adapt to the rules under the protocol – so this will avoid any disruption to critical medical supplies .
So three commitments entered into , three commitments that we have upheld .
But this agreement in principle also goes further still , providing additional flexibility that will enable us to make the most of the opportunities that face us as the transition period ends .
As you know , Mr Speaker , this House has been concerned about the risk of so-called ‘ reach back ’ from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The concern that many colleagues had was that a company in Great Britain , with only a peripheral link to commercial operations in Northern Ireland , could be caught inadvertently by the tests within the Protocol ’ s text .
That would not have been acceptable ; nor was it what the Protocol had envisaged .
That is why I am pleased that the agreement we have addresses that risk .
It means firms in GB stay outside state aid rules where there is no ‘ genuine and direct ’ link to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreseeable ’ impact on NI-EU trade .
It ’ s an important step forward , dealing with an issue raised by a number of honourable and right honourable members across this House .
Also , this deal ensures that Northern Ireland will be out of the Common Agricultural Policy , which means that the Northern Ireland Executive have full freedom to set their own agricultural subsidies for Northern Ireland ’ s farmers .
It also means appropriate and flexible arrangements which mean that more than £400m of spending each year is totally exempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as this , the deal ensures that support for fishermen in Northern Ireland will also be exempt from EU state aid rules – and that means more than £15m of flexibilities for Northern Ireland ’ s fishermen over the next five years .
And of course Northern Ireland ’ s services industries are totally outside the scope of the Protocol and its state aid measures .
The agreement also respects the Protocol provisions , which were endorsed by Parliament , that allow some EU officials to be present at Northern Ireland ports as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And let me be clear , there will be no Belfast ‘ mini-embassy ’ or mission , as the EU originally sought .
And the EU officials will not have any powers to carry out checks themselves .
There will instead be sensible practical arrangements , cooperation , reciprocal data-sharing , so that both sides can have confidence in these unique arrangements .
We also want to leave no doubt about our ongoing commitments to peace and prosperity in Northern Ireland .
My Right Honourable Friend the Northern Ireland Secretary will set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further measures of financial support , to help businesses and communities to prosper and thrive from the end of the year and beyond .
And Mr Speaker , we ’ ve been able to deliver a package which now means that the Protocol can be implemented in a pragmatic and a proportionate way .
It takes account of the Belfast ( Good Friday ) Agreement in all of its dimensions , and it protects the interests both of the EU single-market but more importantly , the territorial and constitutional integrity of the whole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be approved officially at a Joint Committee meeting in the coming days .
And , of course this agreement that we have reached also enables the Government to withdraw clauses 44 , 45 and 47 of the UK Internal Market Bill , and avoids the need for any additional provisions in the Taxation Bill .
Having put beyond doubt the primacy of the sovereignty of this place , as we leave the EU , we rest safe in the knowledge that such provisions are no longer required .
We know that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further clarity to business as to the specifics of what this deal means for them , and how it will all work in detail in practice .
And we will do this through the publication of further guidance .
And that will sit along the ongoing , intensive work we will take forward to implement the Protocol .
But above all , Mr Speaker , we will always work with the interests of the people and businesses of Northern Ireland in mind – as this agreement , and the important flexibilities it will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all remember if the Protocol is to work , it must work for the whole community in Northern Ireland .
And whether it is to be maintained in the future , as the Protocol itself sets out , is for the people of Northern Ireland to decide through the democratic consent mechanism that my Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister negotiated .
And on that critical , important note of the primacy of democracy , I recommend this statement to the House .

“With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to update the House, and the people of Northern Ireland, on the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol as part of the Withdrawal Agreement with the European Union.
Throughout 2020 we have worked intensively to ensure that the Withdrawal Agreement, in particular the Northern Ireland Protocol, will be fully operational on 1 January 2021.
Our aims, and the proportionate and pragmatic way we intended to pursue them, were set out in the Command Paper we published in May, ‘The UK’s approach to the Northern Ireland Protocol’ .
This set three key commitments that we believe needed to be respected in all scenarios:
We had to ensure that Northern Ireland businesses retained unfettered access to the rest of the UK market.
Northern Ireland’s place in the UK’s customs territory had to be protected – and that meant that goods that stayed in the UK were not subject to tariffs.
And we had to ensure that the important GB-NI trade flows, on which lives and livelihoods depend, were not disrupted; and we need to ensure a smooth flow of trade, with no need for new physical customs infrastructure.
And Mr Speaker, I am pleased to say that on Monday the European Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič and I – as co-chairs of the Joint Committee set up to negotiate the implementation of the protocol – came to an agreement in principle on a deal which meets all of those commitments, and puts the people of Northern Ireland first.
I would like to begin by paying tribute to Maroš and his team for their pragmatism, their collaborative spirit – and their determination to get a deal done that would work for both sides. And I’d also like to thank the first minister, the deputy first minister and all the members of the Northern Ireland executive for their crucial intervention at significant moments in order to ensure that the rights of the people of Northern Ireland were protected.
Turning now to that first Government commitment, the deal protects unfettered access for Northern Ireland businesses to their most important market.
As the Prime Minister underlined, this had to be protected in full – and that meant removing any prospect of export declarations for Northern Ireland goods moving from Northern Ireland to Great Britain.
And that’s what our agreement will do. There will be no additional requirements will be placed on Northern Ireland businesses for these movements, with the very limited and specific exception of trade in endangered species and conflict diamonds.
On the second commitment, Mr Speaker, the deal safeguards Northern Ireland’s place in the UK’s customs territory.
As recently as July, the Commission had envisaged a default tariffs scenario in which, and I quote:
all goods brought into Northern Ireland [would be] considered to be at risk …and are as such subject to the Common Customs Tariff.”
If that had been implemented that would have raised the prospect of a 58 per cent tariff on a pint of milk going from Scotland to a supermarket in Strabane or 96 per cent on a bag of sugar going from Liverpool to the shops of Belfast.
As we’ve repeatedly made clear, this could never have been an acceptable outcome.
So instead, I am pleased to say that under the agreement that we’ve reached, Northern Ireland businesses selling to consumers or using goods in Northern Ireland will be free of all tariffs.
Whether that is Nissan’s cars from Sunderland; or lamb from Montgomeryshire.
Internal UK trade will be protected as we promised – whether we have a Free Trade Agreement with the EU or not.
And third, Mr Speaker, this deal would keep goods flowing between Great Britain and Northern Ireland in January, and indeed provide some necessary additional flexibilities.
It protects Northern Ireland supermarket supplies. We heard throughout the year that traders needed time to adapt their systems.
That is why we have a grace period for supermarkets to update their procedures.
And our agreement also prevents any disruption at the end of the transition period on the movements of chilled meats. British sausages will continue to make their way to Belfast and Ballymena in the new year. And we have also got time for reciprocal agreements between the UK and EU on agri food to be discussed in the months ahead.
This deal also protects the flow of medicines and vet medicines into Northern Ireland. This means we’ll grant industry a period of up to 12 months to adapt to the rules under the protocol – so this will avoid any disruption to critical medical supplies.
So three commitments entered into, three commitments that we have upheld.
But this agreement in principle also goes further still, providing additional flexibility that will enable us to make the most of the opportunities that face us as the transition period ends.
As you know, Mr Speaker, this House has been concerned about the risk of so-called ‘reach back’ from the state aid provisions that the Protocol applies.
The concern that many colleagues had was that a company in Great Britain, with only a peripheral link to commercial operations in Northern Ireland, could be caught inadvertently by the tests within the Protocol’s text.
That would not have been acceptable; nor was it what the Protocol had envisaged.
That is why I am pleased that the agreement we have addresses that risk.
It means firms in GB stay outside state aid rules where there is no ‘genuine and direct’ link to Northern Ireland, and no ‘real foreseeable’ impact on NI-EU trade. It’s an important step forward, dealing with an issue raised by a number of honourable and right honourable members across this House.
Also, this deal ensures that Northern Ireland will be out of the Common Agricultural Policy, which means that the Northern Ireland Executive have full freedom to set their own agricultural subsidies for Northern Ireland’s farmers.
It also means appropriate and flexible arrangements which mean that more than £400m of spending each year is totally exempt from state aid rules.
As well as this, the deal ensures that support for fishermen in Northern Ireland will also be exempt from EU state aid rules – and that means more than £15m of flexibilities for Northern Ireland’s fishermen over the next five years. And of course Northern Ireland’s services industries are totally outside the scope of the Protocol and its state aid measures.
The agreement also respects the Protocol provisions, which were endorsed by Parliament, that allow some EU officials to be present at Northern Ireland ports as UK authorities carry out our own procedures.
And let me be clear, there will be no Belfast ‘mini-embassy’ or mission, as the EU originally sought. And the EU officials will not have any powers to carry out checks themselves.
There will instead be sensible practical arrangements, cooperation, reciprocal data-sharing, so that both sides can have confidence in these unique arrangements.
We also want to leave no doubt about our ongoing commitments to peace and prosperity in Northern Ireland.
My Right Honourable Friend the Northern Ireland Secretary will set out, in the coming days, further measures of financial support, to help businesses and communities to prosper and thrive from the end of the year and beyond.
And Mr Speaker, we’ve been able to deliver a package which now means that the Protocol can be implemented in a pragmatic and a proportionate way. It takes account of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in all of its dimensions, and it protects the interests both of the EU single-market but more importantly, the territorial and constitutional integrity of the whole United Kingdom.
Now, this agreement will be approved officially at a Joint Committee meeting in the coming days.
And, of course this agreement that we have reached also enables the Government to withdraw clauses 44, 45 and 47 of the UK Internal Market Bill, and avoids the need for any additional provisions in the Taxation Bill.
Having put beyond doubt the primacy of the sovereignty of this place, as we leave the EU, we rest safe in the knowledge that such provisions are no longer required.
We know that we now need to get on and give further clarity to business as to the specifics of what this deal means for them, and how it will all work in detail in practice. And we will do this through the publication of further guidance.
And that will sit along the ongoing, intensive work we will take forward to implement the Protocol.
But above all, Mr Speaker, we will always work with the interests of the people and businesses of Northern Ireland in mind – as this agreement, and the important flexibilities it will provide, reflects.
Because we must all remember if the Protocol is to work, it must work for the whole community in Northern Ireland. And whether it is to be maintained in the future, as the Protocol itself sets out, is for the people of Northern Ireland to decide through the democratic consent mechanism that my Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister negotiated.
And on that critical, important note of the primacy of democracy, I recommend this statement to the House.


conservativehome--2020-12-09--WATCH: The Prime Minister accuses the Opposition Leader of keeping a “sphinx-like silence” on Brexit

“ A year ago , the prime minister promised the country a permanent break from talking about Brexit… How ’ @ @ @ @ @ Labour leader Keir Starmer asks “ His own silence on this matter has been sphinx @ @ @ @ @ Johnson replies # PMQs https : //t.co/hLsdhZ3Wl3 pic.twitter.com/vPrEr0eh9s

“A year ago, the prime minister promised the country a permanent break from talking about Brexit… How’s that going?” Labour leader Keir Starmer asks
“His own silence on this matter has been sphinx like,” PM Boris Johnson replies#PMQs https://t.co/hLsdhZ3Wl3 pic.twitter.com/vPrEr0eh9s
— BBC Politics (@BBCPolitics) December 9, 2020


conservativehome--2020-12-09--Andrew Gimson’s PMQs sketch: Johnson launches a diversionary attack on Starmer for being a North Lon

Andrew Gimson’s PMQs sketch: Johnson launches a diversionary attack on Starmer for being a North Londoner

What ebullience !
What effrontery !
What love of diversions and jokes !
The Prime Minister looked and sounded like a man without a care in the world .
Nobody would have supposed , from his demeanour , that he was about to fly to Brussels for a crucial dinner with Ursula von der Leyen , President of the European Commission , on which could turn the whole question of whether or not Britain gets a trade deal with the EU by the end of the year .
Boris Johnson suggested we shall “ prosper mightily ” whether or not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , folks , it doesn ’ t really matter either way .
“ A good deal is still there to be done , ” he assured Sir Edward Leigh ( Con , Gainsborough ) , but we shall not concede to “ our friends ” in the EU “ the automatic right to punish us ” if they pass some new law with which we refuse to comply .
That was about as serious as Johnson became .
He needs to carry his own backbenchers with him .
They , after all , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him when they decide he has become a liability .
Sir Keir Starmer already considers Johnson a liability , but does not at the moment have the power to get rid of him .
Johnson wished Sir Keir “ all the best in self-isolation in Islington , his spiritual home ” , for the Leader of the Opposition was obliged , having been in contact with someone who has Covid-19 , to appear by video link .
Sir Keir remarked that he lives in Camden , not Islington .
The Prime Minister accepted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sure he already knew it , for he too has lived in North London man and boy .
The point was that he was going to pin on Sir Keir the damaging charge of being an out-of-touch member of the metropolitan elite , while the PM is on the side of ordinary people who like to have a good laugh at ridiculous North Londoners .
Sir Keir remarked that a year ago Johnson had promised us a permanent break from talking about Brexit : “ Can the Prime Minister tell us how that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by accusing Sir Keir of maintaining a “ sphinx-like silence ” on the question of Brexit .
Sir Keir recalled that Johnson had said failure to get a trade deal with the EU would be “ a failure of statecraft ” .
The Prime Minister declared that Sir Keir was “ totally delphic ” on the question of Brexit .
The same might be said of the PM himself : like the Oracle at Delphi , it was impossible to work out what he meant .
Here is a negotiator who does not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Only with the benefit of hindsight will it be possible to see what game he is playing .

What ebullience! What effrontery! What love of diversions and jokes! The Prime Minister looked and sounded like a man without a care in the world.
Nobody would have supposed, from his demeanour, that he was about to fly to Brussels for a crucial dinner with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, on which could turn the whole question of whether or not Britain gets a trade deal with the EU by the end of the year.
Boris Johnson suggested we shall “prosper mightily” whether or not we get a deal. Lighten up, folks, it doesn’t really matter either way.
“A good deal is still there to be done,” he assured Sir Edward Leigh (Con, Gainsborough), but we shall not concede to “our friends” in the EU “the automatic right to punish us” if they pass some new law with which we refuse to comply.
That was about as serious as Johnson became. He needs to carry his own backbenchers with him. They, after all, have the power to get rid of him when they decide he has become a liability.
Sir Keir Starmer already considers Johnson a liability, but does not at the moment have the power to get rid of him.
Johnson wished Sir Keir “all the best in self-isolation in Islington, his spiritual home”, for the Leader of the Opposition was obliged, having been in contact with someone who has Covid-19, to appear by video link.
Sir Keir remarked that he lives in Camden, not Islington. The Prime Minister accepted this, indeed one can be pretty sure he already knew it, for he too has lived in North London man and boy.
The point was that he was going to pin on Sir Keir the damaging charge of being an out-of-touch member of the metropolitan elite, while the PM is on the side of ordinary people who like to have a good laugh at ridiculous North Londoners.
Sir Keir remarked that a year ago Johnson had promised us a permanent break from talking about Brexit: “Can the Prime Minister tell us how that’s going?”
Johnson counter-attacked by accusing Sir Keir of maintaining a “sphinx-like silence” on the question of Brexit. Sir Keir recalled that Johnson had said failure to get a trade deal with the EU would be “a failure of statecraft”.
The Prime Minister declared that Sir Keir was “totally delphic” on the question of Brexit. The same might be said of the PM himself: like the Oracle at Delphi, it was impossible to work out what he meant.
Here is a negotiator who does not believe in showing the world his cards. Only with the benefit of hindsight will it be possible to see what game he is playing.


conservativehome--2020-12-10--Henry Hill: As rumours swirl about the UKIM Bill, unease in Government about an ‘appease the SNP’ me

Henry Hill: As rumours swirl about the UKIM Bill, unease in Government about an ‘appease the SNP’ mentality

Is there an ‘ appease the SNP tendency ’ inside the Government ?
Yesterday , I wrote about the deal Michael Gove has struck to try to ameliorate the problems caused by Boris Johnson ’ s capitulation to Brussels over an Irish Sea border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland .
Conservative MPs are also wary about parts of the agreement , with the Daily Telegraph reporting that the role of the European Court of Justice is a source of particular concern .
Some are even threatening to try and re-insert the ‘ international law-breaking ’ clauses of the UK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take them out .
On the face of it , the removal of those clauses ought to make it easier for the Government to pass the rest of the Bill , with its controversial but important provisions regarding mutual recognition of regulation in the British internal market and allowing Westminster to step in to replace EU regional funding powers .
But Paul Waugh , of the Huffington Post , instead suggests that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster might be preparing to jettison those provisions too , following the backlash from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the House of Lords .
Coming as it does on top of the unease about his Ulster bargain , these won ’ t assuage unionists concerned about Gove ’ s approach .
Whilst Waugh says abandoning the provisions would be good for the Union – a position wholly rooted in discredited devolutionary orthodoxy – such a retreat would simply be a re-enactment of the very failures by Theresa May that made the UKIM Bill necessary in the first place .
Fortunately , those I have spoken too so far suggest that such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Prime Minister recognises the importance of re-connecting Westminster to the day-to-day lives of everyone in the United Kingdom .
However , apparently Waugh ’ s report does reflect conversations that were taking place at one point , there is unease in some quarters about an “ appease-the-SNP ” mentality on the part of some of Gove ’ s advisers – embodied by the leaked Hanbury memo and kites flown for such outré proposals as putting Nicola Sturgeon in the Cabinet , as well as the impression that the ‘ CDL ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referendum the Government is publicly committed to refusing .
As I wrote elsewhere recently , Boris Johnson should stamp out any talk of conceding a referendum .
As the First Minister and her Party ’ s woes continue to mount ( of which more below ) , the prospect of an imminent re-run of 2014 is the greatest gift he could give them .
Unfortunately , the old retreat-and-pray mentality still dominates outside the Government .
Sir Keir Starmer has unveiled Labour ’ s ‘ new offer ’ to Scots ahead of next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consists of – you guessed it – a promise of ‘ more powers ’ .
Nor is that the only Labour intervention .
Gordon Brown has joined forces with several Labour mayors to demand the Prime Minister takes urgent action to save the Union .
Can you guess what they want ?
Got it in one : ‘ more powers ’ .
Labour ’ s stubborn determination to keep having their one idea until the clocks strike thirteen and it finally works makes it all the more important that the Government do what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UKIM Bill , and defend British governance through our shared Parliament .
Twist in the Sturgeon tale as First Minister ’ s husband contradicts her evidence to MSPs This week , MSPs investigating the Scottish Government ’ s botch inquiry into sexual misconduct allegations against Alex Salmond – which ended up costing taxpayers ’ over half a million pounds – took evidence from Peter Murrell .
He is a very important man in Nationalist circles , combining as he does the roles of the SNP ’ s Chief Executive and the First @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not go well .
In fact , Murrell is already facing demands that he be recalled before the committee .
Why ?
Because his evidence seems to directly contradict that offered to MSPs by Sturgeon herself .
At the centre of the current row is the question of what Sturgeon knew and when , and in particular to meetings she had with Salmond in 2018 , which were not minuted .
The First Minister claims that the meeting took place in her capacity as leader of the SNP , in which case no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strongly suggests that Murrell ought to have known what the meeting was about .
He says he didn ’ t , because “ the issue raised at the time was a Scottish Government matter ” .
Opposition MSPs have leapt on the discrepancy .
Murdo Fraser , quoted in the Press & Journal , put it starkly : “ Peter Murrell ’ s words indicate that Nicola Sturgeon misled parliament , gave false evidence to the committee , and broke the ministerial code.
” They also pressed the Chief Executive on leaked messages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on the authorities to investigate Salmond .
Sturgeon has also been dragged into a ‘ secrecy row ’ , according to the Daily Record , over meetings with her most senior civil servant about the anti-harassment policy which was used in the Salmond investigation .
And on the ‘ other problems ’ front : the elderly are still dying in Scottish care homes ; more public sector bodies are clamouring for the First Minister ’ s £500 bung to NHS staff ; and one of Scotland ’ s top historians has accused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” in schools .

Is there an ‘appease the SNP tendency’ inside the Government?
Yesterday, I wrote about the deal Michael Gove has struck to try to ameliorate the problems caused by Boris Johnson’s capitulation to Brussels over an Irish Sea border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Conservative MPs are also wary about parts of the agreement, with the Daily Telegraph reporting that the role of the European Court of Justice is a source of particular concern. Some are even threatening to try and re-insert the ‘international law-breaking’ clauses of the UK Internal Market Bill when ministers try to take them out.
On the face of it, the removal of those clauses ought to make it easier for the Government to pass the rest of the Bill, with its controversial but important provisions regarding mutual recognition of regulation in the British internal market and allowing Westminster to step in to replace EU regional funding powers.
But Paul Waugh, of the Huffington Post, instead suggests that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster might be preparing to jettison those provisions too, following the backlash from the devolved administrations and a heavy defeat in the House of Lords.
Coming as it does on top of the unease about his Ulster bargain, these won’t assuage unionists concerned about Gove’s approach. Whilst Waugh says abandoning the provisions would be good for the Union – a position wholly rooted in discredited devolutionary orthodoxy – such a retreat would simply be a re-enactment of the very failures by Theresa May that made the UKIM Bill necessary in the first place.
Fortunately, those I have spoken too so far suggest that such a move is not on the cards and that the Prime Minister recognises the importance of re-connecting Westminster to the day-to-day lives of everyone in the United Kingdom.
However, apparently Waugh’s report does reflect conversations that were taking place at one point, there is unease in some quarters about an “appease-the-SNP” mentality on the part of some of Gove’s advisers – embodied by the leaked Hanbury memo and kites flown for such outré proposals as putting Nicola Sturgeon in the Cabinet, as well as the impression that the ‘CDL’ is trying to develop arguments for a referendum the Government is publicly committed to refusing.
As I wrote elsewhere recently, Boris Johnson should stamp out any talk of conceding a referendum. As the First Minister and her Party’s woes continue to mount (of which more below), the prospect of an imminent re-run of 2014 is the greatest gift he could give them.
Unfortunately, the old retreat-and-pray mentality still dominates outside the Government. Sir Keir Starmer has unveiled Labour’s ‘new offer’ to Scots ahead of next year’s Holyrood elections and it consists of – you guessed it – a promise of ‘more powers’. Nor is that the only Labour intervention. Gordon Brown has joined forces with several Labour mayors to demand the Prime Minister takes urgent action to save the Union. Can you guess what they want? Got it in one: ‘more powers’.
Labour’s stubborn determination to keep having their one idea until the clocks strike thirteen and it finally works makes it all the more important that the Government do what the Opposition won’t: pass the UKIM Bill, and defend British governance through our shared Parliament.
Twist in the Sturgeon tale as First Minister’s husband contradicts her evidence to MSPs
This week, MSPs investigating the Scottish Government’s botch inquiry into sexual misconduct allegations against Alex Salmond – which ended up costing taxpayers’ over half a million pounds – took evidence from Peter Murrell. He is a very important man in Nationalist circles, combining as he does the roles of the SNP’s Chief Executive and the First Minister’s husband.
It did not go well. In fact, Murrell is already facing demands that he be recalled before the committee. Why? Because his evidence seems to directly contradict that offered to MSPs by Sturgeon herself.
At the centre of the current row is the question of what Sturgeon knew and when, and in particular to meetings she had with Salmond in 2018, which were not minuted.
The First Minister claims that the meeting took place in her capacity as leader of the SNP, in which case no official record was required. But that strongly suggests that Murrell ought to have known what the meeting was about. He says he didn’t, because “the issue raised at the time was a Scottish Government matter”.
Opposition MSPs have leapt on the discrepancy. Murdo Fraser, quoted in the Press & Journal, put it starkly: “Peter Murrell’s words indicate that Nicola Sturgeon misled parliament, gave false evidence to the committee, and broke the ministerial code.” They also pressed the Chief Executive on leaked messages which suggest he was trying to put pressure on the authorities to investigate Salmond.
Sturgeon has also been dragged into a ‘secrecy row’, according to the Daily Record, over meetings with her most senior civil servant about the anti-harassment policy which was used in the Salmond investigation.
And on the ‘other problems’ front: the elderly are still dying in Scottish care homes; more public sector bodies are clamouring for the First Minister’s £500 bung to NHS staff; and one of Scotland’s top historians has accused the SNP of placing “arrant propaganda” in schools.