newrepublic--2020-07-15--Anthony Fauci Is Not Our Savior

Anthony Fauci Is Not Our Savior

Anthony Fauci , the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases , is on the outs with the president .
Fauci has said that he hasn ’ t seen Donald Trump since the first week of June ; people in the White House are reportedly circulating material aimed at puncturing his public profile .
“ In a remarkable broadside by the Trump administration against one of its own , a White House official said Sunday that ‘ several White House officials are concerned about the number of times Dr. Fauci has been wrong on things , ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kelly O ’ Donnell wrote Sunday .
“ The official gave NBC News a list of nearly a dozen past comments by Fauci that the official said had ultimately proven erroneous.
” In an appearance on Meet the Press , the White House ’ s testing czar , Assistant Secretary for Health Brett Giroir , said that Fauci “ doesn ’ t necessarily—and he admits that—have the whole national interest in mind.
” On Wednesday , Trump trade adviser Peter Navarro went further in a USA Today op-ed , writing that Fauci “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interacted with him on.
” The White House has insisted that Navarro went “ rogue ” and his op-ed was not sanctioned by the administration .
But Trump himself has been dismissing or contradicting Fauci ’ s more pessimistic remarks since the pandemic began .
Last week , Trump ’ s critiques in interviews with Sean Hannity and Greta Van Susteren were pointed .
Fauci , he told Hannity , “ is a nice man , but he ’ s made a lot of mistakes.
” It ’ s true that Fauci , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and contagiousness of the virus , but it goes without saying that Trump isn ’ t losing sleep over the accuracy of the White House ’ s messaging here .
“ Several White House aides view Fauci ’ s interviews as unhelpful , ” The Washington Post reported Saturday , “ and say they ’ re frustrated he has expressed interest in appearing on programs such as MSNBC ’ s ‘ Rachel Maddow Show , ’ which are hostile to the administration.
” It ’ s plain why Trump and his loyalists are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are far more interested in hearing from Fauci , wherever he appears , than they are in hearing the administration ’ s line on how the pandemic is going .
A June poll from The New York Times showed that 67 percent of American voters , including 51 percent of Republicans and 67 percent of independents , trusted Fauci on the coronavirus , while only 26 percent trusted Trump .
The president would much rather have his officials sounding like Education Secretary Betsy DeVos , who ’ s backed his push to fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of unyielding support he believes might make our mounting death toll go down more smoothly with voters .
A remarkable fandom has sprung up around Fauci over the last several months .
A petition to make him People ’ s “ Sexiest Man Alive ” garnered 15,000 signatures in April ; his face graces both bobbleheads and devotional candles .
It ’ s highly reminiscent of the hullabaloo surrounding Robert Mueller before the release of his report last year— “ Mueller Time ” caps and patches are still widely available—as well as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service and military witnesses who testified against Trump during his impeachment hearings .
Sally Yates and James Comey each had their season ; since the pandemic began , New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has been Fauci ’ s formidable rival for the affections of the press .
Under Trump , a general respect for good , competent people just doing their jobs has been distended into a vague faith that competence itself might symbolically or literally represent the administration ’ s undoing and a return to reason—all the more so when the people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration itself .
But in Fauci ’ s case , the numbers on trust suggest there are many Americans who take Fauci seriously and support Trump anyway ; in general , almost a quarter of voters who intend to vote for Trump do not consider the president particularly honest .

Given this, Trump’s growing concern about Fauci seems strange. He’s heretofore understood quite well that the truthful pronouncements of experts can only go so far and that they never in themselves shape political outcomes. As awkward as it might be to contend with a competing message coming from his own administration, the fundamental challenge now facing him isn’t a communicative one. The problem is that the pandemic, as a lived reality—as opposed to what is being said about it in the press, in Trump’s tweets, and in the White House’s communiqués—is spiraling out of control in ways that even constituencies once friendly to the president are finding difficult to ignore. Well over three million people have been infected and well over 100,000 are dead; 100,000 small businesses are gone; over 20 million people might be evicted from their homes between now and September. Trump has yet to demonstrate that he might bluster and misdirect his way through this; if Fauci simply vanished tomorrow, he wouldn’t be standing on any firmer ground.
In a column Tuesday, The Washington Post’s Daniel Drezner argued that Fauci has offered an example of “how technocrats can also use candor as a way to preserve credibility,” that might be more broadly useful as right-wing populism spreads around the globe. “It is telling that even as voter trust in Trump’s handling of the pandemic has dropped like a stone, Fauci is trusted enough to have Americans listen to him,” he wrote. “Trump’s more loyal subordinates have hardly inspired confidence. Candor is hardly the preserve of the populist. Consider this a sign that even in Trump’s America, well-executed technocratic leadership is both better and better-liked by the populace.”
But “Trump’s America” has never actually contained a majority of Americans who support Trump, his policies, or his approach to politics. The country’s Faucis have long been more popular than its right-wing demagogues. We should see this as emblematic not of how facts and reason might ultimately prevail but of how little they can functionally matter when pitted against a minority disproportionately empowered by our political system and by material and social forces more central to politics than the opinions of experts ever will be. Trump is losing ground, and voters may well hand the presidency to a Democratic nominee chosen partially because he projects sensibility and stability. But Joe Biden owes his position in the polls largely to a real collapse in the country’s material situation; the race between projected competence and wild ignorance was a tighter one mere months ago, and ignorance may well win the day even if Biden takes the White House. We’re headed for dark times, and it seems unlikely that Fauci candles will light the way ahead.


newrepublic--2020-07-15--How Food Media Created Monsters in the Kitchen

For years now , the New York food media has returned to Bowien again and again , seeking his perspective , offering him a platform , knowing that , whatever happens , at the very least it can expect good copy .
Like many chefs , he is a creation of the media , including even general-interest magazines like this one .
But now that serious allegations have surfaced about him , the response from the same journalists who ’ ve invested years in boosting his profile ?
Nothing .
In its consistent , uncritical celebration of chefs and owners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and in its refusal to reckon with its own role in facilitating their rise to the top , the food media has failed us .
Consider the recent case of chef Abe Conlon , whose Chicago restaurant Fat Rice was garlanded with awards and critical acclaim , then forced to shut down after employees exposed Conlon on social media as a torrential asshole .
Where was the reporting on the restaurant ’ s toxic kitchen culture when Fat Rice was being showered with accolades and praise ?
Mainstream food media perpetuates the dysfunction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to report on the “ who ” behind the “ what.
” Either the media glosses over its own role in creating kitchen monsters , or it busies itself with a studied silence , steadfastly refusing to address the sins of its imperiled darlings .
Take Momofuku founder David Chang .
Chang is a longtime friend and collaborator of food writer Peter Meehan , who recently resigned from his post as food editor of the Los Angeles Times after several colleagues came forward to describe an abusive newsroom culture that flourished under Meehan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times and , earlier , at Lucky Peach , the now-defunct food magazine that Meehan co-founded in 2011 with Chang and Chris Ying .
Meehan ’ s resignation from the Times was the biggest story in the food world for much of this summer .
He and Chang are close : They have worked on cookbooks together , and in 2018 Meehan featured extensively in several episodes of the first season of Ugly Delicious , Chang ’ s popular Netflix series .
Chang obviously felt some pressure to say something about Meehan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : a thin , say-nothing statement on his podcast , in which Chang shed some crocodile tears , affected a dash of emotional rawness , claimed to have fallen out with Meehan soon after the first edition of Lucky Peach came out in 2011 ( how , then , is it possible they were so chummy on the 2018 season of Ugly Delicious ? )
, then said he couldn ’ t comment further because of a binding NDA with Meehan .
The food media ’ s response to this impossibly weak statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might have expected to criticize Chang or delve into the long-standing whispers of abuse in his own restaurants ’ kitchens had nothing to say , which is perhaps not surprising when you consider that many of them have themselves benefited from Chang ’ s patronage , appearing on his podcast and in episodes of Ugly Delicious .
Celebrity chefs and food writers need each other—to build their brands and “ do numbers , ” whether online ( for the writers ) or at the point of sale ( for restaurants ) .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of kitchen tyrants , building their profiles , massaging their egos , exploiting their personalities for clicks—and chefs , in turn , help elevate the careers of food writers with access and exposure .
In this sense the food world represents the marriage of two uniquely flawed industries : restaurants and the media .
Cooks and food writers are all brutalized to some degree by the imperatives of competition and profit .
The economics of restaurants are notoriously inhospitable , which means that chefs need to aggressively market themselves in order to stay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as more traditional newspapers and magazines , naturally gravitate to whatever ’ s going to bring in clicks and readers .
What ’ s really at stake here is how the food media approaches the task of covering the food industry .
There are , of course , important exceptions , but the restaurant media , not unlike technology media in the breathless days of the big new iPhone reveal , is for the most part an uncritical hype machine .
It still views its function as handing out recommendations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eat .
But a restaurant is more than just its food : It ’ s a workplace , a repository of labor practices , a kitchen with its own particular culture and approach to the management of people and creativity .
When so much of food coverage is devoted to celebrating and cultifying chefs as eccentric , demanding “ creatives , ” unbeholden to the ordinary rules of the workplace , can we be surprised that this new moment , in which many chefs and restaurant owners are being revealed as the abusive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has left the food media flat-footed ?
A pivot to a more critical , adversarial approach to covering restaurants seems unlikely as long as the food media is built on the idea of the chef as a singular creative mind .
Despite the waves of revelations that have rocked the restaurant industry in recent years—starting with the # MeToo-fueled implosions of the careers of Mario Batali and Ken Friedman in 2017—the media ’ s reckoning with its own role in elevating and enabling these kitchen abusers has been scant to nonexistent .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serving good food deserve to be celebrated if employees are regularly harassed and demeaned , and the culture of the kitchen is built on manipulation and abuse ?
Why should it be up to individual employees to put their necks on the line and tell these stories of abuse , often at great risk to themselves and their future employment prospects , when there ’ s a whole segment of the media that ’ s nominally devoted to covering the food world ?

What’s really at stake here is how the food media approaches the task of covering the food industry. There are, of course, important exceptions, but the restaurant media, not unlike technology media in the breathless days of the big new iPhone reveal, is for the most part an uncritical hype machine. It still views its function as handing out recommendations and instructing people where and what to eat. But a restaurant is more than just its food: It’s a workplace, a repository of labor practices, a kitchen with its own particular culture and approach to the management of people and creativity. When so much of food coverage is devoted to celebrating and cultifying chefs as eccentric, demanding “creatives,” unbeholden to the ordinary rules of the workplace, can we be surprised that this new moment, in which many chefs and restaurant owners are being revealed as the abusive, domineering bosses they really are, has left the food media flat-footed? A pivot to a more critical, adversarial approach to covering restaurants seems unlikely as long as the food media is built on the idea of the chef as a singular creative mind.
The food media is complicit in the creation of kitchen tyrants, building their profiles, massaging their egos, exploiting their personalities for clicks.
Despite the waves of revelations that have rocked the restaurant industry in recent years—starting with the #MeToo-fueled implosions of the careers of Mario Batali and Ken Friedman in 2017—the media’s reckoning with its own role in elevating and enabling these kitchen abusers has been scant to nonexistent. This seems grossly unfair. Does a restaurant serving good food deserve to be celebrated if employees are regularly harassed and demeaned, and the culture of the kitchen is built on manipulation and abuse? Why should it be up to individual employees to put their necks on the line and tell these stories of abuse, often at great risk to themselves and their future employment prospects, when there’s a whole segment of the media that’s nominally devoted to covering the food world?
Food journalists rarely, if ever, take the time to get behind the scenes and talk to the “little people” in restaurants—the line cooks, dishwashers, and servers—to understand what these workplaces are really like. They engage only with owners and operators, which means their reporting on restaurants is necessarily superficial, reflecting their own impressions and the restaurant’s party line. Some outlets have recognized their own role in hyping up places later revealed to be shitty places to work (there’s a single, terse paragraph in the Eater piece on Win Son to that effect: “Bon Appetit has heaped accolades on the restaurant, the New York Times loved it, and Eater has covered it extensively as one of the city’s most exciting restaurants”). But there’s little discussion of embracing a different model for reporting on restaurants, of engaging with the industry in a deeper, more expansive, more engaged way. The hype-to-backlash pipeline rolls on undisturbed.


newrepublic--2020-07-15--The Long War on Objectivity

The Long War on Objectivity

The mess of histrionics and misinformation that passes for right-wing media these days didn ’ t spring from nowhere .
@ @ @ @ @ and well-funded sphere become what it is ?
On Episode 11 of The Politics of @ @ @ @ @ and Alex Pareene talk with Moira Weigel , a postdoctoral scholar at the Harvard Society @ @ @ @ @ editor of Logic magazine , about the early careers of pivotal figures such as Matt @ @ @ @ @ the regulatory and technological changes that paved the way for their success .
Later in @ @ @ @ @ reporter Walter Shapiro offers an update on the state of the Trump campaign , whose @ @ @ @ @ important goals : 1 ) Make a lot of money and 2 ) Don ’ @ @ @ @

The mess of histrionics and misinformation that passes for right-wing media these days didn’t spring from nowhere. How did this increasingly influential and well-funded sphere become what it is? On Episode 11 of The Politics of Everything, hosts Laura Marsh and Alex Pareene talk with Moira Weigel, a postdoctoral scholar at the Harvard Society of Fellows and a founding editor of Logic magazine, about the early careers of pivotal figures such as Matt Drudge and Andrew Breitbart and the regulatory and technological changes that paved the way for their success.
Later in the show, veteran politics reporter Walter Shapiro offers an update on the state of the Trump campaign, whose strategists have settled on two important goals: 1) Make a lot of money and 2) Don’t get fired.


newrepublic--2020-07-16--Trump’s Campaign Doesn’t Need a New Manager. It Needs a New Candidate.

Being the guy who resets a “ Days/Hours/Minutes Without Donald Trump Firing Someone ” sign could be a full-time job , though given the turnover that has plagued Trump ’ s campaigns and administration , it wouldn ’ t be a particularly secure one .
The latest high-profile head to roll is a satisfying one to see : Brad Parscale , the Trump campaign manager who has been falsely hailed as some kind of digital genius .
Important Trumpworld figures like Parscale often receive extensive and semi-awed coverage—think of how Steve “ Darth Vader ” Bannon was covered early in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such a repulsive and dumb man could become president of the United States seek answers .
But even Wunderbrad could not steer the president smoothly through the impossible task of running a reelection campaign during a pandemic that has been made more catastrophic by Trump ’ s own mismanagement .
The beginning of the end was reportedly the underwhelming attendance at the president ’ s much-hyped Tulsa rally , where he wowed the diminished crowd by drinking water .
Now Bill Stepien—a Trump aide who was previously fired by Chris Christie during New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take on the impossible job of trying to lead a deluded president to victory , without any power to make Trump actually address any of his failings that have been greeted by voters with dismay .
How long can any campaign manager walk the tightrope of staying in Trump ’ s good graces , stroking his fragile ego , assuring him that all the haters are wrong , and trying to make him appealing to an increasingly hostile public ?
This Sisyphean task is made ever more difficult by Trump ’ s inability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common and tiring warnings of the Trump era has been that whatever Trump is currently doing , saying , or tweeting is just a distraction from what actually matters .
Half-baked schemes like his May executive order seemingly aimed at getting conservatives more likes on their posts are seen by many as cunning diversions from the Real Issues , which for the last few months have plainly been the coronavirus and the George Floyd protests .
As others have argued in the past , it doesn ’ t especially matter whether Trump is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he is still doing these things as the president , which makes them important .
But it ’ s also true that the amount of media coverage an individual action by the administration gets doesn ’ t seem to have much to do with whether Trump succeeds or fails ; the media ’ s focus on Russia certainly didn ’ t amount to any kind of major defeat for Trump .
I would be thrilled if most of the national politics reporters in Washington stopped writing about Trump and started writing about people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it isn ’ t worth fretting that we ’ re playing his game .
( There has also been a decent amount of coverage of Americans ’ economic hardship , even if it ’ s not always amplified by cable news and social media . )
Crucially , Trump doesn ’ t seem to know what game he ’ s playing , and his ideas about what coverage or messages benefit him are often completely wrong .
There is a funny sort of parallel here between worrying about Trump ’ s ability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump insiders are expressing about his flailing campaign .
An anonymous White House source , quotes from whom comprise the most plentiful renewable resource on the planet , confessed to CNN that the campaign is struggling because Trump himself is distracted : “ He ’ s not focused .
Everyone has told him that .
Nothing has changed.
” Of course , this is something you hardly need inside knowledge to deduce .
When has Trump ever been on message ?
Never mind tell-all books from relatives ; anyone paying attention can deduce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly those that have to do with whether he is powerful , masculine , or simply Winning .
Hence his obsession with the idea that he can ’ t walk down stairs properly or that he can ’ t drink a glass of water .

As others have argued in the past, it doesn’t especially matter whether Trump is purposefully trying to distract us, because he is still doing these things as the president, which makes them important. But it’s also true that the amount of media coverage an individual action by the administration gets doesn’t seem to have much to do with whether Trump succeeds or fails; the media’s focus on Russia certainly didn’t amount to any kind of major defeat for Trump. I would be thrilled if most of the national politics reporters in Washington stopped writing about Trump and started writing about people who are waiting for unemployment checks, but it isn’t worth fretting that we’re playing his game. (There has also been a decent amount of coverage of Americans’ economic hardship, even if it’s not always amplified by cable news and social media.) Crucially, Trump doesn’t seem to know what game he’s playing, and his ideas about what coverage or messages benefit him are often completely wrong.
There is a funny sort of parallel here between worrying about Trump’s ability to distract us and the worries that Trump insiders are expressing about his flailing campaign. An anonymous White House source, quotes from whom comprise the most plentiful renewable resource on the planet, confessed to CNN that the campaign is struggling because Trump himself is distracted: “He’s not focused. Everyone has told him that. Nothing has changed.” Of course, this is something you hardly need inside knowledge to deduce. When has Trump ever been on message? Never mind tell-all books from relatives; anyone paying attention can deduce that Trump fixates on trivial matters, particularly those that have to do with whether he is powerful, masculine, or simply Winning. Hence his obsession with the idea that he can’t walk down stairs properly or that he can’t drink a glass of water.


newrepublic--2020-07-16--Twitter Is Not Prepared for the 2020 Election

That Twitter was caught flat-footed by the unprecedented security breach that occurred on Wednesday evening , in which a number of prominent accounts—including those of Joe Biden , Kanye West , and Elon Musk—were hacked as a part of a Bitcoin scam was not , in itself , surprising .
Despite leapfrogging from scandal to scandal , the social media company has never shown itself to be particularly adept at crisis management ; the seeds of this particular failure appeared years ago .
But the incident was nevertheless unnerving in that it revealed the internet ’ s fragility and how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies that are effectively monopolies .
Though Twitter took action on Wednesday by blocking verified users from tweeting , it disclosed very little about what was actually going on .
We know a little bit more about what happened now , the day after .
The Twitter accounts were taken over using “ internal systems and tools , ” according to a company statement .
Vice reported that a “ Twitter insider was responsible ” for giving hackers access to those tools .
If indeed this was an inside job , it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past few years ; the first involved an employee leaking information to Saudi intelligence .
However it happened , hackers were able to access many of the platform ’ s most prominent accounts and tweet a solicitation : “ Everyone is asking me to give back and now is the time , ” the tweets read .
They then promised to double money sent to a Bitcoin address .
It was a rudimentary con , but it worked : One analysis showed that 400 payments totaling over $ 120,000 were sent to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible some of this money was sent by the scammers themselves . )
The security breach may have been limited to that Bitcoin haul , which would be something of a best-case scenario , both for Twitter and its users .
It ’ s also possible , however , that the hackers were also after other valuable loot , namely the contents of Twitter ’ s unencrytped direct messages .
While the platform shut down tweets from verified users fairly quickly , it did not appear to do anything to secure this part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Republican Senator Josh Hawley ( a frequent critic of tech companies ) raised this possibility , warning , “ As you know , millions of your users rely on your service not just to tweet publicly but also to communicate privately through your direct message service .
A successful attack on your system ’ s servers represents a threat to all of your users ’ privacy and data security.
” Even though the scope of this attack is still not known , it reveals a great deal about Twitter ’ s profound @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As The Verge ’ s Casey Newton wrote shortly after the attack , “ The threat here is not simply user privacy and data security , though those threats are real and substantial .
It is about the striking potential of Twitter to incite real-world chaos through impersonation and fraud.
” The 2016 election was shaken by fraud and disinformation ; this scheme may serve as a prelude to several months of unsettling breaches .
Twitter is still ill-equipped to handle hacks , data breaches , and other chicanery , whether perpetrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Given the increasing centralization of the internet , moreover , platforms like Twitter have a profound effect on how people communicate and stay informed—though Twitter ’ s user base is small relative to other major social media services ’ , it includes a disproportionate number of politicians , celebrities , and journalists .
Wednesday ’ s hack underlines Twitter ’ s centrality to news—and to emergency alerts—but also its fundamental shortcomings , particularly when dealing with hostile actors .
The platform that millions rely on to stay informed and up-to-date remains profoundly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mischief or maliciousness .

That Twitter was caught flat-footed by the unprecedented security breach that occurred on Wednesday evening, in which a number of prominent accounts—including those of Joe Biden, Kanye West, and Elon Musk—were hacked as a part of a Bitcoin scam was not, in itself, surprising. Despite leapfrogging from scandal to scandal, the social media company has never shown itself to be particularly adept at crisis management; the seeds of this particular failure appeared years ago. But the incident was nevertheless unnerving in that it revealed the internet’s fragility and how much power is concentrated in a few companies that are effectively monopolies. Though Twitter took action on Wednesday by blocking verified users from tweeting, it disclosed very little about what was actually going on.
We know a little bit more about what happened now, the day after. The Twitter accounts were taken over using “internal systems and tools,” according to a company statement. Vice reported that a “Twitter insider was responsible” for giving hackers access to those tools. If indeed this was an inside job, it would be the second at the company in the past few years; the first involved an employee leaking information to Saudi intelligence. However it happened, hackers were able to access many of the platform’s most prominent accounts and tweet a solicitation: “Everyone is asking me to give back and now is the time,” the tweets read. They then promised to double money sent to a Bitcoin address. It was a rudimentary con, but it worked: One analysis showed that 400 payments totaling over $120,000 were sent to that wallet. (It’s possible some of this money was sent by the scammers themselves.)


newrepublic--2020-07-17--Will Big Philanthropy Defang Our Radical Moment?

Philanthropy also serves as yet another tax advantage for the already wealthy .
“ We ’ re at a moment in American society in which the winners in the marketplace attempt to diminish their tax burdens , both corporately and individually , as low as they can legally go , ” Reich told The Atlantic in 2018 .
“ Then having diminished their tax burden as low as it can go , they turn around and set up a private foundation , taking a further tax break.
” Today philanthropic institutions ’ tax breaks cost the U.S. Treasury around $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
Despite these criticisms , approximately a century after the philanthropic sector was born , foundations have only multiplied—with Silicon Valley the latest hotbed of philanthropic activity—and opposition frequently goes unheard .
After all , who can afford to criticize one of the last options for funding ?
As the government continues an austerity regime that withdraws support for social services , the arts , education , and other public programs , few nonprofits today are in a position to spurn funding where they can find it .
As a result , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and wary of the strings attached to philanthropic dollars often find themselves trapped in an uneasy dance with such funders in order to keep the lights on .
Yet , when it comes to radical agendas , in particular , philanthropic involvement can often result in diverting movement energy into establishment channels .
The Ford Foundation , which recently increased support to Black organizations—and also gave $ 40 million to support the Movement for Black Lives in 2016—has one such history .
Karen Ferguson , a professor of African American studies at Simon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Down : The Ford Foundation , Black Power , and the Reinvention of Racial Liberalism , has argued that in the 1960s , in the wake of riots , the foundation provided funding to the active Black Power movement as a means of managing ( rather than advancing ) Black militancy .
Though its support was controversial at the time , Ford poured money into a number of signature Black Power programs , including high-profile “ community control ” experiments in New York and Afrocentric arts institutions .
Yet the foundation was also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more militant elements of the movement when they ran up against Ford ’ s ideology , and it ultimately sought less to overhaul society than to assimilate Black Power into mainstream life .
As Ferguson wrote , “ Their solution was to foster the creation of a new black leadership class that could broker for the black poor from within the American establishment—a kind of elite pluralism that would at once demonstrate the nation was living up to its egalitarian ideals and dampen black insurgency.
” Megan Ming Francis , an associate professor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington , tracks a similar phenomenon—a process she calls “ movement capture ” —in her research on the relationship between the NAACP and the philanthropic Garland Fund .
In the 1920s , Francis writes , the then-underfunded NAACP ’ s primary campaign was fighting lynching and other forms of racist mob violence .
However , when the Garland Fund began granting money to the organization , that financial backing allowed it to nudge the NAACP ’ s agenda toward a focus on education , which Garland saw as a less contentious issue .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventually lead to the NAACP ’ s involvement in a number of important civil rights reforms , including the landmark Brown v. Board case , but also represented a marked departure from the organization ’ s stated mission at a critical time .
“ I ’ m concerned that sometimes even with the best of intentions , the priorities of the poorest and marginalized get replaced by the priorities of the rich and powerful , ” Francis told Vox last year .
In other words , attracting the attention of foundations has long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the influence of the foundation world has only increased in recent years .
These days , it ’ s easy enough for foundations to profess radical commitments or even acknowledge certain limitations of the philanthropic model while the fundamental structure of philanthropy stays unchanged .
Current Ford Foundation president Darren Walker , for instance , has often signaled his openness to criticisms of philanthropy .
“ Philanthropists need to engage in repairing the very mechanisms that produce , preserve , and promote our privilege , ” he said last year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ better vision of philanthropy , one that improves itself and the societies of which we are members.
” And yet , as Ferguson noted a few years ago , Walker also remains at least partially convinced of the potential of the market to right injustice .
“ Let us bridge the philosophies of Smith , and Carnegie , and King , and break the scourge of inequality , ” Walker wrote in 2015 .
“ For when we do , to paraphrase another of Dr. King ’ s most powerful insights , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward justice.
” That capital-friendly mentality has paid off handsomely for foundations , but as a new mass groundswell of protest comes face to face with the same philanthropic system that neutralized so many that came before , its utility for the rest of us is far less clear .

Though its support was controversial at the time, Ford poured money into a number of signature Black Power programs, including high-profile “community control” experiments in New York and Afrocentric arts institutions. Yet the foundation was also quick to cut off support to the more militant elements of the movement when they ran up against Ford’s ideology, and it ultimately sought less to overhaul society than to assimilate Black Power into mainstream life. As Ferguson wrote, “Their solution was to foster the creation of a new black leadership class that could broker for the black poor from within the American establishment—a kind of elite pluralism that would at once demonstrate the nation was living up to its egalitarian ideals and dampen black insurgency.”
Megan Ming Francis, an associate professor of political science at the University of Washington, tracks a similar phenomenon—a process she calls “movement capture”—in her research on the relationship between the NAACP and the philanthropic Garland Fund. In the 1920s, Francis writes, the then-underfunded NAACP’s primary campaign was fighting lynching and other forms of racist mob violence. However, when the Garland Fund began granting money to the organization, that financial backing allowed it to nudge the NAACP’s agenda toward a focus on education, which Garland saw as a less contentious issue. As Francis notes, that shift would eventually lead to the NAACP’s involvement in a number of important civil rights reforms, including the landmark Brown v. Board case, but also represented a marked departure from the organization’s stated mission at a critical time. “I’m concerned that sometimes even with the best of intentions, the priorities of the poorest and marginalized get replaced by the priorities of the rich and powerful,” Francis told Vox last year.
In other words, attracting the attention of foundations has long been a double-edged sword for social movements, and the influence of the foundation world has only increased in recent years. These days, it’s easy enough for foundations to profess radical commitments or even acknowledge certain limitations of the philanthropic model while the fundamental structure of philanthropy stays unchanged. Current Ford Foundation president Darren Walker, for instance, has often signaled his openness to criticisms of philanthropy. “Philanthropists need to engage in repairing the very mechanisms that produce, preserve, and promote our privilege,” he said last year. “I believe we must practice a better vision of philanthropy, one that improves itself and the societies of which we are members.”


newrepublic--2020-07-17--The Threat of a GOP That Accepts Climate Change

To many Democrats , the idea of a GOP that no longer denies the science of climate change might sound like welcome news .
But what comes next ?
GOP climate positions , historically , have swung wildly in response to changing political conditions .
Just over a decade ago , Nancy Pelosi and Newt Gingrich sat together on a couch talking about their shared commitment to “ take action to address climate change , ” setting out to “ spark the innovation we need.
” John McCain ran for president in 2008 on a cap-and-trade program , and Lindsay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that in 2009 before defecting dramatically .
( Fossil fuel companies who ’ d backed the legislation and convinced green groups to let them weaken it to the point that it would have kneecapped the EPA also pulled out abruptly . )
The internal logic isn ’ t hard to spot in hindsight : At the beginning of the Obama administration , climate legislation seemed inevitable , so Republicans and their donors in the fossil fuel industry came on board to make it as toothless as possible .
Once it no longer seemed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House both—they each withdrew their support , and Koch Industries–backed GOP insurgents found a more potent political strategy stoking ire against both cap-and-trade and the country ’ s first Black president through the Tea Party .
Ten years on , there are still a few members of the old guard of each party holding out hope for some mythical bipartisan compromise on climate through market-based solutions .
Neither the Democratic nor the Republican politicians of this persuasion seem to have much sway in Washington or even over a Biden campaign that , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a painful recession , has ditched the older establishment climate talk of carbon markets to focus on green jobs .
Despite a number of nonstart bills introduced over the last year , the bipartisan , centrist Climate Solutions Caucus is a shell of its perennially useless self , its moderate Republican figurehead—Florida Congressman Carlos Curbelo—having lost his seat to a Democrat in 2018 .
If it was ever truly docked , the hope for a grand bargain on carbon pricing in the United States has long since sailed .
Several suggestions have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ John Kerry—a member of the Sanders-Biden unity task force on climate—is holding out hope for a slightly different kind of bipartisan unity with a project called World War Zero .
The idea is to bring together military officials , retired politicians , and celebrities from both sides of the aisle in a bid to win over conservative skeptics through a series of talks , in part around the idea of the climate crisis being a national security threat .
The Economist recently speculated that a post-climate-denial GOP , under the leadership of moderate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its century-old ideals about conservation and land stewardship .
Anti-environmentalism isn ’ t so core to the GOP that it wouldn ’ t be up for negotiation in the event of Trump losing , especially as the oil and gas industry continues to shrink and other segments of big business embrace the good P.R .
from appearing to be forward-thinking on climate .
But even if some kind of business-friendly climate action does emerge from a post-Trump Republican Party , there ’ s no reason to think it wouldn ’ t still involve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a larger profit .
Nor would a shift in messaging on climate cause the party to abandon its other overarching commitments .
With its travel bans and hardened borders ready to halt refugees fleeing heat , drought , and disaster , the GOP is already writing a form of climate policy—even if it would never call it that .
Should it start to openly embrace something like climate action , the party would almost certainly retain the racism and xenophobia that has animated it for decades , fusing them into green policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hope for .
As countless analyses these past four years have argued , white supremacy is today a fundamental feature of the Republican Party—much more so than anti-environmentalism .
Any post-Trump pivot on the latter will likely leave the former fully intact .
Versions of this hellish fusion are already visible in parties abroad , where climate denial of the American sort has been marginal .
After its bizarre and mostly unsuccessful campaign against Greta Thunberg during last year ’ s European Parliament election , the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland might be pivoting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ homeland protection.
” In Europe , Marine Le Pen ’ s far right has embraced “ localist ” environmentalism , calling borders “ the environment ’ s greatest ally ” as climate became a top concern among the continent ’ s voters .
Austria ’ s right-wing People ’ s Party this year formed a coalition government with the country ’ s Greens .
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz called their deal a “ breakthrough , ” boasting that it “ is possible to slash taxes and make environment-friendly tax policies .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the borders.
” The groundwork is already laid for this sort of development in the U.S. : American environmentalism has long had deep and ugly ties to virulent anti-immigrant politics .
What all of this suggests is that , while bipartisan compromise on climate may be possible , it could also prove just as dangerous as the Republican denialism of old .
It ’ s all too easy to imagine some new and cursed grand bargain between Democrats and a post-Trump GOP on climate .
Having agreed that climate change is an urgent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would win a loophole-filled national renewable portfolio standard in exchange for beefed-up border security .
The Department of Energy would continue to support U.S. fossil fuel producers to provide so-called energy security to Eastern Europe through natural gas exports , all the while running climate-resilient military bases fully on renewable energy .
A lucrative government procurement contract would pay Elon Musk to start making electric tanks , as Tucker Carlson runs nightly segments that a do-nothing Biden administration isn ’ t doing enough to stop hordes of climate refugees from flooding into the @ @ @ @ @ @

To many Democrats, the idea of a GOP that no longer denies the science of climate change might sound like welcome news. But what comes next?
GOP climate positions, historically, have swung wildly in response to changing political conditions. Just over a decade ago, Nancy Pelosi and Newt Gingrich sat together on a couch talking about their shared commitment to “take action to address climate change,” setting out to “spark the innovation we need.” John McCain ran for president in 2008 on a cap-and-trade program, and Lindsay Graham supported a bill to do just that in 2009 before defecting dramatically. (Fossil fuel companies who’d backed the legislation and convinced green groups to let them weaken it to the point that it would have kneecapped the EPA also pulled out abruptly.) The internal logic isn’t hard to spot in hindsight: At the beginning of the Obama administration, climate legislation seemed inevitable, so Republicans and their donors in the fossil fuel industry came on board to make it as toothless as possible. Once it no longer seemed inevitable—lacking enthusiasm from the public and the White House both—they each withdrew their support, and Koch Industries–backed GOP insurgents found a more potent political strategy stoking ire against both cap-and-trade and the country’s first Black president through the Tea Party.
Ten years on, there are still a few members of the old guard of each party holding out hope for some mythical bipartisan compromise on climate through market-based solutions. Neither the Democratic nor the Republican politicians of this persuasion seem to have much sway in Washington or even over a Biden campaign that, under pressure from its left and amid a painful recession, has ditched the older establishment climate talk of carbon markets to focus on green jobs. Despite a number of nonstart bills introduced over the last year, the bipartisan, centrist Climate Solutions Caucus is a shell of its perennially useless self, its moderate Republican figurehead—Florida Congressman Carlos Curbelo—having lost his seat to a Democrat in 2018. If it was ever truly docked, the hope for a grand bargain on carbon pricing in the United States has long since sailed.


newrepublic--2020-07-17--The Empathy of Black Voters

The Empathy of Black Voters

Last month ’ s Democratic primaries in New York likely made history—for all of American politics .
Mondaire Jones won in the 17th Congressional District , which includes Rockland County and parts of Westchester County , while Ritchie Torres won in the 15th Congressional District , in the Bronx .
As both districts are deep blue , Jones and Torres will almost certainly become the first openly gay Black and Black-Latinx members , respectively , ever to serve in the U.S. Congress .
But their victories aren ’ t just symbolically significant : They also seriously challenge the myth that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates .
According to a survey conducted just before primary day by Data for Progress , Torres had higher support among African Americans than non-Black voters .
( No such data exists on Jones voters . )
Black voters have long been depicted as hostile to LGBTQ rights , including same-sex marriage .
Last fall , a leaked memo from Pete Buttigieg ’ s presidential campaign , based on internal focus groups , worried that “ being gay was a barrier ” for some Black voters in South Carolina .
Asked on CNN @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a problem , South Carolina Representative James E. Clyburn , who is Black , said , “ I ’ m not going to sit here and tell you otherwise , because I think everybody knows that ’ s an issue .
But I ’ m saying it ’ s an issue not the way it used to be.
” David Axlerod , the chief strategist for Barack Obama ’ s presidential campaigns , warned that Buttigieg ’ s sexual orientation was “ a real issue for him [ because there ] has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ African-American community to homosexuality.
” But our research shows that these concerns are unjustified and unfair .
In fact , Black voters are now more likely to support gay candidates and other minority candidates than non-Black voters .
This is partly because gay candidates in the United States tend to be Democrats , and African Americans remain incredibly loyal to the party , regardless of the candidate ’ s identity .
But there is more to it than that .
This past spring , we surveyed a nationally representative sample of over 6,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether they would vote for Donald Trump or Buttigieg , if the latter were to become the Democratic nominee .
Black voters overwhelmingly supported Buttigieg over Trump , 70 versus 12 percent , while white voters narrowly backed Trump , 46–42 percent .
Even when we highlighted Buttigieg ’ s sexual orientation , displaying a picture of the candidate kissing his husband , Chasten , on stage , Black voters remained substantially more supportive of him versus Trump , 61 to 11 percent , versus 40–48 among whites .
There are , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When Buttigieg was presented as a proudly gay man , he lost a third of his vote among Black men , as almost all switched to undecided .
In contrast , Black women supported Buttigieg over Trump by over 70 percent regardless of whether he was presented in a neutral way or as proudly gay .
Black voters under 35 supported Buttigieg over Trump by massive margins ( 75–11 ) , and even more so when his sexual orientation was accentuated ( 78–3 ) .
Older Black voters were far less enthusiastic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 26 percent undecided ) and were thrown into a quandary when Buttigieg was presented as proudly gay ( 31–15 , with 54 percent undecided ) .

African Americans show greater support than white voters for other minority candidates, above and beyond party ID. In our survey, we also investigated the likelihood of voters to support candidates running for Congress with the following conditions: being overweight with diabetes; having experienced a heart attack, cancer, HIV, depression, bipolar disorder; being in a wheelchair; being blind or visually impaired; being deaf; and being a little person. Black voters said in significantly higher numbers than all other groups that they were more or much more likely to vote for a candidate knowing that the candidate had a health condition or disability.
Such support may be due in part to familiarity, as Black Americans are more likely to be overweight, have diabetes, experience heart attacks, die from cancer, have depression, use a wheelchair, be blind, and be HIV-postive, than the general population. More recently, African Americans have been disproportionately impacted by Covid-19. There is overwhelming evidence that African Americans are much more likely to be hospitalized and die from the coronavirus than whites.
Black Americans, however, are not more likely to have a bipolar disorder or to be—or be related to—little people. African Americans are also much less likely to be deaf than the general population. This suggests that their higher levels of likelihood of voting for candidates with these conditions is partly the result of empathy rather than direct experience. As members of a historically disadvantaged and oppressed group, they can relate to the conditions of those who have been unfairly treated, even if they belong to a different group. As a result, they are more likely to support members of other groups who have faced discrimination.


newrepublic--2020-07-17--The Forever War Over War Literature

The Forever War Over War Literature

The Asia Society conference came at a crossroads for the country ’ s memory of the war , for Vietnam war literature as a whole , and for a number of the attendees still figuring out their writing careers .
It might have proven just another gathering , a curious historical artifact that brought together scribes to dispute and drink , if much of the prominent literature formed in its aftermath didn ’ t carry scars in its pages from arguments lobbed at the conference .
The conference opened just three days after the public unveiling of Vietnam Veterans Plaza @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the partisan battles over Maya Lin ’ s war memorial in D.C. built earlier in the decade—a long wall of black granite listing the names of the dead , “ a black gash of shame ” to embittered traditionalists who had wanted a sculpture there that represented martial values like glory and duty .
( These included Webb , who ’ d called Lin ’ s design “ a nihilistic slab of stone.
” ) Perhaps broader America was ready to move on from the war , but many of its participants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars are fought twice , ” Vietnamese-American novelist Viet Thanh Nguyen would write decades later .
“ The first time on the battlefield , the second time in memory.
” This was a battle for memory .
It would prove a defining one , worth revisiting today , as my generation of forever-war literati fights similar battles and , in many ways , stakes out similar paths .
“ Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam , we ’ ve all been there , ” Michael Herr wrote in Dispatches , the foundational nonfiction-ish account of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society cleaved down the middle by the war—though in 1985 , it was still an open question whether that society intended to read and learn about the war , or forget it entirely .
The initial wave of Vietnam memoirs , journalism and autofiction had come and gone , with some publishing successes and many more flops .
This was evident at the Asia Society conference .
Military-intelligence veteran Robert Olen Butler attended , a couple novels in but still years away from his Pulitzer-winning A Good Scent from a Strange Mountain .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ William Broyles , who ’ d go on to write the screenplays for Apollo 13 and Cast Away .
Journalist Wallace Terry came as well , fresh off of the publication of Bloods , his breakthrough oral history about African-American experiences in Vietnam .
And so did the war ’ s foremost storyteller , Tim O ’ Brien , already a National Book Award winner but still developing The Things They Carried , the collection that would ultimately distinguish both his work and the Vietnam canon .
Ron Kovic , the Long Island–born @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fourth of July would be made into an Oscar-winning 1989 film by Oliver Stone , attended as well .
There were tense divides between authors at the conference that weren ’ t confined to partisan politics or combat bona fides .
Literature produced by former officers tended to differ in scope and tone from that of their enlisted brethren .
The work of veterans and journalists who ’ d been to the war before the 1968 Tet Offensive contrasted starkly to that produced post-Tet .
Broader cultural trends had influenced the trajectory and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fortune of some and the dark grumbling of others .
Apocalypse Now , for example , broke through in cinema and returned the war to public consciousness in 1979 , and it cast an immense shadow over later art seeking to reckon with the war or its legacy .
But the political gulf dominated much of the three-day event .
Immediately after Webb ’ s jeremiad , audience members pushed back on his politics , his insinuations about their literary output , and his suggestion that novels and stories deemed insufficiently antiwar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( His own work was a conspicuous exception . )
“ Current American literature regarding the Vietnam era is too self-absorbed , ” Webb had said ; journalist and future Primary Colors author Joe Klein rose to respond that the “ ultimate in narcissism ” was “ to , 10 years later , try to justify a policy that was essentially misguided .
’ ”

As contentious as Webb’s talking points were—his conference speech also inveighed against Soviet access to Vietnamese ports in the Pacific—the literary broadside had conveyed one hard truth. His call that Vietnam literature written by Americans should be less “narcissistic,” that it should consider the peoples, histories, and cultures impacted by foreign soldiering and not just dwell on the myopic American experience, resonated like mortar fire through the remainder of the conference.
The year before, prominent book critic Michiko Kakutani had surveyed the Vietnam literature to that point in a New York Times essay, zeroing in on the “typical Bildungsroman” quality of many of the works. “They related the story of a young man, usually identifiable with the author, whose progress from idealism to disillusionment echoes the changes that America itself underwent in the ’60s,” she wrote. In contrast to these plentiful narratives, “A large novel that embraces the entire scene, that deals with the military and political complexities of the war, its consequences in public and private lives, as well as its reverberations at home—that novel has yet to be written.”
The novel The Sorrow of War by North Vietnamese veteran Bào Ninh wouldn’t be translated into English for five more years. A Bright Shining Lie, Neil Sheehan’s expansive nonfiction account of the disastrous Indochinese war for “hearts and minds,” wouldn’t be published until 1988. O’Brien had only returned to short stories the year prior to the conference, and figures now he was “about two in” to what would become The Things They Carried. The late Larry Heinemann was still stitching together Paco’s Story, the novel that would upset Toni Morrison’s Beloved for the 1987 National Book Award. And macro novels with geopolitical context, like Denis Johnson’s Tree of Smoke and Viet Thanh Nguyen’s The Sympathizer, were still decades away. Political scientist Timothy Lomperis wrote in Reading the Wind, his account of the Asia Society conference, that its proceedings forced attendees to come to terms with their “cultural narcissism” and to deliberate over how, or even if, it could be overcome.


newrepublic--2020-07-17--The Trump Administration Is Treating U.S. Cities Like Occupied Territory

In an outcome absolutely no one could have predicted , President Trump ’ s decision to send federal Department of Homeland Security agents into Portland , Oregon , ostensibly to protect statues , has led to violent crackdowns on protesters .
On Saturday , a demonstrator was maimed by a “ less lethal ” munition , sustaining injuries that required facial reconstruction surgery .
Just as disturbing is new evidence that federal agents in Portland are now abducting protesters in unmarked vehicles , as reported by Oregon Public Broadcasting on Thursday night .
Mark Pettibone , one such protester , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officers early on Wednesday morning .
Pettibone told OPB that while he was in the vehicle , the men pulled his beanie over his head and held his hands above his head .
As for why he was picked up , Pettibone had no idea .
He told OPB that he “ just happened to be wearing black on a sidewalk in downtown Portland at the time , ” but hadn ’ t been engaging in anything approaching violence or property damage .
He was not provided with an explanation , was apparently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was released after he declined to be interrogated without a lawyer present .
OPB reported that officers from the U.S .
Marshals Special Operations Group and Customs and Border Protection ’ s tactical unit , BORTAC , have been seen in Portland , but the Marshals told the station that it was not they who arrested Pettibone .
As The Washington Post reported in its story about the arrest , Pettibone “ did not know whether the men were police or far-right extremists , who frequently don militarylike outfits and harass left-leaning protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ uniform grab people off the street , or when lines of unidentified , armed men in riot gear ( who refuse to tell reporters who they are ) stand menacingly at the edges of a protest , it exposes the raw edge of brute force in this country ’ s version of law and order .
It ’ s no longer about the state having a legitimate monopoly on violence ; you no longer know whether the guy with a gun is just a nutjob from a militia or an actual police officer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The officers who detained Pettibone are barely operating within the confines of the law ; they ’ re certainly not accountable in the way the police are supposed to be .
( Both the mayor of Portland and the governor of Oregon have asked federal forces to leave , to no avail . )
Without any sort of attempt at legitimacy and accountability—or that thing we used to call due process—there ’ s little difference , in the moment , between a guy with a badge and a random kidnapper .
Pettibone told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realize he had been brought into a federal courthouse until after he was released ; until that point , they were just guys with a minivan and guns , and there were more of them than there were of him , so they won .
An encounter between members of a society quickly collapses into a crude calculation of relative power and force .
The rules of schoolyard bullying become the foundation of “ law and order.
” This is the consequence of police treating protests not just as vectors of potential violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quelled .
Much has been said about how local police forces buying up absurd pieces of military hardware—in 2014 , the Los Angeles school district ’ s police force returned some grenade launchers it had bought but kept its Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles—represents the militarization of police .
But Stuart Schrader , author of the book Badges Without Borders : How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing , has shown how the American military ’ s imperial project learned from the practices of American policing , not just the other way around .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ !
last month , George Floyd “ was killed by a police officer , in ordinary gear , who basically turned his body into a lethal weapon.
” Some of the most horrifying and violent acts committed by police in response to the protests haven ’ t been marked by their use of military gear : Cops didn ’ t need advanced weaponry to fracture the skull of Martin Gugino , the 75-year-old protester who was casually pushed to the ground by a negligent police officer .
Many , many others have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which have blinded or severely hurt a number of protesters .

Without any sort of attempt at legitimacy and accountability—or that thing we used to call due process—there’s little difference, in the moment, between a guy with a badge and a random kidnapper. Pettibone told OPB that he didn’t even realize he had been brought into a federal courthouse until after he was released; until that point, they were just guys with a minivan and guns, and there were more of them than there were of him, so they won. An encounter between members of a society quickly collapses into a crude calculation of relative power and force. The rules of schoolyard bullying become the foundation of “law and order.”
This is the consequence of police treating protests not just as vectors of potential violence but as an insurgency that must be quelled. Much has been said about how local police forces buying up absurd pieces of military hardware—in 2014, the Los Angeles school district’s police force returned some grenade launchers it had bought but kept its Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles—represents the militarization of police. But Stuart Schrader, author of the book Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing, has shown how the American military’s imperial project learned from the practices of American policing, not just the other way around. As Schrader pointed out on Democracy Now! last month, George Floyd “was killed by a police officer, in ordinary gear, who basically turned his body into a lethal weapon.” Some of the most horrifying and violent acts committed by police in response to the protests haven’t been marked by their use of military gear: Cops didn’t need advanced weaponry to fracture the skull of Martin Gugino, the 75-year-old protester who was casually pushed to the ground by a negligent police officer. Many, many others have been maimed by “less lethal” rounds, which have blinded or severely hurt a number of protesters.


newrepublic--2020-07-20--The Whiners Who Earn $200,000 and Complain They’re Broke

The phenomenon of wealthy people who lack liquidity and therefore essentially live hand-to-mouth is now so prevalent that economists are studying its macroeconomic effects .
Historically , economists have assumed that rich people will spend very little out of any income increase because they can already afford whatever they want .
But if the rich are constrained by a lack of cash flow , they may spend a considerable portion of any income increase , which would raise short-run growth .
Indeed , there are reports that a sharp slowdown in spending by the rich is a key factor in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ask people about who they think belongs in various social classes , based on income .
According to Gallup , only 2 percent of Americans historically have put themselves in the upper class , with 16 percent in the upper-middle class , 43 percent in the middle class , 30 percent in the working class , and just 9 percent calling themselves poor .
Gallup data also shows that people ’ s perceptions of what income puts people in what class vary a lot .
As the first chart demonstrates , practically every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as belonging to every other social class .
The Gallup findings are confirmed by YouGov data .
There are many reasons why someone who appears to be poor or middle class , objectively , might nevertheless put themselves in a higher social class .
They could be children of the well-to-do who are temporarily making little income or expect an inheritance to pull them up at some point .
They may be people with degrees from good schools whose perception of their social class is based on their prospects rather than their current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs in fields like journalism or book publishing that don ’ t necessarily pay very much .
They may also be retirees , whose income is relatively low but who have considerable wealth they can draw upon .
Indeed , retirees are generally better off financially than nonretirees , elderly homeowners tend to have substantial home equity , and about half don ’ t even have a mortgage .
The issue of wealth versus income is critical to perceptions of social class and general well-being .
A 2019 study by Charles Schwab found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million in wealth to be considered reasonably rich .
Perceptions of wealth are also self-fueled to no small degree , since the wealthier people become , the more wealth they think they need to be considered rich .
A 2011 survey of millionaires by Fidelity Investments found that they thought they needed at least $ 7.5 million to feel rich .
Yet there are those with very considerably more wealth than that who will nevertheless insist that they are just ordinary middle-class people .
In 2012 , Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t consider herself to be wealthy despite a net worth of $ 250 million and $ 22 million of income the previous year .
In 2015 , New Jersey Governor Chris Christie , then running for the GOP presidential nomination , also denied being wealthy , even though his investment banker wife made more than $ 700,000 on top of his salary as governor .
Absurdly , there are even billionaires who refuse to admit that they are rich .
Tom Steyer is one .
Of course , he was running @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt that it was politically expedient to downplay his wealth .
But Republican billionaires also push back against any suggestion that they might be deemed ultrawealthy .
Billionaire Florida auto dealer Norman Braman , a big supporter of Senator Marco Rubio , insisted in a 2015 interview that he was not especially wealthy or important .
“ I don ’ t consider myself a fat cat , ” he said .
“ Don ’ t make me out to be a fat cat.
” The question of who is wealthy and who isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well beyond electoral politics ; it is important for tax policy , among other things .
Republicans are always keen to stretch the definition of “ middle class ” to include as many rich people as possible , because it ’ s easier to sell tax cuts for the middle class than for the wealthy .
Democrats , on the other hand , are always looking to lower the threshold for being rich when proposing tax increases—since , conversely , it ’ s easier to enact higher taxes on the rich than on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the income cutoff at the lower end of the well-to-do rung is set too high , there is less revenue available .
Social scientists are also exploring what might be called the existential facets of wealth .
One such researcher is Rachel Sherman of the New School for Social Research , who has written a book on the subject , Uneasy Street : The Anxieties of Affluence .
She conducted intensive interviews with 50 very affluent New Yorkers to see how their wealth affected their lives beyond the obvious ability to own lots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the depiction of them as unworthy of their wealth ; to dispute that notion , they tended to emphasize how hard they worked for it .
And most went to great lengths to keep their children grounded and not see themselves as excessively privileged .
As Sherman writes :

The phenomenon of wealthy people who lack liquidity and therefore essentially live hand-to-mouth is now so prevalent that economists are studying its macroeconomic effects. Historically, economists have assumed that rich people will spend very little out of any income increase because they can already afford whatever they want. But if the rich are constrained by a lack of cash flow, they may spend a considerable portion of any income increase, which would raise short-run growth. Indeed, there are reports that a sharp slowdown in spending by the rich is a key factor in the recent economic slowdown.
Pollsters periodically ask people about who they think belongs in various social classes, based on income. According to Gallup, only 2 percent of Americans historically have put themselves in the upper class, with 16 percent in the upper-middle class, 43 percent in the middle class, 30 percent in the working class, and just 9 percent calling themselves poor. Gallup data also shows that people’s perceptions of what income puts people in what class vary a lot. As the first chart demonstrates, practically every income group includes people who consider themselves as belonging to every other social class. The Gallup findings are confirmed by YouGov data.
There are many reasons why someone who appears to be poor or middle class, objectively, might nevertheless put themselves in a higher social class. They could be children of the well-to-do who are temporarily making little income or expect an inheritance to pull them up at some point. They may be people with degrees from good schools whose perception of their social class is based on their prospects rather than their current circumstances. Or they may hold high-status jobs in fields like journalism or book publishing that don’t necessarily pay very much. They may also be retirees, whose income is relatively low but who have considerable wealth they can draw upon. Indeed, retirees are generally better off financially than nonretirees, elderly homeowners tend to have substantial home equity, and about half don’t even have a mortgage.


newrepublic--2020-07-20--Our Towns Aren’t Equipped to Handle Climate Emergencies

Theoretically , an OEM should be able to perform its four core functions no matter where it ’ s housed .
But those within first responder or public safety offices , Amanda Savitt , executive director of the Center for Climate Adaptation Research , told me , can tend to emphasize preparedness and response over recovery and mitigation .
While there haven ’ t been holistic studies conducted as to where OEMs are housed , Savitt estimates that as many as half are independent agencies that report to local elected officials—the setup emergency management experts recommend .
A relatively small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and development offices .
Many OEMs are already located in sheriffs ’ or fire departments and public safety offices , often a result of budget pressures ; general confusion about what it is that emergency managers do ; and the fact that many coordinators are themselves former police officers , firefighters , or military personnel .
“ My sense is it comes down to resources : Municipal and county governments with larger budgets are more likely to have independent emergency management offices than municipal and county governments with smaller budgets , ” Savitt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cut and dry , though .
Part of the calculation for where to locate an OEM is cultural or historical , and some jurisdictions may feel there is a legitimate and compelling reason to combine offices.
” Savitt suspects more will be shuffled into public safety departments as cities look for places to cut corners .
So far , evidence for how potential cuts will shape local OEMs remains anecdotal .
The city council of Rosenberg , Texas—a city of just under 40,000 people , near Houston—voted unanimously earlier this month to scrap @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start of its annual budget discussions .
The police , meanwhile , are requesting vehicle upgrades and new SWAT team helmets .
Florida ’ s coastal Brevard County began discussing where to put its 19-person independent Office of Emergency Management in May , when its executive director resigned to take a job in the private sector .
That was an opening for Sheriff Wayne Ivey who , for two years , according to local media , had been proposing that his office run the county ’ s emergency management department .
Ivey would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personnel , with their finances remaining under the control of the County Commission .
A feasibility report , however , raised concerns about jurisdiction and responsibility , and county officials are wary of making the switch in the middle of hurricane season .
“ I have no question that Sheriff Ivey is fully capable of overseeing the additional responsibility emergency operations would entail , ” County Commission Chair Bryan Lober told Florida Today .
“ Yet , there are so many variables to consider , I require additional time before I can possibly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This is not a decision which should be made impulsively or , in my opinion , at this juncture of a global pandemic.
” The County Commission report evaluating Ivey ’ s proposal found that 55 of Florida ’ s 67 county OEMs report directly to county commissions .
In the remaining 12 , emergency management coordinators either report to the sheriff or are the sheriff .
The sheriff of Michigan ’ s Gratiot County—who recently refused to enforce statewide mask orders—has proposed boosting the part-time emergency manager coordinator position in his office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fill the new position with a certified police officer who ’ ll spend a quarter of their time working on sheriff ’ s department business , including transporting prisoners and serving as a court bailiff .
On the flip side , Seattle announced on Monday that it will seek to reallocate $ 3.3 million to have its Office of Emergency Management operate outside the city ’ s police department as part of a broader effort to limit the scope of the SPD , in response to ongoing protests , and defund it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in next year ’ s budget .
What ’ s all too obvious to researchers is that offices of emergency management were operating on a shoestring budget well before the pandemic set in .
Los Angeles ’ s independent Emergency Management Department , for instance , is currently one of that city ’ s most sparsely funded bodies , receiving just $ 3.3 million in the 2021 budget—about $ 1 million less than the city ’ s Department of Cannabis Regulation .
The situation is worse for smaller cities , where many county-level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ volunteer basis with limited ( if any ) paid staff .
This puts already cash-strapped cities at a disadvantage in dealing with emergencies .
As with other public services , it also means that more of the duties that might ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of an OEM fall to far better-funded police departments .
These sorts of asymmetries are mirrored at the national level .
Since it was formed in the paranoid months after 9/11 , the Department of Homeland Security has housed FEMA alongside Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hate that FEMA is included in DHS , ” Slavitt said of emergency management experts in academia .
“ DHS as an agency should be dismantled .
It doesn ’ t make any sense to have FEMA and the Coast Guard and the Secret Service all a part of the same federal agency.
” Samantha Montano , assistant professor of emergency management at Massachusetts Maritime Academy , who runs the blog Disasterology , put it more bluntly : “ The only way for FEMA to ever be effective as a starting point is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Much of the federal funding made available to local OEMs through DHS is still specifically geared toward anti-terrorism , a priority of questionable importance for Gratiot County , Michigan , or Rosenberg , Texas .
In most cases , the relative lack of specific funds for OEMs to coordinate longer-term mitigation and recovery climate planning—things like keeping new development off flood plains or adjusting building code for more frequent heat waves—means it simply won ’ t happen .

Theoretically, an OEM should be able to perform its four core functions no matter where it’s housed. But those within first responder or public safety offices, Amanda Savitt, executive director of the Center for Climate Adaptation Research, told me, can tend to emphasize preparedness and response over recovery and mitigation. While there haven’t been holistic studies conducted as to where OEMs are housed, Savitt estimates that as many as half are independent agencies that report to local elected officials—the setup emergency management experts recommend. A relatively small number of OEMs are housed within planning and development offices. Many OEMs are already located in sheriffs’ or fire departments and public safety offices, often a result of budget pressures; general confusion about what it is that emergency managers do; and the fact that many coordinators are themselves former police officers, firefighters, or military personnel. “My sense is it comes down to resources: Municipal and county governments with larger budgets are more likely to have independent emergency management offices than municipal and county governments with smaller budgets,” Savitt says. “It’s not cut and dry, though. Part of the calculation for where to locate an OEM is cultural or historical, and some jurisdictions may feel there is a legitimate and compelling reason to combine offices.” Savitt suspects more will be shuffled into public safety departments as cities look for places to cut corners.
So far, evidence for how potential cuts will shape local OEMs remains anecdotal. The city council of Rosenberg, Texas—a city of just under 40,000 people, near Houston—voted unanimously earlier this month to scrap its emergency management coordinator position at the start of its annual budget discussions. The police, meanwhile, are requesting vehicle upgrades and new SWAT team helmets.
Florida’s coastal Brevard County began discussing where to put its 19-person independent Office of Emergency Management in May, when its executive director resigned to take a job in the private sector. That was an opening for Sheriff Wayne Ivey who, for two years, according to local media, had been proposing that his office run the county’s emergency management department. Ivey would manage the department’s programs and personnel, with their finances remaining under the control of the County Commission. A feasibility report, however, raised concerns about jurisdiction and responsibility, and county officials are wary of making the switch in the middle of hurricane season. “I have no question that Sheriff Ivey is fully capable of overseeing the additional responsibility emergency operations would entail,” County Commission Chair Bryan Lober told Florida Today. “Yet, there are so many variables to consider, I require additional time before I can possibly commit to supporting any such shift. This is not a decision which should be made impulsively or, in my opinion, at this juncture of a global pandemic.” The County Commission report evaluating Ivey’s proposal found that 55 of Florida’s 67 county OEMs report directly to county commissions. In the remaining 12, emergency management coordinators either report to the sheriff or are the sheriff.


newrepublic--2020-07-20--The Only Person Who’s Figured Out How to Interview Trump

Chris Wallace ’ s interview with Donald Trump on this past Sunday ’ s edition of Fox News Sunday ended up being a bigger bombshell than it should have been .
Sure , Wallace did his job—he asked tough questions about pressing issues , he offered resistance to the president ’ s lies , and he didn ’ t make much of a fuss about it .
And yet , this particular tête-à-tête has generated a surge of coverage not just because it included news , but because of the way it underscored how few of the president ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ successfully as Wallace .
The Fox host ’ s method is simple , and yet so few have tried it , either out of fear of being accused of bias or out of deference to the office of the president .
Interviewing President Trump is not , in theory , a difficult thing to do .
This is , after all , someone who regularly , with no provocation at all , broadcasts his narcissism , megalomania , profound lack of empathy , and near-total ignorance of basic facts .
He lies with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are often so absurd and apparent that they barely need to be scrutinized at all .
There are so many scandals swirling at any one time that any would-be interlocutor always has more than enough material to generate several days ’ worth of news .
But interviewing Donald Trump , both as a candidate and as president , has proven to be trickier than it would seem .
Trump , after all , won the Republican primary in 2016 in part because he granted so many interviews , many of them uncritical , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coverage he managed to generate swamped his GOP opponents , who often struggled mightily for some smaller portion of attention .
The constant lying and the endless barrage of scandals can sometimes be an asset .
Reporters are unable to fact-check in real time because of the overabundance of available material .
Trump is a political Mr. Burns , who is nearly indestructible because he has so many ailments that no single one can gain the upper hand .
But reporters also often self-handicap when interviewing the president .
Wary of allegations that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrat-aligned networks—they have to pick and choose their barbs , fact-checks , and sharp questions .
And while the president may have few qualms about debasing his office , the press tends to be hyperconscious of its significance and often accords Trump an unearned surfeit of gravitas and respect .
Trump gets his share of pointed questions , but in terms of standards , Trump ’ s treatment in most interviews is not so different from that of his predecessors—some softballs , some tough questions , a handful of real-time fact-checks .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his presidential forebears , Trump lies constantly .
But Chris Wallace comes to the table free of the concerns and constraints that hamstring many of his colleagues .
Despite being a true product of the media establishment—the son of Mike Wallace , he is one of history ’ s few good nepotism hires—Wallace does not try to cosplay as his father or Edward R. Murrow .
As an interviewer , he has cultivated a mischievous , sometimes anarchic , sensibility .
His best quality is his incredulity—he will interrupt a politician with “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ try to wriggle out of one of his traps ; at other times , he ’ ll start laughing .
Wallace will occasionally dial up a fawning exchange with a subject—there ’ s a particularly famous interview with Dick Cheney that comes to mind .
Trump doesn ’ t seem to have earned the kid gloves treatment .

You see many of these qualities in Wallace’s Sunday exchange with the president. When Trump complained, “Now they want to make it the 1619 project. Where did that come from? What does it represent?” Wallace interrupted his train of thought by saying, “It’s slavery.” When Trump insisted that Joe Biden wants to defund the police, Wallace interjected: “He does not.” When Trump claimed that the U.S. has one of the lowest coronavirus mortality rates in the world—eventually forcing a staffer to bring out a doctored chart—Wallace pushed back, revealing the White House’s flawed methodology. But Wallace’s sharp exchange over Trump’s claim that he “aced” a cognitive test designed to show if someone is suffering from dementia was particularly noteworthy.
WALLACE: Incidentally, I took the test too when I heard that you passed it. TRUMP: Yeah, how did you do? WALLACE: It’s not—well, it’s not that hard a test. They have a picture, and it says, “What’s that?” and it’s an elephant. TRUMP: No, no, no.… You see, that’s all misrepresentation. WALLACE: Well, that’s what it was on the web. TRUMP: It’s all misrepresentation. Because, yes, the first few questions are easy, but I’ll bet you couldn’t even answer the last five questions. I’ll bet you couldn’t, they get very hard, the last five questions. WALLACE: Well, one of them was count back from 100 by seven. TRUMP: Let me tell you … WALLACE: Ninety-three. TRUMP: … you couldn’t answer — you couldn’t answer many of the questions.
The president’s lies about the test are ridiculous and not worthy of deference or respect; Wallace gives Trump a thin sliver of each, favoring instead his barbed provocations about the picture of an elephant and the number 93.
This may be as close as someone has gotten to calling Trump “stupid” to his face since he entered the White House. It certainly demonstrates Wallace’s superior cunning. Ask the president a question about policy and he will try to rope-a-dope you, going on endless, discursive ramblings that inevitably return to his personal grievances. The president doesn’t actually know anything about policy, and he doesn’t care to learn. Wallace, who gets this, keeps things simple. He asks how Trump can claim to protect people with preexisting conditions when he doesn’t even have a health care plan. He asks why the president is boasting about doing well on a test that asks you to identify a drawing of an elephant. He aims low, in other words, and the results reveal the president for what he is: Vain, incompetent, dumb.


newrepublic--2020-07-20--I Scored Worse Than Donald Trump Did on That Brain Test

At the time , I was constantly worried that my internet habits had impaired my ability to think and remember things : Spending hours on Twitter , training my brain to absorb and quickly purge thousands of tiny pieces of information , is probably not that healthy .
I held out hope , however , that the answer would involve my medication , and that a doctor might recognize my symptoms and suggest some obvious alternative cocktail of SSRIs that would fix the problem .
Specifically , I was worried that Wellbutrin was doing something to my brain : Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I noticed myself mixing up words .
If I was talking about two concepts—say “ pizza ” and “ football ” —they ’ d be swapped by the time the sentence came out of my mouth ; suddenly we were ordering a football for the pizza game .
In December 2019 , I did something deeply inadvisable that a lot of people inevitably do when they can ’ t get mental health care : I tried managing my own medication , and tapered myself off Wellbutrin slowly .
This failed to fix @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dropped me into a deep depression to boot .
I spent much of January in throes of a migraine .
It was a relief to finally get in to see a doctor .
Most of my first appointment was pretty standard .
I answered questions about my life , my childhood , and my migraines .
It was more than two hours long .
And because I mentioned this fear about my cognitive abilities , the doctor gave me the MOCA test .
When she suggested it , I said , excitedly : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” They should have committed me on the spot .
The test is , as Wallace said , not hard .
You draw a clock face .
You ’ re shown a picture of a lion and you say , “ That ’ s a lion.
” While Trump insisted that his doctors told him that “ rarely does anybody do what you just did , ” that makes little sense : The point of the test is not that those who get a perfect score have a perfect brain .
A perfect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ functioning within normal parameters .
Rather than detecting some superior intellectual agility that might enable a person to paint like Picasso or discover the secret of cold fusion , the MOCA test attests to the possibility that you might be able to open a can of beans without hurting yourself .
It confirms “ mild cognitive impairment , ” not very stable genius .
A passing score is 26 out of 30 .
I had a couple of stumbles .
On one part of the test , the doctor reads a list of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asked to repeat them immediately and then repeat them a second time after a few minutes have passed .
During my second recital , I forgot one of the words .
I also got tripped up on another section where the test-taker is asked to list as many words as they can that begin with the letter F in a minute ’ s time .
After saying a few , I found myself taking an increasingly painful amount of time to think of new words to list .
I was also thrown by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t count .
I didn ’ t realize the MOCA test follows Scrabble rules .
Looking back , I feel like I was struggling with a form of stage fright .
I can still recall feeling anxious about the test , and I remember how I questioned everything I did while I was doing it , right down to whether the minute-hand on the clock is the big one or the little one .
( It ’ s the big one . )
Perhaps I was correct that my brain wasn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; it could also be the case that this extra caution was my brain properly routing its way around the anxiety I was feeling .
As I said and would hasten to emphasize before The New Republic reconsiders my employment , I did pass the test .
My psychiatrist ’ s conclusion was that my body was under a lot of stress from persistent migraines and that I was “ severely ” under-medicated after ditching the Wellbutrin .
As I ’ d hoped , she came up with the right pharmacological cocktail and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feel that my Internet Brain symptoms have totally subsided , I feel much more chill about them , and I do feel as if I might be able to get a perfect score if I had another go .
All thanks to the magic of SSRIs , and possibly also deleting Twitter from my phone .
And yet here I am , left with the fact that I did not get a perfect score on a test that Donald Trump claims to have aced .
This is a man who recently seemed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share of blame for the coronavirus outbreak , despite the fact that it didn ’ t exist until he ’ d long left the White House .
Prior to that , Trump suggested that we should inject coronavirus patients with bleach and that the key to lowering the rate of infection was to stop testing to see if people were infected .

The test is, as Wallace said, not hard. You draw a clock face. You’re shown a picture of a lion and you say, “That’s a lion.” While Trump insisted that his doctors told him that “rarely does anybody do what you just did,” that makes little sense: The point of the test is not that those who get a perfect score have a perfect brain. A perfect score merely indicates that your brain is functioning within normal parameters. Rather than detecting some superior intellectual agility that might enable a person to paint like Picasso or discover the secret of cold fusion, the MOCA test attests to the possibility that you might be able to open a can of beans without hurting yourself. It confirms “mild cognitive impairment,” not very stable genius. A passing score is 26 out of 30.
I had a couple of stumbles. On one part of the test, the doctor reads a list of five words, whereupon the patient is asked to repeat them immediately and then repeat them a second time after a few minutes have passed. During my second recital, I forgot one of the words. I also got tripped up on another section where the test-taker is asked to list as many words as they can that begin with the letter F in a minute’s time. After saying a few, I found myself taking an increasingly painful amount of time to think of new words to list. I was also thrown by the fact that “France” didn’t count. I didn’t realize the MOCA test follows Scrabble rules.
Looking back, I feel like I was struggling with a form of stage fright. I can still recall feeling anxious about the test, and I remember how I questioned everything I did while I was doing it, right down to whether the minute-hand on the clock is the big one or the little one. (It’s the big one.) Perhaps I was correct that my brain wasn’t working too well at the time; it could also be the case that this extra caution was my brain properly routing its way around the anxiety I was feeling.


newrepublic--2020-07-20--Moving Beyond Good and Evil in the Middle East

The chaotic and conflict-ridden Middle East is a scene of American failure .
In recent decades , the United States has lavished more resources and attention there than on any other region .
It has incurred more American military deaths in Iraq than in any other war since the Vietnam War .
The current state of the region , and of U.S. influence in it , doesn ’ t come close to representing a worthwhile return on that huge investment .
A major redirection of U.S. policy toward the Middle East is in order , and not only in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration .
That administration has carried to extremes an assumption that has underpinned previous administrations ’ approach toward the region .
That assumption , simply put , is that the U.S. must exert its power , including military might , on the side of those in the region considered good and friendly , to secure superiority or domination over those considered evil or unfriendly .
That approach might be defensible in responding to the threat of an unfriendly power achieving hegemony over the Middle East , but no such threat exists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a supposed regional hegemon , but it is militarily inferior to several of its rivals , and it has the permanent handicap of being a mostly Persian and Shia nation in a region that is mostly Arab and Sunni .
One major problem with the U.S. approach of trying to prop up good over evil is that players in the Middle East do not sort readily into good guys and bad guys .
The region is a tangle of cross-cutting rivalries and conflicts—of Sunni against Shia , Arabs against Israelis , Arabs against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ monarchies against republics .
Trying to hammer these competing interests into a U.S.-imposed imbalance has been disastrous for human security—and ignores the regional powers ’ own capacity for checking each other ’ s emergent threats .
Exploiting regional balances of power requires far fewer American resources than the traditional , long-standing , inadequate U.S. strategy to achieve domination .
Intra-regional balancing works even among those considered adversaries of the U.S. Iran and Russia are commonly put in that category , and both have helped to shore up the Assad regime during the Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rivals for influence in Syria , with the rivalry working against either one of them achieving destabilizing political dominance in Damascus .

Such balancing also entails engaging diplomatically with each side of a rivalry. The U.S. administration has conducted foreign relations with one hand tied behind its back by refusing to engage with certain regimes it doesn’t like. Discarding the practice of always siding with a fixed set of presumptive friends against a fixed set of adversaries means also discarding the notion that it is necessarily a U.S. interest to support “allies” in the region—where the U.S. has no formal NATO-like collective security obligations. That notion turns the whole concept of allies and interests upside down. The U.S. should have allies to advance U.S. interests, not to define what those interests are.
Rigid side-taking has impeded the ability of the U.S. to explore the areas of common interest that invariably exist even with states rightly considered adversaries. The confidence among presumed friends of the U.S. that Washington would always back them and would not deal with regional rivals has encouraged those friends to indulge in behaviors harmful both to U.S. interests and to regional stability. Thus we have a Saudi regime that gets away with the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and an Israeli government that, with expansion of settlements and threats of annexation, is hammering more nails into the coffin of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The principle of using, rather than vainly trying to overcome, a balance of power in the Middle East is incorporated in a new report on U.S. policy toward the region from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. The report is grounded in a strict definition of U.S. interests in the Middle East, which ultimately must advance the security and well-being of the American people. The report contains a full set of policy recommendations—including an American military drawdown, support for a new multilateral security architecture, normalization of U.S.-Iran relations, and diplomatic efforts to end the wars in Syria and Yemen. Each of these is achievable, as long as the U.S. can get past old, stultifying, and ineffective ways of looking at power in the region.