newrepublic--2020-06-05--After Defunding the Police, Nationalize Their Benefits

The staggering excess of the New York Police Department , the largest municipal police force in the country , is hard to hide at this point .
The NYPD commands 36,000 officers , a bloated budget of nearly $ 6 billion that the mayor all but refuses to touch , and a reserve of military-grade equipment collected in the name of anti-terrorism , including machine guns and armored vehicles .
Since last Friday , the police have met ongoing protests in New York over police violence and the murder of Minneapolis resident George Floyd with grotesque displays of might , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officers in state-of-the-art riot gear assaulting protesters in the streets .
On Wednesday , the city ’ s Civilian Complaint Review Board said it had received more reports of police misconduct in the previous five days than it had in all of April .
The expanse of shields , riot batons , and ballistic vests routinely dispatched to contain civilian demonstrators is even more bleak in light of the dire shortages—of supplies , money , and basic necessities—that other workers have had to endure during the pandemic .
Barely a month ago , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were still pleading for enough masks and other personal protective equipment .
In March , as the coronavirus death toll spiked and hospitals feared they would run short of ventilators , some staffers at Mount Sinai West wore garbage bags in the absence of proper garments .
The NYPD , on the other hand , has a $ 10 million high-tech surveillance helicopter .
Beneath the obscene spectacle of roided-out weaponry is a different , more mundane kind of resourcing that nevertheless also demonstrates the fundamentally antisocial priorities of capitalist allocation .
New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the best employer benefits in America , including those unheard of in almost every other sector since perhaps the postwar era .
Last year , the average annual income of police in the New York metro area was a little over $ 83,000—nothing approaching robber baron money , of course , but far above what EMTs ( $ 45,420 ) , nursing assistants ( $ 38,250 ) , childcare workers ( $ 30,060 ) , or teacher ’ s aides ( $ 34,380 ) make .
Like other public employees , the police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deductibles , copays , or premiums ” —the goal , to a word , of Bernie Sanders ’ s Medicare for All plan .
NYPD officers also receive unlimited sick leave with full pay and a famously generous pension , deliverable after 22 years of service , which means that a cop could potentially retire around age 42 with a pension worth $ 1.75 million , according to the NYPD ’ s recruitment materials .
( That ’ s incidentally a little over what personal finance experts recommend people have saved by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of civilians , as you can probably guess , fall short . )
Finally , that compensation ( and far more ) is safeguarded by a union so powerful that it regularly bullies city officials with impunity and sneers at public demands for accountability in the wake of officer misconduct , violence , and killing .
The point , though , isn ’ t that we should think of the living wage , health insurance , pension , paid leave , and union muscle offered by the NYPD as extravagant luxuries .
Rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blocks of a decent life that have been kicked out from most other American workers precisely while police departments across the nation have swelled .
As we ’ re being asked to imagine a future free from cops , a parallel demand presents itself : to use the money gained from defunding the police to build a future in which cop-style benefits are the standard for all .

The staggering excess of the New York Police Department, the largest municipal police force in the country, is hard to hide at this point. The NYPD commands 36,000 officers, a bloated budget of nearly $6 billion that the mayor all but refuses to touch, and a reserve of military-grade equipment collected in the name of anti-terrorism, including machine guns and armored vehicles. Since last Friday, the police have met ongoing protests in New York over police violence and the murder of Minneapolis resident George Floyd with grotesque displays of might, including near-constant air surveillance and ranks of officers in state-of-the-art riot gear assaulting protesters in the streets. On Wednesday, the city’s Civilian Complaint Review Board said it had received more reports of police misconduct in the previous five days than it had in all of April.
The expanse of shields, riot batons, and ballistic vests routinely dispatched to contain civilian demonstrators is even more bleak in light of the dire shortages—of supplies, money, and basic necessities—that other workers have had to endure during the pandemic. Barely a month ago, health care professionals and other essential workers were still pleading for enough masks and other personal protective equipment. In March, as the coronavirus death toll spiked and hospitals feared they would run short of ventilators, some staffers at Mount Sinai West wore garbage bags in the absence of proper garments. The NYPD, on the other hand, has a $10 million high-tech surveillance helicopter.


newrepublic--2020-06-05--Donald Trump Is Celebrating the Wrong Economic Accomplishment

But that 3.1 million job gain is wiped out when you take into account a statistical glitch that the BLS admits to—the misclassification of about five million workers as “ employed ” who said they were “ not at work for other reasons ” than losing their jobs .
The likelihood that these people will get their old jobs back diminishes with each passing day .
But even aside from the question of job viability for these workers , the BLS is required to classify such people as unemployed , and for some as yet ill-explained reason , it didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the BLS says , the unemployment rate would have risen in May to 16.1 percent .
And that ’ s before seasonal adjustment to the jobless count , which would raise the rate even higher .
Jason Furman , who was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Barack Obama , and Wilson Powell III , his colleague at Harvard ’ s Kennedy School of Government , calculate that when you figure in this and other problems with the May calculations , the true unemployment rate is 17.1 percent .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ single-digit job gain must be balanced against a two-month loss in March and April of more than 22 million jobs . )
Without diving into the weeds , though , it appears that even an honest reckoning of May ’ s employment trend , based on the limited data available , yields a rather surprising gain rather than the loss most observers were anticipating .
Furman and Powell ’ s reckoning of the “ realistic unemployment rate ” at 17 .
1 percent is , as they note , lower than their similarly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s true unemployment rate was 20.5 percent .
We all want unemployment to go down , so that really is something to celebrate—however cautiously .
It ’ s also a reason to congratulate the president on his administration ’ s greatest ( indeed , sole ) domestic accomplishment : the $ 600 sweetener added to weekly unemployment benefits .
Trump being Trump , he ’ d rather you didn ’ t .
He agreed to it only at the prodding of congressional Democrats in March , and reportedly he ’ s itching to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the end of next month .

He’s far from alone. Business groups and congressional Republicans have been moaning lately that the $600 sweetener is fouling up their attempts to reopen America. They complain that the additional money in unemployed workers’ pockets is a disincentive for them to get back on the job. As generations of welfare critics have long preached, individual initiative is supposed to collapse when you can make more (or even as much) from not working than working. (Though congressional Republicans do at least concede that there’s also that small matter of a deadly epidemic continuing to rage.)
Conservatives aren’t wrong that a lot of workers got a raise when the coronavirus sent them to the unemployment office. The $600 figure was a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation of what it would take for the typical worker to receive in unemployment benefits a sum roughly equivalent to what that worker would normally receive in salary. But the job losses caused by the lockdown did not fall on the “typical” worker. They were tilted heavily toward low-income people, especially in the fast-food and hotel industries.
Consequently, the median salary replacement achieved under the $600 weekly bonus overshot the target of 100 percent of lost income and worked out to 134 percent of income, according to a mid-May study from the University of Chicago. Two-thirds of those eligible for unemployment benefits are able to pull down more in unemployment than they did on salary, the study concluded. Were the $600 sweetener to be extended another six months through January, the Congressional Budget Office reported Thursday, about five-sixths of recipients would receive more in unemployment benefits than they received on salary.


newrepublic--2020-06-05--Rethinking the Press’s Relationship With Police

In the last week and a half , over 200 journalists have been maced , beaten with batons , teargassed , and arrested by police while covering anti-police protests .
Many of these journalists clearly identified themselves as members of the media ; in some instances , reporters appear to be targeted because they identify themselves .
While some have been assaulted by protesters or vigilante groups , police are responsible for the overwhelming majority—over 80 percent—of attacks .
The U.S. Press Freedom Tracker cataloged 150 press freedom violations in 2019 ; it is currently investigating nearly 300 incidents from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s a scale that we have not seen before , ” the organization ’ s managing editor , Kristin McCudden , told Time .
“ It ’ s unprecedented in scope without a doubt.
” Journalists have long covered protests with some detachment .
This was often literally the case , with cameras and reporters off to the side of the action .
Journalists were not to take sides .
But now , because of how they have been treated by police , they have been grouped with protesters and have suffered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Reporters have been zip-tied ; a cameraman from Australia ’ s Channel 7 was hit with a riot shield ; CNN ’ s Omar Jimenez was arrested on camera .
These are clear violations of the First Amendment .
They ’ re also a wake-up call for journalists who , for too long , have given too much credence to the police ’ s side of the story .
This implicit bias toward police narratives comes in many forms .
It can be seen in grammar .
As Nick Martin documented in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The New York Times used the active voice when describing protesters assaulting journalists ( “ Protesters struck a journalist with his own microphone ” ) but used the passive voice when describing police assaulting journalists ( “ A reporter was hit by a pepper ball on live television by an officer who appeared to be aiming at her ” ) .
Many journalistic organizations are inclined to be deferential to the police , while being less respectful of the rabble—a reflection of the power dynamic at work in these situations .
The result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realism , as if tear gas was fired without anyone pulling a trigger and batons floated through the air to hit protesters .
As Mike Laws wrote in The Columbia Journalism Review , “ In news coverage of the nationwide protests against police brutality , breezy , anodyne words like deploy , disperse , and engage have served as a gloss on state-licensed aggression , papering over municipal forces ’ and National Guardsmen ’ s frequently appalling crowd-control tactics.
” The images we have seen from these protests puncture these clichés .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the way that police have treated protesters or media .
People are not “ dispersed , ” they are charged at and shoved .
Tear gas might be “ deployed , ” but it also burns .
Far from being composed figures of order , the police are agents of chaos .

In the last week and a half, over 200 journalists have been maced, beaten with batons, teargassed, and arrested by police while covering anti-police protests. Many of these journalists clearly identified themselves as members of the media; in some instances, reporters appear to be targeted because they identify themselves. While some have been assaulted by protesters or vigilante groups, police are responsible for the overwhelming majority—over 80 percent—of attacks. The U.S. Press Freedom Tracker cataloged 150 press freedom violations in 2019; it is currently investigating nearly 300 incidents from the last week alone. “It’s a scale that we have not seen before,” the organization’s managing editor, Kristin McCudden, told Time. “It’s unprecedented in scope without a doubt.”
Journalists have long covered protests with some detachment. This was often literally the case, with cameras and reporters off to the side of the action. Journalists were not to take sides. But now, because of how they have been treated by police, they have been grouped with protesters and have suffered the same violence that is being protested. Reporters have been zip-tied; a cameraman from Australia’s Channel 7 was hit with a riot shield; CNN’s Omar Jimenez was arrested on camera. These are clear violations of the First Amendment. They’re also a wake-up call for journalists who, for too long, have given too much credence to the police’s side of the story.


newrepublic--2020-06-05--Nihilism and White Bliss in America’s Most Livable City

From a distance , Le Magnifique looks almost like a scene from a cartoon .
The hero of the statue , former Penguins center and captain Mario Lemieux , is skating one way with the puck dangling on the blade of his stick , every bit the menace in the open ice who earned the right to be called the best hockey player who ever lived .
( In this town , Gretzky is always second .
And after a few beers , an argument about what kind of numbers Sidney Crosby would put up during the stand-up goaltending era @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other side of Lemieux are two defenders skating completely the opposite way , colliding , dumbfounded by this marvel of a human being who skates past with a Looney Tunes smirk on his face .
The statue is beautiful , save for the hair .
The hair on bronze statues always looks a little weird texturally , like uncooked ramen noodles .
The statue captures a moment from a December 1988 game against the New York Islanders , played in the Civic Arena , when Lemieux split two defenders and displayed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off .
Like many of the city ’ s white residents , fans of this very white game , I felt proud when the statue went up .
Our hero , the city ’ s icon , finally immortalized .
And like many of the city ’ s white residents , I didn ’ t know what stood at the spot where he skated roughly 30 years earlier , in the 1950s , when the city razed over a thousand structures and displaced 8,000 residents , the vast majority of them black , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last weekend , during Pittsburgh ’ s uprising in response to the brutal murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer , protesters spray-painted a hammer and sickle above Mario ’ s powerful wagon , and the phrase “ IT IS RIGHT TO REBEL.
” Unlike the poverty , mass surveillance , and routine state violence that black residents of the city are subjected to , and which the protesters made their target , the spray paint splatter on the city ’ s idol was enough to get white Pittsburghers to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sprang into action to defend the poor statue , unable to defend itself , and fans rallied behind them , decrying the likelihood that any real Pittsburgher would ever deface Lemieux .
The implied neutrality of the statue—a belief that some symbols can exist outside politics or geographies of race—attempts to bypass more urgent questions about where we are right now and why .
Like why a statue of a white sports icon and the arena it guards may actively represent something quite different for generations of residents displaced by the franchise that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prosperity in a heavily segregated city .

Lee’s argument is quite simple: To effectively fight against systemic racism, one must completely disrupt the system that was created to benefit the white, powerful, and affluent. “That’s not something that can be solved at the local level. We need state and federal working in tandem,” she said. “The divestment of black and brown communities, the underfunding of our schools, the underfunding of our transportation system: All these things were intentionally done. You can’t eradicate them unintentionally.” Band-Aid solutions, like those offered by overwhelmed mayors seeking to calm a distressed populace, can’t create effective long-term change. Economic development can only go as far as the developers who are willing to come to the table and guarantee beneficial arrangements for the communities that have never had a seat at the table.
The Reverend Dr. John Welch, who leads an organization of interfaith activist chapters throughout the country and helped coordinate and organize demonstrations during the Ferguson, Missouri, rebellion of 2014, ran for mayor in 2017 on a platform of police reform and equitable investment in schools and housing. Welch said he felt called to run after watching what happened to the previous police chief, Cameron McLay. McLay was an outsider who was brought in by then-incumbent and current Mayor Bill Peduto to bring police reform but clashed with the union, being seen as someone who did not have the officers’ best interest at heart. McLay first came under fire for holding a sign pledging to end white silence. He resigned in November 2016, a couple of months after the Pittsburgh police union voted 91 percent no confidence in his leadership during labor contract negotiations. Welch lost that race, but his analysis of the situation hasn’t changed: “We need to change the culture of policing here,” he told me.
“In Pittsburgh in particular, which is a highly racist city already, police are allowed to do what they do with impunity,” Welch continued. “This is the same police force that was under federal consent decree because of abuse of force. The first one in the country to do so.” Summer Lee described the relationship between the black community and the police in the city as tenuous, at best. Besides the brutality and counterinsurgency tactics, the issue remains the accountability of those responsible. The city and region has had its own national news about police treatment, most tragically the police killing of 17-year-old Antwon Rose in 2018. The city hid behind the fact that it was done by the East Pittsburgh police department, and not the city’s, failing to own any accountability for the racist tone it set in the region.


newrepublic--2020-06-06--BP Is Not Woke. It’s an Imperialist Success Story.

Bernard Looney , named CEO of the multinational fossil fuel conglomerate BP last fall , has one or two things he ’ d like you to know .
“ I hope it goes without saying , I absolutely condemn racial injustice in all forms , ” Looney wrote in an email sent out to the company ’ s global team and then on June 1st posted—like all heartfelt messages of solidarity—to LinkedIn .
“ Many of you are probably not aware , ” he continued , that BP was a “ major contributor ” to the building of the Martin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , DC .
BP , he says , backs a number of efforts “ aimed at trying to get to the root of deep inequities that exist in our society .
If we could address some of the basics—like access to education—we might find ways to help heal some of these deep divisions once and for all .
I want bp to be right there in the mix—trying to help where we can .
It is who we are , and part of our history.
” Is it ?
Fossil fuels ’ rise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supremacy : of Western powers and corporations claiming resources from the Global South and maintaining access to them through imperial might .
At times , that has looked like Britain treating the Middle East as its empire ’ s gas station .
At others , it took the form of CIA-backed coups .
The industry ’ s funding of denial and delay of climate action in recent decades through bodies like the Global Climate Coalition ( GCC ) , which BP left in 1996 , and American Petroleum Institute ( API ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bought it time to keep pouring greenhouse gasses into the air .
Cruelly , the places many fuels have been extracted abroad , the Middle East being only one example , are already shouldering the worst of the climate crisis , as Black and brown communities stateside are disproportionately burdened , relative to wealthier white communities , with leaky , polluting fossil fuel infrastructure in their backyards .
The history BP ’ s current CEO now claims as anti-racist began in 1901 , when a well-off British land speculator named William Knox D @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waning monarchy for the exclusive rights to explore , drill and profit off the country ’ s oil .
That deal laid the groundwork for the concession system that would give U.S. and European companies control over oil markets for decades to come .
D ’ Arcy became director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company ( APOC ) in 1909 .
To meet growing oil demand from its military and domestic economy , Britain bought a 51 percent equity stake in APOC , turning it into Britain ’ s national oil company just as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described in historian Giuliano Garavini ’ s The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the 20th Century , the entire arrangement was premised on the company hoarding profits as it made paltry payments to the Iranian government , paying as little as possible to get oil out of the ground .
APOC ’ s highest-paid workers were predominately either European or Indian , while local workers were crammed into tents or shantytowns and paid miserable wages that were periodically cut to maintain discipline .
“ According to the company , ” a 1924 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ APOC refinery in Abadan wrote , “ paying the full salary stops the workers from staying at work during the summer when the weather is hot.
” When the Shah of Iran suddenly revoked APOC ’ s concession in 1932—citing its grossly skewed distribution of profits—parties broke out in the streets of Tehran .
Britain quickly turned to an early version of the World Trade Organization—the League of Nations ’ Permanent Court of International Justice—to enforce its property rights .
The company told the world about all the good it was doing for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs , installing infrastructure—and Britain won its case , securing a new concession set to last for 70 years ; the company was also rebranded as the Anglo Iranian Oil Company ( AIOC ) .
In 1949 , as Iranian oil accounted for some 75 percent of AIOC ’ s profits , the company paid the Iranian government in royalties roughly half of what it paid to the UK government in taxes alone , all as Brits received a deep discount on oil that Iranians paid market prices for .
As ever , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s oil was premised on the threat of state violence .
“ As late as 1946 , ” Garavini writes , “ the British Foreign ministry and ministry of Power had contemplated various options to retain control of Iranian oil , including the ‘ use of force .
It could be decided that if the Persians would not keep order we would .
’ ”

Bernard Looney, named CEO of the multinational fossil fuel conglomerate BP last fall, has one or two things he’d like you to know. “I hope it goes without saying, I absolutely condemn racial injustice in all forms,” Looney wrote in an email sent out to the company’s global team and then, on June 1, posted—like all heartfelt messages of solidarity—to LinkedIn. “Many of you are probably not aware,” he continued, that BP was a “major contributor” to the building of the Martin Luther King Jr. memorial in Washington, D.C. BP, he says, backs a number of efforts “aimed at trying to get to the root of deep inequities that exist in our society. If we could address some of the basics—like access to education—we might find ways to help heal some of these deep divisions once and for all. I want bp to be right there in the mix—trying to help where we can. It is who we are, and part of our history.”
Is it? Fossil fuels’ rise and reign is a story of white supremacy: of Western powers and corporations claiming resources from the global south and maintaining access to them through imperial might. At times, that has looked like Britain treating the Middle East as its empire’s gas station. At others, it took the form of CIA-backed coups. The industry’s funding of denial and delay of climate action in recent decades, through bodies like the Global Climate Coalition, which BP left in 1996, and the American Petroleum Institute, to which BP still gives, has bought it time to keep pouring greenhouse gases into the air. Cruelly, the places many fuels have been extracted abroad, the Middle East being only one example, are already shouldering the worst of the climate crisis, as black and brown communities stateside are disproportionately burdened, relative to wealthier white communities, with leaky, polluting fossil fuel infrastructure in their backyards.


newrepublic--2020-06-07--Tom Cotton and the Elite Media’s Dalliance With Illiberalism

It shouldn ’ t be a surprise , given all this , that years of angst about political correctness and speech on campus have culminated in efforts to tether higher education funding to discursive standards set by conservative state legislators and the White House .
Similarly it makes both no sense whatsoever and all the sense in the world that a cadre of centrist speech advocates have been less alarmed by a Senator ’ s call for the deployment of the military against protests than by an editorial debate at the Times over whether it should have been published .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a conviction that the truly critical threats to speech are coming from the left .
“ The censorious left has become more aggressive and promiscuous in its condemnations , ” Stephens wrote in February .
“ No wonder the administration has taken up the banner of free speech : Even a president who called the media the ‘ enemy of the people ’ has a case to make that his opponents are more hostile to the letter and spirit of the First Amendment than he is.
” The relationship between the ideas being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ illiberal right isn ’ t fully symbiotic—again , the nationalists want to end freedoms vital to the functioning of a truly free press .
It ’ s in the interest of all in the media , then , to think seriously about whether and how to represent illiberal viewpoints .
The Times has long maintained that it selects its columnists and op-ed writers to expose its readers to a broad range of political perspectives .
It ’ s recently made some progress legitimizing that claim—hires like Jamelle Bouie , Michelle Alexander , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paper to include more views well left of center .
But the Times can not actually live up to its representational goals without soliciting more contributions from the unabashedly Trumpist right—that would mean more pieces like Cotton ’ s , not fewer , and offered regularly enough that they don ’ t seem like one-off performances of open-mindedness .
Is representation worthwhile ?
One case for it should be familiar to all by now .
The representation of a broad range of political viewpoints productively broadens the minds of a publication ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disagree with induces useful shifts in perspective and allows them to poke holes in noxious opinions .
This , it is often said , is the best and perhaps only way to truly defeat bad ideas .
The main problem with this perspective is that it is substantially untrue : Researchers have told us time and time again that it is difficult to change minds by political argument and reason , and the material and social disincentives for accepting a new truth even once recognized can be incredibly strong .
Moreover , many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world well after they ’ ve been refuted by evidence and experience .
The very concept of a “ free marketplace of ideas ” is itself a decent example of this .
The notion that argument is always and obviously a better way than suppression to defeat bad ideas is fanciful—we fear the erosion of free speech to begin with because we understand that censorship and rendering arguments inaccessible have often worked alarmingly well on ideas both good and bad .
A better case is that publications should present a broad range of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not change their minds about anything at all , simply to inform them about the ideological composition of our political landscape , just as they might do in their reporting .
One can even make an instrumental progressive case for this as far as representing the illiberal right is concerned—exposure to opinions like Cotton ’ s could galvanize the opposition of liberal readers to the Republican Party and the conservative movement much more than exposure to the views of unrepresentative NeverTrump columnists .
But the Times ’ readers are regularly exposed to arguments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times publishes them or not .
And the educative benefits of representation are inevitably weighed against whatever harms publication might bring about , including the risk that representation might normalize and facilitate the spread of destructive views .

These and other centrist writers who have sounded alarms about the progressive left would recoil at the suggestion they have anything to do with illiberalism on the right—they are, after all, opponents of President Trump, nationalism, and populism, and fervent defenders of free speech. But the consequences of the press’s catastrophizing about the state of speech in America have been clear. If progressives have already mostly dismantled free speech in the service of their agenda, a growing faction on the right muses, conservatives might as well do away with what remains of it in a desperate defense of their own principles. If the public square has already been functionally destroyed by a mob of coddled twerps, they argue, conservatives should work to reconstitute it as they see fit. The growth of illiberalism on the right has been fed, in large part, by the belief that progressives have already rendered liberalism a fiction. “[Progressives] regulate compliance with an established order and orthodoxy,” Sohrab Ahmari wrote last year. “We should seek to use these values to enforce our order and our orthodoxy, not pretend that they could ever be neutral.”
It shouldn’t be a surprise, given all this, that years of angst about political correctness and speech on campus have culminated in efforts to tether higher education funding to discursive standards set by conservative state legislators and the White House. Similarly it makes both no sense whatsoever and all the sense in the world that a cadre of centrist speech advocates have been less alarmed by a senator’s call for the deployment of the military against protests than by an editorial debate at the Times over whether it should have been published. Their advocacy has always been guided by a conviction that the truly critical threats to speech are coming from the left. “The censorious left has become more aggressive and promiscuous in its condemnations,” Stephens wrote in February. “No wonder the administration has taken up the banner of free speech: Even a president who called the media the ‘enemy of the people’ has a case to make that his opponents are more hostile to the letter and spirit of the First Amendment than he is.”
It’s in the interest of all in the media, then, to think seriously about whether and how to represent illiberal viewpoints.
The relationship between the ideas being advanced by centrists in the media and the illiberal right isn’t fully symbiotic—again, the nationalists want to end freedoms vital to the functioning of a truly free press. It’s in the interest of all in the media, then, to think seriously about whether and how to represent illiberal viewpoints. The Times has long maintained that it selects its columnists and op-ed writers to expose its readers to a broad range of political perspectives. It’s recently made some progress legitimizing that claim—hires like Jamelle Bouie, Michelle Alexander, and Elizabeth Bruenig mark an effort by the paper to include more views well left of center. But the Times cannot actually live up to its representational goals without soliciting more contributions from the unabashedly Trumpist right—that would mean more pieces like Cotton’s, not fewer, and offered regularly enough that they don’t seem like one-off performances of open-mindedness.


newrepublic--2020-06-08--Bill Barr’s Invisible Crusade

Bill Barr’s Invisible Crusade

It ’ s a steep drop to go from critiquing utopian schemes of human perfectibility to lazy millennials who won ’ t get off their couch .
But the same intellectual pivot drives today ’ s religious right : a sanctification of laissez-faire capitalism in the name of the one true Christian faith .
Appeals to religious authority in this context often flitter between spiritual transcendence and crude worldly functionalism .
So as he moved into a litany of political prescriptions for a better civic-spiritual order , Barr subtly downgraded what might be called the vertical dimension of faith in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the reach of religion ’ s worldly foes .
He defended religion as a stabilizing force in society under siege by intemperate radicals .
He counseled decentralization of government power as an “ essential check on despotism ” in the religious and political spheres alike .
The “ destruction of federalism ” by mandating one-size-fits-all rules on abortion , he argued , is “ another source of the extreme discontent in our contemporary political life.
” And he decried the secular mainstream press—another force that ’ s grown too ideological , and too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breakwater for the tyranny of the majority.
” Both sides in the culture wars often ascribe the most extreme-sounding motivations to their adversaries .
So in a public discourse littered with charges of crypto-fascism or allegiance to a “ culture of death , ” it may not seem all that incendiary for Barr to claim that his main antagonists are would-be tyrants .
But such a charge is far more troubling when it comes from someone obligated to uphold and defend the American constitutional order , which theoretically protects adherents of any faith—or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more , the body of theologically informed principles that animate Barr ’ s worldview tends , on balance , to dismiss most basic precepts of democratic governance as untrustworthy power grabs by a secular state and the sinister forces of cultural radicalism mobilized behind it .
One key plank of the Barr doctrine is the notion that American conservatism in its Reaganite guise is the guiding model for governing American life .
Any proposed policy deviations from it—a more lenient approach toward criminal sentencing , say , or any measure to expand the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s version of Christian morality .
In this rigid scheme of intellectual conflict , deeper ideological differences are not only wrong as a matter of policy and morality ; they also pose a fundamental threat to Americans ’ liberties and freedoms as Barr understands them .
Such efforts to safeguard against the threat of “ totalitarian ” democracy might come across as , well , undemocratic .
But since spiritual affiliations precede democratic obligations in Barr ’ s legal theology , the highest civic priority is not so much to expand the reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against secular misrule .
If the people decide to adopt a policy agenda that does not comport with his worldview , it ’ s because they ’ ve been seduced away from the righteous path .
When Americans express support for greater government intervention , Barr draws upon Alexis de Tocqueville to argue that they are “ vulnerable to a soft despotism wherein the majority would gradually let itself be taken care of by the state—much like dependent children.
” When Americans react to an outrage described in the newspapers , Barr argues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gives them “ an unprecedented ability to mobilize a broad segment of the public on a national scale and direct that opinion in a particular direction.
” By arguing that the people still possess the abstract right to govern themselves but are easily duped by the state or the press , Barr can pay lip service to the constitutional freedoms that he ’ s sworn to uphold while in practice opposing most things that would advance them in real life .
In other words , he manages both to defend democracy in theory @ @ @ @ @ @ @

Barr has taken a different path in the Trump era. Less than a week after the Senate acquitted the president in February, federal prosecutors filed their sentencing recommendation for erstwhile Trump adviser Roger Stone. A District of Columbia jury had found the veteran GOP political operative guilty late last year of witness tampering, obstruction of Congress, and other crimes. Federal prosecutors recommended a sentence of seven to nine years, telling the court that Stone not only had obstructed inquiries into Russian election interference, but also had “displayed contempt for this court and the rule of law” after his arrest.
Later that evening, Trump lacerated the Justice Department on Twitter for proposing such a lengthy sentence for a longtime Trump loyalist. “This is a horrible and very unfair situation,” he wrote. “The real crimes were on the other side, as nothing happens to them. Cannot allow this miscarriage of justice!” Sure enough, the Justice Department’s leaders intervened the next day. By the week’s end, the U.S. attorney’s office in D.C. had filed a new brief with the court that recommended no specific sentence, but asked the court to take into account Stone’s age and lack of prior convictions—a request more commonly made by defense attorneys than prosecutors. All four of the DOJ prosecutors who had charged and tried Stone withdrew from the case in protest.
It was a humiliating moment for the Justice Department, and for Barr himself. DOJ officials anonymously told reporters that their intervention was unrelated to Trump’s criticism, but few believed them. More than 2,000 former DOJ employees signed an open letter demanding the attorney general’s resignation for overseeing what appeared to be a quintessentially corrupt act. Barr embarked on a personal media blitz to repair his reputation, including an interview with ABC News where he effectively told the president to stop tweeting about federal criminal cases. (Spoiler alert: Trump ignored him.) Unnamed DOJ officials told multiple news outlets that he was considering resignation.
It’s unclear how close Barr came to actually quitting over the episode—but it’s also unclear why he would contemplate doing so, any more than the outlandish suspension of charges in the Michael Flynn case would prompt his resignation. The attorney general has spent most of his career advocating for a presidency unbound—a constitutional order that allows the nation’s chief magistrates to wield all the various instrumentalities of executive power without any meaningful safeguard beyond their own conscience (or lack thereof). Perpetual irritants like congressional oversight and media scrutiny can be briskly pushed to the side, and even a president’s most powerful subordinates would carry out the White House’s instructions without hesitation. The Roger Stone scandal, in other words, was not the lowest point of Barr’s career. It was its culmination.


newrepublic--2020-06-08--He Is Even Dumber Than We Thought

He Is Even Dumber Than We Thought

A Washington Post–ABC News poll taken the last week of May 2020 asked Americans , “ Do you think Trump has the mental sharpness it takes to serve effectively as president ?
” Fifty-two percent of respondents said no , with only 46 percent saying yes .
One might see this solid majority response as the weary , off-the-cuff judgment of an American public worn down by Trump ’ s barrage of outlandish claims about coronavirus treatments , or fantasized accounts of legions of violent antifa leaders orchestrating the present nationwide protests over the police killing of George Floyd .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s release , it was reported that Trump mistakenly tried to register to vote in his newly adopted home state of Florida using an out-of-state address . )
But in truth , this was far from the first poll to find that a substantial number of Americans see Trump as not very bright .
An Economist/YouGov poll in 2019 asked , “ Compared to other presidents since World War II , would you say that Trump is more or less intelligent ?
” Forty-seven percent said that he is less intelligent , 22 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence , and just 21 percent thought he is more intelligent .
It appears that Trump ’ s performance in office has had a negative effect on perceptions of his mental acuity .
The Quinnipiac poll tracked perceptions of Trump ’ s mental sharpness from 2016 through 2018 , asking , “ Would you say that Donald Trump is intelligent , or not ?
” When first asked in November 2016 , 74 percent of people said yes , and only 21 percent said no .
A year later , however , those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 55 percent , while those in the negative camp rose to 41 percent .
Subsequent polls found roughly the same ratio .
Closely related to doubts about Trump ’ s intelligence is the question of whether he is too ignorant to do his job .
In 2016 and 2017 , the Fox News poll asked people , “ Do you think Trump has the knowledge to serve effectively as president ?
” In the five times the question was asked , 60 percent of people said no and just 40 percent or fewer @ @ @

A Washington Post–ABC News poll taken the last week of May 2020 asked Americans, “Do you think Trump has the mental sharpness it takes to serve effectively as president?” Fifty-two percent of respondents said no, with only 46 percent saying yes.
One might see this solid majority response as the weary, off-the-cuff judgment of an American public worn down by Trump’s barrage of outlandish claims about coronavirus treatments, or fantasized accounts of legions of violent antifa leaders orchestrating the present nationwide protests over the police killing of George Floyd. (Indeed, since that poll’s release, it was reported that Trump mistakenly tried to register to vote in his newly adopted home state of Florida using an out-of-state address.) But in truth, this was far from the first poll to find that a substantial number of Americans see Trump as not very bright. An Economist/YouGov poll in 2019 asked, “Compared to other presidents since World War II, would you say that Trump is more or less intelligent?” Forty-seven percent said that he is less intelligent, 22 percent said he has about the same intelligence, and just 21 percent thought he is more intelligent.


newrepublic--2020-06-08--The Revolt of the Center-Right

The Revolt of the Center-Right

On the opening night of the 2004 Republican convention , Georgia Senator Zell Miller delivered a blistering attack on the Democratic presidential nominee .
Ridiculing John Kerry ’ s votes to cut military spending , Miller asked incredulously , “ This is the man who wants to be Commander in Chief of our U.S. Armed Forces ?
U.S. forces armed with what ?
Spitballs ?
” Miller ’ s speech transcended standard convention oratory for one reason : He was a Democrat , albeit a conservative one , who crossed party lines to endorse incumbent George W. Bush in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of apostasy is rare in presidential politics , but that gives testimonials like Miller ’ s maximum credibility .
The argument—pushed by Miller and the Bush campaign—that Kerry was weak on national security may have been decisive in the close 2004 election .
I remember a liberal Democratic nurse with a 10-year-old son in Des Moines telling me that she was reluctantly voting for Bush because “ you don ’ t change presidents in the middle of a war.
” Bush carried Iowa by just 10,000 votes .
The Zell Miller precedent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Donald Trump may finally have gone too far for beaten-down old-school Republicans and military leaders .
Gassing a peaceful crowd so that Trump could strut across Lafayette Square to brandish a Bible , which Ivanka had carried over for him in her white $ 1,400 Max Mara bag , was likely the turning point .
It certainly was for former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis .
The participation of General Mark Milley , the chairman of the Joint Chiefs , in this walk of shame prompted Mattis to write , “ We are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mature leadership.
” Think of all the provocations that Mattis grimly accepted with clenched teeth before he expressed his rage over the Battle of Lafayette Square .

The Zell Miller precedent has become relevant because there are signs that Donald Trump may finally have gone too far for beaten-down old-school Republicans and military leaders. Gassing a peaceful crowd so that Trump could strut across Lafayette Square to brandish a Bible, which Ivanka had carried over for him in her white $1,400 Max Mara bag, was likely the turning point. It certainly was for former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. The participation of General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in this walk of shame prompted Mattis to write, “We are witnessing the consequences of three years without mature leadership.” Think of all the provocations that Mattis grimly accepted with clenched teeth before he expressed his rage over the Battle of Lafayette Square.
Now, The New York Times reports that Republicans from George W. Bush to Senators Mitt Romney and Lisa Murkowski are balking at voting for Trump in November. And Democrats are preparing to roll out a “Republicans for Biden” coalition in the coming months, probably culminating in a night at the convention dedicated to disgruntled Republicans and former military leaders for whom the full horrors of a presidency built around an insecure, incompetent autocrat have become too much to bear.


newrepublic--2020-06-08--No Slogan Is Safe From Politicians

No Slogan Is Safe From Politicians

The moment we have all been waiting for has arrived : Willard Mitt Romney , a man who claims his favorite meat is “ hot dog , ” showed up at this weekend ’ s protests in Washington , D.C.
It ’ s easy to mock Romney , as I have just done , but it must be a sign of something new happening when a Republican politician marches in the streets against racist policing .
Consider the common skepticism about that phrase just a few years ago , after the Ferguson and Baltimore protests .
Republican Senator Rand Paul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change its name to All Lives Matter ; even Democrat Martin O ’ Malley once admonished protesters with this same point .
Others , like then–New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and Senator Ted Cruz , argued that the BLM movement was pushing for the murder of police officers .
It was classic white grievance politics .
So something must have changed , at least a little , for politicians like Romney to use the phrase , and for Democrats to embrace it so fully .
The question is whether that ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new phase of these protests—one where the chief danger is not that they will be brutally repressed , but that those in power will neuter them with careful co-optation , with sweet but poisonous encouragement .
There may be no better demonstration of this dynamic than D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser ’ s move last week , clearly designed to enrage President Trump , to order city workers to paint “ Black Lives Matter ” in enormous yellow all caps across two blocks near the White House .
It was an ingenious political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ went viral , garnering press the world over .
Washington Post columnist Petula Dvorak praised it as “ a clapback so mighty , it can be seen by satellites.
” The move , which Bowser has now tweeted about more than a dozen times , has elevated her profile such that she ’ s even being mentioned in the Democratic veepstakes .

To our friends in national media who will be covering Mayor Bowser's large "Black Lives Matter" street painting / renamed intersection—welcome! And a few notes for context (thread): https://t.co/2sNEy1ANOD — Rachel Kurzius (@Curious_Kurz) June 5, 2020
The stunt stands in similar contrast to her police department’s handling of these exact protests. Just days ago, D.C. police conducted a “mass arrest” of 194 protesters on Swann St. NW, after blocking them in on both sides with dozens of police officers (a technique known as “kettling”). Officers fired pepper spray at the protesters, many of whom retreated into the homes of welcoming residents; some officers reportedly even attempted to pepper-spray protesters through the windows. One protester told Washingtonian, “We were inside, and people were coughing their lungs out.… People were running everywhere, and they had mace in their eyes.” These arrests were done under the authority of Bowser’s 7 p.m. curfew—and under a police chief who ordered the use of kettling during protests in 2017 and 2002.
The genius of “black lives matter” is that the core demand is so basic. If black people have to chant and march just to assert that their lives matter, how bad must things be? The flip side of this is that it’s very easy for a politician to say of course black lives matter—without endorsing everything else that the demand implies or even acknowledging their own role in impeding progress. This is the trouble with slogans: Anyone can say them, and no one can control their meaning.
Other cities have followed Bowser’s lead: A street in Raleigh, North Carolina, was painted with 20-foot-high letters reading “End Racism Now.” Is this evidence of just how far we’ve come in turning the tide against racism, and how historic this moment is? Or is it just an easily served platitude for the Instagram crowd—a viral moment instead of real action? Many would agree that it is time to End Racism, just as it is now becoming increasingly easy for politicians to say that black lives matter. It is much harder, and more important, to make progress on enacting policies that would achieve true equality. That progress will necessarily be achieved in conflict with power, not arm in arm with it.


newrepublic--2020-06-08--The Limits and Dangers of a Fixation on “Nonviolence”

In the immediate aftermath of the Twin Cities protests following the police killing of George Floyd , St. Paul Mayor Melvin Carter claimed that all of the arrests tied to rioting in the area were from out of state .
“ We don ’ t know these folks , ” he said .
Minnesota Governor Tim Walz made a similar claim .
Both statements were widely disseminated by other news outlets , but a KARE 11 investigation quickly revealed most of those arrests were in fact of local residents .
As anti-police-brutality demonstrations sweep all 50 states and countries around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Breonna Taylor , so has debate about what constitutes legitimate protest and legitimate protesters .
With sensational imagery of extreme police repression of protests alongside riots and looting saturating the news cycle , many commentators are seeking to distinguish between peaceful protests and what many have labeled “ outside agitation , ” in which property destruction following , or sometimes during , demonstrations is blamed primarily on white anarchists or even police or vigilante agents provocateurs .
In many cases , this focus on the specter of destructive interlopers is an attempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ uncertain moment , and some of it comes from a place of seeking to legitimize nonviolent protests in the face of widespread repression .
But there are real risks that come with this desire to tell a clean story about “ good ” protesters and “ bad ” protesters .
Labeling all riots the work of outside agitators threatens to legitimize state violence that has only become more dangerous with President Trump ’ s attempted designation of antifa as a terrorist organization and threat to send the U.S. military into states and cities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that was echoed last week by Senator Tom Cotton in the legitimizing pages of The New York Times ) .
The emphasis on the conduct of protesters erases the violent escalation of law enforcement , who in recent days have blinded people with rubber bullets , sprayed tear gas and pepper spray indiscriminately ( a tactic that is under scrutiny in Ohio after a 22-year-old woman died after she was reportedly teargassed ) , incited physical confrontation , driven vehicles into crowds , and killed a man while clearing a protest in Louisville @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ right way to protest ” also flatten nonviolent resistance into a form of respectability politics that robs those enacting or rejecting it of their agency and precludes the complex forms of solidarity that can exist within and beyond it .
These dynamics are not without precedent , both in our history and globally .
They put emphasis on optics , when the focus of these protests is changing the material conditions of Black lives in a country built on violent white supremacy and colonialism .
And by seeking refuge in such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future these protests are trying to build just as they ’ re beginning to cohere—unpredictably and often tenuously—at a mass scale .
The U.S. media ’ s fascination with “ peaceful protests ” is often colored by a romanticized and sometimes ahistorical view of the civil rights movement , in which organizers like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee opposed segregation , and the violence used to maintain it , with nonviolent protests , sit-ins , and boycotts .
And while concrete gains were won by these tactics , those enacting them were often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ segregationists , and their tactics were regarded by white observers as confrontational , disruptive , and worthy of condemnation .
These peaceful protests could not stop the violent repression of their movements nor the constant arrests and eventual assassination of leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. and Medgar Evers .

In the immediate aftermath of the Twin Cities protests following the police killing of George Floyd, St. Paul Mayor Melvin Carter claimed that all of the arrests tied to rioting in the area were from out of state. “We don’t know these folks,” he said. Minnesota Governor Tim Walz made a similar claim. Both statements were widely disseminated by other news outlets, but a KARE 11 investigation quickly revealed most of those arrests were in fact of local residents. As anti-police-brutality demonstrations sweep all 50 states and countries around the world following the deaths of Floyd and Breonna Taylor, so has debate about what constitutes legitimate protest and legitimate protesters. With sensational imagery of extreme police repression of protests alongside riots and looting saturating the news cycle, many commentators are seeking to distinguish between peaceful protests and what many have labeled “outside agitation,” in which property destruction following, or sometimes during, demonstrations is blamed primarily on white anarchists or even police or vigilante agents provocateurs.
In many cases, this focus on the specter of destructive interlopers is an attempt to grasp onto certainty in a terrifyingly uncertain moment, and some of it comes from a place of seeking to legitimize nonviolent protests in the face of widespread repression. But there are real risks that come with this desire to tell a clean story about “good” protesters and “bad” protesters. Labeling all riots the work of outside agitators threatens to legitimize state violence that has only become more dangerous with President Trump’s attempted designation of antifa as a terrorist organization and threat to send the U.S. military into states and cities where protests continue (a violent sentiment that was echoed last week by Senator Tom Cotton in the legitimizing pages of The New York Times). The emphasis on the conduct of protesters erases the violent escalation of law enforcement, who in recent days have blinded people with rubber bullets, sprayed tear gas and pepper spray indiscriminately (a tactic that is under scrutiny in Ohio after a 22-year-old woman died after she was reportedly teargassed), incited physical confrontation, driven vehicles into crowds, and killed a man while clearing a protest in Louisville, Kentucky.


newrepublic--2020-06-08--The Pernicious Influence of Big Oil on America’s Universities

As multiple crises converge—the global pandemic , racist state violence , and ever-growing economic and political inequality—the fossil fuel–driven climate catastrophe rumbles irreversibly forward .
As in all times of crisis , the decisions taken now will sow either self-destruction or the possibility of renewal .
Dire times expand the palette of the possible , and perhaps this is one reason why a slew of elite and powerful establishment institutions—including the University of Oxford , Cornell , and Brown —have announced disinvestment from fossil fuel production , something unthinkable a decade ago .
Even Harvard , that bastion of service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Epstein ’ s money even as his criminal transgressions came to light , has announced a new , climate-informed investment policy , weak though its goal of a “ greenhouse-gas neutral ” endowment by 2050 may be .
And on June 10 and 11 , Stanford will decide the fate of its fossil fuel investments as well .
A central factor delaying endowment divestment in the United States has been the quiet influence of the fossil fuel industry in America ’ s universities .
At Stanford , where this is an especially large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from passing the university board ’ s upcoming vote .
While divestment campaigns often focus on ethics , removing investments from fossil fuel production isn ’ t just ethical : It ’ s necessary .
In 2013 , the International Energy Agency estimated that to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius ( 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit ) , global investments in fossil fuels would need to decline by $ 5 trillion by 2035 ( about $ 200 billion per year , on average ) .
In its latest Assessment Report , the Intergovernmental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stopping climate destruction at that level would require fossil divestment of hundreds of billions of dollars per year .
Peer-reviewed research in top scientific journals further shows that to meet that two-degree goal—now codified in the Paris climate agreement—new fossil fuel development should cease ( because even current reserves can not all be used ) , and no more fossil-fueled power plants can be built unless they are retired before the end of their economically useful life ( rendering them unattractive investments ) .
A recent analysis in the top scientific journal Nature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trajectory consistent with the Paris climate agreement , investors should increase the proportion of their energy investments in clean energy systems over time : At least half such investments should be in clean energy by 2025 and 80 percent by 2035 .

In the heart of Silicon Valley, Stanford University—where I am currently a doctoral student studying law, history of science, and climate change—prides itself on a scientific and progressive outlook. So we might expect divestment, as a scientific necessity to avoid catastrophic and irreversible damage, to be an easy choice. Both undergraduate and graduate student governments, filled with young people whose futures are on the line, unanimously passed divestment resolutions in March. The university, too, has boasted of its efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption and in May announced plans for a new school focused on climate and sustainability.
A common theme was fear of retaliation from oil companies should Stanford divest.
But on May 28, when it came time for Stanford’s faculty senate to discuss divestment, faculty hesitated. When I went to watch the debate, I saw professor after professor at one of America’s richest universities first declare concern about climate change, then pivot to defend Big Oil, with many pointing to their receipt of industry funding. One professor suggested society needs oil to make hand sanitizer. To state the obvious: The vast majority of fossil fuels are not used for that purpose. When I marveled over the comment later to my adviser, science historian Robert Proctor, he said he recalled a similarly bizarre argument being made in the faculty senate in 2007 to justify continued acceptance of tobacco funding: One faculty member, according to Proctor, had said we needed the cigarette industry to make vaccines. Records of that debate also show professors’ fear that if the university rejected tobacco funding, people would start to question its receipt of oil money next.
“Funding from fossil fuels supports a lot of environmental and alternative energy research on campus,” geophysics professor Dustin Schroeder argued at the recent oil divestment meeting, as reported by The Stanford Daily. Yet fossil fuel spending on alternative energy research is comparatively minuscule: The industry spends 99 percent of its capital expenditures—over $100 billion per year—to explore for, develop, and acquire new fossil fuel reserves, despite the fact that current reserves are already more than enough to cause irreversible, catastrophic damage to life on Earth.


American Psycho

To understand how Jared Kushner received the opportunity to fail at managing the federal response to the Covid-19 pandemic , you mostly need to know that he is married to the president ’ s daughter .
But to truly grasp the distinctive style of failure that Kushner has brought to bear on his latest and most urgent challenge , it helps to know about the career of a man named Kevin Hassett .
In 1999 , Hassett was 37 years old and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute , a familiar home port for Republican policy types , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The New Strategy for Profiting From the Coming Rise in the Stock Market , arrived in stores on October 1 .
The timing was not ideal for a hucksterish book arguing that the market would soon “ rise to much higher ground.
” Three months later , the Dow began a steep descent ; stocks declined by 44 percent in real terms over the next few years .
That book-length public blooper didn ’ t adversely affect his career .
Hassett spent the next two decades flitting between AEI and various political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s Council of Economic Advisers from 2017 to 2019 before returning in March of this year as an adviser focused on the economic recovery .
It was in this new role that Hassett produced another simple econometric model that was , once again , preposterously wrong .
Jason Furman , who headed up the CEA under President Obama , called Hassett ’ s “ cubic model ” projection , which showed coronavirus deaths dwindling away entirely by the middle of May , “ utterly superficial and misleading , ” and tweeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point in the 74 year history of the Council of Economic Advisers.
” In The Washington Post , Hassett insisted that “ no administration policy has been influenced by my projections.
” He had to produce this disclaimer because administration policy had , in fact , been influenced by his projections .
The Washington Post reported that Hassett ’ s chart sketching out the projected death tolls “ was embraced inside the West Wing by the president ’ s son-in-law , Jared Kushner , and other powerful aides helping to oversee the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not hard to see why , ” Slate ’ s Jordan Weissmann wrote .
“ It has a trail of pink dots leading to zero.
” So here we have Kushner , a powerful special adviser with no meaningful expertise in public health or epidemiology , using a breathtakingly specious chart produced by an economist who ’ d flubbed the biggest prediction he ’ d ever made—all as a justification for the federal government to do less to confront a rampaging pandemic .
While the Trump years have offered many such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , this one felt uniquely Jared .
The collaboration is what makes it—a legacy figure in the field of elite ineptitude , delivering the old egregiousness in a style optimized for the vacuous new avatar of elite incompetence .
The gilded tools of one generation of catastrophic conservative governance pass into the soft and clammy hands of the next .
If it weren ’ t for all those people dying , it would be beautiful .

That rise is the signal success of his professional life. Kushner bought the New York Observer in 2006 and wrecked it utterly; its last print issue ran the day that Trump won election in 2016. His record $1.8 billion purchase of 666 Fifth Avenue remains one of the great boondoggles in New York commercial real estate history. And yet Kushner’s many failures seem only to have made him more ardent and secure in his self-belief. He has carried that forward into his political career, forcing himself into and up the organizational chart at the White House not because there’s anything in particular he wants to do with that power, but because he believes he deserves it.
A Trumpian suspicion of conventional expertise, a trendy deference to business-boy buzzwords, and a rich kid’s innate distaste for people with less money all likely had something to do with how Kushner came to oversee a team of two dozen volunteers he’d borrowed from big management consultancies or from other government agencies to help coordinate the response. (At FEMA, officials came to call this group the Slim Suit Crowd.) But in the search for answers to the question of how this bespoke team with, per The Washington Post, no “significant experience in health care, procurement or supply-chain operations” wound up tinkering unhelpfully in all three areas, it’s important not to overthink it, given the people involved. Volunteers from McKinsey and the Boston Consulting Group were asked to procure protective gear for the same reasons that there are (presumably) chandeliers in the bathrooms at Mar-a-Lago—in the absence of actual discernment or real consideration, a rich person simply defaulted to the most luxurious option.
So how did this crew of private-sector efficiency experts come to award a $69 million contract to an unvetted and unqualified Twitter reply guy, or send PPE to a preferred hospital of Trump’s favorite on-air talent at Fox News? Quite naturally. Kushner’s crew wound up overseeing essential things they knew little about in the same way that McKinseyfied efficiency came to hold sway over American capitalism—because of a certain inbred deference to rich people in suits, but mostly because no one stopped them.


newrepublic--2020-06-09--The Lost Rebellious Spirit of Keynes

The Lost Rebellious Spirit of Keynes

Over the past few months , as the orderly operations of the world economy have been superseded by panic , fear , and lockdown , as the circuit breaker has paused trading on Wall Street more than once , and as oil prices flipped to negative , editorial pages across the country have revived the ideas of John Maynard Keynes .
Should the government spend to counter the possibility of recession or worse ?
And if so , how much and through what particular mechanism : tax cuts , subsidies , direct federal spending , grants to cities and states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was folly for economists ( or anyone else ) to forecast the future , might have taken pleasure in just how predictable it is that when a disaster unfolds , his name is invoked .
There are few market purists who can resist Keynes in a crisis .
But what Keynes would have made of the use of his thought is another question altogether .
As Zachary D. Carter ’ s new biography , The Price of Peace : Money , Democracy , and the Life of John Maynard Keynes , makes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and more challenging economic thinker than we generally take him to be .
Debates about stimulus and spending are only the beginning of his thought , which ranged over ethics and politics as well as economics , and which was far more heterodox than the interpretations of his work that have come down to us today would suggest .
Our own moment , in which an apparently prosperous society has been undone in a matter of weeks , would have been all too familiar to Keynes , whose adult life was bookended by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Great Depression .
Inspired by this climate of disaster , Keynes came to embrace a very radical set of faiths about capitalism .
He suggested that investment decisions might be too crucial to be left to the whims of finicky entrepreneurs .
He argued that the willingness of people to consume was the key determinant of social wealth .
He made the case that markets were never self-correcting , autonomous realms , that their smooth operation could not be taken for granted , and that the state should not be reluctant to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secure the social good .
And as Carter suggests , he was deeply skeptical of the wisdom of frugality and the prudence of saving for the future—an attitude that grew in large part out of his lifelong association with the countercultural and modernist intellectuals of the Bloomsbury Group .
The distillation today of Keynes ’ s legacy into a Hail Mary of stimulus spending on airlines or highways or McDonald ’ s franchises ( “ small business ” ) might mark in its own way a quiet tragedy—one of misapprehension and missed chances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about Keynes .
In the last paragraph of his most influential book , The General Theory of Employment , Interest and Money , Keynes famously insisted that “ it is ideas , not vested interests , which are dangerous for good or evil , ” and that “ the world is ruled by little else.
” But the way ideas are taken up or not is always shaped by material circumstances , and , oddly enough , the history of Keynes and his thought—for all its brilliance and idiosyncrasy—points ultimately to the limits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

Keynes attended Cambridge University on scholarship, though he never studied economics there, instead focusing on mathematics. He fell in early with a secretive intellectual society known as the Apostles, and became devoted in particular to the work of philosopher G.E. Moore, who argued that what mattered most in life was inculcating in oneself a “state of consciousness” that would be open to “the good”—with goodness being understood as intrinsic to art, literature, music, something “simple, undefinable, unanalyzable.” This was the opposite of utilitarianism, or the suggestion that what was good was that which would benefit the greatest number of people. Moore’s philosophical approach had a distinctly noncommercial quality to it: It argued for the primacy of aesthetics and ethics over the ordinary business of life.
The Apostles was also a society of men, and the young Keynes was condescending to women at best. “I seem to hate every movement of their minds,” he once wrote to a friend about women students at Cambridge. Carter emphasizes that Keynes as a young man was exclusively gay, and during his early twenties he pursued what appear to have been dozens of romantic relationships and sexual encounters with men. (He cites Keynes’s tallying of these on note cards bearing titles such as “The Young American Near the British Museum.”) British society in the early twentieth century was hostile to homosexuality, but the Apostles provided a space that embraced and honored these connections—even as it did so in secret, for Keynes would never have wanted his sexuality to be known by employers or others. At the same time, Keynes’s sexual rebelliousness, as with his embrace of Moore’s thought, mirrored his rejection of the conventional faith of the business classes of his day. “Free trade and free thought! Down with pontiffs and tariffs,” he proclaimed in December 1903.
When he left Cambridge, it was to move to London along with a group of friends, many connected with the Apostles, mostly artists and writers, including Lytton Strachey, E.M. Forster, Leonard Woolf, Virginia Woolf, and her brother Adrian Stephen. The intellectual community became known as Bloomsbury after the London square where many of its members lived, and it was as devoted as the Apostles once had been to art, literature, and aesthetic experience as the highest goal of life. Keynes was in some ways an odd fit for the “Bloomsberries,” as Virginia Woolf called them. While his closest friends were writing experimental fiction and painting, he was ascending the ranks of the British government—working for the India Office (though he never visited the subcontinent), the Treasury, and then, once Britain entered World War I, taking responsibility for war finance. He was quickly becoming a star in these official circles. Yet he applied for conscientious objector status during the war, using a framework that Bloomsbury would have recognized: “I have a conscientious objection to surrendering my liberty of judgment on so vital a question as undertaking military service.”


newrepublic--2020-06-09--Will 2020 Finally Kill America’s War Fetish?

How many wars can the United States handle at any one time ?
The question became pertinent last week as the Trump administration , along with the president ’ s most militant supporters in Congress , rushed to define the civil unrest triggered by the police killing of George Floyd as a military problem requiring a military solution .
President Trump put Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley—in Trump ’ s words “ a fighter , a warrior , and a lot of victories and no losses ” — “ in charge ” of administration efforts to restore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so often the case with Trump , no one quite knew what “ in charge ” signified , if anything .
Senator Tom Cotton , Republican of Arkansas and Trump loyalist , stood ready to translate presidential bluster into concrete action .
Cotton is on the record calling for the deployment of up to five regular U.S. Army divisions—there are only six stationed in the continental U.S.—to do “ whatever it takes to restore order .
No quarter for insurrectionists , anarchists , rioters , and looters.
” In a military context , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ redolent with meaning .
It implies using maximum force and taking no prisoners .
It suggests that the laws of war do not apply .
It comes precariously close to calling for extermination—all pretty extreme stuff .
Yet Cotton was by no means alone in his eagerness to use war as an instrument to dispose of any and all problems , large or small , in the nation ’ s path .
Indeed , members of the American political class to which Senator Cotton belongs ( and to which Trump remains an outsider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , both real and metaphorical .
Over the past half-century or so , U.S. forces have fought major wars in Vietnam , Iraq ( twice ) , and Afghanistan .
Interspersed among these large conflicts have been a dozen or so lesser skirmishes , typically classified under the anodyne heading of “ armed interventions.
” Over roughly that same period , U.S. presidents have initiated policies styled as wars that targeted poverty , cancer , drugs , crime , and terrorism .
Throughout this long stretch of official belligerence , waxing and waning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been the culture war , taking in conflicts over the agendas allegedly lurking behind major institutions like the courts , the universities , the media , and the centers of power in Washington , D.C. And now , of course , we are said to be engaged in a war against Covid-19 .
To listen to hawkish politicians and pundits , the U.S. is always “ at war ” against something somewhere .

After 1945, most Americans (though certainly not all) took it as a given that their way of life was vastly superior to any alternative. They also believed it to be durable, resilient—and, where deficient, correctable. The American way of life was the world’s gold standard back when the world was on a gold standard. It made good on promises.
Always, of course, there was dissent. Always there was a radical fringe. But even during dark times marred by assassination, riots, and mass protest, the postwar consensus held. Even in 1968, marked by the Tet Offensive, the murder of Martin Luther King and a second Kennedy brother, cities in flames, and the tumult of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, the forces upholding the postwar status quo were never seriously threatened. The election of Richard Nixon as president in November of that year affirmed as much.
Always and forever, we remained the people who—at least in our own minds—had defeated the Nazis.
Of course, this postwar consensus was itself famously the product of war—the global conflict that definitively placed the U.S. in the role of the protector of the democratic, capitalist West (and all too often, as the self-appointed policeman of the world at large). The new postwar consensus worked within the U.S. to affirm the basic social order—and by extension, a political economy centered on corporate capitalism. More important still, it removed most remaining global restraints on mustering American power to police the international order. World War II empowered the U.S. to lead. And leadership almost immediately took on military connotations. Name your issue: developing and deploying thermonuclear weapons; committing to the defense of Western Europe; sending U.S. combat troops into Korea; replacing the French in Indochina; conspiring to overthrow regimes not to Washington’s liking in Tehran, Havana, and elsewhere; converting the Persian Gulf into a theater of permanent armed conflict. In each and every case, proponents of action or instant readiness to act enjoyed the benefit of the doubt—and usually the upper hand when it came to charting policy.


newrepublic--2020-06-09--The NFL Is for Cops

The NFL Is for Cops

“ We were wrong for not listening to NFL players earlier , ” NFL commissioner Roger Goodell said Friday in a hastily composed video statement on the police and white vigilante killings of George Floyd , Breonna Taylor , and Ahmaud Arbery .
That Goodell said anything at all is a testament to the work of the league ’ s black stars , like Patrick Mahomes , Saquon Barkley , Odell Beckham , and others , who the day before released a video condemning the NFL for its silence .
It ’ s a point of journalistic responsibility to state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care what Goodell , a bootlicking yes-man , has to say .
He is a meat shield paid handsomely by the league ’ s owners to extract profit .
And when it comes to protecting the craven millionaires and billionaires atop the most profitable sports league in the nation , he has no equal .
While , by all accounts , Goodell wields very little actual power—meaning the message he shared on Friday was not the message of an NFL commissioner but of an NFL lackey—his statement is still instructive : It demonstrates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ owners will simultaneously serve their profit mandate and erase the work of the players who—at real personal risk—forced the change .
For the past three seasons , Colin Kaepernick , once a quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers , has been blackballed by the overwhelmingly white NFL owners .
His unforgivable offense was his protest of police brutality , which included silently kneeling during the playing of “ The Star-Spangled Banner ” prior to kickoff .
He has not played a down since January 1 , 2017 .
In the time since then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign backed by Nike , a soulless corporation mainly operating out of a fear of backlash should it cut ties , which spurred the hilarious trend of True Americans™ trashing their swooshes .
Meanwhile , the NFL brought in Jay-Z and Roc Nation and was rewarded with the “ We ’ ve moved past kneeling ” soundbite from Jay-Z it was looking for .
( Some NFL players , like Kenny Stills , were rightfully pissed at the statement , telling reporters at the time that Jay-Z was , “ choosing to speak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the people.
” ) Otherwise , the league hasn ’ t much bothered to respond to the actual issue Kaepernick was protesting , beyond handing him $ 10 million in a settlement to end his collusion lawsuit .
This continued on Friday : Goodell did not once say Kaepernick ’ s name in his video statement on Floyd ’ s murder .
If we ’ re being generous , Goodell was including him when he referenced the vague cohort of “ NFL players ” he believes the league should have listened to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Eric Reid and Stills both continued protesting after the league owners shadow-banned Kaepernick , and as Houston Texans safety Michael Thomas told NBCSports , it ’ s difficult to buy the league ’ s sincerity if its commissioner is too frightened or proud to say the names of the people he ’ s apologizing to .
But even had Goodell come out and said , “ Colin Kaepernick , I was wrong , the owners were wrong , ” it ’ s also worth asking whether anything the league says on this @ @ @ @ @

And while the matter of intent is the obvious and crucial difference, the same dynamic is at work in Kaepernick, who is both a person and, now, a brand. Kaepernick, the man, accomplished something great at great professional cost. He spread awareness of police brutality while exposing the NFL as a cynical, racist outfit. He then redirected his settlement dollars toward affected communities and grassroots organizations. But Kaepernick, the brand, cashes Nike checks and signs deals to distribute his memoir through Amazon-owned Audible. Even as a force for good, separating oneself entirely from the transactional system of capitalism and public-facing do-gooding means sacrificing some of the ground you’re standing on. It’s a fraught position. There is no such dilemma for the league.
With or without Goodell’s 81-second response, the NFL is no better than any of the other brands trying to seize the moment by throwing money at the issue in hopes of whitewashing their complicity. But, as the video put out by Patrick Mahomes and other players made clear, silence was not an option, either.
Corporate responses are, unfortunately, the norm now, and as they represent the most visible sport in America, the NFL and its leaders were always going to have to say something. This precise moment is one that the NFL should have been ready for after Kaepernick took a knee four years ago. So how the hell did it screw it up so badly? Because it’s trying to walk the untenable line of making a statement against something that it is not actually against. The NFL is racist inequality—runs on it, reproduces it, requires it. How do you make a statement against yourself?


newrepublic--2020-06-09--The Glaring Hole in the Democrats’ Police Reform Bill

There ’ s been a sea change in the American public ’ s perception of law enforcement since the killing of George Floyd last month .
A Washington Post survey on Tuesday found that 69 percent of Americans think Floyd ’ s brutal death , which came at the hands of four Minneapolis police officers , is a “ sign of broader problems ” in American policing .
That ’ s a substantial leap from 2014 , when the Post found that only 43 percent of Americans saw the killings of Michael Brown and Eric Garner as more than isolated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shift in public mood , sought to harness it by unveiling a police reform bill on Monday .
The Justice in Policing Act , if passed into law , would effectively impose a wide range of policy and practice changes on police departments nationwide .
“ What we are witnessing is the birth of a new movement in our country with thousands coming together in every state marching to demand a change that ends police brutality , holds police officers accountable , and calls for transparency , ” California Representative Karen Bass , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said in a statement on Monday .
The bill features a series of reforms aimed at taming America ’ s wayward police departments .
But what ’ s not in the Justice in Policing Act is just as notable .
Though some of its broadest provisions would affect federal law enforcement agencies , the proposed legislation spends little time addressing problems with those agencies in particular .
That makes for an unusual situation .
As Politico ’ s Garrett Graff has reported , these are the very agencies that have played a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of late , by sending a “ motley assortment ” of unidentified and , ultimately , unaccountable “ military-style men ” out on the streets of the nation ’ s capital .
Congressional Democrats have thus responded strangely to the situation : Their legislative proposal does not remedy problems in the very agencies it ’ s best equipped to reform , and which have become so recently and famously controversial .
The Justice in Policing Act is best read as an omnibus compilation of various police reform proposals that have circulated on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highest-profile provisions are the creation of a National Police Misconduct Registry—a central database of disciplinary and termination records—and a mandate for police departments to report regular use-of-force statistics to the Justice Department .
Those measures are aimed at preventing fired cops from being rehired by other departments and providing metrics on how often police officers and departments use force .

Naturally, there are practical and constitutional limits to the power of Congress to reform local police departments. Many of the bill’s provisions, including bans on chokeholds, racial profiling, and no-knock warrants in drug cases, would apply directly to federal law enforcement officials. But those and others, including body-camera reforms and racial-bias training, can’t be imposed by Congress on state and local police through federal law. Instead, Congress would try to compel departments to make those reforms by withholding Justice Department grants if they don’t comply. The law would also make lynching a federal crime for the first time, after 120 years of failed legislative efforts.
But while federal law enforcement officials would be covered on some of the proposed law’s most sweeping changes, the bill avoids taking steps that would address several problems that are unique to the federal sphere. For instance, though the bill would strengthen Section 1983 by scrapping qualified immunity, that provision only allows civil rights lawsuits in federal court against state and local officials. There is no general statutory equivalent for civil rights violations committed by federal officials. The nearest comparable option is what’s known as a Bivens lawsuit, which draws its name from the 1971 Supreme Court case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.
In Bivens, the court sided with a plaintiff who accused federal narcotics agents of conducting an unconstitutional search. The justices held that the lawsuit was allowed under the Fourth Amendment even if no federal law specifically permitted it. Here, too, the justices have steadily pared back what could be a formidable tool against civil rights abuses by federal officials. In the 2017 case Ziglar v. Abbasi, for example, the court rejected a Bivens lawsuit brought by a group of men of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent who were arrested and detained for months without sufficient cause in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The justices further held that they would not expand Bivens any further beyond the few circumstances where it had already been applied. Congress has not acted to fill that void.


newrepublic--2020-06-09--The Rush to Redefine “Defund the Police”

But there is a difference between rewriting activists ’ demands into something less radical and drawing a distinction between defunding and abolishing the police .
It is correct not to confuse one with the other .
“ Defund ” is part of an abolitionist project , but abolition is not necessarily a part of a project to defund police budgets .
Some proposals to reduce police budgets by a certain percentage or dollar amount don ’ t end with a world without police and prisons .
Others are advanced by abolitionist groups who ultimately seek an end to the carceral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a city budget is not the only measure of what it means to defund the police .
Well before getting to zero , reducing police budgets could mean reducing police violence or any interaction police have with the public that results in harm .
It is a direct and therefore challenging tactic meant to prevent police from acting with impunity .
But what divestment and abolition have in common is not how much money police have or would not have , but how much power they have .
In a world with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tasked with “ essential safety work , ” if police retain the power they have now , policing as an institution will remain intact .
Critical Resistance , a national abolitionist organization , has worked for two decades to make these distinctions clear .
Of a range of proposed police reform measures , like body cameras or demilitarizing police , it offers a set of questions to help determine : Does this reform expand or chip away at the power of police ?
“ Does this reduce funding for police ?
” is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ways significantly on specific proposals .
But for now , in cities and small towns over the last two weeks , those activists seem united on the premise that police must be defunded .
What happens after that will likely be a point of departure for these tenuously formed coalitions .
These are not abstract questions , as city councils across the country—in New York , in Washington , in Los Angeles , and in Minneapolis—are debating police budgets right now .
It will become even more critical for policymakers , journalists , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in asking questions like those formulated by Critical Resistance .
On Sunday , news that the Minneapolis City Council had secured a veto-proof majority who pledged to disband the police broke and spread widely across social media and in the streets .
But here ’ s how one council member who backed this measure described what the council really did : It called “ to disband our police department and start fresh with a community-oriented , non-violent public safety and outreach capacity.
” If police functions are redistributed across other city agencies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is more than just cops ; it ’ s a system that reproduces itself in other functions and contexts .
After Camden , New Jersey , “ disbanded ” its police department seven years ago , as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor writes in From # blacklivesmatter to Black Liberation , the footprint of the police force expanded , firing 250 officers and hiring 411 new ones , along with 120 “ civilian clerks.
” In its first year , excessive force complaints still topped those of any other police department in the state .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disorderly conduct summonses increasing by 43 percent .
There are a lot of reasons people are second-guessing the demand to defund the police .
It ’ s a radical shift from current policy and creates opportunities for additional ruptures .
More than just finding it difficult to imagine a world without police or prisons , many policymakers and media alike are deeply invested in maintaining and upholding those systems .
Such experts feel they are justified in trying to correct the people—abolitionist scholars , black feminists , queer activists—who have long advanced this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics .
In these attempts to undermine the clarity of activist demands , what we are seeing is an act of discipline .
Another way to say that is , it is an act of trying to restore order .

But there is a difference between rewriting activists’ demands into something less radical and drawing a distinction between defunding and abolishing the police. It is correct not to confuse one with the other. “Defund” is part of an abolitionist project, but abolition is not necessarily a part of a project to defund police budgets. Some proposals to reduce police budgets by a certain percentage or dollar amount don’t end with a world without police and prisons. Others are advanced by abolitionist groups who ultimately seek an end to the carceral state itself. But a line item in a city budget is not the only measure of what it means to defund the police. Well before getting to zero, reducing police budgets could mean reducing police violence or any interaction police have with the public that results in harm. It is a direct and therefore challenging tactic meant to prevent police from acting with impunity.
But what divestment and abolition have in common is not how much money police have or would not have, but how much power they have. In a world with “defunded” police who are still tasked with “essential safety work,” if police retain the power they have now, policing as an institution will remain intact. Critical Resistance, a national abolitionist organization, has worked for two decades to make these distinctions clear. Of a range of proposed police reform measures, like body cameras or demilitarizing police, it offers a set of questions to help determine: Does this reform expand or chip away at the power of police? “Does this reduce funding for police?” is the first one. Activists may part ways significantly on specific proposals. But for now, in cities and small towns over the last two weeks, those activists seem united on the premise that police must be defunded. What happens after that will likely be a point of departure for these tenuously formed coalitions.
These are not abstract questions, as city councils across the country—in New York, in Washington, in Los Angeles, and in Minneapolis—are debating police budgets right now. It will become even more critical for policymakers, journalists, and the broader public to become fluent in asking questions like those formulated by Critical Resistance. On Sunday, news that the Minneapolis City Council had secured a veto-proof majority who pledged to disband the police broke and spread widely across social media and in the streets. But here’s how one council member who backed this measure described what the council really did: It called “to disband our police department and start fresh with a community-oriented, non-violent public safety and outreach capacity.” If police functions are redistributed across other city agencies, what does that look like? Policing is more than just cops; it’s a system that reproduces itself in other functions and contexts. After Camden, New Jersey, “disbanded” its police department seven years ago, as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor writes in From #blacklivesmatter to Black Liberation, the footprint of the police force expanded, firing 250 officers and hiring 411 new ones, along with 120 “civilian clerks.” In its first year, excessive force complaints still topped those of any other police department in the state. “Broken windows” policing escalated, with disorderly conduct summonses increasing by 43 percent.