newrepublic--2020-07-02--Elena Kagan’s Fiery Defense of the Administrative State

While the Constitution itself makes clear that the Senate must approve high-level presidential appointments , its text is silent on their removal .
A medley of Supreme Court cases over the past century filled that void .
In the 1926 case Myers v. United States , the court ruled against an Oregon postal official who claimed Woodrow Wilson needed the Senate ’ s assent to remove him .
Roughly a decade later , in Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States , the justices sided with a deceased member of the Federal Trade Commission who had been dismissed by Franklin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case Morrison v. Olson , the court signed off on the Independent Counsel Act , which set up a special prosecutor ’ s office to lead criminal investigations into top executive-branch officials .
Unlike every other federal prosecutor , however , this one would be appointed by a three-judge panel and not the president himself .
Humphrey ’ s Executor and Morrison are frequent targets of criticism from the conservative legal movement .
Morrison is best known today for the impassioned solo dissent by Antonin Scalia , who saw the ruling as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad , so to speak , in sheep ’ s clothing , ” he wrote .
“ But this wolf comes as a wolf.
” Legal conservatives also often deride Humphrey ’ s Executor for recognizing Congress ’ s power to create independent regulatory agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission , which helped nurture the growth of the modern “ administrative state.
” Both rulings run counter to the strictest version of the unitary executive theory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the workings and personnel of the executive branch .
How the justices view these three precedents influenced how they decided Selia Law .
To Roberts and the conservatives , the court had correctly recognized a broad presidential removal power in Myers , then found a series of exceptions to the general rule .
“ We are now asked to extend these precedents to a new configuration : an independent agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual who can not be removed by the president unless certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote .
“ We decline to take that step.
” He avoided addressing outright whether Humphrey ’ s Executor or Morrison were in error , noting simply that the justices “ need not and do not ” revisit them this time .
Kagan , by contrast , drew a much different conclusion from those precedents .
She contends that the Constitution ’ s silence on removal actually reflects an unresolved debate among the Framers about its limits .
In The Federalist Papers , Kagan noted , Alexander Hamilton and James Madison even envisioned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removal when it structured the federal bureaucracy .
Then–Chief Justice William Howard Taft— “ a judicial presidentialist if there ever was one , ” notes Kagan—ignored that history while writing Myers to read an “ illimitable power ” for removal into the Constitution , she argued .
In Kagan ’ s telling , Humphrey ’ s Executor , Morrison , and a handful of smaller cases aren ’ t exceptions to Myers but conscious efforts by subsequent justices to limit a flawed and overbroad holding .
This parting of the ways flows from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ executive branch .
Roberts argued that the Framers saw legislative power “ as a special threat to individual liberty , ” and thus crafted a strong , unitary presidency to resist it .
“ To justify and check that authority—unique in our constitutional structure—the Framers made the president the most democratic and politically accountable official in government , ” he wrote , quoting Hamilton in The Federalist Papers .
“ Only the president ( along with the vice president ) is elected by the entire nation .
And the president ’ s political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the executive branch , which provides ‘ a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people.
’ ” This is a dubious understanding of the presidency , both as it was drafted in 1787 and as it functioned in the early republic after 1789 .
The Electoral College is an explicit check on the people ’ s ability to choose the president , and it can even overrule them .
Our current predicament shows how this flaw can undermine the office ’ s supposedly democratic and politically accountable nature .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ often didn ’ t get to vote for the president or for the electors at all .
That task instead fell to some state legislatures , especially in Southern states , until 1832 .
And the vice presidency wasn ’ t truly designed as an elected office at all , since it simply went to the presidential runner-up .
Roberts nonetheless makes the case for a clear separation of powers among the three branches of government and a high wall between them when it comes to their respective domains .
“ The resulting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everywhere except for the presidency , and render the president directly accountable to the people through regular elections , ” he concluded .
“ In that scheme , individual executive officials will still wield significant authority , but that authority remains subject to the ongoing supervision and control of the elected president.
” Kagan dismissed Roberts ’ s narrative as the “ civics class version of separation of powers—call it the Schoolhouse Rock definition of the phrase ” for its excessive simplicity .
She noted the other Framers feared a constitutional breakdown “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department , ” as Madison explained in The Federalist Papers .
Early Americans expected that while each branch would be sovereign and independent of the other , there would also be collaboration , cooperation , and interdependence to carry out the people ’ s work .
“ The problem lies in treating the beginning as an ending too—in failing to recognize that the separation of powers is , by design , neither rigid nor complete , ” she explained .

“At other times, the arguments favor greater independence from presidential involvement,” she added. “Insulation from political pressure helps ensure impartial adjudications. It places technical issues in the hands of those most capable of addressing them. It promotes continuity, and prevents short-term electoral interests from distorting policy. (Consider, for example, how the Federal Reserve’s independence stops a President trying to win a second term from manipulating interest rates.)” Kagan urged the judiciary to take a more humble approach to these questions, arguing that presidents and lawmakers are better equipped to determine the structure of the federal bureaucracy than them.
Recall again how this dispute got started. In the midst of the Great Recession, Congress and the President came together to create an agency with an important mission. It would protect consumers from the reckless financial practices that had caused the then-ongoing economic collapse. Not only Congress but also the President thought that the new agency, to fulfill its mandate, needed a measure of independence. So the two political branches, acting together, gave the CFPB Director the same job protection that innumerable other agency heads possess. All in all, those branches must have thought, they had done a good day’s work. Relying on their experience and knowledge of administration, they had built an agency in the way best suited to carry out its functions. They had protected the public from financial chicanery and crisis. They had governed. And now consider how the dispute ends—with five unelected judges rejecting the result of that democratic process. The outcome today will not shut down the CFPB: A different majority of this Court, including all those who join this opinion, believes that if the agency’s removal provision is unconstitutional, it should be severed. But the majority on constitutionality jettisons a measure Congress and the President viewed as integral to the way the agency should operate. The majority does so even though the Constitution grants to Congress, acting with the President’s approval, the authority to create and shape administrative bodies. And even though those branches, as compared to courts, have far greater understanding of political control mechanisms and agency design.
Roberts and the conservative majority disagreed. He dismissed the idea that lawmakers and presidents could try to structure federal agencies in novel ways to better carry out their duties. A staid and simplistic vision for American governance and self-governance, purportedly rooted in a Constitution that made no mention of it, carried the day. “Today, as always, the urge to meet new technological and societal problems with novel governmental structures must be tempered by constitutional restraints that are not known—and were not chosen—for their efficiency or flexibility,” Roberts wrote.
The outcome in Selia Law was no surprise. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s conservative bloc openly describes the modern administrative state as semi-tyrannical and likely unconstitutional. In a concurring opinion, Thomas argued that the court should go further and embrace an unrestrained approach to the removal power. “Continued reliance on Humphrey’s Executor to justify the existence of independent agencies creates a serious, ongoing threat to our government’s design,” he wrote. “Leaving these unconstitutional agencies in place does not enhance this court’s legitimacy; it subverts political accountability and threatens individual liberty.”


newrepublic--2020-07-02--Hurricane Season Traps People on the Wrong Side of the Income Gap

But even a mildly active hurricane season this year could be disastrous .
Florida is still dealing with exploding Covid-19 cases and an unemployment system that has been so slow and inconsistent in providing aid that it is facing a class-action lawsuit .
Those catastrophes have disproportionately fallen on low-income people .
In response to Covid , the federal government has provided a slightly enhanced social safety net : a onetime $ 1,200 stimulus check and an additional $ 600 a week in unemployment benefits .
But especially with those unemployment expansions set to expire at the end of July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bills may be devastated by any hurricanes or floods that hit the state .
In 2018 , it cost the average family around $ 1,000 to evacuate for Hurricane Irma , a number that is out of reach for many Floridians right now .
And in a worst-case scenario , not being able to leave could be fatal .
In 2005 , over 1,800 people died in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina , with drowning reported as the likely cause of death .
Many were essentially trapped because they couldn ’ t afford @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Orleans was nearly 30 percent , and 112,000 of the 500,000 in New Orleans didn ’ t have access to a car .
In 2018 , Hurricane Michael hit the Florida panhandle , killing at least 30 people .
In Panama City , where about one out of every five residents lives below the poverty line , those who felt the hurricane the hardest were those with the least money .
“ Hurricanes are particularly punishing because of the exorbitant costs associated with adequate preparation , ” reported HuffPost .
“ For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ homes and personal property in Florida , it could take years for them to recoup the losses.
” Even when your home is not destroyed , staying in a hurricane-ravaged town is a hardship .
In 2004 , one of Florida ’ s worst hurricane seasons , there were four back-to-back hurricanes between August 13 and September 26 : Charley , Ivan , Frances , and Jeanne .
The last two hit South Florida directly , leaving us without power for weeks .
Schools were canceled for a month , and without power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closed for days .
A few convenience stores opened their doors on a cash-only basis , and I stood in line for hours to buy the last plastic-wrapped muffin on the shelf .
My friends and I were in our twenties , and we had just signed leases to our first apartments .
Our furniture was handed down , and we had just started making payments on our student loans and second-hand cars .
None of us had the reserves to cover an evacuation : Like many Floridians , leaving wasn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ having a job flexible enough to give time off and either driving the eight-plus hours to the nearest state to book a hotel or buying airline tickets before prices tripled or quadrupled .
Those who can afford to leave often take off a week before the hurricane hits , sheltering with family out of state , watching from afar .
I never evacuated until 2017 ’ s Hurricane Maria .
In South Florida , we watched the storm wreak havoc on Dominica , St. Croix , and finally Puerto Rico .
Maria was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t slowing down as she headed straight for South Florida .
While we had been hit by some pretty bad hurricanes since moving to Florida , I had never lived through a Category 5 ; I had only heard stories about the last one , 1992 ’ s Hurricane Andrew , which destroyed over 25,000 homes and damaged another 100,000 .
It caused $ 26 billion of damage and killed 65 people .
I was working as a teacher , and in response to Maria , my school announced it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s job also announced it would be closing its offices .
We had a big enough window to plan our evacuation , and we could finally afford to leave .
We put up our hurricane shutters , gassed up , and drove out of the state to wait out the storm , a trip that cost us nearly $ 1,500 .
In the end , Maria ended up only grazing the west coast of the state , but the evacuation gave us peace of mind—if it had made landfall , it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But we would have been safe no matter what happened to South Florida .
We had the luxury of evacuating .

But even a mildly active hurricane season this year could be disastrous. Florida is still dealing with exploding Covid-19 cases and an unemployment system that has been so slow and inconsistent in providing aid that it is facing a class-action lawsuit. Those catastrophes have disproportionately fallen on low-income people. In response to Covid, the federal government has provided a slightly enhanced social safety net: a onetime $1,200 stimulus check and an additional $600 a week in unemployment benefits. But especially with those unemployment expansions set to expire at the end of July, Floridians already struggling to pay their bills may be devastated by any hurricanes or floods that hit the state.
In 2018, it cost the average family around $1,000 to evacuate for Hurricane Irma, a number that is out of reach for many Floridians right now. And in a worst-case scenario, not being able to leave could be fatal. In 2005, over 1,800 people died in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, with drowning reported as the likely cause of death. Many were essentially trapped because they couldn’t afford to leave: The poverty rate in New Orleans was nearly 30 percent, and 112,000 of the 500,000 in New Orleans didn’t have access to a car.
In 2018, Hurricane Michael hit the Florida panhandle, killing at least 30 people. In Panama City, where about one out of every five residents lives below the poverty line, those who felt the hurricane the hardest were those with the least money. “Hurricanes are particularly punishing because of the exorbitant costs associated with adequate preparation,” reported HuffPost. “For low-income people who endured damage to their homes and personal property in Florida, it could take years for them to recoup the losses.”


newrepublic--2020-07-02--Searching for Consolation in Max Weber’s Work Ethic

Modern invocations of the work ethic are usually misreadings : The Protestant Ethic was more lament than celebration .
Weber sought to narrate the arrival of what had become a no-longer-questioned assumption : that our duty was to labor in a calling , even to labor for labor ’ s sake .
He sought the origins of this attitude toward work and the meaning of life , of an ethic that saved money but somehow never enjoyed it , of a joyless and irrational rationality .
He found the origins in Calvinism , specifically in what he called Calvinism ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s argument was not that Calvinism caused capitalism ; rather , The Protestant Ethic was a speculative psycho-historical excavation of capitalism ’ s emergence .
The interpretation , like most of his interpretations , had twists that are not easy to summarize .
It was , after all , really the failure of Calvinism—in the sense of the unmeetable-ness of Calvinism ’ s demands on an individual psyche and soul—that generated a proto-capitalist orientation to the world .
The centerpiece of Calvin ’ s theology—the absolute , opaque sovereignty of God and our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Weber ’ s account , impossibly severe , unsustainable for the average person .
The strictures of that dogma ended up creating a new kind of individual and a new kind of community : a community bound paradoxically together by their desperate anxiety about their individual salvation .
Together and alone .
The germ of the capitalist “ spirit ” lay in the way Calvinists dealt with that predicament .
They labored in their calling , for what else was there to do ?
To work for work ’ s sake was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of itself .
Having foreclosed all other Christian comforts—a rosary , an indulgence , a ritual , a communion—Weber ’ s original Calvinists needed always to perform their own salvation , to themselves and to others , precisely because they could never be sure of it .
No wonder they would come to see their material blessings as a sign that they were in fact blessed .
And no wonder their unlucky descendants would internalize our economic miseries as somehow just .
Calvinism , in other words , was less capitalism ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things people did for desperate religious reasons gave way to a secular psychology .
That secular psychology was no “ freer ” than the religious one ; we had been emancipated into jobs .
“ The Puritans wanted to be men of the calling , ” Weber wrote ; “ we , on the other hand , must be.
” As a historical process—i.e.
, something happening over time—this process was gradual enough that the people participating in it did not really apprehend it as it happened .
In Milton ’ s Paradise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expelled from Eden and into the world , the archangel Michael offers faith as a consolation within the worldliness that is humanity ’ s lot : the faithful “ shalt possess / A Paradise within thee , happier by far.
” Paradise Lost , written more than a century after Calvin ’ s Institutes in 1536 , was , for Weber , a symptomatic expression of the spirit ’ s historical unfolding .
Only later still could the gloomy sociologist see , mirrored in that Puritan epic , our own dismal tendency to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As a hypothesis , this one has a maddening unprovability .
That is one reason it has endured .
It does not really explain capitalism ’ s rise ; it is structured around the “ elective affinity ” between Calvinist and capitalist asceticism .
( Weber took the phrase from Goethe ; part of the lore of Weber ’ s own inner drive is his childhood reading of all 42 volumes of Goethe . )
But the argument depended on a caricature of Calvinism , not to mention a selective slice of “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about , say , inequality , but it illuminated manners and mindsets .
The spiritual germ of capitalism flowered in the minds of merchants and men of business , and in the paragons of success and frugal living .
Benjamin Franklin , secular sermonizer of “ The Way to Wealth , ” was Weber ’ s patron saint of capitalism .
Weber mocked the Franklinian attitude—indeed he drew his portrait of Franklin from a German satire , Der Amerikamüde ( The Man Who Was Tired of America ) —but at the same time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of themselves .
For historians of capitalism , the book is inspiring but soon turns frustrating .
Weberian interpretations tend to stand back from history ’ s contingencies and exploitations in order to find some churning and ultimately unstoppable process : “ rationalization , ” for instance , by which tradition gives way ironically but inexorably to modernity .
Humans wanted things like wholeness , community , or salvation ; but our efforts , systematized in ways our feeble consciousness can ’ t ever fully grasp , end up ushering in anomie , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ analysis then offers no relief from that process , only a fatalism without a teleology .
The moral of the story , if there is a moral , is to reconcile yourself to the modernity that has been narrated , and to find in the narrative itself something like an intellectual consolation , which is the only consolation that matters .
Still , the book ’ s melancholy resonates , if only aesthetically .
At moments , it even stabs with a sharpness that Weber could not have foreseen : the “ monstrous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with overwhelming coercion , the style of life not only of those directly involved in business but of every individual who is born into this mechanism , ” he wrote in the book ’ s final pages , “ and may well continue to do so until the day that the last ton of fossil fuel has been consumed.
” Gothic images—ghosts and shadowy monsters—abound in what is , at times , a remarkably literary portrait .
“ The idea of the ‘ duty in a calling ’ haunts our lives like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The book ’ s most famous image is the “ iron cage.
” For Puritans , material concerns were supposed to lie lightly on one ’ s shoulders , “ like a thin cloak which can be thrown off at any time ” ( Weber was quoting the English poet Richard Baxter ) , but for us moderns , “ fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.
” That morsel of sociological poetry was not in fact Weber ’ s but the American sociologist Talcott Parsons ’ , whose English @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside of Germany .
Weber ’ s phrase was “ stahlhartes Gehäuse ” —a shell hard as steel .
It describes not a room we can ’ t leave but a suit we can ’ t take off .

Modern invocations of the work ethic are usually misreadings: The Protestant Ethic was more lament than celebration.
Calvinism, in other words, was less capitalism’s cause than its ironic precondition. The things people did for desperate religious reasons gave way to a secular psychology. That secular psychology was no “freer” than the religious one; we had been emancipated into jobs. “The Puritans wanted to be men of the calling,” Weber wrote; “we, on the other hand, must be.” As a historical process—i.e., something happening over time—this process was gradual enough that the people participating in it did not really apprehend it as it happened. In Milton’s Paradise Lost, when Adam and Eve are expelled from Eden and into the world, the archangel Michael offers faith as a consolation within the worldliness that is humanity’s lot: The faithful, Michael promises Adam, “shal[l] possess / A Paradise within thee, happier by far.” Those lines appeared in 1674, more than a century after John Calvin’s death; for Weber, they were an inadvertent expression of the capitalist spirit’s historical unfolding. Only later still could the gloomy sociologist see, mirrored in that Puritan epic, our own dismal tendency to approach life itself as a task.
As a hypothesis, this one has a maddening unprovability. That is one reason it has endured. It does not really explain capitalism’s rise; it is structured around the “elective affinity” between Calvinist and capitalist asceticism. (Weber took the phrase from Goethe; part of the lore of Weber’s own inner drive is his childhood reading of all 42 volumes of Goethe.) But the argument depended on a caricature of Calvinism, not to mention a selective slice of “capitalism.” A Weberian analysis said little about, say, inequality, but it illuminated manners and mindsets. The spiritual germ of capitalism flowered in the minds of merchants and men of business, and in the paragons of success and frugal living. Benjamin Franklin, secular sermonizer of “The Way to Wealth,” was Weber’s patron saint of capitalism. Weber mocked the Franklinian attitude—indeed he drew his portrait of Franklin from a German satire, Der Amerikamüde (The Man Who Was Tired of America)—but at the same time fell for businessmen’s pious narratives of themselves.
For historians of capitalism, the book is inspiring but soon turns frustrating. Weberian interpretations tend to stand back from history’s contingencies and exploitations in order to find some churning and ultimately unstoppable process: “rationalization,” for instance, by which tradition gives way ironically but inexorably to modernity. Humans wanted things like wholeness, community, or salvation; but our efforts, systematized in ways our feeble consciousness can’t ever fully grasp, end up ushering in anomie, bureaucracy, or profit. The Weberian analysis then offers no relief from that process, only a fatalism without a teleology. The moral of the story, if there is a moral, is to reconcile yourself to the modernity that has been narrated and to find in the narrative itself something like an intellectual consolation, which is the only consolation that matters.


newrepublic--2020-07-02--The Democrats’ Dumb Idea to Cut Pandemic Unemployment Benefits

However , Senate Democrats , led by Chuck Schumer , propose ratcheting down the $ 600 add-on according to an individual state ’ s unemployment rate .
If unemployment is more than 11 percent , then people collecting benefits get the full $ 600 .
If it ’ s more than 10 percent but less than 11 percent , they get only $ 500 .
Benefits drop $ 100 for every additional percentage point the rate ticks down ; if unemployment falls below 6 percent , there ’ s no add-on at all .
The logic here is that as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then your likelihood of being able to get a job will go up .
But if unemployment is going down in your state , then the work disincentive created by the $ 600 can ’ t be much of a problem .
It ’ s not even clear that we want unemployment to go down further just now .
According to BLS ’ s May figures ( the June breakdown isn ’ t yet available ) , Alabama , Georgia , and Arizona all have unemployment rates below 10 percent .
If they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then under the Senate proposal , weekly unemployment benefits would fall by $ 200 in Alabama and Georgia , and by $ 300 in Arizona ( where unemployment is below 9 percent ) .
But these three states are all coronavirus hot spots .
Covid-19 hospitalizations are up 21 percent in Alabama over the past 14 days , according to Kaiser Health News ; by 37 percent in Georgia ; and by 75 percent in Arizona .
That ’ s a pretty high price to pay for keeping unemployment below the national rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in unemployment are a fairly theoretical proposition .
Although the Trump administration sees the health crisis and the economic crisis as two separate calamities , they are the same problem , and as Covid-19 cases increase we ’ ll likely see states back away from plans to reopen .
( We ’ re seeing that already in New York and California . )
That will drive unemployment percentages back up , making even more unwise the planned termination of the $ 600 weekly benefit .
If Congress doesn ’ t like paying people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it might think about making work pay better by raising the hourly minimum wage , currently $ 7.25 , to $ 15 .
A person who works a 40-hour week at $ 15 per hour earns , as it happens , $ 600 .
Nobody ’ s advertising the $ 600 sweetener to unemployment benefits as a victory for Fight for $ 15 , but that ’ s what it is .
President Donald Trump hinted Wednesday that he may have a proposal soon on minimum wage , by which he presumably means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to have a statement on minimum wage , ” Trump said .
“ I feel differently than a lot of people on minimum wage—some people in my own party.
” ( He may have been thinking of Larry Kudlow , director of his National Economic Council , who opposes there being any federal minimum wage at all . )
During the 2016 campaign , Trump -- whose various statements on minimum wage have been wildly contradictory , even for him -- ended up proposing a $ 10 minimum .
Then he forgot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If Trump now proposes a minimum wage hike but doesn ’ t go all the way to $ 15—as the House did in the minimum wage bill that passed almost a year ago and then stalled in the Senate—then congressional Democrats , knowing the next election is less than four months away , will likely scorn his proposal as too little , too late .
But things suddenly get very interesting if Trump endorses a $ 15 wage minimum wage .
Last year , he blurted out that he was “ looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What if Trump actually put a $ 15 minimum wage on the table now , when his ghastly blunders on Covid are finally draining away his support and making his reelection look pretty unlikely ?
Very possibly Senate Republicans would judge it a desperation move and refuse to fall in line .
The minimum wage workers who would benefit the most don ’ t typically vote Republican anyway .

However, Senate Democrats, led by Chuck Schumer, propose ratcheting down the $600 add-on according to an individual state’s unemployment rate. If unemployment is more than 11 percent, then people collecting benefits get the full $600. If it’s more than 10 percent but less than 11 percent, they get only $500. Benefits drop $100 for every additional percentage point the rate ticks down; if unemployment falls below 6 percent, there’s no add-on at all.
The logic here is that as unemployment goes down in your state, then your likelihood of being able to get a job will go up. But if unemployment is going down in your state, then the work disincentive created by the $600 can’t be much of a problem.
It’s not even clear that we want unemployment to go down further just now. According to the BLS’s May figures (the June breakdown isn’t yet available), Alabama, Georgia, and Arizona all have unemployment rates below 10 percent. If they sustained that level over three months, then under the Senate proposal, weekly unemployment benefits would fall by $200 in Alabama and Georgia, and by $300 in Arizona (where unemployment is below 9 percent). But these three states are all coronavirus hot spots. Covid-19 hospitalizations are up 21 percent in Alabama over the past 14 days, according to Kaiser Health News; by 37 percent in Georgia; and by 75 percent in Arizona. That’s a pretty high price to pay for keeping unemployment below the national rate.


newrepublic--2020-07-02--Trump’s Extraordinary Gift for Self-Sabotage

The publishing industry , knocked first by the loss of Oprah ’ s Book Club and then Jon Stewart ’ s departure from The Daily Show , has found an unlikely savior : Donald Trump .
The president ’ s tweets about sycophantic tomes that compare him to Churchill or attempt to retcon his obvious lack of Christian faith can juice sales , but his promotional talent is particularly apparent when it comes to books detailing his gross incompetence as president .
In a series of moves that suggest the Streisand effect—a phenomenon wherein attempts to suppress damaging information only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be renamed .
Trump ’ s tweets and lawsuits ( or threats of lawsuits ) about books like Michael Wolff ’ s Fire and Fury , Bob Woodward ’ s Fear , and , most recently , John Bolton ’ s The Room Where It Happened , which was published last month after a lengthy legal battle , helped make them stratospheric bestsellers .
Fire and Fury has sold more than four million copies ; The Room Where It Happened had 780,000 in its first week after publication .
The latest example in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Much and Never Enough : How My Family Created The World ’ s Most Dangerous Man , from the president ’ s niece , psychologist Mary Trump .
Scheduled for release later this month , the book was first blocked in court and then allowed to go forward after Trump ’ s brother filed suit ; the president , meanwhile , has been adamant .
“ She ’ s not allowed to write this book , ” he told Axios , citing a non-disclosure agreement that was signed after a legal battle over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As with previous bestsellers , this is likely to be a futile , even pathetic , lawsuit .
It has only succeeded in bolstering the book ’ s popularity ; when it is released , whether in July or later this year , it will undoubtedly be a bestseller .
It ’ s in these fights that Trump ’ s fundamental incompetence—and growing political impotence—is most obvious .
They undercut the narrative that fueled his rise : that he is a once-in-a-generation political combatant .
Instead , they reveal him as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can ’ t help but elevate and legitimize every criticism he receives , no matter how flawed .
As pundits struggled to account for Trump ’ s rise in 2015 , many seized on a simple narrative : He was a preternaturally gifted brawler with a knack for schoolyard nicknames .
In pro wrestling terms , he was the perfect heel , a villain the crowd could root for even as he attacked war heroes and suggested his interlocutors were on their period .
Trump ’ s political rise , this line of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his pugilistic approach : He might be uncouth , but he knows how to spar .
It ’ s proven to be a resilient argument .
“ If the lesson of Trump ’ s 2016 victory was that deeply personal attacks and factually inaccurate innuendo are a pathway to victory , his 2020 playbook appears to include more of the same , ” wrote the Associated Press ’ s Julie Pace last year .

This narrative has also been deployed repeatedly as a shield by Trump’s defenders, particularly since he took office. When the president said something offensive, they would note that the president was simply doing what he does best. Asked why the president suggested at a 2019 political rally that recently deceased former Democratic Congressman John Dingell was in hell, then–White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham claimed Trump was a “counterpuncher” who was “under attack” from Dingell’s widow.
But Trump’s tool kit is even more limited than it appeared five years ago. Then, he was heralded for nicknames like “Crooked Hillary” and “Little Marco.” These not particularly clever jibes were presented as evidence that Trump was a master of political branding. But in 2020, Trump has lost even the modicum of cleverness he had five years ago. Unhappy with the “Sleepy Joe” moniker he came up with, Trump reportedly is workshopping alternative nicknames for Joe Biden—as if all that’s needed to reverse his cratering poll numbers is a snappier insult.
Trump has tried something similar with his response to tell-all accounts that paint him as incompetent. He has labeled the most critical of these, like Fire and Fury and The Room Where It Happened, “fake news.” His ardent supporters may thrill to this designation, but it does little to damage the credibility of the books themselves or their authors. Instead, Wolff, known for his gossipy and sometimes sloppy approach to journalism, and Bolton, a warmongering buffoon hated by many of the people who loathe Trump, are granted even more attention, notoriety, and wealth.


newrepublic--2020-07-02--Can the White People of Small-Town America Get Behind the
Movement for Black Lives?

Most people seemed to support him .
Drivers-by honked their horns and waved .
A teacher who saw his invitation even showed up and stood with him for a while .
But his mother told me that , after I had left , a man slowed down and started yelling at them .
He said that this sort of protest was going to get them killed .
Millersport isn ’ t the only place in Ohio where protests have occurred .
There have been rallies , vigils , and marches in Chillicothe , Portsmouth , Mount Vernon , Newark , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other communities across Ohio .
It is rare to see protests like this in rural America , especially in places with so many white faces—and all of the above towns are in counties that went for Donald Trump in 2016 .
But there the protesters are , lamenting the death of a man who lived far away .
They are joining a movement for black lives that stretches back to Ferguson and Baltimore—to Trayvon Martin , Freddie Gray , and Michael Brown .
Young people , especially , have grown up with social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the hands of police officers .
And they are tired of it .
Clearly something new is afoot .
In a Monmouth University poll conducted shortly after George Floyd ’ s death , 76 percent of respondents ( and 71 percent of white respondents ) said that racism and ethnic discrimination are a “ big problem ” in the United States , an increase of 25 percent from January 2015 .
An overwhelming majority said that protesters ’ anger was partially or fully justified .
The protests that have swept the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been emphatically multiracial .
The protests in rural Ohio , in contrast , have been predominantly white , revealing the potential value of what has been called white allyship—and how far white people still have to go when it comes to racial justice .
That is not to say that the protests in rural Ohio have been monolithically white .
In places like Warren , Newark , Coshocton , Zanesville , and Nelsonville , young black organizers helped bring hundreds of people out to protests .
The energy at each march was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collective voice .
In Mount Vernon , some 700 protesters circled the town square , before a group of maybe 50 people broke off and marched out to the highway , toward the edge of town .
“ Did you watch me start this ?
” beamed Justin , a dreadlocked 21-year-old .
“ I started this !
I started this movement.
” Justin told me he was surprised to see something like this in Mount Vernon , which is 96 percent white .
As a black man in this town , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no reason at all .
In Ohio , racism is baked into political and social structures .
From 2013 to 2019 , 37 percent of people killed by police in Ohio were black , in a state where black people make up only 12 percent of the population .
Writing for Ohio Capital Journal , Rob Moore noted that the statistic “ makes Ohio a top 10 worst state for racial disparities in police killings and constitutes a bigger disparity than all of its neighboring states.
” And according to the Prison Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up only 12 percent of the state ’ s population but 43 percent of people in its jails and prisons .
By comparison , 81 percent of Ohioans were tallied as white that year , but white people made up only 52 percent of Ohio ’ s incarcerated population .
According to Harm Reduction Ohio , black people died from overdose at a rate of 37.6 per 100,000 people , while white people died at a rate of 33.4 per 100,000 .
Ohio Democrats recently introduced legislation that would declare racism a health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did .
But state government remains well behind the curve .
On June 12 , in the midst of all the protests , at a time when statues of Confederate figures are being brought down across the South and Nascar has banned Confederate flags from races , the Ohio House voted down an amendment that would have prevented the sale or display of the flag at county fairs .

Clearly something new is afoot. In a Monmouth University poll conducted shortly after George Floyd’s death, 76 percent of respondents (and 71 percent of white respondents) said that racism and ethnic discrimination are a “big problem” in the United States, an increase of 25 percent from January 2015. An overwhelming majority said that protesters’ anger was partially or fully justified. The protests that have swept the country, particularly in large urban centers, have been emphatically multiracial. The protests in rural Ohio, in contrast, have been predominantly white, revealing the potential value of what has been called white allyship—and how far white people still have to go when it comes to racial justice.
That is not to say that the protests in rural Ohio have been monolithically white. In places like Warren, Newark, Coshocton, Zanesville, and Nelsonville, young black organizers helped bring hundreds of people out to protests. The energy at each march was palpable—the exhilaration of young people finding a collective voice. In Mount Vernon, some 700 protesters circled the town square, before a group of maybe 50 people broke off and marched out to the highway, toward the edge of town. “Did you watch me start this?” beamed Justin, a dreadlocked 21-year-old. “I started this! I started this movement.” Justin told me he was surprised to see something like this in Mount Vernon, which is 96 percent white. As a black man in this town, he spoke of being stopped by police for no reason at all.
In Ohio, racism is baked into political and social structures. From 2013 to 2019, 37 percent of people killed by police in Ohio were black, in a state where black people make up only 12 percent of the population. Writing for Ohio Capital Journal, Rob Moore noted that the statistic “makes Ohio a top 10 worst state for racial disparities in police killings and constitutes a bigger disparity than all of its neighboring states.”


newrepublic--2020-07-03--What Woodrow Wilson Did to Robert Smalls

Smalls founded the South Carolina Republican Party in 1867 and , in 1868 , joined 71 Black delegates to the state convention that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution .
In that same convention , Smalls and his fellow Black delegates adopted a progressive state constitution , providing for public education , abolishing race and property ownership as conditions for holding public office , and overturning Black Codes .
He would live long enough to see his achievement dismantled in 1895 , when whites regained power in South Carolina and adopted a Jim Crow Constitution .
As one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ We can trust white men to do right by the inferior race , but we can not trust the inferior race with power over the white man.
” With some amendments , that constitution remains in effect to this day .
In the years in between , Smalls was first a state representative , then a state senator , and finally , between 1875 and 1887 , a U.S. representative .
He served in Congress alongside Richard Cain , the pastor of Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church , where , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ congregants .
He represented the 7th congressional district , then the 5th district ; once white Southern Democrats regained power , Smalls was the last Republican to represent the 5th for nearly 130 years , until 2011 , when Mick Mulvaney , Donald Trump ’ s former chief of staff , won the seat as part of the Tea Party wave that rose in opposition to the election of the first Black president .
But it was while serving in the South Carolina legislature that Smalls first crossed paths , unbeknownst to him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ latter was just eight years old when his uncle took him to observe the proceedings of the statehouse .
Dixon would go on to author The Leopard ’ s Spots : A Romance of the White Man ’ s Burden , The Clansman : An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan , and The Traitor : A Story of the Rise and Fall of the Invisible Empire .
Dixon claimed that the memory of “ ninety-four Negroes , seven native scalawags and twenty-three white men ” debating affairs of state moved him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with his white supremacist trilogy .
Griffith ’ s movie , which drew heavily from The Clansman , opened on February 8 , 1915 ; Smalls died two weeks later ; it ’ s unlikely he ever saw it .
The movie proved popular in part because Dixon enlisted the help of a powerful friend to promote it : President Woodrow Wilson , whom he ’ d met at John Hopkins University .
Wilson screened the film in the White House and helped arrange a viewing for members of Congress and Supreme Court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boycott of the film over its portrayal of newly freedmen as bloodthirsty savages , newspapers reported that the president himself had seen and liked the film .
Wilson promoted the film not just out of loyalty to his college friend but because Wilson himself was an avowed white supremacist who , even by the mores of his time , held Black people in the sort of racist contempt that even his gracious manners and urbane sophistication could not hide .
As president , he reinstated Jim Crow in Washington , D.C. , after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward ending it .
But he did not limit himself to just the nation ’ s capital : He ordered the elimination of all senior positions in the federal government where Blacks supervised whites .
One of the federal officials Wilson arranged to have fired was a Black customs inspector living out his last years in Beaufort , South Carolina : Robert Smalls .
As president , Wilson can rightfully be credited with a number of achievements .
He was , in his day , and indeed even in the context of our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also a man born into a family that benefited from slave labor , whose theologian father preached that God commanded Black people to be slaves , and whose vast education never disabused him of the belief that Black people were his inferiors .
That belief led him to visit incalculable pain and hardship on millions of people at home and abroad when , among other things , he had U.S. Marines occupy and establish a system of forced labor in Haiti that in effect reinstituted slavery in the very first Republic to have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Smalls will never be as well-known as Wilson .
In the hard calculus of affairs of state , perhaps Wilson counts more than Smalls .
But on a human level , Smalls was a larger and better man than Wilson .
We should be able to speak that plain fact without nostalgia , condescension , or defensiveness for the quite simple reason that the distance Wilson traveled from his privileged upbringing to the presidency of Princeton , to the governorship of New Jersey , and the presidency of the U.S. is objectively much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being enslaved by his own father to fighting for the Union , to ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment , and representing the people of South Carolina in Congress .
In the end , it doesn ’ t matter terribly much whether Princeton removes Wilson ’ s name .
He did destroy a generation of the Black middle class , and he did take away a freedom Haitians had fought a war of independence to earn .
And yet , it should scarcely be surprising that an American university would choose to name a school @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former presidents who , among other achievements , saw the country through World War I and was an intellectual architect of the precursor for the United Nations .

Smalls founded the South Carolina Republican Party in 1867 and, in 1868, joined 71 Black delegates to the state convention that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In that same convention, Smalls and his fellow Black delegates adopted a progressive state constitution, providing for public education, abolishing race and property ownership as conditions for holding public office, and overturning Black Codes. He would live long enough to see his achievement dismantled in 1895, when whites regained power in South Carolina and adopted a Jim Crow Constitution. As one state newspaper put it at the time, “We can trust white men to do right by the inferior race, but we cannot trust the inferior race with power over the white man.” With some amendments, that constitution remains in effect to this day.
In the years in between, Smalls was first a state representative, then a state senator, and finally, between 1875 and 1887, a U.S. representative. He served in Congress alongside Richard Cain, the pastor of Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church, where, in 2015, Dylann Roof murdered nine Black congregants. He represented the 7th congressional district, then the 5th district; once white Southern Democrats regained power, Smalls was the last Republican to represent the 5th for nearly 130 years, until 2011, when Mick Mulvaney, Donald Trump’s former chief of staff, won the seat as part of the Tea Party wave that rose in opposition to the election of the first Black president.
But it was while serving in the South Carolina legislature that Smalls first crossed paths, unbeknownst to him, with Tomas Dixon Jr. The latter was just eight years old when his uncle took him to observe the proceedings of the statehouse. Dixon would go on to author The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s Burden, The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan, and The Traitor: A Story of the Rise and Fall of the Invisible Empire. Dixon claimed that the memory of “ninety-four Negroes, seven native scalawags and twenty-three white men” debating affairs of state moved him to set the record straight on Reconstruction with his white supremacist trilogy.


newrepublic--2020-07-03--Reckoning With Anti-Blackness in Indian Country

The Indianz.com piece was less a journalistic endeavor than a pile-on .
Agoyo interviewed Elena Ortiz , an Ohkay Owingeh citizen who provided the necessarily flashy quote for the headline , calling Roanhorse “ the Elizabeth Warren of the sci-fi set.
” Agoyo also spoke with Dr. Jennifer Denetdale , a Diné citizen who holds the position of Associate Professor of American Studies at the University of New Mexico .
Denetdale told Indianz.com that she felt Roanhorse ’ s use of Diné stories and culture in her popular 2018 novel , Trail of Lightning , and Locusts , its sequel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added that , “ an in-law keeps their place , ” another snipe at the fact that Roanhorse is not a tribally enrolled citizen .
Agoyo only spoke with academics and government officials who denigrated Roanhorse ’ s authenticity by claiming that she does not maintain a continuous connection with the Ohkay Owingeh community—an inference that Roanhorse both legally and socially is distant from the culture .
What the piece fails to grapple with , though , is Roanhorse ’ s creative and craft-driven lens .
It instead limits the reader ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political spectacle .
This alone is troubling because , as Adrian Jawort wrote in this incisive piece in the Los Angeles Review of Books , “ What does or doesn ’ t count as Native art is sometimes defined by a narrow anthropological lens and a pressure to produce something ‘ authentic.
’ ” The Indianz.com article also never once mentions the fact that Roanhorse is Black—an omission that attempts to sidestep the question of anti-Blackness and other kinds of discrimination in tribal communities .
( The article “ practically turns itself into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Sterling HolyWhiteMountain , a Blackfeet writer , noted in a thread on the piece . )
Speaking to this same issue , Kayla Shaggy , a gay Dine writer who responded to the reception to Roanhorse ’ s work , wrote : Anti-Blackness is what prevented Roanhorse from truly connecting with her Indigenous roots , family , and culture .
Anti-Blackness is what motivates her harshest critics to flail wildly in the name of “ protecting culture ” against her .
Anti-Blackness is what suffocates and influences Indigenous circles of varying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , history , etc .
Anti-Blackness is alive and well within Indigenous culture , like the monsters of old , hiding deep within members of the Indigenous community and perpetuated by them with excuses of “ maintaining and preserving traditions.
” There is an enormous amount of fraught history baked into the above incidents .
One could look through the Lumbee ’ s history of being discriminated against and segregated by the North Carolina government , how that has created their difficult and ongoing journey to federal recognition , and why tribal nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who oppose Lumbee recognition , take such serious offense to others claiming their heritage .
It would also be worth looking over how the racialization of Native people in the South shaped the surrounding structures of racism , from policing to housing to environmental policy .
Turning to Roanhorse , one could also point out , as author Terese Mailhout did , that Native communities , like all communities , are “ wide and splintered ” and don ’ t share uniform ideologies , beliefs , or laws about who is and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you ’ re a Native writer , Lipan Apache author Darcie Little Badger noted this week , “ there will be people who look at you in disbelief & demand the chance to dissect your heart , the most personal facets of your life and history .
They want your family tree.
” There are very good reasons why those hecklers in Pembroke felt so comfortable and why so many Native professionals feel comfortable telling Roanhorse what she is and what she is not .
The vitriol that Roanhorse and the Pembroke protestors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ separate ; rather , it is the result of decades and centuries of colonization policies being internalized by Indian Country governments and communities .
At a systems level , borne out of both self-preservation and greed , some Native nations initially mimicked their white , European counterparts by adopting practices like slavery , blood quantum policing , and racial segregation—all with the express interest of ensuring that Black people remained on the margins of their society , too .
A handful of nations even went full method actor and followed their interpretation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ongoing—legal battles against granting full citizenship rights to Black tribal members , known as Freedmen .
This is the end goal of the four-century long assimilation ploy .
It is easy to point at boarding schools and urban relocation programs and decry the American government for attacking Native culture ; it is far more difficult and more prudent to acknowledge how we allowed our governing bodies to slowly take the shape of the racist oppressor we share with Black community members .
When I take a step back and look at Pembroke and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distinct examples of how anti-Black racism works in Native communities .
Pembroke is an overt , physical rejection of Black community members being allowed the space to voice their needs .
This version of racism is easier to identify , because its proponents have few fears about being labeled racist , which also makes this brand difficult to combat .
( Robeson County will again be one of the counties Donald Trump counts on come November , seeing as he won it by five points in 2016 . )

At a systems level, born out of both self-preservation and greed, some Native nations initially mimicked their white, European counterparts by adopting practices like slavery, blood quantum policing, and racial segregation—all with the express interest of ensuring that Black people remained on the margins of their society, too. A handful of nations even went full method actor and followed their interpretation of American governance up with years of protracted—and ongoing—legal battles against granting full citizenship rights to Black tribal members known as Freedmen. This is the end goal of the four-century-long assimilation ploy. It is easy to point at boarding schools and urban relocation programs and decry the American government for attacking Native culture; it is far more difficult and more prudent to acknowledge how we allowed our governing bodies to slowly take the shape of the racist oppressor we share with Black community members.
When I take a step back and look at Pembroke and the Roanhorse cases, I see two distinct examples of how anti-Black racism works in Native communities. Pembroke is an overt, physical rejection of Black community members being allowed the space to voice their needs. This version of racism is easier to identify, because its proponents have few fears about being labeled racist, which also makes this brand difficult to combat. (Robeson County will again be one of the counties Donald Trump counts on come November, seeing as he won it by five points in 2016.)
Roanhorse’s, on the other hand, is a slightly more sinister, “just-asking-questions” attempt at exclusion that functions at an individual level but also through different systems of prestige and legitimacy. What critics of this sort refuse to acknowledge, or quickly brush off, is the fact that their campaign against this one artist easily fits in a pattern of “vetting” Black Native people. While Roanhorse’s critics might believe themselves to be pursuing the same line of critique used to address Senator Warren, they feel closer in spirit to the Obama-era birthers than anything else. There is no denying that there exist today dozens of people in prominent positions who are lying about their own Native ancestry either because they’re greedy and craven or just because it’s a warm comfort to wrap themselves in. But as Shaggy wrote, Roanhorse’s creative and professional intentions do not appear predatory or self-affirming but rather “create a positive space and proper representation of Indigenous characters and cultures.” That is to say, she seeks to create what did not exist for her.


newrepublic--2020-07-03--Conservative Austerity Created the Mask Wars

As coronavirus cases soared this week in a number of states—not a few of them red—a handful of GOP leaders and right-wing pundits had a desperate message for conservatives : Wear a mask , please .
Mike Pence now wears a mask ; Arizona Governor Doug Ducey , who had previously blocked local governments from requiring masks , now calls them “ your best defense against this virus ” ; Fox & Friends host Steve Doocy , whom Donald Trump once ranked a 12 out of 10 in terms of loyalty , said recently , “ I think that if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just set a good example.
” Even Trump himself , who has irresponsibly stoked anti-mask messaging for months , is now saying vaguely pro-mask things .
The right ’ s about-face comes when the national coronavirus death toll is approaching 130,000 .
In such circumstances , wearing masks seems like literally the least anyone can do .
It was a unique kind of American idiocy that produced the ongoing conflict over wearing masks in public , a culture war now captured forever in the dozens of videos of unmasked , aggrieved individuals trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states .
But if anti-mask tantrums of conspiracists or wing nuts attract the most attention , they ’ re ultimately just a symptom of something much more dangerous : the long-running erosion of public programs in the United States , which set the stage for a type of extreme individualism that extends to almost every aspect of American life today .
Conservatives have spent decades shrinking the scope and efficacy of social welfare initiatives .
Now the near-total abdication of the government during the pandemic has shifted even more responsibility for weathering the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a vicious clash between pro- and anti-mask culture warriors .
But that conflict over personal choices just underscores how our government has been designed to fail .
At least since Ronald Reagan ’ s 1981 inaugural address in which he declared , “ Government is not the solution to our problem , government is the problem , ” Republicans ( along with plenty of Democrats ) have leaped to dismantle or weaken a range of federal and state-level programs constructed during the country ’ s New Deal and postwar eras , all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we ’ re almost completely on our own .
As a result of that relentless assault , the already threadbare safety net has reached a breaking point during the pandemic .
Thanks to conservatives ’ painstaking efforts to weaken states ’ unemployment insurance programs over the years ( in some cases intentionally making it harder for people to apply for benefits ) , millions of laid-off workers struggled to access badly needed money as the economy cratered .
Likewise , the lack of paid leave policies , both nationally and in most states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the impossible choice between their health and their jobs since the start of the outbreak .
And , of course , the U.S. has nothing approaching a national health care system in the middle of the biggest public health crisis in a century .
Though many—including Joe Biden—have argued that Medicare for All wouldn ’ t have prevented the spread of the coronavirus , it ’ s plain that the senselessness of chaining people ’ s health insurance to their jobs has created additional stress on people caught up in the twin crises @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( The federal government has promised to reimburse providers who treat uninsured Covid-19 patients , but that initiative has limitations . )

As America’s intentionally weakened social safety net has frayed, Trump’s federal government has utterly failed to sufficiently expand testing or contact tracing, necessary ingredients of any successful effort to fight Covid. The administration was disorganized from the beginning of the pandemic and couldn’t even come up with a coherent plan for dealing with it. That left a patchwork of local and state governments and private institutions to fend for themselves in an environment so confused that they sometimes found themselves competing with the federal government for vital supplies. It’s no wonder, then, that the public have resorted to bickering among themselves. There is no one offering even minimal guidance, no sense of a shared goal—the things that we might ordinarily expect a government to provide.
And while the calls for simply bootstrapping our way out of the pandemic have mostly come from Trump and his cronies, even critics of his administration have doubled down on a certain kind of individualism. “We can and should hold our leaders responsible, but ultimately, we have no one but ourselves to blame,” the former Republican commentator Max Boot wrote this week. “Nobody forced so many Americans to act so recklessly.” That’s true in a sense, but in other ways, the American public is being told to fend for itself and then being punished for it. As The Washington Post’s Helaine Olen put it in a recent piece on the outrage over people violating social distancing guidelines after months of lockdown, “We’re expecting individuals to compensate for government and societal failures, and then yelling at them when they fail to do so—and act like people instead.”
The lack of meaningful early intervention also means that at this point, with the mask wars well underway, any kind of national mask mandate would be a difficult thing to carry out, particularly given how the enforcement of social distancing rules has rather predictably resulted in the increased surveillance and policing of disproportionately Black and Latino residents. The longer we wait, the more the culture wars will escalate, and there seem to be few solutions for ending them on the table. Democrats, for their part, have advocated some basic federal protections like extending coronavirus unemployment benefits and initiating another round of stimulus payments. And Bernie Sanders recently floated what might be the closest thing to a de-escalation of the mask wars—a proposal for the government to simply manufacture and distribute free masks to everyone. Like so many of Sanders’s proposals, it seems reasonable and also nearly impossible to imagine the current government doing.


newrepublic--2020-07-06--Policing Doesn’t Protect Women

Policing Doesn’t Protect Women

These things are often framed as proof that policing is “ broken , ” but that again accepts the premise of the police on their own terms .
Gender-based violence enabled by and within the criminal-legal system is by design , and it is inseparable from the way that “ crime ” itself is construed : racialized , atomized , and alienated from broader social problems .
Far from being protected , it ’ s under the guise of “ fighting crime ” that Black women , trans women , indigenous , undocumented , and poor women have been subjected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continually exposes them to gender-based harm at the same time as it hems them into the margins of society .
This system is self-protecting—it conspires to conceal the means through which it reproduces and justifies itself , making it difficult to imagine an alternative to it .
This is the bind that leaves many people , when first encountering abolition and ideas about the end of policing , asking : What about the rapists ?
But there is a way out , long-paved by radical feminists of color , and a future where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good .
This difficulty in imagining a response to sexual violence beyond the criminal-legal system is strange given that it is only somewhat recently that gender-based violence came to be regarded as a kind of crime .
In her research , Mimi Kim , professor in the school of social work at California State University in Long Beach , anti-domestic violence advocate , and member of INCITE !
, an organization of radical feminists of color , traces this shift .
“ In the 1970 ’ s , the police were wholly disinterested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even more so domestic violence , ” she told The New Republic .
The latter was explicitly addressed as a ‘ family matter ’ outside of the boundaries of policing.
” The American Bar Association ’ s official recommendations at the time regarding “ the resolution of conflict such as that which occurs between husband and wife , ” for example , were that the police should operate “ without reliance upon criminal assault or disorderly conduct statutes.
” As part of the broader agenda of the women ’ s movement , second-wave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matters ” into the public sphere and incorporate them into a critique of patriarchy writ large .
But they found that the political landscape around them was mutating .
The tide of neoliberalism—the conservative backlash to the social movements of the 1960s and 70s—was on the rise , and with it came an rapacious appetite to do away with social safety nets , and pour resources into prisons and policing .
“ With growing attacks against the U.S. welfare state and the stigmatizing of welfare recipients came the increasing belief that crime should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hence , governmental efforts , ” Kim writes in a 2018 paper .
This was the era of the War on Drugs , the Welfare Queen , and the starting point for the country ’ s soaring rates of incarceration—cornerstones of an outright and sustained campaign of state violence against Black people in America .
White , mainstream feminists looking to gain popular support for their cause took the temperature of their political moment and surrendered to it .
They “ forged partnerships with the police , framed sexual assault and domestic violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these forms of violence as the only legitimate response to gender-based violence.
” These women helped push through now-ubiquitous policies like “ mandatory arrest ” statutes , whereby the police are required to make an arrest if they have reason to believe domestic violence has occurred .
As INCITE !
noted in 2001 , these laws have had precisely the wrong impact— “ a decrease in the number of battered women who kill their partners in self-defense , but [ no ] decrease in the number of batterers who kill their partners.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Violence Against Women Act in 1994—part of Bill Clinton ’ s infamous Crime Bill , which infused police departments with funding , called for thousands of added cops on the streets , and introduced more punitive sentencing measures—was heralded as a victory .
Contrarily , an understanding of gender-based violence as bound to state violence and broad social injustices—housing insecurity , poverty , crises in mental health , homophobia and transphobia , etc.—was abandoned wholesale on the level of policy-making .
It was a trade-off buttressed by the Clinton administration ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which stripped communities of government resources while painting their ( poor , Black ) inhabitants as latent criminals .
And models of justice that did not rely on the state , the only kinds that might actually serve communities under attack from that same institution , were consigned to the margins .
“ In the reformist frame of mind , these gains looked like wins , ” said Kim .
“ However , over time , they proved to be profound losses for the movement—and tied feminists more tightly to the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainstream anti-violence movement has been mired in the language of crime-and-punishment ever since .
The result has been interlocking fields of violence for Black , undocumented , indigenous , and trans people : interpersonal harm on one side and state brutality on the other .
But despite the complicity of mainstream feminists for the last half century , radical feminist communities have continued to develop more holistic frameworks for resisting these layers of violence .
Sex workers in particular have been at the forefront of the project .
In their book Revolting Prostitutes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Rights , Molly Smith and Juno Mac write , “ when we think of police violence not only as state violence but as male violence against women , the criminalisation of prosititution comes into focus in a new way.
” By bringing “ criminalization ” into the schema of patriarchal oppression , the policing of sex work can be seen for what it is : yet another arena in which Black women , gender-nonconforming people , and others are exposed to violence that , due to their work , is inherently “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their arrests , deportation , incarceration , the parole terms that threaten their housing and families , the threat of rape and abuse while in police custody or during state-sanctioned police “ stings , ” and the lack of protection from a system that will always treat them as deserving of such surveillance and punishment ?
As my colleague Melissa Gira Grant , author of Playing the Whore , writes , “ I ’ ve stopped asking ‘ Why have we made prostitution illegal ?
’ Instead I want an explanation for , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” have we made acceptable ?
’ ” Locked in the paradigm of policing , how much violence have we similarly made acceptable ?
How much violence against “ survivors ” have we made acceptable ?
It ’ s through the work of groups like Survived and Punished , which organizes on behalf of criminalized and incarcerated survivors , as well as the stories of survivors themselves , that we can uncover some answers .
In recent years , several cases have risen to prominence as some of the most egregious examples of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state , cases like those of Marissa Alexander—who faced 20 years in prison after firing a warning shot at her abusive husband when he threatened to kill her—Nan Hui-Jo—who tried to flee to her home country of Korea after repeated abuse by her husband and was instead found guilty of abducting her own child—Eisha Love—a trans woman who went to the police to report an attack on her life and who was then arrested herself for injuring her attacker before being incarcerated in a men ’ s prison—and Cyntoia Brown—who was sentenced to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ age of 16 for shooting her 43-year-old rapist in self-defense .
The stories of these women and so many others whose names we will never know are best synthesized by feminist activist Beth Richie in her 1996 book Compelled to Crime : The Gender Entrapment of Battered Black Women : “ The cases presented here are extreme not because the women themselves are extreme , but because the degree to which their lives are stigmatized and marginalized is extreme .
”

As opposed to punitive justice, which excises people from their communities, the principles of transformative justice are rooted in a practice of community accountability. Here, perpetrators are treated as people (rather than eternal criminals) who have the capacity to permanently change their behavior. Survivors are treated as agents (rather than eternal victims) who can ask for and be provided with whatever resources and courses of action they might need. Forgiveness may be part of that equation; it may not be. And harm is located within a broader nexus of violence within the community. In her seminal work Are Prisons Obsolete?, abolitionist Angela Davis writes that the prison “functions ideologically as an abstract site into which undesirables are deposited, relieving us of the responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those communities from which prisoners are drawn in such disproportionate numbers.” Transformative justice, on the other hand, does not let us off so easily. It asks us to understand acts of violence as arising from conditions of scarcity, trauma, and oppressive hierarchies like racism and sexism. In doing so, it reveals the pressure points where real interventions can have real impact.
This is not a simple process. It also does not mean an instant, clean eradication of violence. In these accountability processes, friends, family, neighbors, co-workers, community organizations, apartment complexes, labor unions, and other sites of social and community meaning work together to repair harm done and generate safety in their communities, often with some degree of involvement by either the survivor or the perpetrator, or both. Within the context of these processes, survivors are afforded more flexibility to decide for themselves what justice looks like. This is critical, because the open secret of sexual assault is that even if the criminal justice system worked perfectly (putting rapists behind bars), it would still have little to nothing to offer survivors in the way of healing. “One of the things that I’ve learned over the years is that people mostly want … answers. ‘Why are you doing this?’ ‘Why did you do this to me?’” Mariame Kaba has said of this work. “They want you to admit that you did what you did.… The current system … makes it impossible for you to admit that you did harm.” Here again is the weird double bind of “crime” on full display: In the context of the criminal legal system, to admit guilt is to submit to possible punishment and violence. There is no incentive to take responsibility for harm done, which is often the very thing that survivors need. Accountability processes create a structure in which a perpetrator can voluntarily “enter into accountability,” as INCITE! puts it.
Of course, if justice is going to happen at the level of the community, it is important that those communities are materially fortified and equipped to deliver on the promise of transformative justice. But Mimi Kim warns that it is not enough to tinker at the edges of our fraying social safety net. “In looking towards investments in social welfare or public health as demanded today, it is also important to be clear about the punitive histories of these systems in the United States,” she says. Writing in The Chronicle of Social Change, Dorothy Roberts makes a similar point: “Abolitionists must also ask … whether the recommended reallocation of money and authority will reduce and not increase other parts of the state’s punishment regime.” In her piece, Roberts goes on to lay out how the “family regulation system,” embodied by agencies such as Child Protective Services, is a central perpetrator of this “punishment regime.” CPS, she writes, is no less than “a multi-billion-dollar government apparatus that regulates millions of marginalized people through intrusive investigations, monitoring and forcible removal of children from their homes.” For Kim, as well, these bodies require a kind of transformation rooted in abolition: “They are not in and of themselves helpful, much less liberatory. We need to make demands for the humanization of these systems.”


newrepublic--2020-07-06--Woodrow Wilson Was Even More Racist Than You Thought

The explanation is that Wilson was a man of the South .
I think many people erroneously believe he was from New Jersey , where he served as governor before becoming president .
In fact , he was born in Staunton , Virginia , in 1856 .
Much of his childhood was spent in Georgia , North Carolina , and South Carolina .
Wilson ’ s father , Joseph Wilson , was an itinerant Presbyterian minister who defended slavery on biblical grounds .
During the war , his church was used as a hospital by the Confederate Army , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s devastating march to the sea .
The Civil War and its aftermath left a deep impression on Wilson for the rest of his life .
Much of Wilson ’ s professional work as an academic dealt with the Civil War and Reconstruction .
He always took a Southern point of view , seeing slavery as relatively benign , militant groups such as the Ku Klux Klan as fairly harmless , and Reconstruction as a disaster .
However , Wilson was very adept , politically .
When running for governor he successfully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did nothing for them .
The same pattern emerged when Wilson ran for president .
Even W.E.B .
Du Bois was sufficiently impressed with him to give him his endorsement .
Later , Du Bois was bitterly disappointed .
Elected president in 1912 , only the second Democratic president since before the Civil War , Wilson appeared to be the quintessential Progressive Era leader .
But he understood that the South was the base of the Democratic Party , as well as the region to which he had the most affinity .
Moreover @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was in many ways quite racist .
Wilson made certain that the South was well represented in his Cabinet , designating Albert Burleson of Texas as postmaster general and North Carolinians David F. Houston as secretary of agriculture and Josephus Daniels as secretary of the Navy .
Although Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo was living in New York at the time of his appointment , he was born in Georgia and spent much of his life in Tennessee .
In the words of one historian , “ The President surrounded himself with men @ @ @ @ @ @ @ narrowest sense.
” At one of the first Cabinet meetings of the new administration , on April 11 , 1913 , Burleson urged the institution of racial segregation throughout the federal government .
Wilson said nothing against it , so Burleson , Daniels , and McAdoo interpreted his silence as constituting permission for them to impose segregation within their departments at their own discretion .
No announcement was made of the new policy , but it quickly became known that the Wilson administration was instituting a major modification in the treatment of black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been the case under postwar presidents .
Historian Kathleen Wolgemuth describes the changes : By the end of 1913 , segregation had been realized in the [ Treasury Department ’ s ] Bureau of Engraving and Printing , the Post Office Department , the Office of the Auditor for the Post Office , and had even begun in the City Post Office in Washington , D.C .
This involved not only separated or screened-off working positions , but segregated lavatories and lunchrooms.… In the office of the Auditor of the Navy … @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a separate lavatory in the cellar was provided for the colored clerks .
In 1914 , the Civil Service began demanding photographs to accompany employment applications for the first time .
It was widely understood that the only purpose of this requirement was to weed out black applicants .

At one of the first Cabinet meetings of the new administration, on April 11, 1913, Burleson urged the institution of racial segregation throughout the federal government. Wilson said nothing against it, so Burleson, Daniels, and McAdoo interpreted his silence as constituting permission for them to impose segregation within their departments at their own discretion. No announcement was made of the new policy, but it quickly became known that the Wilson administration was instituting a major modification in the treatment of black workers throughout the federal government from what had been the case under postwar presidents. Historian Kathleen Wolgemuth describes the changes:
By the end of 1913, segregation had been realized in the [Treasury Department’s] Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the Post Office Department, the Office of the Auditor for the Post Office, and had even begun in the City Post Office in Washington, D.C. This involved not only separated or screened-off working positions, but segregated lavatories and lunchrooms.… In the office of the Auditor of the Navy … screens set off Negroes from whites, and a separate lavatory in the cellar was provided for the colored clerks.
In 1914, the Civil Service began demanding photographs to accompany employment applications for the first time. It was widely understood that the only purpose of this requirement was to weed out black applicants.
According to Wilson biographer Arthur S. Link, “Burleson and McAdoo made a clean sweep of Negro political appointees in the South and allowed local postmasters and collectors of internal revenue either to downgrade or dismiss Negro workers with civil service status.” The postmaster in Atlanta fired 35 blacks, and the chief federal tax collector in Georgia said publicly, “A Negro’s place is in the cornfield.”


newrepublic--2020-07-06--The Willful Blindness of Reactionary Liberalism

Overall , the liberal ideal is a diverse , pluralistic society of autonomous people guided by reason and tolerance .
The dream is harmonious coexistence .
But liberalism also happens to excel at generating dissensus , and some of the major sociopolitical controversies of the past few years should be understood as conflicts not between liberalism and something else but between parties placing emphasis on different liberal freedoms—chiefly freedom of speech , a popular favorite which needs no introduction , and freedom of association , the under-heralded right of individuals to unite for a common purpose or in alignment with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free speech , freedom of association has been enshrined in liberal democratic jurisprudence here and across the world ; liberal theorists from John Stuart Mill to John Rawls have declared it one of the essential human liberties .
Yet associative freedom is often entirely absent from popular discourse about liberalism and our political debates , perhaps because liberals have come to take it entirely for granted .
For instance , while public universities in America are generally bound by the First Amendment , controversial speakers have no broad right to speak at private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , have a right to decide what ideas they are and aren ’ t interested in entertaining and what people they believe will or will not be useful to their communities of scholars—a right that limits the entry and participation not only of public figures with controversial views but the vast majority of people in our society .
Senators like Tom Cotton have every right to have their views published in a newspaper .
But they have no specific right to have those views published by any particular publication .
Rather , publications @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the press , and by convention as collections of individuals engaged in lawful projects—to decide what and whom they would or would not like to publish , based on whatever standards happen to prevail within each outlet .
When a speaker is denied or when staffers at a publication argue that something should not have been published , the rights of the parties in question haven ’ t been violated in any way .
But what we tend to hear in these and similar situations are criticisms that are at odds with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the general right to commit themselves to values which many might disagree with and make decisions on that basis .
There ’ s nothing unreasonable about criticizing the substance of such decisions and the values that produce them .
But accusations of “ illiberalism ” in these cases carry the implication that nonstate institutions under liberalism have an obligation of some sort to be maximally permissive of opposing ideas—or at least maximally permissive of the kinds of ideas critics of progressive identity politics consider important .
In fact , they do not .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberalism than the other freedoms , and is actually integral to their functioning .
There isn ’ t a right explicitly enumerated in the First Amendment that isn ’ t implicitly dependent on or augmented by similarly minded individuals having the right to come together .
Most people worship with others ; an assembly or petition of one isn ’ t worth much ; the institutions of the press are , again , associations ; and individual speech is functionally inert unless some group chooses to offer a venue or a platform .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ first place , generally aimed at stirring some group or constituency to contemplation or action .
Ultimately , associative freedom is critical because groups and associations are the very building blocks of society .
Political parties and unions , nonprofits and civic organizations , whole religions and whole ideologies—individuals can not be meaningfully free unless they have the freedom to create , make themselves part of , and define these and other kinds of affiliations .
Some of our affiliations , including the major identity categories , are involuntary , and this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as messy as it is important .
Just as the principle of free speech forces us into debates over hate speech , obscenity , and misinformation , association is the root of identity-based discrimination and other ills .
The Supreme Court ’ s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County banning employment discrimination on the basis of LGBTQ identity last month was a huge step forward , but in practice , workers of all stripes often lack the means and opportunity to defend themselves from unjust firings—all the more reason for those preoccupied with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dismissals to support just-cause provisions and an end to at-will employment .
What about the oft-repeated charge that progressives today intend to establish “ group rights ” over and above the rights of the individual—that , specifically , minorities and certain disadvantaged groups are to be given more rights than , and held as superior to , white people ?
If this were the case , the critics of left “ illiberalism ” would truly be onto something : Individual rights are , again , at the center of liberal thought .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be found in any of the major controversies that have recently captured broad attention .
A minority chef who says she wants to be paid as much as her white colleagues has not said that white people are inferior ; an unarmed black man under the knee of a policeman and begging for his life is not asking to be conferred a special privilege .
The goal is parity , not superiority .
The heart of the protests and cultural agitation we ’ ve witnessed has clearly been a desire to see minorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people are entitled but that have been denied to many by society ’ s extant bigots and the residual effects of injustices past .
Ultimately , it ’ s the realities of our collective past that make the notion that progressives are dragging the country toward illiberalism especially ridiculous .
Over the course of two and a half centuries in this country , millions of human beings held as property toiled for the comfort and profit of already wealthy people who tortured and raped them .
Just over 150 years ago , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ systems of subjugation from which its descendants have not recovered .
August will mark just 100 years since women were granted the right to vote ; Black Americans , nominally awarded that right during Reconstruction , couldn ’ t take full advantage of it until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 .
The litany of other inequities and crimes our country has perpetrated and continues to perpetrate against Native Americans , immigrants , religious and sexual minorities , political dissidents , and the poor is endless .
All told , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at best , just over half a century old : If it were a person , it would be too young to qualify for Medicare .

Associative freedom is often entirely absent from popular discourse about liberalism and our political debates, perhaps because liberals have come to take it entirely for granted.
Overall, the liberal ideal is a diverse, pluralistic society of autonomous people guided by reason and tolerance. The dream is harmonious coexistence. But liberalism also happens to excel at generating dissensus, and some of the major sociopolitical controversies of the past few years should be understood as conflicts not between liberalism and something else but between parties placing emphasis on different liberal freedoms—chiefly freedom of speech, a popular favorite which needs no introduction, and freedom of association, the under-heralded right of individuals to unite for a common purpose or in alignment with a particular set of values. Like free speech, freedom of association has been enshrined in liberal democratic jurisprudence here and across the world; liberal theorists from John Stuart Mill to John Rawls have declared it one of the essential human liberties. Yet associative freedom is often entirely absent from popular discourse about liberalism and our political debates, perhaps because liberals have come to take it entirely for granted.
For instance, while public universities in America are generally bound by the First Amendment, controversial speakers have no broad right to speak at private institutions. Those institutions do, however, have a right to decide what ideas they are and aren’t interested in entertaining and what people they believe will or will not be useful to their communities of scholars—a right that limits the entry and participation not only of public figures with controversial views but the vast majority of people in our society. Senators like Tom Cotton have every right to have their views published in a newspaper. But they have no specific right to have those views published by any particular publication. Rather, publications have the right—both constitutionally as institutions of the press, and by convention as collections of individuals engaged in lawful projects—to decide what and whom they would or would not like to publish, based on whatever standards happen to prevail within each outlet.
When a speaker is denied or when staffers at a publication argue that something should not have been published, the rights of the parties in question haven’t been violated in any way. But what we tend to hear in these and similar situations are criticisms that are at odds with the principle that groups in liberal society have the general right to commit themselves to values which many might disagree with and make decisions on that basis. There’s nothing unreasonable about criticizing the substance of such decisions and the values that produce them. But accusations of “illiberalism” in these cases carry the implication that nonstate institutions under liberalism have an obligation of some sort to be maximally permissive of opposing ideas—or at least maximally permissive of the kinds of ideas critics of progressive identity politics consider important. In fact, they do not.


newrepublic--2020-07-06--The People Killed the Pipelines

The People Killed the Pipelines

On Sunday , Duke Energy and Dominion announced the cancellation of their natural gas pipeline project , the Atlantic Coast Pipeline .
Citing constant legal challenges and rising construction costs—the pipeline had already nearly doubled its projected cost—the energy companies shuttered the project while Dominion separately announced its plans to sell off its other natural gas pipelines and storage assets to Berkshire Hathaway Energy .
Alone , the death of ACP would have been enough to stand out as a monumental achievement .
But then , on Monday morning , the U.S. District Court released another shocker : Because the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the National Environmental Policy Act ” when it issued a permit that allowed the Dakota Access Pipeline to run underneath Lake Oahe , the court ruled that the pipeline must halt all operations by August 5 until a new environmental review can be completed .
It was remarkable , almost unbelievable , to watch the two widely detested pipelines fall in the span of just 24 hours .
And there ’ s a vital message in the spectacle : These extractive projects which endangered the people in their path were in the end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be directly affected by them .
Through a multitude of means—direct action , political organizing , and , of course , court challenges—Native , Black , Hispanic , and white communities across the southeast organized first among themselves when Duke and Dominion came knocking , asking for community support or formal approval for their project .
The same happened among the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe when Transfer Energy Partners began developing DAPL .
These communities all held conversations about whether the money was worth the potential of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of them , like the Lumbee Tribe and Haliwa-Saponi Tribe in North Carolina , rejected the pipeline pay-offs .
When the corporations teamed up with their own regulators and local and national politicians to circumvent this opposition , the people did what they could .
In Standing Rock , the affected tribal citizens and community members constructed a camp that became a community of its own .
They stared down the hyper-militarized , multi-state police force and the violent enforcement of a colonizing power ’ s will .
They set aside national media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accurately represented them .
They used social media to break through to a nation long dismissive of Indigenous rights .
And when the United States plowed forward anyways , the tribal nations beat them in their own court .
Hundreds of miles away , in places like Robeson County , North Carolina and Union Hill , Virginia , marginalized communities organized and talked openly about what a raw deal the trade-off would be in time .
They refused to sign on the dotted line .
They protested and marched ; when Duke and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those same courts and they won , not just against massive energy corporations and grifting conservative politicians but against Democratic governors as well .
One of the biggest victories against the ACP , up until this weekend , came in January , when the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with groups representing Buckingham County , Virginia , ruling that a permit for an ACP compressor station in the historic black community of Union Hill had failed to reckon with the projects ’ s possible disproportionate and adverse effects on a minority community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pipeline routes realized early on , the courts were the only battlefield not slanted against them , and so it was the courts where they leveraged their power .

There are naturally brief addendums to this declaration of victory. For instance, the U.S. will have the opportunity to appeal the DAPL ruling, which Ron Ness, president of the North Dakota Petroleum Council, has already said his group plans to explore. Even if that doesn’t pan out, they can also address the permitting issue that the court ruled on, though that is estimated to require roughly 13 months to complete. (The loophole-ridden federal permitting process that initially allowed DAPL’s construction is still in place, but it’s not clear how long Energy Transfer Partners will be willing to shoulder the costs of the pipeline without a profit in sight.)
Financial instability from the current pandemic also played a role in Duke and Dominion’s decision to walk away from ACP, and would likely be an attributable factor should DAPL close up shop. Although, even without the coronavirus, neither DAPL or ACP were particularly economically responsible or necessary; rather, they were a last-minute attempt to cash in on the extractive industry’s dying breath. As my colleague Kate Aronoff put it, “Natural gas simply isn’t very good business anymore.” (Not that Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette would admit it, given he tried to offset the pipeline defeats with the approval of the Jordan Cove natural gas export facility in Coos Bay, Oregon on Monday, another project that is opposed by numerous tribal nations.)
Still, it feels clarifying to have veritable proof that the pathway to environmental justice is not wholly dependent on Mark Ruffalo speeches and the whims of high-minded national environmentalist groups. Though those people and groups got involved as well, these victories should be credited to the grassroots Black and Indigenous and working class organizers, who used the legal options at their disposal to form a multi-part counter-response crafted specifically by and for the people, towns, and tribal communities the pipelines were designed to run through and under. Going forward, national groups tackling everything from Amazon rainforest preservation to tackling emissions-heavy, community-endangering meat farming would be wise to heed this lesson about the power of local communities. As Dr. Ryan Emanuel, a Lumbee tribal member and associate professor at North Carolina State University, told me last fall when ruminating on the porous permit process, “If you ignore our existence in the preparation of these environmental documents, then you don’t acknowledge that we have any right to decide what happens on lands that are historically our territory, or places where our communities live today.”