21stcenturywire--2020-02-28--Turkey’s Eurasianist Moment: The Importance of Idlib and Russia

Turkey and Russia have enjoyed a good relationship over the past years .
The Islamist President of the Republic , Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ( aka the Prez ) , and Russia ’ s President Vladimir Putin ( aka the Czar ) have enjoyed very cordial connections in that time – having spoken approximately 40 times over the phone and about 24 times face-to-face since 2016 ‘ s Coup-that-was-no-Coup , according to data provided by BBC Türkçe .
Gone are the days that the Republic of Turkey ’ s internal and external affairs were encapsulated in Atatürk ’ s famous phrase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ( 20 April 1931 ) .
That was then and this is now , and now is the New Turkey , a nation of believers led by an overly ambitious Tayyip Erdoğan : “ Turkey has been at the forefront of the armed effort to unseat Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning .
Even though in previous years Erdoğan and Assad had been the best of buddies , ever since the supposedly peaceful protests against Damascus came into their own , morphing into Syria ’ s not-so civil war , he has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Allawite-led regime in Damascus should fall and be replaced by a Sunni-friendly administration arguably headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and/or its proxies , ” as I opined in late 2015 .
But then President Putin threw a spanner in the works : “ Russian warplanes launched their first airstrikes .
.
.
against opposition targets in Syria [ on 30 September 2015 ] , ” as reported in the mainstream press at the time .
And subsequently , the Syrian government formally invited the Russians on 2 October 2015 to send in troops @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jihadi factions , including ISIS or the Islamic State , battling to topple the Damascus government .
And in the context of Russian planes flying in the local sky , a serious diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Moscow occurred – namely when a Turkish Air Force F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24 that had accidentally intruded into Turkish airspace on 24 November 2015 .
Following this outright emergency , “ Vladimir Putin and Tayyip Erdoğan engaged in a tit-for-tat battle of words about Turkey and its policy aims and goals , ” as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not shy attacking his Turkish counterpart : “ [ t ] he problem is not the tragedy we witnessed yesterday .
.
.
The problem is much deeper .
We observe .
.
.
that the current Turkish leadership over a significant number of years has been pursuing a deliberate policy of supporting the ‘ Islamization ’ of their country.
” This accusation might seem strange in view of the fact that Putin himself is well-known as a champion of the Orthodox Church in Russia .
The Czar uttered his words of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ larger accusatory discourse linking Turkey-under-the-AKP to the Islamic State ( or IS/ISIS/ISIL ) and its illegitimate oil deals and weapon shipments.
” The Prez jocularly responded in kind , saying that “ ISIS sells the oil it extracts to Assad .
[ And t ] hat is also where it gets its money from , ” linking Putin ’ s Russia to the Islamic State ( or IS/ISIS/ISIL ) .
Freezing and Thawing and Freezing Again : Russo-Turkish Relations In spite of this duel of words , the two leaders were eventually able @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that rapprochement could happen though , Putin exerted some pressure on Erdoğan , with Russia hitting Turkey with a raft of sanctions – a “ [ b ] an on import of Turkish fruit and vegetables , poultry and salt .
[ A b ] an on sale of Russian package holidays to Turkey .
[ The s ] uspension of construction projects involving Turkish firms in Russia .
[ As well as r ] estrictions on Turkish citizens working for companies registered in Russia [ and the s ] uspension of new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian gas exports to Turkey , ” as dutifully listed by the BBC .
In this way , the Czar hit the Prez where it hurt , in his country ’ s pocketbook .
As a result , the latter was duly able to see the error of his ways , which enabled him to come to his senses and tender an apology : “ I want to once again express my sympathy and deep condolences to the family of the Russian pilot who died and I say : ‘ I ’ m @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Kremlin statement ( 27 June 2016 ) .
For in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian jet – crashing in the mountainous Jabal Turkman area of the Syrian province of Latakia – its pilot Lt Col Oleg Peshkov , who had jumped to safety , was killed in the air by an armed group of “ Turkmen rebels.
” These so-called “ rebels ” formed part of the Jihadi terrorist factions fighting the Assad government .
The actual Turkmen shooting down the Russian turned out to be a Turkish citizen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , hailing from the district of Keban in the province of Elazığ , and even more surprising is the fact that this sharpshooting not-quite Syrian Turkmen even turned out to be the son of a one-time mayor belonging to the ultra-nationalist ( or fascist , if you will ) MHP ( or Party of the Nationalist Movement ) , as indicated by the journalist Tunca Öğreten .
This political coloration probably explains why Çelik acted as a commander of the Turkmen brigade roaming the countryside .
At the moment , the MHP openly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a political grouping the party espouses an openly racist ( or Turkist , if you will ) agenda .
As a Turkist organisation , the MHP always supports and aids each and every social grouping or individual claiming a Turkish ( or broadly Turkist ) identity .
The area where the plane was hit just happened to be a region where members of Syria ’ s ethnic Turkmen community are living .
The Turkish authorities even claimed that the Russian jet that was downed had been taking part in aerial attacks on Turkmen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bayirbucak ( or Bayırbucak , in Turkish ) .
The Turkish journalist Öğreten even asserts that the Turkmen brigades active in the area were at the time fighting and training with the Jihadi terror group Jabhat al-Nusra ( currently known as a ‘ HTS ’ or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ) .
The veteran rightist journalist and commentator Taha Akyol explains that the “ Syrian Turkmens settled in Syria with the Seljuks [ 1072-1194 ] , the Turkmens at the Bayır and Bucak regions [ , on the other hand , ] were relocated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1299-1922 ] , with the security of the hajj [ pilgrimage ] route and population strategy in .
.
.
mind , ” and even adding that “ [ f ] or this reason , they have many relatives in Turkey , ” which could arguably explain Alparslan Çelik ’ s presence on the ground .
Following Erdoğan ’ s public apology , things moved pretty quickly .
Turkey ’ s tomato producers were happy again , being able to sell their wares to Russia .
AKP-led Ankara was again put into position @ @ @ @ @ @ @ veritable energy hub were alive again , with plans for a TurkStream pipeline actually coming to fruition some time ago .
Russian tourists were flocking to Antalya again .
And on a political and diplomatic plane , Tayyip Erdoğan ’ s New Turkey joined the big boys at the negotiation table – as a part of both the Astana Process ( which started on 23-4 January 2017 ) and the Sochi agreement ( 22 October 2019 ) , negotiated settlements that were meant to bring Syria ’ s not-so civil war to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became a part of the New Cold War realignments , taking its place next Russia , China , and Iran – a development that led the pro-AKP political scientist Burhanettin Duran , who happens to be heading the Turkish think tank SETA as its general manager , to state that “ Turkey ’ s Western allies .
.
.
effectively compelled the Turks to work more closely with Moscow and Tehran ” ( 6 October 2017 ) .
At that stage , Dr Duran said that Turkey seemed to be “ shifting toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added that it is “ not possible to ignore the differences of opinion between Russia and Iran.
” And the present sudden cooling of the Russo-Turkish love affair all but underlines Duran ’ s reservations .
The latest developments in Syria ’ s not-so civil war next door suddenly soured relations – so much so that the Turkish writer Burak Tuygan recently even proposed that “ this [ Turco-Russian ] honeymoon could not last long , ” particularly now with the “ emergence of the developments in Idlib ” ( 12 February 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense made no bones about this , releasing a statement saying that “ reason for the crisis in the Idlib de-escalation zone unfortunately is the non-fulfilment by our Turkish colleagues of their undertakings to separate moderate opposition militants from terrorists , ” a key component of the Sochi agreement .
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov , for his part , added that “ according to [ the Sochi agreement ] , the Turkish side undertook to ensure that terrorist groups in Idlib were neutralised .
We continue to note with regret that these groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian forces and also taking aggressive action against our military facilities , ” adding ominously that “ [ t ] his is unacceptable.
” Sochi and Idlib : One Man ’ s Terrorist is Another Man ’ s Freedom Fighter As such , one can but wonder about Russia and its intentions , as Turkey had been given an impossible task – to separate “ moderate opposition militants from terrorists ” – given that the mere concept of ‘ moderate opposition ’ seems alien to the reality on the ground , and particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ US envoy Brett McGurk stated on the record that “ Idlib provice is the largest al-Qaeda safe-haven since 9/11 , tied directly to Ayman al Zawahiri , this is a huge problem ” ( 27 July 2017 ) .
And that seems to be the reason behind the Prez ’ s current intransigent stance on Idlib , for I have argued elsewhere that he all but sees the “ Syrian Theatre as a Laboratory for [ his ] Islamist Agenda.
” The already mentioned grouping HTS or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham effectively controls the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ player , ’ imposing its network of Sharia courts on Idlib ’ s population .
Next to HTS , a whole host of other small Jihad terror factions is active in the province – such as the Jabhat al-Wataniya lil-Tahrir ( or National Liberation Front/NLF ) , which the BBC calls a “ Turkish-backed rebel alliance , ” which arguably denotes its nominal connection with the so-called FSA ( or al-Jaysh as-Sūrī al-Ḥurr or Free Syrian Army ) now somewhat disingenuously renamed as the SNA ( or al-Jaysh al-Watani as-Sūrī or Syrian National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Guardians of Religion ) ; and significantly , the TIP ( or Hizb al-Islami al-Turkistani or Turkistan Islamic Party ) .
In connection with the latter grouping , the HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani ( Ahmed Hussein al-Shar ’ a ) had this to say in a recent interview with the International Crisis Group ( ICG ) : “ As for the Turkistan Islamic Party , things are a little different .
These guys have been in Syria for seven years and have never constituted a threat to the outside world .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime aggression .
As Uighurs , they face persecution in China – which we strongly condemn – and they have nowhere else to go .
Of course , I sympathise with them .
But their struggle in China is not ours , so we tell them that they are welcome here as long as they abide by our rules – which they do.
” In other words , I would argue that Turkey , or at the very least , the now firmly AKP-aligned MHP or its popular formations known as the Grey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Turkish ) have been instrumental in transporting these Islamist Uighurs to the Syrian theatre where they enthusiastically joined the Jihad against Assad as a kind of displaced fight against the Chinese authorities back home in Xinjiang .
This is explained by the San Francisco-based author Chris Kanthan : “ [ f ] rom 2009 to 2015 , there were a lot of terrorist attacks by the [ Uighur ] jihadists ( here ’ s an example ) .
That ’ s when China decided to really crack down .
During the peak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radicalized [ Uighur ] Muslims went to Syria and joined ISIS to fight Assad , ” with the aid of the New Turkey ’ s now government-allied Grey Wolves , no doubt .
Publicly though , the Prez shies away from endorsing any kind of Islamist or Jihadi agenda in Syria , instead uttering words expressive of quite different goals and intentions : “ [ o ] ur military observation posts play a vital role [ in Idlib ] and they shall remain in place .
.
.
we have informed [ the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ the realisation of ] a civil massacre and a [ new ] migratory wave [ of refugees ] .
” Tayyip Erdoğan made these announcements on 3 February 2020 , while visiting the Ukraine .
In fact , the Turkish President is really playing with fire , as on the previous day , the Turkish government pledged aid consisting of TL 200 million ( $ 33.4 million ) to be spent on the needs of the Ukrainian army , as confirmed by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey , Andrey Sibiga .
Given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country where pro-Russian forces are facing the onslaught of the Ukrainian army as well as far-right armed groups such as the Azov Battalion – a conflict which the West likes to portray as an example of “ Russian aggression ” – this sample of Turkish generosity can not be seen as anything but the Prez standing up to and challenging the Czar .
Whereas , with regard to Syria , the messages broadcast by Erdoğan convey broadly humanitarian concerns ( with possible massacres and refugee crises ) , even implying that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has installed on Syrian territories only function as guaranteeing AKP-led Ankara ’ s philanthropic considerations for Idlib ’ s population .
In reality though , these much-vaunted incursions of Syrian sovereignty do not even appear to have been part of Turkish government policy or even an initiative of Turkey ’ s Armed Forces ( TSK ) .
Instead , erecting observation posts all across Idlib was an idea that Tayyip Erdoğan received from his close adviser Adnan Tanrıverdi and the organisation he founded and supervises , SADAT A.Ş .
This organsation presents itself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company in Turkey , that internationally provides consultancy and military training services at the international defense and interior security sector.
” In other words , rather than fulfilling either a strategic or tactical function within Turkey ’ s military designs in Syria , the posts appear to have sprung-up in response to an operation designed and facilitated by a private entity and paid for by the Turkish state .
In this way , the traditional love for privatisation displayed by the AKP has now also become part of Turkey ’ s military operations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also privatised the business of war .
In a way , this revamping of Turkish military affairs seems to echo Donald Rumsfeld ’ s plans originally voiced on 10 September 2001 .
And this means that a move interpreted by many as proving the New Turkey ’ s expansionist leanings is in reality part of a wider money-making scheme concocted by one of the Prez ’ s henchmen – Adnan Tanrıverdi , the man who late last year caused quite a stir in the country as he had publicly stated that “ [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the coming of the Mahdi.
” To be clear , I would like to remind everybody that both “ Sunni Muslims and Shia are awaiting a person who is referred to as Al-Mahdi ( Shia call him Imam Mahdi because they are expecting him to be their 12th Imam ) .
.
.
There is no Hadith that tells us explicitly the actual name of the Mahdi , ” as can be read on the website Discovering Islam .
Russia and Turkey : Neighbours , Rivals , and Enemies or Friends Though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has had a troubled relationship with Russia for a long time – indeed , a very long time , if we want to put our trust in Professor Dr Halil İnalcık ( 1916-2026 ) , Turkey ’ s godfather of Ottoman history and historiography , who penned a scholarly article back in 1947 , pointing to the year 1569 as marking the beginning of the “ Ottoman–Russian Rivalry.
” A rivalry that was to lead to open warfare a little more than a century later ( 1677-78 ) .
And today ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a veritable love-hate relationship with its northern neighbour .
Whereas Turkey is oftentimes seen as a bridge straddling Europe and Asia , Russia as a political and cultural construct is understood as occupying a “ dual or median position between Europe and Asia , ” as expressed by the well-respected Russia specialist Dr Marlene Laruelle .
These obtuse words ( or this exercise in downright academic verbiage ) seem to denote that Russian Westernisation moved along more quickly than had been the case for Turkey ( or its Ottoman imperial predecessor ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 1682-1725 ) appears to have single-handedly initiated if not achieved this feat of material and cultural transformation , by “ forcing Russia into the western world , ” as worded by the eminent historian B. H. Sumner ( 1893-1951 ) in 1950 .
In this way , Czar Peter once and for all removed Mother Russia from the Orient where she had previously assumed the position of the defunct ‘ Byzantine Empire ’ ( 330-1453 ) as the local Christian Orthodox powerhouse .
In her new book , Reclaiming Byzantium , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Imperial Russia opened one of the world ’ s leading centres for Byzantine archaeology in Istanbul [ in 1894 ] , the Russian Archaeological Institute – its purpose was to stake the claim that Russia was the correct heir to ‘ Czargrad ’ ( as Istanbul was referred to in Russian circles ) .
” Dr Üre ’ s work adds a religious dimension to the tension present between Moscow and Istanbul ( nowadays , Ankara of course ) , a dimension that very likely has not escaped President Putin ’ s attention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ‘ has been pushing an Orthodox agenda at home ever since he came to power at the end of the year 1999.
’ Still , away from such religious or ideological spheres , in terms of modernisation as Westernisation , the Ottomans ( or Turkey , if you will ) have been lagging behind , as they were only able to enter the European Concert of Nations about a century later than their northern neighbours – like Peter the Great , Sultan Mahmud II ( 1808-39 ) forced his subjects to dress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the structure of the Ottoman Empire .
Westernization in the real sense began during his reign , ” as declared by the popular Turkish historian Erhan Afyoncu .
Sultan Mahmud ’ s son and successor Abdülmecid ( 1839-61 ) proclaimed the Gülhane Imperial Edict which led directly to the Tanzimat reforms ( 1839-76 ) that thoroughly modernized the Ottoman state and its institutions .
These two neighbours located at Europe ’ s eastern flank thus both went though a process of drastic modernisation as Westernisation only to find themselves at loggerheads with each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russo-Ottoman wars took place between the late 17th and the late 19th centuries .
.
.
Russia [ has been ] at war with the Ottoman Empire .
.
.
more frequently .
.
.
than with any other power , ” explains the historian Victor Taki .
In his 2016 book Tsar and Sultan , Dr Taki even reasons that primarily textual “ representations of the brutal realities of the Russo-Turkish conflicts contributed to the Orientalization of the Ottoman Empire [ in Russian eyes ] and helped to construct Russian identity as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ These words show to what extent the two neighbours have really been inter-dependent , though mostly in a hostile fashion , for long swathes of time .
In the aftermath of the Great War though , the Soviet Union ( as the successor to the Russian Empire ) was at first on friendly terms with its southern neighbour , even providing logistical and other support to the Turkish resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal ( to be known as Atatürk , 1881-1938 ) .
Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was signed in 1925 , which was renewed in 1929 , 1931 , and 1935 , with the Soviet Union even providing technical assistance and interest-free loans .
The outbreak of the Second World War ( 1939-45 ) caused Turkey to engage in a wide of variety of diplomatic manoeuvres which enabled the country to remain neutral till the very end .
As the end of World War II gave way to the Cold War between east and west , with the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan ( August 1945 ) as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict , as deftly argued by Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick in their magisterial Untold History of the United States .
As a result , the Turkish Republic which had just joined the allied side , was drafted into service as a buffer-head against the Communist East .
In the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union , Turkey profited greatly from commercial ties and exchanges with the new states to its north and north-east .
Still , political relations were tense , particularly as Russia violently subdued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow and the Russian Federation ( 1994-97 , 1999-2009 ) .
As Muslims and , as numerous Chechen refugees that had fled for the Ottoman lands whose descendants are now Turks ( or Turkish citizens , if you will ) , the Republic also felt morally obliged to support the Chechen position against Russia .
But eventually , as outlined above , Erdoğan-led Turkey came to an agreement with Putin-led Russia .
But now , Tayyip Erdoğan ’ s open support for Jihadi terrorist activity in Idlib has put a strain on Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been somewhat shaky to begin with in view of the Turkish President ’ s now tedious history of vilifying his Syrian counterpart and Russia ’ s open espousal of the Damascus government .
The Syrian Arab Army ( or SAA ) has been acting against the Turkish observation points in Idlib , which basically constitute a legitimate casus belli as they compose a foreign occupation of home soil , as far as the Assad government is concerned : “ [ t ] he SAA has been encircling Turkish observation posts since August @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria ’ s Russian ally has been equally vocal and forthright about Turkey , its incursion and non-compliance with earlier-made agreements .
Burak Tuygan ’ s earlier-mentioned claim that the Turco-Russian honeymoon is over , did however not take account of the Prez ’ s incredible dancing skills which allow him to pirouette back and forth between east and west , between Moscow and Washington , between Putin and Trump .
And this uncanny ability led to a top-level meeting between Turkish and Russian delegations in Moscow on 17-18 February .
Alas , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real outcome , as subsequently voiced by the AKP spokesman İbrahim Kalın : “ [ t ] here was no satisfactory outcome for Turkey from the meetings with Russia over Syria ’ s Idlib .
We rejected the paper and map offered to us.
” In the next instance , Erdoğan proposed a multilateral meeting on 5 March .
The news agency Reuters reports that the “ German and French leaders expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Idlib and urged an end to the conflict , while the Kremlin said it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ summit ” on 4 March 2020 .
At the same time , Turkey ’ s President has been in touch with his American counterpart , asking for air support and “ for two batteries of Patriot missile systems to shield its border area from air attacks.
” In other words , the Prez keeps performing his breath-taking pirouettes , but one can not but wonder how long he will be able to stay in the air like that .
Assessing these recent Turco-Russian travails , the Hürriyet Daily News columnist Barçın Yinanç recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an utterly cynical fashion , that “ Russian President Vladimir Putin will definitely find a way that Turkey will present as a compromise to its own public.
” Yinanç thus thinks that the Czar will come up with a way for the Prez to save face so that Turkey will be able to have its cake and eat it too .
Will Tayyip Erdoğan ’ s support for the Jihad against Assad spell his end on the international scene possibly leading to a domestic debacle as well , or will he yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and continue ruling his land with an iron fist and an open palm , freely handing out gifts to his supporters and believers ?
!
?
Will Erdoğan succumb to the ‘ Assad must go ’ curse or will he instead continue riding into the sunset ?
!
?
?
As per usual , only time will tell .
*** 21WIRE special contributor Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent historian and geo-political analyst who used to live in Istanbul .
At present , he is in self-imposed exile from Turkey .
He has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history and culture of the Balkans , the greater Middle East , and the world beyond .
He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his graduate work at the universities of Essex and Oxford .
In Oxford , Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002 .
His publications include the revisionist monograph “ Ottomans Looking West ?
” as well as numerous scholarly articles .
In Istanbul , Erimtan started publishing in Today ’ s Zaman and in Hürriyet Daily News @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette .
Subsequently , he commenced writing for RT Op-Edge , NEO , and finally , the 21st Century Wire .
You can find him on Twitter at @ theerimtanangle .
Read Can ’ s archive here .

By
Dr Can Erimtan
21st Century Wire
Turkey and Russia have enjoyed a good relationship over the past years. The Islamist President of the Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (aka the Prez), and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (aka the Czar) have enjoyed very cordial connections in that time – having spoken approximately 40 times over the phone and about 24 times face-to-face since 2016‘s Coup-that-was-no-Coup, according to data provided by BBC Türkçe.
Gone are the days that the Republic of Turkey’s internal and external affairs were encapsulated in Atatürk’s famous phrase ‘Peace at Home, Peace Abroad’ (20 April 1931). That was then and this is now, and now is the New Turkey, a nation of believers led by an overly ambitious Tayyip Erdoğan:
“Turkey has been at the forefront of the armed effort to unseat Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning. Even though in previous years Erdoğan and Assad had been the best of buddies, ever since the supposedly peaceful protests against Damascus came into their own, morphing into Syria’s not-so civil war, he has been adamant about the fact that the Allawite-led regime in Damascus should fall and be replaced by a Sunni-friendly administration arguably headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and/or its proxies,” as I opined in late 2015.
But then President Putin threw a spanner in the works: “Russian warplanes launched their first airstrikes . . . against opposition targets in Syria [on 30 September 2015],” as reported in the mainstream press at the time. And subsequently, the Syrian government formally invited the Russians on 2 October 2015 to send in troops to aid in the fight against various Jihadi factions, including ISIS or the Islamic State, battling to topple the Damascus government. And in the context of Russian planes flying in the local sky, a serious diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Moscow occurred – namely when a Turkish Air Force F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24 that had accidentally intruded into Turkish airspace on 24 November 2015. Following this outright emergency, “Vladimir Putin and Tayyip Erdoğan engaged in a tit-for-tat battle of words about Turkey and its policy aims and goals,” as I wrote at the time. Putin was not shy attacking his Turkish counterpart: “[t]he problem is not the tragedy we witnessed yesterday . . . The problem is much deeper. We observe . . . that the current Turkish leadership over a significant number of years has been pursuing a deliberate policy of supporting the ‘Islamization’ of their country.” This accusation might seem strange in view of the fact that Putin himself is well-known as a champion of the Orthodox Church in Russia. The Czar uttered his words of criticism as part of a “much larger accusatory discourse linking Turkey-under-the-AKP to the Islamic State (or IS/ISIS/ISIL) and its illegitimate oil deals and weapon shipments.” The Prez jocularly responded in kind, saying that “ISIS sells the oil it extracts to Assad. [And t]hat is also where it gets its money from,” linking Putin’s Russia to the Islamic State (or IS/ISIS/ISIL).
Freezing and Thawing and Freezing Again: Russo-Turkish Relations
In spite of this duel of words, the two leaders were eventually able to see eye to eye. Before that rapprochement could happen though, Putin exerted some pressure on Erdoğan, with Russia hitting Turkey with a raft of sanctions – a “[b]an on import of Turkish fruit and vegetables, poultry and salt. [A b]an on sale of Russian package holidays to Turkey. [The s]uspension of construction projects involving Turkish firms in Russia. [As well as r]estrictions on Turkish citizens working for companies registered in Russia [and the s]uspension of new Black Sea pipeline that was to boost Russian gas exports to Turkey,” as dutifully listed by the BBC. In this way, the Czar hit the Prez where it hurt, in his country’s pocketbook. As a result, the latter was duly able to see the error of his ways, which enabled him to come to his senses and tender an apology: “I want to once again express my sympathy and deep condolences to the family of the Russian pilot who died and I say: ‘I’m sorry,’” reports Reuters citing a Kremlin statement (27 June 2016). For in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian jet – crashing in the mountainous Jabal Turkman area of the Syrian province of Latakia – its pilot Lt Col Oleg Peshkov, who had jumped to safety, was killed in the air by an armed group of “Turkmen rebels.”
These so-called “rebels” formed part of the Jihadi terrorist factions fighting the Assad government. The actual Turkmen shooting down the Russian turned out to be a Turkish citizen, a young man called Alparslan Çelik, hailing from the district of Keban in the province of Elazığ, and even more surprising is the fact that this sharpshooting not-quite Syrian Turkmen even turned out to be the son of a one-time mayor belonging to the ultra-nationalist (or fascist, if you will) MHP (or Party of the Nationalist Movement), as indicated by the journalist Tunca Öğreten. This political coloration probably explains why Çelik acted as a commander of the Turkmen brigade roaming the countryside. At the moment, the MHP openly supports the AKP-led government, and as a political grouping the party espouses an openly racist (or Turkist, if you will) agenda. As a Turkist organisation, the MHP always supports and aids each and every social grouping or individual claiming a Turkish (or broadly Turkist) identity. The area where the plane was hit just happened to be a region where members of Syria’s ethnic Turkmen community are living. The Turkish authorities even claimed that the Russian jet that was downed had been taking part in aerial attacks on Turkmen villages in the area, known as Bayirbucak (or Bayırbucak, in Turkish). The Turkish journalist Öğreten even asserts that the Turkmen brigades active in the area were at the time fighting and training with the Jihadi terror group Jabhat al-Nusra (currently known as a ‘HTS’ or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). The veteran rightist journalist and commentator Taha Akyol explains that the “Syrian Turkmens settled in Syria with the Seljuks [1072-1194], the Turkmens at the Bayır and Bucak regions [, on the other hand,] were relocated there from Anatolia by the Ottomans [1299-1922], with the security of the hajj [pilgrimage] route and population strategy in . . . mind,” and even adding that “[f]or this reason, they have many relatives in Turkey,” which could arguably explain Alparslan Çelik’s presence on the ground.
Following Erdoğan’s public apology, things moved pretty quickly. Turkey’s tomato producers were happy again, being able to sell their wares to Russia. AKP-led Ankara was again put into position where dreams of transforming Turkey into a veritable energy hub were alive again, with plans for a TurkStream pipeline actually coming to fruition some time ago. Russian tourists were flocking to Antalya again. And on a political and diplomatic plane, Tayyip Erdoğan’s New Turkey joined the big boys at the negotiation table – as a part of both the Astana Process (which started on 23-4 January 2017) and the Sochi agreement (22 October 2019), negotiated settlements that were meant to bring Syria’s not-so civil war to a conclusion. As a result, Turkey became a part of the New Cold War realignments, taking its place next Russia, China, and Iran – a development that led the pro-AKP political scientist Burhanettin Duran, who happens to be heading the Turkish think tank SETA as its general manager, to state that “Turkey’s Western allies . . . effectively compelled the Turks to work more closely with Moscow and Tehran” (6 October 2017). At that stage, Dr Duran said that Turkey seemed to be “shifting toward the Eurasian axis,” but insightfully added that it is “not possible to ignore the differences of opinion between Russia and Iran.” And the present sudden cooling of the Russo-Turkish love affair all but underlines Duran’s reservations. The latest developments in Syria’s not-so civil war next door suddenly soured relations – so much so that the Turkish writer Burak Tuygan recently even proposed that “this [Turco-Russian] honeymoon could not last long,” particularly now with the “emergence of the developments in Idlib” (12 February 2020). And the Russian Ministry of Defense made no bones about this, releasing a statement saying that “reason for the crisis in the Idlib de-escalation zone unfortunately is the non-fulfilment by our Turkish colleagues of their undertakings to separate moderate opposition militants from terrorists,” a key component of the Sochi agreement. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, for his part, added that “according to [the Sochi agreement], the Turkish side undertook to ensure that terrorist groups in Idlib were neutralised. We continue to note with regret that these groups are carrying out strikes from Idlib on Syrian forces and also taking aggressive action against our military facilities,” adding ominously that “[t]his is unacceptable.”
Sochi and Idlib: One Man’s Terrorist is Another Man’s Freedom Fighter
As such, one can but wonder about Russia and its intentions, as Turkey had been given an impossible task – to separate “moderate opposition militants from terrorists” – given that the mere concept of ‘moderate opposition’ seems alien to the reality on the ground, and particularly in Idlib.
Even the then-U.S. Special US envoy Brett McGurk stated on the record that “Idlib provice is the largest al-Qaeda safe-haven since 9/11, tied directly to Ayman al Zawahiri, this is a huge problem” (27 July 2017). And that seems to be the reason behind the Prez’s current intransigent stance on Idlib, for I have argued elsewhere that he all but sees the “Syrian Theatre as a Laboratory for [his] Islamist Agenda.”
The already mentioned grouping HTS or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham effectively controls the whole province as the ‘key power player,’ imposing its network of Sharia courts on Idlib’s population. Next to HTS, a whole host of other small Jihad terror factions is active in the province – such as the Jabhat al-Wataniya lil-Tahrir (or National Liberation Front/NLF), which the BBC calls a “Turkish-backed rebel alliance,” which arguably denotes its nominal connection with the so-called FSA (or al-Jaysh as-Sūrī al-Ḥurr or Free Syrian Army) now somewhat disingenuously renamed as the SNA (or al-Jaysh al-Watani as-Sūrī or Syrian National Army); Hurras al-Din (or Guardians of Religion); and significantly, the TIP (or Hizb al-Islami al-Turkistani or Turkistan Islamic Party). In connection with the latter grouping, the HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a) had this to say in a recent interview with the International Crisis Group (ICG): “As for the Turkistan Islamic Party, things are a little different. These guys have been in Syria for seven years and have never constituted a threat to the outside world. They are committed solely to defending Idlib against regime aggression. As Uighurs, they face persecution in China – which we strongly condemn – and they have nowhere else to go. Of course, I sympathise with them. But their struggle in China is not ours, so we tell them that they are welcome here as long as they abide by our rules – which they do.” In other words, I would argue that Turkey, or at the very least, the now firmly AKP-aligned MHP or its popular formations known as the Grey Wolves (or Bozkurt or Ülkücü, in Turkish) have been instrumental in transporting these Islamist Uighurs to the Syrian theatre where they enthusiastically joined the Jihad against Assad as a kind of displaced fight against the Chinese authorities back home in Xinjiang. This is explained by the San Francisco-based author Chris Kanthan: “[f]rom 2009 to 2015, there were a lot of terrorist attacks by the [Uighur] jihadists (here’s an example). That’s when China decided to really crack down. During the peak of the Syrian war, about 18,000 radicalized [Uighur] Muslims went to Syria and joined ISIS to fight Assad,” with the aid of the New Turkey’s now government-allied Grey Wolves, no doubt.
Publicly though, the Prez shies away from endorsing any kind of Islamist or Jihadi agenda in Syria, instead uttering words expressive of quite different goals and intentions: “[o]ur military observation posts play a vital role [in Idlib] and they shall remain in place . . . we have informed [the Russians] that we will not permit [the realisation of] a civil massacre and a [new] migratory wave [of refugees].” Tayyip Erdoğan made these announcements on 3 February 2020, while visiting the Ukraine. In fact, the Turkish President is really playing with fire, as on the previous day, the Turkish government pledged aid consisting of TL 200 million ($33.4 million) to be spent on the needs of the Ukrainian army, as confirmed by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey, Andrey Sibiga. Given the tense situation in the east of the country where pro-Russian forces are facing the onslaught of the Ukrainian army as well as far-right armed groups such as the Azov Battalion – a conflict which the West likes to portray as an example of “Russian aggression” – this sample of Turkish generosity cannot be seen as anything but the Prez standing up to and challenging the Czar. Whereas, with regard to Syria, the messages broadcast by Erdoğan convey broadly humanitarian concerns (with possible massacres and refugee crises), even implying that the purpose of the observation posts which Turkey has installed on Syrian territories only function as guaranteeing AKP-led Ankara’s philanthropic considerations for Idlib’s population. In reality though, these much-vaunted incursions of Syrian sovereignty do not even appear to have been part of Turkish government policy or even an initiative of Turkey’s Armed Forces (TSK). Instead, erecting observation posts all across Idlib was an idea that Tayyip Erdoğan received from his close adviser Adnan Tanrıverdi and the organisation he founded and supervises, SADAT A.Ş. This organsation presents itself as the “first and the only company in Turkey, that internationally provides consultancy and military training services at the international defense and interior security sector.” In other words, rather than fulfilling either a strategic or tactical function within Turkey’s military designs in Syria, the posts appear to have sprung-up in response to an operation designed and facilitated by a private entity and paid for by the Turkish state. In this way, the traditional love for privatisation displayed by the AKP has now also become part of Turkey’s military operations, which means that Erdoğan has now also privatised the business of war. In a way, this revamping of Turkish military affairs seems to echo Donald Rumsfeld’s plans originally voiced on 10 September 2001. And this means that a move interpreted by many as proving the New Turkey’s expansionist leanings is in reality part of a wider money-making scheme concocted by one of the Prez’s henchmen – Adnan Tanrıverdi, the man who late last year caused quite a stir in the country as he had publicly stated that “[w]e must prepare the ground for the coming of the Mahdi.” To be clear, I would like to remind everybody that both “Sunni Muslims and Shia are awaiting a person who is referred to as Al-Mahdi (Shia call him Imam Mahdi because they are expecting him to be their 12th Imam) . . . There is no Hadith that tells us explicitly the actual name of the Mahdi,” as can be read on the website Discovering Islam.
Russia and Turkey: Neighbours, Rivals, and Enemies or Friends
Though neighbours sharing the Black Sea, Turkey has had a troubled relationship with Russia for a long time – indeed, a very long time, if we want to put our trust in Professor Dr Halil İnalcık (1916-2026), Turkey’s godfather of Ottoman history and historiography, who penned a scholarly article back in 1947, pointing to the year 1569 as marking the beginning of the “Ottoman–Russian Rivalry.” A rivalry that was to lead to open warfare a little more than a century later (1677-78). And today’s AKP-ruled pseudo-Ottoman Turkey has been torn inside a veritable love-hate relationship with its northern neighbour. Whereas Turkey is oftentimes seen as a bridge straddling Europe and Asia, Russia as a political and cultural construct is understood as occupying a “dual or median position between Europe and Asia,” as expressed by the well-respected Russia specialist Dr Marlene Laruelle. These obtuse words (or this exercise in downright academic verbiage) seem to denote that Russian Westernisation moved along more quickly than had been the case for Turkey (or its Ottoman imperial predecessor). In fact, Czar Peter the Great (1682-1725) appears to have single-handedly initiated if not achieved this feat of material and cultural transformation, by “forcing Russia into the western world,” as worded by the eminent historian B. H. Sumner (1893-1951) in 1950. In this way, Czar Peter once and for all removed Mother Russia from the Orient where she had previously assumed the position of the defunct ‘Byzantine Empire’ (330-1453) as the local Christian Orthodox powerhouse. In her new book, Reclaiming Byzantium, the historian Dr Pınar Üre argues that “Imperial Russia opened one of the world’s leading centres for Byzantine archaeology in Istanbul [in 1894], the Russian Archaeological Institute – its purpose was to stake the claim that Russia was the correct heir to ‘Czargrad’ (as Istanbul was referred to in Russian circles).” Dr Üre’s work adds a religious dimension to the tension present between Moscow and Istanbul (nowadays, Ankara of course), a dimension that very likely has not escaped President Putin’s attention either, as I would argue that he ‘has been pushing an Orthodox agenda at home ever since he came to power at the end of the year 1999.’ Still, away from such religious or ideological spheres, in terms of modernisation as Westernisation, the Ottomans (or Turkey, if you will) have been lagging behind, as they were only able to enter the European Concert of Nations about a century later than their northern neighbours – like Peter the Great, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) forced his subjects to dress in European fashion and “completely changed the structure of the Ottoman Empire. Westernization in the real sense began during his reign,” as declared by the popular Turkish historian Erhan Afyoncu. Sultan Mahmud’s son and successor Abdülmecid (1839-61) proclaimed the Gülhane Imperial Edict which led directly to the Tanzimat reforms (1839-76) that thoroughly modernized the Ottoman state and its institutions.
These two neighbours located at Europe’s eastern flank thus both went though a process of drastic modernisation as Westernisation only to find themselves at loggerheads with each other more often than not: “Russo-Ottoman wars took place between the late 17th and the late 19th centuries . . . Russia [has been] at war with the Ottoman Empire . . . more frequently . . . than with any other power,” explains the historian Victor Taki. In his 2016 book Tsar and Sultan, Dr Taki even reasons that primarily textual “representations of the brutal realities of the Russo-Turkish conflicts contributed to the Orientalization of the Ottoman Empire [in Russian eyes] and helped to construct Russian identity as the counter-image of the demonized Turk.” These words show to what extent the two neighbours have really been inter-dependent, though mostly in a hostile fashion, for long swathes of time. In the aftermath of the Great War though, the Soviet Union (as the successor to the Russian Empire) was at first on friendly terms with its southern neighbour, even providing logistical and other support to the Turkish resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal (to be known as Atatürk, 1881-1938). Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (1923), a Turco-Soviet Friendship Treaty was signed in 1925, which was renewed in 1929, 1931, and 1935, with the Soviet Union even providing technical assistance and interest-free loans. The outbreak of the Second World War (1939-45) caused Turkey to engage in a wide of variety of diplomatic manoeuvres which enabled the country to remain neutral till the very end. As the end of World War II gave way to the Cold War between east and west, with the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan (August 1945) as the informal opening shot of the latter conflict, as deftly argued by Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick in their magisterial Untold History of the United States. As a result, the Turkish Republic which had just joined the allied side, was drafted into service as a buffer-head against the Communist East. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey profited greatly from commercial ties and exchanges with the new states to its north and north-east. Still, political relations were tense, particularly as Russia violently subdued Chechen separatists intent on breaking away from Moscow and the Russian Federation (1994-97, 1999-2009). As Muslims and, as numerous Chechen refugees that had fled for the Ottoman lands whose descendants are now Turks (or Turkish citizens, if you will), the Republic also felt morally obliged to support the Chechen position against Russia. But eventually, as outlined above, Erdoğan-led Turkey came to an agreement with Putin-led Russia.
Currently in Idlib
But now, Tayyip Erdoğan’s open support for Jihadi terrorist activity in Idlib has put a strain on Turkey’s relationship with Russia, which had been somewhat shaky to begin with in view of the Turkish President’s now tedious history of vilifying his Syrian counterpart and Russia’s open espousal of the Damascus government. The Syrian Arab Army (or SAA) has been acting against the Turkish observation points in Idlib, which basically constitute a legitimate casus belli as they compose a foreign occupation of home soil, as far as the Assad government is concerned: “[t]he SAA has been encircling Turkish observation posts since August 2019 as it recaptured opposition-held territories.” Syria’s Russian ally has been equally vocal and forthright about Turkey, its incursion and non-compliance with earlier-made agreements.
Burak Tuygan’s earlier-mentioned claim that the Turco-Russian honeymoon is over, did however not take account of the Prez’s incredible dancing skills which allow him to pirouette back and forth between east and west, between Moscow and Washington, between Putin and Trump. And this uncanny ability led to a top-level meeting between Turkish and Russian delegations in Moscow on 17-18 February. Alas, these meetings seem to have produced no real outcome, as subsequently voiced by the AKP spokesman İbrahim Kalın: “[t]here was no satisfactory outcome for Turkey from the meetings with Russia over Syria’s Idlib. We rejected the paper and map offered to us.” In the next instance, Erdoğan proposed a multilateral meeting on 5 March. The news agency Reuters reports that the “German and French leaders expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Idlib and urged an end to the conflict, while the Kremlin said it is discussing the possibility of holding a four-way summit” on 4 March 2020. At the same time, Turkey’s President has been in touch with his American counterpart, asking for air support and “for two batteries of Patriot missile systems to shield its border area from air attacks.” In other words, the Prez keeps performing his breath-taking pirouettes, but one cannot but wonder how long he will be able to stay in the air like that.
Assessing these recent Turco-Russian travails, the Hürriyet Daily News columnist Barçın Yinanç recently proposed, in a matter-of-fact manner or in an utterly cynical fashion, that “Russian President Vladimir Putin will definitely find a way that Turkey will present as a compromise to its own public.” Yinanç thus thinks that the Czar will come up with a way for the Prez to save face so that Turkey will be able to have its cake and eat it too.
Will Tayyip Erdoğan’s support for the Jihad against Assad spell his end on the international scene possibly leading to a domestic debacle as well, or will he yet again be able to stay on top and continue ruling his land with an iron fist and an open palm, freely handing out gifts to his supporters and believers?!?
Will Erdoğan succumb to the ‘Assad must go’ curse or will he instead continue riding into the sunset?!?? As per usual, only time will tell.
***
21WIRE special contributor Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent historian and geo-political analyst who used to live in Istanbul. At present, he is in self-imposed exile from Turkey. He has a wide interest in the politics, history and culture of the Balkans. the greater Middle East, and the world beyond.. He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his graduate work at the universities of Essex and Oxford. In Oxford, Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002. His publications include the revisionist monograph “Ottomans Looking West?” as well as numerous scholarly articles. In Istanbul, Erimtan started publishing in the English language Turkish press, culminating in him becoming the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette. Subsequently, he commenced writing for RT Op-Edge, NEO, and finally, the 21st Century Wire. You can find him on Twitter at @TheErimtanAngle. Read Can’s archive here.
READ MORE TURKEY NEWS AT: 21st Century Wire Turkey Files
SUPPORT OUR MEDIA PLATFORM – BECOME A MEMBER @21WIRE.TV


21stcenturywire--2020-02-28--UKC News: Turkey and NATO Pushing for War, Assange in Court, Mini Nukes

This week Turkey seems determined to push hostilities to the brink of all-out war with its provocations in Idlib , @ @ @ @ @ drag NATO into the crisis ?
This past week , part one of the US @ @ @ @ @ Julian Assange took place in London as his defense team battled US lawyers and a @ @ @ @ @ client being rendered to the US .
Also , the US announce their mini-nukes arsenal @ @ @ @ @ award for their outstanding achievement in producing bias propaganda .
All this and more .
@ @ @ @ @ Henningsen with his week ’ s top stories .
Watch :

By
This week Turkey seems determined to push hostilities to the brink of all-out war with its provocations in Idlib, Syria. Will they successfully drag NATO into the crisis? This past week, part one of the US extradition hearing for WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange took place in London as his defense team battled US lawyers and a British judge to prevent their client being rendered to the US. Also, the US announce their mini-nukes arsenal, and BBC receive new award for their outstanding achievement in producing bias propaganda. All this and more.
Co-hosts Mike Robinson and Patrick Henningsen with this week’s top stories. Watch:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wu71Z-cM3CM
.
SUPPORT OUR MEDIA PLATFORM – BECOME A MEMBER @21WIRE.TV


21stcenturywire--2020-03-01--Episode #317 – ‘The Next Big Crisis ’ with guests Dr Can Erimtan and more

Episode # 317 of SUNDAY WIRE SHOW resumes on March 1 , 2020 with host Patrick Henningsen , broadcasting LIVE on the Alternate Current Radio Network ( ACR ) … 5pm-8pm UK Time | 12pm-3pm ET ( US ) | 9am-12pm PT ( US ) This week the SUNDAY WIRE broadcasts LIVE on ACR with host Patrick Henningsen covering the top stories in the US , Europe and internationally .
This week , we look back at the Julian Assange US extradition hearing in London , what happened and what it means going forward .
We ’ ll take a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and try to get a rational fix on what exactly is happening , also we ’ ll cover the Bolivian election study which exonerates Evo Morales , as well as Trump ’ s ‘ peace deal ’ for Afghanistan – will it really last ?
Later in the first hour , we ’ re joined by author and scholar of Turkish history and politics , Dr Can Erimtan , to talk about the newest crisis brewing over Idlib , Syria – with Erdogan and Turkey attacking Syria and threatening to pull in NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the final segment we ’ ll talk with SUNDAY WIRE Roving Correspondent for Culture & Sport , Basil Valentine , about the inside manuevers of the British state regarding the Assange case and other related news .
All this and much , much more .
Enjoy the show… See more LIVE reporting of Assange march and court hearing @ 21WIRE on Twitter ONE WEEK LEFT : SUPPORT 21WIRE – DONATE TO OUR WINTER FUNDRAISING DRIVE !
AND ALSO BECOME A TEAM MEMBER @ 21WIRE.TV *NOTE : THIS EPISODE MAY CONTAIN STRONG @ @ @ @

By
Episode #317 of SUNDAY WIRE SHOW resumes on March 1, 2020 with host Patrick Henningsen, broadcasting LIVE on the Alternate Current Radio Network (ACR)…
LISTEN LIVE ON THIS PAGE – START TIMES:
5pm-8pm UK Time | 12pm-3pm EST (US) | 9am-12pm PST (US)
This week the SUNDAY WIRE broadcasts LIVE on ACR with host Patrick Henningsen covering the top stories in the US, Europe and internationally. This week, we look back at the Julian Assange US extradition hearing in London, what happened and what it means going forward. We’ll take a look at the Coronavirus fear and hype and try to get a rational fix on what exactly is happening, also we’ll cover the Bolivian election study which exonerates Evo Morales, as well as Trump’s ‘peace deal’ for Afghanistan – will it really last? Later in the first hour, we’re joined by author and scholar of Turkish history and politics, Dr Can Erimtan, to talk about the newest crisis brewing over Idlib, Syria – with Erdogan and Turkey attacking Syria and threatening to pull in NATO if anyone dares to engage with them. In the final segment we’ll talk with SUNDAY WIRE Roving Correspondent for Culture & Sport, Basil Valentine, about the inside manuevers of the British state regarding the Assange case and other related news. All this and much, much more. Enjoy the show…
See more LIVE reporting of Assange march and court hearing @21WIRE on Twitter
ONE WEEK LEFT: SUPPORT 21WIRE – DONATE TO OUR WINTER FUNDRAISING DRIVE!
AND ALSO BECOME A TEAM MEMBER@21WIRE.TV
*NOTE: THIS EPISODE MAY CONTAIN STRONG LANGUAGE AND MATURE THEMES*
Download Episode #317
Sunday Wire Radio Show Archives


21stcenturywire--2020-03-01--Iranian Forces in Syria Warn Turkey Over Recent Drone Strikes in Idlib

While the US is well known for its prolific use of combat UAV drones aircraft , there is relatively little awareness about Turkey ’ s own expansive domestic drone program .
Since the battle for Idlib was ramped-up in recent week , every day has featured a story about a Turkish drone which either hit a Syrian Arab Army target , or which was shot down .
Turkey is using drones as a way to side skirt having to deploy its manned F16 combat fighter jets into a air space which is currently controlled by the Russian and Syrian air @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state , now appears to be using its drones to target “ Iranian ” positions on the front lines in Idlib .
The Iranian Consultative Center in Syria , an operations room commanding Iranian forces in the country , revealed on February 29 that several of its fighters were killed in the recent Turkish drone and artillery strikes on Greater Idlib .
In an official statement , the center said the Turkish military attacked Iranian-backed troops near the Aleppo-Damascus highway , known as the M5 .
The Turkish strikes were meant to support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highway .
According to the center , the Turkish side was asked through mediators to halt its strikes .
However , it went on , killing several Iranian-backed fighters .
In what appears to be a warning , the center said its forces could attack Turkish troops in Greater Idlib , but the order from the political leadership is to not fire at them .
“ The Iranian consultative center , and the Mujahedeen of the resistance front , call on the Turkish forces to act rationally in the interests of the Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people that their sons have been present for a month in the range of our forces and we could take revenge , but we did not do so in response to the orders of our leadership , and we call on them [ Turkish people ] to pressure the Turkish leadership to reform its decisions , ” the statement , that was shared by the U-News agency , reads .
Earlier , Lebanese sources revealed that nine fighters of Hezbollah were killed in recent Turkish drone strikes on Greater Idlib .
An Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strikes .
Turkey ’ s aggressive moves in Greater Idlib are apparently provoking Syria ’ s allies .
Any more escalation by Ankara could lead to a serious military confrontation in the region .

By
IMAGE: TAI “Anka” unmanned aerial vehicles developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries (Image: Twitter)
While the US is well known for its prolific use of combat UAV drones aircraft, there is relatively little awareness about Turkey’s own expansive domestic drone program.
Since the battle for Idlib was ramped-up in recent week, every day has featured a story about a Turkish drone which either hit a Syrian Arab Army target, or which was shot down. Turkey is using drones as a way to side skirt having to deploy its manned F16 combat fighter jets into a air space which is currently controlled by the Russian and Syrian air forces.
Turkey, a NATO member state, now appears to be using its drones to target “Iranian” positions on the front lines in Idlib.
South Front reports…
The Iranian Consultative Center in Syria, an operations room commanding Iranian forces in the country, revealed on February 29 that several of its fighters were killed in the recent Turkish drone and artillery strikes on Greater Idlib.
In an official statement, the center said the Turkish military attacked Iranian-backed troops near the Aleppo-Damascus highway, known as the M5. The Turkish strikes were meant to support an attack by al-Qaeda-affiliated militants on the highway.
According to the center, the Turkish side was asked through mediators to halt its strikes. However, it went on, killing several Iranian-backed fighters.
In what appears to be a warning, the center said its forces could attack Turkish troops in Greater Idlib, but the order from the political leadership is to not fire at them.
“The Iranian consultative center, and the Mujahedeen of the resistance front, call on the Turkish forces to act rationally in the interests of the Syrian and Turkish peoples, reminding the Turkish people that their sons have been present for a month in the range of our forces and we could take revenge, but we did not do so in response to the orders of our leadership, and we call on them [Turkish people] to pressure the Turkish leadership to reform its decisions,” the statement, that was shared by the U-News agency, reads.
Earlier, Lebanese sources revealed that nine fighters of Hezbollah were killed in recent Turkish drone strikes on Greater Idlib. An Iranian field commander was also killed in the strikes.
Turkey’s aggressive moves in Greater Idlib are apparently provoking Syria’s allies. Any more escalation by Ankara could lead to a serious military confrontation in the region.
Turkish drones had a shitty day yesterday. Anka-S drone downed/crashed in Idlib and wreckage recovered by Syrian Army including intact rocket. Going to be sent to Russia. They also lost yet another Bayraktar TB2 drone in Libya. pic.twitter.com/JVTZxw0KwF — Serge (@Zinvor) February 26, 2020
READ MORE SYRIA NEWS AT: 21st Century Wire Syria Files
SUPPORT OUR MEDIA PLATFORM – BECOME A MEMBER @21WIRE.TV


21stcenturywire--2020-02-29--Idlib’s Bloody Thursday: Where Fake News and Martyrdom Collide

Syria ’ s not-so civil war is now finally nearing its end .
.
.
but not if Turkey ’ s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ( or the Prez ) can have his way .
At present , he seems hell-bent on preserving the province of Idlid as a protected zone , protected by his words and Turkey ’ s army stationed across the area .
But things might not be that easy after all .
Ever since Turkey supposedly switched sides and started co-operating with Russia , Syria ’ s not-so civil war next door has been a sore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Russian presidents quite tense at times .
And now , this sore spot has exploded like a huge pus-filled cyst , covering the Prez and his soldiers in an ill-smelling mixture of blood and misery .
Thursday ( 27 February 2020 ) night , pro-AKP television channels started reporting about “ Russian ” aerial assaults on the Turkish Army ( TSK or Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ) , indicating that numerous Turkish soldiers had been injured and many perished in the attack , calling them ‘ martyrs ’ ( şehit , in Turkish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the pro-AKP Daily Sabah carried the following item : “ [ t ] hirty-three Turkish soldiers were killed and 32 others were injured in a Russian-backed Assad regime airstrike in northwestern Syria ’ s Idlib Thursday , according to the governor of Hatay , Rahmi Doğan .
Gov .
Doğan initially confirmed the death toll as nine but later increased the number to 22 , 29 and eventually , 33 .
Another 32 wounded Turkish soldiers are in stable condition and are receiving treatment in hospitals , he added .
With the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the recent escalation of tensions reached a tipping point.
” At that point , Tayyip Erdoğan convened “ an impromptu # Idlib summit at his palace in Ankara ’ s # Beştepe , ” as I tweeted subsequently ( at 9:34 PM , Feb 27 , 2020 ) .
This summit seems to have lasted two hours and rather surprisingly , next pro-AKP media reported that the Turkish Army had ‘ killed more that 1,700 Syrian soldiers ’ ( belonging to the Syrian Arab Army or SAA ) in the past 17 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkish medical doctors apparently active on the ground in the neighbouring Turkish area of Hatay , claimed on social media that the remains of close to a hundred dead Turkish soldiers had arrived in various hospitals across the province .
In addition , they indicated that apparretly one complete battalion ( tabur , in Turkish ) had been struck in the assault .
The independent news outlet dokuz8HABER tweeted footage purporting to show the arrival of numerous “ lifeless bodies ” and “ wounded ” individuals at the Reyhanlı State Hospital .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Turkish YouTube user called “ Erdal Erdoğan ” posted a video consisting of footage of scenes reminiscent of the just-mentioned dokuz8HABER tweeted video , showing multitudes of people congregating in front of a building that appears to be a hospital .
The YouTube video was removed in the course of the same day .
Accompanying the images in the now no longer available clip are various voice messages supposedly pertaining to individual Turkish soldiers posted in the region of Idlib .
The video starts out with a voice saying that the situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past four to five days Turkish positions ( arguably referring to the observation posts that have been set upon the recommendation of the consultancy SADAT A.Ş.
, founded and led by the Sunni zealot Adnan Tanrıverdi ) have been assaulted by F-16 fighter jets ( this claim seems spurious or simply mistaken , as Syria and Russia do not possess F16 fighters ) .
Continuing his account , the anonymous voice adds that the jets destroy the buildings located inside the Turkish observation posts , and that those soldiers remaining inside do not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ buried in the rubble .
The voice then adds that Turkish soldiers of his unit were able to listen to the attacking forces wireless ’ communications via the members of the FSA ( or Free Syrian Army now renamed the Syrian National Army ) , who arguably did the translating .
These intercepted messages indicated that the unit to which the anonymous voice belonged was next on the list of targets to be attacked .
Rather sheepishly , the anonymous voice next admits that he is now on Turkish soil , as he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the remains of his dead fellow-soldiers ( whom he calls , ‘ martyrs ’ ) to the Turkish border crossing at Çilvegözü .
SEE ALSO : Turkey ’ s Eurasianist Moment : The Importance of Idlib and Russia Another testimonials adds that the mainstream media ( in Turkey ) are spreading lies , and that the public should not give them any credence .
In the next instance , another voice adds that a battalion belonging to the “ 65 .
Mekanize Piyade Tugayı ” ( or the 65th Mechanised Artillery Brigade , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city of Lüleburgaz ) was also hit .
The İstanbul-based independent news website HaberERK , run by an Editor-in-Chief called Nil Apaydın , ran a story on this tank unit the same night ( story published at “ 22:46 ” ) , indicating that “ numerous martyrs were incurred as a result of aerial attack ” executed by “ regime forces.
“ In fact , only the sub-headline talks about the tank brigade , while the bulk of the story consists of rehashed bit of information gleaned from Turkey ’ s mainstream media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the video posted by “ Erdal Erdoğan ” contains different voices that indicate that “ 40 martyrs ” were transported to Turkey , or that “ 58 coffins ” have been taken to the border town of Reyhanlı or that “ 20 to 30 martyrs ” were transported to the Turkish province of Hatay .
An anonymous WhatsApp message ( again , as yet unverified ) purportedly also belonging to a Turkish soldier stationed in Idlib , and distributed by the already mentioned collective of Turkish medical doctors contains even starker words and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tank brigade hailing from the province of Tunceli had been brought over to assist the 65th Mechanised Artillery Brigade , only to be completely obliterated from above by yet another aerial attack .
The message specifies that Turkish troops suffered many dead and wounded , with many hapless soldiers stuck underneath the rubble of destroyed structures within the compound of the observation post under attack .
The anonymous WhatsApp message declares that the Turkish Army suffered approximately 240 casualties as a result of the enemy attack , an attack that took place during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s important to note also that all this coincided with reports of a coordinated social media blackout in Turkey following the attack on Turkish forces on Thursday .
This would indicate the possibility that Ankara was attempting to control the narrative , and worried about information circulating on those platforms .
If anything , these unverified reports clearly indicate that the Prez ’ s propaganda bullhorns are skillfully spreading fake news ( to employ the term popularised if not coined by Donald Trump ) .
And it would seem that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ readily believes the lies spread by the government and its willing propaganda outlets expert at distributing fake news as the ‘ truth ’ for those who want to believe .
The Official Response : Stacking the Mountain of Martyrs On its official website , Turkey ’ s Armed Forces ( TSK ) , support a webpage with the ominous heading ŞEHİTLERİMİZ ( or , ‘ OUR MARTYRS ’ ) .
The page contains the names of two individuals that perished on the 26th of February , and those of 34 others who were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February 2020 ) , the Army thus adheres to the official story , dutifully spread by the pro-AKP mainstream media , while the figure of the Prez himself has been conspicuously absent in the aftermath of Idlib ’ s Bloody Thursday , only managing to emerge two days later to address a group of AKP deputies at a meeting in Istanbul , telling his believers the following : “ I asked Putin for Russia to leave the Turkish forces alone to fight the regime [ Syrian government ] , we can ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there , ” communicating that he had been on the phone again with his Russian counterpart .
Erdoğan then sounded a bit like George W. Bush , “ [ i ] f we do not clear our borders from terrorists now , we might have to fight bigger wars inside Turkey later on.
” And in a sure way to deflect attention away from Turkish losses , he next started bragging that “ [ s ] everal sites , including airfields , ammunition depots , air defense systems , hangars and chemical weapon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and destroyed ” – specifying that the TSK had destroyed seven chemical sites , and nearly 300 military vehicles , including 94 tanks , and killed more than 2,100 SAA troops .
And that was probably the main message , as claims of 2,100 is a lot more than 240 and a whole lot more than 36 .
The independent journalist Ayşenur Arslan , appearing on the opposition television channel Halk TV , remarked that the President ’ s words were most puzzling indeed and indicative of the latter ’ s bloodlust .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ discourse , Erdoğan namely said that “ [ w ] e have to keep this in mind , the mountain of martyrs is never empty , [ and ] will not stay empty .
If you squeeze these territories , then these lands will gush martyrs , ” indicating that he seems prepared to sacrifice more conscripts on the altar of his policy of Sunnification in Idlib .
Arslan is correct in her assessment , as these words seem detached from the day-to-day reality of most Turks trying make ends meet in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic crisis at the moment .
Even more amazing is the fact that Tayyip Erdoğan used the expression “ şüheda ” when talking about martyrs .
As such , these days very few Turks are probably aware of this expression , as it is the Arabic plural form of the singular noun şehid ( spelled with a , in Turkish ) .
It seems that the Prez is ready to sacrifice more innocent lives in the pursuit of his ultimate goal – a goal that I would describe as establishing an Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the whole of Syria ) and in the next instance , in the New Turkey .
Ayşenur Arslan was equally baffled by Erdoğan ’ s answer to the query why the Turkish Army is actually present in Syria .
Arguably in an attempt to upstage Putin , who sent his forces into Syria upon having received an official invitation , the Turkish President quipped that the Turkish Army is at present in Syria , upon the “ invitation of the Syrian people ” and the absurdity of the statement speaks for itself .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ keep the Turkish people ’ s minds occupied by means of boasting about the numbers of SAA soldiers killed and about the amount of Syrian hardware destroyed .
And in another “ genius move , ” as worded by the independent journalist Adem Yavuz Arslan , Erdoğan next played a hand revealing his often-mentioned refugee card as a persuasive instrument of pressure on the EU .
While also diverting attention from the fact that Turkish troops and Turkish observation posts on Syrian soil probably do constitute a valid casus belli , the Prez @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fire : “ We can not handle a new influx of refugees but we can not leave those people at the mercy of the Assad regime either .
.
.
What did we do yesterday [ Friday ] ?
We opened the doors .
We will not close those doors .
.
.
Why ?
Because the European Union should keep its promises.
” For , the West ’ s mainstream media as well as Turkey ’ s pro-AKP propaganda outlets have for the past weeks and months continuously repeated the mantra that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stronghold ( as if the Jihadi terrorist of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and/or its many allies and/or affiliates were Jedi Knights fighting the Evil Empire ) on the verge of falling for the cruel and inhumane onslaught of Assad and his Russian allies .
This narrative is very similar or perhaps I should say , the same as the one employed in Libya back in 2011 .
The population of Idlib has presently swollen to an UN-estimated “ 3 million people , including 1 million children ” from a mere million and a half @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 500,000 opponents of the Assad government have fled to the north-west of the country , as they apparently felt more at ease living under a network of Sharia courts , instituted by HTS .
In the meantime , these 500,000 adults managed to produce one million children , though some of them might have simply joined their fleeing parents , while a fair amount of these children were probably born in Idlib .
And that would mean that about a million and a half Sharia-minded refugees would end up in the New Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not readily available to indicate the actual percentage of Idlib ’ s original population remaining in the province , the numbers might be a lot bigger .
.
.
but at the very least , 1.5 million Syrians could arguably end up on the Prez ’ s doorstep .
But in reality , the refugees that are now flocking to the Greek border or are now attempting to cross the Mediterranean to get to the Greeks islands are for the most part people that have fled dire circumstances in Afghanistan , Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conditions and who through whatever tortuous route have ended up in AKP-led Turkey .
If anything , this denotes that Recept Tayyip Erdoğan is playing a most disingenuous game with the EU and the population of Turkey .
.
.
he is at present playing poker with two separate hands : one promising a replenishing of the mountain of martyrs with Turkish citizens and the other , blackmailing the EU with multitudes of brown-skinned people fleeing unstable regions and desirous of a better life .
Will people be able to call his bluff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet again to be an accomplished and cunning trickster .
.
.
an artful trickster employing fake news and human misery to his best advantage ?
*** 21WIRE special contributor Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent historian and geo-political analyst who used to live in Istanbul .
At present , he is in self-imposed exile from Turkey .
He has a wide interest in the politics , history and culture of the Balkans , the greater Middle East , and the world beyond .
He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Oxford .
In Oxford , Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002 .
His publications include the revisionist monograph “ Ottomans Looking West ?
” as well as numerous scholarly articles .
In Istanbul , Erimtan started publishing in Today ’ s Zaman and in Hürriyet Daily News .
In the next instance , he became the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette .
Subsequently , he commenced writing for RT Op-Edge , NEO , and finally , the 21st Century @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Twitter at @ theerimtanangle .
Read Can ’ s archive here .

By
Dr Can Erimtan
21st Century Wire
Syria’s not-so civil war is now finally nearing its end . . . but not if Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (or the Prez) can have his way. At present, he seems hell-bent on preserving the province of Idlid as a protected zone, protected by his words and Turkey’s army stationed across the area. But things might not be that easy after all.
Ever since Turkey supposedly switched sides and started co-operating with Russia, Syria’s not-so civil war next door has been a sore spot that made relation between the Turkish and Russian presidents quite tense at times. And now, this sore spot has exploded like a huge pus-filled cyst, covering the Prez and his soldiers in an ill-smelling mixture of blood and misery.
Thursday (27 February 2020) night, pro-AKP television channels started reporting about “Russian” aerial assaults on the Turkish Army (TSK or Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri), indicating that numerous Turkish soldiers had been injured and many perished in the attack, calling them ‘martyrs’ (şehit, in Turkish). At about the same time, the pro-AKP Daily Sabah carried the following item: “[t]hirty-three Turkish soldiers were killed and 32 others were injured in a Russian-backed Assad regime airstrike in northwestern Syria’s Idlib Thursday, according to the governor of Hatay, Rahmi Doğan. Gov. Doğan initially confirmed the death toll as nine but later increased the number to 22, 29 and eventually, 33. Another 32 wounded Turkish soldiers are in stable condition and are receiving treatment in hospitals, he added. With the attack, the growing alarm in Ankara over the recent escalation of tensions reached a tipping point.”
At that point, Tayyip Erdoğan convened “an impromptu #Idlib summit at his palace in Ankara’s #Beştepe,” as I tweeted subsequently (at 9:34 PM, Feb 27, 2020). This summit seems to have lasted two hours and rather surprisingly, next pro-AKP media reported that the Turkish Army had ‘killed more that 1,700 Syrian soldiers’ (belonging to the Syrian Arab Army or SAA) in the past 17 days. At the same time, Turkish medical doctors apparently active on the ground in the neighbouring Turkish area of Hatay, claimed on social media that the remains of close to a hundred dead Turkish soldiers had arrived in various hospitals across the province. In addition, they indicated that apparretly one complete battalion (tabur, in Turkish) had been struck in the assault. The independent news outlet dokuz8HABER tweeted footage purporting to show the arrival of numerous “lifeless bodies” and “wounded” individuals at the Reyhanlı State Hospital.
Unverified Reports: 240 not 34 Casualties
At about the same time Thursday night, a Turkish YouTube user called “Erdal Erdoğan” posted a video consisting of footage of scenes reminiscent of the just-mentioned dokuz8HABER tweeted video, showing multitudes of people congregating in front of a building that appears to be a hospital. The YouTube video was removed in the course of the same day. Accompanying the images in the now no longer available clip are various voice messages supposedly pertaining to individual Turkish soldiers posted in the region of Idlib. The video starts out with a voice saying that the situation is very dire, that for the past four to five days Turkish positions (arguably referring to the observation posts that have been set upon the recommendation of the consultancy SADAT A.Ş., founded and led by the Sunni zealot Adnan Tanrıverdi) have been assaulted by F-16 fighter jets (this claim seems spurious or simply mistaken, as Syria and Russia do not possess F16 fighters). Continuing his account, the anonymous voice adds that the jets destroy the buildings located inside the Turkish observation posts, and that those soldiers remaining inside do not have any way of escaping and are buried in the rubble. The voice then adds that Turkish soldiers of his unit were able to listen to the attacking forces wireless’ communications via the members of the FSA (or Free Syrian Army now renamed the Syrian National Army), who arguably did the translating. These intercepted messages indicated that the unit to which the anonymous voice belonged was next on the list of targets to be attacked. Rather sheepishly, the anonymous voice next admits that he is now on Turkish soil, as he had been given the task of accompanying the remains of his dead fellow-soldiers (whom he calls, ‘martyrs’) to the Turkish border crossing at Çilvegözü.
SEE ALSO: Turkey’s Eurasianist Moment: The Importance of Idlib and Russia
Another testimonials adds that the mainstream media (in Turkey) are spreading lies, and that the public should not give them any credence. In the next instance, another voice adds that a battalion belonging to the “65. Mekanize Piyade Tugayı” (or the 65th Mechanised Artillery Brigade, a tank brigade hailing from the Thracian city of Lüleburgaz) was also hit. The İstanbul-based independent news website HaberERK, run by an Editor-in-Chief called Nil Apaydın, ran a story on this tank unit the same night (story published at “22:46”), indicating that “numerous martyrs were incurred as a result of aerial attack” executed by “regime forces.“ In fact, only the sub-headline talks about the tank brigade, while the bulk of the story consists of rehashed bit of information gleaned from Turkey’s mainstream media and the government.
The remainder of the video posted by “Erdal Erdoğan” contains different voices that indicate that “40 martyrs” were transported to Turkey, or that “58 coffins” have been taken to the border town of Reyhanlı or that “20 to 30 martyrs” were transported to the Turkish province of Hatay. An anonymous WhatsApp message (again, as yet unverified) purportedly also belonging to a Turkish soldier stationed in Idlib, and distributed by the already mentioned collective of Turkish medical doctors contains even starker words and images: this testimony indicates that a tank brigade hailing from the province of Tunceli had been brought over to assist the 65th Mechanised Artillery Brigade, only to be completely obliterated from above by yet another aerial attack. The message specifies that Turkish troops suffered many dead and wounded, with many hapless soldiers stuck underneath the rubble of destroyed structures within the compound of the observation post under attack. The anonymous WhatsApp message declares that the Turkish Army suffered approximately 240 casualties as a result of the enemy attack, an attack that took place during the day, starting in the morning.
It’s important to note also that all this coincided with reports of a coordinated social media blackout in Turkey following the attack on Turkish forces on Thursday. This would indicate the possibility that Ankara was attempting to control the narrative, and worried about information circulating on those platforms.
If anything, these unverified reports clearly indicate that the Prez’s propaganda bullhorns are skillfully spreading fake news (to employ the term popularised if not coined by Donald Trump). And it would seem that the bulk of Turkey’s population readily believes the lies spread by the government and its willing propaganda outlets expert at distributing fake news as the ‘truth’ for those who want to believe.
The Official Response: Stacking the Mountain of Martyrs
On its official website, Turkey’s Armed Forces (TSK), support a webpage with the ominous heading ŞEHİTLERİMİZ (or, ‘OUR MARTYRS’). The page contains the names of two individuals that perished on the 26th of February, and those of 34 others who were ‘martyred’ on Thursday (27 February 2020), the Army thus adheres to the official story, dutifully spread by the pro-AKP mainstream media, while the figure of the Prez himself has been conspicuously absent in the aftermath of Idlib’s Bloody Thursday, only managing to emerge two days later to address a group of AKP deputies at a meeting in Istanbul, telling his believers the following: “I asked Putin for Russia to leave the Turkish forces alone to fight the regime [Syrian government], we can’t seem to understand Russia’s intentions there,” communicating that he had been on the phone again with his Russian counterpart. Erdoğan then sounded a bit like George W. Bush, “[i]f we do not clear our borders from terrorists now, we might have to fight bigger wars inside Turkey later on.” And in a sure way to deflect attention away from Turkish losses, he next started bragging that “[s]everal sites, including airfields, ammunition depots, air defense systems, hangars and chemical weapon production facilities were put under heavy fire and destroyed” – specifying that the TSK had destroyed seven chemical sites, and nearly 300 military vehicles, including 94 tanks, and killed more than 2,100 SAA troops. And that was probably the main message, as claims of 2,100 is a lot more than 240 and a whole lot more than 36.
The independent journalist Ayşenur Arslan, appearing on the opposition television channel Halk TV, remarked that the President’s words were most puzzling indeed and indicative of the latter’s bloodlust. For in the further course of his discourse, Erdoğan namely said that “[w]e have to keep this in mind, the mountain of martyrs is never empty, [and] will not stay empty. If you squeeze these territories, then these lands will gush martyrs,” indicating that he seems prepared to sacrifice more conscripts on the altar of his policy of Sunnification in Idlib. Arslan is correct in her assessment, as these words seem detached from the day-to-day reality of most Turks trying make ends meet in a country that is going through a severe economic crisis at the moment. Even more amazing is the fact that Tayyip Erdoğan used the expression “şüheda” when talking about martyrs. As such, these days very few Turks are probably aware of this expression, as it is the Arabic plural form of the singular noun şehid (spelled with a, in Turkish). It seems that the Prez is ready to sacrifice more innocent lives in the pursuit of his ultimate goal – a goal that I would describe as establishing an Islamic State, first in Idlib (and arguably the whole of Syria) and in the next instance, in the New Turkey.
Ayşenur Arslan was equally baffled by Erdoğan’s answer to the query why the Turkish Army is actually present in Syria. Arguably in an attempt to upstage Putin, who sent his forces into Syria upon having received an official invitation, the Turkish President quipped that the Turkish Army is at present in Syria, upon the “invitation of the Syrian people” and the absurdity of the statement speaks for itself.
Tactics of Diversion: Playing the Refugee Card
The Prez has been at pains to keep the Turkish people’s minds occupied by means of boasting about the numbers of SAA soldiers killed and about the amount of Syrian hardware destroyed. And in another “genius move,” as worded by the independent journalist Adem Yavuz Arslan, Erdoğan next played a hand revealing his often-mentioned refugee card as a persuasive instrument of pressure on the EU. While also diverting attention from the fact that Turkish troops and Turkish observation posts on Syrian soil probably do constitute a valid casus belli, the Prez has now rekindled 2015’s refugee fire: “We cannot handle a new influx of refugees but we cannot leave those people at the mercy of the Assad regime either . . . What did we do yesterday [Friday]? We opened the doors. We will not close those doors . . . Why? Because the European Union should keep its promises.”
For, the West’s mainstream media as well as Turkey’s pro-AKP propaganda outlets have for the past weeks and months continuously repeated the mantra that Idlid as the last ‘rebel’ stronghold (as if the Jihadi terrorist of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and/or its many allies and/or affiliates were Jedi Knights fighting the Evil Empire) on the verge of falling for the cruel and inhumane onslaught of Assad and his Russian allies. This narrative is very similar or perhaps I should say, the same as the one employed in Libya back in 2011.
The population of Idlib has presently swollen to an UN-estimated “3 million people, including 1 million children” from a mere million and a half in 2011. This means that about 500,000 opponents of the Assad government have fled to the north-west of the country, as they apparently felt more at ease living under a network of Sharia courts, instituted by HTS. In the meantime, these 500,000 adults managed to produce one million children, though some of them might have simply joined their fleeing parents, while a fair amount of these children were probably born in Idlib. And that would mean that about a million and a half Sharia-minded refugees would end up in the New Turkey. In fact, as hard figures are not readily available to indicate the actual percentage of Idlib’s original population remaining in the province, the numbers might be a lot bigger . . . but at the very least, 1.5 million Syrians could arguably end up on the Prez’s doorstep. But in reality, the refugees that are now flocking to the Greek border or are now attempting to cross the Mediterranean to get to the Greeks islands are for the most part people that have fled dire circumstances in Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other location exhibiting undesirable living conditions and who through whatever tortuous route have ended up in AKP-led Turkey.
If anything, this denotes that Recept Tayyip Erdoğan is playing a most disingenuous game with the EU and the population of Turkey . . . he is at present playing poker with two separate hands: one promising a replenishing of the mountain of martyrs with Turkish citizens and the other, blackmailing the EU with multitudes of brown-skinned people fleeing unstable regions and desirous of a better life.
Will people be able to call his bluff this time or will he reveal himself yet again to be an accomplished and cunning trickster . . . an artful trickster employing fake news and human misery to his best advantage?
***
21WIRE special contributor Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent historian and geo-political analyst who used to live in Istanbul. At present, he is in self-imposed exile from Turkey. He has a wide interest in the politics, history and culture of the Balkans. the greater Middle East, and the world beyond.. He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his graduate work at the universities of Essex and Oxford. In Oxford, Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002. His publications include the revisionist monograph “Ottomans Looking West?” as well as numerous scholarly articles. In Istanbul, Erimtan started publishing in the English language Turkish press, culminating in him becoming the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette. Subsequently, he commenced writing for RT Op-Edge, NEO, and finally, the 21st Century Wire. You can find him on Twitter at @TheErimtanAngle. Read Can’s archive here.
READ MORE TURKEY NEWS AT: 21st Century Wire Turkey Files
SUPPORT OUR MEDIA PLATFORM – BECOME A MEMBER @21WIRE.TV


21stcenturywire--2020-03-01--MH17 Public Meeting & Documentary Screening – Tuesday March 3rd in London

This Tuesday , a public meeting entitled , MH17 – Awaiting Trial , is being held in London , UK , in advance of the MH17 trial due to begin in The Hague , Netherlands starting on March 9th .
This event will also feature a documentary film screening for “ MH17 – Call for Justice ” A public meeting and film screening will take place at London ’ s historic Conway Hall in advance of the trial in absentia of three Russians and one Ukrainian in The Hague , beginning on March 9th .
The investigative documentary MH17 – @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Media , will be presented by its authors , Dutch journalist Max van der Werf and Russian journalist and film director Yana Erlashova , who will also present new and important information on the case .
Two special guests will also speak , Colonel Mohd Sakri bin Hussin , the Malaysian army colonel who went to Donbass to pick up flight MH17 ’ s black boxes and arrange the return of the Malaysians who died ; and Akash Rosen , an audio expert who has analysed the Ukrainian Secret Service tapes of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Justice is the first detailed documentary to challenge the Dutch and mainstream western media version of what actually happened on 17 July 2014 in eastern Ukraine .
It includes wide-reaching and exclusive interviews with the Malaysian prime minister , Malaysian army colonel Mohd Sakri bin Hussin , and one of the suspects accused of shooting down the MH17 .
There are also testimonies from witnesses , evidence from experts , and previously unseen footage from the crash site in Ukraine .
Date and Time : Tue , 3 March 2020 , beginning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Conway Hall , 25 Red Lion Square , London WC1R 4RL ( See map ) Admission : FREE The event is organised by the International platform – Global Rights of Peaceful People , and Bonanza Media , an international group of independent journalists .

By

This Tuesday, a public meeting entitled, MH17 – Awaiting Trial, is being held in London, UK, in advance of the MH17 trial due to begin in The Hague, Netherlands starting on March 9th.
This event will also feature a documentary film screening for “MH17 – Call for Justice”
About the Event
A public meeting and film screening will take place at London’s historic Conway Hall in advance of the trial in absentia of three Russians and one Ukrainian in The Hague, beginning on March 9th.
The investigative documentary MH17 – Call for Justice, produced by Bonanza Media, will be presented by its authors, Dutch journalist Max van der Werf and Russian journalist and film director Yana Erlashova, who will also present new and important information on the case.
Two special guests will also speak, Colonel Mohd Sakri bin Hussin, the Malaysian army colonel who went to Donbass to pick up flight MH17’s black boxes and arrange the return of the Malaysians who died; and Akash Rosen, an audio expert who has analysed the Ukrainian Secret Service tapes of the MH17 shooting down.
MH17 – Call for Justice is the first detailed documentary to challenge the Dutch and mainstream western media version of what actually happened on 17 July 2014 in eastern Ukraine. It includes wide-reaching and exclusive interviews with the Malaysian prime minister, Malaysian army colonel Mohd Sakri bin Hussin, and one of the suspects accused of shooting down the MH17. There are also testimonies from witnesses, evidence from experts, and previously unseen footage from the crash site in Ukraine.
Date and Time: Tue, 3 March 2020, beginning at 18:30 – 22:00 GMT
Location: Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4RL (See map)
Admission: FREE
The event is organised by the International platform – Global Rights of Peaceful People, and Bonanza Media, an international group of independent journalists.
Watch the documentary trailer:


21stcenturywire--2020-03-01--Episode #317 – ‘The Next Big Crisis’ with guests Dr Can Erimtan and more


21stcenturywire--2020-03-02--MIT Study: No Evidence of ‘Election Fraud’ in Bolivia That Resulted in Coup

Real transparency : Bolivia ’ s president publishes his government ’ s financial account on billboards ( Photo : Andre Vltchek 2019© ) Back in November 2019 , former Bolivian President Evo Morales was ousted in a coup after claims of election fraud from the Organization for American States ( OAS ) .
A new MIT study into the October 20th presidential election does not support the conclusions of the OAS and casts further doubt on the already flimsy claims .
Much damage has already been done , Morales fled the country , members of his Movimento al Socialismo ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and dozens of his supporters were shot and killed by police in the unrest that followed the coup .
The claims of election fraud stem from a 24-hour pause of the preliminary count system on election day .
The counting was paused after 84 percent of the votes were tallied , at the time it showed Morales leading his closest opponent Carlos Mesa by just under eight percent .
When the counting resumed the next day , Morales ’ lead increased to over 10 percent .
In Bolivia ’ s election system , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 40 percent of the votes , and a 10 percent lead to their nearest opponent to prevent a runoff vote .
The OAS claims that during this 24-hour pause in the preliminary count , manipulations occurred that resulted in Morales taking a large enough lead to prevent the runoff vote .
The new MIT study examined the data and concluded , “ The OAS ’ s claim that the stopping of the trep ( preliminary count ) during the Bolivian election produced an oddity in the voting trend is contradicted by the data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ results that would lead us to the same conclusion as the OAS .
We find it is very likely that Morales won the required 10 percentage point margin to win in the first round of the election on October 20 , 2019.
” The MIT study was commissioned by the Center for Economic Policy and Policy Research ( CEPR ) .
The CEPR conducted their own study on the election shortly after it happened that found “ no evidence that irregularities or fraud affected the official result that gave President Evo Morales a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that came out with the MIT study , CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot said , “ The OAS greatly misled the media and the public about what happened in Bolivia ’ s elections , and helped to foster a great deal of mistrust in the electoral process and the results .
”

By
Real transparency: Bolivia’s president publishes his government’s financial account on billboards
(Photo: Andre Vltchek 2019©)
Antiwar.com reports…
Back in November 2019, former Bolivian President Evo Morales was ousted in a coup after claims of election fraud from the Organization for American States (OAS). A new MIT study into the October 20th presidential election does not support the conclusions of the OAS and casts further doubt on the already flimsy claims. Much damage has already been done, Morales fled the country, members of his Movimento al Socialismo (MAS) party have been arrested, and dozens of his supporters were shot and killed by police in the unrest that followed the coup.
The claims of election fraud stem from a 24-hour pause of the preliminary count system on election day. The counting was paused after 84 percent of the votes were tallied, at the time it showed Morales leading his closest opponent Carlos Mesa by just under eight percent. When the counting resumed the next day, Morales’ lead increased to over 10 percent. In Bolivia’s election system, a candidate is required to have over 40 percent of the votes, and a 10 percent lead to their nearest opponent to prevent a runoff vote.
The OAS claims that during this 24-hour pause in the preliminary count, manipulations occurred that resulted in Morales taking a large enough lead to prevent the runoff vote. The new MIT study examined the data and concluded, “The OAS’s claim that the stopping of the trep (preliminary count) during the Bolivian election produced an oddity in the voting trend is contradicted by the data … Therefore, we cannot find results that would lead us to the same conclusion as the OAS. We find it is very likely that Morales won the required 10 percentage point margin to win in the first round of the election on October 20, 2019.”
The MIT study was commissioned by the Center for Economic Policy and Policy Research (CEPR). The CEPR conducted their own study on the election shortly after it happened that found “no evidence that irregularities or fraud affected the official result that gave President Evo Morales a first-round victory.” In a press release that came out with the MIT study, CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot said, “The OAS greatly misled the media and the public about what happened in Bolivia’s elections, and helped to foster a great deal of mistrust in the electoral process and the results.”
Continue this story at Antiwar.com…
READ MORE BOLIVIA NEWS AT: 21st Century Wire Bolivia Files
SUPPORT 21WIRE – SUBSCRIBE & BECOME A MEMBER @21WIRE.TV