veteranstoday--2020-09-05--VT Nuclear Education: Russia’s Files on 9/11

— The report below is taken from an intelligence dump by Russian sources .
As the origin is from an intelligence agency in the form of a “ leak , ” there are always questions .
Thus far , we have found not only is the majority of the material confirmed but several solutions to serious problems involving 9/11 are included .
I have redacted little here .
However , this arrived with vast supporting documentation which can , in the future , be uploaded on SCRIBD for access .
One key area is that the US had supplied Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s note : We are advised that some of the documentation can never be uploaded or distributed for reasons that will be obvious . )
We have a very solid confirmation on this .
Back during the 1980s , Israel showed her inventory of Davy Crockett tactical nuclear warheads to one of our editors , who at the time was a senior NATO intelligence official .
These early “ micro-nukes ” were taken out of US inventory in 1978 and “ disappeared.
” This highly classified report is being published unaltered except @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
My personal opinion is that this is NOT a disinformation piece but rather represents a significant breakthrough .
I believe that this is a rare glimpse behind the curtain .
I am publishing this for the use of those qualified to understand how little of this is really new .
Those things that are new are groundbreaking .
For those who find this all a bit over their heads , there is little I can do other than to let you know that this is the world “ your elders ” really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a chance to look in mom and dads top dresser drawer .
According to a retired FXX agent specializing in Israeli counter intel : The type of nuclear devices used on 911 were a modified version of the W-54 nuclear artillery shells that were covertly provided to the Israelis between 1988 and 1998 from US surplus stockpiles illegally exported during the Bush/Clinton era .
Chemical analysis done by DOE Sandi was able to identify the chemical/radiation footprint or fingerprint of the warheads based on samples taken after 911 of the fallout at ground @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Nuclear weapon use at ground zero is confirmed from multiple sources ) All plutonium based warheads have a chemical fingerprint that can identify the type of design and where the PU was made and how old it is .
This was the 911 blackmail on Bush 1 and 2 , the illegal transfer of surplus US nuclear weapons to the Israelis and why the continued cover up , along with the stolen gold and stock fraud that was going on Wall Street etc .
According to file ENW57.pdf on page 66 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ received and confirmed ) Only a 2 kiloton device was needed to drop the buildings .
A 2 kiloton device will produce a fireball of apx 150 to 200 feet in diameter at over 4000 degrees Centigrade .
Just large enough to melt the I beams of the central core of the building and drop them in place .
The light flash would last less than 1 second and primarily be in the UV light range .
Overpressure would only be at 60PSI max and directed upwards with the blast .
See underground @ @ @ @ @ @ @ located to within ground zero range only .
Radiation would drop to acceptable levels within 72 hrs .
after the blast .
Most fall out was trapped in the cement dust thus causing all of the recent cancer deaths that we are now seeing in NYC amongst first responders .
( Editor ’ s note : Consistent with site data ) Melted steel and iron oxide or “ nano thermite ” is a byproduct of the very high gamma ray / Neutron flux induced into the central steel core .
The radiation dissolves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carbon and silicone in the steel .
This explains the missing steel columns and the very important clue of the “ vaporized ’ 20 ton antenna tower atop the south tower .
The upward blast of radiation literally vaporized it .
Video evidence proves this to be true .
( Editor ’ s note : Tower issue a vital one . )
The total XXOO data file from DOE Sandia on the 911 event is well over 72 MB .
P.S .
Snowden didn ’ t have a Q clearance so he missed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good stash of documents on the subject .
( All under the transit stuff . )
The entire nuclear nonproliferation story of stolen nuclear material coming from Russia was an Israeli cover story to hide the original source of weapons material coming from the US stock piles .
( Editor ’ s note : Fully confirmed ) Illegal distribution of US nuclear material to foreign allies was not limited to Israel .
Virtually all NATO allies were in on this scam too .
Dick Cheney was the bad guy on this one .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as IOU ’ s in order to get what they wanted .
Tom Countryman a well-known Israeli operative is curiously now in charge of N.N.P .
at the State Department under Obama.
( ? )
He was put there by Ram Emanuel .
It appears that the weapon of choice for the Israelis were the W-54 and follow on series of nuclear pits taken from the Amarillo TX storage dump .
This was what Carnaberry was working on for Bush senior in Houston .
A total of over 350 pits were transferred to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year period of time .
The W-54 type of pit design were the most desirable due to the 2 point implosion pit design .
This is the easiest to re manufacture and modify as compared to other circular pit designs .
The pill shaped design of the W-54 type weapon contains over 1.5 times more plutonium than a standard pit .
This would allow enough Plutonium to be recovered that was still of weapons grade use even after 32 plus years of age .
Americium build up in the pit over time eventually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so they have a limited shelf life based on how fast or slow the Plutonium was produce in the reactor at Stanford .
Usually it was about 150 days max .
Irradiation time in the reactor during production determines the shelf life of the pit as weapons grade material .
All of the micro nukes used by the Israelis are re-manufactured W-54 type series devices .
These devices were used in the Bali bombing and the London bombing and in Japan on their reactors .
( Editor ’ s note : Nuclear weapon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Damascus , Iraq and Afghanistan by the US .
( Editor ’ s note : Multiple confirmation including site samples . )
These are stored in most Israelite embassies for ease of deployment .
The one ’ s used on 911 were kept at the Israeli consulate in NYC until put in place .
After 911 the FBI now checks all diplomatic pouches with a Geiger counter before entering or leaving the US .
The South African weapons were also surplus W-54 artillery shells acquired from Israeli and final assembly and testing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assistance .
( Editor ’ s note : This explains Pelendaba production issues . )
This was done because the Israelis needed a testing ground in order to make sure that there rebuilt weapons would work as designed .
( Editor ’ s note : Testing on Sept. 22 , 1979 multiple confirmations . )
The North Korean weapons are also of the 155 mm artillery design as provided by Israel .
The true North Korean nuclear weapons program is based on nuclear artillery use and not missiles .
The plan is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea if war breaks out this include the use of small nuclear artillery shells to counter US tanks rockets and artillery .
The Saudi ’ s also have a stash of W-54 ’ s acquired from the US under Bush2 .
( Editor ’ s note : Confirmed ) The Israelis have also provided them to India , Brazil , China , Taiwan , Japan , North and South Korea etc .
( Editor ’ s note : All but South Korea confirmed .
Canada had been believed to be the source of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a standard 75 megawatt thermal open top reactor as used in France for their plutonium weapons production program , their version of Stanford ( Editor ’ s note : Probably “ Hanford ” ) .
Due to over use as a fast breeder reactor by the Israelis , Dimona suffered a “ steam explosion ” IE a flash over indecent due to neutron criticality back in the late 1980 ’ s under Bush 1 .
This shut down its operation for many years until repairs could be made .
It know only operates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neutron absorption damage to the containment vessel .
Now mainly use for isotope production .
This forced the Israelis to turn to stolen nuclear stock piles from the US for the continuation of their nuclear program .
The Israelis knowing that the nuclear material that they had acquire only had a limited shelf life left before it was no longer usable as weapons grade then tried to dump it on the surplus market as fast as possible before it was of no use to them .
So they dumped it on unsuspecting nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be able to test it .
These were the fissile tests in North Korea .
( Editor ’ s note : Confirmed , multiple sources ) When everybody caught on to the scam such as Japan and Korea .
( IE the Korean sub sinkings etc ) they were angry because they paid big bucks for junk .
This started a mini cold war with Israel and her old clients .
However with micro nukes even as the plutonium ages it will still fissile producing a smaller size detonation well under 2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still be used as small dirty bombs or as very small tactical nukes such as the nuclear artillery strikes on Damascus with rocket assisted W-54 ’ s .
( Editor ’ s note : Confirmed strike , May 4 , 2013 ) On the W-54 pit design it is pill shaped and it is only about 4 inches in diameter and weighs about 24 pounds .
Most of the fuel is consumed in the plasma fire ball when detonated so there is very little plutonium fallout left to escape .
If it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be even reduced to lower levels such as in an enhanced radiation device or the so called neutron bomb .
This is what was used on 911 .
The primary purpose of the nuclear weapon used on 911 was to produce a massive Gama ray / neutron flux that would vaporize about 150 to 300 feet of 6 inch thick steal I beams that constituted the central core of the WTC buildings .
This created a free fall event as seen on TV that day .
( Editor ’ s note : Critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be hidden from sight due to the underground detonation .
Most of the light was in the non-visible light spectrum any way .
Over pressure would be reduced to 6 psi due to the blast traveling up the central core and neutron radiation vaporizing the TV antenna at the top of the building as see on TV .
The fallout would be mainly vaporized concrete cement and iron oxide .
This is why after 911 they told everyone on TV that the beta radiation burns that people were getting were due to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the radiation effects from the radioactive cement fallout .
( Editor ’ s note : Fully confirmed ) The iron oxide found all over the place was what was left of the steel I beams .
This was the so called Nano Thermite that was found everywhere .
Fallout was limited to a 1 mile area around down town NYC .
See charts .
( Editor ’ s note : Received ) Radiation decay was reduced to safe low levels after 72 hrs.
, ( Editor ’ s note : Fully confirmed ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This is why the area was blocked off from the public for 3 days after the event , in order to let the radiation drop to safe levels

The report below is taken from an intelligence dump by Russian sources. As the origin is from an intelligence agency in the form of a “leak,” there are always questions. Thus far, we have found not only is the majority of the material confirmed but several solutions to serious problems involving 9/11 are included.
I have redacted little here. However, this arrived with vast supporting documentation which can, in the future, be uploaded on SCRIBD for access. One key area is that the US had supplied Israel with surplus nuclear weapons. (Editor’s note: We are advised that some of the documentation can never be uploaded or distributed for reasons that will be obvious.)
We have a very solid confirmation on this. Back during the 1980s, Israel showed her inventory of Davy Crockett tactical nuclear warheads to one of our editors, who at the time was a senior NATO intelligence official. These early “micro-nukes” were taken out of US inventory in 1978 and “disappeared.”
This highly classified report is being published unaltered except for bad machine translation errors being repaired. My personal opinion is that this is NOT a disinformation piece but rather represents a significant breakthrough. I believe that this is a rare glimpse behind the curtain.
I am publishing this for the use of those qualified to understand how little of this is really new. Those things that are new are groundbreaking. For those who find this all a bit over their heads, there is little I can do other than to let you know that this is the world “your elders” really live in and that you finally have a chance to look in mom and dads top dresser drawer.
______________________________________
Too Classified to Publish
According to a retired FXX agent specializing in Israeli counter intel: The type of nuclear devices used on 911 were a modified version of the W-54 nuclear artillery shells that were covertly provided to the Israelis between 1988 and 1998 from US surplus stockpiles illegally exported during the Bush/Clinton era.
Chemical analysis done by DOE Sandi was able to identify the chemical/radiation footprint or fingerprint of the warheads based on samples taken after 911 of the fallout at ground zero. (Editor’s note: Nuclear weapon use at ground zero is confirmed from multiple sources)
All plutonium based warheads have a chemical fingerprint that can identify the type of design and where the PU was made and how old it is. This was the 911 blackmail on Bush 1 and 2, the illegal transfer of surplus US nuclear weapons to the Israelis and why the continued cover up, along with the stolen gold and stock fraud that was going on Wall Street etc. According to file ENW57.pdf on page 66. (Editor’s note: Document received and confirmed)
Only a 2 kiloton device was needed to drop the buildings. A 2 kiloton device will produce a fireball of apx 150 to 200 feet in diameter at over 4000 degrees Centigrade. Just large enough to melt the I beams of the central core of the building and drop them in place. The light flash would last less than 1 second and primarily be in the UV light range. Overpressure would only be at 60PSI max and directed upwards with the blast. See underground effect.
Fallout would be minimal and located to within ground zero range only. Radiation would drop to acceptable levels within 72 hrs. after the blast. Most fall out was trapped in the cement dust thus causing all of the recent cancer deaths that we are now seeing in NYC amongst first responders. (Editor’s note: Consistent with site data)
Melted steel and iron oxide or “nano thermite” is a byproduct of the very high gamma ray / Neutron flux induced into the central steel core. The radiation dissolves the steel into iron oxide consuming the carbon and silicone in the steel.
This explains the missing steel columns and the very important clue of the “vaporized’ 20 ton antenna tower atop the south tower. The upward blast of radiation literally vaporized it. Video evidence proves this to be true. (Editor’s note: Tower issue a vital one.)
The total XXOO data file from DOE Sandia on the 911 event is well over 72 MB. P.S. Snowden didn’t have a Q clearance so he missed this one. Carnaberry had a pretty good stash of documents on the subject. (All under the transit stuff.) The entire nuclear nonproliferation story of stolen nuclear material coming from Russia was an Israeli cover story to hide the original source of weapons material coming from the US stock piles. (Editor’s note: Fully confirmed)
Illegal distribution of US nuclear material to foreign allies was not limited to Israel. Virtually all NATO allies were in on this scam too. Dick Cheney was the bad guy on this one. Bush2/Cheney traded nuclear pits to foreign country as IOU’s in order to get what they wanted. Tom Countryman a well-known Israeli operative is curiously now in charge of N.N.P. at the State Department under Obama.(?) He was put there by Ram Emanuel.
It appears that the weapon of choice for the Israelis were the W-54 and follow on series of nuclear pits taken from the Amarillo TX storage dump. This was what Carnaby was working on for Bush senior in Houston.
A total of over 350 pits were transferred to the Israelis over a 10 to 20 year period of time. The W-54 type of pit design were the most desirable due to the 2 point implosion pit design. This is the easiest to re manufacture and modify as compared to other circular pit designs.
The pill shaped design of the W-54 type weapon contains over 1.5 times more plutonium than a standard pit. This would allow enough Plutonium to be recovered that was still of weapons grade use even after 32 plus years of age. Americium build up in the pit over time eventually makes the Pit unusable as a weapon so they have a limited shelf life based on how fast or slow the Plutonium was produce in the reactor at Stanford.
Usually it was about 150 days max. Irradiation time in the reactor during production determines the shelf life of the pit as weapons grade material. All of the micro nukes used by the Israelis are re-manufactured W-54 type series devices.
These devices were used in the Bali bombing and the London bombing and in Japan on their reactors. (Editor’s note: Nuclear weapon use in Bali confirmed) Also used in Damascus, Iraq and Afghanistan by the US. (Editor’s note: Multiple confirmation including site samples.)
These are stored in most Israelite embassies for ease of deployment. The one’s used on 911 were kept at the Israeli consulate in NYC until put in place. After 911 the FBI now checks all diplomatic pouches with a Geiger counter before entering or leaving the US. The South African weapons were also surplus W-54 artillery shells acquired from Israeli and final assembly and testing was done in South Africa with Israel assistance. (Editor’s note: This explains Pelendaba production issues.)
This was done because the Israelis needed a testing ground in order to make sure that there rebuilt weapons would work as designed. (Editor’s note: Testing on Sept. 22, 1979 multiple confirmations.) The North Korean weapons are also of the 155 mm artillery design as provided by Israel.
The true North Korean nuclear weapons program is based on nuclear artillery use and not missiles. The plan is to use a massive artillery barge on South Korea if war breaks out this include the use of small nuclear artillery shells to counter US tanks rockets and artillery.
The Saudi’s also have a stash of W-54’s acquired from the US under Bush2. (Editor’s note: Confirmed) The Israelis have also provided them to India, Brazil, China, Taiwan, Japan, North and South Korea etc. (Editor’s note: All but South Korea confirmed. Canada had been believed to be the source of Brazilian nuclear weapons.) Dimona is a standard 75 megawatt thermal open top reactor as used in France for their plutonium weapons production program, their version of Stanford (Editor’s note: Probably “Hanford”).
Due to over use as a fast breeder reactor by the Israelis, Dimona suffered a “steam explosion” IE a flash over indecent due to neutron criticality back in the late 1980’s under Bush 1. This shut down its operation for many years until repairs could be made.
It know only operates at very low power levels due to neutron absorption damage to the containment vessel. Now mainly use for isotope production. This forced the Israelis to turn to stolen nuclear stock piles from the US for the continuation of their nuclear program.
The Israelis knowing that the nuclear material that they had acquire only had a limited shelf life left before it was no longer usable as weapons grade then tried to dump it on the surplus market as fast as possible before it was of no use to them. So they dumped it on unsuspecting nations who would only sit on it and not be able to test it. These were the fissile tests in North Korea. (Editor’s note: Confirmed, multiple sources)
When everybody caught on to the scam such as Japan and Korea. (IE the Korean sub sinkings etc) they were angry because they paid big bucks for junk. This started a mini cold war with Israel and her old clients. However with micro nukes even as the plutonium ages it will still fissile producing a smaller size detonation well under 2 kiloton in size.
So they can still be used as small dirty bombs or as very small tactical nukes such as the nuclear artillery strikes on Damascus with rocket assisted W-54’s. (Editor’s note: Confirmed strike, May 4, 2013) On the W-54 pit design it is pill shaped and it is only about 4 inches in diameter and weighs about 24 pounds.
Most of the fuel is consumed in the plasma fire ball when detonated so there is very little plutonium fallout left to escape. If it is salted with other materials the fallout can be even reduced to lower levels such as in an enhanced radiation device or the so called neutron bomb. This is what was used on 911.
The primary purpose of the nuclear weapon used on 911 was to produce a massive Gama ray / neutron flux that would vaporize about 150 to 300 feet of 6 inch thick steal I beams that constituted the central core of the WTC buildings. This created a free fall event as seen on TV that day. (Editor’s note: Critical information here.)
The flash would be hidden from sight due to the underground detonation. Most of the light was in the non-visible light spectrum any way. Over pressure would be reduced to 6 psi due to the blast traveling up the central core and neutron radiation vaporizing the TV antenna at the top of the building as see on TV.
The fallout would be mainly vaporized concrete cement and iron oxide. This is why after 911 they told everyone on TV that the beta radiation burns that people were getting were due to the caustic cement dust and not due to the radiation effects from the radioactive cement fallout. (Editor’s note: Fully confirmed)
The iron oxide found all over the place was what was left of the steel I beams. This was the so called Nano Thermite that was found everywhere. Fallout was limited to a 1 mile area around down town NYC. See charts. (Editor’s note: Received)
Radiation decay was reduced to safe low levels after 72 hrs., (Editor’s note: Fully confirmed) outside of ground zero its self. This is why the area was blocked off from the public for 3 days after the event, in order to let the radiation drop to safe levels
Editing: Jim W. Dean
___________________________________


veteranstoday--2020-09-05--VT Nuclear Education: Dimona Classified

VT Nuclear Education: Dimona Classified

By Gordon Duff and the DGSE ( French Intelligence Classified Material Partially Redacted ) INTRODUCTION Veterans Today is putting “ out there ” enough “ non damaging ” nuclear weapons facts to undo the obfuscation that allows nuclear terrorism to be covered up by a complicit press .
We are putting an end to this .
Our confirmations of nuclear weapon use at Gound Zero at the World Trade Center are now covered by endless documents .
We are somewhat fearful of putting things in print that contain formulas that could lead to nuclear proliferation .
We now know that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major explosions at the WTC on 9/11 were nuclear events reported as neutron bombs by an official and never declassified report written for the Department of Energy and Vice President Dick Cheney by teams from Sandia Labs and put into limited circulation to American political leaders in 2003 , years before the totally false 9/11 investigation was undertaken , provable as a criminal coverup .
We have solid confirmations of both use of nuclear weapons in state sponsored false flag terrorism , US and “ other ” military operations and of a real @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
We have both full and partial confirmations of nuclear weapons in the hands of right wing groups being recovered in both the US and United Kingdom .
We have confirmations of the sale of “ scrapped ” nuclear weapons taken out of service by NATO and returned to the US .
We can confirm not only Israel ’ s nuclear weapons program but will now systematically dismember their lies about it .
“ Welcome to that world.
” If you don ’ t like what we put out , be thankful for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who leak information aren ’ t always aware of the difference between “ need to know ” and becoming part of the problem .
We at VT can get anything , at least now we can .
No one talks to the corporate media and everyone wants to talk while they believe there may be a chance to save something of the world .
I wouldn ’ t have what I have if people weren ’ t desperate .
Here we go , roughly translated using my “ restaurant French.
” 1 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for an 18 Mega Watt low pressure water cooled open top thermal plutonium production reactor with 144 fuel rods .
Later increased to 24 MW thermal in the final design .
It was originally built with a triple redundant cooling system ( 3 each , separate electrically powered cooling systems in parallel ) Each cooling system was rated at 25 MW thermal for a total emergency cooling capacity of 75 MW thermal .
All cooling circuits are externally electrically powered due to the low pressure high volume cooling design .
With both an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diesel powered power plant for back up emergency electrical power .
The steam plant also provides all military base electrical power plus extra steam for uranium and plutonium fuel processing .
Each fuel rod is rated at 175 KW thermal .
With heavy water added for fast breeder operation this was dangerously pushed up to 500KW per fuel rod for a total production rate of 75 MW thermal .
2 .
A 75 mega watt thermal plant only produces about 25 MW of electrical power .
They are only about 30 % efficient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1 .
3 .
If you run the reactor in fast breeder mode with heavy water , criticality issues become a serious problem .
If you do not have excess cooling ability to handle an overload condition or if a circuit fails you can not cool down the reactor fast enough and a steam explosion caused by a flash over event will occur .
This is what happened at Dimona during an on line refiling cycle .
( This is called fuel rod hot swamping . )
The rods half to continuously be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to even out the neutron flux density in the core preventing hot spots from building up .
This guarantees that all rods are radiated at the same level in order to maximize plutonium production .
4 .
Due to advanced neutron absorption in the reactor containment / pressure vessel , accelerated vessel wall corrosion and faulty welds ( not 100 % weld ) in the fuel rod support structures .
( They used copper clad welding rods instead of stainless steel welding rods . )
The reactor failed some time after 1988 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ at to high of a power level for too long .
The containment / pressure vessel was never designed to be ran at this power level for long periods of time .
They pushed the envelop and lost .
5 .
The containment / pressure vessel failure was a combination of the steel casing becoming to brittle from excess neutron radiation at the 75 MW power level , forming micro cracks in the containment vessel side walls .
Advanced corrosion of the containment vessels surface walls and the internal fuel rod support structure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the copper in the welds .
The Russians lost a few subs because of fault welding causing cooling failures in there reactors too .
6.Basically the welds that attached the fuel rod support racks to the side of the pressure vessel failed during a fuel rod removal procedure .
At that power level a flash over event occurred causing a major steam explosion seriously damaging the reactors containment /pressure vessel , support structure and cooling system .
The explosion was so sever that it cracked the concrete outer containment dome .
7 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about 1990 up to at least 1994 according to my data .
The Israelis required extensive French assistance in cleaning up the mess .
All of the highly radioactive wast was eventually dumped in Mauritian because it was deemed to dangerous to dispose of in Israel .
It was so badly damaged that the French recommended that they just fill it full of cement and weld the door shut……… 8 .
This is an excerpt from the French DGSE report on the Dimona steam explosion to the DOE , circa 1994 .
Note @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will redact “ actionable material ” voluntarily , editor ) The Dimona steam explosion was caused by a prompt criticality event and the initial mechanism of destruction was a steam-driven water hammer slamming into the top of the reactor vessel with enough force to blow off the control rod drives , pull out the closure studs , shear the cooling pipes and jack the whole vessel several feet upward .
The large negative moderator coefficient shut the reaction down in microseconds .
Bulk fuel failure did not occur .
The fuel was distorted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place but the cladding did NOT melt .
9 .
This ended the Israeli experiment in home grown Plutonium production .
After 1994 the reactor if operational at all was severely limited in its power output to levels to low for continued plutonium production.It was now only good for isotope production , lithium 6 and Tritium / Deuterium production .
10 .
The minimum power level of a plutonium producing reactor that will produce 24 KG of pu-239 in one year , with a pu-240 content level less than 6 % is about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of thermal energy per 24 hr day produces 1 gram of PU-239 .
365 days of operation at 100 % efficiency will only produce 365 grams of weapons grade pu-239 per mega watt .
11 .
The minimal amount of PU needed for a 20 KT Hiroshima size bomb is about 24 KG .
It takes a 75 MW reactor running at full power for one entire year to produce this amount of fuel .
Dimona as originally designed by the French at 24 MW could only produce about 8 KG of PU-239 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and heavy water added it was increased by the Israelis up to 75 MW thermal in size .
However this increase in power output rapidly burnt out the reactors containment / pressure vessel leading to its early demise .
12 .
Estimates of Israeli nuclear weapons production is highly exaggerated for several reasons .
A .
Maximum Dimona output is only 24KG of weapons grade pu-239 per year .
Up to 1990 that would only be about 30 , 20 kt devices at 24 KG each .
b .
With a ( REDACTED @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 6 KG per device with a 2kt maximum yield .
note at 97 % pure pu-239 .
See charts .
c. For a neutron bomb with no uranium tamper it will take apx ( REDACTED ) pure PU-239 .
d. For a Fission Fusion boosted weapon ( hydrogen bomb ) another 24kg of pu-239 is required for a total weapons count of ( REDACTED ) of pu-239 fuel .
Producing a 200 KT yield .
( REDACTED PARAGRAPH ) E. After about 16 to 32 years depending upon how it is made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ repossessing due to “ Poison ” build up in the metal .
In the US it is supposed to be retired or re used as MOX fuel only.This is why you half to continually make new fuel .
To replace the older aging stockpiles that go bad after time .
So a single 75 MW reactor can only support a 32 year production run or life cycle of PU-239 fuel totaling about 800 KG .
After the fuel is no longer 92 % pure it is no longer good as weapons grade material @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the reactor to off set uranium fuel consumption and to run the reactor in the fast breeder mode .
However Japan taught us what happens when you do that and something big goes wrong .
…….. F. 800KG of PU-239 will only produce about 16 , 200 KT Hydrogen bombs or 32 , 20 KT Hiroshima size bombs or 66 1 KT neutron bombs or 133 2KT fission bombs with a ( REDACTED ) .
G. If the reactor has continuously ran for 50 years with no shut downs at all and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It could only have produced a maximum of 1200 KG of PU-239 at 92 to 97 % purity .
Weapons grade material .
This would be equal to 25 , 200 KT hydrogen bombs or 100 , 1 KT neutron bombs or 200 , 2 KT fission bombs or any mix in between .
H. If the lower number is correct and the reactor shut down by 1990.After 26 years of production.Then by 2022 or earlier , Israel will have ran out of usable weapons grade Pu-239 and it will no longer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replace its fuel supply from external stockpiles in the US .
France and Great Britten only have about 150 to 300 weapons each and they do not have the spare production capacity to share it with other country ’ s .
France stopped producing new Plutonium in 1992 .
13 .
Plutonium Pit Swapping .
A .
Normally in a US plutonium producing reactor such as at Hanford , it can produce enough weapons grade PU-239 at one time to make up to 3 weapons or about 75 kg of pu-239 every 3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons grade PU has a decay rate that differs from all other PU based on when , where and how fast it was made.This also sets its usable life time as weapons grade material .
So only PU that was made at the same time in the same reactor can be matched .
If you try matching old PU from different reactors with highly different fissile rate it will spontaneously blow its self apart with several tons of force .
Not a good idea .
A Dimona size reactor can not do this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Once in once out production only .
C. There for all PU made at Dimona or in any other very small clandestine PU production reactors such as in Iraqi , Iran , Pakistan , India etc is not matchable with any other PU .
As PU decays over time due to what is called Poisson build up in the metal it becomes no good for weapons use .
This ranges from about 16 to 32 years for weapons grade PU and about 12 years for Deuterium .
Uranium dose not have this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off line then Iran and Pakistan will out produce Dimona in PU production in Just a few years of operation .
This is the Israeli “ missile gap ” fear and why they are in a panic to take out the Iranian nuclear production capability.. E. The Iranian reactor at Bushehr is basically a 1,000 MW thermal BWR if converted to military use it could produce up to 15 , 20KT fission weapons per year at 24 KG PU each or up to 365 KG of PU per year max .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Missile gap and the Israeli panic attack .
Pakistan has a total civilian nuclear production capacity of 725 MW or about 10 times that of Israel .
If there reactors were converted into PU production reactors they could make up to 10 , 20 KT fission weapons per year or about 250 KG of weapons grade PU-239 .
F. The total Islamic nuclear program in theory can produce up to 600 KG of weapons grade PU-239 per year if converted to military use .
However Israel and Dimona can only produce up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ per Year if it is still in operational condition and if not ; Israeli will start running out of weapons grade PU by 2020……… The mass-dependent efficiency equation shows that it is desirable to assembly as many critical masses as possible .
Applying this equation to Little Boy ( and ignoring the equation ’ s limitations in the very low yield range ) we can examine the effect of varying the amount of fissile material present : mass vs blast size in tons .
1.05 80 kg 1.1 1.2 tons 1.2 17 tons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 490 tons 1.6 930 tons 1.8 2.5 kt 2.0 5.2 kt 2.25 10.5 kt 2.40 15.0 kt LITTLE BOY 2.5 18.6 kt 2.75 29.6 kt 3.0 44 kt 3.1 If its fissile content had been increased by a mere 25 % , its yield would have tripled .
The explosive efficiency of Little Boy was 0.23 kt/kg of fissile material ( 1.3 % ) , compared to 2.8 kt/kg ( 16 % ) for Fat Man ( both are adjusted to account for the yield contribution from tamper fast fission ) .
Use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least doubled Little Boy yield and efficiency , but it would still have remained disappointing compared to the yields achievable using implosion and the same quantity of fissile material .
This describes the system installed in all Westinghouse PWRs .
Other reactor brands use similar systems .
Note that these capsules are located next to the core where they receive significantly more irradiation than the reactor pot .
It is from these very specimens that it was extrapolated that neutron embrittlement MIGHT be a problem toward the design life of the pot .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the problem .
But first a little review of what the problem really is .
Steel exhibits a property called the Nil Ductility Transition ( NDI ) .
Below the transition temperature , steel loses its ductility and becomes brittle .
The temperature varies with allow but is usually fairly low , below the freezing point of water .
Long term neutron irradiation causes crystal lattice defects in the steel which raises the NDT temperature .
The concern is that if the NDT temperature rises above that of cooling water , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ water could shock the reactor while it was below NDT and thus cause it to fracture .
Under no scenario of irradiation is the NDT predicted rise above approximately ambient temperature .
Several simple steps have been taken to address the problem .
Because the rise in NDT is directly related to the total integrated fast neutron flux dose , the first simple step was reduce the enrichment of the fuel in peripheral fuel channels .
This reduces the generation of fast neutrons AND provides shielding from fast neutrons in the interior of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose capsules show the possibility of problems , they have been derated , typically to 95 % full power .
Again this markedly reduces the fast flux impinging on the pot .
Lastly and most expensively , the sources of emergency cooling water now have heaters installed so that the cooling water is hotter than any possible NDT temperature .
The other important fact is that neutron embrittlement is completely reversed by annealing .
The high temperature allows displaced atoms in the crystal lattice to snap back into place .
If embrittlement becomes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annealed in place .
The process will involve adapting the same equipment used to anneal the reactor after fabrication to a radiation environment .
Not particularly pleasant for the workers but certainly doable .
Massive literature on the subject is available .
Reports of work at the FFTF on the subject are of great interest .
Much work has been done on neutron embrittlement in relation to hot fusion research because most of the energy from a hot fusion reaction is postulated to come from fast neutrons that will heavily irradiate the reactor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons

(by me)
INTRODUCTION
VT is putting “out there” enough “non damaging” nuclear weapons facts to undo the obfuscation that allows nuclear terrorism to be covered up by a complicit press.
We are putting an end to this. Our confirmations of nuclear weapon use at Gound Zero at the World Trade Center are now covered by endless documents. We are somewhat fearful of putting things in print that contain formulas that could lead to nuclear proliferation.
We now know that at least two or more of the major explosions at the WTC on 9/11 were nuclear events reported as neutron bombs by an official and never declassified report written for the Department of Energy and Vice President Dick Cheney by teams from Sandia Labs and put into limited circulation to American political leaders in 2003, years before the totally false 9/11 investigation was undertaken, provable as a criminal coverup.
We have solid confirmations of both use of nuclear weapons in state sponsored false flag terrorism, US and “other” military operations and of a real threat of the use of nuclear weapons. We have both full and partial confirmations of nuclear weapons in the hands of right wing groups being recovered in both the US and United Kingdom. We have confirmations of the sale of “scrapped” nuclear weapons taken out of service by NATO and returned to the US.
We can confirm not only Israel’s nuclear weapons program but will now systematically dismember their lies about it. “Welcome to that world.” If you don’t like what we put out, be thankful for the things we keep back.
Those who leak information aren’t always aware of the difference between “need to know” and becoming part of the problem. We at VT can get anything, at least now we can. No one talks to the corporate media and everyone wants to talk while they believe there may be a chance to save something of the world. I wouldn’t have what I have if people weren’t desperate.
Here we go, roughly translated using my “restaurant French.”
1. The original French design for Dimona was for an 18 Mega Watt low pressure water cooled open top thermal plutonium production reactor with 144 fuel rods. Later increased to 24 MW thermal in the final design. It was originally built with a triple redundant cooling system (3 each, separate electrically powered cooling systems in parallel) Each cooling system was rated at 25 MW thermal for a total emergency cooling capacity of 75 MW thermal. All cooling circuits are externally electrically powered due to the low pressure high volume cooling design. With both an oil fired steam power plant and a diesel powered power plant for back up emergency electrical power. The steam plant also provides all military base electrical power plus extra steam for uranium and plutonium fuel processing. Each fuel rod is rated at 175 KW thermal. With heavy water added for fast breeder operation this was dangerously pushed up to 500KW per fuel rod for a total production rate of 75 MW thermal.
2. A 75 mega watt thermal plant only produces about 25 MW of electrical power. They are only about 30% efficient max. The ratio is 3 to 1.
3. If you run the reactor in fast breeder mode with heavy water, criticality issues become a serious problem. If you do not have excess cooling ability to handle an overload condition or if a circuit fails you can not cool down the reactor fast enough and a steam explosion caused by a flash over event will occur. This is what happened at Dimona during an on line refiling cycle. (This is called fuel rod hot swamping.) The rods half to continuously be moved while under going radiation in order to even out the neutron flux density in the core preventing hot spots from building up. This guarantees that all rods are radiated at the same level in order to maximize plutonium production.
4. Due to advanced neutron absorption in the reactor containment / pressure vessel, accelerated vessel wall corrosion and faulty welds (not 100% weld) in the fuel rod support structures. (They used copper clad welding rods instead of stainless steel welding rods.) The reactor failed some time after 1988.
This was due to it being run at to high of a power level for too long. The containment / pressure vessel was never designed to be ran at this power level for long periods of time. They pushed the envelop and lost.
5. The containment / pressure vessel failure was a combination of the steel casing becoming to brittle from excess neutron radiation at the 75 MW power level, forming micro cracks in the containment vessel side walls. Advanced corrosion of the containment vessels surface walls and the internal fuel rod support structure welds failing to due heavy neutron bombardment of the copper in the welds. The Russians lost a few subs because of fault welding causing cooling failures in there reactors too.
6.Basically the welds that attached the fuel rod support racks to the side of the pressure vessel failed during a fuel rod removal procedure.
At that power level a flash over event occurred causing a major steam explosion seriously damaging the reactors containment /pressure vessel, support structure and cooling system. The explosion was so sever that it cracked the concrete outer containment dome.
7. The reactor was off line from about 1990 up to at least 1994 according to my data. The Israelis required extensive French assistance in cleaning up the mess. All of the highly radioactive wast was eventually dumped in Mauritian because it was deemed to dangerous to dispose of in Israel. It was so badly damaged that the French recommended that they just fill it full of cement and weld the door shut………
8. This is an excerpt from the French DGSE report on the Dimona steam explosion to the DOE, circa 1994. Note it is Still Classified.(I will redact “actionable material” voluntarily, editor)
CLEARANCE LEVEL “Q” AND ABOVE/EYES ONLY
The Dimona steam explosion was caused by a prompt criticality event and the initial mechanism of destruction was a steam-driven water
hammer slamming into the top of the reactor vessel with enough force to blow off the control rod drives, pull out the closure studs, shear the cooling pipes and jack the whole vessel several feet upward.
The large negative moderator coefficient shut the reaction down in microseconds. Bulk fuel failure did not occur.
The fuel was distorted and the control rods were locked in place but the cladding did NOT melt.
9. This ended the Israeli experiment in home grown Plutonium production. After 1994 the reactor if operational at all was severely limited in its power output to levels to low for continued plutonium production.It was now only good for isotope production, lithium 6 and Tritium / Deuterium production.
10. The minimum power level of a plutonium producing reactor that will produce 24 KG of pu-239 in one year, with a pu-240 content level less than 6 % is about 65 MW thermal.
1 mega watt of thermal energy per 24 hr day produces 1 gram of PU-239. 365 days of operation at 100% efficiency will only produce 365 grams of weapons grade pu-239 per mega watt.
11. The minimal amount of PU needed for a 20 KT Hiroshima size bomb is about 24 KG. It takes a 75 MW reactor running at full power for one entire year to produce this amount of fuel.
Dimona as originally designed by the French at 24 MW could only produce about 8 KG of PU-239 per year. With fast breeder operation and heavy water added it was increased by the
Israelis up to 75 MW thermal in size. However this increase in power output rapidly burnt out the reactors containment / pressure vessel leading to its early demise.
12. Estimates of Israeli nuclear weapons production is highly exaggerated for several reasons.
A. Maximum Dimona output is only 24KG of weapons grade pu-239 per year. Up to 1990 that would only be about 30, 20 kt devices at 24 KG each.
b. With a (REDACTED) it will drop to a minimum of 6 KG per device with a 2kt maximum yield. note at 97 % pure pu-239. See charts.
c. For a neutron bomb with no uranium tamper it will take apx (REDACTED) pure PU-239.
d. For a Fission Fusion boosted weapon (hydrogen bomb) another 24kg of pu-239 is required for a total weapons count of (REDACTED) of pu-239 fuel. Producing a 200 KT yield.
(REDACTED PARAGRAPH)
E. After about 16 to 32 years depending upon how it is made the PU-239 fuel has to under go repossessing due to “Poison” build up in the metal.
In the US it is supposed to be retired or re used as MOX fuel only.This is why you half to continually make new fuel. To replace the older aging stockpiles that go bad after time.
So a single 75 MW reactor can only support a 32 year production run or life cycle of PU-239 fuel totaling about 800 KG.
After the fuel is no longer 92% pure it is no longer good as weapons grade material.
But it can be put back into the reactor to off set uranium fuel consumption and to run the reactor in the fast breeder mode.
However Japan taught us what happens when you do that and something big goes wrong. ……..
F. 800KG of PU-239 will only produce about 16, 200 KT Hydrogen bombs or 32, 20 KT Hiroshima size bombs or 66 1 KT neutron bombs or 133 2KT fission bombs with a (REDACTED).
G. If the reactor has continuously ran for 50 years with no shut downs at all and at 100% maximum efficiency. 1964-1994.
It could only have produced a maximum of 1200 KG of PU-239 at 92 to 97% purity. Weapons grade material.
This would be equal to 25, 200 KT hydrogen bombs or 100, 1 KT neutron bombs or 200, 2 KT fission bombs or any mix in between.
H. If the lower number is correct and the reactor shut down by 1990.After 26 years of production.Then by 2022 or earlier, Israel will have ran out of usable weapons grade Pu-239
and it will no longer be a nuclear power unless it can replace its fuel supply from external stockpiles in the US.
France and Great Britten only have about 150 to 300 weapons each and they do not have the spare production capacity to share it with other country’s.
France stopped producing new Plutonium in 1992.
13. Plutonium Pit Swapping.
A. Normally in a US plutonium producing reactor such as at Hanford, it can produce enough weapons grade PU-239 at one time to make up to 3 weapons or about 75 kg of pu-239
every 3 to 4 mounts.
B. All weapons grade PU has a decay rate that differs from all other PU based on when, where and how fast it was made.This also sets its usable life time as weapons grade material.
So only PU that was made at the same time in the same reactor can be matched. If you try matching old PU from different reactors with highly different fissile rate it will
spontaneously blow its self apart with several tons of force. Not a good idea. A Dimona size reactor cannot do this, it is too small in size. Once in once out production only.
C. There for all PU made at Dimona or in any other very small clandestine PU production reactors such as in Iraqi, Iran, Pakistan, India etc is not matchable with any other PU.
As PU decays over time due to what is called Poisson build up in the metal it becomes no good for weapons use.
This ranges from about 16 to 32 years for weapons grade PU and about 12 years for Deuterium. Uranium dose not have this problem.
D. If Dimona is permanently off line then Iran and Pakistan will out produce Dimona in PU production in Just a few years of operation.
This is the Israeli “missile gap” fear and why they are in a panic to take out the Iranian nuclear production capability..
E. The Iranian reactor at Bushehr is basically a 1,000 MW thermal BWR if converted to military use it could produce up to 15, 20KT fission weapons per year at 24 KG PU each
or up to 365 KG of PU per year max. It is 13 times larger than Dimona. IE the Missile gap and the Israeli panic attack.
Pakistan has a total civilian nuclear production capacity of 725 MW or about 10 times that of Israel. If there reactors were converted into PU production reactors
they could make up to 10, 20 KT fission weapons per year or about 250 KG of weapons grade PU-239.
F. The total Islamic nuclear program in theory can produce up to 600 KG of weapons grade PU-239 per year if converted to military use. However Israel and Dimona can only produce
up to 25 KG of weapons grade PU per Year if it is still in operational condition and if not; Israeli will start running out of weapons grade PU by 2020………
The mass-dependent efficiency equation shows that it is desirable to assembly as many critical masses as possible. Applying this equation to Little Boy (and ignoring the equation’s limitations in the very low yield range) we can examine the effect of varying the amount of fissile material present:
mass vs blast size in tons.
1.05 80 kg
1.1 1.2 tons
1.2 17 tons
1.3 78 tons
1.4 220 tons
1.5 490 tons
1.6 930 tons
1.8 2.5 kt
2.0 5.2 kt
2.25 10.5 kt
2.40 15.0 kt LITTLE BOY
2.5 18.6 kt
2.75 29.6 kt
3.0 44 kt
3.1
If its fissile content had been increased by a mere 25%, its yield would have tripled.
The explosive efficiency of Little Boy was 0.23 kt/kg of fissile material (1.3%), compared to 2.8 kt/kg (16%) for Fat Man (both are adjusted to account for the yield contribution from tamper fast fission). Use of 93.5% U-235 would have at least doubled Little Boy yield and efficiency, but it would still have remained disappointing compared to the yields achievable using implosion and the same quantity of fissile material.
More notes:
The effects of neutron irradiation on the physical properties of the vessel materials is of primary concern in reactor vessel operation. The reactor vessel is provided with specimen capsules, located between the thermal shield (heavy metal designed to absorb much of the gamma radiation and prevent gamma heating of ex-vessel components) and vessel wall opposite the center of the core. The capsules contain tensile Charpy V-notch and wedge-opening-loading specimens taken from hte reactor vessel shell plates and associated weld materials and heat-affected zone. Dosimeters and thermal monitors are included to permit evaluation of the neutron flux and temperatures experienced by the specimens. By comparing test data from the specimens removed periodically during refueling shutdowns with the unirradiated specimen data provided, the effects of neutron irradiation on the material properties can be determined.
This describes the system installed in all Westinghouse PWRs. Other
reactor brands use similar systems. Note that these capsules are
located next to the core where they receive significantly more irradiation
than the reactor pot. It is from these very specimens that it was
extrapolated that neutron embrittlement MIGHT be a problem toward the
design life of the pot. Several steps have been taken to mitigate the
problem. But first a little review of what the problem really is.
Steel exhibits a property called the Nil Ductility Transition (NDI). Below
the transition temperature, steel loses its ductility and becomes brittle.
The temperature varies with allow but is usually fairly low, below
the freezing point of water. Long term neutron irradiation causes
crystal lattice defects in the steel which raises the NDT temperature.
The concern is that if the NDT temperature rises above that of cooling
water, in the event of an accident, cold cooling water could shock
the reactor while it was below NDT and thus cause it to fracture.
Under no scenario of irradiation is the NDT predicted rise above
approximately ambient temperature.
Several simple steps have been taken to address the problem. Because
the rise in NDT is directly related to the total integrated fast neutron
flux dose, the first simple step was reduce the enrichment of the fuel
in peripheral fuel channels. This reduces the generation of fast
neutrons AND provides shielding from fast neutrons in the interior
of the core. Next, for reactors whose capsules show the possibility
of problems, they have been derated, typically to 95% full power.
Again this markedly reduces the fast flux impinging on the pot.
Lastly and most expensively, the sources of emergency cooling water
now have heaters installed so that the cooling water is hotter than
any possible NDT temperature.
The other important fact is that neutron embrittlement is completely
reversed by annealing. The high temperature allows displaced
atoms in the crystal lattice to snap back into place. If embrittlement
becomes a problem, the reactor can be annealed in place. The process
will involve adapting the same equipment used to anneal the reactor
after fabrication to a radiation environment. Not particularly
pleasant for the workers but certainly doable. Massive literature
on the subject is available. Reports of work at the FFTF on the
subject are of great interest. Much work has been done on neutron
embrittlement in relation to hot fusion research because most of the
energy from a hot fusion reaction is postulated to come from fast
neutrons that will heavily irradiate the reactor components.
Bonus section:
A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons


veteranstoday--2020-09-05--VT Nuclear Education: Troublesome Issues for Nuclear Weapons Owners (classified/partially redacted)

Plutonium aging is going to have some serious implications .
Since the government has been so worried about this , it is important to try to understand why .
First of all , spallation due to PU aging and corrosion effects will ruin the implosion symmetry .
But , the central issue with boosting is to keep the boost gas cool as long as possible .
This is very difficult to do inside an exploding nuclear bomb .
Spalled flakes due to PU aging will fly off the inner pit wall at around 5000 m/s .
This conceivably could generate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force you to compress it at a higher adiabat .
Then , as the neutrons start to build up , the spalding flakes are going to fission , evaporate , and generate all kinds of entropy in the gas .
This is potentially a big effect for weapons failure .
A larger boost gas volume will also end up heating up more due to recoil from fission neutrons .
More heat and more volume means that further compression of the boost gas cavity after the neutrons build up will be much less effective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The greater volume means that it will take more energy in photons to heat it up so the boost doesn ’ t really go in that event .
If you are not using the most stable of Pu alloys , then the phase transition properties may be important in the hydrodynamics .
If this is true , that would help explain why the government has been so worried about this .
Anyway , it ’ s nuts to design bombs so close to the margin of error that this would be become an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plutonium are very susceptible to corrosion .
A number of the problem-plagued W47UGM-27 Polaris warheads had to be replaced after corrosion of the fissile material was discovered during routine maintenance .
The W58 pits also suffered corrosion problems .
The W45 pit was prone to corrosion that could alter its geometry .
The Green Grass pit was also corrosion-prone .
The radioactivity of the materials used can also cause radiation corrosion in the surrounding materials .
Plutonium is highly susceptible to humidity ; moist air increases corrosion rate about 200 times .
Hydrogen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its presence can accelerate corrosion rate by 13 orders of magnitude .
Hydrogen can be generated from moisture and nearby organic materials ( e.g .
plastics ) by radiolysis .
These factors cause issues with storage of plutonium .
The volume increase during oxidation can cause rupture of storage containers or deformation of pits .
Contamination of the pit with deuterium and tritium , whether accidental or if filled by design , can cause a hydride corrosion , which manifests as pitting corrosion and a growth of a surface coating of pyrophoricplutonium hydride @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates by atmospheric oxygen .
Deuterium and tritium also cause hydrogen embrittlement in many materials .
Improper storage can promote corrosion of the pits .
The AL-R8 containers used in the Pantex facility for storage of the pits are said to promote instead of hinder corrosion , and tend to corrode themselves .
The decay heat released by the pits is also a concern ; some pits in storage can reach temperatures as high as 150°C , and the storage facilities for larger numbers of pits may require active cooling .
Humidity control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Beryllium cladding can be corroded by some solvents used for cleaning of the pits .
Research shown that trichloroethylene ( TCE ) causes beryllium corrosion , while trichloroethane ( TCA ) does not .
[ 31 ] Pitting corrosion of beryllium cladding is a significant concern during prolonged storage of pits in the Pantex facility .
The presence of plutonium-240 in the pit material causes increased production of heat and neutrons , impairs fission efficiency and increases the risk of predetonation and fizzle .
Weapon-grade plutonium therefore has plutonium-240 content limited to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has less than 4 % of the 240 isotope , and is used in systems where the radioactivity is a concern , e.g .
in the US Navyweapons which have to share confined spaces on ships and submarines with the crews .
Plutonium-241 , commonly comprising about 0.5 % of weapon-grade plutonium , decays to americium-241 , which is a powerful gamma radiation emitter .
After several years , americium builds up in the plutonium metal , leading to increased gamma activity that poses occupational hazard for workers .
Americium should therefore be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ produced and reprocessed plutonium .
However in around 1967 the Rocky Flats Plant stopped this separation , blending up to 80 % of old americium-containing pits directly to the foundry instead , in order to reduce costs and increase productivity ; this led to higher exposure of workers to gamma radiation .
Metallic plutonium , notably in the form of the plutonium-gallium alloy , degrades chiefly by two mechanisms : corrosion , and self-irradiation .
In very dry air , plutonium , despite its high chemical reactivity , forms a passivation layer of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down the corrosion to about 200 nanometers per year .
In moist air , however , this passivation layer is disrupted and the corrosion proceeds at 200 times this rate ( 0.04 mm/year ) at room temperature , and 100,000 times faster ( 20 mm/year ) at 100°C .
Plutonium strips oxygen from water , absorbs the liberated hydrogen and forms plutonium hydride .
The hydride layer can grow at up to 20 cm/hour , for thinner shells its formation can be considered almost instant .
In presence of water the plutonium dioxide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Plutonium chips can spontaneously ignite ; the mechanism involves formation of Pu O layer , which then rapidly oxidizes to PuO , and the liberated heat is sufficient to bring the small particles with low thermal mass to autoignition temperature ( about 500 °C ) .
The self-irradiation occurs as the plutonium undergoes alpha-decay .
The decaying atom of plutonium-239 liberates an alpha particle and a uranium-235 nucleus .
The alpha particle has an energy of more than 5 MeV and in the metal lattice has range of about 10 micrometers ; then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nearby atoms , and becomes a helium atom .
The contaminant plutonium-241 beta-decays to americium-241 , which then alpha-decays to neptunium-237 .
The alpha-particles lose most of their energy to electrons , which manifests as heating the material .
The heavier uranium nucleus has about 85 keV energy and about three quarters of it deposit as a cascade of atomic displacements ; the uranium nucleus itself has the range of about 12 nanometers in the lattice .
Each such decay event influences about 20,000 other atoms , 90 % of which stay in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ excited , the rest being displaced , resulting in formation of about 2500 Frenkel pairs and a local thermal spike lasting few picoseconds , during which the newly formed defects recombine or migrate .
In a typical weapons-grade bulk material , each atom gets displaced in average once per 10 years .
At cryogenic temperatures , where next to no annealing occurs , the α-phase of plutonium expands ( swells ) during self-irradiation , the δ-phase contracts markedly , and the β-phase contracts slightly .
The electrical resistance increases , which indicates the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All three phases , with sufficient time , converge to amorphous-like state with density averaging at 18.4 g/cm3 .
At normal temperature , however , most of the damage is annealed away ; above 200K vacancies become mobile and at around 400K the clusters of interstitials and vacancies recombine , healing the damage .
Plutonium stored at non-cryogenic temperatures does not show signs of major macroscopic structural changes after more than 40 years .
After 50 years of storage , a typical sample contains 2000 ppm of helium , 3700 ppm americium , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neptunium .
One kilogram of material contains 200 cm3 of helium , which equals three atmospheres of pressure in the same empty volume .
Helium migrates through the lattice similarly to the vacancies , and can be trapped in them .
The helium-occupied vacancies can coalesce , forming bubbles and causing swelling .
Void-swelling is however more likely than bubble-swelling .
The Radiation Identification System is among a number of methods developed for nuclear weapons inspections .
It allows the fingerprinting of the nuclear weapons so that their identity and status can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including gamma spectroscopy with high-resolution germanium detectors .
The 870.7 keV line in the spectrum , corresponding to the first excited state ofoxygen-17 , indicates the presence of plutonium ( IV ) oxide in the sample .
The age of the plutonium can be established by measuring the ratio of plutonium-241 and its decay product , americium-241.However , even passive measurements of gamma spectrums may be a contentious issue in international weapon inspections , as it allows characterization of materials used e.g .
the isotopic composition of plutonium , which can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pit Corrosion Problems Confirmed Top of Form • The W88 is the replacement warhead for our aging inventory .
It is essentially a rehash of what we had on the shelf when we stopped making them in the 80s .
After a ‘ competition ’ , this design won .
The W78 is in service , and its ‘ pit ’ isn ’ t a happy camper .
The problem is , after 30 years we ’ ve really forgotten how to do this .
People grow old and retire .
Processes aren @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook has provided the first open-source confirmation of rumors that the W78 warhead has a pit corrosion problem .
For some time , I have wondered why the Obama Administration wants to replace both the W88 and the W78 with a common warhead , utilizing newly manufactured W88 pits .
The statement of work for the W78 LEP isn ’ t all that helpful .
Stephen Young has previously noted rumors of pit corrosion problems with the W78 .
The Jasons themselves noted that the 100 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” or “ predominant ” pit types .
There were other pit types for which NNSA was undertaking or considering “ mitigation paths.
” Cook , in answer to a question by Senator Feinstein about why the Administration wants to produce between 50-80 pits per year appeared to confirm those rumors by describing how the decay of plastics and other materials may corrode the pit and then confirming “ we ’ re seeing those kinds of problems ” in some pit types .
MR. COOK : Again , I think this is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to give a quick technical answer .
JASON [ An elite advisory committee of our scientific overlords -ed . ]
determined that the lifetime of the plutonium parts in pits are good for 100 years or 80 was their conclusion .
Due to plutonium decay which is by alpha — that ’ s helium that interstitially causes a potential problem .
The actual problems that we have go well beyond that .
We have the plutonium pits in the midst of the chemistry of high explosives with binders that decompose just like plastics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The plutonium is radioactive .
The decay goes on .
That degrades all of the plastics , all of the cushions , all of the things that are around the pit .
And it also causes corrosion in the pit .
So on the one hand , JASON is absolutely correct about what they said .
But the difficulty is that , as weapons get older , much of the chemistry in a radiolytic environment starts to take over .
And that has been the problem , and we ’ ve invested many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to actually pin down in which weapons systems we ’ re seeing those kinds of problems .
And we can predict how long they ’ re good for .
Those are not good for 100 years .
Bottom of Form — Template measurement is an important method in nuclear disarmament .
The gamma-ray spectrum of Plutonium pit shows unique property due to age , abundance , amounts and thickness of the Plutonium pit ; that is , same designed pits yield similar gamma-ray spectra while different design give distinct spectra .
Useful information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the reliable Plutonium pit radiation as ‘ template ’ .
Comparison of the data from inspected objects with the template can give conclusion whether they are of the same type .
Because of the strong self-absorption of Plutonium , some characteristics of a Plutonium pit can only be identified by gamma spectrum .
MCNP simulation was employed to prove that in some cases , template depending on gamma-ray spectrum from the reliable Plutonium pit alone can ’ t effectively distinguish the spurious objects .
And a further approach indicates that enhancing neutron counting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ improve the problem .
Neutron counting rate can be indirectly acquired by spontaneous fissile neutrons bombarding a 10B target .
478 keV γ rays are concomitant with the nuclear reaction 10B ( n , α ) 7Li* from 7Li* nuclei ’ s deexcitation .
Neutron information is gathered by detecting 478 keV γ photons .
Using HPGe γ detector can both detect γ-ray spectrum and acquire neutron counting rate .
This method efficiently increases confidence of template measurement and also ensures the dismantling process without revealing sensitive nuclear warhead design information .

By Gordon Duff and Jeff Smith
Troublesome Issues for Nuclear Weapons Owners
Plutonium Aging
Plutonium aging is going to have some serious implications. Since the government has been so worried about this, it is important to try to understand why.
First of all, spallation due to PU aging and corrosion effects will ruin the implosion symmetry. But, the central issue with boosting is to keep the boost gas cool as long as possible. This is very difficult to do inside an exploding nuclear bomb.
Spalled flakes due to PU aging will fly off the inner pit wall at around 5000 m/s. This conceivably could generate entropy in the boost gas which would force you to compress it at a higher adiabat.
Then, as the neutrons start to build up, the Spalding flakes are going to fission, evaporate, and generate all kinds of entropy in the gas. This is potentially a big effect on weapons failure.
A larger boost gas volume will also end up heating up more due to recoil from fission neutrons.
More heat and more volume mean that further compression of the boost gas cavity after the neutrons build-up will be much less effective at increasing both temperature and density.
The greater volume means that it will take more energy in photons to heat it up so the boost doesn’t really go in that event.
If you are not using the most stable of Pu alloys, then the phase transition properties may be important in the hydrodynamics. If this is true, that would help explain why the government has been so worried about this. Anyway, it’s nuts to design bombs so close to the margin of error that this would become an issue….. (redacted)
Corrosion issues
Both uranium and plutonium are very susceptible to corrosion. A number of the problem-plagued W47UGM-27 Polaris warheads had to be replaced after corrosion of the fissile material was discovered during routine maintenance. The W58 pits also suffered corrosion problems. The W45 pit was prone to corrosion that could alter its geometry.
The Green Grass pit was also corrosion-prone. The radioactivity of the materials used can also cause radiation corrosion in the surrounding materials. Plutonium is highly susceptible to humidity; moist air increases the corrosion rate about 200 times. Hydrogen has a strong catalytic effect on corrosion; its presence can accelerate corrosion rate by 13 orders of magnitude. Hydrogen can be generated from moisture and nearby organic materials (e.g. plastics) by radiolysis. These factors cause issues with the storage of plutonium. The volume increase during oxidation can cause a rupture of storage containers or deformation of pits.
Contamination of the pit with deuterium and tritium, whether accidental or if filled by design, can cause hydride corrosion, which manifests as pitting corrosion and growth of a surface coating of pyrophoric plutonium hydride. It also greatly accelerates the corrosion rates by atmospheric oxygen. Deuterium and tritium also cause hydrogen embrittlement in many materials.
Improper storage can promote corrosion of the pits. The AL-R8 containers used in the Pantex facility for storage of the pits are said to promote instead of hinder corrosion and tend to corrode themselves. The decay heat released by the pits is also a concern; some pits in storage can reach temperatures as high as 150°C, and the storage facilities for larger numbers of pits may require active cooling. Humidity control can also present problems for pit storage.
Beryllium cladding can be corroded by some solvents used for cleaning of the pits. Research has shown that trichloroethylene (TCE) causes beryllium corrosion, while trichloroethane (TCA) does not.[31] Pitting corrosion of beryllium cladding is a significant concern during the prolonged storage of pits in the Pantex facility.
Isotopic composition issues
The presence of plutonium-240 in the pit material causes increased production of heat and neutrons, impairs fission efficiency, and increases the risk of detonation and fizzle. Weapon-grade plutonium, therefore, has plutonium-240 content limited to less than 7%. Supergrade plutonium has less than 4% of the 240 isotopes, and is used in systems where the radioactivity is a concern, e.g. in the US Navyweapons which have to share confined spaces on ships and submarines with the crews.
Plutonium-241, commonly comprising about 0.5% of weapon-grade plutonium, decays to americium-241, which is a powerful gamma radiation emitter. After several years, americium builds up in the plutonium metal, leading to increased gamma activity that poses an occupational hazard for workers. Americium should therefore be separated, usually chemically, from newly produced and reprocessed plutonium.
However, around 1967 the Rocky Flats Plant stopped this separation, blending up to 80% of old americium-containing pits directly to the foundry instead, in order to reduce costs and increase productivity; this led to higher exposure of workers to gamma radiation.
Aging issues
Metallic plutonium, notably in the form of the plutonium-gallium alloy, degrades chiefly by two mechanisms: corrosion, and self-irradiation.
In very dry air, plutonium, despite its high chemical reactivity, forms a passivation layer of plutonium(IV) oxide that slows down the corrosion to about 200 nanometers per year. In moist air, however, this passivation layer is disrupted and the corrosion proceeds at 200 times this rate (0.04 mm/year) at room temperature, and 100,000 times faster (20 mm/year) at 100°C. Plutonium strips oxygen from water absorbs the liberated hydrogen and forms plutonium hydride.
The hydride layer can grow at up to 20 cm/hour, for thinner shells its formation can be considered almost instant. In the presence of water, the plutonium dioxide becomes hyperstoichiometric, up to PuO 2.26 . Plutonium chips can spontaneously ignite; the mechanism involves the formation of the Pu 2 O 3 layer, which then rapidly oxidizes to PuO 2 , and the liberated heat is sufficient to bring the small particles with low thermal mass to autoignition temperature (about 500 °C).
The self-irradiation occurs as the plutonium undergoes alpha-decay. The decaying atom of plutonium-239 liberates an alpha particle and a uranium-235 nucleus. The alpha particle has an energy of more than 5 MeV and in the metal, the lattice has a range of about 10 micrometers; then it stops, acquires two electrons from nearby atoms, and becomes a helium atom. The contaminant plutonium-241 beta-decays to americium-241, which then alpha-decays to neptunium-237.
The alpha-particles lose most of their energy to electrons, which manifests as heating the material. The heavier uranium nucleus has about 85 keV energy and about three-quarters of it deposit as a cascade of atomic displacements; the uranium nucleus itself has the range of about 12 nanometers in the lattice.
Each such decay event influences about 20,000 other atoms, 90% of which stay in their lattice site and only are thermally excited, the rest being displaced, resulting in the formation of about 2500 Frenkel pairs and a local thermal spike lasting few picoseconds, during which the newly formed defects recombine or migrate. In a typical weapons-grade bulk material, each atom gets displaced on average once per 10 years.
At cryogenic temperatures, where next to no annealing occurs, the α-phase of plutonium expands (swells) during self-irradiation, the δ-phase contrasts markedly, and the β-phase contracts slightly. The electrical resistance increases, which indicates the increase of defects in the lattice.
All three phases, with sufficient time, converge to an amorphous-like state with density averaging at 18.4 g/cm3. At normal temperature, however, most of the damage is annealed away; above 200K vacancies become mobile and at around 400K the clusters of interstitials and vacancies recombine, healing the damage. Plutonium stored at non-cryogenic temperatures does not show signs of major macroscopic structural changes after more than 40 years.
After 50 years of storage, a typical sample contains 2000 ppm of helium, 3700 ppm americium, 1700 ppm uranium, and 300 ppm neptunium. One kilogram of material contains 200 cm3 of helium, which equals three atmospheres of pressure in the same empty volume. Helium migrates through the lattice similarly to the vacancies and can be trapped in them. The helium-occupied vacancies can coalesce, forming bubbles and causing swelling. Void-swelling is however more likely than bubble-swelling.
Production and inspections
The Radiation Identification System is among a number of methods developed for nuclear weapons inspections. It allows the fingerprinting of nuclear weapons so that their identity and status can be verified. Various physics methods are used, including gamma spectroscopy with high-resolution germanium detectors. The 870.7 keV line in the spectrum, corresponding to the first excited state of oxygen-17, indicates the presence of plutonium(IV) oxide in the sample.
The age of the plutonium can be established by measuring the ratio of plutonium-241 and its decay product, americium-241. However, even passive measurements of gamma spectrums may be a contentious issue in international weapon inspections, as it allows characterization of materials used e.g. the isotopic composition of plutonium, which can be considered a secret.
W78 Nuke Warhead Pit Corrosion Problems Confirmed
Top of Form
The W88 is the replacement warhead for our aging inventory. It is essentially a rehash of what we had on the shelf when we stopped making them in the 80s. After a ‘competition’, this design won. The W78 is in service, and its ‘pit’ isn’t a happy camper. The problem is, after 30 years we’ve really forgotten how to do this. People grow old and retire. Processes aren’t always documented… I believe NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook has provided the first open-source confirmation of rumors that the W78 warhead has a pit corrosion problem.
For some time, I have wondered why the Obama Administration wants to replace both the W88 and the W78 with a common warhead, utilizing newly manufactured W88 pits. The statement of work for the W78 LEP isn’t all that helpful.
Stephen Young has previously noted rumors of pit corrosion problems with the W78. The Jasons themselves noted that the 100-year estimate was only for “most” or “predominant” pit types. There were other pit types for which NNSA was undertaking or considering “mitigation paths.”
Congressional testimony:
Cook, in answer to a question by Senator Feinstein about why the Administration wants to produce between 50-80 pits per year appeared to confirm those rumors by describing how the decay of plastics and other materials may corrode the pit and then confirming “we’re seeing those kinds of problems” in some pit types.
MR. COOK: Again, I think this is a very good question. Let me try to give a quick technical answer.
JASON [An elite advisory committee of our scientific overlords -ed.] determined that the lifetime of the plutonium parts in pits are good for 100 years or 80 was their conclusion. Due to plutonium decay which is by alpha — that’s helium that interstitially causes a potential problem. The actual problems that we have to go well beyond that.
We have the plutonium pits in the midst of the chemistry of high explosives with binders that decompose just like plastics in cars exposed to the sun. The plutonium is radioactive. The decay goes on. That degrades all of the plastics, all of the cushions, all of the things that are around the pit. And it also causes corrosion in the pit.
So on the one hand, JASON is absolutely correct about what they said. But the difficulty is that, as weapons get older, much of the chemistry in a radiolytic environment starts to take over. And that has been the problem, and we’ve invested many of the people and time in surveillance to actually pin down in which weapons systems we’re seeing those kinds of problems. And we can predict how long they’re good for.
Those are not good for 100 years.
Bottom of Form
Template measurement is an important method in nuclear disarmament. The gamma-ray spectrum of the Plutonium pit shows unique property due to the age, abundance, amounts, and thickness of the Plutonium pit; that is, the same designed pits yield similar gamma-ray spectra while different designs give distinct spectra.
Useful information is extracted from the gamma-ray spectrum generated by the reliable Plutonium pit radiation as a ‘template’. A comparison of the data from inspected objects with the template can give a conclusion whether they are of the same type. Because of the strong self-absorption of Plutonium, some characteristics of a Plutonium pit can only be identified by the gamma spectrum. MCNP simulation was employed to prove that in some cases, a template depending on the gamma-ray spectrum from the reliable Plutonium pit alone can’t effectively distinguish the spurious objects.
And a further approach indicates that enhancing the neutron counting rate of spontaneous fission of Plutonium can improve the problem. Neutron counting rate can be indirectly acquired by spontaneous fissile neutrons bombarding a 10B target. 478 keV γ rays are concomitant with the nuclear reaction 10B(n,α)7Li* from 7Li* nuclei’s deexcitation.
Neutron information is gathered by detecting 478 keV γ photons. Using the HPGe γ detector can both detect the γ-ray spectrum and acquire neutron counting rate. This method efficiently increases the confidence of template measurement and also ensures the dismantling process without revealing sensitive nuclear warhead design information.