iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-06--COVID-19: the “second wave” in Europe

COVID-19: the “second wave” in Europe

Charles has asked me to clarify the Blavatnik stringency index I use in this paper .
Here ’ s where you can find its definition : in Chapter 4 of https : //www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-11/BSG-WP-2020-032-v9.pdf .
I share Charles ’ s concerns about the way the index is put together .
My own criticisms are : One , they weight their 9 factors equally , without justification .
My main objective in this paper is to try to put together some evidence to test that equal weighting !
Two , they do not rightly weight regional lockdowns in comparison with national ones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lockdown should be weighted according to the population affected by it .
A lockdown measure in England ( 84 % of the UK population ) , for example , ought to carry almost 17 times as much weight in the index as the same measure in Wales ( 5 % of the population ) .
All that said , if the Blavatnik data has been put together honestly ( and I don ’ t have any evidence to lead me to doubt that ) , my inclination is to use it to get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month ago , I compared the histories of the COVID-19 epidemic in fourteen Western European countries .
At that point , the “ second wave ” of the virus , which had been building throughout the region for three or four months , was giving governments an excuse to start re-introducing lockdowns .
So , I said that I would review the situation in a month or so .
That month has now elapsed , so here ’ s the review .
Maybe , just maybe , I ’ ll now have enough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lockdown measures have been effective , and which haven ’ t .
Once again , here is the list of countries : The data sources are the same as before : Our World in Data and the Blavatnik School of Government , both at Oxford University .
The data I used was taken on December 3rd , and it included figures up to and including December 2nd .
In the last week or so , the Our World in Data feed has changed quite substantially .
Most data before the third week of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ – France , Germany and Sweden at least – have taken the opportunity to wipe and re-write a lot of their data , some of it right back to the beginning of the epidemic .
And the data for UK dependencies ( Jersey , Guernsey , Isle of Man , Gibraltar ) and Danish dependencies ( Faeroe Islands , Greenland ) has disappeared entirely .
I would have expected that this data might have been consolidated into the parent country ’ s ; but for the UK at least , I don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Every so often , the Our World in Data feed adds new data columns .
One of these recently added is the reproduction rate ( Rt ) .
This is the average number of new infections passed on ( as at a given day ) by a single infected person .
It is usually expressed as a fraction .
Rt bigger than 1 means the infection numbers are generally rising , and less than 1 means they are generally falling .
In the UK at least , this is modelled data rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll see , some countries ’ figures are smoother than others , so it looks as if different countries are calculating it differently .
But it ’ s still of interest to compare even a modelled Rt with the observed rate of growth of new cases .
Also , in November the Swedes have also completely re-written their lockdown stringency data , and it now looks as if for months their lockdown hasn ’ t been nearly as light as we had been led to believe .
All this said , I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said many times before : It ’ s the best data I have , so I ’ ll use it .
I ’ ll begin with cases .
Here are the total ( cumulative ) cases per million population over the whole period of the epidemic , up to December 2nd .
Here is a daily cases per million population comparison .
The data shown are centrally averaged over a 7-day period .
That is , the date against which a count is plotted is the 4th ( central ) day of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 14 countries , the new case counts have peaked since late October , and in many have since fallen significantly .
So , the recent lockdowns must have had an effect .
Which measures have had the most effect , is a moot point at this stage .
Here is the list of daily cases per million as at the end of the month : To put this in perspective , only Spain , Ireland and France are currently below the 200 new cases per million population per day , at which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endemic , and no unlocks should be considered .
However , four more countries , including the UK , are now only slightly above it .
Another way to look at the cases figures is in terms of weekly new case growth .
This is the percentage growth in the ( weekly averaged ) new cases from a particular day to the same day of the week a week later .
This requires the weekly averaged new cases up to 3 days after the current date , meaning there must be at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ current date .
That is why the graph stops before the end of November .
It ’ s obvious that , over the last four weeks , the trends in weekly case growth have almost all been downward .
So much so , that only three of the countries are now showing positive growth in new cases : Another way to look at infection rates is to plot the reproduction rate , Rt .
This is based on numbers of infections , not cases , so it may show a slightly different picture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when I come to plot the two on the same axis , it will become plain that while the two are clearly related , they don ’ t always move together in perfect sync .
Here are the Rt values supplied by each country over the course of the epidemic .
With the exception of Sweden , the Rt rates have been trending down throughout November : The UK is one of only four of the countries with an Rt rate below 1 at the end of November .
In contrast , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all been upward since late October : The UK ( pink line ) appears to be bucking this trend ; but , like most things political , that is a deceit .
The apparent drop around November 10th was caused by the release of “ circuit-breaker ” lockdowns in Wales and Northern Ireland .
Yet people in England are ( were ? )
far harder locked down at the end of November than at the end of October .
At the moment at least , the figure pulled through to Our World in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place UK wide ; it seems to miss additional measures in the individual constituent countries .
On top of the currently reported figure of about 64 % , these additional measures account as of November 30th for around 5 % extra stringency in England , 3 % in Northern Ireland and Wales , and around 1 % in Scotland .
The number of cases which get found depends , in part at least , on the testing capacity available .
Here are the cumulative tests carried out per 100,000 population in each country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do not report cumulative test counts ) : Luxembourg and Denmark are well ahead of the rest .
In fact , the number of tests done in Luxembourg since the start of the epidemic is more than twice the population !
Another interesting statistic is the cumulative percentage of positives among the tests done since the very beginning of the epidemic : In many of the countries , the cases per test percentage has climbed significantly in the second wave of the epidemic .
I ’ d guess this is simply because infections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the number of tests available .
This is consistent with the observation that , in most of the countries , this ratio now seems to be nearing a second peak .
Here are four spaghetti graphs of deaths from the virus .
The first is total deaths per million population .
The second shows the daily deaths per million , over the course of the epidemic ; and I have appended to it a histogram of the deaths per million rates as at November 30th .
You can see here which countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” of the second wave , and which haven ’ t .
The third shows deaths per case , with the cases offset 21 days back from the deaths ( 21 days being the mean length of the course of the disease , in the UK at least ) .
The fourth and final graph shows the cumulative totals of deaths per case over the whole course of the epidemic .
The UK ( pink line ) is not doing well in the deaths-per-case stakes .
It is second only to Italy in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UK is now top of the list in terms of deaths per case over the whole epidemic , at about 3.6 % .
Deaths per case is , I think , a fair indicator of lack of quality in a country ’ s health care system ; for lack of testing capacity , and less effective treatment of those who need hospitalization , will both tend to increase it .
I come now to the meat of this review .
For each country , I have plotted weekly case growth percentage ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( brown line ) and Rt rate multiplied by 100 to express it as a percentage ( grey line ) , all on the same graph .
Both the weekly case growth and Rt are capped at a maximum of 200 % .
If a particular lockdown measure is effectual , then I would expect the grey and blue lines to move in the opposite direction to the brown , at or shortly after the day the measure comes into effect .
A newly introduced lockdown measure , if successful , ought to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case growth , or both , within the incubation period of the virus ( maximum 12 days ) .
This is complicated by the fact that , as you will see from the graphs , the virus has a rhythm of its own .
Under conditions of constant stringency , the weekly case growth tends to oscillate periodically .
The period can be different in different countries , and sometimes varies from time to time within a country ; but 2 to 6 weeks from peak to peak or trough to trough is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the course of many cycles , the weekly case growth will tend to rise .
But if a lockdown measure is effective , it may change the overall trend between peaks or troughs from upwards to downwards , and may also start to smooth out the peaks and troughs .
As to the reproduction rate , it too tends to oscillate periodically , in the same direction as the weekly case growth .
Peaks and troughs in weekly case growth often show a few days ahead of peaks and troughs in the Rt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the examples below will show , it is now quite common to have Rt above 1 and case growth negative at the same time .
The other component of my review is the detailed data , which the Blavatnik School of Government provide on the status of 12 lockdown indicators ( 9 of which contribute to the stringency index ) for each country for each day .
I have converted these to a list of measures which have been imposed ( or unlocked ) in each country , with dates , since August @ @ @ @ @ @ @ summary of the currently active lockdown measures in each country .
Current ( 20201127 ) : Schools : Mandatory closed , Workplaces : Mandatory closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Public transport : Recommended closed , Stay at home : Required with exceptions , Travel : Recommended not to travel , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : Open , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required when with others .
Notes : Given the high peaks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the end of October , I don ’ t think the lockdown measures introduced during September and early October had a whole lot of effect .
However , the September 29th “ Stay at home : Recommended ” did appear to produce an all but immediate downturn in weekly case growth and in reproduction rate .
The October 23rd reduced limit on the size of gatherings also seems to have had an immediate beneficial effect .
The November 2nd measures also had some positive effect , though it ’ s not possible to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
The November 17th measures have continued the drop in weekly case growth , but I don ’ t yet have the Rt figures to cross-check with .
There ’ s something else curious about this graph .
Look at the peaks in Rt and in the weekly case growth .
They seem to be getting vertically further apart from each other .
As time goes on , it looks as if it takes a higher Rt to produce a given growth in cases .
I wonder , perhaps , if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to confirmed cases ( for example , because they are asymptomatic ) is rising ?
If so , that ’ s good news .
Current ( 20201123 ) : Schools : Recommended closed , Workplaces : Mandatory closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at home : Required with exceptions , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required when with others .
Notes : I added the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , because they do seem to have had an immediate and significant effect .
The only national measure in that group was the restriction of gathering size to 10 or below , so that may have been what “ did the trick ” at that stage .
The precipitate fall in weekly case growth around October 22nd , and in the reproduction rate a little later , looks likely to be due to the October 19th “ Stay at home : Required with exceptions.
” The November 2nd mandatory closure of workplaces and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ followed by an increase in weekly case growth , though it is still ( just ) negative .
Rt has continued to drop , but there is no “ knee ” to suggest that these measures on their own made a significant difference .
I will , however , note that the stringent October 1st “ Face covering : Required when with others ” mandate seems to have done nothing at all to prevent the huge peak in new cases in mid to late October .
And it seems to have sent the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I think that gives us some evidence that mandating face coverings brings little or no benefits .
Current ( 20201130 ) : Schools : Recommended closed , Workplaces : Recommended closed , Events : Recommended cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at home : Recommended ( Regional ) , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : Open , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required in some places .
Notes : Denmark ’ s Rt rate looks smoother than either Austria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it doesn ’ t show all the peaks and troughs in weekly case growth .
It looks as if they may be calculating it a different way from the others .
The last three troughs in Rt ( the final one is only just visible ) look to have all bottomed out at similar values around 120 % , and all at stringency levels near 50 % , too .
The October 26th reduction of maximum group size , combined with the stay at home and not-to-travel recommendations in force from November @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rt down somewhat , but not as much as I would have expected .
They may also have contributed to the small size of the following case growth peak ; but I can ’ t be sure .
We ’ ll have to wait a bit longer to draw any conclusions from Denmark .
Current ( 20201128 ) : Schools : Some closed , Workplaces : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at home : Required with exceptions , Travel : Mandatory restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Public info : Co-ordinated .
Testing : Open .
Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required when with others .
Notes : To help make sense of the French data , I ’ ll also show the daily cases graph : What seems to have happened is that the French waited until the last possible moment , then on October 30th threw in just about every lockdown idea they could think of , all at the same time .
It seems to have “ worked , ” after a fashion ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harsh as the first lockdown .
Moreover , the French have had “ Face covering : Required when with others ” nationally since July 20th .
So , that rush up to the peak from July to October , I think , is fairly good evidence that face mask wearing by the public doesn ’ t hamper the spread of the virus .
Note also that , as of mid-November and under stringent lockdown , Rt was still above 100 % , and yet new cases were dropping .
Current ( 20201129 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at home : Recommended , Travel : Recommended not to travel , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : Open , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required in some places .
Notes : German cases have recently all but stabilized .
Here ’ s the new cases graph : The most likely causes of this recent stabilization would seem to be the October 15th “ Stay at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Recommended not to travel.
” Germans will usually do what they are told to !
The November 2nd restriction on group size , and the closure of some workplaces , have reduced Rt , but they don ’ t seem to have had much effect so far on case growth .
And for much of November , Rt was well above 100 % , but the new case counts weren ’ t consistently growing .
Current ( 20201123 ) : Schools : Some closed , Workplaces : Mandatory closed , Events : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ < =10 , Public transport : Recommended closed , Stay at home : Required with exceptions , Travel : Mandatory restrictions , International : Quarantine high-risk , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required in some places .
Notes : The regional measures of August 8th seem to have brought the immediate problem under control .
After that , nothing seemed to have much effect until October 7th .
It was probably the national measures , “ Travel : Mandatory restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cancelled ” that did the trick .
And the ( over ? )
draconian measures of October 21st have certainly brought Rt down , and to well below 100 % .
Current ( 20201125 ) : Schools : Some closed , Workplaces : Mandatory closed ( Regional ) , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Public transport : Recommended closed , Stay at home : Required with exceptions , Travel : Mandatory restrictions ( Regional ) , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tracing : Limited , Face covering : Required when with others .
Notes : The August 17th closure of some workplaces did seem to have an effect .
The package of measures on October 6th did have an immediate effect , but not as strong as the Italians might have hoped .
October 23rd , for me , looks like the key date ; and on that date , the only national measure was the restriction of gatherings to 10 or less .
This looks like more evidence that restricting gathering sizes works @ @ @ @ @ @ @ November 6th have made a difference , or are simply “ over the top , ” I – once again – can not tell ; and it doesn ’ t help that the Italians haven ’ t reported any Rt figures since November 20th .
But once again , an Rt consistently above 100 % has nevertheless allowed case growth to drop significantly .
Current ( 20201123 ) : Schools : Recommended closed , Workplaces : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : Open , Contact tracing : Limited , Face covering : Required when with others .
Notes : Because Luxembourg is a small country , its weekly case growth will tend to be more volatile than in larger countries .
There were also significant adjustments to the numbers of cases in late August .
Since then , a significant drop in weekly case growth seems to have started since the October 20th measures .
I ’ m a little surprised by that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not mandated ; perhaps the mandatory cancellation of events was a bigger factor .
The October 31st “ Stay at home : Required with exceptions ” also produced a drop in Rt , as you can see by the “ knee ” on the graph .
But since then , case growth hasn ’ t come down much , even though Rt has continued to drop .
As to the November 26th closure of some workplaces , we ’ ll have to wait and see .
Current ( 20201122 ) : Schools @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at home : Recommended , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required in some places .
Notes : The August 18th restriction on gathering size did seem to pull down the size of the next peak in case growth .
How significant the recommendation to cancel events was , I don ’ t know .
But Rt started to increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The September 29th measures , events cancellation and recommendation not to travel , did seem to get the cases coming down at last .
Rt also started to drop significantly , a week or so afterwards .
All was well for a while ; and by the middle of November , Rt had dropped well below 100 % .
But the November 4th closure of workplaces seems to have had no beneficial effect at all .
In fact , since the middle of November , Dutch cases have been dropping , but more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) : Schools : Recommended closed , Workplaces : Some closed ( Regional ) , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 ( Regional ) , Public transport : Recommended closed , Stay at home : Required with exceptions ( Regional ) , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : Open , Contact tracing : Limited , Face covering : Required outside the home .
Notes : Since early September , all the lockdowns have been regional .
They have been quite stringent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ getting on top of the virus , albeit slowly .
The peaks and troughs in Rt in Portugal don ’ t seem to correspond to any particular lockdown measures being introduced or released at the time .
Rt did , however , drop during September , a period when some workplaces were closed nationally .
And , though Rt is still well above 100 % , new cases have started to drop significantly .
The Portuguese must be doing something right ; but I have no idea what it is !
Current ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Workplaces : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Stay at home : Required with exceptions , Travel : Mandatory restrictions , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required outside the home .
Notes : The two sets of lockdowns during July do seem to have had an effect on both Rt and weekly case growth , but they were regional only .
Another “ sea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around October 25th .
The measures introduced then were event cancellations , reduced gathering size , stay at home , and travel restrictions .
All four of these have been seen to be effective elsewhere , so the Spaniards are probably on the right track as far as dealing with the virus is concerned .
Here , too , we see Rt consistently above 100 % during November , and yet a significant drop in new cases .
The face covering requirement introduced on October 13th – the most stringent in all the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have had any effect on Rt .
And any effects it might have had on case growth will have been eclipsed by the measures of October 25th .
Current ( 20201124 ) : Schools : Recommended closed , Workplaces : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Public transport : Recommended closed , Stay at home : Recommended , Travel : Recommended not to travel ( Regional ) , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Limited .
Notes : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the end of October , with no particular lockdown measure being an obvious cause .
However , Rt – which is unusually smooth , like Denmark ’ s – has been rising since July , and now seems to have just about peaked .
The November 24th closure of some workplaces hasn ’ t been in force long enough yet to draw any conclusions .
Current ( 20201123 ) : Schools : Some closed ( Regional ) , Workplaces : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled ( Regional ) , Gatherings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Comprehensive , Face covering : Required when with others .
Notes : This is an odd one .
Rt went up enormously during September and early October , perhaps due to the re-opening of schools after the summer break .
( There was a similar rise back in May , when schools re-opened after the first lockdown ) .
Weekly case growth and Rt have been coming down almost continuously since then , and Rt is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet there was no national lockdown measure in early October to trigger that !
New cases peaked and started coming down around the time of the October 29th closure of some workplaces .
Looking at Rt , there is a “ knee ” at precisely that time ; so perhaps this measure added to the already existing downward trends in Rt and weekly case growth .
Current ( 20201116 ) : Workplaces : Some closed , Events : Mandatory cancelled , Gatherings : Up to < =10 , Public transport : Recommended closed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Travel : Recommended not to travel , International : Ban some arrivals , Public info : Co-ordinated , Testing : If symptoms , Contact tracing : Limited , Face covering : Required in some places .
Notes : The UK seems to have the best correlation between Rt and weekly case growth of all the countries .
There was a sea-change from a rising to a falling Rt trend some time in September , only broken by the huge spike in early October .
“ Gatherings : Up to < =10 ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may have helped with this .
Here is the new cases graph for the UK as a whole : The “ tiered ” local lockdowns in place in the second half of October seemed to have just about stabilized the new cases .
When a new national lockdown was introduced in early November , cases suddenly went up again !
But they peaked around November 13th , and have been going down ever since .
The UK data is particularly difficult to analyze , not only because of the tiers system ( a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on December 2nd ) , but also because England , Northern Ireland , Scotland and Wales each have their own separate additional lockdown rules .
Differences from UK wide measures ( 20201130 ) : Schools : Some closed ( Regional ) , Stay at home : Required with exceptions ( Regional ) , International : Quarantine high-risk .
Notes : The August 27th “ Face covering : Required in some places ” almost exactly coincided with the start of the second wave .
And after the September 25th tightening , cases went soaring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of face coverings .
And despite “ Schools : Recommended closed , ” most schools did in fact re-open , and the results are visible in the cases graph .
Of the November measures , the most likely to have brought about the drop in cases were the stay-at-home requirement and the travel restrictions .
Notes : Due to the low proportion of the population , these measures are unlikely to have contributed much to the UK wide picture .
Notes : Due to the low proportion of the population , these measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UK wide picture .
Notes : Due to the low proportion of the population , these measures are unlikely to have contributed much to the UK wide picture .
In many cases , it ’ s hard to establish a strong correlation between success against the virus and any one particular lockdown measure .
Part of the reason is that governments like to make lots of different regulations all starting on the same date , so it ’ s hard to determine which worked and which didn ’ t .
The following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tentative .
While schools are well known to be a breeding ground for the virus , I couldn ’ t find any evidence that school closures , either recommended or mandated , have on their own caused a significant drop in case growth anywhere during the second wave .
Workplace closures appear not to have been beneficial in Belgium or the Netherlands , and their effectiveness in Germany is doubtful .
There is , however , some evidence that they did make a difference in Italy ; and perhaps in Portugal and Switzerland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , large scale events have been ( and still are ) cancelled .
But when a country has relaxed this measure , re-imposing it often seems to have had a beneficial effect on new case counts ; at least in Ireland , Luxembourg , the Netherlands and Spain .
But there seems to have been no clear benefit from re-imposing this measure in Belgium .
The reduction in maximum gathering size to 10 or less seems to have been effective in Austria , Belgium , Italy , Spain and the UK .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem to have made much of a difference is the Netherlands .
Public transport closures do not appear to have been a significant factor during the second wave of the epidemic .
Stay at home requirements look to have had a significant effect .
Even just recommending stay-at-home has produced effects in Austria , Germany and the UK .
Mandating stay-at-home seems to have made a difference in Belgium and Spain , and perhaps in Luxembourg .
Travel restrictions , too , do make a difference .
Even a recommendation not to travel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Netherlands .
Mandatory restrictions on travel have been effective in Ireland , and arguably in Spain .
And a mixture of the two has , probably , had some effect in the UK .
The only countries which changed their international travel rules in October or November are Germany , Switzerland and Italy .
I would expect that the effects of these changes will have been negligible ; since international travel bans and quarantines would have far more effect in times when the virus is at a low level in a country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is higher than in the rest of the world .
As to face masks for the general public , evidence from Belgium , France , Spain and the UK suggests that they have no beneficial effects .
Indeed , it ’ s not implausible , given the data , that requiring the public to wear face coverings actually helps to spread the virus .

By Neil Lock
Preface
Charles has asked me to clarify the Blavatnik stringency index I use in this paper. Here’s where you can find its definition: in Chapter 4 of https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-11/BSG-WP-2020-032-v9.pdf. I share Charles’s concerns about the way the index is put together. My own criticisms are: One, they weight their 9 factors equally, without justification. My main objective in this paper is to try to put together some evidence to test that equal weighting! Two, they do not rightly weight regional lockdowns in comparison with national ones. In my view, any regional lockdown should be weighted according to the population affected by it. A lockdown measure in England (84% of the UK population), for example, ought to carry almost 17 times as much weight in the index as the same measure in Wales (5% of the population). All that said, if the Blavatnik data has been put together honestly (and I don’t have any evidence to lead me to doubt that), my inclination is to use it to get the best picture I can.
A month ago, I compared the histories of the COVID-19 epidemic in fourteen Western European countries. At that point, the “second wave” of the virus, which had been building throughout the region for three or four months, was giving governments an excuse to start re-introducing lockdowns. So, I said that I would review the situation in a month or so. That month has now elapsed, so here’s the review. Maybe, just maybe, I’ll now have enough data to form some idea of which lockdown measures have been effective, and which haven’t.
Once again, here is the list of countries:
Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK
The data sources are the same as before: Our World in Data and the Blavatnik School of Government, both at Oxford University. The data I used was taken on December 3rd, and it included figures up to and including December 2nd.
In the last week or so, the Our World in Data feed has changed quite substantially. Most data before the third week of January has been deleted. Some countries – France, Germany and Sweden at least – have taken the opportunity to wipe and re-write a lot of their data, some of it right back to the beginning of the epidemic. And the data for UK dependencies (Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Gibraltar) and Danish dependencies (Faeroe Islands, Greenland) has disappeared entirely. I would have expected that this data might have been consolidated into the parent country’s; but for the UK at least, I don’t see any evidence of this.
Every so often, the Our World in Data feed adds new data columns. One of these recently added is the reproduction rate (Rt). This is the average number of new infections passed on (as at a given day) by a single infected person. It is usually expressed as a fraction. Rt bigger than 1 means the infection numbers are generally rising, and less than 1 means they are generally falling. In the UK at least, this is modelled data rather than measured data. And, as we’ll see, some countries’ figures are smoother than others, so it looks as if different countries are calculating it differently. But it’s still of interest to compare even a modelled Rt with the observed rate of growth of new cases.
Also, in November the Swedes have also completely re-written their lockdown stringency data, and it now looks as if for months their lockdown hasn’t been nearly as light as we had been led to believe. All this said, I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times before: It’s the best data I have, so I’ll use it.
Cases
I’ll begin with cases. Here are the total (cumulative) cases per million population over the whole period of the epidemic, up to December 2nd.
Here is a daily cases per million population comparison. The data shown are centrally averaged over a 7-day period. That is, the date against which a count is plotted is the 4th (central) day of the period.
In the great majority of the 14 countries, the new case counts have peaked since late October, and in many have since fallen significantly. So, the recent lockdowns must have had an effect. Which measures have had the most effect, is a moot point at this stage.
Here is the list of daily cases per million as at the end of the month:
To put this in perspective, only Spain, Ireland and France are currently below the 200 new cases per million population per day, at which the WHO considers the virus to be endemic, and no unlocks should be considered. However, four more countries, including the UK, are now only slightly above it.
Another way to look at the cases figures is in terms of weekly new case growth. This is the percentage growth in the (weekly averaged) new cases from a particular day to the same day of the week a week later. This requires the weekly averaged new cases up to 3 days after the current date, meaning there must be at least 6 days of case data after the current date. That is why the graph stops before the end of November.
It’s obvious that, over the last four weeks, the trends in weekly case growth have almost all been downward. So much so, that only three of the countries are now showing positive growth in new cases:
Another way to look at infection rates is to plot the reproduction rate, Rt. This is based on numbers of infections, not cases, so it may show a slightly different picture to the weekly case growth. Later, when I come to plot the two on the same axis, it will become plain that while the two are clearly related, they don’t always move together in perfect sync.
Here are the Rt values supplied by each country over the course of the epidemic. With the exception of Sweden, the Rt rates have been trending down throughout November:
The UK is one of only four of the countries with an Rt rate below 1 at the end of November.
In contrast, the trends in lockdown stringency have almost all been upward since late October:
The UK (pink line) appears to be bucking this trend; but, like most things political, that is a deceit. The apparent drop around November 10th was caused by the release of “circuit-breaker” lockdowns in Wales and Northern Ireland. Yet people in England are (were?) far harder locked down at the end of November than at the end of October. At the moment at least, the figure pulled through to Our World in Data only reports measures which are in place UK wide; it seems to miss additional measures in the individual constituent countries. On top of the currently reported figure of about 64%, these additional measures account as of November 30th for around 5% extra stringency in England, 3% in Northern Ireland and Wales, and around 1% in Scotland.
Tests
The number of cases which get found depends, in part at least, on the testing capacity available. Here are the cumulative tests carried out per 100,000 population in each country (except Sweden and France, which do not report cumulative test counts):
Luxembourg and Denmark are well ahead of the rest. In fact, the number of tests done in Luxembourg since the start of the epidemic is more than twice the population!
Another interesting statistic is the cumulative percentage of positives among the tests done since the very beginning of the epidemic:
In many of the countries, the cases per test percentage has climbed significantly in the second wave of the epidemic. I’d guess this is simply because infections have been climbing faster than any increase in the number of tests available. This is consistent with the observation that, in most of the countries, this ratio now seems to be nearing a second peak.
Deaths
Here are four spaghetti graphs of deaths from the virus. The first is total deaths per million population. The second shows the daily deaths per million, over the course of the epidemic; and I have appended to it a histogram of the deaths per million rates as at November 30th. You can see here which countries have started to “get on top” of the second wave, and which haven’t. The third shows deaths per case, with the cases offset 21 days back from the deaths (21 days being the mean length of the course of the disease, in the UK at least). The fourth and final graph shows the cumulative totals of deaths per case over the whole course of the epidemic.
The UK (pink line) is not doing well in the deaths-per-case stakes. It is second only to Italy in current daily deaths per case. And the UK is now top of the list in terms of deaths per case over the whole epidemic, at about 3.6%. Deaths per case is, I think, a fair indicator of lack of quality in a country’s health care system; for lack of testing capacity, and less effective treatment of those who need hospitalization, will both tend to increase it.
Lockdowns
I come now to the meat of this review. For each country, I have plotted weekly case growth percentage (blue line), lockdown stringency percentage (brown line) and Rt rate multiplied by 100 to express it as a percentage (grey line), all on the same graph. Both the weekly case growth and Rt are capped at a maximum of 200%. If a particular lockdown measure is effectual, then I would expect the grey and blue lines to move in the opposite direction to the brown, at or shortly after the day the measure comes into effect. A newly introduced lockdown measure, if successful, ought to visibly slow Rt rate, or weekly case growth, or both, within the incubation period of the virus (maximum 12 days).
This is complicated by the fact that, as you will see from the graphs, the virus has a rhythm of its own. Under conditions of constant stringency, the weekly case growth tends to oscillate periodically. The period can be different in different countries, and sometimes varies from time to time within a country; but 2 to 6 weeks from peak to peak or trough to trough is typical. Left to itself, over the course of many cycles, the weekly case growth will tend to rise. But if a lockdown measure is effective, it may change the overall trend between peaks or troughs from upwards to downwards, and may also start to smooth out the peaks and troughs.
As to the reproduction rate, it too tends to oscillate periodically, in the same direction as the weekly case growth. Peaks and troughs in weekly case growth often show a few days ahead of peaks and troughs in the Rt rate. However, as some of the examples below will show, it is now quite common to have Rt above 1 and case growth negative at the same time.
The other component of my review is the detailed data, which the Blavatnik School of Government provide on the status of 12 lockdown indicators (9 of which contribute to the stringency index) for each country for each day. I have converted these to a list of measures which have been imposed (or unlocked) in each country, with dates, since August 1st. I have also included a summary of the currently active lockdown measures in each country.
Austria
Date Stringency Measures 20200906 36.11 Schools: Recommended closed (Regional) International: Ban some arrivals 20200914 36.11 Face covering: Required when with others 20200917 37.04 Workplaces: Recommended closed (Regional) Gatherings: Up to 11-100 20200929 40.74 Stay at home: Recommended 20201013 44.91 Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional) Gatherings: Up to <=10 (Regional) 20201017 58.8 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20201023 60.19 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20201027 64.81 Schools: Recommended closed Events: Mandatory cancelled 20201102 75 Schools: Some closed Workplaces: Some closed Public transport: Recommended closed Stay at home: Required with exceptions Travel: Recommended not to travel 20201117 82.41 Schools: Mandatory closed Workplaces: Mandatory closed
Current (20201127): Schools: Mandatory closed, Workplaces: Mandatory closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Public transport: Recommended closed, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, Travel: Recommended not to travel, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: Open, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required when with others.
Notes: Given the high peaks in both Rt and case growth near the end of October, I don’t think the lockdown measures introduced during September and early October had a whole lot of effect. However, the September 29th “Stay at home: Recommended” did appear to produce an all but immediate downturn in weekly case growth and in reproduction rate. The October 23rd reduced limit on the size of gatherings also seems to have had an immediate beneficial effect. The November 2nd measures also had some positive effect, though it’s not possible to tell which of them were responsible for it. The November 17th measures have continued the drop in weekly case growth, but I don’t yet have the Rt figures to cross-check with.
There’s something else curious about this graph. Look at the peaks in Rt and in the weekly case growth. They seem to be getting vertically further apart from each other. As time goes on, it looks as if it takes a higher Rt to produce a given growth in cases. I wonder, perhaps, if the proportion of infections which do not lead to confirmed cases (for example, because they are asymptomatic) is rising? If so, that’s good news.
Belgium
Date Stringency Measures 20200729 62.96 Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional) Gatherings: Up to <=10 Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) 20200807 59.26 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional) 20200809 64.81 Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20200812 58.33 Workplaces: Some closed Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) Travel: No restrictions 20200827 52.78 Stay at home: No measures 20200930 47.22 Events: Recommended cancelled Face covering: Required in some places 20201001 47.22 Face covering: Required when with others 20201009 45.37 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) 20201019 54.63 Workplaces: Some closed Stay at home: Required with exceptions 20201029 56.48 Schools: Some closed (Regional) 20201102 65.74 Workplaces: Mandatory closed Events: Mandatory cancelled 20201116 63.89 Schools: Recommended closed
Current (20201123): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Mandatory closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required when with others.
Notes: I added the July 29th measures to the list above, because they do seem to have had an immediate and significant effect. The only national measure in that group was the restriction of gathering size to 10 or below, so that may have been what “did the trick” at that stage. The precipitate fall in weekly case growth around October 22nd, and in the reproduction rate a little later, looks likely to be due to the October 19th “Stay at home: Required with exceptions.” The November 2nd mandatory closure of workplaces and cancellation of events have in fact been followed by an increase in weekly case growth, though it is still (just) negative. Rt has continued to drop, but there is no “knee” to suggest that these measures on their own made a significant difference.
I will, however, note that the stringent October 1st “Face covering: Required when with others” mandate seems to have done nothing at all to prevent the huge peak in new cases in mid to late October. And it seems to have sent the reproduction rate up, not down! I think that gives us some evidence that mandating face coverings brings little or no benefits.
Denmark
Date Stringency Measures 20200801 50.93 Schools: Recommended closed 20200822 50.93 Face covering: Required in some places 20200909 47.69 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) Gatherings: Up to 11-100 (Regional) Public info: Co-ordinated (Regional) 20200919 50.93 Workplaces: Some closed Gatherings: Up to 11-100 20201010 41.67 Workplaces: Recommended closed Gatherings: Up to 101-1000 Public transport: Open Public info: Co-ordinated Contact tracing: Limited 20201021 37.04 Schools: Open Gatherings: Up to 11-100 Stay at home: No measures Contact tracing: Comprehensive 20201026 39.81 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20201109 54.63 Schools: Some closed (Regional) Stay at home: Recommended Travel: Recommended not to travel 20201116 50 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional) Travel: Recommended not to travel (Regional) 20201119 43.52 Schools: Recommended closed Stay at home: No measures Travel: No restrictions 20201123 45.37 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional)
Current (20201130): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Recommended closed, Events: Recommended cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Recommended (Regional), International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: Open, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required in some places.
Notes: Denmark’s Rt rate looks smoother than either Austria’s or Belgium’s, and it doesn’t show all the peaks and troughs in weekly case growth. It looks as if they may be calculating it a different way from the others.
The last three troughs in Rt (the final one is only just visible) look to have all bottomed out at similar values around 120%, and all at stringency levels near 50%, too. The October 26th reduction of maximum group size, combined with the stay at home and not-to-travel recommendations in force from November 9th to 19th, have brought the Rt down somewhat, but not as much as I would have expected. They may also have contributed to the small size of the following case growth peak; but I can’t be sure. We’ll have to wait a bit longer to draw any conclusions from Denmark.
France
Date Stringency Measures 20200803 46.3 Face covering: Required outside the home (Regional) 20200814 48.15 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) 20200901 46.76 Gatherings: Up to <=10 (Regional) 20200903 48.61 Schools: Some closed (Regional) 20200922 46.76 Schools: Recommended closed 20200926 49.54 Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional) 20201010 43.98 Events: Recommended cancelled Travel: No restrictions 20201017 49.54 Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) 20201030 78.7 Schools: Some closed Workplaces: Mandatory closed Events: Mandatory cancelled Gatherings: Up to <=10 Stay at home: Required with exceptions Travel: Mandatory restrictions 20201128 75 Workplaces: Some closed
Current (20201128): Schools: Some closed, Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, Travel: Mandatory restrictions, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated. Testing: Open. Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required when with others.
Notes: To help make sense of the French data, I’ll also show the daily cases graph:
What seems to have happened is that the French waited until the last possible moment, then on October 30th threw in just about every lockdown idea they could think of, all at the same time. It seems to have “worked,” after a fashion; but it’s been almost as harsh as the first lockdown. Moreover, the French have had “Face covering: Required when with others” nationally since July 20th. So, that rush up to the peak from July to October, I think, is fairly good evidence that face mask wearing by the public doesn’t hamper the spread of the virus.
Note also that, as of mid-November and under stringent lockdown, Rt was still above 100%, and yet new cases were dropping.
Germany
Date Stringency Measures 20200807 59.72 Schools: Some closed (Regional) 20200808 56.94 Gatherings: Up to 11-100 (Regional) 20200824 59.72 Gatherings: Up to <=10 (Regional) 20200903 57.87 Schools: Recommended closed 20200904 49.54 Travel: No restrictions 20201001 46.76 International: Quarantine high-risk 20201015 56.02 Stay at home: Recommended Travel: Recommended not to travel 20201022 57.87 Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) 20201102 59.26 Workplaces: Some closed Gatherings: Up to <=10 Stay at home: Recommended 20201110 62.04 International: Ban some arrivals
Current (20201129): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Recommended, Travel: Recommended not to travel, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: Open, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required in some places.
Notes: German cases have recently all but stabilized. Here’s the new cases graph:
The most likely causes of this recent stabilization would seem to be the October 15th “Stay at home: Recommended” and “Travel: Recommended not to travel.” Germans will usually do what they are told to! The November 2nd restriction on group size, and the closure of some workplaces, have reduced Rt, but they don’t seem to have had much effect so far on case growth. And for much of November, Rt was well above 100%, but the new case counts weren’t consistently growing.
Ireland
Date Stringency Measures 20200808 59.72 Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional) Gatherings: Up to 11-100 (Regional) Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20200818 63.43 Events: Mandatory cancelled 20200921 52.31 Schools: Recommended closed Workplaces: Some closed Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional) Gatherings: Up to 11-100 (Regional) Public transport: Recommended closed (Regional) Travel: Recommended not to travel (Regional) 20201007 61.57 Schools: Recommended closed (Regional) Events: Mandatory cancelled Travel: Mandatory restrictions 20201021 81.48 Schools: Some closed Workplaces: Mandatory closed Gatherings: Up to <=10 Public transport: Recommended closed Stay at home: Required with exceptions
Current (20201123): Schools: Some closed, Workplaces: Mandatory closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Public transport: Recommended closed, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, Travel: Mandatory restrictions, International: Quarantine high-risk, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required in some places.
Notes: The regional measures of August 8th seem to have brought the immediate problem under control. After that, nothing seemed to have much effect until October 7th. It was probably the national measures, “Travel: Mandatory restrictions” and/or the “Events: mandatory cancelled” that did the trick. And the (over?) draconian measures of October 21st have certainly brought Rt down, and to well below 100%.
Italy
Date Stringency Measures 20200808 50.93 International: Ban some arrivals 20200817 54.63 Workplaces: Some closed 20200914 47.22 Schools: Recommended closed 20201006 55.56 Gatherings: Up to 11-100 Public transport: Recommended closed Contact tracing: Limited Face covering: Required when with others 20201014 50 Public transport: Open 20201023 66.67 Schools: Some closed (Regional) Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) Gatherings: Up to <=10 Public transport: Recommended closed (Regional) Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) International: Quarantine high-risk Contact tracing: Comprehensive 20201106 76.85 Schools: Some closed Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional) Stay at home: Required with exceptions International: Ban some arrivals 20201110 79.63 Public transport: Recommended closed Contact tracing: Limited
Current (20201125): Schools: Some closed, Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional), Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Public transport: Recommended closed, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional), International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Limited, Face covering: Required when with others.
Notes: The August 17th closure of some workplaces did seem to have an effect. The package of measures on October 6th did have an immediate effect, but not as strong as the Italians might have hoped. October 23rd, for me, looks like the key date; and on that date, the only national measure was the restriction of gatherings to 10 or less. This looks like more evidence that restricting gathering sizes works.
Whether the strong restrictions added on November 6th have made a difference, or are simply “over the top,” I – once again – cannot tell; and it doesn’t help that the Italians haven’t reported any Rt figures since November 20th. But once again, an Rt consistently above 100% has nevertheless allowed case growth to drop significantly.
Luxembourg
Date Stringency Measures 20200807 31.48 Events: Recommended cancelled Stay at home: Recommended 20200812 34.26 International: Screening 20200821 39.1 International: Ban some arrivals 20200825 43.52 Workplaces: Recommended closed 20200913 40.74 Gatherings: Up to 11-100 20200926 43.52 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20201006 43.52 Contact tracing: Limited 20201020 52.78 Schools: Recommended closed Events: Mandatory cancelled 20201030 56.48 Stay at home: Required with exceptions Face covering: Required when with others 20201126 60.19 Workplaces: Some closed
Current (20201123): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: Open, Contact tracing: Limited, Face covering: Required when with others.
Notes: Because Luxembourg is a small country, its weekly case growth will tend to be more volatile than in larger countries. There were also significant adjustments to the numbers of cases in late August. Since then, a significant drop in weekly case growth seems to have started since the October 20th measures. I’m a little surprised by that, as school closures were only recommended, not mandated; perhaps the mandatory cancellation of events was a bigger factor.
The October 31st “Stay at home: Required with exceptions” also produced a drop in Rt, as you can see by the “knee” on the graph. But since then, case growth hasn’t come down much, even though Rt has continued to drop. As to the November 26th closure of some workplaces, we’ll have to wait and see.
Netherlands
Date Stringency Measures 20200818 50.93 Events: Recommended cancelled Gatherings: Up to <=10 20200920 48.15 Events: Recommended cancelled (Regional) 20200929 62.04 Events: Mandatory cancelled Travel: Recommended not to travel 20201104 65.74 Workplaces: Mandatory closed 20201122 56.48 Workplaces: Some closed Travel: No restrictions
Current (20201122): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Recommended, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required in some places.
Notes: The August 18th restriction on gathering size did seem to pull down the size of the next peak in case growth. How significant the recommendation to cancel events was, I don’t know. But Rt started to increase shortly afterwards, not to decrease!
The September 29th measures, events cancellation and recommendation not to travel, did seem to get the cases coming down at last. Rt also started to drop significantly, a week or so afterwards.
All was well for a while; and by the middle of November, Rt had dropped well below 100%. But the November 4th closure of workplaces seems to have had no beneficial effect at all. In fact, since the middle of November, Dutch cases have been dropping, but more slowly than before.
Portugal
Date Stringency Measures 20200801 65.28 Face covering: Required outside the home (Regional) 20200810 66.2 Events: Mandatory cancelled Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) 20200825 55.09 Schools: Recommended closed Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) Stay at home: No measures 20200904 56.94 Workplaces: Some closed 20200915 58.8 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional) 20201002 56.94 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) 20201023 60.65 Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) 20201024 66.2 Schools: Mandatory closed (Regional) 20201030 74.54 Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20201104 66.2 Travel: No restrictions 20201106 60.65 Schools: Recommended closed 20201114 69.91 Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional) 20201116 66.2 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional) 20201121 69.91 Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional) 20201123 66.2 Workplaces: Some closed (Regional)
Current (20201123): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Some closed (Regional), Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10 (Regional), Public transport: Recommended closed, Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional), International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: Open, Contact tracing: Limited, Face covering: Required outside the home.
Notes: Since early September, all the lockdowns have been regional. They have been quite stringent. And they do seem to be getting on top of the virus, albeit slowly.
The peaks and troughs in Rt in Portugal don’t seem to correspond to any particular lockdown measures being introduced or released at the time. Rt did, however, drop during September, a period when some workplaces were closed nationally. And, though Rt is still well above 100%, new cases have started to drop significantly. The Portuguese must be doing something right; but I have no idea what it is!
Spain
Date Stringency Measures 20200810 60.65 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional) 20200814 62.5 Workplaces: Some closed 20200907 60.65 Schools: Some closed (Regional) 20201007 64.35 Schools: Mandatory closed (Regional) 20201013 64.35 Contact tracing: Comprehensive Face covering: Required outside the home 20201022 58.8 Schools: Recommended closed 20201025 71.3 Events: Mandatory cancelled Gatherings: Up to <=10 Stay at home: Required with exceptions Travel: Mandatory restrictions
Current (20201129): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Stay at home: Required with exceptions, Travel: Mandatory restrictions, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required outside the home.
Notes: The two sets of lockdowns during July do seem to have had an effect on both Rt and weekly case growth, but they were regional only. Another “sea change” seems to have taken place around October 25th. The measures introduced then were event cancellations, reduced gathering size, stay at home, and travel restrictions. All four of these have been seen to be effective elsewhere, so the Spaniards are probably on the right track as far as dealing with the virus is concerned. Here, too, we see Rt consistently above 100% during November, and yet a significant drop in new cases.
The face covering requirement introduced on October 13th – the most stringent in all the 14 countries – does not appear to have had any effect on Rt. And any effects it might have had on case growth will have been eclipsed by the measures of October 25th.
Sweden
Date Stringency Measures 20200817 55.56 Schools: Recommended closed 20201110 58.33 Travel: Recommended not to travel (Regional) 20201111 50 Gatherings: No restrictions 20201124 53.7 Workplaces: Some closed
Current (20201124): Schools: Recommended closed, Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Public transport: Recommended closed, Stay at home: Recommended, Travel: Recommended not to travel (Regional), International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Limited.
Notes: The weekly case growth has come down since the end of October, with no particular lockdown measure being an obvious cause. However, Rt – which is unusually smooth, like Denmark’s – has been rising since July, and now seems to have just about peaked. The November 24th closure of some workplaces hasn’t been in force long enough yet to draw any conclusions.
Switzerland
Date Stringency Measures 20200917 43.06 Face covering: Required when with others 20200918 43.06 Testing: If symptoms 20201010 33.8 Schools: Recommended closed (Regional) Events: Recommended cancelled (Regional) International: Quarantine high-risk 20201019 35.19 Gatherings: Up to 11-100 20201020 40.74 Events: Recommended cancelled International: Ban some arrivals 20201029 45.37 Workplaces: Some closed Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional) 20201102 49.07 Schools: Some closed (Regional)
Current (20201123): Schools: Some closed (Regional), Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional), Gatherings: Up to 11-100, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Comprehensive, Face covering: Required when with others.
Notes: This is an odd one. Rt went up enormously during September and early October, perhaps due to the re-opening of schools after the summer break. (There was a similar rise back in May, when schools re-opened after the first lockdown). Weekly case growth and Rt have been coming down almost continuously since then, and Rt is now down almost to 100%. Yet there was no national lockdown measure in early October to trigger that!
New cases peaked and started coming down around the time of the October 29th closure of some workplaces. Looking at Rt, there is a “knee” at precisely that time; so perhaps this measure added to the already existing downward trends in Rt and weekly case growth.
UK
UK wide measures
Date Stringency Measures 20200801 69.91 Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20200813 66.2 Schools: Some closed (Regional) 20200830 66.2 Contact tracing: Limited 20200901 64.35 Schools: Recommended closed 20200914 65.74 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20200924 67.59 Stay at home: Recommended 20201012 60.19 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional) Travel: Recommended not to travel (Regional) 20201019 65.74 Schools: Mandatory closed (Regional) 20201022 67.59 Stay at home: Recommended 20201023 75 Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20201106 75 Workplaces: Mandatory closed (Regional) Stay at home: Recommended Travel: Recommended not to travel International: Ban some arrivals 20201110 63.89 Schools: Open Workplaces: Some closed
Current (20201116): Workplaces: Some closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled, Gatherings: Up to <=10, Public transport: Recommended closed, Stay at home: Recommended, Travel: Recommended not to travel, International: Ban some arrivals, Public info: Co-ordinated, Testing: If symptoms, Contact tracing: Limited, Face covering: Required in some places.
Notes: The UK seems to have the best correlation between Rt and weekly case growth of all the countries. There was a sea-change from a rising to a falling Rt trend some time in September, only broken by the huge spike in early October. “Gatherings: Up to <=10” and “Stay at home: Recommended” may have helped with this.
Here is the new cases graph for the UK as a whole:
The “tiered” local lockdowns in place in the second half of October seemed to have just about stabilized the new cases. When a new national lockdown was introduced in early November, cases suddenly went up again! But they peaked around November 13th, and have been going down ever since.
The UK data is particularly difficult to analyze, not only because of the tiers system (a version of which comes back into force on December 2nd), but also because England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales each have their own separate additional lockdown rules.
England (84% of UK population)
Date Stringency Measures 20200801 66.2 Stay at home: No measures Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20200827 66.2 Face covering: Required in some places 20200901 62.5 Schools: Recommended closed 20200914 63.89 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20200925 63.89 Face covering: Required in some places 20201012 65.74 Stay at home: Recommended (Regional) 20201105 74.07 Stay at home: Required with exceptions Travel: Mandatory restrictions 20201117 66.67 Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional) Travel: Recommended not to travel 20201130 68.52 Schools: Some closed (Regional)
Differences from UK wide measures (20201130): Schools: Some closed (Regional), Stay at home: Required with exceptions (Regional), International: Quarantine high-risk.
Notes: The August 27th “Face covering: Required in some places” almost exactly coincided with the start of the second wave. And after the September 25th tightening, cases went soaring! Not good evidence for the efficacy of face coverings. And despite “Schools: Recommended closed,” most schools did in fact re-open, and the results are visible in the cases graph.
Of the November measures, the most likely to have brought about the drop in cases were the stay-at-home requirement and the travel restrictions.
Northern Ireland (3% of UK population)
Date Stringency Measures 20200810 62.96 Face covering: Required in some places 20200824 57.41 Schools: Some closed (Regional) 20200831 55.56 Schools: Recommended closed 20200911 54.17 Gatherings: Up to <=10 (Regional) 20200922 55.56 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20200925 55.56 Face covering: Required in some places 20201014 77.78 Schools: Mandatory closed Stay at home: Recommended Travel: Mandatory restrictions 20201102 68.52 Schools: Some closed Travel: Recommended not to travel Contact tracing: Limited 20201110 66.67 Schools: Some closed (Regional)
Differences from UK wide measures (20201123): Schools: Some closed (Regional), International: Quarantine high-risk.
Notes: Due to the low proportion of the population, these measures are unlikely to have contributed much to the UK wide picture.
Scotland (8% of UK population)
Date Stringency Measures 20200805 71.3 Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20200817 67.59 Schools: Recommended closed 20200821 73.15 Stay at home: Required, minimal exceptions (Regional) 20200824 70.37 Travel: Recommended not to travel 20200831 64.81 Stay at home: Recommended 20200923 64.81 Contact tracing: Comprehensive 20200925 64.81 Face covering: Required in some places 20201004 64.81 Contact tracing: Limited 20201102 67.59 Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20201117 64.81 Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional)
Differences from UK wide measures (20201123): Schools: Recommended closed, Events: Mandatory cancelled (Regional), Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional), International: Quarantine high-risk.
Notes: Due to the low proportion of the population, these measures are unlikely to have contributed much to the UK wide picture.
Wales (5% of UK population)
Date Stringency Measures 20200816 59.26 Stay at home: No measures 20200901 55.56 Schools: Recommended closed 20200908 62.5 Gatherings: Up to <=10 (Regional) Travel: Mandatory restrictions (Regional) 20200914 62.5 Face covering: Required in some places 20200925 62.5 Face covering: Required in some places 20200928 66.2 Stay at home: Recommended 20201013 67.59 Gatherings: Up to <=10 20201016 70.37 Travel: Mandatory restrictions 20201023 77.78 Workplaces: Mandatory closed Stay at home: Required with exceptions 20201109 64.81 Workplaces: Some closed Stay at home: Recommended Travel: Recommended not to travel 20201117 64.81 Contact tracing: Limited 20201123 66.67 Schools: Some closed (Regional)
Differences from UK wide measures (20201123): Schools: Some closed (Regional), International: Quarantine high-risk.
Notes: Due to the low proportion of the population, these measures are unlikely to have contributed much to the UK wide picture.
Some tentative conclusions
In many cases, it’s hard to establish a strong correlation between success against the virus and any one particular lockdown measure. Part of the reason is that governments like to make lots of different regulations all starting on the same date, so it’s hard to determine which worked and which didn’t. The following conclusions, therefore, can only be tentative.
While schools are well known to be a breeding ground for the virus, I couldn’t find any evidence that school closures, either recommended or mandated, have on their own caused a significant drop in case growth anywhere during the second wave.
Workplace closures appear not to have been beneficial in Belgium or the Netherlands, and their effectiveness in Germany is doubtful. There is, however, some evidence that they did make a difference in Italy; and perhaps in Portugal and Switzerland too.
In most of the countries, large scale events have been (and still are) cancelled. But when a country has relaxed this measure, re-imposing it often seems to have had a beneficial effect on new case counts; at least in Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. But there seems to have been no clear benefit from re-imposing this measure in Belgium.
The reduction in maximum gathering size to 10 or less seems to have been effective in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK. The only country where it doesn’t seem to have made much of a difference is the Netherlands.
Public transport closures do not appear to have been a significant factor during the second wave of the epidemic.
Stay at home requirements look to have had a significant effect. Even just recommending stay-at-home has produced effects in Austria, Germany and the UK. Mandating stay-at-home seems to have made a difference in Belgium and Spain, and perhaps in Luxembourg.
Travel restrictions, too, do make a difference. Even a recommendation not to travel has had beneficial effects in Germany and the Netherlands. Mandatory restrictions on travel have been effective in Ireland, and arguably in Spain. And a mixture of the two has, probably, had some effect in the UK.
The only countries which changed their international travel rules in October or November are Germany, Switzerland and Italy. I would expect that the effects of these changes will have been negligible; since international travel bans and quarantines would have far more effect in times when the virus is at a low level in a country, than when – as now – it is higher than in the rest of the world.
As to face masks for the general public, evidence from Belgium, France, Spain and the UK suggests that they have no beneficial effects. Indeed, it’s not implausible, given the data, that requiring the public to wear face coverings actually helps to spread the virus.
Like this: Like Loading…
Related


Despair

Edmund Burke once wrote : “ Never despair , but if you do , work on in despair.
” I just hope he would have made it to the end of this thread .
That ’ s all very well , Mr BrainyQuote , but what work can we usefully do about climate alarm and its resultant , seemingly all-powerful , policy bandwagon ?
It ’ s not just climate .
The problem is , once we go to Donald Trump , or any other climate-related subject ( we ’ ll always have Paris , as somebody on here said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re-ratify it ) we tend to lose some admirable Cliscep contributors and lurkers .
( The loss of the lurkers is an assumption on my part but it figures . )
If that doesn ’ t make you despair , what will ?
I orginally had another design for this thread : to give some personal background to Provocation .
There were connections between the first three tweets in the first section and the Bristol Eye Hospital , for me .
That probably won ’ t have been obvious .
But it speaks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it worked out pretty well , compared to the alternative .
But I ’ m going to tell that story in the comments .
The parts that can be told , given doctor-patient confidentiality .
Except I wasn ’ t the doctor .
Let me think more about this .
This is mainly about climate and the future of Cliscep , then .
In the context of Edmund Burke ’ s highly illogical aphorism .
“ Never x , but if you do , y ” That ’ s why I like @ @ @ @

Edmund Burke once wrote: “Never despair, but if you do, work on in despair.” I just hope he would have made it to the end of this thread.
Let’s add a beautiful, tranquil backdrop.
That’s all very well, Mr BrainyQuote, but what work can we usefully do about climate alarm and its resultant, seemingly all-powerful, policy bandwagon?
It’s not just climate. The problem is, once we go to Donald Trump, or any other climate-related subject (we’ll always have Paris, as somebody on here said before me, but only until they re-ratify it) we tend to lose some admirable Cliscep contributors and lurkers. (The loss of the lurkers is an assumption on my part but it figures.)
If that doesn’t make you despair, what will?
I orginally had another design for this thread: to give some personal background to Provocation. There were connections between the first three tweets in the first section and the Bristol Eye Hospital, for me. That probably won’t have been obvious. But it speaks of a day when I overcame despair and it worked out pretty well, compared to the alternative. But I’m going to tell that story in the comments. The parts that can be told, given doctor-patient confidentiality. Except I wasn’t the doctor. Let me think more about this.
This is mainly about climate and the future of Cliscep, then. In the context of Edmund Burke’s highly illogical aphorism. “Never x, but if you do, y” That’s why I like it so much.


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-06--Biden’s coming China headache: Climate change and “Developing Countries”

Regime survival , China ’ s red line , is predicated on meeting the material aspirations of ordinary citizens , the only source of legitimacy afforded to unelected governments throughout history .
A Biden presidency , which now seems most likely , will have plenty on its foreign policy plate , ranging from relations with Russia , China and Europe to the Iran question in the Middle East .
But it is likely that global climate change policy , especially in relation to China ’ s position in it , will be among the most contentious challenges it will face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slated for a Biden presidency , we will get the most climate change-conscious administrations in US history .
The climate agenda has been elevated to a “ whole of government ” approach , straddling the key portfolios of national security , foreign policy , and economy and finance .
From January 20th 2021 , “ fighting global warming ” will be elevated to a primary concern of the vast US government bureaucracies ranging from the EPA and the Federal Reserve to the Pentagon and the State Department .
A Biden administration would “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to push the rest of the world to raise their ambitions alongside with the US ” and it would “ pursue strong measures ” to stop other countries from cheating on their climate commitments .
No doubt a future Biden presidency would seek to emulate the lauded bargain between Obama and China ’ s President Xi that set the foundations of the non-binding Paris Agreement .
The 2015 agreement was hailed as ex-President Obama ’ s “ breakthrough ” understanding with China that the latter too would join in the global effort to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by European leaders , Biden has vowed that the US would re-join the Paris climate accord on his first day in the White House in January .
It will seek to reverse President Trump ’ s formal withdrawal notice from the Paris Agreement issued in November 2019 .
To steer this vision — an example of an enlightened , “ lead from behind ” , multilateral approach in concert with Europe — Biden has appointed the aristocratic Europhile John Kerry to a Cabinet-level role as “ climate tsar ” .
Kerry oversaw the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and signed the accord on the behalf of the US in 2016 as ex-President Obama ’ s Secretary of State ( 2013 – 2017 ) .
As “ special presidential envoy for climate ” , Kerry does not require Senate confirmation .
He has vowed that under his watch “ America will soon have a government that treats the climate crisis as the urgent national security threat it is ” .
To the proponents of “ climate crisis ” , a Biden-Xi collaboration is an opportunity to set the terms for meaningful global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the more hard headed diplomats — not least China ’ s ‘ wolf warriors ’ – more at home reading Machiavelli ’ s The Prince than Obama ’ s latest bestseller A Promised Land , the hopes of a US-China ‘ grand bargain ’ will seem naïve .
The celebrated Paris Agreement was only so much of smoke and mirrors as far as China ’ s practitioners of strategic statecraft were concerned .
For Obama ’ s end of the bargain , his administration unleashed such punitive measures on US ’ s own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Waters Of The US Act by Executive Orders ( since the Paris Agreement was conveniently not a “ treaty ” requiring an impossible Senate approval ) .
At Xi ’ s end , China promised to peak its emissions by 2030 at a level and a rate of subsequent decline that were not specified.MORE FOR YOUThe Coming Energy Shocks Under A Biden AdministrationThe West Intends Energy Suicide : Will It Succeed ?
How Disney Plus Personalizes Your Viewing Experience Nor were Chinese planners unaware that research showed that China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less ambitious than continuing business as usual , that the country ’ s emissions would have peaked by then anyway whatever it did ( or not ) .
Meanwhile , signing the agreement did not stop China from approving 23 gigawatts of new coal-power projects the first half of 2020 , more than the previous two years combined .
Note that China had commissioned more coal power capacity than the rest of the world combined in those two years .
From the earliest UN negotiations starting in 1994 under the Framework Convention on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firmly and consistently played the ‘ Third World ’ position .
Developing countries carried “ common but differentiated responsibilities ” .
This meant that while developed countries ( primarily the West , but also including Japan ) adopted binding commitments to reduce carbon emissions by specified amounts , the developing countries not only did not have any binding policy commitments but were expected to receive considerable sums in “ climate finance ” to assist mitigating and adapting to climate change .
The BASIC group ( Brazil , South Africa , India and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ‘ developing countries ’ ) formed a bloc in 2009 to act jointly at the Copenhagen climate summit , including a possible united walk-out if their “ common minimum position ” was not met by the developed nations .
Effectively , the Kyoto Protocol , brought into force in 2005 , became an exercise in massive international income distribution , as senior UN officials openly admitted .
To be sure , the ‘ third world ’ position is not necessarily a cynical one .
The rationale behind the ‘ developing country ’ position @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equity and historical responsibility .
Since the major portion of the stock of man-made greenhouse gases ( GHGs ) in the earth ’ s atmosphere is accounted for by the industrialised West , the developed countries should launch serious efforts to reduce their own emissions before calling upon the developing countries to contribute .
By the time Trump came into office in 2016 , China was already the world ’ s largest emitter of GHGs by far .
By then it was also long evident that it was a stretch to call China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meaningful sense .
President Trump boiled over last year on China ‘ s “ developing country ” status : among his many tweets , “ The WTO is BROKEN when the world ’ s RICHEST countries claim to be developing countries to avoid WTO rules and get special treatment .
NO more !
!
!
” China ’ s emergence as an economic and military power challenging US dominance in Asia and beyond is a fact not denied even by the left wing of the US Democratic party .
China is one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial markets .
Its investments in the much hyped Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) , often grossly inflated in the business press , have nevertheless grown into an extensive web of infrastructure construction and investments in over a hundred countries .
As a source of loans for deficit-ridden governments in Asia , the Middle East , Africa and Europe , China has emerged as the major competitor to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund , the Washington-based pillars of the post-WWII economic international system .
Indeed , David Malpass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bank chief was supported by President Trump , was an outspoken critic of the World Bank ’ s loans to China ( and India ) .
Malpass quite rightly argued that these countries had become rich enough to tap global capital markets on reasonable terms .
If China is no more a ‘ developing country ’ with little responsibility in the West-led global “ fight against climate change ” , then just what can a Biden administration extract from the Chinese government in decarbonization commitments ?
China ’ s state planners are likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laws of physics and economics in their assessments of decarbonization than their counterparts in the West who are busy pursuing a quixotic Green Industrial Revolution .
They will insist on delivering to their people an Industrial Revolution first , of the sort enjoyed by the West since its birth over two centuries ago , before signing up to anything that might come in the way .
The post Biden ’ s coming China headache : Climate change and “ Developing Countries ” appeared first on The Global Warming Policy Forum ( GWPF ) @

Regime survival, China’s red line, is predicated on meeting the material aspirations of ordinary citizens, the only source of legitimacy afforded to unelected governments throughout history.
A Biden presidency, which now seems most likely, will have plenty on its foreign policy plate, ranging from relations with Russia, China and Europe to the Iran question in the Middle East. But it is likely that global climate change policy, especially in relation to China’s position in it, will be among the most contentious challenges it will face in international diplomacy.
If we are slated for a Biden presidency, we will get the most climate change-conscious administrations in US history. The climate agenda has been elevated to a “whole of government” approach, straddling the key portfolios of national security, foreign policy, and economy and finance. From January 20th 2021, “fighting global warming” will be elevated to a primary concern of the vast US government bureaucracies ranging from the EPA and the Federal Reserve to the Pentagon and the State Department. A Biden administration would “use every tool of American foreign policy to push the rest of the world to raise their ambitions alongside with the US” and it would “pursue strong measures” to stop other countries from cheating on their climate commitments.
The “Grand Bargain” of Paris
No doubt a future Biden presidency would seek to emulate the lauded bargain between Obama and China’s President Xi that set the foundations of the non-binding Paris Agreement. The 2015 agreement was hailed as ex-President Obama’s “breakthrough” understanding with China that the latter too would join in the global effort to cut emissions. In a move welcomed by European leaders, Biden has vowed that the US would re-join the Paris climate accord on his first day in the White House in January. It will seek to reverse President Trump’s formal withdrawal notice from the Paris Agreement issued in November 2019.
To steer this vision — an example of an enlightened , “lead from behind”, multilateral approach in concert with Europe — Biden has appointed the aristocratic Europhile John Kerry to a Cabinet-level role as “climate tsar”. Kerry oversaw the negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement and signed the accord on the behalf of the US in 2016 as ex-President Obama’s Secretary of State (2013 – 2017). As “special presidential envoy for climate”, Kerry does not require Senate confirmation. He has vowed that under his watch “America will soon have a government that treats the climate crisis as the urgent national security threat it is”.
To the proponents of “climate crisis”, a Biden-Xi collaboration is an opportunity to set the terms for meaningful global cooperation on climate change policies. For the more hard headed diplomats — not least China’s ‘wolf warriors’ – more at home reading Machiavelli’s The Prince than Obama’s latest bestseller A Promised Land, the hopes of a US-China ‘grand bargain’ will seem naïve.
The celebrated Paris Agreement was only so much of smoke and mirrors as far as China’s practitioners of strategic statecraft were concerned. For Obama’s end of the bargain, his administration unleashed such punitive measures on US’s own economic interests as the Clean Power Plan and the Waters Of The US Act by Executive Orders (since the Paris Agreement was conveniently not a “treaty” requiring an impossible Senate approval). At Xi’s end, China promised to peak its emissions by 2030 at a level and a rate of subsequent decline that were not specified.MORE FOR YOUThe Coming Energy Shocks Under A Biden AdministrationThe West Intends Energy Suicide: Will It Succeed?How Disney Plus Personalizes Your Viewing Experience
Nor were Chinese planners unaware that research showed that China’s commitment to peak by 2030 was actually less ambitious than continuing business as usual, that the country’s emissions would have peaked by then anyway whatever it did (or not). Meanwhile, signing the agreement did not stop China from approving 23 gigawatts of new coal-power projects the first half of 2020, more than the previous two years combined. Note that China had commissioned more coal power capacity than the rest of the world combined in those two years.
The Developing Country Position
From the earliest UN negotiations starting in 1994 under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), China firmly and consistently played the ‘Third World’ position. Developing countries carried “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This meant that while developed countries (primarily the West, but also including Japan) adopted binding commitments to reduce carbon emissions by specified amounts, the developing countries not only did not have any binding policy commitments but were expected to receive considerable sums in “climate finance” to assist mitigating and adapting to climate change.
The BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China – the world’s four largest ‘developing countries’) formed a bloc in 2009 to act jointly at the Copenhagen climate summit, including a possible united walk-out if their “common minimum position” was not met by the developed nations. Effectively, the Kyoto Protocol, brought into force in 2005, became an exercise in massive international income distribution, as senior UN officials openly admitted.
To be sure, the ‘third world’ position is not necessarily a cynical one. The rationale behind the ‘developing country’ position is based on the reasonable grounds of equity and historical responsibility. Since the major portion of the stock of man-made greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the earth’s atmosphere is accounted for by the industrialised West, the developed countries should launch serious efforts to reduce their own emissions before calling upon the developing countries to contribute.
By the time Trump came into office in 2016, China was already the world’s largest emitter of GHGs by far. By then it was also long evident that it was a stretch to call China a ‘developing’ country in any meaningful sense. President Trump boiled over last year on China‘s “developing country” status: among his many tweets, “The WTO is BROKEN when the world’s RICHEST countries claim to be developing countries to avoid WTO rules and get special treatment. NO more!!!”
China’s emergence as an economic and military power challenging US dominance in Asia and beyond is a fact not denied even by the left wing of the US Democratic party. China is one of the prime movers of global commodity and financial markets. Its investments in the much hyped Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often grossly inflated in the business press, have nevertheless grown into an extensive web of infrastructure construction and investments in over a hundred countries.
As a source of loans for deficit-ridden governments in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe, China has emerged as the major competitor to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Washington-based pillars of the post-WWII economic international system. Indeed, David Malpass, whose appointment in 2019 as World Bank chief was supported by President Trump, was an outspoken critic of the World Bank’s loans to China (and India). Malpass quite rightly argued that these countries had become rich enough to tap global capital markets on reasonable terms.
China’s Red Line
If China is no more a ‘developing country’ with little responsibility in the West-led global “fight against climate change”, then just what can a Biden administration extract from the Chinese government in decarbonization commitments? China’s state planners are likely to have a keener appreciation for the laws of physics and economics in their assessments of decarbonization than their counterparts in the West who are busy pursuing a quixotic Green Industrial Revolution. They will insist on delivering to their people an Industrial Revolution first, of the sort enjoyed by the West since its birth over two centuries ago, before signing up to anything that might come in the way.
The post Biden’s coming China headache: Climate change and “Developing Countries” appeared first on The Global Warming Policy Forum (GWPF).
via The Global Warming Policy Forum (GWPF)
https://ift.tt/2VGUJAy
December 6, 2020 at 02:20AM


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-06--UK Government sets up secret ‘green nudge unit’

The Government has established an environmental ‘ nudge unit ’ to work out how to persuade people into green behaviours such as driving less and cutting down on meat .
The team was set up in April this year because of a recognition that the next phase of decarbonising will require much more personal behaviour change .
The 45 per cent cut in emissions already achieved since 1990 has come mostly from the phase-out of coal and its replacement with renewable energy such as offshore wind .
Boris Johnson on Friday set the UK one of the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by 68 per cent within the next decade , up from a previous target of 61 per cent .
The new ‘ behaviour change and public engagement team ’ , which is working from inside the Business , Energy and Industrial Strategy department , is focused on how to get public buy-in for further emissions cuts , which will be targeted at what we eat and how we travel and heat our homes .
BEIS will also work to ensure that green policies do not unfairly impact one area of society .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how much reaching net zero will cost , but the NAO said it could ultimately reach hundreds of billions .
The cost of inaction would be far greater .
The head of the unit is Gervase Poulden , a former environmental journalist and committed vegan .
Its existence was revealed in a report this week from the National Audit Office , which warned that the UK faced a “ colossal challenge ” in reaching its legally binding goal to be net zero by 2050 .
The Government ’ s policies have so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ green plan unveiled last month would leave emissions at 5 per cent below even the previous reduction target , according to analysis by energy consultancy Aurora .
One of the trickiest areas will be to improve energy efficiency and switch heating systems in the UK ’ s draughty homes .
Installing a heat pump is expected to cost between £8000 and £17000 .
A £2bn Green Homes Grant to encourage insulation measures has so far had fewer than 300 successful applicants .
The widespread uptake of smart meters will also be needed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and cars .
The 10-point plan included the ban of new petrol and diesel cars from 2030 but experts , including figures from the car industry , this week warned there would also need to be a significant reduction in the amount of traffic on the roads .
Dr Steve Melia , senior lecturer in transport and planning at the University of the West of England told MPs on the Environmental Audit Committee that “ if we are going to achieve these carbon budgets , we ’ ve got to be significantly reducing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between 20-60 per cent reduction .
Konstanze Scharring , director of policy and government affairs at the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders was asked whether traffic level reductions would be necessary .
She said : “ I think absolutely we need to look at all methods of reducing the impact of road transport.
” Meanwhile , the NAO reported that there was an increasing recognition in Government that consumers would have to reduce their meat and dairy consumption .
The post UK Government sets up secret ‘ green nudge unit ’ appeared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( GWPF ) .

The Government has established an environmental ‘nudge unit’ to work out how to persuade people into green behaviours such as driving less and cutting down on meat.
The team was set up in April this year because of a recognition that the next phase of decarbonising will require much more personal behaviour change.
The 45 per cent cut in emissions already achieved since 1990 has come mostly from the phase-out of coal and its replacement with renewable energy such as offshore wind.
Boris Johnson on Friday set the UK one of the world’s most ambitious targets to cut emissions, by 68 per cent within the next decade, up from a previous target of 61 per cent.
The new ‘behaviour change and public engagement team’, which is working from inside the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy department, is focused on how to get public buy-in for further emissions cuts, which will be targeted at what we eat and how we travel and heat our homes.
BEIS will also work to ensure that green policies do not unfairly impact one area of society.
The Government has not made any calculations for how much reaching net zero will cost, but the NAO said it could ultimately reach hundreds of billions. The cost of inaction would be far greater.
The head of the unit is Gervase Poulden, a former environmental journalist and committed vegan.
Its existence was revealed in a report this week from the National Audit Office, which warned that the UK faced a “colossal challenge” in reaching its legally binding goal to be net zero by 2050.
The Government’s policies have so far been dismissed as inadequate. The 10-point green plan unveiled last month would leave emissions at 5 per cent below even the previous reduction target, according to analysis by energy consultancy Aurora.
One of the trickiest areas will be to improve energy efficiency and switch heating systems in the UK’s draughty homes.
Installing a heat pump is expected to cost between £8000 and £17000. A £2bn Green Homes Grant to encourage insulation measures has so far had fewer than 300 successful applicants.
The widespread uptake of smart meters will also be needed to help handle increased electricity demand from heating and cars.
The 10-point plan included the ban of new petrol and diesel cars from 2030 but experts, including figures from the car industry, this week warned there would also need to be a significant reduction in the amount of traffic on the roads.
Dr Steve Melia, senior lecturer in transport and planning at the University of the West of England told MPs on the Environmental Audit Committee that “if we are going to achieve these carbon budgets, we’ve got to be significantly reducing traffic.” He pointed to targets of between 20-60 per cent reduction.
Konstanze Scharring, director of policy and government affairs at the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders was asked whether traffic level reductions would be necessary.
She said: “I think absolutely we need to look at all methods of reducing the impact of road transport.”
Meanwhile, the NAO reported that there was an increasing recognition in Government that consumers would have to reduce their meat and dairy consumption.
The post UK Government sets up secret ‘green nudge unit’ appeared first on The Global Warming Policy Forum (GWPF).
via The Global Warming Policy Forum (GWPF)
https://ift.tt/39LL9F5
December 6, 2020 at 01:30AM