iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--Climategate Revised: Quotations from the Major Players

“ It is possible that some areas of climate science have become sclerotic … too partisan , too centralized .
The tribalism that some of the leaked emails display is something more usually associated with … primitive cultures.
” – Mike Hulme , CRU climate scientist .
Quoted in Fred Pierce , The Climate Files ( below ) Fred Piece ’ s The Climate Files : The Battle for the Truth About Global Warming ( 2010 ) remains the definitive account of one of the greatest scientific scandals of our time .
The book ’ s self-described summary states : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ writers on climate change tells the inside story of the events leading up to the much-publicized theft of climate-change related emails .
He explores the personalities involved , the feuds and disagreements at the heart of climate science , and the implications the scandal has for the future .
In November 2009 it emerged that thousands of documents and emails had been stolen from one of the top climate science centers in the world .
The emails appeared to reveal that scientists had twisted research in order to strengthen the case for global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climate summit in Copenhagen just days away , the hack could not have happened at a worse time for climate researchers , or at a better time for climate skeptics .
Although the scandal caused a media frenzy , the fact is that just about everything the public heard and read about the University of East Anglia emails is wrong .
They are not , as some have claimed , the smoking gun for a great global warming hoax , nor do they reveal a sinister conspiracy by scientists to fabricate global warming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raise deeply disturbing questions about the way climate science is conducted , about researchers ’ preparedness to block access to climate data and downplay flaws in their data , and about the siege mentality and scientific tribalism at the heart of the most important international issue of the age .
The second paragraph , certainly politically correct , can be reframed as the ends do not justify the means ; emotions and agendas are the enemy of dispassionate science ; and hiding and blocking data and methods from critics is suspicious and alarming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no hack .
His byline reads : Fred Pearce has reported on environment , science , and development issues from 64 countries over the past 20 years .
Trained as a geographer , he has been environment consultant of New Scientist magazine since 1992 , has written for such publications as Audubon , Foreign Policy , Popular Science , Seed , and Time , and has appeared on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart .
He writes a weekly column for the Guardian , and recently published a 12-part investigation of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emails affair .
His books include The Coming Population Crash , Confessions of an Eco-Sinner , Earth : Then and Now , When the Rivers Run Dry , and With Speed and Violence .
Pierce himself was urged by the climate establishment to not write his history .
But he persevered to everyone ’ s benefit–except the agenda-driven alarmists that can not let the “ science ” be questioned .
At the beginning of the book , Pierce provides quotations from each of the major players that together give the reader a helpful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these quotations follow from the mainstream side and the skeptic side : Phil Jones [ central figure as head of the Climate Research Unit ( CRU ) of the University of East Anglia , where the emails were located . ]
“ I know I ’ m on the right side and honest , but I seem to be telling myself this more often recently.
” “ This crowd of charlatans … look for one little thing they can say is wrong , and thus generalize that the science is entirely compromised.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ present a nice tidy story … but in reality the situation is not quite so simple.
” “ It is possible that some areas of climate science have become sclerotic … too partisan , too centralized .
The tribalism that some of the leaked emails display is something more usually associated with … primitive cultures.
” “ As for thinking that it is ‘ better that nothing appear , than something unacceptable to us ’ … as thought we are the gatekeepers of all that is acceptable in the world of paleoclimatology seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has no interest in rational scientific discource… .
He is the self-appointed Joe McCarthy of climate science.
” “ Gravity isn ’ t a useful theory because Newton was a nice man.
” “ CRU ’ s policies of obstructing critical articles in the peer-reviewed literature and withholding data from critics have unfortunately placed issues into play that might otherwise have been settled long ago.
” “ The key ingredient in most of the studies that have been invoked to support the hockey stick … depends on the influence of a woefully thin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ readily available date for the same area.
” “ Climate tribes were established in response to the politically motivated climate disinformation machine … to circle the wagons and point the guns outward in an attempt to discredit misinformation.
” “ Proper scientists , scientists with integrity , wish to reveal their data and all their methods .
They do not require freedom of information requests.
” Tomorrow ’ s post commemorating the 11th anniversary of Climategate will focus on the role and character of Michael Mann , the infamous figure of what has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
”

“It is possible that some areas of climate science have become sclerotic … too partisan, too centralized. The tribalism that some of the leaked emails display is something more usually associated with … primitive cultures.” – Mike Hulme, CRU climate scientist. Quoted in Fred Pierce, The Climate Files (below)
Fred Piece’s The Climate Files: The Battle for the Truth About Global Warming (2010) remains the definitive account of one of the greatest scientific scandals of our time. The book’s self-described summary states:
One of the world’s leading writers on climate change tells the inside story of the events leading up to the much-publicized theft of climate-change related emails. He explores the personalities involved, the feuds and disagreements at the heart of climate science, and the implications the scandal has for the future. In November 2009 it emerged that thousands of documents and emails had been stolen from one of the top climate science centers in the world. The emails appeared to reveal that scientists had twisted research in order to strengthen the case for global warming. With the UN’s climate summit in Copenhagen just days away, the hack could not have happened at a worse time for climate researchers, or at a better time for climate skeptics. Although the scandal caused a media frenzy, the fact is that just about everything the public heard and read about the University of East Anglia emails is wrong. They are not, as some have claimed, the smoking gun for a great global warming hoax, nor do they reveal a sinister conspiracy by scientists to fabricate global warming data. They do, however, raise deeply disturbing questions about the way climate science is conducted, about researchers’ preparedness to block access to climate data and downplay flaws in their data, and about the siege mentality and scientific tribalism at the heart of the most important international issue of the age.
The second paragraph, certainly politically correct, can be reframed as the ends do not justify the means; emotions and agendas are the enemy of dispassionate science; and hiding and blocking data and methods from critics is suspicious and alarming.
Fred Pierce
The author of The Climate Files is no hack. His byline reads:
Fred Pearce has reported on environment, science, and development issues from 64 countries over the past 20 years. Trained as a geographer, he has been environment consultant of New Scientist magazine since 1992, has written for such publications as Audubon, Foreign Policy, Popular Science, Seed, and Time, and has appeared on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. He writes a weekly column for the Guardian, and recently published a 12-part investigation of the University of East Anglia “climategate” emails affair. His books include The Coming Population Crash, Confessions of an Eco-Sinner, Earth: Then and Now, When the Rivers Run Dry, and With Speed and Violence.
Pierce himself was urged by the climate establishment to not write his history.
Some people–scientists, climate activists and even some journalists–have argued passionately that writing this story is folly. They say that it can only create confusion and undermine public confident in the basic, unchallenged science of climate change. I disagree. (p. 7)
But he persevered to everyone’s benefit–except the agenda-driven alarmists that cannot let the “science” be questioned.
Quotations of Players
At the beginning of the book, Pierce provides quotations from each of the major players that together give the reader a helpful overview of the saga. Many of these quotations follow from the mainstream side and the skeptic side:
1. Climategate Side
Phil Jones [central figure as head of the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia, where the emails were located.]
“I know I’m on the right side and honest, but I seem to be telling myself this more often recently.”
Michael Mann: “Hockey Stick” manufacturer and central Climategate figure.
“This crowd of charlatans … look for one little thing they can say is wrong, and thus generalize that the science is entirely compromised.”
Keith Briffa: Climatologist who disagreed with Mann.
“I know there is pressure to present a nice tidy story … but in reality the situation is not quite so simple.”
Mike Hume: CRU researcher.
“It is possible that some areas of climate science have become sclerotic … too partisan, too centralized. The tribalism that some of the leaked emails display is something more usually associated with … primitive cultures.”
Raymond Bradley: Climatologist, University of Massachusetts.
“As for thinking that it is ‘better that nothing appear, than something unacceptable to us’ … as thought we are the gatekeepers of all that is acceptable in the world of paleoclimatology seems amazingly arrogant.”
Ben Santer: Climate modeler and CRU alumnus.
“[McIntyre] has no interest in rational scientific discource…. He is the self-appointed Joe McCarthy of climate science.”
Gavin Schmidt: Climatologist, NASA.
“Gravity isn’t a useful theory because Newton was a nice man.”
2. Skeptic Side
Steve McIntyre: mathematician, retired mineral prospector.
“CRU’s policies of obstructing critical articles in the peer-reviewed literature and withholding data from critics have unfortunately placed issues into play that might otherwise have been settled long ago.”
Ross McKitrick: Environmental Economist.
“The key ingredient in most of the studies that have been invoked to support the hockey stick … depends on the influence of a woefully thin subsample of trees and the exclusion of readily available date for the same area.”
Judith Curry: Climatologist.
“Climate tribes were established in response to the politically motivated climate disinformation machine … to circle the wagons and point the guns outward in an attempt to discredit misinformation.”
Lord Lawson: UK politician and founder, Global Warming Policy Foundation.
“Proper scientists, scientists with integrity, wish to reveal their data and all their methods. They do not require freedom of information requests.”
Tomorrow’s post commemorating the 11th anniversary of Climategate will focus on the role and character of Michael Mann, the infamous figure of what has also been called “The CRUtape Letters.”


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--Renewables Can’t Save the Planet, So Why Let Wind & Solar Industries Keep Destroying It?

A moment ’ s employment of our critical faculties reveals just why wind and solar will never be meaningful power sources .
STT is dedicated to explaining why .
But , for the uninitiated , we ’ ll simply mention sunset and calm weather as the most obvious starting points .
Explaining how readily the naïve and gullible have been taken in by the rent seekers that sit behind and profit from the so-called wind and solar ‘ industries ’ takes a little more intellectual horsepower , however .
You ’ d be hard pressed to find a group of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when a reliable power source – like a gas turbine or coal-fired power plant – is launched into operation .
So , why is it that retired school teachers and Uni academics will drive miles out of their way to genuflect in the middle of a field carpeted with these things , with a like-minded group , equally keen to display their self-perceived ‘ virtue ’ ?
Andy West has been studying that peculiar phenomenon , for some time now .
As West explains in this detailed article , there ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explained as a cultural crusade , driven by a mixture of fear and ignorance .
“ For me the question now is , now that we know that renewables can ’ t save the planet , are we going to keep letting them destroy it ?
” .
– Michael Schellenberger There have been many technical analyses of Wind and Solar energy , covering a raft of issues from energy density and efficiency , through subsidies and land usage , to maintenance , grid impacts , intermittency and more .
The angle examined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replace such necessary views , whether they lean to the pessimistic or the optimistic or anywhere in-between .
Rather , a complementary view is provided regarding an aspect that such technical analyses can not address , albeit it often features in the conclusions and questions these analyses raise at the end .
Right here at Climate Etc , the first of the excellent analyses by ‘ Planning Engineer ’ ( on his retirement revealed to be Russ Schussler , ex-VP of Transmission Planning at Georgia Transmission Corporations ) , laudably highlighted the limitation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ line : “ Power System Planners do not have the expertise or knowledge to say whether or not the benefits of reducing carbon emissions are worth the costs .
However they should be respected as experts for obtaining a better understanding of what the implications and costs of such programs are.
” So , who does have this critical knowledge and expertise regarding ultimate cost / benefit ?
The answer is highly likely to be no one at all , because not only is this issue deeply disputed , it is culturally ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indeed , to the extent that the overwhelming public and authority narrative about climate change contradicts mainstream science let alone any skeptical science , which also means that , especially in some nations such as the US , there are cultural counter-narratives too .
Hence debates about policy , including renewables deployment , aren ’ t legitimately resolved , because the potent cultural angle corrupts or polarizes or simply overrides any such debate .
Schussler acknowledges this cultural dispute , saying in the line following the above quote : “ Unfortunately many non-experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have done much to cloud , distort and ignore critical issues around the cost and capabilities of renewable energy and the realities relating to the provision of electrical power.
” He also returns to this theme at the very end of his post : “ …I believe most planners and utilities recognize that the overall impacts to society ( unless needed to aver environmental disaster ) would be extremely harmful in the net analysis .
I hope that the voices of concerned utility experts are not drowned out by the noise of ‘ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ false accusations of self-interest.
” For sure ‘ true belief ’ is a cultural feature and may often prompt ‘ false accusations ’ .
Plus that caveat of ‘ unless needed ’ , or more subtly ‘ how much needed ’ , is a major issue within the dispute above .
An apparent need , could be partly or wholly the result of emotive belief , of which ‘ fear of [ C ] AGW ’ is a major component .
Schussler ’ s title , ‘ Myths and realities of renewable energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the element that technical analysis can not ultimately probe regarding character and impact , because myths are cultural phenomena .
Others cite myth as Renewables motivation , and David Archibald goes further in directly framing this element as ‘ religious ’ in nature ( religions being just one brand of cultural entities ) .
In a recent article on renewables ( and focusing on hydrogen ) at Jo Nova ’ s , he employs religiously orientated terms such as ‘ believers ’ and ‘ government encyclicals ’ : “ Briefly , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look-in is because solar panels and wind turbines are made using energy from coal at $ 0.04 per kWh and turn out power at $ 0.20 per kWh… …You can ’ t use solar and wind power to make solar and wind power equipment ; as such they are neither renewable nor sustainable .
And they certainly won ’ t be replacing fossil fuels when the fossil fuels run out .
Even some lefties are figuring this out and thus the documentary Planet of the Humans .
So the global warming clerisy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ Australia ] , needs to keep coming up with new content to satisfy their simple-minded believers… …Vast sums are to be spent on hydrogen .
The language of the Government encyclicals suggests that hydrogen is a new source of energy that just has to be tapped to guarantee a wonderful future.
” Needless to say , Archibald views this ‘ religious ’ influence as overwhelmingly negative , adding as part of his conclusion : “ Global warming doesn ’ t build orphanages or hospitals .
As a religion it doesn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ others claim a cultish / ‘ religious ’ motivation too .
Yet whether viewing culture as only a clouding / distorting influence , or as an overwhelmingly negative force , technical analyses critical of renewables inevitably falter or get speculative when it comes demonstrating cultural sway ( for example , across nations invested in renewables ) .
An alternate approach is needed to progress this .
There are less critical / more optimistic analyses of Solar or Wind ‘ renewables ’ , which nevertheless tend to justify some amount of pain in achieving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this is needed to avoid an otherwise inevitable and imminent global catastrophe ( apart from the most wildly optimistic , in which all changes are apparently painless ) .
Yet mainstream science says such a justification is unfounded ( notwithstanding the cultural dispute above ) .
Meanwhile the implementation of Solar and Wind is surging ahead , and has done so for decades in some countries .
So , is this global implementation largely due to pragmatic considerations that are consistent with mainstream science ?
After all , these things do actually produce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cultural motivation that spreads solar-panels and wind-turbines as merely icons for the ‘ secular religion ’ of certain and catastrophic climate change ?
And no matter the costs , fiscal or environmental .
This question is resolvable , as hard social data on the cultural attitudes of many nations to climate-change , allows national motivations to be mapped to Renewables deployment .
Prior posts here , show that supportive attitudes to climate-change ( CC ) across national publics , have a dual and systemic strong relationship with religiosity .
CC supportive public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with national religiosity , while oppositely , CC supportive responses to reality-constrained questions anti-correlate with national religiosity .
[ Reality-constrained questions force survey participants to consider and compare other reality issues in relation to climate change , typically by asking them to nominate the X ‘ most important ’ from a larger list of Y issues , of which one represents a climate-change issue , or literally just ‘ climate-change ’ .
Unconstrained questions don ’ t force such a comparative choice ] .
Using some data-series from the prior posts , Chart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For many nations and plotted against national religiosity , it shows the CC supportive public responses measured ( and for the dashed lines , intuited ) for different strengths of both unconstrained and reality-constrained survey questions .
Strength for the unconstrained questions ( blue lines ) reflects how aligned these are to the emotive and existential values of catastrophic climate change culture ( CCCC ) , plus how much this is targeted at the personal .
Another way of thinking about this strength , is how biased the questions are towards CCCC , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and not of rationality .
Strength for reality-constrained questions ( orange lines ) reflects the tightness of the constraint .
Picking the ‘ most important ’ single issue of 12 , for example , is a stronger reality-constraint , a stronger clash with the other issues , than say picking the top 3 of 12 , which is stronger in turn than the top 5 of 12 .
Table 1 at the end of this post , shows which actual climate-change survey questions generated the data-series each line represents ( each is depicted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along with the related r/r2/p values .
The most important conclusion to draw from these trends is that , as revealed by their strong relationships with religiosity ( an entirely cultural phenomenon ) , attitudes to climate-change across nations are likewise cultural .
In fact , they ’ re the net result of interaction between 2 cultures , i.e .
CCCC and religion .
So , this means they are not due to rationality ( cultural attitudes are emotively driven ) , or anything physical such as the characteristics of the climate-system , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exposures of nations , or likewise any views on same as expressed by mainstream ( or any ) climate science .
With the exception of one historical coincidence ( annual sunshine duration – see later ) no matters encompassed by these categories would exhibit a systemic relationship with religiosity .
And for sure none can exhibit both correlation and anti-correlation simultaneously , depending only upon the type of question asked ; yet such is certainly possible for cultural responses .
This duality raises apparent contradictions .
For instance , maximum climate concerns ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1 ) occur in the same nations as minimum support for climate action / priority ( RH ends of orange trends ) .
But such apparent contradictions aren ’ t unusual for cultural causation .
From the prior series here at Climate Etc , see : Apparent Paradoxes in the relationship of Climate ‘ Concerns , Skepticism , Activism , and Priority ’ explained by Religiosity .
In fact , the full situation is more complex than depicted by Chart 1 .
See the Summary File linked below ( and especially Chart 2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ post ) for more explanation , visualized via more series plus features added to the above Chart 1 .
However , the conclusion remains that climate-change attitudes across nations are mainly cultural , so not from either rationality or physical factors .
[ Note : the attached summary is more distilled and easier going than the 3 prior posts linked above .
Regarding the US , see the note at the very end of this post ] .
If a particular domain is dominated by cultural attitudes , spending and policy support within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those attitudes .
Hence , armed with the above cultural attitudes to climate-change , we now need to explore the relationship across nations , between these and actual Renewables deployment .
It isn ’ t that mass publics rush out and purchase Wind Turbines with their credit cards , in proportion to their national attitudes .
The actual commitment works via elites who enact policy .
Yet the limits on such policy should still be in proportion to the national public attitudes ( which doesn ’ t mean alignment in an absolute sense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether or not a nation is a democracy , or in the latter case whether or not democratic processes are actually involved ( e.g .
in the UK , ‘ net-zero by 2050 ’ was nodded through without a parliamentary vote , and with essentially no costing or scrutiny or meaningful opposition ) .
As per the Introduction above , the primary justification for Renewables is indeed climate-change .
So , if culture does rule the roost for this particular policy area , Renewables deployment per nation should be governed by its ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which case , we must see a very strong correlation between these two aspects .
But which of the above attitudes to climate-change are relevant , when comparing on a national basis with renewables commitment ?
As there is at least some reality-constraint on deploying renewables ( because all nations have budgets and competition for same ) , if indeed the expression of renewables policy is mainly cultural , this ought to align with a reality-constrained ( orange ) trend , not an unconstrained ( blue ) trend .
Plus , because public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ renewables is likely very poor on average , this makes the constraint weak at best ( if the downsides of deployment were better understood , then the constraint would be stronger ) .
So , we should be looking at a comparison with the attitude data from the ‘ WC ’ series in Chart 1 .
This comes from an enormous UN survey on policy priorities in many nations , the vote share for ‘ action on climate-change ’ forming the series Y-values .
Nations can be matched from this series to those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , Wind turbine deployment ( also 40 , with 5 nations different to the Solar list ) , plus a common set ( of 35 ) deploying both .
Looking at the combined commitment for Wind and Solar should produce a more reliable result , as each may have technology / policy idiosyncrasies that could buck the trend in some way , but which are more likely to average out over the combination of both ( though we can start by examining each type in turn ) .
In practice , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or full correlation .
Policy decisions are very rarely 100 % free of cultural factors , yet they ’ d rarely be wholly cultural either .
So , we can set reasonable thresholds for the test .
If ‘ r ’ for the correlation of renewables commitment with weakly-constrained climate attitudes is say ~0.33 or less , then we can say culture ( per above inherent in those attitudes ) doesn ’ t dominate .
But if r~0.66 or above , then we can say that cultural motivation does dominate renewables commitment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ guess we ’ d have to see where and think more about dual modes .
Preamble : 1 ] Due to various impacts on very long-term social development , it is well-known that with some exceptions ( which aren ’ t an issue here ) GDP-per-capita across nations strongly negatively correlates with religiosity ( see Chart F1 in Xcel datafile ) .
2 ] Hence if above this , deploying Wind Turbine capacity is indeed motivated by a ‘ WC ’ type climate-attitude , which itself negatively correlates with religiosity ( see Chart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against each nation ’ s Wind Turbine capacity per-capita , should yield a power type function .
It does ( see Chart F2 in Xcel datafile ) .
3 ] Power functions are more difficult to deal with or apply our test thresholds for ‘ r ’ to ( based on linear ) .
So , normalizing the Wind Turbine capacity per-capita wrt to GDP per-capita ( I used Spain ’ s GDP as the arbitrary standard ) , will remove the long-term effect of religiosity upon societies and any unequal fulfillment of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ~fraction of GDP , will purchase more Wind Turbines if the GDP is bigger ) .
So , this resets our expectation back to a linear function… The plot : Across the 40 nations , UN vote share for ‘ action on climate change ’ ( from ‘ WC ’ data ) , versus GDP-per-Capita-normalised Wind Turbine Capacity / Population ( to 2018 ) , shows a +ve correlation .
This suggests that Wind Turbines are significantly motivated by a ‘ WC ’ type cultural climate-change attitude : An ‘ r ’ of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dominance ; but this is only half the story so far .
And it looks like there are idiosyncrasies regarding individual national policies for Wind deployment .
E.g .
the Czech Republic has very little despite a high vote for ‘ action on climate-change ’ .
And with a vote share that is a little lower , Portugal nevertheless seems to have a huge Wind capacity .
In summary it seems that as motivation rises towards the right , especially beyond the green line , the range of expression in Wind Turbines , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more targeted Renewable Energy policies , which hence spread from gung-ho for Wind Turbines right down to minimal deployment , because other Renewables are or aren ’ t more prioritized instead ( e.g .
Solar , Biomass , etc ) .
So , to better insulate against the effects of targeted policies , we can add into the mix the identical analysis for Solar deployment .
Preamble : 1 ] The equivalent charts for F1 and F2 in the Wind Turbine case , are F3 and F4 ( see the Excel datafile ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s an extra issue for Solar Power , which is that we need to adjust the MW that each nation has deployed , according to its annual sunshine hours .
Otherwise the same spend ( where spend corresponds to motivation ) , hence the label MW , will produce different actual power per year in different nations .
So in Chart 4 , Solar Capacity deployed is normalized ( to Spain ) for Annual-Sunshine-DurationP1 .
The plot : Across the 40 nations ( 5 different to the Wind Turbine set ) UN vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ( from ‘ WC ’ data ) , versus GDP-per-Capita-normalised Annual-Sunshine-Adjusted Solar Capacity / Population ( to 2018 ) , shows a +ve correlation .
See Chart F7 in the Excel datafile .
This chart is very similar to Chart 2 above , with a greater range of expression in Solar Power to the right of the green line .
However , different nations than for Chart 2 are either high and low within this expression , because the idiosyncrasies associated with Solar Power are different to those for Wind Turbines .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ somewhat lower than the case for Wind Turbines alone ; much of the reduction appears to stem from Japan going nuts on Solar despite only middling climate concerns , while Sweden has very modest Solar despite very high climate concerns .
But this is only half the story too .
Combining the results for both the technologies , will give us a more robust picture for Renewables motivation overall .
Across 35 nations , Chart 3 below shows UN vote share for ‘ action on climate change ’ ( from ‘ WC ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Commitment / Population ( to 2018 ) .
The +ve correlation has improved .
Surpassing the upper test threshold with some to spare , ‘ r ’ is now at 0.73 .
The greater range of spread of nations at the RHS has considerably reduced ( excepting for Germany ) , this being consistent with expected total renewables motivation , which nevertheless may express much more in Wind Turbines than Solar for any particular single nation , or vice versa .
The lens we used to see in the first place that attitudes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the religiosity of nations , is color-coded onto Chart 3 .
This falls from left to right , albeit fuzzily because aside from some random noise , there ’ s a minor secondary variable at play which impacts religiosity as seen in this view ( see Postscript 2 ) .
Notwithstanding some utility , the main motivation for Wind and Solar Renewables is cultural .
Thus , their installations are more akin to churches than to power-stations .
This also means that , just like the cultural attitude it is rooted in , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ religiosity ; see Postscript 2 .
While it seems highly intuitive that national attitudes for action on climate-change would align with the corresponding renewables deployments , going straight for the jugular might not result in understanding exactly how to compare ( or at least , there ’ d be more chance of making a mistake in so doing ) , or indeed what the result actually means .
For instance , without the benefit of the big picture in Chart 1 and what this is about in cultural terms , we wouldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not due to rationality .
Plus , we may have ended up comparing the attitudes from an unconstrained climate survey question , and still be wondering why more Renewables correlates with dramatically less concern about climate-change .
And the steps in the above preambles , usefully confirm the roles of GDP-per-capita and sunshine duration .
Note : widespread public knowledge of Renewables issues would increase constraints on policy , likely collapsing motivation from the ‘ WC ’ line in Chart1 , to the ‘ FC ’ line .
Note : This post says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nor about the mainstream science of same ( which the CCCC narratives contradict ) .
It ’ s only about public attitudes and their expression in Renewables policy .
Michael Shellenberger , the environmentalist who tirelessly advocates for Nuclear Power as a solution to our energy needs , says this of Renewables ( and he ’ s talking largely about Solar and Wind deployments ) : “ For me the question now is , now that we know that renewables can ’ t save the planet , are we going to keep letting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consistent with the fact that the ‘ purpose ’ of cultural narratives is to gain emotive commitment , in turn only to hold the cultural group together ; it ’ s irrelevant to this actual purpose that the resulting actions may undermine or even reverse their stated purpose ; this happens .
In the blurb for his book ‘ Apocalypse Never ’ Shellenberger also speaks about the character of modern environmentalism , the motivation beneath it , which along with much else drives Renewables deployment ( and also a net resistance to Nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : “ What ’ s really behind the rise of apocalyptic environmentalism ?
There are powerful financial interests .
There are desires for status and power .
But most of all there is a desire among supposedly secular people for transcendence .
This spiritual impulse can be natural and healthy .
But in preaching fear without love , and guilt without redemption , the new religion is failing to satisfy our deepest psychological and existential needs.
” Emphasis mine .
Shellenberger rightly identifies the overall motivation as cultural .
He uses the term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many others , simply because this is the most familiar example of a bounded cultural entity that people tend to have .
Regarding a ‘ climate catastrophe ’ generally , the social data completely agrees with him , as shown in Chart 1 ( and more fully elsewhere , see the Summary File below ) .
And as demonstrated above , this is exactly the case too for the specific motivation behind Renewables deployment .
However , I believe Shellenberger has one thing wrong .
Catastrophic climate culture is so pervasive exactly because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which needs stem from signaling in-group identification via emotive , and preferentially existential , narratives .
These in turn activate deep mental mechanisms which bypass our rationality , be that the advice of Planning Engineer or any other mere reason , via whatever expertise , experience or analysis .
Anyone or any group that contradicts or even questions in-group narratives , is automatically out-group , and so passionately resisted .
Via the historical accident of atheism spreading outwards from NW Europe , and hence from mostly very cloudy ( annually averaged ) countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sunshine duration of countries has a pretty decent linear correlation with national religiosity , albeit some major individual exceptions .
See Chart F5 in the datafile , ‘ r ’ is 0.56 .
Note : annual sunshine duration per country is derived from the average measurements for between 2 cities ( smaller countries ) and 5 cities ( larger countries , excepting 10 for Russia ) ; see the Excel datafile for tables of same , plus original sources .
So , if national sunshine hours are substituted as a proxy for national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows a power type function , see Chart F6 in the datafile .
Similarly to above , we can then normalize this wrt GDP-per-capita , thereby removing the simple effect of spending power ( and too its long-term relationship to religiosity ) .
This reveals the relative priority of Solar deployment ( and so relative motivation ) for each of the nations .
The result of this operation , shown in Chart 4 below , demonstrates a significant irony that stems from the cultural motivation behind Renewables .
Which is that , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduces , then more nations choose to deploy more Solar MW per capita – i.e .
within exactly those geographies it is least useful .
The increasing spread of nations right to left in the green triangle , represents the same increasing range of expression in Solar that is also seen in F7 ( see datafile ) , and likewise for Wind Turbines in Chart 2 above , which in both cases is more obvious to the right of the green lines .
That increasing range is due to an increasing cultural motivation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which for particular nations may preference other Renewables options over Solar , to some degree .
Religiosity is used as a ‘ lens ’ in Chart 1 , which allows us to ‘ see ’ that national climate-change attitudes are indeed cultural .
The two strong cultures interact to produce the various trends , and in particular the correlation with religiosity of climate-change supportive answers to unconstrained questions , yet also anti-correlation with religiosity of climate-change supportive answers to reality-constrained questions , for sure is extremely hard to explain any other way .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ or proxy itself to have quite such a robust correlation with national Renewables Commitment as the ‘ WC ’ climate attitude , but it ’ s a useful ‘ parity check ’ to graph this and demonstrate that it should still be pretty strong .
Chart F9 in the Excel datafile shows this .
‘ r ’ is ~0.65 against ranked Renewables Commitment ( compresses some of the outliers a bit , especially Germany ) , and ~0.6 against actual values .
In practice , there is more than just extra randomity via @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of ‘ weaker strengths ’ in Chart 1 ( so ‘ WC ’ and ‘ WA ’ ) have some systemic variability about trend , due to the GDP-per-Capita of each nation relative to its religio-regional group .
This variability is faithfully reflected in Chart F9 , and is color-coded onto the chart .
See also Chart F10 and F11 , which show the consistency of the religio-regional-GDP-per-Capita group averages between the ‘ WC ’ and Renewables Commitment series .
See the Summary File for a full explanation , plus some ‘ weaker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visualizations , to better see the raw effect .
For a version of ‘ WC ’ using the same 35 nations as in Chart 3 , with hi / lo Renewables commitment and hi / lo GDP-per-religio-regional-group both encoded , see Chart F8 in the Datafile .
Note : Norway is excluded from above charts as policy bias to immense amounts of natural hydro-power available , denudes Solar and Wind Turbine motivations .
This could be accommodated by the inclusion of a third renewables string across all nations for hydro-power , but there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extra effort .
• Climate Survey Data-source : The huge 2015 UN ‘ My World ’ poll with ~10 million participants across many nations .
• Climate Survey Data-source : Climate questions in the Reuters / University of Oxford ‘ Digital News Report 2020 ’ survey .
• Original Excel chart : ‘ 1yx ’ here ( 22 nations , debiased X scale ) , ‘ 2xy ’ here ( 24 nations , x/y reversed , raw X scale , delete US & Vietnam rows ) .
• Original Excel chart : ‘ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debiased X scale ) , ‘ 4xy ’ here ( 24 nations , x/y reversed , raw X scale , delete US & Vietnam rows ) .
• Original Excel chart : See ‘ 3yx ’ here ( red crosses , and just left of chart , column G and J for data ) .
• Original Excel chart : See ‘ F6 ’ here ( and superimposed on other series , chart 3yx just to the left ) .
• Original Excel chart : See ‘ 4yx ’ and ‘ 5yx ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ religio-regional color-coded ) .
• Original Excel chart : Not on the Internet yet , see Footnote 9 in the attached Summary File below .
Link to Summary File regarding the generic relationship between national religiosities and attitudes to climate change : [ SUMMARY Religiosity Predicts CC Beliefs 2 ] Note : the above file includes a short separate section on the situation in the US , where there is a 4-way cultural dance ( the extra dancers being Rep / Con and Dem / Lib cultures ) .
See Footnote 14 in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nations covered , there is a simpler 2-way cultural dance ( i.e .
religious faith and catastrophic climate-change culture ) .
The same basic principles apply , however , which allows the framework derived from the 59 nations to produce some insight on the US situation .
I may expand on this in a future post .
Outside of the US , religiosity as a predictor of national climate-change attitudes dwarfs any net political considerations .
( And incidentally within nations on this issue , polarization due to political affiliation is much less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cites the US situation as exceptional ) .
Link to Excel Datafile : [ Wind and Solar motivations Data ] Climate Etc .

A moment’s employment of our critical faculties reveals just why wind and solar will never be meaningful power sources. STT is dedicated to explaining why. But, for the uninitiated, we’ll simply mention sunset and calm weather as the most obvious starting points.
Explaining how readily the naïve and gullible have been taken in by the rent seekers that sit behind and profit from the so-called wind and solar ‘industries’ takes a little more intellectual horsepower, however.
You’d be hard pressed to find a group of people turning up to venerate the moment when a reliable power source – like a gas turbine or coal-fired power plant – is launched into operation. So, why is it that retired school teachers and Uni academics will drive miles out of their way to genuflect in the middle of a field carpeted with these things, with a like-minded group, equally keen to display their self-perceived ‘virtue’?
Andy West has been studying that peculiar phenomenon, for some time now.
As West explains in this detailed article, there’s a quasi-religious element to what is more readily explained as a cultural crusade, driven by a mixture of fear and ignorance.
Cultural motivations for wind and solar renewables deployment
Climate Etc.
Andy West
19 November 2020
“For me the question now is, now that we know that renewables can’t save the planet, are we going to keep letting them destroy it?”. – Michael Schellenberger
Introduction
There have been many technical analyses of Wind and Solar energy, covering a raft of issues from energy density and efficiency, through subsidies and land usage, to maintenance, grid impacts, intermittency and more. The angle examined here is in no way intended to replace such necessary views, whether they lean to the pessimistic or the optimistic or anywhere in-between. Rather, a complementary view is provided regarding an aspect that such technical analyses cannot address, albeit it often features in the conclusions and questions these analyses raise at the end. Right here at Climate Etc, the first of the excellent analyses by ‘Planning Engineer’ (on his retirement revealed to be Russ Schussler, ex-VP of Transmission Planning at Georgia Transmission Corporations), laudably highlighted the limitation of technical analyses with his very first line: “Power System Planners do not have the expertise or knowledge to say whether or not the benefits of reducing carbon emissions are worth the costs. However they should be respected as experts for obtaining a better understanding of what the implications and costs of such programs are.”
So, who does have this critical knowledge and expertise regarding ultimate cost / benefit? The answer is highly likely to be no one at all, because not only is this issue deeply disputed, it is culturally (as well as technically) disputed. Indeed, to the extent that the overwhelming public and authority narrative about climate change contradicts mainstream science let alone any skeptical science, which also means that, especially in some nations such as the US, there are cultural counter-narratives too. Hence debates about policy, including renewables deployment, aren’t legitimately resolved, because the potent cultural angle corrupts or polarizes or simply overrides any such debate.
Schussler acknowledges this cultural dispute, saying in the line following the above quote: “Unfortunately many non-experts, driven by fear of AGW, have done much to cloud, distort and ignore critical issues around the cost and capabilities of renewable energy and the realities relating to the provision of electrical power.” He also returns to this theme at the very end of his post: “…I believe most planners and utilities recognize that the overall impacts to society (unless needed to aver environmental disaster) would be extremely harmful in the net analysis. I hope that the voices of concerned utility experts are not drowned out by the noise of ‘true believers’ or disbelieved because of false accusations of self-interest.” For sure ‘true belief’ is a cultural feature and may often prompt ‘false accusations’. Plus that caveat of ‘unless needed’, or more subtly ‘how much needed’, is a major issue within the dispute above. An apparent need, could be partly or wholly the result of emotive belief, of which ‘fear of [C]AGW’ is a major component.
Schussler’s title, ‘Myths and realities of renewable energy’, emphasis mine, is inclusive of the element that technical analysis cannot ultimately probe regarding character and impact, because myths are cultural phenomena. Others cite myth as Renewables motivation, and David Archibald goes further in directly framing this element as ‘religious’ in nature (religions being just one brand of cultural entities). In a recent article on renewables (and focusing on hydrogen) at Jo Nova’s, he employs religiously orientated terms such as ‘believers’ and ‘government encyclicals’:
“Briefly, the only reason solar and wind get a look-in is because solar panels and wind turbines are made using energy from coal at $0.04 per kWh and turn out power at $0.20 per kWh… …You can’t use solar and wind power to make solar and wind power equipment; as such they are neither renewable nor sustainable. And they certainly won’t be replacing fossil fuels when the fossil fuels run out.
Even some lefties are figuring this out and thus the documentary Planet of the Humans. So the global warming clerisy, headed by Alan Finkel in this country [Australia], needs to keep coming up with new content to satisfy their simple-minded believers… …Vast sums are to be spent on hydrogen. The language of the Government encyclicals suggests that hydrogen is a new source of energy that just has to be tapped to guarantee a wonderful future.”
Needless to say, Archibald views this ‘religious’ influence as overwhelmingly negative, adding as part of his conclusion: “Global warming doesn’t build orphanages or hospitals. As a religion it doesn’t do any good at all.” And others claim a cultish / ‘religious’ motivation too. Yet whether viewing culture as only a clouding / distorting influence, or as an overwhelmingly negative force, technical analyses critical of renewables inevitably falter or get speculative when it comes demonstrating cultural sway (for example, across nations invested in renewables). An alternate approach is needed to progress this.
There are less critical / more optimistic analyses of Solar or Wind ‘renewables’, which nevertheless tend to justify some amount of pain in achieving rosier end-scenarios, upon the premise that this is needed to avoid an otherwise inevitable and imminent global catastrophe (apart from the most wildly optimistic, in which all changes are apparently painless). Yet mainstream science says such a justification is unfounded (notwithstanding the cultural dispute above).
Meanwhile the implementation of Solar and Wind is surging ahead, and has done so for decades in some countries. So, is this global implementation largely due to pragmatic considerations that are consistent with mainstream science? After all, these things do actually produce power. Or instead, largely due to cultural motivation that spreads solar-panels and wind-turbines as merely icons for the ‘secular religion’ of certain and catastrophic climate change? And no matter the costs, fiscal or environmental. This question is resolvable, as hard social data on the cultural attitudes of many nations to climate-change, allows national motivations to be mapped to Renewables deployment.
Cultural attitudes to climate-change across national publics
Prior posts here, show that supportive attitudes to climate-change (CC) across national publics, have a dual and systemic strong relationship with religiosity. CC supportive public responses to unconstrained climate survey questions correlate with national religiosity, while oppositely, CC supportive responses to reality-constrained questions anti-correlate with national religiosity. [Reality-constrained questions force survey participants to consider and compare other reality issues in relation to climate change, typically by asking them to nominate the X ‘most important’ from a larger list of Y issues, of which one represents a climate-change issue, or literally just ‘climate-change’. Unconstrained questions don’t force such a comparative choice]. Using some data-series from the prior posts, Chart 1 below summarizes this dual relationship. For many nations and plotted against national religiosity, it shows the CC supportive public responses measured (and for the dashed lines, intuited) for different strengths of both unconstrained and reality-constrained survey questions.
Strength for the unconstrained questions (blue lines) reflects how aligned these are to the emotive and existential values of catastrophic climate change culture (CCCC), plus how much this is targeted at the personal. Another way of thinking about this strength, is how biased the questions are towards CCCC, emotive content being a feature of bias and not of rationality. Strength for reality-constrained questions (orange lines) reflects the tightness of the constraint. Picking the ‘most important’ single issue of 12, for example, is a stronger reality-constraint, a stronger clash with the other issues, than say picking the top 3 of 12, which is stronger in turn than the top 5 of 12. Table 1 at the end of this post, shows which actual climate-change survey questions generated the data-series each line represents (each is depicted as just the stand-alone trendline), along with the related r/r2/p values.
The most important conclusion to draw from these trends is that, as revealed by their strong relationships with religiosity (an entirely cultural phenomenon), attitudes to climate-change across nations are likewise cultural. In fact, they’re the net result of interaction between 2 cultures, i.e. CCCC and religion. So, this means they are not due to rationality (cultural attitudes are emotively driven), or anything physical such as the characteristics of the climate-system, or indeed the particular climates or climate exposures of nations, or likewise any views on same as expressed by mainstream (or any) climate science.
With the exception of one historical coincidence (annual sunshine duration – see later) no matters encompassed by these categories would exhibit a systemic relationship with religiosity. And for sure none can exhibit both correlation and anti-correlation simultaneously, depending only upon the type of question asked; yet such is certainly possible for cultural responses. This duality raises apparent contradictions. For instance, maximum climate concerns (RH ends of blue trends in Chart 1) occur in the same nations as minimum support for climate action / priority (RH ends of orange trends). But such apparent contradictions aren’t unusual for cultural causation. From the prior series here at Climate Etc, see : Apparent Paradoxes in the relationship of Climate ‘Concerns, Skepticism, Activism, and Priority’ explained by Religiosity.
In fact, the full situation is more complex than depicted by Chart 1. See the Summary File linked below (and especially Chart 2 in there, not in the main post) for more explanation, visualized via more series plus features added to the above Chart 1. However, the conclusion remains that climate-change attitudes across nations are mainly cultural, so not from either rationality or physical factors. [Note: the attached summary is more distilled and easier going than the 3 prior posts linked above. Regarding the US, see the note at the very end of this post].
Probing motivations for Renewables Commitment
If a particular domain is dominated by cultural attitudes, spending and policy support within the domain should ultimately be rooted in those attitudes. Hence, armed with the above cultural attitudes to climate-change, we now need to explore the relationship across nations, between these and actual Renewables deployment. It isn’t that mass publics rush out and purchase Wind Turbines with their credit cards, in proportion to their national attitudes. The actual commitment works via elites who enact policy. Yet the limits on such policy should still be in proportion to the national public attitudes (which doesn’t mean alignment in an absolute sense).
Culture works to this end whether or not a nation is a democracy, or in the latter case whether or not democratic processes are actually involved (e.g. in the UK, ‘net-zero by 2050’ was nodded through without a parliamentary vote, and with essentially no costing or scrutiny or meaningful opposition). As per the Introduction above, the primary justification for Renewables is indeed climate-change. So, if culture does rule the roost for this particular policy area, Renewables deployment per nation should be governed by its (cultural) attitudes to climate-change. In which case, we must see a very strong correlation between these two aspects.
But which of the above attitudes to climate-change are relevant, when comparing on a national basis with renewables commitment? As there is at least some reality-constraint on deploying renewables (because all nations have budgets and competition for same), if indeed the expression of renewables policy is mainly cultural, this ought to align with a reality-constrained (orange) trend, not an unconstrained (blue) trend. Plus, because public and also elite / authority knowledge about renewables is likely very poor on average, this makes the constraint weak at best (if the downsides of deployment were better understood, then the constraint would be stronger).
So, we should be looking at a comparison with the attitude data from the ‘WC’ series in Chart 1. This comes from an enormous UN survey on policy priorities in many nations, the vote share for ‘action on climate-change’ forming the series Y-values. Nations can be matched from this series to those with major Solar deployment (40 nations), Wind turbine deployment (also 40, with 5 nations different to the Solar list), plus a common set (of 35) deploying both.
Looking at the combined commitment for Wind and Solar should produce a more reliable result, as each may have technology / policy idiosyncrasies that could buck the trend in some way, but which are more likely to average out over the combination of both (though we can start by examining each type in turn). In practice, there’s highly unlikely to be zero or full correlation. Policy decisions are very rarely 100% free of cultural factors, yet they’d rarely be wholly cultural either. So, we can set reasonable thresholds for the test. If ‘r’ for the correlation of renewables commitment with weakly-constrained climate attitudes is say ~0.33 or less, then we can say culture (per above inherent in those attitudes) doesn’t dominate. But if r~0.66 or above, then we can say that cultural motivation does dominate renewables commitment. If the value lands in-between, I guess we’d have to see where and think more about dual modes.
Commitment for Wind Turbines across 40 nations
Preamble: 1] Due to various impacts on very long-term social development, it is well-known that with some exceptions (which aren’t an issue here) GDP-per-capita across nations strongly negatively correlates with religiosity (see Chart F1 in Xcel datafile). 2] Hence if above this, deploying Wind Turbine capacity is indeed motivated by a ‘WC’ type climate-attitude, which itself negatively correlates with religiosity (see Chart 1), then national religiosity plotted against each nation’s Wind Turbine capacity per-capita, should yield a power type function. It does (see Chart F2 in Xcel datafile). 3] Power functions are more difficult to deal with or apply our test thresholds for ‘r’ to (based on linear).
So, normalizing the Wind Turbine capacity per-capita wrt to GDP per-capita (I used Spain’s GDP as the arbitrary standard), will remove the long-term effect of religiosity upon societies and any unequal fulfillment of motivation (the same motivation, so ~fraction of GDP, will purchase more Wind Turbines if the GDP is bigger). So, this resets our expectation back to a linear function…
The plot: Across the 40 nations, UN vote share for ‘action on climate change’ (from ‘WC’ data), versus GDP-per-Capita-normalised Wind Turbine Capacity / Population (to 2018), shows a +ve correlation. This suggests that Wind Turbines are significantly motivated by a ‘WC’ type cultural climate-change attitude:
An ‘r’ of 0.64 just misses our test threshold for dominance; but this is only half the story so far. And it looks like there are idiosyncrasies regarding individual national policies for Wind deployment. E.g. the Czech Republic has very little despite a high vote for ‘action on climate-change’. And with a vote share that is a little lower, Portugal nevertheless seems to have a huge Wind capacity. In summary it seems that as motivation rises towards the right, especially beyond the green line, the range of expression in Wind Turbines, grows. This likely reflects larger and more targeted Renewable Energy policies, which hence spread from gung-ho for Wind Turbines right down to minimal deployment, because other Renewables are or aren’t more prioritized instead (e.g. Solar, Biomass, etc). So, to better insulate against the effects of targeted policies, we can add into the mix the identical analysis for Solar deployment.
Commitment for Solar Power across 40 nations
Preamble: 1] The equivalent charts for F1 and F2 in the Wind Turbine case, are F3 and F4 (see the Excel datafile). 2] However, there’s an extra issue for Solar Power, which is that we need to adjust the MW that each nation has deployed, according to its annual sunshine hours. Otherwise the same spend (where spend corresponds to motivation), hence the label MW, will produce different actual power per year in different nations. So in Chart 4, Solar Capacity deployed is normalized (to Spain) for Annual-Sunshine-DurationP1.
The plot: Across the 40 nations (5 different to the Wind Turbine set) UN vote share for ‘action on climate change’ (from ‘WC’ data), versus GDP-per-Capita-normalised Annual-Sunshine-Adjusted Solar Capacity / Population (to 2018), shows a +ve correlation. See Chart F7 in the Excel datafile. This chart is very similar to Chart 2 above, with a greater range of expression in Solar Power to the right of the green line. However, different nations than for Chart 2 are either high and low within this expression, because the idiosyncrasies associated with Solar Power are different to those for Wind Turbines.
An ‘r’ of 0.48 is somewhat lower than the case for Wind Turbines alone; much of the reduction appears to stem from Japan going nuts on Solar despite only middling climate concerns, while Sweden has very modest Solar despite very high climate concerns. But this is only half the story too. Combining the results for both the technologies, will give us a more robust picture for Renewables motivation overall.
Commitment for combined Wind / Solar Renewables across 35 (common) nations
Across 35 nations, Chart 3 below shows UN vote share for ‘action on climate change’ (from ‘WC’ data), versus GDP-per-Capita-normalised Combined Renewables Commitment / Population (to 2018). The +ve correlation has improved. Surpassing the upper test threshold with some to spare, ‘r’ is now at 0.73.
The greater range of spread of nations at the RHS has considerably reduced (excepting for Germany), this being consistent with expected total renewables motivation, which nevertheless may express much more in Wind Turbines than Solar for any particular single nation, or vice versa. The lens we used to see in the first place that attitudes to climate-change are cultural, i.e. the religiosity of nations, is color-coded onto Chart 3. This falls from left to right, albeit fuzzily because aside from some random noise, there’s a minor secondary variable at play which impacts religiosity as seen in this view (see Postscript 2).
Discussion
Notwithstanding some utility, the main motivation for Wind and Solar Renewables is cultural. Thus, their installations are more akin to churches than to power-stations. This also means that, just like the cultural attitude it is rooted in, Renewables deployment per nation directly anti-correlates with religiosity; see Postscript 2.
While it seems highly intuitive that national attitudes for action on climate-change would align with the corresponding renewables deployments, going straight for the jugular might not result in understanding exactly how to compare (or at least, there’d be more chance of making a mistake in so doing), or indeed what the result actually means. For instance, without the benefit of the big picture in Chart 1 and what this is about in cultural terms, we wouldn’t have known that those attitudes are not due to rationality. Plus, we may have ended up comparing the attitudes from an unconstrained climate survey question, and still be wondering why more Renewables correlates with dramatically less concern about climate-change. And the steps in the above preambles, usefully confirm the roles of GDP-per-capita and sunshine duration.
Note: widespread public knowledge of Renewables issues would increase constraints on policy, likely collapsing motivation from the ‘WC’ line in Chart1, to the ‘FC’ line. Note: This post says nothing about actual physical climate change, nor about the mainstream science of same (which the CCCC narratives contradict). It’s only about public attitudes and their expression in Renewables policy.
Michael Shellenberger, the environmentalist who tirelessly advocates for Nuclear Power as a solution to our energy needs, says this of Renewables (and he’s talking largely about Solar and Wind deployments): “For me the question now is, now that we know that renewables can’t save the planet, are we going to keep letting them destroy it?” An insight consistent with the fact that the ‘purpose’ of cultural narratives is to gain emotive commitment, in turn only to hold the cultural group together; it’s irrelevant to this actual purpose that the resulting actions may undermine or even reverse their stated purpose; this happens.
In the blurb for his book ‘Apocalypse Never’ Shellenberger also speaks about the character of modern environmentalism, the motivation beneath it, which along with much else drives Renewables deployment (and also a net resistance to Nuclear Power as a ‘solution’): “What’s really behind the rise of apocalyptic environmentalism? There are powerful financial interests. There are desires for status and power. But most of all there is a desire among supposedly secular people for transcendence. This spiritual impulse can be natural and healthy. But in preaching fear without love, and guilt without redemption, the new religion is failing to satisfy our deepest psychological and existential needs.” Emphasis mine.
Shellenberger rightly identifies the overall motivation as cultural. He uses the term ‘religion’, as indeed do many others, simply because this is the most familiar example of a bounded cultural entity that people tend to have. Regarding a ‘climate catastrophe’ generally, the social data completely agrees with him, as shown in Chart 1 (and more fully elsewhere, see the Summary File below). And as demonstrated above, this is exactly the case too for the specific motivation behind Renewables deployment.
However, I believe Shellenberger has one thing wrong. Catastrophic climate culture is so pervasive exactly because it does satisfy deep psychological needs, which needs stem from signaling in-group identification via emotive, and preferentially existential, narratives. These in turn activate deep mental mechanisms which bypass our rationality, be that the advice of Planning Engineer or any other mere reason, via whatever expertise, experience or analysis. Anyone or any group that contradicts or even questions in-group narratives, is automatically out-group, and so passionately resisted.
Postscript 1: Historical accident and irony regarding Solar Deployment
Via the historical accident of atheism spreading outwards from NW Europe, and hence from mostly very cloudy (annually averaged) countries towards typically sunnier climes, the annual sunshine duration of countries has a pretty decent linear correlation with national religiosity, albeit some major individual exceptions. See Chart F5 in the datafile, ‘r’ is 0.56. Note: annual sunshine duration per country is derived from the average measurements for between 2 cities (smaller countries) and 5 cities (larger countries, excepting 10 for Russia); see the Excel datafile for tables of same, plus original sources. So, if national sunshine hours are substituted as a proxy for national religiosity in Chart F4, this still shows a power type function, see Chart F6 in the datafile. Similarly to above, we can then normalize this wrt GDP-per-capita, thereby removing the simple effect of spending power (and too its long-term relationship to religiosity). This reveals the relative priority of Solar deployment (and so relative motivation) for each of the nations.
The result of this operation, shown in Chart 4 below, demonstrates a significant irony that stems from the cultural motivation behind Renewables. Which is that, as the annual sunshine hours experienced by nations reduces, then more nations choose to deploy more Solar MW per capita – i.e. within exactly those geographies it is least useful.
The increasing spread of nations right to left in the green triangle, represents the same increasing range of expression in Solar that is also seen in F7 (see datafile), and likewise for Wind Turbines in Chart 2 above, which in both cases is more obvious to the right of the green lines. That increasing range is due to an increasing cultural motivation for Renewables, coupled with targeted policies which for particular nations may preference other Renewables options over Solar, to some degree.
Postscript 2: Renewables Commitment versus Religiosity
Religiosity is used as a ‘lens’ in Chart 1, which allows us to ‘see’ that national climate-change attitudes are indeed cultural. The two strong cultures interact to produce the various trends, and in particular the correlation with religiosity of climate-change supportive answers to unconstrained questions, yet also anti-correlation with religiosity of climate-change supportive answers to reality-constrained questions, for sure is extremely hard to explain any other way. One wouldn’t expect this lens or proxy itself to have quite such a robust correlation with national Renewables Commitment as the ‘WC’ climate attitude, but it’s a useful ‘parity check’ to graph this and demonstrate that it should still be pretty strong. Chart F9 in the Excel datafile shows this. ‘r’ is ~0.65 against ranked Renewables Commitment (compresses some of the outliers a bit, especially Germany), and ~0.6 against actual values. In practice, there is more than just extra randomity via looking through this proxy.
The series of ‘weaker strengths’ in Chart 1 (so ‘WC’ and ‘WA’) have some systemic variability about trend, due to the GDP-per-Capita of each nation relative to its religio-regional group. This variability is faithfully reflected in Chart F9, and is color-coded onto the chart. See also Chart F10 and F11, which show the consistency of the religio-regional-GDP-per-Capita group averages between the ‘WC’ and Renewables Commitment series. See the Summary File for a full explanation, plus some ‘weaker strength’ climate attitude series as full-data visualizations, to better see the raw effect. For a version of ‘WC’ using the same 35 nations as in Chart 3, with hi / lo Renewables commitment and hi / lo GDP-per-religio-regional-group both encoded, see Chart F8 in the Datafile.
Note: Norway is excluded from above charts as policy bias to immense amounts of natural hydro-power available, denudes Solar and Wind Turbine motivations. This could be accommodated by the inclusion of a third renewables string across all nations for hydro-power, but there’d be little value for this extra effort.
Link to Summary File regarding the generic relationship between national religiosities and attitudes to climate change: [SUMMARY Religiosity Predicts CC Beliefs 2]
Note: the above file includes a short separate section on the situation in the US, where there is a 4-way cultural dance (the extra dancers being Rep / Con and Dem / Lib cultures). See Footnote 14 in the file. In the other 59 nations covered, there is a simpler 2-way cultural dance (i.e. religious faith and catastrophic climate-change culture). The same basic principles apply, however, which allows the framework derived from the 59 nations to produce some insight on the US situation. I may expand on this in a future post. Outside of the US, religiosity as a predictor of national climate-change attitudes dwarfs any net political considerations. (And incidentally within nations on this issue, polarization due to political affiliation is much less than in the US; various literature cites the US situation as exceptional).
Link to Excel Datafile: [Wind and Solar motivations Data]
Climate Etc.


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--Claim: Autonomous EVs will Help Solve the Climate Crisis

Relinquishing private automobile ownership , and hoping the previous occupant of your autonomous electric vehicle taxi didn ’ t have lice .
Hitting the Books : How autonomous EVs could help solve climate change Climate change is far and away the greatest threat of the modern human era — a crisis that will only get worse the longer we dither — with American car culture as a major contributor to the nation ’ s greenhouse emissions .
But carbon-neutralizing energy and solutions are already on the horizon and , in some more developed countries like Sweden , are already being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Our Livable World , science and technology analyst Marc Shaus , takes readers on a fascinating tour of the emerging tools — from “ smart highways ” to jet fuel made from trash — that will not only help curb climate change but perhaps even usher in a new , more sustainable , livable world .
Depending on where you live , going electric may still be perceived as elitist or unnecessary .
But neither of these stigmas can survive much longer .
The more states roll out pro-EV regulations , build the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for buyers , the more these vehicles become a near-term solution for our transport problems .
Many countries and individual regions have EV charging stations along major highways already or have those projects in development .
Some of these charging stations even have the promise of being renewably powered .
If publicly funded , they could also be free to use .
Multiple larger global companies have likewise installed free EV charging stations in their parking lots for employees to use .
Or , of course , to lure potential customers to parking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The promise of wireless charging tech for electric vehicles is not simply to save homeowners the hardship of plugging in their car at night—the real promise is encouraging public transit operators to transition with increasing ease .
Taxi companies may scale up EV fleet ownership if they know that charging pad locations throughout cities will help them avoid re-routing back to the company HQ for power .
Any city ’ s fleet vehicles could also employ this technology .
Think , too , of stopping zones by hospitals , schools , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from experts see the global wireless EV charging market increasing from the $ 21.8 million it was in 2017 to about $ 1.4 billion by the year 2025 .
You have likely heard about driverless cars , but for most auto market analysts , it seems to be a foregone conclusion that autonomous vehicles ( AVs ) will eventually dominate the market .
In assessing expert analysis , Project Drawdown estimates that AVs will likely capture a market share of approximately 75 percent of cars on the road by the year 2040 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ sectors in a number of ways .
For example , increased data coupled with connected vehicle systems can cut down on collisions , gridlock conditions , and potentially even the number of drivers on the road ( more on that soon ) .
Reducing collisions and idling cars can have direct implications for the footprint of remedying either .
Two cars exchanging the same data points in real time will essentially be able to “ see around corners ” with the situational awareness of where other cars on the road are .
Hence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drivers operating cars under the influence or falling asleep at the wheel , AV applications offer more safety through interconnectivity .
We ’ ll also see gridlock improvement when AVs become connected to a larger , smarter set of citywide driving data for route optimization .
For these reasons , some industry commentators see the possibility of future AV ride-sharing services actually reducing the number of people who even purchase a car .
After all , it may one day be cheaper to simply call an AEV from a shuttle service , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any moment ; purchase a ride somewhere for smaller amounts of money than fuel , insurance , and possible monthly car payments ; and then send the AV on its way .
AVs equipped with charging commands could know in advance whether a pre-set passenger destination will deplete its energy reserves and signal operators that a trip back to a charging station may be necessary first .

Guest essay by Eric Worrall
Relinquishing private automobile ownership, and hoping the previous occupant of your autonomous electric vehicle taxi didn’t have lice.
Hitting the Books: How autonomous EVs could help solve climate change
Andrew Tarantola·Senior Editor
Sun, 29 November 2020, 2:30 am AEST
Climate change is far and away the greatest threat of the modern human era — a crisis that will only get worse the longer we dither — with American car culture as a major contributor to the nation’s greenhouse emissions. But carbon-neutralizing energy and solutions are already on the horizon and, in some more developed countries like Sweden, are already being deployed. In his latest book, Our Livable World, science and technology analyst Marc Shaus, takes readers on a fascinating tour of the emerging tools — from “smart highways” to jet fuel made from trash — that will not only help curb climate change but perhaps even usher in a new, more sustainable, livable world.
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Depending on where you live, going electric may still be perceived as elitist or unnecessary. But neither of these stigmas can survive much longer. The more states roll out pro-EV regulations, build the necessary charging infrastructure, and offer incentives for buyers, the more these vehicles become a near-term solution for our transport problems. Many countries and individual regions have EV charging stations along major highways already or have those projects in development. Some of these charging stations even have the promise of being renewably powered. If publicly funded, they could also be free to use. Multiple larger global companies have likewise installed free EV charging stations in their parking lots for employees to use. Or, of course, to lure potential customers to parking lots with the promise of free electrons.
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The promise of wireless charging tech for electric vehicles is not simply to save homeowners the hardship of plugging in their car at night—the real promise is encouraging public transit operators to transition with increasing ease. Taxi companies may scale up EV fleet ownership if they know that charging pad locations throughout cities will help them avoid re-routing back to the company HQ for power. Any city’s fleet vehicles could also employ this technology. Think, too, of stopping zones by hospitals, schools, and anywhere else people routinely idle. Analyses from experts see the global wireless EV charging market increasing from the $21.8 million it was in 2017 to about $1.4 billion by the year 2025.
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You have likely heard about driverless cars, but for most auto market analysts, it seems to be a foregone conclusion that autonomous vehicles (AVs) will eventually dominate the market. In assessing expert analysis, Project Drawdown estimates that AVs will likely capture a market share of approximately 75 percent of cars on the road by the year 2040.
AVs can contribute to decarbonizing our transport sectors in a number of ways. For example, increased data coupled with connected vehicle systems can cut down on collisions, gridlock conditions, and potentially even the number of drivers on the road (more on that soon). Reducing collisions and idling cars can have direct implications for the footprint of remedying either.
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Two cars exchanging the same data points in real time will essentially be able to “see around corners” with the situational awareness of where other cars on the road are. Hence, aside from reducing the number of drivers operating cars under the influence or falling asleep at the wheel, AV applications offer more safety through interconnectivity. We’ll also see gridlock improvement when AVs become connected to a larger, smarter set of citywide driving data for route optimization.
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For these reasons, some industry commentators see the possibility of future AV ride-sharing services actually reducing the number of people who even purchase a car. After all, it may one day be cheaper to simply call an AEV from a shuttle service, which may have a fleet in motion at any moment; purchase a ride somewhere for smaller amounts of money than fuel, insurance, and possible monthly car payments; and then send the AV on its way. AVs equipped with charging commands could know in advance whether a pre-set passenger destination will deplete its energy reserves and signal operators that a trip back to a charging station may be necessary first.
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iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--The Lewisburg, Tennessee Vortex

The Lewisburg, Tennessee Vortex

The number of 90 degree days at Lewisburg , Tennessee has tripled since the 1970s .
But none of the @ @ @ @ @ show the same pattern .
The station at Lewisburg seems to be well sited , @ @ @ @ @ reading →

The number of 90 degree days at Lewisburg, Tennessee has tripled since the 1970s. But none of the other stations in that region show the same pattern. The station at Lewisburg seems to be well sited, so what would … Continue reading →
via Real Climate Science
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November 29, 2020 at 11:46PM


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--Middle East Oil and Gas At The Cross-Roads under a Biden Presidency

Now that Joe Biden has most likely won the US presidential election , one might presume that the campaign rhetoric of the Democratic party will be pared back as the real costs of some of the more radical policies proposed become apparent in post-election reality .
Most observers would contend , however , that the odds are low that a ‘ tack back to the centre ’ ( a la President Clinton ) will happen .
The Middle East is at the cross-roads , and policy choices made by a future Biden presidency will play a critical role in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and gas producers .
As was apparent through the election campaigning , the contrast in Republican and Democratic world-views over fossil fuels and global energy geopolitics could not be starker .
Joe Biden ’ s pledge to “ transition away from the oil industry ” in his last debate with Trump put climate change concerns as the top policy priority .
He is more committed than any previous presidential nominee to take radical policy actions against the so-called “ climate crisis ” .
In 2019 , the U.S. outproduced Saudi Arabia to become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ petroleum .
In response , Saudi Arabia launched a self-debilitating and unsuccessful price war in late 2014 in its attempt to starve out the so-called high-cost producers that had powered the US “ shale revolution ” .
US oil producers have faced not only market competition by Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies which attempted to drive high-cost non-OPEC producers out of the market by increasing oil supplies and allowing prices to fall .
In 2017 , a report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence found that the Sea Change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corporation with direct ties to Putin and Russian oil interests — funnelled more than $ 43 million to environmental causes .
The Foundation funded anti-fracking organizations like the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defence Council .
Another report states “ the Kremlin is financing and choreographing anti-fracking propaganda in the United States… Putin hopes to increase oil and gas prices , destabilize the U.S. economy and threaten America ’ s energy independence.
” The surge in U.S. oil and gas production over the past decade was used by President Trump to pursue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy dominance ” agendas .
It increased its foreign policy leverage in achieving strategic objectives , giving his administration greater latitude to support allies and sanction rivals .
But a Biden administration focused on constraining US oil and gas production in favour of renewable energy and climate change policy priorities would deliver what Saudi Arabia , Russia and other members of the OPEC+ group have been seeking all along .
It would achieve results that Saudi oil policy had consistently failed to attain by engaging in an all-out price war against a resilient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of it , things couldn ’ t be looking better for the major oil and gas producers .
Under a Biden presidency , Saudi Arabia and Russia – along with other OPEC+ members – face the incredible prospect of their largest competitor agreeing to exit the industry voluntarily .
No price or disinformation wars need to be waged by US competitors as the Biden administration forces a “ transition ” away from oil and gas production .
It would seem that Russia ’ s propaganda war against fracking was the more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , given that a Biden presidency would be stacked by advisors on climate change which support the very same NGOs funded by the Russians .
There are limits as to what a US Presidency can do within constitutional limits .
There is the likelihood that the US Senate will remain Republican and hence provide a check on the more extreme pledges made in the name of ‘ net zero ’ emissions in the power sector by 2035 and in the entire economy by 2050 .
Even if the Republicans lose control of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which rely most on fossil fuels either as producers or consumers may not be forthcoming .
Moderates from both parties in oil and gas-dependent states such as Colorado , New Mexico , North Dakota , Oklahoma and Texas would be fearful of destroying jobs and tax-revenues while recovering from the devastating pandemic-induced lockdowns .
Nevertheless , oil and gas producers can count on Mr. Biden to undo most of President Trump ’ s initiatives in energy and environmental affairs , even if blocked by an uncooperative Congress .
As promised , he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and oil and gas drilling in federal lands .
A politicized Environmental Protection Agency – following the previous Obama-Biden playbook – would discourage the fossil fuels development on private lands in countless ways through administrative and regulatory procedures .
The blocking of oil and gas pipelines and other fossil fuel infrastructure would be enabled by activists launching legal suits , as in the recent case of the Dakota Access Pipeline .
While hobbling US oil and gas production , a Biden administration will also consider ceasing President Trump ’ s sanctions on Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Obama ’ s legacy project to rehabilitate Iran , he would return to the 2015 nuclear deal if Tehran “ resumes compliance ” .
It would be impossible for the OPEC+ production cut agreement to balance global supply and demand were Iranian exports ( of over 2.5 million b/d ) to resume .
The OPEC+ agreement would collapse , along with oil prices from their already low $ 40/barrel levels .
Key OPEC officials are “ wary that strains in the OPEC+ alliance could re-emerge with Joe Biden as U.S. President ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump who went from criticising the group to helping bring about a record oil output cut ” .
The economic outlook of the Middle East oil and gas producers depends crucially on whether the US ceases to be the world ’ s leading oil and gas producer ( leading to a reprieve from low oil and gas prices ) or it drops the sanctions on Iranian exports ( leading to even lower oil and gas prices ) .

By Dr. Tilak K. Doshi
Now that Joe Biden has most likely won the US presidential election, one might presume that the campaign rhetoric of the Democratic party will be pared back as the real costs of some of the more radical policies proposed become apparent in post-election reality. Most observers would contend, however, that the odds are low that a ‘tack back to the centre’ (a la President Clinton) will happen.
The Middle East is at the cross-roads, and policy choices made by a future Biden presidency will play a critical role in the outlook for the region’s oil and gas producers. As was apparent through the election campaigning, the contrast in Republican and Democratic world-views over fossil fuels and global energy geopolitics could not be starker. Joe Biden’s pledge to “transition away from the oil industry” in his last debate with Trump put climate change concerns as the top policy priority. He is more committed than any previous presidential nominee to take radical policy actions against the so-called “climate crisis”.
Price and Propaganda Wars
In 2019, the U.S. outproduced Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest producer of petroleum. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a self-debilitating and unsuccessful price war in late 2014 in its attempt to starve out the so-called high-cost producers that had powered the US “shale revolution”. US oil producers have faced not only market competition by Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies which attempted to drive high-cost non-OPEC producers out of the market by increasing oil supplies and allowing prices to fall.
In 2017, a report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence found that the Sea Change Foundation – funded by a Bermuda-based shell corporation with direct ties to Putin and Russian oil interests — funnelled more than $43 million to environmental causes. The Foundation funded anti-fracking organizations like the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defence Council. Another report states “the Kremlin is financing and choreographing anti-fracking propaganda in the United States… Putin hopes to increase oil and gas prices, destabilize the U.S. economy and threaten America’s energy independence.”
The surge in U.S. oil and gas production over the past decade was used by President Trump to pursue the “America First” and “energy dominance” agendas. It increased its foreign policy leverage in achieving strategic objectives, giving his administration greater latitude to support allies and sanction rivals. But a Biden administration focused on constraining US oil and gas production in favour of renewable energy and climate change policy priorities would deliver what Saudi Arabia, Russia and other members of the OPEC+ group have been seeking all along. It would achieve results that Saudi oil policy had consistently failed to attain by engaging in an all-out price war against a resilient US oil and gas sector.
On the face of it, things couldn’t be looking better for the major oil and gas producers. Under a Biden presidency, Saudi Arabia and Russia – along with other OPEC+ members – face the incredible prospect of their largest competitor agreeing to exit the industry voluntarily. No price or disinformation wars need to be waged by US competitors as the Biden administration forces a “transition” away from oil and gas production. It would seem that Russia’s propaganda war against fracking was the more effective strategy than the Saudi price war, given that a Biden presidency would be stacked by advisors on climate change which support the very same NGOs funded by the Russians.
Checks and Balances
There are limits as to what a US Presidency can do within constitutional limits. There is the likelihood that the US Senate will remain Republican and hence provide a check on the more extreme pledges made in the name of ‘net zero’ emissions in the power sector by 2035 and in the entire economy by 2050.
Even if the Republicans lose control of the Senate, support from senators of states which rely most on fossil fuels either as producers or consumers may not be forthcoming. Moderates from both parties in oil and gas-dependent states such as Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Texas would be fearful of destroying jobs and tax-revenues while recovering from the devastating pandemic-induced lockdowns.
Nevertheless, oil and gas producers can count on Mr. Biden to undo most of President Trump’s initiatives in energy and environmental affairs, even if blocked by an uncooperative Congress. As promised, he would issue Executive Orders aimed at ending fracking and oil and gas drilling in federal lands. A politicized Environmental Protection Agency – following the previous Obama-Biden playbook – would discourage the fossil fuels development on private lands in countless ways through administrative and regulatory procedures. The blocking of oil and gas pipelines and other fossil fuel infrastructure would be enabled by activists launching legal suits, as in the recent case of the Dakota Access Pipeline.
The Iran Factor
While hobbling US oil and gas production, a Biden administration will also consider ceasing President Trump’s sanctions on Iran. Given Biden’s loyalty to President Obama’s legacy project to rehabilitate Iran, he would return to the 2015 nuclear deal if Tehran “resumes compliance”. It would be impossible for the OPEC+ production cut agreement to balance global supply and demand were Iranian exports (of over 2.5 million b/d) to resume. The OPEC+ agreement would collapse, along with oil prices from their already low $40/barrel levels. Key OPEC officials are “wary that strains in the OPEC+ alliance could re-emerge with Joe Biden as U.S. President”; indeed, they “would miss President Donald Trump who went from criticising the group to helping bring about a record oil output cut”.
The economic outlook of the Middle East oil and gas producers depends crucially on whether the US ceases to be the world’s leading oil and gas producer (leading to a reprieve from low oil and gas prices) or it drops the sanctions on Iranian exports (leading to even lower oil and gas prices).
Dr. Tilak K. Doshi
Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
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iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--Solar astronomers can now predict future sunspots

Astronomers have learned that the Sun can be studied using sound waves .
( Excerpt ) – The surface of the Sun is a turbulent dance of gravity , plasma , and magnetic fields .
Much like the weather on Earth , its behavior can seem unpredictable , but there are patterns to be found when you look closely .
The first pattern to be observed on the solar surface was that of sunspots .
Sunspots were noticed by a few ancient astronomers , but they have been regularly studied since the 1600s .
As astronomers counted the number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Sun goes through active years and quiet years .
There is an 11-year cycle of high and low sunspot counts .
There are other cycles as well , such as the Gleisberg Cycle , which lasts 80 – 90 years .
These patterns are similar to the tornado seasons of the American Midwest , or the El Niño/La Niña cycles of the Pacific .
These large patterns have a regularity that makes them easy to anticipate .
But while predicting sunspot cycles is relatively easy , predicting the appearance of an individual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenges with sunspot prediction is that we can ’ t put sensors directly on the Sun ’ s surface .
Measuring the magnetic fields that create sunspots is difficult .
But astronomers have learned that the Sun can be studied using sound waves , and this technique is starting to let them predict individual sunspots .
To realize just how big a sunspot really can be , the above image shows a sunspot compared to Earth .
Thanks to Jay Park for this link The post Solar astronomers can now predict future sunspots @ @ @ @ @ @ @

Astronomers have learned that the Sun can be studied using sound waves.
(Excerpt) – The surface of the Sun is a turbulent dance of gravity, plasma, and magnetic fields. Much like the weather on Earth, its behavior can seem unpredictable, but there are patterns to be found when you look closely.
The first pattern to be observed on the solar surface was that of sunspots. Sunspots were noticed by a few ancient astronomers, but they have been regularly studied since the 1600s. As astronomers counted the number of spots seen each year, they found the Sun goes through active years and quiet years. There is an 11-year cycle of high and low sunspot counts. There are other cycles as well, such as the Gleisberg Cycle, which lasts 80 – 90 years.
These patterns are similar to the tornado seasons of the American Midwest, or the El Niño/La Niña cycles of the Pacific. These large patterns have a regularity that makes them easy to anticipate. But while predicting sunspot cycles is relatively easy, predicting the appearance of an individual sunspot is not.
One of the challenges with sunspot prediction is that we can’t put sensors directly on the Sun’s surface. Measuring the magnetic fields that create sunspots is difficult. But astronomers have learned that the Sun can be studied using sound waves, and this technique is starting to let them predict individual sunspots.
[end excerpt]
To realize just how big a sunspot really can be, the above image shows a sunspot compared to Earth.
https://www.universetoday.com/148925/solar-astronomers-can-now-predict-future-sunspots-there-should-be-a-big-one-in-a-couple-of-days/
Thanks to Jay Park for this link
The post Solar astronomers can now predict future sunspots appeared first on Ice Age Now.
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November 30, 2020 at 04:44PM


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-11-30--Record snowfall in Denver

Record snowfall in Denver

Denver International Airport tallied 5 inches of snow .
This is a record daily snowfall for Nov. 24 , breaking @ @ @ @ @ inches set in 1946 .
However , even more notably , it was the first @ @ @ @ @ fall in the city since 1994 ( meaning that it was the first time in @ @ @ @ @ broken the snowfall record for any day in the entire month of November ) .
@ @ @ @ @ been record-breaking , it is rare for any sort of snowstorm to hit the Denver @ @ @ @ @ rarity lies within the heavy and wet nature of the snow .
The post Record @ @ @ @ @ on Ice Age Now .

Breaks old record set in 1946.
Denver International Airport tallied 5 inches of snow. This is a record daily snowfall for Nov. 24, breaking the old record of 4 inches set in 1946.
However, even more notably, it was the first daily November snow record to fall in the city since 1994 (meaning that it was the first time in 26 years that Denver had broken the snowfall record for any day in the entire month of November).
Even if it had not been record-breaking, it is rare for any sort of snowstorm to hit the Denver area in November. Another rarity lies within the heavy and wet nature of the snow.
The post Record snowfall in Denver appeared first on Ice Age Now.
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November 30, 2020 at 04:30PM