iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--Ayn Rand, Energy, and Enron: Five Questions

This post reproduces a short q & a with The Atlas Society on how the worldview of Ayn Rand and Objectivism influenced me personally and as a scholar interested in energy , history , and political economy , and public policy .
[ For more information , see “ The Fall of Ken Lay : An Interview with Former Enron Insider Robert Bradley Jr. ” ( April 1 , 2006 ) and “ Political Capitalism : Warnings and Reality ” ( February 4 , 2013 ) Tell us who you are ?
What ’ s the couple of sentence summary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve done ?
I am a classical-liberal intellectual , or at least a student of classical liberalism .
I specialize in energy history and public policy .
That has led me to business/government cronyism .
And that had led to trying to understand contra-capitalism as it applies to organizational failure .
2 ) When did you first become familiar with Ayn Rand and her works ?
Ayn Rand ’ s The Fountainhead was on my summer reading list in high school .
I was not into reading at the time and picked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I got hooked on page 1 , practically from “ Howard Roark laughed.
” I remember exactly where I was at the time !
3 ) What most interested you or hit you with an “ Ah hah !
” about her thinking ?
The first time was reading The Fountainhead and thinking how it spoke to me in a ‘ second hander ’ world regarding a lot of my fellow students at school .
The second time ( and I had left Objectivism for some years ) was realizing that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I worked for 16 years—was right out of an Ayn Rand novel .
And the real tragedy there was philosophical , with Ken Lay being a second hander and Enron trying to invent its own reality .
4 ) How does her work help or inform you today ?
The philosophy of Objectivism has helped me to ‘ understand the world , ’ not unlike what the Austrian School of economics ( realistic economics ) has done on another level .
Objectivism completes , or at least is an important element of , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us to aspire to a world as it can be and should be .
Can you tell us something optimistic you see in the world today or in the future ?
Rand and Objectivism remain decades ahead of where society and culture are today .
It is a slow process , sometimes , to expand the realm of reason and shrink the realm of faith .
In my area of energy , for example , the foe is a postmodernist philosophy where the dominant thinking is that if we all believe that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there it is a problem .
And if we can all believe renewable energy is the solution , it is .
But climate and energy reality are quite different .
Hence the recent attempt to criminalize what the other side claims is ‘ climate denial.
’ But to be optimistic , some of us Objectivists/classical liberals must see our work as a placeholder in the present to be ‘ discovered ’ or ‘ mainstreamed ’ in the future .
And so the Atlas Summit is a way to remind ourselves that our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even heroic , and to enjoy truth and beauty for its own sake .
—————————— [ Hear Rob Bradley speak at the Atlas Summit , July 11-13 , 2016 , in Las Vegas , Nevada ! ]

This post reproduces a short q&a with The Atlas Society on how the worldview of Ayn Rand and Objectivism influenced me personally and as a scholar interested in energy, history, and political economy, and public policy. [For more information, see “The Fall of Ken Lay: An Interview with Former Enron Insider Robert Bradley Jr.” (April 1, 2006) and “Political Capitalism: Warnings and Reality” (February 4, 2013)
Tell us who you are? What’s the couple of sentence summary of what you do and what you’ve done?
I am a classical-liberal intellectual, or at least a student of classical liberalism.
I specialize in energy history and public policy. That has led me to business/government cronyism. And that had led to trying to understand contra-capitalism as it applies to organizational failure.
2) When did you first become familiar with Ayn Rand and her works?
Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead was on my summer reading list in high school. I was not into reading at the time and picked up this fat book one June evening. I got hooked on page 1, practically from “Howard Roark laughed.” I remember exactly where I was at the time!
3) What most interested you or hit you with an “Ah hah!” about her thinking?
The first time was reading The Fountainhead and thinking how it spoke to me in a ‘second hander’ world regarding a lot of my fellow students at school.
The second time (and I had left Objectivism for some years) was realizing that the artificial boom/decisive bust of Enron—the company where I worked for 16 years—was right out of an Ayn Rand novel. And the real tragedy there was philosophical, with Ken Lay being a second hander and Enron trying to invent its own reality.
4) How does her work help or inform you today?
The philosophy of Objectivism has helped me to ‘understand the world,’ not unlike what the Austrian School of economics (realistic economics) has done on another level. Objectivism completes, or at least is an important element of, classical liberalism.
5) Rand wanted us to aspire to a world as it can be and should be. Can you tell us something optimistic you see in the world today or in the future?
Rand and Objectivism remain decades ahead of where society and culture are today. It is a slow process, sometimes, to expand the realm of reason and shrink the realm of faith.
In my area of energy, for example, the foe is a postmodernist philosophy where the dominant thinking is that if we all believe that the human influence on climate is a problem, there it is a problem. And if we can all believe renewable energy is the solution, it is. But climate and energy reality are quite different. Hence the recent attempt to criminalize what the other side claims is ‘climate denial.’
But to be optimistic, some of us Objectivists/classical liberals must see our work as a placeholder in the present to be ‘discovered’ or ‘mainstreamed’ in the future. And so the Atlas Summit is a way to remind ourselves that our work is good and worthy, maybe even heroic, and to enjoy truth and beauty for its own sake.
——————————
[Hear Rob Bradley speak at the Atlas Summit, July 11-13, 2016, in Las Vegas, Nevada!]


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--Starry-Eyed Dreams v Economic Reality: Why The Wind Industry’s Numbers Can Never Stack Up

Take away the massive subsidies , guaranteed fixed price contracts , soft loans , mandated targets , etc and the wind industry would disappear in a heartbeat .
Those matters , all the product of meddling governments , are the only reason we are having this discussion , at all .
After 30 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies – redirected from unwitting power consumers and/or taxpayers – the wind industry still doesn ’ t make sense .
In terms of the wind industry ’ s ‘ economics ’ , it ’ s still very much a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reality .
Professor Gordon Hughes , School of Economics , University of Edinburgh has been sifting through the wind industry ’ s numbers for nearly as long as the great wind power fraud has been on foot .
Recently , Professor Hughes launched two new reports for the REF Renewable Energy Foundation : Wind Power Costs in the United Kingdom – and The Performance of Wind Power in Denmark Here is the thrust of both studies .
It is difficult to make predictions , especially about the future .
[ Attributed variously to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) and Sam Goldwyn ( movie mogul ) ] The theme of my talk is the disparity between predictions about the future costs and performance of wind power ( especially offshore wind ) – the Rhetoric – and the actual evidence that is available on what it costs to build and operate wind farms and the amount of power they produce over their lifetime – the Reality .
As background , I was co-author of one of the first studies of climate change produced by an international organization in 1992 .
I have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to climate change .
My academic field is applied statistics and economics , but much of my work has been on the interface between economics and engineering .
I have worked on energy and infrastructure policies for more than three decades .
For example I was responsible for developing a set of international environmental standards for power plants while I was at the World Bank .
In the UK and most of Europe , both policymakers and investors have adopted the rhetoric around renewables as the basis for very costly transformations of our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of low or zero carbon emissions .
In doing so , they have accepted the claims of dramatic improvements in costs and performance made by wind operators for new projects now and in the future .
Unfortunately , the propensity of both governments and companies to understate the costs and overstate the performance of new projects has a history that is long and inglorious .
The ongoing record of HS2 – and , indeed , the whole history of railways in the UK – should be sufficient warning not to believe the rhetoric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is crucial for proponents of renewable technologies across a wide range .
This is that costs – or specifically capex costs – will decline as installed capacity grows due to what are called economies of scale and learning .
The issue then is how rapid the decline , usually measured as the % reduction for each doubling in capacity , is likely to be .
There is no doubt that such a decline in unit costs has occurred in specific cases – notably the manufacture of aircraft , the production of solar PV @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as FGD for power plants .
However , the pattern is far from universal – the unit costs of nuclear , coal and LNG plants have tended to increase rather than decline .
It is much more plausible for manufactured capital goods than for large projects involving complicated sites and civil works .
In the case of offshore wind , the parallel experience of offshore oil & gas is not encouraging .
The reality of what will happen to the costs of key renewable energy and other low carbon technologies is critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for meeting its Net Zero target at an affordable cost rests on the core assumption that the costs of wind power have fallen – and will continue to fall .
There is , however , a major problem with all of the projections produced by official agencies , academics and other organisations .
Put bluntly , they are the product of wishful thinking applied to notional projects in the future with little or no connection to commercial reality .
Hence , in my work I have adopted a completely different approach .
My @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by companies in their accounts over the last two decades .
This is possible because the standard commercial arrangement is that solar , wind and other projects are operated via legal entities known as Special Purpose Vehicles whose accounts are usually audited and are filed with Companies House .
I have collected data for more than 350 SPVs responsible for wind projects that have filed accounts since 2005 .
The dataset is unique and provides the basis for a detailed analysis of the actual costs of wind power .
Figure 1 shows the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the early 2000s when the modern technology using turbines with a capacity of 2+ MW became standard for utility scale projects of 10+ MW .
There are large variations in unit capex costs across sites but overall the dashed line shows that there has been a significant increase in the average capex cost per MW as the amount of installed capacity has increased .
Onshore wind generation has been a mature technology for at least 15 years .
Global installed capacity was about 58 GW in 2005 and reached 540 GW in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MW in the UK have been rising for 15 years , there is no reason to believe that the trend will abruptly change .
Figure 2 shows the equivalent data for UK offshore wind projects .
In this case the average capex costs include the cost of the offshore transmission system , since this is an essential element of any project .
There are two points to note .
First , offshore wind is a pan-European industry with the major operators having projects spread over North-West Europe .
Hence , I have used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capacity variable .
Second , the outlier with a very high capex cost per MW is the Hywind floating turbine project .
Capex costs for floating turbines are typically 50 % to 100 % more expensive than for turbines fixed to the sea bed .
Offshore wind is less mature with global capacity of 3 GW in 2010 reaching 24 GW in 2018 .
The trend line shows that , leaving out the Hywind project , actual offshore capex costs for UK projects have increased by 15 % for each doubling in European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ results but over time with markers that indicate the typical water depth for each wind farm .
Statistical analysis confirms that one factor contributing to the increase in costs over time has been the need to use deeper water sites as offshore capacity has grown .
This is a more powerful influence than distance from the coast .
Underlying costs are likely to continue to increase because the number of suitable offshore sites with shallow or medium depths is limited .
As for offshore oil & gas the costs of building and operating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sites in hostile marine environments will inevitably be higher than for the initial set of shallow water projects .
But there is worse to come .
Figure 4 and 5 shows the evolution of average opex costs for typical onshore and offshore projects .
The graphs are based on analyses of large samples spread over 15 years which allow for turbine size , water depth , OFTO status and other factors .
In each graph the blue line shows the costs for a project commissioned in 2008 .
Note that opex cost is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at 2018 prices .
The reason is that the expected load factor for new projects has increased over time .
The grey line shows the costs for a project commissioned in 2018 .
For the offshore wind farms the 2008 project is assumed to be in shallow water with no OFTO while the 2018 project is in deep water with an OFTO .
The operating costs allow for OFTO charges in the latter case .
For both onshore and offshore wind the base level opex cost has shifted up significantly over time and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I will focus on offshore wind because this is central to the whole Net Zero strategy .
Converting offshore opex costs to £ per MWh using an expected load factor of 35 % for the 2008 project and 50 % for the 2018 project we get initial opex costs of £17 per MWh for the 2008 project and £44 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project .
By age 12 the opex cost for the 2008 shallow water project will be £30 per MWh and it will be £82 per MWh for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wind-weighted average market price of power in 2019-20 was £35 per MWh .
This means that at market prices – i.e .
without subsidies – offshore wind from deep water projects can not even cover operating expenses at age 1 , let alone earn an adequate return on capital .
In the case of offshore wind the initial average opex cost of £44 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project , which is typical of the future for the sector , exceeds the average revenue per MWh in 2019-20 at market prices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opex cost of £82 per MWh for this project after 12 years of service either equals or exceeds the guaranteed strike for all offshore projects awarded contracts from Allocation Round 2 ( 2017 ) onwards .
These results for capex and opex costs run completely counter to the wishful thinking put out by BEIS .
The opex estimates , in particular , prompt the question of why costs are so high and have been increasing over time .
To investigate this issue I have examined detailed data on the performance of 6,400 turbines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ update of my previous work published in 2012 using satellite data that allows me to control more reliably for variations in wind conditions .
The first part of the study examines equipment failures and major breakdowns .
Figure 6 shows the failure curves by turbine category focusing on the time to the first equipment failure .
The results are similar if alternative failure indicators are used .
The conclusions are that ( i ) offshore turbines are less reliable than onshore turbines , and ( ii ) the older small ( < 1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reliable than the 2+ MW turbines that dominate wind farms constructed since 2005 .
Nearly 60 % of offshore turbines will experience an equipment failure in their first 5 years of operation .
The reliability of 2+ MW onshore turbines deteriorates over time , so that the risk of failure increases sharply once they have been operating for more than 10 years .
Finally , there are strong locational differences within Denmark with the expected number of months affected by equipment failure over a 20-year operating life increasing from 8 months in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the east .
The reason seems to be a combination of site choice and wind turbulence caused by wind flows over land for the prevailing westerly winds .
Figure 6 : Denmark turbines : failure curve for time to first equipment failure The second part of the Danish study looks at the evolution of the average load factors for onshore and offshore turbines with age after allowing for variations in the distribution of wind speeds and other factors .
One major conclusion is that the 2+ MW turbines that were introduced in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the period from 2002 to 2010 .
This is very obvious when such turbines are compared with the smaller turbines of less than 1 MW installed up to 2000 .
In Denmark – and probably in the UK – the new generation of 2+ MW turbines experienced major teething problems for 5 to 8 years after they were introduced on a large scale .
That is an important warning about the effects of generational shifts in turbine technology .
The third major conclusion is that the average load factor for onshore turbines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as turbines age , while the average load factor for offshore turbines declines at about 4.5 % per year .
This means that an onshore wind turbine installed in a location where its load factor , standardised for wind conditions , at age 1 should be 35 % can be expected to achieve a standardised load factor of 25 % at age 12 years .
For an offshore wind turbine the decline might be from a standardised load factor of 55 % at age 1 to one of only 33 % at age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the analysis of the performance of Danish turbines is combined with the actual opex costs for UK wind farms .
Once the decline in load factor with age is taken into account , the average opex per MWh for an onshore wind farm installed in 2018 rises from £24 per MWh at age 1 to £42 per MWh at age 12 .
The equivalent figures for an offshore wind farm are £41 per MWh at age 1 and £125 per MWh at age 12 .
The increases in opex costs have a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of wind farms .
If wind farms do not receive offtake prices that are higher than the market price – or very much higher in the case of offshore wind – their expected revenues will not cover opex costs after 12 or 15 years .
Operators will either cease production or drastically cut operating costs leading to closure within a relatively short period .
There is no way out of this trap because opex costs are linked to reliability ; the decline in reliability with age means that high opex costs must be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that the assumption made by BEIS and many investors that the expected operating life of new wind farms will be 25 or 30 years is completely at odds with the underlying economic reality .
Few modern wind turbines operate for more than 20 years and many offshore wind turbines are likely to be decommissioned before they reach an age of 20 years .
Pulling these threads together I have examined the overall economic prospects for some specific projects and for offshore wind in general , focusing on the separate perspectives of investors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ study I have carried out a detailed risk analysis of the Kriegers Flak offshore wind farm being built by Vattenfall .
This has all of elements of a financial disaster .
It is unclear whether Vattenfall – a state-owned Swedish company underwritten by Swedish electricity consumers – understands what it is doing .
Implicitly it has placed a huge speculative bet on the market price of power in Germany in the period from 2033 onwards , after the expiry of the initial power purchase agreement ( PPA ) .
The breakeven price for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transmission charges whereas the actual PPA price is €50 per MWh .
To recover its initial losses and offset the expected decline in the average load factor the market price in Germany would have to be roughly 6 times in real terms the average price over the last 12 months – equivalent to about €130 per MWh at 2018 prices .
This is far higher than current plans for increasing carbon taxes would imply .
It is standard practice for offshore wind operators to refinance completed projects , in part by bringing in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or groups of pension funds .
This allows the operator to recoup some of its investment , thus realising part of its expected profit or limiting its potential losses .
However , investors might be well-advised to steer well clear of Kriegers Flak .
The fundamental problem is that the gross cash flow is likely to be consumed by debt service for the initial 12 to 15 years .
Any cash extracted by Vattenfall will merely increase the risk borne by the passive investors .
The story is similar for offshore wind projects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ awarded in 2017 or 2019 .
Figure 7 shows a simplified version of the cash flows for the Triton Knoll wind farm based on its CfD contract using alternative performance scenarios .
The blue solid line shows gross revenue for a constant load factor of 50 % over its lifetime , while the green solid lines shows gross revenue for a load factor of 55 % at age 1 with a performance decline of 2 % per year thereafter .
This decline is much lower than the actual experience in Denmark .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while the mauve dashed line is the sum of opex and a finance charge for a real WACC of 4 % with an asset life of 15 years .
The economic life would be 15 years with the constant load factor and only 12 years for the declining load factor .
Operating profit – gross revenue minus opex – is less than the finance charge in every year under both revenue scenarios .
The project is clearly a dud for both lenders and investors if we base projections for revenues and costs on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have is the usual bromide “ this time things will be different ” – a variant of Samuel Johnson ’ s triumph of hope over experience .
Figure 8 shows average strike prices and my estimates of breakeven prices for the CfD contracts in different allocation rounds together with the assumption necessary to achieve the breakeven prices .
For onshore wind the average AR1 strike price is very close to the breakeven prices in the 2018 cost and performance scenario .
For offshore wind the Investment Contract strike price of £161 was slightly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of £152 per MWh .
For projects in operation the CfD prices are reasonably close to breakeven prices and no-one should lose a lot of money .
• ( a ) Model A : the breakeven price of £114 / MWh assumes a constant load factor of 58 % with other parameters based on actual values • ( b ) Model B : the breakeven price of £68 / MWh assumes a constant load factor of 60 % plus operating costs for shallow water projects completed in 2008-2009 However , for Allocation Rounds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make very ambitious assumptions about costs and performance to match the average CfD strike prices .
In AR1 the average CfD strike price was £112 per MWh .
For a breakeven cost at that level projects would require a constant load factor of 58 % over 15 years if costs are similar to the 2018-19 actual costs .
No offshore project , even with 8-10 MW turbines , has got close to achieving that performance .
In AR2 the average CfD strike price was £65 per MWh .
To get the breakeven price @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assume a constant load factor of 60 % and operating costs equivalent to those for shallow water projects completed in 2008-09 .
This is pure fantasy !
There is a larger issue behind the story of individual project risks .
This concerns the stability of the financial sector .
In the UK and several other European countries governments , central banks and financial regulators have actively promoted green finance .
They argue that banks , money managers and pension funds should increase their lending to and investment in wind farms and similar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responsibility .
However , if many such projects are very risky – as is clearly the case – this pressure is a betrayal of their fundamental duty to protect the stability of the financial system .
It is no different from urging financial institutions to finance speculative property developments at the beginning of a property crash .
The likely response is that general advice does not override the obligation of lenders and investors to identify good and bad projects .
That position highlights the central problem .
There are no good offshore wind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ higher market prices .
Government policy is based on assumptions that can be shown to be wrong with any reasonable amount of due diligence .
Financial institutions that do their job properly are likely to be condemned for failing to support the shift to green energy .
Most of them will prefer not to look too hard and to go along with the short term pressure .
This is an old and disreputable story with only one outcome , so everyone should face up to what will happen .
Financial institutions will do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party .
In roughly a decade the likelihood of large future losses will become all too obvious and asset write-downs will jeopardise both loan security and investment returns .
Governments will blame financial institutions for irresponsible behaviour .
They will bail out all parties via a large increase in market prices .
Apart from a few people who get fired – no doubt with ample compensation – the ultimate patsy in all of this will be electricity customers .
So far I have focused on the costs and performance of wind power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economic value of the output produced from wind farms .
It is well known that both wind and solar power give rise to significant system costs that are paid by customers in general .
To economists these are known as negative externalities and , just as for CO2 and other pollution , their cost should be covered by the producer .
That is the standard case for a carbon tax .
If we follow that logic , wind and solar generators should be required to pay a charge equal to the marginal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ output .
In a forthcoming study I have estimated the marginal cost of balancing supply and demand in the UK which covers some but not all of these system costs .
The marginal balancing cost is closely related to the level of wind output , varying from £11 per MWh at the 5th percentile to £31 per MWh at the 95th percentile .
Figure 9 shows the effect of allowing for this element of system costs on the cumulative distribution of the net values of wind and solar output in 2019-20 .
Net @ @ @ @ @ @ @ value of the power minus the extra system costs incurred in handling wind or solar output .
The solid black line is the cumulative distribution of market prices , while the dashed blue line shows the cumulative distribution of the net values of wind output .
There is a large difference between the two : 50 % of all wind output in the year had a net value of less than £13 per MWh and 20 % of all output had a negative net value , i.e .
it made everyone worse off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shows that the breakeven cost of producing wind output with a net value of less than £13 per MWh is between £91 and £152 per MWh .
Figure 9 : Effect of system costs on the net value of wind and solar generation In stark terms a significant portion of wind output is expensive to produce and of no value in terms of its contribution to national wellbeing .
Other than sheer ignorance there is no excuse for policymakers tolerating , let alone promoting , this outcome .
I will conclude with some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Stop pretending !
The projections of the costs of achieving Net Zero put out by government bodies and many others rely on cost estimates that are just wishful thinking .
They have no basis in actual experience and a realistic appraisal of trends in costs .
As a very broad brush calculation the cost of meeting the Net Zero target by 2050 is much more likely to be 10+ % of annual GDP than the claimed 1-2 % of GDP .
• Accelerating arbitrary targets is very expensive .
If the Government persists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of extra offshore wind capacity by 2030 the costs discussed here are likely to be significant under-estimates .
This will be reinforced by the adoption of similar targets elsewhere in NW Europe .
The offshore wind sector does not have the capacity to build new projects at a rate of 3 to 4 times the last decade .
Any familiarity with the history of offshore oil & gas and other energy projects tells us that the consequence will be a gold rush .
It is plausible to assume that capex and opex costs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ % and probably closer to 50 % above the already high costs that we observe in the audited accounts .
• Bailouts of wind farms and financial institutions are inevitable .
The Government is creating a situation in which it will have no option other than to bail out failed and failing projects simply to ensure continuity of electricity supply .
There will be a game of pass the parcel over how the losses will be distributed but ultimately they will fall largely on taxpayers and energy customers .
Any business investor outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the basis that electricity prices in 2030 will be 3-4 times in real terms what they are today .
• Remember that not everyone has the same priorities .
The UK and the EU are very minor bit players in what happens about climate change .
The outcome will depend on choices made in China , the US and India .
Focusing on China and India , they are only interested in options that are consistent with both economic growth and other environmental goals .
Offshore wind is expensive and of limited interest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a rich country , the UK can afford Net Zero by 2050 at the aggregate level .
However , it will mean allocating the proceeds of 10 or 15 years of economic growth to that single goal .
Past experience shows that the UK ’ s political system can not handle the structural and redistributive consequences of following that path .
A strategy that acknowledges the real economic costs and difficulties of trying to make the transition too quickly is much more likely to be accepted and implemented .

Take away the massive subsidies, guaranteed fixed price contracts, soft loans, mandated targets, etc and the wind industry would disappear in a heartbeat. Those matters, all the product of meddling governments, are the only reason we are having this discussion, at all.
After 30 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies – redirected from unwitting power consumers and/or taxpayers – the wind industry still doesn’t make sense. In terms of the wind industry’s ‘economics’, it’s still very much a case of the dreams never equating with reality.
Professor Gordon Hughes, School of Economics, University of Edinburgh has been sifting through the wind industry’s numbers for nearly as long as the great wind power fraud has been on foot. Recently, Professor Hughes launched two new reports for the REF Renewable Energy Foundation:
Wind Power Costs in the United Kingdom – and
The Performance of Wind Power in Denmark
Here is the thrust of both studies.
Wind Power Economics – Rhetoric and Reality
Renewable Energy Foundation
Professor Gordon Hughes
3 November 2020
It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future. [Attributed variously to Niels Bohr (Nobel Prize in Physics) and Sam Goldwyn (movie mogul)]
The theme of my talk is the disparity between predictions about the future costs and performance of wind power (especially offshore wind) – the Rhetoric – and the actual evidence that is available on what it costs to build and operate wind farms and the amount of power they produce over their lifetime – the Reality.
As background, I was co-author of one of the first studies of climate change produced by an international organization in 1992. I have written or co-written several studies of adaptation to climate change. My academic field is applied statistics and economics, but much of my work has been on the interface between economics and engineering. I have worked on energy and infrastructure policies for more than three decades. For example I was responsible for developing a set of international environmental standards for power plants while I was at the World Bank.
In the UK and most of Europe, both policymakers and investors have adopted the rhetoric around renewables as the basis for very costly transformations of our economy and society to meet the goal of low or zero carbon emissions. In doing so, they have accepted the claims of dramatic improvements in costs and performance made by wind operators for new projects now and in the future. Unfortunately, the propensity of both governments and companies to understate the costs and overstate the performance of new projects has a history that is long and inglorious. The ongoing record of HS2 – and, indeed, the whole history of railways in the UK – should be sufficient warning not to believe the rhetoric.
There is a core idea that is crucial for proponents of renewable technologies across a wide range. This is that costs – or specifically capex costs – will decline as installed capacity grows due to what are called economies of scale and learning. The issue then is how rapid the decline, usually measured as the % reduction for each doubling in capacity, is likely to be. There is no doubt that such a decline in unit costs has occurred in specific cases – notably the manufacture of aircraft, the production of solar PV modules and the cost of environmental controls such as FGD for power plants. However, the pattern is far from universal – the unit costs of nuclear, coal and LNG plants have tended to increase rather than decline. It is much more plausible for manufactured capital goods than for large projects involving complicated sites and civil works. In the case of offshore wind, the parallel experience of offshore oil & gas is not encouraging.
The reality of what will happen to the costs of key renewable energy and other low carbon technologies is critical. The UK Government’s strategy for meeting its Net Zero target at an affordable cost rests on the core assumption that the costs of wind power have fallen – and will continue to fall. There is, however, a major problem with all of the projections produced by official agencies, academics and other organisations. Put bluntly, they are the product of wishful thinking applied to notional projects in the future with little or no connection to commercial reality.
Hence, in my work I have adopted a completely different approach. My starting point is the actual data reported by companies in their accounts over the last two decades. This is possible because the standard commercial arrangement is that solar, wind and other projects are operated via legal entities known as Special Purpose Vehicles whose accounts are usually audited and are filed with Companies House. I have collected data for more than 350 SPVs responsible for wind projects that have filed accounts since 2005. The dataset is unique and provides the basis for a detailed analysis of the actual costs of wind power.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of capex costs for onshore wind since the early 2000s when the modern technology using turbines with a capacity of 2+ MW became standard for utility scale projects of 10+ MW. There are large variations in unit capex costs across sites but overall the dashed line shows that there has been a significant increase in the average capex cost per MW as the amount of installed capacity has increased. Onshore wind generation has been a mature technology for at least 15 years. Global installed capacity was about 58 GW in 2005 and reached 540 GW in 2018. If actual capex costs per MW in the UK have been rising for 15 years, there is no reason to believe that the trend will abruptly change.
Figure 1 : UK onshore wind : actual capex cost versus installed capacity
Figure 2 shows the equivalent data for UK offshore wind projects. In this case the average capex costs include the cost of the offshore transmission system, since this is an essential element of any project. There are two points to note. First, offshore wind is a pan-European industry with the major operators having projects spread over North-West Europe. Hence, I have used installed offshore capacity in Europe as my capacity variable. Second, the outlier with a very high capex cost per MW is the Hywind floating turbine project. Capex costs for floating turbines are typically 50% to 100% more expensive than for turbines fixed to the sea bed.
Figure 2 : UK offshore wind : actual capex cost versus installed capacity in Europe
Offshore wind is less mature with global capacity of 3 GW in 2010 reaching 24 GW in 2018. The trend line shows that, leaving out the Hywind project, actual offshore capex costs for UK projects have increased by 15% for each doubling in European capacity. Figure 3 shows the same results but over time with markers that indicate the typical water depth for each wind farm. Statistical analysis confirms that one factor contributing to the increase in costs over time has been the need to use deeper water sites as offshore capacity has grown. This is a more powerful influence than distance from the coast. Underlying costs are likely to continue to increase because the number of suitable offshore sites with shallow or medium depths is limited. As for offshore oil & gas the costs of building and operating offshore wind farms located at deep water sites in hostile marine environments will inevitably be higher than for the initial set of shallow water projects.
Figure 3 : UK offshore wind : actual capex cost by depth and year
But there is worse to come. Figure 4 and 5 shows the evolution of average opex costs for typical onshore and offshore projects. The graphs are based on analyses of large samples spread over 15 years which allow for turbine size, water depth, OFTO status and other factors. In each graph the blue line shows the costs for a project commissioned in 2008. Note that opex cost is reported in £000s per MW per year at 2018 prices. The reason is that the expected load factor for new projects has increased over time. The grey line shows the costs for a project commissioned in 2018. For the offshore wind farms the 2008 project is assumed to be in shallow water with no OFTO while the 2018 project is in deep water with an OFTO. The operating costs allow for OFTO charges in the latter case.
Figure 4 UK onshore wind: average opex costs vs year of service
Figure 5 UK offshore wind: average opex costs vs year of service
For both onshore and offshore wind the base level opex cost has shifted up significantly over time and costs increase with year of service. I will focus on offshore wind because this is central to the whole Net Zero strategy. Converting offshore opex costs to £ per MWh using an expected load factor of 35% for the 2008 project and 50% for the 2018 project we get initial opex costs of £17 per MWh for the 2008 project and £44 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project. By age 12 the opex cost for the 2008 shallow water project will be £30 per MWh and it will be £82 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project. The wind-weighted average market price of power in 2019-20 was £35 per MWh. This means that at market prices – i.e. without subsidies – offshore wind from deep water projects cannot even cover operating expenses at age 1, let alone earn an adequate return on capital.
In the case of offshore wind the initial average opex cost of £44 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project, which is typical of the future for the sector, exceeds the average revenue per MWh in 2019-20 at market prices weighted by wind output. The average opex cost of £82 per MWh for this project after 12 years of service either equals or exceeds the guaranteed strike for all offshore projects awarded contracts from Allocation Round 2 (2017) onwards.
These results for capex and opex costs run completely counter to the wishful thinking put out by BEIS. The opex estimates, in particular, prompt the question of why costs are so high and have been increasing over time. To investigate this issue I have examined detailed data on the performance of 6,400 turbines in Denmark. This is a substantial update of my previous work published in 2012 using satellite data that allows me to control more reliably for variations in wind conditions.
The first part of the study examines equipment failures and major breakdowns. Figure 6 shows the failure curves by turbine category focusing on the time to the first equipment failure. The results are similar if alternative failure indicators are used. The conclusions are that (i) offshore turbines are less reliable than onshore turbines, and (ii) the older small (< 1 MW) onshore turbines were much more reliable than the 2+ MW turbines that dominate wind farms constructed since 2005. Nearly 60% of offshore turbines will experience an equipment failure in their first 5 years of operation. The reliability of 2+ MW onshore turbines deteriorates over time, so that the risk of failure increases sharply once they have been operating for more than 10 years. Finally, there are strong locational differences within Denmark with the expected number of months affected by equipment failure over a 20-year operating life increasing from 8 months in the west of the country to 15 months in the east. The reason seems to be a combination of site choice and wind turbulence caused by wind flows over land for the prevailing westerly winds.
Figure 6 : Denmark turbines: failure curve for time to first equipment failure
The second part of the Danish study looks at the evolution of the average load factors for onshore and offshore turbines with age after allowing for variations in the distribution of wind speeds and other factors. One major conclusion is that the 2+ MW turbines that were introduced in the early 2000s experienced major performance problems in the period from 2002 to 2010. This is very obvious when such turbines are compared with the smaller turbines of less than 1 MW installed up to 2000. In Denmark – and probably in the UK – the new generation of 2+ MW turbines experienced major teething problems for 5 to 8 years after they were introduced on a large scale. That is an important warning about the effects of generational shifts in turbine technology.
The third major conclusion is that the average load factor for onshore turbines declines at about 3% per year as turbines age, while the average load factor for offshore turbines declines at about 4.5% per year. This means that an onshore wind turbine installed in a location where its load factor, standardised for wind conditions, at age 1 should be 35% can be expected to achieve a standardised load factor of 25% at age 12 years. For an offshore wind turbine the decline might be from a standardised load factor of 55% at age 1 to one of only 33% at age 12.
There is an important corollary when the analysis of the performance of Danish turbines is combined with the actual opex costs for UK wind farms. Once the decline in load factor with age is taken into account, the average opex per MWh for an onshore wind farm installed in 2018 rises from £24 per MWh at age 1 to £42 per MWh at age 12. The equivalent figures for an offshore wind farm are £41 per MWh at age 1 and £125 per MWh at age 12. The increases in opex costs have a drastic impact on the expected economic life of wind farms.
If wind farms do not receive offtake prices that are higher than the market price – or very much higher in the case of offshore wind – their expected revenues will not cover opex costs after 12 or 15 years. Operators will either cease production or drastically cut operating costs leading to closure within a relatively short period. There is no way out of this trap because opex costs are linked to reliability; the decline in reliability with age means that high opex costs must be incurred to maintain production. The consequence is that the assumption made by BEIS and many investors that the expected operating life of new wind farms will be 25 or 30 years is completely at odds with the underlying economic reality. Few modern wind turbines operate for more than 20 years and many offshore wind turbines are likely to be decommissioned before they reach an age of 20 years.
Pulling these threads together I have examined the overall economic prospects for some specific projects and for offshore wind in general, focusing on the separate perspectives of investors and policy makers.
In the Danish study I have carried out a detailed risk analysis of the Kriegers Flak offshore wind farm being built by Vattenfall. This has all of elements of a financial disaster. It is unclear whether Vattenfall – a state-owned Swedish company underwritten by Swedish electricity consumers – understands what it is doing. Implicitly it has placed a huge speculative bet on the market price of power in Germany in the period from 2033 onwards, after the expiry of the initial power purchase agreement (PPA).
The breakeven price for the PPA is €75-85 per MWh excluding transmission charges whereas the actual PPA price is €50 per MWh. To recover its initial losses and offset the expected decline in the average load factor the market price in Germany would have to be roughly 6 times in real terms the average price over the last 12 months – equivalent to about €130 per MWh at 2018 prices. This is far higher than current plans for increasing carbon taxes would imply.
It is standard practice for offshore wind operators to refinance completed projects, in part by bringing in passive investors such as an infrastructure funds or groups of pension funds. This allows the operator to recoup some of its investment, thus realising part of its expected profit or limiting its potential losses. However, investors might be well-advised to steer well clear of Kriegers Flak. The fundamental problem is that the gross cash flow is likely to be consumed by debt service for the initial 12 to 15 years. Any cash extracted by Vattenfall will merely increase the risk borne by the passive investors.
The story is similar for offshore wind projects in the UK supported by CfD contracts awarded in 2017 or 2019. Figure 7 shows a simplified version of the cash flows for the Triton Knoll wind farm based on its CfD contract using alternative performance scenarios. The blue solid line shows gross revenue for a constant load factor of 50% over its lifetime, while the green solid lines shows gross revenue for a load factor of 55% at age 1 with a performance decline of 2% per year thereafter. This decline is much lower than the actual experience in Denmark. The red dashed line is total opex, while the mauve dashed line is the sum of opex and a finance charge for a real WACC of 4% with an asset life of 15 years. The economic life would be 15 years with the constant load factor and only 12 years for the declining load factor. Operating profit – gross revenue minus opex – is less than the finance charge in every year under both revenue scenarios. The project is clearly a dud for both lenders and investors if we base projections for revenues and costs on actual experience. So, what we have is the usual bromide “this time things will be different” – a variant of Samuel Johnson’s triumph of hope over experience.
Figure 7 : Prospective cash flows for Triton Knoll project
Figure 8 shows average strike prices and my estimates of breakeven prices for the CfD contracts in different allocation rounds together with the assumption necessary to achieve the breakeven prices. For onshore wind the average AR1 strike price is very close to the breakeven prices in the 2018 cost and performance scenario. For offshore wind the Investment Contract strike price of £161 was slightly more generous than the 2018 breakeven price of £152 per MWh. For projects in operation the CfD prices are reasonably close to breakeven prices and no-one should lose a lot of money.
Figure 8 : Breakeven prices for CfD projects
CfD Allocation Round Average CfD Strike Price (£/MWh) Breakeven Prices Built 2008-09 (£/MWh) Built 2018-19 (£/MWh) In Progress (£/MWh) Onshore Wind (actual costs) Allocation Round 1 £92 £92 £91 Offshore Wind (actual costs) Investment Contract £161 £125 £152 Offshore Wind (Model A)a Allocation Round 1 £112 £114 Offshore Wind (Model B)b Allocation Round 2 £65 £68
(a) Model A: the breakeven price of £114 / MWh assumes a constant load factor of 58% with other parameters based on actual values
(b) Model B: the breakeven price of £68 / MWh assumes a constant load factor of 60% plus operating costs for shallow water projects completed in 2008-2009
However, for Allocation Rounds AR1 and AR2 it is necessary to make very ambitious assumptions about costs and performance to match the average CfD strike prices. In AR1 the average CfD strike price was £112 per MWh. For a breakeven cost at that level projects would require a constant load factor of 58% over 15 years if costs are similar to the 2018-19 actual costs. No offshore project, even with 8-10 MW turbines, has got close to achieving that performance. In AR2 the average CfD strike price was £65 per MWh. To get the breakeven price down to that level it is necessary to assume a constant load factor of 60% and operating costs equivalent to those for shallow water projects completed in 2008-09. This is pure fantasy!
There is a larger issue behind the story of individual project risks. This concerns the stability of the financial sector. In the UK and several other European countries governments, central banks and financial regulators have actively promoted green finance. They argue that banks, money managers and pension funds should increase their lending to and investment in wind farms and similar projects as part of their wider social responsibility. However, if many such projects are very risky – as is clearly the case – this pressure is a betrayal of their fundamental duty to protect the stability of the financial system. It is no different from urging financial institutions to finance speculative property developments at the beginning of a property crash.
The likely response is that general advice does not override the obligation of lenders and investors to identify good and bad projects. That position highlights the central problem. There are no good offshore wind projects without either huge subsidies or much higher market prices. Government policy is based on assumptions that can be shown to be wrong with any reasonable amount of due diligence. Financial institutions that do their job properly are likely to be condemned for failing to support the shift to green energy. Most of them will prefer not to look too hard and to go along with the short term pressure.
This is an old and disreputable story with only one outcome, so everyone should face up to what will happen. Financial institutions will do as they are told and join the party. In roughly a decade the likelihood of large future losses will become all too obvious and asset write-downs will jeopardise both loan security and investment returns. Governments will blame financial institutions for irresponsible behaviour. They will bail out all parties via a large increase in market prices. Apart from a few people who get fired – no doubt with ample compensation – the ultimate patsy in all of this will be electricity customers.
So far I have focused on the costs and performance of wind power. There is an equally important issue concerning the economic value of the output produced from wind farms. It is well known that both wind and solar power give rise to significant system costs that are paid by customers in general. To economists these are known as negative externalities and, just as for CO2 and other pollution, their cost should be covered by the producer. That is the standard case for a carbon tax. If we follow that logic, wind and solar generators should be required to pay a charge equal to the marginal system costs of additional wind or solar output.
In a forthcoming study I have estimated the marginal cost of balancing supply and demand in the UK which covers some but not all of these system costs. The marginal balancing cost is closely related to the level of wind output, varying from £11 per MWh at the 5th percentile to £31 per MWh at the 95th percentile. Figure 9 shows the effect of allowing for this element of system costs on the cumulative distribution of the net values of wind and solar output in 2019-20. Net value in this context means the market value of the power minus the extra system costs incurred in handling wind or solar output. The solid black line is the cumulative distribution of market prices, while the dashed blue line shows the cumulative distribution of the net values of wind output. There is a large difference between the two: 50% of all wind output in the year had a net value of less than £13 per MWh and 20% of all output had a negative net value, i.e. it made everyone worse off. To be clear, Figure 9 shows that the breakeven cost of producing wind output with a net value of less than £13 per MWh is between £91 and £152 per MWh.
Figure 9 : Effect of system costs on the net value of wind and solar generation
In stark terms a significant portion of wind output is expensive to produce and of no value in terms of its contribution to national wellbeing. Other than sheer ignorance there is no excuse for policymakers tolerating, let alone promoting, this outcome.
I will conclude with some general lessons from the study:
Stop pretending! The projections of the costs of achieving Net Zero put out by government bodies and many others rely on cost estimates that are just wishful thinking. They have no basis in actual experience and a realistic appraisal of trends in costs. As a very broad brush calculation the cost of meeting the Net Zero target by 2050 is much more likely to be 10+% of annual GDP than the claimed 1-2% of GDP. Accelerating arbitrary targets is very expensive. If the Government persists with the goal of building 30 GW of extra offshore wind capacity by 2030 the costs discussed here are likely to be significant under-estimates. This will be reinforced by the adoption of similar targets elsewhere in NW Europe. The offshore wind sector does not have the capacity to build new projects at a rate of 3 to 4 times the last decade. Any familiarity with the history of offshore oil & gas and other energy projects tells us that the consequence will be a gold rush. It is plausible to assume that capex and opex costs will rise by a minimum of 20% and probably closer to 50% above the already high costs that we observe in the audited accounts. Bailouts of wind farms and financial institutions are inevitable. The Government is creating a situation in which it will have no option other than to bail out failed and failing projects simply to ensure continuity of electricity supply. There will be a game of pass the parcel over how the losses will be distributed but ultimately they will fall largely on taxpayers and energy customers. Any business investor outside the renewable energy sector should plan on the basis that electricity prices in 2030 will be 3-4 times in real terms what they are today. Remember that not everyone has the same priorities. The UK and the EU are very minor bit players in what happens about climate change. The outcome will depend on choices made in China, the US and India. Focusing on China and India, they are only interested in options that are consistent with both economic growth and other environmental goals. Offshore wind is expensive and of limited interest in most of Asia. As a rich country, the UK can afford Net Zero by 2050 at the aggregate level. However, it will mean allocating the proceeds of 10 or 15 years of economic growth to that single goal. Past experience shows that the UK’s political system cannot handle the structural and redistributive consequences of following that path. A strategy that acknowledges the real economic costs and difficulties of trying to make the transition too quickly is much more likely to be accepted and implemented.
Attachments:
Download this file (Gordon Hughes – REF Wind Economics webinar.pdf)Gordon Hughes REF webinar text 4 Nov 2020
Renewable Energy Foundation


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--Mitochondrial Changes Key to Health Problems in Space

Living in space isn ’ t easy .
There are notable impacts on the biology of living things in the harsh environment of space .
A team of scientists has now identified a possible underlying driver of these impacts : the powerhouse of the cell , called mitochondria , experiences changes in activity during spaceflight .
Recently published in the journal Cell , these results used data collected over decades of experimental research on the International Space Station , including samples from 59 astronauts .
Studies such as these are critical to understanding the effects of low gravity , radiation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NASA sends astronauts deep into space for extended missions to the Moon , Mars , and beyond .
“ We ’ ve found a universal mechanism that explains the kinds of changes we see to the body in space , and in a place we didn ’ t expect , ” said Afshin Beheshti the lead author on the paper and a researcher with KBR , which provides contract support to NASA ’ s Ames Research Center in California ’ s Silicon Valley .
“ Everything gets thrown out of whack and it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ research also made use of a comprehensive database of animal studies collected on the GeneLab platform at Ames , as well as the NASA twin study comparing identical twins Mark and Scott Kelly over the course of a year .
The GeneLab platform is the first of its kind to capture large amounts of space biology “ omics ” data that can be used to characterize and quantify biological molecules – such as DNA , RNA , and proteins – and their systematic effects on the structures and functions of organisms .
GeneLab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scientists from all over the world to collaborate on the study and get the most out of the data housed on the open-source platform .
Mitochondria are tiny structures within cells that produce energy for the basic units of biology that make up our bodies .
When that energy production breaks down , many of the body ’ s key organs and its immune system can be put in jeopardy .
This new research indicates this breakdown in activity of mitochondria might contribute to health or performance challenges faced by humans in space @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between mitochondria and spaceflight came from research using rodents .
“ When we started comparing the tissues from mice flown on separate space missions , we noticed that mitochondrial dysfunction kept popping up , ” said Beheshti .
“ Whether we were looking at problems in the eyes or in the liver , the same pathways related to mitochondria were the source of the problem.
” NASA ’ s data on humans backed this hypothesis up .
The changes identified in astronaut Scott Kelly ’ s immune system during his year in space @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the changes observed in the activity of his mitochondria as well .
Blood and urine samples from dozens of other astronauts showed further evidence that , in various types of cells , being in space led to altered mitochondrial activity .
“ This is a big step toward figuring out how our bodies can live healthily off-world , ” said Beheshti .
“ And the good news is , this is a problem we can already start to tackle .
We can look at countermeasures and drugs we already use to deal with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they might work in space , to start.
” From issues as wide-ranging as disrupted circadian rhythms to cardiovascular alterations , scientists can now turn to this small but essential structure in cells as a place to continue research and look for solutions .
Mitochondria are indeed the powerhouse of the cell , and may also power the future of space biology research – pointing the way toward discoveries that will help astronauts live safely in orbit and beyond .
Members of the news media interested in covering this topic should reach out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ image : Astronaut Scott Kelly is working with the Microgravity Sciences Glovebox during a Rodent Research session with Bone Densitometer .
Credit : NASA Last Updated : Nov. 30 , 2020 Editor : Frank Tavares

From NASA Ames
Nov. 25, 2020
Living in space isn’t easy. There are notable impacts on the biology of living things in the harsh environment of space. A team of scientists has now identified a possible underlying driver of these impacts: the powerhouse of the cell, called mitochondria, experiences changes in activity during spaceflight.
Recently published in the journal Cell, these results used data collected over decades of experimental research on the International Space Station, including samples from 59 astronauts. Studies such as these are critical to understanding the effects of low gravity, radiation, confined spaces, and more as NASA sends astronauts deep into space for extended missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.
Valery Boyko, lead of NASA GeneLab’s Sample Processing Lab, is setting up automated liquid handling instrument to quantify the amount of sequencing material in a sample.Credits: NASA/Dominic Hart
“We’ve found a universal mechanism that explains the kinds of changes we see to the body in space, and in a place we didn’t expect,” said Afshin Beheshti the lead author on the paper and a researcher with KBR, which provides contract support to NASA’s Ames Research Center in California’s Silicon Valley. “Everything gets thrown out of whack and it all starts with the mitochondria.”
The research also made use of a comprehensive database of animal studies collected on the GeneLab platform at Ames, as well as the NASA twin study comparing identical twins Mark and Scott Kelly over the course of a year. The GeneLab platform is the first of its kind to capture large amounts of space biology “omics” data that can be used to characterize and quantify biological molecules – such as DNA, RNA, and proteins – and their systematic effects on the structures and functions of organisms. GeneLab’s Analysis Working Group drew in scientists from all over the world to collaborate on the study and get the most out of the data housed on the open-source platform.
Mitochondria are tiny structures within cells that produce energy for the basic units of biology that make up our bodies. When that energy production breaks down, many of the body’s key organs and its immune system can be put in jeopardy. This new research indicates this breakdown in activity of mitochondria might contribute to health or performance challenges faced by humans in space.
The first clue about the connection between mitochondria and spaceflight came from research using rodents.
“When we started comparing the tissues from mice flown on separate space missions, we noticed that mitochondrial dysfunction kept popping up,” said Beheshti. “Whether we were looking at problems in the eyes or in the liver, the same pathways related to mitochondria were the source of the problem.”
NASA’s data on humans backed this hypothesis up. The changes identified in astronaut Scott Kelly’s immune system during his year in space starting in 2015 may be explained by the changes observed in the activity of his mitochondria as well. Blood and urine samples from dozens of other astronauts showed further evidence that, in various types of cells, being in space led to altered mitochondrial activity.
“This is a big step toward figuring out how our bodies can live healthily off-world,” said Beheshti. “And the good news is, this is a problem we can already start to tackle. We can look at countermeasures and drugs we already use to deal with mitochondrial disorders on Earth to see how they might work in space, to start.”
From issues as wide-ranging as disrupted circadian rhythms to cardiovascular alterations, scientists can now turn to this small but essential structure in cells as a place to continue research and look for solutions. Mitochondria are indeed the powerhouse of the cell, and may also power the future of space biology research – pointing the way toward discoveries that will help astronauts live safely in orbit and beyond.
For news media:
Members of the news media interested in covering this topic should reach out to the NASA Ames newsroom.
Author: Frank Tavares, NASA’s Ames Research Center
Top image: Astronaut Scott Kelly is working with the Microgravity Sciences Glovebox during a Rodent Research session with Bone Densitometer. Credit: NASA
Last Updated: Nov. 30, 2020
Editor: Frank Tavares
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iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--The Speech every media outlet should play in full: Watch Trump — solemn, careful, determined

This is a historic “ Let ’ s Do This ” moment .
For 45 minutes Trump calmly and methodically presents the evidence of massive corruption and fraud .
Anyone who doesn ’ t see this and relies on the Legacy and Tech Giant filtered propaganda will be blindsided by what ’ s unfolding in the United States .
As Donald Trump says : “ This may be the most important speech I ’ ve ever made….
” As President , I have no higher duty than to defend the laws and the Constitution of the United States .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our election system , which is now under coordinated assault and siege .
We were warned we should not declare a premature victory in this election — it would take weeks… My opponent was told to stay away — to not campaign — “ we ’ ve got it ” , and perhaps they did .
It ’ s about ensuring Americans can have faith in this election and all future elections .
If we are right about the fraud Joe Biden can ’ t be President .
“ The single greatest achievement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you are doing now ”

This is a historic “Let’s Do This” moment. For 45 minutes Trump calmly and methodically presents the evidence of massive corruption and fraud. Anyone who doesn’t see this and relies on the Legacy and Tech Giant filtered propaganda will be blindsided by what’s unfolding in the United States.
As Donald Trump says: “This may be the most important speech I’ve ever made….”
As President, I have no higher duty than to defend the laws and the Constitution of the United States. That is why I am determined to protect our election system, which is now under coordinated assault and siege.
We were warned we should not declare a premature victory in this election — it would take weeks…
My opponent was told to stay away — to not campaign — “we’ve got it”, and perhaps they did.
It’s about ensuring Americans can have faith in this election and all future elections.
If we are right about the fraud Joe Biden can’t be President.
This is a national disgrace.
“The single greatest achievement in your Presidency will be exactly what you are doing now”
Voter […]
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December 2, 2020 at 09:32PM


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--New Paleoclimatology Finding Shows Earth’s Climate Was Typically Warmer than Today

Archaeologists have published a new paper in The Holocene , DOI : 10.1177/0959683620972775 that confirms what previous research has shown : numerous periods during recent history have been as warm as or warmer than the present .
The press release was covered in The New Scientist , “ Climate change has revealed a huge haul of ancient arrows in Norway , ” and discusses the findings of researchers from the Universities of Cambridge , Oslo , and Bergen .
The researchers discovered a “ treasure trove ” of arrows , arrowheads , clothing , and other artifacts , recently uncovered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region of southern Norway .
The oldest arrows and artifacts date from around 4100 BC .
The youngest artifacts date from approximately AD 1300 , at the end of the Medieval Warm Period .
Because present temperatures are only now exposing some of the artifacts were deposited when no ice covered the ground , temperatures were clearly warmer during the many periods when artifacts were deposited .
Along with the arrows and other artifacts , the researchers found nearly 300 specimens of reindeer antler and bone exposed by receding ice .
Because reindeer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say they are confident the area has served as an important hunting ground , off and on , for millennia .
The fact that artifacts were found from several different periods separated by hundreds and thousands of years in time indicates the ice and snow in the region has expanded and receded several times over the current interglacial period .
Elsewhere in Norway , scientists also recently uncovered what they have labeled a “ Viking highway , ” a route the ancient peoples inhabiting the region used to travel regularly .
The route @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by snow and ice that expanded as the region ’ s climate shifted from a relatively warm period , comparable to present temperatures , to a colder period during which “ permanent ” thick snow and ice cover formed .
This erected the equivalent of a “ highway closed ” sign .
More evidence for relative warm periods in recent history has recently been found half a world away in frozen Antarctica , where scientists report they have discovered perfectly preserved , 800-year-old penguin remains exposed by a patch of melting ice along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ published in the peer-reviewed journal Geology , scientists reported discovering what appeared to be the fresh remains of Adelie penguins in a region currently uninhabitable by penguins .
Carbon dating showed the penguin remains were approximately 800 years old , implying the remains had only recently been exposed by thawing ice .
Further analysis of the site showed penguins colonized and abandoned the site multiple times between 800 and 5,000 years ago .
Penguins are currently unable to inhabit the area where the frozen corpse was found because “ fast ice ” ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many miles out into the ocean ) prevents them from accessing the ocean for food .
During the Medieval Warm Period , the absence of fast ice allowed penguins to colonize and nest in the area for hundreds of years .
Numerous other frozen and near-perfectly preserved human and animal corpses have been discovered in Arctic and glacial alpine regions in recent decades as the Earth has modestly warmed .
The most famous of these , perhaps , is the frozen human mummy scientists call Otzi , which hikers discovered in 1991 in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italian Alps .
Analysis of the mummy ’ s clothing , body , stomach contents , and the plants found frozen around it indicate Otzi died , was nearly flash-frozen in place , and then covered over by and ice- and snow-driven glacial expansion more than 5,300 years ago .
This fact suggests the Earth was just as warm , and the snow and ice extent just as low , 5,300 years ago as it is today .
Also , in the December 3 , 2019 edition of Geophysical Research Letters , scientists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Svalbard archipelago jutting into the Arctic Ocean found evidence that from 11,700 through 8,200 years BP , temperatures in the region often exceeded both currently recorded temperatures and those projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to occur even under its worst-case scenarios .
Such ancient warmth existed for hundreds of years at a time .
According to Svalbard evidence , peak warmth occurred approximately 10,000 years before the present , at which time temperatures in the region were estimated to be 7 degrees Celsius warmer than today .
Proxy data from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pollen trapped in peat , fossilized remains , and oral and written historical records all show not only that global temperatures have been as warm as or warmer than today , but also that all of these warm periods have been a boon for life , including the expansion of human communities .
Indeed , history shows these warmer periods contributed to the rise of agricultural societies , human civilizations with large permanent settlements ( which have recently morphed into megalopolises ) , and modern nation-states .

Guest essay by H. Sterling Burnett, originally published on ClimateRealism.com
Archaeologists have published a new paper in The Holocene, DOI: 10.1177/0959683620972775 that confirms what previous research has shown: numerous periods during recent history have been as warm as or warmer than the present.
The press release was covered in The New Scientist, “Climate change has revealed a huge haul of ancient arrows in Norway,” and discusses the findings of researchers from the Universities of Cambridge, Oslo, and Bergen. The researchers discovered a “treasure trove” of arrows, arrowheads, clothing, and other artifacts, recently uncovered by a receding ice in a mountainous region of southern Norway. The oldest arrows and artifacts date from around 4100 BC. The youngest artifacts date from approximately AD 1300, at the end of the Medieval Warm Period. Because present temperatures are only now exposing some of the artifacts were deposited when no ice covered the ground, temperatures were clearly warmer during the many periods when artifacts were deposited.
Along with the arrows and other artifacts, the researchers found nearly 300 specimens of reindeer antler and bone exposed by receding ice. Because reindeer presently frequent the area, the archaeologists say they are confident the area has served as an important hunting ground, off and on, for millennia.
The fact that artifacts were found from several different periods separated by hundreds and thousands of years in time indicates the ice and snow in the region has expanded and receded several times over the current interglacial period.
Elsewhere in Norway, scientists also recently uncovered what they have labeled a “Viking highway,” a route the ancient peoples inhabiting the region used to travel regularly. The route had for approximately 2,000 years been covered by snow and ice that expanded as the region’s climate shifted from a relatively warm period, comparable to present temperatures, to a colder period during which “permanent” thick snow and ice cover formed. This erected the equivalent of a “highway closed” sign.
More evidence for relative warm periods in recent history has recently been found half a world away in frozen Antarctica, where scientists report they have discovered perfectly preserved, 800-year-old penguin remains exposed by a patch of melting ice along the Antarctic coast.
In an article published in the peer-reviewed journal Geology, scientists reported discovering what appeared to be the fresh remains of Adelie penguins in a region currently uninhabitable by penguins. Carbon dating showed the penguin remains were approximately 800 years old, implying the remains had only recently been exposed by thawing ice. Further analysis of the site showed penguins colonized and abandoned the site multiple times between 800 and 5,000 years ago.
Penguins are currently unable to inhabit the area where the frozen corpse was found because “fast ice” (ice that extends from the Antarctic shore many miles out into the ocean) prevents them from accessing the ocean for food. During the Medieval Warm Period, the absence of fast ice allowed penguins to colonize and nest in the area for hundreds of years.
Numerous other frozen and near-perfectly preserved human and animal corpses have been discovered in Arctic and glacial alpine regions in recent decades as the Earth has modestly warmed.
The most famous of these, perhaps, is the frozen human mummy scientists call Otzi, which hikers discovered in 1991 in a then-recently thawed area of the northern Italian Alps. Analysis of the mummy’s clothing, body, stomach contents, and the plants found frozen around it indicate Otzi died, was nearly flash-frozen in place, and then covered over by and ice- and snow-driven glacial expansion more than 5,300 years ago. This fact suggests the Earth was just as warm, and the snow and ice extent just as low, 5,300 years ago as it is today.
Also, in the December 3, 2019 edition of Geophysical Research Letters, scientists examining materials from three lakes on the Svalbard archipelago jutting into the Arctic Ocean found evidence that from 11,700 through 8,200 years BP, temperatures in the region often exceeded both currently recorded temperatures and those projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to occur even under its worst-case scenarios. Such ancient warmth existed for hundreds of years at a time.
According to Svalbard evidence, peak warmth occurred approximately 10,000 years before the present, at which time temperatures in the region were estimated to be 7 degrees Celsius warmer than today.
Proxy data from tree rings, shell middens, and pollen trapped in peat, fossilized remains, and oral and written historical records all show not only that global temperatures have been as warm as or warmer than today, but also that all of these warm periods have been a boon for life, including the expansion of human communities. Indeed, history shows these warmer periods contributed to the rise of agricultural societies, human civilizations with large permanent settlements (which have recently morphed into megalopolises), and modern nation-states.
[Photo courtesy of Wikimedia commons, https://ift.tt/3qqwJjE%5D
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iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--Bicoastal Climate Elites: Rumored Biden EPA Pick Got a 2nd Home Because of…Climate Week

CHRIS HORNER GAO , In The New The Washington Post ran an item , “ Perspective : Biden is building @ @ @ @ @ the people it serves ” .
Author Steven Miller pithily replied , “ Undeniably true @ @ @ @ @ way they intended it.
” Exhibit A : Mary Nichols — the head of California @ @ @ @ @ and rumored top-three pick for a Biden EPA Administrator — apparently was moved to get @ @ @ @ @ own across the country in New York after attending Climate Week in the Big Apple @ @ @ @ @ stone ’ s throw from the Park .
Nice !
Very cool indeed .
For @ @ @ @ @ all of thee yahoos , mind .
One just can ’ t miss Climate Week @ @ @ @ @ grubby Four Seasons .
Expect nothing less from ( Green ) Royalty .
Go Bi-Coastal…for @ @ @ @ @ still for your next four-year lecture on the need for state-imposed privation because climate change @

Climate bureaucrat on the green carpet
Reposted from Government Accountability & Oversight
CHRIS HORNER GAO, In The New
The Washington Post ran an item, “Perspective: Biden is building a team that looks like the people it serves”. Author Steven Miller pithily replied, “Undeniably true headline but certainly not the way they intended it.”
Exhibit A: Mary Nichols — the head of California’s Air Resources Board and rumored top-three pick for a Biden EPA Administrator — apparently was moved to get a second place of her own across the country in New York after attending Climate Week in the Big Apple. Upper West Side, stone’s throw from the Park. Nice!
Very cool indeed. For me, if not for all of thee yahoos, mind. One just can’t miss Climate Week. Or stay in some grubby Four Seasons. Expect nothing less from (Green) Royalty.
Go Bi-Coastal…for the climate! Now sit still for your next four-year lecture on the need for state-imposed privation because climate change.
Hat-tip Energy Policy Advocates.
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iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--Prince Harry: COVID-19 is what we get for messing with ‘Mother Nature’

Inspired by this New York Post report ( Web | PDF ) .
Drawn exclusively for JunkScience.com by Cartoons By @ @

Inspired by this New York Post report (Web | PDF). Drawn exclusively for JunkScience.com by Cartoons By Josh.
via JunkScience.com
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December 3, 2020 at 01:40PM


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--Nov. 2020 Ocean Air Temps Cooling

Nov. 2020 Ocean Air Temps Cooling

With apologies to Paul Revere , this post is on the lookout for cooler weather with an eye on both the Land and the Sea .
UAH has updated their tlt ( temperatures in lower troposphere ) dataset for November 2020 .
Previously I have done posts on their reading of ocean air temps as a prelude to updated records from HADSST3 .
This month also has a separate graph of land air temps because the comparisons and contrasts are interesting as we contemplate possible cooling in coming months and years .
Presently sea surface temperatures ( SST ) are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gained or lost from earth ’ s climate system .
Enthalpy is the thermodynamic term for total heat content in a system , and humidity differences in air parcels affect enthalpy .
Measuring water temperature directly avoids distorted impressions from air measurements .
In addition , ocean covers 71 % of the planet surface and thus dominates surface temperature estimates .
Eventually we will likely have reliable means of recording water temperatures at depth .
Recently , Dr. Ole Humlum reported from his research that air temperatures lag 2-3 months behind changes in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in CO2 atmospheric concentrations lag behind SST by 11-12 months .
This latter point is addressed in a previous post Who to Blame for Rising CO2 ?
HadSST3 results will be posted later this month .
For comparison we can look at lower troposphere temperatures ( TLT ) from UAHv6 which are now posted for November .
The temperature record is derived from microwave sounding units ( MSU ) on board satellites like the one pictured above .
The UAH dataset includes temperature results for air above the oceans , and thus should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There is the additional feature that ocean air temps avoid Urban Heat Islands ( UHI ) .
In 2015 there was a change in UAH processing of satellite drift corrections , including dropping one platform which can no longer be corrected .
The graphs below are taken from the latest and current dataset , Version 6.0 .
The graph above shows monthly anomalies for ocean temps since January 2015 .
After all regions peaked with the El Nino in early 2016 , the ocean air temps dropped back down with all regions showing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Then a warming phase ensued peaking with NH and Tropics spikes in February , and a lesser rise May 2020 .
As was the case in 2015-16 , the warming was driven by the Tropics and NH , with SH lagging behind .
Since the peak in February 2020 , all ocean regions have trended downward in a sawtooth pattern , returning to a flat anomaly in the three Summer months , close to the 0.4C average for the period .
A small rise occurred in September , mostly due to SH .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the storm activity in north Pacific and Atlantic .
Now in November that NH warmth is gone , and the global anomaly declined due also to dropping temps in the Tropics We sometimes overlook that in climate temperature records , while the oceans are measured directly with SSTs , land temps are measured only indirectly .
The land temperature records at surface stations sample air temps at 2 meters above ground .
UAH gives tlt anomalies for air over land separately from ocean air temps .
The graph updated for November 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ noisy evidence of the greater volatility of the Land temperatures , along with extraordinary departures , first by NH land with SH often offsetting .
The overall pattern is similar to the ocean air temps , but obviously driven by NH with its greater amount of land surface .
The Tropics synchronized with NH for the 2016 event , but otherwise follow a contrary rhythm .
SH seems to vary wildly , especially in recent months .
Note the extremely high anomaly November 2019 , cold in March 2020 , and then again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , all land regions converged , erasing the earlier spikes in NH and SH , and showing anomalies comparable to the 0.5C average land anomaly this period .
After a relatively quiet Summer , land air temps rose Globally in September with spikes in both NH and SH .
In October , the SH spike reversed , but November NH land is showing a warm spike , driving down pulling up the Global anomaly slightly .
Next month will show whether NH land will cool off as rapidly as did the NH @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from UAH is a return to the in for the period starting with 1995 .
2019 average rose and caused 2020 to start warmly , but currently lacks any El Nino or NH warm blob to sustain it .
These charts demonstrate that underneath the averages , warming and cooling is diverse and constantly changing , contrary to the notion of a global climate that can be fixed at some favorable temperature .
TLTs include mixing above the oceans and probably some influence from nearby more volatile land temps .
Clearly NH and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a seesaw pattern , NH in July more than 1C lower than the 2016 peak .
TLT measures started the recent cooling later than SSTs from HadSST3 , but are now showing the same pattern .
It seems obvious that despite the three El Ninos , their warming has not persisted , and without them it would probably have cooled since 1995 .
Of course , the future has not yet been written .

With apologies to Paul Revere, this post is on the lookout for cooler weather with an eye on both the Land and the Sea. UAH has updated their tlt (temperatures in lower troposphere) dataset for November 2020. Previously I have done posts on their reading of ocean air temps as a prelude to updated records from HADSST3. This month also has a separate graph of land air temps because the comparisons and contrasts are interesting as we contemplate possible cooling in coming months and years.
Presently sea surface temperatures (SST) are the best available indicator of heat content gained or lost from earth’s climate system. Enthalpy is the thermodynamic term for total heat content in a system, and humidity differences in air parcels affect enthalpy. Measuring water temperature directly avoids distorted impressions from air measurements. In addition, ocean covers 71% of the planet surface and thus dominates surface temperature estimates. Eventually we will likely have reliable means of recording water temperatures at depth.
Recently, Dr. Ole Humlum reported from his research that air temperatures lag 2-3 months behind changes in SST. He also observed that changes in CO2 atmospheric concentrations lag behind SST by 11-12 months. This latter point is addressed in a previous post Who to Blame for Rising CO2?
HadSST3 results will be posted later this month. For comparison we can look at lower troposphere temperatures (TLT) from UAHv6 which are now posted for November. The temperature record is derived from microwave sounding units (MSU) on board satellites like the one pictured above.
The UAH dataset includes temperature results for air above the oceans, and thus should be most comparable to the SSTs. There is the additional feature that ocean air temps avoid Urban Heat Islands (UHI). In 2015 there was a change in UAH processing of satellite drift corrections, including dropping one platform which can no longer be corrected. The graphs below are taken from the latest and current dataset, Version 6.0.
The graph above shows monthly anomalies for ocean temps since January 2015. After all regions peaked with the El Nino in early 2016, the ocean air temps dropped back down with all regions showing the same low anomaly August 2018. Then a warming phase ensued peaking with NH and Tropics spikes in February, and a lesser rise May 2020. As was the case in 2015-16, the warming was driven by the Tropics and NH, with SH lagging behind.
Since the peak in February 2020, all ocean regions have trended downward in a sawtooth pattern, returning to a flat anomaly in the three Summer months, close to the 0.4C average for the period. A small rise occurred in September, mostly due to SH. In October NH spiked, coincidental with all the storm activity in north Pacific and Atlantic. Now in November that NH warmth is gone, and the global anomaly declined due also to dropping temps in the Tropics
Land Air Temperatures Showing Volatility.
We sometimes overlook that in climate temperature records, while the oceans are measured directly with SSTs, land temps are measured only indirectly. The land temperature records at surface stations sample air temps at 2 meters above ground. UAH gives tlt anomalies for air over land separately from ocean air temps. The graph updated for November 2020 is below.
Here we see the noisy evidence of the greater volatility of the Land temperatures, along with extraordinary departures, first by NH land with SH often offsetting. The overall pattern is similar to the ocean air temps, but obviously driven by NH with its greater amount of land surface. The Tropics synchronized with NH for the 2016 event, but otherwise follow a contrary rhythm.
SH seems to vary wildly, especially in recent months. Note the extremely high anomaly November 2019, cold in March 2020, and then again a spike in April. In June 2020, all land regions converged, erasing the earlier spikes in NH and SH, and showing anomalies comparable to the 0.5C average land anomaly this period. After a relatively quiet Summer, land air temps rose Globally in September with spikes in both NH and SH. In October, the SH spike reversed, but November NH land is showing a warm spike, driving down pulling up the Global anomaly slightly. Next month will show whether NH land will cool off as rapidly as did the NH ocean temps.
The longer term picture from UAH is a return to the in for the period starting with 1995. 2019 average rose and caused 2020 to start warmly, but currently lacks any El Nino or NH warm blob to sustain it.
These charts demonstrate that underneath the averages, warming and cooling is diverse and constantly changing, contrary to the notion of a global climate that can be fixed at some favorable temperature.
TLTs include mixing above the oceans and probably some influence from nearby more volatile land temps. Clearly NH and Global land temps have been dropping in a seesaw pattern, NH in July more than 1C lower than the 2016 peak. TLT measures started the recent cooling later than SSTs from HadSST3, but are now showing the same pattern. It seems obvious that despite the three El Ninos, their warming has not persisted, and without them it would probably have cooled since 1995. Of course, the future has not yet been written.
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December 3, 2020 at 01:23PM


iowaclimatescienceeducation--2020-12-03--UN Paris Agreement Architect Blasts Australia’s “Lack of Integrity” on Climate Action

According to former UN climate chief and Paris Agreement architect Christiana Figueres , coal exporting Australia is not acting with integrity when it comes to global efforts to reduce CO2 emissions .
Christiana Figueres who was executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change from 2010 to 2016 , has slammed Australia ’ s “ suicidal ” position on climate action saying it conveys “ a lack of integrity ” .
“ The climate wars that have been going on in Australia for over a decade now are just – honestly they are such a suicidal situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy , ” she said during a recorded session for the Australasian Emissions Reductions Summit , which began online today .
Now the director of the global climate movement Mission 2020 , Figueres said she had never shied from speaking about her frustration with Australia ’ s haphazard stance to a pressing emergency .
“ I ’ ve been pretty vocal about my frustration for so many years of a completely unstable , volatile , unpredictable stand and position on climate change in Australia.
” “ There is no other country that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she added .
Rather than extend itself on Paris Agreement commitments , Morrison has instead suggested that Australia ’ s overachievements on Kyoto Protocol targets could be used as credits– a position Figueres simply branded “ cheating ” .
“ It is just a total lack of integrity and not something that does Australia proud , ” she said .
I agree with Figures about Australia having a two faced position on Climate Change .
The Australian government could end coal exports overnight with a single act of parliament .
But instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carbon intensive industry to continue and grow , or supporting the climate skepticism of President Trump on the international stage , Australian politicians maintain a transparent fiction that they care about climate change , both at home and abroad .
Figures ’ comment that Australia has lots of “ sun potential ” is just plain wrong .
What is missing from Australia is copious quantities of clean fresh water to wash the solar panels or collectors .
The dust which accumulates in Australia has to be seen to be believed .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , thanks to static electric charges which accumulate when the dust is blown by the wind .
Covering even a sizeable fraction of Australia ’ s deserts with solar systems would require cleaning water on a scale which we simply don ’ t have .

Guest essay by Eric Worrall
According to former UN climate chief and Paris Agreement architect Christiana Figueres, coal exporting Australia is not acting with integrity when it comes to global efforts to reduce CO2 emissions.
Christiana Figueres blasts Australia’s “suicidal” position on climate change by Tarla Lambert Christiana Figueres who was executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change from 2010 to 2016, has slammed Australia’s “suicidal” position on climate action saying it conveys “a lack of integrity”. “The climate wars that have been going on in Australia for over a decade now are just – honestly they are such a suicidal situation because Australia… holds such promise with renewable energy,” she said during a recorded session for the Australasian Emissions Reductions Summit, which began online today. Now the director of the global climate movement Mission 2020, Figueres said she had never shied from speaking about her frustration with Australia’s haphazard stance to a pressing emergency. “I’ve been pretty vocal about my frustration for so many years of a completely unstable, volatile, unpredictable stand and position on climate change in Australia.” “There is no other country that has as much sun potential as Australia,” she added. … Rather than extend itself on Paris Agreement commitments, Morrison has instead suggested that Australia’s overachievements on Kyoto Protocol targets could be used as credits– a position Figueres simply branded “cheating” . “It is just a total lack of integrity and not something that does Australia proud,” she said. … Read more: https://womensagenda.com.au/climate/christiana-figueres-blasts-australias-suicidal-position-on-climate-change/
I agree with Figures about Australia having a two faced position on Climate Change.
The Australian government could end coal exports overnight with a single act of parliament. But instead of coming clean about wanting an important carbon intensive industry to continue and grow, or supporting the climate skepticism of President Trump on the international stage, Australian politicians maintain a transparent fiction that they care about climate change, both at home and abroad.
Figures’ comment that Australia has lots of “sun potential” is just plain wrong.
What is missing from Australia is copious quantities of clean fresh water to wash the solar panels or collectors.
The dust which accumulates in Australia has to be seen to be believed. In the dry inland the dust sticks to everything, thanks to static electric charges which accumulate when the dust is blown by the wind. Covering even a sizeable fraction of Australia’s deserts with solar systems would require cleaning water on a scale which we simply don’t have.
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