osce--2020-03-31--Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on info

Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on information as of 31 March 2020

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy , Russian Federation .
The Observer Mission ( OM ) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points ( BCPs ) .
The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week .
The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members , including the Chief Observer ( CO ) .
The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna .
COVID-19 has had an impact on the OM ’ s operations , with measures put in place to ensure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with measures set by the host authorities .
The CO has maintained regular working contacts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the respective local authorities .
The Mission is continuing to keep the situation under review , in close contact with the Secretariat and Chairmanship ; it is capable of continuing to fulfill its mandate under the current circumstances .
Due to the mandatory self-isolation in the Mission ’ s area , the OM ’ s main office has operated with limited capability as of 30 March , but without significant consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reporting activities .
The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows : • Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage ; • Families ( often including elderly persons and/or children ) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage .
The average number of entries/exits decreased from 4,735 to 3,360 per day at both BCPs compared to last week [ 1 ] .
During the reporting period , the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine , with an average @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both BCPs .
The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP .
Responding to the COVID-19 crisis , the host country closed its borders for the majority of foreigners from 18 March to 1 May 2020 .
Among the exceptions , entered into force on 19 March , there are Ukrainian citizens and stateless people having passport or Identification Document with the mark of permanent residence in certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine .
This category of people crossing is significant at both BCPs .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was eight , compared to four last week , four of them crossed into the Russian Federation , and four into Ukraine ( 100 per cent of this category ’ s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP ) .
They continued to cross the border individually or in groups .
Most individuals crossed on foot , however , some made use of private vehicles , buses or minivans , making it more difficult for the observer teams ( OTs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ border , especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows , and buses and minivans had drawn curtains .
The OTs continued to report on families , sometimes with elderly persons and/or children , crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage , or travelling in heavily loaded cars .
During this reporting week , one family was observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five families were observed crossing into Ukraine , compared to the previous reporting period when one family was observed crossing to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine ( mostly from/to the Luhansk region ) and the Russian Federation .
In addition to regular bus connections , the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes .
Often the buses did not state their route ; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “ irregular ” .
During the reporting period , the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs ( 192 compared to 245 observed during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 104 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 88 bound for Ukraine .
On some occasions , the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses , while some buses did not display their route at all .
The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “ LPR ” plates .
During the reporting period , the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compared to 949 during the previous reporting week ) ; 428 at the Gukovo BCP and 451 at the Donetsk BCP , 440 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 439 crossed into Ukraine .
Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region ; however , on a daily basis , the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and trucks with “ LPR ” plates .
The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number of tanker trucks decreased from 63 to 42 .
These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs .
The trucks had the words “ Propane ” and “ Flammable ” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian .
The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs , indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane .
All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials , which could include an X-ray check .
Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unable to observe any X-ray checks .
Compared to the previous week , the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 179 to 142 .
Of the total number of trucks scanned , 126 trucks ( 89 per cent ) were bound for Ukraine : the remaining 16 trucks ( 11 per cent ) crossed into the Russian Federation ) .
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans [ 2 ] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs .
The OTs observed minivans predominantly with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region ; however , the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation .
Compared to the previous week , the number of cargo minivans decreased from 97 to 71 vehicles ; 38 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 33 into Ukraine .
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP .
During the reporting week , the OTs heard trains on 19 occasions ; the OTs assessed that ten trains were travelling to the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ details are provided in the sections “ trends and figures at a glance ” below ) .
Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP .
The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region , or Russian Federation licence plates .
A significant number of vehicles with “ LPR ” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis .
The OTs also observed vehicles with “ DPR ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During the reporting week , the OTs at Donetsk BCP observed ambulances on two separate occasions : On 27 March at 07:30 , an ambulance entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building .
Two paramedics left the vehicle carrying a medical suitcase and entered the main building .
At 07:55 the same day , the vehicle left the BCP for the Russian Federation with the two people on board .
On 31 March at 01:13 , an ambulance arrived at the BCP from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ main building .
At 01:20 , the vehicle drove back to the Russian Federation .
The OT was unable to notice any other details from its position .
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 25 February to 31 March 2020 , please see the attachment here [ 1 ] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation .
[ 2 ] Cargo minivans : light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg ( small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1 ) .

SUMMARY
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.
Update on COVID-19 measures
COVID-19 has had an impact on the OM’s operations, with measures put in place to ensure the safety of its staff and compliance with measures set by the host authorities. The CO has maintained regular working contacts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the respective local authorities. The Mission is continuing to keep the situation under review, in close contact with the Secretariat and Chairmanship; it is capable of continuing to fulfill its mandate under the current circumstances. Due to the mandatory self-isolation in the Mission’s area, the OM’s main office has operated with limited capability as of 30 March, but without significant consequences in the Mission’s observation and reporting activities.
OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS
Persons crossing the border
The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:
Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage; Persons in military-style outfits; Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.
The average number of entries/exits decreased from 4,735 to 3,360 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].
During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of 159 per day for both BCPs. The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.
Responding to the COVID-19 crisis, the host country closed its borders for the majority of foreigners from 18 March to 1 May 2020. Among the exceptions, entered into force on 19 March, there are Ukrainian citizens and stateless people having passport or Identification Document with the mark of permanent residence in certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. This category of people crossing is significant at both BCPs.
Persons in military-style outfits
During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was eight, compared to four last week, four of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and four into Ukraine (100 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.
Families with a significant amount of luggage
The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, one family was observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five families were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when one family was observed crossing to the Russian Federation and two families into Ukraine.
Bus connections
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.
During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (192 compared to 245 observed during the previous week). There were 104 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 88 bound for Ukraine.
On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.
Trucks
During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border at both BCPs (879 compared to 949 during the previous reporting week); 428 at the Gukovo BCP and 451 at the Donetsk BCP, 440 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 439 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and trucks with “LPR” plates.
The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased from 63 to 42. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.
All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.
Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 179 to 142. Of the total number of trucks scanned, 126 trucks (89 per cent) were bound for Ukraine: the remaining 16 trucks (11 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation).
Minivans
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 97 to 71 vehicles; 38 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 33 into Ukraine.
Trains
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 19 occasions; the OTs assessed that ten trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).
Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.
Other observations
The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also observed vehicles with “DPR” plates and vehicles with Georgian licence plates. During the reporting week, the OTs at Donetsk BCP observed ambulances on two separate occasions:
On 27 March at 07:30, an ambulance entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building. Two paramedics left the vehicle carrying a medical suitcase and entered the main building. At 07:55 the same day, the vehicle left the BCP for the Russian Federation with the two people on board.
On 31 March at 01:13, an ambulance arrived at the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked close to the main building. At 01:20, the vehicle drove back to the Russian Federation. The OT was unable to notice any other details from its position.
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 25 February to 31 March 2020, please see the attachment here
[1]Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).


osce--2020-03-31--Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group

MOSCOW / PARIS / WASHINGTON , D.C. , 31 March 2020 - The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs ( Igor Popov @ @ @ @ @ Stéphane Visconti of France , and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America ) @ @ @ @ @ so-called “ general elections ” in Nagorno-Karabakh , the first round of which took place @ @ @ @ @ the context of a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , the Co-Chairs recognize the @ @ @ @ @ Nagorno-Karabakh in deciding its future in accordance with the principles and elements reiterated in the @ @ @ @ @ March 2019 .
The Co-Chairs note , however , that Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized as @ @ @ @ @ by any of the Co-Chair countries or any other country .
Accordingly , the Co-Chairs @ @ @ @ @ of these “ elections ” as affecting the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh and stress that @ @ @ @ @ prejudge the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh or the outcome of the ongoing negotiations to bring @ @ @ @ @ to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict .

MOSCOW / PARIS / WASHINGTON, D.C., 31 March 2020 - The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) have taken note of the so-called “general elections” in Nagorno-Karabakh, the first round of which took place on 31 March.
In the context of a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Co-Chairs recognize the role of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh in deciding its future in accordance with the principles and elements reiterated in the Co-Chairs’ statement of 9 March 2019. The Co-Chairs note, however, that Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized as an independent and sovereign state by any of the Co-Chair countries or any other country.
Accordingly, the Co-Chairs do not accept the results of these “elections” as affecting the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh and stress that the results in no way prejudge the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh or the outcome of the ongoing negotiations to bring a lasting and peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.


osce--2020-03-31--Statement of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions

TIRANA / BRUSSELS / GENEVA , 31 March 2020 - As we mark the date when the 51st round of the Geneva International Discussions ( GID ) was supposed to take place ( 31 March - 1 April 2020 ) , we , the Co-Chairs of the GID ( UN Representative Cihan Sultanoglu , Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus Rudolf Michalka and EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar ) , remain fully engaged to help address the challenges created by the coronavirus pandemic .
While we commend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are working hard to stop the spread of COVID-19 , we appeal to all GID participants to respond to the call by UN Secretary General António Guterres to put aside mistrust and animosity , avoid antagonistic rhetoric , and work together to reach out to the most vulnerable .
In particular , we urge all GID participants to do their utmost to protect vulnerable conflict-affected populations , especially women , men and children in areas facing particular isolation .
These populations need assistance and must not be allowed to suffer even more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approaches that have already taken place , but more needs to be done to ensure that all people , regardless of where they happen to live or what language they may speak , have equal access to health care .
While co-operation across dividing lines , under other circumstances , may be challenging , we appeal to all participants of the GID to set aside differences and ensure that all individuals have the best possible access to testing and treatment .
On behalf of our organizations , we reiterate our readiness to assist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as we , together , address this global threat .

TIRANA / BRUSSELS / GENEVA, 31 March 2020 - As we mark the date when the 51st round of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) was supposed to take place (31 March - 1 April 2020), we, the Co-Chairs of the GID (UN Representative Cihan Sultanoglu, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus Rudolf Michalka and EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar), remain fully engaged to help address the challenges created by the coronavirus pandemic.
While we commend the efforts of health professionals and others who are working hard to stop the spread of COVID-19, we appeal to all GID participants to respond to the call by UN Secretary General António Guterres to put aside mistrust and animosity, avoid antagonistic rhetoric, and work together to reach out to the most vulnerable.
In particular, we urge all GID participants to do their utmost to protect vulnerable conflict-affected populations, especially women, men and children in areas facing particular isolation. These populations need assistance and must not be allowed to suffer even more. We are encouraged by some collaborative approaches that have already taken place, but more needs to be done to ensure that all people, regardless of where they happen to live or what language they may speak, have equal access to health care. While co-operation across dividing lines, under other circumstances, may be challenging, we appeal to all participants of the GID to set aside differences and ensure that all individuals have the best possible access to testing and treatment.
On behalf of our organizations, we reiterate our readiness to assist and are at the disposal of participants as we, together, address this global threat.


osce--2020-03-31--OSCE Media Freedom Representative Désir calls on Ukrainian Government not to cut budget of public se

OSCE Media Freedom Representative Désir calls on Ukrainian Government not to cut budget of public service broadcaster

VIENNA , 31 March 2020 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media , Harlem Désir , called today on the Ukrainian Government not to cut the budget of the public broadcasting company of Ukraine , UA : PBC .
In a draft governmental bill to amend the 2020 national budget in response to the COVID-19 pandemic , a significant portion of the budget of the public service broadcaster would be sequestered , in order to find new funds for counteracting COVID-19 in Ukraine .
The draft , in its latest version , proposed the reduction of state support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hryvnas ( 5.6 million Euro ) , to the amount of 1.5 billion Hryvnas ( 47.6 million Euro ) .
The cuts would also affect the spheres of cinematography , book publishing and other cultural projects .
The draft bill was voted down today by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and returned to parliamentary committees for further discussions .
“ I call on the Ukrainian authorities to urgently explore and find effective solutions to preserve the budget of UA : PBC and the mission of the public service broadcaster , ” Désir said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis , the public service broadcaster has an indispensable role to play in providing reliable information to the population , reporting on the pandemic and combating false information .
This is not the time to risk the economic sustainability of public service media , ” concluded the Representative .
The OSCE Representative recalls his previous interventions on different occasions expressing concern over the financial sustainability as well as the independence and viability of the public service broadcaster UA : PBC , which can be found here : https : //www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/447478 and https : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States .
He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments .
Learn more at www.osce.org/fom , Twitter : @ OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom .

VIENNA, 31 March 2020 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, called today on the Ukrainian Government not to cut the budget of the public broadcasting company of Ukraine, UA:PBC.
In a draft governmental bill to amend the 2020 national budget in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a significant portion of the budget of the public service broadcaster would be sequestered, in order to find new funds for counteracting COVID-19 in Ukraine. The draft, in its latest version, proposed the reduction of state support for UA:PBC by 178 million Hryvnas (5.6 million Euro), to the amount of 1.5 billion Hryvnas (47.6 million Euro). The cuts would also affect the spheres of cinematography, book publishing and other cultural projects. The draft bill was voted down today by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and returned to parliamentary committees for further discussions.
“I call on the Ukrainian authorities to urgently explore and find effective solutions to preserve the budget of UA:PBC and the mission of the public service broadcaster,” Désir said. “In today’s health crisis, the public service broadcaster has an indispensable role to play in providing reliable information to the population, reporting on the pandemic and combating false information. This is not the time to risk the economic sustainability of public service media,” concluded the Representative.
The OSCE Representative recalls his previous interventions on different occasions expressing concern over the financial sustainability as well as the independence and viability of the public service broadcaster UA:PBC, which can be found here: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/447478 and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/410984
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.


osce--2020-03-30--OSCE SMM Spot Report 6/2020: Members of the armed formations continued to deny SMM patrols passage a

OSCE SMM Spot Report 6/2020: Members of the armed formations continued to deny SMM patrols passage at three checkpoints in Donetsk region and two in Luhansk region

On 28 , 29 and 30 March , members of the armed formations again denied attempts of the SMM to travel towards non-government-controlled areas – seven times in Donetsk region , and three times in Luhansk region , along official crossing routes .
On 28 March , at a checkpoint east of Kreminets ( non-government-controlled , 16km south-west of Donetsk ) on road H-15 , four members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol – comprising three vehicles and three members travelling from government-controlled areas – passage towards non-government-controlled areas , citing “ the closure of the checkpoint due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 29 and 30 March at a checkpoint 200m south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge ( 15km north-east of Luhansk ) , members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas , citing “ orders from superiors ” .
On 28 , 29 March and 30 March , at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske ( formerly Oktiabr , non-government-controlled , 85km south of Donetsk ) , members of the armed formations ( some of them visibly armed ) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas , citing “ the closure of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 28 March , “ demining activities in the area ” on 29 March and “ orders from superiors related to COVID-19 ” on 30 March .
On 28 , 29 and 30 March , at a checkpoint near Olenivka ( non-government-controlled , 23km south-west of Donetsk ) , members of the armed formations ( some of them visibly armed ) again denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas , citing “ the closure of the checkpoint ” on 28 March , and providing no reason on the following two days .
In addition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boundary line between Donetsk and Luhansk regions near Debaltseve ( non-government-controlled , 58km north-east of Donetsk ) , four members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol – comprising two vehicles and four members travelling from non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region – passage towards non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region , citing “ new rules concerning virus protocols ” and “ the requirement to provide health certificates ” in order to pass .
The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region on 23 March ( see SMM Spot Reports 2/2020 4/2020 and 5/2020 ) .
They restrict the SMM ’ s freedom of movement across the contact line , thus impeding the implementation of its Mandate throughout the country .

On 28, 29 and 30 March, members of the armed formations again denied attempts of the SMM to travel towards non-government-controlled areas – seven times in Donetsk region, and three times in Luhansk region, along official crossing routes.
On 28 March, at a checkpoint east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) on road H-15, four members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol – comprising three vehicles and three members travelling from government-controlled areas – passage towards non-government-controlled areas, citing “the closure of the checkpoint due to COVID-19”.
On 28, 29 and 30 March at a checkpoint 200m south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, citing “orders from superiors”.
On 28, 29 March and 30 March, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), members of the armed formations (some of them visibly armed) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, citing “the closure of the checkpoint due to COVID-19” on 28 March, “demining activities in the area” on 29 March and “orders from superiors related to COVID-19” on 30 March.
On 28, 29 and 30 March, at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations (some of them visibly armed) again denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, citing “the closure of the checkpoint” on 28 March, and providing no reason on the following two days.
In addition, on 30 March, at the boundary line between Donetsk and Luhansk regions near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), four members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol – comprising two vehicles and four members travelling from non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region – passage towards non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, citing “new rules concerning virus protocols” and “the requirement to provide health certificates” in order to pass.
The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March and Luhansk region on 23 March (see SMM Spot Reports 2/2020 4/2020 and 5/2020 ). They restrict the SMM’s freedom of movement across the contact line, thus impeding the implementation of its Mandate throughout the country.


osce--2020-03-30--Сoronavirus response bill should not curb freedom of information in Romania, stresses OSCE Media Fre

Сoronavirus response bill should not curb freedom of information in Romania, stresses OSCE Media Freedom Representative

VIENNA , 30 March 2020 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media , Harlem Désir , expressed his concerns today about the provisions of the Romanian coronavirus response decree that grants the government special powers to curb freedom of information in the country .
On 16 March 2020 , the Romanian President Klaus Iohannis signed an emergency decree that included provisions to counter the spread of disinformation related to COVID-19 online and allowed for the removal of reports and entire websites , without providing appeal or redress mechanisms .
“ I share the preoccupation of the Romanian authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ related to the health crisis , ” the Representative said .
“ However , at the same time , I want to recall the importance of ensuring the free flow of information , which is a key component for providing the public with information on the vital measures needed to contain the virus , as well as the respect for the right of the media to report on the pandemic and governmental policies .
These provisions of the emergency decree , as they stand today , pose a risk of undue restriction to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for media actors trying to inform the public , and could even be counterproductive .
The media and independent journalists have an important role to play in the fight against disinformation , especially online , and should not be unduly restrained in their reporting on the pandemic.
” The National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications ( ANCOM ) , an institution for communication infrastructure established under the Romanian Parliament , with no previous expertise in dealing with such content issues , was made responsible for implementing the removal of content through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implement the relevant recommendations coming from the Strategic Communication Group , a task force at the Ministry of Internal Affairs charged with managing the pandemic .
The task force is to provide , on a daily basis , all COVID-19 related data at the national level .
A separate decision provided for an extension of the time allowed to the authorities to respond to freedom of information requests from 30 to 60 days , which could further impede media access to information about the pandemic .
The Representative noted similar concerns of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society organizations , as well as the European Federation of Journalists in this regard .
“ There is a great risk that the new regulation will not so much penalize the disseminators of harmful disinformation , but will make independent journalism more difficult .
I therefore urge the Romanian authorities to restore the capacity of journalists to act in the public interest , without undue restriction , ” said Désir .
“ I call for the respect of media freedom in the context of the current crisis , and for the authorities to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in any decision related to the emergency situation.
” The Representative recalled the joint statement that he published last week with David Kaye , UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression , and Edison Lanza , IACHR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression , which emphasized that : “ Human health depends not only on readily accessible health care .
It also depends on access to accurate information about the nature of the threats and the means to protect oneself , one ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community ” .
The Representative and the two Special Rapporteurs also stated that : “ The right of access to information means that governments must be making exceptional efforts to protect the work of journalists .
Journalism serves a crucial function at a moment of public health emergency , particularly when it aims to inform the public of critical information and monitors government actions.
” The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States .
He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with OSCE media freedom commitments .
Learn more at www.osce.org/fom , Twitter : @ OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom .

VIENNA, 30 March 2020 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concerns today about the provisions of the Romanian coronavirus response decree that grants the government special powers to curb freedom of information in the country.
On 16 March 2020, the Romanian President Klaus Iohannis signed an emergency decree that included provisions to counter the spread of disinformation related to COVID-19 online and allowed for the removal of reports and entire websites, without providing appeal or redress mechanisms.
“I share the preoccupation of the Romanian authorities to combat the dissemination of false information related to the health crisis,” the Representative said. “However, at the same time, I want to recall the importance of ensuring the free flow of information, which is a key component for providing the public with information on the vital measures needed to contain the virus, as well as the respect for the right of the media to report on the pandemic and governmental policies. These provisions of the emergency decree, as they stand today, pose a risk of undue restriction to the work of journalists, of self-censorship for media actors trying to inform the public, and could even be counterproductive. The media and independent journalists have an important role to play in the fight against disinformation, especially online, and should not be unduly restrained in their reporting on the pandemic.”
The National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM), an institution for communication infrastructure established under the Romanian Parliament, with no previous expertise in dealing with such content issues, was made responsible for implementing the removal of content through hosting service providers.
ANCOM has to implement the relevant recommendations coming from the Strategic Communication Group, a task force at the Ministry of Internal Affairs charged with managing the pandemic. The task force is to provide, on a daily basis, all COVID-19 related data at the national level. A separate decision provided for an extension of the time allowed to the authorities to respond to freedom of information requests from 30 to 60 days, which could further impede media access to information about the pandemic.
The Representative noted similar concerns of the national union of journalists, other civil society organizations, as well as the European Federation of Journalists in this regard.
“There is a great risk that the new regulation will not so much penalize the disseminators of harmful disinformation, but will make independent journalism more difficult. I therefore urge the Romanian authorities to restore the capacity of journalists to act in the public interest, without undue restriction,” said Désir. “I call for the respect of media freedom in the context of the current crisis, and for the authorities to respect the principles of necessity and proportionality in any decision related to the emergency situation.”
The Representative recalled the joint statement that he published last week with David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and Edison Lanza, IACHR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, which emphasized that: “Human health depends not only on readily accessible health care. It also depends on access to accurate information about the nature of the threats and the means to protect oneself, one’s family, and one’s community”. The Representative and the two Special Rapporteurs also stated that: “The right of access to information means that governments must be making exceptional efforts to protect the work of journalists. Journalism serves a crucial function at a moment of public health emergency, particularly when it aims to inform the public of critical information and monitors government actions.”
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.


osce--2020-04-15--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 89/2020 issued on 15 April 2020

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osce--2020-04-15--OSCE SMM Spot Report 13/2020: Members of the armed formations continued to deny SMM patrols passage

OSCE SMM Spot Report 13/2020: Members of the armed formations continued to deny SMM patrols passage at checkpoints in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions

On 14 and 15 April , members of the armed formations again denied SMM attempts to cross along official crossing routes : twice in Luhansk region and once in Donetsk region , while a further attempt to cross into non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region was unsuccessful due to an obstruction .
On the afternoon of 14 April , at a checkpoint near Horlivka ( non-government-controlled , 39km north-east of Donetsk ) , an SMM patrol travelling from government-controlled areas was unable to proceed into non-government-controlled areas due to spikes laid across the entire road , and the presence of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road .
No members of the armed formations were observed by the SMM .
On 14 and 15 April , at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge ( 15km north-east of Luhansk ) , members of the armed formations denied SMM patrols passage into government-controlled areas on one occasion and passage into non-government-controlled areas on another occasion , referring to quarantine restrictions due to COVID-19 .
On the afternoon of 15 April , at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske ( formerly Oktiabr , non-government-controlled , 85km @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the armed formations denied an SMM patrol , travelling from government-controlled areas , passage into non-government-controlled areas , referring to quarantine restrictions due to COVID-19 .
The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March , and Luhansk region on 23 March ( see SMM Spot Reports 2/2020 , 3/2020 , 4/2020 , 5/2020 , 6/2020 , 7/2020 , 8/2020 , 9/2020 , 10/2020 , 11/2020 ) .
They restrict the SMM ’ s freedom of movement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the implementation of its Mandate throughout the country .
With regard to COVID-19 , the SMM has introduced a number of stringent mitigation measures into its operational procedures .
These include strict adherence to social distancing rules both internally and with external interlocutors , daily temperature checks , use of PPE , and minimizing the number of personnel in vehicles .

On 14 and 15 April, members of the armed formations again denied SMM attempts to cross along official crossing routes: twice in Luhansk region and once in Donetsk region, while a further attempt to cross into non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region was unsuccessful due to an obstruction.
On the afternoon of 14 April, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM patrol travelling from government-controlled areas was unable to proceed into non-government-controlled areas due to spikes laid across the entire road, and the presence of a mine sign in the middle of the road. No members of the armed formations were observed by the SMM.
On 14 and 15 April, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), members of the armed formations denied SMM patrols passage into government-controlled areas on one occasion and passage into non-government-controlled areas on another occasion, referring to quarantine restrictions due to COVID-19.
On the afternoon of 15 April, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol, travelling from government-controlled areas, passage into non-government-controlled areas, referring to quarantine restrictions due to COVID-19.
The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March, and Luhansk region on 23 March (see SMM Spot Reports 2/2020, 3/2020, 4/2020, 5/2020, 6/2020, 7/2020, 8/2020, 9/2020, 10/2020, 11/2020). They restrict the SMM’s freedom of movement across the contact line, thus impeding the implementation of its Mandate throughout the country.
***
With regard to COVID-19, the SMM has introduced a number of stringent mitigation measures into its operational procedures. These include strict adherence to social distancing rules both internally and with external interlocutors, daily temperature checks, use of PPE, and minimizing the number of personnel in vehicles.


osce--2020-04-15--COVID-19 response in Bulgaria should not curb media freedom, says OSCE Representative on Freedom of

COVID-19 response in Bulgaria should not curb media freedom, says OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media

VIENNA , 15 April 2020 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media , Harlem Désir , expressed his concerns today about Bulgaria ’ s draft legislation that would criminalize the spread of `` internet misinformation '' .
Punishment includes fines of up to 1,000 euros and even imprisonment of up to three years .
After the President of Bulgaria , Rumen Radev , partially vetoed a state of emergency law in March , a new bill with amendments to the Radio and Television Act and the Criminal Code was presented to the National Assembly .
These amendments would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s broadcasting regulator with the power to suspend websites for distributing “ internet misinformation ” .
Unlike the first law , which would have only targeted “ fake news ” related to the pandemic , the new bill would criminalize all forms of false information disseminated on the internet .
No criteria are defined as to what constitutes misinformation .
“ I fully share the need to fight the dissemination of false information related to the pandemic , but it is paramount to ensure that media freedom is respected and that journalists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , without undue restrictions , ” said Désir .
“ Measures aimed at combating disinformation should be necessary , proportionate and in line with international standards .
I welcome the fact that the President of Bulgaria vetoed the initially proposed legal restrictions on the work of journalists .
Unfortunately , the new draft amendments , as they have been proposed , pose a risk of undue restriction on media freedom , the work of journalists , and the free flow of information , both in the context of the current pandemic and thereafter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to play in providing information on vital health measures to the public and in combating false information on the pandemic .
The fight against ‘ fake news ’ and misinformation should be based on the role of free media , access to information , the promotion of fact-checking initiatives , and media literacy.
” He recalled the joint statement that he published together with David Kaye , UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression , and Edison Lanza , the Inter-American Commission for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Expression , which emphasized that : “ Human health depends not only on readily accessible health care .
It also depends on access to accurate information about the nature of the threats and the means to protect oneself , one ’ s family , and one ’ s community ” .
The Representative and the two Special Rapporteurs also stated that : “ The right of access to information means that governments must be making exceptional efforts to protect the work of journalists .
Journalism serves a crucial function at a moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it aims to inform the public of critical information and monitors government actions.
” The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States .
He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments .
Learn more at www.osce.org/fom , Twitter : @ OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom .

VIENNA, 15 April 2020 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concerns today about Bulgaria’s draft legislation that would criminalize the spread of "internet misinformation". Punishment includes fines of up to 1,000 euros and even imprisonment of up to three years.
After the President of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev, partially vetoed a state of emergency law in March, a new bill with amendments to the Radio and Television Act and the Criminal Code was presented to the National Assembly. These amendments would, if adopted, vest the country’s broadcasting regulator with the power to suspend websites for distributing “internet misinformation”. Unlike the first law, which would have only targeted “fake news” related to the pandemic, the new bill would criminalize all forms of false information disseminated on the internet. No criteria are defined as to what constitutes misinformation.
“I fully share the need to fight the dissemination of false information related to the pandemic, but it is paramount to ensure that media freedom is respected and that journalists are free to report on the pandemic, without undue restrictions,” said Désir. “Measures aimed at combating disinformation should be necessary, proportionate and in line with international standards. I welcome the fact that the President of Bulgaria vetoed the initially proposed legal restrictions on the work of journalists. Unfortunately, the new draft amendments, as they have been proposed, pose a risk of undue restriction on media freedom, the work of journalists, and the free flow of information, both in the context of the current pandemic and thereafter. The media have an important role to play in providing information on vital health measures to the public and in combating false information on the pandemic. The fight against ‘fake news’ and misinformation should be based on the role of free media, access to information, the promotion of fact-checking initiatives, and media literacy.”
He recalled the joint statement that he published together with David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and Edison Lanza, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, which emphasized that: “Human health depends not only on readily accessible health care. It also depends on access to accurate information about the nature of the threats and the means to protect oneself, one’s family, and one’s community”. The Representative and the two Special Rapporteurs also stated that: “The right of access to information means that governments must be making exceptional efforts to protect the work of journalists. Journalism serves a crucial function at a moment of public health emergency, particularly when it aims to inform the public of critical information and monitors government actions.”
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.


osce--2020-04-15--Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on info

Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on information as of 14 April 2020

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy , Russian Federation .
The Observer Mission ( OM ) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points ( BCPs ) .
The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week .
The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members , including the Chief Observer ( CO ) .
The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna .
Activities have been impacted by COVID-19 and measures undertaken by the OM to ensure the safety and duty of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with measures set by the host country authorities .
The Mission is continuing to keep the situation under review , in close contact with the OSCE Secretariat and Chairmanship and it is capable of continuing to fulfill its mandate under the current circumstances .
Due to the mandatory self-isolation and social distancing in the Mission ’ s area , the OM ’ s main office has operated with limited capacity as of 30 March , but without significant consequences in the Mission ’ s observation and reporting activities .
The profile of persons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follows : • Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage ; • Families ( often including elderly persons and/or children ) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage .
The average number of entries/exits decreased from 1,111 to 846 per day at both BCPs compared to last week [ 1 ] .
During the reporting period , the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine , with an average net flow of 220 per day for both BCPs .
The Donetsk BCP continued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gukovo BCP .
Responding to the COVID-19 situation , the host country has closed its borders for the majority of foreigners from 18 March to 1 May .
Among the exceptions of persons allowed to cross the border ( which entered into force on 19 March ) , are Ukrainian citizens and stateless persons holding passports or identification documents proving permanent residence in certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine .
This category of people crossing is significant at both BCPs .
In addition , reportedly , due to the threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from 10 April , the organized passenger transport commuting between the non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region of Ukraine and the Russian Federation was suspended .
During the reporting period , the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was five , compared to nine last week , no crossings of this category was observed into the Russian Federation , while five were observed crossing into Ukraine ( 40 per cent of this category ’ s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP ) .
They continued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups .
Most individuals crossed on foot , however , some made use of private vehicles , buses or minivans , making it more difficult for the observer teams ( OTs ) to observe their movement across the border , especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows , and buses and minivans had drawn curtains .
The OTs continued to report on families , sometimes with elderly persons and/or children , crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage , or travelling in heavily loaded cars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation while four families were observed crossing into Ukraine , compared to the previous reporting period when also no families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and three families crossed into Ukraine .
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine ( mostly from/to the Luhansk region ) and the Russian Federation until 10 April .
In addition to regular bus connections , the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes .
Often the buses did not state their route @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the windshield stating “ irregular ” .
During the reporting period , and especially due to the above-mentioned restrictions from 10 April , the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs ( 51 compared to 64 observed during the previous week ) .
There were 26 buses bound for the Russian Federation and the remaining 25 bound for Ukraine .
On some occasions , the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses , while some buses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “ LPR ” plates .
During the reporting period , the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border at both BCPs ( 734 compared to 825 during the previous reporting week ) ; 378 at the Gukovo BCP and 356 at the Donetsk BCP , 392 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 342 crossed into Ukraine .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region ; however , on a daily basis , the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and trucks with “ LPR ” plates .
The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions .
During the reporting week , the number of tanker trucks increased from 45 to 56 .
These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs .
The trucks had the words “ Propane ” and “ Flammable ” written across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs , indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane .
All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials , which could include an X-ray check .
Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP , the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks .
Compared to the previous week , the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 153 to 98 .
Of the total number of trucks scanned , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were bound for Ukraine : the remaining 14 trucks ( 14 per cent ) crossed into the Russian Federation ) .
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans [ 2 ] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs .
The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region ; however , the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation .
Compared to the previous week , the number of cargo minivans decreased from 37 to 22 vehicles ; ten crossed into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukraine .
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP .
During the reporting week , the OTs heard trains on 19 occasions ; the OTs assessed that nine trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine ( more details are provided in the sections “ trends and figures at a glance ” below ) .
Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region , or Russian Federation licence plates .
A significant number of vehicles with “ LPR ” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis .
On 8 April at 12:05 , the Donetsk OT observed two ambulances with “ LPR ” plates arriving at the BCP from Ukraine .
While undergoing border control procedures , the OT observed the presence of a driver and one paramedic on board each vehicle .
At 12:30 , both vehicles left the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same day at 18:16 , both ambulances were observed crossing back to Ukraine .
From its position , the OT was unable to observe any other details .
On 9 April at 11:01 , the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a helicopter type Mi-17 painted in white and blue , flying at an altitude of approximately 500 metres .
It arrived from a north-easterly direction and at a distance of approximately 100 metres from the BCP it made a turn in a north-northwesterly direction .
The helicopter remained inside the airspace of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was visible to the OT .
On 12 April at 17:11 , an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side .
At 17:22 , the vehicle then crossed the border to Ukraine .
From its position the OT was unable to observe any other details .
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 10 March to 14 April 2020 , please see the attachment here [ 1 ] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t ; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg ( small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1 ) .

SUMMARY
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.
Update on COVID-19 measures
Activities have been impacted by COVID-19 and measures undertaken by the OM to ensure the safety and duty of care of its Mission members and compliance with measures set by the host country authorities. The Mission is continuing to keep the situation under review, in close contact with the OSCE Secretariat and Chairmanship and it is capable of continuing to fulfill its mandate under the current circumstances. Due to the mandatory self-isolation and social distancing in the Mission’s area, the OM’s main office has operated with limited capacity as of 30 March, but without significant consequences in the Mission’s observation and reporting activities.
OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS
Persons crossing the border
The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:
Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage; Persons in military-style outfits; Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.
The average number of entries/exits decreased from 1,111 to 846 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].
During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of 220 per day for both BCPs. The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.
Responding to the COVID-19 situation, the host country has closed its borders for the majority of foreigners from 18 March to 1 May. Among the exceptions of persons allowed to cross the border (which entered into force on 19 March), are Ukrainian citizens and stateless persons holding passports or identification documents proving permanent residence in certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. This category of people crossing is significant at both BCPs. In addition, reportedly, due to the threat of the spread of COVID-19, starting from 10 April, the organized passenger transport commuting between the non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region of Ukraine and the Russian Federation was suspended.
Persons in military-style outfits
During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was five, compared to nine last week, no crossings of this category was observed into the Russian Federation, while five were observed crossing into Ukraine (40 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.
Families with a significant amount of luggage
The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, no families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation while four families were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when also no families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and three families crossed into Ukraine.
Bus connections
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation until 10 April. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.
During the reporting period, and especially due to the above-mentioned restrictions from 10 April, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (51 compared to 64 observed during the previous week). There were 26 buses bound for the Russian Federation and the remaining 25 bound for Ukraine.
On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.
Trucks
During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border at both BCPs (734 compared to 825 during the previous reporting week); 378 at the Gukovo BCP and 356 at the Donetsk BCP, 392 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 342 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and trucks with “LPR” plates.
The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased from 45 to 56. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.
All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.
Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 153 to 98. Of the total number of trucks scanned, 84 trucks (86 per cent) were bound for Ukraine: the remaining 14 trucks (14 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation).
Minivans
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 37 to 22 vehicles; ten crossed into the Russian Federation and another 12 into Ukraine.
Trains
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 19 occasions; the OTs assessed that nine trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).
Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.
Other observations
The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.
On 8 April at 12:05, the Donetsk OT observed two ambulances with “LPR” plates arriving at the BCP from Ukraine. While undergoing border control procedures, the OT observed the presence of a driver and one paramedic on board each vehicle. At 12:30, both vehicles left the BCP towards the Russian Federation. The same day at 18:16, both ambulances were observed crossing back to Ukraine. From its position, the OT was unable to observe any other details.
On 9 April at 11:01, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a helicopter type Mi-17 painted in white and blue, flying at an altitude of approximately 500 metres. It arrived from a north-easterly direction and at a distance of approximately 100 metres from the BCP it made a turn in a north-northwesterly direction. The helicopter remained inside the airspace of the Russian Federation the entire time it was visible to the OT.
On 12 April at 17:11, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. At 17:22, the vehicle then crossed the border to Ukraine. From its position the OT was unable to observe any other details.
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 10 March to 14 April 2020, please see the attachment here
[1]Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).


osce--2020-01-06--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 3/2020 issued on 6 January 2020


osce--2020-01-04--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 2/2020 issued on 4 January 2020


osce--2020-01-03--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 1/2020 issued on 3 January 2020


osce--2020-01-02--OSCE Programme Office launches EU-funded project on Green Border Protection and Emergency Response

On 1 January 2020 , the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe launched a EUR 3.3 million project on the “ @ @ @ @ @ southern border region with Afghanistan ” , funded within the framework of the European Union @ @ @ @ @ .
The 18-month project aims to increase the professional capability of the Tajik and Afghan @ @ @ @ @ better tackle illicit activities in border areas .
The project also aims to strengthen the @ @ @ @ @ Emergency Situations and Civil Defense ( CoESCD ) to respond to natural disasters in border @ @ @ @ @ and border services will undergo practical training on operational planning and sustaining field operations .
@ @ @ @ @ services of both countries the skills needed to respond to security incidents and effectively protect @ @ @ @ @ the training facilities of the Tajik Border Troops in Khalkayor and Langar will be partly @ @ @ @ @ centre of the CoESCD in Karatag will be extensively renovated and put into service .
@ @ @ @ @ a more stable and secure border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan .

On 1 January 2020, the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe launched a EUR 3.3 million project on the “Stabilization of Tajikistan’s southern border region with Afghanistan”, funded within the framework of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Instrument. The 18-month project aims to increase the professional capability of the Tajik and Afghan Border Services in order to better tackle illicit activities in border areas. The project also aims to strengthen the capacity of the Committee on Emergency Situations and Civil Defense (CoESCD) to respond to natural disasters in border regions.
Beneficiaries from CoESCD and border services will undergo practical training on operational planning and sustaining field operations. The project will provide border services of both countries the skills needed to respond to security incidents and effectively protect the border.
Additionally, the training facilities of the Tajik Border Troops in Khalkayor and Langar will be partly refurbished, and the training centre of the CoESCD in Karatag will be extensively renovated and put into service. The project will contribute to a more stable and secure border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.


osce--2020-01-07--Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on info

Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on information as of 7 January 2020

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy , Russian Federation .
The Observer Mission ( OM ) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points ( BCPs ) .
The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members , including the Chief Observer ( CO ) .
The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna .
Due to the Russian National holidays , the OM was not able to receive and process the usual data on persons crossing at the two border checkpoints from the regional authorities .
The profile of persons crossing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : • Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage ; • Families ( often including elderly persons and/or children ) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage .
During the reporting period , the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 15 , compared to 20 last week : eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation , and seven into Ukraine ( 73 per cent of this category ’ s crossings occurred at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cross the border individually or in groups .
Most individuals crossed on foot , however , some made use of private vehicles , buses or minivans , making it more difficult for the observer teams ( OTs ) to observe their movement across the border , especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows , and buses and minivans had drawn curtains .
The OTs continued to report on families , sometimes with elderly persons and/or children , crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During this reporting week , one family were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two families were observed crossing into Ukraine , compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine .
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine ( mostly from/to the Luhansk region ) and the Russian Federation .
In addition to regular bus connections , the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes .
Often the buses did not state their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the windshield stating “ irregular ” .
During the reporting period , the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs ( 343 compared to 597 observed during the previous week ) .
There were 186 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 157 bound for Ukraine .
On some occasions , the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses , while some buses did not display their route at all .
The majority of long-distance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “ LPR ” plates .
During the reporting period , the OTs observed a decrease in overall number of trucks crossing the border at both BCPs ( 81 compared to 595 during the previous reporting week ) ; 56 at the Gukovo BCP and 25 at the Donetsk BCP , 60 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 21 crossed into Ukraine .
Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a daily basis , the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus , the Russian Federation and with “ LPR ” plates .
The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions .
During the reporting week , the number of tanker trucks decreased from 47 to 20 .
These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs .
The trucks had the words “ Propane ” and “ Flammable ” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian .
The majority of tanker trucks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane .
All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials , which could include an X-ray check .
Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP , the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks .
Compared to the previous week , the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 66 to zero .
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans [ 1 ] crossing the border in both directions at both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region ; however , the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation .
Compared to the previous week , the number of cargo minivans decreased from 153 to 72 vehicles ; 34 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 38 into Ukraine .
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP .
During the reporting week , the OTs heard trains on 21 occasions ; the OTs assessed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine ( more details are provided in the sections “ trends and figures at a glance ” below ) .
The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission ( SMM ) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine .
Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP .
The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region , or Russian Federation licence plates .
A significant number of vehicles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis .
The OTs also observed cars with “ DPR ” plates .
On 2 January at 11:51 , an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates entered the Gukovo BCP from the direction of the Russian Federation .
The OT observed a woman leaving the main building and getting into the ambulance .
At 12:04 , the ambulance returned to the Russian Federation .
On 4 January at 09:24 , the OT observed a white minivan type “ Gazelle ” with Russian licence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian Federation side and crossing the border to Ukraine .
The vehicle had signs “ Ritual ” and “ Cargo 200 ” on its windshield written in Russian .
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 3 December to 7 January 2020 , please see the attachment here [ 1 ] Cargo minivans : light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t ; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ licence C1 ) .

SUMMARY
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs).
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.
Due to the Russian National holidays, the OM was not able to receive and process the usual data on persons crossing at the two border checkpoints from the regional authorities.
OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS
Persons crossing the border
The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:
Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage; Persons in military-style outfits; Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.
Persons in military-style outfits
During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 15, compared to 20 last week: eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and seven into Ukraine (73 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.
Families with a significant amount of luggage
The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, one family were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two families were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.
Bus connections
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.
During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (343 compared to 597 observed during the previous week). There were 186 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 157 bound for Ukraine.
On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.
Trucks
During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in overall number of trucks crossing the border at both BCPs (81 compared to 595 during the previous reporting week);56 at the Gukovo BCP and 25 at the Donetsk BCP, 60 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 21 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates.
The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased from 47 to 20. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.
All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.
Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 66 to zero.
Minivans
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[1] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 153 to 72 vehicles; 34 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 38 into Ukraine.
Trains
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 21 occasions; the OTs assessed that 12 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).
The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine. Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.
Other observations
The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also observed cars with “DPR” plates.
On 2 January at 11:51, an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates entered the Gukovo BCP from the direction of the Russian Federation. The OT observed a woman leaving the main building and getting into the ambulance. At 12:04, the ambulance returned to the Russian Federation.
On 4 January at 09:24, the OT observed a white minivan type “Gazelle” with Russian licence plates entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and crossing the border to Ukraine. The vehicle had signs “Ritual” and “Cargo 200” on its windshield written in Russian.
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 3 December to 7 January 2020, please see the attachment here
[1] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).


osce--2020-01-07--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 4/2020 issued on 7 January 2020


osce--2020-01-07--ODIHR opens election observation mission in Azerbaijan

BAKU , 7 January 2020 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ( ODIHR ) today formally opened its election observation mission ( EOM ) for the 9 February early parliamentary elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan .
The mission ’ s deployment follows an official invitation from the Azerbaijani authorities .
The mission is led by Ambassador Peter Tejler and consists of a core team of 12 experts based in Baku .
ODIHR has requested 30 long-term observers to be deployed throughout the country from 14 January , as well as 350 short-term observers to monitor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether the early parliamentary elections are held in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards and obligations for democratic elections , as well as with national legislation .
Observers will follow the candidate registration process , campaign activities , the work of the election administration and relevant state bodies , implementation of the legal framework and the resolution of election disputes .
As part of the observation , the mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign .
Meetings with representatives of relevant authorities and political parties , civil society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ form an integral part of the observation .
On election day , the ODIHR EOM will join efforts with delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to monitor the opening of polling stations , voting , the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results .
An interim report will be published to update the public and media during the course of the observation , and a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions issued the day after the elections .
A final report summing up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be published approximately two months after the end of the election process .
For further information please visit https : //www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan or contact Kira Kalinina , ODIHR EOM Media Analyst , at +994 ( 0 ) 554 142 812 ( mobile ) or kira.kalinina @ odihr.az Katya Andrusz , ODIHR Spokesperson , at +48 609 522 266 ( Warsaw mobile ) or at katya.andrusz @ odihr.pl

BAKU, 7 January 2020 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened its election observation mission (EOM) for the 9 February early parliamentary elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The mission’s deployment follows an official invitation from the Azerbaijani authorities.
The mission is led by Ambassador Peter Tejler and consists of a core team of 12 experts based in Baku. ODIHR has requested 30 long-term observers to be deployed throughout the country from 14 January, as well as 350 short-term observers to monitor election day.
The mission will assess whether the early parliamentary elections are held in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards and obligations for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will follow the candidate registration process, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant state bodies, implementation of the legal framework and the resolution of election disputes. As part of the observation, the mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign.
Meetings with representatives of relevant authorities and political parties, civil society, the media and the international community form an integral part of the observation.
On election day, the ODIHR EOM will join efforts with delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results.
An interim report will be published to update the public and media during the course of the observation, and a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions issued the day after the elections. A final report summing up the entire election process and including recommendations will be published approximately two months after the end of the election process.
For further information please visit https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan or contact Kira Kalinina, ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +994 (0) 554 142 812 (mobile) or kira.kalinina@odihr.az
or
Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl


osce--2020-01-08--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 5/2020 issued on 8 January 2020


osce--2020-01-09--OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 6/2020 issued on 9 January 2020