informnapalm--2020-10-06--History Lessons: Wildfire as a Weapon

History Lessons: Wildfire as a Weapon

For the past few days , Ukraine has been experiencing massive wildfires on its eastern border , particularly in Luhansk Region .
The fire has already claimed the lives of dozens of people and destroyed many homes .
The fires have covered an area of more than 100 sq km .
There is direct evidence that these fires were the result of deliberate arson committed by Russian aggressors or their mercenaries .
This is a well-organized military operation .
The fires were started in the gray zone and then reached the frontline positions and nearby rear areas of the Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fire was used as a weapon against the enemy .
After all , fire is not only an element that destroys material objects , it is also important as an instrument of psychological pressure , as something that causes fear and panic in the ranks of opponents .
Our very ancient ancestors from the biological genus Homo had learned to control fire , maintain and produce it , probably even before the modern human species , Homo sapiens , appeared .
And soon enough , primitive people began to use fire , both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with rival tribes .
Archaeologists have evidence that our ancestors performed arson and fought with sticks set on fire from the “ battle ” end .
Fire-based weapons were perfected during the development of ancient civilizations .
The Chinese developed devices for throwing pots with a burning mixture during the Qin Dynasty in the 5-4 centuries BC .
During the Mongol invasion of the 1230s and 1270s , the Chinese had already invented gunpowder and used it to fire rockets and grenades , which , when exploded after a fall , caused intense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and used them during the storming of the fortresses of Eastern and Central Europe and the Muslim East .
In addition , the Mongols used fire as a means of terror against those who resisted them .
According to their tradition , if the city refused to open its gates to them , after the attack and capture the city was burned down .
The famous Greek fire became a powerful military tool in Byzantium .
It is believed to have been invented by a Syrian named Kallinikos , who became a subject @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Kallinikos not only developed a recipe for a burning mixture ( which included crude oil , sulfur , lime and some other ingredients ) , but also invented a device that he called a “ siphon ” – a metal vessel to which bellows were attached ( as those used by blacksmiths in the smithies ) .
The fires caused by Greek fire were extremely difficult to extinguish .
The Byzantines ( Romans ) successfully used Greek fire in the seas , destroying enemy fleets .
In the Middle Ages , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ centuries , one of the means of war was the so-called “ scorched earth tactic.
” Thus , in June 1687 , the Crimean Tatars ( Kyrymly ) set fire to the steppe north of Perekop , creating a dead zone 200 kilometers wide .
The purpose of this arson was to prevent the capture of the Crimean Khanate by an army led by the Moscow military leader Prince V. Golitsyn , which included about 50,000 Ukrainian Cossacks of Hetman Samoilovich .
The Crimean tactics proved to be victorious for them and devastating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week of crossing the dead steppe without fresh water and without fodder under the scorching sun , horses and people were terribly tired .
Horses began to die ; people began to get sick .
Golitsyn ordered a withdrawal .
Two years later , in May 1689 , with Ivan Mazepa now the Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks , history repeated itself : the Tatars set fire to the steppe again .
The Crimean Khanate lasted for almost another century , until 1783 .
On the eve of the First World War , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States adopted a new device for destroying the enemy with fire – a flamethrower .
The first flamethrowers were quite primitive and resembled devices for Greek fire – the burning mixture was ejected from them with compressed air .
Like the Byzantine “ siphons ” , they fired to a distance of up to 200 meters , but from 50 meters the stream of fire thinned , because the mixture burned in the air , and the only much weaker fire could reach the target .
However , even these first flamethrowers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is evidence that during the “ trench war ” of 1915-1918 , soldiers jumped out of the trenches and fled when they saw enemy soldiers with knapsack flamethrowers .
In the 1930 ’ s and 1950 ’ s , flamethrowers improved significantly : high-explosive and jet variants of these machines appeared .
Scorched earth tactics , as well as incendiary bombs , were widely used during World War II .
Almost immediately after the beginning of the invasion of Hitler ’ s army and its allies into the territory of the USSR in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee launched an operation of “ scorched earth ” to create unbearable conditions for the occupiers .
This operation included arson and the organization of explosions at industrial facilities .
Grain fields , grain elevators , and even houses were doomed to be destroyed by fire .
The latter was often a death sentence for peasants , especially during the very cold winter of 1941 .
As is now known , 18-year-old Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was given just such a task – to set fire to the homes of residents of the village of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the German army stood .
Germans executed her , hanging her with a sign around her neck that said “ Brandstifter von Wohngebäuden ” , “ the arsonist of houses.
” For all their hatred of the German invaders , it is unlikely that Petrishcheve ’ s peasants took pity on this young girl , almost a child , who had fallen victim to the Kremlin ’ s incredibly brutal policies .
And then in the Spring of 1945 Hitler ordered to use the same tactics of scorched earth in the territories of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be captured by Soviet or Allied troops .
Particularly brutal was the use of powerful incendiary bombs during the Allied air attack on the German city of Dresden on February 13-15 , 1945 .
This attack was carried out by a fleet of 1,249 heavy bombers from Great Britain and the United States .
( Several Polish crews also took part in the bombing after a rather long and heated argument about its expediency . )
About 2,000 tons of high-explosive bombs and about 500 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explosive and incendiary bombs caused terrible fires .
Tens of thousands of people were killed , most of them civilians ( Dresden did not have a large garrison ) .
Most of the victims died from the fires ( burned or suffocated from smoke and lack of oxygen ) .
Due to a tragic coincidence , about 5,000 American prisoners of war also died .
This is described in Kurt Vonnegut ’ s famous novel Slaughterhouse-Five , or the Children ’ s Crusade .
The debate over how many Dresdenites were killed and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to this day .
In 1942 , a secret laboratory on the campus of Harvard University in the United States developed the recipe for a mixture called “ napalm ” ( short for the two ingredients in the mixture , naphthenic and palmitic acids , which were added to gasoline and caused it to condense into a gel ) .
The burning temperature of napalm is up to 1200 degrees Celsius .
It has the property of sticking to human skin , where it burns for a long time and causes severe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underground and destroys bunkers and other underground structures along with personnel .
Burning napalm produces a lot of carbon dioxide , which can kill those who are not affected by burns .
The air , heated by napalm flames , moves in a centrifugal direction and speeds up to 110 kilometers per hour , causing new fires .
American aircraft widely used napalm during the bombing of Japanese cities .
Napalm also gained notoriety during the US war against North Korea in 1950-1953 , and against Vietnam and Cambodia in 1963-1973 .
Napalm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both sides during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s , and during the civil war in Angola and elsewhere in Africa .
Today , huge reserves of napalm are stored in the United States , Russia , China , North Korea and Iran .
In January 2009 , the United States signed an international agreement to curb the use of napalm in military operations .
Editor ’ s note : The InformNapalm website was created in March 2014 .
It doesn ’ t refer to the atrocities of the wars in the 20th @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used by the defenders of the Maidan during the Revolution of Dignity against armed troops of the Yanukovych regime .
The symbol of fire as an effective tool to “ burn out the enemy forces ” and “ burn away the barriers to their secrets ” became the basis of the name of the international volunteer community .
The Aggressor sets the Donbas on fire As we can see , Russia is now using the deadly properties of fire in its illegal , undeclared , vile war against Ukraine .
Of course , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ damaged electrical wires , etc .
for the fires that are now raging near the eastern border of Ukraine is simply a deception .
These attempts to shift the blame should be stopped immediately and decisively .
And , again , it is very wrong from the point of view of basic information hygiene and human morality to rely on the nonsense being spread by the Russian media ( Ukraine ’ s direct enemy ) and the Western media ( one of Russia ’ s main paid collaborators ) .
Therefore , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the priest or deacon exhorts us during the Divine Liturgy of Sts .
John Chrysostom .
Glory to those who are just now fighting fires and resisting Russia with all its mercenaries .
And , of course , glory to Ukraine .
George V. Pinchuk especially for InformNapalm .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

For the past few days, Ukraine has been experiencing massive wildfires on its eastern border, particularly in Luhansk Region. The fire has already claimed the lives of dozens of people and destroyed many homes. The fires have covered an area of more than 100 sq km.
There is direct evidence that these fires were the result of deliberate arson committed by Russian aggressors or their mercenaries. This is a well-organized military operation. The fires were started in the gray zone and then reached the frontline positions and nearby rear areas of the Ukrainian forces.
History knows many examples when fire was used as a weapon against the enemy. After all, fire is not only an element that destroys material objects, it is also important as an instrument of psychological pressure, as something that causes fear and panic in the ranks of opponents.
Our very ancient ancestors from the biological genus Homo had learned to control fire, maintain and produce it, probably even before the modern human species, Homo sapiens, appeared. And soon enough, primitive people began to use fire, both to hunt wild animals and during clashes with rival tribes. Archaeologists have evidence that our ancestors performed arson and fought with sticks set on fire from the “battle” end.
Fire-based weapons were perfected during the development of ancient civilizations. The Chinese developed devices for throwing pots with a burning mixture during the Qin Dynasty in the 5-4 centuries BC. During the Mongol invasion of the 1230s and 1270s, the Chinese had already invented gunpowder and used it to fire rockets and grenades, which, when exploded after a fall, caused intense fires.
The Mongols borrowed these devices and used them during the storming of the fortresses of Eastern and Central Europe and the Muslim East. In addition, the Mongols used fire as a means of terror against those who resisted them. According to their tradition, if the city refused to open its gates to them, after the attack and capture the city was burned down.
The famous Greek fire became a powerful military tool in Byzantium. It is believed to have been invented by a Syrian named Kallinikos, who became a subject of the Eastern Roman Empire around 672. Kallinikos not only developed a recipe for a burning mixture (which included crude oil, sulfur, lime and some other ingredients), but also invented a device that he called a “siphon” – a metal vessel to which bellows were attached (as those used by blacksmiths in the smithies). The fires caused by Greek fire were extremely difficult to extinguish. The Byzantines (Romans) successfully used Greek fire in the seas, destroying enemy fleets.
In the Middle Ages, and especially from the 17th to the 18th centuries, one of the means of war was the so-called “scorched earth tactic.” Thus, in June 1687, the Crimean Tatars (Kyrymly) set fire to the steppe north of Perekop, creating a dead zone 200 kilometers wide. The purpose of this arson was to prevent the capture of the Crimean Khanate by an army led by the Moscow military leader Prince V. Golitsyn, which included about 50,000 Ukrainian Cossacks of Hetman Samoilovich. The Crimean tactics proved to be victorious for them and devastating for the Moscow-Cossack army. After a week of crossing the dead steppe without fresh water and without fodder under the scorching sun, horses and people were terribly tired. Horses began to die; people began to get sick. Golitsyn ordered a withdrawal. Two years later, in May 1689, with Ivan Mazepa now the Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks, history repeated itself: the Tatars set fire to the steppe again. The Crimean Khanate lasted for almost another century, until 1783.
On the eve of the First World War, the armies of European countries and the United States adopted a new device for destroying the enemy with fire – a flamethrower. The first flamethrowers were quite primitive and resembled devices for Greek fire – the burning mixture was ejected from them with compressed air. Like the Byzantine “siphons”, they fired to a distance of up to 200 meters, but from 50 meters the stream of fire thinned, because the mixture burned in the air, and the only much weaker fire could reach the target. However, even these first flamethrowers were a powerful psychological weapon. There is evidence that during the “trench war” of 1915-1918, soldiers jumped out of the trenches and fled when they saw enemy soldiers with knapsack flamethrowers. In the 1930’s and 1950’s, flamethrowers improved significantly: high-explosive and jet variants of these machines appeared.
Scorched earth tactics, as well as incendiary bombs, were widely used during World War II. Almost immediately after the beginning of the invasion of Hitler’s army and its allies into the territory of the USSR in June 1941, the USSR State Defense Committee launched an operation of “scorched earth” to create unbearable conditions for the occupiers. This operation included arson and the organization of explosions at industrial facilities. Grain fields, grain elevators, and even houses were doomed to be destroyed by fire. The latter was often a death sentence for peasants, especially during the very cold winter of 1941. As is now known, 18-year-old Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was given just such a task – to set fire to the homes of residents of the village of Petrishcheve, where a small garrison of the German army stood. Germans executed her, hanging her with a sign around her neck that said “Brandstifter von Wohngebäuden”, “the arsonist of houses.” For all their hatred of the German invaders, it is unlikely that Petrishcheve’s peasants took pity on this young girl, almost a child, who had fallen victim to the Kremlin’s incredibly brutal policies. And then in the Spring of 1945 Hitler ordered to use the same tactics of scorched earth in the territories of the Third Reich, which were about to be captured by Soviet or Allied troops.
Particularly brutal was the use of powerful incendiary bombs during the Allied air attack on the German city of Dresden on February 13-15, 1945. This attack was carried out by a fleet of 1,249 heavy bombers from Great Britain and the United States. (Several Polish crews also took part in the bombing after a rather long and heated argument about its expediency.) About 2,000 tons of high-explosive bombs and about 500 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on the city. The combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs caused terrible fires. Tens of thousands of people were killed, most of them civilians (Dresden did not have a large garrison). Most of the victims died from the fires (burned or suffocated from smoke and lack of oxygen). Due to a tragic coincidence, about 5,000 American prisoners of war also died. This is described in Kurt Vonnegut’s famous novel Slaughterhouse-Five, or the Children’s Crusade. The debate over how many Dresdenites were killed and the appropriateness of this air attack continues to this day.
Napalm
In 1942, a secret laboratory on the campus of Harvard University in the United States developed the recipe for a mixture called “napalm” (short for the two ingredients in the mixture, naphthenic and palmitic acids, which were added to gasoline and caused it to condense into a gel). The burning temperature of napalm is up to 1200 degrees Celsius. It has the property of sticking to human skin, where it burns for a long time and causes severe, often fatal burns. Napalm also seeps underground and destroys bunkers and other underground structures along with personnel. Burning napalm produces a lot of carbon dioxide, which can kill those who are not affected by burns. The air, heated by napalm flames, moves in a centrifugal direction and speeds up to 110 kilometers per hour, causing new fires. American aircraft widely used napalm during the bombing of Japanese cities. Napalm also gained notoriety during the US war against North Korea in 1950-1953, and against Vietnam and Cambodia in 1963-1973. Napalm bombardment was also regularly carried out by both sides during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, and during the civil war in Angola and elsewhere in Africa. Today, huge reserves of napalm are stored in the United States, Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. In January 2009, the United States signed an international agreement to curb the use of napalm in military operations.
Editor’s note: The InformNapalm website was created in March 2014. It doesn’t refer to the atrocities of the wars in the 20th century but rather to the incendiary mixes used by the defenders of the Maidan during the Revolution of Dignity against armed troops of the Yanukovych regime. The symbol of fire as an effective tool to “burn out the enemy forces” and “burn away the barriers to their secrets” became the basis of the name of the international volunteer community.
The Aggressor sets the Donbas on fire
СТАНИЧНО-ЛУГАНСКИЙ РАЙОН#У_наших_смелых_все_окТо,что было сегодня это просто кошмар!Весь район горит.. Сейчас пожар в Нижней Ольховой рядом со мной ,в Камышном (граница с рашей) и горит лес в Красной Таловке (граница с рашей)Горит лес возле Станции Ольховой,не локализован пожар в Болотенном и Сизом..Зарево в Макарово и в КондрашевкеВозле нашего дома появились искры как от салюта,дети заливают водой вокруг дома..С 11 часов до 12 часов одновременно стали поступать звонки о возгорании и это не в одном месте,а по всей площади.По моей инсайдерской информации в Малиновом загорелся трансформатор,который не работал,очаги возле газовых труб и т.д.Наличие подпалов это уже просто очевидно.Столько слез,горя…На видео КондрашевкаПроще назвать населённые пункты,которые не загорелись..Новая тактика Раши в действии..#РАША_АГРЕССОР!Никогда ей не верьте!#ООС_2020#Станица_Луганская Posted by Sveta Svetikova on Wednesday, September 30, 2020
As we can see, Russia is now using the deadly properties of fire in its illegal, undeclared, vile war against Ukraine. Of course, blaming drought, cigarette butts, accidentally damaged electrical wires, etc. for the fires that are now raging near the eastern border of Ukraine is simply a deception. These attempts to shift the blame should be stopped immediately and decisively. And, again, it is very wrong from the point of view of basic information hygiene and human morality to rely on the nonsense being spread by the Russian media (Ukraine’s direct enemy) and the Western media (one of Russia’s main paid collaborators).
Therefore, “let us be attentive,” as the priest or deacon exhorts us during the Divine Liturgy of Sts. John Chrysostom. Glory to those who are just now fighting fires and resisting Russia with all its mercenaries. And, of course, glory to Ukraine.
George V. Pinchuk especially for InformNapalm. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-10-07--For Putin’s Review: 183 casualties among Russian PMC Wagner military intelligence troops

On October 7 , on the birthday of war criminal and Russian dictator Vladimir Putin , the Ukrainian Center for Analytics and Security ( UCAS ) prepared its “ gift ” – a large-scale review of personal data of more than 200 employees of the General Staff of the Russian Army , known under the code name Wagner ’ s private military company ( hereinafter Wagner ’ s PMC ) .
The array of this data is provided exclusively by the authors of the review for publication on the website of the InformNapalm international intelligence community .
The review includes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secret units of Russian military intelligence , available in InformNapalm investigations : • Artillerymen of Wagner PMC in the service of Russia from Donbas to Syria – 20 mercenaries operating 2S1 howitzers identified • Tankmen of Wagner PMC in the service of Russia from Donbas to Syria – 25 mercenaries identified This review also contains previously unpublished data on the Russian combat losses , which are concealed by the intelligence services of the Putin regime from the Russian citizens and the world community .
The review is available in Russian as a PDF @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PMCs in armed conflicts • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Identified : more than 300 Wagner PMC mercenaries who took part in a botched offensive at Deir-Ez-Zor • From Donbas to Syria : exposing mercenaries of Wagner PMC ’ s 6th assault detachment • Pulp Fiction of PMC “ Wagner ” : Murderers , Drug Addicts and Rapists in Putin ’ s Service • List of the Karpaty company task force : who of the Donbas militants recruited to the Russian Wagner PMC ( PHOTO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

On October 7, on the birthday of war criminal and Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, the Ukrainian Center for Analytics and Security (UCAS) prepared its “gift” – a large-scale review of personal data of more than 200 employees of the General Staff of the Russian Army, known under the code name Wagner’s private military company (hereinafter Wagner’s PMC). The array of this data is provided exclusively by the authors of the review for publication on the website of the InformNapalm international intelligence community.
The review includes previously published materials on the activities of secret units of Russian military intelligence, available in InformNapalm investigations:
This review also contains previously unpublished data on the Russian combat losses, which are concealed by the intelligence services of the Putin regime from the Russian citizens and the world community.
The review is available in Russian as a PDF file.
Read more from InformNapalm
Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-10-07--Russia grossly violates ceasefire terms: mortars observed 2 km from the line of contact (PHOTOS)

Volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community received from their own sources another visual proof of a gross violation of the Minsk agreements by the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas .
It is a photo from the classified part of an OSCE SMM report , which states that two Podnos 2B14 82 mm mortars are deployed only 2 km from the line of contact near the settlement of Veselohorivka , Luhansk Oblast .
It should be noted that , according to the Addendum to the Complex of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements of February 12 , 2015 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a distance of more than 15 km from the line of contact .
It is also interesting that in the text of the OSCE SMM report №228 / 2020 dated September 24 , 2020 , the information about the spotting of two 82 mm mortars on September 21 was somewhat distorted and indicated another settlement , Nadarivka , which is a few kilometers farther away from the line of contact .
It also stated that one Podnos 2B14 mortar and one Vasilek 2B9 82 mm mortar were observed .
The maximum range @ @ @ @ @ @ @ – 3.9 km ( depending on the shell type ) , the rate of fire is 24 shots per minute without correction , or 15 – with correction .
And the Vasilek 2B9 mortar has 100-120 shots per minute and a maximum range of 4270 meters .
It is possible that the information in the text report was modified or deliberately distorted to avoid the indication in the report ’ s open part a gross violation by the Russian occupation forces , evident from the available UAV images .
In addition , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report of a locality slightly farther from the line of contact could be misleading as to the danger posed by these types of weapons , which can be used ( or are being used ) for shelling of Ukrainian positions when placed just 2km from the contact line .
Who benefits from distortions in the public part of the OSCE reports ?
InformNapalm international volunteer community has repeatedly raised in the public space the issue of the inclusion of Russian citizens among the OSCE SMM observers .
Russia is in fact a party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas , as well as the occupation of the Ukrainian Crimea , but dozens of Russians or their allies are constantly stationed in the OSCE SMM , and there are no Ukrainians .
As of September 2020 , the OSCE observers in the Donbas include 39 Russian citizens and 5 citizens of Belarus .
Russian citizens as part of the OSCE SMM have also repeatedly been involved in scandals cooperating with the armed formations of the hybrid Russian army in the Donbas .
During consultative meetings of NGO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council of Ukraine , InformNapalm volunteers also publicly addressed the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov and called for an international discussion regarding exclusion of Russian citizens from the OSCE SMM team in the Donbas due to their affiliation with the aggressor country and their operation as de-facto agents of influence .
However , these appeals were rejected on the basis that Russia contributes financially to the OSCE and can also block the work of the SMM in Ukraine , because all decisions in the OSCE are taken by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ absurd conditions when the aggressor actually controls and influences international institutions , which leads to both half-hearted decisions and softened terminology , in which Russia is not directly called a party to the conflict .
Perhaps , given this sad experience , both the OSCE and the UN need to review decision-making mechanisms so that the aggressor country couldn ’ t misuse legal formalities as an instrument of influence .
The mortars are positioned on the line between Veselohorivka and Nadarivka , at 48.461591 , 38.425495 .
Since daily updates of OSCE SMM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s likely that the weekly report with the classified information that included the UAV photos contained corrected details about the type of the mortars and their distance from the contact line .
 Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence  Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea  Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas  A column of Russian equipment secretly crosses the border of Ukraine ( photo from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates )  More Russians among OSCE observers in Donbas .
Manipulations detected in reports This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm .
Translated Andrii Gryganskyi , edited by Max Alginin .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

Volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community received from their own sources another visual proof of a gross violation of the Minsk agreements by the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas. It is a photo from the classified part of an OSCE SMM report, which states that two Podnos 2B14 82 mm mortars are deployed only 2 km from the line of contact near the settlement of Veselohorivka, Luhansk Oblast. It should be noted that, according to the Addendum to the Complex of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements of February 12, 2015, such types of weapons must be withdrawn to a distance of more than 15 km from the line of contact.
It is also interesting that in the text of the OSCE SMM report №228 / 2020 dated September 24, 2020, the information about the spotting of two 82 mm mortars on September 21 was somewhat distorted and indicated another settlement, Nadarivka, which is a few kilometers farther away from the line of contact. It also stated that one Podnos 2B14 mortar and one Vasilek 2B9 82 mm mortar were observed. The maximum range of the Podnos 2B14 mortar is 3.1 – 3.9 km (depending on the shell type), the rate of fire is 24 shots per minute without correction, or 15 – with correction. And the Vasilek 2B9 mortar has 100-120 shots per minute and a maximum range of 4270 meters.
It is possible that the information in the text report was modified or deliberately distorted to avoid the indication in the report’s open part a gross violation by the Russian occupation forces, evident from the available UAV images. In addition, the indication in the text of the open report of a locality slightly farther from the line of contact could be misleading as to the danger posed by these types of weapons, which can be used (or are being used) for shelling of Ukrainian positions when placed just 2km from the contact line.
Who benefits from distortions in the public part of the OSCE reports?
InformNapalm international volunteer community has repeatedly raised in the public space the issue of the inclusion of Russian citizens among the OSCE SMM observers. Russia is in fact a party to the conflict: it continues its aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas, as well as the occupation of the Ukrainian Crimea, but dozens of Russians or their allies are constantly stationed in the OSCE SMM, and there are no Ukrainians. As of September 2020, the OSCE observers in the Donbas include 39 Russian citizens and 5 citizens of Belarus. Russian citizens as part of the OSCE SMM have also repeatedly been involved in scandals cooperating with the armed formations of the hybrid Russian army in the Donbas.
During consultative meetings of NGO representatives with the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, InformNapalm volunteers also publicly addressed the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov and called for an international discussion regarding exclusion of Russian citizens from the OSCE SMM team in the Donbas due to their affiliation with the aggressor country and their operation as de-facto agents of influence. However, these appeals were rejected on the basis that Russia contributes financially to the OSCE and can also block the work of the SMM in Ukraine, because all decisions in the OSCE are taken by consensus – unanimously. This creates certain absurd conditions when the aggressor actually controls and influences international institutions, which leads to both half-hearted decisions and softened terminology, in which Russia is not directly called a party to the conflict. Perhaps, given this sad experience, both the OSCE and the UN need to review decision-making mechanisms so that the aggressor country couldn’t misuse legal formalities as an instrument of influence.
Update
The mortars are positioned on the line between Veselohorivka and Nadarivka, at 48.461591, 38.425495. Since daily updates of OSCE SMM are released the following day, it’s likely that the weekly report with the classified information that included the UAV photos contained corrected details about the type of the mortars and their distance from the contact line.
Read also other thematic materials InformNapalm
 Proofs of the Russian Aggression: InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence
 Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea
 Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas
 A column of Russian equipment secretly crosses the border of Ukraine (photo from a UAV)
 Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo (photo and coordinates)
 More Russians among OSCE observers in Donbas. Manipulations detected in reports
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm. Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi, edited by Max Alginin. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-10-08--CSTO’s Strategic Command and Staff Training in the South Caucasus (Document)

In early October 2020 , InformNapalm , an international intelligence community , obtained a large bulk of data from the exchange of confidential correspondence maintained by the Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization ( CSTO ) , a military and political alliance among the Russian Federation , Armenia , Belarus , Kazakhstan , Kyrgyzstan , and Tajikistan .
In this dataset , our curiosity was piqued by a letter with a copy of the operational objective statement for a command and staff training of the Allied Staff , the CSTO Secretariat , and CSTO member states ’ operational teams @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , was sent by the CSTO Secretariat to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia .
The letter described a plan of undertaking a strategic command and staff training ( SCST ) with the focus on “ Preparing Proposals and Developing Draft Decisions of CSTO Bodies for Mustering and Deploying Collective Security System Forces and Facilities in the Caucasian Region ” starting from September 15 .
Effectively , the letter refers to developing the CSTO ’ s plan to provide military assistance to Armenia in the climate of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The SCST was supposed to take place in the format of online video conferences .
Scanned copies of the map of the opening situation from the SCST document The SCST was likely occasioned by the Turkey-Azerbaijan military exercises that took place from July 29 to August 10 , 2020 , in various regions of Azerbaijan and were perceived by the CSTO as a threat to Armenia .
Notably , the SCST took place two weeks before the escalation of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh .
The operational objective statement ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Autonomous Republic ( designated as the “ Republic of Noyakert ” in the SCST legend ) indicates that the SCST has been initiated in response to the Turkey-Azerbaijan exercises .
The entry of Turkish troops into this Azerbaijan ’ s exclave during the summer exercises impressed the expert community a lot .
Strikingly , the CSTO ( effectively , the Russians ) produced a pretty awkward assessment of the situation in the crisis area .
It relies on a number of propaganda stereotypes to create the air of an excessively dramatic situation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ opponents ’ ostensibly making use of militants from terrorist organizations or mercenaries .
At the same time , it is not really necessary at all because both Turkey and Azerbaijan rely only on their regular forces and technological superiority .
Thus , either Russia is trying to use this document to incite fears in Armenia , or the Russian intelligence is deliberately cultivating paranoid ideas of Russia ’ s strategists by meeting their expectations ( anyway , these options are not mutually exclusive ) .
Now Russia has taken a wait-and-see stance , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CSTO ally with actions .
Whatever the SCST results , the nervous reaction of the Armenian leadership indicates that something went wrong .
It appears that the video conferences were a formality aimed at calming Armenia down by assuring the country of the allied support .
In real life , the plans to fend off “ Islamist terrorists ” from Turkey have proved futile against combat drones made in Turkey… Perhaps our readers , among whom there are officers of armed forces and military analysts , will be able to study this document @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conclusions .
Please download the PDF file or view it on our website .
Actual names of the countries and military alliances codenamed in the text are disclosed at the end of the SCST file .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas • SurkovLeaks ( part 3 ) : analysis of the correspondence of Surkov @ @ @ @ @ @ @ How can COVID-19 influence on the changes in the political map of the world ?
• Karabakh and Donbas : parallel tracks of the Minsk process This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm .
Translated Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

In early October 2020, InformNapalm, an international intelligence community, obtained a large bulk of data from the exchange of confidential correspondence maintained by the Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military and political alliance among the Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
In this dataset, our curiosity was piqued by a letter with a copy of the operational objective statement for a command and staff training of the Allied Staff, the CSTO Secretariat, and CSTO member states’ operational teams. The letter dated September 1, 2020, was sent by the CSTO Secretariat to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia.
The letter described a plan of undertaking a strategic command and staff training (SCST) with the focus on “Preparing Proposals and Developing Draft Decisions of CSTO Bodies for Mustering and Deploying Collective Security System Forces and Facilities in the Caucasian Region” starting from September 15.
Effectively, the letter refers to developing the CSTO’s plan to provide military assistance to Armenia in the climate of the growing threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan. The SCST was supposed to take place in the format of online video conferences.
Scanned copies of the map of the opening situation from the SCST document
The SCST was likely occasioned by the Turkey-Azerbaijan military exercises that took place from July 29 to August 10, 2020, in various regions of Azerbaijan and were perceived by the CSTO as a threat to Armenia. Notably, the SCST took place two weeks before the escalation of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The operational objective statement’s focus on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (designated as the “Republic of Noyakert” in the SCST legend) indicates that the SCST has been initiated in response to the Turkey-Azerbaijan exercises. The entry of Turkish troops into this Azerbaijan’s exclave during the summer exercises impressed the expert community a lot.
Strikingly, the CSTO (effectively, the Russians) produced a pretty awkward assessment of the situation in the crisis area. It relies on a number of propaganda stereotypes to create the air of an excessively dramatic situation. For example, it refers to the opponents’ ostensibly making use of militants from terrorist organizations or mercenaries. At the same time, it is not really necessary at all because both Turkey and Azerbaijan rely only on their regular forces and technological superiority.
Thus, either Russia is trying to use this document to incite fears in Armenia, or the Russian intelligence is deliberately cultivating paranoid ideas of Russia’s strategists by meeting their expectations (anyway, these options are not mutually exclusive).
Now Russia has taken a wait-and-see stance, either unwilling or unable to support its CSTO ally with actions. Whatever the SCST results, the nervous reaction of the Armenian leadership indicates that something went wrong.
It appears that the video conferences were a formality aimed at calming Armenia down by assuring the country of the allied support. In real life, the plans to fend off “Islamist terrorists” from Turkey have proved futile against combat drones made in Turkey…
Perhaps our readers, among whom there are officers of armed forces and military analysts, will be able to study this document in more depth and draw their own conclusions. Please download the PDF file or view it on our website. Actual names of the countries and military alliances codenamed in the text are disclosed at the end of the SCST file.
Read also other thematic materials InformNapalm:


informnapalm--2020-10-09--Azerbaijani kamikaze drones falling on Georgian territory may be a provocation by a third country (P

Azerbaijani kamikaze drones falling on Georgian territory may be a provocation by a third country (PHOTOS)

On the evening of October 7 , 2020 , a number of Georgian media outlets disseminated information that two foreign “ kamikaze ” drones crashed in the area of the settlements Udabno in Sagarejo District and Sanavardo in Kvareli District of Kakheti Province at about 6:30 pm .
The approximate coordinates of the incidents are 41.502843 , 45.371749 and 41.903265 , 45.825498 , respectively .
There were no casualties ; the locals got off with fright .
Note that Udabno directly borders Azerbaijan , while Sanavardo is located in the depths of Georgia in the foothills of the Greater Caucasus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgian-Russian border , which is 70 km away from the border with Azerbaijan and the crash site of the first UAV .
According to preliminary data , the fallen drones are the IAI Harop strike drones of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces , over 100 units of which were purchased from Israel .
This type of kamikaze drones is actively used by the Azerbaijani military in combat .
Kamikaze drone Harop ( or Harpy 2 ) is distinguished by high combat effectiveness .
It can circle on the battlefield for several hours and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the operator directs the drone at it .
It is known that both UAVs crashed almost simultaneously .
This may indicate a takeover of their control .
Perhaps the plans of provocation were not fully realized and at some stage of the takeover the control was also lost .
InformNapalm volunteers from Georgia believe that this was a provocation implemented by a third party .
It was aimed at undermining good-neighborly relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan .
One of the probable versions is that the control of the Azerbaijani combat drones was intercepted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Georgia .
Recall that the Russian 102nd Military Base ( military unit 04436 ) is stationed in Armenia .
The base has standard electronic warfare equipment .
At the same time , Russia , within the framework of the CSTO , supplies Armenia with modern electronic warfare and reconnaissance means .
Moreover , according to information from our sources , the latest electronic warfare and suppression equipment capable of countering modern UAVs has also been delivered to Armenia from Russia .
Volunteers from Georgia believe that in this difficult situation Azerbaijan should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia and the possibility of such incidents .
In case of loss of control over its UAVs , the Azerbaijani side must promptly notify Georgia of this .
In addition , we present for InformNapalm readers exclusive photographs of the wreckage of the UAVs that fell in Georgia which were sent by our sources directly from the scene of the incident .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas • SurkovLeaks ( part 3 ) : analysis of the correspondence of Surkov ’ s first deputy Inal Ardzinba • How can COVID-19 influence on the changes in the political map of the world ?
• Karabakh and Donbas : parallel tracks of the Minsk process • CSTO ’ s Strategic Command and Staff Training in the South Caucasus ( Document ) Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) .
does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

On the evening of October 7, 2020, a number of Georgian media outlets disseminated information that two foreign “kamikaze” drones crashed in the area of the settlements Udabno in Sagarejo District and Sanavardo in Kvareli District of Kakheti Province at about 6:30 pm. The approximate coordinates of the incidents are 41.502843, 45.371749 and 41.903265, 45.825498, respectively. There were no casualties; the locals got off with fright.
Note that Udabno directly borders Azerbaijan, while Sanavardo is located in the depths of Georgia in the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range near the Dagestan section of the Georgian-Russian border, which is 70 km away from the border with Azerbaijan and the crash site of the first UAV.
According to preliminary data, the fallen drones are the IAI Harop strike drones of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, over 100 units of which were purchased from Israel. This type of kamikaze drones is actively used by the Azerbaijani military in combat. Kamikaze drone Harop (or Harpy 2) is distinguished by high combat effectiveness. It can circle on the battlefield for several hours and, as soon as a target appears, the operator directs the drone at it.
It is known that both UAVs crashed almost simultaneously. This may indicate a takeover of their control. Perhaps the plans of provocation were not fully realized and at some stage of the takeover the control was also lost. InformNapalm volunteers from Georgia believe that this was a provocation implemented by a third party. It was aimed at undermining good-neighborly relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan. One of the probable versions is that the control of the Azerbaijani combat drones was intercepted and they were sent to the territory of Georgia.
Recall that the Russian 102nd Military Base (military unit 04436) is stationed in Armenia. The base has standard electronic warfare equipment. At the same time, Russia, within the framework of the CSTO, supplies Armenia with modern electronic warfare and reconnaissance means. Moreover, according to information from our sources, the latest electronic warfare and suppression equipment capable of countering modern UAVs has also been delivered to Armenia from Russia.
Volunteers from Georgia believe that in this difficult situation Azerbaijan should take into account the interests of friendly Georgia and the possibility of such incidents. In case of loss of control over its UAVs, the Azerbaijani side must promptly notify Georgia of this.
In addition, we present for InformNapalm readers exclusive photographs of the wreckage of the UAVs that fell in Georgia which were sent by our sources directly from the scene of the incident.
Read also other thematic materials InformNapalm:
By Irakli Komaxidze, specially for InformNapalm. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0).
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-10-19--Analyzing Armenian and Azerbaijani media operations designed to pull Georgia into the conflict

This article discusses the attempts by Armenia and Azerbaijan to use media manipulation in order to pull Georgia into their military conflict .
False news , viral posts , radical statements and insinuations coming from both countries and their leaders , are analyzed for the readers of Informnapalm by the Georgian politologist Andro Dzhashi .
“ Why is Georgia maintaining strict neutrality ?
Why are Georgians looking calmly at Azerbaijanis and Turks killing their Armenian brothers in faith ?
Why are Georgians staying silent , not protesting the use of the Georgian airspace for the transfer of military cargo and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Israel under the cover of civilian cargo ?
” – These are just some of the questions being asked by the Armenian society ( and in some cases by officials too ) since the end of September , against the background of the large-scale combat activities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh .
The main reason for such questions is common : Georgia borders both sides of the conflict .
However , the reasons for the existence of such admonitions and complaints are quite complex and even difficult , requiring a more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it should be noted that both Armenian and Azerbaijani sources are constantly spreading false information regarding the position of Georgia in this military conflict .
With the beginning of large-scale hostilities , a kind of virtual information warfare front line was created around Georgia .
The most widespread information on this frontline are data and screenshots of Flightradar24 , on the basis of which authors of various posts and comments speak about Georgia siding with Azerbaijan by allowing the transit of military cargo from Turkey and Israel through its territory .
Notably , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including the Armenians living in Georgia , become victims of this kind of disinformation , which in itself contributes to the growth of anti-Georgian sentiments .
One evidence of that are the protests of ethnic Armenians living in Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia .
The participants of demonstrations openly stated that the information about Georgia allowing transit of military cargo for Armenia through its territory they found on social networks .
Based on social networks posts and comments , Armenians demand an “ equal ” treatment , that is , the creation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supply of weapons from Russia , ignoring the fact that since the beginning of the conflict , Georgia has banned the transit of any kind of military cargo through its territory .
However , Armenian sources simply stay silent about this statement of the Georgian government .
The objections coming from Armenia are now being voiced at the highest state levels .
For example , the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan shared pictures of solidarity demonstrations organized by Armenian diaspora around the world .
For all locations mentioned in the photos , their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the notable exception of Samtskhe-Javakheti ( the area of Georgia populated by Armenians ) , which is presented with its Armenian version , “ Javakh ” .
For Armenian nationalists , “ Javakh ” is an Armenian territory that should be returned to Armenia .
At the same time , despite the fact that the official Yerevan has never expressed such a position , a certain and growing segment of the Armenian society welcomes this idea , which can be seen in the growing number of posts and comments on social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many Facebook users are aware of the statement by Karen Okhanjanian , who made a provocative call to declare the independence of “ Javakh ” .
This hysteria reached its climax with the statement of the Vice-Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Lena Nazaryan who said that the independence of Georgia is protected by Armenian soldiers in Artsakh , thereby saying that Georgia should support Armenia .
In parallel with the Armenian claims against Georgia , the Azerbaijani side is also quite active .
Unlike Armenian sources , it spreads “ positive ” disinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a post of gratitude to Georgia for allowing the transit of military cargo from Turkey to Azerbaijan through its territory .
Old footage that has nothing to do with the current events is presented as evidenc .
Despite an immediate refutation of it by the Georgian government as well as by the Embassy of Armenia in Georgia , Armenian and pro-Armenian sources spread it as news all over social networks and beyond .
And there were other fakes , for example , “ In support of Azerbaijan , Tbilisi TV tower and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ colors of the Azerbaijani flag ” , which was initially published by the Oxu.az news agency .
It was yet another disservice done by Azerbaijan to Georgia that further worsened the situation by going viral in both Azerbaijani and Armenian social networks and media .
The origins of the information war and the answers to the questions presented at the very beginning of this article can be found in the territorial problems and conflicts of the South Caucasian states .
Add to this the ambitions of Russia in the Transcaucasia , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whose territory is actively used by a number of states in their interests , most of all by Azerbaijan and Armenia .
All these point to the economic interdependence of the neighboring countries .
In addition , it should be also noted that : – Taking into account the membership of Armenia in the “ CSTO ” , the shortest and in fact the only route from Russia to Armenia passes through the territory of Georgia , which has been affected by the Russian aggression ( Russia occupies more than 20 % of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even the slightest military involvement of Russia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will further jeopardize the territorial sovereignty of Georgia ; – Given the fact that Georgia is a home for quite large diasporas of Armenians and Azerbaijanis , there is an increasing possibility that representatives of these national and ethnic minorities , upset by disinformation and trolling of their compatriots , can cause violence and produce new spots of inter-ethnic conflict ; – The oil and gas pipelines passing through the territory of Georgia , and thus , the energy security of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; – at the same time , due to the escalation and lengthening of the military conflict , the likelihood of a large flow of refugees from the conflict zones is growing .
It should be noted that Georgia is already facing a refugee problem – as a result of the Russian occupation a number of people have been displaced from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region .
In conclusion , it should be mentioned that the Armenians , including those living in Georgia , are more and more often reminding Georgians and Georgia in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ showed during the Russian military aggression in 2008 .
Although , in reality , the relations between Armenia and Georgia include a number of “ awkward moments ” , which Armenian sources try not to recall .
For example , several representatives of the authorities and opposition of Armenia ( Levon Ter-Petrosyan , Serzh Sargsyan , Tigran Sagrsyan among others ) have repeatedly mentioned Georgia as an aggressor in the 2008 war , expressed support for Russia and the so-called South Ossetia .
In addition , Georgia remembers the unfriendly steps of Armenia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the UN resolution regarding the return of Georgian refugees .
Also , the tendency of rapprochement of NKR and the separatist and now occupied regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia .
And of course , the factor of the 102nd Russian military base located in Armenia , the personnel and equipment of which were alerted in August 2008 and became the strike force for the invasion of Georgia from Armenia ; moreover , the aircraft of the 426th air group from Erebuni , repeatedly violated the airspace of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not prevent at all .
To sum up , all this directly contradicts the most important national interest of Georgia – territorial integrity , which is under constant threat due to the Russian factor .
To summarize , we can say that any hotbed of tensions and hostilities and especially an armed conflict in the South Caucasus region , poses a potential threat to the security and stability of Georgia .
Hence , the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh , which has already taken the form of an Azerbaijani-Armenian war , places Georgia in front @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to its free and democratic future .
• Azerbaijani kamikaze drones falling on Georgian territory may be a provocation by a third country ( PHOTOS ) • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas • SurkovLeaks ( part 3 ) : analysis of the correspondence of Surkov ’ s first deputy Inal Ardzinba • How can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political map of the world ?
• Karabakh and Donbas : parallel tracks of the Minsk process • CSTO ’ s Strategic Command and Staff Training in the South Caucasus ( Document ) Specially Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) .
does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

This article discusses the attempts by Armenia and Azerbaijan to use media manipulation in order to pull Georgia into their military conflict. False news, viral posts, radical statements and insinuations coming from both countries and their leaders, are analyzed for the readers of Informnapalm by the Georgian politologist Andro Dzhashi.
False news and manipulations by Armenia
“Why is Georgia maintaining strict neutrality? Why are Georgians looking calmly at Azerbaijanis and Turks killing their Armenian brothers in faith? Why are Georgians staying silent, not protesting the use of the Georgian airspace for the transfer of military cargo and mercenaries, which are transported from Turkey and Israel under the cover of civilian cargo?” – These are just some of the questions being asked by the Armenian society (and in some cases by officials too) since the end of September, against the background of the large-scale combat activities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The main reason for such questions is common: Georgia borders both sides of the conflict. However, the reasons for the existence of such admonitions and complaints are quite complex and even difficult, requiring a more detailed analysis.
To begin with, it should be noted that both Armenian and Azerbaijani sources are constantly spreading false information regarding the position of Georgia in this military conflict. With the beginning of large-scale hostilities, a kind of virtual information warfare front line was created around Georgia. The most widespread information on this frontline are data and screenshots of Flightradar24, on the basis of which authors of various posts and comments speak about Georgia siding with Azerbaijan by allowing the transit of military cargo from Turkey and Israel through its territory. Notably, a number of pro-Armenian social networks users, including the Armenians living in Georgia, become victims of this kind of disinformation, which in itself contributes to the growth of anti-Georgian sentiments. One evidence of that are the protests of ethnic Armenians living in Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia. The participants of demonstrations openly stated that the information about Georgia allowing transit of military cargo for Armenia through its territory they found on social networks.
Based on social networks posts and comments, Armenians demand an “equal” treatment, that is, the creation of a kind of a corridor for the supply of weapons from Russia, ignoring the fact that since the beginning of the conflict, Georgia has banned the transit of any kind of military cargo through its territory. However, Armenian sources simply stay silent about this statement of the Georgian government.
The objections coming from Armenia are now being voiced at the highest state levels. For example, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan shared pictures of solidarity demonstrations organized by Armenian diaspora around the world. For all locations mentioned in the photos, their official, international names are used, with the notable exception of Samtskhe-Javakheti (the area of Georgia populated by Armenians), which is presented with its Armenian version, “Javakh”.
For Armenian nationalists, “Javakh” is an Armenian territory that should be returned to Armenia. At the same time, despite the fact that the official Yerevan has never expressed such a position, a certain and growing segment of the Armenian society welcomes this idea, which can be seen in the growing number of posts and comments on social media and open sources. For example, many Facebook users are aware of the statement by Karen Okhanjanian, who made a provocative call to declare the independence of “Javakh”. This hysteria reached its climax with the statement of the Vice-Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Lena Nazaryan who said that the independence of Georgia is protected by Armenian soldiers in Artsakh, thereby saying that Georgia should support Armenia.
Disinformation by Azerbaijan
In parallel with the Armenian claims against Georgia, the Azerbaijani side is also quite active. Unlike Armenian sources, it spreads “positive” disinformation about Georgia. One of the examples is a post of gratitude to Georgia for allowing the transit of military cargo from Turkey to Azerbaijan through its territory. Old footage that has nothing to do with the current events is presented as evidenc. Despite an immediate refutation of it by the Georgian government as well as by the Embassy of Armenia in Georgia, Armenian and pro-Armenian sources spread it as news all over social networks and beyond. And there were other fakes, for example, “In support of Azerbaijan, Tbilisi TV tower and the Peace Bridge were lit in the colors of the Azerbaijani flag”, which was initially published by the Oxu.az news agency. It was yet another disservice done by Azerbaijan to Georgia that further worsened the situation by going viral in both Azerbaijani and Armenian social networks and media.
Russian threat and influence
The origins of the information war and the answers to the questions presented at the very beginning of this article can be found in the territorial problems and conflicts of the South Caucasian states. Add to this the ambitions of Russia in the Transcaucasia, as well as the geopolitical position of Georgia, whose territory is actively used by a number of states in their interests, most of all by Azerbaijan and Armenia. All these point to the economic interdependence of the neighboring countries.
In addition, it should be also noted that:
– Taking into account the membership of Armenia in the “CSTO”, the shortest and in fact the only route from Russia to Armenia passes through the territory of Georgia, which has been affected by the Russian aggression (Russia occupies more than 20% of the territory of Georgia). Consequently, even the slightest military involvement of Russia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will further jeopardize the territorial sovereignty of Georgia;
– Given the fact that Georgia is a home for quite large diasporas of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, there is an increasing possibility that representatives of these national and ethnic minorities, upset by disinformation and trolling of their compatriots, can cause violence and produce new spots of inter-ethnic conflict;
– The oil and gas pipelines passing through the territory of Georgia, and thus, the energy security of the country, were also under threat;
– at the same time, due to the escalation and lengthening of the military conflict, the likelihood of a large flow of refugees from the conflict zones is growing. It should be noted that Georgia is already facing a refugee problem – as a result of the Russian occupation a number of people have been displaced from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region.
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the Armenians, including those living in Georgia, are more and more often reminding Georgians and Georgia in general about the support they expressed and showed during the Russian military aggression in 2008. Although, in reality, the relations between Armenia and Georgia include a number of “awkward moments”, which Armenian sources try not to recall. For example, several representatives of the authorities and opposition of Armenia (Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Tigran Sagrsyan among others) have repeatedly mentioned Georgia as an aggressor in the 2008 war, expressed support for Russia and the so-called South Ossetia. In addition, Georgia remembers the unfriendly steps of Armenia and its refusal to support the adoption of the UN resolution regarding the return of Georgian refugees. Also, the tendency of rapprochement of NKR and the separatist and now occupied regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. And of course, the factor of the 102nd Russian military base located in Armenia, the personnel and equipment of which were alerted in August 2008 and became the strike force for the invasion of Georgia from Armenia; moreover, the aircraft of the 426th air group from Erebuni, repeatedly violated the airspace of Georgia, which the Armenian side did not prevent at all. To sum up, all this directly contradicts the most important national interest of Georgia – territorial integrity, which is under constant threat due to the Russian factor.
To summarize, we can say that any hotbed of tensions and hostilities and especially an armed conflict in the South Caucasus region, poses a potential threat to the security and stability of Georgia. Hence, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has already taken the form of an Azerbaijani-Armenian war, places Georgia in front of new challenges and poses an immediate threat to its free and democratic future.
Read also other thematic materials InformNapalm:
Specially for informnapalm by Андро Джаши (Andro Jashi). Tbilisi, Georgia. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0).
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.