informnapalm--2020-10-20--A short review of the infosphere-based information and psychological operations targeting relations

A short review of the infosphere-based information and psychological operations targeting relations between Poland and Ukraine

Article prepared by Info Ops Polska Foundation .
Info OPS Polska Foundation was established for the implementation of projects aimed at ensuring the safety of the information environment .
The project includes support for the development of the capacity to identify information and psychological operations , including conducting analyses of manipulation processes of the Polish-speaking information environment : disinformation , propaganda , social engineering and cyber activities .
In this report , we present a short review of the infosphere-based information and psychological operations targeting relations between Poland and Ukraine .
This report and the presentation contain the expert view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which may not constitute the official view of the Polish government .
To manipulate and influence relations between Poland and Ukraine and between our nations , Russians target all areas of the infosphere : virtual area ( cyberspace ) , physical area ( physical actions and events ) and cognitive area ( the way we interpret events and make decisions based on these interpretations ) .
In this report , we review the main characteristics of their activities , we share our data on the messaging dynamics and we share examples of messaging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spheres .
We also describe one of the advanced information distribution and replication model , which we believe Russia uses to saturate the virtual sphere with manipulative messaging and to influence the cognitive sphere of Poles in relation to their view of Ukraine and Ukrainians .
Processes of manipulating information , which are supposed to negatively influence the mutual perception of Polish and Ukrainian societies , have the character of multidimensional activities .
Manipulation activities are carried out in the media , Polish-speaking Russian media , social networks , the blogosphere and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ environment .
Communication activities would not be sufficiently effective if they were separate from events , inspired by provocations , carried out in the physical dimension , as well as other active measures : information , political , military and economic pressure exerted by the Russian Federation against Poland and Ukraine , and in particular against mutual relations .
The specific features directly related to the Russian impact assessment of Polish-Ukrainian relations described above can be divided into basic groups by the methodology for implementing the Russian active measures .
The Russian influence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a comprehensive set of manipulative operations , journalism , disinformation , provocation , and other active information operations measures .
The most important techniques include : • Multivector narratives – adapted to the primary goal of shaping a negative image of Polish-Ukrainian relations on both sides of the border .
• Continuity of operations – that is a permanent and systematic influence on journalism , use of negative context , suggestive messages , including auxiliary materials ( journalism other than just Russian „ journalism ” ) .
• Manipulation activities in physical and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directly called propaganda centers , select the message aligned with the sensitive elements of history between Poland and Ukraine .
Alternatively , in the case of messages referring to current events , they present these events in a negative context , using elements that evoke emotions based on a deliberate choice of words , graphics , and sociotechnics .
The activities occur both in the physical and virtual dimensions .
Provocations , including special operations aimed at triggering information incidents destabilizing mutual relations , are one of the critical features of destabilizing Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the distribution of manipulative messages – Russia built a comprehensive cognitive model for the cyberspace .
This model is a complex process of specially crafted distribution of a message to saturate the targeted areas of cyberspace and permanently distort the information , which realizes the ultimate goal – the distortion of the perception of events by the targeted audience .
• Other active measures – these are actions of political warfare conducted – most probably – by the Russian security services ( to influence the course of world events , in addition to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” assessment of such events ) .
Active measures range from media manipulations to special operations involving various degrees of provocation and violence .
We have selected and analyzed the most popular examples , in terms of the scope of the operation of discrediting mutual Polish-Ukrainian relations , coming directly from the Russian propaganda center Sputnik which is one of the main information objects implementing Russian manipulation activities into the Polish information environment .
Sputnik is not overly popular in Poland , however , its range is constantly growing and its message is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only readers of the information portal , which is discussed at the end of this report .
One of the main objectives of Russian disinformation is to evoke the conviction that „ Ukraine is a failed state , plunged into economic crisis and corruption ” , that „ Ukrainians threaten its neighbors ” and that Kyiv lacks decision-making power and the authorities are powerless The fact that Russia and its supporters are playing out the issue of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of remembrance , focused on the issue of the Volhynia massacre , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the „ divide and rule ” method .
However , it is important to note that the Russian propaganda uses not only an artificial , chauvinistic and falsified image , but also facts are used for the purposes of their campaigns – to mix the messaging and make it harder for the human cognitive space to differentiate the truth from fake .
One of the features of the continuity of influence of Russian propaganda centers is the desire to saturate the information environment with a manipulated message in a systematic way – which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to ensure operational continuity , the Russian side systematically produces a certain number of manipulative materials , disinformation , and propaganda , which it then implements into the Polish-speaking information environment .
Measurement of communication dynamics highlights the main informational objectives of Russian operations .
We measured the communication dynamics of the Russian media .
Here is the list of 7 main thematic areas discussed by Russian media outlets in Poland since the first day of its operation till May 25 , 2019 – on Sputnik website .
Apart from shaping propaganda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the USA , Poland , NATO , the third place in terms of the number of messages is taken by Ukraine .
The result of this measurement confirms that Ukraine is one of the main vectors of the impact of Russian propaganda in Poland .
The priorities of Russian activities are variable , but the subject matter of Ukraine is invariably high in the objectives of Russian propaganda .
Over the past two years , operations to influence Polish-Ukrainian relations have been at the forefront of Russian operations .
Comparing the growing data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact in the period of 2017-2018 , there are no significant changes in the objectives of the Kremlin ’ s activities .
• 38 % – Presenting the negative image of the foreign policy of the United States and NATO countries .
• 32 % – Creating a falsely positive image of relations between Poland and the Russian Federation .
• 23 % – Shaping the negative image of Ukraine in the context of relations with Poland .
• 22 % – Shaping the negative image of the European Union .
• 18 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the actions taken by the European Union Member States in their relations with the Russian Federation .
• 17 % – Disavowing the Polish statehood , shaping the negative image of Poland .
• 4 % – Manipulating the area of information related to the Polish energy sector .
The detailed research shows the constant influence that Russia has adopted in order to manipulate the image of Poland , Ukraine , and mutual relations .
In a daily survey , on average since 2014 , the Russians have been creating 6.23 messages per @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activities is aimed at permanent creation of cognitive conditions in the information environment , which will have a permanent negative impact on the perception of mutual relations between Poland and Ukraine by the societies of both countries .
Among these materials , there is a variety of topics discussed in the context of Ukraine .
The chosen subject matter devoted to Ukraine is consistent with the context of the current situation , including the promotion of false theses , manipulative materials concerning the situation in occupied Donbas , Crimea , or the promotion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Donetsk and Lugansk .
Apart from the above-mentioned goals , such approach allows to carry out a number of destabilizing operations using themes sensitive to both nations : Poland and Ukraine .
Therefore , the messaging contains materials devoted to the Volhynia crime , the promotion of a false fascist painting , the Bandera of Ukraine as well as the promotion of all negative information , which are supposed to influence the perception of Ukraine by Poles .
The selected measurement indicates the messaging threads .
However , one should not forget @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disinformation measures contained in the Russian messaging .
An important element recognized in Russian activities is the reference to the current situation context , events taking place in Poland and Ukraine .
Messaging and manipulative actions are adapted to interact with the current media coverage of actual events and consist of not only manipulative materials .
It can , therefore , be concluded that the attempt to create a false image of Ukraine in order to influence mutual relations is multidimensional in nature .
In order to illustrate some of these actions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and permanent narratives which systematically appear in the Russian Sputnik : “ Ukraine as an unfriendly country to Poland ” : • negative aspects of relations between Poland and Ukraine in the historical context .
“ Ukraine as an economic risk for Poland ” : • reasons for underpayment , falling standard of living in Poland ; • the threat to the retirement and health care system .
Manipulative journalism aimed at creating the impression that the influx of emigrants from Ukraine to Poland caused unemployment and reduced the standard of living of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to create the impression that the presence of Ukrainian citizens in Poland , their employment , has a negative impact on Polish society .
To justify these manipulative theses , propagandists invoke narratives concerning unemployment among Poles , the reduction of Poles earnings by Ukrainians due to performing work for a lower salary than Poles , and many similar , negative impact on the image of Ukraine , false information .
One of them is promoting all negative media reports and falsifying media reports on negative events related to Ukrainian citizens in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of crimes , fights and similar incidents .
Ukrainians and Ukraine as a military threat to Poland Another example is disinformation about an alleged flood of Poland with weapons from Ukraine and an attempt to build underground armed organizations .
This false information message is intended to create the false impression that Ukraine is a military threat to Poland .
The propaganda materials contain elements of a conspiracy theory suggesting that Ukrainians are preparing for an armed uprising on Polish territory , or similar , saying that they are an element of hybrid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action .
These messages are usually combined with many others , such as promoting disinformation about Ukraine ’ s territorial claims against Poland and vice versa .
Fascism and the cult of Bandera “ Ukraine as a country possessed by fascism and the cult of Bandera.
” A fake message that has been realized constantly since the moment of the launch of the Polish-language Sputnik .
Russian propaganda promotes the theses about the fascism that dominates Ukraine , promotes all negative media reports related to the speeches of Ukrainian nationalists and duplicates disinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society by imposing the image of fascism , flag and nationalism through propaganda messages .
Another frequently encountered propaganda message is an attempt to evoke fear of the threat that may result from giving support to Ukraine .
These disinformation activities are being implemented in many accompanying narratives , such as support in economic , military and political contexts .
Russian propaganda centers create false theses that the „ conflict ” is exacerbated ( conflict in the eyes of Russian propaganda , which avoids statements that Russia is at war with Ukraine and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukraine ) .
The messaging is the following : the war between Ukraine and Russia , to which the Western world is supposed to contribute , will lead to the outbreak of war , including the Third World War and even nuclear extermination .
This type of messaging is intended to reduce the willingness of Poland to support Ukraine and to change the way the society perceives Ukraine ’ s role in the international security system .
Another example is creating the picture of the risk of immigration from Ukraine due to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ try to create a false impression that Ukrainian citizens living in Poland are an epidemiological threat .
Both information on the situation regarding vaccinations or lack of vaccinations in Ukraine and promotion of fake messages based on previously prepared materials by the Russian administration sector , such as Russian Federal Supervisory Service for the Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Welfare ( Rospotriebnadzor ) and it ’ s manipulative report „ About the situation with the Tuberculosis in Ukraine ’ .
Its main goal was to build negative narratives to influence project of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This material was also published in the Polish version of the Russian website Sputnik .
The general goal of these activities is obvious : it is another attempt to shape the negative impression and image of Ukraine in the eyes of Poles in order to obtain in the future permanent conditions for lowering the sympathy between the two nations .
Building a negative image of the Ukrainian authorities in accordance with the situational context .
Russian propaganda activities are not detached from the context of current events in Ukraine .
They pursue one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukrainian authorities , shaping the impression that the Ukrainian state is unstable , incapable of self-determination , permeated with corruption and Ukrainian politicians are presented as incompetent , unable to function in the reality of international politics and pursuing only their own particular interests .
An example was a series of publications on a Polish-language Sputnik related to the inauguration of the new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky .
In a short period of time , propaganda materials targeted both the outgoing President Petro Poroshenko and the new President Volodymyr Zelensky .
The fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation increases the effectiveness of actions as well as allows to maintain a constant narrative of a negative message about Ukraine using current contexts , aimed at creating manipulated information resources that will have a negative impact in the future as well .
One of the elements of these activities is also the use of sarcasm and humor through publications and the reproduction of mocking drawings such as the one depicting the outgoing President Potro Poroshenko who is „ fleeing Ukraine to take up a lucrative position in the structures of the European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Polish-Ukrainian relations not only by using the context of the image of Ukraine or Ukrainian citizens but also by promoting a negative image of Poland in the eyes of Ukrainians , as well as attempts to provide media support for communities involved in activities aimed at restitution of property .
These operations are aimed at promoting the message that the property of Poles living in the territory of present-day Ukraine before the Second World War should be returned to Poles and at the same time constitute an element of building and stimulating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by promoting information on territorial claims of Ukraine against Poland as well as territorial claims of Poland against Ukraine .
One of the side elements of Russian psychological operations is a visible attempt to create and popularize words that have a permanent negative impact on Ukraine ’ s image .
Such an element is called a rhetorical incident In this case , we have investigated two such cases , the words “ Banderowcy ” and “ Upaina ” .
One of these words is “ Upaina ” , which is a combination of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is an abbreviation of the Ukrainian insurgent army .
This word was intended to attribute the image of Ukraine as a nationalist state to one unique word which was promoted in the Polish language network , but it is not possible to say that this operation was successful in the success of the gradual permanent inclusion of Upaina phrases in social networks in the context of discussions on Ukraine – it did not become popular .
The situation is different with the second word : „ Banderowcy ” which was created from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was to create a unique word negatively depicting Ukraine in the eyes of Poles .
The statistical chart shows that this word can be considered as at least partially successful – the range and popularity of this tag/word have been steadily increasing since 2014 .
Another element of manipulating and disrupting Polish-Ukrainian relations are physical incidents and provocations , aimed at fuelling xenophobia , local hatred , provoking international incidents as well as provocations , which are then promoted in the media by Russian propaganda to disrupt the mutual relations between Poland and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launcher of the Polish consulate in Lutsk took place in the night of 28-29 March .
The perpetrators of the attack were arrested by the Ukrainian justice system and are said to be involved in many similar provocations , such as the devastation of the synagogue in Czernowce and the grenade attack on the U.S. Embassy .
One can assume the thesis that the group ’ s activity was deliberately aimed at taking criminal action in order to destabilize relations between Ukraine and its allies , including Poland .
Apart from the attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were also other incidents and provocations of various nature : the devastation of the monument of the Poles murdered in the Pieniacka Steelworks .
In the Lviv region in Mościski , there was also arson of one of the classes of the Polish school .
All these events were condemned by the Ukrainian authorities , who explicitly stated that the nature of these provocations is aimed at provoking a conflict between Poland and Ukraine and Russian secret services were pointed out as the initiators .
Other similar provocations include an attack on Polish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Polish tourist bus among which former local government officials were set on fire in order to intimidate the population , arouse fear and negative associations associated with Ukraine , and provoke international complications in relations between Ukraine and Poland .
Provocations directed against Polish-Ukrainian relations are even more effective if Poles are directly involved in them , as in the case of the setting fire to the Hungarian cultural center in Uzhorod in Ukrainian Zakarpatie .
The perpetrators tried twice to set fire to the Hungarian cultural center in Uzhorod at night .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the second time the ground floor of the building was partially burned down .
The incident affected not only Polish-Ukrainian relations but also Ukrainian-Hungarian relations .
The attack in Uzhorod was perpetrated by Poles belonging to a radical right-wing organization and detained by the Polish law enforcement .
One of the defendants , who recruited both Poles from the radical right wing to arson , claimed that the financing of this provocation ( a total of 1.5 thousand EUR ) was by Manuel Ochsenreiter , an associate of Markus Frohnmaier , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alternative to Germany ( AfD ) , allegedly known for his pro-Russian sympathies and many Russian contacts .
Russian advanced model for the distribution of manipulative messages We discovered and analyzed multiple models that we believe Russians use to distribute and replicate manipulative messages .
We present a short description of one of these models .
The first information object that operates in this model is the Sputnik website .
It is used to inject manipulative messages into the Polish-language infosphere .
It has a limited range as a website , but this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are changed and replicated multiple times by other means .
Sputnik s the beginning of the process of entering of a message into the infosphere .
The second stage of the model is the first multiplication of Sputnik content into a set of websites .
At this stage , the text of the message is not significantly changed by Russian operators .
The title sometimes changes , but the lead remains similar to the content placed on Sputnik .
This the duplication of content , slightly changed to other information objects in order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The next phase is the transfer of content to the blogging network .
What distinguishes this process from the previous one is the fact that the contents are subject to major changes at this stage and are often referred to in the form of opinions on publications from the second stage .
This phase is already used to stage the shaping the cognitive area through the creation of specially crafted information environments .
The next step in this distribution model is to use objects in social media to distribute propaganda material in various @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adapted to the purpose of the operation , the recipients ’ vulnerability , the preferences of groups and social units in relation to which the opponent wants the disinformation operation to be effective .
The infographic shows selected social media sites , but in practice we have seen the use of even small social networking sites as tools for distribution .
The next area shaped by the opponent are the places on the web which can be qualified as areas of exchange of opinions by natural internet users .
The field of opinion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fields of publications on the pages with messages links to content created and multiplied in the two previous areas – alternative websites and the blogosphere .
This stage of the process is also the beginning of the activity of the Russian or so-called pro-Russian objects in the social media that distribute this content and/or address selected users .
The next information area targeted in this model are the internet forums that can be qualified to the previous areas , i.e , the exchange of opinions by the society , but in this case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by another team of opponent ’ s operators .
These are generally well-prepared fictitious users of the forum , conducting discussions using materials from the second and third area of influence , as well as organically produced content , but conducted using a logical previously planned sequence .
The area of hybrid content is in practice the storage of resources in the fields of comments and opinions by mixing , transforming the content of the publication in order to hide the relationship with other pro-Russian activities on the Internet or publications of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and materials used so far in the areas of opinion exchange .
The next phase of the impact is the creation of micro information areas dedicated to the impact on selected individuals or leaders of recognized groups with certain vulnerabilities/preferences .
A good example of these actions are the opponent ’ s resources used to disrupt the relations between Poland and Ukraine based on the stirring of conflicts on the historical background .
This area is also an opportunity to conduct professional attempts to influence the impact on selected people or decision makers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distribution of all previously created cognitive areas , information environments using the users that we qualify as opinion leaders in the social media .
The opinion leader can be physical , for example , an influence agent or virtual – seemingly existing user , social group and others .
In addition to the opinion leader , at this stage tools to strengthen the scope of operations , such as botnets , are also used .
This phase of the operation also includes maintaining discussions , sending false positive messages to individual recipients , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a specific person or a team of people .
The next stage of operations in this distribution pyramid is dedicated and qualified operations for specialized psychological operations conducted against events or individual recipients .
In this case , an extensive profiling and targeting model can be identified .
One of the tools used by the Russians is checking the response to information stimuli – in this case , information , disinformation or manipulation .
One of the elements facilitating the identification of these activities is the recognition of a user or group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ addressing them to selected persons or groups that are in fact checked and recognized .
In some very specific operations , one can identify special operation techniques , such as the use of a color graphic message adapted to the prevailing weather conditions in a given location ( a human reacts differently to bright colors at low and high atmospheric pressure ) .
The use of such methods proves the involvement of professional special operators in the process of conducting an information attack .
Modern society functions in a much different data flow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It will come as no surprise to anyone that cyberspace has now become the dominant dimension of message shaping .
The information environment requires increasing commitment to ensuring sovereignty and security in the complex space of human beings , organizations , entities and systems that collect , process and distribute data .
Cyberspace and the infosphere are inseparable areas of the information environment , which functions in three interacting dimensions : physical , virtual and cognitive .
The present virtual information environment differs from the traditional one because messages are subjected to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tools , media centers , social media , and the blogosphere .
The Russian operation to influence Polish-Ukrainian relations can not be seen only in the context of actions carried out in social networks or using media centers .
The process of recognizing Russian influence operations requires a comprehensive approach .
The recognition of the message should be based not only on the verification of media or propaganda content but above all on the analysis of the entire spectrum in which a public or private entity may conduct a hostile operation .
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has become a key communication space , intensively used to manipulate the information environment by shaping all dimensions of the informational impact in open and hidden areas .
However , cyberspace is not the only dimension of impact operations .
It often remains a secondary aspect of the stimuli initiated by actual or simulated incidents in the physical dimension .
In order to protect information environment shaping the way Poles and Ukrainians perceive mutual relations , a broad spectrum of recognition of all Russian hostile operations is required , in order combat one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to destabilize the social , political and economic relations between the two countries .
This report reflects only the report publisher ’ s views and does not constitute an official position of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs .
The unabridged version of the report in PDF format is available here :

Cover photo by outsourcingreview.org
Article prepared by Info Ops Polska Foundation. Info OPS Polska Foundation was established for the implementation of projects aimed at ensuring the safety of the information environment. The project includes support for the development of the capacity to identify information and psychological operations, including conducting analyses of manipulation processes of the Polish-speaking information environment: disinformation, propaganda, social engineering and cyber activities.
Management summary
In this report, we present a short review of the infosphere-based information and psychological operations targeting relations between Poland and Ukraine. This report and the presentation contain the expert view of the Info Ops Polska Foundation, which may not constitute the official view of the Polish government.
To manipulate and influence relations between Poland and Ukraine and between our nations, Russians target all areas of the infosphere: virtual area (cyberspace), physical area (physical actions and events) and cognitive area (the way we interpret events and make decisions based on these interpretations). In this report, we review the main characteristics of their activities, we share our data on the messaging dynamics and we share examples of messaging and activities in the virtual and physical spheres. We also describe one of the advanced information distribution and replication model, which we believe Russia uses to saturate the virtual sphere with manipulative messaging and to influence the cognitive sphere of Poles in relation to their view of Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Introduction
Processes of manipulating information, which are supposed to negatively influence the mutual perception of Polish and Ukrainian societies, have the character of multidimensional activities. Manipulation activities are carried out in the media, Polish-speaking Russian media, social networks, the blogosphere and other dedicated information areas in a virtual information environment. Communication activities would not be sufficiently effective if they were separate from events, inspired by provocations, carried out in the physical dimension, as well as other active measures: information, political, military and economic pressure exerted by the Russian Federation against Poland and Ukraine, and in particular against mutual relations.
The specific features directly related to the Russian impact assessment of Polish-Ukrainian relations described above can be divided into basic groups by the methodology for implementing the Russian active measures. The Russian influence operations on Polish-Ukrainian relations are characterized by a comprehensive set of manipulative operations, journalism, disinformation, provocation, and other active information operations measures. The most important techniques include:
Multivector narratives – adapted to the primary goal of shaping a negative image of Polish-Ukrainian relations on both sides of the border.
Continuity of operations – that is a permanent and systematic influence on journalism, use of negative context, suggestive messages, including auxiliary materials (journalism other than just Russian „journalism”).
Manipulation activities in physical and virtual dimensions – Russian media centers, directly called propaganda centers, select the message aligned with the sensitive elements of history between Poland and Ukraine. Alternatively, in the case of messages referring to current events, they present these events in a negative context, using elements that evoke emotions based on a deliberate choice of words, graphics, and sociotechnics. The activities occur both in the physical and virtual dimensions. Provocations, including special operations aimed at triggering information incidents destabilizing mutual relations, are one of the critical features of destabilizing Russian information operations.
Advanced model for the distribution of manipulative messages – Russia built a comprehensive cognitive model for the cyberspace. This model is a complex process of specially crafted distribution of a message to saturate the targeted areas of cyberspace and permanently distort the information, which realizes the ultimate goal – the distortion of the perception of events by the targeted audience.
Other active measures – these are actions of political warfare conducted – most probably – by the Russian security services (to influence the course of world events, in addition to collecting intelligence and producing „politically correct” assessment of such events). Active measures range from media manipulations to special operations involving various degrees of provocation and violence.
We have selected and analyzed the most popular examples, in terms of the scope of the operation of discrediting mutual Polish-Ukrainian relations, coming directly from the Russian propaganda center Sputnik which is one of the main information objects implementing Russian manipulation activities into the Polish information environment. Sputnik is not overly popular in Poland, however, its range is constantly growing and its message is available to a much wider audience than only readers of the information portal, which is discussed at the end of this report.
One of the main objectives of Russian disinformation is to evoke the conviction that „Ukraine is a failed state, plunged into economic crisis and corruption”, that „Ukrainians threaten its neighbors” and that Kyiv lacks decision-making power and the authorities are powerless
The fact that Russia and its supporters are playing out the issue of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of remembrance, focused on the issue of the Volhynia massacre, is a model example of the implementation of the „divide and rule” method. However, it is important to note that the Russian propaganda uses not only an artificial, chauvinistic and falsified image, but also facts are used for the purposes of their campaigns – to mix the messaging and make it harder for the human cognitive space to differentiate the truth from fake.
One of the features of the continuity of influence of Russian propaganda centers is the desire to saturate the information environment with a manipulated message in a systematic way – which is called continuity of activities.
In order to ensure operational continuity, the Russian side systematically produces a certain number of manipulative materials, disinformation, and propaganda, which it then implements into the Polish-speaking information environment. Measurement of communication dynamics highlights the main informational objectives of Russian operations.
Communication dynamics
We measured the communication dynamics of the Russian media. Here is the list of 7 main thematic areas discussed by Russian media outlets in Poland since the first day of its operation till May 25, 2019 – on Sputnik website.
Apart from shaping propaganda materials on Russia, negative communication about the USA, Poland, NATO, the third place in terms of the number of messages is taken by Ukraine.
The result of this measurement confirms that Ukraine is one of the main vectors of the impact of Russian propaganda in Poland.
The priorities of Russian activities are variable, but the subject matter of Ukraine is invariably high in the objectives of Russian propaganda. Over the past two years, operations to influence Polish-Ukrainian relations have been at the forefront of Russian operations.
Comparing the growing data in relation to the measurement of informational impact in the period of 2017-2018, there are no significant changes in the objectives of the Kremlin’s activities.
38% – Presenting the negative image of the foreign policy of the United States and NATO countries. 32% – Creating a falsely positive image of relations between Poland and the Russian Federation. 23% – Depreciation of Poland’s defense capabilities. 23% – Shaping the negative image of Ukraine in the context of relations with Poland. 22% – Shaping the negative image of the European Union. 18% – Shaping a negative image of the actions taken by the European Union Member States in their relations with the Russian Federation. 17% – Disavowing the Polish statehood, shaping the negative image of Poland. 17% – Building a negative image of immigration and refugees. 4% – Manipulating the area of information related to the Polish energy sector.
The detailed research shows the constant influence that Russia has adopted in order to manipulate the image of Poland, Ukraine, and mutual relations. In a daily survey, on average since 2014, the Russians have been creating 6.23 messages per day.
Such a model of propaganda activities is aimed at permanent creation of cognitive conditions in the information environment, which will have a permanent negative impact on the perception of mutual relations between Poland and Ukraine by the societies of both countries.
Among these materials, there is a variety of topics discussed in the context of Ukraine. The chosen subject matter devoted to Ukraine is consistent with the context of the current situation, including the promotion of false theses, manipulative materials concerning the situation in occupied Donbas, Crimea, or the promotion of the so-called „self-proclaimed republics”, Donetsk and Lugansk. Apart from the above-mentioned goals, such approach allows to carry out a number of destabilizing operations using themes sensitive to both nations: Poland and Ukraine. Therefore, the messaging contains materials devoted to the Volhynia crime, the promotion of a false fascist painting, the Bandera of Ukraine as well as the promotion of all negative information, which are supposed to influence the perception of Ukraine by Poles.
The selected measurement indicates the messaging threads. However, one should not forget that these are not all the negative disinformation measures contained in the Russian messaging. An important element recognized in Russian activities is the reference to the current situation context, events taking place in Poland and Ukraine. Messaging and manipulative actions are adapted to interact with the current media coverage of actual events and consist of not only manipulative materials.
It can, therefore, be concluded that the attempt to create a false image of Ukraine in order to influence mutual relations is multidimensional in nature.
In order to illustrate some of these actions, one can quote some simple, false and permanent narratives which systematically appear in the Russian Sputnik:
“Ukraine as an unfriendly country to Poland”:
nationalism;
territorial claims;
risk of military action against Poland;
negative aspects of relations between Poland and Ukraine in the historical context.
“Ukraine as a failed state”:
corruption;
lawlessness;
epidemiological threat.
“Ukraine as an economic risk for Poland”:
reason for unemployment of Poles;
reasons for underpayment, falling standard of living in Poland;
the threat to the retirement and health care system.
Examples of Russian manipulative messaging
Unemployment risk and lower wages in Poland
Manipulative journalism aimed at creating the impression that the influx of emigrants from Ukraine to Poland caused unemployment and reduced the standard of living of Poles. The aim of the message is to create the impression that the presence of Ukrainian citizens in Poland, their employment, has a negative impact on Polish society. To justify these manipulative theses, propagandists invoke narratives concerning unemployment among Poles, the reduction of Poles earnings by Ukrainians due to performing work for a lower salary than Poles, and many similar, negative impact on the image of Ukraine, false information. One of them is promoting all negative media reports and falsifying media reports on negative events related to Ukrainian citizens in Poland and Ukraine. E.g. Reports of crimes, fights and similar incidents.
Ukrainians and Ukraine as a military threat to Poland
Another example is disinformation about an alleged flood of Poland with weapons from Ukraine and an attempt to build underground armed organizations. This false information message is intended to create the false impression that Ukraine is a military threat to Poland. The propaganda materials contain elements of a conspiracy theory suggesting that Ukrainians are preparing for an armed uprising on Polish territory, or similar, saying that they are an element of hybrid actions, potential in terms of military action.
These messages are usually combined with many others, such as promoting disinformation about Ukraine’s territorial claims against Poland and vice versa.
Fascism and the cult of Bandera
“Ukraine as a country possessed by fascism and the cult of Bandera.” A fake message that has been realized constantly since the moment of the launch of the Polish-language Sputnik. Russian propaganda promotes the theses about the fascism that dominates Ukraine, promotes all negative media reports related to the speeches of Ukrainian nationalists and duplicates disinformation shaping the image of Ukraine and Ukrainian society by imposing the image of fascism, flag and nationalism through propaganda messages.
Another frequently encountered propaganda message is an attempt to evoke fear of the threat that may result from giving support to Ukraine. These disinformation activities are being implemented in many accompanying narratives, such as support in economic, military and political contexts. Russian propaganda centers create false theses that the „conflict” is exacerbated (conflict in the eyes of Russian propaganda, which avoids statements that Russia is at war with Ukraine and masks all information about hostile actions against Ukraine). The messaging is the following: the war between Ukraine and Russia, to which the Western world is supposed to contribute, will lead to the outbreak of war, including the Third World War and even nuclear extermination. This type of messaging is intended to reduce the willingness of Poland to support Ukraine and to change the way the society perceives Ukraine’s role in the international security system.
The epidemiological risk for Poland
Another example is creating the picture of the risk of immigration from Ukraine due to the epidemiological threat Russian “media” outlets try to create a false impression that Ukrainian citizens living in Poland are an epidemiological threat. Both information on the situation regarding vaccinations or lack of vaccinations in Ukraine and promotion of fake messages based on previously prepared materials by the Russian administration sector, such as Russian Federal Supervisory Service for the Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Welfare (Rospotriebnadzor) and it’s manipulative report „About the situation with the Tuberculosis in Ukraine’. Its main goal was to build negative narratives to influence project of visa-free traveling to EU for Ukrainians. This material was also published in the Polish version of the Russian website Sputnik. The general goal of these activities is obvious: it is another attempt to shape the negative impression and image of Ukraine in the eyes of Poles in order to obtain in the future permanent conditions for lowering the sympathy between the two nations.
Ukraine as a failed state
Building a negative image of the Ukrainian authorities in accordance with the situational context. Russian propaganda activities are not detached from the context of current events in Ukraine. They pursue one common goal: the depreciation of the Ukrainian authorities, shaping the impression that the Ukrainian state is unstable, incapable of self-determination, permeated with corruption and Ukrainian politicians are presented as incompetent, unable to function in the reality of international politics and pursuing only their own particular interests. An example was a series of publications on a Polish-language Sputnik related to the inauguration of the new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In a short period of time, propaganda materials targeted both the outgoing President Petro Poroshenko and the new President Volodymyr Zelensky. The fact that Russian propaganda refers to the current situation increases the effectiveness of actions as well as allows to maintain a constant narrative of a negative message about Ukraine using current contexts, aimed at creating manipulated information resources that will have a negative impact in the future as well. One of the elements of these activities is also the use of sarcasm and humor through publications and the reproduction of mocking drawings such as the one depicting the outgoing President Potro Poroshenko who is „fleeing Ukraine to take up a lucrative position in the structures of the European Union”.
Restitution of Polish property lost in Ukraine
Russian activities are aimed at Polish-Ukrainian relations not only by using the context of the image of Ukraine or Ukrainian citizens but also by promoting a negative image of Poland in the eyes of Ukrainians, as well as attempts to provide media support for communities involved in activities aimed at restitution of property. These operations are aimed at promoting the message that the property of Poles living in the territory of present-day Ukraine before the Second World War should be returned to Poles and at the same time constitute an element of building and stimulating animosity on both sides of the border by promoting information on territorial claims of Ukraine against Poland as well as territorial claims of Poland against Ukraine.
Negative wording
One of the side elements of Russian psychological operations is a visible attempt to create and popularize words that have a permanent negative impact on Ukraine’s image. Such an element is called a rhetorical incident In this case, we have investigated two such cases, the words “Banderowcy” and “Upaina”.
One of these words is “Upaina”, which is a combination of the words Ukraine and UPA, which is an abbreviation of the Ukrainian insurgent army. This word was intended to attribute the image of Ukraine as a nationalist state to one unique word which was promoted in the Polish language network, but it is not possible to say that this operation was successful in the success of the gradual permanent inclusion of Upaina phrases in social networks in the context of discussions on Ukraine – it did not become popular.
The situation is different with the second word: „Banderowcy” which was created from the name of Stepan Bandera. The idea was to create a unique word negatively depicting Ukraine in the eyes of Poles. The statistical chart shows that this word can be considered as at least partially successful – the range and popularity of this tag/word have been steadily increasing since 2014.
Causing incidents and provocations; maskirovka
Another element of manipulating and disrupting Polish-Ukrainian relations are physical incidents and provocations, aimed at fuelling xenophobia, local hatred, provoking international incidents as well as provocations, which are then promoted in the media by Russian propaganda to disrupt the mutual relations between Poland and Ukraine.
The shooting from the grenade launcher of the Polish consulate in Lutsk took place in the night of 28-29 March. The perpetrators of the attack were arrested by the Ukrainian justice system and are said to be involved in many similar provocations, such as the devastation of the synagogue in Czernowce and the grenade attack on the U.S. Embassy. One can assume the thesis that the group’s activity was deliberately aimed at taking criminal action in order to destabilize relations between Ukraine and its allies, including Poland.
Apart from the attack on the consulate in Lutsk, there were also other incidents and provocations of various nature: the devastation of the monument of the Poles murdered in the Pieniacka Steelworks. In the Lviv region in Mościski, there was also arson of one of the classes of the Polish school.
All these events were condemned by the Ukrainian authorities, who explicitly stated that the nature of these provocations is aimed at provoking a conflict between Poland and Ukraine and Russian secret services were pointed out as the initiators.
Other similar provocations include an attack on Polish cemeteries in Lviv, arson of a Polish tourist bus among which former local government officials were set on fire in order to intimidate the population, arouse fear and negative associations associated with Ukraine, and provoke international complications in relations between Ukraine and Poland.
Provocations directed against Polish-Ukrainian relations are even more effective if Poles are directly involved in them, as in the case of the setting fire to the Hungarian cultural center in Uzhorod in Ukrainian Zakarpatie.
The perpetrators tried twice to set fire to the Hungarian cultural center in Uzhorod at night. The first time the losses were small, the second time the ground floor of the building was partially burned down. The incident affected not only Polish-Ukrainian relations but also Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. The attack in Uzhorod was perpetrated by Poles belonging to a radical right-wing organization and detained by the Polish law enforcement. One of the defendants, who recruited both Poles from the radical right wing to arson, claimed that the financing of this provocation (a total of 1.5 thousand EUR) was by Manuel Ochsenreiter, an associate of Markus Frohnmaier, a deputy to the Bundestag from the party Alternative to Germany (AfD), allegedly known for his pro-Russian sympathies and many Russian contacts.
Russian advanced model for the distribution of manipulative messages
We discovered and analyzed multiple models that we believe Russians use to distribute and replicate manipulative messages. We present a short description of one of these models.
The first information object that operates in this model is the Sputnik website. It is used to inject manipulative messages into the Polish-language infosphere. It has a limited range as a website, but this is misleading. Messages originating from Sputnik are changed and replicated multiple times by other means. Sputnik s the beginning of the process of entering of a message into the infosphere.
The second stage of the model is the first multiplication of Sputnik content into a set of websites. At this stage, the text of the message is not significantly changed by Russian operators. The title sometimes changes, but the lead remains similar to the content placed on Sputnik. This the duplication of content, slightly changed to other information objects in order to increase the potential of impact.
The next phase is the transfer of content to the blogging network. What distinguishes this process from the previous one is the fact that the contents are subject to major changes at this stage and are often referred to in the form of opinions on publications from the second stage. This phase is already used to stage the shaping the cognitive area through the creation of specially crafted information environments.
The next step in this distribution model is to use objects in social media to distribute propaganda material in various ways. The distribution method is obviously adapted to the purpose of the operation, the recipients’ vulnerability, the preferences of groups and social units in relation to which the opponent wants the disinformation operation to be effective.
The infographic shows selected social media sites, but in practice we have seen the use of even small social networking sites as tools for distribution. The next area shaped by the opponent are the places on the web which can be qualified as areas of exchange of opinions by natural internet users.
The field of opinion means in practice putting comments in the fields of publications on the pages with messages links to content created and multiplied in the two previous areas – alternative websites and the blogosphere.
This stage of the process is also the beginning of the activity of the Russian or so-called pro-Russian objects in the social media that distribute this content and/or address selected users.
The next information area targeted in this model are the internet forums that can be qualified to the previous areas, i.e, the exchange of opinions by the society, but in this case, the distribution process is carried out by another team of opponent’s operators. These are generally well-prepared fictitious users of the forum, conducting discussions using materials from the second and third area of influence, as well as organically produced content, but conducted using a logical previously planned sequence.
The area of hybrid content is in practice the storage of resources in the fields of comments and opinions by mixing, transforming the content of the publication in order to hide the relationship with other pro-Russian activities on the Internet or publications of the first, third and third information areas and materials used so far in the areas of opinion exchange. The next phase of the impact is the creation of micro information areas dedicated to the impact on selected individuals or leaders of recognized groups with certain vulnerabilities/preferences. A good example of these actions are the opponent’s resources used to disrupt the relations between Poland and Ukraine based on the stirring of conflicts on the historical background.
This area is also an opportunity to conduct professional attempts to influence the impact on selected people or decision makers.
The next stage is the planned distribution of all previously created cognitive areas, information environments using the users that we qualify as opinion leaders in the social media. The opinion leader can be physical, for example, an influence agent or virtual – seemingly existing user, social group and others. In addition to the opinion leader, at this stage tools to strengthen the scope of operations, such as botnets, are also used. This phase of the operation also includes maintaining discussions, sending false positive messages to individual recipients, or distributing support for special operations aimed at a specific person or a team of people.
The next stage of operations in this distribution pyramid is dedicated and qualified operations for specialized psychological operations conducted against events or individual recipients. In this case, an extensive profiling and targeting model can be identified. One of the tools used by the Russians is checking the response to information stimuli – in this case, information, disinformation or manipulation. One of the elements facilitating the identification of these activities is the recognition of a user or group of users who conduct contradictory discussions and addressing them to selected persons or groups that are in fact checked and recognized.
In some very specific operations, one can identify special operation techniques, such as the use of a color graphic message adapted to the prevailing weather conditions in a given location (a human reacts differently to bright colors at low and high atmospheric pressure). The use of such methods proves the involvement of professional special operators in the process of conducting an information attack.
Summary
Modern society functions in a much different data flow than it was ten years ago. It will come as no surprise to anyone that cyberspace has now become the dominant dimension of message shaping. The information environment requires increasing commitment to ensuring sovereignty and security in the complex space of human beings, organizations, entities and systems that collect, process and distribute data.
Cyberspace and the infosphere are inseparable areas of the information environment, which functions in three interacting dimensions: physical, virtual and cognitive. The present virtual information environment differs from the traditional one because messages are subjected to a process of dynamic continuous creation/processing/replicating/modification by various tools, media centers, social media, and the blogosphere.
The Russian operation to influence Polish-Ukrainian relations cannot be seen only in the context of actions carried out in social networks or using media centers. The process of recognizing Russian influence operations requires a comprehensive approach. The recognition of the message should be based not only on the verification of media or propaganda content but above all on the analysis of the entire spectrum in which a public or private entity may conduct a hostile operation.
With the development of the Internet, cyberspace has become a key communication space, intensively used to manipulate the information environment by shaping all dimensions of the informational impact in open and hidden areas. However, cyberspace is not the only dimension of impact operations. It often remains a secondary aspect of the stimuli initiated by actual or simulated incidents in the physical dimension.
In order to protect information environment shaping the way Poles and Ukrainians perceive mutual relations, a broad spectrum of recognition of all Russian hostile operations is required, in order combat one of the primary Russia goals which is to destabilize the social, political and economic relations between the two countries.
This report reflects only the report publisher’s views and does not constitute an official position of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The unabridged version of the report in PDF format is available here:


informnapalm--2020-10-21--National Guard of Russia is practicing training and combat operations in Belarus

Special-purpose units of the National Guard of Russia ( Federal National Guard Troops Service of the Russian Federation ) are practicing training and combat operations on the territory of Belarus .
This is taking place against the backdrop of ongoing mass protests in the country .
According to the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus , an interdepartmental shooting tournament with standard service weapons was held on the territory of Belarus .
Competitions were held among special-purpose forces of Belarus and Russia .
The tournament was dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Almaz @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus .
The tournament , hosted by Almaz , was held on the grounds of the Volovshchina training center of the Minsk military garrison near Minsk .
Let us recall that , according to the testimony of the expert community , the killer of a peaceful protester Alexander Taraikovsky shot dead on August 10 , 2020 could have been affiliated with Almaz unit .
Alexander Taraikovsky , moments before his death from a gunshot wound , August 10 , 2020 / Associated Press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of illegal armed groups were practiced during the tournament .
Shooting in the dark was also an important component .
It was found that the Rys Special Rapid Response Unit ( SRRU ) and the Vityaz 604th Special Purpose Center ( SPC ) took part in the competition from the Russian side .
Both of these special-purpose units are part of the Federal National Guard Troops Service of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs .
The leadership of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs often calls the Rys unit the elite of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side , the tournament was attended by two army groups of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus ( 5th Separate Special Operations Brigade and 33rd Separate Special Forces Detachment ) , Group A of the Belarusian KGB , SRRU of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a unit of the State Border Committee , presumably OSAM ( Separate Detachment for Active Measures ) .
Yuri Karaev , Interior Minister of Belarus , presenting a diploma to a soldier of the Rys special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , October 2020 / rg.ru Representatives of the Belarusian security and intelligence agencies closely cooperate with Russian formations that were directly involved in the military aggression against Ukraine .
It is known that Russia uses the special forces of the National Guard of Russia to strengthen its military presence in the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine .
According to the information of the Main Intelligence Directorate ( GUR ) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine , in May 2016 , the Rys was deployed in the occupied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the criminal entourage of the head of the so called Luhansk People Republic terrorist group Ihor Plotnitsky and to stop the activities of bandit groups , also to reassert control over the actions of Kremlin-controlled leaders .
Serviceman of the Rys special forces unit of National Guard of Russia / warweapons.ru Also , according to GUR intelligence data , the subdivisions of the Vityaz SPC arrived from the town of Balashikha near Moscow to the occupied city Yasynuvata , Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine , as a part of the regular personnel rotation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vityaz SPC also took an active part in the special operation to seize the Ukrainian Crimea .
It is known that the Rys SRRU takes an active part in the joint military exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization ( CSTO ) , which are taking place on the territory of its member countries .
At the moment , a joint task force of National Guard of Russia is deployed under the guise of participating in the Indestructible Brotherhood 2020 command and staff training within the CSTO .
command and staff training at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Oblast , October 12 , 2020 / dfnc.ru It should be especially noted that following secret negotiations with the Lukashenko ’ s regime in the first week of mass protests , Russian leader Vladimir Putin announced in August his readiness to deploy the dedicated reserve of National Guard of Russia on the territory of Belarus .
Apparently , this indicates that top military and political leaders of Belarus and Russia coordinate their actions in the context of their intention to crack down on peaceful protests in Belarus .
During the period of significant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the National Guard of Russia under the guise of participation in various competitions and military exercises are deployed on the territory of Belarus on a regular and rotational basis .
Servicemen of the special forces of the National Guard of Russia deployed in Belarus may be involved in both overt and covert operations of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs against the peaceful protests .
They could also participate in planned provocations or sabotage in order to destabilize the socio-political situation , as well as escalate the confrontation in Belarus .
Proofs of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ database of evidence Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas The leader of the Belarusian protest movement Sergei Tikhanovsky illegally visited Crimea Russian officer-potential witness in MH17 case-spotted at parade in Minsk A unit of the 275th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment participates in the parade in Minsk , whose servicemen shelled Mariupol How the Servicemen of the Russian 46th Brigade ‘ Overpassed ’ Ukraine Preparing for the invasion : purchases of mortars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military aggression by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Monitoring department of the Belarusian service of the InformNapalm international intelligence community .
Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi , edited by Artem Velichko .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) .
does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

Special-purpose units of the National Guard of Russia (Federal National Guard Troops Service of the Russian Federation) are practicing training and combat operations on the territory of Belarus. This is taking place against the backdrop of ongoing mass protests in the country.
According to the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, an interdepartmental shooting tournament with standard service weapons was held on the territory of Belarus.
Competitions were held among special-purpose forces of Belarus and Russia. The tournament was dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Almaz Special Anti-Terrorism Unit (SPBT Almaz) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus.
The tournament, hosted by Almaz, was held on the grounds of the Volovshchina training center of the Minsk military garrison near Minsk.
Let us recall that, according to the testimony of the expert community, the killer of a peaceful protester Alexander Taraikovsky shot dead on August 10, 2020 could have been affiliated with Almaz unit.
Alexander Taraikovsky, moments before his death from a gunshot wound, August 10, 2020 / Associated Press
Sniper pairs operation, blocking and destruction of illegal armed groups were practiced during the tournament. Shooting in the dark was also an important component.
It was found that the Rys Special Rapid Response Unit (SRRU) and the Vityaz 604th Special Purpose Center (SPC) took part in the competition from the Russian side. Both of these special-purpose units are part of the Federal National Guard Troops Service of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The leadership of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs often calls the Rys unit the elite of the Russian special forces.
On the Belarusian side, the tournament was attended by two army groups of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (5th Separate Special Operations Brigade and 33rd Separate Special Forces Detachment), Group A of the Belarusian KGB, SRRU of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a unit of the State Border Committee, presumably OSAM (Separate Detachment for Active Measures).
Yuri Karaev, Interior Minister of Belarus, presenting a diploma to a soldier of the Rys special unit of the National Guard of Russia, October 2020 / rg.ru
Representatives of the Belarusian security and intelligence agencies closely cooperate with Russian formations that were directly involved in the military aggression against Ukraine.
It is known that Russia uses the special forces of the National Guard of Russia to strengthen its military presence in the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine.
According to the information of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, in May 2016, the Rys was deployed in the occupied territory of Luhansk Oblast to increase pressure on the criminal entourage of the head of the so called Luhansk People Republic terrorist group Ihor Plotnitsky and to stop the activities of bandit groups, also to reassert control over the actions of Kremlin-controlled leaders.
Serviceman of the Rys special forces unit of National Guard of Russia / warweapons.ru
Also, according to GUR intelligence data, the subdivisions of the Vityaz SPC arrived from the town of Balashikha near Moscow to the occupied city Yasynuvata, Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, as a part of the regular personnel rotation in September 2016.
Soldiers of the Vityaz SPC also took an active part in the special operation to seize the Ukrainian Crimea.
Soldiers of the Vityaz 604th SPC / zarodinu.net
It is known that the Rys SRRU takes an active part in the joint military exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which are taking place on the territory of its member countries.
At the moment, a joint task force of National Guard of Russia is deployed under the guise of participating in the Indestructible Brotherhood 2020 command and staff training within the CSTO.
Opening of the Indestructible Brotherhood 2020 command and staff training at the Losvido training ground in the Vitebsk Oblast, October 12, 2020 / dfnc.ru
It should be especially noted that following secret negotiations with the Lukashenko’s regime in the first week of mass protests, Russian leader Vladimir Putin announced in August his readiness to deploy the dedicated reserve of National Guard of Russia on the territory of Belarus.
Apparently, this indicates that top military and political leaders of Belarus and Russia coordinate their actions in the context of their intention to crack down on peaceful protests in Belarus.
Photo: warweapons.ru
During the period of significant protest activity in Belarus, servicemen of the National Guard of Russia under the guise of participation in various competitions and military exercises are deployed on the territory of Belarus on a regular and rotational basis.
Servicemen of the special forces of the National Guard of Russia deployed in Belarus may be involved in both overt and covert operations of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs against the peaceful protests. They could also participate in planned provocations or sabotage in order to destabilize the socio-political situation, as well as escalate the confrontation in Belarus.
Read also:
Proofs of the Russian Aggression: InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence
Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea
Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas
The leader of the Belarusian protest movement Sergei Tikhanovsky illegally visited Crimea
Russian officer-potential witness in MH17 case-spotted at parade in Minsk
A unit of the 275th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment participates in the parade in Minsk, whose servicemen shelled Mariupol
How the Servicemen of the Russian 46th Brigade ‘Overpassed’ Ukraine
Preparing for the invasion: purchases of mortars and Ural trucks on the eve of military aggression by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
Monitoring department of the Belarusian service of the InformNapalm international intelligence community. Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi, edited by Artem Velichko. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0).
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-10-22--US charges six Russian intelligence officers with global hacking attacks

On October 15 , 2020 , the US Department of Justice filed formal charges against six Russian officers serving in the Main Center for Special Technologies ( Unit 74455 ) of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate ( GRU ) , a military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces , accusing them of committing global cyberattacks against the United States , Ukraine , France , Georgia , South Korea , the United Kingdom , and other countries , as well as the worldwide distribution of dangerous malware , which caused billions of dollars in losses .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Sergey Detistov , Pavel Frolov , Anatoliy Kovalev , Artem Ochichenko , and Petr Pliskin with conspiracy , computer hacking , wire fraud , aggravated identity theft , and false registration of a domain name .
“ No country has weaponized its cyber capabilities as maliciously irresponsibly as Russia , ” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers announcing the charges .
In October 2019 , we wrote that Western intelligence agencies uncovered another Russian military unit 29155 which specializes in cyber operations and sabotage in Europe .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discovered that Russian officers from unit 26165 and unit 74455 hacked into the servers of the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton campaign , i.e .
the senior Russian military and political leadership was directly involved in US election interference in 2016 .
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

On October 15, 2020, the US Department of Justice filed formal charges against six Russian officers serving in the Main Center for Special Technologies (Unit 74455) of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), a military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, accusing them of committing global cyberattacks against the United States, Ukraine, France, Georgia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and other countries, as well as the worldwide distribution of dangerous malware, which caused billions of dollars in losses.
The indictment charges Russian officers Yuriy Andrienko, Sergey Detistov, Pavel Frolov, Anatoliy Kovalev, Artem Ochichenko, and Petr Pliskin with conspiracy, computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and false registration of a domain name.
“No country has weaponized its cyber capabilities as maliciously irresponsibly as Russia,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers announcing the charges.
In October 2019, we wrote that Western intelligence agencies uncovered another Russian military unit 29155 which specializes in cyber operations and sabotage in Europe. In addition to those activities, it was discovered that Russian officers from unit 26165 and unit 74455 hacked into the servers of the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton campaign, i.e. the senior Russian military and political leadership was directly involved in US election interference in 2016.
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-10-26--Shelling in Donbas is most actively carried out by 3 units of Russian 1st Army Corps

On October 21 , website Donbas.Realii , citing the report of InformNapalm international volunteer community on the location of areas of responsibility of the Russian 1st and 2nd Army Corps in the occupied Donbas , published an analysis and map of the ceasefire violations .
According to the analysis , provocations and shelling of Ukrainian positions for the period from October 14 to 21 were mainly carried out by militants of the 100th Motorized Rifle Brigade ( 100 MRB , unit 08826 ) , 11 Motorized Rifle Regiment ( 11 MRR , unit 08818 ) and 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the 1st Army Corps , which is deployed by the Russian Federation in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas .
These units occupy positions in the Donetsk-Yasynuvata-Horlivka agglomeration .
Additional information on these hybrid units , their personnel , weapons and equipment can be found in InformNapalm materials : Identified : 1500 Russian servicemen of the 3rd MRB in Donbas Artillery officer of the 1st Army Corps under UCA surveillance .
Part 1 From Transnistria to Donbas , more data on Russian occupants in Ukraine According to the information from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Russian armed forces violated the ceasefire in the Donbas three times .
In Donetsk Oblast , near the towns of Avdiivka and Maryinka , the Ukrainian military also documented the flight of a Russian Orlan-10 drone along the demarcation line .
The UAV was suppressed by means of EW .
Let us remind you that the Russian Orlan-10 UAV has repeatedly come under the scrutiny of InformNapalm international intelligence community .
You can learn more about its use in the Donbas in the articles : Reconnaissance commander of the 2nd Army @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Part 1 .
Orlan-10 drone Russian drone Orlan-10 consists of parts produced in the USA and other countries – photo evidence Another Russian drone shot down in Syria .
Overview of Orlan-10 crashes from Syria to Ukraine As of 2020 , InformNapalm volunteers have collected facts about the use of at least 8 different types of Russian UAVs in the Donbas , in particular : Granat-1 , Granat-2 , Granat-4 , Forpost , Orlan-10 , Eleron-3SV , Takhyon , and Zastava , as well as another type of secret Russian drones with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also part of the Russian Leer-3 RB-341V system designed to suppress GSM-communication .
The system is also able to replace cellular towers and send fake SMS to subscribers in order to mislead or exert psychological pressure .
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

On October 21, website Donbas.Realii, citing the report of InformNapalm international volunteer community on the location of areas of responsibility of the Russian 1st and 2nd Army Corps in the occupied Donbas, published an analysis and map of the ceasefire violations.

According to the analysis, provocations and shelling of Ukrainian positions for the period from October 14 to 21 were mainly carried out by militants of the 100th Motorized Rifle Brigade (100 MRB, unit 08826), 11 Motorized Rifle Regiment (11 MRR, unit 08818) and 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3 MRB, unit 08803) of the 1st Army Corps, which is deployed by the Russian Federation in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas. These units occupy positions in the Donetsk-Yasynuvata-Horlivka agglomeration.
Additional information on these hybrid units, their personnel, weapons and equipment can be found in InformNapalm materials:
Identified: 1500 Russian servicemen of the 3rd MRB in Donbas
Artillery officer of the 1st Army Corps under UCA surveillance. Part 1
Rubicon – another Russian mobile EW station spotted in Donbas
From Transnistria to Donbas, more data on Russian occupants in Ukraine
According to the information from the Joint Forces Operation, on October 21, the Russian armed forces violated the ceasefire in the Donbas three times. In Donetsk Oblast, near the towns of Avdiivka and Maryinka, the Ukrainian military also documented the flight of a Russian Orlan-10 drone along the demarcation line. The UAV was suppressed by means of EW.
Let us remind you that the Russian Orlan-10 UAV has repeatedly come under the scrutiny of InformNapalm international intelligence community. You can learn more about its use in the Donbas in the articles:
Reconnaissance commander of the 2nd Army Corps in the focus of the UCA. Part 1. Orlan-10 drone
Russian drone Orlan-10 consists of parts produced in the USA and other countries – photo evidence
Russian command sends army drone systems to Donbas – photo evidence
Another Russian drone shot down in Syria. Overview of Orlan-10 crashes from Syria to Ukraine
Russian Army UAVs on Transpele grounds in occupied Luhansk (PHOTO)
Volunteers: Russia Violating Ukraine’s Airspace Since 2014
As of 2020, InformNapalm volunteers have collected facts about the use of at least 8 different types of Russian UAVs in the Donbas, in particular: Granat-1, Granat-2, Granat-4, Forpost, Orlan-10, Eleron-3SV, Takhyon, and Zastava, as well as another type of secret Russian drones with an unknown name.
The Orlan-10 is also part of the Russian Leer-3 RB-341V system designed to suppress GSM-communication. The system is also able to replace cellular towers and send fake SMS to subscribers in order to mislead or exert psychological pressure.
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
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informnapalm--2020-10-26--The court as banned a book about the trial of Vasyl Stus, boosting its popularity. Reactions in soci

The court as banned a book about the trial of Vasyl Stus, boosting its popularity. Reactions in social networks

According to BBC Ukraine , in the morning of October 19 , Darnytskyi District Court of Kyiv partially upheld the complaint of Viktor Medvedchuk , Vladimir Putin ’ s ( Putin is the godfather of Medvedchuk ’ s daughter ) and banned the distribution of the journalist Vakhtang Kipiani ’ s book “ The Case of Vasyl Stus ” .
“ Kipiani and the Vivat publishing house are compelled to remove all information about Medvedchuk ’ s identity from the book in the sections “ Criminal case No5 .
The book of life and the death of Vasyl Stus ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the poet Vasyl Stus ” .
Prohibit Kipiani and the Vivat publishing house from distributing the printed circulation of the book “ The Case of Vasyl Stus ” and its subsequent printing until the illegal violation of Medvedchuk ’ s personal privacy is remediated , ” the judge announced .
The court ’ s decision has not yet entered into force and will take effect if Vakhtang Kipiani does not file an appeal within the next 30 days .
Viktor Medvedchuk has not yet commented on the court decision , and Vakhtang Kipiani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on his Facebook page with a quote from Vasyl Stus : “ A bunch of bandits , KGB men , thieves and rapists in the capital occupied the city as the party of Bolsheviks.
” Many other Ukrainians also responded to this event in social networks .
The former head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance , the deputy of the Ukrainian Parliament ( Verkhovna Rada ) of the IX convocation Volodymyr Viatrovych wrote on Twitter : “ In Ukraine , Stus is banned again .
We ’ ll have to defeat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ll do it.
” The Ukrainian TV presenter , volunteer , public and political activist Serhiy Prytula wrote on Facebook : “ Stus is eternal !
And Medvedchuk is just a temporary misunderstanding in the history of Ukraine .
Once again , I thank Vakhtang Kipiani for his titanic work and tireless struggle against the Kremlin satellite and the Communist lackey !
And to all presidents of Ukraine – my “ sincere thanks ” for the creation of the judiciary that keeps surprising us by going lower and lower !
” “ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the second time , this time in the Independent Ukraine , and this the second time is because of the same person , the torturer and collaborator Medvedchuk… You know , we have to be at the appeal .
For if we miss it , then the Stalinist Kolyma concentration camps will soon come to each of us.
” A well-known Ukrainian blogger , journalist Denis Kazansky , who joined the Three-party Contact Group negotiating the settlement of the situation in Eastern Ukraine as a representative of Donetsk Oblast , noted on Facebook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to show Medvedchuk what the “ Streisand effect ” is and organize a flashmob .
Putin ’ s kum wants the information in the book about his crimes not to be distributed .
Well , let ’ s do everything to make the whole country learn about this book and the “ heroics ” of the leader of the Opposition Platform party – from a schoolboy in Kramatorsk to a grandmother in the village of Velyka Kosharyshcha… “ The Ukrainian diplomat , former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin also commented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Everyone resents the court decision that upheld Medvedchuk ’ s claim against Vakhtang Kipiani regarding his book “ The Case of Vasyl Stus ” .
The outrage is 101 % fair , but the promotion the original Vakhtang ’ s text gets thanks to the decision is fantastic !
Now everyone will consider it their duty to get and read the original – Ukrainians will look at Stus ’ s case through the eyes of Kipiani , not Medvedchuk .
So , there is a positive side even in the decisions that look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caused a lot of unprintable words from the public ” .
And it seems that the court decision , which caused outrage in the Ukrainian society , did become a catalyst for the book ’ s wild popularity .
The author and editor of the book , Vakhtang Kipiani , and the marketing director of the Vivat publishing house Kateryna Avramchuk reported on Facebook that the book was sold out in a matter of hours and a new print is planned , which will be distributed while the court decision hasn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to appeal .
“ And who are the judges ?
” Vakhtang Kipiani also said on his Facebook page that , based on the data by the Anti-Corruption Action Centre expert Galina Zhizhyk , the crooked judge in this case , Maryna Zastavenko , had visited the occupied territories during the war : “ The decision to ban the mentions of Medvedchuk in the book by Vakhtang Kipiani about the trial of Stus was made by a judge from Donetsk , who in 2017 was close to being fired for her ties to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to transferring to Kyiv , Maryna Zastavenko worked in Chervonogvardiysky district court of Makiyivka , Donetsk Oblast .
In 2016 , the SBU ( the Ukrainian state security agency ) appealed to the High Qualification Commission of Judges , indicating that the judge had property in the temporarily occupied territories and was systematically traveling back and forth .
At the same time , the judge did not show up at the court bench for a long time , because she was in the territories not controlled by Ukraine .
The HQCJ initially opened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dismiss Judge Zastavenko .
It is unlikely that a Ukrainian judge can safely ride in and out of the “ DPR ” without receiving a guarantee of security from “ the other side , ” especially given how eager the Russians were to replenish the numbers of their prisoners for subsequent swaps .
That is why the SBU wrote complaints against such judges to the HQCJ ” .
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm .
Translated by George Pinchuk .
Edited by Max Alginin .
Distribution and reprint with reference to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

According to BBC Ukraine, in the morning of October 19, Darnytskyi District Court of Kyiv partially upheld the complaint of Viktor Medvedchuk, Vladimir Putin’s kum (Putin is the godfather of Medvedchuk’s daughter) and banned the distribution of the journalist Vakhtang Kipiani’s book “The Case of Vasyl Stus”.
“Kipiani and the Vivat publishing house are compelled to remove all information about Medvedchuk’s identity from the book in the sections “Criminal case No5. The book of life and the death of Vasyl Stus” and “Did the lawyer Medvedchuk kill the poet Vasyl Stus”. Prohibit Kipiani and the Vivat publishing house from distributing the printed circulation of the book “The Case of Vasyl Stus” and its subsequent printing until the illegal violation of Medvedchuk’s personal privacy is remediated,” the judge announced.
The court’s decision has not yet entered into force and will take effect if Vakhtang Kipiani does not file an appeal within the next 30 days.
Viktor Medvedchuk has not yet commented on the court decision, and Vakhtang Kipiani responded to it with a short post on his Facebook page with a quote from Vasyl Stus:
“A bunch of bandits, KGB men, thieves and rapists in the capital occupied the city as the party of Bolsheviks.”
Reactions in social networks
Many other Ukrainians also responded to this event in social networks. The former head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, the deputy of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) of the IX convocation Volodymyr Viatrovych wrote on Twitter:
Back to USSR.
В Україні Стус знов під забороною.
Доведеться знов валити совок.
І ми це зробимо. pic.twitter.com/HZ21aBgw09 — Volodymyr Viatrovych (@viatrovych) October 19, 2020
“In Ukraine, Stus is banned again. We’ll have to defeat the sovok yet again. And we’ll do it.”
The Ukrainian TV presenter, volunteer, public and political activist Serhiy Prytula wrote on Facebook:
“Stus is eternal! And Medvedchuk is just a temporary misunderstanding in the history of Ukraine. Once again, I thank Vakhtang Kipiani for his titanic work and tireless struggle against the Kremlin satellite and the Communist lackey! And to all presidents of Ukraine – my “sincere thanks” for the creation of the judiciary that keeps surprising us by going lower and lower!”
Julia Aquarius, a volunteer, wrote on Facebook:
“It seems Vasyl Stus has been sentenced for the second time, this time in the Independent Ukraine, and this the second time is because of the same person, the torturer and collaborator Medvedchuk… You know, we have to be at the appeal. For if we miss it, then the Stalinist Kolyma concentration camps will soon come to each of us.”
A well-known Ukrainian blogger, journalist Denis Kazansky, who joined the Three-party Contact Group negotiating the settlement of the situation in Eastern Ukraine as a representative of Donetsk Oblast, noted on Facebook:
“. .. Egor Firsov proposed to show Medvedchuk what the “Streisand effect” is and organize a flashmob. Putin’s kum wants the information in the book about his crimes not to be distributed. Well, let’s do everything to make the whole country learn about this book and the “heroics” of the leader of the Opposition Platform party – from a schoolboy in Kramatorsk to a grandmother in the village of Velyka Kosharyshcha… “
The Ukrainian diplomat, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin also commented on the event on Facebook:
“Everyone resents the court decision that upheld Medvedchuk’s claim against Vakhtang Kipiani regarding his book “The Case of Vasyl Stus”. The outrage is 101% fair, but the promotion the original Vakhtang’s text gets thanks to the decision is fantastic! Now everyone will consider it their duty to get and read the original – Ukrainians will look at Stus’s case through the eyes of Kipiani, not Medvedchuk. So, there is a positive side even in the decisions that look very similar to censorship and thus have caused a lot of unprintable words from the public”.
And it seems that the court decision, which caused outrage in the Ukrainian society, did become a catalyst for the book’s wild popularity. The author and editor of the book, Vakhtang Kipiani, and the marketing director of the Vivat publishing house Kateryna Avramchuk reported on Facebook that the book was sold out in a matter of hours and a new print is planned, which will be distributed while the court decision hasn’t come into force and is still subject to appeal.
“And who are the judges?”
Vakhtang Kipiani also said on his Facebook page that, based on the data by the Anti-Corruption Action Centre expert Galina Zhizhyk, the crooked judge in this case, Maryna Zastavenko, had visited the occupied territories during the war:
“The decision to ban the mentions of Medvedchuk in the book by Vakhtang Kipiani about the trial of Stus was made by a judge from Donetsk, who in 2017 was close to being fired for her ties to the so-called “DPR”.
Prior to transferring to Kyiv, Maryna Zastavenko worked in Chervonogvardiysky district court of Makiyivka, Donetsk Oblast.
In 2016, the SBU (the Ukrainian state security agency) appealed to the High Qualification Commission of Judges, indicating that the judge had property in the temporarily occupied territories and was systematically traveling back and forth. At the same time, the judge did not show up at the court bench for a long time, because she was in the territories not controlled by Ukraine.
The HQCJ initially opened a disciplinary case, but then refused to dismiss Judge Zastavenko.
It is unlikely that a Ukrainian judge can safely ride in and out of the “DPR” without receiving a guarantee of security from “the other side,” especially given how eager the Russians were to replenish the numbers of their prisoners for subsequent swaps. That is why the SBU wrote complaints against such judges to the HQCJ”.
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm. Translated by George Pinchuk. Edited by Max Alginin. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.