informnapalm--2020-09-06--Analysis of the OSCE SMM reports in Donbas for August: intelligence shows preparations for escalatio

Analysis of the OSCE SMM reports in Donbas for August: intelligence shows preparations for escalation

Volunteers of the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community continue to collect data on the operational situation in Donbas , conduct OSINT monitoring of social networks and document numerous proofs of the Russian military personnel and mercenaries participating in the Russian war against Ukraine .
Reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission ( SMM ) in Ukraine are among the most important official sources for analyzing and comparing information .
They can be compared with public statements by the Office of the President or with the data from the press service of the Joint Forces Operation ( JFO ) in Donbas ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ previous “ ceasefire ” ) .
Of course , many questions remain about the OSCE SMM reports , given that there is a stable large number of Russians , as well as citizens of the countries loyal to Russia among the observers of the Mission in Ukraine , which allows the aggressor country to influence the monitoring data .
However , so far there is no alternative and there are no other official monitoring organizations to collect data , therefore we have to use this source of information , albeit with a pinch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remembering that very often the OSCE international observers themselves become the object of information operations of Russia and their movement in the territory controlled by the Russian occupation forces ( 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Armed Forces ) are restricted in every possible way .
And when visual contact is limited ( observation cameras are turned off or disabled , and monitoring UAVs jammed by Russian electronic warfare equipment ) observers often have to fully rely on sound information about explosions or small arms fire .
This method has material @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contact , the Russian troops also actively use technical assets for deception , for example , the ZS-82 sound broadcasting stations , able to simulate explosions and other sounds that can distort the real situation .
Analysis of the OSCE SMM reports from the second half of August to September 2020 InformNapalm volunteers analyzed 11 OSCE SMM reports with numbers from 199/2020 to 209/2020 for the period from August 21 to September 2 , 2020 .
The list of links to reports is given below : During this period , Ukraine celebrated National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Independence Day ( August 24 ) and honored the memory of the fallen servicemen on Remembrance Day ( August 29 ) .
The purpose of the monitoring was to analyze the key points of the reports , to identify meaningful intelligence indicators for the real current situation in the combat zone .
“ Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire , from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period , the SMM has so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions ( including 149 explosions , two projectiles in flight , 13 illumination flares and 729 bursts and shots ) ” – OSCE .
The situation in the areas of disengagement of forces and assets “ The SMM continued to monitor the security situation in and around the three pilot disengagement areas .
Meanwhile , the Mission constantly recorded the presence of people in former military and military-type positions , as well as near them within the disengagement areas in the Zolote and Petrivske areas , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each of the areas for the disengagement of forces and assets in more detail : The SMM observed members of the illegal armed formations ( wearing armbands with “ JCCC ” written on them ) every day at the southern end of the new bridge span near Stanytsia Luhanska .
Only one small arms shot was recorded on the evening of 24 August .
However , residents of Stanytsia Luhanska regularly write on social media about the violation of the “ ceasefire regime ” by the Russian occupation forces .
For example , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about violations on August 27 at 21:23 and on August 30 at 6:07 and 6:40 am .
We also noticed that the OSCE SMM in its reports continues to manipulate sensitive information about the violation of the agreements on the withdrawal of weapons .
We wrote about this in January 2020 and we see the same pattern again in the report for September 1 , 2020 №208/2020 .
It is worth reminding that according to the Minsk protocols , tanks , artillery , MLRS , tactical missiles are subject to withdrawal , whereas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Any disclosure of such irrelevant data contradicts the principles of neutrality and impartiality , which should guide the OSCE SMM in providing sensitive defense information .
Every day the SMM see members of the illegal armed formations ( wearing armbands with “ JCCC ” written on them ) , alone or with people in protective gear , going 350 m deep into the disengagement area near the T1316 road .
“ On the same day , outside of the disengagement area , about 100m south of its southern edge , the Mission saw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truck with a trailer conducting groundworks across and along road T-1316.
” – OSCE .
It should be noted that they work non-stop .
“ On 26 August , outside the disengagement area , an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a new L-shaped trench ( 30m long ) about 150m west of the area ’ s western edge and about 100m north of the railway tracks that pass through the disengagement area , assessed as belonging to the armed formations ” – OSCE .
That is , the occupying forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to expand their strongholds and strengthen their offensive capabilities .
While monitoring the disengagement near Petrivske village , members of the Mission ’ s patrols normally note a calm situation there .
However , long-range SMM UAVs spot from 1 to 6 people manning the former position of the illegal armed formations every night .
“ On 30 August , inside the disengagement area near Petrivske ( non-governmentcontrolled , 41km south of Donetsk ) , an SMM mini-UAV spotted construction materials with wooden logs and sandbags piled near a position of the armed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corner ( not seen in imagery from 20 August 2020 ) .
” InformNapalm draws readers ’ attention to the fact that during the reporting period , the OSCE SMM cameras did not work from 20 to 24 August in Zolote and from 20 August to 1 September in Petrivske .
These bits of data bring us to the conclusion that the SMM has no conclusive information about what is happening in these disengagement areas .
Therefore , the situation can be only nominally called “ calm ” , since , for example @ @ @ @ @ @ @ landmines apparently goes unnoticed .
On August 20 The Mission saw for the first time a new mine hazard sign ( 30x30cm red wooden board with “ Stop Mines ” in Cyrillic ) attached to a tree about 20m north of a road about 1.5km north-east of Raivka ( non-government-controlled , 16km north-west of Luhansk ) .
” On August 28 “ on the western outskirts of the Trudovski microdistrict in the Petrovsky district of Donetsk SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 10 anti-tank mines placed in 2 rows and blocking the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Read more : Ukraine at the OSCE spoke about Russian anti-personnel mines in Donbas , which are prohibited by international conventions • near the settlement of Styla ( Donetsk Oblast ) , probably a recent fortification of two covered trenches ( 20 August ) ; • near the settlement Golubovske ( Luhansk Oblast ) trench and trench extension about 175 m in length ( August 22 ) ; • near the village of Oleksandrivka ( Donetsk Oblast ) , a trench about 25 m long ( August 22 ) ; • near the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two trenches with a total length of 170 m ( 23 August ) ; • near the Uzhivka village ( ex .
Leninske , Donetsk Oblast ) 20 and 30 meter trench extension ( August 29 ) .
At the beginning of the article , we have already cited examples of constant obstruction of the OSCE SMM ’ s access to certain facilities or restriction of movement along the roads in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts .
In recent weeks , despite the “ ceasefire regime ” , the Mission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the occupied territory : • August 24 near the village of Olenivka ( Donetsk Oblast ) , at the border checkpoint near the village of Izvaryne ( Luhansk Oblast ) and at the border checkpoint near the settlement of Sievernyi ( Luhansk Oblast ) ; • On August 29 , at the border checkpoint near the village of Voznesenivka ( formerly Chervonopartizansk , Luhansk Oblast ) ; • August 31 at the border checkpoint near the village of Izvaryne ( Lugansk Oblast ) .
According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week , about 700 tons of fuel and 6 wagons with ammunition were delivered to formations and units of the Russian occupation forces in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts .
In addition , Russian mercenaries who have undergone special training in the training camps of the Southern Military District in certain military specialties ( snipers , scouts , signalmen ) , continue to arrive from the territory of the Russian Federation to reinforce the enemy units .
The Ukrainian military men of the 503rd Separate Marine Battalion also report about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian occupation forces .
“ Also on the same day , while at the railway station in Voznesenivka ( formerly Chervonopartyzansk , 65km south-east of Luhansk ) for about ten minutes , the SMM saw between 80 and 100 stationary empty open freight wagons and a chemical/oil rail tanker.
” – OSCE .
Ammunition from Russia arrives not only by rail , but also by trucks under the cover of the so-called “ humanitarian convoys ” .
On August 27 , the 98th “ humanitarian convoy ” drove into the occupied areas of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ On 27 August , the Mission observed a convoy of six covered cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates ( with “ Russian Federation humanitarian aid ” written in Russian on the side ) escorted by another vehicle ( with “ MChS ” written on the side ) driving near a compound in Donetsk city ’ s Budonivskyi district.
” This correlates well with InformNapalm ’ s data for August and confirms the conclusions that Russia is using the “ ceasefire ” to prepare for an escalation of hostilities in Donbas .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ repeatedly revealed that Russian troops are operating under the guise of “ humanitarian convoys ” .
It was found that the military men of the Russian 108th Air Assault Regiment took part in the operation of “ humanitarian convoys ” in the Donbas .
Also , one of the servicemen of the 22nd Special Forces Brigade of the GRU , who took part in the operation to seize Crimea , was subsequently seen as a participant of “ humanitarian convoys ” under the cover of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations .
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been recording massive violations in the deployment of heavy weapons in the occupied territory .
Large concentrations of military equipment are observed in the territories of the training grounds near the villages of Ternove ( Donetsk Oblast ) , Bugaivka ( Luhansk Oblast ) , Miusinsk ( Luhansk Oblast ) , Boykivske ( former Telmanove , Donetsk Oblast ) , Myrne ( Luhansk Oblast ) , Kruglyk ( Luhansk Oblast ) .
Russia continues to use the ceasefire to build up the combat capability in Donbas .
Engineering work is underway , new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and ammunition is constantly being replenished .
Against the background of preparations for local elections in Ukraine , some politicians are trying to speculate on the topic of “ achieving a consistent ceasefire regime ” and “ elections in Donbas ” , which in fact creates a false impression among Ukrainians about the real state of affairs in the war zone .
Russia is not withdrawing its weapons and equipment , it is not withdrawing its hybrid armed formations ; on the contrary , it continues to reinforce and build up its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ achieving peace ” is dangerous for the national security of Ukraine .
Read and share more from InformNapalm • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russian multipurpose armored vehicle Tigr , part of MK-BLA-01 drone system spotted in the Donbas ( video ) Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi , edited by Artem Velichko .
The monitoring was prepared by Victoria Volska specially for InformNapalm .
Distribution and reprint with reference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

Volunteers of the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community continue to collect data on the operational situation in Donbas, conduct OSINT monitoring of social networks and document numerous proofs of the Russian military personnel and mercenaries participating in the Russian war against Ukraine.
Reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine are among the most important official sources for analyzing and comparing information. They can be compared with public statements by the Office of the President or with the data from the press service of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in Donbas (as we did last year during the previous “ceasefire”). Of course, many questions remain about the OSCE SMM reports, given that there is a stable large number of Russians, as well as citizens of the countries loyal to Russia among the observers of the Mission in Ukraine, which allows the aggressor country to influence the monitoring data. However, so far there is no alternative and there are no other official monitoring organizations to collect data, therefore we have to use this source of information, albeit with a pinch of salt. It is also worth remembering that very often the OSCE international observers themselves become the object of information operations of Russia and their movement in the territory controlled by the Russian occupation forces (1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Armed Forces) are restricted in every possible way. And when visual contact is limited (observation cameras are turned off or disabled, and monitoring UAVs jammed by Russian electronic warfare equipment) observers often have to fully rely on sound information about explosions or small arms fire. This method has material flaws. In the absence of visual contact, the Russian troops also actively use technical assets for deception, for example, the ZS-82 sound broadcasting stations, able to simulate explosions and other sounds that can distort the real situation.
Analysis of the OSCE SMM reports from the second half of August to September 2020
InformNapalm volunteers analyzed 11 OSCE SMM reports with numbers from 199/2020 to 209/2020 for the period from August 21 to September 2, 2020. The list of links to reports is given below:
During this period, Ukraine celebrated National Flag Day (August 23), Independence Day (August 24) and honored the memory of the fallen servicemen on Remembrance Day (August 29). The purpose of the monitoring was to analyze the key points of the reports, to identify meaningful intelligence indicators for the real current situation in the combat zone.
“Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 893 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 149 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 729 bursts and shots)” – OSCE.
The situation in the areas of disengagement of forces and assets
“The SMM continued to monitor the security situation in and around the three pilot disengagement areas. Meanwhile, the Mission constantly recorded the presence of people in former military and military-type positions, as well as near them within the disengagement areas in the Zolote and Petrivske areas, ” – OSCE.
Let us dwell on each of the areas for the disengagement of forces and assets in more detail:
Stanytsia Luhanska
The SMM observed members of the illegal armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) every day at the southern end of the new bridge span near Stanytsia Luhanska. Only one small arms shot was recorded on the evening of 24 August.
However, residents of Stanytsia Luhanska regularly write on social media about the violation of the “ceasefire regime” by the Russian occupation forces. For example, the well-known volunteer Sveta Svetikova repeatedly wrote about violations on August 27 at 21:23 and on August 30 at 6:07 and 6:40 am .
We also noticed that the OSCE SMM in its reports continues to manipulate sensitive information about the violation of the agreements on the withdrawal of weapons. We wrote about this in January 2020 and we see the same pattern again in the report for September 1, 2020 №208/2020.
It is worth reminding that according to the Minsk protocols, tanks, artillery, MLRS, tactical missiles are subject to withdrawal, whereas anti-aircraft missile systems are not regulated. Any disclosure of such irrelevant data contradicts the principles of neutrality and impartiality, which should guide the OSCE SMM in providing sensitive defense information.
Zolote
Every day the SMM see members of the illegal armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), alone or with people in protective gear, going 350 m deep into the disengagement area near the T1316 road.
“On the same day, outside of the disengagement area, about 100m south of its southern edge, the Mission saw 15 workers with three excavators and a truck with a trailer conducting groundworks across and along road T-1316.” – OSCE.
It should be noted that they work non-stop.
“On 26 August, outside the disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a new L-shaped trench (30m long) about 150m west of the area’s western edge and about 100m north of the railway tracks that pass through the disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the armed formations” – OSCE.
That is, the occupying forces continue to use the “ceasefire” to expand their strongholds and strengthen their offensive capabilities.
Petrivske
While monitoring the disengagement near Petrivske village, members of the Mission’s patrols normally note a calm situation there. However, long-range SMM UAVs spot from 1 to 6 people manning the former position of the illegal armed formations every night.
“On 30 August, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-governmentcontrolled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted construction materials with wooden logs and sandbags piled near a position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner (not seen in imagery from 20 August 2020).”
InformNapalm draws readers’ attention to the fact that during the reporting period, the OSCE SMM cameras did not work from 20 to 24 August in Zolote and from 20 August to 1 September in Petrivske. These bits of data bring us to the conclusion that the SMM has no conclusive information about what is happening in these disengagement areas. Therefore, the situation can be only nominally called “calm”, since, for example, the process of the enemy laying landmines apparently goes unnoticed.
Mining operations
Russian occupation forces continue to mine new areas.
On August 20 The Mission saw for the first time a new mine hazard sign (30x30cm red wooden board with “Stop Mines” in Cyrillic) attached to a tree about 20m north of a road about 1.5km north-east of Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).”
On August 28 “on the western outskirts of the Trudovski microdistrict in the Petrovsky district of Donetsk SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 10 anti-tank mines placed in 2 rows and blocking the road leading west to Maryinka village”
Read more: Ukraine at the OSCE spoke about Russian anti-personnel mines in Donbas, which are prohibited by international conventions
Engineering works
Russian occupation forces continue engineering work along the entire contact line:
near the settlement of Styla (Donetsk Oblast), probably a recent fortification of two covered trenches (20 August);
near the settlement Golubovske (Luhansk Oblast) trench and trench extension about 175 m in length (August 22);
near the village of Oleksandrivka (Donetsk Oblast), a trench about 25 m long (August 22);
near the settlement Nyzhnie Lozove (Donetsk Oblast) two trenches with a total length of 170 m (23 August);
near Pikuzy village (Donetsk Oblast) 50m trench extension (26 August);
near Vasylivka village (Donetsk Oblast) fortification of a military-type position (August 26);
near Staromykhaylivka village (Donetsk Oblast) 20 meter trench extension (28 August);
near the Uzhivka village (ex. Leninske, Donetsk Oblast) 20 and 30 meter trench extension (August 29).
Restriction of freedom of movement
At the beginning of the article, we have already cited examples of constant obstruction of the OSCE SMM’s access to certain facilities or restriction of movement along the roads in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. In recent weeks, despite the “ceasefire regime”, the Mission has faced restrictions on freedom of movement in the occupied territory:
August 24 near the village of Olenivka (Donetsk Oblast), at the border checkpoint near the village of Izvaryne (Luhansk Oblast) and at the border checkpoint near the settlement of Sievernyi (Luhansk Oblast);
On August 29, at the border checkpoint near the village of Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartizansk, Luhansk Oblast);
August 31 at the border checkpoint near the village of Izvaryne (Lugansk Oblast).
Reinforcement of the occupation forces
According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, last week, about 700 tons of fuel and 6 wagons with ammunition were delivered to formations and units of the Russian occupation forces in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
In addition, Russian mercenaries who have undergone special training in the training camps of the Southern Military District in certain military specialties (snipers, scouts, signalmen), continue to arrive from the territory of the Russian Federation to reinforce the enemy units.
Read more: InformNapalm review: predicted escalation in Donbas
The Ukrainian military men of the 503rd Separate Marine Battalion also report about the rotation in the ranks of the Russian occupation forces.
“Also on the same day, while at the railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw between 80 and 100 stationary empty open freight wagons and a chemical/oil rail tanker.” – OSCE.
Ammunition from Russia arrives not only by rail, but also by trucks under the cover of the so-called “humanitarian convoys”. On August 27, the 98th “humanitarian convoy” drove into the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
Also, “On 27 August, the Mission observed a convoy of six covered cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates (with “Russian Federation humanitarian aid” written in Russian on the side) escorted by another vehicle (with “MChS” written on the side) driving near a compound in Donetsk city’s Budonivskyi district.”
This correlates well with InformNapalm’s data for August and confirms the conclusions that Russia is using the “ceasefire” to prepare for an escalation of hostilities in Donbas.
InformNapalm volunteers in their investigations have also repeatedly revealed that Russian troops are operating under the guise of “humanitarian convoys”. It was found that the military men of the Russian 108th Air Assault Regiment took part in the operation of “humanitarian convoys” in the Donbas. Also, one of the servicemen of the 22nd Special Forces Brigade of the GRU , who took part in the operation to seize Crimea, was subsequently seen as a participant of “humanitarian convoys” under the cover of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations.
Withdrawal of weapons
Since 23 August, the OSCE SMM has been recording massive violations in the deployment of heavy weapons in the occupied territory. Large concentrations of military equipment are observed in the territories of the training grounds near the villages of Ternove (Donetsk Oblast), Bugaivka (Luhansk Oblast), Miusinsk (Luhansk Oblast), Boykivske (former Telmanove, Donetsk Oblast), Myrne (Luhansk Oblast), Kruglyk (Luhansk Oblast).
Screenshots from OSCE SMM reports
Conclusions
Russia continues to use the ceasefire to build up the combat capability in Donbas. Engineering work is underway, new areas of the terrain are being mined, and ammunition is constantly being replenished. Against the background of preparations for local elections in Ukraine, some politicians are trying to speculate on the topic of “achieving a consistent ceasefire regime” and “elections in Donbas”, which in fact creates a false impression among Ukrainians about the real state of affairs in the war zone. Russia is not withdrawing its weapons and equipment, it is not withdrawing its hybrid armed formations; on the contrary, it continues to reinforce and build up its forces. Therefore, any speculation about “achieving peace” is dangerous for the national security of Ukraine.
Read and share more from InformNapalm


informnapalm--2020-09-08--Ukrainian paratroopers contain an avalanche of fire near Krasnohorivka.

From the Headquarters of the Air Assault Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine : Paratroopers contain an avalanche of fire near Krasnohorivka A fire broke out once again near the settlement of Krasnohorivka due to the brazen actions of the Russian occupiers .
It started before dawn .
According to the press officer of the Air Assault Troops ( AAT ) unit , Captain Oleksandr , at about 4:00 a.m.on 6 September 2020 , a single RPG shot was registered at the observation post at a position near Krasnohorivka .
The grenade exploded in the field about three hundred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minutes later , smoke billowed from the place where the grenade fell .
The duty officer reported seeing the smoke near our trenches to his commander .
The commander of the forward base ordered the personnel to take their positions according to the order of battle and be ready to engage the enemy .
But around four in the morning the paratroopers were forced to start a fight .
This time , the had to fight the fire that reached the positions of the AAT unit because of the wind from the east @ @ @ @ @ @ @ localize the fire .
The soldiers used shovels , picks and saws to stop the flames from spreading .
Everyone acted decisively and quickly .
At first it seemed that the fire was contained .
But at eleven o ’ clock in the morning it flamed up with new vigor .
The wind intensified and the fire reached even the trenches and dugouts .
Firefighters arrived to help the servicemen .
Extinguishing the fire was complicated by the fact that the flames spread through the mined areas and there was the danger of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There was also the possibility that the enemy , taking advantage of extreme circumstances , could resort to other provocative actions .
The command took all necessary measures to prevent this scenario .
Additional fire-fighting equipment and tools were brought in .
Despite the difficult situation , the military fully controls the dangerous section of the front line .
P.S .
On 6 September 2020 , 1 soldier was wounded near Krasnohorivka , where enemy opened fire from grenade launchers .
2 soldiers reported dead in landmine blast during firefighting mission in Luhansk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enemy sniper in Prychepylivka , Luh Read also : Russian occupation forces start fires in tinder-dry steppes of Donbas Translated by George V. Pinchuk .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

From the Headquarters of the Air Assault Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:
Paratroopers contain an avalanche of fire near Krasnohorivka A fire broke out once again near the settlement of Krasnohorivka due to the brazen actions of the Russian occupiers. It started before dawn. According to the press officer of the Air Assault Troops (AAT) unit, Captain Oleksandr, at about 4:00 a.m.on 6 September 2020, a single RPG shot was registered at the observation post at a position near Krasnohorivka.
The grenade exploded in the field about three hundred meters from our position. A few minutes later, smoke billowed from the place where the grenade fell. The duty officer reported seeing the smoke near our trenches to his commander. The commander of the forward base ordered the personnel to take their positions according to the order of battle and be ready to engage the enemy. But around four in the morning the paratroopers were forced to start a fight.
This time, the had to fight the fire that reached the positions of the AAT unit because of the wind from the east.The personnel did not hesitate to localize the fire. The soldiers used shovels, picks and saws to stop the flames from spreading. Everyone acted decisively and quickly. At first it seemed that the fire was contained. But at eleven o’clock in the morning it flamed up with new vigor. The wind intensified and the fire reached even the trenches and dugouts. Firefighters arrived to help the servicemen. Extinguishing the fire was complicated by the fact that the flames spread through the mined areas and there was the danger of explosions of mines and other ammunition.
There was also the possibility that the enemy, taking advantage of extreme circumstances, could resort to other provocative actions. The command took all necessary measures to prevent this scenario. Additional fire-fighting equipment and tools were brought in. Despite the difficult situation, the military fully controls the dangerous section of the front line.
by Alexander Kindsfater, correspondent News Agency ArmyInform
P.S. On 6 September 2020, 1 soldier was wounded near Krasnohorivka, where enemy opened fire from grenade launchers. 2 soldiers reported dead in landmine blast during firefighting mission in Luhansk Oblast. 1 Ukrainian soldier killed by enemy sniper in Prychepylivka, Luhansk Oblast.
Read also: Russian occupation forces start fires in tinder-dry steppes of Donbas
Translated by George V. Pinchuk. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-09-08--On the Eve of Kavkaz 2020 exercises, NATO intelligence services collecting data on Russian military

On the Eve of Kavkaz 2020 exercises, NATO intelligence services collecting data on Russian military facilities in Crimea

In early September , the topic of Russian-occupied Ukrainian Crimea came to the fore in the context of NATO intelligence operations and drills which are likely to become a deterrent to any Kremlin ’ s aggressive intentions ahead of the Kavkaz 2020 Russian military exercises planned for the second half of September .
According to the Russian media , on September 7 , 2020 , the French reconnaissance ship Dupuy de Lome in the Black Sea “ attacked the positions of the Russian S-400 in the Crimea.
” The drill simulating the “ attack ” , according to the Russians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-aircraft missile systems at certain frequencies .
The authors noted that this was possible only in the case of interception of radio frequencies of the S-400 radar , whereas the capabilities of Dupuy de Lome include interception and analysis of all types of signals , including satellite traffic .
Apparently the drill caused a panic attack at the Russian military command , and they did not think of anything better than to urgently practice rolling up and redeployment of S-400 ; the system was moved to another area to “ participate in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that on September 4 , 2020 , NATO troops , with the assistance of Ukraine , conducted a reconnaissance of Russian air defense forces in Crimea and southern Russia .
According to texty.org.ua , Russian systems were “ live-lured ” by American B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers used as this bait .
US strategic bombers crossed the airspace of Ukraine and approached Crimea , where they demonstratively turned their transponders on and off .
At the same time , the reaction of Russian air defense forces in Crimea was monitored by at least 3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ R135 and Sentinel R1 of the Royal British Air Force , which are capable of intercepting not only signals of air defense systems but also Russian military radio communications .
Interestingly , a large reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force RC-135W flew around Crimea from the south and west ( near Feodosia ) .
We remind our readers that in 2016 , volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community in the course of OSINT research identified Russian servicemen from chemical , biological , radiological and nuclear defense ( CBRN ) units who were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Feodosia-13 .
On September 6 , 2020 , Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the activity of the US strategic bombers near Crimea amounted to an The United States European Command ( EUCOM ) has officially stated that the purpose of the flight of a group of American strategic bombers B-52H was to “ to deter Russia and assure Allies and partners ” .
One should remember that on June 12 , 2020 , the North Atlantic Council recognized Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunity Partner ( EOP ) .
And in July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ US Armed Forces in Europe , retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges , said in an interview that Russia , under the guise of the Kavkaz 2020 exercise , could venture a new military attack related to its desire to resolve the issue of providing Crimea with water .
So now the active maneuvers of the air force and navy of Ukraine ’ s allies in the Black Sea can serve as a clear deterring signal to curb the appetites of the Russian aggressor .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas • Crimea Behind the Curtain book made available to the public [ ukr ] • Putin has arrived in occupied Crimea .
Timely data about Russian Army maneuvers near Ukrainian Border By Andriy Lysytsyn specially for InformNapalm.Translated by George V. Pinchuk .
Edited by Artem Velichko .
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In early September, the topic of Russian-occupied Ukrainian Crimea came to the fore in the context of NATO intelligence operations and drills which are likely to become a deterrent to any Kremlin’s aggressive intentions ahead of the Kavkaz 2020 Russian military exercises planned for the second half of September.
According to the Russian media, on September 7, 2020, the French reconnaissance ship Dupuy de Lome in the Black Sea “attacked the positions of the Russian S-400 in the Crimea.” The drill simulating the “attack”, according to the Russians, was aimed at jamming the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems at certain frequencies. The authors noted that this was possible only in the case of interception of radio frequencies of the S-400 radar, whereas the capabilities of Dupuy de Lome include interception and analysis of all types of signals, including satellite traffic.
Pictured: French reconnaissance ship Dupuy de Lome / source
Apparently the drill caused a panic attack at the Russian military command, and they did not think of anything better than to urgently practice rolling up and redeployment of S-400; the system was moved to another area to “participate in the maneuvers”.
Our readers might recall that on September 4, 2020, NATO troops, with the assistance of Ukraine, conducted a reconnaissance of Russian air defense forces in Crimea and southern Russia. According to texty.org.ua, Russian systems were “live-lured” by American B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers used as this bait.
US strategic bombers crossed the airspace of Ukraine and approached Crimea, where they demonstratively turned their transponders on and off. At the same time, the reaction of Russian air defense forces in Crimea was monitored by at least 3 NATO reconnaissance systems: 2 reconnaissance aircraft R135 and Sentinel R1 of the Royal British Air Force, which are capable of intercepting not only signals of air defense systems but also Russian military radio communications. Interestingly, a large reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force RC-135W flew around Crimea from the south and west (near Feodosia).
Source: @AuroraIntel
We remind our readers that in 2016, volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community in the course of OSINT research identified Russian servicemen from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense (CBRN) units who were probably reactivating the secret Soviet nuclear facility Feodosia-13.
On September 6, 2020, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the activity of the US strategic bombers near Crimea amounted to an “imitation of missile strikes on Russian territory.”
The United States European Command (EUCOM) has officially stated that the purpose of the flight of a group of American strategic bombers B-52H was to “to deter Russia and assure Allies and partners”.
One should remember that on June 12, 2020, the North Atlantic Council recognized Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP).
And in July 2020, the former commander of the US Armed Forces in Europe, retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, said in an interview that Russia, under the guise of the Kavkaz 2020 exercise, could venture a new military attack related to its desire to resolve the issue of providing Crimea with water.
So now the active maneuvers of the air force and navy of Ukraine’s allies in the Black Sea can serve as a clear deterring signal to curb the appetites of the Russian aggressor.
Read more from InformNapalm


informnapalm--2020-09-16--Putin’s Problematic Perspective on Contemporary Post-Totalitarian Russia

Article prepared by Dr. Algimantas Kasparavičius , firstly published in The National Interest .
Algimantas Kasparavičius is a historian , author , publicist , and a senior researcher at the Institute of History of Lithuania .
He is also a member of the Lithuania-Russia Commission of Historians .
The issue of World War II is both confusing and complex .
Historically , there are many questions that do not and can not have easy answers .
Different nations and states had different relationships and experiences with World War II .
Therefore , it is not surprising that in their historical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the events and facts of the war .
The focus of historical assessments also differs , and this is natural .
In such discourse , a public attempt by the head of one state or another to reflect again on the occasion of the unique anniversary of the end of World War II , to analyze the causes and circumstances of the most brutal event of the twentieth century and to critically evaluate painful historical lessons should probably not surprise us .
Especially when global pacifism and even the “ end of history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of the Cold War is rapidly dissolving , and in the early twenty-first century , the arms race and the geopolitical stability/security situation in the world and Europe are moving away not only from the ideal but also from the normal .
In a rather emotional historical essay , based on personal and family experiences , Vladimir Putin reflects on the position of contemporary post-totalitarian Russia .
However , the problem is that Putin presented in his humanly sensitive essay interpretations on some issues that were highly biased and bitterly hostile to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the historical memory of ordinary Russians and shapes a leading doctrine on history policy but can at the same time testify to certain manifestations of contemporary Russia ’ s neo-imperialism .
First of all , in regard to the three western neighbors of Russia Lithuania , Latvia and Estonia .
Such an attitude towards the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the occupation and annexation of the three sovereign and independent Baltic States , as recognized by the global community , by the USSR at the beginning of World War II show that neither historical memory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is characteristic of not a mere draftee-newcomer in the arena of great politics , but rather a long-standing leader of state who has accumulated a lot of political experience and has a university law degree .
But , naturally , the question arises : what does such a position actually mean ?
What is behind it ?
Signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in Moscow in 1939 / photo thenewfederalist.eu The claim that the Soviet Union was the last state in Europe to form a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany , that the pact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on two fronts with Germany and Japan at the same time , and that it was in line with the country ’ s national interests is far from historical truth and leads to a logical trap .
Firstly , the nonaggression pacts concluded by other states with Nazi Germany were purely pacifist in nature and did not conceal any secret protocols that aggressively denied or limited the sovereignty of third countries .
Secondly , recall that in the summer of 1939 , the European political map was constructed in such a way that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been a two-front war of the USSR with Germany and Japan at the same because the USSR did not have a direct border with Germany .
It was separated from Germany by Poland and the Baltic States .
Only by destroying that geopolitical bumper could Hitler strike the Soviet Union .
This meant that the preservation of such a buffer was a certain guarantee of the security of the USSR against the aggression of Nazi Germany .
Even more so considering that since the Anschluss Österreichs , the general staff of the Lithuanian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modeling joint Lithuanian-USSR defense against eventual German aggression .
At the initiative of the Lithuanian military attaché in Moscow , Col. Kazys Skučas , the issue was also discussed at the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs .
In contrast , Poland maintained a policy of “ equal distance ” ( ) from Moscow and Berlin during November 1938–August 1939 , and in no way agreed with the role of satellite , as proposed by Hitler in his projected journey eastward .
Thus , on Aug. 23 , 1939 , the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact de @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security bumper and placed it face-to-face with Nazi Germany ’ s war machine .
Thirdly , according to sources from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation , sharing of the “ limitrophic ” Baltic States “ at the right moment ” with Germany came to Moscow in the summer of 1926 , when the Soviet-Lithuanian Non-Aggression Pact was drafted .
At the People ’ s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs , some officials did not rule out the possibility that “ in certain circumstances ” Germany could “ offer ” Latvia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself in Poland and Lithuania .
Justifying the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on the eve of World War II and the occupation/annexation of the Baltic States in the summer of 1940 repeats the clichés of Soviet historical propaganda that have long been denied by contemporary Russian historians , defends the Stalinist foreign policy doctrine based on an imperial approach to the sovereignty of other states .
In the autumn of 1939 to the summer of 1940 , when the USSR carried out the “ process of the incorporation ” of Lithuania , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international law of the time , Lithuania and the USSR acted as two distinct and fully-fledged subjects of international law on the international arena .
At that time , at least a few bilateral agreements between Lithuania and the Soviet Union were signed and ratified by which Russia ( later the USSR ) recognized Lithuania ’ s sovereignty and independence without reservations .
In particular , Article 1 of the Soviet-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of July 12 , 1920 , stipulated that “ Russia recognises without reservation the sovereign rights and independence of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequences arising from such recognition , and voluntarily and for all time abandons all the sovereign rights of Russia over the Lithuanian people and their territory.
” On Sept. 28 , 1926 , Lithuania and the USSR signed the Soviet-Lithuanian Non-Aggression Pact , the first article of which reaffirmed that the peace treaty ’ s “ provisions shall uphold their full force and integrity and shall remain the basis for relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
” In the second article of the pact , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and territorial integrity of each other in all circumstances.
” This pact was renewed twice and was due to expire on Dec. 31 , 1945 .
The pact would therefore have been in place until the end of World War II , without the Soviet Union breaking international law between 1939–1940 .
In essence , the same legal and political provisions were also laid down in the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty , signed in Moscow on October 10 , 1939 .
The preamble to the treaty states that the July 12 , 1920 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pact of Sept. 28 , 1926 “ remain a solid basis for relations and obligations between the parties.
” It is important to underline that the “ transfer ” of the city of Vilnius and the whole region to the Republic of Lithuania from the point of view of international law was not some sort of gift from the USSR to Lithuania .
Instead , it was only the implementation of previous agreements between Lithuania and the RSFSR/USSR ( peace ; nonaggression ) in which the RSFSR/USSR had already freely recognized the sovereignty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territories .
The document ( Article 7 ) stressed that “ the implementation of this Treaty shall in no way affect the law of the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties , in particular their state order , economic and social system , military measures and general non-interference in internal affairs.
” In addition to bilateral agreements , both parties were the subjects of several multilateral international agreements prohibiting aggression .
Thus , the rules of international law in force at the time are very specifically and clearly bound .
Lithuania and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nations , a pacifist global international organization that strictly prohibited any offensive war and declared collective security .
On Aug. 27 , 1928 , another multilateral pacifist agreement was signed in Paris , the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact , which , in principle , “ renounced war as an instrument of national policy.
” The Soviets joined the Kellogg-Briand Pact on Feb. 9 , 1929 , and Lithuania joined the pact on April 5 .
Furthermore , Lithuania and the USSR signed the Convention for the Definition of Aggression on July 5 , 1933 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the document made it very clear that “ the aggressor [ … ] shall [ … ] be considered to be State which is the first to commit any of the following actions : ( 1 ) Declaration of war upon another State ; ( 2 ) Invasion by its armed forces , with or without a declaration of war , of the territory of another State.
” Article 3 of the Convention stated that “ No political , military , economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” This includes Putin ’ s openly expressed aspiration of the Stalinist Soviet Union to secure “ its strategic military and defensive goals ” on the eve of the upcoming war with Germany .
The historical documents contradict , in principle and indiscriminately , Putin ’ s conclusions that the “ process of the incorporation ” of Lithuania to the Soviet Union , which began in autumn 1939 , were “ implemented on a contractual basis , with the consent of the elected authorities ” and “ in line with international and state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ testify to the contrary .
But to err is to be human .
It is notable that even despite the fact that such a position is obviously dissonant with the historiography of Western countries and the positions and assessments of Russian professional historians-researchers .
In 2006–2012 , researchers from the Lithuanian Institute of History and the Institute of World History at the Russian Academy of Sciences collegiately prepared and published the two volumes of books that contained copies of close to six hundred original documents from Lithuanian and Russian archives .
These two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ precise manner the situation in Europe in 1939–1940 .
They also show the USSR ’ s political-military preparedness for the occupation/annexation of Lithuania and the mechanisms of its realization .
For example , when trying to cover the Soviet occupation of Lithuania , which began in the summer of 1940 with “ elections ” to the so-called “ People ’ s Seimas , ” which would take the necessary decisions for the Kremlin , Moscow carefully selected nearly all the members of the future “ People ’ s Seimas ” and decided on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the “ parliament.
” With one week left until the future Seimas ’ “ elections , ” on July 7 the USSR emissaries in Kaunas , Vladimir Dekanozov and Nikolaj Pozdniakov , reported to Stalin that the “ new Seimas ” would be made up of seventy-nine deputies .
From a political point of view , forty communists and five Komsomol members were to be “ elected , ” with the rest non-partisan .
By nationality , there were sixty-five Lithuanians , five Jews , two Russians , five Poles , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ historical terms this report by Dekanozov and Pozdniakov to Stalin , it would probably be possible to only ironically discuss that the processes begun after the start of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania were in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania , the treaties with the USSR , and the existing international law of the time .
Not to mention the fact that Lithuania , which was occupied/annexed in later years , “ preserved its government bodies , language , and had representation in the higher state structures of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ” and its representation in “ [ Soviet ] state structures ” were basically a legal fiction , which collapsed as soon as the Soviet president reformer , Mikhail Gorbachev , loosened the bindings of Soviet totalitarianism and allowed free elections in Lithuania in February 1990 .
This ended with the restoration of Lithuanian national statehood .
On the other hand , as shown in Putin ’ s essay , in which the fundamental right and identity of each nation to speak their own language , is essentially aligned to a much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This shows that Putin looked from up high at the issues and noticed little .
He even forgot that the government of Tsarist Russia could not take the Lithuanian language away from Lithuanians for almost half a century .
Which , between 1864 and 1904 , was attempted not only through propaganda , but even by repression .
For example , printing , distributing and reading of Lithuanian books was punished by prison or exile to Siberia .
In general terms , the reference is made to the two-volume books “ ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aspects : – It shows that although in the summer of 1939 Berlin was the initiator of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact , which entered the final stage of preparation for the war with Poland , thus seeking to isolate its future victim , the idea and initiative of the Secret Protocols , contrary to international law , came in from Moscow ; – It shows that , on June 15 , 1940 , the political-military leadership of the USSR planned and organized the invasion of Lithuania ( and the other Baltic States ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On the eve of the operation , several thousand places for the wounded were prepared in the USSR ’ s military hospitals , and around fifty to seventy thousand places for future prisoners of war were prepared in the GULAG system .
In early June , the demobilization of the Red Army ’ s soldiers was suspended by order of the commissar of defense and a large combination of the Red Army ’ s live forces and equipment was mobilized at the borders of Lithuania , Latvia and Estonia : 435,000 soldiers ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3,000 tanks ; more than 500 armored vehicles ; 2,601 warplanes .
In mid-June 1940 , the USSR used in its campaign of the occupation of the Baltic States three armies , seven infantry and three cavalry corps , twenty rifles , two motorized rifles , and four cavalry divisions , nine tanks and one parachutist brigade .
If we add to all of these forces the groups of the Soviet military bases based in Lithuania , Latvia and Estonia in November 1939 and the Baltic States blockade launched by the Soviet Navy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of June 14 , 1940 , we have over half a million troops with a huge armament of military equipment .
This means that on June 15–17 1940 , the Soviet Union sent a larger military armada than Great Britain did through the English Channel in Spring 1940 to help France save Europe from Nazi Germany , against the three small Baltic States , whose armies did not exceed seventy thousand fighters .
Hitler and Stalin / photo Illustration by The Daily Beast – It shows that , from June 15 , 1940 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ i.e .
from the beginning of the occupation of the Republic of Lithuania to its annexation , the representatives of the USSR occupying power in Kaunas Dekanozov and Pozdniakov newly appointed or selected Lithuanian officials ( to act as president , the new prime minister , ministers of the “ People ’ s Government ” and members of the “ People ’ s Seimas ” , etc . )
implemented constitutional reforms of a political-economic-legal nature of the Republic of Lithuania under the dictatorship of the USSR .
These reforms were incompatible with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lithuania , the international law in force at the time , and the Lithuanian-Soviet political treaties concluded in 1920–1939 .
Lithuania and Russia have lived as neighbors for more than a thousand years .
History and historical memory are fundamental elements of the identity of each nation and state .
History can unite nations but it can also divide them .
It is therefore important that common history and historical memory are based on facts , arguments , respectful dialogue , and consensus-building .
This should be without lies , defaults , distortions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create a safe and comfortable future for ourselves and future generations without meaningless “ memory wars.
” • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas • Crimea Behind the Curtain book made available to the public [ ukr ] • Putin has arrived in occupied Crimea .
Timely data about Russian Army maneuvers near Ukrainian @

Cover photo: Donkey Hotey via Flickr/The Rooster
Article prepared by Dr. Algimantas Kasparavičius, firstly published in The National Interest. Algimantas Kasparavičius is a historian, author, publicist, and a senior researcher at the Institute of History of Lithuania. He is also a member of the Lithuania-Russia Commission of Historians.
The truth is that the geopolitical stability/security situation in the world and Europe are moving away from the ideal but from the normal.
The issue of World War II is both confusing and complex. Historically, there are many questions that do not and cannot have easy answers. Different nations and states had different relationships and experiences with World War II. Therefore, it is not surprising that in their historical memory ipso facto historiography contains slightly different interpretations of the events and facts of the war. The focus of historical assessments also differs, and this is natural.
In such discourse, a public attempt by the head of one state or another to reflect again on the occasion of the unique anniversary of the end of World War II, to analyze the causes and circumstances of the most brutal event of the twentieth century and to critically evaluate painful historical lessons should probably not surprise us. Especially when global pacifism and even the “end of history” promised by the optimism of the end of the Cold War is rapidly dissolving, and in the early twenty-first century, the arms race and the geopolitical stability/security situation in the world and Europe are moving away not only from the ideal but also from the normal. In a rather emotional historical essay, based on personal and family experiences, Vladimir Putin reflects on the position of contemporary post-totalitarian Russia.
The role of the USSR in World War II is extremely significant but far from unambiguous. On the one hand, it is obvious that at some point the USSR fought a total war of survival in its territory. It had the most amount of the casualties and, in military terms, contributed most to the victory over Nazism. On the other hand, during the war, it radically changed camps and its march to Eastern and Central Europe in 1944–1945 brought to the nations of the region not only liberation from Nazism but also direct Soviet occupation and ideological coercion. Or, at least a limited sovereignty and total political dependence on the ideology of Soviet totalitarianism and the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Up to the end of 1940, it had basically acted as an informal ally of Nazi Germany and became a member of the anti-Hitler coalition from the summer of 1941. Under such historical circumstances, the official position on this topical issue of the USSR’s legal successor, the Russian Federation, becomes even more significant especially given that the Russian Federation is now one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power. It has also become one of the largest nuclear powers in the world. Thus, it is an important part of the architecture of the geopolitical security of modern Europe and the world, with global stability and global peace depending to a large extent on its actions in the international scene and signals to the international community.
However, the problem is that Putin presented in his humanly sensitive essay interpretations on some issues that were highly biased and bitterly hostile to historical truth, which not only misleads the historical memory of ordinary Russians and shapes a leading doctrine on history policy but can at the same time testify to certain manifestations of contemporary Russia’s neo-imperialism. First of all, in regard to the three western neighbors of Russia—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Such an attitude towards the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the occupation and annexation of the three sovereign and independent Baltic States, as recognized by the global community, by the USSR at the beginning of World War II show that neither historical memory nor international law is respected. This is characteristic of not a mere draftee-newcomer in the arena of great politics, but rather a long-standing leader of state who has accumulated a lot of political experience and has a university law degree. But, naturally, the question arises: what does such a position actually mean? What is behind it?
Signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in Moscow in 1939 / photo thenewfederalist.eu
The claim that the Soviet Union was the last state in Europe to form a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany, that the pact allowed the Soviet Union to avoid war on two fronts with Germany and Japan at the same time, and that it was in line with the country’s national interests is far from historical truth and leads to a logical trap. Firstly, the nonaggression pacts concluded by other states with Nazi Germany were purely pacifist in nature and did not conceal any secret protocols that aggressively denied or limited the sovereignty of third countries.
Secondly, recall that in the summer of 1939, the European political map was constructed in such a way that in principle there couldn’t have been a two-front war of the USSR with Germany and Japan at the same because the USSR did not have a direct border with Germany. It was separated from Germany by Poland and the Baltic States. Only by destroying that geopolitical bumper could Hitler strike the Soviet Union. This meant that the preservation of such a buffer was a certain guarantee of the security of the USSR against the aggression of Nazi Germany. Even more so considering that since the Anschluss Österreichs, the general staff of the Lithuanian Armed Forces had been developing plans and modeling joint Lithuanian-USSR defense against eventual German aggression. At the initiative of the Lithuanian military attaché in Moscow, Col. Kazys Skučas, the issue was also discussed at the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, Poland maintained a policy of “equal distance” (polityka równowagi) from Moscow and Berlin during November 1938–August 1939, and in no way agreed with the role of satellite, as proposed by Hitler in his projected journey eastward. Thus, on Aug. 23, 1939, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact de facto destroyed the USSR’s natural security bumper and placed it face-to-face with Nazi Germany’s war machine.
Thirdly, according to sources from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, sharing of the “limitrophic” Baltic States “at the right moment” with Germany came to Moscow in the summer of 1926, when the Soviet-Lithuanian Non-Aggression Pact was drafted. At the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, some officials did not rule out the possibility that “in certain circumstances” Germany could “offer” Latvia and Estonia to the Soviet Union and establish itself in Poland and Lithuania.
Justifying the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on the eve of World War II and the occupation/annexation of the Baltic States in the summer of 1940 repeats the clichés of Soviet historical propaganda that have long been denied by contemporary Russian historians, defends the Stalinist foreign policy doctrine based on an imperial approach to the sovereignty of other states.
In the autumn of 1939 to the summer of 1940, when the USSR carried out the “process of the incorporation” of Lithuania, from the point of view of the international law of the time, Lithuania and the USSR acted as two distinct and fully-fledged subjects of international law on the international arena. At that time, at least a few bilateral agreements between Lithuania and the Soviet Union were signed and ratified by which Russia (later the USSR) recognized Lithuania’s sovereignty and independence without reservations. In particular, Article 1 of the Soviet-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, stipulated that “Russia recognises without reservation the sovereign rights and independence of the Lithuanian State, with all the juridical consequences arising from such recognition, and voluntarily and for all time abandons all the sovereign rights of Russia over the Lithuanian people and their territory.” On Sept. 28, 1926, Lithuania and the USSR signed the Soviet-Lithuanian Non-Aggression Pact, the first article of which reaffirmed that the peace treaty’s “provisions shall uphold their full force and integrity and shall remain the basis for relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” In the second article of the pact, the parties promised to “respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other in all circumstances.” This pact was renewed twice and was due to expire on Dec. 31, 1945. The pact would therefore have been in place until the end of World War II, without the Soviet Union breaking international law between 1939–1940.
In essence, the same legal and political provisions were also laid down in the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty, signed in Moscow on October 10, 1939. The preamble to the treaty states that the July 12, 1920, Moscow Peace Treaty and the nonaggression pact of Sept. 28, 1926 “remain a solid basis for relations and obligations between the parties.” It is important to underline that the “transfer” of the city of Vilnius and the whole region to the Republic of Lithuania from the point of view of international law was not some sort of gift from the USSR to Lithuania. Instead, it was only the implementation of previous agreements between Lithuania and the RSFSR/USSR (peace; nonaggression) in which the RSFSR/USSR had already freely recognized the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania in these territories. The document (Article 7) stressed that “the implementation of this Treaty shall in no way affect the law of the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, in particular their state order, economic and social system, military measures and general non-interference in internal affairs.”
In addition to bilateral agreements, both parties were the subjects of several multilateral international agreements prohibiting aggression. Thus, the rules of international law in force at the time are very specifically and clearly bound. Lithuania and the Soviet Union belonged to the League of Nations, a pacifist global international organization that strictly prohibited any offensive war and declared collective security. On Aug. 27, 1928, another multilateral pacifist agreement was signed in Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact, which, in principle, “renounced war as an instrument of national policy.” The Soviets joined the Kellogg-Briand Pact on Feb. 9, 1929, and Lithuania joined the pact on April 5.
Furthermore, Lithuania and the USSR signed the Convention for the Definition of Aggression on July 5, 1933, in London. Article 2 of the document made it very clear that “the aggressor […] shall […] be considered to be State which is the first to commit any of the following actions: (1) Declaration of war upon another State; (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State.” Article 3 of the Convention stated that “No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2.” This includes Putin’s openly expressed aspiration of the Stalinist Soviet Union to secure “its strategic military and defensive goals” on the eve of the upcoming war with Germany.
The historical documents contradict, in principle and indiscriminately, Putin’s conclusions that the “process of the incorporation” of Lithuania to the Soviet Union, which began in autumn 1939, were “implemented on a contractual basis, with the consent of the elected authorities” and “in line with international and state law of that time.” The documents testify to the contrary.
But to err is to be human. It is notable that even despite the fact that such a position is obviously dissonant with the historiography of Western countries and the positions and assessments of Russian professional historians-researchers. In 2006–2012, researchers from the Lithuanian Institute of History and the Institute of World History at the Russian Academy of Sciences collegiately prepared and published the two volumes of books that contained copies of close to six hundred original documents from Lithuanian and Russian archives. These two books reflect in a rather detailed and precise manner the situation in Europe in 1939–1940. They also show the USSR’s political-military preparedness for the occupation/annexation of Lithuania and the mechanisms of its realization. For example, when trying to cover the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, which began in the summer of 1940 with “elections” to the so-called “People’s Seimas,” which would take the necessary decisions for the Kremlin, Moscow carefully selected nearly all the members of the future “People’s Seimas” and decided on the political, social and national composition of the “parliament.” With one week left until the future Seimas’ “elections,” on July 7 the USSR emissaries in Kaunas, Vladimir Dekanozov and Nikolaj Pozdniakov, reported to Stalin that the “new Seimas” would be made up of seventy-nine deputies. From a political point of view, forty communists and five Komsomol members were to be “elected,” with the rest—non-partisan. By nationality, there were sixty-five Lithuanians, five Jews, two Russians, five Poles, and two Latvians. Thus, assessing in historical terms this report by Dekanozov and Pozdniakov to Stalin, it would probably be possible to only ironically discuss that the processes begun after the start of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania were in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the treaties with the USSR, and the existing international law of the time.
Not to mention the fact that Lithuania, which was occupied/annexed in later years, “preserved its government bodies, language, and had representation in the higher state structures of the Soviet Union.” The supposedly Lithuanian “government” and its representation in “[Soviet] state structures” were basically a legal fiction, which collapsed as soon as the Soviet president reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev, loosened the bindings of Soviet totalitarianism and allowed free elections in Lithuania in February 1990. This ended with the restoration of Lithuanian national statehood. On the other hand, as shown in Putin’s essay, in which the fundamental right and identity of each nation—to speak their own language, is essentially aligned to a much more rapidly changing form of policy/political government. This shows that Putin looked from up high at the issues and noticed little. He even forgot that the government of Tsarist Russia could not take the Lithuanian language away from Lithuanians for almost half a century. Which, between 1864 and 1904, was attempted not only through propaganda, but even by repression. For example, printing, distributing and reading of Lithuanian books was punished by prison or exile to Siberia.
In general terms, the reference is made to the two-volume books “ССCР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны” (SSSR i Litva v gody vtoroi mirovoi voiny) is important in at least several aspects:
– It shows that although in the summer of 1939 Berlin was the initiator of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, which entered the final stage of preparation for the war with Poland, thus seeking to isolate its future victim, the idea and initiative of the Secret Protocols, contrary to international law, came in from Moscow;
– It shows that, on June 15, 1940, the political-military leadership of the USSR planned and organized the invasion of Lithuania (and the other Baltic States) as a typical offensive military operation. On the eve of the operation, several thousand places for the wounded were prepared in the USSR’s military hospitals, and around fifty to seventy thousand places for future prisoners of war were prepared in the GULAG system. In early June, the demobilization of the Red Army’s soldiers was suspended by order of the commissar of defense and a large combination of the Red Army’s live forces and equipment was mobilized at the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia: 435,000 soldiers; about 8,000 cannons and mortars; over 3,000 tanks; more than 500 armored vehicles; 2,601 warplanes. In mid-June 1940, the USSR used in its campaign of the occupation of the Baltic States three armies, seven infantry and three cavalry corps, twenty rifles, two motorized rifles, and four cavalry divisions, nine tanks and one parachutist brigade. If we add to all of these forces the groups of the Soviet military bases based in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in November 1939 and the Baltic States blockade launched by the Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea on the morning of June 14, 1940, we have over half a million troops with a huge armament of military equipment. This means that on June 15–17 1940, the Soviet Union sent a larger military armada than Great Britain did through the English Channel in Spring 1940 to help France save Europe from Nazi Germany, against the three small Baltic States, whose armies did not exceed seventy thousand fighters.
Hitler and Stalin / photo Illustration by The Daily Beast
– It shows that, from June 15, 1940, until Aug. 3, 1940, i.e. from the beginning of the occupation of the Republic of Lithuania to its annexation, the representatives of the USSR occupying power in Kaunas—Dekanozov and Pozdniakov—newly appointed or selected Lithuanian officials (to act as president, the new prime minister, ministers of the “People’s Government” and members of the “People’s Seimas”, etc.) implemented constitutional reforms of a political-economic-legal nature of the Republic of Lithuania under the dictatorship of the USSR. These reforms were incompatible with the 1938 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the international law in force at the time, and the Lithuanian-Soviet political treaties concluded in 1920–1939.
Lithuania and Russia have lived as neighbors for more than a thousand years. History and historical memory are fundamental elements of the identity of each nation and state. History can unite nations but it can also divide them. It is therefore important that common history and historical memory are based on facts, arguments, respectful dialogue, and consensus-building. This should be without lies, defaults, distortions. This is the only way to create a safe and comfortable future for ourselves and future generations without meaningless “memory wars.”
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InformNapalm Partner in Lithuania: Res Publica – Civic Resilience Center.
InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-09-19--EU ambassadors approve continued personal sanctions against Russian officials because of Crimea

On September 9 , 2020 , the Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States of the EU ( COPEREPER ) agreed without discussion a 6-month extension of personal sanctions against individuals and organizations undermining the territorial integrity , sovereignty and independence of Ukraine .
This was announced by the correspondent of Radio Liberty in Brussels Rikard Jozwiak .
The journalist noted that 15 individuals and organizations associated with the construction of the Kerch Bridge will soon be added to the sanctions list .
“ EU ambs have given the green light to the 6 months roll-over sanctions on 175 ppl @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the territorial integrity of # Ukraine .
Soon around 15 ppl & a handful of entities will be added to this list for the construction of the # Kerchbridge ” he tweeted .
InformNapalm international volunteer community also continues to identify and publish information about Russian war criminals who took an active part in the special operation to seize Crimea .
Evidence has now been collected regarding military personnel from more than 32 Russian military units .
At the same time , it was established that servicemen from 22 units from this list @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Crimea , also took part in hostilities against Ukraine in the Donbas .
In total , more than 2,600 regular Russian servicemen from 99 units of the Russian Army and Russian security forces were identified in the InformNapalm ’ s OSINT investigations as participants of the aggression against Ukraine .
This is a clear indication that the hybrid Russian military aggression in the east of Ukraine is a continuation of the war that the Russian Federation started with the invasion of Crimea .
All of these materials have been translated into dozens of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomats and international partners , entered in court cases and are part of a large body of evidence against Russia .
The results of InformNapalm ’ s investigations were repeatedly presented by official Ukrainian delegations at meetings of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe , NATO and the OSCE , and were entered in Ukraine ’ s suit against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights .
Ukraine Imposes Sanctions Against the Company that Participated In Seizure of Ukrainian Sailors In early September , the topic of Russian-occupied Ukrainian Crimea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of NATO intelligence operations and drills which are likely to become a deterrent to any Kremlin ’ s aggressive intentions ahead of the Kavkaz 2020 Russian military exercises planned for the second half of September .
In addition , the United Efforts 2020 strategic command and staff exercise is to take place in southern Ukraine in September with the participation of of NATO member countries .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas • Crimea Behind the Curtain book made available to the public [ ukr ] • The leader of the Belarusian protest movement Sergei Tikhanovsky illegally visited Crimea Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi , edited by Artem Velichko .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

On September 9, 2020, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States of the EU (COPEREPER) agreed without discussion a 6-month extension of personal sanctions against individuals and organizations undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. This was announced by the correspondent of Radio Liberty in Brussels Rikard Jozwiak.
The journalist noted that 15 individuals and organizations associated with the construction of the Kerch Bridge will soon be added to the sanctions list.
“EU ambs have given the green light to the 6 months roll-over sanctions on 175 ppl & 44 entities deemed to have undermined the territorial integrity of #Ukraine. Soon around 15 ppl & a handful of entities will be added to this list for the construction of the #Kerchbridge” he tweeted.
EU ambs have given the green light to the 6 months roll-over sanctions on 175 ppl & 44 entities deemed to have undermined the territorial integrity of #Ukraine. soon around 15 ppl & a handful of entities will be added to this list for the construction of the #Kerchbridge #Russia — Rikard Jozwiak (@RikardJozwiak) September 9, 2020
InformNapalm international volunteer community also continues to identify and publish information about Russian war criminals who took an active part in the special operation to seize Crimea. Evidence has now been collected regarding military personnel from more than 32 Russian military units. At the same time, it was established that servicemen from 22 units from this list, in addition to the invasion of Crimea, also took part in hostilities against Ukraine in the Donbas. In total, more than 2,600 regular Russian servicemen from 99 units of the Russian Army and Russian security forces were identified in the InformNapalm’s OSINT investigations as participants of the aggression against Ukraine. This is a clear indication that the hybrid Russian military aggression in the east of Ukraine is a continuation of the war that the Russian Federation started with the invasion of Crimea. All of these materials have been translated into dozens of languages by InformNapalm volunteers, distributed among diplomats and international partners, entered in court cases and are part of a large body of evidence against Russia.
The results of InformNapalm’s investigations were repeatedly presented by official Ukrainian delegations at meetings of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE, and were entered in Ukraine’s suit against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights.
Read more: Ukraine Imposes Sanctions Against the Company that Participated In Seizure of Ukrainian Sailors
In early September, the topic of Russian-occupied Ukrainian Crimea came to the fore in the context of NATO intelligence operations and drills which are likely to become a deterrent to any Kremlin’s aggressive intentions ahead of the Kavkaz 2020 Russian military exercises planned for the second half of September.
In addition, the United Efforts 2020 strategic command and staff exercise is to take place in southern Ukraine in September with the participation of of NATO member countries.
Read more from InformNapalm


informnapalm--2020-09-23--Kavkaz-2020 exercises: Russian T-90A tank accidentally knocked out near Astrakhan

Russian media , several bloggers and other social media sources reported that on September 16 , 2020 , during military exercises at the Kapustin Yar training range in the Astrakhan Oblast , a Russian T-90A tank was accidentally hit by a 9M113M rocket from a Konkurs ATGM mounted on a BMP-2 .
According to one version , the BMP-2 crew fired a shot and hit the side of the T-90A in thick dust сonditions created by actively maneuvering fighting vehicles .
According to another version , the shot was a high-explosive projectile fired from another tank .
Allegedly , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side armor of the T-90A from full penetration .
Nevertheless , it is reported that the tank commander ( in some sources , he is called Zamir Urkachaev ) received burns to his face and hands .
Russian Ministry of Defense has not yet officially commented on this information .
However , several photographs of the accident ’ s aftermath have appeared on the web .
It is also known that on September 16 , servicemen from Belarus and China arrived at the Kapustin Yar training range to participate in the Kavkaz-2020 exercise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the official channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense .
It is reported that the main phase of the Kavkaz-2020 exercise will take place from September 21 to 26 .
Background information : Exactly 3 years ago , on September 18 , 2017 , a 9M729 cruise missile ( NATO reporting name SSC-8 ) was launched Kapustin Yar as part of the Zapad-2017 exercise .
The rocket flew 480 km .
Apparently this event was one of the main reasons that drove the United States in 2019 out of the Treaty on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ INF Treaty ) after a series of Russia ’ s other violations of the terms of this treaty .
Official information on tank range practice from the Russian Ministry of Defense On September 17 , the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense reported about the exercises of tank crews at two other training ranges .
According to the official data , T-90A tank crews at the Prudboy training range in the Volgograd Oblast , practiced engagement of the opposing force using the tank carousel tactics as part of a bilateral battalion tactical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is , when a tank is firing from a position , another one moves in from a flank preparing to take its firing position .
As the shooting sectors , the sequence of target raising , and the distance to them are not known to the crews in advance , this could cause the incidents described above .
Also , the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that 10 crews of T-72B3 tanks , part of a tank company of the army corps of the Black Sea Fleet , fired at the Angarsky range @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rough terrain during a conditional oncoming battle .
Also , the crews of the T-72B3 tanks conducted firing practice at targets simulating armored vehicles and artillery systems of an opposing force .
Russian tanks T-90A and T-72B3 in combat in the Donbas The database of OSINT investigations of the InformNapalm international intelligence community contains evidence of the use of uniquely Russian types of military hardware in the hostilities in the Donbas .
These types of weapons were not in service with the Ukrainian army , therefore , they could not have been captured @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and T-72B3 main battle tanks are among these types of weapons .
Tanks for Peskov : Russian modifications found in the occupied territories of Donbas On September 3 , 2014 , on the territory of the Luhansk Oblast , local residents recorded a convoy of Russian military equipment consisting of 25 vehicles .
Two T-72B3 tanks and other fighting vehicles were identified in the convoy .
According to the data about Russian weapons in the Donbas collected on the Ukrainian section of Wikipedia with reference to OSINT investigations of the InformNapalm international volunteer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Askai707 and other media reports , it is known that in the battles near Ilovaisk in August 2014 , the Ukrainian military destroyed several T-72B3 tanks of the 6th Armored Brigade ( military unit 54096 ) of Russian Army .
In the summer of 2014 , the battalion-tactical group of the Russian invasion forces of 17th Motorized Rifle Brigade ( military unit 65384 ) was also equipped with T-72B3 tanks .
Also in the August battles near Luhansk , Russian 200 Motorized Rifle Brigade ( military unit 08275 ) operated T-72B3 tanks .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ used by the 6th Armored Brigade in the battles at Debaltseve in the winter of 2015 .
British journalist and pro-Russian propagandist Graham Phillips also accidentally showed a convoy of these tanks in the village of Sanzharivka .
It is also known about one destroyed Russian T-72B3 tank in winter battles near Debaltseve close to Vosme Bereznia village .
Russian T-90A tanks have also been spotted in the Donbas on several occasions .
Tanks of this modification were filmed in the area of the railway crossing close to the village of Lyse near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2014 .
The photos found by InformNapalm OSINT investigators in the profile of Russian serviceman Vitaly Marakasov in October 2014 provide one of the clearest proofs of Russian military invasion .
The photo showed a whole convoy of T-90A tanks of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade ( military unit 63354 ) of the Russian Army , which was moving along a dirt road near the Fabrychne settlement close to the Luhansk airport .
This photo also appeared on the cover of Donbas in Flames guide book , prepared by the Prometheus Security Environment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donbas has been going on for many years .
Russia continues to officially deny its active participation in the hostilities , despite a huge amount of the incriminating information collected over the years and indicating direct participation of Russian military personnel , weaponry and equipment in the aggression against Ukraine .
And while there is a temporary lull in the Donbas , Russian tanks continue to burn , even during exercises on the Russian territory .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram InformNapalm does not have any financial support from any government or large donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You can also help InformNapalm by signing up for monthly mini-contributions through @ @

Russian media, several bloggers and other social media sources reported that on September 16, 2020, during military exercises at the Kapustin Yar training range in the Astrakhan Oblast, a Russian T-90A tank was accidentally hit by a 9M113M rocket from a Konkurs ATGM mounted on a BMP-2.
According to one version, the BMP-2 crew fired a shot and hit the side of the T-90A in thick dust сonditions created by actively maneuvering fighting vehicles. According to another version, the shot was a high-explosive projectile fired from another tank. Allegedly, a box with tools and accessories saved the side armor of the T-90A from full penetration. Nevertheless, it is reported that the tank commander (in some sources, he is called Zamir Urkachaev) received burns to his face and hands. Russian Ministry of Defense has not yet officially commented on this information. However, several photographs of the accident’s aftermath have appeared on the web.
It is also known that on September 16, servicemen from Belarus and China arrived at the Kapustin Yar training range to participate in the Kavkaz-2020 exercise. A relevant video was published on the official channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is reported that the main phase of the Kavkaz-2020 exercise will take place from September 21 to 26.
Background information: Exactly 3 years ago, on September 18, 2017, a 9M729 cruise missile (NATO reporting name SSC-8) was launched from the Kapustin Yar training range as part of the Zapad-2017 exercise. The rocket flew 480 km. Apparently this event was one of the main reasons that drove the United States in 2019 out of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) after a series of Russia’s other violations of the terms of this treaty.
Official information on tank range practice from the Russian Ministry of Defense
On September 17, the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense reported about the exercises of tank crews at two other training ranges. According to the official data, T-90A tank crews at the Prudboy training range in the Volgograd Oblast, practiced engagement of the opposing force using the tank carousel tactics as part of a bilateral battalion tactical exercise. The essence of the tactics is, when a tank is firing from a position, another one moves in from a flank preparing to take its firing position. As the shooting sectors, the sequence of target raising, and the distance to them are not known to the crews in advance, this could cause the incidents described above.
Also, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that 10 crews of T-72B3 tanks, part of a tank company of the army corps of the Black Sea Fleet, fired at the Angarsky range. Tankmen performed firing in motion on rough terrain during a conditional oncoming battle. Also, the crews of the T-72B3 tanks conducted firing practice at targets simulating armored vehicles and artillery systems of an opposing force.
Russian tanks T-90A and T-72B3 in combat in the Donbas
The database of OSINT investigations of the InformNapalm international intelligence community contains evidence of the use of uniquely Russian types of military hardware in the hostilities in the Donbas. These types of weapons were not in service with the Ukrainian army, therefore, they could not have been captured in battle. Russian modifications of T-90A and T-72B3 main battle tanks are among these types of weapons.
Read more: Tanks for Peskov: Russian modifications found in the occupied territories of Donbas
On September 3, 2014, on the territory of the Luhansk Oblast, local residents recorded a convoy of Russian military equipment consisting of 25 vehicles. Two T-72B3 tanks and other fighting vehicles were identified in the convoy.
According to the data about Russian weapons in the Donbas collected on the Ukrainian section of Wikipedia with reference to OSINT investigations of the InformNapalm international volunteer community, postings of investigative blogger @Askai707 and other media reports, it is known that in the battles near Ilovaisk in August 2014, the Ukrainian military destroyed several T-72B3 tanks of the 6th Armored Brigade (military unit 54096) of Russian Army. In the summer of 2014, the battalion-tactical group of the Russian invasion forces of 17th Motorized Rifle Brigade (military unit 65384) was also equipped with T-72B3 tanks. Also in the August battles near Luhansk, Russian 200 Motorized Rifle Brigade (military unit 08275) operated T-72B3 tanks. Tanks of the same modification were also used by the 6th Armored Brigade in the battles at Debaltseve in the winter of 2015. British journalist and pro-Russian propagandist Graham Phillips also accidentally showed a convoy of these tanks in the village of Sanzharivka. It is also known about one destroyed Russian T-72B3 tank in winter battles near Debaltseve close to Vosme Bereznia village.
Russian T-90A tanks have also been spotted in the Donbas on several occasions.
Tanks of this modification were filmed in the area of the railway crossing close to the village of Lyse near Novosvitlivka (Luhansk Oblast) in August 2014.
The photos found by InformNapalm OSINT investigators in the profile of Russian serviceman Vitaly Marakasov in October 2014 provide one of the clearest proofs of Russian military invasion. The photo showed a whole convoy of T-90A tanks of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (military unit 63354) of the Russian Army, which was moving along a dirt road near the Fabrychne settlement close to the Luhansk airport. This photo also appeared on the cover of Donbas in Flames guide book, prepared by the Prometheus Security Environment Research Center.
The war in the Donbas has been going on for many years. Russia continues to officially deny its active participation in the hostilities, despite a huge amount of the incriminating information collected over the years and indicating direct participation of Russian military personnel, weaponry and equipment in the aggression against Ukraine. And while there is a temporary lull in the Donbas, Russian tanks continue to burn, even during exercises on the Russian territory.
Read more from InformNapalm
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from any government or large donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You can also help InformNapalm by signing up for monthly mini-contributions through Patreon.