informnapalm--2020-12-14--Transcausasia: the Armenian dilemma

Transcausasia: the Armenian dilemma

The author , Andrius Kubilius , is a Member of the European Parliament and the Standing Rapporteur on Russia by the decision of the EP .
The article was published for the first time on the website of the Lithuanian delegation belonging to the European People ’ s Party group .
The article was prepared for publication by InformNapalm partner in Lithuania : Res Publica – Civic Resilience Center .
The second war of Nagorno-Karabakh has ended and there are many opinions on the exact winner .
Some claim that it is Azerbaijan whereas others claim that Putin gained the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and some experts believe that Erdogan is the real winner , as he enforced Russia to give up their long-running geopolitical monopoly in Transcaucasia .
And Turkey has undoubtedly benefited from it .
This year it was the 3rd conflict already where Russia had to admit the advantage of Turkey regarding military technologies ( Libya and Idlib in Syria were another 2 cases ) .
Therefore , it may even seem that the Kremlin did not dare to help Armenia in defending Nagorno-Karabakh .
When Moscow is afraid of losing against the Turks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , keeping whispering that Putin wanted revenge on Pasinyan sounds like a decent idea .
After all , the latter came to power through the ‘ velvet revolution ’ , and Putin simply hates them .
Can the results of the 2nd major Nagorno-Karabakh war become a valid proof that the Kremlin influence keeps diminishing not only in Belarus , Moldova or Khabarovsk , but also in Transcaucasia ?
It is a topic worth deeper analysis , and I expect to develop this point further in a separate text in the future .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ right answer , what attitude and goals across Moscow and Istanbul caused the outcome of the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh war .
However , it is obvious that the geopolitical earthquake has occurred in Transcaucasia , and its consequences will be noticeable for at least a few upcoming decades .
These consequences will be primarily experienced by the smallest participants of this armed conflict , namely Armenia and Azerbaijan .
An Azerbaijani soldier and a Russian “ peacekeeper ” are on duty at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Shushah in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Therefore , I would like to dedicate this text to the participant in this conflict , who is unanimously considered as the greatest loser in this war .
It is Armenia .
It is hard to imagine how the Armenian society all over the world is feeling after such a loss .
Anger , pain , anxiety regarding the long-term prospects are probably the most significant emotions there .
So is the harsh criticism towards the incumbent government , and it is absolutely understandable given the tragic history of Armenia in recent centuries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the genocide towards the Armenian nation and the location leading to dangerous geopolitical neighbourhood .
Therefore , in this text , I want to discuss the long-term future alternatives for Armenia rather than why this country lost the war or what it did wrong geopolitically ( even though I have a couple of remarks on these ) .
I appreciate that the advice from Lithuania , which is quite distant in this context , is not the subject to consider rationally in light of such a national crisis .
Therefore , I am @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I can better understand how the EU can be more beneficial in helping this suffering nation .
Armenia is not the first nation to experience a massive and even tragic challenge through a painful defeat .
For some nations , these tragedies led to the complete collapse .
Yet the world history provides a number of convincing examples how painful defeats became a drastic encouragement to reconsider their further path and thus regenerate .
In his last book “ Upheaval : How Nations Cope with Crisis and Change “ ( 2019 ; ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regeneration of some nations after massive tragedies .
Amongst the examples , this author lists Finland , Japan , Chile , Indonesia , Germany , Australia and the US .
Diamond is convincingly developing the theory that during the state crisis , the nations should act similarly as people experiencing deep personal difficulties .
Psychologists distinguish 12 essential actions and factors which determine the recovery of such people .
These ones start from Psichologai žino net 12 esminių veiksmų ir veiksnių , kurie lemia tokio asmens atsigavimą , pradedant the confession of such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a deep crisis and only they can take action to get over it .
Diamond transforms these principles into 12 rules for the nations experiencing crisis .
In this case , the action list should begin with the national consensus and recognition that the nation and the state are in the crisis .
As a result , the nation should find a new recovery way itself .
This can be completed through analysing the experiences of other nations , the rejection of established geopolitical limitations and the acceptance of support from other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So , what exactly the book of Diamond can teach Armenia ?
First of all , Armenia should seek the national consensus and understanding that the state and the nation is in a deep crisis at the moment .
Therefore , there is the necessity to find new strategies by these actors themselves .
It is not easy to reach the mentioned consensus as there are numerous temptations to accuse the incumbent government of the loss in the war .
Subsequently , the current leaders will always find various ways how to blame @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such an armed conflict .
Such a festival of accusations is not the way recommended by Diamond ; neither it is the way chosen by other nations which overcame the crisis in the past .
On the contrary , they managed to avoid mutual accusations while digging deeper into the deeper analysis of their problems and causes .
Such an approach is the only one allowing to find new strategic solutions which allow the nation to recover and defeat the crisis .
I do not know much about the exact answers Armenia would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ However , I would like to hear the answers to these main questions which are interconnected .
The first question : was it reasonable for Armenia to maintain the status quo only all the time since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1990s ?
Even though Armenia won , this state did not seek any long-term peace agreement and gave up the territories which remained occupied by Armenians , yet did not belong to the Armenian part of Nagorno-Karabakh in fact .
The maintenance of territory-based status quo has become the primary national idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
However , it was also the only idea which distinguished Armenia in the global community .
Therefore , it may seem that Armenians lacked not only physical but also intellectual or emotional power for anything else .
The belief that the Russian military forces would help to maintain such a status quo eventually turned out to be false .
Moreover , it was the main cause for the military tragedy this year .
Additionally , it is obvious that the result of war loss is basically the return to the situation which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first military conflict took place .
The second question : was it strategically right to associate the geopolitical security with Russia only , given the fact that the Kremlin opposed any attempt to become closer to the West and the EU ?
Finally , it came to light that the security guarantees from Moscow were not efficient ( especially regarding the context of recent clashes between Russia and Turkey and their outcomes ) .
The maintenance of status quo , supported by the Kremlin , turned out to be deceptive too .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ markets of Russia and Eurasia did not allow Armenia to adapt to the Western markets fully and thus create the long-term success story .
Meanwhile , the EU-Armenia relations remained ambivalent only .
The illusion of security .
Russian-Armenian military exercises .
Russia didn ’ t help Armenia when it really needed for help / massispost.com photo Looking from the perspective of Vilnius , all these details and events are the strategy of Armenia during the last three decades which led to the current national tragedy of Armenians .
For the record , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the questions of Armenian self-reflection , based on the book of Diamond .
Only Armenians themselves can provide deeper and more accurate answers , yet they have to find courage to search for such answers first .
The answers formulated by myself may give me a clue how the brand new and recovering strategy of Armenia could look like .
I would see two essential things which could be related to the EU-Armenia relations .
First of all , the EU should take initiative and establish the international security mechanism for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be implemented with the help of other Western partners ( the new US administration ) .
Of course , such a mechanism should not rely on the so-called Kremlin peacekeepers only .
Not so long ago , the West had to take care of the Albanians in Kosovo ; the international guarantees of security had been successfully created then .
I do not imply that the West should copy the model of Kosovo in Nagorno-Karabakh .
Yet it is obvious that the Western countries should take up a more proactive role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If the security in Transcaucasia is left for the supervision of Russia and Turkey only , this region , holding a lot of strategic resources of oil and gas , will always remain the zone of unrest and manipulation of the Kremlin .
It is crucially important in the context of the closer EU-Armenia relations .
The international security guarantees , aimed at the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh , would allow Armenia to listen to one more important advice by Diamond : to review established geopolitical constraints .
Secondly , Armenia will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons remains the only determinant of state security there .
As this state is surrounded by such geopolitical players as Turkey and its main satellite Azerbaijan or even Russia and Iran , the only reasonable way to ensure security is to focus on the economic and social prosperity of Armenia .
Let ’ s take the example of Israel in the Middle East .
Even though this state is experiencing many great challenges of international security for decades , it remains safe .
It happens exactly because of the strong economy established , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons .
All in all , Armenia has no other way than concentrating on the creation of the economic miracle in Transcaucasia .
To realize that , Armenians had to shift their national strategy priorities from military to development , investment and modernisation .
Having not much natural resources , Armenia will be able to strengthen its economy only through the integration towards the West and the partnership with the EU as these regions are particularly strong regarding their economies .
Armenia will hardly realize such a strategic change itself .
Therefore , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role there .
According to Diamond , the support from other countries is vital when it comes to the recovery from any national crisis .
However , the suffering nation must understand the causes of that crisis and reach a consensus regarding their new national strategy first .
The stable situation in Transcaucasia should be an important priority for the EU .
The EU itself should also learn to create and develop such stability .
It is crucial to know that the passive observation of how Armenians and Azeris are failing to reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will create such stability is a short-sighted self-deception .
The Kremlin cares only about the long-term instability in the former Soviet space , as it will prevent the Western integration there .
Meanwhile , the EU would rather benefit from the export of stability , because otherwise , the import of instability remains the only option available .
The administration of Trump has recently demonstrated the great example how to create stability in the zones of long-term instability .
The US encouraged a few Arab states to sign the peace agreement with Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of economic support were offered .
Such deals have a major historical meaning .
It is not surprising that these peace agreements were officially titled the Abraham Accords , recalling the biblical story of the origins of the Jewish and Arab people .
The EU could follow the example of the US and offer similar agreements to Armenians and Azeris .
They could be also supported by the plans of extensive economic support and the long-term peace agreements , including the international mechanism guaranteeing security to the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh .
Such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as they would open the door to long-term success , based on the strength of the economy rather than the amount of weapons .
The international community should help Armenia to expand its geopolitical agenda , which should also become more ambitious .
This means that it should include not only security but also economic growth , investment attraction , reforms , social welfare , corruption prevention , more attention towards human rights and democracy .
As a result , Armenia could return to both local and international politics with refreshed power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community , and the European Union in particular , could offer Armenia a new agreement on further strategic goals .
This could involve international donors ( G7 ) and financial institutions ( International Monetary Fund , World Bank , European Investment Bank , European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ) .
Finally , the national investment institutions from the EU member states could contribute as well .
Given another biblical story , related to Armenia and Mount Ararat , such agreements , proposed by the European Union to Armenia and Azerbaijan with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Armenia , could have the historic name of the Noah ’ s Ark Accords .
The Bible says : ‘ Love your neighbor as yourself ’ .
It is also a common formula for peace between neighbours .
Finally , this is advice for the European Union to appreciate its Eastern partners as itself , since it is the only way to guarantee peace in Transcaucasia .

Illustration: ankasam.org
The author, Andrius Kubilius, is a Member of the European Parliament and the Standing Rapporteur on Russia by the decision of the EP. The article was published for the first time on the website of the Lithuanian delegation belonging to the European People’s Party group. The article was prepared for publication by InformNapalm partner in Lithuania: Res Publica – Civic Resilience Center.
The second war of Nagorno-Karabakh has ended and there are many opinions on the exact winner. Some claim that it is Azerbaijan whereas others claim that Putin gained the most profit there. Meanwhile, me and some experts believe that Erdogan is the real winner, as he enforced Russia to give up their long-running geopolitical monopoly in Transcaucasia. And Turkey has undoubtedly benefited from it.
This year it was the 3rd conflict already where Russia had to admit the advantage of Turkey regarding military technologies (Libya and Idlib in Syria were another 2 cases). Therefore, it may even seem that the Kremlin did not dare to help Armenia in defending Nagorno-Karabakh. When Moscow is afraid of losing against the Turks for the 3rd time in a row, keeping whispering that Putin wanted revenge on Pasinyan sounds like a decent idea. After all, the latter came to power through the ‘velvet revolution’, and Putin simply hates them.
Can the results of the 2nd major Nagorno-Karabakh war become a valid proof that the Kremlin influence keeps diminishing not only in Belarus, Moldova or Khabarovsk, but also in Transcaucasia? It is a topic worth deeper analysis, and I expect to develop this point further in a separate text in the future.
It is probably difficult to find the right answer, what attitude and goals across Moscow and Istanbul caused the outcome of the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh war. However, it is obvious that the geopolitical earthquake has occurred in Transcaucasia, and its consequences will be noticeable for at least a few upcoming decades. These consequences will be primarily experienced by the smallest participants of this armed conflict, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan.
An Azerbaijani soldier and a Russian “peacekeeper” are on duty at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Shushah in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. November 13 / Reuters photo
Therefore, I would like to dedicate this text to the participant in this conflict, who is unanimously considered as the greatest loser in this war. It is Armenia.
It is hard to imagine how the Armenian society all over the world is feeling after such a loss. Anger, pain, anxiety regarding the long-term prospects are probably the most significant emotions there. So is the harsh criticism towards the incumbent government, and it is absolutely understandable given the tragic history of Armenia in recent centuries. The most prominent details here are the genocide towards the Armenian nation and the location leading to dangerous geopolitical neighbourhood.
Therefore, in this text, I want to discuss the long-term future alternatives for Armenia rather than why this country lost the war or what it did wrong geopolitically (even though I have a couple of remarks on these).
I appreciate that the advice from Lithuania, which is quite distant in this context, is not the subject to consider rationally in light of such a national crisis. Therefore, I am listing the following ideas for myself so I can better understand how the EU can be more beneficial in helping this suffering nation.
Armenia is not the first nation to experience a massive and even tragic challenge through a painful defeat. For some nations, these tragedies led to the complete collapse. Yet the world history provides a number of convincing examples how painful defeats became a drastic encouragement to reconsider their further path and thus regenerate.
In his last book “Upheaval: How Nations Cope with Crisis and Change“ (2019; https://www.amazon.com/Upheaval-Turning-Points-Nations-Crisis/dp/0316409138 ), Jeremy Diamond focuses exactly on the regeneration of some nations after massive tragedies. Amongst the examples, this author lists Finland, Japan, Chile, Indonesia, Germany, Australia and the US. Diamond is convincingly developing the theory that during the state crisis, the nations should act similarly as people experiencing deep personal difficulties. Psychologists distinguish 12 essential actions and factors which determine the recovery of such people. These ones start from Psichologai žino net 12 esminių veiksmų ir veiksnių, kurie lemia tokio asmens atsigavimą, pradedant the confession of such a person to themselves that they are in a deep crisis and only they can take action to get over it. Diamond transforms these principles into 12 rules for the nations experiencing crisis. In this case, the action list should begin with the national consensus and recognition that the nation and the state are in the crisis. As a result, the nation should find a new recovery way itself. This can be completed through analysing the experiences of other nations, the rejection of established geopolitical limitations and the acceptance of support from other states (https://blog.12min.com/upheaval-pdf-summary/).
So, what exactly the book of Diamond can teach Armenia?
First of all, Armenia should seek the national consensus and understanding that the state and the nation is in a deep crisis at the moment. Therefore, there is the necessity to find new strategies by these actors themselves. It is not easy to reach the mentioned consensus as there are numerous temptations to accuse the incumbent government of the loss in the war. Subsequently, the current leaders will always find various ways how to blame former leaders for not enough preparation for such an armed conflict. Such a festival of accusations is not the way recommended by Diamond; neither it is the way chosen by other nations which overcame the crisis in the past. On the contrary, they managed to avoid mutual accusations while digging deeper into the deeper analysis of their problems and causes. Such an approach is the only one allowing to find new strategic solutions which allow the nation to recover and defeat the crisis.
I do not know much about the exact answers Armenia would find in this discussion of self-reflection. However, I would like to hear the answers to these main questions which are interconnected.
The first question: was it reasonable for Armenia to maintain the status quo only all the time since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1990s? Even though Armenia won, this state did not seek any long-term peace agreement and gave up the territories which remained occupied by Armenians, yet did not belong to the Armenian part of Nagorno-Karabakh in fact.
The maintenance of territory-based status quo has become the primary national idea for all Armenians worldwide for many years. However, it was also the only idea which distinguished Armenia in the global community. Therefore, it may seem that Armenians lacked not only physical but also intellectual or emotional power for anything else. The belief that the Russian military forces would help to maintain such a status quo eventually turned out to be false. Moreover, it was the main cause for the military tragedy this year. Additionally, it is obvious that the result of war loss is basically the return to the situation which had existed up until 1992, when the first military conflict took place.
The second question: was it strategically right to associate the geopolitical security with Russia only, given the fact that the Kremlin opposed any attempt to become closer to the West and the EU?
Finally, it came to light that the security guarantees from Moscow were not efficient (especially regarding the context of recent clashes between Russia and Turkey and their outcomes). The maintenance of status quo, supported by the Kremlin, turned out to be deceptive too. Also, the economic association with the markets of Russia and Eurasia did not allow Armenia to adapt to the Western markets fully and thus create the long-term success story. Meanwhile, the EU-Armenia relations remained ambivalent only.
The illusion of security. Russian-Armenian military exercises. Russia didn’t help Armenia when it really needed for help / massispost.com photo
Looking from the perspective of Vilnius, all these details and events are the strategy of Armenia during the last three decades which led to the current national tragedy of Armenians.
For the record, these thoughts are simply my subjective answers to the questions of Armenian self-reflection, based on the book of Diamond. Only Armenians themselves can provide deeper and more accurate answers, yet they have to find courage to search for such answers first.
The answers formulated by myself may give me a clue how the brand new and recovering strategy of Armenia could look like.
I would see two essential things which could be related to the EU-Armenia relations.
First of all, the EU should take initiative and establish the international security mechanism for the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. This step should be implemented with the help of other Western partners (the new US administration). Of course, such a mechanism should not rely on the so-called Kremlin peacekeepers only. Not so long ago, the West had to take care of the Albanians in Kosovo; the international guarantees of security had been successfully created then. I do not imply that the West should copy the model of Kosovo in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet it is obvious that the Western countries should take up a more proactive role in order to avoid the new Middle East. If the security in Transcaucasia is left for the supervision of Russia and Turkey only, this region, holding a lot of strategic resources of oil and gas, will always remain the zone of unrest and manipulation of the Kremlin. It is crucially important in the context of the closer EU-Armenia relations.
The international security guarantees, aimed at the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh, would allow Armenia to listen to one more important advice by Diamond: to review established geopolitical constraints.
Secondly, Armenia will never feel safe if the amount of weapons remains the only determinant of state security there. As this state is surrounded by such geopolitical players as Turkey and its main satellite Azerbaijan or even Russia and Iran, the only reasonable way to ensure security is to focus on the economic and social prosperity of Armenia. Let’s take the example of Israel in the Middle East. Even though this state is experiencing many great challenges of international security for decades, it remains safe. It happens exactly because of the strong economy established, not due to the large base of weapons. All in all, Armenia has no other way than concentrating on the creation of the economic miracle in Transcaucasia. To realize that, Armenians had to shift their national strategy priorities from military to development, investment and modernisation. Having not much natural resources, Armenia will be able to strengthen its economy only through the integration towards the West and the partnership with the EU as these regions are particularly strong regarding their economies.
Armenia will hardly realize such a strategic change itself. Therefore, the EU could take up an important role there. According to Diamond, the support from other countries is vital when it comes to the recovery from any national crisis. However, the suffering nation must understand the causes of that crisis and reach a consensus regarding their new national strategy first.
The stable situation in Transcaucasia should be an important priority for the EU. The EU itself should also learn to create and develop such stability. It is crucial to know that the passive observation of how Armenians and Azeris are failing to reach the agreement or the hope that Russia will create such stability is a short-sighted self-deception. The Kremlin cares only about the long-term instability in the former Soviet space, as it will prevent the Western integration there. Meanwhile, the EU would rather benefit from the export of stability, because otherwise, the import of instability remains the only option available.
The administration of Trump has recently demonstrated the great example how to create stability in the zones of long-term instability. The US encouraged a few Arab states to sign the peace agreement with Israel. As the exchange, generous packages of economic support were offered. Such deals have a major historical meaning. It is not surprising that these peace agreements were officially titled the Abraham Accords, recalling the biblical story of the origins of the Jewish and Arab people.
The EU could follow the example of the US and offer similar agreements to Armenians and Azeris. They could be also supported by the plans of extensive economic support and the long-term peace agreements, including the international mechanism guaranteeing security to the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such deals would be especially important to Armenia, as they would open the door to long-term success, based on the strength of the economy rather than the amount of weapons.
The international community should help Armenia to expand its geopolitical agenda, which should also become more ambitious. This means that it should include not only security but also economic growth, investment attraction, reforms, social welfare, corruption prevention, more attention towards human rights and democracy. As a result, Armenia could return to both local and international politics with refreshed power, expectations and prospects. The international community, and the European Union in particular, could offer Armenia a new agreement on further strategic goals. This could involve international donors (G7) and financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Finally, the national investment institutions from the EU member states could contribute as well.
Given another biblical story, related to Armenia and Mount Ararat, such agreements, proposed by the European Union to Armenia and Azerbaijan with the particular focus on the future prospects of Armenia, could have the historic name of the Noah’s Ark Accords.
The Bible says: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself’. It is also a common formula for peace between neighbours. Finally, this is advice for the European Union to appreciate its Eastern partners as itself, since it is the only way to guarantee peace in Transcaucasia.
Read more from InformNapalm:
InformNapalm Partner in Lithuania: Res Publica – Civic Resilience Center
InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-12-07--New Russian 2B26 Grad launch rocket system in Donbas

Photos and videos of military maneuvers in Donbas filmed by Russian propagandists and the militants themselves sometimes show interesting examples of heavy Russian weapons and equipment that could enter the combat zone exclusively from the Russian Federation .
This photo , which was posted in February 2016 ( archive ) on the page of Dizel Tank Battalion ( military unit 08810 ) of the 1st Army Corps of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas , shows a Russian 2B26 Grad MLRS on KamAZ-5350 6×6 military truck .
It entered service in the Russian army in 2012 .
Let us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers from InformNapalm international intelligence community also and determined their exact coordinates in Donetsk Oblast : 47°58 ’ 14.5″N 38°40 ’ 09.0″E .
the facts of supply of Russian weapons and equipment to the combat zone in the Donbas .
In 2014-2020 , InformNapalm ’ s OSINT investigations identified more than 2,630 Russian servicemen from 101 units of Russian Armed Forces , as well as 51 types of Russian weapons and equipment that were secretly supplied to the Donbas from Russia .
, which are also built on the basis of KamAZ-5350 6×6 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the combat zone in eastern Ukraine .
was spotted 12 km from the combat line at approximate coordinates : 48°31 ’ 40.2″N 39° 24 ’ 01.6″E .
It is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks , in particular , to find coordinates of targets for artillery and MLRS battalions .
The control station of the Navodchik-2 system is built on the basis of another modification of the KamAZ truck : KamAZ-4350 , wheel formula 4×4 .
The difference is shown in the drawing below .
On December 3 and 4 , 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violated the terms of the Minsk agreements and and mortars in the Donbas .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring PHOTO REPORT ) • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site .
Translated by Sveta @ @ @ @ @ @ @ article is illustrative .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers .
You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon .

Photos and videos of military maneuvers in Donbas filmed by Russian propagandists and the militants themselves sometimes show interesting examples of heavy Russian weapons and equipment that could enter the combat zone exclusively from the Russian Federation.
This photo, which was posted in February 2016 (archive) on the page of Dizel Tank Battalion (military unit 08810) of the 1st Army Corps of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas, shows a Russian 2B26 Grad MLRS on KamAZ-5350 6×6 military truck. It entered service in the Russian army in 2012.
Let us remind you that in February 2016, observers from InformNapalm international intelligence community also filmed two Russian 2B26 Grad systems and determined their exact coordinates in Donetsk Oblast: 47°58’14.5″N 38°40’09.0″E.
We continue to document the facts of supply of Russian weapons and equipment to the combat zone in the Donbas. In 2014-2020, InformNapalm’s OSINT investigations identified more than 2,630 Russian servicemen from 101 units of Russian Armed Forces, as well as 51 types of Russian weapons and equipment that were secretly supplied to the Donbas from Russia.
Russian RB-341V Leer-3 systems, which are also built on the basis of KamAZ-5350 6×6 trucks, have been repeatedly spotted in the combat zone in eastern Ukraine.
On November 8, the newest Russian Navodchik-2 system was spotted 12 km from the combat line at approximate coordinates: 48°31’40.2″N 39° 24’01.6″E. It is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks, in particular, to find coordinates of targets for artillery and MLRS battalions. The control station of the Navodchik-2 system is built on the basis of another modification of the KamAZ truck: KamAZ-4350, wheel formula 4×4.
The difference is shown in the drawing below.
On December 3 and 4, 2020, the Russian occupation forces once again violated the terms of the Minsk agreements and used heavy artillery and mortars in the Donbas.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site. Translated by Sveta Kemblowski. The title photo for the article is illustrative. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-12-17--Russian rocket systems 2B26 in Donbas – for the first time in OSCE SMM report

The Russian 2B26 Grad multiple launch rocket system ( MLRS ) recently featured for the first time in the official OSCE SMM report in the Donbas .
This 122 mm MLRS mounted on the KamAZ-5350 chassis has been in service exclusively with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation since 2012 .
The SMM daily report No.297/2020 dated December 14 , 2020 , indicates that a 2B26 Grad system was spotted by the mission ’ s mini-UAV on December 8 , 2020 , near the village of Ternove , 57 km east of Donetsk .
It is noted that this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the withdrawal line .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this report .
Today we are making public this exclusive data .
The OSINT investigation of InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community about the spotting of the Russian MLRS 2B26 Grad published on December 7 , 2020 probably helped the OSCE observers to identify this system near the village of Ternove .
The investigation has been translated into 12 languages .
The InformNapalm publication also indicated that these Russian MLRS were spotted in February 2016 in Donetsk Oblast in the area @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ 09.0″E .
The new location of their detection by the SMM mini-UAVs was also recorded not far from that spot .
Photo from the OSINT investigation by InformNapalm .
This is not the first case when modern or modernized Russian weapons and military systems were first detected by volunteers during OSINT investigations and later appeared in the official reports of the OSCE SMM , which confirmed the deployment of such systems in the Donbas .
For example , the Russian electronic warfare ( EW ) system R-330Zh Zhitel was yet again spotted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of November 2020 .
However , it had been for the first time detected in the war zone and identified by InformNapalm volunteers while monitoring the social media pages of the collaborators of the Russian occupation forces in June 2015 .
This system appeared for the first time in an OSCE SMM report in August 2015 .
Another example is the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 EW system , which has been actively featuring in the OSCE SMM reports since 2018 .
InformNapalm OSINT investigations have been following this system in the Donbas since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence , was made available to the international community in InformNapalm reports presented at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul in 2016 , as well as at other international venues of PACE and OSCE .
Apparently , the materials of OSINT investigations by the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community identifying modern Russian weapons and systems in the Ukrainian Donbas since 2014 have contributed to further identification of these assets by international observers while monitoring the situation in the combat zone .
New OSCE SMM reports confirm at the official level the data on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equipment in eastern Ukraine .
These types of modernized weapons and systems could have entered the Donbas exclusively from the territory of the Russian Federation .
They are deployed in violation of the heavy weapons withdrawal lines .
These facts signal the plans of the Russian Federation to continue an aggressive hybrid war against Ukraine .
Although Russia at the international diplomatic level makes propaganda statements about its “ desire to achieve peace in the Donbas ” , in practice it continues to keep and accumulate in the occupied areas of Luhansk and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soviet weaponry but also new types of military hardware .
The Russian Federation constantly supplies ammunition to the Donbas and completely controls the hostilities against Ukraine with the help of the regular servicemen of the Russian Army , assigned to the hybrid armed formations of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called “ republics ” .
Russia has not abandoned its aggressive intentions and continues to occupy parts of Ukrainian territory and wage a treacherous hybrid war , although according to the Budapest Memorandum it was Russia , together with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukraine ’ s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine renouncing its nuclear weapons .
These facts should convince the international community to step up diplomatic and economic pressure on the Russian Federation , which grossly violates its international obligations and for many years continues to wage a war in Eastern Europe .
At the same time , Ukraine needs stronger international support at all levels , being the only country in Europe that after giving up its nuclear arsenal has become a victim of the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ army among the strongest in the world .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring PHOTO REPORT ) • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established • Russian occupation forces used heavy artillery and mortars in Donbas ( December 04 , 2020 ) • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occupied Donbas • Artillery officer of the 1st Army Corps under UCA surveillance .
Part 1 This publication was prepared by Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
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Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers .
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The Russian 2B26 Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) recently featured for the first time in the official OSCE SMM report in the Donbas. This 122 mm MLRS mounted on the KamAZ-5350 chassis has been in service exclusively with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation since 2012. The SMM daily report No.297/2020 dated December 14, 2020, indicates that a 2B26 Grad system was spotted by the mission’s mini-UAV on December 8, 2020, near the village of Ternove, 57 km east of Donetsk. It is noted that this type of weapon is deployed in violation of the withdrawal line.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this report. Today we are making public this exclusive data.
The OSINT investigation of InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community about the spotting of the Russian MLRS 2B26 Grad published on December 7, 2020 , probably helped the OSCE observers to identify this system near the village of Ternove. The investigation has been translated into 12 languages. The InformNapalm publication also indicated that these Russian MLRS were spotted in February 2016 in Donetsk Oblast in the area of coordinates: 47°58’14.5″N 38°40’09.0″E. The new location of their detection by the SMM mini-UAVs was also recorded not far from that spot.
Photo from the OSINT investigation by InformNapalm.
From OSINT investigations to OSCE SMM reports
This is not the first case when modern or modernized Russian weapons and military systems were first detected by volunteers during OSINT investigations and later appeared in the official reports of the OSCE SMM, which confirmed the deployment of such systems in the Donbas. For example, the Russian electronic warfare (EW) system R-330Zh Zhitel was yet again spotted by the SMM in Donbas at the end of November 2020. However, it had been for the first time detected in the war zone and identified by InformNapalm volunteers while monitoring the social media pages of the collaborators of the Russian occupation forces in June 2015. This system appeared for the first time in an OSCE SMM report in August 2015.
Another example is the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 EW system, which has been actively featuring in the OSCE SMM reports since 2018. InformNapalm OSINT investigations have been following this system in the Donbas since 2015. Its detection, among other evidence, was made available to the international community in InformNapalm reports presented at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul in 2016, as well as at other international venues of PACE and OSCE.
Conclusion
Apparently, the materials of OSINT investigations by the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community identifying modern Russian weapons and systems in the Ukrainian Donbas since 2014 have contributed to further identification of these assets by international observers while monitoring the situation in the combat zone. New OSCE SMM reports confirm at the official level the data on the presence of these types of weapons and equipment in eastern Ukraine. These types of modernized weapons and systems could have entered the Donbas exclusively from the territory of the Russian Federation. They are deployed in violation of the heavy weapons withdrawal lines. These facts signal the plans of the Russian Federation to continue an aggressive hybrid war against Ukraine. Although Russia at the international diplomatic level makes propaganda statements about its “desire to achieve peace in the Donbas”, in practice it continues to keep and accumulate in the occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts of Ukraine not only old Soviet weaponry but also new types of military hardware. The Russian Federation constantly supplies ammunition to the Donbas and completely controls the hostilities against Ukraine with the help of the regular servicemen of the Russian Army, assigned to the hybrid armed formations of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called “republics”.
Russia has not abandoned its aggressive intentions and continues to occupy parts of Ukrainian territory and wage a treacherous hybrid war, although according to the Budapest Memorandum it was Russia, together with the United States and Great Britain that guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine renouncing its nuclear weapons.
These facts should convince the international community to step up diplomatic and economic pressure on the Russian Federation, which grossly violates its international obligations and for many years continues to wage a war in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Ukraine needs stronger international support at all levels, being the only country in Europe that after giving up its nuclear arsenal has become a victim of the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation, a nuclear power with a conventional army among the strongest in the world.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-12-19--Large Ukrainian IT outsourcer SoftServe works in Crimea and the Russian Federation

In September 2020 , SoftServe experienced a major data breach that compromised personal information of their customers and employees .
In this OSINT investigation , InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community will cast some light on the murky side of the company ’ s activities that has been hushed up by its public representatives for the past six years .
We will touch upon the company ’ s activities in the occupied Crimea , business in the Russian Federation , and cooperation with government authorities of the aggressor country .
SoftServe was founded in 1993 by Taras Kytsmey and Yaroslav Lyubinets , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The company focuses on outsourcing software development for clients around the world .
After seventeen years of operation , the company has significantly increased its employee base—there are more than 7000 people registered in Ukrainian offices only .
Among SoftServe ’ s clients , there are Microsoft , Google , Cisco , Dell , and many other globally renowned corporations .
SoftServe founders Kytsmey and Lyubinets are placed 41st ( $ 188 million ) and 51st ( $ 153 million ) in the latest TOP 100 richest Ukrainians ranking .
In addition to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IT Ukraine Association .
He features in videos about the quarantine , helps raise money for the Holodomor Museum , and is generally quite active in the media .
But for almost seven years of the war , he has kept a conspicuous silence about the war in the Donbas , the ATO , the annexation of Crimea .
Apparently , this is due to a conflict of interest , as his company continues to work with Russia .
In April 2014 , SoftServe announced that they were closing their office in Sevastopol @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 150 people .
The office on the peninsula was headed by Igor Tsimbal .
According to him , in 2013 , being a part of SoftServe , the division earned about $ 5.5 million from exporting software services .
Since he did not want to lose such profits , Tsimbal ( probably together with Kytsmey ) decided to continue software development in Crimea under the Alvion Europe brand registered in the Russian Federation on May 14 , 2014 ( OGRN 1149204001968 ) .
It is interesting that Tsimbal had registered a company with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In 2007 , it was reorganized into Alvion Ukraine LLC that soon became part of SoftServe .
After the Ukrainian outsourcer “ left ” Crimea , Alvion again reorganized into an independent company , which , in fact , became the legal successor of SoftServe in Crimea .
At the same time , Tsimbal remains the head of two more companies in Ukraine : Alvis Realty Europe and Black Sea Holding .
The founder of both companies is Vilnis Ezerins , a 60-year-old US citizen .
In the case of Alvis Realty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Tsimbal .
The same person sits on the SoftServe board of directors .
And this is not the only thing that connects Softserve , Ezerins , and Tsimbal .
There is also a company with the name Alvis Realty Europe that is registered in the Russian Federation .
At its foundation , Tsimbal contributed 1 % of its authorized capital .
Another 99 % was contributed by one Gennady Menshchikov .
It is known that this man is 81 years old and , back in 2002 he asked Vladimir Putin for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the owner of Dialog shopping center in Sevastopol .
It was the place where in 2017 the Tsimbal ’ s IT company Alvion Europe rented an office .
SoftServe had rented office space there as well .
In Sevastopol , there is also a clone of the above-mentioned Ukrainian company Black Sea Holding .
However , its founder is not Vilnis Ezerins but the above-mentioned Gennady Menshchikov .
The most important fact here is that all these companies are connected .
And not only via Tsimbal .
Valeriya Ezerins , the wife of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gennady Menshchikov ’ s daughter .
And such intricacies in the statutory documents of different companies and the fact that they have clones in the Russian Federation can indicate only one thing—neither Vilnis Ezerins , nor SoftServe has severed ties with Crimea .
Apparently , they did everything instead to not be de jure associated with the peninsula .
And this is logical since the IT company under Tsimbal ’ s leadership develops software for the Russian occupation administration in Crimea , builds an IT cluster in Crimea , and in 2017 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the self-proclaimed head of Sevastopol Alexei Chaly .
For all these “ merits ” back in 2018 , Tsimbal got into Myrotvorets Center database .
SoftServe is a large company with offices in a number of countries .
The official website lists offices in Ukraine , the USA , Great Britain , Germany , Sweden , Singapore , Poland , and Bulgaria .
But there is not a single mention of offices in the Russian Federation .
And this is another fact that Kytsmey and other members of the board deliberately try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In fact , in Russia , there is a subsidiary of the company SoftServe LLC that is successfully operating up till today .
According to the register data , the company is headquartered in Moscow .
The director is Vladimir Nistratov , there are 12 employees .
The company ’ s founder is SoftServe LLC , registered in Pustomyty , Lviv region .
Even on the official website of the Russian SoftServe , they do not hide the information about their connection with the Ukrainian parent company .
And in the Contacts section @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and representative offices in Moscow , St. Petersburg , Novosibirsk , Yekaterinburg , and Samara .
In the Russian capital , SoftServe rents the 7th floor of the Alekseevskaya Tower business center on Raketny Boulevard , 16 .
IT specialists moved in there six years ago .
“ We are pleased to make a significant announcement “ , they wrote in the news section of their website about the change of location of the Moscow office on May 5 , 2014 ( archive ) .
It is noteworthy that on this very day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and there was the first serious battle near Sloviansk in the Donbas—that was when the pro-Russian militants led by Igor Girkin first attacked a column of the Ukrainian military .
SoftServe ’ s operations in Russia are quite diverse and generate considerable income .
Last year alone , the company earned 76.8 million rubles , and in 2018 , the company ’ s revenue amounted to 292 million rubles .
The company regularly pays taxes from this revenue to Russia .
In 2019 alone , SoftServe replenished the Kremlin treasury by 3.5 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ income taxes .
VAT amounted to another 7.5 million rubles .
It is possible the money was later used to finance terrorists in the Donbas .
A subsidiary of Ukrainian SoftServe does not shy away from working with Russian government authorities .
According to the extract of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities , the company has become a service provider for the “ Main Scientific Innovation Center of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation.
” The deal was worth 585,000 rubles .
It is clear that the cooperation with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is hardly possible without a clearance from the FSB .
We should like to pay special attention to the attitude of the company ’ s employees to the law of Ukraine and border crossing rules .
We found some evidence of company representatives visiting Crimea bypassing Ukraine .
For example , in June 2019 , the regional manager of SoftServe , 37-years-old Ivan Belyaev from Yekaterinburg went by car to Crimea .
On the way , his family spent the night in Anapa .
The employee wrote about this on his Instagram page @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the peninsula from Anapa through the Kerch Strait , and that is a violation of the state border crossing rules liable to a ban of entry into Ukraine .
However , not for everyone—a month after this trip , Ivan Belyaev visited the company ’ s office in Lviv for the Hawaiian-style staff party .
Thus SoftServe , one of the largest IT developing companies in Ukraine continues to do business in Russia and the occupied Ukrainian Crimea through deliberate schemes .
It takes orders from state authorities of the Russian Federation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Federation .
At the same time , its employees brazenly violate Ukrainian border crossing procedures with the occupied Crimea , and for some reason this does not lead to any sanctions or entry bans to Ukraine .
After illegally traveling to Crimea through the Kerch Bridge built by Russia in violation of the international law , company ’ s employees immediately attend the “ Hawaiian party ” in Lviv .
Perhaps this publication will help the company management to reconsider their attitude to the realities of the long-term Russian occupation of Crimea and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donbas .
Russia ’ s aggression against Ukraine continues , the civilized world consistently imposes economic sanctions on the Russian Federation and deems doing business in the occupied Crimea inadmissible , whereas a large Ukrainian IT company based in Lviv and operating in the EU and the United States sets up schemes to circumnavigate sanctions and continue to do business with the occupier .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring ( PHOTO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tapes .
About one special operation to interfere in the US presidential election • Ukraine Imposes Sanctions Against the Company that Participated In Seizure of Ukrainian Sailors This publication was prepared by Mykhaillo Makaruk specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter /

In September 2020, SoftServe experienced a major data breach that compromised personal information of their customers and employees. In this OSINT investigation, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community will cast some light on the murky side of the company’s activities that has been hushed up by its public representatives for the past six years. We will touch upon the company’s activities in the occupied Crimea, business in the Russian Federation, and cooperation with government authorities of the aggressor country.
Background information about SoftServe
SoftServe was founded in 1993 by Taras Kytsmey and Yaroslav Lyubinets, two post-graduate students of Lviv Polytechnic. The company focuses on outsourcing software development for clients around the world. After seventeen years of operation, the company has significantly increased its employee base—there are more than 7000 people registered in Ukrainian offices only. Among SoftServe’s clients, there are Microsoft, Google, Cisco, Dell, and many other globally renowned corporations. SoftServe founders Kytsmey and Lyubinets are placed 41st ($188 million) and 51st ($153 million) in the latest TOP 100 richest Ukrainians ranking.
In addition to this, 54-year-old Taras Kytsmey heads the IT Ukraine Association. He features in videos about the quarantine, helps raise money for the Holodomor Museum, and is generally quite active in the media. But for almost seven years of the war, he has kept a conspicuous silence about the war in the Donbas, the ATO, the annexation of Crimea. Apparently, this is due to a conflict of interest, as his company continues to work with Russia.
The Crimea issue
In April 2014, SoftServe announced that they were closing their office in Sevastopol. At that time, it employed 150 people. The office on the peninsula was headed by Igor Tsimbal. According to him, in 2013, being a part of SoftServe, the division earned about $5.5 million from exporting software services.
Since he did not want to lose such profits, Tsimbal (probably together with Kytsmey) decided to continue software development in Crimea under the Alvion Europe brand registered in the Russian Federation on May 14, 2014 (OGRN 1149204001968). It is interesting that Tsimbal had registered a company with the same name in 2002 in Ukraine. In 2007, it was reorganized into Alvion Ukraine LLC that soon became part of SoftServe. After the Ukrainian outsourcer “left” Crimea, Alvion again reorganized into an independent company, which, in fact, became the legal successor of SoftServe in Crimea.
At the same time, Tsimbal remains the head of two more companies in Ukraine: Alvis Realty Europe and Black Sea Holding. The founder of both companies is Vilnis Ezerins, a 60-year-old US citizen. In the case of Alvis Realty Europe, he manages the company together with Tsimbal. The same person sits on the SoftServe board of directors.
And this is not the only thing that connects Softserve, Ezerins, and Tsimbal. There is also a company with the name Alvis Realty Europe that is registered in the Russian Federation. At its foundation, Tsimbal contributed 1% of its authorized capital. Another 99% was contributed by one Gennady Menshchikov. It is known that this man is 81 years old and, back in 2002 he asked Vladimir Putin for the Russian citizenship. Alvis Realty Europe is the owner of Dialog shopping center in Sevastopol. It was the place where in 2017 the Tsimbal’s IT company Alvion Europe rented an office. SoftServe had rented office space there as well.
In Sevastopol, there is also a clone of the above-mentioned Ukrainian company Black Sea Holding. However, its founder is not Vilnis Ezerins but the above-mentioned Gennady Menshchikov.
The most important fact here is that all these companies are connected. And not only via Tsimbal. Valeriya Ezerins, the wife of SoftServe board member Vilnis Ezerins, is Gennady Menshchikov’s daughter. And such intricacies in the statutory documents of different companies and the fact that they have clones in the Russian Federation can indicate only one thing—neither Vilnis Ezerins, nor SoftServe has severed ties with Crimea. Apparently, they did everything instead to not be de jure associated with the peninsula.
And this is logical since the IT company under Tsimbal’s leadership develops software for the Russian occupation administration in Crimea, builds an IT cluster in Crimea, and in 2017, Tsimbal was even called an IT advisor to the self-proclaimed head of Sevastopol Alexei Chaly. For all these “merits” back in 2018, Tsimbal got into Myrotvorets Center database.
Activity in the Russian Federation
SoftServe is a large company with offices in a number of countries. The official website lists offices in Ukraine, the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, Singapore, Poland, and Bulgaria. But there is not a single mention of offices in the Russian Federation. And this is another fact that Kytsmey and other members of the board deliberately try not to talk about in public.
In fact, in Russia, there is a subsidiary of the company SoftServe LLC that is successfully operating up till today. According to the register data, the company is headquartered in Moscow. The director is Vladimir Nistratov, there are 12 employees. The company’s founder is SoftServe LLC, registered in Pustomyty, Lviv region.
Even on the official website of the Russian SoftServe, they do not hide the information about their connection with the Ukrainian parent company.
And in the Contacts section, there are phone numbers in Ukraine and representative offices in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, and Samara.
In the Russian capital, SoftServe rents the 7th floor of the Alekseevskaya Tower business center on Raketny Boulevard, 16. IT specialists moved in there six years ago. “We are pleased to make a significant announcement“, they wrote in the news section of their website about the change of location of the Moscow office on May 5, 2014 (archive).
It is noteworthy that on this very day Ukraine closed the checkpoints in Crimea, and there was the first serious battle near Sloviansk in the Donbas—that was when the pro-Russian militants led by Igor Girkin first attacked a column of the Ukrainian military.
Earning millions and paying taxes in Russia
SoftServe’s operations in Russia are quite diverse and generate considerable income. Last year alone, the company earned 76.8 million rubles, and in 2018, the company’s revenue amounted to 292 million rubles.
The company regularly pays taxes from this revenue to Russia. In 2019 alone, SoftServe replenished the Kremlin treasury by 3.5 million rubles. And that’s just income taxes. VAT amounted to another 7.5 million rubles. It is possible the money was later used to finance terrorists in the Donbas.
A subsidiary of Ukrainian SoftServe does not shy away from working with Russian government authorities. According to the extract of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, the company has become a service provider for the “Main Scientific Innovation Center of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation.” The deal was worth 585,000 rubles. It is clear that the cooperation with the state authorities in the Russian Federation is hardly possible without a clearance from the FSB.
Breach of border crossing procedures in Crimea
We should like to pay special attention to the attitude of the company’s employees to the law of Ukraine and border crossing rules. We found some evidence of company representatives visiting Crimea bypassing Ukraine. For example, in June 2019, the regional manager of SoftServe, 37-years-old Ivan Belyaev from Yekaterinburg went by car to Crimea. On the way, his family spent the night in Anapa. The employee wrote about this on his Instagram page. But you can only get to the peninsula from Anapa through the Kerch Strait, and that is a violation of the state border crossing rules liable to a ban of entry into Ukraine. However, not for everyone—a month after this trip, Ivan Belyaev visited the company’s office in Lviv for the Hawaiian-style staff party.
Conclusion
Thus SoftServe, one of the largest IT developing companies in Ukraine continues to do business in Russia and the occupied Ukrainian Crimea through deliberate schemes. It takes orders from state authorities of the Russian Federation. It pays considerable taxes to the Russian Federation. At the same time, its employees brazenly violate Ukrainian border crossing procedures with the occupied Crimea, and for some reason this does not lead to any sanctions or entry bans to Ukraine. After illegally traveling to Crimea through the Kerch Bridge built by Russia in violation of the international law, company’s employees immediately attend the “Hawaiian party” in Lviv. Perhaps this publication will help the company management to reconsider their attitude to the realities of the long-term Russian occupation of Crimea and the Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continues, the civilized world consistently imposes economic sanctions on the Russian Federation and deems doing business in the occupied Crimea inadmissible, whereas a large Ukrainian IT company based in Lviv and operating in the EU and the United States sets up schemes to circumnavigate sanctions and continue to do business with the occupier.
Read more from InformNapalm
Тwitter / This publication was prepared by Mykhaillo Makaruk specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook


informnapalm--2020-04-01--Russian occupiers distribute leaflets to apply psychological pressure on the population in Zolote-4

Volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community analyzed the leaflets spread by Russian occupation forces in the village of Zolote-4 with the purpose of putting psychological pressure on the local population .
On October 29 , 2019 , the withdrawal of troops and military weapons at disengagement site No .
2 near the village of Zolote-4 in Luhansk Oblast began .
After the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces , this village has repeatedly come into the focus of news .
Russian occupation troops repeatedly fired at areas near the withdrawal site using mortars and 122 mm howitzers .
Now , after a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resort to tactics of informational and psychological warfare against the local population and distribute leaflets in Zolote-4 in order to incite local residents to actions demanding further withdrawal of Ukrainian troops .
On March 31 , readers of InformNapalm sent us a photo of a leaflet that was found in the village of Zolote-4 .
The text of this leaflet , written in Russian language against the background of blue and yellow colors of the Ukrainian flag , represents a clear example of information and psychological pressure on the local population .
Also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaflet to enhance psychological impact .
The text of the leaflet is as follows : “ People near the disengagement line , demand a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the settlements .
Ask authorities to assist in the withdrawing of Ukrainian weapons from civilian neighborhoods .
Do not let Ukrainian soldiers hide behind you and your children because you will be hurt by retaliatory fire !
!
!
” What can be learned from the photo InformNapalm volunteers decided to look for the source of this photo .
The search showed that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news resources .
For example , in a February 9 , 2020 article on the Novorosinform website , this photo accompanies a fake message about placing Ukrainian armored vehicles in a courtyard next to apartment buildings in Kryakivka , Luhansk Oblast .
On August 21 , 2018 , the same website used the above photo for another fake message regarding the placement of Ukrainian weaponry among houses in the town of Krasnohorivka , Donetsk Oblast .
However , these locations have nothing to do with the photo above .
Another Russian news website @ @ @ @ @ @ @ illustrate the July 5 , 2017 news regarding the Minsk talks .
The photo in this article was signed : “ Avdiivka , Ukraine .
June 2015 ( Photo : Gleb Garanich / Reuters ) ” .
InformNapalm volunteers also determined that the photo was taken near a well-known 9-story apartment building on the eastern outskirts of Avdiivka with the address : 15 Vorobyev Street .
The same photo was used more than once to accompany fake messages on the site Novorosinform.org ( which was registered by a private person in Moscow ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ informational-psychological pressure on the civilian population in Zolote-4 .
It seems that Russian officers responsible for information and psychological operations in the Donbas are fond of this particular photo owned by Reuters .
Year after year , it shows in both paper and electronic materials aimed at discrediting Ukrainian troops .
The photo was illegally used to create fake material without specifying the source , location or date it was taken .
As a reminder , in addition to printed propaganda leaflets and fake news on Russia-controlled websites , the Russian Armed Forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tools for sending SMS messages to Ukrainian servicemen and civilians in the Donbas .
• Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established • Electronic warfare systems in Donbas .
Specialists from EW company of Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Brigade detected • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea Translated by Svitlana Kemblowski .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram .

Volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community analyzed the leaflets spread by Russian occupation forces in the village of Zolote-4 with the purpose of putting psychological pressure on the local population.
On October 29, 2019, the withdrawal of troops and military weapons at disengagement site No. 2 near the village of Zolote-4 in Luhansk Oblast began. After the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces, this village has repeatedly come into the focus of news. Russian occupation troops repeatedly fired at areas near the withdrawal site using mortars and 122 mm howitzers. Now, after a long period of shelling, Russian invaders resort to tactics of informational and psychological warfare against the local population and distribute leaflets in Zolote-4 in order to incite local residents to actions demanding further withdrawal of Ukrainian troops.
Leaflets of Russian invaders
On March 31, readers of InformNapalm sent us a photo of a leaflet that was found in the village of Zolote-4. The text of this leaflet, written in Russian language against the background of blue and yellow colors of the Ukrainian flag, represents a clear example of information and psychological pressure on the local population. Also, there is a photo in the leaflet to enhance psychological impact.
The text of the leaflet is as follows: “People near the disengagement line, demand a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the settlements. Ask authorities to assist in the withdrawing of Ukrainian weapons from civilian neighborhoods. Do not let Ukrainian soldiers hide behind you and your children because you will be hurt by retaliatory fire!!!”
What can be learned from the photo
InformNapalm volunteers decided to look for the source of this photo. The search showed that the photo was repeatedly used by Russian propaganda news resources.
For example, in a February 9, 2020 article on the Novorosinform website, this photo accompanies a fake message about placing Ukrainian armored vehicles in a courtyard next to apartment buildings in Kryakivka, Luhansk Oblast.
On August 21, 2018, the same website used the above photo for another fake message regarding the placement of Ukrainian weaponry among houses in the town of Krasnohorivka, Donetsk Oblast.
However, these locations have nothing to do with the photo above. Another Russian news website RBC.ru also used the above photo to illustrate the July 5, 2017 news regarding the Minsk talks. The photo in this article was signed: “Avdiivka, Ukraine. June 2015 (Photo: Gleb Garanich / Reuters)”.
InformNapalm volunteers also determined that the photo was taken near a well-known 9-story apartment building on the eastern outskirts of Avdiivka with the address: 15 Vorobyev Street.
Conclusion
The same photo was used more than once to accompany fake messages on the site Novorosinform.org (which was registered by a private person in Moscow) and printed on leaflets spread to apply informational-psychological pressure on the civilian population in Zolote-4.
It seems that Russian officers responsible for information and psychological operations in the Donbas are fond of this particular photo owned by Reuters. Year after year, it shows in both paper and electronic materials aimed at discrediting Ukrainian troops. The photo was illegally used to create fake material without specifying the source, location or date it was taken.
As a reminder, in addition to printed propaganda leaflets and fake news on Russia-controlled websites, the Russian Armed Forces also actively use the latest electronic warfare tools for sending SMS messages to Ukrainian servicemen and civilians in the Donbas.
Read more:
Translated by Svitlana Kemblowski. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram.