informnapalm--2020-11-19--OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring

OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring (PHOTO REPORT)

The international volunteer intelligence community InformNapalm continues to actively collect evidence of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine during the years of 2014-2020 .
These materials are distributed in many world languages , not only through publications on the community ’ s website , but also in print .
These are being distributed at high international level among foreign experts , journalists , diplomats , and politicians .
The dissemination of these materials is possible thanks to the activity of volunteers from different countries and with the assistance of representatives of official Ukrainian delegations in the Parliamentary Assembly of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as through the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and individual diplomats .
In the USA , representatives of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly ( OSCE PA ) from different countries were presented with handbooks that contained the facts about the Russian aggression in the Crimea .
This time , Ukrainian representatives of the Permanent Delegation to the OSCE PA , which was present in the United States as election observers between 1 and 4 November 2020 , took the opportunity to present @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Crimea Behind the Curtain .
Guide to the Occupied Zone ” .
This guide was developed by the Prometheus Security Environment Research Center .
It contains exclusive materials on the occupation and militarization of Crimea , gathered by the InformNapalm community .
The guide was published with the assistance of the Canadian Foundation for Local Initiatives and the International Renaissance Foundation , so it is distributed free of charge to experts .
It is notable that despite the internal political competition , the members of the Ukrainian parliament from three different parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Solidarity , and Voice , offered an example of cooperation in the international representation .
The distribution of this guide was a suggestion made together by several Ukrainian MPs and representatives participating in the US trip : MPs Mykyta Poturayev , Serhiy Rakhmanin , and Pavlo Frolov , and Vitaliy Rudenko , an aide to the MP Artur Herasymov .
This shows the ability of different members of international Ukrainian delegations to cooperate in the interest of Ukraine .
After returning from the United States , Mykyta Poturayev , Head of the Permanent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a photo report on the effective distribution of the publications .
Copies of the guide were delivered to OSCE PA Secretary-General Roberto Montella ( Italy ) , OSCE PA Deputy Secretary-General Gustavo Pallares ( Spain ) , OSCE PA Delegate Lars Thomsson ( Sweden ) , OSCE Vice-President Maarte / Margareta Cederfelt ( Sweden ) , Head of the OSCE Delegation from Sweden Johan Büser , Italian Delegate to the OSCE PA Mauro Del Barba , Delegate from the Netherlands to the OSCE PA Farah Karimi , Portuguese Delegate to the OSCE PA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Coordinator of the OSCE Election Observation Mission , German delegate to the OSCE PA Michael Link , Norwegian delegate to the OSCE PA Kari Henriksen and many other politicians and delegates from various countries who were present at the US elections as observers .
As Pavlo Frolov , a member of the OSCE PA Permanent Delegation from Ukraine , said on his Facebook page , due to the COVID-19 pandemic this was in fact the first in-person meeting of OSCE PA representatives from different countries after the OSCE PA winter session in Vienna @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to use this opportunity to inform its colleagues about the problem of occupation and militarization of Crimea .
Also , separately during the meeting , the English-language copies of “ Crimea Behind the Curtain .
Guide to the Occupied Zone ” were presented to the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States Volodymyr Yelchenko so that the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States could use these materials in its work , too .
The guidebook “ Crimea Behind the Curtain .
Guide to the Occupied Zone ” reveals various @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Crimea .
PDF versions of the book can be found at the website of the Prometheus Center for the Study of the Security Environment .
One might recall that in 2018 , experts from the Prometheus Center also presented the results of the international success of the book about Russia ’ s aggression in the Donbas : “ Donbas in Flames .
Guide to the Conflict Zone ” .
The electronic version of the book in 5 languages was downloaded by users from 82 countries , and the printed version was presented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world .
Over the course of a year , presentations of the book , which was distributed free of charge , took place in various cities of Ukraine , as well as in Estonia , Lithuania , Latvia , Germany , Austria and the USA .
You can download the PDF version of the book by following the link .
Consequences of the occupation of Crimea and ways to punish Russia As a topic of a special significance , Ukrainian diplomats constantly note the following negative consequences of the ongoing occupation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the status of a nuclear state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council , for the first time since World War II , the Russian Federation has decided to start an international conflict within Europe and occupy Crimea .
Without meeting the proper reaction of the world community to these actions , the Kremlin took further steps to build a “ land corridor ” to Crimea at the expense of the territories of southeastern Ukraine .
This led to the outbreak of an undeclared ( hybrid ) war in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 14,000 lives .
• The largest multi-branch group of Russian troops in Europe is in the occupied Crimea .
Soviet military airfields , missile launch sites , air defense facilities and nuclear weapons storage bases are now restored .
Fifteen ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea are equipped with Kalibr missiles , some modifications of this type of missile being able to be equipped with a nuclear warhead and have a range of up to 2600 km , which makes the Black Sea Fleet a dangerous combat unit .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 9M729 cruise missiles can hit targets at a distance up to 2,500 km .
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty between the United States and Russia was terminated specifically because of the issue of the Kalibr missiles and the Iskander system .
It should be noted that once Crimea was occupied , Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Su-34 tactical bombers , which can also carry nuclear charges , were transferred to the Crimean Peninsula .
• In addition to the total militarization of the Black and Azov seas of the Crimean Peninsula @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numerous disinformation actions , Russia uses international organizations as platforms for interpreting in its own interests criminal acts against neighboring countries and outright crimes against humanity .
Russia ’ s actions are destructive and negatively affect the security and stability of neighboring countries , both the Black Sea region and Europe as a whole .
• In fact , the waters of the Sea of Azov have become more dangerous than the coast of Somalia .
The Kerch bridge blocks the Azov Strait .
Accordingly , fewer vessels can overcome the artificial obstacle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The OSCE should fully implement its mandate in the Black and Azov Seas to ensure the realization of the rights of Ukrainian seafarers in connection with Russian aggression .
About 20,000 Ukrainian sailors and fishermen in Crimea do not have access to legal documents and do not have free access to courts that deal with labor issues .
• At the level of international institutions , the necessary package of sanctions against the Russian Federation that would correspond to the scale of Russia ’ s international crimes and would be sufficient to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign policy course has not been used .
As a result , aggression and war crimes have become the norm for the Putin regime ’ s policy of terror .
Serious international crimes , accompanied by violence against countries , peoples and individuals , have become commonplace for the Russian authorities .
Тhe world community , including authoritative international organizations such as the UN , PACE and OSCE , should take more effective measures that will force Russia to choose a peaceful path : strengthening sanctions against certain sectors of the economy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international governmental organizations , both global and regional .
Russia can only be forced into peace , and Crimea is the key to peace in the region .
In this context , the book “ Crimea Behind the Curtain .
Guide to the Occupied Zone “ reinforces the statements of diplomats with concrete facts and evidence .
Volunteers of the international intelligence community InformNapalm thank the Ukrainian diplomats and representatives of Ukrainian delegations for the high appreciation of the quality of research and materials on the Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ materials to the highest political levels .
Translated by George Pinchuk , edited by Max Alginin .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers .
You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

The international volunteer intelligence community InformNapalm continues to actively collect evidence of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine during the years of 2014-2020. These materials are distributed in many world languages, not only through publications on the community’s website, but also in print. These are being distributed at high international level among foreign experts, journalists, diplomats, and politicians. The dissemination of these materials is possible thanks to the activity of volunteers from different countries and with the assistance of representatives of official Ukrainian delegations in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, as well as through the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and individual diplomats.
In the USA, representatives of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) from different countries were presented with handbooks that contained the facts about the Russian aggression in the Crimea.
This time, Ukrainian representatives of the Permanent Delegation to the OSCE PA, which was present in the United States as election observers between 1 and 4 November 2020, took the opportunity to present to their OSCE colleagues the English-language guidebook “Crimea Behind the Curtain. Guide to the Occupied Zone”. This guide was developed by the Prometheus Security Environment Research Center. It contains exclusive materials on the occupation and militarization of Crimea, gathered by the InformNapalm community. The guide was published with the assistance of the Canadian Foundation for Local Initiatives and the International Renaissance Foundation, so it is distributed free of charge to experts.
It is notable that despite the internal political competition, the members of the Ukrainian parliament from three different parties, Servant of the People, European Solidarity, and Voice, offered an example of cooperation in the international representation. The distribution of this guide was a suggestion made together by several Ukrainian MPs and representatives participating in the US trip: MPs Mykyta Poturayev, Serhiy Rakhmanin, and Pavlo Frolov, and Vitaliy Rudenko, an aide to the MP Artur Herasymov. This shows the ability of different members of international Ukrainian delegations to cooperate in the interest of Ukraine.
Photo repor
After returning from the United States, Mykyta Poturayev, Head of the Permanent Delegation to the OSCE PA, provided a photo report on the effective distribution of the publications.
Copies of the guide were delivered to OSCE PA Secretary-General Roberto Montella (Italy), OSCE PA Deputy Secretary-General Gustavo Pallares (Spain), OSCE PA Delegate Lars Thomsson (Sweden), OSCE Vice-President Maarte / Margareta Cederfelt (Sweden), Head of the OSCE Delegation from Sweden Johan Büser, Italian Delegate to the OSCE PA Mauro Del Barba, Delegate from the Netherlands to the OSCE PA Farah Karimi, Portuguese Delegate to the OSCE PA Lima / André Coelho Lima, Special Coordinator of the OSCE Election Observation Mission, German delegate to the OSCE PA Michael Link, Norwegian delegate to the OSCE PA Kari Henriksen and many other politicians and delegates from various countries who were present at the US elections as observers.
As Pavlo Frolov, a member of the OSCE PA Permanent Delegation from Ukraine, said on his Facebook page, due to the COVID-19 pandemic this was in fact the first in-person meeting of OSCE PA representatives from different countries after the OSCE PA winter session in Vienna. The delegation made the best effort to use this opportunity to inform its colleagues about the problem of occupation and militarization of Crimea.
Also, separately during the meeting, the English-language copies of “Crimea Behind the Curtain. Guide to the Occupied Zone” were presented to the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States Volodymyr Yelchenko so that the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States could use these materials in its work, too.
For reference
The guidebook “Crimea Behind the Curtain. Guide to the Occupied Zone ” reveals various aspects of the Russian aggression and militarization of Crimea. PDF versions of the book can be found at the website of the Prometheus Center for the Study of the Security Environment.
One might recall that in 2018, experts from the Prometheus Center also presented the results of the international success of the book about Russia’s aggression in the Donbas: “Donbas in Flames. Guide to the Conflict Zone”. The electronic version of the book in 5 languages was downloaded by users from 82 countries, and the printed version was presented in 54 diplomatic missions of Ukraine around the world. Over the course of a year, presentations of the book, which was distributed free of charge, took place in various cities of Ukraine, as well as in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, Austria and the USA. You can download the PDF version of the book by following the link.
Consequences of the occupation of Crimea and ways to punish Russia
As a topic of a special significance, Ukrainian diplomats constantly note the following negative consequences of the ongoing occupation of the Crimean Peninsula:
Taking advantage of the status of a nuclear state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, for the first time since World War II, the Russian Federation has decided to start an international conflict within Europe and occupy Crimea. Without meeting the proper reaction of the world community to these actions, the Kremlin took further steps to build a “land corridor” to Crimea at the expense of the territories of southeastern Ukraine. This led to the outbreak of an undeclared (hybrid) war in the Donbas, which has already claimed more than 14,000 lives. The largest multi-branch group of Russian troops in Europe is in the occupied Crimea. Soviet military airfields, missile launch sites, air defense facilities and nuclear weapons storage bases are now restored. Fifteen ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea are equipped with Kalibr missiles, some modifications of this type of missile being able to be equipped with a nuclear warhead and have a range of up to 2600 km, which makes the Black Sea Fleet a dangerous combat unit. In addition, Iskander-M missile systems equipped with 9M729 cruise missiles can hit targets at a distance up to 2,500 km. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and Russia was terminated specifically because of the issue of the Kalibr missiles and the Iskander system. It should be noted that once Crimea was occupied, Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Su-34 tactical bombers, which can also carry nuclear charges, were transferred to the Crimean Peninsula. In addition to the total militarization of the Black and Azov seas of the Crimean Peninsula, the rattling of new weapons and numerous disinformation actions, Russia uses international organizations as platforms for interpreting in its own interests criminal acts against neighboring countries and outright crimes against humanity. Russia’s actions are destructive and negatively affect the security and stability of neighboring countries, both the Black Sea region and Europe as a whole. In fact, the waters of the Sea of Azov have become more dangerous than the coast of Somalia. The Kerch bridge blocks the Azov Strait. Accordingly, fewer vessels can overcome the artificial obstacle, and some ships are periodically detained. The OSCE should fully implement its mandate in the Black and Azov Seas to ensure the realization of the rights of Ukrainian seafarers in connection with Russian aggression. About 20,000 Ukrainian sailors and fishermen in Crimea do not have access to legal documents and do not have free access to courts that deal with labor issues. At the level of international institutions, the necessary package of sanctions against the Russian Federation that would correspond to the scale of Russia’s international crimes and would be sufficient to force the Kremlin to reconsider its chosen foreign policy course has not been used. As a result, aggression and war crimes have become the norm for the Putin regime’s policy of terror. Serious international crimes, accompanied by violence against countries, peoples and individuals, have become commonplace for the Russian authorities.
Тhe world community, including authoritative international organizations such as the UN, PACE and OSCE, should take more effective measures that will force Russia to choose a peaceful path: strengthening sanctions against certain sectors of the economy and limiting Russia’s participation in various international governmental organizations, both global and regional. Russia can only be forced into peace, and Crimea is the key to peace in the region.
In this context, the book “Crimea Behind the Curtain. Guide to the Occupied Zone “reinforces the statements of diplomats with concrete facts and evidence.
Volunteers of the international intelligence community InformNapalm thank the Ukrainian diplomats and representatives of Ukrainian delegations for the high appreciation of the quality of research and materials on the Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas, as well as for bringing these materials to the highest political levels.
Translated by George Pinchuk, edited by Max Alginin. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-11-19--The Information Defense Legion on Tackling the Kremlin Propaganda

Article prepared by Giorgi Molodini , Head of the Strategic Communication Center – Georgia .
Firstly published by Georgia Today .
Even the staunchest critic would have to acknowledge that a democratic , united and economically strong Georgia is a serious headache within the framework of the grand strategy of the Kremlin leaders , i.e .
the leaders of the modern Russian Federation .
Georgia remains a serious black hole for the Kremlin in the relations of the West with the East , and a serious obstacle in terms of the political geography in the relations of the North with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North ” is Moscow itself , which has no direct terrestrial connection with Armenia , and then the Middle East ) .
In short , geopolitics has not disappeared .
The Kremlin often uses a brutal force to pursue its foreign and domestic policy goals like in Chechnya , Georgia , Ukraine and Syria .
It also grossly violates the rules established in the international relations , but manages to remain a player in these relations .
It does not give other states sufficient grounds to outcast Russia .
The use of brutal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ always possible , but the Kremlin simply changes tools and these tools are no less harmful .
These are political subversive games , where a special role is given to information-psychological operations .
That is , the kidnapping and killing of Georgian citizens , borderization , airspace violations , information attacks on the Lugar laboratory , confrontations between different groups of society , and reaching a zero consensus on all essential issues , stirring hatred and animosity towards the majority in ethnic minorities – this is part of the information-psychological campaign , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia by destroying its statehood .
What is the nature of Russia ’ s information warfare in Georgia ?
We are witnessing a purely communicative process where people try to manage the environment through information , change and by twisting the existing reality .
Even a superficial analysis of the information policy of the Russia-Ukraine 2014 and Russia-Georgia 2008 wars and the post-war period reveals that the main targets of the Russian Federation ’ s military and political elite were to influence the leadership ’ s decision-making process , to decrease combat readiness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make disappear the desire and resistance in society .
These goals are still valid , and Russia ’ s actions have not stopped .
In this context , there are a couple of fundamental questions that need to be answered .
First and foremost : In the long run , what could be the main goals of the Russian hybrid war in Georgia ?
• Destruction of ideological and political values or the formation of new ones How effectively does the Georgian state respond ?
I do not support the view that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posed by the Kremlin can only be measured by repelling attacks on the Lugar ’ s Lab .
First , the attack on the laboratory is a strategic-level task , not a strategic-level goal .
By such attacks , the Kremlin seeks to increase pressure on the government so that the decision-makers make mistakes .
For example , engaging in a completely futile political haggling for the Georgian side , obtain concessions and intimidate the population through creating the image of the Kremlin ’ s invincibility and the feebleness of the Georgian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sowing fear and insecurity has a special role in the Russian information and psychological operations .
By using different techniques and tactics , the Kremlin also seeks to convince Georgian society that confronting it will be costly both to the state and society .
An information attack on Lugar Laboratory is also a way to achieve this goal .
If the Kremlin manages to infiltrate the laboratory on favorable terms , it will reaffirm the Georgian government ’ s weakness and strengthen the belief of that part of the Georgian public that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is in the Kremlin , that opposing it makes no sense and that it can not be irritated .
In fact , there is no need to irritate the Kremlin .
As long as there is an independent state of Georgia , it will be constantly irritated .
Those interested in Russian-Georgian relations know that if we look at the statements made by the Kremlin ’ s military and political elite about Georgia , we will see two characteristics of the Kremlin ’ s communication with Tbilisi ; namely , cynicism and threats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the statement of the President of the Russian Federation , where he says that his attitude towards the Georgian people has not changed even in the most difficult moments , including during the August War , and he has remained as benevolent as ever .
In this case , it is important to understand the reasons for his self-confidence and optimism so that we will accept , believe and embrace his words .
In other words , the President of the Russian Federation believes that he will influence a part of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ business , political and public elite .
Threat is a second element that defines Moscow ’ s attitude towards Tbilisi .
The leaders of the Russian Federation often remind us that we can be severely punished for any significant steps taken on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration .
Thus , the Kremlin seeks to make its target audience make political decisions in Georgia on the basis of these constructions marked by its narratives .
In the end , the narratives of cynicism and threat must produce the most desirable result for the Kremlin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ability of society to fight and a large degree of the public resilience must be lost .
Groups of confused and undecided people should not be able to unite around such big and important ideas as independence , freedom , or de-occupation .
What is the Information Defense Legion and why was it created ?
Meir Elran from the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University says that the recent analyzes of the security environment ( on the example of Israel ) have demonstrated that national security is more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the mental , social , cultural and political protection of citizens is a priority .
Meir Erlan emphasizes the importance of the public engagement , their education and awareness , in citizens ’ preparedness and resilience : “ An active society is a resilient society , while a passive society is easily vulnerable.
” The fact that the resilience of an individual and various social groups is the basis of the political national resilience as a dimension of defense and security discourse is also evident from the doctrine of Lim Siong Guan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Total Defense System : “ It is possible that social inequality may be the cause of the division of society and call into question the unity of Singapore .
That is why Singapore ’ s total defense strategy considers psychological defense to be one of the most important components… If a Singaporean does not have the feeling that he has to fight for his country because this country is the place that offers him the best opportunity for a better future – the rest will fall apart by itself.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ created with USAID financial support and the active support of the East-West Management Institute , and we want to thank each and every member of the institute for their help ) has put the information field of as much of the Georgian population as possible under the security umbrella , through an effective , regular and proactive communication strategy .
We do not wait for the adversary to spread another lie to mislead our people , and let it fill the gaps left in the information field with its own messages : We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the true goals and motives of the opponent .
We strive to contribute to protecting citizens from mental , social , cultural and political influences .
In this way , we seek to contribute to building a united , strong and democratic state .

Article prepared by Giorgi Molodini, Head of the Strategic Communication Center – Georgia. Firstly published by Georgia Today.
Even the staunchest critic would have to acknowledge that a democratic, united and economically strong Georgia is a serious headache within the framework of the grand strategy of the Kremlin leaders, i.e. the leaders of the modern Russian Federation. Georgia remains a serious black hole for the Kremlin in the relations of the West with the East, and a serious obstacle in terms of the political geography in the relations of the North with the South (here, the “North” is Moscow itself, which has no direct terrestrial connection with Armenia, and then the Middle East). In short, geopolitics has not disappeared. The Kremlin often uses a brutal force to pursue its foreign and domestic policy goals like in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. It also grossly violates the rules established in the international relations, but manages to remain a player in these relations. It does not give other states sufficient grounds to outcast Russia. The use of brutal force on this path is neither not always possible, but the Kremlin simply changes tools and these tools are no less harmful. These are political subversive games, where a special role is given to information-psychological operations. That is, the kidnapping and killing of Georgian citizens, borderization, airspace violations, information attacks on the Lugar laboratory, confrontations between different groups of society, and reaching a zero consensus on all essential issues, stirring hatred and animosity towards the majority in ethnic minorities – this is part of the information-psychological campaign, which in its turn is a war against Georgia by destroying its statehood.
What is the nature of Russia’s information warfare in Georgia?
We are witnessing a purely communicative process where people try to manage the environment through information, change and by twisting the existing reality. Even a superficial analysis of the information policy of the Russia-Ukraine 2014 and Russia-Georgia 2008 wars and the post-war period reveals that the main targets of the Russian Federation’s military and political elite were to influence the leadership’s decision-making process, to decrease combat readiness of the armed forces, and to make disappear the desire and resistance in society. These goals are still valid, and Russia’s actions have not stopped. In this context, there are a couple of fundamental questions that need to be answered.
First and foremost: In the long run, what could be the main goals of the Russian hybrid war in Georgia?
• Destruction of ideological and political values or the formation of new ones
• Disruption of education and communication systems
• “Correction” of psychological, cultural and social life
How effectively does the Georgian state respond?
I do not support the view that the effectiveness of the government against the threats posed by the Kremlin can only be measured by repelling attacks on the Lugar’s Lab. First, the attack on the laboratory is a strategic-level task, not a strategic-level goal. By such attacks, the Kremlin seeks to increase pressure on the government so that the decision-makers make mistakes. For example, engaging in a completely futile political haggling for the Georgian side, obtain concessions and intimidate the population through creating the image of the Kremlin’s invincibility and the feebleness of the Georgian government on the opposite side. In general, sowing fear and insecurity has a special role in the Russian information and psychological operations. By using different techniques and tactics, the Kremlin also seeks to convince Georgian society that confronting it will be costly both to the state and society. An information attack on Lugar Laboratory is also a way to achieve this goal. If the Kremlin manages to infiltrate the laboratory on favorable terms, it will reaffirm the Georgian government’s weakness and strengthen the belief of that part of the Georgian public that thinks that the key to all conflicts is in the Kremlin, that opposing it makes no sense and that it cannot be irritated. In fact, there is no need to irritate the Kremlin. As long as there is an independent state of Georgia, it will be constantly irritated.
Those interested in Russian-Georgian relations know that if we look at the statements made by the Kremlin’s military and political elite about Georgia, we will see two characteristics of the Kremlin’s communication with Tbilisi; namely, cynicism and threats. Under cynicism falls, for example, the statement of the President of the Russian Federation, where he says that his attitude towards the Georgian people has not changed even in the most difficult moments, including during the August War, and he has remained as benevolent as ever. In this case, it is important to understand the reasons for his self-confidence and optimism so that we will accept, believe and embrace his words. In other words, the President of the Russian Federation believes that he will influence a part of the Georgian society, including representatives of the business, political and public elite.
Threat is a second element that defines Moscow’s attitude towards Tbilisi. The leaders of the Russian Federation often remind us that we can be severely punished for any significant steps taken on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, the Kremlin seeks to make its target audience make political decisions in Georgia on the basis of these constructions marked by its narratives. In the end, the narratives of cynicism and threat must produce the most desirable result for the Kremlin on the ground. In Georgia, the ability of society to fight and a large degree of the public resilience must be lost. Groups of confused and undecided people should not be able to unite around such big and important ideas as independence, freedom, or de-occupation.
What is the Information Defense Legion and why was it created?
Meir Elran from the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University says that the recent analyzes of the security environment (on the example of Israel) have demonstrated that national security is more than just physical protection. According to him, the mental, social, cultural and political protection of citizens is a priority. Meir Erlan emphasizes the importance of the public engagement, their education and awareness, in citizens’ preparedness and resilience: “An active society is a resilient society, while a passive society is easily vulnerable.”
The fact that the resilience of an individual and various social groups is the basis of the political national resilience as a dimension of defense and security discourse is also evident from the doctrine of Lim Siong Guan, one of the founders of Singapore’s Total Defense System: “It is possible that social inequality may be the cause of the division of society and call into question the unity of Singapore. That is why Singapore’s total defense strategy considers psychological defense to be one of the most important components… If a Singaporean does not have the feeling that he has to fight for his country because this country is the place that offers him the best opportunity for a better future – the rest will fall apart by itself.”
The Information Defense Legion (the project was created with USAID financial support and the active support of the East-West Management Institute, and we want to thank each and every member of the institute for their help) has put the information field of as much of the Georgian population as possible under the security umbrella, through an effective, regular and proactive communication strategy.
We do not wait for the adversary to spread another lie to mislead our people, and let it fill the gaps left in the information field with its own messages: We try to inform our audience in advance of the true goals and motives of the opponent. We strive to contribute to protecting citizens from mental, social, cultural and political influences. In this way, we seek to contribute to building a united, strong and democratic state.


informnapalm--2020-11-20--More soldiers from Russian 8th Motorized Brigade who participated in aggression against Ukraine iden

More soldiers from Russian 8th Motorized Brigade who participated in aggression against Ukraine identified

The first time , the 8th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade ( MMRB ) of the Russian Armed Forces came to the attention of volunteers from InformNapalm international intelligence community back in 2014 .
Overall , several investigations have been published about the participation of servicemen of this unit in the aggression against Ukraine which you can find in our interactive database .
One of these investigations got its sequel now , in 2020 .
We identified two more Russian servicemen on the previously published group photos .
In the fall of 2016 , InformNapalm investigator Irakli Komaxidze conducted yet another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war of the Russian 8th MMRB ( military unit 16544 , home base : town of Borzoi , Chechen Republic , Russia ) .
The article presented a group photo showing four Russian servicemen .
Three of them were then identified .
Four years later , we identified the fourth person on the photograph .
Ruslan Nurgaliyev was born in Tolyatti on August 5 , 1993 and lives in Dimitrovgrad , Russia .
In 2013-2016 he served under contract in the Russian 8th MMRB .
On August 17 , 2014 , in his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posted the same group photo .
In the comments to the photo he reported about the deployment of his unit to Ukraine : “ Departure to Ukraine… we are all going to Ukraine.
” In the next photo ( here ) we see a group of Russian soldiers ready to be sent to war against Ukraine .
The non-statutory uniforms of the servicemen are very conspicuous .
In the background on the left , we see a MT-LB VM/K armored vehicle .
When the photo is enlarged , various inscriptions can be seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Russians often resorted to such makeshift attempts to disguise the presence of their regular army in the Ukrainian Donbas .
The soldiers were photographed in front of a 2S1 Gvozdika howitzer with the hand-painted side number 432 on it .
This number was painted over the original side number , a traditional ploy for Russian occupiers , whom Russia tries to present in the International Court of Justice in The Hague as “ Ukrainian rebel miners ” who found military equipment in the mines of the Donbas .
Nurgaliyev in the photo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the right .
Also in this photo , there are subjects of the previous : in the first row the second on the left is Konstantinovsky , in the center is Evdokimov Also , we found Nurgaliyev ’ s social media account which he created under the username .
On this page , he posted a photo of himself with a white armband that the Russian occupiers used in the fighting in eastern Ukraine to distinguish themselves .
In Nurgaliyev ’ s album , there was also a photo of a shoulder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Also , there was a photo of the Suvorov Medal received for participation in the war against Ukraine .
The same medals were awarded to Nurgaliyev ’ s comrades , as shown in the previous article : While studying the circle of Nurgaliyev ’ s connections , we established the name of another occupier from the Russian 8th MMRB .
Nikolai Olegovich Shevtsov , born on January 27 , 1993 , in the town of Shakhty , Russia .
He served in the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade , as evidenced by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( the certificate indicates the number of the military unit – 63354 ) and a photo near the military equipment of this unit .
After completing his conscription term , Shevtsov signed a contract for service in the 8th MMRB .
It is evidenced by his own comments , friends contacts and photos of military equipment with a tactical marking of this unit – a white circle inscribed in a white square ( this photo of a convoy of military equipment was posted in Nurgaliyev ’ s photo album also ) .
Also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found a photo with white armbands typical of the Russian occupiers .
In the photo , Shevtsov is on the far right .
The Russian occupation forces used white armbands in both the Crimea and the Donbas * If you are viewing the mobile AMP version of this article ( Accelerated Mobile Page ) , some photos and links to archives may not be displayed .
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The first time, the 8th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (MMRB) of the Russian Armed Forces came to the attention of volunteers from InformNapalm international intelligence community back in 2014. Overall, several investigations have been published about the participation of servicemen of this unit in the aggression against Ukraine which you can find in our interactive database. One of these investigations got its sequel now, in 2020. We identified two more Russian servicemen on the previously published group photos.
In the fall of 2016, InformNapalm investigator Irakli Komaxidze conducted yet another investigation into the participation in the Donbas war of the Russian 8th MMRB (military unit 16544, home base: town of Borzoi, Chechen Republic, Russia). The article presented a group photo showing four Russian servicemen. Three of them were then identified. Four years later, we identified the fourth person on the photograph.
Established information
Ruslan Nurgaliyev (Russian: Руслан Нургалиев) was born in Tolyatti on August 5, 1993 and lives in Dimitrovgrad, Russia. In 2013-2016 he served under contract in the Russian 8th MMRB.
On August 17, 2014, in his photo album on social media, Nurgaliyev posted the same group photo. In the comments to the photo he reported about the deployment of his unit to Ukraine: “Departure to Ukraine… we are all going to Ukraine.”
In the next photo (here) we see a group of Russian soldiers ready to be sent to war against Ukraine. The non-statutory uniforms of the servicemen are very conspicuous. In the background on the left, we see a MT-LB VM/K armored vehicle. When the photo is enlarged, various inscriptions can be seen on the vehicle. In 2014and 2015, Russians often resorted to such makeshift attempts to disguise the presence of their regular army in the Ukrainian Donbas. The soldiers were photographed in front of a 2S1 Gvozdika howitzer with the hand-painted side number 432 on it. This number was painted over the original side number, a traditional ploy for Russian occupiers, whom Russia tries to present in the International Court of Justice in The Hague as “Ukrainian rebel miners” who found military equipment in the mines of the Donbas.
Nurgaliyev in the photo is in the first row the second on the right. Also in this photo, there are subjects of the previous investigation: in the first row the second on the left is Konstantinovsky, in the center is Evdokimov
Also, we found Nurgaliyev’s social media account which he created under the username Dark Angel. On this page, he posted a photo of himself with a white armband that the Russian occupiers used in the fighting in eastern Ukraine to distinguish themselves.
In Nurgaliyev’s album, there was also a photo of a shoulder patch of the Ukrainian Kryvbas Battalion.
Also, there was a photo of the Suvorov Medal received for participation in the war against Ukraine. The same medals were awarded to Nurgaliyev’s comrades, as shown in the previous article:
Pages, photos and archives of Ruslan Nurgaliyev https://vk.com/ruslan1393 (http://archive.is/dK6hl) http://archive.vn/mQkje http://archive.vn/9yGLt http://archive.vn/jEOkX http://archive.vn/OcIJq https://ok.ru/profile/563083267944 (http://archive.is/EGsxF) http://archive.is/s2V9j http://archive.vn/G18h4 https://www.ok.ru/profile/567759097151 http://archive.ph/t04Pz http://archive.is/zw6Xo http://archive.ph/341lR https://www.ok.ru/profile/554140375661 http://archive.ph/8Twkn http://archive.ph/3nucy
https://www.ok.ru/profile/566055948974 http://archive.is/Og8GO http://archive.ph/rs4fb http://archive.ph/XmmIH
While studying the circle of Nurgaliyev’s connections, we established the name of another occupier from the Russian 8th MMRB.
Nikolai Olegovich Shevtsov (Russian: Николай Олегович Шевцов), born on January 27, 1993, in the town of Shakhty, Russia.
He served in the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade, as evidenced by a photo of the certificate to the badge (the certificate indicates the number of the military unit – 63354) and a photo near the military equipment of this unit.
After completing his conscription term, Shevtsov signed a contract for service in the 8th MMRB. It is evidenced by his own comments, friends contacts and photos of military equipment with a tactical marking of this unit – a white circle inscribed in a white square (this photo of a convoy of military equipment was posted in Nurgaliyev’s photo album also).
Also, in Shevtsov’s album was found a photo with white armbands typical of the Russian occupiers. In the photo, Shevtsov is on the far right. The Russian occupation forces used white armbands in both the Crimea and the Donbas
Pages, photos and archives of Nikolai Shevtsov https://ok.ru/profile/514220322633 (http://archive.is/Saeao) https://ok.ru/profile/560471923904 (http://archive.vn/KrRDo) https://vk.com/id260314153 (http://archive.vn/MjKZI) http://archive.vn/l4YrE http://archive.vn/GDtBa
* If you are viewing the mobile AMP version of this article (Accelerated Mobile Page), some photos and links to archives may not be displayed. If you are interested in studying the materials of this publication in more detail, we recommend that you view the article from a computer.


informnapalm--2020-11-20--Advanced Russian EW system Navodchik-2 spotted in Donbas for the first time

Advanced Russian electronic warfare ( EW ) system Navodchik-2 was reliably spotted for the first time in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast , 12 km from the front line .
The system includes seven unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) of the Granat family of various modifications with ranges of 10 , 15 , 25 and 100 km .
The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks , in particular , to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems ( MLRS ) on the battalion level .
The first text report ( without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control station of the Navodchik-2 system appeared in the OSCE SMM report No .
272/2020 dated November 14 , 2020 .
It said that , according to the updated data of the mission , the type of equipment , which had been indicated in the OSCE SMM report No .
268/2020 of November 10 as “ the RB-341V Leer-3 electronic warfare system ” , was later identified as a UAV control station of the Navodchik-2 system following a more detailed analysis .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this text @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OSCE UAV undeniably confirms that the newest Russian system Navodchik-2 is actually deployed in the Donbas .
Three boxes for storing and transporting of the UAVs were also seen near the control station .
This information is an important supplement to the multilingual evidence base compiled by InformNapalm listing Russian military hardware actively used in the Donbas .
It is important to note that unlike the Navodchik-2 , which was recorded for the first time in the Donbas , the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system which includes three Orlan-10 UAVs , had already been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the east of Ukraine .
It also featured in InformNapalm ’ s OSINT investigations since 2015 , and from 2018 to 2020 it began to frequently appear on the OSCE SMM reports .
This type of equipment was also included in the InformNapalm report with the evidence of the presence of Russian troops in the Donbas , which was presented by the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul in 2016 , as well as at other international events organized by PACE and OSCE from 2016 to 2019 .
Publications @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the occupied Donbas with reference to InformNapalm investigations were also published by the Associated Press and in the German tabloid Bild .
Therefore , the presence of this system has been well established and entered in the evidence base .
A still-frame image from the video of Russian propagandists in 2015 showing the training of a Russian terrorist unit from the so-called 1st Army Corps of the Russian Army in the Donbas .
A Russian EW system RB-341V Leer-3 was accidentally captured by the camera .
As for the Navodchik-2 system , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war zone only once in April 2017 , when a Granat-1 UAV , which is part of this system , was detected in use near the Svitlodarsk bulge .
However , the detection of this type of UAV could not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the deployment of the whole system , as these UAVs are also capable of operating separately .
For example in 2015 , InformNapalm established the use of the Granat-1 and Granat-2 UAVs by the units of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas .
In addition , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the territory of the Kuzminskiy training range of the Rostov Oblast of the Russian Federation , indicating that back in December 2014 , the Russian Ministry of Defense trained the militants to operate the Granat-2 UAV .
Photo from the OSINT investigation by InformNapalm , included in the Donbas in Flames guide book which was distributed in 5 languages in 82 countries Considering that the OSCE observers made an error in their first identification of this Russian equipment , we thought it important to emphasize a characteristic feature of the Navodchik-2 system .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( four-wheel drive ) , while the RB-341V Leer-3 system is mounted on the KamAZ-5350 chassis ( six-wheel drive ) .
Before the Donbas , Russia actively used the Navodchik-2 at the 102nd Military Base in Armenia Navodchik-2 entered service with the Russian Army in 2014 .
It was immediately deployed to Armenia at the Russian 102nd Military Base in the city of Gyumri .
Since then , any reports about the use of this system both in the Russian media and on the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defense concerned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also mentioned several times in the context of exercises on the territory of the 4th Military Base of the Russian occupation forces deployed in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia .
• UAVs of the Granat-1 , Granat-2 , Granat-3 and Granat-4 types ( there are seven UAVs in the system ) .
The newest Russian system Navodchik-2 was exhibited at the military technical forum Army-2019 / Photo source bastion-karpenko.ru This article contains unique and important data , evidence of the ongoing covert military activity of the Russian Federation in the occupied part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began in the spring of 2014 and it continues in 2020 , whereas Russian military command and political leadership continue to deny Russia ’ s direct participation and control of the hostilities .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community calls on the expert , journalistic and diplomatic community as well as on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to actively use the data from the OSCE SMM reports and the materials of open-source intelligence ( OSINT ) investigations of InformNapalm volunteers to step up diplomatic pressure on the aggressor state , strengthen the sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achieve a real peace , which is only possible after full withdrawal of Russian weaponry , military equipment , servicemen and mercenaries from Ukraine .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers .
You can also volunteer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon .

Advanced Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 was reliably spotted for the first time in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast, 12 km from the front line. The system includes seven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) of the Granat family of various modifications with ranges of 10, 15, 25 and 100 km. The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks, in particular, to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS) on the battalion level.
The first text report (without photos) about sighting of the ground control station of the Navodchik-2 system appeared in the OSCE SMM report No. 272/2020 dated November 14, 2020. It said that, according to the updated data of the mission, the type of equipment, which had been indicated in the OSCE SMM report No. 268/2020 of November 10 as “the RB-341V Leer-3 electronic warfare system”, was later identified as a UAV control station of the Navodchik-2 system following a more detailed analysis.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this text report. The photo taken by the OSCE UAV undeniably confirms that the newest Russian system Navodchik-2 is actually deployed in the Donbas. Three boxes for storing and transporting of the UAVs were also seen near the control station.
This information is an important supplement to the multilingual evidence base compiled by InformNapalm listing Russian military hardware actively used in the Donbas.
Navodchik-2 and RB-341V Leer-3
It is important to note that unlike the Navodchik-2, which was recorded for the first time in the Donbas, the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system which includes three Orlan-10 UAVs, had already been repeatedly spotted in the combat zone in the east of Ukraine. It also featured in InformNapalm’s OSINT investigations since 2015, and from 2018 to 2020 it began to frequently appear on the OSCE SMM reports. This type of equipment was also included in the InformNapalm report with the evidence of the presence of Russian troops in the Donbas, which was presented by the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul in 2016, as well as at other international events organized by PACE and OSCE from 2016 to 2019. Publications about the deployment of RB-341V Leer-3 in the occupied Donbas with reference to InformNapalm investigations were also published by the Associated Press and in the German tabloid Bild. Therefore, the presence of this system has been well established and entered in the evidence base.
A still-frame image from the video of Russian propagandists in 2015 showing the training of a Russian terrorist unit from the so-called 1st Army Corps of the Russian Army in the Donbas. A Russian EW system RB-341V Leer-3 was accidentally captured by the camera.
As for the Navodchik-2 system, it was mentioned in reports from the Donbas war zone only once in April 2017, when a Granat-1 UAV, which is part of this system, was detected in use near the Svitlodarsk bulge. However, the detection of this type of UAV could not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the deployment of the whole system, as these UAVs are also capable of operating separately. For example in 2015, InformNapalm established the use of the Granat-1 and Granat-2 UAVs by the units of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas. In addition, photographic evidence was found with geolocated to the territory of the Kuzminskiy training range of the Rostov Oblast of the Russian Federation, indicating that back in December 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense trained the militants to operate the Granat-2 UAV.
Photo from the OSINT investigation by InformNapalm, included in the Donbas in Flames guide book which was distributed in 5 languages in 82 countries
Identification
Considering that the OSCE observers made an error in their first identification of this Russian equipment, we thought it important to emphasize a characteristic feature of the Navodchik-2 system. It is mounted a KamAZ-4350 truck chassis (four-wheel drive), while the RB-341V Leer-3 system is mounted on the KamAZ-5350 chassis (six-wheel drive).
Before the Donbas, Russia actively used the Navodchik-2 at the 102nd Military Base in Armenia
Navodchik-2 entered service with the Russian Army in 2014. It was immediately deployed to Armenia at the Russian 102nd Military Base in the city of Gyumri. Since then, any reports about the use of this system both in the Russian media and on the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defense concerned mainly only Armenia. This system was also mentioned several times in the context of exercises on the territory of the 4th Military Base of the Russian occupation forces deployed in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia.
The system consists of:
ground control station;
UAVs of the Granat-1, Granat-2, Granat-3 and Granat-4 types (there are seven UAVs in the system).
The newest Russian system Navodchik-2 was exhibited at the military technical forum Army-2019 / Photo source bastion-karpenko.ru
Conclusion
This article contains unique and important data, evidence of the ongoing covert military activity of the Russian Federation in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas. The military aggression began in the spring of 2014 and it continues in 2020, whereas Russian military command and political leadership continue to deny Russia’s direct participation and control of the hostilities.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community calls on the expert, journalistic and diplomatic community as well as on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to actively use the data from the OSCE SMM reports and the materials of open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations of InformNapalm volunteers to step up diplomatic pressure on the aggressor state, strengthen the sanctions and other political measures that will help achieve a real peace, which is only possible after full withdrawal of Russian weaponry, military equipment, servicemen and mercenaries from Ukraine.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-11-24--Who is fighting against Ukraine and how? Locked N’ Loaded interview with Ukrainian officer

Interview with Ukrainian officer is taken by Lithuanian partisans of infosphere Locked N ’ Loaded .
Article prepared for publishing by InformNapalm Lithuanian editorial office Res Publica .
The best way to find out about an enemy is to talk to those who fought against him .
We had a very interesting conversation with the intelligence and planning commander of one Ukrainian battalion Andrii “ Pidlyi ” .
He agreed to share his thoughts and experiences about the Russian army and the separatists , their capabilities , armaments and tactics .
What kind of people form the core of “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukrainians from Donbas region .
What is the probable morale of the soldiers and the motives for the fight ?
At the beginning of the war their goal was to separate and become a part of Russia , now – just a salary without any motivation How did you assess the combat possibilities of the “ separatists ” before and after encountering them ?
Are they gradually improving or regressing ?
They changed significantly .
In 2014 , there were different groups of well prepared Russians and the groups of native separatists without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of separatists consists of Russian officers ( mostly ) and native separatists , well prepared as Russian instructors work with them thoroughly How did you assess the combat possibilities of the Russian Federation forces before and after encountering them ?
Are they gradually improving or regressing ?
I didn ’ t know exactly who was on another side when we had met on the battlefield .
Chief positions – battalion commander , brigade commander – are taken by Russians .
Mostly “ natives ” that I met .
Better prepared soldiers come from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tank units .
Did you see the interaction between RF and “ separatists ” ( fire and maneuver support , control ) on the battlefield and how would you assess it ?
They are now working as one structure .
Because of that , the skills of separatists and Russians in Donbas improved a lot .
Russians take all the important positions and control all the processes .
Do you have any knowledge of how the planning of operations works ?
Are they planning them on their own or are they getting tasks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the operation , of course , but most often the whole planning comes from Russia .
For example , the local battalion commanders represent a formal position only , as each unit has an assigned officer from Russia who oversees everything .
Is command and control centralized or decentralized ?
What role does the FSB / GRU play at the tactical level ?
What decision-making power and freedom do local commanders have ?
Would the removal of the commanders disrupt the rhythm of the battle ?
Command in the separatist army is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ functions as in Russia , they are usually intermediaries between the local separatist government and Russia .
Changing commanders is not a problem and commanders change quite often due to the death or conflict of interest , but this does not affect the course of the battle , as the motivation is money .
What are you able to say about the combat training of “ separatists ” ( in-depth defense and in the line of contact ) ?
They are really very well prepared and the discipline is high .
Currently , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Russians have passed the compulsory training in Russia , while the local battalions usually have training sites 5-15 km away and the training is taking place there on a regular basis .
Do “ separatists ” carry on long range reconnaissance ?
What is their composition and at what distance from their forces do they operate ?
Are they covered by indirect fire ?
Long-range reconnaissance is rare .
Battalion reconnaissance patrols usually do not go further than 5 km in depth , it is usually covered by the Russian artillery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the special forces coming from Russia , which take exams in Donbas .
They have their tasks when they look for places where they can pass through the lines of defense , they go far away , they come to the positions and kidnap or kill a Ukrainian soldier in them .
The similar case is with artillery , FSB groups , snipers .
They have their own separate tasks and don ’ t stay long .
The reccy group consists of 1-2 sections , but as I previously mentioned , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian military are different .
Russian intelligence operates within the distance of up to 10 km , with the most common tasks being to mine roads or capturing prisoners .
Separatist intelligence usually performs the functions of guarding command posts , and sometimes operates within a distance of up to 5 km to locate Ukrainian forces in a particular area .
There have been no major separatist attacks in the last few years .
Most of what is done is an attack on the position of the section or platoon base , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops and it happens chaotically .
If we take 2014 as an example , then the offensive planned by the Russian Federation was carried out as part of brigades with the involvement of all available forces and means and was managed from the Russian Federation .
The structure of the separatists is identical to the Russian one .
Two army corps consisting of brigades , battalions , companies , platoons and sections .
Most positions consist of sections that are at a certain distance from each other .
Their tasks are to carry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They are well disguised , know how to camouflage well and sometimes test new technologies in the Russian army .
Do they carry out echoloning and do they have reserve left behind ?
Yes , in each battalion they traditionally have a system of two echelons of trenches and an additional reserve .
There are not as many of them as in 2014 .
About every 9-10 months the battalions rotate and each works a little differently .
However , the battalions remain in the same positions and do not make a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they are destroyed by our artillery and / or armored groups , so they do not have much opportunity to move around .
How do you assess RF / “ separatists ” logistics ?
They are very well prepared and can last for a very long time without any replenishment .
We estimate that stocks of fuel and ammunition will last for about 5 more years to come .
Have you come across RF EW tools and what can you say about such an experience ?
They usually make noise in our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They also have electronic rifles that are being used to stop the movement of our drones , then we no longer receive a video signal .
Sometimes they try to interfere and pass on fake information .
What role do drones play in RF / “ separatists ” operations ?
Reconnaissance and bombing with VOG-17 ammunition ( depending on the type of the drone ) are mainly carried out .
They often use Chinese models .
Also used for the correction of artillery .
They have the night vision ability and therefore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Such drones , like in Bayraktar , have not yet been used in Donbass yet .
Methods of distinguishing separatists from the civilian mass ?
Do they act alone or in teams , do they have exceptional looks or clothes ?
They mostly wear Russian uniforms , however , they live not only in the trenches , but also inside the buildings near where the civilians live .
During rallies or other demonstrations , do separatists “ fuel ” the crowd or do they only act as observers / information gatherers / security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take an active part in them , usually disguising themselves as civilians .
Weapons used by the separatists ?
Is it RF charity ( old model ) or new model armament being tested in battle conditions ?
Usually it is both old and new or experimental models of weapons .
For the Russian Federation , Ukraine is a testing ground for testing new weapons and weapon models .
You can see more about the weapons used by RF in Donbas here : Is the intensity of the battle influenced by RF / UKR @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation , usually it is not the case .
Is there a rotation of forces ( not in the positions , but on the battlefield ) and if so , for how long do the shifts last ?
Usually every three months , separatists rotate their companies within the battalion , it continues for 2-3 days .
Usually two companies are active in the battalion , and one remains in reserve and usually rests in the cities or trains in the rear training grounds .
At the brigade level , each battalion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations do they perform ?
Are the operations targeted only at civilians or also at the UKR army ?
These are mainly conducted through the mass media that spread the fake news , it is applied for both the civilian population and the Ukrainian army .
Is there persecution / intimidation of family members of UKR forces ?
It was the case in 2014 , but it is no longer the case .
What are the possible ways of providing Class I equipment ( food , water ) ?
Is the support provided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the locals ?
Most of the time everything comes from RF , but there are local volunteers who organize the supply .
Is it possible to identify that it operates under some kind of standard operating procedures ?
Yes , in reality everything is based on standard Soviet tactics .
Do they use anti-aircraft defence systems ?
If yes , what type ?
Yes , they use all the Soviet and Russian systems that you can find on Google .
Before the Minsk peace agreements , our drones were usually shot with their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more fun case was when our drone was shot down with the OSA system .
The value of our drone was $ 10,000 , and the value of one of their rockets fired was $ 50,000 dollars .
Does it feel that there may be infiltrators / information providers to the separatists in the UKR forces ?
Yes , and there are many situations like this .
However , I will not go into details in public here , but such situations can also be exploited .
Is mining done manually or mechanically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out according to the doctrine or it ’ s unpredictable – without mining sheets and the mining steps ?
It is mostly done manually , as there is a big risk of losing the transport during the process .
The most commonly used are POM-2 anti-infantry mines .
How is the communication between separatist units and within the unit carried out ?
Mobile phones , radio stations , landline telephony , internet , commercial messaging apps ?
They use all of that .
They use secured connection systems , change diapasons , numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like the American Harris system .
Between positions they use the Soviet lines of connection TA57 .
They also use the Chinese radio stations , but do not transmit information through them , it is mostly for signaling .
They have the internet , they also get secured information through it .
How important is artillery in RF/separatists operations ?
Are the artillery adjusters local or do they come from RF ?
When firing artillery , do they use shooting landmarks ( churches , tall buildings and etc . )
and is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come to hold their exams in Ukraine .
Local artillerists complete the courses with RF soldiers .
They mostly use just maps and drones .
Do they use snipers and what is their role ?
We saw a video with FSB sniper in contact line .
Can you feel when professionals are working and when “ tractor driver – separatist ” Now about 80 percent of all deaths are from sniper bullets .
Artillery is used more for psychological effects .
In 2014 , there were a lot of “ snipers ” with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experience .
Now snipers are professionals and mostly come from RF , mostly with new weapons .
They usually work at nights , have night vision systems ( can see up to 1 km at night ) .
Depending on the operation , different calibers are used .
They do not come from ordinary battalions , but are instead assigned to individual reconnaissance battalions , very well prepared .
If we talk about snipers from GRU and special forces , they use British armaments ( Accuracy International ) , American scopes , operate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation , they have other rifles ( including anti-drone ) , use their drones for reconnaissance ( to determine distances to positions ) .
We estimate that the value of the equipment alone is 40 thousand dollars .
They are commonly used after receiving some information from separatists , are invited to conduct assignments .
Operations take about 1-3 days , can be up to a week .
In 2019 , we destroyed such a group of snipers , I also participated in that operation .
At night , the drone spotted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ glowing missile , and the unit destroyed them with all the weapons at hand .

Interview with Ukrainian officer is taken by Lithuanian partisans of infosphere Locked N’ Loaded. Article prepared for publishing by InformNapalm Lithuanian editorial office Res Publica.
The best way to find out about an enemy is to talk to those who fought against him. We had a very interesting conversation with the intelligence and planning commander of one Ukrainian battalion Andrii “Pidlyi”. He agreed to share his thoughts and experiences about the Russian army and the separatists, their capabilities, armaments and tactics.
What kind of people form the core of “separatists”?
Most of them are Ukrainians from Donbas region.
What is the probable morale of the soldiers and the motives for the fight?
At the beginning of the war their goal was to separate and become a part of Russia, now – just a salary without any motivation
How did you assess the combat possibilities of the “separatists” before and after encountering them? Are they gradually improving or regressing?
They changed significantly. In 2014, there were different groups of well prepared Russians and the groups of native separatists without any skills. Now, the structure of separatists consists of Russian officers (mostly) and native separatists, well prepared as Russian instructors work with them thoroughly.
How did you assess the combat possibilities of the Russian Federation forces before and after encountering them? Are they gradually improving or regressing?
I didn’t know exactly who was on another side when we had met on the battlefield. Chief positions – battalion commander, brigade commander – are taken by Russians. Mostly “natives” that I met. Better prepared soldiers come from Russia: snipers, artillerists, anti tank units.
Did you see the interaction between RF and “separatists” (fire and maneuver support, control) on the battlefield and how would you assess it?
They are now working as one structure. Because of that, the skills of separatists and Russians in Donbas improved a lot. Russians take all the important positions and control all the processes.
Do you have any knowledge of how the planning of operations works? Are they planning them on their own or are they getting tasks straight down from RF?
It depends on the operation, of course, but most often the whole planning comes from Russia. For example, the local battalion commanders represent a formal position only, as each unit has an assigned officer from Russia who oversees everything.
Is command and control centralized or decentralized? What role does the FSB / GRU play at the tactical level? What decision-making power and freedom do local commanders have? Would the removal of the commanders disrupt the rhythm of the battle?
Command in the separatist army is centralized. The FSB performs the same functions as in Russia, they are usually intermediaries between the local separatist government and Russia. Changing commanders is not a problem and commanders change quite often due to the death or conflict of interest, but this does not affect the course of the battle, as the motivation is money.
What are you able to say about the combat training of “separatists” (in-depth defense and in the line of contact)?
They are really very well prepared and the discipline is high. Currently, they are not inferior to Ukrainian soldiers. The Russians have passed the compulsory training in Russia, while the local battalions usually have training sites 5-15 km away and the training is taking place there on a regular basis.
Do “separatists” carry on long range reconnaissance? What is their composition and at what distance from their forces do they operate ? Are they covered by indirect fire?
Long-range reconnaissance is rare. Battalion reconnaissance patrols usually do not go further than 5 km in depth, it is usually covered by the Russian artillery and air reconnaissance.
A different thing is the special forces coming from Russia, which take exams in Donbas. They have their tasks when they look for places where they can pass through the lines of defense, they go far away, they come to the positions and kidnap or kill a Ukrainian soldier in them. The similar case is with artillery, FSB groups, snipers. They have their own separate tasks and don’t stay long.
Describe a standard RF / “separatist” reconnaissance team (size, tasks, armament, combat support, size of operation area, tactical principles)
The reccy group consists of 1-2 sections, but as I previously mentioned, the tasks of the local separatists and the Russian military are different. Russian intelligence operates within the distance of up to 10 km, with the most common tasks being to mine roads or capturing prisoners. Separatist intelligence usually performs the functions of guarding command posts, and sometimes operates within a distance of up to 5 km to locate Ukrainian forces in a particular area.
Describe a standard RF / “separatist” attack operation (size, tasks, armament, combat support, size of operation area, tactical principles)
There have been no major separatist attacks in the last few years. Most of what is done is an attack on the position of the section or platoon base, but such decisions are not supported by Russian troops and it happens chaotically. If we take 2014 as an example, then the offensive planned by the Russian Federation was carried out as part of brigades with the involvement of all available forces and means and was managed from the Russian Federation.
Describe RF / “separatists” in defense (size, tasks, armament, combat support, size of operation area, tactical principles)
The structure of the separatists is identical to the Russian one. Two army corps consisting of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections. Most positions consist of sections that are at a certain distance from each other. Their tasks are to carry out defense and install engineering barriers. They are well disguised, know how to camouflage well and sometimes test new technologies in the Russian army.
Do they carry out echoloning and do they have reserve left behind?
Yes, in each battalion they traditionally have a system of two echelons of trenches and an additional reserve.
Describe RF / “separatists” in a march
There are not as many of them as in 2014. About every 9-10 months the battalions rotate and each works a little differently. However, the battalions remain in the same positions and do not make a lot of movements. As for mobile groups, they are destroyed by our artillery and / or armored groups, so they do not have much opportunity to move around.
How do you assess RF / “separatists” logistics?
They are very well prepared and can last for a very long time without any replenishment. We estimate that stocks of fuel and ammunition will last for about 5 more years to come.
Have you come across RF EW tools and what can you say about such an experience?
They usually make noise in our communication systems to make communication more difficult. They also have electronic rifles that are being used to stop the movement of our drones, then we no longer receive a video signal. Sometimes they try to interfere and pass on fake information.
What role do drones play in RF / “separatists” operations ?
Reconnaissance and bombing with VOG-17 ammunition (depending on the type of the drone) are mainly carried out. They often use Chinese models. Also used for the correction of artillery. They have the night vision ability and therefore conduct reconnaissance at night as well. Such drones, like in Bayraktar, have not yet been used in Donbass yet.
Methods of distinguishing separatists from the civilian mass? Do they act alone or in teams, do they have exceptional looks or clothes?
They mostly wear Russian uniforms, however, they live not only in the trenches, but also inside the buildings near where the civilians live.
During rallies or other demonstrations, do separatists “fuel” the crowd or do they only act as observers / information gatherers / security?
During rallies or demonstrations, separatists take an active part in them, usually disguising themselves as civilians.
Weapons used by the separatists? Is it RF charity (old model) or new model armament being tested in battle conditions?
Usually it is both old and new or experimental models of weapons. For the Russian Federation, Ukraine is a testing ground for testing new weapons and weapon models. You can see more about the weapons used by RF in Donbas here: https://bit.ly/2K5Ndgj
Is the intensity of the battle influenced by RF / UKR / international holidays?
It depends on the situation, usually it is not the case.
Is there a rotation of forces (not in the positions, but on the battlefield) and if so, for how long do the shifts last?
Usually every three months, separatists rotate their companies within the battalion, it continues for 2-3 days. Usually two companies are active in the battalion, and one remains in reserve and usually rests in the cities or trains in the rear training grounds. At the brigade level, each battalion also rotates.
What type of psychological operations do they perform? Are the operations targeted only at civilians or also at the UKR army?
These are mainly conducted through the mass media that spread the fake news, it is applied for both the civilian population and the Ukrainian army.
Is there persecution / intimidation of family members of UKR forces?
It was the case in 2014, but it is no longer the case.
What are the possible ways of providing Class I equipment (food, water)? Is the support provided only by RF forces or also by the locals?
Most of the time everything comes from RF, but there are local volunteers who organize the supply.
Is it possible to identify that it operates under some kind of standard operating procedures?
Yes, in reality everything is based on standard Soviet tactics.
Do they use anti-aircraft defence systems? If yes, what type?
Yes, they use all the Soviet and Russian systems that you can find on Google.
Before the Minsk peace agreements, our drones were usually shot with their rifles and machine guns. But the more fun case was when our drone was shot down with the OSA system. The value of our drone was $10,000, and the value of one of their rockets fired was $50,000 dollars.
Does it feel that there may be infiltrators / information providers to the separatists in the UKR forces?
Yes, and there are many situations like this. However, I will not go into details in public here, but such situations can also be exploited.
Is mining done manually or mechanically? Is the mining of positions carried out according to the doctrine or it’s unpredictable – without mining sheets and the mining steps?
It is mostly done manually, as there is a big risk of losing the transport during the process. The most commonly used are POM-2 anti-infantry mines.
How is the communication between separatist units and within the unit carried out? Mobile phones, radio stations, landline telephony, internet, commercial messaging apps?
They use all of that. They use secured connection systems, change diapasons, numbers (every few seconds), much like the American Harris system. Between positions they use the Soviet lines of connection TA57. They also use the Chinese radio stations, but do not transmit information through them, it is mostly for signaling. They have the internet, they also get secured information through it.
How important is artillery in RF/separatists operations? Are the artillery adjusters local or do they come from RF? When firing artillery, do they use shooting landmarks (churches, tall buildings and etc.) and is the fire accurate enough?
Artillerists here also come to hold their exams in Ukraine. Local artillerists complete the courses with RF soldiers. They mostly use just maps and drones.
Do they use snipers and what is their role? We saw a video with FSB sniper in contact line. Can you feel when professionals are working and when “tractor driver – separatist”
Now about 80 percent of all deaths are from sniper bullets. Artillery is used more for psychological effects. In 2014, there were a lot of “snipers” with SVD who didn’t have much experience. Now snipers are professionals and mostly come from RF, mostly with new weapons. They usually work at nights, have night vision systems (can see up to 1 km at night). Depending on the operation, different calibers are used. They do not come from ordinary battalions, but are instead assigned to individual reconnaissance battalions, very well prepared.
If we talk about snipers from GRU and special forces, they use British armaments (Accuracy International), American scopes, operate in pairs or groups. Depending on the situation, they have other rifles (including anti-drone), use their drones for reconnaissance (to determine distances to positions). We estimate that the value of the equipment alone is 40 thousand dollars. They are commonly used after receiving some information from separatists, are invited to conduct assignments. Operations take about 1-3 days, can be up to a week.
In 2019, we destroyed such a group of snipers, I also participated in that operation. At night, the drone spotted their movement, we then launched a glowing missile, and the unit destroyed them with all the weapons at hand.


“Cyber Truce”

On Friday , 25 September , Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement calling for the United States and Russia to create “ a comprehensive program of practical measures to reboot relations in the field of security in the use of information and communication technologies.
” Putin ’ s proposal was otherwise broad and vague .
He mentioned nothing about Russia ’ s well documented misdeeds in cyberspace .
The White House dismissed Putin ’ s proposal in a statement to the New York Times , and Russia-watchers expressed the usual caution , with such tweets as “ The Kremlin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We should take this former KGB officer up on his offer !
” Russian GRU officers are responsible for numerous cyber attacks around the world / source teiss.co.uk Putin is no strategic genius , and the corrupt system he has built in Russia is designed to overlook the logical consequences of his malign behavior .
Putin irrationally states that any cyber or influence operations against the United States must be the work of private , “ patriotic ” Russians and not of the Russian government itself .
First of all , literally nobody @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if someone did , what use would a cyber truce be with the Russian State when the Russian State claims it has has no control over the cyber attacks ?
Putin and his cronies frequently ignore or violate Russia ’ s long-standing treaty commitments ( the Vienna Convention , the UN Charter , and the Budapest Memorandum all come to mind , but there are many others ) , so what is to say that Moscow would abide by this proposed treat of theirs , assuming they could get anyone to take it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself is already codified in Article VI of the Helsinki Final Act on the non-interference in the internal affairs of signatories which Brezhnev himself demanded and then promptly violated repeatedly .
Putin has a well-known reputation for violating that and every other article of the Helsinki agreement .
With this kind of record , why does he expect the United States to trust him not to continue violating their sovereignty .
Why should we trust him not to violate ours ?
InformNapalm has already written about that – “ US charges six Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Putin ’ s calls for a bilateral agreement echo Stalin ’ s approach at Yalta , where he argued for the Great Powers to secure their own interests at the expense of less powerful countries .
Putin is essentially asking the United States to abandon its allies and to cut a separate peace .
State departments of Russian Federation responsible for cyber espionage and attacks / source securityaffairs.co Putin ’ s hypocritical proposal is proof positive that Moscow is behind the ongoing cyber attacks aimed at modern , Western democracies–the very kinds of @ @ @ @ @ @

Illustration: sloanreview.mit.edu
Article prepared by InformNapalm Lithuanian editorial office.
On Friday, 25 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement calling for the United States and Russia to create “a comprehensive program of practical measures to reboot relations in the field of security in the use of information and communication technologies.” Putin’s proposal was otherwise broad and vague. He mentioned nothing about Russia’s well documented misdeeds in cyberspace. The White House dismissed Putin’s proposal in a statement to the New York Times, and Russia-watchers expressed the usual caution, with such tweets as “The Kremlin is trolling us!” and “We should take this former KGB officer up on his offer!”
Russian GRU officers are responsible for numerous cyber attacks around the world / source teiss.co.uk
Putin is no strategic genius, and the corrupt system he has built in Russia is designed to overlook the logical consequences of his malign behavior. Putin irrationally states that any cyber or influence operations against the United States must be the work of private, “patriotic” Russians and not of the Russian government itself. First of all, literally nobody on earth believes this. But even if someone did, what use would a cyber truce be with the Russian State when the Russian State claims it has has no control over the cyber attacks?
Putin and his cronies frequently ignore or violate Russia’s long-standing treaty commitments (the Vienna Convention, the UN Charter, and the Budapest Memorandum all come to mind, but there are many others), so what is to say that Moscow would abide by this proposed treat of theirs, assuming they could get anyone to take it seriously? The spirit of the proposal itself is already codified in Article VI of the Helsinki Final Act on the non-interference in the internal affairs of signatories which Brezhnev himself demanded and then promptly violated repeatedly. Putin has a well-known reputation for violating that and every other article of the Helsinki agreement. With this kind of record, why does he expect the United States to trust him not to continue violating their sovereignty. Why should we trust him not to violate ours?
InformNapalm has already written about that – “US charges six Russian intelligence officers with global hacking attacks”
Putin’s calls for a bilateral agreement echo Stalin’s approach at Yalta, where he argued for the Great Powers to secure their own interests at the expense of less powerful countries. Putin is essentially asking the United States to abandon its allies and to cut a separate peace.
State departments of Russian Federation responsible for cyber espionage and attacks / source securityaffairs.co
Putin’s hypocritical proposal is proof positive that Moscow is behind the ongoing cyber attacks aimed at modern, Western democracies–the very kinds of countries that make him nervous.