informnapalm--2020-08-25--History of Ukraine: The First Modern Ukrainian State.

Some trivia about Ukraine on the 29th anniversary of country ’ s Independence by George V.Pinchuk .
The First Modern Ukrainian State .
Part 6 .
Between January 1905 and December 1907 , the Russian Empire was greatly shaken by its first anti-Monarchist revolution .
Although the Romanov dynasty survived , a parliament , called the State Duma , was formed and began to function .
The first and the second Duma included a Ukrainian faction , led by Illya Shrag , an attorney from Chernihiv .
The Ukrainian MPs included representatives from the right-wing Ukrayinska Narodna Partiya and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , founded by M. Mikhnovsky , was , essentially , a party of wealthy rural landowners , while the UDRP was more of a party of urban intellectuals .
Both were later labeled as “ Nationalist , ” although in fact they were merely in favor of a national autonomy for Ukraine within the “ federalized ” Russian Empire .
The Ukrainian Duma faction worked rather successfully , voting for the abolition of the Valuev Circular and the Ems Ukaz , thus legalizing the use of the Ukrainian language in print and in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MPs , dozens of Ukrainian-language newspapers and magazines began to work .
However , after 1908 , the UNP evolved to the right , absorbing many ideas of D. Dontsov ’ s “ Integral Nationalism , ” while the UDRP merged with Social Democratic parties .
Both became illegal and went to work underground .
Thus , the third and the fourth assemblies of the Duma were not attended by the Ukrainian faction .
The years 1908-1916 in the Russian Empire are often called the “ period of reaction , ” i.e .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ its massive attack on the progressive political movements .
These years , among other phenomena , were marked by a surge of xenophobic anti-Ukrainian activities .
The so-called Union of Michael the Archangel and the so-called Union of the Russian People published numerous books and brochures where Ukraine was called a non-entity and the Ukrainian “ separatism ” was cursed as Mazepian treason of the ideal of unity of Great Russia .
Sadly , some of the notorious Ukrainophobes of the time were ethnic Ukrainians , such as P.I .
Kovalevsky ( a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kovalevsky and Sofia Kovalevska ) , V. Shulgin , A. Storozhenko ( in his youth , a student of the founder of “ Hromada ” V .
Antonovych ! )
, and others .
In February-March 1917 , the Romanov dynasty fell .
In the first days of March , the UDRP , now re-named Tovarystvo Ukrayinskykh Postupovtsiv ( TUP ) came out of the underground and formed a committee with the goal to create a new government of autonomous Ukraine .
On March 7 , 1917 , this government was officially named @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A renowned historian Mykhailo Serhiyovych Hrushevsky was called the Head ( “ Holova ” ) of the Central Rada .
( Today , many Ukrainians call him the first President of independent Ukraine , although in fact his functions were closer to those of the Speaker of the parliament than to those of the chief executive and head of the state . )
Hrushevsky , the author of a fundamental “ History of Ukraine-Rus , ” was a man of colossal erudition and scholarly achievements , but as a politician he was somewhat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ required for the job .
Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Serhiy Efremov were made Hrushevsky ’ s Deputies .
Vynnychenko was a very colorful , eccentric person – a popular writer ( Sci-Fi ) , an artist , a Raw Foodist , a nudist , and a diehard Socialist .
Efremov , the TUP chairperson , was perhaps the only competent politician of the three ; his political views were more to the right .
The Central Rada called Kyiv its capital and chose the former Pavlo Galagan College building as its headquarters .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress , which convened on April 5 , 1917 in Kyiv .
The First Universal ( summary document ) of the first Congress declared Ukraine an autonomy within the federative Russian Republic , on par with other autonomies ( Polish , Finnish , Trans-Caucasian et al. )
.
In parallel , the “ Ukrainized ” units of the crumbling Russian imperial army held their own First Ukrainian Military Congress , which declared primacy of the Ukrainian chain of command over the old Russian imperial one .
However , when Efremov and Vynnychenko met @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Government in St. Petersburg in May 1917 , they were sorely disappointed .
The Provisional Government refused to recognize the Ukrainian autonomy and explicitly forbade the plan to call the Second Ukrainian Military Congress .
In July 1917 the Provisional Government with its new premier Kerensky began to look for a compromise with Ukraine .
The Russian leadership was in dire need of support from Ukraine as it was threatened both from the right ( Gen. Kornilov with his ambitions of a military dictator ) and from the left ( Lenin and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Provisional Government , M. Tereshchenko , an ethnic Ukrainian , came to Kyiv and told the Central Rada that the Russian government does not object against the Ukrainian autonomy , but simply asks the Ukrainians to wait until the appropriate decision will be made by the Constituent Assembly of all the peoples of the former Russian Empire ( planned on January 1918 ) .
The Central Rada was not ready to react uniformly to this dubious proposition .
Endless debates ensued .
To make things worse , about 5,000 Ukrainian military men @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power by force .
They arrested the commander of the Kyiv garrison and started a shootout with the troops loyal to the Provisional Government .
There were rumors ( later proven false ) that Polubotkivtsi want to massacre all ethnic Russians in Kyiv .
To stop the bloodshed , the Central Rada had to mobilize one of its loyal regiments .
Thus began – or , rather , resumed – the sad story of Ukrainians fighting each other .
On November 7 ( old Julian calendar , October 25 ) , 1917 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Provisional Government and established a “ Socialist ” ( actually , a sectarian pseudo-Marxist ) dictatorship .
The Central Rada did not recognize the new government of Russia , stating that the revolution in the former Russian Empire must remain , first and foremost , democratic .
The General Secretariat of the Central Rada issued a special document where the Bolsheviks were called “ the irresponsible people who use the idea of revolution in order to break any order in any organization of the human life.
” In response , the Bolshevik government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Central Rada allows the forming of the so-called Red Guards within its jurisdiction ( which would mean , essentially , a military occupation ) .
Paradoxically , the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets ( Councils ) of Workers ’ , Peasants ’ , and Soldiers ’ Deputies , held in Kyiv in mid-December 1917 and attended by more than 2,000 participants , took the side of the Central Rada .
The hostilities between the two governments further increased when the troops loyal to the Bolsheviks installed a puppet government of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kharkiv on December 24 , 1917 ; on December 30 , this illegal “ government ” declared that “ the Central Rada has been overthrown.
” Finally , when the Bolsheviks forcefully made the Constituent Assembly disband in January 1918 , the Central Rada issued its famous Fourth Universal , where the Ukrainian People ’ s Republic was pronounced a “ State , self-governed and not dependent on any other.
” On January 22 , 1918 , the Bolsheviks attempted their coup-d ’ état , provoking an armed uprising of the Arsenal plant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the help of the Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi , a regiment of highly trained and disciplined troops from Halychyna ( the “ Austrian ” part of Ukraine ) under the command of Colonel Yevhen Konovalets .
Unfortunately , in just 4 days after this significant victory , Kyiv was seized by the Bolshevik army of M. Muravyov , a pathological sadistic Ukrainophobe who organized mass executions of Kyivites .
Up to 3,000 people were massacred in less than one month .
Muravyov ’ s minions killed people for speaking Ukrainian , wearing a Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fled to Zhytomyr , a city west of Kyiv .
Fortunately for the population of Kyiv , the German troops , which occupied Ukraine according to the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk , drove the Muravyov horde out of the city in February .
In spring 1918 , the Central Rada experienced a crisis .
Being overwhelmingly Socialist , it could not solve the problem of land ownership .
The ideology of the parties that sent their representatives to the Central Rada insisted on collective or “ communal ” ownership of the land , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cede what they considered their rightful property .
The German military administration , fearing anarchy , took the landowners ’ side and established local military courts with the prerogative to prevent any seizure of land , which infuriated the poorer part of the Ukrainian peasantry .
While the debates in the Central Rada led nowhere , a new organization of civic activists , called Narodna Hromada , began to work on the idea to replace the uniformly Socialist government by a more conservative ruling coalition .
The NH found a strong support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Skoropadsky , one of the most interesting figures ( in my opinion , the most interesting figure ) of the Ukrainian patriotic movement , became its Chairman .
Pavlo Petrovych Skoropadsky was a descendant of an old Kozak aristocracy .
One of his ancestors , Ivan Illich Skoropadsky , was Hetman of the Left Bank ( Eastern ) Ukraine in 1708-1722 .
Pavlo ’ s father Petro Ivanovych Skoropadsky was a Colonel of the Russian Imperial Guard , and his mother , Maria Andriyivna Myklashevska-Skoropadska , was a daughter of a landlord and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a high-ranking Kozak dynasty .
Pavlo Skoropadsky was born in 1873 in Wiesbaden , Germany , and grew up in Trostyanets , a Skoropadsky family estate in northeastern Ukraine .
He was educated at the elite Imperial Page Corps , a military boarding school exclusively for the children of the highest nobility in St. Petersburg , Russia .
( Incidentally , one of his classmates was Karl Gustav Mannerheim , the future leader of the people of Finland in their struggle for independence . )
During the ill-fated war between Russia and Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a cavalry officer and became a war hero .
He was awarded with an honorary Golden Sword and , in 1905 , became a personal aid-de-camp of the Russian Tzar Nicholas II in the rank of a Colonel .
By that time Pavlo Skoropadsky was married to Oleksandra Durnovo , the daughter of a Russian noble Peter Durnovo and a Ukrainian woman from a Kozak dynasty of the Kochubeys .
The family had 6 children .
Skoropadsky became a General in 1912 .
He continued to distinguish himself as a brave and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fall of the Romanovs , Pavlo Skoropadsky briefly served with the Russian General Kornilov .
It is quite paradoxical that it was during his interactions with a staunch Russian chauvinist Kornilov that Skoropadsky firmly decided that his duty was to serve Ukraine .
As he later wrote in his memoir , Kornilov was in favor of “ Ukrainization ” of the regiments of the Russian army that served in Ukraine .
However , the Russian general understood it in a strictly decorative sense ; to “ Ukrainize ” an army unit was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a Kozak uniform and to give it commands in the “ Small Russian dialect.
” Skoropadsky , on the other hand , began to think about the creation of a real army that would defend real Ukraine and be independent of the commands given by the Russian commanding officers .
In summer and fall 1917 , he sided with the Provisional Government against the rebellious Kornilov .
Pavlo Skoropadsky understood that because of the fear of Kornilov from the right and of the Bolsheviks from the left , the Russian leadership will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the army on the Ukrainian terrain as he would see fit .
By October 1917 , the 34th Army Corps , which included 20 divisions and several reserve regiments , was completely Ukrainized and re-named by Skoropadsky into the 1st Ukrainian Army Corps .
In November , after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia , the units of the 1st Ukrainian Corps showed excellent discipline and bravery in stopping the trains of Bolshevik troops when these crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border .
The Bolshevik armies were at that time quite weakened as they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committees , ” which were , essentially , Anarchist .
They had no desire to fight and , when stopped by the Skoropadsky troops , usually surrendered without even firing a shot .
They were quickly disarmed and sent back to Russia on the same trains .
This campaign made the 44-year old General Skoropadsky popular among the Ukrainian military and civilians as well .
Skoropadsky , however , could not work with the Central Rada .
He despised Socialist ideas and quarreled with the Central Rada ’ s appointee , The Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Secretaries of the Central Rada did not like Skoropadsky because of him being a noble and the owner of enormous agrarian estates .
On December 31 , 1917 Pavlo Skoropadsky resigned from his duties as the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Army Corps and began to live as a private person .
He did not take part in the turmoil of January and February 1918 ; during the Muravyov massacre , he hid in a private residence with a fake ID .
With the advent of the German occupational army , Skoropadsky @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but was greatly encouraged by the above-mentioned Narodna Hromada civic organization .
He became friends with M. Mikhnovsky and V. Lypynsky , the leaders of a conservative Union of Land-Owning Grain Growers .
In March and April , this organization made Pavlo Skoropadsky its chief member and offered him a plan to make him a military dictator of Ukraine .
On April 24 , 1918 , the representatives of the Union met with V. Groener , a German general who served as a spokesman of the Commander of the German occupational army in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Central Rada with its inability to solve the agrarian question should not continue to serve as the government of Ukraine .
On April 26 , the Socialist majority of the Central Rada declared that Ukraine is not willing to supply the German army with food because the occupiers do not show enough respect for the oppressed Ukrainian peasantry .
In response , on April 28 , Gen. Groener sent a platoon of German soldiers who forced the Central Rada to stop the meeting and disband .
On April 29 , the Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , attended by approximately 6,500 activists .
The Congress unanimously voted for Pavlo Petrovych Skoropadsky to become the leader of the Ukrainian state , with the restored ancient title of Hetman .
Essentially , they offered Skoropadsky to become a monarch .
Skoropadsky accepted .
That same day , after the Divine Liturgy celebrated at the St. Sofia Cathedral , the new Hetman was anointed according to the ancient Orthodox Christian ceremony by the Metropolitan Nicodemus .
In the evening , the press published the “ Hramota ” ( Appeal ) of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” where the new ruler wrote that the Socialist majority of the Central Rada failed the Ukrainian people , allowing the country to plunge into anarchy and jeopardizing the cooperation with the German army as stipulated by the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk .
The Hetman ordered the Secretaries of the Central Rada to resign from their positions .
In another document , called “ About the Temporary Structure of the Ukrainian State , ” the Hetman declared his sovereign right to appoint the Otaman ( Prime Minister ) and the Cabinet of Ministers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hramota ” and the other document stressed that private property is a sacred foundation of all order in the life of any state and of all organized forms of the human life .
The Ukrainian People ’ s Republic was officially re-named into the Ukrainian State ( “ Українська Держава ” ) .
2.History of Ukraine : The Princes and the Kozaks 5 .
History of Ukraine : The rise of nationalism in 19th century or two Ukrainian nationalisms Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

Some trivia about Ukraine on the 29th anniversary of country’s Independence by George V.Pinchuk. The First Modern Ukrainian State. Part 6.
Between January 1905 and December 1907, the Russian Empire was greatly shaken by its first anti-Monarchist revolution. Although the Romanov dynasty survived, a parliament, called the State Duma, was formed and began to function. The first and the second Duma included a Ukrainian faction, led by Illya Shrag, an attorney from Chernihiv. The Ukrainian MPs included representatives from the right-wing Ukrayinska Narodna Partiya and a center-left Ukrayinska Demokratychno-Radykalna Partiya. The UNP, founded by M. Mikhnovsky, was, essentially, a party of wealthy rural landowners, while the UDRP was more of a party of urban intellectuals. Both were later labeled as “Nationalist,” although in fact they were merely in favor of a national autonomy for Ukraine within the “federalized” Russian Empire. The Ukrainian Duma faction worked rather successfully, voting for the abolition of the Valuev Circular and the Ems Ukaz, thus legalizing the use of the Ukrainian language in print and in theaters. With the help of Ukrainian MPs, dozens of Ukrainian-language newspapers and magazines began to work. However, after 1908, the UNP evolved to the right, absorbing many ideas of D. Dontsov’s “Integral Nationalism,” while the UDRP merged with Social Democratic parties. Both became illegal and went to work underground. Thus, the third and the fourth assemblies of the Duma were not attended by the Ukrainian faction.
The years 1908-1916 in the Russian Empire are often called the “period of reaction,” i.e. the time when the Romanov autocracy made its massive attack on the progressive political movements. These years, among other phenomena, were marked by a surge of xenophobic anti-Ukrainian activities. The so-called Union of Michael the Archangel and the so-called Union of the Russian People published numerous books and brochures where Ukraine was called a non-entity and the Ukrainian “separatism” was cursed as Mazepian treason of the ideal of unity of Great Russia. Sadly, some of the notorious Ukrainophobes of the time were ethnic Ukrainians, such as P.I. Kovalevsky (a relative of a Ukrainian patriot V.O. Kovalevsky and Sofia Kovalevska), V. Shulgin, A. Storozhenko (in his youth, a student of the founder of “Hromada” V. Antonovych!), and others.
In February-March 1917, the Romanov dynasty fell. In the first days of March, the UDRP, now re-named Tovarystvo Ukrayinskykh Postupovtsiv (TUP) came out of the underground and formed a committee with the goal to create a new government of autonomous Ukraine. On March 7, 1917, this government was officially named the Central Rada (Council). A renowned historian Mykhailo Serhiyovych Hrushevsky was called the Head (“Holova”) of the Central Rada. (Today, many Ukrainians call him the first President of independent Ukraine, although in fact his functions were closer to those of the Speaker of the parliament than to those of the chief executive and head of the state.) Hrushevsky, the author of a fundamental “History of Ukraine-Rus,” was a man of colossal erudition and scholarly achievements, but as a politician he was somewhat an idealist without the “savvy” required for the job. Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Serhiy Efremov were made Hrushevsky’s Deputies. Vynnychenko was a very colorful, eccentric person – a popular writer (Sci-Fi), an artist, a Raw Foodist, a nudist, and a diehard Socialist. Efremov, the TUP chairperson, was perhaps the only competent politician of the three; his political views were more to the right. The Central Rada called Kyiv its capital and chose the former Pavlo Galagan College building as its headquarters.
The Central Rada called the first All-Ukrainian National Congress, which convened on April 5, 1917 in Kyiv. The First Universal (summary document) of the first Congress declared Ukraine an autonomy within the federative Russian Republic, on par with other autonomies (Polish, Finnish, Trans-Caucasian et al.). In parallel, the “Ukrainized” units of the crumbling Russian imperial army held their own First Ukrainian Military Congress, which declared primacy of the Ukrainian chain of command over the old Russian imperial one. However, when Efremov and Vynnychenko met with the representatives of the Russian Provisional Government in St. Petersburg in May 1917, they were sorely disappointed. The Provisional Government refused to recognize the Ukrainian autonomy and explicitly forbade the plan to call the Second Ukrainian Military Congress.
In July 1917 the Provisional Government with its new premier Kerensky began to look for a compromise with Ukraine. The Russian leadership was in dire need of support from Ukraine as it was threatened both from the right (Gen. Kornilov with his ambitions of a military dictator) and from the left (Lenin and his Bolsheviks). A special envoy of the Provisional Government, M. Tereshchenko, an ethnic Ukrainian, came to Kyiv and told the Central Rada that the Russian government does not object against the Ukrainian autonomy, but simply asks the Ukrainians to wait until the appropriate decision will be made by the Constituent Assembly of all the peoples of the former Russian Empire (planned on January 1918). The Central Rada was not ready to react uniformly to this dubious proposition. Endless debates ensued. To make things worse, about 5,000 Ukrainian military men who called themselves Polubotkivtsi attempted to seize power by force. They arrested the commander of the Kyiv garrison and started a shootout with the troops loyal to the Provisional Government. There were rumors (later proven false) that Polubotkivtsi want to massacre all ethnic Russians in Kyiv. To stop the bloodshed, the Central Rada had to mobilize one of its loyal regiments. Thus began – or, rather, resumed – the sad story of Ukrainians fighting each other.
On November 7 (old Julian calendar, October 25), 1917, the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg overthrew the Provisional Government and established a “Socialist” (actually, a sectarian pseudo-Marxist) dictatorship. The Central Rada did not recognize the new government of Russia, stating that the revolution in the former Russian Empire must remain, first and foremost, democratic. The General Secretariat of the Central Rada issued a special document where the Bolsheviks were called “the irresponsible people who use the idea of revolution in order to break any order in any organization of the human life.” In response, the Bolshevik government made an ultimatum to Ukraine, demanding that the Central Rada allows the forming of the so-called Red Guards within its jurisdiction (which would mean, essentially, a military occupation). Paradoxically, the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (Councils) of Workers’, Peasants’, and Soldiers’ Deputies, held in Kyiv in mid-December 1917 and attended by more than 2,000 participants, took the side of the Central Rada. The hostilities between the two governments further increased when the troops loyal to the Bolsheviks installed a puppet government of the “Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic” in Kharkiv on December 24, 1917; on December 30, this illegal “government” declared that “the Central Rada has been overthrown.” Finally, when the Bolsheviks forcefully made the Constituent Assembly disband in January 1918, the Central Rada issued its famous Fourth Universal, where the Ukrainian People’s Republic was pronounced a “State, self-governed and not dependent on any other.”
On January 22, 1918, the Bolsheviks attempted their coup-d’état, provoking an armed uprising of the Arsenal plant workers. The uprising was suppressed with the help of the Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi, a regiment of highly trained and disciplined troops from Halychyna (the “Austrian” part of Ukraine) under the command of Colonel Yevhen Konovalets. Unfortunately, in just 4 days after this significant victory, Kyiv was seized by the Bolshevik army of M. Muravyov, a pathological sadistic Ukrainophobe who organized mass executions of Kyivites. Up to 3,000 people were massacred in less than one month. Muravyov’s minions killed people for speaking Ukrainian, wearing a Ukrainian embroidered shirt etc. The Central Rada fled to Zhytomyr, a city west of Kyiv. Fortunately for the population of Kyiv, the German troops, which occupied Ukraine according to the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, drove the Muravyov horde out of the city in February.
In spring 1918, the Central Rada experienced a crisis. Being overwhelmingly Socialist, it could not solve the problem of land ownership. The ideology of the parties that sent their representatives to the Central Rada insisted on collective or “communal” ownership of the land, but the wealthy landowners had no desire to cede what they considered their rightful property. The German military administration, fearing anarchy, took the landowners’ side and established local military courts with the prerogative to prevent any seizure of land, which infuriated the poorer part of the Ukrainian peasantry. While the debates in the Central Rada led nowhere, a new organization of civic activists, called Narodna Hromada, began to work on the idea to replace the uniformly Socialist government by a more conservative ruling coalition. The NH found a strong support among the patriotic Ukrainian military. Pavlo Skoropadsky, one of the most interesting figures (in my opinion, the most interesting figure) of the Ukrainian patriotic movement, became its Chairman.
Pavlo Petrovych Skoropadsky was a descendant of an old Kozak aristocracy. One of his ancestors, Ivan Illich Skoropadsky, was Hetman of the Left Bank (Eastern) Ukraine in 1708-1722. Pavlo’s father Petro Ivanovych Skoropadsky was a Colonel of the Russian Imperial Guard, and his mother, Maria Andriyivna Myklashevska-Skoropadska, was a daughter of a landlord and a porcelain manufacturer who also came from a high-ranking Kozak dynasty. Pavlo Skoropadsky was born in 1873 in Wiesbaden, Germany, and grew up in Trostyanets, a Skoropadsky family estate in northeastern Ukraine. He was educated at the elite Imperial Page Corps, a military boarding school exclusively for the children of the highest nobility in St. Petersburg, Russia. (Incidentally, one of his classmates was Karl Gustav Mannerheim, the future leader of the people of Finland in their struggle for independence.) During the ill-fated war between Russia and Japan, in 1904, Skoropadsky fought bravely as a cavalry officer and became a war hero. He was awarded with an honorary Golden Sword and, in 1905, became a personal aid-de-camp of the Russian Tzar Nicholas II in the rank of a Colonel. By that time Pavlo Skoropadsky was married to Oleksandra Durnovo, the daughter of a Russian noble Peter Durnovo and a Ukrainian woman from a Kozak dynasty of the Kochubeys. The family had 6 children. Skoropadsky became a General in 1912. He continued to distinguish himself as a brave and competent commanding officer during WW1.
After the fall of the Romanovs, Pavlo Skoropadsky briefly served with the Russian General Kornilov. It is quite paradoxical that it was during his interactions with a staunch Russian chauvinist Kornilov that Skoropadsky firmly decided that his duty was to serve Ukraine. As he later wrote in his memoir, Kornilov was in favor of “Ukrainization” of the regiments of the Russian army that served in Ukraine. However, the Russian general understood it in a strictly decorative sense; to “Ukrainize” an army unit was, for Kornilov, to dress it in a Kozak uniform and to give it commands in the “Small Russian dialect.” Skoropadsky, on the other hand, began to think about the creation of a real army that would defend real Ukraine and be independent of the commands given by the Russian commanding officers. In summer and fall 1917, he sided with the Provisional Government against the rebellious Kornilov. Pavlo Skoropadsky understood that because of the fear of Kornilov from the right and of the Bolsheviks from the left, the Russian leadership will let him do the “Ukrainization” of the army on the Ukrainian terrain as he would see fit. By October 1917, the 34th Army Corps, which included 20 divisions and several reserve regiments, was completely Ukrainized and re-named by Skoropadsky into the 1st Ukrainian Army Corps. In November, after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, the units of the 1st Ukrainian Corps showed excellent discipline and bravery in stopping the trains of Bolshevik troops when these crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border. The Bolshevik armies were at that time quite weakened as they were commanded by the “Soldiers’ Committees,” which were, essentially, Anarchist. They had no desire to fight and, when stopped by the Skoropadsky troops, usually surrendered without even firing a shot. They were quickly disarmed and sent back to Russia on the same trains. This campaign made the 44-year old General Skoropadsky popular among the Ukrainian military and civilians as well.
Skoropadsky, however, could not work with the Central Rada. He despised Socialist ideas and quarreled with the Central Rada’s appointee, The Secretary of Military. On their part, the Secretaries of the Central Rada did not like Skoropadsky because of him being a noble and the owner of enormous agrarian estates. On December 31, 1917 Pavlo Skoropadsky resigned from his duties as the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Army Corps and began to live as a private person. He did not take part in the turmoil of January and February 1918; during the Muravyov massacre, he hid in a private residence with a fake ID. With the advent of the German occupational army, Skoropadsky continued to keep a low profile, but was greatly encouraged by the above-mentioned Narodna Hromada civic organization. He became friends with M. Mikhnovsky and V. Lypynsky, the leaders of a conservative Union of Land-Owning Grain Growers. In March and April, this organization made Pavlo Skoropadsky its chief member and offered him a plan to make him a military dictator of Ukraine. On April 24, 1918, the representatives of the Union met with V. Groener, a German general who served as a spokesman of the Commander of the German occupational army in Ukraine. The two sides agreed that the Central Rada with its inability to solve the agrarian question should not continue to serve as the government of Ukraine. On April 26, the Socialist majority of the Central Rada declared that Ukraine is not willing to supply the German army with food because the occupiers do not show enough respect for the oppressed Ukrainian peasantry. In response, on April 28, Gen. Groener sent a platoon of German soldiers who forced the Central Rada to stop the meeting and disband. On April 29, the Union of Land-Owning Grain Growers had their Congress, attended by approximately 6,500 activists. The Congress unanimously voted for Pavlo Petrovych Skoropadsky to become the leader of the Ukrainian state, with the restored ancient title of Hetman. Essentially, they offered Skoropadsky to become a monarch. Skoropadsky accepted.
That same day, after the Divine Liturgy celebrated at the St. Sofia Cathedral, the new Hetman was anointed according to the ancient Orthodox Christian ceremony by the Metropolitan Nicodemus. In the evening, the press published the “Hramota” (Appeal) of the Hetman to the People of Ukraine,” where the new ruler wrote that the Socialist majority of the Central Rada failed the Ukrainian people, allowing the country to plunge into anarchy and jeopardizing the cooperation with the German army as stipulated by the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Hetman ordered the Secretaries of the Central Rada to resign from their positions. In another document, called “About the Temporary Structure of the Ukrainian State,” the Hetman declared his sovereign right to appoint the Otaman (Prime Minister) and the Cabinet of Ministers. Perhaps most importantly, the “Hramota” and the other document stressed that private property is a sacred foundation of all order in the life of any state and of all organized forms of the human life. The Ukrainian People’s Republic was officially re-named into the Ukrainian State (“Українська Держава”).
(featured photo:Prayer on Kyiv’s Sophia Square after the proclamation of Pavlo Skoropadsky as Hetman of Ukraine, 1918)
Read also:
1.History of Ukraine: The Beginnings
2.History of Ukraine: The Princes and the Kozaks
3.History of Ukraine: The Russian Captivity
4.History of Ukraine: Taras Shevchenko
5. History of Ukraine: The rise of nationalism in 19th century or two Ukrainian nationalisms
By George V. Pinchuk
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-08-28--“Bomb Voronezh”: Russia plans to redeploy Su-34 bombers

It is time to recall the famous Internet meme “ Voronezh will be bombed ” , which vividly describes the relationship between domestic and foreign policy of modern Russia .
The Russian Izvestia media outlet , citing sources in the Russian Defense Ministry , reported that the 47th Composite Air Regiment , equipped with Su-34 bombers , is planned to be relocated to the city of Voronezh in October .
The plan is to transfer these bombers to the airfield with an unusual for Russia name “ Baltimore ” , which is located 5 kilometres from the center of Voronezh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ volunteer community , based on careful analysis and open source intelligence , identified 116 officers and crew members of the Russian Aerospace Forces who participated in the bombing of Syria , killing thousands of civilians , women and children .
Among them there were 8 officers from the crews of Su-34 bombers of the 47th Composite Air Regiment .
This data was presented in an infographic and translated into 13 languages .
Notably , the publication of this data in 2016 caused hysteria in the Russian media , which called it a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible that these officers currently continue to serve in the Russian Aerospace Forces and could be deployed to bomb the territory of Ukraine if the Russian aggression in the Donbas evolves into a full-scale Russian invasion .
The members of these crews gained combat experience in Syria and have already demonstrated their readiness to carry out the Kremlin ’ s criminal orders .
Read also These Su-34 Pilots Could Bomb Ukraine after Coming Back from Syria .
Read more from InformNapalm and share • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russian Federation in occupied Donbas Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi .
Edited by Max Alginin .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

It is time to recall the famous Internet meme “Voronezh will be bombed”, which vividly describes the relationship between domestic and foreign policy of modern Russia.
The Russian Izvestia media outlet, citing sources in the Russian Defense Ministry, reported that the 47th Composite Air Regiment, equipped with Su-34 bombers, is planned to be relocated to the city of Voronezh in October. The plan is to transfer these bombers to the airfield with an unusual for Russia name “Baltimore”, which is located 5 kilometres from the center of Voronezh.
In 2016, the InformNapalm international volunteer community, based on careful analysis and open source intelligence, identified 116 officers and crew members of the Russian Aerospace Forces who participated in the bombing of Syria, killing thousands of civilians, women and children. Among them there were 8 officers from the crews of Su-34 bombers of the 47th Composite Air Regiment.
This data was presented in an infographic and translated into 13 languages.
(Click on the image to zoom in)
Notably, the publication of this data in 2016 caused hysteria in the Russian media, which called it a “leak of classified information.”
It is possible that these officers currently continue to serve in the Russian Aerospace Forces and could be deployed to bomb the territory of Ukraine if the Russian aggression in the Donbas evolves into a full-scale Russian invasion. The members of these crews gained combat experience in Syria and have already demonstrated their readiness to carry out the Kremlin’s criminal orders.
Read also These Su-34 Pilots Could Bomb Ukraine after Coming Back from Syria.
Read more from InformNapalm and share
Translated by Andrii Gryganskyi. Edited by Max Alginin. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-08-29--Russia Repeating Its Ukrainian Scenario of Hybrid Aggression in Belarus

We republish the analytical review first published on the magazine website on August 25 , 2020 .
The analytical review was prepared by , editor of the Belarusian version of InformNapalm international initiative ’ s website editors added links to supporting OSINT studies and images to complement the article .
The events of the past months in Belarus are starting to resemble Russia ’ s direct meddling with Ukraine in 2004-2005 and 2013-2014 .
There is a persistent apprehension of Russia ’ s making use of its Ukrainian scenario of hybrid aggression in Belarus adjusted for the Belarusian specifics .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ focused chiefly on re-electing dictator Lukashenka , gave rise to processes that may remove the Belarusian state from the world map .
The underpinnings for that were laid two years ago by the Russian intelligence services operating legally based on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ’ offices in Belarus .
Mikhail Babich , Russia ’ s ambassador to Belarus , who has been close to KGB and FSB throughout his work life , has been enjoying broad opportunities for supporting the political warfare actions in Belarus initiated by the Russian foreign intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activities , recruiting some high-ranking military and public officials , regional and business leaders , as well as opinion leaders representing Belarus ’ civil society .
As a member of Russia ’ s Security Council , Mikhail Babich took part in launching the special operation to occupy the Crimea .
This fact urged Kyiv to reject him as Russia ’ s potential ambassador to Ukraine .
However , Minsk has been more conciliatory in dealing with this “ ambassador of war.
” Over the past two years , the Russian Embassy in Belarus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces ( ex GRU ) , Russia ’ s Foreign Intelligence Service ( SVR ) and Federal Security Service ( FSB ) .
While staying in Belarus , they were able to develop all potential scenarios of forcing Lukashenka ’ s regime to fully integrate Belarus into the so-called Union State .
To do so , Russia needs to weaken Lukashenka ’ s regime as much as possible , create conditions for the resumption of his international isolation , to make the dictator @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessary , transfer the power from him to another pro-Russian figure in a controlled manner .
Russia ’ s influence agents at all tiers of Belarus ’ government system play an essential role in making this scenario come true .
Evidently , Lukashenka ’ s August 2020 re-election campaign was chosen to deliver the critical blow .
In May , three months earlier , three new opponents to the regime appeared from nowhere ; they have never taken part in the political process before , nor have they ever claimed the highest office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this “ new opposition ” have links to the Russian Federation in some way .
It bears mentioning that neither Belarusian national democracy matters nor issues of the national development or support to the strengthening of the ethnic identity are on the agenda .
Valery Tsapkala , who has not been registered as a presidential candidate , started his professional life as an officer of the USSR Embassy to Finland that had been filled to the brim with agents of KGB ’ s First Chief Directorate—the predecessor of Russia ’ s Foreign Intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he maintained close ties with Valery Skurlatov , a Russian far-right Black Hundred functionary .
Together with him , he used to be a member of Russia ’ s Revival Party , aiming at restoring the USSR in its 1945 borders .
A fortnight before the end of the electoral campaign , Tsapkala fled to Russia and wrote an open letter to Putin asking him to support a “ free presidential election ” and defending Russian militants detained in Belarus .
Russian media are quite active in covering his political activity .
Valery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contender for a leading role in the new opposition .
Siarhei Tsikhanouski , a businessman , is yet another Lukashenka ’ s new opponent with presidential ambitions .
Holding his core assets in Russia , he suddenly became active in Belarus media in March 2019 , with Mikhail Babich still in his chair in the Russian Embassy in Minsk .
His first video published on YouTube channel immediately gathered dozens of thousands of views , a potential pointer to the targeted funding of the channel .
Being totally unknown politically , he starts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition .
Unprecedentedly , Tsikhanouski starts claiming the highest office in the state to himself within a year .
established as a fact that Siarhei Tsikhanouski visited Ukraine ’ s temporarily occupied territory in Crimea unlawfully in 2017 and produced a video claiming that Belarus has always been a part of the so-called “ Russian world.
” His wife , Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya , who mobilized all of Belarus ’ protest potential , has become Lukashenka ’ s primary opponent .
It was catalyzed by a special services ’ provocation against her husband , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since May 2020 .
The joint headquarters of the “ new opposition ” that came into existence around her as the only registered presidential candidate has made use of her husband ’ s social capital to the fullest .
Tsikhanouskaya has always been claiming the purely technical nature of her candidacy .
On August 11 , she also left Belarus ; she is currently physically separated from the joint headquarters .
Her statements pacified the hitherto radical mass protests .
Despite Tsikhanouskaya ’ s openly referring to Russia as the “ big brother @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is possible that she would support the materialization of the native Belarusian scenario , given the appropriate influence of international actors .
Viktаr Babaryka , Lukashenka ’ s yet another emerging opponent with presidential ambitions , is directly affiliated with Russia ’ s strategically important Gazprom—for twenty years , he was the chief executive Belgazprombank , its Belarusian subsidiary .
Babaryka was the chief executive officer of an entity whose profits funded , for instance , Russia ’ s military aggression in Georgia , Ukraine , and Syria .
With the help of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure to bear on Belarus directly in the energy sector .
In 2010 , Russia waged a full-fledged information war against the Lukashenka regime , relying on Gazprom and its Gazprom-Media Holding subsidiary ( NTV channel ) .
This campaign resulted in TV series that urged people to take part in mass protests against the regime in December 2010 after the so-called “ presidential election.
” At that time , the Russian Federation aimed at putting an end to the rapprochement of the Republic of Belarus with the EU dangerous to the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Customs Union , and forcing Minsk to join the Common Economic Space .
Lukashenka ’ s engagement of the repressive mechanism , brutal dispersal of protesters on December 19 , 2010 , arrests , and criminal prosecution of hundreds of people throughout the country resulted in the international isolation of his regime .
Russia ’ s goals and objectives have been met fully .
Besides , Russia has gained strategic control over Belarus ’ gas transit system , and become the country ’ s sole creditor and energy supplier .
Belarus ’ foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respects , with the country ’ s almost becoming a Russian protectorate .
Ten years later , Russia is using the “ presidential election ” in Belarus in a similar fashion , trying to attain its current geopolitical goals .
Direct agents of Russian influence pervading the entire public governance system in Belarus provide assistance .
On August 9-12 , 2020 , the whole world was shocked by the outright terror applied by the security forces against the civilian population of Belarus .
By now , the deaths of at least three protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officially .
These are Aliaksandr Taraikouski from Minsk , Aliaksandr Vikhor from Homel , and Henadz Shutau from Brest .
Hundreds of people suffered gunshot wounds or injuries caused by grenade blasts .
About 7,000 people were apprehended across the country , and a lot of them were subjected to torture and abuse .
Many of them were treated in inhumane conditions , with 50 people held in four-person cells .
The deaths , a large number of wounded , the completely unmotivated brutality of units of the Ministry of Interior , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detainees in the early days triggered large-scale nationwide peaceful protests , unprecedented for Belarus .
There is evidence that even the elite Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Belarus were involved in punitive operations against the protesters .
In other words , even the army was sent against civilians .
While dozens of thousands of people protested in the early days , the number of protesters grew by a factor of ten after this outburst of outright terror against civilians .
It was also one of the contributing factors to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the regime ’ s actions demonstrates that the processes of inhibiting the threat created for it are clearly taking place under Russian control .
As in 2010 , after some thaw in relations with the West , Lukashenka ’ s rhetoric has changed completely , with accusations of interference from Poland , Czechia , the United States , and the United Kingdom .
Apparently , fears of the growing potential of the peaceful Belarusian protest , barricades in Minsk ’ s streets , street clashes in several cities at once , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s regime to seek help from Russia .
He also handed over the militants from Wagner private military company detained earlier to Russia .
According to the official version offered by Belarusian investigators , this proxy formation of the General Directorate of the Russian army ’ s General Staff was sent to destabilize the situation in the country .
The hand-over of Wagner militants took place despite the significant damage to relations with Ukraine , which demanded their extradition .
Many people in Ukraine perceived the hand-over as an openly hostile move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side with Russia as the aggressor state .
For the first time , Ukraine has recalled its ambassador from Belarus for consultations .
At the same time , the EU foreign ministers have decided to impose sanctions on those involved in the crackdown on protests and the falsification of “ election ” results in Belarus .
On August 12 , the InformNapalm community detected a flight of two Tupolev-134AK aircraft owned by Russia ’ s Aerospace Forces to Belarus .
These two VIP class airplanes usually transport Russian military officers ranking at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Deputy Minister of Defense , together with service staff .
On August 16 , Russia officially made it known to Lukashenka that it was ready to support solving the issues based on the so-called Union State Treaty or in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization , should the need arise .
A special Tupolev-204/2014VPU flight landed in Minsk National Airport on the evening of August 18 .
It has been ascertained that this aircraft is operated by the Russia Special Air Squadron of the Russian Presidential Office .
It is equipped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was custom-built for Russia ’ s Federal Security Service .
Russia Special Air Squadron transports primarily the highest officials of Russia ’ s government .
It means that both the Federal Security Service director and members of Putin ’ s office staff could have come to Minsk for urgent negotiations .
Ilyushin IL-76MD military transport plane made several suspicious flights between Russia and Belarus The above circumstances demonstrate that Russia is engaged in intensive talks with Lukashenka , and is advising him at the highest level .
It is well within the realm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military specialists , advisers , and political technologists to Belarus to engage in crisis management .
It may well be the explanation of the sudden mass rallies supportive of Lukashenka held throughout Belarus for the first time since 1994 .
In terms of their spirit , form , and nature , they resemble the Anti-Maidan rallies held to mobilize Yanukovych ’ s supporters and oppose the Revolution of Dignity Rally participants both in Minsk and in the regions were delivered en masse from various regions of Belarus .
Symbols of the ( pro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NOD ) and official flags of Russia have been displayed prominently at the rallies .
Lukashenka ’ s appearance in the center of Minsk in combat gear with an AKS machine gun against the backdrop of special forces and internal troops engaged in the particularly ferocious crackdown on peaceful protests puts him for practical purposes among Kremlin-controlled Russian field commanders , like Kadyrov or exterminated Zakharchenko .
Probably , this is yet another product of the Russian political technologists , so keen earlier on creating a superhero image for Putin .
In any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
At the same time , the Kremlin strategists are trying to artificially inflame the civil unrest in Belarus and initiate the use of force on behalf of the part of society supportive of Lukashenka .
Russia acted in a similar fashion in Ukraine both during and between the last two revolutions .
Materials published by InformNapalm international community on the basis of the unearthed correspondence between the architects of the so-called Russian Spring—Vladislav Surkov , head of Putin ’ s office , see SurkovLeaks , and Kirill Frolov , a representative of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , see FrolovLeaks , —describe the entire mechanism of the application of this element of the hybrid war by Russia .
Meanwhile , the striking journalists and technical specialists of the Belarusian TV and Radio Company have already been replaced by several groups of Russian information warfare experts .
RT , one of the key Russian propaganda outlets , is already streaming live the pro-Lukashenka rallies .
Evidently , establishing control over the information and socio-political domain of Belarus is among Russia ’ s priorities at this stage .
So far , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who would defend the Kremlin ’ s interests and represent it .
Thus , Russia can make use of the available potential to establish a pseudo-pro-Democracy opposition movement similar to the ( pro ) Russian Opposition Platform for Life party in Ukraine to exert influence .
Such a movement can emerge from the bowels of the “ new opposition.
” Obviously , taking Belarus ’ public governance system and uniformed agencies under control is Russia ’ s primary goal .
As in 2010 , Russia also intends to gain full access to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
At the moment , both the Lukashenka regime and the Russian media run simultaneous information warfare and psychological operations to create perceived threat from the NATO and , first of all , Poland , purportedly seeking to take over territory in the west of Belarus .
The Belarusian Army has already committed substantial forces and resources to Hrodna Oblast in order to counter this bogus threat .
Media are conditioning the public opinion in both Belarus and Russia for a probable Russian invasion of the country .
These activities create opportunities for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turn , it will be used to justify the use of Russian troops in Belarus on the basis of the Union State commitments or the implementation of the Collective Security Treaty provisions .
Obviously , the Lukashenka regime can resort to these tactics if it loses control over the situation in the country .
Notably , the Russian army has already formed a single offensive line near the border between Ukraine and Belarus .
The shock formations of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Army of the Russian army have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The military equipment in field camps near the city of Klintsi , Bryansk region , and in the city Yelnya , Smolensk region , is in full combat readiness , being located next to the main routes leading to Belarus .
The second line comprises units of the 1st Armored Army , Russia ’ s main armored fist .
At this moment , Russia has , unfortunately , at its disposal all the forces and resources capable of establishing full control over Belarus .
Russia ’ s principal geostrategic goal is to fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Russia with a view to incorporating Ukraine ’ s occupied territories .
The firm will and wisdom of the Belarusian people can forestall these developments—they can , and they must turn their own scenario into reality and make their own existential choice .
Undoubtedly , powerful external actors , such as the EU member states , the USA , the UK , Russia , and the PRC , will be highly active in trying to influence their choice and playing on the political chessboard of Belarus .
Changes in Belarus drastically affect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continent .

We republish the analytical review first published on the Ukrainian Tyzhden (Week) magazine website on August 25, 2020. The analytical review was prepared by Dzianis Ivashyn, editor of the Belarusian version of InformNapalm international initiative’s website
InformNapalm’s editors added links to supporting OSINT studies and images to complement the article.
The events of the past months in Belarus are starting to resemble Russia’s direct meddling with Ukraine in 2004-2005 and 2013-2014. There is a persistent apprehension of Russia’s making use of its Ukrainian scenario of hybrid aggression in Belarus adjusted for the Belarusian specifics.
The latest electoral campaign in Belarus, was supposed to “elegantly” re-elect dictator Lukashenka, triggered processes that may remove the Belarusian state from the world map. The underpinnings for that were laid two years ago by the Russian intelligence services operating from the Russian diplomatic missions in Belarus.
Base of Operations
Mikhail Babich, Russia’s ambassador to Belarus, who has been close to KGB and FSB throughout his work life, has been enjoying broad opportunities for supporting the political warfare actions in Belarus initiated by the Russian foreign intelligence service since 2018. They included HUMINT activities, recruiting some high-ranking military and public officials, regional and business leaders, as well as opinion leaders representing Belarus’ civil society.
As a member of Russia’s Security Council, Mikhail Babich took part in launching the special operation to occupy the Crimea. This fact urged Kyiv to reject him as Russia’s potential ambassador to Ukraine. However, Minsk has been more conciliatory in dealing with this “ambassador of war.”
Mikhail Babich and Vladislav Surkov / Photo by: premier.gov.ru
Over the past two years, the Russian Embassy in Belarus has been teeming with officers from the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (ex GRU), Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Federal Security Service (FSB). While staying in Belarus, they were able to develop all potential scenarios of forcing Lukashenka’s regime to fully integrate Belarus into the so-called Union State.
To do so, Russia needs to weaken Lukashenka’s regime as much as possible, push him deeper into international isolation, make the dictator himself exceedingly toxic, and, if necessary, orchestrate the power transfer from him to another pro-Russian figure in a controlled manner. Russia’s influence agents at all tiers of Belarus’ government system play an essential role in making this scenario come true.
“New Opposition”
Evidently, Lukashenka’s August 2020 re-election campaign was chosen to deliver the critical blow. In May, three months earlier, three new opponents to the regime appeared from nowhere; they have never taken part in the political process before, nor have they ever claimed the highest office in the state. All personalities in this “new opposition” have links to the Russian Federation in some way. It bears mentioning that neither Belarusian national democracy matters nor issues of the national development or support to the strengthening of the ethnic identity are on the agenda.
Valery Tsapkalo, who has not been registered as a presidential candidate, started his professional life as an officer of the USSR Embassy to Finland that had been filled with agents of KGB’s First Chief Directorate—the predecessor of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. For a long time, he maintained close ties with Valery Skurlatov, a Russian far-right Black Hundred functionary. Together with him, he used to be a member of Russia’s Revival Party, aiming at restoring the USSR in its 1945 borders.
A fortnight before the end of the electoral campaign, Tsapkala fled to Russia and wrote an open letter to Putin asking him to support a “free presidential election” and defending Russian militants detained in Belarus. Russian media are quite active in covering his political activity. Valery Tsapkala can be identified as the main contender for a leading role in the new opposition.
Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a businessman, is yet another Lukashenka’s new opponent with presidential ambitions. Holding his core assets in Russia, he suddenly became active in Belarus media in March 2019, with Mikhail Babich still in his chair in the Russian Embassy in Minsk. His first video published on Country for Life YouTube channel immediately gathered dozens of thousands of views, a potential pointer to the targeted funding of the channel. Being totally unknown politically, he starts meeting with leaders of the Belarusian mainstream opposition. Unprecedentedly, Tsikhanouski starts claiming the highest office in the state to himself within a year.
InformNapalm International Intelligence Community established as a fact that Siarhei Tsikhanouski visited Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territory in Crimea unlawfully in 2017 and produced a video claiming that Belarus has always been a part of the so-called “Russian world.”
His wife, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who mobilized all of Belarus’ protest potential, has become Lukashenka’s primary opponent. It was catalyzed by a special services’ provocation against her husband, who has been held in pretrial custody since May 2020. The joint headquarters of the “new opposition” that came into existence around her as the only registered presidential candidate has made use of her husband’s social capital to the fullest. Tsikhanouskaya has always been claiming the purely technical nature of her candidacy. On August 11, she also left Belarus; she is currently physically separated from the joint headquarters. Her statements pacified the hitherto radical mass protests.
Despite Tsikhanouskaya’s openly referring to Russia as the “big brother” and her pro-Russian rhetoric, it is possible that she would support the materialization of the native Belarusian scenario, given the appropriate influence of international actors.
Viktаr Babaryka, Lukashenka’s yet another emerging opponent with presidential ambitions, is directly affiliated with Russia’s strategically important Gazprom—for twenty years, he was the chief executive Belgazprombank, its Belarusian subsidiary. Babaryka was the chief executive officer of an entity whose profits funded, for instance, Russia’s military aggression in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. With the help of Belgazprombank, Russia was able to bring pressure to bear on Belarus directly in the energy sector.
In 2010, Russia waged a full-fledged information war against the Lukashenka regime, relying on Gazprom and its Gazprom-Media Holding subsidiary (NTV channel). This campaign resulted in The Godfather TV series that urged people to take part in mass protests against the regime in December 2010 after the so-called “presidential election.” At that time, the Russian Federation aimed at putting an end to the rapprochement of the Republic of Belarus with the EU dangerous to the Russian interests, intensifying the development of the Customs Union, and forcing Minsk to join the Common Economic Space.
Lukashenka’s reliance on the repressive mechanism, brutal crackdown on protesters on December 19, 2010, arrests, and criminal prosecution of hundreds of people throughout the country resulted in the international isolation of his regime. Russia’s goals and objectives have been met fully. Besides, Russia has gained strategic control over Belarus’ gas transit system, and become the country’s sole creditor and energy supplier. Belarus’ foreign policy became subservient to Russia in many respects, with the country’s almost becoming a Russian protectorate.
Coerced Integration
Ten years later, Russia is using the “presidential election” in Belarus in a similar fashion, trying to attain its current geopolitical goals. Direct agents of Russian influence pervading the entire public governance system in Belarus provide assistance.
On August 9-12, 2020, the whole world was shocked by the outright terror unleashed by the security forces against the civilian population of Belarus. By now, the deaths of at least three protesters against the dictatorial regime have been confirmed officially. These are Aliaksandr Taraikouski from Minsk, Aliaksandr Vikhor from Homel, and Henadz Shutau from Brest. Hundreds of people suffered gunshot wounds or injuries caused by grenade blasts. About 7,000 people were apprehended across the country, and a lot of them were subjected to torture and abuse. Many of them were treated in inhumane conditions, with 50 people held in four-person cells.
Unprovoked massive brutality of police units leading to deaths of protesters and a large number of wounded, the failure to provide information to relatives of detainees in the early days triggered large-scale nationwide peaceful protests, unprecedented for Belarus. There is evidence that even the elite Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Belarus were involved in punitive operations against the protesters. In other words, even the army was sent against civilians.
While dozens of thousands of people protested in the early days, the number of protesters grew by a factor of ten after this outburst of outright terror against civilians. It was also one of the contributing factors to the broad-based industrial action.
The logic of the regime’s actions demonstrates that the processes of inhibiting the threat created for it are clearly taking place under Russian control.
As in 2010, after some thaw in relations with the West, Lukashenka’s rhetoric has changed completely, with accusations of interference from Poland, Czechia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Apparently, fears of the growing potential of the peaceful Belarusian protest, barricades in Minsk’s streets, street clashes in several cities at once, and the threat of losing real power urged Lukashenka’s regime to seek help from Russia. He also handed over the militants from Wagner private military company detained earlier to Russia.
According to the official version offered by Belarusian investigators, this proxy formation of the General Directorate of the Russian army’s General Staff was sent to destabilize the situation in the country. The hand-over of Wagner militants took place despite the significant damage to relations with Ukraine, which demanded their extradition. Many people in Ukraine perceived the hand-over as an openly hostile move placing Lukashenka’s regime side by side with Russia as the aggressor state.
For the first time, Ukraine summoned the its ambassador from Belarus for consultations. At the same time, the EU foreign ministers have decided to impose sanctions on those involved in the crackdown on protests and the falsification of “election” results in Belarus.
Crisis Management of Belarus
On August 12, the InformNapalm community detected a flight of two Tupolev-134AK aircraft owned by Russia’s Aerospace Forces to Belarus. These two VIP class airplanes usually transport high-ranking Russian military officers at least at the level of Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, together with service staff.
On August 16, Russia officially made it known to Lukashenka that it was ready to support solving the issues based on the so-called Union State Treaty or in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, should the need arise.
A Tupolev-204/2014VPU on a special flight landed in Minsk National Airport on the evening of August 18. This aircraft is operated by the Russia Special Air Squadron of the Russian Presidential Office. It is equipped with a situation room and was custom-built for Russia’s Federal Security Service. Russia Special Air Squadron transports primarily the highest officials of Russia’s government. It means that both the Federal Security Service director and members of Putin’s office staff could have come to Minsk for urgent negotiations.
Also see: Belarusian IL-76MD military transport plane made several suspicious flights between Russia and Belarus
The above circumstances demonstrate that Russia is engaged in intensive talks with Lukashenka, and is advising him at the highest level. It is well within the realm of possibility that the planes delivered Russian military specialists, advisers, and political technologists to Belarus to engage in crisis management. It may well be the explanation of the sudden mass rallies supportive of Lukashenka held throughout Belarus for the first time since 1994.
In terms of their spirit, form, and nature, they resemble the Anti-Maidan rallies held to mobilize Yanukovych’s supporters and oppose the Revolution of Dignity Rally participants both in Minsk and in the regions were delivered en masse from various regions of Belarus. Symbols of the (pro)Russian far-right National Liberation Movement (NOD) and official flags of Russia have been displayed prominently at the rallies.
Lukashenka’s appearance in the center of Minsk in combat gear with an AKS assault rifle against the backdrop of special forces and internal troops engaged in the particularly ferocious crackdown on peaceful protests puts him for practical purposes among Kremlin-controlled Russian field commanders, like Kadyrov or exterminated Zakharchenko. Probably, this is yet another product of the Russian political technologists, so keen earlier on creating a superhero image for Putin. In any case, Lukashenka has become exceedingly toxic.
At the same time, the Kremlin strategists are trying to artificially inflame the civil unrest in Belarus and initiate the use of force on behalf of the part of society supportive of Lukashenka. Russia acted in a similar fashion in Ukraine both during and between the last two revolutions. Materials published by InformNapalm international community on the basis of the unearthed correspondence between the architects of the so-called Russian Spring—Vladislav Surkov, head of Putin’s office, see SurkovLeaks, and Kirill Frolov, a representative of Konstantin Zatulin’s CIS Countries Institute, see FrolovLeaks,—describe the internal workings of this element of the hybrid war by Russia.
Devouring a Nation
Meanwhile, the striking journalists and technical specialists of the Belarusian TV and Radio Company have already been replaced by several groups of Russian information warfare experts. RT, one of the key Russian propaganda outlets, is already streaming live from the pro-Lukashenka rallies. Evidently, establishing control over the information and socio-political domain of Belarus is among Russia’s priorities at this stage.
So far, there has been no influential political actor in Belarus, who would defend the Kremlin’s interests and represent it. Thus, Russia can make use of the available potential to establish a pseudo-pro-Democracy opposition movement similar to the (pro)Russian Opposition Platform for Life party in Ukraine to exert influence. Such a movement can emerge from the bowels of the “new opposition.”
Obviously, taking Belarus’ public governance system and uniformed agencies under control is Russia’s primary goal. As in 2010, Russia is also looking to gain full access to the key sectors of the Belarusian economy.
At the moment, both the Lukashenka regime and the Russian media run simultaneous information warfare and psychological campaigns to create perceived threat from the NATO and, first of all, Poland, purportedly seeking to take over territory in the west of Belarus. The Belarusian Army has already committed substantial forces and resources to Hrodna Oblast in order to counter this bogus threat. Media are conditioning the public opinion in both Belarus and Russia for a probable Russian invasion of the country.
These activities create opportunities for sabotage of any kind; in their turn, it will be used to justify the use of Russian troops in Belarus on the basis of the Union State commitments or the implementation of the Collective Security Treaty provisions. Obviously, the Lukashenka regime can resort to these tactics if it loses control over the situation in the country.
Notably, the Russian army has already formed a single offensive line near the border between Ukraine and Belarus. The assault formations of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Army of the Russian army have been stationed near the Belarusian border. The military equipment in field camps near the city of Klintsi, Bryansk region, and in the city Yelnya, Smolensk region, is in full combat readiness, being located next to the main routes leading to Belarus. The second line comprises units of the 1st Armored Army, Russia’s main armored fist.
At this moment, Russia has, unfortunately, at its disposal all the forces and resources capable of establishing full control over Belarus. Russia’s principal geostrategic goal is to fully roll out the Union State of Belarus and Russia with a view to incorporating Ukraine’s occupied territories.
Belarusian Chessboard
The firm will and wisdom of the Belarusian people can forestall these developments—they can, and they must turn their own scenario into reality and make their own existential choice. Undoubtedly, powerful external actors, such as the EU member states, the USA, the UK, Russia, and the PRC, will be highly active in trying to influence their choice and playing on the political chessboard of Belarus. Changes in Belarus drastically affect the balance of power across the European continent.


informnapalm--2020-08-31--Militants drop VOG grenades from drones on positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

During the next declared truce , the militants of the Russian occupation forces dropped VOG grenades ( suspended VOG-17 fragmentation projectile for under-barrel grenade launchers ) from the unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine .
This was reported by the Ukrainian Military Portal with reference to the press service of the Joint Forces Operation .
According to the official information , one such fact was recorded on August 24 near Mayorsk , although according to the sources of the Ukrainian Military Portal , another such case occurred in the morning on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Command reports that on August 25 , while patrolling the area , two Ukrainian servicemen were hit by an explosion of the enemy ’ s POM-2 anti-personnel fragmentation mine .
As a result of the explosion , they received shrapnel wounds and are now in treatment .
Their health is satisfactory .
It was previously established that the antipersonnel mine was delivered remotely .
The enemy uses such provocations both in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts .
The new ceasefire agreement prohibits the use of UAVs on both sides .
Such a violation by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not the first .
In March 2020 , the aggressor dropped VOGs from a similar UAV , hitting an ambulance , which is a gross violation of international agreements on the protection of medical personnel on the front line : At that time , in the area of the settlement of Hnutove two grenades were dropped on the ambulance of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces .
We would like to remind that it is not first time when Russian occupation forces violate ceasefire agreement in such way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use of a UAV with a suspended VOG-25 fragmentation grenade was reported by the Joint Forces Operation Press Center during the 5th Week of the “ ceasefire ” in the Donbas .
Translated by George Pinchuk .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

During the next declared truce, the militants of the Russian occupation forces dropped VOG grenades (suspended VOG-17 fragmentation projectile for under-barrel grenade launchers) from the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This was reported by the Ukrainian Military Portal with reference to the press service of the Joint Forces Operation.
According to the official information, one such fact was recorded on August 24 near Mayorsk, although according to the sources of the Ukrainian Military Portal, another such case occurred in the morning on August 25.
Also the Joint Forces Command reports that on August 25, while patrolling the area, two Ukrainian servicemen were hit by an explosion of the enemy’s POM-2 anti-personnel fragmentation mine. As a result of the explosion, they received shrapnel wounds and are now in treatment. Their health is satisfactory.
It was previously established that the antipersonnel mine was delivered remotely. The enemy uses such provocations both in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
The new ceasefire agreement prohibits the use of UAVs on both sides.
Such a violation by the Russian terrorist forces, unfortunately, is not the first. In March 2020, the aggressor dropped VOGs from a similar UAV, hitting an ambulance, which is a gross violation of international agreements on the protection of medical personnel on the front line:
[Picture: The result of the shelling of an ambulance near the village of Hnutove 10th Mountain Assault Brigade
At that time, in the area of the settlement of Hnutove two grenades were dropped on the ambulance of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
We would like to remind that it is not first time when Russian occupation forces violate ceasefire agreement in such way. On August 19, 2019 the use of a UAV with a suspended VOG-25 fragmentation grenade was reported by the Joint Forces Operation Press Center during the 5th Week of the “ceasefire” in the Donbas.
Translated by George Pinchuk. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram