informnapalm--2020-11-28--Russian mission to the OSCE manipulating data about “redeployment of more than 70 Ukrainian tanks to

Russian mission to the OSCE manipulating data about “redeployment of more than 70 Ukrainian tanks to Donbas”

InformNapalm volunteers analyzed manipulative statements actively promoted on the official Tweeter page of the Russian Mission to the OSCE .
In particular , we noted that the manipulations intensified immediately following the reports about the spotting of the latest Russian equipment in the Donbas .
Notably , the Russian mission illustrated its official messages with modified photos taken in 2014 .
This combination of unconnected photos and manipulative information is aimed at distracting attention from the facts of constant arms withdrawal violations of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas .
Thus , on November 22 , 2020 , messages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Twitter page of the Russian Mission to the OSCE informed that the OSCE SMM recorded a large build-up of Ukrainian Armed Forces weaponry at railway hubs in the Donbas .
It was noted that “ in the past few days alone , over 70 tanks and dozens of heavy large-caliber weapons ” were heading to the Donbas .
( links to the tweets in Russian and English ) Volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community have found this information too sensational .
We decided to look for the original source of this image @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immediately got a matching photo with the only difference – it was slightly lighter .
The photo led to the news story on the UApress website from July 10 , 2014 headlined “ A train with Ukrainian tanks is moving to the Donbas ” ( archive ) .
For the sake of objectivity , we will not rush to the conclusion that the tweet is a fake story .
Perhaps it is illustrated by a modified old photo but based on real facts ?
What the OSCE SMM reports about the tanks We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine ( SMM ) to find out recent records of any significant equipment redeployment .
Considering that “ more than 70 tanks ” were mentioned in the tweets of the Russian Mission to the OSCE , we searched through 10 official OSCE SMM reports from 12 to 23 November with the key words .
• Report 279/2020 dated November 23 : “ The SMM saw three tanks beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area of Donetsk Oblast … 55 kilometers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dated November 21 : “ The SMM observed a tank in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk Oblast , in violation of withdrawal lines … near a residential area of Novohryhorivka ( 61km north-east of Donetsk ) ; “ Т-64 tank In a residential area of Lutuhyne ( 20km south-west of Luhansk ) ” .
• Report 277/2020 dated November 20 : “ 5 tanks near Pidlisne ( 70km north-west of Luhansk ) ” ; “ 15 + 2 Т-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka ( 60km north of Donetsk ) ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ station in Pokrovsk ( 55km north-west of Donetsk ) ” • Report 276/2020 dated November 19 : “ 10 T-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka ( 60 km north of Donetsk ) .
” • Report 275/2020 dated November 18 : “ 8 T-64BV tanks and 12 T-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka , 60 km north of Donetsk ” ; “ 22 T-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka , 60 km north of Donetsk.
” • Report 274/2020 dated November 17 : “ 9 tanks near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” ; “ 21 T-72 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka ( 60km north of Donetsk ) ” • Report 273/2020 dated November 16 : “ 2 tanks in a training area near Miusynsk ( 62km south-west of Luhansk ) ” ; “ 7 T-64 tanks and 3 T-72 tanks in an industrial compound near Khrustalnyi ( formerly Krasnyi Luch , 56km south-west of Luhansk ) in a non-government-controlled area ” .
• Report 271/2020 dated November 13 does not contain any information about tanks .
• Report 270/2020 dated November 12 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ railway station in Kostyantynivka ( 60km north of Donetsk ) ” A significant number of Ukrainian tanks were indeed seen at railway stations 55-60 km from the war zone ( far beyond the withdrawal lines ) .
However , this may indicate not only the arrival , but also the dispatch of the equipment for maintenance .
Indeed , the equipment is periodically withdrawn from the Joint Forces Operation ( JFO ) zone and sent for repairs to other parts of Ukraine .
For instance , in October 2020 , Ukroboronprom reported that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and modernized a batch of T-64 tanks from the JFO zone in the Donbas .
Russian weaponry violates withdrawal lines and is deployed in residential areas Meanwhile , the OSCE SMM reports also periodically show that tanks and other heavy weapons of the Russian occupying forces in the Donbas are not only positioned in violation of the withdrawal lines but are also located near and within residential areas .
In particular , these facts were recorded in one of the latest reports No .
278/2020 .
However this did not raise any concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The rhetoric of the official page of the Russian Mission is nothing short of black propaganda and manipulation .
For example , on November 19 , they posted another propaganda tweet : At the same time , Russia continues to deny the multitude of evidence-based facts proving that Kremlin is actually the main minder of the war in the Donbas .
It controls hybrid armed formations and constantly deploys Russian military personnel and assets to certain areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts .
For instance , InformNapalm with reference to OSCE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that advanced Russian electronic warfare system Navodchik-2 was reliably spotted for the first time in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast , 12 km from the front line .
The system includes seven UAV of the Granat family of various modifications with ranges of 10 , 15 , 25 and 100 km .
The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks , in particular , to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems ( MLRS ) at the battalion level .
In total , during the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OSINT research by InformNapalm alone , more than 2,600 Russian servicemen from 101 units of the Russian Army and Russian law enforcement agencies were identified in Ukraine , as well as 51 types of Russian weapons and military equipment that could not have been captured in combat and apparently were secretly brought to the Donbas from the Russian Federation .
Main battle tanks of 5 modifications which are not in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been identified among the equipment that was transferred to the Donbas from the Russian Federation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring ( PHOTO REPORT ) • Personal Data Disclosed 140 Officers and Sergeants 4th Military Base of Russia in Georgia • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established This publication was prepared specially for InformNapalm .
Translated by Artem Velichko .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers .
You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon .

InformNapalm volunteers analyzed manipulative statements actively promoted on the official Tweeter page of the Russian Mission to the OSCE. In particular, we noted that the manipulations intensified immediately following the reports about the spotting of the latest Russian equipment in the Donbas. Notably, the Russian mission illustrated its official messages with modified photos taken in 2014. This combination of unconnected photos and manipulative information is aimed at distracting attention from the facts of constant arms withdrawal violations of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas.
Thus, on November 22, 2020, messages in Russian and English on the official Twitter page of the Russian Mission to the OSCE informed that the OSCE SMM recorded a large build-up of Ukrainian Armed Forces weaponry at railway hubs in the Donbas. It was noted that “in the past few days alone, over 70 tanks and dozens of heavy large-caliber weapons” were heading to the Donbas.
(links to the tweets in Russian and English)
Volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community have found this information too sensational. We decided to look for the original source of this image. Through regular Google search, we immediately got a matching photo with the only difference – it was slightly lighter. The photo led to the news story on the UApress website from July 10, 2014 headlined “A train with Ukrainian tanks is moving to the Donbas” (archive).
For the sake of objectivity, we will not rush to the conclusion that the tweet is a fake story. Perhaps it is illustrated by a modified old photo but based on real facts?
What the OSCE SMM reports about the tanks
We also went on to check the official reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) to find out recent records of any significant equipment redeployment. Considering that “more than 70 tanks” were mentioned in the tweets of the Russian Mission to the OSCE, we searched through 10 official OSCE SMM reports from 12 to 23 November with the key words tank / tanks.
Report 279/2020 dated November 23: “The SMM saw three tanks beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area of Donetsk Oblast … 55 kilometers northwest of Donetsk.”
Report 278/2020 dated November 21: “The SMM observed a tank in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk Oblast, in violation of withdrawal lines … near a residential area of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk); “Т-64 tank In a residential area of Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk)”.
Report 277/2020 dated November 20: “5 tanks near Pidlisne (70km north-west of Luhansk)”; “15 + 2 Т-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)”, “5 tanks at a railway station in Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk)”
Report 276/2020 dated November 19: “10 T-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka (60 km north of Donetsk).”
in Kostyantynivka (60 km north of Donetsk).” Report 275/2020 dated November 18: “8 T-64BV tanks and 12 T-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka, 60 km north of Donetsk”; “22 T-64 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka, 60 km north of Donetsk.”
in Kostyantynivka, 60 km north of Donetsk”; “22 T-64 tanks in Kostyantynivka, 60 km north of Donetsk.” Report 274/2020 dated November 17: “9 tanks near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk)”; “21 T-72 tanks at the railway station in Kostyantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)”
Report 273/2020 dated November 16: “2 tanks in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)”; “7 T-64 tanks and 3 T-72 tanks in an industrial compound near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) in a non-government-controlled area”.
Report 272/2020 dated November 14: “4 T-64 tanks in a compound in Luhansk city.”
Report 271/2020 dated November 13 does not contain any information about tanks.
Report 270/2020 dated November 12: “1 T-64 tank at the railway station in Kostyantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)”
A significant number of Ukrainian tanks were indeed seen at railway stations 55-60 km from the war zone (far beyond the withdrawal lines). However, this may indicate not only the arrival, but also the dispatch of the equipment for maintenance. Indeed, the equipment is periodically withdrawn from the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) zone and sent for repairs to other parts of Ukraine. For instance, in October 2020, Ukroboronprom reported that state enterprise Malyshev Plant in Kharkiv repaired and modernized a batch of T-64 tanks from the JFO zone in the Donbas.
Russian weaponry violates withdrawal lines and is deployed in residential areas
Meanwhile, the OSCE SMM reports also periodically show that tanks and other heavy weapons of the Russian occupying forces in the Donbas are not only positioned in violation of the withdrawal lines but are also located near and within residential areas. In particular, these facts were recorded in one of the latest reports No. 278/2020. However this did not raise any concern of the Russian Mission to the OSCE. The rhetoric of the official page of the Russian Mission is nothing short of black propaganda and manipulation. For example, on November 19, they posted another propaganda tweet:
“We call on the OSCE and external minders of Ukraine to exert the necessary influence on the Ukrainian authorities in order to induce them to a direct and result-oriented dialog with representatives of Donbass…”
At the same time, Russia continues to deny the multitude of evidence-based facts proving that Kremlin is actually the main minder of the war in the Donbas. It controls hybrid armed formations and constantly deploys Russian military personnel and assets to certain areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.
For instance, InformNapalm with reference to OSCE SMM records and UAV photo evidence reported that advanced Russian electronic warfare system Navodchik-2 was reliably spotted for the first time in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast, 12 km from the front line. The system includes seven UAV of the Granat family of various modifications with ranges of 10, 15, 25 and 100 km. The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks, in particular, to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS) at the battalion level.
In total, during the war in the eastern Ukraine, according to OSINT research by InformNapalm alone, more than 2,600 Russian servicemen from 101 units of the Russian Army and Russian law enforcement agencies were identified in Ukraine, as well as 51 types of Russian weapons and military equipment that could not have been captured in combat and apparently were secretly brought to the Donbas from the Russian Federation. Main battle tanks of 5 modifications which are not in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been identified among the equipment that was transferred to the Donbas from the Russian Federation.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared specially for InformNapalm. Translated by Artem Velichko. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-11-20--Advanced Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 spotted in Donbas for the first time

Advanced Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 was reliably spotted for the first time in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast , 12 km from the front line .
The system includes seven unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) of the Granat family of various modifications with ranges of 10 , 15 , 25 and 100 km .
The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks , in particular , to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems ( MLRS ) on the battalion level .
The first text report ( without photos ) about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Navodchik-2 system appeared in the OSCE SMM report No .
272/2020 dated November 14 , 2020 .
It said that , according to the updated data of the mission , the type of equipment , which had been indicated in the OSCE SMM report No .
268/2020 of November 10 as “ the RB-341V Leer-3 electronic warfare system ” , was later identified as a UAV control station of the Navodchik-2 system following a more detailed analysis .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this text report .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirms that the newest Russian system Navodchik-2 is actually deployed in the Donbas .
Three boxes for storing and transporting of the UAVs were also seen near the control station .
This information is an important supplement to the multilingual evidence base compiled by InformNapalm listing Russian military hardware actively used in the Donbas .
It is important to note that unlike the Navodchik-2 , which was recorded for the first time in the Donbas , the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system which includes three Orlan-10 UAVs , had already been repeatedly spotted in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukraine .
It also featured in InformNapalm ’ s OSINT investigations since 2015 , and from 2018 to 2020 it began to frequently appear on the OSCE SMM reports .
This type of equipment was also included in the InformNapalm report with the evidence of the presence of Russian troops in the Donbas , which was presented by the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul in 2016 , as well as at other international events organized by PACE and OSCE from 2016 to 2019 .
Publications about the deployment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with reference to InformNapalm investigations were also published by the Associated Press and in the German tabloid Bild .
Therefore , the presence of this system has been well established and entered in the evidence base .
A still-frame image from the video of Russian propagandists in 2015 showing the training of a Russian terrorist unit from the so-called 1st Army Corps of the Russian Army in the Donbas .
A Russian EW system RB-341V Leer-3 was accidentally captured by the camera .
As for the Navodchik-2 system , it was mentioned in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once in April 2017 , when a Granat-1 UAV , which is part of this system , was detected in use near the Svitlodarsk bulge .
However , the detection of this type of UAV could not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the deployment of the whole system , as these UAVs are also capable of operating separately .
For example in 2015 , InformNapalm established the use of the Granat-1 and Granat-2 UAVs by the units of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas .
In addition , photographic evidence was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Kuzminskiy training range of the Rostov Oblast of the Russian Federation , indicating that back in December 2014 , the Russian Ministry of Defense trained the militants to operate the Granat-2 UAV .
Photo from the OSINT investigation by InformNapalm , included in the Donbas in Flames guide book which was distributed in 5 languages in 82 countries Considering that the OSCE observers made an error in their first identification of this Russian equipment , we thought it important to emphasize a characteristic feature of the Navodchik-2 system .
It is mounted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , while the RB-341V Leer-3 system is mounted on the KamAZ-5350 chassis ( six-wheel drive ) .
Before the Donbas , Russia actively used the Navodchik-2 at the 102nd Military Base in Armenia Navodchik-2 entered service with the Russian Army in 2014 .
It was immediately deployed to Armenia at the Russian 102nd Military Base in the city of Gyumri .
Since then , any reports about the use of this system both in the Russian media and on the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defense concerned mainly only Armenia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ times in the context of exercises on the territory of the 4th Military Base of the Russian occupation forces deployed in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia .
• UAVs of the Granat-1 , Granat-2 , Granat-3 and Granat-4 types ( there are seven UAVs in the system ) .
The newest Russian system Navodchik-2 was exhibited at the military technical forum Army-2019 / Photo source bastion-karpenko.ru This article contains unique and important data , evidence of the ongoing covert military activity of the Russian Federation in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spring of 2014 and it continues in 2020 , whereas Russian military command and political leadership continue to deny Russia ’ s direct participation and control of the hostilities .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community calls on the expert , journalistic and diplomatic community as well as on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to actively use the data from the OSCE SMM reports and the materials of open-source intelligence ( OSINT ) investigations of InformNapalm volunteers to step up diplomatic pressure on the aggressor state , strengthen the sanctions and other political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace , which is only possible after full withdrawal of Russian weaponry , military equipment , servicemen and mercenaries from Ukraine .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers .
You can also volunteer or support the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with your donations through Patreon .

Advanced Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 was reliably spotted for the first time in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast, 12 km from the front line. The system includes seven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) of the Granat family of various modifications with ranges of 10, 15, 25 and 100 km. The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks, in particular, to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS) on the battalion level.
The first text report (without photos) about sighting of the ground control station of the Navodchik-2 system appeared in the OSCE SMM report No. 272/2020 dated November 14, 2020. It said that, according to the updated data of the mission, the type of equipment, which had been indicated in the OSCE SMM report No. 268/2020 of November 10 as “the RB-341V Leer-3 electronic warfare system”, was later identified as a UAV control station of the Navodchik-2 system following a more detailed analysis.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this text report. The photo taken by the OSCE UAV undeniably confirms that the newest Russian system Navodchik-2 is actually deployed in the Donbas. Three boxes for storing and transporting of the UAVs were also seen near the control station.
This information is an important supplement to the multilingual evidence base compiled by InformNapalm listing Russian military hardware actively used in the Donbas.
Navodchik-2 and RB-341V Leer-3
It is important to note that unlike the Navodchik-2, which was recorded for the first time in the Donbas, the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system which includes three Orlan-10 UAVs, had already been repeatedly spotted in the combat zone in the east of Ukraine. It also featured in InformNapalm’s OSINT investigations since 2015, and from 2018 to 2020 it began to frequently appear on the OSCE SMM reports. This type of equipment was also included in the InformNapalm report with the evidence of the presence of Russian troops in the Donbas, which was presented by the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul in 2016, as well as at other international events organized by PACE and OSCE from 2016 to 2019. Publications about the deployment of RB-341V Leer-3 in the occupied Donbas with reference to InformNapalm investigations were also published by the Associated Press and in the German tabloid Bild. Therefore, the presence of this system has been well established and entered in the evidence base.
A still-frame image from the video of Russian propagandists in 2015 showing the training of a Russian terrorist unit from the so-called 1st Army Corps of the Russian Army in the Donbas. A Russian EW system RB-341V Leer-3 was accidentally captured by the camera.
As for the Navodchik-2 system, it was mentioned in reports from the Donbas war zone only once in April 2017, when a Granat-1 UAV, which is part of this system, was detected in use near the Svitlodarsk bulge. However, the detection of this type of UAV could not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the deployment of the whole system, as these UAVs are also capable of operating separately. For example in 2015, InformNapalm established the use of the Granat-1 and Granat-2 UAVs by the units of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas. In addition, photographic evidence was found with geolocated to the territory of the Kuzminskiy training range of the Rostov Oblast of the Russian Federation, indicating that back in December 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense trained the militants to operate the Granat-2 UAV.
Photo from the OSINT investigation by InformNapalm, included in the Donbas in Flames guide book which was distributed in 5 languages in 82 countries
Identification
Considering that the OSCE observers made an error in their first identification of this Russian equipment, we thought it important to emphasize a characteristic feature of the Navodchik-2 system. It is mounted a KamAZ-4350 truck chassis (four-wheel drive), while the RB-341V Leer-3 system is mounted on the KamAZ-5350 chassis (six-wheel drive).
Before the Donbas, Russia actively used the Navodchik-2 at the 102nd Military Base in Armenia
Navodchik-2 entered service with the Russian Army in 2014. It was immediately deployed to Armenia at the Russian 102nd Military Base in the city of Gyumri. Since then, any reports about the use of this system both in the Russian media and on the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defense concerned mainly only Armenia. This system was also mentioned several times in the context of exercises on the territory of the 4th Military Base of the Russian occupation forces deployed in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia.
The system consists of:
ground control station;
UAVs of the Granat-1, Granat-2, Granat-3 and Granat-4 types (there are seven UAVs in the system).
The newest Russian system Navodchik-2 was exhibited at the military technical forum Army-2019 / Photo source bastion-karpenko.ru
Conclusion
This article contains unique and important data, evidence of the ongoing covert military activity of the Russian Federation in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas. The military aggression began in the spring of 2014 and it continues in 2020, whereas Russian military command and political leadership continue to deny Russia’s direct participation and control of the hostilities.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community calls on the expert, journalistic and diplomatic community as well as on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to actively use the data from the OSCE SMM reports and the materials of open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations of InformNapalm volunteers to step up diplomatic pressure on the aggressor state, strengthen the sanctions and other political measures that will help achieve a real peace, which is only possible after full withdrawal of Russian weaponry, military equipment, servicemen and mercenaries from Ukraine.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. InformNapalm.org website is kept alive only by the community volunteers and our readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-12-03--Russian military UAV shot down in the war zone (Updated)

A Russian military unmanned aerial vehicle ( UAV ) Granat-1 , which is part of the new Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 , was shot down on November 29 , 2020 over the zone of the Joint Forces Operation ( JFO ) in Donbas .
This was reported on the JFO ’ s official Facebook page with a photo of the downed UAV .
On November 19 , 2020 , InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published exclusive images and additional facts about the ground control station of the newest Russian Navodchik-2 system , which featured for the first time in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mission ( SMM ) on November 14 , 2020 .
The system was spotted in the Luhansk Oblast , 12 km from the line of contact , approximate coordinates : 48°31 ’ 40.2″N 39°24 ’ 01.6″E .
Back in 2015 , InformNapalm established the use of the Granat-1 and Granat-2 UAVs by the units of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas .
The use of these types of Russian military UAVs was detected in a propaganda video story of the Novorossia.TV channel .
It is known that the Russian Army used these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February 2015 .

A Russian military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Granat-1, which is part of the new Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2, was shot down on November 29, 2020 over the zone of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in Donbas. This was reported on the JFO’s official Facebook page with a photo of the downed UAV.
Video footage from the downed UAV

Navodchik-2 system
On November 19, 2020, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published exclusive images and additional facts about the ground control station of the newest Russian Navodchik-2 system, which featured for the first time in the official reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) on November 14, 2020. The system was spotted in the Luhansk Oblast, 12 km from the line of contact, approximate coordinates: 48°31’40.2″N 39°24’01.6″E.
Granat-1, UAV
Back in 2015, InformNapalm established the use of the Granat-1 and Granat-2 UAVs by the units of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas. The use of these types of Russian military UAVs was detected in a propaganda video story of the Novorossia.TV channel. It is known that the Russian Army used these UAVs during the hostilities near Debaltseve in February 2015.


informnapalm--2020-12-04--Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century

Article prepared by Info Ops Polska Foundation .
Info OPS Polska Foundation was established for the implementation of projects aimed at ensuring the safety of the information environment .
The project includes support for the development of the capacity to identify information and psychological operations , including conducting analyses of manipulation processes of the Polish-speaking information environment : disinformation , propaganda , social engineering and cyber activities .
In the twenty-first century , the concept of war and fight between states has changed .
Nowadays , threats to state security can be observed primarily on the Internet .
Kamil Basaj @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OPS Poland Foundation , talked to Izabela Wojtyczka , editor-in-chief of The Warsaw Institute Review , about manipulation , information warfare and extensive disinformation operations .
Izabela Wojtyczka : In your opinion , how right are the emerging diagnoses of the global disinformation warfare ?
How many directions and what specific features are we able to indicate ?
Kamil Basaj : Currently , the Polish-language information ecosystems , but not only , are under permanent manipulative influence .
Among such activities one can find disinformation and propaganda operations , as well as , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This subject has a wide range and can not be limited solely to an operation using only correct , false or mixed information .
The processes of influence are carried out by more or less specialized action units , generally state-controlled ones .
The reconnaissance processes are also sophisticated .
The state security sector , non-governmental organizations and society all have distinct capabilities to identify such threats .
Manipulative operations are very often complex and are not limited to overt , propaganda and/or manipulative actions .
An active information operation , conducted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transmission , activities ( in multiple dimensions , e.g .
physical and virtual ) , use of active means , e.g .
provocation , simulation , mystification , or inspiration ( made either consciously or not by the actor ) and a planning process based on cognitive models , including subjectivity models .
To make the whole action more effective and gain influence over the decision-making process of an individual and/or a social group in a wider context .
The existing research shows that the basic parameter , which becomes the target of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the recipients and they should be given special attention in the first place .
This is also important from the perspective of developing models for the recognition of such operations , because skillfully created queries/surveys taking into account the recognition of elements of an information opponent ’ s actions enable to detect an information operation at its early stage .
More broadly – in some cases this takes place already during the preparation of the background information by the attacker , which is supposed to constitute the foundation for future manipulative actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diagnoses of the global disinformation warfare are , one can only point out that the information ecosystem , the processes of shaping views and decisions ( including the abandonment of decisions ) , are the space for conducting information warfare and are coming from several basic directions in Poland .
The centers conducting offensive actions through open or overt channels are undoubtedly China , Russia , Germany and other actors , whose actions can be omitted for the purpose of this statement .
It should be remembered , however , that propaganda processes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian Federation undertakes through open channels of communication the Kremlin-controlled media , vary from influencing public opinion through lobbying and paying off selected publicists and editorial boards for propaganda activities , related to , for example , masking , or otherwise – information cloaking , provided for e.g .
Huawei products .
Unfortunately , in both cases such activities are constantly present in the Polish information space .
Other threats , such as the distribution of terrorist materials or manuals ( e.g .
how to construct a bomb or transform a vehicle into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a completely different structure and origin , but there are cases where materials of the so-called Islamic State are hidden in domains involved in manipulative operations of the Russian Federation .
From this perspective , the answer to the question on the accuracy of the aforementioned diagnosis is not obvious , as the very nature of the threats makes special services in individual states be responsible for recognition and prevention .
There is no doubt that Polish special services have already developed capabilities both to recognize and counteract these threats within the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which often narrows down their possibilities of active performance .
Disinformation , even if it resembles true information , is intended to effectively interfere with the recipient ’ s decision-making process , i.e .
in accordance with their preferences .
One of the techniques commonly used by the planners is to build models of reflection , based on models of subjectivity .
Could you please tell us about the mechanism of this process ?
Reflexive management ( control ) has become a popular theme , used in the discourse on the use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations , no less it has a very broad definition and can be used differently .
The area of research , which I am currently focusing on in my professional activity at the INFO OPS Poland Foundation , concerns tactical level of control ( low level ) , i.e .
multidimensional method of influencing an individual ’ s decision-making process .
By definition , it takes place through the development of reflection on the collected resources of data , stimuli , memory , knowledge , decisions and the so far produced outlooks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the tactical level of control in the research allowed to recognize processes classified as the group of models of subjectivity , i.e .
individual patterns of perception of a stimulus – any information – by an affected entity .
This research has a long history .
In the Foundation we have also conducted research on volunteers to confirm the effectiveness of the applied solutions of conducting manipulative actions in an unconscious but effective way .
The results of the research allowed us to determine the special features of this type of operations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the use of models of subjectivity .
They can be applied to defensive actions and the recognition of the occurrence of events that may suggest the use of specialized tools by the attacker , which we qualify under models of subjectivity .
From this perspective , the reflexive management has a very precise nature , because it is based on the understanding how the attacker seeks to permanently impair the decision-making process of the attacked , which from the perspective of the domain of reconnaissance is a significant element , as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often before they reach the right phase of action .
Going further , it is , of course , necessary to distinguish between operational areas in which it may apply .
In simple terms , we should distinguish other models used , e.g .
in reconnaissance conducted by APT teams , conducting intelligence operations in cyberspace , where the element of target profiling plays an important role through the operation against a single decision maker ( e.g .
commander , director of the department responsible for security ) , up to widely understood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of subjectivity can also be found by examining semantics and rhetorical clues or through applied social engineering .
All these areas as well as subsets of reflexive control ( models of subjectivity , pre-reflexive patterns , individual thinking patterns ) , have a different potential to cause harm and in general their recognition process has a diversified form .
Can we trace this pattern on a specific example ?
Are there only public or private entities among the clients ?
Employing models of subjectivity in conducting information attacks and more broadly – the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preparation , and I have not yet encountered a study that would reveal that the attacker using models of subjectivity was not a part of the security apparatus of the attacking state .
However , it can not be ruled out that such specialized abilities of non-state actors will appear in the future , for instance , through the progressive commercialization of manipulative services .
Do we have any data on the financing and organization of disinformers ’ work ?
Are these secret units operating at specific organizations with a hierarchy of orders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determining which sector of the state apparatus is responsible for conducting the information operation .
Typically , such an operation requires several different data sets , which can be obtained through the following processes : reconnaissance , analysis ( including profiling of an object or a group of objects ) and planning ( also the use of manipulative matrices , models of subjectivity ) .The very scope of activities preceding the information operation indicates that the responsible centers , for instance in the case of the Russian Federation , are the Russian state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sectors .
A good example of such a complex action was the process of cloaking the use of chemical weapon in Syria , where the information operation involved the Russian state administration apparatus , the military and media sectors as well as diplomacy and a number of cover-up activities carried out by Russian services in the form of inspiration and mystification , performed for the purposes of the so-called “ media ” activities .
Of course , overt actions , being conducted through open propaganda channels , such as Sputnik , RT or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is convergent with the actions of Russian propaganda , are somewhat different .
In this case , recognizing and defining actors is simplified , rather similar to information or media operations .
However , please be careful about the so-called Russian troll factories , because these centers would not be able to effectively perform their activities without the substantive support of reconnaissance , analysis and planning carried out by special centers , controlled by the security system of the Russian Federation .
THE MASCOT OF A TROJAN HORSE MADE FROM ELECTRONIC PARTS STANDS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WEEK SECURITY CONFERENCE OPENING AT THE TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY CAMPUS IN TEL AVIV , ISRAEL , EPA/JIM HOLLANDER SOURCE : PAP/EPA .
Since the closure of national borders due to the coronavirus pandemic we have been receiving reports on intensified Russian cyberattacks .
What are the main threats to Poland and the European Union ?
What defense mechanisms do we have ?
The Russian Federation permanently uses cyberspace as an operational environment in information , intelligence and penetration operations .
The threats are permanent and concern all state sectors being of interest for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the security sector , the army , diplomacy , state administration , to the economic sphere , state-owned enterprises and non-governmental organizations , which from the perspective of the attacker have the potential to obtain the desired information from the organization ’ s resources .
This threat should be defined as permanent and important , also due to the low visibility of this type of operation , especially for the public .
In the European Union , the infrastructure of the European Commission or the European Parliament is an equally sensitive target due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can present the background of many international events .
Hostile actions of the Russian Federation can not be underestimated and compared to other criminal activities because this runs greater risk to state security .
There are various possibilities of prevention .
Poland and other EU or NATO members are constantly developing the potential to ensure the security of telecommunication systems and this process will continue .
The human factor still plays a vital role in this system and often this aspect determines whether an attack is successful or not , for instance phishing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reached many milestones , from the bill on the national cybersecurity system to the achievement of operational capabilities by specialized agencies , such as CERT Poland ( CERT Polska ) – a Computer Emergency Response Team operating within the structures of Research and Academic Computer Network ( NASK ) , CSIRT GOV – a Computer Security Incident Response Team operated by the Internal Security Agency ( ABW ) and CSIRT MON – operated by the Ministry of National Defense ( MON ) , which continuously monitor and counteract threats in cyberspace , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or North Korea .

Article prepared by Info Ops Polska Foundation. Info OPS Polska Foundation was established for the implementation of projects aimed at ensuring the safety of the information environment. The project includes support for the development of the capacity to identify information and psychological operations, including conducting analyses of manipulation processes of the Polish-speaking information environment: disinformation, propaganda, social engineering and cyber activities.
In the twenty-first century, the concept of war and fight between states has changed. Nowadays, threats to state security can be observed primarily on the Internet. Kamil Basaj, founder and president of the INFO OPS Poland Foundation, talked to Izabela Wojtyczka, editor-in-chief of The Warsaw Institute Review, about manipulation, information warfare and extensive disinformation operations.
Izabela Wojtyczka: In your opinion, how right are the emerging diagnoses of the global disinformation warfare? How many directions and what specific features are we able to indicate?
Kamil Basaj: Currently, the Polish-language information ecosystems, but not only, are under permanent manipulative influence. Among such activities one can find disinformation and propaganda operations, as well as, more widely – psychological and informational ones. This subject has a wide range and cannot be limited solely to an operation using only correct, false or mixed information.
The processes of influence are carried out by more or less specialized action units, generally state-controlled ones. The reconnaissance processes are also sophisticated. The state security sector, non-governmental organizations and society all have distinct capabilities to identify such threats. Manipulative operations are very often complex and are not limited to overt, propaganda and/or manipulative actions. An active information operation, conducted by professionals, often features a multi-vector transmission, activities (in multiple dimensions, e.g. physical and virtual), use of active means, e.g. provocation, simulation, mystification, or inspiration (made either consciously or not by the actor) and a planning process based on cognitive models, including subjectivity models. To make the whole action more effective and gain influence over the decision-making process of an individual and/or a social group in a wider context. The existing research shows that the basic parameter, which becomes the target of the attacker, are the cognitive processes of the recipients and they should be given special attention in the first place. This is also important from the perspective of developing models for the recognition of such operations, because skillfully created queries/surveys taking into account the recognition of elements of an information opponent’s actions enable to detect an information operation at its early stage. More broadly – in some cases this takes place already during the preparation of the background information by the attacker, which is supposed to constitute the foundation for future manipulative actions.
When wondering how correct the emerging diagnoses of the global disinformation warfare are, one can only point out that the information ecosystem, the processes of shaping views and decisions (including the abandonment of decisions), are the space for conducting information warfare and are coming from several basic directions in Poland. The centers conducting offensive actions through open or overt channels are undoubtedly China, Russia, Germany and other actors, whose actions can be omitted for the purpose of this statement. It should be remembered, however, that propaganda processes and activities, as those of the Russian Federation undertakes through open channels of communication the Kremlin-controlled media, vary from influencing public opinion through lobbying and paying off selected publicists and editorial boards for propaganda activities, related to, for example, masking, or otherwise – information cloaking, provided for e.g. Huawei products. Unfortunately, in both cases such activities are constantly present in the Polish information space. Other threats, such as the distribution of terrorist materials or manuals (e.g. how to construct a bomb or transform a vehicle into a weapon, etc.), have a completely different structure and origin, but there are cases where materials of the so-called Islamic State are hidden in domains involved in manipulative operations of the Russian Federation.
A DIGITAL SCREEN DISPLAYS A LIVE CYBER HACK ATTACK DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL POLICE OFFICE (BKA) IN WIESBADEN, GERMANY, 11 NOVEMBER 2019. EPA/RONALD WITTEK
From this perspective, the answer to the question on the accuracy of the aforementioned diagnosis is not obvious, as the very nature of the threats makes special services in individual states be responsible for recognition and prevention. There is no doubt that Polish special services have already developed capabilities both to recognize and counteract these threats within the framework of the applicable law in Poland, which often narrows down their possibilities of active performance.
Disinformation, even if it resembles true information, is intended to effectively interfere with the recipient’s decision-making process, i.e. in accordance with their preferences. One of the techniques commonly used by the planners is to build models of reflection, based on models of subjectivity. Could you please tell us about the mechanism of this process?
Reflexive management (control) has become a popular theme, used in the discourse on the use of active measures, deception and psychological operations, no less it has a very broad definition and can be used differently. The area of research, which I am currently focusing on in my professional activity at the INFO OPS Poland Foundation, concerns tactical level of control (low level), i.e. multidimensional method of influencing an individual’s decision-making process. By definition, it takes place through the development of reflection on the collected resources of data, stimuli, memory, knowledge, decisions and the so far produced outlooks, accumulated unconsciously in human mind. Focusing on the tactical level of control in the research allowed to recognize processes classified as the group of models of subjectivity, i.e. individual patterns of perception of a stimulus – any information – by an affected entity. This research has a long history.
In the Foundation we have also conducted research on volunteers to confirm the effectiveness of the applied solutions of conducting manipulative actions in an unconscious but effective way. The results of the research allowed us to determine the special features of this type of operations, i.e. a manipulative operation conducted with the use of models of subjectivity. They can be applied to defensive actions and the recognition of the occurrence of events that may suggest the use of specialized tools by the attacker, which we qualify under models of subjectivity. From this perspective, the reflexive management has a very precise nature, because it is based on the understanding how the attacker seeks to permanently impair the decision-making process of the attacked, which from the perspective of the domain of reconnaissance is a significant element, as it enables an early identification of threats, often before they reach the right phase of action.
Going further, it is, of course, necessary to distinguish between operational areas in which it may apply. In simple terms, we should distinguish other models used, e.g. in reconnaissance conducted by APT teams, conducting intelligence operations in cyberspace, where the element of target profiling plays an important role through the operation against a single decision maker (e.g. commander, director of the department responsible for security), up to widely understood psychological operations, where elements of models of subjectivity can also be found by examining semantics and rhetorical clues or through applied social engineering. All these areas as well as subsets of reflexive control (models of subjectivity, pre-reflexive patterns, individual thinking patterns), have a different potential to cause harm and in general their recognition process has a diversified form.
Can we trace this pattern on a specific example? Are there only public or private entities among the clients?
Employing models of subjectivity in conducting information attacks and more broadly – the use of active measures –– requires professional preparation, and I have not yet encountered a study that would reveal that the attacker using models of subjectivity was not a part of the security apparatus of the attacking state. However, it cannot be ruled out that such specialized abilities of non-state actors will appear in the future, for instance, through the progressive commercialization of manipulative services.
Do we have any data on the financing and organization of disinformers’ work? Are these secret units operating at specific organizations with a hierarchy of orders?
The answer to this question requires determining which sector of the state apparatus is responsible for conducting the information operation. Typically, such an operation requires several different data sets, which can be obtained through the following processes: reconnaissance, analysis (including profiling of an object or a group of objects) and planning (also the use of manipulative matrices, models of subjectivity).The very scope of activities preceding the information operation indicates that the responsible centers, for instance in the case of the Russian Federation, are the Russian state apparatus as well as special and security sectors. A good example of such a complex action was the process of cloaking the use of chemical weapon in Syria, where the information operation involved the Russian state administration apparatus, the military and media sectors as well as diplomacy and a number of cover-up activities carried out by Russian services in the form of inspiration and mystification, performed for the purposes of the so-called “media” activities.
Of course, overt actions, being conducted through open propaganda channels, such as Sputnik, RT or other documents that disseminate content, which is convergent with the actions of Russian propaganda, are somewhat different. In this case, recognizing and defining actors is simplified, rather similar to information or media operations. However, please be careful about the so-called Russian troll factories, because these centers would not be able to effectively perform their activities without the substantive support of reconnaissance, analysis and planning carried out by special centers, controlled by the security system of the Russian Federation.
THE MASCOT OF A TROJAN HORSE MADE FROM ELECTRONIC PARTS STANDS GUARD OUTSIDE THE ENTRANCE TO THE CYBER WEEK SECURITY CONFERENCE OPENING AT THE TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY CAMPUS IN TEL AVIV, ISRAEL, EPA/JIM HOLLANDER SOURCE: PAP/EPA.
Since the closure of national borders due to the coronavirus pandemic we have been receiving reports on intensified Russian cyberattacks. What are the main threats to Poland and the European Union? What defense mechanisms do we have?
The Russian Federation permanently uses cyberspace as an operational environment in information, intelligence and penetration operations. The threats are permanent and concern all state sectors being of interest for a country conducting hostile politics. From the security sector, the army, diplomacy, state administration, to the economic sphere, state-owned enterprises and non-governmental organizations, which from the perspective of the attacker have the potential to obtain the desired information from the organization’s resources.
This threat should be defined as permanent and important, also due to the low visibility of this type of operation, especially for the public. In the European Union, the infrastructure of the European Commission or the European Parliament is an equally sensitive target due to the potential gain of information that can present the background of many international events. Hostile actions of the Russian Federation cannot be underestimated and compared to other criminal activities because this runs greater risk to state security. There are various possibilities of prevention. Poland and other EU or NATO members are constantly developing the potential to ensure the security of telecommunication systems and this process will continue. The human factor still plays a vital role in this system and often this aspect determines whether an attack is successful or not, for instance phishing. In recent years, Poland has reached many milestones, from the bill on the national cybersecurity system to the achievement of operational capabilities by specialized agencies, such as CERT Poland (CERT Polska) – a Computer Emergency Response Team operating within the structures of Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK), CSIRT GOV – a Computer Security Incident Response Team operated by the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and CSIRT MON – operated by the Ministry of National Defense (MON), which continuously monitor and counteract threats in cyberspace, including attacks by the Russian Federation, China or North Korea.


informnapalm--2020-12-06--Russian occupation forces used heavy artillery and mortars in Donbas

On December 3 and 4 , 2020 , Russian hybrid occupation forces in the Donbas shelled positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the village of Vodiane in the Donetsk Oblast using 122 mm cannon artillery systems and 120 mm mortars prohibited under Minsk protocols .
This was reported by the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in their situation update for the area of the Joint Forces Operation ( JFO ) .
Ukrainian side of the JCCC promptly notified the OSCE representatives about the use of prohibited types of heavy weapons by the armed formations of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vodiane area , 4 cases were recorded of remote mining of Ukrainian positions by Russian occupants using portable mining kits and prohibited POM-2 anti-personnel land mines .
Based on our analysis Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas , we can assume that the shelling of the Ukrainian positions near Vodiane village was carried out by the 9th Separate Assault Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Marines ( military unit 08809 , permanent station at Novoazovsk , occupied part of Donetsk Oblast ) .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by low discipline .
In addition , the area of responsibility of the 9th Regiment is periodically used to provide their first real combat experience to artillery men of the Russian Army , recent graduates of Russian artillery schools .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has already published precise coordinates of the identified permanent bases of 2S1 Gvozdika 122-mm self-propelled howitzers of the Russian occupation forces .
One of these locations is an industrial site in the village of Novoazovsk , 17-20 km from Vodiane .
As InformNapalm volunteers noted back in September 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia actively used the ceasefire to build up the combat capability of its occupation forces in the Donbas : did engineering work , mining of new areas and replenishment of ammunition by covert cargo trafficking through uncontrolled areas of the border .
According to the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine , Russian occupation forces have recently increased the number of reconnaissance groups and sniper pairs at the front , looking to carry out subversive operations in the gray zone , shoot at the positions of the Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as inflict personnel losses .
Let us also recall that on November 29 , 2020 , a modern Russian short-range UAV was shot down in the war zone .
This type of UAVs is used for artillery reconnaissance and target designation as well as artillery fire adjustment .
And on November 8 , the newest Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 was spotted 12 km from the line of contact ( at the approximate coordinates 48°31 ’ 40.2″N 39°24 ’ 01.6″E ) .
The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems ( MLRS ) at the battalion level .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring PHOTO REPORT ) • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site @ @ @ @ @ @ @ title photo for the article is illustrative .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers .
You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon .

On December 3 and 4, 2020, Russian hybrid occupation forces in the Donbas shelled positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the village of Vodiane in the Donetsk Oblast using 122 mm cannon artillery systems and 120 mm mortars prohibited under Minsk protocols. This was reported by the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in their situation update for the area of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO).
Ukrainian side of the JCCC promptly notified the OSCE representatives about the use of prohibited types of heavy weapons by the armed formations of the Russian Federation.
Also in the Vodiane area, 4 cases were recorded of remote mining of Ukrainian positions by Russian occupants using portable mining kits and prohibited POM-2 anti-personnel land mines.
Based on our analysis Intelligence data on 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Federation in the occupied Donbas, we can assume that the shelling of the Ukrainian positions near Vodiane village was carried out by the 9th Separate Assault Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Marines (military unit 08809, permanent station at Novoazovsk, occupied part of Donetsk Oblast). This regiment of hybrid Russian forces is characterized by low discipline. In addition, the area of responsibility of the 9th Regiment is periodically used to provide their first real combat experience to artillery men of the Russian Army, recent graduates of Russian artillery schools.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has already published precise coordinates of the identified permanent bases of 2S1 Gvozdika 122-mm self-propelled howitzers of the Russian occupation forces. One of these locations is an industrial site in the village of Novoazovsk, 17-20 km from Vodiane.
Expected escalation
As InformNapalm volunteers noted back in September 2020, relying on numerous intelligence signs, Russia actively used the ceasefire to build up the combat capability of its occupation forces in the Donbas: did engineering work, mining of new areas and replenishment of ammunition by covert cargo trafficking through uncontrolled areas of the border.
According to the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian occupation forces have recently increased the number of reconnaissance groups and sniper pairs at the front, looking to carry out subversive operations in the gray zone, shoot at the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to provoke return fire, as well as inflict personnel losses.
Let us also recall that on November 29, 2020, a modern Russian short-range UAV was shot down in the war zone. This type of UAVs is used for artillery reconnaissance and target designation as well as artillery fire adjustment.
And on November 8, the newest Russian artillery reconnaissance system Navodchik-2 was spotted 12 km from the line of contact (at the approximate coordinates 48°31’40.2″N 39°24’01.6″E). The system is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks, in particular, to provide targeting coordinates for barrel artillery and multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS) at the battalion level.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site. Translated by Artem Velichko. The title photo for the article is illustrative. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-12-08--New Russian 2B26 Grad launch rocket system in Donbas

Photos and videos of military maneuvers in Donbas filmed by Russian propagandists and the militants themselves sometimes show interesting examples of heavy Russian weapons and equipment that could enter the combat zone exclusively from the Russian Federation .
This photo , which was posted in February 2016 ( archive ) on the page of Dizel Tank Battalion ( military unit 08810 ) of the 1st Army Corps of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas , shows a Russian 2B26 Grad MLRS on KamAZ-5350 6×6 military truck .
It entered service in the Russian army in 2012 .
Let us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers from InformNapalm international intelligence community also and determined their exact coordinates in Donetsk Oblast : 47°58 ’ 14.5″N 38°40 ’ 09.0″E .
the facts of supply of Russian weapons and equipment to the combat zone in the Donbas .
In 2014-2020 , InformNapalm ’ s OSINT investigations identified more than 2,630 Russian servicemen from 101 units of Russian Armed Forces , as well as 51 types of Russian weapons and equipment that were secretly supplied to the Donbas from Russia .
, which are also built on the basis of KamAZ-5350 6×6 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the combat zone in eastern Ukraine .
was spotted 12 km from the combat line at approximate coordinates : 48°31 ’ 40.2″N 39° 24 ’ 01.6″E .
It is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks , in particular , to find coordinates of targets for artillery and MLRS battalions .
The control station of the Navodchik-2 system is built on the basis of another modification of the KamAZ truck : KamAZ-4350 , wheel formula 4×4 .
The difference is shown in the drawing below .
On December 3 and 4 , 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violated the terms of the Minsk agreements and and mortars in the Donbas .
• Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring PHOTO REPORT ) • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site .
Translated by Sveta @ @ @ @ @ @ @ article is illustrative .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country ’ s government or large donors .
Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers .
You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon .

Photos and videos of military maneuvers in Donbas filmed by Russian propagandists and the militants themselves sometimes show interesting examples of heavy Russian weapons and equipment that could enter the combat zone exclusively from the Russian Federation.
This photo, which was posted in February 2016 (archive) on the page of Dizel Tank Battalion (military unit 08810) of the 1st Army Corps of the Russian occupation forces in the Donbas, shows a Russian 2B26 Grad MLRS on KamAZ-5350 6×6 military truck. It entered service in the Russian army in 2012.
Let us remind you that in February 2016, observers from InformNapalm international intelligence community also filmed two Russian 2B26 Grad systems and determined their exact coordinates in Donetsk Oblast: 47°58’14.5″N 38°40’09.0″E.
We continue to document the facts of supply of Russian weapons and equipment to the combat zone in the Donbas. In 2014-2020, InformNapalm’s OSINT investigations identified more than 2,630 Russian servicemen from 101 units of Russian Armed Forces, as well as 51 types of Russian weapons and equipment that were secretly supplied to the Donbas from Russia.
Russian RB-341V Leer-3 systems, which are also built on the basis of KamAZ-5350 6×6 trucks, have been repeatedly spotted in the combat zone in eastern Ukraine.
On November 8, the newest Russian Navodchik-2 system was spotted 12 km from the combat line at approximate coordinates: 48°31’40.2″N 39° 24’01.6″E. It is designed to perform reconnaissance and special tasks, in particular, to find coordinates of targets for artillery and MLRS battalions. The control station of the Navodchik-2 system is built on the basis of another modification of the KamAZ truck: KamAZ-4350, wheel formula 4×4.
The difference is shown in the drawing below.
On December 3 and 4, 2020, the Russian occupation forces once again violated the terms of the Minsk agreements and used heavy artillery and mortars in the Donbas.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site. Translated by Sveta Kemblowski. The title photo for the article is illustrative. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.


informnapalm--2020-12-08--The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Stalinist Soviet Union is as guilty of starting World War II as Naz

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Stalinist Soviet Union is as guilty of starting World War II as Nazi Germany

Article prepared by Info Ops Polska Foundation .
Info OPS Polska Foundation was established for the implementation of projects aimed at ensuring the safety of the information environment .
The project includes support for the development of the capacity to identify information and psychological operations , including conducting analyses of manipulation processes of the Polish-speaking information environment : disinformation , propaganda , social engineering and cyber activities .
The Versailles system united the countries defeated in the World War I against each other .
It was due to a striking difference of views between particular great powers .
The most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Third Reich and the USSR .
In 1936 , Germany remilitarized the Rhineland .
In 1938 , it carried out the so-called Anschluss ( inclusion ) of Austria and annexed the country without a voice of opposition from other capitals .
In the same year , Germany made claims to the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia populated by Germans .
The action was followed by the so-called Czechoslovak crisis – Germany threatened Czechoslovakia with war in case the latter did not accept the former ’ s claims .
A conference was held in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ participation of the leaders of Germany , Italy , France and the United Kingdom.The last two powers , fearing the start of a new war , agreed to German demands .
The conference was held without the participation of the most interested party – Czechoslovakia .
In 1938 , Germany occupied a part of Czechoslovakia , then in March 1939 , it liquidated the country , creating the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Germany-dependent Slovak state .
Such policy would not have been possible without the concessions of France and Great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new armed conflict that would spread across the whole of Europe .
The non-aggression agreements concluded by Poland at the beginning of the 1930s – with Germany ( 1934 ) and the USSR ( 1932 ) – seemed to provide the country with certain guarantees of the minimum of stability .
The one signed with Germany was particularly significant .
At present , this step is still sometimes placed in a false light .
Between 1934 and 1939 , Poland consistently rejected the repeated offers of Polish-German cooperation against the USSR made by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concluding an alleged secret agreement with the Third Reich , thrown by Stalin at the Polish authorities , never had anything to do with reality .
Nor do they find any justification in historical knowledge .
As long as there was an independent Polish state , it was impossible for Germany to attack Russia .
As a consequence of rejecting the German proposal by Poland , Hitler had to enter in an agreement with Stalin .
On May 3 , 1939 , Stalin dismissed Maksim Litvinov from the post of the Commissioner for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vyacheslav Molotov , his trusted comrade who had long been a supporter of an agreement with Germany , whereas Litvinov had opted for a possible alliance with Great Britain and France .
Stalin and Molotov did not intend to enter into agreements with Western democracies and , as a consequence , take on the main role in the fight against the Third Reich .
On August 21 , Stalin gave his approval to the arrival of Ribbentrop to Moscow , yet he made it clear that the non-aggression treaty would be concluded only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defining the interests of both parties in foreign policy matters .
On August 22 , 1939 , it was announced that the government of the Third Reich and the Soviet authorities had reached an agreement on signing a non-aggression pact .
The German minister arrived in the capital of the USSR at noon the following day .
The pact was signed on August 23 , 1939 , in Moscow by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov who on behalf of their leaders – Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin respectively – divided the territories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ publicly available agreement contained seven articles .
It was a non-aggression pact whose secret protocol laid down the terms of the division of Central and Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union .
In this way Hitler secured the upcoming attack on Poland and the eastern front , while Stalin enlarged the sphere of influence of communism .
The first point of the pact stipulates that : „ In case of territorial and political transformations in the Baltic States ( Finland , Estonia , Latvia and Lithuania ) , the northern border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time the border between the interest zones of Germany and the USSR .
Therefore , both parties recognise Lithuania ’ s interest in the Vilnius region.
” The second point , directly related to Poland , read as follows : „ In case of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Polish State , the border between the interest zones of Germany and the USSR will run approximately along the rivers Narew , Vistula and San .
The question of whether it is in mutual interest to maintain an independent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ borders of that State will be can only be finally clarified in the course of further political events .
In any case , both governments will resolve this issue with a friendly agreement.
” Further point related to the area of South-Eastern Europe .
The Soviets highlighted their interest in Romania ’ s Bessarabia , while the Germans expressed no interest whatsoever in this area .
The last point of the document stated : „ This Protocol shall be treated as strictly confidential by both Parties.
” The conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Third Reich and the Soviet Union marked the end of peace and the beginning of war .
By dividing their spheres of influence in Europe , both countries jointly started the war .
With the German claims to Poland and the incorporation of Gdansk into the Third Reich , the policy of appeasement ceased to exist .
Peace which had been prolonged since mid 1930s transformed on September 1 , 1939 , into the Polish-German war which then became World War II .
On September 17 , 1939 , Soviet Russia carried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violating the previously signed non-aggression pact and joining the German attack .
The symbol of this alliance has since been the joint German-Russian parade of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on September 22 , 1939 , in the city of Brest-Litovsk captured by the Germans .
Between 1939 and 1941 , the NKVD together with the Gestapo fought against the Polish resistance movement – the principles of this cooperation were established during a series of conferences that were held in the same period the following locations : Brest-Litovsk , Przemyśl , Zakopane @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exchange of information between the USSR and the Third Reich on the Polish conspiracy .
Actions were also taken to eliminate the Polish leadership elite and intellectuals .
Germany and the USSR also took actions to denationalise Poles in order to deprive them of their national identity and incorporate the population of Polish nationality into the nations of both countries within the framework of Germanisation or Russification .
In addition , 1939-1941 was a period of a close economic cooperation between Germany and the USSR .
Until June 1941 , the USSR provided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Stalin concluded two trade agreements with Hitler – in 1939 and 1940 .
The goods and commodities delivered by the USSR to Germany included 1.6 million tons of grain , 900 thousand tons of oil , 500 thousand tons of iron ore , as well as manganese , chromium , cotton , phosphate , soya , rubber and platinum .
These supplies allowed Germany to continue the war and take over Europe .
The German-Soviet system determined the outbreak of the war , which meant no less than next partition of Polish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the agreement between the two totalitarian states was the secret protocol defining the division of Central and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence .
That collusion constituted the prelude to a genocidal policy pursued in the name of two criminal ideas – nazism and communism .
The Stalinist Soviet Union is as guilty for starting World War II as Nazi Germany .

Article prepared by Info Ops Polska Foundation. Info OPS Polska Foundation was established for the implementation of projects aimed at ensuring the safety of the information environment. The project includes support for the development of the capacity to identify information and psychological operations, including conducting analyses of manipulation processes of the Polish-speaking information environment: disinformation, propaganda, social engineering and cyber activities.
The Versailles system united the countries defeated in the World War I against each other. It was due to a striking difference of views between particular great powers. The most aggressive policy was pursued in the 1930s by the Third Reich and the USSR. In 1936, Germany remilitarized the Rhineland. In 1938, it carried out the so-called Anschluss (inclusion) of Austria and annexed the country without a voice of opposition from other capitals. In the same year, Germany made claims to the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia populated by Germans. The action was followed by the so-called Czechoslovak crisis – Germany threatened Czechoslovakia with war in case the latter did not accept the former’s claims. A conference was held in Munich for this purpose, with the participation of the leaders of Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom.The last two powers, fearing the start of a new war, agreed to German demands. The conference was held without the participation of the most interested party – Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Germany occupied a part of Czechoslovakia, then in March 1939, it liquidated the country, creating the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Germany-dependent Slovak state. Such policy would not have been possible without the concessions of France and Great Britain who were too afraid of a new armed conflict that would spread across the whole of Europe.
The non-aggression agreements concluded by Poland at the beginning of the 1930s – with Germany (1934) and the USSR (1932) – seemed to provide the country with certain guarantees of the minimum of stability. The one signed with Germany was particularly significant. At present, this step is still sometimes placed in a false light. Between 1934 and 1939, Poland consistently rejected the repeated offers of Polish-German cooperation against the USSR made by the Third Reich leaders. Accusations of concluding an alleged secret agreement with the Third Reich, thrown by Stalin at the Polish authorities, never had anything to do with reality. Nor do they find any justification in historical knowledge. As long as there was an independent Polish state, it was impossible for Germany to attack Russia. As a consequence of rejecting the German proposal by Poland, Hitler had to enter in an agreement with Stalin.
On May 3, 1939, Stalin dismissed Maksim Litvinov from the post of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and replaced him with Vyacheslav Molotov, his trusted comrade who had long been a supporter of an agreement with Germany, whereas Litvinov had opted for a possible alliance with Great Britain and France. Stalin and Molotov did not intend to enter into agreements with Western democracies and, as a consequence, take on the main role in the fight against the Third Reich. On August 21, Stalin gave his approval to the arrival of Ribbentrop to Moscow, yet he made it clear that the non-aggression treaty would be concluded only on condition of signing an additional agreement defining the interests of both parties in foreign policy matters. On August 22, 1939, it was announced that the government of the Third Reich and the Soviet authorities had reached an agreement on signing a non-aggression pact. The German minister arrived in the capital of the USSR at noon the following day. The pact was signed on August 23, 1939, in Moscow by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov who on behalf of their leaders – Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin respectively – divided the territories of Central and Eastern Europe. The publicly available agreement contained seven articles. It was a non-aggression pact whose secret protocol laid down the terms of the division of Central and Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. In this way Hitler secured the upcoming attack on Poland and the eastern front, while Stalin enlarged the sphere of influence of communism.
The first point of the pact stipulates that: „In case of territorial and political transformations in the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be at the same time the border between the interest zones of Germany and the USSR. Therefore, both parties recognise Lithuania’s interest in the Vilnius region.”
The second point, directly related to Poland, read as follows: „In case of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Polish State, the border between the interest zones of Germany and the USSR will run approximately along the rivers Narew, Vistula and San. The question of whether it is in mutual interest to maintain an independent Polish State as well as what the borders of that State will be can only be finally clarified in the course of further political events. In any case, both governments will resolve this issue with a friendly agreement.”
Further point related to the area of South-Eastern Europe. The Soviets highlighted their interest in Romania’s Bessarabia, while the Germans expressed no interest whatsoever in this area.
The last point of the document stated: „This Protocol shall be treated as strictly confidential by both Parties.”
The conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at the end of August 1939 between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union marked the end of peace and the beginning of war. By dividing their spheres of influence in Europe, both countries jointly started the war. With the German claims to Poland and the incorporation of Gdansk into the Third Reich, the policy of appeasement ceased to exist. Peace which had been prolonged since mid 1930s transformed on September 1, 1939, into the Polish-German war which then became World War II. On September 17, 1939, Soviet Russia carried out a military attack on Poland, violating the previously signed non-aggression pact and joining the German attack.
The symbol of this alliance has since been the joint German-Russian parade of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on September 22, 1939, in the city of Brest-Litovsk captured by the Germans. Between 1939 and 1941, the NKVD together with the Gestapo fought against the Polish resistance movement – the principles of this cooperation were established during a series of conferences that were held in the same period the following locations: Brest-Litovsk, Przemyśl, Zakopane and Cracow. The cooperation included the exchange of information between the USSR and the Third Reich on the Polish conspiracy. Actions were also taken to eliminate the Polish leadership elite and intellectuals. Germany and the USSR also took actions to denationalise Poles in order to deprive them of their national identity and incorporate the population of Polish nationality into the nations of both countries within the framework of Germanisation or Russification.
In addition, 1939-1941 was a period of a close economic cooperation between Germany and the USSR. Until June 1941, the USSR provided Germany with considerable military and economic assistance. Stalin concluded two trade agreements with Hitler – in 1939 and 1940. The goods and commodities delivered by the USSR to Germany included 1.6 million tons of grain, 900 thousand tons of oil, 500 thousand tons of iron ore, as well as manganese, chromium, cotton, phosphate, soya, rubber and platinum. These supplies allowed Germany to continue the war and take over Europe.
The German-Soviet system determined the outbreak of the war, which meant no less than next partition of Polish territories. The most important part of the agreement between the two totalitarian states was the secret protocol defining the division of Central and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. That collusion constituted the prelude to a genocidal policy pursued in the name of two criminal ideas – nazism and communism. The Stalinist Soviet Union is as guilty for starting World War II as Nazi Germany.


informnapalm--2020-12-14--Russian electronic warfare system R-330Zh Zhitel once again spotted in Donbas

The Russian R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare system has been repeatedly spotted in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas .
It periodically featured both in the OSCE SMM reports and in the photographs that InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published in the course of their OSINT investigations .
This system entered service with the Russian army in 2008 , and the Russian Federation has been actively deploying it throughout the entire war in eastern Ukraine , starting at least since 2015 .
This article provides new details , as well as the time line of the identification and sightings of this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zhitel system was spotted once again on the night of November 28 , 2020 by a long-range OSCE SMM drone , 4 km north-west of the village of Kovske , Novoazovsk raion of Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine , about 5 km from the border with the Russian Federation .
The OSCE SMM reported this in its report No .
286/2020 issued on December 1 , 2020 .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this report .
Today we are making public this exclusive data .
Here are the approximate coordinates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was spotted again : 47°15 ’ 14.5″N 38°11 ’ 03.4″E .
Although the quality of the night image is rather low , the photo clearly reveals the characteristic visual features of the R-330Zh Zhitel system .
Also , the R-330Zh Zhitel and other Russian electronic warfare systems were spotted in the occupied part of the Donbas by an OSCE SMM drone in early 2020 , on February 16 .
Russia has been using the R-330Zh Zhitel in the Donbas at least since 2015 For the first time , the Russian electronic warfare R-330Zh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donbas in June 2015 – it was identified in the background of a photograph posted on social media by a collaborator of the Russian occupation forces from Vostok 11th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment ( military unit 08818 ) .
It was possible to determine the coordinates of the footage location : 48°05 ’ 18.8″N 37°54 ’ 30.2″E ( the city of Makiivka , Donetsk Oblast ) .
It is curious that in December 2015 , a press release of the Russian scientific enterprise NPP PROTEK , the manufacturer of this system , boasted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ real combat ( archive page ) .
In 2016 , InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community also published a unique investigation based on the analysis of screenshots from the control workstation of the R-330Zh Zhitel system .
These photos were obtained by Ukrainian hacktivists of the Trinity group from a hacked smartphone of a Russian serviceman .
The investigation indicated that the Russian Army actively deployed the R-330Zh system in hostilities against the Armed Forces of Ukraine outside the city of Debaltseve in the winter of 2015 .
The Russian system R-330Zh Zhitel has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aerial photographs during 2016 and 2017 .
For example , the picture below was taken 7 km from the contact line in November 2017 .
Coordinates : 48°37 ’ 46.3″N 39°12 ’ 54.1″E ( near Zemlyane village , Luhansk Oblast ) – read more in another InformNapalm investigation .
An example of the deployment and operation of the R-330Zh Zhitel system You can see a typical example of the deployment and operation of the Russian R-330Zh Zhitel system in the following video : At the 1267th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , the delegation of Ukraine yet again recalled that Russia had not responded to numerous requests for explanations regarding the presence in the temporarily occupied parts of the Donbas of modern Russian weapons and military equipment including the electronic warfare systems RB-341V Leer-3 , R-934B Sinitsa , R-330Zh Zhitel and others .
As of 2020 , the InformNapalm database of the Russian aggression against Ukraine has listed evidence of the deployment of at least 12 types of Russian electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems in Donbas .
• Proofs of the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • OSCE PA Representatives Receive Publications on Occupation of Crimea During US Elections Monitoring PHOTO REPORT ) • Exact coordinates of location with newest Russian EW systems in Donbas established This publication was prepared by Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
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The Russian R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare system has been repeatedly spotted in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas. It periodically featured both in the OSCE SMM reports and in the photographs that InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published in the course of their OSINT investigations. This system entered service with the Russian army in 2008, and the Russian Federation has been actively deploying it throughout the entire war in eastern Ukraine, starting at least since 2015. This article provides new details, as well as the time line of the identification and sightings of this system in the Donbas.
The R-330Zh Zhitel system was spotted once again on the night of November 28, 2020 by a long-range OSCE SMM drone, 4 km north-west of the village of Kovske, Novoazovsk raion of Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, about 5 km from the border with the Russian Federation. The OSCE SMM reported this in its report No. 286/2020 issued on December 1, 2020.
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has received visual confirmation of this report. Today we are making public this exclusive data. Here are the approximate coordinates of the location where Russian R-330Zh Zhitel was spotted again: 47°15’14.5″N 38°11’03.4″E.
Although the quality of the night image is rather low, the photo clearly reveals the characteristic visual features of the R-330Zh Zhitel system.
Also, the R-330Zh Zhitel and other Russian electronic warfare systems were spotted in the occupied part of the Donbas by an OSCE SMM drone in early 2020, on February 16.
Russia has been using the R-330Zh Zhitel in the Donbas at least since 2015
For the first time, the Russian electronic warfare R-330Zh Zhitel system was spotted in the Ukrainian Donbas in June 2015 – it was identified in the background of a photograph posted on social media by a collaborator of the Russian occupation forces from Vostok 11th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (military unit 08818). It was possible to determine the coordinates of the footage location: 48°05’18.8″N 37°54’30.2″E (the city of Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast). It is curious that in December 2015, a press release of the Russian scientific enterprise NPP PROTEK, the manufacturer of this system, boasted the deployment of the R-330Zh Zhitel in real combat (archive page).
In 2016, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community also published a unique investigation based on the analysis of screenshots from the control workstation of the R-330Zh Zhitel system. These photos were obtained by Ukrainian hacktivists of the Trinity group from a hacked smartphone of a Russian serviceman. The investigation indicated that the Russian Army actively deployed the R-330Zh system in hostilities against the Armed Forces of Ukraine outside the city of Debaltseve in the winter of 2015.
The Russian system R-330Zh Zhitel has been repeatedly spotted the Donbas on other better-quality aerial photographs during 2016 and 2017. For example, the picture below was taken 7 km from the contact line in November 2017. Coordinates: 48°37’46.3″N 39°12’54.1″E (near Zemlyane village, Luhansk Oblast) – read more in another InformNapalm investigation.
An example of the deployment and operation of the R-330Zh Zhitel system
You can see a typical example of the deployment and operation of the Russian R-330Zh Zhitel system in the following video:

Conclusion
At the 1267th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council which took place on May 14, 2020, the delegation of Ukraine yet again recalled that Russia had not responded to numerous requests for explanations regarding the presence in the temporarily occupied parts of the Donbas of modern Russian weapons and military equipment including the electronic warfare systems RB-341V Leer-3, R-934B Sinitsa, R-330Zh Zhitel and others.
As of 2020, the InformNapalm database of the Russian aggression against Ukraine has listed evidence of the deployment of at least 12 types of Russian electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems in Donbas.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko, infographics by Alex Alexidze specially for InformNapalm international intelligence community web site. Translated by Artem Velichko. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter
InformNapalm does not receive any financial support from any country’s government or large donors. Our site is kept alive solely through the contributions of our volunteers and readers. You can also volunteer or support the development of the unique volunteer intelligence resource with your donations through Patreon.