informnapalm--2020-03-22--Exclusive data: more Russian electronic warfare systems spotted in Donbas

Every two or three weeks , the latest Russian electronic warfare ( EW ) systems are featuring in the texts of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission ( SMM ) reports .
InformNapalm volunteers , in their turn , closely monitor this type of data and look for visual evidence that can give a better understanding of the purpose and logic behind a particular type of military hardware being in a certain area .
Our community also strives to provide our readers with the maximum possible amount of evidence that is not limited to text .
This article contains unique data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Federation in the Ukrainian Donbas .
This military activity began in the spring of 2014 and it continues in 2020 , whereas Russian military and political leadership continues to deny Russia ’ s direct participation and control of the hostilities .
We call on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to actively use the data from the OSCE SMM reports and the materials of open-source intelligence ( OSINT ) investigations of InformNapalm volunteers to step up diplomatic pressure on the aggressor state , strengthen the sanctions and other political measures that will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is only possible after full withdrawal of Russian weaponry , military equipment , servicemen and mercenaries from Ukraine .
The regular OSCE SMM report No .
60/2020 of March 12 , 2020 revealed a new spot of deployment of three modern Russian EW systems in the southern outskirts of Luhansk : RB-341V Leer-3 , R-934B Sinitsa and RB-636 Svet-KU .
These systems also fell into the focus of multiple OSINT investigations of the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community .
For example , at the end of 2019 , we published a story titled Modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again ( PHOTO ) featuring exclusive photos and a list of 12 Russian systems spotted in Donbas during the war .
The presence of this sophisticated Russian military technology in the occupied territory of Ukraine is direct evidence of the military aggression of the Russian Federation .
A month ago , the OSCE SMM report No .
40/2020 of February 18 , 2020 contained other interesting information about three EW systems spotted by long-range SMM drones on February 16 : R-330Zh Zhitel , R-934B Sinitsa and RB-636 Svet-KU near the village of Verbova @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Through our HUMINT network , InformNapalm volunteers managed to obtain exclusive photos reiterating the spotting report of the SMM .
Having done some additional intelligence and refinement of the received data we could identify the likely location of the equipment and possible reasons for its deployment .
This photo has not been openly published before , it visually confirms and provides additional details to the text data of the OSCE report No .
40/2020 .
This photo became the starting point for an investigation by volunteers of the InformNapalm community .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
We are adding other photos of these systems for visual comparison of their elements .
The report lists the spotted vehicle as “ R-934B Sinitsa ” , but InformNapalm investigators have grounds to believe that this is a modification of that system , namely the R934BMV , which makes part of the Borisoglebsk-2 , a system recorded earlier in Donbas on multiple occasions .
Yet again , the RB-636 Svet-KU system got spotted by an OSCE SMM drone .
We should like to remind our readers that in 2016 InformNapalm first identified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protection system RB-636 Svet-KU which was spotted in a photo in Luhansk at the intersection of 50-letia SSSR and Kurchatov streets .
Our readers also helped us to establish that the system was operated by 18th Electronic Warfare Company ( military unit # L-05776 based in Luhansk ) of the 2nd Army Corps of the Russian occupation forces in Donbas .
The chassis of the system is bearing a tactical sign “ 18 in a square ” and the registration number LK 4686 .
In recent years , the Russian RB-636 Svet-KU system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SMM reports .
Conclusions on the OSCE SMM report No .
40/2020 According to the source data , the picture of deployed Russian EW systems was taken near the village of Verbova Balka , 28 km south-east of Donetsk ( information from OSCE report No .
40/2020 ) .
InformNapalm OSINT investigators identified the spot as being in the territory of the Mospino airfield , judging by the characteristic features of the terrain and the roof corner of the building .
Coordinates : 47°50 ’ 46.0″N 38°05 ’ 54.5″E .
The territory of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infrastructure which remained intact .
The distance from the front line is sufficient and optimal for using this airfield as a base for army UAVs .
For example , the Orlan-10 UAVs , which make part of the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system , are designed to jam and interfere with GSM communications .
The system is capable of simulating GSM base stations and sending faked SMS messages to subscribers in order to mislead or effect psychological pressure .
The powerful cover of this territory by Russian electronic warfare and radar systems also indicates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deployed in this area .
The Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system was also spotted by the OSCE SMM on March 10 , 2020 in the vicinity of Luhansk , which is recorded in the report No .
60/2020 .
Interestingly , on February 27 , InformNapalm readers sent us photos of SMS messages received in the city of Shchastia in the Novoaydar Raion of the Luhansk Oblast .
These photos also indirectly confirm the active use of RB-341V Leer-3 system and Orlan-10 drones by the Russian occupation forces for psychological operations against the Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Russian Federation continues to use its latest weapons and military technology in the Ukrainian Donbas .
This is increasingly recorded by international observers , but neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the President of Ukraine have given enough attention to these facts to call for tighter international sanctions against the aggressor state .
Read and share more from InformNapalm • Evidence collected : commander and crew of R-60 missile boat took part in the aggression against Ukraine • Personal identification of LLS Orsk commander who led the crew during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OSCE observers in Donbas .
Manipulations detected in reports • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • List of armament and military equipment of the Russian Army in Donbas .
• Award stigma of war criminals from the Russian Army , database and video overview • Crimea Behind the Curtain book made available to the public [ ukr ] Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Telegram .

Every two or three weeks, the latest Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are featuring in the texts of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reports. InformNapalm volunteers, in their turn, closely monitor this type of data and look for visual evidence that can give a better understanding of the purpose and logic behind a particular type of military hardware being in a certain area. Our community also strives to provide our readers with the maximum possible amount of evidence that is not limited to text. This article contains unique data proving the military activity of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian Donbas. This military activity began in the spring of 2014 and it continues in 2020, whereas Russian military and political leadership continues to deny Russia’s direct participation and control of the hostilities. We call on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to actively use the data from the OSCE SMM reports and the materials of open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations of InformNapalm volunteers to step up diplomatic pressure on the aggressor state, strengthen the sanctions and other political measures that will help achieve a real peace, which is only possible after full withdrawal of Russian weaponry, military equipment, servicemen and mercenaries from Ukraine.
Key reports of the OSCE SMM
The regular OSCE SMM report No. 60/2020 of March 12, 2020 revealed a new spot of deployment of three modern Russian EW systems in the southern outskirts of Luhansk: RB-341V Leer-3, R-934B Sinitsa and RB-636 Svet-KU. These systems also fell into the focus of multiple OSINT investigations of the InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community. For example, at the end of 2019, we published a story titled Modern Russian electronic warfare systems spotted in Donbas again (PHOTO) featuring exclusive photos and a list of 12 Russian systems spotted in Donbas during the war. The presence of this sophisticated Russian military technology in the occupied territory of Ukraine is direct evidence of the military aggression of the Russian Federation.
A month ago, the OSCE SMM report No. 40/2020 of February 18, 2020 contained other interesting information about three EW systems spotted by long-range SMM drones on February 16: R-330Zh Zhitel, R-934B Sinitsa and RB-636 Svet-KU near the village of Verbova Balka, 28 km southeast of Donetsk. Through our HUMINT network, InformNapalm volunteers managed to obtain exclusive photos reiterating the spotting report of the SMM. Having done some additional intelligence and refinement of the received data we could identify the likely location of the equipment and possible reasons for its deployment.
Spotting Russian EW with UAVs
This photo has not been openly published before, it visually confirms and provides additional details to the text data of the OSCE report No. 40/2020.
This photo became the starting point for an investigation by volunteers of the InformNapalm community. We made an identity check of this equipment.
We are adding other photos of these systems for visual comparison of their elements.
R-330Zh Zhitel
R-934B Sinitsa or R934BMV
The report lists the spotted vehicle as “R-934B Sinitsa”, but InformNapalm investigators have grounds to believe that this is a modification of that system, namely the R934BMV, which makes part of the Borisoglebsk-2, a system recorded earlier in Donbas on multiple occasions.
RB-636 Svet-KU
Yet again, the RB-636 Svet-KU system got spotted by an OSCE SMM drone.
We should like to remind our readers that in 2016 InformNapalm first identified the Russian mobile radio control and information protection system RB-636 Svet-KU which was spotted in a photo in Luhansk at the intersection of 50-letia SSSR and Kurchatov streets. Our readers also helped us to establish that the system was operated by 18th Electronic Warfare Company (military unit # L-05776 based in Luhansk) of the 2nd Army Corps of the Russian occupation forces in Donbas. The chassis of the system is bearing a tactical sign “18 in a square” and the registration number LK 4686.
In recent years, the Russian RB-636 Svet-KU system has been increasingly featuring on the OSCE SMM reports.
Conclusions on the OSCE SMM report No. 40/2020
According to the source data, the picture of deployed Russian EW systems was taken near the village of Verbova Balka, 28 km south-east of Donetsk (information from OSCE report No. 40/2020). InformNapalm OSINT investigators identified the spot as being in the territory of the Mospino airfield, judging by the characteristic features of the terrain and the roof corner of the building. Coordinates: 47°50’46.0″N 38°05’54.5″E.
The territory of the former soviet airfield has a suitable infrastructure which remained intact. The distance from the front line is sufficient and optimal for using this airfield as a base for army UAVs. For example, the Orlan-10 UAVs, which make part of the Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system, are designed to jam and interfere with GSM communications. The system is capable of simulating GSM base stations and sending faked SMS messages to subscribers in order to mislead or effect psychological pressure. The powerful cover of this territory by Russian electronic warfare and radar systems also indicates the likelihood of a Russian command post deployed in this area.
The Russian RB-341V Leer-3 system was also spotted by the OSCE SMM on March 10, 2020 in the vicinity of Luhansk, which is recorded in the report No. 60/2020.
Interestingly, on February 27, InformNapalm readers sent us photos of SMS messages received in the city of Shchastia in the Novoaydar Raion of the Luhansk Oblast. These photos also indirectly confirm the active use of RB-341V Leer-3 system and Orlan-10 drones by the Russian occupation forces for psychological operations against the Ukrainian military and the civilian population.
Сьогодні під м.Щастя в Новоайдарському районі Луганської області росіяни черговий раз проводили… Posted by Roman Burko on Thursday, February 27, 2020
Thus, the Russian Federation continues to use its latest weapons and military technology in the Ukrainian Donbas. This is increasingly recorded by international observers, but neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the President of Ukraine have given enough attention to these facts to call for tighter international sanctions against the aggressor state.
Read and share more from InformNapalm
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram.


informnapalm--2020-01-06--Russian offensive forces near Belarus and Ukraine: Klintsy

We are publishing a translation of an important investigation made by Dzianis Ivashin , the editor of the Belarusian team of InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community , which first appeared on the Belarusian independent media outlet novychas.by .
The investigation is dedicated to the rapid build-up of the Russian offensive forces in the vicinity of the border with Belarus and Ukraine .
After the start of Russian military aggression against Ukraine , the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation started establishing new military units to build up strike potential and create a single offensive front .
The new units formed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their permanent station locations , the terrain , infrastructure and available transport routes indicate high priority of the Belarusian strategic direction for the Russian military and political leadership .
Since 2018 , these units have started a substantial build-up of armaments and military equipment at their permanent stations , which by now poses an open threat to Belarus .
Build-up of Russian offensive forces near the border with Belarus and Ukraine In April 2016 , volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community were the first to discover and report the plans of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 28th Motorized Rifle Brigade ( MRB ) from Yekaterinburg to the border with Belarus and Ukraine .
It is significant that in May of that year , Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that “ new divisions will be created to counter the build-up of NATO forces at the Russian borders ” .
However , Belarus is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and has never officially expressed any intention to join .
At the same time , it is in a close military alliance with Russia .
Such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Russian media about the creation of a near the Belarusian border , were apparently designed to conceal the main objective for the deployment of new military facilities on the border with Belarus , which could become a bridgehead for further eventual escalation of westward aggression from Russia .
In May 2016 , the first subunits of the 28th MRB of the Central Military District were transferred from Yekaterinburg to the border areas with Belarus and Ukraine ( towns of Yelnya in Smolensk Oblast , and Klintsy in Bryansk Oblast ) .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 144th Motorized Rifle Division ( MRD ) , military unit # 61423 ( the unit number was inherited from the 28th MRB ) .
According to the new table of organization and equipment , the division makes part of the reorganized 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation .
A battalion of 2S19 Msta-S 152 mm self-propelled howitzers arriving by train at the border with Belarus and Ukraine At the moment , the 144th MRD has the following units : • It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and to upgrade 59th AR and 254th MRR .
The city of Klintsy , located in the zone with an elevated level of radiation due to the Chernobyl accident , only 34 kilometers from the border with the Mahiliow Voblast of Belarus and 42 kilometers from the Chernihiv Oblast of Ukraine , has become a permanent deployment location for two Russian infantry regiments .
The first unit to be based in Klintsy was the newly formed 488th MRR ( military unit # 12721 ) .
Since 2019 , it has been under command @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 , the units of the 28th MRB freshly redeployed from the Urals were located in the area to the north-west of Klintsy , near the village Filatov Khutor , A field camp for personnel and hardware was set up .
In the late 2016 and early 2017 , the personnel was moved to the territory of the restored military town # 2 ( coordinates of the location : 52°44 ’ 49.4″N 32°15 ’ 02.3″E ) .
Through open source intelligence we could determine that the personnel was quartered in two reconstructed three-story @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and in three combined two-story dormitories for 200 military men each .
Estimated capacity of the barracks in the garrison is up to 1,200 military men .
The territory of the restored military town # 2 with a permanent deployment location for the personnel of 488th MRR / Google Earth According to the approved master plan , two more dormitories were to be built on the garrison territory and one building was to be reconstructed to accommodate up to 700 more military men .
It was also planned to build at least 14 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a total of 470 vehicle parking positions .
However , as of October 2019 , the list of completed large facilities included five barracks , a reconstructed canteen for 1000 people , reconstructed regimental headquarters and parade ground .
Soldiers of the 488th MRR on the parade ground of military town # 2 in Klintsy From late 2016 and early 2017 , armaments and military equipment began to be moved from the camp site near Filatov Khutor to the village of Zaimishche , an administrative part of Klintsy located in the south of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ period from the end of June to September 2016 , they began to build a field storage for armament , military and special-purpose equipment ( 41 km from the border with Belarus ; coordinates of the location : 52°43 ’ 02.2″N 32°16 ’ 18.0″E ) .
The field storage in Zaimishche is organized on battalion principles .
Its layout and equipment provide , above all , the ability to quickly drive out the hardware in case of combat alert .
At the same time , the protective features of the terrain are practically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not screened or camouflaged .
The analysis of satellite images reveals that the 488th MRR consists of three mechanized infantry and one armored battalion , one howitzer and one artillery and missile battalion .
In addition to special military equipment , the regiment also has separate companies ( engineers , repairmen , communications , logistics support ) .
The satellite photos show armament and military equipment of the 488th MRR : up to 30 T-72 main battle tanks , almost 90 BMP-2 infantry mobility vehicles , other armored fighting vehicles ( AFV @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vehicles , dozens of artillery systems , including 12 units of 2A65 Msta-B towed 152-mm howitzers , several BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers .
We also found mobile equipment for the maintenance of armored vehicles and other hardware in the field .
Field storage and military camp built in 2018 , photo of October 2019 / TerraServer , DigitalGlobe It is significant that the total area of the military base in Zaimishche village in May 2018 was 25 hectares , whereas by October 2019 the plot more than doubled to over 60 hectares @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is set to further expand while its personnel and equipment is being upgraded and new subunits being formed .
Satellite photos for comparison of the Zaimishche base area , left – May 2018 , right – October 2019 / TerraServer , DigitalGlobe A significant increase in the area of the military facility in Zaimishche occurred due to the deployment in 2018 of the second military unit belonging to the 144th MRD , which now has a permanent deployment station .
This is the 254th MRR ( military unit # 91704 , permanent station @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Today , it is not yet a full regiment , but rather a battalion task force in terms of personnel and available hardware .
The analysis of satellite photos reveals that it consists of an infantry battalion equipped with up to 40 AFVs ( presumably BTR-80 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers ) and reinforced with a tank company ( at least 8 main battle tanks , probably T-72BA ) .
In addition , there are several dozens of artillery systems in service , including a battalion of 2A65 Msta-B towed 152-mm howitzers ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Grad multiple rocket launchers .
The staffing of this unit to a full regiment is still underway .
In the summer of 2018 , the construction of barracks for military personnel began on the territory of the field storage in Zaimishche .
For several months , until October 2018 , four modular structures were built with a total capacity to quarter at least 800 military men .
Most probably , the personnel of the 254th MRR is housed in them .
The active redeployment of military hardware from the Russian inland areas to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intensification of measures on the part of the Russian Federation to implement the so-called “ Union State ” .
Despite the fact that Belarus is one of the main military allies of Russia , with a joint regional alignment of forces and a joint air defense system , Russian command is deploying a self-sufficient attack front along the Belarusian border with the assets of the 144th MRD .
Directions of potential strikes by the units of the 144th MRD of the Russian Armed Forces / Google Maps The military base in Klintsy is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is connected to the city by rail and a regional highway .
It has become the permanent deployment location for the 28th MRB from Yekaterinburg , which gained significant combat experience during the Russian military aggression against Ukraine and Syria .
The newly redeployed and reorganized units of the Russian army have significant potential for conventional and hybrid military operations in Eastern Belarus , if other means to force the integration of Belarus with Russia prove ineffective .
This is clearly a factor of direct political and military pressure on the leadership of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of border control from Belarusian side and significant military buildup on the border with Russia in the Mahiliow and Gomel Voblasts significantly increase these threats .
Apart from the Belarusian strategic direction the newly redeployed units of the 144th MRD can be used by the Russian army against Ukraine as well .
A full-scale invasion scenario of the Russian Armed Forces into Ukraine provides for the use of the territory of Belarus as a massive bridgehead for a strategic offensive with mechanized infantry reinforced by the 1st Tank Army .
Elements of these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joint strategic military exercises .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome !
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• Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russian sociological centers study Belarus like Ukraine before the war • Latent adherents of the Russian World ideology at the General Staff of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • List of armament and military equipment of the Russian Army in Donbas .
• Award stigma of war criminals from the Russian Army .
Database and video overview • Crimea Behind the Curtain book made available to the public [ ukr ] • JIT published recordings of intercepted conversations and made a reference to SurkovLeaks

We are publishing a translation of an important investigation made by Dzianis Ivashin, the editor of the Belarusian team of InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community, which first appeared on the Belarusian independent media outlet novychas.by. The investigation is dedicated to the rapid build-up of the Russian offensive forces in the vicinity of the border with Belarus and Ukraine.
After the start of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation started establishing new military units to build up strike potential and create a single offensive front. The new units formed in 2016 at the border with Belarus, their permanent station locations, the terrain, infrastructure and available transport routes indicate high priority of the Belarusian strategic direction for the Russian military and political leadership.
Since 2018, these units have started a substantial build-up of armaments and military equipment at their permanent stations, which by now poses an open threat to Belarus.
Build-up of Russian offensive forces near the border with Belarus and Ukraine
In April 2016, volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community were the first to discover and report the plans of the Russian Armed Forces to redeploy units of the 28th Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) from Yekaterinburg to the border with Belarus and Ukraine. It is significant that in May of that year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that “new divisions will be created to counter the build-up of NATO forces at the Russian borders”. However, Belarus is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and has never officially expressed any intention to join. At the same time, it is in a close military alliance with Russia.
Such statements, together with reports circulated by the Russian media about the creation of a “heavy armored fist” near the Belarusian border, were apparently designed to conceal the main objective for the deployment of new military facilities on the border with Belarus, which could become a bridgehead for further eventual escalation of westward aggression from Russia.
In May 2016, the first subunits of the 28th MRB of the Central Military District were transferred from Yekaterinburg to the border areas with Belarus and Ukraine (towns of Yelnya in Smolensk Oblast, and Klintsy in Bryansk Oblast). They gave a start to the deployment of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), military unit #61423 (the unit number was inherited from the 28th MRB). According to the new table of organization and equipment, the division makes part of the reorganized 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
A battalion of 2S19 Msta-S 152 mm self-propelled howitzers arriving by train at the border with Belarus and Ukraine
At the moment, the 144th MRD has the following units:
488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR),
254th MRR,
59th Armored Regiment (AR)
856th Self-propelled Artillery and Missile Regiment,
1259th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment,
Separate anti-aircraft missile and anti-tank battalions,
5 separate battalions and 3 separate companies,
It is planned to deploy another infantry regiment and to upgrade 59th AR and 254th MRR.
488th Motorized Rifle Regiment
The city of Klintsy, located in the zone with an elevated level of radiation due to the Chernobyl accident, only 34 kilometers from the border with the Mahiliow Voblast of Belarus and 42 kilometers from the Chernihiv Oblast of Ukraine, has become a permanent deployment location for two Russian infantry regiments.
The first unit to be based in Klintsy was the newly formed 488th MRR (military unit #12721). Since 2019, it has been under command of Colonel Vladimir Koralo.
Commander of the 488th MRR Colonel Vladimir Koralo / klintsy.info
Since May 2016, the units of the 28th MRB freshly redeployed from the Urals were located in the area to the north-west of Klintsy, near the village Filatov Khutor, A field camp for personnel and hardware was set up.
Field Camp (bottom left) and field vehicle storage of 488th MRR, June 2016 / TerraServer, DigitalGlobe
In the late 2016 and early 2017, the personnel was moved to the territory of the restored military town #2 (coordinates of the location: 52°44’49.4″N 32°15’02.3″E). Through open source intelligence we could determine that the personnel was quartered in two reconstructed three-story open-layout barracks designed for 300 soldiers, and in three combined two-story dormitories for 200 military men each. Estimated capacity of the barracks in the garrison is up to 1,200 military men.
The territory of the restored military town #2 with a permanent deployment location for the personnel of 488th MRR / Google Earth
According to the approved master plan, two more dormitories were to be built on the garrison territory and one building was to be reconstructed to accommodate up to 700 more military men. It was also planned to build at least 14 storage facilities for military hardware designed for a total of 470 vehicle parking positions. However, as of October 2019, the list of completed large facilities included five barracks, a reconstructed canteen for 1000 people, reconstructed regimental headquarters and parade ground.
Soldiers of the 488th MRR on the parade ground of military town #2 in Klintsy
From late 2016 and early 2017, armaments and military equipment began to be moved from the camp site near Filatov Khutor to the village of Zaimishche, an administrative part of Klintsy located in the south of this city. Here, in the period from the end of June to September 2016, they began to build a field storage for armament, military and special-purpose equipment (41 km from the border with Belarus; coordinates of the location: 52°43’02.2″N 32°16’18.0″E).
Field equipment storage of the 488th MRR, Klintsy, Zaimishche village
Field equipment storage of the 488th MRR, Klintsy, Zaimishche village
The field storage in Zaimishche is organized on battalion principles. Its layout and equipment provide, above all, the ability to quickly drive out the hardware in case of combat alert. At the same time, the protective features of the terrain are practically not used; the vehicles and armament are not screened or camouflaged.
Previously / Google Earth
Currently / Google Earth
The analysis of satellite images reveals that the 488th MRR consists of three mechanized infantry and one armored battalion, one howitzer and one artillery and missile battalion.
Field storage of the 488th MRR, October 2019 / TerraServer, DigitalGlobe
In addition to special military equipment, the regiment also has separate companies (engineers, repairmen, communications, logistics support). The satellite photos show armament and military equipment of the 488th MRR: up to 30 T-72 main battle tanks, almost 90 BMP-2 infantry mobility vehicles, other armored fighting vehicles (AFV), dozens of different armored support vehicles, dozens of artillery systems, including 12 units of 2A65 Msta-B towed 152-mm howitzers, several BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers. We also found mobile equipment for the maintenance of armored vehicles and other hardware in the field.
Field storage and military camp built in 2018, photo of October 2019 / TerraServer, DigitalGlobe
It is significant that the total area of the military base in Zaimishche village in May 2018 was 25 hectares, whereas by October 2019 the plot more than doubled to over 60 hectares. The territory of this military facility is set to further expand while its personnel and equipment is being upgraded and new subunits being formed.
Satellite photos for comparison of the Zaimishche base area, left – May 2018, right – October 2019 / TerraServer, DigitalGlobe
254th Motorized Rifle Regiment
A significant increase in the area of the military facility in Zaimishche occurred due to the deployment in 2018 of the second military unit belonging to the 144th MRD, which now has a permanent deployment station. This is the 254th MRR (military unit #91704, permanent station in Zaimishche village, Klintsy).
Today, it is not yet a full regiment, but rather a battalion task force in terms of personnel and available hardware. The analysis of satellite photos reveals that it consists of an infantry battalion equipped with up to 40 AFVs (presumably BTR-80 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers) and reinforced with a tank company (at least 8 main battle tanks, probably T-72BA). In addition, there are several dozens of artillery systems in service, including a battalion of 2A65 Msta-B towed 152-mm howitzers (12 pieces recorded) and several BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers. The staffing of this unit to a full regiment is still underway.
In the summer of 2018, the construction of barracks for military personnel began on the territory of the field storage in Zaimishche. For several months, until October 2018, four modular structures were built with a total capacity to quarter at least 800 military men. Most probably, the personnel of the 254th MRR is housed in them.
Modular military barracks and infrastructure, Zaimishche village, Klintsy, October 2019 / TerraServer, DigitalGlobe
Conclusions
The active redeployment of military hardware from the Russian inland areas to the border with Belarus coincides with the intensification of measures on the part of the Russian Federation to implement the so-called “Union State”. Despite the fact that Belarus is one of the main military allies of Russia, with a joint regional alignment of forces and a joint air defense system, Russian command is deploying a self-sufficient attack front along the Belarusian border with the assets of the 144th MRD.
Directions of potential strikes by the units of the 144th MRD of the Russian Armed Forces / Google Maps
The military base in Klintsy is located only 90 kilometers from Gomel and is connected to the city by rail and a regional highway. It has become the permanent deployment location for the 28th MRB from Yekaterinburg, which gained significant combat experience during the Russian military aggression against Ukraine and Syria. The newly redeployed and reorganized units of the Russian army have significant potential for conventional and hybrid military operations in Eastern Belarus, if other means to force the integration of Belarus with Russia prove ineffective. This is clearly a factor of direct political and military pressure on the leadership of the Republic of Belarus.
The absence of border control from Belarusian side and significant military buildup on the border with Russia in the Mahiliow and Gomel Voblasts significantly increase these threats.
Apart from the Belarusian strategic direction the newly redeployed units of the 144th MRD can be used by the Russian army against Ukraine as well. A full-scale invasion scenario of the Russian Armed Forces into Ukraine provides for the use of the territory of Belarus as a massive bridgehead for a strategic offensive with mechanized infantry reinforced by the 1st Tank Army. Elements of these actions have already been trained during the Zapad-2017 joint strategic military exercises.
Author: Dzianis Ivashin
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
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informnapalm--2020-01-09--More Russians among OSCE observers in Donbas. Manipulations detected in reports

On January 7 , 2020 , Ukrainian representatives at the Joint Center for Control and Coordination ( JCCC ) reported on the official Facebook page of the Joint Forces Operation that the OSCE SMM in its reports for January 4 and 6 , 2020 manipulated sensitive information about violation of the weapons withdrawal agreements .
The OSCE SMM reported as a violation the presence of 9K33 Osa anti-aircraft missile systems located dozens of kilometers deep into the government-controlled territory and away from the contact line .
The SCCC , in turn , emphasized that according to the Minsk protocols , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tactical missiles are subject to withdrawal , whereas the Minsk protocols do not touch upon the withdrawal of anti-aircraft missile systems .
The JCCC also emphasized that the disclosure of such information is contrary to the principles of neutrality and impartiality , which should guide the OSCE SMM in providing sensitive defense information .
Volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community have grounds to believe that the manipulation in the reports is associated with an increase in the number of citizens of the Russian Federation among OSCE SMM observers .
As of August 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian Federation among the observers and not a single Ukrainian , whereas in the report of the OSCE SMM on the composition of the mission as of December 2019 , there are already 41 citizens of the Russian Federation .
It should also be noted that the mission includes nationals of other countries loyal to the Russian Federation .
In early December 2019 , representatives of 19 countries voted against the resolution of the UN General Assembly calling on Russia to withdraw its troops from the annexed Crimean peninsula .
Among them were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and others .
As of December 2019 , there were 5 observers from Belarus as part of the OSCE SMM in the Donbas , 2 from Armenia , 23 from Kyrgyzstan , 15 from Serbia .
There are 86 observers in the Mission ( including the Russians ) who could be working in the interests of the Russian Federation opening a significant potential for manipulation and distortion of information .
Moreover , there is not a single citizen of Ukraine among the observers .
In November 2019 , after the UN court in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and recognized its jurisdiction in the lawsuit of Ukraine against the Russian Federation , the InformNapalm international volunteer community urged to raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian representatives from the SMM , as Russian Federation is legally recognized as an aggressor state , and a side directly interested in continuing the war .
However , citizens of the Russian Federation and citizens of other countries loyal to Russia remained in the OSCE SMM in Donbas , and most probably continued to work in the interests of Russian intelligence and propaganda .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the facts of information manipulation , it is necessary to intensify the process of their removal from the documenting process of the monitoring mission .
These issues should be raised not only by volunteers and activists , but also by Ukrainian policy makers and diplomats .
• OSCE SMM withheld information about Russian EW systems in Donbas for two weeks • 2B16 ‘ Nona-K ’ Artillery Mount Near Mariupol – Our Signal to OSCE • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the invasion of Crimea • List of armament and military equipment of the Russian Army in Donbas .
• Award stigma of war criminals from the Russian Army Database and video overview • Crimea Behind the Curtain book made available to the public • Russian drone Orlan-10 consists of parts produced in the USA and other countries – photo evidence • JIT posted recordings of intercepted conversations and made a reference to SurkovLeaks This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm .
Translated by Artem Velichko .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

On January 7, 2020, Ukrainian representatives at the Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC) reported on the official Facebook page of the Joint Forces Operation that the OSCE SMM in its reports for January 4 and 6, 2020 manipulated sensitive information about violation of the weapons withdrawal agreements.
The OSCE SMM reported as a violation the presence of 9K33 Osa anti-aircraft missile systems located dozens of kilometers deep into the government-controlled territory and away from the contact line. The SCCC, in turn, emphasized that according to the Minsk protocols, tanks, while artillery, MLRS, tactical missiles are subject to withdrawal, whereas the Minsk protocols do not touch upon the withdrawal of anti-aircraft missile systems. The JCCC also emphasized that the disclosure of such information is contrary to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, which should guide the OSCE SMM in providing sensitive defense information.
Volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community have grounds to believe that the manipulation in the reports is associated with an increase in the number of citizens of the Russian Federation among OSCE SMM observers.
As of August 2019, there were 35 citizens of the Russian Federation among the observers and not a single Ukrainian, whereas in the report of the OSCE SMM on the composition of the mission as of December 2019, there are already 41 citizens of the Russian Federation. It should also be noted that the mission includes nationals of other countries loyal to the Russian Federation.
In early December 2019, representatives of 19 countries voted against the resolution of the UN General Assembly calling on Russia to withdraw its troops from the annexed Crimean peninsula. Among them were Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and others.
As of December 2019, there were 5 observers from Belarus as part of the OSCE SMM in the Donbas, 2 from Armenia, 23 from Kyrgyzstan, 15 from Serbia. There are 86 observers in the Mission (including the Russians) who could be working in the interests of the Russian Federation opening a significant potential for manipulation and distortion of information. Moreover, there is not a single citizen of Ukraine among the observers.
In November 2019, after the UN court in The Hague dismissed all the Russian objections and recognized its jurisdiction in the lawsuit of Ukraine against the Russian Federation, the InformNapalm international volunteer community urged to raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian representatives from the SMM, as Russian Federation is legally recognized as an aggressor state, and a side directly interested in continuing the war.
However, citizens of the Russian Federation and citizens of other countries loyal to Russia remained in the OSCE SMM in Donbas, and most probably continued to work in the interests of Russian intelligence and propaganda.
Following the latest statements by the JCCC on the facts of information manipulation, it is necessary to intensify the process of their removal from the documenting process of the monitoring mission. These issues should be raised not only by volunteers and activists, but also by Ukrainian policy makers and diplomats.
Read more from InformNapalm
This publication was prepared especially for InformNapalm. Translated by Artem Velichko. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-01-25--InformNapalm Survey: We Predict the Situation in the Zones of Troops Withdrawal in the Donbas to Esc

InformNapalm Survey: We Predict the Situation in the Zones of Troops Withdrawal in the Donbas to Escalate

On January 17 , 2020 , the Ukrayinsky Tyzhden Web site published a next regular survey done by the volunteers of the InformNapalm international community , dedicated to the escalation of events in the Donbas region ’ s areas from where the Ukrainian troops had been withdrawn in fall 2019 .
It ’ s now the sixth year of the Donbas remaining to be a hot spot on the European map .
Just like experts and military professionals have predicted , in no case a withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces makes the adversary lower their activity ; on the contrary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intensify the aggression .
On January 15 , the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky had a telephone conversation with the chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel , where they discussed , in particular , the issue of peace settlement in the Donbas .
He noted that Ukraine has already made a list of the points where the next troop withdrawals will take place .
Meanwhile , in Minsk , during sessions of the security section of the Trilateral Contact Group ( TCG ) they discussed 9 possible points of the bilateral withdrawal .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the sides have decided only on one actual withdrawal site , the one near the Hnutove entrance-exit checkpoint .
In these negotiations , Russia insisted on withdrawal of the troops in the areas of Schastia , Veselohorivka , Rozsadky , Shyrokyne , and in the vicinity of Avdiivka and Hnutove checkpoint .
In turn , the Ukrainian side offered to withdraw troops neat the railroad bridge in Stanytsya Luhanska , near Avdiivka , Novoselivka Druha , and the Hnutove checkpoint .
We need to remind our readers here that in May 2018 it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with guided anti-tank missiles PTUR by the Russian terrorist armed units , when there were civilians at the checkpoint .
The Enemy Goes for Escalation However , the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops that had been accomplished previously did not result in creation of the security zone as it had been declared .
For example , in the beginning of November 2019 , a withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops and their military facilities was completed near Zolote township of the Luhansk district .
Nonetheless , just this week the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ Operation reported yet another series of episodes when the armed Russian terrorist units opened fire using heavy artillery in that area .
The Ukrainian military specialists identified the units on the other side that kept covering our positions near Orikhove and Zolote with mortar shells .
And on January 16 , 2020 the Russian occupational troops fired at the Ukrainian positions near Orikhove ( 4.5 kilometers from Zolote ) with heavy artillery guns of the 152 mm and 122 mm caliber , and with 120-mm and 82-mm caliber mortars .
How Does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Numerous investigations done by the InformNapalm international volunteers ’ community revealed that the Artillery systems of the 152 mm caliber were , occasionally , used by the Russian terrorist troops .
For example , in February 2019 , they found that the terrorists used a modern Russia-made 152-mm guided artillery shell of the Krasnopol type , with a 9E421 semi-active self-targeting warhead .
During the attack with the use of this weapon , the Russians hit the house of a peaceful civilian called Viktor Frolov .
The building was completely ruined .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reconnaissance clearly documented transportation of at least four heavy artillery guns 2A36 Giatsint-B ( Hyacinth ) of the 152 mm caliber .
The InformNapalm volunteers also have proof that these guns were towed by Russian military trucks Ural-632301 , which never were on the list of weapons assigned for the Ukrainian army and thus can not be described as “ trophies ” allegedly seized from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donbas .
Regarding the 122 mm artillery , the InformNapalm volunteers also have revealed , many times , the sites of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ complete list of the personnel and the weapons of the self-propelled artillery division of the Russian terrorist troops .
Russia Increases Her Influence in the Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE in the Donbas Formerly , the Special Monitoring Mission ( SMM ) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ( OSCE ) rather frequently used to highlight the uncovering of the heavy artillery systems beyond their officially agreed locations in the Donbas .
However , in the last half-year the reports about the violations by the Russian occupational troops became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers began , in their reports , to shift the focus towards the reports about the Ukrainian military devices that are , in fact , located far away from the demarcation line and are a part of the anti-aircraft defense , like the anti-aircraft missile systems 9K33 Osa .
The InformNapalm volunteers noted that this re-orientation of the SMM observers was strange and suggested that this could be related with an increase of the number of Russian citizens among the SMM observers in the Donbas .
Overall , by December 2019 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers grew to 41 , while the mission also includes 5 observers from Belarus , 2 from Armenia , 23 from Kyrgyzstan and 15 from Serbia – the countries that have traditionally and routinely voted in favor of Russia ’ s interests in the UN and have close political and economical ties with Moscow .
For example , in the beginning of December 2019 , these countries voted , together with the Russian Federation , against a UN resolution that urged Russia to withdraw her troops from the Crimea peninsula .
Meanwhile , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SMM observers .
This situation means that Russia , the aggressor , has much opportunity to manipulate the information in the SMM reports .
Russia can add data or delete the data that are inconvenient for the Russian Federation .
Of course , as long as it has representatives from other countries , the OSCE mission retains its potential for accumulating important data about the Russian military aggression , and it does every now and then publish , among other , the data that are absolutely uncomfortable for the Russian Federation .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year 2019 , they published the data about the contemporary Russian EW systems located in the Donbas .
On January 15 , 2020 there were also communications from the war zone about the Russian snipers beefing up their activity .
There was a separate survey from InformNapalm , called “ Sniper Fire an Propaganda Smokescreen.
” Translated by George Pinchuk .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

On January 17, 2020, the Ukrayinsky Tyzhden Web site published a next regular survey done by the volunteers of the InformNapalm international community, dedicated to the escalation of events in the Donbas region’s areas from where the Ukrainian troops had been withdrawn in fall 2019.
It’s now the sixth year of the Donbas remaining to be a hot spot on the European map. Just like experts and military professionals have predicted, in no case a withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces makes the adversary lower their activity; on the contrary, it only fuels their courage to intensify the aggression.
Next “Bilateral Withdrawals…”
On January 15, the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky had a telephone conversation with the chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, where they discussed, in particular, the issue of peace settlement in the Donbas. He noted that Ukraine has already made a list of the points where the next troop withdrawals will take place. Meanwhile, in Minsk, during sessions of the security section of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) they discussed 9 possible points of the bilateral withdrawal. According to journalists’ testimonies, so far the sides have decided only on one actual withdrawal site, the one near the Hnutove entrance-exit checkpoint. In these negotiations, Russia insisted on withdrawal of the troops in the areas of Schastia, Veselohorivka, Rozsadky, Shyrokyne, and in the vicinity of Avdiivka and Hnutove checkpoint. In turn, the Ukrainian side offered to withdraw troops neat the railroad bridge in Stanytsya Luhanska, near Avdiivka, Novoselivka Druha, and the Hnutove checkpoint. We need to remind our readers here that in May 2018 it was the Hnutove checkpoint that was shelled with guided anti-tank missiles PTUR by the Russian terrorist armed units, when there were civilians at the checkpoint.
The Enemy Goes for Escalation
However, the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops that had been accomplished previously did not result in creation of the security zone as it had been declared. For example, in the beginning of November 2019, a withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops and their military facilities was completed near Zolote township of the Luhansk district. Nonetheless, just this week the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the headquarters of the United Forces’ Operation reported yet another series of episodes when the armed Russian terrorist units opened fire using heavy artillery in that area. The Ukrainian military specialists identified the units on the other side that kept covering our positions near Orikhove and Zolote with mortar shells. And on January 16, 2020 the Russian occupational troops fired at the Ukrainian positions near Orikhove (4.5 kilometers from Zolote) with heavy artillery guns of the 152 mm and 122 mm caliber, and with 120-mm and 82-mm caliber mortars.
How Does the Enemy’s Heavy Artillery Work
Numerous investigations done by the InformNapalm international volunteers’ community revealed that the Artillery systems of the 152 mm caliber were, occasionally, used by the Russian terrorist troops. For example, in February 2019, they found that the terrorists used a modern Russia-made 152-mm guided artillery shell of the Krasnopol type, with a 9E421 semi-active self-targeting warhead. During the attack with the use of this weapon, the Russians hit the house of a peaceful civilian called Viktor Frolov. The building was completely ruined.
In November 2019, our volunteers’ aerial reconnaissance clearly documented transportation of at least four heavy artillery guns 2A36 Giatsint-B (Hyacinth) of the 152 mm caliber. The InformNapalm volunteers also have proof that these guns were towed by Russian military trucks Ural-632301, which never were on the list of weapons assigned for the Ukrainian army and thus cannot be described as “trophies” allegedly seized from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donbas.
Regarding the 122 mm artillery, the InformNapalm volunteers also have revealed, many times, the sites of its concentration, and even have compiled the complete list of the personnel and the weapons of the self-propelled artillery division of the Russian terrorist troops.
Russia Increases Her Influence in the Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE in the Donbas
Formerly, the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) rather frequently used to highlight the uncovering of the heavy artillery systems beyond their officially agreed locations in the Donbas. However, in the last half-year the reports about the violations by the Russian occupational troops became conspicuously fewer. Instead, the SMM observers began, in their reports, to shift the focus towards the reports about the Ukrainian military devices that are, in fact, located far away from the demarcation line and are a part of the anti-aircraft defense, like the anti-aircraft missile systems 9K33 Osa.
The InformNapalm volunteers noted that this re-orientation of the SMM observers was strange and suggested that this could be related with an increase of the number of Russian citizens among the SMM observers in the Donbas. Overall, by December 2019, the number of Russian citizens among the SMM observers grew to 41, while the mission also includes 5 observers from Belarus, 2 from Armenia, 23 from Kyrgyzstan and 15 from Serbia – the countries that have traditionally and routinely voted in favor of Russia’s interests in the UN and have close political and economical ties with Moscow. For example, in the beginning of December 2019, these countries voted, together with the Russian Federation, against a UN resolution that urged Russia to withdraw her troops from the Crimea peninsula. Meanwhile, there are no Ukrainian citizens among the SMM observers. This situation means that Russia, the aggressor, has much opportunity to manipulate the information in the SMM reports. Russia can add data or delete the data that are inconvenient for the Russian Federation.
Of course, as long as it has representatives from other countries, the OSCE mission retains its potential for accumulating important data about the Russian military aggression, and it does every now and then publish, among other, the data that are absolutely uncomfortable for the Russian Federation. For example, at the end of the year 2019, they published the data about the contemporary Russian EW systems located in the Donbas.
On January 15, 2020 there were also communications from the war zone about the Russian snipers beefing up their activity. There was a separate survey from InformNapalm, called “Sniper Fire an Propaganda Smokescreen.”
Translated by George Pinchuk. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-01-25--InformNapalm survey: hostilities will escalate in troops withdrawal zones in Donbas


informnapalm--2020-01-27--Donbas conflict intensification: Militants transported 120- and 122-mm guns via residential areas da

Donbas conflict intensification: Militants transported 120- and 122-mm guns via residential areas day before

Russia ’ s hybrid troops had been preparing for the intensification of fighting in Donbas of January 24 , 2020 , for several days .
This is the conclusion made as a result of the OSINT analysis by volunteers of InformNapalm .
On January 22 and 23 , on the eve of the assault , the militants had transported heavy artillery systems via residential areas of the occupied Donbas settlements .
It was stated in new OSCE SMM Report No .
19/2020 dated January 24 that three self-propelled 2S9 ( 120 mm ) mortars were seen driving westward in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It was evident from the data obtained from other sources that these guns were used to shell emplacements of the Ukrainian Army a day after .
It could be concluded on the basis of comments made by Donetsk locals in the social media on January 24 that the guns in question had not just been “ driving ” , but also had “ worked ” intensively .
Thus , the Russian militants shelled the Ukrainian Army emplacements with gunfire in the evening of January 24 using , for instance , 120-mm mortars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
These data are confirmed by the morning JFO bulletin of January 25 , 2020 .
We quote here the most interesting details correlated with the above-mentioned OSCE SMM report about the movements of the militants ’ artillery .
“ The Russian forces violated ceasefire 12 times on January 24 .
Enemy forces shelled our emplacements using 122-mm artillery systems , 120-mm and 82-mm mortars prohibited by the Minsk agreements… – twice near Opytne with 14 rounds from a 120-mm mortar – near Orikhove with 9 rounds from 122-mm artillery systems ” .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ bulletin has been writing about shelling “ near Orikhove ” for a number of days ; to provide perspective , Orikhove is merely 3 km away from the force separation area in Zolote .
InformNapalm survey : hostilities will escalate in troops withdrawal zones in Donbas Now , we have the context for reading the OSCE SMM report that mentioned 3 D-30 howitzers towed near Perevalsk of Luhansk Oblast on January 22 ( however , they forgot to state in the report an important detail that these were 122-mm howitzers ) ; we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ artillery systems shelled Orikhove ( near Zolote ) .
Having analyzed the OSCE reports with details dated January 22–23 and reconciled them with OSINT data , InformNapalm ’ s volunteers found out that Russia ’ s hybrid forces moved their heavy artillery systems well in advance in order to escalate and shell the Ukrainian Army emplacements in Donbas on January 24—for instance , in the vicinity of the forces separation zone near Zolote .
This shelling by the Russian hybrid forces may have been linked to the 5th anniversary of the bombardment of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also under the command of the Russian officers .
Some of them were later promoted and made generals at the order of Russia ’ s president Vladimir Putin .
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko especially for InformNapalm .
Translated by Oleksand Ivanov .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

Russia’s hybrid troops had been preparing for the intensification of fighting in Donbas of January 24, 2020, for several days. This is the conclusion made as a result of the OSINT analysis by volunteers of InformNapalm. On January 22 and 23, on the eve of the assault, the militants had transported heavy artillery systems via residential areas of the occupied Donbas settlements.
It was stated in new OSCE SMM Report No. 19/2020 dated January 24 that three self-propelled 2S9 Nona-S (120 mm) mortars were seen driving westward in a residential area of Kyivskyi district of Donetsk.
It was evident from the data obtained from other sources that these guns were used to shell emplacements of the Ukrainian Army a day after.
It could be concluded on the basis of comments made by Donetsk locals in the social media on January 24 that the guns in question had not just been “driving”, but also had “worked” intensively. Thus, the Russian militants shelled the Ukrainian Army emplacements with gunfire in the evening of January 24 using, for instance, 120-mm 2S9 Nona-S mortars. Comment screenshots were published by Obozrevatel website.
Details from the Joint Forces Operation Report
These data are confirmed by the morning JFO bulletin of January 25, 2020. We quote here the most interesting details correlated with the above-mentioned OSCE SMM report about the movements of the militants’ artillery.
“The Russian forces violated ceasefire 12 times on January 24. Enemy forces shelled our emplacements using 122-mm artillery systems, 120-mm and 82-mm mortars prohibited by the Minsk agreements…
– twice near Opytne with 14 rounds from a 120-mm mortar
– near Orikhove with 9 rounds from 122-mm artillery systems”.
It is worth mentioning that the JFO bulletin has been writing about shelling “near Orikhove” for a number of days; to provide perspective, Orikhove is merely 3 km away from the force separation area in Zolote.
Read more: InformNapalm survey: hostilities will escalate in troops withdrawal zones in Donbas
Now, we have the context for reading the OSCE SMM report that mentioned 3 D-30 howitzers towed near Perevalsk of Luhansk Oblast on January 22 (however, they forgot to state in the report an important detail that these were 122-mm howitzers); we can see, however, that 122-mm artillery systems shelled Orikhove (near Zolote).
Conclusions
Having analyzed the OSCE reports with details dated January 22–23 and reconciled them with OSINT data, InformNapalm’s volunteers found out that Russia’s hybrid forces moved their heavy artillery systems well in advance in order to escalate and shell the Ukrainian Army emplacements in Donbas on January 24—for instance, in the vicinity of the forces separation zone near Zolote. This shelling by the Russian hybrid forces may have been linked to the 5th anniversary of the bombardment of Mariupol on January 24, 2015, also under the command of the Russian officers. Some of them were later promoted and made generals at the order of Russia’s president Vladimir Putin.
This publication was prepared by Roman Burko especially for InformNapalm. Translated by Oleksand Ivanov. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.


informnapalm--2020-01-27--Joint Forces Operation soldiers: “we stand by Ukrainian citizens”

On January 24 , Joint Forces Operation posted an update on their Facebook page : Today , a small section of the demarcation line in Ukraine between Zolote-4 and Orikhove townships is one of the hottest spots of the war zone in the area of Luhansk .
The adversary is at an arm ’ s reach .
The enemy positions are very close to the positions of the Ukrainian defenders .
Leonid , a Ukrainian Army serviceman , shows us an armful of debris from artillery and mortar shells collected from nearby craters left by shelling , and says , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the occupier troops open fire on us .
They use their artillery , and , in parallel , shoot their grenade launchers and machine guns.
” Earlier today , the Russian occupiers hit a few more residential buildings in Khutir Vilnyy village – for yet another time .
Luckily , there were no fatalities among civilian residents ; however , artillery shells hit a garage and ruined utility rooms , mortar shrapnel damaged several houses and blew out windows .
The shelling damaged a power line .
Every next shelling tells , over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cruel , and unscrupulous the adversary is .
The Russian occupiers fire at residential areas , knowing perfectly well that the people who dwell there are peaceful civilians , mostly elderly and bed-ridden people who have nowhere to go .
The forward-deployed Ukrainian troops positioned nearby would never abandon these people and leave them on their own .
The soldiers bring food and drinking water for the local residents , help them to stock firewood , buy and deliver medicines .
In short , they care about the residents like those were their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called Serhiy tells us , “ We will never abandon these people .
They have always been under our care , and they always will be .
And we do keep the enemy at bay .
We watch the adversary around the clock .
If the Russian occupiers think that they got the Lady Luck on their side , they are mistaken .
We are ready for any shenanigans of our enemy , and , most importantly , we know how to put a stop on any belligerent plans of the occupiers.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rest off duty , nevertheless he runs to a local pharmacy to buy an elderly local resident the medicines she needs .
In this incredibly difficult situation near the line of fire , this defender of Ukraine is about the only help she can get .
We continue to defend Ukraine from the aggressor !
Together , we will win !
Glory to Ukraine !
Translated by George Pinchuk Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

On January 24, Joint Forces Operation posted an update on their Facebook page:
Today, a small section of the demarcation line in Ukraine between Zolote-4 and Orikhove townships is one of the hottest spots of the war zone in the area of Luhansk. The adversary is at an arm’s reach. The enemy positions are very close to the positions of the Ukrainian defenders.
Leonid, a Ukrainian Army serviceman, shows us an armful of debris from artillery and mortar shells collected from nearby craters left by shelling, and says, “The moment it gets dark, the occupier troops open fire on us. They use their artillery, and, in parallel, shoot their grenade launchers and machine guns.”
Earlier today, the Russian occupiers hit a few more residential buildings in Khutir Vilnyy village – for yet another time. Luckily, there were no fatalities among civilian residents; however, artillery shells hit a garage and ruined utility rooms, mortar shrapnel damaged several houses and blew out windows. The shelling damaged a power line.
Every next shelling tells, over and over again, how cynical, cruel, and unscrupulous the adversary is. The Russian occupiers fire at residential areas, knowing perfectly well that the people who dwell there are peaceful civilians, mostly elderly and bed-ridden people who have nowhere to go.
The forward-deployed Ukrainian troops positioned nearby would never abandon these people and leave them on their own. The soldiers bring food and drinking water for the local residents, help them to stock firewood, buy and deliver medicines. In short, they care about the residents like those were their own family.
A Ukrainian army serviceman called Serhiy tells us, “We will never abandon these people. They have always been under our care, and they always will be. And we do keep the enemy at bay. We watch the adversary around the clock. If the Russian occupiers think that they got the Lady Luck on their side, they are mistaken. We are ready for any shenanigans of our enemy, and, most importantly, we know how to put a stop on any belligerent plans of the occupiers.”
Serhiy has only a few hours to rest off duty, nevertheless he runs to a local pharmacy to buy an elderly local resident the medicines she needs. In this incredibly difficult situation near the line of fire, this defender of Ukraine is about the only help she can get.
We continue to defend Ukraine from the aggressor! Together, we will win!
Glory to Ukraine!
Original: Операція об’єднаних сил / Joint Forces Operation
Translated by George Pinchuk Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
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informnapalm--2020-01-28--InformNapalm review: Black January of the Russo-Ukrainian war

In 2020 , Ukraine and the world remember many tragic anniversaries on the calendar of the Russo-Ukrainian war .
Five years have passed since these tragic dates , since the days of bloody acts of terrorism and war crimes committed by Russian hybrid troops – mercenaries , collaborators and active duty officers of the Russian Armed Forces .
After these tragedies , research materials have been published on the website of InformNapalm International Volunteer Community that shed light on important circumstances , presented evidence and reported the perpetrators of these crimes .
All of these publications have been translated into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them , volunteers remind the international community of the true face of the Russian Federation .
They remind of the atrocities of a country waging hybrid wars and carrying out terrorist attacks against civilians .
Unfortunately , the perpetrators of these terrible acts of terrorism and those who directed and coordinated their actions have not yet been punished , but these crimes have no statute of limitations ; the main thing is to remember about them .
On January 13 , 2015 , Russian terrorists shelled a civilian bus near the town of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and injured 18 .
In 2017 , the Prosecutor General ’ s Office of Ukraine had named the organizers of the shelling .
Investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine brought offences of a serious crime to a citizen of the Russian Federation , Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Anatoly Sinelnikov ( call sign Zakhar ) , who gave commands to the artillery units of pro-Russian terrorists .
On January 22 , 2015 , Russian terrorists fired at Donetskmiskmash ( Bosse ) bus stop in Donetsk .
As a result , 8 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were injured .
Immediately after the firing , the militants used the tragedy for the purpose of information and psychological pressure .
They brought to the scene of the tragedy 17 Ukrainian prisoners of war , publicly humiliated and beat them , and filmed it on video .
Then the prisoners were forced to load the bodies of the dead on a vehicle .
Based on photos and videos from the scene of the tragedy , the volunteers conducted independent OSINT investigations that indicated that the shelling was carried out by terrorists from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a photo of Christopher Miller , who took a close-up shot of a phone with a compass near a crater at the site of a bus attack , the volunteers determined the direction from which the shelling came .
The volunteers ’ conclusion coincided with the OSCE ’ s findings and indicated that the firing was done from a close proximity , and the Ukrainian artillery , which was more than 15 km away from the affected area , was not involved .
Two days after the shelling , observers from Human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the site were filled up on the orders from “ local authorities ” and , therefore any further examination and research was impossible.In addition to analyzing photos and videos from the site of the shooting , volunteers from the InformNapalm community monitored social networking messages from local residents on the day of the tragedy and found that most of them reported mortar rather than artillery shelling and indicated that the mortar had “ worked ” from housing blocks in Donetsk .
The time when the residents heard the mortar bombardment roughly coincided with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same time , Russian propaganda tried to distort information about this tragedy and shift the blame for it to the Ukrainian side .
However , on January 28 , 2015 , DPR military themselves reported the detention of a group of three saboteurs who were moving around the city in a vehicle with a mortar , all three were citizens of the Russian Federation .
On January 24 , 2015 , Russian military and collaborators fired shells at the Vostochny neighborhood in Mariupol from rocket launchers .
29 people were killed and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and teenagers.The investigation into this large-scale terrorist attack took a long time , and only on May 7 , 2018 , at a press briefing , the Security Service of Ukraine presented evidence that the firing of Mariupol was carried out by personnel of the Russian military .
From the territory of Russia , the operation was directly directed by the chief of missile troops and artillery of the Southern military district of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation , Major-General Stepan Yaroshchuk .
In the temporarily occupied Donetsk , the shelling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Armed Forces Alexander Tsaplyuk with the call sign Gorets .
The coordination of the Russian missile units was carried out by Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Maxim Vlasov with the call sign Yugra .
In 2019 , before the anniversary of the Mariupol shelling , InformNapalm volunteers , using information from open sources , gathered intelligence and additional data on Russian military personnel involved in the war crime and the killing of dozens of civilians .
Volunteers found that after the terrorist attack in Mariupol , having gained experience in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Russian Colonel Alexander Tsaplyuk was appointed chief of the Penza Artillery Institute , and in 2017 , Vladimir Putin personally awarded him a military rank of Major General.It is also interesting that another military offender involved in the tragedy , Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Oleg Tsekov was appointed personally by Vladimir Putin by his private order , to the post of Deputy Commander of the 8th Army of the Southern Military District , and also promoted to the rank of Major General .
Other Russian officers who have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general ranks are listed in the InformNapalm research materials .
The Russian media even wrote that the commanding officers of the 8th Army were selected especially carefully , with the preference given to “ combatants ” .
This particular approach was due to the fact that the 8th Army and the 150th Motorized Infantry Brigade that was part of it were deployed in a strategic direction for Russia – near the border with Ukraine.In 2020 , when we commemorate the 5th anniversary of the terrible acts of terrorism and war crimes against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ direct leadership of the Russian military , the Russian Federation does not admit its responsibility .
Vladimir Putin continues to make allegations that the Russian Federation is not a party to the conflict .
He continues to visit international forums , to be greeted by the leaders of the Western democratic countries .
He shake hands with EU leaders , the President of the United States and the President of Ukraine , who also wished him a Happy New Year .
Such acceptance of the aggressor and restoration of friendly relations not only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the war in the Donbas and the occupation of Crimea , but also encourage the offender to further implement his plans using the hybrid military and terrorist potential of the Russian army and special services .
And the next target for Russian GRADs and mortars may be not only Ukrainian cities , but also other neighboring states , or those countries where Russians see the possibility of expanding their geopolitical influence through blood , war , suffering , and chaos .
This material in Ukrainian was prepared by InformNapalm for Tyzden.ua .
Translated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors , the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers .
You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform .
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications .

In 2020, Ukraine and the world remember many tragic anniversaries on the calendar of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Five years have passed since these tragic dates, since the days of bloody acts of terrorism and war crimes committed by Russian hybrid troops – mercenaries, collaborators and active duty officers of the Russian Armed Forces. After these tragedies, research materials have been published on the website of InformNapalm International Volunteer Community that shed light on important circumstances, presented evidence and reported the perpetrators of these crimes. All of these publications have been translated into dozens of languages, and by shearing them, volunteers remind the international community of the true face of the Russian Federation. They remind of the atrocities of a country waging hybrid wars and carrying out terrorist attacks against civilians. Unfortunately, the perpetrators of these terrible acts of terrorism and those who directed and coordinated their actions have not yet been punished, but these crimes have no statute of limitations; the main thing is to remember about them.
On January 13, 2015, Russian terrorists shelled a civilian bus near the town of Volnovakha. The attack killed 12 people and injured 18.
In 2017, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine had named the organizers of the shelling. Investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine brought offences of a serious crime to a citizen of the Russian Federation, Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Anatoly Sinelnikov (call sign Zakhar), who gave commands to the artillery units of pro-Russian terrorists.
On January 22, 2015, Russian terrorists fired at Donetskmiskmash (Bosse) bus stop in Donetsk. As a result, 8 people were killed and more than 20 were injured.
Immediately after the firing, the militants used the tragedy for the purpose of information and psychological pressure. They brought to the scene of the tragedy 17 Ukrainian prisoners of war, publicly humiliated and beat them, and filmed it on video. Then the prisoners were forced to load the bodies of the dead on a vehicle.
Based on photos and videos from the scene of the tragedy, the volunteers conducted independent OSINT investigations that indicated that the shelling was carried out by terrorists from a 82 mm caliber mortar. Thanks to a photo of Christopher Miller, who took a close-up shot of a phone with a compass near a crater at the site of a bus attack, the volunteers determined the direction from which the shelling came. The volunteers’ conclusion coincided with the OSCE’s findings and indicated that the firing was done from a close proximity, and the Ukrainian artillery, which was more than 15 km away from the affected area, was not involved.
Two days after the shelling, observers from Human Rights Watch said that the craters at the site were filled up on the orders from “local authorities” and, therefore any further examination and research was impossible.In addition to analyzing photos and videos from the site of the shooting, volunteers from the InformNapalm community monitored social networking messages from local residents on the day of the tragedy and found that most of them reported mortar rather than artillery shelling and indicated that the mortar had “worked” from housing blocks in Donetsk. The time when the residents heard the mortar bombardment roughly coincided with the time of the tragedy.
At the same time, Russian propaganda tried to distort information about this tragedy and shift the blame for it to the Ukrainian side. However, on January 28, 2015, DPR military themselves reported the detention of a group of three saboteurs who were moving around the city in a vehicle with a mortar, all three were citizens of the Russian Federation.
On January 24, 2015, Russian military and collaborators fired shells at the Vostochny neighborhood in Mariupol from rocket launchers. 29 people were killed and more than 92 injured, including children and teenagers.The investigation into this large-scale terrorist attack took a long time, and only on May 7, 2018, at a press briefing, the Security Service of Ukraine presented evidence that the firing of Mariupol was carried out by personnel of the Russian military. From the territory of Russia, the operation was directly directed by the chief of missile troops and artillery of the Southern military district of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Major-General Stepan Yaroshchuk. In the temporarily occupied Donetsk, the shelling was led by Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Alexander Tsaplyuk with the call sign Gorets. The coordination of the Russian missile units was carried out by Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Maxim Vlasov with the call sign Yugra.
In 2019, before the anniversary of the Mariupol shelling, InformNapalm volunteers, using information from open sources, gathered intelligence and additional data on Russian military personnel involved in the war crime and the killing of dozens of civilians. Volunteers found that after the terrorist attack in Mariupol, having gained experience in the massacres of civilians, in June 2015, the Russian Colonel Alexander Tsaplyuk was appointed chief of the Penza Artillery Institute, and in 2017, Vladimir Putin personally awarded him a military rank of Major General.It is also interesting that another military offender involved in the tragedy, Colonel of the Russian Armed Forces Oleg Tsekov was appointed personally by Vladimir Putin by his private order, to the post of Deputy Commander of the 8th Army of the Southern Military District, and also promoted to the rank of Major General.
Other Russian officers who have been promoted for aggression against Ukraine by the general ranks are listed in the InformNapalm research materials. The Russian media even wrote that the commanding officers of the 8th Army were selected especially carefully, with the preference given to “combatants”. This particular approach was due to the fact that the 8th Army and the 150th Motorized Infantry Brigade that was part of it were deployed in a strategic direction for Russia – near the border with Ukraine.In 2020, when we commemorate the 5th anniversary of the terrible acts of terrorism and war crimes against the people of Ukraine, committed under the direct leadership of the Russian military, the Russian Federation does not admit its responsibility. Vladimir Putin continues to make allegations that the Russian Federation is not a party to the conflict. He continues to visit international forums, to be greeted by the leaders of the Western democratic countries. He shake hands with EU leaders, the President of the United States and the President of Ukraine, who also wished him a Happy New Year. Such acceptance of the aggressor and restoration of friendly relations not only do not contributes to the ending of the war in the Donbas and the occupation of Crimea, but also encourage the offender to further implement his plans using the hybrid military and terrorist potential of the Russian army and special services. And the next target for Russian GRADs and mortars may be not only Ukrainian cities, but also other neighboring states, or those countries where Russians see the possibility of expanding their geopolitical influence through blood, war, suffering, and chaos.
This material in Ukrainian was prepared by InformNapalm for Tyzden.ua. Translated by Svitlana Kemblovski. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0)
InformNapalm does not have any financial support from the government of any country or donors, the only sponsors of the project are its volunteers and readers. You too can help InformNapalm by making a charitable contribution through the Patreon platform.
Follow InformNapalm on Facebook / Twitter / Telegram and keep abreast of new community publications.