informnapalm--2020-05-05--Personal identification of LLS Orsk commander who led the crew during the invasion of Crimea

On January 15 , volunteers of the InformNapalm international community published evidence of the large landing ship ( LLS ) Orsk participating in the invasion of Crimea .
LLS Orsk belongs to 197th Brigade of Landing Ships BLS of the Russian Black Sea Fleet ( military unit 72136 ) .
It this feature , we supplement that investigation by the data of the LLS Orsk commander .
It was under his command , that the crew of the ship took part in the aggression against Ukraine .
It is important to note that Kuzmin is not yet on the list @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor ’ s Office of Ukraine .
Therefore , we appeal to the relevant authorities of Ukraine and urge them to carry out all the necessary legal proceedings .
Andrey Skvortsov , was born on April 12 , 1978 in the city of Baku , Azerbajan .
Photo source – Skvortsov ’ s page on the OK social network : https : //ok.ru/profile359895483207 , archives : http : //archive.is/l3OMY http : //archive.ph/VO2eU http : //archive.ph/j6Yzd http : //archive.ph/E4U7C http : //archive.ph/zHmNq http @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Radioelectronics Naval College and took the higher special naval officer course in St. Petersburg .
He served on the following ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet : Ochakov , Kerch , Saratov , Orsk .
He is currently captain of the 2nd rank .
While monitoring open sources , we found that in an interview in September 2015 , to the question about the duration of his service as the officer in command of LLS Orsk , he replied that it had been 2 years .
It means that the crew of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they participated in the special operation to capture Crimea .
In the interview it is also said that Skvortsov was awarded the medal For the Return of Crimea .
In 2017 , Skvortsov was tried for extorting money from his subordinates .
He was banned by the court decision from holding senior positions in the armed forces and state bodies of Russia .
In the following photo published on June 23 , 2019 , Skvortsov is pictured next to his relative Vasily Kvyshko and his son Timofey Kvyshko .
Both are identified as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ships and the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy during the Russian invasion of Crimea .
Both feature on the Myrotvorets Center database .
52-year-old LLS Orsk and the arms race with the US Ironically , on August 31 , 2015 , Skvortsov was invited to the TV show called Santa Barbara .
During the conversation ( archive ) , the anchor asked him about the Russian navy lagging behind the American one in terms of aircraft carriers .
To which the captain of Orsk replied that in the near future Russia would catch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the comments , readers posted a photo of LLS Orsk , pointing out its age and constant breakdowns .
Readers even advised Skvortsov to have mercy on the ship and sink it .
They also criticized the capabilities of Russia : “ … why do we need aircraft carriers when we have no carrier-based aviation ?
?
?
?
…… .
and where will we keep these aircraft carriers ?
?
?
?
… we do not have bases for them ……..
I am surprised at people repeating the nonsense of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ catch up and overtake America ” … God help us to gain enough on Africa… And what sense is there in all this catching up and overtaking BS ?
?
?
?
Why don ’ t we just get a normal life , instead of engaging in the bare-ass racing ?
” The skepticism of commentators is understandable , as LLS Orsk was launched in 1968 .
From 2004 to 2017 , it moved between shipyards and therefore did not participate in the Syrian Express like other Russian ships .
In December 2017 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time in years beyond the Black Sea on a mission to Tartus .
The ship delivered military equipment and servicemen to Syria .
While passing through the Bosphorus in April 2019 , the ship was photographed and the following equipment was identified in the photo : BTR-80 with Pelena-6BK2 electronic systems , KamAZ trucks , a Ural-4230 fuel truck , and Tiger armored vehicles .
However , on January 3 , 2020 , Turkish blogger Yörük Işık , who spots the passage of ships through the Bosphorus , published a photo of LLS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Strait .
One of the two diesels broke down on LLS Orsk , and it was unable to return on its own from the combat mission .
Therefore , 2020 began for the glorious Russian ship with yet another shipyard visit .
Read more from InformNapalm and share • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied territories in connection with COVID-19 • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics Translated by , edited by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter

On January 15, volunteers of the InformNapalm international community published evidence of the large landing ship (LLS) Orsk participating in the invasion of Crimea. LLS Orsk belongs to 197th Brigade of Landing Ships BLS of the Russian Black Sea Fleet(military unit 72136). It this feature, we supplement that investigation by the data of the LLS Orsk commander. It was under his command, that the crew of the ship took part in the aggression against Ukraine.
It is important to note that Kuzmin is not yet on the list (1, 2) of the Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine. Therefore, we appeal to the relevant authorities of Ukraine and urge them to carry out all the necessary legal proceedings.
Background details
Andrey Skvortsov, was born on April 12, 1978 in the city of Baku, Azerbajan.
Photo source – Skvortsov’s page on the OK social network: https://ok.ru/profile359895483207 , archives: http://archive.is/l3OMY http://archive.ph/VO2eU http://archive.ph/j6Yzd http://archive.ph/E4U7C http://archive.ph/zHmNq http://archive.is/mfsCY
Skvortsov graduated from the Popov Radioelectronics Naval College and took the higher special naval officer course in St. Petersburg. He served on the following ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet: Ochakov, Kerch, Saratov, Orsk. He is currently captain of the 2nd rank.
While monitoring open sources, we found that in an interview in September 2015, to the question about the duration of his service as the officer in command of LLS Orsk, he replied that it had been 2 years. It means that the crew of LLS Orsk was under his command when they participated in the special operation to capture Crimea. In the interview it is also said that Skvortsov was awarded the medal For the Return of Crimea.
In 2017, Skvortsov was tried for extorting money from his subordinates. He was banned by the court decision from holding senior positions in the armed forces and state bodies of Russia.
In the following photo published on June 23, 2019, Skvortsov is pictured next to his relative Vasily Kvyshko and his son Timofey Kvyshko. Both are identified as militants participating in the capture of Ukrainian ships and the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy during the Russian invasion of Crimea. Both feature on the Myrotvorets Center database.
52-year-old LLS Orsk and the arms race with the US
Ironically, on August 31, 2015, Skvortsov was invited to the TV show called Santa Barbara. During the conversation (archive), the anchor asked him about the Russian navy lagging behind the American one in terms of aircraft carriers. To which the captain of Orsk replied that in the near future Russia would catch up and even overtake the US Navy.
In the comments, readers posted a photo of LLS Orsk, pointing out its age and constant breakdowns. Readers even advised Skvortsov to have mercy on the ship and sink it.
They also criticized the capabilities of Russia: “… why do we need aircraft carriers when we have no carrier-based aviation???? ……. and where will we keep these aircraft carriers???? … we do not have bases for them …….. I am surprised at people repeating the nonsense of Soviet leaders – “we’ll catch up and overtake America”… God help us to gain enough on Africa… And what sense is there in all this catching up and overtaking BS???? Why don’t we just get a normal life, instead of engaging in the bare-ass racing?”
The skepticism of commentators is understandable, as LLS Orsk was launched in 1968. From 2004 to 2017, it moved between shipyards and therefore did not participate in the Syrian Express like other Russian ships. In December 2017, LLS Orsk ventured for the first time in years beyond the Black Sea on a mission to Tartus. The ship delivered military equipment and servicemen to Syria. While passing through the Bosphorus in April 2019, the ship was photographed and the following equipment was identified in the photo: BTR-80 with Pelena-6BK2 electronic systems, KamAZ trucks, a Ural-4230 fuel truck, and Tiger armored vehicles.
However, on January 3, 2020, Turkish blogger Yörük Işık, who spots the passage of ships through the Bosphorus, published a photo of LLS Orsk being towed back through the Bosphorus Strait. One of the two diesels broke down on LLS Orsk, and it was unable to return on its own from the combat mission.
Back from Tartus #Syria but broken down⚠Engine failure: #ВМФ Project 745 BSF #ЧФ 145th Resue Ship Squad/1st group’s Sorum class rescue tug MB304 towed#ВМФ Project 1171 #ЧФ BSF 197th Assault Ship Brigade’s Tapir (NATO:Alligator) class LST Orsk through Bosphorus towards BlackSea pic.twitter.com/HTu6EeVDgt — Yörük Işık (@YorukIsik) January 3, 2020
Therefore, 2020 began for the glorious Russian ship with yet another shipyard visit.
Read more from InformNapalm and share
Translated by Andrii Gryga, edited by Artem Velichko.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter


informnapalm--2020-05-05--Evidence collected: commander and crew of R-60 missile boat took part in the aggression against Ukra

Evidence collected: commander and crew of R-60 missile boat took part in the aggression against Ukraine

InformNapalm volunteers gathered new evidence against the Russian military men who participated in the aggression against Ukraine in Crimea .
It was established that R-60 missile boat from the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Russian Black Sea Fleet participated in blocking the ships of the Ukrainian Navy in Donuzlav Bay during a special operation to seize Crimea .
The crew and the commander of the boat received awards for participating in the aggression against Ukraine .
Interestingly , R-60 missile boat commander had been also previously awarded for the aggression against Georgia .
The commander of the ship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor ’ s Office of Ukraine .
R-60 missile boat is also not listed among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine .
Therefore , InformNapalm volunteers have collected new materials , and publicly call on the competent authorities of Ukraine to carry out all necessary legal proceedings regarding the commander and crew members of the R-60 missile boat of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation .
Two squadrons of the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats The 41st Brigade of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Russian Federation ( military unit 72165 , permanent station in temporarily occupied Crimea , Sevastopol ) includes two squadrons : The 166th Novorossiysk Small Missile Ship Squadron ( 166th SMSS ) and the 295th Sulino Missile Boat Squadron .
Ships of both squadrons participated in a special operation to seize Crimea .
InformNapalm wrote earlier about the participation of the 166th SMSS in the war against Ukraine .
In this feature , we publish the data of the Russian aggressors from the 295th Missile Boat Squadron , specifically of the crew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number 955 ) .
Pictured in the photo are Russian sailors Konstantin Tyazhko ( left ) and Oleg Lyovochkin ( right ) with medals for the occupation of Crimea .
Both posted this photo in their social media albums .
He did his conscript service on the R-60 missile boat .
The caption under the photo of the boat says : “ Here he is , our handsome r-60 boat ” In Lyovochkin ’ s album , there is a photo on board .
We compared this photo with the photo of R-60 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military website .
In his social network profile , he indicated the brigade in which he served from 2013 to 2014 .
In March 2014 , R-60 missile boat took part in the operation of blocking Ukrainian Navy ships in Donuzlav Bay .
Previously , InformNapalm also wrote that Moskva missile cruiser took part in the operation of blocking Ukrainian ships .
At the time of the Crimea invasion operation captain of the 3rd rank Evgeny Kuzmin was in command of R-60 boat .
A photo of Kuzmin and detailed information about him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ October 30 , 2015 in the newspaper of the Russian Black Sea Fleet Flag Rodiny ( Russian for the “ Flag of the Motherland ” , pdf version was saved on our website in case of removal from a Russian source ) .
The article says that Kuzmin graduated from the Popov Naval Institute of Radio Electronics in 2003 .
His first position was the commander of the combat services 4 & 7 ( communications and signals ) of the missile boat R-71 , then later he became an executive officer on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ course , he was appointed executive officer of Samum missile corvette ( or “ small missile ship ” according to the Russian naval classification ) , and in September 2012 he became commander of the R-60 missile boat .
He was awarded medal class II of the Order For Merit to the Fatherland ( the award was granted for participating in the aggression against Georgia ) , a medal class II For Military Valor ( for the military service of the missile boat in the Mediterranean Sea ) , and Medal of Ushakov @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boat , Kuzmin was also spotted after the annexation of Crimea .
We found the lists of Russians awarded for participating in the war against Georgia , and Evgeny Yuryevich Kuzmin was among them .
Thus we reliably established his full name .
InformNapalm found a photo of Kuzmin with awards mentioned above .
Kuzmin also has a photo with a medal For the Return of Crimea .
Kuzmin is not on the list ( 1 , 2 ) of the Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile boat is also not listed among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine .
Therefore , we appeal to the relevant authorities of Ukraine and urge them to carry out all the necessary legal proceedings .
If you are viewing this article in the Accelerated Mobile Page ( AMP ) mode , some of the links and pictures might not be displayed .
If you are interested in the whole content of this page , we recommend viewing it on a PC or laptop .
Read more from InformNapalm and share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied territories in connection with COVID-19 • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics Translated by , edited by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter

InformNapalm volunteers gathered new evidence against the Russian military men who participated in the aggression against Ukraine in Crimea. It was established that R-60 missile boat from the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Russian Black Sea Fleet participated in blocking the ships of the Ukrainian Navy in Donuzlav Bay during a special operation to seize Crimea. The crew and the commander of the boat received awards for participating in the aggression against Ukraine. Interestingly, R-60 missile boat commander had been also previously awarded for the aggression against Georgia.
The commander of the ship is not on the list of Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine. R-60 missile boat is also not listed among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, InformNapalm volunteers have collected new materials, and publicly call on the competent authorities of Ukraine to carry out all necessary legal proceedings regarding the commander and crew members of the R-60 missile boat of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.
Two squadrons of the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats
The 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation (military unit 72165, permanent station in temporarily occupied Crimea, Sevastopol) includes two squadrons: The 166th Novorossiysk Small Missile Ship Squadron (166th SMSS) and the 295th Sulino Missile Boat Squadron.
Ships of both squadrons participated in a special operation to seize Crimea. InformNapalm wrote earlier about the participation of the 166th SMSS in the war against Ukraine. In this feature, we publish the data of the Russian aggressors from the 295th Missile Boat Squadron, specifically of the crew members of R-60 missile boat (tail number 955).
Background details
Pictured in the photo are Russian sailors Konstantin Tyazhko (left) and Oleg Lyovochkin (right) with medals for the occupation of Crimea. Both posted this photo in their social media albums.
Oleg Lyovochkin, born on October 15, 1990, in Stavropol city, Russia.
He did his conscript service on the R-60 missile boat. The caption under the photo of the boat says: “Here he is, our handsome r-60 boat”
In Lyovochkin’s album, there is a photo on board. We compared this photo with the photo of R-60 boat published on the Russian VTS Bastion military website.
Archived social media pages and photos of Lyovochkin https://ok.ru/profile/344022629202 (http://archive.ph/57vvO)
http://archive.is/uSqbc
http://archive.ph/MBFmZ
https://ok.ru/profile/584631545604 (http://archive.ph/K7rWs)
http://archive.is/evYZH
http://archive.ph/U6Rbp https://vk.com/olyovochkin (http://archive.li/TNYsP)
http://archive.ph/auyDV
http://archive.ph/0cqkC
https://vk.com/oleg.vianor (http://archive.is/HFR1f)
http://archive.ph/WIk2W
http://archive.ph/l2WnW
Konstantin Tyazhko, born on November 10, 1990, city of Izobilny, Stavropol Krai, Russian Federation.
In his social network profile, he indicated the brigade in which he served from 2013 to 2014.
A photo of R-60 missile boat captioned: “My little boat”:
Archived social media pages and photos of Tyazhko https://ok.ru/profile/526512854676 (http://archive.ph/qGk9l)
http://archive.ph/4MrUM
http://archive.ph/0i4NE https://vk.com/id69276030 (http://archive.is/3VNDU)
https://vk.com/id228404173 (http://archive.is/WXQi9)
http://archive.ph/INM1q
http://archive.ph/40pkl
R-60 missile boat commander
In March 2014, R-60 missile boat took part in the operation of blocking Ukrainian Navy ships in Donuzlav Bay.
Previously, InformNapalm also wrote that Moskva missile cruiser took part in the operation of blocking Ukrainian ships.
At the time of the Crimea invasion operation captain of the 3rd rank Evgeny Kuzmin was in command of R-60 boat. A photo of Kuzmin and detailed information about him can be found in the article of October 30, 2015 in the newspaper of the Russian Black Sea Fleet Flag Rodiny (Russian for the “Flag of the Motherland”, pdf version was saved on our website in case of removal from a Russian source).
The article says that Kuzmin graduated from the Popov Naval Institute of Radio Electronics in 2003. His first position was the commander of the combat services 4&7 (communications and signals) of the missile boat R-71, then later he became an executive officer on the same boat. After a senior officer course, he was appointed executive officer of Samum missile corvette (or “small missile ship” according to the Russian naval classification), and in September 2012 he became commander of the R-60 missile boat. He was awarded medal class II of the Order For Merit to the Fatherland (the award was granted for participating in the aggression against Georgia), a medal class II For Military Valor (for the military service of the missile boat in the Mediterranean Sea), and Medal of Ushakov.
As a commander of R-60 missile boat, Kuzmin was also spotted after the annexation of Crimea.
We found the lists of Russians awarded for participating in the war against Georgia, and Evgeny Yuryevich Kuzmin was among them. Thus we reliably established his full name.
InformNapalm found a photo of Kuzmin with awards mentioned above. Kuzmin also has a photo with a medal For the Return of Crimea.
Conclusions
Kuzmin is not on the list (1, 2) of the Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine. R-60 missile boat is also not listed among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, we appeal to the relevant authorities of Ukraine and urge them to carry out all the necessary legal proceedings.
*If you are viewing this article in the Accelerated Mobile Page (AMP) mode, some of the links and pictures might not be displayed. If you are interested in the whole content of this page, we recommend viewing it on a PC or laptop.
Read more from InformNapalm and share
Translated by Andrii Gryga, edited by Artem Velichko.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter


informnapalm--2020-04-22--The princes of Ghana and Nigeria send letters not only about inherited wealth

This time , they failed .
They failed to provoke confusion and subvert society , intoxicate its information , social and political environment .
Although the time is very good – during the COVID-19 pandemic , society is vulnerable and susceptible to any information , and in the autumn , there is the election and a new political cycle begins .
In March , the social network platforms Facebook and Twitter had deleted over 200 accounts and web pages that were active in Ghana and Nigeria and were broadcasting to the USA .
All these accounts were created by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the initiative that is better known as ‘ the troll factory ’ .
In February , the secret services of Ghana identified ‘ the troll factory ’ operating in the suburbs of Accra , the capital of Ghana , and organised the raid against it .
This factory was established by the incorporated in Ghana non-profit organisation Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation in Africa ( EBLA ) .
The title of this organisation sounds very similar to those of the Cold War times , when the Soviets were patronising African countries and were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very similar titles as the above mentioned .
EBLA was executing the so-called social network management order from Russia .
The customer – the Internet Research Agency ( ‘ the troll factory ’ ) incorporated in St. Petersburg , whose owner is the Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin , often referred to as ‘ Putin ’ s Chef ’ .
Facebook reported that on its platform , it deleted 49 public and 85 personal pages .
From Instagram , the company deleted 69 accounts and 71 accounts were deleted by the social network Twitter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their followers .
For example , one Facebook account had 13,200 followers , on Twitter one such account was followed by 68,000 followers , and several Instagram accounts had about 263,200 followers .
Social networks ’ platforms reported that the information published on these accounts was mainly ( 65 per cent ) addressed to the black population of the USA , it ” was promoting rifts , provoking controversy and arguments on the basis of racial and civil rights issues ” .
Social networks also noted that in the contents of the accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the elections in the USA , “ there were no agitations and discrediting of the presidential candidates ” .
“ The troll factory ” in Ghana and Nigeria was operating under the same principle as that in St. Petersburg , in 2016 , which was trying to influence the US presidential elections.
” It appeared that the princes and lawyers of Nigeria have been dispatching the e-mails the content of which is not only about the inherited assets and properties .
“ The troll factory ” in Ghana and Nigeria was operating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in St. Petersburg , in 2016 , which was trying to influence the USA presidential elections .
After the robust study , in February 2018 , the US authorities brought charges against 13 Russian citizens and 3 organisations on illegal intervention in the USA presidential election .
Among the above mentioned , there was the Internet Research Agency ( ‘ the troll factory ’ ) and also two companies – Concord Management and Concord Catering – all owned by the Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin .
The USA has imposed sanctions against Yevgeny Prigozhin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mike Pompeo , the US Secretary of State , said that “ the US administration will continue to work to ensure that Yevgeny Prigozhin and others like him find no refuge ” .
It must be noted that the robust journalistic investigation on the activity of “ the troll factory ” in Ghana and Nigeria was carried out by the journalists of the CNN news service .
The CNN journalists revealed that in “ the troll factory ” of Ghana were operating sixteen 20-year old persons , who were creating and managing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were supplied with , and they would receive the messages and visual information from Russia .
They were working in a rented house , sitting around the table .
Their ‘ business day ’ would start in the afternoon and would last until late evening , when there would be a business day in the USA .
The company was managed by Seth Wiredu , a citizen of Ghana , who also has resided in Russia .
The employees – “ trolls ” – would receive extra payment for good generating of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and networks .
Some of them did not understand that they were working for Russia .
It is also important to note that Seth Wiredu has already started talking again to those young persons on the resumption of the works .
By the way , the CNN journalists found that Seth Wiredu is also looking for employees via LinkedIn , where they put ads offering the workplaces in the USA , South Carolina .
So what is the point and what should be done about that ?
First , it is important to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is important to think critically and use social networks responsibly and demandingly .
It is also very important that the social network platforms itself would responsibly monitor their users and the purposes of their use .
It is desired to believe that such responsible monitoring of the platforms is carried out not only due to the immediate liability regulated by laws and their business pattern based on the reliability and good repute of a platform , but that the managers of social platforms really care about ethics and moral in terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Third , it is remarkable that information space is protected by media .
Fourth , the role of civil society is to protect information space actively by reporting on the information that instigates dissension and not becoming the myrmidons of such “ toll factories ” .
Then the fraudsters and information operations creators and executors will not be so successful .

This time, they failed. They failed to provoke confusion and subvert society, intoxicate its information, social and political environment. Although the time is very good – during the COVID-19 pandemic, society is vulnerable and susceptible to any information, and in the autumn, there is the election and a new political cycle begins.
In March, the social network platforms Facebook and Twitter had deleted over 200 accounts and web pages that were active in Ghana and Nigeria and were broadcasting to the USA. All these accounts were created by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) – the initiative that is better known as ‘the troll factory’. In February, the secret services of Ghana identified ‘the troll factory’ operating in the suburbs of Accra, the capital of Ghana, and organised the raid against it. This factory was established by the incorporated in Ghana non-profit organisation Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation in Africa (EBLA). The title of this organisation sounds very similar to those of the Cold War times, when the Soviets were patronising African countries and were establishing the ‘non-governmental’ organisations with very similar titles as the above mentioned. EBLA was executing the so-called social network management order from Russia. The customer – the Internet Research Agency (‘the troll factory’) incorporated in St. Petersburg, whose owner is the Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, often referred to as ‘Putin’s Chef’.
Facebook reported that on its platform, it deleted 49 public and 85 personal pages. From Instagram, the company deleted 69 accounts and 71 accounts were deleted by the social network Twitter. Those accounts were ‘nurturing’ their followers.
For example, one Facebook account had 13,200 followers, on Twitter one such account was followed by 68,000 followers, and several Instagram accounts had about 263,200 followers. Social networks’ platforms reported that the information published on these accounts was mainly (65 per cent) addressed to the black population of the USA, it ”was promoting rifts, provoking controversy and arguments on the basis of racial and civil rights issues”. Social networks also noted that in the contents of the accounts there was no direct discussions in relation to the elections in the USA, “there were no agitations and discrediting of the presidential candidates”.
“The troll factory” in Ghana and Nigeria was operating under the same principle as that in St. Petersburg, in 2016, which was trying to influence the US presidential elections.” It appeared that the princes and lawyers of Nigeria have been dispatching the e-mails the content of which is not only about the inherited assets and properties.
Deja vu
“The troll factory” in Ghana and Nigeria was operating under the same principle as that based in St. Petersburg, in 2016, which was trying to influence the USA presidential elections. After the robust study, in February 2018, the US authorities brought charges against 13 Russian citizens and 3 organisations on illegal intervention in the USA presidential election. Among the above mentioned, there was the Internet Research Agency (‘the troll factory’) and also two companies – Concord Management and Concord Catering – all owned by the Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin. The USA has imposed sanctions against Yevgeny Prigozhin and his companies. In 2019, Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, said that “the US administration will continue to work to ensure that Yevgeny Prigozhin and others like him find no refuge”. It must be noted that the robust journalistic investigation on the activity of “the troll factory” in Ghana and Nigeria was carried out by the journalists of the CNN news service.
The CNN journalists revealed that in “the troll factory” of Ghana were operating sixteen 20-year old persons, who were creating and managing the accounts using the mobile telephones that they were supplied with, and they would receive the messages and visual information from Russia. They were working in a rented house, sitting around the table. Their ‘business day’ would start in the afternoon and would last until late evening, when there would be a business day in the USA.

The company was managed by Seth Wiredu, a citizen of Ghana, who also has resided in Russia. The employees – “trolls” – would receive extra payment for good generating of the streams of followers (follower traffic) and networks. Some of them did not understand that they were working for Russia. It is also important to note that Seth Wiredu has already started talking again to those young persons on the resumption of the works. By the way, the CNN journalists found that Seth Wiredu is also looking for employees via LinkedIn, where they put ads offering the workplaces in the USA, South Carolina. So what is the point and what should be done about that? First, it is important to be aware that such things are happening. It is important to think critically and use social networks responsibly and demandingly. It is also very important that the social network platforms itself would responsibly monitor their users and the purposes of their use. It is desired to believe that such responsible monitoring of the platforms is carried out not only due to the immediate liability regulated by laws and their business pattern based on the reliability and good repute of a platform, but that the managers of social platforms really care about ethics and moral in terms it is perceived in the democratic world. Third, it is remarkable that information space is protected by media. Fourth, the role of civil society is to protect information space actively by reporting on the information that instigates dissension and not becoming the myrmidons of such “toll factories”. Then the fraudsters and information operations creators and executors will not be so successful.
Source: www.15min.lt


informnapalm--2020-05-15--New evidence of Russian 41st Brigade of Missile Boats participating in aggression against Ukraine

In its new OSINT investigation identifying Russian troops directly involved in the aggression against Ukraine in Crimea , InformNapalm international intelligence community has gathered new evidence against some naval sailors of the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation .
With regard to the results of this investigation , we are calling on the competent authorities of Ukraine with a request to supplement their data on Russian military aggression in Crimea and to carry out appropriate legal proceedings .
While researching open sources of information , we discovered on VK social network a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , born in 1992 .
He posted a photo of a medal for the occupation of Crimea and an award certificate to it .
The certificate indicates the number of the military unit in which Yermakov served when Russia launched its armed aggression against Ukraine in February 2014 .
Military unit 72165 is 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Russian Black Sea Fleet , stationed in Sevastopol city , temporarily occupied Crimea .
The Brigade consists of two squadrons : .
The ships of both squadrons participated in the aggression against Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
On the following photo from Yermakov ’ s album taken on board of a boat , at a closer look , we can see an inscription on the lifebuoy which reads “ РКА 953 ” .
“ РКА ” is the Russian abbreviation for “ ракетный катер ” , a missile boat .
The numeral “ 953 ” is the hull number of the R-239 missile boat ( 12411 Molniya project , part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet since 1992 , the boat ’ s permanent base is in temporarily occupied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boat is part of the 295th MBS of the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Russian Black Sea Fleet .
In 2018 , the boat was given the name Naberezhnye Chelny .
We invite interested readers to compare the characteristic elements of the boat on the photo from Yermakov ’ s album and on other P-239 photos found online .
On the list of Yermakov ’ s friends , we found another subject for our investigation .
This is Aleksandr Piskarev , born May 30 , 1991 in the city of Ivanovo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For the Return of Crimea .
He is a member of the group called “ 41 Missile Boats Brigade ” on VK social network .
Has an album photo taken on board the R-239 missile moat .
Captain of the 3rd rank Aleksey Orlyapov , born on November 15 , 1982 , was the commanding officer of the R-239 missile boat during the special operation to seize the Crimea .
In the photo , Orlyapov is on the left .
Aleksey Orlyapov was born in Kemin city ( formerly Bystrovka ) in Kyrgyzstan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Judging by the data from the page of Nikolai Orlyapov ( 1 , 2 ) , the father of our suspect , he served in the Russian Black Sea Fleet , after the discharge he continued to serve in the Navy .
So the Orlyapovs ended up in Crimea .
Aleksey Orlyapov participated in the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 .
In winter of 2015 , Aleksey Orlyapov had a rank of captain of the 2nd rank and held a position of the Chief of Staff of a missile boats task @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became the commander of the guided missile corvette Orekhovo-Zuevo ( hull number 626 , part of the 166th GMCS of 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of Russian Black Sea Fleet ) .
We also noticed that Aleksey Orlyapov was added to the database of the Myrotvorets Center , but as of April 8 , 2020 only as the commanding officer of the GMC Orekhovo-Zuevo , without indicating data on his participation in the occupation of Crimea as the commanding officer of the R-239 missile boat .
We call on the Myrotvorets center to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accordance with the results of this investigation .
• Screen from the profile of father Nikolai Orlyapov , Alexei first on the left Screen from the profile of his wife , caption under the photo : “ Awarding in the Kremlin ” On March 19 , 2019 Aleksey Orlyapov was entered on the sanctions list of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine for a period of 3 years .
However he is missing from the list ( 1 , 2 ) of the Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Ukraine .
Also , the R-239 missile boat hasn ’ t been included on the list of the Military Prosecutor ’ s Office among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine .
Therefore , based on the results of this investigation , volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community call on the competent authorities of Ukraine to carry out all the necessary legal proceedings .
* If you are viewing this article in the Accelerated Mobile Page ( AMP ) mode , some of the links and pictures might not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the whole content of this page , we recommend viewing it on a PC or a laptop Read more from InformNapalm and share • Personal identification of LLS Orsk commander who led the crew during the invasion of Crimea • Evidence collected : commander and crew of R-60 missile boat took part in the aggression against Ukraine • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied territories in connection with COVID-19 • Russia lost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ list of military units operating this UAV • Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics Translated by , edited by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter

In its new OSINT investigation identifying Russian troops directly involved in the aggression against Ukraine in Crimea, InformNapalm international intelligence community has gathered new evidence against some naval sailors of the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. With regard to the results of this investigation, we are calling on the competent authorities of Ukraine with a request to supplement their data on Russian military aggression in Crimea and to carry out appropriate legal proceedings.
Investigating social media pages of Russian sailors
While researching open sources of information, we discovered on VK social network a page of Russian sailor Oleg Nikolayevich Yermakov, born in 1992.
He posted a photo of a medal for the occupation of Crimea and an award certificate to it.
The certificate indicates the number of the military unit in which Yermakov served when Russia launched its armed aggression against Ukraine in February 2014. Military unit 72165 is 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Sevastopol city, temporarily occupied Crimea.
The Brigade consists of two squadrons: 166th Novorossiysk Guided Missile Corvette Squadron (166th GMCS) and 295th Sulino Missile Boat Squadron (295th MBS). The ships of both squadrons participated in the aggression against Ukraine and featured in OSINT investigations of InformNapalm.
On the following photo from Yermakov’s album taken on board of a boat, at a closer look, we can see an inscription on the lifebuoy which reads “РКА 953”.
“РКА” is the Russian abbreviation for “ракетный катер”, a missile boat. The numeral “953” is the hull number of the R-239 missile boat (12411 Molniya project, part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet since 1992, the boat’s permanent base is in temporarily occupied Sevastopol, Quarantine Bay). This boat is part of the 295th MBS of the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In 2018, the boat was given the name Naberezhnye Chelny.
We invite interested readers to compare the characteristic elements of the boat on the photo from Yermakov’s album and on other P-239 photos found online.
Archived social media pages and photos of Yermakov https://vk.com/id251216339 (http://archive.vn/IQhi6)
http://archive.vn/E6P8j
http://archive.vn/u7qTm
On the list of Yermakov’s friends, we found another subject for our investigation. This is Aleksandr Piskarev, born May 30, 1991 in the city of Ivanovo, Russian Federation. Awarded a medal For the Return of Crimea.
He is a member of the group called “41 Missile Boats Brigade” on VK social network. Has an album photo taken on board the R-239 missile moat.
Social network pages and archives of Piskarev https://vk.com/id228682564 (http://archive.is/IPeFx)
http://archive.vn/msm5T
http://archive.vn/6WVI7
Commander of R-239
Captain of the 3rd rank Aleksey Orlyapov, born on November 15, 1982, was the commanding officer of the R-239 missile boat during the special operation to seize the Crimea.
In the photo, Orlyapov is on the left.
Aleksey Orlyapov was born in Kemin city (formerly Bystrovka) in Kyrgyzstan, his parents lived and studied there. Judging by the data from the page of Nikolai Orlyapov (1, 2), the father of our suspect, he served in the Russian Black Sea Fleet, after the discharge he continued to serve in the Navy. So the Orlyapovs ended up in Crimea.
Aleksey Orlyapov participated in the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008.
In winter of 2015, Aleksey Orlyapov had a rank of captain of the 2nd rank and held a position of the Chief of Staff of a missile boats task force.
And in 2018, he became the commander of the guided missile corvette Orekhovo-Zuevo (hull number 626, part of the 166th GMCS of 41st Brigade of Missile Boats of Russian Black Sea Fleet).
We also noticed that Aleksey Orlyapov was added to the database of the Myrotvorets Center, but as of April 8, 2020 only as the commanding officer of the GMC Orekhovo-Zuevo, without indicating data on his participation in the occupation of Crimea as the commanding officer of the R-239 missile boat. We call on the Myrotvorets center to update the information in its database in accordance with the results of this investigation.
Social network pages and archives of Orlyapov https://ok.ru/profile/516767555191 (http://archive.is/5oitM) http://archive.vn/LptZS http://archive.vn/oBpyf https://ok.ru/aleksey.orlyapov (http://archive.is/QdlEs ) http://archive.vn/b7eS1 http://archive.vn/p62T1 https://vk.com/id94682068 (http://archive.is/RWpFi ) http://archive.vn/dxzPv http://archive.vn/vgO1i Screen from the profile of father Nikolai Orlyapov, Alexei first on the left Screen from the profile of his wife, caption under the photo: “Awarding in the Kremlin”
Conclusions
On March 19, 2019 Aleksey Orlyapov was entered on the sanctions list of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine for a period of 3 years. However he is missing from the list (1, 2) of the Russian military commanders and Russian officials indicted by the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine. Also, the R-239 missile boat hasn’t been included on the list of the Military Prosecutor’s Office among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, based on the results of this investigation, volunteers of the InformNapalm international intelligence community call on the competent authorities of Ukraine to carry out all the necessary legal proceedings.
*If you are viewing this article in the Accelerated Mobile Page (AMP) mode, some of the links and pictures might not be displayed. If you are interested in the whole content of this page, we recommend viewing it on a PC or a laptop.
Read more from InformNapalm and share
Translated by Andrii Gryga, edited by Artem Velichko.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter


informnapalm--2020-05-25--Data of the 108th AAR paratrooper participating in the invasion of Crimea + VIDEO of military hardwa

Data of the 108th AAR paratrooper participating in the invasion of Crimea + VIDEO of military hardware redeployment

On February 20 , 2014 , Russia attacked Ukraine and started a war that continues to this day .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community continues to identify individual Russian soldiers who participated in the aggression against Ukraine .
We urge the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to carry out all the appropriate legal proceedings regarding the invaders in accordance with Ukrainian and international law and submit their data to Interpol .
Identification data of an invader from the 108th Air Assault Regiment Russian President Putin claimed that there had been no Russian soldiers involved in the operation to seize Crimea , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the many thousands of Russian soldiers who took part in that operation .
Oleg Chumak , born May 06 , 1994 in the village of Vyselki , Krasnodar Krai , Russian Federation .
He served in the 108th Air Assault Regiment ( AAR ) , military unit 42091 , permanent deployment point in Novorossiysk city .
This regiment is now part of the 7th Air Assault Division of the Russian Armed Forces .
On March 08 , 2014 , Chumak posted a video of a convoy of military equipment on his page @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s OSINT analyst identified the following hardware in that convoy : 2B26 multiple-launch rocket system , several artillery fire control vehicles , BTR-82A armored personnel carriers , R-330Zh Zhlitel and Leer-2 electronic warfare systems on the Tigr-M armored vehicle mounts .
It should be noted that on March 13 , 2014 , a Leer-2 on the Tiger-M mount was spotted at the Kerch crossing .
Identification of the probable unit operating the equipment The side numbers on the equipment containing the digits “ 21 ” point to the Southern Military District of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A 2B26 multiple rocket launcher bears the guards mark , which means it belongs to a guards brigade .
We know that at the beginning of March 2014 , a convoy of the 18th Motorized Rifle Brigade entered Crimea through Krasnodar , which contained BTR-82A armored personnel carriers .
The destination of the convoy was Voinka village in Krasnoperekopsk raion of Crimea .
We wrote about this in the investigation titled List-1097 : How the Russian 18th Brigade occupied Crimea .
Apparently , the video posted by Chumak shows this particular convoy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the subject of our investigation tries to destroy the evidence .
The name of Chumak ’ s unit is visible on the photos on his race number – 108th AAR .
Also , the number of the military unit , the name of its commander , and the full name of the subject of this investigation are well visible on the letter of acknowledgment .
On March 21 , 2014 , Chumak also posted a photo with weapons on a seashore .
It was captioned : “ Crimea : ) ” .
Later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we saved a screen shot .
On May 8 , 2014 , he published several photos of the medal for the occupation of Crimea .
Read more from InformNapalm and share • Personal identification of LLS Orsk commander who led the crew during the invasion of Crimea • Evidence collected : commander and crew of R-60 missile boat took part in the aggression against Ukraine • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics Translated by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter

On February 20, 2014, Russia attacked Ukraine and started a war that continues to this day. InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community continues to identify individual Russian soldiers who participated in the aggression against Ukraine. We urge the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to carry out all the appropriate legal proceedings regarding the invaders in accordance with Ukrainian and international law and submit their data to Interpol.
Identification data of an invader from the 108th Air Assault Regiment
Russian President Putin claimed that there had been no Russian soldiers involved in the operation to seize Crimea, however in this feature we identify yet another of the many thousands of Russian soldiers who took part in that operation. Oleg Chumak, born May 06, 1994 in the village of Vyselki, Krasnodar Krai, Russian Federation. He served in the 108th Air Assault Regiment (AAR), military unit 42091, permanent deployment point in Novorossiysk city. This regiment is now part of the 7th Air Assault Division of the Russian Armed Forces.
Important video on Chumak’s page
On March 08, 2014, Chumak posted a video of a convoy of military equipment on his page. The video is titled “Krasnodar-Novorossiysk Highway, a convoy of Russian troops heading to Crimea”. InformNapalm’s OSINT analyst identified the following hardware in that convoy: 2B26 multiple-launch rocket system, several artillery fire control vehicles, BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, R-330Zh Zhlitel and Leer-2 electronic warfare systems on the Tigr-M armored vehicle mounts. It should be noted that on March 13, 2014, a Leer-2 on the Tiger-M mount was spotted at the Kerch crossing.
Identification of the probable unit operating the equipment
The side numbers on the equipment containing the digits “21”point to the Southern Military District of the Russian Federation, the North Caucasus. A 2B26 multiple rocket launcher bears the guards mark, which means it belongs to a guards brigade. We know that at the beginning of March 2014, a convoy of the 18th Motorized Rifle Brigade entered Crimea through Krasnodar, which contained BTR-82A armored personnel carriers. The destination of the convoy was Voinka village in Krasnoperekopsk raion of Crimea. We wrote about this in the investigation titled List-1097: How the Russian 18th Brigade occupied Crimea. Apparently, the video posted by Chumak shows this particular convoy.
 We saved the video in case the subject of our investigation tries to destroy the evidence.
The name of Chumak’s unit is visible on the photos on his race number – 108th AAR.
Also, the number of the military unit, the name of its commander, and the full name of the subject of this investigation are well visible on the letter of acknowledgment.
On March 21, 2014, Chumak also posted a photo with weapons on a seashore. It was captioned: “Crimea:)”. Later, he deleted the caption, but we saved a screen shot.
On May 8, 2014, he published several photos of the medal for the occupation of Crimea.
Read more from InformNapalm and share
Translated by Artem Velichko.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter


informnapalm--2020-06-01--“Unprecedented move in OSCE”: the representative of Russia tried to interrupt speeches on Crimea

“ An unprecedented move in OSCE in Vienna : the representative from Russia is trying to prevent and interrupt speeches they don ’ t like from Ukraine & another expert on the security situation in the Black & Azov Sea ” .
This was tweeted by Radio Liberty correspondent Rikard Jozwiak .
During an online OSCE meeting in Vienna , a representative of the Russian Federation tried to interfere with the delivery of reports on the situation in the annexed Crimea , as well as on the militarization of the Azov and Black Sea basin .
Apparently , the tantrum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fact that the day before , on May 22 , Ukraine took another important step and filed a memorandum on referring the case of the capture of Ukrainian sailors by Russia to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea .
On May 14 , InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community signaled the critical importance of the timely filing of this memorandum .
The deadlines for Ukraine to submit the memorandum were set at the end of November 2019 .
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to file the document before May 24 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE since August 5 , 2015 .
According to the web site of the Russian MFA , he was awarded the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary by decree No .
67 of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of February 10 , 2018 .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community should like to remind that Mr Lukashevich is known for numerous scandalous statements , including in the case of MH17 .
Over the past 6 years , InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , occupation and militarization of Ukrainian Crimea , which can be found under Crimea section of our web site .
Among other findings , we have collected evidence of the following relevant facts : • participation of 32 military units of the Russian Armed Forces in the invasion of Crimea , • identification of military personnel of the National Guard of the Russian Federation and the Nuclear , Chemical and Biological Defense Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation , who reactivated the secret nuclear facility Feodosia-13 , • detection in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concentration of transport and launch containers for S-300 surface-to-air missile systems , • a series of investigations into the illegal armed seizure of two Chernomorneftegaz drilling rigs by Russian units , also known as the “ Boyko ’ s Rigs ” .
We also recommend reading one of the best comprehensive multilingual studies into the occupation of Crimea prepared by experts of Prometheus security environment research center : Crimea Behind the Curtain .
Guide to the Occupation Zone .
Read and share more from InformNapalm • • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Signs of PSYOP against Ukrainian army and OSCE at Horlivka • Obstruction of OSCE SMM activity in Donbas by the Russian Federation – Q1 2020 analysis • More Russians among OSCE observers in Donbas .
Manipulations detected in reports Translated by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Twitter / Telegram

“An unprecedented move in OSCE in Vienna: the representative from Russia is trying to prevent and interrupt speeches they don’t like from Ukraine & another expert on the security situation in the Black & Azov Sea”. This was tweeted by Radio Liberty correspondent Rikard Jozwiak.
an unprecedented move in OSCE in Vienna: the representative from #Russia is trying to prevent & interrupt speeches they don’t like from #Ukraine & another expert on the security situation in the Black Sea & Azov Sea. #Crimea — Rikard Jozwiak (@RikardJozwiak) May 27, 2020
During an online OSCE meeting in Vienna, a representative of the Russian Federation tried to interfere with the delivery of reports on the situation in the annexed Crimea, as well as on the militarization of the Azov and Black Sea basin.
Hysterics of Russian diplomats over Crimea
Apparently, the tantrum of the Russian diplomat is due to the fact that the day before, on May 22, Ukraine took another important step and filed a memorandum on referring the case of the capture of Ukrainian sailors by Russia to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. On May 14, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community signaled the critical importance of the timely filing of this memorandum. The deadlines for Ukraine to submit the memorandum were set at the end of November 2019. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to file the document before May 24, 2020.
Alexander Lukashevich has been the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE since August 5, 2015. According to the web site of the Russian MFA, he was awarded the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary by decree No. 67 of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of February 10, 2018. InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community should like to remind that Mr Lukashevich is known for numerous scandalous statements, including in the case of MH17. And on-site of the Forum for Security Co-operation, the head of the delegation was Andrey Vorobyov, who actually was noted for the rude behavior.
Capture, occupation and militarization of Crimea
Over the past 6 years, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has conducted numerous OSINT investigations about the capture, occupation and militarization of Ukrainian Crimea, which can be found under Crimea section of our web site.
Among other findings, we have collected evidence of the following relevant facts:
We also recommend reading one of the best comprehensive multilingual studies into the occupation of Crimea prepared by experts of Prometheus security environment research center: Crimea Behind the Curtain. Guide to the Occupation Zone.
Read and share more from InformNapalm
Translated by Artem Velichko. Distribution and reprint with reference to the source are welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Twitter / Telegram


informnapalm--2020-06-02--DPR militant extradited from Russia to Kazakhstan and sentenced to 4.5 years for mercenarism

The court of the Kazakh city of Kostanay sentenced Yevgeny Shcherbak , a citizen of Kazakhstan , to 4.5 years in prison for fighting in the eastern Ukraine in the ranks of the Donetsk People ’ s Republic ( DPR ) terrorist organization .
Details of the case were reported by the Russian outlet EADaily .
It is known that the militant participated in the hostilities at Shyrokyne and Debaltseve , served in the Sparta battalion under the command of the Russian terrorist Arseny “ Motorola ” Pavlov , liquidated in Donetsk on October 16 , 2016 .
Cautionary tale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shcherbak As a citizen of Kazakhstan , Shcherbak was convicted for taking part in an armed conflict on the territory of a foreign state .
Since January 2017 , he lived in St. Petersburg with his aunt , after he failed to get into the territory controlled by Russian troops and DPR militants following a vacation .
In September 2018 , Shcherbak was stopped by police in Leningrad Oblast during an identity check and was detained as he was wanted in Kazakhstan for mercenary activities .
At first he was kept in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Kresty pre-trial detention facility .
In October 2018 , after some public outcry , Shcherbak was released from the pre-trial detention facility , and was referred to immigration authorities for temporary asylum paperwork .
In St. Petersburg , at the Residents Registration Center , where Shcherbak tried to complete his paperwork , an official who introduced himself as an FSB officer declined his application and called Shcherbak “ a looter and mercenary who killed and robbed peaceful civilians in Ukraine.
” The intelligence officer also threatened him with deportation to Kazakhstan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moved to Chelyabinsk Oblast to his relatives , got a job there as a construction worker , and restarted his paperwork .
On December 22 , 2019 , Shcherbak was again detained by police in Chelyabinsk at a bus stop on the way from work .
Being unregistered and wanted in Kazakhstan , he was placed in a temporary detention center for foreigners and put up for deportation .
Several times police took Shcherbak to the Kazakh border and then returned to the temporary detention center .
Shcherbak ’ s deportation was delayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closure .
Law enforcement authorities of the Chelyabinsk Oblast rejected the militant ’ s asylum appeals .
On April 1 , 2020 , the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Chelyabinsk Oblast sent Shcherbak a letter stating that his temporary asylum in Russia was denied “ for lack of humanitarian reasons , according to the article 12 of the federal law On Refugees .
Copy of Shcherbak ’ s denial of temporary asylum in the Russian Federation State Duma deputy Sergey Shargunov tried to help the militant who fought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in eastern Ukraine , but even his influence was not enough to prevent the mercenary from being deported from Russia .
On May 21 , 2020 the Russian MP wrote on his page on Facebook : “ Today the court of the City of Kostanay sentenced Zhenya Shcherbak , a Russian man , to 4 and a half years in prison .
Let me remind you : the guy went as a militiaman to the Donbass , where he survived by a miracle .
From Russia , which beckoned him to the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her television screens , Yevgeny was extradited to Kazakhstan .
Although he begged to grant him refuge .
And of course , no one bothered about the fate of the betrayed .
I had to pay his lawyer in full .
If there was a “ public defender , ” things would have been worse .
He could have got 9 years .
So the family is happy even with such a sentence.
” And here are some explicit photos made in the Ukrainian Donbas from the VK account of Yevgeny Shcherbak , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is self-satisfied , posing with weapons and military equipment , hailing the bloody “ Russian world ” that he brought to the Ukrainian Donbas .
Of course , 4.5 years is not enough as a fair punishment , but the example itself and the details of this story show that even in Russia with its bureaucracy the militants with other citizenships can not feel safe .
Whereas reporting of mercenaries to Interpol creates the preconditions for their prosecution and extradition , even from the territory of the Russian Federation , to countries where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and share more from InformNapalm • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics • Data of the 108th AAR paratrooper participating in the invasion of Crimea + VIDEO of military hardware redeployment • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine should utilize the full potential of the OSCE SMM reports – InformNapalm • “ Unprecedented move in OSCE ” : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speeches on Crimea

The court of the Kazakh city of Kostanay sentenced Yevgeny Shcherbak, a citizen of Kazakhstan, to 4.5 years in prison for fighting in the eastern Ukraine in the ranks of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) terrorist organization. Details of the case were reported by the Russian outlet EADaily. It is known that the militant participated in the hostilities at Shyrokyne and Debaltseve, served in the Sparta battalion under the command of the Russian terrorist Arseny “Motorola” Pavlov, liquidated in Donetsk on October 16, 2016.
Cautionary tale of the detention and conviction of Yevgeny Shcherbak
As a citizen of Kazakhstan, Shcherbak was convicted for taking part in an armed conflict on the territory of a foreign state. Since January 2017, he lived in St. Petersburg with his aunt, after he failed to get into the territory controlled by Russian troops and DPR militants following a vacation. In September 2018, Shcherbak was stopped by police in Leningrad Oblast during an identity check and was detained as he was wanted in Kazakhstan for mercenary activities. At first he was kept in a temporary detention center, and then transferred to the Kresty pre-trial detention facility. In October 2018, after some public outcry, Shcherbak was released from the pre-trial detention facility, and was referred to immigration authorities for temporary asylum paperwork.
In St. Petersburg, at the Residents Registration Center, where Shcherbak tried to complete his paperwork, an official who introduced himself as an FSB officer declined his application and called Shcherbak “a looter and mercenary who killed and robbed peaceful civilians in Ukraine.” The intelligence officer also threatened him with deportation to Kazakhstan or Ukraine. After that, Shcherbak moved to Chelyabinsk Oblast to his relatives, got a job there as a construction worker, and restarted his paperwork. On December 22, 2019, Shcherbak was again detained by police in Chelyabinsk at a bus stop on the way from work. Being unregistered and wanted in Kazakhstan, he was placed in a temporary detention center for foreigners and put up for deportation. Several times police took Shcherbak to the Kazakh border and then returned to the temporary detention center. Shcherbak’s deportation was delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic and border closure. Law enforcement authorities of the Chelyabinsk Oblast rejected the militant’s asylum appeals.
On April 1, 2020, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Chelyabinsk Oblast sent Shcherbak a letter stating that his temporary asylum in Russia was denied “for lack of humanitarian reasons, according to the article 12 of the federal law On Refugees.
Copy of Shcherbak’s denial of temporary asylum in the Russian Federation
State Duma deputy Sergey Shargunov tried to help the militant who fought in the interests of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine, but even his influence was not enough to prevent the mercenary from being deported from Russia. On May 21, 2020 the Russian MP wrote on his page on Facebook:
“Today the court of the City of Kostanay sentenced Zhenya Shcherbak, a Russian man, to 4 and a half years in prison. Let me remind you: the guy went as a militiaman to the Donbass, where he survived by a miracle. From Russia, which beckoned him to the war with all the brilliance and clamor of her television screens, Yevgeny was extradited to Kazakhstan. Although he begged to grant him refuge. And of course, no one bothered about the fate of the betrayed. I had to pay his lawyer in full. If there was a “public defender,” things would have been worse. He could have got 9 years. So the family is happy even with such a sentence.”
And here are some explicit photos made in the Ukrainian Donbas from the VK account of Yevgeny Shcherbak, the militant. In the photos he is self-satisfied, posing with weapons and military equipment, hailing the bloody “Russian world” that he brought to the Ukrainian Donbas.
Conclusion
Of course, 4.5 years is not enough as a fair punishment, but the example itself and the details of this story show that even in Russia with its bureaucracy the militants with other citizenships cannot feel safe. Whereas reporting of mercenaries to Interpol creates the preconditions for their prosecution and extradition, even from the territory of the Russian Federation, to countries where they are wanted by authorities.
Read and share more from InformNapalm


informnapalm--2020-06-04--Activists Against Digital Lies

Activists Against Digital Lies

Scrappy , resourceful civil society activists in Europe are becoming a powerful tool for fighting disinformation online .
Author : Thomas Kent , a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation , teaches at Columbia University ’ s Harriman Institute .
He was formerly president and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty .
This article is based on his forthcoming book about Russian disinformation .
hen COVID-19 swept into Lithuania , conspiracy-oriented Facebook groups bulged with disinformation : U.S. soldiers brought the virus to Lithuania , dark forces invented the virus to dominate the world , vaccines will contain nanochips to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signals .
New people suddenly started filtering into the Facebook groups , attacking the conspiracy theories .
Group administrators blocked them .
But the interlopers kept coming .
New names and accounts kept appearing , each fighting the false narratives in its own way .
There was nothing accidental about the arrival of these new voices .
Behind them was a coordinated effort by the “ elves , ” a team of Lithuanian activists who have been fighting disinformation for six years .
Team members worked together to penetrate the groups .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blocked and deployed new assets as needed , a team spokesman said .
Lithuania ’ s elves are just one branch of a surprisingly complex and creative network across Europe that is combating disinformation from local sources , Russia , and elsewhere .
( The elves organized themselves after Russian forces entered Ukraine . )
While most news media have focused on the tide of disinformation sweeping the continent , the growing forces fighting it have received far less attention .
Their work may suggest some strategies for the United States , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the coronavirus pandemic and attempted to spread panic over the past week ’ s rioting .
Some activists work in secret teams to challenge trolls directly on social platforms .
Others map entire networks of trolls and bots to help Facebook and Twitter shut them down .
They campaign for advertisers to boycott sites that promote racist and conspiratorial narratives .
They jump onto newspapers ’ comment boards to push down hostile comments under dozens of moderate posts .
Some even lure particularly active promoters of conspiracy narratives into private chats where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alongside the most militant campaigners stands a corps of investigative journalists armed with artificial intelligence tools for deeply detailed investigations , along with fact-checkers who are learning to expose disinformation with increasing speed .
When false information about the virus started circulating in Slovakia , members of the new Digital Infospace Security Initiative swiftly created a website , a campaign on Facebook , and another on Instagram to debunk the most dangerous rumors .
In the course of a month , the shares and “ likes ” attracted by their warnings propelled their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 130,000 people .
Tomáš Kriššák , one of those behind the coronavirus website in Slovakia , says he has seen clear results from years of pro-democracy campaigning .
“ Little by little , over time , we have seen people become more aware of disinformation , more suspicious , ” he says .
Slovakia ’ s population has been the most pro-Russian of any NATO country .
But its populist-oriented ruling party was defeated in elections this year and the nation ’ s leadership has now pledged itself to a pro-NATO and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fighting disinformation would bridle at the idea that they are political actors , arguing that they simply expose wrongdoing and falsehoods from any source .
But the effect of their work heavily favors democratic forces struggling against fake news , hate , and conspiracy theories .
Some journalists openly focus their work on Russia , untangling in detail its money laundering , military movements , and intelligence activity .
These private actors fighting disinformation are particularly significant at a time when democratic governments are often hesitant to engage in the battle themselves .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ politically disastrous because they could be portrayed as directed against rightwing parties in their own countries , whose messages often coincide with the Kremlin ’ s .
Officials also fear being accused of engaging in their own “ propaganda , ” even if they only advocate for facts and democratic values .
Non-government activists have few such worries .
They also are quicker and more agile than governments , where bureaucratic delays can slow responses to disinformation to the point where they are useless .
Activists are often young , with a deep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They are brave as well .
Often their work results in threats to themselves and their families .
Still , said a spokesman for the Lithuanian elves , “ A lot of people are fine with using their own names .
They feel there ’ s nothing to be afraid of , that we ’ re in our own country , that we ’ re fighting for real values.
” The activists ’ commitment and courage have attracted increasing attention and funding from major Western governments and foundations .
Some groups resist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private , volunteer status .
Bohumil Kartous , a spokesman for Czech elves , said taking money , especially from donors abroad , opens activists to accusations they are agents of foreign interests .
“ The whole idea of the elves is that we do this voluntarily , ” he said .
“ It ’ s your decision to do it , it ’ s your time and energy .
You do it for your country , not for money.
” However , money makes a difference in reacting quickly and reaching large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Values Center in Prague estimates that a response to disinformation must come within two hours to have a chance of success .
Many groups acknowledge they need training in quickly identifying false narratives , creating memes and videos to counter them , and targeting audiences for the greatest effect .
Even those reluctant to take money acknowledge that funding for a few full-time employees would help with organization , recruitment , and technology .
The U.S. State Department ’ s Global Engagement Center said last year it had arranged to train civil society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to disinformation “ in locally relevant ways.
” The United Kingdom is spending £18 million over three years to counter disinformation and fake news across Eastern Europe and strengthen independent media in the Western Balkans .
Many other funders , such as George Soros ’ Open Societies Foundations , the National Endowment for Democracy , and the European Endowment for Democracy , support grassroots civil society and independent journalism efforts .
Facebook contributes millions of dollars to subsidize fact-checking projects .
U.S. and German funders support Trolless , a Moldovan group that tipped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trafficking in disinformation and false identities ahead of elections in 2019 .
Facebook responded with its own investigation and removed nearly 200 .
Perhaps the activists ’ most powerful tool is international cooperation .
Funders have supported a series of conferences to spur cross-border collaborations of civil society activists , journalists , and fact-checkers .
The more aggressive activists exchange tales at such meetings of how they have exposed Russian disinformation and even hoaxed Russian soldiers online .
The InformNapalm investigative group publishes the names of Russian servicemen who have fought in Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largely from clues on social media .
Other conferences , for fact-checkers , have helped create a standing mutual-aid network aimed at countering false information from any source .
As an example , a fact-checking group in France asked fellow members of the International Fact-Checking Network in May about a supposed Italian breakthrough that could lead to curing coronavirus at home .
Within 45 minutes it received detailed responses from fact-checkers in Britain , Italy , and Spain describing how the same rumor had spread in their countries and sharing detailed evidence that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ways , the anti-disinformation movement is still struggling to reach critical mass .
Many groups have only a few dozen activists .
Members who lose courage or interest must constantly be replaced .
Activists ’ posts struggle for visibility against sensational , highly shareable content from disinformation and conspiracy sites .
Some of the most aggressive and innovative work is going on in new democracies in East and Central Europe ; in West European countries , the struggle over disinformation has largely become a subtheme in existing political conflicts .
Funding is probably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most help .
The millions of dollars available for their work often trickle down in small grants , awarded after long application processes and for limited periods .
Grants often fall in the $ 10,000- $ 50,000 range—hardly enough to hire staff and get major projects underway .
Real breakthrough projects might be big-ticket items like opening radio and television stations to compete with broadcasters controlled by authoritarian governments and corrupt financial interests .
Projects of this scope are almost impossible given the way funding is handled now .
Just as important as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incentive for disinformation .
Many disinformation and conspiracy sites exist not out of deep ideology , but simply to make money .
By one estimate , they reap a quarter-billion dollars a year , much of it by running ads from Google and other U.S. advertising networks .
The Global Disinformation Index , Konšpirátori.sk in Slovakia , and the Czech Elves are trying to persuade businesses to order networks not to send their ads to disinformation sites , and to get networks to cut off such outlets entirely .
Not all activists agree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same aggressiveness and snark that disinformation sites use—seeking to anger people in a pro-democracy direction ?
Or instead , should they work to create more thoughtful , rational public dialogue that might discourage conspiracy theories and extremism ?
Emblematic of the softer approach is the “ I Am Here ” movement , an initiative in Europe and North America that describes itself as non-political and focused on fighting hate speech .
The Swedish founder of the campaign , Mina Dennert , says teams patrol the internet looking for groups and comment boards where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out these locations to each other and then try to submerge angry comments with more moderate posts of their own .
“ We don ’ t answer trolls , ” Dennert says .
“ We ‘ like ’ each other ’ s comments to increase their visibility in algorithms and create a healthier conversation .
If trolls discuss our comments , it helps to push them up further.
” Sometimes just two or three people can change the tone of conversation , she says .
At times it may take 100 .
Lithuania @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more pointed tone .
When Adidas in 2018 marketed a Soviet-retro sportswear line bearing the letters “ USSR ” and the hammer and sickle , the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry accused the company of abetting Soviet “ imperial nostalgia.
” The elves were among many Lithuanians who took up the campaign .
By the next morning , they had created a # StopAdidas hashtag and began posting to the Adidas Facebook page memes showing an Adidas logo on a Soviet labor camp and images of Adidas ’ clothing with the Soviet imagery replaced by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ # StopAdidas posts had appeared , Adidas stopped selling the products .
Pro-democracy groups face challenges in breaking out of the urban , upscale bubble many of them inhabit .
Rural voters are often targeted by social posts and email chain letters that claim democracy means liberal social policies that will undermine their conservative way of life .
Some activists have launched their own chain emails to debunk the claims , but they find they are shared much less than the conspiracy-filled emails with their dire predictions .
Sometimes activists despair that their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compared to the deluge of disinformation and propaganda they seek to confront .
“ Our organization is very small compared to all the hate .
I ’ m not very optimistic , ” Dennert says .
However , in the absence of stronger government action , activists and journalists—if properly supported—could grow to become a significant counterweight to disinformation .
Civil society groups “ are going to be the heroes of counter-disinformation techniques , ” Daniel Fried , a former U.S. ambassador to Poland and now an Atlantic Council fellow , told the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ They , not government bureaucracy , are going to be able to expose , in real-time , Russian and other disinformation operations .
We ought to put our trust in them .
We ought to put some of our resources behind them.
” The coronavirus pandemic could help clarify where the battle for trust goes from here .
Will people believe ever more lurid conspiracy theories , and act and vote based on them ?
Or will fake narratives start to collapse , the victims of their own illogic as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcome will help determine whether Europe ’ s broad but still-emerging coalition against disinformation has a fighting chance of success .
Author : Thomas Kent , a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation , teaches at Columbia University ’ s Harriman Institute .
He was formerly president and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty .
This article is based on his forthcoming book about Russian disinformation .
Read and share more from InformNapalm • • Proofs of the Russian Aggression : InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence • Signs of PSYOP against Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of OSCE SMM activity in Donbas by the Russian Federation – Q1 2020 analysis • More Russians among OSCE observers in Donbas .
Manipulations detected in reports • “ Unprecedented move in OSCE ” : the representative of Russia tried to interrupt speeches on Crimea

Scrappy, resourceful civil society activists in Europe are becoming a powerful tool for fighting disinformation online.
Source: The American Interest, рublished on: June 2, 2020.
Author: Thomas Kent, a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation, teaches at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. He was formerly president and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. This article is based on his forthcoming book about Russian disinformation.
When COVID-19 swept into Lithuania, conspiracy-oriented Facebook groups bulged with disinformation: U.S. soldiers brought the virus to Lithuania, dark forces invented the virus to dominate the world, vaccines will contain nanochips to let people be controlled by 5G cellphone signals.
Then something happened.
New people suddenly started filtering into the Facebook groups, attacking the conspiracy theories. Group administrators blocked them. But the interlopers kept coming. New names and accounts kept appearing, each fighting the false narratives in its own way.
There was nothing accidental about the arrival of these new voices. Behind them was a coordinated effort by the “elves,” a team of Lithuanian activists who have been fighting disinformation for six years. Team members worked together to penetrate the groups. They reported to each other who had been blocked and deployed new assets as needed, a team spokesman said.
Lithuania’s elves are just one branch of a surprisingly complex and creative network across Europe that is combating disinformation from local sources, Russia, and elsewhere. (The elves organized themselves after Russian forces entered Ukraine.) While most news media have focused on the tide of disinformation sweeping the continent, the growing forces fighting it have received far less attention. Their work may suggest some strategies for the United States, where disinformation has threatened to intensify the dangers of the coronavirus pandemic and attempted to spread panic over the past week’s rioting.
Some activists work in secret teams to challenge trolls directly on social platforms. Others map entire networks of trolls and bots to help Facebook and Twitter shut them down. They campaign for advertisers to boycott sites that promote racist and conspiratorial narratives. They jump onto newspapers’ comment boards to push down hostile comments under dozens of moderate posts. Some even lure particularly active promoters of conspiracy narratives into private chats where they try to change their views. Alongside the most militant campaigners stands a corps of investigative journalists armed with artificial intelligence tools for deeply detailed investigations, along with fact-checkers who are learning to expose disinformation with increasing speed.
When false information about the virus started circulating in Slovakia, members of the new Digital Infospace Security Initiative swiftly created a website, a campaign on Facebook, and another on Instagram to debunk the most dangerous rumors. In the course of a month, the shares and “likes” attracted by their warnings propelled their posts into the Facebook feeds of more than 130,000 people. Tomáš Kriššák, one of those behind the coronavirus website in Slovakia, says he has seen clear results from years of pro-democracy campaigning. “Little by little, over time, we have seen people become more aware of disinformation, more suspicious,” he says. Slovakia’s population has been the most pro-Russian of any NATO country. But its populist-oriented ruling party was defeated in elections this year and the nation’s leadership has now pledged itself to a pro-NATO and EU course.
Some journalists and fact-checkers fighting disinformation would bridle at the idea that they are political actors, arguing that they simply expose wrongdoing and falsehoods from any source. But the effect of their work heavily favors democratic forces struggling against fake news, hate, and conspiracy theories. Some journalists openly focus their work on Russia, untangling in detail its money laundering, military movements, and intelligence activity.
These private actors fighting disinformation are particularly significant at a time when democratic governments are often hesitant to engage in the battle themselves. Some governments fear such efforts would be politically disastrous because they could be portrayed as directed against rightwing parties in their own countries, whose messages often coincide with the Kremlin’s. Officials also fear being accused of engaging in their own “propaganda,” even if they only advocate for facts and democratic values.
Non-government activists have few such worries. They also are quicker and more agile than governments, where bureaucratic delays can slow responses to disinformation to the point where they are useless. Activists are often young, with a deep appreciation of the power of social networks. They are brave as well. Often their work results in threats to themselves and their families. Still, said a spokesman for the Lithuanian elves, “A lot of people are fine with using their own names. They feel there’s nothing to be afraid of, that we’re in our own country, that we’re fighting for real values.”
The activists’ commitment and courage have attracted increasing attention and funding from major Western governments and foundations. Some groups resist money from outside, proud of their private, volunteer status. Bohumil Kartous, a spokesman for Czech elves, said taking money, especially from donors abroad, opens activists to accusations they are agents of foreign interests. “The whole idea of the elves is that we do this voluntarily,” he said. “It’s your decision to do it, it’s your time and energy. You do it for your country, not for money.”
However, money makes a difference in reacting quickly and reaching large audiences. Veronika Špalková of the European Values Center in Prague estimates that a response to disinformation must come within two hours to have a chance of success. Many groups acknowledge they need training in quickly identifying false narratives, creating memes and videos to counter them, and targeting audiences for the greatest effect. Even those reluctant to take money acknowledge that funding for a few full-time employees would help with organization, recruitment, and technology.
The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center said last year it had arranged to train civil society actors in 14 European nations to respond to disinformation “in locally relevant ways.” The United Kingdom is spending £18 million over three years to counter disinformation and fake news across Eastern Europe and strengthen independent media in the Western Balkans. Many other funders, such as George Soros’ Open Societies Foundations, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the European Endowment for Democracy, support grassroots civil society and independent journalism efforts. Facebook contributes millions of dollars to subsidize fact-checking projects. U.S. and German funders support Trolless, a Moldovan group that tipped Facebook to some 700 accounts and pages trafficking in disinformation and false identities ahead of elections in 2019. Facebook responded with its own investigation and removed nearly 200.
Perhaps the activists’ most powerful tool is international cooperation. Funders have supported a series of conferences to spur cross-border collaborations of civil society activists, journalists, and fact-checkers. The more aggressive activists exchange tales at such meetings of how they have exposed Russian disinformation and even hoaxed Russian soldiers online. The InformNapalm investigative group publishes the names of Russian servicemen who have fought in Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria, working largely from clues on social media.
Other conferences, for fact-checkers, have helped create a standing mutual-aid network aimed at countering false information from any source. As an example, a fact-checking group in France asked fellow members of the International Fact-Checking Network in May about a supposed Italian breakthrough that could lead to curing coronavirus at home. Within 45 minutes it received detailed responses from fact-checkers in Britain, Italy, and Spain describing how the same rumor had spread in their countries and sharing detailed evidence that it was not true.
In many ways, the anti-disinformation movement is still struggling to reach critical mass. Many groups have only a few dozen activists. Members who lose courage or interest must constantly be replaced. Activists’ posts struggle for visibility against sensational, highly shareable content from disinformation and conspiracy sites. Some of the most aggressive and innovative work is going on in new democracies in East and Central Europe; in West European countries, the struggle over disinformation has largely become a subtheme in existing political conflicts.
Funding is probably the area where activists can use the most help. The millions of dollars available for their work often trickle down in small grants, awarded after long application processes and for limited periods. Grants often fall in the $10,000-$50,000 range—hardly enough to hire staff and get major projects underway. Real breakthrough projects might be big-ticket items like opening radio and television stations to compete with broadcasters controlled by authoritarian governments and corrupt financial interests. Projects of this scope are almost impossible given the way funding is handled now.
Just as important as funding pro-democracy groups is reducing the financial incentive for disinformation. Many disinformation and conspiracy sites exist not out of deep ideology, but simply to make money. By one estimate, they reap a quarter-billion dollars a year, much of it by running ads from Google and other U.S. advertising networks. The Global Disinformation Index, Konšpirátori.sk in Slovakia, and the Czech Elves are trying to persuade businesses to order networks not to send their ads to disinformation sites, and to get networks to cut off such outlets entirely.
Not all activists agree on tactics. Should they copy the same aggressiveness and snark that disinformation sites use—seeking to anger people in a pro-democracy direction? Or instead, should they work to create more thoughtful, rational public dialogue that might discourage conspiracy theories and extremism?
Emblematic of the softer approach is the “I Am Here” movement, an initiative in Europe and North America that describes itself as non-political and focused on fighting hate speech. The Swedish founder of the campaign, Mina Dennert, says teams patrol the internet looking for groups and comment boards where hate content is prominent. Members point out these locations to each other and then try to submerge angry comments with more moderate posts of their own.
“We don’t answer trolls,” Dennert says. “We ‘like’ each other’s comments to increase their visibility in algorithms and create a healthier conversation. If trolls discuss our comments, it helps to push them up further.” Sometimes just two or three people can change the tone of conversation, she says. At times it may take 100.
Lithuania’s elves are known for a more pointed tone. When Adidas in 2018 marketed a Soviet-retro sportswear line bearing the letters “USSR” and the hammer and sickle, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry accused the company of abetting Soviet “imperial nostalgia.” The elves were among many Lithuanians who took up the campaign. By the next morning, they had created a #StopAdidas hashtag and began posting to the Adidas Facebook page memes showing an Adidas logo on a Soviet labor camp and images of Adidas’ clothing with the Soviet imagery replaced by a swastika. After more than 6,000 #StopAdidas posts had appeared, Adidas stopped selling the products.
Pro-democracy groups face challenges in breaking out of the urban, upscale bubble many of them inhabit. Rural voters are often targeted by social posts and email chain letters that claim democracy means liberal social policies that will undermine their conservative way of life. Some activists have launched their own chain emails to debunk the claims, but they find they are shared much less than the conspiracy-filled emails with their dire predictions.
Sometimes activists despair that their efforts are a drop in the bucket compared to the deluge of disinformation and propaganda they seek to confront. “Our organization is very small compared to all the hate. I’m not very optimistic,” Dennert says. However, in the absence of stronger government action, activists and journalists—if properly supported—could grow to become a significant counterweight to disinformation.
Civil society groups “are going to be the heroes of counter-disinformation techniques,” Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland and now an Atlantic Council fellow, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee last year. “They, not government bureaucracy, are going to be able to expose, in real-time, Russian and other disinformation operations. We ought to put our trust in them. We ought to put some of our resources behind them.”
The coronavirus pandemic could help clarify where the battle for trust goes from here. Will people believe ever more lurid conspiracy theories, and act and vote based on them? Or will fake narratives start to collapse, the victims of their own illogic as well as the efforts of anti-disinformation warriors? The outcome will help determine whether Europe’s broad but still-emerging coalition against disinformation has a fighting chance of success.
Source: The American Interest, рublished on: June 2, 2020.
Author: Thomas Kent, a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation, teaches at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. He was formerly president and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. This article is based on his forthcoming book about Russian disinformation.
Read and share more from InformNapalm