informnapalm--2020-04-22--Obstruction of OSCE SMM activity in Donbas by the Russian Federation – Q1 2020 analysis

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community prepared an analysis of the instances of obstruction of the activities of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission ( SMM ) in the Donbas and aggressive behavior towards international observers in the first quarter of 2020 .
This material contains statistics , charts and maps that may come useful to diplomats , politicians , military , journalists , experts and any party that could use them to apply diplomatic , economic and media pressure on the Russian aggressor state .
On March 19 , Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported on its official Facebook page that the mandate of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another 12 months until 31 March 2021 .
The OSCE participating states also agreed to significantly increase the Mission ’ s budget to strengthen its monitoring capabilities .
“ Because of this decision , the SMM will be able to continue to inform the international community of the facts confirming the military presence of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine , ” the report says .
Indeed , from time to time the OSCE SMM daily reports contain unique data indicating the types of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come to Donbas only from the Russian Federation and that can be operated only by qualified Russian military personnel .
InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community regularly cites and supplements this data with its own open-source intelligence ( OSINT ) .
According to our observations , the aerial operations of the SMM are the most effective source of data on Russian military hardware in OSCE reports , while any sensitive facilities and areas in the occupied territory are kept virtually inaccessible to patrols .
To illustrate this situation , InformNapalm volunteers tried to collect and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the activities of the OSCE SMM in the Donbas for the period from January through March 2020 .
Obstacles in the work of OSCE SMM and threats to observers Russian occupation forces and their subordinate armed formations periodically obstruct the movement of the OSCE SMM observers and deny their access to certain areas and facilities .
However , in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian troops , the OSCE observers move freely .
This is one of the factors that creates a certain imbalance in the reports .
Another significant factor is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian Federation among the OSCE SMM observers .
There are 40 of them , and they could be agents of influence of the Russian Federation .
This combination of factors looks like another dimension of the Russian hybrid warfare , as Russian Federation is an aggressor state and a party to the conflict .
This fact must be taken into account to increase the effectiveness of the Mission .
Citizens of the Russian Federation must be banned from exercising any observer functions ; international pressure on the Russian Federation must be stepped up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers to areas and facilities in the occupied territory .
The daily report of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine No .
65/2020 of March 18 , 2020 , contains a section about aggressive behavior displayed towards SMM personnel by armed militants controlled by the Russian Federation .
The first incident occurred near the temporarily occupied Yenakiieve in the village of Sofiivka The second incident occurred near the disengagement area No .
3 on the way of the Mission patrol to the temporarily occupied village of Petrivske Russian propaganda in the occupied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the frequency of aggressive behavior against OSCE SMM observers may well be not only the result of instructions from the Russian command to prevent access to certain facilities , but also the result of militants ’ fears of the coronavirus infection .
These fears are deliberately fueled by channels of the Russian propaganda in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts that promote the alleged threat of the spread of COVID-19 in the territory of the so-called Donetsk People ’ s Republic ( DPR ) by the representatives of the OSCE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actions is to further impede the movement of the observers who monitor the security situation .
Regular obstruction of the OSCE SMM activity in the south of Donetsk Oblast The tendency towards increased obstruction of the Mission ’ s activities in the south by the Russian occupation forces has been observed for a long period .
Since the beginning of 2020 , the Mission has not been able to regularly and fully monitor the security situation in the areas between Donetsk and the coast of the Sea of Azov , including the border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ patrols have been blocked by representatives of the armed formations controlled by the Russian Federation ; aerial surveillance has also been restricted by the Russian electronic warfare assets in Donbas .
Access has remained restricted or prohibited in at least 27 temporarily occupied communities throughout the southern part of the occupied territory .
And , given that the observers are stopped at the checkpoints of the militants located on the main roads , the entire line of contact in the occupied southern part of the Donetsk Oblast remains inaccessible .
The OSCE SMM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Hnutove , which is considered a new potential site for the disengagement of forces and assets in the Donbas .
For instance , almost every day the Russian occupation forces prevent the Mission ’ s passage towards the local checkpoint used by local residents on their way to the Hnutove EECP .
In January 2020 , at a checkpoint west of Verkhnioshyrokivske ( formerly Oktyabr , non-government-controlled , 85km south of Donetsk ) the OSCE SMM patrol was delayed 11 times for 20 minutes to 2 hours .
13 times , Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at all under the pretext of “ special measures continuing in the area ” , “ carrying out an operation ” , “ demining activities ” etc .
At the same time , civilian vehicles were passing this checkpoint unhindered in both directions .
In February , at the same checkpoint , militants denied passage to the OSCE patrol 21 times , and blocked them for long periods 3 times .
In March , the same checkpoint denied passage to the SMM 6 times , however the number of occasions of obstruction to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Apparently , the balance change is due to the SMM shifting the balance in the observation in this area to aerial operations .
In March , OSCE ’ s short- and medium-range UAVs experienced GPS signal interference on 16 occasions as a result of jamming by electronic warfare systems , and on four occasions Russian mercenaries opened fire on the OSCE UAVs with their small arms .
Statistical data on the OSCE SMM obstruction by the Russian occupation forces for the first quarter of 2020 We would like to point out that at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Minsk on February 12 , 2020 , the parties were very close to reaching an agreement on a new section for disengagement of forces and assets near Hnutove .
Darka Olifer , the press secretary of the head of the Ukrainian delegation , said after the meeting , “ The Ukrainian side insists on ensuring the complete security of the Mission observers , whereas the OSCE SMM should enjoy unhindered access to the entire territory of Ukraine , as provided for by its mandate.
” However , the reports of the OSCE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hnutove EECP and its vicinity , controlled by the Russian occupation administration , are exactly the areas that remain inaccessible to the Mission , and it can not effectively monitor the security situation and the military presence of armed formations .
Situation in the disengagement area No .
3 It should be noted that the access of the OSCE Mission patrols to the village of Petrivske controlled by the Russian occupation forces and to the SMM camera positioned on the edge of the disengagement area , opposite the camera in the government-controlled Bohdanivka @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in January 2020 .
During the same period in January , the operations of the Mission ’ s short- and medium-range UAVs in this area were hindered by jamming at least 16 times .
It should be noted that Petrivske is the location of the only camera of the OSCE SMM in the south of the non-governement-controlled territory , while there are nine of them ( in Maryinka , Berezove , Bohdanivka , Hranitne , Chermalyk , Pyschevyk , Shyrokyne , Hnutove and Hnutove checkpoint ) in the adjacent areas controlled by Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SMM patrol was regularly denied access to the SMM permanent observation post at the central railway station of the temporarily occupied Donetsk .
Armed militants have denied access to the patrol at least 8 times since early March .
Observers reported the reasons for restrictions cited by the militants , which included “ orders of the superiors ” and the refusal of the observers to delete photographs taken by them on their previous visit .
“ A member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to its regular observation post at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre ) , citing the SMM ’ s recent refusal to delete photographs that it had taken on a previous visit.
” – OSCE SMM Report No .
56/2020 of March 7 , 2020 .
• After analyzing the reports of the OSCE SMM for the first quarter of 2020 , we can conclude that full monitoring of the security situation is carried out by the Mission only on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian troops , while the territory controlled by the Russian occupation forces remains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OSCE SMM .
• The Ukrainian side contributes to the work of the Mission , unlike the Russian occupation forces .
During 2020 , the access of the OSCE patrols to villages and towns as well as the Misson ’ s cameras located in the territory controlled by Ukrainian troops has never been restricted .
• This imbalance in access to areas and facilities is affecting the content of the OSCE SMM reports , as the section on military presence in the security zone mainly reflects the information on personnel and assets in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the assets allowed by the Minsk protocols ) , whereas the information on the military presence of the Russian occupation forces in the non-government-controlled territory is rarely included in the SMM reports .
• This leads to an imbalance in the media coverage , which , in turn , is used by pro-Russian propagandists in their media controlled by the Russian Federation to discredit the actions of the Ukrainian military command .
This imbalance is also used by the Russian Federation as a propaganda tool in the negotiations within the Trilateral Contact Group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more from InformNapalm and share • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • List of armament and military equipment of the Russian Army in Donbas .
• Award stigma of war criminals from the Russian Army , database and video overview Translated by , edited by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram .

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community prepared an analysis of the instances of obstruction of the activities of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in the Donbas and aggressive behavior towards international observers in the first quarter of 2020. This material contains statistics, charts and maps that may come useful to diplomats, politicians, military, journalists, experts and any party that could use them to apply diplomatic, economic and media pressure on the Russian aggressor state.
On March 19, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported on its official Facebook page that the mandate of the OSCE SMM had been extended for another 12 months until 31 March 2021. The OSCE participating states also agreed to significantly increase the Mission’s budget to strengthen its monitoring capabilities.
“Because of this decision, the SMM will be able to continue to inform the international community of the facts confirming the military presence of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine,” the report says.
Indeed, from time to time the OSCE SMM daily reports contain unique data indicating the types of modern Russian military hardware that could have come to Donbas only from the Russian Federation and that can be operated only by qualified Russian military personnel. InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community regularly cites and supplements this data with its own open-source intelligence (OSINT). According to our observations, the aerial operations of the SMM are the most effective source of data on Russian military hardware in OSCE reports, while any sensitive facilities and areas in the occupied territory are kept virtually inaccessible to patrols.
To illustrate this situation, InformNapalm volunteers tried to collect and structure all the data on the obstruction of the activities of the OSCE SMM in the Donbas for the period from January through March 2020.
Obstacles in the work of OSCE SMM and threats to observers
Russian occupation forces and their subordinate armed formations periodically obstruct the movement of the OSCE SMM observers and deny their access to certain areas and facilities. However, in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian troops, the OSCE observers move freely. This is one of the factors that creates a certain imbalance in the reports. Another significant factor is the large number of citizens of the Russian Federation among the OSCE SMM observers. There are 40 of them, and they could be agents of influence of the Russian Federation. This combination of factors looks like another dimension of the Russian hybrid warfare, as Russian Federation is an aggressor state and a party to the conflict. This fact must be taken into account to increase the effectiveness of the Mission. Citizens of the Russian Federation must be banned from exercising any observer functions; international pressure on the Russian Federation must be stepped up with the requirement of unhindered admission of observers to areas and facilities in the occupied territory.
The daily report of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine No. 65/2020 of March 18, 2020, contains a section about aggressive behavior displayed towards SMM personnel by armed militants controlled by the Russian Federation.
The first incident occurred near the temporarily occupied Yenakiieve in the village of Sofiivka
× “In Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations stopped an SMM patrol consisting of two vehicles and five patrol members. One of the members of the armed formations, who was visibly intoxicated, aggressively told the SMM to open the driver’s door of the first vehicle, which the SMM did. He then pointed his rifle through the open door at the patrol
members, and subsequently opened the rear left door while demanding that the patrol members disembark the vehicle and open the trunk. After he moved away from the SMM vehicle to use a handheld radio, the SMM members closed all car doors and immediately locked them. The same member of the armed formations then tried to open the car doors while shouting aggressively. After eight minutes, they allowed the SMM to proceed further.”
The second incident occurred near the disengagement area No. 3 on the way of the Mission patrol to the temporarily occupied village of Petrivske
× “Positioned on a road about 1km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard a buzzing sound assessed as the engine of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) at an assessed range of 400m-1km northeast of its position. After about two minutes, the SMM saw an unidentified object attached to a white/light grey parachute land about 400m north-east. About 50 minutes later, after moving to a position about 1.5km further north-north-east, the SMM saw a black UAV (delta-wing, more than 1m in width) flying at an assessed range of 200-300m south-east, and saw an unidentified about 1m-long object attached to a white/light grey parachute land about 400m south-south-east of the patrol’s position. The SMM left the area.”
Russian propaganda in the occupied areas spreads disinformation about COVID-19
The increase in the frequency of aggressive behavior against OSCE SMM observers may well be not only the result of instructions from the Russian command to prevent access to certain facilities, but also the result of militants’ fears of the coronavirus infection. These fears are deliberately fueled by channels of the Russian propaganda in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts that promote the alleged threat of the spread of COVID-19 in the territory of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) by the representatives of the OSCE SMM. The main objective of these actions is to further impede the movement of the observers who monitor the security situation.
(Watch the video from the video titled Civil Defense dated March 17, 2020 at 36:50)

Regular obstruction of the OSCE SMM activity in the south of Donetsk Oblast
The tendency towards increased obstruction of the Mission’s activities in the south by the Russian occupation forces has been observed for a long period. Since the beginning of 2020, the Mission has not been able to regularly and fully monitor the security situation in the areas between Donetsk and the coast of the Sea of Azov, including the border areas with the Russian Federation. OSCE patrols have been blocked by representatives of the armed formations controlled by the Russian Federation; aerial surveillance has also been restricted by the Russian electronic warfare assets in Donbas.
Access has remained restricted or prohibited in at least 27 temporarily occupied communities throughout the southern part of the occupied territory. And, given that the observers are stopped at the checkpoints of the militants located on the main roads, the entire line of contact in the occupied southern part of the Donetsk Oblast remains inaccessible.
The OSCE SMM does not have access to the area of Hnutove, which is considered a new potential site for the disengagement of forces and assets in the Donbas.
For instance, almost every day the Russian occupation forces prevent the Mission’s passage towards the local checkpoint used by local residents on their way to the Hnutove EECP. In January 2020, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnioshyrokivske (formerly Oktyabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk) the OSCE SMM patrol was delayed 11 times for 20 minutes to 2 hours. 13 times, Russian militants did not let the patrol pass at all under the pretext of “special measures continuing in the area”, “carrying out an operation”, “demining activities” etc. At the same time, civilian vehicles were passing this checkpoint unhindered in both directions. In February, at the same checkpoint, militants denied passage to the OSCE patrol 21 times, and blocked them for long periods 3 times. In March, the same checkpoint denied passage to the SMM 6 times, however the number of occasions of obstruction to the Mission’s UAVs increased. Apparently, the balance change is due to the SMM shifting the balance in the observation in this area to aerial operations. In March, OSCE’s short- and medium-range UAVs experienced GPS signal interference on 16 occasions as a result of jamming by electronic warfare systems, and on four occasions Russian mercenaries opened fire on the OSCE UAVs with their small arms.
Statistical data on the OSCE SMM obstruction by the Russian occupation forces for the first quarter of 2020
We would like to point out that at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk on February 12, 2020, the parties were very close to reaching an agreement on a new section for disengagement of forces and assets near Hnutove. Darka Olifer, the press secretary of the head of the Ukrainian delegation, said after the meeting, “The Ukrainian side insists on ensuring the complete security of the Mission observers, whereas the OSCE SMM should enjoy unhindered access to the entire territory of Ukraine, as provided for by its mandate.” However, the reports of the OSCE SMM make it perfectly clear that the Hnutove EECP and its vicinity, controlled by the Russian occupation administration, are exactly the areas that remain inaccessible to the Mission, and it cannot effectively monitor the security situation and the military presence of armed formations.
Situation in the disengagement area No. 3
It should be noted that the access of the OSCE Mission patrols to the village of Petrivske controlled by the Russian occupation forces and to the SMM camera positioned on the edge of the disengagement area, opposite the camera in the government-controlled Bohdanivka, was limited for 8 consecutive days in January 2020. During the same period in January, the operations of the Mission’s short- and medium-range UAVs in this area were hindered by jamming at least 16 times.
It should be noted that Petrivske is the location of the only camera of the OSCE SMM in the south of the non-governement-controlled territory, while there are nine of them (in Maryinka, Berezove, Bohdanivka, Hranitne, Chermalyk, Pyschevyk, Shyrokyne, Hnutove and Hnutove checkpoint) in the adjacent areas controlled by Ukrainian troops.
Occupied Donetsk
In March 2020, OSCE SMM patrol was regularly denied access to the SMM permanent observation post at the central railway station of the temporarily occupied Donetsk. Armed militants have denied access to the patrol at least 8 times since early March. Observers reported the reasons for restrictions cited by the militants, which included “orders of the superiors” and the refusal of the observers to delete photographs taken by them on their previous visit.
“A member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to its regular observation post at the central railway station in non-government-controlled Donetsk city (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), citing the SMM’s recent refusal to delete photographs that it had taken on a previous visit.” – OSCE SMM Report No. 56/2020 of March 7, 2020.
Conclusions
After analyzing the reports of the OSCE SMM for the first quarter of 2020, we can conclude that full monitoring of the security situation is carried out by the Mission only on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian troops, while the territory controlled by the Russian occupation forces remains mostly “terra incognita” for the OSCE SMM.
The Ukrainian side contributes to the work of the Mission, unlike the Russian occupation forces. During 2020, the access of the OSCE patrols to villages and towns as well as the Misson’s cameras located in the territory controlled by Ukrainian troops has never been restricted.
This imbalance in access to areas and facilities is affecting the content of the OSCE SMM reports, as the section on military presence in the security zone mainly reflects the information on personnel and assets in the government-controlled areas (notably, describing the assets allowed by the Minsk protocols), whereas the information on the military presence of the Russian occupation forces in the non-government-controlled territory is rarely included in the SMM reports.
This leads to an imbalance in the media coverage, which, in turn, is used by pro-Russian propagandists in their media controlled by the Russian Federation to discredit the actions of the Ukrainian military command. This imbalance is also used by the Russian Federation as a propaganda tool in the negotiations within the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) in Minsk.
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Translated by Artem Velichko, edited by Max Alginin.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram.


informnapalm--2020-04-23--Signs of PSYOP against Ukrainian army and OSCE at Horlivka

Attention of volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community was drawn to the signs of a complex informational and psychological operation carried out by the Russian occupation forces near Horlivka .
This operation has been aimed at discrediting Ukrainian troops and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission ( SMM ) to Ukraine .
One of its main focuses is the destructive psychological impact on the local population of the occupied territories in order to maintain the degree of hatred formed around resonant stories about shelling , injuries or deaths .
At the same time , the local population of the occupied territories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the tragic events exclusively through the channels of Russian propaganda , and the OSCE SMM attempts to obtain information from the scene and to conduct independent research are blocked on a regular basis .
This may indicate signs of deliberate crimes committed by Russian occupation forces in the Donbas in order to stage propaganda stories .
Propaganda in occupied territories blames OSCE for the lack of monitoring During last month , Russian propagandists purposefully bombarded the local population around the city of Horlivka with messages about the lack of the OSCE monitoring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5 , 2020 , propagandists of the so-called UNM DPR press service on their YouTube channel ( https : //youtu.be/jRdRxu22r-c ?
t=18 ) blamed the Ukrainian Armed Forces for shelling a residential neighborhood and the OSCE SMM for allegedly not monitoring this area .
“ How often do OSCE staff appear ?
“ The voice-over in Russian asks in the video .
“ Rarely , the last time I saw them was a long time ago , near the village council , ” a woman , named as “ Tatiana , a resident @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replies .
• The propagandists also resorted to similar manipulation in the story on April 9 ( https : //youtu.be/eZUdlXFEJWk ?
t=84 ) : “ At the moment , the biggest problem for us is that the OSCE mission does not come here and does not record the shelling , ” Vladislav Cherkashin , the so-called “ head of the village administration ” of the village of Zaitseve controlled by the Russian occupation forces , said on video .
Later in the story , the propagandist behind the scenes again emphatically asks the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OSCE staff appear in the area ?
We don ’ t see the OSCE here , ” the woman in the video replies .
All these periodic accentuated messages about the absence of the OSCE SMM around Horlivka could have been ignored if not for the next step of the propagandist : their reporting on the murder of 25-year-old Miroslava Vorontsova , who died under rather strange circumstances .
On April 9 , the so-called “ mayor ” of the Russian-occupied Horlivka , Ivan Prikhodko , reported that the girl had died as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The propagandists also emphasized that the girl was an orphan , had only a Ukrainian passport and frequently visited the government-controlled territory of Ukraine .
Some additional information and photos can be found on the archive web-page of the town of Horlivka .
The young girl ’ s death itself is beyond doubt .
Through their own sources , InformNapalm volunteers were able to confirm that her Ukrainian passport was valid and the last time the girl crossed the Ukrainian check point in February of 2020 .
The Russian web site posted additional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Horlivka .
The video shows a dead woman , looking similar to Miroslava Vorontsova .
In addition , church figures and puppet representatives of the occupying administration of Horlivka made loud propaganda statements calling on the world community to respond to the event and impose sanctions on Ukraine .
They mentioned the Hague tribunal and threatened a “ hard response ” .
However , it ’ s hard to believe in their sincerity knowing the history of Russian propaganda in the Donbas .
The circumstances of the woman ’ s death could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It could have been a purposeful bloody provocation staged using Russian drones to create a story of a Why the OSCE SMM does not come Now , let ’ s look again at the propaganda stories about lack of the OSCE monitoring in the area .
On April 10 , propagandists continued to focus on the lack of OSCE monitoring ( “ The OSCE presence has not been recorded , ” Irina Dzhelomanova , the so-called “ head of administration ” of Nikitovsky district of Horlivka , controlled by the Russian occupation forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sarcasm is very cynical , because only in the last 3 weeks pro-Russian forces have blocked the OSCE SMM patrols in Horlivka three times : on March 26 , April 2 , and April 10 .
“ On the morning of 10 April , at a checkpoint near Horlivka ( non-government-controlled , 39km north-east of Donetsk ) , three members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol , travelling from government-controlled areas , passage into non-government-controlled areas , citing “ orders from commanders that nobody may pass ” , said in SMM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daily report No .
86/2020 of April 11 states : “ On 10 April , staff at a hospital in Horlivka ( non-government-controlled , 39km northeast of Donetsk ) declined to share information with the SMM about civilian casualties , citing the necessity to receive “ instructions from superiors ” .
It should be noted that restrictions of the freedom of movement of the SMM patrols and drones near Horlivka were recorded in SMM reports prior to the COVID-19 quarantine .
The restrictions can be seen as systemic obstacles to the OSCE Mission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SMM activity in Donbas by the Russian Federation – Q1 2020 analysis This is a rather strange situation where , on the one hand , Russian propagandists have for several weeks been imposing on the local population the opinion that the OSCE SMM does not want to record violations and shelling , and on the other hand , the occupying forces do not allow observers access and refuse to provide information on the dead or wounded , referring to the “ instructions from superiors ” .
The Russian occupation forces and DPR and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ repeatedly been caught violating international humanitarian law , norms and principles of warfare .
They repeatedly fired at not only Ukrainian troops but also at residential neighborhoods , placed GRAD launchers and artillery between civilians ’ homes , and carried out provocative shelling by mortars at public transport in Donetsk and Volnovakha in order to blame the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the death of civilians .
The Russian Federation constantly supplies weapons and ammunition , sends its troops to the Donbas , and manages all internal processes in the occupied territories .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war and a cause of the death of civilians .
It is the Russian Federation that should bear full responsibility for the deaths and suffering of tens of thousands of Ukrainians , the broken lives , destroyed buildings and infrastructure .
The war can be ended only if Russia stops its aggression against Ukraine .
Read more from InformNapalm and share • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied territories in connection with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) Translated by , edited by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram .

Attention of volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community was drawn to the signs of a complex informational and psychological operation carried out by the Russian occupation forces near Horlivka. This operation has been aimed at discrediting Ukrainian troops and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. One of its main focuses is the destructive psychological impact on the local population of the occupied territories in order to maintain the degree of hatred formed around resonant stories about shelling, injuries or deaths. At the same time, the local population of the occupied territories receives metered, incomplete and distorted information about the tragic events exclusively through the channels of Russian propaganda, and the OSCE SMM attempts to obtain information from the scene and to conduct independent research are blocked on a regular basis. This may indicate signs of deliberate crimes committed by Russian occupation forces in the Donbas in order to stage propaganda stories.
Propaganda in occupied territories blames OSCE for the lack of monitoring
During last month, Russian propagandists purposefully bombarded the local population around the city of Horlivka with messages about the lack of the OSCE monitoring in their videos:
On April 5, 2020, propagandists of the so-called UNM DPR press service on their YouTube channel (https://youtu.be/jRdRxu22r-c?t=18) blamed the Ukrainian Armed Forces for shelling a residential neighborhood and the OSCE SMM for allegedly not monitoring this area . “How often do OSCE staff appear?“ The voice-over in Russian asks in the video. “Rarely, the last time I saw them was a long time ago, near the village council,” a woman, named as “Tatiana, a resident of the village of Zaytseve”, replies.
. “How often do OSCE staff appear?“ The voice-over in Russian asks in the video. “Rarely, the last time I saw them was a long time ago, near the village council,” a woman, named as “Tatiana, a resident of the village of Zaytseve”, replies. The propagandists also resorted to similar manipulation in the story on April 9 (https://youtu.be/eZUdlXFEJWk?t=84 ): “At the moment, the biggest problem for us is that the OSCE mission does not come here and does not record the shelling,” Vladislav Cherkashin, the so-called “head of the village administration” of the village of Zaitseve controlled by the Russian occupation forces, said on video. Later in the story, the propagandist behind the scenes again emphatically asks the local resident: “ How often do OSCE staff appear in the area? ” “ We don’t see the OSCE here ,” the woman in the video replies.
Bloody propaganda
All these periodic accentuated messages about the absence of the OSCE SMM around Horlivka could have been ignored if not for the next step of the propagandist: their reporting on the murder of 25-year-old Miroslava Vorontsova, who died under rather strange circumstances.
On April 9, the so-called “mayor” of the Russian-occupied Horlivka, Ivan Prikhodko, reported that the girl had died as a result of “a mortar round dropped by a drone”, supposedly Ukrainian.
The propagandists also emphasized that the girl was an orphan, had only a Ukrainian passport and frequently visited the government-controlled territory of Ukraine. Some additional information and photos can be found on the archive web-page of the town of Horlivka.
The young girl’s death itself is beyond doubt. Through their own sources, InformNapalm volunteers were able to confirm that her Ukrainian passport was valid and the last time the girl crossed the Ukrainian check point in February of 2020.
The Russian web site Komsomolskaya Pravda posted additional information about the funeral that took place in Horlivka. The video shows a dead woman, looking similar to Miroslava Vorontsova. In addition, church figures and puppet representatives of the occupying administration of Horlivka made loud propaganda statements calling on the world community to respond to the event and impose sanctions on Ukraine. They mentioned the Hague tribunal and threatened a “hard response”. However, it’s hard to believe in their sincerity knowing the history of Russian propaganda in the Donbas. The circumstances of the woman’s death could have been fabricated by the occupiers. It could have been a purposeful bloody provocation staged using Russian drones to create a story of a “mortar round dropped by a Ukrainian UAV”.
Read also: Russian occupiers misuse Reuters photo in propaganda PSYOPs in Donbas.
Why the OSCE SMM does not come
Now, let’s look again at the propaganda stories about lack of the OSCE monitoring in the area. On April 10, propagandists continued to focus on the lack of OSCE monitoring (https://youtu.be/ucum-BQcVkc?t=68). The behind-the-scenes person asks: “Did the OSCE react?“ “The OSCE presence has not been recorded,” Irina Dzhelomanova, the so-called “head of administration” of Nikitovsky district of Horlivka, controlled by the Russian occupation forces, replied with a smiley. Her sarcasm is very cynical, because only in the last 3 weeks pro-Russian forces have blocked the OSCE SMM patrols in Horlivka three times: on March 26, April 2, and April 10.
“On the morning of 10 April, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations denied an SMM patrol, travelling from government-controlled areas, passage into non-government-controlled areas, citing “orders from commanders that nobody may pass”, said in SMM Spot Report 10/2020.
The OSCE SMM daily report No. 86/2020 of April 11 states: “On 10 April, staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km northeast of Donetsk) declined to share information with the SMM about civilian casualties, citing the necessity to receive “instructions from superiors”.
It should be noted that restrictions of the freedom of movement of the SMM patrols and drones near Horlivka were recorded in SMM reports prior to the COVID-19 quarantine. The restrictions can be seen as systemic obstacles to the OSCE Mission in the area.
Read also: Obstruction of OSCE SMM activity in Donbas by the Russian Federation – Q1 2020 analysis.
This is a rather strange situation where, on the one hand, Russian propagandists have for several weeks been imposing on the local population the opinion that the OSCE SMM does not want to record violations and shelling, and on the other hand, the occupying forces do not allow observers access and refuse to provide information on the dead or wounded, referring to the “instructions from superiors”.
Conclusions
The Russian occupation forces and DPR and LPR armed formations controlled by them have repeatedly been caught violating international humanitarian law, norms and principles of warfare. They repeatedly fired at not only Ukrainian troops but also at residential neighborhoods, placed GRAD launchers and artillery between civilians’ homes, and carried out provocative shelling by mortars at public transport in Donetsk and Volnovakha in order to blame the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the death of civilians.
The Russian Federation constantly supplies weapons and ammunition , sends its troops to the Donbas, and manages all internal processes in the occupied territories. It is the main driving force of the war and a cause of the death of civilians. It is the Russian Federation that should bear full responsibility for the deaths and suffering of tens of thousands of Ukrainians, the broken lives, destroyed buildings and infrastructure. The war can be ended only if Russia stops its aggression against Ukraine.
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Translated by Sveta Kemblowski, edited by Artem Velichko.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram.


informnapalm--2020-05-04--How can COVID-19 influence on the changes in the political map of the world?

Will COVID-19 change the political map of the world ?
It is already clear that the challenges brought by the coronavirus extend well beyond the sphere of public health .
The pandemic came as a blow to the world economy , seriously changed oil prices , and provoked the growth of unemployment .
In some countries , it has already influenced the social and even the criminogenic situation .
Ukraine still has to go through a tough ordeal .
The country faces some existential challenges , like the physical survival of millions of her citizens , the struggle to avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her population , and the effort to prevent the above-mentioned criminogenic situation .
However , there remains one more challenge , one that never disappeared – Russia , and its armed aggression against Ukraine .
Although President Zelensky has shared his plans to end the Russian-Ukrainian war before the end of his presidential term , it remains absolutely unclear , just how is he going to do that .
It is obvious that nobody in the office of the President , nor the government , or the parliament bothers to give a careful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian Federation in 2020-2021 , and what consequences will it have for Ukraine , and whether or not our state will be able to mitigate these consequences .
What challenges might Ukraine meet in this regard ?
Or , more precisely , why is it not possible to pretend that “ this is not our problem since we have many other problems of our own ” and avoid serious consequences for Ukraine and Ukrainians ?
How Do Oil Prices Rock the Russian Federation ?
For the Russian economy , the situation that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very unfavorable .
According to Mykhailo Honchar , the President of the Strategy XXI Globalistics research center , the agreement about reducing the production of oil reached between the OPEC countries , Saudi Arabia , and Russia on April 10 had been , even beforehand , not adequate for reducing the excess of oil in the world .
Back then , OPEC mentioned 14.7 million barrels of surplus oil , and the International Energy Agency mentioned 25 million .
The agreement stated that the surplus was 14.7 million barrels a day ; however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its term starts on May 1 , it will be of no effect .
The government of Russia can not agree with the Russian oil companies on the issue of reducing oil production .
There is already a 30-million-barrel surplus of oil , and one should also consider the impact of the recession of the economy due to restrictions related to the quarantine .
If the agreement about 14.7 million is not working , it is hard to imagine that any talks about a 30 million-barrel reduction will be successful .
Honchar also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where oil is often produced by shale drilling ( fracking ) , in Russia an oil well can not be conserved because of the design of the drill : it either is working or is shut down with no economically profitable way of restoring its activity .
Thus , it is difficult for Russia to preserve its share of the market .
Russia ’ s oil is also poorer in light fractions than the Saudi oil , which makes the former less suitable for making gasoline .
Overall , this situation can provoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Saudis , and even – possibly – against Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to remove them as competitors on the oil market at the time when the Russian budget is suffering the loss of petro-dollars .
The oil price issue is not merely theorizing about the global economy and about possible aggravation in the relations between Moscow and other oil market actors .
It is a significant factor in the internal political situation within the Federation .
Oil revenues are the main part of currency flowing into the budget of Russia .
The budget @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 states that minimal profit from the Urals brand of oil ( the Russian oil trademark ) is set at $ 42.4 a barrel .
According to Anton Siluanov , the Minister of Economy of Russia , the decrease of oil prices will make Russia lose up to $ 40 billion in the current year .
Just over the month of March , Russia lost almost $ 300 million , which was covered from the budget of the National Welfare Fund .
At the beginning of March , the NWF kept a budget @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ministry of Treasury stated that this money would be enough to compensate for low oil prices for the next 5 to 10 years .
However , their estimates were done three weeks before the COVID-19 outbreak .
What Changes Does the COVID-19 Pandemic Introduce ?
So , how can the coronavirus pandemic change these calculations ?
What we see happening in Russia is a steady worsening of the epidemiological situation , and a substantial weakening of federal control over the situation in its regions .
In order to maintain a stable internal political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the federal social programs rather than to cut the financial aid to the regions .
This will be very difficult to do because the number of regions in the Russian Federation that receive financial aid from the center is much bigger than the number of regions that fill up the budget of the country .
Besides , Moscow is already forced to revise its policy toward migrants ; the so-called “ patent ” ( financial aid ) to “ migrant laborers ” has been temporarily stopped , which , according to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 7 and 8 million individuals , mostly from the Central Asia countries , are not paid .
Of course , this is merely a temporary measure not enough to solve the main problem with migrant laborers – which is , how to keep them on the labor market under the conditions of the crisis .
Millions of citizens of Uzbekistan , Tajikistan , and Kyrgyzstan did not rush to buy train tickets back to their homes because they know that things at home are , at best , not simple , and they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burden to their families which is the reason they migrated to Russia in the first place .
Millions of migrants will thus require expenditures from the Russian budget .
Any attempt to ignore their needs might bring unpredictable consequences because people need food and shelter regardless of plans made by the government .
So , there will be , again , a need to tap the NWF .
The government will need to save money and to cut federal spending .
At the same time , there will be increasing pressure on Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Tatarstan , which are already experiencing difficulties .
What Consequences Will It Have ?
The events that took place recently in the city of Vladikavkaz give a rich material for modeling the future development .
Vadim Cheldiyev , a North Ossetian opera singer , called his compatriots to boycott the restrictions of the coronavirus quarantine , defining the pandemic as a “ purely imagined threat.
” Late in the evening of April 17 , the police arrested Vadim Cheldiyev in his St. Petersburg home , charging him with spreading fake news about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adopted in Russia .
However , in spite of the singer ’ s arrest , his fans in his native city of Vladikavkaz , took Cheldiyev ’ s words seriously and made it to the city ’ s main square on April 20 .
In addition to the demand to free Cheldiev , the crowd of two thousand people insisted on lifting the self-isolation rules and urged the North Ossetia governor Vyacheslav Bitarov to resign .
This time , things ended favorably for Moscow and for the local administration .
There were minor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the law enforcement managed to disperse the protesters .
However , even those Russian political analysts who are the most loyal to Putin ’ s government admit that the incident in Vladikavkaz can be just a prelude to the future events .
The thing is , the republics of the Northern Caucasus that are parts of the Russian Federation are especially vulnerable in the current situation .
The wellbeing of the local population depends on financial injections from the center , which are now under scrutiny , and on the services industry that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region .
In Northern Caucasus , there are no industrial giants or powerful enterprises capable to bring monetary profit enough to secure a certain welfare package for the workers during the quarantine .
So , if the quarantine continues , there is always the issue of a future rebellion .
And here , another problem appears : the problem of keeping Russia ’ s control in the regions by Russia ’ s law enforcement .
The demographic picture in this region differs dramatically from the picture in the rest of Russia .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which means that it has a sizeable fraction of its population that is young .
In addition , the peoples of North Caucasus are known to be passionate by their character , and volatile .
No doubt , a mass unrest of the Ingush , Circassian , Avar , or Koomyk people – not to mention the Chechens – will differ from rallies of the retired people of Ulyanovsk or businesspeople of Yekaterinburg .
If the riots , massive as they are , are limited to Vladikavkaz , or even to Vladikavkaz and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solved by the local police and the Rosgvardiya ( the Russian National Guard ) , maybe enhanced by reinforcements from Chechnya .
But how will the situation develop if the riots begin simultaneously in North Ossetia , Ingushetia , Chechnya , Dagestan , Kabardino-Balkaria , Karachayevo-Circassia , and Adygeya ?
And what if the unrest occurs simultaneously in other regions , for example , in Idel-Urals ?
Will there be enough reinforcements ?
And how will Zolotov , the head of the Rosgvardiya , and the Mayor of Moscow , interact ?
Whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the second , is , even now , a subject of doubt of the Russian political analysts who discuss it publicly .
There might be different scenarios of the development of events in the RF .
Today , it is difficult to model them .
The Prometheus Center considered these as the most important and probable : • A ) Weakening of the federal powers .
Growth in the power of the regions .
An increase in the power of regions .
An increase in the influence of the local political actors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ An increase of the activity of the regionalist and nationalist moods , with the “ voice of the streets ” becoming louder .
A weakening of the influence of Russia on the international events , and a stronger focus of the Russian government on internal problems , including welfare .
It is possible that in certain regions the local administration will soon act in accordance with the demands of street protesters rather than with the federal center .
• B ) Mass unrest and riots because of the escalation of social and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loss of control over whole regions .
Emergence of alternative power centers both at the federal and local levels .
A communication breakdown within the law enforcement block ( police+Rosguard+FSB+regular army ) .
Possibly , a “ parade of sovereignties.
” This scenario can be accompanied by armed conflicts within the territories that are subjects of the Russian federation , for example , conflicts between Nationalists and Salafites within some republics of the North Caucasus , or between the subjects and the federal center , or even between the subjects themselves .
• @ @ @ @ @ @ @ external politics with the goal to improve their economic and political situation .
For example , they can start a new hybrid war with Saudi Arabia ( forming an alliance with Iran , whose oil industry is already knocked down by the Western sanctions ) , and/or an aggression ( in its various forms ) against Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan , which will involve combat operations and political sabotage rather than just diplomatic pressure .
These measures are supposed to weaken the oil-producing competitors and to rise the oil prices , which is thought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ RF .
• D ) A sudden normalization of the epidemiologic situation .
Rapid renewal of the federal control over regions .
Taming of the forces that demonstrated disloyalty to Putin during the crisis and passing the blame for the failures and miscalculations on the direct performers .
• E ) Replacement of Putin due to his loss of control over the situation : his removal by his inner circle , or his voluntary resignation ( for example , because of poor health ) .
Neither of these scenarios excludes a whole chain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For example , the USA might intervene because of its desire to preserve the Russian Federation as a stabilizing factor in Eurasia and a restraint for China .
Washington might decide that it is better to “ put Russia on a ventilator , ” be it even on the US expense , than to let new conflicts develop into “ another Syria.
” Also , the possibility that Moscow will escalate its war against Ukraine can not be dismissed .
This escalation can take forms of man-made ecologic and technogenic catastrophes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movements , organizing acts of terror and sabotage in the Ukrainian heartland .
So , what should the leadership of Ukraine contemplate right now ?
• How to act in each of the above scenarios ?
• Prepare operational plans for each of the scenarios , according to the principle , “ if A happens , we will do B.
” • Decide on the line of conduct in case new power centers , ones parallel to the existing power centers , appear .
How will Ukraine react to attempts of these new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
• How will Ukraine act if in the Russian Federation , some centrifugal movements will be activated , or the movement for autonomization , or even attempts to proclaim independence of certain regions ?
• We should also prepare for possible unrest and even armed conflicts in European Russia ( including North Caucasus ) , and , as its consequence , a humanitarian crisis and emergence of a large flow of refugees .
The events may develop very rapidly so that one of the scenarios could be followed by another .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movements can result in a sudden normalization of the epidemiological situation , as well as in a change in the energy carrier markets ( especially because of a growth in the carriers ’ consumption and the renewal of the demand ) .
This , in turn , might be followed by a renewal of the control of the federal center .
If the events develop according to this pattern , there might be a rush of the Russian political emigrants to Ukraine , including the Russian opposition figures and the representatives of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will Ukraine act if this happens ?
What will be our politics regarding the political emigrants , given that they exist as groups that are different and , possibly , hostile to each other ?
There is no doubt that our Ukrainian rulers might choose for themselves the position that is the most convenient for themselves , which is , “ something is going to happen , because it never happened before that something did not happen.
” But this is the scenario that is the worst one for Ukraine .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a collapsing high rise and imagine that you are watching its collapse from a remote position .
Of course , “ we have the right to make a mistake… ” Read more from InformNapalm and share • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied territories in connection with COVID-19 • Russia lost another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics Translated by , edited by .
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome !
( Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0 ) InformNapalm social media pages : Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram .

By Pavlo Podobed, the Prometheus Security Environment Research Center.
Will COVID-19 change the political map of the world?
It is already clear that the challenges brought by the coronavirus extend well beyond the sphere of public health. The pandemic came as a blow to the world economy, seriously changed oil prices, and provoked the growth of unemployment. In some countries, it has already influenced the social and even the criminogenic situation.
Ukraine still has to go through a tough ordeal. The country faces some existential challenges, like the physical survival of millions of her citizens, the struggle to avoid default and prevent the precipitous impoverishment of her population, and the effort to prevent the above-mentioned criminogenic situation. However, there remains one more challenge, one that never disappeared – Russia, and its armed aggression against Ukraine. Although President Zelensky has shared his plans to end the Russian-Ukrainian war before the end of his presidential term, it remains absolutely unclear, just how is he going to do that.
It is obvious that nobody in the office of the President, nor the government, or the parliament bothers to give a careful thought about what can happen to the Russian Federation in 2020-2021, and what consequences will it have for Ukraine, and whether or not our state will be able to mitigate these consequences. What challenges might Ukraine meet in this regard? Or, more precisely, why is it not possible to pretend that “this is not our problem since we have many other problems of our own” and avoid serious consequences for Ukraine and Ukrainians?
How Do Oil Prices Rock the Russian Federation?
For the Russian economy, the situation that has developed in the world oil markets is very unfavorable. According to Mykhailo Honchar, the President of the Strategy XXI Globalistics research center, the agreement about reducing the production of oil reached between the OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia, and Russia on April 10 had been, even beforehand, not adequate for reducing the excess of oil in the world. Back then, OPEC mentioned 14.7 million barrels of surplus oil, and the International Energy Agency mentioned 25 million. The agreement stated that the surplus was 14.7 million barrels a day; however, we can now see that when its term starts on May 1, it will be of no effect. The government of Russia cannot agree with the Russian oil companies on the issue of reducing oil production. There is already a 30-million-barrel surplus of oil, and one should also consider the impact of the recession of the economy due to restrictions related to the quarantine. If the agreement about 14.7 million is not working, it is hard to imagine that any talks about a 30 million-barrel reduction will be successful. Honchar also notes that unlike in the US, where oil is often produced by shale drilling (fracking), in Russia an oil well cannot be conserved because of the design of the drill: it either is working or is shut down with no economically profitable way of restoring its activity. Thus, it is difficult for Russia to preserve its share of the market. Russia’s oil is also poorer in light fractions than the Saudi oil, which makes the former less suitable for making gasoline. Overall, this situation can provoke Moscow and Tehran to act jointly against the Saudis, and even – possibly – against Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to remove them as competitors on the oil market at the time when the Russian budget is suffering the loss of petro-dollars.
The oil price issue is not merely theorizing about the global economy and about possible aggravation in the relations between Moscow and other oil market actors. It is a significant factor in the internal political situation within the Federation. Oil revenues are the main part of currency flowing into the budget of Russia. The budget of the Russian Federation for the year 2020 states that minimal profit from the Urals brand of oil (the Russian oil trademark) is set at $42.4 a barrel. According to Anton Siluanov, the Minister of Economy of Russia, the decrease of oil prices will make Russia lose up to $40 billion in the current year. Just over the month of March, Russia lost almost $300 million, which was covered from the budget of the National Welfare Fund. At the beginning of March, the NWF kept a budget of $150.1 billion. The Russian Ministry of Treasury stated that this money would be enough to compensate for low oil prices for the next 5 to 10 years. However, their estimates were done three weeks before the COVID-19 outbreak.
What Changes Does the COVID-19 Pandemic Introduce?
So, how can the coronavirus pandemic change these calculations? What we see happening in Russia is a steady worsening of the epidemiological situation, and a substantial weakening of federal control over the situation in its regions. In order to maintain a stable internal political situation, Moscow needs to continue financing of the federal social programs rather than to cut the financial aid to the regions. This will be very difficult to do because the number of regions in the Russian Federation that receive financial aid from the center is much bigger than the number of regions that fill up the budget of the country. Besides, Moscow is already forced to revise its policy toward migrants; the so-called “patent” (financial aid) to “migrant laborers” has been temporarily stopped, which, according to the Jamestown Foundation estimate, means that between 7 and 8 million individuals, mostly from the Central Asia countries, are not paid. Of course, this is merely a temporary measure not enough to solve the main problem with migrant laborers – which is, how to keep them on the labor market under the conditions of the crisis. Millions of citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan did not rush to buy train tickets back to their homes because they know that things at home are, at best, not simple, and they do not want to become a financial burden to their families which is the reason they migrated to Russia in the first place. Millions of migrants will thus require expenditures from the Russian budget. Any attempt to ignore their needs might bring unpredictable consequences because people need food and shelter regardless of plans made by the government. So, there will be, again, a need to tap the NWF. The government will need to save money and to cut federal spending. At the same time, there will be increasing pressure on Russian regions that are budget donors, such as Tatarstan, which are already experiencing difficulties.
What Consequences Will It Have?
The events that took place recently in the city of Vladikavkaz give a rich material for modeling the future development. Vadim Cheldiyev, a North Ossetian opera singer, called his compatriots to boycott the restrictions of the coronavirus quarantine, defining the pandemic as a “purely imagined threat.” Late in the evening of April 17, the police arrested Vadim Cheldiyev in his St. Petersburg home, charging him with spreading fake news about COVID-19, according to a new law adopted in Russia. However, in spite of the singer’s arrest, his fans in his native city of Vladikavkaz, took Cheldiyev’s words seriously and made it to the city’s main square on April 20. In addition to the demand to free Cheldiev, the crowd of two thousand people insisted on lifting the self-isolation rules and urged the North Ossetia governor Vyacheslav Bitarov to resign. This time, things ended favorably for Moscow and for the local administration. There were minor clashes with the police, but then the law enforcement managed to disperse the protesters.
However, even those Russian political analysts who are the most loyal to Putin’s government admit that the incident in Vladikavkaz can be just a prelude to the future events. The thing is, the republics of the Northern Caucasus that are parts of the Russian Federation are especially vulnerable in the current situation. The wellbeing of the local population depends on financial injections from the center, which are now under scrutiny, and on the services industry that gives jobs to most people in the region. In Northern Caucasus, there are no industrial giants or powerful enterprises capable to bring monetary profit enough to secure a certain welfare package for the workers during the quarantine. So, if the quarantine continues, there is always the issue of a future rebellion. And here, another problem appears: the problem of keeping Russia’s control in the regions by Russia’s law enforcement. The demographic picture in this region differs dramatically from the picture in the rest of Russia. The region has a high birth rate, which means that it has a sizeable fraction of its population that is young. In addition, the peoples of North Caucasus are known to be passionate by their character, and volatile. No doubt, a mass unrest of the Ingush, Circassian, Avar, or Koomyk people – not to mention the Chechens – will differ from rallies of the retired people of Ulyanovsk or businesspeople of Yekaterinburg. If the riots, massive as they are, are limited to Vladikavkaz, or even to Vladikavkaz and Magas, then the problem could be solved by the local police and the Rosgvardiya (the Russian National Guard), maybe enhanced by reinforcements from Chechnya. But how will the situation develop if the riots begin simultaneously in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Circassia, and Adygeya? And what if the unrest occurs simultaneously in other regions, for example, in Idel-Urals? Will there be enough reinforcements? And how will Zolotov, the head of the Rosgvardiya, and the Mayor of Moscow, interact? Whether the first will submit to the commands of the second, is, even now, a subject of doubt of the Russian political analysts who discuss it publicly.
There might be different scenarios of the development of events in the RF. Today, it is difficult to model them. The Prometheus Center considered these as the most important and probable:
A) Weakening of the federal powers. Growth in the power of the regions. An increase in the power of regions. An increase in the influence of the local political actors: regional elites, civic movements. An increase of the activity of the regionalist and nationalist moods, with the “voice of the streets” becoming louder. A weakening of the influence of Russia on the international events, and a stronger focus of the Russian government on internal problems, including welfare. It is possible that in certain regions the local administration will soon act in accordance with the demands of street protesters rather than with the federal center.
Weakening of the federal powers. Growth in the power of the regions. An increase in the power of regions. An increase in the influence of the local political actors: regional elites, civic movements. An increase of the activity of the regionalist and nationalist moods, with the “voice of the streets” becoming louder. A weakening of the influence of Russia on the international events, and a stronger focus of the Russian government on internal problems, including welfare. It is possible that in certain regions the local administration will soon act in accordance with the demands of street protesters rather than with the federal center. B) Mass unrest and riots because of the escalation of social and economic problems in the Russian Federation. A loss of control over whole regions. Emergence of alternative power centers both at the federal and local levels. A communication breakdown within the law enforcement block (police+Rosguard+FSB+regular army). Possibly, a “parade of sovereignties.” This scenario can be accompanied by armed conflicts within the territories that are subjects of the Russian federation, for example, conflicts between Nationalists and Salafites within some republics of the North Caucasus, or between the subjects and the federal center, or even between the subjects themselves.
Mass unrest and riots because of the escalation of social and economic problems in the Russian Federation. A loss of control over whole regions. Emergence of alternative power centers both at the federal and local levels. A communication breakdown within the law enforcement block (police+Rosguard+FSB+regular army). Possibly, a “parade of sovereignties.” This scenario can be accompanied by armed conflicts within the territories that are subjects of the Russian federation, for example, conflicts between Nationalists and Salafites within some republics of the North Caucasus, or between the subjects and the federal center, or even between the subjects themselves. C) Moscow switching to an aggressive external politics with the goal to improve their economic and political situation. For example, they can start a new hybrid war with Saudi Arabia (forming an alliance with Iran, whose oil industry is already knocked down by the Western sanctions), and/or an aggression (in its various forms) against Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which will involve combat operations and political sabotage rather than just diplomatic pressure. These measures are supposed to weaken the oil-producing competitors and to rise the oil prices, which is thought to improve the economic situation in the RF.
Moscow switching to an aggressive external politics with the goal to improve their economic and political situation. For example, they can start a new hybrid war with Saudi Arabia (forming an alliance with Iran, whose oil industry is already knocked down by the Western sanctions), and/or an aggression (in its various forms) against Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which will involve combat operations and political sabotage rather than just diplomatic pressure. These measures are supposed to weaken the oil-producing competitors and to rise the oil prices, which is thought to improve the economic situation in the RF. D) A sudden normalization of the epidemiologic situation. Rapid renewal of the federal control over regions. Taming of the forces that demonstrated disloyalty to Putin during the crisis and passing the blame for the failures and miscalculations on the direct performers.
A sudden normalization of the epidemiologic situation. Rapid renewal of the federal control over regions. Taming of the forces that demonstrated disloyalty to Putin during the crisis and passing the blame for the failures and miscalculations on the direct performers. E) Replacement of Putin due to his loss of control over the situation: his removal by his inner circle, or his voluntary resignation (for example, because of poor health).
Neither of these scenarios excludes a whole chain of variables that can affect the situation. For example, the USA might intervene because of its desire to preserve the Russian Federation as a stabilizing factor in Eurasia and a restraint for China. Washington might decide that it is better to “put Russia on a ventilator,” be it even on the US expense, than to let new conflicts develop into “another Syria.”
Also, the possibility that Moscow will escalate its war against Ukraine cannot be dismissed. This escalation can take forms of man-made ecologic and technogenic catastrophes, or provoking and financing the anti-government protest movements, organizing acts of terror and sabotage in the Ukrainian heartland.
So, what should the leadership of Ukraine contemplate right now?
How to act in each of the above scenarios? Prepare operational plans for each of the scenarios, according to the principle, “if A happens, we will do B.” Decide on the line of conduct in case new power centers, ones parallel to the existing power centers, appear. How will Ukraine react to attempts of these new power centers to establish contacts with Kyiv? How will Ukraine act if in the Russian Federation, some centrifugal movements will be activated, or the movement for autonomization, or even attempts to proclaim independence of certain regions? We should also prepare for possible unrest and even armed conflicts in European Russia (including North Caucasus), and, as its consequence, a humanitarian crisis and emergence of a large flow of refugees.
The events may develop very rapidly so that one of the scenarios could be followed by another. For example, the activation of the centrifugal movements can result in a sudden normalization of the epidemiological situation, as well as in a change in the energy carrier markets (especially because of a growth in the carriers’ consumption and the renewal of the demand). This, in turn, might be followed by a renewal of the control of the federal center. If the events develop according to this pattern, there might be a rush of the Russian political emigrants to Ukraine, including the Russian opposition figures and the representatives of the national and regional separatist movements. How will Ukraine act if this happens? What will be our politics regarding the political emigrants, given that they exist as groups that are different and, possibly, hostile to each other?
There is no doubt that our Ukrainian rulers might choose for themselves the position that is the most convenient for themselves, which is, “something is going to happen, because it never happened before that something did not happen.” But this is the scenario that is the worst one for Ukraine. It is like to stand under a balcony of a collapsing high rise and imagine that you are watching its collapse from a remote position. Of course, “we have the right to make a mistake…”
By Pavlo Podobed, the Prometheus Security Environment Research Center.
Read more from InformNapalm and share
Translated by George V. Pinchuk, edited by Sveta Kemblowski.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram.


informnapalm--2020-05-05--Established: crew of the Russian guided missile corvette Shtil participated in the aggression agains

Established: crew of the Russian guided missile corvette Shtil participated in the aggression against Ukraine

The participation of the crew of the Russian guided missile corvette ( GMC ) Shtil in the aggression against Ukraine has been established .
This ship was involved in blocking the ships of the Ukrainian Navy in Donuzlav Bay .
The list of ( 1 , 2 ) of the military officers the Russian Federation who were served charges by the Main Military Prosecutor ’ s Office of Ukraine currently does not contain the commanding officer of GMC Shtil .
This corvette has not been included on the list of the Military Prosecutor ’ s Office among the ships involved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urge the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to carry out all the appropriate legal proceedings regarding the invaders in accordance with Ukrainian and international law and submit their data to Interpol .
It has been 28 years since the collapse of the USSR .
In this relatively short time , Russia has launched several wars against neighboring post-soviet countries .
The criminal decisions of the Russian political elite have been carried out by ordinary Russian citizens – conscripts , contract soldiers , officers of the Russian Armed Forces , mercenaries of private military companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They received military ranks , awards , and benefits for the execution of the criminal orders and then boasted them on social media .
They are being made into heroes by Russian propagandists for the sake of bringing up new generations of combatants for new wars .
That is the only reason why Yunarmiya was created in Russia as a modern version of Hitler Youth .
The publications of propagandists and social media posts of the direct war crime perpetrators have been for over six years providing open-source data to InformNapalm volunteers who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Criminal Court .
This feature looks into the role of the guided missile corvette Shtil from the 166th Small Missile Ships Squadron of the 41 Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade .
In 2013 , the commander of the GMC Shtil Vladimir Derbetov , a native of the Kalmyk city of Lagan , held the rank of lieutenant commander .
After participating in the special operation to capture Crimea , he received an early promotion to the captain of the 3rd rank and was awarded a Medal of Ushakov .
He was also awarded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the status of a “ war veteran ” and has a note of acknowledgment from Putin .
From 2015 to 2017 , he was in command of GMC Zeleny Dol , whereas his ship performed combat missions in Syria .
After this period , GMC Zeleny Dol became a part of the Baltic Fleet , and Derbetov was appointed commanding officer of hoverborne guided missile corvette Samum .
As of May 2018 , his rank has been identified as captain of the 2nd rank .
In 2016 , Derbetov , as the commander @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Myrotvorets Center database .
On Russian social networks , we found sailors who participated in the special operation to capture Crimea as part of the crew of GMC Shtil .
He posted a photo of the medal for the occupation of Crimea and a photo of the award certificate .
Mikheyev also posted several videos on his page from the indictable period of service that can be used for identification of other sailors who participated in the aggression – in case of the evidence is removed by the defendant ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ GMC Shtil , the other shows Mikheyev arriving by train after his discharge from the navy .
On the freeze frame , a shoulder patch of GMC Shtil is clearly visible , worn by one of the subjects of our investigation .
Dmitry Doras , born April 14 , 1994 , in Stavropol city , Russian Federation .
He was found on the contact list of Mikheyev .
The following photo from the album of Doras may look uninformative at first glance , but it turned out it showed characteristic elements of GMC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ photos of the ship found online .
Doras pictured with a medal for the occupation of Crimea .
In 2014 , GMC Shtil was among the vessels that blocked Ukrainian ships in the Donuzlav Bay .
It should be noted that the participation in the special operation to capture Crimea was not the first war crime for the crew of this ship .
In 2008 , GMC Shtil participated in the war against Georgia .
Since 2009 , on an ongoing basis , the ship was on combat duty off the coast of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are interesting comments on the Sevastopol Forum that illustrate the situation not only on GMC Shtil , but also in the Russian navy as a whole .
In 2016 , a Russian from the Urals region received a referral to serve on GMC Shtil and sought local advice on Sevastopol Forum : “ Good afternoon , dear forum users !
Need your support !
I got a referral to GMC Shtil .
I myself am from the Urals , 32 years old , higher education , have a family , children .
… @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I currently live is extremely unpleasant : salaries have been cut everywhere , layoffs are coming , there is a chance of being out of work .
And then I got this chance to both fulfill my dream and somehow change my life , I hope for the better .
However , after reading this forum thread ( and not only ) , I am getting more and more doubts if it is it worth the while .
It is great to dream , but I have a family to feed .
After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not a joke !
The question is , what to expect from the very beginning and what are the future prospects ?
… “ “ There is nowhere to live .
No one is waiting here for you .
They will give you a berth on a ship , then you search for rental housing for the family .
Then no one lets you go off the ship .
They demand you to have shoes and clothes , but they won ’ t give you anything , you buy it all from your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the shop at your own expense .
Then your wife can ’ t stand it any longer and relocates to her mother ’ s… ” Project Ovod and “ pistol at the temple ” The Ovod series of guided missile corvettes ( or small missile ships in Soviet classification ) were designed in the 1960s .
These ships were initially to be classified as missile boats , but the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy , Admiral Sergey Gorshkov , specifically approved a new class for them that loosely fit the corvette class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launch of the first Ovod project corvette he said an epic phrase : “ These missile ships are a gun at the temple of [ western ] imperialism .
” As of 2019 , 12 Ovod project corvettes were still in operation , the rest had been decommissioned because they were outdated morally and physically .
Those that remain are in need of deep modernization , with naval officers saying that after the modernization only the hull and superstructure , as well as part of general ship systems could stay .
GMC Shtil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The ship was launched in 1978 .
In the summer 2019 , a photo the “ stripping ” process of the GMC Shtil appeared on the forums , that is of its equipment being removed from it before disposal .
In February 2020 , GMC Shtil was decommissioned from the Russian Black Sea Fleet .
However , the participation of its crews in the aggression against Ukraine and Georgia can not be dismissed .
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If you are interested in the whole content of this page , we recommend viewing it on a PC or a laptop Read more from InformNapalm and share • Personal identification of LLS Orsk commander who led the crew during the invasion of Crimea • Evidence collected : commander and crew of R-60 missile boat took part in the aggression against Ukraine • Volunteers gathered evidence of 32 Russian military units taking part in the invasion of Crimea • Russia re-deploys Radiological , Chemical and Biological Warfare units in occupied territories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another modern Zastava drone in Donbas : list of military units operating this UAV • Newest Russian equipment in Donbas in aerial photo ( photo and coordinates ) • Donbas in Flames – a year after publication .
Facts and infographics Translated by , edited by .
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The participation of the crew of the Russian guided missile corvette (GMC) Shtil in the aggression against Ukraine has been established. This ship was involved in blocking the ships of the Ukrainian Navy in Donuzlav Bay. The list of (1, 2) of the military officers the Russian Federation who were served charges by the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine currently does not contain the commanding officer of GMC Shtil. This corvette has not been included on the list of the Military Prosecutor’s Office among the ships involved in the aggression against Ukraine. We urge the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to carry out all the appropriate legal proceedings regarding the invaders in accordance with Ukrainian and international law and submit their data to Interpol.
Foreword
It has been 28 years since the collapse of the USSR. In this relatively short time, Russia has launched several wars against neighboring post-soviet countries. The criminal decisions of the Russian political elite have been carried out by ordinary Russian citizens – conscripts, contract soldiers, officers of the Russian Armed Forces, mercenaries of private military companies and militants of numerous paramilitary groups. They received military ranks, awards, and benefits for the execution of the criminal orders and then boasted them on social media. They are being made into heroes by Russian propagandists for the sake of bringing up new generations of combatants for new wars. That is the only reason why Yunarmiya was created in Russia as a modern version of Hitler Youth.
The publications of propagandists and social media posts of the direct war crime perpetrators have been for over six years providing open-source data to InformNapalm volunteers who are consistently gathering evidence for the International Criminal Court. This feature looks into the role of the guided missile corvette Shtil (Project 1234.1 Ovod-1, pennant number 620) from the 166th Small Missile Ships Squadron of the 41 Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade (military unit 72165, stationed in Sevastopol, temporarily occupied Crimea).
Rewards and promotions for military crimes
In 2013, the commander of the GMC Shtil Vladimir Derbetov, a native of the Kalmyk city of Lagan, held the rank of lieutenant commander.
After participating in the special operation to capture Crimea, he received an early promotion to the captain of the 3rd rank and was awarded a Medal of Ushakov. He was also awarded a Medal of Admiral Gorshkov, enjoys the status of a “war veteran” and has a note of acknowledgment from Putin.
From 2015 to 2017, he was in command of GMC Zeleny Dol, whereas his ship performed combat missions in Syria. After this period, GMC Zeleny Dol became a part of the Baltic Fleet, and Derbetov was appointed commanding officer of hoverborne guided missile corvette Samum. As of May 2018, his rank has been identified as captain of the 2nd rank.
In 2016, Derbetov, as the commander of GMC Zeleny Dol, was added to the Myrotvorets Center database.
Social media page: https://vk.com/id14496215 (http://archive.is/eow11) http://archive.vn/TMuWj
Personal identification of GMC Shtil seamen
On Russian social networks, we found sailors who participated in the special operation to capture Crimea as part of the crew of GMC Shtil.
Dmitry Mikheyev, born December 19, 1994 in Zelenodolsk, Tatarstan, Russian Federation.
He posted a photo of the medal for the occupation of Crimea and a photo of the award certificate.
Mikheyev also posted several videos on his page from the indictable period of service that can be used for identification of other sailors who participated in the aggression (video links: 1 , 2; archive – in case of the evidence is removed by the defendant). One of the videos shows sailors of GMC Shtil, the other shows Mikheyev arriving by train after his discharge from the navy. On the freeze frame, a shoulder patch of GMC Shtil is clearly visible, worn by one of the subjects of our investigation.
Social network pages and archives of Dmitry Mikheyev https://vk.com/id156793567 (http://archive.vn/mBLHp) http://archive.vn/400jf http://archive.vn/t2SzT
https://vk.com/iddmitriy_m (http://archive.is/lqCS5)
https://vk.com/id555076169 (http://archive.vn/OT6NL) http://archive.vn/Y1ZQl http://archive.vn/vFegc
Dmitry Doras, born April 14, 1994, in Stavropol city, Russian Federation. He was found on the contact list of Mikheyev.
The following photo from the album of Doras may look uninformative at first glance, but it turned out it showed characteristic elements of GMC Shtil.
Here is a comparison with photos of the ship found online.
Doras pictured with a medal for the occupation of Crimea.
Social network pages and archives of Dmitry Doras https://vk.com/id148737963 (http://archive.vn/mwC24) http://archive.vn/xor1Z http://archive.vn/Sn93u https://ok.ru/profile/561249080441 (http://archive.is/nM4gG) http://archive.vn/EaVnq
Crimes of GMC Shtil seamen
In 2014, GMC Shtil was among the vessels that blocked Ukrainian ships in the Donuzlav Bay. It should be noted that the participation in the special operation to capture Crimea was not the first war crime for the crew of this ship. In 2008, GMC Shtil participated in the war against Georgia. Since 2009, on an ongoing basis, the ship was on combat duty off the coast of Abkhazia occupied by the Russians.
Additional information about GMC Shtil
There are interesting comments on the Sevastopol Forum that illustrate the situation not only on GMC Shtil, but also in the Russian navy as a whole.
In 2016, a Russian from the Urals region received a referral to serve on GMC Shtil and sought local advice on Sevastopol Forum:
“Good afternoon, dear forum users! Need your support! I got a referral to GMC Shtil. I myself am from the Urals, 32 years old, higher education, have a family, children. … At the moment, the situation where I currently live is extremely unpleasant: salaries have been cut everywhere, layoffs are coming, there is a chance of being out of work. And then I got this chance to both fulfill my dream and somehow change my life, I hope for the better. However, after reading this forum thread (and not only), I am getting more and more doubts if it is it worth the while. It is great to dream, but I have a family to feed. After all, moving over 3,000 km is not a joke! The question is, what to expect from the very beginning and what are the future prospects? … “
Answer:
“There is nowhere to live. No one is waiting here for you. They will give you a berth on a ship, then you search for rental housing for the family. Then no one lets you go off the ship. They demand you to have shoes and clothes, but they won’t give you anything, you buy it all from your own money. Then you do repairs at the shop at your own expense. Then your wife can’t stand it any longer and relocates to her mother’s…”
Project Ovod and “pistol at the temple”
The Ovod series of guided missile corvettes (or small missile ships in Soviet classification) were designed in the 1960s. These ships were initially to be classified as missile boats, but the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, specifically approved a new class for them that loosely fit the corvette class specifications in western terms. At the launch of the first Ovod project corvette he said an epic phrase: “These missile ships are a gun at the temple of [western] imperialism.”
As of 2019, 12 Ovod project corvettes were still in operation, the rest had been decommissioned because they were outdated morally and physically. Those that remain are in need of deep modernization, with naval officers saying that after the modernization only the hull and superstructure, as well as part of general ship systems could stay.
GMC Shtil is a project 1234.1 Ovod-1 vessel. The ship was launched in 1978. In the summer 2019, a photo the “stripping” process of the GMC Shtil appeared on the forums, that is of its equipment being removed from it before disposal.
In February 2020, GMC Shtil was decommissioned from the Russian Black Sea Fleet. However, the participation of its crews in the aggression against Ukraine and Georgia cannot be dismissed.
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Translated by Andrii Gryga, edited by Artem Velichko.
Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons — Attribution 4.0 International — CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter