sluggerotoole--2020-11-28--Welcome to the Era of Vaccine Politics…

Welcome to the Era of Vaccine Politics…

If recent developments around COVID vaccination has reminded us of anything , surely it ’ s that nothing is easy .
Proof of anything is hard to come by .
Weighing up a 90 % -effective vaccine against a 70 % -effective one might seem straightforward , but that ’ s without knowing if those numbers remain stable as more evidence comes in , and if so , who are the 10 and 30 % and when and why a vaccine can be ineffective in a given instance .
Then you ’ re straight on to , well what if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doses of the less effective drug , or if because of storage temperature requirements , the more effective one also was ten times more expensive ?
What then ?
Time , I think , for the standard “ I ’ m no immunologist ” disclaimer , and to highlight that most of those numbers were hypothetical .
What I am is a football fan , one whose enjoyment of the most recent series of international matches was curtailed by the rising prevalence of COVID among elite players .
The thought struck me while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first of Egypt ’ s two victories against African Nations Cup rivals Togo : how long until these guys get vaccinated ?
The fixture had been robbed of its superstar Mo Salah of Liverpool and Egypt , who had registered two positive test results and returned to England .
Where ’ s Mo on the list , I wondered .
We ’ re familiar with the idea that telling people “ what you do ” , i.e .
your job , conveys more information than what your typical day consists of .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be good at , what your value is to the rest of us and what it ’ s like to be you .
Prepare that for the stakes to be raised as we , as a society , face into the vexed task of determining who gets vaccinated and how soon .
Jobs are already consequential for health and happiness , but what we do could yet determine which of us waits to access the vaccine because what that job we do isn ’ t important enough in this moment .
Footballers occupy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Their position in society is a privileged one by dint of the huge salaries the sport ’ s free market awards them for their skills .
But you ’ d be hard pressed to find anyone who thinks those salaries are ‘ fair ’ in the grander scheme , or who personally values what those skills add to society more than the skills of nurses , doctors , teachers or entrepreneurs .
Football has been ‘ back ’ almost continually since the resumption of the 2019/20 season in June , a development cheerled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April , ostensibly with an eye to improving public morale .
To make this work , clubs have imposed strict bubble policies , aimed at reducing the risk their employees might otherwise face in their place of work , by cutting them off from the cities they represent .
Footballers do a job where social distancing is considered poor defending .
Wearing a mask throughout 10km of running and in a packed penalty box full of flailing arms would be more hazardous than protective .
From a health and safety perspective , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ players have been compelled by those manning the industry ’ s commercial engine-room to keep the show on the road .
Now those who represent their countries have become participants in a live experiment to test what happens when bubbles mix .
Preliminary results suggest that it ’ s probably not best practice : the number of COVID cases recorded in the league this week was higher than in any week since the June re-start .
Fast forward to a scenario where vaccinations are being rolled out .
Will the court of public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been vaccinated before a single footballer does ?
Having worked through the pandemic and put themselves at risk for the public ’ s entertainment , won ’ t Mo Salah and his teammates in Cairo and on Merseyside have a reasonable claim to protection from further risk ?
Or would the parents of a nurse yet to receive his vaccination be entitled to a sense of moral outrage , having not hugged their son since March to minimise the risk to their health , should they open their paper to read about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its starting eleven ?
This example might seem trivial and , in numerical terms , the impact on the UK ’ s capacity to distribute vaccines to even the 25 senior squad members of the 20 premiership teams , would be miniscule .
But that ’ s the first thing to note about the foreseeable public discourse around vaccination : it ’ s likely to get emotive and the emotional salience of some options may override any questions of their actual impact .
Beyond that , the footballer example touches on several facets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is no one profession which will be vaccinated in its entirety before others are reached .
There will be some politicians vaccinated before some doctors , some Fortune 500 CEOs vaccinated before some hospitality workers .
We have already seen this with access to rapid priority testing .
After a number of positive tests among the negotiation teams for the post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement , all negotiators were able to be emergency tested and receive results within hours .
They ’ re very important people you see .
So we won ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chosen day for our occupation , but nor will it be a random or first-come-first-served process .
When managing tasks , people often assess which tasks are urgent and which are important and start with those which are both urgent and important .
We could transpose this simplified scheme and imagine two groups : those whose health is most at risk personally from COVID ( urgent ) and those who , should they become infected , will infect the most people ( important ) .
Vaccination in either of these categories will make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Those working and residing in care homes appear to be at the exact intersection of these groups .
Care home residents and staff are becoming extremely ill and dying , while also making a lot of other people ill and passing the virus rapidly among one another .
Possibly we didn ’ t realise just what a sizable section of the workforce are employed in care homes prior to COVID .
But now that we ’ ve learned the hard way , priority vaccination in care homes would seem like a logical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is unclear .
A frontline health or social service worker may be in daily contact with hundreds of people either at risk of transmitting the virus or becoming seriously ill from the virus .
But they themselves might be younger and at reduced risk .
So in a world of scarce supply , there may be a balance to be struck between using a vaccine to curb spread versus using it to protect the life of the recipient .
Where best to dam the river : upstream or downstream ?
Then there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and how loudly money will be allowed to talk .
So far we ’ ve been thinking of governments as the main customer of vaccine providers .
That ’ s a very European-style mode of thought and ignores the queue of private providers around the globe who will want their patient-clients to have access .
Even beyond medical providers , imagine the following scenario .
A tech giant tries to place an order for a million vaccine doses so they can offer those as a benefit to employees .
A rival tech company @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an effort to be the employer of choice and tries to outdo the first bid to avert a stampede across Silicon Valley .
What is the producer to do ?
And how do governments assert their priority place as the customers whose research infrastructures have allowed these vaccines to be developed ?
If I were to bet , Mo Salah seems much more likely to be given a vaccine by his employer at Liverpool FC ( or possibly Real Madrid depending how long production takes ) than by the NHS or their Spanish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even further is the fact that some football clubs are owned almost wholly by sovereign wealth funds .
What if one of their players is found to have received a vaccine which was obtained ostensibly to treat the citizens of that sovereign ?
Are we up for that as society ?
What then of those who refuse to be vaccinated ?
A doctor of my acquaintance assured me that , in the short term , this won ’ t be a concern as it will curtail demand on what will be a scare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while nobody may be panicking just yet about anti-vaxxers , eventually someone will fall ill with a virus they chose not to be immunised from .
Then what ?
Will we have we thought through whether that person ’ s decisions affect their entitlement to treatment ?
In single payer healthcare systems , we generally don ’ t factor how someone got sick into their ability to access treatment .
But could more market-oriented systems see large numbers losing access to insurance through non-uptake of vaccination .
By the time we are confronted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more about what we know little of now , namely what proportion of the population would need to be vaccinated for the virus to stop circulating .
In other words , how many unvaccinated people will we be able to carry through uptake by those who might otherwise have infected them .
Again deferring to my doctor friend , this will require more knowledge than we currently have about transmissibility of COVID through various routes , who can carry it where and for how long .
Finally , I realise that by framing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I ’ m pressing different buttons for different people .
Politics is a neutral descriptive term for some people , it ’ s a passion for some and for many many others it ’ s the worst force that exists in the world , enough to probably turn someone off reading on .
Anti-politics is becoming one of the most potent modes of thought currently in circulation and that ’ s something we as a society need to confront if we want to maintain any sense of ‘ we ’ into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we ’ re best returning to a simple definition of politics , namely how groups make decisions , and accept that if vaccination is our route back to a new normal which better resembles the old one , decisions await us at every turn .
Nothing is easy .
“ Vaccine with a possible cure for Coronavirus and Planet Earth ” by focusonmore.com is licensed under CC BY

If recent developments around COVID vaccination has reminded us of anything, surely it’s that nothing is easy. Proof of anything is hard to come by. Weighing up a 90%-effective vaccine against a 70%-effective one might seem straightforward, but that’s without knowing if those numbers remain stable as more evidence comes in, and if so, who are the 10 and 30% and when and why a vaccine can be ineffective in a given instance. Then you’re straight on to, well what if we could have ten times as many doses of the less effective drug, or if because of storage temperature requirements, the more effective one also was ten times more expensive? What then?
Time, I think, for the standard “I’m no immunologist” disclaimer, and to highlight that most of those numbers were hypothetical. What I am is a football fan, one whose enjoyment of the most recent series of international matches was curtailed by the rising prevalence of COVID among elite players. The thought struck me while watching a phase of passing during the first of Egypt’s two victories against African Nations Cup rivals Togo: how long until these guys get vaccinated? The fixture had been robbed of its superstar Mo Salah of Liverpool and Egypt, who had registered two positive test results and returned to England. Where’s Mo on the list, I wondered.
We’re familiar with the idea that telling people “what you do”, i.e. your job, conveys more information than what your typical day consists of. It signals what you’re supposed to be good at, what your value is to the rest of us and what it’s like to be you. Prepare that for the stakes to be raised as we, as a society, face into the vexed task of determining who gets vaccinated and how soon. Jobs are already consequential for health and happiness, but what we do could yet determine which of us waits to access the vaccine because what that job we do isn’t important enough in this moment.
Footballers occupy a precarious place in cultural consciousness. Their position in society is a privileged one by dint of the huge salaries the sport’s free market awards them for their skills. But you’d be hard pressed to find anyone who thinks those salaries are ‘fair’ in the grander scheme, or who personally values what those skills add to society more than the skills of nurses, doctors, teachers or entrepreneurs.
Football has been ‘back’ almost continually since the resumption of the 2019/20 season in June, a development cheerled by Boris Johnson as far back as April, ostensibly with an eye to improving public morale. To make this work, clubs have imposed strict bubble policies, aimed at reducing the risk their employees might otherwise face in their place of work, by cutting them off from the cities they represent.
Footballers do a job where social distancing is considered poor defending. Wearing a mask throughout 10km of running and in a packed penalty box full of flailing arms would be more hazardous than protective. From a health and safety perspective, it’s not ideal. Still, players have been compelled by those manning the industry’s commercial engine-room to keep the show on the road. Now those who represent their countries have become participants in a live experiment to test what happens when bubbles mix. Preliminary results suggest that it’s probably not best practice: the number of COVID cases recorded in the league this week was higher than in any week since the June re-start.
Fast forward to a scenario where vaccinations are being rolled out. Will the court of public opinion decree that every nurse have to have been vaccinated before a single footballer does? Having worked through the pandemic and put themselves at risk for the public’s entertainment, won’t Mo Salah and his teammates in Cairo and on Merseyside have a reasonable claim to protection from further risk? Or would the parents of a nurse yet to receive his vaccination be entitled to a sense of moral outrage, having not hugged their son since March to minimise the risk to their health, should they open their paper to read about the premiership team which has successfully inoculated its starting eleven?
This example might seem trivial and, in numerical terms, the impact on the UK’s capacity to distribute vaccines to even the 25 senior squad members of the 20 premiership teams, would be miniscule. But that’s the first thing to note about the foreseeable public discourse around vaccination: it’s likely to get emotive and the emotional salience of some options may override any questions of their actual impact. Beyond that, the footballer example touches on several facets of the decisions ahead.
First, there is no one profession which will be vaccinated in its entirety before others are reached. There will be some politicians vaccinated before some doctors, some Fortune 500 CEOs vaccinated before some hospitality workers. We have already seen this with access to rapid priority testing. After a number of positive tests among the negotiation teams for the post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement, all negotiators were able to be emergency tested and receive results within hours. They’re very important people you see.
So we won’t all be called upon on the chosen day for our occupation, but nor will it be a random or first-come-first-served process. When managing tasks, people often assess which tasks are urgent and which are important and start with those which are both urgent and important. We could transpose this simplified scheme and imagine two groups: those whose health is most at risk personally from COVID (urgent) and those who, should they become infected, will infect the most people (important). Vaccination in either of these categories will make an impact on COVID-related illness and death.
Those working and residing in care homes appear to be at the exact intersection of these groups. Care home residents and staff are becoming extremely ill and dying, while also making a lot of other people ill and passing the virus rapidly among one another. Possibly we didn’t realise just what a sizable section of the workforce are employed in care homes prior to COVID. But now that we’ve learned the hard way, priority vaccination in care homes would seem like a logical starting point.
Where to go after that is unclear. A frontline health or social service worker may be in daily contact with hundreds of people either at risk of transmitting the virus or becoming seriously ill from the virus. But they themselves might be younger and at reduced risk. So in a world of scarce supply, there may be a balance to be struck between using a vaccine to curb spread versus using it to protect the life of the recipient. Where best to dam the river: upstream or downstream?
Then there’s the question of who pays and how loudly money will be allowed to talk. So far we’ve been thinking of governments as the main customer of vaccine providers. That’s a very European-style mode of thought and ignores the queue of private providers around the globe who will want their patient-clients to have access. Even beyond medical providers, imagine the following scenario. A tech giant tries to place an order for a million vaccine doses so they can offer those as a benefit to employees. A rival tech company sees a risk of losing out in an effort to be the employer of choice and tries to outdo the first bid to avert a stampede across Silicon Valley. What is the producer to do? And how do governments assert their priority place as the customers whose research infrastructures have allowed these vaccines to be developed?
If I were to bet, Mo Salah seems much more likely to be given a vaccine by his employer at Liverpool FC (or possibly Real Madrid depending how long production takes) than by the NHS or their Spanish or Egyptian counterparts. Confusing this picture even further is the fact that some football clubs are owned almost wholly by sovereign wealth funds. What if one of their players is found to have received a vaccine which was obtained ostensibly to treat the citizens of that sovereign? Are we up for that as society?
What then of those who refuse to be vaccinated? A doctor of my acquaintance assured me that, in the short term, this won’t be a concern as it will curtail demand on what will be a scare resource for the foreseeable future. But while nobody may be panicking just yet about anti-vaxxers, eventually someone will fall ill with a virus they chose not to be immunised from. Then what? Will we have we thought through whether that person’s decisions affect their entitlement to treatment? In single payer healthcare systems, we generally don’t factor how someone got sick into their ability to access treatment. But could more market-oriented systems see large numbers losing access to insurance through non-uptake of vaccination.
By the time we are confronted by these issues, we may know more about what we know little of now, namely what proportion of the population would need to be vaccinated for the virus to stop circulating. In other words, how many unvaccinated people will we be able to carry through uptake by those who might otherwise have infected them. Again deferring to my doctor friend, this will require more knowledge than we currently have about transmissibility of COVID through various routes, who can carry it where and for how long.
Finally, I realise that by framing this debate as the politics of vaccination, I’m pressing different buttons for different people. Politics is a neutral descriptive term for some people, it’s a passion for some and for many many others it’s the worst force that exists in the world, enough to probably turn someone off reading on. Anti-politics is becoming one of the most potent modes of thought currently in circulation and that’s something we as a society need to confront if we want to maintain any sense of ‘we’ into the future. In the meantime, perhaps we’re best returning to a simple definition of politics, namely how groups make decisions, and accept that if vaccination is our route back to a new normal which better resembles the old one, decisions await us at every turn. Nothing is easy.
“Vaccine with a possible cure for Coronavirus and Planet Earth” by focusonmore.com is licensed under CC BY


sluggerotoole--2020-11-29--Renewing trust, confidence and motivation to make Northern Ireland a home for all

The meeting took place in Portrush .
In addition to local members , it was attended by the recently elected UUP party leader .
In the course of a short speech which seemed unrehearsed and lacked emphasis on any key messaging , he said : “ Unionism is always at its best when it has something to fight against.
” Like ‘ United We Stand ‘ it maybe works as a rallying cry but , not unusual within unionist groupings , reveals a limiting view of any vision or hope for a preferred future .
Stuck between the incompatibility of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tiocfaidh ár lá ’ , both chosen to shepherd the community into binary categories , partisan agendas and the pursuit of power , if people in Northern Ireland , robbed of hope amidst the rubble of prejudice and political conflict , want a meaningful future , they will have to become their own leaders and build it themselves .
Many within the pro-union constituency have already chosen to do so ; no longer willing to endorse the communal polarisation in which some would seek to tell them they have to live .
Intensity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and political stagnation , their aim is to mould a future for all that is worth having and make change happen better .
Writing in 1998 , in an update to his book , author articulated the need for ‘ unionism to disentangle from sectarianism.
’ In referring to cultural , liberal and civic unionism he recognised cultural shifts resulting from globalisation and other influences but notes that ‘ it does not fully translate into political openness ‘ and rejection of ’ absolutist political orthodoxy.
’ This is no longer the case .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the age percentiles with regard to what people deem important to their lives and health , economy and employment are prioritised above constitutional concerns .
Political unionism is slow to respond and still seeking out sectarian battles to fight ; oblivious it seems to the reality that many see unionism as anti-Catholic and uber-Protestant , it continues to use language couched in denominational tones and embrace rituals accordingly .
In effect , it is abandoning the more important challenges of , for example , health reform , the regional and low wage failings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under-developed infrastructure , disability rights and pockets showing high rates of economic inactivity .
The prosperity and investment in the Titanic Quarter and elsewhere is a welcome driver for an improving Northern Ireland but levelling up is paramount .
The creativity , energy and desire are there .
Individuals who deploy the term civic unionist or pro-Union , particularly , but not only the post- ceasefire and GFA generation , invest their energy and activism into issue-centred politics prioritising social and economic well-being , education , equality , health and reconciliation .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership , creating jobs , the social economy and challenging racial prejudice .
Confident in their unionism , they recognise that the Union is not a given ; that it requires respect , pluralism and inclusivity ; first and foremost , a home where people are welcomed , where staunch denominational attitudes do not consign individuals to exist in the dark corners .
For them Unionism without such humanity and empathy is not unionism .
Asked by a civic nationalist friend : “ Where are all these pro-Union and civic-unionists ?
” I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and racism out of sport , campaigning for women ’ s and LBGT rights , running ‘ Marching to get Fit ’ walks for bands , taking drama to cross-community venues , participating in Féile , making music with traditional musicians , organising foodbanks , supporting charities , writing books , learning Gaelic , exploring the culture and heritage they were not taught , running innovative Peace IV projects in the midst of the pandemic , engaging with ex-prisoners , renewing friendships that were interrupted by conflict , organising catch-up classes in literacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , creating jobs and working in the public service , challenging patriarchy and misogyny , making Northern Ireland work by doing all the things that ‘ Unionists are not supposed to do ; and not a banner or bonfire in sight !
Why won ’ t civic nationalism engage ?
” We are friends but I am growing frustrated with the ‘ basket-case ’ and ‘ it ’ s all over ’ mantra Unlike civic nationalism , pro-Union advocates wants to act as a catalyst for reconciliation and transformation , to make Northern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what the future may bring in terms of constitutional change , or not .
This is something , in a post-Brexit world , that will not lie solely in the control of civic nationalists , political nationalists and republican voters in Northern Ireland ; groups , the terminology for whom points largely to a distinction without a difference as the manner in which they pursue change renders problematic the vision they claim .
For them to succeed , others have to fail .
It is a zero-sum approach .
Rather than a dove @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of prey .
Determined in their misplaced confidence and in the interests of their long-term aspirations to present Northern Ireland as ‘ a failed statelet or micro-jurisdiction ‘ , it can not be in their interests to make Northern Ireland work so the only equality they can offer is access to the ruins they want to represent .
With some content to exist within their essentialism and assert claims as truth , it looks as if the task will fall to those who designate as pro-Union , more enlightened nationalists or those neither @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the building of relationships , promising transition and growth taking place will be developed further .
The future will be blended not shared .
Sharing is a bridge over a gulf of latent differences ; a half-way house accommodating superficial integration .
You might as well leave the scorpions to which John Darby referred in his book Scorpions in a Bottle : Conflicting Cultures in Northern Ireland ( 1997 ) in the bottle .
In so far as the description applies , pro-unionism wants to climb out of the bottle .
When that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unionism needing ‘ a fight ’ to be ‘ at its best ’ there may be a modicum of truth in what he said but he was in all probability thinking of old battles ; references to meeting challenges would have delivered a more positive message .
Much as you might wish too and political unionism tries hard , you can not build the future by focusing on the past .
Pro-union and civic unionist groups are modelling what can be achieved ; open-eyed to the difficulties they breathe and provide evidence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ireland work in workplaces , through creativity and a desire to sustain progress .
It is not to deny historical problems but it is too easily forgotten and dismissed that prior to the outbreak of violence on the streets in 1968 towns and rural areas were , in the main , sites of community where inhabitants although wearing different labels worked , socialised and lived within and across diverse neighbourhoods .
There was a sense of common purpose , humanity and trust .
It can not be beyond the abilities of civic society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ motivation to make Northern Ireland a home for all .
The Good Friday Agreement provided the process .
Politicians may be failing it but civic society can make and is making better choices .
It is providing answers that politics is yet to discover .

The meeting took place in Portrush. In addition to local members, it was attended by the recently elected UUP party leader. In the course of a short speech which seemed unrehearsed and lacked emphasis on any key messaging, he said: “Unionism is always at its best when it has something to fight against.” Like ‘United We Stand ‘it maybe works as a rallying cry but, not unusual within unionist groupings, reveals a limiting view of any vision or hope for a preferred future. Stuck between the incompatibility of echoes of a fighting past and ‘Tiocfaidh ár lá’, both chosen to shepherd the community into binary categories, partisan agendas and the pursuit of power, if people in Northern Ireland, robbed of hope amidst the rubble of prejudice and political conflict, want a meaningful future, they will have to become their own leaders and build it themselves.
Many within the pro-union constituency have already chosen to do so; no longer willing to endorse the communal polarisation in which some would seek to tell them they have to live. Intensity and passion being no substitute for problem-solving and political stagnation, their aim is to mould a future for all that is worth having and make change happen better.
Writing in 1998, in an update to his book Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland , author Norman Porter articulated the need for ‘unionism to disentangle from sectarianism.’ In referring to cultural, liberal and civic unionism he recognised cultural shifts resulting from globalisation and other influences but notes that ‘it does not fully translate into political openness ‘and rejection of’ absolutist political orthodoxy.’ This is no longer the case. Data confirms a significant shift across all the age percentiles with regard to what people deem important to their lives and health, economy and employment are prioritised above constitutional concerns.
Political unionism is slow to respond and still seeking out sectarian battles to fight; oblivious it seems to the reality that many see unionism as anti-Catholic and uber-Protestant, it continues to use language couched in denominational tones and embrace rituals accordingly. In effect, it is abandoning the more important challenges of, for example, health reform, the regional and low wage failings of the ‘trickle-down economy’, under-developed infrastructure, disability rights and pockets showing high rates of economic inactivity. The prosperity and investment in the Titanic Quarter and elsewhere is a welcome driver for an improving Northern Ireland but levelling up is paramount.
The creativity, energy and desire are there. Individuals who deploy the term civic unionist or pro-Union, particularly, but not only the post- ceasefire and GFA generation, invest their energy and activism into issue-centred politics prioritising social and economic well-being, education, equality, health and reconciliation. At community level, they commit to building leadership, creating jobs, the social economy and challenging racial prejudice. Confident in their unionism, they recognise that the Union is not a given; that it requires respect, pluralism and inclusivity; first and foremost, a home where people are welcomed, where staunch denominational attitudes do not consign individuals to exist in the dark corners. For them Unionism without such humanity and empathy is not unionism.
Asked by a civic nationalist friend: “Where are all these pro-Union and civic-unionists?” I replied: ‘ working to take sectarianism and racism out of sport, campaigning for women’s and LBGT rights, running ‘Marching to get Fit’ walks for bands, taking drama to cross-community venues, participating in Féile, making music with traditional musicians, organising foodbanks, supporting charities, writing books, learning Gaelic, exploring the culture and heritage they were not taught, running innovative Peace IV projects in the midst of the pandemic, engaging with ex-prisoners, renewing friendships that were interrupted by conflict, organising catch-up classes in literacy and mathematics, running businesses and schools, creating jobs and working in the public service, challenging patriarchy and misogyny, making Northern Ireland work by doing all the things that ‘ Unionists are not supposed to do; and not a banner or bonfire in sight! Why won’t civic nationalism engage?”
We are friends but I am growing frustrated with the ‘basket-case’ and ‘it’s all over’ mantra
Unlike civic nationalism, pro-Union advocates wants to act as a catalyst for reconciliation and transformation, to make Northern Ireland work for all, regardless of what the future may bring in terms of constitutional change, or not. This is something, in a post-Brexit world, that will not lie solely in the control of civic nationalists, political nationalists and republican voters in Northern Ireland; groups, the terminology for whom points largely to a distinction without a difference as the manner in which they pursue change renders problematic the vision they claim. For them to succeed, others have to fail.
It is a zero-sum approach. Rather than a dove of peace they act like a bird of prey. Determined in their misplaced confidence and in the interests of their long-term aspirations to present Northern Ireland as ‘a failed statelet or micro-jurisdiction ‘, it cannot be in their interests to make Northern Ireland work so the only equality they can offer is access to the ruins they want to represent. With some content to exist within their essentialism and assert claims as truth, it looks as if the task will fall to those who designate as pro-Union, more enlightened nationalists or those neither unionist nor nationalist.
Incremental change, the building of relationships, promising transition and growth taking place will be developed further. The future will be blended not shared. Sharing is a bridge over a gulf of latent differences; a half-way house accommodating superficial integration. You might as well leave the scorpions to which John Darby referred in his book Scorpions in a Bottle: Conflicting Cultures in Northern Ireland (1997) in the bottle. In so far as the description applies, pro-unionism wants to climb out of the bottle.
When that Unionist leader of the past spoke of unionism needing ‘a fight’ to be ‘at its best’ there may be a modicum of truth in what he said but he was in all probability thinking of old battles; references to meeting challenges would have delivered a more positive message. Much as you might wish too and political unionism tries hard, you cannot build the future by focusing on the past. Pro-union and civic unionist groups are modelling what can be achieved; open-eyed to the difficulties they breathe and provide evidence of how people from all backgrounds make Northern Ireland work in workplaces, through creativity and a desire to sustain progress.
It is not to deny historical problems but it is too easily forgotten and dismissed that prior to the outbreak of violence on the streets in 1968 towns and rural areas were, in the main, sites of community where inhabitants although wearing different labels worked, socialised and lived within and across diverse neighbourhoods. There was a sense of common purpose, humanity and trust.
It cannot be beyond the abilities of civic society to renew trust, confidence and the motivation to make Northern Ireland a home for all. The Good Friday Agreement provided the process. Politicians may be failing it but civic society can make and is making better choices. It is providing answers that politics is yet to discover.


sluggerotoole--2020-11-30--No point in waiting, a border poll can only really build on our successes rather than failures

On Friday I was invited to talk about the interim report on the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland which we covered last week , on The Irish Times Inside Politics podcast with Etain Tannan , Pat Leahy and host Hugh Linihan… I welcomed the report and would recommend you get a hold of the short but comprehensive Executive Summary .
It ’ s important to re-emphasise that the report is decidedly non political in the sense that it takes no view of outcome , just notes the complications in getting there .
The prompt was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Brexit has become because of the lack of preparation .
It gets pointed out too that the unique complications is that the Belfast Agreement provides for not one but two referendums north and south holds great potential for muddle .
Personally , I ’ ve always assumed that if NI said yes , then the south would hardly refuse .
But as the report makes clear , a proper period of deliberation would have to outline the proposes in great detail not least what so of “ dowry ” as I put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and liabilities .
A hasty rush which foregoes the sort of deliberation techniques seen in the preceding period before the relatively straightforward issues of abortion and marriage equality in one state ( ie , the south ) could see even popular sentiment in favour of unification drain under the burden of reality .
Terms would have to be hammered out if not in complete detail , then with all potential icebergs mapped and owned before a single ( metaphorical ) shot was fired .
Of course , politics is a slippery creature .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the wisest route forward doesn ’ t mean it won ’ t happen .
But whilst sentiment may carry the day in the south , the bigger problem in Northern Ireland isn ’ t just the large ( minority ) group that still call themselves unionist , but a very third group in the middle ( up to 30 % ) which considers itself ‘ neither ’ and according to surveys is put off by loose chatter around constitutional questions .
As Katy Hayward points out , “ inclusivity , consensus , British-Irish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is timely that the shared island dialogues continued last week with a session with young people .
Deliberation is the key to re-engineering the future for the better with actions that benefit everyone .
Then maybe , if and when the referendum on unification comes , it might be a question of building on the strengths rather than the weakness of the past ( such as the Belfast Agreement , the AIA and UK Legislation from 75/6 which changed the employment landscape for the two generations , forever .
Photo by Aloïs Moubax @ @ @ @

On Friday I was invited to talk about the interim report on the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland which we covered last week, on The Irish Times Inside Politics podcast with Etain Tannan, Pat Leahy and host Hugh Linihan…
I welcomed the report and would recommend you get a hold of the short but comprehensive Executive Summary. It’s important to re-emphasise that the report is decidedly non political in the sense that it takes no view of outcome, just notes the complications in getting there.
The prompt was clearly routed in the muddle and disruption that Brexit has become because of the lack of preparation. It gets pointed out too that the unique complications is that the Belfast Agreement provides for not one but two referendums north and south holds great potential for muddle.
Personally, I’ve always assumed that if NI said yes, then the south would hardly refuse. But as the report makes clear, a proper period of deliberation would have to outline the proposes in great detail not least what so of “dowry” as I put it in the division of UK assets and liabilities.
A hasty rush which foregoes the sort of deliberation techniques seen in the preceding period before the relatively straightforward issues of abortion and marriage equality in one state (ie, the south) could see even popular sentiment in favour of unification drain under the burden of reality.
Terms would have to be hammered out if not in complete detail, then with all potential icebergs mapped and owned before a single (metaphorical) shot was fired. Of course, politics is a slippery creature. Knowing that it wouldn’t be the wisest route forward doesn’t mean it won’t happen.
But whilst sentiment may carry the day in the south, the bigger problem in Northern Ireland isn’t just the large (minority) group that still call themselves unionist, but a very third group in the middle (up to 30%) which considers itself ‘neither’ and according to surveys is put off by loose chatter around constitutional questions.
As Katy Hayward points out, “inclusivity, consensus, British-Irish cooperation… remain essential”. So it is timely that the shared island dialogues continued last week with a session with young people. Deliberation is the key to re-engineering the future for the better with actions that benefit everyone.
Then maybe, if and when the referendum on unification comes, it might be a question of building on the strengths rather than the weakness of the past (such as the Belfast Agreement, the AIA and UK Legislation from 75/6 which changed the employment landscape for the two generations, forever.
Photo by Aloïs Moubax is licensed under CC0


sluggerotoole--2020-12-01--Confronting the issues of organising Unity referendums. Academics in London, Dublin and Belfast show

Confronting the issues of organising Unity referendums. Academics in London, Dublin and Belfast show the way. Will the politicians follow?

In addressing the existential core of politics north and south in Ireland , a working group of academics has laboured long on grappling with the issues on Referendums on Irish unity and delivered a modest proposal in the form of an “ interim report ” .
But unlike Swift ’ s biting satire , theirs is an impeccably rational approach to procedural issues and the broad context for holding twin if not quite simultaneous referendums .
They recommend as best option a model of what unity would look like – Dublin ’ s prime responsibility – and a closely coordinated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presented in advance – crucially a joint British-Irish obligation .
So far , so good .
But the political context throughout these islands is highly volatile .
The hitherto obsessively introverted issue of Irish unity has been transformed by the external twin hammer blows of Brexit and Covid and the half external issue of the future of the British Union .
If demand for a border poll looked like peaking at around 50 % the prospect of unity could come unsettlingly quick and begin to dominate the politics of the Oireachtas and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If the group were to be taken as proxies for the three governments and many more parties , the process would be carried out very smoothly indeed .
But this the easy bit .
Like soldiers looking gingerly over a trench parapet expecting a hail of gunfire , the working party are now inviting responses .
The politics are certain to be more contentious than the report and may well upset some of its recommendations .
Procedures for the vote are a lot easier to agree on than the shape and substance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report throws out multiple choices .
Despite the obvious difficulties of prescribing , it is a pity they are quite so numerous .
The Northern referendum should embrace two choices in one question .
The wording will be crucial .
Will it refer baldly to a government paper where the terms are set out and distributed to every household as happened in the 1998 referendum ; or spelt out on the ballot paper itself ?
In 98 the public had no difficulty in deciding .
But wherever the choice is described , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the traditional unionist concept of the Union emphasising British sovereignty which tends to alienate nationalists and the embracing terms of the reformed Union under the GFA which enjoys cross community appeal .
The report affirms the 50 % + 1 threshold for the referendums and rightly puts paid to unionist musings about a super majority consistent with cross community voting in the Assembly .
However it ’ s disappointing that the working party did not exploit their three centred objectivity to come closer to recommending criteria for calling a Northern referendum .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ can ?
As the Secretary of State in this capacity is obliged to be neutral about the outcome , would the trigger be pulled around the 50 % threshold ?
Over what period of time and how many polls ?
Independent or commissioned by the UK government ?
The questions being a simple yes or no , or detailed and nuanced as in the political attitudes section of the Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys ?
Public confidence in opinion polls and British ministers are at a low ebb and yet the Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and near absolute .
It will be very difficult to maintain it .
Better that the legal position is understood to mean that he will act on compelling advice from the Assembly , voting on a simple majority on the basis of clear manifesto commitments in favour of unity within a specified time scale .
Admittedly this is what the GFA system tried to avoid by detaching the question from an Assembly ideally preoccupied with making power sharing work .
But it reflects the compelling political realities of today .
Creating vital transparency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process in the Dail and enable parallel debates to take place .
The report seems to imply the neutrality of the United Kingdom government in the campaign and run up .
This is not necessarily so .
The legal obligation to facilitate the process with strict impartiality does not rule out GB parties campaigning for either desired result .
Although they have no role in deciding Irish unity they have powerful interests in the future of the UK .
GB parties have held different formal positions on Irish unity since partition .
Why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point of decision ?
The formal campaign period would need to prescribed in synch north and south and indeed UK wide .
But campaigning in various forms will go on for years .
When has it ever stopped ?
I see no likelihood of an agreement to impose purdah other than in the narrowest sense of specifically banning financial incentives from either government which would immediately recall the rampant bribery of the politics that created the Unions of 1707 and 1801 .
Unitary or federal state ?
The policies for a model of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within NI , suggesting that a federal Ireland might be preferable .
Debate on change consequent on unity is constant within the North , but is much less so within the present Republic where for instance an NHS on the UK model would involve significant change .
A federal state is accommodated in the design of the GFA , would be easier to implement and would preserve a district role for unionists .
All Ireland policy reform on the health service and other matters would not be precluded .
The reports hints that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not frustrate the implementation of either result in a northern referendum .
This is an important principle for all parties specifically to assert in advance of the referendums , consistent with the GFA principle of “ exclusively peaceful means ” for conducting politics .
However discreet but comprehensive preparations should be made by the two governments with UKG taking prime responsibility to counter the possibility of serious disruption .
Almost certainly though , there will be no repetition of events from 1912 to 1922 .
On the other hand , if anxiety was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the event of a hard Brexit border , would the threat be any less at the prospect of no constitutional border at all ?
And where are the ideas for countering a formal or informal unionist boycott ?
Worryingly no consideration has been given on the impact of a change of sovereignty on tackling the legacy of the Troubles .
This is unlikely to have been settled within the decade .
Supporters of unity could probably afford to lose a referendum in each jurisdiction unless the unity vote was derisory .
Principles for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ date should be considered and should surely differ from the first .
Possible scenarios littered with elephant traps are many more than are discussed here .
To achieve some sort of coherence for political parties bitterly divided on the issue and two sovereign governments , the Working Group has set clear principles of procedure and standards of political conduct .
This is not a negligible achievement .
But it is not even the end of the beginning .
The really difficult stage begins when they receive the responses to their modest proposal .

In addressing the existential core of politics north and south in Ireland, a working group of academics has laboured long on grappling with the issues on Referendums on Irish unity and delivered a modest proposal in the form of an “interim report”. But unlike Swift’s biting satire, theirs is an impeccably rational approach to procedural issues and the broad context for holding twin if not quite simultaneous referendums.
They recommend as best option a model of what unity would look like – Dublin’s prime responsibility – and a closely coordinated plan for conducting the referendums to be presented in advance – crucially a joint British-Irish obligation. So far, so good. But the political context throughout these islands is highly volatile. The hitherto obsessively introverted issue of Irish unity has been transformed by the external twin hammer blows of Brexit and Covid and the half external issue of the future of the British Union. If demand for a border poll looked like peaking at around 50% the prospect of unity could come unsettlingly quick and begin to dominate the politics of the Oireachtas and the Assembly for at least a full term.
If the group were to be taken as proxies for the three governments and many more parties, the process would be carried out very smoothly indeed. But this the easy bit. Like soldiers looking gingerly over a trench parapet expecting a hail of gunfire, the working party are now inviting responses. The politics are certain to be more contentious than the report and may well upset some of its recommendations.
Procedures for the vote are a lot easier to agree on than the shape and substance of unity. On the latter the report throws out multiple choices. Despite the obvious difficulties of prescribing, it is a pity they are quite so numerous.
The Northern referendum should embrace two choices in one question. The wording will be crucial. Will it refer baldly to a government paper where the terms are set out and distributed to every household as happened in the 1998 referendum; or spelt out on the ballot paper itself? In 98 the public had no difficulty in deciding. But wherever the choice is described, there is an important distinction to be made between the traditional unionist concept of the Union emphasising British sovereignty which tends to alienate nationalists and the embracing terms of the reformed Union under the GFA which enjoys cross community appeal.
The report affirms the 50%+ 1 threshold for the referendums and rightly puts paid to unionist musings about a super majority consistent with cross community voting in the Assembly. However it’s disappointing that the working party did not exploit their three centred objectivity to come closer to recommending criteria for calling a Northern referendum. If they can’t, who can? As the Secretary of State in this capacity is obliged to be neutral about the outcome, would the trigger be pulled around the 50% threshold? Over what period of time and how many polls? Independent or commissioned by the UK government? The questions being a simple yes or no, or detailed and nuanced as in the political attitudes section of the Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys?
Public confidence in opinion polls and British ministers are at a low ebb and yet the Secretary of State’s discretion is opaque and near absolute. It will be very difficult to maintain it. Better that the legal position is understood to mean that he will act on compelling advice from the Assembly, voting on a simple majority on the basis of clear manifesto commitments in favour of unity within a specified time scale. Admittedly this is what the GFA system tried to avoid by detaching the question from an Assembly ideally preoccupied with making power sharing work. But it reflects the compelling political realities of today. Creating vital transparency, It would also mirror the necessary process in the Dail and enable parallel debates to take place.
The report seems to imply the neutrality of the United Kingdom government in the campaign and run up. This is not necessarily so. The legal obligation to facilitate the process with strict impartiality does not rule out GB parties campaigning for either desired result. Although they have no role in deciding Irish unity they have powerful interests in the future of the UK. GB parties have held different formal positions on Irish unity since partition. Why should they abandon them at a possible point of decision?
The formal campaign period would need to prescribed in synch north and south and indeed UK wide. But campaigning in various forms will go on for years. When has it ever stopped? I see no likelihood of an agreement to impose purdah other than in the narrowest sense of specifically banning financial incentives from either government which would immediately recall the rampant bribery of the politics that created the Unions of 1707 and 1801.
Unitary or federal state? The policies for a model of unity strongly resemble the existing reform agenda within NI, suggesting that a federal Ireland might be preferable. Debate on change consequent on unity is constant within the North, but is much less so within the present Republic where for instance an NHS on the UK model would involve significant change. A federal state is accommodated in the design of the GFA, would be easier to implement and would preserve a distinct role for unionists. All Ireland policy reform on the health service and other matters would not be precluded.
The reports hints that violence or the threat of violence should not frustrate the implementation of either result in a northern referendum. This is an important principle for all parties specifically to assert in advance of the referendums, consistent with the GFA principle of “exclusively peaceful means” for conducting politics. However discreet but comprehensive preparations should be made by the two governments with UKG taking prime responsibility to counter the possibility of serious disruption. Almost certainly though, there will be no repetition of events from 1912 to 1922. On the other hand, if anxiety was raised over the possibility of violence in the event of a hard Brexit border, would the threat be any less at the prospect of no constitutional border at all? And where are the ideas for countering a formal or informal unionist boycott?
Worryingly no consideration has been given on the impact of a change of sovereignty on tackling the legacy of the Troubles. This is unlikely to have been settled within the decade.
Supporters of unity could probably afford to lose a referendum in each jurisdiction unless the unity vote was derisory. Principles for holding a second series at a later date should be considered and should surely differ from the first.
Possible scenarios littered with elephant traps are many more than are discussed here. To achieve some sort of coherence for political parties bitterly divided on the issue and two sovereign governments, the Working Group has set clear principles of procedure and standards of political conduct. This is not a negligible achievement. But it is not even the end of the beginning. The really difficult stage begins when they receive the responses to their modest proposal.
.


sluggerotoole--2020-12-01--Blue sky thinking on political reform long overdue at Assembly

Sam McBride writes in the Newsletter this week about potential political reform at Stormont and believes that the “ idea that a voluntary coalition would automatically mean Sinn Féin ’ s exclusion from government is outdated.
” Of course that all depends on whose bums are on Stormont seats and what mechanisms govern the legislature .
However as recent elections show there are some changes to voting patterns and the political environment in the north that add credibility to that argument .
The north is now effectively 3 minorities reflected in the Assembly as unionist , nationalist and a smaller @ @ @ @ @ @ @ McCallister proposed a Private Members Bill that would have replaced the Petition of Concern and ended the designation system of ‘ unionist ’ , ‘ nationalist ’ and ‘ other ’ .
It was voted down and no significant legislation on reform have come before the Assembly since .
There is obvious public opposition to how the Petition of Concern is currently framed and the blocking mechanisms that we have seen deployed at Executive level .
Clearly reform and alternative minority protections need to be given further consideration .
A welcome development is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not been deployed as often as in previous mandates but its hardly a direct comparison given the context within the Assembly has had to operate for much of this year .
With the reduction in the number of MLAs from 110 down to 90 in 2017 we now have a situation where no one party can trigger a Petition of Concern .
This opens up a number of possibilities in this mandate , especially for private members ’ legislation that comes from within the Assembly and not through the Executive where it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Indeed the current Assembly without the deployment of the Petition of Concern mirrors Belfast City Council in that Alliance effectively hold the balance of power between the unionist and nationalist blocs .
This could reduce the amount of legislation that gets gridlocked in the Assembly which is to be welcome .
On the other hand the legislative timetable until 2022 is likely to be overflowing with Coronavirus and Brexit related business that will mean that much planned legislation may not get to be aired .
The Equality Commission issued a briefing document @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ‘ St Andrews Veto ’ within the Executive .
Introduced in 2006 the veto “ changed how Executive decisions were taken by introducing a process where three ministers ( without any criteria ) can require a NI Executive decision to be taken on a ‘ cross community basis ’ , rather than by a simple majority.
” The Commission is also critical of the way the PoC has been deployed : “ The Petition of Concern to date in practice has therefore not been linked , as intended , to compliance with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In the absence of this it instead became a veto exercisable without criteria by unionist and nationalist designated MLAs , with votes of ‘ others ’ not counting.
” McBride is right to say that “ what is driving people away from mandatory coalition is its failure to deliver good government.
” Blame will be put on different parties at different times in regard to who is responsible for that but ultimately there is a high degree of systemic failure .
You can not do the same thing over and over again and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to see a systematic solution that includes minority safeguards but removes the potential of gridlock and paralysis that we have seen in recent years .
Recent events in the Executive have helped reignite the public scepticism and frustration that we saw in the run-up to the signing of ‘ New Decade New Approach ’ ( NDNA ) .
Political reform should be debated more within parties and between parties as they need to take into account the fact that we have a changing society and the changing expectations of the electorate , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of government gridlock and failures , whether justified or not , could well have a huge impact on the results of the next Assembly election .

Sam McBride writes in the News Letter this week about potential political reform at Stormont and believes that the “idea that a voluntary coalition would automatically mean Sinn Féin’s exclusion from government is outdated.”
Of course that all depends on whose bums are on Stormont seats and what mechanisms govern the legislature. However as recent elections show there are some changes to voting patterns and the political environment in the north that add credibility to that argument. The north is now effectively 3 minorities reflected in the Assembly as unionist, nationalist and a smaller but growing other.
In 2016 John McCallister proposed a Private Members Bill that would have replaced the Petition of Concern and ended the designation system of ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ and ‘other’.
It was voted down and no significant legislation on reform have come before the Assembly since.
There is obvious public opposition to how the Petition of Concern is currently framed and the blocking mechanisms that we have seen deployed at Executive level. Clearly reform and alternative minority protections need to be given further consideration.
A welcome development is the fact that Petitions of Concern have not been deployed as often as in previous mandates but its hardly a direct comparison given the context within the Assembly has had to operate for much of this year.
With the reduction in the number of MLAs from 110 down to 90 in 2017 we now have a situation where no one party can trigger a Petition of Concern. This opens up a number of possibilities in this mandate, especially for private members’ legislation that comes from within the Assembly and not through the Executive where it could be more easily stopped in its tracks.
Indeed the current Assembly without the deployment of the Petition of Concern mirrors Belfast City Council in that Alliance effectively hold the balance of power between the unionist and nationalist blocs.
This could reduce the amount of legislation that gets gridlocked in the Assembly which is to be welcome. On the other hand the legislative timetable until 2022 is likely to be overflowing with Coronavirus and Brexit related business that will mean that much planned legislation may not get to be aired.
The Equality Commission issued a briefing document in response to the recent use of the ‘St Andrews Veto’ within the Executive. Introduced in 2006 the veto “changed how Executive decisions were taken by introducing a process where three ministers (without any criteria) can require a NI Executive decision to be taken on a ‘cross community basis’, rather than by a simple majority.”
The Commission is also critical of the way the PoC has been deployed :
“The Petition of Concern to date in practice has therefore not been linked, as intended, to compliance with the ECHR and Bill of Rights. In the absence of this it instead became a veto exercisable without criteria by unionist and nationalist designated MLAs, with votes of ‘others’ not counting.”
McBride is right to say that “what is driving people away from mandatory coalition is its failure to deliver good government.”
Blame will be put on different parties at different times in regard to who is responsible for that but ultimately there is a high degree of systemic failure. You cannot do the same thing over and over again and expect different results.
The public want to see a systematic solution that includes minority safeguards but removes the potential of gridlock and paralysis that we have seen in recent years.
Recent events in the Executive have helped reignite the public scepticism and frustration that we saw in the run-up to the signing of ‘New Decade New Approach’ (NDNA).
Political reform should be debated more within parties and between parties as they need to take into account the fact that we have a changing society and the changing expectations of the electorate, especially new and younger voters.
The perception of government gridlock and failures, whether justified or not, could well have a huge impact on the results of the next Assembly election.
Some blue sky thinking is long overdue.


sluggerotoole--2020-12-01--Dominic Cummings, the limitations of excellence and the need for societal re-imagination

Brilliant analysis ( H/T John ) from Sam Freeman who worked with Dominic Cummings in Whitehall , firstly on why some the rigidity of what Cummings complained about is actually grounded in reality ( and has the same overworking into the Irish Civil Service too , never mind the NICS ) … Whitehall is still overly attached to a model whereby high-flying generalists are moved too frequently between different policy areas ; where technical specialists are kept out of decision-making ; and where hierarchies are rigidly enforced .
These more justified Cummings ’ criticisms are not new .
Lord Fulton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , back in 1968 , noted the lack of specialists , particularly those with scientific training , in key roles ; the tendency to rely on generalists and the absence of modern project management techniques .
Whatever else he is I ’ ve always deferred to Cummings on his understanding of the speed at which technology is changing the social and commercial environments , but I ’ ve also taken the view that his idea of speeding government up almost at all costs was an enticing but wrong way forward .
Sam thinks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] the lack of incentive within the civil service to reform .
But there ’ s another , bigger reason , that Cummings largely ignores : it suits the way politicians like to work .
The standard ministerial tenure is around two years .
A mere 1 in 10 of the junior ministers appointed in 2010 made it to the end of the Parliament .
Given the limited time they have to make an impact the last thing politicians want is a machinery that is geared to long-term , expert-driven , and evidence-based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reason why all of Cummings ’ treasured examples of high-performance either come from the American military ( Manhattan Project ; DARPA ) or single party states like Singapore or China .
They are typically long-term , highly technical programmes , undertaken with no or minimal public transparency , and with the role of politician limited to signing cheques .
The absence of any major social reforms from his analysis of success is something of a warning sign that what he wants is not in fact possible , certainly within the confines of British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cummings ’ worldview is the refusal to see the contradiction between his technocratic utopia of expert scientists driving paradigmatic change and his own rock-solid conviction that whatever policies he happens to support right now must be implemented at maximum speed .
For all his demands for a scientific approach to government not a single policy either of us worked on at the DfE had been properly evaluated through , for example , a randomised control trial , because they were rolled out nationally without any piloting .
In technocrat utopia a major policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been phased in such a way as to allow for evaluation .
In the real-world huge amounts of capital ( real and political ) were spent arguing academies were the way forward , so the suggestion that they might not work couldn ’ t be countenanced .
So rather than breaking with the past Cummings was pushing new technocratic models of governance without ever considering testing them ( disciplined pluralism ) to see if they work .
If nothing else it shows Dom was a man in hurry , who had little time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or any ability to speak ‘ human ’ .
Underneath it all was the sense that we all ‘ know the model ’ so there is no need for trial and error process by which we gradually improve the world ( if we are so minded ) , with , as Collier and Kay put it , our “ distinctive capacity for imaginative and creative play ” .
To the technocrat par excellence Cummings , this means nothing .
We are , at the end of the day , more than just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As I noted in the Irish Times podcast , deliberation works by creating imaginative and intellectual spaces that weren ’ t there before .
As innately communitarian creatures we need to meet face to face to develop our common purposes .

Brilliant analysis (H/T John) from Sam Freeman who worked with Dominic Cummings in Whitehall, firstly on why some the rigidity of what Cummings complained about is actually grounded in reality (and has the same overworking into the Irish Civil Service too, never mind the NICS)…
Whitehall is still overly attached to a model whereby high-flying generalists are moved too frequently between different policy areas; where technical specialists are kept out of decision-making; and where hierarchies are rigidly enforced. These more justified Cummings’ criticisms are not new. Lord Fulton’s report on the civil service, back in 1968, noted the lack of specialists, particularly those with scientific training, in key roles; the tendency to rely on generalists and the absence of modern project management techniques.
Whatever else he is I’ve always deferred to Cummings on his understanding of the speed at which technology is changing the social and commercial environments, but I’ve also taken the view that his idea of speeding government up almost at all costs was an enticing but wrong way forward. Sam thinks so too:
…[there is] the lack of incentive within the civil service to reform. But there’s another, bigger reason, that Cummings largely ignores: it suits the way politicians like to work. The standard ministerial tenure is around two years. A mere 1 in 10 of the junior ministers appointed in 2010 made it to the end of the Parliament. Given the limited time they have to make an impact the last thing politicians want is a machinery that is geared to long-term, expert-driven, and evidence-based policy making. There’s a reason why all of Cummings’ treasured examples of high-performance either come from the American military (Manhattan Project; DARPA) or single party states like Singapore or China. They are typically long-term, highly technical programmes, undertaken with no or minimal public transparency, and with the role of politician limited to signing cheques. The absence of any major social reforms from his analysis of success is something of a warning sign that what he wants is not in fact possible, certainly within the confines of British democracy. The truly baffling thing about Cummings’ worldview is the refusal to see the contradiction between his technocratic utopia of expert scientists driving paradigmatic change and his own rock-solid conviction that whatever policies he happens to support right now must be implemented at maximum speed. For all his demands for a scientific approach to government not a single policy either of us worked on at the DfE had been properly evaluated through, for example, a randomised control trial, because they were rolled out nationally without any piloting. In technocrat utopia a major policy like the introduction of academies would have been phased in such a way as to allow for evaluation. In the real-world huge amounts of capital (real and political) were spent arguing academies were the way forward, so the suggestion that they might not work couldn’t be countenanced.
So rather than breaking with the past Cummings was pushing new technocratic models of governance without ever considering testing them (disciplined pluralism) to see if they work. If nothing else it shows Dom was a man in hurry, who had little time to listen to the counsel of others, or any ability to speak ‘human’.
Underneath it all was the sense that we all ‘know the model’ so there is no need for trial and error process by which we gradually improve the world (if we are so minded), with, as Collier and Kay put it, our “distinctive capacity for imaginative and creative play”. To the technocrat par excellence Cummings, this means nothing.
We are, at the end of the day, more than just expressive individuals shouting on the internet. As I noted in the Irish Times podcast, deliberation works by creating imaginative and intellectual spaces that weren’t there before. As innately communitarian creatures we need to meet face to face to develop our common purposes.


sluggerotoole--2020-12-02--Might a Peace Plan be part of the Unfinished Business of Reconciliation?

That was the question posed by Dympna McGlade at a recent discussion arranged by the John & Pat Hume Foundation .
The vice chair of the Civil Rights 50th Anniversary Committee remarked : Since the Belfast Agreement we ’ ve had … • The New Decade – New Approach Deal ( January 2020 ) • Running alongside these we have had a series of community and good relations research , policies and strategies : • And the current -Together : Building A United Community ( T : BUC ) strategy ( 2013 ) “ Apart from tinkering around the edges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ terminologies and trendy new ways to record output , I question the impact of all these policies on the areas worst affected by the conflict .
“ Each new government policy/strategy designed to build the peace tends to water down terminology and aspirations so much so that they lean more towards community and economic development rather than peace and reconciliation .
“ Therefore , I suggest that we move to the next phase of the peace process and produce a Peace Plan for the current time we are in : no fancy title @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and to the point ‘ peace and reconciliation speak ’ that people on the street will understand and hopefully buy into and participate in.
” In her address , Dympna outlined how “ the politics of blame and disagreement ” have hampered the once favourable conditions to build a lasting peace .
She called on politicians to “ become leaders and champions in peace building , working collectively rather than as mini fiefdoms ” and to take responsibility to the whole of society and not just their electoral base .
A Peace Plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace is being delivered , and build on what has been achieved to date .
As well as a strategic framework and dedicated resources , it must include “ a robust way to monitor progress to ensure we keep moving positively forward towards a united multicultural society ” and “ agreement to hear and act upon expert external advice ” .
While Executive must deliver on its agreements and not undermine them – citing the example of ‘ shared housing ’ projects that were quickly owned by one side of the community – @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was a “ vital ingredient to successful peace building ” .
She said that approaches to legacy issues “ have been piecemeal and need to be addressed in a time bound , inclusive , well-resourced plan to address all the issues contained in the Fresh Start Implementation Plan ” .
And she underscored the role of paramilitaries in impeding progress .
“ If people moving away from paramilitary groups want to be involved in the transformation of society , then they must fit in with legitimate community plans as many of their colleagues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has elapsed , enough education , training and funding given , and plenty of consideration to the plight of paramilitary groups .
They have a responsibility to disband , discontinue violence and give up control within communities .
It is time to move on boys .
And politicians and the police have a responsibility to make this happen.
” “ Reconciliation is the beating heart of the peace process .
Reconciliation and peace building shouldn ’ t be a chore .
Nor should it be complicated .
It should be as euphoric and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Friday Agreement was .
“ Northern Ireland needs to make its mind up about what it now expects from the peace process .
We can either push peacebuilding down under the weight of Brexit , COVID , recession and any other crisis you care to name , or we can develop a long term roadmap for the direction of travel in respect of policy interventions to deliver a shared , reconciled and multicultural society .
If we choose to move forward then we need long-term intervention and political and civic commitment .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government with an opportunity to build on the strong foundation that have and push forward on addressing the outstanding issues and how to tackle them .
“ John Hume said : ‘ The real duty now , if we want to have a totally peaceful and stable country , is for all true democrats to implement the will of the people.
’ As Bill Clinton said : ‘ finish the job ’ .
” Eileen Bell ( network coordinator at Shankill Women ’ s Centre ) and Duncan Morrow ( director of community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the paper in a discussion chaired by Dawn Purvis ( board member of the Hume Foundation ) .
The hour long event was one of a number that is being organised , with another look at the Unfinished Business of Reconciliation being recorded in Derry next week .

That was the question posed by Dympna McGlade at a recent discussion arranged by the John & Pat Hume Foundation. The vice chair of the Civil Rights 50th Anniversary Committee remarked:
“The Northern Ireland Executive is obsessed with agreements, but not necessarily their full implementation.”
Since the Belfast Agreement we’ve had …
St Andrews agreement (2007)
Hillsborough Agreement (2010)
Stormont House Agreement (2014)
Fresh Start Implementation Plan (2015)
The New Decade – New Approach Deal (January 2020)
Have I missed any?
Running alongside these we have had a series of community and good relations research, policies and strategies:
Review of Community Relations Policy by Jeremy Harbison (2002),
Shared Future Policy (2005)
Racial Equality Strategy (2005 and updated on 2015)
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration Strategy (2010)
And the current -Together: Building A United Community (T:BUC) strategy (2013)
“Apart from tinkering around the edges and creating lots of new buzzwords and terminologies and trendy new ways to record output, I question the impact of all these policies on the areas worst affected by the conflict. “Each new government policy/strategy designed to build the peace tends to water down terminology and aspirations so much so that they lean more towards community and economic development rather than peace and reconciliation. “Therefore, I suggest that we move to the next phase of the peace process and produce a Peace Plan for the current time we are in: no fancy title; … no confusing terminology; simple and to the point ‘peace and reconciliation speak’ that people on the street will understand and hopefully buy into and participate in.”
In her address, Dympna outlined how “the politics of blame and disagreement” have hampered the once favourable conditions to build a lasting peace.
She called on politicians to “become leaders and champions in peace building, working collectively rather than as mini fiefdoms” and to take responsibility to the whole of society and not just their electoral base.
A Peace Plan should reflect the current context in which peace is being delivered, and build on what has been achieved to date. As well as a strategic framework and dedicated resources, it must include “a robust way to monitor progress to ensure we keep moving positively forward towards a united multicultural society” and “agreement to hear and act upon expert external advice”.
While Executive must deliver on its agreements and not undermine them – citing the example of ‘shared housing’ projects that were quickly owned by one side of the community – Dympna also highlighted that broad civic engagement was a “vital ingredient to successful peace building”.
“Voluntary and community groups should have the right to give their honest opinion and recommendations to government without fear of losing their funding or being side-lined when it runs contrary to political views.”
She said that approaches to legacy issues “have been piecemeal and need to be addressed in a time bound, inclusive, well-resourced plan to address all the issues contained in the Fresh Start Implementation Plan”.
“Until legacy of the past issues are tackled they will continue to cause disagreement, division and hinder political progress, reconciliation and economic growth.”
And she underscored the role of paramilitaries in impeding progress.
“If people moving away from paramilitary groups want to be involved in the transformation of society, then they must fit in with legitimate community plans as many of their colleagues have successfully achieved. “Enough time has elapsed, enough education, training and funding given, and plenty of consideration to the plight of paramilitary groups. They have a responsibility to disband, discontinue violence and give up control within communities. It is time to move on boys. And politicians and the police have a responsibility to make this happen.”
She finished:
“Reconciliation is the beating heart of the peace process. Reconciliation and peace building shouldn’t be a chore. Nor should it be complicated. It should be as euphoric and exciting as the signing of the Good Friday Agreement was. “Northern Ireland needs to make its mind up about what it now expects from the peace process. We can either push peacebuilding down under the weight of Brexit, COVID, recession and any other crisis you care to name, or we can develop a long term roadmap for the direction of travel in respect of policy interventions to deliver a shared, reconciled and multicultural society. If we choose to move forward then we need long-term intervention and political and civic commitment. “The next phase peace plan will provide government with an opportunity to build on the strong foundation that have and push forward on addressing the outstanding issues and how to tackle them. “John Hume said: ‘The real duty now, if we want to have a totally peaceful and stable country, is for all true democrats to implement the will of the people.’ As Bill Clinton said: ‘finish the job’.”
Eileen Bell (network coordinator at Shankill Women’s Centre) and Duncan Morrow (director of community engagement at Ulster University) responded to the paper in a discussion chaired by Dawn Purvis (board member of the Hume Foundation).
The hour long event was one of a number that is being organised, with another look at the Unfinished Business of Reconciliation being recorded in Derry next week.