sluggerotoole--2020-04-16--Complacent Assumptions vs Political Reality: a border poll is not inevitable…

Following the vote for Brexit in 2016 , a persistent media drumbeat has highlighted the enhanced likelihood of a future border poll – a referendum for a United Ireland .
Many Irish nationalists , noting the changing demographics and loss of Unionism ’ s political majority , have already priced it in .
But is this assumption complacent , and if it does happen what are the consequences ?
The key to unlocking a border poll is the view of the people who live in Northern Ireland ( the Republic are already persuaded – a 2019 poll indicated 65 % @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which brings this voice to life is the Good Friday Agreement , which states the Secretary of State should call a referendum “ if it appears likely that a majority of voters would express a wish to form a United Ireland.
” To date most NI polls have indicated a small majority against a border poll , which has led the UK Government to declare the conditions for a vote are “ not remotely satisfied.
” In all probability the UK will only call a border poll if there is majority support in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ installed 40 Unionist seats , 39 Nationalists , and 11 others .
Of the main parties only Sinn Fein support an immediate border poll .
The SDLP , with 12 seats , have adopted it as a medium-term policy , allowing time to bring Unionists into the conversation .
The Alliance , with 8 seats , are unpersuaded as they want to focus on making NI work .
The 40 Unionists would naturally vote against .
In other words , if there was a vote for a Border Poll tomorrow it would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SF/PBP ) .
The UK Government ’ s current assessment appears to be justified .
But could this position be vulnerable to sudden change ?
Much has been made of changing demographics .
Using religion as a ( albeit imperfect ) proxy for voting intentions Unionism faces long term decline .
In 1920 over 60 % of births were Protestant ; in 2020 this has fallen to less than 30 % .
While this is a sobering statistic for Unionists it is worth noting that the biggest beneficiary of this change is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ % of recent births , but no religion or not stated .
This new secular constituency will not vote on a tribal basis but on future opportunities .
In recent years it is no surprise that progressive parties , such as Alliance and Green , have been most successful in growing their vote .
In addition , while 9 out of 10 protestants traditionally vote to remain in the UK , Catholic voting intentions are more diverse .
A 2017 poll suggested that 37 % would still vote to stay in the UK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Ireland inevitable .
There are two main scenarios that will unlock the politics for a border poll ( and I am assuming that a positive vote in the Assembly will satisfy the conditions of the GFA , and legally require the SoS to call a referendum ) .
• At a future Assembly election there is a substantial increase in the nationalist vote which increases their seats from 39 to 46 or greater .
This is combined with a change in SDLP policy to request an immediate border poll .
• Both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an immediate referendum is in the best interests of Northern Ireland and join with Sinn Fein to vote it through .
The nationalist vote , which marshalled its base successfully at the last Assembly , already had a substantial boost between the 2016 and 2017 elections .
This fact , combined with the increasingly diverse nature of our demographics and SDLP ’ s current policy position , does not make option 1 appear likely for the foreseeable future .
At the current point in time option 2 would also mark a significant step @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular ) .
There is no indication that either party is considering this type of change , so option 2 also seems to have limited prospects in the short to medium term .
But Northern Ireland , and the wider social , economic and cultural environment that it operates in , is changing fast and this debate will not go away .
To find a resolution the issue needs to be taken beyond party politics .
The leader ( s ) who can create a broad-based coalition of interests – a wider social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a compelling and inclusive vision that benefits all of our people , will be the leader ( s ) who shapes the destiny of this region .
This vision could either be UK based – focusing perhaps on advantages such as the NHS and the strong financial and cultural benefits ; or it could be a vision for a New Ireland , whose potential benefits include re-entry into the EU and the ability of local parties to genuinely shape our social and economic futures as coalition partners within a sovereign government .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ shaped by external events .
What if post-Brexit arrangements , combined with economic damage following Coronavirus , plunge the region into a great depression ?
In this scenario perhaps re-entry into the EU and a share of the Republic ’ s international investment is seen as a way out .
Or what if Scotland , which already has the backing of its Parliament , secures a new referendum and becomes independent ?
And if a new wave of progressive voters start to demand a similar choice would SDLP and Alliance policy change ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a border poll has been secured following the next Assembly elections , and I will identify four potential outcomes than an early referendum could produce .
The year is 2023 .
Northern Ireland is in deep economic recession following Brexit and Coronavirus .
The UK Government has finally allowed Scotland another referendum , and the NI Assembly has voted to give its citizens the opportunity to participate in a border poll too .
So , what happens next ?
{ NB : it is assumed an Assembly vote will meet the legislative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SoS to call a referendum – see my last post “ A border poll is not inevitable ” for a wider discussion } In a scenario where a border poll is agreed there are essentially four main outcomes .
In all but one scenario I will assume the Republic votes yes , in line with current opinion polling data .
Scenario 1 : Northern Ireland votes to remain in the UK .
Life appears to continue as normal and the GFA stipulation , prohibiting a new referendum for 7 years , resolves the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in reality , the vote changes northern politics for good : 1a ) Despite their win the border poll shocks Unionism , who agree to reform Northern Ireland and reach out to other groups as never before .
The reforms go far enough to satisfy disparate traditions and social groups , the UK government pledges continuing support , and as a result momentum for a future border poll is lost .
The referendum is not repeated for a generation .
1b ) There is insufficient reform and lack of action from Unionists to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with nationalists who continue coalition building and debate .
Northern Ireland continues to degenerate in comparison with a newly independent Scotland and the Republic of Ireland .
A border poll is repeated in 2030 and this time a cross community electorate support a United Ireland .
Scenario 2 : Northern Ireland narrowly votes to leave the UK and join a United Ireland .
Having agreed that 50 % plus 1 is the only voting model that will carry democratic legitimacy , the UK has no option but to respect a waver thin victory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been insufficient consensus building amongst the Unionist / Loyalist community and it leads to civil unrest with a range of potential outcomes : 2b ) There has been insufficient groundwork on what a New Ireland , along with its governance and institutions , should look like .
There is sharp disagreement between maintaining a devolved NI Assembly or creating a unitary state .
There is confusion over voting models , the powers of the legislature , the role of cities , and the size and shape of Local Councils ( which are very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has thought about the role of the Civil Service , including the trade-off between a smaller , integrated and more effective All-Ireland service , versus the short-term job losses and economic damage a rationalised service would create in the North .
There is no consensus over the shape of the health service , policing and Courts , armed services , or support for culture and traditions .
Although all these issues are agreed over time it is a messy and inefficient process that creates sub-optimal solutions .
This harms the social and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcomes for all its citizens , North and South .
Scenario 3 : Northern Ireland votes yes , but the Republic votes no .
Concerned that there has been insufficient groundwork and consensus building , and anxious that the successful Republic will be dragged down by its northern neighbour , the south votes no .
This causes a nationalist backlash and potentially encourages fringe groups to claim that democracy has failed , and further violence is justified .
Both North and South are destabilised for years to come and a future referendum is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is defeated .
The possibility of a Sinn Fein led government in Dublin also increases .
The NI Assembly votes for a border poll , but in an unusual degree of cross-party consensus and foresight agrees that it should be delayed for three years .
Working alongside Dublin a series of Civic Forums and Citizen Assemblies are set up North and South to consider future governance models .
Professional consultancy is commissioned to assesses what health , education and other services would look like in a New Ireland , or in a reformed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
An informed vote leads to better outcomes for all citizens and a proper debate adds credibility to the result , settling the issue one way or another for at least a generation , if not for good .
This is a hypothetical referendum , but the same scenarios could apply to a genuine border poll , whether it takes place in 2023 or at some indeterminate point in the future .
Without proper planning most of the potential outcomes to a border poll would be negative , and some would inflict permanent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the time for an immediate border poll .
However , it is time for genuine cross party and cross community engagement .
Whatever your perspective on a United Ireland now is the time for deep rooted and informed thinking about what a referendum might actually mean .
Photo by bongkarn thanyakij is licensed under CC0

Following the vote for Brexit in 2016, a persistent media drumbeat has highlighted the enhanced likelihood of a future border poll – a referendum for a United Ireland. Many Irish nationalists, noting the changing demographics and loss of Unionism’s political majority, have already priced it in. But is this assumption complacent, and if it does happen what are the consequences?
The key to unlocking a border poll is the view of the people who live in Northern Ireland (the Republic are already persuaded – a 2019 poll indicated 65% would vote yes). The legislation which brings this voice to life is the Good Friday Agreement, which states the Secretary of State should call a referendum “if it appears likely that a majority of voters would express a wish to form a United Ireland.” To date most NI polls have indicated a small majority against a border poll, which has led the UK Government to declare the conditions for a vote are “not remotely satisfied.”
In all probability the UK will only call a border poll if there is majority support in the Assembly. In 2017 the electorate installed 40 Unionist seats, 39 Nationalists, and 11 others. Of the main parties only Sinn Fein support an immediate border poll. The SDLP, with 12 seats, have adopted it as a medium-term policy, allowing time to bring Unionists into the conversation. The Alliance, with 8 seats, are unpersuaded as they want to focus on making NI work. The 40 Unionists would naturally vote against. In other words, if there was a vote for a Border Poll tomorrow it would be defeated by 62 votes to 28 (SF/PBP). The UK Government’s current assessment appears to be justified.
But could this position be vulnerable to sudden change?
Much has been made of changing demographics. Using religion as a (albeit imperfect) proxy for voting intentions Unionism faces long term decline. In 1920 over 60% of births were Protestant; in 2020 this has fallen to less than 30%.
While this is a sobering statistic for Unionists it is worth noting that the biggest beneficiary of this change is not Catholic, who record less than 45% of recent births, but no religion or not stated. This new secular constituency will not vote on a tribal basis but on future opportunities. In recent years it is no surprise that progressive parties, such as Alliance and Green, have been most successful in growing their vote.
In addition, while 9 out of 10 protestants traditionally vote to remain in the UK, Catholic voting intentions are more diverse. A 2017 poll suggested that 37% would still vote to stay in the UK. Changing demographics do not make a United Ireland inevitable.
There are two main scenarios that will unlock the politics for a border poll (and I am assuming that a positive vote in the Assembly will satisfy the conditions of the GFA, and legally require the SoS to call a referendum).
At a future Assembly election there is a substantial increase in the nationalist vote which increases their seats from 39 to 46 or greater. This is combined with a change in SDLP policy to request an immediate border poll. Both the Alliance and SDLP are persuaded that an immediate referendum is in the best interests of Northern Ireland and join with Sinn Fein to vote it through.
The nationalist vote, which marshalled its base successfully at the last Assembly, already had a substantial boost between the 2016 and 2017 elections. This fact, combined with the increasingly diverse nature of our demographics and SDLP’s current policy position, does not make option 1 appear likely for the foreseeable future. At the current point in time option 2 would also mark a significant step change in policy (for Alliance in particular). There is no indication that either party is considering this type of change, so option 2 also seems to have limited prospects in the short to medium term.
But Northern Ireland, and the wider social, economic and cultural environment that it operates in, is changing fast and this debate will not go away.
To find a resolution the issue needs to be taken beyond party politics. The leader(s) who can create a broad-based coalition of interests – a wider social and political movement – and ally this with a compelling and inclusive vision that benefits all of our people, will be the leader(s) who shapes the destiny of this region. This vision could either be UK based – focusing perhaps on advantages such as the NHS and the strong financial and cultural benefits; or it could be a vision for a New Ireland, whose potential benefits include re-entry into the EU and the ability of local parties to genuinely shape our social and economic futures as coalition partners within a sovereign government.
Another alternative is Northern Ireland simply gets shaped by external events. What if post-Brexit arrangements, combined with economic damage following Coronavirus, plunge the region into a great depression? In this scenario perhaps re-entry into the EU and a share of the Republic’s international investment is seen as a way out. Or what if Scotland, which already has the backing of its Parliament, secures a new referendum and becomes independent? And if a new wave of progressive voters start to demand a similar choice would SDLP and Alliance policy change?
In my next post I will assume that a border poll has been secured following the next Assembly elections, and I will identify four potential outcomes than an early referendum could produce.
The United Ireland Referendum of 2023.
The year is 2023. Northern Ireland is in deep economic recession following Brexit and Coronavirus. The UK Government has finally allowed Scotland another referendum, and the NI Assembly has voted to give its citizens the opportunity to participate in a border poll too. So, what happens next?
{NB: it is assumed an Assembly vote will meet the legislative test in the GFA and require the SoS to call a referendum – see my last post “A border poll is not inevitable” for a wider discussion}
In a scenario where a border poll is agreed there are essentially four main outcomes. In all but one scenario I will assume the Republic votes yes, in line with current opinion polling data.
Scenario 1: Northern Ireland votes to remain in the UK.
Life appears to continue as normal and the GFA stipulation, prohibiting a new referendum for 7 years, resolves the matter in the short term. But in reality, the vote changes northern politics for good:
1a) Despite their win the border poll shocks Unionism, who agree to reform Northern Ireland and reach out to other groups as never before. The reforms go far enough to satisfy disparate traditions and social groups, the UK government pledges continuing support, and as a result momentum for a future border poll is lost. The referendum is not repeated for a generation.
1b) There is insufficient reform and lack of action from Unionists to build an inclusive society. This contrasts with nationalists who continue coalition building and debate. Northern Ireland continues to degenerate in comparison with a newly independent Scotland and the Republic of Ireland. A border poll is repeated in 2030 and this time a cross community electorate support a United Ireland.
Scenario 2: Northern Ireland narrowly votes to leave the UK and join a United Ireland.
Having agreed that 50% plus 1 is the only voting model that will carry democratic legitimacy, the UK has no option but to respect a waver thin victory for leave.
2a) There has been insufficient consensus building amongst the Unionist / Loyalist community and it leads to civil unrest with a range of potential outcomes:
Short Term Long Term High Impact There is a violent insurgency which is only defeated after significant loss of life. The legacy of violence creates longer term unrest. Brutal civil war only resolved via truncated independent Ulster. Quality of life plummets. Low level violence permeates island & relations in deep freeze. Low Impact The unrest has minimal support. After a short period it is supressed, and violent groups disband. Ongoing low-level unrest. This is contained but it destabilises the economy and society of Ireland over the longer term.
2b) There has been insufficient groundwork on what a New Ireland, along with its governance and institutions, should look like. There is sharp disagreement between maintaining a devolved NI Assembly or creating a unitary state. There is confusion over voting models, the powers of the legislature, the role of cities, and the size and shape of Local Councils (which are very different North and South).
Nobody has thought about the role of the Civil Service, including the trade-off between a smaller, integrated and more effective All-Ireland service, versus the short-term job losses and economic damage a rationalised service would create in the North. There is no consensus over the shape of the health service, policing and Courts, armed services, or support for culture and traditions.
Although all these issues are agreed over time it is a messy and inefficient process that creates sub-optimal solutions. This harms the social and economic potential of a New Ireland and diminishes outcomes for all its citizens, North and South.
Scenario 3: Northern Ireland votes yes, but the Republic votes no.
Concerned that there has been insufficient groundwork and consensus building, and anxious that the successful Republic will be dragged down by its northern neighbour, the south votes no. This causes a nationalist backlash and potentially encourages fringe groups to claim that democracy has failed, and further violence is justified.
Both North and South are destabilised for years to come and a future referendum is kicked into the long grass until insurgency is defeated. The possibility of a Sinn Fein led government in Dublin also increases.
Scenario 4: Border Poll delayed in favour of Citizen Assemblies
The NI Assembly votes for a border poll, but in an unusual degree of cross-party consensus and foresight agrees that it should be delayed for three years. Working alongside Dublin a series of Civic Forums and Citizen Assemblies are set up North and South to consider future governance models. Professional consultancy is commissioned to assesses what health, education and other services would look like in a New Ireland, or in a reformed Northern Ireland with island wide shared services.
An informed vote leads to better outcomes for all citizens and a proper debate adds credibility to the result, settling the issue one way or another for at least a generation, if not for good.
This is a hypothetical referendum, but the same scenarios could apply to a genuine border poll, whether it takes place in 2023 or at some indeterminate point in the future. Without proper planning most of the potential outcomes to a border poll would be negative, and some would inflict permanent long-term damage.
In reality now is not the time for an immediate border poll. However, it is time for genuine cross party and cross community engagement. Whatever your perspective on a United Ireland now is the time for deep rooted and informed thinking about what a referendum might actually mean.
Photo by bongkarn thanyakij is licensed under CC0


sluggerotoole--2020-04-16--COVID19 Spread In Both Irelands, the UK and Selected Countries: Cases Rates of Change by County and

COVID19 Spread In Both Irelands, the UK and Selected Countries: Cases Rates of Change by County and Council:

The rate of increase of Covid19 cases on the island seems to be slowing down in the greater Dublin and @ @ @ @ @ , Donegal and Derry & Strabane have had a large rate of increase , as @ @ @ @ @ Also , commuter-belt counties around Dublin-Wicklow have also had increases greater than average .
Dublin @ @ @ @ @ Lisburn & Castlereagh , Cavan , Westmeath , and Monaghan are the only counties or @ @ @ @ @ of the population is above their jurisdictional average .
Further details , and more graphs @ @ @ @ @ at my COVIDWATCH webpage .

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sluggerotoole--2020-01-07--Taxing times at Christmas…

Taxing times at Christmas…

Following the abrupt end to the holiday season , the kids have gone back to school and many of us have begrudgingly returned to work .
The holidays seem but a distant memory .
However , my time off got me thinking about many things and as I stood outside shivering for the non-existent taxi that would never arrive to take me home in the early hours after my single night out during the holidays whilst waiting with the hundreds of other revellers doing the same , it reminded me of my travels across the UK and Europe last year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using an Uber app a taxi would arrive , as I waited in warm comfortable civilised surroundings as a benefit off the late opening of premises in the UK and Europe to the point that I knew the exact second when the taxi would pull up outside the door and no hanging around in the cold .
I also reflected on the paradoxical ( and comical ) scarcity of taxi ’ s and the police campaign telling us that they would be launching their most ambitious anti drink drive campaign ever and I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a difficult job in policing drink driving given the temptation for people do stupid things when they can ’ t get home and have no other options available to them .
The satisfaction and amazement one experiences in the UK and Europe using Uber is something that most who live outside of Belfast will never experience in NI with our highly regulated , anti-competitive and overpriced taxi system , a system so antiquated at having a phone call answered by a taxi firm is a moment of euphoria in itself .
Now combine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state and highly regulated licensing laws which results in everyone and I mean everyone , being put onto the streets at the exactly the same time to compete for what few taxi ’ s are available , many of who are worse for wear due to the culture of binge drinking that has now become engrained in our culture as a result of highly restrictive opening times in licensed premises as patrons try to get as many drinks in as they can .
Again I had not thought too much about this until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GAA has acknowledged that binge drinking is now affecting elite footballers who are only given narrow windows during their footballing careers to have a drinking and socialise .
I want to live in a modern , socially liberal society just as people do in the UK , ROI and Europe , but sadly Northern Ireland is not such a place .
Real change is long overdue .
Our politicians and civil servants could start by treating “ adults ” as funnily enough “ adults ” and reform our licensing laws so they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encourage the adoption of life changing technologies and industries where the benefits of change have been well documented and embraced across the rest of the world and stop trying to prop up time expired protected industries just because of historic political links .
I urge all readers to try the likes of Uber ( other ride hailing apps are available ) the next time they are visiting the UK and Europe as this will be the only way of experiencing first-hand how backward we have become here in Northern Ireland .
My New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ability to hail a cab safely using a ride hailing app at my time of choosing , whilst not being surrounded by worse for wear binge drinkers , but sadly I don ’ t think this will be happening anytime soon .
Photo by MichaelGaida is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA

Following the abrupt end to the holiday season, the kids have gone back to school and many of us have begrudgingly returned to work. The holidays seem but a distant memory.
However, my time off got me thinking about many things and as I stood outside shivering for the non-existent taxi that would never arrive to take me home in the early hours after my single night out during the holidays whilst waiting with the hundreds of other revellers doing the same, it reminded me of my travels across the UK and Europe last year were at the touch of a button using an Uber app a taxi would arrive, as I waited in warm comfortable civilised surroundings as a benefit off the late opening of premises in the UK and Europe to the point that I knew the exact second when the taxi would pull up outside the door and no hanging around in the cold.
I also reflected on the paradoxical (and comical) scarcity of taxi’s and the police campaign telling us that they would be launching their most ambitious anti drink drive campaign ever and I suddenly understood why the police have such a difficult job in policing drink driving given the temptation for people do stupid things when they can’t get home and have no other options available to them.
The satisfaction and amazement one experiences in the UK and Europe using Uber is something that most who live outside of Belfast will never experience in NI with our highly regulated, anti-competitive and overpriced taxi system, a system so antiquated at having a phone call answered by a taxi firm is a moment of euphoria in itself.
Now combine the scarcity of taxis with our nanny state and highly regulated licensing laws which results in everyone and I mean everyone, being put onto the streets at the exactly the same time to compete for what few taxi’s are available, many of who are worse for wear due to the culture of binge drinking that has now become engrained in our culture as a result of highly restrictive opening times in licensed premises as patrons try to get as many drinks in as they can. Again I had not thought too much about this until I read over the holidays that the GAA has acknowledged that binge drinking is now affecting elite footballers who are only given narrow windows during their footballing careers to have a drinking and socialise.
I want to live in a modern, socially liberal society just as people do in the UK, ROI and Europe, but sadly Northern Ireland is not such a place. Real change is long overdue.
Our politicians and civil servants could start by treating “adults” as funnily enough “adults” and reform our licensing laws so they are not as restrictive. They also could encourage the adoption of life changing technologies and industries where the benefits of change have been well documented and embraced across the rest of the world and stop trying to prop up time expired protected industries just because of historic political links.
I urge all readers to try the likes of Uber (other ride hailing apps are available) the next time they are visiting the UK and Europe as this will be the only way of experiencing first-hand how backward we have become here in Northern Ireland.
My New Year’s wish for 2020 is the ability to hail a cab safely using a ride hailing app at my time of choosing, whilst not being surrounded by worse for wear binge drinkers, but sadly I don’t think this will be happening anytime soon.
Photo by MichaelGaida is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA


sluggerotoole--2020-01-07--Commemorating the RIC and allowing an Irish Language Act are opposite sides of the same coin

The Irish government ’ s decision to commemorate the RIC in a major state ceremony is the right one precisely because it is as controversial as it is fundamental .
There is no point in filling an entire decade with an orgy of self congratulation .
The modern Irish state was born in insurgency and revolution is always controversial .
But it is s also a reminder of that the state born out of revolution was part of a much longer continuum that is not about revolution only .
And as Varadkar and Flanagan have pointed out , there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commemorating rather than celebrating people and an institution that was fundamental to Irish life for over a century and is therefore unignorable .
A mature state does not airbrush out its former self .
Plenty in Ireland respect the memory of the routine peacetime functions of the RIC before their role as instruments of state repression dominated and they became ” legitimate targets .
” In some respects insurgency took on civil war characteristics as early as 1916 and certainly from January 1919 .
It is entirely possible to recognise the RIC ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believing that by late 1920 the British presence in most of Ireland had finally forfeited all legitimacy because of state sponsored reprisals .
But it remains a monstrous hypocrisy for supporters of revolution to hold the state to account by its own laws while claiming exemption from those same laws for themselves and their own cruelties .
In this commemoration we get a glimpse of what a fully reconciled Ireland suffused with mutual respect might look like .
As their contribution , a virtuous circle would be created if unionists accepted a well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and not only nationalists want it .
Convert the political weapon to a civilised cause by embracing it .
Personally I would favour the option of basic Irish in all primary schools as part of our indivisible non compulsory culture , with opportunities for development later .
My granddaughter in New Zealand sings Maori songs and writes stories in Maori even though Maoris are only 15 % of the population .
And she takes voluntary Mandarin classes too – all part of enjoying a civilised country ’ s distinctive diversity while at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state ’ s origins .
All this is elementary civic good behaviour which too many of the politically committed have yet to learn .

RTE
The Irish government’s decision to commemorate the RIC in a major state ceremony is the right one precisely because it is as controversial as it is fundamental. There is no point in filling an entire decade with an orgy of self congratulation. The modern Irish state was born in insurgency and revolution is always controversial. But it is s also a reminder of that the state born out of revolution was part of a much longer continuum that is not about revolution only. And as Varadkar and Flanagan have pointed out, there is an important distinction to be made between commemorating rather than celebrating people and an institution that was fundamental to Irish life for over a century and is therefore unignorable. A mature state does not airbrush out its former self. Plenty in Ireland respect the memory of the routine peacetime functions of the RIC before their role as instruments of state repression dominated and they became ” legitimate targets. ” In some respects insurgency took on civil war characteristics as early as 1916 and certainly from January 1919. It is entirely possible to recognise the RIC’s place in Irish life while also believing that by late 1920 the British presence in most of Ireland had finally forfeited all legitimacy because of state sponsored reprisals. But it remains a monstrous hypocrisy for supporters of revolution to hold the state to account by its own laws while claiming exemption from those same laws for themselves and their own cruelties.
In this commemoration we get a glimpse of what a fully reconciled Ireland suffused with mutual respect might look like. As their contribution, a virtuous circle would be created if unionists accepted a well defined Irish Language Act precisely because nationalists and not only nationalists want it. Convert the political weapon to a civilised cause by embracing it. Personally I would favour the option of basic Irish in all primary schools as part of our indivisible non compulsory culture, with opportunities for development later. My granddaughter in New Zealand sings Maori songs and writes stories in Maori even though Maoris are only 15% of the population. And she takes voluntary Mandarin classes too – all part of enjoying a civilised country’s distinctive diversity while at the same time acknowledging uncomfortable facts about the state’s origins.
All this is elementary civic good behaviour which too many of the politically committed have yet to learn.


sluggerotoole--2020-01-06--Parity of esteem: A unionist perspective

I have been a supporter of the Good Friday Agreement since its inception .
I believe many of the mechanisms contained therein are sensible and necessary to manage the divided society we live in , and I accepted the principle of consent as a reasonable compromise in pursuit of a peaceful and democratic society .
Nonetheless , while I have been a fierce advocate of the Agreement , I certainly won ’ t dismiss every criticism levelled at it .
Mandatory coalition , for example , has led to a situation where Stormont has lain dormant for three years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less palatable given the grave problems in our health service and education system .
The petition of concern has also caused considerable controversy in recent years .
The mechanism was a central tenet of the Good Friday Agreement , designed to ensure that “ key decisions ” would be made on a cross-community basis .
This was implemented in response to the concerns of nationalists around the majoritarianism that plagued our society for decades .
However , the mechanism has more recently been condemned as “ undemocratic ” with detractors pointing to decisions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marriage , welfare reform and ministerial accountability .
The Belfast Telegraph on Friday said that reform of the petition of concern remains “ one of several key sticking points ” in the current talks process .
However , while it has unarguably had its difficulties , these are nothing compared to the problems likely without it .
The flag protests showed us first-hand how controversial decisions that disregard cross-community consent can lead to anger , resentment , protests and even violence ; particularly those decisions that relate to identity .
In a 2013 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and parity of esteem should threaten no-one.
” However , they also acknowledge that parity of esteem means different things to different people .
It is these differences that can open up divisions and cause problems .
Reform may be a popular demand , but majoritarianism can manifest itself in so many different ways and areas that it is difficult to decide where exactly the petition of concern should begin and end to ensure adequate protection for all .
The question of whether cross-community consent should extend to Brexit is another question that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is difficult to think of a more significant “ key decision ” than a change to our constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom , something that Boris Johnson ’ s Brexit deal will achieve with a vengeance .
The argument made by nationalists and others is that Brexit itself did not attract cross-community consent , so why should cross-community consent be required for whatever Brexit deal we may have to live with ?
At first glance this is a compelling argument .
However while concerns around a hard border on the island @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brexit negotiations , concerns around a border down the Irish Sea have largely been confined to social media and the occasional mention in the House of Commons .
A violent response has been predicted by some , but even if this does not arise it is not unreasonable to suggest this will impact the peace process given that trust is such an integral part of any political settlement .
With Loyalist communities having been marginalised and the so-called ‘ peace dividend ’ failing to reach many of these same communities , it wouldn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see how this could tip us over the edge .
As a supporter of the Belfast Agreement since its inception I have found it difficult enough to weather that position through the notorious side-deals , comfort letters and royal pardons , notorious killers being set free , unionist culture almost criminalised and Stormont left dormant for three years as Sinn Fein pursue their own agenda .
Many in the unionist community will continue to support peace , but we are limited by realities on the ground in terms of the arguments we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have .
This may not suit Boris Johnson , Leo Varadkar , Michel Barnier and their new Brexit deal , but no community in Northern Ireland should be excluded from these decisions .
Parity of esteem is intrinsic to the Good Friday Agreement that the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland signed up to , and which is now enshrined in international law .
The question remains : what kind of a society do we want to build ?
While the petition of concern should not be used to stifle genuine concerns around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t need to be reminded of the danger of returning to old ways .
Without parity of esteem at all levels there is always the danger that history could repeat itself .
Photo by veve is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA

I have been a supporter of the Good Friday Agreement since its inception.
I believe many of the mechanisms contained therein are sensible and necessary to manage the divided society we live in, and I accepted the principle of consent as a reasonable compromise in pursuit of a peaceful and democratic society.
Nonetheless, while I have been a fierce advocate of the Agreement, I certainly won’t dismiss every criticism levelled at it.
Mandatory coalition, for example, has led to a situation where Stormont has lain dormant for three years, a position that has become less and less palatable given the grave problems in our health service and education system.
The petition of concern has also caused considerable controversy in recent years. The mechanism was a central tenet of the Good Friday Agreement, designed to ensure that “key decisions” would be made on a cross-community basis. This was implemented in response to the concerns of nationalists around the majoritarianism that plagued our society for decades.
However, the mechanism has more recently been condemned as “undemocratic” with detractors pointing to decisions being blocked on issues such as same-sex marriage, welfare reform and ministerial accountability.
The Belfast Telegraph on Friday said that reform of the petition of concern remains “one of several key sticking points” in the current talks process.
However, while it has unarguably had its difficulties, these are nothing compared to the problems likely without it.
The flag protests showed us first-hand how controversial decisions that disregard cross-community consent can lead to anger, resentment, protests and even violence; particularly those decisions that relate to identity.
In a 2013 article, Sinn Fein stated “Equality and parity of esteem should threaten no-one.” However, they also acknowledge that parity of esteem means different things to different people. It is these differences that can open up divisions and cause problems.
Reform may be a popular demand, but majoritarianism can manifest itself in so many different ways and areas that it is difficult to decide where exactly the petition of concern should begin and end to ensure adequate protection for all.
The question of whether cross-community consent should extend to Brexit is another question that has attracted debate in recent months.
It is difficult to think of a more significant “key decision” than a change to our constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom, something that Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal will achieve with a vengeance.
The argument made by nationalists and others is that Brexit itself did not attract cross-community consent, so why should cross-community consent be required for whatever Brexit deal we may have to live with?
At first glance this is a compelling argument.
However while concerns around a hard border on the island of Ireland have been central to the Brexit negotiations, concerns around a border down the Irish Sea have largely been confined to social media and the occasional mention in the House of Commons.
A violent response has been predicted by some, but even if this does not arise it is not unreasonable to suggest this will impact the peace process given that trust is such an integral part of any political settlement.
With Loyalist communities having been marginalised and the so-called ‘peace dividend’ failing to reach many of these same communities, it wouldn’t exactly take Bran Stark to see how this could tip us over the edge.
As a supporter of the Belfast Agreement since its inception I have found it difficult enough to weather that position through the notorious side-deals, comfort letters and royal pardons, notorious killers being set free, unionist culture almost criminalised and Stormont left dormant for three years as Sinn Fein pursue their own agenda.
Many in the unionist community will continue to support peace, but we are limited by realities on the ground in terms of the arguments we can make and the persuasive effects they will have.
This may not suit Boris Johnson, Leo Varadkar, Michel Barnier and their new Brexit deal, but no community in Northern Ireland should be excluded from these decisions.
Parity of esteem is intrinsic to the Good Friday Agreement that the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland signed up to, and which is now enshrined in international law.
The question remains: what kind of a society do we want to build?
While the petition of concern should not be used to stifle genuine concerns around rights and accountability, we shouldn’t need to be reminded of the danger of returning to old ways. Without parity of esteem at all levels there is always the danger that history could repeat itself.
Photo by veve is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA


Fergus on Monday

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sluggerotoole--2020-01-05--What if we re-run the Boundary Commission for 650 MPs, 18 in Northern Ireland?

Rumours started last week suggesting that the newly re-elected British government now plans to drop the current Boundary Commission proposals to cut the House of Commons to 600 MPs , and to start a new revision process which would keep the number of MPs at 650 .
It was always going to be a stretch to get 50 MPs to vote for their own abolition , so I am not at all surprised that this is where we will end up .
Remember that the orignal plans to cut the number of seats by 50 were killed by a disagreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the current proposals got mired in the general Brexit malaise , as well as a particular Northern Ireland wrinkle that I 'll discuss briefly below .
I would expect that any change to the rules will retain the current instruction to the Boundary Commission to make constituency sizes as equal as possible .
There is a real problem with the current situation .
The average size of electorate for a UK constituency is 73,173 voters ; for England , it 's 74,851 , for Scotland it 's 68,696 , for Northern Ireland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This basically means that a Welsh vote is worth 1.29 English votes , in terms of the number of MPs it can elect ; Wales has 40 MPs , but on a proportional basis should have only 32 if the total is 650 .
Scotland is likewise a little over-represented , with 59 MPs rather than the 56 it should have proportionally .
Northern Ireland , with 18 seats , comes out about right .
There is no particularly good historical reason for Welsh over-representation .
No policy decision was ever made for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Boundary Commissions found their maps easier to draw with more seats , and then one thing led to another .
The effect is to help the Labour Party , a little , in that its MPs represent seats with an average electorate of 72,180 , while Conservative MPs have an average electorate of 74,621 .
( Since you asked , for other parties with more than one seat : Lib Dems 68,218 ; SNP 69,678 ; Plaid Cymru 50,095 ; DUP 71,839 ; SF 72,547 ; SDLP 72,165 .
Smaller GB parties , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the status quo . )
So the four Boundary Commissions will likely be tasked to ensure that all seats should in principle be within 5 % of the UK average ( apart from the Isle of Wight and the two Scottish island constituencies ) .
There is some extra wiggle room allowed for Northern Ireland , given the small number of seats and limited space , so seats can vary by 5 % of the Northern Ireland average even if this takes them outside the limit of 5 % of the UK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessary .
A quick aside on this point : I personally urged the Commission not to be shy about invoking this extra flexibility for the last round of revisions , in order to make its own work easier .
The Commission did so for both its revised proposals and its final report , but this was challenged by an anonymous litigant in the courts through judicial review .
The judge found that the Commission was not wrong to invoke the lower limit , but could have explained itself better .
( See here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found that the Commission should have taken responses in the final stage of consultation more seriously than it did , but did not strike down the final proposals , so they stand until parliament rejects them . )
The numbers were particularly brutal last time – this time round , if we are working from December 2019 electorate figures or anything like them , it may well be possible to draw a map that does not need the extra flexibility that is permitted .
Coming back to the main point , what are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government does proceed to direct the Boundary Commissions as described above ?
The first thing to note is that there is already a big problem with the sizes of the 18 constituencies .
If we take the figures for electorate of each seat from the December 2019 election , we can see that East Antrim votes are worth 1.29 as much as Upper Bann votes ( coincidentally , the same ratio as for Wales and England ) .
NB that both East Antrim and Upper Bann are held by the DUP ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smallest seats , in both cases three are held by the DUP and two by SF , so this is n't especially ; a party political issue .
I should add a caveat that we do n't have exactly the right figures to calculate with , so everything below needs to be taken with a pinch of salt .
The Electoral Office has published the parliamentary electorate for the existing 18 seats and for the old electoral wards from which they are constructed ; and the seats will be drawn to match the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British , Irish and Commonwealth citizens can vote in all elections ; citizens of the other 24 EU countries can vote in local and Assembly elections , at least for now ; expat voters can vote for Westminster elections , but not local or Assembly elections .
new wards , and the electoral office has published only the local government electorate for those wards , which will be larger than the parliamentary electorate .
In some cases there are very big differences .
Several of the old Dungannon wards recorded between 20 % @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who do not have parliamentary votes , a total of 2,600 voters ; these were presumably mostly EU citizens connected with Moy Park .
However the new seats will be drawn on thewards , and the electoral office has published only the local government electorate for those wards , which will be larger than the parliamentary electorate .
In some cases there are very big differences .
Several of the old Dungannon wards recorded between 20 % and 35 % of local government voters who do not have parliamentary votes , a total @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mostly EU citizens connected with Moy Park .
Looking at the quota for the UK as a whole ( the average electorate for the 647 seats apart from than the three island constituencies ) we can see that eleven of Northern Ireland 's 18 constituencies deviate from it by more than 5 % .
The UK-wide quota would be 73,290 , so in principle each seat should have no less than 69,626 voters and no more than 76,954 .
Under the rules , Northern Ireland is allowed extra wiggle room , if necessary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 68,293 .
( Which would mean that East Londonderry is actually OK ; but I think the geography of West Tyrone means that it will have to change anyway . )
This map shows the divergence from the UK-wide quota of each of the 18 Northern Ireland seats , and the table gives the same figures and also the number of voters by which each seat exceeds or falls short of the permissible size ( including also the potential lower margin for Northern Ireland ) .
The good thing about this from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that there are a number of seats which will hardly have to change at all .
There will have to be some smoothing at the edges , because the map of electoral wards , which are the building blocks for the constituencies , has been drastically changed and there is no seat whose boundaries exactly match the new ward boundaries .
But if we colour in the under-quota seats in red , the over-quota seats in blue , and the within-quota seats in green , we can see that the question resolves into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all , West Belfast is an isolated undersized constituency , at 10.3 % below the quota .
But it borders Lagan Valley , which is 3.5 % above the quota .
If 4,000-6,000 Lagan Valley voters could be found , conveniently located on the border with West Belfast , they could be moved in , keeping both seats within limits .
The two wards of Derryaghy and Lambeg are conveniently located on the border with West Belfast , and together they have 5,440 local government voters ( the number of Westminster voters will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I would not be surprised to see West Belfast being extended further south ( as was proposed by the Boundary Commission for the 17-seat map ) .
That leaves two broad zones to consider .
First , the south-eastern belt of six seats , three of them contiguous and over-sized ( Newry and Armagh , Upper Bann and South Down ) and three of them contiguous and undersized ( East Belfast , North Down and Strangford ) .
If the neighbouring seats of Fermanagh and South Tyrone , Lagan Vally and South Belfast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being the right size ( apart from straightening out the boundaries for the new wards , and the adjustment to the Lagan Valley/West Belfast border mentioned above ) , there are n't a lot of solutions .
I could see the following emerge : • Upper Bann takes Tandragee and Loughgall , with upwards of 7,000 voters , from Newry and Armagh , which puts Newry and Armagh at the right number ; • Upper Bann then cedes Banbridge and Loughbrickland , with around 18,000 voters , to South Down , which puts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the other end , North Down gives East Belfast the two western wards , Holywood and Loughview , with 6,400 voters , which sets East Belfast right ; • North Down must take the entire Ards Peninsula ( once you 've taken one ward you have to go all the way ) , with 18,000 voters , from Strangford , which puts it in the zone ; • Strangford now needs at least another 21,000 voters , and South Down needs to lose about the same number , and that means the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its immediate hinterland get transferred from South Down to Strangford ( which really should be renamed East Down at that rate ) .
The northern belt of four constituencies is probably the most difficult to resolve .
West Tyrone is 9.5 % under the quota ; East Londonderry 5.4 % under ; North Antrim 5.4 % over and East Antrim , the smallest constituency , 11.4 % under .
There are n't enough voters there for four seats with at least 95 % of the UK quota each ( there are , just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lower limit for Northern Ireland , but even then I do n't think the geography of the wards makes it possible ) .
It 's also difficult to justify much tinkering with the boundaries of the neighbouring seats , and even if we could , the wiggle room on their numbers is limited .
My best guess would be that : • a nibble is taken from Foyle to help the numbers – perhaps Eglinton ward , with 2,800 voters , annexed to East Londonderry , though it could be Slievekirk , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • West Tyrone expands northwards by a couple of wards ( certainly Park , with 2,600 voters , and either Slievekirk as noted above or Claudy with another 2,600 ) – it would probably have to be renamed Sperrin due to too much non-Tyrone territory ; • East Londonderry needs another 3,000-5,500 voters now , and that probably means Giant 's Causeway and Kinbane , with 5,100 between them ; that takes it almost to Ballycastle , so East Londonderry would probably get renamed Causeway Coast ; • North Antrim is now OK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ give any more ground to East Antrim ; • Neither South Antrim nor North Belfast has a lot to give , but I guess if all the necessary ward boundary adjustments are resolved in East Antrim 's favour , it may only need another ward or two from one or both of its southern neighbours ( Jordanstown from South Antrim ?
Carnmoney Hill from North Belfast ? )
to get the numbers to come out .
The changes to East Londonderry and West Tyrone/Sperrin in particular will look striking on the map , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many people owing to the sparse population of the areas concerned .
The biggest single shift of voters would be in the south-eastern corner of Northern Ireland with Downpatrick moving from South Down to Strangford/East Down .
That 's also the biggest political shift .
Strangford/East Down certainly gets enough Nationalist voters for them to elect a Nationalist to the Assembly , and to give the DUP 's opponents at Westminster elections a tactical boost ; South Down on the other hand certainly loses a Nationalist seat at Assembly level .
The Ards @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cost of more favourable territory in Holywood certainly makes life interesting for Stephen Farry of the Alliance Party , but it 's far from a killer blow .
Those who feel that they may have something to lose from the process will of course have plenty of time and opportunity to make their voices heards .
This will be a lot less painful than the proposed maps when we were looking at a reduction in the number of seats from 18 to 16 or 17 , and frankly I hope that something like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5 % variation in constituency size is way too tight – worldwide , only the notoriously contested redistricting of the seats of the U.S. House of Representatives has a tighter margin – but I also think that we will probably need to see a couple of revisions go through with that unrealistic restriction before the powers that be catch themselves on and it gets changed .
( I have been told that the Conservatives were originally looking at a 2 % rather than 5 % variation in constituency size , back in 2008 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and painful to implement , and would certainly have meant breaching ward boundaries all over the place . )
So there we go .
Of course , if the government sticks to the 600-seat commitment , rather than returning to 650 seats , the above speculation will be largely irrelevant .
And if the 5 % wiggle room is made more flexible , more imaginative solutions may be possible .
In the end , rearranging boundaries for 18 seats is a lot less painful than chopping one , let alone two , from @ @ @

Rumours started last week suggesting that the newly re-elected British government now plans to drop the current Boundary Commission proposals to cut the House of Commons to 600 MPs, and to start a new revision process which would keep the number of MPs at 650. It was always going to be a stretch to get 50 MPs to vote for their own abolition, so I am not at all surprised that this is where we will end up. Remember that the orignal plans to cut the number of seats by 50 were killed by a disagreement between the then coalition parties, and that the current proposals got mired in the general Brexit malaise, as well as a particular Northern Ireland wrinkle that I'll discuss briefly below.
I would expect that any change to the rules will retain the current instruction to the Boundary Commission to make constituency sizes as equal as possible. There is a real problem with the current situation. The average size of electorate for a UK constituency is 73,173 voters; for England, it's 74,851, for Scotland it's 68,696, for Northern Ireland 71,887 but for Wales only 57,996. This basically means that a Welsh vote is worth 1.29 English votes, in terms of the number of MPs it can elect; Wales has 40 MPs, but on a proportional basis should have only 32 if the total is 650. Scotland is likewise a little over-represented, with 59 MPs rather than the 56 it should have proportionally. Northern Ireland, with 18 seats, comes out about right.
There is no particularly good historical reason for Welsh over-representation. No policy decision was ever made for that purpose. It happened because successive Boundary Commissions found their maps easier to draw with more seats, and then one thing led to another. The effect is to help the Labour Party, a little, in that its MPs represent seats with an average electorate of 72,180, while Conservative MPs have an average electorate of 74,621. (Since you asked, for other parties with more than one seat: Lib Dems 68,218; SNP 69,678; Plaid Cymru 50,095; DUP 71,839; SF 72,547; SDLP 72,165. Smaller GB parties, apart from the Greens, also benefit from the status quo.)
So the four Boundary Commissions will likely be tasked to ensure that all seats should in principle be within 5% of the UK average (apart from the Isle of Wight and the two Scottish island constituencies). There is some extra wiggle room allowed for Northern Ireland, given the small number of seats and limited space, so seats can vary by 5% of the Northern Ireland average even if this takes them outside the limit of 5% of the UK average, if the Commission finds it necessary.
A quick aside on this point: I personally urged the Commission not to be shy about invoking this extra flexibility for the last round of revisions, in order to make its own work easier. The Commission did so for both its revised proposals and its final report, but this was challenged by an anonymous litigant in the courts through judicial review. The judge found that the Commission was not wrong to invoke the lower limit, but could have explained itself better. (See here, paragraph 48. The judge also found that the Commission should have taken responses in the final stage of consultation more seriously than it did, but did not strike down the final proposals, so they stand until parliament rejects them.) The numbers were particularly brutal last time – this time round, if we are working from December 2019 electorate figures or anything like them, it may well be possible to draw a map that does not need the extra flexibility that is permitted.
(There is a not very interesting discussion to be had about whether electoral boundaries should take account of the number of registered voters or the total population. Worldwide, about a third of countries allocate seats on the basis of the number of voters, and about half on the basis of total population. Personally I incline a bit towards basing them on the number of voters, which in the UK is just as easy, if not easier, to track, and also I don't really see why areas with larger non-voting populations – children and non-citizens – necessarily deserve greater representation. But I am not especially bothered.)
Coming back to the main point, what are the likely consequences for Northern Ireland if the government does proceed to direct the Boundary Commissions as described above? The first thing to note is that there is already a big problem with the sizes of the 18 constituencies. If we take the figures for electorate of each seat from the December 2019 election, we can see that East Antrim votes are worth 1.29 as much as Upper Bann votes (coincidentally, the same ratio as for Wales and England). NB that both East Antrim and Upper Bann are held by the DUP; looking at the five largest and five smallest seats, in both cases three are held by the DUP and two by SF, so this isn't especially ;a party political issue.
I should add a caveat that we don't have exactly the right figures to calculate with, so everything below needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. The Electoral Office has published the parliamentary electorate for the existing 18 seats and for the old electoral wards from which they are constructed; and the seats will be drawn to match the parliamentary rather than local government voters. British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens can vote in all elections; citizens of the other 24 EU countries can vote in local and Assembly elections, at least for now; expat voters can vote for Westminster elections, but not local or Assembly elections.
new wards, and the electoral office has published only the local government electorate for those wards, which will be larger than the parliamentary electorate. In some cases there are very big differences. Several of the old Dungannon wards recorded between 20% and 35% of local government voters who do not have parliamentary votes, a total of 2,600 voters; these were presumably mostly EU citizens connected with Moy Park. However the new seats will be drawn on thewards, and the electoral office has published only the local government electorate for those wards, which will be larger than the parliamentary electorate. In some cases there are very big differences. Several of the old Dungannon wards recorded between 20% and 35% of local government voters who do not have parliamentary votes, a total of 2,600 voters; these were presumably mostly EU citizens connected with Moy Park. Looking at the quota for the UK as a whole (the average electorate for the 647 seats apart from than the three island constituencies) we can see that eleven of Northern Ireland's 18 constituencies deviate from it by more than 5%. The UK-wide quota would be 73,290, so in principle each seat should have no less than 69,626 voters and no more than 76,954. Under the rules, Northern Ireland is allowed extra wiggle room, if necessary, taking the lower limit down to 68,293. (Which would mean that East Londonderry is actually OK; but I think the geography of West Tyrone means that it will have to change anyway.) This map shows the divergence from the UK-wide quota of each of the 18 Northern Ireland seats, and the table gives the same figures and also the number of voters by which each seat exceeds or falls short of the permissible size (including also the potential lower margin for Northern Ireland).
(Maps above and below adapted from the one on the Northern Ireland Assembly website.)
Constituency Dec 2019
Electorate % of UK quota difference from
upper/lower limit held by East Antrim 64,830 89% -4,796 (-3,643) DUP Belfast West 65,644 90% -3,982 (-2,649) SF Belfast East 66,245 91% -3,381 (-2,048) DUP West Tyrone 66,259 91% -3,367 (-2,034) SF Strangford 66,928 91% -2,698 (-1,365) DUP North Down 67,099 92% -2,527 (-1,194) Alliance East Londonderry 69,246 95% -380 (OK) DUP Belfast South 69,984 96% OK SDLP Mid Ulster 70,449 96% OK SF South Antrim 71,711 98% OK DUP Belfast North 72,225 99% OK SF Fermanagh and South Tyrone 72,848 100% OK SF Foyle 74,346 102% OK SDLP Lagan Valley 75,735 103% OK DUP North Antrim 77,134 105% +180 DUP South Down 79,175 108% +2,221 SF Newry and Armagh 81,226 111% +4,272 SF Upper Bann 82,887 113% +5,933 DUP Total 1,293,971
The good thing about this from the Boundary Commission's point of view is that there are a number of seats which will hardly have to change at all. There will have to be some smoothing at the edges, because the map of electoral wards, which are the building blocks for the constituencies, has been drastically changed and there is no seat whose boundaries exactly match the new ward boundaries. But if we colour in the under-quota seats in red, the over-quota seats in blue, and the within-quota seats in green, we can see that the question resolves into three distinct geographical challenges.
First of all, West Belfast is an isolated undersized constituency, at 10.3% below the quota. But it borders Lagan Valley, which is 3.5% above the quota. If 4,000-6,000 Lagan Valley voters could be found, conveniently located on the border with West Belfast, they could be moved in, keeping both seats within limits. The two wards of Derryaghy and Lambeg are conveniently located on the border with West Belfast, and together they have 5,440 local government voters (the number of Westminster voters will be a bit less), so I would not be surprised to see West Belfast being extended further south (as was proposed by the Boundary Commission for the 17-seat map).
That leaves two broad zones to consider. First, the south-eastern belt of six seats, three of them contiguous and over-sized (Newry and Armagh, Upper Bann and South Down) and three of them contiguous and undersized (East Belfast, North Down and Strangford). If the neighbouring seats of Fermanagh and South Tyrone, Lagan Vally and South Belfast are left largely alone due to already being the right size (apart from straightening out the boundaries for the new wards, and the adjustment to the Lagan Valley/West Belfast border mentioned above), there aren't a lot of solutions. I could see the following emerge:
Upper Bann takes Tandragee and Loughgall, with upwards of 7,000 voters, from Newry and Armagh, which puts Newry and Armagh at the right number; Upper Bann then cedes Banbridge and Loughbrickland, with around 18,000 voters, to South Down, which puts Upper Bann in the zone; at the other end, North Down gives East Belfast the two western wards, Holywood and Loughview, with 6,400 voters, which sets East Belfast right; North Down must take the entire Ards Peninsula (once you've taken one ward you have to go all the way), with 18,000 voters, from Strangford, which puts it in the zone; Strangford now needs at least another 21,000 voters, and South Down needs to lose about the same number, and that means the seven or eight wards comprising Downpatrick and its immediate hinterland get transferred from South Down to Strangford (which really should be renamed East Down at that rate).
The northern belt of four constituencies is probably the most difficult to resolve. West Tyrone is 9.5% under the quota; East Londonderry 5.4% under; North Antrim 5.4% over and East Antrim, the smallest constituency, 11.4% under. There aren't enough voters there for four seats with at least 95% of the UK quota each (there are, just about, if we take the special lower limit for Northern Ireland, but even then I don't think the geography of the wards makes it possible). It's also difficult to justify much tinkering with the boundaries of the neighbouring seats, and even if we could, the wiggle room on their numbers is limited. My best guess would be that:
a nibble is taken from Foyle to help the numbers – perhaps Eglinton ward, with 2,800 voters, annexed to East Londonderry, though it could be Slievekirk, with 2,600, added to West Tyrone; West Tyrone expands northwards by a couple of wards (certainly Park, with 2,600 voters, and either Slievekirk as noted above or Claudy with another 2,600) – it would probably have to be renamed Sperrin due to too much non-Tyrone territory; East Londonderry needs another 3,000-5,500 voters now,and that probably means Giant's Causeway and Kinbane, with 5,100 between them; that takes it almost to Ballycastle, so East Londonderry would probably get renamed Causeway Coast; North Antrim is now OK, on numbers, but cannot give any more ground to East Antrim; Neither South Antrim nor North Belfast has a lot to give, but I guess if all the necessary ward boundary adjustments are resolved in East Antrim's favour, it may only need another ward or two from one or both of its southern neighbours (Jordanstown from South Antrim? Carnmoney Hill from North Belfast?) to get the numbers to come out.
The changes to East Londonderry and West Tyrone/Sperrin in particular will look striking on the map, but actually will not involve all that many people owing to the sparse population of the areas concerned. The biggest single shift of voters would be in the south-eastern corner of Northern Ireland with Downpatrick moving from South Down to Strangford/East Down.
That's also the biggest political shift. Strangford/East Down certainly gets enough Nationalist voters for them to elect a Nationalist to the Assembly, and to give the DUP's opponents at Westminster elections a tactical boost; South Down on the other hand certainly loses a Nationalist seat at Assembly level. The Ards Peninsula moving into North Down at the cost of more favourable territory in Holywood certainly makes life interesting for Stephen Farry of the Alliance Party, but it's far from a killer blow. Those who feel that they may have something to lose from the process will of course have plenty of time and opportunity to make their voices heards.
This will be a lot less painful than the proposed maps when we were looking at a reduction in the number of seats from 18 to 16 or 17, and frankly I hope that something like this goes through. I think the 5% variation in constituency size is way too tight – worldwide, only the notoriously contested redistricting of the seats of the U.S. House of Representatives has a tighter margin – but I also think that we will probably need to see a couple of revisions go through with that unrealistic restriction before the powers that be catch themselves on and it gets changed. (I have been told that the Conservatives were originally looking at a 2% rather than 5% variation in constituency size, back in 2008; that really would have been difficult and painful to implement, and would certainly have meant breaching ward boundaries all over the place.)
So there we go. Of course, if the government sticks to the 600-seat commitment, rather than returning to 650 seats, the above speculation will be largely irrelevant. And if the 5% wiggle room is made more flexible, more imaginative solutions may be possible. In the end, rearranging boundaries for 18 seats is a lot less painful than chopping one, let alone two, from the map.


Last chance saloon…

On talkback this week there was a fair but cutting analysis of the many manoeuvrings of the 1990s to bring about the peace settlement and the near universal condemnation of how its inheritors in today ’ s politics have failed at the mission statement set out at this time .
Brian Rowan quotes sources calling it a ‘ last chance ’ for Stormont to prove that it can actually work .
For if an institution fails in its adoption of rules of change it becomes finite .
An assembly that can not reform key constitutional instruments ( blunt though they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not hope to fulfil its larger function – the reform of society to make life better here .
By bogging itself down on constitutional procedure we risk our assembly devolving into a Roman senate style standoff with an emperor secretary of state fiddling while our public services burn in the fires of Brexit and institutional stagnation – Feeney calls him the ‘ proconsul ’ in the Irish news which is what makes this analogy all the more fitting .
I have written this week about how our piecemeal devolution settlement , particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contributed to the culture laid bare in ‘ Burned ’ by Sam MacBride ’ s excellent description of the events exposed at the RHI inquiry , which he expertly weaves into his analysis of how the modern Northern Ireland state functions .
With this in mind , PoC reform and the accountability it would inject into key Stormont votes is more crucial than we might give it credence ( bearing in mind that it was used over 100 times between 2011-15 ) .
It was a compromise made in a world that felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the 1990s and eventual cessation of hostilities .
But that context is gone , the compromise is no longer the key to action and is in fact the source of log jam and inaction .
To my generation who grew up in a period of ‘ normalcy ’ because of the peace , this history is important , but it isn ’ t our narrative .
We want institutions to believe in , the fact that most young people are ardent supporters of the EU and international institutions generally is actually something @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to me particularly by left wing Brexiteers .
We need to see that the assembly can and will be changed in order to make this place work .
David Ford penned a piece discussing the eventual abolition of community designation and replacing it with qualified or weighted majorities instead .
What is interesting in all of this is how far we are diverting from British legal norms and instead drifting into a US constitutional style of governance .
At the Irish times podcast in Dublin it was put to Sam McBride that Northern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good reason , ’ to which he concurred .
By contrived what is meant here is that politics is done by the very technical legalistic mechanisms of the PoC and community designation .
Both tools are increasingly redundant and seem to block progress more than the fathers of peace in 1998 thought they would .
Therefore to avoid future dysfunction why not take such constitutional reforms outside of the assembly institutions ?
The GFA never had much of an amendment or reform mechanism universally accepted other than the NI act passed in Westminster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reform locked inside the dysfunctional Stormont system .
Instead of community designation why not have make a referendum a legal requirement if an essential element of the GFA is to be altered ?
It would free it from the institutions and reduce the stink of a ‘ two party carve up ’ which Saint Andrew ’ s has created an image of for posterity .
“ Lössnitzgrund : Fort Henry ” by hutschinetto is licensed under CC BY-SA

On talkback this week there was a fair but cutting analysis of the many manoeuvrings of the 1990s to bring about the peace settlement and the near universal condemnation of how its inheritors in today’s politics have failed at the mission statement set out at this time.
Brian Rowan quotes sources calling it a ‘last chance’ for Stormont to prove that it can actually work. For if an institution fails in its adoption of rules of change it becomes finite. An assembly that cannot reform key constitutional instruments (blunt though they may be) such as the PoC cannot hope to fulfil its larger function – the reform of society to make life better here.
By bogging itself down on constitutional procedure we risk our assembly devolving into a Roman senate style standoff with an emperor secretary of state fiddling while our public services burn in the fires of Brexit and institutional stagnation – Feeney calls him the ‘proconsul’ in the Irish news which is what makes this analogy all the more fitting.
I have written this week about how our piecemeal devolution settlement, particularly on fiscal policy, has in part contributed to the culture laid bare in ‘Burned’ by Sam MacBride’s excellent description of the events exposed at the RHI inquiry, which he expertly weaves into his analysis of how the modern Northern Ireland state functions.
With this in mind, PoC reform and the accountability it would inject into key Stormont votes is more crucial than we might give it credence (bearing in mind that it was used over 100 times between 2011-15). It was a compromise made in a world that felt like compromise was impossible, the fires of the 1990s and eventual cessation of hostilities. But that context is gone, the compromise is no longer the key to action and is in fact the source of log jam and inaction.
To my generation who grew up in a period of ‘normalcy’ because of the peace, this history is important, but it isn’t our narrative. We want institutions to believe in, the fact that most young people are ardent supporters of the EU and international institutions generally is actually something of a conservative revolution oft pointed out to me particularly by left wing Brexiteers. We need to see that the assembly can and will be changed in order to make this place work.
David Ford penned a piece discussing the eventual abolition of community designation and replacing it with qualified or weighted majorities instead. What is interesting in all of this is how far we are diverting from British legal norms and instead drifting into a US constitutional style of governance.
At the Irish times podcast in Dublin it was put to Sam McBride that Northern politics was ‘contrived, albeit for good reason,’ to which he concurred. By contrived what is meant here is that politics is done by the very technical legalistic mechanisms of the PoC and community designation. Both tools are increasingly redundant and seem to block progress more than the fathers of peace in 1998 thought they would. Therefore to avoid future dysfunction why not take such constitutional reforms outside of the assembly institutions?
The GFA never had much of an amendment or reform mechanism universally accepted other than the NI act passed in Westminster, leaving the nitty gritty of constitutional reform locked inside the dysfunctional Stormont system. Instead of community designation why not have make a referendum a legal requirement if an essential element of the GFA is to be altered? It would free it from the institutions and reduce the stink of a ‘two party carve up’ which Saint Andrew’s has created an image of for posterity.
“Lössnitzgrund: Fort Henry” by hutschinetto is licensed under CC BY-SA


sluggerotoole--2020-01-03--Whatever you do, don’t handle the debate on a border poll like the politics of Brexit

The decision of the two governments to publish “ the basis of an agreement “ on a return to Stormont next week as recommended here and by others is very welcome .
Publication will either expose to your judgement and mine the reasonableness or otherwise of whoever is holding out against agreement , or it will constitute the agreement itself .
While an atmosphere of optimism among the parties is being fostered ( no pun intended ) in the sketchy reporting , there is nothing objective to suggest that gaps have yet been closed .
Meanwhile in the Irish Times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s professor of Constitutional and European Law argues that the UK ” s handling of the Brexit referendum offers a terrible guide for how to approach a border poll .
Next Monday the deputy director of UCL ’ s Constitution Unit Alan Renwick talks at Queens about the Unit ’ s research project on a border poll which may feature a citizens ’ assembly .
Whether this ought to include unionists to be made valid is a moot point often discussed in Slugger and elsewhere .
… the problem is that , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ independence would require detailed negotiations on the economic and institutional details .
It is hard to see either the DUP or British government engaging in such negotiations before a referendum lest concluding a decent deal would encourage voters to opt to leave the UK .
It will , therefore , likely be impossible to provide voters with detailed information in advance of a referendum vote .
One could have a two-referendum process where an in-principle decision triggers detailed negotiations whose outcome is then subject to a confirmatory referendum .
However , this may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government or the DUP may be tempted to take a very hard line in post-referendum negotiations in the hope of triggering a negative vote in the confirmatory vote .
There are no easy solutions , but the status quo is not an option .
The UK ’ s uncodified constitution meant that Brexiteers were able to win majority support for Brexit without spelling out what Brexit would mean .
Given the history of conflict these issues are particularly pressing in relation to a Border poll .
A vote on Irish unity will stir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fears are to be managed and instability avoided , it will be necessary to devise systems and procedures to reassure voters that the process will not be hijacked by unrepresentative groups .
As the Brexit process has shown , the UK currently lacks any such procedures .
Political stability in Ireland and Britain may depend on finding them .
It would be pinning a lot on any form of public consultation to devise procedures that would “ avoid instability.
” Unlike social issues such as abortion or equal marriage which they were all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within certain limits , the Irish government would be certain to assume prime responsibility for conducting the debates on unity in the Republic after the preliminary explorations .
Both governments will want to keep as much control as possible over such an existential matter .
The big problem here is that a border poll unlike Scottish Indyref2 does not require Westminster ’ s consent , nor even that of the local parties directly .
It is the people ’ s call .
How that call is registered is the responsibility of the British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question is : should they set criteria for assessing public demand for a border poll before the two governments have reached agreement on the broad political context for holding complementary ” concurrent ” referendums as the GFA prescribes ?
Or should they sit tight until we all learn whether the Stormont Assembly can function effectively for several years ?
If it does so , why risk disturbing the arrangement with plans for a border poll unless it is an agreed settled will ?
If it doesn ’ t , what do the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for unity seem like the appropriate response ?

The decision of the two governments to publish “ the basis of an agreement “ on a return to Stormont next week as recommended here and by others is very welcome. Publication will either expose to your judgement and mine the reasonableness or otherwise of whoever is holding out against agreement, or it will constitute the agreement itself. While an atmosphere of optimism among the parties is being fostered (no pun intended) in the sketchy reporting, there is nothing objective to suggest that gaps have yet been closed.
Meanwhile in the Irish Times, the Irishman who is UCL’s professor of Constitutional and European Law argues that the UK”s handling of the Brexit referendum offers a terrible guide for how to approach a border poll. Next Monday the deputy director of UCL’s Constitution Unit Alan Renwick talks at Queens about the Unit’s research project on a border poll which may feature a citizens’ assembly. Whether this ought to include unionists to be made valid is a moot point often discussed in Slugger and elsewhere.
On a border poll, McCrea writes:
… the problem is that, as with Brexit, Irish unity or Scottish independence would require detailed negotiations on the economic and institutional details.
It is hard to see either the DUP or British government engaging in such negotiations before a referendum lest concluding a decent deal would encourage voters to opt to leave the UK.
It will, therefore, likely be impossible to provide voters with detailed information in advance of a referendum vote.
One could have a two-referendum process where an in-principle decision triggers detailed negotiations whose outcome is then subject to a confirmatory referendum.
However, this may not overcome the problem. The UK government or the DUP may be tempted to take a very hard line in post-referendum negotiations in the hope of triggering a negative vote in the confirmatory vote. There are no easy solutions, but the status quo is not an option. The UK’s uncodified constitution meant that Brexiteers were able to win majority support for Brexit without spelling out what Brexit would mean.
Given the history of conflict these issues are particularly pressing in relation to a Border poll. A vote on Irish unity will stir emotions and raise fears. If these fears are to be managed and instability avoided, it will be necessary to devise systems and procedures to reassure voters that the process will not be hijacked by unrepresentative groups.
As the Brexit process has shown, the UK currently lacks any such procedures. Political stability in Ireland and Britain may depend on finding them.
It would be pinning a lot on any form of public consultation to devise procedures that would “ avoid instability.” Unlike social issues such as abortion or equal marriage which they were all too happy to devolve to citizens assemblies within certain limits, the Irish government would be certain to assume prime responsibility for conducting the debates on unity in the Republic after the preliminary explorations. Both governments will want to keep as much control as possible over such an existential matter.
The big problem here is that a border poll unlike Scottish Indyref2 does not require Westminster’s consent, nor even that of the local parties directly. It is the people’s call. How that call is registered is the responsibility of the British government and is still undeclared. The question is: should they set criteria for assessing public demand for a border poll before the two governments have reached agreement on the broad political context for holding complementary ” concurrent” referendums as the GFA prescribes? Or should they sit tight until we all learn whether the Stormont Assembly can function effectively for several years? If it does so, why risk disturbing the arrangement with plans for a border poll unless it is an agreed settled will? If it doesn’t, what do the two governments do then? Does making arrangements for unity seem like the appropriate response?


sluggerotoole--2020-01-03--Death of Broadcasting Pioneer Marian Finucane (1950-2020)

Over the course of a career spanning almost five decades , she was at the vanguard of media and social @ @ @ @ @ in particular when it came to the position and rights of Irish women .
For @ @ @ @ @ , her voice was as familiar as that of close family members .


sluggerotoole--2020-01-03--Brexit, Citizens’ Assemblies and the future of Democracy in the UK

The Brexit process has put the UK ’ s democratic system under great strain , pitting competing democratic visions against each other and exposing weaknesses in each .
Join Queen ’ s Policy Engagement for our first event of 2020 with Dr Alan Renwick from the UCL Constitution Unit where he will examine those weaknesses and consider possible ways of addressing them .
Could the 2016 referendum have been designed differently to create a less polarised process ?
How could the grievances with current politics that the referendum result highlighted be tackled ?
In particular , we will examine whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people who meet over several weekends to learn about , discuss , and make recommendations on selected issues – could make a difference .
The strengths , and also the limitations , of this approach will be explored and possible paths forward proposed .
This special event takes place on Monday 6 January 2020 in the Canada Room at Queen ’ s .
Registration from 6pm ; talk starts 6.30pm .
To register , please click here .
Dr Alan Renwick is Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ Assembly on Brexit and in 2019 , with MichelaPalese , published a major report on strengthening democracy , Doing Democracy Better : How Can Information and Discourse in Election and Referendum Campaigns in the UK Be Improved ?
Alan is now project lead for the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland .

The Brexit process has put the UK’s democratic system under great strain, pitting competing democratic visions against each other and exposing weaknesses in each.
Join Queen’s Policy Engagement for our first event of 2020 with Dr Alan Renwick from the UCL Constitution Unit where he will examine those weaknesses and consider possible ways of addressing them. Could the 2016 referendum have been designed differently to create a less polarised process? How could the grievances with current politics that the referendum result highlighted be tackled?
In particular, we will examine whether citizens’ assemblies – randomly selected groups of people who meet over several weekends to learn about, discuss, and make recommendations on selected issues – could make a difference. The strengths, and also the limitations, of this approach will be explored and possible paths forward proposed.
This special event takes place on Monday 6 January 2020 in the Canada Room at Queen’s. Registration from 6pm; talk starts 6.30pm. To register, please click here.
About Dr Alan Renwick
Dr Alan Renwick is Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London. He led the 2017 UK Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit and in 2019, with MichelaPalese, published a major report on strengthening democracy, Doing Democracy Better: How Can Information and Discourse in Election and Referendum Campaigns in the UK Be Improved? Alan is now project lead for the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland.