thebulwark--2020-10-21--Fifty Trillion Reasons Why

Fifty Trillion Reasons Why

In the past four decades—under Democrats and Republicans alike— $ 50 trillion has moved from the bottom 90 percent to the top 1 percent of Americans .
Yes , that is trillion with a “ t. ” And it wasn ’ t capitalism that did it .
It was anti-capitalism : Corporate bail-outs , oligopolies , laws literally written by lobbyists , stock buy-backs , offshore accounts , tax dodges–dark money and outright corruption .
Capitalism depends on competition and innovation , yet the goal of all of these strategies was to eliminate the need for either .
When two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are far more likely to raise prices than lower them ; just look at your cable bill .
And while this was happening , America ’ s middle class—the wonder of the world—was decimated .
Two generations have grown to adulthood not even knowing what “ middle class ” means .
Those generations have no conception of a time when factory workers could afford to own a home , two cars , send their kids to college , pay their medical bills , take a vacation , retire with dignity .
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now seems like fantasy to people who have grown up in a work environment where the minimum wage today has half the buying power it did in 1968 .
Our present-day impossibly low minimum wage gives a hint of the devastation , a hint at why Americans can ’ t afford their medicines or schools or homes , a hint at why our suicide rate has grown by a third since 2000 while our life-expectancy—alone among developed nations—has gone down , a hint at how an opioid epidemic hollowed out the heartland .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ what is happening in America : “ Deaths of Despair.
” Any Democrat , Republican , or libertarian should agree that this is an existential problem .
This is not economic inequality , this is economic injustice .
The top 1 percent didn ’ t get that much smarter or more innovative in 40 years , and the bottom 90 percent didn ’ t get that much lazier or inept .
It ’ s corruption and game-rigging , pure and simple , and it goes right down to the marrow of our so-called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the greatest wealth-builder in history , but it ’ s also a bit like the scorpion and the frog : it ’ s in its nature for the strong to overpower the weak and the big to devour the small .
But just like with the scorpion , if that nature is not tempered , in the end even the strong and the big will drown along with their victims .
Does anyone think America can long endure when wealth , education , opportunity , and access to power devolve into fewer and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after all these years , what do we do about it ?
Democratic socialists say the answer is to tax wealth and the rich , and provide for free what used to be affordable , i.e.
, college , healthcare , etc .
But that solution has been rejected by voters .
Workers don ’ t want things for free ; they want the higher pay they deserve .
And in a truly capitalist system they would be getting it .
But they don ’ t live in that system anymore , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system is our media-information-entertainment ecosystem .
Because it ’ s designed to keep us fixated on anything but what has become of us .
In its competition for eyeballs , its fire-hose blasts of 24-hour news and social media , information has been fragmented and weaponized to suit the needs of those who control it .
And those who control it—for the densest among us—are not part of the 90 percent .
Everything you see has been designed , focus-grouped , and engineered by teams of addiction experts to keep the needle in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough , just yearning enough , just mesmerized enough to prevent you from changing the status-quo .
Existing on the grid in 2020 means trying to tune out a constant stream of gossip about topics algorithmically selected to be the most salacious and outrageous to you personally in order to keep your emotions in thrall to something—anything—but the root problem .
So instead of focusing on the $ 50 trillion looting of our country , we ’ re staggering around thinking we actually believe that antifa mobs are murdering people in suburban homes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cultural appropriation in Halloween costumes is an act of disrespect bordering on violence .
Or that online furniture companies are trafficking children .
Or that it ’ s a personal threat to us when a football player decides to kneel peacefully during the national anthem .
In other words , we have been manipulated into fighting symbolic battles instead of the real-world battles we actually need to fight .
Because as long as Americans fight symbolic battles — egged on by Russian troll farms and Cambridge Analytica-style targeting—the 1 percent can go on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if you ’ re not focused on solving this problem—whether you wrap yourself in the flag to own the libs or encode your personal feelings in a barrage of accusatory wokespeak—you ’ re a part of it .
Which is fine .
Just don ’ t pretend you ’ re not .
What ’ s needed is a cultural shift—one that ’ s beginning to form on the left and the right—a recognition that America does well when those who want to work do well .
We must demand of our lawmakers that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lobbyists and the big donors and the anti-competitors .
Demand of our CEO ’ s that if the law sees their corporations as people then their companies must also act like citizens .
Think it can ’ t happen ?
People thought smoking would never be curbed either , and that same-sex couples would never be able to marry .
When the cultural wheel finally turns , immense changes are possible .
Fifty trillion dollars .
The toxic source waters of so many of our ills .
Fifty trillion dollars that could have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ medical care , job training , pensions , renewable energy .
That ’ s $ 150,000 for every man , woman , and child in America , money that could have created hundreds of millions of consumers , investors , business owners , allowed families and neighborhoods to flourish , given people the hardest hit now—communities of color , white working class , vets , the elderly—the chance to benefit the most .
All boats would rise ; the change would be remarkable .
We ’ ve arrived at a precipice of disaster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that matters moving forward is what we actually do .

In the past four decades—under Democrats and Republicans alike—$50 trillion has moved from the bottom 90 percent to the top 1 percent of Americans.
Yes, that is trillion with a “t.”
And it wasn’t capitalism that did it. It was anti-capitalism: Corporate bail-outs, oligopolies, laws literally written by lobbyists, stock buy-backs, offshore accounts, tax dodges–dark money and outright corruption.
Capitalism depends on competition and innovation, yet the goal of all of these strategies was to eliminate the need for either. When two or three companies dominate an industry, they are far more likely to raise prices than lower them; just look at your cable bill.
And while this was happening, America’s middle class—the wonder of the world—was decimated. Two generations have grown to adulthood not even knowing what “middle class” means. Those generations have no conception of a time when factory workers could afford to own a home, two cars, send their kids to college, pay their medical bills, take a vacation, retire with dignity. What was once a normal and basic reality now seems like fantasy to people who have grown up in a work environment where the minimum wage today has half the buying power it did in 1968.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Our present-day impossibly low minimum wage gives a hint of the devastation, a hint at why Americans can’t afford their medicines or schools or homes, a hint at why our suicide rate has grown by a third since 2000 while our life-expectancy—alone among developed nations—has gone down, a hint at how an opioid epidemic hollowed out the heartland. A phrase had to be coined for what is happening in America: “Deaths of Despair.”
Any Democrat, Republican, or libertarian should agree that this is an existential problem.
This is not economic inequality, this is economic injustice. The top 1 percent didn’t get that much smarter or more innovative in 40 years, and the bottom 90 percent didn’t get that much lazier or inept. It’s corruption and game-rigging, pure and simple, and it goes right down to the marrow of our so-called capitalist system. Capitalism is without doubt the greatest wealth-builder in history, but it’s also a bit like the scorpion and the frog: it’s in its nature for the strong to overpower the weak and the big to devour the small. But just like with the scorpion, if that nature is not tempered, in the end even the strong and the big will drown along with their victims. Does anyone think America can long endure when wealth, education, opportunity, and access to power devolve into fewer and fewer hands?
The question is, after all these years, what do we do about it? Democratic socialists say the answer is to tax wealth and the rich, and provide for free what used to be affordable, i.e., college, healthcare, etc. But that solution has been rejected by voters. Workers don’t want things for free; they want the higher pay they deserve. And in a truly capitalist system they would be getting it. But they don’t live in that system anymore, and one of the pillars of the new system is our media-information-entertainment ecosystem. Because it’s designed to keep us fixated on anything but what has become of us.
In its competition for eyeballs, its fire-hose blasts of 24-hour news and social media, information has been fragmented and weaponized to suit the needs of those who control it. And those who control it—for the densest among us—are not part of the 90 percent.
Everything you see has been designed, focus-grouped, and engineered by teams of addiction experts to keep the needle in your arm, keep you just frustrated enough, just yearning enough, just mesmerized enough to prevent you from changing the status-quo. Existing on the grid in 2020 means trying to tune out a constant stream of gossip about topics algorithmically selected to be the most salacious and outrageous to you personally in order to keep your emotions in thrall to something—anything—but the root problem.
So instead of focusing on the $50 trillion looting of our country, we’re staggering around thinking we actually believe that antifa mobs are murdering people in suburban homes daily instead of never. Or that cultural appropriation in Halloween costumes is an act of disrespect bordering on violence. Or that online furniture companies are trafficking children. Or that it’s a personal threat to us when a football player decides to kneel peacefully during the national anthem.
In other words, we have been manipulated into fighting symbolic battles instead of the real-world battles we actually need to fight. Because as long as Americans fight symbolic battles — egged on by Russian troll farms and Cambridge Analytica-style targeting—the 1 percent can go on looting the country.
Which is why if you’re not focused on solving this problem—whether you wrap yourself in the flag to own the libs or encode your personal feelings in a barrage of accusatory wokespeak—you’re a part of it. Which is fine. Just don’t pretend you’re not.
What’s needed is a cultural shift—one that’s beginning to form on the left and the right—a recognition that America does well when those who want to work do well. We must demand of our lawmakers that they throw off the shackles of the lobbyists and the big donors and the anti-competitors. Demand of our CEO’s that if the law sees their corporations as people then their companies must also act like citizens. Think it can’t happen? People thought smoking would never be curbed either, and that same-sex couples would never be able to marry. When the cultural wheel finally turns, immense changes are possible.
Fifty trillion dollars. The toxic source waters of so many of our ills. Fifty trillion dollars that could have been spent on infrastructure, schools, medical care, job training, pensions, renewable energy. That’s $150,000 for every man, woman, and child in America, money that could have created hundreds of millions of consumers, investors, business owners, allowed families and neighborhoods to flourish, given people the hardest hit now—communities of color, white working class, vets, the elderly—the chance to benefit the most. All boats would rise; the change would be remarkable.
We’ve arrived at a precipice of disaster where ideological posturing is useless.
All that matters moving forward is what we actually do.


thebulwark--2020-10-21--The Internationalized Culture War Is a Gift to China and Russia

Now Roman is to Roman More hateful than a foe , And the tribunes beard the high , And the fathers grind the low .
As we wax hot in faction , In battle we wax cold ; Wherefore men fight not as they fought In the brave days of old “ Democracy and pluralism are under assault , ” reports Freedom House .
“ 2019 was the 14th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.
” This alarming trend is partially thanks to the preeminent challengers to the liberal international order , Russia and China , exporting their models @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much to deteriorating politics within the free world , especially the United States , which makes it harder to confront foreign threats to democracy .
The cultural-political polarization in America , as in much of the West , extends to mirror-imaged tolerance of one or the other of the United States ’ greatest great-power challengers , making it more difficult—if not impossible—for the democratic world to defend itself .
China and Russia each have claim to a faction of the democratic world that crosses borders—ensuring that whoever wins any given election , freedom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Republicans consistently view China as a major security threat , but frequently admire Russia to a greater degree than ever before , and have become willing to tolerate it given its ties to President Trump .
Conversely , at least until the Obama administration , and to some extent through it , Democrats regarded China in more neutral terms , seeking to integrate it into a shared world order and even hoping for a durable climate deal .
Though this attitude has shifted massively since the outbreak of COVID-19 , positive attitudes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tend to cluster among the Democratic base and dovetail with its ideology .
On the other hand , Democrats now regard Russia as a major national security threat .
This polarization connects to a similar , parallel polarization within and among America ’ s allies , hamstringing the democratic world .
To see how this operates , it helps to examine linkages and divides that cut across national boundaries .
Where Europe is concerned , Russia may be the most relevant outside power , but Europe ’ s polarization links to America ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , most European states have a pro-EU faction and a Euroskeptic faction .
Both groups are pushing a European identity agenda , but from opposite perspectives .
This factional divide corresponds to America ’ s pro- and anti-Russian divide .
While there is significant divergence about the future of the EU , the pro-EU vision of Europe is of an continent that is mostly secularized , stripped of major cultural differences , and admiring of the postwar ( and post-Cold War ) vision of a Europe united by a desire to overcome its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drove them .
The EU proponents tend also to be free-trading ( at least within Europe ) , relatively pro-immigration and pro–intra-European free movement , and relatively cosmopolitan ( at least in their more left-wing variant ) .
With some exceptions , this faction ’ s prominent members include most of parties under the tents of the European People ’ s Party , the Party of European Socialists , and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe , among others .
It should be noted : There are also disconcerting connections and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kremlin , but these groups and parties should be considered distinct from the mainstream European center-left .
A consideration of links between Russian outreach to far-left factions in both Europe and the United States is less relevant due to their failure to capture a major faction , although Bernie Sanders ’ s and Jeremy Corbyn ’ s insurgencies may be portents .
Euroskeptic parties , meanwhile , tend to be immigration-skeptic ( indeed , this is often their founding issue ) , willing or even eager to cut back on the free movement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fundamentally nationalist , this last feature being perhaps their common denominator .
While they are not uniformly protectionist ( and mainstream pro-EU parties often are ) , Euroskeptic parties often profess some sort of nationalist protectionism .
Critically , they are generally friendlier to Russia : Their nationalism tends more toward fear of Muslim immigrants crossing borders than Russian soldiers .
The gradual adoption by Putin ’ s government of the self-appointed role of protector of traditional Christianity—not to mention generous financial arrangements—have endeared Russia to the European far right .
Exceptions do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Finland ’ s historic national enemy was a contributing factor to the split within the populist Finns Party .
Poland ’ s ruling Law and Justice Party is an interesting case study in ambiguity on this issue , having both improved Poland ’ s defenses and regurgitated Putinist anti-immigrant and anti-LGBT talking points .
( The nationalist model for Finland has historically been a combination of appeasement and military readiness ; in this , eastern European Euroskeptics are following an old playbook . )
In general , however , the Euroskeptic parties are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then Putin-tolerant .
Though the Euroskeptic parties are often cast as opponents of European unity by virtue of being nationalists , this is not entirely the case .
They often subscribe to a European identity narrative based on a mythology of Western civilization ( in its historical , rather than current , form ) , some form of white supremacism , Christian or ethnic identitarianism , and/or hostility to or suspicion of non-European outsiders .
In other words , the Euroskeptic right , while possibly driving European atomism and separatism , not infrequently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-liberal nature .
In fact , it remains to be seen whether nationalist separatism or illiberal Western supremacism will be the dominant political force among the European Euroskeptic right in the coming years .
These fissures transcend the Atlantic .
Partisanship on each side not only mirrors the other , but political partisans are connected to their opposite numbers abroad and embrace a grand strategy or policy that mobilizes like-minded outside parties against domestic opponents doing the same .
At the moment , Democrats in the United States tend to have a positive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it as a model for the United States ’ s domestic policy , notably admiring European healthcare , environmental , and firearms policies .
Some Republicans , particularly Trump-skeptics , are also supportive of the EU , even if they are less enthusiastic about copying European domestic policies at home .
Taken together , these groups form a faction that is broadly pro-NATO and pro-EU , embraces conventional models of trade and institutionalism , regards Russia as a major national security problem , and seeks to solve that problem by whatever means possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right is linked to the Euroskeptic European right .
This is most easily recognized on the fringes .
The American alt-right and similar far-right elements regard Russia as a friend against Islam , non-white immigration , Islamic terrorism , or other essentially cultural opponents .
However , this alignment is not unique to the far right .
It is found among the Republican base and especially among Republican social and cultural conservatives .
Among Republicans , approval of Russia has spiked since 2016 , but outreach to conservatives by Putin ’ s United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Qualitatively , while Republicans still appear in surveys to have a net negative view of Putin , the substantial minority who view him positively are likely to be the most vocal and committed members of the Republican base .
Longstanding cultural issues in the United States have been internationalized and turned into reasons for American rightists to support Putinism .
A major Republican criticism of the EU that mirrors Republican admiration for Putin is the EU ’ s subreplacement fertility rate and indifference to traditional family structures , as contrasted with Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditional religion , and hostility to LGBT concerns .
Perhaps the largest instance of soft cooperation , in terms of numbers involved , involves gun rights .
Gun ownership is historically one of the most reliable predictors of voting patterns in U.S. elections and a major motivator for Republicans .
It is therefore significant that the nation ’ s principal Second Amendment advocacy organization , the National Rifle Association , is heavily subject to Russian aid and influence , and yet remains the movement leader and , for Second Amendment advocates , almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ More absolutist startup Second Amendment advocacy groups are also at the very least targets for Russian influence . )
Cultural conservatism , in short , has been internationalized , and not just on the far-right fringe , but among relatively mainstream cultural conservatives—in exactly the same way that admiration for Western Europe is a cultural-political delineator for cultural progressives .
Anecdotes exist of Trump rally attendees wearing shirts expressing a cultural preference for Russia over the American left .
Nor is right-wing tolerance or favoritism for Putin limited to cultural issues .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( and some still are ) impressed by what they saw as a Russian economic miracle and business opportunity .
So , too , have been opponents of the United States ’ s post-9/11 foreign policy , many of whom are skeptical of American continued participation in NATO .
Some also ( perhaps not entirely without justification ) regard American Middle East policy as a series of own-goals in which Russia has saved the day by suppressing Salafist jihadism .
American rightists often admire Putin ’ s unapologetic nationalism and subscribe without reservation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia as a bulwark against militant Islam ( and are willing to overlook the Russian Air Force ’ s creation of mass refugee flows and instability by brutality , as well as Putin ’ s cooption of Islamic militants in Chechnya and Afghanistan ) .
Many critics of American foreign policy avoid endorsing Putin ’ s agenda .
Nevertheless , the tribal politics of American discourse tends to push all but the most independent into one camp or the other , and the result is a subtribe of the right that is both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right is more uniformly hostile to China than it is friendly to Russia .
Its rhetoric—especially in informal online fora—has tended to be hyperbolically Sinophobic , a posture hardened by President Trump ’ s blaming of Xi Jinping for the coronavirus and willing to overlook Trump ’ s own inconsistencies on the subject .
A leading indicator of one ’ s allegiance to Democrats or Republicans is the tendency to believe or disregard allegations that the coronavirus is the product of a Chinese laboratory and not a naturally occurring phenomenon .
As of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in American right-wing discourse but frequently regarded as racist on the left .
American China hawks , in general , tend to be Russia doves , and vice versa .
It is noteworthy that , while Trump ’ s actual record on confronting China is mixed at best , his rhetoric on China has been well-received by his base .
The American left and center , meanwhile , have historically been more willing to give China the benefit of the doubt on many questions related to internal humanitarianism and outward intentions , going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accession to the World Trade Organization .
In particular , the hope has been that a free-trading China would not only be agreeable to the rules of the system ( instead of committed to reshaping them ) , but would internally liberalize economically and in humanitarian terms , would not be unduly militarily aggressive ( or at any rate would not pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. allies ) , and would be an honest collaborator on a durable future climate deal .
These were not exclusively left-wing views , and they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but they persisted longest on the center-left .
Recent experience has cast doubt on all of these propositions .
It is no longer the case that Democrats regard China in favorable terms—in fact , though more dovish on average than Republicans , Democrats now tend to be China skeptics .
However , as assuredly as Russophilia exerts heavy influence on the American right , tolerance of China clusters on the American left .
Defenses of China ’ s handling of the coronavirus were standard in center-left media in the early weeks of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ online trolls .
Hollywood and Silicon Valley are reliable Democratic constituencies ( and donors ) and continue to search for market access in China .
Something similar obtains in American academia , a reliable Democratic stronghold , where criticism of China is disincentivized .
Although the College Democrats joined the College Republicans in opposing the Confucius Institutes on U.S. campuses as PRC propaganda outlets , opposition to them initially came from Republicans .
Most recently , while it may be said that the New York Times is well justified in publishing a variety @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that an op-ed justifying the Chinese crackdown in Hong Kong was much more gently received on the American left than a similar one by Republican Senator Tom Cotton calling for force majeure against demonstrations in New York .
This cultural partisanship also drives Americans ’ attitudes toward allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific .
A noteworthy case involves balancing concerns about Narendra Modi ’ s Hindu nationalism against the imperative for Indian cooperation to counterbalance China .
Members of the American center-left have condemned Modi and regarded him as another specimen of out-of-control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transatlantic center-left and the EU itself .
Trump has courted him .
This is not to say that all politicians on either side in the United States adopt these views .
Just for example , Pete Buttigieg was fairly hawkish on both Russia and China in the Democratic presidential debates ; he is mirrored on the right by the likes of Mitt Romney .
Joe Biden appears to be cutting across this divide .
Nor do all ( or even most ) Democratic or Republican voters share these biases .
It is merely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tend to follow predictable and opposite patterns , particularly among the most committed members of both factions , and the cultures of both right and left—or , more specifically , what the cultures of right and left consider their paramount threats—are major driving forces behind these views .
Republicans and Democrats , in their domestic factionalism , have oriented themselves toward their preferred cultural outcomes in the rest of the world , dismissing each other ’ s concerns as invalid and adopting “ enemy of my enemy ” logic towards each other ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ friends as well as enemies in doing so .
In fact , the divide between internationalist/liberal and nationalist/authoritarian factions is found in voting patterns and broader cultural attitudes across the developed world .
Residents of the economically depressed former East Germany are portrayed in press reporting as perhaps having more in common with Trump voters in dysfunctional communities than with Germany ’ s political class or even that in Brussels .
Within England , if not Britain as a whole , voting patterns for Brexit followed an urban-rural divide that would be instantaneously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American liberals often express greater ease traveling in western Europe than in Trump country .
Support for Brexit was a reliable predictor of support for Trump .
Thus , opposing American factions have found their allies and adversaries across borders and oceans .
The result is not merely a case of domestic political paralysis , but of transnational political paralysis brought on by identity and cultural politics and the resulting effective partisanship of opposing political bases .
This is hugely relevant in an era when , especially since the Iran deal , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to negate each other ’ s foreign policy decisions , making coherent strategy impossible .
( Not ) Putting It All Together All of this is a major problem if one regards both Russia and China to be geopolitical competitors .
The American strategy for the Cold War was ( usually ) to establish that partisan politics stopped at the water ’ s edge , to mobilize the public behind addressing the challenge , and to work on building consensus among American allies .
All of this was not perfect—the rift with France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ostpolitik are two major examples ( and there are others ) of Western allies not being on the same page with American policy .
In general , however , in past decades there was an ability at least to point the allies in the same direction .
The United States acted simultaneously as a leader and , if need be , a file closer .
It was not paralyzed by indecision and an inability to address one problem without reversing course on another .
Nor were its allies .
It is useless to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , as much of a problem as that is , when the United States itself can not make up its mind .
The security of the free world depends first on reconstructing it .
Although that may be one or several election cycles away , an attempt to end mindless identity politics and put the culture wars on pause will be required if the United States is to build the consensus that liberal democracy is worth protecting , even to the point of sacrificing partisan advantages .
Putting First Things First : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible way forward may lie not in trying to eliminate the U.S. culture war but in limiting it .
Cultural differences and their intersection with politics are too near to the hearts of citizens of democracies to be cast aside .
It is unreasonable to expect voters not to be animated by issues that are foundational to their cultural traditions .
What might work instead would be to acknowledge them and reduce their impact on grand strategy .
At the moment , the culture war has descended into actual violence , and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divide will have to wait for the violence to subside .
Supposing this could be done , however , addressing the deeper cultural rift might be possible .
In effect , Americans could try to acknowledge their cultural differences while committing to preventing them from getting out of hand .
As with any other truce , there would be a tacit agreement among politically influential figures ( including some not normally considered political figures ) to play defense rather than offense on culture war issues .
Existing Supreme Court precedents would largely be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( a key understanding , because cultural issues do not allow for a permanent settlement ) , with as few major alterations as possible .
Chief Justice John Roberts has , in recent years , signaled his endorsement of exactly this kind of jurisprudence .
National legislation on sensitive matters would be limited in scope and brought up only when events drew attention .
Parties would be free to maintain their stances on issues they consider too important to ignore while accepting détente with their opponents in the national interest .
Members of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues into emergency legislation .
Political candidates could also make an effort to campaign outside their strongholds and avoid using language demonizing their opponents .
( Because of President Trump ’ s direct incitement of violence and countless breaches of democratic norms , he belongs in a special category , and remedies for this assume his absence from positions of power , if not public life entirely . )
The usage of foreign policy topics as wedge issues—a common occurrence since the intense politicization of the Iraq War—could be reduced or avoided .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ less inflammatory character could use the bully pulpit to call the country ’ s attention to the fact that it has multiple adversaries who would like nothing better than to see it tear itself apart .
The truly divisive and toxic aspects of the far right need not be appeased in order to build consensus ; neither should left-wing looting and vandalism or mutual street violence .
But by reducing the intensity of the more mainstream culture war , the United States could begin to rebuild strategy .
All of this would require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either party have thus far shown—but the United States has a proud history of responding successfully at the last minute , and may yet do so again .
Part of doing so must be to acknowledge that , where the United States is concerned , a big country based on freedom of conscience will always have at least some cultural dissonance .
Arguments about values are signs of freedom ; free countries must manage them when full agreement can not be reached .
The key is to keep them from being a crippling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so will democracies voting against democracy .
As long as opposite factions within the liberal world are played off each other by its adversaries , freedom and America will lose .

Now Roman is to Roman
More hateful than a foe,
And the tribunes beard the high,
And the fathers grind the low.
As we wax hot in faction,
In battle we wax cold;
Wherefore men fight not as they fought
In the brave days of old
–Macaulay, “Horatius at the Bridge”
“Democracy and pluralism are under assault,” reports Freedom House. “2019 was the 14th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.” This alarming trend is partially thanks to the preeminent challengers to the liberal international order, Russia and China, exporting their models of authoritarianism. But it also owes much to deteriorating politics within the free world, especially the United States, which makes it harder to confront foreign threats to democracy.
The cultural-political polarization in America, as in much of the West, extends to mirror-imaged tolerance of one or the other of the United States’ greatest great-power challengers, making it more difficult—if not impossible—for the democratic world to defend itself. China and Russia each have claim to a faction of the democratic world that crosses borders—ensuring that whoever wins any given election, freedom loses globally.
In the United States, Republicans consistently view China as a major security threat, but frequently admire Russia to a greater degree than ever before, and have become willing to tolerate it given its ties to President Trump. Conversely, at least until the Obama administration, and to some extent through it, Democrats regarded China in more neutral terms, seeking to integrate it into a shared world order and even hoping for a durable climate deal. Though this attitude has shifted massively since the outbreak of COVID-19, positive attitudes toward China and defenses of its actions tend to cluster among the Democratic base and dovetail with its ideology. On the other hand, Democrats now regard Russia as a major national security threat.
This polarization connects to a similar, parallel polarization within and among America’s allies, hamstringing the democratic world.
The EU’s European Identity Problem
To see how this operates, it helps to examine linkages and divides that cut across national boundaries. Where Europe is concerned, Russia may be the most relevant outside power, but Europe’s polarization links to America’s on this issue.
Broadly speaking, most European states have a pro-EU faction and a Euroskeptic faction. Both groups are pushing a European identity agenda, but from opposite perspectives. This factional divide corresponds to America’s pro- and anti-Russian divide.
While there is significant divergence about the future of the EU, the pro-EU vision of Europe is of an continent that is mostly secularized, stripped of major cultural differences, and admiring of the postwar (and post-Cold War) vision of a Europe united by a desire to overcome its historical divisions and the nationalist ideologies that drove them. The EU proponents tend also to be free-trading (at least within Europe), relatively pro-immigration and pro–intra-European free movement, and relatively cosmopolitan (at least in their more left-wing variant). With some exceptions, this faction’s prominent members include most of parties under the tents of the European People’s Party, the Party of European Socialists, and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, among others.
It should be noted: There are also disconcerting connections and sympathies between the European far-left and the Kremlin, but these groups and parties should be considered distinct from the mainstream European center-left. A consideration of links between Russian outreach to far-left factions in both Europe and the United States is less relevant due to their failure to capture a major faction, although Bernie Sanders’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s insurgencies may be portents.
Euroskeptic parties, meanwhile, tend to be immigration-skeptic (indeed, this is often their founding issue), willing or even eager to cut back on the free movement provisions of the Schengen Agreement, and fundamentally nationalist, this last feature being perhaps their common denominator. While they are not uniformly protectionist (and mainstream pro-EU parties often are), Euroskeptic parties often profess some sort of nationalist protectionism. Critically, they are generally friendlier to Russia: Their nationalism tends more toward fear of Muslim immigrants crossing borders than Russian soldiers. The gradual adoption by Putin’s government of the self-appointed role of protector of traditional Christianity—not to mention generous financial arrangements—have endeared Russia to the European far right.
Exceptions do occur. Division over how to handle Finland’s historic national enemy was a contributing factor to the split within the populist Finns Party. Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party is an interesting case study in ambiguity on this issue, having both improved Poland’s defenses and regurgitated Putinist anti-immigrant and anti-LGBT talking points. (The nationalist model for Finland has historically been a combination of appeasement and military readiness; in this, eastern European Euroskeptics are following an old playbook.) In general, however, the Euroskeptic parties are, if not Putinist or pro-Putin, then Putin-tolerant.
Though the Euroskeptic parties are often cast as opponents of European unity by virtue of being nationalists, this is not entirely the case. They often subscribe to a European identity narrative based on a mythology of Western civilization (in its historical, rather than current, form), some form of white supremacism, Christian or ethnic identitarianism, and/or hostility to or suspicion of non-European outsiders. In other words, the Euroskeptic right, while possibly driving European atomism and separatism, not infrequently adopts a European-identity driven politics of an anti-liberal nature. In fact, it remains to be seen whether nationalist separatism or illiberal Western supremacism will be the dominant political force among the European Euroskeptic right in the coming years.
Meanwhile, in America . . .
These fissures transcend the Atlantic. Partisanship on each side not only mirrors the other, but political partisans are connected to their opposite numbers abroad and embrace a grand strategy or policy that mobilizes like-minded outside parties against domestic opponents doing the same.
At the moment, Democrats in the United States tend to have a positive view of the EU and often regard it as a model for the United States’s domestic policy, notably admiring European healthcare, environmental, and firearms policies. Some Republicans, particularly Trump-skeptics, are also supportive of the EU, even if they are less enthusiastic about copying European domestic policies at home. Taken together, these groups form a faction that is broadly pro-NATO and pro-EU, embraces conventional models of trade and institutionalism, regards Russia as a major national security problem, and seeks to solve that problem by whatever means possible.
By contrast, the American far right is linked to the Euroskeptic European right. This is most easily recognized on the fringes. The American alt-right and similar far-right elements regard Russia as a friend against Islam, non-white immigration, Islamic terrorism, or other essentially cultural opponents.
However, this alignment is not unique to the far right. It is found among the Republican base and especially among Republican social and cultural conservatives. Among Republicans, approval of Russia has spiked since 2016, but outreach to conservatives by Putin’s United Russia Party began several election cycles earlier. Qualitatively, while Republicans still appear in surveys to have a net negative view of Putin, the substantial minority who view him positively are likely to be the most vocal and committed members of the Republican base.
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Longstanding cultural issues in the United States have been internationalized and turned into reasons for American rightists to support Putinism. A major Republican criticism of the EU that mirrors Republican admiration for Putin is the EU’s subreplacement fertility rate and indifference to traditional family structures, as contrasted with Putin’s pro-reproduction policies, support for traditional religion, and hostility to LGBT concerns. Perhaps the largest instance of soft cooperation, in terms of numbers involved, involves gun rights. Gun ownership is historically one of the most reliable predictors of voting patterns in U.S. elections and a major motivator for Republicans. It is therefore significant that the nation’s principal Second Amendment advocacy organization, the National Rifle Association, is heavily subject to Russian aid and influence, and yet remains the movement leader and, for Second Amendment advocates, almost the only game in town. (More absolutist startup Second Amendment advocacy groups are also at the very least targets for Russian influence.)
Cultural conservatism, in short, has been internationalized, and not just on the far-right fringe, but among relatively mainstream cultural conservatives—in exactly the same way that admiration for Western Europe is a cultural-political delineator for cultural progressives. Anecdotes exist of Trump rally attendees wearing shirts expressing a cultural preference for Russia over the American left.
Nor is right-wing tolerance or favoritism for Putin limited to cultural issues. Even American economic rightists were for a time (and some still are) impressed by what they saw as a Russian economic miracle and business opportunity. So, too, have been opponents of the United States’s post-9/11 foreign policy, many of whom are skeptical of American continued participation in NATO. Some also (perhaps not entirely without justification) regard American Middle East policy as a series of own-goals in which Russia has saved the day by suppressing Salafist jihadism. American rightists often admire Putin’s unapologetic nationalism and subscribe without reservation to the image Putin has constructed of Russia as a bulwark against militant Islam (and are willing to overlook the Russian Air Force’s creation of mass refugee flows and instability by brutality, as well as Putin’s cooption of Islamic militants in Chechnya and Afghanistan).
Many critics of American foreign policy avoid endorsing Putin’s agenda. Nevertheless, the tribal politics of American discourse tends to push all but the most independent into one camp or the other, and the result is a subtribe of the right that is both pro-Putin and highly influential.
On China
The American right is more uniformly hostile to China than it is friendly to Russia. Its rhetoric—especially in informal online fora—has tended to be hyperbolically Sinophobic, a posture hardened by President Trump’s blaming of Xi Jinping for the coronavirus and willing to overlook Trump’s own inconsistencies on the subject. A leading indicator of one’s allegiance to Democrats or Republicans is the tendency to believe or disregard allegations that the coronavirus is the product of a Chinese laboratory and not a naturally occurring phenomenon. As of now, criticisms of China are unremarkable in American right-wing discourse but frequently regarded as racist on the left. American China hawks, in general, tend to be Russia doves, and vice versa. It is noteworthy that, while Trump’s actual record on confronting China is mixed at best, his rhetoric on China has been well-received by his base.
The American left and center, meanwhile, have historically been more willing to give China the benefit of the doubt on many questions related to internal humanitarianism and outward intentions, going back at least to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. In particular, the hope has been that a free-trading China would not only be agreeable to the rules of the system (instead of committed to reshaping them), but would internally liberalize economically and in humanitarian terms, would not be unduly militarily aggressive (or at any rate would not pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. allies), and would be an honest collaborator on a durable future climate deal. These were not exclusively left-wing views, and they are fast becoming obsolete across the board, but they persisted longest on the center-left. Recent experience has cast doubt on all of these propositions. It is no longer the case that Democrats regard China in favorable terms—in fact, though more dovish on average than Republicans, Democrats now tend to be China skeptics.
However, as assuredly as Russophilia exerts heavy influence on the American right, tolerance of China clusters on the American left. Defenses of China’s handling of the coronavirus were standard in center-left media in the early weeks of the pandemic, and were exploited by Chinese online trolls. Hollywood and Silicon Valley are reliable Democratic constituencies (and donors) and continue to search for market access in China. Something similar obtains in American academia, a reliable Democratic stronghold, where criticism of China is disincentivized. Although the College Democrats joined the College Republicans in opposing the Confucius Institutes on U.S. campuses as PRC propaganda outlets, opposition to them initially came from Republicans. Most recently, while it may be said that the New York Times is well justified in publishing a variety of viewpoints, it has been noted that an op-ed justifying the Chinese crackdown in Hong Kong was much more gently received on the American left than a similar one by Republican Senator Tom Cotton calling for force majeure against demonstrations in New York.
This cultural partisanship also drives Americans’ attitudes toward allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. A noteworthy case involves balancing concerns about Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalism against the imperative for Indian cooperation to counterbalance China. Members of the American center-left have condemned Modi and regarded him as another specimen of out-of-control nationalism, a view echoed by the transatlantic center-left and the EU itself. Trump has courted him.
It’s the Culture Wars, Stupid!
This is not to say that all politicians on either side in the United States adopt these views. Just for example, Pete Buttigieg was fairly hawkish on both Russia and China in the Democratic presidential debates; he is mirrored on the right by the likes of Mitt Romney. Joe Biden appears to be cutting across this divide. Nor do all (or even most) Democratic or Republican voters share these biases. It is merely the case that views of foreign policy tend to follow predictable and opposite patterns, particularly among the most committed members of both factions, and the cultures of both right and left—or, more specifically, what the cultures of right and left consider their paramount threats—are major driving forces behind these views. Republicans and Democrats, in their domestic factionalism, have oriented themselves toward their preferred cultural outcomes in the rest of the world, dismissing each other’s concerns as invalid and adopting “enemy of my enemy” logic towards each other’s perceived threats. They have found friends as well as enemies in doing so.
In fact, the divide between internationalist/liberal and nationalist/authoritarian factions is found in voting patterns and broader cultural attitudes across the developed world. Residents of the economically depressed former East Germany are portrayed in press reporting as perhaps having more in common with Trump voters in dysfunctional communities than with Germany’s political class or even that in Brussels. Within England, if not Britain as a whole, voting patterns for Brexit followed an urban-rural divide that would be instantaneously recognizable to an upstate New Yorker. American liberals often express greater ease traveling in western Europe than in Trump country. Support for Brexit was a reliable predictor of support for Trump.
Thus, opposing American factions have found their allies and adversaries across borders and oceans. The result is not merely a case of domestic political paralysis, but of transnational political paralysis brought on by identity and cultural politics and the resulting effective partisanship of opposing political bases. This is hugely relevant in an era when, especially since the Iran deal, it is now normal for American political parties to negate each other’s foreign policy decisions, making coherent strategy impossible.
(Not) Putting It All Together
All of this is a major problem if one regards both Russia and China to be geopolitical competitors. The American strategy for the Cold War was (usually) to establish that partisan politics stopped at the water’s edge, to mobilize the public behind addressing the challenge, and to work on building consensus among American allies. All of this was not perfect—the rift with France over NATO and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik are two major examples (and there are others) of Western allies not being on the same page with American policy. In general, however, in past decades there was an ability at least to point the allies in the same direction. The United States acted simultaneously as a leader and, if need be, a file closer. It was not paralyzed by indecision and an inability to address one problem without reversing course on another. Nor were its allies. It is useless to speak of European inaction on Russia and China, as much of a problem as that is, when the United States itself cannot make up its mind.
The security of the free world depends first on reconstructing it. Although that may be one or several election cycles away, an attempt to end mindless identity politics and put the culture wars on pause will be required if the United States is to build the consensus that liberal democracy is worth protecting, even to the point of sacrificing partisan advantages.
Putting First Things First: Agreeing (Temporarily) to Disagree
A possible way forward may lie not in trying to eliminate the U.S. culture war but in limiting it. Cultural differences and their intersection with politics are too near to the hearts of citizens of democracies to be cast aside. It is unreasonable to expect voters not to be animated by issues that are foundational to their cultural traditions. What might work instead would be to acknowledge them and reduce their impact on grand strategy.
At the moment, the culture war has descended into actual violence, and a real solution to America’s political divide will have to wait for the violence to subside. Supposing this could be done, however, addressing the deeper cultural rift might be possible. In effect, Americans could try to acknowledge their cultural differences while committing to preventing them from getting out of hand.
As with any other truce, there would be a tacit agreement among politically influential figures (including some not normally considered political figures) to play defense rather than offense on culture war issues. Existing Supreme Court precedents would largely be left to stand for the time being (a key understanding, because cultural issues do not allow for a permanent settlement), with as few major alterations as possible. Chief Justice John Roberts has, in recent years, signaled his endorsement of exactly this kind of jurisprudence. National legislation on sensitive matters would be limited in scope and brought up only when events drew attention. Parties would be free to maintain their stances on issues they consider too important to ignore while accepting détente with their opponents in the national interest. Members of Congress could decide not to insert cultural issues into emergency legislation. Political candidates could also make an effort to campaign outside their strongholds and avoid using language demonizing their opponents. (Because of President Trump’s direct incitement of violence and countless breaches of democratic norms, he belongs in a special category, and remedies for this assume his absence from positions of power, if not public life entirely.)
The usage of foreign policy topics as wedge issues—a common occurrence since the intense politicization of the Iraq War—could be reduced or avoided. And a future U.S. president with a less inflammatory character could use the bully pulpit to call the country’s attention to the fact that it has multiple adversaries who would like nothing better than to see it tear itself apart.
The truly divisive and toxic aspects of the far right need not be appeased in order to build consensus; neither should left-wing looting and vandalism or mutual street violence. But by reducing the intensity of the more mainstream culture war, the United States could begin to rebuild strategy.
All of this would require more patriotism and leadership than leaders of either party have thus far shown—but the United States has a proud history of responding successfully at the last minute, and may yet do so again. Part of doing so must be to acknowledge that, where the United States is concerned, a big country based on freedom of conscience will always have at least some cultural dissonance. Arguments about values are signs of freedom; free countries must manage them when full agreement cannot be reached. The key is to keep them from being a crippling liability.
The consequences of not doing so will democracies voting against democracy. As long as opposite factions within the liberal world are played off each other by its adversaries, freedom and America will lose.


Biden’s Refreshing Boringness

A group of former Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren supporters have decided to put their own twist on encouraging unity in the Democratic party as Democrats work to recapture the White House .
They have created a website called “ Settle for Biden , ” which tries to sell the former vice president to the voting public by arguing that that “ Biden isn ’ t fantastic but Trump is far , far worse.
” The group ’ s social media accounts kinda-sorta-cheerlead for Biden by assuring Americans that Biden “ won ’ t destroy the planet , ” by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better than an F , ” and by pointing out that “ Joe Biden won ’ t let 180,000 Americans die of a disease that is easily preventable , ” adding further that “ Donald Trump has done just that.
” ( As of this writing , the death toll is actually 217,000 . )
To be sure , kinda-sorta-cheerleading isn ’ t the same as actual cheerleading , and “ Settle for Biden ” doesn ’ t exactly offer the kind of full-throated support that the Biden-Harris team would undoubtedly wish that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any doubt as to my own position , let me place my own cards on the table : I believe that Joe Biden deserves full-throated support .
That ’ s because I believe that the presidential election of 2020 is the most important presidential election since at least the one held in 1864 , and because I believe that a Trump re-election could very well pose a mortal threat to actual and genuine American greatness and the preeminence of a liberal order that has brought unparalleled freedom and prosperity to America , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rest of the world .
But while I am more than eager to offer full-throated support to the Biden campaign , I still find something healthy and refreshing about the “ Settle for Biden ” crowd .
Notwithstanding the fact that legions of Sanders and Warren supporters actually did idolize and place on pedestals their own first choices for the Democratic presidential nomination , the former Sanders and Warren backers who make up the “ Settle for Biden ” group refuses to extend the same treatment to Joe Biden .
Instead , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to vote for the Biden-Harris ticket because it is the grown-up thing to do , and because “ if Donald Trump wins , there won ’ t be an election that is even remotely free and fair for decades to come in the United States.
” In a political era that sees just about every serious campaign for the presidency turn into a mini-personality cult , it is something of a relief to see that the Biden campaign is not working to engender fanatical devotion to the former vice president .
Maybe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better than to think that fanatical hero worship of Joe Biden will ever actually be a thing .
But maybe it is also because Biden is more interested in offering himself as a sane , sober and levelheaded alternative to the incumbent president , and sane , sober and levelheaded people don ’ t encourage their allies and supporters to behave like fawning devotees who checked their critical faculties at the door .
Accordingly , there are no “ Biden Bros. ” There is also no Bidenesque equivalent of QAnon , making up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frightening stories that portray the Democratic nominee for president as a providential and messianic savior , secretly battling vile and barbaric foes engaged in committing unimaginably reprehensible crimes .
While Trump supporters are willing to endanger themselves and others by flocking in a maskless and physically non-distanced fashion to campaign rallies that could prove to be COVID-19-superspreader events ( even after the president himself tested positive for COVID-19 ) , Biden supporters—who are at least as determined to oust Trump from the White House as Trump supporters are willing to give him four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more years—refuse to endanger their health and lives , or the health and lives of those in their community , by turning Biden campaign events into opportunities for the coronavirus to do its worst .
And even if Biden supporters were willing to toss public health considerations to the side to show their devotion to the Democratic ticket , the Biden campaign wouldn ’ t let them do so .
Speeches and events featuring Biden or Kamala Harris involve a small number of masked and physically distanced participants , in strict observance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has made clear that debates will either feature the strictest health precautions , or they won ’ t happen at all .
Contrast this with Trump , who is more than glad to hold campaign events that endanger his fans and could pose a public health threat to the communities in which the events are located , and who continues to scorn the idea of wearing masks , notwithstanding his contraction of COVID-19 .
Biden and Harris don ’ t jeopardize the health and lives of others just so that they can jazz @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vast throngs of supporters , and unless they are speaking at a socially distant podium , both make sure to model good behavior for the American people by wearing masks .
There is , after all , a difference between a responsible and adult presidential campaign on the one hand , and a rampantly reckless clique on the other .
And while we may be living in a # lolnothingmatters world , and while there is still plenty of time for the race to shift , it is worth noting that the responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responsible and adult behavior rewarded in the polls .
It ’ s hard to beat an incumbent president seeking re-election , but for the moment , the refreshingly boring Biden campaign is doing just that .
The refreshingly boring Biden campaign is modeling good behavior and sanity in other ways as well .
It seems amazing to have to write the following words , but here goes : Joe Biden is helping bring back best practices and good and responsible government to America by—wait for it !
—promising to read his intelligence briefings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is not enough to blow the minds of voters , Biden has also urged the American people to not drink bleach , just in case any of the president ’ s followers interpreted his medical advice that way .
Ordinarily , such common-sense banalities would not amount to much of anything at all .
But in 2020 , these Bidenesque pronouncements constitute genuine and profound pearls of wisdom when compared to the words and statements of Donald Trump .
So , here ’ s to the virtues of a conventional , chaos-free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promises to restore some semblance of normalcy and decency to American politics .
In the continuing chaos of the 200 presidential campaign , it would appear that the almost humdrum lucidity exhibited by Joe Biden ’ s campaign is not just welcomed by Americans ; it is craved .
Donald Trump insists on treating America and the American presidency as a reality show .
Joe Biden , by contrast , insists on treating Americans as adults and the presidency as serious business .
And unless current political trajectories are dramatically altered , Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joe Biden , and in doing so , bringing back more refreshing boringness back into American life .
We could do worse than to have that happen .

A group of former Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren supporters have decided to put their own twist on encouraging unity in the Democratic party as Democrats work to recapture the White House. They have created a website called “Settle for Biden,” which tries to sell the former vice president to the voting public by arguing that that “Biden isn’t fantastic but Trump is far, far worse.” The group’s social media accounts kinda-sorta-cheerlead for Biden by assuring Americans that Biden “won’t destroy the planet,” by reminding us that “a C+ is better than an F,” and by pointing out that “Joe Biden won’t let 180,000 Americans die of a disease that is easily preventable,” adding further that “Donald Trump has done just that.” (As of this writing, the death toll is actually 217,000.)
To be sure, kinda-sorta-cheerleading isn’t the same as actual cheerleading, and “Settle for Biden” doesn’t exactly offer the kind of full-throated support that the Biden-Harris team would undoubtedly wish that it would. And lest there be any doubt as to my own position, let me place my own cards on the table: I believe that Joe Biden deserves full-throated support. That’s because I believe that the presidential election of 2020 is the most important presidential election since at least the one held in 1864, and because I believe that a Trump re-election could very well pose a mortal threat to actual and genuine American greatness and the preeminence of a liberal order that has brought unparalleled freedom and prosperity to America, to her allies, and to much of the rest of the world.
But while I am more than eager to offer full-throated support to the Biden campaign, I still find something healthy and refreshing about the “Settle for Biden” crowd. Notwithstanding the fact that legions of Sanders and Warren supporters actually did idolize and place on pedestals their own first choices for the Democratic presidential nomination, the former Sanders and Warren backers who make up the “Settle for Biden” group refuses to extend the same treatment to Joe Biden. Instead, “Settle for Biden” urges Americans to vote for the Biden-Harris ticket because it is the grown-up thing to do, and because “if Donald Trump wins, there won’t be an election that is even remotely free and fair for decades to come in the United States.”
In a political era that sees just about every serious campaign for the presidency turn into a mini-personality cult, it is something of a relief to see that the Biden campaign is not working to engender fanatical devotion to the former vice president. Maybe that’s just because the campaign knows better than to think that fanatical hero worship of Joe Biden will ever actually be a thing. But maybe it is also because Biden is more interested in offering himself as a sane, sober and levelheaded alternative to the incumbent president, and sane, sober and levelheaded people don’t encourage their allies and supporters to behave like fawning devotees who checked their critical faculties at the door.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Accordingly, there are no “Biden Bros.” There is also no Bidenesque equivalent of QAnon, making up and spreading bizarre, ridiculous, and frightening stories that portray the Democratic nominee for president as a providential and messianic savior, secretly battling vile and barbaric foes engaged in committing unimaginably reprehensible crimes. While Trump supporters are willing to endanger themselves and others by flocking in a maskless and physically non-distanced fashion to campaign rallies that could prove to be COVID-19-superspreader events (even after the president himself tested positive for COVID-19), Biden supporters—who are at least as determined to oust Trump from the White House as Trump supporters are willing to give him four (or eight, or twelve) more years—refuse to endanger their health and lives, or the health and lives of those in their community, by turning Biden campaign events into opportunities for the coronavirus to do its worst.
And even if Biden supporters were willing to toss public health considerations to the side to show their devotion to the Democratic ticket, the Biden campaign wouldn’t let them do so. Speeches and events featuring Biden or Kamala Harris involve a small number of masked and physically distanced participants, in strict observance of public health guidelines. The Biden campaign has made clear that debates will either feature the strictest health precautions, or they won’t happen at all. Contrast this with Trump, who is more than glad to hold campaign events that endanger his fans and could pose a public health threat to the communities in which the events are located, and who continues to scorn the idea of wearing masks, notwithstanding his contraction of COVID-19. Biden and Harris don’t jeopardize the health and lives of others just so that they can jazz up a campaign event with images of vast throngs of supporters, and unless they are speaking at a socially distant podium, both make sure to model good behavior for the American people by wearing masks.
There is, after all, a difference between a responsible and adult presidential campaign on the one hand, and a rampantly reckless clique on the other. And while we may be living in a #lolnothingmatters world, and while there is still plenty of time for the race to shift, it is worth noting that the responsible and adult presidential campaign is having its responsible and adult behavior rewarded in the polls. It’s hard to beat an incumbent president seeking re-election, but for the moment, the refreshingly boring Biden campaign is doing just that.
The refreshingly boring Biden campaign is modeling good behavior and sanity in other ways as well. It seems amazing to have to write the following words, but here goes: Joe Biden is helping bring back best practices and good and responsible government to America by—wait for it!—promising to read his intelligence briefings if he becomes president. As if that is not enough to blow the minds of voters, Biden has also urged the American people to not drink bleach, just in case any of the president’s followers interpreted his medical advice that way. Ordinarily, such common-sense banalities would not amount to much of anything at all. But in 2020, these Bidenesque pronouncements constitute genuine and profound pearls of wisdom when compared to the words and statements of Donald Trump.
So, here’s to the virtues of a conventional, chaos-free, non-crazy presidential campaign, one that promises to restore some semblance of normalcy and decency to American politics. In the continuing chaos of the 200 presidential campaign, it would appear that the almost humdrum lucidity exhibited by Joe Biden’s campaign is not just welcomed by Americans; it is craved. Donald Trump insists on treating America and the American presidency as a reality show. Joe Biden, by contrast, insists on treating Americans as adults and the presidency as serious business. And unless current political trajectories are dramatically altered, Americans are set to reciprocate by voting for Joe Biden, and in doing so, bringing back more refreshing boringness back into American life.
We could do worse than to have that happen.


thebulwark--2020-10-21--Sending Signals of Support for Tibet

Sending Signals of Support for Tibet

On October 15 , the Trump administration elevated—at least slightly—America ’ s relationship with the democratic Tibetan exile government by welcoming its leader , Lobsang Sangay , to the State Department for the first time .
Robert Destro , the newly appointed special coordinator for Tibetan issues , brought the elected Tibetan leader if not exactly in from the cold then at least in from the coffee shops where American diplomats used to meet him .
Officially , the United States considers Tibet part of China and Washington has previously avoided any hint of the kind of official recognition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the department might suggest .
But now : Keeping the leader of Tibet ’ s democratic exile government at a distance no longer makes sense while the United States moves toward greater coordination with Indo-Pacific democracies .
However , if Sangay ’ s step across the State Department ’ s threshold is to amount to more than a photo op , the United States should include the Tibetan leader in a response to the PRC ’ s assertive international Tibet agenda .
Tibet ’ s democracy in exile dates to 2011 , when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the government elected from Tibet ’ s diaspora .
“ Now we are completely changed from the theocracy of the past , ” the Dalai Lama said at the time .
“ Our decision is a real answer to the Chinese Communist accusation that the whole aim of our struggle is the restoration of the old system.
” The Tibetan government based in India , known as the Central Tibet Administration , has executive , legislative , and judicial branches and enjoys jurisdiction over a number of issues .
The Dalai Lama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identity and therefore the target of PRC efforts to usurp his authority and exert control over Tibetan Buddhism .
At a rare Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) meeting on the subject of Tibet this past August , Chinese leader Xi Jinping repeated a call to “ actively guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society and promote the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism.
” Internationally , Tibet serves as both a means and an end in Beijing ’ s assault on liberal democratic norms .
China presses its positions on Tibet within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manipulating the Human Rights Council—to which it was just re-elected—and imposing litmus tests related to Tibet throughout the organization .
Even history is put at the service of the PRC ’ s objectives as CCP-approved history has progressively backdated the PRC ’ s claims to Tibet to “ antiquity ” just as it has insisted its rights in the South China Sea date to “ ancient times.
” In countries with Buddhist traditions , Beijing is on a spending spree , developing and appropriating historic Buddhist sites , coopting Buddhist monks and institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an authority on Tibetan Buddhism and sow disloyalty to the Dalai Lama .
One of the CCP ’ s top priorities : Gaining the world ’ s acquiescence to a China-designated successor to the Dalai Lama .
The consequences of all this for Tibetans are dire , inside and outside Tibet .
Nepal , once a haven for Tibetan refugees , has capitulated to Chinese demands to repatriate fleeing Tibetans and persecute the historic settled Tibetan community .
China built Nepal a police academy and according to reports Chinese security officials have operated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has continued its aggression on other fronts : • China has escalated its pressure across the disputed border between occupied Tibet and India , leading this past summer to the deadliest clash in decades , while amplifying China ’ s claim to large areas of Indian territory as “ South Tibet.
” • After the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in November 2016 , the PRC shut down border trade with Mongolia and imposed fees on exports .
Beijing was furious that Ulaanbaatar allowed the Dalai Lama to exercise an authority that Beijing claims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prominent lama in Mongolia ’ s branch of Tibetan Buddhism .
Not only did the use of economic pressure intimidate Mongolia—by December 2016 , Mongolian officials were expressing regret for having welcomed the Dalai Lama—but it also sent a signal to other countries of the costs they might face if they fail to acquiesce when the PRC names its own Dalai Lama .
America has made less headway on the priorities of Tibet policy , a Sino-Tibetan dialogue , “ meaningful autonomy , ” and religious , linguistic and human rights , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is under Communist rule .
U.S. officials should consider why America ’ s position on Tibet evolved in stark contrast to Washington ’ s staunch refusal to recognize the 1940 Soviet annexation of Estonia , Latvia , and Lithuania .
Over five decades , the United States maintained contacts with Baltic diplomats and sent other signals of support , even symbolic ones such as hanging the Baltic flags in the State Department lobby .
Such moves were judged vital to the Baltic people ’ s morale , and their countries ’ eventual independence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conduct of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union .
Indeed , one might argue that sticking to principle helped the United States achieve other goals with Moscow .
Such a principled position on Tibet would be of great help today in blunting the PRC ’ s international Tibet agenda and its impact on democratic norms .
Perhaps Mr. Sangay ’ s visit to Foggy Bottom hints at further innovation in America ’ s policy .
The establishment of the Tibetan democratic government in exile will be the Dalai Lama ’ s legacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s leading democracy to preserve and expand it .

On October 15, the Trump administration elevated—at least slightly—America’s relationship with the democratic Tibetan exile government by welcoming its leader, Lobsang Sangay, to the State Department for the first time. Robert Destro, the newly appointed special coordinator for Tibetan issues, brought the elected Tibetan leader if not exactly in from the cold then at least in from the coffee shops where American diplomats used to meet him. Officially, the United States considers Tibet part of China and Washington has previously avoided any hint of the kind of official recognition of the Tibetan exile government that meetings in the department might suggest. But now:
Great honor to meet with the Special Coordinator on Tibetan Issues @DRL_AS. This is the first time a Sikyong (President) of the Central Tibetan Administration was formally invited inside the State Department. pic.twitter.com/6iYoAFJ3Ym — Lobsang Sangay (@Drlobsangsangay) October 15, 2020
Keeping the leader of Tibet’s democratic exile government at a distance no longer makes sense while the United States moves toward greater coordination with Indo-Pacific democracies. However, if Sangay’s step across the State Department’s threshold is to amount to more than a photo op, the United States should include the Tibetan leader in a response to the PRC’s assertive international Tibet agenda.
Tibet’s democracy in exile dates to 2011, when the Dalai Lama transferred his political authority to the government elected from Tibet’s diaspora. “Now we are completely changed from the theocracy of the past,” the Dalai Lama said at the time. “Our decision is a real answer to the Chinese Communist accusation that the whole aim of our struggle is the restoration of the old system.” The Tibetan government based in India, known as the Central Tibet Administration, has executive, legislative, and judicial branches and enjoys jurisdiction over a number of issues. The Dalai Lama however, remains central to Tibetan national identity and therefore the target of PRC efforts to usurp his authority and exert control over Tibetan Buddhism. At a rare Chinese Communist Party (CCP) meeting on the subject of Tibet this past August, Chinese leader Xi Jinping repeated a call to “actively guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society and promote the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism.”
Internationally, Tibet serves as both a means and an end in Beijing’s assault on liberal democratic norms. China presses its positions on Tibet within the United Nations and its bodies, manipulating the Human Rights Council—to which it was just re-elected—and imposing litmus tests related to Tibet throughout the organization. Even history is put at the service of the PRC’s objectives as CCP-approved history has progressively backdated the PRC’s claims to Tibet to “antiquity” just as it has insisted its rights in the South China Sea date to “ancient times.”
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In countries with Buddhist traditions, Beijing is on a spending spree, developing and appropriating historic Buddhist sites, coopting Buddhist monks and institutions as a way to gain legitimacy as an authority on Tibetan Buddhism and sow disloyalty to the Dalai Lama. One of the CCP’s top priorities: Gaining the world’s acquiescence to a China-designated successor to the Dalai Lama. The consequences of all this for Tibetans are dire, inside and outside Tibet. Nepal, once a haven for Tibetan refugees, has capitulated to Chinese demands to repatriate fleeing Tibetans and persecute the historic settled Tibetan community. China built Nepal a police academy and according to reports Chinese security officials have operated inside its territory.
Meanwhile, Beijing has continued its aggression on other fronts:
China has escalated its pressure across the disputed border between occupied Tibet and India, leading this past summer to the deadliest clash in decades, while amplifying China’s claim to large areas of Indian territory as “South Tibet.”
After the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in November 2016, the PRC shut down border trade with Mongolia and imposed fees on exports. Beijing was furious that Ulaanbaatar allowed the Dalai Lama to exercise an authority that Beijing claims by confirming the reincarnation of the most prominent lama in Mongolia’s branch of Tibetan Buddhism. Not only did the use of economic pressure intimidate Mongolia—by December 2016, Mongolian officials were expressing regret for having welcomed the Dalai Lama—but it also sent a signal to other countries of the costs they might face if they fail to acquiesce when the PRC names its own Dalai Lama.
America has made less headway on the priorities of Tibet policy, a Sino-Tibetan dialogue, “meaningful autonomy,” and religious, linguistic and human rights, which are virtually impossible to achieve while China is under Communist rule.
U.S. officials should consider why America’s position on Tibet evolved in stark contrast to Washington’s staunch refusal to recognize the 1940 Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Over five decades, the United States maintained contacts with Baltic diplomats and sent other signals of support, even symbolic ones such as hanging the Baltic flags in the State Department lobby. Such moves were judged vital to the Baltic people’s morale, and their countries’ eventual independence, but did not interfere with the conduct of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, one might argue that sticking to principle helped the United States achieve other goals with Moscow.
Such a principled position on Tibet would be of great help today in blunting the PRC’s international Tibet agenda and its impact on democratic norms. Perhaps Mr. Sangay’s visit to Foggy Bottom hints at further innovation in America’s policy. The establishment of the Tibetan democratic government in exile will be the Dalai Lama’s legacy. It is up to the world’s leading democracy to preserve and expand it.


thebulwark--2020-10-22--Donald Trump Ruined Conservatism. Don’t Let Him Ruin Patriotism.

Donald Trump has a documented history of driving Americans away from the policies he favors .
This is both good and bad .
As Catherine Rampell noted , the president has moved American public opinion toward greater approval of immigration .
The percentage of Americans who said that immigration is good for the country bounced around in the 50s and 60s in the first decade and a half of this century .
But since 2016 , the trend has been up sharply .
In 2020 , 77 percent of Americans told Gallup that they think immigration is good for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that accepting refugees fleeing war or persecution should be a priority has increased from 62 percent in 2016 to 73 percent in 2019 .
As Linda Chavez has noted at The Bulwark , the U.S. led the world in refugee admissions for decades , but under Trump , the number of refugees has dropped to record lows .
The president has set a ceiling of 18,000 for fiscal year 2020 , down from 70,000 in 2001 .
We ’ ve come a long way from George W. Bush ’ s admirable insistence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump has also increased the appetite for government involvement in health care .
Since embarking on his quest for the presidency , Trump has denounced the Affordable Care Act , but only because he promised something superior .
His specific policy proposal for replacing the law was something “ terrific , ” “ phenomenal , ” and “ fantastic.
” In February of 2017 , having been in office a few weeks , Trump tweeted “ repeal and replacement of ObamaCare is coming fast !
” At the end of March , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more time .
It didn ’ t happen .
The Republicans shrugged and moved on to tax reform , and the president turned to important matters like accusing Joe Scarborough of murder and warning America about the imminent danger from caravans of immigrants heading for our border .
Health care reform was a dead letter , except that having failed to repeal or replace the ACA through legislation , the administration joined in a legal assault on the law , challenging its constitutionality .
If the Trump administration were to get its way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans would lose health insurance in the midst of a pandemic .
Oh , and on August 3 of this year , the president once again promised his own health care proposal “ hopefully , prior to the end of the month.
” Amazingly , the public ’ s response to this clown show was to express increasing support for the ACA , with a solid 55 percent expressing approval of the law this month , up from about 40 percent in 2016 .
Trump ’ s fulminations against trade have convinced some—Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than in the pre-Trump era—but most Americans have moved in the other direction , with 74 percent agreeing that trade is an opportunity for economic growth versus 21 percent who view it as a threat to the economy .
As a pro-immigrant free-trader , I ’ m not sorry that Trump has driven people away from his views , though I do regret that the Republican party , which I once believed was sincere about favoring more free-market approaches to health care delivery , has crumbled into a heap of ashes on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue they had made the centerpiece of four consecutive elections , they are reduced to attempting to sabotage the law Democrats managed to pass .
Trump has driven people away from the Republican party , and caused them to reject the label “ conservative.
” I ’ m inclined to reject it myself , because in the age of Trump , it has become associated with nativism , racism , ignorance , authoritarianism , contempt , and crackpottery .
And while it ’ s no loss for the nation if protectionism and nativism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Trumpism endangers that would be serious losses .
I worry that Trump is contaminating patriotism itself .
His blatantly racist appeals combined with his crude and offensive invocations of “ America First ” run the risk of associating patriotism with whiteness .
His fondness for the Confederacy stains his embrace of the American flag .
What Trump ’ s fans on the right never seem to grapple with as they ceaselessly invoke the specter of socialism , riots , and gun confiscation , is how much Trump drives the left toward extremism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a left-wing fever of revisionism about American history .
From the 1619 Project to the toppling of statues of anti-slavery heroes , there is a movement afoot that Bari Weiss calls a “ mixture of postmodernism , postcolonialism , identity politics , neo-Marxism , critical race theory , intersectionality , and the therapeutic mentality.
” Some of this predated Trump of course , but he has turbo-charged it .
The leftwing challenge to American legitimacy has always stressed racism , colonialism , sexism , and unconstrained capitalism .
Trump has lived down to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( You may object that he wasn ’ t a colonialist , but don ’ t forget “ Take the oil !
” ) As we look to rebuild in a post-Trump world , we non-leftists must be able to make the case for American patriotism .
We can not respond to the 1619 Project with heavy-handed attempts to limit its reach , but with arguments and context .
No , this country would not be lovable if its history were one long chronicle of racism and oppression .
It isn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ashamed of in our history but much more to celebrate and be grateful for .
We have been free and a beacon of freedom for more than two centuries .
We have welcomed people from all over the globe and insisted that when they become citizens they are the full equals of those born here .
We have confronted our past sins , imperfectly of course , but diligently nevertheless .
We ’ ve given the world fantastic inventions like the airplane and the Salk vaccine , but nothing more important than the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of natural rights .
Trump is a shriveled soul and tends to diminish everything and everyone he touches .
As we move out of his orbit , we can begin to recapture some of the grandeur of the nation he has led so miserably .
Consider the words of Ronald Reagan in his farewell address in January , 1989 , ruminating on what America meant to the world : I ’ ve been reflecting on what the past 8 years have meant and mean .
And the image that comes to mind like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ story about a big ship , and a refugee , and a sailor .
It was back in the early ‘ 80s , at the height of the boat people .
And the sailor was hard at work on the carrier Midway , which was patrolling the South China Sea .
The sailor , like most American servicemen , was young , smart , and fiercely observant .
The crew spied on the horizon a leaky little boat .
And crammed inside were refugees from Indochina hoping to get to America .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them to the ship and safety .
As the refugees made their way through the choppy seas , one spied the sailor on deck , and stood up , and called out to him .
He yelled , ‘ Hello , American sailor .
Hello , freedom man.
’ We can not permit American patriotism to be hijacked by yahoos and bigots .
As we start to heal from the past four years , we must rescue patriotism from Trumpism .

Donald Trump has a documented history of driving Americans away from the policies he favors. This is both good and bad.
As Catherine Rampell noted, the president has moved American public opinion toward greater approval of immigration. The percentage of Americans who said that immigration is good for the country bounced around in the 50s and 60s in the first decade and a half of this century. But since 2016, the trend has been up sharply. In 2020, 77 percent of Americans told Gallup that they think immigration is good for the country. Similarly, the percentage who believe that accepting refugees fleeing war or persecution should be a priority has increased from 62 percent in 2016 to 73 percent in 2019. As Linda Chavez has noted at The Bulwark, the U.S. led the world in refugee admissions for decades, but under Trump, the number of refugees has dropped to record lows. The president has set a ceiling of 18,000 for fiscal year 2020, down from 70,000 in 2001. We’ve come a long way from George W. Bush’s admirable insistence on admitting refugees even after 9/11.
Trump has also increased the appetite for government involvement in health care. Since embarking on his quest for the presidency, Trump has denounced the Affordable Care Act, but only because he promised something superior. His specific policy proposal for replacing the law was something “terrific,” “phenomenal,” and “fantastic.” In February of 2017, having been in office a few weeks, Trump tweeted “repeal and replacement of ObamaCare is coming fast!” At the end of March, with negotiations bogging down, he pleaded for more time.
I never said repeal and replace Obamacare. You’ve all heard my speeches. I never said repeal it and replace it within 64 days. [He said 100 days.] I have a long time. But I want to have a great health care bill and plan, and we will. It will happen. And it won’t be in the very distant future.
It didn’t happen. The Republicans shrugged and moved on to tax reform, and the president turned to important matters like accusing Joe Scarborough of murder and warning America about the imminent danger from caravans of immigrants heading for our border. Health care reform was a dead letter, except that having failed to repeal or replace the ACA through legislation, the administration joined in a legal assault on the law, challenging its constitutionality. If the Trump administration were to get its way at the Supreme Court, millions of Americans would lose health insurance in the midst of a pandemic. Oh, and on August 3 of this year, the president once again promised his own health care proposal “hopefully, prior to the end of the month.”
Amazingly, the public’s response to this clown show was to express increasing support for the ACA, with a solid 55 percent expressing approval of the law this month, up from about 40 percent in 2016.
Trump’s fulminations against trade have convinced some—Republicans are now far more negative about NAFTA than in the pre-Trump era—but most Americans have moved in the other direction, with 74 percent agreeing that trade is an opportunity for economic growth versus 21 percent who view it as a threat to the economy.
As a pro-immigrant free-trader, I’m not sorry that Trump has driven people away from his views, though I do regret that the Republican party, which I once believed was sincere about favoring more free-market approaches to health care delivery, has crumbled into a heap of ashes on the subject. Unable to tackle the one issue they had made the centerpiece of four consecutive elections, they are reduced to attempting to sabotage the law Democrats managed to pass.
Trump has driven people away from the Republican party, and caused them to reject the label “conservative.” I’m inclined to reject it myself, because in the age of Trump, it has become associated with nativism, racism, ignorance, authoritarianism, contempt, and crackpottery. And while it’s no loss for the nation if protectionism and nativism are discredited, there are other things that Trumpism endangers that would be serious losses.
I worry that Trump is contaminating patriotism itself. His blatantly racist appeals combined with his crude and offensive invocations of “America First” run the risk of associating patriotism with whiteness. His fondness for the Confederacy stains his embrace of the American flag.
What Trump’s fans on the right never seem to grapple with as they ceaselessly invoke the specter of socialism, riots, and gun confiscation, is how much Trump drives the left toward extremism. We are in the midst of a left-wing fever of revisionism about American history. From the 1619 Project to the toppling of statues of anti-slavery heroes, there is a movement afoot that Bari Weiss calls a “mixture of postmodernism, postcolonialism, identity politics, neo-Marxism, critical race theory, intersectionality, and the therapeutic mentality.” Some of this predated Trump of course, but he has turbo-charged it.
The leftwing challenge to American legitimacy has always stressed racism, colonialism, sexism, and unconstrained capitalism. Trump has lived down to each and every one of those stereotypes. (You may object that he wasn’t a colonialist, but don’t forget “Take the oil!”)
As we look to rebuild in a post-Trump world, we non-leftists must be able to make the case for American patriotism. We cannot respond to the 1619 Project with heavy-handed attempts to limit its reach, but with arguments and context. No, this country would not be lovable if its history were one long chronicle of racism and oppression. It isn’t. We have much to be ashamed of in our history but much more to celebrate and be grateful for. We have been free and a beacon of freedom for more than two centuries. We have welcomed people from all over the globe and insisted that when they become citizens they are the full equals of those born here. We have confronted our past sins, imperfectly of course, but diligently nevertheless. We’ve given the world fantastic inventions like the airplane and the Salk vaccine, but nothing more important than the Declaration of Independence with its ringing invocation of natural rights.
Trump is a shriveled soul and tends to diminish everything and everyone he touches. As we move out of his orbit, we can begin to recapture some of the grandeur of the nation he has led so miserably. Consider the words of Ronald Reagan in his farewell address in January, 1989, ruminating on what America meant to the world:
I’ve been reflecting on what the past 8 years have meant and mean. And the image that comes to mind like a refrain is a nautical one—a small story about a big ship, and a refugee, and a sailor. It was back in the early ‘80s, at the height of the boat people. And the sailor was hard at work on the carrier Midway, which was patrolling the South China Sea. The sailor, like most American servicemen, was young, smart, and fiercely observant. The crew spied on the horizon a leaky little boat. And crammed inside were refugees from Indochina hoping to get to America. The Midway sent a small launch to bring them to the ship and safety. As the refugees made their way through the choppy seas, one spied the sailor on deck, and stood up, and called out to him. He yelled, ‘Hello, American sailor. Hello, freedom man.’
We cannot permit American patriotism to be hijacked by yahoos and bigots. As we start to heal from the past four years, we must rescue patriotism from Trumpism.