thebulwark--2020-04-27--The Hidden Nuclear Risk of the Pandemic

The Hidden Nuclear Risk of the Pandemic

The coronavirus crisis has revealed a significant Achilles ’ heel in civilian nuclear power : The plants can ’ t operate if their relatively few highly skilled operators get sick or become contagious and have to be quarantined , a situation that , according to news reports , some plants are getting close to .
That puts a dent in nuclear-industry assertions that its plants provide a level of protection against natural events far beyond that of most other electricity suppliers .
The chief problem is one of public safety .
Unlike other types of electric-generating plants , nuclear plants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after they are shut down because their radioactive uranium fuel cores , typically about 100 tons , continue to generate large amounts of heat .
If the heat is not removed by cooling water , it can melt the core .
During the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania , over half the inadequately cooled core melted in hours .
In recent weeks , several vital institutions—police forces , food-processing plants , the U.S .
Postal Service , not to mention health care providers—have reportedly been strained as personnel have become sick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it could create a problem for the smooth functioning of nuclear plants , as well .
Just operating in safe shutdown state could be challenging .
The details differ from plant to plant and are spelled out in technical specifications that are part of each plant ’ s federal license , but generally it takes a supervisor and several operators to man the control room and some number of maintenance staff .
Altogether , counting all shifts , there may be a couple of dozen operators per plant .
That doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are highly skilled personnel who are licensed to operate an individual plant .
You can ’ t just pull in operators from elsewhere .
If the licensed operators are unavailable because of disease or medical concerns , you are out of luck .
The operators would surely not abandon their plant so long as they could remain at their posts , but having a skeleton crew of sick and fatigued individuals operating a nuclear plant is , to say the least , not a desirable state of affairs .
A similar concern applies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire , the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors are doing most of their inspections over the phone from home .
As one citizen oversight group remarked , while “ understandable , it ’ s still a bit unsettling , considering we are talking about nuclear power.
” A COVID-19-related notice on the NRC website states the commission “ will require plants to shut down if they can not appropriately staff their facilities , ” but during a March 20 teleconference the NRC representative assured the industry that the agency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ license requirements .
Operating a plant at power takes a lot more staff than maintaining it in safe shutdown state .
Nuclear plant managements around the world have been forced to consider the consequences of coronavirus infections and the need to quarantine employees who have been in contact with infected people .
The conclusions are stark .
According to a Reuters report , EDF , the utility that runs all the nuclear plants in France , said its plants “ could operate for three months with a 25 % reduction in staffing levels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 40 % fewer staff.
” At one plant in the north of France , Flameville , EDF announced it was reducing the staff at the plant from 800 to 100 , keeping only those “ in charge of safety and security.
” There are reports that U.S. nuclear plants may ask essential staff to live on-site if the pandemic worsens , and plants have stockpiled bedding and ready-to-eat meals .
During this emergency , nuclear plant managers are doing their best to keep the lights on and the public safe .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plants that we will have to take account of in future decisions .
One thing is clear : The picture painted by the trade association for the nuclear industry , the Nuclear Energy Institute , of the essential invulnerability of nuclear plants is not correct .
The Nuclear Energy Institute also argues that by contributing reliable power to military installations , nuclear energy “ supports the nation ’ s ability to defend itself.
” Yet here we have a type of emergency—involving a possible lack of operating staff—in which the nuclear plants could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asset .
Nuclear plants are not without their advantages .
But they also come with serious disadvantages , one of which—the safety imperative for constant , highly trained staffing no matter what—has become evident during the current pandemic .
They are an inflexible source of energy that carries an enormous overhead in terms of safety and security , when what we need in our energy system for dealing with inevitable emergencies is not rigidity , but resilience .

The coronavirus crisis has revealed a significant Achilles’ heel in civilian nuclear power: The plants can’t operate if their relatively few highly skilled operators get sick or become contagious and have to be quarantined, a situation that, according to news reports, some plants are getting close to. That puts a dent in nuclear-industry assertions that its plants provide a level of protection against natural events far beyond that of most other electricity suppliers.
The chief problem is one of public safety. Unlike other types of electric-generating plants, nuclear plants need operators to remain in control even after they are shut down because their radioactive uranium fuel cores, typically about 100 tons, continue to generate large amounts of heat. If the heat is not removed by cooling water, it can melt the core. During the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, over half the inadequately cooled core melted in hours.
In recent weeks, several vital institutions—police forces, food-processing plants, the U.S. Postal Service, not to mention health care providers—have reportedly been strained as personnel have become sick with COVID-19. As the pandemic spreads, it could create a problem for the smooth functioning of nuclear plants, as well. Just operating in safe shutdown state could be challenging. The details differ from plant to plant and are spelled out in technical specifications that are part of each plant’s federal license, but generally it takes a supervisor and several operators to man the control room and some number of maintenance staff. Altogether, counting all shifts, there may be a couple of dozen operators per plant. That doesn’t sound like much, but these are highly skilled personnel who are licensed to operate an individual plant. You can’t just pull in operators from elsewhere. If the licensed operators are unavailable because of disease or medical concerns, you are out of luck.
The operators would surely not abandon their plant so long as they could remain at their posts, but having a skeleton crew of sick and fatigued individuals operating a nuclear plant is, to say the least, not a desirable state of affairs.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
A similar concern applies to the government safety regulators. At the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors are doing most of their inspections over the phone from home. As one citizen oversight group remarked, while “understandable, it’s still a bit unsettling, considering we are talking about nuclear power.” A COVID-19-related notice on the NRC website states the commission “will require plants to shut down if they cannot appropriately staff their facilities,” but during a March 20 teleconference the NRC representative assured the industry that the agency was prepared to issue blanket exemptions from license requirements.
Operating a plant at power takes a lot more staff than maintaining it in safe shutdown state. Nuclear plant managements around the world have been forced to consider the consequences of coronavirus infections and the need to quarantine employees who have been in contact with infected people. The conclusions are stark. According to a Reuters report, EDF, the utility that runs all the nuclear plants in France, said its plants “could operate for three months with a 25% reduction in staffing levels and for two to three weeks with 40% fewer staff.” At one plant in the north of France, Flamanville, EDF announced it was reducing the staff at the plant from 800 to 100, keeping only those “in charge of safety and security.” There are reports that U.S. nuclear plants may ask essential staff to live on-site if the pandemic worsens, and plants have stockpiled bedding and ready-to-eat meals.
During this emergency, nuclear plant managers are doing their best to keep the lights on and the public safe. But the pandemic exposes a vulnerability of the nuclear plants that we will have to take account of in future decisions. One thing is clear: The picture painted by the trade association for the nuclear industry, the Nuclear Energy Institute, of the essential invulnerability of nuclear plants is not correct.
The Nuclear Energy Institute also argues that by contributing reliable power to military installations, nuclear energy “supports the nation’s ability to defend itself.” Yet here we have a type of emergency—involving a possible lack of operating staff—in which the nuclear plants could become a serious liability rather than an asset.
Nuclear plants are not without their advantages. But they also come with serious disadvantages, one of which—the safety imperative for constant, highly trained staffing no matter what—has become evident during the current pandemic. They are an inflexible source of energy that carries an enormous overhead in terms of safety and security, when what we need in our energy system for dealing with inevitable emergencies is not rigidity, but resilience.


Federalism vs. Trumpism

One unanticipated side effect of President Trump ’ s actions in office has been a years-long , force-fed civics lesson on the meaning of the constitutional separation of powers .
Now , his words and deeds during the coronavirus crisis are putting another important constitutional concept on center stage : federalism .
But while Senate Republicans unabashedly abandoned their oaths to uphold the Constitution by failing to seriously consider the impeachment charges against Trump , state governors from both sides of the aisle are choosing the people over politics—demonstrating the benefits of federalism and proving that ethics and principle still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ federalism , ” like “ separation of powers , ” does not explicitly appear in the text of the Constitution .
It represents the compact that the states made in surrendering a portion of their sovereignty to a central authority , the federal ( i.e.
, national ) government .
They did it by ratifying the Constitution in 1788 , and by constitutional amendment 27 times since .
In the words of James Madison in Federalist No .
51 , the principle of federalism also operates so that each government—state and national—serves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other in protection of individual liberties : The Constitution contains competing provisions that come into play when federal and state powers clash : the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I on the one hand , which together give the federal government broad power in certain circumstances , and the 10th Amendment , which reserves any residual powers not given to the federal government to the states , on the other .
That residual power includes the so-called police power , which is the source of the various stay-at-home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by states to reduce widespread COVID-19 illness and death .
Historically , much of the federal-state conflict centered on slavery and then civil rights , with the federal government often in the posture of enforcing the Constitution against recalcitrant states .
Southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention invoked federalism to protect slave interests .
Much later , after the Civil War , the 13th , 14th , and 15th amendments to the Constitution abolished slavery , provided equal protection of the laws to everyone , including formerly enslaved people , and gave formerly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Supreme Court later interpreted the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to apply to the states most of the provisions of the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights .
Just last week , the Court held that states must abide by criminal defendants ’ 6th Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict in Ramos v. Louisiana .
Federalism was again advanced for purposes of preserving segregation and discrimination in the South during the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s , culminating in the landmark Supreme Court decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It deemed segregation in public education unconstitutional while at the same time confirming that “ education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
” By the same token , the Supreme Court has relied on federalism principles to strike down efforts by the national government to remedy segregation in public schools , deny relief to individuals who allegedly suffered discriminatory mistreatment by police , and outright reject a range of cases alleging unconstitutional state conduct , among other things .
Federalism ’ s push-and-pull between national authority and state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tensions in American politics .
In his tortured dance with state governors over responsibility for crafting and implementing a coherent , humane , and effective COVID-19 response , President Trump has put the tension between the national government and the state governments in bold relief .
But this time around , it ’ s the states that are coming to the rescue of the people .
And they are doing it regardless of Trump ’ s bullying politics .
Trump ’ s incoherence on federalism has become infamous .
He recently claimed “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directing them to deal with the virus on their own .
And he has refused to fully invoke the federal government ’ s statutory powers to address a national pandemic while chiding governors for imposing social distancing and other restrictions that epidemiologists believe are crucial to public health .
And he directed a trio of “ LIBERATE ” tweets at Michigan , Minnesota , and Virginia—all states headed by Democratic governors .
But unlike in the U.S. Congress , where Republicans are now happy to follow Donald Trump in walking across any coals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaping off any cliff , Republican governors have faced off against Trump in the name of public health .
Maryland governor Larry Hogan , with his wife as translator , recently negotiated and secured the purchase of 500,000 test kits from South Korea—a practical fix to the feds ’ unresponsiveness .
When Trump claimed that Hogan “ could ’ ve saved a lot of money ” by simply calling Vice President Mike Pence for help , Hogan—a Republican—retorted , “ We did what [ Trump ] told us to do which was go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when , in March , Mike DeWine , the Republican governor of Ohio , was asked about Trump ’ s Twitter refrain that “ THE CURE CAN NOT BE WORSE ( by far ) THAN THE PROBLEM !
” he responded : “ We ’ ve got to do it in the right order .
When people are dying , when people don ’ t feel safe , this economy is not coming back .
.
.
.
.
We have to do everything we can to separate ourselves from others.
” Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to coordinate reopening—fulfilling a role that would typically be expected from a federal response in an emergency—while others are “ flying blind ” to invite public contact amidst criticism that reopening without robust testing and contract tracing defies science .
Since much of the size and scope of today ’ s federal government , including the massive regulatory state that is so derided by conservatives , was born of the New Deal , federalism has long been associated with conservative values .
Conservatives have for decades argued that much of the national government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the better to facilitate local self-government , citizen participation , and innovation .
Yet during a national pandemic , a strong case for a national response can be made .
Representative Francis Rooney ( R-Florida ) made that case last week for The Hill : But with Donald Trump at the helm , this is a time to thank the heavens for federalism .
If the national government lacked the counterbalance of state governors poised to act , it ’ s beyond comprehension what havoc Trump would wreak .

One unanticipated side effect of President Trump’s actions in office has been a years-long, force-fed civics lesson on the meaning of the constitutional separation of powers. Now, his words and deeds during the coronavirus crisis are putting another important constitutional concept on center stage: federalism.
But while Senate Republicans unabashedly abandoned their oaths to uphold the Constitution by failing to seriously consider the impeachment charges against Trump, state governors from both sides of the aisle are choosing the people over politics—demonstrating the benefits of federalism and proving that ethics and principle still exist in American politics.
The term “federalism,” like “separation of powers,” does not explicitly appear in the text of the Constitution. It represents the compact that the states made in surrendering a portion of their sovereignty to a central authority, the federal (i.e., national) government. They did it by ratifying the Constitution in 1788, and by constitutional amendment 27 times since.
In the words of James Madison in Federalist No. 51, the principle of federalism also operates so that each government—state and national—serves as a “sentinel” of the other in protection of individual liberties:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
The Constitution contains competing provisions that come into play when federal and state powers clash: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I on the one hand, which together give the federal government broad power in certain circumstances, and the 10th Amendment, which reserves any residual powers not given to the federal government to the states, on the other. That residual power includes the so-called police power, which is the source of the various stay-at-home, travel-restriction, and business-interruption orders issued by states to reduce widespread COVID-19 illness and death.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Historically, much of the federal-state conflict centered on slavery and then civil rights, with the federal government often in the posture of enforcing the Constitution against recalcitrant states. Southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention invoked federalism to protect slave interests. Much later, after the Civil War, the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution abolished slavery, provided equal protection of the laws to everyone, including formerly enslaved people, and gave formerly enslaved men the right to vote. The Supreme Court later interpreted the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to apply to the states most of the provisions of the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights. Just last week, the Court held that states must abide by criminal defendants’ 6th Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict in Ramos v. Louisiana.
Federalism was again advanced for purposes of preserving segregation and discrimination in the South during the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the landmark Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education. It deemed segregation in public education unconstitutional while at the same time confirming that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.”
By the same token, the Supreme Court has relied on federalism principles to strike down efforts by the national government to remedy segregation in public schools, deny relief to individuals who allegedly suffered discriminatory mistreatment by police, and outright reject a range of cases alleging unconstitutional state conduct, among other things.
Federalism’s push-and-pull between national authority and state autonomy thus remains one of the greatest tensions in American politics.
In his tortured dance with state governors over responsibility for crafting and implementing a coherent, humane, and effective COVID-19 response, President Trump has put the tension between the national government and the state governments in bold relief. But this time around, it’s the states that are coming to the rescue of the people. And they are doing it regardless of Trump’s bullying politics.
Trump’s incoherence on federalism has become infamous. He recently claimed “total” authority over the states while directing them to deal with the virus on their own. And he has refused to fully invoke the federal government’s statutory powers to address a national pandemic while chiding governors for imposing social distancing and other restrictions that epidemiologists believe are crucial to public health. And he directed a trio of “LIBERATE” tweets at Michigan, Minnesota, and Virginia—all states headed by Democratic governors.
But unlike in the U.S. Congress, where Republicans are now happy to follow Donald Trump in walking across any coals, jumping off any bridge, and leaping off any cliff, Republican governors have faced off against Trump in the name of public health. Maryland governor Larry Hogan, with his wife as translator, recently negotiated and secured the purchase of 500,000 test kits from South Korea—a practical fix to the feds’ unresponsiveness. When Trump claimed that Hogan “could’ve saved a lot of money” by simply calling Vice President Mike Pence for help, Hogan—a Republican—retorted, “We did what [Trump] told us to do which was go out and get our testing.”
And when, in March, Mike DeWine, the Republican governor of Ohio, was asked about Trump’s Twitter refrain that “THE CURE CANNOT BE WORSE (by far) THAN THE PROBLEM!” he responded: “We’ve got to do it in the right order. When people are dying, when people don’t feel safe, this economy is not coming back. . . . . We have to do everything we can to separate ourselves from others.”
Now several states are forming “pacts” to coordinate reopening—fulfilling a role that would typically be expected from a federal response in an emergency—while others are “flying blind” to invite public contact amidst criticism that reopening without robust testing and contract tracing defies science.
Since much of the size and scope of today’s federal government, including the massive regulatory state that is so derided by conservatives, was born of the New Deal, federalism has long been associated with conservative values. Conservatives have for decades argued that much of the national government’s power should be devolved, the better to facilitate local self-government, citizen participation, and innovation.
Yet during a national pandemic, a strong case for a national response can be made. Representative Francis Rooney (R-Florida) made that case last week for The Hill:
We need the president to intervene, like Presidents Truman and Kennedy did with the steel companies, to ensure that production and distribution [of ventilators and personal protective equipment] is taking place in a timely manner. . . . The administration can also utilize trained federal employees, military and civilian, to provide much needed relief for our overworked front-line workers. . . . [A]nd perhaps most importantly, the president must assemble, and Congress should fund, research and development to find a cure.
But with Donald Trump at the helm, this is a time to thank the heavens for federalism. If the national government lacked the counterbalance of state governors poised to act, it’s beyond comprehension what havoc Trump would wreak.


Biden’s Choice

Amidst Joe Biden ’ s many challenges—defeating an incumbent president , formulating a plan to rescue America from a global pandemic , reforming our healthcare system—one stands out : Selecting a running mate .
COVID-19 has raised the already high stakes .
Given Biden ’ s age , his choice must be plausibly presidential .
But he should also find someone who can help him accomplish the first step—winning—while avoiding a Palin-esque running mate who , when weighed against the presidency , threatens to become an electoral millstone .
This complex equation complicates guesswork .
Still , Biden is beginning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of early speculation inspires one to tempt fate .
Besides , doesn ’ t his elimination of male candidates shrink the opportunities for folly ?
So , at great risk of being dead wrong in public , here goes : First , some competing and no doubt tendentious criteria .
For several reasons , Biden should heed the estimable James Clyburn by strongly considering a woman of color .
Among Democrats , the swift exit of minority presidential candidates provoked considerable discontent : to many the prospect of an all-white ticket began feeling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidate who inspires more nostalgia than excitement could profit by making a breakthrough choice which speaks to the future .
Further , Biden owes his nomination to African-American voters , whose unalloyed enthusiasm could help buoy Democratic turnout in battleground states—enthusiasm Hillary Clinton lacked in 2016 .
Conversely , the primaries exposed his need to do much better among Hispanics .
And whether black or Hispanic , a strong minority candidate might help with other Biden-averse constituencies : progressives and young people .
Even granting that Donald Trump is , in himself , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to get every last base voter to the polls .
But his selection should also appeal to—and certainly not alienate—the swing voters Democrats rallied in 2018 : suburbanites , women , independents and alienated Republicans .
Finding the right demographic and ideological balance while complementing Biden will be as difficult as it is essential .
No doubt Democrats would take Michelle Obama in a heartbeat .
But the party has other strong contenders of color .
And , in my subjective assessment , there is no non-–minority candidate whose overall strengths are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That said , a look at some leading candidates : Gretchen Whitmer .
The increasingly visible governor has one obvious credential : Michigan is crucial in November .
Drawbacks ?
Little national experience .
No real connection to progressives .
The dubious optics of a first-term governor , beset by politicized fractiousness over her stringent lockdown , abandoning her post to seek higher office while the pandemic persists .
Amy Klobuchar .
Granted , she ’ s Midwestern , an experienced legislator , and skilled in debate .
But her appeal to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Having campaigned as a militant moderate , she has zero cachet with progressives .
Among minorities , she flat-lined .
She adds little which complements Biden but her popularity in a state , Minnesota , which is otherwise not a lock—although , in the end , Biden should win there .
Elizabeth Warren.Here ’ s a president-in-waiting : smart , principled , steeped in policy , and addicted to knowledge .
She ’ s a strong debater and campaigner who would excite progressives—save for Sanders supporters so hard-core that they ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s also in her 70s .
She lacks a strong personal relationship with Biden : Their somewhat contentious history goes back to clashes over the 2005 bankruptcy bill .
She decisively lost the primary in her own very blue state .
Despite her best efforts , she did not register with minority voters .
Nor is she catnip for swing voters in battleground states .
One must hope that Warren gets the top-flight cabinet post she deserves .
Andrew Cuomo .
I throw in this twitterverse fantasy just so I can quote John @ @ @ @ @ @ @ umpires : You can ’ t be serious .
He ’ s at once too moderate and too abrasive .
Also : He ’ s a guy .
For Biden to renege on his pledge to nominate a woman would be crazy .
Kamala Harris .
She ’ s everyone ’ s default choice .
So why does one instinctively squirm ?
Because she is so obviously that—a default choice—rather than someone who should become president .
Harris ’ s attributes remain those praised throughout her career .
Whatever office she occupied , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and performative skills caused many to encourage her in seeking the next .
Rising became her raison d ’ être ; running for president exposed its limits .
She offered no compelling reason that she wanted to be president—she just did .
Her oscillations on basic issues such as healthcare exposed a lack of interest or depth .
Bereft of real commitment to policy , her candidacy became a tactical exercise in serial repositioning .
Her campaign organization was a fractious mess .
What would she bring ?
Talent—as always .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suburban women .
As a practical politician Biden has no doubt discounted her contrived attack in an early debate , that made-for-TV moment when she feigned outrage over a long-buried issue—busing—on which they had little substantive difference .
But he may wonder whose interests she would serve as vice-president .
Still , she ’ s Kamala Harris .
That may suffice .
Stacey Abrams .
She trails only Harris in the most-mentioned category , and enjoys deep popularity among blacks and progressives .
She ’ s charismatic , a terrific speaker , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s degree in Public Affairs , a law degree from Yale , and has authored numerous articles on pertinent issues in addition to—believe it or not—romance novels .
Since her narrow defeat for governor of Georgia , she has maintained her visibility by advocating voting rights .
Still , her peak experience in office was as minority leader in Georgia ’ s House of Representatives .
Given that Georgia Republicans have perfected the art of voter suppression , it seems unlikely that Abrams can help carry her state .
And the contrast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political experience and her relative lack of it might prove detrimental to both .
Catherine Cortez Masto .
Like Harris , she ’ s a freshman senator who was her state ’ s attorney general .
The current chair of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee is deemed very effective by her peers—smart , focused , hard-working , collegial , and good to staff .
While her closely-contested state , Nevada , has only six electoral votes , Cortez Masto could also help with Hispanics elsewhere .
Val Demings .
The two-term Florida congresswoman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from poverty to earn a master ’ s degree , serve in law enforcement , and become Orlando ’ s first female chief-of-police .
She has three kids , and a 32-year marriage to a former county sheriff and current mayor .
She impressed during the House impeachment hearings , and as a manager in the Senate impeachment trial .
While Demings has never held statewide office , she might add some value in a pivotal state .
The question is whether she ’ s sufficiently seasoned , politically and substantively , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One of these women will likely become Biden ’ s choice ; one might become president .
Biden should not rush .
He has much to consider : the least-known—Cortez Masto and Demings—may offer the most potential to make a small but critical electoral difference .
This decision will test his sagacity , instincts and , above all , ability to judge capacity and character when it matters most .

Amidst Joe Biden’s many challenges—defeating an incumbent president, formulating a plan to rescue America from a global pandemic, reforming our healthcare system—one stands out: Selecting a running mate.
COVID-19 has raised the already high stakes. Given Biden’s age, his choice must be plausibly presidential. But he should also find someone who can help him accomplish the first step—winning—while avoiding a Palin-esque running mate who, when weighed against the presidency, threatens to become an electoral millstone.
This complex equation complicates guesswork. Still, Biden is beginning his selection process, and the torrent of early speculation inspires one to tempt fate. Besides, doesn’t his elimination of male candidates shrink the opportunities for folly?
So, at great risk of being dead wrong in public, here goes:
First, some competing and no doubt tendentious criteria.
For several reasons, Biden should heed the estimable James Clyburn by strongly considering a woman of color. Among Democrats, the swift exit of minority presidential candidates provoked considerable discontent: to many the prospect of an all-white ticket began feeling, well, retrograde. And a candidate who inspires more nostalgia than excitement could profit by making a breakthrough choice which speaks to the future.
Further, Biden owes his nomination to African-American voters, whose unalloyed enthusiasm could help buoy Democratic turnout in battleground states—enthusiasm Hillary Clinton lacked in 2016. Conversely, the primaries exposed his need to do much better among Hispanics. And whether black or Hispanic, a strong minority candidate might help with other Biden-averse constituencies: progressives and young people.
Even granting that Donald Trump is, in himself, a Democratic turnout machine, Biden will need to get every last base voter to the polls. But his selection should also appeal to—and certainly not alienate—the swing voters Democrats rallied in 2018: suburbanites, women, independents and alienated Republicans. Finding the right demographic and ideological balance while complementing Biden will be as difficult as it is essential.
No doubt Democrats would take Michelle Obama in a heartbeat. But the party has other strong contenders of color. And, in my subjective assessment, there is no non-–minority candidate whose overall strengths are so compelling that they impel her selection.
That said, a look at some leading candidates:
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Gretchen Whitmer. The increasingly visible governor has one obvious credential: Michigan is crucial in November. Drawbacks? Little national experience. No real connection to progressives. The dubious optics of a first-term governor, beset by politicized fractiousness over her stringent lockdown, abandoning her post to seek higher office while the pandemic persists.
Amy Klobuchar. Granted, she’s Midwestern, an experienced legislator, and skilled in debate. But her appeal to independents and Republicans duplicates Biden’s. Having campaigned as a militant moderate, she has zero cachet with progressives. Among minorities, she flat-lined. She adds little which complements Biden but her popularity in a state, Minnesota, which is otherwise not a lock—although, in the end, Biden should win there.
Elizabeth Warren.Here’s a president-in-waiting: smart, principled, steeped in policy, and addicted to knowledge. She’s a strong debater and campaigner who would excite progressives—save for Sanders supporters so hard-core that they’re probably out of reach.
The problems?
She’s also in her 70s. She lacks a strong personal relationship with Biden: Their somewhat contentious history goes back to clashes over the 2005 bankruptcy bill. She decisively lost the primary in her own very blue state. Despite her best efforts, she did not register with minority voters. Nor is she catnip for swing voters in battleground states. One must hope that Warren gets the top-flight cabinet post she deserves.
Andrew Cuomo. I throw in this twitterverse fantasy just so I can quote John McEnroe’s trademark plaint to tennis umpires: You can’t be serious. He’s at once too moderate and too abrasive. Also: He’s a guy. For Biden to renege on his pledge to nominate a woman would be crazy.
Kamala Harris. She’s everyone’s default choice. So why does one instinctively squirm? Because she is so obviously that—a default choice—rather than someone who should become president.
Harris’s attributes remain those praised throughout her career. Whatever office she occupied, her combination of presence, personal appeal, and performative skills caused many to encourage her in seeking the next. Rising became her raison d’être; running for president exposed its limits.
She offered no compelling reason that she wanted to be president—she just did. Her oscillations on basic issues such as healthcare exposed a lack of interest or depth. Bereft of real commitment to policy, her candidacy became a tactical exercise in serial repositioning. Her campaign organization was a fractious mess.
What would she bring? Talent—as always. And Biden could hope that Harris resonates with suburban women.
As a practical politician Biden has no doubt discounted her contrived attack in an early debate, that made-for-TV moment when she feigned outrage over a long-buried issue—busing—on which they had little substantive difference. But he may wonder whose interests she would serve as vice-president.
Still, she’s Kamala Harris. That may suffice.
Stacey Abrams. She trails only Harris in the most-mentioned category, and enjoys deep popularity among blacks and progressives. She’s charismatic, a terrific speaker, and a genuine intellectual who holds a Master’s degree in Public Affairs, a law degree from Yale, and has authored numerous articles on pertinent issues in addition to—believe it or not—romance novels. Since her narrow defeat for governor of Georgia, she has maintained her visibility by advocating voting rights.
Still, her peak experience in office was as minority leader in Georgia’s House of Representatives. Given that Georgia Republicans have perfected the art of voter suppression, it seems unlikely that Abrams can help carry her state. And the contrast between Biden’s lifetime of high-level political experience and her relative lack of it might prove detrimental to both.
Catherine Cortez Masto. Like Harris, she’s a freshman senator who was her state’s attorney general. The current chair of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee is deemed very effective by her peers—smart, focused, hard-working, collegial, and good to staff. While her closely-contested state, Nevada, has only six electoral votes, Cortez Masto could also help with Hispanics elsewhere.
Val Demings. The two-term Florida congresswoman has an appealing biography. She rose from poverty to earn a master’s degree, serve in law enforcement, and become Orlando’s first female chief-of-police. She has three kids, and a 32-year marriage to a former county sheriff and current mayor. She impressed during the House impeachment hearings, and as a manager in the Senate impeachment trial.
While Demings has never held statewide office, she might add some value in a pivotal state. The question is whether she’s sufficiently seasoned, politically and substantively, for voters nationwide to envision as president.
One of these women will likely become Biden’s choice; one might become president. Biden should not rush. He has much to consider: the least-known—Cortez Masto and Demings—may offer the most potential to make a small but critical electoral difference. This decision will test his sagacity, instincts and, above all, ability to judge capacity and character when it matters most.


thebulwark--2020-04-27--Is Donald Trump Manly?

Is Donald Trump Manly?

Like everyone else in this godforsaken business , I have a list of things that I might like to write about some day .
A piece about Sebastian Gorka , however , is very very low on that list .
I would much rather write about Umberto Eco ’ s essay on “ Ur-Fascism , ” but I ’ m afraid if I did , I ’ d end up writing about Gorka after all .
This is the dilemma of our times : even when you try to step back to get some perspective , it ’ s hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political life .
I ’ ve actually mentioned Eco ’ s 1995 essay a few times on the podcast and you should take the time to read the whole thing .
Eco ’ s main point is that , while the term is thrown around so promiscuously , Fascism is actually quite difficult to define with any precision .
“ Contrary to common opinion , fascism in Italy had no special philosophy , ” he wrote .
Unlike Naziism or Communism , it had no fixed ideology or program .
“ On the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fascism was a fuzzy totalitarianism , a collage of 4 different philosophical and political ideas , a beehive of contradictions.
” But despite its fuzziness and lack of systematic thought , Eco outlines the features and attitudes that were typical of what he called “ Ur-Fascism.
” While some of them “ are also typical of other kinds of despotism or fanaticism , ” he writes , “ it is enough that one of them be present to all fascism to coagulate around it.
” What follows is a list of those attitudes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ cult of tradition , ” the rejection of modernism , a streak of irrationalism , which “ depends on the cult of action for action ’ s sake , ” and intolerance of dissent , because “ disagreement is treason.
” Ur-Fascism exploits “ fear of difference ” by making “ an appeal against the intruders.
” It feeds off of “ individual and or social frustration , ” so it makes an “ appeal to a frustrated middle class , a class suffering from an economic crisis or feelings of political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lower social groups.
” To people who “ feel deprived of a clear social identity , ” Fascism says “ that their only privilege is the most common one , to be born in the same country , ” Thus Hyper-nationalism .
He goes on to identity the belief that life is always about fighting , because “ life is lived for struggle.
” Fascists also advocate a kind of “ a popular elitism , ” which includes “ contempt for the weak.
” In Eco ’ s description of Ur-Fascism , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he wrote back in 1995 : “ There is in our future a TV or Internet populism , in which the emotional response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.
” Any of this sounding vaguely familiar ?
Eco notes that the movement also has its own distinctive language : Newspeak .
“ All the Nazi or Fascist schoolbooks made use of an impoverished vocabulary , and an elementary syntax , in order to limit the instruments for complex and critical reasoning.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the substitution of reasoned argumentation with slogans , cliches , and catch-phrases , is an essential feature of a movement that despises and wears down the habits of critical thinking .
The Ur-Fascist is also obsessed with “ manliness ” or machismo .
.
.
or , at least role-playing masculinity .
“ Since both permanent war and heroism are difficult games to play , the Ur-Fascist transfers his will to power to sexual matters , ” writes Eco .
“ This is the origin of machismo .
.
.
.
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play , the Ur-Fascist hero tends to play with weapons—doing so becomes an ersatz phallic exercise.
” And so , we ’ re back to Seb Gorka .
This is a recurring theme for Gorka and for others in TrumpWold : that not only is Trump a paragon of manliness , but support for him is a test of one ’ s machismo .
Last week , Gorka doubled down on the idea , writing on his blog : ‘ The Left and NeverTrumpers Learn a Painful Lesson in Masculinity.
” Gorka explained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alike who hate the President hate him because he is a man ’ s man , and an old school leader in every sense of the phrase.
” Trump , Gorka insists , “ is a strong man because he is a strong leader , and because words lead to actions.
” And his critics can ’ t handle that , “ since the Left and NeverTrumpers have spent the last several years decrying ‘ toxic masculinity ’ and trying to abolish traditional gender roles , but it also proves that they fundamentally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and why it matters.
” We don ’ t have time or space here to explore all of the literature of what it means to be “ manly , ” A few years back , I wrote : Consider the problems of raising children in in an era in which our most famous role model is President Trump .
As parents , we struggle to teach our children empathy and compassion .
We hope to teach them character , humility , impulse control , kindness and good sportsmanship .
We want them to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , treat others with respect , avoiding name-calling , and tell the truth even if it ’ s inconvenient .
Especially for young men still searching for a model of what it means to be a man , Trump ’ s behavior will carry significant weight .
And why not ?
He may be a bully , a fabulist , a serial insulter and abuser of women , but our alpha-male president is a billionaire , married to a supermodel , and has been elevated to the most powerful job in the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for many young men , Trump is both liberating and revolutionary : freeing them from the demands of civility and what many of them see as overly feminized hypersensitivity .
Rudyard Kipling famously took a shot and defining what it meant to be a man .
Suffice it to say that the insecure , thin-skinned , self- fellating , crybaby bully in the Oval Office was not what Kipling had in mind .

Like everyone else in this godforsaken business, I have a list of things that I might like to write about some day. A piece about Sebastian Gorka, however, is very very low on that list.
I would much rather write about Umberto Eco’s essay on “Ur-Fascism,” but I’m afraid if I did, I’d end up writing about Gorka after all. This is the dilemma of our times: even when you try to step back to get some perspective, it’s hard to escape the opera bouffa of our political life.
I’ve actually mentioned Eco’s 1995 essay a few times on the podcast and you should take the time to read the whole thing.
Eco’s main point is that, while the term is thrown around so promiscuously, Fascism is actually quite difficult to define with any precision. “Contrary to common opinion, fascism in Italy had no special philosophy,” he wrote. Unlike Naziism or Communism, it had no fixed ideology or program. “On the contrary, fascism had no quintessence. Fascism was a fuzzy totalitarianism, a collage of 4 different philosophical and political ideas, a beehive of contradictions.”
But despite its fuzziness and lack of systematic thought, Eco outlines the features and attitudes that were typical of what he called “Ur-Fascism.” While some of them “are also typical of other kinds of despotism or fanaticism,” he writes, “it is enough that one of them be present to all fascism to coagulate around it.”
What follows is a list of those attitudes and “features,” including a “cult of tradition,” the rejection of modernism, a streak of irrationalism, which “depends on the cult of action for action’s sake,” and intolerance of dissent, because “disagreement is treason.”
Ur-Fascism exploits “fear of difference” by making “an appeal against the intruders.” It feeds off of “individual and or social frustration,” so it makes an “appeal to a frustrated middle class, a class suffering from an economic crisis or feelings of political humiliation and frightened by the pressure of lower social groups.”
To people who “feel deprived of a clear social identity,” Fascism says “that their only privilege is the most common one, to be born in the same country,” Thus Hyper-nationalism. He goes on to identity the belief that life is always about fighting, because “life is lived for struggle.” Fascists also advocate a kind of “a popular elitism,” which includes “contempt for the weak.”
In Eco’s description of Ur-Fascism, the populism is always highly selective. Presciently, he wrote back in 1995: “There is in our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.”
Any of this sounding vaguely familiar?
Eco notes that the movement also has its own distinctive language: Newspeak. “All the Nazi or Fascist schoolbooks made use of an impoverished vocabulary, and an elementary syntax, in order to limit the instruments for complex and critical reasoning.” The dumbing down of the discourse, the substitution of reasoned argumentation with slogans, cliches, and catch-phrases, is an essential feature of a movement that despises and wears down the habits of critical thinking.
The Ur-Fascist is also obsessed with “manliness” or machismo . . . or, at least role-playing masculinity.
“Since both permanent war and heroism are difficult games to play, the Ur-Fascist transfers his will to power to sexual matters,” writes Eco. “This is the origin of machismo. . . . Since even sex is a difficult game to play, the Ur-Fascist hero tends to play with weapons—doing so becomes an ersatz phallic exercise.”
And so, we’re back to Seb Gorka.
Sebastian Gorka says 'the Left' hates Trump because they hate masculinity, adding that "manly men" don't hate Trump pic.twitter.com/2ST4yVXzm9 — Jason Campbell (@JasonSCampbell) April 23, 2020
This is a recurring theme for Gorka and for others in TrumpWold: that not only is Trump a paragon of manliness, but support for him is a test of one’s machismo. Last week, Gorka doubled down on the idea, writing on his blog: ‘The Left and NeverTrumpers Learn a Painful Lesson in Masculinity.”
Gorka explained that “the Left and the NeverTrumpers alike who hate the President hate him because he is a man’s man, and an old school leader in every sense of the phrase.”
Trump, Gorka insists, “is a strong man because he is a strong leader, and because words lead to actions.” And his critics can’t handle that, “since the Left and NeverTrumpers have spent the last several years decrying ‘toxic masculinity’ and trying to abolish traditional gender roles, but it also proves that they fundamentally do not understand what masculinity really means and why it matters.”
David French responded:
One of the cultural consequences of Trumpism is the truly wild idea that Trump represents any form of acceptable masculinity. Thin skinned? Hot-tempered? Unfaithful? Draft-dodging? Ignorant? Impulsive? That's every dad's dream for his son. https://t.co/Ao57tMb2pf — David French (@DavidAFrench) April 23, 2020
We don’t have time or space here to explore all of the literature of what it means to be “manly,” A few years back, I wrote:
Consider the problems of raising children in in an era in which our most famous role model is President Trump. As parents, we struggle to teach our children empathy and compassion. We hope to teach them character, humility, impulse control, kindness and good sportsmanship. We want them to learn how to win and lose graciously, treat others with respect, avoiding name-calling, and tell the truth even if it’s inconvenient. Good luck with that now…. Especially for young men still searching for a model of what it means to be a man, Trump’s behavior will carry significant weight. And why not? He may be a bully, a fabulist, a serial insulter and abuser of women, but our alpha-male president is a billionaire, married to a supermodel, and has been elevated to the most powerful job in the world. That is a powerful symbol because for many young men, Trump is both liberating and revolutionary: freeing them from the demands of civility and what many of them see as overly feminized hypersensitivity.
Rudyard Kipling famously took a shot and defining what it meant to be a man.
If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch,
If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
If all men count with you, but none too much;
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run,
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it,
And—which is more—you’ll be a Man, my son!
Suffice it to say that the insecure, thin-skinned, self- fellating, crybaby bully in the Oval Office was not what Kipling had in mind.


A Democratic Renaissance

For the world ’ s established autocracies , and even for opportunistic leaders in some immature democracies , the coronavirus pandemic is a crisis that hasn ’ t gone to waste .
Governments from Beijing to Bangkok and even Budapest have consolidated power or intensified repression .
Opposition politics has been stifled .
Restraints on executive power have eroded .
Journalists have been muzzled and even assaulted .
It comes as no surprise that at the forefront of this authoritarian assertiveness has been the People ’ s Republic of China .
Since the virus spread out of Wuhan , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the South China Sea .
It has rounded up prominent champions of democracy in Hong Kong , and sought to exploit the pandemic to undo Article 22 of Hong Kong ’ s Basic Law so that Chinese authorities can intervene at will in the city ’ s internal affairs .
And Chinese agents have reportedly sowed virus panic in the United States .
To be sure , COVID-19 presents a special challenge that demands extraordinary powers , usually vested in the executive , to manage and eventually prevent the lethal effects of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , tracing their contacts , and quarantining them will put various systems of governance to a stringent test .
But prudent and aggressive measures to fight the virus ought not to be treated as license for regimes to put their countries on an anti-democratic path .
The prevailing mood has been well captured by Thailand ’ s autocratic prime minister , Prayuth Chan-ocha : “ Right now it is health over liberty.
” To ensure that liberty does not suffer once global public health is restored , nations committed to the liberal order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to their pandemic response—to show their model remains worthy of emulation .
Governance that is flexible and farsighted—the opposite form , in short , of that demonstrated by the American president ’ s mingled ignorance and incompetence , to say nothing of his open contempt for epidemiology and appalling summonses to social anarchy—can showcase the virtues of free and open societies .
But the free world must resist rather than ignore—let alone echo—the trend of authoritarian assertion .
After a long stretch of neglect and complacency , democracies must again show themselves capable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal creed in addition to the health and security of their nations .
This will come as something of a surprise to liberal states long accustomed to thinking of themselves as status quo powers in a global order that was established by and for them .
But if the phenomenon of authoritarian power-grabs proceeds unchecked , the facile assumptions of the permanence of that order may look more and more fallacious .
As leading authoritarian states pursue a strategy of “ co-option , coercion , and concealment , ” as H.R .
McMaster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order may rapidly give way to a new order that is distinctly illiberal , with the world reverting to its historical norms of chaos and conflict .
Even before COVID-19 , if you can recall that antique era , the liberal order was already unraveling of its own accord .
While authoritarian states fundamentally rejected the American-led international system , the liberal states favored under that system came to act as though it was simply the natural order of things .
Meanwhile , revisionist powers increasingly contested liberal norms , to their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and open societies that had been a conspicuous feature of the latter half of the twentieth century seemed to have stalled , or even reversed .
The democratic world must show vigilance against autocracies bent on revising the terms of international order , as well as solidarity for the potential victims of these non-liberal rising powers .
The wider liberal order will not thrive or even survive without the determined effort of the strongest liberal states in the international system , acting in concert but also in their own interest .
The pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of our way of life are , to a considerable degree , at Beijing ’ s mercy .
Changing that situation can not happen in the absence of robust and inspired American leadership .
Even if American power is no longer “ unipolar , ” and even if the United States no longer thinks of itself as the “ indispensable nation , ” the world ’ s autocracies have no illusion that the liberal order depends on the ideals and exertions of the world ’ s only superpower .
As it did for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must check the rising authoritarian trend and restore prestige to liberal values by leading a concerted bloc of like-minded nations to defend the cause of liberty .
The votaries of freedom abroad are in desperate need of such leadership in a time when innumerable regimes exploit the pandemic––itself incubated , willfully or not , by authoritarian authorities––to consolidate control and eviscerate civil society .
If it chooses to ignore this challenge , the Western core of the liberal order will find itself living in a world no longer of its own making .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the age of Pericles : the worst form of government except for all the others .
For all its flaws , it is the political system that guarantees universal suffrage , the rule of law , and the peaceful and regular transfer of power .
Not so long ago , this political culture of self-government was thought to be destined to spread across the globe .
At the end of the Cold War , the political and business elite of the West imagined the “ end of history ” in which democratic capitalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all future time .
This was a mirage , and one to which a decadent society ( on both sides of the Atlantic ) was particularly prone .
In the post-pandemic world , this utopian notion should be among the first that we dispense with .
It turns out that there is no democratic destiny .
This is just as well .
There is no despotic destiny either .
It remains open for the taking .
In a previous age with less need than our own for false consolation , James Madison proclaimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Epoch ” was the conflict between “ liberty and despotism.
” It still is .

For the world’s established autocracies, and even for opportunistic leaders in some immature democracies, the coronavirus pandemic is a crisis that hasn’t gone to waste. Governments from Beijing to Bangkok and even Budapest have consolidated power or intensified repression. Opposition politics has been stifled. Restraints on executive power have eroded. Journalists have been muzzled and even assaulted.
It comes as no surprise that at the forefront of this authoritarian assertiveness has been the People’s Republic of China. Since the virus spread out of Wuhan, the PRC has pressed its aggressive maritime claims in the South China Sea. It has rounded up prominent champions of democracy in Hong Kong, and sought to exploit the pandemic to undo Article 22 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law so that Chinese authorities can intervene at will in the city’s internal affairs. And Chinese agents have reportedly sowed virus panic in the United States.
To be sure, COVID-19 presents a special challenge that demands extraordinary powers, usually vested in the executive, to manage and eventually prevent the lethal effects of the coronavirus. Discovering who is infected, tracing their contacts, and quarantining them will put various systems of governance to a stringent test. But prudent and aggressive measures to fight the virus ought not to be treated as license for regimes to put their countries on an anti-democratic path. The prevailing mood has been well captured by Thailand’s autocratic prime minister, Prayuth Chan-ocha: “Right now it is health over liberty.”
To ensure that liberty does not suffer once global public health is restored, nations committed to the liberal order must exhibit effective governance—including but not limited to their pandemic response—to show their model remains worthy of emulation. Governance that is flexible and farsighted—the opposite form, in short, of that demonstrated by the American president’s mingled ignorance and incompetence, to say nothing of his open contempt for epidemiology and appalling summonses to social anarchy—can showcase the virtues of free and open societies.
But the free world must resist rather than ignore—let alone echo—the trend of authoritarian assertion. After a long stretch of neglect and complacency, democracies must again show themselves capable of acting boldly to defend their common liberal creed in addition to the health and security of their nations. This will come as something of a surprise to liberal states long accustomed to thinking of themselves as status quo powers in a global order that was established by and for them. But if the phenomenon of authoritarian power-grabs proceeds unchecked, the facile assumptions of the permanence of that order may look more and more fallacious. As leading authoritarian states pursue a strategy of “co-option, coercion, and concealment,” as H.R. McMaster has summarized it, the old liberal order may rapidly give way to a new order that is distinctly illiberal, with the world reverting to its historical norms of chaos and conflict.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Even before COVID-19, if you can recall that antique era, the liberal order was already unraveling of its own accord. While authoritarian states fundamentally rejected the American-led international system, the liberal states favored under that system came to act as though it was simply the natural order of things. Meanwhile, revisionist powers increasingly contested liberal norms, to their own advantage. The global progress toward free and open societies that had been a conspicuous feature of the latter half of the twentieth century seemed to have stalled, or even reversed.
The democratic world must show vigilance against autocracies bent on revising the terms of international order, as well as solidarity for the potential victims of these non-liberal rising powers. The wider liberal order will not thrive or even survive without the determined effort of the strongest liberal states in the international system, acting in concert but also in their own interest. The pandemic has revealed that the safety and prosperity of our way of life are, to a considerable degree, at Beijing’s mercy. Changing that situation cannot happen in the absence of robust and inspired American leadership. Even if American power is no longer “unipolar,” and even if the United States no longer thinks of itself as the “indispensable nation,” the world’s autocracies have no illusion that the liberal order depends on the ideals and exertions of the world’s only superpower.
As it did for the Soviet challenge, the United States must check the rising authoritarian trend and restore prestige to liberal values by leading a concerted bloc of like-minded nations to defend the cause of liberty. The votaries of freedom abroad are in desperate need of such leadership in a time when innumerable regimes exploit the pandemic––itself incubated, willfully or not, by authoritarian authorities––to consolidate control and eviscerate civil society. If it chooses to ignore this challenge, the Western core of the liberal order will find itself living in a world no longer of its own making.
Democracy remains what it has been since the age of Pericles: the worst form of government except for all the others. For all its flaws, it is the political system that guarantees universal suffrage, the rule of law, and the peaceful and regular transfer of power. Not so long ago, this political culture of self-government was thought to be destined to spread across the globe. At the end of the Cold War, the political and business elite of the West imagined the “end of history” in which democratic capitalism had triumphed over its ideological rivals for all future time.
This was a mirage, and one to which a decadent society (on both sides of the Atlantic) was particularly prone. In the post-pandemic world, this utopian notion should be among the first that we dispense with. It turns out that there is no democratic destiny. This is just as well. There is no despotic destiny either. It remains open for the taking. In a previous age with less need than our own for false consolation, James Madison proclaimed that the “great struggle of the Epoch” was the conflict between “liberty and despotism.” It still is.


thebulwark--2020-04-28--COVID-19 Is This Generation’s Vietnam

COVID-19 Is This Generation’s Vietnam

On June 8 , 1956 , Technical Sergeant Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr. was shot in cold blood outside a U.S. base in South Vietnam by a fellow airman .
He would become the first American military death in the conflict that was not yet thought of by his countrymen as the Vietnam war .
On May 15 , 1975 , Private Kelton R. Turner , an 18-year-old Marine , became the final definitively known American casualty , in an incident that took place two weeks after the fall of Saigon .
( Three of Turner ’ s comrades were left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later date . )
In between these two days—a span of almost 19 years—58,318 Americans were killed in the Vietnam war .
On February 6 , 2020 , an unidentified resident of California ’ s Santa Clara County became the first American to die of the coronavirus .
Or at least , that is what we think right now .
Subsequent testing may reveal that COVID-19 was responsible for some other U.S. death a few days , or even weeks , before then .
But let ’ s assume the February 6 start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or tomorrow , another unidentified person will become the 58,319th American officially to have died of COVID-19 .
Meaning that the coronavirus has killed more Americans in 12 weeks than the Vietnam war killed in 19 years .
I want to say that again because it bears repeating : Think about that for a moment .
And now think about what it means for America ’ s future .
If you view American society as a curvilinear space , you find the Vietnam war ’ s slow expansion intersecting with other large-scale social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rise of recreational drugs ; the birth of student radicalism .
These developments might seem as though they were entirely separate , but they all pushed and pulled on one another .
They all shared an idea : the conviction that America ’ s institutional authority was bankrupt .
Seen in this light , the most damning aspect of the Vietnam war wasn ’ t the casualty count—as bad as it was .
And it wasn ’ t the mission : However misunderstood it has become over the decades , the idea of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or poorly executed , but it was not crazy .
No , the signature problem of the Vietnam war was that it was a glaring failure of American political leadership—and the first failure of America ’ s military establishment .
In the aftermath of the Second World War , the American military “ became more ‘ corporate , ’ ” as Tom Ricks put it : “ less tolerant of the maverick and more likely to favor conformist ‘ organization men.
’ ” This led to the creation of a leadership culture that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ results .
When confronted with the challenge of Vietnam , the military leadership was rudderless , incompetent , or worse .
And its failures were largely either tolerated or covered up .
The failures at the top of the chain of command were the worst sort .
General William Westmoreland , commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam , pursued a failed strategy irrespective of the results and was constantly shifting blame and ducking responsibility .
Above him sat General Earle Wheeler ( chairman of the Joint Chiefs ) and Robert McNamara ( secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ duty became cautionary tales for generations of military men .
And their commanders-in-chief—especially Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon—bore much blame as well .
What made Vietnam so devastating to America was the combination of the mass death plus the realization that the colossal failings of the country ’ s leadership had contributed to the catastrophe .
Much of the turmoil that we associate with “ the Sixties ” didn ’ t actually begin until 1968—and a lot of it took place during the Seventies .
When you look at that period , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hippies , the Manson murders , Watergate , the collapse of the Detroit automakers , the Catholic Church priest abuse scandals , the crime wave , the Weathermen , the gas shortage—is the collapse of some institution that had functioned perfectly well until it suddenly came apart .
Vietnam not only fed this narrative , it became the single biggest example of it—the ur-story of why American institutions could no longer be trusted .
Because American lives were tossed into the maw of a war that the political leadership had lied about and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to win .
And so , over the course of 19 grinding years , the bodies piled up until 16,899 Americans perished in a single year .
That year was 1968 .
It is not a coincidence that the height of the death toll in Vietnam marked the beginning of the political and social revolution that changed the face of America for a generation .
A pandemic is not a war .
But there are parallels between what happened in Vietnam and America ’ s experience of the coronavirus .
The first is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both cases were disastrous .
The president could have banned all travel from China after the outbreak in Wuhan .
Despite what he now claims , he did not .
The administration could have taken a hard line with the Chinese government and insisted on embedding American researchers with the Chinese teams in order to get an unfiltered view of the facts on the ground .
Instead , the president took the word of China ’ s authoritarian leader and repeated Chinese propaganda .
The government could have stockpiled essential medical supplies and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ period between the Wuhan outbreak and the arrival of the virus on America ’ s shores .
It did not .
Another similarity is the manner in which the American political class deceived the public about what was going on .
In Vietnam , these deceptions become famous : pretending that bombing was a form of communication ; saying that entering the conflict was a way of avoiding conflict ; insisting that the war could be won with air power alone ; claiming successes and progress which did not exist as a means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Richard Nixon ’ s electoral prospects .
Such lies are not far from the president watching the coronavirus spread across the country and yet promising Americans that “ it ’ s going to disappear one day , it ’ s like a miracle.
” But the most striking similarity is the presence of other large-scale societal changes that threaten to interact with the pandemic .
There ’ s the internet revolution , which , 20 years in , is beginning to mature now that it has incorporated mobile computing and social networks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of much of the legacy economy and the spread of mis- and disinformation at a scale never before possible in human history .
There ’ s the emergence of massive income inequality in the United States , which has widened the socioeconomic distance between the upper class and the lower class and has pushed both edges of the political spectrum further out from the realm of constructive compromise and toward the fringes .
And there ’ s the rise of nationalism , both in a Trumpian strain in the United States and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trends move only somewhat independently of one another .
In the months ahead , COVID-19 is going to shape and be shaped by all of them in some ways that can be foreseen .
But mostly in ways that can not .
The single best argument against the idea that the pandemic will be an agent of massive change in America is its relatively short duration .
Whereas Vietnam stretched over multiple decades , the coronavirus outbreak is a compressed event .
Once it is over , the thinking goes , American society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ snap back quickly to the old ways .
That is one possibility .
Here is another : The long Vietnam debacle created tremendous pressure on American society .
As people watched the casualty count climb and saw friends and loved ones perish , this pressure built until the old order cracked and was swept away in revolution and counter-revolution .
In physics , we measure pressure by calculating force applied over area .
Given the same amount of force , but a smaller area , the pressure increases .
I wonder if something @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Take the force of a shock and spread it out over a large time horizon—say , three or four years—and the resulting societal pressures will be smaller than if it happens across a relatively short time frame .
What happens when you compress the time frame ?
Even aside from the economic impact of the last two months and the months ahead , what is the societal impact of experiencing the death toll of Vietnam—and counting—over a 12 week period ?
The answer is : A great deal of societal pressure .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse than Vietnam , or vice versa ; historically and morally , they are very different world events .
The point , rather , is that , three months into the COVID-19 crisis , most Americans have yet to internalize the magnitude of the change that could come from it .
The effects of the Vietnam war on American society and the American psyche—and on more than a generation of U.S. foreign and domestic politics—were enormous .
The present pandemic could have similarly huge effects .
These might be the early days of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everything in America : Our politics .
Our economics .
Our views of each other and of the world around us .

On June 8, 1956, Technical Sergeant Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr. was shot in cold blood outside a U.S. base in South Vietnam by a fellow airman. He would become the first American military death in the conflict that was not yet thought of by his countrymen as the Vietnam war.
On May 15, 1975, Private Kelton R. Turner, an 18-year-old Marine, became the final definitively known American casualty, in an incident that took place two weeks after the fall of Saigon. (Three of Turner’s comrades were left behind and presumed executed at an unknown later date.)
In between these two days—a span of almost 19 years—58,318 Americans were killed in the Vietnam war.
On February 6, 2020, an unidentified resident of California’s Santa Clara County became the first American to die of the coronavirus. Or at least, that is what we think right now. Subsequent testing may reveal that COVID-19 was responsible for some other U.S. death a few days, or even weeks, before then. But let’s assume the February 6 start date.
At some point either today or tomorrow, another unidentified person will become the 58,319th American officially to have died of COVID-19.
Meaning that the coronavirus has killed more Americans in 12 weeks than the Vietnam war killed in 19 years.
I want to say that again because it bears repeating:
The coronavirus has killed more Americans in 12 weeks than the Vietnam war killed in 19 years.
Think about that for a moment.
And now think about what it means for America’s future.
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If you view American society as a curvilinear space, you find the Vietnam war’s slow expansion intersecting with other large-scale social changes: the sexual revolution; the rise of recreational drugs; the birth of student radicalism.
These developments might seem as though they were entirely separate, but they all pushed and pulled on one another.
They all shared an idea: the conviction that America’s institutional authority was bankrupt.
Seen in this light, the most damning aspect of the Vietnam war wasn’t the casualty count—as bad as it was. And it wasn’t the mission: However misunderstood it has become over the decades, the idea of containing communist expansion might have been imprudent or poorly executed, but it was not crazy.
No, the signature problem of the Vietnam war was that it was a glaring failure of American political leadership—and the first failure of America’s military establishment.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the American military “became more ‘corporate,’” as Tom Ricks put it: “less tolerant of the maverick and more likely to favor conformist ‘organization men.’” This led to the creation of a leadership culture that prized box-checking and ass-covering over initiative and results. When confronted with the challenge of Vietnam, the military leadership was rudderless, incompetent, or worse. And its failures were largely either tolerated or covered up.
The failures at the top of the chain of command were the worst sort. General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, pursued a failed strategy irrespective of the results and was constantly shifting blame and ducking responsibility. Above him sat General Earle Wheeler (chairman of the Joint Chiefs) and Robert McNamara (secretary of defense), whose dereliction of duty became cautionary tales for generations of military men. And their commanders-in-chief—especially Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon—bore much blame as well.
What made Vietnam so devastating to America was the combination of the mass death plus the realization that the colossal failings of the country’s leadership had contributed to the catastrophe.
Much of the turmoil that we associate with “the Sixties” didn’t actually begin until 1968—and a lot of it took place during the Seventies.
When you look at that period, the underlying story of just about every signpost—the hippies, the Manson murders, Watergate, the collapse of the Detroit automakers, the Catholic Church priest abuse scandals, the crime wave, the Weathermen, the gas shortage—is the collapse of some institution that had functioned perfectly well until it suddenly came apart.
Vietnam not only fed this narrative, it became the single biggest example of it—the ur-story of why American institutions could no longer be trusted. Because American lives were tossed into the maw of a war that the political leadership had lied about and the military leadership had no idea how to win. And so, over the course of 19 grinding years, the bodies piled up until 16,899 Americans perished in a single year.
That year was 1968. It is not a coincidence that the height of the death toll in Vietnam marked the beginning of the political and social revolution that changed the face of America for a generation.
A pandemic is not a war. But there are parallels between what happened in Vietnam and America’s experience of the coronavirus.
The first is that the choices of elite leadership in both cases were disastrous.
The president could have banned all travel from China after the outbreak in Wuhan. Despite what he now claims, he did not.
The administration could have taken a hard line with the Chinese government and insisted on embedding American researchers with the Chinese teams in order to get an unfiltered view of the facts on the ground. Instead, the president took the word of China’s authoritarian leader and repeated Chinese propaganda.
The government could have stockpiled essential medical supplies and built a robust testing system during the period between the Wuhan outbreak and the arrival of the virus on America’s shores. It did not.
Another similarity is the manner in which the American political class deceived the public about what was going on. In Vietnam, these deceptions become famous: pretending that bombing was a form of communication; saying that entering the conflict was a way of avoiding conflict; insisting that the war could be won with air power alone; claiming successes and progress which did not exist as a means to bolster first Lyndon Johnson and then Richard Nixon’s electoral prospects.
Such lies are not far from the president watching the coronavirus spread across the country and yet promising Americans that “it’s going to disappear one day, it’s like a miracle.”
But the most striking similarity is the presence of other large-scale societal changes that threaten to interact with the pandemic.
There’s the internet revolution, which, 20 years in, is beginning to mature now that it has incorporated mobile computing and social networks, and which makes possible both the transformation of much of the legacy economy and the spread of mis- and disinformation at a scale never before possible in human history.
There’s the emergence of massive income inequality in the United States, which has widened the socioeconomic distance between the upper class and the lower class and has pushed both edges of the political spectrum further out from the realm of constructive compromise and toward the fringes.
And there’s the rise of nationalism, both in a Trumpian strain in the United States and a more blood-and-soil variety in Europe.
These trends move only somewhat independently of one another. In the months ahead, COVID-19 is going to shape and be shaped by all of them in some ways that can be foreseen. But mostly in ways that cannot.
The single best argument against the idea that the pandemic will be an agent of massive change in America is its relatively short duration. Whereas Vietnam stretched over multiple decades, the coronavirus outbreak is a compressed event. Once it is over, the thinking goes, American society, having retained its plasticity, will snap back quickly to the old ways.
That is one possibility. Here is another:
The long Vietnam debacle created tremendous pressure on American society. As people watched the casualty count climb and saw friends and loved ones perish, this pressure built until the old order cracked and was swept away in revolution and counter-revolution.
In physics, we measure pressure by calculating force applied over area. Given the same amount of force, but a smaller area, the pressure increases.
I wonder if something like this holds for societal stressors. Take the force of a shock and spread it out over a large time horizon—say, three or four years—and the resulting societal pressures will be smaller than if it happens across a relatively short time frame.
What happens when you compress the time frame? Even aside from the economic impact of the last two months and the months ahead, what is the societal impact of experiencing the death toll of Vietnam—and counting—over a 12 week period?
The answer is: A great deal of societal pressure.
The point is not that the pandemic is worse than Vietnam, or vice versa; historically and morally, they are very different world events. The point, rather, is that, three months into the COVID-19 crisis, most Americans have yet to internalize the magnitude of the change that could come from it.
The effects of the Vietnam war on American society and the American psyche—and on more than a generation of U.S. foreign and domestic politics—were enormous.
The present pandemic could have similarly huge effects. These might be the early days of a wave of change that could reshape everything in America: Our politics. Our economics. Our views of each other and of the world around us.