thebulwark--2020-09-10--The Coming Biden Landslide

The Coming Biden Landslide

With a few notable exceptions , like my estimable colleague Jonathan V. Last , it seems that nobody wants to predict the November 3 election—not the staunchest partisans and particularly not the professional prognosticators .
Snake-bit from 2016 , they ’ re all hedging with terms like “ the race seems stable ” ( translation : Biden is comfortably ahead ) or “ Trump has a 26 percent chance ” of winning ( which strikes me as CYA ) .
What the heck , I predict that Joe Biden will win in a landslide .
I know , I know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out there .
And no one knows how the virus will affect turnout .
And there could be “ shy Trump voters ” who will surge to the polls on election day .
And the country is so polarized that the era of landslide victories is over .
And remember what happened in 2016 !
Fine .
Most of that could be true , and Biden could still win in a landslide .
While there is no historical analog to 2020 ( and hopefully never will be again ) , the contest that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is 1980 .
The final two years of Jimmy Carter ’ s presidency were terrible for the country .
The oil shock following the 1979 Iranian revolution sent prices soaring , while the Federal Reserve ’ s tight money policy to fight inflation sent the economy into its worst recession since World War II .
The unemployment rate in 1980 was 7.2 percent , which may not seem so bad to 2020 eyes , but it was combined with an inflation rate of 13.5 percent , yielding what came to be known as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to economic malaise , Carter ’ s term saw foreign policy reversals .
On Carter ’ s watch , the Soviet Union brought 13 new countries , including Mozambique , Ethiopia , and Nicaragua within its orbit , and in 1979 , the USSR rolled tanks into Afghanistan , prompting Carter , who had entered office scolding the nation for its “ inordinate fear of communism , ” to concede that the invasion of Afghanistan “ made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets ’ ultimate goals are than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ previous time I ’ ve been in office.
” The final insult was delivered in January by the nascent Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran , which took 53 American diplomats hostage , parading them , blindfolded , for the world ’ s cameras .
The “ hostage crisis ” lasted 444 days , and made Carter look ever more hapless .
Having first forsworn a military response , he resorted to a rescue mission in April , but it failed ignominiously , with three helicopters crashing in the desert .
The great political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too young in 2000 ) , captured Carter ’ s diminishing stature by drawing him as a smaller and smaller figure behind the Resolute desk .
And the Boston Globe spoke for many when a joke headline about a Carter speech accidentally made it into print : “ More Mush from the Wimp.
” In retrospect , we ’ ve come to think that the majority of the electorate had soured on Jimmy Carter ’ s leadership , but it was far from clear at the time .
Carter led Reagan by as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even after the bungled rescue attempt ( which cost the lives of eight U.S. servicemen ) , Carter ’ s lead slipped only slightly , declining from six points shortly before the botched operation to four points just after it .
Carter attempted to portray Reagan as a dangerous cowboy who might get the nation into a nuclear war .
Many believed that the conservative Reagan would suffer a fate similar to Barry Goldwater ’ s in 1964 .
And much was made of his career as an actor .
Despite the manifold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1980 , the incumbent president enjoyed a polling lead throughout most of the campaign .
And then came the one and only debate on October 28 , just one week before the election ( the debate was delayed as the campaigns squabbled over whether third party contender John Anderson would be included—he wasn ’ t , though he and Reagan had debated without the incumbent president in September ) .
Most commentators frame debates as “ gotcha ” moments .
They fixate on one-liners that they claim make or break candidates .
Maybe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ zingers at the expense of substance .
The Reagan/Carter debates are nearly always summed up by two lines : “ There you go again ” and “ Are you better off now than you were four years ago ?
” Actually , if you read the transcript , Reagan was blazingly good .
Yes , his genial affect was in evidence , but he also had facts at his fingertips and made solid arguments .
He was comfortable , well-versed , and in charge .
Carter seemed peevish and defensive .
It was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s polling began to leap up .
This was no warmonger .
This was not an inexperienced actor attempting to play a leader .
He was the real deal .
And while he ’ d been governor of California for two terms , and on the campaign trail for nearly two years at that point , a significant number of Americans just didn ’ t know whether the stories about him were true .
Though it puzzles observers like me , lots of people who vote don ’ t pay much attention until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the bad economy , and the hostage crisis , and Carter seeming out of his depth , voters needed to see for themselves , through the crucible of a debate , if Reagan was the sort of man they could entrust with the presidency .
Once they got a sense of Reagan , they moved en masse .
He won 51 percent of the vote to Carter ’ s 41 percent ( 7 percent went for John Anderson ) .
In 2020 , the electorate is even less satisfied with the incumbent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has trailed Biden consistently since Biden emerged as the Democratic frontrunner and later the nominee .
As in 1980 , the country is beset by troubles—a pandemic , a severe recession , and racial strife .
And unlike Carter , Trump has never enjoyed majority support .
The electorate is poised to fire the president .
The one remaining test they need is to see Biden pass is debate .
Pundits keep saying that Trump and Biden are well-known figures and that there aren ’ t going to be any surprises in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sure .
Trump is known .
But is Biden ?
Sure , people know he served in the Senate and as Barack Obama ’ s vice president .
But do they have a real sense of how he talks , how he interacts with others , how he leads ?
Fewer than 20 million Americans watched the Democratic debates .
And those committed enough to tune in to the intra-Democrat contest are probably not in doubt about which party to support in November .
About 25 million watched some portion of the Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were undecideds ?
Hard to know .
An estimated 156 million Americans will vote in November .
Debates are not really about policy , but about whether you can imagine the person in the Oval Office .
Yes , Trump inexplicably cleared this hurdle in 2016 , but his opponent was a hate figure for half of the country .
Biden is not hated .
He is , I believe , hardly known at all .
“ There is some awareness that he is a longtime politician , but there is little substance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consultants associated with the pro-Biden Super PAC Unite the Country told the Atlantic .
The Trump team has blundered by lowering expectations of Biden ’ s performance .
They ’ ve been circulating fake videos supposedly showing Biden falling asleep during an interview , and asserting ( falsely ) that he supports defunding the police .
This frequently comes up among disengaged voters in focus groups .
They ’ ve seen something on Facebook or heard that Biden is “ sundowning.
” That messaging was , to quote Talleyrand , not just a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Biden who showed up at the Democratic convention and delivered a boffo acceptance speech blew away the Trump claims that he is senile .
And Biden in debate can similarly dispatch the stories that he is sleepy or slow .
Biden isn ’ t always a stellar performer , but he doesn ’ t need to be .
Assuming that Biden handles himself during the debates only as well as he managed the one-on-one debate with Bernie Sanders , he will be fine , because people have already decided they want to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be sure that Biden is competent .
Should he have some zingers in his back pocket ?
Absolutely .
Give the commentators what they want .
But the most important task is to be well-informed , under control , and non-scary .
Likable is nice too .
And that comes naturally to Biden .
Throughout the campaign , Biden ’ s instincts have served him well .
He didn ’ t sign on to Medicare-for-All or for defunding the police .
He isn ’ t for open borders , far less for giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Rio Grande .
And during the coming debates , some people will discover this for the first time .
If Biden can turn in three solid debates ( or even just two ) , he will win the election in a landslide .
There , I said it .

With a few notable exceptions, like my estimable colleague Jonathan V. Last, it seems that nobody wants to predict the November 3 election—not the staunchest partisans and particularly not the professional prognosticators. Snake-bit from 2016, they’re all hedging with terms like “the race seems stable” (translation: Biden is comfortably ahead) or “Trump has a 26 percent chance” of winning (which strikes me as CYA).
What the heck, I predict that Joe Biden will win in a landslide. I know, I know, there are all those Trump flotillas out there. And no one knows how the virus will affect turnout. And there could be “shy Trump voters” who will surge to the polls on election day. And the country is so polarized that the era of landslide victories is over. And remember what happened in 2016!
Fine. Most of that could be true, and Biden could still win in a landslide.
While there is no historical analog to 2020 (and hopefully never will be again), the contest that most resembles it, I submit, is 1980. The final two years of Jimmy Carter’s presidency were terrible for the country. The oil shock following the 1979 Iranian revolution sent prices soaring, while the Federal Reserve’s tight money policy to fight inflation sent the economy into its worst recession since World War II. The unemployment rate in 1980 was 7.2 percent, which may not seem so bad to 2020 eyes, but it was combined with an inflation rate of 13.5 percent, yielding what came to be known as the “misery index.”
In addition to economic malaise, Carter’s term saw foreign policy reversals. On Carter’s watch, the Soviet Union brought 13 new countries, including Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua within its orbit, and in 1979, the USSR rolled tanks into Afghanistan, prompting Carter, who had entered office scolding the nation for its “inordinate fear of communism,” to concede that the invasion of Afghanistan “made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets’ ultimate goals are than anything they’ve done in the previous time I’ve been in office.”
The final insult was delivered in late 1979 by the nascent Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran, which took 53 American diplomats hostage, parading them, blindfolded, for the world’s cameras. The “hostage crisis” lasted 444 days, and made Carter look ever more hapless. Having first forsworn a military response, he resorted to a rescue mission in April, but it failed ignominiously, with three helicopters crashing in the desert. The great political cartoonist Jeff McNelly (who died way too young in 2000), captured Carter’s diminishing stature by drawing him as a smaller and smaller figure behind the Resolute desk. And the Boston Globe spoke for many when a joke headline about a Carter speech accidentally made it into print: “More Mush from the Wimp.”
In retrospect, we’ve come to think that the majority of the electorate had soured on Jimmy Carter’s leadership, but it was far from clear at the time. Carter led Reagan by as much as 8 points into October. Even after the bungled rescue attempt (which cost the lives of eight U.S. servicemen), Carter’s lead slipped only slightly, declining from six points shortly before the botched operation to four points just after it.
Carter attempted to portray Reagan as a dangerous cowboy who might get the nation into a nuclear war. Many believed that the conservative Reagan would suffer a fate similar to Barry Goldwater’s in 1964. And much was made of his career as an actor. Despite the manifold troubles the country was saddled with in 1980, the incumbent president enjoyed a polling lead throughout most of the campaign.
And then came the one and only debate on October 28, just one week before the election (the debate was delayed as the campaigns squabbled over whether third party contender John Anderson would be included—he wasn’t, though he and Reagan had debated without the incumbent president in September). Most commentators frame debates as “gotcha” moments. They fixate on one-liners that they claim make or break candidates. Maybe. Certainly pundits tend to focus on zingers at the expense of substance. The Reagan/Carter debates are nearly always summed up by two lines: “There you go again” and “Are you better off now than you were four years ago?”
Actually, if you read the transcript, Reagan was blazingly good. Yes, his genial affect was in evidence, but he also had facts at his fingertips and made solid arguments. He was comfortable, well-versed, and in charge. Carter seemed peevish and defensive.
It was only after that debate that Reagan’s polling began to leap up. This was no warmonger. This was not an inexperienced actor attempting to play a leader. He was the real deal. And while he’d been governor of California for two terms, and on the campaign trail for nearly two years at that point, a significant number of Americans just didn’t know whether the stories about him were true. Though it puzzles observers like me, lots of people who vote don’t pay much attention until the last minute. In 1980, despite the bad economy, and the hostage crisis, and Carter seeming out of his depth, voters needed to see for themselves, through the crucible of a debate, if Reagan was the sort of man they could entrust with the presidency. Once they got a sense of Reagan, they moved en masse. He won 51 percent of the vote to Carter’s 41 percent (7 percent went for John Anderson).
In 2020, the electorate is even less satisfied with the incumbent than they were in 1980. Trump has trailed Biden consistently since Biden emerged as the Democratic frontrunner and later the nominee. As in 1980, the country is beset by troubles—a pandemic, a severe recession, and racial strife. And unlike Carter, Trump has never enjoyed majority support. The electorate is poised to fire the president.
The one remaining test they need is to see Biden pass is debate. Pundits keep saying that Trump and Biden are well-known figures and that there aren’t going to be any surprises in the race. I’m not so sure. Trump is known. But is Biden? Sure, people know he served in the Senate and as Barack Obama’s vice president. But do they have a real sense of how he talks, how he interacts with others, how he leads? Fewer than 20 million Americans watched the Democratic debates. And those committed enough to tune in to the intra-Democrat contest are probably not in doubt about which party to support in November. About 25 million watched some portion of the Democratic Convention, but how many of those were undecideds? Hard to know. An estimated 156 million Americans will vote in November.
Debates are not really about policy, but about whether you can imagine the person in the Oval Office. Yes, Trump inexplicably cleared this hurdle in 2016, but his opponent was a hate figure for half of the country. Biden is not hated. He is, I believe, hardly known at all. “There is some awareness that he is a longtime politician, but there is little substance or specificity behind the impressions,” consultants associated with the pro-Biden Super PAC Unite the Country told the Atlantic.
The Trump team has blundered by lowering expectations of Biden’s performance. They’ve been circulating fake videos supposedly showing Biden falling asleep during an interview, and asserting (falsely) that he supports defunding the police. This frequently comes up among disengaged voters in focus groups. They’ve seen something on Facebook or heard that Biden is “sundowning.” That messaging was, to quote Talleyrand, not just a crime, it was a mistake. The Biden who showed up at the Democratic convention and delivered a boffo acceptance speech blew away the Trump claims that he is senile. And Biden in debate can similarly dispatch the stories that he is sleepy or slow.
Biden isn’t always a stellar performer, but he doesn’t need to be. Assuming that Biden handles himself during the debates only as well as he managed the one-on-one debate with Bernie Sanders, he will be fine, because people have already decided they want to fire Trump, they just want to be sure that Biden is competent. Should he have some zingers in his back pocket? Absolutely. Give the commentators what they want. But the most important task is to be well-informed, under control, and non-scary. Likable is nice too. And that comes naturally to Biden.
Throughout the campaign, Biden’s instincts have served him well. He didn’t sign on to Medicare-for-All or for defunding the police. He isn’t for open borders, far less for giving free medical care to everyone who crosses the Rio Grande. And during the coming debates, some people will discover this for the first time. If Biden can turn in three solid debates (or even just two), he will win the election in a landslide.
There, I said it.


thebulwark--2020-09-10--Trump Says He Wanted to Avoid COVID Panic—But Panic Is His Whole Shtick

Wednesday ’ s revelation that President Trump knowingly lied to the American people about the seriousness of COVID-19 was both shocking and yet also unsurprising .
Throughout the early months of the pandemic , he repeatedly reassured the public that COVID-19 was no more of a threat than the ordinary flu and that it “ looks like by April , you know , in theory , when it gets a little warmer , it miraculously goes away.
” At the same time , he was telling Washington Post associate editor Bob Woodward a very different story .
Weeks before the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the president acknowledged that the virus was dangerous , airborne , highly contagious and “ more deadly than even your strenuous flus.
” In a series of phone conversations that were recorded with his consent Trump conceded that the virus was “ deadly stuff.
” It was , the president speculated , maybe five times “ more deadly ” than the flu .
Soon after the news of his deception broke , the president ’ s press secretary , Kayleigh McEnany , rushed to Trump ’ s defense , claiming that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American public on COVID.
” A few hours later , though , the president himself came close to owning up to his duplicity , He explained that his intention in his public remarks downplaying the seriousness of COVID-19 was to avoid creating panic : I don ’ t want people to be frightened .
I don ’ t want to create panic , as you say .
And certainly , I ’ m not going to drive this country or the world into a frenzy .
We want to show confidence .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to show strength as a nation .
.
.
.
We don ’ t want to—we don ’ t want to instill panic .
We don ’ t want to jump up and down and start shouting that we have a problem that is a—a tremendous problem—scare everybody .
.
.
.
The last thing we can show is panic or excitement or fear or anything else .
The depth and depravity of the president ’ s hypocrisy about COVID-19 can only be fully grasped by examining his panic defense .
His claim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people beggars the imagination .
Trump ’ s entire political career has been built on using fear as a weapon .
As he explained to Woodward and a colleague in a 2016 interview , “ Real power is—I don ’ t even want to use the word—fear.
” And the president ’ s suggestion that his lie was an extraordinary act of a statesmanship hardly fits the reality of a man who has made more than 20,000 false or misleading claims since he took the oath of office on January , 20 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declared his candidacy for president in 2015 he has gone out of his way to try to frighten the American people and make fear a centerpiece of his campaign strategy .
As he said at the time , “ When Mexico sends its people , they ’ re not sending their best .
They ’ re not sending you .
They ’ re not sending you .
They ’ re sending people that have lots of problems , and they ’ re bringing those problems with us .
They ’ re bringing drugs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They ’ re rapists.
” Linking immigration and the threat of terrorism , Trump explained , “ It ’ s coming from more than Mexico .
It ’ s coming from all over South and Latin America , and it ’ s coming probably—probably from the Middle East .
But we don ’ t know .
Because we have no protection and we have no competence , we don ’ t know what ’ s happening.
” In his acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention , he said that “ attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in our cities , threaten our very way of life .
.
.
.
Americans watching this address tonight have seen the recent images of violence in our streets and the chaos in our communities .
Many have witnessed this violence personally .
Some have even been its victims.
” He went on to say that any “ politician who does not grasp this danger is not fit to lead our country.
” And in his inaugural address on January 20 , 2017 , he warned of an unfolding “ American carnage ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year and a half later , in the run-up to the 2018 midterm election , the president issued dire warnings of a migrant caravan snaking up through Central America toward the U.S. border .
He accused “ bad people ” of starting the caravan and “ very , very bad people ” of being part of it .
Trump tweeted that there were “ criminals and unknown Middle Easterners ” among the migrants heading for Texas .
In 2019 , he again stirred the embers of racial fear by trying to make newly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members of Congress , the so-called “ Squad , ” the face of the Democratic party and the embodiment of a demographic shift that he suggested threatened the economic well-being and political influence of working class whites .
Stoking fear also has been central to the president ’ s re-election effort .
In his acceptance speech at this year ’ s RNC , Trump took pains to remind his listeners of the rampant “ violence and danger in the streets ” and of “ violent crime ” especially in “ Democrat-run cities.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has frequently told voters that his opponent , former Vice President Joe Biden , would “ abolish ” suburbs because Biden wants to end racially discriminatory housing rules .
Thus in July , the president tweeted out a critical column on the Obama-era housing program with the plea , “ The Suburban Housewives of America must read this article .
Biden will destroy your neighborhood and your American Dream .
I will preserve it , and make it even better !
” This is not the record of a president who sincerely cares @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the American public .
Moreover , given Trump ’ s daily record of lying and deception he can not now pretend to be the true inheritor of a tradition of “ just lies ” told by leaders to advance citizens ’ interests or protect their well-being .
His claims about the motivation for his deadly lies about COVID-19 ring hollow .
The damage that Trump ’ s campaign of deception and his attacks on truth itself have inflicted on the fabric of our public life has been well documented .
Yesterday , caught @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nor dismiss , the cost of Donald Trump ’ s callous disregard for the welfare of all Americans was fully and hopefully finally revealed .

Wednesday’s revelation that President Trump knowingly lied to the American people about the seriousness of COVID-19 was both shocking and yet also unsurprising.
Throughout the early months of the pandemic, he repeatedly reassured the public that COVID-19 was no more of a threat than the ordinary flu and that it “looks like by April, you know, in theory, when it gets a little warmer, it miraculously goes away.”
At the same time, he was telling Washington Post associate editor Bob Woodward a very different story. Weeks before the coronavirus pandemic took its first American life, the president acknowledged that the virus was dangerous, airborne, highly contagious and “more deadly than even your strenuous flus.” In a series of phone conversations that were recorded with his consent Trump conceded that the virus was “deadly stuff.” It was, the president speculated, maybe five times “more deadly” than the flu.
Soon after the news of his deception broke, the president’s press secretary, Kayleigh McEnany, rushed to Trump’s defense, claiming that “The president has never lied to the American public on COVID.”
A few hours later, though, the president himself came close to owning up to his duplicity. He explained that his intention in his public remarks downplaying the seriousness of COVID-19 was to avoid creating panic:
I don’t want people to be frightened. I don’t want to create panic, as you say. And certainly, I’m not going to drive this country or the world into a frenzy. We want to show confidence. We want to show strength. We want to show strength as a nation. . . . We don’t want to—we don’t want to instill panic. We don’t want to jump up and down and start shouting that we have a problem that is a—a tremendous problem—scare everybody. . . . The last thing we can show is panic or excitement or fear or anything else.
The depth and depravity of the president’s hypocrisy about COVID-19 can only be fully grasped by examining his panic defense. His claim that he did not want to frighten people beggars the imagination.
Trump’s entire political career has been built on using fear as a weapon. As he explained to Woodward and a colleague in a 2016 interview, “Real power is—I don’t even want to use the word—fear.”
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
And the president’s suggestion that his lie was an extraordinary act of a statesmanship hardly fits the reality of a man who has made more than 20,000 false or misleading claims since he took the oath of office on January, 20, 2017.
From the moment Trump first declared his candidacy for president in 2015 he has gone out of his way to try to frighten the American people and make fear a centerpiece of his campaign strategy. As he said at the time, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”
Linking immigration and the threat of terrorism, Trump explained, “It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably—probably from the Middle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening.”
In his acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention, he said that “attacks on our police, and the terrorism in our cities, threaten our very way of life. . . . Americans watching this address tonight have seen the recent images of violence in our streets and the chaos in our communities. Many have witnessed this violence personally. Some have even been its victims.” He went on to say that any “politician who does not grasp this danger is not fit to lead our country.”
And in his inaugural address on January 20, 2017, he warned of an unfolding “American carnage” and pledged to stop it.
A year and a half later, in the run-up to the 2018 midterm election, the president issued dire warnings of a migrant caravan snaking up through Central America toward the U.S. border. He accused “bad people” of starting the caravan and “very, very bad people” of being part of it. Trump tweeted that there were “criminals and unknown Middle Easterners” among the migrants heading for Texas.
In 2019, he again stirred the embers of racial fear by trying to make newly elected black, Latino, and Palestinian members of Congress, the so-called “Squad,” the face of the Democratic party and the embodiment of a demographic shift that he suggested threatened the economic well-being and political influence of working class whites.
Stoking fear also has been central to the president’s re-election effort. In his acceptance speech at this year’s RNC, Trump took pains to remind his listeners of the rampant “violence and danger in the streets” and of “violent crime” especially in “Democrat-run cities.”
Moreover, in racially coded terms he has frequently told voters that his opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, would “abolish” suburbs because Biden wants to end racially discriminatory housing rules. Thus in July, the president tweeted out a critical column on the Obama-era housing program with the plea, “The Suburban Housewives of America must read this article. Biden will destroy your neighborhood and your American Dream. I will preserve it, and make it even better!”
This is not the record of a president who sincerely cares about calming fears and avoiding panic among the American public. Moreover, given Trump’s daily record of lying and deception he cannot now pretend to be the true inheritor of a tradition of “just lies” told by leaders to advance citizens’ interests or protect their well-being. His claims about the motivation for his deadly lies about COVID-19 ring hollow.
The damage that Trump’s campaign of deception and his attacks on truth itself have inflicted on the fabric of our public life has been well documented. Yesterday, caught in a lie he could neither ignore nor dismiss, the cost of Donald Trump’s callous disregard for the welfare of all Americans was fully and hopefully finally revealed.


thebulwark--2020-09-11--The Hotel Rwanda Hero Is the Latest Victim of Transnational Repression

On Monday , August 31 , Rwanda ’ s government made a shocking announcement : Paul Rusesabagina , the man made famous by the film Hotel Rwanda for sheltering hundreds of civilians during the 1994 genocide , was in Rwandan custody and being held on suspicion of terrorism .
His troubling arrest may be one of the latest installments in a dangerous and underreported global trend : transnational repression .
The news of Rusesabagina ’ s arrest was especially stunning given that he had left the country in 1996 , like thousands of other Rwandans who chafed at the brutal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Rwandan Patriotic Front ( RPF ) , which brooks no democratic discussion , much less opposition .
Rwandan authorities did not reveal how Rusesabagina came to be in custody , except to say that he was brought to Rwanda through “ international cooperation.
” His family has indicated that although he had Belgian citizenship and lived in the U.S. with a green card , he had last been in touch from Dubai on the Thursday before Rwanda ’ s announcement .
CNN has since reported that he had traveled from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Friday , mere hours after his last contact with family .
The UAE itself denied any role in his detention .
That Rusesabagina would have traveled to Rwanda willingly seems unlikely ; the fact he was incommunicado from Friday to the announcement of his arrest on Monday also raises suspicions .
Rusesabagina ’ s appearance in Rwanda looks quite a lot like a flagrant case of transnational repression , or the targeting of exiles and diasporas by their origin countries ’ governments .
Transnational repression is a widespread tool of authoritarian regimes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has called the “ illiberal paradox ” : they want to control their populations ’ political and civic activities , but they must allow migration so as to earn remittance revenue , reduce unemployment , and cope with overpopulation .
Transnational repression enables these states to maintain a grip on citizens after they leave .
Transnational repression thrives in the nooks and crannies of the existing international order , with its ubiquitous digital communications and tracking technologies , and its dense webs of finance , criminality , mobility , and intelligence .
Dubai @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Central Africa , as for many other regions of the world , and if Rusesabagina was taken from there , he would not be the first .
The Emirati city has been the site of numerous kidnappings , forced deportations , and even assassinations by state actors from Israel to Russia and Central Asia .
The international legal regimes governing mobility provide a ready conduit for transnational repression .
Authoritarian states have found it easy and effective first to manipulate the international warning system INTERPOL to detain dissidents in transit outside their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , coercion , or diplomatic suasion to have the detainees transferred into their custody .
The fact that we still do not know what process preceded Rusesabagina ’ s appearance in Rwanda itself raises questions about its legality .
If the UAE did play a role , despite its denials , the Rwandan state ’ s established record of employing torture against dissidents should have precluded any handover .
Kagame denied that Rusesabagina was kidnapped , but conflictingly suggested that Rwanda lured Rusesabagina into what amounted to a trap , saying , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family had no knowledge of his detention until the August 31 announcement , and has not been able to communicate with him since then , indicates that he received no access to counsel before he was taken into custody .
In light of these apparent rights violations and others , on Monday Rusesabagina ’ s lawyers filed an urgent appeal to the UN special rapporteur on torture requesting immediate intervention .
Pending further information , Rusesabagina ’ s case looks more like an abduction than a lawful extradition .
The groundwork for such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Rwandan exiles in countries as far-flung as Uganda , Canada , Australia , Belgium , and the United States have reported intense fear of surveillance and retribution by the RPF .
Sweden and South Africa have expelled Rwandan diplomats for these very activities .
Just in the last several years , Rwandan exiles have been targeted with sophisticated spyware purchased from the Israeli company NSO Group and forcibly transferred from Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo .
There have also been high-profile assassinations and mysterious deaths over the span of decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shot to death in Kenya in 1998 .
On January 1 , 2014 , Patrick Karegeya , a former spy chief who had fled the country and gone into opposition , was murdered in a Johannesburg hotel .
Kagame himself has publicly endorsed these attacks .
The week after Karegeya ’ s murder , he gave a speech stating that “ no one will betray Rwanda and get away with it.
” In its announcement , the Rwanda Investigation Bureau accused Rusesabagina of terrorism .
After leaving Rwanda in 1996 following threats on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition politics .
Like many others who dared to question Paul Kagame and the RPF , he faced smears and threats even while abroad .
He seems to have become more radical over time as Paul Kagame ’ s intense and often violent control over the political system has ossified .
More recently , he has assumed a leading role in the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change ( MRCD ) , which has an armed wing , the National Liberation Front ( FLN ) .
There are allegations that in recent years Rusesabagina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the Rwandan government held the FLN responsible for attacks in Rwanda in 2018 .
Even an accusation of terrorism does not remove the requirement that Rusesabagina be afforded due process before being transferred to Rwandan custody .
If Rwanda wants its accusations taken seriously , and if it has credible evidence of terrorism , it should have worked to have Rusesabagina extradited through a normal legal process .
It should allow Rusesabagina full access to legal counsel of his choosing , and the chance to challenge any charges against him in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transnational repression is becoming more common , supporters of democracy should not allow it to be normalized .
An environment in which exiled dissidents disappear and ordinary emigrants live in fear would not just eliminate the possibility of refuge from repressive regimes .
It would also contribute to a broader breakdown in international law and order , creating a world of borderless persecution in which spies and assassins dispatched by tyrants prowl the globe untrammeled by borders or domestic laws .
Such a world is closer than we think , as many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international community .
Kagame ’ s Rwanda has long been a darling of the global development community , Saudi Arabia is a privileged partner of the United States , and China ’ s intercontinental influence continues to grow .
If policymakers remain blind to transnational repression , our globalized future will undoubtedly include more cases like Rusesabagina ’ s .

On Monday, August 31, Rwanda’s government made a shocking announcement: Paul Rusesabagina, the man made famous by the film Hotel Rwanda for sheltering hundreds of civilians during the 1994 genocide, was in Rwandan custody and being held on suspicion of terrorism. His troubling arrest may be one of the latest installments in a dangerous and underreported global trend: transnational repression.
The news of Rusesabagina’s arrest was especially stunning given that he had left the country in 1996, like thousands of other Rwandans who chafed at the brutal police state led by President Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which brooks no democratic discussion, much less opposition. Rwandan authorities did not reveal how Rusesabagina came to be in custody, except to say that he was brought to Rwanda through “international cooperation.”
His family has indicated that although he had Belgian citizenship and lived in the U.S. with a green card, he had last been in touch from Dubai on the Thursday before Rwanda’s announcement. CNN has since reported that he had traveled from the UAE to Rwanda via private jet on Friday, mere hours after his last contact with family. The UAE itself denied any role in his detention. That Rusesabagina would have traveled to Rwanda willingly seems unlikely; the fact he was incommunicado from Friday to the announcement of his arrest on Monday also raises suspicions.
Rusesabagina’s appearance in Rwanda looks quite a lot like a flagrant case of transnational repression, or the targeting of exiles and diasporas by their origin countries’ governments. Transnational repression is a widespread tool of authoritarian regimes, which face what the scholar Gerasimos Tsourapas has called the “illiberal paradox”: they want to control their populations’ political and civic activities, but they must allow migration so as to earn remittance revenue, reduce unemployment, and cope with overpopulation. Transnational repression enables these states to maintain a grip on citizens after they leave.
Transnational repression thrives in the nooks and crannies of the existing international order, with its ubiquitous digital communications and tracking technologies, and its dense webs of finance, criminality, mobility, and intelligence. Dubai is an important hub for such connections for Central Africa, as for many other regions of the world, and if Rusesabagina was taken from there, he would not be the first. The Emirati city has been the site of numerous kidnappings, forced deportations, and even assassinations by state actors from Israel to Russia and Central Asia.
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The international legal regimes governing mobility provide a ready conduit for transnational repression. Authoritarian states have found it easy and effective first to manipulate the international warning system INTERPOL to detain dissidents in transit outside their borders, and then to use bribery, coercion, or diplomatic suasion to have the detainees transferred into their custody. The fact that we still do not know what process preceded Rusesabagina’s appearance in Rwanda itself raises questions about its legality. If the UAE did play a role, despite its denials, the Rwandan state’s established record of employing torture against dissidents should have precluded any handover. Kagame denied that Rusesabagina was kidnapped, but conflictingly suggested that Rwanda lured Rusesabagina into what amounted to a trap, saying, “It was actually flawless.” That his family had no knowledge of his detention until the August 31 announcement, and has not been able to communicate with him since then, indicates that he received no access to counsel before he was taken into custody. In light of these apparent rights violations and others, on Monday Rusesabagina’s lawyers filed an urgent appeal to the UN special rapporteur on torture requesting immediate intervention. Pending further information, Rusesabagina’s case looks more like an abduction than a lawful extradition.
The groundwork for such an operation was no doubt well prepared. Rwandan exiles in countries as far-flung as Uganda, Canada, Australia, Belgium, and the United States have reported intense fear of surveillance and retribution by the RPF. Sweden and South Africa have expelled Rwandan diplomats for these very activities. Just in the last several years, Rwandan exiles have been targeted with sophisticated spyware purchased from the Israeli company NSO Group and forcibly transferred from Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
There have also been high-profile assassinations and mysterious deaths over the span of decades. Former interior minister Seth Sendashonga was shot to death in Kenya in 1998. On January 1, 2014, Patrick Karegeya, a former spy chief who had fled the country and gone into opposition, was murdered in a Johannesburg hotel. Kagame himself has publicly endorsed these attacks. The week after Karegeya’s murder, he gave a speech stating that “no one will betray Rwanda and get away with it.”
In its announcement, the Rwanda Investigation Bureau accused Rusesabagina of terrorism. After leaving Rwanda in 1996 following threats on his life, Rusesabagina became active in opposition politics. Like many others who dared to question Paul Kagame and the RPF, he faced smears and threats even while abroad. He seems to have become more radical over time as Paul Kagame’s intense and often violent control over the political system has ossified. More recently, he has assumed a leading role in the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change (MRCD), which has an armed wing, the National Liberation Front (FLN). There are allegations that in recent years Rusesabagina had endorsed armed struggle against the RPF, and the Rwandan government held the FLN responsible for attacks in Rwanda in 2018.
Even an accusation of terrorism does not remove the requirement that Rusesabagina be afforded due process before being transferred to Rwandan custody. If Rwanda wants its accusations taken seriously, and if it has credible evidence of terrorism, it should have worked to have Rusesabagina extradited through a normal legal process. It should allow Rusesabagina full access to legal counsel of his choosing, and the chance to challenge any charges against him in an independent court of law.
While transnational repression is becoming more common, supporters of democracy should not allow it to be normalized. An environment in which exiled dissidents disappear and ordinary emigrants live in fear would not just eliminate the possibility of refuge from repressive regimes. It would also contribute to a broader breakdown in international law and order, creating a world of borderless persecution in which spies and assassins dispatched by tyrants prowl the globe untrammeled by borders or domestic laws.
Such a world is closer than we think, as many of the culprits hold outsized sway in the international community. Kagame’s Rwanda has long been a darling of the global development community, Saudi Arabia is a privileged partner of the United States, and China’s intercontinental influence continues to grow. If policymakers remain blind to transnational repression, our globalized future will undoubtedly include more cases like Rusesabagina’s.


thebulwark--2020-09-11--Can Lebanon Be Fixed?

Can Lebanon Be Fixed?

The massive explosion last month in Beirut ’ s port has devastated the Lebanese capital .
The great Arab metropolis is now convulsed in a solemn rage , with Lebanese civil society beginning to stir on behalf of “ revolution !
” Such is the nature of life in Beirut that it can move from something so lowering to the spirit to something so ennobling to the spirit within an instant .
Popular unrest has become the rule in this land racked by state malignancy .
The mood of Lebanese is more outraged than surprised by the spectacle of thousands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to sit idle for years in a dense urban area until a spark blew away the last vestiges of the government ’ s legitimacy .
For a growing number of Lebanese , it is a government and a regime that is manifestly failing to meet its rudimentary duties .
Lebanon , trapped in a constitutional vise evolved to ensure representation for its many sectarian communities while impeding the rise of cross-sectarian or secular parties , is hurtling toward full-scale breakdown .
It is one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by sectarian fiefs .
The governing class plays each tribe against the other , Sunni against Shia against Christian against Druze , to enrich themselves while immiserating the nation .
Woeful economic mismanagement has proceeded for many long years without respite .
Combined with the arrival of the pandemic , rising unemployment has now plunged more than half the country—pushing upwards to three-quarters—into poverty .
To make matters worse , the power behind the throne in Lebanon resides with a vicious militia-cum-political party that is resistant to change and that refuses to treat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most conspicuous legacy of Syria ’ s long occupation of the country , and it has increasingly disfigured the proper operations of the government .
Facilitated by Persian power and largesse , the Shia terrorist organization has risen to become the primus inter pares of Lebanese affairs .
In concert with its domestic allies , the Party of God holds the majority in Parliament and dominates the government ’ s security and foreign policies .
French President Emmanuel Macron has visited the former French protectorate twice within a month to spur a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Macron has countered claims that meaningful progress is impossible so long as Hezbollah holds the reins of government , and warned of the costs of challenging Lebanon ’ s main political force .
“ If we fight force with force , that ’ s called escalation , ” he said , suggesting that war is not a viable option .
What Macron hasn ’ t addressed is how Lebanon ’ s corrupt and sectarian status quo can be changed at all when it is so conducive to Hezbollah ’ s true mission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ de facto sovereign police state and vessel for a foreign revolution .
A functional state would mean an end to separate governing authorities , to say nothing of the paranoid death cult that maintains its own private army while taking orders from a theocratic foreign state .
For this reason , Hezbollah has exhibited hysterical contempt for Lebanese civil resistance and democrats of every stripe and sect who seek to write “ finis ” to the power-sharing arrangement that allows a totalitarian polity to exist within a more or less free Lebanon .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to imagine the Mediterranean branch of the Shia empire of “ resistance ” genuinely committing itself to rebuilding Lebanon , when it has long conceived of itself as part of a transnational confessional community with Tehran as its capital .
It must be conceded , though , that Hezbollah enjoys a considerable base of support , especially in the dahiyeh ( suburb ) of Haet Hreik , among other predominantly Shia areas .
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah ’ s tenure has rescued the Shia—roughly a third of Lebanon ’ s population , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditionally been their lot .
Now they find themselves with a measure of prestige undreamt of in previous generations but also living as dependents on Hezbollah ’ s welfare system .
And yet , if the nation at large cowers in fear of Hezbollah , dissidents who live under the yellow flag surely have measured the grave risk involved in assailing the mighty Shiite leadership .
Despite this risk , Shiite demonstrators joined the nationwide protests last autumn , and were promptly repressed by Hezbollah goons with the same brute force that was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beirut ’ s Martyrs ’ Square .
These teeming numbers of Shiite men and women prove the ill effects of having—as George Orwell put it in Coming Up for Air—cheered for the Leader “ until they deafen themselves into thinking that they really worship him , and all the time , underneath , they hate him so that they want to puke.
” Under the right circumstances , they may decide to brave Nasrallah ’ s vengeful wrath yet again .
And Lebanese society will have to provide them every means of support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aftermath of the blast , the old question about the nature of a Lebanese government that exists alongside such a formidable militia has returned to the fore : is the regime criminal or merely derelict ?
The grim truth is that it is both : it is derelict because the Lebanese government is run not by high-minded technocrats or even civic-minded politicians but instead by a multi-confessional gang of oligarchs and criminals .
The negligence that led to the port explosion was one true expression of the character of the Lebanese state , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Another is Hezbollah ’ s implacable hostility toward Israel—a powerful neighbor double its size—and the United States .
Yet another is the repression meted out to protesters who long for a decent state that addresses their modest needs .
This was the thinly-veiled threat issued by Nasrallah days ago when he warned of a reversion to civil war should protests gain momentum .
All of this perfidy points to the same conclusion : Lebanon will remain on its current downward trajectory as long as Hezbollah is permitted to maintain its “ state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being an affront to Lebanon ’ s sovereignty , Hezbollah ’ s arms deter and debilitate the kind of initiatives required to lift the Lebanese people out of their excruciating economic decline .
“ Eventually , ” as Michael Totten writes in his fine study of contemporary Lebanon , “ The Road to Fatima Gate , ” “ the state would have to absorb Hezbollah , or Hezbollah would devour the state.
” The authentic question before the Lebanese people , and their foreign allies , is how to ameliorate—or even begin to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act of malfeasance and the host of other maladies afflicting Lebanon today .
How can Hezbollah be confronted and ultimately defanged ?
It has lately become fashionable in certain quarters to argue that Lebanon is something of a lost cause , that it has emerged as Iran ’ s client state , fully entwined with Hezbollah .
These skeptics of the U.S. alliance with Lebanon warn that any further support would constitute de facto support for Hezbollah , bolstering and preserving its capacity for mayhem .
This is not an unreasonable fear .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , it will point Lebanon toward the very outcome it seeks to prevent .
A failed Lebanese state will become a plaything of Hezbollah , to the detriment of U.S. and Lebanese interests alike .
Likewise , issuing foreign aid without attaching stringent conditions for how it is used will pursue the same path of state failure , because as presently constituted those charged with distributing the aid are also its chief beneficiaries .
All this would suggest that reforming state institutions is the only path to eventually dismantling Hezbollah and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capable of delivering essential services and drawing on the actual and potential human capital of this resilient citizenry will wean Lebanese from their dependency on crooks and faith-based fanatics .
What ’ s more , the enduring sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran will deprive the Party of God of crucial resources .
( Please note , Mr. Biden and Mrs .
Harris . )
But the great issue of political reform can not be neglected .
This means devising a government of direct rather than sectarian representation .
This can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elections law to hold the next vote for a refurbished system free of the stain of entirely sectarian parties .
Needless to say , this measure would represent an almost complete overhaul of Lebanon ’ s decrepit political structures , but as Firas Maksad writes , it is the only conceivable way of “ resuscitating the Lebanese state and constraining Hezbollah.
” The good news is that the United States has the leverage to help the Lebanese accomplish this weighty task , should it choose to do so .
It is already providing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and training for the Lebanese military and security forces , according to U.S. officials .
And it ’ s the largest aid donor for Lebanon ’ s estimated 1.3 million Syrian war refugees .
The entirety of this aid can be made contingent on Lebanese rulers finding a new structure for the country that represents the future instead of the past , and is more oriented toward liberal democracy than autocratic kleptocracy .
“ The solution ” to the problem of Hezbollah and its foul militia , as the sage Druze warlord Walid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not in Lebanon.
” What this means is that the solution lies with the rulers of Iran , who have long staked the greatest claim to this Levantine nation .
Meanwhile , the Lebanese government has been too fractured to assert its authority , the Israelis never possessed the capacity to dictate political outcomes across the Blue Line , and the French ( let alone the Americans ) have lacked the grit required for such a monumental undertaking .
It behooves those in the West who oppose Iranian hegemony in the Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off Lebanon .
The greatest gift that could be offered to Hezbollah and its Persian masters in this moment is a cringing “ realism ” that has no policy save a stick used to hold together a wretched status quo .
A more enlightened strategy would see the United States , acting in concert with other like-minded nations , putting its comprehensive power and potential influence in the service of building a new political compact in Lebanon .
Until this happens , fear will continue to stalk this troubled land to the unspoiled @ @ @ @ @ @ @

The massive explosion last month in Beirut’s port has devastated the Lebanese capital. The great Arab metropolis is now convulsed in a solemn rage, with Lebanese civil society beginning to stir on behalf of “revolution!” Such is the nature of life in Beirut that it can move from something so lowering to the spirit to something so ennobling to the spirit within an instant.
Popular unrest has become the rule in this land racked by state malignancy. The mood of Lebanese is more outraged than surprised by the spectacle of thousands of tons of ammonium nitrate being allowed to sit idle for years in a dense urban area until a spark blew away the last vestiges of the government’s legitimacy. For a growing number of Lebanese, it is a government and a regime that is manifestly failing to meet its rudimentary duties.
Lebanon, trapped in a constitutional vise evolved to ensure representation for its many sectarian communities while impeding the rise of cross-sectarian or secular parties, is hurtling toward full-scale breakdown. It is one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world, owing to entrenched patronage networks run by sectarian fiefs. The governing class plays each tribe against the other, Sunni against Shia against Christian against Druze, to enrich themselves while immiserating the nation. Woeful economic mismanagement has proceeded for many long years without respite. Combined with the arrival of the pandemic, rising unemployment has now plunged more than half the country—pushing upwards to three-quarters—into poverty.
To make matters worse, the power behind the throne in Lebanon resides with a vicious militia-cum-political party that is resistant to change and that refuses to treat Lebanese as fellow citizens. Hezbollah is the most conspicuous legacy of Syria’s long occupation of the country, and it has increasingly disfigured the proper operations of the government. Facilitated by Persian power and largesse, the Shia terrorist organization has risen to become the primus inter pares of Lebanese affairs. In concert with its domestic allies, the Party of God holds the majority in Parliament and dominates the government’s security and foreign policies.
French President Emmanuel Macron has visited the former French protectorate twice within a month to spur a reform-minded government in exchange for a bailout. Macron has countered claims that meaningful progress is impossible so long as Hezbollah holds the reins of government, and warned of the costs of challenging Lebanon’s main political force. “If we fight force with force, that’s called escalation,” he said, suggesting that war is not a viable option.
What Macron hasn’t addressed is how Lebanon’s corrupt and sectarian status quo can be changed at all when it is so conducive to Hezbollah’s true mission, which is to serve as a de facto sovereign police state and vessel for a foreign revolution. A functional state would mean an end to separate governing authorities, to say nothing of the paranoid death cult that maintains its own private army while taking orders from a theocratic foreign state. For this reason, Hezbollah has exhibited hysterical contempt for Lebanese civil resistance and democrats of every stripe and sect who seek to write “finis” to the power-sharing arrangement that allows a totalitarian polity to exist within a more or less free Lebanon. Put another way, it is impossible to imagine the Mediterranean branch of the Shia empire of “resistance” genuinely committing itself to rebuilding Lebanon, when it has long conceived of itself as part of a transnational confessional community with Tehran as its capital.
It must be conceded, though, that Hezbollah enjoys a considerable base of support, especially in the dahiyeh (suburb) of Haet Hreik, among other predominantly Shia areas. Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s tenure has rescued the Shia—roughly a third of Lebanon’s population, and growing—from the fate of dispossession that had traditionally been their lot. Now they find themselves with a measure of prestige undreamt of in previous generations but also living as dependents on Hezbollah’s welfare system.
And yet, if the nation at large cowers in fear of Hezbollah, dissidents who live under the yellow flag surely have measured the grave risk involved in assailing the mighty Shiite leadership. Despite this risk, Shiite demonstrators joined the nationwide protests last autumn, and were promptly repressed by Hezbollah goons with the same brute force that was visited on the throngs of activists in Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square. These teeming numbers of Shiite men and women prove the ill effects of having—as George Orwell put it in Coming Up for Air—cheered for the Leader “until they deafen themselves into thinking that they really worship him, and all the time, underneath, they hate him so that they want to puke.” Under the right circumstances, they may decide to brave Nasrallah’s vengeful wrath yet again. And Lebanese society will have to provide them every means of support if they do so.
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In the aftermath of the blast, the old question about the nature of a Lebanese government that exists alongside such a formidable militia has returned to the fore: is the regime criminal or merely derelict? The grim truth is that it is both: it is derelict because the Lebanese government is run not by high-minded technocrats or even civic-minded politicians but instead by a multi-confessional gang of oligarchs and criminals.
The negligence that led to the port explosion was one true expression of the character of the Lebanese state, but it is not the only one. Another is Hezbollah’s implacable hostility toward Israel—a powerful neighbor double its size—and the United States. Yet another is the repression meted out to protesters who long for a decent state that addresses their modest needs. This was the thinly-veiled threat issued by Nasrallah days ago when he warned of a reversion to civil war should protests gain momentum.
All of this perfidy points to the same conclusion: Lebanon will remain on its current downward trajectory as long as Hezbollah is permitted to maintain its “state within a state.” In addition to being an affront to Lebanon’s sovereignty, Hezbollah’s arms deter and debilitate the kind of initiatives required to lift the Lebanese people out of their excruciating economic decline. “Eventually,” as Michael Totten writes in his fine study of contemporary Lebanon, “The Road to Fatima Gate,” “the state would have to absorb Hezbollah, or Hezbollah would devour the state.”
The authentic question before the Lebanese people, and their foreign allies, is how to ameliorate—or even begin to address—the malignant state responsible for a historic act of malfeasance and the host of other maladies afflicting Lebanon today. How can Hezbollah be confronted and ultimately defanged?
It has lately become fashionable in certain quarters to argue that Lebanon is something of a lost cause, that it has emerged as Iran’s client state, fully entwined with Hezbollah. These skeptics of the U.S. alliance with Lebanon warn that any further support would constitute de facto support for Hezbollah, bolstering and preserving its capacity for mayhem. This is not an unreasonable fear. If this fear leads to American disengagement, however, it will point Lebanon toward the very outcome it seeks to prevent. A failed Lebanese state will become a plaything of Hezbollah, to the detriment of U.S. and Lebanese interests alike. Likewise, issuing foreign aid without attaching stringent conditions for how it is used will pursue the same path of state failure, because as presently constituted those charged with distributing the aid are also its chief beneficiaries.
All this would suggest that reforming state institutions is the only path to eventually dismantling Hezbollah and preserving Lebanese pluralism. A functional state capable of delivering essential services and drawing on the actual and potential human capital of this resilient citizenry will wean Lebanese from their dependency on crooks and faith-based fanatics. What’s more, the enduring sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran will deprive the Party of God of crucial resources. (Please note, Mr. Biden and Mrs. Harris.) But the great issue of political reform cannot be neglected.
This means devising a government of direct rather than sectarian representation. This can be achieved by means of a non-sectarian elections law to hold the next vote for a refurbished system free of the stain of entirely sectarian parties. Needless to say, this measure would represent an almost complete overhaul of Lebanon’s decrepit political structures, but as Firas Maksad writes, it is the only conceivable way of “resuscitating the Lebanese state and constraining Hezbollah.”
The good news is that the United States has the leverage to help the Lebanese accomplish this weighty task, should it choose to do so. It is already providing about $200 million annually in equipment and training for the Lebanese military and security forces, according to U.S. officials. And it’s the largest aid donor for Lebanon’s estimated 1.3 million Syrian war refugees. The entirety of this aid can be made contingent on Lebanese rulers finding a new structure for the country that represents the future instead of the past, and is more oriented toward liberal democracy than autocratic kleptocracy.
“The solution” to the problem of Hezbollah and its foul militia, as the sage Druze warlord Walid Jumblatt is fond of saying, “is not in Lebanon.” What this means is that the solution lies with the rulers of Iran, who have long staked the greatest claim to this Levantine nation. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government has been too fractured to assert its authority, the Israelis never possessed the capacity to dictate political outcomes across the Blue Line, and the French (let alone the Americans) have lacked the grit required for such a monumental undertaking.
It behooves those in the West who oppose Iranian hegemony in the Middle East to resist the temptation to write off Lebanon. The greatest gift that could be offered to Hezbollah and its Persian masters in this moment is a cringing “realism” that has no policy save a stick used to hold together a wretched status quo. A more enlightened strategy would see the United States, acting in concert with other like-minded nations, putting its comprehensive power and potential influence in the service of building a new political compact in Lebanon. Until this happens, fear will continue to stalk this troubled land to the unspoiled advantage of the forces of menace.