You’re Not Batman

Since mid-2015 or so , we ’ ve seen an uptick in vigilante justice .
Something happened in the middle of that year that reopened a door that we have battled over two centuries to keep closed .
Like seemingly everything else , this problem has reached something of a peak in 2020 .
In incidents large and small , American citizens are deciding they can be police , judge , jury , and , occasionally executioner all by themselves .
In early June , Edgar Samaniego shot and paralyzed Shay Mikalonis , a Las Vegas police officer sent to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Floyd ’ s killing .
He claimed he fired his gun because he wanted to scare protestors into leaving and didn ’ t know police were in the crowd .
During the Kenosha , Wisconsin riots , 17-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse was driven across state lines by his mother to provide “ security ” for businesses using an AR-15 rifle .
He shot three protesters , killing two , and was later charged with multiple felonies including intentional homicide .
In Portland , Oregon , a local MAGA Patriot Prayer Group Caravan had it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Aaron Danielson was killed by Michael Reinhol , a self-described anti-fascist , who was subsequently killed in a police raid meant to capture him .
More recently , right-wing enforcers have accused suspicious ( to them ) characters of setting some of the fires that are devastating Oregon .
A local Sheriff ’ s office issuing a Facebook statement refuting these conspiracy theories yet they persist .
America has a long history of vigilantism .
Emerging during the dark chapter of Reconstruction and extending through the Jim Crow era , thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There was also the destruction of Tulsa ’ s “ Black Wall Street ” in 1921 in which whites rampaged through one of the most economically prosperous Black communities in the country , decimating its emerging professional and business classes .
Then there were the numerous bombings , burnings , and beatings inflicted on civil rights protestors during the 1950s and 60s , led by ordinary citizens and often joined by government police forces .
As civil rights laws and enforcement took hold , including aggressive investigation and prosecution of the Klan and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ receded .
Though it scarcely seems necessary to explain why we don ’ t allow privatized violence , the need also seems unavoidable at the moment .
We reserve the use of force to the state to both legitimize it and keep passions leading to violence in check .
The state uses force and executes justice on our behalf under tight controls that are designed to ensure equal justice and prevent unjust takings of life , liberty , and property .
When individuals abandon this social contract—forgoing private violence in exchange for police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the principles , laws , and rules that define and protect their liberty and security both from other people and the state .
When Lincoln talked about preserving the Union as the main goal of the Civil War , this was , in macro , what he meant .
The Confederacy was a legal fiction , a cover for privatized violence that threatened to destroy government of , by , and for the people .
For ordered liberty to succeed , the Southern “ riot ” against legitimate authority had to be defeated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wholly depressing development has been President Trump ’ s role in driving it .
In both his political and governing strategies , he ’ s sought to arouse political passions , on both sides , rather than ameliorate them , preferring a classic game of divide-and-conquer .
It ’ s arguable that his encouragement to violence among his own followers at a number of rallies in 2016 has been a key factor in legitimizing vigilantism .
When he told audiences he wanted to assault rally hecklers and cheered on physical attacks against them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ megaphones available to legitimize private use of force .
He ’ s declined several opportunities to condemn the Rittenhouse killings in Kenosha .
Anyone who is for him gets a pass ( and sometimes support ) while those who are against him are condemned as thugs and murderers .
As the Portland incident showed us , some of those who oppose Trump are thugs and murderers .
But the solution lies in arresting , trying , and imprisoning them rather than unleashing vigilantes to combat them .
That way lies chaos and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less free .
To paraphrase The Hunt for Red October , we all need to turn the temperature down before this business gets out of control , even more people are killed , and the rule of law becomes an after-thought as we settle disputes and disagreements with fists , knives , and guns .
Before people succumb to this version of violent and dangerous cosplay , we should try to remember that we ’ re not living in Gotham City or anything like it , and that Batman is a fictional character @ @ @ @ @

Since mid-2015 or so, we’ve seen an uptick in vigilante justice. Something happened in the middle of that year that reopened a door that we have battled over two centuries to keep closed. Like seemingly everything else, this problem has reached something of a peak in 2020. In incidents large and small, American citizens are deciding they can be police, judge, jury, and, occasionally executioner all by themselves.
In early June, Edgar Samaniego shot and paralyzed Shay Mikalonis, a Las Vegas police officer sent to control rioting associated with protests about George Floyd’s killing. He claimed he fired his gun because he wanted to scare protestors into leaving and didn’t know police were in the crowd.
During the Kenosha, Wisconsin riots, 17-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse was driven across state lines by his mother to provide “security” for businesses using an AR-15 rifle. He shot three protesters, killing two, and was later charged with multiple felonies including intentional homicide.
In Portland, Oregon, a local MAGA Patriot Prayer Group Caravan had it out with antifa on the downtown streets. Aaron Danielson was killed by Michael Reinhol, a self-described anti-fascist, who was subsequently killed in a police raid meant to capture him. More recently, right-wing enforcers have accused suspicious (to them) characters of setting some of the fires that are devastating Oregon. A local Sheriff’s office issuing a Facebook statement refuting these conspiracy theories yet they persist.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
America has a long history of vigilantism. Emerging during the dark chapter of Reconstruction and extending through the Jim Crow era, thousands of African-Americans were murdered in vigilante riots. There was also the destruction of Tulsa’s “Black Wall Street” in 1921 in which whites rampaged through one of the most economically prosperous Black communities in the country, decimating its emerging professional and business classes. Then there were the numerous bombings, burnings, and beatings inflicted on civil rights protestors during the 1950s and 60s, led by ordinary citizens and often joined by government police forces. As civil rights laws and enforcement took hold, including aggressive investigation and prosecution of the Klan and its activities, vigilantism against Blacks gradually receded.
Though it scarcely seems necessary to explain why we don’t allow privatized violence, the need also seems unavoidable at the moment. We reserve the use of force to the state to both legitimize it and keep passions leading to violence in check. The state uses force and executes justice on our behalf under tight controls that are designed to ensure equal justice and prevent unjust takings of life, liberty, and property. When individuals abandon this social contract—forgoing private violence in exchange for police, prosecutors, courts and prisons—they sacrifice the principles, laws, and rules that define and protect their liberty and security both from other people and the state. When Lincoln talked about preserving the Union as the main goal of the Civil War, this was, in macro, what he meant. The Confederacy was a legal fiction, a cover for privatized violence that threatened to destroy government of, by, and for the people. For ordered liberty to succeed, the Southern “riot” against legitimate authority had to be defeated.
The most depressing aspect of this wholly depressing development has been President Trump’s role in driving it. In both his political and governing strategies, he’s sought to arouse political passions, on both sides, rather than ameliorate them, preferring a classic game of divide-and-conquer. It’s arguable that his encouragement to violence among his own followers at a number of rallies in 2016 has been a key factor in legitimizing vigilantism. When he told audiences he wanted to assault rally hecklers and cheered on physical attacks against them he was using one of the loudest megaphones available to legitimize private use of force. He’s declined several opportunities to condemn the Rittenhouse killings in Kenosha. Anyone who is for him gets a pass (and sometimes support) while those who are against him are condemned as thugs and murderers.
As the Portland incident showed us, some of those who oppose Trump are thugs and murderers. But the solution lies in arresting, trying, and imprisoning them rather than unleashing vigilantes to combat them. That way lies chaos and a country that is both less safe and less free.
To paraphrase The Hunt for Red October, we all need to turn the temperature down before this business gets out of control, even more people are killed, and the rule of law becomes an after-thought as we settle disputes and disagreements with fists, knives, and guns. Before people succumb to this version of violent and dangerous cosplay, we should try to remember that we’re not living in Gotham City or anything like it, and that Batman is a fictional character not a role model.


thebulwark--2020-09-17--What a Post-Trump Conservative Coalition Should Look Like

The future of the Republican party depends on when and how Trump leaves office .
The same is not necessarily true of the future of American conservatism .
Is conservatism dead—and , if so , can it be resurrected ?
Before discussing what might come next , we need to understand what American conservatism was , why it succeeded , and why it failed .
Painting with very broad brush strokes , modern American conservatism began as a coalition of three forces who didn ’ t much care for one another and even had contradictory values .
There were the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Friedman and the Mont Pelerin Society ; the traditionalists , often associated with the likes of Russell Kirk , author of The Conservative Mind ; and the anti-Communist hawks , some of whom , like Whittaker Chambers , the author of Witness , were themselves former Communists and radicals .
These separate groups never reconciled their contradictory principles over the importance of traditional values vs. minimalistic government involvement in the economy vs. military spending and foreign policy activism .
But they teamed up , joined together by one single cause they all shared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ didn ’ t like the Soviet Union because it didn ’ t respect market economy and individual liberty .
The traditionalists hated its godlessness .
The hawks feared the existential threat it posed to the United States .
Each of the three groups evolved over time as old generations faded and new generations came on the scene .
There were some institutions , publications , and politicians who managed to speak to all three .
As Bill Kristol recently wrote , the 1980s were the heyday of American conservatism , with President Reagan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic politics and world affairs suited to the ideas of each of the three strands .
Then , though , the movement began to decline .
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 dissolved the only glue that had held the factions together .
In the three decades that followed , conservatives were sometimes able briefly to regain some unity in opposition—standing athwart Bill Clinton in the 1990s and Barack Obama in the 2010s .
And the attacks of September 11 , 2001 and the global war on terror also had the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again only briefly , and ultimately the war on Iraq exacerbated divides on the right .
So yes , conservatism is dead .
The Tea Party in 2010s tried to resurrect it .
But all that the angry and bitter zombie Reaganites of the Tea Party ultimately accomplished was making conservatism look obstructionist—and , with the ascension of Donald Trump , they have turned into zombie Buchananites .
To the extent that the mindless mush that is called “ conservatism ” today is in obedient lockstep with Donald Trump , it is nationalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Before turning to the future , it ’ s worth making two other observations about conservatism ’ s past—and specifically about its anti-elitism and about race .
Since the 1960s , the electoral coalition that allowed the Republican party to win at the ballot box became more populist , more anti-elite , and more anti-cosmopolitan .
To some extent , this was just baked into American conservatism from the beginning : Although William F. Buckley Jr. and National Review could be highbrow , there was a clear populist , anti-elite , anti-expert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Buckley ’ s famous quip about how he would rather be governed by the first 2,000 people listed in the Boston phonebook than by the 2,000 people on the Harvard faculty . )
One of the great ironies of movement conservatism was the Ivy-educated public intellectuals who would go on cruises to complain about the elite .
In reality , the relationship between the conservative leadership and much of the Republican voter base was something like that of guards and inmates in an asylum .
For decades , those leaders managed to keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rise of the Tea Party and then Trump , the inmates took over the asylum .
Whole books could be written—indeed , whole books have been written—about the GOP , conservatism , and race .
Here , though , it ’ s just worth mentioning that the conservative objection to the Civil Rights Act ( and , conversely , the embrace of the act by liberals and Democrats ) had lasting effects on makeup of the Republican party .
It pushed minorities to the left .
It made conservatism much more white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt they had a political home , at least at the edges of the party .
Recreating the conservatism of 1955-1991 in the post-Trump era is not just tenable .
Its good parts are useless and its bad parts should have never been there .
The old model of conservatism served its purpose .
It is gone , and that ’ s just a fact that must be accepted .
But while that conservatism is gone , some of the truths for which it stood remain .
The U.S. Constitution is the greatest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it is worth protecting .
Individual liberty must be protected .
The institutions of civil society , especially the family and organized religion , are necessary for a nation to function , as are traditions .
Market economies are still the best way to prosper .
America still occupies a unique place in the world as a guarantor of order and an inspiration for people everywhere who long for liberty .
A new coalition , whatever one might call it—the new right , the future right , the new Whigs , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these five broad principles and apply them to the problems of today .
And its litmus test for who should count as a conservative ought not to extend far beyond adherence to these five principles , creating a big tent for difference and compromise within the coalition , both of which are necessary for governing .
This new conservatism should also actively engage the issues of race and poverty—not only because it ’ s electorally sensible to do so , but because it is just and proper .
When some American schools are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ correction centers than schools ; when many police departments routinely cover for racist cops ; when racial disparities in health outcomes are only worsened by a global pandemic—well , it ’ s all well and good to appreciate the enormous progress that America has made on race while acknowledging the great task remaining before us .
The old conservative inclination to emphasize personal responsibility is fine , but only when childhood circumstances are taken into account and when those who have failed in the past are provided with opportunities to correct their mistakes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to engage with the concerns of young Americans to a greater extent than the defunct conservatism did .
Younger Americans tend to be more favorable toward immigration and to be friendlier with non-white immigrants , including those without legal status , because they went to school and college with first- or second-generation non-white immigrants and are friends with them .
Younger Americans care deeply about climate change .
They are worried about the crushing burden of student-loan debt , especially when the value of college degrees seems to be decreasing .
Again , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good policy , a new conservatism should try to speak to these concerns .
This doesn ’ t mean that a new conservatism should disregard working-class Americans .
To the contrary , it should be more flexible in its market-orientation than before to address such concerns .
The growing wealth and income disparities are real problems and , as arguably threats to democracy .
And , last , a new conservatism must emphasize statesmanship and liberal democratic values .
That is to say , it can not be a conservatism worthy of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wicked and buffoonish characters the GOP has elevated in recent years or the kinds of reckless anti-democratic and illiberal politics they have practiced .
And back up these convictions by boosting support for civic education in our schools .
Is it reasonable to try to create such a new conservatism ?
Probably not .
The reasonable thing to do would probably be to try to salvage whatever little good is left in it in today ’ s Republican party .
But as George Bernard Shaw said , “ the reasonable man adapts himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persists in trying to adapt the world to himself .
Therefore , all progress depends on the unreasonable man .
”

The future of the Republican party depends on when and how Trump leaves office. The same is not necessarily true of the future of American conservatism. Is conservatism dead—and, if so, can it be resurrected?
Before discussing what might come next, we need to understand what American conservatism was, why it succeeded, and why it failed. Painting with very broad brush strokes, modern American conservatism began as a coalition of three forces who didn’t much care for one another and even had contradictory values. There were the libertarians, mostly associated with Hayek and Friedman and the Mont Pelerin Society; the traditionalists, often associated with the likes of Russell Kirk, author of The Conservative Mind; and the anti-Communist hawks, some of whom, like Whittaker Chambers, the author of Witness, were themselves former Communists and radicals. These separate groups never reconciled their contradictory principles over the importance of traditional values vs. minimalistic government involvement in the economy vs. military spending and foreign policy activism. But they teamed up, joined together by one single cause they all shared: fighting Soviet communism. The libertarians didn’t like the Soviet Union because it didn’t respect market economy and individual liberty. The traditionalists hated its godlessness. The hawks feared the existential threat it posed to the United States.
Each of the three groups evolved over time as old generations faded and new generations came on the scene. There were some institutions, publications, and politicians who managed to speak to all three. As Bill Kristol recently wrote, the 1980s were the heyday of American conservatism, with President Reagan in the White House and circumstances in domestic politics and world affairs suited to the ideas of each of the three strands.
Then, though, the movement began to decline. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 dissolved the only glue that had held the factions together. In the three decades that followed, conservatives were sometimes able briefly to regain some unity in opposition—standing athwart Bill Clinton in the 1990s and Barack Obama in the 2010s. And the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the global war on terror also had the effect of holding conservatives together, but again only briefly, and ultimately the war on Iraq exacerbated divides on the right.
So yes, conservatism is dead. The Tea Party in 2010s tried to resurrect it. But all that the angry and bitter zombie Reaganites of the Tea Party ultimately accomplished was making conservatism look obstructionist—and, with the ascension of Donald Trump, they have turned into zombie Buchananites. To the extent that the mindless mush that is called “conservatism” today is in obedient lockstep with Donald Trump, it is nationalist, hateful, intolerant, and unpatriotic.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Before turning to the future, it’s worth making two other observations about conservatism’s past—and specifically about its anti-elitism and about race.
Since the 1960s, the electoral coalition that allowed the Republican party to win at the ballot box became more populist, more anti-elite, and more anti-cosmopolitan. To some extent, this was just baked into American conservatism from the beginning: Although William F. Buckley Jr. and National Review could be highbrow, there was a clear populist, anti-elite, anti-expert streak in their conservatism. (Recall Buckley’s famous quip about how he would rather be governed by the first 2,000 people listed in the Boston phonebook than by the 2,000 people on the Harvard faculty.) One of the great ironies of movement conservatism was the Ivy-educated public intellectuals who would go on cruises to complain about the elite.
In reality, the relationship between the conservative leadership and much of the Republican voter base was something like that of guards and inmates in an asylum. For decades, those leaders managed to keep the inmates contained, but, with the rise of the Tea Party and then Trump, the inmates took over the asylum.
Whole books could be written—indeed, whole books have been written—about the GOP, conservatism, and race. Here, though, it’s just worth mentioning that the conservative objection to the Civil Rights Act (and, conversely, the embrace of the act by liberals and Democrats) had lasting effects on makeup of the Republican party. It pushed minorities to the left. It made conservatism much more white. And it meant that white supremacists felt they had a political home, at least at the edges of the party.
Recreating the conservatism of 1955-1991 in the post-Trump era is not just tenable. Its good parts are useless and its bad parts should have never been there. The old model of conservatism served its purpose. It is gone, and that’s just a fact that must be accepted.
But while that conservatism is gone, some of the truths for which it stood remain. The U.S. Constitution is the greatest governing document that man has created, and it is worth protecting. Individual liberty must be protected. The institutions of civil society, especially the family and organized religion, are necessary for a nation to function, as are traditions. Market economies are still the best way to prosper. America still occupies a unique place in the world as a guarantor of order and an inspiration for people everywhere who long for liberty.
A new coalition, whatever one might call it—the new right, the future right, the new Whigs, the liberals, the centrists—should still adhere to these five broad principles and apply them to the problems of today. And its litmus test for who should count as a conservative ought not to extend far beyond adherence to these five principles, creating a big tent for difference and compromise within the coalition, both of which are necessary for governing.
This new conservatism should also actively engage the issues of race and poverty—not only because it’s electorally sensible to do so, but because it is just and proper. When some American schools are underfunded and overpopulated and look more like correction centers than schools; when many police departments routinely cover for racist cops; when racial disparities in health outcomes are only worsened by a global pandemic—well, it’s all well and good to appreciate the enormous progress that America has made on race while acknowledging the great task remaining before us. The old conservative inclination to emphasize personal responsibility is fine, but only when childhood circumstances are taken into account and when those who have failed in the past are provided with opportunities to correct their mistakes.
Also, this new conservatism ought to engage with the concerns of young Americans to a greater extent than the defunct conservatism did. Younger Americans tend to be more favorable toward immigration and to be friendlier with non-white immigrants, including those without legal status, because they went to school and college with first- or second-generation non-white immigrants and are friends with them. Younger Americans care deeply about climate change. They are worried about the crushing burden of student-loan debt, especially when the value of college degrees seems to be decreasing. Again, both electorally and as a matter of good policy, a new conservatism should try to speak to these concerns.
This doesn’t mean that a new conservatism should disregard working-class Americans. To the contrary, it should be more flexible in its market-orientation than before to address such concerns. The growing wealth and income disparities are real problems and, as arguably threats to democracy.
And, last, a new conservatism must emphasize statesmanship and liberal democratic values. That is to say, it cannot be a conservatism worthy of the name if it embraces the kinds of wicked and buffoonish characters the GOP has elevated in recent years or the kinds of reckless anti-democratic and illiberal politics they have practiced. And back up these convictions by boosting support for civic education in our schools.
Is it reasonable to try to create such a new conservatism? Probably not. The reasonable thing to do would probably be to try to salvage whatever little good is left in it in today’s Republican party. But as George Bernard Shaw said, “the reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.”


thebulwark--2020-09-17--The Price of Peace

The Price of Peace

In the midst of America ’ s expedition to Afghanistan after September 11 , 2001 , Noam Chomsky predicted a “ silent genocide ” was in store for the Afghan people .
What transpired instead was something else entirely : Nearly 2 million Afghans , refugees who had either fled during the brutal Soviet occupation or the ghastly period of Taliban rule , returned to their own country .
Paul Berman was among those who noticed that whereas genocide reduces populations , the invasion of Afghanistan increased the population by nearly 10 percent .
As Berman pointed out in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of genocide , genogenesis.
” Nearly twenty years later , Chomsky ’ s intellectual brethren are desperate to suggest that American power is premised on the scattering if not the annihilation of Muslim populations in the lands of Islam .
One prominent example of this tendency recently grabbed headlines : With this salvo , a new report written by American University anthropologist David Vine and his students and published by Brown University ’ s Costs of War Project purports to tally one element of the balance sheet of America ’ s military activity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s hardly the only factor involved in the intricate moral calculus of U.S. foreign policy in matters of war and peace , but it is a salient one .
It would therefore be a weighty indictment of U.S. policy if American arms were actively driving scores of millions from their homes and across treacherous terrain in search of refuge .
As it turns out , however , this calculation is grossly flawed , arising from shoddy methodology applied by authors plainly driven more by rigid ideology than rigorous investigation .
Let ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of refugees caused by American military actions is more than zero .
Even limited and precise and thoroughly justified military interventions can displace people .
And estimating the number of refugees displaced by any given event can be complicated .
That said , the contention that America ’ s role in the Middle East—the primary realm of U.S. kinetic activity in recent years and the primary focus of this report—caused the global migration surge that the report attributes to it is fatuous nonsense .
The single largest migratory wave of this century @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emanated not from America ’ s wars in Afghanistan or even Iraq , but from the long and bloody Syrian war .
This must come as a devastating shock to those who do not know how to process world events except through the provincial prism of U.S. global supremacy , but that doesn ’ t make it any less true .
How , then , does the Cost of War Project deal with the inconvenient truth that some of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of our time have unfolded in the absence of American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the conventional left-wing view left that the Syrian war , or at any rate a vast amount of its human cost , was at least “ shap [ ed ] ” by America ’ s ill-fated expedition to neighboring Iraq .
The sacking of Saddam Hussein , this facile argument runs , spurred a jihadist onslaught with which many nations , and particularly Syria , are still contending—and whose lethal consequences are almost purely America ’ s fault .
This narrative is at once disgraceful and bizarre .
The report does offer the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ solely responsible for the displacement ” of Arab masses , conceding that “ causation is never so simple ” and that even in seemingly simple cases , other factors , including environmental and economic factors can play a part .
But it then goes on to disregard all those complicating factors , effectively saddling the American-led “ war on terror ” ( a term it never uses without sneering quote marks ) with all the human costs that have accrued from a wide-ranging combat against theocratic terror .
The sleight of hand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as the one in postbellum Iraq ) are only inflamed and never suppressed by U.S. military action , and have no other principal causes , is a species of moral idiocy .
It presumes that the only actor with historical agency is the American hegemon , and therefore that all the miseries of the Middle East are to be laid at its feet .
The established order of power in the Middle East , to say nothing of the cynical interventions of foreign states , is given fleeting attention .
Thus are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partners—indicted for battling against the scum of the earth while organized cadres of proven killers responsible for unbridled mayhem are left out of the account , ignored and exculpated .
Of course , if the United States bowed out of its vocation as guarantor of regional peace and security , and called a swift halt to its military operations , a host of secular and theocratic despots would rise to reduce the region to utter ruin .
And what of the Syrian rebellion that broke out in March 2011 ?
Its roots are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the Syrian people ’ s robust determination to take part in this historic movement against tyranny—all of which cuts against the report ’ s presumption of American culpability for the Syrian ordeal .
Vine and his coauthors are forced to concede that U.S. involvement there has been “ relatively limited ” compared to the rogue ’ s gallery of Syrian government forces , foreign militants , and Russian airpower that have wrought excruciating havoc in the country .
While maintaining its supine posture in the face of Bashar al-Assad ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brought its power to bear in Syria in 2014 to contain and defeat the caliphate .
The report therefore derives its calculations from “ people displaced from five Syrian provinces where U.S. forces have fought and operated since 2014.
” A less conservative and , the report avers , “ arguably more accurate ” approach would include the displaced from all of Syria ’ s provinces since 2014 or as early as 2013 when the U.S. government began backing Syrian rebel groups—as if the paltry amount of lethal aid delivered by the Obama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could conceivably have contributed to mass human flight , as opposed to Assad ’ s malicious butchers or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ’ s medieval sadists ) .
In point of fact , Washington ’ s threadbare assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces remains a humiliation for the Obama administration and a stain on American honor .
There can be little doubt that a decisive but modest deployment of U.S. military force in Syria would have saved many more lives than it would have taken , and prevented the displacement of millions of Syrians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk , could have declared Syria a no-fly zone on the model of Iraqi Kurdistan after the Gulf War of 1991 .
It could have destroyed the regime ’ s air force on the ground , cratering its airfields for the duration of the conflict .
In one fell swoop , the Assad regime would have lost the strategic initiative and American deterrence would have assured that the Russians would have stayed out and watched helplessly as their foul client contemplated a fin de régime .
It might seem curious that a report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suffering did not find time to offer a word of regret that Washington did not choose to exert a fraction of its strength to bring about a more benign outcome .
But doing so would have left the impression that the most pressing duty was the relief of mass suffering rather than opposition to American hegemony .
The Cost of War Project report subordinates the former in service of the latter , starkly refusing to grapple with competing moral imperatives .
It therefore ranks not only as a tendentious enterprise but a morally @ @ @

In the midst of America’s expedition to Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, Noam Chomsky predicted a “silent genocide” was in store for the Afghan people. What transpired instead was something else entirely: Nearly 2 million Afghans, refugees who had either fled during the brutal Soviet occupation or the ghastly period of Taliban rule, returned to their own country. Paul Berman was among those who noticed that whereas genocide reduces populations, the invasion of Afghanistan increased the population by nearly 10 percent. As Berman pointed out in a sharp rebuke of Chomsky: “Instead of genocide, genogenesis.”
Nearly twenty years later, Chomsky’s intellectual brethren are desperate to suggest that American power is premised on the scattering if not the annihilation of Muslim populations in the lands of Islam. One prominent example of this tendency recently grabbed headlines:
The United States’ post-9/11 wars have contributed significantly to the dramatic increase in recent years in the number of people displaced by war and violent conflict worldwide: Between 2010 and 2019, the total number of refugees and IDPs globally has nearly doubled from 41 million to 79.5 million.
With this salvo, a new report written by American University anthropologist David Vine and his students and published by Brown University’s Costs of War Project purports to tally one element of the balance sheet of America’s military activity in the 21st century. It’s hardly the only factor involved in the intricate moral calculus of U.S. foreign policy in matters of war and peace, but it is a salient one. It would therefore be a weighty indictment of U.S. policy if American arms were actively driving scores of millions from their homes and across treacherous terrain in search of refuge.
As it turns out, however, this calculation is grossly flawed, arising from shoddy methodology applied by authors plainly driven more by rigid ideology than rigorous investigation.
Let’s start by stating the obvious: The number of refugees caused by American military actions is more than zero. Even limited and precise and thoroughly justified military interventions can displace people. And estimating the number of refugees displaced by any given event can be complicated.
That said, the contention that America’s role in the Middle East—the primary realm of U.S. kinetic activity in recent years and the primary focus of this report—caused the global migration surge that the report attributes to it is fatuous nonsense. The single largest migratory wave of this century, without a close second, has emanated not from America’s wars in Afghanistan or even Iraq, but from the long and bloody Syrian war. This must come as a devastating shock to those who do not know how to process world events except through the provincial prism of U.S. global supremacy, but that doesn’t make it any less true.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
How, then, does the Cost of War Project deal with the inconvenient truth that some of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of our time have unfolded in the absence of American power? Vine and his coauthors recycle the conventional left-wing view left that the Syrian war, or at any rate a vast amount of its human cost, was at least “shap[ed]” by America’s ill-fated expedition to neighboring Iraq. The sacking of Saddam Hussein, this facile argument runs, spurred a jihadist onslaught with which many nations, and particularly Syria, are still contending—and whose lethal consequences are almost purely America’s fault. This narrative is at once disgraceful and bizarre.
The report does offer the caveat that the U.S. government is not “solely responsible for the displacement” of Arab masses, conceding that “causation is never so simple” and that even in seemingly simple cases, other factors, including environmental and economic factors can play a part. But it then goes on to disregard all those complicating factors, effectively saddling the American-led “war on terror” (a term it never uses without sneering quote marks) with all the human costs that have accrued from a wide-ranging combat against theocratic terror.
The sleight of hand involved in suggesting that jihadist insurgencies (such as the one in postbellum Iraq) are only inflamed and never suppressed by U.S. military action, and have no other principal causes, is a species of moral idiocy. It presumes that the only actor with historical agency is the American hegemon, and therefore that all the miseries of the Middle East are to be laid at its feet. The established order of power in the Middle East, to say nothing of the cynical interventions of foreign states, is given fleeting attention. Thus are U.S.-led coalition forces—including local allies and indigenous partners—indicted for battling against the scum of the earth while organized cadres of proven killers responsible for unbridled mayhem are left out of the account, ignored and exculpated. Of course, if the United States bowed out of its vocation as guarantor of regional peace and security, and called a swift halt to its military operations, a host of secular and theocratic despots would rise to reduce the region to utter ruin.
And what of the Syrian rebellion that broke out in March 2011? Its roots are to be found in the Arab Awakening, and the Syrian people’s robust determination to take part in this historic movement against tyranny—all of which cuts against the report’s presumption of American culpability for the Syrian ordeal. Vine and his coauthors are forced to concede that U.S. involvement there has been “relatively limited” compared to the rogue’s gallery of Syrian government forces, foreign militants, and Russian airpower that have wrought excruciating havoc in the country. While maintaining its supine posture in the face of Bashar al-Assad’s unrelenting crimes against humanity, Washington only brought its power to bear in Syria in 2014 to contain and defeat the caliphate.
The report therefore derives its calculations from “people displaced from five Syrian provinces where U.S. forces have fought and operated since 2014.” A less conservative and, the report avers, “arguably more accurate” approach would include the displaced from all of Syria’s provinces since 2014 or as early as 2013 when the U.S. government began backing Syrian rebel groups—as if the paltry amount of lethal aid delivered by the Obama administration was at all consequential (or could conceivably have contributed to mass human flight, as opposed to Assad’s malicious butchers or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s medieval sadists).
In point of fact, Washington’s threadbare assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces remains a humiliation for the Obama administration and a stain on American honor. There can be little doubt that a decisive but modest deployment of U.S. military force in Syria would have saved many more lives than it would have taken, and prevented the displacement of millions of Syrians. The United States, at minimal risk, could have declared Syria a no-fly zone on the model of Iraqi Kurdistan after the Gulf War of 1991. It could have destroyed the regime’s air force on the ground, cratering its airfields for the duration of the conflict. In one fell swoop, the Assad regime would have lost the strategic initiative and American deterrence would have assured that the Russians would have stayed out and watched helplessly as their foul client contemplated a fin de régime.
It might seem curious that a report ostensibly committed to “overlooked” civilian suffering did not find time to offer a word of regret that Washington did not choose to exert a fraction of its strength to bring about a more benign outcome. But doing so would have left the impression that the most pressing duty was the relief of mass suffering rather than opposition to American hegemony. The Cost of War Project report subordinates the former in service of the latter, starkly refusing to grapple with competing moral imperatives. It therefore ranks not only as a tendentious enterprise but a morally unserious one.


thebulwark--2020-09-17--The Campus Surveillance State

The Campus Surveillance State

That many college campuses have adopted a culture of intellectual intolerance has become something of a cliché , as well as a chess piece in the culture wars that are now consuming our politics .
One side has turned the campus woke-scolds into an all-purpose bogeyman , a preview of an imminent totalitarianism the likes of which we haven ’ t seen since the Cultural Revolution ’ s struggle sessions ; the other side tends to dismiss the problem as overblown , the rare excesses of a tiny minority .
A recent incident at Skidmore College , a small liberal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provides a microcosm of what ’ s happening .
It ’ s a story of the attempt to create a woke surveillance state in which all instances of possible intellectual disagreement are to be hunted down and purged .
The result also shows us the limits of the success of this campaign—so far—but suggests something about the extent of its ambitions .
It began on July 30 , when David Peterson , a professor who teaches metalsmithing at Skidmore , was spotted in the crowd around a Blue Lives Matter rally in Saratoga @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was spotted standing there as a spectator , mingling with others in the crowd .
Peterson was not an organizer of the rally and did not speak at it .
In fact , he tells me that he arrived there late , after the main event was over .
But his presence was noticed by several students , who immediately started a social media campaign calling for him to be fired along with an unrelated list of ridiculous demands .
This reflects the kind of volunteer surveillance state that is being created @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which kids with their cell phones monitor everyone for the slightest signs of thoughtcrime .
It ’ s similar to the call-out websites being compiled by high-schoolers to report on their fellow teenagers in what seems like a mash up of Nineteen Eighty-Four and Lord of the Flies .
And the right has its own version : a Professor Watchlist to “ expose ” academics with “ anti-American values.
” But here ’ s where we get to the limits of political correctness and cancel culture , because Skidmore did not fire Peterson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consider firing him merely for being in the crowd at a rally .
( Peterson notes that he is already known to some of his fellow faculty as someone with conservative political views—but not usually to students , because politics just doesn ’ t come up in a class on metalsmithing . )
The administration did investigate complaints—many of them seemingly generated from form letters—that he had created a hostile environment for minority students in his classes .
That complaint is so vague that it is nearly impossible to prove or disprove , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been cleared of those charges in the last week .
However , he was warned to be more careful about students ’ “ perceptions.
” So , Peterson won ’ t be out of a job .
But as his wife asks , “ Where do we go to get our reputations back ?
” Enrollment in his classes , in a program he has spent thirty years building , have tanked and may take years to recover as memories fade and new students come onto campus .
The real signature of campus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is driven not by any central authority but by students acting as a spontaneous mob .
The thing that struck Peterson most was that none of the crusaders calling for him to be fired bothered to contact him to ask why he was at the rally or to explain his views .
Nor has he personally received angry or harassing e-mails .
( Displaying more good sense than most of us , Professor Peterson is not on social media . )
It ’ s as if he , as a person , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he told me , “ I think they just needed a heretic.
” That leads us to what we agreed is actually the big story here .
It ’ s not the attempted persecution of Peterson .
It is another demand made by the woke kids : that blue-collar facilities workers not be allowed to display any sign of their political preferences : In addition to many white professors ridiculing students of color , white staff that work in different departments , such as Facilities , Campus Safety , and the Dining Hall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Blue Lives Matter masks , “ F***Cuomo !
” car stickers , and Trump-supporting attire/bumper stickers .
Students of color and Black students especially feel threatened to have staff enter their spaces or to come face-to-face with individuals that empower beliefs that inherently go against their identities .
Just several days ago , a Black student had taken and shared a photograph of a Facilities staff member wearing a Blue Lives Matter mask when they entered her space to help with a situation she had called for .
Similarly , other students of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entering their homes for maintenance purposes with “ Make America Great Again ” T-shirts or sporting Trump bumper stickers on the back of their trucks and cars .
In other words , the big injustice these kids attending a $ 58,000-per-year school want to fight is the help getting uppity and presuming to have political opinions .
Progressivism is looking more and more like a white-collar-versus-blue-collar class war .
Peterson describes Skidmore as a politically monolithic campus where the campus Republican club attracted only a handful of members and has since shut down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place where students are shocked to meet anyone who holds right-of-center views .
So if , in these times of protest , they want to go around looking for The Oppressor , the ideological opponent who represents everything that is wrong with the world , he can be a little hard to find .
But then , as Peterson puts it , “ There he is , screwing in lightbulbs.
” All of this serves as a massive in-kind contribution to Donald Trump ’ s re-election campaign—proof for “ real Americans ” that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them and want to impose their dogmas on them .
But the two sides of this particular class struggle are not quite the opposites they might seem .
We are living in a time when the mechanisms of political persuasion are breaking down—everywhere and on both sides .
As we ’ ve watched with dismay while people on the right have been willing to distort their thinking and adopt conspiracy theories that support their partisan political narratives , it ’ s important to remember that the same kind of mental breakdown is happening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have produced a new generation of students who lack the mental fortitude to hear a common Chinese word that vaguely sounds like a racial slur in English .
At Skidmore , they are traumatized to discover that the blue-collar workers serving them have the temerity to hold different political beliefs .
If persuasion and the ability to deal with opposing ideas breaks down on college campuses—the centers of learning where we ought to expect debate to be most robust—then how can we expect it to last everywhere else ?

That many college campuses have adopted a culture of intellectual intolerance has become something of a cliché, as well as a chess piece in the culture wars that are now consuming our politics. One side has turned the campus woke-scolds into an all-purpose bogeyman, a preview of an imminent totalitarianism the likes of which we haven’t seen since the Cultural Revolution’s struggle sessions; the other side tends to dismiss the problem as overblown, the rare excesses of a tiny minority.
A recent incident at Skidmore College, a small liberal arts school in upstate New York, provides a microcosm of what’s happening. It’s a story of the attempt to create a woke surveillance state in which all instances of possible intellectual disagreement are to be hunted down and purged. The result also shows us the limits of the success of this campaign—so far—but suggests something about the extent of its ambitions.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
It began on July 30, when David Peterson, a professor who teaches metalsmithing at Skidmore, was spotted in the crowd around a Blue Lives Matter rally in Saratoga Springs. That’s it: he was spotted standing there as a spectator, mingling with others in the crowd. Peterson was not an organizer of the rally and did not speak at it. In fact, he tells me that he arrived there late, after the main event was over. But his presence was noticed by several students, who immediately started a social media campaign calling for him to be fired along with an unrelated list of ridiculous demands.
This reflects the kind of volunteer surveillance state that is being created by way of social media, in which kids with their cell phones monitor everyone for the slightest signs of thoughtcrime. It’s similar to the call-out websites being compiled by high-schoolers to report on their fellow teenagers in what seems like a mash up of Nineteen Eighty-Four and Lord of the Flies. And the right has its own version: a Professor Watchlist to “expose” academics with “anti-American values.”
But here’s where we get to the limits of political correctness and cancel culture, because Skidmore did not fire Peterson. It seems they did not even consider firing him merely for being in the crowd at a rally. (Peterson notes that he is already known to some of his fellow faculty as someone with conservative political views—but not usually to students, because politics just doesn’t come up in a class on metalsmithing.) The administration did investigate complaints—many of them seemingly generated from form letters—that he had created a hostile environment for minority students in his classes. That complaint is so vague that it is nearly impossible to prove or disprove, but administrators let him know he had been cleared of those charges in the last week.
However, he was warned to be more careful about students’ “perceptions.”
So, Peterson won’t be out of a job. But as his wife asks, “Where do we go to get our reputations back?” Enrollment in his classes, in a program he has spent thirty years building, have tanked and may take years to recover as memories fade and new students come onto campus.
The real signature of campus “cancel culture” is that it is driven not by any central authority but by students acting as a spontaneous mob.
The thing that struck Peterson most was that none of the crusaders calling for him to be fired bothered to contact him to ask why he was at the rally or to explain his views. Nor has he personally received angry or harassing e-mails. (Displaying more good sense than most of us, Professor Peterson is not on social media.) It’s as if he, as a person, is actually irrelevant to the process. As he told me, “I think they just needed a heretic.”
That leads us to what we agreed is actually the big story here. It’s not the attempted persecution of Peterson. It is another demand made by the woke kids: that blue-collar facilities workers not be allowed to display any sign of their political preferences:
In addition to many white professors ridiculing students of color, white staff that work in different departments, such as Facilities, Campus Safety, and the Dining Hall, work and drive around campus with Blue Lives Matter masks, “F***Cuomo!” car stickers, and Trump-supporting attire/bumper stickers. Students of color and Black students especially feel threatened to have staff enter their spaces or to come face-to-face with individuals that empower beliefs that inherently go against their identities. Just several days ago, a Black student had taken and shared a photograph of a Facilities staff member wearing a Blue Lives Matter mask when they entered her space to help with a situation she had called for. Similarly, other students of color have also encountered several staff members entering their homes for maintenance purposes with “Make America Great Again” T-shirts or sporting Trump bumper stickers on the back of their trucks and cars.
In other words, the big injustice these kids attending a $58,000-per-year school want to fight is the help getting uppity and presuming to have political opinions. Progressivism is looking more and more like a white-collar-versus-blue-collar class war.
Peterson describes Skidmore as a politically monolithic campus where the campus Republican club attracted only a handful of members and has since shut down. It’s the kind of place where students are shocked to meet anyone who holds right-of-center views. So if, in these times of protest, they want to go around looking for The Oppressor, the ideological opponent who represents everything that is wrong with the world, he can be a little hard to find. But then, as Peterson puts it, “There he is, screwing in lightbulbs.”
All of this serves as a massive in-kind contribution to Donald Trump’s re-election campaign—proof for “real Americans” that “the elites” look down on them and want to impose their dogmas on them. But the two sides of this particular class struggle are not quite the opposites they might seem.
We are living in a time when the mechanisms of political persuasion are breaking down—everywhere and on both sides. As we’ve watched with dismay while people on the right have been willing to distort their thinking and adopt conspiracy theories that support their partisan political narratives, it’s important to remember that the same kind of mental breakdown is happening in the ivory tower. Our schools have produced a new generation of students who lack the mental fortitude to hear a common Chinese word that vaguely sounds like a racial slur in English. At Skidmore, they are traumatized to discover that the blue-collar workers serving them have the temerity to hold different political beliefs.
If persuasion and the ability to deal with opposing ideas breaks down on college campuses—the centers of learning where we ought to expect debate to be most robust—then how can we expect it to last everywhere else?


thebulwark--2020-09-16--The Arab World’s Long, Slow Turn Away from Anti-Zionism

Yesterday , in a noon ceremony at the White House , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed peace treaties with Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyani and Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani—the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates ( UAE ) and Bahrain .
The deal with the UAE was first announced last month ; the Bahrain agreement was announced on Friday .
Together , they have been dubbed the “ Abraham Accords.
” “ After decades of division and conflict , we mark the dawn of a new Middle East , ” said President Trump at the signing ceremony .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ was at war with Israel—indeed , neither was ever at war with Israel , and both have long been friendly with and quietly cooperative with Israel in important ways—the signing of these treaties is nonetheless an important milestone .
The Abraham Accords must be seen in the context of Israel ’ s campaign in recent years to warm relations with Persian Gulf Arab states , including Saudi Arabia and Oman .
The long-desired “ Middle East peace ” is now finally on the horizon .
The Arab-Israeli conflict had taken U.S. policy in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , one of several factors forcing the United States to kowtow to Arab autocrats in hope of a peace deal that never arrived , sacrificing promotion of basic human rights and democracy in the region , let alone economic and social development .
The prospects for change are now real .
The Trump administration deserves its due credit for this monumental moment , as does the Obama administration ’ s foolish elevation of Iran—a senior official of that administration told me once that part of the thinking that led to the Iran deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moronic idea to balance an ally by strengthening an adversary—but this achievement is more a product of time than anything else .
When Israel was created in 1948 , in a strange but very real sense Arab states came to rely on it for their survival .
Look back at the history : For long stretches of the Ottoman Empire , the future Arab states were largely just manufactured nations with no sense of national identity—only tribal identities .
They became independent states during the interwar years ( except the UAE and Bahrain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
To survive , these new states needed legitimacy .
To get legitimacy , they needed an enemy .
Israel was the ideal enemy : It was a Jewish state in a Muslim region , in close enough proximity to be a regional bogeyman , and , they alleged , the occupier of Arab land .
The only exception was Egypt , with its long tradition of national identity .
Gamal Abdel Nasser , who came to power in the 1950s , had ambitions beyond ruling Egypt .
He wanted to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and so promoted and became the de facto leader of pan-Arabism—the idea that Arabs , despite their many states , are one nation .
A core value of pan-Arabism was anti-Zionism .
Nasser promoted anti-Zionism , often spoke of how Israel would be “ exterminated , ” and led his country into two wars with Israel .
( These wars , especially the Six Day War , had an additional benefit for Nasser : If other Arab leaders followed his lead , as some of them did in 1967 , they would legitimize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t , they would become less popular among their anti-Zionist constituents , making Nasser more popular . )
In May 2018 , the modern state of Israel celebrated its seventieth anniversary .
The vast majority of Arabs alive today , and all of their leaders , don ’ t remember what the Israelis call their War of Independence and the Arab states call the Nakba ( “ catastrophe ” ) .
The last full-scale war between Arab states and Israel was in 1973 , almost half a century ago .
( There have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Lebanon , but they weren ’ t supported by other Arab states , nor did any of those three conflicts involve an Arab coalition . )
Most Arabs don ’ t feel trauma or injured pride for having been defeated by Israel ; in parts of the Arab world , to the extent that enmity toward Israel remains , it results from a kind of momentum , or a feeling of the necessity of hostilities out of honor .
Fifty years ago , overthrowing the Israeli regime would have felt to many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quo .
Today , Israel ’ s existence is the status quo , and people are more comfortable with preserving the status quo than with overthrowing it .
Meanwhile , in most of the Arab world , the ideology of Islamism has lost much of its appeal .
As Arab states have increasingly developed a sense of national identity , they have relied less on Islamism for legitimacy .
Financial prosperity and the appeal of Western life have also made those societies more secular than they used to be .
Once promoters of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Muslim Brothers , the governments of the UAE , Saudi Arabia , and Bahrain now oppose them , as Islamism threatens their legitimacy .
All these factors have made these states less Islamist , hence , less anti-Zionist .
Like the state of Israel , Arab states have now become the status quo .
Just as most Arabs don ’ t remember life without Israel , they also don ’ t remember life without their own states .
Pan-Arabism has lost ground to several Arab nation-states , and a legitimacy dependent upon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just based on the status quo .
The main obstacle to recognizing Israel , anti-Zionism as a core for Arab identity , is largely no longer relevant .
To be clear : This does not mean that anti-Semitism , anti-Zionism , and Islamism have disappeared from Arab societies—they have not—but just that they are not the high priorities they once were .
Overall , as the Arab states have become more “ normal , ” foreign affairs have come to play a smaller role in their domestic politics .
There are obviously other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab leaders have had it with the Palestinian leadership , which has rejected any peace deal because conflict benefits those leaders financially and keeps them in power .
Iran ’ s regional aggressions against Israel and Arabs alike is a uniting factor among Arabs and Israel .
The relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem has removed a bargaining chip from the hand of the Arab side .
There is a lesson here .
While the Israeli-Arab conflict is effectively over , the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not .
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the table .
It will only be resolved when the Palestinian leadership is forced by the Palestinian Arabs to drop anti-Zionism as a source for legitimacy .
Once anti-Zionism doesn ’ t serve Mahmoud Abbas , or whoever replaces him , politically and financially , then , there will be hope for peace .

Yesterday, in a noon ceremony at the White House, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed peace treaties with Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyani and Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani—the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. The deal with the UAE was first announced last month; the Bahrain agreement was announced on Friday. Together, they have been dubbed the “Abraham Accords.”
“After decades of division and conflict, we mark the dawn of a new Middle East,” said President Trump at the signing ceremony. And while neither the UAE nor Bahrain was at war with Israel—indeed, neither was ever at war with Israel, and both have long been friendly with and quietly cooperative with Israel in important ways—the signing of these treaties is nonetheless an important milestone.
The Abraham Accords must be seen in the context of Israel’s campaign in recent years to warm relations with Persian Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Oman. The long-desired “Middle East peace” is now finally on the horizon. The Arab-Israeli conflict had taken U.S. policy in the Middle East hostage for many decades, one of several factors forcing the United States to kowtow to Arab autocrats in hope of a peace deal that never arrived, sacrificing promotion of basic human rights and democracy in the region, let alone economic and social development.
The prospects for change are now real. The Trump administration deserves its due credit for this monumental moment, as does the Obama administration’s foolish elevation of Iran—a senior official of that administration told me once that part of the thinking that led to the Iran deal was balancing Saudis with Iran, a moronic idea to balance an ally by strengthening an adversary—but this achievement is more a product of time than anything else.
When Israel was created in 1948, in a strange but very real sense Arab states came to rely on it for their survival. Look back at the history: For long stretches of the Ottoman Empire, the future Arab states were largely just manufactured nations with no sense of national identity—only tribal identities. They became independent states during the interwar years (except the UAE and Bahrain, which became states in the 1970s). To survive, these new states needed legitimacy. To get legitimacy, they needed an enemy. Israel was the ideal enemy: It was a Jewish state in a Muslim region, in close enough proximity to be a regional bogeyman, and, they alleged, the occupier of Arab land.
The only exception was Egypt, with its long tradition of national identity. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who came to power in the 1950s, had ambitions beyond ruling Egypt. He wanted to be the leader of the entire Arab world and so promoted and became the de facto leader of pan-Arabism—the idea that Arabs, despite their many states, are one nation. A core value of pan-Arabism was anti-Zionism. Nasser promoted anti-Zionism, often spoke of how Israel would be “exterminated,” and led his country into two wars with Israel. (These wars, especially the Six Day War, had an additional benefit for Nasser: If other Arab leaders followed his lead, as some of them did in 1967, they would legitimize his leadership. If they didn’t, they would become less popular among their anti-Zionist constituents, making Nasser more popular.)
Time, however, has changed things.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
In May 2018, the modern state of Israel celebrated its seventieth anniversary. The vast majority of Arabs alive today, and all of their leaders, don’t remember what the Israelis call their War of Independence and the Arab states call the Nakba (“catastrophe”). The last full-scale war between Arab states and Israel was in 1973, almost half a century ago. (There have been smaller conflicts between Israel and Iraq and Lebanon, but they weren’t supported by other Arab states, nor did any of those three conflicts involve an Arab coalition.) Most Arabs don’t feel trauma or injured pride for having been defeated by Israel; in parts of the Arab world, to the extent that enmity toward Israel remains, it results from a kind of momentum, or a feeling of the necessity of hostilities out of honor. Fifty years ago, overthrowing the Israeli regime would have felt to many Arabs like the restoration of the status quo. Today, Israel’s existence is the status quo, and people are more comfortable with preserving the status quo than with overthrowing it.
Meanwhile, in most of the Arab world, the ideology of Islamism has lost much of its appeal. As Arab states have increasingly developed a sense of national identity, they have relied less on Islamism for legitimacy. Financial prosperity and the appeal of Western life have also made those societies more secular than they used to be. Once promoters of international Islamism and organizations like al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brothers, the governments of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain now oppose them, as Islamism threatens their legitimacy. All these factors have made these states less Islamist, hence, less anti-Zionist.
Like the state of Israel, Arab states have now become the status quo. Just as most Arabs don’t remember life without Israel, they also don’t remember life without their own states. Pan-Arabism has lost ground to several Arab nation-states, and a legitimacy dependent upon anti-Zionism has been replaced by a legitimacy just based on the status quo. The main obstacle to recognizing Israel, anti-Zionism as a core for Arab identity, is largely no longer relevant. To be clear: This does not mean that anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and Islamism have disappeared from Arab societies—they have not—but just that they are not the high priorities they once were.
Overall, as the Arab states have become more “normal,” foreign affairs have come to play a smaller role in their domestic politics.
There are obviously other factors at play, as well. Arab leaders have had it with the Palestinian leadership, which has rejected any peace deal because conflict benefits those leaders financially and keeps them in power. Iran’s regional aggressions against Israel and Arabs alike is a uniting factor among Arabs and Israel. The relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem has removed a bargaining chip from the hand of the Arab side.
There is a lesson here. While the Israeli-Arab conflict is effectively over, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not cease to exist with the best deal on the table. It will only be resolved when the Palestinian leadership is forced by the Palestinian Arabs to drop anti-Zionism as a source for legitimacy. Once anti-Zionism doesn’t serve Mahmoud Abbas, or whoever replaces him, politically and financially, then, there will be hope for peace.


thebulwark--2020-09-16--The European Central Bank Is Running Out of Options

One has to pity Christine Lagarde , the president of the European Central Bank ( ECB ) .
In its effort to revitalize the Eurozone economy and avoid deflation , the last thing that the ECB needs is a strong Euro .
Yet the Euro has been strengthening , and there is little that the ECB can do to weaken the currency without creating another set of serious problems for itself .
It would be an understatement to say that the ECB is now facing historic economic challenges .
The Eurozone is experiencing its worst economic recession in the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of deflation .
At the same time , a second wave of coronavirus could require a reversal of the recent opening up of its economy that has allowed for a partial recovery .
The combination of a weak economy and falling prices would be troubling for any central bank .
It is particularly so for the ECB considering that two of the Eurozone ’ s largest member countries , Italy and Spain , have exceedingly high public debt levels and shaky banking systems .
Slow growth and deflation would make it all the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grow their way out of their debt and banking sector problems .
Over the past few months , largely in response to the Federal Reserve ’ s shift to an easier monetary policy , the Euro has appreciated by more than 10 percent against the U.S. dollar .
If sustained , that would threaten to weaken the Eurozone economy by making Eurozone exports less competitive and by making imports from abroad all the more attractive .
At the same time , it would intensify deflationary pressures by reducing import prices and by making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the ECB could take action to cheapen the currency by reducing interest rates or by increasing its bond-buying program .
However , it can ill afford to take such action with the explicit purpose of weakening the currency for fear of sparking a currency and trade war with the United States .
This is especially the case at a time that the U.S. Treasury has already put Germany on notice for its very large trade surplus and for using the Euro as the means to gain an unfair competitive advantage with respect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the risk of sparking a currency war , reducing interest rates to weaken the currency would not seem to be a viable option for the ECB .
With interest rates already in negative territory , reducing them further into negative territory would run the risk of further destabilizing the Eurozone ’ s banking sector .
Banks , including the shaky ones in Italy and Spain , would need to find a way to make up for lost income on their bond holdings , but they would find it difficult to reduce deposit rates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their depositors .
It might seem like the ECB could avoid those complications by expanding its bond buying program , but that would risk sparking a backlash from Germany .
Last May , the German Constitutional Court issued a ruling questioning whether or not the ECB had exceeded its mandate by engaging in an aggressive bond-buying program .
If the ECB were to significantly expand that program now , it would risk inviting the German Court to carry through on its threat to proscribe the Bundesbank from participating in any future ECB bond-buying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political fallout from such action for Eurozone cohesion , without the Bundesbank , the ECB ’ s largest member bank , the ECB would be rendered rather ineffective .
All of this leaves Madame Lagarde with few good options to address the Euro ’ s recent strength .
She can hope that once the U.S. economic recovery strengthens or markets begin to focus on Italy and Spain ’ s economic weaknesses , the Euro will revert to its previous value .
Alternately , she can exhort Eurozone economic policymakers to help the ECB @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong Euro by engaging in a more expansionary fiscal policy than has been the case to date .
That , too , would be a more attractive option if so many of the Eurozone countries were not already suffering from crushing levels of public debt .
That ’ s not Lagarde ’ s fault , but it has become her problem .

One has to pity Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB). In its effort to revitalize the Eurozone economy and avoid deflation, the last thing that the ECB needs is a strong Euro. Yet the Euro has been strengthening, and there is little that the ECB can do to weaken the currency without creating another set of serious problems for itself.
It would be an understatement to say that the ECB is now facing historic economic challenges. The Eurozone is experiencing its worst economic recession in the past 90 years and is showing incipient signs of deflation. At the same time, a second wave of coronavirus could require a reversal of the recent opening up of its economy that has allowed for a partial recovery.
The combination of a weak economy and falling prices would be troubling for any central bank. It is particularly so for the ECB considering that two of the Eurozone’s largest member countries, Italy and Spain, have exceedingly high public debt levels and shaky banking systems. Slow growth and deflation would make it all the more difficult for those two countries to grow their way out of their debt and banking sector problems.
Over the past few months, largely in response to the Federal Reserve’s shift to an easier monetary policy, the Euro has appreciated by more than 10 percent against the U.S. dollar. If sustained, that would threaten to weaken the Eurozone economy by making Eurozone exports less competitive and by making imports from abroad all the more attractive. At the same time, it would intensify deflationary pressures by reducing import prices and by making the economy more sluggish.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
In principle, the ECB could take action to cheapen the currency by reducing interest rates or by increasing its bond-buying program. However, it can ill afford to take such action with the explicit purpose of weakening the currency for fear of sparking a currency and trade war with the United States. This is especially the case at a time that the U.S. Treasury has already put Germany on notice for its very large trade surplus and for using the Euro as the means to gain an unfair competitive advantage with respect to the United States.
Leaving aside the risk of sparking a currency war, reducing interest rates to weaken the currency would not seem to be a viable option for the ECB. With interest rates already in negative territory, reducing them further into negative territory would run the risk of further destabilizing the Eurozone’s banking sector. Banks, including the shaky ones in Italy and Spain, would need to find a way to make up for lost income on their bond holdings, but they would find it difficult to reduce deposit rates to negative levels for fear of antagonizing their depositors.
It might seem like the ECB could avoid those complications by expanding its bond buying program, but that would risk sparking a backlash from Germany. Last May, the German Constitutional Court issued a ruling questioning whether or not the ECB had exceeded its mandate by engaging in an aggressive bond-buying program. If the ECB were to significantly expand that program now, it would risk inviting the German Court to carry through on its threat to proscribe the Bundesbank from participating in any future ECB bond-buying program. Not to mention the adverse political fallout from such action for Eurozone cohesion, without the Bundesbank, the ECB’s largest member bank, the ECB would be rendered rather ineffective.
All of this leaves Madame Lagarde with few good options to address the Euro’s recent strength. She can hope that once the U.S. economic recovery strengthens or markets begin to focus on Italy and Spain’s economic weaknesses, the Euro will revert to its previous value. Alternately, she can exhort Eurozone economic policymakers to help the ECB cope with the problems caused by a strong Euro by engaging in a more expansionary fiscal policy than has been the case to date.
That, too, would be a more attractive option if so many of the Eurozone countries were not already suffering from crushing levels of public debt.
That’s not Lagarde’s fault, but it has become her problem.


thebulwark--2020-09-16--The ‘Democrats Made Me Do It’ Excuse

The ‘Democrats Made Me Do It’ Excuse

Danielle Pletka , senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute , has announced that while she never considered voting for Donald Trump in 2016 , she may well do so this year .
Oh , to be sure , she deplores Trump ’ s “ odious tweets , chronic mendacity , and general crudeness.
” But she is being driven to this extremity by the “ hard left ideologues ” of the Democratic party .
Judging by chatter on the right , this rationalization—so redolent of the Flight 93 argument from 2016—is somewhat popular .
So let ’ s take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrist slaps Trump for his lies and tweets , she does so as a backhanded compliment .
The trouble with his style is that it “ has managed to obscure his administration ’ s more-substantive accomplishments , such as focusing the world ’ s attention on China ’ s threat to global security and brokering a new era of Middle East peace.
” So , you see , it ’ s not that he is degrading the very idea of truth or undermining cherished national ideals , it ’ s just that those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ !
The notion that Trump has awakened the world to the threat from China is risible .
He has , in fact , been played by China .
After four years of tariffs and obsequiousness toward Xi Jinping , China is more powerful and the U.S. weaker .
Trump may deserve a measure of credit for the peace deals between Israel and the Gulf Arab states , but it ’ s more likely that those are the unintended consequences of Obama ’ s Iran deal , which scared the Gulf states into Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Pletka really defending Trump ’ s foreign policy record ?
Maybe not .
She castigates his “ erratic , personality-driven decisionmaking ” and frets about his “ contempt ” for NATO .
She regrets his “ delusion that he can manage rogue leaders.
” Again , that last bit is sort of a backhanded compliment .
Franklin Roosevelt thought he could “ manage ” Stalin .
Franz von Papen thought he could “ manage ” Hitler .
They were naive .
With Trump we have something altogether different .
Trump gets a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likes them and wants them to admire him .
He revels in their cruelty—boasting to Bob Woodward that Kim Jong Un “ tells me everything ” including graphic details of the public murder of his uncle—and envies their absolute power .
This has been evident not just in the past four years , but for decades .
Pletka , a student of foreign affairs , surely noticed this .
Trump has the soul of a mobster , and far from hoping to “ manage ” rogue leaders , he aspires to become one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Woodward , It may be a mystery to Trump himself , but it shouldn ’ t be to Pletka .
But her chief complaint is not about foreign affairs .
Acknowledging that Joe Biden is a “ decent ” person , she endorses Trump ’ s insult that he is an empty suit .
“ He doesn ’ t even know he ’ s alive , ” Trump said ( in the days before he claimed the right to get vicious ) , and Pletka agrees .
“ Joe Biden would be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership , who would run a teleprompter presidency with the words drafted by his party ’ s hard-left ideologues.
” What is the evidence for this ?
Biden ran a centrist campaign throughout the Democratic primaries despite lots of encouragement to tilt left .
He resisted the siren song of Medicare for All , and opposed open borders , free public college tuition , banning fracking , and defunding the police .
If the left couldn ’ t budge him when he was just one candidate in a field of 29 , what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ luck when he is the party ’ s nominee , or the president of the United States ?
Though Republicans are having a hard time taking yes for an answer , Democrats chose a candidate who has always positioned himself in the middle of his party .
That may be way to the left of nearly all Republicans , but it ain ’ t Venezuela .
To sidestep this inconvenient reality , Trump supporters like Pletka have taken to suggesting that Biden will be merely a cardboard cutout and that the real power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Warren , Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez , or Rashida Tlaib .
Pletka summons a scare list of possible policy changes if Democrats win big in 2020—the Green New Deal , nationalized health care , the “ dismantling of US borders , ” and eliminating the filibuster .
This is rubbish .
Biden is on record opposing nationalized health care and he has never remotely suggested support for dismantling U.S. borders .
Even many Democratic senators are opposed to ending the filibuster .
Some aspects of the Green New Deal might pass , but the proposal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undeployable .
Anything carrying that label would have to be drastically rewritten .
So let ’ s wait and see what emerges , shall we ?
Besides , these congeries of horrors assume that if Democrats achieve majorities in both houses and take the White House in 2020 , the democratic process will be over .
It ’ s as if there will never be another election .
The Flight 93 election essay said , “ Crash the plane into the Pennsylvania turf , because the end is nigh !
” That isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s hysteria .
The pedestrian truth is that if Democrats overestimate their mandate and go too far , they may find that voters clip their wings in 2022 .
Amazing how that works .
Pletka also invites us to believe that other stakeholders — business interests , the bond market , local and state governments , educators , farmers , and yes , Republicans—will be ignored or bulldozed .
That ’ s not the way American politics has ever worked .
What these doomsday scenarios also overlook is that if Biden is elected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are going to have their hands full attempting to guide the nation safely through the remainder of this pandemic .
They will be busy trying to keep the economy from tanking in the meanwhile .
More ambitious projects may have to wait , and as we ’ ve seen , a president ’ s capacity to enact new legislation is its apex in the first 18 months after election .
After that , it loses oxygen .
But perhaps Pletka only gets to her true complaint toward the end : These are the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far more than budget deficits , foreign policy , or climate change .
And they are Trump ’ s last best hope of salvaging victory from the ashes of his four-year record .
If Pletka is genuinely alarmed by the extremism of the left , maybe the best solution is not to throw herself into the arms of an openly racist , authoritarian right-wing extremist who embodies every stereotype the left harbors about conservatives .
If she ’ s upset that her children are being challenged about their whiteness , why not teach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they can reply , American history , like all human history , has ugly aspects , racism chief among them .
Not judging people by skin color is one of the lessons of that history , and that applies to everyone .
But denying that history , or worse , giving aid and comfort to white nationalists is the very worst response and will only intensify the left ’ s reaction .
Pletka doesn ’ t like Manhattan-San Francisco progressivism .
Neither do I , but like so many in modern America , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Choosing a president is not the answer to Berkeley ’ s political correctness .
We don ’ t elect a chief executive to outlaw Drag Queen story hour .
Nor does the left operate in a vacuum .
The extremism of the right , enthroned in the White House no less , is stimulating ever more reaction from the left .
Trump has been the greatest gift Antifa could have wished for .
Pletka highlights this or that sin or tendency on the part of “ progressives ” and declares it to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The party may have nominated centrist Joe Biden , but never mind .
He ’ s a Potemkin facade .
The real party is Bernie Sanders , Ilhan Omar , and the woke people in her timeline .
Meanwhile , we can disregard Trump and the grotesque menagerie he has invited into public life .
Pletka writes : “ These execrable gun-toting racists have received too much tacit encouragement from Trump .
But they do not represent the mainstream of the Republican Party or guide the choices of the vast mass of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the left and in the center would be forgiven for concluding that Trump is precisely the “ mainstream of the Republican Party ” if he is reelected .
And who among the leaders of the Democratic party has offered anything like the encouragement to extremism that Trump has given to QAnon and the vigilantes on the streets ?
We expect a president to uphold the Constitution and the laws , to respect our traditions and mores , and to take the responsibilities of office seriously .
It ’ s not really so hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will address the coronavirus more competently than Trump ?
Does she have any reason to think he will lie to the people about a public health emergency as Trump did , causing tens of thousands of needless deaths ?
Does she wonder whether he ’ ll ignore Putin ’ s bounties on the heads of American soldiers ?
Does she believe Biden will pervert the Department of Justice to protect his friends and punish his enemies ?
Does she imagine that Biden will staff his administration with the likes of Michael Caputo , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Does she think that Biden will grovel before dictators , issue pardons to cronies , unleash the military on civilian protesters , encourage vigilantism , or threaten the legitimacy of elections ?
The one essential rock upon which this country depends is the rule of law .
It ’ s more crucial than blocking Medicare for All , more essential even than preventing another Iran nuclear deal .
If the rule of law is undermined as Trump is doing and threatens to accelerate , everything else— prosperity , civil cohesion , security—is in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the filibuster , not hair styles , and not virtue signaling .

Danielle Pletka, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has announced that while she never considered voting for Donald Trump in 2016, she may well do so this year. Oh, to be sure, she deplores Trump’s “odious tweets, chronic mendacity, and general crudeness.” But she is being driven to this extremity by the “hard left ideologues” of the Democratic party.
Judging by chatter on the right, this rationalization—so redolent of the Flight 93 argument from 2016—is somewhat popular. So let’s take a closer look.
Though she dutifully wrist slaps Trump for his lies and tweets, she does so as a backhanded compliment. The trouble with his style is that it “has managed to obscure his administration’s more-substantive accomplishments, such as focusing the world’s attention on China’s threat to global security and brokering a new era of Middle East peace.” So, you see, it’s not that he is degrading the very idea of truth or undermining cherished national ideals, it’s just that those darned tweets distract from his great accomplishments!
The notion that Trump has awakened the world to the threat from China is risible. He has, in fact, been played by China. After four years of tariffs and obsequiousness toward Xi Jinping, China is more powerful and the U.S. weaker. Trump may deserve a measure of credit for the peace deals between Israel and the Gulf Arab states, but it’s more likely that those are the unintended consequences of Obama’s Iran deal, which scared the Gulf states into Israel’s arms.
But wait, is Pletka really defending Trump’s foreign policy record? Maybe not. She castigates his “erratic, personality-driven decisionmaking” and frets about his “contempt” for NATO. She regrets his “delusion that he can manage rogue leaders.”
Again, that last bit is sort of a backhanded compliment. Franklin Roosevelt thought he could “manage” Stalin. Franz von Papen thought he could “manage” Hitler. They were naive. With Trump we have something altogether different. Trump gets a charge out of vicious dictators. He likes them and wants them to admire him. He revels in their cruelty—boasting to Bob Woodward that Kim Jong Un “tells me everything” including graphic details of the public murder of his uncle—and envies their absolute power. This has been evident not just in the past four years, but for decades. Pletka, a student of foreign affairs, surely noticed this. Trump has the soul of a mobster, and far from hoping to “manage” rogue leaders, he aspires to become one. As he put it to Bob Woodward,
I get along very well with Erdogan, even though you’re not supposed to because everyone says, ‘What a horrible guy.’ But for me it works out good. It’s funny, the relationships I have—the tougher and meaner they are, the better I get along with them. You know? Explain that to me someday, OK?
It may be a mystery to Trump himself, but it shouldn’t be to Pletka.
But her chief complaint is not about foreign affairs. Acknowledging that Joe Biden is a “decent” person, she endorses Trump’s insult that he is an empty suit. “He doesn’t even know he’s alive,” Trump said (in the days before he claimed the right to get vicious), and Pletka agrees. “Joe Biden would be a figurehead president, incapable of focus or leadership, who would run a teleprompter presidency with the words drafted by his party’s hard-left ideologues.”
What is the evidence for this? Biden ran a centrist campaign throughout the Democratic primaries despite lots of encouragement to tilt left. He resisted the siren song of Medicare for All, and opposed open borders, free public college tuition, banning fracking, and defunding the police. If the left couldn’t budge him when he was just one candidate in a field of 29, what makes people think they will have better luck when he is the party’s nominee, or the president of the United States?
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Though Republicans are having a hard time taking yes for an answer, Democrats chose a candidate who has always positioned himself in the middle of his party. That may be way to the left of nearly all Republicans, but it ain’t Venezuela.
To sidestep this inconvenient reality, Trump supporters like Pletka have taken to suggesting that Biden will be merely a cardboard cutout and that the real power will be wielded by fill-in-the-blank: Elizabeth Warren, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, or Rashida Tlaib.
Pletka summons a scare list of possible policy changes if Democrats win big in 2020—the Green New Deal, nationalized health care, the “dismantling of US borders,” and eliminating the filibuster. This is rubbish. Biden is on record opposing nationalized health care and he has never remotely suggested support for dismantling U.S. borders. Even many Democratic senators are opposed to ending the filibuster. Some aspects of the Green New Deal might pass, but the proposal as it stands now is vaporous and undeployable. Anything carrying that label would have to be drastically rewritten. So let’s wait and see what emerges, shall we?
Besides, these congeries of horrors assume that if Democrats achieve majorities in both houses and take the White House in 2020, the democratic process will be over. It’s as if there will never be another election. The Flight 93 election essay said, “Crash the plane into the Pennsylvania turf, because the end is nigh!” That isn’t political prognostication, it’s hysteria. The pedestrian truth is that if Democrats overestimate their mandate and go too far, they may find that voters clip their wings in 2022. Amazing how that works.
Pletka also invites us to believe that other stakeholders — business interests, the bond market, local and state governments, educators, farmers, and yes, Republicans—will be ignored or bulldozed. That’s not the way American politics has ever worked.
What these doomsday scenarios also overlook is that if Biden is elected and Democrats take the Senate, they are going to have their hands full attempting to guide the nation safely through the remainder of this pandemic. They will be busy trying to keep the economy from tanking in the meanwhile. More ambitious projects may have to wait, and as we’ve seen, a president’s capacity to enact new legislation is its apex in the first 18 months after election. After that, it loses oxygen.
But perhaps Pletka only gets to her true complaint toward the end:
I fear the grip of Manhattan-San Francisco progressive mores that increasingly permeate my daily newspapers, my children’s curriculums and my local government. I fear the virtue-signaling bullies who increasingly try to dominate or silence public discourse—and encourage my children to think that their being White is intrinsically evil, that America’s founding is akin to original sin. I fear the growing self-censorship that guides many people’s every utterance, and the leftist vigilantes who view every personal choice—from recipes to hairdos—through their twisted prisms of politics and culture.
These are the cultural battles that increasingly matter to Americans far more than budget deficits, foreign policy, or climate change. And they are Trump’s last best hope of salvaging victory from the ashes of his four-year record.
If Pletka is genuinely alarmed by the extremism of the left, maybe the best solution is not to throw herself into the arms of an openly racist, authoritarian right-wing extremist who embodies every stereotype the left harbors about conservatives. If she’s upset that her children are being challenged about their whiteness, why not teach them to answer it? Yes, they can reply, American history, like all human history, has ugly aspects, racism chief among them. Not judging people by skin color is one of the lessons of that history, and that applies to everyone. But denying that history, or worse, giving aid and comfort to white nationalists is the very worst response and will only intensify the left’s reaction.
Pletka doesn’t like Manhattan-San Francisco progressivism. Neither do I, but like so many in modern America, she confuses cultural and political arguments. Choosing a president is not the answer to Berkeley’s political correctness. We don’t elect a chief executive to outlaw Drag Queen story hour.
Nor does the left operate in a vacuum. The extremism of the right, enthroned in the White House no less, is stimulating ever more reaction from the left. Trump has been the greatest gift Antifa could have wished for.
Pletka highlights this or that sin or tendency on the part of “progressives” and declares it to be the true essence of the Democratic party. The party may have nominated centrist Joe Biden, but never mind. He’s a Potemkin facade. The real party is Bernie Sanders, Ilhan Omar, and the woke people in her timeline. Meanwhile, we can disregard Trump and the grotesque menagerie he has invited into public life. Pletka writes: “These execrable gun-toting racists have received too much tacit encouragement from Trump. But they do not represent the mainstream of the Republican Party or guide the choices of the vast mass of Republican members of Congress.”
People on the left and in the center would be forgiven for concluding that Trump is precisely the “mainstream of the Republican Party” if he is reelected. And who among the leaders of the Democratic party has offered anything like the encouragement to extremism that Trump has given to QAnon and the vigilantes on the streets?
We expect a president to uphold the Constitution and the laws, to respect our traditions and mores, and to take the responsibilities of office seriously. It’s not really so hard. Does Pletka genuinely doubt that Biden will address the coronavirus more competently than Trump? Does she have any reason to think he will lie to the people about a public health emergency as Trump did, causing tens of thousands of needless deaths? Does she wonder whether he’ll ignore Putin’s bounties on the heads of American soldiers? Does she believe Biden will pervert the Department of Justice to protect his friends and punish his enemies? Does she imagine that Biden will staff his administration with the likes of Michael Caputo, Stephen Miller, and Chad Wolf? Does she think that Biden will grovel before dictators, issue pardons to cronies, unleash the military on civilian protesters, encourage vigilantism, or threaten the legitimacy of elections?
The one essential rock upon which this country depends is the rule of law. It’s more crucial than blocking Medicare for All, more essential even than preventing another Iran nuclear deal. If the rule of law is undermined as Trump is doing and threatens to accelerate, everything else— prosperity, civil cohesion, security—is in danger. Those are the stakes, not the filibuster, not hair styles, and not virtue signaling.