thebulwark--2020-12-30--How Biden Won: Six Hard Truths

How Biden Won: Six Hard Truths

How did Joe Biden win the presidential election ?
And what lessons does his victory hold for how he should govern ?
Early attempts to interpret the results of the election were hampered by the slowness of the counting—the major news outlets didn ’ t even call the presidential race until the Saturday after the election—and by other 2020 idiosyncrasies .
In particular , the exit polls , which in a normal election year can help explain how different political and demographic subgroups voted , were conducted abnormally because of the pandemic .
And the pre-election polls , which normally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were dramatically off this year .
My aim in this piece is to offer an overview—based on an analysis of the data available—of the electoral mathematics behind Biden ’ s win .
The exit polling data does not speak with a singular authoritative voice .
This year , there were two major exit surveys , the “ traditional ” one done by Edison Research ( based upon a sample of 15,590 in-person and self-described mail-in voters ; see CNN and the New York Times ) and the AP VoteCast survey ( based upon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see NPR and the New York Times ) .
The raw data from each of these surveys is “ weighted ” to reflect the actual election results .
These two exit polls point to different results among key voting blocs , suggesting that one or both of these surveys are suffering from some of the same sampling problems that affected this year ’ s pre-election polls .
To be fair , those conducting these exit polls faced a Herculean task , given the sheer size of the electorate that voted early in person @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the total vote , based on the AP VoteCast estimate .
In short , 71 percent of this year ’ s electorate could not be captured by the exit pollsters upon leaving the polls , which is the easiest and most reliable means of ascertaining whether someone actually voted .
Consequently , the diverging results in these two exit polls will leave us scratching our heads .
For example , the Edison data had whites constituting a 67 percent share of the total vote and overwhelmingly favoring Trump , by 58-41 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 13 percent of the total ) by 87-12 , Hispanics ( 13 percent of the total ) by 65-32 , and Asians ( 4 percent of the total ) by 61-34 .
The AP VoteCast data put the white share of the total vote at 74 percent and going 55-43 for Trump , with Biden winning among black voters ( 11 percent of the total ) by 90-8 , Hispanics ( 9 percent of the total ) by 63-35 , and Asians ( 2 percent of the total ) by 70-28 .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different pictures of the electorate .
Which exit survey is correct , and in which ways ?
For example , if Edison were right on the share of the total vote attributed to each racial bloc but AP VoteCast were correct on how those blocs divided their votes between Biden and Trump , that would be significantly different from an electorate in which AP VoteCast got the shares right but Edison got the spreads right .
When you match up the actual voting returns in key states , the much larger AP VoteCast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That does not mean , of course , that the VoteCast data got everything right .
Given the differences between the two surveys , we should resist pretending that either is totally correct—at least until the more detailed census-based studies of who voted and how they voted are completed in the coming months .
While searching for answers to the questions emerging from this election , we must supplement the exit-polling data with findings extrapolated from the actual election returns and relevant demographic data .
With those caveats set forth , we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand : How did Biden win ?
After melding the exit-polling data with the actual vote counts , six hard truths emerge that should , for reasons I ’ ll explain , prove unsettling to both Democrats and Republicans .
Women outvoted men—by 4 percent in the Edison data and 6 percent in the AP VoteCast survey—and rejected Donald Trump , denying him re-election .
According to the AP VoteCast , Biden carried women by 55-44 , while Trump carried men by 52-46 .
Edison had similar numbers : Biden won women by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 53-45 .
The bigger margins and bigger turnout among women were decisive .
The Edison data showed Trump carrying white men ( 35 percent of the total vote ) by a 61-38 margin , while white women ( 32 percent of the total vote ) broke for Trump by a far smaller margin of 55-44 .
The Edison data also showed black men ( 4 percent of the total vote ) breaking for Biden by 79-19 , while black women ( 8 percent of the total vote ) favored Biden 90-9 .
Among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 5 percent of the total vote ) favoring Biden by 59-36 and women ( 8 percent of the total vote ) favoring Biden by 69-30 .
Even if those splits in the Edison data are less accurate than the AP VoteCast spreads along race and ethnicity , it is clear that women voters delivered the White House to the Biden-Harris ticket .
2 .
The ‘ Education Gap ’ and Its Link to Race and Sex Second , the emerging education gap worked in Biden ’ s favor , amplifying the impact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the AP VoteCast data , voters with high school or less as their education level ( 27 percent of the total vote ) , broke for Trump over Biden by 52-46 , a figure nearly identical to that group ’ s Trump vs. Clinton figure from 2016 .
( The 2016 exit polls are archived here by CNN and here by the New York Times . )
Voters with some college or an associate ’ s degree but less than a four-year degree ( 34 percent of the total vote ) tipped dramatically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exit poll they preferred him by 8 percent , but in the 2020 AP VoteCast data they preferred him by just 2 percent .
The narrowing gap by which Trump carried that category of voters opened the door for Biden to win by sweeping the votes of those with higher levels of education .
Biden carried college graduates with no postgraduate studies ( 25 percent of the total vote ) by 56-42 and voters with postgraduate studies ( 15 percent of the total vote ) by 58-40 .
Biden ’ s landslide margin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than Trump ’ s margin among the 61 percent of the electorate with less than a college degree .
Gender and race were the crucial building blocks underlying this education divide in the electorate .
Most notably , white college-educated men ( 16 percent of the total vote ) voted for Trump by 52-46 while white college-educated women ( 14 percent of the electorate ) went for Biden by 59-39 .
( It should be noted that this divergence echoes the age and gender divides more generally : Because men formerly far outnumbered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far outnumber men in college , the population of women with college degrees is younger than the population of men with college degrees—and older men skew toward Trump while younger women skew toward Biden . )
White men without college degrees ( 19 percent of the total vote ) , gave Trump a landslide margin of 64-34 , while white women without college degrees ( 24 percent of the total vote ) gave Trump a large but lesser margin of 60-39 .
Big though those margins are , they are each smaller than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by contrast , Biden won regardless of education status ( or sex ) : • among non-white non-college-educated men ( 7 percent of the vote ) , he won by 68-30 ; • among non-white non-college-educated women ( 10 percent of the total vote ) , he won by 77-21 ; • among non-white college-educated men ( 4 percent of the total vote ) , he won by 66-31 ; and • among non-white college-educated women ( 4 percent of the total vote ) , he won by a lopsided 80-19 .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he dominated among non-white women regardless of education level ( perhaps buttressed by Kamala Harris ’ s outreach to black and Asian women ) .
And he shaved down Trump ’ s edge among women with no or only some college education ( perhaps aided slightly by Jill Biden ’ s long career as a community college professor ) .
Thomas Edsall , in a statistically rich and insightful column , points out that in 1980 , Ronald Reagan ’ s Republicans “ won 76 of the 100 counties with the largest share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , Biden ’ s Democrats carried 84 of those 100 counties .
Third , Biden carried the nation ’ s suburbs by 10 percent in the AP VoteCast survey .
From the Eisenhower through the Reagan eras , Republicans held a lock on highly educated and affluent suburban voters .
It began eroding in 2004—and cracked apart in 2020 .
Edsall notes that in 1980 Republicans carried 91 out of the 100 counties with the highest median income level ; in 2020 , they carried only 43 .
Assuming the trend holds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The suburbs cast 45-47 percent of the total vote in high-turnout elections and 48-50 percent of the electorate in low-turnout elections .
If Democrats can forge a coalition that unites the suburbs ( 45 percent of the total 2020 vote ) while continuing to sweep the urban vote ( 20 percent of the total vote ) , that is a winning coalition—so long as they can also manage to do just a little better among blue-collar white voters in America ’ s small towns ( 17 percent of the total vote ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the total vote ) .
The small-town and rural vote that Trump ’ s Republicans have solidified is simply not large enough to hold a majority in either the Electoral College or the popular vote .
Keep in mind that the margins among suburban voters tend to be narrow ( Obama carried the suburbs by only 2 percent in 2008 and lost them by 2 percent in 2012 ) , thus Biden carrying the suburbs by 10 percent was a huge factor in his election .
4 .
The Young and the Faithful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ win , even as it did not expand its share of the total vote from 2016 .
Voters aged 18 to 29 , according to the AP VoteCast data , cast the same 13 percent share of the total vote that an in-depth , post-election Pew study showed from 2016 .
( The 2016 exit polls put the figure higher , at 19 percent of the total vote . )
Biden carried these under-30 voters by 61-36 .
Nevertheless , even adding in the 23 percent of the vote cast by those aged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the total vote was from those 44 and younger .
Voters 45 and older cast the other 64 percent of the ballots .
Consequently , had Biden not cut Trump ’ s lead among those 45 and older from about 7 percent in 2016 to only 3 percent ( 51-48 ) , things might have gotten very tight in the Electoral College .
Most of the pre-election public polls showed Biden carrying seniors by close to double digits .
That proved inaccurate .
Edison put the senior ( 65 and older ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overall electorate and showed Trump carrying it by 52-47 , whereas the AP VoteCast data had seniors at 28 percent of the electorate , with Trump carrying them 51-48 .
That is not to say that the youth vote was unimportant .
The 25 percent edge Biden had in the AP VoteCast data among under-30 voters gave him a huge boost , especially since he carried voters aged 30 to 44 by only 54-43 .
But that large margin from the under-30 voters for Biden mattered only because Biden also succeeded in significantly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ older voters .
There was a hidden nugget in the exit polls from Georgia , where 20 percent of the total vote was cast by those under 30 in age , higher than the national average , which was obviously a factor in Biden ’ s surprising albeit narrow victory in Georgia , enabling him to cross 300 votes in the Electoral College .
It is worth charting the key voting blocs enabling Biden ’ s ability to shave Trump ’ s edge among older voters .
Religion played a key role .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ among Catholics by 4 percentage points , a margin powered by white Catholic voters .
Biden , only the second Catholic to be elected president , cut Trump ’ s lead among Catholics to 1 percent—a dead heat .
Jewish voters ( 3 percent of the total ) , voted for Biden over Trump by 68-31 .
This is down slightly—by 3 or 4 percent— from recent presidential elections , where Obama and Clinton got in the low 70s among Jewish voters .
The slight drop may reflect the growing share of more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within the full range of Jewish voters , but it does not represent a wholesale change in partisan loyalties among Jewish voters who still sharply gravitate towards the Democrats .
We are probably at mid-passage where the Jewish vote is on the way from a 75-25 split favoring Democrats a couple of decades ago toward a 65-35 split favoring Democrats by the end of this decade .
The combined share of the ( mostly white ) Catholic and Jewish vote has always played an outsized role in the large , swing Electoral College @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and California , but Pennsylvania , Michigan , and Wisconsin , as well as Arizona and Georgia .
Fifth , after all the talk during the campaign about how Trump ’ s supporters were more enthusiastic than Biden ’ s , we can now see in the data that there was an enthusiasm gap at the core of this election—but that it helped Biden , not Trump .
In the AP VoteCast survey , 46 percent of voters rated President Trump favorably , while 53 percent rated him unfavorably .
Therefore , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular vote now stands at 51.3 percent for Biden and 46.8 percent for Trump .
Biden ’ s achievement was to sponge up the votes of nearly the entire range of those who opposed Trump .
Among the 46 percent of voters who reported in the AP VoteCast survey that they “ disapprove strongly ” of President Trump , Biden won 97-1 .
On the flip side , meanwhile , the voters who said they “ approve strongly ” of Trump , who voted for him by 98-2 , amounted to a much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In other words , the notion that Trump ’ s base was more passionate about supporting him than was Biden ’ s is not reflected in the data .
Instead the real enthusiasm gap was that 15 percent more of the electorate strongly disapproved of Trump than was passionately in his corner : The 46 percent of the voters who really and truly disliked Trump put Biden on a glide path to victory that MAGA nation , constituting only 31 percent of the electorate , could not overcome .
In fact , Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to encompass the nearly the full range of the anti-Trump majority , all the way from the “ woke ” left to the middle to the Never Trump Republicans .
That coalition did not produce a landslide .
But it did form a solid majority of the electorate .
This enthusiasm gap was enough to overcome the late move to Trump among the 5 percent of the total vote who told AP VoteCast that they decided who to vote for in last few days .
Those late-deciding voters broke for Trump by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the outcome , but enough to help take Biden ’ s popular-vote margin down to 4.5 percent , rather than something closer to the 8 to 10 percent level forecast by most of the public polling data in the days before November 3 .
( Another big reason the public pollsters once again had to scrape egg off their faces : They badly misread how senior voters would land—thinking Biden was leading by 8 to 10 percent among voters 65 and older , when Trump won them by 3 to 5 percent .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of polling error than those of four years ago , writes Nate Cohn .
“ It suggests a fundamental mismeasurement of the attitudes of a large demographic group.
” ) In retrospect , this presidential race was a negative referendum on Trump and his presidency .
The Democratic party was not able to erase many voters ’ perception that the Democrats would swing too far left ( influenced by the Trumpist rants that the Democrats would pursue “ socialism ” and the defunding of police , despite the fact that neither Biden nor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates for Congress were advocating anything close to that as a platform ) .
The enthusiasm gap—the fact that many of the votes for Biden were really just votes against Trump—was also the reason Biden had no coattails in the congressional races ( with the Democrats losing seats in the House and Biden not able to boost the Democrats into a clear majority in the Senate ) .
That inconvenient political reality for Democrats on coattails can be seen in some interesting data Thomas Edsall obtained from Robert Stein , a political scientist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ results of the five House seats in Texas that were at the top of the Democrats ’ list of potential pick-up opportunities : The difference between the 2018 midterm elections , when the Republican candidates in swing House districts were defeated , almost savaged , and this year , when the Democrats both lost some swing seats they had won last time and whiffed badly on challenge races to extend their majority , is clear .
In 2018 , the anti-Trump majority , which included conservative Democrats , moderate independents , and traditional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlet to express opposition to Trump : voting against Republican congressional candidates .
In 2020 , they could direct their anger straight at Trump—and many of those voters chose to stick with Republican candidates down-ballot .
Neither party should take comfort in projecting what will motivate these swing voters in the 2022 races and beyond .
Those are difficult-to-read voters whose support will prove a hard-earned prize .
6 .
Big Turnout But No Big Shift to the Left Which brings us to the final piece needed to crack the code for how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Never Trump Republicans to Biden ’ s banner .
The one thing Trump and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez could agree on was that the impact of Never Trump Republican initiatives—like Republican Voters Against Trump and the Lincoln Project—would be minimal .
The dogma on the left—that if only turnout surged , then younger voters would drive the electorate not only in favor of the Democrats but sharply toward the left ideologically—proved not to be true in 2020 .
Despite the surge from 137 million total votes in 2016 to 158 million in 2020 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the eligible population , there was partisan parity in the turnout : The AP VoteCast survey found that 47 percent of the voters self-identified as Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents , while 48 percent of the voters said they were Republicans or Republican-leaning independents .
Edison found that 37 percent of the voters were Democrats , 36 percent Republicans .
The turnout surge did not make the electorate more Democratic .
In terms of ideology , this year ’ s electorate remained center-right , if the exit-polling data is correct .
The Edison survey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-described as liberal ( favoring Biden by 89-10 ) , 38 percent moderate ( going for Biden by 64-34 ) , and 38 percent conservative ( favoring Trump 85-14 ) .
Despite recent polls suggesting the liberal share of the electorate was rising above 25 percent while the conservative share was drifting down from the 40 percent level ( which held steady from 1966-2006 ) toward 35 percent , in fact the conservative share held at 38 percent .
And remember that not all of the self-described “ liberals ” are pure progressives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 24 percent of liberals , the pure progressives are but a fraction of that in a general election .
Which means that to win not only the presidency but also to gain congressional majorities , Democrats will need moderate and non-Trumpist Republican votes to succeed , outside the large urban centers .
The AP VoteCast data reveals the equation that won the presidency for Biden ’ s Democrats with partisan parity in place and with conservatives enjoying a solid edge over liberals : Democrats broke for Biden by 95-4 while Republicans went for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of independents ( 5 percent of the electorate ) broke for Biden by 52-37 .
In the Edison data , which used a broader , more traditional definition of independents , they broke for Biden by a margin of 13 percent ( 54-41 ) .
The bottom line is clear : Biden won because the Never Trump Republicans gave him twice as many defections from Trump ( 8 percent ) as Trump was able to pull away from Biden among Democrats ( 4 percent ) , enabling Biden ’ s clear double-digit edge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The robust efforts of those leading this Never Trump Republican assault on Trump may not have moved huge pools of voters , but in terms of the actual significance of the votes that they turned , they moved mountains .
Donald Trump liked to denigrate the full gamut of Never Trump Republicans as losers , but their efforts turned Trump into the real and ultimate loser of the 2020 election .

How did Joe Biden win the presidential election? And what lessons does his victory hold for how he should govern?
Early attempts to interpret the results of the election were hampered by the slowness of the counting—the major news outlets didn’t even call the presidential race until the Saturday after the election—and by other 2020 idiosyncrasies. In particular, the exit polls, which in a normal election year can help explain how different political and demographic subgroups voted, were conducted abnormally because of the pandemic. And the pre-election polls, which normally also aid in interpreting election results, were dramatically off this year.
My aim in this piece is to offer an overview—based on an analysis of the data available—of the electoral mathematics behind Biden’s win.
Clarifying the Exit Poll Mess
The exit polling data does not speak with a singular authoritative voice. This year, there were two major exit surveys, the “traditional” one done by Edison Research (based upon a sample of 15,590 in-person and self-described mail-in voters; see CNN and the New York Times) and the AP VoteCast survey (based upon a sample of 110,485 self-described voters; see NPR and the New York Times). The raw data from each of these surveys is “weighted” to reflect the actual election results.
These two exit polls point to different results among key voting blocs, suggesting that one or both of these surveys are suffering from some of the same sampling problems that affected this year’s pre-election polls. To be fair, those conducting these exit polls faced a Herculean task, given the sheer size of the electorate that voted early in person or by mail—respectively 30 percent and 41 percent of the total vote, based on the AP VoteCast estimate. In short, 71 percent of this year’s electorate could not be captured by the exit pollsters upon leaving the polls, which is the easiest and most reliable means of ascertaining whether someone actually voted.
Consequently, the diverging results in these two exit polls will leave us scratching our heads. For example, the Edison data had whites constituting a 67 percent share of the total vote and overwhelmingly favoring Trump, by 58-41, with Biden carrying black voters (13 percent of the total) by 87-12, Hispanics (13 percent of the total) by 65-32, and Asians (4 percent of the total) by 61-34. The AP VoteCast data put the white share of the total vote at 74 percent and going 55-43 for Trump, with Biden winning among black voters (11 percent of the total) by 90-8, Hispanics (9 percent of the total) by 63-35, and Asians (2 percent of the total) by 70-28.
In short, these two exit polls painted different pictures of the electorate. Which exit survey is correct, and in which ways? For example, if Edison were right on the share of the total vote attributed to each racial bloc but AP VoteCast were correct on how those blocs divided their votes between Biden and Trump, that would be significantly different from an electorate in which AP VoteCast got the shares right but Edison got the spreads right.
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When you match up the actual voting returns in key states, the much larger AP VoteCast sample appears to be more accurate. That does not mean, of course, that the VoteCast data got everything right. Given the differences between the two surveys, we should resist pretending that either is totally correct—at least until the more detailed census-based studies of who voted and how they voted are completed in the coming months.
While searching for answers to the questions emerging from this election, we must supplement the exit-polling data with findings extrapolated from the actual election returns and relevant demographic data.
With those caveats set forth, we can now turn to the big question at hand: How did Biden win? After melding the exit-polling data with the actual vote counts, six hard truths emerge that should, for reasons I’ll explain, prove unsettling to both Democrats and Republicans.
1. Women Won the Election for Biden
Women outvoted men—by 4 percent in the Edison data and 6 percent in the AP VoteCast survey—and rejected Donald Trump, denying him re-election. According to the AP VoteCast, Biden carried women by 55-44, while Trump carried men by 52-46. Edison had similar numbers: Biden won women by 57-42, while Trump won men by 53-45. The bigger margins and bigger turnout among women were decisive.
The Edison data showed Trump carrying white men (35 percent of the total vote) by a 61-38 margin, while white women (32 percent of the total vote) broke for Trump by a far smaller margin of 55-44. The Edison data also showed black men (4 percent of the total vote) breaking for Biden by 79-19, while black women (8 percent of the total vote) favored Biden 90-9. Among Hispanics, the Edison data showed men (5 percent of the total vote) favoring Biden by 59-36 and women (8 percent of the total vote) favoring Biden by 69-30. Even if those splits in the Edison data are less accurate than the AP VoteCast spreads along race and ethnicity, it is clear that women voters delivered the White House to the Biden-Harris ticket.
2. The ‘Education Gap’ and Its Link to Race and Sex
Second, the emerging education gap worked in Biden’s favor, amplifying the impact of gender and race. According to the AP VoteCast data, voters with high school or less as their education level (27 percent of the total vote), broke for Trump over Biden by 52-46, a figure nearly identical to that group’s Trump vs. Clinton figure from 2016. (The 2016 exit polls are archived here by CNN and here by the New York Times.)
Voters with some college or an associate’s degree but less than a four-year degree (34 percent of the total vote) tipped dramatically away from Trump: In the 2016 exit poll they preferred him by 8 percent, but in the 2020 AP VoteCast data they preferred him by just 2 percent. The narrowing gap by which Trump carried that category of voters opened the door for Biden to win by sweeping the votes of those with higher levels of education. Biden carried college graduates with no postgraduate studies (25 percent of the total vote) by 56-42 and voters with postgraduate studies (15 percent of the total vote) by 58-40. Biden’s landslide margin among the highly educated was much larger than Trump’s margin among the 61 percent of the electorate with less than a college degree.
Gender and race were the crucial building blocks underlying this education divide in the electorate. Most notably, white college-educated men (16 percent of the total vote) voted for Trump by 52-46 while white college-educated women (14 percent of the electorate) went for Biden by 59-39. (It should be noted that this divergence echoes the age and gender divides more generally: Because men formerly far outnumbered women in college, and today women far outnumber men in college, the population of women with college degrees is younger than the population of men with college degrees—and older men skew toward Trump while younger women skew toward Biden.)
White men without college degrees (19 percent of the total vote), gave Trump a landslide margin of 64-34, while white women without college degrees (24 percent of the total vote) gave Trump a large but lesser margin of 60-39. Big though those margins are, they are each smaller than in 2016.
Among non-white voters, by contrast, Biden won regardless of education status (or sex):
among non-white non-college-educated men (7 percent of the vote), he won by 68-30;
among non-white non-college-educated women (10 percent of the total vote), he won by 77-21;
among non-white college-educated men (4 percent of the total vote), he won by 66-31; and
among non-white college-educated women (4 percent of the total vote), he won by a lopsided 80-19.
So Biden swept highly educated white women and he dominated among non-white women regardless of education level (perhaps buttressed by Kamala Harris’s outreach to black and Asian women). And he shaved down Trump’s edge among women with no or only some college education (perhaps aided slightly by Jill Biden’s long career as a community college professor).
Thomas Edsall, in a statistically rich and insightful column, points out that in 1980, Ronald Reagan’s Republicans “won 76 of the 100 counties with the largest share of college degrees.” However, in 2020, Biden’s Democrats carried 84 of those 100 counties.
3. Location, Location, Location
Third, Biden carried the nation’s suburbs by 10 percent in the AP VoteCast survey. From the Eisenhower through the Reagan eras, Republicans held a lock on highly educated and affluent suburban voters. It began eroding in 2004—and cracked apart in 2020. Edsall notes that in 1980 Republicans carried 91 out of the 100 counties with the highest median income level; in 2020, they carried only 43.
Assuming the trend holds, the significance for Democrats is enormous. The suburbs cast 45-47 percent of the total vote in high-turnout elections and 48-50 percent of the electorate in low-turnout elections. If Democrats can forge a coalition that unites the suburbs (45 percent of the total 2020 vote) while continuing to sweep the urban vote (20 percent of the total vote), that is a winning coalition—so long as they can also manage to do just a little better among blue-collar white voters in America’s small towns (17 percent of the total vote) and rural communities (18 percent of the total vote). The small-town and rural vote that Trump’s Republicans have solidified is simply not large enough to hold a majority in either the Electoral College or the popular vote.
Keep in mind that the margins among suburban voters tend to be narrow (Obama carried the suburbs by only 2 percent in 2008 and lost them by 2 percent in 2012), thus Biden carrying the suburbs by 10 percent was a huge factor in his election.
4. The Young and the Faithful
Fourth, the youth vote helped Biden win, even as it did not expand its share of the total vote from 2016. Voters aged 18 to 29, according to the AP VoteCast data, cast the same 13 percent share of the total vote that an in-depth, post-election Pew study showed from 2016. (The 2016 exit polls put the figure higher, at 19 percent of the total vote.) Biden carried these under-30 voters by 61-36.
Nevertheless, even adding in the 23 percent of the vote cast by those aged 30 to 44, only 36 percent of the total vote was from those 44 and younger. Voters 45 and older cast the other 64 percent of the ballots. Consequently, had Biden not cut Trump’s lead among those 45 and older from about 7 percent in 2016 to only 3 percent (51-48), things might have gotten very tight in the Electoral College.
Most of the pre-election public polls showed Biden carrying seniors by close to double digits. That proved inaccurate. Edison put the senior (65 and older) vote at a 22 percent of the overall electorate and showed Trump carrying it by 52-47, whereas the AP VoteCast data had seniors at 28 percent of the electorate, with Trump carrying them 51-48.
That is not to say that the youth vote was unimportant. The 25 percent edge Biden had in the AP VoteCast data among under-30 voters gave him a huge boost, especially since he carried voters aged 30 to 44 by only 54-43. But that large margin from the under-30 voters for Biden mattered only because Biden also succeeded in significantly shaving Trump’s 2016 margin among older voters.
There was a hidden nugget in the exit polls from Georgia, where 20 percent of the total vote was cast by those under 30 in age, higher than the national average, which was obviously a factor in Biden’s surprising albeit narrow victory in Georgia, enabling him to cross 300 votes in the Electoral College.
It is worth charting the key voting blocs enabling Biden’s ability to shave Trump’s edge among older voters. Religion played a key role. Back in 2016, Trump led Clinton among Catholics by 4 percentage points, a margin powered by white Catholic voters. Biden, only the second Catholic to be elected president, cut Trump’s lead among Catholics to 1 percent—a dead heat. Jewish voters (3 percent of the total), voted for Biden over Trump by 68-31. This is down slightly—by 3 or 4 percent— from recent presidential elections, where Obama and Clinton got in the low 70s among Jewish voters. The slight drop may reflect the growing share of more conservative Hasidic and highly Orthodox Jewish voters within the full range of Jewish voters, but it does not represent a wholesale change in partisan loyalties among Jewish voters who still sharply gravitate towards the Democrats. We are probably at mid-passage where the Jewish vote is on the way from a 75-25 split favoring Democrats a couple of decades ago toward a 65-35 split favoring Democrats by the end of this decade. The combined share of the (mostly white) Catholic and Jewish vote has always played an outsized role in the large, swing Electoral College states—not just New York, Florida, and California, but Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, as well as Arizona and Georgia.
5. The Real Enthusiasm Gap
Fifth, after all the talk during the campaign about how Trump’s supporters were more enthusiastic than Biden’s, we can now see in the data that there was an enthusiasm gap at the core of this election—but that it helped Biden, not Trump. In the AP VoteCast survey, 46 percent of voters rated President Trump favorably, while 53 percent rated him unfavorably. Therefore, it should not really surprise anyone that the popular vote now stands at 51.3 percent for Biden and 46.8 percent for Trump. Biden’s achievement was to sponge up the votes of nearly the entire range of those who opposed Trump. Among the 46 percent of voters who reported in the AP VoteCast survey that they “disapprove strongly” of President Trump, Biden won 97-1. On the flip side, meanwhile, the voters who said they “approve strongly” of Trump, who voted for him by 98-2, amounted to a much smaller 31 percent of the electorate.
In other words, the notion that Trump’s base was more passionate about supporting him than was Biden’s is not reflected in the data. Instead the real enthusiasm gap was that 15 percent more of the electorate strongly disapproved of Trump than was passionately in his corner: The 46 percent of the voters who really and truly disliked Trump put Biden on a glide path to victory that MAGA nation, constituting only 31 percent of the electorate, could not overcome. In fact, Biden was able to extend his electoral reach to encompass the nearly the full range of the anti-Trump majority, all the way from the “woke” left to the middle to the Never Trump Republicans. That coalition did not produce a landslide. But it did form a solid majority of the electorate.
This enthusiasm gap was enough to overcome the late move to Trump among the 5 percent of the total vote who told AP VoteCast that they decided who to vote for in last few days. Those late-deciding voters broke for Trump by a margin of 51-38 percent—not enough to change the outcome, but enough to help take Biden’s popular-vote margin down to 4.5 percent, rather than something closer to the 8 to 10 percent level forecast by most of the public polling data in the days before November 3. (Another big reason the public pollsters once again had to scrape egg off their faces: They badly misread how senior voters would land—thinking Biden was leading by 8 to 10 percent among voters 65 and older, when Trump won them by 3 to 5 percent. “This is a deeper kind” of polling error than those of four years ago, writes Nate Cohn. “It suggests a fundamental mismeasurement of the attitudes of a large demographic group.”)
In retrospect, this presidential race was a negative referendum on Trump and his presidency. The Democratic party was not able to erase many voters’ perception that the Democrats would swing too far left (influenced by the Trumpist rants that the Democrats would pursue “socialism” and the defunding of police, despite the fact that neither Biden nor more than a half-dozen or so Democratic candidates for Congress were advocating anything close to that as a platform). The enthusiasm gap—the fact that many of the votes for Biden were really just votes against Trump—was also the reason Biden had no coattails in the congressional races (with the Democrats losing seats in the House and Biden not able to boost the Democrats into a clear majority in the Senate).
That inconvenient political reality for Democrats on coattails can be seen in some interesting data Thomas Edsall obtained from Robert Stein, a political scientist at Rice University. Stein tracked the results of the five House seats in Texas that were at the top of the Democrats’ list of potential pick-up opportunities:
The five districts—two in Collin County north of Dallas, two in Tarrant County (Fort Worth) and one in Dallas County—Stein noted, were “predominately white suburban or exurban districts with above average education and income for Texas.” What happened in these districts on Nov. 3? Biden carried all of them, by an average of 6.5 points, Stein wrote, but all the Democratic challengers for state legislative offices fell short.
The difference between the 2018 midterm elections, when the Republican candidates in swing House districts were defeated, almost savaged, and this year, when the Democrats both lost some swing seats they had won last time and whiffed badly on challenge races to extend their majority, is clear. In 2018, the anti-Trump majority, which included conservative Democrats, moderate independents, and traditional non-Tea Party Republicans, had only one outlet to express opposition to Trump: voting against Republican congressional candidates. In 2020, they could direct their anger straight at Trump—and many of those voters chose to stick with Republican candidates down-ballot. Neither party should take comfort in projecting what will motivate these swing voters in the 2022 races and beyond. Those are difficult-to-read voters whose support will prove a hard-earned prize.
6. Big Turnout But No Big Shift to the Left
Which brings us to the final piece needed to crack the code for how Biden won this election: the defection of Never Trump Republicans to Biden’s banner. The one thing Trump and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez could agree on was that the impact of Never Trump Republican initiatives—like Republican Voters Against Trump and the Lincoln Project—would be minimal.
That assessment was flat-out wrong.
The dogma on the left—that if only turnout surged, then younger voters would drive the electorate not only in favor of the Democrats but sharply toward the left ideologically—proved not to be true in 2020. Despite the surge from 137 million total votes in 2016 to 158 million in 2020, a modern record of 66.7 percent of the eligible population, there was partisan parity in the turnout: The AP VoteCast survey found that 47 percent of the voters self-identified as Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents, while 48 percent of the voters said they were Republicans or Republican-leaning independents. Edison found that 37 percent of the voters were Democrats, 36 percent Republicans. The turnout surge did not make the electorate more Democratic.
(This, by the way, is another reason the pre-election public polling got it wrong: Most polls wrongly projected that Democrats had a lead of 3-5 percent in who voted, when instead there was partisan parity.)
In terms of ideology, this year’s electorate remained center-right, if the exit-polling data is correct. The Edison survey found that 24 percent of the voters self-described as liberal (favoring Biden by 89-10), 38 percent moderate (going for Biden by 64-34), and 38 percent conservative (favoring Trump 85-14). Despite recent polls suggesting the liberal share of the electorate was rising above 25 percent while the conservative share was drifting down from the 40 percent level (which held steady from 1966-2006) toward 35 percent, in fact the conservative share held at 38 percent. And remember that not all of the self-described “liberals” are pure progressives; many are traditional liberals—so among that 24 percent of liberals, the pure progressives are but a fraction of that in a general election.
Which means that to win not only the presidency but also to gain congressional majorities, Democrats will need moderate and non-Trumpist Republican votes to succeed, outside the large urban centers.
The AP VoteCast data reveals the equation that won the presidency for Biden’s Democrats with partisan parity in place and with conservatives enjoying a solid edge over liberals: Democrats broke for Biden by 95-4 while Republicans went for Trump by 91-8. The narrow band of independents (5 percent of the electorate) broke for Biden by 52-37. In the Edison data, which used a broader, more traditional definition of independents, they broke for Biden by a margin of 13 percent (54-41).
The bottom line is clear: Biden won because the Never Trump Republicans gave him twice as many defections from Trump (8 percent) as Trump was able to pull away from Biden among Democrats (4 percent), enabling Biden’s clear double-digit edge among independents to carry the day.
The robust efforts of those leading this Never Trump Republican assault on Trump may not have moved huge pools of voters, but in terms of the actual significance of the votes that they turned, they moved mountains. Donald Trump liked to denigrate the full gamut of Never Trump Republicans as losers, but their efforts turned Trump into the real and ultimate loser of the 2020 election.


Let’s Talk Solutions.

This problem is of a nature that we do not even have a vocabulary sufficient to describe—no portmanteau or Germanicized club sandwich of a word that combines “ undemocratic ” and “ disgraceful ” and “ unprecedented ” and “ mein Gott.
” All we have to go on is that we ’ re facing a capital-p Problem .
And this sort of ineffable Problem does not have neat and obvious solutions .
The Problem is , roughly , this : The leadership of one of the country ’ s two major political parties is all-in on trying to brainwash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believing that a presidential election was “ stolen ” from their guy and thereby justify the subversion of democracy in his name .
We can only begin to imagine the downstream consequences .
For future elections , the behavior that ’ s outrageous now may well become the norm—and a precursor to worse .
Kelli Ward ’ s rhetoric has less a chance of being an outlier than a harbinger .
So , friends : What are we going to do about it ?
First , we must ground ourselves in reality .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country as we ’ ve known it ( democratic , functional , stable ) is on a downward and unalterable trajectory .
Second , we must avoid making perfection the enemy of the good—or allowing tenuousness to become the enemy of the possible .
We will have to try a number of different tacks and see how they go .
Third , we should be open to the idea that possible solutions are asymmetric .
And this is where things get interesting .
I propose that we separate how we think about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the grasstops level , we can ’ t go straight through the bosses ( the Trump family ) or even their capos ( at , for example , OANN , Newsmax , the Federalist , TPU $ A ) .
The truth is that those actors are so post-truth they can ’ t even be opposed in the arena of ideas .
Their existence in such a forum is no more real than an apparition .
Just look at Eric Metaxas , who recently argued that Donald Trump won the 2020 election by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explanation : “ So who cares what I can prove in the courts ?
This is right .
This happened .
.
.
” As Rod Dreher puts it , this isn ’ t an argument .
It ’ s a statement of faith .
Which is exactly what the top-level Trumpists—whose modus operandi has more in common with religious fanatics than political polemicists—traffic in .
So while it might be fun or self-actualizing to subtweet beaucoup crazies like Metaxas or Emerald Robinson , it ’ s not going to accomplish anything productive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s probably best to just ignore them .
David Brooks recently called their work the establishment of a separate “ epistemic regime.
” That ’ s right .
And we don ’ t have to live in it .
When Aristotle imagined the best life , he probably wasn ’ t thinking of people living out their days on Planet Parler .
Instead , the way past Trumpism at the grasstops level is the path around it .
Trumpism can and should be trapped in a pincer movement between the existing Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side , and a new common cause on the other—one formed by conservatives and Republicans in exile from their former homes .
What will distinguish this second group from the party of Trump ?
At its core , a commitment to the democratic process and the Constitution : the foundation of the American political system which the outgoing president and his professional allies and enablers have fractured .
Realistically , a right-of-center movement that rejects Trumpism will continue to have meaningful differences on matters of public policy with the party of President-elect Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the two entities in upholding the rules , formal and informal alike , of democracy .
They should create a shared political space that represents most of the country and is inhospitable to Trumpism .
Who knows what shape Republican defectors will take in the political process : If they ’ ll stand up their own distinct political movement , if they ’ ll just wind up as Red Dogs , or some of both .
In whichever case , the basic truth about the Republican party is the same : As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the GOP , the GOP needs to be marginalized , not retaken .
And the Democratic party can not do that alone .
At the grassroots level , we have to circumvent Trumpism a different way , with a different set of tools : neither with a pincer movement nor with political arguments .
It ’ s with a strategy that lives outside the partisan atmosphere , that targets cultural flaws in nonpolitical spaces and incorporates communications and advocacy tactics largely outside the political process .
We often think about “ nonpartisan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better to think in terms of being “ pre-partisan ” —reaching people before they ’ ve formed partisan identities—and “ post-partisan ” —getting people to see the characteristics of their communities ( and the country ) outside a partisan frame .
Consider the following spheres : Media .
One of the Republican party ’ s cognitive dissonances is that many of its thinkers advocate for localism , while Trump constantly directs his followers ’ attention to his Acela corridor-based political obsessions .
We should fight against this nationalizing of the American experience .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ For example , someone with deep pockets could take the Texas Tribune model nationwide and replicate it in all 50 states .
Or create a nonprofit network of local papers in swing states with large rural populations .
People in “ flyover country ” —where I was raised and which I always will love—should not care if a major coastal newspaper “ gets them.
” Let ’ s tell more stories about where they live—stories told by outlets headquartered and staffed by people in their backyard .
Education .
History curricula are a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would look like in 10 years if high schools taught kids more about topics that helped them understand the modern world of which they ’ re becoming a part : say , the connection between Jim Crow and redlining and the Black Lives Matter movement .
In general , Americans ought to incorporate a greater diversity of subject material and authors into their thinking , which includes but doesn ’ t reduce the nation ’ s story to its Founding .
Absolutely , citizens of every political ID should know about the Framers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to function .
But that period of American history should not obscure the periods since , which is exactly what an announcement such as “ Protecting America ’ s Founding Ideals by Promoting Patriotic Education ” is designed to do .
Tech .
Some group with authority—of political scientists and sociologists and behavioral economists and psychologists—and well-known advocates who are not on , have left , or criticize Twitter and Facebook—George Packer , Millie Bobbie Brown , Franklin Foer—need to carpet-bomb the country with a social media disengagement campaign .
# QuitTwitter .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave these platforms to deprive them of their influence .
But that ’ s not the point .
The point is that it would get the attention of Dorsey and Zuck .
To relax social media ’ s grip on society , the elites who are active on social media first need to start souring on social media .
Here ’ s your “ to be clear !
” disclaimer : Social media isn ’ t all bad .
But its pernicious effect on American culture and politics is undeniable .
As one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are prepared to effectively navigate the online information environment.
” This same study found that exposure to material as simple as “ ‘ tips ’ to help spot false news stories .
.
.
reduces people ’ s belief in false headlines.
” The study ’ s authors refer to these as “ media literacy interventions.
” When they ’ re appended to the bottom of a tweet with a little exclamation point , the Trumpists invariably label them “ censorship.
” Regardless of what they ’ re called ( by any name @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they address only the supply side of the issue .
The demand side is on us , particularly the people who “ drive conversations ” on social .
We can choose to engage less or engage the same or more .
As a wise knight once advised an archaeologist , we should choose wisely .
Community culture .
What if we repurposed the concept of “ sister cities ” domestically , to foster cultural exchange between communities of different socioeconomic or racial makeups ?
Consider how the urban/rural divide in voting patterns is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suggest that the cultural difference between Idaho and Massachusetts is at least as big as the one between certain countries .
Americans need to understand each other ; to develop a shared set of assumptions about the world and preempt many of the U.S. ’ s meaningless partisan divisions .
Imagine making conscious efforts to foster cultural exchange between a black-majority neighborhood in Atlanta and a town like Ellijay , Georgia ( population 1,700 ) —not merely to “ get people talking , ” but to get them learning about and invested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up the road .
This idea has nothing to do with politics but could pay dividends to the polity .
Of course , the preceding ideas aren ’ t an exhaustive ingredients list for some cure that will heal the country .
But taken together , they ’ re intended in the spirit of reorienting Americans ’ worldviews toward the fact- , history- , and community-based , and away from the partisan- , identitarian- , and digital-without-boundaries-based .
Such a shift would take years—maybe decades—as well as the mobilization of creativity and goodwill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undertaking .
But it ’ s how to help secure the future of the generations to follow .

America has a Problem.
This problem is of a nature that we do not even have a vocabulary sufficient to describe—no portmanteau or Germanicized club sandwich of a word that combines “undemocratic” and “disgraceful” and “unprecedented” and “mein Gott.” All we have to go on is that we’re facing a capital-p Problem. And this sort of ineffable Problem does not have neat and obvious solutions.
The Problem is, roughly, this: The leadership of one of the country’s two major political parties is all-in on trying to brainwash its tens of millions of supporters into believing that a presidential election was “stolen” from their guy and thereby justify the subversion of democracy in his name. We can only begin to imagine the downstream consequences. For future elections, the behavior that’s outrageous now may well become the norm—and a precursor to worse. Kelli Ward’s rhetoric has less a chance of being an outlier than a harbinger.
So, friends: What are we going to do about it?
First, we must ground ourselves in reality. There’s a reasonable chance that the country as we’ve known it (democratic, functional, stable) is on a downward and unalterable trajectory.
Second, we must avoid making perfection the enemy of the good—or allowing tenuousness to become the enemy of the possible. We will have to try a number of different tacks and see how they go.
Third, we should be open to the idea that possible solutions are asymmetric. And this is where things get interesting. I propose that we separate how we think about the grassroots versus the grasstops.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
At the grasstops level, we can’t go straight through the bosses (the Trump family) or even their capos (at, for example, OANN, Newsmax, the Federalist, TPU$A).
The truth is that those actors are so post-truth they can’t even be opposed in the arena of ideas. Their existence in such a forum is no more real than an apparition. Just look at Eric Metaxas, who recently argued that Donald Trump won the 2020 election by a “landslide” with the following explanation: “So who cares what I can prove in the courts? This is right. This happened . . .”
As Rod Dreher puts it, this isn’t an argument. It’s a statement of faith. Which is exactly what the top-level Trumpists—whose modus operandi has more in common with religious fanatics than political polemicists—traffic in.
So while it might be fun or self-actualizing to subtweet beaucoup crazies like Metaxas or Emerald Robinson, it’s not going to accomplish anything productive. And the truth is, it’s probably best to just ignore them. David Brooks recently called their work the establishment of a separate “epistemic regime.” That’s right. And we don’t have to live in it. When Aristotle imagined the best life, he probably wasn’t thinking of people living out their days on Planet Parler.
Instead, the way past Trumpism at the grasstops level is the path around it.
Trumpism can and should be trapped in a pincer movement between the existing Democratic coalition spanning the political left on one side, and a new common cause on the other—one formed by conservatives and Republicans in exile from their former homes.
What will distinguish this second group from the party of Trump? At its core, a commitment to the democratic process and the Constitution: the foundation of the American political system which the outgoing president and his professional allies and enablers have fractured. Realistically, a right-of-center movement that rejects Trumpism will continue to have meaningful differences on matters of public policy with the party of President-elect Biden. But there should be no light between the two entities in upholding the rules, formal and informal alike, of democracy. They should create a shared political space that represents most of the country and is inhospitable to Trumpism.
Who knows what shape Republican defectors will take in the political process: If they’ll stand up their own distinct political movement, if they’ll just wind up as Red Dogs, or some of both. In whichever case, the basic truth about the Republican party is the same: As long as Trump is the dominant influence over the GOP, the GOP needs to be marginalized, not retaken.
And the Democratic party cannot do that alone.
At the grassroots level, we have to circumvent Trumpism a different way, with a different set of tools: neither with a pincer movement nor with political arguments. It’s with a strategy that lives outside the partisan atmosphere, that targets cultural flaws in nonpolitical spaces and incorporates communications and advocacy tactics largely outside the political process.
We often think about “nonpartisan” ideas. But it would be better to think in terms of being “pre-partisan”—reaching people before they’ve formed partisan identities—and “post-partisan”—getting people to see the characteristics of their communities (and the country) outside a partisan frame.
Consider the following spheres:
Media. One of the Republican party’s cognitive dissonances is that many of its thinkers advocate for localism, while Trump constantly directs his followers’ attention to his Acela corridor-based political obsessions.
We should fight against this nationalizing of the American experience. And the journalism trade can help.
For example, someone with deep pockets could take the Texas Tribune model nationwide and replicate it in all 50 states. Or create a nonprofit network of local papers in swing states with large rural populations. People in “flyover country”—where I was raised and which I always will love—should not care if a major coastal newspaper “gets them.” Let’s tell more stories about where they live—stories told by outlets headquartered and staffed by people in their backyard.
Education. History curricula are a mess. But imagine what the world would look like in 10 years if high schools taught kids more about topics that helped them understand the modern world of which they’re becoming a part: say, the connection between Jim Crow and redlining and the Black Lives Matter movement. In general, Americans ought to incorporate a greater diversity of subject material and authors into their thinking, which includes but doesn’t reduce the nation’s story to its Founding. Absolutely, citizens of every political ID should know about the Framers and how our government institutions were designed to function. But that period of American history should not obscure the periods since, which is exactly what an announcement such as “Protecting America’s Founding Ideals by Promoting Patriotic Education” is designed to do.
Tech. Some group with authority—of political scientists and sociologists and behavioral economists and psychologists—and well-known advocates who are not on, have left, or criticize Twitter and Facebook—George Packer, Millie Bobbie Brown, Franklin Foer—need to carpet-bomb the country with a social media disengagement campaign. #QuitTwitter. #QuitFacebook.
I’m not kidding.
Not enough people would leave these platforms to deprive them of their influence. But that’s not the point. The point is that it would get the attention of Dorsey and Zuck. To relax social media’s grip on society, the elites who are active on social media first need to start souring on social media.
Here’s your “to be clear!” disclaimer: Social media isn’t all bad. But its pernicious effect on American culture and politics is undeniable. As one recent study concluded, “few people are prepared to effectively navigate the online information environment.” This same study found that exposure to material as simple as “‘tips’ to help spot false news stories . . . reduces people’s belief in false headlines.” The study’s authors refer to these as “media literacy interventions.” When they’re appended to the bottom of a tweet with a little exclamation point, the Trumpists invariably label them “censorship.”
Regardless of what they’re called (by any name, they’re legal), they address only the supply side of the issue. The demand side is on us, particularly the people who “drive conversations” on social. We can choose to engage less or engage the same or more. As a wise knight once advised an archaeologist, we should choose wisely.
Community culture. What if we repurposed the concept of “sister cities” domestically, to foster cultural exchange between communities of different socioeconomic or racial makeups? Consider how the urban/rural divide in voting patterns is widening. It’s not crazy to suggest that the cultural difference between Idaho and Massachusetts is at least as big as the one between certain countries. Americans need to understand each other; to develop a shared set of assumptions about the world and preempt many of the U.S.’s meaningless partisan divisions. Imagine making conscious efforts to foster cultural exchange between a black-majority neighborhood in Atlanta and a town like Ellijay, Georgia (population 1,700)—not merely to “get people talking,” but to get them learning about and invested in solving the problems that exist just up the road. This idea has nothing to do with politics but could pay dividends to the polity.
Of course, the preceding ideas aren’t an exhaustive ingredients list for some cure that will heal the country. But taken together, they’re intended in the spirit of reorienting Americans’ worldviews toward the fact-, history-, and community-based, and away from the partisan-, identitarian-, and digital-without-boundaries-based.
Such a shift would take years—maybe decades—as well as the mobilization of creativity and goodwill. It may well be a generational undertaking. But it’s how to help secure the future of the generations to follow.


thebulwark--2020-12-30--Josh Hawley Is Madison Cawthorn Is Marjorie Taylor Greene

Suppose you banged your head really hard , got knocked out , and went to the emergency room to assess the damage .
In that case , you might expect a doctor to ask very easy questions to test whether or not you ’ re able to perceive reality accurately .
Questions such as “ Who is the president of the United States ?
” Or , “ Who won the 2020 presidential election ?
” Well , a good number of Republicans can ’ t come up with the right answers and they don ’ t have any injuries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that voting machines possessed by the ghost of Hugo Chavez flipped the election for Joe Biden .
The ones with Ivy League degrees—but who are absolutely not elites—simply oppose any voter expansion rules made prior to the election and want to cancel votes in the swing states won by Joe Biden—but , funnily enough , only in the swing states won by Joe Biden .
Not that there ’ s any difference to this distinction : Both contentions are nonsense that has been debunked or overruled in courts dozens of times .
Many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bottom feeders , and other assorted carnival barkers .
But some of them want to be taken Very Seriously .
Some of them aspire to do more than just make it to the main stage at TPUSA .
Some of them want to be Thought Leaders .
Some of them even want to be .
.
.
president of these United States .
But , why , when it ’ s been proven repeatedly that Biden is president and it has been established , as a factual matter , that there was no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , should anyone listen to the people who are peddling this lie ?
Because if they are willing to lie about something as objectively simple as the results of a presidential election—about 2+2 equaling 4—what else will they lie about ?
Missouri Senator Josh Hawley is trying to get to the pole position for 2024 on the off chance that Donald Trump decides to self-exile in Mar-a-Lago and Donald Jr. then takes a pass on the race .
And he wants to take the “ smart , but populist ” lane .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet on Wednesday , he linked arms with the crazies by announcing that he will object to the counting of Biden ’ s Electoral College victory , thus forcing a roll-call vote in an attempt to push the determination of the election to Congress .
He ’ s avoiding all of that ghost-of-Chavez talk and instead couching his attempt to overturn the election as being deeply-held conviction about “ voter integrity ” and the “ unprecedented effort of mega-corporations , including Facebook and Twitter , to interfere in this election , in support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not pandering to the MAGA fundraising file who want the election overthrown .
No sir .
He just wants to highlight the problems with ballot integrity and social media .
He ’ s not just some crank trying to impress Parler .
He ’ s a Very Serious Person who the crazies just so happen to like .
He can unite the party !
That ’ s his lane .
So , even if you think MTG or Mad-Caw are a little on the nutty side , Hawley wants you to trust him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2024 .
Will he get away with it ?
What about all the Very Serious People who supported Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton ’ s lawsuit to throw out Biden ’ s votes in the swing states he won ?
Or how about all of the people who , in late December , were still insisting publicly that could pull out a win ?
Do we have to take them seriously , ever again ?
Are we supposed to treat the people who gave credence to Sidney Powell and Michael Flynn as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who should be entrusted with making decisions about anything to do with our government , whatsoever ?
Even the Trump-aligned New York Post is now begging Trump and his enablers to “ Give it up !
” “ Sidney Powell is a crazy person , ” the Post says .
“ Michael Flynn suggesting martial law is tantamount to treason .
It is shameful.
” But we all knew—or readers should have known that this was coming .
We should never forget exactly who and what these people did in this moment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Josh Hawleys of the world and the Marjorie Taylor Greenes and Madison Cawthorns .
Don ’ t ever let them pretend otherwise .

Suppose you banged your head really hard, got knocked out, and went to the emergency room to assess the damage. In that case, you might expect a doctor to ask very easy questions to test whether or not you’re able to perceive reality accurately. Questions such as “Who is the president of the United States?” Or, “Who won the 2020 presidential election?” Well, a good number of Republicans can’t come up with the right answers and they don’t have any injuries to blame.
The dumb ones say that voting machines possessed by the ghost of Hugo Chavez flipped the election for Joe Biden. The ones with Ivy League degrees—but who are absolutely not elites—simply oppose any voter expansion rules made prior to the election and want to cancel votes in the swing states won by Joe Biden—but, funnily enough, only in the swing states won by Joe Biden. Not that there’s any difference to this distinction: Both contentions are nonsense that has been debunked or overruled in courts dozens of times.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Many of these people are scammers, attention-hungry bottom feeders, and other assorted carnival barkers. But some of them want to be taken Very Seriously.
Some of them aspire to do more than just make it to the main stage at TPUSA. Some of them want to be Thought Leaders. Some of them even want to be . . . president of these United States.
But, why, when it’s been proven repeatedly that Biden is president and it has been established, as a factual matter, that there was no widespread voter fraud in the 2020 election, should anyone listen to the people who are peddling this lie? Because if they are willing to lie about something as objectively simple as the results of a presidential election—about 2+2 equaling 4—what else will they lie about?
Missouri Senator Josh Hawley is trying to get to the pole position for 2024 on the off chance that Donald Trump decides to self-exile in Mar-a-Lago and Donald Jr. then takes a pass on the race. And he wants to take the “smart, but populist” lane.
He has degrees from Yale and Stanford. Yet on Wednesday, he linked arms with the crazies by announcing that he will object to the counting of Biden’s Electoral College victory, thus forcing a roll-call vote in an attempt to push the determination of the election to Congress.
He’s avoiding all of that ghost-of-Chavez talk and instead couching his attempt to overturn the election as being deeply-held conviction about “voter integrity” and the “unprecedented effort of mega-corporations, including Facebook and Twitter, to interfere in this election, in support of Joe Biden.”
He absolutely is not pandering to the MAGA fundraising file who want the election overthrown. No sir. He just wants to highlight the problems with ballot integrity and social media. He’s not just some crank trying to impress Parler. He’s a Very Serious Person who the crazies just so happen to like. He can unite the party! That’s his lane.
So, even if you think MTG or Mad-Caw are a little on the nutty side, Hawley wants you to trust him when he runs for the Big Job in 2024.
Will he get away with it?
What about all the Very Serious People who supported Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s lawsuit to throw out Biden’s votes in the swing states he won?
Or how about all of the people who, in late December, were still insisting publicly that could pull out a win? Do we have to take them seriously, ever again?
Are we supposed to treat the people who gave credence to Sidney Powell and Michael Flynn as though they are normal, responsible adults who should be entrusted with making decisions about anything to do with our government, whatsoever?
Even the Trump-aligned New York Post is now begging Trump and his enablers to “Give it up!” “Sidney Powell is a crazy person,” the Post says. “Michael Flynn suggesting martial law is tantamount to treason. It is shameful.”
Indeed.
But we all knew—or readers should have known that this was coming.
We should never forget exactly who and what these people did in this moment. There is no difference—none, at all—between the Josh Hawleys of the world and the Marjorie Taylor Greenes and Madison Cawthorns.
Don’t ever let them pretend otherwise.


thebulwark--2020-12-31--Crimes, Crises, and Coup

Crimes, Crises, and Coup

The biggest stain left on the fabric of our nation after Donald Trump ’ s departure will be the stain of acceptance .
Many people on the left and in the middle , along with a few on the right , have fought against his desecration of political and social norms and stood up to his bullying .
But what is striking is how many more Americans have just accepted all of it—the insanity , the narcissism , the lies , and the bullying of the last few years .
Millions have adapted to the Trump madness , accepting it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ welcomed it , embraced it .
That is true even now , when Trump has lost his re-election bid—and instead of a working president striving to lead the country through the ongoing crisis of the pandemic , we have a whimpering crybaby camped out at Mar-a-Lago who spends his days golfing , tweeting and plotting a coup .
He has not led the effort to vaccinate Americans .
“ Operation Warp Speed ” has become “ Operation Turtle Crawl , ” as the distribution of vaccines has been appallingly slow and disorganized .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ enormous power of his office to bring speed and order to the process .
In fact , he has specifically denied responsibility , fecklessly tweeting that “ it is up to the states to administer ” the vaccines .
As usual , he refuses to accept any responsibility—though he always wants the accolades .
Nor is Trump leading in the effort to bring economic relief to the Americans affected by the pandemic .
The self-described dealmaker ignored months of negotiations among lawmakers .
This allowed Mitch McConnell and Senate Republicans to stonewall various @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last-second veto hint over the size of the relief checks going out to Americans angered and confused the Republicans and Democrats who had finally worked out a deal—but then , just as bizarrely , after a delay of a few days he signed the bill anyway .
And he damn sure hasn ’ t tried to make the transition peaceful .
Since Christmas , the president ’ s communications staff has issued White House reporters a daily email telling us of Trump ’ s activities .
It amounts to an out-of-order sign : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump will continue to work tirelessly for the American People .
His schedule includes many meetings and calls.
” The meetings are with Roger Stone and Michael Flynn—members of his fellowship of the crime ring .
The phone calls are to sycophants , as he disparages the Supreme Court for not doing his bidding .
The only work he is concentrating on , the only thing he is obsessing over besides his daily golf game , is his right-in-plain-sight coup .
One part of the coup attempt will play out inside the Capitol @ @ @ @ @ @ @ objecting without merit to the counting of Electoral College votes on January 6 .
The other is to be the same day in the streets—as per Trump ’ s cryptic tweets of incitement : On January 4 he plans to be in Georgia for a “ big and wonderful ” rally .
Meanwhile , he ’ s still trying to write that last episode of his reality show—which includes a last-minute rewrite given to us via an email to the press corps Wednesday night : In addition to the usual “ out-of-order ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump will be coming back to the White House for New Year ’ s Eve .
Perhaps he has another maskless superspreader event in mind to ring in the New Year .
Aside from Trump and his family , the individuals most directly responsible for the horror show of the last few yearse have been those who work for him—the senior staffers who have funneled his fecund lies to the public .
Without them acting as megaphones and amplifiers , Donald Trump would have far less influence .
They have fed his message @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trumpian broadcasters and publishers .
They have warped reality with their mix of alternative facts , racism , and sedition .
They have told us to wear masks but they don ’ t themselves .
They have called the pandemic a hoax or a fraud—but are now the first in line for vaccines .
They have claimed the president has done a fantastic job of dealing with the pandemic—but now one out of every thousand Americans is dead because of the coronavirus .
They have claimed that Trump dealt with Russia tougher than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent revelations about Russian hacking our defense systems , just as he did nothing about the 2016 election hacks and nothing about the bounties placed on our soldiers .
Knowing that I am a White House reporter who has raised these issues—and been routinely ignored , lied to , or insulted for doing so—friends and acquaintances often ask me if the members of Trump ’ s team are “ viciously evil ” or “ morally bankrupt.
” My reply now usually mentions Hannah Arendt ’ s description of Adolf Eichmann .
Arendt , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in her 1963 book Eichmann in Jerusalem about the trial of the infamous Nazi bureaucrat , said he was “ terribly and terrifyingly normal.
” In trying to understand how Eichmann could seem so ordinary in contrast to the horrendous crimes he committed , Arendt argued that his actions weren ’ t driven by hate or malice but a “ blind dedication ” to the Nazi regime and a need to belong .
This need , she said , overcame Eichmann ’ s ability to think for himself .
His desire to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ find a meaningful role for himself as an individual in a group dynamic clouded his thoughts and made the most horrific actions possible .
“ The lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us , ” Arendt famously wrote , was “ the lesson of the fearsome , word-and-thought-defying banality of evil.
” Six decades after she wrote those words , we are learning that hard lesson again .
Man ’ s inhumanity to man , the source of so much suffering , comes in part from an inability to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while often providing a sense of meaning in a cold and alienating world , can lead seemingly normal people to do terrible things , thus leading to more suffering .
There are many friendly , smiling faces inside the Trump White House .
There are also many unfriendly and vapid faces—the faces of those who believe that to question Trump ’ s motives or actions is a result of being a “ libtard ” or an “ activist ” reporter .
It is always easier to question the motives of others than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially actions taken in defense of a man like Donald Trump .
Such self-examination and critical thinking are absent from many of the people who surround the president .
He , of course , wants it that way .
Unlike presidents who have worked with “ teams of rivals ” or administrations which welcomed and thrived on internal criticism , Trump demands blind obedience .
Moreover , that requirement extends outward from the White House to the far corners of his party and to millions of supporters eager to accept his false @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the ugliness of the last four years—and of the ugliness that remains in these last three weeks of the Trump administration , including the pending coup attempt—has not only damaged our political system .
It has also stained the fabric of our society , our decency , and our humanity .
Donald Trump has brought the United States closer to the precipice of political and social disaster than anyone in my lifetime .
And he did it not with an intellect of deep thought , but with the shallow narcissistic desires of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He bullied and used the banality of belonging to a seemingly successful group to keep those of weaker resolve in his embrace .
Those who could think for themselves either left his circle or never joined it .
In the end , I think many of the Trumplicans will try to destroy all evidence of their misdeeds , much as other criminals try to do .
That ’ s as far as they ’ ll go in admitting any guilt .
When the music stops—and it will soon—these Trump supporters will be ashamed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Many others , though , not wanting the dance to end , will try to find ways to keep humming along .

The biggest stain left on the fabric of our nation after Donald Trump’s departure will be the stain of acceptance.
Many people on the left and in the middle, along with a few on the right, have fought against his desecration of political and social norms and stood up to his bullying.
But what is striking is how many more Americans have just accepted all of it—the insanity, the narcissism, the lies, and the bullying of the last few years. Millions have adapted to the Trump madness, accepting it as the new normal.
Many even welcomed it, embraced it.
That is true even now, when Trump has lost his re-election bid—and instead of a working president striving to lead the country through the ongoing crisis of the pandemic, we have a whimpering crybaby camped out at Mar-a-Lago who spends his days golfing, tweeting and plotting a coup.
He has not led the effort to vaccinate Americans. “Operation Warp Speed” has become “Operation Turtle Crawl,” as the distribution of vaccines has been appallingly slow and disorganized. Trump has done nothing to use the enormous power of his office to bring speed and order to the process. In fact, he has specifically denied responsibility, fecklessly tweeting that “it is up to the states to administer” the vaccines. As usual, he refuses to accept any responsibility—though he always wants the accolades.
Nor is Trump leading in the effort to bring economic relief to the Americans affected by the pandemic. The self-described dealmaker ignored months of negotiations among lawmakers. This allowed Mitch McConnell and Senate Republicans to stonewall various Democratic proposals. Trump’s bizarre last-second veto hint over the size of the relief checks going out to Americans angered and confused the Republicans and Democrats who had finally worked out a deal—but then, just as bizarrely, after a delay of a few days he signed the bill anyway.
And he damn sure hasn’t tried to make the transition peaceful.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Since Christmas, the president’s communications staff has issued White House reporters a daily email telling us of Trump’s activities. It amounts to an out-of-order sign: “During the Holiday season, President Trump will continue to work tirelessly for the American People. His schedule includes many meetings and calls.”
The meetings are with Roger Stone and Michael Flynn—members of his fellowship of the crime ring. The phone calls are to sycophants, as he disparages the Supreme Court for not doing his bidding.
The only work he is concentrating on, the only thing he is obsessing over besides his daily golf game, is his right-in-plain-sight coup. One part of the coup attempt will play out inside the Capitol, where Trumpist lawmakers are planning on objecting without merit to the counting of Electoral College votes on January 6. The other is to be the same day in the streets—as per Trump’s cryptic tweets of incitement:
See you in Washington, DC, on January 6th. Don’t miss it. Information to follow! — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) December 27, 2020
JANUARY SIXTH, SEE YOU IN DC! — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) December 30, 2020
On January 4 he plans to be in Georgia for a “big and wonderful” rally. Meanwhile, he’s still trying to write that last episode of his reality show—which includes a last-minute rewrite given to us via an email to the press corps Wednesday night: In addition to the usual “out-of-order” message, we were also told that Trump will be coming back to the White House for New Year’s Eve. Perhaps he has another maskless superspreader event in mind to ring in the New Year.
Aside from Trump and his family, the individuals most directly responsible for the horror show of the last few years have been those who work for him—the senior staffers who have funneled his fecund lies to the public. Without them acting as megaphones and amplifiers, Donald Trump would have far less influence.
They have fed his message into the vast, hungry maw of Trumpian broadcasters and publishers. They have warped reality with their mix of alternative facts, racism, and sedition.
They have told us to wear masks but they don’t themselves. They have called the pandemic a hoax or a fraud—but are now the first in line for vaccines. They have claimed the president has done a fantastic job of dealing with the pandemic—but now one out of every thousand Americans is dead because of the coronavirus.
They have claimed that Trump dealt with Russia tougher than any other president—but he did nothing about recent revelations about Russian hacking our defense systems, just as he did nothing about the 2016 election hacks and nothing about the bounties placed on our soldiers.
Knowing that I am a White House reporter who has raised these issues—and been routinely ignored, lied to, or insulted for doing so—friends and acquaintances often ask me if the members of Trump’s team are “viciously evil” or “morally bankrupt.”
My reply now usually mentions Hannah Arendt’s description of Adolf Eichmann. Arendt, who wrote in the New Yorker and in her 1963 book Eichmann in Jerusalem about the trial of the infamous Nazi bureaucrat, said he was “terribly and terrifyingly normal.”
In trying to understand how Eichmann could seem so ordinary in contrast to the horrendous crimes he committed, Arendt argued that his actions weren’t driven by hate or malice but a “blind dedication” to the Nazi regime and a need to belong. This need, she said, overcame Eichmann’s ability to think for himself. His desire to be able to say “we” and find a meaningful role for himself as an individual in a group dynamic clouded his thoughts and made the most horrific actions possible.
“The lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us,” Arendt famously wrote, was “the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil.”
Six decades after she wrote those words, we are learning that hard lesson again. Man’s inhumanity to man, the source of so much suffering, comes in part from an inability to understand that blind allegiance to certain ideologies, while often providing a sense of meaning in a cold and alienating world, can lead seemingly normal people to do terrible things, thus leading to more suffering.
There are many friendly, smiling faces inside the Trump White House. There are also many unfriendly and vapid faces—the faces of those who believe that to question Trump’s motives or actions is a result of being a “libtard” or an “activist” reporter. It is always easier to question the motives of others than reflect on one’s own actions, especially actions taken in defense of a man like Donald Trump.
Such self-examination and critical thinking are absent from many of the people who surround the president. He, of course, wants it that way. Unlike presidents who have worked with “teams of rivals” or administrations which welcomed and thrived on internal criticism, Trump demands blind obedience. Moreover, that requirement extends outward from the White House to the far corners of his party and to millions of supporters eager to accept his false version of reality.
So the acceptance of the ugliness of the last four years—and of the ugliness that remains in these last three weeks of the Trump administration, including the pending coup attempt—has not only damaged our political system. It has also stained the fabric of our society, our decency, and our humanity.
Donald Trump has brought the United States closer to the precipice of political and social disaster than anyone in my lifetime. And he did it not with an intellect of deep thought, but with the shallow narcissistic desires of conquest over our fellow human beings. He bullied and used the banality of belonging to a seemingly successful group to keep those of weaker resolve in his embrace. Those who could think for themselves either left his circle or never joined it.
In the end, I think many of the Trumplicans will try to destroy all evidence of their misdeeds, much as other criminals try to do. That’s as far as they’ll go in admitting any guilt. When the music stops—and it will soon—these Trump supporters will be ashamed of what they’ve done.
Many others, though, not wanting the dance to end, will try to find ways to keep humming along.