thebulwark--2020-12-03--Bill Barr’s Very “Special” Episode

Bill Barr’s Very “Special” Episode

In what might prove to be his last significant act as attorney general , William Barr appointed John Durham to be a special counsel , in order to continue the Trump administration ’ s investigation into the Obama administration even after Trump himself leaves office .
Critics immediately recognized a legal glitch in Barr ’ s memo appointing Durham , but that glitch will not negate Durham ’ s appointment .
In that respect , the glitch is less significant than it might seem .
Yet , at the same time , it is also more significant than it seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tuesday that he had , back in October , appointed Durham to be a special counsel , his memo vested Durham with extraordinary powers and independence from oversight as he continues his investigation into the Obama administration ’ s Crossfire Hurricane investigation of the 2016 Trump campaign .
Barr made clear that Durham is also investigating “ the investigation of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller , III.
” And other language in the memo ( “ including , but not limited to ” ) suggests that Durham may investigate even more , too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of “ special counsel ” twenty years ago—following the 1999 expiration of the old independent counsel statute , under which Ken Starr ’ s wide-ranging investigation of Bill Clinton had been conducted—in order to create a mechanism for the Justice Department to investigate allegations of misconduct within the president ’ s own administration , without interference by the president ’ s attorney general .
But Barr ’ s appointment of Durham is intended to do something quite different : to continue investigating the Obama administration , and with insulation against interference by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-restraint by President Trump ’ s Justice Department—indeed , the very opposite .
Commentators quickly recognized an apparent glitch in Barr ’ s memo .
Under Section 600.3 of the Justice Department ’ s regulations , a special counsel “ shall be selected from outside the United States Government.
” Durham , of course , is not “ outside ” the U.S. government ; he has been in the Justice Department since 1982 ; he was appointed by President Trump to be the U.S. Attorney for Connecticut in 2018 ; and from that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration ’ s investigation of Crossfire Hurricane since May 2019 .
But that legal technicality is much less significant than it appears , because Barr ’ s new order appointing Durham as a “ special counsel ” very carefully avoids invoking the DOJ ’ s regulations as authorizing this appointment in the first place .
He sidesteps the regulatory provisions defining the kinds of cases suitable for a special counsel , and defining the qualifications of a special counsel ( that is , Sections 600.1 through Sections 600.3 ) ; instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Durham ’ s new appointment : “ the authority vested in the Attorney General , including 28 U.S.C .
§§ 509 , 510 , and 515.
” ( Of that open-ended list of vague authorities , the most important ones are Section 510 ’ s authorization for the attorney general to “ delegate ” his powers to others , and Section 515 ’ s authorization for him to make “ special ” appointments . )
But Attorney General Barr ’ s order does invoke the rest of the Justice Department ’ s special @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for the purposes of protecting Special Counsel Durham from day-to-day management by the attorney general .
For the next few weeks , the order will insulate Durham from Attorney General Barr—assuming he isn ’ t fired by President Trump—and then , more importantly , from Sally Yates , Lisa Monaco , or whomever Biden eventually appoints to succeed Barr .
In short , Attorney General Barr ’ s appointment of Durham tries to have it both ways : appointing a special counsel with the benefits of the DOJ regulations ’ protections , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ prerequisites .
Barr ’ s action is not without precedent .
As Charlie Savage observed in the New York Times , Robert Mueller was appointed special counsel in 2017 under similar circumstances .
His appointment satisfied the regulation ’ s requirement that he come from outside of government , but the investigation that he was appointed to lead violated another regulatory prerequisite : instead of being limited to a “ criminal investigation , ” it also included non-criminal national-security matters .
( Thus , when Mueller ’ s appointment was challenged by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the special counsel ’ s proponents emphasized that Mueller ’ s appointment involved only the DOJ regulations ’ provisions for independence and process , not their provisions for the appointment itself—just like Durham now . )
Indeed , that part of Attorney General Barr ’ s order appointing Special Counsel Durham is phrased in the very same words as Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein ’ s order appointing Special Counsel Mueller : giving the protections of the DOJ regulations , but not citing those regulations as the basis for the appointment itself .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a matter of law .
Can an attorney general wave off the regulatory protections that Barr gave to Durham , simply because Durham was not appointed pursuant to those same regulations ?
We won ’ t know until someone tries to oppose , constrain , or remove Durham .
But Mueller ’ s appointment , surrounded by the same legal questions , offers the same basic answer : The real point was to amplify the practical protections surrounding the special counsel , because any attorney general ( or president ) who attempted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protections would find himself embroiled in a significant legal debate ( with the risk of litigation ) that would exacerbate the political debates around the Justice Department , and the institutional debates within the Justice Department .
The first test of this question might come early in the Biden administration .
Each new presidential administration calls for the resignations of U.S. attorneys appointed by the last administration , and all but the most intractable ones comply .
Given that Durham remains the U.S. attorney for the District of Connecticut , the next attorney @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the general call for U.S. attorney resignations , hoping that Durham will follow the normal protocol and resign voluntarily , rendering the legal question moot .
If Durham refuses to join the other U.S. attorneys in resigning , then there will be many questions asked in the months to come : about whether he is staying within the defined scope of his investigation ; whether he is following the procedures for continuing or expanding his investigation ; and whether the attorney general is giving him the independence that Section 600.7 and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s experience is a guide , then Durham ’ s investigation will not be declared null and void simply because his new appointment as special counsel didn ’ t meet the requirements of Section 600.3 .
So this legal issue means much less than the Trump administration ’ s critics might hope .
But it also means much more .
This appointment is simply the latest example of one of the worst trends in modern government : an administration trying enjoy the benefits of making new appointments or new policies without actually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new appointments or policies should be made .
We have seen this most clearly in the Trump administration ’ s unprecedented propensity for appointing “ acting ” officers instead of enduring the trouble of appointing them with the Senate ’ s advice and consent .
As President Trump put it bluntly , “ I like acting [ officers ] .
It gives me more flexibility .
Do you understand that ?
I like acting.
” The flexibility to hire and fire comes at a cost—less credibility and political capital for cabinet secretaries and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and a greater risk that courts will nullify actions taken by an acting director who was not properly appointed , as a federal court recently did to the Department of Homeland Security under Acting Secretary Chad Wolf .
Alexander Hamilton knew from the start that Senate confirmation of officers was indispensable ; more recently Clarence Thomas suggested that acting officers are simply unconstitutional .
But even if the new trend toward regular reliance upon acting officers is not unconstitutional , it exemplifies the problem of administrations trying to wield power while shortchanging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wield it .
But the problem of personnel is dwarfed by the problem of policymaking .
For virtually all new policies of any consequence , presidents eschew Congress for the administrative state .
Instead of committing their proposals to the frustrations , compromises , and moderation of the legislative process , presidents much prefer to simply create new rules , through executive orders or agency regulations , with much simpler and unilateral processes .
While each administration will attempt to frame its new policy as simply the administration of decades-old statutes , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The actual legislative process , though more frustrating and limiting , produces laws that ( for the very same reasons ) are harder to undo ; by relying instead on the administrative process , presidents write policy into regulations for four or eight years , and hope that the next president will be stymied legally or politically from undoing them .
A similar problem exists in foreign policy , as presidents increasingly rely not on treaties with Senate approval , but on executive agreements that purport to accomplish similar ends without the burdens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Accord exemplifies the trend : President Obama and his administration committed the nation to the accord without the formality of an actual treaty , hoping that future administrations would be bound in practice , if not in law , to maintain the agreement despite the lack of Senate consent .
Though President Trump and his administration eagerly withdrew the nation from the accord , it is only a matter of time before the Biden administration returns us to it—presumably once again without seeking Senate consent , and once again hoping that future administrations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or diplomatically from exiting it .
This is no way to run a country ; it is the very opposite of the good , steady administration that Hamilton saw as the best proof of a good constitution .
Attorney General Barr wants to have his cake and eat it too .
And in the modern age of American governance , who doesn ’ t ?

In what might prove to be his last significant act as attorney general, William Barr appointed John Durham to be a special counsel, in order to continue the Trump administration’s investigation into the Obama administration even after Trump himself leaves office. Critics immediately recognized a legal glitch in Barr’s memo appointing Durham, but that glitch will not negate Durham’s appointment. In that respect, the glitch is less significant than it might seem. Yet, at the same time, it is also more significant than it seems.
When Attorney General Barr announced on Tuesday that he had, back in October, appointed Durham to be a special counsel, his memo vested Durham with extraordinary powers and independence from oversight as he continues his investigation into the Obama administration’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation of the 2016 Trump campaign. Barr made clear that Durham is also investigating “the investigation of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III.” And other language in the memo (“including, but not limited to”) suggests that Durham may investigate even more, too.
The Justice Department created the office of “special counsel” twenty years ago—following the 1999 expiration of the old independent counsel statute, under which Ken Starr’s wide-ranging investigation of Bill Clinton had been conducted—in order to create a mechanism for the Justice Department to investigate allegations of misconduct within the president’s own administration, without interference by the president’s attorney general. But Barr’s appointment of Durham is intended to do something quite different: to continue investigating the Obama administration, and with insulation against interference by the Biden administration. Not an act of self-restraint by President Trump’s Justice Department—indeed, the very opposite.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Commentators quickly recognized an apparent glitch in Barr’s memo. Under Section 600.3 of the Justice Department’s regulations, a special counsel “shall be selected from outside the United States Government.” Durham, of course, is not “outside” the U.S. government; he has been in the Justice Department since 1982; he was appointed by President Trump to be the U.S. Attorney for Connecticut in 2018; and from that office he has already been carrying out the Trump administration’s investigation of Crossfire Hurricane since May 2019.
But that legal technicality is much less significant than it appears, because Barr’s new order appointing Durham as a “special counsel” very carefully avoids invoking the DOJ’s regulations as authorizing this appointment in the first place. He sidesteps the regulatory provisions defining the kinds of cases suitable for a special counsel, and defining the qualifications of a special counsel (that is, Sections 600.1 through Sections 600.3); instead, Barr invokes separate legal authority for Durham’s new appointment: “the authority vested in the Attorney General, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515.” (Of that open-ended list of vague authorities, the most important ones are Section 510’s authorization for the attorney general to “delegate” his powers to others, and Section 515’s authorization for him to make “special” appointments.)
But Attorney General Barr’s order does invoke the rest of the Justice Department’s special counsel regulations, Sections 600.4 through 600.10, for the purposes of protecting Special Counsel Durham from day-to-day management by the attorney general. For the next few weeks, the order will insulate Durham from Attorney General Barr—assuming he isn’t fired by President Trump—and then, more importantly, from Sally Yates, Lisa Monaco, or whomever Biden eventually appoints to succeed Barr.
In short, Attorney General Barr’s appointment of Durham tries to have it both ways: appointing a special counsel with the benefits of the DOJ regulations’ protections, but without burdens of the DOJ regulations’ prerequisites.
Barr’s action is not without precedent. As Charlie Savage observed in the New York Times, Robert Mueller was appointed special counsel in 2017 under similar circumstances. His appointment satisfied the regulation’s requirement that he come from outside of government, but the investigation that he was appointed to lead violated another regulatory prerequisite: instead of being limited to a “criminal investigation,” it also included non-criminal national-security matters. (Thus, when Mueller’s appointment was challenged by Paul Manafort and others, some of the special counsel’s proponents emphasized that Mueller’s appointment involved only the DOJ regulations’ provisions for independence and process, not their provisions for the appointment itself—just like Durham now.) Indeed, that part of Attorney General Barr’s order appointing Special Counsel Durham is phrased in the very same words as Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s order appointing Special Counsel Mueller: giving the protections of the DOJ regulations, but not citing those regulations as the basis for the appointment itself.
It’s unclear what this means as a matter of law. Can an attorney general wave off the regulatory protections that Barr gave to Durham, simply because Durham was not appointed pursuant to those same regulations? We won’t know until someone tries to oppose, constrain, or remove Durham. But Mueller’s appointment, surrounded by the same legal questions, offers the same basic answer: The real point was to amplify the practical protections surrounding the special counsel, because any attorney general (or president) who attempted to negate the special counsel’s protections would find himself embroiled in a significant legal debate (with the risk of litigation) that would exacerbate the political debates around the Justice Department, and the institutional debates within the Justice Department.
The first test of this question might come early in the Biden administration. Each new presidential administration calls for the resignations of U.S. attorneys appointed by the last administration, and all but the most intractable ones comply. Given that Durham remains the U.S. attorney for the District of Connecticut, the next attorney general could choose not to exempt him from the general call for U.S. attorney resignations, hoping that Durham will follow the normal protocol and resign voluntarily, rendering the legal question moot. If Durham refuses to join the other U.S. attorneys in resigning, then there will be many questions asked in the months to come: about whether he is staying within the defined scope of his investigation; whether he is following the procedures for continuing or expanding his investigation; and whether the attorney general is giving him the independence that Section 600.7 and the other regulations provide. But if Mueller’s experience is a guide, then Durham’s investigation will not be declared null and void simply because his new appointment as special counsel didn’t meet the requirements of Section 600.3.
So this legal issue means much less than the Trump administration’s critics might hope. But it also means much more. This appointment is simply the latest example of one of the worst trends in modern government: an administration trying enjoy the benefits of making new appointments or new policies without actually going through the processes by which those new appointments or policies should be made.
We have seen this most clearly in the Trump administration’s unprecedented propensity for appointing “acting” officers instead of enduring the trouble of appointing them with the Senate’s advice and consent. As President Trump put it bluntly, “I like acting [officers]. It gives me more flexibility. Do you understand that? I like acting.” The flexibility to hire and fire comes at a cost—less credibility and political capital for cabinet secretaries and others who did not receive Senate approval, and a greater risk that courts will nullify actions taken by an acting director who was not properly appointed, as a federal court recently did to the Department of Homeland Security under Acting Secretary Chad Wolf. Alexander Hamilton knew from the start that Senate confirmation of officers was indispensable; more recently Clarence Thomas suggested that acting officers are simply unconstitutional. But even if the new trend toward regular reliance upon acting officers is not unconstitutional, it exemplifies the problem of administrations trying to wield power while shortchanging the proper process for appointing people to wield it.
But the problem of personnel is dwarfed by the problem of policymaking. For virtually all new policies of any consequence, presidents eschew Congress for the administrative state. Instead of committing their proposals to the frustrations, compromises, and moderation of the legislative process, presidents much prefer to simply create new rules, through executive orders or agency regulations, with much simpler and unilateral processes. While each administration will attempt to frame its new policy as simply the administration of decades-old statutes, they are in substance legislating without Congress. The actual legislative process, though more frustrating and limiting, produces laws that (for the very same reasons) are harder to undo; by relying instead on the administrative process, presidents write policy into regulations for four or eight years, and hope that the next president will be stymied legally or politically from undoing them.
A similar problem exists in foreign policy, as presidents increasingly rely not on treaties with Senate approval, but on executive agreements that purport to accomplish similar ends without the burdens of Senate approval. The Paris Climate Accord exemplifies the trend: President Obama and his administration committed the nation to the accord without the formality of an actual treaty, hoping that future administrations would be bound in practice, if not in law, to maintain the agreement despite the lack of Senate consent. Though President Trump and his administration eagerly withdrew the nation from the accord, it is only a matter of time before the Biden administration returns us to it—presumably once again without seeking Senate consent, and once again hoping that future administrations will be prevented legally, politically, or diplomatically from exiting it.
This is no way to run a country; it is the very opposite of the good, steady administration that Hamilton saw as the best proof of a good constitution. Attorney General Barr wants to have his cake and eat it too. And in the modern age of American governance, who doesn’t?


thebulwark--2020-12-03--The Trump Pardon Spree

The Trump Pardon Spree

Donald J. Trump is trashing even more of the Constitution on his way out the door .
This time , it ’ s Article II ’ s pardon power .
No surprise there : Trump has long shown his eagerness to pardon his cronies .
His pardon spree began , controversially , with Joe Arpaio , the former sheriff of Arizona ’ s Maricopa County , who was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a court order directing him to halt his immigration roundup policy .
Trump pardoned Arpaio in 2017 .
This past July , Trump commuted the sentence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felony counts .
Most recently , Trump gave a sweeping pardon to his former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn , who pleaded guilty twice to making false statements to the FBI and is implicated in a number of other potential no-no ’ s , including secretly lobbying on behalf of Turkey .
Over the past couple of days , we learned that his “ lawyer ” Rudy Guiliani reportedly discussed a preemptive pardon with Trump ; that Trump has floated pardons of his three eldest children ; and that since August , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential pardon-for-pay bribery scheme that it inadvertently uncovered in conducting a sweep of materials obtained through an unrelated subpoena .
It would not be unreasonable to expect pardons of a slew of other Trump loyalists , including : • Paul Manafort , whom a jury convicted of tax and bank fraud ; • Steve Bannon , Trump ’ s former White House strategist who was arrested and charged with defrauding donors to a nonprofit supposedly involved in building the elusive southern border wall ; • Rick Gates , who worked with Manafort but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lying to federal agents and other crimes ; and • George Papadopoulos , a former foreign policy advisor on the 2016 Trump campaign , who also pleaded guilty to lying to investigators in connection with former Special Counsel Robert Mueller ’ s probe of Russian interference on Trump ’ s behalf in 2016 .
Politically tinged pardons are not new .
President Gerald Ford famously—or infamously—pardoned Richard Nixon in 1974 .
Newsweek correspondent Tom DeFrank later recounted , “ No one could believe it.
” Among a raft of pardons issued on his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pardoned his half-brother Roger Clinton , who had pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine .
In his last month in office , George H.W .
Bush pardoned six people in connection with the Reagan-era Iran-Contra scandal , including former secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger .
Special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh , who had investigated Iran-Contra , criticized the pardons as a fait accompli : “ In light of President Bush ’ s own misconduct , we are gravely concerned about his decision to pardon others who lied to Congress and obstructed official investigations.
” Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pardon spree , as well .
The difference is that he could cement a precedent that converts the pardon power into a presidential license to commit federal crimes while in office .
Although scholars mostly agree that the pardon power is vast and virtually limitless , there is no doubt that the Framers anticipated some measure of accountability for presidential crimes .
The problem is that , these days , the other means of holding presidents accountable—including formal processes like congressional investigations and oversight , impeachment , and possibly even indictments , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tarnished reputations—have become nullities .
Trump doesn ’ t care about his reputation—because he doesn ’ t have to .
No low is too low for him , for the Republican party , or for his millions of adoring supporters .
By acquitting Trump on abuse of power and obstruction of Congress without a trial , the Republican-controlled Senate handed over Congress ’ s oversight power to the presidency , effectively gutting the ability to engage in meaningful congressional scrutiny because presidents can now ignore subpoenas with impunity .
The Nixon- and Clinton-era @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lops off the judicial branch as a mechanism for holding criminals in the Oval Office accountable during their terms .
And although Senate Republicans pointed to elections as the proper method to address wrongdoing in the White House in the midst of the Ukrainian quid pro quo scandal , they are now largely in lockstep with Trump ’ s fraudulent claims of a fraudulent election , as well as his unprecedented legal assault on thousands of duly cast ballots .
Well , it ’ s conceivable that the U.S. Supreme Court might draw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pardon power .
Article II states that “ The President .
.
.
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States , except in Cases of Impeachment.
” Because the Framers rejected additional conditions—such as an exception for treason , for example—some scholars believe that no limit on this language would be constitutionally acceptable .
“ Shall ” means “ shall , ” in other words .
But that ’ s not how the word “ shall ” has been construed in other parts of the Constitution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of legislative power in the Congress ( presidents also make laws by executive order and through agency regulations , for example ) .
Moreover , in Knote v. United States , the Court in 1877 expressly confined the scope of the pardon power to exclude return of money paid to the U.S. Treasury as part of a criminal sentence .
Money can ’ t back come out of that pot without an act of Congress appropriating a payment .
“ However large , therefore , may be the power of pardon possessed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ and however extended may be its application , there is this limit to it , as there is to all his powers , —it can not touch moneys in the treasury of the United States , except expressly authorized by act of Congress .
The Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.
” Exhortations of an absolute pardon power are thus irrefutably overblown .
The wrinkle here , however , is—as Trump himself recently complained to Fox Business host Maria Bartiromo regarding Joe Biden ’ s election win , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get into the Supreme Court.
” Unless DOJ decides to prosecute a pardoned offender again , the propriety of a pardon is unlikely to reach the courts .
( One possible but highly unlikely exception is the Flynn pardon , which U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan still has pending before him on the government ’ s motion to dismiss the case due to the pardon . )
Even harder to fathom is litigation over a presidential self-pardon .
While it is possible to make a strong case that the pardon power does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that argument has not been tested in the courts , and a Biden administration is unlikely to spend precious political capital on prosecuting a former president , which is the only way the legitimacy of a self-pardon could get before a court .
America is left with only unappealing options : a constitutional amendment to the pardon power , which is virtually impossible to achieve , or reliance on voters to elect presidents who won ’ t abuse the power of the office in the wake of suspect pardons before their terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that “ there are strong reasons ” for invoking Congress as a check on the pardon power ( the Supreme Court has since held that Congress can not pass legislative restrictions ) .
But , he reasoned , Hamilton thus assumed that presidents would mostly do the right thing , and that additional checks are unnecessary .
Sadly , history has proven him wrong .

Donald J. Trump is trashing even more of the Constitution on his way out the door. This time, it’s Article II’s pardon power.
No surprise there: Trump has long shown his eagerness to pardon his cronies. His pardon spree began, controversially, with Joe Arpaio, the former sheriff of Arizona’s Maricopa County, who was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a court order directing him to halt his immigration roundup policy. Trump pardoned Arpaio in 2017. This past July, Trump commuted the sentence of his pal Roger Stone on seven felony counts. Most recently, Trump gave a sweeping pardon to his former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, who pleaded guilty twice to making false statements to the FBI and is implicated in a number of other potential no-no’s, including secretly lobbying on behalf of Turkey.
Over the past couple of days, we learned that his “lawyer” Rudy Guiliani reportedly discussed a preemptive pardon with Trump; that Trump has floated pardons of his three eldest children; and that since August, the Department of Justice has been investigating a potential pardon-for-pay bribery scheme that it inadvertently uncovered in conducting a sweep of materials obtained through an unrelated subpoena.
It would not be unreasonable to expect pardons of a slew of other Trump loyalists, including:
Paul Manafort, whom a jury convicted of tax and bank fraud;
Steve Bannon, Trump’s former White House strategist who was arrested and charged with defrauding donors to a nonprofit supposedly involved in building the elusive southern border wall;
Rick Gates, who worked with Manafort but cooperated with prosecutors after pleading guilty to lying to federal agents and other crimes; and
George Papadopoulos, a former foreign policy advisor on the 2016 Trump campaign, who also pleaded guilty to lying to investigators in connection with former Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s probe of Russian interference on Trump’s behalf in 2016.
Politically tinged pardons are not new. President Gerald Ford famously—or infamously—pardoned Richard Nixon in 1974. Newsweek correspondent Tom DeFrank later recounted, “No one could believe it.” Among a raft of pardons issued on his last day in office, Bill Clinton pardoned his half-brother Roger Clinton, who had pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine. In his last month in office, George H.W. Bush pardoned six people in connection with the Reagan-era Iran-Contra scandal, including former secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger. Special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, who had investigated Iran-Contra, criticized the pardons as a fait accompli: “In light of President Bush’s own misconduct, we are gravely concerned about his decision to pardon others who lied to Congress and obstructed official investigations.”
Trump is likely to get away with this pardon spree, as well. The difference is that he could cement a precedent that converts the pardon power into a presidential license to commit federal crimes while in office. Although scholars mostly agree that the pardon power is vast and virtually limitless, there is no doubt that the Framers anticipated some measure of accountability for presidential crimes. The problem is that, these days, the other means of holding presidents accountable—including formal processes like congressional investigations and oversight, impeachment, and possibly even indictments, and also informal processes like political backlash and tarnished reputations—have become nullities.
Trump doesn’t care about his reputation—because he doesn’t have to. No low is too low for him, for the Republican party, or for his millions of adoring supporters. By acquitting Trump on abuse of power and obstruction of Congress without a trial, the Republican-controlled Senate handed over Congress’s oversight power to the presidency, effectively gutting the ability to engage in meaningful congressional scrutiny because presidents can now ignore subpoenas with impunity. The Nixon- and Clinton-era internal DOJ policy against indicting sitting presidents lops off the judicial branch as a mechanism for holding criminals in the Oval Office accountable during their terms. And although Senate Republicans pointed to elections as the proper method to address wrongdoing in the White House in the midst of the Ukrainian quid pro quo scandal, they are now largely in lockstep with Trump’s fraudulent claims of a fraudulent election, as well as his unprecedented legal assault on thousands of duly cast ballots.
What’s a constitutional hawk to do?
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Well, it’s conceivable that the U.S. Supreme Court might draw a boundary when it comes to the pardon power. Article II states that “The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” Because the Framers rejected additional conditions—such as an exception for treason, for example—some scholars believe that no limit on this language would be constitutionally acceptable. “Shall” means “shall,” in other words. But that’s not how the word “shall” has been construed in other parts of the Constitution, including Article I’s lodging of legislative power in the Congress (presidents also make laws by executive order and through agency regulations, for example).
Moreover, in Knote v. United States, the Court in 1877 expressly confined the scope of the pardon power to exclude return of money paid to the U.S. Treasury as part of a criminal sentence. Money can’t back come out of that pot without an act of Congress appropriating a payment. “However large, therefore, may be the power of pardon possessed by the President,” the Court wrote, “and however extended may be its application, there is this limit to it, as there is to all his powers,—it cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress. The Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.”
Exhortations of an absolute pardon power are thus irrefutably overblown.
The wrinkle here, however, is—as Trump himself recently complained to Fox Business host Maria Bartiromo regarding Joe Biden’s election win, “The problem is it’s hard to get into the Supreme Court.” Unless DOJ decides to prosecute a pardoned offender again, the propriety of a pardon is unlikely to reach the courts. (One possible but highly unlikely exception is the Flynn pardon, which U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan still has pending before him on the government’s motion to dismiss the case due to the pardon.) Even harder to fathom is litigation over a presidential self-pardon. While it is possible to make a strong case that the pardon power does not extend to a president pardoning himself, that argument has not been tested in the courts, and a Biden administration is unlikely to spend precious political capital on prosecuting a former president, which is the only way the legitimacy of a self-pardon could get before a court.
America is left with only unappealing options: a constitutional amendment to the pardon power, which is virtually impossible to achieve, or reliance on voters to elect presidents who won’t abuse the power of the office in the wake of suspect pardons before their terms.
In Federalist No. 74, Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that “there are strong reasons” for invoking Congress as a check on the pardon power (the Supreme Court has since held that Congress cannot pass legislative restrictions). But, he reasoned,
there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever.
Hamilton thus assumed that presidents would mostly do the right thing, and that additional checks are unnecessary. Sadly, history has proven him wrong.


thebulwark--2020-12-03--The End of an Era—or the Beginning of One?

American politics—maybe all politics ?
—tends to feature generational waves : the Founding generation , the Civil War generation , the Greatest Generation , etc .
Obviously this categorization is something of a construct of observers and an artifact of historians , but it also captures something real .
Generational waves seem to characterize the American presidency .
Consider the last century or so .
Franklin Roosevelt was born in 1882 , Harry Truman in 1884 , and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1890 .
So for 28 years , we had presidents born within a decade of each other , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Great Depression .
Then came 1960 .
As was much noticed at the time , the John Kennedy-Richard Nixon race marked a pretty dramatic generational change .
Kennedy was born in 1917 , 27 years after Ike .
And he was followed by a host of near-contemporaries : Lyndon Johnson ( b .
1908 ) , Nixon ( b .
1913 ) , Gerald Ford ( b .
1913 ) , Jimmy Carter ( b .
1924 ) , Ronald Reagan ( b .
1911 ) , and George H. W. Bush ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War 2 generation populated the presidency for 32 years .
Then came the most recent generational change .
In 1992 Bill Clinton defeated George H.W .
Bush , over two decades older than Clinton .
Clinton was born in 1946—as was his successor George W. Bush , and as was Donald J. Trump .
Barack Obama is younger—born in 1961—but still a Baby Boomer .
Joe Biden is a bit older , born in 1942 , slightly pre-Boomer .
But let ’ s call this the Boomer presidential generation .
Assuming for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , its tenure will last 32 years as well .
So three generational waves have marked almost the whole of the last century .
In 2024 ( or possibly 2028 ) , we ’ ll see the next wave .
Kamala Harris , for one , is more than two decades younger than Joe Biden—and so are most of her likely competitors from both parties .
So 2024 will presumably be a 1960- or 1992-type moment .
Past generational presidential turnovers have marked pretty profound changes in politics more broadly .
Could the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party structure , in mode of governance ?
And what about the Biden presidency itself ?
Joe Biden will be the post-Trump , post-pandemic , post-development of a new media landscape , and post-all-kinds-of-other-big-changes president .
Will Biden simply mark the end of an era ?
Or could he be the harbinger of the next era ?
Or could he be the person who ushers it in ?
Biden has said he expects to be a transitional figure .
Will he preside over a transition that ends an era , or lays the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that I ’ m no longer such a loyal Republican , or even such a convinced conservative , perhaps I can quote Antonio Gramsci , from his prison notebooks : “ The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new can not be born.
” The old era of hyper-polarization , divisive demagoguery , policy paralysis , culture war , and everything else we see around us , does seem to be dying .
But could a new era be successfully birthed ?
Could America deal with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ old era and shaping a new one , one that renews the institutions of liberal democracy , that restores a decent civil life , that revives a healthy liberalism and creates a sound conservatism , that enables a new governing center in the midst of a reasonable and deliberative politics ?
One wouldn ’ t have expected Joe Biden to be the person who would succeed in providing an American answer—perhaps an exceptionally American answer ?
—to Gramsci ’ s challenge .
But history is full of surprises .
Perhaps the new can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distemper of the old .

American politics—maybe all politics?—tends to feature generational waves: the Founding generation, the Civil War generation, the Greatest Generation, etc. Obviously this categorization is something of a construct of observers and an artifact of historians, but it also captures something real.
Generational waves seem to characterize the American presidency. Consider the last century or so.
Franklin Roosevelt was born in 1882, Harry Truman in 1884, and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1890. So for 28 years, we had presidents born within a decade of each other, shaped by two world wars and the Great Depression.
Then came 1960. As was much noticed at the time, the John Kennedy-Richard Nixon race marked a pretty dramatic generational change. Kennedy was born in 1917, 27 years after Ike. And he was followed by a host of near-contemporaries: Lyndon Johnson (b. 1908), Nixon (b. 1913), Gerald Ford (b. 1913), Jimmy Carter (b. 1924), Ronald Reagan (b. 1911), and George H. W. Bush (b. 1924). This World War 2 generation populated the presidency for 32 years.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Then came the most recent generational change. In 1992 Bill Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush, over two decades older than Clinton. Clinton was born in 1946—as was his successor George W. Bush, and as was Donald J. Trump. Barack Obama is younger—born in 1961—but still a Baby Boomer. Joe Biden is a bit older, born in 1942, slightly pre-Boomer. But let’s call this the Boomer presidential generation. Assuming for the moment that Joe Biden serves one term, its tenure will last 32 years as well.
So three generational waves have marked almost the whole of the last century.
In 2024 (or possibly 2028), we’ll see the next wave. Kamala Harris, for one, is more than two decades younger than Joe Biden—and so are most of her likely competitors from both parties. So 2024 will presumably be a 1960- or 1992-type moment.
Past generational presidential turnovers have marked pretty profound changes in politics more broadly. Could the next one as well—in policy, in party structure, in mode of governance?
And what about the Biden presidency itself?
Joe Biden will be the post-Trump, post-pandemic, post-development of a new media landscape, and post-all-kinds-of-other-big-changes president. Will Biden simply mark the end of an era? Or could he be the harbinger of the next era? Or could he be the person who ushers it in? Biden has said he expects to be a transitional figure. Will he preside over a transition that ends an era, or lays the groundwork for a new one?
Now that I’m no longer such a loyal Republican, or even such a convinced conservative, perhaps I can quote Antonio Gramsci, from his prison notebooks: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.”
The old era of hyper-polarization, divisive demagoguery, policy paralysis, culture war, and everything else we see around us, does seem to be dying. But could a new era be successfully birthed? Could America deal with this crisis by peacefully ushering out the old era and shaping a new one, one that renews the institutions of liberal democracy, that restores a decent civil life, that revives a healthy liberalism and creates a sound conservatism, that enables a new governing center in the midst of a reasonable and deliberative politics?
One wouldn’t have expected Joe Biden to be the person who would succeed in providing an American answer—perhaps an exceptionally American answer?—to Gramsci’s challenge.
But history is full of surprises. Perhaps the new can be born out of the dysfunction and distemper of the old.


thebulwark--2020-12-03--Vaccines Don’t Protect People. Vaccination Does.

On Wednesday , the United Kingdom authorized the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine for distribution .
Here in America , both the Pfizer and the Moderna vaccines have applied to the FDA for Emergency Use Authorization .
Help is on the way .
But there is a mantra in medicine : Vaccines don ’ t protect us from disease—vaccination does .
And there are at least four important hurdles that vaccines are likely to encounter in the coming months .
The first step is ensuring a medicine is delivered wherever it ’ s going with its activity intact .
This is an important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pharmacies and is particularly important for the two COVID vaccines .
That ’ s because they both utilize a novel technology which generates immunity not by introducing either a killed or attenuated virus , but rather by introducing a strand of nucleic acid—mRNA—encapsulated by a soap-bubble-like membrane called a “ lipid nanoparticle ” ( see here ) .
Vaccines delivered in this way are exceptionally fragile and need to be kept extremely cold in order to preserve their activity .
In the case of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine , the product must travel and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ -70°C ( -94°F ) .
The Moderna vaccine requires transport and storage “ only ” at -20°C ( -4°F ) .
Meticulous planning is required to ensure these vaccines are maintained at suitable temperatures until they are just about ready to be deployed .
The requirements for the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine are a particular challenge since the special freezers are needed which are relatively unusual , especially outside of large hospitals and research centers .
Working out these details has required extensive planning , and it remains to be seen how well these plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of dosing can significantly impact a medicine ’ s effectiveness .
A huge advance in HIV treatment , for example , came not from a new biological discovery , but from dramatically simplifying the once-overwhelming treatment regimen .
( I wrote about this nearly two decades ago , and the dosing has improved significantly since then , too . )
The remarkable efficacy observed ( so far ) in the clinical trials with the Moderna and the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccines involved two doses , spaced several weeks apart ( 21 days for the Pfizer/BioNTech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s ) .
This raises a series of concerns : patients need to come in twice ; healthcare providers need a reliable way to keep track of who ’ s already received a dose , and when , and of which vaccine ( the two are not interchangeable ) .
The repeat dosing may not be a particular challenge for healthcare providers based at a particular hospital , but may be more difficult for professionals who work in a more temporary fashion at any one clinic .
Meanwhile long-term care facilities often have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appropriate dosing .
Potentially exacerbating the need for two doses is the observation of side effects already evident from the initial clinical trials .
According to recent comments from Moncef Slaoui , who spearheads the Operation Warp Speed initiative , “ significantly noticeable ” side effects were seen in 10 percent to 15 percent of study volunteers , and include injection site soreness and flu-like symptoms .
Consequently , it ’ s possible that some who receive the initial dose of a vaccination may be less inclined to receive the subsequent dose , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better than nothing .
Data reporting how much protection the second dose adds are not yet available .
A person ’ s decision to receive a medicine requires a belief that it ’ s likely to do more good than harm .
Lack of trust in childhood vaccinations—spurred in large measure by fraudulent , subsequently retracted reports that the vaccinations were associated with autism—has resulted in a dispiriting degree of what ’ s now termed “ vaccine hesitancy ” observed across the political spectrum .
And popular books playing up the idea that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ haven ’ t helped .
Because of this lack of trust , an estimated 42,000 adults and 300 children die annually in the U.S. from vaccine-preventable illness .
On top of existing anxieties about vaccines we can now layer on the trust issues associated with our current partisan era .
Some people who oppose Donald Trump may worry about the safety of a vaccine developed during Trump ’ s administration .
And some who support Donald Trump may be suspicious of a vaccine distributed by a government run by the other party .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vaccination-related conspiracies are also common on QAnon and Trump himself was once a vaccine-skeptic .
And those are just the unreasonable concerns .
Some concerns may be reasonable .
I suspect that most front-line healthcare providers caring for COVID-19 patients will be eager to receive the vaccination .
But it wouldn ’ t surprise me if some physicians , particularly those at lower immediate risk , are likely to worry about the paucity of long-term safety data on the new vaccines .
The pandemic has occasioned a national crash-course in the complexities of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fitting that we are now poised to learn about the importance , and the challenge , of translating even the most promising clinical trial data into real world impact .

On Wednesday, the United Kingdom authorized the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine for distribution. Here in America, both the Pfizer and the Moderna vaccines have applied to the FDA for Emergency Use Authorization. Help is on the way.
But there is a mantra in medicine: Vaccines don’t protect us from disease—vaccination does. And there are at least four important hurdles that vaccines are likely to encounter in the coming months.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Logistics
The first step is ensuring a medicine is delivered wherever it’s going with its activity intact. This is an important consideration even for pills delivered to neighborhood pharmacies and is particularly important for the two COVID vaccines.
That’s because they both utilize a novel technology which generates immunity not by introducing either a killed or attenuated virus, but rather by introducing a strand of nucleic acid—mRNA—encapsulated by a soap-bubble-like membrane called a “lipid nanoparticle” (see here).
Vaccines delivered in this way are exceptionally fragile and need to be kept extremely cold in order to preserve their activity. In the case of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine, the product must travel and be stored under unusually cold conditions: -70°C (-94°F). The Moderna vaccine requires transport and storage “only” at -20°C (-4°F).
Meticulous planning is required to ensure these vaccines are maintained at suitable temperatures until they are just about ready to be deployed.
The requirements for the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine are a particular challenge since the special freezers are needed which are relatively unusual, especially outside of large hospitals and research centers.
Working out these details has required extensive planning, and it remains to be seen how well these plans will translate into practice.
Dosing
The frequency of dosing can significantly impact a medicine’s effectiveness. A huge advance in HIV treatment, for example, came not from a new biological discovery, but from dramatically simplifying the once-overwhelming treatment regimen. (I wrote about this nearly two decades ago, and the dosing has improved significantly since then, too.)
The remarkable efficacy observed (so far) in the clinical trials with the Moderna and the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccines involved two doses, spaced several weeks apart (21 days for the Pfizer/BioNTech product, 28 days for Moderna’s).
This raises a series of concerns: patients need to come in twice; healthcare providers need a reliable way to keep track of who’s already received a dose, and when, and of which vaccine (the two are not interchangeable).
The repeat dosing may not be a particular challenge for healthcare providers based at a particular hospital, but may be more difficult for professionals who work in a more temporary fashion at any one clinic. Meanwhile long-term care facilities often have relatively high turnover, which could complicate appropriate dosing.
Side Effects
Potentially exacerbating the need for two doses is the observation of side effects already evident from the initial clinical trials. According to recent comments from Moncef Slaoui, who spearheads the Operation Warp Speed initiative, “significantly noticeable” side effects were seen in 10 percent to 15 percent of study volunteers, and include injection site soreness and flu-like symptoms.
Consequently, it’s possible that some who receive the initial dose of a vaccination may be less inclined to receive the subsequent dose, rationalizing that what they already have is better than nothing.
Data reporting how much protection the second dose adds are not yet available.
Trust
A person’s decision to receive a medicine requires a belief that it’s likely to do more good than harm.
Lack of trust in childhood vaccinations—spurred in large measure by fraudulent, subsequently retracted reports that the vaccinations were associated with autism—has resulted in a dispiriting degree of what’s now termed “vaccine hesitancy”observed across the political spectrum. And popular books playing up the idea that vaccines aren’t “natural” haven’t helped. Because of this lack of trust, an estimated 42,000 adults and 300 children die annually in the U.S. from vaccine-preventable illness.
On top of existing anxieties about vaccines we can now layer on the trust issues associated with our current partisan era. Some people who oppose Donald Trump may worry about the safety of a vaccine developed during Trump’s administration. And some who support Donald Trump may be suspicious of a vaccine distributed by a government run by the other party. This is not a fanciful concern. Vaccination-related conspiracies are also common on QAnon and Trump himself was once a vaccine-skeptic.
And those are just the unreasonable concerns. Some concerns may be reasonable. I suspect that most front-line healthcare providers caring for COVID-19 patients will be eager to receive the vaccination. But it wouldn’t surprise me if some physicians, particularly those at lower immediate risk, are likely to worry about the paucity of long-term safety data on the new vaccines.
The pandemic has occasioned a national crash-course in the complexities of medical product development; it seems only fitting that we are now poised to learn about the importance, and the challenge, of translating even the most promising clinical trial data into real world impact.


thebulwark--2020-12-04--Moving Films to VOD Can’t Make Up the Revenue the Traditional Theatrical Model Generates

Recently , I described what I thought a world without movie theaters would look like .
One of the first things I predicted that would happen is that the production budgets for movies—even the biggest ones—would be significantly reduced .
Without a worldwide theatrical release to boost the film ’ s awareness and , maybe more importantly , its perceived value , films would make less money across their entire lifespan .
Studio movies are expensive and if they can ’ t recoup their value , the only way to keep making them is to make them cost less .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Comcast/Universal reached their second agreement with a theater chain to shorten the window from theatrical to other video streams .
This differs slightly from their first agreement in that it allows three paths for movies depending on how large their opening weekend is .
If a film grosses more than $ 50 million in its first weekend , Universal can get 30 days ( instead of 17 days ) of an exclusive theatrical window before putting the film up on digital platforms and DVD/Blu Ray .
Essentially , Universal wants a path for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weekends in theaters before the transactional window .
While Universal is still providing a third option of letting a movie play through the traditional 90 window if they want , the mere fact that they are considering giving even their biggest films a shortened window is concerning to me .
Even if a movie makes most of its theatrical revenue in that 17 to 30 day time frame—opening weekend grosses account for 44 percent on average , while the first month usually accounts for 86 percent—I believe the importance of the exclusive theatrical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theaters and digital or DVD/Blu-ray .
How will the average moviegoer react if they know they only have to wait weeks to watch a movie at home rather than months ?
Will 30 days be enough to protect the theaters ?
I don ’ t believe so .
I would like to have at least a 45 or 60 day window .
I agree 90 days doesn ’ t make sense anymore , but just assuming you can still do the same theatrical business with the windowing Universal has settled on is foolhardy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sizable audience will no longer be motivated by theatrical exclusivity and will just watch even the biggest movies at home .
While there will be some theatrical business left , the outcome will be similar to the fate I posited in my piece about the death of theaters .
Fewer dollars made at the box office will mean smaller budgets for movies as non-theatrical revenue will never replace the dollars or profits studios and smaller distributors make now with a theatrically driven business model .
The best way to show this is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are coming out now with the shortened window and movies that came out prior to the pandemic .
To be sure , I will be making a few assumptions here based on the hundreds of actual profit and loss statements I ’ ve worked on in the decades of being in the entertainment business .
If you ’ re reading this and you know any errors I ’ ve made in my assumptions , I welcome that correction and I ask you to make the numbers as public and transparent as you can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as possible .
The main assumptions I ’ ll be making are : • Movies opening now have a smaller possible audience as most moviegoers will not return to theaters until there is a vaccine widely distributed .
• Movies released with a short window will make less box office because some consumers will now wait to see the movie on VOD since they only have to wait 17 or 30 days .
• Domestic VOD revenue—which normally is projected to be about 50 % of a film ’ s domestic box office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the audience shifts from theatrical to home viewing .
• Since box office will be less , marketing expenses will be less , but some of those savings will be used to place and promote the movie on VOD .
The other assumptions are standard industry multiples used to project revenues and costs off a movie ’ s domestic box office .
How these multiples change over time as the industry shifts to a shorter window and less dependent on domestic box office is anyone ’ s guess .
Will international box @ @ @ @ @ @ @ usage finally catch up with domestic VOD ?
Eventually , you have to think so , although how and when , I just don ’ t know .
Since these assumptions are not educated guesses , I ’ m going to save them for another time .
What I ’ ve done here is compare a historical release ( Happy Death Day 2U ) with the 11/13 release of Freaky—only I did the math so I could adjust its actual box office to a box office with audiences going as they did prior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that forecast by 33 % to account for the audience that will now wait to see the film on VOD .
I believe a loss of 33 % is generous as it ’ s likely to be a great deal more for a movie that ’ s not a four-quad release like Freaky .
For our purpose here , I want to be conservative with this estimate .
I picked these movies because they are • Written and directed by the same person ( Christopher Landon ) • Produced and distributed by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • Made for similar audiences ( genre , slightly female and slightly caucausian ) .
Since Freaky is R and Happy Death Day 2U is PG13 , the age audience won ’ t line up , but I don ’ t believe that affects this analysis .
Finally , it ’ s worth noting that the deal between Blumhouse and Universal is complicated in terms of how they split the revenue that the movie earns , so for the purposes here , I am treating the film as if Universal owns the film @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this in mind , here are numbers : Even with a four-fold increase in the VOD number , Freaky not only grosses less than Happy Death Day 2U , it also profits less and therefore , has a tighter margin .
Freaky would have to do EIGHTEEN TIMES what is now normally expected for VOD—or over $ 110m on VOD—to match the same profit as Happy Death Day 2U .
I don ’ t believe Universal will spend the dollars needed ( over $ 40m ) to get to that VOD number , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the threshold would be for the movie to be as profitable as Happy Death Day 2U was .
My point , hopefully , is obvious : a collapsed VOD window will generate fewer dollars and less profit for a movie like Freaky .
While Freaky is not on the same level as Universal ’ s Fast and Furious movies , the result there will still be the same : less revenue and less profit .
That means smaller production budgets on everything , from movies that cost $ 200 million to movies that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ m not even taking the Wonder Woman 1984 situation into consideration , as that is a different tragedy given that Warner Bros is flushing dollars down the toilet with a film that before the pandemic hit , I thought would have been 2020 ’ s biggest grosser .
The 17-to-30-day window is just too short .
While theaters are still getting an exclusive window , it ’ s not a big enough buffer to motivate movie-goers not to wait for that exclusivity to end .
A vaccine arriving next year is great , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AMC and Cinemark bending to Universal ’ s will and granting a window that will ultimately negatively affect them and change the way movies are made forever .

Recently, I described what I thought a world without movie theaters would look like. One of the first things I predicted that would happen is that the production budgets for movies—even the biggest ones—would be significantly reduced. Without a worldwide theatrical release to boost the film’s awareness and, maybe more importantly, its perceived value, films would make less money across their entire lifespan. Studio movies are expensive and if they can’t recoup their value, the only way to keep making them is to make them cost less.
Since the publication of that piece, Comcast/Universal reached their second agreement with a theater chain to shorten the window from theatrical to other video streams. This differs slightly from their first agreement in that it allows three paths for movies depending on how large their opening weekend is. If a film grosses more than $50 million in its first weekend, Universal can get 30 days (instead of 17 days) of an exclusive theatrical window before putting the film up on digital platforms and DVD/Blu Ray. Essentially, Universal wants a path for their biggest movies to get two more weekends in theaters before the transactional window.
While Universal is still providing a third option of letting a movie play through the traditional 90 window if they want, the mere fact that they are considering giving even their biggest films a shortened window is concerning to me. Even if a movie makes most of its theatrical revenue in that 17 to 30 day time frame—opening weekend grosses account for 44 percent on average, while the first month usually accounts for 86 percent—I believe the importance of the exclusive theatrical window is the buffer it provides between theaters and digital or DVD/Blu-ray. How will the average moviegoer react if they know they only have to wait weeks to watch a movie at home rather than months? Will 30 days be enough to protect the theaters? I don’t believe so. I would like to have at least a 45 or 60 day window. I agree 90 days doesn’t make sense anymore, but just assuming you can still do the same theatrical business with the windowing Universal has settled on is foolhardy.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Without having a strong buffer, a sizable audience will no longer be motivated by theatrical exclusivity and will just watch even the biggest movies at home. While there will be some theatrical business left, the outcome will be similar to the fate I posited in my piece about the death of theaters. Fewer dollars made at the box office will mean smaller budgets for movies as non-theatrical revenue will never replace the dollars or profits studios and smaller distributors make now with a theatrically driven business model. The best way to show this is by doing a comparison between movies that are coming out now with the shortened window and movies that came out prior to the pandemic.
To be sure, I will be making a few assumptions here based on the hundreds of actual profit and loss statements I’ve worked on in the decades of being in the entertainment business. If you’re reading this and you know any errors I’ve made in my assumptions, I welcome that correction and I ask you to make the numbers as public and transparent as you can so this conversation can be as accurate as possible. The main assumptions I’ll be making are:
Movies opening now have a smaller possible audience as most moviegoers will not return to theaters until there is a vaccine widely distributed. Movies released with a short window will make less box office because some consumers will now wait to see the movie on VOD since they only have to wait 17 or 30 days. Domestic VOD revenue—which normally is projected to be about 50% of a film’s domestic box office gross—will be much higher as some percent of the audience shifts from theatrical to home viewing. Since box office will be less, marketing expenses will be less, but some of those savings will be used to place and promote the movie on VOD.
The other assumptions are standard industry multiples used to project revenues and costs off a movie’s domestic box office. How these multiples change over time as the industry shifts to a shorter window and less dependent on domestic box office is anyone’s guess. Will international box office take off? Will international VOD usage finally catch up with domestic VOD? Eventually, you have to think so, although how and when, I just don’t know. Since these assumptions are not educated guesses, I’m going to save them for another time.
What I’ve done here is compare a historical release (Happy Death Day 2U) with the 11/13 release of Freaky—only I did the math so I could adjust its actual box office to a box office with audiences going as they did prior to the pandemic. I then reduced that forecast by 33% to account for the audience that will now wait to see the film on VOD. I believe a loss of 33% is generous as it’s likely to be a great deal more for a movie that’s not a four-quad release like Freaky. For our purpose here, I want to be conservative with this estimate.
I picked these movies because they are
Written and directed by the same person (Christopher Landon) Produced and distributed by the same companies (Blumhouse and Universal) Made for similar audiences (genre, slightly female and slightly caucausian). Since Freaky is R and Happy Death Day 2U is PG13, the age audience won’t line up, but I don’t believe that affects this analysis.
Finally, it’s worth noting that the deal between Blumhouse and Universal is complicated in terms of how they split the revenue that the movie earns, so for the purposes here, I am treating the film as if Universal owns the film and retains all the dollars. With this in mind, here are numbers:
Even with a four-fold increase in the VOD number, Freaky not only grosses less than Happy Death Day 2U, it also profits less and therefore, has a tighter margin. Freaky would have to do EIGHTEEN TIMES what is now normally expected for VOD—or over $110m on VOD—to match the same profit as Happy Death Day 2U. I don’t believe Universal will spend the dollars needed (over $40m) to get to that VOD number, but I wanted us to see what the threshold would be for the movie to be as profitable as Happy Death Day 2U was.
My point, hopefully, is obvious: a collapsed VOD window will generate fewer dollars and less profit for a movie like Freaky. While Freaky is not on the same level as Universal’s Fast and Furious movies, the result there will still be the same: less revenue and less profit. That means smaller production budgets on everything, from movies that cost $200 million to movies that cost $2 million. I’m not even taking the Wonder Woman 1984 situation into consideration, as that is a different tragedy given that Warner Bros is flushing dollars down the toilet with a film that before the pandemic hit, I thought would have been 2020’s biggest grosser.
The 17-to-30-day window is just too short. While theaters are still getting an exclusive window, it’s not a big enough buffer to motivate movie-goers not to wait for that exclusivity to end. A vaccine arriving next year is great, but exhibitors now have to deal with AMC and Cinemark bending to Universal’s will and granting a window that will ultimately negatively affect them and change the way movies are made forever.


thebulwark--2020-12-04--They’re Fine With It

They’re Fine With It

Why aren ’ t more Republicans standing up and speaking out about Donald Trump ’ s reprehensible acts ?
It ’ s the eternal question of the Trump era and one that ’ s been renewed this week after GOP officials in Georgia made public pleas to Republicans to rein in the president ’ s dangerous election conspiracies .
After four long years , it ’ s finally time to stop parsing the motivations behind their collective silence and say what the real answer is , which is almost too scary to admit .
They ’ re fine with it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grim circumstances of our current reality .
The overwhelming majority of Republicans voted for Trump in 2020 .
Even after witnessing his escalating threats of violence and direct attacks on our democratic system .
Take your pick of the worst events of the Trump presidency .
Charlottesville , Lafayette Square , kids in cages , Trump ’ s egging on of militiamen , pipe bombers , mass shooters , and vigilantes .
None of it led to a significant break between Trump and elected Republicans .
Sure , sometimes someone like Mitt Romney @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he and the others like him who occasionally chime in are outliers .
Far-out outliers .
The only times we ’ ve heard real , vigorous pushback against Trump have been when Republicans found themselves suffering the unpleasant consequences of their party ’ s decision to cultivate a rabid , unhinged base .
Which brings us to Georgia .
There , two Republican elections officials are speaking out against Trump for the looney conspiracy theories he ’ s pushing about how the election was supposedly stolen from him .
But , one has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anything if they weren ’ t the ones being targeted ?
You see , I remember Trump calling lots of other Americans “ an enemy of the people ” and putting them in danger before he attached that label to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensberger .
For some reason , though , it didn ’ t matter to Raffensberger until it happened to him .
In an op-ed lamenting the attacks from Trump and his allies , Raffensberger said the “ smooth election ” should “ be something for Georgians to celebrate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or lost .
For those wondering , mine lost—my family voted for him , donated to him and are now being thrown under the bus by him.
” Meaning everything was fine before Raffensberger faced with the rough end of the conspiracy stick .
He voted for Trump but didn ’ t like it when Trumpism collided directly into his life .
All that other bad stuff didn ’ t matter .
Likewise for Raffensberger ’ s colleague , elections administrator Gabriel Sterling .
A fellow Republican , Sterling held a solo press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Millions of people watched the video of him bemoaning the fact that a young technician involved in the Georgia recount had received death threats , and that Sterling himself and Raffensberger now require police protection .
“ Someone ’ s going to get hurt , someone ’ s going to get shot , someone ’ s going to get killed , and it ’ s not right , ” he warned .
He blasted Trump campaign lawyer and former U.S. Attorney Joe diGenova for calling for the execution of Chris Krebs , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump .
Many more election workers are reporting threats , too .
Sterling begged the GOP to put an end to it all .
“ It has to stop , ” he said .
“ Mr .
President , you have not condemned these actions or this language .
Senators , you have not condemned this language or these actions .
This has to stop .
We need you to step up.
” Sterling added , “ I ’ m talking about Sen. David Perdue and Sen. Kelly Loeffler , two people whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to step up.
” Except they haven ’ t , and most likely won ’ t .
Perdue and Loeffler , who are competing in January run-off elections that will determine the balance of power in the Senate , are both all in on Trump ’ s rigged-election claims , perpetuating the very nonsense that is putting people ’ s lives in danger .
Perdue and Loeffler have called for Raffensberger to step down , citing unnamed “ failures ” in the Georgia presidential election counts .
Under pressure to respond to Sterling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they issued the most basic , boilerplate statements imaginable .
In nearly the same breath , Perdue said , “ We won ’ t apologize for addressing the obvious issues with the way our state conducts its elections.
” What are those “ issues ” ?
Perdue never said .
It ’ s whatever Trump and his supporters believe they are .
Whatever happens to people like Krebs , Raffensberg , and Sterling because of it , oh well .
Because what are a few death threats , even among supposed GOP friends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reclaiming political power ?
Deep down , Sterling is too .
Just as long as it isn ’ t affecting him .

Why aren’t more Republicans standing up and speaking out about Donald Trump’s reprehensible acts? It’s the eternal question of the Trump era and one that’s been renewed this week after GOP officials in Georgia made public pleas to Republicans to rein in the president’s dangerous election conspiracies.
After four long years, it’s finally time to stop parsing the motivations behind their collective silence and say what the real answer is, which is almost too scary to admit.
They’re fine with it. All of it.
Really.
Ponder the grim circumstances of our current reality.
The overwhelming majority of Republicans voted for Trump in 2020. Even after witnessing his escalating threats of violence and direct attacks on our democratic system.
Take your pick of the worst events of the Trump presidency. Charlottesville, Lafayette Square, kids in cages, Trump’s egging on of militiamen, pipe bombers, mass shooters, and vigilantes. None of it led to a significant break between Trump and elected Republicans.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Sure, sometimes someone like Mitt Romney makes a statement—but the point is that he and the others like him who occasionally chime in are outliers. Far-out outliers.
The only times we’ve heard real, vigorous pushback against Trump have been when Republicans found themselves suffering the unpleasant consequences of their party’s decision to cultivate a rabid, unhinged base.
Which brings us to Georgia.
There, two Republican elections officials are speaking out against Trump for the looney conspiracy theories he’s pushing about how the election was supposedly stolen from him. But, one has to ask, would they be saying anything if they weren’t the ones being targeted?
Therein lies the problem.
You see, I remember Trump calling lots of other Americans “an enemy of the people” and putting them in danger before he attached that label to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. For some reason, though, it didn’t matter to Raffensperger until it happened to him.
In an op-ed lamenting the attacks from Trump and his allies, Raffensperger said the “smooth election” should “be something for Georgians to celebrate, whether their favored presidential candidate won or lost. For those wondering, mine lost—my family voted for him, donated to him and are now being thrown under the bus by him.”
Meaning everything was fine before Raffensperger faced with the rough end of the conspiracy stick. He voted for Trump but didn’t like it when Trumpism collided directly into his life. All that other bad stuff didn’t matter.
Likewise for Raffensperger’s colleague, elections administrator Gabriel Sterling. A fellow Republican, Sterling held a solo press conference that went viral on Tuesday. Millions of people watched the video of him bemoaning the fact that a young technician involved in the Georgia recount had received death threats, and that Sterling himself and Raffensperger now require police protection.
“Someone’s going to get hurt, someone’s going to get shot, someone’s going to get killed, and it’s not right,” he warned. He blasted Trump campaign lawyer and former U.S. Attorney Joe diGenova for calling for the execution of Chris Krebs, the federal elections cybersecurity chief recently fired by Trump. Many more election workers are reporting threats, too.
Sterling begged the GOP to put an end to it all. “It has to stop,” he said. “Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this language. Senators, you have not condemned this language or these actions. This has to stop. We need you to step up.”
Sterling added, “I’m talking about Sen. David Perdue and Sen. Kelly Loeffler, two people whom I still support. But they need to step up.”
Except they haven’t, and most likely won’t.
Perdue and Loeffler, who are competing in January run-off elections that will determine the balance of power in the Senate, are both all in on Trump’s rigged-election claims, perpetuating the very nonsense that is putting people’s lives in danger.
Perdue and Loeffler have called for Raffensperger to step down, citing unnamed “failures” in the Georgia presidential election counts. Under pressure to respond to Sterling’s plea to condemn diGenova, they issued the most basic, boilerplate statements imaginable. In nearly the same breath, Perdue said, “We won’t apologize for addressing the obvious issues with the way our state conducts its elections.”
What are those “issues”? Perdue never said. It’s whatever Trump and his supporters believe they are. Whatever happens to people like Krebs, Raffensperger, and Sterling because of it, oh well.
Because what are a few death threats, even among supposed GOP friends, when it comes to retaining and reclaiming political power?
They’re fine with it.
Deep down, Sterling is too. Just as long as it isn’t affecting him.


thebulwark--2020-12-04--Michael Cohen on What Trump Wants Now

Michael Cohen on What Trump Wants Now

Michael Cohen , Trump ’ s former fixer , pinned that label on him and it has stuck .
Now , with less than seven weeks to go before he is escorted from the White House , Captain Chaos is trying his hardest to destroy the United States .
He is a dangerous con man and is all about the grift .
He probably doesn ’ t want to burn it all down , because that could damage his income—but he ’ s too incompetent and stupid to see that his actions risk that very outcome .
His latest speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transmitted on Wednesday via YouTube , Facebook , and Twitter , served as another trigger for his rabid , emotional base .
He began by saying , “ This may be the most important speech I ’ ve ever made ” before again spewing tepid conspiracy theories and lying incessantly about the election results .
But he wasn ’ t alone .
Wednesday in Michigan , Trump campaign attorney Rudy Giuliani asked state lawmakers to deliver the state ’ s 16 electoral votes to Donald Trump though he lost the election in that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Detroit Free Press , Dave Boucher said that when the four and a half hour hearing , commandeered by Giuliani , ended , “ The testimony did not show any evidence of widespread fraud.
” Democrats were indifferent to Giuliani ’ s pleas , and a Republican state representative , Steve Johnson , questioned why the Trump campaign did not request a recount of votes : “ Instead , what we hear is a lot of talk , a lot of thoughts , a lot of allegations .
But we had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a recount ] and the Trump campaign did not make that request.
” During the hearing , Melissa Carone , Trump ’ s “ star witness ” to supposed campaign irregularities in Michigan , made a series of baffling and ridiculous claims—including smuggling ballots inside food vans—that drew criticism from the assembled lawmakers .
They said she was “ not credible.
” Even Giuliani , the king of bad hair dye and forced theatrics tried to silence her to no avail .
Her critics say she ’ s a self-written Saturday Night Live @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the appropriate wig and glasses .
Thus Donald Trump ’ s continued efforts to win an election by hook or by crook that he couldn ’ t win at the ballot box are playing out like the cheap carnival sideshow we always knew Trump was .
He could never make the midway .
He will forever be relegated to the rigged games of ring toss , near where the carnies who guess your weight troll the easy marks and the ground is littered with the sticky remains of half-eaten cheap cotton candy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump cronies might receive pardons in his final lame-duck weeks , there is one name that never comes up : Michael Cohen .
After a dozen years as Trump ’ s lawyer and fixer , Cohen famously broke with his boss in 2018 .
He pleaded guilty to tax fraud , bank fraud , campaign finance violations , and lying to Congress .
He was sentenced to three years in federal prison , although because of the pandemic he was released this past May to serve out his sentence under house arrest .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ his presidency , Cohen told me this week that Trump is the ultimate grifter , and as many have speculated , merely wishes to whip his supporters into a frenzy .
“ I want him to leave and keep his mouth shut for the next four years , the guy is so ignorant and arrogant , ” Cohen said .
“ He billed himself as a builder and he ’ s done nothing .
He couldn ’ t even get an infrastructure bill passed.
” It is true wherever Trump and his minions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follow .
But these days Trump is limiting his exposure because he can not face the press , the truth , or any question that would challenge the warped , delusional view that he continues to sell to his base .
Cohen believes Trump has “ done the math ” and figures that , of his 72 million voters , he could successfully con about 20 million of them to continue donating money to him .
“ He ’ s very bright when it comes to figuring out angles and money , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ podcast Just Ask the Question .
“ But he knows he can ’ t go back to real estate and he knows he has to leave the White House in January .
But if he can get a large enough number of his supporters to send him money—then he ’ s set .
That ’ s what he wants.
” It is the collateral damage that Trump continues to inflict on the country in the last seven weeks of his demented administration that should have us all concerned .
The anger Trump displayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ translated to a wide variety of threats to those in the public who opposed him—entertainers , reporters , athletes—anyone who had a voice and questioned his legitimacy .
That faded after the first year—but has come back with a vengeance in the last few weeks .
Trump ’ s feverish , delusional , insane and perhaps seditious denial of his loss , coupled with his ability to twist people into a knot and partnered with idiots like Giuliani and most of the White House senior staff have produced an environment ripe for violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as it doesn ’ t get too violent .
He wants to protect his bottom line , but he ’ s never been able to contain the Frankenstein monster he ’ s created—triggered racists , sycophants and marginalized Americans who believe Trump has given them permission to access the very worst versions of themselves and threaten the world around them for perceived and often erroneous indiscretions .
So the irony is that Trump , in his frenzied delusional anger , is not only a hypocrite , but a vile , dangerous lunatic who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Will he face prosecution for federal or state crimes ?
Will he launch a new phase of a career in politics or the media ?
Or will he merely go away , financially and morally bankrupt , slinking into the night muttering to himself and wondering why everyone seems to despise him ?
“ I wish him nothing for Christmas , ” Cohen said .
“ Except what he deserves .
”

Donald Trump is Captain Chaos.
Michael Cohen, Trump’s former fixer, pinned that label on him and it has stuck.
Now, with less than seven weeks to go before he is escorted from the White House, Captain Chaos is still trampling norms and harming institutions. He is a dangerous con man and is all about the grift. He probably doesn’t want to burn it all down, because that could damage his income—but he’s too incompetent and stupid to see that his actions risk that very outcome.
His latest speech, recorded in the White House and transmitted on Wednesday via YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, served as another trigger for his rabid, emotional base. He began by saying, “This may be the most important speech I’ve ever made” before again spewing tepid conspiracy theories and lying incessantly about the election results.
But he wasn’t alone. Wednesday in Michigan, Trump campaign attorney Rudy Giuliani asked state lawmakers to deliver the state’s 16 electoral votes to Donald Trump though he lost the election in that state by 154,000 popular votes.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Reporting in the Detroit Free Press, Dave Boucher said that when the four and a half hour hearing, commandeered by Giuliani, ended, “The testimony did not show any evidence of widespread fraud.”
Democrats were indifferent to Giuliani’s pleas, and a Republican state representative, Steve Johnson, questioned why the Trump campaign did not request a recount of votes: “Instead, what we hear is a lot of talk, a lot of thoughts, a lot of allegations. But we had one opportunity to actually do this [a recount] and the Trump campaign did not make that request.”
During the hearing, Melissa Carone, Trump’s “star witness” to supposed campaign irregularities in Michigan, made a series of baffling and ridiculous claims—including smuggling ballots inside food vans—that drew criticism from the assembled lawmakers. They said she was “not credible.” Even Giuliani, the king of bad hair dye and forced theatrics, tried to silence her to no avail. Her critics say she’s a self-written Saturday Night Live sketch—all that is needed is Kate McKinnon in the appropriate wig and glasses.
Thus Donald Trump’s continued efforts to win an election by hook or by crook that he couldn’t win at the ballot box are playing out like the cheap carnival sideshow we always knew Trump was. He could never make the midway. He will forever be relegated to the rigged games of ring toss, near where the carnies who guess your weight troll the easy marks and the ground is littered with the sticky remains of half-eaten cheap cotton candy.
In all the talk about which Trump cronies might receive pardons in his final lame-duck weeks, there is one name that never comes up: Michael Cohen. After a dozen years as Trump’s lawyer and fixer, Cohen famously broke with his boss in 2018. He pleaded guilty to tax fraud, bank fraud, campaign finance violations, and lying to Congress. He was sentenced to three years in federal prison, although because of the pandemic he was released this past May to serve out his sentence under house arrest.
Reflecting on Trump and the end of his presidency, Cohen told me this week that Trump is the ultimate grifter and, as many have speculated, merely wishes to whip his supporters into a frenzy. “I want him to leave and keep his mouth shut for the next four years, the guy is so ignorant and arrogant,” Cohen said. “He billed himself as a builder and he’s done nothing. He couldn’t even get an infrastructure bill passed.”
It is true that wherever Trump and his minions go, chaos, corruption, and destruction follow.
But these days Trump is limiting his exposure because he cannot face the press, the truth, or any question that would challenge the warped, delusional view that he continues to sell to his base.
Cohen believes Trump has “done the math” and figures that, of his 74 million voters, he could successfully con about 20 million of them to continue donating money to him. “He’s very bright when it comes to figuring out angles and money,” Cohen explained in an interview for my podcast Just Ask the Question. “But he knows he can’t go back to real estate and he knows he has to leave the White House in January. But if he can get a large enough number of his supporters to send him money—then he’s set. That’s what he wants.”
It is the collateral damage that Trump continues to inflict on the country in the last seven weeks of his demented administration that should have us all concerned.
The anger that Trump displayed in his first few months in office translated to a wide variety of threats to those in the public who opposed him—entertainers, reporters, athletes: anyone who had a voice and questioned his legitimacy.
That faded after the first year—but has come back with a vengeance in the last few weeks.
Trump’s feverish, delusional, insane, and perhaps seditious denial of his loss, coupled with his ability to twist people into a knot and partnered with idiots like Giuliani and most of the White House senior staff have produced an environment ripe for violence.
Trump doesn’t care—as long as it doesn’t get too violent.
He wants to protect his bottom line, but he’s never been able to contain the Frankenstein monster he’s created—triggered racists, sycophants, and marginalized Americans who believe Trump has given them permission to access the very worst versions of themselves and threaten the world around them for perceived and often erroneous indiscretions.
So the irony is that Trump, in his frenzied delusional anger, is not only a hypocrite, but a vile, dangerous lunatic who threatens his own post-White House existence.
Will he face prosecution for federal or state crimes? Will he launch a new phase of a career in politics or the media? Or will he merely go away, financially and morally bankrupt, slinking into the night muttering to himself and wondering why everyone seems to despise him?
“I wish him nothing for Christmas,” Cohen said. “Except what he deserves.”