thebulwark--2020-10-26--Trump’s Legacy is COVID and QAnon

Trump’s Legacy is COVID and QAnon

On Saturday , President Donald J. Trump emerged from his West Palm Beach voting center , boasting he voted a “ straight Republican ticket.
” A “ straight Republican ticket ” in his congressional district—the Florida 21st—is one that includes House candidate Laura Loomer , a QAnon supporter who gained notoriety for being so bigoted that she became , according to herself , the “ most banned woman on the planet.
” From there , Trump jetted off on Air Force One to dance to the Village People ’ s “ YMCA ” at yet another rally amid the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Four years ago , it would have been impossible to imagine such a vignette—because before Trump became president , most people had no idea what a “ coronavirus ” was and QAnon didn ’ t yet exist .
Now , though , these hateful mental and physical plagues are inescapable .
They are dominant facts of our personal lives and our national politics .
This is America on Trump .
We have become a country where an entire party will go along thinking that anything that reflects poorly on Trump can be connected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ deep state , ” the regime behind the “ China virus , ” the Obama administration , or the Biden campaign .
Connecting the dots is so easy that any redpill addict can do it .
One of the main benefits of Trumpism is that it doesn ’ t require much intellectual work .
Loomer , a self-described “ proud Islamophobe ” who worked for InfoWars to recast various mass shootings as hoaxes , is hardly an outlier .
After she won her primary , Trump tweeted his support : “ You @ @ @ @ @ @ @ puppet !
” Loomer bragged that RNC Chair Ronna McDaniel phoned her to call her “ a political rock star and a change agent for the Republican party.
” Last month , Trump ’ s daughter-in-law and campaign surrogate Lara Trump campaigned alongside Loomer .
Loomer also has thoughts on COVID .
During a recent interview , Loomer said that she doesn ’ t believe that COVID is worse than the bird flu , doesn ’ t think that masks stop the spread of the coronavirus , and wouldn ’ t take a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ She called her opponent a “ self-hating Jew.
” ( Mind you , this was an interview with a mainstream news outlet—a local TV station—and not an obscure right-wing website . )
Even with Trump ’ s vote , Loomer isn ’ t likely to win her race : The Florida 21st is a blue district , and the one poll conducted to date shows Democratic incumbent Rep. Lois Frankel crushing Loomer among likely voters by 61 to 33 .
But another QAnon-turned-Trump-famous congressional candidate is all but certain to win on election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a safe Republican district , the Georgia 14th .
She is every bit the bigoted loon Loomer is but hasn ’ t managed to get herself banned from social media ( yet ) .
And let ’ s be clear : Trump is picking winners and losers .
The Washington Post reports that Trump privately told donors : “ There are a couple senators I can ’ t really get involved in .
I just can ’ t do it .
You lose your soul if you do .
I can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t want to help some of them.
” Those senators were unnamed , but you can guess they aren ’ t fluent in Q .
The Daily Beast found that the National Republican Congressional Committee sent the maximum donation to Greene ’ s campaign last month .
Georgia Senator Kelly Loeffler has been campaigning with Greene , and the two eagerly showcase their mutual support for one another on social media .
Keep in mind , Loeffler and Greene are candidates in a Republican stronghold state .
If anyone was looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics , this is it .
Trump ’ s instincts could be right , too : A recent poll found that more than one-third of Americans are open to the idea that Hollywood , government , and media elites “ are secretly engaging in large-scale child trafficking and abuse.
” If even a few Republican candidates can win by successfully courting the Q vote , it won ’ t take much for the GOP to officially rebrand as the GQP .
They ’ re much more than conspiracy curious at this point .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ How did this happen ?
Much faster and more easily than you think .
Once someone is willing to accept the idea that mass shootings at schools might be false-flag operations , the “ unlogic ” of conspiracies , as Charlotte Alter memorably put it , takes over .
The thrill of whataboutism is all-consuming .
To someone of this mindset , COVID isn ’ t a pandemic ; it ’ s a hoax—or a “ planDemic , ” as one Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate put it last month : To @ @ @ @ @ @ @ News , InfoWars , and the local Facebook Trump group , it ’ s entirely reasonable for the president to hold potential superspreader events , just as long as he calls them “ peaceful protests ” to mock those who protested police violence against blacks .
Two wrongs don ’ t make a right anymore ; they make a free pass .
It doesn ’ t matter that Trump booster Herman Cain died from coronavirus , that Trump surrogate and former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie spent a week in the hospital after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump got it and needed to be put on oxygen , airlifted to Walter Reed , and dosed with an experimental cocktail .
Nothing will stop President Trump , or any of his supporters , from enjoying their COVID joyride now !
You ’ d be shocked by how easy it is to make arguments when they aren ’ t bound by logic .
The president can say with a straight face that “ we ’ re rounding the turn ” on COVID , without caring whether that turn is curving down or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the performative art of pissing off the right people is the real point of these exercises , no matter how high the body count gets .
This is why someone such as South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem adopts Trump ’ s illogical talking points that testing only creates new cases as hospitals in her state are filling up , or that people shouldn ’ t be “ shamed into ” wearing a mask as her state breaks COVID records .
Noem is fully engaged in the kind of Trumpian magical thinking that leads @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less COVID ” is actually a good slogan and strategy so long as it makes Democrats ’ heads explode .
How brainwashed have people become ?
Here ’ s a sampling .
Although Christie stared down the barrel of a ventilator during his week-long hospitalization from COVID and emerged begging people to wear masks , he still won ’ t turn against the president who politicized wearing them in the first place .
Local officials in Minnesota knew that allowing Trump to hold one of his campaign events would pose a risk to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ antagonizing him if they turned the campaign away .
They chose to appease the president rather than protect the public .
Ohio ’ s lieutenant governor , Republican Jon Husted , pleaded with people to wear masks at a Trump rally in September—and was nearly booed off the stage .
At least five members of Vice President Mike Pence ’ s inner circle tested positive for COVID-19 over the weekend .
Anyone in their right mind would quarantine for 14 days—but Pence will still keep up his campaign appearances .
The White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worker , ” so CDC guidelines need not apply .
They ’ ve all learned the secret .
Facts and reason are not what Trump ’ s base wants to hear .
Don ’ t do anything to betray the Big Lie , or else you won ’ t have an audience anymore .
COVID is beside the point .
Such is the natural conclusion of Trumpism .
It ’ s a loyalty cult , where members risk coronavirus infection as a feat of strength .
The president of the United States himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyone wants in , they have to follow his lead .
COVID and QAnon will be Trump ’ s enduring legacy—a mass poisoning of the American body and mind .

On Saturday, President Donald J. Trump emerged from his West Palm Beach voting center, boasting he voted a “straight Republican ticket.” A “straight Republican ticket” in his congressional district—the Florida 21st—is one that includes House candidate Laura Loomer, a QAnon supporter who gained notoriety for being so bigoted that she became, according to herself, the “most banned woman on the planet.” From there, Trump jetted off on Air Force One to dance to the Village People’s “YMCA” at yet another rally amid the pandemic that has struck dead 225,000 Americans.
Four years ago, it would have been impossible to imagine such a vignette—because before Trump became president, most people had no idea what a “coronavirus” was and QAnon didn’t yet exist. Now, though, these hateful mental and physical plagues are inescapable. They are dominant facts of our personal lives and our national politics.
This is America on Trump.
We have become a country where an entire party will go along thinking that anything that reflects poorly on Trump can be connected to a shadowy enemy or evil cabal—the “deep state,” the regime behind the “China virus,” the Obama administration, or the Biden campaign. Connecting the dots is so easy that any redpill addict can do it. One of the main benefits of Trumpism is that it doesn’t require much intellectual work.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
Loomer, a self-described “proud Islamophobe” who worked for InfoWars to recast various mass shootings as hoaxes, is hardly an outlier. After she won her primary, Trump tweeted his support: “You have a great chance against a Pelosi puppet!” Loomer bragged that RNC Chair Ronna McDaniel phoned her to call her “a political rock star and a change agent for the Republican party.” Last month, Trump’s daughter-in-law and campaign surrogate Lara Trump campaigned alongside Loomer.
Loomer also has thoughts on COVID. During a recent interview, Loomer said that she doesn’t believe that COVID is worse than the bird flu, doesn’t think that masks stop the spread of the coronavirus, and wouldn’t take a vaccine when it’s available. She called her opponent a “self-hating Jew.” (Mind you, this was an interview with a mainstream news outlet—a local TV station—and not an obscure right-wing website.)
Even with Trump’s vote, Loomer isn’t likely to win her race: The Florida 21st is a blue district, and the one poll conducted to date shows Democratic incumbent Rep. Lois Frankel crushing Loomer among likely voters by 61 to 33. But another QAnon-turned-Trump-famous congressional candidate is all but certain to win on election day: Marjorie Taylor Greene, running in a safe Republican district, the Georgia 14th. She is every bit the bigoted loon Loomer is but hasn’t managed to get herself banned from social media (yet).
Naturally, Trump loves her:
Congratulations to future Republican Star Marjorie Taylor Greene on a big Congressional primary win in Georgia against a very tough and smart opponent. Marjorie is strong on everything and never gives up – a real WINNER! — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) August 12, 2020
And let’s be clear: Trump is picking winners and losers. The Washington Post reports that Trump privately told donors: “There are a couple senators I can’t really get involved in. I just can’t do it. You lose your soul if you do. I can’t help some of them. I don’t want to help some of them.” Those senators were unnamed, but you can guess they aren’t fluent in Q.
The Daily Beast found that the National Republican Congressional Committee sent the maximum donation to Greene’s campaign last month. Georgia Senator Kelly Loeffler has been campaigning with Greene, and the two eagerly showcase their mutual support for one another on social media.
Keep in mind, Loeffler and Greene are candidates in a Republican stronghold state. If anyone was looking for a test case of GOP base politics, this is it. Trump’s instincts could be right, too: A recent poll found that more than one-third of Americans are open to the idea that Hollywood, government, and media elites “are secretly engaging in large-scale child trafficking and abuse.”
If even a few Republican candidates can win by successfully courting the Q vote, it won’t take much for the GOP to officially rebrand as the GQP. They’re much more than conspiracy curious at this point. It’s their new lifestyle.
How did this happen? Much faster and more easily than you think.
Once someone is willing to accept the idea that mass shootings at schools might be false-flag operations, the “unlogic” of conspiracies, as Charlotte Alter memorably put it, takes over. The thrill of whataboutism is all-consuming. To someone of this mindset, COVID isn’t a pandemic; it’s a hoax—or a “planDemic,” as one Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate put it last month:
It appears Mr. Hiddin’ Biden you knew something About the coronavirus a few months before it hit the US. it’s not a pandemic & it’s a planDemic; but you already knew that. #PerkinsForU.S.Senate Will help Pres Trump by confirming Fed judges. #ArrestsComing. — Jo Rae Perkins (@PerkinsForUSSen) September 13, 2020
To anyone breathing the mind-bending ether of Fox News, InfoWars, and the local Facebook Trump group, it’s entirely reasonable for the president to hold potential superspreader events, just as long as he calls them “peaceful protests” to mock those who protested police violence against blacks.
It doesn’t matter that Trump booster Herman Cain died from coronavirus, that Trump surrogate and former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie spent a week in the hospital after contracting it, or even that Donald Trump got it and needed to be put on oxygen, airlifted to Walter Reed, and dosed with an experimental cocktail. Nothing will stop President Trump, or any of his supporters, from enjoying their COVID joyride now!
You’d be shocked by how easy it is to make arguments when they aren’t bound by logic. The president can say with a straight face that “we’re rounding the turn” on COVID, without caring whether that turn is curving down or up.
Acting defiantly and engaging in the performative art of pissing off the right people is the real point of these exercises, no matter how high the body count gets.
This is why someone such as South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem adopts Trump’s illogical talking points that testing only creates new cases as hospitals in her state are filling up, or that people shouldn’t be “shamed into” wearing a mask as her state breaks COVID records. Noem is fully engaged in the kind of Trumpian magical thinking that leads one to think “More hunting, less COVID” is actually a good slogan and strategy so long as it makes Democrats’ heads explode.
How brainwashed have people become? Here’s a sampling.
Although Christie stared down the barrel of a ventilator during his week-long hospitalization from COVID and emerged begging people to wear masks, he still won’t turn against the president who politicized wearing them in the first place.
Local officials in Minnesota knew that allowing Trump to hold one of his campaign events would pose a risk to public health but they were afraid of antagonizing him if they turned the campaign away. They chose to appease the president rather than protect the public.
Ohio’s lieutenant governor, Republican Jon Husted, pleaded with people to wear masks at a Trump rally in September—and was nearly booed off the stage.
At least five members of Vice President Mike Pence’s inner circle tested positive for COVID-19 over the weekend. Anyone in their right mind would quarantine for 14 days—but Pence will still keep up his campaign appearances. The White House says he’s an “essential worker,” so CDC guidelines need not apply.
They’ve all learned the secret. Facts and reason are not what Trump’s base wants to hear. Don’t do anything to betray the Big Lie, or else you won’t have an audience anymore.
COVID is beside the point.
Such is the natural conclusion of Trumpism. It’s a loyalty cult, where members risk coronavirus infection as a feat of strength. The president of the United States himself has voted for QAnon, and if anyone wants in, they have to follow his lead.
COVID and QAnon will be Trump’s enduring legacy—a mass poisoning of the American body and mind.


thebulwark--2020-10-26--How Trump Could Still Pull It Off

How Trump Could Still Pull It Off

But not because of the worst phantasms conjured by febrile Democrats .
Donald Trump has no October surprise .
Joe Biden did not implode in debate .
COVID-19 is worse , not better .
And so is Trump the campaigner .
By now millions of Americans understand that he is a catastrophic president and sick human being .
Millions more are simply too exhausted or apprehensive to want another four years .
Every fundamental of politics argues that Trump should lose—indeed , Biden ’ s margin in the popular vote will doubtless surpass Hillary Clinton ’ s .
Yet Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what hasn ’ t changed since 2016 is that kangaroo court of representative democracy : the Electoral College .
Such are its vagaries that one can still imagine Trump ’ s twisting path to victory through the minefield of his richly deserved unpopularity .
Warns Biden ’ s campaign manager Jen O ’ Malley Dillon : “ The very searing truth is that Donald Trump can still win this race , and every indication we have shows that this thing is going to come down to the wire.
” Regular readers will know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who believe that , with so little time remaining , Biden ’ s margin has become close to prohibitive .
Among the many reasons is that polls in battleground states have remained remarkably static : Biden holds significant and relatively stable leads in Pennsylvania , Michigan , and Wisconsin and , albeit more narrowly , in North Carolina , Florida , and Arizona .
The polls in these states have barely twitched over the last few months , resembling the flat line on a heart monitor—a fair metaphor for the state of Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out that Biden ’ s lead in all six states has not made the leap from steady to daunting , and that requests for mail-in ballots are not as voluminous as some Democrats hoped .
True .
But going into the campaign ’ s final week Biden holds an enormous financial advantage through which to defend his lead .
Republicans are still absorbing that their presumptive money machine—the once-vaunted “ Death Star ” —has been eclipsed by a Democratic funding apparatus they formerly mocked as moribund .
Entering October , Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Wisconsin has more than doubled the president ’ s , a dominance mirrored in Arizona .
Biden now has the luxury of running positive ads which extol his humanity and desire to serve as a healer—balm for voters sick of vitriol and division .
But the GOP has staved off eclipse .
The Republican National Committee has stepped up its support of Trump , and his campaign announced a $ 55 million spending plan for Arizona , Iowa , Ohio , Michigan , North Carolina , Florida , Pennsylvania , Georgia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be enough to compete—Trump was outspent in 2016 , yet eked out the states he needed .
In the home stretch , Barack Obama is helping rally Democratic base voters .
The former president obviously relishes the task , and his maiden speech in Philadelphia filleted Trump with a lacerating combination of humor and truth .
That said , both Obamas did wonderful work for Clinton in 2016 ; surrogates , experience shows , seldom win elections for somebody else .
Still , some Democrats have been quietly dreaming about an Electoral College @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Silver—projecting a far greater nationwide turnout than in 2016—provides some encouragement .
But these visions rest on imagining that traditionally red states like Texas and Georgia will break the mold by breaking for Biden .
One should remember the downside of attempting to actualize such aspirations , reflected in Clinton ’ s regrettable decision in 2016 to expand the electoral map at the expense of more assiduous efforts in indispensable states .
In 2020 , these ambitions could divert resources from the states Biden must win , becoming the equivalent of Lucy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into Georgia on the way to Florida , Biden ’ s team seems too disciplined to go full Charlie Brown .
Trump ’ s reality is this : His victory in 2020 was the political equivalent of filling an inside straight , and after four years of a historically miserable presidency , he needs to draw a straight-flush .
So what could go wrong for Joe Biden—so wrong that he could lose ?
Start with a falloff in Latino support .
Latinos are philosophically heterodox , and are particularly critical in Florida , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden ’ s lead is narrow .
That Trump is polling slightly higher among Hispanics than he performed in the 2016 exit polls is cause for concern .
In Florida , Cuban-Americans scarred by the legacy of Fidel Castro respond to charges that Biden is a “ socialist.
” There , and elsewhere , culturally conservative Hispanics may respond to Trump ’ s pro-life stance , and his castigation of Democrats as the party of civil disorder .
Reflecting the gender gap among our populace at large , Trump ’ s version of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ males .
Moreover , the Biden campaign was tardy in its organizing efforts among Hispanics .
Belatedly , they are advocating and advertising far more intensely , highlighting Biden ’ s proposals for immigration reform and the toll of COVID-19 in the Hispanic community .
But the states where Latinos matter most are those where Biden has the least margin for error .
Another unsettling indicium is a distinct GOP advantage in new registrations among white , non-college-educated voters in Pennsylvania , Wisconsin , and Michigan .
Perhaps some are simply formalizing their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Trump ’ s chances is unearthing an appreciable number of new voters roused by his appeals to cultural conservatism and white identity politics .
This is particularly crucial in Pennsylvania , which both campaigns view as critical to winning .
But there are several other concerns about turnout .
While early voting among Democrats has been heavy , it is impossible to know whether it is sufficient to withstand Trump ’ s anticipated margin among in-person voters on November 3 .
The ultimate participation among historically unreliable young people remains uncertain .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans—lack a robust ground game in swing states focused on person-to-person organizing .
Though many Republican-leaning voters find Trump unappealing , their aversion to Democrats runs deep .
It may not take much to bring a lot of them home—they simply need an excuse .
For some , Trump ’ s pseudo-normality in the final debate may be enough .
That brings us to Biden ’ s one misstep that evening : his inartful pledge to “ transition from the oil industry ” in response to climate change .
The snap polls taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But among whom ?
Trump ’ s assertion that Biden “ is going to destroy the oil industry ” may register in industrial states like Michigan , Wisconsin and , in particular , Pennsylvania—where Biden is already vulnerable on the fraught issue of fracking .
That last is a worry .
Pro-environmental groups insist that Biden ’ s remarks will rally those who appreciate the existential threat of global warming .
No doubt they have science and right on their side .
But what is it , I keep wondering , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oblivious ?
Any voter who prioritizes environmental issues already supports Biden .
It ’ s the still-persuadable who matter , including folks in Pennsylvania torn between aversion to Trump and their economic connection to the fossil fuel industry .
One wishes that Biden had spoken more precisely .
The subject of political obliviousness brings us to the curdled legacy of the otherwise admirable Justice Ginsburg .
Her lamentable decision to overstay her health—and the insistence of her acolytes that she was irreplaceable when Obama could have replaced her—has at length come to shadow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the White House and Senate .
Call it the Ginsburg-Barrett Effect .
A majority of Americans now support Barrett ’ s confirmation .
Those voters for whom the Supreme Court is more salient , social and economic conservatives , are the most likely to be swayed to Trump by his success in delivering the Court for a generation .
That is of particular help in North Carolina , but also among pro-life Hispanics in Florida and Arizona .
But the ultimate damage may occur in Pennsylvania .
This stems from the vulnerability of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mischance .
Compared to in-person ballots , their rejection rate will likely be high .
There are several reasons .
Most states require that mail-in ballots arrive by election day ; the dramatic increase in such ballots during a pandemic means that many thousands of otherwise timely ballots won ’ t count .
Others may be disqualified by technical errors such as a voter ’ s failure to sign the ballot envelope , or by the subjective decision of partisan election officials that a signature does not match that which is already on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pennsylvania ’ s primary highlights these problems—which the Republican party , knowing that more mail-in ballots will be cast by Democrats , is eager to exploit .
Already the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that ballots received by November 6 must be counted—a ruling which barely survived a 4-4 tie in the U.S. Supreme Court just last week .
More GOP lawsuits are certain to come .
Even without legal intervention , the disqualification of mail-in ballots may ultimately affect the outcome in states like Pennsylvania .
Then there ’ s the ultimate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mail-in ballots become a legal controversy to be resolved by the high court , there is little doubt that a conservative majority including Justice Barrett would rule for the GOP .
In the worst case—where Pennsylvania determines who carries the Electoral College—the Court could deliver a second term for Donald Trump .
I will save the complexities of Electoral College mathematics for my column on election eve .
For now , it is enough to say that victory for Trump remains quite improbable .
But not impossible : Just take all the contingencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and put them together .
After all , it has happened before .
That ’ s reason enough to worry—in 2020 the ingredients are different , but the prospect of mischance remains .
All who want Trump gone should make every effort between now and Election Day to consign such nightmares to memory .

Can Trump still win?
In short, yes.
But not because of the worst phantasms conjured by febrile Democrats. Donald Trump has no October surprise. Joe Biden did not implode in debate. COVID-19 is worse, not better. And so is Trump the campaigner.
By now millions of Americans understand that he is a catastrophic president and sick human being. Millions more are simply too exhausted or apprehensive to want another four years. Every fundamental of politics argues that Trump should lose—indeed, Biden’s margin in the popular vote will doubtless surpass Hillary Clinton’s.
Yet Trump is president—and could remain so. For what hasn’t changed since 2016 is that kangaroo court of representative democracy: the Electoral College. Such are its vagaries that one can still imagine Trump’s twisting path to victory through the minefield of his richly deserved unpopularity. Warns Biden’s campaign manager Jen O’Malley Dillon: “The very searing truth is that Donald Trump can still win this race, and every indication we have shows that this thing is going to come down to the wire.”
Regular readers will know that I’m among those commentators who believe that, with so little time remaining, Biden’s margin has become close to prohibitive. Among the many reasons is that polls in battleground states have remained remarkably static: Biden holds significant and relatively stable leads in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin and, albeit more narrowly, in North Carolina, Florida, and Arizona. The polls in these states have barely twitched over the last few months, resembling the flat line on a heart monitor—a fair metaphor for the state of Trump’s campaign.
Trump partisans point out that Biden’s lead in all six states has not made the leap from steady to daunting, and that requests for mail-in ballots are not as voluminous as some Democrats hoped. True. But going into the campaign’s final week Biden holds an enormous financial advantage through which to defend his lead.
Republicans are still absorbing that their presumptive money machine—the once-vaunted “Death Star”—has been eclipsed by a Democratic funding apparatus they formerly mocked as moribund. Entering October, Biden’s media spending in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin has more than doubled the president’s, a dominance mirrored in Arizona. Biden now has the luxury of running positive ads which extol his humanity and desire to serve as a healer—balm for voters sick of vitriol and division.
But the GOP has staved off eclipse. The Republican National Committee has stepped up its support of Trump, and his campaign announced a $55 million spending plan for Arizona, Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, North Carolina, Florida, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Nevada, and Wisconsin. It should be enough to compete—Trump was outspent in 2016, yet eked out the states he needed.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
In the home stretch , Barack Obama is helping rally Democratic base voters. The former president obviously relishes the task, and his maiden speech in Philadelphia filleted Trump with a lacerating combination of humor and truth. That said, both Obamas did wonderful work for Clinton in 2016; surrogates, experience shows, seldom win elections for somebody else.
Still, some Democrats have been quietly dreaming about an Electoral College rout. A recent forecast by Nate Silver—projecting a far greater nationwide turnout than in 2016—provides some encouragement. But these visions rest on imagining that traditionally red states like Texas and Georgia will break the mold by breaking for Biden.
One should remember the downside of attempting to actualize such aspirations, reflected in Clinton’s regrettable decision in 2016 to expand the electoral map at the expense of more assiduous efforts in indispensable states. In 2020, these ambitions could divert resources from the states Biden must win, becoming the equivalent of Lucy and the football. Despite a scheduled foray into Georgia on the way to Florida, Biden’s team seems too disciplined to go full Charlie Brown.
Trump’s reality is this: His victory in 2016 was the political equivalent of filling an inside straight, and after four years of a historically miserable presidency, he needs to draw a straight-flush. So what could go wrong for Joe Biden—so wrong that he could lose?
Start with a falloff in Latino support. Latinos are philosophically heterodox, and are particularly critical in Florida, Arizona, and North Carolina—the states where Biden’s lead is narrow. That Trump is polling slightly higher among Hispanics than he performed in the 2016 exit polls is cause for concern.
In Florida, Cuban-Americans scarred by the legacy of Fidel Castro respond to charges that Biden is a “socialist.” There, and elsewhere, culturally conservative Hispanics may respond to Trump’s pro-life stance, and his castigation of Democrats as the party of civil disorder. Reflecting the gender gap among our populace at large, Trump’s version of hyper-masculinity resonates among a cohort of traditional males.
Moreover, the Biden campaign was tardy in its organizing efforts among Hispanics. Belatedly, they are advocating and advertising far more intensely, highlighting Biden’s proposals for immigration reform and the toll of COVID-19 in the Hispanic community. But the states where Latinos matter most are those where Biden has the least margin for error.
Another unsettling indicium is a distinct GOP advantage in new registrations among white, non-college-educated voters in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Perhaps some are simply formalizing their prior voting preference. But the key to Trump’s chances is unearthing an appreciable number of new voters roused by his appeals to cultural conservatism and white identity politics. This is particularly crucial in Pennsylvania, which both campaigns view as critical to winning.
But there are several other concerns about turnout. While early voting among Democrats has been heavy, it is impossible to know whether it is sufficient to withstand Trump’s anticipated margin among in-person voters on November 3. The ultimate participation among historically unreliable young people remains uncertain. And because of the pandemic, Democrats—unlike Republicans—lack a robust ground game in swing states focused on person-to-person organizing.
Though many Republican-leaning voters find Trump unappealing, their aversion to Democrats runs deep. It may not take much to bring a lot of them home—they simply need an excuse. For some, Trump’s pseudo-normality in the final debate may be enough.
That brings us to Biden’s one misstep that evening: his inartful pledge to “transition from the oil industry” in response to climate change. The snap polls taken after the debate suggest that Biden won. But among whom?
Trump’s assertion that Biden “is going to destroy the oil industry” may register in industrial states like Michigan, Wisconsin and, in particular, Pennsylvania—where Biden is already vulnerable on the fraught issue of fracking. That last is a worry.
Pro-environmental groups insist that Biden’s remarks will rally those who appreciate the existential threat of global warming. No doubt they have science and right on their side. But what is it, I keep wondering, that makes so many white progressives so politically oblivious?
Any voter who prioritizes environmental issues already supports Biden. It’s the still-persuadable who matter, including folks in Pennsylvania torn between aversion to Trump and their economic connection to the fossil fuel industry. One wishes that Biden had spoken more precisely.
The subject of political obliviousness brings us to the curdled legacy of the otherwise admirable Justice Ginsburg. Her lamentable decision to overstay her health—and the insistence of her acolytes that she was irreplaceable when Obama could have replaced her—has at length come to shadow the Democrats’ fight for control of the White House and Senate. Call it the Ginsburg-Barrett Effect.
A majority of Americans now support Barrett’s confirmation. Those voters for whom the Supreme Court is more salient, social and economic conservatives, are the most likely to be swayed to Trump by his success in delivering the Court for a generation. That is of particular help in North Carolina, but also among pro-life Hispanics in Florida and Arizona. But the ultimate damage may occur in Pennsylvania.
This stems from the vulnerability of mail-in ballots to GOP attacks and sheer mischance. Compared to in-person ballots, their rejection rate will likely be high.
There are several reasons. Most states require that mail-in ballots arrive by election day; the dramatic increase in such ballots during a pandemic means that many thousands of otherwise timely ballots won’t count. Others may be disqualified by technical errors such as a voter’s failure to sign the ballot envelope, or by the subjective decision of partisan election officials that a signature does not match that which is already on file.
The chaos which occurred in Pennsylvania’s primary highlights these problems—which the Republican party, knowing that more mail-in ballots will be cast by Democrats, is eager to exploit. Already the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that ballots received by November 6 must be counted—a ruling which barely survived a 4-4 tie in the U.S. Supreme Court just last week. More GOP lawsuits are certain to come.
Even without legal intervention, the disqualification of mail-in ballots may ultimately affect the outcome in states like Pennsylvania. Then there’s the ultimate Ginsburg-Barrett Effect: Should the counting of mail-in ballots become a legal controversy to be resolved by the high court, there is little doubt that a conservative majority including Justice Barrett would rule for the GOP. In the worst case—where Pennsylvania determines who carries the Electoral College—the Court could deliver a second term for Donald Trump.
I will save the complexities of Electoral College mathematics for my column on election eve. For now, it is enough to say that victory for Trump remains quite improbable. But not impossible: Just take all the contingencies that could break Trump’s way, and put them together.
After all, it has happened before.
That’s reason enough to worry—in 2020 the ingredients are different, but the prospect of mischance remains. All who want Trump gone should make every effort between now and Election Day to consign such nightmares to memory.


thebulwark--2020-10-26--What’s Going on with Republican Women?

What’s Going on with Republican Women?

There ’ s something going on with Republican women—a troubling feedback loop between these women , their support for the president , and their interest in social media-driven conspiracy theories .
Let ’ s start with some of the data on the support of Republican women for the president .
A recent Washington Post/ABC News poll conducted October 6-9 found that , on issues from Trump ’ s job approval to whether they would accept his defeat on November 3 , Republican women are more supportive of the president or his positions than the nation as a whole , often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In a partisan , highly polarized age , that isn ’ t surprising .
What is surprising is that these women are more supportive of Trump than the Republican men who were seen to have powered his victory in 2016 .
Here are some of the key data points from the Post/ABC survey : When it comes to the issue of COVID-19 , the Post/ABC poll shows that Republican women are consistently more supportive of the Trump administration ’ s efforts and tend to believe in the administration ’ s pronouncements on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approve of Trump ’ s handling of the virus ; that figure is 89 percent among Republican women .
Eighty-six percent of GOP women trust what Trump says about the pandemic while just 38 percent of the rest of the country share in that trust .
On matters related to public health and COVID-19 , the views of Republican women are distinct—and distinctly tilted toward President Trump .
Of additional interest is how reluctant these women are to contemplate the president ’ s defeat : Over 20 percent of Republican women say they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if their preferred candidate lost compared to 14 percent of the general public and 11 percent of Republican men .
A September survey conducted by the American Enterprise Institute ’ s Survey Center on American Life in partnership with the Center for American Progress sheds additional light on what may be driving these numbers .
In general , Republican women show a greater openness to popular conspiracy theories that are channeled chiefly through social media platforms , some of which President Trump amplifies or justifies through his Twitter account and other public comments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who had heard of the QAnon conspiracy was smaller than the percentage among Americans overall , those who have heard of it were more than twice as likely as the general public to believe it .
Republican women are also significantly more likely than the general public and Republican men to believe in a range of public health conspiracies , including that GMO foods are harmful to humans , vaccines cause autism , and drug companies withhold information about their products that are important to public health and welfare .
Republican women appear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conspiracy-related theories and positions than the rest of the public .
This doesn ’ t hold for all conspiracy theories—for instance , Republican women are not more likely than men to believe that President Obama wasn ’ t born in the United States—but when it comes to QAnon and to information relating to public health , Republican women are more likely to believe unsubstantiated and highly inflammatory information .
Social media platforms and habits appear to be an important factor in feeding women ’ s interest in conspiracy-related materials .
On platforms like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ QAnon ” has emerged that repackages conspiracies in “ live , laugh , love ” fonts and with softer and more aesthetically pleasing imagery than has been typical for sites that propagate conspiracy theories .
This repackaging acts as “ breadcrumbs ” that first grab women ’ s attention and then lead them deeper into the QAnon world .
Annie Kelly , a researcher at the University of East Anglia , pointed out recently in the New York Times that the use of the # SavetheChildren hashtag has been a key mechanism for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are being trafficked by an international cabal of powerful public figures .
The outsized numbers of Republican women who are being influenced by QAnon isn ’ t a problem that can be ignored .
Nationally , almost thirty congressional candidates on the ballot in November have either endorsed the theory or supported it or content related to it—and more than half of them are women , a remarkable number in a field like electoral politics that continues to be largely dominated by men .
This includes Marjorie Taylor Green ( now a shoo-in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Lauren Boebert , who , after defeating Republican incumbent Scott Tipton , is effectively tied with her Democratic opponent , Diane Mitsch Bush .
Taylor Green has amassed sufficient influence that the leading candidate for one of the U.S. Senate seats from Georgia , Kelly Loeffler , sought and received Taylor Green ’ s endorsement in her primary .
It is easy to discount QAnon—but the reality is it is quickly emerging from the shadows into a full-blown political movement that periodically receives the passive , and at times , active support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While YouTube , Facebook , Reddit , and Twitter have all imposed restrictions on QAnon content , it remains to be seen whether those controls will help stem the tide of misinformation , conspiracy-mongering , and the social and political distortions that accompany them .

There’s something going on with Republican women—a troubling feedback loop between these women, their support for the president, and their interest in social media-driven conspiracy theories.
Let’s start with some of the data on the support of Republican women for the president. A recent Washington Post/ABC News poll conducted October 6-9 found that, on issues from Trump’s job approval to whether they would accept his defeat on November 3, Republican women are more supportive of the president or his positions than the nation as a whole, often by margins of 2:1 or higher. In a partisan, highly polarized age, that isn’t surprising. What is surprising is that these women are more supportive of Trump than the Republican men who were seen to have powered his victory in 2016.
Here are some of the key data points from the Post/ABC survey:
When it comes to the issue of COVID-19, the Post/ABC poll shows that Republican women are consistently more supportive of the Trump administration’s efforts and tend to believe in the administration’s pronouncements on the issue. Only 41 percent of Americans approve of Trump’s handling of the virus; that figure is 89 percent among Republican women. Eighty-six percent of GOP women trust what Trump says about the pandemic while just 38 percent of the rest of the country share in that trust. On matters related to public health and COVID-19, the views of Republican women are distinct—and distinctly tilted toward President Trump. Of additional interest is how reluctant these women are to contemplate the president’s defeat: Over 20 percent of Republican women say they would be unwilling to accept an outcome if their preferred candidate lost compared to 14 percent of the general public and 11 percent of Republican men.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
A September survey conducted by the American Enterprise Institute’s Survey Center on American Life in partnership with the Center for American Progress sheds additional light on what may be driving these numbers. In general, Republican women show a greater openness to popular conspiracy theories that are channeled chiefly through social media platforms, some of which President Trump amplifies or justifies through his Twitter account and other public comments.
While the percentage of GOP women who had heard of the QAnon conspiracy was smaller than the percentage among Americans overall, those who have heard of it were more than twice as likely as the general public to believe it. Republican women are also significantly more likely than the general public and Republican men to believe in a range of public health conspiracies, including that GMO foods are harmful to humans, vaccines cause autism, and drug companies withhold information about their products that are important to public health and welfare.
Republican women appear to be far more predisposed to accept conspiracy-related theories and positions than the rest of the public. This doesn’t hold for all conspiracy theories—for instance, Republican women are not more likely than men to believe that President Obama wasn’t born in the United States—but when it comes to QAnon and to information relating to public health, Republican women are more likely to believe unsubstantiated and highly inflammatory information.
Social media platforms and habits appear to be an important factor in feeding women’s interest in conspiracy-related materials. On platforms like Facebook and Instagram, a “pastel QAnon” has emerged that repackages conspiracies in “live, laugh, love” fonts and with softer and more aesthetically pleasing imagery than has been typical for sites that propagate conspiracy theories. This repackaging acts as “breadcrumbs” that first grab women’s attention and then lead them deeper into the QAnon world. Annie Kelly, a researcher at the University of East Anglia, pointed out recently in the New York Times that the use of the #SavetheChildren hashtag has been a key mechanism for introducing mothers to the theory that children are being trafficked by an international cabal of powerful public figures.
The outsized numbers of Republican women who are being influenced by QAnon isn’t a problem that can be ignored. Nationally, almost thirty congressional candidates on the ballot in November have either endorsed the theory or supported it or content related to it—and more than half of them are women, a remarkable number in a field like electoral politics that continues to be largely dominated by men. This includes Marjorie Taylor Green (now a shoo-in for election to Congress in Georgia) and Lauren Boebert, who, after defeating Republican incumbent Scott Tipton, is effectively tied with her Democratic opponent, Diane Mitsch Bush. Taylor Green has amassed sufficient influence that the leading candidate for one of the U.S. Senate seats from Georgia, Kelly Loeffler, sought and received Taylor Green’s endorsement in her primary.
It is easy to discount QAnon—but the reality is it is quickly emerging from the shadows into a full-blown political movement that periodically receives the passive, and at times, active support of the president of the United States. While YouTube, Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter have all imposed restrictions on QAnon content, it remains to be seen whether those controls will help stem the tide of misinformation, conspiracy-mongering, and the social and political distortions that accompany them.


thebulwark--2020-10-26--Five Trump-Era Ideas That Should End with His Presidency

Since his election , it has become an article of conventional wisdom that Donald Trump ’ s presidency was not an aberration or a brief historical detour but heralded the beginning of a political realignment .
Some on the right decry the “ dead consensus ” of yesteryear and call for a new conservatism , one less scrupulous about its traditional adherence to American constitutionalism , taking no prisoners in new culture wars , and upending the decade-long consensus in U.S. foreign policy in favor of a nationalist outlook .
On the left , meanwhile , woke-ism and its young @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal orthodoxies .
Yet if one sees Trump ’ s presidency with all its idiosyncrasies as a contingent result of fewer than 80,000 votes in just three states , and not as an authentic expression of the will of the people—remember , he received nearly 3 million fewer votes than Hillary Clinton—then the idea that nothing will ever be the same again finds itself on less firm ground .
More importantly , political and ideological shifts are not result of vast , impersonal historical forces .
Rather , such shifts are products of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political entrepreneurship .
The question of how lasting a footprint Trump and Trumpism will leave is up to the people who make up the Republican party and the conservative movement .
If Trump is soundly defeated on November 3 , the GOP will have an opportunity similar to that provided to the U.K. ’ s Labour Party after its crushing defeat in the general election last year .
Jeremy Corbyn ’ s radicalism did not disappear under Keir Starmer ’ s leadership—but it has been firmly relegated to the party ’ s fringes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the voting public , those who care about the long-term viability of conservatism should seize the months that follow to reject some of the ideas and tendencies that have characterized Trumpism .
They should be buried alongside Trump ’ s presidency , alongside his unhinged political style , alongside his penchant for conspiracies and racism .
Here are five of them .
While the center-right and the center-left need to adapt , political life in the United States does not need “ successor ideologies ” to liberalism and conservatism .
If conservatives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s political life , they have to rediscover their appreciation of the importance of fiscal probity , free markets , thriving families , and American leadership in the world—adjusted , of course , to the realities of the 21st century .
The caveat is important , because critics are correct in pointing out that the party ’ s—and the movement ’ s—monomania with marginal tax rates and size of government are increasingly out of sync with a reality in which a dynamic market economy has to be complemented and even sustained by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Likewise , in the light of seemingly fruitless interventions in the Middle East and new realities such as China ’ s growing assertiveness , America ’ s centrist foreign policy consensus needs a rethink and a recalibration .
Climate change is not a hoax and needs thoughtful policy responses from conservatives , compatible with the world ’ s and America ’ s long-term economic prosperity .
Still , the fusionism of free-marketeers , social conservatives , and foreign policy hawks has by and large served the center-right well .
Instead of trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some half-baked nationalist ideology , it is time to update it and clean it of unhinged and nativist undertones brought to the foreground under Trump ’ s presidency .
Not so long ago , the GOP could credibly claim to be the party of policy ideas , good or bad .
Its platform in 2020 , however , is limited to its “ enthusiastic support of President Trump.
” Republicans ’ recent legislative accomplishments are scarce , perhaps with the exception of a run-of-the-mill tax reform .
Instead , the party ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lies in fighting cultural wars , emoting , and tweeting memes , providing evidence for the writer Bruno Maçães ’ s thesis that political life in America has become unmoored from reality , moving to the realm of fiction and entertainment .
As an aside , woke-ism , with its emphasis on symbols , words , and imperceptible slights as opposed to policy reform , provides a similar temptation to America ’ s left .
Yet policies still matter , and the current flight of America ’ s political class from reality , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and entertainer-in-chief , has real-world consequences—as the country has learned the hard way during the current pandemic .
Yet , the looming defeat of Republicans at the hand of the most anodyne , conventional , and uninspiring candidate in decades should be a wake-up call .
Perhaps the politics of tribalism and “ owning the libs ” is a dead end after all .
No , America is not on the verge of descending into a totalitarian dystopia if the other side wins—no matter who is on the other side today or in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact that the United States government has survived four years of Trump largely intact is a testament not simply to its resiliency but also to its highly complex , unwieldy nature—which does not make it susceptible to the sudden , autocratic centralization of power observed in countries such as Hungary or the Philippines .
It is true that the United States is heavily polarized and that its present environment is unlikely to provide respite from the all-encompassing cultural conflicts .
Still , contrary to the hopes of those who want to see “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good and ultimately the Highest Good , ” seeking to use national politics as the venue to settle such conflicts is a disastrous idea , risking tearing America apart .
But what if the current woke-ism on the political left gets out of control , you ask ?
Especially in those circumstances it is the job of adults on the center-right to bring down the temperature by reaching out to concerned left-of-center liberals—instead of thoughtlessly upping the ante .
4 . )
Foreign policy realism is the way of the future .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crude version of foreign policy realism provided a helpful corrective both to neoconservative overreach and to the blind faith in historical progress .
In that sense , there is a legitimate place for a dose of foreign policy realism in both parties , balanced by a clear moral compass and long-term vision of America ’ s place in the world .
Some Trump admirers see his gut instincts and his disruptive behavior as a foundation for a distinctly realist approach that could guide U.S. foreign policy in the coming years and perhaps become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s foreign policy outlook .
Jeremy Stern , Ambassador Richard Grenell ’ s ex-chief of staff , argues in realist terms that future administrations ought “ to break free of ‘ the West , ’ ” namely our traditional European and other allies , and presumably forge partnerships with undemocratic and nationalist regimes—as long as doing so gives the United States leverage over its adversaries .
But while working with unsavory regimes and being aware of our and of other nations ’ interests is necessary , unchecked foreign policy realism can be as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not more .
For one , America ’ s principles and its moral standing in the world are not burdens but our most valuable foreign policy assets .
And for all the deals that can ( and occasionally should ) be struck with the world ’ s autocrats , the United States will never have better and more reliable friends than the democracies of the North Atlantic space , with which we are bound by much more than a fleeting alignment of interests .
5 . )
America must turn inward—for the sake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general rule , openness to trade and immigration has not come at the cost of America ’ s workers .
Technological change accounts for a much greater proportion of “ destroyed ” jobs than international trade and immigration .
Efforts to impose tariffs during the Trump era have been overwhelmingly counterproductive for job creation and economic dynamism .
Likewise , halting working-age immigration is bound to reduce growth prospects , especially given the demographic headwinds the U.S. economy is going to face in the coming decades .
To be sure , openness to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need for robust domestic policies fostering social and geographic mobility , and providing a degree of economic security to those who need it .
But if the post-Trump GOP becomes the party of pulling up drawbridges , ham-fisted immigration policies , tariffs on imports from our closest allies , or attacks on the World Trade Organization , it will deserve to lose much more than the November election .

Since his election, it has become an article of conventional wisdom that Donald Trump’s presidency was not an aberration or a brief historical detour but heralded the beginning of a political realignment. Some on the right decry the “dead consensus” of yesteryear and call for a new conservatism, one less scrupulous about its traditional adherence to American constitutionalism, taking no prisoners in new culture wars, and upending the decade-long consensus in U.S. foreign policy in favor of a nationalist outlook. On the left, meanwhile, woke-ism and its young radical voices have mounted a challenge to liberal orthodoxies.
Yet if one sees Trump’s presidency with all its idiosyncrasies as a contingent result of fewer than 80,000 votes in just three states, and not as an authentic expression of the will of the people—remember, he received nearly 3 million fewer votes than Hillary Clinton—then the idea that nothing will ever be the same again finds itself on less firm ground. More importantly, political and ideological shifts are not result of vast, impersonal historical forces. Rather, such shifts are products of human agency, intellectual leadership, and political entrepreneurship. The question of how lasting a footprint Trump and Trumpism will leave is up to the people who make up the Republican party and the conservative movement.
If Trump is soundly defeated on November 3, the GOP will have an opportunity similar to that provided to the U.K.’s Labour Party after its crushing defeat in the general election last year. Jeremy Corbyn’s radicalism did not disappear under Keir Starmer’s leadership—but it has been firmly relegated to the party’s fringes. Similarly, if Trump is repudiated by the voting public, those who care about the long-term viability of conservatism should seize the months that follow to reject some of the ideas and tendencies that have characterized Trumpism. They should be buried alongside Trump’s presidency, alongside his unhinged political style, alongside his penchant for conspiracies and racism. Here are five of them.
1.) “Fusionism is dead.”
While the center-right and the center-left need to adapt, political life in the United States does not need “successor ideologies” to liberalism and conservatism. If conservatives want to be constructive actors in America’s political life, they have to rediscover their appreciation of the importance of fiscal probity, free markets, thriving families, and American leadership in the world—adjusted, of course, to the realities of the 21st century.
The caveat is important, because critics are correct in pointing out that the party’s—and the movement’s—monomania with marginal tax rates and size of government are increasingly out of sync with a reality in which a dynamic market economy has to be complemented and even sustained by robust social safety nets and government-provided infrastructure. Likewise, in the light of seemingly fruitless interventions in the Middle East and new realities such as China’s growing assertiveness, America’s centrist foreign policy consensus needs a rethink and a recalibration. Climate change is not a hoax and needs thoughtful policy responses from conservatives, compatible with the world’s and America’s long-term economic prosperity.
Still, the fusionism of free-marketeers, social conservatives, and foreign policy hawks has by and large served the center-right well. Instead of trying to destroy it and replace it with some half-baked nationalist ideology, it is time to update it and clean it of unhinged and nativist undertones brought to the foreground under Trump’s presidency.
2.) Policies don’t matter; “owning the libs” does.
Not so long ago, the GOP could credibly claim to be the party of policy ideas, good or bad. Its platform in 2020, however, is limited to its “enthusiastic support of President Trump.” Republicans’ recent legislative accomplishments are scarce, perhaps with the exception of a run-of-the-mill tax reform. Instead, the party’s and the conservative movement’s energy lies in fighting cultural wars, emoting, and tweeting memes, providing evidence for the writer Bruno Maçães’s thesis that political life in America has become unmoored from reality, moving to the realm of fiction and entertainment.
Podcast · August 15 2023 A.B. Stoddard: All the Ex-President’s Conspirators Donald Trump has been a low-rent mobster for his entire career, and now he’s getting…
As an aside, woke-ism, with its emphasis on symbols, words, and imperceptible slights as opposed to policy reform, provides a similar temptation to America’s left. Yet policies still matter, and the current flight of America’s political class from reality, accelerated by the country’s tweeter- and entertainer-in-chief, has real-world consequences—as the country has learned the hard way during the current pandemic. Yet, the looming defeat of Republicans at the hand of the most anodyne, conventional, and uninspiring candidate in decades should be a wake-up call. Perhaps the politics of tribalism and “owning the libs” is a dead end after all.
3.) It’s Flight 93.
No, America is not on the verge of descending into a totalitarian dystopia if the other side wins—no matter who is on the other side today or in 2024. After all, the very fact that the United States government has survived four years of Trump largely intact is a testament not simply to its resiliency but also to its highly complex, unwieldy nature—which does not make it susceptible to the sudden, autocratic centralization of power observed in countries such as Hungary or the Philippines. It is true that the United States is heavily polarized and that its present environment is unlikely to provide respite from the all-encompassing cultural conflicts. Still, contrary to the hopes of those who want to see “the public square re-ordered to the common good and ultimately the Highest Good,” seeking to use national politics as the venue to settle such conflicts is a disastrous idea, risking tearing America apart. But what if the current woke-ism on the political left gets out of control, you ask? Especially in those circumstances it is the job of adults on the center-right to bring down the temperature by reaching out to concerned left-of-center liberals—instead of thoughtlessly upping the ante.
4.) Foreign policy realism is the way of the future.
One can argue that Trump’s admittedly crude version of foreign policy realism provided a helpful corrective both to neoconservative overreach and to the blind faith in historical progress. In that sense, there is a legitimate place for a dose of foreign policy realism in both parties, balanced by a clear moral compass and long-term vision of America’s place in the world.
Some Trump admirers see his gut instincts and his disruptive behavior as a foundation for a distinctly realist approach that could guide U.S. foreign policy in the coming years and perhaps become the defining feature of the GOP’s foreign policy outlook. Jeremy Stern, Ambassador Richard Grenell’s ex-chief of staff, argues in realist terms that future administrations ought “to break free of ‘the West,’” namely our traditional European and other allies, and presumably forge partnerships with undemocratic and nationalist regimes—as long as doing so gives the United States leverage over its adversaries.
But while working with unsavory regimes and being aware of our and of other nations’ interests is necessary, unchecked foreign policy realism can be as reckless as its intellectual alternatives, if not more. For one, America’s principles and its moral standing in the world are not burdens but our most valuable foreign policy assets. And for all the deals that can (and occasionally should) be struck with the world’s autocrats, the United States will never have better and more reliable friends than the democracies of the North Atlantic space, with which we are bound by much more than a fleeting alignment of interests.
5.) America must turn inward—for the sake of its working class.
As a general rule, openness to trade and immigration has not come at the cost of America’s workers. Technological change accounts for a much greater proportion of “destroyed” jobs than international trade and immigration. Efforts to impose tariffs during the Trump era have been overwhelmingly counterproductive for job creation and economic dynamism. Likewise, halting working-age immigration is bound to reduce growth prospects, especially given the demographic headwinds the U.S. economy is going to face in the coming decades. To be sure, openness to trade and immigration leads to dislocation—hence the need for robust domestic policies fostering social and geographic mobility, and providing a degree of economic security to those who need it. But if the post-Trump GOP becomes the party of pulling up drawbridges, ham-fisted immigration policies, tariffs on imports from our closest allies, or attacks on the World Trade Organization, it will deserve to lose much more than the November election.


thebulwark--2020-10-27--A Tale of Three Possible Outcomes

A Tale of Three Possible Outcomes

In the last century , three presidents have lost re-election bids for a second term : Herbert Hoover in 1932 , Jimmy Carter in 1980 , and George H.W .
Bush in 1992 .
Each of these losses was different from the others , and each brought its own distinctive after-effects .
Since it now seems likely that Donald Trump will follow in these three one-term presidents ’ footsteps , let ’ s take a quick look at their defeats .
( And I of course stipulate the usual caveats : Today ’ s is a very different political world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small that you can ’ t get too much guidance , each case is sui generis , etc . )
They could at least be suggestive for what happens next , assuming a Trump defeat next week .
In 1992 , President George H.W .
Bush lost by 5.6 percentage points to Bill Clinton—a defeat , but not a rout .
There was no change in the party composition of the Senate , and Republicans ( helped by redistricting ) actually picked up nine House seats .
Voters were tired of Republican rule @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they were reassured that Clinton wasn ’ t seeking to undo the positive aspects of that period .
And , of course , the Cold War had ended .
So 1992 was a “ time to move on ” kind of election , in which the voters chose to consign President Bush to an involuntarily early retirement .
Internally , the Clinton campaign even talked about their election narrative this way : They wanted to convince voters that it was time to thank Bush for his service , give him his gold watch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country moved on .
The election wasn ’ t really a repudiation of the Republican party or the conservative movement as a whole .
And , sure enough , Republicans promptly took over both Houses of Congress in 1994 , held them for the rest of the decade , and George W. Bush ( barely ) won the presidency in 2000 .
Though it didn ’ t seem so at the time to those of us involved at the time ( ! )
, 1992 was a pretty gentle re-election defeat .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ronald Reagan by 9.7 percentage points .
And Republicans took control of the Senate for the first time in a quarter century , picking up 12 Senate seats , along with 34 House seats .
The 1980 election marked a clear rejection of the Carter presidency .
And the rejection lingered : Reagan and Bush would go on to win the next two presidential elections , easily .
Some of the policy changes put in place during the 1980s had a lasting effect , and Bill Clinton didn ’ t campaign on reversing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election had consequences , with some structural political changes : It created a class of party-switching Reagan-Democrats , who became a permanent part of the Republican coalition .
And it marked the modern conservative movement ’ s conquest of the GOP and its first time in power .
All of that is important .
But 1980 wasn ’ t , in the grand scheme of things , either a realigning election or a transformative one .
Its after-effects—which were significant—were measured in decades , rather than generations .
In 1932 , President Herbert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a 17.7 percent margin in the popular vote .
Republicans also lost 12 Senate seats and 97 House seats .
1932 was a watershed election , one of the three or four big realigning elections in U.S. history .
It resulted in policy by the New Deal , which fundamentally changed the American political , social , and economic compacts .
Politically it was followed by Democratic control of the presidency for the next 20 years and then , after an Eisenhower hiatus , another 8 years—along with control of Congress for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ FDR crushed Alf Landon in 1936 , it also led to a change in the character of the Republican party , with Willkie , Dewey , and Eisenhower as GOP nominees from 1940 until 1960 .
In a transformative election like 1932 , even what might have seemed important legacies at the time tend to get reversed .
Hoover had three Supreme Court appointments in his one term , and the Court did then put some roadblocks in the way of the New Deal .
But after FDR ’ s reelection and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ By FDR ’ s third term , our government and public policies were very different from what had prevailed in Herbert Hoover ’ s America .
The implications are obvious : Size of defeat matters .
A Trump defeat by 5 or 6 points in the popular vote , say , and especially one in which Republicans hold the Senate , would look somewhat like 1992 .
A defeat by 8 or 9 points , with the loss of the Senate , would be more reminiscent of 1980 .
A double-digit tsunami extending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Texas or Georgia , accompanied by a higher number of Senate seats flipping , might begin to look more like 1932 .
• “ Trump defeated by big margin ; election called early as Florida and North Carolina go to Biden ; Democrats win Senate.
” • “ Biden wins by double digits in popular vote ; rout extends to victory in Texas ; Democrats control Senate easily.
” The initial reactions to these would be very different .
But so , probably , would be the lasting effects .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the second a rejection not just of Trump but perhaps of Trumpism .
The third would open up the possibility for a re-making of the GOP and of conservatism itself .
Of course , history doesn ’ t repeat itself .
It doesn ’ t even rhyme .
And election consequences don ’ t move in a straight line from size of victory to impact on our politics .
But it does seem likely that next week not just the fact of victory , but the margin of victory , will matter .

In the last century, three presidents have lost re-election bids for a second term: Herbert Hoover in 1932, Jimmy Carter in 1980, and George H.W. Bush in 1992. Each of these losses was different from the others, and each brought its own distinctive after-effects.
Since it now seems likely that Donald Trump will follow in these three one-term presidents’ footsteps, let’s take a quick look at their defeats. (And I of course stipulate the usual caveats: Today’s is a very different political world, the number of examples is so small that you can’t get too much guidance, each case is sui generis, etc.) They could at least be suggestive for what happens next, assuming a Trump defeat next week.
Let’s go in backwards order:
1992: Retirement
In 1992, President George H.W. Bush lost by 5.6 percentage points to Bill Clinton—a defeat, but not a rout. There was no change in the party composition of the Senate, and Republicans (helped by redistricting) actually picked up nine House seats.
Voters were tired of Republican rule after 12 years of Reagan-Bush, and they were reassured that Clinton wasn’t seeking to undo the positive aspects of that period. And, of course, the Cold War had ended. So 1992 was a “time to move on” kind of election, in which the voters chose to consign President Bush to an involuntarily early retirement. Internally, the Clinton campaign even talked about their election narrative this way: They wanted to convince voters that it was time to thank Bush for his service, give him his gold watch, and wish him well as the country moved on. The election wasn’t really a repudiation of the Republican party or the conservative movement as a whole.
And, sure enough, Republicans promptly took over both Houses of Congress in 1994, held them for the rest of the decade, and George W. Bush (barely) won the presidency in 2000. Though it didn’t seem so at the time to those of us involved at the time (!), 1992 was a pretty gentle re-election defeat.
1980: Rejection
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter lost to Ronald Reagan by 9.7 percentage points. And Republicans took control of the Senate for the first time in a quarter century, picking up 12 Senate seats, along with 34 House seats.
The 1980 election marked a clear rejection of the Carter presidency. And the rejection lingered: Reagan and Bush would go on to win the next two presidential elections, easily. Some of the policy changes put in place during the 1980s had a lasting effect, and Bill Clinton didn’t campaign on reversing many of them.
So the 1980 election had consequences, with some structural political changes: It created a class of party-switching Reagan-Democrats, who became a permanent part of the Republican coalition. And it marked the modern conservative movement’s conquest of the GOP and its first time in power.
All of that is important. But 1980 wasn’t, in the grand scheme of things, either a realigning election or a transformative one. Its after-effects—which were significant—were measured in decades, rather than generations.
1932: Repudiation
In 1932, President Herbert Hoover was defeated by Franklin D. Roosevelt by a 17.7 percent margin in the popular vote. Republicans also lost 12 Senate seats and 97 House seats.
1932 was a watershed election, one of the three or four big realigning elections in U.S. history. It resulted in policy by the New Deal, which fundamentally changed the American political, social, and economic compacts.
Politically it was followed by Democratic control of the presidency for the next 20 years and then, after an Eisenhower hiatus, another 8 years—along with control of Congress for almost that entire period. And after FDR crushed Alf Landon in 1936, it also led to a change in the character of the Republican party, with Willkie, Dewey, and Eisenhower as GOP nominees from 1940 until 1960.
In a transformative election like 1932, even what might have seemed important legacies at the time tend to get reversed. Hoover had three Supreme Court appointments in his one term, and the Court did then put some roadblocks in the way of the New Deal. But after FDR’s reelection and the threat of court-packing, those collapsed. By FDR’s third term, our government and public policies were very different from what had prevailed in Herbert Hoover’s America.
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The implications are obvious: Size of defeat matters. A Trump defeat by 5 or 6 points in the popular vote, say, and especially one in which Republicans hold the Senate, would look somewhat like 1992. A defeat by 8 or 9 points, with the loss of the Senate, would be more reminiscent of 1980. A double-digit tsunami extending even to the loss of Republican strongholds such as Texas or Georgia, accompanied by a higher number of Senate seats flipping, might begin to look more like 1932.
Consider three alternate Wednesday, November 4, headlines:
“Trump loses presidency as Midwest flips; GOP holds Senate.”
“Trump defeated by big margin; election called early as Florida and North Carolina go to Biden; Democrats win Senate.”
“Biden wins by double digits in popular vote; rout extends to victory in Texas; Democrats control Senate easily.”
The initial reactions to these would be very different. But so, probably, would be the lasting effects. One would be a defeat for Trump, the second a rejection not just of Trump but perhaps of Trumpism. The third would open up the possibility for a re-making of the GOP and of conservatism itself.
Of course, history doesn’t repeat itself. It doesn’t even rhyme. And election consequences don’t move in a straight line from size of victory to impact on our politics. But it does seem likely that next week not just the fact of victory, but the margin of victory, will matter.


thebulwark--2020-10-27--Who Wants to Give Italy a Free Loan?

Who Wants to Give Italy a Free Loan?

Every credit binge has a poster child—a bond that encapsulates the misallocation of resources caused by easy money .
The last poster child was the 100-year bond that the Argentine government issued in 2017 .
The leading candidate to succeed it would seem to be the recently issued Italian government ’ s zero-interest bond .
In response to the September 2008 Lehman bankruptcy , the world ’ s major central banks embarked on an unprecedented round of monetary easing , evidenced by a $ 10 trillion increase in the combined size of their balance sheets .
In 2017 , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ binge , global investors in search of yield fell over themselves to buy a 100-year Argentine government bond .
Never mind that the Argentine government had defaulted five times over the previous 100 years and that the country was , to be generous , not known for sound economic management .
For investors , the penny only seemed to drop towards the end of 2019 when the country was forced to impose capital controls and a few months later when it drastically rescheduled its debt .
The world ’ s major central banks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a manner that makes their earlier response to the Lehman bankruptcy pale in comparison .
As an example , while it took Ben Bernanke ’ s Federal Reserve seven years to expand the Fed ’ s balance sheet by more than $ 3 trillion , Jerome Powell ’ s Fed has taken less than five months to do the same .
This is once again ushering in a period of global financial folly as , in their desperate search for yield , investors are now lending to the most un-creditworthy of borrowers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Argentina .
Now , it is Italy , which can borrow at a zero interest rate—a lower rate than even the U.S. government .
However , there is likely to be a major difference between the Argentine bond experience and the prospective Italian bond experience .
When reality finally set in and Argentina defaulted on its bonds , there was barely a ripple in world financial markets .
With Italy , the world ’ s third-largest sovereign bond market after the United States and Japan , we are unlikely to be so lucky @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restructure its sovereign debt , a major European banking sector crisis with ripples across the world would be the all-too-likely result .
Investors with seemingly short memories of Italy ’ s 2012 sovereign debt crisis do not seem to be fazed by the fact that Italy is presently experiencing its worst economic recession in the last 90 years , totally undermining the country ’ s public finances .
According to the IMF ’ s latest estimates , largely as a result of its pandemic-induced recession , Italy ’ s budget deficit will balloon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Meanwhile , by the end of the year its public debt level will skyrocket to more than 160 percent of GDP , the highest level in the country ’ s history .
Investors also seem to be forgetting that Italy is hemmed in by the Euro , which will once again limit its options to mend its public finances without exacerbating its recession .
They are also discounting ( or ignoring ) the apparent second wave of the pandemic cresting over Italy , threatening a double-dip recession .
In snapping up Italian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem to be making the classic mistake of thinking that this time will be different .
Somehow despite Rome being on an unsustainable public debt path , investors are betting that the European Central Bank ( ECB ) will keep buying enormous quantities of Italian government bonds in the belief that Italy is too big to fail .
It does not seem to have occurred to investors that with a government debt of more than €2.5 trillion , Italy might also be too big for the ECB to bail , especially when another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need the ECB ’ s support .
Nor do investors seem to be paying much attention to the recent German Constitutional Court ’ s ructions about the legality of the ECB ’ s bond buying program , or to the deep divisions that are emerging within the ECB ’ s governing board over the advisability of further large bond purchases .
U.S. economic policymakers must hope that global investors are right in thinking that Italy can avoid a debt restructuring with all of its unwelcome spillovers to the rest of the global economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy , and officials in the Treasury and the Fed would be well advised to make contingency plans for the overwhelmingly likely outcome that this time will not be different and that Italy ’ s current borrowing binge too will end in tears .

Every credit binge has a poster child—a bond that encapsulates the misallocation of resources caused by easy money. The last poster child was the 100-year bond that the Argentine government issued in 2017. The leading candidate to succeed it would seem to be the recently issued Italian government’s zero-interest bond.
In response to the September 2008 Lehman bankruptcy, the world’s major central banks embarked on an unprecedented round of monetary easing, evidenced by a $10 trillion increase in the combined size of their balance sheets. In 2017, at the crest of the ensuing global credit binge, global investors in search of yield fell over themselves to buy a 100-year Argentine government bond.
Never mind that the Argentine government had defaulted five times over the previous 100 years and that the country was, to be generous, not known for sound economic management. For investors, the penny only seemed to drop towards the end of 2019 when the country was forced to impose capital controls and a few months later when it drastically rescheduled its debt.
The world’s major central banks are now responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in a manner that makes their earlier response to the Lehman bankruptcy pale in comparison. As an example, while it took Ben Bernanke’s Federal Reserve seven years to expand the Fed’s balance sheet by more than $3 trillion, Jerome Powell’s Fed has taken less than five months to do the same. This is once again ushering in a period of global financial folly as, in their desperate search for yield, investors are now lending to the most un-creditworthy of borrowers. Last time, that borrower was Argentina. Now, it is Italy, which can borrow at a zero interest rate—a lower rate than even the U.S. government.
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However, there is likely to be a major difference between the Argentine bond experience and the prospective Italian bond experience. When reality finally set in and Argentina defaulted on its bonds, there was barely a ripple in world financial markets. With Italy, the world’s third-largest sovereign bond market after the United States and Japan, we are unlikely to be so lucky. Should the country indeed have to restructure its sovereign debt, a major European banking sector crisis with ripples across the world would be the all-too-likely result.
Investors with seemingly short memories of Italy’s 2012 sovereign debt crisis do not seem to be fazed by the fact that Italy is presently experiencing its worst economic recession in the last 90 years, totally undermining the country’s public finances. According to the IMF’s latest estimates, largely as a result of its pandemic-induced recession, Italy’s budget deficit will balloon to 13 percent of GDP in 2020. Meanwhile, by the end of the year its public debt level will skyrocket to more than 160 percent of GDP, the highest level in the country’s history.
Investors also seem to be forgetting that Italy is hemmed in by the Euro, which will once again limit its options to mend its public finances without exacerbating its recession. They are also discounting (or ignoring) the apparent second wave of the pandemic cresting over Italy, threatening a double-dip recession.
In snapping up Italian bonds at ridiculously low yields, investors seem to be making the classic mistake of thinking that this time will be different. Somehow despite Rome being on an unsustainable public debt path, investors are betting that the European Central Bank (ECB) will keep buying enormous quantities of Italian government bonds in the belief that Italy is too big to fail.
It does not seem to have occurred to investors that with a government debt of more than €2.5 trillion, Italy might also be too big for the ECB to bail, especially when another big ECB member like Spain might also need the ECB’s support. Nor do investors seem to be paying much attention to the recent German Constitutional Court’s ructions about the legality of the ECB’s bond buying program, or to the deep divisions that are emerging within the ECB’s governing board over the advisability of further large bond purchases.
U.S. economic policymakers must hope that global investors are right in thinking that Italy can avoid a debt restructuring with all of its unwelcome spillovers to the rest of the global economy. However, hope is not a policy, and officials in the Treasury and the Fed would be well advised to make contingency plans for the overwhelmingly likely outcome that this time will not be different and that Italy’s current borrowing binge too will end in tears.