asiapacificresearch--2020-11-02--Misplaced Priorities, Unnecessary Effects: Collective Suffering and Survival in Pandemic Philippines

Despite one of the world ’ s strictest and longest lockdown policies , the Philippines ’ securitized approach to containing the COVID-19 pandemic has led to unnecessary suffering , especially in poor communities .
This article explores how the Philippine government ’ s prioritizing of punitive policies such as detaining quarantine violators or attempting to decongest Manila by sending poor families to neighbouring provinces , magnifies existing socio-spatial inequalities and further spreads disease .
In many of these communities , poverty is a co-morbidity .
As local governments struggle to provide frontline health and social welfare services , high-profile arrests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Anti-Terrorism Bill spark concerns about restrictions on free speech while movement is curtailed .
Nevertheless , community and private sector efforts around localized healthcare , food security , and inclusive mobility indicate potential paths towards a ‘ better normal ’ that goes beyond just survival .
“ I will not hesitate .
My orders are to the police and military , as well as village officials , if there is any trouble , or occasions where there ’ s violence and your lives are in danger , shoot them dead , ” -Rodrigo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April 1 , 2020 , during the president ’ s weekly late-night address to the nation and Day 21 of the global pandemic The president ’ s orders were clear—the Philippines ’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic would be led by the military and the police instead of the beleaguered civilian health ministry .
Thus , the Philippine Inter-Agency Task Force on Eradicating Infectious Diseases and its implementing bodies would not be led by the Secretary of Health , but by senior military staff .
Set on a war footing , the Philippines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s strictest and longest lockdown policies , and yet is still struggling to contain infections across an archipelago of approximately 7,500 islands .
The Department of Health has confirmed 44,254 cases and is still verifying 10,341 more as of this writing ( Department of Health , 2020b ) —validating early estimates predicted by the University of the Philippines that the country would breach the 30,000 case mark by mid-June ( Guido , Rye and Agbulos , 2020 ) .
This number is projected to double in a month ’ s time ( Guido @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 ) .
Three months into various stages of quarantine , the Philippines now has the second highest number of infections in the ASEAN region and recently reported the steepest jump in confirmed cases ( 8,143 ) for the entire Western Pacific ( Yee , 2020 ) .
It also has the second highest case fatality rate ( 3.6 % ) compared with its ASEAN neighbours ( Center for Strategic and International Studies , 2020 ) .
The regional director of the World Health Organization ( WHO ) also observed that the Philippines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for frontline workers worldwide .
Almost 13 % of all COVID-19 deaths are doctors and other medical personnel , when other countries in the region remain at only 2-3 % ( CNN Philippines , 2020e ) .
Figure 1 .
COVID-19 Cases , Deaths , and Recoveries ( log scale ) as of 6 July 2020 Economic losses for the year have reached an estimated PHP 2.2 trillion ( USD 44 billion ) based on reports by the National Economic Development Authority ( NEDA ) ( de Vera , 2020 ) ; this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ sizeable informal economy .
Big companies have announced massive layoffs , especially those from the tourism , travel , and service industries .
There is also a decrease in remittances with the forced return of hundreds of thousands of overseas workers who have historically kept the Philippine economy afloat ( Laforga , 2020 ) .
COVID-19 exposes the structural limitations of the Philippine health system , which was assessed by the 2020 Global Health Security Index report as only “ somewhat prepared ” ( 47.6 on an index score of 100 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to epidemics or pandemics .
Prior to COVID-19 , the Philippines did not have enough doctors and nurses with 0.6 doctors per 1,000 population , which is still below the WHO recommended physician density rate and at the median among ASEAN countries ( World Development Indicators , 2017 ) .
There are only 10,447 doctors ( 37 % ) and 30,368 nurses ( 27 % ) in public hospitals in Metro Manila , where COVID-19 cases have been concentrated ( Department of Health cited in Fernandez , et .
al.
, 2020 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2012 ( Dayrit et .
al.
, 2018 ) —have already gone overseas to work in hospitals in the US , UK , and the Middle East , illustrated by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s post-COVID convalescence photograph wearing a t-shirt with a ‘ Philippines ’ logo fuelled speculation he was paying tribute to the numerous Filipino nurses working in the UK during the pandemic .
Low pay at home is a factor contributing to this exodus ; while the police and the Philippines ’ armed forces continue to see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the case for health sector workers ( Morallo , 2018 ) .
Based on 2018 data , not enough hospital beds are available should even 1 % of the over-100 million national population be infected ( Dayrit et al.
, 2018 ) .
Private hospitals outnumber public hospitals , comprising 70 % of the total number of hospitals despite serving a small segment of the population ( Department of Health , 2018 ) .
Recently , public health doctors assigned to geographically isolated and disadvantaged communities under the “ Doctors to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s order reassigning them to private hospitals in the emerging hotspot of Cebu City , citing that doing so would leave their rural service areas without medical care ( Palma , 2020 ) .
Testing and tracing capacity also remain low compared to other countries .
The Philippines has conducted an estimated 800,000 tests to date However , testing capacity falls short of the daily target of 30,000 tests , only reaching just over 17,000 per day ( Department of Health , 2020c ) .
As of May , 38,315 contact tracers were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personnel are required to hit the 1:800 ratio ( Magsambol , 2020 ) .
The low investment in the health sector reflects a growing anti-science attitude among public officials , which intensified with the post-2016 demonization of an anti-dengue fever vaccine that was administered to schoolchildren under the previous administration .
Despite limited evidence that the Sanofi-developed Dengvaxia caused child deaths , vaccine confidence in the Philippines dropped from 93 % in 2015 to 32 % in 2018 thanks to a highly politicized health misinformation campaign ( Larson , Hartigan-Go and de Figueiredo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensued , as did the resurfacing of polio which was already deemed eradicated nearly two decades ago ( Punay , 2018 , Rola , 2019 ) .
Despite the “ healthworkers-as-heroes ” rhetoric , the Philippine medical and R & D sector is hampered not only by limited funding but also deadly misinformation .
A prominent local official has drawn fire for not wearing masks and advocating steam inhalation as a coronavirus cure despite a massive outbreak in her city ( ABS-CBN News , 2020 ) .
The early weeks of the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , driven out of their neighbourhoods , or assaulted with bleach .
This led to cities such as Manila , Pasig , and Muntinlupa adopting ordinances against discrimination of COVID-related cases .
However , these incidents are likely to continue without extensive information dissemination to address fears ( Hallare , 2020 ; Kabagani , 2020 ; Manila Standard , 2020 ; Mendez , 2020 ; Robles , 2020 ) .
As a result , the Philippines has been ranked the 9th riskiest and least safe country amid the pandemic globally , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Deep Knowledge Group cited by Rappler , 2020 ) .
These rankings indict the highly-securitised approach led by military and police personnel .
By focusing on mobility restrictions first and health and social welfare second—driven by an overriding rhetoric that the government must punish the ‘ pasaway ’ ( stubborn , non-compliant citizens ) —the effect has heightened existing inequalities and vulnerabilities and led to unnecessary suffering , especially in poor communities .
Critics state that the Philippines has prioritised the wrong policies in its COVID-19 response , beginning with losing its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restrictions fast enough .
The country ’ s first reported COVID-19 cases in January were both foreign nationals travelling from China .
It was only in March 2020 that community transmission in Metro Manila was confirmed after COVID-19 cases in Taiwan and Australia were traced to travel from the Philippines ( Department of Health , 2020a ) .
In response , the Philippine government declared a National State of Calamity ( Proclamation No .
929 ) , which placed large portions of the country under the euphemism ‘ Enhanced Community Quarantine ( ECQ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to elsewhere as a hard lockdown .
While cases were originally concentrated in Manila , it appears that the three-day lag between ECQ announcement and enforcement led many people to flee the city for the countryside , bringing infection along with them .
Further transmission was facilitated by the return of so-called ‘ locally stranded individuals ’ to their hometowns after mobility restrictions were eased at the 100-day mark .
A since-suspended national program called Balik Probinsya ( literally translates to “ return to the province ” ) offered urban poor families and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and livelihood assistance provided that they return to their provinces , with the aim of decongesting the national capital region .
There were reports that local government units were ordered to accept individuals who availed of the program and some returning overseas Filipino workers even if proper coordination and documentation was incomplete , increasing the risk of community transmission ( Marquez , 2020b ) .
Official DOH data as of 12 June 2020 states that only 12 out of 81 provinces in the country are deemed “ COVID-19 free ” , with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed COVID-19 case .
However , the movement of residents has led to new spikes in the cities of Cebu , Davao , and Zamboanga , the three major urban hubs outside of Metro Manila ( Department of Health , 2020b ) .
Map 1 .
Coronavirus in the Philippines as of 12 June 2020 Source : Department of Health Data Drop as of June 12 , 2020 The executive was quick to request emergency powers through Republic Act No .
11469 or the Bayanihan to Heal-As-One Act , which gave President Duterte @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the COVID-19 response .
The massive PHP 350 billion budget ( approximately USD 7 billion ) includes PHP 200 billion ( USD 4 billion ) cash assistance for 18 million poor households .
An estimated PHP 370 billion ( USD 7.4 billion ) in loans have also been secured with the Asian Development Bank , World Bank , China ’ s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank , and the Japanese government to finance COVID-19 response programs , including continued infrastructure spending through the infamous “ build , build , build ” program to bolster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joint Oversight Congressional Committee cited in Esguerra , 2020 ; GMA News Online , 2020b ) .
President Duterte ’ s emergency powers lapsed on 24 June 2020 .
While the law was in effect , it did not hasten the provision of cash aid nor did it enable local governments to use resources to respond to the crisis .
Focus was placed on mobility restrictions implemented by the militarized national leadership , where illness was blamed on citizens not cooperating with the stay at home order .
With this stern “ hands-off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control of resources and decision-making while passing the burden of responsibility to the local government units , the private sector , and ordinary citizens .
Select local government officials from Metro Manila have expressed dismay with how the national government has handled the crisis , stating there is lack of consultation , coordination , or concrete and detailed action plans to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic ( Ranada , Tagolong , Gotinga , 2020 ) .
Inconsistent pronouncements from the president—often shared in hours-long , late night talks announced only shortly in advance—caused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials .
Informed of national decisions barely hours before execution , local officials struggled to put up localised testing facilities and provide transport for health workers ( Tan , 2020 ; GMA News Online , 2020a ) .
Both national and local governments are plagued by slow disbursement of funds : weekly reports from the executive branch show that only 63 % of the reported budget has been spent thus far .
Meanwhile , apparently only 15 % of the PHP 3.9 billion ( USD 78 million ) in grants for local governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tracker , 2020 ) .
In the meantime , the nimbler private sector stepped in to address the gap .
Business organizations invested more than two billion pesos ( USD 40 million ) to supplement national and local relief efforts and support hospitals with PPE and medical supplies in the first three months of the pandemic , while struggling to keep their employees on the payroll .
Companies such as ABS-CBN , the country ’ s biggest broadcast media company , which was recently shut down by the government , raised PHP 400 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assist urban poor communities while trying to stay on air ( Castro , 2020 ) .
Private sector groups were the first to react when national government officials violated the quarantine rules , as with the cases of a Philippine senator and a high ranking police official , but the President rushed to defend these violators , setting a bad example ( Marquez , 2020a ) .
Ongoing tussles regarding local and mass transport exemplify this mismatch between national-level decision-making and citizens ’ needs .
On the first few days of lockdown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stranded because of the suspension of public transport , and the system of rigid and sometimes arbitrary checkpoints set up throughout the megacity .
These local checkpoints were manned by armed police , many of whom were not provided with PPE or adequate training on health protocols .
More red tape came in the form of additional checkpoints set up by city and village-level officials , who often had their own system of permits .
Given that 70 % of the population in Metro Manila uses public transport ( Abad , 2019 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ walk for hours or ride a bicycle despite the absence of safe bike lanes .
While attempting to use retrofitted tricycles to transport health workers , a popular local official was reprimanded ( and later scolded by the president in a televised speech ) for having violated social distancing rules—despite current Davao city mayor and presidential daughter Sara Duterte continuing to use tricycles in her city ( Inquirer.net , 2020a ) .
Several hospital frontliners were killed in vehicular accidents while biking to work .
The suspension of mass transportation also translated to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including drivers of the iconic Philippine jeepney who were banned from operating but ordered to comply with a contested modernization program .
Some have been forced to beg for aid ( Pedrajas , 2020 ) .
Six mostly elderly jeepney drivers were jailed for staging a protest against the ban ; two out of the six later tested positive for COVID-19 after being released from detention ( CNN Philippines , 2020a ) .
Figure 2 .
Caption : Hundreds of commuters were stranded at the checkpoint along the boundary of Metro Manila ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Source : Jonathan Andal , GMA News , 17 March 2020 .
All evidence points to poverty as a co-morbidity of COVID-19 .
The way poverty shapes a person ’ s access to the social determinants of health such as economic stability , education , health care , the neighbourhood and built environment , and the social context of a community , greatly affects vulnerability to a pandemic such as COVID-19 .
Prior to COVID-19 , the poor were already exposed to various health issues due to substandard living conditions and limited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly correlated to chronic impoverishment ( Diwakar and Sheperd , 2018 ) .
With limited means to comply with health protocols such as physical distancing and hand washing , the poor are more vulnerable to the disease .
This is seen in the case of Metro Manila , the first epicentre of COVID-19 in the Philippines .
As one of the densest urban settlements in the world where 2.5 out of 13 million residents live in slums , poverty compounds the effects of a pandemic .
Map 2 shows the poorest areas ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the magnitude of poor households in the areas ) and their proximity to COVID-19 cases .
For highly segregated megacities like Metro Manila , the concentration of COVID-19 cases is a reflection of those who were able to access testing facilities and hospitals , which many of the urban poor communities do not have access to ( Fernandez et al.
, 2020 ) .
Access to government assistance is also a challenge for impoverished members of the large informal economy , because they are not included in government databases ( Karaos , 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wages slid further into poverty when their primary sources of income were halted by prolonged quarantine restrictions , thus doubling the incidence of involuntary hunger over the past three months ( Social Weather Station , 2020 ) .
These dynamics are more clearly seen at the city level .
Map 3 looks at Quezon City , one of Metro Manila ’ s larger cities with a population of 2.9 million , 52,000 of whom are poor based on official poverty data ( Department of Social Welfare and Development , 2017 ) .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ villages ) in QC have pandemic infections , including two of the country ’ s densest slums , Payatas and Batasan ; 105 of these communities were tagged to have high to moderate risk based on the number of COVID-19 cases .
For poorer areas , the level of risk is between high and moderate , thus requiring local villages to impose strict lockdowns for an extended period .
Following the same pattern throughout Metro Manila , poorer areas have closer proximity to COVID-19 cases but are not close to COVID-19 care facilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provided by the Quezon City government on verified COVID-19 positive cases which remains on an upward trend ( Quezon City Government , 2020 ) .
These same impoverished areas are vulnerable to environmental disasters such as flooding , fires , and earthquakes , causing regular evacuations during the rainy season .
The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world ; as such , COVID-19 is just one additional risk that poor families have to endure ( Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft , 2017 .
Once the typhoons arrive , cash-strapped local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the necessary health protocols , despite having drained existing resources during the first lockdown .
The Philippine National Police ( PNP ) recorded around 152,000 curfew and quarantine violations since the beginning of the lockdown and 71,540 people have been arrested ( CNN Philippines , 2020d ; Bajo , 2020 ) .
Some of these arrests have led to deaths–a police shooting and killing of a retired military personnel at a checkpoint on 22 April and a 28 April mauling of a fish vendor without a mask are only two of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by state actors ( Ferreras and Cahiles , 2020 ; Gonzales , 2020 ) .
Local village officials also employed punitive approaches in punishing alleged quarantine violators in their jurisdiction .
Punishments are largely arbitrary and have ranged anywhere from monetary fines , to being imprisoned in cages made for impounded dogs , to doing ‘ duck walks ’ , push-ups or squat jumps , or other forms of public humiliation ( Human Rights Watch , 2020b ) .
Gated communities are also not exempt , with incidents of the police entering the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ engaging in an altercation with a foreigner resident in an exclusive village in Metro Manila ( Ong , 2020 ) .
While alleged violators from poor communities get punished immediately , the treatment and handling of violations in affluent communities and positions of power tends towards greater leniency .
That this highly securitised approach has led to multiple cases of excessive use of force by police officers and barangay officials is not surprising given the escalation of human rights violations in the Philippines , particularly those tied to the Duterte administration ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Duterte ’ s “ shoot them dead ” order for quarantine violators echoes the public shoot-to-kill order he gave earlier in his administration , but this time instead of advocating the executions of the so-called “ nanlaban ” , or drug personalities who fight back , the crosshairs are set on the so-called “ pasaway ” – those who do not comply .
All of this is consistent with the findings of a 2020 UN Human Rights Council report ( OHCHR , 2020 ) on widespread killings and arbitrary detentions in the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by disinformation and the vilification of dissent .
The COVID response powers given to Duterte also had provisions that have been used to go after perceived critics of the administration .
A “ Task Force COVID Kontra Peke ” ’ whose mandate is “ prevent and report fake news ” led to the arrest of at least 32 people in April including teachers and other individuals tagged as left-wing supporters ( CNN Philippines , 2020b ) .
The government also cemented the conviction of investigative journalist Maria Ressa over trumped-up cyber-libel charges , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controversial Anti-Terrorism Bill , which was signed into law by the president on 3 July 2020 .
Its loose definition of terrorism allows police , law enforcement , and military personnel authorised by an appointed Anti-Terrorism Council to carry out warrantless arrests on tagged “ terrorists ” who can then be detained for up to 24 days , wiretapped for up to 90 days , and if found guilty , imprisoned from 12 years to a full life sentence ( Ratcliffe , 2020 ; CNN Philippines , 2020c ) .
Other major human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in prisons and amongst internally displaced populations and protocols for LGBTQ+ families whose partners die from COVID-19 but are not given the full spousal or civil partnership rights accorded by law to heterosexual couples ( Human Rights Watch , 2020a ) .
As in other countries , the lockdown and its behavioural stresses have led to a rise to violence against women and children ( UN Women , 2020 ) .
The Department of Justice reported online sexual harassment cases increased by an alarming 264 % since March 2020 ( Chapman , 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Department of Social Welfare and Development has already set up hotlines for referral of these kinds of cases , but the burden for monitoring also depends on stretched local government mechanisms .
Keeping each other alive : Reimagining collective resilience in a time of COVID-19 As the world realizes that old methods of crisis response and recovery no longer apply , the Philippine case points to how a securitised approach that prioritises punitive policy over health and social protection—especially one that implements these policies in a one-sided , arbitrary fashion—will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One of the overused concepts by the national government throughout this pandemic has been the concept of bayanihan , or the Filipino practice of community action to accomplish a specific task .
By using a familiar rallying call to work together to “ flatten the curve , ” the national government was able to stealthily pass on the burden of response and survival to the populace–specifically the private sector , local government units , and everyday citizens .
However , bayanihan is impossible in an environment of fear and mistrust .
As in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is occurring in an environment of populism , impunity , anti-poor sentiments and an assault on human and civil rights .
At the same time , the Duterte administration ’ s pivot to China has very local implications .
Secret Chinese-only underground clinics have been discovered treating the uncounted POGO ( Philippine offshore gaming operators ) workers , a euphemism for online gambling workers who have set up shop in the country to sidestep mainland China law .
It appears that they may have spread the coronavirus undetected ( Straits Times , 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the COVID-19 battleground is not just in hospitals but also within communities .
The country ’ s existing vulnerabilities call for a community-centred approach that promotes accountability and puts citizens , especially the poor and vulnerable , at the centre of its programs and interventions .
Beyond imposing mobility restrictions and creating a climate of fear , the outbreak countermeasures require harmonised efforts to address the problems of poverty , mobility , and food security as critical elements in disease prevention .
The pandemic is testing the limits of the social contract @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national government fails to deliver on its promises , local community leaders are forced to innovate to deliver basic services and protect citizens ’ rights .
Modest attempts by local officials include setting up local testing facilities and mobile markets to make fresh produce available to their communities ( GMA News Online , 2020a ) .
Local officials have also pushed back against the national government ’ s Balik Probinsiya program as a means to tighten border controls which contribute to the spread of the disease in the provinces ( Marquez , 2020b @ @ @ @ @ @ @ developed with support from the private sector such as food chain models where pop-up neighbourhood kitchens and volunteers have been distributing hot meals and relief goods in poor communities ( Layno , 2020 ) .
Mental health services led by volunteer psychologists and counsellors are also being offered for free for both health workers and citizens .
These early models are indications that the community plays a vital role in collective resilience ( Biong,2020 ; Lozada , 2020 ) .
However , these social services are not enough .
Battling COVID-19 means breaking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ testing , treating , and isolating cases while keeping priority industries running and families fed .
A major part of this is transparency and ensuring community access to accurate information—which is currently at odds with the media crackdown and official government claims that the Philippines has among the lowest number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in Asia ( Rappler.com , 2020a ) .
The economic impact of the pandemic is likely to worsen in the coming months .
With the monsoon season , food security and income support for the poor and vulnerable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sending the poor back to the provinces , proper preconditions to enable households to comply with the ‘ stay at home ’ directive must be put in place .
This includes access to decent housing and sanitation in addition to income support for those who lost their jobs and sources of livelihood .
Existing systems must adjust to handle prolonged periods of relief and response and ensure basic food security of affected households , while reopening the local economy .
All these require laser-sharp focus on keeping citizens alive—not shooting them dead .
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This article is a part of the Special Issue : Pandemic Asia , Part II .
See the Table of Contents here .
See the Table of Contents for Part I. Nastassja Quijano is a development professional specializing in monitoring and evaluation .
[ email protected ] Ica Fernandez is a spatial planner working on the intersections of urban governance , culture , and armed conflict .
[ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urban planner and development worker immersed in social protection and poverty reduction programs .
[ email protected ] This report contains maps by spatial planner Wilfredo Dizon , Jr. and the authors .
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Abstract
Despite one of the world’s strictest and longest lockdown policies, the Philippines’ securitized approach to containing the COVID-19 pandemic has led to unnecessary suffering, especially in poor communities. This article explores how the Philippine government’s prioritizing of punitive policies such as detaining quarantine violators or attempting to decongest Manila by sending poor families to neighbouring provinces, magnifies existing socio-spatial inequalities and further spreads disease. In many of these communities, poverty is a co-morbidity. As local governments struggle to provide frontline health and social welfare services, high-profile arrests, media shutdowns, and the proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill spark concerns about restrictions on free speech while movement is curtailed. Nevertheless, community and private sector efforts around localized healthcare, food security, and inclusive mobility indicate potential paths towards a ‘better normal’ that goes beyond just survival.
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“I will not hesitate. My orders are to the police and military, as well as village officials, if there is any trouble, or occasions where there’s violence and your lives are in danger, shoot them dead,” -Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines, April 1, 2020, during the president’s weekly late-night address to the nation and Day 21 of the global pandemic
The president’s orders were clear—the Philippines’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic would be led by the military and the police instead of the beleaguered civilian health ministry. Thus, the Philippine Inter-Agency Task Force on Eradicating Infectious Diseases and its implementing bodies would not be led by the Secretary of Health, but by senior military staff. Set on a war footing, the Philippines has enforced one of the world’s strictest and longest lockdown policies, and yet is still struggling to contain infections across an archipelago of approximately 7,500 islands. The Department of Health has confirmed 44,254 cases and is still verifying 10,341 more as of this writing (Department of Health, 2020b)—validating early estimates predicted by the University of the Philippines that the country would breach the 30,000 case mark by mid-June (Guido, Rye and Agbulos, 2020). This number is projected to double in a month’s time (Guido, Rye, Agbulos and Austriaco, 2020).
Three months into various stages of quarantine, the Philippines now has the second highest number of infections in the ASEAN region and recently reported the steepest jump in confirmed cases (8,143) for the entire Western Pacific (Yee, 2020). It also has the second highest case fatality rate (3.6%) compared with its ASEAN neighbours (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). The regional director of the World Health Organization (WHO) also observed that the Philippines has one of the highest mortality rates for frontline workers worldwide. Almost 13% of all COVID-19 deaths are doctors and other medical personnel, when other countries in the region remain at only 2-3% (CNN Philippines, 2020e).
Figure 1. COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Recoveries (log scale) as of 6 July 2020
Source: The ASEAN Post, 2020
Economic losses for the year have reached an estimated PHP 2.2 trillion (USD 44 billion) based on reports by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) (de Vera, 2020); this estimate does not fully reflect the Philippines’ sizeable informal economy. Big companies have announced massive layoffs, especially those from the tourism, travel, and service industries. There is also a decrease in remittances with the forced return of hundreds of thousands of overseas workers who have historically kept the Philippine economy afloat (Laforga, 2020).
COVID-19 exposes the structural limitations of the Philippine health system, which was assessed by the 2020 Global Health Security Index report as only “somewhat prepared” (47.6 on an index score of 100) to prevent, detect, and respond to epidemics or pandemics. Prior to COVID-19, the Philippines did not have enough doctors and nurses with 0.6 doctors per 1,000 population, which is still below the WHO recommended physician density rate and at the median among ASEAN countries (World Development Indicators, 2017). There are only 10,447 doctors (37%) and 30,368 nurses (27%) in public hospitals in Metro Manila, where COVID-19 cases have been concentrated (Department of Health cited in Fernandez, et. al., 2020). Many healthcare professionals—reaching around 20,000 departures in 2012 (Dayrit et. al., 2018)—have already gone overseas to work in hospitals in the US, UK, and the Middle East, illustrated by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s post-COVID convalescence photograph wearing a t-shirt with a ‘Philippines’ logo fuelled speculation he was paying tribute to the numerous Filipino nurses working in the UK during the pandemic. Low pay at home is a factor contributing to this exodus; while the police and the Philippines’ armed forces continue to see an increase in salaries, this is not the case for health sector workers (Morallo, 2018).
Based on 2018 data, not enough hospital beds are available should even 1% of the over-100 million national population be infected (Dayrit et al., 2018). Private hospitals outnumber public hospitals, comprising 70% of the total number of hospitals despite serving a small segment of the population (Department of Health, 2018). Recently, public health doctors assigned to geographically isolated and disadvantaged communities under the “Doctors to the Barrios” program protested the government’s order reassigning them to private hospitals in the emerging hotspot of Cebu City, citing that doing so would leave their rural service areas without medical care (Palma, 2020). Testing and tracing capacity also remain low compared to other countries. The Philippines has conducted an estimated 800,000 tests to date However, testing capacity falls short of the daily target of 30,000 tests, only reaching just over 17,000 per day (Department of Health, 2020c). As of May, 38,315 contact tracers were hired, but at least 94,000 more personnel are required to hit the 1:800 ratio (Magsambol, 2020).
The low investment in the health sector reflects a growing anti-science attitude among public officials, which intensified with the post-2016 demonization of an anti-dengue fever vaccine that was administered to schoolchildren under the previous administration. Despite limited evidence that the Sanofi-developed Dengvaxia caused child deaths, vaccine confidence in the Philippines dropped from 93% in 2015 to 32% in 2018 thanks to a highly politicized health misinformation campaign (Larson, Hartigan-Go and de Figueiredo, 2018). A measles outbreak ensued, as did the resurfacing of polio which was already deemed eradicated nearly two decades ago (Punay, 2018, Rola, 2019).
Despite the “healthworkers-as-heroes” rhetoric, the Philippine medical and R&D sector is hampered not only by limited funding but also deadly misinformation. A prominent local official has drawn fire for not wearing masks and advocating steam inhalation as a coronavirus cure despite a massive outbreak in her city (ABS-CBN News, 2020). The early weeks of the pandemic saw incidents of health workers being shunned, driven out of their neighbourhoods, or assaulted with bleach. This led to cities such as Manila, Pasig, and Muntinlupa adopting ordinances against discrimination of COVID-related cases. However, these incidents are likely to continue without extensive information dissemination to address fears (Hallare, 2020; Kabagani, 2020; Manila Standard, 2020; Mendez, 2020; Robles, 2020).
As a result, the Philippines has been ranked the 9th riskiest and least safe country amid the pandemic globally, and the least safe in the entire Asia-Pacific region (Deep Knowledge Group cited by Rappler, 2020). These rankings indict the highly-securitised approach led by military and police personnel. By focusing on mobility restrictions first and health and social welfare second—driven by an overriding rhetoric that the government must punish the ‘pasaway’ (stubborn, non-compliant citizens)—the effect has heightened existing inequalities and vulnerabilities and led to unnecessary suffering, especially in poor communities.
Outbreak and the Response: Misplaced Priorities?
Critics state that the Philippines has prioritised the wrong policies in its COVID-19 response, beginning with losing its geographic advantage by not putting up border restrictions fast enough.
The country’s first reported COVID-19 cases in January were both foreign nationals travelling from China. It was only in March 2020 that community transmission in Metro Manila was confirmed after COVID-19 cases in Taiwan and Australia were traced to travel from the Philippines (Department of Health, 2020a). In response, the Philippine government declared a National State of Calamity (Proclamation No. 929), which placed large portions of the country under the euphemism ‘Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ)’, or what is referred to elsewhere as a hard lockdown. While cases were originally concentrated in Manila, it appears that the three-day lag between ECQ announcement and enforcement led many people to flee the city for the countryside, bringing infection along with them.
Further transmission was facilitated by the return of so-called ‘locally stranded individuals’ to their hometowns after mobility restrictions were eased at the 100-day mark. A since-suspended national program called Balik Probinsya (literally translates to “return to the province”) offered urban poor families and out of work Overseas Filipino Workers cash and livelihood assistance provided that they return to their provinces, with the aim of decongesting the national capital region. There were reports that local government units were ordered to accept individuals who availed of the program and some returning overseas Filipino workers even if proper coordination and documentation was incomplete, increasing the risk of community transmission (Marquez, 2020b).
Official DOH data as of 12 June 2020 states that only 12 out of 81 provinces in the country are deemed “COVID-19 free”, with the remaining 69 provinces having at least one confirmed COVID-19 case. However, the movement of residents has led to new spikes in the cities of Cebu, Davao, and Zamboanga, the three major urban hubs outside of Metro Manila (Department of Health, 2020b).
Map 1. Coronavirus in the Philippines as of 12 June 2020
Source: Department of Health Data Drop as of June 12, 2020
The executive was quick to request emergency powers through Republic Act No. 11469 or the Bayanihan to Heal-As-One Act, which gave President Duterte authorization to reallocate all available resources to the COVID-19 response. The massive PHP 350 billion budget (approximately USD 7 billion) includes PHP 200 billion (USD 4 billion) cash assistance for 18 million poor households. An estimated PHP 370 billion (USD 7.4 billion) in loans have also been secured with the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Japanese government to finance COVID-19 response programs, including continued infrastructure spending through the infamous “build, build, build” program to bolster the flagging economy (Report to the Joint Oversight Congressional Committee cited in Esguerra, 2020; GMA News Online, 2020b).
President Duterte’s emergency powers lapsed on 24 June 2020. While the law was in effect, it did not hasten the provision of cash aid nor did it enable local governments to use resources to respond to the crisis. Focus was placed on mobility restrictions implemented by the militarized national leadership, where illness was blamed on citizens not cooperating with the stay at home order. With this stern “hands-off” approach, the national government took control of resources and decision-making while passing the burden of responsibility to the local government units, the private sector, and ordinary citizens.
Select local government officials from Metro Manila have expressed dismay with how the national government has handled the crisis, stating there is lack of consultation, coordination, or concrete and detailed action plans to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic (Ranada, Tagolong, Gotinga, 2020). Inconsistent pronouncements from the president—often shared in hours-long, late night talks announced only shortly in advance—caused confusion and tension between national and local officials. Informed of national decisions barely hours before execution, local officials struggled to put up localised testing facilities and provide transport for health workers (Tan, 2020; GMA News Online, 2020a).
Both national and local governments are plagued by slow disbursement of funds: weekly reports from the executive branch show that only 63% of the reported budget has been spent thus far. Meanwhile, apparently only 15% of the PHP 3.9 billion (USD 78 million) in grants for local governments have been utilized (COVID-19 Citizen Budget Tracker, 2020). In the meantime, the nimbler private sector stepped in to address the gap. Business organizations invested more than two billion pesos (USD 40 million) to supplement national and local relief efforts and support hospitals with PPE and medical supplies in the first three months of the pandemic, while struggling to keep their employees on the payroll. Companies such as ABS-CBN, the country’s biggest broadcast media company, which was recently shut down by the government, raised PHP 400 million (USD 8 million) to assist urban poor communities while trying to stay on air (Castro, 2020). Private sector groups were the first to react when national government officials violated the quarantine rules, as with the cases of a Philippine senator and a high ranking police official, but the President rushed to defend these violators, setting a bad example (Marquez, 2020a).
Ongoing tussles regarding local and mass transport exemplify this mismatch between national-level decision-making and citizens’ needs. On the first few days of lockdown, thousands of commuters in Metro Manila were stranded because of the suspension of public transport, and the system of rigid and sometimes arbitrary checkpoints set up throughout the megacity. These local checkpoints were manned by armed police, many of whom were not provided with PPE or adequate training on health protocols. More red tape came in the form of additional checkpoints set up by city and village-level officials, who often had their own system of permits.
Given that 70% of the population in Metro Manila uses public transport (Abad, 2019), the shutdown forced healthcare frontliners to walk for hours or ride a bicycle despite the absence of safe bike lanes. While attempting to use retrofitted tricycles to transport health workers, a popular local official was reprimanded (and later scolded by the president in a televised speech) for having violated social distancing rules—despite current Davao city mayor and presidential daughter Sara Duterte continuing to use tricycles in her city (Inquirer.net, 2020a). Several hospital frontliners were killed in vehicular accidents while biking to work. The suspension of mass transportation also translated to heavy losses amongst low-income transport workers, including drivers of the iconic Philippine jeepney who were banned from operating but ordered to comply with a contested modernization program. Some have been forced to beg for aid (Pedrajas, 2020). Six mostly elderly jeepney drivers were jailed for staging a protest against the ban; two out of the six later tested positive for COVID-19 after being released from detention (CNN Philippines, 2020a).
Figure 2. Caption: Hundreds of commuters were stranded at the checkpoint along the boundary of Metro Manila (Valenzuela) and the province of Bulacan. Source: Jonathan Andal, GMA News, 17 March 2020.
Poverty as Co-morbidity: Community Burdens and Unnecessary Suffering
All evidence points to poverty as a co-morbidity of COVID-19. The way poverty shapes a person’s access to the social determinants of health such as economic stability, education, health care, the neighbourhood and built environment, and the social context of a community, greatly affects vulnerability to a pandemic such as COVID-19. Prior to COVID-19, the poor were already exposed to various health issues due to substandard living conditions and limited access to basic services, which are highly correlated to chronic impoverishment (Diwakar and Sheperd, 2018). With limited means to comply with health protocols such as physical distancing and hand washing, the poor are more vulnerable to the disease. This is seen in the case of Metro Manila, the first epicentre of COVID-19 in the Philippines. As one of the densest urban settlements in the world where 2.5 out of 13 million residents live in slums, poverty compounds the effects of a pandemic. Map 2 shows the poorest areas (the darker the colour, the higher the magnitude of poor households in the areas) and their proximity to COVID-19 cases.
For highly segregated megacities like Metro Manila, the concentration of COVID-19 cases is a reflection of those who were able to access testing facilities and hospitals, which many of the urban poor communities do not have access to (Fernandez et al., 2020). Access to government assistance is also a challenge for impoverished members of the large informal economy, because they are not included in government databases (Karaos, 2020). Low-income families dependent on daily wages slid further into poverty when their primary sources of income were halted by prolonged quarantine restrictions, thus doubling the incidence of involuntary hunger over the past three months (Social Weather Station, 2020).
Map 2. NCR and Coronavirus Cases
These dynamics are more clearly seen at the city level. Map 3 looks at Quezon City, one of Metro Manila’s larger cities with a population of 2.9 million, 52,000 of whom are poor based on official poverty data (Department of Social Welfare and Development, 2017). At present, 137 of 142 barangays (villages) in QC have pandemic infections, including two of the country’s densest slums, Payatas and Batasan; 105 of these communities were tagged to have high to moderate risk based on the number of COVID-19 cases. For poorer areas, the level of risk is between high and moderate, thus requiring local villages to impose strict lockdowns for an extended period. Following the same pattern throughout Metro Manila, poorer areas have closer proximity to COVID-19 cases but are not close to COVID-19 care facilities. Figure 3 shows the weekly report provided by the Quezon City government on verified COVID-19 positive cases which remains on an upward trend (Quezon City Government, 2020).
These same impoverished areas are vulnerable to environmental disasters such as flooding, fires, and earthquakes, causing regular evacuations during the rainy season. The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world; as such, COVID-19 is just one additional risk that poor families have to endure (Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft, 2017. Once the typhoons arrive, cash-strapped local governments need to provide evacuation facilities compliant with the necessary health protocols, despite having drained existing resources during the first lockdown.
Map 3. Quezon City COVID-19 Cases as of 26 June 2020
Source: Quezon City Epidemiology and Surveillance Unit COVID-19 Master Data
Figure 3. Weekly rate of increase of verified COVID-19 cases, Quezon City (June 2020)
Source: Quezon City Government, 2020
‘Shoot Them Dead’: Punitive Policies as Added Vulnerability
The Philippine National Police (PNP) recorded around 152,000 curfew and quarantine violations since the beginning of the lockdown and 71,540 people have been arrested (CNN Philippines, 2020d; Bajo, 2020). Some of these arrests have led to deaths–a police shooting and killing of a retired military personnel at a checkpoint on 22 April and a 28 April mauling of a fish vendor without a mask are only two of the publicised incidents of alleged abuse of power by state actors (Ferreras and Cahiles, 2020; Gonzales, 2020).
Local village officials also employed punitive approaches in punishing alleged quarantine violators in their jurisdiction. Punishments are largely arbitrary and have ranged anywhere from monetary fines, to being imprisoned in cages made for impounded dogs, to doing ‘duck walks’, push-ups or squat jumps, or other forms of public humiliation (Human Rights Watch, 2020b). Gated communities are also not exempt, with incidents of the police entering the pool area of a posh condominium or engaging in an altercation with a foreigner resident in an exclusive village in Metro Manila (Ong, 2020). While alleged violators from poor communities get punished immediately, the treatment and handling of violations in affluent communities and positions of power tends towards greater leniency.
That this highly securitised approach has led to multiple cases of excessive use of force by police officers and barangay officials is not surprising given the escalation of human rights violations in the Philippines, particularly those tied to the Duterte administration’s so-called ‘war on drugs’. Duterte’s “shoot them dead” order for quarantine violators echoes the public shoot-to-kill order he gave earlier in his administration, but this time instead of advocating the executions of the so-called “nanlaban”, or drug personalities who fight back, the crosshairs are set on the so-called “pasaway” – those who do not comply. All of this is consistent with the findings of a 2020 UN Human Rights Council report (OHCHR, 2020) on widespread killings and arbitrary detentions in the country, which are made even more deadly by disinformation and the vilification of dissent.
The COVID response powers given to Duterte also had provisions that have been used to go after perceived critics of the administration. A “Task Force COVID Kontra Peke”’ whose mandate is “prevent and report fake news” led to the arrest of at least 32 people in April including teachers and other individuals tagged as left-wing supporters (CNN Philippines, 2020b). The government also cemented the conviction of investigative journalist Maria Ressa over trumped-up cyber-libel charges, and fast tracked the passage of the controversial Anti-Terrorism Bill, which was signed into law by the president on 3 July 2020. Its loose definition of terrorism allows police, law enforcement, and military personnel authorised by an appointed Anti-Terrorism Council to carry out warrantless arrests on tagged “terrorists” who can then be detained for up to 24 days, wiretapped for up to 90 days, and if found guilty, imprisoned from 12 years to a full life sentence (Ratcliffe, 2020; CNN Philippines, 2020c).
Other major human rights concerns related to COVID-19 include infections in prisons and amongst internally displaced populations and protocols for LGBTQ+ families whose partners die from COVID-19 but are not given the full spousal or civil partnership rights accorded by law to heterosexual couples (Human Rights Watch, 2020a). As in other countries, the lockdown and its behavioural stresses have led to a rise to violence against women and children (UN Women, 2020). The Department of Justice reported online sexual harassment cases increased by an alarming 264% since March 2020 (Chapman, 2020). The Commission on Human Rights and the Department of Social Welfare and Development has already set up hotlines for referral of these kinds of cases, but the burden for monitoring also depends on stretched local government mechanisms.
Keeping each other alive: Reimagining collective resilience in a time of COVID-19
As the world realizes that old methods of crisis response and recovery no longer apply, the Philippine case points to how a securitised approach that prioritises punitive policy over health and social protection—especially one that implements these policies in a one-sided, arbitrary fashion—will not succeed in stamping out COVID-19 infections. One of the overused concepts by the national government throughout this pandemic has been the concept of bayanihan, or the Filipino practice of community action to accomplish a specific task. By using a familiar rallying call to work together to “flatten the curve,” the national government was able to stealthily pass on the burden of response and survival to the populace–specifically the private sector, local government units, and everyday citizens. However, bayanihan is impossible in an environment of fear and mistrust.
As in many other countries, the health crisis is occurring in an environment of populism, impunity, anti-poor sentiments and an assault on human and civil rights. At the same time, the Duterte administration’s pivot to China has very local implications. Secret Chinese-only underground clinics have been discovered treating the uncounted POGO (Philippine offshore gaming operators) workers, a euphemism for online gambling workers who have set up shop in the country to sidestep mainland China law. It appears that they may have spread the coronavirus undetected (Straits Times, 2020).
For all of these reasons, the COVID-19 battleground is not just in hospitals but also within communities. The country’s existing vulnerabilities call for a community-centred approach that promotes accountability and puts citizens, especially the poor and vulnerable, at the centre of its programs and interventions. Beyond imposing mobility restrictions and creating a climate of fear, the outbreak countermeasures require harmonised efforts to address the problems of poverty, mobility, and food security as critical elements in disease prevention.
The pandemic is testing the limits of the social contract on a global scale. When the national government fails to deliver on its promises, local community leaders are forced to innovate to deliver basic services and protect citizens’ rights. Modest attempts by local officials include setting up local testing facilities and mobile markets to make fresh produce available to their communities (GMA News Online, 2020a). Local officials have also pushed back against the national government’s Balik Probinsiya program as a means to tighten border controls which contribute to the spread of the disease in the provinces (Marquez, 2020b). Community led innovations are being developed with support from the private sector such as food chain models where pop-up neighbourhood kitchens and volunteers have been distributing hot meals and relief goods in poor communities (Layno, 2020). Mental health services led by volunteer psychologists and counsellors are also being offered for free for both health workers and citizens. These early models are indications that the community plays a vital role in collective resilience (Biong,2020; Lozada, 2020).
However, these social services are not enough. Battling COVID-19 means breaking the anti-science culture and focusing on aggressively testing, treating, and isolating cases while keeping priority industries running and families fed. A major part of this is transparency and ensuring community access to accurate information—which is currently at odds with the media crackdown and official government claims that the Philippines has among the lowest number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in Asia (Rappler.com, 2020a).
The economic impact of the pandemic is likely to worsen in the coming months. With the monsoon season, food security and income support for the poor and vulnerable is no longer optional. Instead of sending the poor back to the provinces, proper preconditions to enable households to comply with the ‘stay at home’ directive must be put in place. This includes access to decent housing and sanitation in addition to income support for those who lost their jobs and sources of livelihood. Existing systems must adjust to handle prolonged periods of relief and response and ensure basic food security of affected households, while reopening the local economy. All these require laser-sharp focus on keeping citizens alive—not shooting them dead.
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This article is a part of the Special Issue: Pandemic Asia, Part II. See the Table of Contents here.
See the Table of Contents for Part I.
Nastassja Quijano is a development professional specializing in monitoring and evaluation. [email protected]
Ica Fernandez is a spatial planner working on the intersections of urban governance, culture, and armed conflict. [email protected]
Abbey Pangilinan is an urban planner and development worker immersed in social protection and poverty reduction programs. [email protected]
This report contains maps by spatial planner Wilfredo Dizon, Jr. and the authors.
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asiapacificresearch--2020-11-02--Extreme Pro-US BJP Ideologues Must Not be Allowed to Sabotage Russian-Indian Relations

Influential BJP ideologue Subramanian Swamy published an unprecedentedly vitriolic screed against Russia which spits in the face of their decades-long strategic partnership by arguing that Moscow is an irresponsible imperialist power that ’ s historically exploited New Delhi ’ s naive leaders , but the reality is that these two Great Powers are presently enjoying a renaissance in their relations and that Swamy ’ s twisted depiction of their ties is nothing more than an information warfare narrative which proves the existence of a very powerful pro-American lobby that ’ s pulling out all the stops to sabotage Russian-Indian relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work for the past few years should already be well aware of my very critical attitude towards the Hindu nationalist BJP that ’ s ruled India since Prime Minister Modi ’ s election in 2014 .
I ’ ve consistently argued that the country is manipulating nostalgia in Moscow over their Old Cold War-era relations to dupe Russian decision makers into ignoring India ’ s pro-American anti-Chinese pivot in recent years .
I chronicled this development in two pieces since September about how “ It Was Inevitable That India Would Seek To Actively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The US ’ Alliance With India Is A Bipartisan Issue Of Grand Strategic Importance ” .
The first article also references my first work on the topic back in May 2016 which later led to me receiving death threats on social media , being defamed as a drug addict by one of India ’ s top Russia experts , and even being subjected to other intimidation tactics in the real world that I ’ d prefer not to publicly disclose for the time being , and all because I wouldn ’ t back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been vindicated .
Nevertheless , my intentions always remained sincere and transparent .
All that I endeavor to do is warn Russia about India ’ s duplicity in the hopes that decision makers would wise up to the game being played against them , asymmetrically respond in a plausibly deniable way ( such as through the “ bait strategy ” vis-a-vis Pakistan as I argued in summer 2019 ) , and ultimately restore “ balance ” to their historical relations .
It ’ s arguably in Russia ’ s best interests to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” status with India would contradict Moscow ’ s publicly proclaimed pro-sovereignty strategy as I wrote over the weekend when insisting that “ Russia Must Resist Indian Pressure ” to curtail its relations with Pakistan .
Becoming India ’ s “ junior partner ” could also unintentionally trigger a “ security dilemma ” with China , which might misinterpret Russian “ weakness ” in this respect as tacit approval of India ’ s anti-Chinese alliance with the US , thus compelling Beijing to reconsider the nature of its strategic relations with Moscow in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian-Indian relations are presently experiencing a renaissance as I wrote for Pakistan ’ s Tribune newspaper in September after the two sides supercharged their strategic partnership following Prime Minister Modi ’ s attendance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivistok 12 months prior .
So excellent are their ties , which have overcome mutual suspicions stemming from Russia ’ s relations with China and India ’ s own with the US , that I even co-authored an academic article for the official journal of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations ( MGIMO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ministry of Foreign Affairs ) about “ The Prospects Of Russia And India Jointly Leading A New Non-Aligned Movement ” with a view towards making their recently improved strategic partnership more globally significant this century .
Still , I also warned that Russia mustn ’ t side too closely with India at China ’ s perceived expense otherwise it risks provoking the same “ security dilemma ” that Moscow sought to avoid by not becoming its “ junior partner ” , ergo the importance of improving Russian-Pakistani relations to “ balance ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act between those two Asian Great Powers .
The reason why I spent so much time explaining the gist of my vision for Russian-Indian relations is to dispel any questions about my credibility in addressing the very sensitive subject of the present analysis , which is influential BJP ideologue Subramanian Swamy ’ s unprecedentedly vitriolic screed against Russia that he published over the weekend at The Sunday Guardian provocatively declaring that “ Russia Is Not A Friend Of India ” .
Looking beyond the factual errors in his article such as stating that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( it actually happened in 1969 ) , writing that the Soviet Union broke up into 16 different countries ( 15 is the real number ) , and fearmongering that President Putin “ recently won a rigged election to be President of Russia till 2036 ” ( only constitutional amendments were passed to enable this possibility after his present term expires in 2024 ) , his general argument of Russia being an irresponsible imperialist power that ’ s historically exploited India ’ s naive leaders must be countered head-on in order to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relations to the benefit of the US ’ dangerous divide-and-rule grand strategy .
Who ’ s Really At Risk Of Becoming Whose “ Junior Partner ” ?
As I argued earlier in my analysis , it ’ s Russia — not India — that ’ s at risk of becoming the “ junior partner ” in this relationship if any party can be described as such .
Russia ’ s “ balancing ” act between China and India is becoming increasingly “ imbalanced ” after Moscow supported New Delhi ’ s annexation and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ August 2019 despite Beijing ’ s concerns that this could negatively affect the situation in Aksai Chin ( as ultimately happened earlier this year during their ongoing standoff there ) , opposed China ’ s efforts to seek meaningfully address the issue at the UN Security Council , and recently fulfilled India ’ s defense requirements from June at the start of the Himalayan Crisis for wares that will almost certainly be used to “ contain ” China .
It is therefore categorically false for Swamy to misportray India as being at risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partner ” when New Delhi ’ s de-facto military alliance with the US through the so-called “ Quad ” is proceeding apace despite Moscow ’ s earlier expressed concerns that it could be exploited to “ contain ” China .
Political Russophobia Must Urgently Be Suppressed In India Swamy ’ s intentions seem to be to influence the ruling party of which he ’ s a part into jettisoning its historic strategic partnership with Russia for the purpose of doubling down on its pro-American anti-Chinese military alliance , which would actually ironically make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parallel with Russia becoming equally dependent on China in response , the scenario of which the Kremlin is eager to avoid and which explains its recent efforts in achieving the Russian-Indian renaissance that I earlier described .
There ’ s no other way to describe Swamy ’ s malicious writings than as a desire to divide-and-rule Eurasia for destabilizing ends that would ultimately work out to the US ’ grand strategic benefit .
His article wouldn ’ t have even warranted any attention from me had he not been the influential ruling party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to India ’ s top decision makers and strategists .
It ’ s completely unprecedented for someone of his stature in India to publish such a hateful text against Russian-Indian relations , which hints at political Russophobia gradually becoming “ normalized ” at the highest levels of political society if it isn ’ t suppressed as soon as possible .
The proverbial genie already seems to be out of the bottle , however , since The Sunday Guardian — the same outlet that Swamy chose to publish his anti-Russian screed — released @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how “ US-India Ties Attract Attention Of Russian Intelligence ” .
The journalist who wrote it very strongly implies that Russian intelligence has infiltrated the highest levels of the Indian leadership , ominously hinting that its military-intelligence agency GRU — of Skripal poisoning infamy according to Western sources at least — is preparing to meddle in Indian affairs in order to sabotage the country ’ s pro-American military alliance .
The article quotes an unnamed Indian official who warned that “ Russia , like a few other countries , has a lot of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Russia has highly capable infrastructure and units to launch cyber campaigns with deep ramifications .
We are aware of the challenges that can come in the near future due to recent developments that we are witnessing between India and the US ” .
It ’ s American Meddling , Not Russian , That India Should Be Worried About In reality , the only meddling taking place in India is from the American side , not the Russian one , since the latter — with all due respect to them — seems to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Soviet-era nostalgia about their relations that they ’ ve been basically blinded to India ’ s pro-American pivot of recent years to the extent that they ’ re now unwittingly risking provoking a “ security dilemma ” with China by too openly supporting the South Asian state against the People ’ s Republic .
It personally pains me to see the country that I love , Russia , being taken advantage of by its historical strategic partner through these means and having the relationship that it holds so dear spit upon by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his allies at The Sunday Guardian .
I ’ ve warned about this for nearly the past 4,5 years in literally hundreds of articles about India ’ s trend of transitioning from a policy of so-called “ multipolar multi-alignment ” to one of anti-Chinese pro-American alignment which would inevitably harm Russian-Indian relations , and once again I ’ ve been vindicated .
Neither Russia Nor India Has To Become Anyone ’ s “ Junior Partner ” The path ahead will be a difficult one for both parties , but provided that the political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should hopefully be able to surmount what convincingly appears to be a coming crisis in their relations .
On the one hand , Russia must ensure that it doesn ’ t become India ’ s “ junior partner ” and thus unwittingly provoke a “ security dilemma ” with China by doing so , ergo the importance of improving Russian-Pakistani relations in order to restore “ balance ” to its increasingly imperfect “ balancing ” act .
On the other hand , India must ensure that it doesn ’ t become the US @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lose its cherished “ strategic autonomy ” , to which end it mustn ’ t allow pro-American ideologues such as Swamy to sabotage Russian-Indian relations otherwise New Delhi will lose the only solution to its foreign policy dilemma of attempting to “ balance ” its “ frenemy ” relations with China and its newfound allied ones with America .
It ’ s therefore incumbent on the Indian government to either publicly condemn Swamy for his hateful screed or take other measures to unequivocally communicate the message to Moscow that his views aren ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian side , considering how “ naive ” they ’ ve been about relations with India ( once again , with all due respect to them ) , must certainly have been shocked to discover that such an influential ruling party official — and one of its chief ideologues , no less !
— would publish such a vicious rant against their historic relations with India .
Just as concerning must have been the observation that the same outlet which released his article followed it up a day later by strongly implying that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with all the ominous consequences that could follow .
As such , there ’ s shouldn ’ t be any doubt that a coordinated pro-American anti-Russian information warfare campaign has been unleashed at the highest levels of Indian political society which , if anything , should hopefully serve as a long-overdue and much-needed wake-up call to Russian decision makers about the reality of what ’ s happening in India nowadays .
To reaffirm my personal views , I ’ m fully in support of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership so long as relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equal footing , but I ’ m adamantly against Moscow being taken advantage of by New Delhi for pro-American anti-Chinese ends .
Eurasian geopolitics are on the precipice of profound and pivotal change since it ’ s impossible to maintain the status quo of Russian-Indian relations due to Chinese security concerns and American pressure respectively .
Russia must decide whether to submit to becoming India ’ s “ junior partner ” or actively “ recalibrate ” its “ balancing ” act between it and China by moving towards a strategic partnership with Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prospect of any “ security dilemma ” inadvertently popping up with the People ’ s Republic due to the Kremlin ’ s extremely close relations with unquestionably pro-American India .
As for that South Asian state , there ’ s little doubt that it ’ ll continue to ally itself with the US in pursuit of their shared grand strategic goal of “ containing ” China , but India would lose what little “ strategic autonomy ” it still has left if it submits to the pressure of pro-American ideologues such as Swamy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and thus fully submitting to becoming the US ’ “ junior partner ” .
Eurasia is on the brink of a major divide-and-rule destabilization if either Great Power , let alone both of them at the same time , makes the wrong move , which is why sincere supporters of the Multipolar World Order like me hope that this scenario will be avoided .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums @ @ @ @ @ @ @ published on OneWorld .
Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia , China ’ s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity , and Hybrid Warfare .
He is a frequent contributor to Global Research .

Influential BJP ideologue Subramanian Swamy published an unprecedentedly vitriolic screed against Russia which spits in the face of their decades-long strategic partnership by arguing that Moscow is an irresponsible imperialist power that’s historically exploited New Delhi’s naive leaders, but the reality is that these two Great Powers are presently enjoying a renaissance in their relations and that Swamy’s twisted depiction of their ties is nothing more than an information warfare narrative which proves the existence of a very powerful pro-American lobby that’s pulling out all the stops to sabotage Russian-Indian relations.
The US-Indian Alliance
Those who’ve followed my work for the past few years should already be well aware of my very critical attitude towards the Hindu nationalist BJP that’s ruled India since Prime Minister Modi’s election in 2014. I’ve consistently argued that the country is manipulating nostalgia in Moscow over their Old Cold War-era relations to dupe Russian decision makers into ignoring India’s pro-American anti-Chinese pivot in recent years. I chronicled this development in two pieces since September about how “It Was Inevitable That India Would Seek To Actively ‘Contain’ China” and “The US’ Alliance With India Is A Bipartisan Issue Of Grand Strategic Importance”. The first article also references my first work on the topic back in May 2016 which later led to me receiving death threats on social media, being defamed as a drug addict by one of India’s top Russia experts, and even being subjected to other intimidation tactics in the real world that I’d prefer not to publicly disclose for the time being, and all because I wouldn’t back down from my assessment which has since been vindicated.
My Professional Intentions
Nevertheless, my intentions always remained sincere and transparent. All that I endeavor to do is warn Russia about India’s duplicity in the hopes that decision makers would wise up to the game being played against them, asymmetrically respond in a plausibly deniable way (such as through the “bait strategy” vis-a-vis Pakistan as I argued in summer 2019), and ultimately restore “balance” to their historical relations. It’s arguably in Russia’s best interests to do so since acquiescing to “junior partner” status with India would contradict Moscow’s publicly proclaimed pro-sovereignty strategy as I wrote over the weekend when insisting that “Russia Must Resist Indian Pressure” to curtail its relations with Pakistan. Becoming India’s “junior partner” could also unintentionally trigger a “security dilemma” with China, which might misinterpret Russian “weakness” in this respect as tacit approval of India’s anti-Chinese alliance with the US, thus compelling Beijing to reconsider the nature of its strategic relations with Moscow in defensive response.
The Russian-Indian Renaissance
As it stands, Russian-Indian relations are presently experiencing a renaissance as I wrote for Pakistan’s Tribune newspaper in September after the two sides supercharged their strategic partnership following Prime Minister Modi’s attendance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivistok 12 months prior. So excellent are their ties, which have overcome mutual suspicions stemming from Russia’s relations with China and India’s own with the US, that I even co-authored an academic article for the official journal of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO, which is run by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) about “The Prospects Of Russia And India Jointly Leading A New Non-Aligned Movement” with a view towards making their recently improved strategic partnership more globally significant this century. Still, I also warned that Russia mustn’t side too closely with India at China’s perceived expense otherwise it risks provoking the same “security dilemma” that Moscow sought to avoid by not becoming its “junior partner”, ergo the importance of improving Russian-Pakistani relations to “balance” the Kremlin’s delicate “balancing” act between those two Asian Great Powers.
An Unprecedented Infowar Attack
The reason why I spent so much time explaining the gist of my vision for Russian-Indian relations is to dispel any questions about my credibility in addressing the very sensitive subject of the present analysis, which is influential BJP ideologue Subramanian Swamy’s unprecedentedly vitriolic screed against Russia that he published over the weekend at The Sunday Guardian provocatively declaring that “Russia Is Not A Friend Of India”. Looking beyond the factual errors in his article such as stating that the Russian-Chinese border conflict occurred in 1977 (it actually happened in 1969), writing that the Soviet Union broke up into 16 different countries (15 is the real number), and fearmongering that President Putin “recently won a rigged election to be President of Russia till 2036” (only constitutional amendments were passed to enable this possibility after his present term expires in 2024), his general argument of Russia being an irresponsible imperialist power that’s historically exploited India’s naive leaders must be countered head-on in order to prevent him from sabotaging the renaissance of Russian-Indian relations to the benefit of the US’ dangerous divide-and-rule grand strategy.
Who’s Really At Risk Of Becoming Whose “Junior Partner”?
As I argued earlier in my analysis, it’s Russia — not India — that’s at risk of becoming the “junior partner” in this relationship if any party can be described as such. Russia’s “balancing” act between China and India is becoming increasingly “imbalanced” after Moscow supported New Delhi’s annexation and subsequent bifurcation of Jammu & Kashmir in August 2019 despite Beijing’s concerns that this could negatively affect the situation in Aksai Chin (as ultimately happened earlier this year during their ongoing standoff there), opposed China’s efforts to seek meaningfully address the issue at the UN Security Council, and recently fulfilled India’s defense requirements from June at the start of the Himalayan Crisis for wares that will almost certainly be used to “contain” China. It is therefore categorically false for Swamy to misportray India as being at risk of becoming Russia’s “junior partner” when New Delhi’s de-facto military alliance with the US through the so-called “Quad” is proceeding apace despite Moscow’s earlier expressed concerns that it could be exploited to “contain” China.
Political Russophobia Must Urgently Be Suppressed In India
Swamy’s intentions seem to be to influence the ruling party of which he’s a part into jettisoning its historic strategic partnership with Russia for the purpose of doubling down on its pro-American anti-Chinese military alliance, which would actually ironically make India more dependent on the US in parallel with Russia becoming equally dependent on China in response, the scenario of which the Kremlin is eager to avoid and which explains its recent efforts in achieving the Russian-Indian renaissance that I earlier described. There’s no other way to describe Swamy’s malicious writings than as a desire to divide-and-rule Eurasia for destabilizing ends that would ultimately work out to the US’ grand strategic benefit. His article wouldn’t have even warranted any attention from me had he not been the influential ruling party ideologue that he is who directly has access to India’s top decision makers and strategists. It’s completely unprecedented for someone of his stature in India to publish such a hateful text against Russian-Indian relations, which hints at political Russophobia gradually becoming “normalized” at the highest levels of political society if it isn’t suppressed as soon as possible.
The Ridiculous GRU Conspiracy
The proverbial genie already seems to be out of the bottle, however, since The Sunday Guardian — the same outlet that Swamy chose to publish his anti-Russian screed — released a provocative piece the day afterwards about how “US-India Ties Attract Attention Of Russian Intelligence”. The journalist who wrote it very strongly implies that Russian intelligence has infiltrated the highest levels of the Indian leadership, ominously hinting that its military-intelligence agency GRU — of Skripal poisoning infamy according to Western sources at least — is preparing to meddle in Indian affairs in order to sabotage the country’s pro-American military alliance. The article quotes an unnamed Indian official who warned that “Russia, like a few other countries, has a lot of interest in how things move in India. Russia has highly capable infrastructure and units to launch cyber campaigns with deep ramifications. We are aware of the challenges that can come in the near future due to recent developments that we are witnessing between India and the US”.
It’s American Meddling, Not Russian, That India Should Be Worried About
In reality, the only meddling taking place in India is from the American side, not the Russian one, since the latter — with all due respect to them — seems to be so powerfully influenced by the illusion of Soviet-era nostalgia about their relations that they’ve been basically blinded to India’s pro-American pivot of recent years to the extent that they’re now unwittingly risking provoking a “security dilemma” with China by too openly supporting the South Asian state against the People’s Republic. It personally pains me to see the country that I love, Russia, being taken advantage of by its historical strategic partner through these means and having the relationship that it holds so dear spit upon by an influential ideologue such as Swamy and his allies at The Sunday Guardian. I’ve warned about this for nearly the past 4,5 years in literally hundreds of articles about India’s trend of transitioning from a policy of so-called “multipolar multi-alignment” to one of anti-Chinese pro-American alignment which would inevitably harm Russian-Indian relations, and once again I’ve been vindicated.
Neither Russia Nor India Has To Become Anyone’s “Junior Partner”
The path ahead will be a difficult one for both parties, but provided that the political will is present, Russia and India should hopefully be able to surmount what convincingly appears to be a coming crisis in their relations. On the one hand, Russia must ensure that it doesn’t become India’s “junior partner” and thus unwittingly provoke a “security dilemma” with China by doing so, ergo the importance of improving Russian-Pakistani relations in order to restore “balance” to its increasingly imperfect “balancing” act. On the other hand, India must ensure that it doesn’t become the US’ “junior partner” and thus lose its cherished “strategic autonomy”, to which end it mustn’t allow pro-American ideologues such as Swamy to sabotage Russian-Indian relations otherwise New Delhi will lose the only solution to its foreign policy dilemma of attempting to “balance” its “frenemy” relations with China and its newfound allied ones with America. It’s therefore incumbent on the Indian government to either publicly condemn Swamy for his hateful screed or take other measures to unequivocally communicate the message to Moscow that his views aren’t supported by New Delhi.
A Rude Awakening For Russia
The Russian side, considering how “naive” they’ve been about relations with India (once again, with all due respect to them), must certainly have been shocked to discover that such an influential ruling party official — and one of its chief ideologues, no less! — would publish such a vicious rant against their historic relations with India. Just as concerning must have been the observation that the same outlet which released his article followed it up a day later by strongly implying that GRU plans to meddle in Indian affairs, with all the ominous consequences that could follow. As such, there’s shouldn’t be any doubt that a coordinated pro-American anti-Russian information warfare campaign has been unleashed at the highest levels of Indian political society which, if anything, should hopefully serve as a long-overdue and much-needed wake-up call to Russian decision makers about the reality of what’s happening in India nowadays. To reaffirm my personal views, I’m fully in support of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership so long as relations as “balanced” and on an equal footing, but I’m adamantly against Moscow being taken advantage of by New Delhi for pro-American anti-Chinese ends.
Concluding Thoughts
Eurasian geopolitics are on the precipice of profound and pivotal change since it’s impossible to maintain the status quo of Russian-Indian relations due to Chinese security concerns and American pressure respectively. Russia must decide whether to submit to becoming India’s “junior partner” or actively “recalibrate” its “balancing” act between it and China by moving towards a strategic partnership with Pakistan for the purpose of preemptively mitigating the prospect of any “security dilemma” inadvertently popping up with the People’s Republic due to the Kremlin’s extremely close relations with unquestionably pro-American India. As for that South Asian state, there’s little doubt that it’ll continue to ally itself with the US in pursuit of their shared grand strategic goal of “containing” China, but India would lose what little “strategic autonomy” it still has left if it submits to the pressure of pro-American ideologues such as Swamy by jettisoning its strategic relations with Russia and thus fully submitting to becoming the US’ “junior partner”. Eurasia is on the brink of a major divide-and-rule destabilization if either Great Power, let alone both of them at the same time, makes the wrong move, which is why sincere supporters of the Multipolar World Order like me hope that this scenario will be avoided.
*
Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.
This article was originally published on OneWorld.
Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity, and Hybrid Warfare. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.
Featured image is from OneWorld