asiapacificresearch--2020-10-07--Japan’s Economy of the Post-Abe Era. Powerless Fiscal and Monetary Policy

New Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has inherited from Abe Shinzo an economy in bad shape .
The arrow of fiscal policy has made itself powerless , the arrow of monetary policy flooded the country with money which has lost its direction , The arrow of the structural adjustment has never left the bow .
The long shadow of corona-virus is threatening the Japanese economy .
Abe Shinzo is the unique Japanese prime minister who has ruled Japan for nine years , one year in 2007-2008 and eight years , 2012-2020 .
This is a remarkable achievement in terms of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s mandate .
But , the people ’ s expectation for national leaders is correlated with the length of the leader ’ s being in power .
So , one asks if Abe has done something which is commensurate with length of governing .
Perhaps , the most important criterion for judging Abe ’ s policy achievements is his economic policy which may be grouped in to two policies : Abenomics and CORONA-19 policy .
What I am trying to argue in this paper is this .
First , the Abenomics has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of enormous resources .
This is attributable to wrong diagnosis of the problem of post-bubble Japanese economy .
Second , the delayed emergency measures taken by Abe against the COVID-19 have made the recovery of the Japanese economy more difficult .
The malaise of the Japanese economy began with the real estate bubble burst of 1989 .
But , who made the bubble in the first place ?
Japan enjoyed unprecedented economic boom for three decades before the bubble .
GDP increased by more than 10 % a year .
Such prosperity was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dodge Plan , the Cold War and the Japanese people ’ s remarkable ability to import foreign know how – especially the technology of the U.S.- and japanize it .
However , the Japanese miracle was attributable primarily to the Japan Inc. led by the golden triangle composed of highly motivated and competent politicians , business leaders and the bureaucrats .
The success of the golden triangle led to the trilateral collusion , which became a powerful oligarchy and ruled the economy .
Real estate speculation was the fastest way of making quick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the oligarchy and other rich people were the chief source of the asset bubble .
In 1988 , a year before the drama of the bubble burst , in Ginza ( Tokyo ) area , one-square-meter land was worth US $ 149,000 .
The territory of Japan was 37 % of that of the U.S .
But the value of real estate in Japan was 4 times that of the U.S. real estate .
In the Tokyo stock market , the value of stocks was 69 % of GDP in 1988 ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is hard to understand how such bubble is possible .
One possible reason was the fact that the Japanese elite groups were little concerned with the health of the national economy ; they were more interested in making quick bucks .
Then , in 1989 , the bubble exploded without noise .
But it was as devastating as large earthquakes .
The value of real estate in Tokyo fell by 80 % ; the stock index in the Tokyo Stock market fell from 30,000 to 15,000 .
This created a panic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan ( BoJ ) reacted in a disturbing way ; it jacked up , in 1990 , the interest rate from 2 % to 6 % .
This was too much ; it created uncertainty ; it reduced consumption ; it slowed down production of goods and services .
The recession began .
To fight the recession , the BoJ reduced the interest rate to zero per cent by1994 .
This was too drastic and too late .
The recession did not stop .
What was more worrisome was the danger that this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ monetary policy powerless in recovering the economy from recession .
To recover the economy from the recession , interest rate should go down , but it could no longer go down below 0 % .
Here , Japan was trapped in so called the liquidity trap .
Therefore , the BoJ had to use another monetary policy tool , namely the quantity easing policy ( QE ) in addition to two other policies comprising the fiscal policy and the structural adjustment policy .
In this way , Japan picked three policies : the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ structural adjustment policy .
These three sets of policies became Abenomics adopted in 2012 , the year when Ave became prime minster for the second time .
The QE policy is a monetary policy which does not rely in the interest rate , rather , it consists in expanding liquid funds to the financial institutions which can finance consumer expenditures and business activities including investments and exports of goods and services .
The fiscal policy consists in expanding tax income or government debts in order to bail out firms in trouble or expand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures .
Of these three policies , the structural adjustment policy was the most difficult , because to implement it , the government was forced to discipline large corporations and people and institutions which were parts of the oligarchy .
One wonders why Abe picked arrows to identify economic policies .
It is unusual to name economic policy with war weapons such as arrow .
Abe took arrows to show his strong wish to carry out these policies .
In fact , his policies were bulldozer policies of pushing through no matter what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speeding up the policies .
But , it is not wise to handle in this way such a complex reality as the economy .
Anyway , we have three arrows designed to kill the enemy , the stagflation of the Japanese economy which was , once , strong enough to challenge even the American economy .
In this way Abe , got himself three arrows : the monetary arrow , the fiscal arrow and the structural adjustment arrow .
Unfortunately , none of the three arrows have hit the target , the recovery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The fiscal arrow ended up with astronomic government debt representing 250 % of GDP in 2019 .
This was the highest public debt rate in the developed countries .
This presents serious problem .
Some people say that it is not a problem , because the creditors are Japanese citizens and they do not force the government to pay back the debt .
But , sooner or later , the government must honour its debt and to do so , it has to find needed funds , more taxes , which means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The more important question is whether or not the fiscal arrow has hit the target , that is , the freeing the economy from decades-long stagflation .
Unfortunately , the fiscal arrow has not hit the target .
Even with government debt representing 250 % of GDP , it was not enough to hit the target .
It could not go through the tall wall of the structural ailment of the Japanese economy .
The fiscal arrow was broken .
Much of the funds generated by the public debt should have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the bail out of insolvent large corporations which were , in fact , the source of the structural ailment of the Japanese economy .
The monetary arrow did fly far , but it was also broken before hitting the target of saving the Japanese economy .
The BoJ literally flooded the financial market with US $ 923 in billion in 2013 , US $ 1,056 billion in 2014 and US $ 656 billion in 2015 amounting to a total of US $ 2,835 billion .
There were other QE measures giving total @ @ @ @ @ @ @ representing 2.4 times the Japan ’ s GDP of US $ 5 trillion in 2019 .
So , money supply had no limit .
But , was there any demand for the money ?
By and large , the demand for money comes from the consumer and the businesses .
The income distribution has become more and more unequal , because the income of the vast majority of the Japanese people stopped to increase for years .
Under such circumstance , it is no wonder that few people went to banks to borrow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they had no means to pay back the debt .
The businesses did not go to banks either , because there was no demand for their products .
So , the banks ended up with mountains of money which was , in fact , a burden in a situation of zero per cent interest rate .
What banks did was to finance the bailout of firms in trouble , make loans to pay old debts of consumers and businesses and even invest in foreign countries .
One thing sure was that the QE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stagflation of the Japanese economy .
In this way , the monetary arrow was also broken .
It could not pierce the thick wall of the structural defects of the Japanese economy .
The failure or the limited success of the fiscal and the QE arrow was , perhaps , due to a wrong diagnosis of the aliment of the Japanese economy .
It is possible that the ailment of the Japanese economy was not something that could be cured by fiscal or monetary policies .
At least , there was a limit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The real nature of the problem was structural ailment of the economy .
Therefore , what Japan needed was the structural reform of the economy .
There were surely many structural problems .
But , as far as the stagflation of the economy is concerned , two problems may be identified : demographic problem and the low productivity of large corporation .
Japan is one of the countries which suffer much from demographic problem .
The absolute number of the population of Japan will decrease from 126.5 million habitants in 2019 to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of aging of the population is such that the population of 65 years old plus which counted for 17.4 % in 2000 now represents 28 % of the population .
On the other hand , the active population of age group of 15-64 years old which represented 67.5 % in 2013 now represents 59.3 % .
The demography is perhaps one of the most important determinant factors of the potential growth of the economy .
It determines the quantity and the quality of the labour force ; it determines the size of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the common challenge of all the developed countries .
The obvious solution is immigration .
But Japan is the most anti-immigration country among the developed countries In average , in OECD countries , immigrants account for 12.2 % of total population against 1.2 % in Japan .
The main reason for the absence of immigrants in Japan is obviously the racism .
Under the centuries-old Shintoism , the Japanese believe that they are the Yamato-race meaning the emperor ’ s race , hence superior to all other races .
Even now , discrimination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan .
There are about one million Koreans most of whom still remain Korean citizens poorly integrated into the labour market .
Suga , the new prime minister , has to assure massive immigration to survive economically .
But , to do so , Japanese must stop thinking that they are superior to all other races .
There is another factor which is responsible for the stagflation in Japan .
It was the loss of global competitiveness of large corporations , members of the Keiretsu ( assembly of big corporations ) .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the envy of the world .
However , since the bubble burst followed by stagflation , they lost the support of the domestic market as well as the global market .
In the period , 1995-2011 , the global share of Toyota car production fell from 51 % to 41 % .
The world share of Honda car production went down from 39 % to 29 % .
In the period from 1995 to 2007 , the global share of DRAM memory chip production dropped from 42 % to 9.2 % .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Japanese production of navigator had free fall from 100 % to 0 % .
As for the profit of Japanese firms , in the period , 2001-2011 , the profit of the Mazda decreased from 4.3 % to 2.5 % , while that of Toyota dropped down from 9.5 % to 1.9 % .
The implication of these figures is that the real cause of the Japanese stagflation was the losing competitiveness of Japanese large corporations in the global market .
Therefore , the real structural adjustment policy was not the balling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should have been given to SMEs .
True , large corporations have made great contribution to the Japanese economic development by making GDP grow .
However , as labour-saving technology developed further , the capacity of large corporations to create jobs became marginal .
The large corporations were also responsible for the concentration of income and assets in the hands of a small group of people .
This has invited unequal income distribution leading to shrinking consumer demand and declining GDP growth .
In fact , Abe ’ s third arrow of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bailing out non-viable large firms ; it should have helped competitive large corporation ; it should have allocated more resources to the development of SMEs .
But there was no one to promote and pursue such policy .
In other word , the third arrow did not have its archer .
Abenomics has failed .
If it is a success , it was surely very limited success .
It is true that since 2012 , the minus GDP growth became relatively rare ; the jobs increased in number , mainly low paid jobs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success .
But this can not be regarded as success , given the injection of fiscal resources and quantity easing which amount to almost 5 times GDP .
The failure of Abenomics is largely due to the lack of Abe ’ s political will to impose structural reform of Japan ’ s industrial structure on the one hand and , on the other , the absence of effective immigration policy .
Thus , Suga has inherited the economy which was still facing the danger of stagflation .
To make the matter worse , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Abe ’ s poor management of corona-virus crisis .
The Japanese economy had barely survived the decades-long stagflation .
Now , the shadow of the corona-virus is cast over the sky .
Nobody knows the degree of devastation created by the virus crisis .
However , Abe ’ s poor management of the virus crisis could have worsened the negative impact on the Japanese economy .
Abe lost the golden time in stopping the virus propagation so that he could protect his friends ’ investments in the Summer Olympics .
Undoubtedly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact of the virus crisis on the economy , because even the first wave of the pandemic is not over .
It is possible to have , soon , a second wave .
But , already some of available data suggest that the damage of the economy caused by the pandemic seems very grave .
For instance , in the second quarter of 2020 , the Japanese GDP has fallen by almost 28 % compared to the same period of 2019 .
For the entire year of 2020 , the GDP is expected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is serious .
For the entire period of Abe ’ s rule from 2012 to 2020 , the annual growth rate of the Japanese GDP was , in general , a little , below 1 % .
The fall of 6 % in 2020 is indeed a big blow .
There are already 500 bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized enterprises ( SMEs ) of which 69 were food and beverage business ; 53 , hotel business ; 54 , apparel business .
The consumer spending has shrunk by 14 % as of July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spending took place for travel ( -58 % ) , entertainment ( -38 ) , department stores sales ( -29 % ) and transport ( -28 % ) There is no doubt that they were the SMEs which suffer the most from the pandemics .
This is the problem , because , in Japan , 70 % of all jobs are created by the SMEs .
Moreover , we should not forget that the vast majority of Japanese earn their butter and bread from working for the SMEs .
Abe has provided a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the devastating outcome of the lockdown .
His government has provided as much as US $ 2 trillion , which may look like a large amount .
It is .
In addition , Abe has provided a series of fiscal and monetary incentives for the production and the consumption of goods and services as well the exports of goods and services .
Perhaps , the most important policy measure taken by Abe is the access to bank loans .
However , the trouble is this .
In all probability , the bulk of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large corporations for two reasons .
First , the trilateral collusion of politics-corporations-bureaucracy has always favoured large corporations in policy making .
Second , what counts in the long run is bank loans , but they are difficult for SMEs to have access because of prejudice and weak collaterals .
It is a well known fact that the global economy had hard time to recover from the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 .
The main reason was the fact that the QE money was spent for the survival of unhealthy large banks and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the SMEs .
Don ’ t forget .
The results of the anti-SMEs policy is rising jobless and shrinking consumer demand .
In Japan , the consumer spending accounts for 60 % of GDP .
To sum up , Abenomics has done some good to the Japanese economy .
But , Abe Shinzo has injected more than US $ 20 trillion of money and fiscal funds to free the Japanese economy for persistent stagflation .
So , one would have expected better results , given the amount of money spent to save @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sun .
This is an amount of money large enough to expect a victory over the ailing Japanese economy .
But , we can not say that it is a success .
It has failed to put new breath into the economy ; it has failed to attenuate the suffering of ordinary Japanese people .
In fact , according to a survey , 70 % of the respondents said that they had received no or little benefits from Abenomics .
The huge negative impact of the corona-virus crisis on the Japanese economy is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ However , it could hurt severely the economy which had barely survived the decades-long stagflation .
Thus , Suga is facing very challenging task of saving the economy he has inherited .
We all wish him good luck , but it is hoped that he would consider the following policies .
First , the government should not rule the people .
it should serve the people .
The master of the country is not the government but the people .
Second , the government should stop its decades-long pro-large corporation policy and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the center of economy .
Third , the new government of Suga should find the archer of the third arrow ; Suga must become himself the archer .
He should boldly undertake the structural adjustment of large companies .
If history says anything , Korea could have had stagflation , if President Kim Dae-jung did not go through the extensive structural adjustment of large corporations during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 .
President Kim closed insolvent Chaebols ; he forced healthy Chabols to specialize ; he forced to make their accounting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cooperate with SMEs to create productive value chain .
Fourth , this is difficult .
Japan should stop thinking that they are superior to other races .
The demographic problem and the problem of shrinking labour force can be solved only through immigration .
Immigrants will not come , unless the racial discrimination is solved in Japan .
But , it should be pointed out that the immigration policy is one of the most difficult government policies .
Japan should learn much from Canada which has a very successful immigration policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums .
etc .
Professor Joseph H. Chung is professor of economics and co-director of the East Asia Laboratory ( OAE ) -the Study Center for Integration and Globalization ( CEIM ) , Quebec University in Montreal ( UQAM ) .
He is Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization ( CRG ) .
Featured image : Suga announcing the new imperial era name “ Reiwa ” on 1 April @ @ @ @ @ @

New Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has inherited from Abe Shinzo an economy in bad shape. The arrow of fiscal policy has made itself powerless, the arrow of monetary policy flooded the country with money which has lost its direction, The arrow of the structural adjustment has never left the bow. The long shadow of corona-virus is threatening the Japanese economy.
Abe Shinzo is the unique Japanese prime minister who has ruled Japan for nine years, one year in 2007-2008 and eight years, 2012-2020. This is a remarkable achievement in terms of the length of the prime minister’s mandate. But, the people’s expectation for national leaders is correlated with the length of the leader’s being in power. So, one asks if Abe has done something which is commensurate with length of governing.
Perhaps, the most important criterion for judging Abe’s policy achievements is his economic policy which may be grouped in to two policies: Abenomics and CORONA-19 policy.
What I am trying to argue in this paper is this. First, the Abenomics has not been a big success given the injection of enormous resources. This is attributable to wrong diagnosis of the problem of post-bubble Japanese economy. Second, the delayed emergency measures taken by Abe against the COVID-19 have made the recovery of the Japanese economy more difficult.
1. Abenomics
The malaise of the Japanese economy began with the real estate bubble burst of 1989. But, who made the bubble in the first place? Japan enjoyed unprecedented economic boom for three decades before the bubble. GDP increased by more than 10% a year. Such prosperity was due to the Korean war, the Dodge Plan, the Cold War and the Japanese people’s remarkable ability to import foreign know how – especially the technology of the U.S.- and japanize it.
However, the Japanese miracle was attributable primarily to the Japan Inc. led by the golden triangle composed of highly motivated and competent politicians, business leaders and the bureaucrats.
The success of the golden triangle led to the trilateral collusion, which became a powerful oligarchy and ruled the economy. Real estate speculation was the fastest way of making quick money and it is more than possible that the oligarchy and other rich people were the chief source of the asset bubble.
In 1988, a year before the drama of the bubble burst, in Ginza (Tokyo) area, one-square-meter land was worth US$ 149,000. The territory of Japan was 37% of that of the U.S. But the value of real estate in Japan was 4 times that of the U.S. real estate. In the Tokyo stock market, the value of stocks was 69% of GDP in 1988; it jumped to 152% in 1989. It is hard to understand how such bubble is possible. One possible reason was the fact that the Japanese elite groups were little concerned with the health of the national economy; they were more interested in making quick bucks.
Then, in 1989, the bubble exploded without noise. But it was as devastating as large earthquakes. The value of real estate in Tokyo fell by 80%; the stock index in the Tokyo Stock market fell from 30,000 to 15,000. This created a panic among policy makers. The Bank of Japan ( BoJ) reacted in a disturbing way; it jacked up, in 1990, the interest rate from 2% to 6%. This was too much; it created uncertainty; it reduced consumption; it slowed down production of goods and services. The recession began.
To fight the recession, the BoJ reduced the interest rate to zero per cent by1994. This was too drastic and too late. The recession did not stop. What was more worrisome was the danger that this policy of the BoJ made the traditional monetary policy powerless in recovering the economy from recession. To recover the economy from the recession, interest rate should go down, but it could no longer go down below 0%. Here, Japan was trapped in so called the liquidity trap. Therefore, the BoJ had to use another monetary policy tool, namely the quantity easing policy (QE) in addition to two other policies comprising the fiscal policy and the structural adjustment policy.
In this way, Japan picked three policies: the QE policy, fiscal policy and the structural adjustment policy. These three sets of policies became Abenomics adopted in 2012, the year when Ave became prime minster for the second time.
The QE policy is a monetary policy which does not rely in the interest rate, rather, it consists in expanding liquid funds to the financial institutions which can finance consumer expenditures and business activities including investments and exports of goods and services. The fiscal policy consists in expanding tax income or government debts in order to bail out firms in trouble or expand consumption expenditure through subsidies or tax incentive measures. Of these three policies, the structural adjustment policy was the most difficult, because to implement it, the government was forced to discipline large corporations and people and institutions which were parts of the oligarchy.
One wonders why Abe picked arrows to identify economic policies. It is unusual to name economic policy with war weapons such as arrow. Abe took arrows to show his strong wish to carry out these policies. In fact, his policies were bulldozer policies of pushing through no matter what. Such strategy may have merits in speeding up the policies. But, it is not wise to handle in this way such a complex reality as the economy.
Anyway, we have three arrows designed to kill the enemy, the stagflation of the Japanese economy which was, once, strong enough to challenge even the American economy. In this way Abe, got himself three arrows: the monetary arrow, the fiscal arrow and the structural adjustment arrow. Unfortunately, none of the three arrows have hit the target, the recovery of the dynamism of the Japanese economy.
The fiscal arrow ended up with astronomic government debt representing 250% of GDP in 2019. This was the highest public debt rate in the developed countries. This presents serious problem. Some people say that it is not a problem, because the creditors are Japanese citizens and they do not force the government to pay back the debt. But, sooner or later, the government must honour its debt and to do so, it has to find needed funds, more taxes, which means burden on the future generation of citizens.
The more important question is whether or not the fiscal arrow has hit the target, that is, the freeing the economy from decades-long stagflation. Unfortunately, the fiscal arrow has not hit the target. Even with government debt representing 250% of GDP, it was not enough to hit the target. It could not go through the tall wall of the structural ailment of the Japanese economy. The fiscal arrow was broken.
Much of the funds generated by the public debt should have been used for enforcement of productive firms, not the bail out of insolvent large corporations which were, in fact, the source of the structural ailment of the Japanese economy.
The monetary arrow did fly far, but it was also broken before hitting the target of saving the Japanese economy. The BoJ literally flooded the financial market with US$ 923 in billion in 2013, US$ 1,056 billion in 2014 and US$ 656 billion in 2015 amounting to a total of US$ 2,835 billion. There were other QE measures giving total money supply of US$ 12 trillion representing 2.4 times the Japan’s GDP of US$ 5 trillion in 2019.
So, money supply had no limit. But, was there any demand for the money? By and large, the demand for money comes from the consumer and the businesses. The income distribution has become more and more unequal, because the income of the vast majority of the Japanese people stopped to increase for years. Under such circumstance, it is no wonder that few people went to banks to borrow money, for the simple reason that they had no means to pay back the debt. The businesses did not go to banks either, because there was no demand for their products. So, the banks ended up with mountains of money which was, in fact, a burden in a situation of zero per cent interest rate.
What banks did was to finance the bailout of firms in trouble, make loans to pay old debts of consumers and businesses and even invest in foreign countries. One thing sure was that the QE was no longer the solution to the stagflation of the Japanese economy. In this way, the monetary arrow was also broken. It could not pierce the thick wall of the structural defects of the Japanese economy.
The failure or the limited success of the fiscal and the QE arrow was, perhaps, due to a wrong diagnosis of the aliment of the Japanese economy. It is possible that the ailment of the Japanese economy was not something that could be cured by fiscal or monetary policies. At least, there was a limit to what the two arrows could do.
The real nature of the problem was structural ailment of the economy. Therefore, what Japan needed was the structural reform of the economy. There were surely many structural problems. But, as far as the stagflation of the economy is concerned, two problems may be identified: demographic problem and the low productivity of large corporation.
Japan is one of the countries which suffer much from demographic problem. The absolute number of the population of Japan will decrease from 126.5 million habitants in 2019 to 100 million in 2050. The speed of aging of the population is such that the population of 65 years old plus which counted for 17.4 % in 2000 now represents 28% of the population. On the other hand, the active population of age group of 15-64 years old which represented 67.5% in 2013 now represents 59.3%.
The demography is perhaps one of the most important determinant factors of the potential growth of the economy. It determines the quantity and the quality of the labour force; it determines the size of the domestic market. The declining population is the common challenge of all the developed countries. The obvious solution is immigration. But Japan is the most anti-immigration country among the developed countries In average, in OECD countries, immigrants account for 12.2 % of total population against 1.2 % in Japan.
The main reason for the absence of immigrants in Japan is obviously the racism. Under the centuries-old Shintoism, the Japanese believe that they are the Yamato-race meaning the emperor’s race, hence superior to all other races. Even now, discrimination against foreigners is a common phenomenon in Japan. There are about one million Koreans most of whom still remain Korean citizens poorly integrated into the labour market. Suga, the new prime minister, has to assure massive immigration to survive economically. But, to do so, Japanese must stop thinking that they are superior to all other races.
There is another factor which is responsible for the stagflation in Japan. It was the loss of global competitiveness of large corporations, members of the Keiretsu (assembly of big corporations). These corporations were once the pride of Japan and the envy of the world. However, since the bubble burst followed by stagflation, they lost the support of the domestic market as well as the global market.
In the period, 1995-2011, the global share of Toyota car production fell from 51% to 41%. The world share of Honda car production went down from 39% to 29%. In the period from 1995 to 2007, the global share of DRAM memory chip production dropped from 42% to 9.2%. This is incredible. The global share of Japanese production of navigator had free fall from 100% to 0 %. As for the profit of Japanese firms, in the period, 2001-2011, the profit of the Mazda decreased from 4.3% to 2.5%, while that of Toyota dropped down from 9.5% to 1.9%.
The implication of these figures is that the real cause of the Japanese stagflation was the losing competitiveness of Japanese large corporations in the global market. Therefore, the real structural adjustment policy was not the balling out of these corporations. The priority should have been given to SMEs. True, large corporations have made great contribution to the Japanese economic development by making GDP grow. However, as labour-saving technology developed further, the capacity of large corporations to create jobs became marginal.
The large corporations were also responsible for the concentration of income and assets in the hands of a small group of people. This has invited unequal income distribution leading to shrinking consumer demand and declining GDP growth.
In fact, Abe’s third arrow of the structural reform should have consisted in not bailing out non-viable large firms; it should have helped competitive large corporation; it should have allocated more resources to the development of SMEs. But there was no one to promote and pursue such policy. In other word, the third arrow did not have its archer.
Abenomics has failed. If it is a success, it was surely very limited success. It is true that since 2012, the minus GDP growth became relatively rare; the jobs increased in number, mainly low paid jobs; the stagflation was dealt with some success. But this cannot be regarded as success, given the injection of fiscal resources and quantity easing which amount to almost 5 times GDP. The failure of Abenomics is largely due to the lack of Abe’s political will to impose structural reform of Japan’s industrial structure on the one hand and, on the other, the absence of effective immigration policy.
2. Haunting COVID-19 Crisis
Thus, Suga has inherited the economy which was still facing the danger of stagflation. To make the matter worse, Suga is given the economy further devastated by Abe’s poor management of corona-virus crisis. The Japanese economy had barely survived the decades-long stagflation. Now, the shadow of the corona-virus is cast over the sky. Nobody knows the degree of devastation created by the virus crisis. However, Abe’s poor management of the virus crisis could have worsened the negative impact on the Japanese economy. Abe lost the golden time in stopping the virus propagation so that he could protect his friends’ investments in the Summer Olympics.
Undoubtedly, it is rather early to assess the impact of the virus crisis on the economy, because even the first wave of the pandemic is not over. It is possible to have, soon, a second wave. But, already some of available data suggest that the damage of the economy caused by the pandemic seems very grave. For instance, in the second quarter of 2020, the Japanese GDP has fallen by almost 28 % compared to the same period of 2019. For the entire year of 2020, the GDP is expected to decrease by 6%. This is serious. For the entire period of Abe’s rule from 2012 to 2020, the annual growth rate of the Japanese GDP was, in general, a little, below 1 %. The fall of 6% in 2020 is indeed a big blow.
There are already 500 bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) of which 69 were food and beverage business; 53, hotel business; 54, apparel business. The consumer spending has shrunk by 14% as of July 2020. The major fall of consumer spending took place for travel (-58%), entertainment (-38), department stores sales (-29%) and transport (-28%) There is no doubt that they were the SMEs which suffer the most from the pandemics. This is the problem, because, in Japan, 70% of all jobs are created by the SMEs. Moreover, we should not forget that the vast majority of Japanese earn their butter and bread from working for the SMEs.
Abe has provided a set of emergency funds to cope with the devastating outcome of the lockdown. His government has provided as much as US$ 2 trillion, which may look like a large amount. It is. In addition, Abe has provided a series of fiscal and monetary incentives for the production and the consumption of goods and services as well the exports of goods and services.
Perhaps, the most important policy measure taken by Abe is the access to bank loans. However, the trouble is this. In all probability, the bulk of benefits of these measures will go to large corporations for two reasons. First, the trilateral collusion of politics-corporations-bureaucracy has always favoured large corporations in policy making. Second, what counts in the long run is bank loans, but they are difficult for SMEs to have access because of prejudice and weak collaterals.
It is a well known fact that the global economy had hard time to recover from the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The main reason was the fact that the QE money was spent for the survival of unhealthy large banks and corporations at the expense of the development of the SMEs. Don’t forget. The results of the anti-SMEs policy is rising jobless and shrinking consumer demand. In Japan, the consumer spending accounts for 60% of GDP.
To sum up, Abenomics has done some good to the Japanese economy. But, Abe Shinzo has injected more than US$ 20 trillion of money and fiscal funds to free the Japanese economy for persistent stagflation. So, one would have expected better results, given the amount of money spent to save the economy of the country of rising sun. This is an amount of money large enough to expect a victory over the ailing Japanese economy.
But, we cannot say that it is a success. It has failed to put new breath into the economy; it has failed to attenuate the suffering of ordinary Japanese people. In fact, according to a survey, 70% of the respondents said that they had received no or little benefits from Abenomics.
The huge negative impact of the corona-virus crisis on the Japanese economy is difficult to estimate at this moment. However, it could hurt severely the economy which had barely survived the decades-long stagflation. Thus, Suga is facing very challenging task of saving the economy he has inherited. We all wish him good luck, but it is hoped that he would consider the following policies.
First, the government should not rule the people. it should serve the people. The master of the country is not the government but the people.
Second, the government should stop its decades-long pro-large corporation policy and, instead, invest heavily in SMEs which are the center of economy.
Third, the new government of Suga should find the archer of the third arrow; Suga must become himself the archer. He should boldly undertake the structural adjustment of large companies. If history says anything, Korea could have had stagflation, if President Kim Dae-jung did not go through the extensive structural adjustment of large corporations during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. President Kim closed insolvent Chaebols; he forced healthy Chabols to specialize; he forced to make their accounting system more transparent; he induced hem to cooperate with SMEs to create productive value chain.
Fourth, this is difficult. Japan should stop thinking that they are superior to other races. The demographic problem and the problem of shrinking labour force can be solved only through immigration. Immigrants will not come, unless the racial discrimination is solved in Japan. But, it should be pointed out that the immigration policy is one of the most difficult government policies. Japan should learn much from Canada which has a very successful immigration policy.
*
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Professor Joseph H. Chung is professor of economics and co-director of the East Asia Laboratory (OAE)-the Study Center for Integration and Globalization (CEIM), Quebec University in Montreal (UQAM). He is Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
Featured image: Suga announcing the new imperial era name “Reiwa” on 1 April 2019 (CC BY 4.0)


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-07--Treadmill of Magic Seeds and Broken Promises: Dismantling the Myth of Bt Cotton Success in India

Political posturing aligned with commercial interests means that truth is becoming a casualty in the debate about genetically modified ( GM ) crops in India .
The industry narrative surrounding Bt cotton is that it has been a great success .
The current Modi-led administration is parroting this claim and argues its success must be replicated by adopting a range of GM food crops , amounting to what would be a full-scale entry of GM technology into Indian agriculture .
Currently , Bt cotton is India ’ s only officially approved commercially cultivated GM crop .
With the aim of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ event took place on Friday , 6 September in New Delhi at the Constitution Club of India during which it was declared that Bt cotton has been a costly and damaging failure .
Speakers included prominent environmentalists Aruna Rodrigues and Vandana Shiva who presented a good deal of information based on official reports , research papers and documents submitted as evidence to the Supreme Court on Bt cotton .
It was argued that even the government ’ s own data contradicts its tale of Bt cotton success and that the consequences of irresponsibly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a false narrative would be disastrous for the country .
In the early 2000s , Bt cotton was being heavily promoted in India on the basis it would cut pesticide use dramatically , boost yields and contribute to the financial well-being of farmers .
However , pesticide use is back to pre-Bt levels and yields have stagnated or are falling .
Moreover , some 31 countries rank above India in terms of cotton yield and of these only 10 grow GM cotton .
As will be shown , farmers now find themselves on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with an increasing number of Bt/insecticide resistant pests and rising costs of production .
For many small-scale cotton farmers , this has resulted in greater levels of indebtedness and financial distress .
Over 90 % of cotton sown in India is now Bt .
Although initially introduced to the country in 2002 , its adoption was only about 12 and 38 % respectively in 2005 and 2006 .
A good deal of data was contained in the media briefing that accompanied the event in Delhi .
In it , Aruna Rodrigues and Vandana @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2005-2006 ) , average yields had already reached the current plateau of about 450-500 kg/ha .
Average all-India Bt cotton yields hovered around or below 500 kg/ha during the period 2005-2018 .
What is particularly revealing is that cotton production for 2018-2019 will be the lowest in a decade , down to an estimated 420.72 kg/ha , according to a press release issued in July by the Cotton Association of India .
Furthermore , the argument is that increases in yields that may have occurred were in any case due to various factors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high-yielding hybrid seeds , and not Bt technology .
The data presented by Rodrigues and Shiva shows that cotton yield in the pre-Bt era increased significantly from its 191 kg/ha low in 2002 to 318 kg/ha in 2004-2005 , registering an increase of 66 % in just three years ( the baseline for Bt cotton is 2005-2006 as prior to this adoption rates were not significant ) .
The two environmentalists say this was a result of increased acreage under hybrids and a new class of insecticides .
They note that the momentum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bt era and had nothing to do with that technology .
Their argument is that Bt cotton has failed but is being trumpeted as a success under the cover of increased fertiliser use , hybrid seed trait yield ( not attributable to Bt technology ) , better irrigation and insecticide seed coating .
Bt technology was used in conjunction with high-yielding hybrids ( as opposed to pure line varieties ) and has no trait for intrinsic yield .
This , Rodrigues and Shiva argue , conveniently allowed a smudging of the yield data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yield would prove to be difficult ) and also provided a ‘ value-capture ’ mechanism for Monsanto : the introduction of these hybrids disallows seed saving , forcing farmers to buy new expensive hybrid Bt cotton seed each year ( hybridisation gives one-time vigour ) .
Prior to Bt cotton , the extensive use of insecticides to cope with the Pink Bollworm ( PBW ) , which is native to India , had become a problem .
Spraying for PBW caused outbreaks of the American Bollworm ( ABW ) .
The ABW is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extensive insecticide use and became the target for Bt cotton .
Although Bt cotton was supposed to control both species of bollworm , PBW resistance to Bt toxin has now occurred and the ABW is also developing resistance .
Moreover , post 2002 , new pests have appeared , such as whitefly , jassids and mealybugs .
However , Rodrigues and Shiva note that resistance in PBW now occurs to both Monsanto ’ s Bollgard I and Bollgard II Bt cotton ( BGI and BG II ) .
BGI was replaced by BG @ @ @ @ @ @ @ six years after its introduction because the PBW had developed resistance .
The ABW is also now developing resistance to stacked Bt toxins in BG II .
Hybrids are input intensive and are sown at suboptimal wide spacing .
Unlike in other countries that grow Bt cotton , they are long season cottons and are thus more susceptible to pest build-up .
With this in mind , Rodrigues and Shiva refer to Dr K R Kranthi , former director of the Central Institute for Cotton Research , who says : “ Insecticide usage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development in sucking pests to imidacloprid and other neonicotinoid insecticides—by 2012 insecticide usage was at 2002 levels and will continue to increase inducing further outbreaks of insecticide and Bt resistant pests.
” Bt cotton hybrids also require more human labour and perform better under irrigation .
However , 66 % of cotton in India is cultivated in rain fed areas , where yields depend on the timing and quantity of highly variable monsoon rains .
Unreliable rains , the high costs of Bt hybrid seed , continued insecticide use and debt have placed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a situation of severe financial hardship .
In fact , Professor A P Gutierrez argues that Bt cotton has effectively put these farmers in a corporate noose : his research has noted a link between Bt cotton , weather , yields , financial distress and farmer suicides .
Rodrigues and Shiva note that Monsanto was allowed a ‘ royalty ’ on Bollgard I seed without having a patent on it .
Drawing on conservative estimates ( by K R Kranthi ) , on average , the additional expenditure on seeds ( compared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rs 1,179 per hectare and the Indian farmer may have spent a total extra amount of Rs 14,000 crores ( 140 billion ) on Bt cotton seeds during the period 2002-2018 .
The trait value charged ( 2002-2018 ) is around Rs 7,000 crores .
This excludes royalties accruing to Mahyco-Monsanto , which were illegal on Bollgard I ( first generation Bt cotton ) and yet allowed by the regulators .
Overall net profit for cotton farmers was Rs 5,971/ha in 2003 ( pre-Bt ) but plummeted to average net losses of Rs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kg/ha exhibited a 2.2-fold increase .
As Bt technology was being rolled out , costs of production were thus increasing .
And these costs were increasing in the face of stagnant yields .
At this point , it is worth broadening the scope of this article by noting that in 2010 , an indefinite moratorium was placed on Bt brinjal , which would have been India ’ s first GM food crop .
Despite the current push for a full-scale entry of GM into Indian agriculture , the moratorium is still in place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , negligence and lack of competence inherent in the GM regulatory process that were acknowledged at that time remain unaddressed .
It would therefore be grossly irresponsible to roll out GM .
If the experience of Bt cotton tells us anything , it would also be extremely unwise to proceed without carrying out independent health , environmental and socio-economic risk assessments .
Of course , establishing the need for GM – crops that outperform current non-GM options currently available – is paramount but totally absent .
With this in mind , Rodrigues and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and newer methods outperform GM agriculture at much less cost , release fewer carbon emissions and earn much greater profits for farmers .
Given this situation ( the fraud of GM and its dubious track record aside ) , anyone could be forgiven for thinking that the plan to get GM into Indian agriculture is solely driven by ideology and commercial interest .
Instead of drawing on proven traditional knowledge and practices to ensure food security , the strategy seems to be to place farmers on biotech-chemical treadmills for the benefit of corporate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Green Revolution , it too was also sold under the guise of ‘ feeding the world ’ .
But in India , according to Professor Glenn Stone , it merely led to more wheat in the diet , while food productivity per capita showed no increase or actually decreased .
Nevertheless , there have been dire consequences for the Indian diet , the environment , farmers , rural communities and public health .
More generally , the Green Revolution dovetailed with an international system of chemical-dependent , agro-export mono-cropping and big infrastructure projects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sovereign debt repayment and World Bank/IMF directives , the outcomes of which included a displacement of the peasantry , the consolidation of global agri-food oligopolies and the transformation of many countries into food deficit regions .
Often regarded as Green Revolution 2.0 , the ‘ gene revolution ’ is integral to the plan to ‘ modernise ’ Indian agriculture This means the displacement of peasant farmers , further corporate consolidation and commercialisation based on industrial-scale monocrop farms incorporated into global supply chains dominated by transnational agribusiness and retail giants .
It would also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
GM-based agriculture is key to what would amount to a wholesale corporate capture of the agri-food sector : a sure-fire money spinner that would dwarf the amount drained from India courtesy of Monsanto ’ s ‘ royalties ’ on Bt cotton .
This wholesale shift to industrial agriculture would have devastating impacts on the environment , rural communities , public health , local and regional food security , seed sovereignty , nutritional yield per acre , water tables and soil quality , etc .
Industrial agriculture has massive health , social and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public and taxpayers , certainly not by the ( subsidised ) corporations that rake in the massive profits .
It is no surprise , therefore , that an increasing international consensus is emerging on the role of agroecology .
In this respect , smallholder farmers are not to be regarded as residues from the past but as being crucial to the future .
And this is not lost on Rodrigues and Shiva who note the vital importance and productivity of small farms ( which outperform industrial-scale enterprises and feed most of the global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farming .
They refer to the recent UN FAO High Level Panel of Experts which concludes that agroecology provides greatly improved food security and nutritional , gender , environmental and yield benefits compared to industrial agriculture .
Furthermore , according to Rodrigues and Shiva , regenerative organic farming can draw down excess carbon from the atmosphere and put it in the soil , thereby reversing climate change and making agriculture climate resilient .
They argue that organic systems are competitive with conventional yields and leach no toxic chemicals .
As for cotton , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of cotton varieties are highly amenable to low-cost organic farming , providing an excellent opportunity for India to emerge as a global leader in organic cotton .
The take-home message is that if GM food crops are to be rolled out – based on a narrative about Bt cotton that relies more on industry spin than actual facts – it would be disastrous for India .
Given the evidence , it ’ s a warning that should not be taken lightly .
An eight-page briefing was issued to coincide with the media event @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and numerous informative charts .
It can be accessed here .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums .
etc .
Colin Todhunter is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research .
Featured image is from Abhishek Srivastava / Flickr / CC BY 2.0

First published in 2019.
Political posturing aligned with commercial interests means that truth is becoming a casualty in the debate about genetically modified (GM) crops in India. The industry narrative surrounding Bt cotton is that it has been a great success. The current Modi-led administration is parroting this claim and argues its success must be replicated by adopting a range of GM food crops, amounting to what would be a full-scale entry of GM technology into Indian agriculture. Currently, Bt cotton is India’s only officially approved commercially cultivated GM crop.
With the aim of putting the record straight, a media event took place on Friday, 6 September in New Delhi at the Constitution Club of India during which it was declared that Bt cotton has been a costly and damaging failure. Speakers included prominent environmentalists Aruna Rodrigues and Vandana Shiva who presented a good deal of information based on official reports, research papers and documents submitted as evidence to the Supreme Court on Bt cotton.
It was argued that even the government’s own data contradicts its tale of Bt cotton success and that the consequences of irresponsibly rolling out various GM crops based on a false narrative would be disastrous for the country.
PR and broken promises
In the early 2000s, Bt cotton was being heavily promoted in India on the basis it would cut pesticide use dramatically, boost yields and contribute to the financial well-being of farmers. However, pesticide use is back to pre-Bt levels and yields have stagnated or are falling. Moreover, some 31 countries rank above India in terms of cotton yield and of these only 10 grow GM cotton.
As will be shown, farmers now find themselves on a chemical-biotech treadmill and have to deal with an increasing number of Bt/insecticide resistant pests and rising costs of production. For many small-scale cotton farmers, this has resulted in greater levels of indebtedness and financial distress.
Failure to yield
Over 90% of cotton sown in India is now Bt. Although initially introduced to the country in 2002, its adoption was only about 12 and 38% respectively in 2005 and 2006. A good deal of data was contained in the media briefing that accompanied the event in Delhi. In it, Aruna Rodrigues and Vandana Shiva show that, even then (2005-2006), average yields had already reached the current plateau of about 450-500 kg/ha. Average all-India Bt cotton yields hovered around or below 500 kg/ha during the period 2005-2018.
What is particularly revealing is that cotton production for 2018-2019 will be the lowest in a decade, down to an estimated 420.72 kg/ha, according to a press release issued in July by the Cotton Association of India.
Furthermore, the argument is that increases in yields that may have occurred were in any case due to various factors, such as increased fertiliser use and high-yielding hybrid seeds, and not Bt technology.
The data presented by Rodrigues and Shiva shows that cotton yield in the pre-Bt era increased significantly from its 191 kg/ha low in 2002 to 318 kg/ha in 2004-2005, registering an increase of 66% in just three years (the baseline for Bt cotton is 2005-2006 as prior to this adoption rates were not significant). The two environmentalists say this was a result of increased acreage under hybrids and a new class of insecticides.
They note that the momentum of this upward swing carried into the Bt era and had nothing to do with that technology. Their argument is that Bt cotton has failed but is being trumpeted as a success under the cover of increased fertiliser use, hybrid seed trait yield (not attributable to Bt technology), better irrigation and insecticide seed coating.
Biotech treadmill and ecological disruption
Bt technology was used in conjunction with high-yielding hybrids (as opposed to pure line varieties) and has no trait for intrinsic yield. This, Rodrigues and Shiva argue, conveniently allowed a smudging of the yield data (isolating the precise impact of hybrid yield would prove to be difficult) and also provided a ‘value-capture’ mechanism for Monsanto: the introduction of these hybrids disallows seed saving, forcing farmers to buy new expensive hybrid Bt cotton seed each year (hybridisation gives one-time vigour).
Prior to Bt cotton, the extensive use of insecticides to cope with the Pink Bollworm (PBW), which is native to India, had become a problem. Spraying for PBW caused outbreaks of the American Bollworm (ABW). The ABW is a secondary pest that was induced by extensive insecticide use and became the target for Bt cotton.
Although Bt cotton was supposed to control both species of bollworm, PBW resistance to Bt toxin has now occurred and the ABW is also developing resistance. Moreover, post 2002, new pests have appeared, such as whitefly, jassids and mealybugs.
However, Rodrigues and Shiva note that resistance in PBW now occurs to both Monsanto’s Bollgard I and Bollgard II Bt cotton (BGI and BG II). BGI was replaced by BG II as early as 2007-8, just six years after its introduction because the PBW had developed resistance. The ABW is also now developing resistance to stacked Bt toxins in BG II.
Irresponsible roll out
Hybrids are input intensive and are sown at suboptimal wide spacing. Unlike in other countries that grow Bt cotton, they are long season cottons and are thus more susceptible to pest build-up. With this in mind, Rodrigues and Shiva refer to Dr K R Kranthi, former director of the Central Institute for Cotton Research, who says:
“Insecticide usage is increasing each year because of resistance development in sucking pests to imidacloprid and other neonicotinoid insecticides—by 2012 insecticide usage was at 2002 levels and will continue to increase inducing further outbreaks of insecticide and Bt resistant pests.”
Bt cotton hybrids also require more human labour and perform better under irrigation. However, 66% of cotton in India is cultivated in rain fed areas, where yields depend on the timing and quantity of highly variable monsoon rains. Unreliable rains, the high costs of Bt hybrid seed, continued insecticide use and debt have placed many poor (marginal) smallholder farmers in a situation of severe financial hardship.
In fact, Professor A P Gutierrez argues that Bt cotton has effectively put these farmers in a corporate noose: his research has noted a link between Bt cotton, weather, yields, financial distress and farmer suicides.
Monsanto’s profiteering
Rodrigues and Shiva note that Monsanto was allowed a ‘royalty’ on Bollgard I seed without having a patent on it. Drawing on conservative estimates (by K R Kranthi), on average, the additional expenditure on seeds (compared to non-Bt seeds) was at least Rs 1,179 per hectare and the Indian farmer may have spent a total extra amount of Rs 14,000 crores (140 billion) on Bt cotton seeds during the period 2002-2018. The trait value charged (2002-2018) is around Rs 7,000 crores. This excludes royalties accruing to Mahyco-Monsanto, which were illegal on Bollgard I (first generation Bt cotton) and yet allowed by the regulators.
Overall net profit for cotton farmers was Rs 5,971/ha in 2003 (pre-Bt) but plummeted to average net losses of Rs 6,286 in 2015, while fertiliser use kg/ha exhibited a 2.2-fold increase. As Bt technology was being rolled out, costs of production were thus increasing. And these costs were increasing in the face of stagnant yields.
Why GM anyway?
At this point, it is worth broadening the scope of this article by noting that in 2010, an indefinite moratorium was placed on Bt brinjal, which would have been India’s first GM food crop. Despite the current push for a full-scale entry of GM into Indian agriculture, the moratorium is still in place: the conflicts of interest, secrecy, negligence and lack of competence inherent in the GM regulatory process that were acknowledged at that time remain unaddressed.
It would therefore be grossly irresponsible to roll out GM. If the experience of Bt cotton tells us anything, it would also be extremely unwise to proceed without carrying out independent health, environmental and socio-economic risk assessments.
Of course, establishing the need for GM – crops that outperform current non-GM options currently available – is paramount but totally absent. With this in mind, Rodrigues and Shiva cite evidence that traditional plant breeding and newer methods outperform GM agriculture at much less cost, release fewer carbon emissions and earn much greater profits for farmers.
Given this situation (the fraud of GM and its dubious track record aside), anyone could be forgiven for thinking that the plan to get GM into Indian agriculture is solely driven by ideology and commercial interest. Instead of drawing on proven traditional knowledge and practices to ensure food security, the strategy seems to be to place farmers on biotech-chemical treadmills for the benefit of corporate interests.
Green Revolution to ‘gene revolution’
If we look at the Green Revolution, it too was also sold under the guise of ‘feeding the world’. But in India, according to Professor Glenn Stone, it merely led to more wheat in the diet, while food productivity per capita showed no increase or actually decreased. Nevertheless, there have been dire consequences for the Indian diet, the environment, farmers, rural communities and public health.
More generally, the Green Revolution dovetailed with an international system of chemical-dependent, agro-export mono-cropping and big infrastructure projects (dams) linked to loans, sovereign debt repayment and World Bank/IMF directives, the outcomes of which included a displacement of the peasantry, the consolidation of global agri-food oligopolies and the transformation of many countries into food deficit regions.
Often regarded as Green Revolution 2.0, the ‘gene revolution’ is integral to the plan to ‘modernise’ Indian agriculture . This means the displacement of peasant farmers, further corporate consolidation and commercialisation based on industrial-scale monocrop farms incorporated into global supply chains dominated by transnational agribusiness and retail giants. It would also mean the undermining of national food security.
GM-based agriculture is key to what would amount to a wholesale corporate capture of the agri-food sector: a sure-fire money spinner that would dwarf the amount drained from India courtesy of Monsanto’s ‘royalties’ on Bt cotton.
Agroecological solutions
This wholesale shift to industrial agriculture would have devastating impacts on the environment, rural communities, public health, local and regional food security, seed sovereignty, nutritional yield per acre, water tables and soil quality, etc. Industrial agriculture has massive health, social and environmental costs which are borne by the public and taxpayers, certainly not by the (subsidised) corporations that rake in the massive profits.
It is no surprise, therefore, that an increasing international consensus is emerging on the role of agroecology. In this respect, smallholder farmers are not to be regarded as residues from the past but as being crucial to the future.
And this is not lost on Rodrigues and Shiva who note the vital importance and productivity of small farms (which outperform industrial-scale enterprises and feed most of the global population) and the advantages of agroecological farming. They refer to the recent UN FAO High Level Panel of Experts which concludes that agroecology provides greatly improved food security and nutritional, gender, environmental and yield benefits compared to industrial agriculture.
Furthermore, according to Rodrigues and Shiva, regenerative organic farming can draw down excess carbon from the atmosphere and put it in the soil, thereby reversing climate change and making agriculture climate resilient. They argue that organic systems are competitive with conventional yields and leach no toxic chemicals. As for cotton, they state that ‘desi’ species of cotton varieties are highly amenable to low-cost organic farming, providing an excellent opportunity for India to emerge as a global leader in organic cotton.
The take-home message is that if GM food crops are to be rolled out – based on a narrative about Bt cotton that relies more on industry spin than actual facts – it would be disastrous for India. Given the evidence, it’s a warning that should not be taken lightly.
An eight-page briefing was issued to coincide with the media event and contains relevant references, additional data and numerous informative charts. It can be accessed here.
*
Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.
Colin Todhunter is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research.
Featured image is from Abhishek Srivastava / Flickr / CC BY 2.0


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-07--Australia: Are the “Chooks Coming Home to Roost” for the British Empire, and Their Treatment of Slav

Australia: Are the “Chooks Coming Home to Roost” for the British Empire, and Their Treatment of Slaves Around the World?

This article was originally published in June 2020 .
Australia ’ s Admission to the treatment of the indigenous people , as their slaves , came to light recently when Prime Minister Morrison revealed some of the detail of Australia ’ s “ treatment of slaves ” .
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has apologised for saying on Thursday that there was no slavery in Australia , after he was accused of ignoring the nation ’ s history of forced labour .
Speaking on a Sydney radio on Thursday , Scott Morrison argued against the idea and claimed that Australia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of other countries of the colonial era .
“ Well , when you ’ re talking about Captain James Cook , in his time he was one of the most enlightened persons on these issues you could imagine , ” he said .
“ While slave ships continued to travel around the world , when Australia was established , sure it was a pretty brutal settlement … but there was no slavery in Australia.
” The exploitation of Aboriginal labour took place until the 1970s , with wages being paid not directly to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Protection Acts ” .
Last year the Queensland government agreed to pay 10,000 Indigenous people a total of $ 190 million for wages unpaid between 1939 and 1972 .
How will Britain answer for their treatment and exploitation of the people from India , who were sent as slaves to South Africa , Fiji , and elsewhere around the world – to work in the sugar cane fields .
Those people sent from India , were slaves of the British Empire .
Let the flood gates open .
A very sorrowful state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people from not only India ; what about Africa ?
Let the “ movement ” change what has been wrong for so many years .
Britain ’ s time to answer the questions , and compensate .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums .
etc .
Gordon J Brigsley is a writer , contributing to the information flow , in creating a thinking and understanding in challenging what is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and challenging the mainstream media “ news ” .
Gordon is a professional , with a passion to see the wrongs of the world analysed and shared with those who have an enquiring mind , and ( hopefully ) those who can be enlightened through accurate and honest reporting .
Gordon can be contacted at [ email protected ]

This article was originally published in June 2020.
Australia’s Admission to the treatment of the indigenous people, as their slaves, came to light recently when Prime Minister Morrison revealed some of the detail of Australia’s “treatment of slaves”.
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has apologised for saying on Thursday that there was no slavery in Australia, after he was accused of ignoring the nation’s history of forced labour.
“My comments were not intended to give offence and if they did, I deeply regret that, and apologise for that,” Morrison said on Friday, admitting that there have been “all sorts of hideous practices” in Australia.
Speaking on a Sydney radio on Thursday, Scott Morrison argued against the idea and claimed that Australia’s record was better than that of other countries of the colonial era.
“Well, when you’re talking about Captain James Cook, in his time he was one of the most enlightened persons on these issues you could imagine,” he said. “While slave ships continued to travel around the world, when Australia was established, sure it was a pretty brutal settlement … but there was no slavery in Australia.”
The exploitation of Aboriginal labour took place until the 1970s, with wages being paid not directly to them but to the state through special “Protection Acts”. Last year the Queensland government agreed to pay 10,000 Indigenous people a total of $190 million for wages unpaid between 1939 and 1972.
How will Britain answer for their treatment and exploitation of the people from India, who were sent as slaves to South Africa, Fiji, and elsewhere around the world – to work in the sugar cane fields. Those people sent from India, were slaves of the British Empire.
Let the flood gates open. A very sorrowful state – Britain – which lead the enslaving of people from not only India; what about Africa?
Let the “movement” change what has been wrong for so many years. Britain’s time to answer the questions, and compensate.
*
Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.
Gordon J Brigsley is a writer, contributing to the information flow, in creating a thinking and understanding in challenging what is really happening in our world today; and challenging the mainstream media “news”. Gordon is a professional, with a passion to see the wrongs of the world analysed and shared with those who have an enquiring mind, and (hopefully) those who can be enlightened through accurate and honest reporting. Gordon can be contacted at [email protected].


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-09--Omnibus Collisions: Coronavirus Policing and Overreach in Victoria

In her September 17 speech to parliament , the Attorney General of the Australian state of Victoria , Jill Hennessy , explained various provisions of the COVID-19 Omnibus ( Emergency Measures ) and Other Acts Amendment Bill .
Of most interest was the proposal that would dramatically inflate the scope of public health power in ostensibly preventing a spread of COVID-19 .
“ The broader class of persons who may be appointed as authorised officers may include public sector employees from Victoria and other jurisdictions .
For example , health services staff , WorkSafe officers such as Inspectors , Victoria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The formulation seemed an odd one : health services staff as designated officers to halt transmission perhaps , but unqualified members of the Victoria Police , along with Protective Service Officers ?
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services was the proposed appointer ; the appointees ( “ authorised officers ” ) would be anybody deemed to possess appropriate skills , attributes or experience .
Such elevated , muscularly vested officers would have the power to detain anyone who has tested positive for COVID-19 , or anyone who had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for a period “ reasonably necessary to eliminate a serious risk to public health , ” provided it was “ reasonably believed ” they would fail to comply with a direction of self-quarantine .
Hennessy evaded the severe implications of such a broadly worded provision , arguing for convenience and efficiency , the two traditional hallmarks of the authoritarian mentality .
The appointment power would focus upon “ individuals with particular attributes , such as connection to particular communities ” .
“ Contact tracing ” would be able to take place in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for any oversight limitations , these appointments would be subject to a “ specific instrument ” outlining specific authority and limitations authorised by the Secretary and Chief Health Officer .
This was something that did not escape the notice of some members of the Victorian Parliament .
Greens MP Tim Read noted how the Omnibus Bill , in that draft form , gave police , protective services officers and private security guards powers to unilaterally determine who constituted a high risk with little regard to medical expertise .
“ Currently only public servants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make that decision ” .
Enforcing directions was a separate function of law enforcement .
“ So the bill would allow police to both make health directions on individuals and then to enforce them.
” The Omnibus Bill also saw various legal advocates spring into action .
Michael Borsky QC went for understatement in claimingthat detaining someone for hypothetical future conduct was a “ very unusual legal construct ” .
The provision was “ open to abuse ” .
Nor did impress the legal heads at the Victorian Bar , where there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for appointing such officers was deemed too “ broad and generic ” .
Their lack of precision “ potentially opened the door for those who are not trained as health professionals to be appointed ‘ authorised officers ’ .
” Granting such individuals unilateral powers of detention against individuals not abiding by a public health direction was another point of concern .
An officer ’ s “ reasonable belief ” was a “ standard of validation ” vast and subjective .
The Victorian Bar also suggested some measure of accountability : that decisions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reviewed by the Chief Health Officer ( or senior delegate ) within a short , stipulated period ( preferably not longer than 24 hours ) .
” The talents of Victorian policing have already been found wanting during one of the most extreme lockdown measures in the developed world .
Reem Mussa , humanitarian advisor on forced migration to Médicins Sans Frontières , remembered the terror caused by the appearance of five hundred police “ on housing estates [ in Melbourne ] , trapping residents inside with no coherent health strategy or plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with access to medication and essentials.
” 23 confirmed cases of COVID-19 had been found on the estates in July .
Panic coursed through the various administrative arms of government .
In September , a very public display of policing mismanagement took place with the arrest of Ballarat resident Zoe Buhler , a pregnant mother apprehended in front of her children and husband in their home for a Facebook post inciting protest against the lockdown rules .
No police officer thought it necessary to explain the offence of incitement , nor accept her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It was such conduct that prompted Greg Barns of the Australian Lawyers Alliance to argue for limits on police powers when linked to pandemic controls .
The Police Accountability Project , based at the Flemington & Kensington Community Legal Centre in Melbourne , has also been alarmed by the aggressive , untutored policing formula pursued in the state .
“ The policing we have seen in Victoria to date and the scale of the policing we have seen [ on July 4 ] and today in Flemington & North Melbourne , has caused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the course of the lockdown , the PAP project has noted ten concerns about how harsh Stage 4 restrictions have been enforced .
A few are worth noting .
Police , for instance , were ill trained to make complex assessments about exemptions requiring health expertise .
“ Police ignored genuine health based exemptions and continually resorted to lock-down responses because it more closely aligned with their training.
” They had failed to comprehend the public health impacts of their work , and that most pressing of points that policing “ undermines public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been “ applied in a discriminatory , abusive and harmful manner.
” With such a stunning resume of faults and blunders , it is a wonder how the drafters in the Attorney-General ’ s department took leave of their senses .
On October 8 , the Victorian government quietly trimmed parts of the proposed bill dealing with detention .
Finding themselves in retreat , a flutter of qualifications were made .
“ We have always said we would negotiate in good faith , ” claimed a less than chastened Hennessy .
Giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have made such amendments that will continue “ to deliver the temporary , necessary changes we need to respond to the challenges the pandemic presents ” .
According to Guardian Australia , the proposed table of changes will still preserve the power to appoint police and protective services officers as authorised officers , but with fewer powers .
They will still be able to exercise considerable discretion in , for instance , searching property without a warrant if “ necessary for the purpose of investigation , eliminating or reducing the risk to public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making police and security personnel pseudo-health officers remain .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College , Cambridge .
He lectures at RMIT University , Melbourne .
He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research .
Email : [ email protected ] Featured image : A woman walks her dogs in Fitzroy Gardens park as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Melbourne , Victoria , Australia [ David Crosling/EPA ]

In her September 17 speech to parliament, the Attorney General of the Australian state of Victoria, Jill Hennessy, explained various provisions of the COVID-19 Omnibus (Emergency Measures) and Other Acts Amendment Bill. Of most interest was the proposal that would dramatically inflate the scope of public health power in ostensibly preventing a spread of COVID-19. “The broader class of persons who may be appointed as authorised officers may include public sector employees from Victoria and other jurisdictions. For example, health services staff, WorkSafe officers such as Inspectors, Victoria Police members and Protective Service Officers.”
The formulation seemed an odd one: health services staff as designated officers to halt transmission perhaps, but unqualified members of the Victoria Police, along with Protective Service Officers? The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services was the proposed appointer; the appointees (“authorised officers”) would be anybody deemed to possess appropriate skills, attributes or experience. Such elevated, muscularly vested officers would have the power to detain anyone who has tested positive for COVID-19, or anyone who had been in close contact with a positive case, for a period “reasonably necessary to eliminate a serious risk to public health,” provided it was “reasonably believed” they would fail to comply with a direction of self-quarantine.
Hennessy evaded the severe implications of such a broadly worded provision, arguing for convenience and efficiency, the two traditional hallmarks of the authoritarian mentality. The appointment power would focus upon “individuals with particular attributes, such as connection to particular communities”. “Contact tracing” would be able to take place in “a culturally safe manner.” A for any oversight limitations, these appointments would be subject to a “specific instrument” outlining specific authority and limitations authorised by the Secretary and Chief Health Officer.
This was something that did not escape the notice of some members of the Victorian Parliament. Greens MP Tim Read noted how the Omnibus Bill, in that draft form, gave police, protective services officers and private security guards powers to unilaterally determine who constituted a high risk with little regard to medical expertise. “Currently only public servants with the relevant skills and experience can make that decision”. Enforcing directions was a separate function of law enforcement. “So the bill would allow police to both make health directions on individuals and then to enforce them.”
The Omnibus Bill also saw various legal advocates spring into action. Michael Borsky QC went for understatement in claimingthat detaining someone for hypothetical future conduct was a “very unusual legal construct”. The provision was “open to abuse”. Nor did impress the legal heads at the Victorian Bar, where there was much head shaking. The proposed criteria for appointing such officers was deemed too “broad and generic”. Their lack of precision “potentially opened the door for those who are not trained as health professionals to be appointed ‘authorised officers’.”
Granting such individuals unilateral powers of detention against individuals not abiding by a public health direction was another point of concern. An officer’s “reasonable belief” was a “standard of validation” vast and subjective. The Victorian Bar also suggested some measure of accountability: that decisions made by such authorised officers be “reviewed by the Chief Health Officer (or senior delegate) within a short, stipulated period (preferably not longer than 24 hours).”
The talents of Victorian policing have already been found wanting during one of the most extreme lockdown measures in the developed world. Reem Mussa, humanitarian advisor on forced migration to Médicins Sans Frontières, remembered the terror caused by the appearance of five hundred police “on housing estates [in Melbourne], trapping residents inside with no coherent health strategy or plans to keep them safe, fed or with access to medication and essentials.” 23 confirmed cases of COVID-19 had been found on the estates in July. Panic coursed through the various administrative arms of government.
In September, a very public display of policing mismanagement took place with the arrest of Ballarat resident Zoe Buhler, a pregnant mother apprehended in front of her children and husband in their home for a Facebook post inciting protest against the lockdown rules. No police officer thought it necessary to explain the offence of incitement, nor accept her offer to remove the offending post. It was such conduct that prompted Greg Barns of the Australian Lawyers Alliance to argue for limits on police powers when linked to pandemic controls.
The Police Accountability Project, based at the Flemington & Kensington Community Legal Centre in Melbourne, has also been alarmed by the aggressive, untutored policing formula pursued in the state. “The policing we have seen in Victoria to date and the scale of the policing we have seen [on July 4] and today in Flemington & North Melbourne, has caused and continues to do harm.”
Over the course of the lockdown, the PAP project has noted ten concerns about how harsh Stage 4 restrictions have been enforced. A few are worth noting. Police, for instance, were ill trained to make complex assessments about exemptions requiring health expertise. “Police ignored genuine health based exemptions and continually resorted to lock-down responses because it more closely aligned with their training.” They had failed to comprehend the public health impacts of their work, and that most pressing of points that policing “undermines public health responses.” The policing of curfews had been “applied in a discriminatory, abusive and harmful manner.” With such a stunning resume of faults and blunders, it is a wonder how the drafters in the Attorney-General’s department took leave of their senses.
On October 8, the Victorian government quietly trimmed parts of the proposed bill dealing with detention. Finding themselves in retreat, a flutter of qualifications were made. “We have always said we would negotiate in good faith,” claimed a less than chastened Hennessy. Giving little away, the Attorney-General claims to have made such amendments that will continue “to deliver the temporary, necessary changes we need to respond to the challenges the pandemic presents”.
According to Guardian Australia, the proposed table of changes will still preserve the power to appoint police and protective services officers as authorised officers, but with fewer powers. They will still be able to exercise considerable discretion in, for instance, searching property without a warrant if “necessary for the purpose of investigation, eliminating or reducing the risk to public health”. The daft dangers of making police and security personnel pseudo-health officers remain.
*
Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]
Featured image: A woman walks her dogs in Fitzroy Gardens park as police and defence force officers patrol in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia [David Crosling/EPA]


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-12--Malaysia: A Clear Direction for the Present

Malaysians at this moment are concerned about two different types of numbers .
The overwhelming majority are worried about the recent spike in Covid 19 infections and the increase in the number of related deaths .
There is a much smaller segment of the population that is focussed upon the number of members of Parliament that the leader of the Opposition Anwar Ibrahim can mobilise in his bid to oust current Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and seize the post for himself .
If Covid deaths in Malaysia are small compared to many other countries , the impact of the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It has increased the destitution of the poor and vulnerable in our midst .
In contrast , Anwar ’ s pursuit of numbers is linked to one man ’ s obsessive ambition to become Prime Minister .
It is an obsession that has expressed itself on other occasions in the last 22 years .
In 1998 he sought to undermine then UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad through certain unscrupulous party functionaries when the nation was facing a massive financial and economic crisis .
In 2008 , he attempted to topple @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Badawi through an unsuccessful bid to engineer cross-overs in parliament though Abdullah ’ s Barisan coalition was just 8 seats short of a two-thirds majority .
Today , he is trying again encouraged by the fact that Muhyiddin has only a razor thin majority in Parliament .
However , he forgets that Muhyiddin is widely perceived as a leader who has managed Malaysia ’ s twin health and economic crises with a sincere heart and a steady hand .
For Anwar and his supporters , Muhyuddin still lacks legitimacy because he had set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government and instead teamed up with their foe , namely UMNO .
While all these manoeuvres were not illegal , they continue to raise ethical issues .
But how can these ethical issues be resolved if Anwar is now willing to collude with tarnished characters in UMNO in order to get rid of Muhyiddin and become Prime Minister ?
It is not through morally questionable moves that one will be able to restore integrity to the political process .
Perhaps it is only through a general election that one can re-set the moral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Sabah , one has every reason to be apprehensive about a general election and how it could lead to an explosion of Covid cases .
If it is judicious to avoid a general election , then what other avenues are available to ensure that there is a degree of stability in the political system ?
One , the Conference of Rulers an entity which commands constitutional authority should at a time like this play a much more active role .
As a collective institution it should not only advise and guide the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that political actors do not deviate from their entrusted responsibilities .
In fact the King and individual Sultans have on a few occasions asked political leaders to concentrate upon the Covid and economic crises and not get embroiled in the constant pursuit of political power .
Two , in concrete terms , the Conference of Rulers could persuade the government and the opposition at both federal and state levels to establish a mechanism that would enable them to cooperate closely in finding solutions to the Covid and economic challenges .
Genuine , sincere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in more effective measures especially in the economy which would bring significant benefits to the people .
Three , such cooperation should lead to a situation where the leader of the government , the Prime Minister , and the leader of the Opposition are concerned solely with fulfilling their duties , undertaking their amanah , rather than undermining each other .
The well-being of the people — not their own self-serving interests — would be their overriding passion .
Four , their commitment to the people would translate into policies and laws in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curb certain unsavoury practices which have been detrimental to the national interest .
For instance a law to curb ‘ party hopping ’ which some legislators are working on should be expedited .
Similarly , the proposal to create an ‘ Ombudsman , first mooted in the early seventies , which will endow the office with autonomous powers to investigate and act against wrongdoings that have not received due attention from the government department or agency concerned , should be prioritised without delay .
Five , the Dewan Rakyat and the Dewan Negara @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolutions that will re-affirm the clarion call of the Conference of Rulers to adhere to the 5 Aspirations and the 5 Principles of the Rukunegara as the “ moral compass ” of the nation made on the 10th of October 2017 .
Given the prevailing atmosphere , the Aspirations and Principles serve as laudable guidelines .
If the five proposals made here and other similar ideas are implemented within the next 6 to 9 months , it is quite conceivable that the nation will be able to concentrate upon tackling the Covid challenge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would also be able to devote our time , energy and efforts towards implementing the 2021 Budget and adopting the 12th Malaysia Plan early next year .
The nation will not be distracted by unproductive politics .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums .
etc .
Dr Chandra Muzaffar has been writing about Malaysian politics since the early seventies .
He is a frequent contributor to Global Research .

Malaysians at this moment are concerned about two different types of numbers. The overwhelming majority are worried about the recent spike in Covid 19 infections and the increase in the number of related deaths. There is a much smaller segment of the population that is focussed upon the number of members of Parliament that the leader of the Opposition Anwar Ibrahim can mobilise in his bid to oust current Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and seize the post for himself.
If Covid deaths in Malaysia are small compared to many other countries, the impact of the coronavirus upon lives and livelihoods has been devastating. It has increased the destitution of the poor and vulnerable in our midst. In contrast, Anwar’s pursuit of numbers is linked to one man’s obsessive ambition to become Prime Minister. It is an obsession that has expressed itself on other occasions in the last 22 years. In 1998 he sought to undermine then UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad through certain unscrupulous party functionaries when the nation was facing a massive financial and economic crisis. In 2008, he attempted to topple the elected government of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi through an unsuccessful bid to engineer cross-overs in parliament though Abdullah’s Barisan coalition was just 8 seats short of a two-thirds majority. Today, he is trying again encouraged by the fact that Muhyiddin has only a razor thin majority in Parliament. However, he forgets that Muhyiddin is widely perceived as a leader who has managed Malaysia’s twin health and economic crises with a sincere heart and a steady hand.
For Anwar and his supporters, Muhyuddin still lacks legitimacy because he had set aside his partners in the Pakatan Harapan government and instead teamed up with their foe, namely UMNO. While all these manoeuvres were not illegal, they continue to raise ethical issues. But how can these ethical issues be resolved if Anwar is now willing to collude with tarnished characters in UMNO in order to get rid of Muhyiddin and become Prime Minister ? It is not through morally questionable moves that one will be able to restore integrity to the political process.
Perhaps it is only through a general election that one can re-set the moral barometer. But after what has happened in Sabah, one has every reason to be apprehensive about a general election and how it could lead to an explosion of Covid cases. If it is judicious to avoid a general election, then what other avenues are available to ensure that there is a degree of stability in the political system?
One, the Conference of Rulers an entity which commands constitutional authority should at a time like this play a much more active role. As a collective institution it should not only advise and guide the legislature and the Cabinet but also ensure that political actors do not deviate from their entrusted responsibilities. In fact the King and individual Sultans have on a few occasions asked political leaders to concentrate upon the Covid and economic crises and not get embroiled in the constant pursuit of political power.
Two, in concrete terms, the Conference of Rulers could persuade the government and the opposition at both federal and state levels to establish a mechanism that would enable them to cooperate closely in finding solutions to the Covid and economic challenges. Genuine, sincere cooperation between the two could even result in more effective measures especially in the economy which would bring significant benefits to the people.
Three, such cooperation should lead to a situation where the leader of the government, the Prime Minister, and the leader of the Opposition are concerned solely with fulfilling their duties, undertaking their amanah, rather than undermining each other. The well-being of the people — not their own self-serving interests — would be their overriding passion.
Four, their commitment to the people would translate into policies and laws in the next few months which seek to curb certain unsavoury practices which have been detrimental to the national interest. For instance a law to curb ‘party hopping’ which some legislators are working on should be expedited. Similarly, the proposal to create an ‘ Ombudsman, first mooted in the early seventies, which will endow the office with autonomous powers to investigate and act against wrongdoings that have not received due attention from the government department or agency concerned, should be prioritised without delay.
Five, the Dewan Rakyat and the Dewan Negara should also as soon as possible adopt resolutions that will re-affirm the clarion call of the Conference of Rulers to adhere to the 5 Aspirations and the 5 Principles of the Rukunegara as the “ moral compass” of the nation made on the 10th of October 2017. Given the prevailing atmosphere, the Aspirations and Principles serve as laudable guidelines.
If the five proposals made here and other similar ideas are implemented within the next 6 to 9 months, it is quite conceivable that the nation will be able to concentrate upon tackling the Covid challenge and the current economic woes. We would also be able to devote our time, energy and efforts towards implementing the 2021 Budget and adopting the 12th Malaysia Plan early next year. The nation will not be distracted by unproductive politics.
*
Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.
Dr Chandra Muzaffar has been writing about Malaysian politics since the early seventies. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-13--Deepening Solidarities Beyond Borders Among Southeast Asian Peoples

Several premises underpin the need for new directions and strategies for Southeast Asian civil society groups and movements .
The first is to make a distinction between Southeast Asia as a geographic region and its peoples and diverse cultures and histories on the one hand , and ASEAN as a regional organization locked in a market-centered and state-supported process with a particular ideology and strategy of development on the other .
This strategy was conceived and undertaken by regional and national elites to perpetuate their control over the region ’ s natural resources and productive capacities and rule over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Starting in 1967 as a mechanism to support the United States ( US ) -led Western faction of the Cold War , it has evolved into a tool of the neoliberal market-led agenda of development promoted by global capitalism .
Southeast Asia is a much greater entity than what ASEAN currently encompasses .
Various scholars have argued that the region should not be confined to the ten ASEAN member states , but should include areas in other countries whose peoples bear similar cultural and ethnic characteristics as those who live in what has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In addition to Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste , both of which continue to be denied full ASEAN membership , references have been made of Southeast Asian historical affinities with parts of Northeast India and three southwestern provinces of China ( Scott 2009 , 13–14 ) .3 Our vision of a region without borders is , therefore , not contingent on citizenship and location .

Premises
Several premises underpin the need for new directions and strategies for Southeast Asian civil society groups and movements. The first is to make a distinction between Southeast Asia as a geographic region and its peoples and diverse cultures and histories on the one hand, and ASEAN as a regional organization locked in a market-centered and state-supported process with a particular ideology and strategy of development on the other. This strategy was conceived and undertaken by regional and national elites to perpetuate their control over the region’s natural resources and productive capacities and rule over the greater masses of Southeast Asian peoples. Starting in 1967 as a mechanism to support the United States (US)-led Western faction of the Cold War, it has evolved into a tool of the neoliberal market-led agenda of development promoted by global capitalism.
Southeast Asia is a much greater entity than what ASEAN currently encompasses. Various scholars have argued that the region should not be confined to the ten ASEAN member states, but should include areas in other countries whose peoples bear similar cultural and ethnic characteristics as those who live in what has been normally referred to as Southeast Asia. In addition to Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste, both of which continue to be denied full ASEAN membership, references have been made of Southeast Asian historical affinities with parts of Northeast India and three southwestern provinces of China (Scott 2009, 13–14).3 Our vision of a region without borders is, therefore, not contingent on citizenship and location.