asiapacificresearch--2020-12-18--This Book Turns Everything You Thought You Knew About North Korea Upside Down

How 70 years of CIA deceit and mainstream media complicity convinced the American public that North Korea was the Bad Guy and the U.S. was the Good Guy—when it was almost always the other way around In the United States today , North Korea is the standard reference point for modern-day totalitarianism : a land of darkness that is considered a dangerous security threat because of the development of nuclear missiles capable of striking the U.S. A.B .
Abrams ’ new book , Immovable Object : North Korea ’ s 70 Years at War with American Power ( Clarity Press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common perceptions in the U.S. of North Korea are mostly wrong .
Though the Kim dynasty has ruled through autocratic methods , it has also adopted rational and at times intelligent policies , which have enabled North Korea to weather unprecedented outside hostility and develop into something of a military powerhouse .
Between July and November 2017 , North Korea successfully test-fired three intercontinental range ballistic missiles ( ICBMs ) and a more sophisticated miniaturized thermonuclear warhead , which demonstrated beyond much reasonable doubt that one of America ’ s oldest adversaries had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainland , with U.S. intelligence later confirming the viability of both ICBM designs tested as well as their warheads .
[ 1 ] North Korea as such is no military pushover and may be gaining the upper hand in the long war with the United States—which is a source of pride for its people .
Amidst the backdrop of U.S. sanctions , Pyongyang has recently undergone a major construction boom .
[ Source : 38north.com ] The conflict between the U.S. and North Korea , or Democratic People ’ s Republic of Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea ’ s defiance of the U.S.-led world order .
The DPRK ’ s founding father , Kim Il-Sung , was the son of prominent Korean nationalists Kim Hyong Jik and Kang Pan Sok and a leader of the Manchurian partisan exiles in the Soviet Far East who fought against Japanese colonial occupation .
During Japan ’ s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 , it promoted industrialization and built the Suiho dam—the second largest in the world after the Hoover dam—while also developing a draconian surveillance apparatus and repressing political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its hostility to left-wing , nationalist movements , and construction of a police state apparatus in South Korea , which relied on many former Japanese collaborators .
The U.S. had divided the Koreas artificially at the end of World War II and installed a client regime in the south led by Syngman Rhee , who was flown in on General Douglas MacArthur ’ s plane after having spent years in exile .
CIA reports from the time showed a stark contrast between Kim and Rhee ’ s leadership .
Under Kim ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industry increased exponentially in the DPRK , with average salaries of factory and office workers increasing by 83 percent .
A successful program of land reform also offered new opportunities for rural farmers , and many benefited from state-subsidized health care and education .
The Rhee government , by contrast , triggered a social rebellion through economic policies that were designed to tie South Korea ’ s economy with Japan—which the U.S. was trying to build up as a junior partner in the Cold War—along with a heavy reliance on Japanese collaborators and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreak of the Korean War , the Rhee regime , with the support of U.S. military and police advisers , had killed at least 100,000 of its own people , including through the brutal suppression of a left-wing uprising in the southern island of Cheju-do .
In the late 1940s , the Kim regime promoted the peaceful reunification of the Koreas through free elections .
The U.S. government blocked these elections because they knew that Kim would win—similarly to Vietnam in 1956 when they knew that Ho Chi Minh would win at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a professed commitment to democracy , the U.S. trampled on Korea ’ s sovereignty in order to fulfill its imperial ambitions in Southeast Asia , which the U.S. had ringed with military bases due to its victory in the Pacific War .
The official narrative maintains that the North started the Korean War by invading South Korea on June 25 , 1950 .
However , Abrams ’ account provides strong evidence that it was the other way around .
Bent on achieving what he could never do through the ballot box , Rhee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North , and then on June 25th struck first when they attacked the border city of Haeju .
The South Koreans would later amend their claim to state that they had attacked Haeju at a later date as part of a counter-offensive—long after announcing the successful capture of the city .
American government officials at the time were elated by the outbreak of the Korean War–Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that “ the Korean War came along and saved us.
” This was because it gave an excuse to prevent major cutbacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and strike a blow at communist China , which entered the war in support of the DPRK .
Furthermore , the United States military used Korea , like Vietnam subsequently , as a testing ground for new weapons systems , including super-bazookas and napalm , or jellied gasoline , which burns the flesh .
The North Korean population also served as guinea pigs for medical experiments on prisoners of war ( POWs ) , and for techniques of germ warfare that had been learned from Japanese war criminals who had been secretly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Army Biological Warfare Center at Ft. Detrick , Maryland , at the end of World War II .
According to the Truth Commission that was established decades after the war ended , South Korean ( ROK ) troops committed six times more atrocities than the North Korean People ’ s Army ( KPA ) .
American troops also torched villages , raped local women , and committed dozens of massacres , some of which were motivated by pure racial bigotry .
Summary executions carried out by the South Korean army under U.S. oversight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
[ Source : wikipedia.org ] A fighter pilot , David Tatum , told Time magazine that “ I figured if we had to kill ten civilians to kill one soldier who might later shoot at us , we were justified.
” Retreating American forces destroyed cultural relics such as the shrine of Mo Ran bon and the Yen Myen Sa temple of the Buddha in Pyongyang and tortured and mistreated POWs far more systematically than the North Koreans and Chinese .
Painting of American brutality at the Sinchon Museum of American War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : peacehistory-usfp.org ] The losses North Korea suffered during the war had few parallels in history , with conservative estimates placing the death toll at 20 percent of the population .
The U.S. Air Force dropped between 635,000 and 698,000 tons of bombs compared to 503,000 tons dropped on the Japanese empire during the entirety of the Pacific War .
Thatched huts go up in flames after B-26 bombers unload napalm bombs on a village near Hanchon , North Korea , on May 10 , 1951 .
[ Source : peacehistory-usfp.org ] In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raid on the city of Sinuiju destroyed 2,100 of the 3,017 state and municipal buildings , 6,800 of 11,000 houses , 16 of 17 primary schools , and 15 of 17 places of worship .
Eighty percent of the deaths caused by the bombing were women and children , with survivors forced to live in underground caves .
The attack was intended to maximize casualties beginning with the use of incendiaries followed by explosives , and time bombs which prevented rescue work .
In 1953 , the U.S. Air Force targeted crucial Yalu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the DPRK ’ s rice crop which the already malnourished population needed to subsist .
One report stated that “ the westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple commodity has for the Asian–starvation and slow death.
” These comments epitomize the horrible human consequences of the Korean War , which ended in stalemate with the country permanently divided at the 38th parallel .
Afterwards , General MacArthur and other military commanders acknowledged that they had underestimated the fighting capabilities of the Chinese and North Koreans whom MacArthur @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well led.
” Today , North Koreans consider the Great Fatherland Liberation War a victory , which solidified the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty .
In the U.S. , by contrast , the Korean War is little commemorated or talked about—largely because it contradicts the nation ’ s righteous self-conception .
After the Korean War ended , U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the Rhee government was actively contemplating launching another attack on the North and had threatened use of the hydrogen bomb .
The Eisenhower administration ’ s Korea policy under NSC 5702/2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowed U.S. forces to provide support for a unilateral ROK military initiative against the DPRK .
By January 1958 , the U.S. had stationed approximately 150 nuclear warheads across four different weapons platforms in the ROK , which stimulated development of the North ’ s own nuclear program through collaboration with the Soviet Union .
Tensions boiled over in January 1968 when the KPA captured a U.S. Navy surveillance warship , the U.S.S .
Pueblo—allegedly in coordination with the Vietminh who just seven days later launched the Tet offensive against U.S. forces in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Pentagon was ready to use nuclear weapons to force Pyongyang to comply with American demands over the incident—much as threats to use them had helped to facilitate favorable terms to the Korean War armistice .
In April 1959 , when a U.S. Navy aircraft was shot down over the Sea of Japan by North Korean MiG-21 fighters after it had penetrated North Korean airspace , President Richard Nixon in a state of inebriation gave authorization for a nuclear attack that , according to CIA agent George Carver , the military took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though a tense military standoff endured in which the threat of nuclear war remained high .
Besides enhancing the threat of nuclear Armageddon , the U.S.-North Korean conflict resulted in proxy wars like in Vietnam , where North Korea dispatched pilots to fly air defense missions for the Vietnam People ’ s Air Force .
Fourteen North Korean pilots were killed .
Kim Il-Sung reportedly stressed the importance of assisting the Vietnamese struggle in a 1965 meeting with a visiting Chinese delegation .
He stated : “ If the American imperialists fail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Asia …We are supporting Vietnam as if it were our own war .
When Vietnam has a request , we will disrupt our own plans in order to try and meet their demands.
” A number of reports indicate that KPA forces participated in ground battles alongside Vietcong insurgents and that KPA psychological warfare specialists aided the Vietminh .
President Kim Il-Sung stressed the importance of fortifications in his discussion with the Vietminh leadership , and instructed them to dig caves and place factories half inside .
Besides the Vietnamese struggle , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Egypt following the 1967 Six-Day War and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel , which the United States was heavily supporting .
Also in the late 1970s , Kim ’ s regime dispatched 1,500 personnel to train and advise the Cuban-backed People ’ s Movement for the Liberation of Angola ( MPLA ) , which fought against U.S. proxies allied with apartheid South Africa , and supported the African National Congress ( ANC ) and South West Africa People ’ s Organization ( SWAPO ) liberation forces in Namibia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zimbabwe , which was a target of U.S. sanctions .
In 1982 , North Korea contributed to Lebanon ’ s defense after it was invaded by Israel with U.S. backing , and assisted Hezbollah in constructing an underground armory , bunker and communications network that proved decisive in thwarting Israeli war aims in the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War .
Since that time , North Korea has assisted Iran and Libya—before the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi—to develop a nuclear deterrent , and dispatched Special Forces units to Syria to engage jihadi forces backed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bashar al-Assad .
The above policies place in context the unremitting U.S. hostility toward North Korea , and plans for regime change , which are designed to remove a principal supporter of Washington ’ s global adversaries .
The U.S. first imposed sanctions on North Korea during the Korean War and then expanded them in the 1980s , with the goal of completely isolating North Korea from the world economy .
The DPRK nevertheless remained a strong economic performer compared to other socialist bloc countries throughout the Cold War .
This was in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of education , even in rural areas , and construction of amazing hydroelectric dams and the deepest underground public railway system in the world , which benefited from DPRK ’ s experience building underground defenses during the Korean War .
Built in the 1970s , the Pyongyang metro is one of the deepest in the world at 360 feet underground .
[ Source : wikipedia.org ] While the DPRK quickly rebuilt its infrastructure after the war , South Korea remained one of the poorest countries in the world until Syngman Rhee was forced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1960 .
Under Rhee , 24 % of ROK ’ s Gross National Product ( GNP ) relied on prostitution that serviced U.S. soldiers who continued to occupy the country .
Kim Ae Ran , a 58-year-old former prostitute , said in 2009 that “ our government was one big pimp for the U.S. military.
” The South ’ s economy began to boom in the 1970s under General Park Chung Hee , who provided more adept economic management than Rhee , and benefited from massive injections of Japanese capital .
These comments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kim dynasty in a period when the North ’ s economic output was being eclipsed .
The 1990s were a particularly trying decade for the DPRK .
In 1994 , Kim Il-Sung died , and was replaced by his son , Kim Jong-Il .
The DPRK had recently lost many of its key trading partners with the collapse of the socialist bloc .
To add insult to injury , the country suffered a series of natural disasters , including devastating floods in the breadbasket provinces in the south and west , which destroyed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been stored underground .
As well , 85 % of the country ’ s power generating capacity was lost and around 5.4 million people lost their homes .
Under normal circumstances , the international community would have intervened to alleviate the humanitarian crisis known in North Korea as the “ arduous march.
” Rather , however , the Clinton administration pushed for the ratcheting up of economic sanctions and blocked oil from coming into the country in an attempt to sow discontent and facilitate regime change .
CIA agents stationed on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of rice for cow ’ s tails in an attempt to further ruin North Korea ’ s agricultural economy .
Without oil or electricity and the use of tractors , cows were being used to plough the local fields , and so their removal was designed to induce starvation .
The North Korean people had long been pawns in a deadly geopolitical game in which all measures of cruelty were adopted .
A parallel was with Iraq , where sanctions designed to undermine Saddam Hussein ’ s regime led to the deaths of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korean case , UNICEF and the World Food Program were prevented from providing vitamin A supplementation to children , which resulted in the deaths of at least 2,772 of them .
The impact of the sanctions on medical equipment related to reproductive health was estimated to have killed 72 pregnant women and 1,200 infants in the late 2010s .
The imperative of North Korea ’ s developing a nuclear deterrent in the face of the sanctions and America ’ s regime change efforts was recognized by top U.S. officials such as James @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under Barack Obama .
He referred to the North Korean nuclear program as “ their ticket to survival.
” In June 1994 , the Clinton administration nearly went to war over North Korea ’ s nuclear program .
The crisis started when Kim Il-Sung ’ s government refused an International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) request to inspect its nuclear facility at Yongbyon because they felt they were being singled out and that the inspection teams would be infiltrated by intelligence agents .
After the U.S. threatened a preemptive military strike , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , met with Kim , and brokered an agreement in which the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for new nuclear reactors that did not produce weapons-grade plutonium along with oil to help meet its energy needs .
Selig S. Harrison , a State Department official who played an important role in the negotiations , later asserted that , while North Korea had lived up to its end of the bargain and ceased operating the Yongbyon reactor , the Clinton administration failed to adhere to its own commitments , notably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the North saw as crucial to solving its economic problems , especially its food shortage .
The Clinton administration further failed to provide promised oil deliveries or fund light water reactors .
[ 2 ] Having lost complete trust in the U.S. by this point , North Korea pulled out of the nuclear agreement in 2002 and accelerated its development of a nuclear weapon .
From the Axis of Evil to Trump The George W. Bush administration poured gasoline on the fire when it designated North Korea as part of its “ Axis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iran , and other alleged state sponsors of terrorism .
The U.S. Congressional Research Service ’ s East Asia specialist , Larry Niksch , wrote at the time that “ regime change in North Korea [ was ] the Bush administration ’ s main policy objective , ” which was to be achieved through renewed economic pressure through sanctions and interdiction of Korean shipping lanes intended to provoke a collapse of government and , if this failed , Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was considering a “ broader plan for massive strikes against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Bush ’ s second term , the Obama administration renewed a hard-line approach , increasing economic pressure and informational war , and launching cyber-attacks—the Stuxnet worm–on the DPRK ’ s nuclear infrastructure .
Obama ’ s liberal base largely supported these policies alongside conservatives because they had been conditioned to think of the U.S. as fighting a good fight against an evil Asian communist regime .
For years , the mainstream media had demonized North Korea and broadcast stories of North Korean defectors , who were paid for promoting disinformation about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was condemned for assassinating his half-brother , Kim Jong-Nam , at the Kuala Lampur International Airport in Malaysia , though a Malaysian investigation did not find any proof that Kim Jong-Un was involved .
The North Korean security services were subsequently accused of torturing to death an American college student , Otto Wambier , though proof was again absent .
The public ’ s stereotypical views about North Korea were reflected in the 2014 Hollywood film , The Interview , Sony ’ s top-grossing digital release , which adopted “ racist images and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and celebrated the gory execution of North Korea ’ s caricatured leader .
For years , the mainstream media had demonized North Korea and broadcast stories of North Korean defectors , who were paid for promoting disinformation about the DPRK .
In 2017 , Kim Jong-Un was condemned for assassinating his half-brother , Kim Jong-Nam , at the Kuala Lampur International Airport in Malaysia , though a Malaysian investigation did not find any proof that Kim Jong-Un was involved .
The North Korean security services were subsequently accused of torturing to death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though proof was again absent .
The public ’ s stereotypical views about North Korea were reflected in the 2014 Hollywood film , The Interview , Sony ’ s top-grossing digital release , which adopted “ racist images and tropes , ” according to one reviewer , and celebrated the gory execution of North Korea ’ s caricatured leader .
Abrams ’ book is most significant in helping readers to understand the DPRK ’ s long staying power and in debunking media stereotypes , which have helped validate aggressive regime-change policies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Koreans are crazy , North Koreans have far more grounds for believing that the reverse holds true .
They are the ones holding the upper moral hand in a conflict that was started by the United States and needs to be ended by it .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
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Jeremy Kuzmarov is managing editor of CovertAction Magazine and author of four books on U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extended essay on the Korean War called “ Barbarism Unleashed.
” [ 1 ] Joby Warrick , Ellen Nakashima , and Anna Fifield , “ North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons , U.S. analysts say , ” Washington Post , August 8 , 2017 ; Jeffrey Lewis , “ The Game Is Over , and North Korea Has Won , ” Foreign Policy , August 9 , 2017 .
[ 2 ] The U.S. claimed that North Korea violated the agreement by proliferating missile and nuclear technology to Iran , Pakistan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea began to test three-stage rockets in an attempt to build its long-range ballistic missile capability .

How 70 years of CIA deceit and mainstream media complicity convinced the American public that North Korea was the Bad Guy and the U.S. was the Good Guy—when it was almost always the other way around
***
In the United States today, North Korea is the standard reference point for modern-day totalitarianism: a land of darkness that is considered a dangerous security threat because of the development of nuclear missiles capable of striking the U.S.
A.B. Abrams’ new book, Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power (Clarity Press, 2020), shows that the common perceptions in the U.S. of North Korea are mostly wrong.
Though the Kim dynasty has ruled through autocratic methods, it has also adopted rational and at times intelligent policies, which have enabled North Korea to weather unprecedented outside hostility and develop into something of a military powerhouse.
Between July and November 2017, North Korea successfully test-fired three intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a more sophisticated miniaturized thermonuclear warhead, which demonstrated beyond much reasonable doubt that one of America’s oldest adversaries had gained the capability to strike the U.S. mainland, with U.S. intelligence later confirming the viability of both ICBM designs tested as well as their warheads.[1]
North Korea as such is no military pushover and may be gaining the upper hand in the long war with the United States—which is a source of pride for its people.
Engagement Range of Hwasong-15 ICBM [Source: militarywatchmagazine.com]
Amidst the backdrop of U.S. sanctions, Pyongyang has recently undergone a major construction boom. [Source: 38north.com]
Roots of the Conflict
The conflict between the U.S. and North Korea, or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is rooted in North Korea’s defiance of the U.S.-led world order.
The DPRK’s founding father, Kim Il-Sung, was the son of prominent Korean nationalists Kim Hyong Jik and Kang Pan Sok and a leader of the Manchurian partisan exiles in the Soviet Far East who fought against Japanese colonial occupation.
During Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945, it promoted industrialization and built the Suiho dam—the second largest in the world after the Hoover dam—while also developing a draconian surveillance apparatus and repressing political dissent.
The United States followed Japan in its hostility to left-wing, nationalist movements, and construction of a police state apparatus in South Korea, which relied on many former Japanese collaborators.
The U.S. had divided the Koreas artificially at the end of World War II and installed a client regime in the south led by Syngman Rhee, who was flown in on General Douglas MacArthur’s plane after having spent years in exile.
CIA reports from the time showed a stark contrast between Kim and Rhee’s leadership.
Under Kim’s direction, industrial output and state industry increased exponentially in the DPRK, with average salaries of factory and office workers increasing by 83 percent. A successful program of land reform also offered new opportunities for rural farmers, and many benefited from state-subsidized health care and education.
Syngman Rhee (right) waltzes with General Douglas MacArthur. [Source: wilsoncenter.org]
The Rhee government, by contrast, triggered a social rebellion through economic policies that were designed to tie South Korea’s economy with Japan—which the U.S. was trying to build up as a junior partner in the Cold War—along with a heavy reliance on Japanese collaborators and intolerance for dissent.
Before the official outbreak of the Korean War, the Rhee regime, with the support of U.S. military and police advisers, had killed at least 100,000 of its own people, including through the brutal suppression of a left-wing uprising in the southern island of Cheju-do.
In the late 1940s, the Kim regime promoted the peaceful reunification of the Koreas through free elections. The U.S. government blocked these elections because they knew that Kim would win—similarly to Vietnam in 1956 when they knew that Ho Chi Minh would win at least 80 percent of the vote.
Despite a professed commitment to democracy, the U.S. trampled on Korea’s sovereignty in order to fulfill its imperial ambitions in Southeast Asia, which the U.S. had ringed with military bases due to its victory in the Pacific War.
The Korean War
The official narrative maintains that the North started the Korean War by invading South Korea on June 25, 1950. However, Abrams’ account provides strong evidence that it was the other way around.
Bent on achieving what he could never do through the ballot box, Rhee’s forces staged raids into the North, and then on June 25th struck first when they attacked the border city of Haeju. The South Koreans would later amend their claim to state that they had attacked Haeju at a later date as part of a counter-offensive—long after announcing the successful capture of the city.
American government officials at the time were elated by the outbreak of the Korean War–Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that “the Korean War came along and saved us.”
This was because it gave an excuse to prevent major cutbacks in military spending after World War II, and strike a blow at communist China, which entered the war in support of the DPRK.
Furthermore, the United States military used Korea, like Vietnam subsequently, as a testing ground for new weapons systems, including super-bazookas and napalm, or jellied gasoline, which burns the flesh.
The North Korean population also served as guinea pigs for medical experiments on prisoners of war (POWs), and for techniques of germ warfare that had been learned from Japanese war criminals who had been secretly invited to give lectures at the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Center at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, at the end of World War II.
[Source: whowhatwhy.org]
General Douglas MacArthur, who had previously led the war effort against imperial Japan, stated that as one who had seen as much “blood and disaster as any living man,” he had never seen such devastation as that experienced in Korea during the Korean War. “It just curdled my stomach the last time I was there.” Subsequently MacArthur referred to the war as “a slaughter never heard of in the history of mankind.”
According to the Truth Commission that was established decades after the war ended, South Korean (ROK) troops committed six times more atrocities than the North Korean People’s Army (KPA). American troops also torched villages, raped local women, and committed dozens of massacres, some of which were motivated by pure racial bigotry.
Summary executions carried out by the South Korean army under U.S. oversight at Taejon in the summer of 1950. [Source: wikipedia.org]
A fighter pilot, David Tatum, told Time magazine that “I figured if we had to kill ten civilians to kill one soldier who might later shoot at us, we were justified.”
Retreating American forces destroyed cultural relics such as the shrine of Mo Ran bon and the Yen Myen Sa temple of the Buddha in Pyongyang and tortured and mistreated POWs far more systematically than the North Koreans and Chinese.
Painting of American brutality at the Sinchon Museum of American War Atrocities in North Korea. [Source: peacehistory-usfp.org]
The losses North Korea suffered during the war had few parallels in history, with conservative estimates placing the death toll at 20 percent of the population. The U.S. Air Force dropped between 635,000 and 698,000 tons of bombs compared to 503,000 tons dropped on the Japanese empire during the entirety of the Pacific War.
Thatched huts go up in flames after B-26 bombers unload napalm bombs on a village near Hanchon, North Korea, on May 10, 1951. [Source: peacehistory-usfp.org]
In November 1950, a single American firebombing raid on the city of Sinuiju destroyed 2,100 of the 3,017 state and municipal buildings, 6,800 of 11,000 houses, 16 of 17 primary schools, and 15 of 17 places of worship. Eighty percent of the deaths caused by the bombing were women and children, with survivors forced to live in underground caves. The attack was intended to maximize casualties beginning with the use of incendiaries followed by explosives, and time bombs which prevented rescue work.
General Emmet O’Donnell, the head of the bomber command in Asia who formerly oversaw the firebombing of Tokyo, testified that within three months of the war’s outbreak “almost all of the Korean peninsula was just a terrible mess”; as a result of the air campaign “almost everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name.”
In 1953, the U.S. Air Force targeted crucial Yalu river irrigation dams–flooding whole towns and destroying the DPRK’s rice crop which the already malnourished population needed to subsist. One report stated that “the westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple commodity has for the Asian–starvation and slow death.” These comments epitomize the horrible human consequences of the Korean War, which ended in stalemate with the country permanently divided at the 38th parallel.
Afterwards, General MacArthur and other military commanders acknowledged that they had underestimated the fighting capabilities of the Chinese and North Koreans whom MacArthur described as “a tough opponent, well led.”
Today, North Koreans consider the Great Fatherland Liberation War a victory, which solidified the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty. In the U.S., by contrast, the Korean War is little commemorated or talked about—largely because it contradicts the nation’s righteous self-conception.
Monument in Pyongyang commemorating Great Fatherland Liberation War. [Source: uritours.com]
The War Continues
After the Korean War ended, U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the Rhee government was actively contemplating launching another attack on the North and had threatened use of the hydrogen bomb.
The Eisenhower administration’s Korea policy under NSC 5702/2, dated August 9, 1957, allowed U.S. forces to provide support for a unilateral ROK military initiative against the DPRK.
By January 1958, the U.S. had stationed approximately 150 nuclear warheads across four different weapons platforms in the ROK, which stimulated development of the North’s own nuclear program through collaboration with the Soviet Union.
Tensions boiled over in January 1968 when the KPA captured a U.S. Navy surveillance warship, the U.S.S. Pueblo—allegedly in coordination with the Vietminh who just seven days later launched the Tet offensive against U.S. forces in South Vietnam.
[Source: usspueblo.org]
Cables since declassified show that the Pentagon was ready to use nuclear weapons to force Pyongyang to comply with American demands over the incident—much as threats to use them had helped to facilitate favorable terms to the Korean War armistice.
In April 1959, when a U.S. Navy aircraft was shot down over the Sea of Japan by North Korean MiG-21 fighters after it had penetrated North Korean airspace, President Richard Nixon in a state of inebriation gave authorization for a nuclear attack that, according to CIA agent George Carver, the military took seriously.
[Source: washingtonpost.com]
Luckily, cooler heads prevailed, though a tense military standoff endured in which the threat of nuclear war remained high.
Proxy Wars
Besides enhancing the threat of nuclear Armageddon, the U.S.-North Korean conflict resulted in proxy wars like in Vietnam, where North Korea dispatched pilots to fly air defense missions for the Vietnam People’s Air Force. Fourteen North Korean pilots were killed.
Former Vietnamese deputy defense minister and former Vietnam War pilot, Tran Hanh, stated: “we found [the North Korean pilots] to be very brave. Their national pride was so high…they feared nothing, even death.”
Kim Il-Sung reportedly stressed the importance of assisting the Vietnamese struggle in a 1965 meeting with a visiting Chinese delegation. He stated: “If the American imperialists fail in Vietnam, then they will collapse in Asia …We are supporting Vietnam as if it were our own war. When Vietnam has a request, we will disrupt our own plans in order to try and meet their demands.”
A number of reports indicate that KPA forces participated in ground battles alongside Vietcong insurgents and that KPA psychological warfare specialists aided the Vietminh. President Kim Il-Sung stressed the importance of fortifications in his discussion with the Vietminh leadership, and instructed them to dig caves and place factories half inside.
Besides the Vietnamese struggle, Kim Il-Sung provided economic and military support to Egypt following the 1967 Six-Day War and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel, which the United States was heavily supporting.
Also in the late 1970s, Kim’s regime dispatched 1,500 personnel to train and advise the Cuban-backed People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which fought against U.S. proxies allied with apartheid South Africa, and supported the African National Congress (ANC) and South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) liberation forces in Namibia, and Robert Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe, which was a target of U.S. sanctions.
Kim Il-Sung with SWAPO delegation in Namibia. [Source: asiabyafrica.com]
In 1982, North Korea contributed to Lebanon’s defense after it was invaded by Israel with U.S. backing, and assisted Hezbollah in constructing an underground armory, bunker and communications network that proved decisive in thwarting Israeli war aims in the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War.
Since that time, North Korea has assisted Iran and Libya—before the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi—to develop a nuclear deterrent, and dispatched Special Forces units to Syria to engage jihadi forces backed by the U.S. during its war to topple Bashar al-Assad.
The above policies place in context the unremitting U.S. hostility toward North Korea, and plans for regime change, which are designed to remove a principal supporter of Washington’s global adversaries.
North vs. South
The U.S. first imposed sanctions on North Korea during the Korean War and then expanded them in the 1980s, with the goal of completely isolating North Korea from the world economy.
The DPRK nevertheless remained a strong economic performer compared to other socialist bloc countries throughout the Cold War. This was in part because of the high technical levels of education, even in rural areas, and construction of amazing hydroelectric dams and the deepest underground public railway system in the world, which benefited from DPRK’s experience building underground defenses during the Korean War.
Built in the 1970s, the Pyongyang metro is one of the deepest in the world at 360 feet underground. [Source: wikipedia.org]
While the DPRK quickly rebuilt its infrastructure after the war, South Korea remained one of the poorest countries in the world until Syngman Rhee was forced out of power by student-led demonstrations in 1960.
Under Rhee, 24% of ROK’s Gross National Product (GNP) relied on prostitution that serviced U.S. soldiers who continued to occupy the country. Kim Ae Ran, a 58-year-old former prostitute, said in 2009 that “our government was one big pimp for the U.S. military.”
The South’s economy began to boom in the 1970s under General Park Chung Hee, who provided more adept economic management than Rhee, and benefited from massive injections of Japanese capital.
The former Director of South Korea’s Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Brigadier General Kim Hyong-Uk, testified to the U.S. Congress in 1977, nevertheless, that it was the North Korean population which “most likely feels less deprived than their southern counterparts,” because there were “no visible gaps between the haves and have-nots [in North Korea].”
These comments help explain the continued viability of the Kim dynasty in a period when the North’s economic output was being eclipsed.
Surviving the 1990s
The 1990s were a particularly trying decade for the DPRK. In 1994, Kim Il-Sung died, and was replaced by his son, Kim Jong-Il. The DPRK had recently lost many of its key trading partners with the collapse of the socialist bloc.
To add insult to injury, the country suffered a series of natural disasters, including devastating floods in the breadbasket provinces in the south and west, which destroyed 1.5 million tons of grain reserves that had been stored underground. As well, 85% of the country’s power generating capacity was lost and around 5.4 million people lost their homes.
Propaganda poster depicting Kim Jong-Il’s leadership during the arduous march. [Source: youtube.com]
Under normal circumstances, the international community would have intervened to alleviate the humanitarian crisis known in North Korea as the “arduous march.”
Rather, however, the Clinton administration pushed for the ratcheting up of economic sanctions and blocked oil from coming into the country in an attempt to sow discontent and facilitate regime change.
CIA agents stationed on the Chinese border offered desperate farmers a bag of rice for cow’s tails in an attempt to further ruin North Korea’s agricultural economy. Without oil or electricity and the use of tractors, cows were being used to plough the local fields, and so their removal was designed to induce starvation.
Deadly Geopolitical Game
The North Korean people had long been pawns in a deadly geopolitical game in which all measures of cruelty were adopted. A parallel was with Iraq, where sanctions designed to undermine Saddam Hussein’s regime led to the deaths of at least 500,000 children.
In the North Korean case, UNICEF and the World Food Program were prevented from providing vitamin A supplementation to children, which resulted in the deaths of at least 2,772 of them.
The impact of the sanctions on medical equipment related to reproductive health was estimated to have killed 72 pregnant women and 1,200 infants in the late 2010s.
The imperative of North Korea’s developing a nuclear deterrent in the face of the sanctions and America’s regime change efforts was recognized by top U.S. officials such as James Clapper, the director of national intelligence under Barack Obama. He referred to the North Korean nuclear program as “their ticket to survival.”
In June 1994, the Clinton administration nearly went to war over North Korea’s nuclear program. The crisis started when Kim Il-Sung’s government refused an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) request to inspect its nuclear facility at Yongbyon because they felt they were being singled out and that the inspection teams would be infiltrated by intelligence agents.
After the U.S. threatened a preemptive military strike, former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang, met with Kim, and brokered an agreement in which the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for new nuclear reactors that did not produce weapons-grade plutonium along with oil to help meet its energy needs.
Selig S. Harrison, a State Department official who played an important role in the negotiations, later asserted that, while North Korea had lived up to its end of the bargain and ceased operating the Yongbyon reactor, the Clinton administration failed to adhere to its own commitments, notably by failing to remove economic sanctions which the North saw as crucial to solving its economic problems, especially its food shortage. The Clinton administration further failed to provide promised oil deliveries or fund light water reactors.[2]
Having lost complete trust in the U.S. by this point, North Korea pulled out of the nuclear agreement in 2002 and accelerated its development of a nuclear weapon.
From the Axis of Evil to Trump
The George W. Bush administration poured gasoline on the fire when it designated North Korea as part of its “Axis of Evil,” along with Iraq, Iran, and other alleged state sponsors of terrorism.
[Source: usrussianrelations.org]
The U.S. Congressional Research Service’s East Asia specialist, Larry Niksch, wrote at the time that “regime change in North Korea [was] the Bush administration’s main policy objective,” which was to be achieved through renewed economic pressure through sanctions and interdiction of Korean shipping lanes intended to provoke a collapse of government and, if this failed, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was considering a “broader plan for massive strikes against multiple targets.”
After a brief thaw in Bush’s second term, the Obama administration renewed a hard-line approach, increasing economic pressure and informational war, and launching cyber-attacks—the Stuxnet worm–on the DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure.
Obama’s liberal base largely supported these policies alongside conservatives because they had been conditioned to think of the U.S. as fighting a good fight against an evil Asian communist regime.
For years, the mainstream media had demonized North Korea and broadcast stories of North Korean defectors, who were paid for promoting disinformation about the DPRK.
In 2017, Kim Jong-Un was condemned for assassinating his half-brother, Kim Jong-Nam, at the Kuala Lampur International Airport in Malaysia, though a Malaysian investigation did not find any proof that Kim Jong-Un was involved. The North Korean security services were subsequently accused of torturing to death an American college student, Otto Wambier, though proof was again absent.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicated that she had been seriously misinformed by anti-North Korean propaganda and prejudice when visiting Pyongyang in 2000, stating that she had been briefed on what kind of weirdo Kim Jong-Il was, but found him to be well-prepared for their meeting, charming, smart, technically adept with regards to military matters, and well informed.
The public’s stereotypical views about North Korea were reflected in the 2014 Hollywood film, The Interview, Sony’s top-grossing digital release, which adopted “racist images and tropes,” according to one reviewer, and celebrated the gory execution of North Korea’s caricatured leader.
For years, the mainstream media had demonized North Korea and broadcast stories of North Korean defectors, who were paid for promoting disinformation about the DPRK.
In 2017, Kim Jong-Un was condemned for assassinating his half-brother, Kim Jong-Nam, at the Kuala Lampur International Airport in Malaysia, though a Malaysian investigation did not find any proof that Kim Jong-Un was involved. The North Korean security services were subsequently accused of torturing to death an American college student, Otto Wambier, though proof was again absent.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicated that she had been seriously misinformed by anti-North Korean propaganda and prejudice when visiting Pyongyang in 2000, stating that she had been briefed on what kind of weirdo Kim Jong-Il was, but found him to be well-prepared for their meeting, charming, smart, technically adept with regards to military matters, and well informed.
The public’s stereotypical views about North Korea were reflected in the 2014 Hollywood film, The Interview, Sony’s top-grossing digital release, which adopted “racist images and tropes,” according to one reviewer, and celebrated the gory execution of North Korea’s caricatured leader.
Abrams’ book is most significant in helping readers to understand the DPRK’s long staying power and in debunking media stereotypes, which have helped validate aggressive regime-change policies.
As much as Americans think that the North Koreans are crazy, North Koreans have far more grounds for believing that the reverse holds true.
They are the ones holding the upper moral hand in a conflict that was started by the United States and needs to be ended by it.
*
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Jeremy Kuzmarov is managing editor of CovertAction Magazine and author of four books on U.S. foreign policy, as well as an extended essay on the Korean War called “Barbarism Unleashed.”
Notes
[1] Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima, and Anna Fifield, “North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say,” Washington Post, August 8, 2017; Jeffrey Lewis, “The Game Is Over, and North Korea Has Won,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2017.
[2] The U.S. claimed that North Korea violated the agreement by proliferating missile and nuclear technology to Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, and in 1998 North Korea began to test three-stage rockets in an attempt to build its long-range ballistic missile capability.
Featured image is from CovertAction Magazine


asiapacificresearch--2020-12-18--Hints Hun Sen Starting to Look Away from China

When Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced this week that his country will order its first batch of Covid-19 vaccines from the United Nations-backed COVAX facility , it was notable that Cambodia ’ s first inoculations were not coming from China .
“ Cambodia is not a dustbin.. and not a place for a vaccine trial , ” Hun Sen said in blunt terms during a marathon speech on December 15 , adding that he will only trust and accept vaccines approved by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
According to reports , Cambodia ’ s government has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in donations , mostly from wealthy tycoons allied to Hun Sen ’ s ruling Cambodian People ’ s Party ( CPP ) , which will go towards the US $ 200 million needed to purchase inoculations .
The vaccine collection drive comes amid fears a community-transmission outbreak that started late last month may still be spreading .
A first batch of China ’ s Sinovac vaccines has already been delivered to Indonesia , yet there has been no official comment on whether Beijing will donate doses to its so-called “ ironclad friend ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in August that mainland Southeast Asian states would be given priority once shots are ready .
That ’ s raising questions why Beijing hasn ’ t rushed to engage in “ vaccine diplomacy ” with one of its few close regional allies , especially amid an ongoing debate among Cambodian intellectuals about whether Phnom Penh needs to rethink its foreign policy , which has steered closer to China at the expense of the US in recent years .
“ Cambodia needs also to rethink its foreign policy approach…It needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in particular , by addressing the widespread perception that it is a Chinese proxy , ” Kimkong Heng , a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Queensland , wrote last month .
In many ways , Cambodia has been here before .
Back in 1958 , just a few years after it gained its independence , its monarch-cum-civilian ruler Norodom Sihanouk penned an article for Foreign Affairs , entitled “ Cambodia Neutral : the Dictate of Necessity.
” First , he argued , Cambodia ’ s geography , wedged between the much larger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side of the US-Soviet Union rivalry , and in the vicinity of China , means that the country has no other choice “ but to try to maintain an equal balance ” between the more powerful states .
Second , in foreign relations Cambodia favors “ neutrality , which in the United States is all too often confused with ‘ neutralism , ’ although it is fundamentally different , ” he wrote .
“ We are neutral in the same way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral-not neutralist like Egypt or Indonesia.
” For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no formal alliance with one of the superpowers but a strong attachment and support to its causes .
Indonesia was resoundingly pro-US and anti-communist throughout the Cold War , although also the architect of the non-aligned movement .
Cambodia ’ s present-day relations with China also turn on the nuanced distinction between these two terms .
According to Phnom Penh , it engages in strict “ neutrality ” between the US and China , favoring neither and open to both , as its constitution mandates .
Critics of the ruling CPP as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assert that Phnom Penh ’ s foreign relations are now heavily skewed towards a pro-China and anti-US cause , although not formally allied with Beijing .
As in Sihanouk ’ s day , Phnom Penh now vehemently rejects America ’ s reading of the situation .
In early 2017 , Phnom Penh unilaterally canceled joint military drills with the US and began training instead with China ’ s armed forces the following year .
After the authorities recently knocked down two US-built facilities at the country ’ s largest naval base , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese state-run firm .
Phnom Penh denies constant allegations it will allow Chinese troops to be stationed on its soil , a claim made by senior US officials .
Cambodian navy sailors stand in formation on a Chinese naval patrol boat during a hand over ceremony at Cambodias Ream Naval Base .
Photo : Twitter Cambodia ’ s reliance on China increased after authorities forcibly dissolved the country ’ s only viable opposition party in 2017 , sent most opponents into exile and then secured a de facto one-party system at the 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the US , which has imposed targeted sanctions on several Cambodian officials , and from the European Union , which partially cut Cambodia ’ s trade privileges in August .
In comparison , China ’ s aid and trade is said to come with “ no strings attached ” , a characterization critics contest when taking into account big land concessions and domestic economic policies that have been tailored to favor China ’ s interests .
Yet Beijing has publicly defended Phnom Penh from supposed Western attempts to interfere in Cambodia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lie on an axis of “ neutrality ” or “ neutralism ” , there is clearly a perception by many in Cambodia that it can not do without its most loyal foreign ally .
Chheang Vannarith , president of the Asian Vision Institute , a self-described “ independent ” think-tank , told the Chinese state-run news service Xinhua in late November that “ Cambodia and China share the same world view on promoting multilateralism as the basis for peace , security and prosperity.
” Also in late November , Seun Sam , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , wrote in a local newspaper that Phnom Penh “ should not forget that the US and EU are the biggest markets for Cambodia to sell their products , not China .
But China has been a very honest friend who supports Cambodia under all situations.
” The CPP government is often more overt about its lean towards China .
“ Cambodia ’ s development could not be detached from China .
Without Chinese aid , Cambodia would go nowhere , ” Deputy Prime Minister Hor Namhong commented a few years ago .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ trading partner , with bilateral trade worth US $ 8.53 billion in 2019 , and its largest investor for some years , with investments reaching US $ 9 billion by 2019 .
By one estimate , China has also provided more than US $ 6 billion in aid between 2001 and 2021 .
The trend is gathering pace .
In the first quarter of 2020 , 51.5 % of all investment projects approved in Cambodia were from Chinese investors , the largest percentage share of Chinese investment in recent years .
It fell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this year but that was still a higher share than in most quarters in 2019 and 2018 , according to National Bank of Cambodia data .
In mid-October , the two sides signed a free-trade agreement – Cambodia ’ s first bilateral pact – which took less than a year to negotiate and comes into effect next month .
Moreover , if Cambodia ’ s vital tourism is to begin recovery next year , it will likely be reliant on Chinese tourists , who will be able to travel more freely than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China ’ s preponderance in trade and investment doesn ’ t always work in Cambodia ’ s favor .
Bilateral trade skews heavily towards China , which enjoys a large bilateral trade surplus most years .
Locals accuse Chinese firms of only hiring Chinese workers and engaging in land grabs .
They also carp Chinese outprice local in property deals .
This is most keenly felt in Sihanoukville , a coastal city and hub for Chinese investment , where locals have complained since 2017 that the city is being turned into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insistence in 2012 and 2016 that the Southeast Asian bloc tone down its communiques against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea , where it controversially claims ownership of territory already claimed by four regional states , has also made Phnom Penh the source of frustration amongst its neighbors .
There has even been recent talk that Cambodia and Laos , another close friend of China , should be kicked out of the regional bloc because their foreign policies are overly aligned with Beijing ’ s .
Recent articles have noted that Cambodia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by political elites whose views are not in line with the majority of the public , who are more fearful of China ’ s economic and strategic influence than America ’ s , according to the 2020 State of Southeast Asia survey produced by the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute .
Indeed , Chinese largesse tends to flow chiefly to Cambodia ’ s elites , whereas Western aid is largely directed to grassroots organizations , which makes Beijing ’ s funds more attractive for those in power and , indeed , supports the CPP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sensible voices note that Cambodia can maintain close economic and diplomatic relations with China whilst also improving ties with other states , not least the US .
In other words , Cambodia ’ s current foreign policy problems can be rectified .
It ’ s unclear why Hun Sen didn ’ t specifically mention China during his four-hour televised speech this week , with many now guessing whether it was an intentional omission or a ploy to extract greater concessions from Beijing .
Image on the right : Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Xinhua What ’ s clear , however , is that the escalating tensions of the US-China-Cambodia “ triangle ” have hardly worked in Phnom Penh ’ s favor this year , and there may be a growing realization that conditions could become a lot worse for the Cambodian government in 2021 without a recalibration .
Indeed , a group of US lawmakers last month called on the outgoing Donald Trump administration , and presumably also on the incoming Joe Biden administration , to impose harsh targeted sanctions on dozens of senior Cambodian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden ’ s administration , which may or may not go harder on Phnom Penh for its democratic backsliding , at least offers the Cambodian government a reset moment to realign its foreign policy back closer to neutrality than neutralism .
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Featured image : A new China-Cambodia trade pact will not provide Phnom Penh the economic lifeline it needs amid the @ @ @ @ @ @

When Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced this week that his country will order its first batch of Covid-19 vaccines from the United Nations-backed COVAX facility, it was notable that Cambodia’s first inoculations were not coming from China.
“Cambodia is not a dustbin.. and not a place for a vaccine trial,” Hun Sen said in blunt terms during a marathon speech on December 15, adding that he will only trust and accept vaccines approved by the World Health Organization (WHO).
According to reports, Cambodia’s government has so far collected US$48 million in donations, mostly from wealthy tycoons allied to Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which will go towards the US$200 million needed to purchase inoculations.
The vaccine collection drive comes amid fears a community-transmission outbreak that started late last month may still be spreading.
A first batch of China’s Sinovac vaccines has already been delivered to Indonesia, yet there has been no official comment on whether Beijing will donate doses to its so-called “ironclad friend” Cambodia. This is despite pledges from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in August that mainland Southeast Asian states would be given priority once shots are ready.
That’s raising questions why Beijing hasn’t rushed to engage in “vaccine diplomacy” with one of its few close regional allies, especially amid an ongoing debate among Cambodian intellectuals about whether Phnom Penh needs to rethink its foreign policy, which has steered closer to China at the expense of the US in recent years.
“Cambodia needs also to rethink its foreign policy approach…It needs to improve its tarnished international image, in particular, by addressing the widespread perception that it is a Chinese proxy,” Kimkong Heng, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Queensland, wrote last month.
In many ways, Cambodia has been here before. Back in 1958, just a few years after it gained its independence, its monarch-cum-civilian ruler Norodom Sihanouk penned an article for Foreign Affairs, entitled “Cambodia Neutral: the Dictate of Necessity.”
First, he argued, Cambodia’s geography, wedged between the much larger Thailand and Vietnam, then on either side of the US-Soviet Union rivalry, and in the vicinity of China, means that the country has no other choice “but to try to maintain an equal balance” between the more powerful states.
Second, in foreign relations Cambodia favors “neutrality, which in the United States is all too often confused with ‘neutralism,’ although it is fundamentally different,” he wrote. “We are neutral in the same way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral-not neutralist like Egypt or Indonesia.”
For Sihanouk, “neutralism” meant that no formal alliance with one of the superpowers but a strong attachment and support to its causes. Indonesia was resoundingly pro-US and anti-communist throughout the Cold War, although also the architect of the non-aligned movement.
Cambodia’s present-day relations with China also turn on the nuanced distinction between these two terms. According to Phnom Penh, it engages in strict “neutrality” between the US and China, favoring neither and open to both, as its constitution mandates.
Critics of the ruling CPP as well as many in Washington, however, assert that Phnom Penh’s foreign relations are now heavily skewed towards a pro-China and anti-US cause, although not formally allied with Beijing. As in Sihanouk’s day, Phnom Penh now vehemently rejects America’s reading of the situation.
In early 2017, Phnom Penh unilaterally canceled joint military drills with the US and began training instead with China’s armed forces the following year. After the authorities recently knocked down two US-built facilities at the country’s largest naval base, they are now reportedly being rebuilt by a Chinese state-run firm.
Phnom Penh denies constant allegations it will allow Chinese troops to be stationed on its soil, a claim made by senior US officials.
Cambodian navy sailors stand in formation on a Chinese naval patrol boat during a hand over ceremony at Cambodias Ream Naval Base. Photo: Twitter
Cambodia’s reliance on China increased after authorities forcibly dissolved the country’s only viable opposition party in 2017, sent most opponents into exile and then secured a de facto one-party system at the 2018 general election.
This earned strong rebukes from the US, which has imposed targeted sanctions on several Cambodian officials, and from the European Union, which partially cut Cambodia’s trade privileges in August.
In comparison, China’s aid and trade is said to come with “no strings attached”, a characterization critics contest when taking into account big land concessions and domestic economic policies that have been tailored to favor China’s interests.
Yet Beijing has publicly defended Phnom Penh from supposed Western attempts to interfere in Cambodia’s internal affairs. Wherever Cambodia-China relations lie on an axis of “neutrality” or “neutralism”, there is clearly a perception by many in Cambodia that it cannot do without its most loyal foreign ally.
Chheang Vannarith, president of the Asian Vision Institute, a self-described “independent” think-tank, told the Chinese state-run news service Xinhua in late November that “Cambodia and China share the same world view on promoting multilateralism as the basis for peace, security and prosperity.”
Also in late November, Seun Sam, a researcher at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, wrote in a local newspaper that Phnom Penh “should not forget that the US and EU are the biggest markets for Cambodia to sell their products, not China. But China has been a very honest friend who supports Cambodia under all situations.”
The CPP government is often more overt about its lean towards China. “Cambodia’s development could not be detached from China. Without Chinese aid, Cambodia would go nowhere,” Deputy Prime Minister Hor Namhong commented a few years ago.
China is now Cambodia’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade worth US$8.53 billion in 2019, and its largest investor for some years, with investments reaching US$9 billion by 2019. By one estimate, China has also provided more than US$6 billion in aid between 2001 and 2021.
The trend is gathering pace. In the first quarter of 2020, 51.5% of all investment projects approved in Cambodia were from Chinese investors, the largest percentage share of Chinese investment in recent years. It fell to 27.4% in the second quarter of this year but that was still a higher share than in most quarters in 2019 and 2018, according to National Bank of Cambodia data.
In mid-October, the two sides signed a free-trade agreement – Cambodia’s first bilateral pact – which took less than a year to negotiate and comes into effect next month. Moreover, if Cambodia’s vital tourism is to begin recovery next year, it will likely be reliant on Chinese tourists, who will be able to travel more freely than Europeans and Americans in 2021.
However, China’s preponderance in trade and investment doesn’t always work in Cambodia’s favor. Bilateral trade skews heavily towards China, which enjoys a large bilateral trade surplus most years.
Locals accuse Chinese firms of only hiring Chinese workers and engaging in land grabs. They also carp Chinese outprice local in property deals. This is most keenly felt in Sihanoukville, a coastal city and hub for Chinese investment, where locals have complained since 2017 that the city is being turned into a Chinese “colony.”
Cambodia’s insistence in 2012 and 2016 that the Southeast Asian bloc tone down its communiques against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, where it controversially claims ownership of territory already claimed by four regional states, has also made Phnom Penh the source of frustration amongst its neighbors.
There has even been recent talk that Cambodia and Laos, another close friend of China, should be kicked out of the regional bloc because their foreign policies are overly aligned with Beijing’s.
Recent articles have noted that Cambodia’s foreign policy is being shaped by political elites whose views are not in line with the majority of the public, who are more fearful of China’s economic and strategic influence than America’s, according to the 2020 State of Southeast Asia survey produced by the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
Indeed, Chinese largesse tends to flow chiefly to Cambodia’s elites, whereas Western aid is largely directed to grassroots organizations, which makes Beijing’s funds more attractive for those in power and, indeed, supports the CPP regime’s survival.
However, sensible voices note that Cambodia can maintain close economic and diplomatic relations with China whilst also improving ties with other states, not least the US. In other words, Cambodia’s current foreign policy problems can be rectified.
It’s unclear why Hun Sen didn’t specifically mention China during his four-hour televised speech this week, with many now guessing whether it was an intentional omission or a ploy to extract greater concessions from Beijing.
Image on the right: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo: Xinhua
What’s clear, however, is that the escalating tensions of the US-China-Cambodia “triangle” have hardly worked in Phnom Penh’s favor this year, and there may be a growing realization that conditions could become a lot worse for the Cambodian government in 2021 without a recalibration.
Indeed, a group of US lawmakers last month called on the outgoing Donald Trump administration, and presumably also on the incoming Joe Biden administration, to impose harsh targeted sanctions on dozens of senior Cambodian political, military and business officials.
Biden’s administration, which may or may not go harder on Phnom Penh for its democratic backsliding, at least offers the Cambodian government a reset moment to realign its foreign policy back closer to neutrality than neutralism.
*
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Featured image: A new China-Cambodia trade pact will not provide Phnom Penh the economic lifeline it needs amid the Covid-19 pandemic. Image: Twitter/Bilaterals.org


asiapacificresearch--2020-12-18--Myanmar’s Perennial Ceasefire Talks

Myanmar’s Perennial Ceasefire Talks

Cease-fire and talks for peace are normally welcome news .
But the politics in Myanmar is anything but normal , hence such talks do not necessarily signify prospects for peace , ephemeral or lasting .
This week the Spokesperson for Myanmar Tatmadaw or the Military Brig .
Zaw Min Tun told Mizzima TV that the Defense Ministry is holding talks via intermediaries with the Arakan Army ( AA ) which Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s National League for Democracy ( NLD ) government had officially declared a “ terrorist ” organization .
Taking to Twitter , a pro-AA Rakhine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there have been no military clashes between the Tatmadaw and AA which has emerged as an effective military and political movement seeking autonomy – and even independence – from the Balkan-like country of Myanmar , with highly diverse ethnic communities .
However , the timing of the talks is suspect .
The political proxy of the Burmese military named Union Solidarity and Development Party has suffered a near-total existential electoral defeat at the polls by their nemesis Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD .
The generals and ex-generals in politicians ’ garb @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s unpopularity among Rakhine Buddhist voters by demanding a fresh round of elections in the conflict-soaked Rakhine region .
The Arakan Army has abducted three ethnically Rakhine NLD MPs for collaborating with the political foe – the victorious NLD .
Earlier Myanmar politicians and military leaders played this triangular political game with Buddhist and Muslim communities as represented by Rakhine and Rohingyas .
They tried splitting them through different political and economic sweeteners , keeping the flames of WWII-era communal violence between them alive and exploiting any differences in the region which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of secessionist movements – by Muslim separatists and Buddhist nationalists .
Now the military ’ s “ unfinished business ” of clearing Rohingya presence in Rakhine has largely been finished – with only estimated 500,000 Rohingyas left languishing as IDPs and in vast open prisons – inside Myanmar the military is now focused on the two new competing threats of Rakhine nationalists ’ Arakan Army and Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s NLD party .
For the last 30-odd years , I have watched very closely the dynamics – and outcomes – of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interactions with those from all sides who have been engaged in cease-fire – previously “ internal or domestic peace talks “ .
And some were my close relations , and some close friends and contemporaries .
What I have come to know intimately about these talks instill in no confidence in me about their concrete and eventual outcome of peace and reconciliation in either Rakhine or any region of the country – with 20 plus different ethnic armed organizations ( EAOs ) in Myanmar ’ s peace industry ’ s lingo .
Any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strain – is not warranted when it comes to Myanmar cease-fire talks .
The fact that EAOs have divergent – and in some cases – competing or conflicting interests , rationales , and objectives were pointed out by the Euro-Burma Office in a policy brief released in November entitled The Union Peace Accord : Moving Forward after the Election .
In my judgment , the fundamental problem lies with the colonial nature of the post-independence state in Myanmar and the correspondent psychological outlook of the dominant ethnic elite , civilians and soldiers ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the generals ) , namely Burmese or Bama whose namesake the country bears .
A cursory glance at the half-century of negotiations is essential in assessing the prospects for peace in Rakhine – and the rest of the country ’ s outlying regions where ethnic minority communities live among the natural riches , such as teak forests , jade , gold , ruby , and other precious stones and minerals , natural gas and agriculturally fertile virgin land and rivers for billion-dollar hydropower potentials .
In the official publication of the then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Socialist Program Party ( 1964 ) entitled The Policies and Attitude of the Revolutionary Council towards the Indigenous Races ( of the Union of Burma ) , Col. Hla Han , the head of Myanmar ’ s military ’ s “ Internal Peace Talks Delegation ” , was quoted as saying candidly , in effect , that Myanmar military and political leaders were resorting to the classic colonial divide-and-rule towards the ( ethnic ) Karens ’ revolutionary organization .
In Hla Han ’ s words , “ when one group of the Karens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we instigated other groups to establish a rival KYO [ Karen Youth Organization ] .
That was the result of our political immaturity among the Burmese.
” The Burmese colonel also admitted to the pervasive presence of the typical Burmese Buddhist cultural chauvinism and ethnic superiority complex vis-a-vis non-Burmese ethnic communities , which make up 30-40 % of the total population of the country .
One year before the publication of this 96-page official policy booklet by the then ruling military junta , with the socialist façade , led by Gen. Ne @ @ @ @ @ @ @ publication The Guardian in July 1963 editorialized the junta ’ s “ peace offer ” .
It reads , “ the Revolutionary Council was solely motivated by the desire to achieve internal peace so that socialism could be built in the quickest time unhampered by civil strife .
The council offered insurgent organizations ( particularly the White Flag and the Red Flag factions of the Burmese communist armed movements , the Karen National Defense Organization , various Shan armed organizations including Shan State Revolutionary Council and Shan State Independence Army , the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebels , the Arakanese National Youths , pro-communist Burmese student activists and so on ) , a safe passage to come to the talks and also promised them immunity from arrest and hostile action for three days even if the talks failed .
Some of the Burmese communist leaders who decided to “ return to the legal fold ” and took up the military junta ’ s peace offer as well as prominent indigenous leaders urged their respective political and ethnic communities to pursue peace with the central state .
In another state-run @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 1963 ) , one of the founders of modern Burma and Kachin Chief Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng was quoted as saying , “ underground organizations have for many years been demanding the right to negotiate for peace .
Now that this right has been granted , there is no alternative for them but to come forward and negotiate with the Revolutionary Council Government ” .
The Cold War Containment policy of the West that afforded the anti-communist , but not pro-free market Myanmar military free reign in the way it chose to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more .
As a matter of fact , the emerging Cold War 2.0 between the increasingly richer and powerful state-capitalist China next to geostrategic important Myanmar and the waning , if the undeclared empire of the US has put Myanmar ’ s military and Aung San Suu Kyi as two most important stakeholders in decisively advantageous positions vis-a-vis the country ’ s restive ethnic minorities with nearly two-dozen armed organizations .
The central military and political actors are getting away with the Rohingya genocide as none on the Security Council will point – @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to put an end to Myanmar ’ s institutionalized destruction of Rohingyas as a protected group under the Genocide Convention .
Over the last 50-plus years since the early days of “ internal peace talks ” Myanmar has seen the tripling and even quadrupling of EAOs fighting for divergent political objectives – some genuinely federated form of a state , while others actively keeping alive their decades-old and , in the case of Rakhine Buddhists as represented by the Arakan Army , the centuries-old dream of regaining sovereignty from the dominant ethnic group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seasoned watcher of Burmese affairs including the cease-fire talks , it is rather exhausting for me to read the alphabet soup of acronyms of EAOs , Myanmar ’ s mechanisms or shifting alliances , multiplying , shrinking , or disappearing armed groups .
To be brutally honest , I have long stopped counting my country ’ s civil war deeds , the war-triggered IDPs ( internally displaced persons ) , or the military clashes between the central military of Tatmadaw and EAOs as well as between the EAOs themselves .
Myanmar ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War isolation of Myanmar – several decades before the UN ’ peacekeeping lingo – Disarmament , Demobilization , and Reintegration or DDR – became the mantra in the global peace industry .
In those days , no “ stabilization units ” in western foreign or intelligence ministries , no de-mining initiatives , no “ peace fund ” or no International Crisis Group , with its central mission of turning old war zones into the free market .
Irrespective of Cold War 1.0 or Cold War 2.0 , Myanmar ’ s civil war will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at fluctuating intensities , in the foreseeable future .
Besides the military leaders and the NLD under Suu Kyi walking sideways politically and strategically , Myanmar military has made the pledge which it is not prepared to honor , which is the military will vacate the commanding heights of power , which it has secured in the constitution of 2008 when the sound of gunfire went silent .
The military has been firmly in control of all organs of the state since the 1962 military coup .
Which rational actor in its institutional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ near-monopoly over power , wealth , and population control ?
The manageable level of civil war – and the opportunities to be seen to be talking peace – while keeping this strategically beneficial war has been the generals ’ golden goose , which reliably lays eggs for the armed forces .
Another round of mandate for five more years of Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s leadership , rich in rhetoric and short incompetence , straight-jacketed with the amendment-proof constitution , has not made even a slight dent in the structures of state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lever .
The prospects for genuine peace and reconciliation in the internal national politics will not increase when the Myanmar military sits above the law and society .
Against this scenario , Myanmar has witnessed the world ’ s longest “ peace talks ” with the continuation of its longest-running ethnic wars .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
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A Buddhist humanist from Burma , Maung Zarni @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Peace Development Environment , former Visiting Lecturer with Harvard Medical School , specializing in racism and violence in Burma and Sri Lanka , and Non-resident Scholar in Genocide Studies with Documentation Center – Cambodia .
Zarni s the co-founder of FORSEA , a grass-roots organization of Southeast Asian human rights defenders , coordinator for Strategic Affairs for Free Rohingya Coalition , and an adviser to the European Centre for the Study of Extremism , Cambridge .

Cease-fire and talks for peace are normally welcome news. But the politics in Myanmar is anything but normal, hence such talks do not necessarily signify prospects for peace, ephemeral or lasting.
This week the Spokesperson for Myanmar Tatmadaw or the Military Brig. Zaw Min Tun told Mizzima TV that the Defense Ministry is holding talks via intermediaries with the Arakan Army (AA) which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government had officially declared a “terrorist” organization.
Taking to Twitter, a pro-AA Rakhine activist approved the talks, welcoming that there have been no military clashes between the Tatmadaw and AA which has emerged as an effective military and political movement seeking autonomy – and even independence – from the Balkan-like country of Myanmar, with highly diverse ethnic communities.
However, the timing of the talks is suspect. The political proxy of the Burmese military named Union Solidarity and Development Party has suffered a near-total existential electoral defeat at the polls by their nemesis Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD.
The generals and ex-generals in politicians’ garb are trying to further undermine Suu Kyi’s unpopularity among Rakhine Buddhist voters by demanding a fresh round of elections in the conflict-soaked Rakhine region. The Arakan Army has abducted three ethnically Rakhine NLD MPs for collaborating with the political foe – the victorious NLD.
Earlier Myanmar politicians and military leaders played this triangular political game with Buddhist and Muslim communities as represented by Rakhine and Rohingyas. They tried splitting them through different political and economic sweeteners, keeping the flames of WWII-era communal violence between them alive and exploiting any differences in the region which is the country’s original birthplace of secessionist movements – by Muslim separatists and Buddhist nationalists. Now the military’s “unfinished business” of clearing Rohingya presence in Rakhine has largely been finished – with only estimated 500,000 Rohingyas left languishing as IDPs and in vast open prisons – inside Myanmar the military is now focused on the two new competing threats of Rakhine nationalists’ Arakan Army and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party.
Talks do not instill confidence
For the last 30-odd years, I have watched very closely the dynamics – and outcomes – of such talks, and have had significant interactions with those from all sides who have been engaged in cease-fire – previously “internal or domestic peace talks “. And some were my close relations, and some close friends and contemporaries.
What I have come to know intimately about these talks instill in no confidence in me about their concrete and eventual outcome of peace and reconciliation in either Rakhine or any region of the country – with 20 plus different ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar’s peace industry’s lingo. Any optimism – even a remote and cautious strain – is not warranted when it comes to Myanmar cease-fire talks.
The fact that EAOs have divergent – and in some cases – competing or conflicting interests, rationales, and objectives were pointed out by the Euro-Burma Office in a policy brief released in November entitled The Union Peace Accord: Moving Forward after the Election. In my judgment, the fundamental problem lies with the colonial nature of the post-independence state in Myanmar and the correspondent psychological outlook of the dominant ethnic elite, civilians and soldiers (that is, Aung San Suu Kyi and the generals), namely Burmese or Bama whose namesake the country bears.
A cursory glance at the half-century of negotiations is essential in assessing the prospects for peace in Rakhine – and the rest of the country’s outlying regions where ethnic minority communities live among the natural riches, such as teak forests, jade, gold, ruby, and other precious stones and minerals, natural gas and agriculturally fertile virgin land and rivers for billion-dollar hydropower potentials.
In the official publication of the then ruling military and its political wing Burma Socialist Program Party (1964) entitled The Policies and Attitude of the Revolutionary Council towards the Indigenous Races (of the Union of Burma), Col. Hla Han, the head of Myanmar’s military’s “Internal Peace Talks Delegation”, was quoted as saying candidly, in effect, that Myanmar military and political leaders were resorting to the classic colonial divide-and-rule towards the (ethnic) Karens’ revolutionary organization. In Hla Han’s words, “when one group of the Karens formed KCO [Karen Central Organization], we instigated other groups to establish a rival KYO [Karen Youth Organization]. That was the result of our political immaturity among the Burmese.”
The Burmese colonel also admitted to the pervasive presence of the typical Burmese Buddhist cultural chauvinism and ethnic superiority complex vis-a-vis non-Burmese ethnic communities, which make up 30-40 % of the total population of the country.
One year before the publication of this 96-page official policy booklet by the then ruling military junta, with the socialist façade, led by Gen. Ne Win, the state-controlled English language monthly publication The Guardian in July 1963 editorialized the junta’s “peace offer”. It reads, “the Revolutionary Council was solely motivated by the desire to achieve internal peace so that socialism could be built in the quickest time unhampered by civil strife.
Geostrategic Myanmar
The council offered insurgent organizations (particularly the White Flag and the Red Flag factions of the Burmese communist armed movements, the Karen National Defense Organization, various Shan armed organizations including Shan State Revolutionary Council and Shan State Independence Army, the “Kachin Independence Army”, the Mon rebels, the Arakanese National Youths, pro-communist Burmese student activists and so on), a safe passage to come to the talks and also promised them immunity from arrest and hostile action for three days even if the talks failed.
Some of the Burmese communist leaders who decided to “return to the legal fold” and took up the military junta’s peace offer as well as prominent indigenous leaders urged their respective political and ethnic communities to pursue peace with the central state.
In another state-run English-language magazine the Forward on June 22, 1963), one of the founders of modern Burma and Kachin Chief Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng was quoted as saying, “underground organizations have for many years been demanding the right to negotiate for peace. Now that this right has been granted, there is no alternative for them but to come forward and negotiate with the Revolutionary Council Government”.
The Cold War Containment policy of the West that afforded the anti-communist, but not pro-free market Myanmar military free reign in the way it chose to deal with its internal rebellions is no more. As a matter of fact, the emerging Cold War 2.0 between the increasingly richer and powerful state-capitalist China next to geostrategic important Myanmar and the waning, if the undeclared empire of the US has put Myanmar’s military and Aung San Suu Kyi as two most important stakeholders in decisively advantageous positions vis-a-vis the country’s restive ethnic minorities with nearly two-dozen armed organizations.
The central military and political actors are getting away with the Rohingya genocide as none on the Security Council will point – and has not pointed – a finger to put an end to Myanmar’s institutionalized destruction of Rohingyas as a protected group under the Genocide Convention.
Over the last 50-plus years since the early days of “internal peace talks” Myanmar has seen the tripling and even quadrupling of EAOs fighting for divergent political objectives – some genuinely federated form of a state, while others actively keeping alive their decades-old and, in the case of Rakhine Buddhists as represented by the Arakan Army, the centuries-old dream of regaining sovereignty from the dominant ethnic group Bama or Myanmar.
Civil wars continue
Even as a seasoned watcher of Burmese affairs including the cease-fire talks, it is rather exhausting for me to read the alphabet soup of acronyms of EAOs, Myanmar’s mechanisms or shifting alliances, multiplying, shrinking, or disappearing armed groups.
To be brutally honest, I have long stopped counting my country’s civil war deeds, the war-triggered IDPs (internally displaced persons), or the military clashes between the central military of Tatmadaw and EAOs as well as between the EAOs themselves.
Myanmar’s peace talks began deep in the Cold War isolation of Myanmar – several decades before the UN’ peacekeeping lingo – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration or DDR – became the mantra in the global peace industry. In those days, no “stabilization units” in western foreign or intelligence ministries, no de-mining initiatives, no “peace fund” or no International Crisis Group, with its central mission of turning old war zones into the free market.
Irrespective of Cold War 1.0 or Cold War 2.0, Myanmar’s civil war will most definitely continue to rage on, at fluctuating intensities, in the foreseeable future. Besides the military leaders and the NLD under Suu Kyi walking sideways politically and strategically, Myanmar military has made the pledge which it is not prepared to honor, which is the military will vacate the commanding heights of power, which it has secured in the constitution of 2008 when the sound of gunfire went silent.
The military has been firmly in control of all organs of the state since the 1962 military coup. Which rational actor in its institutional right mind would voluntarily give up its near-monopoly over power, wealth, and population control? The manageable level of civil war – and the opportunities to be seen to be talking peace – while keeping this strategically beneficial war has been the generals’ golden goose, which reliably lays eggs for the armed forces.
Another round of mandate for five more years of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership, rich in rhetoric and short incompetence, straight-jacketed with the amendment-proof constitution, has not made even a slight dent in the structures of state power, where the military holds the lever. The prospects for genuine peace and reconciliation in the internal national politics will not increase when the Myanmar military sits above the law and society.
Against this scenario, Myanmar has witnessed the world’s longest “peace talks” with the continuation of its longest-running ethnic wars.
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Note to readers: please click the share buttons above or below. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums. etc.
A Buddhist humanist from Burma, Maung Zarni is a member of the TRANSCEND Network for Peace Development Environment, former Visiting Lecturer with Harvard Medical School, specializing in racism and violence in Burma and Sri Lanka, and Non-resident Scholar in Genocide Studies with Documentation Center – Cambodia. Zarni s the co-founder of FORSEA, a grass-roots organization of Southeast Asian human rights defenders, coordinator for Strategic Affairs for Free Rohingya Coalition, and an adviser to the European Centre for the Study of Extremism, Cambridge.
Featured image is from AA