asiapacificresearch--2020-10-13--The Limits of Chinese Power

The Limits of Chinese Power

This article was originally published on Asia Times .
Everything about US-China hinges on the result of the upcoming US presidential election .
Trump 2.0 essentially would turbo-charge its bet on decoupling , aiming to squeeze “ malign ” China on a multiple Hybrid War front , undermine the Chinese trade surplus , co-opt large swathes of Asia , while always insisting on characterizing China as evil incarnate .
Team Biden , even as it professes no desire to fall into the trap of a new Cold War , according to the Dem official platform , would be only slightly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ rules-based order ” while keeping Trump-enacted sanctions .
Very few Chinese analysts are better positioned to survey the geopolitical and geoeconomic chessboard than Lanxin Xiang : expert on relations between China , US and Europe , professor of History and International Relations at the IHEID in Geneva and director of the Center for One Belt , One Road Studies in Shanghai .
Xiang got his PhD at SAIS at Johns Hopkins , and is as well respected in the US as in China .
During a recent webinar he laid out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ignores at its own peril .
Xiang has been focusing on the Trump administration ’ s push to “ redefine an external target ” : a process he brands , “ risky , dangerous , and highly ideological ” .
Not because of Trump – who is “ not interested in ideological issues ” – but due to the fact that the “ China policy was hijacked by the real Cold Warriors ” .
The objective : “ regime change .
But that was not Trump ’ s original plan.
” Xiang blasts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We made a huge mistake in the past 40 years ” .
That is , he insists , “ absurd – reading back into History , and denying the entire history of US-China relations since Nixon.
” And Xiang fears the “ lack of overall strategy .
That creates enormous strategic uncertainty – and leads to miscalculations.
” Compounding the problem , “ China is not really sure what the US wants to do.
” Because it goes way beyond containment – which Xiang defines as a “ very well thought of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Cold War.
” Xiang only detects a pattern of “ Western civilization versus a non-Caucasian culture .
That language is very dangerous .
It ’ s a direct rehash of Samuel Huntington , and shows very little room for compromise.
” In a nutshell , that ’ s the “ American way of stumbling into a Cold War.
” All of the above directly connects with Xiang ’ s great concern about a possible October Surprise : “ It could probably be over Taiwan .
Or a limited engagement in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Chinese military people are terribly worried .
October Surprise as a military engagement is not unthinkable , because Trump may want to re-establish a war presidency.
” Image on the right : Prof. Lanxin Xiang For Xiang , “ if Biden wins , the danger of a Cold War turning Hot War will be reduced dramatically.
” He is very much aware of shifts in the bipartisan consensus in Washington : “ Historically , Republicans don ’ t care about human rights and ideology .
Chinese always preferred to deal with Republicans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats – human rights , values issues .
Now the situation is reversed.
” Xiang , incidentally , “ invited a top Biden adviser to Beijing .
Very pragmatic .
Not too ideological.
” But in case of a possible Trump 2.0 administration , everything could change : “ My hunch is he will be totally relaxed , may even reverse China policy 180 degrees .
I would not be surprised .
He would turn back to being Xi Jinping ’ s best friend.
” As it stands , the problem is “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chief propagandist , taking advantage of an erratic president.
” And that ’ s why Xiang never rules out even an invasion of Taiwan by Chinese troops .
He games the scenario of a Taiwanese government announcing , “ We are independent ” coupled with a visit by the Secretary of State : “ That would provoke a limited military action , and could turn into an escalation .
Think about Sarajevo .
That worries me .
If Taiwan declares independence , Chinese invade in less than 24 hours .
“ Unlike most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about Beijing ’ s own shortcomings : “ Several things should have been better controlled .
Like abandoning Deng Xiaoping ’ s original advice that China should bide its time and keep a low profile .
Deng , in his last will , had set a timeline for that , at least 50 years.
” The problem is “ the speed of China ’ s economic development led to hot headed , and premature , calculations .
And a not well thought of strategy .
‘ Wolf warrior ’ diplomacy is an extremely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began to upset the US – and even the Europeans .
That was a geostrategic miscalculation.
” And that brings us to what Xiang characterizes as “ the overextension of Chinese power : geopolitical and geoconomic.
” He ’ s fond of quoting Paul Kennedy : “ Any great superpower , if overstretched , becomes vulnerable.
” Xiang goes as far as stating that the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) – whose concept he enthusiastically praises – may be overstretched : “ They thought it was a purely economic project .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” So is BRI a case of overstretching or a source of destabilization ?
Xiang notes how , “ Chinese are never really interested in other countries ’ domestic policies .
Not interested in exporting a model .
Chinese have no real model .
A model has to be mature – with a structure .
Unless you ’ re talking about export of traditional Chinese culture.
” The problem , once again , is that China thought it was possible to “ sneak into geographical areas that the US never paid too much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , without necessarily provoking a geopolitical setback .
But that is naiveté.
” Xiang is fond of reminding Western analysts that , “ the infrastructure investment model was invented by Europeans .
Railways .
The Trans-Siberian .
Canals , like in Panama .
Behind these projects there was always a colonial competition .
We pursue similar projects – minus colonialism.
” Still , “ Chinese planners buried their head in the sand .
They never use that word – geopolitics.
” Thus his constant jokes with Chinese policy makers : “ You may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you.
” The crucial aspect of the “ post-pandemic situation ” , according to Xiang , is to forget about “ that wolf warrior stuff .
China may be able to re-start the economy before anyone else .
Develop a really working vaccine .
China should not politicize it .
It should show a universal value about it , pursue multilateralism to help the world , and improve its image.
” On domestic politics , Xiang is adamant that “ during the last decade the atmosphere at home , on minority issues , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the extent that it does not help China ’ s image as a global power.
” Compare it , for instance , with “ unfavorable views of China ” in a survey of nations in the industrialized West that includes only two Asians : Japan and South Korea .
And that brings us to Xiang ’ s The Quest for Legitimacy in Chinese Politics – arguably the most important contemporary study by a Chinese scholar capable of explaining and bridging the East-West political divide .
This book is such a major breakthrough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the subject of a follow-up column .
Xiang ’ s main thesis is that “ legitimacy in Chinese tradition political philosophy is a dynamic question .
To transplant Western political values to the Chinese system does not work.
” Yet even as the Chinese concept of legitimacy is dynamic , Xiang stresses , “ the Chinese government is facing a legitimacy crisis.
” He refers to the anti-corruption campaign of the past four years : “ Widespread official corruption , that is a side-effect of economic development , bringing out the bad side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jinping , who understood that if we allow this to continue , the CCP will lose all legitimacy.
” Xiang stresses how , in China , “ legitimacy is based on the concept of morality – since Confucius .
The communists can ’ t escape the logic .
Nobody before Xi dared to tackle corruption .
He had the guts to root it out , arrested hundreds of corrupt generals .
Some even attempted two or three coups d ’ état.
” At the same time , Xiang is adamantly against the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in terms of freedom of speech .
He mentions the example of Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew , an “ enlightened authoritarian system ” .
The problem is ” China has no rule of law .
There are a lot of legal aspects though .
Singapore is a little city-state .
Like Hong Kong .
They just took over the British legal system .
It ’ s working very well for that size.
” And that brings Xiang to quote Aristotle : “ Democracy can never work in bigger countries .
In city-states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Aristotle , we step into Hong Kong : “ Hong Kong had rule of law – but never a democracy .
The government was directly appointed by London .
That ’ s how Hong Kong actually worked – as an economic dynamo .
Neoliberal economists consider Hong Kong as a model .
It ’ s a unique political arrangement .
Tycoon politics .
No democracy – even as the colonial government did not rule like an authoritarian figure .
Market economy was unleashed .
Hong Kong was ruled by the Jockey Club , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ colonial government as coordinator .
They never cared about people in the bottom.
” Xiang notes how , “ the richest man in Hong Kong only pays 15 % of income tax .
China wanted to keep that pattern , with a colonial government appointed by Beijing .
Still tycoon politics .
But now there ’ s a new generation .
People born after the handover – who know nothing about the colonial history .
Chinese elite ruling since 1997 did not pay attention to the grassroots and neglected younger generation sentiment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t do anything .
Law and order collapsed .
This is the reason why mainland Chinese decided to step in .
That ’ s what the new security law is all about.
” And what about that other favorite “ malign ” actor across the Beltway – Russia ?
“ Putin would love to have a Trump win .
The Chinese as well , up to three months ago .
The Cold War was a great strategic triangle .
After Nixon went to China , the US sat in the middle manipulating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changed.
” Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums .
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This article was originally published on Asia Times.
Everything about US-China hinges on the result of the upcoming US presidential election.
Trump 2.0 essentially would turbo-charge its bet on decoupling, aiming to squeeze “malign” China on a multiple Hybrid War front, undermine the Chinese trade surplus, co-opt large swathes of Asia, while always insisting on characterizing China as evil incarnate.
Team Biden, even as it professes no desire to fall into the trap of a new Cold War, according to the Dem official platform, would be only slightly less confrontational, ostensibly “saving” the “rules-based order” while keeping Trump-enacted sanctions.
Very few Chinese analysts are better positioned to survey the geopolitical and geoeconomic chessboard than Lanxin Xiang: expert on relations between China, US and Europe, professor of History and International Relations at the IHEID in Geneva and director of the Center for One Belt, One Road Studies in Shanghai.
Xiang got his PhD at SAIS at Johns Hopkins, and is as well respected in the US as in China. During a recent webinar he laid out the lineaments of an analysis the West ignores at its own peril.
Xiang has been focusing on the Trump administration’s push to “redefine an external target”: a process he brands, “risky, dangerous, and highly ideological”. Not because of Trump – who is “not interested in ideological issues” – but due to the fact that the “China policy was hijacked by the real Cold Warriors”. The objective: “regime change. But that was not Trump’s original plan.”
Xiang blasts the rationale behind these Cold Warriors: “We made a huge mistake in the past 40 years”. That is, he insists, “absurd – reading back into History, and denying the entire history of US-China relations since Nixon.” And Xiang fears the “lack of overall strategy. That creates enormous strategic uncertainty – and leads to miscalculations.”
Compounding the problem, “China is not really sure what the US wants to do.” Because it goes way beyond containment – which Xiang defines as a “very well thought of strategy by George Kennan, the father of the Cold War.” Xiang only detects a pattern of “Western civilization versus a non-Caucasian culture. That language is very dangerous. It’s a direct rehash of Samuel Huntington, and shows very little room for compromise.”
In a nutshell, that’s the “American way of stumbling into a Cold War.”
An October Surprise?
All of the above directly connects with Xiang’s great concern about a possible October Surprise: “It could probably be over Taiwan. Or a limited engagement in the South China Sea.” He stresses, “Chinese military people are terribly worried. October Surprise as a military engagement is not unthinkable, because Trump may want to re-establish a war presidency.”
Image on the right: Prof. Lanxin Xiang
For Xiang, “if Biden wins, the danger of a Cold War turning Hot War will be reduced dramatically.” He is very much aware of shifts in the bipartisan consensus in Washington: “Historically, Republicans don’t care about human rights and ideology. Chinese always preferred to deal with Republicans. They can’t deal with Democrats – human rights, values issues. Now the situation is reversed.”
Xiang, incidentally, “invited a top Biden adviser to Beijing. Very pragmatic. Not too ideological.” But in case of a possible Trump 2.0 administration, everything could change: “My hunch is he will be totally relaxed, may even reverse China policy 180 degrees. I would not be surprised. He would turn back to being Xi Jinping’s best friend.”
As it stands, the problem is “a chief diplomat that behaves as a chief propagandist, taking advantage of an erratic president.”
And that’s why Xiang never rules out even an invasion of Taiwan by Chinese troops. He games the scenario of a Taiwanese government announcing, “We are independent” coupled with a visit by the Secretary of State: “That would provoke a limited military action, and could turn into an escalation. Think about Sarajevo. That worries me. If Taiwan declares independence, Chinese invade in less than 24 hours. “
How Beijing miscalculates
Unlike most Chinese scholars, Xiang is refreshingly frank about Beijing’s own shortcomings: “Several things should have been better controlled. Like abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s original advice that China should bide its time and keep a low profile. Deng, in his last will, had set a timeline for that, at least 50 years.”
The problem is “the speed of China’s economic development led to hot headed, and premature, calculations. And a not well thought of strategy. ‘Wolf warrior’ diplomacy is an extremely assertive posture – and language. China began to upset the US – and even the Europeans. That was a geostrategic miscalculation.”
And that brings us to what Xiang characterizes as “the overextension of Chinese power: geopolitical and geoconomic.” He’s fond of quoting Paul Kennedy: “Any great superpower, if overstretched, becomes vulnerable.”
Xiang goes as far as stating that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – whose concept he enthusiastically praises – may be overstretched: “They thought it was a purely economic project. But with such wide global reach?”
So is BRI a case of overstretching or a source of destabilization? Xiang notes how, “Chinese are never really interested in other countries’ domestic policies. Not interested in exporting a model. Chinese have no real model. A model has to be mature – with a structure. Unless you’re talking about export of traditional Chinese culture.”
The problem, once again, is that China thought it was possible to “sneak into geographical areas that the US never paid too much attention to, Africa, Central Asia, without necessarily provoking a geopolitical setback. But that is naiveté.”
Xiang is fond of reminding Western analysts that, “the infrastructure investment model was invented by Europeans. Railways. The Trans-Siberian. Canals, like in Panama. Behind these projects there was always a colonial competition. We pursue similar projects – minus colonialism.”
Still, “Chinese planners buried their head in the sand. They never use that word – geopolitics.” Thus his constant jokes with Chinese policy makers: “You may not like geopolitics, but geopolitics likes you.”
Ask Confucius
The crucial aspect of the “post-pandemic situation”, according to Xiang, is to forget about “that wolf warrior stuff. China may be able to re-start the economy before anyone else. Develop a really working vaccine. China should not politicize it. It should show a universal value about it, pursue multilateralism to help the world, and improve its image.”
On domestic politics, Xiang is adamant that “during the last decade the atmosphere at home, on minority issues, freedom of speech, has been tightening to the extent that it does not help China’s image as a global power.”
Compare it, for instance, with “unfavorable views of China” in a survey of nations in the industrialized West that includes only two Asians: Japan and South Korea.
And that brings us to Xiang’s The Quest for Legitimacy in Chinese Politics – arguably the most important contemporary study by a Chinese scholar capable of explaining and bridging the East-West political divide.
This book is such a major breakthrough that its main conceptual analyses will be the subject of a follow-up column.
Xiang’s main thesis is that “legitimacy in Chinese tradition political philosophy is a dynamic question. To transplant Western political values to the Chinese system does not work.”
Yet even as the Chinese concept of legitimacy is dynamic, Xiang stresses, “the Chinese government is facing a legitimacy crisis.” He refers to the anti-corruption campaign of the past four years: “Widespread official corruption, that is a side-effect of economic development, bringing out the bad side of the system. Credit to Xi Jinping, who understood that if we allow this to continue, the CCP will lose all legitimacy.”
Xiang stresses how, in China, “legitimacy is based on the concept of morality – since Confucius. The communists can’t escape the logic.
Nobody before Xi dared to tackle corruption. He had the guts to root it out, arrested hundreds of corrupt generals. Some even attempted two or three coups d’état.”
At the same time, Xiang is adamantly against the “tightening of the atmosphere” in China in terms of freedom of speech. He mentions the example of Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, an “enlightened authoritarian system”. The problem is” China has no rule of law. There are a lot of legal aspects though. Singapore is a little city-state. Like Hong Kong. They just took over the British legal system. It’s working very well for that size.”
And that brings Xiang to quote Aristotle: “Democracy can never work in bigger countries. In city-states, it does.” And armed with Aristotle, we step into Hong Kong: “Hong Kong had rule of law – but never a democracy. The government was directly appointed by London. That’s how Hong Kong actually worked – as an economic dynamo. Neoliberal economists consider Hong Kong as a model. It’s a unique political arrangement. Tycoon politics. No democracy – even as the colonial government did not rule like an authoritarian figure. Market economy was unleashed. Hong Kong was ruled by the Jockey Club, HSBC, Jardine Matheson, with the colonial government as coordinator. They never cared about people in the bottom.”
Xiang notes how, “the richest man in Hong Kong only pays 15% of income tax. China wanted to keep that pattern, with a colonial government appointed by Beijing. Still tycoon politics. But now there’s a new generation. People born after the handover – who know nothing about the colonial history. Chinese elite ruling since 1997 did not pay attention to the grassroots and neglected younger generation sentiment. For a whole year the Chinese didn’t do anything. Law and order collapsed. This is the reason why mainland Chinese decided to step in. That’s what the new security law is all about.”
And what about that other favorite “malign” actor across the Beltway – Russia? “Putin would love to have a Trump win. The Chinese as well, up to three months ago. The Cold War was a great strategic triangle. After Nixon went to China, the US sat in the middle manipulating Moscow and Beijing. Now everything has changed.”
*
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Pepe Escobar is a frequent contributor to Global Research.


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-15--Cambodia Has Become China’s Unofficial Representative in ASEAN

China has made a decisive move to strengthen ties with one of its main partners in Southeast Asia by opening its markets for duty-free trade .
Leaders in Beijing and the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh strengthened their political and economic ties at a time when the U.S. actively opposes China and the EU renewed sanctions against the Southeast Asian country .
The signing of a Free Trade Agreement was one of the main highlights of the Chinese Foreign Minister ’ s recent visit to Cambodia .
This agreement will allow Cambodia to export up to 340 items to Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This could make up for the losses Cambodia has suffered because of declining trade with the EU .
At the same time however , trade with China is developing positively , especially with agricultural products reaching Chinese markets .
In August 2020 , the EU temporarily abolished the preferential trade regime that Cambodia enjoyed under the program “ Everything but arms.
” The sanctions are due to the EU ’ s so-called concerns about human rights in Cambodia and has mostly affected traditional exports – clothing , shoes , and tourism goods .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU sharply reduced imports of rice from Cambodia .
The tariff restrictions were introduced in January for a period of three years .
However , the loss was offset by an increase in sales of rice to China .
In 2019 , bilateral trade between China and Cambodia reached $ 8 billion .
During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi ’ s ’ s visit to Cambodia , the two sides agreed to raise this to $ 10 billion over the next three years .
The two countries regularly exchange high-level visits .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Republic of China Li Keqiang officially visited Cambodia and updated the cooperation program between China and Mekong River basin countries .
In early 2019 , Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen paid a visit to Beijing .
High-level negotiations took place on the eve of the Cambodian election , in which he won unconditionally , despite the opposition having support from the U.S. and the EU .
This time , Yi ’ s meeting with Cambodia ’ s top leader was held amid increasing pressure from the U.S. against Phnom Penh .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s ecosystem and alleged widespread corruption , sanctions have been imposed against Chinese company Union Development Group .
This company is involved in the construction of one of Southeast Asia ’ s largest tourist hubs , Dara Sakor , which will be located on Cambodia ’ s shores on the Gulf of Thailand .
The project promises many billions of dollars in revenue for the Cambodian economy .
Recently , the U.S. has also expressed strong outrage over Cambodia ’ s demolition of an American-built military facility at the country ’ s largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the U.S. has also been provoked by reports that China could be participating in the modernization of the base .
During a meeting with Cambodian Foreign Minister , Prak Sokhonn , Yi assured that China would continue to strongly support Cambodia in defending its sovereignty and national dignity .
For his part , Sokhonn affirmed that Cambodia wants to further develop relations with China .
This will further strengthen China ’ s position in the region as Cambodia openly acknowledges that it will by all means protect China ’ s interests in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two .
Cambodia will persistently promote economic and political cooperation with China in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) .
It is clear that Hun Sen is looking to manoeuvre in some way by openly declaring the diversification of its economic strategy with China as a visible and vocal friend .
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Hor Namhong recently called on powers outside of the region to not interfere in issues in the South China Sea and supported China ’ s statement saying that Beijing is ready to resolve this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , historical accuracy and in accordance with international law .
Although Cambodia is not a stakeholder in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea , it has repeatedly announced which side of the dispute it is on .
For example , in 2012 , as Chairman of ASEAN , Phnom Penh firmly opposed the inclusion of a summary statement condemning Beijing ’ s actions in its dispute with the Philippines in the South China Sea , and therefore , for the first time in ASEAN history , the summit ’ s key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 , Cambodia once again supported China by rejecting the proposal to include any mention of the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that ruled against Beijing ’ s claims of sovereignty over most of the South China Sea .
Because of the lack of a necessary consensus among all ASEAN members , the passage referring to the final Hague ruling was not recorded in the summary document .
Cambodian-Chinese relations are mutually beneficial .
As the EU sanctions the Southeast Asian country as it allegedly violated the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has strongly stepped in to make up Cambodia ’ s lost revenue .
In return , Cambodia has become a strong and unapologetic backer of China , even turning against fellow ASEAN members in their dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea .
Cambodia , as a country with no stake in the South China Sea dispute , will continue being a country representing Beijing ’ s interest in ASEAN while it also becomes a pivot for China to more easily expand its influence across Southeast Asia , particularly in Laos .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ share buttons above or below .
Forward this article to your email lists .
Crosspost on your blog site , internet forums .
etc .
This article was originally published on InfoBrics .

China has made a decisive move to strengthen ties with one of its main partners in Southeast Asia by opening its markets for duty-free trade. Leaders in Beijing and the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh strengthened their political and economic ties at a time when the U.S. actively opposes China and the EU renewed sanctions against the Southeast Asian country.
The signing of a Free Trade Agreement was one of the main highlights of the Chinese Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Cambodia. This agreement will allow Cambodia to export up to 340 items to Chinese markets without being subject to tax. This could make up for the losses Cambodia has suffered because of declining trade with the EU. At the same time however, trade with China is developing positively, especially with agricultural products reaching Chinese markets.
In August 2020, the EU temporarily abolished the preferential trade regime that Cambodia enjoyed under the program “Everything but arms.” The sanctions are due to the EU’s so-called concerns about human rights in Cambodia and has mostly affected traditional exports – clothing, shoes, and tourism goods. In addition, in 2019, the EU sharply reduced imports of rice from Cambodia. The tariff restrictions were introduced in January for a period of three years. However, the loss was offset by an increase in sales of rice to China. In 2019, bilateral trade between China and Cambodia reached $8 billion. During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s’s visit to Cambodia, the two sides agreed to raise this to $10 billion over the next three years.
The two countries regularly exchange high-level visits. In early 2018, Premier of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang officially visited Cambodia and updated the cooperation program between China and Mekong River basin countries. In early 2019, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen paid a visit to Beijing. High-level negotiations took place on the eve of the Cambodian election, in which he won unconditionally, despite the opposition having support from the U.S. and the EU.
This time, Yi’s meeting with Cambodia’s top leader was held amid increasing pressure from the U.S. against Phnom Penh. Due to so-called concerns for Cambodia’s ecosystem and alleged widespread corruption, sanctions have been imposed against Chinese company Union Development Group. This company is involved in the construction of one of Southeast Asia’s largest tourist hubs, Dara Sakor, which will be located on Cambodia’s shores on the Gulf of Thailand. The project promises many billions of dollars in revenue for the Cambodian economy.
Recently, the U.S. has also expressed strong outrage over Cambodia’s demolition of an American-built military facility at the country’s largest naval base in Ream. The outburst from the U.S. has also been provoked by reports that China could be participating in the modernization of the base. During a meeting with Cambodian Foreign Minister, Prak Sokhonn, Yi assured that China would continue to strongly support Cambodia in defending its sovereignty and national dignity. For his part, Sokhonn affirmed that Cambodia wants to further develop relations with China.
This will further strengthen China’s position in the region as Cambodia openly acknowledges that it will by all means protect China’s interests in the region and promote economic projects between the two. Cambodia will persistently promote economic and political cooperation with China in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is clear that Hun Sen is looking to manoeuvre in some way by openly declaring the diversification of its economic strategy with China as a visible and vocal friend.
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Hor Namhong recently called on powers outside of the region to not interfere in issues in the South China Sea and supported China’s statement saying that Beijing is ready to resolve this issue peacefully on the basis of respect, historical accuracy and in accordance with international law.
Although Cambodia is not a stakeholder in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, it has repeatedly announced which side of the dispute it is on. For example, in 2012, as Chairman of ASEAN, Phnom Penh firmly opposed the inclusion of a summary statement condemning Beijing’s actions in its dispute with the Philippines in the South China Sea, and therefore, for the first time in ASEAN history, the summit’s key document was not passed. Then in 2016, Cambodia once again supported China by rejecting the proposal to include any mention of the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that ruled against Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Because of the lack of a necessary consensus among all ASEAN members, the passage referring to the final Hague ruling was not recorded in the summary document.
Cambodian-Chinese relations are mutually beneficial. As the EU sanctions the Southeast Asian country as it allegedly violated the “Everything but arms” program, China has strongly stepped in to make up Cambodia’s lost revenue. In return, Cambodia has become a strong and unapologetic backer of China, even turning against fellow ASEAN members in their dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea. Cambodia, as a country with no stake in the South China Sea dispute, will continue being a country representing Beijing’s interest in ASEAN while it also becomes a pivot for China to more easily expand its influence across Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos.
*
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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.
Paul Antonopoulos is an independent geopolitical analyst.
Featured image is from InfoBrics


asiapacificresearch--2020-10-18--Philippine Foreign Relations: A Look Back in 2018

The following is an excerpt from the author ’ s article that was first published in “ 2018 Philippine Development Report ” by Hainan Normal University .
The year 2018 was a period of enormous challenges and opportunities for the Philippines in the arena of diplomatic relations .
The challenges the country faced in the previous year signalled a need for reexamination of its foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific region , particularly with China and the USA , while pursuing new interests and approaches for optimizing opportunities that would benefit the Filipino population .
The Philippine foreign policy essentially contains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preservation and enhancement of national security , 2 ) promotion and attainment of economic security and 3 ) protection of the rights and promotion of the welfare and interest of Filipinos overseas .
Using these three main components , this paper aims to identify , describe and assess the Philippine external affairs at a time when it was increasingly challenging to redefine its priorities , alliances and interests .
The Philippines , to put it simply , made notable attempts to diversify and expand its relations in 2018 .
Since taking the oath @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been keen on pursuing an independent foreign policy , one that puts a premium on national development as the Philippines engages with the global community .
To realize its goals in the aspects of national and economic security , the Philippine state has worked towards broadening ties of cooperation with countries ( i.e .
Russia , Turkey , Nordic countries , and the Pacific region ) and regions with which the Philippines has limited , or non-existent , relations , while sustaining long-established partnerships , such as those with the US , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ linkage between migration and socio-economic development prompted the Philippine government to finally launch Overseas Filipino Bank , the banking institution that supports and aids in the transfer of remittances from Filipino migrant workers to their families and hometowns .
2018 was inopportune for Filipino domestic workers affected by the temporary migration ban .
It compelled the Philippines to clarify the terms of a bilateral agreement with Kuwait , one of the Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) destinations of Filipino domestic workers following the death of a Filipino migrant in February .
Whereas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Philippines particularly in relation to Russia and China , enduring challenges such as the South China Sea dispute have in check the relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) .
Note to readers : please click the share buttons above or below .
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Jocelyn Celero is an Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines Diliman .
She obtained her Ph.D. in International Studies at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Her research interests are Japan Studies , Filipino Migration to Japan , Japan and Philippine ( and Southeast Asia ) Relations , and Social welfare , development and policy in East Asia .
She can be reached at [ email protected ] .

The following is an excerpt from the author’s article that was first published in “2018 Philippine Development Report” by Hainan Normal University.
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The year 2018 was a period of enormous challenges and opportunities for the Philippines in the arena of diplomatic relations. The challenges the country faced in the previous year signalled a need for reexamination of its foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with China and the USA, while pursuing new interests and approaches for optimizing opportunities that would benefit the Filipino population. The Philippine foreign policy essentially contains three mutually constitutive pillars: 1) preservation and enhancement of national security, 2) promotion and attainment of economic security and 3) protection of the rights and promotion of the welfare and interest of Filipinos overseas. Using these three main components, this paper aims to identify, describe and assess the Philippine external affairs at a time when it was increasingly challenging to redefine its priorities, alliances and interests. The Philippines, to put it simply, made notable attempts to diversify and expand its relations in 2018.
Brief Assessment
Since taking the oath to office in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte has been keen on pursuing an independent foreign policy, one that puts a premium on national development as the Philippines engages with the global community. To realize its goals in the aspects of national and economic security, the Philippine state has worked towards broadening ties of cooperation with countries (i.e. Russia, Turkey, Nordic countries, and the Pacific region) and regions with which the Philippines has limited, or non-existent, relations, while sustaining long-established partnerships, such as those with the US, China, and Japan. The strong linkage between migration and socio-economic development prompted the Philippine government to finally launch Overseas Filipino Bank, the banking institution that supports and aids in the transfer of remittances from Filipino migrant workers to their families and hometowns. 2018 was inopportune for Filipino domestic workers affected by the temporary migration ban. It compelled the Philippines to clarify the terms of a bilateral agreement with Kuwait, one of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) destinations of Filipino domestic workers following the death of a Filipino migrant in February. Whereas new opportunities for cooperation opened for the Philippines particularly in relation to Russia and China, enduring challenges such as the South China Sea dispute have in check the relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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Jocelyn Celero is an Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She obtained her Ph.D. in International Studies at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. Her research interests are Japan Studies, Filipino Migration to Japan, Japan and Philippine (and Southeast Asia) Relations, and Social welfare, development and policy in East Asia. She can be reached at [email protected].