npr--2020-01-30--WHO Declares Coronavirus Outbreak A Global Health Emergency

The World Health Organization announced Thursday that the outbreak of a deadly and fast-spreading strain of coronavirus constitutes a global health emergency .
`` Over the past few weeks , we have witnessed the emergence of a previously unknown pathogen , which has escalated into an unprecedented outbreak and which has been met by an unprecedented response , '' WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told reporters in Geneva .
However , Tedros was adamant that `` the main reason for the declaration is not because of what is happening in China but because of what is happening in other countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this vote is not a declaration of no confidence in China . ''
He said that the WHO is deeply concerned about what will happen if the virus begins spreading in countries with weak health systems and that the purpose of the declaration is to help those countries .
The declaration of a global health emergency can work to galvanize international funding .
According to the WHO 's procedures , the three criteria for such a declaration are that it is an `` extraordinary event , '' that it `` constitute [ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States through the international spread of disease '' and that it `` potentially require [ s ] a coordinated international response . ''
The last time the WHO announced an international health emergency was in July 2019 over the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo .
Before that , international emergencies were declared in 2016 for the Zika virus and in 2014 for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa .
The new coronavirus has sickened more than 7,800 people worldwide and killed at least 170 , all of them in China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that `` all countries should be prepared for containment , including active surveillance , early detection , isolation and case management , contact tracing and prevention of onward spread '' of the virus .
`` There is no reason for measures that unnecessarily interfere with international travel and trade .
WHO does n't recommend limiting trade and movement , '' Tedros added .
But the WHO also said that in certain circumstances , such as when there are many cases of transmission among a vulnerable population , such measures could be `` temporarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attention after Chinese authorities began reporting cases of pneumonia in the city of Wuhan last month .
They were able to pinpoint the cause to a previously unknown strain .
Other forms of coronavirus , such as SARS and MERS , have been responsible for past international outbreaks .
Health authorities believe this particular strain , known as 2019-nCoV , likely first spread from an animal .
China 's National Health Commission has said it is associated with exposure at a seafood market in Wuhan that also sold live animals .
Since then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to countries around the world , including the United States , Japan , Singapore and Thailand .
`` The vast majority of those cases are still associated with travel to Wuhan , '' said Dr. Michael Ryan , executive director of the WHO 's health emergencies program .
`` We know that this virus can cause severe disease and that it can kill , although for most people it causes milder symptoms , '' Tedros told reporters last week .
The WHO said that about 20 % of those infected experience severe illness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerning for several reasons .
First , the WHO said there is evidence that the virus could spread from human to human .
`` The disease is mainly a respiratory disease passing via droplets from one person to another and mostly still through close contact , '' Ryan said .
The droplets could come from sneezing , coughing or even talking .
This is worrying because it is easier for a virus to spread quickly between humans compared with a virus transmitted from an animal to humans .
Human-to-human transmission has now been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tedros said .
Second , experts still do n't know for certain what animal the virus originated from in Wuhan .
`` Until we know what the animal is , there potentially could still be animals being sold in markets all across China that is spilling virus over into people , '' Matthew Frieman , a virologist with the University of Maryland School of Medicine , recently told NPR 's Nurith Aizenman .
And third , Chinese authorities say the virus has also infected medical workers — people who already would be taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is currently no targeted drug to treat the virus , Chinese health authorities said .
And there is no vaccine to guard against it .
Tedros is calling on countries to `` accelerate the development of vaccines , therapeutics and diagnostics . ''
Several countries , including the U.S. , have started to evacuate citizens from Wuhan because of concerns about the coronavirus .
As NPR 's Bill Chappell reported , American passengers broke into cheers after their flight from Wuhan touched down Tuesday night in Alaska .
The Centers for Disease Control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoid all nonessential travel to all of [ China ] . ''
Major airlines , such as United Airlines and British Airways , have suspended flights to Chinese cities .
Chinese health authorities recently announced new sweeping measures to try to contain the new coronavirus by implementing a strict quarantine on Wuhan , a city of some 11 million people .
`` There 's no sense of when the quarantine might be lifted , '' NPR 's Emily Feng reported from Beijing .
`` The big problem is that people are going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the Lunar New Year is over .
Many of them are coming from villages where there are very few screening measures for the virus . ''
China 's government has come under criticism for not responding more quickly to the outbreak .
But WHO officials have praised the Chinese response .
`` The Chinese government is to be congratulated for the extraordinary measures it has taken to contain the outbreak , despite the severe social and economic impact those measures are having on the Chinese people , '' Tedros said .
`` @ @ @ @ @ @ @ setting a new standard for outbreak response . ''

WHO Declares Coronavirus Outbreak A Global Health Emergency
Enlarge this image toggle caption Kin Cheung/AP Kin Cheung/AP
Updated at 9:40 p.m. ET
The World Health Organization announced Thursday that the outbreak of a deadly and fast-spreading strain of coronavirus constitutes a global health emergency.
"Over the past few weeks, we have witnessed the emergence of a previously unknown pathogen, which has escalated into an unprecedented outbreak and which has been met by an unprecedented response," WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told reporters in Geneva.
However, Tedros was adamant that "the main reason for this declaration is not because of what is happening in China but because of what is happening in other countries. ... Let me be clear — this vote is not a declaration of no confidence in China." He said that the WHO is deeply concerned about what will happen if the virus begins spreading in countries with weak health systems and that the purpose of the declaration is to help those countries.
The declaration of a global health emergency can work to galvanize international funding. According to the WHO's procedures, the three criteria for such a declaration are that it is an "extraordinary event," that it "constitute[s] a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease" and that it "potentially require[s] a coordinated international response."
The last time the WHO announced an international health emergency was in July 2019 over the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Before that, international emergencies were declared in 2016 for the Zika virus and in 2014 for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
Also on Thursday, the U.S. State Department issued a "do not travel" advisory for China.
"Do not travel to China due to novel coronavirus first identified in Wuhan, China," the advisory reads. "Those currently in China should consider departing using commercial means. The Department of State has requested that all non-essential U.S. government personnel defer travel to China in light of the novel coronavirus."
The new coronavirus has sickened around 9,800 people worldwide and killed at least 213, all of them in China.
The WHO said in a statement that "all countries should be prepared for containment, including active surveillance, early detection, isolation and case management, contact tracing and prevention of onward spread" of the virus.
"There is no reason for measures that unnecessarily interfere with international travel and trade. WHO doesn't recommend limiting trade and movement," Tedros added. But the WHO also said that in certain circumstances, such as when there are many cases of transmission among a vulnerable population, such measures could be "temporarily useful."
The coronavirus drew worldwide attention after Chinese authorities began reporting cases of pneumonia in the city of Wuhan last month. They were able to pinpoint the cause to a previously unknown strain. Other forms of coronavirus, such as SARS and MERS, have been responsible for past international outbreaks.
Health authorities believe this particular strain, known as 2019-nCoV, likely first spread from an animal. China's National Health Commission has said it is associated with exposure at a seafood market in Wuhan that also sold live animals.
Since then, the virus has spread from Wuhan to countries around the world, including the United States, Japan, Singapore and Thailand. "The vast majority of those cases are still associated with travel to Wuhan," said Dr. Michael Ryan, executive director of the WHO's health emergencies program.
"We know that this virus can cause severe disease and that it can kill, although for most people it causes milder symptoms," Tedros told reporters last week. The WHO said that about 20% of those infected experience severe illness.
Experts find the new coronavirus particularly concerning for several reasons. First, the WHO said there is evidence that the virus could spread from human to human. "The disease is mainly a respiratory disease passing via droplets from one person to another and mostly still through close contact," Ryan said.
The droplets could come from sneezing, coughing or even talking. This is worrying because it is easier for a virus to spread quickly between humans compared with a virus transmitted from an animal to humans. Human-to-human transmission has now been documented in three countries outside China, Tedros said.
Second, experts still don't know for certain what animal the virus originated from in Wuhan. "Until we know what the animal is, there potentially could still be animals being sold in markets all across China that is spilling virus over into people," Matthew Frieman, a virologist with the University of Maryland School of Medicine, recently told NPR's Nurith Aizenman.
And third, Chinese authorities say the virus has also infected medical workers — people who already would be taking serious precautions to protect themselves.
There is currently no targeted drug to treat the virus, Chinese health authorities said. And there is no vaccine to guard against it. Tedros is calling on countries to "accelerate the development of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics."
Several countries, including the U.S., have started to evacuate citizens from Wuhan because of concerns about the coronavirus. As NPR's Bill Chappell reported, American passengers broke into cheers after their flight from Wuhan touched down Tuesday night in Alaska. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is advising that travelers "avoid all nonessential travel to all of [China]."
Major airlines, such as United Airlines and British Airways, have suspended flights to Chinese cities.
Chinese health authorities recently announced new sweeping measures to try to contain the new coronavirus by implementing a strict quarantine on Wuhan, a city of some 11 million people. "There's no sense of when the quarantine might be lifted," NPR's Emily Feng reported from Beijing. "The big problem is that people are going to have to return to work soon, when the Lunar New Year is over. Many of them are coming from villages where there are very few screening measures for the virus."
China's government has come under criticism for not responding more quickly to the outbreak. But WHO officials have praised the Chinese response.
"The Chinese government is to be congratulated for the extraordinary measures it has taken to contain the outbreak, despite the severe social and economic impact those measures are having on the Chinese people," Tedros said. "In many ways, China is actually setting a new standard for outbreak response."


npr--2020-01-30--Opinion: Trump's Fundamentally Flawed 'Vision' For Mideast Peace

Daniel B. Shapiro ( @ DanielBShapiro ) is a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv .
He served as U.S. ambassador to Israel and on the National Security Council during the Obama administration .
When President Trump issued his `` Vision for Peace , Prosperity , and a Brighter Future for Israel and the Palestinian People '' at the White House on Tuesday , I was reminded that no one should be more humble about critiquing new Middle East peace initiatives than those who have taken part in previous ones .
I am in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poured thousands of hours into that effort — and failed .
So I appreciate President Trump , Jared Kushner and their colleagues ' hard work over three years to advance this noble cause , as well as their attentiveness to Israel 's security .
I wish them success — but worry that a failure in this instance could come with severe ramifications that would set back prospects for an end to the conflict irreparably .
The major problems with the president 's plan result from having talked to only one side in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel 's capital in December 2017 , the Palestinian Authority boycotted any contact with his administration .
That was surely an overreaction , although Trump failed to offer the Palestinians any signal that he recognized their legitimate aspirations for a capital in Jerusalem .
Nevertheless , the communication breakdown handicapped all efforts that followed .
When I was involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations while serving on the National Security Council and as U.S. ambassador to Israel , I could summarize the stance of officials on either side in one sentence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , would just adopt our positions as your own and impose them on the other side , everything would be fine . ''
That always struck me as an odd definition of a mediator 's role .
A mediator does not need to show perfect balance , but does need to earn the parties ' trust about taking their concerns seriously .
At a minimum , a mediator needs to be to be able to talk with both sides .
But for over two years , the U.S.-Palestinian diplomatic channel has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you would expect .
On nearly every major issue in dispute , the president 's `` Vision '' comes down firmly on the side of Israeli preferences .
On territory , it permits Israel to annex some 30 % of the West Bank , including all Israeli settlements , while leaving a semi-state of Palestine with some 70 % — far less than contemplated in previous negotiations — in disconnected chunks .
On Jerusalem , it allows Israel to hold the entire city as its capital , while giving Palestinians a few outer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It bars the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel ( a reasonable restriction , because no Israeli leader could agree to absorb such a large population that would change Israel 's Jewish character ) , but does not permit meaningful immigration of Palestinians from other countries even to the Palestinian semi-state .
On security , it describes a regime in which Israeli security forces would maintain constant presence , and likely experience friction , with Palestinians even in their own territory .
In any realistic peace plan , Palestinians will have to agree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before .
So will Israel .
But this version would place Palestinian leaders — even stronger and bolder ones than the current , aging President Mahmoud Abbas — in an untenable position , unable to defend to their people something that will look like a total surrender .
That makes the plan unimplementable .
It calls for Palestinians to accept these terms within four years .
The high likelihood is that the plan is a dead letter .
The authors , and the Israelis , seem to know this .
And the prospect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — whether by design or misjudgment — is pushing Israel toward unilateral actions instead , namely annexing large chunks of the West Bank .
While the text suggests such unilateral annexation could be the result if the Palestinians fail to accept the plan within four years , already Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu , fighting for his political life in a competitive election , is signaling he may advance annexation legislation much sooner .
It could happen within weeks or months .
I see four dangerous ramifications from this plan and the way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it undercuts longstanding principles that the United States and Israel have agreed should govern U.S. peace efforts : that agreements can only be reached in direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians , not by outside parties ; and that both sides should avoid unilateral acts that undercut negotiations .
The violations of these principles set new precedents .
Today they work in Israel 's favor .
It is possible to imagine future scenarios where they would not .
Second , while some Arab states are offering tepid support for Trump 's efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two-state solution and unilateral Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley is being greeted with alarm in Jordan .
A key moderate Arab ally of the United States and peace partner to Israel , Jordan 's stability is in the interest of both the U.S. and Israel .
But King Abdullah II will feel pressure from Jordan 's majority Palestinian-origin population and other opponents of the peace with Israel to downgrade ties .
Quiet security cooperation benefits both countries and could be a buffer , but this relationship is best not put under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ envisions most of the roughly 2.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank living in the Palestinian semi-state , there is a reasonable possibility that at some point , that non-viable entity will collapse .
If it does , the Israeli military will be drawn back into the main West Bank population centers , and Israel will find itself in full control of everyone and everything west of the Jordan River .
At that point , the question Palestinians and many others will raise is : Why not simply have one-person , one-vote in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ account the over 2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel who already vote in Israeli elections , that is the moment when Israel will face a dilemma with no solution : How can it remain what it has always been — a Jewish and democratic state without a solid Jewish majority ?
The answer : It ca n't .
Finally , the plan 's release so close to the U.S. election creates another dilemma for Israel .
If Trump loses in November , his successor will not feel bound by it .
The plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy through multiple administrations of both parties , and the Trump administration made minimal efforts to build support for its approach before its release .
All the leading Democratic presidential candidates have criticized it .
So if Israel were to invest deeply in this plan in 2020 , even going so far as to commence unilateral annexation , it has approximately a 50 % chance of finding itself in a serious clash with a new administration in January 2021 .
Palestinian leaders , who have long boycotted direct talks , denied Israel 's @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant responsibility for their people 's hardship .
But a plan that , even if they change their ways , offers them little they can highlight with pride to their people and fails to to truly separate Palestinians and Israelis into two states , is unlikely to end the conflict or succeed in making their lives better .
It wo n't do any favors for Israel or the United States , either .

Opinion: Trump's Fundamentally Flawed 'Vision' For Mideast Peace
Enlarge this image toggle caption Susan Walsh/AP Susan Walsh/AP
Daniel B. Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro) is a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He served as U.S. ambassador to Israel and on the National Security Council during the Obama administration.
When President Trump issued his "Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and a Brighter Future for Israel and the Palestinian People" at the White House on Tuesday, I was reminded that no one should be more humble about critiquing new Middle East peace initiatives than those who have taken part in previous ones. I am in the club of U.S. government officials who poured thousands of hours into that effort — and failed.
So I appreciate President Trump, Jared Kushner and their colleagues' hard work over three years to advance this noble cause, as well as their attentiveness to Israel's security. I wish them success — but worry that a failure in this instance could come with severe ramifications that would set back prospects for an end to the conflict irreparably.
The major problems with the president's plan result from having talked to only one side in the conflict — Israel. Ever since President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017, the Palestinian Authority boycotted any contact with his administration. That was surely an overreaction, although Trump failed to offer the Palestinians any signal that he recognized their legitimate aspirations for a capital in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the communication breakdown handicapped all efforts that followed.
When I was involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations while serving on the National Security Council and as U.S. ambassador to Israel, I could summarize the stance of officials on either side in one sentence: "If you, the United States, would just adopt our positions as your own and impose them on the other side, everything would be fine."
That always struck me as an odd definition of a mediator's role. A mediator does not need to show perfect balance, but does need to earn the parties' trust about taking their concerns seriously. At a minimum, a mediator needs to be to be able to talk with both sides. But for over two years, the U.S.-Palestinian diplomatic channel has been completely silent.
The results are as you would expect. On nearly every major issue in dispute, the president's "Vision" comes down firmly on the side of Israeli preferences.
On territory, it permits Israel to annex some 30% of the West Bank, including all Israeli settlements, while leaving a semi-state of Palestine with some 70% — far less than contemplated in previous negotiations — in disconnected chunks.
On Jerusalem, it allows Israel to hold the entire city as its capital, while giving Palestinians a few outer neighborhoods beyond an Israeli security barrier. It bars the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel (a reasonable restriction, because no Israeli leader could agree to absorb such a large population that would change Israel's Jewish character), but does not permit meaningful immigration of Palestinians from other countries even to the Palestinian semi-state.
Enlarge this image toggle caption Abbas Momani/AFP via Getty Images Abbas Momani/AFP via Getty Images
On security, it describes a regime in which Israeli security forces would maintain constant presence, and likely experience friction, with Palestinians even in their own territory.
In any realistic peace plan, Palestinians will have to agree to major concessions they have not accepted before. So will Israel. But this version would place Palestinian leaders — even stronger and bolder ones than the current, aging President Mahmoud Abbas — in an untenable position, unable to defend to their people something that will look like a total surrender.
That makes the plan unimplementable. It calls for Palestinians to accept these terms within four years. The high likelihood is that the plan is a dead letter. The authors, and the Israelis, seem to know this.
And the prospect of a plan that is going nowhere — whether by design or misjudgment — is pushing Israel toward unilateral actions instead, namely annexing large chunks of the West Bank. While the text suggests such unilateral annexation could be the result if the Palestinians fail to accept the plan within four years, already Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fighting for his political life in a competitive election, is signaling he may advance annexation legislation much sooner. It could happen within weeks or months.
I see four dangerous ramifications from this plan and the way it was constructed and presented.
First, it undercuts longstanding principles that the United States and Israel have agreed should govern U.S. peace efforts: that agreements can only be reached in direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, not by outside parties; and that both sides should avoid unilateral acts that undercut negotiations. The violations of these principles set new precedents. Today they work in Israel's favor. It is possible to imagine future scenarios where they would not.
Second, while some Arab states are offering tepid support for Trump's efforts, the prospect of the death of the two-state solution and unilateral Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley is being greeted with alarm in Jordan. A key moderate Arab ally of the United States and peace partner to Israel, Jordan's stability is in the interest of both the U.S. and Israel. But King Abdullah II will feel pressure from Jordan's majority Palestinian-origin population and other opponents of the peace with Israel to downgrade ties. Quiet security cooperation benefits both countries and could be a buffer, but this relationship is best not put under stress.
Third, while the plan envisions most of the roughly 2.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank living in the Palestinian semi-state, there is a reasonable possibility that at some point, that non-viable entity will collapse. If it does, the Israeli military will be drawn back into the main West Bank population centers, and Israel will find itself in full control of everyone and everything west of the Jordan River.
At that point, the question Palestinians and many others will raise is: Why not simply have one-person, one-vote in all areas Israel controls? Taking into account the over 2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel who already vote in Israeli elections, that is the moment when Israel will face a dilemma with no solution: How can it remain what it has always been — a Jewish and democratic state without a solid Jewish majority? The answer: It can't.
Finally, the plan's release so close to the U.S. election creates another dilemma for Israel. If Trump loses in November, his successor will not feel bound by it. The plan is well outside the historical consensus U.S. policy through multiple administrations of both parties, and the Trump administration made minimal efforts to build support for its approach before its release. All the leading Democratic presidential candidates have criticized it.
So if Israel were to invest deeply in this plan in 2020, even going so far as to commence unilateral annexation, it has approximately a 50% chance of finding itself in a serious clash with a new administration in January 2021.
Palestinian leaders, who have long boycotted direct talks, denied Israel's legitimacy and winked at violence, bear significant responsibility for their people's hardship. But a plan that, even if they change their ways, offers them little they can highlight with pride to their people and fails to to truly separate Palestinians and Israelis into two states, is unlikely to end the conflict or succeed in making their lives better. It won't do any favors for Israel or the United States, either.


npr--2020-01-30--'Black Wave' Author Chronicles Cultural, Religious Upheaval In The Middle East

Kim Ghattas grew up in Lebanon during the civil war and covered the Mideast for the BBC for 20 years .
She says events in the region in 1979 set off waves of extremism and violence that continue today .
This is FRESH AIR .
I 'm Terry Gross .
In her new book , journalist Kim Ghattas asked the question she says haunts her and most people in the Arab and Muslim world - what happened to us ?
Ghattas is Lebanese and grew up during her country 's civil war .
For people in the Middle East , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different country , one that is not mired in the horrors of sectarian killings , a more vibrant place without the crushing intolerance of religious zealots and seemingly endless wars .
Her new book is a history of how the Middle East unraveled in the past few decades .
It 's called `` Black Wave : Saudi Arabia , Iran , And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture , Religion , And Collective Memory In The Middle East . ''
She covered the Middle East for the BBC and The Financial Times for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington .
She divides her time between Washington and Beirut .
Kim Ghattas , welcome to FRESH AIR .
So I want to start by asking you about General Qassem Soleimani because you 've written about him .
The U.S. killed him in a drone strike earlier this month .
And , you know , he was a very powerful leader in Iran .
He was the leading commander .
He headed a powerful militia , the al-Quds Force .
He was also a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars in the Middle East .
After the U.S. killed Soleimani and then Iran retaliated , it really looked like we were on the brink of war with Iran .
Things have quieted down since then .
And here in America , we 're so absorbed in the impeachment and the Senate trial and the upcoming Iowa caucus that Soleimani has kind of - and Iran has of kind of , like , fallen off the radar .
But it feels like this story is not over .
What 's your sense of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : You 're absolutely right that the story is not over even if it 's not making headlines in the U.S. anymore , and that 's a pattern often when it comes to covering the Middle East .
The story continues in two ways .
One , there are renewed protests in Iraq , where Qassem Soleimani had led the crackdown on protesters in Iraq who were protesting against the corrupt leadership of the country but also Iran 's stranglehold on its politics , where Iran is basically in charge of deciding almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and how to form a government .
And they run , as you say , very powerful militias .
So the protests in Iraq paused for a second after Qassem Soleimani was killed and after people celebrated his death - because people did celebrate in Iraq - and now they have resumed .
People are back in force .
The story also continues because after the back-and-forth , Iran 's retaliation - the very unfortunate plane crash , the tragic plane crash of the Ukrainian plane that was brought down unintentionally by Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. interests in Iraq - Iran is looking at how it can capture this moment where - it is supposed to look like a moment of weakness for Iran where they 've just lost their top commander , the architect of their regional policy .
But Iran and their - and its regional allies are very good at seizing on moments like that , sometimes provoking chaos to try to grab as much as they can territorially or politically just the way they 're doing in Lebanon , for example , where Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and political party .
So there is almost a counterrevolution happening in Iran , in Iraq and in Lebanon where Iran is trying to seize the day and use this moment of vulnerability and of weakness to come on top because the U.S. has turned its sights away .
GROSS : I do n't understand how Iran uses this moment of weakness to come out on top .
GHATTAS : Well , if you look , for example , at Lebanon , where , for the last hundred days or so , young @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all sects and all faiths and all social classes have been protesting relentlessly , doggedly against the corruption in the country , the mismanagement of the country , the establishment that has , in essence , brought the country almost to or - I think we are about to default on a huge debt .
And Hezbollah , which has always positioned itself as the defender of the oppressed and the poor , found itself in the sights of the protesters as well because it has become so entrenched in the establishment that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well .
And for the first time in its history in Lebanon , it found that protesters were directly attacking its power in Lebanon , insulting some of its leaders and some of its allies .
And for a few months , it looked like Hezbollah was in a very difficult position .
And it looked like Iran was in a difficult position because there were also protests , as I mentioned , in Iraq that had a very strong anti-Iran sentiment .
And I thought that it was very interesting , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soleimani was killed in Baghdad on that January 3 morning , he was coming back from Beirut .
There was no proxy war to run there , but there was a proxy militia to manage .
Hezbollah was trying to figure out how to get out of this bind where its position in Lebanon was being challenged as part of this wider movement of protest .
And so what they 're doing now is instead of compromising - and they could have gone both ways .
They could have said , OK , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going under - we are coming under a lot of pressure .
So we need to compromise , solidify our position in the country .
Or we could go another way , break everything in front of us and just grab everything that we can .
And I think they 're going for that second option , where , in Lebanon , they 've imposed , in essence , a new cabinet that represents them and their allies .
GROSS : Wow .
That sounds like quite a dramatic move .
GHATTAS : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I said , they 're also very cunning in their planning .
And they have a long-term strategy , and that is Iran 's strength in the region .
Whatever you think of Iran , its policies , what it has done in the past to the region or to Americans , they 're very good at positioning themselves and taking advantage of moments of weakness .
GROSS : So another question about Iran and Soleimani - after the U.S. killed Soleimani , Iran retaliated by bombing a U.S. military base , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could have been .
American soldiers had what is probably traumatic brain injuries , but considering what many people were braced for , it was , you know , a relatively restrained attack .
It almost seemed like they were intentionally not doing more damage than they did .
I did not expect Iran to use restraint .
Why do you think they did ?
GHATTAS : I would have to disagree about the fact that it 's unexpected that they use restraint .
I think they are , in their own very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to avert a full-on conflict with the United States , which they think - which they know they ca n't win .
And so they resort to the pattern that they 've adopted over the last four decades of the existence of the regime in Iran , which is mostly proxy wars , proxy militias , restrained attacks with a big message , something symbolic that shows their people at home , that the government has not stayed silent to this affront and yet does not bring the risk of full-on war .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ response that Iran would adopt would be limited .
And there was almost , like , a dance , a very dangerous dance , where everybody understood that this would be the extent of their reaction , even the Americans understood that .
But the tragedy in that restrained response was the downing of the Ukrainian plane that carried 290 people , who all died , and that was an unspeakable mistake that is causing ripples within Iran as well now .
GROSS : Let 's take a short break here , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If you 're just joining us , my guest is journalist Kim Ghattas .
She 's Lebanese but now divides her time between Washington and Lebanon .
She covered the Middle East for the BBC for 20 years .
Her new book is called `` Black Wave : Saudi Arabia , Iran , And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture , Religion , And Collective Memory In The Middle East . ''
We 'll be right back .
This is FRESH AIR .
GROSS : This is FRESH AIR .
And if you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is journalist Kim Ghattas , who covered the Middle East for the BBC for 20 years .
Her new book is called `` Black Wave : Saudi Arabia , Iran , And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture , Religion , And Collective Memory In The Middle East . ''
I want to ask you about your book .
Your book - one chapter with your book starts with the question , what happened to us ?
I want you to elaborate on that question - what you 're asking and why you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question , what happened to us , is one that we ask ourselves a lot in the region because we look at childhood and the young adulthood of our parents and we realize they had a completely different life .
First of all , it was not one that was mired in sectarian bloodletting and constant upheaval and constant wars .
There were coups .
There were wars .
But they were more contained in time , and they were more localized .
It did n't feel like this endless war across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was a much more diverse and vibrant time politically , culturally , socially and religiously .
And so we look at pictures of our parents , you know , walking on the streets of Beirut or riding bicycles in Baghdad , men and women .
We look at posters of Egyptian actresses from the '60s .
We look at , you know , women dressed in skirts on the campus of Kabul University , you know , also in that same period .
And we wonder what happened ?
What went so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
And how can we move forward ?
And who is responsible in the region and , also , abroad ?
And how can we recapture the lost hope from the past ?
GROSS : Well , in trying to answer that question - what happened to us , and how did it happen ?
- you spend a lot of time in the book focusing on 1979 .
That 's the year of the Iranian Revolution and , for Americans , the Iranian hostage crisis , when radical students took Americans hostage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It 's also the year that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the year that the jihad against the Soviets was launched .
And I should add , 1979 is also the year that the Grand Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia is seized by zealots who took it over .
So this is a really consequential year .
Are all the things , the three things that we just focused on , leading toward a more extreme form of Islam and more extreme cultural norms , social norms , religious norms enforced by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such a consequential year that sometimes I think I should have written a book just about that year because so much else happened .
In Egypt , you had President Anwar Sadat , who signed peace with Israel .
In Pakistan , you had the execution of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by his successor , the dictator Zia ul-Haq , an ally of the U.S .
There was so much that happened in that year that one Pakistani journalist told me that it felt like the sky had fallen to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found was crucial about looking into the consequences of that year was that , you know , other turning points in the Middle East , you know , brought an end to wars or started wars or brought an end to certain political ideologies or signaled the birth of a new movement , but 1979 did all of this and more because 1979 is the year when Saudi Arabia and Iran - two former allies , in fact , twin pillars of U.S. policy in the region to contain the Soviet Union - @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia , which sees itself as the leader of the Muslim world , is challenged in that role by Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini , who emerges as the ultimate leader of this revolution and turns the country into a theocracy .
He also wants to be leader of the Muslim world , except Khomeini is Shia and Saudi Arabia is Sunni , and that rivalry puts them in a constant dynamic of trying to one up each other about who is really the most righteous leader of the Muslim world .
And so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just in the geopolitics of it and in the military aspects of it , but in the cultural and social aspects of it .
So they both try to use and wield and exploit religion to rally people to their side .
And in doing so , they create new divisions within the Arab and Muslim world that are very sectarian-driven , something that did not exist in that same way before .
And because the rivalry continues , we 're still living with the consequences today .
GROSS : Give us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia exploit religion for their own rivalry between them .
GHATTAS : So there are many ways in which they do that .
But I would look at , for example , the efforts by Iran to export its own understanding , its own version of , in essence , state-sponsored Shiism .
And they do that , for example , in Lebanon very early on in the early '80s by sending , around 1982 , members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to set up a front base there and train this new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doing so , they bring with them , you know , literature .
They set up radios .
They introduce the chador , the all-enveloping black cloth that is known in Shiism .
The chador starts spreading in Baalbek , in this town in eastern Lebanon that becomes later a stronghold of Hezbollah , and women start adopting the chador because of the pressure that they feel under when they 're walking on the street because more and more women are wearing it .
And they 're afraid of these revolutionary guards that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 's just safer to wear it because you do n't want to stand out .
This is in the middle of a civil war , as well in Lebanon , and Baalbek is a very distant town .
And there are reports that they also paid women to put on this chador .
At the same time roughly or a little bit later on , the Saudis start focusing on ways that they can rally people to their understanding of Islam , and one way in which they do that is by spending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the '90s to rally people in the media , for example , to their side .
So you have laudatory editorials or articles , and journalists are paid for that .
They get paid huge sums of money , which they would not get if they were just writing for an Egyptian newspaper .
And you have this sudden wave of Egyptian actresses who had been beloved in the Middle East for their roles in these beautiful films , black-and-white and then in color , where they suddenly start donning the veil - @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face , and the Saudi-style black abaya , the robe , the black robe .
And that had been unseen and unheard of in Egypt before .
And there was a joke at the time in Egypt that described how , you know , the second richest women in Egypt were the belly dancers who were getting money slipped on their - under their skirt by Saudi - rich Saudi men who were watching them dance .
But the richest Egyptian women were the belly dancers who had converted and donned the veil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ money directly in their bank accounts .
GROSS : You talked about how Iran created Hezbollah in 1982 as a proxy force that Iranians trained .
You were living in Lebanon then .
You were 5 years old at the time .
Did you notice the change ?
Did - the civil war was already underway .
Did you notice the country becoming more fundamentalist or parts of it more fundamentalist ?
Did you notice changes in social codes and how people dressed ?
And again , you were only 5 .
GHATTAS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civil war , and we were very - the country was very divided .
So I happened to live on the frontline sort of with our front door facing towards the Christian part of Beirut .
But we had to go to school in the - what was then known as the western part in the more dominantly Muslim part of Beirut .
And so it was kind of cantonized , and you did n't necessarily know what was going on in other parts of the country .
And I would say two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Sunni-Shia divide that is so prevalent today in everyone 's discussions about the Middle East did not feature in that war .
The second thing that I would say is that there were a lot of reports about the chador spreading in the southern suburbs of Beirut or the southern parts of Lebanon or in the Bekaa .
But , you know , we did n't really know what was going on exactly and what it meant and who was doing it .
And I have a chapter where I describe the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I go a little bit against the accepted truth about how they were created because most people think that they were a direct result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 , whereas I argue that Iran was already planning to sort of set up a foothold on the Mediterranean even before 1982 .
It wanted to export its revolution .
GROSS : My guest is Kim Ghattas , author of the new book `` Black Wave : Saudi Arabia , Iran , And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture , Religion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East . ''
After we take a short break , we 'll talk about growing up in Lebanon during the Civil War , and Lara Maiklem will tell us about hunting for historical treasures along the muddy banks of the River Thames in London .
She 's found amazing things .
I 'm Terry Gross , and this is FRESH AIR .
GROSS : This is FRESH AIR .
I 'm Terry Gross .
Let 's get back to my interview with journalist Kim Ghattas , author of the new book `` Black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture , Religion , And Collective Memory In The Middle East . ''
She covered the Middle East for the BBC and The Financial Times for 20 years and is now a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington .
She divides her time between Washington and Beirut .
You point out that in Lebanon , where you 're from , you know - and you grew up during the Lebanese civil war .
You know , you say that the Sunni-Shia divide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war , but on the other hand , the Islam that 's predominantly practiced is a branch of Shia Islam .
And also , there was a Christian-Muslim divide in the civil war , and your family is Christian .
What was it like to be Christian during the civil war ?
GHATTAS : Growing up in the war was unreal , but it was the only reality that I knew .
And in a way , it felt normal even though I knew that beyond the borders of Lebanon , there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and so we traveled sometimes to the Netherlands on vacation whenever we could .
And I would be in tears every time we had to come back to Lebanon .
We were very lucky because we survived unscathed .
There were material losses .
We lost our house several times .
But all of us survived .
No one was injured .
I ca n't believe that none of our friends , none of our relatives were killed or injured because this is a war that killed 150,000 people .
And this could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cry about the fact that I have probably some kind of trauma about growing up in that war , but the war also made me who I am .
It drove me to become a journalist .
It drove me to write .
It drove me to explain other people 's stories in the hope that I could bring more understanding about Lebanon and about the Middle East to the rest of the world .
GROSS : Did you grow up afraid ?
Like , if you played outside , did you hear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the street ?
GHATTAS : We saw everything .
We lived on the frontline , so we really did see everything .
We saw militias who camped in the ground floor of our building , all sorts of militias - you know , whoever was on top at the time , whether it was , you know , Christian militias or the PLO and then the Syrian army and then the Israelis .
You know , everybody came through .
And , you know , we did n't play outside very much .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But because it was a no man 's land where we lived - the frontline and a no man 's land - I did n't have many friends to play with after school .
So I would go to school whenever it was possible and there was no shelling .
And there were long periods where we could n't go to school .
But then when I came home , I really just stayed home .
And no one would visit us because it was so dangerous .
And I know that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I think , why did you stay ?
The answer is , well , we did n't know how long it would last .
My parents simply did n't know how long it would last .
There would be cease-fires , and then there would be more fighting , and then there would be cease-fires .
And we 're like , well , it ca n't get worse than this , but then it would .
And we ended up staying almost until the end of the war in that no man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave Lebanon either .
So we saw it all .
We had to walk through checkpoints to get to school .
We had to sleep in shelters .
GROSS : When you were a child growing up during the civil war , were children targeted by snipers , or did snipers try to protect children from their own gunfire ?
GHATTAS : I do n't think anyone was protected from snipers .
We had to dodge sniper bullets often , crazily enough - I know it sounds crazy - when we had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighborhood .
But snipers were playing a game , and I do n't think they spared anyone .
GROSS : You mentioned that you lost your home several times .
Was it the same home ?
GHATTAS : Yes .
We lived in that terrible area that was known as - I do n't know - sniper central , called Gallery Samaan , at the intersection of east and west Beirut .
And it was shelled several times , so we had to move out every time and rebuild .
It was a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ floor of a building , and it took a lot of direct hits .
I mean , the whole building was n't brought down .
There was just , you know , pockmarks .
And shells had entered or bullets , or glass was broken and holes in the walls and so on .
It 's slightly surreal scenery .
But again , you know , it 's the syndrome of the boiling frog .
You 're in it , and then it gets worse and worse .
But your sense of how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lived , you know , five hours ago , 10 hours ago , five years ago , 10 years ago is dulled by the intensity of the moment that you are in .
GROSS : You were a friend and colleague of Jamal Khashoggi .
He was murdered in October of 2018 in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul .
And it 's believed that MBS , the crown prince of Saudi Arabia , ordered his murder .
How did you hear about his death ?
GHATTAS : On Twitter .
I was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remember who tweeted it first that he had gone into the consulate and not reemerged .
And I really got the chills because somehow - and I do n't say in hindsight .
Somehow , I felt instantly that something was terribly wrong - terribly , terribly wrong .
And I also got the chills because at the time , I was somehow writing a passage about Jamal 's life .
It was the episode around the time when he was fired from his job at a Saudi newspaper around 2003 or so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was very critical of how Saudi Arabia understood and exercised Islam .
And I thought , wow .
You know , he had been an incredible friend and a person I interviewed as a source for the book to try to understand things about Saudi Arabia .
And it was just devastating that he was killed in the way that he was killed because he still held much promise .
He was such a towering figure in the Arab world , in the world of commentary and analysis about Saudi Arabia .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ macabre twist to the tale that I was trying to tell .
GROSS : I assume that the reason why he was murdered was not only to stop him from writing but to teach a lesson and to warn other journalists and opinion writers and analysts .
Do you think it had a chilling effect on other journalists in the Middle East ?
GHATTAS : It had .
It definitely had .
First of all , it had a chilling effect on young Saudis within the country who were hopeful that their country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more progressive future under this crown prince who promises so much change and reform and is implementing some of it .
But , you know , there 's a lot to be said about how and what exactly he is doing .
And suddenly , they thought , oh , my goodness , our country is going to turn into a pariah .
So there was that fear .
And then there was the chilling effect of the example that was set .
You cross the crown prince .
You rain on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ writing from the U.S. in The Washington Post , of all newspapers , and you get punished for that .
And across the region , yes , I think people are thinking twice about what they write and what they do n't write about the kingdom .
And a lot of people ask me whether I was afraid to write what I was writing in `` Black Wave , '' and my answer is , I pull no punches .
I write it as it is .
I describe what happened , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And I write about Iran , and I write about Saudi Arabia , and I say exactly what both of those countries did .
And I think that they are both guilty of having driven the region to the abyss .
GROSS : Well , Kim Ghattas , thank you so much for talking with us .
GHATTAS : Thank you so much for having me , Terry .
It was wonderful to speak to you .
GROSS : Kim Ghattas is the author of the new book `` Black Wave : Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rivalry That Unraveled Culture , Religion , And Collective Memory In The Middle East . ''
After we take a short break , Lara Maiklem will tell us how she searches for and finds historic treasures during low tide on the banks of the River Thames in London .
This is FRESH AIR .

'Black Wave' Author Chronicles Cultural, Religious Upheaval In The Middle East
Kim Ghattas grew up in Lebanon during the civil war and covered the Mideast for the BBC for 20 years. She says events in the region in 1979 set off waves of extremism and violence that continue today.
TERRY GROSS, HOST:
This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. In her new book, journalist Kim Ghattas asked the question she says haunts her and most people in the Arab and Muslim world - what happened to us? Ghattas is Lebanese and grew up during her country's civil war. For people in the Middle East, she says, the past is a different country, one that is not mired in the horrors of sectarian killings, a more vibrant place without the crushing intolerance of religious zealots and seemingly endless wars. Her new book is a history of how the Middle East unraveled in the past few decades. It's called "Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, And Collective Memory In The Middle East." She covered the Middle East for the BBC and The Financial Times for 20 years and is now a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. She divides her time between Washington and Beirut.
Kim Ghattas, welcome to FRESH AIR. So I want to start by asking you about General Qassem Soleimani because you've written about him. The U.S. killed him in a drone strike earlier this month. And, you know, he was a very powerful leader in Iran. He was the leading commander. He headed a powerful militia, the al-Quds Force. He was also a political leader and ran Iran's proxy wars in the Middle East. After the U.S. killed Soleimani and then Iran retaliated, it really looked like we were on the brink of war with Iran. Things have quieted down since then. And here in America, we're so absorbed in the impeachment and the Senate trial and the upcoming Iowa caucus that Soleimani has kind of - and Iran has of kind of, like, fallen off the radar. But it feels like this story is not over. What's your sense of what's coming next?
KIM GHATTAS: You're absolutely right that the story is not over even if it's not making headlines in the U.S. anymore, and that's a pattern often when it comes to covering the Middle East. The story continues in two ways. One, there are renewed protests in Iraq, where Qassem Soleimani had led the crackdown on protesters in Iraq who were protesting against the corrupt leadership of the country but also Iran's stranglehold on its politics, where Iran is basically in charge of deciding almost who gets to run for political office and how to form a government. And they run, as you say, very powerful militias. So the protests in Iraq paused for a second after Qassem Soleimani was killed and after people celebrated his death - because people did celebrate in Iraq - and now they have resumed. People are back in force.
The story also continues because after the back-and-forth, Iran's retaliation - the very unfortunate plane crash, the tragic plane crash of the Ukrainian plane that was brought down unintentionally by Iran after they launched missiles in retaliation at U.S. interests in Iraq - Iran is looking at how it can capture this moment where - it is supposed to look like a moment of weakness for Iran where they've just lost their top commander, the architect of their regional policy. But Iran and their - and its regional allies are very good at seizing on moments like that, sometimes provoking chaos to try to grab as much as they can territorially or politically just the way they're doing in Lebanon, for example, where Iran's ally is Hezbollah, a militia and political party.
So there is almost a counterrevolution happening in Iran, in Iraq and in Lebanon where Iran is trying to seize the day and use this moment of vulnerability and of weakness to come on top because the U.S. has turned its sights away.
GROSS: I don't understand how Iran uses this moment of weakness to come out on top.
GHATTAS: Well, if you look, for example, at Lebanon, where, for the last hundred days or so, young people, older people, people of all sects and all faiths and all social classes have been protesting relentlessly, doggedly against the corruption in the country, the mismanagement of the country, the establishment that has, in essence, brought the country almost to or - I think we are about to default on a huge debt. And Hezbollah, which has always positioned itself as the defender of the oppressed and the poor, found itself in the sights of the protesters as well because it has become so entrenched in the establishment that it became a target of the protests as well. And for the first time in its history in Lebanon, it found that protesters were directly attacking its power in Lebanon, insulting some of its leaders and some of its allies.
And for a few months, it looked like Hezbollah was in a very difficult position. And it looked like Iran was in a difficult position because there were also protests, as I mentioned, in Iraq that had a very strong anti-Iran sentiment. And I thought that it was very interesting, Terry, to see that when Qassem Soleimani was killed in Baghdad on that January 3 morning, he was coming back from Beirut. There was no proxy war to run there, but there was a proxy militia to manage. Hezbollah was trying to figure out how to get out of this bind where its position in Lebanon was being challenged as part of this wider movement of protest.
And so what they're doing now is instead of compromising - and they could have gone both ways. They could have said, OK, we need to compromise because we're going under - we are coming under a lot of pressure. So we need to compromise, solidify our position in the country. Or we could go another way, break everything in front of us and just grab everything that we can. And I think they're going for that second option, where, in Lebanon, they've imposed, in essence, a new cabinet that represents them and their allies.
GROSS: Wow. That sounds like quite a dramatic move.
GHATTAS: Hezbollah is very pragmatic, but as I said, they're also very cunning in their planning. And they have a long-term strategy, and that is Iran's strength in the region. Whatever you think of Iran, its policies, what it has done in the past to the region or to Americans, they're very good at positioning themselves and taking advantage of moments of weakness.
GROSS: So another question about Iran and Soleimani - after the U.S. killed Soleimani, Iran retaliated by bombing a U.S. military base, but it wasn't as catastrophic as it could have been. American soldiers had what is probably traumatic brain injuries, but considering what many people were braced for, it was, you know, a relatively restrained attack. It almost seemed like they were intentionally not doing more damage than they did. I did not expect Iran to use restraint. Why do you think they did?
GHATTAS: I would have to disagree about the fact that it's unexpected that they use restraint. I think they are, in their own very interesting way, restrained because they want to avert a full-on conflict with the United States, which they think - which they know they can't win. And so they resort to the pattern that they've adopted over the last four decades of the existence of the regime in Iran, which is mostly proxy wars, proxy militias, restrained attacks with a big message, something symbolic that shows their people at home, that the government has not stayed silent to this affront and yet does not bring the risk of full-on war.
So I knew right then that the response that Iran would adopt would be limited. And there was almost, like, a dance, a very dangerous dance, where everybody understood that this would be the extent of their reaction, even the Americans understood that. But the tragedy in that restrained response was the downing of the Ukrainian plane that carried 290 people, who all died, and that was an unspeakable mistake that is causing ripples within Iran as well now.
GROSS: Let's take a short break here, and then we'll talk some more. If you're just joining us, my guest is journalist Kim Ghattas. She's Lebanese but now divides her time between Washington and Lebanon. She covered the Middle East for the BBC for 20 years. Her new book is called "Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, And Collective Memory In The Middle East." We'll be right back. This is FRESH AIR.
(SOUNDBITE OF AVISHAI COHEN SONG, "GBEDE TEMIN")
GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. And if you're just joining us, my guest is journalist Kim Ghattas, who covered the Middle East for the BBC for 20 years. Her new book is called "Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, And Collective Memory In The Middle East."
I want to ask you about your book. Your book - one chapter with your book starts with the question, what happened to us? I want you to elaborate on that question - what you're asking and why you're asking it.
GHATTAS: The question, what happened to us, is one that we ask ourselves a lot in the region because we look at childhood and the young adulthood of our parents and we realize they had a completely different life. First of all, it was not one that was mired in sectarian bloodletting and constant upheaval and constant wars. There were coups. There were wars. But they were more contained in time, and they were more localized. It didn't feel like this endless war across the whole region. Second of all, it was a much more diverse and vibrant time politically, culturally, socially and religiously.
And so we look at pictures of our parents, you know, walking on the streets of Beirut or riding bicycles in Baghdad, men and women. We look at posters of Egyptian actresses from the '60s. We look at, you know, women dressed in skirts on the campus of Kabul University, you know, also in that same period. And we wonder what happened? What went so wrong? Where did we go wrong? And how can we move forward? And who is responsible in the region and, also, abroad? And how can we recapture the lost hope from the past?
GROSS: Well, in trying to answer that question - what happened to us, and how did it happen? - you spend a lot of time in the book focusing on 1979. That's the year of the Iranian Revolution and, for Americans, the Iranian hostage crisis, when radical students took Americans hostage at the American Embassy in Tehran. It's also the year that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the year that the jihad against the Soviets was launched. And I should add, 1979 is also the year that the Grand Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia is seized by zealots who took it over.
So this is a really consequential year. Are all the things, the three things that we just focused on, leading toward a more extreme form of Islam and more extreme cultural norms, social norms, religious norms enforced by the state?
GHATTAS: 1979 is such a consequential year that sometimes I think I should have written a book just about that year because so much else happened. In Egypt, you had President Anwar Sadat, who signed peace with Israel. In Pakistan, you had the execution of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by his successor, the dictator Zia ul-Haq, an ally of the U.S. There was so much that happened in that year that one Pakistani journalist told me that it felt like the sky had fallen to the earth that year.
And what I found was crucial about looking into the consequences of that year was that, you know, other turning points in the Middle East, you know, brought an end to wars or started wars or brought an end to certain political ideologies or signaled the birth of a new movement, but 1979 did all of this and more because 1979 is the year when Saudi Arabia and Iran - two former allies, in fact, twin pillars of U.S. policy in the region to contain the Soviet Union - became rivals.
And suddenly, Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the leader of the Muslim world, is challenged in that role by Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini, who emerges as the ultimate leader of this revolution and turns the country into a theocracy. He also wants to be leader of the Muslim world, except Khomeini is Shia and Saudi Arabia is Sunni, and that rivalry puts them in a constant dynamic of trying to one up each other about who is really the most righteous leader of the Muslim world.
And so they keep trying to outdo each other not just in the geopolitics of it and in the military aspects of it, but in the cultural and social aspects of it. So they both try to use and wield and exploit religion to rally people to their side. And in doing so, they create new divisions within the Arab and Muslim world that are very sectarian-driven, something that did not exist in that same way before. And because the rivalry continues, we're still living with the consequences today.
GROSS: Give us an example of how Iran and Saudi Arabia exploit religion for their own rivalry between them.
GHATTAS: So there are many ways in which they do that. But I would look at, for example, the efforts by Iran to export its own understanding, its own version of, in essence, state-sponsored Shiism. And they do that, for example, in Lebanon very early on in the early '80s by sending, around 1982, members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to set up a front base there and train this new movement that becomes Hezbollah. And in doing so, they bring with them, you know, literature. They set up radios. They introduce the chador, the all-enveloping black cloth that is known in Shiism.
The chador starts spreading in Baalbek, in this town in eastern Lebanon that becomes later a stronghold of Hezbollah, and women start adopting the chador because of the pressure that they feel under when they're walking on the street because more and more women are wearing it. And they're afraid of these revolutionary guards that are coming from Iran, and it's just safer to wear it because you don't want to stand out. This is in the middle of a civil war, as well in Lebanon, and Baalbek is a very distant town. And there are reports that they also paid women to put on this chador.
At the same time roughly or a little bit later on, the Saudis start focusing on ways that they can rally people to their understanding of Islam, and one way in which they do that is by spending money in a country like Egypt in the '90s to rally people in the media, for example, to their side. So you have laudatory editorials or articles, and journalists are paid for that. They get paid huge sums of money, which they would not get if they were just writing for an Egyptian newspaper.
And you have this sudden wave of Egyptian actresses who had been beloved in the Middle East for their roles in these beautiful films, black-and-white and then in color, where they suddenly start donning the veil - the Saudi-style niqab, which covers the face, and the Saudi-style black abaya, the robe, the black robe. And that had been unseen and unheard of in Egypt before. And there was a joke at the time in Egypt that described how, you know, the second richest women in Egypt were the belly dancers who were getting money slipped on their - under their skirt by Saudi - rich Saudi men who were watching them dance. But the richest Egyptian women were the belly dancers who had converted and donned the veil because the rich Saudi men deposited the money directly in their bank accounts.
GROSS: You talked about how Iran created Hezbollah in 1982 as a proxy force that Iranians trained. You were living in Lebanon then. You were 5 years old at the time. Did you notice the change? Did - the civil war was already underway. Did you notice the country becoming more fundamentalist or parts of it more fundamentalist? Did you notice changes in social codes and how people dressed? And again, you were only 5.
GHATTAS: First, we were in a civil war, and we were very - the country was very divided. So I happened to live on the frontline sort of with our front door facing towards the Christian part of Beirut. But we had to go to school in the - what was then known as the western part in the more dominantly Muslim part of Beirut. And so it was kind of cantonized, and you didn't necessarily know what was going on in other parts of the country.
And I would say two things about that period. One, the Sunni-Shia divide that is so prevalent today in everyone's discussions about the Middle East did not feature in that war. The second thing that I would say is that there were a lot of reports about the chador spreading in the southern suburbs of Beirut or the southern parts of Lebanon or in the Bekaa. But, you know, we didn't really know what was going on exactly and what it meant and who was doing it. And I have a chapter where I describe the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon. And I go a little bit against the accepted truth about how they were created because most people think that they were a direct result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, whereas I argue that Iran was already planning to sort of set up a foothold on the Mediterranean even before 1982. It wanted to export its revolution.
GROSS: My guest is Kim Ghattas, author of the new book "Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, And Collective Memory In The Middle East." After we take a short break, we'll talk about growing up in Lebanon during the Civil War, and Lara Maiklem will tell us about hunting for historical treasures along the muddy banks of the River Thames in London. She's found amazing things. I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.
(SOUNDBITE OF RENAUD GARCIA-FONS' "ALIJAMIADO")
GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. Let's get back to my interview with journalist Kim Ghattas, author of the new book "Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, And Collective Memory In The Middle East." She covered the Middle East for the BBC and The Financial Times for 20 years and is now a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. She divides her time between Washington and Beirut.
You point out that in Lebanon, where you're from, you know - and you grew up during the Lebanese civil war. You know, you say that the Sunni-Shia divide was not an issue in the civil war, but on the other hand, the Islam that's predominantly practiced is a branch of Shia Islam. And also, there was a Christian-Muslim divide in the civil war, and your family is Christian. What was it like to be Christian during the civil war?
GHATTAS: Growing up in the war was unreal, but it was the only reality that I knew. And in a way, it felt normal even though I knew that beyond the borders of Lebanon, there was peace. My mother is Dutch, and so we traveled sometimes to the Netherlands on vacation whenever we could. And I would be in tears every time we had to come back to Lebanon. We were very lucky because we survived unscathed. There were material losses. We lost our house several times. But all of us survived. No one was injured. I can't believe that none of our friends, none of our relatives were killed or injured because this is a war that killed 150,000 people.
And this could be a sob story where I can cry about the fact that I have probably some kind of trauma about growing up in that war, but the war also made me who I am. It drove me to become a journalist. It drove me to write. It drove me to explain other people's stories in the hope that I could bring more understanding about Lebanon and about the Middle East to the rest of the world.
GROSS: Did you grow up afraid? Like, if you played outside, did you hear shelling? Did you see militias down the street?
GHATTAS: We saw everything. We lived on the frontline, so we really did see everything. We saw militias who camped in the ground floor of our building, all sorts of militias - you know, whoever was on top at the time, whether it was, you know, Christian militias or the PLO and then the Syrian army and then the Israelis. You know, everybody came through. And, you know, we didn't play outside very much. We played indoors at friends' houses. But because it was a no man's land where we lived - the frontline and a no man's land - I didn't have many friends to play with after school. So I would go to school whenever it was possible and there was no shelling. And there were long periods where we couldn't go to school.
But then when I came home, I really just stayed home. And no one would visit us because it was so dangerous. And I know that the next question is going to be, I think, why did you stay? The answer is, well, we didn't know how long it would last. My parents simply didn't know how long it would last. There would be cease-fires, and then there would be more fighting, and then there would be cease-fires. And we're like, well, it can't get worse than this, but then it would. And we ended up staying almost until the end of the war in that no man's land, and we didn't leave Lebanon either.
So we saw it all. We had to walk through checkpoints to get to school. We had to sleep in shelters.
GROSS: When you were a child growing up during the civil war, were children targeted by snipers, or did snipers try to protect children from their own gunfire?
GHATTAS: I don't think anyone was protected from snipers. We had to dodge sniper bullets often, crazily enough - I know it sounds crazy - when we had to go to school or even leave the neighborhood. But snipers were playing a game, and I don't think they spared anyone.
GROSS: You mentioned that you lost your home several times. Was it the same home?
GHATTAS: Yes. We lived in that terrible area that was known as - I don't know - sniper central, called Gallery Samaan, at the intersection of east and west Beirut. And it was shelled several times, so we had to move out every time and rebuild. It was a flat, an apartment on the third floor of a building, and it took a lot of direct hits. I mean, the whole building wasn't brought down. There was just, you know, pockmarks. And shells had entered or bullets, or glass was broken and holes in the walls and so on. It's slightly surreal scenery. But again, you know, it's the syndrome of the boiling frog. You're in it, and then it gets worse and worse. But your sense of how it compares to the normality that you lived, you know, five hours ago, 10 hours ago, five years ago, 10 years ago is dulled by the intensity of the moment that you are in.
GROSS: You were a friend and colleague of Jamal Khashoggi. He was murdered in October of 2018 in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul. And it's believed that MBS, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, ordered his murder. How did you hear about his death?
GHATTAS: On Twitter. I was in Beirut. And I can't remember who tweeted it first that he had gone into the consulate and not reemerged. And I really got the chills because somehow - and I don't say in hindsight. Somehow, I felt instantly that something was terribly wrong - terribly, terribly wrong. And I also got the chills because at the time, I was somehow writing a passage about Jamal's life. It was the episode around the time when he was fired from his job at a Saudi newspaper around 2003 or so for having printed an opinion piece that was very critical of how Saudi Arabia understood and exercised Islam.
And I thought, wow. You know, he had been an incredible friend and a person I interviewed as a source for the book to try to understand things about Saudi Arabia. And it was just devastating that he was killed in the way that he was killed because he still held much promise. He was such a towering figure in the Arab world, in the world of commentary and analysis about Saudi Arabia. And it just provided a devastating and very macabre twist to the tale that I was trying to tell.
GROSS: I assume that the reason why he was murdered was not only to stop him from writing but to teach a lesson and to warn other journalists and opinion writers and analysts. Do you think it had a chilling effect on other journalists in the Middle East?
GHATTAS: It had. It definitely had. First of all, it had a chilling effect on young Saudis within the country who were hopeful that their country could have a different, more open, more progressive future under this crown prince who promises so much change and reform and is implementing some of it. But, you know, there's a lot to be said about how and what exactly he is doing. And suddenly, they thought, oh, my goodness, our country is going to turn into a pariah. So there was that fear. And then there was the chilling effect of the example that was set. You cross the crown prince. You rain on his parade in op-eds that you're writing from the U.S. in The Washington Post, of all newspapers, and you get punished for that. And across the region, yes, I think people are thinking twice about what they write and what they don't write about the kingdom.
And a lot of people ask me whether I was afraid to write what I was writing in "Black Wave," and my answer is, I pull no punches. I write it as it is. I describe what happened, and I'm an equal opportunity critic. And I write about Iran, and I write about Saudi Arabia, and I say exactly what both of those countries did. And I think that they are both guilty of having driven the region to the abyss.
GROSS: Well, Kim Ghattas, thank you so much for talking with us.
GHATTAS: Thank you so much for having me, Terry. It was wonderful to speak to you.
GROSS: Kim Ghattas is the author of the new book "Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, And The Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, And Collective Memory In The Middle East." After we take a short break, Lara Maiklem will tell us how she searches for and finds historic treasures during low tide on the banks of the River Thames in London. This is FRESH AIR.
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npr--2020-01-30--'Dangerous': Democrats Fire Back At Trump Lawyer's Answer On Foreign Interference

President Trump 's legal position welcoming information from foreigners threatens to open Pandora 's box in coming elections and nullify one of the key lessons from 2016 , critics warned .
`` This is setting precedent that is unheard of in our country , '' said Sen. Debbie Stabenow , D-Mich. `` It 's dangerous , dangerous , dangerous . ''
She and other members of Congress said they were aghast after Trump attorney Patrick Philbin responded to a question in the president 's impeachment trial late Wednesday by saying it would be proper for Trump or another politician to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a political opponent .
`` If there is credible information of wrongdoing by someone who is running for a public office , it 's not campaign interference for credible information about wrongdoing to be brought to light , '' Philbin said .
Congress has limited the ways foreigners can take part in elections — by forbidding them from voting and restricting their contributions — but the idea that simply because `` information '' originates overseas is a `` non sequitur , '' Philbin said .
Democratic Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Intelligence Committee , said he was `` flabbergasted '' by Philbin 's explanation and worried it might mean open season for election interference by foreign governments already known to be working to influence this year 's race .
`` The president 's counsel ... gave a green light for that kind of behavior to continue , '' Warner said .
`` I hope and pray that cooler heads will prevail , but I think there was a dramatic step backwards in terms of protecting the integrity of our election . ''
Philbin 's @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Russia investigation involving a meeting in which Trump 's top campaign lieutenants met with a Russian delegation that had promised them dirt on Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton .
A Russian attorney brought a tip that has been described as involving alleged impropriety by Democratic donors , but one that Donald Trump Jr. , his brother-in-law , Jared Kushner , and Trump campaign Chairman Paul Manafort did n't or could n't put to much use .
A burning question for the months of special counsel Robert Mueller 's investigation was whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ connection with the meeting ; in the end , they did not .
Mueller 's report assessed the complexity of applying U.S. law in that situation , and his prosecutors concluded it was too difficult .
Although it 's unlawful for American campaigns to accept a `` thing of value '' from foreigners , assessing what that means is complex .
And Mueller 's analysis also concluded that people involved must know they 're breaking the law in order to face charges .
In the case of the Trump campaign meeting , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump Jr. nor the others knew enough to realize their actions might violate the law , and accordingly , Mueller 's team did not seek an indictment .
Russian cyberattackers stole reams of material from American political targets in 2016 and released it to embarrass them and disrupt the election .
This worked to historic effect , but they fenced the material through WikiLeaks , rather than transmitting it directly to American campaigns .
Mueller 's investigation concluded that although there were some contacts , he could not establish a criminal conspiracy between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interfered in the election .
A passel of Russian intelligence officers and others have been charged in connection with the cyberattacks and other `` active measures '' targeting the United States .
Lawyer : DOJ said all OK Philbin addressed the `` thing of value '' element and the complexity of campaign finance law in his answer on Wednesday .
He reminded senators that the whistleblower complaint that brought the Ukraine affair to light originated as a referral to the Justice Department framed as a campaign finance question .
The president 's attorney @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an opinion on this issue in the Ukraine affair — one supportive of Trump .
Did Trump violate campaign finance law , as that question ran , by asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for the investigations he wanted last year ?
Attorneys at the Justice Department concluded that he had n't , Philbin observed , and so they considered the matter closed .
Philbin also told senators that in the ABC News interview in which Trump later said he would consider taking information about an opponent from a foreign source , the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the situation , but that broadly , acceptance would be copacetic .
`` He pointed out in that interview that he might contact the FBI , '' Philbin said .
`` He might listen to something .
But mere information is not something that would violate the campaign finance laws . ''
For Democrats , Trump 's request of Zelenskiy not only was inappropriate but was an abuse of power so egregious it 's the subject of Article I of the impeachment legislation now under consideration by the Senate .
The Senate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is expected to permit Trump to keep his office .
Critics , including lead impeachment manager Rep. Adam Schiff , D-Calif. , argue that the view taken by the Justice Department is n't valid because its boss , Attorney General Bill Barr , is too eager to please Trump .
That 's why Democrats had to lead the fact-finding in the Ukraine affair — which Trump and Republicans have criticized as being incomplete and unfair — because , Schiff has said , the Justice Department would n't conduct the kind of complete @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was impeached in the late 1990s .
Schiff also warned senators that if Trump keeps his office after this episode , especially following the declaration by Philbin , it 'll be even more difficult to conduct an incident-free election this year .
`` It 's unimpeachable for a president of the United States to say , 'Hey , Russia , ' or 'Hey , Ukraine , ' or 'Hey , China , I want your help in my election ' ? ''
Schiff said .
`` Because that 's the policy of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy .
I 'm sorry , that 's what I call corruption . ''

'Dangerous': Democrats Fire Back At Trump Lawyer's Answer On Foreign Interference
Enlarge this image toggle caption Senate Television via AP Senate Television via AP
President Trump's legal position welcoming information from foreigners threatens to open Pandora's box in coming elections and nullify one of the key lessons from 2016, critics warned.
"This is setting precedent that is unheard of in our country," said Sen. Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich. "It's dangerous, dangerous, dangerous."
She and other members of Congress said they were aghast after Trump attorney Patrick Philbin responded to a question in the president's impeachment trial late Wednesday by saying it would be proper for Trump or another politician to take a tip from a foreigner about a political opponent.
"If there is credible information of wrongdoing by someone who is running for a public office, it's not campaign interference for credible information about wrongdoing to be brought to light," Philbin said.
Congress has limited the ways foreigners can take part in elections — by forbidding them from voting and restricting their contributions — but the idea that simply because "information" originates overseas is a "non sequitur," Philbin said.
Intel vice chair: It's outrageous
Democratic Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, who is the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said he was "flabbergasted" by Philbin's explanation and worried it might mean open season for election interference by foreign governments already known to be working to influence this year's race.
"The president's counsel ... gave a green light for that kind of behavior to continue," Warner said. "I hope and pray that cooler heads will prevail, but I think there was a dramatic step backwards in terms of protecting the integrity of our election."
Philbin's comments recalled one of the key moments of the Russia investigation involving a meeting in which Trump's top campaign lieutenants met with a Russian delegation that had promised them dirt on Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.
A Russian attorney brought a tip that has been described as involving alleged impropriety by Democratic donors, but one that Donald Trump Jr., his brother-in-law, Jared Kushner, and Trump campaign Chairman Paul Manafort didn't or couldn't put to much use.
A burning question for the months of special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation was whether those men might face criminal charges in connection with the meeting; in the end, they did not.
Mueller's report assessed the complexity of applying U.S. law in that situation, and his prosecutors concluded it was too difficult.
Although it's unlawful for American campaigns to accept a "thing of value" from foreigners, assessing what that means is complex. And Mueller's analysis also concluded that people involved must know they're breaking the law in order to face charges.
In the case of the Trump campaign meeting, the special counsel's office reasoned, neither Trump Jr. nor the others knew enough to realize their actions might violate the law, and accordingly, Mueller's team did not seek an indictment.
Russian cyberattackers stole reams of material from American political targets in 2016 and released it to embarrass them and disrupt the election. This worked to historic effect, but they fenced the material through WikiLeaks, rather than transmitting it directly to American campaigns.
Mueller's investigation concluded that although there were some contacts, he could not establish a criminal conspiracy between Trump's camp and the Russians who interfered in the election.
A passel of Russian intelligence officers and others have been charged in connection with the cyberattacks and other "active measures" targeting the United States.
Lawyer: DOJ said all OK
Philbin addressed the "thing of value" element and the complexity of campaign finance law in his answer on Wednesday.
He reminded senators that the whistleblower complaint that brought the Ukraine affair to light originated as a referral to the Justice Department framed as a campaign finance question.
The president's attorney also observed that the Justice Department formed an opinion on this issue in the Ukraine affair — one supportive of Trump.
Did Trump violate campaign finance law, as that question ran, by asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for the investigations he wanted last year? Attorneys at the Justice Department concluded that he hadn't, Philbin observed, and so they considered the matter closed.
Philbin also told senators that in the ABC News interview in which Trump later said he would consider taking information about an opponent from a foreign source, the president didn't rule out telling authorities depending on the situation, but that broadly, acceptance would be copacetic.
"He pointed out in that interview that he might contact the FBI," Philbin said. "He might listen to something. But mere information is not something that would violate the campaign finance laws."
For Democrats, Trump's request of Zelenskiy not only was inappropriate but was an abuse of power so egregious it's the subject of Article I of the impeachment legislation now under consideration by the Senate.
The Senate, where Republicans hold a clear majority, is expected to permit Trump to keep his office.
Critics, including lead impeachment manager Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., argue that the view taken by the Justice Department isn't valid because its boss, Attorney General Bill Barr, is too eager to please Trump.
That's why Democrats had to lead the fact-finding in the Ukraine affair — which Trump and Republicans have criticized as being incomplete and unfair — because, Schiff has said, the Justice Department wouldn't conduct the kind of complete investigation it had when President Bill Clinton was impeached in the late 1990s.
Schiff also warned senators that if Trump keeps his office after this episode, especially following the declaration by Philbin, it'll be even more difficult to conduct an incident-free election this year.
"It's unimpeachable for a president of the United States to say, 'Hey, Russia,' or 'Hey, Ukraine,' or 'Hey, China, I want your help in my election'?" Schiff said. "Because that's the policy of the president ... That's what they call policy. I'm sorry, that's what I call corruption."