washingtonmonthly--2020-02-14--Alan Dershowitz Tries to Play the Victim Card

The arguments Alan Dershowitz made during the Senate trial as to why Trump ’ s behavior didn ’ t constitute an impeachable offense were roundly panned by most legal scholars .
Since lawyers tend to engage on an intellectual ( rather that personal ) level , that is how they responded .
Initially , Dershowitz suggested that his arguments had been taken out of context , which wasn ’ t true .
But now he is pretending to occupy the high ground , while playing the role of victim , by claiming that his detractors are simply demonizing defense lawyers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the left who refuse to understand why a liberal Democrat would defend the constitutional rights of a controversial Republican president .
This is the mirror image of the McCarthyism of my youth , when many on the right could not understand why anti-communist centrist lawyers would defend the rights of communists .
Those lawyers were demonized as I am being today .
I have a thick skin , developed over many years of defending controversial and unpopular clients and causes .
But I am concerned that young lawyers will be deterred from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it will destroy their careers .
I am hearing that from young lawyers and students .
Demonizing defense lawyers for representing politically incorrect clients and causes is the true road to tyranny .
First of all , I suspect that most “ liberal Democrats ” parted ways with Dershowitz a long time ago for a variety of reasons , not the least of which is the fact that he has become a regular commentator on Fox News as a disseminator of that network ’ s propaganda .
But when Dershowitz claimed to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ representing controversial clients , I immediately did a Google search to see if he had said or written anything about a civil rights lawyer named Debo Adegbile .
Back in 2013 , Tom Perez—who had served as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights—became the Secretary of Labor .
Obama nominated Adegbile to replace Perez at the Civil Rights Division .
He had spent the previous twelve years working as a lawyer at the NAACP .
But his confirmation blew up when he was accused of defending a “ cop killer ” during his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racially-charged trial in the 1981 shooting death of a white Philadelphia police officer , Daniel Faulkner .
Mumia Abu-Jamal , a black journalist , was convicted and sentenced to death .
The NAACP began handling his appeals before Adegbile started his tenure with the organization .
But he eventually contributed to the filing of a 2009 court brief arguing that Abu-Jamal faced a discriminatory jury—an appeal found to have merit by a judge .
Abu-Jamal ’ s sentence was eventually reduced to life in prison without the possibility of parole .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a campaign against Adegbile ’ s confirmation by suggesting that he was an extremist who “ helped get a cop-killer off the hook.
” In the end , seven Democrats joined Republicans in blocking a vote on Adegbile ’ s confirmation .
It was one of the most shameful examples of political capitulation to racist sentiments in the years just prior to the Trump presidency .
As then-Attorney General Eric Holder said , “ It is a very dangerous precedent to set for the legal profession when individual lawyers can have their otherwise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clients that their organizations represent.
” When he had his chance , Dershowitz certainly didn ’ t lead the charge in defending Adegbile for his minimal role in representing a politically incorrect client .
So here ’ s my message to the famed defense lawyer : Spare me your crocodile tears of concern , Alan .
As your colleagues in the legal profession have pointed out , your arguments on behalf of Donald Trump were not only wrong , they were dangerous .
It ’ s time for you to take some personal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not the victim here .

The arguments Alan Dershowitz made during the Senate trial as to why Trump’s behavior didn’t constitute an impeachable offense were roundly panned by most legal scholars. Since lawyers tend to engage on an intellectual (rather that personal) level, that is how they responded.
Initially, Dershowitz suggested that his arguments had been taken out of context, which wasn’t true. But now he is pretending to occupy the high ground, while playing the role of victim, by claiming that his detractors are simply demonizing defense lawyers.
I have been demonized by many on the left who refuse to understand why a liberal Democrat would defend the constitutional rights of a controversial Republican president. This is the mirror image of the McCarthyism of my youth, when many on the right could not understand why anti-communist centrist lawyers would defend the rights of communists. Those lawyers were demonized as I am being today. I have a thick skin, developed over many years of defending controversial and unpopular clients and causes. But I am concerned that young lawyers will be deterred from representing such clients and causes for fear it will destroy their careers. I am hearing that from young lawyers and students. Demonizing defense lawyers for representing politically incorrect clients and causes is the true road to tyranny.
First of all, I suspect that most “liberal Democrats” parted ways with Dershowitz a long time ago for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that he has become a regular commentator on Fox News as a disseminator of that network’s propaganda.
But when Dershowitz claimed to be concerned about young lawyers being deterred from representing controversial clients, I immediately did a Google search to see if he had said or written anything about a civil rights lawyer named Debo Adegbile.
Back in 2013, Tom Perez—who had served as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights—became the Secretary of Labor. Obama nominated Adegbile to replace Perez at the Civil Rights Division. He had spent the previous twelve years working as a lawyer at the NAACP. But his confirmation blew up when he was accused of defending a “cop killer” during his tenure there.
The case involved a racially-charged trial in the 1981 shooting death of a white Philadelphia police officer, Daniel Faulkner. Mumia Abu-Jamal, a black journalist, was convicted and sentenced to death. The NAACP began handling his appeals before Adegbile started his tenure with the organization. But he eventually contributed to the filing of a 2009 court brief arguing that Abu-Jamal faced a discriminatory jury—an appeal found to have merit by a judge. Abu-Jamal’s sentence was eventually reduced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
That is all it took for Republicans to launch a campaign against Adegbile’s confirmation by suggesting that he was an extremist who “helped get a cop-killer off the hook.” In the end, seven Democrats joined Republicans in blocking a vote on Adegbile’s confirmation. It was one of the most shameful examples of political capitulation to racist sentiments in the years just prior to the Trump presidency. As then-Attorney General Eric Holder said, “It is a very dangerous precedent to set for the legal profession when individual lawyers can have their otherwise sterling qualifications denigrated based solely on the clients that their organizations represent.”
When he had his chance, Dershowitz certainly didn’t lead the charge in defending Adegbile for his minimal role in representing a politically incorrect client. So here’s my message to the famed defense lawyer: Spare me your crocodile tears of concern, Alan. As your colleagues in the legal profession have pointed out, your arguments on behalf of Donald Trump were not only wrong, they were dangerous. It’s time for you to take some personal responsibility for your own actions. You are not the victim here.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-14--The Mistake Trump Risks Repeating in the Middle East

A Middle Eastern power seeks regional hegemony .
A Western power with a history of military intervention initiates a campaign to weaken that country ’ s economy and isolate it from the world .
The ensuing showdown drives a wedge in the transatlantic alliance and pushes the region to the brink of war .
That sounds like the current situation between the United States and Iran , but it also describes the conflict between the United Kingdom and Egypt in the 1950s .
Although Washington and Tehran averted war in the immediate aftermath of the Trump administration ’ s assassination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the Iran nuclear deal and imposition of crushing sanctions against the Islamic Republic have set the two powers on a collision course .
Even though an armed confrontation has been avoided for now , national security experts still worry that Iran could strike the United States again if it lets its guard down .
“ Iran has a long history of striking when their adversaries least expect it , ” Andrew McCabe , the former deputy director of the FBI wrote in the Washington Post .
Since the assassination , Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ program raise the specter of a U.S. or Israeli preemptive strike , which could trigger a costly and chaotic war .
This , in turn , could spur an even deeper backlash against America ’ s presence in the region .
Simply put , the United States is on the precipice of a potential catastrophe .
Indeed , history has shown us the dangers of this kind of Western posturing .
The mid-twentieth century rivalry between Great Britain and Egypt provides a cautionary tale about a foreign policy rooted in maximum pressure .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ minister in 1955 , he signed a treaty aimed at securing British influence in the Middle East for years to come .
The treaty , known as the Baghdad Pact , sought to pull London ’ s allies in the Middle East into a mutual self-defense agreement .
The UK , which remained the most influential country in the region in spite of increasing American power , wanted to knit together its former colonies into a pro-Western coalition .
Its primary concern was maintaining a foothold at the Suez Canal , a vital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ came through Suez , making Egypt the lynchpin of Britain ’ s economic security .
Just as global energy interests collide in the Strait of Hormuz today , the Suez Canal was the maritime chokepoint that set the boundaries of the 1950s geopolitical playing field .
But the newly independent Egypt had no interest in British security guarantees .
Egypt ’ s president at the time , Gamal Abdel Nasser , viewed foreign military presence in Egypt as a violation of his country ’ s sovereignty .
In a January 1955 article written @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ the defense of the Middle East must rest primarily with the inhabitants of the area.
” Prime Minister Anthony Eden viewed Nasser and Arab nationalism as existential threats to British interests .
In a July 1956 letter to President Eisenhower , Eden urged the United Statesto join Britain ’ s campaign to bring “ maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt ” and to be ready “ in the last resort , to use force to bring Nasser to his senses.
” The parallel with Iran today could not be clearer .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional contest for power .
But the crisis also facilitated the rise of a new regional player : the Soviet Union .
Nasser soon struck an agreement with Czechoslovakia to procure $ 200 million of Soviet weapons in response to both the Baghdad Pact and Israel ’ s purchase of French arms.The deal , a victory for Nikita Khrushchev , was the first major expansion of Soviet influence into the Middle East .
Nasser then took his most dramatic step yet : nationalizing the Suez Canal .
Soon after , Dwight Eisenhower dispatched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deliver a critical message : the White House would not back a military solution .
Nevertheless , British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd characterized the imperative of taking back the canal as tantamount to preventing a “ potential Hitler , ” as he wrote in his memoir .
( Today , Trump officials make the same historical comparison , likening Iran to Nazi Germany and comparing .
the JCPOA to the 1938 Munich agreement . )
Britain then signed onto a secret military plan with France and Israel to retake control of the canal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward the canal zone , requiring an Anglo-French intervention to protect the international waterway .
Eisenhower urged Eden not to take military action , warning that the use of force would turn Arab public opinion against the West .
Eden ignored him .
But just as Eisenhower .
warned , the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt triggered massive Arab resistance .
Riots erupted across Iraq .
To quell the uproar , Iraq cut relations with France and excluded Britain from all meetings of the Baghdad Pact .
In Egypt , Nasser ordered the sinking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If hewasn ’ t going to control the canal , no one would .
Even more damaging to Britainwas the reaction of the superpowers .
Khrushchevdelivered the firstSovietnuclear threat of the Cold War , threateningto attack Western Europe with nuclear weapons if Britain did not withdraw .
Londonfound no diplomatic support from its closest allies in Washington ; Eisenhower dispatched Dulles to the floor of the UN General Assembly to condemn the military action .
The ensuing military fiasco and subsequent withdrawal of British troops from Egypt under U.S. and Soviet pressurereverberated throughout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Middle East .
By 1956 , Egypt had evicted all British forces , and Syria was drifting into the Soviet camp .
The final blow to British influence in the Middle East came inJuly 1958 when nationalist officers overthrew the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq .
Army officers sympathetic to Nasser ’ s pan-Arab vision seized power , murdering the pro-British royal family .
The Soviet Union , sensing the imminent unraveling of the pact , promptly recognized the new Iraqi government .
By year ’ s end , Soviet and Iraqi diplomats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ several trade and military assistance agreements .
This was the very outcome the alliance had been created to prevent .
At the end of the decade , Britain ’ s role as the dominant power in the Middle East was over .
Its regional defense alliances had collapsed .
Soviet arms were arriving in Arab capitals .
The United States no longer trusted Britain to uphold the regional order .
London knew its days were numbered .
By 1960 , British troops were out of the Middle East for good .
Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to recall this history .
The UK ’ s miscalculations in the 1950s left it humiliated and ultimately weakened in the region .
By demonizing Nasser and applying its own form of “ maximum pressure , ” the British government triggered exactly the result it sought to avoid .
Even if war today is averted , Baghdad ’ s weakened support for America ’ s military presence in Iraq is a sign that U.S. policy is alienating allies and producing unintended consequences that hurt America ’ s strategic position in the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be repeating itself , but as Mark Twain ’ s adage goes , we are certainly seeing it rhyme .
President Trump campaigned on keeping America out of military adventures overseas .
His policy toward Iran may be taking him exactly where he said he didn ’ t want to go .

A Middle Eastern power seeks regional hegemony. A Western power with a history of military intervention initiates a campaign to weaken that country’s economy and isolate it from the world. The ensuing showdown drives a wedge in the transatlantic alliance and pushes the region to the brink of war.
That sounds like the current situation between the United States and Iran, but it also describes the conflict between the United Kingdom and Egypt in the 1950s.
Although Washington and Tehran averted war in the immediate aftermath of the Trump administration’s assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and imposition of crushing sanctions against the Islamic Republic have set the two powers on a collision course. Even though an armed confrontation has been avoided for now, national security experts still worry that Iran could strike the United States again if it lets its guard down. “Iran has a long history of striking when their adversaries least expect it,” Andrew McCabe, the former deputy director of the FBI wrote in the Washington Post.
Since the assassination, Iran’s continued threats to restart its nuclear program raise the specter of a U.S. or Israeli preemptive strike, which could trigger a costly and chaotic war. This, in turn, could spur an even deeper backlash against America’s presence in the region. Simply put, the United States is on the precipice of a potential catastrophe.
Indeed, history has shown us the dangers of this kind of Western posturing. The mid-twentieth century rivalry between Great Britain and Egypt provides a cautionary tale about a foreign policy rooted in maximum pressure.
The day before Churchill resigned as prime minister in 1955, he signed a treaty aimed at securing British influence in the Middle East for years to come. The treaty, known as the Baghdad Pact, sought to pull London’s allies in the Middle East into a mutual self-defense agreement. The UK, which remained the most influential country in the region in spite of increasing American power, wanted to knit together its former colonies into a pro-Western coalition. Its primary concern was maintaining a foothold at the Suez Canal, a vital waterway. Three quarters of British imports came through Suez, making Egypt the lynchpin of Britain’s economic security. Just as global energy interests collide in the Strait of Hormuz today, the Suez Canal was the maritime chokepoint that set the boundaries of the 1950s geopolitical playing field.
But the newly independent Egypt had no interest in British security guarantees. Egypt’s president at the time, Gamal Abdel Nasser, viewed foreign military presence in Egypt as a violation of his country’s sovereignty. In a January 1955 article written for Foreign Affairs, Nasser argued that “the defense of the Middle East must rest primarily with the inhabitants of the area.”
Prime Minister Anthony Eden viewed Nasser and Arab nationalism as existential threats to British interests. In a July 1956 letter to President Eisenhower, Eden urged the United States to join Britain’s campaign to bring “maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt” and to be ready “in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses.” The parallel with Iran today could not be clearer.
Cairo and London faced off in a regional contest for power. But the crisis also facilitated the rise of a new regional player: the Soviet Union. Nasser soon struck an agreement with Czechoslovakia to procure $200 million of Soviet weapons in response to both the Baghdad Pact and Israel’s purchase of French arms.The deal, a victory for Nikita Khrushchev, was the first major expansion of Soviet influence into the Middle East.
Nasser then took his most dramatic step yet: nationalizing the Suez Canal. Soon after, Dwight Eisenhower dispatched Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to deliver a critical message: the White House would not back a military solution. Nevertheless, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd characterized the imperative of taking back the canal as tantamount to preventing a “potential Hitler,” as he wrote in his memoir. (Today, Trump officials make the same historical comparison, likening Iran to Nazi Germany and comparing the JCPOA to the 1938 Munich agreement.)
Britain then signed onto a secret military plan with France and Israel to retake control of the canal. The casus belliwas an Israeli feint toward the canal zone, requiring an Anglo-French intervention to protect the international waterway. Eisenhower urged Eden not to take military action, warning that the use of force would turn Arab public opinion against the West. Eden ignored him.
But just as Eisenhower warned, the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt triggered massive Arab resistance. Riots erupted across Iraq. To quell the uproar, Iraq cut relations with France and excluded Britain from all meetings of the Baghdad Pact. In Egypt, Nasser ordered the sinking of ships to blockadethe Suez Canal. If hewasn’t going to control the canal, no one would.
Even more damaging to Britain was the reaction of the superpowers. Khrushchev delivered the first Soviet nuclear threat of the Cold War, threatening to attack Western Europe with nuclear weapons if Britain did not withdraw. London found no diplomatic support from its closest allies in Washington; Eisenhower dispatched Dulles to the floor of the UN General Assembly to condemn the military action.
The ensuing military fiasco and subsequent withdrawal of British troops from Egypt under U.S. and Soviet pressure reverberated throughout the region, permanently discrediting Britain in the Middle East.
By 1956, Egypt had evicted all British forces, and Syria was drifting into the Soviet camp. The final blow to British influence in the Middle East came in July 1958 when nationalist officers overthrew the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq. Army officers sympathetic to Nasser’s pan-Arab vision seized power, murdering the pro-British royal family. The Soviet Union, sensing the imminent unraveling of the pact, promptly recognized the new Iraqi government. By year’s end, Soviet and Iraqi diplomats signed what would be the first of several trade and military assistance agreements. This was the very outcome the alliance had been created to prevent.
At the end of the decade, Britain’s role as the dominant power in the Middle East was over. Its regional defense alliances had collapsed. Soviet arms were arriving in Arab capitals. The United States no longer trusted Britain to uphold the regional order. London knew its days were numbered. By 1960, British troops were out of the Middle East for good.
Trump’s national security team would do well to recall this history. The UK’s miscalculations in the 1950s left it humiliated and ultimately weakened in the region. By demonizing Nasser and applying its own form of “maximum pressure,” the British government triggered exactly the result it sought to avoid.
Even if war today is averted, Baghdad’s weakened support for America’s military presence in Iraq is a sign that U.S. policy is alienating allies and producing unintended consequences that hurt America’s strategic position in the Middle East.
History, therefore, may not be repeating itself, but as Mark Twain’s adage goes, we are certainly seeing it rhyme. President Trump campaigned on keeping America out of military adventures overseas. His policy toward Iran may be taking him exactly where he said he didn’t want to go.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-14--Why Barr Couldn’t Answer a Simple Question From Senator Harris

By Tuesday night , after the four prosecutors who were involved with the Roger Stone case resigned , NBC News reported that William Barr had basically taken control of Justice Department matters that are of personal interest to Trump .
As I suggested previously , that flushes the standard of an independent attorney general down the drain .
While Trump celebrated that fact on Twitter , Barr knows that when the president does things like that , it undermines his ability to carry out what Trump wants him to do—which is basically to protect the chief executive and punish his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to an interview with ABC News , where he criticized the president for those tweets and suggested that he won ’ t be bullied .
But this whole question of Barr ’ s independence as attorney general has been an issue since before he was even nominated for the job .
As a reminder , back in 2017 , Peter Baker contacted 10 former attorneys general to ask them how they would respond to pressure from a president to open an investigation on a political rival .
The only one who responded was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inherently wrong about a president calling for an investigation , ” said William P. Barr , who ran the Justice Department under President George Bush .
“ Although an investigation shouldn ’ t be launched just because a president wants it , the ultimate question is whether the matter warrants investigation.
” Mr. Barr said he sees more basis for investigating the uranium deal [ ie , Hillary Clinton ] than any supposed collusion between Mr. Trump and Russia .
“ To the extent it is not pursuing these matters , the department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
The current attorney general suggested that there ’ s nothing wrong with a president pressuring the Justice Department to open an investigation on a political opponent .
It is also important to keep in mind that , by the time Barr answered that query , the whole Uranium One story about Hillary Clinton had been debunked as nothing more than a right-wing conspiracy theory .
So , at minimum , that response also calls into question Barr ’ s judgement about whether something warrants an investigation .
You might also remember @ @ @ @ @ @ @ direct question about this from Kamala Harris when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on his response to the Mueller report .
Harris asked whether “ the president or anyone at the White House ever asked or suggested that you open an investigation on anyone ?
” Barr initially asked her to repeat the question and proceeded to hem and haw—ultimately avoiding a direct answer .
According to reporters at the Washington Post , the sentencing recommendations on Roger Stone come against the backdrop of Trump raging that the Justice Department isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enemies .
That includes the president ’ s demands for the FBI to purge the department of people who aren ’ t loyal to him and prosecute James Comey .
The recent news that U.S. Attorney John Huber wound down his investigation into the Clinton Foundation without any findings of wrongdoing has increased Trump ’ s pressure on U.S. Attorney John Durham to finish his investigation of the Trump-Russia probe and provide the president with some dirt to use in his upcoming campaign .
While Barr criticized Trump ’ s tweets in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ independent , this is what the New York Times reported on Friday .
Attorney General William P. Barr has assigned an outside prosecutor to scrutinize the criminal case against President Trump ’ s former national security adviser Michael T. Flynn , according to people familiar with the matter… Mr. Barr has also installed a handful of outside prosecutors to broadly review the handling of other politically sensitive national-security cases in the U.S. attorney ’ s office in Washington , the people said… Over the past two weeks , the outside prosecutors have begun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about various cases — some public , some not — including investigative steps , prosecutorial actions and why they took them , according to the people… The moves amounted to imposing a secondary layer of monitoring and control over what career prosecutors have been doing in the Washington office .
They are part of a broader turmoil in that office coincided with Mr. Barr ’ s recent installation of a close aide , Timothy Shea , as interim United States attorney in the District of Columbia , after Mr. Barr maneuvered out the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Jessie K. Liu .
That aligns with what NBC News reported about Barr taking control of cases that are of personal interest to Trump .
He got rid of a prosecutor that wasn ’ t toeing the line , installed his own man , and is now combing over the work of career prosecutors to find an opening that he can exploit on Trump ’ s behalf .
The reason Barr couldn ’ t answer Senator Harris ’ s question is that he is constantly under pressure to do Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oblige .
To say “ no ” to the senator ’ s question would have meant lying to Congress and a “ yes ” would have revealed the lack of independence that currently exists between the president and the attorney general .
Unlike his unhinged boss , Barr is smart enough to know that , once that truth is obvious to everyone , it undermines his ability to protect Trump and punish his enemies .
That is why Barr suggested that the president ’ s tweets are a problem : much as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question would have done , they publicly expose his lack of independence .

By Tuesday night, after the four prosecutors who were involved with the Roger Stone case resigned, NBC News reported that William Barr had basically taken control of Justice Department matters that are of personal interest to Trump. As I suggested previously, that flushes the standard of an independent attorney general down the drain.
While Trump celebrated that fact on Twitter, Barr knows that when the president does things like that, it undermines his ability to carry out what Trump wants him to do—which is basically to protect the chief executive and punish his enemies. That is why Barr agreed to an interview with ABC News, where he criticized the president for those tweets and suggested that he won’t be bullied.
But this whole question of Barr’s independence as attorney general has been an issue since before he was even nominated for the job. As a reminder, back in 2017, Peter Baker contacted 10 former attorneys general to ask them how they would respond to pressure from a president to open an investigation on a political rival. The only one who responded was William Barr.
“There is nothing inherently wrong about a president calling for an investigation,” said William P. Barr, who ran the Justice Department under President George Bush. “Although an investigation shouldn’t be launched just because a president wants it, the ultimate question is whether the matter warrants investigation.” Mr. Barr said he sees more basis for investigating the uranium deal [ie, Hillary Clinton] than any supposed collusion between Mr. Trump and Russia. “To the extent it is not pursuing these matters, the department is abdicating its responsibility,” he said.
The current attorney general suggested that there’s nothing wrong with a president pressuring the Justice Department to open an investigation on a political opponent. It is also important to keep in mind that, by the time Barr answered that query, the whole Uranium One story about Hillary Clinton had been debunked as nothing more than a right-wing conspiracy theory. So, at minimum, that response also calls into question Barr’s judgement about whether something warrants an investigation.
You might also remember that Barr was unable to answer a direct question about this from Kamala Harris when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on his response to the Mueller report.
Harris asked whether “the president or anyone at the White House ever asked or suggested that you open an investigation on anyone?” Barr initially asked her to repeat the question and proceeded to hem and haw—ultimately avoiding a direct answer.
According to reporters at the Washington Post, the sentencing recommendations on Roger Stone come against the backdrop of Trump raging that the Justice Department isn’t doing enough to punish his enemies. That includes the president’s demands for the FBI to purge the department of people who aren’t loyal to him and prosecute James Comey. The recent news that U.S. Attorney John Huber wound down his investigation into the Clinton Foundation without any findings of wrongdoing has increased Trump’s pressure on U.S. Attorney John Durham to finish his investigation of the Trump-Russia probe and provide the president with some dirt to use in his upcoming campaign.
While Barr criticized Trump’s tweets in an effort to convince us that he remains independent, this is what the New York Times reported on Friday.
Attorney General William P. Barr has assigned an outside prosecutor to scrutinize the criminal case against President Trump’s former national security adviser Michael T. Flynn, according to people familiar with the matter… Mr. Barr has also installed a handful of outside prosecutors to broadly review the handling of other politically sensitive national-security cases in the U.S. attorney’s office in Washington, the people said… Over the past two weeks, the outside prosecutors have begun grilling line prosecutors in the Washington office about various cases — some public, some not — including investigative steps, prosecutorial actions and why they took them, according to the people… The moves amounted to imposing a secondary layer of monitoring and control over what career prosecutors have been doing in the Washington office. They are part of a broader turmoil in that office coincided with Mr. Barr’s recent installation of a close aide, Timothy Shea, as interim United States attorney in the District of Columbia, after Mr. Barr maneuvered out the Senate-confirmed former top prosecutor in the office, Jessie K. Liu.
That aligns with what NBC News reported about Barr taking control of cases that are of personal interest to Trump. He got rid of a prosecutor that wasn’t toeing the line, installed his own man, and is now combing over the work of career prosecutors to find an opening that he can exploit on Trump’s behalf.
The reason Barr couldn’t answer Senator Harris’s question is that he is constantly under pressure to do Trump’s bidding and seems more than happy to oblige. To say “no” to the senator’s question would have meant lying to Congress and a “yes” would have revealed the lack of independence that currently exists between the president and the attorney general.
Unlike his unhinged boss, Barr is smart enough to know that, once that truth is obvious to everyone, it undermines his ability to protect Trump and punish his enemies. That is why Barr suggested that the president’s tweets are a problem: much as an honest answer to Senator Harris’s question would have done, they publicly expose his lack of independence.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-14--Does the Media Ignore Trump Voters?

Does the Media Ignore Trump Voters?

I was prepared to be receptive to John Daniel Davidson ’ s column in The Federalist .
The premise seemed promising .
He ’ s been traveling across the country to cover the Democratic primaries .
In doing so , he ’ s made a habit of talking to Democratic voters to see what ’ s on their mind and how they feel about the various candidates .
He doesn ’ t adopt a confrontational tone but instead hides his own political beliefs in order to get a more candid response from the people he interviews .
By contrast , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making the same good faith effort to understand Trump voters because the mainstream press loathes Trump and has nothing but contempt for his followers .
I was hoping he might offer me one of two things , if not both .
First , I thought he ’ d tell me what he ’ s learned about the Democratic voters and what it might mean for the upcoming primaries and the general election .
Perhaps he ’ d also find time to give an example or two in which he ’ s learned something @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After all , it would be a bit strange not to find any merit in anything he hears people say about politics or not to discover any new angles on policy after listening to people discuss their struggles and challenges .
Second , I thought he ’ d tell us some of what the mainstream reporters would likely discover if they were to adopt his respectful approach to listening to people he disagrees with .
If there ’ s a story out there that helps explain Trump ’ s appeal that isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ listening , then couldn ’ t Davidson give us at least a preview on that ?
Unfortunately , Davidson did none of these things in his column .
He provided no opinion on how Democrats are leaning in the primaries or whether or not one candidate or another is in a good position because they ’ re in tune with the voters .
He didn ’ t say that he had modified a single opinion of his own through his interactions with Democrats or discovered some way that a Republican could attract a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about what really drives Trump voters to Trump .
His column was built entirely around documenting examples of mainstream journalists and television personalities showing condescension toward anyone who puts their trust in Trump .
As we move further into the 2020 cycle , you ’ re going to see a lot more of this sneering contempt for Trump voters from the media , especially for voters in rural and exurban areas .
When you do , know that of all the reporters and pundits traveling the country to cover the election , very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of trying to understand and empathize with the people they ’ re writing about .
The media wasn ’ t interested in why so many people were drawn to Trump four years ago , and despite all that ’ s happened since then , they still aren ’ t interested .
That ’ s why so much of the political reporting you ’ ll see this year will be flat and colorless , lacking any real insight or nuance , and dripping with a condescension bordering on hatred .
There ’ s a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this , even though it isn ’ t openly expressed in the piece .
Basically , Davidson is saying that Trump voters hate the media because the media hate them .
What people like about Trump is that he has the same relationship with the elitist press that they do .
It ’ s as if the mainstream press could make Trump less appealing by being more respectful to his supporters .
Except that wasn ’ t supposed to the point of the piece .
Most Democrats I encounter feel like there has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how Trump voters feel and comparatively few articles about what Clinton voters felt .
Even after the election , this trend continued .
As a major resistance rose up and got organized to fight President Trump , these organizers were profiled now and then , but not with the same frequency as the mainstream press filled their articles with quotes from Trump voters .
But even if we accept Davidson ’ s premise that reporters don ’ t actually talk to or listen to Trump voters , it ’ s clear that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ramp up a feeling of grievance .
Davidson wants to highlight examples of people in the press showing disrespect to Trump ’ s supporters so that they won ’ t give any credence to negative stories about Trump .
He wants to feed their sense of victimhood so that they behave like a threatened tribe .
It ’ s too bad that Davidson has no higher ambitions than this .
If he ’ s to be believed , he ’ s talked to enough voters to have plenty of interesting material .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @

I was prepared to be receptive to John Daniel Davidson’s column in The Federalist. The premise seemed promising. He’s been traveling across the country to cover the Democratic primaries. In doing so, he’s made a habit of talking to Democratic voters to see what’s on their mind and how they feel about the various candidates. He doesn’t adopt a confrontational tone but instead hides his own political beliefs in order to get a more candid response from the people he interviews. By contrast, he feels that most reporters are not making the same good faith effort to understand Trump voters because the mainstream press loathes Trump and has nothing but contempt for his followers.
I was hoping he might offer me one of two things, if not both. First, I thought he’d tell me what he’s learned about the Democratic voters and what it might mean for the upcoming primaries and the general election. Perhaps he’d also find time to give an example or two in which he’s learned something or modified his view on some subject. After all, it would be a bit strange not to find any merit in anything he hears people say about politics or not to discover any new angles on policy after listening to people discuss their struggles and challenges.
Second, I thought he’d tell us some of what the mainstream reporters would likely discover if they were to adopt his respectful approach to listening to people he disagrees with. If there’s a story out there that helps explain Trump’s appeal that isn’t getting reported for lack of listening, then couldn’t Davidson give us at least a preview on that?
Unfortunately, Davidson did none of these things in his column. He provided no opinion on how Democrats are leaning in the primaries or whether or not one candidate or another is in a good position because they’re in tune with the voters. He didn’t say that he had modified a single opinion of his own through his interactions with Democrats or discovered some way that a Republican could attract a few of them. He said nothing about what really drives Trump voters to Trump.
His column was built entirely around documenting examples of mainstream journalists and television personalities showing condescension toward anyone who puts their trust in Trump.
As we move further into the 2020 cycle, you’re going to see a lot more of this sneering contempt for Trump voters from the media, especially for voters in rural and exurban areas. When you do, know that of all the reporters and pundits traveling the country to cover the election, very few are doing the relatively easy work of trying to understand and empathize with the people they’re writing about. The media wasn’t interested in why so many people were drawn to Trump four years ago, and despite all that’s happened since then, they still aren’t interested. That’s why so much of the political reporting you’ll see this year will be flat and colorless, lacking any real insight or nuance, and dripping with a condescension bordering on hatred.
There’s a kind of circular reasoning that emerges from this, even though it isn’t openly expressed in the piece. Basically, Davidson is saying that Trump voters hate the media because the media hate them. What people like about Trump is that he has the same relationship with the elitist press that they do. It’s as if the mainstream press could make Trump less appealing by being more respectful to his supporters. Except that wasn’t supposed to the point of the piece.
Most Democrats I encounter feel like there has been a lot of articles published about how Trump voters feel and comparatively few articles about what Clinton voters felt. Even after the election, this trend continued. As a major resistance rose up and got organized to fight President Trump, these organizers were profiled now and then, but not with the same frequency as the mainstream press filled their articles with quotes from Trump voters.
But even if we accept Davidson’s premise that reporters don’t actually talk to or listen to Trump voters, it’s clear that the entire point of his piece is to ramp up a feeling of grievance. Davidson wants to highlight examples of people in the press showing disrespect to Trump’s supporters so that they won’t give any credence to negative stories about Trump. He wants to feed their sense of victimhood so that they behave like a threatened tribe.
It’s too bad that Davidson has no higher ambitions than this. If he’s to be believed, he’s talked to enough voters to have plenty of interesting material. But he provides nothing interesting at all.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-16--What Klobuchar’s Tater Tot Recipe Says About Her Candidacy

I ’ ve been frustrated by a recent lapse in journalistic rigor .
Many political reporters disclosed Amy Klobuchar ’ s recipe for the Taconite Tater Tot Hot Dish but none ventured into the kitchen to bake it .
I decided to try .
My project was quickly beset by the same cleavages that have torn apart America .
I wanted to shop at C-Town .
My wife insisted on Whole Foods .
I wanted Campbells Cream of Mushroom , her vote was for Amy ’ s Organic Cream of Mushroom Bisque with Arborio Rice .
This middle American dish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was instead turning into a source of division .
Part of the equation : the same kind of coastal food snobbery that got Trump elected .
My wife believed that the corporate food monopolists put in preservatives and exacerbated global warming .
McCain ’ s Tasti Taters had cottonseed oil and pyrophosphate , while the Alexia Organic Yukon Select boasted 0 g of trans fat .
I made two batches , one with the organic ingredients and the other without .
Both put a smile on my face and immediately made me want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down a thick ground cover of beef , onions , cream of mushroom , and cream of chicken soup .
On top , you place a layer of cheese and then the tater tots .
Ingeniously , the tater tots on the top seal in the gloopy concoction below , crispy on the top , soupy below .
In truth , they were hard to tell apart .
In a blind test , Amy , my wife , was initially unable to choose , and then went with the one in the metal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , healthier ingredients .
“ This has a more authentic character , ” she said .
But really , it was hard to tell .
Perhaps we ’ re not so different , after all .
The dish tells us a great deal about Klobuchar .
It ’ s middle of the road in some ways , but the use of Pepper Jack instead of Monterey Jack shows a desire to excite .
On the other hand , while delicious in the first few minutes , it soon started to harden and become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ll use Ore Ida tots with the locally produced raw milk cheese .
We must see not a blue America or a red America , but a golden , crispy , gooey America .
In a large bowl , mix together beef , onions , garlic , both cans of soup , salt and pepper .
Spread evenly into the bottom of a 9×13 baking dish .
Cover with about half of the shredded cheese .
Then , place tater tops in one layer over the entire pan .
Bake at 450 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tater tots are crisp .
Cover with remaining cheese and bake until cheese melts .

I’ve been frustrated by a recent lapse in journalistic rigor. Many political reporters disclosed Amy Klobuchar’s recipe for the Taconite Tater Tot Hot Dish but none ventured into the kitchen to bake it. I decided to try.
My project was quickly beset by the same cleavages that have torn apart America. I wanted to shop at C-Town. My wife insisted on Whole Foods. I wanted Campbells Cream of Mushroom, her vote was for Amy’s Organic Cream of Mushroom Bisque with Arborio Rice.
This middle American dish, which could have united us, was instead turning into a source of division. Part of the equation: the same kind of coastal food snobbery that got Trump elected. My wife believed that the corporate food monopolists put in preservatives and exacerbated global warming. McCain’s Tasti Taters had cottonseed oil and pyrophosphate, while the Alexia Organic Yukon Select boasted 0 g of trans fat.
I made two batches, one with the organic ingredients and the other without.
Both put a smile on my face and immediately made me want to take a nap. You lay down a thick ground cover of beef, onions, cream of mushroom, and cream of chicken soup. On top, you place a layer of cheese and then the tater tots. Ingeniously, the tater tots on the top seal in the gloopy concoction below, crispy on the top, soupy below.
In truth, they were hard to tell apart. In a blind test, Amy, my wife, was initially unable to choose, and then went with the one in the metal dish, the one with the fancier, healthier ingredients. “This has a more authentic character,” she said. But really, it was hard to tell. Perhaps we’re not so different, after all.
The dish tells us a great deal about Klobuchar. It’s middle of the road in some ways, but the use of Pepper Jack instead of Monterey Jack shows a desire to excite. On the other hand, while delicious in the first few minutes, it soon started to harden and become less charismatic.
Next time, we’ll use Ore Ida tots with the locally produced raw milk cheese. We must see not a blue America or a red America, but a golden, crispy, gooey America.
P.S., here’s the recipe from Senator Klobuchar:
– Ground beef (1-1.5 lbs)
– Cream of mushroom (1 can)
– Cream of chicken (1 can)
– Onions (1 small)
– Garlic (couple cloves)
– Salt
– Pepper
– Pepper jack cheese, shredded (8-12 ounces)
– Tater tots (1 package)
Brown ground beef, drain off fat. Sautee onions and garlic.
In a large bowl, mix together beef, onions, garlic, both cans of soup, salt and pepper. Spread evenly into the bottom of a 9×13 baking dish. Cover with about half of the shredded cheese. Then, place tater tops in one layer over the entire pan.
Bake at 450 degrees for 30 minutes, or until tater tots are crisp. Cover with remaining cheese and bake until cheese melts.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-16--No, Impeachment Did Not Liberate Trump

No, Impeachment Did Not Liberate Trump

It is becoming conventional wisdom in certain centrist and leftist circles that impeaching Trump was a mistake .
The leftist argument goes that Democrats wasted time on non-material-needs issues like presidential abuse of power , extorting a foreign government for help with an election and undermining democracy and rule of law , instead of spending even more time talking about healthcare .
The centrist argument goes that impeaching Trump was divisive and never a good idea to begin with because it didn ’ t play well in frontline districts .
This is all hogwash : there are certain principles that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics of a a few weeks ’ news cycles .
Healthcare gets plenty of time in the press and public eye , and no frontline Democrats are going to lose their seats just because they supported impeaching Trump for extortion .
Trump is obliterating the guardrails of democracy that separate a wobbly yet accountable system of government from a dictatorship with only the window dressing of democracy and liberal constitutional government .
That is a far bigger issue than any policy platform this side of climate change .
But there ’ s another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cropping up more often : that Trump ’ s acquittal in the Senate is giving him unbridled free rein to behave like a dictator : Trump appears emboldened by his acquittal in the Republican-controlled Senate , ousting individuals from his White House and administration whom he believes crossed him during impeachment .
This includes Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman , who the Army secretary said Friday , was not under investigation after Trump hinted he may face further disciplinary action after he was dismissed from his White House post and sent back to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president would be chastened by the impeachment proceedings , the opposite has proven true .
He has expressed no remorse over his actions , instead seeking to strengthen his hold over the executive branch .
It ’ s certainly true that the president has been attempting to purge all who crossed him during the impeachment proceeding .
But he has also desperately tried to do likewise against all who crossed him during the Mueller inquiry , too .
That ’ s who he is and what he does .
He ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caught in wrongdoing is to double down on his bad conduct and attempt to punish those who held him accountable .
What these narratives leave unspoken is the contrafactual : what sort of lesson would Trump have taken from not being impeached ?
If it had come out that the president had attempted to bribe and extort a foreign leader by withholding crucial aid unless he announced a fraudulent investigation into the president ’ s chief ( at the time ) political opponent and Democrats had failed to take the utmost action , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sure , Lt. Col. Vindman and his brother would still have their jobs , as would Ambassador Sondland .
But Trump would have been triply emboldened by the fact that not only would his own political party shamelessly run interference for him , but even the opposition party would be so cowed that it wouldn ’ t even bother to place the stain of impeachment on his presidency .
Could there be any doubt that he would do the same thing again and in even larger fashion ?
Trump now knows that if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an election , the Democratic House will impeach him for it , even in an election year .
He knows that if he is caught doing it again , the House may well impeach him again , laying out the evidence for weeks in front of the American people .
He knows that he is on notice and that the opposition party will , in fact , take the maximum action it can without actively instigating a Constitutional crisis .
The fact that Trump has been behaving like a raving tyrant since his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean he is unleashed .
It simply means he is vindictive .
But he is vindictive precisely because the House has dared to constrain him , even if ever so slightly , and Trump can not stand being told what to do .
Which is why it ’ s incredibly important to keep telling him what to do , mocking his narcissistic ego and belittling his sense of impunity as often as possible with whatever tools exist in the Democratic arsenal .
Let the blowhard explode like a furious teakettle .
His furious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not of power .
They are the actions of a spoiled child unexpectedly chastened , not a confident adult in control of his destiny .
Pushing him to this point was not a mistake .
It was what Democrats were capable of doing under the circumstances .
And it was the right thing to do .

It is becoming conventional wisdom in certain centrist and leftist circles that impeaching Trump was a mistake. The leftist argument goes that Democrats wasted time on non-material-needs issues like presidential abuse of power, extorting a foreign government for help with an election and undermining democracy and rule of law, instead of spending even more time talking about healthcare. The centrist argument goes that impeaching Trump was divisive and never a good idea to begin with because it didn’t play well in frontline districts.
This is all hogwash: there are certain principles that are worth defending far more than the politics of a a few weeks’ news cycles. Healthcare gets plenty of time in the press and public eye, and no frontline Democrats are going to lose their seats just because they supported impeaching Trump for extortion. Trump is obliterating the guardrails of democracy that separate a wobbly yet accountable system of government from a dictatorship with only the window dressing of democracy and liberal constitutional government. That is a far bigger issue than any policy platform this side of climate change.
But there’s another line of argument against impeachment that is cropping up more often: that Trump’s acquittal in the Senate is giving him unbridled free rein to behave like a dictator:
Trump appears emboldened by his acquittal in the Republican-controlled Senate, ousting individuals from his White House and administration whom he believes crossed him during impeachment. This includes Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, who the Army secretary said Friday, was not under investigation after Trump hinted he may face further disciplinary action after he was dismissed from his White House post and sent back to the Pentagon early. While some Republicans hoped the president would be chastened by the impeachment proceedings, the opposite has proven true. He has expressed no remorse over his actions, instead seeking to strengthen his hold over the executive branch.
It’s certainly true that the president has been attempting to purge all who crossed him during the impeachment proceeding. But he has also desperately tried to do likewise against all who crossed him during the Mueller inquiry, too. That’s who he is and what he does. He’s a shameless bully whose response to being caught in wrongdoing is to double down on his bad conduct and attempt to punish those who held him accountable.
What these narratives leave unspoken is the contrafactual: what sort of lesson would Trump have taken from not being impeached? If it had come out that the president had attempted to bribe and extort a foreign leader by withholding crucial aid unless he announced a fraudulent investigation into the president’s chief (at the time) political opponent and Democrats had failed to take the utmost action, what would Trump have done then?
Sure, Lt. Col. Vindman and his brother would still have their jobs, as would Ambassador Sondland. But Trump would have been triply emboldened by the fact that not only would his own political party shamelessly run interference for him, but even the opposition party would be so cowed that it wouldn’t even bother to place the stain of impeachment on his presidency. Could there be any doubt that he would do the same thing again and in even larger fashion?
Trump now knows that if he attempts to solicit foreign interference in an election, the Democratic House will impeach him for it, even in an election year. He knows that if he is caught doing it again, the House may well impeach him again, laying out the evidence for weeks in front of the American people. He knows that he is on notice and that the opposition party will, in fact, take the maximum action it can without actively instigating a Constitutional crisis.
The fact that Trump has been behaving like a raving tyrant since his corrupted acquittal by Senate Republicans does not mean he is unleashed. It simply means he is vindictive. But he is vindictive precisely because the House has dared to constrain him, even if ever so slightly, and Trump cannot stand being told what to do.
Which is why it’s incredibly important to keep telling him what to do, mocking his narcissistic ego and belittling his sense of impunity as often as possible with whatever tools exist in the Democratic arsenal. Let the blowhard explode like a furious teakettle. His furious rages are a show of weakness, not of power. They are the actions of a spoiled child unexpectedly chastened, not a confident adult in control of his destiny.
Pushing him to this point was not a mistake. It was what Democrats were capable of doing under the circumstances. And it was the right thing to do.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-15--Warren Is Paying the Price for her Honesty. And Her Gender.

Elizabeth Warren ’ s presidential campaign is up against a wall .
After leading the Democratic field in the polling for a couple of weeks , her support has now softened considerably .
She ’ s not in a terrible position in terms of raw delegates : she overperformed her polling to take third place in in Iowa .
But a disappointing fourth-place finish in New Hampshire did little to boost the campaign and her path forward seems uncertain beyond persisting and hoping that other candidates fall flat and their supporters flock to her .
How did we get here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short there will be numerous well-sourced accounts , but the trajectory from the outside is already clear enough .
In a primary where voters have been obsessively seeking “ electability , ” and where other candidates have been willing to spin fables or dramatically change positions to secure votes , Warren ’ s basic decency and honesty have cost her .
And the sexism undergirding much of the conversation around electability hasn ’ t helped .
Both Warren ’ s defenders and detractors on the left and right side of the Democratic field @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the key turning point .
As the primary hit the first series of debates , Warren remained ambiguous about the details of her healthcare plan , dodging questions about taxation and saying only that “ costs will go down.
” Both Sanders on her left and Buttigieg , Biden and Klobuchar on her right pilloried her for her lack of specificity on this front .
The Buttigieg/Biden/Klobuchar wing was content to diss Medicare for All entirely , hedging toward frankly unworkable “ Medicare for All Who Want It ” style plans .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be the same as that of the ACA : half-measures that will be immediately hobbled by the medical provider and insurance industries , and that will not provide the cost savings required for a universal plan to be effective .
Politically , this was an attempt to undermine Warren whom they saw as the primary threat , and to solidify their own control of the “ moderate ” lane .
None of them saw Sanders as a serious threat at the time , nor did they factor in the degree to which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the moderate lane had Sanders as their second choice .
They also strongly underestimated the degree to which Democratic voters genuinely like and want Medicare for All .
The Sanders campaign , for their part , took advantage by playing a dangerous game .
Sanders openly admitted to planning to raise taxes on more than just the top 1 % , but correctly noted that it would be made up for by removing premiums .
While this is correct on its own terms and is a smart play in a Democratic primary , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the general election where Republicans will take those “ raise taxes ” sound bites , scaring seniors into believing that Sanders will raise their taxes while destroying Medicare and handing their money to supposedly undeserving poor young people .
There is a reason that no other candidate in the field was willing to deliver that sort of public sound bite–and it ’ s not due to dishonesty or corruption .
Sanders ’ strategy has been to simply win the Democratic primary and worry about the consequences for the general election later .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ so far : he is the definitive frontrunner for the Democratic nomination .
And perhaps the downside will not be so grave in the general election should he become the nominee .
Current head-to-head polling shows Sanders doing quite well against Trump .
That said , the general election attacks on taxes and Medicare for All have yet to begin .
The attacks could turn out to have no impact–or they could be as devastating as they were against Democrats across the board in 2010 .
Besieged on both sides , Warren was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans on how she would pay for Medicare for All–and how she would pass it .
Curiously , however , no such particular specificity was asked of Sanders , who has persistently refused to explain exactly how much it would cost or how he would pay for it .
Of course , the moderate candidates refused to even attempt it .
Only Warren , apparently , had to have a plan .
To be fair , having a plan is her brand .
But on the other hand , it smacked more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ woman in the race had to get the details all squared away while Sanders , Biden and Buttigieg remained vague .
On the more serious wonk side , it quickly became apparent that a rapid , 1st-term conversion to Medicare for All would be fiscally difficult and politically impossible for all the stakeholders involved ( including and especially much of labor . )
So Warren straddled the divide , calling for a phased-in transition in her second term while avoiding any tax increases on any but the top 1 % to pay for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Warren has long advocated for eliminating the filibuster and expanding the courts–fully aware that not even a public option much less a Medicare for All plan would garner 60 Senate votes , and that the stacked conservative Supreme Court would find a way to strike down whatever did get passed .
The moderate candidates ( Buttigieg excepted ) have mostly demurred on these political necessities , while Sanders has advocated requiring a talking filibuster as a solution ( does anyone doubt that Republicans would talk as long as it takes to stop Medicare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules and using the Vice President to cheat the parliamentarian by trying to pass the law through reconciliation–which no serious person believes will actually happen , and which would be struck down in the courts if it did .
Warren has consistently been the only one tied to both budget and procedural realities , while also taking care to position herself responsibly for a general election and maintain the commitment to Medicare for All that the majority of Democratic voters expect .
No good deed goes unpunished in politics .
Warren ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that she had betrayed her commitment to Medicare for All , and ( ironically ) that she had become dishonest or inconsistent on the subject .
Her more moderate opponents followed suit as well , still underestimating Sanders and assuming that they would dominate the field with Warren weakened .
Warren ’ s poll numbers began to slip–first from the conservatives in her unity coalition who shifted to Buttigieg , and then from some progressives who shifted to Sanders .
In a perverse turn of events , Warren has struggled to regain her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the fact that she remains arguably the only candidate who has put forward a serious , credible proposal for achieving the healthcare proposals that Democratic voters want .
But electability issues have also plagued the Warren campaign .
Consistently for months now , Warren has beaten Trump in head to head polling , but by smaller margins than Biden or Sanders .
It would be unwise to put too much stock into this given factors like name recognition that can generate small differences , as well as the fact that the hyperpartisanship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out those differences .
But Democratic voters are obsessed above all else with who can beat Trump , and a series of polls showing Warren underperforming her male opponents against Trump certainly haven ’ t helped .
Again , though , this is hardly Warren ’ s fault .
Democratic voters shellshocked after Trump ’ s unexpected victory were told that sexism denied Hillary Clinton the White House .
While this is true in part , the typical analysis also consistently undersold the mistakes Clinton made in the 2016 campaign that another woman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ match .
Instead , mainstream newspapers delivered ethnography after ethnography of unshakeable and deplorable Trump voters in midwestern diners .
The notion that a woman can not beat Trump began to take on the air of an self-fulfilling prophecy .
Dispatches from canvassers for the Warren campaign on social media have consistently told of voters who like Warren but are afraid that she can ’ t beat Trump in a general election–essentially a story of Democratic voters vainly attempting to second-guess what archetypical Obama-Trump voters in Wisconsin exurbs might or might not do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are well to the right of Warren ’ s , has suffered similar electability concerns despite her actual track record of electoral success in the midwest .
Meanwhile , a male candidate whose biggest claim to fame and electoral victory is the mayorship of a small city in Indiana is reaping the benefits of nervous voters rejecting more accomplished women on “ electability ” grounds .
Warren ’ s chief male opponents in Sanders on the left and Biden and Bloomberg on the right , meanwhile , are promoting theories of electability with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little evidence that Sanders will generate a turnout surge to propel him to the White House , nor is there any particularly compelling evidence that Biden or Bloomberg have significantly greater crossover appeal than more progressive candidates–especially when their liabilities are exploited .
All are vulnerable to the same dirty tricks that were used against supposedly unassailable moderates Clinton , Kerry and Gore .
There is , however , a large amount of evidence that both Warren and Klobuchar are suffering from both real sexism in the general electorate and the internalized sexism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unpredictable notions of electability .
Where does Warren go from here ?
It ’ s hard to say .
She is famously persistent and refuses to be anything other than who she is .
The entry of Mike Bloomberg , a paragon of exactly the sort of Wall Street-friendly billionaire she has made it her political life ’ s work to oppose , potentially gives her an opportunity to regain her footing and reassert herself as a champion of both policy and the middle class .
There would be many salutary effects of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Democratic Party toward a more progressive vision ( so long as Sanders ’ most toxic supporters can be sidelined and avoid becoming the face the campaign and the party . )
But it would be a terrible shame if one of the lessons of the 2020 election cycle were that honesty , decency and attention to detail–as well as just being a woman in a world where Donald Trump festers in the White House–were seen as lethal drawbacks for a candidate rather than the strengths they rightly ought to be .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic Party if a woman attempting to unite the two factions of the party after an ugly rift in 2016 were left high and dry by both sides in their respective attempts to dominate the other .

Elizabeth Warren’s presidential campaign is up against a wall. After leading the Democratic field in the polling for a couple of weeks, her support has now softened considerably. She’s not in a terrible position in terms of raw delegates: she overperformed her polling to take third place in in Iowa. But a disappointing fourth-place finish in New Hampshire did little to boost the campaign and her path forward seems uncertain beyond persisting and hoping that other candidates fall flat and their supporters flock to her. How did we get here?
If Warren does end up falling short there will be numerous well-sourced accounts, but the trajectory from the outside is already clear enough. In a primary where voters have been obsessively seeking “electability,” and where other candidates have been willing to spin fables or dramatically change positions to secure votes, Warren’s basic decency and honesty have cost her. And the sexism undergirding much of the conversation around electability hasn’t helped.
Both Warren’s defenders and detractors on the left and right side of the Democratic field rightly point to the healthcare debate as the key turning point. As the primary hit the first series of debates, Warren remained ambiguous about the details of her healthcare plan, dodging questions about taxation and saying only that “costs will go down.” Both Sanders on her left and Buttigieg, Biden and Klobuchar on her right pilloried her for her lack of specificity on this front.
The Buttigieg/Biden/Klobuchar wing was content to diss Medicare for All entirely, hedging toward frankly unworkable “Medicare for All Who Want It” style plans. The challenge for the moderate approach to healthcare will be the same as that of the ACA: half-measures that will be immediately hobbled by the medical provider and insurance industries, and that will not provide the cost savings required for a universal plan to be effective. Politically, this was an attempt to undermine Warren whom they saw as the primary threat, and to solidify their own control of the “moderate” lane. None of them saw Sanders as a serious threat at the time, nor did they factor in the degree to which many of their own voters supposedly in the moderate lane had Sanders as their second choice. They also strongly underestimated the degree to which Democratic voters genuinely like and want Medicare for All.
The Sanders campaign, for their part, took advantage by playing a dangerous game. Sanders openly admitted to planning to raise taxes on more than just the top 1%, but correctly noted that it would be made up for by removing premiums. While this is correct on its own terms and is a smart play in a Democratic primary, it’s an extremely risky move for the general election where Republicans will take those “raise taxes” sound bites, scaring seniors into believing that Sanders will raise their taxes while destroying Medicare and handing their money to supposedly undeserving poor young people. There is a reason that no other candidate in the field was willing to deliver that sort of public sound bite–and it’s not due to dishonesty or corruption. Sanders’ strategy has been to simply win the Democratic primary and worry about the consequences for the general election later. Admittedly, it is working for him so far: he is the definitive frontrunner for the Democratic nomination. And perhaps the downside will not be so grave in the general election should he become the nominee. Current head-to-head polling shows Sanders doing quite well against Trump. That said, the general election attacks on taxes and Medicare for All have yet to begin. The attacks could turn out to have no impact–or they could be as devastating as they were against Democrats across the board in 2010.
Besieged on both sides, Warren was forced to draw up some more specific plans on how she would pay for Medicare for All–and how she would pass it. Curiously, however, no such particular specificity was asked of Sanders, who has persistently refused to explain exactly how much it would cost or how he would pay for it. Of course, the moderate candidates refused to even attempt it. Only Warren, apparently, had to have a plan. To be fair, having a plan is her brand. But on the other hand, it smacked more than a little of sexism that only the woman in the race had to get the details all squared away while Sanders, Biden and Buttigieg remained vague.
On the more serious wonk side, it quickly became apparent that a rapid, 1st-term conversion to Medicare for All would be fiscally difficult and politically impossible for all the stakeholders involved (including and especially much of labor.) So Warren straddled the divide, calling for a phased-in transition in her second term while avoiding any tax increases on any but the top 1% to pay for it. On the practical side, Warren has long advocated for eliminating the filibuster and expanding the courts–fully aware that not even a public option much less a Medicare for All plan would garner 60 Senate votes, and that the stacked conservative Supreme Court would find a way to strike down whatever did get passed. The moderate candidates (Buttigieg excepted) have mostly demurred on these political necessities, while Sanders has advocated requiring a talking filibuster as a solution (does anyone doubt that Republicans would talk as long as it takes to stop Medicare for All?) while violating Senate rules and using the Vice President to cheat the parliamentarian by trying to pass the law through reconciliation–which no serious person believes will actually happen, and which would be struck down in the courts if it did. Warren has consistently been the only one tied to both budget and procedural realities, while also taking care to position herself responsibly for a general election and maintain the commitment to Medicare for All that the majority of Democratic voters expect.
No good deed goes unpunished in politics. Warren’s critics on the left pounced, declaring that she had betrayed her commitment to Medicare for All, and (ironically) that she had become dishonest or inconsistent on the subject. Her more moderate opponents followed suit as well, still underestimating Sanders and assuming that they would dominate the field with Warren weakened. Warren’s poll numbers began to slip–first from the conservatives in her unity coalition who shifted to Buttigieg, and then from some progressives who shifted to Sanders. In a perverse turn of events, Warren has struggled to regain her footing as the master of policy, despite the fact that she remains arguably the only candidate who has put forward a serious, credible proposal for achieving the healthcare proposals that Democratic voters want.
But electability issues have also plagued the Warren campaign. Consistently for months now, Warren has beaten Trump in head to head polling, but by smaller margins than Biden or Sanders. It would be unwise to put too much stock into this given factors like name recognition that can generate small differences, as well as the fact that the hyperpartisanship of a general election will likely smooth out those differences. But Democratic voters are obsessed above all else with who can beat Trump, and a series of polls showing Warren underperforming her male opponents against Trump certainly haven’t helped.
Again, though, this is hardly Warren’s fault. Democratic voters shellshocked after Trump’s unexpected victory were told that sexism denied Hillary Clinton the White House. While this is true in part, the typical analysis also consistently undersold the mistakes Clinton made in the 2016 campaign that another woman candidate might successfully avoid in a 2020 match. Instead, mainstream newspapers delivered ethnography after ethnography of unshakeable and deplorable Trump voters in midwestern diners. The notion that a woman cannot beat Trump began to take on the air of an self-fulfilling prophecy. Dispatches from canvassers for the Warren campaign on social media have consistently told of voters who like Warren but are afraid that she can’t beat Trump in a general election–essentially a story of Democratic voters vainly attempting to second-guess what archetypical Obama-Trump voters in Wisconsin exurbs might or might not do. Senator Amy Klobuchar, whose politics are well to the right of Warren’s, has suffered similar electability concerns despite her actual track record of electoral success in the midwest. Meanwhile, a male candidate whose biggest claim to fame and electoral victory is the mayorship of a small city in Indiana is reaping the benefits of nervous voters rejecting more accomplished women on “electability” grounds.
Warren’s chief male opponents in Sanders on the left and Biden and Bloomberg on the right, meanwhile, are promoting theories of electability with little intrinsic merit. There is precious little evidence that Sanders will generate a turnout surge to propel him to the White House, nor is there any particularly compelling evidence that Biden or Bloomberg have significantly greater crossover appeal than more progressive candidates–especially when their liabilities are exploited. All are vulnerable to the same dirty tricks that were used against supposedly unassailable moderates Clinton, Kerry and Gore. There is, however, a large amount of evidence that both Warren and Klobuchar are suffering from both real sexism in the general electorate and the internalized sexism of a Democratic electorate disproportionately obsessed with unpredictable notions of electability.
Where does Warren go from here? It’s hard to say. She is famously persistent and refuses to be anything other than who she is. The entry of Mike Bloomberg, a paragon of exactly the sort of Wall Street-friendly billionaire she has made it her political life’s work to oppose, potentially gives her an opportunity to regain her footing and reassert herself as a champion of both policy and the middle class.
There would be many salutary effects of a Sanders nomination in terms of pushing the Democratic Party toward a more progressive vision (so long as Sanders’ most toxic supporters can be sidelined and avoid becoming the face the campaign and the party.) But it would be a terrible shame if one of the lessons of the 2020 election cycle were that honesty, decency and attention to detail–as well as just being a woman in a world where Donald Trump festers in the White House–were seen as lethal drawbacks for a candidate rather than the strengths they rightly ought to be. And it would be a stain on the Democratic Party if a woman attempting to unite the two factions of the party after an ugly rift in 2016 were left high and dry by both sides in their respective attempts to dominate the other.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-17--Inside the Chaotic, Underfunded World of Probation and Parole

The number of people on probation or parole in the United States is roughly double the number of people behind bars .
Yet a quick search on Amazon reveals that the number of books about incarceration exceeds the number of books about probation by more than tenfold .
That imbalance matters .
If we don ’ t provide adequate services for probationers and parolees , we will fail to build on the recent trend of modest decarceration .
Jason Hardy helps rectify this imbalance with The Second Chance Club , a thoughtful account of his work at the New Orleans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ P & P ” in the local argot ) .
In his agreeably unpretentious style , Hardy introduces himself as a failed former public school teacher , failed former novelist , and currently failing JCPenney watch salesman , who aspires to a more meaningful and remunerative career .
Disgusted by mass incarceration , he responds to an advertisement for a position at P & P , which he gets simply because the desperate agency assumes that he can leave his current job without giving two weeks ’ notice .
During training he learns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has already washed out from other occupations .
Their instructors make it clear that the department is so short of officers they will bend over backward to make sure everyone passes the training course .
Hardy ’ s training requires him to memorize “ obscure Louisiana statutes like Theft of an alligator ” and provides hours of instruction on how to put on handcuffs and fire a gun .
As his book later makes clear , his training did not provide him with the essentials of effective community supervision , such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ social welfare bureaucracy , nor did it offer thorough knowledge of addiction and behavior change principles .
Despite their insufficient training , Hardy is surprised to discover that his fellow officers are generally dedicated and even , at times , idealistic .
With admirable candor , he immediately surrenders any delusions of being a savior , recognizing that P & P ’ s challenges are not produced by the characteristics of its officers so much as the rules under which they work .
These structural challenges become clear on Hardy ’ s first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ handed 220 thick files on the people he is supposed to supervise .
Absorbing so much information is daunting , supervising so many people even more so .
His fellow officers tell him to triage , focusing his effort on the cases that pose the highest risk and have the greatest needs .
This strategy relies on the assumption that the criminal justice system is consistently accurate in measuring risk .
Hardy doesn ’ t question this assumption , but many social scientists would .
More barriers to success soon become evident .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the department , when Louisiana—rhetorically , at least—is moving away from incarceration .
What this means practically is letting slide many probation and parole infractions that once triggered harsh punishment .
But it doesn ’ t mean that there is much more investment in services .
Hardy puts his finger on the larger political challenge : “ Nobody who mattered gave a shit about probation and parole.
” The result is a system that in at least one sense has no bias : “ P & P treated everyone equally—that is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have the resources to treat anybody well.
” Hardy also makes an astute point about political economy .
Much of the public simultaneously resents the high cost of prisons yet also opposes spending on services for people under community supervision , considering them “ goodies for baddies.
” This is spectacularly shortsighted , because providing such services is critical for diverting some people from prison to probation and keeping paroled ex-prisoners from being reincarcerated .
Hardy also grapples with the system ’ s inability to impose consequences other than imprisonment for infractions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ one pays them , and no one is punished for not paying them .
This leaves incarceration as the only way to deter violation of supervision conditions .
And officers , he notes , are punished for responding to violations—it creates piles of paperwork , the need for court appearances , and then more paperwork .
It ’ s easy for the supervisors and the supervised to fall into an implicit bargain : If you pretend you are a good supervisee , I will pretend that I ’ m a good officer .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite it all .
The heart of the book is narratives about seven of the individuals he supervises .
Their problems are manifold , the most consistent being poverty and addiction .
Some of them are also exploitative of others and prone to violence , and many run with a rough crowd .
As a white parole officer in a notoriously corrupt city where many black people are understandably suspicious of cops , Hardy realizes that he has to overcome his charges ’ skepticism .
He largely succeeds , through evident compassion toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he is assigned to supervise .
Hardy struggles alongside his supervisees through the maddening process of finding psychiatric , vocational , educational , and addiction-related services .
On multiple occasions , he finds that he can ’ t place someone in a treatment program until a physician diagnoses them with a mental health or addictive disorder , but the only way to do that is to admit the person to a treatment program in the first place .
He rages and grieves , and the reader does so along with him ; yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ victories that are an antidote to despair .
Failed novelist or not , Hardy has some literary gifts that enliven the book .
His regional manager wears “ a constant , nervous smile , as if he ’ d gotten good news but was holding off on believing until he saw the proof.
” Hardy also takes breaks from the pain of his subjects ’ lives by adding some amusing details , such as the deep affection some offenders have for cop shows .
His supervisees root for TV cops , who tend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the real-world cops they know .
And they hate TV criminals , who are portrayed as sociopathic and thus , in their view , completely different than themselves , who are just trying to get by in an unfair world .
Hardy deserves credit for providing counterexamples to common liberal pieties about his work , including ones he previously espoused himself .
He finds that , rather than being the exclusive purview of racist whites , tough-on-crime attitudes are prevalent among poor , black residents of neighborhoods with high crime rates .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ punishment has a positive impact .
One woman struggling with addiction thanks him for sending her to jail after a relapse , because it helped her turn her life around .
Another woman plans to get high but chooses not to because she realizes that she has a drug test coming up .
He is also candid about the fact that the social welfare programs he advocates , such as food stamps and Social Security , are often abused by scammers .
Indeed , he observes sadly that bureaucratic rules around these programs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to overcome than they are for the sick and the needy .
A healthy , intelligent drug dealer can supplement his income by faking chronic pain , making all his doctor ’ s appointments , and filling out all of the required disability forms .
Someone who is actually living in excruciating pain finds these same steps much more challenging .
These insights help compensate for the things that Hardy gets wrong .
He relentlessly touts what the law professor John Pfaff calls the “ standard story ” of mass incarceration : that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of drug prohibition , which was designed to fill prisons with black people .
This is not a criticism of Hardy in particular , as the standard story has been repeated in countless media stories , movies , and academic journal articles .
In fact , drug offenders are only about one-sixth of U.S. prisoners , and if they were all released tomorrow the proportion of African Americans in prison would go up rather than down .
Further , the drug that drives by far the most crime , arrests , and incarceration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ latter point , it is discouraging that everyone in Hardy ’ s department , including him , ignores heavy drinking by their supervisees , yet virtually all of them lecture their charges to avoid “ drugs.
” Hardy ’ s analysis of the appeal of drug dealing to his supervisees and to low-income people more generally is partly false and partly true .
He repeatedly describes drug dealing as lucrative , when careful research by Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter shows that it ’ s a boom-or-bust business ; over a typical year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minimum-wage job .
He ’ s on stronger ground when he points to the appeal of the lifestyle to some young men , particularly being feared and being attractive to young women .
But the strengths of the book shine through .
The Second Chance Club illuminates the lives of people who provide and receive community supervision , and it lays out necessary structural changes .
Hardy makes a powerful case that minimal funding for community supervision increases risks to those in the system and the people around them .
This is bad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also penny-wise and pound-foolish .
Many offenders end up back in prison , costing taxpayers even more than it would have to adequately fund parole and probation .
That ’ s to say nothing of the human cost .
Hardy ’ s other critical point is that a system that relies exclusively on ignoring violations or handing out long prison terms will fail to change behavior , protect public safety , and provide justice .
Finding an intermediate route for responding to violations is one of the central goals of the “ swift @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to community supervision that were described in this magazine in 2013 by the late Mark Kleiman .
Such systems combine frequent testing for drug use with transparent , pre-specified , and modest consequences ( for example , a single night in jail instead of a return to prison to serve out one ’ s term ) .
This approach also minimizes staff paperwork and delays when supervisors report an infraction to the judge .
Evidence shows that swift , certain , and fair systems reduce substance use , crime , and reincarceration among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look to these strategies as one solution to many of the problems that Hardy documents in his candid , engaging book .

The number of people on probation or parole in the United States is roughly double the number of people behind bars. Yet a quick search on Amazon reveals that the number of books about incarceration exceeds the number of books about probation by more than tenfold. That imbalance matters. If we don’t provide adequate services for probationers and parolees, we will fail to build on the recent trend of modest decarceration. Jason Hardy helps rectify this imbalance with The Second Chance Club, a thoughtful account of his work at the New Orleans Department of Probation and Parole (“P&P” in the local argot).
The Second Chance Club: Hardship and Hope after Prison by Jason Hardy, Simon & Schuster, 287 pp.
In his agreeably unpretentious style, Hardy introduces himself as a failed former public school teacher, failed former novelist, and currently failing JCPenney watch salesman, who aspires to a more meaningful and remunerative career. Disgusted by mass incarceration, he responds to an advertisement for a position at P&P, which he gets simply because the desperate agency assumes that he can leave his current job without giving two weeks’ notice. During training he learns that virtually everyone else, like himself, has already washed out from other occupations. Their instructors make it clear that the department is so short of officers they will bend over backward to make sure everyone passes the training course.
Hardy’s training requires him to memorize “obscure Louisiana statutes like Theft of an alligator” and provides hours of instruction on how to put on handcuffs and fire a gun. As his book later makes clear, his training did not provide him with the essentials of effective community supervision, such as skills in counseling and in navigating the social welfare bureaucracy, nor did it offer thorough knowledge of addiction and behavior change principles.
Despite their insufficient training, Hardy is surprised to discover that his fellow officers are generally dedicated and even, at times, idealistic. With admirable candor, he immediately surrenders any delusions of being a savior, recognizing that P&P’s challenges are not produced by the characteristics of its officers so much as the rules under which they work. These structural challenges become clear on Hardy’s first day at work, when he is handed 220 thick files on the people he is supposed to supervise. Absorbing so much information is daunting, supervising so many people even more so. His fellow officers tell him to triage, focusing his effort on the cases that pose the highest risk and have the greatest needs. This strategy relies on the assumption that the criminal justice system is consistently accurate in measuring risk. Hardy doesn’t question this assumption, but many social scientists would.
More barriers to success soon become evident. Hardy arrives at a time of transition in the department, when Louisiana—rhetorically, at least—is moving away from incarceration. What this means practically is letting slide many probation and parole infractions that once triggered harsh punishment. But it doesn’t mean that there is much more investment in services. Hardy puts his finger on the larger political challenge: “Nobody who mattered gave a shit about probation and parole.” The result is a system that in at least one sense has no bias: “P&P treated everyone equally—that is to say, poorly—because we didn’t have the resources to treat anybody well.”
Hardy also makes an astute point about political economy. Much of the public simultaneously resents the high cost of prisons yet also opposes spending on services for people under community supervision, considering them “goodies for baddies.” This is spectacularly shortsighted, because providing such services is critical for diverting some people from prison to probation and keeping paroled ex-prisoners from being reincarcerated.
Hardy also grapples with the system’s inability to impose consequences other than imprisonment for infractions. Fines are sometimes levied, but no one pays them, and no one is punished for not paying them. This leaves incarceration as the only way to deter violation of supervision conditions. And officers, he notes, are punished for responding to violations—it creates piles of paperwork, the need for court appearances, and then more paperwork. It’s easy for the supervisors and the supervised to fall into an implicit bargain: If you pretend you are a good supervisee, I will pretend that I’m a good officer.
Hardy and his fellow officers soldier on despite it all. The heart of the book is narratives about seven of the individuals he supervises. Their problems are manifold, the most consistent being poverty and addiction. Some of them are also exploitative of others and prone to violence, and many run with a rough crowd. As a white parole officer in a notoriously corrupt city where many black people are understandably suspicious of cops, Hardy realizes that he has to overcome his charges’ skepticism. He largely succeeds, through evident compassion toward the frequently difficult and sometimes dangerous people he is assigned to supervise.
Hardy struggles alongside his supervisees through the maddening process of finding psychiatric, vocational, educational, and addiction-related services. On multiple occasions, he finds that he can’t place someone in a treatment program until a physician diagnoses them with a mental health or addictive disorder, but the only way to do that is to admit the person to a treatment program in the first place. He rages and grieves, and the reader does so along with him; yet he also persists, facilitating a few victories that are an antidote to despair.
Failed novelist or not, Hardy has some literary gifts that enliven the book. His regional manager wears “a constant, nervous smile, as if he’d gotten good news but was holding off on believing until he saw the proof.” Hardy also takes breaks from the pain of his subjects’ lives by adding some amusing details, such as the deep affection some offenders have for cop shows. His supervisees root for TV cops, who tend to be more professional and honorable than the real-world cops they know. And they hate TV criminals, who are portrayed as sociopathic and thus, in their view, completely different than themselves, who are just trying to get by in an unfair world.
Hardy deserves credit for providing counterexamples to common liberal pieties about his work, including ones he previously espoused himself. He finds that, rather than being the exclusive purview of racist whites, tough-on-crime attitudes are prevalent among poor, black residents of neighborhoods with high crime rates. He also highlights examples where actual or threatened punishment has a positive impact. One woman struggling with addiction thanks him for sending her to jail after a relapse, because it helped her turn her life around. Another woman plans to get high but chooses not to because she realizes that she has a drug test coming up.
He is also candid about the fact that the social welfare programs he advocates, such as food stamps and Social Security, are often abused by scammers. Indeed, he observes sadly that bureaucratic rules around these programs are often easier for determined con artists to overcome than they are for the sick and the needy. A healthy, intelligent drug dealer can supplement his income by faking chronic pain, making all his doctor’s appointments, and filling out all of the required disability forms. Someone who is actually living in excruciating pain finds these same steps much more challenging.
These insights help compensate for the things that Hardy gets wrong. He relentlessly touts what the law professor John Pfaff calls the “standard story” of mass incarceration: that our large prison populations are a consequence of drug prohibition, which was designed to fill prisons with black people. This is not a criticism of Hardy in particular, as the standard story has been repeated in countless media stories, movies, and academic journal articles. In fact, drug offenders are only about one-sixth of U.S. prisoners, and if they were all released tomorrow the proportion of prisoners who are African American would go up rather than down. Further, the drug that drives by far the most crime, arrests, and incarceration is legal: alcohol. On that latter point, it is discouraging that everyone in Hardy’s department, including him, ignores heavy drinking by their supervisees, yet virtually all of them lecture their charges to avoid “drugs.”
Hardy’s analysis of the appeal of drug dealing to his supervisees and to low-income people more generally is partly false and partly true. He repeatedly describes drug dealing as lucrative, when careful research by Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter shows that it’s a boom-or-bust business; over a typical year, it pays less than a steady minimum-wage job. He’s on stronger ground when he points to the appeal of the lifestyle to some young men, particularly being feared and being attractive to young women.
But the strengths of the book shine through. The Second Chance Club illuminates the lives of people who provide and receive community supervision, and it lays out necessary structural changes. Hardy makes a powerful case that minimal funding for community supervision increases risks to those in the system and the people around them. This is bad enough in itself, but it is also penny-wise and pound-foolish. Many offenders end up back in prison, costing taxpayers even more than it would have to adequately fund parole and probation. That’s to say nothing of the human cost.
Hardy’s other critical point is that a system that relies exclusively on ignoring violations or handing out long prison terms will fail to change behavior, protect public safety, and provide justice. Finding an intermediate route for responding to violations is one of the central goals of the “swift, certain, and fair” approaches to community supervision that were described in this magazine in 2013 by the late Mark Kleiman. Such systems combine frequent testing for drug use with transparent, pre-specified, and modest consequences (for example, a single night in jail instead of a return to prison to serve out one’s term). This approach also minimizes staff paperwork and delays when supervisors report an infraction to the judge. Evidence shows that swift, certain, and fair systems reduce substance use, crime, and reincarceration among people on community supervision. Reformers should look to these strategies as one solution to many of the problems that Hardy documents in his candid, engaging book.