washingtonmonthly--2020-01-10--How Trump Threatens the Constitution

How Trump Threatens the Constitution

In the nearly three years Donald Trump has occupied the White House , he has been busily installing the Imperial Presidency that writers have been warning us about for a generation , precipitating a fundamental crisis going well beyond the question of whether he has engaged in bribery , abuse of power , obstruction of justice , or committed other “ high crimes and misdemeanors.
” The most serious offense committed by President Trump is notamong the crimes for which he was impeached .
Since taking office , he has been seizing powers for himself that are assigned exclusively to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Constitution .
These exclusive powers include taxing ; borrowing and spending ; carrying out acts of war ; regulating domestic and international commerce ; and others .
As he has infringed on these powers , Trump has greatly accelerated a trend that has been under way—but little noticed—for the past half century : the erosion of the checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches essential to the Constitutional structure .
The seizure of legislative authority by the Executive Branch has undermined the guardrails the founding fathers designed to protect us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hands of the Chief Executive .
That was the fundamental feature of the “ republic—if you can keep it ” established at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 Trump is the crest of a long-term trend , augmented in recent years by the bitter ideological deadlock that has gripped Washington for the past 30 years .
The question now is how do we stop and reverse this trend ?
The task belongs either to the voters this November , or more likely , to the biggest governmental losers , members of Congress .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ defend its Constitutional powers , who will ?
Trump has not been alone in accelerating this trend .
Hamstrung by the gridlock that left his legislative proposals “ dead on arrival ” after his first two years as president , Obama resorted increasingly in the following six years to executive orders to achieve his objectives .
Republicans objected that he was exceeding his powers , and some of Obama ’ s actions were successfully challenged in the courts .
But Obama ’ s appointees to key regulatory agencies continued to pursue policies he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the expertise of government regulatory bodies , many of those policies took effect .
Obama ’ s regulatory successes were short-lived , however .
Far more than most presidents of opposing parties , Trump has been eager to undo whatever Obama did .
Even though he enjoyed majority support in Congress in his first two years , Trump often chose to issue his own executive orders to reverse those signed by Obama .
( Republicans , who complained loudly about Obama ’ s executive orders , fell silent ) , and accomplished @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But he appointed leaders of numerous regulatory bodies and tasked them with modifying or abolishing rules put in place by their predecessors .
Several of Trump ’ s nominees were avowed enemies of the agencies they were chosen to head .
Alarmingly , a frequent feature of Trump ’ s presidency has been his increasing tendency to name political appointees as “ acting ” heads of departments and agencies after their predecessors depart .
As of this writing , the heads of the Office of Management and Budget , the Labor Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Director of National Intelligence are all serving in an acting capacity and were not confirmed by the Senate .
So , too , are the heads of at least half a dozen other important agencies .
In taking this approach , Trump has been able to avoid subjecting his chosen operatives to the Senate ’ s “ advise-and-consent ” authority .
What ’ s more , under GOP control , the Senate has been unwilling to reassert its prerogatives by setting a firm limit on the interim period during which “ acting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As a consequence , political appointees responsible for many governmental functions are answerable only to the White House .
Trump has likewise disregarded the power granted exclusively to the Legislative Branch to determine by law what funds “ shall be drawn from the treasury ” and for what purpose .
Violation of that provision is at the crux of one of the articles of impeachment dealing with the alleged “ bribery attempt ” of withholding funds Congress had appropriated for Ukrainian defense against Russian incursion .
Although it has received less attention , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Trump ’ s taking funds set aside for projects on U.S. military bases in the U.S. and Europe to instead build his promised wall on the Mexican border .
The latter action seems especially egregious in light of Congress ’ s explicit refusal on more than one occasion to approve construction of that wall .
Even more disconcerting , President Trump has instructed government officials to ignore subpoenas from committees of the House of Representatives requiring testimony and the production of data .
He has laid claim to “ absolute immunity ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and former members of his staff , and has instructed members of agencies outside the White House not to testify .
That behavior led to the other article of impeachment advanced in the House—obstruction of Congress .
While Trump has not quite resorted to blocking testimony on all subjects , he appears determined to prevent Congress from inquiring into any matter that might result in bad publicity , further proof of misconduct , or additional impeachment charges .
It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will rule on Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must testify before Congress and what information must be surrendered .
Congress has also all but lost its exclusive power “ to declare war.
” Over the last two decades , war and foreign policy have essentially become the sole province of the Executive Branch .
In authorizing the recent assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani , the administration chose to notify Russia , Israel , and Republican leaders in the House and Senate .
Notably , it excluded the bipartisan “ Gang of Eight.
” Since approving the Gulf of Tonkin resolution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War , and voting to invade Iraq based on highly questionable evidence presented by the Bush-Cheney administration , Congress has seemed willing to allow the Executive Branch to determine on its own if and when military conflict is justified .
Only now is it showing some spine after yesterday ’ s House vote on curbing Trump ’ s Iran war powers .
Both Republicans and Democrats have long complained about the use of Executive Orders to bypass the legislative process .
But Congress has failed to devise an effective method for delaying or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disagrees .
Until it does , the status quo will continue .
The political circumstances that have led to the Executive Branch overriding Congress have deep roots going back decades .
Since tracing those circumstances depends , to a certain extent , on personal experience , I hope readers will forgive my reliance on first-person narration .
I arrived in Washington in 1957 as a Congressional Fellow appointed by the American Political Science Association .
Dwight Eisenhower still had more than three years left in his second term as president .
Democrats controlled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the leadership of two formidable Texans : Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson .
Although I had acquired a graduate degree in political science and had studied American Government , I quickly learned that Congress behaved very differently than my college texts had led me to believe .
Our widely advertised “ two-party system ” had actually disguised the four-party system that ruled in the House and the Senate .
In effect , each of the two major parties were split amongst themselves into two warring tribes Both parties were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal and more conservative elements .
While some legislative matters might be decided on a partisan basis , majority support for successful bills had to be assembled among the four groupings across party lines .
The much-vaunted “ civility ” of the day was far from incidental .
It was an absolute necessity .
The nominal “ two-party system ” became an actual two-party system in the 1960s , following passage of the Civil Rights Act .
As the South began to support Republicans over Democrats , each of the parties took on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unacceptable to the newly dominant elements on both sides of the aisle , inviting challenges in party primaries .
Republican moderates retired in droves or were defeated in primaries by less-accommodating challengers or defeated in the general election by Democrats in purple , usually suburban districts .
In general elections , business-friendly Blue Dogs disappeared from the Democratic side .
Three decades later , Newt Gingrich greatly augmented this new dynamic .
Before he took over as Speaker in 1995 , Gingrich argued that tooth-and-nail attack was the secret to winning a Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his opponents—the “ politics of personal destruction , ” as it has been described—put an end to civility as the prevailing mode of interaction across party lines .
As a consequence , bitter partisanship has emerged as the dominant condition on Capitol Hill .
When the government is divided , as it is now , cooperation has become impossible .
On each side of the partisan divide , compromise has become a form of betrayal .
Under those constraints , Democrats and Republicans—from George W. Bush to Barack Obama to Donald Trump—have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress .
When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence in 1776 , he included a long list of “ injuries and usurpations ” that the British King , George III , had committed against the thirteen colonies to establish “ an absolute tyranny.
” Eleven years later , having experimented unsuccessfully with a Confederation , the thirteen liberated colonies sent delegates to Philadelphia to create a new form of government , unlike any previously seen .
The Constitution was a direct response to Jefferson ’ s Declaration .
It repudiated the British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent any future ruler from accumulating the arbitrary powers that the British King had exercised to the detriment of American colonists .
In short , it was a defense against tyranny .
Are Republicans in the House and Senate content to see that defense dismantled ?
Will the American public be satisfied if Donald Trump is acquitted on the impeachment charges , especially in a sham trial without witnesses ?
Would acquittal affirm the present-day reality that we are gradually enabling what the Founding Fathers labored to contain ?
Short answer : I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s long past time for U.S. Senate—the jurors in the forthcoming impeachment trial—to acquaint or reacquaint themselves with The Federalist Papers .
Alexander Hamilton dealt with the constitution ’ s critics in Articles 67-69 , arguing that the powers granted to the Executive Branch in Article II were republican in character , not monarchical in scope .
Monarchies of the 18th century , he wrote , recognized no limits on the powers of the king .
The only recourse ordinary people had was armed rebellion .
Instead , America would have the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a manner consistent with the rule of law : impeachment .
Impeachment , however , was not envisioned as the main defense against the chief executive ’ s over-accumulation of authority .
Articles 47 through 51 , written by James Madison , who is generally credited with being the principal author of the Constitution itself , explained the document ’ s reliance on separation of powers among the Legislative , Executive , and Judicial branches .
The primary assumption was that excesses by one branch would be resisted by the other two .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ expectation that the Senate and the House would often find it necessary to resist each other .
Anyone who has witnessed one of the annual budget battles between the two bodies knows that expectation is consistently fulfilled .
That leaves us to reflect on these four facts : First , the American Revolution , as the Declaration of Independence affirms in detail , was precipitated by the tyrannies of the British king ; second , preventing tyrannical government was a primary objective of the Constitution written in 1787 and approved in 1789 ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each of the three branches of government to resist the excesses of the others ; and fourth , keeping the Republic intact is an unfinished task that must be undertaken by every generation of Americans , not least this generation and its representatives in Congress .

In the nearly three years Donald Trump has occupied the White House, he has been busily installing the Imperial Presidency that writers have been warning us about for a generation, precipitating a fundamental crisis going well beyond the question of whether he has engaged in bribery, abuse of power, obstruction of justice, or committed other “high crimes and misdemeanors.” The most serious offense committed by President Trump is not among the crimes for which he was impeached.
Since taking office, he has been seizing powers for himself that are assigned exclusively to the Legislative Branch under Article I of the Constitution. These exclusive powers include taxing; borrowing and spending; carrying out acts of war; regulating domestic and international commerce; and others. As he has infringed on these powers, Trump has greatly accelerated a trend that has been underway—but little noticed—for the past half-century: the erosion of the checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches essential to the Constitutional structure.
The seizure of legislative authority by the Executive Branch has undermined the guardrails the founding fathers designed to protect us from the accumulation of tyrannical authority in the hands of the Chief Executive. That was the fundamental feature of the “republic—if you can keep it” established at the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
Trump is the crest of a long-term trend, augmented in recent years by the bitter ideological deadlock that has gripped Washington for the past 30 years. The question now is: how do we stop and reverse this trend? The task belongs either to the voters this November, or more likely, to the biggest governmental losers, members of Congress. After all, if Congress fails to defend its Constitutional powers, who will?
Trump has not been alone in accelerating this trend. Hamstrung by the gridlock that left his legislative proposals “dead on arrival” after his first two years as president, Obama resorted increasingly in the following six years to executive orders to achieve his objectives. Republicans objected that he was exceeding his powers, and some of Obama’s actions were successfully challenged in the courts. But Obama’s appointees to key regulatory agencies continued to pursue policies he supported. Given the deference long afforded to the expertise of government regulatory bodies, many of those policies took effect.
Obama’s regulatory successes were short-lived, however. Far more than most presidents of opposing parties, Trump has been eager to undo whatever Obama did. Even though he enjoyed majority support in Congress in his first two years, Trump often chose to issue his own executive orders to reverse those signed by Obama (Republicans, who complained loudly about Obama’s executive orders, fell silent), and accomplished very little of this regulatory agenda legislatively. But Trump appointed leaders of numerous regulatory bodies and tasked them with modifying or abolishing rules put in place by their predecessors. Several of Trump’s nominees were avowed enemies of the agencies they were chosen to head.
Alarmingly, a frequent feature of Trump’s presidency has been his increasing tendency to name political appointees as “acting” heads of departments and agencies after their predecessors depart. As of this writing, the heads of the Office of Management and Budget, the Labor Department, the Homeland Security Department, and the Director of National Intelligence are all serving in an acting capacity and were not confirmed by the Senate. So, too, are the heads of at least half a dozen other important agencies. In taking this approach, Trump has been able to avoid subjecting his chosen operatives to the Senate’s “advise-and-consent” authority.
What’s more, under GOP control, the Senate has been unwilling to reassert its prerogatives by setting a firm limit on the interim period during which “acting chiefs” can continue to serve. As a consequence, political appointees responsible for many governmental functions are answerable only to the White House.
Trump has likewise disregarded the power granted exclusively to the Legislative Branch to determine by law what funds “shall be drawn from the treasury” and for what purpose. Violation of that provision is at the crux of one of the articles of impeachment dealing with the alleged “bribery attempt” of withholding funds Congress had appropriated for Ukrainian defense against Russian incursion.
Although it has received less attention, the same idea also applies in principle to Trump’s taking funds set aside for projects on U.S. military bases in the U.S. and Europe to instead build his promised wall on the Mexican border. The latter action seems especially egregious in light of Congress’s explicit refusal on more than one occasion to approve construction of that wall.
Even more disconcerting, President Trump has instructed government officials to ignore subpoenas from committees of the House of Representatives requiring testimony and the production of data. He has laid claim to “absolute immunity” for himself as well as for present and former members of his staff and has instructed members of agencies outside the White House not to testify. That behavior led to the other article of impeachment advanced in the House—obstruction of Congress.
While Trump has not quite resorted to blocking testimony on all subjects, he appears determined to prevent Congress from inquiring into any matter that might result in bad publicity, further proof of misconduct, or additional impeachment charges. It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will rule on Trump’s assertion of unlimited authority to determine who must testify before Congress and what information must be surrendered.
Congress has also all but lost its exclusive power “to declare war.” Over the last two decades, war and foreign policy have essentially become the sole province of the Executive Branch. In authorizing the recent assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, the administration chose to notify Russia, Israel, and Republican leaders in the House and Senate. Notably, it excluded the bipartisan “Gang of Eight.”
Since approving the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which greatly expanded the ill-starred Vietnam War, and voting to invade Iraq based on highly questionable evidence presented by the Bush-Cheney administration, Congress has seemed willing to allow the Executive Branch to determine on its own if and when military conflict is justified. Only now is it showing some spine after yesterday’s House vote on curbing Trump’s Iran war powers.
Both Republicans and Democrats have long complained about the use of Executive Orders to bypass the legislative process. But Congress has failed to devise an effective method for delaying or cancelling implementation of orders with which it disagrees. Until it does, the status quo will continue.
The political circumstances that have led to the Executive Branch overriding Congress have deep roots going back decades. Since tracing those circumstances depends, to a certain extent, on personal experience, I hope readers will forgive my reliance on first-person narration.
I arrived in Washington in 1957 as a Congressional Fellow appointed by the American Political Science Association. Dwight Eisenhower still had more than three years left in his second term as president. Democrats controlled both the House and the Senate under the leadership of two formidable Texans: Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson.
Although I had acquired a graduate degree in political science and had studied American Government, I quickly learned that Congress behaved very differently than my college texts had led me to believe. Our widely advertised “two-party system” had actually disguised the four-party system that ruled in the House and the Senate. In effect, each of the two major parties were split amongst themselves into two warring tribes.
Both parties were, in reality, coalitions of more liberal and more conservative elements. While some legislative matters might be decided on a partisan basis, majority support for successful bills had to be assembled among the four groupings across party lines. The much-vaunted “civility” of the day was far from incidental. It was an absolute necessity.
The nominal “two-party system” became an actual two-party system in the 1960s, following passage of the Civil Rights Act. As the South began to support Republicans over Democrats, each of the parties took on a distinctly ideological complexion. Moderation became unacceptable to the newly dominant elements on both sides of the aisle, inviting challenges in party primaries. Republican moderates retired in droves or were defeated in primaries by less-accommodating challengers or in the general election by Democrats in purple, usually suburban districts. In general elections, business-friendly Blue Dogs disappeared from the Democratic side.
Three decades later, Newt Gingrich greatly augmented this new dynamic. Before he took over as Speaker in 1995, Gingrich argued that tooth-and-nail attack was the secret to winning a Republican majority. His assault on the integrity of his opponents—the “politics of personal destruction,” as it has been described—put an end to civility as the prevailing mode of interaction across party lines.
As a consequence, bitter partisanship has emerged as the dominant condition on Capitol Hill. When the government is divided, as it is now, cooperation has become impossible. On each side of the partisan divide, compromise has become a form of betrayal. Under those constraints, Democrats and Republicans—from George W. Bush to Barack Obama to Donald Trump—have taken measures like those discussed to circumvent Congress.
When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence in 1776, he included a long list of “injuries and usurpations” that the British King, George III, had committed against the thirteen colonies to establish “an absolute tyranny.” Eleven years later, having experimented unsuccessfully with a Confederation, the thirteen liberated colonies sent delegates to Philadelphia to create a new form of government, unlike any previously seen.
The Constitution was a direct response to Jefferson’s Declaration. It repudiated the British model. The clear objective was to prevent any future ruler from accumulating the arbitrary powers that the British King had exercised to the detriment of American colonists. In short, it was a defense against tyranny.
Are Republicans in the House and Senate content to see that defense dismantled? Will the American public be satisfied if Donald Trump is acquitted on the impeachment charges, especially in a sham trial without witnesses? Would acquittal affirm the present-day reality that we are gradually enabling what the Founding Fathers labored to contain?
Short answer: I don’t know. But it’s long past time for the U.S. Senate—the jurors in the forthcoming impeachment trial—to acquaint or reacquaint themselves with The Federalist Papers.
Alexander Hamilton dealt with the constitution’s critics in Articles 67-69, arguing that the powers granted to the Executive Branch in Article II were republican in character, not monarchical in scope. Monarchies of the 18th century, he wrote, recognized no limits on the powers of the king. The only recourse ordinary people had was armed rebellion. Instead, America would have the power to remove a tyrannical President in a manner consistent with the rule of law: impeachment.
Impeachment, however, was not envisioned as the main defense against the chief executive’s over-accumulation of authority. Articles 47 through 51, written by James Madison, who is generally credited with being the principal author of the Constitution itself, explained the document’s reliance on separation of powers among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches. The primary assumption was that excesses by one branch would be resisted by the other two. Madison extended the assumption to include the expectation that the Senate and the House would often find it necessary to resist each other. Anyone who has witnessed one of the annual budget battles between the two bodies knows that expectation is consistently fulfilled.
That leaves us to reflect on these four facts: First, the American Revolution, as the Declaration of Independence affirms in detail, was precipitated by the tyrannies of the British king; second, preventing tyrannical government was a primary objective of the Constitution written in 1787 and approved in 1789; third, it is the obligation of each of the three branches of government to resist the excesses of the others; and fourth, keeping the Republic intact is an unfinished task that must be undertaken by every generation of Americans, not least this generation and its representatives in Congress.


washingtonmonthly--2020-01-10--Is Virginia Headed for a New Charlottesville?

Lois Beckett has an article in The Guardian on the growing backlash against the prospect of Virginia ’ s state legislature passing gun violence legislation this year .
Apparently , opponents of gun control are surprising people , including their own organizational leaders , with the size and breadth of their activism .
The forcefulness of Virginia ’ s second-amendment movement has taken even longtime organizers by surprise .
Government meetings across the state that typically attract a few dozen people have seen overflowing crowds of hundreds or even thousands showing up to protest against new gun laws… … Still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and towns across Virginia have passed some version of a second amendment sanctuary resolution since November , according to the Virginia Citizens Defense League .
Just this week , the city council in Virginia Beach , the site of a major mass shooting last May , became one of the latest local governments to pass a resolution pledging to support citizens ’ gun rights .
“ I ’ ve never seen anything like this in the second amendment movement , ” echoed Cam Edwards , a Virginia resident and former NRA TV host @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a pro-gun website .
The closest political analogy would be the Tea Party , he said , “ but this movement is centered around a single issue.
” These sanctuary resolutions are pledges by local governments that they won ’ t enforce state law .
The movement is reportedly being led less by the NRA than by the more radical Virginia Citizens Defense League and its president Philip Van Cleave : Van Cleave sounded almost breathless in a mid-December interview as he described being overwhelmed with emails , phone calls , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ VCDL ’ s membership to double over the course of that month , from 8000 to 16,000 members .
“ I ’ m telling you , people that have never committed a crime , that are law-abiding , and pay their taxes , do everything right , don ’ t even have a speeding ticket , are saying , ‘ I ’ m not giving up my guns , ’ ” Van Cleave said .
The group has organized a rally in Richmond for January 20 , which is also Martin Luther King @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attracting out-of-state pro-gun folks , including a potential horde of white nationalists .
They ’ re being mobilized by the usual suspects : The movement is already steeped in bad information and conspiracy theories , and they ’ ve locked on Michael Bloomberg and his Judaism as a rallying cry .
White supremacist “ accelerationists ” have seized on the standoff as the potential beginning of a civil war that will destroy the United States and allow them to build a white nation in its ruins , according to Alex Friedfeld , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The story they ’ re telling is that the Jews and immigrants are responsible for turning Virginia blue , and they ’ re coming to take your guns , ” Friedfeld said .
( Michael Bloomberg , the billionaire philanthropist and presidential candidate , is Jewish , and the gun violence prevention advocacy group he founded touted an investment of $ 2.5 million in Virginia ’ s 2019 elections to back local lawmakers who support gun control . )
To white supremacists , Virginia looks like a perfect example of their ideology : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You ’ ve got what they ’ re calling Jewish gun grabbers , and the people rising up , saying the government is illegitimate.
” The prospect of a possible repeat of the violence we saw in 2017 in Charlottesville has local and state officials concerned .
So far , Ralph Northam , the state ’ s Democratic governor , has said that plans to pass new gun violence prevention laws will move forward despite the public backlash .
“ Everyone needs to work to turn the rhetoric down – at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about keeping people safe , ” Alena Yarmosky , a spokesperson for the governor , said .
The January 20 rally in the capital will be a challenge for law enforcement , especially because many of the protestors are actively yearning for a civil war that will destroy the country and allow them to set up a new nation based on white supremacy and anti-Semitism .
Apparently , even many people within the gun rights movement are concerned and are working to prevent people from openly bringing weapons to the rally .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump rooting them on , the “ good people ” who will descend on Richmond on January 20 may feel like they have approval to light a spark .

Lois Beckett has an article in The Guardian on the growing backlash against the prospect of Virginia’s state legislature passing gun violence legislation this year. Apparently, opponents of gun control are surprising people, including their own organizational leaders, with the size and breadth of their activism.
The forcefulness of Virginia’s second-amendment movement has taken even longtime organizers by surprise. Government meetings across the state that typically attract a few dozen people have seen overflowing crowds of hundreds or even thousands showing up to protest against new gun laws… … Still, at least 125 counties, cities and towns across Virginia have passed some version of a second amendment sanctuary resolution since November, according to the Virginia Citizens Defense League. Just this week, the city council in Virginia Beach, the site of a major mass shooting last May, became one of the latest local governments to pass a resolution pledging to support citizens’ gun rights. “I’ve never seen anything like this in the second amendment movement,” echoed Cam Edwards, a Virginia resident and former NRA TV host, and the editor of Bearing Arms, a pro-gun website. The closest political analogy would be the Tea Party, he said, “but this movement is centered around a single issue.”
These sanctuary resolutions are pledges by local governments that they won’t enforce state law. The movement is reportedly being led less by the NRA than by the more radical Virginia Citizens Defense League and its president Philip Van Cleave:
Van Cleave sounded almost breathless in a mid-December interview as he described being overwhelmed with emails, phone calls, and membership requests. He said he expected VCDL’s membership to double over the course of that month, from 8000 to 16,000 members. “I’m telling you, people that have never committed a crime, that are law-abiding, and pay their taxes, do everything right, don’t even have a speeding ticket, are saying, ‘I’m not giving up my guns,’” Van Cleave said.
The group has organized a rally in Richmond for January 20, which is also Martin Luther King Jr. Day. The event is already attracting out-of-state pro-gun folks, including a potential horde of white nationalists.
White supremacist and anti-government groups are gravitating towards the standoff over gun rights in Virginia because they see it as a opportunity for radicalization and recruitment, said Daryl Johnson, a former lead analyst for domestic terrorism at the Department of Homeland Security.
They’re being mobilized by the usual suspects:
Virginia’s gun rights battle is already being covered widely in conservative media outlets. Donald Trump and the rightwing Arizona congressman Paul Gosar shared articles about it on Twitter. The Fox News host Tucker Carlson talked to a guest on his show about fears that local law enforcement in Virginia would be sent in to confiscate citizens’ guns. Carlson blamed the left for “trying to pick a fight, like a real fight, with rural Virginia”.
The movement is already steeped in bad information and conspiracy theories, and they’ve locked on Michael Bloomberg and his Judaism as a rallying cry.
White supremacist “accelerationists” have seized on the standoff as the potential beginning of a civil war that will destroy the United States and allow them to build a white nation in its ruins, according to Alex Friedfeld, a researcher at the Anti-Defamation League. “The story they’re telling is that the Jews and immigrants are responsible for turning Virginia blue, and they’re coming to take your guns,” Friedfeld said. (Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire philanthropist and presidential candidate, is Jewish, and the gun violence prevention advocacy group he founded touted an investment of $2.5 million in Virginia’s 2019 elections to back local lawmakers who support gun control.) To white supremacists, Virginia looks like a perfect example of their ideology: “You’ve got white replacement. You’ve got what they’re calling Jewish gun grabbers, and the people rising up, saying the government is illegitimate.”
The prospect of a possible repeat of the violence we saw in 2017 in Charlottesville has local and state officials concerned.
So far, Ralph Northam, the state’s Democratic governor, has said that plans to pass new gun violence prevention laws will move forward despite the public backlash. “Everyone needs to work to turn the rhetoric down – at the end of the day, this is about keeping people safe,” Alena Yarmosky, a spokesperson for the governor, said.
The January 20 rally in the capital will be a challenge for law enforcement, especially because many of the protestors are actively yearning for a civil war that will destroy the country and allow them to set up a new nation based on white supremacy and anti-Semitism.
Apparently, even many people within the gun rights movement are concerned and are working to prevent people from openly bringing weapons to the rally. But with leaders like Tucker Carlson and Donald Trump rooting them on, the “good people” who will descend on Richmond on January 20 may feel like they have approval to light a spark.


washingtonmonthly--2020-01-10--What Are the Prospects For a Nuclear-Armed Iran?

Back in 2012 , as negotiations were just beginning with Iran , President Obama outlined why it was important to stop the country from developing nuclear weapons .
The president also said that Tehran ’ s nuclear program would represent a “ profound ” national-security threat to the United States even if Israel were not a target of Iran ’ s violent rhetoric , and he dismissed the argument that the United States could successfully contain a nuclear Iran .
“ You ’ re talking about the most volatile region in the world , ” he said .
“ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon .
Iran is known to sponsor terrorist organizations , so the threat of proliferation becomes that much more severe.
” He went on to say , “ The dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think would be very dangerous for the world.
” Obama also pointed out that “ the only way historically that a country has ultimately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [ nuclear weapons ] off the table.
” In other words , diplomacy has been more effective than military intervention .
Even as his entire national security team told Trump that the agreement that was ultimately reached with Iran was working , he withdrew the U.S. from the accord and proceeded to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran—eventually leading to the administration ’ s strategy of maximum pressure .
After the assassination of Soleimani , Iran announced that it would no longer abide by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will continue to allow inspections .
The situation we now face is that , according to French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian , Iran could have nuclear weapons in one to two years .
That is what prompted European Union foreign ministers to call for a rare emergency meeting on Friday afternoon .
“ Iran ’ s desire to prevent the crisis from escalating has bought us some time , it has the effect of cooling this down just a little , ” a senior EU diplomat told Reuters news agency .
Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ latest situation in the region from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at Friday ’ s meeting .
On Monday , EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell tweeted his regret at Iran ’ s decision to step away from more aspects of the nuclear deal , which , he said , was “ now more important than ever ” .
It appears that any diplomatic efforts to halt Iran ’ s development of nuclear weapons will fall to the European Union .
That ’ s because , as we have seen from members of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy with the Christian Zionists , their goal is to inflame a war with Iran .
Similarly , Republican war hawks like Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton view war with Iran as a means of accomplishing regime change .
The pretext for both of those groups will be that we must stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons .
As we saw when they attacked the agreement reached by the Obama administration , diplomacy threatens the goals that they want to achieve .
If the diplomatic efforts of the European Union fail to stop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Donald Trump ’ s presidency would have led us to the brink of two completely unacceptable options : • A nuclear arms race in the Middle East , or For all of the ways that the president has damaged this country both at home and abroad , his decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement might be the most consequential .

Back in 2012, as negotiations were just beginning with Iran, President Obama outlined why it was important to stop the country from developing nuclear weapons.
The president also said that Tehran’s nuclear program would represent a “profound” national-security threat to the United States even if Israel were not a target of Iran’s violent rhetoric, and he dismissed the argument that the United States could successfully contain a nuclear Iran. “You’re talking about the most volatile region in the world,” he said. “It will not be tolerable to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon. Iran is known to sponsor terrorist organizations, so the threat of proliferation becomes that much more severe.” He went on to say, “The dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think would be very dangerous for the world.”
Obama also pointed out that “the only way historically that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table.” In other words, diplomacy has been more effective than military intervention.
Even as his entire national security team told Trump that the agreement that was ultimately reached with Iran was working, he withdrew the U.S. from the accord and proceeded to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran—eventually leading to the administration’s strategy of maximum pressure. After the assassination of Soleimani, Iran announced that it would no longer abide by the limits of the agreement, although they will continue to allow inspections.
The situation we now face is that, according to French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, Iran could have nuclear weapons in one to two years. That is what prompted European Union foreign ministers to call for a rare emergency meeting on Friday afternoon.
“Iran’s desire to prevent the crisis from escalating has bought us some time, it has the effect of cooling this down just a little,” a senior EU diplomat told Reuters news agency. Foreign ministers will receive a briefing on the latest situation in the region from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at Friday’s meeting. On Monday, EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell tweeted his regret at Iran’s decision to step away from more aspects of the nuclear deal, which, he said, was “now more important than ever”.
It appears that any diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s development of nuclear weapons will fall to the European Union. That’s because, as we have seen from members of the Trump administration who are aligning our foreign policy with the Christian Zionists, their goal is to inflame a war with Iran. Similarly, Republican war hawks like Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton view war with Iran as a means of accomplishing regime change. The pretext for both of those groups will be that we must stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. As we saw when they attacked the agreement reached by the Obama administration, diplomacy threatens the goals that they want to achieve.
If the diplomatic efforts of the European Union fail to stop Iran from restarting their nuclear weapons program, Donald Trump’s presidency would have led us to the brink of two completely unacceptable options:
A nuclear arms race in the Middle East, or A forever war with Iran
For all of the ways that the president has damaged this country both at home and abroad, his decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement might be the most consequential.


washingtonmonthly--2020-01-11--Get Rid of the Presidential Pardon

Get Rid of the Presidential Pardon

It is time for America to end the unilateral pardon power of the president .
Donald Trump has abused the pardon power granted him in Article II , Section 2 of the Constitution .
He threatens to do so much more boldly in the years to come , as convicted associates have been lobbying him for pardons .
Trump has erased criminal penalties for ideologically allied individuals like former sheriff Joseph Arpaio and far-right pundit Dinesh D ’ Souza .
For apparent point-scoring with his base , he has also pardoned Navy SEAL Edward Gallagher , reversing the results of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gallagher ’ s own peers in the military decide that he had violated the UCMJ .
These unilateral actions don ’ t just undermine fairness .
They invite a range of future crimes , ranging from reckless and racist law enforcement ( Arpaio ) , to fleeing justice and tax fraud ( Rich ) , to wanton military atrocity in defiance of the chain of command ( Gallagher ) .
As the Post ’ s Colbert King recently predicted , there is now a good chance Trump will use the pardon to reverse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his associates , ranging from Gen. Michael Flynn to Paul Manafort and Roger Stone .
( Restricting the pardon power during impeachment investigations , as some have argued , wouldn ’ t address these and the vast majority of other pardons , which were separate from the impeachment investigation . )
The president can summarily undo the results of painstaking investigations and , not least , the unanimous decisions of juries .
Because federal investigations ( including congressional subpoenas ) depend upon the threat of penalty for non-compliance , perjury or obstruction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidential and administrative oversight can , in theory , be undone by abusive pardons .
Any attempt to reform the pardon power has to confront two realities in tension .
First , the pardon power as currently constructed threatens to undermine separation of powers and enable vast corruption .
If the president directs others to do all of his wrongdoing and then promises ( ahead of time or after the fact ) to pardon those involved , he can thwart legitimate investigations .
Impeachment , conviction and removal are no bulwark against this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the supermajorities required for Senate conviction will not materialize unless the president loses an appreciable chunk of his legislative allies .
Second , pardons and commutations can serve good and humane purposes .
Particularly in the present era of mass incarceration—a scourge that afflicts people of color and the poor at a far higher rate than white and wealthier Americans – commutation in particular can help redress structural and individual injustices .
Oklahoma ’ s recent commutation of 527 criminal sentences is , one hopes , just the beginning of a wider trend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Oklahoma ( currently dominated by Republicans ) , it shows the promise of cross-partisan , multi-branch approaches to criminal justice .
I propose a simple constitutional reform that would preserve the federal government ’ s ability to pardon but would take it out of the hands of the president .
Anyone ( including the president ) could propose a slate of individuals to be pardoned , and that slate would then require two-thirds approval by both the House and the Senate to take effect .
We could add a commission to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slate to the Congress , but the ultimate say would rest with congressional supermajorities .
That ’ s basically it Pardons have been used by monarchs since the European Middle Ages , when subjects often petitioned the king for pardon .
That executive history of the pardon is one reason why the federal Constitution and many state constitutions leave pardon power in the hands of the chief executive .
Yet we are now in a world where this power can be too readily abused , in part to obstruct anticorruption efforts , legislative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clinton ’ s pardon of the financier Marc Rich—who had previously donated to his campaign—shows that Republicans do not have a monopoly on this abuse .
My proposal accords with historical and contemporary practice .
In modern-day state governments and in European history , actors other than kings and governors have accorded grace and mercy to their subjects .
In medieval and early-modern England and France , subjects petitioned collective bodies ( the House of Lords , or the Parliament of Paris ) for their mercy .
Oklahoma ’ s commutation measure followed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also from a bipartisan statute to retroactively apply that measure .
The U.S. Constitution is notoriously difficult to amend , requiring supermajorities in each chamber of Congress and then ratification by three-quarters of state legislatures .
Yet a president who actively campaigned for pardon reform could construct powerful arguments for the plan .
“ I will take this power away from myself and every successor and return it to the people acting in consensus , ” a candidate could say , promising to shackle the designs of a future would-be autocrat .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the power would be taken away from future Democrats as well as himself , and vice versa .
The pardon measures that passed under a reform system might , to be sure , embed troublesome compromises .
Perhaps a Roger Stone would be pardoned along with a Marc Rich in a cross-partisan deal .
Yet a system with such problems would be far superior to the one we have now .
First , the people responsible for voting for the pardon would , unlike a second-term president , stand for re-election .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ votes .
Second , a supermajority bipartisan pardon would prevent a single president from abusing the pardon .
The specter of president using the pardon power to quash or hinder investigations into their own wrongdoing , or that of their allies , would materialize only if that president ’ s party had a supermajority in both chambers of Congress .
If a future corrupt president had any such supermajority , then America would be facing much bigger problems than the pardon alone .
If Oklahoma can grant mercy by democratic consensus and separate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the federal government .
A plan to reform the pardon should preserve the compassion that our institutions allow while removing the abusive monopoly that presidents have over them .

It is time for America to end the unilateral pardon power of the president. Donald Trump has abused the pardon power granted him in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. He threatens to do so much more boldly in the years to come, as convicted associates have been lobbying him for pardons. Trump has erased criminal penalties for ideologically allied individuals like former sheriff Joseph Arpaio and far-right pundit Dinesh D’Souza. For apparent point-scoring with his base, he has also pardoned Navy SEAL Edward Gallagher, reversing the results of a rigorous military justice process that saw Gallagher’s own peers in the military decide that he had violated the UCMJ.
These unilateral actions don’t just undermine fairness. They invite a range of future crimes, ranging from reckless and racist law enforcement (Arpaio), to fleeing justice and tax fraud (President Clinton’s pardon of financier Marc Rich), to wanton military atrocity in defiance of the chain of command (Gallagher). As the Post’s Colbert King recently predicted, there is now a good chance Trump will use the pardon to reverse legitimate criminal investigations, indictments and convictions of his associates, ranging from Gen. Michael Flynn to Paul Manafort and Roger Stone. (Restricting the pardon power during impeachment investigations, as some have argued, wouldn’t address these and the vast majority of other pardons, which were separate from the impeachment investigation.) The president can summarily undo the results of painstaking investigations and, not least, the unanimous decisions of juries. Because federal investigations (including congressional subpoenas) depend upon the threat of penalty for non-compliance, perjury or obstruction of justice, the entire architecture of presidential and administrative oversight can, in theory, be undone by abusive pardons.
Any attempt to reform the pardon power has to confront two realities in tension. First, the pardon power as currently constructed threatens to undermine the separation of powers and enable vast corruption. If the president directs others to do all of his wrongdoing and then promises (ahead of time or after the fact) to pardon those involved, he can thwart legitimate investigations. Impeachment, conviction, and removal are no bulwark against this threat. In a polarized world, the supermajorities required for Senate conviction will not materialize unless the president loses an appreciable chunk of his legislative allies.
Second, pardons and commutations can serve good and humane purposes. Particularly in the present era of mass incarceration—a scourge that afflicts people of color and the poor at a far higher rate than white and wealthier Americans – commutation in particular can help redress structural and individual injustices. Oklahoma’s recent commutation of 527 criminal sentences is, one hopes, just the beginning of a wider trend, but coming from a conservative state like Oklahoma (currently dominated by Republicans), it shows the promise of cross-partisan, multi-branch approaches to criminal justice.
I propose a simple constitutional reform that would preserve the federal government’s ability to pardon but would take it out of the hands of the president. Anyone (including the president) could propose a slate of individuals to be pardoned, and that slate would then require two-thirds approval by both the House and the Senate to take effect. We could add a commission to the front end that investigates pardon-deserving individuals and propose a slate to the Congress, but the ultimate say would rest with congressional supermajorities. That’s basically it.
Pardons have been used by monarchs since the European Middle Ages, when subjects often petitioned the king for mercy. That executive history of the pardon is one reason why the federal Constitution and many state constitutions leave pardon power in the hands of the chief executive. Yet we are now in a world where this power can be too readily abused, in part to obstruct anticorruption efforts, legislative oversight, and judicial functioning. Clinton’s pardon of the financier Marc Rich—who had previously donated to his campaign—shows that Republicans do not have a monopoly on this abuse.
My proposal accords with historical and contemporary practice. In modern-day state governments and in European history, actors other than kings and governors have accorded grace and mercy to their subjects. In medieval and early-modern England and France, subjects petitioned collective bodies (the English Parliament, or the French Chambre des Requêtes) for their mercy. Oklahoma’s commutation measure followed from a voter-approved ballot initiative, but also from a bipartisan statute to retroactively apply that measure.
The U.S. Constitution is notoriously difficult to amend, requiring supermajorities in each chamber of Congress and then ratification by three-quarters of state legislatures. Yet a president who actively campaigned for pardon reform could construct powerful arguments for the plan. “I will take this power away from myself and every successor and return it to the people acting in consensus,” a candidate could say, promising to shackle the designs of a future would-be autocrat. A future Republican candidate could remind voters that the power would be taken away from future Democrats as well as himself, and vice versa.
The pardon measures that passed under a reform system might, to be sure, embed troublesome compromises. Perhaps a Roger Stone would be pardoned along with a Marc Rich in a cross-partisan deal. Yet a system with such problems would be far superior to the one we have now. First, the people responsible for voting for the pardon would, unlike a second-term president, stand for re-election. They would be held electorally accountable for their votes. Second, a supermajority bipartisan pardon would prevent a single president from abusing the pardon. The specter of president using the pardon power to quash or hinder investigations into their own wrongdoing, or that of their allies, would materialize only if that president’s party had a supermajority in both chambers of Congress. If a future corrupt president had any such supermajority, then America would be facing much bigger problems than the pardon alone.
If Oklahoma can grant mercy by democratic consensus and separate pardons from the executive, so can the federal government. A plan to reform the pardon should preserve the compassion that our institutions allow while removing the abusive monopoly that presidents have over them.