washingtonmonthly--2020-02-01--They Know Trump Did It. They Just Don’t Care.

So it has come to this , as we all knew it would .
Republicans in the Senate have decided to hold a sham trial without witnesses or evidence .
It ’ s not because they don ’ t want to hear the truth , it ’ s because they already know the truth .
They know the president is guilty , and they simply don ’ t care .
The few GOP senators who pretended at a conscience toward the end have predictably decided to throw in their lot with the majority of their conservative colleagues cravenly engaging in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pretending to be deeply offended at the suggestion that that is exactly what they are doing .
And why ?
Because they fear the wrath of Trump ’ s base and his twitter feed more than they fear the voters or the judgment of history .
And because they simply don ’ t care .
The House impeachment managers put on a masterful legal display , embarrassing Trump ’ s lawyers at every turn .
It was an impressive feat blunted only by the fact that the case was so easy to make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its face .
He obstructed every witness , document and request–not something that innocent people do .
His legal defense attempted to use this obstruction of direct witness testimony to claim that the only confirmations of his guilt came not from hearsay .
And then former National Security Advisor John Bolton blew that defense out of the water via media reports .
The case , then was open and shut .
The key question at hand was simply whether the Senate wished to hear under oath what former National Security Adviser Bolton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was directly responsible for attempting to bribe and extort the leaders of a foreign nation to help him smear a domestic political opponent .
They decided not to.Again , this was not because they doubted Bolton was telling the truth , but rather because they knew he was .
Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski decided to take cover behind baseless attacks on the House impeachment process—as if the fact that Republicans in the House were also too cowardly to hold the president accountable had any bearing on the truth of the charges , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to obstruct and delay the inquiry by challenging all witness and document requests somehow rendered illegitimate the House ’ s decision by moving forward with the damning evidence they had .
But it was Senator Lamar Alexander ’ s reasoning that was most instructive : Mr. Alexander could easily have gone the other way .
He is retiring from the Senate and free to vote as he pleases without political consequences .
And he said in the interview that Mr. Trump had done exactly what Democrats had accused him of doing : He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country to investigate his political rival — a move he could not condone .
“ I think he did something that was clearly inappropriate , ” Mr. Alexander said .
“ I think it is inappropriate for the president to ask the leader of a foreign nation to investigate a leading political rival , which the president says he did .
I think it is inappropriate at least in part to withhold aid to encourage that investigation.
” “ But that is not treason , that is not bribery , that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he added , listing the criteria enumerated in the Constitution for impeachable offenses .
Senator Alexander also said some fatuous nonsense about how awful it would be to remove a president in the middle of an election year , ignoring the fact that the question at hand was about hearing from witnesses , not about removing Trump just yet .
At the same time , he was ignoring the fact that such logic would give a president imperial abuse of power privileges during an entire quarter of his term .
But here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : the fact that Senator Alexander chose not only to not convict Trump for having doing the dirty deed , but to refuse to even hear direct witness to the fact that he did it .
He simply didn ’ t care , and neither did the rest of the Republicans in the Senate ( except for Mitt Romney and Susan Collins , who in no way get a pass for their vote since they did nothing to persuade others to take a stand for justice and democracy ) .
But the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president has risen steadily in polling as the public hears and understands more about what the president did .
Support for hearing from witnesses exceeds 70 percent in nearly all polling .
The majority of the public understands that Trump committed a terrible abuse of power .
The ones still on the fence want to hear more from those in a position to know .
By refusing to hear witnesses , Republicans in the Senate have illegitimized their own trial process .
This , in turn , will only encourage the House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their own .
The embarrassments for the president will not stop .
More revelations will certainly come out .
The only thing Republicans can hope for now is that the public will simply stop caring .
That ’ s a dangerous bet .
The country isn ’ t quite that apathetic about abuses of power , nor as desperate as Republican Senators to overlook the worst behavior in the raw pursuit of power .

So it has come to this, as we all knew it would. Republicans in the Senate have decided to hold a sham trial without witnesses or evidence. It’s not because they don’t want to hear the truth, it’s because they already know the truth. They know the president is guilty, and they simply don’t care.
The few GOP senators who pretended at a conscience toward the end have predictably decided to throw in their lot with the majority of their conservative colleagues cravenly engaging in a coverup for the president, while pretending to be deeply offended at the suggestion that that is exactly what they are doing. And why? Because they fear the wrath of Trump’s base and his twitter feed more than they fear the voters or the judgment of history. And because they simply don’t care.
The House impeachment managers put on a masterful legal display, embarrassing Trump’s lawyers at every turn. It was an impressive feat blunted only by the fact that the case was so easy to make. Trump’s guilt is obvious on its face. He obstructed every witness, document and request–not something that innocent people do. His legal defense attempted to use this obstruction of direct witness testimony to claim that the only confirmations of his guilt came not from hearsay. And then former National Security Advisor John Bolton blew that defense out of the water via media reports. The case, then was open and shut.
The key question at hand was simply whether the Senate wished to hear under oath what former National Security Adviser Bolton was already saying publicly: that Trump was directly responsible for attempting to bribe and extort the leaders of a foreign nation to help him smear a domestic political opponent. They decided not to.Again, this was not because they doubted Bolton was telling the truth, but rather because they knew he was.
Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski decided to take cover behind baseless attacks on the House impeachment process—as if the fact that Republicans in the House were also too cowardly to hold the president accountable had any bearing on the truth of the charges, or as if the president’s attempt to obstruct and delay the inquiry by challenging all witness and document requests somehow rendered illegitimate the House’s decision by moving forward with the damning evidence they had.
But it was Senator Lamar Alexander’s reasoning that was most instructive:
Mr. Alexander could easily have gone the other way. He is retiring from the Senate and free to vote as he pleases without political consequences. And he said in the interview that Mr. Trump had done exactly what Democrats had accused him of doing: He withheld military aid from Ukraine to pressure the country to investigate his political rival — a move he could not condone. “I think he did something that was clearly inappropriate,” Mr. Alexander said. “I think it is inappropriate for the president to ask the leader of a foreign nation to investigate a leading political rival, which the president says he did. I think it is inappropriate at least in part to withhold aid to encourage that investigation.” “But that is not treason, that is not bribery, that is not a high crime and misdemeanor,” he added, listing the criteria enumerated in the Constitution for impeachable offenses.
Senator Alexander also said some fatuous nonsense about how awful it would be to remove a president in the middle of an election year, ignoring the fact that the question at hand was about hearing from witnesses, not about removing Trump just yet. At the same time, he was ignoring the fact that such logic would give a president imperial abuse of power privileges during an entire quarter of his term. But here’s what’s really important: the fact that Senator Alexander chose not only to not convict Trump for having doing the dirty deed, but to refuse to even hear direct witness to the fact that he did it. He simply didn’t care, and neither did the rest of the Republicans in the Senate (except for Mitt Romney and Susan Collins, who in no way get a pass for their vote since they did nothing to persuade others to take a stand for justice and democracy).
But the American people do care. Support for removing the president has risen steadily in polling as the public hears and understands more about what the president did. Support for hearing from witnesses exceeds 70 percent in nearly all polling. The majority of the public understands that Trump committed a terrible abuse of power. The ones still on the fence want to hear more from those in a position to know.
By refusing to hear witnesses, Republicans in the Senate have illegitimized their own trial process. This, in turn, will only encourage the House to continue holding hearings and call witnesses of their own. The embarrassments for the president will not stop. More revelations will certainly come out.
The only thing Republicans can hope for now is that the public will simply stop caring. That’s a dangerous bet. The country isn’t quite that apathetic about abuses of power, nor as desperate as Republican Senators to overlook the worst behavior in the raw pursuit of power.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-01--The Colleges Doing the Most to Get Their Students to Vote

Several months ago , CNN asked different age groups to rate how enthusiastic they were to vote in the 2020 election .
The good news ?
A majority of young Americans—those aged 18 to 34—said that they were either extremely or very enthusiastic about going to the polls .
The bad news ?
They were , by more than ten percentage points , the age bracket least excited about casting a ballot .
At the Washington Monthly , we believe that colleges have an obligation to close that enthusiasm gap .
For starters , the outcome of 2020 may hinge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pennsylvania , Michigan , and Wisconsin that made Donald Trump president could fit in 21 individual university football stadiums .
A few schools could make a huge difference .
Then , there are the ethical implications .
Today ’ s students are , quite literally , the future of the United States , but they continue to vote in lower numbers than the population as a whole .
It is distressing when any demographic is underrepresented in the electorate , but it is especially so when that demographic will have to deal with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actions for longer than others .
Colleges are tasked with turning kids into citizens , and it is essential that colleges do everything they can to get their students to register and cast ballots .
To that end , each year , the Washington Monthly gathers data about the efforts schools are making to encourage their students to vote .
We use that data in our annual college rankings , and we publish an honor roll featuring schools with perfect voting scores .
Now , six months after releasing our 2019 list , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions well prepared for the presidential contest .
A walloping 139 schools made the list , up from 80 last September .
As usual , the honor roll is a motley crew .
Famous private and public institutions , like Tufts University and the University of Michigan , are featured .
But so are a number of less-known schools , including many community colleges .
Indeed , most honorees are public institutions .
Plenty of America ’ s most prominent private colleges , such as Yale and Williams , are absent .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work to do to boost civic participation .
This work is critical , but it shouldn ’ t be too hard .
Students will do most of the work themselves if empowered by their schools , even as states try to suppress their votes .
And since voting is habitual—if you vote in 2020 , you ’ re likely to vote in 2022 , and then 2024—universities have an opportunity to build lifelong citizens .
We hope our honor roll encourages them to seize it .
To make this honor roll , schools @ @ @ @ @ @ @ six criteria by January 15 , 2020 : • Submitted an ALL IN action plan in 2016 OR in 2020 .
ALL IN is still accepting 2020 action plans .
• Submitted an ALL IN action plan in 2018 .
• Made their 2016 NSLVE data , including voter turnout rates , publicly available through ALL IN ’ s online database .
( ALL IN is experiencing some difficulty loading 2016 NSLVE reports to its database .
We have included schools that sent their reports to ALL IN and granted permission to publish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not yet able to upload it . )
• Made their 2018 NSLVE data , including voter turnout rates , publically available through ALL IN ’ s online database .

Several months ago, CNN asked different age groups to rate how enthusiastic they were to vote in the 2020 election. The good news? A majority of young Americans—those aged 18 to 34—said that they were either extremely or very enthusiastic about going to the polls. The bad news? They were, by more than ten percentage points, the age bracket least excited about casting a ballot.
At the Washington Monthly, we believe that colleges have an obligation to close that enthusiasm gap. For starters, the outcome of 2020 may hinge on students. The 77,744 votes in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin that made Donald Trump president could fit in 21 individual university football stadiums. A few schools could make a huge difference.
Then, there are the ethical implications. Today’s students are, quite literally, the future of the United States, but they continue to vote in lower numbers than the population as a whole. It is distressing when any demographic is underrepresented in the electorate, but it is especially so when that demographic will have to deal with the consequences of the government’s actions for longer than others. Colleges are tasked with turning kids into citizens, and it is essential that colleges do everything they can to get their students to register and cast ballots.
To that end, each year, the Washington Monthly gathers data about the efforts schools are making to encourage their students to vote. We use that data in our annual college rankings, and we publish an honor roll featuring schools with perfect voting scores. Now, six months after releasing our 2019 list, we are publishing an update, highlighting institutions well prepared for the presidential contest. A walloping 139 schools made the list, up from 80 last September.
As usual, the honor roll is a motley crew. Famous private and public institutions, like Tufts University and the University of Michigan, are featured. But so are a number of less-known schools, including many community colleges. Indeed, most honorees are public institutions. Plenty of America’s most prominent private colleges, such as Yale and Williams, are absent.
That means U.S. colleges still have plenty of work to do to boost civic participation. This work is critical, but it shouldn’t be too hard. Students will do most of the work themselves if empowered by their schools, even as states try to suppress their votes. And since voting is habitual—if you vote in 2020, you’re likely to vote in 2022, and then 2024—universities have an opportunity to build lifelong citizens. We hope our honor roll encourages them to seize it.
The Top 139 Schools for Student Voting
Alfred University (NY) Alvernia University (PA) Alverno College (WI) Amherst College (MA) Arapahoe Community College* (CO) Arizona State University* (AZ) Bard College (NY) Bates College (ME) Bowling Green State University* (OH) Brown University (RI) Bryn Mawr College (PA) California State University San Bernardino* (CA) California University of Pennsylvania* (PA) Cedar Crest College (PA) Chatham University (PA) Cleveland State University* (OH) College of the Canyons* (CA) Colorado State University* (CO) Dalton State College* (GA) Denison University (OH) Drake University (IA) Duke University (NC) East Carolina University* (NC) East Tennessee State University* (TN) Emporia State University* (KS) Feather River College* (CA) Ferris State University* (MI) Florida State University* (FL) Fort Hays State University* (KS) Frostburg State University* (MD) George Mason University* (VA) Georgia College* (GA) Goucher College (MD) Governors State University* (IL) Grand Valley State University* (MI) Harvard University (MA) Heartland Community College* (IL) Hobart and William Smith Colleges (NY) Illinois State University* (IL) Indiana University Bloomington* (IN) Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis* (IN) Inver Hills Community College* (MN) Iowa State University* (IA) James Madison University* (VA) Johns Hopkins University (MD) Kennesaw State University* (GA) Knox College (IL) Kutztown University* (PA) Lewis University (IL) Loyola University Maryland (MD) Manhattan College (NY) Manor College (PA) Maryland Institute College of Art (MD) Mercer University (GA) Mesa Community College* (AZ) Metropolitan State University of Denver* (CO) Miami University* (OH) Michigan State University* (MI) Michigan Technological University* (MI) Middle Georgia State University* (GA) Middle Tennessee State University* (TN) Middlebury College (VT) Missouri State University* (MO) Montclair State University* (NJ) Mount Saint Mary’s University (CA) Mount St. Joseph University (OH) Muhlenberg College (PA) New College of Florida* (FL) Northampton Community College* (PA) Northeastern State University* (OK) Northeastern University (MA) Oakland University* (MI) Otterbein University (OH) Pacific University (OR) Piedmont Virginia Community College* (VA) Raritan Valley Community College* (NJ) Rider University (NJ) Rollins College (FL) Rutgers University New Brunswick* (NJ) Saginaw Valley State University* (MI) Saint Louis University (MO) Saint Mary’s College of California (CA) Salem State University* (MA) Samford University (AL) Santa Clara University (CA) Sauk Valley Community College* (IL) Scottsdale Community College* (AZ) Sewanee, The University of the South (TN) Simpson College (IA) Southern Illinois University Edwardsville* (IL) Southwestern Michigan College* (MI) St. Norbert College (WI) SUNY: Albany* (NY) SUNY: Brockport* (NY) SUNY: Geneseo* (NY) SUNY: Stony Brook* (NY) Texas A&M University Central Texas* (TX) The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina* (SC) The College of New Jersey* (NJ) The George Washington University (DC) The Ohio State University* (OH) The University of Illinois at Chicago* (IL) The University of Maine* (ME) The University of North Carolina at Greensboro* (NC) The University of Oklahoma* (OK) The University of South Carolina Upstate* (SC) The University of South Carolina* (SC) The University of Texas at Austin* (TX) Towson University* (MD) Transylvania University (KY) Tufts University (MA) University of Baltimore* (MD) University of California San Diego* (CA) University of California Santa Barbara* (CA) University of Central Florida* (FL) University of Delaware* (DE) University of Denver (CO) University of Florida* (FL) University of Iowa* (IA) University of Louisville* (KY) University of Maryland College Park* (MD) University of Michigan Ann Arbor* (MI) University of Michigan Dearborn* (MI) University of Minnesota Duluth* (MN) University of Minnesota Morris* (MN) University of Missouri Saint Louis* (MO) University of Nebraska at Omaha* (NE) University of Nebraska Lincoln* (NE) University of Northern Iowa* (IA) University of Puget Sound (WA) University of San Diego (CA) University of Washington* (WA) University of Wisconsin Madison* (WI) Virginia Military Institute* (VA) Washington State University* (WA) Weber State University* (UT) Western Carolina University* (NC) Winthrop University* (SC) Worcester State University* (MA)
*Asterisks indicate public institutions.
To make this honor roll, schools had to fulfill each of the following six criteria by January 15, 2020:
Submitted an ALL IN action plan in 2016 OR in 2020. ALL IN is still accepting 2020 action plans.
Submitted an ALL IN action plan in 2018.
Signed up to receive 2016 NSLVE data.
Made their 2016 NSLVE data, including voter turnout rates, publicly available through ALL IN’s online database. (ALL IN is experiencing some difficulty loading 2016 NSLVE reports to its database. We have included schools that sent their reports to ALL IN and granted permission to publish it, but where ALL IN was not yet able to upload it.)
Signed up to receive 2018 NSLVE data.
Made their 2018 NSLVE data, including voter turnout rates, publically available through ALL IN’s online database.


washingtonmonthly--2020-01-31--Stop Blaming Democrats for Republican Intransigence

During Obama ’ s presidency , a critique emerged that , if only he tried hard enough , he could be more successful in enacting the Democratic agenda .
Brendan Nyhan famously labeled this the “ Green Lantern theory of the presidency.
” According to Brendan Nyhan , the Dartmouth political scientist who coined the term , the Green Lantern Theory of the Presidency is “ the belief that the president can achieve any political or policy objective if only he tries hard enough or uses the right tactics.
” In other words , the American president is functionally all-powerful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get something done , it ’ s because he ’ s not trying hard enough , or not trying smart enough .
Nyhan further separates it into two variants : “ the Reagan version of the Green Lantern Theory and the LBJ version of the Green Lantern Theory.
” The Reagan version , he says , holds that “ if you only communicate well enough the public will rally to your side.
” The LBJ version says that “ if the president only tried harder to win over congress they would vote through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Nyhan argues , “ we ’ ve been sold a false bill of goods.
” That theory was embraced by both Obama ’ s critics on the left and most of the mainstream media .
For the latter , it became the basis of their obsession with bothsiderism .
Any failures of Obama to successfully negotiate with Republicans were explained by a lack of compromise on both sides .
None of that took into consideration the fact that , on the day of Obama ’ s inauguration , Republicans settled on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was that , no matter the issue or the proposed solution , they would vote as a block against it .
We are now witnessing how far Republicans are willing to go with that level of intransigence in their refusal to hold Donald Trump accountable .
Senate Republicans will not only refuse to hear from witnesses , they will vote to exonerate the most corrupt president in this country ’ s history .
While the Green Lantern theory was initially tied to the presidency , we ’ re already watching it be applied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take a look at how Dana Bash employs it in a question to Senator Amy Klobuchar .
As Josh Marshall wrote , “ there ’ s always a strong tendency to take consistent and insistent misbehavior as a baseline.
” So because Republicans have now become the party of intransigence , that is the new norm and gets a pass when it comes to accountability .
The burden is placed on Democrats to conjure up some magic trick to stop Republicans from employing a strategy that has worked marvelously for them—partly because the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the problem .
Here is how an NPR affiliate reported on the fact that Republicans are poised to refuse to hear from witnesses in the Senate trial .
They suggest that “ Democrats may have fallen short , ” not that Republicans are intent on covering up the facts .
Todd Purdum applies the Green Lantern theory to Representative Adam Schiff in a piece titled , “ Democrats Never Found Their Hero.
” Since Election Night 2016 , Democrats have been searching for a savior , no matter the party or rank of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s foregone acquittal in sight as soon as tomorrow , it ’ s all come down to Schiff , the terminally earnest chairman of the House Intelligence Committee .
Schiff ’ s powers , while formidable , have proved just as un-super as everyone else ’ s in the near-lockstep partisan loyalty that fear of Trump has produced .
While Purdum at least acknowledged the “ near-lockstep partisan loyalty ” of Republicans , his point is not about how they are putting party over country in defending the most corrupt president in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he focused on the fact that Schiff and the House managers failed to break through a wall that Mitch McConnell ensured would be impenetrable .
Perhaps Purdum actually knows some Democrats who were looking for a savior .
But they won ’ t be found among the ranks of the people who called their Senators demanding witnesses , nor will you find them among these folks .
All of those people have accurately diagnosed the problem .
It doesn ’ t lie with the lack of magical powers on the part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way that Republicans have determined to march in lock-step to defend the indefensible .

During Obama’s presidency, a critique emerged that, if only he tried hard enough, he could be more successful in enacting the Democratic agenda. Brendan Nyhan famously labeled this the “Green Lantern theory of the presidency.”
According to Brendan Nyhan, the Dartmouth political scientist who coined the term, the Green Lantern Theory of the Presidency is “the belief that the president can achieve any political or policy objective if only he tries hard enough or uses the right tactics.” In other words, the American president is functionally all-powerful, and whenever he can’t get something done, it’s because he’s not trying hard enough, or not trying smart enough. Nyhan further separates it into two variants: “the Reagan version of the Green Lantern Theory and the LBJ version of the Green Lantern Theory.” The Reagan version, he says, holds that “if you only communicate well enough the public will rally to your side.” The LBJ version says that “if the president only tried harder to win over congress they would vote through his legislative agenda.” In both cases, Nyhan argues, “we’ve been sold a false bill of goods.”
That theory was embraced by both Obama’s critics on the left and most of the mainstream media. For the latter, it became the basis of their obsession with bothsiderism. Any failures of Obama to successfully negotiate with Republicans were explained by a lack of compromise on both sides.
None of that took into consideration the fact that, on the day of Obama’s inauguration, Republicans settled on a policy of total obstruction. Their position was that, no matter the issue or the proposed solution, they would vote as a block against it.
We are now witnessing how far Republicans are willing to go with that level of intransigence in their refusal to hold Donald Trump accountable. Senate Republicans will not only refuse to hear from witnesses, they will vote to exonerate the most corrupt president in this country’s history.
While the Green Lantern theory was initially tied to the presidency, we’re already watching it be applied to congressional Democrats. For example, take a look at how Dana Bash employs it in a question to Senator Amy Klobuchar.
As Josh Marshall wrote, “there’s always a strong tendency to take consistent and insistent misbehavior as a baseline.” So because Republicans have now become the party of intransigence, that is the new norm and gets a pass when it comes to accountability. The burden is placed on Democrats to conjure up some magic trick to stop Republicans from employing a strategy that has worked marvelously for them—partly because the media fails to identify the source of the problem.
Here is how an NPR affiliate reported on the fact that Republicans are poised to refuse to hear from witnesses in the Senate trial. They suggest that “Democrats may have fallen short,” not that Republicans are intent on covering up the facts.
Todd Purdum applies the Green Lantern theory to Representative Adam Schiff in a piece titled, “Democrats Never Found Their Hero.”
Since Election Night 2016, Democrats have been searching for a savior, no matter the party or rank of the individual… Now, with the defendant’s foregone acquittal in sight as soon as tomorrow, it’s all come down to Schiff, the terminally earnest chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Schiff’s powers, while formidable, have proved just as un-super as everyone else’s in the near-lockstep partisan loyalty that fear of Trump has produced.
While Purdum at least acknowledged the “near-lockstep partisan loyalty” of Republicans, his point is not about how they are putting party over country in defending the most corrupt president in this country’s history. Instead, he focused on the fact that Schiff and the House managers failed to break through a wall that Mitch McConnell ensured would be impenetrable.
Perhaps Purdum actually knows some Democrats who were looking for a savior. But they won’t be found among the ranks of the people who called their Senators demanding witnesses, nor will you find them among these folks.
All of those people have accurately diagnosed the problem. It doesn’t lie with the lack of magical powers on the part of Democrats. Instead, it is the way that Republicans have determined to march in lock-step to defend the indefensible.


washingtonmonthly--2020-01-31--If Trump is Acquitted, the House Democrats Should Press Ahead

In declaring that he won ’ t be voting to allow witness testimony in Donald Trump ’ s impeachment trial , Senator Lamar Alexander made some interesting observations .
First , he acknowledged that the House Democrats had proven that Trump “ ask [ ed ] a foreign leader to investigate his political opponent and…with [ held ] United States aid to encourage that investigation.
” Second , he said that this crime did not rise to a level requiring removal from office .
Third , he said that Trump ’ s blanket noncooperation with the investigation wasn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While it ’ s still possible that the Senate will deadlock at 50-50 on the witness question , forcing Chief Justice John Roberts to decide whether to break the tie , Alexander ’ s position probably spells the end of this sad saga in the Senate .
If so , the House Democrats will have some difficult choices to make .
They could essentially move on and get back to the ordinary business of working on the budget and passing bills that Trump won ’ t sign .
Or , they could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own , with the potential to impeach Trump a second time before the November election .
If they make the latter decision , they will risk looking obsessed .
But , given the stakes , they might feel they have no other choice .
They will almost certainly want to hear from John Bolton , who is likely to cooperate this time around .
They may also want to hear from Lev Parnas , assuming they can do so without screwing up his prosecution by the Department of Justice .
They will also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their right to get witnesses and documents from the administration , so they ’ ll have to pursue a legal angle as well .
Above all , they ’ ll want to make sure the full story is told so that people can fairly judge what the Senate did in refusing to look further into the matter themselves before acquitting the president .
For this purpose , they could set up a special committee to basically compile a full investigation unencumbered by time constraints .
You could think of it as their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be to document everything for history in a final report , which could make recommendations for people who should be charged .
It could also propose new impeachment articles to be passed .
This report might not be complete before the November election , especially given the legal delays in getting a resolution on witnesses and documents , but Trump could be impeached even in a second term , or if he is defeated .
If he ’ s guilty , he should not be able to run for or hold high @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more information will come out through Freedom of Information Requests and people deciding to talk about what they know , as well as through victories in court .
Trump ’ s acquittal will likely look worse and worse with each passing month and year .
The Senate , as an institution , will suffer a similar fate due to the GOP behavior .
This will benefit the Democrats politically , but more importantly , the House Democrats can not allow this result to stand since it eviscerates Congress ’ s power to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institution , they need to fight back .
Unfortunately , this is something they should be obsessed about and they should be willing to take whatever hit comes along with that .

In declaring that he won’t be voting to allow witness testimony in Donald Trump’s impeachment trial, Senator Lamar Alexander made some interesting observations. First, he acknowledged that the House Democrats had proven that Trump “ask[ed] a foreign leader to investigate his political opponent and…with[held] United States aid to encourage that investigation.” Second, he said that this crime did not rise to a level requiring removal from office. Third, he said that Trump’s blanket noncooperation with the investigation wasn’t even close to being an impeachable offense. While it’s still possible that the Senate will deadlock at 50-50 on the witness question, forcing Chief Justice John Roberts to decide whether to break the tie, Alexander’s position probably spells the end of this sad saga in the Senate.
If so, the House Democrats will have some difficult choices to make. They could essentially move on and get back to the ordinary business of working on the budget and passing bills that Trump won’t sign. Or, they could decide to hold a trial of their own, with the potential to impeach Trump a second time before the November election.
If they make the latter decision, they will risk looking obsessed. But, given the stakes, they might feel they have no other choice. They will almost certainly want to hear from John Bolton, who is likely to cooperate this time around. They may also want to hear from Lev Parnas, assuming they can do so without screwing up his prosecution by the Department of Justice. They will also want to vindicate, if possible, their right to get witnesses and documents from the administration, so they’ll have to pursue a legal angle as well. Above all, they’ll want to make sure the full story is told so that people can fairly judge what the Senate did in refusing to look further into the matter themselves before acquitting the president.
For this purpose, they could set up a special committee to basically compile a full investigation unencumbered by time constraints. You could think of it as their own special investigator or prosecutor. Their mission would be to document everything for history in a final report, which could make recommendations for people who should be charged. It could also propose new impeachment articles to be passed.
This report might not be complete before the November election, especially given the legal delays in getting a resolution on witnesses and documents, but Trump could be impeached even in a second term, or if he is defeated. If he’s guilty, he should not be able to run for or hold high office again.
As time goes by, more information will come out through Freedom of Information Requests and people deciding to talk about what they know, as well as through victories in court. Trump’s acquittal will likely look worse and worse with each passing month and year. The Senate, as an institution, will suffer a similar fate due to the GOP behavior.
This will benefit the Democrats politically, but more importantly, the House Democrats cannot allow this result to stand since it eviscerates Congress’s power to hold a president accountable. As an institution, they need to fight back. Unfortunately, this is something they should be obsessed about and they should be willing to take whatever hit comes along with that.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-03--How the Republican Party Became a Threat to Democracy

For years now we ’ ve known that Donald Trump lied and cheated in his business dealings .
We know that—at minimum—he welcomed Russian interference in the 2016 election and that he obstructed justice to thwart the investigation of those efforts .
We know that he extorted the Ukrainian president to get dirt on his political opponent and then covered it up by obstructing investigations in congress .
What wasn ’ t clear until last week is how far the Republican Party , particularly in the Senate , would go to enable the president ’ s abuse of power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ only will they exonerate Trump , but they also refused to call witnesses who would document his guilt .
That is why so many people are beginning to contemplate the demise of our democracy—and rightly so .
Facing that possibility raises the question of how Republicans got to the point that they are willing to risk our democracy for the sake of Donald Trump .
Any attempt to explore the historical roots of current events is an endless process .
That ’ s because there are no periods ( as in punctuation ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in history as the cause inevitably leads to an exploration of what led up to that moment , sending us back even further to find its antecedents .
But I believe there are two significant inflection points when Republicans made choices that led them to be willing to exonerate the most corrupt president in our country ’ s history .
One of those moments came in 1964 when Lyndon Johnson beat Barry Goldwater 486 to 52 in the electoral college .
That led Republicans to complete the process of abandoning their support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regain the party ’ s competitiveness by appealing to white grievance .
Here is how Nixon ’ s strategist , Kevin Phillips , described the so-called “ Southern Strategy.
” In other words , for Republicans , the votes were with white people whose racism could be triggered by dog whistles , such as an appeal to “ state ’ s rights ” and “ law and order.
” That strategy worked .
Richard Nixon won handily in 1968 and in a landslide in 1972 .
The second infection point came with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Just as significant as the emergence of this country ’ s first African American president was the fact that he was elected after the entire Republican policy agenda was in shatters .
The Bush-Cheney administration had demonstrated the folly of the party ’ s policies in both the foreign and domestic arena with the invasion of Iraq , the failed response to Katrina , and the emergence of the Great Recession .
At that point , Republicans decided to completely abandon the idea of having a policy agenda ( other than tax cuts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on obstructing anything the Democrats attempted to do .
In order to justify that decision , they cast aside the dog whistles and openly inflamed the xenophobic fears of their white base with attempts to paint the first African American president as a dangerous extremist who didn ’ t love America .
That decision became even more pronounced in the reaction to Mitt Romney ’ s loss in 2012 .
Recognizing demographic trends , the Republican National Committee issued an autopsy that called on the GOP to do more to win over “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pacific Islanders , African Americans , Indian Americans , Native Americans , women , and youth [ s ] .
” On the other hand , Michael Anton warned that 2016 was “ the flight 93 election.
” The election of Trump was a definitive rejection of the RNC autopsy recommendations and an embrace of Anton ’ s suggestion that it was time to “ storm the cockpit or die.
” Those decisions left the GOP without a coherent agenda other than a common heritage .
As Yoni Appelbaum writes : Whether consciously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States is on a path to the inevitable day when their “ numbers no longer add up.
” As Zachary Roth wrote , the response to those facts led them to decide that “ being outnumbered doesn ’ t have to mean losing.
” The calculation was that they could maintain their power at the expense of our democratic norms and institutions .
But as Appelbaum notes , something more fundamental to our democracy broke .
Democracy depends on the consent of the losers .
For most of the 20th century , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have competed in elections with the understanding that electoral defeats are neither permanent nor intolerable .
The losers could accept the result , adjust their ideas and coalitions , and move on to fight in the next election .
Ideas and policies would be contested , sometimes viciously , but however heated the rhetoric got , defeat was not generally equated with political annihilation .
The stakes could feel high , but rarely existential .
In recent years , however , beginning before the election of Donald Trump and accelerating since , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faith that they can win elections in the future .
With this come dark possibilities…When a group that has traditionally exercised power comes to believe that its eclipse is inevitable , and that the destruction of all it holds dear will follow , it will fight to preserve what it has—whatever the cost .
In his book Trumpocracy , David Frum identified the cost Republicans are willing to pay when he wrote that , “ if conservatives become convinced that they can not win democratically , they will not abandon conservatism .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge we face today .
After casting aside policy and ideas in favor of ethnonationalism , the Republican Party is now in the process of rejecting democracy as their only alternative for survival .
What that portends , as Appelbaum suggested , are some dark possibilities that will remain , even if Trump is defeated in November .

For years now we’ve known that Donald Trump lied and cheated in his business dealings. We know that—at minimum—he welcomed Russian interference in the 2016 election and that he obstructed justice to thwart the investigation of those efforts. We know that he extorted the Ukrainian president to get dirt on his political opponent and then covered it up by obstructing investigations in congress.
What wasn’t clear until last week is how far the Republican Party, particularly in the Senate, would go to enable the president’s abuse of power. It has now become clear that not only will they exonerate Trump, but they also refused to call witnesses who would document his guilt. That is why so many people are beginning to contemplate the demise of our democracy—and rightly so. Facing that possibility raises the question of how Republicans got to the point that they are willing to risk our democracy for the sake of Donald Trump.
Any attempt to explore the historical roots of current events is an endless process. That’s because there are no periods (as in punctuation) in history. Focusing on one point in history as the cause inevitably leads to an exploration of what led up to that moment, sending us back even further to find its antecedents.
But I believe there are two significant inflection points when Republicans made choices that led them to be willing to exonerate the most corrupt president in our country’s history. One of those moments came in 1964 when Lyndon Johnson beat Barry Goldwater 486 to 52 in the electoral college. That led Republicans to complete the process of abandoning their support for civil rights and launch an effort to regain the party’s competitiveness by appealing to white grievance. Here is how Nixon’s strategist, Kevin Phillips, described the so-called “Southern Strategy.”
From now on, the Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the Negro vote and they don’t need any more than that… but Republicans would be shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans. That’s where the votes are.
In other words, for Republicans, the votes were with white people whose racism could be triggered by dog whistles, such as an appeal to “state’s rights” and “law and order.” That strategy worked. Richard Nixon won handily in 1968 and in a landslide in 1972.
The second infection point came with the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Just as significant as the emergence of this country’s first African American president was the fact that he was elected after the entire Republican policy agenda was in shatters. The Bush-Cheney administration had demonstrated the folly of the party’s policies in both the foreign and domestic arena with the invasion of Iraq, the failed response to Katrina, and the emergence of the Great Recession.
At that point, Republicans decided to completely abandon the idea of having a policy agenda (other than tax cuts for the wealthy) and go all-in on obstructing anything the Democrats attempted to do. In order to justify that decision, they cast aside the dog whistles and openly inflamed the xenophobic fears of their white base with attempts to paint the first African American president as a dangerous extremist who didn’t love America.
That decision became even more pronounced in the reaction to Mitt Romney’s loss in 2012. Recognizing demographic trends, the Republican National Committee issued an autopsy that called on the GOP to do more to win over “Hispanic[s], Asian and Pacific Islanders, African Americans, Indian Americans, Native Americans, women, and youth[s].” On the other hand, Michael Anton warned that 2016 was “the flight 93 election.”
“If you haven’t noticed, our side has been losing consistently since 1988,” he wrote, averring that “the deck is stacked overwhelmingly against us.” He blamed “the ceaseless importation of Third World foreigners,” which had placed Democrats “on the cusp of a permanent victory.”…The GOP’s efforts to broaden its coalition, he thundered, were an abject surrender.
The election of Trump was a definitive rejection of the RNC autopsy recommendations and an embrace of Anton’s suggestion that it was time to “storm the cockpit or die.”
Those decisions left the GOP without a coherent agenda other than a common heritage. As Yoni Appelbaum writes:
A conservatism defined by ideas can hold its own against progressivism, winning converts to its principles and evolving with each generation. A conservatism defined by identity reduces the complex calculus of politics to a simple arithmetic question—and at some point, the numbers no longer add up.
Whether consciously or subconsciously, Republicans know that the United States is on a path to the inevitable day when their “numbers no longer add up.” As Zachary Roth wrote, the response to those facts led them to decide that “being outnumbered doesn’t have to mean losing.” The calculation was that they could maintain their power at the expense of our democratic norms and institutions.
But as Appelbaum notes, something more fundamental to our democracy broke.
Democracy depends on the consent of the losers. For most of the 20th century, parties and candidates in the United States have competed in elections with the understanding that electoral defeats are neither permanent nor intolerable. The losers could accept the result, adjust their ideas and coalitions, and move on to fight in the next election. Ideas and policies would be contested, sometimes viciously, but however heated the rhetoric got, defeat was not generally equated with political annihilation. The stakes could feel high, but rarely existential. In recent years, however, beginning before the election of Donald Trump and accelerating since, that has changed… [Conservatives] are losing faith that they can win elections in the future. With this come dark possibilities…When a group that has traditionally exercised power comes to believe that its eclipse is inevitable, and that the destruction of all it holds dear will follow, it will fight to preserve what it has—whatever the cost.
In his book Trumpocracy, David Frum identified the cost Republicans are willing to pay when he wrote that, “if conservatives become convinced that they cannot win democratically, they will not abandon conservatism. They will reject democracy.”
That is the challenge we face today. After casting aside policy and ideas in favor of ethnonationalism, the Republican Party is now in the process of rejecting democracy as their only alternative for survival. What that portends, as Appelbaum suggested, are some dark possibilities that will remain, even if Trump is defeated in November.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-03--Why Iowa Matters and Why It Doesn’t

Why Iowa Matters and Why It Doesn’t

I ’ ve written repeatedly over the years about my contempt for the Iowa caucuses , less because the state is demographically unrepresentative of the nation or because caucuses are inherently undemocratic than because the whole process is basically a sham .
The main problem is that it ’ s more of a beauty contest than an actual result ; the delegates that are “ won ” on caucus night are not really committed to any particular candidate .
But even if the caucus results were iron-clad and binding , the secondary problem is that the media treats the caucuses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The truth is that relatively few delegates are at stake , and a minuscule number of voters will actually participate .
Yet , a typical pre-take on the results looks like this : “ No one has more at stake tonight than Joe Biden .
A first-place finish in the Iowa caucuses here could put him the driver ’ s seat to win the Democratic nomination ; a fourth-place finish could end his political career.
” “ No other Top 4 Democrat has that wide range of possibilities.
” Two more questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tickets out of Iowa — with Michael Bloomberg purchasing the third ?
Think about it : The only realistic third-place finish that would be a positive story for that candidate is Amy Klobuchar ’ s. ” “ And if Sanders really does win Iowa , does he start acting like a front-runner ?
How he declares victory , if he wins , will matter.
” You can read a more sober take from the folks at Daily Kos Elections who also explain how the caucuses actually work .
The reason Iowa is important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in first or fourth than in how those results track with expectations .
A better-than-expected result is a victory , while a disappointingly narrow win can effectively be a momentum-killing loss .
This is superficial because of how the media chooses to report things , but the actual mechanism is that campaigns need a big new influx of cash after Iowa if they ’ re going to be able to maintain and grow their organizations for the many contests to come .
If they get negative news coverage out of Iowa , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ ll have to drop out for lack of funds rather than for any mathematical reason .
Their staffers will either latch on to other , better-paying campaigns or they ’ ll go home to work on state and local races .
Even this logic doesn ’ t work all the time anymore .
Newt Gingrich , for example , sustained a long campaign in 2012 simply because he had one incredibly generous oligarch funding his Super PAC .
Actual billionaires , like Tom Steyer and Michael Bloomberg , can stay in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re willing to spend their own money .
So , Iowa actually is very important , but this derives from the media overhyping the results and the public then swallowing their analysis whole .
In the above example , we are told that only two candidates will remain viable after Monday ’ s caucuses , in addition to Michael Bloomberg ( who isn ’ t even competing there ) .
We ’ re also told that only Amy Klobuchar can exceed expectations by coming in third place and thereby claim some positive news @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told that Biden could see his entire political career destroyed if he doesn ’ t wind up in the top three .
And as a cherry on top , we ’ re informed that Bernie Sanders could blow the positive coverage he ought to get from winning if he “ doesn ’ t act like a front-runner ” in his victory speech .
This is not nonsense exactly , but it ’ s also not good or helpful analysis .
For starters , it ’ s short on details .
It doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one position and other candidates are in another .
But it also seems illogical on its face .
Elizabeth Warren is polling in fourth place in Iowa .
Is she really doomed if she finishes third ?
Will she fold up her campaign before New Hampshire ?
What would a fourth-place finish mean for Sanders , the consensus frontrunner to win the caucuses ?
Yes , this would not be “ a positive story ” for him , but would it necessarily knock him out of the top two going forward ?
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to look forward other than to anticipate Bloomberg ’ s entry in the race .
Biden is still looking like a likely winner in South Carolina , even if his once commanding lead is dwindling .
Wouldn ’ t a win there rekindle his hopes ?
It appears that Tom Steyer is putting his hope in South Carolina , too , so should we say he doesn ’ t have a ticket to stay in the contest if he doesn ’ t finish in the top two in Iowa ?
Meanwhile , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggest that he ’ ll do better in Iowa than he does in more diverse states on Super Tuesday .
Doesn ’ t he have more at stake on Monday than Biden ?
Instead of any effort to understand what the race will look like after the results are in from Iowa , we are told that it will involve two unidentified candidates , plus Bloomberg .
Even if this were a likely outcome , the media should be doing more to prevent it from happening than to bring it about through the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caucuses should not have this kind of winnowing influence for a whole host of reasons that vary from the small number of voters and unrepresentative makeup compared to the rest of the country , to the oversized influence of money and oligarchs , to the mathematical insignificance of the results , to the fact that the actual winner may not actually be awarded their fair share of delegates at Iowa ’ s state party conventions .
In some sense , it ’ s fair that candidates need to win in order to maintain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ready to deny Sanders even this kind of coverage if they don ’ t like his demeanor at his victory speech .
The truth is that some candidates need a good result on Monday more than others because they are low on money or because they don ’ t have funds to pour into their own campaign .
The frontrunners Biden and Sanders have more to lose in the expectations game , but they ’ re also more viable for the long haul .
It ’ s actually quite likely that more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be voting against the eventual declared winner , especially on the first ballot , and the small number of delegates will be split three or four ways , making the result basically a wash as far as who will have the lead .
But most of the stories you read about Iowa will tell a much more dramatic story .
That ’ s why every four years I am newly infuriated by this process .

I’ve written repeatedly over the years about my contempt for the Iowa caucuses, less because the state is demographically unrepresentative of the nation or because caucuses are inherently undemocratic than because the whole process is basically a sham. The main problem is that it’s more of a beauty contest than an actual result; the delegates that are “won” on caucus night are not really committed to any particular candidate. But even if the caucus results were iron-clad and binding, the secondary problem is that the media treats the caucuses as much more important than they are. The truth is that relatively few delegates are at stake, and a minuscule number of voters will actually participate.
Yet, a typical pre-take on the results looks like this:
“No one has more at stake tonight than Joe Biden. A first-place finish in the Iowa caucuses here could put him the driver’s seat to win the Democratic nomination; a fourth-place finish could end his political career.” “No other Top 4 Democrat has that wide range of possibilities.” Two more questions: “Are there really only two tickets out of Iowa — with Michael Bloomberg purchasing the third? Think about it: The only realistic third-place finish that would be a positive story for that candidate is Amy Klobuchar’s.” “And if Sanders really does win Iowa, does he start acting like a front-runner? How he declares victory, if he wins, will matter.”
You can read a more sober take from the folks at Daily Kos Elections who also explain how the caucuses actually work. The reason Iowa is important has less to do with who comes in first or fourth than in how those results track with expectations. A better-than-expected result is a victory, while a disappointingly narrow win can effectively be a momentum-killing loss. This is superficial because of how the media chooses to report things, but the actual mechanism is that campaigns need a big new influx of cash after Iowa if they’re going to be able to maintain and grow their organizations for the many contests to come. If they get negative news coverage out of Iowa, the money won’t be forthcoming and they’ll have to drop out for lack of funds rather than for any mathematical reason. Their staffers will either latch on to other, better-paying campaigns or they’ll go home to work on state and local races.
Even this logic doesn’t work all the time anymore. Newt Gingrich, for example, sustained a long campaign in 2012 simply because he had one incredibly generous oligarch funding his Super PAC. Actual billionaires, like Tom Steyer and Michael Bloomberg, can stay in the race as long as they’re willing to spend their own money.
So, Iowa actually is very important, but this derives from the media overhyping the results and the public then swallowing their analysis whole.
In the above example, we are told that only two candidates will remain viable after Monday’s caucuses, in addition to Michael Bloomberg (who isn’t even competing there). We’re also told that only Amy Klobuchar can exceed expectations by coming in third place and thereby claim some positive news coverage. Conversely, we’re told that Biden could see his entire political career destroyed if he doesn’t wind up in the top three. And as a cherry on top, we’re informed that Bernie Sanders could blow the positive coverage he ought to get from winning if he “doesn’t act like a front-runner” in his victory speech.
This is not nonsense exactly, but it’s also not good or helpful analysis. For starters, it’s short on details. It doesn’t explain why some candidates are in one position and other candidates are in another. But it also seems illogical on its face. Elizabeth Warren is polling in fourth place in Iowa. Is she really doomed if she finishes third? Will she fold up her campaign before New Hampshire? What would a fourth-place finish mean for Sanders, the consensus frontrunner to win the caucuses? Yes, this would not be “a positive story” for him, but would it necessarily knock him out of the top two going forward?
This analysis doesn’t make an effort to look forward other than to anticipate Bloomberg’s entry in the race. Biden is still looking like a likely winner in South Carolina, even if his once commanding lead is dwindling. Wouldn’t a win there rekindle his hopes? It appears that Tom Steyer is putting his hope in South Carolina, too, so should we say he doesn’t have a ticket to stay in the contest if he doesn’t finish in the top two in Iowa? Meanwhile, the demographics of Pete Buttigieg’s support suggest that he’ll do better in Iowa than he does in more diverse states on Super Tuesday. Doesn’t he have more at stake on Monday than Biden?
Instead of any effort to understand what the race will look like after the results are in from Iowa, we are told that it will involve two unidentified candidates, plus Bloomberg.
Even if this were a likely outcome, the media should be doing more to prevent it from happening than to bring it about through the force of their coverage. The Iowa caucuses should not have this kind of winnowing influence for a whole host of reasons that vary from the small number of voters and unrepresentative makeup compared to the rest of the country, to the oversized influence of money and oligarchs, to the mathematical insignificance of the results, to the fact that the actual winner may not actually be awarded their fair share of delegates at Iowa’s state party conventions.
In some sense, it’s fair that candidates need to win in order to maintain their candidacies, but this analysis is ready to deny Sanders even this kind of coverage if they don’t like his demeanor at his victory speech.
The truth is that some candidates need a good result on Monday more than others because they are low on money or because they don’t have funds to pour into their own campaign. The frontrunners Biden and Sanders have more to lose in the expectations game, but they’re also more viable for the long haul. It’s actually quite likely that more than 70 percent of the caucus participants will be voting against the eventual declared winner, especially on the first ballot, and the small number of delegates will be split three or four ways, making the result basically a wash as far as who will have the lead.
But most of the stories you read about Iowa will tell a much more dramatic story. That’s why every four years I am newly infuriated by this process.


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-04--The Role of Center-Right Conservatives in Saving Democracy

For years now , conservative voters have been subjected to increasingly apocalyptic predictions about what will happen if Democrats prevail in elections .
For example , at a campaign kickoff rally in Orlando , Trump told those in attendance that “ our radical Democrat opponents are driven by hatred , prejudice , and rage .
They want to destroy you and they want to destroy our country as we know it.
” From the court evangelicals , the message has been sent that those who oppose Trump are engaged with “ demonic powers , ” and that if the Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean the end of “ religious liberty ” in this country .
Right-wing media personalities like Tucker Carlson and Laura Ingraham warn that Democrats favor “ open borders , ” going on to suggest that immigrants will soon overturn our American way of life .
The attorney general got in on the action during his speech to the Federalist Society when he warned that progressives are waging a “ holy war.
” In any age , the so-called progressives treat politics as their religion .
Their holy mission is to use the coercive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and society in their own image , according to an abstract ideal of perfection .
Whatever means they use are therefore justified because , by definition , they are a virtuous people pursing a deific end .
They are willing to use any means necessary to gain momentary advantage in achieving their end , regardless of collateral consequences and the systemic implications .
They never ask whether the actions they take could be justified as a general rule of conduct , equally applicable to all sides .
Those are the trumped-up fears that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yoni Appelbaum is right to suggest that they will persist , even if Trump loses in November .
The president ’ s defeat would likely only deepen the despair that fueled his rise , confirming his supporters ’ fear that the demographic tide has turned against them .
That fear is the single greatest threat facing American democracy , the force that is already battering down precedents , leveling norms , and demolishing guardrails .
When a group that has traditionally exercised power comes to believe that its eclipse is inevitable , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holds dear will follow , it will fight to preserve what it has—whatever the cost .
Appelbaum is also right when he says that extremism on the left only exacerbates the problem , creating a vicious cycle .
In an otherwise excellent analysis of the current state of the Republican Party , this might be the most important part of Appelbaum ’ s analysis ( emphasis mine ) .
In his recent study of the emergence of democracy in Western Europe , the political scientist Daniel Ziblatt zeroes in on a decisive factor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from those that fell prey to authoritarian impulses : The key variable was not the strength or character of the political left , or of the forces pushing for greater democratization , so much as the viability of the center-right .
A strong center-right party could wall off more extreme right-wing movements , shutting out the radicals who attacked the political system itself… Where the center-right flourishes , it can defend the interests of its adherents , starving more radical movements of support .
As the Republican Party becomes an increasing threat to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a strong center-right as the bulwark against that threat .
It is , therefore , no coincidence that a center-right publication called “ The Bulwark ” has arisen during the Trump administration .
It is , however , worth noting what some of the most public voices on the center-right are saying right now .
Jennifer Rubin wrote this about “ the 2020 choice for ex-Republicans.
” So what is a pro-human-rights , pro-legal-immigration , pro-rule-of-law , pro-free-trade former Republican—who understands that conservatism means to conserve what is good and reject what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unintended consequences and believes compromise and gradualism are worthy of celebration—to do in the 2020 elections ?
The first and only goal must be to support a moderate Democratic nominee with the best chance to beat Trump .
A second Trump term would be disastrous… The same approach applies to Senate seats…A Republican Senate under the auspices of Sen. Mitch McConnell ( R-Ky. ) is a lawless , amoral and destructive body .
It has made clear that fairness , truth and the Constitution are subordinate to the exercise of raw power and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and partisan judges .
While not commenting on his plans in 2020 , Max Boot makes his intentions perfectly clear when it comes to the Republican Party .
I was recently asked if I would ever rejoin the Republican Party after having registered as an independent the day after President Trump ’ s election in 2016 .
The answer is an emphatic no .
Trump will leave office some day ( I hope ! )
, but he will leave behind a quasi-authoritarian party that is as corrupt as he is… I want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the deluded and the dishonest .
I fervently hope our democracy survives this debacle .
I fervently hope the Republican Party does not .
Perhaps the least specific , but most poignant comment came from Bill Kristol , who tweeted : Not presumably forever ; not perhaps for a day after Nov. 3 , 2020 ; not on every issue or in every way until then .
But for the time being one has to say : We are all Democrats now .
When it comes to beating Trump in November , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these anti-Trump conservatives might not be a silent majority , but they could be silent majority-makers .
Remember , Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a total of just under 80,000 votes in the swing states of Pennsylvania , Michigan , and Wisconsin .
Trump got a shade under 63 million votes in 2016 , which means that if he loses one tenth of one percent of those people , his margin is gone .
Yes , yes .
Spare me the pedantry about how , depending on the distribution , he could stand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one percent of his 2016 voters and—if the stars align and Jupiter is in it ’ s seventh house and Ivanka eats Sweetgreen on Election Day—could still , maybe , get to 270 in the Electoral College .
If that ’ s your plan for winning reelection as an incumbent president when the economy is humming and unemployment is under 4 percent .
.
.
well .
Schedule lots of time for self-care November 4 , 2020 .
Which explains why the president is constantly hate tweeting about the human scum NeverTrumpers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ woefully ineffective and dangerously powerful .
Their presence is a constant reminder of the intra-party turmoil .
Democrats who chafe at making common cause with conservatives should remember that , even with the obvious disagreements , there is one thing we all share in common .
Here is how Adam Gopnick articulated it back in 2017 .
What ’ s needed against Trump now is…not an ideologically narrow , politically focussed opposition but the widest possible coalition of people who genuinely value the tenets of democracy , meaning no more than the passionate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argument , rather than by power and cruelty and clan .
As Appelbaum pointed out , however , defeating Trump is a necessary , but insufficient step in solving the problem .
At some point , these center-right conservatives must articulate a policy agenda that is distinct from the ethnonationalism that currently fuels the Republican Party .
To do so they will have to acknowledge the problem and come to grips with their own role in creating and exploiting it in the first place , which could be the most difficult step .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ find a way to garner support for that agenda that doesn ’ t simply exploit white grievance .
That ’ s a tall order and , at this point , I think the odds are stacked against them .
But I , for one , would welcome the possibility of settling differences by debate and argument in an atmosphere where the truth actually matters , because that is pretty much the definition of democracy .

For years now, conservative voters have been subjected to increasingly apocalyptic predictions about what will happen if Democrats prevail in elections. For example, at a campaign kickoff rally in Orlando, Trump told those in attendance that “our radical Democrat opponents are driven by hatred, prejudice, and rage. They want to destroy you and they want to destroy our country as we know it.”
From the court evangelicals, the message has been sent that those who oppose Trump are engaged with “demonic powers,” and that if the Democratic nominee wins in November, it will mean the end of “religious liberty” in this country. Right-wing media personalities like Tucker Carlson and Laura Ingraham warn that Democrats favor “open borders,” going on to suggest that immigrants will soon overturn our American way of life. The attorney general got in on the action during his speech to the Federalist Society when he warned that progressives are waging a “holy war.”
In any age, the so-called progressives treat politics as their religion. Their holy mission is to use the coercive power of the State to remake man and society in their own image, according to an abstract ideal of perfection. Whatever means they use are therefore justified because, by definition, they are a virtuous people pursing a deific end. They are willing to use any means necessary to gain momentary advantage in achieving their end, regardless of collateral consequences and the systemic implications. They never ask whether the actions they take could be justified as a general rule of conduct, equally applicable to all sides.
Those are the trumped-up fears that are animating the Republican base these days. Yoni Appelbaum is right to suggest that they will persist, even if Trump loses in November.
The president’s defeat would likely only deepen the despair that fueled his rise, confirming his supporters’ fear that the demographic tide has turned against them. That fear is the single greatest threat facing American democracy, the force that is already battering down precedents, leveling norms, and demolishing guardrails. When a group that has traditionally exercised power comes to believe that its eclipse is inevitable, and that the destruction of all it holds dear will follow, it will fight to preserve what it has—whatever the cost.
Appelbaum is also right when he says that extremism on the left only exacerbates the problem, creating a vicious cycle.
The more [Trump] radicalizes his opponents against his agenda, the more he gives his own supporters to fear. The excesses of the left bind his supporters more tightly to him, even as the excesses of the right make it harder for the Republican Party to command majority support, validating the fear that the party is passing into eclipse, in a vicious cycle.
In an otherwise excellent analysis of the current state of the Republican Party, this might be the most important part of Appelbaum’s analysis (emphasis mine).
In his recent study of the emergence of democracy in Western Europe, the political scientist Daniel Ziblatt zeroes in on a decisive factor distinguishing the states that achieved democratic stability from those that fell prey to authoritarian impulses: The key variable was not the strength or character of the political left, or of the forces pushing for greater democratization, so much as the viability of the center-right. A strong center-right party could wall off more extreme right-wing movements, shutting out the radicals who attacked the political system itself… Where the center-right flourishes, it can defend the interests of its adherents, starving more radical movements of support.
As the Republican Party becomes an increasing threat to democracy, the research of Ziblatt points to a strong center-right as the bulwark against that threat. It is, therefore, no coincidence that a center-right publication called “The Bulwark” has arisen during the Trump administration.
It is, however, worth noting what some of the most public voices on the center-right are saying right now. Jennifer Rubin wrote this about “the 2020 choice for ex-Republicans.”
So what is a pro-human-rights, pro-legal-immigration, pro-rule-of-law, pro-free-trade former Republican—who understands that conservatism means to conserve what is good and reject what is unnecessary, appreciates the law of unintended consequences and believes compromise and gradualism are worthy of celebration—to do in the 2020 elections? The first and only goal must be to support a moderate Democratic nominee with the best chance to beat Trump. A second Trump term would be disastrous… The same approach applies to Senate seats…A Republican Senate under the auspices of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is a lawless, amoral and destructive body. It has made clear that fairness, truth and the Constitution are subordinate to the exercise of raw power and the population of the judiciary with unqualified and partisan judges. While not commenting on his plans in 2020, Max Boot makes his intentions perfectly clear when it comes to the Republican Party. I was recently asked if I would ever rejoin the Republican Party after having registered as an independent the day after President Trump’s election in 2016. The answer is an emphatic no. Trump will leave office some day (I hope!), but he will leave behind a quasi-authoritarian party that is as corrupt as he is… I want nothing to do with a party led by the deluded and the dishonest. I fervently hope our democracy survives this debacle. I fervently hope the Republican Party does not. Perhaps the least specific, but most poignant comment came from Bill Kristol, who tweeted: Not presumably forever; not perhaps for a day after Nov. 3, 2020; not on every issue or in every way until then. But for the time being one has to say: We are all Democrats now. When it comes to beating Trump in November, Amanda Carpenter is right to suggest that these anti-Trump conservatives might not be a silent majority, but they could be silent majority-makers. Remember, Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a total of just under 80,000 votes in the swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Trump got a shade under 63 million votes in 2016, which means that if he loses one tenth of one percent of those people, his margin is gone. Yes, yes. Spare me the pedantry about how, depending on the distribution, he could stand to lose as much as half of one percent of his 2016 voters and—if the stars align and Jupiter is in it’s seventh house and Ivanka eats Sweetgreen on Election Day—could still, maybe, get to 270 in the Electoral College. If that’s your plan for winning reelection as an incumbent president when the economy is humming and unemployment is under 4 percent . . . well. Schedule lots of time for self-care November 4, 2020. Which explains why the president is constantly hate tweeting about the human scum NeverTrumpers, who he describes as being simultaneously both woefully ineffective and dangerously powerful. Their presence is a constant reminder of the intra-party turmoil. Democrats who chafe at making common cause with conservatives should remember that, even with the obvious disagreements, there is one thing we all share in common. Here is how Adam Gopnick articulated it back in 2017. What’s needed against Trump now is…not an ideologically narrow, politically focussed opposition but the widest possible coalition of people who genuinely value the tenets of democracy, meaning no more than the passionate desire to settle differences by debate and argument, rather than by power and cruelty and clan. As Appelbaum pointed out, however, defeating Trump is a necessary, but insufficient step in solving the problem. At some point, these center-right conservatives must articulate a policy agenda that is distinct from the ethnonationalism that currently fuels the Republican Party. To do so they will have to acknowledge the problem and come to grips with their own role in creating and exploiting it in the first place, which could be the most difficult step. Once articulated, they would have to find a way to garner support for that agenda that doesn’t simply exploit white grievance. That’s a tall order and, at this point, I think the odds are stacked against them. But I, for one, would welcome the possibility of settling differences by debate and argument in an atmosphere where the truth actually matters, because that is pretty much the definition of democracy. This is a companion piece to “How the Republican Party Became a Threat to Democracy.”


washingtonmonthly--2020-02-04--The Case Against Iowa

The Case Against Iowa

This post , by Editor in Chief Paul Glastris , originally appeared in the St. Louis Post Dispatch on February 10 , 1992 .
Given Monday ’ s night ’ s fiasco , in which a software flaw delayed the results of the Iowa caucus , we thought it was worth reviving .
On the rare occasions when he can bring himself to do so , Bruce Babbitt , the former Arizona governor and presidential candidate , watches videotapes of his performance at the 1988 Iowa debates .
Each time he is struck by how he and the other candidates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidies and AIDS testing , instead of the broad issues on which most voters judge presidents , the economy and national security .
“ It ’ s as if we were in a congressional race , ” observes Babbitt , “ each of us responding to the separate disaggregate constituencies of the Democratic Party.
” This year ’ s Democratic hopefuls haven ’ t made that mistake , he says , and he thinks he knows one reason why : “ They don ’ t have to contend with Iowa.
” Tonight ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1972 , will be a virtual non-event .
The first big electoral battle of 1993 will be in New Hampshire , thanks to the fact that the candidates announced so late and that one of them was a favored son , Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin .
Yet few people seem upset about this , aside from Des Moines hoteliers and restauranteurs .
Indeed , a case against Iowa has been building for years among some campaign strategists who claim that the caucuses produce candidates who can ’ t win general elections .
Iowa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hope , will be the Democrats ’ gain .
But criticisms of Iowa aren ’ t universally shared .
University of Iowa political scientist Peverill Squire notes that studies have failed to prove a common complaint about Iowa : That its caucus voters are more liberal than caucus voters elsewhere .
Election results , he says , point to the same conclusion : Iowans preferred Edmund Muskie to George McGovern , Jimmy Carter to Ted Kennedy and Richard Gephardt to Paul Simon .
Two-time presidential candidate Gary Hart complains of press hype and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials , but thinks that any state placed first on the calendar would suffer these problems .
“ There ’ s nothing in the drinking water of Iowa , ” he says .
Yet the 1990 census confirms just how unrepresentative Iowa has become .
The state is 96.6 percent white ; the United States as a whole is 80.3 percent white .
The U.S. population grew 9.8 percent in the 1980s ; Iowa ’ s dropped 4.7 percent .
Fifteen percent of Iowans are now 65 or older , making it the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Americans live in urban areas ; 40 percent of Iowans still live in rural areas .
The U.S. economy grew in the 1980s and many regions boomed .
Iowa remained stuck in a severe recession that eased only at the decade ’ s end .
Those differences were hardly apparent in the ’ 70s , when few candidates spent more than a handful of days in Iowa .
They had serious consequences , however , during the ’ 84 and ’ 88 campaigns , when candidates spent up to three months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic candidates perfected a gloomy economic rhetoric that fit the experience of most Iowans , but played less well in places like Florida and Connecticut , where voters responded better to more upbeat , entrepreneurial messages .
Meanwhile , Democrats paid less attention to problems that were acute almost everywhere except Iowa : crime , drugs , racial tension and suburban traffic snarls .
Why did the home affordability crisis become a central issue only this year ?
In part , perhaps , because in all of Iowa there are only 4,500 homes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iowa-oriented issues Democrats did focus on in ’ 84 and ’ 88 did little to boost their national appeal .
The need to be seen combatting the farm crisis “ drove Democrats to promise so much that it undermined their credibility , ” says Babbitt .
Candidates who didn ’ t understand farm economics also got punished , as Michael Dukakis found out when he suggested that Iowa corn farmers diversify into Belgian endive .
Reporters on past campaign trails , impressed by the undeniable warmth and work ethic of rural Iowans , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the self-reliant American spirit .
Yet farm-based Midwestern communities are more dependent than urban areas on government subsidies , in the form of farm-price supports and old-age benefits , according to a study by the Center for Rural Affairs , a non-profit institute in Nebraska .
Such dependence made Iowa “ a very difficult place to break with the classic orthodoxy of the Democratic Party , ” recalls Bill Galston , issues director for Walter Mondale in 1984 and an adviser to Gov .
Bill Clinton .
Candidates who tried to tailor their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ price later .
Rep. Richard Gephardt , a pro-life , pro-tax-cut moderate in the early 1980s , turned populist in Iowa , championing an extremely generous farm bill while bashing Asian trade barriers to appeal to Iowa ’ s potent labor unions .
After winning decisively in Iowa , Gephardt ’ s campaign fizzled as competitors accused him of “ flip-flopping.
” Harkin is this year ’ s example of the limited appeal of Iowa style populism .
Bending to Iowa ’ s isolationist streak is another common Democratic mistake .
Candidate debates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups such as STAR* PAC and PEACE , “ pulled the whole ticket further to the left , ” complains Galston .
Des Moines Register political reporter David Yepsen , a caucus defender , recalls that after one such debate “ Richard Gephardt sought me out to make it clear which weapons systems he was for.
” Dukakis managed a respectable third place in Iowa by hammering away on his opposition to Contra aid .
He later tried to dispel his resulting soft-on-defense image with an ill-advised tank ride .
Iowa does force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Unfortunately , heavily agricultural Iowa is no longer even emblematic of most rural America , where the bulk of the population now works in manufacturing and services .
New Hampshire , with its ties to urban New England , is more typical .
Moreover , the Granite State ’ s anti-tax fervor and other cultural eccentricities hardly encourage the Democrats ’ New Deal tendencies .
Traditional Rooseveltian promises of more farm loans and crop price supports won ’ t help most rural areas .
What might help , say a growing number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that would benefit urban areas , like infrastructure investments and apprenticeship programs .
Even critics concede that as an early primary state , Iowa has advantages : its small size , clean politics and well-informed voters who demand face-to-face contact with candidates .
Fortunately , it may be possible to keep the advantages of the Iowa caucus while minimizing its problems .
Some political scientists and party leaders advocate for a federal law mandating that three or four small states from different regions of the country hold their primaries on the first day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ picked each year .
If such a law makes sense , politicians might want to act before 1996 , when Iowa will almost certainly regain its place as the eye of the presidential campaign needle .

This post, by Editor in Chief Paul Glastris, originally appeared in the St. Louis Post Dispatch on February 10, 1992. Given Monday’s night’s fiasco, in which a software flaw delayed the results of the Iowa caucus, we thought it was worth reviving.
On the rare occasions when he can bring himself to do so, Bruce Babbitt, the former Arizona governor and presidential candidate, watches videotapes of his performance at the 1988 Iowa debates. Each time he is struck by how he and the other candidates focused on narrow issues, like farm subsidies and AIDS testing, instead of the broad issues on which most voters judge presidents, the economy and national security.
“It’s as if we were in a congressional race,” observes Babbitt, “each of us responding to the separate disaggregate constituencies of the Democratic Party.” This year’s Democratic hopefuls haven’t made that mistake, he says, and he thinks he knows one reason why: “They don’t have to contend with Iowa.”
Tonight’s Iowa caucus, unlike any since 1972, will be a virtual non-event. The first big electoral battle of 1993 will be in New Hampshire, thanks to the fact that the candidates announced so late and that one of them was a favored son, Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin. Yet few people seem upset about this, aside from Des Moines hoteliers and restauranteurs. Indeed, a case against Iowa has been building for years among some campaign strategists who claim that the caucuses produce candidates who can’t win general elections. Iowa’s loss in 1992, they hope, will be the Democrats’ gain.
But criticisms of Iowa aren’t universally shared. University of Iowa political scientist Peverill Squire notes that studies have failed to prove a common complaint about Iowa: That its caucus voters are more liberal than caucus voters elsewhere. Election results, he says, point to the same conclusion: Iowans preferred Edmund Muskie to George McGovern, Jimmy Carter to Ted Kennedy and Richard Gephardt to Paul Simon. Two-time presidential candidate Gary Hart complains of press hype and the inflated egos of some Iowa party officials, but thinks that any state placed first on the calendar would suffer these problems. “There’s nothing in the drinking water of Iowa,” he says.
Yet the 1990 census confirms just how unrepresentative Iowa has become. The state is 96.6 percent white; the United States as a whole is 80.3 percent white. The U.S. population grew 9.8 percent in the 1980s; Iowa’s dropped 4.7 percent. Fifteen percent of Iowans are now 65 or older, making it the third-oldest state in the union. Seventy-five percent of Americans live in urban areas; 40 percent of Iowans still live in rural areas. The U.S. economy grew in the 1980s and many regions boomed. Iowa remained stuck in a severe recession that eased only at the decade’s end.
Those differences were hardly apparent in the ’70s, when few candidates spent more than a handful of days in Iowa. They had serious consequences, however, during the ’84 and ’88 campaigns, when candidates spent up to three months working the state.
For instance, Democratic candidates perfected a gloomy economic rhetoric that fit the experience of most Iowans, but played less well in places like Florida and Connecticut, where voters responded better to more upbeat, entrepreneurial messages. Meanwhile, Democrats paid less attention to problems that were acute almost everywhere except Iowa: crime, drugs, racial tension and suburban traffic snarls. Why did the home affordability crisis become a central issue only this year? In part, perhaps, because in all of Iowa there are only 4,500 homes worth $200,000 or more.
The Iowa-oriented issues Democrats did focus on in ’84 and ’88 did little to boost their national appeal. The need to be seen combatting the farm crisis “drove Democrats to promise so much that it undermined their credibility,” says Babbitt. Candidates who didn’t understand farm economics also got punished, as Michael Dukakis found out when he suggested that Iowa corn farmers diversify into Belgian endive.
Reporters on past campaign trails, impressed by the undeniable warmth and work ethic of rural Iowans, have tended to see them as embodying the self-reliant American spirit. Yet farm-based Midwestern communities are more dependent than urban areas on government subsidies, in the form of farm-price supports and old-age benefits, according to a study by the Center for Rural Affairs, a non-profit institute in Nebraska.
Such dependence made Iowa “a very difficult place to break with the classic orthodoxy of the Democratic Party,” recalls Bill Galston, issues director for Walter Mondale in 1984 and an adviser to Gov. Bill Clinton.
Candidates who tried to tailor their messages for Iowa tended to pay the price later. Rep. Richard Gephardt, a pro-life, pro-tax-cut moderate in the early 1980s, turned populist in Iowa, championing an extremely generous farm bill while bashing Asian trade barriers to appeal to Iowa’s potent labor unions. After winning decisively in Iowa, Gephardt’s campaign fizzled as competitors accused him of “flip-flopping.” Harkin is this year’s example of the limited appeal of Iowa style populism.
Bending to Iowa’s isolationist streak is another common Democratic mistake. Candidate debates sponsored by Iowa’s well-organized disarmament groups such as STAR* PAC and PEACE, “pulled the whole ticket further to the left,” complains Galston.
Des Moines Register political reporter David Yepsen, a caucus defender, recalls that after one such debate “Richard Gephardt sought me out to make it clear which weapons systems he was for.” Dukakis managed a respectable third place in Iowa by hammering away on his opposition to Contra aid. He later tried to dispel his resulting soft-on-defense image with an ill-advised tank ride.
Iowa does force candidates to familiarize themselves with rural problems. Unfortunately, heavily agricultural Iowa is no longer even emblematic of most rural America, where the bulk of the population now works in manufacturing and services. New Hampshire, with its ties to urban New England, is more typical.
Moreover, the Granite State’s anti-tax fervor and other cultural eccentricities hardly encourage the Democrats’ New Deal tendencies. Traditional Rooseveltian promises of more farm loans and crop price supports won’t help most rural areas. What might help, say a growing number of experts, are the same policies that would benefit urban areas, like infrastructure investments and apprenticeship programs.
Even critics concede that as an early primary state, Iowa has advantages: its small size, clean politics and well-informed voters who demand face-to-face contact with candidates. Fortunately, it may be possible to keep the advantages of the Iowa caucus while minimizing its problems. Some political scientists and party leaders advocate for a federal law mandating that three or four small states from different regions of the country hold their primaries on the first day of the season, with different states picked each year.
If such a law makes sense, politicians might want to act before 1996, when Iowa will almost certainly regain its place as the eye of the presidential campaign needle.