independentsciencenews--2020-08-07--Why We Oppose Golden Rice

Why We Oppose Golden Rice

The push for corporate-led solutions to hunger and malnutrition is alarming .
In particular , Golden Rice is now being proposed as a solution to the worsening hunger and malnutrition associated with the pandemic .
Agrochemical transnationals ( TNCs ) and collaborating institutions such as the International Rice Research Institute ( IRRI ) are using concerns over food security during the pandemic to push for an industrial agricultural system that is already discredited .
To quote PAN Asia Pacific : “ in the webinar “ The future of food systems in Southeast Asia post-COVID19 ” organised by IRRI and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s head of Agri-Food Policy , said that they are “ looking to increase the mineral and vitamin content in rice grains ” as a response to the pandemic , alluding to renewed promotion of the genetically-modified Golden Rice , which has recently been approved for commercialization in Bangladesh and the Philippines ” said PANAP .
Golden Rice projects and applications are currently underway in three countries .
On December 10 , 2019 , the Philippines ’ Dept .
of Agriculture ’ s Bureau of Plant Industry ( DA-BPI ) issued a Golden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Feed and Processing .
This was despite the standing challenge by farmers , scientists and civil society groups regarding Golden Rice ’ s unresolved safety and efficacy issues .
In August 2019 , it was confirmed that Indonesia rice research centre ( BB Padi ) had grown Golden Rice in their testing fields in Sukamandi , West Java .
But BB Padi is still awaiting permission from Indonesia ’ s biosafety clearing house for confined field testing in selected areas .
In Bangladesh , rumours have circulated that Golden Rice would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the environment ministry last November 15 , 2019 .
While there have been no specifics yet , proponents are optimistic that approval in Bangladesh will occur .
We , the Stop Golden Rice Network ( SGRN ) , believe that Golden Rice is an unnecessary and unwanted technology being peddled by corporations purely for their profit-making agenda .
Golden Rice will only strengthen the grip of corporations over rice and agriculture and will endanger agrobiodiversity and peoples ’ health as well .
Therefore , farmers , consumers and basic sectors have been campaigning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rice since the mid-2000s , utilizing various forms and actions , including the historical uprooting of Golden Rice field trials back in 2013 .
Why is there intense opposition towards Golden Rice ?
The importance of rice in Asian countries can not be understated ; 90 % of rice is produced and consumed in Asia .
Rice is at the center of the social , cultural and economic activities of peoples across Asia .
It is also a political commodity as rice is the staple food for a majority of the Asian population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Indonesia , and India are centers of origin of more than 100,000 varieties of rice .
Also considered as among the most biodiverse countries in the world , a wide array of vegetables , fruits , root crops and cereals abound in the farms and forests of these countries , ensuring a dependable source of nutrition for the families and the communities .
Yet , malnutrition is prevalent , particularly among children and women .
This is not simply because of the absence of an important nutrient or vitamin .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to sufficient , nutritious and safe food ” due to poverty , and changing food production and consumption patterns ( p. 27 , UN FAO , 2017 ) .
This impact is seen in IRRI ’ s Green Revolution wherein many farmers across Asia have become bound to the expensive inputs and seeds peddled by huge agrochemical TNCs who promote a single-crop diet .
As a result of green revolution , white rice has become dominant in once very diverse Asian diets ; but white rice has a high glycemic index which causes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases are in Asia .
Packing more nutrients , like Vitamin A , in rice , which requires more rice consumption would make this worse .
Especially with the new pandemic for which diabetes is considered a risk factor for severity of Covid-19 .
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ( UN FAO ) identifies the dominance of large corporations over food systems as among the factors that contribute to food insecurity and malnutrition ( p. 27 , UN FAO , 2017 ) .
In developing countries , large tracts of agricultural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and commercial land uses , or to large-scale mono-cropped plantations of cash crops such as pineapples , palm oil and bananas that hardly serve the nutrition needs of the people .
FAO further acknowledges that the changes in food systems and diets , such as the prevalence of highly-processed foods and displacement of traditional foods and eating habits also contributes to the worsening trend of food insecurity and malnutrition .
Given this context , we assert that Golden Rice is simply a ‘ band-aid ’ solution to the wide , gaping wound of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues that continue to hound Golden Rice further prove the point that it is unnecessary and unwanted • Negligible beta carotene content – The current version of the Golden Rice , GR2E contains a negligible amount of beta-carotene ( from 3.57 ug/g to 22 ug/g ) , which the United States Food and Drug Administration ( US FDA ) also acknowledged , making the product useless in addressing Vitamin A deficiency ( VAD ) in contrast to existing and readily available food sources .
Already minimal , Golden Rice ’ s beta-carotene was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , storing and processing , such as milling and even cooking unless the farmers vacuum-pack and refrigerate the GM rice .
Farmers from developing countries however , do not seal or store the paddy rice in vacuum packs , which will make the product more expensive .
Electricity also remains scarce in remote farming communities so refrigerating the harvest is unrealistic bordering on the absurd .
• No meaningful safety tests have been done – Even as the Golden Rice has been approved in the Philippines , there has been no testing done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human consumption .
Meanwhile , the aforementioned beta-carotene degradation may result in toxic compounds causing oxidative stress damage which might lead to cancer .
Dr. David Schubert of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies , USA and Dr. Michael Antoniou of King ’ s College London , state that “ there have never been short nor , more importantly , long-term safety testing in laboratory animals ( of Golden Rice ) and this must be done for several generations in rats to determine if it causes birth defects , which we consider a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rice varieties and wild relatives of rice – Field trials conducted so far have only looked at the agronomic traits of Golden Rice , and not its long-term effects on the environment , including its possible effects on the genetic diversity of the thousands of rice varieties being cared for by small scale farmers and indigenous peoples .
While rice is a self-pollinating crop , cross-contamination is still inevitable Contamination can also occur through seed mixing .
Such contamination has already happened in the US with the Liberty Link rice scandal back in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dollars in losses because of the inadvertent contamination of the yet unapproved GM rice .
• Safer sources of beta-carotene – Being some of the mega-diverse countries , vegetables and fruits that are high in beta-carotene are found in abundance in the Philippines , Indonesia , Bangladesh , India and other target countries for Golden Rice .
These foods are available and accessible for the people , and contain much higher levels of beta-carotene than Golden Rice .
The worsening land-grabbing and land conversion cases , liberalization of agricultural commodities and increasing control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , are preventing farmers and their communities from having access to these safe and nutritious foods .
In developing countries the challenges described above remain the main culprit of food insecurity and malnutrition .
Both the development of biofortified crops like Golden Rice for solving health issues and corporate led projects in agriculture as ways to ensure food security represent a worrisome push for top-down and anti-diversity approaches to food and health that will ultimately undermine people ’ s capacities to strengthen their local food systems .
By emphasizing dependence on just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a poor diet with little nutritional diversity Golden Rice is a failed and useless product , and that is why we continue to resist and oppose it .
Time and again , huge agrochemical companies , philanthrocapitalists and pseudo-public agencies have done everything in their power to deny the people ’ s right to participate in decisions about their food and agriculture .
Already , zinc and iron GM rice and thirty other GM rice are in the pipeline , with Golden Rice serving as the Trojan Horse to lure the people into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than resisting the release of Golden Rice however , we are pushing for safer , better and healthier alternatives to addressing VAD and other malnutrition issues .
VAD and other malnutrition problems can be mitigated and addressed by having a diverse diet .
Nutrition does not need to be an expensive commodity , nor rely on advanced technology .
We believe that instead of pushing Golden Rice and biofortifying crops through genetic modification , governments should promote biodiversity in farms and on tables by supporting safe , healthy and sustainable food production .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ pay attention to the needs of our food producers , including facilitating access to lands to till , appropriate technologies and an agriculture policy that will promote and uphold the people ’ s right to food and the nations ’ food sovereignty .
AGRA ( Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movement ) , Indonesia APC ( Asian Peasants Coalition ) APVUU ( Andhra Pradesh Vyavasaya Vruthidarula Union ) , India BAFLF ( Bangladesh Agricultural Farm Labour Federation ) , Bangladesh Bangladesh Krishok Federation , Bangladesh BINA DESA , Indonesia CENDI ( Community Entrepreneur Development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan , Japan GM Free India Coalition , India GRAIN HEAD ( Health Action for Democracy ) , Philippines KMP ( Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas ) , Philippines Labour Resource Center ( LRC ) , Bangladesh MASIPAG ( Magsasaka at Siyentipiko para sa Pag-unlad ng Agrikultura ) , Philippines MONLAR , Sri Lanka Narasimha Reddy Donthi , Telangana , India NWFA ( National Women Farmers and Workers Association ) , Bangladesh ORRISSA ( Organization for Rural Reconstruction and Integrated Social Services Activities ) , India PAN Phils ( Pesticide Action Network-Phils ) PANAP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Coalition on Food Sovereignty , Global PNSFP ( Philippine Network for Food Security Programs ) RESIST !
Agri-TNCs Network , Philippines Save Our Rice Network , India SERUNI ( National Women ’ s Alliance ) , Indonesia SHISUK ( Shikha Shastha Unnayan Karzakram ) , Bangladesh SIBAT ( Sibol ng Agham at Teknolohiya ) , Philippines SPFT ( Southern Peasants Federation of Thailand ) , Thailand SRD ( Center for Sustainable Rural Development ) , Vietnam TFIP ( Philippine Task Force for Indigenous Peoples Rights ) THANAL , India Save Our Rice campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( WELIGEPOLA ) , Sri Lanka Beta-carotene degradation products – formation , toxicity and prevention of toxicity .
Siems W , Salerno C , Crifò C , Sommerburg O , Wiswedel I .
( 2009 ) Forum Nutr .
61 : 75-86 .
FAO , IFAD , UNICEF , WFP and WHO .
2017 .
The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017 .
Building resilience for peace and food security .
Rome , FAO .
http : //www.fao.org/3/a-I7695e.pdf GRAIN , “ Biofortified crops or biodiversity ?
The fight for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 .
Kinetics of β-carotene degradation under different storage conditions in transgenic Golden Rice® lines .
Bollinedi , H. , Dhakane-Lad , J. , Krishnan , S.G. , Bhowmick , P.K.
, Prabhu , K.V.
, Singh , N.K.
, and Singh , A.K .
( 2019 ) .
Food Chemistry 278 , 773-779. https : //sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308814618320661 Liberty Link Rice : The Scandal that Woke Up the World .
( 2006 , August 27 ) .
Retrieved from https : //dev.panap.net/sites/default/files/rs_libertylink_1.pdf The Global Pipeline of GM crops : an outlook for 2020 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rodriguez-Cerezo , European Commission , Joint Research Centre ( JRC ) , Institute for Prospective Technological Studies ( IPTS ) , Edificio Expo , C/Inca Garcilaso 3 .
41092 , Seville , Spain Who paid for the golden rice eco-attack ?
( 2013 , August 21 ) .
CFact.Retrieved from https : //www.cfact.org/2013/08/21/who-paid-for-the-golden-rice-eco-attack/ If this article was useful to you please consider sharing it with your networks .

By the Stop Golden Rice Network (SGRN)
(Released today in commemoration of the International Day of Protest Against Golden Rice, now in its 7th year)
The push for corporate-led solutions to hunger and malnutrition is alarming. In particular, Golden Rice is now being proposed as a solution to the worsening hunger and malnutrition associated with the pandemic. Agrochemical transnationals (TNCs) and collaborating institutions such as the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) are using concerns over food security during the pandemic to push for an industrial agricultural system that is already discredited. To quote PAN Asia Pacific:
“in the webinar “The future of food systems in Southeast Asia post-COVID19” organised by IRRI and the FAO, Jean Balie, IRRI’s head of Agri-Food Policy, said that they are “looking to increase the mineral and vitamin content in rice grains” as a response to the pandemic, alluding to renewed promotion of the genetically-modified Golden Rice, which has recently been approved for commercialization in Bangladesh and the Philippines” said PANAP.
Golden Rice projects and applications are currently underway in three countries. On December 10, 2019, the Philippines’ Dept. of Agriculture’s Bureau of Plant Industry (DA-BPI) issued a Golden Rice permit for Direct Use for Food, Feed and Processing. This was despite the standing challenge by farmers, scientists and civil society groups regarding Golden Rice’s unresolved safety and efficacy issues.
In August 2019, it was confirmed that Indonesia rice research centre (BB Padi) had grown Golden Rice in their testing fields in Sukamandi, West Java. But BB Padi is still awaiting permission from Indonesia’s biosafety clearing house for confined field testing in selected areas.
In Bangladesh, rumours have circulated that Golden Rice would be approved by the Biosafety Core Committee under the environment ministry last November 15, 2019. While there have been no specifics yet, proponents are optimistic that approval in Bangladesh will occur.
We, the Stop Golden Rice Network (SGRN), believe that Golden Rice is an unnecessary and unwanted technology being peddled by corporations purely for their profit-making agenda. Golden Rice will only strengthen the grip of corporations over rice and agriculture and will endanger agrobiodiversity and peoples’ health as well. Therefore, farmers, consumers and basic sectors have been campaigning against the propagation and commercialization of Golden Rice since the mid-2000s, utilizing various forms and actions, including the historical uprooting of Golden Rice field trials back in 2013.
Why is there intense opposition towards Golden Rice?
The importance of rice in Asian countries cannot be understated; 90% of rice is produced and consumed in Asia. Rice is at the center of the social, cultural and economic activities of peoples across Asia. It is also a political commodity as rice is the staple food for a majority of the Asian population. Asian countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and India are centers of origin of more than 100,000 varieties of rice. Also considered as among the most biodiverse countries in the world, a wide array of vegetables, fruits, root crops and cereals abound in the farms and forests of these countries, ensuring a dependable source of nutrition for the families and the communities.
Yet, malnutrition is prevalent, particularly among children and women. This is not simply because of the absence of an important nutrient or vitamin. It is caused by the “lack of access to sufficient, nutritious and safe food” due to poverty, and changing food production and consumption patterns (p. 27, UN FAO, 2017).
This impact is seen in IRRI’s Green Revolution wherein many farmers across Asia have become bound to the expensive inputs and seeds peddled by huge agrochemical TNCs who promote a single-crop diet. As a result of green revolution, white rice has become dominant in once very diverse Asian diets; but white rice has a high glycemic index which causes diabetes and 60% of global diabetes cases are in Asia. Packing more nutrients, like Vitamin A, in rice, which requires more rice consumption would make this worse. Especially with the new pandemic for which diabetes is considered a risk factor for severity of Covid-19.
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UN FAO) identifies the dominance of large corporations over food systems as among the factors that contribute to food insecurity and malnutrition (p. 27, UN FAO, 2017). In developing countries, large tracts of agricultural lands are being converted either to industrial and commercial land uses, or to large-scale mono-cropped plantations of cash crops such as pineapples, palm oil and bananas that hardly serve the nutrition needs of the people. FAO further acknowledges that the changes in food systems and diets, such as the prevalence of highly-processed foods and displacement of traditional foods and eating habits also contributes to the worsening trend of food insecurity and malnutrition.
Given this context, we assert that Golden Rice is simply a ‘band-aid’ solution to the wide, gaping wound of hunger and poverty. Worse, the issues that continue to hound Golden Rice further prove the point that it is unnecessary and unwanted.
Negligible beta carotene content – The current version of the Golden Rice, GR2E contains a negligible amount of beta-carotene (from 3.57 ug/g to 22 ug/g), which the United States Food and Drug Administration (US FDA) also acknowledged, making the product useless in addressing Vitamin A deficiency (VAD) in contrast to existing and readily available food sources. Already minimal, Golden Rice’s beta-carotene was also found to degrade quickly after harvesting, storing and processing, such as milling and even cooking unless the farmers vacuum-pack and refrigerate the GM rice. Farmers from developing countries however, do not seal or store the paddy rice in vacuum packs, which will make the product more expensive. Electricity also remains scarce in remote farming communities so refrigerating the harvest is unrealistic bordering on the absurd. No meaningful safety tests have been done – Even as the Golden Rice has been approved in the Philippines, there has been no testing done to ascertain if it is safe for human consumption. Meanwhile, the aforementioned beta-carotene degradation may result in toxic compounds causing oxidative stress damage which might lead to cancer. Dr. David Schubert of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, USA and Dr. Michael Antoniou of King’s College London, state that “there have never been short nor, more importantly, long-term safety testing in laboratory animals (of Golden Rice) and this must be done for several generations in rats to determine if it causes birth defects, which we consider a serious possibility.” Contamination of other rice varieties and wild relatives of rice – Field trials conducted so far have only looked at the agronomic traits of Golden Rice, and not its long-term effects on the environment, including its possible effects on the genetic diversity of the thousands of rice varieties being cared for by small scale farmers and indigenous peoples. While rice is a self-pollinating crop, cross-contamination is still inevitable. Contamination can also occur through seed mixing. Such contamination has already happened in the US with the Liberty Link rice scandal back in 2006 that caused US farmers millions of dollars in losses because of the inadvertent contamination of the yet unapproved GM rice. Safer sources of beta-carotene – Being some of the mega-diverse countries, vegetables and fruits that are high in beta-carotene are found in abundance in the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, India and other target countries for Golden Rice. These foods are available and accessible for the people, and contain much higher levels of beta-carotene than Golden Rice.
The worsening land-grabbing and land conversion cases, liberalization of agricultural commodities and increasing control of corporations over agriculture and food, however, are preventing farmers and their communities from having access to these safe and nutritious foods. In developing countries the challenges described above remain the main culprit of food insecurity and malnutrition. Both the development of biofortified crops like Golden Rice for solving health issues and corporate led projects in agriculture as ways to ensure food security represent a worrisome push for top-down and anti-diversity approaches to food and health that will ultimately undermine people’s capacities to strengthen their local food systems. By emphasizing dependence on just a few market-based crops biofortification actually promotes a poor diet with little nutritional diversity.
Golden Rice is a failed and useless product, and that is why we continue to resist and oppose it. Time and again, huge agrochemical companies, philanthrocapitalists and pseudo-public agencies have done everything in their power to deny the people’s right to participate in decisions about their food and agriculture. Already, zinc and iron GM rice and thirty other GM rice products are in the pipeline, with Golden Rice serving as the Trojan Horse to lure the people into social acceptance and false security.
More than resisting the release of Golden Rice however, we are pushing for safer, better and healthier alternatives to addressing VAD and other malnutrition issues. VAD and other malnutrition problems can be mitigated and addressed by having a diverse diet. Nutrition does not need to be an expensive commodity, nor rely on advanced technology. We believe that instead of pushing Golden Rice and biofortifying crops through genetic modification, governments should promote biodiversity in farms and on tables by supporting safe, healthy and sustainable food production. We are also calling on governments to pay attention to the needs of our food producers, including facilitating access to lands to till, appropriate technologies and an agriculture policy that will promote and uphold the people’s right to food and the nations’ food sovereignty.
Stop Golden Rice Network (SGRN)
Members include:
AGRA (Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movement), Indonesia
APC (Asian Peasants Coalition)
APVUU (Andhra Pradesh Vyavasaya Vruthidarula Union), India
BAFLF (Bangladesh Agricultural Farm Labour Federation), Bangladesh
Bangladesh Krishok Federation, Bangladesh
BINA DESA, Indonesia
CENDI (Community Entrepreneur Development Institute), Vietnam
Consumers Union of Japan, Japan
GM Free India Coalition, India
GRAIN
HEAD (Health Action for Democracy), Philippines
KMP (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas), Philippines
Labour Resource Center (LRC), Bangladesh
MASIPAG (Magsasaka at Siyentipiko para sa Pag-unlad ng Agrikultura), Philippines
MONLAR, Sri Lanka
Narasimha Reddy Donthi, Telangana, India
NWFA (National Women Farmers and Workers Association), Bangladesh
ORRISSA (Organization for Rural Reconstruction and Integrated Social Services Activities), India
PAN Phils (Pesticide Action Network-Phils)
PANAP (Pesticide Action Network-Asia Pacific)
Peoples Coalition on Food Sovereignty, Global
PNSFP (Philippine Network for Food Security Programs)
RESIST! Agri-TNCs Network, Philippines
Save Our Rice Network, India
SERUNI (National Women’s Alliance), Indonesia
SHISUK (Shikha Shastha Unnayan Karzakram), Bangladesh
SIBAT (Sibol ng Agham at Teknolohiya), Philippines
SPFT (Southern Peasants Federation of Thailand), Thailand
SRD (Center for Sustainable Rural Development), Vietnam
TFIP (Philippine Task Force for Indigenous Peoples Rights)
THANAL, India
Save Our Rice campaign, India
Women’s Development Federation (WELIGEPOLA), Sri Lanka
Sources:
Beta-carotene degradation products – formation, toxicity and prevention of toxicity. Siems W, Salerno C, Crifò C, Sommerburg O, Wiswedel I. (2009) Forum Nutr. 61: 75-86.
Farmers and consumers urge regulatory body to halt Golden Rice release. 2019 October 16. http://masipag.org/2019/10/farmers-and-consumers-urge-regulatory-body-to-halt-golden-rice-release/
FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2017. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. Rome, FAO. http://www.fao.org/3/a-I7695e.pdf
GRAIN, “Biofortified crops or biodiversity? The fight for genuine solutions to malnutrition is on” 2019.
GM ‘golden rice’ opponents wicked, says Minister Owen Paterson. (2013, October 14). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24515938
Kinetics of β-carotene degradation under different storage conditions in transgenic Golden Rice® lines. Bollinedi, H., Dhakane-Lad, J., Krishnan, S.G., Bhowmick, P.K., Prabhu, K.V., Singh, N.K., and Singh, A.K. (2019). Food Chemistry 278, 773-779. https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308814618320661
Liberty Link Rice: The Scandal that Woke Up the World. (2006, August 27). Retrieved from https://dev.panap.net/sites/default/files/rs_libertylink_1.pdf
The Global Pipeline of GM crops: an outlook for 2020. Claudia Parisi, Pascal Tillie, Emilio Rodriguez-Cerezo, European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), Edificio Expo, C/Inca Garcilaso 3. 41092, Seville, Spain
Who paid for the golden rice eco-attack? (2013, August 21). CFact.Retrieved from https://www.cfact.org/2013/08/21/who-paid-for-the-golden-rice-eco-attack/
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/11/bangladesh-could-be-first-cultivate-golden-rice-genetically-altered-fight-blindness
https://www.grain.org/en/article/5064-how-does-the-gates-foundation-spend-its-money-to-feed-the-world
https://www.grain.org/en/article/6246-biofortified-crops-or-biodiversity-the-fight-for-genuine-solutions-to-malnutrition-is-on
https://panap.net/2020/05/business-as-usual-for-agrochemical-industry-damaging-to-biodiversity-farmers/
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independentsciencenews--2020-08-13--Engineered COVID-19-Infected Mouse Bites Researcher Amid ‘Explosion’ Of Risky Coronavirus Research

University researchers genetically engineer a human pandemic virus .
They inject the new virus into a laboratory mouse .
The infected mouse then bites a researcher…..It is a plot worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster about risky coronavirus research .
But according to newly obtained minutes of the Institutional Biosafety Committee ( IBC ) of the University of North Carolina ( UNC ) , Chapel Hill , these exact events need not be imagined .
They occurred for real between April 1st and May 6th this year .
The identity of the bitten coronavirus researcher has not been revealed except that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BSL-3 virus lab when the accident happened .
According to Richard Ebright , an epidemiologist from Rutgers University , the UNC incident underscores an important development in virus research since the pandemic began : “ There has been an explosion of research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 over the last six months .
Research with infectious SARS-CoV-2 now is occurring in every , or almost every , BSL-3 facility in the US and overseas.
” This strong upsurge is affirmed by Edward Hammond of Prickly Research , Austin , TX , former Director of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tracked the post 9/11 expansion of the US Biodefense program .
“ It is evident that swarms of academic researchers with little prior experience with coronaviruses have leapt into the field in recent months.
” “ We need to be clear headed about the risk .
The first SARS virus was a notorious source of laboratory-acquired infections and there is a very real risk that modified forms of SARS-CoV-2 could infect researchers , especially inexperienced researchers , with unpredictable and potentially quite dangerous results .
The biggest risk is the creation and accidental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ — a variant whose altered characteristics might undermine global efforts to stop the pandemic by evading the approaches being taken to find COVID vaccines and treatments.
” And , continues Hammond : “ Each additional lab that experiments with CoV-2 amplifies the risk.
” Richard Ebright concurs , telling Independent Science News in an email that this research is : “ in many cases being performed by researchers who have no prior experience in BSL-3 operations and pathogens research , and who therefore pose elevated risk of laboratory accidents with BSL-3 pathogens.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experimenters are now calling for reduced oversight : “ The UNC incident also underscores that calls by some , notably Columbia University virologist Vincent Racaniello ( Podcast at 01:35mins onwards ) , to allow virus-culture and virus-production research with fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 at BSL-2 are egregiously irresponsible and absolutely unacceptable.
” Other researchers are also calling for restraint .
In a paper titled “ Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus ” , researchers from China and the US critiqued the synthesis in February of a full length infectious clone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thao et al.
, 2020 ) .
And , in concluding , these researchers asked a question that is even more pertinent now than then “ Once the risks [ of a lab escape ] become a reality , who or which organization should take responsibility for them ?
” The accident at the University of North Carolina ( UNC ) is now in the public domain but only thanks to a FOIA request submitted by Hammond ( in line with NIH guidelines ) and shared with Independent Science News .
Despite the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that UNC classified it as an official “ Reportable Incident ” , i.e .
that must be reported to National Institutes of Health ( NIH ) in Washington DC , scarcely any information about the accident is available .
In part this is because the minutes of the relevant IBC meeting ( May 6th , 2020 , p109 ) are extremely brief .
They do not provide any details of the fate of the bitten researcher .
Nor do they state , for example , whether the researcher developed an active infection , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if they transmitted the recombinant virus to anyone else .
Neither do they reveal what kind of recombinant virus was being used or the purpose of the experiment .
To try to learn more , Independent Science News emailed the lab of Ralph Baric at UNC , which , based on their research history is the most likely coronavirus research group involved ( Roberts et al.
, 2007 ; Menachery et al.
, 2015 ) , the University Biosafety Officer , and UNC Media relations .
Only the latter replied : “ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ University Institutional Biosafety Committee meeting minutes involved a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV-2 strain used in the development of a mouse model system.
” “ The researcher did not develop any symptoms and no infection occurred as a result of the incident.
” Our questions in full and the full UNC reply are available here .
The second reason for this lack of information is that the UNC redacted the names of Principal Investigators ( PIs ) whose research required biosafety scrutiny , along with many of the experimental specifics .
Nevertheless , unredacted parts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contain descriptions of experiments that potentially encompass the accident .
They include : In all , any one of eight sets of different experiments approved by the UNC Chapel Hill IBC in 2020 proposed infecting mice with live infectious and mutant SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses under BSL-3 conditions and therefore could have led to the accident .
According to Hammond the lack of transparency represented by the sparse minutes and especially the redactions represent a violation of science ’ s social contract : “ At the dawn of recombinant DNA , at the request of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fabled Asilomar conference , the United States government took the position of not regulating genetic engineering in the lab .
The “ deal ” that big science struck with the government was that , in return for not being directly regulated , principal investigators would take personal responsibility for lab biosafety , involve the public in decision-making , and accept public accountability for their actions .
The NIH Guidelines and Institutional Biosafety Committee system of “ self-regulation ” by researchers is founded upon the principal of personal responsibility of PIs and the promise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ researchers ’ identities from IBC meeting minutes , in order to hide the activities of researchers and avoid accountability for accidents , fundamentally contradicts the core principles of the US oversight system and violates the commitments that science made.
” “ There is no justification for UNC ’ s redaction of the names of the laboratory heads and the identities of pathogens .
UNC ’ s redactions violate conditions UNC agreed to in exchange for NIH funding of UNC ’ s research and , if not corrected , should result in the termination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loss of eligibility for future NIH funding , of UNC ’ s research.
” Are universities doing too many risky experiments on coronaviruses ?
The second concern of researchers contacted by Independent Science News is that unnecessary and dangerous experiments will be conducted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic .
According to Richard Ebright : “ The UNC incident shows that serious laboratory accidents with SARS-CoV-2 can occur even in a lab having extremely extensive experience in BSL-3 operations and unmatched expertise in coronavirus research , and underscores the risks associated with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ especially for labs lacking prior experience in BSL-3 operations and coronavirus research.
” For this reason Ebright argues that : “ It is essential that a national needs-assessment and biosafety assessment be performed for research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 .
It also is essential that a risk-benefit review be performed before approving research projects involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2–something that currently does not occur–to ensure that potential benefits to the public outweigh the real risks to laboratory workers and the public.
” This concern over risks and benefits is shared by Edward Hammond .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that researchers at the University of Pittsburgh ( whose identity is redacted ) plan to make what Hammond calls Corona-thrax .
In short , according to its Institutional Biosafety Committee , Pittsburgh researchers intend put the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 ( which allows the virus to gain entry into human cells ) into Bacillus anthracis which is the causative agent of anthrax .
The anthrax strain proposed to be used for this experiment is “ disarmed ” but , Hammond agrees with Gao et al.
, ( 2020 ) that the balance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ receiving adequate consideration .
This experiment was nevertheless approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee of the University of Pittsburgh .
But by redacting the name of the laboratory from the minutes and also every name of the members of the committee which approved it , the University has supplied a de facto response to the final question posed by Gao et al .
: who will take responsibility for risky coronavirus research ?
Gao , P. , Ma , S. , Lu , D. , Mitcham , C. , Jing , Y. , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus .
Synthetic and systems biotechnology , 5 ( 2 ) , 59-61 .
Menachery , V. D. , Yount , B. L. , Debbink , K. , Agnihothram , S. , Gralinski , L. E. , Plante , J .
A. , … & Randell , S. H. ( 2015 ) .
A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence .
Nature medicine , 21 ( 12 ) , 1508-1513 .
Roberts , A. , Deming , D. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , A. , Yount , B. , Vogel , L. , … & Zaki , S. R. ( 2007 ) .
A mouse-adapted SARS-coronavirus causes disease and mortality in BALB/c mice .
PLoS Pathog , 3 ( 1 ) , e5 .
Thao , T. T. N. , Labroussaa , F. , Ebert , N. , V ’ kovski , P. , Stalder , H. , Portmann , J. , … & Gultom , M. ( 2020 ) .
Rapid reconstruction of SARS-CoV-2 using a synthetic genomics platform .
BioRxiv .
If this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sharing it with your networks .

by Jonathan Latham, PhD
University researchers genetically engineer a human pandemic virus. They inject the new virus into a laboratory mouse. The infected mouse then bites a researcher…..It is a plot worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster about risky coronavirus research.
But according to newly obtained minutes of the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) of the University of North Carolina (UNC), Chapel Hill, these exact events need not be imagined. They occurred for real between April 1st and May 6th this year.
The identity of the bitten coronavirus researcher has not been revealed except that they were working in a high security BSL-3 virus lab when the accident happened.
According to Richard Ebright, an epidemiologist from Rutgers University, the UNC incident underscores an important development in virus research since the pandemic began:
“There has been an explosion of research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 over the last six months. Research with infectious SARS-CoV-2 now is occurring in every, or almost every, BSL-3 facility in the US and overseas.”
This strong upsurge is affirmed by Edward Hammond of Prickly Research, Austin, TX, former Director of the Sunshine Project, an NGO that tracked the post 9/11 expansion of the US Biodefense program.
“It is evident that swarms of academic researchers with little prior experience with coronaviruses have leapt into the field in recent months.”
For Hammond, this explosion represents a hazard:
“We need to be clear headed about the risk. The first SARS virus was a notorious source of laboratory-acquired infections and there is a very real risk that modified forms of SARS-CoV-2 could infect researchers, especially inexperienced researchers, with unpredictable and potentially quite dangerous results. The biggest risk is the creation and accidental release of a novel form of SARS-CoV-2 — a variant whose altered characteristics might undermine global efforts to stop the pandemic by evading the approaches being taken to find COVID vaccines and treatments.”
And, continues Hammond: “Each additional lab that experiments with CoV-2 amplifies the risk.”
Richard Ebright concurs, telling Independent Science News in an email that this research is:
“in many cases being performed by researchers who have no prior experience in BSL-3 operations and pathogens research, and who therefore pose elevated risk of laboratory accidents with BSL-3 pathogens.”
Ebright is also concerned that some influential experimenters are now calling for reduced oversight :
“The UNC incident also underscores that calls by some, notably Columbia University virologist Vincent Racaniello (Podcast at 01:35mins onwards), to allow virus-culture and virus-production research with fully infectious SARS-CoV-2 at BSL-2 are egregiously irresponsible and absolutely unacceptable.”
Other researchers are also calling for restraint. In a paper titled “Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus”, researchers from China and the US critiqued the synthesis in February of a full length infectious clone (Gao et al., 2020; Thao et al., 2020). And, in concluding, these researchers asked a question that is even more pertinent now than then “Once the risks [of a lab escape] become a reality, who or which organization should take responsibility for them?”
Lack of transparency
The accident at the University of North Carolina (UNC) is now in the public domain but only thanks to a FOIA request submitted by Hammond (in line with NIH guidelines) and shared with Independent Science News.
Despite the FOIA request, apart from the fact that UNC classified it as an official “Reportable Incident”, i.e. that must be reported to National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Washington DC, scarcely any information about the accident is available.
In part this is because the minutes of the relevant IBC meeting (May 6th, 2020, p109) are extremely brief. They do not provide any details of the fate of the bitten researcher. Nor do they state, for example, whether the researcher developed an active infection, nor whether they developed symptoms, nor if they transmitted the recombinant virus to anyone else. Neither do they reveal what kind of recombinant virus was being used or the purpose of the experiment.
To try to learn more, Independent Science News emailed the lab of Ralph Baric at UNC, which, based on their research history is the most likely coronavirus research group involved (Roberts et al., 2007; Menachery et al., 2015), the University Biosafety Officer, and UNC Media relations.
Only the latter replied:
“The April 2020 incident referred to in the University Institutional Biosafety Committee meeting minutes involved a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV-2 strain used in the development of a mouse model system.”
UNC media relations also told Independent Science News that:
“The researcher did not develop any symptoms and no infection occurred as a result of the incident.”
Our questions in full and the full UNC reply are available here.
Redactions of Biosafety Committee discussions
The second reason for this lack of information is that the UNC redacted the names of Principal Investigators (PIs) whose research required biosafety scrutiny, along with many of the experimental specifics.
Nevertheless, unredacted parts of minutes from IBC meetings held in 2020 contain descriptions of experiments that potentially encompass the accident. They include:
Application 75223:
(“a full-length infectious clone” refers to a viable DNA copy of the coronavirus, which is ordinarily an RNA virus)
and
Application 73790:
and
Application 74962:
In all, any one of eight sets of different experiments approved by the UNC Chapel Hill IBC in 2020 proposed infecting mice with live infectious and mutant SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses under BSL-3 conditions and therefore could have led to the accident.
The thorny issue of transparency
According to Hammond the lack of transparency represented by the sparse minutes and especially the redactions represent a violation of science’s social contract:
“At the dawn of recombinant DNA, at the request of the scientific community itself, following the fabled Asilomar conference, the United States government took the position of not regulating genetic engineering in the lab. The “deal” that big science struck with the government was that, in return for not being directly regulated, principal investigators would take personal responsibility for lab biosafety, involve the public in decision-making, and accept public accountability for their actions.
The NIH Guidelines and Institutional Biosafety Committee system of “self-regulation” by researchers is founded upon the principal of personal responsibility of PIs and the promise of transparency. The redaction of the researchers’ identities from IBC meeting minutes, in order to hide the activities of researchers and avoid accountability for accidents, fundamentally contradicts the core principles of the US oversight system and violates the commitments that science made.”
Richard Ebright goes further:
“There is no justification for UNC’s redaction of the names of the laboratory heads and the identities of pathogens. UNC’s redactions violate conditions UNC agreed to in exchange for NIH funding of UNC’s research and, if not corrected, should result in the termination of current NIH funding, and the loss of eligibility for future NIH funding, of UNC’s research.”
Are universities doing too many risky experiments on coronaviruses?
The second concern of researchers contacted by Independent Science News is that unnecessary and dangerous experiments will be conducted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Richard Ebright:
“The UNC incident shows that serious laboratory accidents with SARS-CoV-2 can occur even in a lab having extremely extensive experience in BSL-3 operations and unmatched expertise in coronavirus research, and underscores the risks associated with uncontrolled proliferation of research on SARS-CoV-2, especially for labs lacking prior experience in BSL-3 operations and coronavirus research.”
For this reason Ebright argues that:
“It is essential that a national needs-assessment and biosafety assessment be performed for research involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2. It also is essential that a risk-benefit review be performed before approving research projects involving fully infectious SARS-CoV-2–something that currently does not occur–to ensure that potential benefits to the public outweigh the real risks to laboratory workers and the public.”
This concern over risks and benefits is shared by Edward Hammond. Using FOIA again he has further discovered that researchers at the University of Pittsburgh (whose identity is redacted) plan to make what Hammond calls Corona-thrax.
In short, according to its Institutional Biosafety Committee, Pittsburgh researchers intend put the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 (which allows the virus to gain entry into human cells) into Bacillus anthracis which is the causative agent of anthrax.
The anthrax strain proposed to be used for this experiment is “disarmed” but, Hammond agrees with Gao et al., (2020) that the balance of risks and benefits appears not to be receiving adequate consideration.
This experiment was nevertheless approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee of the University of Pittsburgh. But by redacting the name of the laboratory from the minutes and also every name of the members of the committee which approved it, the University has supplied a de facto response to the final question posed by Gao et al.: who will take responsibility for risky coronavirus research?
References
Gao, P., Ma, S., Lu, D., Mitcham, C., Jing, Y., & Wang, G. (2020). Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Synthetic and systems biotechnology, 5(2), 59-61.
Menachery, V. D., Yount, B. L., Debbink, K., Agnihothram, S., Gralinski, L. E., Plante, J. A., … & Randell, S. H. (2015). A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence. Nature medicine, 21(12), 1508-1513.
Roberts, A., Deming, D., Paddock, C. D., Cheng, A., Yount, B., Vogel, L., … & Zaki, S. R. (2007). A mouse-adapted SARS-coronavirus causes disease and mortality in BALB/c mice. PLoS Pathog, 3(1), e5.
Thao, T. T. N., Labroussaa, F., Ebert, N., V’kovski, P., Stalder, H., Portmann, J., … & Gultom, M. (2020). Rapid reconstruction of SARS-CoV-2 using a synthetic genomics platform. BioRxiv.
Editor’s note. We welcome comments and information about the subject of this article. However, please note that the “reply” function in the comments section is not working for people without high level access to the website. There are two possible solutions for readers wanting to reply to specific comments:
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independentsciencenews--2020-09-08--The Failure of GMO Cotton In India

The Failure of GMO Cotton In India

Grand claims are often made for GMO Bt cotton in India .
Proponents point to increases in national cotton production , while Dr. Ramesh Chand of the Indian Government think tank Niti Aayog recently told BloombergQuint “ there is no credible study to show any adverse impact of growing Bt cotton in the last 18 years in the country… ” The Chand interview occurred at a promotional event for a new book titled Socio Economic Impact Assessment of GM crops : Global Implications Based on Case Studies from India .
Its publisher is the Delhi-based Research and Information System for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy research think tank in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs .
Dr. Chand and much of the RIS volume cite the presumed grand success of Bt cotton as a template for introducing GMO ( and gene editing ) technologies in other important Indian crops such as mustard and brinjal ( eggplant ) .
The opinions of Niti Aayog and RIS representatives are highly significant given their deep links to Indian policy makers .
Yet how Chand came to such positive conclusions is a great mystery to us .
The true measure of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scale neutral : yield and total net income per hectare are more appropriate metrics than national production .
In addition , proper accounting requires the costs of ecosystem and biodiversity losses also be considered .
When viewed from such a perspective , the failure of the ecologically and socially unsustainable Bt cotton system becomes apparent .
It is based on a dystopian relationship between those who control and sell the inputs and the vast majority of farmers who , with less information and resources , attempt to implement them .
And not least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for gaining registration for GMOs ( e.g.
, Pental 2019 and the reply by Gutierrez et al .
2020 ) .
In contrast to the claims of Dr Chand and the RIS publication , our investigations of Bt and hybrid cotton clearly show : 1 .
Hybrid cottons unique to India were introduced in the mid-1970s purportedly to increase yield and quality .
But even before the GMO Bt trait was introduced in 2002 , hybrid seed was considerably more expensive .
Hybrid plants also require more fertilizer and stable water , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thus hybrid technology serves as a value capture mechanism requiring annual purchases of seed ( Gutierrez et al .
2015 ; in press ) .
Even the meager increases in yield which resulted were associated with increased fertilizer use ( Kranthi 2016 ; Kranthi and Stone 2020 ) .
2 .
Indian farmers are planting inappropriate long season hybrid cotton varieties at inappropriately low planting densities due to high seed costs and tradition .
This contributes to low and stagnating yields ( Gutierrez et al .
2017 ; Kranthi and Stone 2020 ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used to control the key pest , the native pink bollworm ( PBW ) , in long season hybrid cotton .
As occurred worldwide , insecticide use caused ecological disruption that in India induced outbreaks of secondary insect pests ( i.e .
normally non pests ) like the highly damaging “ American ” bollworm ( and others ) .
Farmers were spending money on insecticides to lose money due to insecticide-induced pests .
To solve the PBW and insecticide-induced American bollworm and other induced moth problems , hybrid GMO Bt cotton was introduced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bt seed was introduced in Gujarat before 2002 . )
4 .
While the Bt technology initially solved the bollworm problems , outbreaks of secondary pests not controlled by the Bt toxins began to occur , again increasing insecticide use in Bt cotton .
By 2013 pre-2002 levels were surpassed .
This caused ecological disruption and induced outbreaks of still newer secondary pests ( whitefly , jassids , mealybug ) , and increased levels of resistance to insecticides .
By 2013 , Indian farmers were solidly on both the insecticide and biotechnology treadmills @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propose that developing pest issues could be fixed with still further biotech fixes – a proposal akin to a technological dog chasing its own tail .
Data on points 1-4 are depicted in Figure 1 .
5 .
Bt cotton did not increase yields , but did contribute to increased cost of production ( Figure 2 ) , all in the face of stagnant yields ( see Figure 1 ) leading to economic distress .
6 .
Analysis of the available statewide and national data show that suicides among Indian cotton farmers increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ i.e .
economic distress ; Figure 3 ; Gutierrez et al .
2015 ; Gutierrez et al .
in press ; see also Sadanandan 2014 ) .
7 .
High density , short season ( HD-SS ) NON-GMO pure line rainfed cotton varieties have been developed in India that could double yield ( Central Institute for Cotton Research ( CICR ) data ; Figure 4 ) and triple net income .
The average yield of the current hybrid varieties in Maharashtra is shown for comparison .
The obvious question is – Why haven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implemented in the field ?
8 .
The potential exists for development of even higher yielding HD-SS non-hybrid non-GMO varieties in India ; varieties that would allow seed saving by Indian farmers.9 .
Incorporation of hybrid and Bt technologies in HD-SS cottons would not give economic benefit because there would be no increase in yield , seed cost would be 6-8fold current costs , and rainfed HD-SS varieties would avoid infestation by the key pest pink bollworm obviating the need for the Bt technology ( see Gutierrez et al .
2015 ) .10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bollworm is now widespread in India , and resistance to insecticide in many pests is increasing ( Kranthi 2014 ; Naik et al .
2018 ) .
By nearly all measures , hybrid Bt cotton in India is a failure , or at best very suboptimal for farmer welfare .
Despite increases , Indian yields are no more than some of the poorest African countries which do not cultivate hybrid cotton or Bt-cotton .
In 2017 , 31 countries were ranked above India in terms of cotton yield ( i.e .
kg ha–1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 grew GMO cotton ( Kranthi 2014 ) .
So why is hybrid Bt cotton falsely used as an example of a grand success , and why should it be used as a template for implementing the hybrids , GMOs , gene editing and other technologies in other crops – especially food crops ?
Why have legitimate concerns been ignored about the loss of biodiversity and of the irreversible GMO contamination of indigenous crop varieties and wild species ?
Why has the emphasis been on GMO development when viable alternatives are available but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be learned from the template of Bt cotton it is that much of biotechnology in agriculture is an exercise in linear thinking , of reductionism , and of unexpected consequences .
There is instead a need to use caution and back up any decisions that affect the food and nutrition security of over a billion people with strong science and farmers ’ knowledge and experience ( IPES-Food 2016 ) .
Added to this should be an understanding of the possible conflicts of interest at play .
Anything less will be to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the public , and the Nation .
Gutierrez AP , Ponti L , Baumgärtner J ( 2017 ) A critique on the paper ‘ Agricultural biotechnology and crop productivity : macro-level evidences on contribution of Bt cotton in India.
’ Curr Sci 112:690–693 Gutierrez AP , P.E .
Kenmore and A. Rodrigues 2020 , Commentary – A reply by Gutierrez et al .
Curr .
Sci.
, 118 ( 6 ) .
IPES-Food .
2016 .
From uniformity to diversity : a paradigm shift from industrial agriculture to diversified agroecological systems .
International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Naik VC , Kumbhare S , Kranthi S , et al ( 2018 ) Field-evolved resistance of pink bollworm , Pectinophora gossypiella ( Saunders ) ( Lepidoptera : Gelechiidae ) , to transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis ( Bt ) cotton expressing crystal 1Ac ( Cry1Ac ) and Cry2Ab in India .
Pest Manag Sci doi:10.1002/ps.5038 .
https : //doi.org/10.1002/ps.5038 Pental , D. , ( 2019 ) When scientists turn against science : exceptionally flawed analysis of plant breeding technologies Curr .
Sci.
, 117 , 932–939 ; doi:10.18520/cs/v117/i6/932-939 .
Sadanandan , A .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ suicide : Financial reforms , credit crunches and farmer suicides in India .
The Journal of Developing Areas , 48 ( 4 ) , 287–307 .
http : //search.proquest.com/ docview/1523669376 ?
accountid=79789 .
Venugopalan , MV , Prakash AH , Kranthi KR , et al ( 2011 ) Evaluation of cotton genotypes for high density planting systems on rain fed vertisols of Central India .
In : Kranthi KR , Venugopalan MV , Balasubramanya RH , et al ( eds ) World Cotton Research Conference .
International Cotton Advisory Committee , Mumbai , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is based on an open letter to Niti Aayog Andrew Paul Gutierrez FRES is Senior Emeritus Professor in the College of Natural Resources at the University of California at Berkeley .
He was founder of the University of California Integrated Pest Management Program and Associate Director of the National NSF/EPA/USDA IPM Projects .
He has 40years of experience working on cotton globally .
He is CEO of the Center for the Analysis of Sustainable Agricultural systems ( CasasGlobal.org ) with ongoing research programs globally on various crop systems .
Hans R. Herren received @ @ @ @ @ @ @ awards ) for his leadership of the hugely successful project on the biological control of cassava pests in sub Saharan Africa ; he is President of the Millennium Institute , Washington DC ( USA ) and of the NGO Biovision , Zurich , Switzerland and a Foreign Associate of the US National Academy of Sciences .
He has global experience in diverse agricultural systems .
Peter E. Kenmore is a MacArthur Fellow ( Genius Award ) for his work on IPM in green revolution rice , former head of FAO/Plant Protection , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was the founder of the internationally renowned Farmer Field School program in Asia .
If this article was useful to you please consider sharing it with your networks .

by Prof. Andrew Paul Gutierrez, Dr. Hans R. Herren and Dr. Peter E. Kenmore
Grand claims are often made for GMO Bt cotton in India. Proponents point to increases in national cotton production, while Dr. Ramesh Chand of the Indian Government think tank Niti Aayog recently told BloombergQuint “there is no credible study to show any adverse impact of growing Bt cotton in the last 18 years in the country…”
The Chand interview occurred at a promotional event for a new book titled Socio Economic Impact Assessment of GM crops: Global Implications Based on Case Studies from India. Its publisher is the Delhi-based Research and Information System for developing countries (RIS), a policy research think tank in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
Dr. Chand and much of the RIS volume cite the presumed grand success of Bt cotton as a template for introducing GMO (and gene editing) technologies in other important Indian crops such as mustard and brinjal (eggplant).
The opinions of Niti Aayog and RIS representatives are highly significant given their deep links to Indian policy makers. Yet how Chand came to such positive conclusions is a great mystery to us.
The true measure of how well farmers are doing should be scale neutral: yield and total net income per hectare are more appropriate metrics than national production. In addition, proper accounting requires the costs of ecosystem and biodiversity losses also be considered.
When viewed from such a perspective, the failure of the ecologically and socially unsustainable Bt cotton system becomes apparent. It is based on a dystopian relationship between those who control and sell the inputs and the vast majority of farmers who, with less information and resources, attempt to implement them. And not least of this are the often questionable methods for gaining registration for GMOs (e.g., Pental 2019 and the reply by Gutierrez et al. 2020).
The problems of GMO Hybrid cotton
In contrast to the claims of Dr Chand and the RIS publication, our investigations of Bt and hybrid cotton clearly show:
1. Hybrid cottons unique to India were introduced in the mid-1970s purportedly to increase yield and quality. But even before the GMO Bt trait was introduced in 2002, hybrid seed was considerably more expensive. Hybrid plants also require more fertilizer and stable water, and hybridity prevents seed saving and replanting. Thus hybrid technology serves as a value capture mechanism requiring annual purchases of seed (Gutierrez et al. 2015; in press). Even the meager increases in yield which resulted were associated with increased fertilizer use (Kranthi 2016; Kranthi and Stone 2020).
2. Indian farmers are planting inappropriate long season hybrid cotton varieties at inappropriately low planting densities due to high seed costs and tradition. This contributes to low and stagnating yields (Gutierrez et al. 2017; Kranthi and Stone 2020).
3. Pre-2002, insecticides were used to control the key pest, the native pink bollworm (PBW), in long season hybrid cotton. As occurred worldwide, insecticide use caused ecological disruption that in India induced outbreaks of secondary insect pests (i.e. normally non pests) like the highly damaging “American” bollworm (and others). Farmers were spending money on insecticides to lose money due to insecticide-induced pests. To solve the PBW and insecticide-induced American bollworm and other induced moth problems, hybrid GMO Bt cotton was introduced starting in 2002. (Though illegal Bt seed was introduced in Gujarat before 2002.)
4. While the Bt technology initially solved the bollworm problems, outbreaks of secondary pests not controlled by the Bt toxins began to occur, again increasing insecticide use in Bt cotton. By 2013 pre-2002 levels were surpassed. This caused ecological disruption and induced outbreaks of still newer secondary pests (whitefly, jassids, mealybug), and increased levels of resistance to insecticides. By 2013, Indian farmers were solidly on both the insecticide and biotechnology treadmills. And yet, some technologists still propose that developing pest issues could be fixed with still further biotech fixes – a proposal akin to a technological dog chasing its own tail. Data on points 1-4 are depicted in Figure 1.
5. Bt cotton did not increase yields, but did contribute to increased cost of production (Figure 2), all in the face of stagnant yields (see Figure 1) leading to economic distress.
6. Analysis of the available statewide and national data show that suicides among Indian cotton farmers increase with decreasing yield and net revenues (i.e. economic distress; Figure 3; Gutierrez et al. 2015; Gutierrez et al. in press; see also Sadanandan 2014).
7. High density, short season (HD-SS) NON-GMO pure line rainfed cotton varieties have been developed in India that could double yield (Central Institute for Cotton Research (CICR) data; Figure 4) and triple net income. The average yield of the current hybrid varieties in Maharashtra is shown for comparison. The obvious question is – Why haven’t these varieties been developed and implemented in the field?
8. The potential exists for development of even higher yielding HD-SS non-hybrid non-GMO varieties in India; varieties that would allow seed saving by Indian farmers.9. Incorporation of hybrid and Bt technologies in HD-SS cottons would not give economic benefit because there would be no increase in yield, seed cost would be 6-8fold current costs, and rainfed HD-SS varieties would avoid infestation by the key pest pink bollworm obviating the need for the Bt technology (see Gutierrez et al. 2015).10. Resistance to Bt cotton in pink bollworm is now widespread in India, and resistance to insecticide in many pests is increasing (Kranthi 2014; Naik et al. 2018).
By nearly all measures, hybrid Bt cotton in India is a failure, or at best very suboptimal for farmer welfare. Despite increases, Indian yields are no more than some of the poorest African countries which do not cultivate hybrid cotton or Bt-cotton. In 2017, 31 countries were ranked above India in terms of cotton yield (i.e. kg ha–1), and of these, only 10 grew GMO cotton (Kranthi 2014).
So why is hybrid Bt cotton falsely used as an example of a grand success, and why should it be used as a template for implementing the hybrids, GMOs, gene editing and other technologies in other crops – especially food crops? Why have legitimate concerns been ignored about the loss of biodiversity and of the irreversible GMO contamination of indigenous crop varieties and wild species? Why has the emphasis been on GMO development when viable alternatives are available but remain largely unexplored?
If anything is to be learned from the template of Bt cotton it is that much of biotechnology in agriculture is an exercise in linear thinking, of reductionism, and of unexpected consequences. There is instead a need to use caution and back up any decisions that affect the food and nutrition security of over a billion people with strong science and farmers’ knowledge and experience (IPES-Food 2016). Added to this should be an understanding of the possible conflicts of interest at play. Anything less will be to the detriment of the Indian agricultural sector, the public, and the Nation.
References
Gutierrez AP, Ponti L, Baumgärtner J (2017) A critique on the paper ‘Agricultural biotechnology and crop productivity: macro-level evidences on contribution of Bt cotton in India.’ Curr Sci 112:690–693
Gutierrez AP, Ponti L, Herren HR, et al (2015) Deconstructing Indian cotton: weather, yields, and suicides. Environ Sci Eur 27:12. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12302-015-0043-8
Gutierrez, A.P., Luigi Ponti, Keshav R. Kranthi, Johann Baumgärtner, Peter. E. Kenmore, Gianni Gilioli, Antonio Boggia, Jose Ricardo Cure, Daniel Rodríguez (submitted) Bio-economics of Indian hybrid Bt cotton and farmer suicides. Environ Sci Eur
Gutierrez AP, P.E. Kenmore and A. Rodrigues 2020, Commentary – A reply by Gutierrez et al. Curr. Sci., 118(6).
IPES-Food. 2016. From uniformity to diversity: a paradigm shift from industrial agriculture to diversified agroecological systems. International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food systems.
Kranthi K. R. Cotton production systems—need for a change in India. Cotton Statistics & News. 2014;38(16 December 2014):4-7. .
Kranthi, K. R. (2016) Fertilizers gave high yields, Bt only provided cover. Cotton Stat. News. 39, 1-6.
Kranthi K.R., Stone G.D. (2020) Long-term impacts of Bt cotton in India. Nat Plants 6:188–196. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41477-020-0615-5
Naik VC, Kumbhare S, Kranthi S, et al (2018) Field-evolved resistance of pink bollworm, Pectinophora gossypiella (Saunders) (Lepidoptera: Gelechiidae), to transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton expressing crystal 1Ac (Cry1Ac) and Cry2Ab in India. Pest Manag Sci doi:10.1002/ps.5038. https://doi.org/10.1002/ps.5038
Pental, D., (2019) When scientists turn against science: exceptionally flawed analysis of plant breeding technologies Curr. Sci., 117, 932–939; doi:10.18520/cs/v117/i6/932-939.
Sadanandan, A. (2014). Political economy of suicide: Financial reforms, credit crunches and farmer suicides in India. The Journal of Developing Areas, 48(4), 287–307. http://search.proquest.com/ docview/1523669376?accountid=79789.
Venugopalan, MV, Prakash AH, Kranthi KR, et al (2011) Evaluation of cotton genotypes for high density planting systems on rain fed vertisols of Central India. In: Kranthi KR, Venugopalan MV, Balasubramanya RH, et al (eds) World Cotton Research Conference. International Cotton Advisory Committee, Mumbai, India, pp 341–346.
This article is based on an open letter to Niti Aayog
About the authors:
Andrew Paul Gutierrez FRES is Senior Emeritus Professor in the College of Natural Resources at the University of California at Berkeley. He was founder of the University of California Integrated Pest Management Program and Associate Director of the National NSF/EPA/USDA IPM Projects. He has 40years of experience working on cotton globally. He is CEO of the Center for the Analysis of Sustainable Agricultural systems (CasasGlobal.org) with ongoing research programs globally on various crop systems.
Hans R. Herren received the World Food Prize (and others awards) for his leadership of the hugely successful project on the biological control of cassava pests in sub Saharan Africa; he is President of the Millennium Institute, Washington DC (USA) and of the NGO Biovision, Zurich, Switzerland and a Foreign Associate of the US National Academy of Sciences. He has global experience in diverse agricultural systems.
Peter E. Kenmore is a MacArthur Fellow (Genius Award) for his work on IPM in green revolution rice, former head of FAO/Plant Protection, and former FAO Ambassador to India. Kenmore was the founder of the internationally renowned Farmer Field School program in Asia.
Editor’s note. We welcome comments and information about the subject of this article. However, please note that the “reply” function in the comments section is not working for people without high level access to the website. There are two possible solutions for readers wanting to reply to specific comments:
1) Enter your comment but name the commenter you are responding to (if necessary with the date of their comment). Or,
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independentsciencenews--2020-09-17--Genome Editing Pioneer Violated Biosafety Rules

Official documents reveal that Daniel Voytas , a professor at the University of Minnesota and the co-inventor of the genome editing tool TALENs , has been found to have violated basic laboratory biosafety rules for a period of more than two years .
Unapproved and unsupervised genetic engineering in the Voytas lab appears to have included the development of a new commercial technique for rapid production of gene edited plants called Fast-Treated Agrobacterium Co-Culture , or “ Fast-TrACC ” .
The patent-pending technique has been licensed by the University of Minnesota to Calyxt , a controversial biotechnology company co-founded by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Science Officer .
The story is one of a research train wreck .
It involves an ethically dubious and physically dangerous mix of blatant disregard for biosafety rules with the apparent legalized corruption of financial self-dealing , with the approval and participation of the University of Minnesota .
Without seeking or obtaining required safety approvals , Voytas and eight members of his lab genetically engineered a dozen species of plants in a project that lasted from October 2017 through December 2019 , The University of Minnesota institutional biosafety committee ( IBC ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unaware of the experiments , which appear to have come to light only when Voytas filed for patent on part of the research and prepared a manuscript for publication .
The project , many details of which have yet to be released , was discovered by the IBC ’ s Assistant Director in December 2019 .
By that time , according to an incident report filed with the US federal government , the Voytas team had engineered twelve plant species , including a number of food crops .
Two widely cultivated species of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along with tomatoes , potatoes , grapes , and sunflower .
Other species genetically engineered without oversight included the model plant Arabidopsis thaliana as well as Moricandia arvensis , a wild crucifer of interest as a potential source of photosynthesis genes for the large family of brassica crops , including rapeseed ( canola ) and vegetables such as cabbage , broccoli , cauliflower , kale , pak choi , and turnips .
The Voytas lab also transformed other plants without the required approval , including plants with medicinal uses such as Nicotiana benthamiana @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sweet briar ( Rosa rubiginosa ) , periwinkle ( Catharanthus roseus ) , and petunias ( Petunia axillaris ) .
A request for further information was lodged with the University of Minnesota in early September .
The University has yet to reply .
A member of the US National Academies of Science , Voytas rose to prominence as co-inventor of transcription activator-like effector nucleases , or TALENs , which are used as the “ scissors ” to cut DNA sequences in many genome editing projects .
Voytas ’ case is a concrete @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oversight in the United States .
The project operated with nine people working over a period of more than two years at a prominent lab on a university campus without being detected and without biosafety approval .
On 30 January 2020 , the University belatedly reported the over two year old violations that it had belatedly discovered – apparently more than a month earlier – to the US National Institutes of Health ( NIH ) , which oversees genetic engineering laboratory safety in the US .
When the University did so , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its report .
Minnesota merely stated the name of the Agrobacterium vector used to transform the plants and the species of plants engineered .
It did not describe the purpose of the research and “ payload ” of the vector , nor the characteristics of the resulting cells and plants .
Hence , the University ’ s report was fundamentally opaque with respect to the substance of the offending research .
Inexplicably , and alarmingly , on receiving Minnesota ’ s report , NIH did not bother to ask Minnesota for basic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ engineering performed on the plants .
Rather , NIH declared itself satisfied with the University ’ s vacuous report and closed the case with no action on the following day , 31 January 2020 .
While shocking , the NIH “ regulators ” lack of interest in investigating major violations is regrettably typical .
Indeed it is extremely rare for NIH to express concern or interest in further details of those laboratory accidents of which it learns .
Further , there is no indication that the US Department of Agriculture , whose interest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be significant , was informed of the problems .
A second request for further information on this subject is pending with the University of Minnesota .
In a bit of self-dealing not uncommon at American research universities , the Voytas lab at the University of Minnesota works in support of the company Calyxt , which Voytas co-founded and where he is the Chief Science Officer .
Research at Voytas ’ university lab is licensed to Calyxt , whose stock is publicly traded , though it is controlled by the French company Cellectis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Calyxt salaries ( 1 ) , Voytas receives stock options from Calyxt .
At the time of his last regulatory filing in early 2019 , he owned almost 100,000 shares in Calyxt and held options for over 200,000 more .
At the time they were worth nearly US $ 5m , though the company ’ s stock has since fallen .
More stock options will vest with Voytas in the future .
In April 2020 , the University and Calyxt announced a new licensing deal , the financial terms of which were not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology , developed by the Voytas lab , that is described as “ plant gene editing through de novo induction of meristems ” , another name for Fast-TrACC .
The manuscript of the article describing the technique was submitted in December 2019 , the same month when the Minnesota IBC says it discovered the unauthorized research ( Maher et al.
, 2020 ) .
The manuscript describes use of genetically engineered cells to cause the growth of plant meristems ( shoots and root branches ) that are also genetically engineered .
Material from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to generate plants that are wholly transformed .
It describes experiments as using an agrobacterium vector with Arabidopsis , potato , and grapevine , all of which are mentioned in the University ’ s report of unapproved and unsupervised research .
The initial commercial application of the technique appears to be in scaling up production of gene edited varieties of crops that are clonally propagated , hence the selection of potato and grapevine as examples .
A great many other crops are also clonally propagated , including many fruit and nut trees , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , agave , dates , pineapple , hops , yams , cassava , bananas , olives , sugarcane , gingers , and more .
The manuscript notes that three of the authors , including Voytas , have filed for patents on the technology .
It thus appears that the unapproved and unsupervised research at the Voytas lab included the creation of the technology Minnesota has licensed , and perhaps other gene editing projects that have yet to come to public light but which may also be related to the commercial enterprises of Calyxt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lab ?
Does the University or the federal government care ?
Until the University comes forward with additional information , it is hard to precisely know .
One thing that does seem clear is that there were no serious consequences for the violations , a fact that will encourage more rogue gene editing at US universities .
Was Voytas ’ operation too important to be properly inspected by biosafety staff , who might fear the wrath of the prominent professor , or perhaps also the wrath of the University ’ s technology transfer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there active concealment of research from safety oversight ?
That would be grounds for major enforcement action .
Or maybe the University of Minnesota ’ s biosafety oversight program is , like its national counterpart , weak and ineffective ?
The lack of detail in Minnesota ’ s report to NIH suggests that Voytas ’ , and the University ’ s , financial interests may be at the heart of the incident .
Why is the relevant detail unreported ?
How can NIH close the file – in under 24 hours – on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even properly documented ?
Secrecy related to patents and profits appears to be at work , and to be working against safety .
Yet the report also claims that Voytas and his staff were fully up to date on biosafety training – except that they ignored the elementary and obligatory step of submitting a proposal for their activities , obtaining approval and having the experiments inspected .
Why did they fail to submit to safety oversight despite this training ?
So what happened when the unapproved work was discovered ?
Although the Voytas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and large , according to the information obtained to date , the only action taken was to stop the research for a few weeks , until the IBC could approve it , and a recommendation being made that Voytas lab members be “ re-trained ” .
It does not appear that there were any significant consequences for Voytas , nor did the lack of adherence to biosafety rules result in any federal sanction of the University .
To the contrary , NIH immediately closed the case and , in April 2020 , Calytx @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the University to license the arguably illicitly-developed technology .
The message that the federal government and University of Minnesota are sending to researchers is that violating biosafety rules is a trivial matter that will not result in significant consequences .
Even for violations of very basic requirements that go on for years on end .
Indeed , if violation has no consequences , for researchers like Voytas who are seeking patents and are deeply involved in profitable self-dealings , the lack of consequences of ignoring biosafety rules only encourages further violations , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ biosafety oversight may aid in hiding from competitors and generating profits .
( 1 ) Voytas earns US $ 198,000 a year as a professor plus , presumably , royalty income in conjunction the licenses that the University sells to Calyxt and others for technologies from his lab .
His salary as CSO of Calyxt is unknown .
Maher MF et al 2020 .
Plant gene editing through de novo induction of meristems .
Nat Biotechnol .
2020 Jan ; 38 ( 1 ) : 84–89 .
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By Edward Hammond, Prickly Research
Official documents reveal that Daniel Voytas, a professor at the University of Minnesota and the co-inventor of the genome editing tool TALENs, has been found to have violated basic laboratory biosafety rules for a period of more than two years.
Unapproved and unsupervised genetic engineering in the Voytas lab appears to have included the development of a new commercial technique for rapid production of gene edited plants called Fast-Treated Agrobacterium Co-Culture, or “Fast-TrACC”. The patent-pending technique has been licensed by the University of Minnesota to Calyxt, a controversial biotechnology company co-founded by Voytas and where he serves as Chief Science Officer.
The story is one of a research train wreck. It involves an ethically dubious and physically dangerous mix of blatant disregard for biosafety rules with the apparent legalized corruption of financial self-dealing, with the approval and participation of the University of Minnesota.
The Violations
Without seeking or obtaining required safety approvals, Voytas and eight members of his lab genetically engineered a dozen species of plants in a project that lasted from October 2017 through December 2019. The University of Minnesota institutional biosafety committee (IBC) and the University’s biosafety office were unaware of the experiments, which appear to have come to light only when Voytas filed for patent on part of the research and prepared a manuscript for publication.
The project, many details of which have yet to be released, was discovered by the IBC’s Assistant Director in December 2019. By that time, according to an incident report filed with the US federal government, the Voytas team had engineered twelve plant species, including a number of food crops.
Two widely cultivated species of peppers (Capsicum) were altered, along with tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, and sunflower. Other species genetically engineered without oversight included the model plant Arabidopsis thaliana as well as Moricandia arvensis, a wild crucifer of interest as a potential source of photosynthesis genes for the large family of brassica crops, including rapeseed (canola) and vegetables such as cabbage, broccoli, cauliflower, kale, pak choi, and turnips.
The Voytas lab also transformed other plants without the required approval, including plants with medicinal uses such as Nicotiana benthamiana, an Australian relative of cultivated tobacco, sweet briar (Rosa rubiginosa), periwinkle (Catharanthus roseus), and petunias (Petunia axillaris).
A request for further information was lodged with the University of Minnesota in early September. The University has yet to reply.
A member of the US National Academies of Science, Voytas rose to prominence as co-inventor of transcription activator-like effector nucleases, or TALENs, which are used as the “scissors” to cut DNA sequences in many genome editing projects.
Fake Oversight
Voytas’ case is a concrete demonstration of the weakness of genetic engineering oversight in the United States. The project operated with nine people working over a period of more than two years at a prominent lab on a university campus without being detected and without biosafety approval.
On 30 January 2020, the University belatedly reported the over two year old violations that it had belatedly discovered – apparently more than a month earlier – to the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), which oversees genetic engineering laboratory safety in the US. When the University did so, it omitted basic details about the violations described in its report. Minnesota merely stated the name of the Agrobacterium vector used to transform the plants and the species of plants engineered. It did not describe the purpose of the research and “payload” of the vector, nor the characteristics of the resulting cells and plants. Hence, the University’s report was fundamentally opaque with respect to the substance of the offending research.
Inexplicably, and alarmingly, on receiving Minnesota’s report, NIH did not bother to ask Minnesota for basic information about the nature of the genetic engineering performed on the plants. Rather, NIH declared itself satisfied with the University’s vacuous report and closed the case with no action on the following day, 31 January 2020.
While shocking, the NIH “regulators” lack of interest in investigating major violations is regrettably typical. Indeed it is extremely rare for NIH to express concern or interest in further details of those laboratory accidents of which it learns. Further, there is no indication that the US Department of Agriculture, whose interest in improper creation of genetically engineered crops should be significant, was informed of the problems. A second request for further information on this subject is pending with the University of Minnesota.
Calyxt Connection
In a bit of self-dealing not uncommon at American research universities, the Voytas lab at the University of Minnesota works in support of the company Calyxt, which Voytas co-founded and where he is the Chief Science Officer. Research at Voytas’ university lab is licensed to Calyxt, whose stock is publicly traded, though it is controlled by the French company Cellectis.
In addition to his University and Calyxt salaries (1), Voytas receives stock options from Calyxt. At the time of his last regulatory filing in early 2019, he owned almost 100,000 shares in Calyxt and held options for over 200,000 more. At the time they were worth nearly US $5m, though the company’s stock has since fallen. More stock options will vest with Voytas in the future.
In April 2020, the University and Calyxt announced a new licensing deal, the financial terms of which were not described. The license is for a technology, developed by the Voytas lab, that is described as “plant gene editing through de novo induction of meristems”, another name for Fast-TrACC.
The manuscript of the article describing the technique was submitted in December 2019, the same month when the Minnesota IBC says it discovered the unauthorized research (Maher et al., 2020). The manuscript describes use of genetically engineered cells to cause the growth of plant meristems (shoots and root branches) that are also genetically engineered. Material from the meristem growth can then be used to generate plants that are wholly transformed. It describes experiments as using an agrobacterium vector with Arabidopsis, potato, and grapevine, all of which are mentioned in the University’s report of unapproved and unsupervised research.
The initial commercial application of the technique appears to be in scaling up production of gene edited varieties of crops that are clonally propagated, hence the selection of potato and grapevine as examples. A great many other crops are also clonally propagated, including many fruit and nut trees, berries, onions, garlic, taro, agave, dates, pineapple, hops, yams, cassava, bananas, olives, sugarcane, gingers, and more.
The manuscript notes that three of the authors, including Voytas, have filed for patents on the technology.
It thus appears that the unapproved and unsupervised research at the Voytas lab included the creation of the technology Minnesota has licensed, and perhaps other gene editing projects that have yet to come to public light but which may also be related to the commercial enterprises of Calyxt.
Rot and Responsibility
What went wrong at the Voytas lab? Does the University or the federal government care? Until the University comes forward with additional information, it is hard to precisely know. One thing that does seem clear is that there were no serious consequences for the violations, a fact that will encourage more rogue gene editing at US universities.
Was Voytas’ operation too important to be properly inspected by biosafety staff, who might fear the wrath of the prominent professor, or perhaps also the wrath of the University’s technology transfer office and its profit-driven mission? Was there active concealment of research from safety oversight? That would be grounds for major enforcement action. Or maybe the University of Minnesota’s biosafety oversight program is, like its national counterpart, weak and ineffective?
The lack of detail in Minnesota’s report to NIH suggests that Voytas’, and the University’s, financial interests may be at the heart of the incident. Why is the relevant detail unreported? How can NIH close the file – in under 24 hours – on a serious violation that isn’t even properly documented? Secrecy related to patents and profits appears to be at work, and to be working against safety.
Yet the report also claims that Voytas and his staff were fully up to date on biosafety training – except that they ignored the elementary and obligatory step of submitting a proposal for their activities, obtaining approval and having the experiments inspected. Why did they fail to submit to safety oversight despite this training?
So what happened when the unapproved work was discovered? Although the Voytas lab’s biosafety violations were lengthy and large, according to the information obtained to date, the only action taken was to stop the research for a few weeks, until the IBC could approve it, and a recommendation being made that Voytas lab members be “re-trained”.
It does not appear that there were any significant consequences for Voytas, nor did the lack of adherence to biosafety rules result in any federal sanction of the University. To the contrary, NIH immediately closed the case and, in April 2020, Calytx enthusiastically announced the deal it cut with the University to license the arguably illicitly-developed technology.
The message that the federal government and University of Minnesota are sending to researchers is that violating biosafety rules is a trivial matter that will not result in significant consequences. Even for violations of very basic requirements that go on for years on end. Indeed, if violation has no consequences, for researchers like Voytas who are seeking patents and are deeply involved in profitable self-dealings, the lack of consequences of ignoring biosafety rules only encourages further violations, as the secrecy granted by working outside of biosafety oversight may aid in hiding from competitors and generating profits.
(1) Voytas earns US $198,000 a year as a professor plus, presumably, royalty income in conjunction the licenses that the University sells to Calyxt and others for technologies from his lab. His salary as CSO of Calyxt is unknown.
References
Maher MF et al 2020. Plant gene editing through de novo induction of meristems. Nat Biotechnol. 2020 Jan; 38(1): 84–89.
This article was originally published by the Third World Network.
Editor’s note. We welcome comments and information about the subject of this article. However, please note that the “reply” function in the comments section is not working for people without high level access to the website. There are two possible solutions for readers wanting to reply to specific comments:
1) Enter your comment but name the commenter you are responding to (if necessary with the date of their comment). Or,
2) Mail your comment to the editor: [email protected] and they will post it as a reply. Please be sure to say who/what you are replying to.
If this article was useful to you please consider sharing it with your networks.