newyorker--2020-01-13--Briefly Noted Book Reviews

Briefly Noted Book Reviews

Such a Fun Age , by Kiley Reid ( Putnam ) .
Early in this lively début novel , a security guard at an upscale grocery store accuses Emira , a young black woman , of kidnapping the white toddler she is babysitting .
In the aftermath , Emira , mortified , resolves to find a new job , while the well-meaning but delusional mom-blogger who employs her becomes obsessed with winning her affection and loyalty .
The result is a carefully observed study of class and race , whose portrait of white urban affluence—Everlane sweaters , pseudo-feminist babble—is especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conscience in the age of Black Lives Matter , Reid unsparingly maps the moments when good intentions founder .
Wake , Siren : Ovid Resung , by Nina MacLaughlin ( Farrar , Straus & Giroux ) .
“ A certain sort of voice tells the story long enough and part of you ends up believing it.
” So explains Medusa , one of more than thirty women from Ovid ’ s Metamorphoses who reclaim their stories in this stirring collection of vignettes .
The women of MacLaughlin ’ s retelling drink kombucha , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sneakers , and call the King of Thebes “ this asshole jock.
” Above all , they both suffer and find strength at the hands of lascivious men and wrathful gods .
The blind prophet Tiresias , reflecting on his cross-gender experience , says , “ Was it punishment , being turned into a woman ?
I don ’ t know .
Is it punishing to be a woman ?
It is .
It will continue to be.
” The Hidden History of Burma , by Thant Myint-U ( Norton ) .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spectacle of a military junta ’ s acquiescence to popular pressure for reform .
The subsequent tenure of Aung San Suu Kyi has revealed the naïveté of such optimism , and this analysis by a Burmese historian and former Presidential adviser emphasizes the factors that were ignored : widening inequality , turbocharged capitalism coupled with a weak state , and rampant identity politics , which has intensified a seven-decade civil war and ignited ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya .
Myint-U calls for a radically reimagined national narrative , celebrating diversity and socially inclusive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ writes , “ we risk a failed state in the heart of Asia.
” Alice Adams , by Carol Sklenicka ( Scribner ) .
Dubbed “ America ’ s Colette , ” Alice Adams ( 1926-99 ) was known for emotionally unsparing stories and novels that often reflected her own complex relationships .
This psychologically intimate biography frames her work as a testament to the possibilities and paradoxes encountered by astute , ambitious women of her time .
From her childhood , in Chapel Hill , to her time in postwar Europe and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Adams strove for independence and creative fulfillment , but also yearned for affection and romance , a tension that informs her fiction .
Sklenicka celebrates Adams ’ s work and persuasively situates it in an era characterized both by drastic cultural changes and by the persistence of old expectations , conventions , and biases .

Such a Fun Age, by Kiley Reid (Putnam). Early in this lively début novel, a security guard at an upscale grocery store accuses Emira, a young black woman, of kidnapping the white toddler she is babysitting. In the aftermath, Emira, mortified, resolves to find a new job, while the well-meaning but delusional mom-blogger who employs her becomes obsessed with winning her affection and loyalty. The result is a carefully observed study of class and race, whose portrait of white urban affluence—Everlane sweaters, pseudo-feminist babble—is especially pointed. Attempting to navigate the white conscience in the age of Black Lives Matter, Reid unsparingly maps the moments when good intentions founder.
Wake, Siren: Ovid Resung, by Nina MacLaughlin (Farrar, Straus & Giroux). “A certain sort of voice tells the story long enough and part of you ends up believing it.” So explains Medusa, one of more than thirty women from Ovid’s Metamorphoses who reclaim their stories in this stirring collection of vignettes. The women of MacLaughlin’s retelling drink kombucha, dabble in oxycodone, wear jeans and sneakers, and call the King of Thebes “this asshole jock.” Above all, they both suffer and find strength at the hands of lascivious men and wrathful gods. The blind prophet Tiresias, reflecting on his cross-gender experience, says, “Was it punishment, being turned into a woman? I don’t know. Is it punishing to be a woman? It is. It will continue to be.”
The Hidden History of Burma, by Thant Myint-U (Norton). A decade ago, Burma observers celebrated the spectacle of a military junta’s acquiescence to popular pressure for reform. The subsequent tenure of Aung San Suu Kyi has revealed the naïveté of such optimism, and this analysis by a Burmese historian and former Presidential adviser emphasizes the factors that were ignored: widening inequality, turbocharged capitalism coupled with a weak state, and rampant identity politics, which has intensified a seven-decade civil war and ignited ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. Myint-U calls for a radically reimagined national narrative, celebrating diversity and socially inclusive economic development. Without it, he writes, “we risk a failed state in the heart of Asia.”
Alice Adams, by Carol Sklenicka (Scribner). Dubbed “America’s Colette,” Alice Adams (1926-99) was known for emotionally unsparing stories and novels that often reflected her own complex relationships. This psychologically intimate biography frames her work as a testament to the possibilities and paradoxes encountered by astute, ambitious women of her time. From her childhood, in Chapel Hill, to her time in postwar Europe and her later years in San Francisco, Adams strove for independence and creative fulfillment, but also yearned for affection and romance, a tension that informs her fiction. Sklenicka celebrates Adams’s work and persuasively situates it in an era characterized both by drastic cultural changes and by the persistence of old expectations, conventions, and biases.


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newyorker--2020-01-14--Trump Turns to McCarthyite Attacks as His Suleimani Story Crumbles

After insisting for almost two weeks that he ordered the assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani to thwart an imminent Iranian-inspired operation , or operations , that could have killed hundreds of Americans , Donald Trump changed tack on Monday .
In a series of statements , he claimed that Suleimani ’ s history of orchestrating attacks on American soldiers and installations was sufficient to justify his killing , and he also suggested that Democrats who questioned his judgment were giving succor to terrorists .
In one of a barrage of Twitter posts on Monday morning , Trump said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their Democrat Partners are working hard to determine whether or not the future attack by terrorist Soleimani was ‘ imminent ’ or not , & was my team in agreement .
The answer to both is a strong YES.
, but it doesn ’ t really matter because of his horrible past !
” Later in the day , Trump told reporters , “ We killed Soleimani , the No .
1 terrorist in the world by every account .
Bad person .
Killed a lot of Americans , killed a lot of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the Democrats try and defend him , it ’ s a disgrace to our country.
” The Democrats haven ’ t been trying to defend Suleimani , of course .
“ No American will mourn Qassem Solemaini ’ s passing , ” the Presidential candidate Joe Biden said in one of the first Democratic responses to the January 3rd drone strike .
“ He deserved to be brought to justice for his crimes against American troops and thousands of innocents throughout the region.
” Other Democrats made similar statements .
But Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has failed to provide any convincing evidence to back up Trump ’ s claim that the Iranian was plotting imminent attacks against Americans .
Some of them , including Nancy Pelosi , the Speaker of the House , have made the argument that killing Suleimani was a dangerous escalation that has created greater danger for Americans , especially American service members in the Middle East .
When Trump feels challenged , he doesn ’ t let the truth or common decency or respect for his office impair his demagogic response .
Last Thursday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know what bothers me ?
When I see a Nancy Pelosi trying to defend this monster from Iran who has killed so many people.
” Pelosi didn ’ t defend Suleimani .
“ In fact , we were not able to find any examples of Democrats who have defended or ‘ mourned ’ the death of Iran ’ s top military commander , ” FactCheck.org reported last Friday .
But , of course , this admonition didn ’ t halt Trump ’ s efforts to demonize the Democrats .
On Monday morning , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Chuck Schumer , the Senate Minority Leader , wearing traditional Islamic headwear , with an Iranian flag behind them .
The caption on the tweet was : “ The corrupted Dems trying their best to come to the Ayatollah ’ s rescue .
# NancyPelosiFakeNews.
” Appearing on Fox News , Stephanie Grisham , the White House press secretary , didn ’ t just defend Trump ’ s inflammatory retweet .
She sought to expand upon it , saying , “ I think the President is making clear that the Democrats have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taking the side of terrorists and those who are out to kill Americans.
” Trump ’ s explicit adoption of McCarthyite smears , combined with the shift in rationales for the assassination of Suleimani , appeared to reflect alarm that he is losing the Iran messaging battle .
This past weekend , an ABC News/Ipsos poll showed that a majority of Americans agree with the Democrats : fifty-two per cent of the respondents to the poll said that killing Suleimani made America less safe .
And , on the same day that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own Secretary of Defense , Mark Esper , stated publicly that he hadn ’ t seen a single piece of intelligence that backs up Trump ’ s claim that Suleimani was plotting to blow up four American Embassies .
“ I didn ’ t see one with regard to four embassies , ” Esper said on CBS ’ s “ Face the Nation.
” ( He hastily added : “ I share the President ’ s view that probably—my expectation was they were going to go after our embassies.
” ) Esper ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ developments that have undermined Trump ’ s initial explanations .
On Monday , there was another one .
NBC News reported that Trump gave provisional authorization for the killing of Suleimani seven months ago “ if Iran ’ s increased aggression resulted in the death of an American.
” Citing five current and former Administration officials as sources , the NBC News story went on to say that the June Presidential order “ came with the condition that Trump would have final signoff on any specific operation to kill Soleimani.
” Trump hasn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack on four embassies being imminent , and he surely won ’ t .
However , his Administration is clearly looking to make a case for the strike on Suleimani that doesn ’ t hinge on the danger of an imminent attack .
In a speech on Monday , Mike Pompeo , the Secretary of State , argued that Suleimani ’ s elimination was part of a broader U.S. strategy to “ reëstablishing deterrence—real deterrence—against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
” During a press conference at the Justice Department , William Barr , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , describing the question of whether there was an imminent threat as “ a red herring.
” Barr said , “ I think when you ’ re dealing with a situation where you already have attacks under way , you know there is a campaign that involves repeated attacks on American targets , I don ’ t think there is a requirement , frankly , of knowing the exact time and place of the next attack .
That certainly was the position of the Obama Administration when it droned leaders of terrorist organizations.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ drone a sovereign state ’ s top general .
Nor did it needlessly create a war scare with Iran that could have easily escalated into a full-scale conflict .
Just how easily became clear on Monday when reporters visited the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq ’ s Anbar Province , which Iran hit with a barrage of missiles last week .
Contrary to initial reports , the Iranian weapons caused extensive damage , which included the destruction of a dormitory that housed U.S. service members .
“ A lot of people would have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Dan Kvasager told Richard Engel , of NBC News .
If the Iranian missile strike had resulted in multiple American deaths , we ’ d probably be on the way to war with Iran now—and Trump would be busy lying about how it came about .

After insisting for almost two weeks that he ordered the assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani to thwart an imminent Iranian-inspired operation, or operations, that could have killed hundreds of Americans, Donald Trump changed tack on Monday. In a series of statements, he claimed that Suleimani’s history of orchestrating attacks on American soldiers and installations was sufficient to justify his killing, and he also suggested that Democrats who questioned his judgment were giving succor to terrorists.
In one of a barrage of Twitter posts on Monday morning, Trump said, “The Fake News Media and their Democrat Partners are working hard to determine whether or not the future attack by terrorist Soleimani was ‘imminent’ or not, & was my team in agreement. The answer to both is a strong YES., but it doesn’t really matter because of his horrible past!” Later in the day, Trump told reporters, “We killed Soleimani, the No. 1 terrorist in the world by every account. Bad person. Killed a lot of Americans, killed a lot of people. We killed him. And when the Democrats try and defend him, it’s a disgrace to our country.”
The Democrats haven’t been trying to defend Suleimani, of course. “No American will mourn Qassem Solemaini’s passing,” the Presidential candidate Joe Biden said in one of the first Democratic responses to the January 3rd drone strike. “He deserved to be brought to justice for his crimes against American troops and thousands of innocents throughout the region.” Other Democrats made similar statements. But Democrats have also pointed out that the Administration has failed to provide any convincing evidence to back up Trump’s claim that the Iranian was plotting imminent attacks against Americans. Some of them, including Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House, have made the argument that killing Suleimani was a dangerous escalation that has created greater danger for Americans, especially American service members in the Middle East.
When Trump feels challenged, he doesn’t let the truth or common decency or respect for his office impair his demagogic response. Last Thursday, he told reporters, “You know what bothers me? When I see a Nancy Pelosi trying to defend this monster from Iran who has killed so many people.” Pelosi didn’t defend Suleimani. “In fact, we were not able to find any examples of Democrats who have defended or ‘mourned’ the death of Iran’s top military commander,” FactCheck.org reported last Friday. But, of course, this admonition didn’t halt Trump’s efforts to demonize the Democrats. On Monday morning, he retweeted a Photoshopped image of Pelosi and Chuck Schumer, the Senate Minority Leader, wearing traditional Islamic headwear, with an Iranian flag behind them. The caption on the tweet was “The corrupted Dems trying their best to come to the Ayatollah’s rescue. #NancyPelosiFakeNews.”
Appearing on Fox News, Stephanie Grisham, the White House press secretary, didn’t just defend Trump’s inflammatory retweet. She sought to expand upon it, saying, “I think the President is making clear that the Democrats have been parroting Iranian talking points and almost taking the side of terrorists and those who are out to kill Americans.”
Trump’s explicit adoption of McCarthyite smears, combined with the shift in rationales for the assassination of Suleimani, appeared to reflect alarm that he is losing the Iran messaging battle. This past weekend, an ABC News/Ipsos poll showed that a majority of Americans agree with the Democrats: fifty-two per cent of the respondents to the poll said that killing Suleimani made America less safe. And, on the same day that the poll was released, Trump’s own Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, stated publicly that he hadn’t seen a single piece of intelligence that backs up Trump’s claim that Suleimani was plotting to blow up four American Embassies. “I didn’t see one with regard to four embassies,” Esper said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” (He hastily added, “I share the President’s view that probably—my expectation was they were going to go after our embassies.”)
Esper’s admission was only one of many developments that have undermined Trump’s initial explanations. On Monday, there was another one. NBC News reported that Trump gave provisional authorization for the killing of Suleimani seven months ago, “if Iran’s increased aggression resulted in the death of an American.” Citing five current and former Administration officials as sources, the NBC News story went on to say that the June Presidential order “came with the condition that Trump would have final signoff on any specific operation to kill Soleimani.”
Trump hasn’t disavowed his claim about an attack on four embassies being imminent, and he surely won’t. However, his Administration is clearly looking to make a case for the strike on Suleimani that doesn’t hinge on the danger of an imminent attack. In a speech on Monday, Mike Pompeo, the Secretary of State, argued that Suleimani’s elimination was part of a broader U.S. strategy for “reëstablishing deterrence—real deterrence—against the Islamic Republic of Iran.” During a press conference at the Justice Department, William Barr, the Attorney General, also weighed in, describing the question of whether there was an imminent threat as “a red herring.” Barr said, “I think when you’re dealing with a situation where you already have attacks under way, you know there is a campaign that involves repeated attacks on American targets, I don’t think there is a requirement, frankly, of knowing the exact time and place of the next attack. That certainly was the position of the Obama Administration when it droned leaders of terrorist organizations.”
The Obama Administration didn’t drone a sovereign state’s top general. Nor did it needlessly create a war scare with Iran that could have easily escalated into a full-scale conflict. Just how easily became clear on Monday when reporters visited the Ain al-Asad airbase, in Iraq’s Anbar Province, which Iran hit with a barrage of missiles last week. Contrary to initial reports, the Iranian weapons caused extensive damage, which included the destruction of a dormitory that housed U.S. service members. “A lot of people would have died if we hadn’t moved,” U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Dan Kvasager told Richard Engel, of NBC News.
If the Iranian missile strike had resulted in multiple American deaths, we’d probably be on the way to war with Iran now—and Trump would be busy lying about how it came about.


newyorker--2020-01-14--You Will Never Escape This Fancy Food Hall

You fool !
You thought that you could come here for a quick bite—perhaps a slice of pizza drizzled with hot honey , or an empanada filled with chorizo and esquites .
Well , we hope it was worth it , because now you ’ re trapped in our artisanal food hall for all eternity .
Look around .
You will find no egress—simply more stalls .
We feature delicacies from every corner of the earth , and , as we brought in more and more chefs selling more and more Kobe sliders , our hall became as large as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave because you never entered .
You have been reborn in this food hall , in front of the hummus place , and you will die here , next to a different hummus place .
Gaze upon that old , wizened man in tattered rags eating a chimichurri-steak sandwich .
He was like you once—a young foodie , excited about the hall ’ s near-infinite possibilities .
Now he ’ s a spectre of his former self , condemned to walk these aisles for all time , hoping to sample items from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spending seventeen dollars on a bowl of ramen .
Soon , your notions of time and space will begin to break down .
Indeed , the process has already begun .
Can you even be sure that you are you anymore ?
Usually , you don ’ t like Indian food , but here you sit , eating yet another order of tikka masala .
“ What ’ s in that sauce ?
” you whisper to yourself .
“ It is your history and future , ” the void whispers back .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ tikka-masala place is now gone , replaced by a mirror that reflects your soul and also a guy selling popcorn with truffle butter on it .
Your entreaties will get you nowhere .
The passersby you ask for directions are as lost as you are .
They walk , ceaselessly , searching for a table with at least two of those wildly uncomfortable metal stools free or , at the very least , that taco place that David Chang said was “ fucking delicious.
” Turn left , then right .
You see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way out .
You open the door , and what do you find ?
Not the life you left behind but a minotaur !
Excuse us—a minotaur place .
You ’ ve found a place that serves both grilled and fried minotaur .
It ’ s so , so good .
Bathrooms ?
Ha !
We created this netherworld and even we have no idea where they are .
Maybe they ’ re over by the vegan-ice-cream place .
Let us know .
.
.
if you ever return .
As you pass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time , you begin to wonder—maybe you are not trapped in a physical maze but rather in a Kafkaesque maze of your own making .
Incidentally , Kafkaesque Maze of Your Own Making is the name of an amazing Czech stall , where you get to choose what kind of sausage goes in your goulash .
Seriously , you have to try it .
We will offer you a wager .
If you can answer this riddle , you may leave : There are two pan-Asian-dumpling stalls .
The employees at one always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other always lie .
Also , the employees at the first one make this amazing nuoc cham with spicy chilis , whereas the second one specializes in gyoza .
At which one should you ask for directions to the exit ?
Will you grab some soup dumplings to go ?
Can we have some ?
If you consult the ancient scrolls , you will learn that , yes , there is a way out—but you may not like it .
The only way to escape is to go down that long and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Three-Headed Dog ( a gourmet hot-dog stall ) and pass through the portal .
You will have left this cursèd place , but you will not be free .
You will be in a pour-over coffee shop .
And you ’ ll try to order coffee , but they ’ ll talk to you about what kind of beans you want .
For a long time .
For all of time !
Until the sun consumes itself and all living things !
Then , and only then , will your coffee be @ @

You fool! You thought that you could come here for a quick bite—perhaps a slice of pizza drizzled with hot honey, or an empanada filled with chorizo and esquites. Well, we hope it was worth it, because now you’re trapped in our artisanal food hall for all eternity.
Look around. You will find no egress—simply more stalls. We feature delicacies from every corner of the earth, and, as we brought in more and more chefs selling more and more Kobe sliders, our hall became as large as the world itself. You cannot leave because you never entered. You have been reborn in this food hall, in front of the hummus place, and you will die here, next to a different hummus place.
Gaze upon that old, wizened man in tattered rags eating a chimichurri-steak sandwich. He was like you once—a young foodie, excited about the hall’s near-infinite possibilities. Now he’s a spectre of his former self, condemned to walk these aisles for all time, hoping to sample items from a few different places but inevitably ending up spending seventeen dollars on a bowl of ramen.
Soon, your notions of time and space will begin to break down. Indeed, the process has already begun. Can you even be sure that you are you anymore? Usually, you don’t like Indian food, but here you sit, eating yet another order of tikka masala. “What’s in that sauce?” you whisper to yourself. “It is your history and future,” the void whispers back. You look up and realize that the tikka-masala place is now gone, replaced by a mirror that reflects your soul and also a guy selling popcorn with truffle butter on it.
Your entreaties will get you nowhere. The passersby you ask for directions are as lost as you are. They walk, ceaselessly, searching for a table with at least two of those wildly uncomfortable metal stools free or, at the very least, that taco place that David Chang said was “fucking delicious.”
Turn left, then right. You see a door—that’s it! A way out. You open the door, and what do you find? Not the life you left behind but a minotaur! Excuse us—a minotaur place. You’ve found a place that serves both grilled and fried minotaur. It’s so, so good.
Bathrooms? Ha! We created this netherworld and even we have no idea where they are. Maybe they’re over by the vegan-ice-cream place. Let us know . . . if you ever return.
As you pass the same banh-mi stand for the third time, you begin to wonder—maybe you are not trapped in a physical maze but rather in a Kafkaesque maze of your own making. Incidentally, Kafkaesque Maze of Your Own Making is the name of an amazing Czech stall, where you get to choose what kind of sausage goes in your goulash. Seriously, you have to try it.
We will offer you a wager. If you can answer this riddle, you may leave: There are two pan-Asian-dumpling stalls. The employees at one always tell the truth. The employees at the other always lie. Also, the employees at the first one make this amazing nuoc cham with spicy chilis, whereas the second one specializes in gyoza. At which one should you ask for directions to the exit? Will you grab some soup dumplings to go? Can we have some?
If you consult the ancient scrolls, you will learn that, yes, there is a way out—but you may not like it. The only way to escape is to go down that long and winding corridor. Turn when you see the Three-Headed Dog (a gourmet hot-dog stall) and pass through the portal. You will have left this cursèd place, but you will not be free. You will be in a pour-over coffee shop. And you’ll try to order coffee, but they’ll talk to you about what kind of beans you want. For a long time. For all of time! Until the sun consumes itself and all living things! Then, and only then, will your coffee be ready.


newyorker--2020-01-14--Bryan Washington Reads “Visitor”

Bryan Washington Reads “Visitor”

How a Korean Stew Connected Me with My Mom After frequenting Korean restaurants in Houston , the writer Bryan Washington @ @ @ @ @ to cook soondubu—and , in the process , found an unexpected way to renew his @ @ @ @ @

Photograph by Dailey Hubbard
Bryan Washington reads his story from the January 20, 2020, issue of the magazine. Washington is a National Book Award 5 Under 35 honoree. His first story collection, “Lot,” was published last year.


newyorker--2020-01-14--The Democratic Presidential Candidates Need to Start Talking About the Supreme Court

The Democratic Presidential candidates will soon be compelled to talk about what may be the most important issue in the 2020 election : the future of both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts .
A coalition of civil-rights groups has scheduled a Presidential forum for February 8th , in New Hampshire , to address judicial issues , with a “ particular focus ” on reproductive rights .
It ’ s about time .
The Democratic debates so far have featured detailed discussions of the candidates ’ competing health-care plans—none of which is likely to become law in any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far been described .
( It ’ s worth noting that , after similar health-care debates between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in 2008 , Obama ’ s Affordable Care Act , by the time it passed in Congress , looked more like Clinton ’ s campaign plan than Obama ’ s . )
But one thing we know for sure is that , if a Democrat wins the White House this year , he or she will be responsible for appointing federal judges , including a few likely vacancies on the Supreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of federal judicial appointments , both as a political play to his base and as a substantive legacy for his Presidency .
He announced prospective Supreme Court nominees while he was a candidate—a good idea for a Democrat , by the way—and has since worked closely with Mitch McConnell , the Senate Majority Leader , to fill two Supreme Court vacancies and scores of lower-court judgeships , all of which come with life tenure .
Trump moved the Supreme Court significantly to the right by replacing Anthony Kennedy with Brett Kavanaugh , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in three years ; Obama named only fifty-five in eight years .
This is a formidable legacy for Trump and McConnell , but it ’ s not the end of the story .
Most of the judges that Trump has replaced were Republican appointees , and McConnell has been so efficient at filling vacancies that there are relatively few remaining for Trump ’ s final year .
If a Democrat wins the election , he or she may well have a chance to replace the two senior Democratic appointees on the Supreme Court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who are both in their eighties , and also , perhaps , Clarence Thomas , who is seventy-one .
With a major abortion case already on the Court ’ s docket this year , and another crucial case , testing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act , potentially on its way to the Justices , the subject of the forum could not be more pressing .
But the Supreme Court has barely come up in previous debates , and several candidates have scarcely talked about it at all .
This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former Vice-President Joe Biden , who probably has more experience with judicial nominations than any candidate who has ever sought the Presidency .
Biden ’ s reticence on the subject has a clear basis .
His long tenure on the Senate Judiciary Committee included serving as the chair during Thomas ’ s epic confirmation hearings , in 1991 .
The verdict of history on Biden ’ s performance at that moment has been harsh .
He cut short a full examination of Anita Hill ’ s charges of sexual misconduct by Thomas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Republican votes in the Senate were still in play .
Thomas was confirmed by fifty-two votes to forty-eight .
If Biden had allowed more witnesses to testify , the result might have gone the other way , and the nation might have been spared Thomas ’ s appalling record on the Court .
Especially now , in the # MeToo era , it ’ s understandable why Biden has steered away from the subject .
But Biden was also the chair of the committee in 1987 , when the Senate voted down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that instance , Biden ’ s performance was nothing short of heroic ; he led the opposition of a nominee who , if he had had a chance to serve on the Court , would have transformed it .
By leading the fight against Bork—and thereby forcing President Ronald Reagan to pick a more moderate nominee , who ended up being Kennedy—Biden can claim a major and honorable legacy on the Court .
If he had failed to stop Bork , there is little doubt , for example , that the Court would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affirmative action .
The New Hampshire forum , which will take place just three days before the New Hampshire primary—and which is sponsored by the Demand Justice Initiative , the Center for Reproductive Rights , and NARAL—should force the candidates to address these critical issues .
Do they have litmus tests for judicial nominees ?
Who are their judicial heroes ?
What if the Senate is still in Republican hands next year , and McConnell is still in charge ?
If that ’ s the case , how would a new Democratic President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
How big a priority will that be ?
The answers to those questions may not be clear after this Presidential forum , but at least the candidates will finally be asked the right questions .

The Democratic Presidential candidates will soon be compelled to talk about what may be the most important issue in the 2020 election: the future of both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. A coalition of civil-rights groups has scheduled a Presidential forum for February 8th, in New Hampshire, to address judicial issues, with a “particular focus” on reproductive rights. It’s about time.
The Democratic debates so far have featured detailed discussions of the candidates’ competing health-care plans—none of which is likely to become law in any form close to what’s so far been described. (It’s worth noting that, after similar health-care debates between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in 2008, Obama’s Affordable Care Act, by the time it passed in Congress, looked more like Clinton’s campaign plan than Obama’s.) But one thing we know for sure is that, if a Democrat wins the White House this year, he or she will be responsible for appointing federal judges, including a few likely vacancies on the Supreme Court.
Donald Trump understood the importance of federal judicial appointments, both as a political play to his base and as a substantive legacy for his Presidency. He announced prospective Supreme Court nominees while he was a candidate—a good idea for a Democrat, by the way—and has since worked closely with Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, to fill two Supreme Court vacancies and scores of lower-court judgeships, all of which come with life tenure. Trump moved the Supreme Court significantly to the right by replacing Anthony Kennedy with Brett Kavanaugh, and he has named fifty federal appeals-court judges in three years; Obama named only fifty-five in eight years.
This is a formidable legacy for Trump and McConnell, but it’s not the end of the story. Most of the judges whom Trump has replaced were Republican appointees, and McConnell has been so efficient at filling vacancies that there are relatively few remaining for Trump’s final year. If a Democrat wins the election, he or she may well have a chance to replace the two senior Democratic appointees on the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, who are both in their eighties, and also, perhaps, Clarence Thomas, who is seventy-one.
With a major abortion case already on the Court’s docket this year, and another crucial case, testing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, potentially on its way to the Justices, the subject of the forum could not be more pressing. But the Supreme Court has barely come up in previous debates, and several candidates have scarcely talked about it at all. This is especially true of the current front-runner, the former Vice-President Joe Biden, who probably has more experience with judicial nominations than any candidate who has ever sought the Presidency.
Biden’s reticence on the subject has a clear basis. His long tenure on the Senate Judiciary Committee included serving as the chair during Thomas’s epic confirmation hearings, in 1991. The verdict of history on Biden’s performance at that moment has been harsh. He cut short a full examination of Anita Hill’s charges of sexual misconduct by Thomas, at a time when several Democratic and Republican votes in the Senate were still in play. Thomas was confirmed by fifty-two votes to forty-eight. If Biden had allowed more witnesses to testify, the result might have gone the other way, and the nation might have been spared Thomas’s appalling record on the Court. Especially now, in the #MeToo era, it’s understandable why Biden has steered away from the subject.
But Biden was also the chair of the committee in 1987, when the Senate voted down the nomination of Robert Bork. In that instance, Biden’s performance was nothing short of heroic; he led the opposition of a nominee who, if he had had a chance to serve on the Court, would have transformed it. By leading the fight against Bork—and thereby forcing President Ronald Reagan to pick a more moderate nominee, who ended up being Kennedy—Biden can claim a major and honorable legacy on the Court. If he had failed to stop Bork, there is little doubt, for example, that the Court would have overturned Roe v. Wade and banned affirmative action.
The New Hampshire forum, which will take place just three days before the New Hampshire primary—and which is sponsored by the Demand Justice Initiative, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and NARAL—should force the candidates to address these critical issues. Do they have litmus tests for judicial nominees? Who are their judicial heroes? What if the Senate is still in Republican hands next year, and McConnell is still in charge? If that’s the case, how would a new Democratic President push through his or her judicial nominees? How big a priority will that be? The answers to those questions may not be clear after this Presidential forum, but at least the candidates will finally be asked the right questions.


newyorker--2020-01-14--Could New Research on A.I. and White-Collar Jobs Finally Bring About a Strong Policy Response?

The encroachment of automation and robotics into the workplace has forced us to rethink the way that certain jobs are done , and it has produced anxiety about whether there will be enough jobs in the future for the human workers who need them .
So far , much of the attention has focussed on blue-collar work , as factory assembly lines and warehouses have adopted automated processes more quickly and visibly than other industries .
Automation on a factory floor evokes a simple image : robotic arms assembling parts into Tesla cars ; mobile robots driving pallets of goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scenario , the impact on human workers is easy to see .
What is harder to visualize is how similar technology might find its way into the aspects of human labor that are invisible and not as easily routinized , such as complex decision-making , strategic planning , and creative thought .
Until recently , the consensus among researchers seemed to be that workers with higher levels of education would be less affected by automation than those lower down on the economic hierarchy .
Now , though , new research suggests that higher-educated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disruption , as well .
In a study published in November by the Brookings Institution , researchers found that certain higher-wage occupations might be more deeply intertwined with A.I .
technology in the future than previously thought .
“ The big takeaway is that manufacturing professions and occupations will be heavily affected , ” one of the study ’ s co-authors , Mark Muro , told me recently .
“ But so will white-collar jobs—managerial and office activity.
” Muro , a senior fellow at Brookings ’ Metropolitan Policy Program , who specializes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wears spectacles that lend him a bookish air , noted that whether these jobs are likely to be replaced by A.I .
or simply changed by it is still unclear ; in some cases , A.I .
may end up assisting human workers rather than doing their jobs for them .
Either way , the uncertainty is likely to cause alarm in some circles .
One of the challenges of studying the effects of artificial intelligence on white-collar employment is that the integration of algorithms into office work happens slowly , and often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muro and his co-authors tried to narrow their task by focussing on machine learning , a form of A.I .
that uses algorithms to analyze huge amounts of data , find patterns , and then use those patterns to make predictions .
“ When most people talk about A.I.
, they ’ re talking , in many respects , about this , ” Muro said .
“ When they talk about the radiologists reading a scan enhanced by A.I.
, they ’ re talking about machine learning.
” After they defined what they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself : how to figure out what new kinds of machine-learning applications were likely to be introduced in the coming years .
For this , the researchers employed a method developed by Michael Webb , a graduate student in the economics department at Stanford University , who created an algorithm to analyze A.I .
patents that had been filed and cross-reference them with tasks performed in various jobs .
Webb examined a pool of approximately sixteen thousand patents that contained verb-object pairs such as “ diagnose disease ” and “ predict prognosis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used by the Department of Labor .
“ Patents are a reflection of the things that inventors think are going to be important innovations that will make money in the future , ” Webb told me .
“ The reason you patent something is that you think you could make some money off of this innovation , and you want the right to create that product and not have other people do it instead.
” As a way of testing the effectiveness of this research method , Webb looked back at the previous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ software and industrial robotics , to see if the predictions about employment and wage decline one would have found then had panned out .
They had : software patents often referred to “ recording , ” “ storing , ” and “ producing information , ” while robot-related patents talked about “ cleaning , ” “ moving , ” “ welding , ” and “ assembling.
” The words correlated most strongly with the tasks of packers and packagers , hoist and winch operators , machine operators , and those who worked in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ It turns out that the jobs that were highly exposed to those technologies experienced declines in employment and in wages over the next thirty years , ” Webb said .
That , to him , suggested that software and industrial robots were replacing human labor in those fields ( although there were other forces in effect , as well , such as the offshoring of factories ) .
Webb then analyzed A.I .
patent filings and found them using verbs such as “ recognize , ” “ detect , ” “ control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ classify , ” and nouns like “ patterns , ” “ images , ” and “ abnormalities.
” The jobs that appear to face intrusion by these newer patents are different from the more manual jobs that were affected by industrial robots : intelligent machines may , for example , take on more tasks currently conducted by physicians , such as detecting cancer , making prognoses , and interpreting the results of retinal scans , as well as those of office workers that involve making determinations based on data , such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ People with bachelor ’ s degrees might be more exposed to the effects of the new technologies than other educational groups , as might those with higher incomes .
The findings suggest that nurses , doctors , managers , accountants , financial advisers , computer programmers , and salespeople might see significant shifts in their work .
Occupations that require high levels of interpersonal skill seem most insulated .
( Notably , jobs at the very top of the earning scale , such as C.E.O.
, are not shown to be deeply changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he thought the implications of his research might be , he told me about a tweet that someone had written in response to the paper ’ s findings .
The author had expressed concern that his work might “ muddy the water about the underemployed and vulnerable , ” Muro said , by taking attention away from the truck drivers and factory workers who are already being displaced from their jobs , often with less of a financial cushion to fall back on .
“ There ’ s no doubt the white-collar part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most capable , resilient workers in the economy , ” Muro said .
“ For someone in the eightieth percentile of income , they ’ re probably well trained by , and are being invested in by , their employers.
” That kind of investment , Muro added , “ doesn ’ t flow to those at the lower end.
” But he noted that the danger of automation coming for white-collar jobs might help make the issue more real for those in charge of policy decisions .
“ I think maybe this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he said .
“ This suggests that it isn ’ t just somebody else ’ s problem , namely , a black or brown worker in a factory .
.
.
.
We ’ re all going to be contending with tremendous flux and change in the labor market and our work .
”

The encroachment of automation and robotics into the workplace has forced us to rethink the way that certain jobs are done, and it has produced anxiety about whether there will be enough jobs in the future for the human workers who need them. So far, much of the attention has focussed on blue-collar work, as factory assembly lines and warehouses have adopted automated processes more quickly and visibly than other industries. Automation on a factory floor evokes a simple image: robotic arms assembling parts into Tesla cars; mobile robots driving pallets of goods through Amazon distribution centers. In either scenario, the impact on human workers is easy to see. What is harder to visualize is how similar technology might find its way into the aspects of human labor that are invisible and not as easily routinized, such as complex decision-making, strategic planning, and creative thought.
Until recently, the consensus among researchers seemed to be that workers with higher levels of education would be less affected by automation than those lower down on the economic hierarchy. Now, though, new research suggests that higher-educated, white-collar workers may be facing significant disruption, as well. In a study published in November by the Brookings Institution, researchers found that certain higher-wage occupations might be more deeply intertwined with A.I. technology in the future than previously thought. “The big takeaway is that manufacturing professions and occupations will be heavily affected,” one of the study’s co-authors, Mark Muro, told me recently. “But so will white-collar jobs—managerial and office activity.” Muro, a senior fellow at Brookings’ Metropolitan Policy Program, who specializes in economic development and technology and who wears spectacles that lend him a bookish air, noted that whether these jobs are likely to be replaced by A.I. or simply changed by it is still unclear; in some cases, A.I. may end up assisting human workers rather than doing their jobs for them. Either way, the uncertainty is likely to cause alarm in some circles.
One of the challenges of studying the effects of artificial intelligence on white-collar employment is that the integration of algorithms into office work happens slowly, and often imperceptibly. As a starting point, Muro and his co-authors tried to narrow their task by focussing on machine learning, a form of A.I. that uses algorithms to analyze huge amounts of data, find patterns, and then use those patterns to make predictions. “When most people talk about A.I., they’re talking, in many respects, about this,” Muro said. “When they talk about the radiologists reading a scan enhanced by A.I., they’re talking about machine learning.”
After they defined what they were looking for, another challenge presented itself: how to figure out what new kinds of machine-learning applications were likely to be introduced in the coming years. For this, the researchers employed a method developed by Michael Webb, a graduate student in the economics department at Stanford University, who created an algorithm to analyze A.I. patents that had been filed and cross-reference them with tasks performed in various jobs. Webb examined a pool of approximately sixteen thousand patents that contained verb-object pairs such as “diagnose disease” and “predict prognosis,” which correlated with descriptions of occupations used by the Department of Labor. “Patents are a reflection of the things that inventors think are going to be important innovations that will make money in the future,” Webb told me. “The reason you patent something is that you think you could make some money off of this innovation, and you want the right to create that product and not have other people do it instead.”
As a way of testing the effectiveness of this research method, Webb looked back at the previous thirty years or so of patents in software and industrial robotics, to see if the predictions about employment and wage decline one would have found then had panned out. They had: software patents often referred to “recording,” “storing,” and “producing information,” while robot-related patents talked about “cleaning,” “moving,” “welding,” and “assembling.” The words correlated most strongly with the tasks of packers and packagers, hoist and winch operators, machine operators, and those who worked in warehouses—for example, people driving forklifts. “It turns out that the jobs that were highly exposed to those technologies experienced declines in employment and in wages over the next thirty years,” Webb said. That, to him, suggested that software and industrial robots were replacing human labor in those fields (although there were other forces in effect, as well, such as the offshoring of factories).
Webb then analyzed A.I. patent filings and found them using verbs such as “recognize,” “detect,” “control,” “determine,” and “classify,” and nouns like “patterns,” “images,” and “abnormalities.” The jobs that appear to face intrusion by these newer patents are different from the more manual jobs that were affected by industrial robots: intelligent machines may, for example, take on more tasks currently conducted by physicians, such as detecting cancer, making prognoses, and interpreting the results of retinal scans, as well as those of office workers that involve making determinations based on data, such as detecting fraud or investigating insurance claims. People with bachelor’s degrees might be more exposed to the effects of the new technologies than other educational groups, as might those with higher incomes. The findings suggest that nurses, doctors, managers, accountants, financial advisers, computer programmers, and salespeople might see significant shifts in their work. Occupations that require high levels of interpersonal skill seem most insulated. (Notably, jobs at the very top of the earning scale, such as C.E.O., are not shown to be deeply changed.)
When I asked Muro what he thought the implications of his research might be, he told me about a tweet that someone had written in response to the paper’s findings. The author had expressed concern that his work might “muddy the water about the underemployed and vulnerable,” Muro said, by taking attention away from the truck drivers and factory workers who are already being displaced from their jobs, often with less of a financial cushion to fall back on. “There’s no doubt the white-collar part of the story involves some of the most capable, resilient workers in the economy,” Muro said. “For someone in the eightieth percentile of income, they’re probably well trained by, and are being invested in by, their employers.” That kind of investment, Muro added, “doesn’t flow to those at the lower end.” But he noted that the danger of automation coming for white-collar jobs might help make the issue more real for those in charge of policy decisions. “I think maybe this widens the scope of concern,” he said. “This suggests that it isn’t just somebody else’s problem, namely, a black or brown worker in a factory. . . . We’re all going to be contending with tremendous flux and change in the labor market and our work.”


newyorker--2020-01-13--Poll: Americans Say They Will Vote for Bloomberg If That Makes Him Stop Airing Ads

NEW YORK ( The Borowitz Report ) —In a positive sign for the former New York mayor , a new poll indicates that an increasing number of Americans would vote for Michael Bloomberg if that would make him stop airing campaign ads .
The poll found that sixteen per cent of those surveyed were “ somewhat likely ” to vote for Bloomberg if that would convince him to stop airing ads , twenty-one per cent were “ very likely ” to do so for that reason , and a whopping thirty-three per cent “ strongly agreed ” with the statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whatever he wants—please , just make them stop right now.
” By contrast , only eight per cent said that they would vote for Bloomberg ’ s fellow-billionaire Tom Steyer if that would make Steyer stop airing his ads .
At Bloomberg campaign headquarters , in New York , the campaign ’ s chief strategist , Harland Dorrinson , said that the poll numbers made it clear that “ Mike ’ s ads are having exactly their desired effect.
” “ If this many people are willing to vote for Mike to make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s spent only two hundred million , imagine how many will vote to stop him after he spends another eight hundred million , ” Dorrinson crowed .
In a new Bloomberg ad airing this week , the candidate addresses the viewer directly , stating , “ Hi , I ’ m Mike Bloomberg .
Do you want to see more of these ads ?
The choice is yours , ” before the screen abruptly goes black .

NEW YORK (The Borowitz Report)—In a positive sign for the former New York mayor, a new poll indicates that an increasing number of Americans would vote for Michael Bloomberg if that would make him stop airing campaign ads.
The poll found that sixteen per cent of those surveyed were “somewhat likely” to vote for Bloomberg if that would convince him to stop airing ads, twenty-one per cent were “very likely” to do so for that reason, and a whopping thirty-three per cent “strongly agreed” with the statement “Seriously, I’ll do whatever he wants—please, just make them stop right now.”
By contrast, only eight per cent said that they would vote for Bloomberg’s fellow-billionaire Tom Steyer if that would make Steyer stop airing his ads.
At Bloomberg campaign headquarters, in New York, the campaign’s chief strategist, Harland Dorrinson, said that the poll numbers made it clear that “Mike’s ads are having exactly their desired effect.”
“If this many people are willing to vote for Mike to make him stop airing ads after he’s spent only two hundred million, imagine how many will vote to stop him after he spends another eight hundred million,” Dorrinson crowed.
In a new Bloomberg ad airing this week, the candidate addresses the viewer directly, stating, “Hi, I’m Mike Bloomberg. Do you want to see more of these ads? The choice is yours,” before the screen abruptly goes black.


newyorker--2020-01-13--Andrew Bacevich on U.S. Foreign-Policy Mistakes

President Trump ’ s decision to order a drone strike that killed Qassem Suleimani , the head of Iran ’ s Quds Force , has rekindled debates in Washington about the role of the U.S. in the Middle East .
Many Republicans have called for more aggressive action against Iran , while the Democratic Presidential candidates have generally pleaded for restraint and a foreign policy that avoids future wars in the region .
But Democrats have tended to get the U.S. embroiled in military conflicts , too , which has led to critiques by Bernie Sanders and others that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To talk about these issues , I spoke by phone on Friday with Andrew J. Bacevich , who served in the U.S. Army for more than two decades before becoming one of the most outspoken voices criticizing American foreign policy , particularly during the Iraq War , in which his son was killed .
He is now the president of the Quincy Institute , a Washington think tank that was founded in November , 2019 , and advocates for a less militarized approach to foreign policy .
He is the author of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Illusions : How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory.
” Senator Tom Cotton , a Republican from Arkansas , an Army veteran and one of the most extreme hawks in Congress , recently suggested that the Quincy Institute ’ s isolationism was tied to anti-Semitism ; Bacevich called the claim “ absurd.
” During my conversation with Bacevich , which has been edited for length and clarity , we discussed the historical overlap between isolationism and anti-Semitism , how American foreign policy changed after the Cold War , and how the foreign-policy establishment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic Presidential nominee .
Why did you want to describe this moment in world affairs as being the result of America ’ s Cold War victory ?
Well , as someone who has observed the direction of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and came to view that as misguided , coupled with my own Catholic , conservative outlook on matters related to political economy and culture , I just came to the conclusion that this period of time , which began on a note of euphoria , ended @ @ @ @ @ @ @ somebody who is utterly unfit for the office .
It seemed to me that there ’ s a story there .
What is it , specifically , that you think the Cold War and its victory did to the United States ?
I was born in 1947 , basically when the Cold War began .
Even though I served in Vietnam , it ’ d be more accurate to say that I was a Cold Warrior .
That is to say , I served in the Army at a time when preventing World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our purpose .
I certainly came to believe , as I think many other Americans did , that the Cold War defined international relations , and , indeed , the Cold War defined contemporary history .
I did not think that the Cold War would never end .
The political establishment didn ’ t think that the Cold War would never end , and when it did end , really abruptly , I think that the political establishment succumbed to a bout of hubris .
We need to be mindful of the famous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1989 , “ The End of History ?
, ” and the impact that that article had in Washington circles .
People did come to believe that the end of the Cold War marked a transformative moment that left the United States in a position to preside over the history that was going to follow the end of history .
It ’ s led to arrogance , to misjudgments , to the embrace of ideas like globalization , like the notion that we were the indispensable nation , that produced deeply unfortunate consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five Presidents we have had since the end of the Cold War ?
Do you think they all succumbed to a similar hubris ?
I think they were all really creatures of a postwar consensus .
I think that , in the way we talk about Presidents , when we talk about the process of electing a President , we assume somehow that the President is the supreme master of the universe , somebody who is directing the fate of humankind .
That notion is very much an expression of post–Cold War hubris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the book is that the President really is a creature of his time , and that the President ’ s ability to bring change is actually limited by circumstances .
And so , without for a second denying that there are very important differences between Clinton and George W. Bush and Barack Obama as the post–Cold War Presidents , I do try to make the case that their similarities outweigh their differences .
And the similarities come from their efforts to implement the post–Cold War consensus .
Bill Clinton was the principal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we now know an unleashed corporate capitalism has the capacity to create wealth on an unprecedented scale , in which he insisted all would share .
And I think that that notion had a very powerful effect .
It was in December , 1989—that ’ s , like , what , six weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall—that the elder Bush ordered the U.S. intervention in Panama , Operation Just Cause .
As a military episode , it was very brief .
But I think that was the template of how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work .
In contrast to the Cold War , when the principal—not sole , but the principal—rationale for American military power was to prevent war , the idea was to contain the Soviet Union , to deter the Warsaw Pact .
And every President thereafter did his own experimenting with how to use American military power to do good things abroad from [ his ] perspective .
Even Barack Obama , who , when he ran for the Presidency , promised to get out of Iraq and to win the good war in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether we ’ re overthrowing the regime in Libya or embarking on a policy of assassination that , of course , Donald Trump has now himself embraced .
You said that the principal rationale during the Cold War was to “ prevent war.
” But , from Korea to Vietnam and overthrowing or helping overthrow regimes everywhere from Congo to Iran and sending military advisers to Latin America to support dictatorships , I ’ m not sure that I understand the purpose of the Cold War .
I ’ m not going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I trying to suggest that U.S. policy during the Cold War was wise .
I mean , I could write another book that would talk about the folly of the U.S. military policy in the Cold War , and , of course , that book would center on Vietnam but would certainly not be limited to Vietnam .
Americans have forgotten the folly in Korea .
So we made a ton of mistakes .
Nonetheless , never in peacetime in our history had we maintained a large military establishment until the Cold War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war .
It ’ s not my story that matters here , but I spent two tours in West Germany .
We had a very large army and a very large air force situated in West Germany , for close to forty years , in order to deter the Warsaw Pact .
After the Korean War , we maintained substantial forces in South Korea , and we continue to maintain substantial forces in Japan .
The purpose of those forces was not to allow us to project power but to prevent the outbreak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that all changed after the Cold War ended , and now the principal purpose seems to be power projection .
It was motivated by a conviction that we had somehow solved the mysteries of warfare , and that we could guarantee quick and tidy victories , which , of course , turned out to be a vast illusion .
So your feeling is that now it is more about power projection than Wilsonianism , which is your other target of criticism ?
Well , it ’ s Wilsonian when it ’ s convenient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this is where I think George W. Bush is an enormously fascinating character .
You remember that , when he ran for the Presidency in 2000 , he was very critical of Clinton .
Bush said , “ Elect me President , because I am going to have a ‘ humble foreign policy.
’ ” And I suspect when he said that , as a candidate , he probably meant it .
But 9/11 converted him into a Wilsonian—and genuinely converted him .
So the initial phases of the global war on terrorism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that we are not only protecting ourselves from a recurrence of 9/11 but we are indeed spreading freedom and democracy .
I don ’ t think it ’ s simply propaganda that the Afghanistan war was initially called Operation Enduring Freedom and the Iraq War was called Operation Iraqi Freedom .
I think , to some degree , that actually reflected a motive and intention .
By the time you get to the famous Iraq surge of 2007 , obviously , the exercise is no longer to convert Iraq into a liberal democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modest .
You can say the same thing about Afghanistan .
Your think tank , the Quincy Institute , says that it promotes responsible statecraft and less militarization .
I was talking to a friend about this , and he said to ask you what the group ’ s foreign-policy vision is besides “ we won ’ t do dumb shit.
” Or do you think that not doing dumb shit , to use an obviously informal phrase , is sort of it for now ?
I think not doing dumb shit is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ position is that we believe that the United States must be engaged in the world .
We believe that emphasizing armed intervention as the principal mode of engagement is a big mistake .
So what ’ s the alternative ?
Well , the alternative is diplomacy .
Invest in diplomacy , pursue creative diplomacy as a method of trying to , if not solve problems , at least to keep problems manageable .
I don ’ t think that we have a grandiose Wilsonian vision of how to bring peace to planet Earth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least the beginnings of a vision of providing an alternative to militarism , which is , I think , a fair characterization of what U.S. policy has been , at least since the end of the Cold War .
What have you made of the reaction to the Suleimani strike ?
There was more widespread condemnation , especially from Democrats , than I was expecting .
Is that a hopeful sign for your vision , or are we still in a dangerous place ?
I think we ’ re still in a dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people fearing that we were on the brink of World War Three .
Why did they feel that way ?
I think because we ’ re in a moment in our politics when Trump has everybody on edge .
We believe we have somebody in the Oval Office who is utterly impulsive and unpredictable , and he ’ s the Commander-in-Chief .
So I think that sense is probably what prompted the Suleimani assassination to create something pretty close to panic .
I don ’ t see any evidence of any serious rethinking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using military power that has been so central to our approach to foreign policy since the end of the Cold War .
Why do I say that ?
Well , I mean , among other things , look at the size of the Pentagon budget .
Apart from the progressive activist community , I see virtually no serious reflection given about the size of the defense budget , about the positioning of U.S. forces around the world and several hundred bases .
No serious reflection on the implications of the growing U.S. military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that makes sense or where it ’ s going to lead .
There hasn ’ t even actually been a heck of a lot of consideration to the so-called endless wars .
I ’ m struck by the fact that , when the Washington Post published the Afghanistan Papers , there were three or four days of excitement .
Boy , these are incredible revelations .
These show that the Afghanistan war has been mismanaged for years , and that we ’ ve been lied to , and that the people in charge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what they were doing .
Three or four days later , the discussion ended .
Bernie Sanders has basically been saying that the country conducts endless wars that always turn out badly , and that he has opposed them , and that if you want someone who will oppose them you should vote for him .
This is the most blatantly noninterventionist appeal I can remember from a candidate who has a chance to win the Democratic nomination .
What have you made of him , as a Catholic conservative , no less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s position in the 2016 campaign .
Not that he knew what he was talking about or necessarily meant it .
Right .
I guess my sense is that , if Bernie was elected President , he would probably care more about this stuff than Donald Trump does .
I actually agree with that .
What will be interesting to me , if Bernie gets the nomination , is to see how the establishment responds to that critique .
The establishment loathes Donald Trump .
But the establishment , on matters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I can tell , continues to believe in the imperative of American global leadership and of maintaining and being ready to use large military forces .
Now , if Bernie as the candidate positions himself in opposition to those notions , it ’ ll be very interesting to see if the establishment will come along with him .
And my guess is they won ’ t .
Always lurking behind any sort of conversation about U.S. national security is this notion that either the United States must lead or the United States reverts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reject that whole paradigm , but it ’ s always lurking in the background .
And so Bernie will end up being called an isolationist .
And , politically , that charge always carries enormous weight .
Historically , isolationism has at times gone hand in hand with some other less palatable opinions .
Do you think that it ’ s completely unfair that isolationism has somewhat of a bad rap ?
Well , I don ’ t know if we want to go down this path .
[ Laughs . ]
Let @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I think that isolationism is a fiction , and I ’ ll ask your indulgence to let me explain why I think that .
I think , if you look at the arc of U.S. history , beginning with the creation of a Republic consisting of thirteen small states along the Atlantic coastline , and then consider that , by 1945 , we had become the richest and most powerful country in the world , isolationism does not offer any kind of an explanation of how we got from point A to point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. policy virtually from the founding of the Republic has been expansionism .
We buy stuff , we take stuff , we covertly , if you look at the example of Texas , insinuate ourselves into a situation and end up claiming ownership .
We have been involved in blatant imperialism .
So my argument is that expansionism explains U.S. foreign policy better than any other single term .
There was one period of time where you could make the case that a strong isolationist sentiment existed in this country , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1938 and 1941 .
And the noninterventionists were wrong .
They were wrong in their conviction that the European war wasn ’ t our business .
No doubt about that in my mind .
But I think it ’ s fair to ask : Where did the anti-interventionist sentiment of that time , what we call isolationism , come from ?
I think where it came from was the experience of twenty years before , when we had sent an army to Europe , supposedly to make the world safe for democracy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thousand lives .
That was the total American death toll in World War One over a period of eighteen months .
I think the principal reason why the anti-interventionists didn ’ t want to enter another European war , twenty years later , was that they had found the results of the previous intervention to be totally unsatisfactory .
They absolutely had reason to think that after the First World War .
But let me ask you—in 2017 , you wrote , “ The America First Movement did not oppose Jews ; it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , costly , and counterproductive .
That was its purpose , which was an honorable one.
” Do you stand by this ?
Do I stand by what ?
Let ’ s be very careful here , please .
What you wrote there .
You ’ re going to use this—I can tell .
So I need to choose my words very carefully .
Come on now .
I think that the anti-interventionist case was understandable given the outcome of the First World War .
They had reason to oppose U.S. intervention .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , their calculation was wrong .
It ’ s good that they lost their argument .
I do not wish to be put into a position where I ’ m going to make myself some kind of a defender for the people who didn ’ t want to intervene against Nazi Germany .
That ’ s totally fine .
The reason that I brought this up and read you that quote was not only because I don ’ t think it ’ s accurate about the America First movement and Jews but also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worth thinking about the ways in which anti-interventionism can sometimes shade into things that are more ugly .
Let me also say very clearly , it is absolutely the case that there were anti-Semites in the anti-interventionist movement .
It is absolutely the case that Charles Lindbergh was an anti-Semite .
I don ’ t think it is fair , then , to say that the anti-interventionists generally were anti-Semitic .
The television host on the right who ’ s been the most energetically anti-interventionist is Tucker Carlson .
The President who has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican or Democratic President , certainly in decades , is Donald Trump .
Both Trump and Carlson are the most racist people we ’ ve seen in their positions in a very long time .
I don ’ t think that ’ s entirely a coincidence .
Again , I ’ m not trying to say that means anti-interventionism is inherently racist , but I was curious whether you ’ d wrestled with that , and how it plays into your thinking .
Even though I appeared on Tucker Carlson last week for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certainly don ’ t watch the show .
I do have a general understanding that he ’ s become a Trump critic , and I think that ’ s created a certain amount of buzz .
But I don ’ t think I ’ m able to characterize the turn in his view , if even there ’ s been a turn .
As for the President , he ’ s a man of no principles whatsoever .
As far as I can tell , as a President , he acts on impulse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in many cases , from whatever advice he got from the last person that he talked to .
Is the President a racist ?
Yeah , I think so .
Is he a sexist ?
Yeah , I think so .
Is he a fraud ?
I mean , here we have a guy who , when he was running for the Presidency , portrayed himself as a God-fearing Christian .
Is he ?
I don ’ t think so .
So he ’ s a complete phony , as others have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what else I can say on that .
I was interested in the roots of isolationism , and whether you think that ’ s something worth paying attention to .
But , if you don ’ t , that ’ s fine .
I dislike the term , but your question is whether so-called isolationism is inherently racist ?
No , that ’ s not my question at all .
And I certainly don ’ t think it ’ s inherently racist .
Is your question , “ Are racists likely to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In other words , I happen to be a white guy , but [ with ] a white male who is resentful with regard to the way the world is turning and who was looking for someone or something to blame , I can see the logical connection of that person saying that these efforts to somehow save the world , all those people out there who are not like me , which costs a lot of money , which costs American lives , all that ’ s wrongheaded , I can see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would resist the notion that therefore anybody who is an anti-interventionist somehow is a racist .
I would reject that entirely .

President Trump’s decision to order a drone strike that killed Qassem Suleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, has rekindled debates in Washington about the role of the U.S. in the Middle East. Many Republicans have called for more aggressive action against Iran, while the Democratic Presidential candidates have generally pleaded for restraint and a foreign policy that avoids future wars in the region. But Democrats have tended to get the U.S. embroiled in military conflicts, too, which has led to critiques by Bernie Sanders and others that the Party needs to reorient its foreign-policy views.
To talk about these issues, I spoke by phone on Friday with Andrew J. Bacevich, who served in the U.S. Army for more than two decades before becoming one of the most outspoken voices criticizing American foreign policy, particularly during the Iraq War, in which his son was killed. He is now the president of the Quincy Institute, a Washington think tank that was founded in November, 2019, and advocates for a less militarized approach to foreign policy. He is the author of the new book “The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory.” Senator Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas, an Army veteran and one of the most extreme hawks in Congress, recently suggested that the Quincy Institute’s isolationism was tied to anti-Semitism; Bacevich called the claim “absurd.” During my conversation with Bacevich, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed the historical overlap between isolationism and anti-Semitism, how American foreign policy changed after the Cold War, and how the foreign-policy establishment might react if Bernie Sanders became the Democratic Presidential nominee.
Why did you want to describe this moment in world affairs as being the result of America’s Cold War victory?
Well, as someone who has observed the direction of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and came to view that as misguided, coupled with my own Catholic, conservative outlook on matters related to political economy and culture, I just came to the conclusion that this period of time, which began on a note of euphoria, ended with a divided nation electing as President somebody who is utterly unfit for the office. It seemed to me that there’s a story there.
What is it, specifically, that you think the Cold War and its victory did to the United States?
I was born in 1947, basically when the Cold War began. Even though I served in Vietnam, it’d be more accurate to say that I was a Cold Warrior. That is to say, I served in the Army at a time when preventing World War Three was the focal point of our purpose. I certainly came to believe, as I think many other Americans did, that the Cold War defined international relations, and, indeed, the Cold War defined contemporary history.
I did not think that the Cold War would never end. The political establishment didn’t think that the Cold War would never end, and when it did end, really abruptly, I think that the political establishment succumbed to a bout of hubris. We need to be mindful of the famous Francis Fukuyama article that came out in 1989, “The End of History?,” and the impact that that article had in Washington circles. People did come to believe that the end of the Cold War marked a transformative moment that left the United States in a position to preside over the history that was going to follow the end of history. It’s led to arrogance, to misjudgments, to the embrace of ideas like globalization, like the notion that we were the indispensable nation, that produced deeply unfortunate consequences.
How would you distinguish between the five Presidents we have had since the end of the Cold War? Do you think they all succumbed to a similar hubris?
I think they were all really creatures of a postwar consensus. I think that, in the way we talk about Presidents, when we talk about the process of electing a President, we assume somehow that the President is the supreme master of the universe, somebody who is directing the fate of humankind. That notion is very much an expression of post–Cold War hubris. But what I tried to argue in the book is that the President really is a creature of his time, and that the President’s ability to bring change is actually limited by circumstances. And so, without for a second denying that there are very important differences between Clinton and George W. Bush and Barack Obama as the post–Cold War Presidents, I do try to make the case that their similarities outweigh their differences. And the similarities come from their efforts to implement the post–Cold War consensus. Bill Clinton was the principal promoter of globalization. He said that we now know an unleashed corporate capitalism has the capacity to create wealth on an unprecedented scale, in which he insisted all would share. And I think that that notion had a very powerful effect.
It was in December, 1989—that’s, like, what, six weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall—that the elder Bush ordered the U.S. intervention in Panama, Operation Just Cause. As a military episode, it was very brief. But I think that was the template of how we could put American military power to work. In contrast to the Cold War, when the principal—not sole, but the principal—rationale for American military power was to prevent war, the idea was to contain the Soviet Union, to deter the Warsaw Pact. And every President thereafter did his own experimenting with how to use American military power to do good things abroad from [his] perspective. Even Barack Obama, who, when he ran for the Presidency, promised to get out of Iraq and to win the good war in Afghanistan, became a significant interventionist, whether we’re overthrowing the regime in Libya or embarking on a policy of assassination that, of course, Donald Trump has now himself embraced.
You said that the principal rationale during the Cold War was to “prevent war.” But, from Korea to Vietnam and overthrowing or helping overthrow regimes everywhere from Congo to Iran and sending military advisers to Latin America to support dictatorships, I’m not sure that I understand the purpose of the Cold War.
I’m not going to deny any of that, nor am I trying to suggest that U.S. policy during the Cold War was wise. I mean, I could write another book that would talk about the folly of the U.S. military policy in the Cold War, and, of course, that book would center on Vietnam but would certainly not be limited to Vietnam. Americans have forgotten the folly in Korea. So we made a ton of mistakes.
Nonetheless, never in peacetime in our history had we maintained a large military establishment until the Cold War. Its primary purpose was to avert war. It’s not my story that matters here, but I spent two tours in West Germany. We had a very large army and a very large air force situated in West Germany, for close to forty years, in order to deter the Warsaw Pact. After the Korean War, we maintained substantial forces in South Korea, and we continue to maintain substantial forces in Japan. The purpose of those forces was not to allow us to project power but to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.


newyorker--2020-01-13--In Iowa, the Democratic Candidates Respond to the Conflict with Iran

The New Yorker ’ s Eric Lach is in Iowa for the month leading up to the Democratic caucuses .
This week ’ s debate , in Des Moines , was likely going to focus on health care and other domestic issues core to the Democratic platform , but the agenda may instead be dominated by a discussion of the Trump Administration ’ s killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani and the U.S. ’ s fraught history of war in the Middle East .
Polls show that Joe Biden is trusted on foreign-policy issues , but Lach suggests that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars—and his quick and confident articulation of his position on Iran—may sway voters seeking a clear message .
Nearly a year into the campaign , votes will finally be cast , and in Iowa the deciding factor may involve personal contact more than ideological positions .
According to Lach , Iowa voters tend to say , “ I ’ ve shaken this person ’ s hand , and I ’ ve shaken this person ’ s hand , and I ’ m going to make my decision after I ’ ve shaken this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That counts for a lot , I think , ” he adds .

Photograph by Scott Olson / Getty
The New Yorker’s Eric Lach is in Iowa for the month leading up to the Democratic caucuses. This week’s debate, in Des Moines, was likely going to focus on health care and other domestic issues core to the Democratic platform, but the agenda may instead be dominated by a discussion of the Trump Administration’s killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani and the U.S.’s fraught history of war in the Middle East. Polls show that Joe Biden is trusted on foreign-policy issues, but Lach suggests that Bernie Sanders’s history of opposing wars—and his quick and confident articulation of his position on Iran—may sway voters seeking a clear message. Nearly a year into the campaign, votes will finally be cast, and in Iowa the deciding factor may involve personal contact more than ideological positions. According to Lach, Iowa voters tend to say, “I’ve shaken this person’s hand, and I’ve shaken this person’s hand, and I’m going to make my decision after I’ve shaken this other person’s hand.” “That counts for a lot, I think,” he adds.