newyorker--2020-01-03--The Meaning of Qassem Suleimani’s Death in the Middle East

Early on Friday , Qassem Suleimani , the head of the Quds Force—an élite division of Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—was killed by a drone strike at Baghdad International Airport ordered by President Trump .
Suleimani had been responsible for carrying out much of Iran ’ s military and diplomatic efforts over the past decade , from its support for Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime in Syria to its battles against ISIS in Iraq .
His death is almost certain to escalate tension and conflict within Iraq , which has already been shaken by protests this week .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy will be in Syria , Iraq , Lebanon , and elsewhere going forward .
On Thursday night , in the United States , soon after the news broke , I spoke by phone with Vali Nasr , a professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a senior adviser to the State Department during the Obama Administration .
During our conversation , which has been edited for length and clarity , we discussed Suleimani ’ s role within Iran ’ s regime , the importance of his actions throughout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely to respond .
You have written that Suleimani had “ cult status within IRGC and among Shia militias in the region.
” Can you describe that status in more detail ?
Suleimani has been working extensively with Shia militias , as well as other groups in the region , for over two decades .
He was a personal friend of Ahmad Shah Massoud , the legendary Afghan commander who fought against the Taliban .
Suleimani had worked with the Northern Alliance , organizing them against the Taliban .
As commander of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ charge of relations with Hezbollah .
He was instrumental in setting up militias in Iraq after 2003 and brokered numerous political settlements that produced governments in Iraq .
He was also important in organizing Shia militias that fought alongside the Assad regime in Syria , and he probably was the most significant figure in orchestrating the military campaign that saved the Assad regime during the Syrian uprising .
It ’ s reported that it was only after he met with President Putin in the Kremlin that he convinced Putin to deploy the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And also smaller groups in Kuwait , in Bahrain , and elsewhere all came under his command .
If he had described himself , it would probably have been as the commander of Iran ’ s equivalent of CENTCOM , the regional commander of all of Iran ’ s operations—security , intelligence , military—outside of the Iranian border .
He was the longest-serving sitting commander of the Revolutionary Guard .
Other commanders rotate out based on terms they have , but Suleimani had sat in this position as the commander of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , outside of the norm of the rotation of the commanders of the guards .
Throughout this he built personal relationships not only with militia leaders and militia commanders and people like Hassan Nasrallah but also with heads of state , like Assad , with Masoud Barzani , in Iraq , and with all of the Iraqi Prime Ministers .
They all knew him personally , they all dealt with him personally , they all spent hours negotiating with him , and he also became the one commander in Iran that everyone in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Americans or Europeans generally don ’ t know the names of I.R.G.C .
commander leaders .
But he developed an iconic name recognition in the West , sometimes of almost mythical proportions , as a version of a John le Carré character , the master Soviet spy .
What was his name ?
Right .
[ Suleimani ] also became associated with Iran ’ s regional policies and regional power .
And then , within Iran , he gradually developed a similar kind of recognition .
The Iranians don ’ t necessarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yeah , most Americans don ’ t know who the head of CENTCOM is .
It seems like his role was much larger than a CENTCOM commander ’ s would be here .
Right , but this is also much more recent .
Gradually , he became a household name in Iran .
Even though security forces are unpopular , Suleimani personally had an enormous following , because the Iranians saw him as a heroic figure defending the country and someone who stood for patriotism and was pious .
In the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cultivating that image much more openly , taking selfies in Iraq with Shia militias during the fights against ISIS .
In Iran , there was a gradual murmur that he might become the next President .
One other thing I would add here that is actually quite critical is that , in many ways , that is how Iranians and many Shia Iraqis saw him .
And , even though they might not like the Islamic Republic , they do credit him separately for being instrumental in preventing Iraq from completely falling to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders that , when ISIS took Mosul [ in 2014 ] and began to move into the direction of Erbil , there was not Turkish or American support for the Kurdish forces .
Within two hours , Suleimani arrived in Erbil with two large airplanes of military supplies , and his personal presence shored up the front-line peshmerga soldiers , so there was a great deal of gratitude for his role in protecting Erbil and Kirkuk from the ISIS onslaught .
In the south , when Iraqi forces collapsed and ISIS was at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he relied on a fatwa from Ayatollah Sistani to organize Shia militias , which he then commanded very effectively to push back ISIS .
And then there were periods of the war where there was tacit collaboration between him and the U.S. military in fighting ISIS .
You had Revolutionary Guard forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces [ P.M.F . ]
on the ground supported by American air power .
Part of why Iraq may convulse , or Iranians may convulse , at the news of his assassination is because they don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the West does , but they see him through the prism of defeating ISIS and what he did in terms of defending the Iranian national interest .
Can you describe the Iranian role in the Syrian war , and Suleimani ’ s role in particular ?
Iran made a decision that the Assad regime was going to be preserved at all costs , and that Iran would support Assad ’ s military campaign—would help organize his military and intelligence , and also would organize and deploy Shia militias to volunteer from other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war .
Without Suleimani and Iran , Assad would not have survived , and his regime would have collapsed much earlier .
And , without Suleimani and Iran , the shape of Iraq after 2003 would have been different , and ISIS could easily have taken over Iraq .
I think the way to think of it is that Suleimani was in charge of protecting Iran ’ s footprint in the region , but in Syria it came at a tremendous cost .
He is the singular figure associated with the war that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ How much do you think Iran ’ s posture over the past decade , which was marked first and foremost by that war in Syria , was actually the result of his presence and opinions ?
Like any influential general at the Pentagon , his opinion carried , and , given his background and years of experience and stature , he did have certain influence with the Supreme Leader , but , in the end , he carried out orders .
So the over-all policy that Iran can not abandon Syria , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States get comfortable in Iraq , or Assad has to survive—these are regime-level dictates .
Suleimani was influential , particularly given his stature near the end .
But , in the end , he was a general .
He was there to execute what was consensus national policy .
What was the sense of him among those world leaders he dealt with ?
I have asked many of them .
They would say that , among all the revolutionary leaders they knew , he was pragmatic .
That is not to say he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the end of the day , he had a job to do , which was to defend Iran ’ s interests in the region , to head off the United States , to make sure the government of Iraq was toeing the line with Iran , and he was very pragmatic in that .
That was the reason for his success , his pragmatism .
And that is something important to note , because his elimination may be a stumble for the Quds Brigade , and his successor may not be as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as we have seen in the past , with the assassination of leaders of Hamas or Palestinian groups by Israel , this kind of decapitation may bring to the fore much nastier figures , who may not have the depth of relationships and also may be much more ideological and hard-line than Suleimani was .
I think the common image of the Iranian regime in the West is that it has some pragmatists , or moderates , and then you have ideological hard-liners like the Ayatollah .
It seems from what you are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neatly into that paradigm .
You are right .
Pragmatist , whether we talk about the Soviet Union , or China today , is a relative term .
It does not mean liberal democrat .
It means someone likely to make decisions based on calculations rather than ideology .
A lot of people in the West think of Iran as a very ideological regime , so that ’ s interesting .
So was the Soviet Union .
But , in reality , there were factions within it .
If you had looked at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had doctrinaire generals and generals who might have thought that a certain malleability is necessary and they should deal with the Americans .
I am not saying Suleimani was there , but I do think that , even within the narrow bounds of Iran , there is a spectrum .
Suleimani was at some level playing a diplomatic role for Iran , and , if you are cobbling together a coalition in Iraq , if you have to deal with foreign powers and work with Russians and Iraqis and Assad , you would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Do you know if previous Administrations had the chance to assassinate him and considered it ?
I don ’ t know if they considered it , or had the opportunity .
There is a tantalizing passage in a book by Ronen Bergman , called “ Rise and Kill First , ” where he said that , when the Israelis were trying to assassinate a Lebanese Shia terrorist named Imad Mughniyeh , who was responsible for the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut , they saw that at one point he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a bomb but decided they didn ’ t have the authorization to assassinate Suleimani .
Israelis largely understand that , when they assassinated previous leaders of Hezbollah , there was massive retaliation , including the bombing in Argentina .
Having said this , there is another side you need to add , and that is why he is so complicated .
There are two generations of Americans that feel bad blood with Iran .
There are people much older that look at the hostage crisis , and there are people for whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them , he is the guy who put bombs and I.E.D.s to blow up Humvees and kill hundreds of American soldiers , and egged on militias to take on the U.S. , and ultimately forced the U.S. out of Iraq .
And that is also true .
That is the whole complication .
This is the guy that fought ISIS , but he is also the guy who was given the charge to make sure that the United States leaves Iraq .
But do you think this was something a previous Administration would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is an extremely risky and dangerous move , and I think sometimes these decisions are made without thinking about consequences .
But this is an Administration that decided to hit that Kataib Hezbollah base without thinking about what will happen in Baghdad .
It is very difficult to see Iran not retaliating .
What ’ s your biggest fear about where things may be headed now ?
Partly it is that he has a cult following among Lebanese and Iraqis , irrespective of Iran .
There are twenty thousand or thirty thousand Iraqi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Tomorrow morning there might be another charge against the Embassy .
And then , within Iran , this kind of an overt assassination forces the regime to respond .
You can not not respond if such an important public figure is killed .
If they don ’ t react , they will be afraid the Americans will see this as a victory and a sign of weakness .
And , thirdly , it is an opportunity for them .
Because of the support that Suleimani enjoyed and the hero status he had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iranian and Iraqi publics around supporting the Islamic Republic against the United States .
You mentioned Argentina .
Does Iran have any possible responses that extend beyond the Middle East ?
It could .
When they hit tankers for the first time in the Persian Gulf , in June , it came as a surprise , or when they hit the Saudi oil facilities , these were not expected .
We don ’ t know where they may hit , and whether they will hit immediately .
It may very well be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s funeral .
They may focus on turning that into hundreds of thousands of people coming into the streets in Baghdad , in Tehran , in Damascus , in Beirut , and turning this into a regional show of force that galvanizes people before they actually decide how to react .
So who knows how this might play out .

Early on Friday, Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force—an élite division of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—was killed by a drone strike at Baghdad International Airport ordered by President Trump. Suleimani had been responsible for carrying out much of Iran’s military and diplomatic efforts over the past decade, from its support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria to its battles against ISIS in Iraq. His death is almost certain to escalate tension and conflict within Iraq, which has already been shaken by protests this week. It also raises questions about what Iranian policy will be in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere going forward.
On Thursday night, in the United States, soon after the news broke, I spoke by phone with Vali Nasr, a professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a senior adviser to the State Department during the Obama Administration. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed Suleimani’s role within Iran’s regime, the importance of his actions throughout the Middle East, and how Iran is likely to respond.
You have written that Suleimani had “cult status within IRGC and among Shia militias in the region.” Can you describe that status in more detail?
Suleimani has been working extensively with Shia militias, as well as other groups in the region, for over two decades. He was a personal friend of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the legendary Afghan commander who fought against the Taliban. Suleimani had worked with the Northern Alliance, organizing them against the Taliban. As commander of the Quds Brigade, he was in charge of relations with Hezbollah. He was instrumental in setting up militias in Iraq after 2003 and brokered numerous political settlements that produced governments in Iraq. He was also important in organizing Shia militias that fought alongside the Assad regime in Syria, and he probably was the most significant figure in orchestrating the military campaign that saved the Assad regime during the Syrian uprising. It’s reported that it was only after he met with President Putin in the Kremlin that he convinced Putin to deploy the Russian military in Syria to help save Assad. And also smaller groups in Kuwait, in Bahrain, and elsewhere all came under his command.
If he had described himself, it would probably have been as the commander of Iran’s equivalent of CENTCOM, the regional commander of all of Iran’s operations—security, intelligence, military—outside of the Iranian border. He was the longest-serving sitting commander of the Revolutionary Guard. Other commanders rotate out based on terms they have, but Suleimani had sat in this position as the commander of the Quds Brigade for a very long time, outside of the norm of the rotation of the commanders of the guards.
Throughout this he built personal relationships not only with militia leaders and militia commanders and people like Hassan Nasrallah but also with heads of state, like Assad, with Masoud Barzani, in Iraq, and with all of the Iraqi Prime Ministers. They all knew him personally, they all dealt with him personally, they all spent hours negotiating with him, and he also became the one commander in Iran that everyone in the West got to know after 2003. Americans or Europeans generally don’t know the names of I.R.G.C. commander leaders. But he developed an iconic name recognition in the West, sometimes of almost mythical proportions, as a version of a John le Carré character, the master Soviet spy. What was his name?
Karla?
Right. [Suleimani] also became associated with Iran’s regional policies and regional power. And then, within Iran, he gradually developed a similar kind of recognition. The Iranians don’t necessarily know the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard.
Yeah, most Americans don’t know who the head of CENTCOM is. It seems like his role was much larger than a CENTCOM commander’s would be here.
Right, but this is also much more recent. Gradually, he became a household name in Iran. Even though security forces are unpopular, Suleimani personally had an enormous following, because the Iranians saw him as a heroic figure defending the country and someone who stood for patriotism and was pious. In the past two or three years, he was cultivating that image much more openly, taking selfies in Iraq with Shia militias during the fights against ISIS. In Iran, there was a gradual murmur that he might become the next President. One other thing I would add here that is actually quite critical is that, in many ways, that is how Iranians and many Shia Iraqis saw him. And, even though they might not like the Islamic Republic, they do credit him separately for being instrumental in preventing Iraq from completely falling to ISIS.
I have heard from Kurdish leaders that, when ISIS took Mosul [in 2014] and began to move into the direction of Erbil, there was not Turkish or American support for the Kurdish forces. Within two hours, Suleimani arrived in Erbil with two large airplanes of military supplies, and his personal presence shored up the front-line peshmerga soldiers, so there was a great deal of gratitude for his role in protecting Erbil and Kirkuk from the ISIS onslaught. In the south, when Iraqi forces collapsed and ISIS was at the gates in Baghdad and Najaf, he relied on a fatwa from Ayatollah Sistani to organize Shia militias, which he then commanded very effectively to push back ISIS. And then there were periods of the war where there was tacit collaboration between him and the U.S. military in fighting ISIS. You had Revolutionary Guard forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces [P.M.F.] on the ground supported by American air power. Part of why Iraq may convulse, or Iranians may convulse, at the news of his assassination is because they don’t see him as the nefarious figure that the West does, but they see him through the prism of defeating ISIS and what he did in terms of defending the Iranian national interest.
Can you describe the Iranian role in the Syrian war, and Suleimani’s role in particular?
Iran made a decision that the Assad regime was going to be preserved at all costs, and that Iran would support Assad’s military campaign—would help organize his military and intelligence, and also would organize and deploy Shia militias to volunteer from other countries, in order to fight the war. Without Suleimani and Iran, Assad would not have survived, and his regime would have collapsed much earlier. And, without Suleimani and Iran, the shape of Iraq after 2003 would have been different, and ISIS could easily have taken over Iraq. I think the way to think of it is that Suleimani was in charge of protecting Iran’s footprint in the region, but in Syria it came at a tremendous cost. He is the singular figure associated with the war that produced the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.
How much do you think Iran’s posture over the past decade, which was marked first and foremost by that war in Syria, was actually the result of his presence and opinions?
Like any influential general at the Pentagon, his opinion carried, and, given his background and years of experience and stature, he did have certain influence with the Supreme Leader, but, in the end, he carried out orders. So the over-all policy that Iran cannot abandon Syria, or that Iran cannot let the United States get comfortable in Iraq, or Assad has to survive—these are regime-level dictates. Suleimani was influential, particularly given his stature near the end. But, in the end, he was a general. He was there to execute what was consensus national policy.
What was the sense of him among those world leaders he dealt with?


newyorker--2020-01-03--The Killing of Qassem Suleimani Is Tantamount to an Act of War

On orders from President Trump , the United States killed Major General Qassem Suleimani , the leader of Iran ’ s élite Quds Force and the mastermind of its military operations across the Middle East , in an overnight air strike at Baghdad ’ s International Airport .
The assassination was the boldest U.S. act in confronting Iran since the 1979 revolution , tantamount to an act of war .
A brief statement from the Pentagon described it as a “ decisive defensive action ” designed to protect U.S. personnel abroad .
But the strike represented a stunning escalation between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well have the reverse effect .
Iran almost certainly will want to respond in some lethal form , whether directly or through its powerful network of proxies in the region .
U.S. embassies and military bases—and thousands of American personnel across the Middle East and South Asia , and potentially beyond—were instantly vulnerable .
On Friday , the State Department ordered all Americans to leave Iraq .
On Friday , Iran ’ s Supreme Leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , declared three days of public mourning and warned that “ harsh vengeance awaits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” He moved quickly to name Brigadier General Esmail Gha ’ ani , who had worked closely with Suleimani , as the new Quds Force commander .
Mohammad Javad Zarif , Iran ’ s U.S.-educated Foreign Minister , who spent two years negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with the United States , called the American air strike an act of international terrorism .
“ The US bears responsibility for all consequences of its rogue adventurism , ” he tweeted .
Iran ’ s state-controlled television characterized the assassination as the U.S. ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World War .
“ The people of the region will no longer allow Americans to stay , ” it said .
Iran ’ s revolutionary regime often makes boastful threats , but the murder of Suleimani alarmed veteran U.S. military and diplomatic officials who have served in the Middle East .
“ It is almost impossible to overstate the importance of this , ” the retired general David Petraeus , who led U.S. forces in Iraq and later served as the director of the C.I.A.
, told me .
Suleimani was Petraeus ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iraq .
“ Iran has to be in shock right now .
Its version of the National Security Council will be on overdrive , ” he said .
“ But there ’ s a whole universe of possibilities now , everything from proxy retaliation , kidnappings of American citizens , actions against coalition partners , even an attempt to do something in the U.S. We certainly have large force concentrations in the region , too.
” Was the U.S. attack an act of war ?
Douglas Silliman , who was the U.S @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is now the president of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington , told me that the death of Suleimani was the equivalent of Iran killing the commander of U.S. military operations in the Middle East and South Asia .
“ If Iran had killed the commander of U.S. Central Command , what would we consider it to be ?
” he said .
John Limbert , one of fifty-two Americans who were taken hostage in Iran in 1979 , told me that he was happy Suleimani was gone , but quickly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to end well.
” Suleimani , a flamboyant former construction worker and bodybuilder with snowy white hair , a dapper beard , and arching salt-and-pepper eyebrows , gained notice during the eight-year war with Iraq , in the nineteen eighties .
He rose through the Revolutionary Guard to become head of the Quds Force—an Iranian unit of commandos comparable to the U.S .
SEALs , Delta Force , and Rangers combined—in 1998 .
He was the most feared and most admired military leader in the region .
He famously rallied followers with flowery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The war front is mankind ’ s lost paradise , ” Suleimani was quoted as saying , in 2009 .
“ One type of paradise that is portrayed for mankind is streams , beautiful nymphs and greeneries .
But there is another kind of paradise.
” The front , he said , was “ the lost paradise of the human beings.
” Thousands of followers died under his leadership .
Over more than two decades , Suleimani , a Shiite , had more impact than the leaders of either Al Qaeda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movements , in shaping the face of the Middle East .
To counter U.S. influence in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 , he provided Iraqi militants with rockets , bombs , and explosively formed projectiles that could slice through the armor of an American M1 tank .
“ He has the blood of hundreds of Americans on his hands , ” Petraeus said .
The United States designated the Quds Force as a supporter of terrorism , in 2007 , and Suleimani was personally sanctioned for complicity in a plot to kill the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2011 .
That same year , he spearheaded a campaign , now in its ninth year , to save President Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime after civil war erupted in Syria .
Suleimani also channelled arms and aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon , orchestrating its franchise operations in other Middle Eastern countries , and aided Houthi rebels in Yemen .
He cultivated militia proxies in Pakistan and Afghanistan , thousands of whose members were deployed to fight in Syria .
Suleimani gained fame for taking selfies—later posted on social media—on the front @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Force and their allies were deployed .
Many went viral .
“ I think people in the region saw him as untouchable , ” Petraeus said .
The only person more powerful in Iran was the Supreme Leader .
And , in the Shiite region of the Middle East , there may have been no one more powerful than Suleimani when it came to tangible impact .
“ The US just killed Iran ’ s Patton , ” Ian Bremmer , the president of the Eurasia Group , tweeted shortly after the Pentagon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani led a “ huge and largely successful strategic advance by Iran through Iraq and Syria and Lebanon.
” After initially operating in the shadows , Suleimani grew rhetorically audacious in the past decade .
In 2008 , as the U.S. and Iran competed for influence in Iraq , the Iranian general relayed a verbal message to Petraeus through the then Iraqi President , Jalal Talabani , which said , “ Dear General Petraeus , you should know that I , Qassem Suleimani , control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani ’ s point , Petraeus told me , was that the Americans had to deal with him—everywhere .
In 2018 , Suleimani famously responded to the warning that Trump issued to the Iranian President , Hassan Rouhani .
Trump , after a weekend at his golf resort in Bedminster , New Jersey , tweeted , “ NEVER , EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE .
WE ARE NO LONGER A COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani belittled Trump .
“ It is beneath the dignity of our President to respond to you , ” he said , in a speech .
“ We are near you , where you can ’ t even imagine .
We are ready .
We are the man of this arena.
” When Suleimani was killed , Trump was at his Mar-a-Lago resort , in Palm Beach .
Displaying rare restraint , he merely posted an American flag on his Twitter account .
In its statement , the Pentagon charged that Suleimani had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on bases used by U.S. and allied nations as part of an international coalition fighting ISIS .
He “ was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region , ” the Pentagon said .
Suleimani ’ s death capped a week of hostilities that escalated with lightning speed after a U.S. military contractor was killed in a rocket attack by Kata ’ ib Hezbollah , one of the most powerful Iranian-backed militias in Iraq , on December 27th .
The attack was the group ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. claimed .
On December 29th , the Pentagon responded with five air strikes—three in Iraq and two in Syria—on Kata ’ ib Hezbollah ’ s bases .
The group ’ s supporters responded by attacking the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad , which is the largest and most fortified diplomatic mission in the world .
“ General Suleimani also approved the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that took place this week , ” and the attacks on coalition bases in recent months , the Pentagon said , in its statement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ at deterring future Iranian assaults , noting pointedly , “ The United States will continue to take all necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they are around the world.
” Kata ’ ib Hezbollah has been an increasingly important militia since it emerged , under Iranian tutelage , in 2004 .
After ISIS swept through Iraq , in 2014 , it merged with dozens of other Shiite militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces to fight the Islamic State caliphate—with Iranian aid , arms , and Suleimani ’ s strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on which Iran and the U.S. had common cause .
Along with the rest of the P.M.F.
, Kata ’ ib Hezbollah was incorporated into the Iraqi military , in 2019 , yet it continued to carry out its own operations—in defiance of the government and to the frustration of the United States .
The militia has also been deployed in Syria as part of Iran ’ s support for the Assad regime .
The Pentagon provided no initial details on how the attack played out , but the Iranian media reported that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ airport from Lebanon .
The U.S. strike also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , the leader of Kata ’ ib Hezbollah and deputy chief of the P.M.F .
He was “ by far the most important P.M.F .
leader tied to Iran , ” Silliman told me .
Iranian news agencies said that Suleimani and Muhandis were leaving the airport in separate cars when both were attacked by rockets fired from a U.S. helicopter .
The Tasnim news agency , which has been tied to the Revolutionary Guard in the past , tweeted a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large ring with an oval red stone , which Suleimani was often photographed wearing .
The ring was how his body was identified , Iraqi officials said .
The timing was particularly awkward for the Iraqi government , which has long attempted a delicate balancing act between neighboring Iran and the United States .
Since October 1st , protests have swept across the country demanding the ouster of the Prime Minister and the entire political class , and an end to corruption and economic inequality .
The protests have also been noteworthy because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s influence in Iraq .
In November , protesters set fire to Iranian diplomatic missions in the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala .
The U.S. killing of Suleimani and the air strikes on Kata ’ ib Hezbollah over the weekend are an embarrassment to Iraqi leaders and a challenge to Iraqi sovereignty .
They come at a time when Baghdad is gripped by the deepest political crisis since the U.S. invasion ousted Saddam Hussein , in 2003 .
The Prime Minister , Adel Abdul-Mahdi , a Shiite who spent years in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is now playing only a caretaker role .
There are already calls for the Iraqi parliament to demand the withdrawal of some five thousand U.S. troops—and hundreds more from more than a dozen coalition neighbors—that are still waging a campaign against ISIS insurgents .
In a tweet , in Arabic , Mahdi called the assassination of Suleimani an act of aggression against the “ Iraqi state , its government , and its people.
” In an ominous signal to Washington , he said the killing was a “ breach of the conditions for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The Iraqi Parliament is due to debate the U.S. military presence and vote on whether it should continue when it reconvenes , but the Prime Minister has the ultimate say as Commander-in-Chief , Silliman said .
The reaction in Washington played out largely along party lines .
Senator Tom Cotton , a Republican of Arkansas and staunch Trump supporter and military veteran , tweeted that Suleimani “ got what he richly deserved , and all those American soldiers who died by his hand also got what they deserved : justice.
” But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cost in American lives .
The House Speaker , Nancy Pelosi , of California , said that the assassination “ risks provoking further dangerous escalation of violence .
America—and the world— can not afford to have tensions escalate to the point of no return.
” She and other Democrats charged that Trump attacked a high-level Iranian official without congressional authorization for the use of military force .
Tom Udall , a Democrat from New Mexico and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , warned , “ Such a reckless escalation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s war-making authority—as well as our basing agreement with Iraq—putting U.S. forces and citizens in danger and very possibly sinking us into another disastrous war in the Middle East that the American people are not asking for and do not support.
” Ironically , Suleimani died in just the kind of covert operation that he orchestrated against the United States so often over so many years , with such deadly success .
Yet , in his statement on the general ’ s death , Iran ’ s supreme leader warned , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his path or his mission .
”

On orders from President Trump, the United States killed Major General Qassem Suleimani, the leader of Iran’s élite Quds Force and the mastermind of its military operations across the Middle East, in an overnight air strike at Baghdad’s International Airport. The assassination was the boldest U.S. act in confronting Iran since the 1979 revolution, tantamount to an act of war. A brief statement from the Pentagon described it as a “decisive defensive action” designed to protect U.S. personnel abroad. But the strike represented a stunning escalation between Washington and Tehran, and it may well have the reverse effect. Iran almost certainly will want to respond in some lethal form, whether directly or through its powerful network of proxies in the region. U.S. embassies and military bases—and thousands of American personnel across the Middle East and South Asia, and potentially beyond—were instantly vulnerable. On Friday, the State Department ordered all Americans to leave Iraq.
On Friday, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared three days of public mourning and warned that “harsh vengeance awaits those criminals behind martyrdom of General Suleimani.” He moved quickly to name Brigadier General Esmail Gha’ani, who had worked closely with Suleimani, as the new Quds Force commander. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s U.S.-educated Foreign Minister, who spent two years negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with the United States, called the American air strike an act of international terrorism. “The US bears responsibility for all consequences of its rogue adventurism,” he tweeted. Iran’s state-controlled television characterized the assassination as the U.S.’s “biggest miscalculation” since the Second World War. “The people of the region will no longer allow Americans to stay,” it said.
Iran’s revolutionary regime often makes boastful threats, but the murder of Suleimani alarmed veteran U.S. military and diplomatic officials who have served in the Middle East. “It is almost impossible to overstate the importance of this,” the retired general David Petraeus, who led U.S. forces in Iraq and later served as the director of the C.I.A., told me. Suleimani was Petraeus’s nemesis during the eight-year U.S. war in Iraq. “Iran has to be in shock right now. Its version of the National Security Council will be on overdrive,” he said. “But there’s a whole universe of possibilities now, everything from proxy retaliation, kidnappings of American citizens, actions against coalition partners, even an attempt to do something in the U.S. We certainly have large force concentrations in the region, too.”
Was the U.S. attack an act of war? Douglas Silliman, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq until last winter and is now the president of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, told me that the death of Suleimani was the equivalent of Iran killing the commander of U.S. military operations in the Middle East and South Asia. “If Iran had killed the commander of U.S. Central Command, what would we consider it to be?” he said. John Limbert, one of fifty-two Americans who were taken hostage in Iran in 1979, told me that he was happy Suleimani was gone, but quickly added, “This is not going to end well.”
Suleimani, a flamboyant former construction worker and bodybuilder with snowy white hair, a dapper beard, and arching salt-and-pepper eyebrows, gained notice during the eight-year war with Iraq, in the nineteen eighties. He rose through the Revolutionary Guard to become head of the Quds Force—an Iranian unit of commandos comparable to the U.S. SEALs, Delta Force, and Rangers combined—in 1998. He was the most feared and most admired military leader in the region. He famously rallied followers with flowery jihadi rhetoric about the glories of martyrdom. “The war front is mankind’s lost paradise,” Suleimani was quoted as saying, in 2009. “One type of paradise that is portrayed for mankind is streams, beautiful nymphs and greeneries. But there is another kind of paradise.” The front, he said, was “the lost paradise of the human beings.” Thousands of followers died under his leadership.
Over more than two decades, Suleimani, a Shiite, had more impact than the leaders of either Al Qaeda or ISIS, which are both Sunni movements, in shaping the face of the Middle East. To counter U.S. influence in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, he provided Iraqi militants with rockets, bombs, and explosively formed projectiles that could slice through the armor of an American M1 tank. “He has the blood of hundreds of Americans on his hands,” Petraeus said. The United States designated the Quds Force as a supporter of terrorism, in 2007, and Suleimani was personally sanctioned for complicity in a plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, in 2011. That same year, he spearheaded a campaign, now in its ninth year, to save President Bashar al-Assad’s regime after civil war erupted in Syria. Suleimani also channelled arms and aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon, orchestrating its franchise operations in other Middle Eastern countries, and aided Houthi rebels in Yemen. He cultivated militia proxies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, thousands of whose members were deployed to fight in Syria. Suleimani gained fame for taking selfies—later posted on social media—on the front lines of regional conflicts where his Quds Force and their allies were deployed. Many went viral.
“I think people in the region saw him as untouchable,” Petraeus said. The only person more powerful in Iran was the Supreme Leader. And, in the Shiite region of the Middle East, there may have been no one more powerful than Suleimani when it came to tangible impact.
“The US just killed Iran’s Patton,” Ian Bremmer, the president of the Eurasia Group, tweeted shortly after the Pentagon issued its statement. Silliman said that Suleimani led a “huge and largely successful strategic advance by Iran through Iraq and Syria and Lebanon.”
After initially operating in the shadows, Suleimani grew rhetorically audacious in the past decade. In 2008, as the U.S. and Iran competed for influence in Iraq, the Iranian general relayed a verbal message to Petraeus through the then Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, which said, “Dear General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan.” Suleimani’s point, Petraeus told me, was that the Americans had to deal with him—everywhere.
In 2018, Suleimani famously responded to the warning that Trump issued to the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani. Trump, after a weekend at his golf resort in Bedminster, New Jersey, tweeted, “NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE ARE NO LONGER A COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR DEMENTED WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH.” Suleimani belittled Trump. “It is beneath the dignity of our President to respond to you,” he said, in a speech. “We are near you, where you can’t even imagine. We are ready. We are the man of this arena.”
When Suleimani was killed, Trump was at his Mar-a-Lago resort, in Palm Beach. Displaying rare restraint, he merely posted an American flag on his Twitter account.
In its statement, the Pentagon charged that Suleimani had, in recent months, orchestrated attacks on bases used by U.S. and allied nations as part of an international coalition fighting ISIS. He “was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region,” the Pentagon said.
Suleimani’s death capped a week of hostilities that escalated with lightning speed after a U.S. military contractor was killed in a rocket attack by Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the most powerful Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, on December 27th. The attack was the group’s eleventh in recent weeks, the U.S. claimed. On December 29th, the Pentagon responded with five air strikes—three in Iraq and two in Syria—on Kata’ib Hezbollah’s bases. The group’s supporters responded by attacking the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which is the largest and most fortified diplomatic mission in the world.
“General Suleimani also approved the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that took place this week,” and the attacks on coalition bases in recent months, the Pentagon said, in its statement. It said that the assassination was aimed at deterring future Iranian assaults, noting pointedly, “The United States will continue to take all necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they are around the world.”


newyorker--2020-01-03--Warming Up Guatemalan Style in Brooklyn

Warming Up Guatemalan Style in Brooklyn

In Guatemala , there ’ s a common saying , “ A falta de pan , tortilla , ” which translates literally to “ In the absence of bread , tortilla , ” and means , figuratively , “ If you can ’ t get the best thing , take the next best thing.
” It ’ s a snobbish and outdated aphorism , referring to a vestigial hierarchy of carbohydrates , to a time in which tortillas were eaten primarily by the country ’ s indigenous population and associated with poverty .
Today , everyone in Guatemala eats tortillas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nation ’ s cuisine , they figure quite prominently—certainly more so than bread .
You ’ ll find tortillas at Claudia ’ s , in East Williamsburg , which was , until recently , a more casual café called C.Lo ; its owners , the siblings Claudia and Mario Lopez , rebranded it as a full-service Guatemalan restaurant , with an expanded menu and new folk-art-inspired wall murals and upholstery .
For a satisfying dish called tortillas montadas , small , thick , slightly sweet ones , blistered on a hot griddle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then piled high with a stewy scoop of carnitas , a shaggy hunk of brisket , or a spoonful of black beans and a generous segment of sweet plantain .
You ’ ll find bread at Claudia ’ s , too : each of the restaurant ’ s tamales comes with a tiny Hawaiian-style sweet roll , in addition to pickled red onion and jalapeño , and , at breakfast or brunch , a fried egg .
Both are house-made , but the bun pales in comparison to the excellent tamal , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a tortilla does : with masa , a dough made from ground nixtamalized corn mixed with lard and water .
For the tamal , the dense , starchy dough is steamed in a banana leaf , along with a bit of carnitas , brisket , or vegetables , a green olive or two , and a few capers—a perfect package on its own .
Masa shines at Claudia ’ s in several other dishes as well .
For the huevos antigua , it ’ s steamed and sliced into thick rounds , two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fried egg , mashed avocado , shards of chicharrón , red onion , and a splash of zesty chirmol , a traditional salsa made of charred tomatoes coarsely chopped with raw onion and mint .
For a savory pastry called a doblada , it ’ s formed into a folded half-moon , like an empanada , stuffed with meat or vegetables , and deep-fried until its surface is bubbly .
The rest of the menu tends not to distinguish itself , with a few exceptions .
The chile relleno is fantastic , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exterior , filled with sofrito and vegetables and finished with a concentrated tomato sauce .
The pollo campero , a crunchy filet of fried chicken served with a scoop of macaroni salad , is a respectable nod to Pollo Campero , the KFC of Guatemala , and you could do much worse than the churrasco , or skirt steak , which has a short-order simplicity , especially if you get it with yucca fries .
It ’ s disappointing , particularly in wintertime , that Claudia ’ s stews , an integral category @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and thin , lacking in heart and in flavor .
Luckily , there ’ s another Guatemalan restaurant in Brooklyn that more than fills this gap : Ix , which opened in 2016 , in Prospect-Lefferts Gardens .
You could warm yourself up here without even setting foot through the door , by ordering a cup of sweet spiced cacao , or cocoa , from a takeout window that opens onto the street .
( Some believe Guatemala to be the birthplace of chocolate . )
But true nourishment awaits inside , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The ruddy tomato-based hilachas features hearty shreds of brisket , creamy chunks of carrot and potato , green beans , and rice .
The green jocón pairs the same vegetables with chicken instead of beef , and bathes them in a complexly layered broth , bright with tomatillo and cilantro .
On the side : a wedge of lime , a bit of chopped raw onion , and , best of all , fresh tortillas .
( Claudia ’ s dishes $ 6- $ 14 .
Ix dishes $ 7- $ 13 @ @ @

In Guatemala, there’s a common saying, “A falta de pan, tortilla,” which translates literally to “In the absence of bread, tortilla,” and means, figuratively, “If you can’t get the best thing, take the next best thing.” It’s a snobbish and outdated aphorism, referring to a vestigial hierarchy of carbohydrates, to a time in which tortillas were eaten primarily by the country’s indigenous population and associated with poverty. Today, everyone in Guatemala eats tortillas, and, in any definition of the nation’s cuisine, they figure quite prominently—certainly more so than bread.
The tres tostadas, an appetizer, are finished with red onion, cilantro, and cotija cheese. Photograph by Eric Helgas for The New Yorker
You’ll find tortillas at Claudia’s, in East Williamsburg, which was, until recently, a more casual café called C.Lo; its owners, the siblings Claudia and Mario Lopez, rebranded it as a full-service Guatemalan restaurant, with an expanded menu and new folk-art-inspired wall murals and upholstery. For a satisfying dish called tortillas montadas, small, thick, slightly sweet ones, blistered on a hot griddle, are smeared with smashed avocado, then piled high with a stewy scoop of carnitas, a shaggy hunk of brisket, or a spoonful of black beans and a generous segment of sweet plantain.
The chile relleno, stuffed with vegetables and fried in a buttermilk batter, is served with a side of rice and beans. Photograph by Eric Helgas for The New Yorker
You’ll find bread at Claudia’s, too: each of the restaurant’s tamales comes with a tiny Hawaiian-style sweet roll, in addition to pickled red onion and jalapeño, and, at breakfast or brunch, a fried egg. Both are house-made, but the bun pales in comparison to the excellent tamal, which starts, of course, the way a tortilla does: with masa, a dough made from ground nixtamalized corn mixed with lard and water. For the tamal, the dense, starchy dough is steamed in a banana leaf, along with a bit of carnitas, brisket, or vegetables, a green olive or two, and a few capers—a perfect package on its own.
Masa shines at Claudia’s in several other dishes as well. For the huevos antigua, it’s steamed and sliced into thick rounds, two per order, each topped with a fried egg, mashed avocado, shards of chicharrón, red onion, and a splash of zesty chirmol, a traditional salsa made of charred tomatoes coarsely chopped with raw onion and mint. For a savory pastry called a doblada, it’s formed into a folded half-moon, like an empanada, stuffed with meat or vegetables, and deep-fried until its surface is bubbly.
Tortillas montadas (center), which the menu describes as Guatemalan tacos, come with mashed avocado and a choice of carnitas, brisket, or sweet plantain and black beans. Photograph by Eric Helgas for The New Yorker
The rest of the menu tends not to distinguish itself, with a few exceptions. The chile relleno is fantastic, a buttermilk-battered poblano pepper with a lacily crisp exterior, filled with sofrito and vegetables and finished with a concentrated tomato sauce. The pollo campero, a crunchy filet of fried chicken served with a scoop of macaroni salad, is a respectable nod to Pollo Campero, the KFC of Guatemala, and you could do much worse than the churrasco, or skirt steak, which has a short-order simplicity, especially if you get it with yucca fries.
It’s disappointing, particularly in wintertime, that Claudia’s stews, an integral category of Guatemalan cuisine, are sadly bland and thin, lacking in heart and in flavor. Luckily, there’s another Guatemalan restaurant in Brooklyn that more than fills this gap: Ix, which opened in 2016, in Prospect-Lefferts Gardens.
Banana-bread pudding is available at brunch and for dessert at dinner. Photograph by Eric Helgas for The New Yorker
You could warm yourself up here without even setting foot through the door, by ordering a cup of sweet spiced cacao, or cocoa, from a takeout window that opens onto the street. (Some believe Guatemala to be the birthplace of chocolate.) But true nourishment awaits inside, in steaming bowls born of ancient Mayan recipes. The ruddy tomato-based hilachas features hearty shreds of brisket, creamy chunks of carrot and potato, green beans, and rice. The green jocón pairs the same vegetables with chicken instead of beef, and bathes them in a complexly layered broth, bright with tomatillo and cilantro. On the side: a wedge of lime, a bit of chopped raw onion, and, best of all, fresh tortillas. (Claudia’s dishes $6-$14. Ix dishes $7-$13.) ♦


newyorker--2020-01-03--The Funk, Soul, and Saxophone of Winter Jazzfest

The alto saxophonist Lakecia Benjamin plays jazz that is sprinkled with the rich flavors of funk and soul—she ’ s @ @ @ @ @ in step with the rhythms of the young generation .
( One cut on her @ @ @ @ @ Rise Up , ” reimagined Rihanna ’ s “ Stay ” through the sultry tones @ @ @ @ @ As part of this year ’ s Winter Jazzfest marathons , running Jan. 10-11 at @ @ @ @ @ presents music from her upcoming project , “ Pursuance , ” an homage to the @ @ @ @ @ Alice and John Coltrane .

The alto saxophonist Lakecia Benjamin plays jazz that is sprinkled with the rich flavors of funk and soul—she’s a crafty traditionalist who remains in step with the rhythms of the young generation. (One cut on her most recent album, “Rise Up,” reimagined Rihanna’s “Stay” through the sultry tones of her horn.) As part of this year’s Winter Jazzfest marathons, running Jan. 10-11 at venues around Manhattan, Benjamin presents music from her upcoming project, “Pursuance,” an homage to the brilliant, timeless work of Alice and John Coltrane.


newyorker--2020-01-07--The Beauty of Sam Mendes’s “1917” Comes at a Cost

The most vulgar visual effect that I saw in a movie last year wasn ’ t Marvel-ous or otherwise superheroic ; it was in “ 1917 , ” and depicted the death of a soldier in combat .
The soldier is stabbed , and , as he bleeds out , his face is leached of pinkness and turns papery white just before he expires .
The character ’ s death would have been as wrenching for viewers if the soldier ’ s appearance remained unaltered and he merely fell limp .
Instead , the director , Sam Mendes , chose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with an anecdotal detail of the sort that might have cropped up in a war story , a tale told at years ’ remove , and that would have stood for the ineffable horror of the experience .
Instead , rendered as a special effect , the character ’ s end becomes merely poignant—not terrifying or repulsive—making for a very tasteful death .
That tastefulness is a mark of the utter tastelessness of “ 1917 , ” a movie that ’ s filmed in a gimmicky way—as a simulacrum of a single long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bunch of takes that run up to nine minutes and are stitched together with digital effects to make them look continuous ) .
Yet that visual trickery isn ’ t the fakest aspect of the movie .
Rather , the so-called long take serves as a mask—a gross bit of earnest showmanship that both conceals and reflects the trickery and the cheap machinations of the script , the shallowness of the direction of the actors , and the brazenly superficial and emotion-dictating music score .
The story is a sort of “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and that reversal is by far the most interesting thing about “ 1917 , ” with its suggestion of an antiwar ethos .
Somewhere behind the lines in France , a young British lance corporal , Tom Blake ( Dean-Charles Chapman ) , dozing during downtime , is awakened by a sergeant and told , “ Pick a man , bring your kit.
” Blake chooses a fellow lance corporal , Will Schofield ( George MacKay ) , a friend who ’ d been napping in the grass alongside him .
The sergeant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : to cross the former front lines , now abandoned by German forces , and take a letter to a colonel who ’ s with his troops at a new forward position .
That colonel is about to launch an offensive against the apparently retreating Germans , but aerial reconnaissance shows that the Germans are luring the colonel ’ s two battalions into a trap , and the letter is an order calling off the offensive .
What ’ s more , the battalions to which Blake is being dispatched include his brother @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and earnest , Schofield is a sarcastic cynic , and the implication is that Blake has been chosen for this mission not because he ’ s necessarily the best soldier to undertake it but because he ’ s uniquely motivated to complete it—because he knows that , if he doesn ’ t reach the colonel in time , his brother will be among sixteen hundred soldiers who will be entrapped and massacred .
The darker suggestion , utterly unexplored , is that morale and commitment were issues in the British army at this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the action begins on April 6 , 1917 , and concludes the next morning ) , and that a soldier without Blake ’ s personal motive for saving the two battalions might not be trusted to put himself at risk to fulfill it .
( The movie , however , leaves this suggestion utterly unexplored . )
What ’ s clear is that Schofield is dubious about the mission and resentful of Blake for choosing him as his partner .
Of course , because “ 1917 ” is a film of patriotic bombast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mind will be changed in the course of the action .
It ’ s only one in a series of painfully blatant dramatic reversals that wouldn ’ t be out of place in any of the comic-book movies that are so readily contrasted with “ authentic ” cinema .
( For example , while Schofield has the cynicism knocked out of him , Blake—in another overlap with “ Saving Private Ryan ” —has to confront the painful consequences of his own warm-heartedly humane idealism . )
The script is filled with melodramatic coincidences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reducing it to sentiment : Schofield fills his canteen with fresh milk that he finds in a pail at a recently deserted farm , and eventually feeds an abandoned baby with it ; Blake ’ s reminiscence of the blanket of cherry blossoms that covers his family ’ s garden is echoed in Schofield ’ s discovery of cherry blossoms scattered on a river , which serves as a reminder of his duty and a spark of motivation ; an ugly but inconsequential swarm of rats in one part of a battlefield presages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in another .
Whereas Steven Spielberg ’ s “ Saving Private Ryan ” presents an entire army mobilizing to save the life of one soldier , Mendes ’ s “ 1917 ” depicts two ordinary , obscure , and low-ranking soldiers thrust into a mission to potentially save sixteen hundred , and , by implication , the entire British army , and change the course of the war .
This is a classic idea , one that comes packed with an elegant irony .
( For instance , it ’ s the idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brief and brilliant Civil War episode in “ How the West Was Won , ” depicting the fateful encounter of two foot soldiers and two Union generals . )
And it ’ s that very irony which Mendes replaces with a lumbering portentousness .
He endows Blake and Schofield with no comparable sense of their own mission , their own disproportionate moment .
The script ( written by Mendes and Krysty Wilson-Cairns ) is imagination-free , which is to say that it endows the characters with no inner lives whatsoever .
Have Blake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ combat ?
How far along are they in their military experience ?
What have they experienced of the war ?
For that matter , who are they ?
What do they think ?
Where are they from ?
What did they do before the war ?
What are their ambitions beyond survival ?
What ’ s especially revealing about Mendes ’ s superficial and externalized practice in “ 1917 ” is that he ’ s not averse to presenting his characters ’ inner visions and states of mind .
In “ American Beauty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ male protagonist ’ s sexual fantasy of a naked teen-age girl being covered in a sprinkling of rose petals .
While Mendes didn ’ t shrink from displaying the vivid imagination of a suburban horndog , he ’ s unwilling to face the imagination of the valorous combatants of “ 1917.
” It ’ s as if whatever might be on the minds of his protagonists in the course of their dangerous journey toward the front lines , whether fear or lust , frivolity or hatred , would get in the way of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he approaches the subject of the Great War .
( On the other hand , he may fear unleashing his characters ’ imagination , because , when , in “ American Beauty , ” he let his own imagination loose , the result was a cinematic ickiness of historic dimensions . )
Instead , Mendes shuts down Blake and Schofield and envelops them in a silence of the mind in order not to probe or care what they think .
What he substitutes for their inner lives are sequences that exist solely because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ big fire at night , a run through a crowd of soldiers going over a trench wall ) .
These shot-like compositions that arise from the flow of long takes come at the expense of plot and character , as in a scene of hand-to-hand combat that ’ s framed in the distance without regard to its mortal stakes and intense physicality .
Once more , violence is moved offstage and prettified .
The movie ’ s long takes , far from intensifying the experience of war , trivialize it ; the effect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expanded by technique but of convention showily tweaked .
Its visual prose resembles a mass-market novel with the punctuation removed .
The film is dedicated , in the end credits , to Lance Corporal Alfred H. Mendes—the director ’ s grandfather— “ who told us the stories.
” In honoring the recollections and experiences of his grandfather , Mendes remains trapped in the narrow emotional range of filial piety that , far from sparking his imagination , inhibits it .
His sense of duty yields an effortful and sanctimonious movie that , at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a lamentable recent trend .
Mendes joins such directors of proud and bombastic craft as Spielberg , Christopher Nolan , Peter Jackson , and Damien Chazelle , who ’ ve recently made films that are fixated on the heroic deeds of earlier British and American generations .
These filmmakers , celebrating their truncated yet monumental versions of history ’ s heroes , are separating the public figures from their private lives , their visible greatness from mores that might not pass current-day muster .
( It ’ s worth comparing their films @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who ’ s upfront about the powers and limits of his stunted heroes . )
The vision of heroism that these directors present bleaches the past of its presumptions and prejudices , cruelties and pettiness , but also of its genuine humanity , courage , and tragedy .

The most vulgar visual effect that I saw in a movie last year wasn’t Marvel-ous or otherwise superheroic; it was in “1917,” and depicted the death of a soldier in combat. The soldier is stabbed, and, as he bleeds out, his face is leached of pinkness and turns papery white just before he expires. The character’s death would have been as wrenching for viewers if the soldier’s appearance remained unaltered and he merely fell limp. Instead, the director, Sam Mendes, chose to render the moment picturesque—to adorn it with an anecdotal detail of the sort that might have cropped up in a war story, a tale told at years’ remove, and that would have stood for the ineffable horror of the experience. Instead, rendered as a special effect, the character’s end becomes merely poignant—not terrifying or repulsive—making for a very tasteful death.
That tastefulness is a mark of the utter tastelessness of “1917,” a movie that’s filmed in a gimmicky way—as a simulacrum of a single long take (actually, it’s a bunch of takes that run up to nine minutes and are stitched together with digital effects to make them look continuous). Yet that visual trickery isn’t the fakest aspect of the movie. Rather, the so-called long take serves as a mask—a gross bit of earnest showmanship that both conceals and reflects the trickery and the cheap machinations of the script, the shallowness of the direction of the actors, and the brazenly superficial and emotion-dictating music score.
The story is a sort of “Saving Private Ryan” in reverse, and that reversal is by far the most interesting thing about “1917,” with its suggestion of an antiwar ethos. Somewhere behind the lines in France, a young British lance corporal, Tom Blake (Dean-Charles Chapman), dozing during downtime, is awakened by a sergeant and told, “Pick a man, bring your kit.” Blake chooses a fellow lance corporal, Will Schofield (George MacKay), a friend who’d been napping in the grass alongside him. The sergeant sends the duo on a special mission: to cross the former front lines, now abandoned by German forces, and take a letter to a colonel who’s with his troops at a new forward position. That colonel is about to launch an offensive against the apparently retreating Germans, but aerial reconnaissance shows that the Germans are luring the colonel’s two battalions into a trap, and the letter is an order calling off the offensive. What’s more, the battalions to which Blake is being dispatched include his brother, a lieutenant.
Blake is outgoing and earnest, Schofield is a sarcastic cynic, and the implication is that Blake has been chosen for this mission not because he’s necessarily the best soldier to undertake it but because he’s uniquely motivated to complete it—because he knows that, if he doesn’t reach the colonel in time, his brother will be among sixteen hundred soldiers who will be entrapped and massacred. The darker suggestion, utterly unexplored, is that morale and commitment were issues in the British Army at this latter stage of the Great War (the action begins on April 6, 1917, and concludes the next morning), and that a soldier without Blake’s personal motive for saving the two battalions might not be trusted to put himself at risk to fulfill it.
What’s clear is that Schofield is dubious about the mission and resentful of Blake for choosing him as his partner. Of course, because “1917” is a film of patriotic bombast and heroic duty, Schofield’s mind will be changed in the course of the action. It’s only one in a series of painfully blatant dramatic reversals that wouldn’t be out of place in any of the comic-book movies that are so readily contrasted with “authentic” cinema. (For example, while Schofield has the cynicism knocked out of him, Blake—in another overlap with “Saving Private Ryan”—has to confront the painful consequences of his own warm-heartedly humane idealism.) The script is filled with melodramatic coincidences that grossly trivialize the life-and-death action by reducing it to sentiment: Schofield fills his canteen with fresh milk that he finds in a pail at a recently deserted farm, and eventually feeds an abandoned baby with it; Blake’s reminiscence of the blanket of cherry blossoms that covers his family’s garden is echoed in Schofield’s discovery of cherry blossoms scattered on a river, which serves as a reminder of his duty and a spark of motivation; an ugly but inconsequential swarm of rats in one part of a battlefield presages a single fateful encounter with a rat in another.
Whereas Steven Spielberg’s “Saving Private Ryan” presents an entire army mobilizing to save the life of one soldier, Mendes’s “1917” depicts two ordinary, obscure, and low-ranking soldiers thrust into a mission to potentially save sixteen hundred, and, by implication, the entire British Army, and change the course of the war. This is a classic idea, one that comes packed with an elegant irony. (For instance, it’s the idea at work in John Ford’s brief and brilliant Civil War episode in “How the West Was Won,” depicting the fateful encounter of two foot soldiers and two Union generals.) And it’s that very irony which Mendes replaces with a lumbering portentousness. He endows Blake and Schofield with no comparable sense of their own mission, their own disproportionate moment. The script (written by Mendes and Krysty Wilson-Cairns) is imagination-free, which is to say that it endows the characters with no inner lives whatsoever. Have Blake and Schofield ever killed before in hand-to-hand combat? How far along are they in their military experience? What have they experienced of the war? For that matter, who are they? What do they think? Where are they from? What did they do before the war? What are their ambitions beyond survival?
What’s especially revealing about Mendes’s superficial and externalized practice in “1917” is that he’s not averse to presenting his characters’ inner visions and states of mind. In “American Beauty,” he famously showed the middle-aged male protagonist’s sexual fantasy of a naked teen-age girl being covered in a sprinkling of rose petals. While Mendes didn’t shrink from displaying the vivid imagination of a suburban horndog, he’s unwilling to face the imagination of the valorous combatants of “1917.” It’s as if whatever might be on the minds of his protagonists in the course of their dangerous journey toward the front lines, whether fear or lust, frivolity or hatred, would get in the way of the unbroken solemnity and earnestness with which he approaches the subject of the Great War. (On the other hand, he may fear unleashing his characters’ imagination, because, when, in “American Beauty,” he let his own imagination loose, the result was a cinematic ickiness of historic dimensions.)
Instead, Mendes shuts down Blake and Schofield and envelops them in a silence of the mind in order not to probe or care what they think. What he substitutes for their inner lives are sequences that exist solely because they make for striking images (a big fire at night, a run through a crowd of soldiers going over a trench wall). These shotlike compositions that arise from the flow of long takes come at the expense of plot and character, as in a scene of hand-to-hand combat that’s framed in the distance without regard to its mortal stakes and intense physicality. Once more, violence is moved offstage and prettified. The movie’s long takes, far from intensifying the experience of war, trivialize it; the effect isn’t one of artistic imagination expanded by technique but of convention showily tweaked. Its visual prose resembles a mass-market novel with the punctuation removed.
The film is dedicated, in the end credits, to Lance Corporal Alfred H. Mendes—the director’s grandfather—“who told us the stories.” In honoring the recollections and experiences of his grandfather, Mendes remains trapped in the narrow emotional range of filial piety that, far from sparking his imagination, inhibits it. His sense of duty yields an effortful and sanctimonious movie that, at the same time, takes its place in a lamentable recent trend. Mendes joins such directors of proud and bombastic craft as Spielberg, Christopher Nolan, Peter Jackson, and Damien Chazelle, who’ve recently made films that are fixated on the heroic deeds of earlier British and American generations. These filmmakers, celebrating their truncated yet monumental versions of history’s heroes, are separating the public figures from their private lives, their visible greatness from mores that might not pass current-day muster. (It’s worth comparing their films to the work of Clint Eastwood, who’s upfront about the powers and limits of his stunted heroes.) The vision of heroism that these directors present bleaches the past of its presumptions and prejudices, cruelties and pettiness, but also of its genuine humanity, courage, and tragedy.


newyorker--2020-01-07--Trump Drags the Democratic Primary Into a Foreign-Policy Fight

Besides setting the world ’ s governments on edge and getting the hashtag # franzferdinand trending on Twitter , Donald Trump ’ s decision to kill the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani last week had another effect : for the first time , news out of the White House threatened to alter the shape of the 2020 Democratic-primary race .
For much of this past year , the Democratic contest and the daily events of Washington proceeded mostly in parallel .
When the Mueller report was released , and , later , when the Ukraine scandal broke , the leading candidates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occurred in 2016 and was a serious threat to America ’ s democracy ; impeachment was the proper response to the Ukraine scandal ; Trump ’ s actions in both of these matters were wrong and dangerous .
At town halls and meet-and-greets and in televised debates , the candidates tended to talk about—and were generally asked about—how their potential Administrations would deal with issues such as health care , climate change , inequality , education , and gun violence .
The 2020 Democratic race was a battle of imagined futures , held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ headlines coming out of the nation ’ s capital .
“ Washington is its own bubble where people talk to each other , but it ’ s not paying attention to the things that touch the lives of people every single day , ” Elizabeth Warren told reporters in March , when asked for her thoughts on why she got so few questions about the Mueller report at events in Iowa and New Hampshire .
Suleimani ’ s killing was different .
On Thursday night , just as the news broke , Joe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American will mourn Qassem Soleimani ’ s passing .
He deserved to be brought to justice for his crimes against American troops and thousands of innocents throughout the region , ” he said .
“ None of that negates the fact that this is a hugely escalatory move in an already dangerous region.
” Warren tweeted , “ Soleimani was a murderer , responsible for the deaths of thousands , including hundreds of Americans .
But this reckless move escalates the situation with Iran and increases the likelihood of more deaths and new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be to avoid another costly war.
” On Friday , Bernie Sanders addressed the situation in a speech in Anamosa , Iowa .
“ Let me repeat a warning I gave in 2002 , during the debate over the war in Iraq , ” he said .
“ War must be the last recourse in our international relations , and as a caring nation we must do everything we can to prevent the horrible suffering that a war will cause.
” Andrew Yang , the only non-politician left in the top half of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Iran is the last thing we need and is not the will of the American people .
We should be acting to deescalate tensions and protect our people in the region.
” All weekend , the candidates discussed the Suleimani situation .
On Saturday , in Dubuque , Iowa , Sanders sharpened his rhetoric .
“ This country needs a whole lot of things , but one thing that we do not need is another war , ” he said .
“ Let Congress have the guts to vote for war ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action.
” On Sunday , in Grinnell , Iowa , Biden said , of Suleimani , “ The question is , was taking him out—was the risk worth the reward ?
” That morning , Pete Buttigieg , appearing on CNN ’ s “ State of the Union with Jake Tapper , ” struck a similar note , saying , “ None of us should shed a tear for his death .
But just because he deserved it doesn ’ t mean it was the right strategic move .
This is about consequences.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the candidates ’ positions .
There were those—Sanders principally , and , to a lesser extent , Warren and Yang—who focussed on staking out an antiwar position .
And then there were those—Biden and Buttigieg , along with Amy Klobuchar and Cory Booker—who raised questions of strategy and whether the Trump Administration could be trusted to make the right decisions on national security .
After months of debates looking out on the horizon , here was a present-day question of war and peace .
Suddenly , Trump , only a few weeks after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meddling in the 2020 race , was dragging his potential opponents into a fight .
And this may be how things go from here on out .
“ It ’ s always the last month where the nexus between the campaign and current affairs comes together , ” Sue Dvorsky , a former head of the Iowa Democratic Party , told me Monday night .
“ The end always happens in real time .
”

Besides setting the world’s governments on edge and getting the hashtag #franzferdinand trending on Twitter, Donald Trump’s decision to kill the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani last week had another effect: for the first time, news out of the White House threatened to alter the shape of the 2020 Democratic-primary race.
For much of this past year, the Democratic contest and the daily events of Washington proceeded mostly in parallel. When the Mueller report was released, and, later, when the Ukraine scandal broke, the leading candidates were in broad agreement: Russian meddling occurred in 2016 and was a serious threat to America’s democracy; impeachment was the proper response to the Ukraine scandal; Trump’s actions in both of these matters were wrong and dangerous. At town halls and meet-and-greets and in televised debates, the candidates tended to talk about—and were generally asked about—how their potential Administrations would deal with issues such as health care, climate change, inequality, education, and gun violence. The 2020 Democratic race was a battle of imagined futures, held at an explicit remove from the hour-by-hour headlines coming out of the nation’s capital. “Washington is its own bubble where people talk to each other, but it’s not paying attention to the things that touch the lives of people every single day,” Elizabeth Warren told reporters in March, when asked for her thoughts on why she got so few questions about the Mueller report at events in Iowa and New Hampshire.
Suleimani’s killing was different. On Thursday night, just as the news broke, Joe Biden issued a statement. “No American will mourn Qassem Soleimani’s passing. He deserved to be brought to justice for his crimes against American troops and thousands of innocents throughout the region,” he said. “None of that negates the fact that this is a hugely escalatory move in an already dangerous region.” Warren tweeted, “Soleimani was a murderer, responsible for the deaths of thousands, including hundreds of Americans. But this reckless move escalates the situation with Iran and increases the likelihood of more deaths and new Middle East conflict. Our priority must be to avoid another costly war.” On Friday, Bernie Sanders addressed the situation in a speech in Anamosa, Iowa. “Let me repeat a warning I gave in 2002, during the debate over the war in Iraq,” he said. “War must be the last recourse in our international relations, and as a caring nation we must do everything we can to prevent the horrible suffering that a war will cause.” Andrew Yang, the only non-politician left in the top half of the field, tweeted, “War with Iran is the last thing we need and is not the will of the American people. We should be acting to deescalate tensions and protect our people in the region.”
Eric Lach on how the Iowa caucuses can make or break a campaign.
All weekend, the candidates discussed the Suleimani situation. On Saturday, in Dubuque, Iowa, Sanders sharpened his rhetoric. “This country needs a whole lot of things, but one thing that we do not need is another war,” he said. “Let Congress have the guts to vote for war; do not let this President take unilateral action.” On Sunday, in Grinnell, Iowa, Biden said, of Suleimani, “The question is, was taking him out—was the risk worth the reward?” That morning, Pete Buttigieg, appearing on CNN’s “State of the Union with Jake Tapper,” struck a similar note, saying, “None of us should shed a tear for his death. But just because he deserved it doesn’t mean it was the right strategic move. This is about consequences.”
Here was very real daylight between the candidates’ positions. There were those—Sanders principally, and, to a lesser extent, Warren and Yang—who focussed on staking out an antiwar position. And then there were those—Biden and Buttigieg, along with Amy Klobuchar and Cory Booker—who raised questions of strategy and whether the Trump Administration could be trusted to make the right decisions on national security. After months of debates looking out on the horizon, here was a present-day question of war and peace. Suddenly, Trump, only a few weeks after being impeached for trying to solicit foreign meddling in the 2020 race, was dragging his potential opponents into a fight. And this may be how things go from here on out. “It’s always the last month where the nexus between the campaign and current affairs comes together,” Sue Dvorsky, a former head of the Iowa Democratic Party, told me Monday night. “The end always happens in real time.”