newyorker--2020-01-10--Can Ranked-Choice Voting Save American Democracy?

In his new book , “ Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop : The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America , ” the political scientist Lee Drutman explains the ways in which he thinks American democracy has atrophied or broken down , and what can be done to heal it .
“ Trump may not so much be the problem , ” Drutman writes .
“ He is instead the symptom of something much bigger.
” That something is our two-party structure , which Drutman believes has approached collapse .
He believes it has increased partisanship by making everything a binary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been worsened by the sorting of the parties into ideologically coherent entities rather than fluid coalitions .
It wasn ’ t so long ago , after all , that the Democratic Party was full of Southern conservatives , and the G.O.P .
had a large , moderate wing of elected officials in the Northeast .
Drutman believes that some form of proportional representation with ranked-choice voting could lead to an increase in the number of viable parties , which would in turn reduce partisanship , and eventually gridlock and extremism .
Ranked-choice voting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ second and third choices matter , too , giving candidates incentives to not alienate their opponents ’ supporters .
( Hendrik Hertzberg has written extensively for The New Yorker on ranked-choice voting and other potential electoral reforms . )
I recently spoke by phone with Drutman , who is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation .
During our conversation , which has been edited for length and clarity , we discussed whether one party is to blame for the current crisis , why ideologically incoherent voting can benefit democracy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a multiparty system .
It seems as if you are arguing that the problems with our democracy are as much structural as political , if that makes sense—that the politics can be fixed by changing the structures .
Is that a fair way of putting it ?
I wouldn ’ t say that politics can be fixed .
I think it ’ s always going to be messy .
But a lot of the problems that are most dire in this particular moment are a product of having a genuine two-party system .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties , which is something that I think is quite new in this moment and that is at odds with our political institutions , which demand broad compromise , not zero-sum trench warfare .
And it also drives us all crazy , because it really plays into us-versus-them thinking that is inherent in our hardwiring .
O.K .
So then what would be a more fair way of putting it ?
That a lot of the problems that we are experiencing now are a function of our political institutions and particularly our electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two parties .
What would you say to the argument that regardless of the political system , democracies around the world seem to be breaking down ?
I think democracies around the world are all facing certain challenges .
The backlash to the financial crisis and increasing globalization , immigration , changing demographics , and urban/rural polarization—those are issues that are affecting all Western democracies .
The question is which type of political-party system is better equipped to resolve those dynamics .
The two-party system in the U.S. exacerbates those conflicts in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t allow for an easy realignment .
It ’ s almost impossible for new parties to emerge , and we just get two tired boxers stuck in a ring continuing to punch each other .
The advantage of the multiparty systems throughout Western Europe is that although they ’ re also experiencing some of these same shocks , the party system can change , and new parties can emerge , and old parties can die .
And you can see more responses from the system in which not everything is cast in this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different coalitions that come and go , and new coalitions can form .
And it ’ s messy , but all politics is messy .
But I think what you ’ ve seen is that in most of the Western European democracies , although there is a populist far right that has risen , it has not gained power .
In the U.S. it has gained power .
You write in the book , “ This is the danger in a two-party system : while it is easier to marginalize the resentments and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can backfire in the long term .
Marginalization feeds the sustaining populist myth of elite disdain and neglect .
And once anti-system political sentiment grows big enough to take control of a major party , democracy becomes unstable.
” Aren ’ t we seeing this in Europe , with the far-right parties saying they are being treated with disdain and neglect and pushed aside from coalitions , and subsequently gaining ?
I don ’ t think it will be enough to gain power .
It certainly helped those parties , but to build @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , you actually have to build a true majority .
And if that sentiment builds to a true majority , then it ’ s trouble , whatever political system you have .
If you do the math and think about the Republican primary in 2016 , you ’ d say , well , about forty per cent of voters are Republican , or Republican-leaning .
About thirty per cent of them wanted Donald Trump .
That should be a twelve per cent party .
But instead , Trump got the head spot in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transformed the Republican Party .
Because of partisanship being what it is in a two-party system , a lot of folks on the political right said , “ Well , I don ’ t like the guy .
He ’ s kind of crude .
But , well , he has the right enemies , ” and eventually they ’ ve warmed up to him .
In a multiparty system , there would have been another party for folks to join if Trump had taken over their party .
But since there ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lot of folks have found themselves looking past his obvious shortcomings to just say , “ Well , at least he ’ s better than the Democrats.
” Are there any other specific benefits you think would accrue from having multiple parties ?
I think the proportional-voting system that would get us to multiple parties would do wonders for voter turnout .
We have quite low voter turnout in the U.S. , and that has been pretty stagnant for a long time , despite many efforts to increase turnout .
If there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely to feel like one of the parties represents them , speaks to them , and they ’ re excited to vote for it .
But even more important , in a proportional system , every vote counts , because there are no swing districts or swing states and you don ’ t have to live in Iowa or some suburban district near Philadelphia in order for your vote to count .
And most people , if their vote doesn ’ t count , say , “ Well , what ’ s the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more important , the parties don ’ t bother to recruit people to vote , because why waste money on recruiting voters who don ’ t matter ?
Just focus on the limited ten to fifteen per cent of swing districts that actually matter .
People feel like they ’ re better represented in multiparty systems because they feel like they actually have a party that speaks for them .
One point your book makes several times is that the parties used to be less ideologically sorted , with northern liberals in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic Party .
That might have positive effects for partisanship and how the government functioned and so on .
But it also seems wrong in the sense that people were often voting for a party that they didn ’ t really believe in , because of the name of the party and the history behind that party .
And that seems not totally healthy for democracy either .
Was our democracy in somewhat better shape because people were confused about what they were voting for , or am I looking at it wrong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re looking at it right .
It ’ s the sad trade-off in a two-party system , which is either you have parties that are incoherent and people don ’ t know exactly what it is they ’ re voting for , or you have parties that are quite distinct and then they can ’ t work together at all , which our political system requires .
We are a separation-of-powers system that is set up to require broad compromise and coalition .
That was the critique of the bipartisanship of an earlier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to send clear signals because the parties don ’ t really stand for anything .
I think the advantage of multiparty democracy is that it doesn ’ t force that trade-off , and you can have multiple parties that build different coalitions .
But voters can also send clear signals about what parties they actually support , because the parties offer more different alternatives .
So people feel like they are clear in what signals they ’ re sending , and then the coalitions form after the election and have to represent a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party , and the Democratic Party is currently changing and will change more if Bernie Sanders or even Elizabeth Warren wins the nomination .
Is your theory that that is good because it shows parties can change and that they ’ re malleable , and that we ’ re not stuck in ideological ruts ?
Or is your theory that this is bad because we ’ re so partisan that if someone takes over a party , they can get people in the party to kind of go for whatever they want , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look at it much more in the second way .
And that ’ s informed by a lot of political science that suggests that voters really aren ’ t that ideological .
They ’ re much more partisan .
Most people don ’ t read The New Yorker and pay attention to the politics as closely as you and I do .
And mostly they just say , “ Well , I ’ m a Democrat because people like me are Democrats , ” or “ I ’ m a Republican because people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nominee is I ’ ll support that person.
” Look at the ways in which what it has meant to be a Republican has changed under Trump .
That ’ s partisanship now .
Ideology is fluid for a lot of people .
Identity and partisanship are much more fixed , and I think that ’ s what we ’ re experiencing in this moment and will probably experience in the future .
You write , “ The problem is not just Republicans ( or Democrats ) .
The problem is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is that correct ?
I realize saying one party is to blame by definition seems partisan and leads to increased partisanship , but what if it ’ s basically true ?
I definitely struggled with this point and I ’ m sympathetic to arguments that suggest that the Republican Party is more of a problem than the Democratic Party , because the Republican Party has certainly pushed the limits of constitutional hardball much more aggressively , made it harder for a lot of people to vote .
and has pushed gerrymandering much more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ differently .
But , for me , the bigger issue here is where that thinking pushes us .
So say you ’ re a partisan Democrat and you say , “ Well , if the Democrats could just win enough elections and get total control , everything would be O.K.
” Well , one , is that really going to happen anytime in the near future ?
I think we overstate demography as destiny and underrate the ways in which our political institutions overrepresent the rural party .
So I don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going forward , even if it ’ s a reasonable premise .
The second thing , which worries me even more , is that if the plan is for the Democrats to just try to wipe out the Republicans , that means that whatever moderates are still in the Republican Party would have left it .
And then the Republican Party just becomes even more the concentration of rural , left-behind , gun-owning , “ America is for whites and Christians ” —and these are the folks who are girding up for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re not going to have a voice .
These are the folks who thought that if Hillary Clinton became President , she was going to prevent their ability to be practicing Christians in this country .
I think we know from history that when a losing side feels like it ’ s going to be a permanent minority , and it has no legitimate path back to power , it turns aggressive and violent .
And I don ’ t like that future either , so I don ’ t see that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on which America and the G.O.P .
are rather unique in the Western world are race and climate change .
How do you think those two issues would be dealt with in a multiparty system ?
I look at the European countries , which are much further ahead of us on moving to renewable energy and reducing their carbon .
So those are multiparty democracies and they ’ ve achieved much more on climate .
If you look at polling , there is more and more support for doing something to mitigate global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system , it ’ s often minorities who get to rule , because if you ’ re the plurality of a plurality party , you get power .
So I think you would probably , in a multiparty United States , see at least one if not two parties on the right that are open to some form of carbon-reduction policy , maybe a carbon tax , which would be market-based .
Race is a complicated and broad subject .
America is becoming much more multiracial , and it is a challenge to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
But I think the challenge is made much worse by a binary political system in which one side says , “ Well , America is a white Christian nation , and if minorities want to be part of our country , they have to join that culture , and that ’ s our heritage , and we want fewer minorities.
” And the other side saying , “ Well , America is a nation of immigrants , and we need to be a diverse society , and we need to elevate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marginalized into positions of power.
” So what you ’ ve done in that binary system is you ’ ve created a zero-sum conflict about the future of American national identity and who are we as a nation , which is a very tricky thing to navigate .
But it is incredibly dangerous to navigate that in a way in which two sides are competing for power , and both sides feel that if the other side gets into power , their side is going to be marginalized and oppressed .
Would a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in politics ?
Most members of Congress complain endlessly about having to raise all this money , but when it comes to voting for campaign-finance reform , especially on the Republican side , they ’ re told that , well , you shouldn ’ t vote for this because it would hurt you .
But I think in a multiparty system , in which you don ’ t have that binary dynamic of one party being in the majority , and one party being in the minority , and there is no one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ definitive advantage by being able to raise unlimited sums of money , you would see the ability to build a majority coalition around some form of campaign-finance reform .
What ’ s the healthiest democracy in the world right now ?
We constantly mention the Northern European countries as having pretty healthy , stable democracies .
I think Ireland is looking pretty good .
It ’ s a tough time for democracies , generally , but I think certain democracies are better equipped to weather these storms and certain democracies are not .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ two-party system and the binary hyper-partisanship , we have a ship that ’ s not well equipped to navigate these storms .

In his new book, “Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America,” the political scientist Lee Drutman explains the ways in which he thinks American democracy has atrophied or broken down, and what can be done to heal it. “Trump may not so much be the problem,” Drutman writes. “He is instead the symptom of something much bigger.” That something is our two-party structure, which Drutman believes has approached collapse. He believes it has increased partisanship by making everything a binary choice, and that partisanship has itself been worsened by the sorting of the parties into ideologically coherent entities rather than fluid coalitions. It wasn’t so long ago, after all, that the Democratic Party was full of Southern conservatives, and the G.O.P. had a large, moderate wing of elected officials in the Northeast.
Drutman believes that some form of proportional representation with ranked-choice voting could lead to an increase in the number of viable parties, which would in turn reduce partisanship, and eventually gridlock and extremism. Ranked-choice voting, of course, means that voters’ second and third choices matter, too, giving candidates incentives to not alienate their opponents’ supporters. (Hendrik Hertzberg has written extensively for The New Yorker on ranked-choice voting and other potential electoral reforms.)
I recently spoke by phone with Drutman, who is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether one party is to blame for the current crisis, why ideologically incoherent voting can benefit democracy, and the place of right-wing conservatism in a multiparty system.
It seems as if you are arguing that the problems with our democracy are as much structural as political, if that makes sense—that the politics can be fixed by changing the structures. Is that a fair way of putting it?
I wouldn’t say that politics can be fixed. I think it’s always going to be messy. But a lot of the problems that are most dire in this particular moment are a product of having a genuine two-party system. There is no overlap between the two parties, which is something that I think is quite new in this moment and that is at odds with our political institutions, which demand broad compromise, not zero-sum trench warfare. And it also drives us all crazy, because it really plays into us-versus-them thinking that is inherent in our hardwiring.
O.K. So then what would be a more fair way of putting it?
That a lot of the problems that we are experiencing now are a function of our political institutions and particularly our electoral institutions, which tend to generate just two parties.
What would you say to the argument that regardless of the political system, democracies around the world seem to be breaking down?
I think democracies around the world are all facing certain challenges. The backlash to the financial crisis and increasing globalization, immigration, changing demographics, and urban/rural polarization—those are issues that are affecting all Western democracies. The question is which type of political-party system is better equipped to resolve those dynamics.
The two-party system in the U.S. exacerbates those conflicts in a binary way, and it doesn’t allow for an easy realignment. It’s almost impossible for new parties to emerge, and we just get two tired boxers stuck in a ring continuing to punch each other. The advantage of the multiparty systems throughout Western Europe is that although they’re also experiencing some of these same shocks, the party system can change, and new parties can emerge, and old parties can die. And you can see more responses from the system in which not everything is cast in this binary, us-against-them battle. There are different coalitions that come and go, and new coalitions can form. And it’s messy, but all politics is messy. But I think what you’ve seen is that in most of the Western European democracies, although there is a populist far right that has risen, it has not gained power. In the U.S. it has gained power.
You write in the book, “This is the danger in a two-party system: while it is easier to marginalize the resentments and discontent in the short term, it can backfire in the long term. Marginalization feeds the sustaining populist myth of elite disdain and neglect. And once anti-system political sentiment grows big enough to take control of a major party, democracy becomes unstable.” Aren’t we seeing this in Europe, with the far-right parties saying they are being treated with disdain and neglect and pushed aside from coalitions, and subsequently gaining?
I don’t think it will be enough to gain power. It certainly helped those parties, but to build a winning coalition in a multiparty system, you actually have to build a true majority. And if that sentiment builds to a true majority, then it’s trouble, whatever political system you have.
If you do the math and think about the Republican primary in 2016, you’d say, well, about forty per cent of voters are Republican, or Republican-leaning. About thirty per cent of them wanted Donald Trump. That should be a twelve per cent party. But instead, Trump got the head spot in the United States government and has basically transformed the Republican Party. Because of partisanship being what it is in a two-party system, a lot of folks on the political right said, “Well, I don’t like the guy. He’s kind of crude. But, well, he has the right enemies,” and eventually they’ve warmed up to him. In a multiparty system, there would have been another party for folks to join if Trump had taken over their party. But since there’s only one game in town, a lot of folks have found themselves looking past his obvious shortcomings to just say, “Well, at least he’s better than the Democrats.”
Are there any other specific benefits you think would accrue from having multiple parties?
I think the proportional-voting system that would get us to multiple parties would do wonders for voter turnout. We have quite low voter turnout in the U.S., and that has been pretty stagnant for a long time, despite many efforts to increase turnout. If there are more parties, people are more likely to feel like one of the parties represents them, speaks to them, and they’re excited to vote for it. But even more important, in a proportional system, every vote counts, because there are no swing districts or swing states and you don’t have to live in Iowa or some suburban district near Philadelphia in order for your vote to count. And most people, if their vote doesn’t count, say, “Well, what’s the point of voting?” And even more important, the parties don’t bother to recruit people to vote, because why waste money on recruiting voters who don’t matter? Just focus on the limited ten to fifteen per cent of swing districts that actually matter. People feel like they’re better represented in multiparty systems because they feel like they actually have a party that speaks for them.
One point your book makes several times is that the parties used to be less ideologically sorted, with northern liberals in the G.O.P. and southern conservatives in the Democratic Party. That might have positive effects for partisanship and how the government functioned and so on. But it also seems wrong in the sense that people were often voting for a party that they didn’t really believe in, because of the name of the party and the history behind that party. And that seems not totally healthy for democracy either. Was our democracy in somewhat better shape because people were confused about what they were voting for, or am I looking at it wrong?
No, I think you’re looking at it right. It’s the sad trade-off in a two-party system, which is either you have parties that are incoherent and people don’t know exactly what it is they’re voting for, or you have parties that are quite distinct and then they can’t work together at all, which our political system requires. We are a separation-of-powers system that is set up to require broad compromise and coalition. That was the critique of the bipartisanship of an earlier era—that the voters aren’t able to send clear signals because the parties don’t really stand for anything.


newyorker--2020-01-10--“Just Mercy” and the Challenges of Depicting Real-Life Heroes

“ Just Mercy ” is one of the rare films that , in addressing a specific injustice , reaches below the surface of the action to reveal the systemic inequities that cause it to happen .
Based on a true story , the movie presents the conviction , incarceration , and planned execution of an innocent black person in a way that indicts the biased justice system that is faced by black people over all in the United States .
The movie is centered on Bryan Stevenson ( Michael B. Jordan ) , a young black man from Delaware who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he travels to Monroeville , Alabama , to join a white administrative director , Eva Ansley ( Brie Larson ) , in an organization that provides death-row inmates with legal representation .
In the course of their work , Stevenson discovers that Walter McMillian ( Jamie Foxx ) , nicknamed Johnny D. , was wrongly convicted of the crime for which he ’ s facing execution .
What ’ s more , the case reveals itself to be based on a complete fabrication of evidence by a white sheriff and a white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defender , unquestioned by a white judge , and accepted by an all-white jury .
McMillian , who has had prior appeals denied , is resigned to his fate .
He does not want to reopen the case and reawaken hopes only to see them dashed again .
But Stevenson is confident that , with his own local investigation of the evidence , he can bring an appeal to a higher court and have the conviction overturned .
From the start , the movie presents the obstacles that Stevenson and Ansley face in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , some of which are masked as impersonal official actions .
Racism is at the very root of the story : the original case against McMillian was brought because he was hated by whites for having had an affair with a white woman .
Stevenson and Ansley ’ s effort to rent an office is rejected by a white building manager on the grounds that their work will prove controversial .
A white prosecutor arrests , on fabricated charges , a black man who is planning to offer testimony that would exonerate McMillian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and violent : when Stevenson arrives at the prison where McMillian is being held , he is subjected , illegally , to a strip search by a white guard ; a bomb threat , laced with racist insults , is called in to Ansley ’ s home ; and , while driving , Stevenson is pulled over by two white police officers who intimidate him , insult him , and hold a gun at his head .
The drama is infuriating—and devastating , because it presents , clearly and unflinchingly , the agonies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and unjustly executed , as well as those suffered by their families and their community .
The director , Destin Daniel Cretton ( whose film “ Short Term 12 , ” from 2013 , featured Larson ’ s first prominent performance ) , presents scenes of solidarity and friendship among the death-row inmates , principally those in McMillians ’ s nearby cells : Herbert Richardson ( Rob Morgan ) , a mentally ill Vietnam War veteran , and Ray Hinton ( O ’ Shea Jackson , Jr. ) , a hearty young man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spirits up .
Stevenson ’ s visit to the McMillian household , when he makes his pitch to the skeptical family to reopen the case , is the first of many scenes throughout the film that display the collective mobilization of Monroeville ’ s black residents on McMillian ’ s behalf , and their despair at the legally enshrined injustices that they must endure .
The state of race relations in the town reflects what the scholar Michelle Alexander , in her groundbreaking book , calls the “ new Jim Crow ” of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to in a shocking scene in which the town ’ s sheriff ( Michael Harding ) accuses Stevenson of being a Northern interloper looking to expose the racist behavior of Southern whites toward black residents—whom he calls by the N-word .
“ Just Mercy ” is a drama of immense power ; its vision of the possibility of individual triumphs over systematic persecution is guardedly hopeful , and its depiction of the dysfunctional justice system itself looks ahead to the possibility of progress .
Yet , for all the glimmers of hopefulness that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impersonal .
It ’ s not a bio-pic , because there ’ s very little bio in the movie .
Stevenson ’ s heroism is a monumental one—both in scale and in form .
His parents are seen in a brief early glimpse ; otherwise , the movie shows almost nothing of his personal life—mainly , that he ’ s a churchgoer and a runner .
The action covers six years , from 1987 through 1993 , yet it limits Stevenson to his professional functions .
For that matter , he engages in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propels the case into the national spotlight , but this seems to happen in the wink of an eye , without any sense of his strategy or his effective behind-the-scenes action involving a wide-ranging network of connections .
The barriers to such dramatic intimacy are endemic to the current cinema and , in particular , to political movies based on true stories , in which there is little room to deviate from the main narrative of events—and apt hesitation to go beyond the documented record of public or quasi-public activities .
Yet the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a principled , courageous , and brilliant lawyer , rather than as a complete person who does such historic work ; he remains opaque .
Meanwhile , there ’ s an entire set of characters whose connection between their personal lives and their professional actions are at the very core of the movie but whose private existence is similarly rendered invisible : the white racist officials on whose practices the entire drama depends .
Watching such characters behave monstrously in the ostensibly dispassionate dispatch of their public duties , I found myself wondering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
A work of fiction can do what a stereotypical journalistic visit to MAGA-hatted diner patrons can not : it can dramatize the underlying patterns of thought , the embedded nexus of beliefs and practices , the connections between official action and ordinary life that perpetuate and defend the oppressions that the movie so effectively depicts and decries .
Adding an element of fiction can be dangerous , though , as suggested by the frequent criticism that a director or author “ humanizes ” a villain , which is why it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the honor and respect rightly accorded to heroes such as Stevenson often get in the way of dramatizing the struggles of their daily lives and the conflicts in their inner lives that they overcome in their devoted pursuit of justice .
Fictionalizing parts of a story also risks gross distortions , such as Clint Eastwood ’ s grotesque characterization of the journalist Kathy Scruggs ( Olivia Wilde ) in “ Richard Jewell.
” But it ’ s precisely in confronting such risks responsibly and discerningly—and surmounting them to create a wider-ranging , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ film such as “ Just Mercy ” can move into the forefront of American political discourse , where it belongs .

“Just Mercy” is one of the rare films that, in addressing a specific injustice, reaches below the surface of the action to reveal the systemic inequities that cause it to happen. Based on a true story, the movie presents the conviction, incarceration, and planned execution of an innocent black person in a way that indicts the biased justice system that is faced by black people over all in the United States.
The movie is centered on Bryan Stevenson (Michael B. Jordan), a young black man from Delaware who graduates from Harvard Law. In 1987, he travels to Monroeville, Alabama, to join a white administrative director, Eva Ansley (Brie Larson), in an organization that provides death-row inmates with legal representation. In the course of their work, Stevenson discovers that Walter McMillian (Jamie Foxx), nicknamed Johnny D., was wrongly convicted of the crime for which he’s facing execution. What’s more, the case reveals itself to be based on a complete fabrication of evidence by a white sheriff and a white prosecutor, unchallenged by a white public defender, unquestioned by a white judge, and accepted by an all-white jury. McMillian, who has had prior appeals denied, is resigned to his fate. He does not want to reopen the case and reawaken hopes only to see them dashed again. But Stevenson is confident that, with his own local investigation of the evidence, he can bring an appeal to a higher court and have the conviction overturned.
From the start, the movie presents the obstacles that Stevenson and Ansley face in their efforts—social obstacles, rooted in racism, some of which are masked as impersonal official actions. Racism is at the very root of the story: the original case against McMillian was brought because he was hated by whites for having had an affair with a white woman. Stevenson and Ansley’s effort to rent an office is rejected by a white building manager on the grounds that their work will prove controversial. A white prosecutor arrests, on fabricated charges, a black man who is planning to offer testimony that would exonerate McMillian. Sometimes, the menace is physical and violent: when Stevenson arrives at the prison where McMillian is being held, he is subjected, illegally, to a strip search by a white guard; a bomb threat, laced with racist insults, is called in to Ansley’s home; and, while driving, Stevenson is pulled over by two white police officers who intimidate him, insult him, and hold a gun at his head.
The drama is infuriating—and devastating, because it presents, clearly and unflinchingly, the agonies endured by those who are wrongly convicted and unjustly executed, as well as those suffered by their families and their community. The director, Destin Daniel Cretton (whose film “Short Term 12,” from 2013, featured Larson’s first prominent performance), presents scenes of solidarity and friendship among the death-row inmates, principally those in McMillians’s nearby cells: Herbert Richardson (Rob Morgan), a mentally ill Vietnam War veteran, and Ray Hinton (O’Shea Jackson, Jr.), a hearty young man who tries to keep his neighbors’ spirits up. Stevenson’s visit to the McMillian household, when he makes his pitch to the skeptical family to reopen the case, is the first of many scenes throughout the film that display the collective mobilization of Monroeville’s black residents on McMillian’s behalf, and their despair at the legally enshrined injustices that they must endure. The state of race relations in the town reflects what the scholar Michelle Alexander, in her groundbreaking book, calls the “new Jim Crow” of mass incarceration. It’s alluded to in a shocking scene in which the town’s sheriff (Michael Harding) accuses Stevenson of being a Northern interloper looking to expose the racist behavior of Southern whites toward black residents—whom he calls by the N-word.
“Just Mercy” is a drama of immense power; its vision of the possibility of individual triumphs over systematic persecution is guardedly hopeful, and its depiction of the dysfunctional justice system itself looks ahead to the possibility of progress. Yet, for all the glimmers of hopefulness that the film offers, it remains peculiarly impersonal. It’s not a bio-pic, because there’s very little bio in the movie. Stevenson’s heroism is a monumental one—both in scale and in form. His parents are seen in a brief early glimpse; otherwise, the movie shows almost nothing of his personal life—mainly, that he’s a churchgoer and a runner. The action covers six years, from 1987 through 1993, yet it limits Stevenson to his professional functions. For that matter, he engages in some rather brilliant, large-scale strategizing that propels the case into the national spotlight, but this seems to happen in the wink of an eye, without any sense of his strategy or his effective behind-the-scenes action involving a wide-ranging network of connections. The barriers to such dramatic intimacy are endemic to the current cinema and, in particular, to political movies based on true stories, in which there is little room to deviate from the main narrative of events—and apt hesitation to go beyond the documented record of public or quasi-public activities. Yet the result is that Stevenson comes off as a principled, courageous, and brilliant lawyer, rather than as a complete person who does such historic work; he remains opaque.
Meanwhile, there’s an entire set of characters whose connection between their personal lives and their professional actions are at the very core of the movie but whose private existence is similarly rendered invisible: the white racist officials on whose practices the entire drama depends. Watching such characters behave monstrously in the ostensibly dispassionate dispatch of their public duties, I found myself wondering: How do they live with themselves? A work of fiction can do what a stereotypical journalistic visit to MAGA-hatted diner patrons cannot: it can dramatize the underlying patterns of thought, the embedded nexus of beliefs and practices, the connections between official action and ordinary life that perpetuate and defend the oppressions that the movie so effectively depicts and decries.
Adding an element of fiction can be dangerous, though, as suggested by the frequent criticism that a director or author “humanizes” a villain, which is why it’s a severe test of artistry. Conversely, the honor and respect rightly accorded to heroes such as Stevenson often get in the way of dramatizing the struggles of their daily lives and the conflicts in their inner lives that they overcome in their devoted pursuit of justice. Fictionalizing parts of a story also risks gross distortions, such as Clint Eastwood’s grotesque characterization of the journalist Kathy Scruggs (Olivia Wilde) in “Richard Jewell.” But it’s precisely in confronting such risks responsibly and discerningly—and surmounting them to create a wider-ranging, more complex drama—that a powerful and vital film such as “Just Mercy” can move into the forefront of American political discourse, where it belongs.


newyorker--2020-01-10--The Democratic Candidates Respond to the Conflict with Iran

The January 14th Democratic debate , in Des Moines , was likely going to focus on health care and other domestic issues , but now the agenda probably will be dominated by the Trump Administration ’ s killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani and America ’ s history of war in the Middle East .
The New Yorker ’ s Eric Lach , who is in Iowa , describes how the candidates are honing their positions .
Plus , the contributor Anna Wiener reflects on the changing face of Silicon Valley , and the Moscow correspondent Joshua Yaffa describes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia .
In Iowa , the Democratic Candidates Respond to the Conflict with Iran The reporter Eric Lach is in Iowa , ahead of the January debate , as the candidates are honing their responses to the volatile situation with Iran .
An author who bought into the promises of Silicon Valley reflects on her gradual disenchantment , as reality intruded on the mystique .
The New Disinformation Tactics of Putin ’ s Russia Russian media is under government control—but you wouldn ’ t know it at first glance .
Joshua Yaffa explains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propaganda to something more insidious .

Illustration by Golden Cosmos
The January 14th Democratic debate, in Des Moines, was likely going to focus on health care and other domestic issues, but now the agenda probably will be dominated by the Trump Administration’s killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani and America’s history of war in the Middle East. The New Yorker’s Eric Lach, who is in Iowa, describes how the candidates are honing their positions. Plus, the contributor Anna Wiener reflects on the changing face of Silicon Valley, and the Moscow correspondent Joshua Yaffa describes how to succeed in Putin’s Russia.
In Iowa, the Democratic Candidates Respond to the Conflict with Iran
The reporter Eric Lach is in Iowa, ahead of the January debate, as the candidates are honing their responses to the volatile situation with Iran.
The New Disinformation Tactics of Putin’s Russia
Russian media is under government control—but you wouldn’t know it at first glance. Joshua Yaffa explains Channel One’s evolution from Soviet-style propaganda to something more insidious.
Anna Wiener’s “Uncanny Valley”
An author who bought into the promises of Silicon Valley reflects on her gradual disenchantment, as reality intruded on the mystique.


newyorker--2020-01-10--In Ohio, Trump Lists the Sacrifices He Makes for the Nation

It ’ s not easy being President , according to Donald Trump .
For one thing , as he told the crowd at a rally in Toledo , Ohio , on Thursday night , you have to sit through television programs that you don ’ t like—such as the Democratic Presidential debates .
“ I ’ m supposed to watch .
It ’ s , like , my job—try and watch , watch the competition .
But it ’ s like watching death .
It ’ s death .
Those debates are boring.
” The comparison of death to dullness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ someone who almost triggered a war with Iran last week .
But Trump was prepared to be heroic about the arduous viewing service that was asked of him .
“ You ’ ve got to sit through those things for two and a half hours—you ’ ve got to really be committed to the country.
” One of the remarkable aspects of the Toledo rally was how variegated Trump ’ s anger at what comes out of his television can be , even if his target is , in many ways , an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a serious debate going on about the legal basis for the assassination of Qassem Suleimani , the Iranian general whom the United States killed in Iraq earlier this month , and an accompanying push to make sure that any wider war has congressional authorization .
( For too many years , the post-9/11 authorizations for the use of military force have been used for too many tenuously related military actions . )
But according to Trump , it was the media that made it impossible for him to consult with Congress or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Imagine , he asked his supporters , if , with Suleimani in its sights , the Administration had called Representative Adam Schiff , of California , the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee .
“ Schiff is a big leaker , ” Trump said .
“ You know he leaks to Crazy CNN.
” ( No relation , presumably , to “ Crazy Bernie , ” an epithet that Trump has also used several times . )
Trump continued , “ Not too many people are watching CNN .
But he leaks !
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ You know , uh , off the record , I ’ ve got to hurry up because everyone ’ s watching me in the hallway with my cell phone ’ ” —apparently , Trump is even bothered by background shots in cable-news footage— “ ‘ off the record , they ’ ve got the No .
1 terrorist in the world , Suleimani , and they ’ re going to get him , they ’ re going to take him out in the next ten minutes .
Please , don ’ t tell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ” In Trump ’ s alternative-reality tale , CNN tells , anyway : “ ‘ We have breaking news !
President Trump , within the next twenty , twenty-five minutes , looks to be taking out terrorist General Suleimani !
He ’ s going to do it—should be happening about the next twenty minutes , nineteen , eighteen , seventeen.
’ ” Then he , Trump , would ask the military , “ ‘ How ’ d you do , fellows ?
’ ” Only to be told , “ ‘ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he disappeared !
’ ” This is not how Congress operates ; this is not how CNN operates .
It has become commonplace for Trump to decry major media outlets as the enemy of the people , though he did say on Thursday night that there is “ one good one ” —presumably Fox News .
What the President proposed in Toledo , though , was that the supposed perfidy of the media was a reasonable excuse for him to ignore his legal and constitutional obligations regarding congressional oversight .
Indeed , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t have a good-faith commitment to oversight .
Instead , “ They want us to tell them so that they could leak it to their friends in the corrupt media.
” The crowd booed loudly , and the brief interval was enough for Trump ’ s mind to make another , rather garbled connection : “ You ’ ve got to say , though , that ’ s a lot of media , right ?
That ’ s the way the Academy Awards used to look when it was successful !
Then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it became unsuccessful .
I love it .
I love it , actually !
” ( No word on whether he is cheering for “ Marriage Story , ” “ Little Women , ” or “ The Irishman.
” ) And what , Trump went on , is the story with prizes these days , anyhow ?
This was another complaint about the media— “ They get Pulitzer Prizes for being wrong !
” —that segued into a complaint about the failure of the world to honor Donald Trump .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Nobel Peace Prize , ” he said , explaining that he ’ d “ saved a country ” but that , scandalously , the prize had gone to the leader of that country .
( He seemed to be talking about Ethiopia , whose Prime Minister , Abiy Ahmed , was awarded the prize for attaining peace with Eritrea , which was not a Trump achievement ; an Ethiopian official told reporters that Trump was likely referring to his role in a separate dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt , involving a dam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that ’ s the way it is , ” Trump said .
Adam Schiff appeared to be on Trump ’ s mind because of the impeachment .
Trump said that even if he had called a meeting with members of Congress about the Suleimani operation , Schiff— “ Adam , you little pencil-neck !
” —would have said , “ ‘ I can ’ t make it now because I ’ m trying to impeach Trump !
’ ” He derided the Speaker of the House , Nancy Pelosi , as “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that anyone would think that he should talk to her .
“ The radical Democrats have never been more extreme than they are now .
They are stone-cold crazy , ” Trump said .
“ They ’ re vicious , horrible people.
” As for the substance of the impeachment charges ?
“ By the way , did you see , I did nothing wrong.
” The Democrats were just “ wasting America ’ s time with demented hoaxes and crazy witch hunts.
” And , of course , boring television .
Assuming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and watching the Democratic debates , it doesn ’ t appear that he ’ s been listening very carefully .
He spent a couple of minutes mocking Beto O ’ Rourke , the former congressman from El Paso , who left the race months ago .
Trump ’ s griping veered between O ’ Rourke ’ s supposedly outrageous concern about the effects of fossil fuels to the attention that he got from the media , which included a profile in Vanity Fair .
( “ Remember he had the cover of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the magazine—sleazebag magazine.
” ) At least print media still catches Trump ’ s eye , in addition to cable .
The President did bring out his stock insults for the remaining Democratic contenders , whom he called “ some real beauties ” : “ Pocahantas is slipping badly ” ; “ Crazy Bernie , he ’ s surging ” ; Buttigieg reminds him of Alfred E. Neuman , and his name is hard to pronounce , “ so what they do is they call him Mayor Pete.
” Joe Biden “ doesn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Iraq ” and his son Hunter started making a lot of money “ as soon as Sleepy Joe became Vice-President.
” This was a reference to Hunter Biden ’ s role in the story underlying the impeachment case against Trump , who , among other things , is alleged to have threatened to withhold military aid to Ukraine unless its President opened an investigation into the Biden family .
The Senate impeachment trial should get under way in short order .
No doubt , it will make for some good television—not boring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sitting through it .
But the programming of the Presidency is not entirely up to him .

It’s not easy being President, according to Donald Trump. For one thing, as he told the crowd at a rally in Toledo, Ohio, on Thursday night, you have to sit through television programs that you don’t like—such as the Democratic Presidential debates. “I’m supposed to watch. It’s, like, my job—try and watch, watch the competition. But it’s like watching death. It’s death. Those debates are boring.” The comparison of death to dullness might have been a little off-key for someone who almost triggered a war with Iran last week. But Trump was prepared to be heroic about the arduous viewing service that was asked of him. “You’ve got to sit through those things for two and a half hours—you’ve got to really be committed to the country.”
One of the remarkable aspects of the Toledo rally was how variegated Trump’s anger at what comes out of his television can be, even if his target is, in many ways, an imaginary television. For example, there is a serious debate going on about the legal basis for the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, the Iranian general whom the United States killed in Iraq earlier this month, and an accompanying push to make sure that any wider war has congressional authorization. (For too many years, the post-9/11 authorizations for the use of military force have been used for too many tenuously related military actions.) But according to Trump, it was the media that made it impossible for him to consult with Congress or, apparently, with anybody sensible.
Imagine, he asked his supporters, if, with Suleimani in its sights, the Administration had called Representative Adam Schiff, of California, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. “Schiff is a big leaker,” Trump said. “You know he leaks to Crazy CNN.” (No relation, presumably, to “Crazy Bernie,” an epithet that Trump has also used several times.) Trump continued, “Not too many people are watching CNN. But he leaks! So he’ll say, ‘You know, uh, off the record, I’ve got to hurry up because everyone’s watching me in the hallway with my cell phone’ ”—apparently, Trump is even bothered by background shots in cable-news footage—“ ‘off the record, they’ve got the No. 1 terrorist in the world, Suleimani, and they’re going to get him, they’re going to take him out in the next ten minutes. Please, don’t tell anybody I told you about that!’ ” In Trump’s alternative-reality tale, CNN tells, anyway: “ ‘We have breaking news! President Trump, within the next twenty, twenty-five minutes, looks to be taking out terrorist General Suleimani! He’s going to do it—should be happening about the next twenty minutes, nineteen, eighteen, seventeen.’ ” Then he, Trump, would ask the military, “ ‘How’d you do, fellows?’ ” Only to be told, “ ‘I don’t know, sir, he disappeared!’ ”
This is not how Congress operates; this is not how CNN operates. It has become commonplace for Trump to decry major media outlets as the enemy of the people, though he did say on Thursday night that there is “one good one”—presumably Fox News. What the President proposed in Toledo, though, was that the supposed perfidy of the media was a reasonable excuse for him to ignore his legal and constitutional obligations regarding congressional oversight. Indeed, he suggested that even members of Congress don’t have a good-faith commitment to oversight. Instead, “They want us to tell them so that they could leak it to their friends in the corrupt media.” The crowd booed loudly, and the brief interval was enough for Trump’s mind to make another, rather garbled connection: “You’ve got to say, though, that’s a lot of media, right? That’s the way the Academy Awards used to look when it was successful! Then they started hitting us all the time and it became unsuccessful. I love it. I love it, actually!” (No word on whether he is cheering for “Marriage Story,” “Little Women,” or “The Irishman.”)
And what, Trump went on, is the story with prizes these days, anyhow? This was another complaint about the media—“They get Pulitzer Prizes for being wrong!”—that segued into a complaint about the failure of the world to honor Donald Trump. “I’m going to tell you about the Nobel Peace Prize,” he said, explaining that he’d “saved a country” but that, scandalously, the prize had gone to the leader of that country. (He seemed to be talking about Ethiopia, whose Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, was awarded the prize for attaining peace with Eritrea, which was not a Trump achievement; an Ethiopian official told reporters that Trump was likely referring to his role in a separate dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt, involving a dam.) “But, you know, that’s the way it is,” Trump said.
Adam Schiff appeared to be on Trump’s mind because of the impeachment. Trump said that even if he had called a meeting with members of Congress about the Suleimani operation, Schiff—“Adam, you little pencil-neck!”—would have said, “ ‘I can’t make it now because I’m trying to impeach Trump!’ ” He derided the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, as “Nervous Nancy,” and sounded amazed that anyone would think that he should talk to her. “The radical Democrats have never been more extreme than they are now. They are stone-cold crazy,” Trump said. “They’re vicious, horrible people.” As for the substance of the impeachment charges? “By the way, did you see, I did nothing wrong.” The Democrats were just “wasting America’s time with demented hoaxes and crazy witch hunts.”
And, of course, boring television. Assuming that Trump has been making that sacrifice and watching the Democratic debates, it doesn’t appear that he’s been listening very carefully. He spent a couple of minutes mocking Beto O’Rourke, the former congressman from El Paso, who left the race months ago. Trump’s griping veered between O’Rourke’s supposedly outrageous concern about the effects of fossil fuels to the attention that he got from the media, which included a profile in Vanity Fair. (“Remember he had the cover of the magazine? I won’t mention the magazine—sleazebag magazine.”) At least print media still catches Trump’s eye, in addition to cable.
The President did bring out his stock insults for the remaining Democratic contenders, whom he called “some real beauties”: “Pocahantas is slipping badly”; “Crazy Bernie, he’s surging”; Buttigieg reminds him of Alfred E. Neuman, and his name is hard to pronounce, “so what they do is they call him Mayor Pete.” Joe Biden “doesn’t know the difference between Iran and Iraq” and his son Hunter started making a lot of money “as soon as Sleepy Joe became Vice-President.” This was a reference to Hunter Biden’s role in the story underlying the impeachment case against Trump, who, among other things, is alleged to have threatened to withhold military aid to Ukraine unless its President opened an investigation into the Biden family. The Senate impeachment trial should get under way in short order. No doubt, it will make for some good television—not boring at all. Trump may not like sitting through it. But the programming of the Presidency is not entirely up to him.


newyorker--2020-01-10--On the Trail: What’s Going to Happen in Iowa?

Subscribers to The New Yorker ’ s new 2020 election newsletter , On the Trail , received this piece in their in-box .
Sign up to receive future installments .
This past weekend , I was driving on I-80 , the highway that cuts east-west across the middle of Iowa .
Somewhere between Des Moines and Grinnell , amid the bare corn and soy fields and lazily turning wind turbines , I spotted two billboards , a few hundred yards apart .
The first one , white with black letters , said “ JESUS.
” The second , red with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Interesting ticket , I thought .
At a Joe Biden event in Grinnell , I spoke to a woman who was still undecided .
“ I like everybody , ” she said .
“ I mean , that ’ s my problem is that I like everybody.
” I thought of the billboards .
This is the state of things here in Iowa in January , 2020 : total conviction in one place , complete indecision a little farther down the road .
Over Christmas , when I told friends and family that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before the Democratic caucuses travelling around Iowa , they all asked one thing : What is going to happen ?
Which was the same question I myself had been asking .
No one knows .
Campaign staffers , activists , voters—they shrug or laugh .
Every candidate from Biden to Tulsi Gabbard has his or her converts .
After a year of campaigning , and with just a few weeks to go , Biden and three other candidates—Bernie Sanders , Pete Buttigieg , and Elizabeth Warren—are clustered at the top of the state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Klobuchar , Tom Steyer , Andrew Yang—are behind but still expressing confidence .
No one can quite rule out a surprisingly high finish for any of them on February 3rd .
Their very confidence betrays a faith that things will change between now and caucus day .
This week , Qassem Suleimani ’ s killing , and the terrifying prospect that the country would go to war with Iran , with Donald Trump as Commander-in-Chief , was a reminder to every campaign that , for all the careful policy rollouts and message crafting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the selfie lines and fund-raising and ground-operation build-outs , people will ultimately vote in the context of events that are impossible to predict .
“ The end always happens in real time , ” one veteran Iowa Democrat told me this week .
The other adage that people have been throwing around is the one attributed to Dave Nagle , a former Iowa congressman , for how to succeed in the caucuses : “ Organize , organize , and get hot at the end.
” After a year-long campaign dominated by the ideological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left and center lanes , there ’ s something unsatisfying about such a value-neutral assertion .
But , talking to voters here , it ’ s easy to see why people see the wisdom in it .
I ’ ve talked to people torn between Biden and Sanders , or Biden and Yang , or Warren and Buttigieg .
Caucuses—in-person , public voting events—are particularly unpredictable democratic undertakings .
After a first round of voting on caucus night , next month , supporters of candidates who don ’ t reach a certain threshold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ usually fifteen per cent ) will be freed up to support another candidate .
So whether Yang supporters like Biden more than Sanders , or Cory Booker supporters prefer Buttigieg to Warren , may end up being hugely important .
The memory of how victory in Iowa catapulted Barack Obama ’ s candidacy in 2008 is part of why the 2020 candidates have spent so much time here , and why supporters of so many candidates in a large field still find reason to hope .
On Wednesday , I spoke with Chris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama effort , who , this week , published “ They Said This Day Would Never Come , ” an oral history of Obama ’ s 2007-08 campaign .
“ There ’ s a tendency to really want to qualify politics in some way , to have the reassurance of data—that because we know x , y is how it is going to turn out , ” he said .
“ Even after talking to hundreds of people about this exact thing , I can ’ t give you an exact formula for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people feel the way they felt.
” This past weekend , people were feeling anxious about war .
Biden and Sanders , most starkly , were offering them two different responses .
Biden was focussed on tactics , questioning the Trump Administration ’ s decision to kill Suleimani how and when it did , and its readiness to handle the consequences that would come after .
Sanders was talking strategy , and values : he was against entering into another war in the Middle East .
Foreign policy , it was thought , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a new way .
But , by the end of the week , the situation with Iran was cooling off .
Who knows what next week will bring , and how people might feel about it ?

Subscribers to The New Yorker’s new 2020 election newsletter, On the Trail, received this piece in their in-boxes. Sign up to receive future installments.
This past weekend, I was driving on I-80, the highway that cuts east-west across the middle of Iowa. Somewhere between Des Moines and Grinnell, amid the bare corn and soy fields and lazily turning wind turbines, I spotted two billboards, a few hundred yards apart. The first one, white with black letters, said “JESUS.” The second, red with white letters, said “TULSI.” Interesting ticket, I thought.
At a Joe Biden event in Grinnell, I spoke to a woman who was still undecided. “I like everybody,” she said. “I mean, that’s my problem is that I like everybody.” I thought of the billboards. This is the state of things here in Iowa in January, 2020: total conviction in one place, complete indecision a little farther down the road.
Over Christmas, when I told friends and family that I’d be spending the month before the Democratic caucuses travelling around Iowa, they all asked one thing: What is going to happen? Which was the same question I myself had been asking. No one knows. Campaign staffers, activists, voters—they shrug or laugh. Every candidate from Biden to Tulsi Gabbard has his or her converts. After a year of campaigning, and with just a few weeks to go, Biden and three other candidates—Bernie Sanders, Pete Buttigieg, and Elizabeth Warren—are clustered at the top of the state’s polls. A few others—Amy Klobuchar, Tom Steyer, Andrew Yang—are behind but still expressing confidence. No one can quite rule out a surprisingly high finish for any of them on February 3rd. Their very confidence betrays a faith that things will change between now and caucus day.
This week, Qassem Suleimani’s killing, and the terrifying prospect that the country would go to war with Iran, with Donald Trump as Commander-in-Chief, was a reminder to every campaign that, for all the careful policy rollouts and message crafting of the past year, for all the selfie lines and fund-raising and ground-operation build-outs, people will ultimately vote in the context of events that are impossible to predict. “The end always happens in real time,” one veteran Iowa Democrat told me this week.
The other adage that people have been throwing around is the one attributed to Dave Nagle, a former Iowa congressman, for how to succeed in the caucuses: “Organize, organize, and get hot at the end.” After a year-long campaign dominated by the ideological gap between the Democratic Party’s left and center lanes, there’s something unsatisfying about such a value-neutral assertion. But, talking to voters here, it’s easy to see why people see the wisdom in it. I’ve talked to people torn between Biden and Sanders, or Biden and Yang, or Warren and Buttigieg. Caucuses—in-person, public voting events—are particularly unpredictable democratic undertakings. After a first round of voting on caucus night, next month, supporters of candidates who don’t reach a certain threshold of support in a precinct room (usually fifteen per cent) will be freed up to support another candidate. So whether Yang supporters like Biden more than Sanders, or Cory Booker supporters prefer Buttigieg to Warren, may end up being hugely important.
The memory of how victory in Iowa catapulted Barack Obama’s candidacy in 2008 is part of why the 2020 candidates have spent so much time here, and why supporters of so many candidates in a large field still find reason to hope. On Wednesday, I spoke with Chris Liddell-Westefeld, an early organizer for the Obama effort, who, this week, published “They Said This Day Would Never Come,” an oral history of Obama’s 2007-08 campaign.
“There’s a tendency to really want to qualify politics in some way, to have the reassurance of data—that because we know x, y is how it is going to turn out,” he said. “Even after talking to hundreds of people about this exact thing, I can’t give you an exact formula for the exact reason why Barack Obama made people feel the way they felt.”
This past weekend, people were feeling anxious about war. Biden and Sanders, most starkly, were offering them two different responses. Biden was focussed on tactics, questioning the Trump Administration’s decision to kill Suleimani how and when it did, and its readiness to handle the consequences that would come after. Sanders was talking strategy, and values: he was against entering into another war in the Middle East. Foreign policy, it was thought, was poised to enter the campaign debate in a new way. But, by the end of the week, the situation with Iran was cooling off. Who knows what next week will bring, and how people might feel about it?


newyorker--2020-01-10--The Real Backstory of Why Trump Ordered the Killing of Suleimani Is Becoming More Clear

The Trump-Iran story continues to develop in alarming ways .
On Thursday , reports that Western governments believe Iranian military forces mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet , killing a hundred and seventy-six passengers and crew members , produced a predictably divided reaction .
“ Innocent civilians are now dead because they were caught in the middle of an unnecessary and unwanted military tit for tat , ” Pete Buttigieg , the Democratic Presidential candidate , said , on Twitter , immediately drawing cries of outrage from Trump supporters who insisted that Iran was entirely responsible .
Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But , if it does turn out that the Iranian military made a terrible blunder amid the frightening escalation in long-running tensions between Tehran and the Trump Administration , it will be ever more imperative to get a full account , not only of that blunder but also of the escalation .
On that subject , more disturbing details are emerging by the day .
The picture we are getting is of the Secretary of State , Mike Pompeo , and Vice-President Mike Pence both egging on an impetuous President to launch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani at Baghdad International Airport .
None of Trump ’ s other senior political or military advisers , meanwhile , appear to have urged restraint , despite the near-certainty that the move would inflame the entire Middle East and provoke reprisals .
Any deliberative policymaking process appears to have been replaced by a combination of belligerence , toadyism , and saluting the Commander-in-Chief .
In the aftermath of Suleimani ’ s death , members of the Trump Administration claimed that Suleimani , who held great sway over Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was plotting an imminent attack that could have killed hundreds of American service members .
Pompeo said , “ We had deep intelligence indicating there was active plotting to put American lives at risk.
” Trump told reporters at the White House on Thursday , “ We did it because they were looking to blow up our embassy.
” The Administration didn ’ t present any evidence to back up these assertions .
On Wednesday , when it finally briefed Republican legislators about the rationale for the Suleimani killing , two senators—Mike Lee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of Kentucky—walked out of the meeting and publicly trashed the material that had been presented .
“ I didn ’ t learn anything in the hearing that I hadn ’ t seen in a newspaper already , ” Paul told reporters .
“ None of it was overwhelming that X was going to happen.
” Lee was even more scathing .
Outraged by suggestions from the briefers that Republican senators would be “ emboldening Iran ” if they even debated the wisdom of further U.S. military actions , Lee called the session @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen , at least on a military issue , in the nine years I ’ ve served in the United States Senate.
” Meanwhile , Pence fell back on an old evasive tactic : claiming that the Administration did have real and convincing intelligence to justify the missile strike , but saying that it was too sensitive to be revealed , even in a private briefing on Capitol Hill .
“ We ’ re simply not able to share with every member of the House and Senate the intelligence that supported the President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani , ” Pence told Fox News .
“ I can assure your viewers that there was—there was a threat of an imminent attack.
” Detailed reports from a number of different media outlets , as well as statements by Iraqi officials , tell a very different story .
Just two days after the strike , the Times ’ Rukmini Callimachi , in a Twitter thread , cited sources , “ including two US officials who had intelligence briefings after the strike on Suleimani , ” who said the evidence of an imminent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Times itself , a tick-tock account of the decision to kill Suleimani quoted a U.S. official who described the Iranian ’ s visit to Damascus and Baghdad over the New Year as “ business as usual.
” Last weekend , Adel Abdul Mahdi , the Prime Minister of Iraq , told the parliament in Baghdad that Suleimani was scheduled to meet him on the day he was assassinated , adding that the general was bringing a response to efforts to mediate the showdown between Riyadh and Tehran .
“ He came to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the message we delivered from Saudi Arabia to Iran , ” Mahdi said .
Pompeo subsequently mocked this claim , saying , “ We ’ ve heard these same lies before.
” The fact that Suleimani was met at the Baghdad airport by the head of the pro-Iranian militias inside Iraq , Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , who was also killed by the missile attack , suggests that he may have had other reasons for his visit .
But , eight days later , it remains true that the Trump Administration hasn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack was imminent .
By the time Suleimani arrived in the Iraqi capital , the violent protests outside the American Embassy had ended , and Iraqi forces had re-secured the heavily fortified Green Zone , within which the Embassy is located .
Also , more details are emerging about the roles played by Pompeo and Pence in the decision to assassinate Suleimani .
Pompeo and Pence “ were two of the most hawkish voices arguing for a response to Iranian aggression , according to administration officials , ” the Times reported , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death .
“ Mr .
Pence ’ s office helped run herd on meetings and conference calls held by officials in the run-up to the strike.
” On Sunday , the Washington Post , citing a senior U.S official , reported that “ Pompeo first spoke with Trump about killing Suleimani months ago … but neither the president nor Pentagon officials were willing to countenance such an operation.
” On Thursday , CNN ’ s Nicole Gaouette and Jamie Gangel reported that “ Pompeo was a driving force behind President Donald Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general .
The CNN story said that Pompeo , who was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Trump before he moved to the State Department , viewed Suleimani as the mastermind of myriad operations targeting Americans and U.S interests .
It also quoted an unnamed source close to Pompeo , who recalled the Secretary of State telling friends , “ I will not retire from public service until Suleimani is off the battlefield.
” We are also learning more about the roles that other senior members of the Administration played in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack on Suleimani , including Gina Haspel , the current director of the C.I.A .
“ In the days before General Suleimani ’ s death , Ms. Haspel had advised Mr. Trump that the threat the Iranian general presented was greater than the threat of Iran ’ s response if he was killed , ” the Times reported on Wednesday .
“ Indeed , Ms. Haspel had predicted the most likely response would be a missile strike from Iran to bases where American troops were deployed , the very situation that appeared to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On Thursday , the Wall Street Journal , in yet another lengthy account of the Administration ’ s decision-making , reported that all of Trump ’ s top advisers , including “ new Secretary of Defense Mark Esper , new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and new national security adviser Robert O ’ Brien … backed the president ’ s decision to kill the top Iranian military commander and moved swiftly to carry it out .
The new team was cohesive and less inclined than its predecessors to push @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to administration officials and others consulted by the White House.
” Not that Trump needed much encouragement , it seems .
“ In the five days prior to launching a strike that killed Iran ’ s most important military leader , Donald Trump roamed the halls of Mar-a-Lago , his private resort in Florida , and started dropping hints to close associates and club-goers that something huge was coming , ” the Daily Beast reported , quoting unnamed people who had been at Trump ’ s resort over the New Year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You ’ ll see , ’ one of the sources recalled , describing a conversation with Trump days before Thursday ’ s strike.
” We did see , of course , and the reverberations are far from over .

The Trump-Iran story continues to develop in alarming ways. On Thursday, reports that Western governments believe Iranian military forces mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet, killing a hundred and seventy-six passengers and crew members, produced a predictably divided reaction. “Innocent civilians are now dead because they were caught in the middle of an unnecessary and unwanted military tit for tat,” Pete Buttigieg, the Democratic Presidential candidate, said, on Twitter, immediately drawing cries of outrage from Trump supporters who insisted that Iran was entirely responsible. Iran’s government dismissed the reports as disinformation. But, if it does turn out that the Iranian military made a terrible blunder amid the frightening escalation in long-running tensions between Tehran and the Trump Administration, it will be ever more imperative to get a full account, not only of that blunder but also of the escalation.
On that subject, more disturbing details are emerging by the day. The picture we are getting is of the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and Vice-President Mike Pence both egging on an impetuous President to launch the January 2nd drone attack that killed the Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani at Baghdad International Airport. None of Trump’s other senior political or military advisers, meanwhile, appear to have urged restraint, despite the near-certainty that the move would inflame the entire Middle East and provoke reprisals. Any deliberative policymaking process appears to have been replaced by a combination of belligerence, toadyism, and saluting the Commander-in-Chief.
In the aftermath of Suleimani’s death, members of the Trump Administration claimed that Suleimani, who held great sway over Iran’s regular and irregular forces, was plotting an imminent attack that could have killed hundreds of American service members. Pompeo said, “We had deep intelligence indicating there was active plotting to put American lives at risk.” Trump told reporters at the White House on Thursday, “We did it because they were looking to blow up our embassy.”
The Administration didn’t present any evidence to back up these assertions. On Wednesday, when it finally briefed Republican legislators about the rationale for the Suleimani killing, two senators—Mike Lee, of Utah, and Rand Paul, of Kentucky—walked out of the meeting and publicly trashed the material that had been presented. “I didn’t learn anything in the hearing that I hadn’t seen in a newspaper already,” Paul told reporters. “None of it was overwhelming that X was going to happen.” Lee was even more scathing. Outraged by suggestions from the briefers that Republican senators would be “emboldening Iran” if they even debated the wisdom of further U.S. military actions, Lee called the session “probably the worst briefing I have seen, at least on a military issue, in the nine years I’ve served in the United States Senate.”
Meanwhile, Pence fell back on an old evasive tactic: claiming that the Administration did have real and convincing intelligence to justify the missile strike, but saying that it was too sensitive to be revealed, even in a private briefing on Capitol Hill. “We’re simply not able to share with every member of the House and Senate the intelligence that supported the President’s decision to take out Qassem Suleimani,” Pence told Fox News. “I can assure your viewers that there was—there was a threat of an imminent attack.”
Detailed reports from a number of different media outlets, as well as statements by Iraqi officials, tell a very different story. Just two days after the strike, the Times’ Rukmini Callimachi, in a Twitter thread, cited sources, “including two US officials who had intelligence briefings after the strike on Suleimani,” who said the evidence of an imminent attack was “razor thin.” In the Times itself, a tick-tock account of the decision to kill Suleimani quoted a U.S. official who described the Iranian’s visit to Damascus and Baghdad over the New Year as “business as usual.” Last weekend, Adel Abdul Mahdi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, told the parliament in Baghdad that Suleimani was scheduled to meet him on the day he was assassinated, adding that the general was bringing a response to efforts to mediate the showdown between Riyadh and Tehran. “He came to deliver me a message from Iran responding to the message we delivered from Saudi Arabia to Iran,” Mahdi said.
Pompeo subsequently mocked this claim, saying, “We’ve heard these same lies before.” The fact that Suleimani was met at the Baghdad airport by the head of the pro-Iranian militias inside Iraq, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was also killed by the missile attack, suggests that he may have had other reasons for his visit. But, eight days later, it remains true that the Trump Administration hasn’t provided any evidence that a large-scale attack was imminent. By the time Suleimani arrived in the Iraqi capital, the violent protests outside the American Embassy had ended, and Iraqi forces had re-secured the heavily fortified Green Zone, within which the Embassy is located.
Also, more details are emerging about the roles played by Pompeo and Pence in the decision to assassinate Suleimani. Pompeo and Pence “were two of the most hawkish voices arguing for a response to Iranian aggression, according to administration officials,” the Times reported, a couple of days after Suleimani’s death. “Mr. Pence’s office helped run herd on meetings and conference calls held by officials in the run-up to the strike.”
On Sunday, the Washington Post, citing a senior U.S official, reported that “Pompeo first spoke with Trump about killing Suleimani months ago … but neither the president nor Pentagon officials were willing to countenance such an operation.” On Thursday, CNN’s Nicole Gaouette and Jamie Gangel reported that “Pompeo was a driving force behind President Donald Trump’s decision to kill” the Iranian general. The CNN story said that Pompeo, who was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Trump before he moved to the State Department, viewed Suleimani as the mastermind of myriad operations targeting Americans and U.S interests. It also quoted an unnamed source close to Pompeo, who recalled the Secretary of State telling friends, “I will not retire from public service until Suleimani is off the battlefield.”
We are also learning more about the roles that other senior members of the Administration played in the process that led to the drone attack on Suleimani, including Gina Haspel, the current director of the C.I.A. “In the days before General Suleimani’s death, Ms. Haspel had advised Mr. Trump that the threat the Iranian general presented was greater than the threat of Iran’s response if he was killed,” the Times reported on Wednesday. “Indeed, Ms. Haspel had predicted the most likely response would be a missile strike from Iran to bases where American troops were deployed, the very situation that appeared to be playing out on Tuesday afternoon.”
On Thursday, the Wall Street Journal, in yet another lengthy account of the Administration’s decision-making, reported that all of Trump’s top advisers, including “new Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and new national security adviser Robert O’Brien … backed the president’s decision to kill the top Iranian military commander and moved swiftly to carry it out. The new team was cohesive and less inclined than its predecessors to push back against the president’s wishes, according to administration officials and others consulted by the White House.”
Not that Trump needed much encouragement, it seems. “In the five days prior to launching a strike that killed Iran’s most important military leader, Donald Trump roamed the halls of Mar-a-Lago, his private resort in Florida, and started dropping hints to close associates and club-goers that something huge was coming,” the Daily Beast reported, quoting unnamed people who had been at Trump’s resort over the New Year. “He kept saying, ‘You’ll see,’ one of the sources recalled, describing a conversation with Trump days before Thursday’s strike.” We did see, of course, and the reverberations are far from over.