newyorker--2020-10-22--Gig Work on the Ballot in California

Gig Work on the Ballot in California

A.B .
5 was written to codify a 2018 California Supreme Court decision that determined , after a thirteen-year fight , that delivery couriers for Dynamex , a nationwide same-day delivery service , were employees and not independent contractors .
The court and the law addressed the issue of gig work in a somewhat blunt fashion .
Under A.B .
5 , a worker must pass a three-point test in order to count as an independent contractor : she must be free from the “ control and direction ” of her employer , do work that is “ outside the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s business , and have an independent business of her own in the same industry .
Those who don ’ t pass the test are classified as employees and entitled to certain benefits , including a guaranteed minimum wage , workers ’ compensation , unemployment insurance , sexual-harassment protections , overtime pay , paid leave , and shared responsibility for payroll taxes .
A.B .
5 was instantly divisive .
Certain kinds of workers—doctors , real-estate agents , lawyers , and others—were exempted off the bat , because they often dictate their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wage , and have a direct line to customers .
But when the bill went into effect , on January 1 , 2020 , some freelancers , including journalists , photojournalists , composers , and musicians , found themselves out of work .
Within a few months ’ time , exemptions were granted for freelancers in both journalism and the music industry ; since then , more than a hundred other exemptions and limitations to A.B .
5 have been implemented .
The law seems to have made a category error , addressing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs in particular .
Uber and Lyft , the largest ride-hailing firms in California , fought bitterly against A.B .
5 , not just in court but through noncompliance .
Beginning in January , they simply refused to reclassify their workers , and continued operating as they had before .
Last September , Tony West , Uber ’ s chief legal officer , told reporters that Uber ’ s drivers could pass the three-point test .
“ Just because the test is hard doesn ’ t mean that we will not be able @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on a press call .
“ In fact , several previous rulings have found that drivers ’ work is outside the usual course of Uber ’ s business.
” Uber , by this logic , is not really a transportation business—it is , as West put it , “ a technology platform for several different types of digital marketplaces.
” In the spring , California ’ s attorney general , Xavier Becerra , along with a number of city attorneys from across the state , filed a lawsuit against Uber and Lyft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drivers as employees .
In response , both companies filed an appeal , and then threatened to shut down their operations in California .
The court granted the companies an extension until November 4th .
The day before , Californians will have voted on a new ballot initiative , drafted and promoted by gig-work companies , that carves out an exception within A.B .
5 for app-based services .
The initiative , Proposition 22 , is not a referendum on A.B .
5 , but a tech-industry-specific exemption .
Its goal is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reclassified as employees ; it is called the “ App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor Policies Initiative.
” If A.B .
5 is imperfect , imprecise legislation , then Prop .
22 is worse .
In arguing for the new law , the ride-hailing companies have emphasized its inclusion of perks for drivers who work more than fifteen hours a week .
Prop .
22 gives them a guaranteed wage that is twenty per cent higher than the legal minimum , occupational accident coverage , and a graduated health-care stipend .
But critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loopholes and weaknesses .
Prop .
22 counts working hours in terms of “ engaged time , ” which includes only periods when passengers are physically in the car ; time spent driving between drop-offs and pickups , or waiting for customers , doesn ’ t count .
Some studies estimate that drivers spend thirty per cent of their time idling , cruising , and waiting for customers .
Even if a driver racks up more than twenty-four hours of engaged time each week , the health-care stipend will likely be insufficient to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health-insurance plans .
Meanwhile , as independent contractors , drivers would not receive the benefits , such as paid sick leave and unemployment insurance , that they would have received under A.B .
5 .
They would also be on the hook for payroll taxes in their entirety .
If they were employees , they would split taxes with their employers .
By classifying their workers as independent contractors , Uber and Lyft have saved hundreds of millions of dollars in California payroll taxes .
In late 2019 , the Labor Center at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ released a report estimating that drivers working under Prop .
22 could receive a net wage as low as five dollars and sixty-four cents an hour—less than half the minimum wage in California , and hardly a third of the minimum wage in San Francisco .
In publicly making their case for an exemption from A.B .
5 , Uber and Lyft have claimed that Prop .
22 protects drivers ’ scheduling flexibility and ability to work for competitors .
Uber and Lyft have said that adapting their software to an A.B .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ undertaking , during which service might be suspended—leaving drivers out of work .
They ’ ve also previewed more permanent changes .
“ Shifting to an employment model would put pressure on Uber to consolidate working hours across fewer workers in order to manage costs that are fixed per employee , ” Alison Stein , an in-house economist at Uber , wrote , in a recent blog post .
“ Under an employment model , it is likely that the new norm for Uber drivers would conform with the 40-hour work week which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employees.
” Such changes , if they were to happen , would not be mandated by law .
Even if drivers ’ current flexibility is diminished , A.B .
5 does not mention predetermined shift scheduling ; it explicitly allows for part-time work , and for workers to spread their time across competitive services .
The real issue is that most gig-work business models are predicated on the availability of low-paid , independent contractors who can be compensated according to algorithmically determined , dynamic pricing .
Some analysts have estimated that reclassifying millions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operating costs at Uber and Lyft by twenty to thirty per cent .
The companies could be incentivized to limit the number of drivers on the platform or to charge more for rides .
Currently , neither company is profitable ; earlier this year , when Uber acquired Postmates , an UberEats competitor , it was unclear which service would be the loss leader .
The obvious endgame for these companies is monopoly , pursued through low prices : Uber and Lyft want to undercut , and then corner , the market on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight about Prop .
22 is not just about labor rights .
It ’ s also about antitrust .
During the past few months , the ride-hailing companies—along with DoorDash , Instacart , the Republican Party of California , and others—have spent lavishly on television and radio ads , mailers , and billboards in favor of Proposition 22 .
The campaign has cited support from Mothers Against Drunk Driving .
( Uber has historically been one of MADD ’ s largest donors . )
The companies have also endorsed the proposition in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ customers to campaign for it .
These tactics have been unusual .
Uber has sent out “ Yes on 22 ” push notifications , and added a number of in-app modules encouraging riders to vote for the initiative , including a graphic of a car with a speech bubble stating “ Yes on 22 ” that appeared during the checkout flow .
Earlier this month , on Uber , a pop-up screen asked drivers to commit to voting for Prop .
22 before accepting rides .
( The options were “ Yes on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; the language on the pop-up has since changed . )
Earlier this month , DoorDash distributed free carry-out bags printed with “ Yes on 22 ” to restaurants , and Instacart handed out stickers reading “ Yes on 22 ” to its fleet of shoppers , instructing them to affix them to customers ’ orders .
In total , the “ Yes on 22 ” campaign has received more funding—nearly two hundred million dollars—than any other ballot-measure campaign in California history .
The opposition , “ No on 22 , ” has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has the political support of the California Democratic Party ; state senators Maria Elena Durazo , Nancy Skinner , and Scott Wiener ; various California labor unions ; and Bernie Sanders , Elizabeth Warren , Joe Biden , and Kamala Harris .
( Harris has been relatively quiet on the issue , perhaps because West , the Uber C.L.O.
, is her brother-in-law . )
Even so , advocates for Prop .
22 have tried to curry favor on the left .
In late August , on the anniversary of Martin Luther King @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Have a Dream ” address , in 1963 , at the Lincoln Memorial , Uber launched an advertising campaign in thirteen cities , with billboards that read , “ If you tolerate racism , delete Uber.
” Earlier this month , some residents of Southern California received political mailers that looked , at first glance , like progressive voter guides .
The fliers claimed to have been prepared and sent by a small handful of organizations with names like “ Feel the Bern , Progressive Voter Guide , ” “ Our Voice , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council of Concerned Women Voters Guide.
” The endorsements were consistent with those by the California D.N.C.
, with one notable difference : the guides supported Proposition 22 .
SFGate , a sister-site of the San Francisco Chronicle , published an investigation into the mailers and determined that none of the named organizations are legitimate political organizations .
At the moment , Yes on 22 has a slight lead in polls : in late September , a U.C .
Berkeley poll of fifty-nine hundred would-be voters indicated that thirty-nine per cent would vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said they would vote no , and twenty-five per cent said they were undecided .
California has a rich history of leading on labor rights , and , in that context , some have referred to Proposition 22 as a bellwether .
If drivers become employees , they could form an impressive union ; on the other hand , the passage of Prop .
22 could resonate across the country for years to come , inhibiting regulation elsewhere .
The law could also serve as a blueprint for future entanglements between Silicon Valley @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its clauses states that any future amendments to its provisions will require a seven-eighths supermajority vote of the state legislature .
A two-thirds majority is more common for ballot propositions ; a seven-eighths majority is unheard of , and audacious .
Realistically , if Prop .
22 passes , the only way to alter or repeal it will be through a subsequent ballot initiative .
The proposition , therefore , is a power play that favors the sort of political muscle that only comes with vast financial resources .
The campaign for Prop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Silicon Valley ’ s fight against regulation .
Venture capital has given companies like Uber enough money to rework markets .
The same money might rework the law .

In September of 2019, the California state legislature passed Assembly Bill 5. Informally known as the “gig-economy bill,” A.B. 5 aimed to address the challenges faced by people who drive for Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, Instacart, and other similar companies; so-called gig workers, who are classified as independent contractors, do not receive fundamental worker protections, such as guaranteed minimum wage or paid sick days, no matter how much they drive. “We will not in good conscience allow free-riding businesses to continue to pass their own business costs on to taxpayers and workers,” the bill’s author, the assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez, said, following its passage. Six weeks later, Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash launched a campaign to combat the bill. A spokesperson for the effort told the Los Angeles Times, “We’re going to spend what it takes to win.”
A.B. 5 was written to codify a 2018 California Supreme Court decision that determined, after a thirteen-year fight, that delivery couriers for Dynamex, a nationwide same-day delivery service, were employees and not independent contractors. The court and the law addressed the issue of gig work in a somewhat blunt fashion. Under A.B. 5, a worker must pass a three-point test in order to count as an independent contractor: she must be free from the “control and direction” of her employer, do work that is “outside the usual course” of the company’s business, and have an independent business of her own in the same industry. Those who don’t pass the test are classified as employees and entitled to certain benefits, including a guaranteed minimum wage, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, sexual-harassment protections, overtime pay, paid leave, and shared responsibility for payroll taxes.
A.B. 5 was instantly divisive. Certain kinds of workers—doctors, real-estate agents, lawyers, and others—were exempted off the bat, because they often dictate their own fee structures, make more than minimum wage, and have a direct line to customers. But when the bill went into effect, on January 1, 2020, some freelancers, including journalists, photojournalists, composers, and musicians, found themselves out of work. Within a few months’ time, exemptions were granted for freelancers in both journalism and the music industry; since then, more than a hundred other exemptions and limitations to A.B. 5 have been implemented. The law seems to have made a category error, addressing freelance jobs in general rather than gig-work jobs in particular.
Uber and Lyft, the largest ride-hailing firms in California, fought bitterly against A.B. 5, not just in court but through noncompliance. Beginning in January, they simply refused to reclassify their workers, and continued operating as they had before. Last September, Tony West, Uber’s chief legal officer, told reporters that Uber’s drivers could pass the three-point test. “Just because the test is hard doesn’t mean that we will not be able to pass it,” he said, on a press call. “In fact, several previous rulings have found that drivers’ work is outside the usual course of Uber’s business.” Uber, by this logic, is not really a transportation business—it is, as West put it, “a technology platform for several different types of digital marketplaces.”
In the spring, California’s attorney general, Xavier Becerra, along with a number of city attorneys from across the state, filed a lawsuit against Uber and Lyft, ordering them to immediately reclassify eligible drivers as employees. In response, both companies filed an appeal, and then threatened to shut down their operations in California. The court granted the companies an extension until November 4th. The day before, Californians will have voted on a new ballot initiative, drafted and promoted by gig-work companies, that carves out an exception within A.B. 5 for app-based services. The initiative, Proposition 22, is not a referendum on A.B. 5, but a tech-industry-specific exemption. Its goal is to prevent drivers and delivery couriers from being reclassified as employees; it is called the “App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor Policies Initiative.”
If A.B. 5 is imperfect, imprecise legislation, then Prop. 22 is worse. In arguing for the new law, the ride-hailing companies have emphasized its inclusion of perks for drivers who work more than fifteen hours a week. Prop. 22 gives them a guaranteed wage that is twenty per cent higher than the legal minimum, occupational accident coverage, and a graduated health-care stipend. But critics have noted that the law has abundant loopholes and weaknesses. Prop. 22 counts working hours in terms of “engaged time,” which includes only the period between accepting a ride and dropping a customer off; time spent driving between rides doesn’t count. Some studies estimate that drivers spend thirty per cent of their time idling, cruising, and waiting for customers. Even if a driver racks up more than twenty-four hours of engaged time each week, the health-care stipend will likely be insufficient to cover even the most basic, out-of-pocket health-insurance plans. Meanwhile, as independent contractors, drivers would not receive the benefits, such as paid sick leave and unemployment insurance, that they would have received under A.B. 5. They would also be on the hook for payroll taxes in their entirety. If they were employees, they would split taxes with their employers. By classifying their workers as independent contractors, Uber and Lyft have saved hundreds of millions of dollars in California payroll taxes. In late 2019, the Labor Center at the University of California, Berkeley, released a report estimating that drivers working under Prop. 22 could receive a net wage as low as five dollars and sixty-four cents an hour—less than half the minimum wage in California, and hardly a third of the minimum wage in San Francisco.
In publicly making their case for an exemption from A.B. 5, Uber and Lyft have claimed that Prop. 22 protects drivers’ scheduling flexibility and ability to work for competitors. Uber and Lyft have said that adapting their software to an A.B. 5-compliant model could be its own time-consuming undertaking, during which service might be suspended—leaving drivers out of work. They’ve also previewed more permanent changes. “Shifting to an employment model would put pressure on Uber to consolidate working hours across fewer workers in order to manage costs that are fixed per employee,” Alison Stein, an in-house economist at Uber, wrote, in a recent blog post. “Under an employment model, it is likely that the new norm for Uber drivers would conform with the 40-hour work week which is the standard for full time U.S. employees.”
Such changes, if they were to happen, would not be mandated by law. Even if drivers’ current flexibility is diminished, A.B. 5 does not mention predetermined shift scheduling; it explicitly allows for part-time work, and for workers to spread their time across competitive services. The real issue is that most gig-work business models are predicated on the availability of low-paid, independent contractors who can be compensated according to algorithmically determined, dynamic pricing. Some analysts have estimated that reclassifying millions of eligible drivers as employees would increase operating costs at Uber and Lyft by twenty to thirty per cent. The companies could be incentivized to limit the number of drivers on the platform or to charge more for rides. Currently, neither company is profitable; earlier this year, when Uber acquired Postmates, an UberEats competitor, it was unclear which service would be the loss leader. The obvious endgame for these companies is monopoly, pursued through low prices: Uber and Lyft want to undercut, and then corner, the market on private-transportation services. This suggests that the fight about Prop. 22 is not just about labor rights. It’s also about antitrust.
During the past few months, the ride-hailing companies—along with DoorDash, Instacart, the Republican Party of California, and others—have spent lavishly on television and radio ads, mailers, and billboards in favor of Proposition 22. The campaign has cited support from Mothers Against Drunk Driving. (Uber has historically been one of MADD’s largest donors.) The companies have also endorsed the proposition in their apps, using their direct line to customers to campaign for it. These tactics have been unusual. Uber has sent out “Yes on 22” push notifications, and added a number of in-app modules encouraging riders to vote for the initiative, including a graphic of a car with a speech bubble stating “Yes on 22” that appeared during the checkout flow. Earlier this month, on Uber, a pop-up screen asked drivers to commit to voting for Prop. 22. (The options were “Yes on Prop 22” and “OK”; the language on the pop-up has since changed.) Earlier this month, DoorDash distributed free carry-out bags printed with “Yes on 22” to restaurants, and Instacart handed out stickers reading “Yes on 22” to its fleet of shoppers, instructing them to affix them to customers’ orders.
In total, the “Yes on 22” campaign has received more funding—nearly two hundred million dollars—than any other ballot-measure campaign in California history. The opposition, “No on 22,” has raised about fifteen million dollars. It has the political support of the California Democratic Party; state senators Maria Elena Durazo, Nancy Skinner, and Scott Wiener; various California labor unions; and Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Joe Biden, and Kamala Harris. (Harris has been relatively quiet on the issue, perhaps because West, the Uber C.L.O., is her brother-in-law.) Even so, advocates for Prop. 22 have tried to curry favor on the left. In late August, on the anniversary of Martin Luther King, Jr.,’s “I Have a Dream” address, in 1963, at the Lincoln Memorial, Uber launched an advertising campaign in thirteen cities, with billboards that read, “If you tolerate racism, delete Uber.”
Earlier this month, some residents of Southern California received political mailers that looked, at first glance, like progressive voter guides. The fliers claimed to have been prepared and sent by a small handful of organizations with names like “Feel the Bern, Progressive Voter Guide,” “Our Voice, Latino Voter Guide,” and “Council of Concerned Women Voters Guide.” The endorsements were consistent with those by the California D.N.C., with one notable difference: the guides supported Proposition 22. SFGate, a sister-site of the San Francisco Chronicle, published an investigation into the mailers and determined that none of the named organizations are legitimate political organizations. At the moment, Yes on 22 has a slight lead in polls: in late September, a U.C. Berkeley poll of fifty-nine hundred would-be voters indicated that thirty-nine per cent would vote yes on Prop. 22, thirty-six said they would vote no, and twenty-five per cent said they were undecided.
California has a rich history of leading on labor rights, and, in that context, some have referred to Proposition 22 as a bellwether. If drivers become employees, they could form an impressive union; on the other hand, the passage of Prop. 22 could resonate across the country for years to come, inhibiting regulation elsewhere. The law could also serve as a blueprint for future entanglements between Silicon Valley and the political system. One of its clauses states that any future amendments to its provisions will require a seven-eighths supermajority vote of the state legislature. A two-thirds majority is more common for ballot propositions; a seven-eighths majority is unheard of, and audacious. Realistically, if Prop. 22 passes, the only way to alter or repeal it will be through a subsequent ballot initiative. The proposition, therefore, is a power play that favors the sort of political muscle that only comes with vast financial resources. The campaign for Prop. 22 may signal a new stage in Silicon Valley’s fight against regulation. Venture capital has given companies like Uber enough money to rework markets. The same money might rework the law.
A previous version of this post incorrectly described the parameters of “engaged time” for rideshare trips.


newyorker--2020-10-22--Joe Biden and the Possibility of a Remarkable Presidency

There ’ s really nothing in Joe Biden ’ s character or his record to suggest that he would be anything more than a sound , capable , regular President , which would obviously be both a great advance and a relief .
If we could return to the days when we could forget that the White House even existed for days at a time , that in itself would be worth waiting in line for hours to vote .
That said , there ’ s at least an outside chance that the stars are aligning in a way that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if that is what he wants to do .
America clearly has pressing problems that must be addressed , the coronavirus pandemic being the most obvious .
But it also has deep structural tensions that are threatening to tear it apart , and which no President in many years has dared to address .
And here ’ s where Biden could have an opening .
For one thing , it seems possible ( not that I have let up on my phone-banking for a single evening ) that he could win by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead than any candidate was on Election Day since Ronald Reagan , when he crushed Walter Mondale , in 1984 .
A nine-point win , if the margins hold through Election Day , would not be entirely a reflection on him—there ’ s no evidence that he unduly animates the electorate .
But the body politic seems ready to reject , decisively , Donald Trump .
People ’ s eagerness to see him gone from our public life has them voting early , amid a pandemic , in numbers that we ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presage a real groundswell that temporarily breaks the blue-red ice jam that has been frozen in place for so long ; right now it also seems plausible that the Democrats could not just flip the Senate but emerge with a working majority that could get things done .
Under normal circumstances , a new President would temper that power , worried about spending it in ways that might alienate the electorate .
That ’ s because , no matter what new Presidents say publicly , they are always looking four years ahead .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ second possible advantage , carefully hidden in what seems to be his great weakness .
He ’ ll be seventy-eight if he takes office ; the prospect of an eighty-two-year-old man running for reëlection seems slim .
In fact , Biden sent signals in advance of the primaries that he would be a one-term President , and said , in the run-up to his Vice-Presidential pick , that “ I view myself as a transition candidate , ” explaining that “ you got to get more people on the bench that are ready @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coach , I ’ m ready to play.
’ Well , there ’ s a lot of people that are ready to play , women and men.
” Taken together , a big victory and a transitional attitude might let a politician whose career has been marked by compromise and caution throw both to the wind .
If Biden ’ s not guarding his approval ratings for a second run , he could , for instance , demand that his new majority give him a lot of stimulus money to work with , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
and the pundit class as they start warning about deficits .
( The fact that the Republicans ballooned the deficit just to give the rich yet more tax breaks takes the sting out of their arguments , anyhow . )
At this point , getting rid of the filibuster seems all but certain , but Biden could push to expand and reform the courts .
He could embrace the Green New Deal , moving money from the Pentagon to the national-security task of building out solar and wind power and setting irrevocably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transform our economy over the next generation .
He could take millions of undocumented immigrants out of the shadows .
He could make sure that we have a commission to examine and recommend reparations for Black and indigenous Americans .
And so on .
The key things that need to happen if America is ever going to get past its stalemated and sickly status quo are as obvious as they are politically difficult .
But , if Biden decided that the next four years were all that mattered to him , he could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ something else going for him : no one perceives him as a deeply partisan man .
For better or worse , he ’ s been entirely willing to cross the aisle throughout his career ; that ’ s what Trump describes as his being biddable and wishy-washy .
So , Biden would have the credibility to tell Americans , “ I ’ ve given it a real shot my whole life , but right now that aisle can ’ t be crossed.
” He could get away with saying that the other side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirm Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court , isn ’ t behaving honorably , and he might well convince fifty-five per cent of Americans that he ’ s speaking the truth .
In our current politics , fifty-five per cent is an overwhelming number , even if it ’ s not enough to reliably overcome the absurd architecture of the Electoral College ( which is another broken institution that Biden could work on ) .
Yes , Fox News would try to spin whatever he did as an affront to norms and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get as much traction as it otherwise would—the memory of a real norm-breaker will be too fresh in everyone ’ s mind .
Of course , some Democrats may not be happy to follow such a course—particularly , perhaps , newly elected senators who may have won on some variation of the promise that we need to “ work together.
” ( And , in our endless political circus , the midterms will be on people ’ s minds by noon on November 4th . )
But the medium-term and long-term impact of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently ungovernable country might well be as salutary for the Democratic Party as for the country—going big is a risk , but so is going small .
We can ’ t continue on like this , and almost everyone knows it .
If Biden were willing to grasp the nettle , the sting would be real , but history would judge him well for trying , and history now seems to work with greater speed than it used to .
As I said , there ’ s no real reason to think that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He hasn ’ t risked much over the years , and keeping his head down has clearly served him well politically .
He ’ s not a great orator , lacking the kind of passion that ’ s normally required to reorient a nation .
His biggest virtue is the dull ( if welcome ) one of decency .
But the odd situation he could be stepping into—the garish glare of Trump in the background , the deep problems of the moment demanding immediate action—might give him an unlikely chance for greatness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the phone bank .
Read More About the 2020 Election • The fall and rise of Kamala Harris .
• When a sitting President threatens to delay a sacrosanct American ritual like an election , you should listen .
• To understand the path Donald Trump has taken to the 2020 election , look at what he has provided the executive class .
• What happens if Trump fights the election results ?
• The refusal by Mitch McConnell to rein in Trump is looking riskier than ever .
• Sign up for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from our reporters and columnists .

There’s really nothing in Joe Biden’s character or his record to suggest that he would be anything more than a sound, capable, regular President, which would obviously be both a great advance and a relief. If we could return to the days when we could forget that the White House even existed, for days at a time, that in itself would be worth waiting in line for hours to vote. That said, there’s at least an outside chance that the stars are aligning in a way that might let Biden make remarkable change, if that is what he wants to do. America clearly has pressing problems that must be addressed, the coronavirus pandemic being the most obvious. But it also has deep structural tensions that are threatening to tear it apart, and which no President in many years has dared to address. And here’s where Biden could have an opening.
For one thing, it seems possible (not that I have let up on my phone-banking for a single evening) that he could win by a large margin—the polls currently show him further ahead than any candidate was on Election Day since Ronald Reagan when he crushed Walter Mondale, in 1984. A nine-point win, if the margins hold through Election Day, would not be entirely a reflection on him—there’s no evidence that he unduly animates the electorate. But the body politic seems ready to reject, decisively, Donald Trump. People’s eagerness to see him gone from our public life has them voting early, amid a pandemic, in numbers that we’ve never witnessed before. That determination could presage a real groundswell that temporarily breaks the blue-red ice jam that has been frozen in place for so long; right now it also seems plausible that the Democrats could not just flip the Senate but emerge with a working majority that could get things done.
Under normal circumstances, a new President would temper that power, worried about spending it in ways that might alienate the electorate. That’s because, no matter what new Presidents say publicly, they are always looking four years ahead. But here’s Biden’s second possible advantage, carefully hidden in what seems to be his great weakness. He’ll be seventy-eight if he takes office; the prospect of an eighty-two-year-old man running for reëlection seems slim. In fact, Biden sent signals in advance of the primaries that he would be a one-term President, and said, in the run-up to his Vice-Presidential pick, that “I view myself as a transition candidate,” explaining that “you got to get more people on the bench that are ready to go in—‘Put me in coach, I’m ready to play.’ Well, there’s a lot of people that are ready to play, women and men.”
Taken together, a big victory and a transitional attitude might let a politician whose career has been marked by compromise and caution throw both to the wind. If Biden’s not guarding his approval ratings for a second run, he could, for instance, demand that his new majority give him a lot of stimulus money to work with, and simply not worry about the G.O.P. and the pundit class as they start warning about deficits. (The fact that the Republicans ballooned the deficit just to give the rich yet more tax breaks takes the sting out of their arguments, anyhow.) At this point, getting rid of the filibuster seems all but certain, but Biden could push to expand and reform the courts. He could embrace the Green New Deal, moving money from the Pentagon to the national-security task of building out solar and wind power and setting irrevocably in motion an industrial transition that would transform our economy over the next generation. He could take millions of undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. He could make sure that we have a commission to examine and recommend reparations for Black and indigenous Americans. And so on. The key things that need to happen if America is ever going to get past its stalemated and sickly status quo are as obvious as they are politically difficult. But, if Biden decided that the next four years were all that mattered to him, he could get to work.
And Biden has something else going for him: no one perceives him as a deeply partisan man. For better or worse, he’s been entirely willing to cross the aisle throughout his career; that’s what Trump describes as his being biddable and wishy-washy. So Biden would have the credibility to tell Americans, “I’ve given it a real shot my whole life, but right now that aisle can’t be crossed.” He could get away with saying that the other side, as evidenced by the push to confirm Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court, isn’t behaving honorably, and he might well convince fifty-five per cent of Americans that he’s speaking the truth. In our current politics, fifty-five per cent is an overwhelming number, even if it’s not enough to reliably overcome the absurd architecture of the Electoral College (which is another broken institution that Biden could work on). Yes, Fox News would try to spin whatever he did as an affront to norms and traditions. But that wouldn’t get as much traction as it otherwise would—the memory of a real norm-breaker will be too fresh in everyone’s mind.
Of course, some Democrats may not be happy to follow such a course—particularly, perhaps, newly elected senators who may have won on some variation of the promise that we need to “work together.” (And, in our endless political circus, the midterms will be on people’s minds by noon on November 4th.) But the medium-term and long-term impact of forthrightly addressing the key problems in our currently ungovernable country might well be as salutary for the Democratic Party as for the country—going big is a risk, but so is going small. We can’t continue on like this, and almost everyone knows it. If Biden were willing to grasp the nettle, the sting would be real, but history would judge him well for trying, and history now seems to work with greater speed than it used to.
As I said, there’s no real reason to think that this is how Biden views the world. He hasn’t risked much over the years, and keeping his head down has clearly served him well politically. He’s not a great orator, lacking the kind of passion that’s normally required to reorient a nation. His biggest virtue is the dull (if welcome) one of decency. But the odd situation he could be stepping into—the garish glare of Trump in the background, the deep problems of the moment demanding immediate action—might give him an unlikely chance for greatness. I’m heading back to the phone bank.
Read More About the 2020 Election


newyorker--2020-10-23--Why the Pandemic Is Forcing Women Out of the Workforce

I recently spoke by phone with Betsey Stevenson , a professor of public policy and economics at the University of Michigan , whose work focusses on the economic issues facing women in the workforce .
Stevenson also served on the President ’ s Council of Economic Advisers , in the Obama Administration .
During our conversation , which has been edited for length and clarity , we discussed why recessions usually cause greater unemployment rates among men , the economic and societal toll of inadequate child care , and what the past six months should teach us about paid family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how this economic calamity has impacted men and women differently ?
The pandemic has impacted women differently from men in multiple ways .
At the beginning , we really had a gendered shutdown , and that was because many of the industries that laid people off were industries where women were the majority of workers .
A lot of people didn ’ t realize it early on , but a lot of health-care workers got laid off because they didn ’ t want people doing nonessential health care .
And , if we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , seventy-seven per cent of the jobs are held by women .
So , early on in the recession , we saw lots of women laid off because , not surprisingly , women do a lot of the in-person work in the economy , the kinds of work that couldn ’ t be done remotely .
If you look at the people who were employed in February , more than three in ten women who were employed in February had time where they were not working over the next three months , so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a half out of ten men .
And it ’ s worth noting that this is actually really unusual in a normal recession .
How do recessions usually break down in terms of gender ?
In a normal recession , men tend to lose jobs first because men tend to work in more cyclical industries—the kinds of industries where , when the economy goes down , our desire to make purchases from those industries goes down quickly .
So , if you think about the last recession , it hit workers like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit financial services early on , and those are more male-dominated industries .
But every recession is different .
Economic booms don ’ t die of old age ; something has to kill them .
I think COVID-19 actually really illustrated that point .
We were just going along , and , boom , something killed it .
That thing was COVID-19 .
But in the kinds of things that have caused recessions in the past , the traditional thing is to see men lose their jobs first .
And sometimes we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which is what we saw in 2008 , never quite to the same extent .
But , as state and local governments start laying off employees , you see women are more likely to be government employees .
So they lose the majority of those jobs , and that happened later in the 2008 recession .
In fact , it was ongoing for many , many years after the 2008 recession ended , as state and local governments struggled to get their financial footing .
And so we started this conversation with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Their industries got hit hardest early on , and we saw a lot of them get sent home .
That ’ s kind of unusual .
Now we ’ re actually seeing a second thing happening to women that ’ s not unusual—we ’ re starting to see the layoff of those state and local government workers , and that ’ s disproportionately women .
And then the third thing that I ’ m sure you were thinking about , and we can talk more about , is this issue of child care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see that take a toll on women .
My mother is involved in child-care advocacy , so she ’ d be very upset if I didn ’ t ask it .
What precisely is the toll that child care has had on women ?
I think the most shocking thing was the large decline we saw in September in women ’ s labor-force participation .
It ’ s hard to know for sure what the toll of child care is , but it ’ s kind of like there ’ s a mystery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ve got a couple of clues to the puzzle .
And one thing that points to the toll of child care is a survey that was done out of Northeastern , by Alicia Sasser Modestino , in July .
She found 13.3 per cent of working parents had lost a job or reduced their hours because of a lack of child care , and that two-thirds of parents who needed child care were reporting difficulty finding care , which is a number that was double of what parents reported before the pandemic .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported in the Beige Book that half of manufacturers said a lack of child care was an impediment to bringing workers back .
And more generally they were hearing increasingly from a range of employers that a lack of child care was a problem in bringing all their workers back .
And then I think the most jarring thing for a lot of folks was seeing labor-force participation for women who are twenty-plus fall from 57.6 to 56.8 between August and September .
That undid a lot of the recovery .
And that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw for men ages twenty-plus .
I dug into the ages a little bit , and I think the thing that potentially points to an issue with child care is that the decline was really concentrated among women thirty-five to forty-four and women forty-five to fifty-four .
But the decline from August to September among those thirty-five- to forty-four-year-old women was from 75.2 to 73.6 .
That ’ s a fall of more than a point and a half in labor-force participation .
That is huge .
And the age group that had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And it ’ s not at all surprising to me , in the sense that the people who are really struggling are people with young kids and multiple kids at home .
It ’ s the parents who have a four-year-old , a six-year-old , and a nine-year-old , and those kids are at home , and they ’ re trying to do Zoom school .
It ’ s really difficult .
Even if both parents had the opportunity to work from home , that ’ s a really hard thing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that I emphasize that that ’ s one kind of hardship , and then there ’ s another kind of hardship , which is parents or single moms who had an in-person job and no child care .
The challenge of taking this big decline that we saw in September too seriously is that it ’ s one month of data .
And we always say , “ Ah , don ’ t trust that so much , because data is noisy , and we like to see longer patterns.
” But , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s what we ’ ve got .
And in September something real did happen : kids didn ’ t go back to school .
The September drop was really shocking .
If you take a look at what we consider “ prime-age ” women , women who are twenty-five to fifty-four , people who are normally in the labor force , we ’ ve seen their labor-force participation fall to where it was in the nineteen-eighties and it ’ s now back to where it was in 1991 .
It ’ s just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s worth noting that , if you look at the recovery we had in labor-force participation of prime-age adults during the last boom , the one that ended in 2019 , most of that was actually driven by women ’ s increasing labor-force participation , not men ’ s .
So we saw women driving the recovery , and women have more education now than men .
If you look at the annual data , for women with kids under the age of six , 2019 was an all-time high in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were at a place of just enormous progress .
And I think that progress is at a real risk right now .
Given that you say that the losses from this recession are different from those of most recessions , how effective was the CARES Act , and how did it come up short ?
The most important thing that the CARES Act did was stabilize household spending .
So we saw household spending fall off a cliff at the beginning of the pandemic , and it wasn ’ t all due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; people were frightened , and they didn ’ t go out and spend as much .
And they were also frightened of what might happen to their jobs .
We saw people cut spending enormously , and the CARES Act really stopped the worst of that , because it got money into people ’ s hands .
And by May we saw that the worst of the recession was over , even though the worst of the pandemic hadn ’ t even occurred yet .
It allowed people to pay their rent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do some spending that helped keep lots of people employed and helped employers bring lots of people back to work .

Earlier this month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released its employment report for September, which showed that women have been choosing to leave the workforce in staggering numbers: while about two hundred and sixteen thousand men dropped out of the workforce that month, about four times that many women made the same decision. Though the figures for September are particularly stark, they are consistent with trends that have been recorded since March. Unlike most economic downturns, the recession caused by the coronavirus pandemic has led to greater employment losses for women than for men. The unemployment crisis has been compounded by closures of schools and day-care centers, and the resulting caregiving burdens have fallen disproportionately on women.
I recently spoke by phone with Betsey Stevenson, a professor of public policy and economics at the University of Michigan, whose work focusses on the economic issues facing women in the workforce. Stevenson also served on the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, in the Obama Administration. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why recessions usually cause greater unemployment rates among men, the economic and societal toll of inadequate child care, and what the past six months should teach us about paid family leave.
What do we know about how this economic calamity has impacted men and women differently?
The pandemic has impacted women differently from men in multiple ways. At the beginning, we really had a gendered shutdown, and that was because many of the industries that laid people off were industries where women were the majority of workers. A lot of people didn’t realize it early on, but a lot of health-care workers got laid off because they didn’t want people doing nonessential health care. And, if we think about private-sector education and health services, seventy-seven per cent of the jobs are held by women. So, early on in the recession, we saw lots of women laid off because, not surprisingly, women do a lot of the in-person work in the economy, the kinds of work that couldn’t be done remotely.
If you look at the people who were employed in February, more than three in ten women who were employed in February had time where they were not working over the next three months, so they were unemployed, compared to two and a half out of ten men. And it’s worth noting that this is actually really unusual in a normal recession.
How do recessions usually break down in terms of gender?
In a normal recession, men tend to lose jobs first because men tend to work in more cyclical industries—the kinds of industries where, when the economy goes down, our desire to make purchases from those industries goes down quickly. So, if you think about the last recession, it hit workers like construction workers early on, and it hit financial services early on, and those are more male-dominated industries. But every recession is different. Economic booms don’t die of old age; something has to kill them. I think COVID-19 actually really illustrated that point. We were just going along, and, boom, something killed it. That thing was COVID-19.
But in the kinds of things that have caused recessions in the past, the traditional thing is to see men lose their jobs first. And sometimes we’d see women losing their jobs later, which is what we saw in 2008, never quite to the same extent. But, as state and local governments start laying off employees, you see women are more likely to be government employees. So they lose the majority of those jobs, and that happened later in the 2008 recession. In fact, it was ongoing for many, many years after the 2008 recession ended, as state and local governments struggled to get their financial footing.
And so we started this conversation with what’s happened to women. Their industries got hit hardest early on, and we saw a lot of them get sent home. That’s kind of unusual. Now we’re actually seeing a second thing happening to women that’s not unusual—we’re starting to see the layoff of those state and local government workers, and that’s disproportionately women. And then the third thing that I’m sure you were thinking about, and we can talk more about, is this issue of child care, and we really are starting to see that take a toll on women.
My mother is involved in child-care advocacy, so she’d be very upset if I didn’t ask it. What precisely is the toll that child care has had on women?
I think the most shocking thing was the large decline we saw in September in women’s labor-force participation. It’s hard to know for sure what the toll of child care is, but it’s kind of like there’s a mystery to be solved, and we’ve got a couple of clues to the puzzle. And one thing that points to the toll of child care is a survey that was done out of Northeastern, by Alicia Sasser Modestino, in July. She found 13.3 per cent of working parents had lost a job or reduced their hours because of a lack of child care, and that two-thirds of parents who needed child care were reporting difficulty finding care, which is a number that was double of what parents reported before the pandemic.
Much more recently, the Philadelphia Fed reported in the Beige Book that half of manufacturers said a lack of child care was an impediment to bringing workers back. And more generally they were hearing increasingly from a range of employers that a lack of child care was a problem in bringing all their workers back. And then I think the most jarring thing for a lot of folks was seeing labor-force participation for women who are twenty-plus fall from 57.6 to 56.8 between August and September. That undid a lot of the recovery. And that decline was four times the decline we saw for men ages twenty-plus. I dug into the ages a little bit, and I think the thing that potentially points to an issue with child care is that the decline was really concentrated among women thirty-five to forty-four and women forty-five to fifty-four.
But the decline from August to September among those thirty-five- to forty-four-year-old women was from 75.2 to 73.6. That’s a fall of more than a point and a half in labor-force participation. That is huge. And the age group that had the biggest decline was thirty-five to forty-four. And it’s not at all surprising to me, in the sense that the people who are really struggling are people with young kids and multiple kids at home. It’s the parents who have a four-year-old, a six-year-old, and a nine-year-old, and those kids are at home, and they’re trying to do Zoom school. It’s really difficult. Even if both parents had the opportunity to work from home, that’s a really hard thing to manage. I want to make sure that I emphasize that that’s one kind of hardship, and then there’s another kind of hardship, which is parents or single moms who had an in-person job and no child care. The challenge of taking this big decline that we saw in September too seriously is that it’s one month of data. And we always say, “Ah, don’t trust that so much, because data is noisy, and we like to see longer patterns.” But, at the same time, that’s what we’ve got. And in September something real did happen: kids didn’t go back to school. The September drop was really shocking. If you take a look at what we consider “prime-age” women, women who are twenty-five to fifty-four, people who are normally in the labor force, we’ve seen their labor-force participation fall to where it was in the nineteen-eighties and it’s now back to where it was in 1991. It’s just such a big step backward, and it’s worth noting that, if you look at the recovery we had in labor-force participation of prime-age adults during the last boom, the one that ended in 2019, most of that was actually driven by women’s increasing labor-force participation, not men’s. So we saw women driving the recovery, and women have more education now than men. If you look at the annual data, for women with kids under the age of six, 2019 was an all-time high in their labor-force participation. And so we were at a place of just enormous progress. And I think that progress is at a real risk right now.


newyorker--2020-10-22--“On the Rocks,” Reviewed: Sofia Coppola’s Self-Questioning Film of a Father’s Destructive Dazzle

There ’ s no inherent conflict between style and substance—for the best filmmakers , they ’ re inseparable—but one of the most stylistically advanced of current filmmakers , Sofia Coppola , fascinatingly , movingly , and ironically dramatizes her experience of such a conflict in her new film , “ On the Rocks ” ( coming to Apple TV+ this Friday ) , which she wrote and directed .
Here , she once again joins forces with Bill Murray ( who , of course , starred , with Scarlett Johansson , in “ Lost in Translation , ” and was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ A Very Murray Christmas ” ) —and she does so with a surprising , bracing sense of skepticism .
In the new film , even as Coppola distills and delivers the wry and rarefied delights of Murray ’ s style of performance and personal bearing , she wrestles with the very sources of her own sensibility and the roots of her own taste .
It ’ s a story set in the milieu that has long obsessed Coppola—within the four dimensions of money , power , generational relations , and romantic crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rashida Jones ) , is a seemingly well-regarded author with an international career , who lives in a luxury apartment in a converted SoHo loft .
She has an advance on her next book , but she is struggling to write it , because of the busyness of her family life .
The breadwinner is her husband , Dean ( Marlon Wayans ) , the chief executive of a successful tech startup , which requires him to travel far and wide and to devote vast amounts of time to his work , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the couple ’ s two young daughters , Maya ( Liyanna Muscat ) and Theo ( played by the twins Alexandra Mary Reimer and Anna Chanel Reimer ) .
Laura has begun to suspect Dean of having an affair with a new colleague , Fiona ( Jessica Henwick ) , and , when speaking by phone with her father , Felix ( Murray ) , she discloses her suspicions .
Felix—after admonishing her , from Paris , to “ start thinking like a man ” —takes action , showing up spontaneously in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surveillance and deep-delving investigation of Dean .
As if with a cinematic tuning fork that hums its overtones throughout the film , Coppola begins the movie with a black screen and a voice-over conversation : Felix ’ s declaration to the child Laura , “ And remember , don ’ t give your heart to any boys .
You ’ re mine until you get married .
Then you ’ re still mine , ” and the young Laura ’ s audibly eye-rolling response , “ Um , O.K.
, Dad.
” Felix @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ’ s a suave whirlwind of engulfing power , a wealthy and worldly art dealer who takes commanding control of her life .
Dashingly elegant , he makes his appearance like the star of Laura ’ s life—he rolls down the tinted window in the back seat of his limo and fixes her in his luminescent gaze .
Felix dresses up : a pale seersucker suit , a sumptuously soft dark suit , a jaunty racing cap .
He knows the private clubs and concierges and maître d ’ s in New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hotels everywhere and knows what people do there .
He knows what to order in every restaurant , and he has friends to visit and villas to borrow in far-flung destinations .
When he greets Laura with a huge tin of caviar for them to share , he adds an anecdote about cosmonauts who ate it .
( I won ’ t spoil the ending . )
He ’ s a walking volume of the Great American Songbook , and he unhesitatingly adorns social occasions ( as Murray adorns the movie ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ singing voice .
He also whistles , provides whistling lessons for Laura , and reminds her that she was named for the title song from Otto Preminger ’ s film of the same name .
Yet he doesn ’ t call her by name—he addresses her with a handful of diminutives , ranging from “ Shorty ” to “ Kiddo ” to “ Kid , ” and brings her to “ Bogart ’ s table ” at the 21 Club to seal the connection .
When they ’ re together , Felix dominates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lots of theories and stories , ” many of which have to do with sex and gender—his own glamorous romantic adventures and his speculations on the subject .
Laura ’ s bangle bracelet sparks his historical reflection that women were formerly considered men ’ s property ; his reflections on evolutionary theory yield his explanation of why adult men are attracted to adolescent women and why men are relentlessly domineering philanderers .
He claims he ’ s going deaf—but only to women ’ s voices ( and ascribes it to their pitch ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s life as much by his absence as by his presence : when Laura was growing up , Felix left Laura ’ s mother ( Alva Chinn ) and the family for another woman .
Felix is a serial philanderer , a relentless seducer who , even now , at around seventy , in Laura ’ s presence , flirts outrageously with young women , perfect strangers—a waitress , his granddaughters ’ ballet teacher , one of Dean ’ s colleagues .
Felix is also impulsive and intrepid , and the detective-like adventures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to track and survey Dean , run major risks—including legal ones , which he eludes with the aplomb and presumptive impunity of privilege .
The signal moment in the film involves the police—and it ’ s too juicy a scene to spoil , but suffice it to say that a situation that other people might find fearsome ( and Laura , who is Black , observes the events in question dubiously ) , Felix is able to handle in his own inimitable way .
He is equally cavalier with the lives of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , whether they like it or not ; and , whatever they may lose along the way , they ’ re at least left with the stories to tell .
Because Coppola has written ( and dressed ) Felix with such alluring flair and breathtaking savvy ( and because he ’ s played by the charming Murray ) , he comes off as a lovable rogue whose charm dominates the film as it dominates ( and runs roughshod over ) Laura ’ s life—and conceals with lofty irony the film ’ s mighty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Felix is the elegant and roguish villain of Laura ’ s life .
Felix may have offered her , in childhood and adulthood , a significant part of her education in style—though her grandmother ( Barbara Bain ) and mother are also exemplars of worldly refinement , grace , and wisdom , even if they are less flamboyant about it .
They also , unlike Felix , were around and taking care of things at home while Felix was traipsing around the world collecting the souvenirs of experience—exactly as , now , Laura @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dean ’ s business travels .
She also bears the petty humiliations and frustrations of a woman who , though working and despite professional accomplishment , doesn ’ t go to an office ; ends up doing the drop-offs and the pickups and the signups and the registrations ; keeps the household running ; and so does her writing only in stolen moments .
Without at all ascribing Felix ’ s self-justifying , troglodytic philosophy , his condescending manners , his aggressively sexist behavior , or his feckless and domineering ways to any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or her circle , Coppola nonetheless delves dramatically into the personal history of her generation .
She suggests the experience of women in Hollywood ( and , for that matter , outside it ) who came up under the authority of an older generation of men , and of the very assumptions of modern culture , including the masculinized sense of cool that Hollywood shaped and amplified .
As if doing a painful intellectual and emotional archeology of her life and sensibility , she looks sharply and critically at the conveniences of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she confronts the attitudes and assumptions of which old-school charm and commanding manner reek .
The movie ’ s movingly confessional , even penitent tale of private and public abuses of power looks askance at Hollywood mythologies , too , including the ones of the early classic movies that Felix reveres and those that brought Murray to stardom—to which “ On the Rocks ” ironically owes much of its appeal .
Coppola ’ s previous film , “ The Beguiled , ” was her least stylistically refined , because her connection to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a theoretical film in which the very desire to revisit the scene of the crime ( not history ’ s crime , but Hollywood ’ s ) got in the way of her relationship to the events onscreen , and their real-life basis .
In “ On the Rocks , ” Coppola ’ s relationship with the subject is so intense that it nearly burns away style ; there ’ s so little distance between herself and her subject that her exquisite flourishes of refined documentary-rooted observation—short glimpses of city streets , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side in a restaurant , a view of Laura wearing a bright yellow dress in front of a magenta wall—seem extracted with pain from the drama ’ s scrutiny of a certain aesthetic sensibility , and the wealth and the power on which it depends .
“ On the Rocks ” lends a poignantly ironic twist to a self-questioning , even self-excoriating tale of regret : its breezy tone and casual moods suggest a lightness that ’ s no frivolity but an urgent necessity—because the movie shatters Coppola ’ s own artistic bedrock @ @ @ @ @

There’s no inherent conflict between style and substance—for the best filmmakers, they’re inseparable—but one of the most stylistically advanced of current filmmakers, Sofia Coppola, fascinatingly, movingly, and ironically dramatizes her experience of such a conflict in her new film, “On the Rocks” (coming to Apple TV+ this Friday), which she wrote and directed. Here, she once again joins forces with Bill Murray (who, of course, starred, with Scarlett Johansson, in “Lost in Translation,” and was the center of attention in her divertissement “A Very Murray Christmas”)—and she does so with a surprising, bracing sense of skepticism. In the new film, even as Coppola distills and delivers the wry and rarefied delights of Murray’s style of performance and personal bearing, she wrestles with the very sources of her own sensibility and the roots of her own taste.
It’s a story set in the milieu that has long obsessed Coppola—within the four dimensions of money, power, generational relations, and romantic crisis. The protagonist, Laura Keane (Rashida Jones), is a seemingly well-regarded author with an international career, who lives in a luxury apartment in a converted SoHo loft. She has an advance on her next book, but she is struggling to write it, because of the busyness of her family life. The breadwinner is her husband, Dean (Marlon Wayans), the chief executive of a successful tech startup, which requires him to travel far and wide and to devote vast amounts of time to his work, leaving Laura to manage the household and care for the couple’s two young daughters, Maya (Liyanna Muscat) and Theo (played by the twins Alexandra Mary Reimer and Anna Chanel Reimer). Laura has begun to suspect Dean of having an affair with a new colleague, Fiona (Jessica Henwick), and, when speaking by phone with her father, Felix (Murray), she discloses her suspicions. Felix—after admonishing her, from Paris, to “start thinking like a man”—takes action, showing up spontaneously in his chauffeur-driven Mercedes and plotting a wide-ranging surveillance and deep-delving investigation of Dean.
As if with a cinematic tuning fork that hums its overtones throughout the film, Coppola begins the movie with a black screen and a voice-over conversation: Felix’s declaration to the child Laura, “And remember, don’t give your heart to any boys. You’re mine until you get married. Then you’re still mine,” and the young Laura’s audibly eye-rolling response, “Um, O.K., Dad.” Felix is more than a possessive father; he’s a suave whirlwind of engulfing power, a wealthy and worldly art dealer who takes commanding control of her life. Dashingly elegant, he makes his appearance like the star of Laura’s life—he rolls down the tinted window in the back seat of his limo and fixes her in his luminescent gaze. Felix dresses up: a pale seersucker suit, a sumptuously soft dark suit, a jaunty racing cap. He knows the private clubs and concierges and maître d’s in New York and cities worldwide. He knows the hotels everywhere and knows what people do there. He knows what to order in every restaurant, and he has friends to visit and villas to borrow in far-flung destinations. When he greets Laura with a huge tin of caviar for them to share, he adds an anecdote about cosmonauts who ate it. (I won’t spoil the ending.) He’s a walking volume of the Great American Songbook, and he unhesitatingly adorns social occasions (as Murray adorns the movie) with his expressive, emotive yet wry singing voice. He also whistles, provides whistling lessons for Laura, and reminds her that she was named for the title song from Otto Preminger’s film of the same name. Yet he doesn’t call her by name—he addresses her with a handful of diminutives, ranging from “Shorty” to “Kiddo” to “Kid,” and brings her to “Bogart’s table” at the 21 Club to seal the connection.
When they’re together, Felix dominates the conversation with what Laura calls “lots of theories and stories,” many of which have to do with sex and gender—his own glamorous romantic adventures and his speculations on the subject. Laura’s bangle bracelet sparks his historical reflection that women were formerly considered men’s property; his reflections on evolutionary theory yield his explanation of why adult men are attracted to adolescent women and why men are relentlessly domineering philanderers. He claims he’s going deaf—but only to women’s voices (and ascribes it to their pitch). He has also dominated Laura’s life as much by his absence as by his presence: when Laura was growing up, Felix left Laura’s mother (Alva Chinn) and the family for another woman. Felix is a serial philanderer, a relentless seducer who, even now, at around seventy, in Laura’s presence, flirts outrageously with young women, perfect strangers—a waitress, his granddaughters’ ballet teacher, one of Dean’s colleagues.
Felix is also impulsive and intrepid, and the detective-like adventures that he ropes her into, in order to track and survey Dean, run major risks—including legal ones, which he eludes with the aplomb and presumptive impunity of privilege. The signal moment in the film involves the police—and it’s too juicy a scene to spoil, but suffice it to say that a situation that other people might find fearsome (and Laura, who is Black, observes the events in question dubiously), Felix is able to handle in his own inimitable way. He is equally cavalier with the lives of others: his adventures become their adventures, whether they like it or not; and, whatever they may lose along the way, they’re at least left with the stories to tell.
Because Coppola has written (and dressed) Felix with such alluring flair and breathtaking savvy (and because he’s played by the charming Murray), he comes off as a lovable rogue whose charm dominates the film as it dominates (and runs roughshod over) Laura’s life—and conceals with lofty irony the film’s mighty and terrifying core, namely, that Felix is the elegant and roguish villain of Laura’s life. Felix may have offered her, in childhood and adulthood, a significant part of her education in style—though her grandmother (Barbara Bain) and mother are also exemplars of worldly refinement, grace, and wisdom, even if they are less flamboyant about it. They also, unlike Felix, were around and taking care of things at home while Felix was traipsing around the world collecting the souvenirs of experience—exactly as, now, Laura is holding down the home front during Dean’s business travels. She also bears the petty humiliations and frustrations of a woman who, though working and despite professional accomplishment, doesn’t go to an office; ends up doing the drop-offs and the pickups and the signups and the registrations; keeps the household running; and so does her writing only in stolen moments.
Without at all ascribing Felix’s self-justifying, troglodytic philosophy, his condescending manners, his aggressively sexist behavior, or his feckless and domineering ways to any individual in her family, her past, or her circle, Coppola nonetheless delves dramatically into the personal history of her generation. She suggests the experience of women in Hollywood (and, for that matter, outside it) who came up under the authority of an older generation of men, and of the very assumptions of modern culture, including the masculinized sense of cool that Hollywood shaped and amplified. As if doing a painful intellectual and emotional archeology of her life and sensibility, she looks sharply and critically at the conveniences of wealth and the prerogatives of privilege; she confronts the attitudes and assumptions of which old-school charm and commanding manner reek. The movie’s movingly confessional, even penitent tale of private and public abuses of power looks askance at Hollywood mythologies, too, including the ones of the early classic movies that Felix reveres and those that brought Murray to stardom—to which “On the Rocks” ironically owes much of its appeal.
Coppola’s previous film, “The Beguiled,” was her least stylistically refined, because her connection to the subject was tenuous and hesitant—it’s a theoretical film in which the very desire to revisit the scene of the crime (not history’s crime, but Hollywood’s) got in the way of her relationship to the events onscreen, and their real-life basis. In “On the Rocks,” Coppola’s relationship with the subject is so intense that it nearly burns away style; there’s so little distance between herself and her subject that her exquisite flourishes of refined documentary-rooted observation—short glimpses of city streets, a shot of father and daughter side by side in a restaurant, a view of Laura wearing a bright yellow dress in front of a magenta wall—seem extracted with pain from the drama’s scrutiny of a certain aesthetic sensibility, and the wealth and the power on which it depends. “On the Rocks” lends a poignantly ironic twist to a self-questioning, even self-excoriating tale of regret: its breezy tone and casual moods suggest a lightness that’s no frivolity but an urgent necessity—because the movie shatters Coppola’s own artistic bedrock as it goes along.


newyorker--2020-10-22--Americans Favor Continuing to Mute Trump After Debate

MINNEAPOLIS ( The Borowitz Report ) —Americans favor continuing to mute Donald J. Trump after the final Presidential debate , @ @ @ @ @ .
In the study , which was conducted by the psychology department at the University @ @ @ @ @ the responses of subjects when they were told that it was possible to mute Trump @ @ @ @ @ , we were able to gauge how they reacted to this news , ” Dr. @ @ @ @ @ the study , said .
“ The pleasure centers in their brains lit up like @ @ @ @ @ were told that Trump would no longer be muted after the debate , however , @ @ @ @ @ disappointment , anguish , and even rage , ” Logsdon said .
“ One man @ @ @ @ @ ” the researcher said .
“ He said , ‘ I don ’ t understand @ @ @ @ @ keep muting him—they clearly have the technology.
’ ” Logsdon said that the study yielded @ @ @ @ @ a widespread psychological need to mute Donald Trump , Jr .

MINNEAPOLIS (The Borowitz Report)—Americans favor continuing to mute Donald J. Trump after the final Presidential debate, a new study has found.
In the study, which was conducted by the psychology department at the University of Minnesota, researchers measured the responses of subjects when they were told that it was possible to mute Trump.
“Using advanced imaging, we were able to gauge how they reacted to this news,” Dr. Davis Logsdon, who supervised the study, said. “The pleasure centers in their brains lit up like solar flares.”
When they were told that Trump would no longer be muted after the debate, however, the subjects reacted with “disappointment, anguish, and even rage,” Logsdon said.
“One man was reduced to tears,” the researcher said. “He said, ‘I don’t understand why they can’t keep muting him—they clearly have the technology.’ ”
Logsdon said that the study yielded many other findings, including a widespread psychological need to mute Donald Trump, Jr.


newyorker--2020-10-22--Ilana Glazer’s “Cheat Sheet for the Voting Booth”

Ilana Glazer and Abbi Jacobson created “ Broad City ” in the early days of the Obama Administration , and @ @ @ @ @ progressive slackers in New York City struck a nerve with millennial and Gen Z viewers @ @ @ @ @ Donald Trump , Glazer turned her focus to politics .
In her Web series “ @ @ @ @ @ Booth , ” she interviews celebrities who have personal connections to swing states .
Her @ @ @ @ @ people feel the urgency of voting , and to introduce them to down-ballot races where @ @ @ @ @ joins Dorothy Wickenden to discuss her current projects , and how to persuade the country @ @ @ @ @ that they can effect sweeping change .

Download a transcript.|||
Photograph by Jeff Kravitz / Getty
Ilana Glazer and Abbi Jacobson created “Broad City” in the early days of the Obama Administration, and their portrait of young, progressive slackers in New York City struck a nerve with millennial and Gen Z viewers. With the election of Donald Trump, Glazer turned her focus to politics. In her Web series “Cheat Sheet for the Voting Booth,” she interviews celebrities who have personal connections to swing states. Her goal is to make young people feel the urgency of voting, and to introduce them to down-ballot races where they live. Ilana Glazer joins Dorothy Wickenden to discuss her current projects, and how to persuade the country’s biggest voting bloc that they can effect sweeping change.


newyorker--2020-10-22--Joe Biden Has Already Made His Closing Argument

Joe Biden goes into the second and final televised debate in an enviable position .
The polls show him running ahead of Donald Trump ; his campaign is awash in money for a final advertising push ; and , according to some surveys , his favorability ratings are higher than they were when he won the Democratic nomination earlier this year .
Take the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll .
In April , it found that thirty-seven per cent of respondents had a positive opinion of Biden and forty-one per cent had a negative opinion—a net rating of negative four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , those numbers had flipped .
Forty-three per cent of respondents said they viewed Biden positively and forty-two per cent said they viewed him negatively—a net rating of positive one .
At first glance , this five-point shift may not seem like a big deal .
It is .
For many months now , the Trump campaign has been trying to “ define ” Biden , which is the political consultant ’ s term for pouring buckets of slime over the opposing candidate and hoping that some of it sticks .
Often , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of those elections .
On the basis of his success in demonizing Hillary Clinton , Trump had reason to hope that going negative would work for him again in 2020 .
Judging by the polls , it hasn ’ t .
Why not ?
Part of the reason is that many of the charges Trump has lobbed at Biden are flimsy and could more effectively be thrown at him .
Corrupt Washington insider ?
Let me introduce you to the emoluments clause of the Constitution .
Burdened by a family member who seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ position ?
According to one count , the Chinese government has awarded forty-one trademarks to businesses associated with Ivanka Trump .
A puppet of extremists ?
The feed-the-rich Trump-G.O.P .
tax cut of 2017 was the most radically regressive piece of legislation that Congress has passed in many years .
And who could forget that Trump defended the right-wing extremists in Charlottesville , and also Kyle Rittenhouse , the Illinois teen-ager who allegedly shot and killed two demonstrators in Kenosha , Wisconsin ?
Compared with Trump and the rampant cronyism that his Administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would look lily-white .
But , in explaining why Biden is in such a strong position this close to the election , you can ’ t attribute everything to Trump .
Up to this point , the former Vice-President and his political advisers have run a savvy and disciplined campaign .
While Trump is out there every day ranting away , the Biden campaign is so tightly focussed that it is reminiscent of one of Ronald Reagan ’ s campaigns .
The candidate ’ s public appearances are carefully rationed .
His messaging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s disastrous handling of the pandemic shows he ’ s not fit to be President , and there is a better , less divisive option available .
Biden ’ s ads , which are blanketing the airwaves in the battleground states , ram this message home constantly .
Everything Team Biden does is intended to emphasize the contrast between the two candidates , avoid gaffes or diversions , and make sure the election remains primarily a referendum on Trump .
Within the confines of this tightly scripted campaign , though , Biden has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strengths : his unthreatening image and his palpable humanity .
Biden ’ s policy platform , which would raise taxes on the rich to finance a range of programs targeted at ordinary Americans , is in many respects commendably progressive .
But he ’ s also made clear that he won ’ t ban fracking , defund the police , or levy new taxes on any household earning less than four hundred thousand dollars a year .
His empathy comes across whenever he interacts with ordinary voters , as he did very effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hall .
But this goes beyond television events .
One of the most telling moments of the campaign came when , on hearing that Trump and his wife had contracted COVID-19 , Biden wished the First Couple well and took down his attack ads .
Even the alleged contents of Hunter Biden ’ s hard drive , which the New York Post says it obtained from Rudy Giuliani , have illuminated Biden ’ s humanity .
“ Good morning my beautiful son .
I miss you and love you , Dad , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the troubled Hunter , who was then languishing in a drug rehab center .
Of course , Biden ’ s campaign hasn ’ t been without blemishes .
In all probability , his performance in Thursday ’ s debate won ’ t be either .
At the first debate in Cleveland three weeks ago , there were moments when he looked shaky and spoke in non sequiturs .
This was hardly surprising , however , given Trump ’ s constant interruptions , which were designed to knock him off his stride .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ what he needed to do : keep his cool and make his points .
If only he could learn to stop speaking once he ’ s made them , his supporters would feel less nervous as they tune in for the final debate .
Even if Biden does stumble a bit , though , it won ’ t necessarily upend the race .
For all but confirmed members of MAGA nation , the Trump Presidency has been a huge downer : at once enervating , embarrassing , and depressing .
After nearly four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a great yearning for something more uplifting , something that will enable Americans to feel better about their country and themselves .
For Democrats , independents , and even some Republicans , Biden is now the vehicle for this yearning .
That was evident in the stunning fund-raising figures that his campaign reported for September ; in the ratings for his CNN town hall , which were higher than Trump ’ s ratings on the NBC networks ; and in the unprecedented number of people , disproportionately registered Democrats , who have already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the most dynamic of candidates .
But , with less than two weeks to go until November 3rd , his candidacy seems to offer a way out of the morass .
For that , many Americans will forgive him a great deal—and do all they can to carry him across the finish line .
Read More About the 2020 Election • The fall and rise of Kamala Harris .
• When a sitting President threatens to delay a sacrosanct American ritual like an election , you should listen .
• To understand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2020 election , look at what he has provided the executive class .
• What happens if Trump fights the election results ?
• The refusal by Mitch McConnell to rein in Trump is looking riskier than ever .
• Sign up for our election newsletter for insight and analysis from our reporters and columnists .

The former Vice-President and his advisers have run a savvy and disciplined campaign. Photograph by Gabriela Bhaskar / NYT / Redux
Joe Biden goes into the second and final televised debate in an enviable position. The polls show him running ahead of Donald Trump; his campaign is awash in money for a final advertising push; and, according to some surveys, his favorability ratings are higher than they were when he won the Democratic nomination earlier this year. Take the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll. In April, it found that thirty-seven per cent of respondents had a positive opinion of Biden and forty-one per cent had a negative opinion—a net rating of negative four. In a poll taken last week, those numbers had flipped. Forty-three per cent of respondents said they viewed Biden positively and forty-two per cent said they viewed him negatively—a net rating of positive one.
At first glance, this five-point shift may not seem like a big deal. It is. For many months now, the Trump campaign has been trying to “define” Biden, which is the political consultant’s term for pouring buckets of slime over the opposing candidate and hoping that some of it sticks. Often, it does, and 2016 was one of those elections. On the basis of his success in demonizing Hillary Clinton, Trump had reason to hope that going negative would work for him again in 2020. Judging by the polls, it hasn’t.
Why not? Part of the reason is that many of the charges Trump has lobbed at Biden are flimsy and could more effectively be thrown at him. Corrupt Washington insider? Let me introduce you to the emoluments clause of the Constitution. Burdened by a family member who seems determined to cash in on his political position? According to one count, the Chinese government has awarded forty-one trademarks to businesses associated with Ivanka Trump. A puppet of extremists? The feed-the-rich Trump-G.O.P. tax cut of 2017 was the most radically regressive piece of legislation that Congress has passed in many years. And who could forget that Trump defended the right-wing extremists in Charlottesville, and also Kyle Rittenhouse, the Illinois teen-ager who allegedly shot and killed two demonstrators in Kenosha, Wisconsin?
Compared with Trump and the rampant cronyism that his Administration has unleashed, virtually any other candidate would look lily-white. But, in explaining why Biden is in such a strong position this close to the election, you can’t attribute everything to Trump. Up to this point, the former Vice-President and his political advisers have run a savvy and disciplined campaign.
While Trump is out there every day ranting away, the Biden campaign is so tightly focussed that it is reminiscent of one of Ronald Reagan’s campaigns. The candidate’s public appearances are carefully rationed. His messaging is straightforward and consistent: Trump’s disastrous handling of the pandemic shows he’s not fit to be President, and there is a better, less divisive option available. Biden’s ads, which are blanketing the airwaves in the battleground states, ram this message home constantly.
Everything Team Biden does is intended to emphasize the contrast between the two candidates, avoid gaffes or diversions, and make sure the election remains primarily a referendum on Trump. Within the confines of this tightly scripted campaign, though, Biden has managed to exhibit his two big political strengths: his unthreatening image and his palpable humanity.
Biden’s policy platform, which would raise taxes on the rich to finance a range of programs targeted at ordinary Americans, is in many respects commendably progressive. But he’s also made clear that he won’t ban fracking, defund the police, or levy new taxes on any household earning less than four hundred thousand dollars a year. His empathy comes across whenever he interacts with ordinary voters, as he did very effectively at last week’s CNN town hall. But this goes beyond television events. One of the most telling moments of the campaign came when, on hearing that Trump and his wife had contracted COVID-19, Biden wished the First Couple well and took down his attack ads. Even the alleged contents of Hunter Biden’s hard drive, which the New York Post says it obtained from Rudy Giuliani, have illuminated Biden’s humanity. “Good morning my beautiful son. I miss you and love you, Dad,” he wrote in a February 2019 message to the troubled Hunter, who was then languishing in a drug rehab center.
Of course, Biden’s campaign hasn’t been without blemishes. In all probability, his performance in Thursday’s debate won’t be either. At the first debate in Cleveland three weeks ago, there were moments when he looked shaky and spoke in non sequiturs. This was hardly surprising, however, given Trump’s constant interruptions, which were designed to knock him off his stride. Over all, though, Biden did what he needed to do: keep his cool and make his points. If only he could learn to stop speaking once he’s made them, his supporters would feel less nervous as they tune in for the final debate.
Even if Biden does stumble a bit, though, it won’t necessarily upend the race. For all but confirmed members of MAGA nation, the Trump Presidency has been a huge downer: at once enervating, embarrassing, and depressing. After nearly four years of it, there’s a great yearning for something more uplifting, something that will enable Americans to feel better about their country and themselves. For Democrats, independents, and even some Republicans, Biden is now the vehicle for this yearning. That was evident in the stunning fund-raising figures that his campaign reported for September; in the ratings for his CNN town hall, which were higher than Trump’s ratings on the NBC networks; and in the unprecedented number of people, disproportionately registered Democrats, who have already voted.
No one would say Biden is the most dynamic of candidates. But, with less than two weeks to go until November 3rd, his candidacy seems to offer a way out of the morass. For that, many Americans will forgive him a great deal—and do all they can to carry him across the finish line.
Read More About the 2020 Election