newyorker--2020-01-05--Where Will U.S.-Iran Tensions Play Out? An Interview with Iraq’s President

The U.S. assassination of Qassem Suleimani , the mastermind of Tehran ’ s foreign military operations , in Baghdad last week , suddenly made Iraq the front line in tensions between the United States and Iran .
Barham Salih , a British-educated Kurd who spent years representing his party in Washington , was elected President of Iraq in 2018 .
Salih has been increasingly concerned about Iraq ’ s vulnerability since the Trump Administration blamed Iran for an air strike that damaged more than a dozen strategic oil installations in Saudi Arabia , in September .
I ’ ve known @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including when he was in Washington and later when he became the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq .
We began a conversation in September , at the U.N. General Assembly , about the danger that Iraq will become a war zone—again—only this time between the United States and Iran .
I checked in with him again on Sunday to update our conversation .
Iraq has struggled to balance ties with both Washington and Tehran since the U.S. invasion , in 2003 .
“ The United States is our ally .
Iran is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The U.S. attack on Suleimani—which was carried out without informing the government in Baghdad—challenged Iraqi sovereignty and triggered unprecedented political fury at the United States within the country .
On Sunday , the parliament of Iraq voted to require the government to “ end any foreign presence on Iraqi soil and prevent the use of Iraqi airspace , soil and water for any reason ” by foreign troops .
The United States has more than five thousand troops in Iraq ; it leads a multinational coalition that is still fighting ISIS and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the parliament , which has three hundred and twenty-eight seats , was 170–0 .
It was carried largely by Shiite lawmakers ; many Sunnis and Kurds did not vote .
The measure will not go into force until signed by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi , but Mahdi drafted its language .
And , in any case , he has been only a caretaker of the government since he resigned , in November , after weeks of protests .
Over the weekend , Iran vowed major retaliation for Suleimani ’ s death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suspend diplomatic and military operations in Iraq .
On Sunday , the U.S.-led coalition announced that it was at least temporarily halting operations against ISIS .
The U.S. Embassy also suspended consular operations .
The State Department urged all Americans to leave Iraq .
The interview with Salih about current dangers has been edited for length and clarity .
How worried are you about a conflict—openly or covertly—between Iran and the United States after the death of Qassem Suleimani ?
The dynamics are dangerous—and I have to be deeply concerned that Iraq will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict .
Iraq and its hard-won stability in the aftermath of the war on ISIS could unravel .
This would have terrible consequences for Iraq and the region at large .
We must do all that is possible to assert restraint and walk back from the brink .
When we spoke in September , our focus was economic regeneration , job creation , and governance reforms .
Then , in October , protests swept the country demanding reforms , justice , and affirming the sovereignty of Iraq .
Now we are talking about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In this context , and out of these dangerous dynamics , Iraq ’ s sovereignty and stability should become the common interest upon which the regional and international actors agree on a way forward .
What lessons did Iraq learn from its own eight-year war with Iran ?
War is devastating .
There is absolutely no winner in a war .
The human cost has been monumental for Iraq .
Certainly , for Iran , too .
But , also , the lesson is never start a war because you never know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important lesson : Iraq should never serve as a gate for others .
And Iraq should not fight a war , paid for by Iraqi resources and Iraqi lives , for others .
What specific lessons did you learn about fighting Iran particularly ?
If you were looking back on it now , thinking about the current crisis in the Gulf , what were the lessons ?
The last thing the Middle East needs is a terrible war , especially as the last war , against ISIS , is yet to be definitively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the easiest of decisions , but the region can not afford , can not tolerate , another conflict .
Too much is at stake .
You know that eight-year conflict intimately , and you know what fighting Iran is like .
They don ’ t give up easily .
The Middle East has gone through cycles of violence , has literally not known peace and security for a very , very long time .
The onset of the Iraq-Iran War was the end of the regional order in the Middle East .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been a main domain of conflicts across the Middle East .
Everyone had a proxy to fight this war on Iraqi soil , essentially using Iraqi resources and Iraqi lives .
I do not want to see my country embroiled in yet another conflict , and I do not want to see another war undermining the hard-won stability that Iraq has achieved .
The success in Iraq is real but very fragile .
I fear that it can not survive another conflict in the Middle East .
Iraq will be very badly affected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well undermine the hard-won stability that we have achieved after years of conflict , and certainly after the last war , against ISIS .
If we are not careful , we may go beyond the brink , God help us all , in the neighborhood and internationally , as well .
You have a senseless conflict in Yemen , with untold humanitarian suffering .
You have an unfinished war and conflict in Syria .
You have a stable order in Iraq that is still fragile .
And you have the security of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have remnants of ISIS that must not be underestimated .
You have the greatest issue of ISIS families and detainees , and you ’ re talking about the monumental legal , moral , security problems .
And you have Idlib [ a province in Syria ] , with Nusra and Hurras ad-Deen and many other extremist groups .
The military defeat against ISIS was a significant success , no doubt .
But terrorism is yet to be defeated definitively , is yet to be eradicated .
There are many terrorist and extremist groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , again , the last war is yet to be finished , and we ’ re talking about starting a new war ?
It ’ s just madness .
We need to be careful .
Cool heads to prevail .
Restraint .
Go back to the negotiating table and get this talked out .
Economically , what would the impact be ?
We are now focussing on launching a reconstruction fund for infrastructure and to attract foreign direct investment to Iraq .
In a situation of conflict , I can not imagine foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We have legions of unemployed youth across the neighborhood , and we need to expand our economies , create job opportunities for our youth .
If this is true in the United States , when your leaders talk about jobs , jobs , jobs , it ’ s definitely far truer across the Middle East—legions of unemployed youth who can fall prey to extremism and destabilize not only our societies but global security .
This has to be the challenge .
Let me posit you the following context .
I think the Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region in the world that is broken .
In the early part of the twentieth century , Europe was totally broken .
Two world wars .
They fixed it .
In the sixties and seventies , East Asia was the main conflict area of the world .
It was essentially fixed .
And you go to Vietnam , you go to Korea , you go to wherever .
In the nineteen-eighties , it was Latin America and Central America .
It was somewhat fixed .
In the nineteen-nineties , the former Soviet Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East , throughout the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first century , remains the main source of instability across the world .
This region needs to be fixed , and the way to fix it has to come , the solution has to come , from the neighborhood .
And I can not see another alternative but economic integration and creating interdependencies , really moving beyond these senseless dynamics of conflict .
We go back to what you started with : the Iraq-Iran War .
What have we achieved out of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any security ?
Did this bring us any stability ?
No .
A lot of people were killed .
A lot of people were maimed .
A lot of resources were wasted and squandered .
And the conflict can not be resolved by war .
Really .
The lesson of that , and , for that matter , even of 2003 , is just basically that war should be the very , very last option .
That war , at least in the context of our part of the world , has never @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You keep going back to the Iran-Iraq War .
What did you learn about the Iranians , though ?
I mean , I can tell you that Iran is a major geopolitical actor .
Iran is a culture of thousands of years of civilization .
If I go back , I would say the following : one can say the Iraq-Iran War marked the collapse of the regional order .
Iraq is at the heart of this region .
Iraq ’ s stability , in my view , is a common interest of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to afford another destabilization of Iraq .
They should not be able to afford another terrorist wave sweeping across the region .
Instead , we should be focussed on what is vitally important to our societies : creating job opportunities for our children , reforming our education system , and moving on .
And , again , to take things in context , this is the last remaining major region that is broken .
The region can not afford it .
What might a war look like now ?
Would it be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq forty years ago ?
I think it would be very different .
The scale will be different .
The regional implications would be different .
Iran is my neighbor .
We have fourteen hundred kilometres of borders with Iran .
We can ’ t ignore Iran .
I want to remind you that the security of Iraq is vital for the security of the neighborhood .
People should not think that they can have another conflict , essentially undermining Iraq ’ s stability , and think that they can be immune from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respect Iraq ’ s stability and preserve it and protect it , this regional order will not come about .
Look at the geopolitics of Iraq .
This is where , every time , Arabia , for millennia—Persia , Anatolia—collided .
From Alexander the Great , this is where the regional order is defined , when the British came in the twentieth century , when the Americans came in the twenty-first century .
Iraq-Mesopotamia is important geopolitically .
We need to preserve this stability in order to create any regional order .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hussein tried it and failed miserably .
And we paid dearly for it in Iraq .
The neighborhood has paid dearly for it .
The Iranians have paid dearly for it .
Iraq ’ s interests , national interests , is to have very good neighborly relations with Iran .
Never again a war with Iran .
We do not want to be in a state of conflict with our neighbor , with any of our neighbors .
What if Iran was responsible for the attack on Saudi Arabia in September ?
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s intentions ?
The Iranians have been very clear to all .
If you prevent me from selling my oil and acquiring the revenues needed , I ’ m not going to let others do it .
Sanctions are a dubious tool , to say the least .
I ’ m worried about their consequences for the people of Iran , as a neighbor .
They ’ re my neighbors ; I have to be concerned for their well-being .
At the end of the day , we need all the key players @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really discuss it .
.
.
.
Aggression and attacks are not things that I would condone .
Military action , from wherever it comes—I would not condone it .
Again , we have seen too many conflicts and we have seen too many military interventions that meant nothing but destruction to our neighborhood .
Some Americans want to equate it , as if , when Iran says something , Iraq will say , “ Yes , sir.
” It ’ s not .
Wallah , it ’ s not .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Americans should learn from their own history in Iraq , when they were telling the Iraqis to do this and that .
Did they do it ?
No .
Is that a fair point ?
Is that a fair point ?
People have their minds , and there are realities you can look at .
The best line is that the United States is our ally .
Iran is our neighbor .
Is that on the record ?

The U.S. assassination of Qassem Suleimani, the mastermind of Tehran’s foreign military operations, in Baghdad last week, suddenly made Iraq the front line in tensions between the United States and Iran. Barham Salih, a British-educated Kurd who spent years representing his party in Washington, was elected President of Iraq in 2018. Salih has been increasingly concerned about Iraq’s vulnerability since the Trump Administration blamed Iran for an air strike that damaged more than a dozen strategic oil installations in Saudi Arabia, in September. I’ve known Salih for more than a quarter century, including when he was in Washington and later when he became the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. We began a conversation in September, at the U.N. General Assembly, about the danger that Iraq will become a war zone—again—only this time between the United States and Iran. I checked in with him again on Sunday to update our conversation.
Iraq has struggled to balance ties with both Washington and Tehran since the U.S. invasion, in 2003. “The United States is our ally. Iran is our neighbor,” Salih told me. The U.S. attack on Suleimani—which was carried out without informing the government in Baghdad—challenged Iraqi sovereignty and triggered unprecedented political fury at the United States within the country. On Sunday, the parliament of Iraq voted to require the government to “end any foreign presence on Iraqi soil and prevent the use of Iraqi airspace, soil and water for any reason” by foreign troops. The United States has more than five thousand troops in Iraq; it leads a multinational coalition that is still fighting ISIS and training the Iraqi military. The vote in the parliament, which has three hundred and twenty-eight seats, was 170–0. It was carried largely by Shiite lawmakers; many Sunnis and Kurds did not vote. The measure will not go into force until signed by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, but Mahdi drafted its language. And, in any case, he has been only a caretaker of the government since he resigned, in November, after weeks of protests.
Over the weekend, Iran vowed major retaliation for Suleimani’s death, which led the United States to suspend diplomatic and military operations in Iraq. On Sunday, the U.S.-led coalition announced that it was at least temporarily halting operations against ISIS. The U.S. Embassy also suspended consular operations. The State Department urged all Americans to leave Iraq. The interview with Salih about current dangers has been edited for length and clarity.
How worried are you about a conflict—openly or covertly—between Iran and the United States after the death of Qassem Suleimani?
The dynamics are dangerous—and I have to be deeply concerned that Iraq will be embroiled in yet another cycle of conflict. Iraq and its hard-won stability in the aftermath of the war on ISIS could unravel. This would have terrible consequences for Iraq and the region at large. We must do all that is possible to assert restraint and walk back from the brink. When we spoke in September, our focus was economic regeneration, job creation, and governance reforms. Then, in October, protests swept the country demanding reforms, justice, and affirming the sovereignty of Iraq. Now we are talking about the challenge of averting war and conflict. In this context, and out of these dangerous dynamics, Iraq’s sovereignty and stability should become the common interest upon which the regional and international actors agree on a way forward.
What lessons did Iraq learn from its own eight-year war with Iran?
War is devastating. There is absolutely no winner in a war. The human cost has been monumental for Iraq. Certainly, for Iran, too. But, also, the lesson is never start a war because you never know how it ends. And one other important lesson: Iraq should never serve as a gate for others. And Iraq should not fight a war, paid for by Iraqi resources and Iraqi lives, for others.
What specific lessons did you learn about fighting Iran particularly? If you were looking back on it now, thinking about the current crisis in the Gulf, what were the lessons?
The last thing the Middle East needs is a terrible war, especially as the last war, against ISIS, is yet to be definitively over. Starting a war may be the easiest of decisions, but the region cannot afford, cannot tolerate, another conflict. Too much is at stake.
You know that eight-year conflict intimately, and you know what fighting Iran is like. They don’t give up easily.
The Middle East has gone through cycles of violence, has literally not known peace and security for a very, very long time. The onset of the Iraq-Iran War was the end of the regional order in the Middle East. For the last forty years, Iraq has been a main domain of conflicts across the Middle East. Everyone had a proxy to fight this war on Iraqi soil, essentially using Iraqi resources and Iraqi lives. I do not want to see my country embroiled in yet another conflict, and I do not want to see another war undermining the hard-won stability that Iraq has achieved. The success in Iraq is real but very fragile. I fear that it cannot survive another conflict in the Middle East.
Barham Salih, the President of Iraq, addressing the United Nations General Assembly, in New York City, in September, 2019. Photograph by Drew Angerer / Getty
Iraq can’t survive? Why?
Iraq will be very badly affected by yet another conflict, which could well undermine the hard-won stability that we have achieved after years of conflict, and certainly after the last war, against ISIS. If we are not careful, we may go beyond the brink, God help us all, in the neighborhood and internationally, as well.
You have a senseless conflict in Yemen, with untold humanitarian suffering. You have an unfinished war and conflict in Syria. You have a stable order in Iraq that is still fragile. And you have the security of the Gulf very much in question. You have remnants of ISIS that must not be underestimated. You have the greatest issue of ISIS families and detainees, and you’re talking about the monumental legal, moral, security problems. And you have Idlib [a province in Syria], with Nusra and Hurras ad-Deen and many other extremist groups.
The military defeat against ISIS was a significant success, no doubt. But terrorism is yet to be defeated definitively, is yet to be eradicated. There are many terrorist and extremist groups spawning across the Middle East. And, again, the last war is yet to be finished, and we’re talking about starting a new war? It’s just madness. We need to be careful. Cool heads to prevail. Restraint. Go back to the negotiating table and get this talked out.
Economically, what would the impact be?
We are now focussing on launching a reconstruction fund for infrastructure and to attract foreign direct investment to Iraq. In a situation of conflict, I cannot imagine foreign investment coming to the Middle East.
We have legions of unemployed youth across the neighborhood, and we need to expand our economies, create job opportunities for our youth. If this is true in the United States, when your leaders talk about jobs, jobs, jobs, it’s definitely far truer across the Middle East—legions of unemployed youth who can fall prey to extremism and destabilize not only our societies but global security. This has to be the challenge.
Let me posit you the following context. I think the Middle East is probably the last remaining major region in the world that is broken. In the early part of the twentieth century, Europe was totally broken. Two world wars. They fixed it. In the sixties and seventies, East Asia was the main conflict area of the world. It was essentially fixed. And you go to Vietnam, you go to Korea, you go to wherever. In the nineteen-eighties, it was Latin America and Central America. It was somewhat fixed. In the nineteen-nineties, the former Soviet Union and South Africa. Yet the Middle East, throughout the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first century, remains the main source of instability across the world.
This region needs to be fixed, and the way to fix it has to come, the solution has to come, from the neighborhood. And I cannot see another alternative but economic integration and creating interdependencies, really moving beyond these senseless dynamics of conflict. We go back to what you started with: the Iraq-Iran War. What have we achieved out of the Iraq-Iran War? Did this gain us any security? Did this bring us any stability? No. A lot of people were killed. A lot of people were maimed. A lot of resources were wasted and squandered. And the conflict cannot be resolved by war. Really. The lesson of that, and, for that matter, even of 2003, is just basically that war should be the very, very last option. That war, at least in the context of our part of the world, has never been proven to be a solution.


newyorker--2020-01-05--What Will Another Decade of Climate Crisis Bring?

Last week , thousands of people in the Australian state of Victoria were urged to evacuate their homes .
“ Don ’ t wait , ” the alert warned .
Bushfires were burning across the state ; so large were some of the blazes that , according to Victoria ’ s commissioner of emergency management , they were “ punching into the atmosphere ” with columns of smoke nine miles high .
The smoke columns were producing their own weather , generating lightning that , in turn , was setting more fires .
Some time after residents received the evacuation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most seriously affected region , East Gippsland , which is a popular tourist destination , received another alert .
It was now too late to leave : “ You are in danger and need to act immediately to survive.
” Just to the north of Victoria , in New South Wales , blazes have so far destroyed more than nine million acres .
Meanwhile , in the state of South Australia , dozens of fires were burning last week , some of them uncontrollably .
At least nineteen people have died in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of animals , including a significant proportion of the country ’ s koalas .
More than two hundred and fifty thousand people signed a petition arguing that , in light of the devastation , Sydney ’ s famous New Year ’ s Eve fireworks displays should be scrapped , but the celebration proceeded anyway , in part at the insistence of the Australian Prime Minister , Scott Morrison .
“ I can think of no better time to express to the world just how optimistic and positive we are as a country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ figure who was on holiday with his family in Hawaii last month when , owing to all the fires , New South Wales declared a state of emergency .
( It declared a second state of emergency last Thursday , ahead of what was expected to be another catastrophic weekend . )
In a Dantean sort of way , Australia ’ s holiday-season infernos provided a fitting close to 2019 , which has been called “ the year the world woke up to the climate crisis.
” In India this past summer , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hundred people in the northeastern state of Bihar , and in Japan a month later a heat wave sent an estimated eighteen thousand to the hospital .
All-time temperature records were set in France , where a high of a hundred and eight degrees was reached in the town of Vérargues on June 28th , and in Germany , where the mercury in the town of Lingen hit a hundred and seven degrees on July 25th .
In Australia , records were broken only to be rebroken .
On December 17th , maximum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is roughly the size of the continental United States , averaged 105.6 degrees .
Then , on December 18th , they climbed to 107.4 degrees .
The “ feeling when you open the oven door ” is how one Australian described the heat to the BBC .
“ It ’ s like that , but just the whole time.
” Globally , it was the second- or third-warmest year since accurate measurements began .
( The exact ranking is still to be calculated . )
In either case , each of the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five , and the decade counts as the warmest ten-year stretch on record .
If 2019 was supposedly the year we “ woke up to the climate crisis , ” the twenty-tens have been called “ the decade we finally woke up to climate change.
” What will the twenty-twenties bring ?
In geophysical terms , this question is almost too easy to answer .
Temperatures will continue to rise .
It ’ s virtually guaranteed that the coming decade will be warmer than the twenty-tens , which were warmer than the two-thousands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which—you guessed it—were warmer than the nineteen-eighties .
And with still higher temperatures will come still greater damage .
Droughts will grow more punishing .
( Australia ’ s horrific wildfires are , in large part , the result of what Australians are calling a “ big dry , ” which is now in its third year and has forced many towns to truck in water . )
Warmer air holds more moisture , so the flip side of drought is deluge .
( Last week , as Australia was roasting , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people . )
Meanwhile , the planet ’ s ice sheets will continue to melt , leading to ever-higher sea levels , as will the Arctic ice cap .
It ’ s possible that by 2030 the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free at the end of the summer .
Which brings us to the question of what it means to “ wake up.
” If in the past year ( or the past decade ) the world began to understand how dangerous climate change is , it certainly didn ’ t act like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more CO was emitted than in all of human history up to the election of J.F.K .
In 2015 , in Paris , world leaders , including President Barack Obama , committed to holding the average global temperature increase to “ well below 2°C.
” They never committed to how they were going to do this , however , and last month , in Madrid , the creaky machinery of climate diplomacy came very close to breaking down altogether .
The Trump Administration , which has filed to withdraw the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Morrison government , which wanted to use an accounting trick to fulfill its Paris commitments , were explicitly blamed for the stalemate .
Many commentators noted the irony of the situation .
A headline in the Guardian put it this way : “ AUSTRALIA TOOK A MATCH TO UN CLIMATE TALKS WHILE BACK HOME THE COUNTRY BURNED.
” Every decade is consequential in its own way , but the twenty-twenties will be consequential in a more or less permanent way .
Global CO emissions are now so high—in 2019 , they hit a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ten more years of the same will be nothing short of cataclysmic .
Unless emissions are reduced , and radically , a rise of two degrees Celsius ( 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit ) will be pretty much unavoidable by 2030 .
This will make the demise of the world ’ s coral reefs , the inundation of most low-lying island nations , incessant heat waves and fires and misery for millions—perhaps billions—of people equally unavoidable .
Really waking up , and not just dreaming to ourselves that things will be O.K.
, has become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paraphrase Victoria ’ s fire authority : The world is in danger , and we need to act immediately to survive .
♦

Illustration by João Fazenda
Last week, thousands of people in the Australian state of Victoria were urged to evacuate their homes. “Don’t wait,” the alert warned. Bushfires were burning across the state; so large were some of the blazes that, according to Victoria’s commissioner of emergency management, they were “punching into the atmosphere” with columns of smoke nine miles high. The smoke columns were producing their own weather, generating lightning that, in turn, was setting more fires. Some time after residents received the evacuation warning, many of those in the most seriously affected region, East Gippsland, which is a popular tourist destination, received another alert. It was now too late to leave: “You are in danger and need to act immediately to survive.”
Just to the north of Victoria, in New South Wales, blazes have so far destroyed more than nine million acres. Meanwhile, in the state of South Australia, dozens of fires were burning last week, some of them uncontrollably. At least nineteen people have died in the fires, as have hundreds of millions of animals, including a significant proportion of the country’s koalas. More than two hundred and fifty thousand people signed a petition arguing that, in light of the devastation, Sydney’s famous New Year’s Eve fireworks displays should be scrapped, but the celebration proceeded anyway, in part at the insistence of the Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison.
“I can think of no better time to express to the world just how optimistic and positive we are as a country,” said Morrison, a Donald Trump-like figure who was on holiday with his family in Hawaii last month when, owing to all the fires, New South Wales declared a state of emergency. (It declared a second state of emergency last Thursday, ahead of what was expected to be another catastrophic weekend.)
In a Dantean sort of way, Australia’s holiday-season infernos provided a fitting close to 2019, which has been called “the year the world woke up to the climate crisis.” In India this past summer, a heat wave killed more than a hundred people in the northeastern state of Bihar, and in Japan a month later a heat wave sent an estimated eighteen thousand to the hospital. All-time temperature records were set in France, where a high of a hundred and eight degrees was reached in the town of Vérargues on June 28th, and in Germany, where the mercury in the town of Lingen hit a hundred and seven degrees on July 25th.
In Australia, records were broken only to be rebroken. On December 17th, maximum temperatures across the entire country, which is roughly the size of the continental United States, averaged 105.6 degrees. Then, on December 18th, they climbed to 107.4 degrees. The “feeling when you open the oven door” is how one Australian described the heat to the BBC. “It’s like that, but just the whole time.” Globally, it was the second- or third-warmest year since accurate measurements began. (The exact ranking is still to be calculated.) In either case, each of the past five years has been among the hottest five, and the decade counts as the warmest ten-year stretch on record. If 2019 was supposedly the year we “woke up to the climate crisis,” the twenty-tens have been called “the decade we finally woke up to climate change.”
What will the twenty-twenties bring? In geophysical terms, this question is almost too easy to answer. Temperatures will continue to rise. It’s virtually guaranteed that the coming decade will be warmer than the twenty-tens, which were warmer than the two-thousands, which were warmer than the nineteen-nineties, which—you guessed it—were warmer than the nineteen-eighties.
And with still higher temperatures will come still greater damage. Droughts will grow more punishing. (Australia’s horrific wildfires are, in large part, the result of what Australians are calling a “big dry,” which is now in its third year and has forced many towns to truck in water.) Warmer air holds more moisture, so the flip side of drought is deluge. (Last week, as Australia was roasting, flooding in Indonesia killed at least forty people.) Meanwhile, the planet’s ice sheets will continue to melt, leading to ever-higher sea levels, as will the Arctic ice cap. It’s possible that by 2030 the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free at the end of the summer.
Which brings us to the question of what it means to “wake up.” If in the past year (or the past decade) the world began to understand how dangerous climate change is, it certainly didn’t act like it. In the past ten years, more CO 2 was emitted than in all of human history up to the election of J.F.K.
In 2015, in Paris, world leaders, including President Barack Obama, committed to holding the average global temperature increase to “well below 2°C.” They never committed to how they were going to do this, however, and last month, in Madrid, the creaky machinery of climate diplomacy came very close to breaking down altogether. The Trump Administration, which has filed to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement, and the Morrison government, which wanted to use an accounting trick to fulfill its Paris commitments, were explicitly blamed for the stalemate. Many commentators noted the irony of the situation. A headline in the Guardian put it this way: “AUSTRALIA TOOK A MATCH TO UN CLIMATE TALKS WHILE BACK HOME THE COUNTRY BURNED.”
Every decade is consequential in its own way, but the twenty-twenties will be consequential in a more or less permanent way. Global CO 2 emissions are now so high—in 2019, they hit a new record of forty-three billion metric tons—that ten more years of the same will be nothing short of cataclysmic. Unless emissions are reduced, and radically, a rise of two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) will be pretty much unavoidable by 2030. This will make the demise of the world’s coral reefs, the inundation of most low-lying island nations, incessant heat waves and fires and misery for millions—perhaps billions—of people equally unavoidable.
Really waking up, and not just dreaming to ourselves that things will be O.K., has become urgent—beyond urgent, in fact. To paraphrase Victoria’s fire authority: The world is in danger, and we need to act immediately to survive. ♦


newyorker--2020-01-05--Prom Pictures of Ukrainian Teens on the Verge of an Uncertain Adulthood

Amid the maelstrom of the Trump-impeachment proceedings , Ukraine has been less a reality than a projection of America ’ s post-Cold War neuroses .
Although we have learned something about Volodymyr Zelensky , Ukraine ’ s neophyte President , there has been very little said about the lived experiences of the country ’ s nearly forty-four million people .
One of the strongest states in Europe a millennium ago , Ukraine has had a devastating century , including two forced famines , first under Lenin , in 1921 and 1922 , and then under Stalin , a decade later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Soviet Union , it has faced several severe economic depressions and ongoing violent meddling by Russia .
In 2014 , Russia annexed Crimea and fomented war in eastern Ukraine , leading to nearly fifty per cent inflation the following year and to more than ten thousand civilian casualties and the internal displacement of some one and a half million people .
In their long conflict with Russia , Ukrainians have not been submissive : they burned their own fields and livestock to resist Soviet rule ; raised two revolutions , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the U.S.S.R. ; and have fought Vladimir Putin ’ s invasion , despite lacking a functioning military at the start of the conflict .
With the country ’ s economy unable to recover , many Ukrainians have been forced to work or move abroad , to Poland , Hungary , the Czech Republic , and even Russia .
The Israeli photographer Michal Chelbin has made images of Ukrainian teen-agers at two different locations during two distinct periods : first , in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine , in 2008 , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 .
Each time , her subjects were on the precipice of adulthood , attending their high-school graduation , an event that includes a prom .
Our view is that of an outsider , although Chelbin ’ s father was born in western Ukraine , and she grew up fascinated by the black-and-white portraits that he had brought with him when he left as a child .
In some of Chelbin ’ s photographs , the teens re-create those old styles : a subject stands , for instance , with a hand resting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nearby .
Unlike teens in the U.S. , the young men ’ s dress varies quite a bit , from tuxedos or conventional suits to brightly colored jackets or uniforms .
The young women wear ball gowns or more casual short skirts .
From the photos , we can not tell whether the teens are Ukrainian- or Russian-speaking .
One of the results of the war with Russia has been a stronger civic identity .
Russian speakers in Ukraine-controlled territories have become more committed to Ukraine , and Ukrainians as a whole seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who won in a landslide .
A few of these teens , Chelbin told me , are students from an internat , a Soviet-style boarding school that serves mostly poor or under-parented children .
Others attend public schools .
Some of the teens are pictured as heterosexual couples , but not all of them—though none are likely to be out-and-proud L.G.B.T.Q.
, even as participation in this year ’ s Kyiv Pride was nearly double last year ’ s and as Zelensky offered lukewarm support .
Unlike a prom in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ students , teachers , and parents and follow an official school ceremony .
Graduates stay up all night and watch the sunrise from an important , scenic locale in their community .
Until recently , students usually wore graduation sashes—traditionally red with golden letters—only on the last day before the exam period , known as the Day of the Farewell Bell .
But in Chelbin ’ s photographs from 2019 some of the graduates chose to wear them to their graduation prom , now in the colors of the Ukrainian flag .
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been wearing these colors , and embracing traditional textiles and hair styles , in their daily lives .
Teens are , in their developmental stages , driven by hormones .
Surprisingly , Chelbin ’ s photos are relatively unsexualized .
According to Vlada Nedak , who leads mother-daughter workshops in Ukraine for Project Kesher—an organization that seeks to promote Jewish community and gender equality—young people ’ s knowledge about their bodies comes from the Internet , often from pornography that kids first see in grade school , and includes even fewer empowering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights to pleasure than in the United States .
These days especially , teens are focussed on their visual representation , as so much of their lives are lived online—even in Ukraine , where the average income is less than a tenth of what it is in the U.S. Chelbin ’ s photos , however , are not performative in the ways of most young people ’ s photos in the twenty-first century—the emotiveness is paradoxical and emerges from what isn ’ t shown .
These pictures should make us think about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and of their country .
Parts of the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine are still under Moscow ’ s control , and the rest of the region is struggling to rebuild from the war .
In Kyiv , Ukraine ’ s biggest and richest city , teens have been found living in tunnels underneath the infrastructure that was built for the 2012 European Football Championship .
One in five of those who age out of the internat system end up in prison ; one in ten attempt or commit suicide .
In some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ H.I.V .
infection are higher than in the rest of Europe .
Conscription for men , a Soviet legacy , was scrapped in 2013 but then reinstated just a year later , owing to the war .
Women , too , have volunteered in greater numbers , and bans on women in combat and military leadership were recently lifted .
Jobs , especially working-class ones , are few and underpaid , though they have a new resonance following the Russian invasion , as illustrated in a new documentary , “ Heat Singers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ songs in national dress .
There are also unexpected new jobs , such as de-mining the Ukraine-occupied areas of the Donbass , a tedious but important job done predominantly by women .
Experts estimate that it will take decades to make this region safe again for the common pastime of mushroom hunting .
There is another future possible in this era .
Young people have been mobilized by grassroots activism , which sprung up out of the Revolution of Dignity , in 2014 , centering on issues such as fighting corruption and supporting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war effort .
According to Emily Channell-Justice , the head of Harvard ’ s new Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program , “ Ukraine is at a point where young people are trying to build the world they want to live in , but they are limited by the economic instability they inherited from previous generations and an unending war caused by an aggressive neighbor .
They are making change wherever they can , whether at the institutional level or in their own communities and everyday lives.
” Chelbin ’ s photos elicit the timelessness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this moment , inviting all of us to reflect .
Looking at the eyes of the young people photographed in 2008 , before the global turn to illiberal populism , with its demagoguery and myopia , we can wonder what has happened in both their and our lives over the past decade .
Looking into the eyes of the recent graduates , we draw back and see that we have to enter into the third decade of this new millennium with a commitment to try better for them .

Amid the maelstrom of the Trump-impeachment proceedings, Ukraine has been less a reality than a projection of America’s post-Cold War neuroses. Although we have learned something about Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s neophyte President, there has been very little said about the lived experiences of the country’s nearly forty-four million people.
One of the strongest states in Europe a millennium ago, Ukraine has had a devastating century, including two forced famines, first under Lenin, in 1921 and 1922, and then under Stalin, a decade later. Since Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union, it has faced several severe economic depressions and ongoing violent meddling by Russia. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and fomented war in eastern Ukraine, leading to nearly fifty per cent inflation the following year and to more than ten thousand civilian casualties and the internal displacement of some one and a half million people. In their long conflict with Russia, Ukrainians have not been submissive: they burned their own fields and livestock to resist Soviet rule; raised two revolutions, in the pursuit of democracy, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R.; and have fought Vladimir Putin’s invasion, despite lacking a functioning military at the start of the conflict. With the country’s economy unable to recover, many Ukrainians have been forced to work or move abroad, to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and even Russia.
The Israeli photographer Michal Chelbin has made images of Ukrainian teen-agers at two different locations during two distinct periods: first, in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine, in 2008, and then in and around Kyiv, in 2019. Each time, her subjects were on the precipice of adulthood, attending their high-school graduation, an event that includes a prom. Our view is that of an outsider, although Chelbin’s father was born in western Ukraine, and she grew up fascinated by the black-and-white portraits that he had brought with him when he left as a child. In some of Chelbin’s photographs, the teens re-create those old styles: a subject stands, for instance, with a hand resting on the shoulder of a peer sitting nearby. Unlike teens in the U.S., the young men’s dress varies quite a bit, from tuxedos or conventional suits to brightly colored jackets or uniforms. The young women wear ball gowns or more casual short skirts.
From the photos, we cannot tell whether the teens are Ukrainian- or Russian-speaking. One of the results of the war with Russia has been a stronger civic identity. Russian speakers in Ukraine-controlled territories have become more committed to Ukraine, and Ukrainians as a whole seem more open to Russian speakers—including to Zelensky, who won in a landslide.


newyorker--2020-01-05--Sunday Reading: Writers’ Journals

Sunday Reading: Writers’ Journals

Writers ’ diaries and journals often provide fascinating glimpses into the creative inspiration behind great works of literature .
They can also offer a penetrating look at the personal lives and reflections of the literary visionaries who compose such works .
This week , as we embark on a new year , we ’ re bringing you a selection of pieces on writers ’ journals .
In “ The Hunger Diaries , ” Mavis Gallant recounts her early years as a journalist , travelling through Europe and living from paycheck to paycheck .
In “ My Dear God , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faith and writes about the inspiration for her fiction .
John Cheever chronicles his life in the suburbs and the influence of domesticity on his novels .
Finally , the philosopher Roland Barthes explores the nature of grief in “ A Cruel Country , ” an excerpt from the diaries he kept after his mother , Henriette , passed away , in the late nineteen-seventies .
We hope that these pieces offer an insightful view into writers ’ private thoughts and observations .
A writer ’ s notes on his family , his @ @ @ @ @

Writers’ diaries and journals often provide fascinating glimpses into the creative inspiration behind great works of literature. They can also offer a penetrating look at the personal lives and reflections of the literary visionaries who compose such works. This week, as we embark on a new year, we’re bringing you a selection of pieces on writers’ journals. In “The Hunger Diaries,” Mavis Gallant recounts her early years as a journalist, travelling through Europe and living from paycheck to paycheck. In “My Dear God,” Flannery O’Connor reflects on her faith and writes about the inspiration for her fiction. John Cheever chronicles his life in the suburbs and the influence of domesticity on his novels. Finally, the philosopher Roland Barthes explores the nature of grief in “A Cruel Country,” an excerpt from the diaries he kept after his mother, Henriette, passed away, in the late nineteen-seventies. We hope that these pieces offer an insightful view into writers’ private thoughts and observations.
—David Remnick
Photograph by Alfredo Di Molli / Courtesy Mavis Gallant
A writer’s apprenticeship.
A writer’s notes on his family, his writing, and America.
Photograph by Joe Mctyre / Atlanta Journal-Constitution / AP
A young writer’s prayers.
Notes on mourning.


newyorker--2020-01-04--Representative Elissa Slotkin on Trump’s Iran Policy and the Killing of Qassem Suleimani

On Friday morning , an American drone strike ordered by President Trump killed Qassem Suleimani , the head of Iran ’ s Quds Force—a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( I.R.G.C . )
—and the most infamous and feared commander in the region .
In response , the Iranian government vowed retaliation against the United States , while the Pentagon announced that more troops would be sent to the Middle East .
In Congress , the reaction was mixed .
Republicans lined up behind the President , while Democrats generally applauded Suleimani ’ s death but expressed concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy , which has included attempts to isolate Iran and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran that was brokered by the Obama Administration .
A day after the strike , I spoke by phone with Representative Elissa Slotkin , a first-term Democrat from Michigan who is also a former C.I.A .
analyst and Defense Department official with experience serving in Iraq .
During our conversation , which has been edited for length and clarity , we discussed what she learned on the ground in Iraq , whether Congress will take action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and foreign policy , and why Trump has made her rethink her views on how America should conduct itself abroad .
You wrote a long Twitter thread on Friday in which you explained that the Bush and Obama Administrations decided that taking out Suleimani would not be worth the potential costs .
Can you talk more about how much this was discussed ?
Did it ever come close to occurring ?
Well , listen , I think we have to make clear that we ’ re talking about the Quds Force more generally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was the head of a very capable organization , and that organization has really helped destabilize major parts of the Middle East over the span of my career , from 2003 until today .
Both the Obama Administration and the Bush Administration had countless , regular discussions , especially for those who covered the Middle East , on how we would counter the Quds Force .
We had more limited conversations about how to deal with Suleimani .
In particular , when sanctions were levied against him , those were always long conversations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the conversations we had on pushing back on him in particular and the organization generally , we almost never spent a ton of time on the possible assassination , because there are legal and political and military implications to it .
And , whenever we did have conversations on exposing him or pushing back on him or doing things short of assassination that would impact him , you had to acknowledge that there would be a strong reaction , because his star was on the rise , people definitely knew his name @ @ @ @ @ @ @ celebrity status in Iran .
But there were legal and political and military implications to the actions that took place , and those things were always at the forefront of any conversation we had about him .
Who do you mean when you say “ we ” ?
Sometimes the conversations—and , again , this is not on assassination , this is on mitigating the Quds Force—sometimes you would have a theoretical conversation among C.I.A .
analysts who covered Iran and Shia militias .
Later in my career , it was about how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and we would have that conversation at the Pentagon , at the State Department , and then at the National Security Council , as a group .
And that took place in both the Obama and Bush Administrations .
And , as I got more senior , those conversations happened at more and more senior levels .
You referred to yourself as a “ Shia-militia analyst.
” Can you talk more about Suleimani ’ s role in the region , and his importance to Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon ?
Yeah , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I can not think of the rise of Shia militias without thinking of the rise of Qassem Suleimani .
From almost immediately after our invasion , he started building relationships and alliances with some of the most radical Shia groups in Iraq , and systematically provided training , matériel , weapons , logistics , leadership guidance , and advice and counsel to the leadership of those organizations .
Many of them sent their top fighters to train in Iran .
He trained them to use rockets and mortars and E.F.P.s [ explosively formed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most dangerous improvised explosive devices that are armor-penetrating .
These E.F.P.s were responsible for killing American troops in Iraq , yes ?
Rockets , mortars , and E.F.P.s were extremely deadly to our troops .
I can ’ t tell you how many times in my three tours in Iraq I had to run for a duck-and-cover bunker because of Iranian rockets coming into the Green Zone .
Hundreds of times .
A good friend of mine , Stu Wolfer , got killed at the gym in the Green Zone .
Suleimani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the most dangerous groups in Iraq that have killed American forces , American diplomats , American aid workers , and countless Iraqis .
I interviewed the Shia and Iran expert Vali Nasr on Thursday , and he didn ’ t differ with anything you said there .
But he said that he still saw Suleimani as a pragmatist , in part because of how many connections he had to make around the region .
Is that how you or other analysts saw him ?
He was very shrewd , he was very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and carrots and sticks thereof .
Nothing I told you runs counter to the idea of being a pragmatist .
He was very practical in helping to design a strategy that was to inflict pain on U.S. forces in Iraq , so that we would see less and less reason to be there , and then eventually depart .
His desire to arm and train those militias was to not only punish the United States but to build Iran ’ s political power in the capital , and that was successful .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ shrewd and extremely pragmatic .
It is also extremely dark and dangerous .
Did you get much of a sense of his role within the Iranian regime ?
I know he was deeply respected .
I know that he was given more and more leeway over the span of my career .
He was often given top-level strategic guidance , and allowed a lot of creative freedom , but I don ’ t know much unclassified about his relationship with senior leadership in Iran .
The regime has not shown much ability in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western targets outside the region .
Is that something that you fear could change , and was it a fear when you were an analyst ?
Well , now this is all in the public , but there was an attempt by the Iranians to arrange the assassination of a Saudi diplomat not too far from the U.S. Capitol , in Washington .
There were these incidents that happened during my time that demonstrated that the Iranians were still pursuing operations , even in North America .
But I haven ’ t been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so I can ’ t speak about their worldwide network .
When I left , while they were still attempting to establish themselves in a bunch of places across the world , their most capable units were in the Middle East .
You have written about the need for the White House to come to Congress to seek authorization for any wider conflict with Iran .
Is your sense that Congress actually wants to take some responsibility for military conflict ?
Or has it been overly willing to allow the executive branch , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do as it sees fit ?
Why should people believe anything has changed on that score ?
I think that ’ s fair .
I think that Congress , since the vote on the Iraq War , in 2002 , I think there has been a feeling by many members who have been here a long time that that was politically problematic for many reasons and many people .
And that , in combination with the war on terror , has led to an atrophy in Congress ’ s oversight role on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do think the Administration should come back , particularly if they know they are intending to get into a protracted conflict , or if they accidentally get into a protracted conflict and need more money for those military operations , that , to me , is a signal that we are in something protracted , whether we want it to be or not , and therefore requires an authorization of military force .
But you don ’ t have a ton of faith that there will be a push for that course by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate ?
You would have to speak with them .
Honestly , we haven ’ t even seen each other for a couple of weeks , so I don ’ t want to speak for the Speaker .
Whenever I interview Democratic members of Congress , it seems as if they always say that , deep down , a lot of Republicans have concerns about Trump .
That ’ s hard to tell from the public statements this week .
Is your sense that there actually are Republicans concerned about this Administration ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I do think so .
I think that there are a number of Republicans , even on my own committees , who express doubts about how deft a hand this Administration really has when it comes to foreign policy .
And sometimes they will express that in private , but they don ’ t express it very much in public .
And I think particularly for some of the veterans , those with military experience , they know up close and personal who is going to be fighting this war if we get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the President has not earned the trust of a lot of us on foreign policy .
He has systematically alienated our allies and emboldened our adversaries .
And that ’ s not political ; that ’ s a factual retelling of the last three years of foreign policy .
Does having a President like Trump make you think differently about American foreign policy , even if he hasn ’ t yet made a single decision as catastrophic as the one to invade Iraq ?
You know , honestly , it does .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot lately is that there are a lot of people out there in think tanks and on Twitter who seem to be waiting for Trump to be voted out of office , and then “ everything can go back to normal.
” And that means on foreign policy .
And I think what they are missing is that , after eighteen years of war , the American public is just no longer willing to cede decision-making on foreign policy to Washington élites on both sides of the aisle , who just make decisions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I think the public feels like we haven ’ t been successful in a lot of our overseas endeavors , and therefore doesn ’ t trust that we are going to get it right if we do big things abroad .
And we have a responsibility to communicate with the public in a different way .
And that means there is no going back ; there is only the idea that we take President Trump ’ s Presidency as a moment of change , and that foreign policy and national security should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who is elected .
Aside from how the public sees it , have you , as a person who has worked in this field , felt your own thinking changing in some fundamental way ?
Working under the Bush Administration and then the Obama Administration , I realize now , looking back , that a lot of what the President and the White House did was tradition and habit , not law .
This President has really exposed what was practiced as a matter of habit , and what is truly required by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of that and , in some cases , exceeded the limits of the law .
And that surprised me , frankly .
A lot of the things I was trained to do at the Bush White House or the Obama White House , like including Congress in things , or notifying Congress and allies , consulting oversight committees when big decisions had to be made—that was just standard practice .
There is nothing legal about it .
So when the norms go , they aren ’ t there ?
Yeah , they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new precedent , first and foremost , for other Presidents , which I don ’ t love .
But it also makes me think that maybe we haven ’ t designed the system as well as it could be designed .
The last time we did a major reorganization of the national-security apparatus was 1947 .
It may be time to rethink how that apparatus works , and what the rules of the road are , because the standards and norms this President has largely ignored .
The Bush White House had Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House also pushed the envelope with executive power .
What would you say to someone who asked why you are only talking about changing things fundamentally now ?
While I think it is fair to say both Bush and Obama really went as far as they could on executive power , they still largely obeyed the laws .
And this President has shown a willingness to ignore the laws in some cases .
The difference is that the President has demonstrated a level of erratic behavior that makes it a lot harder to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not that I just don ’ t like Twitter ; it ’ s that we have seen it have really difficult consequences with our allies and partners around the world .
His decision to pull out of Syria : I understand he is hellbent on getting out .
Guess what ?
You inform the allies you are working with before you start pulling out .
You don ’ t sell out the partners you are working with in real time and make them run for their lives after they have fought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not what I would call thoughtful , consistent , deliberate decision-making—and that is different from Bush and Obama .
You may not have liked the decisions they made , but at least they had a process , they had a national-security team that was trying to think of all angles , and were deliberate and communicated what they were doing .

On Friday morning, an American drone strike ordered by President Trump killed Qassem Suleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force—a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (I.R.G.C.)—and the most infamous and feared commander in the region. In response, the Iranian government vowed retaliation against the United States, while the Pentagon announced that more troops would be sent to the Middle East. In Congress, the reaction was mixed. Republicans lined up behind the President, while Democrats generally applauded Suleimani’s death but expressed concerns about the Administration’s Middle East strategy, which has included attempts to isolate Iran and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran that was brokered by the Obama Administration.
A day after the strike, I spoke by phone with Representative Elissa Slotkin, a first-term Democrat from Michigan who is also a former C.I.A. analyst and Defense Department official with experience serving in Iraq. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what she learned on the ground in Iraq, whether Congress will take action to assert legislative authority over military action and foreign policy, and why Trump has made her rethink her views on how America should conduct itself abroad.
You wrote a long Twitter thread on Friday in which you explained that the Bush and Obama Administrations decided that taking out Suleimani would not be worth the potential costs. Can you talk more about how much this was discussed? Did it ever come close to occurring?
Well, listen, I think we have to make clear that we’re talking about the Quds Force more generally, as well as Suleimani. He was the head of a very capable organization, and that organization has really helped destabilize major parts of the Middle East over the span of my career, from 2003 until today. Both the Obama Administration and the Bush Administration had countless, regular discussions, especially for those who covered the Middle East, on how we would counter the Quds Force. We had more limited conversations about how to deal with Suleimani. In particular, when sanctions were levied against him, those were always long conversations. To be honest with you, in the conversations we had on pushing back on him in particular and the organization generally, we almost never spent a ton of time on the possible assassination, because there are legal and political and military implications to it. And, whenever we did have conversations on exposing him or pushing back on him or doing things short of assassination that would impact him, you had to acknowledge that there would be a strong reaction, because his star was on the rise, people definitely knew his name, and he sort of had a celebrity status in Iran. But there were legal and political and military implications to the actions that took place, and those things were always at the forefront of any conversation we had about him.
Who do you mean when you say “we”?
Sometimes the conversations—and, again, this is not on assassination, this is on mitigating the Quds Force—sometimes you would have a theoretical conversation among C.I.A. analysts who covered Iran and Shia militias. Later in my career, it was about how you thwart their influence in Iraq, and we would have that conversation at the Pentagon, at the State Department, and then at the National Security Council, as a group. And that took place in both the Obama and Bush Administrations. And, as I got more senior, those conversations happened at more and more senior levels.
You referred to yourself as a “Shia-militia analyst.” Can you talk more about Suleimani’s role in the region, and his importance to Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon?
Yeah, certainly as an Iraqi Shia-militia expert, I cannot think of the rise of Shia militias without thinking of the rise of Qassem Suleimani. From almost immediately after our invasion, he started building relationships and alliances with some of the most radical Shia groups in Iraq, and systematically provided training, matériel, weapons, logistics, leadership guidance, and advice and counsel to the leadership of those organizations. Many of them sent their top fighters to train in Iran. He trained them to use rockets and mortars and E.F.P.s [explosively formed penetrators], which are some of the most dangerous improvised explosive devices that are armor-penetrating.
These E.F.P.s were responsible for killing American troops in Iraq, yes?
Rockets, mortars, and E.F.P.s were extremely deadly to our troops. I can’t tell you how many times in my three tours in Iraq I had to run for a duck-and-cover bunker because of Iranian rockets coming into the Green Zone. Hundreds of times. A good friend of mine, Stu Wolfer, got killed at the gym in the Green Zone. Suleimani was responsible for training and equipping some of the most dangerous groups in Iraq that have killed American forces, American diplomats, American aid workers, and countless Iraqis.
I interviewed the Shia and Iran expert Vali Nasr on Thursday, and he didn’t differ with anything you said there. But he said that he still saw Suleimani as a pragmatist, in part because of how many connections he had to make around the region. Is that how you or other analysts saw him?
He was very shrewd, he was very cosmopolitan, and he understood traditional conflict, and carrots and sticks thereof. Nothing I told you runs counter to the idea of being a pragmatist. He was very practical in helping to design a strategy that was to inflict pain on U.S. forces in Iraq, so that we would see less and less reason to be there, and then eventually depart. His desire to arm and train those militias was to not only punish the United States but to build Iran’s political power in the capital, and that was successful. That, to me, was extremely shrewd and extremely pragmatic. It is also extremely dark and dangerous.
Did you get much of a sense of his role within the Iranian regime?
I know he was deeply respected. I know that he was given more and more leeway over the span of my career. He was often given top-level strategic guidance, and allowed a lot of creative freedom, but I don’t know much unclassified about his relationship with senior leadership in Iran.
The regime has not shown much ability in the past couple of decades to strike Western targets outside the region. Is that something that you fear could change, and was it a fear when you were an analyst?
Well, now this is all in the public, but there was an attempt by the Iranians to arrange the assassination of a Saudi diplomat not too far from the U.S. Capitol, in Washington. There were these incidents that happened during my time that demonstrated that the Iranians were still pursuing operations, even in North America. But I haven’t been deep in the intelligence since 2017, so I can’t speak about their worldwide network. When I left, while they were still attempting to establish themselves in a bunch of places across the world, their most capable units were in the Middle East.
You have written about the need for the White House to come to Congress to seek authorization for any wider conflict with Iran. Is your sense that Congress actually wants to take some responsibility for military conflict? Or has it been overly willing to allow the executive branch, over the past several decades, to do as it sees fit? Why should people believe anything has changed on that score?


newyorker--2020-01-04--For the Person Who’s Fixing My Laptop

For the Person Who’s Fixing My Laptop

Hello and welcome !
Thank you in advance for fixing my computer .
I expect that you ’ re probably going to be tempted to snoop around my laptop to see if I have anything embarrassing on there .
I have no way to stop you from doing this , so I ’ ve decided to get out ahead of it and write you this comprehensive guide .
I keep all my pornography in the folder “ C : > Program Files ( x86 ) > Internet Explorer > en-Us > files > real folder ” —but I ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the desktop for you , for ease of access .
Normally , I don ’ t really organize it , but I took the liberty of separating it into different folders , labelled by category , for you .
I also have some old-fashioned print pornography that I have gone ahead and enclosed in the laptop case .
In my Documents folder , you will find some of my writing .
Much of it is bad and sure to give you and the gang over there a good laugh .
I would recommend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Château Beverly , ” an unfinished novel I tried to write about a forbidden romance between a wealthy socialite and—I don ’ t even remember , a gardener or some shit .
I went ahead and bolded all the worst parts , so you can just skim it for the greatest hits .
But , if you have time to read the whole thing , it ’ s all bad .
Other than the writing , you ’ ll find spreadsheets of my finances and some old tax documents .
Nothing interesting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and crunch the numbers , in which case you ’ ll uncover an absolutely earth-shattering case of unemployment fraud .
Please do not tell !
!
!
I ’ ll save you some time and let you know that there ’ s nothing embarrassing in the Pictures folder .
No nudes or anything like that .
I have some of those on a separate hard drive though , so I ’ ll swing by and drop that off tomorrow after my doctor ’ s appointment , which is regarding sex problems .
You @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Google search history before bringing the laptop in .
Sorry about that , it was an accident .
Here are some searches that you would have found : • “ How to make friends as an adult ” I ’ ll let you know if I remember other ones .
I didn ’ t log out of any of my social-media accounts , so I guess you ’ re free to dive in .
You ’ ll see that I ’ ve sent some messages that are pretty humiliating .
For the record @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that when I wrote them I was a hundred-per-cent , stone-cold sober .
Also , don ’ t forget to check the time stamps , which will show that they were written in broad daylight .
You probably wouldn ’ t even think to check my calendar for anything shameful .
Do not make this mistake !
There ’ s some stuff on there that really sucks for me—I don ’ t even want to spoil it for you .
Feel free to call me afterward and let me know what you think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempt to stop you from snooping through my business , I do ask that you please do not mess with my friends and family .
Many of them have enough problems already and don ’ t need anyone prying into their business .
My friend Andrew Willoughby , for example , is going through a divorce and he does not want anyone to know .
My password for everything is my Social Security number ( 120-80-9758 ) .
Full disclosure , there were a few things on the laptop that I was too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead of time .
They are in the Trash folder , which I don ’ t know how to empty .
Please do that for me while you are fixing the laptop .

Hello and welcome! Thank you in advance for fixing my computer. I expect that you’re probably going to be tempted to snoop around my laptop to see if I have anything embarrassing on there. I have no way to stop you from doing this, so I’ve decided to get out ahead of it and write you this comprehensive guide.
I keep all my pornography in the folder “C: > Program Files (x86) > Internet Explorer > en-Us > files > real folder”—but I’ve gone ahead and moved it all to the desktop for you, for ease of access. Normally, I don’t really organize it, but I took the liberty of separating it into different folders, labelled by category, for you. I also have some old-fashioned print pornography that I have gone ahead and enclosed in the laptop case.
In my Documents folder, you will find some of my writing. Much of it is bad and sure to give you and the gang over there a good laugh. I would recommend checking out “A Mirthless Summer at the Château Beverly,” an unfinished novel I tried to write about a forbidden romance between a wealthy socialite and—I don’t even remember, a gardener or some shit. I went ahead and bolded all the worst parts, so you can just skim it for the greatest hits. But, if you have time to read the whole thing, it’s all bad.
Other than the writing, you’ll find spreadsheets of my finances and some old tax documents. Nothing interesting there, unless you actually dive in and crunch the numbers, in which case you’ll uncover an absolutely earth-shattering case of unemployment fraud. Please do not tell!!!
I’ll save you some time and let you know that there’s nothing embarrassing in the Pictures folder. No nudes or anything like that. I have some of those on a separate hard drive though, so I’ll swing by and drop that off tomorrow after my doctor’s appointment, which is regarding sex problems.
You’ll find that I cleared my Google search history before bringing the laptop in. Sorry about that; it was an accident. Here are some searches that you would have found:
•“How to make friends as an adult”
•“Pro-bono fraud defense attorney New York”
•“Could Alf really happen”
•“Donnie Darko ending explained”
I’ll let you know if I remember other ones.
I didn’t log out of any of my social-media accounts, so I guess you’re free to dive in. You’ll see that I’ve sent some messages that are pretty humiliating. For the record, I would just like to state that when I wrote them I was a hundred-per-cent, stone-cold sober. Also, don’t forget to check the time stamps, which will show that they were written in broad daylight.
You probably wouldn’t even think to check my calendar for anything shameful. Do not make this mistake! There’s some stuff on there that really sucks for me—I don’t even want to spoil it for you. Feel free to call me afterward and let me know what you think.
While I’m making no attempt to stop you from snooping through my business, I do ask that you please do not mess with my friends and family. Many of them have enough problems already and don’t need anyone prying into their business. My friend Andrew Willoughby, for example, is going through a divorce, and he does not want anyone to know.
My password for everything is my Social Security number (120-80-9758). Full disclosure, there were a few things on the laptop that I was too embarrassed by and made sure to delete ahead of time. They are in the Trash folder, which I don’t know how to empty. Please do that for me while you are fixing the laptop.


newyorker--2020-01-03--The Dangers Posed by the Killing of Qassem Suleimani

The killing of Qassem Suleimani , the Iranian commander targeted by an American strike Thursday night , is the most consequential act taken against the regime in Tehran in thirty years—even if we don ’ t know what those consequences will be .
One thing is clear : we ’ re entering a dangerous period , in which the conflict between the two countries could easily spin out of control .
Suleimani ’ s biography as a pivotal figure in Iran and the region is well known .
Since the late nineteen-nineties , he was engaged in trying to remake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advantage , directing his proxies to kill or dispatch anyone who impeded his vision of an Iranian-dominated sphere of influence stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea .
He was remarkably successful , legendary even—certainly the most influential operative in the region in modern times .
He was involved in sponsoring terrorist attacks , propping up despots like Bashar al-Assad in Syria , helping to assassinate at least one foreign leader—the Prime Minister of Lebanon , Rafik Hariri—and killing hundreds of American soldiers along the way .
In the latter years of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s militias deployed a particularly bloody weapon against U.S. soldiers—the “ explosively formed penetrator , ” or E.F.P.—which tore through the armor of U.S. military vehicles and wreaked havoc on soldiers and marines .
It was no small irony that he died on the road to the Baghdad International Airport , where so many Americans soldiers and Iraqis died by ambush .
Suleimani ’ s death is a heavy blow to the Iranian regime .
He was not just the central figure in the country ’ s foreign policy and military ; he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Revolution itself .
Since 1979 , Iran has regarded its defense against foreign enemies , particularly the United States , as central to its survival .
Suleimani ’ s vision of the region was formed in the nineteen-eighties , during the Iran-Iraq War , which left more than a million people dead and for which the Iranians , not entirely without reason , blamed the U.S. and its allies .
Suleimani , a veteran of that war , vowed that nothing like it would happen to Iran again , and he built the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a small , mobile army capable of waging asymmetric warfare against the country ’ s enemies , including the United States .
When I asked Ryan Crocker , a veteran American diplomat , what motivated Suleimani , he said that it was love of country—and also something more visceral : “ Nationalism drives him , and the love of the fight.
” U.S. officials from previous Administrations have said that Suleimani did not live as a well-guarded recluse like Osama bin Laden , in Pakistan , and the military could have killed him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not worth provoking a large-scale retaliation .
“ Suleimani was lucky , ’ ’ Meir Dagan , the former head of Mossad , the Israeli intelligence agency , once told me .
“ It ’ s important to be lucky.
” ( Dagan died in 2016 . )
Suleimani has been replaced by his longtime deputy , but it ’ s not clear that any commander in Iran is his equal in guile or status .
He was as skilled in diplomacy as he was on the battlefield , and as comfortable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers , whom he adored .
And he had an especially close relationship with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , Iran ’ s Supreme Leader .
“ A guy like Suleimani—they don ’ t have any more like him , ’ ’ John Maguire , a twenty-three-year veteran of the C.I.A .
specializing in the Middle East , told me .
Maguire is one of the few Americans ever to come to face to face with Suleimani .
They met in Baghdad , in 2004 , when Iraqi politicians were trying to broker a rapprochement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He had a command presence , ” Maguire said .
“ He walked into the room and you could feel him.
” In Iraq , Suleimani had four deputies , who helped oversee the Shiite militias who have , most recently , been leading demonstrations against the American Embassy .
The leader of one of those militias , Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , of Kata ’ ib Hezbollah , died in the same strike as Suleimani .
Muhandis has a long record of attacking Americans , too , beginning with the bombing of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1983 .
Kata ’ ib Hezbollah—an organization backed , trained , armed , and directed by Suleimani—is responsible for the deaths of scores of American soldiers in Iraq .
Ever since the Trump Administration walked away from the nuclear deal signed under the Obama Administration , the U.S. and Iran have engaged in a series of provocative acts .
By killing Suleimani , the Trump Administration has risked a wider , more unpredictable conflict , which could flare in many places and in many ways .
It ’ s hard to imagine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respond to the American strike—it will feel that it has to .
But where , and how ?
Maguire told me that the Quds Force has long specialized in two tactics : hostage-taking and truck-bombing .
But the Americans are so well fortified in Iraq ( and across the Middle East ) , and the American military presence in Iraq is so robust , that it ’ s more possible that the Iranians , if they decide to retaliate , will do so elsewhere .
“ It ’ s a better bet that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans are not as well protected , ’ ’ he said .
Maguire told me that he is not convinced that the Iranians will respond right away , or even at all , because of the deep sense of shock of losing Suleimani .
“ It ’ s a body blow to the regime , ’ ’ he said .
The biggest danger , of course , is that the Iranians respond , and possibly miscalculate , and then the United States does the same .
That ’ s how wars start .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has previously , that the U.S. is not seeking war or regime change in Iran .
Yet , since taking office , the Trump Administration has made regime change its implicit policy .
By pulling out of the Iranian nuclear accord and imposing crippling sanctions on the country , Trump ’ s advisers have wagered that they can bring the regime down .
By killing Suleimani , the Administration has taken the fight directly to its leadership .

The killing of Qassem Suleimani, the Iranian commander targeted by an American strike Thursday night, is the most consequential act taken against the regime in Tehran in thirty years—even if we don’t know what those consequences will be. One thing is clear: we’re entering a dangerous period, in which the conflict between the two countries could easily spin out of control.
Suleimani’s biography as a pivotal figure in Iran and the region is well known. Since the late nineteen-nineties, he was engaged in trying to remake the Middle East to Iran’s advantage, directing his proxies to kill or dispatch anyone who impeded his vision of an Iranian-dominated sphere of influence stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. He was remarkably successful, legendary even—certainly the most influential operative in the region in modern times. He was involved in sponsoring terrorist attacks, propping up despots like Bashar al-Assad in Syria, helping to assassinate at least one foreign leader—the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri—and killing hundreds of American soldiers along the way. In the latter years of the American war in Iraq, Suleimani’s militias deployed a particularly bloody weapon against U.S. soldiers—the “explosively formed penetrator,” or E.F.P.—which tore through the armor of U.S. military vehicles and wreaked havoc on soldiers and marines. It was no small irony that he died on the road to the Baghdad International Airport, where so many Americans soldiers and Iraqis died by ambush.
Suleimani’s death is a heavy blow to the Iranian regime. He was not just the central figure in the country’s foreign policy and military; he was also considered a pillar of the Revolution itself. Since 1979, Iran has regarded its defense against foreign enemies, particularly the United States, as central to its survival. Suleimani’s vision of the region was formed in the nineteen-eighties, during the Iran-Iraq War, which left more than a million people dead and for which the Iranians, not entirely without reason, blamed the U.S. and its allies. Suleimani, a veteran of that war, vowed that nothing like it would happen to Iran again, and he built the Quds Force—a wing of the Revolutionary Guard—into a small, mobile army capable of waging asymmetric warfare against the country’s enemies, including the United States. When I asked Ryan Crocker, a veteran American diplomat, what motivated Suleimani, he said that it was love of country—and also something more visceral: “Nationalism drives him, and the love of the fight.”
U.S. officials from previous Administrations have said that Suleimani did not live as a well-guarded recluse like Osama bin Laden, in Pakistan, and the military could have killed him; but the U.S. decided that it was not worth provoking a large-scale retaliation. “Suleimani was lucky,’’ Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, once told me. “It’s important to be lucky.” (Dagan died in 2016.)
READ MORE Read Dexter Filkins’s 2013 Profile of Qassem Suleimani.
Suleimani has been replaced by his longtime deputy, but it’s not clear that any commander in Iran is his equal in guile or status. He was as skilled in diplomacy as he was on the battlefield, and as comfortable with diplomats as he was with front-line soldiers, whom he adored. And he had an especially close relationship with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader. “A guy like Suleimani—they don’t have any more like him,’’ John Maguire, a twenty-three-year veteran of the C.I.A. specializing in the Middle East, told me. Maguire is one of the few Americans ever to come to face to face with Suleimani. They met in Baghdad, in 2004, when Iraqi politicians were trying to broker a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. “He had a command presence,” Maguire said. “He walked into the room and you could feel him.”
In Iraq, Suleimani had four deputies, who helped oversee the Shiite militias who have, most recently, been leading demonstrations against the American Embassy. The leader of one of those militias, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, of Kata’ib Hezbollah, died in the same strike as Suleimani. Muhandis has a long record of attacking Americans, too, beginning with the bombing of the American and French Embassies in Kuwait, in 1983. Kata’ib Hezbollah—an organization backed, trained, armed, and directed by Suleimani—is responsible for the deaths of scores of American soldiers in Iraq. Ever since the Trump Administration walked away from the nuclear deal signed under the Obama Administration, the U.S. and Iran have engaged in a series of provocative acts. By killing Suleimani, the Trump Administration has risked a wider, more unpredictable conflict, which could flare in many places and in many ways. It’s hard to imagine that the Iranian regime won’t respond to the American strike—it will feel that it has to. But where, and how? Maguire told me that the Quds Force has long specialized in two tactics: hostage-taking and truck-bombing. But the Americans are so well fortified in Iraq (and across the Middle East), and the American military presence in Iraq is so robust, that it’s more possible that the Iranians, if they decide to retaliate, will do so elsewhere. “It’s a better bet that they will choose another place—somewhere where the Americans are not as well protected,’’ he said. Maguire told me that he is not convinced that the Iranians will respond right away, or even at all, because of the deep sense of shock of losing Suleimani. “It’s a body blow to the regime,’’ he said. The biggest danger, of course, is that the Iranians respond, and possibly miscalculate, and then the United States does the same. That’s how wars start.
President Trump said on Friday, as he has previously, that the U.S. is not seeking war or regime change in Iran. Yet, since taking office, the Trump Administration has made regime change its implicit policy. By pulling out of the Iranian nuclear accord and imposing crippling sanctions on the country, Trump’s advisers have wagered that they can bring the regime down. By killing Suleimani, the Administration has taken the fight directly to its leadership.


newyorker--2020-01-03--Terry Gross Talks with David Remnick

Terry Gross Talks with David Remnick

Gross , the most celebrated interviewer of our time , joins David Remnick for a live conversation at The New @ @ @ @ @ about how she first found her way to the microphone , the role of feminism @ @ @ @ @ limits of her expertise , and what she has had to give up to prepare @ @ @ @ @ day .
Plus , New Yorker writers pick sides for an age-old battle : cats @ @ @ @ @ interviewer opens up about finding her radio voice and what she ’ s given up @ @ @ @ @ ” A debate as old as human society—whether cats or dogs make better pets—will be @ @ @ @ @ by New Yorker staff writers .

Illustration by Golden Cosmos; Source Photograph by Brad Barket / Getty for The New Yorker
Gross, the most celebrated interviewer of our time, joins David Remnick for a live conversation at The New Yorker Festival. They spoke about how she first found her way to the microphone, the role of feminism in establishing NPR, the limits of her expertise, and what she has had to give up to prepare for serious conversations day after day. Plus, New Yorker writers pick sides for an age-old battle: cats or dogs?
Terry Gross Talks with David Remnick
The celebrated interviewer opens up about finding her radio voice and what she’s given up to host “Fresh Air.”
Cats vs. Dogs: The Great Debate
A debate as old as human society—whether cats or dogs make better pets—will be settled once and for all by New Yorker staff writers.


newyorker--2020-01-03--Dexter Filkins on the Air Strike that Killed Qassem Suleimani

Qassem Suleimani was Iran ’ s most powerful military and intelligence leader , and his killing , in a U.S. @ @ @ @ @ Thursday night , will likely be taken as an act of war by Tehran .
@ @ @ @ @ the definitive profile of Suleimani , in 2013 , spoke with David Remnick about the @ @ @ @ @ within the Iranian regime .
Reprisals against the U.S. , he says , might be @ @ @ @ @ world , either by Iran ’ s Quds Force or by affiliates such as Hezbollah @ @ @ @ @ tension between a desire for regime change and the President ’ s desire to avoid @ @ @ @ @ that embattled Presidents , like Bill Clinton during his impeachment , often have itchy trigger @ @

Photograph by Sipa / Shutterstock
Qassem Suleimani was Iran’s most powerful military and intelligence leader, and his killing, in a U.S. air strike in Baghdad on Thursday night, will likely be taken as an act of war by Tehran. Dexter Filkins, who wrote the definitive profile of Suleimani, in 2013, spoke with David Remnick about the commander’s central role within the Iranian regime. Reprisals against the U.S., he says, might be carried out anywhere in the world, either by Iran’s Quds Force or by affiliates such as Hezbollah. The Trump Administration experiences tension between a desire for regime change and the President’s desire to avoid foreign wars; Filkins notes that embattled Presidents, like Bill Clinton during his impeachment, often have itchy trigger fingers.